THE UNIVERSITY
of LIVERPOOL

Contested Discourses: National Identity and Architecture

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Paul R. Jones

August 2003

Acknowledgements

I would like to mention a group of people without whom this Ph.D. would never, ever have been finished.

Firstly I want to thank my family for the encouragement and support they have always given me. My parents have backed me unconditionally throughout my studies, while my brother Graham has been consistently very funny.

Secondly I would like to express gratitude to the many other people who shared their time with me to talk about my dissertation or, sometimes just as importantly, football or music. Of this ever-growing group I would particularly like to mention Sue Povall, Ruth Melville, Matt Donaghy, Karen Evans, Stuart Wilks-Heeg, and Roger Sibeon for both their academic guidance and friendship. I am also very grateful to Gerard Delanty, who has been an understanding and engaging supervisor throughout the whole process. Special thanks also to Paul Stringer, who took time out to show me Berlin's architecture. I would also like to acknowledge the University of Liverpool's Research Development Fund, which funded this trip as well as other aspects of this dissertation.

Lastly I extend a big thank you to Leah for her unbelievable understanding and patience on occasions far too numerous to recall.

Abstract

Architecture has historically been an important part of a cultural repertoire used by states to construct the nation code. In modernity authoritative state definitions of the nation were possible due to the clearly demarcated cultural boundaries that existed between states, and although states seldom had total control over the nation code they were for the most part able to construct dominant, cultural symbols of the nation. In this age of nation-building distinct national styles of architecture, which emerged through the modification of universal styles to particular contexts, provided a significant space for nation codification.

Victorian Britain provides a clear illustration of these general trends. At this time many prominent British architects accepted state commissions to design public buildings in a quintessentially British style. Styles reliant on historical reference such as Gothic and neo-Classical were used by the British state to legitimate their imperialistic, colonial aims. In the twentieth century the emergence of the modern code of architecture, with its more universalised aesthetic, challenged boundaries between national styles. However, many states did attempt to modify this style, as modernism's progressive logic and utopian ideals were ideas with which governments wanted to align 'their' nations.

The cultural boundaries of the state have become more porous due to processes associated with globalization. In most European societies the nation is increasingly a fragmented, diverse concept, and the relatively stable relationship between nation and state in modernity has frequently become unstable under globalized conditions. Post-national identities that pay little heed to geographical and political boundaries have emerged, with new forms of citizenship association threatening the ability of the state to provide the stable national identities that were to a large extent possible in modernity.

This dissertation argues that the ambiguous relationship between the nation, the state and post-national identities finds a tangible form in some contemporary state-led architecture projects. The Millennium Dome, the Jewish Museum, and the Reichstag all express many of the tensions inherent in contemporary state-led architectural projects. The dominant discourses around these buildings are of transparency, openness, and democracy, reflecting themes in contemporary European politics. As the wider political and cultural discourses in which buildings are situated can often shape their interpretation, the architects responsible for these buildings have attempted to control the symbolic meanings attached to their work as far as is possible. States still have a continued interest in architecture that expresses national identities, but vitally not with the same degree of mastery they once had.

In short architecture is a discursive medium, and as such harbours the potential to codify collective identities. The state-led architectural projects assessed here reflect some of the dominant discourses in the construction of post-national identities. Resultantly these buildings have also provided a focus for contestation about contemporary identity projects. The dissertation makes two significant contributions to existing knowledge: firstly by bridging the gap that currently exists between sociology and architectural theory and secondly by developing this framework with reference to three specific illustrative examples in contemporary European architecture.

Table of Contents

Introduction: Social Theory and Architecture

Processes associated with globalization have rejuvenated many of the debates that have bedevilled sociology since its inception. At the forefront of these renewed discussions has been the question of national identity, which has become a key theme in much contemporary sociological literature. Major writers such as Castells (1996, 1997), Habermas (2001), Elias (1982) and Beck (1992, 1999) have all turned their attentions to the changing relationship between the nation-state and collective identities. Globalization has introduced new ways of thinking about citizenship, with states and citizens increasingly aware of the importance of how their societies are represented culturally. This dissertation addresses the relationship in contemporary European societies between the state and national identity, using architecture as a way to give these disparate, abstract debates a more substantive focus. A central aim of the work is to examine the reasons for the growing disjuncture between the nation and the state, while assessing the implications of this tension for state-led, landmark architectural projects.

Although situated in the tradition of European social theory, it is more specifically the sub-disciplines of cultural and political sociology that are most significant for the dissertation. Cultural sociology has an important input for this work because of the substantive focus on architecture, while works of political sociology are particularly useful for framing debates around the nation-state, national identity and the changing reflections of citizenship. Contemporary debates in European social theory increasingly focus on the cultural policies of the state (Roche, 2000; Delanty, 2001) and accordingly the concept of cultural citizenship is of importance for this dissertation. I also draw on architectural theory, as another aim of this research is to bridge the gap that currently exists in the literature between architectural and social theory. The architectural theorist Gary Stevens suggests that it would only take one afternoon to read sociology's current contribution to

architecture (Stevens, 2002: 12), and while this is maybe a slight exaggeration, sociologists have been slow to develop a framework to understand this vitally important expression of cultural identity.[1]

However, there are some noteworthy sociological accounts of architecture, although a coherent 'sociology of architecture' does not currently exist. Significant contemporary contributors on architecture from the sociological tradition include Anthony King (1990), who in a short chapter addresses the relationship between architecture and the globalization of culture, concludes that architecture has a significant role for both the creation of and resistance to a globalized culture. Indeed King also edited *Buildings and Society*, a volume concerned with how institutions developed a spatial reflection in the early modern period (1980). For example, in this collection Adrian Forty suggests that in the nineteenth century the spatial layout of hospitals in England and France reflected the professionalization of the health service (1980), while Robert Thorne traces the development of pubs and coffee houses in the same century alongside the development of a political public sphere (1980).

More recently Manuel Castells (1996) has also briefly addressed some interesting points concerning the theme of architecture and globalization. From the short survey he has written, it is clear that Castells sees architecture as in danger of being drawn into a globalized capitalist project, which would render buildings irrelevant to users. Castells is a significant theorist for the dissertation in this respect as he considers architecture as a potential space for cultural resistance. Ulrich Beck (1999) has also written a short essay on

[1] Although sociologists have not written extensively on architecture many have taken up the related (but distinct) debate on space. The general line of argument in this tradition is that space provides the site in which struggles and conflict over social identity and power takes place. Key works in this area include Lefebvre (1991), Soja (1989, 1996) and Hillier (1996). A huge body of literature addressing the socio-spatial exists outside these key texts of course. The broadly defined 'sociology of space' crosses the disciplinary boundaries of urban sociology, geography, town planning, architecture and cultural studies. Although difficult to summarize such a huge output, many of these studies on space would obviously have a great deal to offer any emergent 'sociology of architecture', perhaps particularly in relation to 'socio-spatial' contexts. Although this thesis is concerned primarily with what is actually built as opposed to the spatial context of architecture, public squares, spaces around buildings, pathways and other public (or private) spaces inform our perceptions of cities and place to a large extent. The Haussmanization of Paris that introduced public squares and other such spaces to the city has arguably been as influential in shaping Parisian identity as has, for example, the Eiffel Tower (addressed in Chapter Two). Although beyond the limits of this thesis there is certainly potential for further research that takes into account the interplay between landmark architecture and public space, and the significance of this relationship for regional, or national, identities.

architecture and the city. He contends, as does Castells (1996), that architecture in late modernity must become more 'rooted' in place if it is to retain meaning for the citizens that it should both represent and serve. Beck contrasts the diverse, inclusive architecture he feels is necessary for the built environment to the exclusive, modernist project, which he claims is now exhausted. Aside from these short and relatively recent works in social theory, some notable works on architecture within historical sociology are by Gloag (1975), who looks at the development of architectural styles in context of the broad historical epoch in which they emerged, and Braunfels (1988) who looks at the development of capital cities and urban centres between 900 and 1900.

Postmodern thinkers such as Jameson, (1985) and Lyotard (1994) have also addressed architecture to varying degrees as part of their broader writings. Jürgen Habermas (1989) has discussed postmodern architecture from the vantage point of his theory of modernity. In his influential chapter on 'Modern and Postmodern Architecture', Habermas argues that postmodern architecture does not represent the rupture with modernism that is often suggested, rather it signifies a deepening or radicalisation of certain tensions within modernism, such as that between the avant-garde and kitsch. Another critic of postmodernism, Harvey (1990), has written on architecture, suggesting that the contradictions of productive organization are increasingly felt within the cultural sphere. Harvey illustrates this argument with reference to some specific buildings in the U.S.A.

In a more philosophical tradition writers such as Heidegger (1971), and Foucault (1985) have both written fragments on architecture. Foucault's main concern was the relationship between space, architecture and power. *Discipline and Punish* (1979) contains Foucault's famous writings on Jeremy Bentham's plans for the 'Panopticon' prison, in which the spatial layout of the building allowed total surveillance over a large number of prisoners by a limited number of warders. However, Foucault also addressed the question of architecture more explicitly, having suggested that architecture is a tangible expression of power

relations and should accordingly be considered a 'field of power' (Foucault, 1985). Foucault also claimed that architecture became highly politicized in the late eighteenth century due to the absorption of the discourse into the state project (Foucault, 1985: 239), an argument that is explored in more detail in this dissertation. Heidegger's essay on 'Building, Dwelling, Thinking' (1971) has also been quite influential for theories on one of architecture's fundamental roles, that of providing shelter suitable for inhabitants. As this dissertation is concerned with the symbolic function of landmark, state-led architectural projects Heidegger's work is not of central importance.[2]

There is also interest within architectural theory in critical theory and the Frankfurt School, as is particularly apparent in the work of Hilde Heynen (1999). Heynen ties Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of cultural modernity to the discourse of modern architecture, questioning the transformatory potential of architecture as a discourse. Heynen's writing is significant for this dissertation as she relates the shifts in architectural style to the broader social transformations of modernity. The Italian philosopher Massimo Cacciari has also written an account of architecture from the vantage point of the major social transformations of modernity. In *Architecture and Nihilism* (1993) Cacciari uses the work of Walter Benjamin as a framework to support his theory of the modernist code of architecture, specifically as expressed in the buildings of Adolf Loos. Andrew Benjamin (2000) has developed a sustained philosophical theory of architecture, in which the general line of argument is that architecture should be considered an expression of more abstract tensions.

Interestingly it would appear that architectural theorists engage with sociological frameworks more readily than sociologists do with architectural theory. Two notable examples of this are Bonta's *Architecture and Its Interpretation* (1974) and Tafuri's *Architecture and Utopia* (1976). Bonta's work adopts a hermeneutic perspective,

[2] Heidegger did, however, influence the theorists associated with Critical Regionalism, as assessed in Chapter Four.

contending that 'canonical' interpretations of architecture emerge through a form of 'collective plagiarism,' with reviewers and critics adopting 'fashionable' stances to styles, motifs and buildings. Bonta illustrates this general argument with reference to some specific buildings, such as Van der Rohe's German Pavilion at the Barcelona 1929 Expo (Bonta, 1979: 131-174). Manfredi Tafuri is another architectural theorist who uses a social theory framework to understand architecture. Tafuri adopts a structuralist Marxist perspective to chart the development of the architectural profession alongside the development of capitalism. In this far-reaching book Tafuri considers architecture as an expression of ideology, focusing in particular on the modernists' attempt to overcome contradictions inherent in the modern project. While Bonta looks specifically at the changing interpretations of styles and buildings across time/space and Tafuri assesses the historical role of architectural profession in general, they both rely heavily on social theoretical frameworks.

A more recent architectural work that uses social theory for understanding architecture is Gary Stevens' *The Favored Circle* (1998). Stevens develops Pierre Bourdieu's writings on distinction (Bourdieu, 1989) to understand how architecture functions as a profession. Stevens, an architectural theorist, suggests that architecture relies on notions of 'good taste' or distinction for its survival. He also assesses how these judgements emerge, paying particular attention to the relationship in a given era between the handful of truly influential architects and their followers. Although Stevens' work shares an aim of this dissertation in attempting to bring a 'sociology of architecture' to the fore, it is Lawrence J. Vale's *Architecture, Power, and National Identity* (1999) that is perhaps closest to the intent of this dissertation. Vale looks at how governments have used the modernist code of architecture as part of a sustained attempt to develop forward-looking, dynamic national identities. Vale assesses designed capitals such as Brasilia (Brazil) and Chandigah (India) paying particular attention to their capitols (buildings that 'house' the state). However, a

key difference is that Vale's focus is on national architecture in 'post-colonial' states such as Papua New Guinea, Brazil, India and Sri Lanka, while this study addresses the significance of a range of state-funded buildings for constructions of the nation code.[3]

So, in general this thesis is concerned with the previously under-researched area of the 'sociology of architecture'. Clearly this problematic opens up multiple lines of enquiry, and it is now necessary to map out the intellectual context of this research in some more detail. This research deal mainly with landmark architecture, and in particular those buildings that have contributed to the symbolic construction of a national identity. Architectural projects can contribute to the cultural construction of a nation in many ways, either explicitly (e.g. it is stated in the competition brief that the building shall reflect, for example, something of French identity) or less so (e.g. links between a building and a collective identity emerge in a more contingent way; through how a building is perceived by the general public, or how it is used. This dissertation also pays attention to the ways in which architects attempt to situate their work vis-à-vis the collective identities their buildings purport to represent). The notion of a 'landmark' building also needs some clarification at this stage. Lasswell (1979) suggests that a landmark building is one whose silhouette[4] is recognizable, and although this basic definition begs the question 'recognizable to whom?', it is important to note that I use 'landmark', as does Lasswell, to denote buildings that may or may not dominate the surrounding landscape but that have a strong association to place, be it city, region, or nation. Of course this line of enquiry is only one aspect of any emerging 'sociology of architecture'. This debate could be concerned with an exploration of the relationship between major social transformations and the built environment (a broader

[3] The term 'nation code' is used in this dissertation to refer to the repertoire of cultural symbols and discourses that sustain the concept of the nation. Its usage here is similar to the one employed by, for example, Giesen and Junge (2003). In this sense the idea of a nation code links architecture and the other cultural symbols of the nation into a (potentially) coherent discourse.

[4] Another line of inquiry for any emergent 'sociology of architecture' could be linking the interiors of buildings to broader social transformations/tensions. Just as many of buildings assessed in this research have recognisable exterior styles then so distinctive interior designs emerged with the onset of modernity, with art deco or art nouveau good examples of these trends.

category than architecture as it includes housing, sculptures, public spaces such as squares and so on). For example such an analysis may concern itself with urban planning, the design of housing estates, aspects of regeneration policy, or the use of space for political purposes. Generally any 'sociology of architecture' should be concerned with understanding the built environment as one expression of more abstract tensions inherent in the broader social relations and transformations.

Why Architecture and National Identity?

Significantly this thesis is written at a time when architects are becoming an ever-more influential group on global political, cultural and social stages. If, as is suggested in this dissertation, architecture is becoming an increasingly important cultural expression of collective identity then so architects have come to have more 'political' input. It is through their buildings that particularly the more high profile architects have the power to codify and contribute to the creation of social identities. As sociologists it is vital that we challenge the frequently assumed background of neutrality and autonomy against which architects work. Such latent assumptions can mean that frequently we do not question the political motivations of influential architects involved with large-scale projects of national and global significance. This dissertation sets out to assess how far landmark, state-led buildings have become the site of major contestations between the state, the nation and national identity. Architecture has ceased to be a marginal discourse with elitist connotations.[5] Not only does the built environment play a huge part in numerous regeneration strategies, but the increased importance placed on notions of cultural

[5] It is a revealing reflection of the growing public interest in architecture and architects that the annual Sterling Prize ceremonies are broadcast live on terrestrial television. There have also been many prime-time British television documentaries about architecture, and architectural critics have weekly sections in numerous British newspapers – *The Guardian*, *The Observer*, *The Times*. Indeed the 'fashionable' nature of architecture led one commentator to comment wryly on 'sexy' architecture as 'the new rock'n'roll.' (Glancey in *The Guardian*, 26.6.00).

citizenship have meant that landmark building projects are often viewed as socially significant by the communities and populations the architecture is supposed to serve and represent. This is perhaps another reason why architecture has become such a contested space in contemporary societies – critics, the 'public', and architects all use, conceptualize, and criticise the same buildings, although from very different perspectives.

As well as these changes to the role of architecture in society, there have also been significant shifts in discussions around the nation-state and national identities. Historically democracy and citizenship have been guaranteed and reflected at the level of the nation-state. Today the nation-state is undergoing fundamental transformation as many of its previous functions are being carried out at a transnational level, due to globalizing processes such as advanced capitalism, European union, and advances in information and communication technologies (ICTs). Such processes have challenged certain aspects of the nation-state's sovereignty and relevance, as understandings of the nation-state have historically depended on its definition as a geo-political, bounded territory. Habermas (1996a) suggests that the best illustration of this much-altered relationship is that today rather than markets being embedded in states, as was the case in the past, states are embedded within transnational markets. For Habermas this expansion of the market is the key factor in undermining the power of the European nation-state. In a variation of this argument Manuel Castells looks at the role of information technologies in compromising the boundaries of the nation-state. His argument is that societies have undergone fundamental political, economic and cultural changes due to what he terms an 'information revolution' (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001), a huge increase in the level of cross-border communication and 'interconnectedness' due to advances in electronic media. Castells suggests that such developments have transformed the capacity and the role of the modern nation-state, as well as having a significant impact on the formation of collective identities.

Classical notions of citizenship, tied to the nation-state, were conceived of to cater for a fairly homogeneous population in terms of ethnicity and a relatively static population in terms of geography. The notion of cultural expression was certainly not central to such statements of citizenship as Marshall's *Citizenship and Social Class* ([1950] 1963) but increasingly researchers into the area of citizenship have attempted to redress this balance (see Delanty 2001; Isin and Wood, 1999; Held, 1995). Indeed contemporary accounts tend to emphasize the importance of the cultural when considering expressions of citizenship. Of course nation-states have always had close links with culture, as the development of a coherent nation-state frequently necessitated the state giving a tangible form to an abstract 'cultural community' (or nation). It is suggested by some theorists that these cultural constructions are the creation of elites for the mobilization of the masses, particularly in times of war (most notably by Gellner, 1983, 1994; Hobsbawm, 1983a, 1983b, 1990). National cultural identities and attachments can be constructed in a variety of ways, but it is most often through history or tradition ('real' or 'invented') that the nation code is deployed. Such abstract narratives are codified culturally via flags, national anthems and, most importantly for present purposes, the creation of landmark buildings and monuments.

Aside from designing monumental or landmark buildings, states must routinely involve themselves in the construction of many other types of buildings, such as hospitals, schools, prisons, military barracks, stations relating to transport infrastructures and so on. Although many of these buildings undeniably do come to have a 'landmark quality' for a given city, region, or even nation, the architects responsible for such buildings have a primarily functional remit, and do not have to situate their work reflexively in relation to social identity. This means that although buildings such as prisons, schools and courts undeniably do express something of power relations and broader social structures, they are very seldom legitimated or analysed in such 'sociological' terms. Indeed I would suggest that

this is an area that would lend itself to fascinating further research linked to the broader field of 'sociology of architecture' identified above.

It is certainly nothing new that achievements of the nation-state are celebrated architecturally. Historically architecture has been closely tied to the development of national identity, with the creation of socially significant buildings very often state-led celebrations of the nation. This dissertation suggests that architecture has been a key cultural representative of the nation code under conditions of modernity. It is a central contention of this dissertation that the relationship between the state, the nation and architecture has undergone fundamental changes, as what is different about this relationship today is that architecture has become more open to multiple forms of codification. Architecture is more 'open' in the sense that it is less controlled by the state than at any time in the past. In short, national architecture projects are much more likely to be contested now than in the past: architectural debates now extend far beyond the remit of national governments, and state-led national projects are much more likely to be shaped by any number of conflicting political or social discourses. Under postmodern conditions culture itself has become a political discourse, and the impacts of this have been felt particularly heavily within the architectural profession, and are visible in the buildings architects design. The contemporary relationship between architecture and the state differs in a number of key aspects from the same relationship in the past.

Perhaps nowhere are these tensions more apparent than in Britain and Germany's respective capital cities, London and Berlin. The last section of this work provides a comparative study of buildings with a significant relationship to respective national identities in London and Berlin, two capital cities where state-led architecture continues to play a very significant role in the 'rebranding' of both the city and the nation. The dissertation poses the question whether the collapse of a coherent nation-state has meant that increasingly the idea of the nation as a cultural community is open to various

interpretations and codifications. The discourse of the nation is certainly no longer the sole preserve of the state. As the cultural community (British or German identity in this dissertation) becomes heterogeneous, fragmented and contested so the very idea of the nation becomes increasingly colonized by a variety of groups in vastly differing ways. This dissertation sets out to assess how far these contestations around national identities are expressed in state-led architectural projects. Of course, architecture has historically been a way for states to express their aims, aspirations, and ultimately their power. A key distinction between designers working on landmark national buildings then and now is that the architects of the past felt themselves to be articulating a more clear sense of national identity; this is in contrast to the contemporary situation in which the controversial nature of even the concept 'British' makes any such projects difficult to conceptualize, execute and to legitimate.

A huge amount of literature has been produced on a 'crisis' of British identity both by academic and political commentators (Robbins, 1993; Nairn, 1977; Marr 2000; Alibhai-Brown, 2002; Powell, 2002). If the nation is increasingly such a contested and fragmented concept then how does state-led architecture purport to reflect a coherent national identity? As the British state tries to relinquish a colonial, oppressive past what part can architecture play? Undoubtedly architecture has a massive symbolic role in the 're-branding' of Britain. Accordingly there is interest in the architectural style of 'British High-Tech' (Davis 1999, Russell et al, 1999) and the two architects that have become synonymous with these designs - Sir Norman Foster (Pawley, 2001) and Lord Richard Rogers (Appleyard, 1985; Laney, 1995). What does not currently exist is literature that ties the two strands of British identity and 'British' architecture together; one of the central aims of Chapter Five is to move towards this.

Similarly the German state is in the midst of an ongoing political and cultural discourse about its own past and future. The project of creating a 'new' democratic Germany has

been one of the most engaging questions in contemporary European social theory (Giesen, 1998; Fulbrook, 1998; Habermas, 2001). What is of great significance for this thesis is that complex debates around national identity should end up having a literal, built form. Because of such tensions in German national identity it is clear that the rebuilding of Berlin had a hugely symbolic role, and that any new architecture would be a significant departure from Speer's epic, neo-classical programme for Berlin under Hitler's totalitarian reign. The contemporary German state has attempted to reshape Berlin's built environment by negotiating these highly complicated and contested cultural legacies. Of course, it is not only the architectural legacies of the Nazi period that has left in its wake buildings that reflected past social programmes, but also, since the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th November 1989, the legacy of Soviet architecture. Resultantly a huge amount of debate has been generated on the role architecture has to play in 'rebranding' German national identity (James-Chakraborty, 2000; Feldmeyer, 1993) with some literature focusing specifically on Berlin's architectural renegotiation of identity (Ladd, 1997; Taylor, 1998; Wise, 1998; Young, 1999). This dissertation assesses how two of the most high profile architecture projects in Berlin attempt to reflect the broadly 'post-national' aims of the German state. The architects responsible for these buildings have certainly suggested that architecture mirrors the political and cultural discourses around contemporary German national identity.

Of course, as with many other aspects of contemporary social life, the pressures that come to bear on architecture go far beyond the remit and control of the nation-state. Over half a century ago the writers of the Frankfurt School suggested that the economy colonizes cultural expressions to such a degree that the market becomes the main consideration. These broader debates found an architectural focus in the International Style of modern architecture, which was a dominant paradigm in architecture in the period of the 1960s-1980s. This style produced the 'glass boxes' that became synonymous with corporate finance. It could be suggested, developing the work of Castells (1996) and Habermas

(1996), that contemporary architecture is in danger of being pulled into an ahistorical, postmodern monumentality which repeats the worst mistakes of the modern era. One of the focuses of the research is on how successful some states have been in imposing a particularly national discourse on landmark architecture, against the backdrop of the ubiquitous pseudo-international aesthetics that have become commonplace in architecture. Can architects operate outside the constraints of a globalized market to produce buildings that are culturally resistant to the universalized, standardizing tendencies of global capitalism? Why should states encourage them to do so?

In short, the central questions uniting this dissertation are around the contemporary potential of the state to define the nation via landmark architectural projects. How do states overcome the contradictions inherent in presenting themselves as 'post-national'? What role does architecture have to play in these renegotiations? This dissertation makes a contribution to existing knowledge in two main areas: firstly in the development of a theoretical framework which bridges the gap between social and architectural theory and secondly by expanding this framework with reference to architectural projects illustrative of this broader theory. The intention of this work is to demonstrate that architecture is a part of a repertoire of cultural symbols that expresses something of the relationship between the state and national identity.

Structure

The dissertation is divided into seven chapters that are in turn divided into three parts. Part One comprises of Chapters One and Two and develops the theoretical framework that is necessary to situate the substantive issues addressed in the last section. Chapter One gives an overview of the development of national identities under the conditions of modernity. It outlines the importance of the relationship between the state and culture for the

construction of coherent national identities and assesses the claim that the modern nation code has often been consciously 'created' by states in order to define the nation from an otherwise diverse community. Most often it has been the cultural sphere in which such definitions have taken place and this chapter provides some substantive examples of how states used cultural artefacts to actively create 'their' nation code. Chapter Two builds on this foundation by suggesting that state-led architecture was a significant way of defining nations in modernity. Focusing mainly on the Victorian state and its associated architectural nation builders, who clearly and self-consciously developed 'suitable' architectural styles, this chapter illustrates how some states attempted to renegotiate, or in this case 'modernize,' the nation code via architectural projects. Victorian Britain is used as the main, although not the only, example in this chapter as it was the location in which a clear and demonstrable architectural 'battle of the styles' was fought. Although there were such struggles around national styles in other nineteenth century contexts, it was Victorian Britain in which these discussions were most clearly articulated. As such, nineteenth century Britain is the best place to illustrate the development of national styles, and its absorption into the state project.

Many of the transformations associated with modernity find a radicalized mirror image under what is often called 'globalization.' Part Two of the dissertation (Chapters Three and Four) provides an account of the major social transformations associated with globalization, assessing the capacity of the state to define the nation within such conditions. Chapter Three focuses on the contemporary role of the nation-state by situating it in globalized conditions of action. This chapter charts the progress of this singularly modern institution into a 'postmodern' or, depending on definition, a late modern era, allowing for a clear assessment of the radically different role of the nation-state today as well as showing how expressions of national identity have changed. Closely linked to the previous chapter, Chapter Four considers the significance of post-national identities for collective

identities outside the state. This chapter explores the claim that the city is becoming a significant site for the acting out of new, more cosmopolitan forms of citizenship that are less tied to the state than they once were. Chapter Four also assesses how far architectural styles reflect this move towards city or regional identities.

Part Three provides some substantive examples to illustrate the theoretical framework developed in Parts One and Two. These chapters (Five, Six and Seven) are concerned with how and why some landmark contemporary buildings can be understood as 'metaphors' for the nation. Chapters Five and Six of the thesis provide a study of key state funded buildings in London and Berlin, two capitals where state-led architecture has played a significant role in the 'rebranding' of both the city and the nation. Chapter Five looks specifically at contemporary attempts by the British state to use architecture to codify a national identity. The main focus of this chapter is on the Millennium Dome, which has come to symbolize, intentionally or otherwise, certain aspects of the British nation.

Chapter Six addresses the German state's efforts to create an 'architecture of democracy' (Wise, 1998) in Berlin. A huge amount of building work has taken place in Berlin city since unification, with Sir Norman Foster's extension to The Reichstag and Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum arguably the two most symbolically significant architectural projects that have been built in the German capital since 1945. I argue that both of these projects give a built expression to many of the tensions inherent in German national identity. What is the significance of these projects for German identity and what is the relationship between the German state and German cultural identity? How did the architects involved in these two projects attempt to codify or give aesthetic form to these broader post-national discourses?

The three buildings assessed in Part Three were in various stages of construction in October 1998, when this research began. It was clear from the early stages of these three commissions that they would display many of the tensions so often inherent in large scale, state-led architectural projects in contemporary Europe. Vitally the commissions all dealt

with the question of national identity, albeit in different ways: the Millennium Dome was to provide a cover for a Millennial exhibition, one of the aims of which was to reflect 'Britishness'; the extension to the Reichstag was to provide a new face to the German parliament in the 'new' capital Berlin; the Jewish Museum was to give a permanent exhibition space to the Jewish experience in Berlin, therefore engaging with the place of the Holocaust in Germany national identity. It was also significant that these commissions were awarded to three of the most high profile architects in the world; Lord Richard Rogers (Millennium Dome), Sir Norman Foster (Reichstag), and Daniel Libeskind (Jewish Museum). Not only did their involvement further guarantee a great deal of exposure for their buildings, it also afforded the opportunity to assess how these high profile architects, well versed in situating their buildings in a political context, did so with these controversial buildings. The 'star architect' status of Foster, Rogers (both operating in the same 'High Tech' style), and Libeskind guaranteed a great deal of publicly accessible interview material. And, although these buildings had different uses, they were all undeniably 'landmark' buildings in the sense that they had huge symbolic importance for the actual place, and potentially the 'imagined' nation, in which they existed. Also, again to varying degrees, there had been state involvement in the 'steering' of the projects. These questions are explored in more detail later on in this work. However, it is worth clarifying at this stage that the aim of Part Three of the dissertation is not a comparison of buildings but rather an assessment of the extent to which the architects involved in three different commissions attempted to control the political meaning of their buildings *vis-à-vis* national identity. To reiterate, the buildings are used as examples to illustrate aspects of the theoretical framework developed in Parts One and Two rather than to 'prove' the thesis.

Chapter Seven ties together the theoretical framework developed in Parts One and two and the illustrative examples from Chapters Five and Six. Although buildings can often develop symbolic meanings unrelated to what is actually built it is a sociologically pertinent question

to ask how the meanings that become attached to architecture actually develop. This chapter assesses the claim that how the Millennium Dome, The Reichstag, and The Jewish Museum come to represent certain aims and aspirations is a highly negotiated, contested process. In this chapter I situate architecture as the site of symbolic conflict and competition over identity, taking aspects from Bourdieu's work on cultural capital and Durkheim's writings on totem. A central aim of this chapter is to assess how successful the architects responsible for the three projects assessed in the previous chapter have been in managing the symbolic meanings of their building projects.

Chapter One: National Identity, the State and Culture

Introduction

This chapter provides an overview on the relationship between the state, the nation and national culture. Since their origins in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries nation-states have frequently demonstrated a strong desire for cultural representation, which has led to attempts to express idiosyncratic national identities against the many universalizing tendencies inherent in modernity. Culture has proved to be an important space in which to reflect, and even more than this to create, an image of the nation. States have historically used national culture as a way to define 'their' nation, with cultural artefacts such as for example flags, national anthems, sport, literature, national costumes and buildings all having an important role in allowing states to shape cultural communities.

This chapter begins by situating the development of the nation-state within conditions of modernity, showing how the nation-state provided an institutional expression of many of the discourses and tensions inherent in the progressive, broader project of modernization. This chapter assesses how two initially separate processes – the formation of the state and the development of national identities – can result in the emergence of a (relatively) coherent nation-state. It is a central contention of this dissertation that the answer to this question is to be found in the relationship between culture and politics. After providing an overview of the huge literature on national identity and nationalism, I go on to give some substantive examples of how states have historically used culture to construct and define the nation code.

Modernity and the Nation-State

'To create the nation, therefore, it is not enough simply to mobilize compatriots. They must be taught who they are, where they came from and whither they are going' (Smith, 1990: 184).

To offer a thorough definition of modernity is far beyond the scope of a single chapter. However, for present purposes, I would follow Habermas (1987, 1989b), Toulmin (1990), Delanty (2000), and Strydom (2000) by suggesting that modernity is best characterized as a 'spirit,' an 'ethos,' or as a 'project' beset with certain creative tensions. By considering modernity in such a disparate way it is possible to identify some of the key themes inherent in the modern age. I would like to suggest that this 'spirit' of modernity is best understood as a series of interconnected, interrelated discourses that emerged in a particular intellectual and historical context. A fluid approach to the concept of modernity helps to reveal the dynamic, reflexive and revolutionary nature of modernity.

From an etymological perspective to be modern is to be in the present, to be clearly distinguished from a distinct past. From this definition modernity would seem to signal something new, a period of time characterized by novelty, or by a reality that did not exist previously. Of course, modernity is more than a solely intellectual category, as the modernization[6] of the economy and the polity in the nineteenth century saw the notion of modernity become a pervasive and dynamic force in other fundamental spheres of existence. Heynen suggests that the modern became 'visible' on many different levels as the 'break with the established values and certainties of tradition could be seen and felt' (Heynen, 1999: 10). Minimally we can say then that modernity is characterized by a change in the nature of the relationship between the present and the future, as '[t]he modern world is distinguished from the old by the fact that it opens itself to the future, the

[6] Modernization theory basically refers to the study of dynamic or broadly 'progressive' tendencies that have change as their goal.

epochal new beginning is rendered constant with each moment that gives birth to the new' (Habermas, 1985: 7).

Although then, at best, an ill-defined concept, modernity has nevertheless provided the framework for social theory and sociology. The continuing relevance of the concept can perhaps be understood because the key tensions within modernity are reflected in many of the social institutions and transformations that were born of this hugely significant epoch. For present purposes I am concerned specifically with the development of the nation-state and nationalism. For Jürgen Habermas, arguably the greatest contemporary philosopher of modernity, one of the central aspects of the 'project of modernity' is the end of tradition as a form of legitimation and the emergence of a communicative public sphere that allows for democratic critique (Habermas, 1989b) - the past and its associated traditions cease to provide sufficiently rational explanation or motivation for social action. Habermas claims that it was this 'radicalized [time] consciousness of modernity that detached itself from all previous historical connection and understood itself solely in abstract opposition to tradition and history as a whole' (Habermas, 1996: 39). This modernizing, progressive dynamic within modernity had its foundations in the belief that generally knowledge has a developmental role. For example the discourse of science was central to modernity as an intellectual project,[7] as the emancipatory potential of this discourse was something that states attempted to colonize. Institutions that successfully aligned themselves with science were perceived as radical modernizers.

Another central tension within modernity is the relationship between universalism and particularism. There are many universalizing tendencies in the modern project and, more specifically, inherent in the formation of nation-states. Put simply, at some level states must resist culturally universal tendencies at some level if they are to develop an identity

[7] In many ways the Enlightenment can be seen a crystallization of many of these broader themes of modernity. The key dynamic of the Enlightenment as an intellectual movement was the belief in and reliance on secular reason as a progressive, even utopian, force. The Enlightenment period saw the rise of knowledge as a powerful discourse. This seminal period was of great importance for the formation of the nation-state.

that is sufficiently distinct. This relationship between the universal and the particular can be recast as a dialectic of culture and civilization on the one side and on the other particularism and universalism. The resolution of this tension within modernity, which is also reflected in the tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism, has been to view culture as the domain of the *particular* and civilization as the realm of the *universal.* Modernity tended to reconcile the pursuit of national culture with the cosmopolitan ideal of the universality of civilization.[8] These universal aspects of modernity were altered to varying degrees as they were processed by nation-states and it is in this way that universals become particular in their specific application. Nation-states had a strong desire for distinctive cultural representations under conditions of modernity and this tendency encouraged the development of cultural particularisms. Throughout the dissertation I suggest that the tension between universalism and particularism is central to the understanding of national identities and to the development of national styles within architecture.

Another key point that should be made in this context is that the onset of modernity sees power become less physical and more abstract. Theorists including Foucault (1979), Habermas (1989a), Strydom (2000) all recognize that under conditions of modernity power becomes increasingly discursive. This is a key point for much of what follows. This thesis is ultimately concerned with tracing cultural and political discourses that emerged in modern conditions of action into a globalized, broadly 'post-national' context. These transformations concern the cultural representation of nationalism and the nation-state, with a particular focus on the role of state-led architecture in this process. For example, the next chapter assesses what part national architecture played in the creation and maintenance of a British nation code by drawing on examples from the Victorian period and the post-war era.

[8] The obvious eurocentricism in this conception of civilization is not of concern in the present context, as the main aim is to explore one dimension of this dialectic within modernity.

The Nation, The State, Nationalism and National Identity

'I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign' (Anderson, 1983: 5).

In many ways the development of the nation-state and the subsequent creation of national identities are clear manifestations of modernity. As is suggested above, the developmental nature of scientific knowledge was a vital dynamic under conditions of modernity, which, as with many of modernity's key discourses, found an institutional expression in the state. As it was the specific social, economic and political conditions of modernity that gave rise to the development of the nation-state, it is possible to view the nation-state as the institutional expression of many of modernity's abstract discourses. For example, the progressive, utopian and developmental nature of modernity found a bureaucratic expression in the state. It was in this modernizing institutionalization that nationalism emerged as a cultural project capable of creating national membership among relatively heterogeneous populations. The next chapter assesses how national architecture has often reflected these state aims, while the present chapter offers a broad theoretical framework within which to situate later, more specific architectural debates.

At this stage it is necessary to distinguish between a number of related, but theoretically distinct terms: nation, state, government, nationalism and national identity. Although these terms are in frequent academic, as well as 'everyday,' usage, they tend to be applied in an imprecise and undifferentiated way. This section sets out to offer workable definitions with an acceptable degree of clarity to allow the development of the dissertation, so the aim here

is not necessarily to define these terms exhaustively.[9] Initially it may seem a rather banal observation that the term nation-state is formed by the hyphenation of the words nation and state. At the most basic level we can consider the nation as a cultural community, while the state can be defined as a political administration. It is the fusion of these two distinct concepts that gives us the nation-state, the institution that emerged under conditions of modernity. In trying to establish workable definitions of nationalism and national identity it is first necessary to expand the idea of the nation.[10] As Billig points out it is impossible to define the nation in terms of 'objective' geographical, political or cultural principles, such is the huge degree of variation between existing nations (Billig, 1995: 19). We are left then with the more abstract idea of the nation as a 'specifically modern form of collective identity' (Arnason, 1990: 208) based around a cultural community. At the most basic level it is possible to assert that nations are political units that develop under modern, capitalist conditions.

In the influential text *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson famously contends that the nation is a culturally constructed community that develops as a necessary integrative component of industrial society (Anderson, 1983). Anderson's account, echoing Durkheim's ([1933] 1964) work on integration, focuses on the shift from traditional religious communities to new, industrial national societies. According to Durkheim this shift in social organization necessitated new forms of solidarity as the old integrative forms, based on a simple division of labour and shared religious practices, could no longer guarantee cohesion in societies fragmented along lines of class. Anderson sees this change as engendering an 'ontological shift,' arguing that the move from traditional to modern societies necessitated fundamental changes in perceptions of social reality. Developing this

[9] There is a huge literature already in existence that tries to do just this. For more precise definitions of nationalism see Greenfield (1992, 1996).

[10] Although not of primary importance here, Paul James shows how 'nation' has its roots in the term from the Middle Ages *natione* which 'was used to distinguish communities of foreigners at the newly formed universities, in refectories of the great monasteries, and at the reform councils of the Church' (James, 1996: 10). For more on the ancient origins of the term nation also see Zernatto (1944). Other accounts of the development of the term focus on the Latin word *natio*, meaning 'birth' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2001).

notion of 'ontological shift' Anderson claims that the nation (in contrast to pre-modern social forms) is an 'imagined community.' It is imagined because 'the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them or even hear them, yet in the minds of each is the image of their communion' (Anderson, 1983: 6). If we follow this line of inquiry about the nation, a key question becomes how the 'imagined'[11] community becomes a reality in the 'minds of each'? How is the nation constructed as a social reality and subsequently reflected and maintained as such?

It is clear that in the above conceptions of the nation there is a strong notion of constructivism. In Gellner's account, as with the work of Anderson, '[n]ationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist' (Gellner, 1983: 5). Anthony Giddens defines the nation as a 'collectivity existing within a clearly demarcated territory, which is subject to a unitary administration, reflexively monitored both by the internal state apparatus and those of other states' (Giddens, 1985: 116). This definition does not depend on the will of attachment, as it is orientated more towards sovereignty, so Giddens avoids the issue of the nation's construction. Although Giddens' initial definition is useful as it suggests the interconnectedness of nation-states it could be argued that this definition conflates nation and nation-state. He writes that 'a nation only exists when a state has a unified administrative reach over territory over which its sovereignty is claimed' (Giddens, 1985: 119), however there are many examples of the existence of nations without such administrative structures (see Chapter Three).

In a definition useful for present purposes Manuel Castells sees nations as '*cultural communes constructed in people's minds and collective memory by the sharing of history and political projects*' (Castells, 1997: 51 - emphasis in original). Within this description there are two lines of inquiry pertinent to this dissertation: Firstly, how do cultural communities become constructed in collective memory? Secondly, who has the power to

[11] James criticises the idea of 'imagination' in this context by arguing that Anderson's notion of imagination is not sufficiently well developed (James, 1998: 6). For present purposes however, we can take Anderson's notion of imagination to mean 'constituted abstractly.'

carry out this 'construction' of shared history? It is a central argument of this dissertation that the state[12] has historically been the most significant actor in creating and maintaining the nation code. As was suggested earlier, at the most basic level the state is a political administration, a bureaucracy set up to govern a given territory or nation; the state can be considered as an interconnected set of actors, discourses and institutions. Building on this initial cursory definition Max Weber (1947) and later Norbert Elias (1982) have shown that the state can be best characterized by its legitimate recourse to violence and coercion. The anarchist tradition also sees the state as a centralized, coercive institution for organized violence. From this perspective the state is a coalition of political, economic and military interests that has conspired to erode the 'naturally' occurring liberties that existed before the state - the state comes to colonize and dominate society. Anarchists are primarily aligned with a 'cosmopolitan' outlook (see Chapters Three and Four) viewing nations and national identities as pernicious and divisive state-led strategies. In *Nationalism and Culture* Rocker suggests that '[t]he nation is not the cause, but the result of the state. It is the state which creates the nation and not the nation the state' (Rocker, [1937] 1946: 27). Rocker also distinguishes between a people and a nation, with the former a 'natural' union of individuals whose similarity is due to operating in similar social structures and the latter an artificial, state-led quest for political power and domination. The nation, even in the anarchist definition, encompasses a diverse range of people who at some point in history and by violent means, were grouped together under the banner of a 'nation.' It is the illegitimate nature of these bonds that means nationalism creates artificial, state-led separations between more universal populations.

[12] Roger Sibeon (1999) has drawn attention to the 'theoretical illegitimacy' of conceiving of the state as a unitary, coherent actor with clearly defined goals. I agree with Sibeon that it is vital to take account of contingency, agency and differentiation within the state to avoid reifying the institution. In this dissertation I sometimes refer to 'the state project' or the 'aims of the state' as a way of indicating the institutionalised nature of a given discourse – this is of course an empirically testable question which is addressed more precisely in Part Three.

So, from these two separate entities of nation and state we can begin to see how we arrive at the nation-state, the most modern of institutions. Brubaker takes France and Germany as two distinct examples of the marrying of nation and state, suggesting that the key factor is whether or not 'national feeling,' in other words a national identity, developed before or after the emergence of the state. Brubaker contends that the French example is one whereby national identity emerged *after* the creation of the nation-state, as national feelings grew out of the state and its institutions. This process is sometimes referred to as *civic nationalism*, broadly the development of a nation from a prior state. Civic nationalism rests on civil society for its legitimacy, so citizenship can be elected within civic nationalism. Britain is an example of citizenship determining nationality. In many senses citizenship is the formal, political definition of a national identity.[13] In Germany, on the other hand, a national consciousness predates the formation of the state with the concept of the *Volk*. In fact German citizenship statute was historically based on a 'Law on Imperial and State Citizenship' dating from 1913, where an ethnic conception of national identity is maintained. The ethnic core of the 1913 citizenship law is reproduced in the Basic Law through the 'Nationalstaatsprinzip' (the Nation-State Principle), which makes it clear that there is a material core (that is 'blood') connecting a citizen to his or her nation. This is sometimes referred to as an *ethnic nationalism*, as it is based around ancestry or 'blood', with such attachments ascribed, rather than chosen by individuals. As Kastoryano points out, the German nation has been 'defined by a common culture' while ' the basic principles of nationality remains sharing common ancestry (jus sanguinis)' (Kastoryano, 2002: 60). This picture has changed as of the 1st January 2000 though, with children born *in* Germany,

[13] Although conflating citizenship with definitions of national(ity)/(ism) does somewhat confuse definitions it is also helpful in that citizenship, conceived of in these terms, necessitates not only rights and duties but also notions of *participation* and *identity*. See Gerard Delanty's (2001) formulation of contemporary citizenship for more on this.

or to parents who have lived in Germany for at least 8 years, considered German in law (Kastoryano, 2002: 61).[14]

For some groups lacking a clearly defined political boundary (e.g. a state) or other boundaries (e.g. social class) as integrative forces, the identification of common language, skin colour or religion can often provide sufficient foundations for the construction of a coherent community. This route to developing a nation code negates the need for the prior existence of social institutions such as an economy or a state as ethnicity is at the forefront of the emergent political culture, as opposed to the membership in civil society that dominates civic forms of nationalism. But even Germany, often held up as model that supports the nation to state route cannot be considered a purely ethnic conception of nationalism. Likewise in France, where the foundations of nationhood were politically rooted there has never existed a solely political conception of the nation. However both countries used nationalism to progress under the conditions of modernity, and '[t]he close links between nation and state illustrate the interpenetration of the societal community and the polity' (Arnason, 1990: 212). The key distinction between these two nationalisms is the point at which people begin to see themselves as members of a *community.*

Breuilly considers nationalism a 'rather clumsy term' but 'can think of nothing better' (Breuilly, 1982: 11). Certainly nationalism *is* a term without clear definition, with few concepts as ill defined still in such frequent academic usage. The conflation of nationalism with ideas of citizenship, national identity and nation (to name but three of many awkward bedfellows) has rendered the term a highly confused one. However, studies on nationalism seldom address this fundamental problem and, as a result, theories of national identity and nationalism, while central to contemporary social theory and sociology, often lack coherent initial definitions. Nearly all writers on nationalism recognise the significance of the onset of modernity, agreeing that these major social transformations are central.

[14] In 2000 this law was changed, with definitions of citizenship now centring on the length of residence. However, despite this legal change, German citizenship is still primarily an ethnic conception (Kastoryano, 2002: 24-25)

Rogers Brubaker (1996) argues nationalism has been both 'cause and effect' of many of the major social and political transformations of space in the twentieth century: nationalism then can be viewed as a particular manifestation of modernity or as a *process* that encourages modernization. In *The Nation-State and Violence* Anthony Giddens also places the nation-state at the centre of processes associated with modernity. Giddens defines nationalism as 'the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality among the members of a political order' (Giddens, 1985: 116). In conceiving of nationalism as 'a phenomenon that is primarily psychological' (Giddens, 1985: 116) Giddens suggests that nationalism occurs 'in fairly unusual and often relatively transitory conditions' (Giddens, 1985: 218). These conditions are usually when the 'nation' is threatened in some way, especially militarily. More usefully for this dissertation is *Banal Nationalism*, in which Michael Billig locates nationalism not, as does Giddens, on the 'periphery' of societies, but centrally. Billig sets about to counter the assumption that populations 'forget' their nationalism when they are not directly caught up in a situation of nationalist mobilization, such as wartime. Of course Billig does not refute the importance of studying the more extreme expressions of nationalism, but he suggests that there exist other, equally pertinent, expressions of nationalism that are routinely 'flagged' in the media and throughout society.[15]

Gellner views nationalism as harbouring the goal of marrying a political unit to the nation, as does Arnason, who claims that nationalism 'presupposes the image of the nation as a manifest, latent or desired form of collective identity and relates it to the nation-state' (Arnason, 1990: 209). Billig also follows this perspective closely by identifying nationalism as the 'ideology that creates and maintains nation-states' (Billig, 1995: 19). If

[15] Although Billig's framework is influential for this dissertation it is worth pointing out that much of the architecture assessed here falls not into the 'banal', everyday construction of national consciousness but rather extraordinary and spectacular displays of the nation. It is suggested throughout this dissertation that architecture is one significant way of 'flagging the nation', but the landmark status of these buildings implies a special, non-habitual character, which is why Roche's work on 'megaevents' (2000), large scale cultural events which shape national identities (2001b), is important for the development of the thesis.

this *is* the case then nationalism has frequently been a very successful endeavour. Benedict Anderson also adheres to the general line of the modernist argument by suggesting that nationalism's roots lie in the secularization of culture; he argues that pre-national cultures tended to be religious cultures, which states replaced with constructed national cultures. Interestingly Anderson locates print capitalism as central to his theory and suggests that it was the advance in printing technologies that allowed the development of unique and specific national culture in the early nineteenth century.[16] The development of print capitalism is another important link between the rise of the nation-state and modernity.

National identity involves a less 'political' claim than does nationalism. Delanty and O'Mahony (2001) suggest that '[n]ational identity is the cultural outcome of the discourse of the nation' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2001: 2). National identity, for this dissertation, will be considered a *cultural association of belonging with the nation code*. Nationalism can be considered as the mobilization of this code. Although the work of John Rex on national identity is not without its critics,[17] he draws attention to the often overlooked concept of identity, claiming '[w]hat one has to distinguish between are the cognitive use of the concept, referring to the way in which individuals, guided by cultural norms, perceive social entities and their own place within a world of such entities, and its more emotive use involving some conception of *identification* or belonging.'[18] For present purposes collective identities are considered a way of organizing meaning and associations around a pre-defined code (be it ethnic, national, regional, gender, lifestyle, sexual, sporting, musical etc).

For the purposes of grouping a huge body of highly diverse literature it is possible to separate writers on national identity into two categories (Delanty, 2000). The first group of writers adopt a broadly constructivist standpoint toward the idea of the nation, generally

[16] A clear parallel can be drawn between Anderson's theory on print capitalism and Habermas' theory on the same topic. In *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* ([1979]) Habermas demonstrates how the development of the printing press was central to the opening of a (theoretically) democratic space.
[17] See for example Delanty (1996).
[18] See for example Rex (1996)

suggesting it is at some level socially constructed. This perspective also emphasizes that the pursuit of a national identity by the state is not a neutral endeavour, but rather a politically significant creation of a collective identity. This is in keeping with the constructivist perspective in sociology, which emphasizes the fact that social actors 'create' reality, and in turn identities. A way to develop the constructivist view of national identity is to juxtapose it with the essentialist framework, which would see the nation as built on an underlying 'reality,' a foundation that provides objects with their substance. The essentialist perspective claims that the nation is an objectively existing, traditionally verifiable entity - it is, in the everyday sense of the word, 'real.'[19] The line of argument here is that national communities cannot have been entirely created in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as there must have been some pre-existing foundation for the creation of such groupings in the first place. Anthony Smith (1981, 1986, 1994) and Walker Connor (1984) both adopt such an essentialist perspective and argue that an ethnic core provides the basis for nations.

Constructivism on the other hand sees identities, in this case national identities, as constructed entities that are created at definite historical points, usually by cultural or political elites. Gerard Delanty sums up the constructivist perspective thus: 'nations are inventions; they are conceived, constructed, even fabricated by social actors and cannot be explained by reference to an underlying historical essence which simply unfolds in history' (Delanty, 2001: 120). This constructivist perspective can be attributed, to varying degrees, to influential theorists such as Ernst Gellner (1983, 1987, 1994), Eric Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b, 1990), Michael Billig (1995), and Rogers Brubaker (1996). These writers tend to be broadly critical of nationalist projects.

[19] This definition is in common with many writers in the tradition of Berger and Luckmann (1971) who use essentialism to assign a necessary, unvarying essence to social phenomena. Although this perspective is of paramount importance for this dissertation it must be remembered that unitariness can be considered an 'emergent outcome of social processes' (Sibeon, 1999: 318)

This constructivist argument is clearly stated by Gellner, whose work is assessed throughout the remainder of this chapter. He defines nationalism as 'entry to, participation in, identification with, a literate high culture which is co-extensive with an entire political unit and its total population' (Gellner, 1983: 9). The writings of Eric Hobsbawm (1983a, 1983b, 1990) offer further support for a constructivist understanding of national identity. Hobsbawm, echoing the anarchist definition of the state outlined earlier on, argues that 'nations are more often the consequence of setting up a state than they are its foundation' (Hobsbawm, 1990: 78). This perspective can also be reframed as the state to nation route. As would be expected, central to all constructivist accounts is the prior existence of the state. Nationalism is ultimately a mass mobilization of national identity, usually directed and managed by a powerful, centralized political and cultural elite such as the state.

From this perspective nationalism and national identity are forms of social integration, offering a way for the state to unite the diverse, heterogeneous mass populations that emerge under modern conditions. Often these populations have little in common save their being governed by the same sovereign institution, so it is ultimately this commonality that states use to integrate these otherwise atomized groups. It is only with the creation of a coherent culture that such collective identifications take place. Culture is the most vital way that a 'veil of forgetfulness' (Gellner, 1987) can cover the huge range of internal differences that divide the modern nation. History must then, to some extent or other, be 'invented.' Such common histories serve to legitimate and explain current disputes or motivations as somehow 'natural' and necessary, as well as giving the masses a 'shortcut' to the high culture of the state elites. Gellner suggests that under modern conditions and the development of the nation-state populations become 'fully and nervously aware of their culture and its vital relevance to their interests.... there is both a push and a pull towards revering a shared culture directly, unmediated and in its own terms' (Gellner, 1987: 16); it

is only by creating and making visible such cultural artefacts that the state is able to let 'their' culture become the 'shared culture.'

In this dissertation I start from the premise that there are no 'essential' or 'real' nations. National identities only exist because of the pervasive and powerful nature of the discourses that create and sustain them (Wodak et al, 1999). It is only in the sense that actors believe the nation to be real that make is thus. Arguing from a similar perspective Mary Fulbrook suggests that '[n]ational identity does not exist, as an essence to be sought for, found and defined. It is a human construct, evident only when sufficient people believe in some version of collective identity for it to be a social reality embodied in and transmitted through institutions, laws, customs, beliefs and practices' (Fulbrook, 1999: 1). So, constructivist and essentialist perspectives are somewhat of an over-simplification inasmuch as the nation is an abstract community 'but one which always, subjectively and ideologically, reaches back to more concrete ways of living and representation' (James, 1996: 2). In other words, regardless of whether or not identities do have some 'real' aspect to them it is clear that such identities become a *social reality* – that is they become real in the minds of the social actors concerned and thus come to exercise some constraint over their behaviour.

Alfred Schutz famously wrote that the aim of the social sciences is to gather knowledge about social reality. Developing this idea Schutz says '[b]y the term "social reality" I wish to be understood the sum total of objects and occurrences within the social cultural world as experienced by the common-sense thinking of men [sic] living their daily lives among their fellow-men [sic], connected with them in manifold relations of interaction. It is the world of cultural objects and social institutions into which we are born, within which we have to find our bearings, and with which we have to come to terms' (Schutz, [1954] 1972: 258). The idea forwarded by Schutz, namely that the world is an 'intersubjective' one, is of great use when studying nationalism and national identity. If the social world is understood

from the outset as being meaningful, then we, as social scientists, must bear in mind that a social reality is not necessarily an 'objective' reality. In other words just because something is not an empirical or 'concrete' reality does not mean it is not real to social actors, or does not exercise some constraint over action (in the Durkheimian sense of a 'social fact'). To illustrate this point Schutz uses W. I. Thomas' work on witchcraft in seventeenth century Salem. Thomas found, according to Schutz, that for Salem's inhabitants 'witchcraft was not a delusion but an element of their social reality' (Schutz, [1954] 1972: 259).

National Identity: The State Culture?

'[W]hy do 'we,' in our established, democratic nations, not forget 'our' national identity?' (Billig, 1995: 93)

The remaining section of this chapter is concerned with the relationship between the state, national identity and cultural belonging. I have argued that it is only through *culture* that national identities become a tangible reality and that different forms of national association emerge from differing relationships between the nation and the state. Taking the extreme constructivist view that the nation is completely socially constructed then it should be able to be socially *reconstructed.* If an identity is built around a culturally specific set of norms and values then what are they? How do they emerge? Who is responsible for the 'construction'? For the development of this dissertation it is vital to understand how certain social actors, in this case the state, are able to 'construct' a national identity by using cultural discourses. It was suggested above that the desire to house a cultural nation within the political framework of the state is a primary concern of nationalism.

Gellner suggests that the move from 'savage' to 'cultivated' cultures involves three relatively distinct stages: hunter-gatherer, agrarian and industrial[20] (Gellner, 1983). According to Gellner it is only at the middle of the agrarian era, at the very earliest, that the proto-state emerges, primarily due to a literate, educated class of administrators. The effect of this emergence is to create a relatively centralized culture and literacy, and the agrarian age is characterized by a growing differentiation of political and cultural boundaries. Vitally, though, with industrialization comes a degree of fluidity, as populations are socially and geographically much more mobile than in previous eras. The other key shift in Gellner's scheme is the emergence of universalized language and, later, universalized literacy, as this allows a relatively homogenized culture to become dominant, largely due to a national education system. This elite culture is then held together by the education system provided by the nation-state. Accordingly Gellner puts a shared culture at the centre of his theory of nationalist formations. In doing so he also clarifies the role of the nation-state, which is to be 'the protector, not of a faith, but *of a culture*' (Gellner, 1983: 110 - emphasis added). For Gellner the importance of the nation-state is in promoting a feeling of cultural commonality amongst potentially atomized individuals ostensibly divided by class, race and gender, and in creating an active involvement in civil society via citizenship. Obviously the type of national identification needed when the state has just developed is very different from when the nation is mobilized *against* the state (see Chapter Three).

Gellner's account of the development of nationalism is arguably the most 'sociological' of any of the writings assessed here, as he sees nationalism as a response to the need for cultural cohesion in the fragmentary and potentially unstable social conditions associated with the onset of industrialism. In giving such a broad structural account Gellner can

[20] As this chapter is concerned with the development of national identity under modern conditions it is not necessary to review Gellner's writing on the hunter-gatherer and agrarian stages here, suffice to say that 'culture' in the first stage of this history reproduces itself, with no 'cultivation' from elites: 'cultures, like plants, can be divided into savage and cultivated varieties.... the savage kinds are produced and reproduce themselves spontaneously, as parts of the life of men [sic]' (Gellner, 1983: 50).

perhaps be accused of overlooking the importance of actors and agency for nationalism, and indeed the next chapter assesses how far social actors, in this case architects, have historically had an active relation to culture. The importance of Gellner's work for this dissertation is in his situating culture as central to the creation and development of national identities. His writings emphasize that the clearest form of nationalism is articulated when the state coincides with the nation; the culture of the state is adopted as the culture of the nation. Gellner offers the following definition as a summary: '[s]o – let culture be worshipped directly in its own name. That is nationalism' (Gellner, 1987: 17). This convergence also serves to give the political power of the state social and cultural boundaries - the process of nationalism implies the desire to house a cultural nation within a political state. Of course, no nation-state fits this framework totally, and indeed to be 'successful' nationalism must draw on both types of association. At some level there exist as many nationalisms as there are nations, because each form of nationalism can be seen to chart the development of that particular nation-state into modernity. In other words 'constructions of collective identity change with changes in experienced realities' (Fulbrook, 1999: 203).

Gellner's work also seeks to remove ethnicity from the centre of definitions of nationalism. He contends that '[n]ationalism is a political principle which maintains that *similarity of culture* is the main social bond' (Gellner, 1997: 3 – emphasis added). Undoubtedly ethnicity can and frequently does provide cultural similarities, but presently we are concerned with the extent to which national identity as a cultural discourse can be controlled by the state. Gellner's account can be criticised for being overly functional and structural, but does provide a framework to start thinking about the relationship between culture and the state. 'Culture is no longer merely the adornment, confirmation and legitimation of a social order which was also sustained by harsher and coercive constraints; culture is now the necessary shared medium, the life-blood or perhaps rather the minimal

shared atmosphere, within which alone the members of society can breathe and survive and produce' (Gellner, 1983: 37-38). Certainly there are problems with Gellner's distinction between structure and culture, with 'unstructured' societies held together by common cultures, as 'the classification of men [sic] by culture is of course the classification by nationality' (Gellner, 1964: 157).

So, how far can states 'control' national identity and, more broadly why is it in the interests of a political administration to do so? As is suggested above, in modernity the state comes to be a central, pervasive institution in society. It is then important to legitimate this power, and under modern conditions the most effective way to do this is discursively (Foucault, 1979; Strydom, 2000). In democracies the state must legitimate itself before the authority of civil society, with culture providing such a space for this. However, what is really of concern presently is the role that culture can play in creating and sustaining feelings of national identity. The question to be addressed here is how far these cultural expressions can be manipulated or controlled by the state. We can see nationalism as a mobilization of national identity based on a (imagined) political community and united by a shared public culture. It is very often this culture that ties the nation to the past while at the same time offering the nation a 'progressive' way forward.

Most generally what differentiates national high cultures is their respective responses to the conditions of modernity. The politicization of culture in modernity means that culture becomes tied in with the very real social and political concerns that impact on economies, territorial boundaries, and lived realities in general. Due to the aforementioned processes under modernity, a community's cultural identity is articulated most clearly through its common features. This aspect of culture in turn comes to represent the national identity that is a dominant and operative identity under modernity. Pursuing this modernist argument further, Gellner argues that 'the mutual relationship of a modern culture and state

is something quite new, and springs, inevitably, from the requirements of a modern economy' (Gellner, 1983: 14).

In general, Gellner's theory centres on the notion that culture has an active relation to structure, with the onset of modernity seeing culture becoming highly politicized. The effect of this is that all members of the community become 'politically' engaged due to their shared culture. Nationalism thus becomes the determination, demarcation or definition of a political/cultural unit by elites. If the nation is to be considered a common cultural community, then the state must aim at congruence with the nation; indeed Gellner suggests that this is a necessity of capitalism. However, in Europe at least, there are no cases of a culturally homogeneous nation-state or a completely congruent nation and state. For example in a historical context 'Britain' has effectively signified four cultural communities, England, parts of Ireland, Scotland and Wales, in one political space (Kearney, 1991).

The move from a group seeing themselves, and being seen by others, as a community to becoming a self-conscious *society* is vital to any modernist notion of nationalism; it was this shift that was also central to the project of modernity. Arnason characterizes this move from community to society as a largely state-driven 'process of cultural unification.... [that] accompanied the centralization of power and thus created a basis on which a closer relationship between culture and power could develop' (Arnason, 1990: 214). Also according to Arnason, it is frequently the state that gives the nation a tangible, cultural form. Clearly the actual forms that these cultural artefacts take are many and varied (see Chapter Two), but due to the primarily discursive nature of national identity, the nation requires a tangible, cultural expression. Often this expression was in the domain of high culture. Aside from architecture, monuments, flags, ceremonies, and money[21] come to mind as significant 'high' cultural expressions of the nation. In the sphere of mass culture

[21] For more on this see Delanty and Jones (2002).

sport has been a significant arena in which to define the nation (Hobsbawm, 1983b), as has education (Gellner, 1983; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Although some of these discourses are not necessarily always state-initiated the state often tries to control these narratives in such a way as to join them to a broader definition of the nation code.

So, if following Gellner (1983, 1987, 1994), Anderson (1983), and Billig (1995) we consider the nation a construction then it is necessary to outline how this cultural community is constructed and subsequently reflected. In other words how do these, often vague, feelings of association become, in Schutz's language, a 'social reality?' I argued above that as initially nations are abstract discourses then the need exists to codify them in a more 'concrete' or 'real' sense. Hobsbawm has demonstrated how significant 'cultural traditions' have been in doing just this, contending that these 'traditions' claiming an ancient heritage are often invented, frequently in relatively recent history. Hobsbawm's work on the 'invention of traditions' is helpful in showing how certain aspects of cultures become institutionalised and bound up irrevocably with the nation code. Hobsbawm has written that he is interested in the use of cultural materials to construct invented traditions: 'a large store of such materials is accumulated in the past of any society, and an elaborate language of symbolic practice and communication is always available' (Hobsbawm, 1983a: 6).

Returning to Giddens' definition of national identity as an affiliation to symbols stressing community within a political border (Giddens, 1985), it is important to frame a question around how cultural symbols are utilized by states seeking to create a cultural affiliation. As the following chapters demonstrate, historically different states have used different cultural symbols or 'tools' to achieve this integrative effect. As Anthony D. Smith argues, these traditions and symbols 'will only survive and flourish as part of the repertoire of national culture, if they can be made continuous with a much longer past that members of that community presume to constitute their 'heritage'' (Smith, 1990: 178). Michael

Billig's general project is concerned with demonstrating how this happens, as he has written on how the nation is 'routinely flagged' (1995) in everyday life through (amongst other things) the media, politician's speeches, sports, and actual flags. For example, in his work on the on the media Billig has shown how important it is for the development of a coherent national identity that a continuous 'we' is created in politicians' speeches, news reports and interviews. Aside from Billig, whose writing is discussed in greater detail below, there have been some other notable attempts to use discourse analysis to study nationalism and national identity. For example Wodak et al (1999) also look in great detail at how certain rhetorical and grammatical devices serve the purpose of symbolically 'uniting' a nation. More broadly these types of studies show us the vital importance of the more cognitive and discursive forms that identification with the nation code can, and frequently does, take.

Billig also locates the state as centrally important for the creation of such national discourses, suggesting that the 'symbols of nationhood' did not exist before the French Revolution of 1789 (Billig, 1995: 25), in keeping with Billig's broader project we can see a strong constructivist tendency in this idea. Again, it is important to reiterate the salience of a repertoire of state-led cultural discourses for flagging of the nation, as '[t]hough nationalist ideas are often dogmatic and strive to be hegemonic, they are nevertheless *discursively articulated and seek to convince*' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002: 114 – emphasis added). It is this background 'flagging' that gives the nation a 'reality' as it were; Billig argues that '[j]ust as a language will die for want of regular users, so a nation must be put to daily use' (Billig, 1995: 95). This argument also hints at the inherently populist nature of flagging a contemporary nation - indeed populism is a key concept when exploring national identity.

Populism can perhaps be best framed as a tacit relationship between the state's elites and the masses (Nairn, 1977). This symbiotic relationship is vital for forms of national identity

as, again following Gellner (1983, 1987, 1994), it is elites that first dominate high culture as the 'masses' are not able to participate due to low levels of literacy, and so are manipulated by the culturally dominant elites. Generally though such projects tend to be 'defensive' in nature, inasmuch as they attempt to protect the nation and its values from perceived 'attack.'[22] Billig, again using discourse analysis, picks up an interesting example of this tendency by looking at one of John Major's speeches when he was the Conservative Prime Minister. Major suggested that 'Britain' is characterized by village greens, cricket, spinsters on bicycles, cream teas on summer afternoons, which is hardly a lived reality for the majority of the British population (Billig, 1995: 101), but it is perhaps a 'social reality' in Schutz's terms. In this speech we can see how culturally powerful actors, such as the Prime Minister, frequently equate 'our' nation, or 'our people,' with the experiences of the few.[23]

Although the discourse of the nation has never been the sole preserve of the state, it is clear that at times states were often able to impose an authoritative definition of the nation in order to define the cultural identity of 'their' community. Most often high culture has been the site where such definitions have taken place, with architecture just one state-led expression of the nation under conditions of modernity. It is primarily because in the modern age citizenship was acted out at, and subsequently reflected on, the level of the nation, that the state was able to define the nation in an authoritative manner. Some important codifications of the nation emerged via art, flags, national anthems and through the discourse of history. State-led landmark architecture has proved a very important space for the expression of the national code, with many of the modernizing discourses identified above finding their substantive reflection in landmark public buildings, an idea that is

[22] It is an interesting suggestion that right wing populism tends to invoke the glory of the past, lost 'golden ages' etc while left wing populism is a more future-orientated utopian discourse. For more on right-wing populist mobilizations see Chapter Three.

[23] In her brilliant work on 'Excitable Speech' (1997) Judith Butler contends that 'speech acts' such as hate speech, although having demonstrably injurious effects, should not be seen necessarily as the *cause* of any damage, but rather as the site at which harm occurs. This framework could be adapted to analyse exclusionary and non-representative cultural narratives.

further explored in the next chapter. It is of interest to address some other ways in which the nation has come to be defined via culture.

Hugh Trevor-Roper (1983) demonstrates how ritual dress came to play a central part in Scottish national identity, providing an example of how national traditions can be invented, in part, through culture. Trevor-Roper shows that the kilt, although claiming an ancient heritage, is a relatively modern invention. He also demonstrates that although tartan kilts ostensibly relate to traditional highland culture and the Scottish 'clan,' it was an Anglicised invention that was imposed often quite arbitrarily on Scots families. According to Trevor-Roper, the kilt originated from the need to create a distinct identity for the Highland Division. However, regardless of its 'real' lineage the kilt did, and continues to, symbolize a form of cultural resistance, further underlining Schutz's argument (1954) about social realities, that just because something is 'invented' this does not mean it is not a 'social reality' in the minds of actors. It is in this way culture serves to mediate individuals' experiences of reality as it necessitates a higher degree of reflexivity than the everyday. Nationalism can also be considered in this light (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002).

In a similar vein Cannadine has highlighted the relatively recent vintage of the British National Anthem,[24] claiming that it has not always been regarded as such a significant or revered piece of music. The age of the piece is underlined by the fact that it was not played at Victoria's Coronation (Cannadine, 1983). However, it has now become absorbed into other forms of Royal pageantry, and indeed is central to many public ceremonies, which seem to lend the song a longer lineage. Ulf Hedetoft also comments on singing as 'an important vehicle for nationalism, mainly because it orchestrates emotions connotatively and processually at once' (Hedetoft, 1995: 140). This point could be expanded to take in much of the pageantry surrounding British Royalty generally, and Cannadine has outlined the central role the British Monarchy have played in 'inventing' some of Britain's foremost

[24] For more on this see Scholes' *'God Save the Queen': The History and Romance of the World's First National Anthem* (1954).

traditions,[25] as does Billig (1990). The Monarch is frequently a key symbolic figure in definitions of national identity, and this is particularly true in the British context. Faulks believes the 'Monarch has remained a symbol of passive obedience, rather than active citizenship. It clearly signifies the dominance of England within the Union and ties British identity closely to English institutions such as the Church of England' (Faulks, 1998: 101).

Many writers have looked at how literature can be influential in shaping and maintaining a national identity. For example, Smyth (1997) looks specifically at the role Irish writers such as James Joyce and Roddy Doyle have had in renegotiating the Irish nation code and concludes that there exists a 'natural link between culture and nation – that is, that the kinds of artefacts and narratives produced by individuals and communities are related to the peculiar national system of social organization, political order and historical identity from which they have emerged' (Smyth, 1997:15). However, Smyth is looking at how people's lived social realities of the nation impact on their identity subsequently; for present purposes we are more concerned with how these identities come to be considered a 'reality' in the first instance. Clearly though literature does have a key role in maintaining the nation code as a stable construction, and Bhabha's edited collection on *Nation and Narration* (1990) looks at how certain literary genres have been central to the creation and reflection of many national identities. Literature is a significant way in which the concept of 'the nation' can be evoked.

Football, and indeed sport generally, have provided another way to persuade mass populations in modernity to associate with the idea of 'their' nation.[26] For example, Billig

[25] On this point it was interesting to see large sections (indeed all) of the British tabloid press imploring the 'nation' to mourn 'the nation's favourite grandmother' (for example see *The Daily Mirror*, 10.4.02, *The Daily Mail* 4.4.02, *The Daily Express*, 6.4.02) after the death of the Queen Mother in April 2002. The media coverage was stage-managed to a remarkable degree, with huge controversy emerging about a BBC newscaster wearing an inappropriately coloured tie. There was, due to the Queen Mother's age, a large amount of coverage bemoaning the perceived lack of respect for the Royal Family and their associated (yet 'invented') traditions. These points would seem to reinforces Billig's argument about the salience of the mass media in 'flagging the nation daily.'

[26] There is related question about the extent to which 'national traits' exist in sport generally. Writing specifically on major national football events, Winner (2001) has suggested that Holland's national football team have historically represented a number of quintessentially Dutch characteristics. In fact he goes as far as

(1995) writes about the key role football played in mobilizing mass national populations. Hobsbawm (1983b) has written about how the proletarianization and subsequent professionalization of the sport made it a suitable symbol for the mass publics that emerged under industrialized conditions. Many have suggested that sport in general or football in particular provide a sublimated form of warfare, or at least a way of expressing nationalist sentiment that is elsewhere considered problematic or suspicious. Wise (1998) suggests that this is the case in contemporary German culture.

Hedetoft claims that the popular image of the English policeman (herein referred to as 'the bobby') is the 'most perfect embodiment' of English civic culture (Hedetoft, 1995: 128-135). Hedetoft shows how media representations of 'the bobby' focus on his (always male) conformity to the rules and sense of fair play, which make him the ideal civil servant. This 'bobby' is an integral part of the community that he serves, symbolizing a 'deep convergence' between state and society.[27] Interestingly Hedetoft points out that the 'bobby' belongs to an internal, or domestic representation of the nation – a way of designating an 'us' to 'us' as opposed as a representation of 'us' to 'them' (Hedetoft, 195: 130). Of course, such internal representations of the nation are at least as vital as the external cultural expressions of nationhood; Chapter Three assesses how internal representations have been challenged in a globalized context.

Language is also central to the creation and the maintenance of any national identity (Billig, 1995; Wodak et al 1999). More than just offering a fundamental communication and a key similarity for populations language frequently takes on a political dimension. For example Castells (1997) suggests that for Catalan nationalists a key sign of solidarity is speaking, or even trying to speak, the language. In fact in this case *learning* the language is

---

to suggest that a number of the more creative Dutch players have gained a heightened spatial awareness due to the architectural plan of major Dutch cities. Although this claim would seem to be almost impossible to test empirically, we can say with some confidence that football has come to represent a significant expression of the nation in the context of mass culture.

[27] For an overview on how the relationship between the community and the police reflected British society in the 1980s see Lea and Young's chapter on 'The Drift to Military Policing' (1990).

even more important than speaking it, because it shows a willingness to affiliate oneself, by choice, to the Catalan nation (see Chapter Three). Blommaert also demonstrates how 'language issues may constitute an important battlefield of nationalist struggle' (Blommaert, 1996: 235) and shows how important spoken Flemish has been for the constructions on Flemish nationalism. It is clear that the state has often been active in the promotion of certain languages and the suppression of others, for example Lowland Scottish and Welsh languages were officially banned in British schools in the nineteenth century (Keirnan, 1993).

Interestingly Billig makes the distinction between 'waved and unwaved flags' (1995: 39-43) and suggests that some of the most potent symbols of the nation are 'unwaved.' Of course, actual flags are still vitally important for definitions of the nation though, retaining a powerful symbolic function. Firth suggests that flags provide a 'focus for sentiment about society' (Firth, 1977: 356).[28] The most effective 'flags' according to Billig are those that 'pass into the conscious awareness of its recipients' (Billig, 1995: 40). Such cultural symbols of the nation are frequently interconnected, both in terms of their symbolic meaning and their physical properties (where symbols have physical properties of course). For example I have already suggested in this chapter that flags, speeches and buildings have been used by states in the construction and subsequent reflection of nations in the modern period. These symbols provide a good example of the aforementioned interconnection between the cultural symbols of a nation code – flags often fly on the buildings in which speeches take place. The relative importance to the nation code of each symbol, for example architecture vis-à-vis flags, is certainly a question for further empirical enquiry. I would suggest that the relative lack of literature on architecture and national identity, as highlighted in the Introduction, is due to the fact that architecture has

[28] For more on the relationship between flags and the collective identities that they represent see Znamierowski (2000).

been relatively neglected by sociologists and not because the built environment has not been a significant 'space' for the constructing nations.

Conclusion

'Nations are made by human will.... The powerful and novel principle of 'one state, one culture' has profound roots' (Gellner, 1987: 8-9)

We can see from some of the examples above that culture can be an effective way of 'reading' a given society's history and the development of their national identity. As Giroux suggests it is the 'relationship between culture and nationalism always bears the traces of those historical, ethical, and political forces that constitute the often shifting and contradictory elements of national identity' (Giroux, 1995: 44). A nation or a national identity comes into existence through a widely held belief in a common cultural history, which can be articulated through wars, heroes, monuments and so on.

However, as much as a collective historical memory is at the heart of national identity, then so is a selective memory, an amnesia that allows certain aspects of a nation's history to be filtered out. Ulf Hedetoft goes so far as to suggest that 'national identities are just as dependent on historical oblivion and erasure, or better: on a highly *selective* memory, as they are on faithfully recreating 'real history'' (Hedetoft, 1995: 123 - emphasis in original). Of course, as Hedetoft intimates with use of apostrophes, this chapter has argued the extent to which a 'real history' exists at all is highly debatable, and in short this is the central contention of the constructivist perspective as was outlined above.[29] However, as some of these examples show this 'remembering' of the nation code can be via something abstract

[29] In this context it is perhaps worth briefly restating Anthony Smith's essentialist argument (1986, 1991, 1995), which is that although these cultural artefacts *were* created they do have historical precedent and they were reaching back to objectively existing traditions that already existed.

like a combination of colours, such as in a flag, or even personified in significant social actors or their roles. We can conclude that these ranges of 'symbols play an important role as vehicles of national discourse and national sentiment' (Hedetoft, 1995: 121). Culture was a key medium for both modernity and nationalism and although the discourse of the nation has very seldom been totally controlled by states, they have often been able to impose a 'strong' definition of the cultural identity of 'their' community. So, never able to impose a purely institutional definition of the nation, states have been instrumental in defining the cultural existence of 'their' communities. Some writers (particularly Elias, 1982; Gellner 1983, 1987, 1994; Anderson, 1983) have suggested that the state is a necessary condition for the formation and stabilization of the nation. We can see, from some of the examples here and in the following chapters, that the creation and maintenance of distinct national identities was a vital way in which the modern state legitimated itself. At the very least states transmit high culture via a universalized education system (Gellner, 1983; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). Most often high culture was the site where such definitions took place. It is suggested in the following chapter that architecture was a significant way in which the state attempted to codify the nation.

Chapter Two: Architecturing the Modern Nation

Introduction

Benedict Anderson (1995) suggests that without print culture (namely the novel and the newspaper) the nation would be unimaginable, and as was established in the previous chapter, it is via culture that states have historically found ways to codify and to create otherwise abstract national identities. From the constructivist perspective it is more than print culture alone that allows the formation of coherent national identities; the earlier examples of sport, dress, stamps, food, flags, narratives of history, museums, anthems, language, and ethnicity have all contributed to the creation of particularistic national identities in modernity. This chapter assesses why architecture has often proved an important cultural expression of national identities. It is in the context of this question that the argument outlined in the previous chapter becomes central: 'in the established nations, there is a continual 'flagging' or reminding of nationhood.... a continual background for political discourses, for cultural products.... daily, its [the nation's] symbols and assumptions are flagged' (Billig, 1995: 8-9). This chapter assesses if architecture has been an important and effective way of 'flagging', and also of actively constructing, the nation code.

As was also suggested in the previous chapter, the development of the nation-state was often accompanied by a strong desire for state representations of the nation. State-led projects that attempted to codify an existing, or create a new, national identity frequently used culture to embody the nation code. This usually meant modifying cultural universals to suit specific, or particular, national contexts. This chapter also addresses why states have historically used architects (and more precisely their architecture) to give a tangible

presence to the nation's identity. The development of nation-states necessitated the state giving a tangible form to an abstract 'cultural community' or nation, and architecture has had a key role in defining the nation code in the modern age. Very often this state representation claims to be the legitimate cultural expression or reflection of the nation. This chapter looks at why architecture has had a significant role in state-led attempts to define the nation.

Architecturing the Nation

'Public statements of collective identity take many forms and make use of many different kinds of symbols for support' (Vale, 1992: 47)

Foucault has claimed that with the emergence of the nation-state in the late eighteenth century, architecture became a highly politicised discourse, as it was drawn into the state project at this time (Foucault, 1985: 239). In many ways architecture is a discourse that is particularly open to national codifications, with the modification of universal styles leading to the development of particularistic, or national, styles. The role of architects in designing monumental, national buildings has been to impose, through such particularistic cultural references, a 'national style.' However architecture has often also represented universalistic expressions of civilization and has frequently transcended the particularism of national cultures. Without modification (or particularization) universal architectural styles such as Baroque, Classicism, Gothic or Modern do not distinguish one nation code sufficiently from any other and, as was argued in the previous chapter, in the era of nation-state building states wanted to encourage the development of distinctive architectural styles to codify 'their' nation.

In fact nowhere is the project of modernity, with all its ambivalence, more evident than in the case of architecture. In many respects the tensions so characteristic of modernity were given literal or, at the expense of a pun, a 'concrete' form by architectural projects and styles. For example the universalistic aspirations of European modernity found a built expression in modernist architecture that imposed form – in which aesthetics and functionality were to be combined - on the diverse contents of its civilization. Architecture has thus been the quintessentially universalistic expression of civilization, as significant architectural styles such as classical Greek or Romanesque, Renaissance, Gothic, Baroque, Rococo, and Modernist have all been universalistic in their self-understandings. Architects have historically created some of the most important expressions of European cultural civilization and have frequently attempted to transcend the particularism of national cultures to design symbols of universal progress, modernity or civilization. Although many of these styles reflected a national culture – for example there was a German, a British, and a French Gothic – the universality of architecture as an expression of European *civilization* was never in doubt. In other words 'though individual national cultures remain distinctive.... there are also broader European cultural patterns which transcend national cultural boundaries' (Smith, 1990: 187).

But, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, architecture *has* been the site of nation-building projects, expressing the particularism in modernity in a much more specific sense. As was suggested earlier, the development of the European nation-state was accompanied by a strong desire for state representations of the nation, with state-led projects that attempted to embody (or more accurately to construct) national identity often using architecture as a way of codifying the nation. This meant modifying universal architectural styles to specific, or particular, national contexts. The constructivist perspective on nation formation would suggest that it is agency that shapes structure; social actors are active and creative in terms of their relationship to culture. Architecture is a profession that has

historically had a considerable amount of influence in the 'creation' of cultures (Frampton, 1992), so a pertinent question becomes: how 'active' have architects been in creating the nation code? Gellner suggests that '[n]o culture is now without its national theatre, national museum, and national university' (Gellner, 1987: 17), and, he could have added, its own national architectural style.

As a result of this desire to create national styles, the history of architectural expressions of national identity is a long and compelling one. Although obviously not 'national' *per se*, both the Greeks and Romans built systematically on a huge scale, with oppressive, exclusionary buildings such as Hadrian's Wall (built circa AD 122-128) sending out a message of colonial might to would-be invaders and the colonized alike. Architecture was certainly a significant discourse in the pre nation-state era, with church and cathedral design one early example of how architecture has been used in history to define and symbolize collective identities. However, although the use of buildings by pre-modern political and religious organizations is a related question, this dissertation is concerned with how industrial capitalist states have attempted to 'architecture' nations. George Mosse contends that before the nineteenth century monumental buildings were erected to honour kings, military generals and other rulers, and it was only after this time that a cultural dimension was added to such structures. It was also in the nineteenth century that '[n]ational self-representation began to displace the less complicated and purely dynastic symbolism of an earlier age' (Mosse, 1994: 47).

Certainly from the beginning of the Victorian Age to the start of the First World War (1837-1914) Britain witnessed the building of a huge amount of buildings that *consciously* attempted to reflect state (read 'national') sentiments and aspirations. Resultantly architecture became drawn into the state project at this time, with many public buildings such as universities and museums emerged as monuments to the progressive and civilizational aspects of Victorian society. It can be suggested that often such architecture

reflected a self-assured, culturally secure, colonial nation that considered its own society as the clearest expression of 'civilization.' As it represents such a conscious attempt to use architecture in developing and reflecting a national identity, Victorian Britain is a good place to illustrate substantively some of these broader theoretical debates.[30]

Victorian Britain and the 'Battle of the Styles'

'In What Style Shall We Build?' (Sutton, 1999: 268)

Interestingly, although not unsurprisingly, there was an ongoing debate in British architectural circles in the nineteenth century about what constituted a 'suitable' style for landmark British buildings to be built in. Architectural styles such as Roman, Gothic, Greek and Baroque (which somewhat ironically had all originated as vernacular constructions) had taken on stylized qualities and had come to be read as cultural codes loaded with meaning, and it was this that gave the 'battle of the styles' an almost moral dimension. It is worth clarifying that these meanings were not necessarily derived from anything inherent in the aesthetic of the style; symbolic associations had developed often

[30] A central claim of this chapter is that landmark, state-led architecture reveals something of the political-cultural environment in which it was conceived, designed and built. Clearly then, and developing this idea, the route to nation-statehood would have a bearing not only on its ideas, aims and aspirations, but also on the landmark architecture it produces. The previous chapter addressed Brubaker's work on the difference between nation to state as opposed to state to nation pathways, and arguably other useful typologies can be introduced to qualify the broad term 'modern nation-state' employed in this thesis. As well as the broad concept of 'modern nation-state' (defined succinctly by Poggi (1978: 1) as 'a complex set of institutional arrangements for rule operating through the continuous and regulated activities of individuals acting as occupants of offices' an artificial, engineered institutional complex) there are many other typologies that exist for differentiating between states. For example, it is suggested in this chapter that Britain's self-perception as an empire to some extent shaped the state's architectural output in the Victorian era. By the same token, and later on in this chapter, I argue that post-colonial states, such as India, Papua New Guinea and Brazil, have used modern architecture as a way to reinvent and re-orientate their national stories. As well as this distinction between colonial/post-colonial nation-states, the relationship between architecture and nation-states founded on a (relatively) multi-ethnic principles such as the USA would, following this general line of argument, be different from buildings emerging from ethno-national states such as Germany.

over periods of many hundreds of years.[31] Jencks underlines this point when he contends that a 'curious property of the architectural sign is its potential for gathering up *cumulative meaning* over time' (Jencks, 1980b: 99). The questions for the nineteenth century state builders thus became one of finding a style to suit the aims and aspirations of the state, and high-profile Victorian architectural theorists and critics were at the time 'torn between various doctrines which they could not reconcile. The authority of historical precedent, the correct use of a national or local style in materials.... conflicted with the belief that history was a storehouse to be raided at random'[32] (Kidson et al, 1965: 272). Historicism within architecture amounts to giving historical styles precedent over contemporary or future-orientated designs, with the historicist discourse at the forefront of Victorian architectural debates. It was only really in the nineteenth century that knowledge of geographically or historically distant societies became available, and it was arguably the dissemination of this information about architectural styles that meant Victorian designers could discuss 'in which style to build'.

Of course Habermas (1987) contends that modernity, as well as containing many progressive, future-orientated aspects, also actively 'creates' the narrative of history. The paradox that modernity, a discourse legitimated with progressive references, should also construct a 'past' with which to break is well illustrated in the case of architecture. Historicism, the aforementioned preference for historical styles and motifs over contemporary or futuristic ones, has been a dominant discourse in architectural production in the modern period. Indeed, as well as the return to the past evident in designs such as Gothic and neo-classicism, many postmodern architects have used aspects of historicism in their designs, frequently juxtaposing such features with radically futuristic motifs (see for example Venturi et al (1979)). As well as having an impact on architectural aesthetics, the

[31] For more on meanings and symbolism associated with architectural styles see Chapter Seven.
[32] Ironically this eclectic approach to materials and the appropriation of 'suitable' historical styles was to be a defining characteristic of postmodern architecture well over 100 years later. For more on this see Chapter Four.

discourse of historicism also raises the broader question of the role of heritage in modernity. The selective preservation, or representation, of certain aspects of the built environment from the past means that, in keeping with the general line of argument in this dissertation, some parts of history are afforded a place in the collective memory while, politically less expedient aspects are forgotten.[33]

Aside from these debates, Victorian architects appear to have considered certain historicist styles suitable for certain types of buildings, although this distinction appears to have broken down towards the end of the nineteenth century. As a general rule Gothic designs were favoured for religious buildings with neo-classical styles considered more suitable for public buildings (Wilkinson, 2000). However, when Gothic *was* used on public, or any secular, buildings the moral dimension to the style was carried over, so the association to the architects and the nation-builders was a desirable one. The style of Gothic came to be understood, at least by leading British architects such as Barry and Pugin, and somewhat myopically, as a quintessentially British national style.[34] Indeed the famous British architect Pugin (1812-1852) regarded Gothic to be morally uplifting, again in no small part due to Gothic's historical origins in twelfth and thirteenth century cathedral design. For Pugin and many others like him, Gothic architecture reflected a civilizing process, providing an aesthetic expression of the epoch when barbarism and paganism had been 'defeated.' As such Gothic became viewed as a built testament to the age when the 'other' could be Westernized or Christianized and assimilated; it is clear that this fitted well with The Imperial Age and Victorian aims and objectives. This is an example of how modern nation-states attempted to reconcile the pursuit or development of a distinct

---

[33] This aspect of the heritage industry has been problematized by a number of authors, with some notable contributions including Fladmark's edited collection on *Heritage and Museums: Shaping National Identity* (2000), Graham et al's *A Geography of Heritage: Power Culture and Economy* (2000) and Uzzell's *Heritage Interpretation* (1989).

[34] It is important to note that although relatively distinctive national styles such as Perpendicular Gothic or German Romanticism did emerge in the nineteenth century they were based around 'classical' forms of architecture with origins in Graeco-Roman civilizations. The broad similarities between national styles at this time is understandable as nations were being legitimated with reference to the same 'civilizational' sources and traditions; in this chapter I argue that architecture was one reflection of these intentions.

national culture with the more cosmopolitan ideal of the universality of European 'civilization' which they would embody. The ethnocentricism in this conception of civilization reflects the universalistic self-understanding of Victorian Society in the Imperial Age.

The English nation-builders seemed to have felt a particular affiliation with Gothic, as was clearly evident in the design competition for the Houses of Parliament in 1834.[35] After a fire had destroyed the medieval Palace of Westminster, the competition to rebuild the damaged section of parliament specified a medieval Gothic style. Barry, up until that point working in a neo-classical style, and Pugin, a particularly vocal supporter of Gothic architecture and an expert in thirteenth and fourteenth century church design, won the design competition for the Houses of Parliament. They decided on the 'inherently' English style of Gothic to rebuild the parliament, an early development of what is now known as Perpendicular or High Victorian Gothic. This style of architecture is perhaps the first that can be called 'English' (it is revealing of the colonial mindset that 'English' identity frequently becomes equated with 'British' identity – see Chapter Five). The High Victorian Gothic was a more creative style of Gothic that finally emerged around about 1845-1850; it was roughly in this period that Italian, French and German Gothic influences merged to create this 'correct' English Gothic (Kidson et al, 1965: 273).

Here is a clear example of how modern nation-states attempted to reconcile the pursuit or development of a distinct national culture with the ideal of the universality of European 'civilization.' There is an almost dialectic relationship between universal architectural styles that are particularized to reflect a specific, non-universal identity. As universalized aesthetics do not allow for much individual expression then problems of distinction abound. It is clear that Gothic was a relatively 'universalized' architectural style until the development of High Victorian or Perpendicular Gothic. As suggested above, Gothic

[35] There are many other examples of state-led Gothic architecture. The building most comparable to The British Houses of Parliament is Thomas Fuller's Parliament Buildings in Ottawa (1859).

carried with it allusion to an epoch of European history when paganism had been defeated and traditions of prior classical civilizations had been built on. 'Gothic' had become somewhat of a catch-all category within architecture, suggesting as it did a universal style which had played a key role in reflecting the achievements of the 'civilised' European nations. Vitally for this dissertation though, what *did* vary from country to country were the associations Gothic had as a style. Sutton (1999) suggests that in Britain Gothic revivalism was a liturgical mission, whereas in Germany for example, the style was equated with Catholicism. Indeed the German critic August Reichensperger, a leading advocate of the style, saw Gothic as a symbol of hostility to Prussian Protestantism (Sutton, 1999: 279). French architects who claimed Gothic as an originally French national style emphasized, perhaps somewhat ironically to the eye of the contemporary critic, the 'rationality' and 'functionality' of the elaborate designs.

John Ruskin also viewed Gothic as a 'celebration' and implored designers to render the architecture of the day historical, to fill their buildings with references and symbolic meanings from the past. He was adamant that history was *the* most important legitimating value, as it was the site of social learning and a 'civilizing process,' and he even believed that no new architectural styles should be developed as existing historical styles were already sufficiently expressive (Ruskin, 1992). Ruskin also emphasized the relationship between history, the state and the nation, believing that architecture should be an explicit reflection of this. He suggested that the state should create and (subsequently find) its reflection in certain types of architecture, and especially in public buildings. This meant that 'successful' or 'good' architecture must be strongly rooted in collective memories and in tradition. So, for Ruskin architecture is central space whereby tensions between past, present and future are played out, making architecture *the* key symbol of the nation. For Ruskin architecture was the clearest representation of such collective understandings. Indeed Ruskin suggests that Gothic architecture has the potential to reflect 'all that need be

known of national feeling or achievement' (Ruskin, 1992: 272). Writing on Ruskin's interpretation of architecture, Hatton (1992) suggests that he viewed buildings and styles in a 'textual' way. In this respect Ruskin can realistically claim some degree of paternity of postmodern/deconstructive theories of interpretation, as Ruskin's contention was that meaning does not necessarily exist in external form, but rather in the reading and historical allusions made by the building or 'text'. This is how people come to appreciate architecture, when each subsequent generation can 'read' it; this would seem to imply a nostalgic, sentimental populism (much national architecture has been characterized by such parochial references). The aforementioned tension between universalism and particularism is also alluded to by Ruskin – who saw significant architecture as that which carries universal messages in culturally specific ways – so for example Gothic as a style has universal 'messages' but differing national interpretations. These 'messages' or values are 'older than history' (Semper, cited in Sutton, 1999: 290) and simply cannot be represented by something 'new.' Ernst Gellner (1983) also suggests that such recycling of the past is vital to nationalism, as it allows the masses to re-experience past glories and to relive former triumphs. It is in this 'recycling' we can again see a tension between universalism and particularism.

The Crystal Palace

'Architecture is stifled by custom' (Le Corbusier, 1923: 3)

From the example of Gothic we can see that the past has proved to be a powerful legitimating force for the aims and aspirations of state definitions of the nation. However, as Habermas (1989) suggests, a key element of modernity is to break with tradition as a source of legitimation for future social activities. It is this discontinuity that for Habermas

is another key tension inherent in the modern project - modernity *creates* traditions as well as destroying the past as a sole category of legitimation (see Chapter One). This explains why the notion of the avant-garde, defined as '*all the new schools* whose aesthetic programs were defined, by and large, by their rejection of the past and by the cult of the new' (Calinescu, 1995: 117 - emphasis in original), is so central to modernist forms of legitimation.

For its part architecture has been hugely significant in inventing traditions as modern and building national histories as continuous and unbroken unities, even when in a different view they are far from it. Historical references are inherently conservative and, in this respect, are anti-modern. In modernity a far clearer source of legitimation is to be found in the future, with utopian aspiration a central dynamic within the modern project. The next group of state-led architectural projects used a potentially Brave New World and progressive future as their justification. True to the spirit of modernity this future was to be ushered in by technological and industrial advance under the auspices of the expanding, modernizing state. The rupture between the High Victorian Gothic and modern architecture could hardly have been more pronounced, for modern architecture renounced ornamentation of any description, especially historical or culturally specific, ushering in a drive towards functional buildings with a universalized aesthetic. Consequently the pure form of aesthetic modernism was not an architectural discourse that could easily be used to codify a national identity.[36]

Coexistent with attempts to use historical references and past 'triumphs' as definitive of British identity, such as with Gothic, was a state-led project with modernization and industrialization as its themes; this discourse was ultimately to prove more significant than debates around the battle of the historical styles. The Great Exhibition of 1851 was undoubtedly one of the defining points of the nineteenth century. Far removed from the

[36] Many planners and architects did try to use a modified modern code though – some notable examples of this are explored later on in this chapter.

historicism of Gothic architecture the central architectural motif of The Exhibition - The Crystal Palace - came to be regarded not only as the definitive symbol of the exhibition, but also more broadly to represent, and to help create, a dynamic, progressive and forward-looking nation. As suggested above, the avant-garde offers the strongest challenge to history and antiquity as legitimation, so accordingly it was the avant-garde nature of the Exhibition, and more specifically of the Crystal Palace, that the Victorian State attempted to place itself as a powerful, advanced institution that was driving a rapidly industrializing society. As Roche (2000) points out, the international dimension of the exhibition should not be overlooked: the official title was 'The Great Exhibition of the Works of Industry of All Nations,' although this was arguably so that the industrial achievements of other nations could be compared unfavourably against the British, at the time the world's strongest industrial power. The Exhibition was certainly supposed to reflect positively on the British nation in terms of culture and industry.

Generally speaking World Fairs and Expositions introduced utopian visions of the future and frequently this linear progress was to be driven by science and industry. Chapter One argued that the intellectualization of culture was a key factor in the formation of the nation-state, often providing the central focus for such state-led events. This intellectualization of culture was also linked to modernity's reliance on intellectuals and knowledge as progressive and emancipatory discourses with utopian potential. Habermas (1989b) argues that the emergence of a public sphere is one of the characteristic developments in modernity. One reading of such exhibitions is that they allow a public culture to form, allowing mass participation in civil society. As with participation in the political public sphere though, involvement in such exhibitions and fairs was not equal across society but the populist nature of the events did guarantee mass participation. Maurice Roche argues that this mobilization was primarily because states and elites 'need[ed] to win the 'hearts and minds' of the newly enfranchised working-class citizens for projects of economic

growth and nation-building' (Roche, 2000: 34). Roche suggests that what he terms 'megaevents' – such as The Olympics and World Fairs – reflect a 'performance complex' inherent in modernity and in which national and international events aimed at involving participation by mass publics. Gellner (1983, 1994) has also shown how national identity aims to, and indeed is dependent on, the incorporation of mass publics into the state via these 'discourses of belonging.'

Considered within these frameworks the Crystal Palace can be seen as an example of monumental, state-led architecture. It is perhaps significant that the building has come to be remembered more than the contents of the Great Exhibition that it enclosed. The winning competition entry was by Joseph Paxton, who designed a pre-fabricated and ultimately revolutionary structure to house the exhibition of science, industry and art. As modernization was such a key idea for the exhibition generally, Paxton's structure was the perfect architectural symbol of these broader state aims, as it utilized the most modern available architectural techniques and building materials. Paxton, originally not an architect *per se* but a greenhouse designer, was at the forefront of the design of functional buildings of glass and iron in the nineteenth century. Other comparable projects of note are London's railway sheds such as King's Cross (1851), Paddington (1852) and St. Pancras (1868).

Indeed, from the point of view of architectural history, it is significant that Paxton merged engineering and architecture, as previously these two professions had been fragmented due to processes associated with industrialization, with architecture associated with art and craft and engineering perceived as the foremost expression of the machine age. As the more functional railways sheds, docks, warehouses and factories that emerged with, and were vital to, the industrial revolution then so the technologically advanced Crystal Palace showcased huge advances in engineering technologies. This engineering-based building was arguably the perfect symbol of mid-nineteenth-century Britain, a rapidly industrializing capitalist nation-state.

It is also worth remembering that the use of iron and glass on buildings of this sort was still relatively new in the mid-nineteenth, as it was only advances in machine technology that allowed the panels of glass to be cut so accurately as to allow repetition of a pattern – a central feature of the Crystal Palace. Perhaps never before had a building made such a virtue from its 'newness,'[37] and architecturally this building was hugely significant. For the first time in a building of this size the volume contained by the building was significantly greater than its mass. The airy effect in the Crystal Palace was accentuated as the iron on the building was painted light-blue, making it almost indistinguishable from the sky and also the glass. This light, glassy 'modernism' was to characterize much of the Bahaus School's aesthetically modern architecture in the twentieth century.

Prince Albert, Victoria's consort, was Honorary President and staunch supporter of the Great Exhibition project, which he suggested should have 'exhibition, competition and encouragement' as its central aims. Accordingly the Crystal Palace mainly housed exhibits that celebrated industry and scientific advance.[38] However, Stern also suggests that this building is significant not only as a vast shelter for such educational and industrial objects but rather as 'an internalization of public life on an unprecedented scale,' as 'it was the first building realized on the scale of mass democracy' (Stern, 1994: 52). In contrast to this William Morris (1834-96), an influential reformer and a staunch supporter of historical reference in architecture, saw the exhibition and the Crystal Palace as a celebration of bad design ethos, the triumph of machine production over craft. Predictably Ruskin was also very critical of this modern, industrial architecture and also suggested it represented all that was negative about design, in particular the triumph of mass production over arts and crafts.

---

[37] Robert Stern suggests that although the Crystal Palace was a radically modernizing statement it also represents the inherited historical ideals updated, and as such can be considered as a 'grand Roman public building of the imperial era translated into glass, metal, and wood' (Stern, 1994: 51-2).

[38] Greenhalgh reminds us that 'many of the exhibits were self-consciously showy.... [b]eginning a trend whereby the international exhibition would aim to present produce in the most overblown proportions possible' (Greenhalgh, 1988: 12).

The Great Exhibition and the Crystal Palace did have very strong state backing though. For example the prominent cultural reformer Henry Cole, and Prince Albert[39] were two high-profile patrons. The future Prime Minister William Gladstone was another member of the Exhibition's commission. Of course there were also dissenters; a suitably cynical Disraeli remarked that 'this Exhibition will be a boon to the Government, for it will make the public forget its misdeeds'; although he also acknowledged that 'in a progressive country change is constant' (Gladstone, cited in Pearce and Stewart, 1992: 11). For present purposes it is the modernizing tendency celebrated by the Exhibition and the role the Crystal Palace played in symbolizing this dynamic that we are concerned with, although it would be a mistake to overlook the continuity with traditional values altogether (Stern, 1994). Other related focuses could well be on the Exhibition as an imperialist project, or as a legitimization of capitalist ideology and a cultural reflection of the industrial revolution, or as a celebration of secular bourgeois values. Greenhalgh offers an interesting reading of the Great Exhibition, which he views as 'a giant counter-revolutionary measure' arguing that 'from its earliest days it was conceived of as an event to foster fear as well as pride in the minds of the British public, an immense show of strength designed to intimidate potential insurrectionists' (Greenhalgh, 1988: 30). For this chapter the important aspect is how far key aspects of modernity such as modernism, industrialism and science were reflected in the state's landmark buildings.

Another comparable example of a state-sponsored iron structure was the Palais des Machines, built to house the World Fair in Paris in 1889 to celebrate the centennial of the Revolution. As with the Crystal Palace, the transparent glass shell accentuated the already

[39] Prince Albert's support for the project was a hugely populist statement from a monarch at the time, and won Albert a great deal of support from the general public. In fact the Albert Memorial (designed by George Gilbert Scott) contains numerous references to the Great Exhibition of 1851. It is perhaps somewhat ironic that such a staunch supporter of a modernizing project should be remembered with a Gothic monument. In fact Wilkinson affirms that if 'Gothic was the style of English patriotism, this is its most intense expression' (Wilkinson, 2000:144). That the monument was of Gothic design illustrates the earlier points on national association; accordingly this memorial can be contrasted with other European monuments, such as Chalgrin's classical Arc de Triomphe in Paris (1806), or the Neoclassical Victor Emmanuel Monument in Rome (started 1885, completed 1911) by Sacconi.

huge interior, with the construction of both buildings made possible by technological advances in the production of steel and glass and by the application of new scientific/mathematical knowledge to design and construction. It was a combination of these dynamics that ushered in the 'machine age' of modern architecture over the following hundred years. The other, more famous, architectural symbol of the Paris World Fair of 1889 was the Eiffel Tower, designed by Gustav Eiffel. This was another example of highly modernized girder construction, albeit on a less 'functional' but still iconic building. The tower has a huge symbolic value for Parisian and French identity,[40] and provides another example of the radically modernized processes of design and construction that, when applied to state-led architecture,[41] reflects certain progressive aims of the nation-state. In common with Paxton's girder construction, the Eiffel Tower is a showcase for the functional construction techniques at the centre of the dynamic nature of architectural modernism.

The Eiffel Tower also provides an illustration of some of the tensions and ambiguities around utilizing a radically modern code of architecture as a national symbol. When it was first built there was certainly nothing specifically 'French' or 'Parisian' about the tower, save for its location. Such advance girder constructions are a good example of the territorially unspecific, universalized design logic of such avant-garde modernism. Of course, this is not to say that it cannot become an instantly recognizable symbol of the French nation, as the landmark quality of this design is not in dispute. Very often even universalized, seemingly 'placeless' architectural statements can become associated with a place just by virtue of being built there. Building landmark architecture in a distinct

[40] Braunfels suggests that historically 'France more than any other country regarded its capital as a monument to its greatness, to the state, and to the level of its culture' (Braunfels 1988:309). For more on the contemporary relationship between Parisian and French identity see Chapter Five. This also raises interesting questions about how far some capital cities can be viewed as reflections of the nation – for a historical perspective on European architectural reflections of this see Braunfels (1998) while Lawrence J. Vale (1999) offers some interesting, contemporary examples in a postcolonial context.

[41] It is also worth noting that the Eiffel Tower, although a centrepiece for the 1889 Expo and thus 'state-led' to some degree, was in fact a private commission that proved to be financially very profitable for Gustav Eiffel.

national style is but one way to 'root' a building into a nation code; another technique is to build it at all (this approach is evident in the design of Bilbao's Guggenheim Museum, assessed later on in the dissertation).

Sigfried Giedion, one of the most influential modernist architects, suggested that new building materials such as iron and glass were responsible for the most important architectural advances of the nineteenth century, as they had come to form a new kind of 'subconscious' in architectural design. In true modernist fashion Giedion saw advances in functional construction techniques as the driving force behind architectural modernism: 'what remains unfaded of the architecture of the last century is those rare instances when construction breaks through. Construction based entirely on provisional purposes, service and change is the only part of building that shows an unerringly consistent development' (Giedion, cited in Heynen, 1999: 30). Giedion's writings on the Eiffel Tower show something of his preoccupation with advanced, construction-driven girder designs; he was captivated by the experiences that he saw as at the heart of these new modernist buildings. When writing about the 'rotating space' created by climbing the 'air-flooded stairs' (read the blurring of interior/exterior) Giedion is clearly fascinated by the new spatial experiences offered by the Eiffel Tower, and by extension other such girder constructions, which 'confront the basic aesthetic experience of today's building: through the delicate iron net suspended in mid-air stream things.... [t]hey lose their delimited form: as one descends, they circle into each other and intermingle simultaneously' (Giedion, cited in Heynen, 1999: 30).

Aesthetic Modernism

'The phenomenon of universalization, while being an advancement of mankind [sic], at the same time constitutes a sort of subtle destruction, not only of traditional cultures, which might not be an irreparable wrong, but also what I shall call for the time being the creative cultures, that nucleus on the basis of which we interpret life' (Ricoeur, 1965: 267-7).

Modernization can be considered the generally progressive tendencies central to the dynamic, linear aspect of the discourse of modernity. The next section addresses some of the 'concrete' forms which state-led modernist architectural projects have taken, assessing the potential of such designs to embody and to simultaneously modernize the nation code. Although definitions of architectural modernism are not central for this dissertation it is important to outline why it signalled a break or a rupture with what went before. Although the many strands of architectural modernism exist the underlying essence that gives them a degree of coherence is that they are all orientated to the future; these were designs driven by a forward-looking, radicalised, frequently utopian ideology, which saw architecture as at the centre of a new culture. This is obviously in great contrast to the Gothic and neo-classical revival in Victorian Britain, which was a celebration of the values and triumphs of the past. In general modernist architects felt themselves to be meeting a new challenge: producing a universalised design solution for a new epoch of history. A cursory overview of some of the central statements of modern architecture is necessary to allow us to situate debates about the nation and architecture within their broader context.

In many ways the most coherent statement of modernist design principle is the dictum *form follows function.*[42] This phrase was first coined by American architect Louis Sullivan

[42] It is certainly worth attempting to deconstruct the notion of 'function', as the dictum *form follows function* obscures the claim that 'function is something that precedes form, that it exists independently of form, that it

in an article in which he also suggested that architectural design was the result of a 'natural' law:

> Whether it be the sweeping eagle in flight or the open apple blossom, the toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun form ever follows function, and this is the law.... shall we, then, daily violate this law in our art? Are we so decadent, so imbecile, so utterly weak of eyesight that we cannot perceive this truth so simple, so very simple' (Sullivan, cited in Michl, 2000: 1)

Although in danger of being lost in a barrage of imagery, the key point Sullivan makes is that nothing in architecture should exist for the sake of ornamentation alone, and that everything should have a 'function' in terms of the overall working of the building's structure. I agree with Hilde Heynen (1999) who sees this tendency towards asceticism as key in the struggle for the new modernist architectural design. The underpinning idea here is that designers could capture the very essence of a building by removing and rejecting anything in the design that was superfluous; such authentic, dispassionate, 'pure' architecture was perceived as the fundamental cultural foundation for a new society. The quest for truth in design is privileged over the lower, more base concerns of representation and outward appearance, as 'correct measures are those that conform to our requirements, that fulfil these needs without any pretensions, that do not claim to be more than they are. Correct measures are those that result in a minimum of ostentation. The struggle for modern architecture then is a struggle against pretentiousness, against every excess' (Stam, cited in Heynen, 1999: 47-8). This notion is clearly in opposition to the earlier, ostentatious statements of historically loaded, culturally specific styles such as Gothic or neo-Classical

---

is there before form emerges' (Michl 2000, at www.geocities.com/athens/2360/jm-eng). Can we really consider something called a 'function' that exists prior to form? Using such a concept of function is to reify the concept, but the functionalist dictum, at the heart of the modernist design project, sees function as predating form. Sullivan even went so far as to claim his dictum was an all-pervasive and natural law. Is, then, function to be considered the same as an object's end-use? It is clear (due to half a century's sustained criticism of functionalist perspectives) that just because defining something's function in an unambiguous manner proves to be impossible this does not necessarily equate to metaphysical importance or a fundamental link to a higher order.

architecture. We can see a problem emerging for the nation builders: *with no ornamentation or historical references how is it possible to impose a national style of architecture?*

Central to the modernist notion of function is the concept of an objective aesthetic, meaning that architecture could be functionally and aesthetically 'perfect.' This purity of form was achieved by the 'correct' design of a building that solved a particular problem. The architectural solution should emerge through neither the aesthetic preference of designers nor of users. It is therefore reasonable to think some will (dis)like the emergent structure, although aesthetic preference simply ceases to be a consideration under pure modernism). This functionalist architecture was to be designed for an ideal-type, universal user and as such attempted to overcome the antinomies of cultural and social difference, while at the same time removing the potential within architecture to *create* or *reflect* cultural or social (i.e. national) differences.

So, functional, modernist architecture was never designed to appeal to taste, but rather to uncover a universal 'truth.' The result of these functionalist projects is to create a shared aesthetic across time and space, and architecture should be understood in terms of its inherent essence, which must conform to a clearly defined prior function. This means that '[b]eauty exists when people succeed in giving this essence as accurate a form as possible, without any 'excess' or anything that is extraneous or superfluous' (Heynen, 1999: 48). Such a retreat from the demands of users, or more broadly the market, saw functionalist architects reasserting a degree of artistic autonomy hitherto unknown (Michl, 2000). Architects had begun to perceive themselves as artists, emancipated from the demands of satisfying the conventional tastes of a 'public'; instead the claim was being made for architecture for its own sake. As a result of this shift, the roles of the user, as well as that of the client, became increasingly tenuous; if users did not like functional forms it was because they could not understand the 'truth' or inherent essence of the architecture.

Aesthetics were the result of forms necessarily following functions, therefore architects saw themselves not as *choosing* particular forms, but rather as the mediators of modernism (Michl, 2000). Ludwig Mies van der Rohe (1886-1969) was in many ways the best representative of the modernist architect. A very influential theorist, Van der Rohe was Director of Bahaus between 1930-33 and accordingly based his design on the aforementioned advanced structural techniques.[43] Indeed it was Van der Rohe who coined the famous dictum 'less is more.' His attempt to create stark and monumental architecture is a clear example of the development of universal, structurally simplified architecture associated with modernism.

Adolf Loos was another modernist architect whose project centred on the enlightenment ideals of reason and progress. His architectural method entailed designs based on objectified scientific knowledge and Loos strongly believed that anything in the built environment that could not be legitimated by reason was, by definition, superfluous and should be excluded. Loos was a forceful opponent of decoration and ornamentation in building, suggesting that the very negation or repression of decoration is necessary for the regulation of social disorder more generally. Indeed Loos even went so far as to claim that culture can be seen as a result of the renunciation of passions, suggesting that which brings us to revoke ornamentation brings with it a pseudo-spiritual power. It was for this reason Loos saw mass-produced ornamentation for general consumption as a trashy and culturally low form.[44] Loos believed that as cultures 'evolved' ornamentation was progressively phased out of architecture, with good taste becoming synonymous with a lack of ostentation and ornamentation. Loos argued that given the disruption of the relationship

[43] For more on the Bahaus see, for example, Heynen (1999).

[44] Loos believed that architecture had no part to play in reflecting the idiosyncrasitiy or preferences of the occupant. For him, architecture's clearly defined task should be to *facilitate* dwelling; dwelling is linked to the private - the acting out of personal histories, preferences for furniture and decoration are ways in which the individual occupant comes to dwell. This notion of 'dwelling', similar to Heidegger's, is due to the fact that Loos saw individuals in industrial society as rootless since they don't truly have a culture. This has echoes in the social theory of Tonnies and his notion of *gemeinschaft* and *gesellschaft*. Following on from this there are also comparisons that can be made with Durkheim's work on modernity, integration and anomie - Loos was certainly not the only fin de siecle theorist who feared disorder.

between the individual and culture the only way for culture to progress is by demonstrating a reflexive awareness of this disruption. This meant accepting that the relationship between interior feelings and external form can never again display the unity it once did, again making a strong distinction between inner and outer. Loos viewed the most cultured contemporary individuals as people who could comport themselves appropriately in almost any given situation (see Part Two). Loos' architecture reflects these modern principles aesthetically, as it is tends towards strictly geometric exteriors and proportions.

The First World War and its associated social experiences proved to be pivotal for the development of modernism in architecture. The destruction engendered by the military technology in the war seems to have convinced most of the need to rein in technology and scientific developments, which since the enlightenment had been viewed as progressive and modernizing. The post-war period had offered a clean slate, an opportunity to develop a 'new' culture that would guide the process of modernization in a more democratic and socially useful direction. The stimuli for the organization of this new culture was the increased pace of life coupled with a break with traditional values and the celebration and embrace of the new. Increasing social mobility, the democratization of leisure time, and revolutions in transport were all to be key factors in this social transformation. As a part of a wider utopian project these architectural processes were seen by many architects to be leading in a linear way to the emancipation of the individual and the advent of social justice. As was outlined in Chapter One the state was to be the key modernizing institution, capable of providing an administrative expression of equality and democracy.

The ubiquitous International Style of architecture was a popular post-World War II style, synonymous with the post-war reconstruction of the capitalist world economy, which came to symbolize not only progress and modernization but also American cultural hegemony (Larson, 1993: 67). Inherently linked to this hegemony was the accusation that architecture in the International Style ignored, indeed often destroyed, context and place. The

International Style was introduced to America in the early 1930s, with the style in many ways the culmination of the modernist movement in architecture. The relatively optimistic post-war American society was the perfect setting for the style, but what were the architectural specifics of the movement? The ideas of the 'modernist orthodoxy' (Larson, 1993: 55) were that architects should design simple programs involving the separation of space and the relation of intersecting horizontal and vertical lines, and these aims are perfectly well articulated in the isolated, free-standing buildings of the International Style. However, the key aspect of the International Style for this dissertation is the exclusion of symbolism. According to the movement, the architect should ultimately aspire to heroic, utopian visions that recommend the application of the most innovative technologies. The expansion and stability of the international capitalist system after World War Two seemed to have underpinned and strengthened belief in rationality, linear progress and the quest for absolutes. The buildings of the International Style reflected these beliefs as their imagery can be related not to other buildings, but rather to the machine age and the desire for a technocratic utopia (Larson, 1993).

Larson considers that the 'modernist conceptions of space and plan were self-consciously founded on a constructional fact: the structural cage of steel or ferroconcrete has eliminated the wall's function of providing support' (Larson, 1993: 42). It is this use of what Frampton refers to as optimized technology that allowed walls, which had up to that time needed strong supports, to be reduced to a tremendously thin layer. The most obvious example of this tendency are the glass membranes on 'sky-scrapers.' The progress facilitated by these advances in technology led Hitchcock and Johnson[45] to conclude that 'the prime architectural symbol is no longer the dense brick but the open box.... the great majority of buildings are in reality, as well as in effect, mere planes surrounding a volume' (Hitchcock and Johnson, cited in Larson, 1993: 42). It is also very revealing that the

[45] It was Henry Russell Hitchcock and Philip Johnson who introduced the term International Style to America in a 1932 exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art after studying the new German inter-war architecture.

International Style also came to be recognized as 'corporate' architecture. This was not only because of the intended functions of the buildings, but also as architects received many commissions from corporations (often multinationals) in this effective, rational style. Nan Ellin wryly suggests that far from following the modernist dictum that 'form follows function' the International Style was guided by the assertion that 'form followed funding' (Ellin, 1996: 188). What certainly is clear is that the modern movement in architecture, and its clearest statement - the International Style - were what Weber would have termed 'ideal types', buildings designed for everyone to solve abstract and universal problems. The aim was to provide architectural 'solutions' that can be applied anywhere, regardless of particular cultural context.

Modernism and the Nation-State

'Architects aspired toward the architectural object, a building which stands alone and does not refer to its particular setting either physically or socially' (Ellin, 1996:188).

In Chapter One of the dissertation I argued that in modernity states used different cultural 'tools' to construct and maintain 'their' nation code. From some of the previous examples we can see that architecture was employed by the British Victorian State as a cultural device to this end. In the case of modern architecture however, there is clearly a tension inherent when states attempt to present such an international or universal image of the nation. In its purest form the modernist code of architecture[46] is, by definition, a deterritorialized, culturally unspecific style that excludes symbolic references. However,

[46] For a more thorough definition of modern architecture see Ghirado (1996), Heynen (1999), or Frampton (1992).

somewhat ironically, this did not stop many states attempting to modify the modern code when attempting to construct a progressive, forward-looking architectural symbol of the nation. It is also clear though that states must be wary when attempting to graft new elements onto the existing nation code as 'the new traditions must evoke a popular response if they are to survive, and that means hewing close to vernacular motifs and styles' (Smith, 1990: 178). What problems emerged when states used the modern code of architecture that is, by definition, bereft of the 'vernacular motifs and styles' that Anthony Smith considers so central to successful nation 'creation'? How did some states attempt to represent this forward-looking and progressive style as part of an unbroken narrative of the nation?

The Festival of Britain in 1951 is one example of a state-led definition of the nation that relied heavily on the medium of modern architecture. As with other state-led British celebrations of the nation this was held in London,[47] on the South Bank of the River Thames. Herbert Morrison, the then Deputy Prime Minister of the Labour Party, believed that the purpose of the festival should be to illustrate Britain's contribution to 'civilization, past, present and future,' in architecture, science, arts, industry and technology. From this perspective it would appear that the aims and objectives of the 1951 Festival of Britain were broadly similar to those of the Great Exhibition in 1851; a celebration of free trade and industrial strength and a pride in national cultural achievement. However, as Frampton points out, post-war Britain had little financial power, the budget for the Festival was £12 million, nor really the cultural assurance to legitimately claim any sort of monumentalist expression (Frampton, 1992). Many things had changed since 1851; an empire was in decline, industrial supremacy had been challenged, and even food rationing had continued after the war. This less self-assured Britain post World-War Two is perhaps reflected in the

[47] This raises interesting questions, which are perhaps even more pertinent today than they were in 1951, about tensions between the nation-state and the city. London-centric conceptions of the British nation still abound today, and it could be suggested that this perhaps one of the central reasons why the nation is such a contested category, as this does not adequately represent the diversity of England, let alone Britain. For more on this see Chapter Five.

lack of monumental state-led architecture of this period. A key factor guiding the ethos of the post-war festival was that the general public were more cynical about the ability of free trade, industrialization and science to provide equality and unhindered progress. The general cultural content of the Festival also reflected changing patterns of leisure, as there was undeniably a less educational tone to this festival than there was at the event one hundred years previous. The 1951 festival was orientated much more toward consumption than was its predecessor, with goods taking the place of the more 'educational' artefacts that were displayed in 1851.

I would like to argue that growing insecurity about cultural expression is reflected in the origins of the project and subsequently the architecture it produced. The Royal Society of Arts suggested a 'Festival for Britain' in 1943, with the spirit of renewal and optimism it was intended to engender clearly articulated in a 1946 exhibition called 'Britain Can Make It', appropriately held at the Victoria & Albert Museum. Indeed, the media at the time frequently described the Festival of Britain as a 'tonic to the nation.' It is an interesting point of comparison that here architecture, and indeed the festival generally, were seen as *part of* the regeneration process, whereas for the Victorians their exhibition architecture served a different function, as it was a *reflection of*, rather than a *catalyst for* social success (also see Chapter Five).

As part of the 1951 festival a group of new buildings demonstrating radical, avant-garde design principles were erected as a celebration of, or more accurately an encouragement to, Britain's post-war culture. The majority of buildings commissioned for the festival were temporary, and this perhaps explains the challenging nature of both Tubb's Dome of Discovery and Powell and Moya's Skylon. Although both these temporary buildings can also be seen to celebrate the potential of technology, the central, permanent architectural symbol of the Festival of Britain was the Royal Festival Hall (designed by London City Council architects). As outlined above, modern architecture had ushered in an era in which

historical ornament or decoration was to be outlawed, with purity of the form to be embraced. The modernist dictum that form should follow function had led to historical reference being renounced and the celebration of a more universalized aesthetic driven solely by function. Aesthetic modernism, with a lack of historical ornament, decoration, or reference points, is not really a discourse that lends itself to being codified around a national identity. Modernism is ultimately an architectural universal, with strong tendencies towards deterritorialized, culturally unspecific buildings. As a result the discourse of modern architecture was not one that could be easily codified around a nation code, so in this sense any 'national' architecture is in the strictest sense of the term 'anti-modern.'

The Festival Hall was the British state's first official use of modern architecture (see Photo 1, Appendix). In keeping with the wider project of post-war reconstruction, the Festival Hall offered the public a glimpse of a new urban fabric. The subtext here was that architectural modernism was a central, progressive aspect of the new culture. However, as was suggested above, modern architecture is not a national discourse, so it was only by making modifications that state-sponsored architects could develop a distinctly British style for landmark buildings such as the Festival Hall. In some respects this quest for distinction was successful. The concrete on the building, shaped in wooden moulds, weathered in such a way to give the exposed, roughened concrete a drab, grey appearance (see Photo 2, Appendix). This geometrically inspired, visually harsh style quickly became labelled 'Brutalism' and was a 'uniquely British style that received widespread condemnation' (Wilkinson, 2000: 178).[48]

As was suggested at the start of this chapter many other national styles also emerged through a particularization of the inherently universalizing modernist discourse. The most famous Finnish architect Alvar Aalto (1898-1976) was at the forefront of developing a Scandinavian interpretation of modernism featuring timber, a traditional building material

[48] This style of 'Brutalism' became synonymous not only with British architecture of the period in general, but also more specifically with failed modernist housing projects, most notably 'high-rise flats.'

there (for example this style is particularly evident in Aalto's Finnish Pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exhibition). Many other architects also attempted to modify the universalism inherent in modernism to a national context. The Russian state post-1917 certainly rejected the past as a source of legitimation, with their future-orientated social programme finding a built expression through architecture. A distinctly 'Russian Modernism' duly emerged, with huge numbers of state-led cultural centres, factories and apartment blocks built in functional concrete designs. Examples of this type of architecture can be seen in Melnikov's Rusakov Club (1927) and Grigory Barkhin's Izvestiya Building (1920), both in Moscow.

Vale (1992) demonstrates how postcolonial states have also attempted to use a modified modernist style of architecture as part of an active recasting of the nation code. Chandigah and Brasília are good examples of this trend because, as was the case with post-war Britain, these states self-consciously attempted to 'rationalize' and 'modernize' a nation code that had previously been legitimated by tradition. Many of the landmark buildings in Brasília signify the state's intent to symbolize social progress in the culture sphere: '[t]his quality of being new and modern remains at the heart of Brasília's symbolism, more than the design of any particular building' (Vale, 1992: 125). A significant point in this case is that this architecture represents a *symbolic break* with Brazil's colonially defined past and offers hope for the future. Vale (1992) points out, that for the architects involved at least, this modernist project also signified an anti-capitalist stance, as in Brazil colonialism was closely associated with capitalism. Resultantly, the 'international' code of modern architecture, elsewhere seen as the expression of architecture as subservient to the economy and detached from national context, was considered not only anti-capitalist but also 'Brazilian', if for no deeper reason than 'it is in Brazil, was designed and built for Brazilians, [and was] named for Brazil.... Nationalism is in the act as well as the forms'[49]

[49] For the development of this idea see Chapter Seven.

(Vale, 1992: 126). Developing this point, it is also the first time that the 'social agenda of modernism [was] applied to the national capital of a major country' (Vale, 1992: 105).

Geertz has also written about how architects designing landmark buildings for non-western states are often torn between two idioms, traditional (vernacular) and progressive ('Western'): 'it is a search for an identity, and a demand that the identity be publicly acknowledged as having import.... the other aim is practical: it is a demand for progress, for a rising standard of living, more effective political order, greater social justice' (Geertz, cited in Vale, 1992: 53). This was certainly the case with the design of Chandigah, which was to be a symbol of an independent India. Although Chandigah is only a provincial Indian capital, it is also a significant attempt to use modern architecture to renegotiate a national identity in a postcolonial context. Mayer, the architect initially charged with the design of the capital, was under no illusions about his task, stating: 'We are seeking symbols to restore or to create pride and confidence in [the Indian] himself [sic] and his [sic] country' (Mayer, cited in Vale, 1992: 107). When Le Corbusier, arguably the most famous modernist architect, took over from Mayer after 1950 he continued with his programme of radical modernist design. The utopian, progressive tendencies in Le Courbusier's scheme are clearly apparent in his functional, geometrically pure buildings. In keeping with the central contention of this chapter I would argue that, as was also the case with Brasília, the modernist rebuilding of Chandigah represented the concrete realization of the state's more abstract social agenda of modernization.

Conclusion

'The history of architecture obviously is a catalogue of changing styles and at any moment in time architects are subject to a set of social pressures which force them to design in certain acceptable ways' (Bonta, 1979: 7).

Although these examples addressed in this chapter vary widely terms of time and space, and therefore political contexts, they do show us something about how supposedly 'universalized' codes of architecture can convey very different meanings in particular national contexts. This idea is explored more fully in Part Three, so for present purposes it is enough to demonstrate that architecture has often been used in a very deliberate way by states to modify an existing nation code or, perhaps more commonly, to support existing understandings of the nation. The examples used in this chapter show how codes of architecture have been utilized by states in differing ways depending on the message that a particular government wants to convey. As Vale has suggested 'nationalism that supported the drive for independence in the name of freedom and self-determination is not the same as the nationalism needed after the revolution to define the self that has been freed' (Vale, 1992: 45). Changes in the profile and style of state-led architecture that mirror such political changes would certainly offer support for this claim.

It is an irony that the modernist architects working on buildings such as The Royal Festival Hall and the buildings in Chandigah, Brasília, and Finland were designing what they considered 'morally correct' buildings, echoing the debates around Gothic style a century earlier. Indeed, as stated above, and *contra* Ruskin, since World War Two a forward-looking, modernist avant-garde architecture has frequently been used to represent the aims and sentiments of the state project. Certainly in the British case at least, there is continuity of modernist architecture, a thread that runs through the Great Exhibition, The Festival of Britain and the Millennium Dome (see Chapter Five for more on this topic): progressive ideals, versions of aesthetic modernism, modernization, and celebrations of industrialization and national culture have all been dominant discourses within this tradition of British state-led architecture. It is in this context that many of the abstract tendencies that gave the project of modernity its dynamic nature find an architectural

expression that serves as a reminder of these aims. The architecture of these exhibitions, as well as many other state–led projects, has become central to symbolizing and reflecting the aims of the state in a monumental, tangible way.

Chapter Three: Globalization and National Identity

Introduction

Chapter One charted the historical rise of the nation and state-led national identities by situating their development as major social transformations within modernity. This chapter assesses the contemporary role of the nation-state, the foremost institutional expression of modernity, by situating it within contemporary 'globalized' conditions of action. This allows a clear overview of both the changing role of the nation-state and also the state's ambiguous relationship with 'new' expressions of national identity. The focus of Part One was on particular historical attempts by the state to codify the nation. Part Two, comprising of this chapter and the next, focuses on the contemporary potential of the state to define the nation, developing a framework for the assessment of specific examples of state-led landmark architecture in Part Three. The previous chapter illustrated how in modernity states used architectural styles to maintain and develop the nation code. I suggested that much state-led architecture could be 'read' as supportive of the general aims of a given state project, as was illustrated with the example of the use of modernist styles in British and postcolonial contexts.

If modernist architecture supported some of the central discourses of those epochs, then what are the central organizing principles of contemporary societies? It is often suggested that 'globalization' has impacted heavily on the state. After offering an initial workable definition of globalization, this chapter assesses how some of the processes associated with globalization have affected the state's capacity to define the nation. Focusing on the relationship between the state, national identity and globalization, it is possible to assess the degree of control the state now has over definitions of the nation code. What has been the impact of globalization on national cultural boundaries and, vitally, the state's capacity to define the nation?

Globalization: A New Modernity?

'Globalization does not explain every nationalist conflict in the sense of causing it; rather the point is that globalization has opened up new possibilities for the emergence of nationalism as a new anti-systemic movement which is able to redefine the state project' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002: 157)

The world, it is suggested, has changed. Some argue that modernity as a developmental project is finished and that we are living in a new era of globalization. Accordingly a great deal of literature has emerged since the early 1990s that has proclaimed the emergence of globalization as a distinct form of social, economic, political and cultural organization.[50] Although how fundamental the break between globalization and what went before is debatable, what can be said with a degree of certainty is that globalization is characterized by increased flows of all kinds. Information (Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001), knowledge (Stehr, 1994), capital (Leyshon and Thrift, 1997), sport (King, 1997), people (Urry, 2000), culture (Friedman, 1994), crime (Findlay, 1999), risk (Beck, 1992), protest (Klein, 1999), and disease (O'Neill, 1990), are just some of the global flows that it is suggested no longer respect territorial boundaries. These flows now characterize our contemporary societies to a greater or lesser degree, and following Castells (1996, 1997, 1998) I would argue that a key factor in facilitating many of these flows has been advances in information and communication technologies (ICTs), as well as their subsequent proliferation. Generally it is argued that increased interconnectedness in various spheres of society has challenged

[50] Some have even proclaimed the end of globalization, for example see Rugman (2001)

borders of all kinds, ultimately compromising the economic, geographical, and political borders that were so central to the sovereignty of the nation-state in modernity.[51]

However, as with the concept of modernity, the term 'globalization' presents us with many initial problems of definition; globalization can refer to a historically defined period of time or, more usefully for present purposes, a group of interconnected processes. The term globalization has become especially contested in the past decade or so as it has developed a normative significance, with many protestors and pressure groups claiming to be 'for' or 'against' globalization. Anti-capitalist demonstrations and protests frequently unite under the banner of 'anti-globalization;' these normative debates tend to equate the term with the expansion of a global free-market capitalism. Although such forms of capitalism have undeniably been hugely influential in shaping the concept of globalization, the purpose of this chapter is to focus specifically on the impact of globalized flows in general on the relationship between nation and state.

In order to avoid reifying the concept it is important to emphasize that globalization is a range of interconnected *processes* rather than a singular explanatory concept. John Urry (1997) is one theorist who points out that 'globalization' refers both to the proliferation of such processes (from the verb to globalize) and also to the outcomes of these processes (from 'globalization' the noun). Friedman (1994) also contends that his work is not about the global mobility of cultural items but rather about 'the structure of the conditions in which they occur' (Friedman, 1994: 1). This notion of a 'structure of conditions' is a useful framework for thinking about globalization. Again following Castells (1996, 1997, 1998, 2001), I would like to suggest that communications technologies have been a central factor in enabling the increased interconnectedness so characteristic of globalization. Advances in

[51] The transgression of the nation-state's boundaries by such flows has led many to question contemporary sociology's object of study (Touraine, 1998). Bryan S. Turner suggests that '[s]ince its formal inception in the first half of the nineteenth century, sociology has been, generally implicitly, located in a tension or contradiction between a science of particular nation-states and a science of global or universal processes' (Turner, 1990: 343). Urry (2000) also suggests that 'society' has previously been understood as sociology's object of study, but increased interconnectedness has challenged the very concept of society (at least society as understood as a social/political unit bounded by the nation-state) and therefore of sociology.

these technologies has facilitated many of the 'flows' listed above, as such communications media allow for individuals and groups to more readily transcend their physical location and communicate, trade and generally engage with others in real time across the globe. In other words the link that had previously existed before between physicality and sociality has been challenged (Giddens, 1991).

So, the cumulative result of these processes associated with globalization (we are now dealing with the noun) has been to increase the levels of interconnectedness across the globe.[52] One of the outcomes of this increased potential for interconnectedness is the ability of flows of many kinds to transcend previously (relatively) secure national boundaries, thus compromising the sovereign boundaries of the nation-state. Robertson's definition of globalization as 'the crystallization of the entire world as a single place' (Robertson, 1987: 38) underlines this lack of frontiers. The remainder of this chapter looks at some examples of how these 'flows' have transcended the boundaries of the nation-state and assesses the implications of this for state expressions of national identity. This framework allows for the subsequent assessment of the role of state funded, national architectural projects.

Globalization as the Era of the Powerless State

'[T]he nation-state is increasingly powerless in controlling monetary policy, deciding its budget, organizing production and trade, collecting its corporate taxes, and fulfilling its commitments to provide social benefits. In sum, it has lost most of its economic power, albeit it still has some regulatory capacity and relative power over its subjects' (Castells, 1997: 254)

[52] Or at least the *potential* for interconnectedness. It is important to keep in mind that mobility and interconnectedness do not characterize social life for the vast majority of people in the world today. For more on this see Evans (2002).

So, turning our attention to the main focus of the thesis, where are the impacts of the aforementioned 'globalization' to be seen in the contemporary nation-state project? Castells (1996, 1997) suggests that the onset of the information revolution has engendered a 'crisis of democracy' as nation-states have lost much of their previous perceived legitimacy. As outlined in Chapter One, I am primarily interested in the relationship between the state and the nation with reference to which Castells has argued that

> state control over space and time is increasingly bypassed by global flows of capital, goods, services, technology, communication and information. The state's capture of historical time through its appropriation of tradition and the (re)construction of national identity is challenged by plural identities as defined by autonomous subjects (Castells, 1997: 243).

As was suggested in the first two chapters, in modernity nations were 'constructed' by states for whom the task was one of creating a solidarity-inducing cultural identity for an otherwise atomised group of people. Are we to believe that the nation-state, such a central institution for the modern age, has lost all relevance for the maintenance and reflection of such collective identities under globalized conditions of action? Some of the more uncritical literature on globalization sees the state as a beleaguered institution, beset at all sides by a reified 'globalization.' Such authors often suggest that there exists a 'crisis' of statehood, with the modern state in serious danger of collapse (Hall, 2000). Clearly though, the nation-state has not lost its power and legitimacy under the aforementioned broadly globalized conditions of action. Far from being a powerless institution on the global stage, the state is still a key institution, and it is vital to bear in mind that, as well as discarding some functions, the European state has generally strengthened its hold on areas of domestic policy such as policing, education, and other aspects of welfare spending. In other words although 'the state's capacities for governance have changed and in many respects (especially national macroeconomic management) have weakened considerably, it remains

a pivotal institution, especially in terms of creating the conditions for effective international governance' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 170). Undeniably there are changing demands placed on the state by a global capitalist economy, and it is partially as a result of these pressures that the relationship between the *state* and *nation* has changed. It is a central contention of this chapter that it is more useful to see the nation and state as becoming decoupled and subsequently recombined in multiple ways than it is to suggest that the nation-state has simply become a powerless irrelevance.

So, globalized flows of many kinds have to some extent subverted the boundaries of the nation-state, compromising *some* of the state's powers and eroding *some* of its influence on the national culture. Held summarizes some of these arguments when he says that globalization 'has contributed simultaneously to an expansion of the liberal democratic state's functional responsibilities and to an erosion of its capacity to deal effectively alone with many of the demands placed upon it' (Held, 1995: 121). Tom Burns (1999) is another theorist who posits that the democratic institutions based around the nation-state have been outstripped, outpaced and undermined by aforementioned global flows. Other influential writers have also argued that institutions that developed 'in the two hundred years of modern history stay local, while power which defines the limits of their ambition and their capacity turns global' (Bauman, 2001: 14). It is easy to overstate this case, as for example does Smith (1990), but to reiterate, nation-states have *not b*een stripped of all relevance and power. The argument that I develop in this chapter is that under contemporary conditions of action the state is less able to offer an authoritative definition of the nation than it was for the main part under conditions of modernity. As well as losing potential to define the nation code, there are many other examples of 'flows' that have evaded the regulatory ability of the state.

For example Ulrich Beck (1992) has written on the subversion of the nation-state's boundaries by environmental disasters. He sees late-modern Western societies as 'risk

societies' characterized by increased levels of insecurity and dangers; in fact Beck suggests that it has been the proliferation of (primarily ecological) 'risk' that has been the most significant factor in the undermining of the nation-states boundaries. Echoing the Frankfurt School's writings on science and domination (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1949) Beck outlines how ecological disasters, paying no heed to political sovereignty, have created an ecological dystopia. Drawing on examples such as Chernobyl, Beck concludes that it is the universalizing nature of environmental dangers such as global warming, the destruction of the rainforests, and nuclear disasters that has forced states to form transnational coalitions that often impinge on their own political borders.[53] Another result of this, which is assessed more fully in the following chapter, is that identities have emerged at local or regional levels to challenge these threats that are global in scope.

In a similar vein Zygmunt Bauman (2001) has written on warfare in a globalized context and suggests that two distinctly new types of conflict have emerged under globalized conditions of action: 'globalizing wars' and 'globalization-induced wars.' Globalizing wars are comparable to the wars in the modern era that were instrumental in the development of the nation-state. Conflicts of this type give the 'international community' a tangible articulation, as they necessitate transnational and supranational institutions to co-ordinate the military actions of individual states. Bauman's writing on 'globalization-induced wars' is more significant for present purposes, as these are conflicts that 'aim to throw the state borders open for some – but also to shut them down for many others' (Bauman, 2001: 16). These types of wars are linked to the increased significance of place in globalization, frequently bringing about a more coercive approach to border controls – as Bauman duly notes it is usually other people's borders that such 'globalizing forces' wish to dismantle. Bauman suggests that increasingly such conflicts have a huge impact on the policing of

[53] The USA, the world's greatest emitter of carbon dioxide, refused to sign the 2001 Kyoto Protocol on Climate Control to reduce emissions, insisting that they should not have to reduce outputs, but that they would create forests, both in the US and the Third World – 'carbon sinks' to soak up excess emissions.

borders, as was clearly illustrated in the wake of the attacks on New York's World Trade Organization buildings on September 11th 2001.

The globalization of crime is another 'flow' that has, to a large extent, outstripped the state's regulatory capacity. Accordingly the United Nations and the G8 countries[54] have identified the 'globalized' crime as a policy priority, with the UN suggesting that '[o]pen borders and advanced technology that have propelled international trade and global commerce have also led to a dramatic proliferation in the number of criminal groups engaged in activities across countries, regions, and continents.'[55] Resultantly the UN has been forced to develop a definition of 'transnational' crime to be able to implement some of the suggestions from the Palermo Conference on organized crime. A crime is defined as transnational if it is committed or planned in more than one state, committed by groups operating across states, or of most interest sociologically, if the impact of an offence carried out in one state is felt substantially in another. Some of the key areas covered by the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime were the trafficking of drugs, the trafficking of people, and money laundering. Of course a defining feature of globalization is mobile populations (Urry, 2000), a huge amount of which is illegal. This illegal trade in humans also exists against the aforementioned backdrop of increasingly coercive national border controls, which have resulted in growing xenophobia and cultural intolerance in many countries.

As well as illegal cross border flows subverting state boundaries, the sovereignty of the nation-state has also been challenged in relation to a globalized economy that is no longer the sum of geographically distinct, politically sovereign units. Some suggest that the economy is now better conceptualized as social, economic and cultural flows which cross the decision-making capabilities and the territorial boundaries of the state (for example Castells, 1996, 1997, 1998; Sassen, 1996, 2000). Habermas characterizes this shift by

[54] Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
[55] At www.odccp.org/palermo/newtool.htm

claiming that states are now situated within markets, whereas in the past markets were situated within the boundaries of the state (Habermas, 2000). The solely economic explanation for expressions of radical new nationalisms tends to focus on competition for resources, and such debates are not the central focus of this dissertation. However, as with all of the examples outlined here, the 'globalization' of the economy points to the previously (relatively) secure geo-political boundaries of the nation-state being compromised in one way or another. Many suggest that the result of these more porous borders has been to undermine the sovereignty and autonomy of the nation-state in contemporary conditions.

Today it is certainly becoming difficult to see the unified territorial state as the sole site where citizenship is played out (see the next chapter), or indeed as the sole collective economic actor, but it can still be suggested that the state has a key role in the regulation of these flows - even if they cannot be 'controlled' as such. It is this shift that has led to the concept of governance gaining ascendancy over that of government in much contemporary literature (Atkinson and Wilks-Heeg, 2000; Sibeon, 1999, 2000, 2003). In these writings the general line of argument is that governance refers to more fluid, disparate forms of political 'steering' than does the notion of government, which has connotations of centralized political power. Sibeon supports this general argument in defining governance as those 'inter-organizational networks of state and non-state actors who, in contrast to classical hierarchical notions of 'top-down' 'government', are jointly engaged in co-governance or 'co-steering' activities in various policy sectors' (Sibeon, 2000: 291). This more de-centred concept has become popular among theorists attempting to understand the workings of a 'hollowed out' state in the conditions associated with globalization. This notion of governance is of

particular use when examining the relationship between actors in the Millennium Dome project (see Chapter Five).[56]

The Rise of the Cultural: Nations *Against* States

'[S]tate and nation are at each other's throats.... the hyphen that links them is now less of an icon of conjuncture than an index of disjuncture' (Appaduri, 1990: 305)

It was suggested in Chapter One that modernity was characterized by state expansion, with nationalism often the result of the mobilization of a cultural identity created for the nation by the state. One of the central contentions of this chapter is that contemporary nationalism is now more likely to be the expression of a conflict *between* nation and state than was the case in the modern period. Moreover in contemporary European societies it is very often the case that national identity and nationalism arise from the nation mobilizing *against* the state. In this section of the chapter I argue that such new nationalisms are often fuelled by the decoupling of nation from state, because under globalized conditions 'nations have a more or less pronounced tendency to become worlds in their own right.... [t]hey also face the task of coming to terms with the other lines of differentiation which are built into the global condition' (Arnason, 1990: 225).

[56] As well distinguishing between government and governance it is also important to separate out definitions of the state and government. Building on the earlier definition of the state as a political institution, it should be noted that this range of interconnected agencies is in fact 'trans-ideological' inasmuch as it does not refer to a particular political project but rather an organizational structure for decision-making. Governments are ideological or political 'projects', which are linked to a given political party. For example, Britain now has a New Labour government, while the mechanisms of the state remain the same regardless of the party in power.

Billig claims that 'nationalism is identified as the ideology that creates and maintains nation-states' (Billig, 1995: 19), and if this is the case then historically the vast majority of states have been successful at creating and maintaining these identities.[57] Somewhat ironically it is against this backdrop of increased interconnectedness and the proliferation of flows of all kinds that national identity has taken on a renewed significance for sociology and for politics. Social theorists including Held (1990), Castells (1996, 1997, 1998), Beck (1999), Friedman (1994), Delanty and O'Mahony (2002), and Habermas (2001) have written on the centrality of national identity for contemporary accounts of the social. Numerous social tensions, such as the fragmentation of the Eastern Bloc, the emergence of the European Union, and the challenges presented by a globalized capitalist elite, have moved questions of national identity and nationalism to the centre of European social theory's agenda.

Arnason suggests that 'in the context of the global situation, the nation and the nation-state intersect with other forms of integration' (Arnason, 1990: 221) – a caveat of 'and conflict with' could also be added. Jameson's work has been also been very influential in the study of cultural identity, with his central claim being that we have witnessed a 'fundamental mutation' in the sphere of culture and collective identity. He argues that there has been a 'prodigious expansion of culture throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our social life – from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself – can be said to have become 'cultural'' (Jameson, 1984: 87). Developing this idea I would suggest that contemporary nationalist movements can often provide a fundamental cultural identity that gives structured meaning to an otherwise potentially anomic existence. The uncertain, fluid nature of globalized conditions of action has led to the emergence of new types of collective identity as 'the shifting institutions of the economy diminish the experience of belonging somewhere.... people's

[57] Of course there are many examples where states have not been able to create and maintain a stable nation code. Ireland and India would be two such examples.

commitments increase to geographic places like nations' (Sennett, cited in Bauman, 2001: 14). In short, processes associated with globalization have put a premium on cultural identities. The role that state-led architecture has to play in symbolizing such identities is assessed in Part Three of the dissertation.

Returning to the central question of this chapter, what have been the implications of this shift for state-led definitions of the nation? I have argued previously that due to some of the aforementioned processes related to globalization the nation and the state have decoupled, and, moreover, the nation-state no longer forms the coherent entity it generally did in modernity. It is also important to emphasize from the outset that the concepts of nation and state are still central, and if anything the nation has actually been enhanced by globalized conditions of action.[58] More specifically then, it is the state that has seen a decline in some of its power under the conditions of globalization. States are certainly no longer autonomous bodies with the potential to manage their own political, economic, and military institutions; rather they have to negotiate with transnational and supranational political bodies as well as globalized capitalist interests.

Appaduri offers a rather unsubtle way of characterizing the changed relationship between nation and state, describing this now disjunctive relationship as a 'battle for the imagination' with both nation and state seeking to 'cannibalize' each other. Appaduri's evocative language is intended to emphasize that the previously stable marriage of nation and state, as outlined in Chapter One, has in many cases descended into unmanageable tensions. What are the changes associated with globalization can be held responsible for such an irrevocable breakdown of this previously harmonious relationship? What are the implications of these changes for representations of national identity? How far do contemporary national identities celebrate or even identify with the *cultural artefacts* of the state? Castells has engaged with these questions, and argues that due to state

[58] The other perspective, as is presented somewhat starkly by Anthony D. Smith (1990) is that '[n]ations and nationalism may have been functional for a world of competing industrial states, but they are obsolete in the 'service society' of an interdependent world based upon technical knowledge' (Smith, 1990: 175).

decentralization brought about by globalizing pressures, the state is less able to provide a protective and/or integrative function for vulnerable minorities (Castells, 1997: 275). Beyond this it is the opening up of the new global 'spaces' that allows the dissemination of anti-state sentiments as well as their subsequent mobilization.[59] It is in this way that we can understand the contemporary resurgence of nationalist sentiment and also the attempts by many nationalist groups to 'renegotiate' the nation code. The suggestion made by many of these groups is that the state is increasingly concerned with the regulation of transnational processes to such an extent that the state is no longer in a position to provide the clearest expression or representation of the nation.

Hirst and Thomson summarize this changed relationship between national identity and state by arguing 'cultural homogeneity at the 'national' level is less central in advanced states linked to world markets, since the nation state as a political entity can offer less. Hence religious, ethnic and lifestyle pluralism can expand within such states and groups within national states can grow in significance as an alternative foci of allegiance' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996: 177). Martin Albrow supports this line of argument, suggesting that ethnic identity 'becomes yet another focus for social life in the Global Age, freed from state definition in the same way as gender, religious, linguistic or stylistic bases for group formation' (Albrow, 1996: 200).

Castells is a key theorist both for this chapter and also for the development of the dissertation in general, as he also adopts globalization as a theoretical framework for understanding contemporary nationalist movements. Castells' concept of 'resistance identities' is a vital part of his broader theory. These collective identities are 'generated by those actors that are in positions/conditions devalued and/or stigmatized by the logic of domination' and aim at building 'trenches of resistance and survival on the basis of principles different from, or opposed to, those permeating the institutions of society'

[59] Of course it is clear that critique was a fundamental aspect of modernity – as was demonstrated by Adorno and Horkheimer (1949) and, following their work, Habermas (1989). What is certainly different today is that there are new spaces in which critique can take place.

(Castells, 1997: 8). This concept offers an important way of thinking about expressions of anti-state national identities in contemporary, globalized social conditions. Of course, the nation has long been claimed as a source of motivation for dominated movements, often by national groups who have been, or have felt to be, unrepresented at state level. Castells highlights the Catalonian experience as illustrative of a dominated nation without a representative state.[60] Without offering a detailed description of Catalan's complicated cultural and political history it is sufficient for present purposes to know that Catalonia, although geographically and 'politically' located in Spain, has a separate language and culture from the Spanish state. These differences have led to a 'continuity of *Catalunya* as a materially lived, distinctive, *national reality*' (Castells, 1997: 43 - emphasis in original). In broad terms we can say that Catalan history has been characterized by resistance to the institutional and cultural identity of the Spanish, with a particular tension emerging between Spain's capital city, Madrid, and Catalonia. Castells, himself a Catalonian, suggests that a Catalonian state did not emerge as Catalan nationalists have never claimed ethnic, religious or strictly political specificity. In fact Catalan identity is so diffuse that even nationalists define Catalans not only as people who live or work there but also anyone who 'wants to be Catalan.' A key sign of this desire to be Catalan is speaking, or even better *learning* to speak, the language. This underlines the point raised in Chapter One about the centrality of language for definitions of the nation code.

The general reason why so many of the contemporary mobilizations based around national identity and nationalism can be grouped as 'resistance identities' with an associated anti-state bias is, Castells suggests, that '[o]nce a nation became established, under the territorial control of a given state, the sharing of history did induce social and cultural bonds, as well as economic and political interests, among its members. Yet, the uneven representation of social interests, cultures, and territories in the nation-state skewed

[60] The Kurds are another frequently cited example of a nation without a state, as are Palestinians.

national institutions towards the interests of originating elites.... thus opening the way for institutional crises when subdued identities.... were able to mobilize for a renegotiation of the historical national contract' (Castells, 1997: 270). In other words, and as the previous chapters have argued, the historical representation of national identity has often been created by powerful elites, reflecting their self-image.

Also developing a point made in Part One, it can be suggested that definitions of the nation were so often articulated in the sphere of high culture because nationalism was a mobilization driven primarily by elites. Today mass culture has become more important for expressions of the nation as 'popular culture has become a powerful site for defining nationalism and national identity against diversity and cultural differences' (Giroux, 1995: 47). It was suggested in Part One that in the modern era state-led expressions of national identity tended to be within high culture; national anthems, discourses of history, art, and of course architecture, all contributed to this national 'high culture.' I would like to argue that contemporary reflections of national identity are increasingly likely to be codified in the sphere of 'mass culture' - pop music, sport, fashion, food and the media are all significant areas in which the contemporary nation code is defined. This shift from high to mass culture has also coincided with the shift from the nation to the city being a form of identification (for more on this see the following chapter).

Castells (1997: 72-83) uses the case study of the Mexican *Zapatistas* movement to illustrate how anti-state sentiments can be strengthened by the mass culture, cross-boundary communication processes so closely associated with globalization. The *Zapatistas* are an insurgent movement, strongly opposed to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the oppressive control exercised by organized crime in Mexico, in which they suggest the state is complicit. Originally a small Indian peasant group the *Zapatistas* gained widespread support both in Mexico and around the world partly to do with their use of information technology to spread the message of their struggle. Castells

argues that '[t]he success of the *Zapatistas* was largely due to their communication strategy, to the point that they can be called the *first informational guerrilla movement* (Castells, 1997: 79 - emphasis in original). Castells supports this bold claim by suggesting that the *Zapatistas* did not want to be drawn into a violent war, and that their strategy was to 'capture the imagination' of groups and intellectuals elsewhere in the world.[61] The internet, videos[62] and other forms of advanced, computer-based telecommunications proved a successful way to do just this, with the *Zapatistas* successfully mobilizing a huge amount of what amounted to anti-state support for their cause. Indeed, *Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos* often evoked the name of 'the Nation' in his communications, which he signed 'From the mountains of Southeast Mexico.'[63]

The American Militia is another social movement identified by Castells as indicative of the new trend towards anti-state nationalism (Castells, 1997: 84-97). This disparate collection of social movements has also used advanced communications networks to spread their racist, fundamentalist beliefs, having relied heavily on the internet in particular. The self-styled 'Patriot Movement' believe the US federal state to be their enemy. Although the reasons for this seem to vary quite considerably from faction to faction, generally these ultra-conservative groups feel they are defending the 'American way of life' from the threat of transnational institutions and more cosmopolitan cultural associations. This social movement see the US State as subservient to a 'New World Order' whose avowed aim is to undermine the autonomy, sovereignty, and ultimately the power, of the state. The Militia claim that The World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank are at the forefront of this New Order; the rights that they believe are being eroded include the right to take up arms and the right to free speech. It is of course an irony that

---

[61] Castells does bring a normative aspect into his analysis in so far as he seems to distinguish between 'good' and 'bad' social movements. He describes the *Zapatistas* as 'lightly armed' (1997: 73) when they fight against 'exclusionary consequences' (Castells, 1997: 77) of the political order.

[62] The leader of the Al-Qaeda group Osama Bin Laden also used videotapes to disseminate messages in the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon buildings.

[63] For example see his open letter addressed to the Mexican President at www.flag.blackened.net./revolt/mexico/ezln/marcos_zedillo_dec94.html

the majority of these rights are in the USA's constitution, but the 'Patriots' feel that the state does not do enough to 'protect' the nation from the erosion of these rights, therefore reneging on the government's side of the social contract. Recasting this tension in terms of universalism and particularism it is clear that these disparate groups feel the state is not defending cultural, economic, and social particularism (i.e. the 'American way of life') against the more universalizing tendencies inherent in institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund. It is another irony that states often worked hard to develop and protect the particularistic identities in conditions of modernity (see Chapters One and Two).

Similarly in Europe over the last decade many popular protests have echoed this 'defensive' approach to the nation code while paradoxically maintaining a strong anti-state sentiment. There are many examples of 'nation against state' mobilization in Britain, with many high-profile groups perceiving themselves to be 'defending' the nation code explicitly taking up anti-state positions. For example the 'People's Fuel Lobby' protests in Britain in 2000 and 2001 centred on the amount of tax paid on petrol and certainly had a very strong anti-state bias. Ros Coward argued that these widespread fuel protests 'articulated wider and deeper grievances: about stealth taxes driving up living costs without any public pay-offs; about unfair advantages for European hauliers and farmers; about British uncompetitiveness with the high pound; and general hostility to a government which seems pre-occupied with abstract 'human' rights and indifferent to the difficulties of ordinary citizens.'[64] The concept of the nation was certainly at the centre of many of the fuel protestor's grievances. Labour MP Shaun Woodward claimed that the far-right British National Party (BNP) was behind a website organizing protests – the site was subsequently traced to the BNP's head of internet technology in East London and Nick Griffin, the

[64] *The Guardian*, 7.11.2000

Leader of the BNP, later verified Woodward's claim.[65] A very strong anti-state sentiment was evident on the site, with protestors encouraged to burn effigies of the Prime Minister Tony Blair. The site also claimed that 'the British people are not only expected to watch their homeland confiscated – the Labour government have the cheek to demand that we finance the process as well.'[66]

The BSE Inquiry Report also found that government health ministers misled the public about the risks to humans associated with eating infected cattle and that a 1995 advertizing campaign created a climate where 'hyperbole replaced accuracy;'[67] the report also established that government policy responses were not quick enough. The overall effect of the 'BSE Crisis' was to further undermine the public's trust in the British Government. As was the case with the fuel protests, many suggested that the BSE outbreak had mobilized a great deal of latent anti-state feeling, with one newspaper leader claiming that the 'BSE crisis was as much about bad government as rotten meat. Politicians and civil servants passed the buck, and were, at least, economical with the truth. As a result, the British beef industry collapsed, the taxpayer had to pay billions of pounds of compensation and dozens fell victim to a terrifying new disease.'[68] The Foot and Mouth epidemic in Britain also underlined the state's failure to inform its citizens of potentially harmful diseases, as do protestors against the introduction of Genetically Modified crops. It is also not a coincidence that many of these issues of the nation have centred on the countryside, traditionally a politically powerful lobby and a key site for constructions of the British nation.

Of course far-right parties frequently have a 'defence of the nation' logic, as is evidenced by the contemporary European political scene. Jean-Marie Le Pen's success in the first round of the French political nominations in 2002 provided a tangible, party political focus

---

[65] *The Guardian*, 3.11.2000
[66] Website at: www.fuel-protest.com
[67] *The Guardian*, 26.10.2000
[68] *The Observer*, 8.8.1999

for these broader theoretical debates on the contested relationship between the state and the nation. Le Pen's rhetoric, as well as including much outright racism, was strongly opposed to the internationalization of finance (in particular the use of the Euro over the Franc - see below), the European project and Maastricht, and 'globalization' in any of its myriad forms.[69] The mass reaction in France against Le Pen was further evidence of the struggle over the definition of the nation code. One anti-Le Pen protestor articulated this conflict clearly by writing 'No to the confiscation of the symbols of France by the Fascists' on a wall on one of Le Pen's processional routes.[70] Similarly in Holland Pim Fortuyn's anti-immigration, anti-Muslim policies also reflected a xenophobic, neo-populist definition of the nation. The far-right Austrian leader Jörg Haider also uses authoritarian language in his speeches to rally against a culture of 'political correctness' and anti-racism.

Some other interesting debates linked to these (perceived) 'defence of the nation' discourses centre on single currency and the Euro. The symbolism associated with currency is interesting as it often has a direct link to self-rule and sovereignty (Hobsbawm, 1983b), with national currencies often displaying imagery that is central to the self-understanding of the nation (see Chapter One). However, on the Euro banknotes it is actually universalized, ahistorical buildings that have replaced the particularistic cultural references that were so prominent in modernity. The designs on the seven banknotes reflect the seven ages of European art and architectural history[71] but with non-representational designs that do not refer to a specific building or nation-state but to what are symbols of openness and access: bridges, windows and gateways are the motifs for the new 'post-national' currency (Delanty and Jones, 2002). Bridges are in fact the central symbol on the notes, and again

---

[69] It is interesting that far right and far left political movements both tend to strongly oppose 'globalization', albeit for very different reasons. The left tend to equate globalization with free-market capitalism and the right, as is outlined above, see globalization as eroding the sovereignty of the state and national identities.

[70] *The Guardian*, 3.5.2002

[71] The classical style is displayed on the Euro 5 note; Romanesque and the hint of a Norman bridge on the Euro 10; Gothic on the Euro 20; Renaissance on the Euro 50; baroque and Rococo on the Euro 100; iron for the industrial age on the Euro 200; and, for the Euro 500 – one of the highest value notes ever printed - the minimalist glassy modern style with a suggestion of the postmodern age.

these are not famous bridges that might be suggestive of a particular national culture or of a specific place, but rather universalistic ones that are devoid of actual histories and are removed from particularistic context. These abstract styles, with resonances of universalised European cultural history, are intended to codify European identity around spatial designs in which historical memory is not bound up with particularistic or national differences. Such 'post-national' designs are potentially very significant in shaping any emerging European cultural identity, especially in view of the fact that the Euro coinage, which unlike the notes, has national icons on one side. In the case of countries that are monarchies the head of state features on the coins, while in other countries national symbols, such as the Harp for the Irish, and the Eagle for Germany, feature on the reverse of the coins. This is obviously an attempt at using currency as a way to forge a relationship between particularistic national cultures and a more universalized, less nationally distinct European culture. By relating national cultures to the official memoryless transculture of the EU in such a way, the coinage supplements the spatial designs on the banknotes, attempting a symbolic reconciliation between universal and particular collective identities. The case of the Euro offers some support for the claim that 'the cultural 'grounds of membership and of citizenship' have begun to shift ineluctably to incorporate a substantial and growing European dimension' (Roche, 2001a: 78).[72]

A way to recast these 'defence of the nation' sentiments in general is in terms of universalism and particularism. Part One established how instrumental the state has been in developing the particularism so important to the national identities of the modern age. For many of the anti-state protest groups assessed above it is precisely the state's inability to maintain these particularistic identities in the face of a 'universalizing' globalization that has led to such internal discontents. The fact that these national identities were created in

[72] As Roche points out in the same paper, EU policy makers have founded the development of such cultural symbols on the assumption of a common 'European' heritage. This belief is underlined in, for example, the Addonino Report, which suggested the need for the development of a European 'popular culture', and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which gave the union a cultural remit (Roche, 2001: 79-86).

the first place does not matter to such groups, providing another clear example of how collective identities become a social reality in the minds of actors. Although the movements assessed in the section above all have very different motivations and goals it is clear that generally they feel themselves to be rallying against universalizing tendencies by defending the particular nation from the 'globalizing' state. Of course, as was also outlined in earlier chapters, nations are effective identities to mobilize as they are, by definition, anti-universal; the key difference with these expressions of national identity is that they are directed against the state. Arnason develops this point by arguing that 'the national imagery and its institutional embodiment can also become the basis for strategies of withdrawal from the global context' (Arnason, 1990: 226). In these examples the state is seen to be universalizing while the nation remains the key for a particularistic collective identity.

It is also clear that globalization has often served to strengthen new nationalisms and national identities. Globalization, namely accelerated interconnectedness beyond the boundaries of the nation-state, allows for the development of transnational 'spaces' in which to circulate messages about a struggle – as with the *Zapatistas*, the American Militia, and the Fuel Protestors – thus empowering these movements. I would also like to argue that globalization, by emphasizing the importance of mass culture, provides a whole new vocabulary of cultural symbols that can be appropriated in a nationalistic way. Although the clearest example of this would be 're-appropriation' of flags (Billig, 1995) there are also many other ways this can be done. In her book on global capitalism and political activism Naomi Klein looks at how demonstrators challenge multinational corporations by using the companies' own adverts in a subversive way, showing how symbols can be reappropriated and used as a tool in political struggle. Roland Robertson (1992) has also argued that globalization provides the local with a range of symbolic cultural resources to be mobilized against the universal. Some of the examples cited above illustrate how the cultural resources of the nation, ironically often originating from the state, have become

ever more central to the discourse of national identity in a globalized context. We can see that national cultures do not just passively internalize universals, rather they mediate them with their own frame of reference, as was also evidenced by architectural examples from Victorian Britain in Chapter Two.

Of course some of these debates around the nation challenging the state are far from new and cannot necessarily be linked to processes associated with globalization. Arnason (1990: 215) cites the work of Morin who claimed that the French Revolution should be considered the point at which the nation was no longer dependent on the state - in fact at this time the reverse became true, with the state dependent on the will of the nation). But, as was outlined in the first two chapters, nationalism has always been a way of 'defending' the nation against the more universalizing tendencies inherent in the project of modernity. The key difference for this dissertation is that then historically this 'defence' was primarily a jingoistic one, it was directed outwards. Contemporary nationalisms are more often turned inwards (xenophobia) and are frequently directed at those within the state's borders who are seen as a 'threat' to the nation; vitally this can often include the state. This shift has had a significant impact on contemporary conceptions of citizenship association, as is reviewed below and in the following chapter.

Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Citizenship

'[N]ew transnational political spaces are not 'contained' by modern nation-states as grantors of rights and imposers of obligations' (Isin and Wood, 1999: 91)

The salience of cultural identity in globalized contexts was outlined above. Developing this idea we can see that cultural rights have become central to many contemporary notions of citizenship (Delanty, 2000b; Isin and Wood, 1999; Habermas, 2001; Roche, 1992). T. H.

Marshall's classic conception of citizenship argued that the rise of capitalism was accompanied by the institutionalization of increasingly differentiated rights, which in feudal times had lacked form and functionality.[73] Marshall separated civil, political and social rights: 'the civil element (is) composed of the rights necessary for individual freedom - liberty of the person, freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to own property and to conclude valid contracts, and the right to justice.... by the political element I mean the right to participate in the exercise of political power, as a member of a body invested with political authority or as an elector of the members of such a body' (Marshall, 1963: 74). For Marshall the move to the more equal 'contract society' of capitalism involves the gradual introduction of civil, then political rights. Social rights are less clearly defined than civil and political rights, but should allow everyone 'to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised[74] being according to the standards prevailing in the society' (Marshall, 1963: 74). Minimally social citizenship should allow for universal security and welfare. The emergence of cultural rights as a component of contemporary citizenship is an attempt to deepen Marshall's traditional model and align it with more contemporary notions of the social, in which (mass) culture is an increasingly important sphere for the construction and maintenance of identities (Baudrillard, 1970). Another key shift for this dissertation is the move away from the state as the sole institution capable of providing citizenship with a referent - this idea is developed more fully in the following chapter.

Delanty and O'Mahony claim that 'one of the paradoxes of globalization is the emergence of new nationalisms of exclusion, on the one side, and cosmopolitan

[73] For an updated version of this classic model see Bobbio (1995).

[74] Terms such as '*the* social heritage' and 'civilised' are obviously more contested than they were when Marshall was writing. The general themes of the argument are not really affected by this ethnocentrism and are still of contemporary relevance, even if the language is somewhat outdated and exclusive. Even overlooking these questions of terminology, Marshall's classification has attracted a great deal of criticism for being deeply Occidental, highly gendered, and thus exclusionary. While Marshall's framework for understanding citizenship rights certainly assumes a linear notion of progressive 'modernization' with increasing inclusionary tendencies, such has been the influence of his work it is difficult to discuss citizenship without at least cursory reference to his writing. The aim here is to use Marshall's work a point of departure to assess more contemporary work on cultural citizenship.

expressions of community on the other' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002: 146). They argue that these two aspects of cultural belonging are not necessarily opposing forces but rather two sides of the same coin. As was suggested in the first chapter, modern states attempted to reconcile the inclusive universals inherent in modernity with the exclusive particularism associated with nation-state formation. Although the notion of cosmopolitanism is certainly not new,[75] present debates around such citizenship affiliation express very different sentiments than the classical models (Isin and Wood, 1999). I have argued above that the challenge for contemporary forms of citizenship association lies in the fact that 'late modernity is a distinctive political time without a corresponding place of collective political accountability' (Connolly, 1995: 159). If, as was established in the previous chapters, the nation-state provided an institutional expression of modernity then what is globalization's attendant citizenship structure?

It is suggested that the 'information society' is one such 'space' in which a global civil society could exist (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001a). In such formulations information society is seen as a decentred, post-national space based on the flows of electronic information and communication (the internet, email, pagers, fax machines, mobile telephones etc). Castells argues that this space is the ultimate expression of global civil society as it is decentred and disparate enough to operate beyond the regulatory capacity of the nation-state. However I would argue that such notions of citizenship founded on an emergent 'global' civil society are unsatisfactory. Held's conception of cosmopolitanism is the clearest articulation of this flawed viewpoint. Held sees a 'cosmopolitan international' framework as the best way to extend democracy in a situation of interdependent polities, operating under interconnected, globalized conditions, arguing (Held, 1995) that only a cosmopolitan democracy can guarantee accountability - firstly of the globally interrelated systems which have challenged the regulatory capacity of the nation-state from 'above'

[75] For thorough discussions on the origin and development of notions of cosmopolitanism see Zolo's *Cosmopolis* (1997) or Toulmin's *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (1992).

(i.e. economic, political, legal, military and cultural), and secondly of the new social movements and local groups which challenge the nation-state's representativeness from 'below' (Held, 1995). In using this argument Held stresses the importance of collective action outside the state, but any notion of a global civil society is impeded by for example language, or in the case of information society by access to ICT (see Evans, 2002).

Martha Nussbaum argues that cosmopolitanism should mean allegiance to 'the worldwide community of human beings' (Nussbaum, 1996: 4). This solely normative conception of cosmopolitanism demands that national boundaries are not 'morally salient.' In arguing for the creation of a moral community over and above national boundaries, Nussbaum attempts to bridge globalization's deficit - namely that 'globalized' interests and identities challenge (and sometimes override) national allegiances. In this and similar cosmopolitan schemes particularistic national allegiances are subservient to universalized general principles, such as human rights. In this sense cosmopolitanism's underpinning logic must rest on a relatively universalized value (e.g. human rights) that is legally enshrined, or perhaps modified, in particularistic contexts. The relationship between human rights and the rights of citizenship has changed. It has been suggested that human rights have become more contextualized and less abstract, while the rights of national citizenship have become contested (Bobbio 1995; Delanty 2000). If the rationale for globalization *is* that of the free market, then cosmopolitanism is an attempt to redress this balance by challenging the purely economic modes of globalization: cosmopolitanism is essentially about cultural overlap as opposed to the interrelation of markets. In this sense 'credible cosmopolitanism has to be combined with a critique of the ethically deficient globalism embodied in neo-liberal modes of thought' (Falk, 1995: 57). This perspective puts cosmopolitanism at the heart of a project of globalization 'from below.'

It is this underpinning logic is that prevents cosmopolitanism from descending into a type of cultural voyeurism or tourism, with the cosmopolitan merely dabbling rootlessly in

many different cultures. In fact Hannerz (1990) defines the cosmopolitan in contrast to the tourist, suggesting that rather than just being a travelling citizen, the cosmopolitan adopts a plural attitude towards other cultures, an 'intellectual and aesthetic stance towards divergent cultural experiences' and a 'willingness to engage with the other' (Hannerz, 1990: 127). However, this more reflexive approach to travel underlines the cultural elitism often attributed to cosmopolitans who despise being mistaken for tourists - tourists are not truly *involved,* nor do they necessarily experience *authentic culture* when travelling. The value of cosmopolitan citizenship rests on a commitment to engage with the other. In this sense cosmopolitanism must be about more than shopping trips or smuggling, it must somehow alter structures of meaning and collective identities (Hannerz, 1990: 239). Again though, it is primarily cultural elites such as politicians, architects, journalists, and academics who have the potential to frame and codify debates on cross-cultural systems of meaning (see the following chapter). Calls for cosmopolitan forms of citizenship ultimately attempt to increase the space where this overlap exists by trying to expand democracy and cultural practices to include the other. In this sense cosmopolitanism is reliant on the potential to be open to reflexive formation by a discursive process.

Conclusion

'National identities and nationalistic perspectives can become the starting-point for different interpretations of the global situation' (Arnason, 1990: 225).

It was argued in Chapters One and Two that the state, although never able to offer a totally definitive version of the nation, was able to offer a relatively coherent definition under conditions of modernity. The reason that states could never really define the nation absolutely is because 'power is expressed in publicly constructed discourses where it may

be legitimated or challenged but it is always contingent and therefore indeterminate' (Delanty and O'Mahony, 2002: 32). In short, the discursive construction of nation formation and codification means that it can never be truly colonized by the state; discourses by their very nature are always open to challenges (Foucault, 1970). Resultantly national identities and affiliations can often be the starting point for a resistance *against* universal, globalizing trends or more accurately against states that are perceived to be powerless to 'protect' the nation code. In this chapter I have claimed that these 'discursive spaces' have become increasingly contested due to processes related to globalization, with the boundaries of the nation now challenged by a range of pluralized identity projects.

In this chapter I have challenged the idea of the nation as a single cultural space defined by the state. Clearly if the metaphor of a single cultural space is to hold then this space clearly must be bounded and sealed, which is demonstrably not the case with national borders today.[76] Processes associated with globalization have challenged the state's ability to provide an authoritative definition of 'its' cultural community, which has led to many tensions emerging between nation and state. The state is not able to manage the boundaries of cultural identity as efficiently as it did in the past; subsequently the ability of the state to control and represent collective identities has been eroded to a huge extent. For Castells, contemporary nationalisms are often a reaction against such universalizing or globalizing tendencies. As was illustrated in some of the examples above, social movements often mobilize around a perceived protection of the particularism they see in 'their' nation code, thus developing a strategy for resistance against the universal.[77] It is perhaps ironic that these groups frequently view the state as an institution supportive of the more universalizing tendencies of the social. Processes associated with globalization have certainly not 'caused' changes in national identity, but they have opened up new spaces that are not controlled by the state which have allowed critique of the state project. So, control

[76] If it ever was – see Hedetoft (1999).

[77] This project of resistance to universals has a comparable architectural expression that is explored in the section on Critical Regionalism in the next chapter.

over national cultural identities increasingly eludes the West European State, as will be illustrated in the remainder of this dissertation. The globalizing flows described above may have lessened the state's potential to clearly delineate its own boundaries, but the state has attempted to restore a degree of control over the cultural definition of the nation, with some of these attempts assessed in the following chapters.

Chapter Four: The City and Critical Regionalism

Introduction

It was argued in the previous chapter that the nation is no longer necessarily the focal point for citizenship identification, as new forms of citizenship do not always operate at the level of the state. Many citizenship groups now claim more transnational, cosmopolitan, or global associations and affiliations that are outside of the nation-state's sovereign boundaries. Firstly this chapter assesses where contemporary collective identities stand in relation to the city and the region, then secondly looks at Critical Regionalism, a discourse within architectural theory that called for buildings to be closely linked to relevant collective identities. The previous chapter argued that due to globalizing processes the relationship between the state and the nation has undergone a fundamental transformation. Many debates around the changing role of the nation-state have crystallised into an interest in the potential of post-national identities to link democracy to a relevant, and not necessarily state-led, collective identity. Much literature has also focused on the potential of the city as a site for the creation of post-national forms of citizenship, with many arguing that the city is best placed to exploit the global nature of the various flows outlined earlier.

Of course this is not to say that state-led national identities have not endured, but rather that the diversity inherent in many nations today in terms of ethnicity, class, lifestyles, and gender has called into question the state's ability to define the nation in a representative way. This chapter assesses why the city has become a significant site for contemporary citizenship identification. Chapter Three contended it is vital to take account of pluralization and fragmentation both within and beyond the nation. The state, I suggested, is no longer able to offer the stable and coherent identities that writers like Smith (1990)

believe to be both desirable and possible. My aim in the remainder of this dissertation is to look at a dimension that might offer a more substantial basis for a kind of identity compatible with the post-national, pluralized societies that are emerging in Europe. The general contention is that post-national collective identities may be more appropriate in representing more diverse, egalitarian forms of citizen association.

The City and Regionalism

'With the partial unbundling or at least weakening of the national as a spatial unit come conditions for the ascendance of other spatial units and scales.... notably cities and regions' (Sassen, 2001: 1).

Many sociologists have engaged with the issue of collective identities beyond the state. Generally in the academic literature one of the main questions has been how collective identity can be defined in a way that avoids the excessively ethnocentric assumptions of particularistic national identities[78] while at the same time maintaining some degree of meaning and a point of association for communities. Often this writing has focused on the city as a point of identification. As was outlined in Part One of the dissertation, integration in the modern age was spearheaded by states, with national identities proving an effective way to stabilize large populations. Today there is some evidence for the resurgence of the

[78] On the whole ethnocentric conceptions of European identity dominate contemporary sociological debates. One view in the literature, as is represented by Habermas (2001), is that post-national identities must move away from the particularistic cultural reference points characteristic of national identities, because these will always be divisive and therefore inappropriate in the context of, for example, a multicultural Europe. Habermas argues for the creation of a degree of European identity, which he sees as harbouring the reflexive and critical potential within modernity (Habermas, 1996, 1998, 2001). The other stance, as represented by, for example, Anthony Smith (1990), is that a post-national European identity can never supplant national identity and that any attempts to codify a post-national (for example European) identity are doomed to failure (Smith, 1992, 1995). In this context what is typically mentioned is the absence of a shared language, a functioning public sphere or civil society and the lack of strong cultural ties comparable to those of national culture and the democratic constitutional state. The dilemma then is to have either a minimal cultural content extrapolated from modernity – the Habermasian option - or a new civilizational identity is to be created, (broadly this would be the Euro-federalist choice).

city under globalized conditions of action. Indeed, the autonomy of the city over the nation-state is a recurring theme of the globalization literature,[79] which tends to argue that cities are moving into the void left by the 'decline,' or as Chapter Three suggested the decoupling, of the nation-state. Far from being under the charge of the state, as in modernity, cities are increasingly becoming detached from the nation-state and asserting this autonomy by providing a referent for new forms of association and collective identities. Maurice Roche paraphrases this shift when asserting that the 'nation-state and the national level of citizenship may no longer be adequate units of analysis in the contemporary world, in which globalisation.... [i]s such a powerful long-term dynamic' (Roche, 2002: 73). Manuel Castells goes further than this when arguing that 'the more national states fade in their role , the more cities emerge as a driving force in the making of a new European society' (Castells, 1994: 23).

This chapter assesses the claim that the city is a significant unit of citizenship analysis in a globalized context. Of course cities have long been sites for the fusion of cultures, economies and people, but increasingly cities are viewed as both the paradigmatic 'space' of globalization and as a key field for citizenship participation and identification *beyond* the state.[80] As such the resurgence of the city is key to much of the writing on post-national citizenship. Previously cities had been an effective way for a centralized state to best distribute goods and services – basically as administrative elements within the nation-state system. Today though cities such as London and Berlin have come to offer strong representations of the nation. The diverse and multicultural nature of western democracies has meant that 'the negotiation of identities and rights.... [r]eveals an abundance of memberships and allegiances divided between the country of origin, the country of

[79] See for example Sassen (1996, 2001); Soja (2000); Short (1999); Isin and Wood (2000).
[80] Sassen says that '[o]ver the centuries cities have been at the cross-roads of major, often worldwide processes. What is different today is the intensity, complexity and global span of these networks' (Sassen, 2001: 20).

residence, and Europe, [leading] to a new concept of citizenship, questioning its link to nationality' (Kastoryano, 2002: 164).

The previous chapter looked at how far processes associated with globalization have released political sovereignty from the nation-state, allowing actors to engage in the formation of new, more reflexive types of identity that are less tied to the state than they were in the past. Chapter Three also concluded that certain aspects of the nation-state's sovereignty have been challenged by the globalizing flows that are no longer the sum of geographically distinct, politically bounded units. For example, globalization has favoured cities that can operate as foundations on which networks of cultural interests can develop in a global context. Accordingly the assertion here is that cities and regions are often better equipped than the nation-state to operate in a global context, with the associated markets that are now increasingly characterised by abstract flows of information. Supporting this claim Castells and Hall argue that nation-states are increasingly powerless to 'act upon the functional processes that shape economies and societies' and that 'cities are more flexible in adapting to the changing conditions of markets, technology and culture, they have less power than governments but a greater response capacity' (Castells and Hall, 1994: 7). It is this capacity to operate in a flexible, information-based economy that partially explains why the city has potential to become the object of primary citizen loyalty. The city has become the site for significant, new forms of collective identification,[81] a point that is developed in this chapter.

Supporters of the cosmopolitan position (briefly reviewed in the previous chapter) argue that such groups can be at the forefront of establishing new post-national citizenship

[81] Although not directly of relevance here it can be suggested that projects seeking to present cities as coherent, integrated and dynamic spaces are similar to nation-state building in conditions of modernity. Often such projects overlook the increasingly fragmented, disparate and exclusionary nature of the city and as such can reproduce exclusive, unrepresentative symbols of the places that they purport to represent. Just, as is suggested in this dissertation, that modern national identities were based on elite constructions then so, with competitions such as the European Capital of Culture, there is a real danger that prior exclusionary cultural projects will be replicated in the symbolic (re)constructions of contemporary cities. See the conclusion for more on this point.

practices that are less tied to the nation-state than in modernity. Such writers see cosmopolitan citizenship as signalling a move from top-down forms of government towards more disparate, flexible forms of governance. The potential of the city to provide a site for the 'acting out' of these more cosmopolitan, inclusive forms of citizenship is central to many of these discussions. It was also argued earlier that as a result of processes associated with globalization, state-led definitions of the nation have become more contested than ever. This has meant that collective identities are increasingly likely to be formulated and acted out at the level of the city rather than at the level of the nation-state. Kymlicka and Norman (2000b: 13) believe that there are now between 5000 and 8000 ethnocultural groups in the world, living in approximately 200 states – this means that over 90% of states are shared by a number of ethnocultural groups. The limited ability of the European state to represent sometimes dozens of collective identities in one political boundary has led to interest in the potential of the city or the region to do so more effectively. In the context of the European Union these theoretical debates have been given a policy focus due to the Committee of the Regions. As Delanty (2000) amongst others points out, the state is the foundation on which the union was built. Indeed it is important to stress that, in the main, cities are dependent on their respective state devolving power to regional or local levels. Political authority and legitimacy cannot be devolved 'from Brussels' and the extent to which cities can act autonomously in a globalized context should certainly not be exaggerated. As is suggested above the nation-state is still an extremely important, and powerful, actor in contemporary society.

I would argue that a great deal of the potential of the city as a site for citizen identification (again at least in a European context) lies in its capacity to reflect *social* as opposed to *state* goals. The city provides a space in which a reflexive relationship between universalism and particularism can be developed (see Chapters Five and Six). The central claim in this chapter is that collective identity is now more likely to be formed at the level

of the city than the nation, primarily because cities are based on lived space. Developing this point we can see that the contemporary city often offers a more relevant site for increased levels of identity formation and citizenship participation as it is associated with mass culture. Increasingly the aspects of social life around which identities form are in the sphere of 'popular culture,' tending to be rooted in specific cities rather than in states. For example football (King, 1997) and sport in general, music, and fashion all have increasingly close ties to cities rather than to nations, whereas conversely the narrative of national identity was usually situated within high culture; history, flags, monuments, anthems (see Chapters One and Two). It is perhaps the link to mass cultures that makes cities more practical, lived realities than the nation. The narrative of nation-states seems increasingly abstract, detached and constructed; resultantly the nation can seem a distant source of identification.

The Catalan example identified in the previous chapter case provides an interesting illustration of the contemporary salience of mass culture for collective identity projects, as historically Catalan identity has been reflected primarily by history and language whereas now sport is central to Catalan citizen association. As stated above, interesting examples of nationalist expression are often to be found in sport.[82] One particularly revealing example is the link between nationalism and football. A modern history of Catalan identity would not be complete without assessing the role played by Barcelona Football Club (or Barça to the converted). The football club has become a central aspect of Catalan national identity; during Franco's reign supporting the club became one of the few 'legitimate' expressions of Catalan identity (Burns, 2000). The cathedral-like Nou Camp Stadium has become an architectural symbol of Catalan identity. Even though (at the time of writing) the team is

[82] Hargreaves (2000) has also looked at the importance of sport for Catalan identity, although his focus was on the impact of the Barcelona Olympics for the region. In his book on *Megaevents and Modernity: Olympics, Expos and the Growth of Global Culture* (2000) Maurice Roche suggests that the nature of the Olympic Games reflects a 'performance complex' inherent in modernity.

composed mainly of Dutch players[83] and has a Dutch coach, the football club is still arguably the clearest representation of Catalan *resistance identity* in the sphere of mass culture. Although increasingly colonized by the economy it is still possible to view football as offering a 'cultural' route to nationalism for many millions of fans globally.

Castells sees the city as a 'command and control centre' that manages intertwined, networked economic and cultural exchanges. Castells suggests that the city is not a place so much as a process in which 'centres of production and consumption.... are connected in a global network' (Castells, 1996: 386). However, although part of a relatively 'open' network the global city as a hub or a node still has a comparative 'value,' as cities are hierarchically organized according to their relative 'weight' in the network. In this respect cities can compete effectively, not to gain territory or wealth - the former goals of nation-states - but to process and control information. Groups are also involved in a process of contestation that fragments the city – Castells writes of the 'dual city.' He suggests that workforces in cities are divided between an information-rich, stable group of workers in the information sector and another group of highly casualized workers (primarily in the service sector). Although the idea of the dual city is a highly contested one, the important link between Castells' idea of information-rich elites and cosmopolitanism is that the type of knowledge possessed by cosmopolitan elites is not tied to place, but is flexible, transferable and decontextualized.

It is fair to acknowledge that elites have always been relatively geographically mobile, indeed historically cosmopolitanism was often be held to be the defining trait of the elite with cosmopolitanism reflecting a 'mastery' over nature, a conquering of time and space, and a generalized competence with other cultures. The consumption of space is still a fundamental marker of an elite who stand in contrast to an expanding population of

[83] The Dutch footballer Johan Cruyff, considered by many to be the best player in the world in the 1970s, in many ways personified the relationship between the club and the fans. Cruyff, much to the annoyance of General Franco allegedly, turned down a move to Real (Royal) Madrid and opted for Barça and while there he proceeded to learn to speak fluent Catalan. He even named his son Jordi, a traditional Catalan name. Johan is still revered in Barcelona to this day.

excluded people who are very much bounded and confined by geographical space. These global elites 'wherever they go, find others who will interact with them in the terms of specialized but collectively held understandings' (Hannerz, 1990: 244). Castells summarizes this paradoxically exclusive perspective of cosmopolitanism by affirming that 'elites are cosmopolitan, people are local' (Castells, 1996: 415). In keeping with his wider project, Castells sees cosmopolitanism in terms of 'space of flows,' with cosmopolitanism just another way globally mobile information-rich elites organize themselves transnationally. From this perspective cosmopolitanism becomes a strategy for elites to symbolically constitute 'their' societies via exclusive cultural codes – and resultantly has little or no democratic potential. There are clear parallels between these forms of cosmopolitanism and the way that elites constructed 'their' nations in modernity. Cosmopolitanism in this sense means 'an increasingly homogeneous lifestyle among the information elite that transcends the cultural borders of all societies' (Castells, 1996: 417).

Isin and Wood (1999) view the potential of cosmopolitan citizenship as a way to contest the notion of sovereignty, seeing the city as a key site for this strategy. This is also a 'professional citizenship' where professionals are seen to be the clearest articulation of the cosmopolitan aspects of the city - they control cultural capital. Developing this idea Mayhew (1997) looks at how elite professional groups gain power and legitimacy by controlling the circulation of discourse. Although Mayhew does not analyse the city as such, it could be suggested that within this framework the city can be read as the epitome of a dominated space, with a strong emphasis on 'political' controlling the flows non-linguistic codes associated with the postmodernism economy and latterly the 'information society' (Castells, 1996). These flows can include images such as adverts, sports, buildings and other such iconic symbols of the city. Certainly in information-rich societies the idea of the city as a discursive space (Delanty, 2000) is vital as it conveys the importance of information (Castells, 1996), often in the form of discourse, to the formation of collective

identities. Although providing the focus for this dissertation, architecture is just one such form of discursive space.

As with some of the other interdisciplinary terms used in the dissertation the concept of 'region' remains poorly elucidated in much academic writing. In trying to clarify this extremely vague term Rappoport (1990) suggests that the notion of sovereignty is key to a coherent definition. He demonstrates how the Latin origin of the term (from *regere,* to rule or govern) was bound up with the notion of political control; the term is still used widely in political science and international relations literature to specify the strictly territorial basis of government. Obviously the more elastic the definition of region then the greater number of regions we can demarcate (depending, of course, which criteria are being used), but this is not to say that the concept of the region is devoid of any meaning or use as a theoretical concept. Regions do exist where there is a degree of similarity of cultural attributes (or geographical, or social, or economic, or political), and can be organized around architecture, religion, language, ethnicity, norms and values, work/non work, diet, sporting allegiances and a whole range of other criteria. The important point is that regions tend to be defined in terms of a number of attributes rather than a distinctive, narrowly defined criteria - 'a region is thus homogeneous only taken as a whole in comparison to other regions' (Rapoport, 1990: 274). As Rapoport (1990) also points out 'regional' is often equated with 'traditional' and so, almost by association, with the rural as opposed to urban. Although perhaps stretching this association a little (and falling back on somewhat contested dichotomies), it is possible to see regions as local as opposed to cosmopolitan, peripheral as opposed to central, as well as traditional instead of modern. The important point for the development of this dissertation is that these 'distinctions' imply, construct and maintain collective identities. In terms of Schutz's definition of 'social reality,' regions have significance for social actors as they mark out the cultural praxis of one region from

another in the collective imagination. Tensions between cosmopolitanism and the nation, or between the universal and particular, have found many architectural expressions.

The new significance of place due to globalization (as was described in Chapter Three) has meant that sociologists increasingly feel the city has the potential for a reflexive resolution between universal and particular, or cosmopolitanism and nationalism. Also over the last few decades the contestations between universal, modern architectural styles (such as the International Style) and regional architecture (such as Critical Regionalism – see below) have been recast as negotiations between the global and the local. The sites of these contestation are now situated both in real and 'virtual' spaces, frequently where global and the local intersect - these are the new political spaces in which identities are formed. Cosmopolitan citizenship almost by definition involves a notion of cultural contestation, with new groups and identities competing in the 'new' social spaces of globalization and increasingly challenging the ability of the nation-state to create and support stable collective identities.

Critical Regionalism: The Postmodern Architecture?

'The more that societies try to recover their identity beyond the global logic of uncontrolled power of flows, the more that they need an architecture which exposes their own reality, without faking beauty from a transhistorical spatial repertoire.... either the new architecture builds the palaces of the new masters, thus exposing their deformity; or it roots itself into places, thus into culture, and into people' (Castells, 1996: 420-3).

It could be suggested that capitalism flourishes in spaces with no strong sense of identity, as cultural and social idiosyncrasies serve to create resistance to the standardizing aspects

within the project of economic globalization.[84] It has been against this backdrop that interest in the potential of vernacular architecture as a form of cultural resistance has re-emerged. The hugely influential architectural theorist Bernard Tschumi cites the art historian Scully, echoing his sentiment that 'the most important movement in architecture today is the revival of the vernacular.... and [its] reintegration into the mainstream of modern architecture in its fundamental aspect: the structure of communities' (Scully, cited in Tschumi, 1997: 227). Chapter Two illustrated that Western architectural discourses have long been dominated by questions of national, cultural, and ethnic identities and given the larger global context of accelerated interconnection the vernacular style of building rooted in place has become ever more polarized from architecture driven primarily by the demands of a capitalist economy. The various architectural strategies that set out to mediate this dichotomy tend to fall under the rubric of Critical Regionalism.

Here I argue that the broad shift in citizenship identification from the nation to the city has been articulated in a number of different ways; this dissertation focuses on how this shift has been represented architecturally. The most notable attempt to link architecture with collective regional identity can be found in the discourse of Critical Regionalism. Based loosely around the writings of Frampton (1979, 1983, 1990) and Tzonis and Lefairve (1992), Critical Regionalism strives to create a contextualized architecture that still engages with the wider, more universal aspects of the social. Critical Regionalism was a popular discourse in the 1980s, emerging through a critique of the prevailing International Style that, as the ultimate expression of modernism, had strong universalizing tendencies (see Chapter Two). Critical Regionalism was an attempt to imbue architecture with the cultural characteristics of a given region or community, to particularize the built environment. In short the architecture associated with Critical Regionalism attempts to reconcile the culturally particular with the culturally universal. Although having come in for stringent

[84] In his oft-cited text *The McDonaldization of Society* George Ritzer presents strategies for coping and subverting the standardizing, rationalized structures of institutions that encourage culturally homogeneous mass consumption (Ritzer, 1996: 178-204)

criticism within architectural theory, I believe that Critical Regionalism has renewed potential for understanding post-national identity. The changes associated with globalizing processes have rejuvenated the relevance of Critical Regionalism as a way to codify, or to contest, regional, ethnic, religious and, most importantly for this dissertation, national identities.

Critical Regionalism is located in the broader discourse of postmodern architecture,[85] resultantly supporting a return to meaning and symbolism in buildings. As was briefly outlined in Chapter Two, modern architecture tended to impose universals on the built environment. Although it is not necessary to go into too much detail or complex definitions,[86] generally I would like to argue that in some sense postmodern architecture heralded a return to both meaning and cultural particularism within the built environment. Postmodern architecture in its regional or vernacular forms celebrates 'community' cultures as opposed to globalized capital, and it is in this way that the approach can be read as a form of cultural struggle. Of course, an initial, some would say insurmountable, problem with postmodern architecture is one of definition, to which postmodernism seems very resistant. On a formal level at least, postmodernism can be seen as the cultural trends which react, respond or more precisely suggest a rupture from, the earlier modernist principles briefly outlined in Chapter Two. In architecture specifically these modernist principles were most clearly articulated by the International Style that was prevalent in the 1980s. Broadly speaking postmodern architecture is anti-universal, as it has strong bonds to traditional or classical elements of style; a key aspect of postmodern design is carrying styles or practices to extremes, to radicalize certain elements of modernist design. The postmodern in architecture then refers to principles that suggest a discontinuity with and a

[85] It was suggested in Chapter Three that postmodernity is not the most useful theoretical framework for explaining contemporary conditions of action or the role of the nation-state within these conditions. However, postmodernism (the cultural component of postmodernity) was such an influential discourse in architecture, where the term originated, it is necessary to outline the main tenets of the debate here to develop the dissertation with reference to contemporary buildings in Part Three.

[86] For more on this see Jencks ([1977] 1991).

reaction against these earlier modernist architectural principles. So, 'if there is something new in postmodernism, it is not the radical critique of modernity, but the redirection of this critique' (Wellmer, 1991: vii).

So, is the postmodern regional aesthetic the language of cultural, and more specifically architectural, empowerment? Regionalism has certainly been a central tenet of postmodernism, having been especially prevalent in the domain of architectural practice and criticism. Broadly speaking regionalism in architecture denotes a built environment firmly 'rooted' in specific regional and cultural practices, with regionally 'authentic' architecture paying heed to local specificities of topology, climate, available building materials, and local cultural traditions and beliefs. Regionalism is bound up with postmodern architecture inasmuch as it is diametrically opposed to the universalism and rationalism associated with modernism.[87] However, it is important to stress that although postmodern architecture has strong links with regionalism and place, it would be incorrect to see this relationship as an organic, apolitical one. Crilley reminds us that much postmodern architecture, with its striking façades and local references 'is fully incorporated into the ideological apparatus of place marketing, playing a major role in mediating perceptions of urban change' (Crilley, 1993: 231). Certainly many of the postmodern projects assessed in the next part of the dissertation would seem to bear out this claim, with many postmodern designs part of political projects. This argument is explored in greater detail over the next three chapters.

Colquhoun locates the 1920s as a key decade for the development of architectural regionalism, arguing that 'it should be seen as the stage on which a deep conflict of ideologies was still being enacted' (Colquhoun, 1997: 14). These ideological conflicts had their origins in eighteenth century Romanticism, specifically in the realisation by

[87] To complicate this much-simplified model it is clear universals and rationalism did not triumph unequivocally in the modern movement; the reality was a much more contested one. As Colquhoun (1997) points out universal rationalism was only one aspect of the modern movement; he looks at the huge influence that the Mediterranean vernacular had on the quintessentially modern Le Corbusier's buildings (cubic forms, white walls etc) and on the modern movement as a whole.

Europeans that ancient cultures (other than antique/biblical) had existed. The interest in such vernaculars led to an increased awareness of the non-Western other. Colquhoun contends that in most cases the concept of regional architecture 'was more an object of desire than an objective fact.... the doctrine of regionalism is based on an ideal social model' (Colquhoun, 1997: 17). In Charles Jencks' seminal *Post-Modern*[88] *Architecture* he locates the origins of postmodern architecture in debates around buildings circa 1950 (Jencks, 1977: 81). He contends that the buildings at the centre of stylistic controversies were the ones with 'vague or repressed historical allusions', ironically a similar approach to the historically eclectic buildings designed in the Victorian era. Jencks cites the 'schizophrenic cross' between styles married in one architectural expression as the ultimate expression of postmodern architecture; postmodern buildings often display historicism and futurism in the same façade for example. Jencks locates Phillip Johnson as the most influential architect for postmodernism as in deviating from the ubiquitous and hegemonic modern/International Style. Johnson saw the problem to be addressed as one of historicism. Indeed Johnson's scathing attacks on modernist architecture in the 1950s and 1960s confronted the modernist architects' retreat from responsibility of formal choices and styles. Because of this his contribution to postmodern architectural theory was, according to Jencks, hugely significant. Johnson's desire to break with the modern movement, as best represented by Mies Van der Rohe, is underlined when he says 'Mies is such a genius! But I grew old! And bored! My direction is clear; *eclectic tradition*.... I try to pick up what I like throughout history. We cannot *know* history' (Johnson, cited in Jencks, [1977] 1991: 82 - emphasis added). Such an ironic, playful statement, like so much postmodern architecture, favours eclectic, regionally and culturally specific buildings, which includes historical references in its repertoire of symbols.

[88] The hyphen in Jencks' title is not incidental, as it further compounds the disjunction between the modern and what follows.

The architectural refrain of Critical Regionalism develops the concept of regionalism, which had been such a fundamental part of architecture in the age of nation-building (see Chapter Two) as well as in postmodern discourses. This type of architectural production attempted to link building styles to place, whether by outward and obvious 'motifs', such as regional materials, plants, text, or other cultural references, or by more abstract associations that become attached to styles (as was the case with Gothic in Victorian Britain). Tzonis and Lefairve see Critical Regionalism as a discourse that 'uphold[s] the individual and local architectonic features against more universal and abstract ones' (Tzonis and Lefairve, 1992: 178). In this sense Critical Regionalism can also be viewed as another way of recasting the tension between universalism and particularism. Regionalism in architecture involves the idea that

> built environments are more than buildings. They comprise those *systems of settings* within which people live, act, and behave. These in turn comprise *cultural landscapes*, which now include most landscapes; all, even 'natural' settings, have been greatly modified by human action. The study of regionalism in environmental design, therefore, concerns the properties of cultural landscapes of regions (Rappoport, 1990: 272 - emphasis in original).

In contrast to previous, more romantic forms of regionalism, the new regionalism of the 1970s and 1980s were said to be 'critical' (Frampton, 1973, 1983; Tzonis and Lefairve, 1992). However, as Tzonis and Lefairve themselves point out (1992), the term 'Critical Regionalism' is somewhat of an oxymoron, as regionalism seems to connote positive, even conservative, values while 'critical' suggests radicalism. Of course, in the sociological tradition critique has its origins in the work of Hegel, Marx, and the Frankfurt School, and finds a contemporary expression in the work of Habermas. In this tradition critique has a transformatory potential as it challenges both subject and object, deconstructing taken-for-granted assumptions. Critical architecture (by definition) must maintain a high degree of reflexivity and self-consciousness, as it is this ability that allows the universal aspects of

civilization to be mediated to particular contexts. In terms of architecture, this critical viewpoint could be based cognitively and aesthetically on 'defamiliarization' (Tzonis and Lefairve, 1992: 18). Tzonis and Lefairve (1992) also argue that regionalism has frequently operated as a 'powerful tool' for populism. For Tzonis and Lefaivre the critical potential of architecture is derived from not only resisting the erosion of local culture but also from removing regional elements from their natural contexts so as to defamiliarize them thus creating a challenging 'estrangement' that encourages reflexive thought. Basically, this strategy's intention is the preservation of 'difference' in a world of increasing and seemingly inexorable homogenisation, and such strategies often fall under the rubric of 'anti-globalization' or perhaps more generally 'cultural resistance.' Tzonis and Lefairve's strategy is a more obviously 'postmodern' one than is Frampton's, as the idea of defamiliarization is taken up by postmodern architects such as Venturi in his 'playful', semantic and deconstructed architecture which parodies, borrows from and challenges architectural paradigms from the past and also from other regions. Venturi (1979) suggested that architects should concentrate on the facades of buildings, loading them with meaning so that they would operate in the manner of a 'billboard.' Another consequence of such regionalism can be to offer an architectural resistance; to 'express aspirations of liberation from the brute force of *a priori* dogmas imposed by a power seen as foreign and illegitimate' (Tzonis and Lefairve, 1992: 17). The oppressive advance of technology, bureaucracy and rationalization coupled symbiotically with the ever-expanding market were the forces against which the Critical Regionalism of the 1970s and 1980s rallied. Architects such as Frampton, and Tzonis and Lefairve saw these functionalizing, technocratic structures eroding the very fabric of (especially urban) sociality.

However, Critical Regionalism is linked to the more nationalist or populist architecture, associated with the aforementioned regionalism, because it too attempts to create an architecture of 'place' through designing buildings that articulate a sense of a particular

place. Often, in the course of delivering this sense of place, Critical Regionalism reacts strongly against universalism in architecture. In this sense the privileging of local/regional determinants over universal ones can be seen as an attempt to create a 'place' or ascribe a 'social identity.' Frampton (1983) develops this idea by suggesting that the vehicle of populism in architecture is often the 'simple-minded' attempt to recover a lost vernacular. Such a project by definition does not encourage a critical approach to reality (or indeed towards architecture) argues Frampton, but rather hankers for an instantly understandable, already-processed rhetorical attempt which generates any level of gratification; the danger with such an approach is that '[u]nless one guards against such a convergence, one will confuse the resistant capacity of a critical practice with the demagogic tendencies of Populism' (Frampton, 1983: 21).

Rudofsky's seminal *Architecture Without Architects* ([1964] 1981) generated interest in particularistic 'vernacular' architecture. For Rudofsky such regionally rooted architecture 'attempts to break down our narrow concepts of the art of building by introducing the unfamiliar world of non-pedigreed architecture. It is so little-known that we don't have a name for it. For want of a generic label, we shall call it vernacular, anonymous, spontaneous, indigenous, rural as the case may be' (Rudofsky, [1964] 1981: 1). Rudofsky championed architecture that was built by its future inhabitants who will literally live the results of their project, arguing that this architecture was not designed for mass consumption but rather for human comfort and interaction (again this can be contrasted to the International Style).

Obviously not all aspects of a cultural landscape lend themselves to the retention of regional characteristics. Rappoport suggests that vernacular modes of buildings can be ignored, rejected, copied or learnt from. For him only the first two options should be dismissed. This is perhaps worth qualifying, for attempts to simply 'copy' buildings in the vernacular will also often lead to the sentimental, populist building from which *Critical*

Regionalism claims to move away. Rappoport also looks at the important fluid, abstract elements of a cultural landscape such as an area's ambience or its people. Attempts to create a built environment that is in harmony with its surroundings have a history as old as architecture itself. It is, however, the 'growing alienation of person from place as well as the separation between community and region [that] has caused a reconsideration of regionalism' (Nyberg and Seif, 1990: 260). In this sense one of the main aims of Critical Regionalism is to overcome the cultural anomie that is often associated with a heterogeneous and (globally) mobile population. The potential for this 'anomie' has increased due to the interconnected, rapidly shifting globalized conditions of action described in Chapter Three.

Kenneth Frampton's essay 'Towards Critical Regionalism: Six Points for an Architecture of Resistance' (1983) can be seen as the most coherent call for such a move in architecture. His work is fundamentally concerned with the alienation of person from place and the potential of architecture to play a role in re-embedding the individual actor into the community or the region.[89] Ricouer's article 'Universal Civilization and National Cultures' famously asks the question: 'how to become modern and return to sources; how to revive an old dormant civilization and take part in universal civilization?' (Ricouer, 1965: 277). It is this discourse, albeit with a more distinctly architectural focus, that Kenneth Frampton engages with in his essay. Frampton argues that 'modern building is now so universally conditioned by optimized technology that the possibility of creating significant urban form has become extremely limited' (Frampton, 1983: 17). In his opinion high-tech architectural approaches associated with the 'apocalyptic thrust' of modernization have served to exacerbate the instrumental reason associated with the development of civilization. The

[89] It is possible to link Frampton's notion of Critical Regionalism to Habermas' wider project of resistance to the functionalizing of the public sphere. While not referencing it directly Frampton's work certainly fits into the Habermasian framework. In general terms, we can define community building as the intentional creation of relationships and social structures, that extend possibilities for shared identity and common action among people, outside usual patterns of economic and functional interactions. The colonization of such public space by architecture further reflects economic globalization, having the overall result of functionalizing the cultural sphere. It is also worth noting then that public space is central to conceptions of Critical Regionalism.

effect of this is a sort of colonization of particularistic local cultures by a universalizing civilization that understands only means and ends, harbouring no potential for either cultural resistance or creativity. For Frampton this optimized technology is best articulated by the 'serpentine freeway' that restricts cities architecturally by ranking the needs of citizens subservient to those of the automobile. This type of universalizing culture is also evident in the modernist high-rise block of the International Style, because such buildings lead to architectural homogeneity as urban design becomes constricted by land prices that impose an instrumentally rational rationale.

Chapter Three argued that although a certain degree of standardization has occurred due to globalized economic conditions, what we are observing is an organization of difference rather than homogenization of culture generally and architecture specifically. For all London is coming to look more like Paris, (due variously to the pedestrianization of city centres, outdoor seating and generally more ecologically conscious cityscapes) a 'Globalized Style' or 'European Style' of architecture has not emerged with an attendant aesthetic. Frampton does, however, qualify this move away from the cultural universals associated with the enlightenment. Critical Regionalism involves a process of 'double mediation' (Frampton, 1983); not only does it serve to deconstruct universalizing cultures (which ultimately must be admitted to some degree or other) but it also offers a 'manifest critique' of universalizing tendencies by imposing some limits on the optimization of technology. In other words a successful strategy of Critical Regionalism must remove itself from simply consuming or appropriating other cultural forms through referencing, although not exclusively, the specific place-form. Frampton's strategy does not necessarily exclude the potential of universals within architecture altogether, but rather it attempts to mediate this potential.

According to Frampton a central strategy for cultural resistance is the architectural 'arriere-garde,' which is the only strategy within architectural theory that 'has the capacity

to cultivate an identity-giving culture while at the same time having discreet recourse to universal technique' (Frampton, 1983: 20). As was briefly stated in Part One, the avant-garde[90] is the search 'for a new basis of culture, because culture [can] no longer be established on the self-evident continuation of tradition' (Heynen, 1998: 27). The arriere-garde on the other hand 'distances itself equally from the Enlightenment myth of progress and from a reactionary, unrealistic impulse to return to the architectonic forms of the pre-industrial past' (Frampton, 1983: 20). With this 'arriere-garde' comes a strong historicism, not the overblown references to history that characterize Gothic architecture in Victorian Britain, but a defence of cultural particularism and of traditional community. It is this aspect of Critical Regionalism that has come in for the criticism within architecture, with Frampton accused of a parochial romanticism that attempts to limit any progressive tendencies within the built environment.[91] Ultimately though, what Frampton is trying to develop is a defence of appropriate technology and of cultural particularism in the face of perceived homogenization. It is in this approach that Frampton articulates most clearly the 'postmodern,' anti-utopian philosophy that suggests an end to the notion of linear progression in both science and art. Although this philosophy echoes the Victorian belief that the past is something worth preserving, replicating and aspiring to, it is the regionalized traditions that Frampton defends most staunchly.

The link between building and human existence becomes more tenuous alongside technological advancements, which can serve to cloud the relationship between the two (Heidegger, 1971) - 'dwelling is in the first instance associated with tradition, security and harmony, with a life situation that guarantees connectedness and meaningfulness. Considerations such as these underlie the dilemmas that architecture is faced with'

[90] The paradoxically radical yet seemingly apolitical nature of the avant-garde does not seem to translate well to the built environment. Indeed, the *rejection* of the theoretical avant-garde by German modernist, functionalist architects (for example Hannes Meyer and Ludwig Hilberseimer) has had more of an influence in architectural theory.

[91] I am grateful to a number of architects in the KVM practice in Berlin for bringing this criticism to my attention, and in particular I would like to thank Paul Stringer for his input on this topic.

(Heynen, 1999: 18). It is by this 'standing against' that we are reminded of the importance of the public place-form, both politically and physically. We are reminded here of Arendt's writings on legitimate political authority and the importance of the 'polis.' Frampton juxtaposes her stance with that of the postmodern architect Robert Venturi who asserts that Americans do not need public space because they should be at home watching TV. Frampton sees this approach as undermining the very basis of urbanization – namely sociality. In his famous essay Frampton attempts to link the liberative potential of the place-form to the critical practice of architecture generally by uncovering 'the latent political and resistant potential of the place-form' (Frampton, 1984: 26).

Just as there are cultural (and architectural) universals that should be resisted or mediated then Critical Regionalism asserts that there are similar moves in light and climate control that seeks to impose similarities on the whole of the built environment, regardless of place. Frampton calls for a more critically engaged relationship between architecture and nature, with a move away from features such as the ubiquitous air conditioning machines or fixed glass windows that are 'indicative of domination by universal technique' (Frampton, 1984: 27). Frampton uses the illuminating example of the practice of lighting in art galleries. Not only does such lighting seek to impose a 'placeless' lighting practice (thus destroying the potentially transformative 'aura' of a naturally lit picture or sculpture) it also serves to apply a static, commodifying condition on the art on display. Here Frampton describes what Walter Benjamin called the 'atrophy of experience;' the experience of the aura and authenticity of a work of art becoming devalued as a result of its interface with (modern) technologies (such as television, tape recording, film, or photography). Following on from this 'nature versus culture' perspective Frampton examines the 'capacity of the body to read the environment in terms other than those of sight' to 'suggest a potential strategy for resisting the domination of universal technology' (Frampton, 1984: 28). This aspect of Critical Regionalism attempts to reintroduce the importance of the tactile as an important

part of the assessment of the built environment. This idea is made all the more interesting by the emphasis placed on signs, symbols and other forms of visual communication by the cultural logic of postmodernism. 'The tactile and the tectonic have the capacity to transcend the mere appearance of the technical in much the same way as the place-form has the potential to withstand the relentless onslaught of global modernization' (Frampton, 1984: 29). However, in turning to the 'palpable presence' of masonry, or the intensity of heat, the cold, light or dark within architecture Frampton returns implicitly to a building's function. Vitally for this dissertation this also serves to deconstruct the Western bias to interpreting and understanding cultural landscapes solely in terms of the visual perspective. This fits in well with Frampton's wider project, as it allows for place to be imbued on a building in terms of its material construction, which obviously further connects architecture to region/collective identity.

As Critical Regionalism is a theoretical approach as opposed to a style, such as Gothic for example, it is difficult to identify 'Critically Regional' buildings, although there are countless thousands that display *some* of the resistant architectural devices identified by Frampton as key to any such movement. Many buildings use local materials not to 'root' a building into a place, but frequently for ease of transport, financial savings or other such practical factors. Indeed even the quintessentially modernist architects paid heed to local materials in their designs. For example Aalto frequently supplemented his 'Scandinavian' modernism with timber to give his work a rooted feel, and even Le Corbusier used different masonry techniques to reflect something on the environment in which the building was situated (see for example the Villa Savoye). However it is a recent project by the British architect Nicholas Grimshaw that is the contemporary building that perhaps comes closest to realizing the somewhat vague notion of Critical Regionalism. The lottery-funded Downland Gridshell building (see Table Three, Appendix) is constructed entirely from wood using traditional craft-based techniques, and is rooted to the topography of the

surrounding hills. It is very difficult to identify examples of other high-profile buildings in this vein, and arguably this difficulty is part of the problem with the notion of Critical Regionalism. Although many buildings display aspects of Frampton's architecture of resistance very few can be identified as having realized the strategy completely, a fact perhaps underlined by the lack of architectural examples of Critical regionalism in Frampton's writings.

Ulrich Beck is a contemporary sociologist who bemoans a 'lack of place' in the built environment. In *Democracy Without Enemies* Beck devotes a chapter to 'The Open City: Architecture and Reflexive Modernity' to examine the idea of architecture under conditions of reflexive modernity. Beck uses Kandinsky's notions of Either-Or and And to chart the two potential cities of the future. Beck suggests that the city of Either-Or is a modernist city based around the delimitation of space and the desire for control; resultantly Either-Or is exclusive by its very nature. The city of And is characterized by diversity and a willingness to embrace the other (science *and* art, women *and* men as opposed to *either* science *or* art, men *or* women). From this rather abstract standpoint Beck suggests that it is ecological crisis and criminality that have called the Either-Or project of the metropolis into question. He claims this crisis is reflected in architecture that has dominated the post-war city. Beck argues that the architectonic expression that should be given to the city of And is a reflexive building which 'discovers the history of the place and expands it into the public sphere' (Beck, 1999: 120). It is in the planning and execution of such 'open-minded' public space that Beck feels the And city can be realized. Importantly though this city does not hark back to utopian tendencies within 'fundamentally overtaxed' modern architecture. This reflexive architecture is of a more spontaneous nature than that of the organized public sphere (museums, libraries, city halls etc.) as its logic is: ' 'even if I cannot change society, I would at least like to influence the way people pass through the spaces, the way they perceive their connection and cohesion in the spaces, including the built-in contradictions' '

(Beck, 1999: 121). So then, for Beck we should be left with less ambitious or heroic designs, and more rooted, publicly aware architecture.

Calls for architecture to adhere to communitarian ideals, indeed to attempt to build 'community', are all too easily associated with nationalist tendencies and attempts to reclaim an often non-existent historical golden age – architecture becomes an articulation of a defensive, parochial approach to the social, comparable to the 'defence of the nation' logic espoused by some of the right-wing political groups assessed earlier. Real and theoretical problems are associated with this, as calls for architecture to be at the forefront of an anti-globalizing resistance are unrealistic, as architecture is almost always reliant on an economic model of commissions and competitions to sustain the profession. The importance of economic globalization for architecture is that under such interconnected conditions the difficulty of sustaining and adapting democratic principles and institutions becomes apparent. In line with Castells' work on architecture (1996, 1997), Beck suggests that the contemporary challenge for architecture is a recovery of place; primarily this can be read as a defence of public space or the creation of what Beck himself refers to as *hospitable space* (Beck, 1999: 117).

Conclusion

'[I]dentity is becoming the main, and sometimes the only, source of meaning in a historical period characterized by widespread destructing of organizations, deligitimization of institutions, fading away of major social movements, and ephemeral cultural expressions' (Castells, 1996: 3).

Many have suggested that the city or region offers the most realistic site for identity-based citizenship association, as described by Castells (1996, 1997). In this argument cities are generally considered as a 'space' in which diversity and difference can be adequately represented. In such formulations the city is often contrasted with the elitist, state-dominated citizenship referents that existed in modern societies. Accordingly it is because cities are less tied to states than are nations that they are less bound up with top-down, modernist projects of national identity construction. It can be suggested that the role of the city has further obfuscated the relationship between the state and the nation. As citizens increasingly associate with the city or region then so their political allegiances to the state or nation can become less pronounced.

There are debates in architectural theory that mirror these shifts from the nation to the city. Critical Regionalism was one discourse in the 1980s that attempted to return relevance and meaning to architecture. Although not a 'style' *per* se, Critical Regionalism can be considered a general approach to the built environment that emphasized architecture should be contextualized or 'rooted' to place. This integration between buildings and communities can be achieved, according to Frampton (1979, 1984, 1990) and Tzonis and Lefairve (1992), by taking account of the cultural traditions of which architecture is a key aspect. It was the ambiguity of the concept that led to the architectural community, for the main part, rejecting the approach. Although somewhat unfashionable in contemporary architectural theory due to its inherently defensive and parochial approach, Critical Regionalism is useful for the development of this dissertation as it allows an understanding of how buildings can come to represent collective identities. Frampton's work in particular offers a basis for thinking about the development of architecture as a way of representing communities, nations, or cities. Critical Regionalism also provides a framework for considering how specific architectural motifs can be used to link a building to a place.

Frampton claims that the use of local materials, natural lighting strategies, and ecologically integrated designs are all ways of doing just this. In the next part of the dissertation I assess how some high profile contemporary architects have attempt to root their work into specific nations and cities, both by what they build and also, just as importantly, by the discourses into which they situate their buildings.

Chapter Five: Britain's Architecture? The Millennium Dome and National Identity

Introduction

It has been suggested throughout this dissertation that the relationship between the nation, the state and national identity is undergoing some fundamental changes, mainly due to processes associated with globalization. This chapter assesses why architecture has come to play an increasingly ambivalent role in the British state project today. It was argued in Part One that in the past architecture had a central role in codifying European national cultures, with states often using landmark buildings to reflect national identities and to supplement the historical narrative of memory. In Chapter Two I focused specifically on how a great deal of significant British architecture of the period 1850 to 1914 testified to the self-confidence of this nation-state as an imperial power. At this time the state self-consciously used buildings to give tangible form to abstract values. It has been a contention of this dissertation that architecture was often central to the cultural self-understanding of the nation-state in conditions of modernity.

This chapter suggests that the contemporary relationship between the British nation-state and architecture has undergone many significant transformations, also due in part to globalization. The transhistorical nature of postmodernism and its associated discourses has meant that national styles in architecture briefly outlined in Chapter Two do not exist to anywhere near the same extent that they once did. Most contemporary architectural styles, although attempting to reintegrate meaning into architecture, ironically have had the overall effect of challenging national styles of building. Nevertheless, the British state has displayed a continued interest in architecture, although arguably no longer with the same degree of mastery as it once had over the discourses surrounding prominent state-led

buildings. Instead of grandeur and pomposity, the new architectural discourses are of transparency, accessibility and, perhaps most importantly for this dissertation, a reflexive approach to the identity projects of which they are a part. Landmark buildings commissioned by governments undeniably still have overtly political purposes, but 'postmodern' architecture is not a discourse that can be readily coded around national identity, leading to tensions emerging around state-led architectural projects.

Nowhere are these ambiguities more clear than in the examples of the Millennium Dome in London, Britain (assessed here) and the Reichstag and the Jewish Museum in Berlin, Germany (assessed in the following chapter). As was established in Part Two, the way national identities are codified has changed a great deal. Chapter Four argued that most contemporary reflections of the nation most frequently take place within mass culture and are, somewhat ironically, often closely linked to specific cities. The next two chapters take examples of socially significant state-led buildings to look at how far this can be considered the case. These examples both illustrate and develop the theoretical framework that has been established throughout this dissertation. This chapter looks at contemporary attempts by the British state to reflect a (post)national identity through the controversial Millennium Dome project.

'Britain' and State-Led Architecture

'[T]he assumption that architecture has an important social and political mission is frequently elided with the question of design. As a consequence 'good design' is often though to have a significant social and political impact' (Leach, 1999: 68)

It was argued in Part Two that the nation is no longer necessarily the site of citizenship identification and that due to processes associated with globalization the state is less able to control the nation code. The state, it is often suggested, is no longer the institutional focal point for new forms of citizenship, primarily because it is unable to adequately reflect the diversity inherent in most modern societies. How have these changes impacted on specific landmark, state-led buildings that purport to represent such identities? Although an exhaustive account of contemporary British identity is not necessary for present purposes we can surmise that British identity is in the process of being redefined. The fluid nature of contemporary British identity is highlighted by much of Tariq Modood's work. He poses the question of how easy, or indeed how desirable, it is to incorporate immigrant groups into the ongoing construction of 'Britishness' (Modood, 2000). Maurice Roche has suggested that the internal fragmentation of the nation in a European context due to labour migrations requires nations to 'periodically and profoundly, re-identify, make explicit and reaffirm their 'common cultures'.... to recognize the new 'common conditions and 'ways of life' produced by culturalism, pluralism, co-existence and hybridization' (Roche, 2001a: 78). In this chapter the Millennium Dome project is viewed as one way in which the British state attempted to renegotiate a national identity that had previously not really accommodated or reflected a diverse, multicultural population.

The contested nature of contemporary British identity is underlined by the Runnymede Trust's report on the future of British society, which came to the conclusion that even the word 'British' has come to suggest a coded racism: 'Britishness.... has systematic, largely

unspoken racial connotations. Whiteness nowhere features as an explicit condition of being British, but it is widely understood.... that by extension Britishness is racially coded.'[92] The report, produced by twenty-three commissioners including Stuart Hall, Bob Heple and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, concluded that British identity was an insular and defensive notion that needed to be redefined in an open national debate (see Alibhai-Brown, 2002). Does the inherently colonial and racist nature of 'Britishness' mean that the nation code has become tainted? Is the British nation code too inherently bound up with racism, colonial attitudes and imperialism? The notion of British national identity had certainly come to have undesirable connotations for many, with the diversity and representativeness of official symbols of Britain increasingly being called into question (Modood, 2000).

Consequently the role that the state plays in creating landmark 'British' architecture has become increasingly challenged. If the nation is increasingly such a contested and fragmented concept then how can state-led architecture purport to reflect coherent national identities? Theoretical debates around the role of state-led architecture in constructions of national identity have found a substantive expression due to the British government's policy statements concerning architecture and public building. In 2000 the New Labour government set up the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment[93] (herein Cabe). Their first report (launched by, and with a foreword from, The Prime Minister Tony Blair) was entitled *Better Public Buildings*. In the report Blair promises that his government will radically improve the standard of landmark public buildings so as to leave 'a legacy of high quality buildings that can match the best of what we inherited from the Victorians.' In the report the Prime Minister frequently harks back to this, perhaps mythical, golden age when architecture 'embodied a strong sense of civic pride.' Certainly the publication of the report, as does the creation of Cabe itself, underlines the importance that the British state continues to place on architectural expressions of the nation. The

[92] From Runnymede Trust Report 'The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain' at www.runneymedetrust.org.
[93] In response to the issue of state reification raised in Chapter One, the formation of Cabe is an example of how the 'state's aims' can be expressed and contextualized through tangible, grounded institutional decisions.

subtext of the report is that the quality and appearance of key public buildings expresses a sense of the British nation, as such architecture operates as a 'badge' of the cultural community in which they are built. It is clear that the New Labour government appreciates that landmark state-led architecture present a tangible, marketable face of Britain to the rest of the world. In a bill in the House of Lords on the built environment Baroness Rawlings suggested that '[i]f new Britain is not simply to be a PR [public relations] gimmick, this Government should encourage change of the widespread attitude towards architecture.'[94]

It seems then that architecture is to play an important role in the creation of a 'New Britain.' The leading Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas has commented on this rebranding of nation, claiming that 'through the combination of money and ambition it's [Britain] trying to reinvent itself, whereas architecture has never been very popular here. In that way it's an interesting experiment to see whether it [architecture] can be reinflated by doing that.'[95] The *Better Public Buildings* report uses the oft-cited example of the role Frank H. Gehry's Guggenheim Museum in the regeneration of Bilbao. However, it is interesting to note that the role that architecture played in the regeneration of Bilbao is fundamentally at odds with the Victorian rationale for the construction of landmark civic buildings. The Victorians did not see their monuments as *catalysts* for regeneration or industrial growth, but rather as *reflections* and *celebrations* of such achievements. However, these abstract debates aside, Bilbao, formerly a declining industrial city in the Basque region, has clearly benefited a great deal from the construction of the Guggenheim, with GDP for the region increasing by 0.5%.[96] In terms of the relationship between architecture and the nation code, the extent to which The Guggenheim Museum was trying to reflect Spanish identity is highly debatable; the strategy of monumental, postmodernism architecture displayed here is more accurately described as 'build and they will come.' Such architectural projects are not necessarily

---

[94] At: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo980112/text/80112-07.htm#80112-07_spnew6

[95] *The Guardian*, 10.05.99

[96] *The Guardian*, 04.05.01

concerned with rooting a building to place through its style, use of local materials, regional cultural references or such like, but are more concerned with creating an architectural spectacle. Certainly the Guggenheim is in keeping with this aspect of the postmodern architectural discourse inasmuch as 'surface appearance and visual effect is paramount as buildings are designed from the outside in, from the vantage of an external gaze.... "the public" are positioned as consumers of visual imagery who passively receive meanings' (Crilley, 1993: 237).[97]

Philo and Kearn's edited collection *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present* (1993) focused on the 'conscious and deliberate manipulation of *culture* in an effort to enhance the appeal and interest of places' (1993: 3) and clearly the Bilbao Guggenheim project has been a prime example of such a strategy. The idea of the city as a commodity has gained a great deal of currency in many recent works of social theory. For example Sharon Zukin's work has addressed the construction of 'social representations' of the city, which include not only a city's 'material' base, such as actual buildings, production capacity and so on, but also its culture and its art (Zukin, 1995).[98] Of course, such an enquiry overlaps significantly with the concerns of this thesis, namely that architecture is one of the most important ways of representing the social in a symbolic, yet tangible, way.

It is interesting, given this general context, that the last time that the British state built civic buildings on the scale that it is now was during the Victorian period.[99] Chapter Two outlined how the Great Exhibition of 1851, including Paxton's seminal Crystal Palace, along with the many major museums, universities and government buildings, were all

---

[97] John Urry develops a similar argument in his work on *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies* (1990), in which he argues tourism has primarily become a form of visual consumption similar to more strictly economic transactions such as shopping.

[98] Of course Lewis Mumford also addressed similar questions in his seminal works. For example in the essay 'What is a City?', significantly published originally in *The Architectural Record*, Mumford conceives of the city 'in its complete sense' as a 'geographic plexus, an economic organization, an institutional process, a theatre of social action, and an aesthetic symbol of collective unity' (Mumford, [1937]1996: 185). Contemporary works have attempted to develop a critical approach to examining how such symbols of collective unity are developed.

[99] *The Observer*, 01.09.00

products of self-conscious Victorian attempts to instil civic pride and codify a distinct British national identity. However, one key difference between contemporary and Victorian architecture projects is that the buildings erected to promote civic pride in the Victorian era were frequently private commissions from 'philanthropic' individuals proud of the state's achievements. As is evidenced by the Millennium Dome project, National Lottery funding has altered this picture dramatically, with a large number of state-led (read state-funded) projects currently underway and already built. It is certainly not since the Victorian era that the state has used architecture to promote British national identity so deliberately. Many issues have contrived to make Cabe's, and more generally the state's, role concerning architecture a difficult one. Cabe's self-defined brief, according to their Corporate Strategy is to 'inject architecture into the bloodstream of the nation.'[100] As a result of their work Cabe suggest that they will not only be able to 'foster public awareness and appreciation of good design in architecture.... and encourage public involvement in its creation' but also to 'create local distinctiveness and foster people's attachment to places.' This aim of Cabe is supported by some of the arguments about the relationship between architecture and collective identities developed in Chapter Four, in particular the notion of Critical Regionalism that attempts to provide regional identities with a suitable reflection in architecture.

The passing of the year 2000 was a central reason why there were so many high-profile state commissions for buildings in Britain over the last few years – these 'Millennium Commissions' were primarily funded with money from the National Lottery. The Millennium Commission was set up as an independent body in 1993 under the National Lottery Act, and was one of the 'Good Causes' funded by profits from the National Lottery – the Commission distributed Lottery money to mark millennium celebrations under four broad headings: Projects, People festival and Dome. The House of Commons Select

[100] At www.cabe.org.uk

Committee on the Millennium Dome project confirmed that the 'Dome is a creature of the National Lottery' and underlined that taxpayers' money should not go towards it.

To date the Millennium Commission has spent over £1.2 billion on over 200 architectural projects, with many of these public buildings erected to mark the millennium. There has been a level of financial partnership for many of these projects, which have attracted additional funding from local authorities, private investors, European grants such as the European Regional Development Fund, and other grants. has further intensified popular debates around architecture in Britain, as many of the state-led architectural projects to celebrate the millennium (including the Millennium Dome and Portcullis House) are widely considered 'failures.' Other more popular state-funded architectural projects to mark the Millennium include the London Eye (Markus Barfield); the Gateshead Music Centre (Norman Foster); the Centre For Life in Newcastle (Terry Farrell); Michael Wilford's Stirling Prize winning Lowry Centre, and Libeskind's Imperial War Museum (both Salford); Peckham Library, again a Stirling Prize winner (Alsop and Stormer); and the New Art Gallery in Walsall by Caruso St. John (see Table Three, Appendix). Hugh Pearman, the architecture critic for the Sunday Times, believes that with these state-funded architectural projects 'some have succeeded better than others. All, however, represent what may, in years to come, be seen as a national spirit of renewal.'[101] Situated in these wider discourses about the role of state-led architecture in Britain, the Millennium Dome can be seen as the crystallization of some these debates.

[101] At www.britcoun.org/arts/design/architecurehugh.htm

The Millennium Dome and British National Identity

'Although there may be some well-intentioned search for a unifying national symbol, normally the choice of symbol, if examined, reveals other, structural, social and economic tensions' (Vale, 1992: 49).

Developing the theme of this quote, how far can the Millennium Dome be considered indicative of other structural, social and economic tensions inherent in the British state's project of nation codification? Here I argue that the Dome is a building that illustrates the contested nature of landmark, state-led architecture in a post-national context. One of the most controversial buildings in the world, the Millennium Dome is certainly the most politically charged piece of architecture Britain has ever seen. It was built on a 181-acre site on the North Greenwich peninsula at the River Thames, which had been bought from British Gas in February 1997 for £20 million. The area had been derelict for over twenty years and the potential to redevelop such a run-down piece of land was one of the main reasons for the choice of this site according to the House of Commons Select Committee Report. The Greenwich site was also preferable to other options as the GMT line cut across the north of the site, fitting in well with the theme of 'Time' that was central to the project. The building itself is a huge one, covering an enclosed area of 100,000 m^2 with a circumference of over one kilometre, measuring 365m in diameter and 50m at its highest point (see Photo 3, Appendix).[102] At the heart of the Dome was a central arena conceived as 'an open, flexible theatrical space'[103] to be filled with various visitor attractions or 'Zones.' Overall the Millennium Dome project cost £789 million over the period it was

[102] Projects of this size tend to attract rather strange comparisons in terms of size. For example, the official government website claims that the Dome could contain 12 full-size football pitches, 1,100 Olympic-sized swimming pools or 18,000 London double-decker buses. It would also take Niagara Falls about 15 minutes to fill the Dome (all from www.culture.gov.uk/millennium/Dome.html). Should you want to, you could also lay the Eiffel Tower on its side in the Dome. The House of Commons Select Committee Report on the Millennium Dome gave some inherently 'British' scale measures: apparently the Dome is capable of housing thirteen Albert Halls or two Wembley Stadiums.

[103] From Richard Rogers Partnership at www.richardrogers.co.uk

open according to the National Audit Office.[104] However the structure of the Millennium Dome itself cost approximately £42 million, and was handed over 'on schedule and under budget, on 30th September 1999.'[105] The architect chiefly responsible for the Millennium Dome was the respected British architect Lord Richard Rogers, who has designed many other high-profile buildings across the world, such as the Pompidou Centre in Paris (1971, with Renzo Piano), Lloyds of London (1990), HSBC Bank HQ in Singapore, significant parts of Podszammer Platz in Berlin (1998). Rogers is perhaps *the* most influential contemporary British architect, with this claim supported by his role as Head of Urban Taskforce, a government think-tank set up to offer advice on the regeneration of British cities and regions. Accordingly Rogers has written quite widely on the built environment, although predictably this work has mainly focused on the role of architecture within regeneration strategies.

The Millennium Dome did have some very comparable predecessors of course, with the precedents of 1851 and 1951 at the forefront of the minds of many. The Great Exhibition and The Festival of Britain had established central places in the construction of British national identity, and so too, for very different reasons, has the Millennium Dome. The Dome project clearly continued the tradition of state-led cultural projects offering a definition of the nation, and of course for present purposes it is the architecture that these celebrations have engendered that is of most interest. As was demonstrated in Chapter Two, frequently state-led projects have similar aims, typically an encouragement to free trade and a celebration of national culture. Michael Manser, a leading British architect, underlines a central claim of this dissertation by arguing that '[w]e [the British] have always had a tradition of putting up buildings to coincide with major events, just look at the Crystal Palace and the Festival Hall.'[106] The Tory MP Michael Heseltine, who was responsible for the inception of the project, also believed that 'it is right in the conduct of

[104] For a detailed breakdown of these figures see McGuigan and Gilmore (2002).
[105] From Richard Rogers Partnership at www.richardrogers.co.uk
[106] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/millennium_Dome/60378.stm

the nation's affairs every so often for nations to make a great statement of confidence, of great commitment to their own pride in the past and their optimism for the future.'[107] From a sociological perspective what becomes clear is that the 'statement of confidence' that the Millennium Dome has come to reflect is very different to those presented by the Crystal Palace, and, to a lesser extent, the Festival Hall. I suggest that the contested nature of contemporary British identity has led the state to occupy an ambiguous position in terms of codifying the nation. However, the similarities between the architecturally-centred state projects of 1851, 1951 and 2000 still evidence a central claim of Maurice Roche's recent work on 'megaevents', namely that such large scale state-led events provide elites with a way of constructing national culture, while also attempting to integrate mass populations into the state project (Roche, 1998, 2000).

The design brief for the Dome commission included 25 'stimulus questions,' devised by the Dome's initial Creative Director Steven Bayley, which were to give competing architects an idea of what the building should be. Some of these questions were at an abstract level, such as:

- Question Four: Is God Dead?
- Question Eight: Who are we – body, mind and soul?
- Question Twelve: What is the meaning of life?

Of more interest for this dissertation are the questions that highlighted the Dome was to reflect a sense of 'British Identity:'

- Question Three: What are we like?
- Question Fifteen: Is Britain a green and pleasant land?
- Question Sixteen: What is Britain's place?
- Question Twenty-Two: How many races make a nation?[108]

---

[107] www.parliament .the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0202.htm
[108] All questions taken from www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~weirds/newDome1.htm – Millennium Factor: First Page on the Dome)

In a more grounded part of the design brief The Millennium Commission had asked architects to design 'an all-weather venue capable of accommodating a large audience for one-off events and entertainment.'[109] Richard Rogers' own interpretation of the design 'problem' supports this functional description of the commission brief, as he surmised: 'What was wanted was a place where everyone could have a massive participatory exhibition. A festival if you like, and it continues that festival concept like the Crystal Palace or the Eiffel Tower or the Festival of Britain in 1951.'[110] Mike Davis, a founding partner of Richard Rogers Partnership, also suggests that the Millennium Dome provided 'a simple, honest, elegant and minimalist answer to a very big, simple problem'[111] – namely the problem of enclosing the said exhibition. This claim to a functional solution to the design problem of enclosing a national exhibition echoes Paxton's description of his Crystal Palace over 150 years earlier. Again it is significant that Davis should claim that his architects did *not* set out to create a great architectural monument, but rather a natural public gathering place. Perhaps attempting to further distance the Rogers architects from the huge controversy being generated by the project, Davis suggested six months before the Dome was to open that '[t]he Dome should not be over-read. In fact, it is not an architecture project at all. It is a lightweight, loose-fit, friendly cover.... [i]t is no accident that it does this [showing how the yellow masts of the Dome resemble outstretched arms].'[112] The significance of this rather tenuous symbolism (see Photo 4, Appendix) is assessed in Chapter Seven, so for present purposes it is enough to say that it was inevitable that at some level the Dome would be 'read', as it was a large, expensive state commission purporting to reflect 'Britishness' at the millennium. By suggesting they had just designed a 'solution' to a 'problem' Davis is harking back to modernist architect's rhetoric whereby designs were driven solely by function (see Chapter Two). So, despite the protestations of

---

[109] At www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0202.htm
[110] From an interview with Richard Rogers at www.abc.net.au/arts/architecture/rogers.htm
[111] *The Guardian*, 26.7.99
[112] *The Guardian*, 27.7.99

the designers, the Millennium Dome, just as were the Festival Hall and the Crystal Palace, symbolizes to some extent a particular British national identity.

However, what does not exist in British architecture today to the same extent as did in 1851 and 1951 is a debate about national styles, often referred to as the question of 'in which style to build.' As Chapter Two demonstrated this was a major preoccupation for Victorian architects and even a pressing concern for some politicians of the era. Although contemporary politicians still have a huge input into landmark architectural projects, as is evidenced by the case of the Millennium Dome, the lack of an unambiguously 'British Style' of architecture has led to discontent in some quarters. As was illustrated by the publication of the *Better Public Buildings* report, some contemporary politicians have bemoaned the decline in commissions for grandiose public buildings. Given this backdrop, it is perhaps understandable that the Victorian age is often held up as a point of comparison for contemporary state buildings. Indeed the MP Denis MacShane believes that 'Britain has one of the greatest public architectural heritages. For two and a half centuries, from the days of Inigo Jones, through Hawksmoor, Nash, Wren, Pugin and Barry, to the confident statements of imperial Britain, British public building had measure and feel to it. That is not the case today. What has gone wrong?'[113] In answer to McShane's question, it can be suggested that the postmodern style of architecture has had the effect, although integrating meaning and symbolism back into buildings (Venturi, 1979), of challenging stylistic and national boundaries. As was briefly outlined in Chapter Four, postmodern architecture celebrates hybridity of styles and aesthetic disjuncture; the cumulative effective of the discourse has been to challenge the already fragile architectural boundaries and styles of modernity.[114]

---

[113] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199697/cmhansrd/vo970214/debtext/70214-21.htm#70214-21_spnew4

[114] Of course there are many examples of high profile architects becoming more 'Europeanized' in that it is now more common for architects to be working in transnational contexts. This not to say that a 'European style' of architecture is emerging – there is very little evidence for this – rather that as the top architects are what Engin Isin and Patricia Wood (1999) refer to as 'professional citizens,' a cosmopolitan group not tied to

Ironically though the contemporary designs closest to a 'British Style' of architecture are to be found in 'High Tech,' the style in which the Millennium Dome is built. Pioneered by Rogers and his old Team 4 partner Sir Norman Foster (it is again interesting to note that the key 'High Tech' architects are English), the style is named after the futuristic aesthetic of their designs. Of course, defining architectural styles is always difficult, but what we can say with a degree of certainty that British High Tech emerged around the work of Foster and Rogers,[115] and that it is perhaps this more than anything else that accounts for its 'Britishness.' As a style High Tech 'purports to adhere to a strict code of honesty of expression, that it usually embodies ideas about industrial production, that it uses industries other than the building industry as sources both of technology and of imagery, and that it puts a high priority on flexibility of use' (Davis, 1991: 6). High Tech architecture reveals close links between engineering, technology and architecture that were such a central tenet of the Crystal Palace (Chapter Two), as well as celebrating the advanced, radical design and building solutions available to the contemporary architect. A key result of this relationship between engineering and architecture is that instead of being 'hidden' the construction of the building is revealed, with pipes and other functional elements exposed, as is demonstrated for example in Rogers' Centre Pompidou, and Lloyds of London, and also in Foster's HSBC HQ in Singapore. Davis says of the High Tech architect that 'he [sic] wants them ['his' buildings] to be functional and efficient, not artistic or symbolic' (Davis, 1991: 6). Despite these protestations this part of the dissertation argues that high-profile architecture is often situated in complex debates about identity that go far beyond the control of an architect (see Chapter Seven).

There are many architectural aspects of the Millennium Dome that situate it as a piece of High Tech, with the associated emphasis on functionality and flexibility. Certainly a key to

---

a particularistic national contexts. There is some evidence to support the claim that such a European transnational flow of elite architects has been gaining momentum in recent years (Kultermann, 1994: 288).

[115] Ironically Rogers and Foster were beginning their architectural careers in the 1950s-60s when 'new brutalism' identified in Chapter Two was the most popular style, and it could be suggested that their visually engaging High Tech buildings are a reaction against the drab functionalism of such structures.

the architectural 'success' of the Dome was due to its exposed structures, for example the yellow masts and steel cables, which allowed for such a large volume of empty space inside (again see Photo 4, Appendix). In fact, in keeping with these principles of High Tech generally, the Select Committee agreed that part of the Dome's architectural merit was its flexibility. Underlining the building's flexibility the roof fabric is made from a 'self-cleaning,' PTFE Teflon coated glass fibre with a life of over twenty-five years, which can be renewed in parts if necessary. The roof covering was originally to be PVC coated polyester, until the intervention of Greenpeace and other environmentalists. However, the control or mastery of nature is a central tenet of this, and much other, architecture: 'High Tech is a forward-looking, optimistic architecture that believes in progress through industrial technology. It believes in invention rather than tradition.... and in the ability to control the environment rather than adapting to it' (Davis, 1991: 14). This aspect of High Tech can be contrasted to the discourse of Critical Regionalism, which *adapts to* the environment rather than controlling it. Critical Regionalism and also looks to tradition, rather than the future, for design influences. Clearly the Millennium Dome's futuristic appearance is not grounded in the past, with few precedents for its appearance.[116] Udo Kultermann has suggested that High Tech architecture 'exaggerates the potential of technology' and intimates that the style, again as was modern architecture, is broadly utopian (Kultermann, 1994: 287).

It was perhaps in part this future-orientated aesthetic that led Mandelson to suggest that the Dome was 'coming to symbolise an innovative, dynamic, assertive and self confident Britain.'[117] The Prime Minister Tony Blair also saw the Dome as symbolic of a dynamic, progressive nation, suggesting it was 'a sign of a new and exciting cultural renaissance in

[116] An interviewer (at www.abc.net.au/arts/architecture/rogers.htm) asked Rogers whether he thought that 'the Dome [was] a worn out vision of the future.' Although Rogers replied that the Dome was a 'forward-looking' piece of architecture, it is true that as an architectural motif the dome has a long history, laden with many symbolic associations. Brunescelli's first dome in Florence, widely held to be a hugely significant engineering and architectural breakthrough, signalled domes being considered as markers of democracy, progress and power. The subsequent use of domes on capitols has further strengthened these associations.

[117] At: www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0202.htm

Britain.'[118] Blair was also confident that the Dome would be 'the envy of the world [because] we [Britain] can boast of.... the finest architects. We are leading the world in creativity.'[119] It is clear then that the politicians responsible for the Millennium Dome intended it to become the architectural symbol of a dynamic nation, an advert for a 'New Britain.'[120]

Given this intention it becomes useful to recast the debate about High tech as a 'British Style' into a discussion of particularism and universalism. Foster is a British architect, and although speculative, it is difficult to imagine the commission being awarded to a non-British architect. The style that the Millennium Dome is built in is the one closest to a *contemporary* British style that exists, although the radicalized aesthetic of the building meant that it was difficult for most people to identify it as such. In fact *The Daily Mail*, a rightwing British newspaper, saw the Dome's shortcomings as mainly due to a lack of anything 'intrinsically British' in the architecture or general project: '[i]t is not carping to say that what the Dome has lacked from the beginning - and still lacks - is any driving vision or high purpose. That's why it has been so slow to win either public support or private sponsorship. People are not fools. They would never voluntarily have footed the bill for such an ephemeral folly.'[121] The hostility towards the project from rightwing populist tabloid newspapers such as *The Daily Mail* can perhaps be recast as hostility towards the New Labour political project in general. This chapter argues that the project became a focus for many kinds of discourses and debates, and perhaps none less so than the antipathy of the rightwing tabloid press to the New Labour political project. Even the short extract

---

[118] At: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/08/98/letters_from_britain/161689.stm
[119] *The Guardian*, 12.04.00
[120] After the Millennium Dome had closed the Prime Minister Tony Blair admitted on television that the project had 'not been the success we hoped,' but added 'neither has it been the disaster that it has been portrayed in some parts'. Blair was speaking days after cabinet minister Clare Short called the Dome 'a flop,' said if he had known in 1997 what he knows now about governments trying to run big leisure attractions he would have considered the project 'too ambitious'
(at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/uk/2000/millennium_Dome/default.stm)
[121] From http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/59996.stm

above illustrates this point, as in claiming that British people 'voluntarily footed the bill' for the lottery funded project aligns it to taxation, public spending and so on.

Steven Bayley, the original Creative Director of the Dome, suggested that 'it [the Millennium Dome project] was a bungled party political advertisement managed by demoralized public servants in thrall to politicians who, in turn, were blown this way and that by gusts from the latest opinion research' (Bayley, 2001: 2). The involvement of the two main political parties at various stages of the planning, as well as offering either condemnation or support depending on who was in power at the time, certainly reveals something of the tension between state and government. As the project spanned both Conservative and Labour governments it was in this sense 'state-led', however the building and its contents became inextricably associated with New Labour's attempt at 'rebranding' Britain as 'Cool Britannia', a creative, dynamic nation which 'led the world' in creative industries. It is significant then that the Dome's original Creative Director should describe the project as a 'bungled party political broadcast', suggesting that the ideologically motivated aims of a political party have colonized what should have been a *state*-led, as opposed to *government*-led project devoid of party-political squabbles.

Even within the Labour government the overall political responsibility for the project was complicated as it straddled three ministerial areas: The Minister for Culture, Media and Sport was in charge of the Millennium Commission (which amounted to finances); The Minister for Environment, Transport and the Regions was responsible for transport; The Minister Without Portfolio was the sole stakeholder in the Millennium Experience Company (ultimately responsible for the fulfilment of the project) (Thornley, 2000). The fragmented nature of the political decision-making processes perhaps accounts for a lack of coherence throughout the project in general. Peter Mandelson, the then Minister Without Portfolio, became the Labour politician responsible for overseeing the project, although it was originally the Conservative government under John Major who first decided to commit

National Lottery money to a year-long celebration of the Millennium. It was also the Tory government that decided both on the location of the site and that the project should be managed in the public sector, after trying and failing to garner support from the private sector (Thornley, 2000). Although there was a general acknowledgement that the incoming Labour government was taking a large risk in carrying on with a Conservative-initiated project that, in June 1997, could still have been dropped with relative ease (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2001: 1) it is perhaps fitting that Peter Mandelson should have taken on the project on Labour taking office. His grandfather was Herbert Morrison, the Labour MP charged with overseeing the Festival of Britain in 1951. Mandelson was the sole government shareholder of all the stock in the 'New Millennium Experience Company Ltd' (his own coinage), the 'company' charged with the management of the project. However, as Thornley points out, having put a great deal of time and effort into the general election in May 1997, the incoming Labour government had a great many time constraints on them. After parliamentary debates about whether or not the money should be spent elsewhere, the new government decided that the project should still go ahead with some provisos. These qualifications were that 'there would be no extra burden on the public purse; its content would inspire; it would be a national event; it would provide a lasting legacy; and the project management would be strengthened' (Thornley, 2000: 694).

McGuigan and Gilmore (2001; 2002) have written the two most sociologically informed articles on the Millennium Dome. Their general line of argument is that corporate sponsorship of the Dome aligned the whole project with the neo-liberalism also to be found at the core of New Labour's political agenda. They saw the Dome as an 'extreme case of the questionable impact of sponsorship on public culture, [which illustrated] the inordinate power symbolically as well as materially of corporations in liberal-democratic polities' (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2001: 18). It is certainly the case that the furore over corporate

sponsorship obfuscated what potentially was a valuable discussion on the make-up and representation of British national identity.

So, how far is what went inside the Dome, rather than the building's ability to be a national symbol, responsible for the widely perceived 'failure' of the project? Hugh Pearman, writing in The Sunday Times, compared the Dome to a 'big meringue,' and added that 'the contents of many of the zones appear vacuous in the extreme if you are a middle-class, reasonably intelligent, slightly world weary adult as most of we critics are. But we are not the target market.... [The Dome] was conceived – by middle-class folk like us – not to be an elitist enclave.'[122] Certainly Mandelson was adamant that he did not want the project to be a 'trade show or a theme-park', and echoing something of his grandfather's attitude to the event he had organized half a century previous, it was to be *educational*. Hugh Pearman has suggested that no-one could remember anything about what was inside the 1951 festival, but the overall 'feel' of such a project is key – how far architects can control this is questionable.

Was the cultural content of the Dome just as important as the architecture for the building's overall symbolic value? For example, the decision to allow ubiquitous McDonalds fast food franchises both inside and outside[123] the Dome may well have recouped some of the huge running costs of the Dome, but it also aligned the project with American capitalism, bad food, and unethical trade principles. In their article entitled 'The Millennium Dome Sponsoring, Meaning and Visiting' McGuigan and Gilmore argue that although 'sponsorship eventually amounted to less than one-fifth in value (around £150 million) of the public expenditure on the Greenwich Peninsula and the NME (around £800 million)... corporate sponsors had a decisive impact on the New Millennium Experience's focal concerns, design and management' (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2001: 2). Indeed the Select Commission Report also emphasized that the Dome 'must not be seen purely as an

[122] *The Sunday Times*, 26.12.99.
[123] The McDonald's outside the Dome was at the time their biggest Franchise in Europe (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2001: 4)

exercise in monumental architecture.... however inspirational the Dome, the impact of the experience will depend principally upon what is inside.'[124] McGuigan and Gilmore conclude that the 'experience of the Dome was conditioned massively by corporate interests' (McGuigan and Gilmore, 2001: 2).

However, aside from some of the issues about what was actually inside the dome, Rogers is correct in his assertion that symbolic architectural landmarks in Britain are rare, more common in France for example. Ironically it was Rogers who designed one of the *Grands Projets du President,* the French landmark architectural projects commissioned by President Mitterand. Understood in this light the Grand Projects, that gave Paris twelve buildings including the Pompidou Centre (Rogers and Piano, 1971), The Pyramid at The Louvre (I. M. Pei, 1989), and La Grande Arche (Otto Von Spreckelsen, 1990), can be seen as an attempt to situate Paris as a postindustrial city, while also contributing to a modernized French national identity. In this respect, Roger's capacity to design a landmark building to reflect 'Cool Britannia' is in contrast to his design of the Centre Pompidou in Paris. Whatever uncertainty was expressed in these buildings' capacity to sustain or develop the existing national imaginary, the Dome can perhaps be read as a metaphor for the exhaustion of the modernist, state-led project which aimed at cultural unification of diverse populations (see Part One). Tzonis and Lefairve see the Centre Culturel D'Art Georges Pompidou as illustrative of how landmark state-funded buildings convey multiple meanings. Often referred to as a 'people's palace' the Pompidou Centre was designed shortly after the Student Revolution of May 1968 (designed and built between 1971-77) and in many ways can be seen to capture the slogan of 'liberation through imagination' most effectively. As with the Millennium Dome, The Reichstag and the Jewish Museum, the centre should also be considered in terms of the wider debates that surrounded the competition for its building; architecture since 1968 had come to be perceived as a

[124] www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0202.htm

fundamental carrier of bourgeois ideology, to be viewed with suspicion. Tzonis and Lefairve believe that the only acceptable message in that particular climate was a purely populist iconography which would function 'in the manner of a billboard,' or as a space for people to operate and play out aspirations and revolutionary ideals (Tzonis and Lefairve, 1981: 178). It is in this sense that The Pompidou Centre can be seen as an act of faith with many of modernity's ideals, (such as progress, emancipation, communication). Rogers himself has said of the Centre that '[a]s a populist urban magnet designed to narrow the gap between culture and everyday life it has been a success beyond our dreams' (Rogers, 1985: 10). As is the case with the Millennium Dome, the flexibility of the museum's functions is reflected in its design; as with the Dome facades and parts can be taken apart and reassembled. Clearly the Pompidou is in the High Tech style. Piano and Rogers thought of the centre as a 'dynamic communications machine.... a university of the street reflecting the constantly changing needs of users' (Rogers, cited in Tzonis and Lefairve, 1992: 86). Braunfels suggests that historically 'France more than any other country regarded its capital as a monument to its greatness, to the state, and to the level of its culture' (Braunfels, 1988: 309). From this perspective The Pompidou Centre and the other *Grand Projects* can be seen as part of a wider project to define the capital city and then the nation, as central to a post-industrial avant-garde.

Similarly the British state had similar aims for the symbolic values of the Millennium Dome that would in turn be attached to London, Britain and their own party political project. The Daily Mail was particularly scathing about the Dome and referred to it as a 'monument to political vanity,' and 'the great Greenwich white elephant' suggesting that '[i]f there was ever a symbol of the Blair administration, this was it – grandiloquent talk, spindoctoring promises, a vacuously empty shell. The execution, epitomising the triumph of style over substance, was bad enough. But the fact that almost £1 billion has been wasted for the sake of political vanity is a terrifying indictment of what happens when

politicians are allowed to spend our money.'[125] However, these party political discussions aside, it is clear that capital cities and their architecture have frequently been the site of struggles over definitions of the nation: 'Like stories written in stone, capitals across the globe embody national identity and historical consciousness' (Wise, 1998: 11). This was also illustrated in the British context in Chapter Two by the examples of the Great Exhibition in 1851 and then the Festival of Britain in 1951. However, for the most part in modernity '[t]he identity of the city was subordinated to the discourse of the nation and was accordingly codified as a 'national capital,' as historic sites of the nation' (Delanty, 2000: 2). But, this picture has changed somewhat, because cities are increasingly becoming fragmented from the region, and in some cases, nation. In the case of London it is widely accepted that we are dealing with a 'global city,' detached from region and nation. Thornley draws on a wealth of empirical and policy data to suggest that the Dome was central to the government's strategy to project a 'dynamic image' of London as a global city able to compete for city tourism with Berlin, Paris, Frankfurt and Barcelona (Thornley, 2000: 690). Thornley quotes the London Docklands Development Corporation who said that 'the New Millennium Experience will support and confirm East London's new role as a dynamic, progressive and enterprising force in London, helping to position the Capital city at the forefront of its rivals in Europe and elsewhere' (House of Commons 1997b: 121).

As well as London's changed status, one of the other fundamental differences between the 1851 and 1951 projects and the Millennium projects is that this time is that the state did not have sufficient control of the nation code. The contested and fragmented nature of British identity at the year 2000 meant that the state's ability to define a coherent national identity through a cultural project was diminished. It would be naïve to suggest that the only reason that the Dome was such a contested project was because the state had less

[125] Daily Mail, 30/5/2002.

mastery of the nation code. Logistical problems with ticketing, transport links, finances and lots of other pragmatic issues proved to further obfuscate debates around the Millennium Dome. However, even taking into account these more pragmatic issues I believe that the state was in a very ambiguous position in terms of offering a strong definition of the nation, which as was suggested in Chapter Three, has to some extent become disjoined from the state. The state is less able to give an authoritative definition of the nation because the nation is an increasingly fragmented, contested notion. Comparing the Millennium Dome project and the Festival of Britain in 1951, it is clear that at that time 'Britishness' was a more coherent identity then than it is now. The sense of optimism that characterized post-war Britain allowed the state to codify the nation with less ambiguity and, resultantly, less controversy. A central contention of this chapter is that, just as was the case in 1851 and 1951, that landmark, state-led architecture provides a significant statement about the society in which it exists. Just as the Crystal Palace came to symbolize a rapidly industrializing, imperial power and the Festival Hall was seen (at the time) to be ushering in a new rational epoch rebuilding post-war then so the Dome came to symbolize many of the tensions inherent in the British state's management of the nation as a more cosmopolitan, multi-cultural entity than it was previously.

One of the biggest logistical problems with the project was transport to and from the Millennium Dome. As it is on a peninsula access to the Greenwich site was difficult, with poor existing public transport links to the site exacerbating the problem of road links to the Dome. The government's projected figures suggested that they wanted to attract at least 12 million visitors in the year 2000, with financial outlay calculated against this number of ticket sales. When selecting a site the Millennium Commission were originally looking for an area served by local transport links already capable of handling 100,000 visitors a day. As existing transport links to the Greenwich site were poor, The Millennium Experience Company responded to these pressures by deciding to make the site practically car-free,

with the only cars allowed on site those of disabled visitors or VIPs. The idea was to have most visitors arriving at the Norman Foster designed Jubilee Line Underground extension. However the 'relationship between the London Underground and the Millennium Experience was a difficult one with lack of full cooperation and understanding' (Thornley, 2000: 694) leading to a series of complications about costs, and exactly to whom responsibilities were. People who arrived by car were supposed to use a park and ride facility, but this strategy was described by the Select Committee as 'more piecemeal than strategic.'

In a BBC Report into the scale and type of architectural projects attracting state funding called 'Why Do We Build to Celebrate the Millennium?' Ben Ruse, The Millennium Commission spokesman, claimed with a pseudo-colonial pride that 'Britain is leading the way in millennium architecture. Nobody is doing anything on the scale that we are.' When asked to explain why other countries did not seem to share the British state's enthusiasm for building architecture for the millennium, he said that '[h]alf the world (who do not follow the Christian calendar) do not regard the millennium with the same importance as we do.'[126] Of course this 'we' is a highly qualified one; where do, for example, British citizens who do not follow the Christian calendar fit in with this aspect of the project? As I argued in Part One, national identities depend in part on a coherent definition of 'insider and outsider' or of 'self and other.' Clearly in the Dome project this distinction was very often highly contested, with the 'Faith Zone' especially controversial in inception and execution. Seeking assurances about the content of the Dome, James Gray MP stated boldly that '2000 and the Millennium mean only one thing: the 2000th anniversary of the birth of Jesus Christ?'[127]

But was the Millennium Dome project inevitably a celebration of 2000 years since Christ's birth? Or was it, as the government suggested, a celebration of Britain today? I

[126] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/millennium_Dome/60378.stm
[127] http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199899/cmhansrd/vo990329/debtext/90329-04.htm

believe that this tension was never adequately resolved. The Department for Media, Culture and Sport (DMCS), in association with the Inter faith Network, published a paper called 'Marking the Millennium in a Multi-Faith Context' in which they acknowledged that 'a significant dimension of life in Britain at the end of the twentieth century is the presence of communities of the world's major religious traditions.'[128] According to the DMCS The Millennium Dome and its associated celebrations provided ' an opportunity for people of *all* faiths to draw on the spiritual heritages of their own traditions to think together about the values that underpin our society and to reflect on the future of our society and our environment of ourselves, our children and generations to come' (ibid). It is interesting to note that this passage speaks of 'our society' and 'our environment,' as this underlines the point made by Billig (1995) and Wodak et al (1999) about how a 'we' can be created using linguistic techniques (see Chapter One). In the paper the DMCS also spoke of 'shared social action' but also acknowledged that in Britain the 'Christian tradition has been rooted for many centuries and has had such a formative influence, many national and civic celebrations will have a specifically Christian framework' (ibid). These debates about the relationship between Britain's essentially Christian past and its multi-faith future are indicative of many of the debates which used the Millennium Dome as focus and can be considered broadly post-national in nature.

Many aspects of the displays in the Dome tried to reflect a multicultural, multi-faith Britain, with the Faith Zone in particular attempting to present Britain as a multi-faith, multi-ethnic nation. Miller suggests that some Muslim groups wanted the Faith Zone to represent Islam as well as Christianity, whereas other Islam groups saw the Dome the same way as James Gray, as Christian celebration. I have suggested throughout the dissertation that representative state codifications of national identities are vital because 'symbolic gestures granting or denying recognition can have profound and continuing effects within a

[128] *Marking the Millennium In a Multi-faith Context* at http://www.culture.gov.uk/millennium/index.html

political culture in ways that directly affect the well-being and self-respect of citizens of minority cultures, as well as their enthusiasm to participate in the political life of the larger state' (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000b: 29). I believe that often the 'symbolic gestures' made by the State through the Millennium Dome were highly ambiguous, and often stemmed from the problem of representing diversity or multiculturalism at the level of the state. 'Multiculturalism' or 'minority rights' 'go beyond common rights of citizenship.... [and] are adopted with the intention of recognizing and accommodating the distinctive identities and needs of ethnocultural groups' (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000b: 2). Even if the state recognizes the significant part played by minority cultures in contemporary British society, reflecting this in a cultural project such as the Millennium Dome proves a great difficulty. The ability of a small political and cultural elite to encompass such 'distinctive identities' and needs is questionable, while the attempt to reflect a post-national, culturally diverse identity frequently runs into opposition from right-wing, xenophobic politicians and commentators for whom British identity should equate with 'their' culture, which is usually white, Christian, middle-class and male.

However, even the Church of England could not agree on what should make up the religious content in the Dome. The Archbishop of Canterbury opened Dome with a Christian prayer and wanted a strong church representation in the 'Faith Zone' of the exhibition, regarding the millennium display as an 'exciting opportunity.' Another strand of opinion within the Christian Church was represented the Archbishop of York, Dr. David Hope, who labelled the Dome a 'monument to arrogance' suggesting that '[a]ll the monies spent to celebrate the millennium will be of little value unless we attend to the values themselves - the values displayed in the crib at Bethlehem.' He also argued that the part-man, part-woman sculpture in the 'Body Zone,' which was the centrepiece of the Dome, reflected the 'confusions of the age.'[129] The debates within the Christian church would

[129] *The Sunday Telegraph*, 20.12.98

seem to support the point that when there is such a hugely symbolic representation of national identity 'it also requires members of the majority to rethink their own group's identity and relation to the state' (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000b: 30). The Dome project did not just cause debate in marginalized groups but also caused the dominant majority to reassess their definitions of 'Britishness.'

Of course this is not to say that nation was not divided in 1951, or before that (maybe along different lines) in 1851. What is significant today however is that the due to processes associated with globalization the spaces exist in which to offer a critique of the state project. Chapters Three and Four showed how globalization has been driven by advanced communication networks such as the internet and email, and how these spaces have been vital in spreading messages about and gaining support for, anti-state struggles. Developing this idea I also suggested in Part Two of the dissertation how these spaces have then become sites for the discursive formation of collective identities; although sceptical about the degree to which ICT have facilitated a global civil society (also see Evans, 2002) I believe, following Castells (1996, 1997, 2001) that these new spaces have been important for mobilizations around the nation code. As evidenced by some of the examples addressed in this chapter, the media and the internet were key sites where the 'nation' expressed discontent about the Millennium Dome, a state-led cultural codification of British identity.

Conclusion

'So this is the crisis; the need to imagine a usable national identity for the next century. But there is also a further crisis: the failure of leading political and cultural elites to contribute to such an imagining. They are part of the problem' (Dodd, cited in Alibhai-Brown, 2002: 100).

The Millennium Dome clearly represents an attempt by the British state to define the British nation. I have argued that contestation around the project in general is indicative of tensions inherent in the codification of post-national identity projects by national states. The Millennium Dome, as a state-led codification of the nation, has for many come to symbolise a crisis in contemporary British identity. This, as is argued in Chapter Seven, is less to do with whether or not the Dome represents 'good' or 'bad' architecture, but rather an assessment of how landmark buildings can come to symbolise the ambiguity of a post-national project led by nation-states. In attempting to create a 'brand' for Britain a tension is revealed is between nationalism and cosmopolitanism; Britain as a European, multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan nation is very different to the Britains that were codified architecturally in the past (for example in the Great Exhibition of 1851). This tension can be recast into architectural debates about universalism and particularism, as although the Dome is clearly within the High Tech style associated with leading British architects it is not as unambiguously 'British' as the state-led buildings that emerged in modern conditions.

However, we can only speculate as to how far has the success or failure of these projects got anything to do with the architecture or the project? Of course, these more pragmatic concerns have not really got anything to do with the design of the architecture. Considered purely as a piece of architecture the Millennium Dome would seem to have fulfilled a number of the required functions of such a building. It was, as Richard Rogers and Mike Davis went to great lengths to point out, functional architecture that allowed an exhibition to go on beneath it. Also it was an instantly recognizable image, with a very distinctive silhouette. Architecture journalist Martin Pauley feels Britain has not been ambitious enough with its millennium architecture. He says: 'There is not really a monument on the scale that we could have had if we had taken it seriously.' Arguing that the Dome will be

'virtually invisible' from the rest of London,[130] he says he favoured the proposal for a Millennium Tower in London, which would have been the world's tallest building. Pawley said there was 'a lot of propaganda which is exaggerating the effort we are putting into it. If we consider how big it could have been, what we're doing is not really so special.'[131]

Recasting these debates at a more abstract level it can be argued that the Millennium Dome project articulated many of the tensions inherent in the contemporary state project: cosmopolitanism and nationalism, particularism and universalism. Also tells us a lot about how important state-led architecture can be when defining a sense of the nation. Just as social justice cannot be guaranteed by 'difference-blind' formal citizenship rules that treat everyone as equal so too symbolic representations of the nation that do not engage with the diverse and fragmentary nature of many contemporary nations are also hugely problematic. Developing the idea from earlier on in the chapter it is clear that the renegotiation of British national identity attempted by the British state should be considered a failed project. The degree to which the Dome managed to include new ways of living and new common cultures is questionable. Although having made an effort to do so with the 'Zones' inside the Dome, the ability of the state to commission architecture that represents diversity symbolically is questionable, and again a clear distinction must be made between Rogers' architecture and the project as a whole. What is certain though is that the Millennium Dome is a highly contested piece of political architecture although of course the architecture *itself* is not political, but the discourses it was inserted into most definitely were – see Chapter Seven. So, in this case we can conclude that perceptions of Rogers' architecture itself were strongly influenced by the debates that surrounded, variously, New Labour, the Millennium Celebrations, the Monarchy, and Europe. Many of the concerns of those critical of the Dome were of a pragmatic nature, frequently centring on cost. What is

[130] Although 'invisible' from the rest of London, the Millennium Dome is reputedly one of only three human-made construction visible from outer space (the other two are Egyptian Pyramids and the Great Wall of China).
From 'Why Do We Build to Commemorate the Millennium?'
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/millennium_Dome/60378.stm

significant for the development of this dissertation is that the Millennium Dome should provide a focus for a huge range of debates about Britain as a multicultural society. Related issues, such as the role of a secular state in representing faiths, and the ability of the state to define Britishness, have also focused on the Millennium Dome, which provided a tangible articulation of many of these broader concerns. Some of the tensions inherent in the project of nation codification in 1951 were explained as 'the retreat from Empire.... seriously disrupted British national identity' (Miller, 2000: 136). In the year 2000 the British state was attempting to renegotiate a British identity, trying to construct an inclusive cultural identity devoid of racism, colonialism and elitism. A central contention of this chapter is that The Millennium Dome was conceived as a symbol of these aims. It is perhaps the more general state 'failures' associated with the inability to represent and sustain more diverse identities, rather than anything to do with the architecture itself, which led to the Dome being such a contested building and discourse.

What can be argued with certainty is that the disparate debates that sometimes had the Millennium Dome as a focus remind us that '[n]ational identity is – always and everywhere – a social, cultural and most of all a political construction, and as such is essentially contested' (Fulbrook, 1999: 238). So, above all the Millennium Dome offers a reminder that national identities are discursive constructions, the constitution of which is a highly negotiated process. Chapter One developed the constructivist perspective that national identities are to some extent social constructions, which need to be actively maintained and 'flagged' if they are to survive as social realities in the minds of actors. In this chapter I have argued that the British state's eagerness to create architectural representations of the nation should be understood in light of this. Of course architecture is just one amongst a repertoire of many representations of the nation. Through explicit involvement in the Millennium Dome, and therefore the state, project, a number of identities became highly

politicised in their quest for institutional recognition of their place in multicultural, multifaith British (post)national identity.

What is also clear is that these attempts are not always wholly successful, at either a commercial or a symbolic level. We are led to question how far the diverse immigrant communities, not to mention Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, can be defined in a representative way by what is still overwhelmingly a male, white, political elite in south east England. Fulbrook says 'it only when a variety of factors combine.... that a sense of national identity will be widely shared and accepted' (Fulbrook, 1999: 232). In other words it is quite rare that the majority of citizens feel a strong bond with the nation code. The British state's attempt at creating a coherent national symbol to represent what is essentially a fragmented and diverse nation reminds us of the almost inherently contested nature of national identity itself. The next chapter focuses on the German state's attempt to use architecture in Berlin to represent democratic ideals and to symbolically reconcile a population also divided along many lines.

Chapter Six: Architecture in the New Berlin

Introduction

There exists a huge literature on German identity since 1945, with many prevalent social theorists still engaging with the topic.[132] The general theme of much of this writing has been to emphasize the contested nature of German national identity since World War Two, with the suggestion often that anything but a minimal national identity is hugely problematic. This perspective is best summed up in the work of Mary Fulbrook, who believes that defining German identity has become an 'obsession' and that 'in the shadow of the holocaust any notion of German national identity was uniquely problematic' (Fulbrook, 1999: 19). Extending this idea Habermas has suggested that the notion of 'constitutional patriotism' can replace these highly contested forms of German national identity while at the same time providing German citizens with a nominal collective identity (Habermas, 2001). Habermas' argument centres on the notion that the constitution offers abstract values that the nation can identify with, while at the same time avoiding the excessively ethnocentric, xenophobic and jingoistic tendencies of national identity creation in modernity.[133]

---

[132] Habermas has written on this subject (1991, 1994, 2001) as has Elias (1996). Of the huge literature in publication Evans' *Rethinking German History* (1987) remains an authoritative text. Schmidt (1993) and Borneman (1995) have written on the relationship between Jewish and German cultures after the Holocaust.

[133] Habermas' work has been subject to criticism from a range of scholars who accuse him of presenting a 'monocultural reason', which is exclusionary and does not deal with inequalities such as gender. Because it is inextricably linked to the discourse of modernity, Habermas' work does occasionally appear to be heavily reliant on a linear notion of progress, with a reduction in inequality and exclusion as citizenship is extended further and further. However, this extension of rights is still problematic because without a truly global polity citizenship will always rest on the exclusion of the other as much as inclusion of the citizen; there is also frequently an assumption of the assimilation of the other, even when 'outside' groups are internalised (see Chapter Five). Besides, even within the framework of formal citizenship rights there still exist huge inequalities. Habermas has attempted addressed this question, especially in his later writings, which have been of a more socio-legal nature. There has certainly been a shift from his more idealized writings like such as *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1989a) to more socio-legal work such *The Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* (2001). In his earlier work Habermas was interested in the potential of a democratically constituted public sphere, which was to be based on a discursive foundation. This participatory social space was to be open to all, with economic power, gender and other forms of status

These debates have found many built expressions due to the reunified German state's desire to remove, commemorate, and renegotiate aspects of German national identity through architecture. Linking these debates more explicitly to the theme of this dissertation, Wise (1999) suggests that no other nation is as aware of the political connotations of architecture than is Germany. This, he suggests, is largely to do with the huge level of debate that has surrounded German architecture for over 100 years now, as well as the broader German culture that is highly suspicious of any form of patriotism (even extending to nationalist references in the built environment). Indeed architecture has played a central symbolic role in Germany's tumultuous twentieth century, retaining an important place in the public consciousness. It is of course against the background of a particularly complex set of social, cultural, and political issues that the architectural reconstruction of Berlin of has taken place. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall on the 9th November 1989 the city's built environment has undergone huge changes. The Reichstag and The Jewish Museum (both in Berlin) are contemporary buildings that display many of the hallmarks of these contestations. In this chapter I explore how far these two buildings in particular express some aspects of the theoretical issues that were developed in Parts One and Two.

Architecture in Berlin: Past and Future

'The process of reattachment has been slow and complicated, in its practical aspects, its politics, and its symbolism' (Ladd, 1997: 179)

---

rendered irrelevant; the public sphere was an attempt to theorize a non-hierarchical and inclusive space in which the normative force of one's argument is the only consideration by which one is judged. Habermas has tried to incorporate criticism of his early, more idealist work in his later writings on constitutional patriotism. However, more radical critiques would still problematize his reliance on the constitutional state, which as Chapter Three addressed, is a quintessentially modernist, exclusionary institution.

Fulbrook argues that in the 1950s the main preoccupation of German public debates was not 'coming to terms with the past' but rather trying to develop a new future, in which Germany would be *the most* democratic state, and *the most* pacifist state (Fulbrook, 1999: 234). Berlin can perhaps be considered a microcosm of these wider German concerns (Wise, 1998), as it was the centre of the Third Reich and thus central to much recent German history. 'Berlin was not only the centre of the Reich, but also the centre of the liquidation of the Jewish population of Europe. This has a tremendous impact on.... the history of Berlin and the history of Europe. So it's not just a problem of Germany.'[134] In this chapter I suggest that these general discourses are expressed in some of Germany's landmark, state-led architectural projects. By expressed I mean either (supposedly) visible in the architectural design itself, or just as importantly, apparent in the debates that go on around the commissions and the buildings.

George Mosse, in his wide-ranging discussion of the use of symbolism in German nationalist discourses, briefly looks at the importance of monumental architecture for sustaining such ideologies (Mosse, 1994). Certainly Germany has a long history of architects being central to these constructions. Nineteenth century architects such as Schinkel, Gilly, Wallot, and Klenze attempted to design self-consciously 'national' architecture, frequently mimicking famous buildings from the ancient world such as Rome's Pantheon and the Propylaem of Athens (see Table One, Appendix). The fact that these buildings were almost always designed in neo-classical style supports one of the key conclusions from Part Two of this thesis. In nineteenth-century nation-building projects the past was frequently used as a legitimising discourse to give a sense of weight, continuity and grandeur to the (relatively new) state projects, which used architectural historicism as one way to reflect and maintain these abstract aims and aspirations.

[134] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at: http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/car1dl.html

Chapters Three and Four showed the continued relevance of capital cities. Of course it is only since reunification that Berlin has been Germany's capital city. Bonn was capital after May 10th 1949. Bonn was 'a beginning, a city without a past' according to West Germany's first ever Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (cited in Wise, 1998). Bonn was selected to be the seat of government immediately after World War Two because it was a relatively small provincial city with no strong identity, in other words it was not recognizably 'German,' and had had no strong links with National Socialism. In this respect Bonn represented a relatively universalised identity as opposed to a too particularly 'German' one, and as such suited the purposes of the post-war German state; Bonn was a 'capital of self-effacement' according to Wise (1998). It is certainly interesting to juxtapose Speer's pretentious and overbearing take on neo-classicism with Bonn's understated modernist buildings. The architecture of Berlin was a major concern for the Nazis, with Hitler's architect Albert Speer describing Berlin as a 'place of worship' (Vale, 1992: 23). Vale suggests that 'the Nazi plans for Berlin envisaged nothing short of a preposterous shrine to power and nationalism' (Vale, 1992: 25) and although these plans were never actually realised[135] it is clear that there was a lack of futurism and an excess of nationalist sentiment inherent in the designs. It is again interesting then that the legitimating reference point for this purely monumental architecture was historical; as with Gothic and neo-classicism in Victorian Britain the past is seen to provide secure values, gravitas, and a remainder of imperial 'triumph.'

Berlin also has another side to its architectural history of course, as many buildings in the city provide a tangible reminder of the communist legacy in East Berlin.[136] Ladd

[135] Robert Harbison's book *The Built, The Unbuilt, and the Unbuildable* suggests that the commissions that were not actually built can tell us as much about a political regime of a society as the ones that were. I would argue that the idea that what is not built is as significant as what is built underlines Billig's central argument that a shared memory is vital for national identity and that it must be 'flagged daily' to survive.

[136] There are many debates about the role of architecture in East Europe. National and regional forms of architecture have re-emerged in numerous former Communist states. Czech architects such as Sramkova and Hubaeck, Hungarian Imre Makovesz and Russian architect Budiloski have been at the forefront of these reassertions of particularistic identities. For more on this see Leach (1999a) and Kultermann (1994).

suggests that this history has provided an even bigger problem for the German government than has the aspects of the built environment left over from the Nazis, as in that case the 'reformist impulse was powerfully reinforced by the widespread desire to suppress all possible links to the capital of the Third Reich, whether that desire was motivated by revulsion at the Nazis or a sense of guilt' (Ladd, 1997: 177). The case of communist architecture articulates some of the wider problems associated with the cultural reunification of East and West Germany. Certainly architecture has figured very prominently in the reunification project, with Berlin's status as capital of the new Germany finding a tangible articulation in the many projects and building going on. State has invested hugely in architectural projects. Much of Berlin has resembled a building site since 1989 (see Photo 5, Appendix), with construction of new buildings still ongoing on a huge scale. Although it would be naïve in the extreme to claim that every architect-designed building constructed in this time has engaged with all of these factors, clearly much architecture in Berlin is 'burdened with the responsibility of providing a legitimate passage from the past into an imagined future' (Grezner, 2000: 220).

Stimman, a West German urban planner, was forced to enter a dialogue with 'the historically charged character of a cityscape that had been successively the capital of the Prussian Court, a unified Imperial Germany, the fragile Weimar republic, Hitler's Nazi dictatorship, and a discredited Communist government' (James-Chakraborty, 2000: 115). As one would expect given this highly-charged political backdrop, the world's top architects have built extensively in Berlin since 1989: Rem Koolhaas, Richard Rogers, Norman Foster, Renzo Piano, Helmut Jahn, I.M. Pei, James Stirling, Michael Wilford, Charles Moore, and Robert Venturi have all added their design onto the existing city fabric.[137] It is also significant for this dissertation that a great many of these commissions

[137] Despite the number of high-profile architects who have worked in Berlin over the last decade or so, many are still critical of the outcomes. Libeskind in particular has been critical of Stimman's overseeing the reconstruction, and has said that 'it is part of a political understanding of how a city develops and to my regret Berlin has been developing rather in a dull and not the most inspired way given its history and the kind of

have been state funded. The two buildings that provide the focus for this chapter pay particular attention to the specificity of Berlin as a social, political and cultural location, articulating many of the tensions identified elsewhere in this dissertation as indicative of post-national cultural projects managed by states. As such I argue that the Reichstag and the Jewish Museum are key projects to support wider analysis of the relationship between the state, national identity and architecture.

The Reichstag: Building for Democracy?

'Every stone, every wall, and every window has a story that is not just a matter of architecture but also a clue to who the Germans are, who they have been, and how they see themselves in the future' (Baker, 2000: 192)

Sir Norman Foster's extension to the Reichstag,[138] the new German Parliament in Berlin, is a clear example of the increasingly contested relationship between the state, the nation and post-national identities. Foster, one of the leading British architects, says he has attempted to codify the complicated history of the Reichstag architecturally, and resultantly the building can be 'read' as a monument to its own, and more broadly to Germany's,

---

character the city has in the minds of those who love it, as I do, and in the minds of those who love what they see here: this kind of variety and tension on a world scale' (http://architronic.saed.kent.edu/v5n2/v5n2.05.html). He has also claimed that 'now when you go about Berlin looking at new buildings, they don't communicate too much. What do they communicate? They communicate that they were built quickly and cheaply. The whole process of planning has failed the city.' However, even with the degree of similarity in the built environment that has encouraged Grenzer to call Berlin a 'capital of self-effacement' I would suggest that 'given the fact that cities are not merely subject to similar economic pressures but may be the sites for investment by the same property developers bringing with them the same architects, the nation-state remains a critical determinant of the local political area' (Strom, 1996: 477). The state, for better or worse, has still been vital in shaping reunified Berlin.

[138] The name 'Reichstag' roughly translates to Imperial Parliament.

contested identity. Certainly some of the tumultuous history of the building, home of Germany's first democratically elected parliament, has been revealed in Foster's project of 'critical reconstruction.' Foster claims to have been concerned that the building should not 'keep any secrets' (Foster, 1999e). Developing the central argument of this dissertation I would argue that the German social and political discourses into which the design has been inserted are of accessibility and transparency, which in turn reflect some of the dominant motifs in contemporary European political culture.

Foster suggests that the 'history of the Reichstag is the history of Berlin in microcosm' (Foster, 1999g: 208), so it is to be expected that this building's long history is also a complex one. Originally commissioned by Bismark in 1871, 20 years after Germany's second unification, the Reichstag was designed by the German architect Paul Wallot. In an echo of the debates taking place in Victorian Britain (as outlined in Chapter Two) Wallot found the design of the building difficult due to the lack of a strictly 'German' national style in architecture at the time (Wise, 1998: 123). As was also the case in Victorian Britain (or more precisely in Victorian England) it was generally felt that the past provided a coherent set of secure vales, a certain gravity, and a ready-made tradition. With no national German style *per se* Wallot used ostentatious ornamentation to underline the building's consequence – perhaps significantly, in keeping with some of the central aspects of the early modern age, much of this decoration celebrated previous military campaigns and not necessarily democratic ideals (Wise, 1998: 123). At the time Wallot lamented that 'we are building a national edifice without a national style' (Wallot, cited in Ladd, 1997: 86) although it could be suggested that this lack of an unambiguously German style reflected a rapidly changing (industrializing and urbanizing) German nation. Parts of the building still reflect the lack of a strictly German style, with a mismatch of styles, neo-classicism, renaissance Baroque, and Rococo all incorporated into this epitome of monumental state architecture (see Photo 6, Appendix).

The fact that an unambiguously German style of architecture did not exist at this time seems to reinforce the point made in Chapter Two that even in the era of nation-building there was never always a national style that everyone agreed upon. The British 'battle of the styles' found a reflection in Germany at the time, albeit a contest between different styles with different meanings. What is clear though is that architects (and politicians) of the day were striving to create a German style to reflect and celebrate the aims and (future) achievements of the Second Reich. Indeed the Gothic script directly above the Reichstag's entrance reads 'Dem Deutschen Volk' (to the German People) (see Photo 7, Appendix) – this was inscribed in 1916, over 30 years after the original building was completed and in the middle of the First World War, as an overtly nationalistic, patriotic gesture. The stone scroll on which the legend was inscribed had remained blank until the German state felt the need to express a nationalistic call-to-arms, a mobilization for the Great War. It is interesting to note that this has an unambiguous quality as it was actually *written* on; this can perhaps be contrasted to what Foster has attempted to do symbolically.

So, the Reichstag is a building that has great significance due to historical and symbolic associations. It is not an exaggeration to say that as 'a symbol, its story is more than that of a building' (Pawley, 2000: 36). As a result of the Reichstag being such a controversial symbol of German national identity I would argue that the choice of Foster, as a British architect, should not be overlooked. At one level the choice of a non-German architect can be read as a move away from making the project too particularistic, too rooted in a particular nation code.[139] It is precisely by engaging with such factors that this architectural project can be viewed as an attempt to reflect a reflexively constituted type of national identity. I develop the argument in this chapter that the Reichstag project is based on a contested, ambiguous identity and is therefore representative of many post-national sentiments and identities. The very choice of a British architect is indicative of such post-

[139] In fact initially there were three joint winners of the competition: as well as Foster, the Dutch architect Pi de Bruijn, and Santiago Calatrava (who is Spanish) were also short-listed.

national sentiments, as Foster was not attempting to build or develop a distinctly 'German' style, as was Wallot for example. In fact the question of a German national style would never have occurred to Foster; as was outlined in the previous chapter his 'British' or 'European' 'international' style of High-Tech characterizes many significant buildings globally. This does not equate it with an emerging global style of architecture though, but it does mean that the cultural High-Tech is not tied closely to anywhere, as it is a relatively 'universalized' style.

These debates about the nationality of the architect did not take place only at an abstract level. Wolfgang Thierse, the President of the German Bundestag, saw the choice of Foster as hugely significant, claiming that 'the decision to choose Norman Foster demonstrates that Germany is serious in its attempts to unite Europe and its people, and sends out a signal against narrow-mindedness' (Thierse, 2000: 7). Thierse's predecessor Rita Süssmuth also saw the selection of a non-German architect as indicative of 'a world shaped less and less by national borders' (Süssmuth, 2000). Foster himself has said that he 'seriously doubted whether a non-German could get the job' (Foster, 1999c: 19). Clearly then, as was the case in Victorian Britain and with the Millennium Dome, there were significant political debates about who should build it and the style in which it should be built.

Lord Richard Rogers, the architect responsible for the Millennium Dome, has said that 'I was on the Reichstag jury when Norman won it [the competition] and I didn't think the Reichstag was worth conserving.... [i]t isn't a great building but it has great memories.... [w]hether memories last or not is another thing. I have my doubts in general about this rather romantic idea of whether you conserve the memories or the building.'[140] In the same interview Rogers also suggested that Norman Foster should have been commissioned to rebuild the whole building from scratch as 'he's a much better architect than Wallot ever was.' However, in terms of developing a reflexive relationship between past and future, it

[140] From an interview with Richard Rogers at: www.abc.net/au/arts/architecture/rogers.htm

could be suggested that Rogers is missing the point here: Foster himself has said that '[w]e wanted to confront the past, not destroy it,'[141] and as was also the case with the Millennium Dome, we are dealing with architecture as a discourse that goes far beyond what is actually built. The Reichstag does have symbolic value, but these values are not *necessarily* derived from the way the building actually looks. Whether or not Foster is a 'better' architect than Wallot becomes immaterial; what was key to the reconstruction of the Reichstag are a range of symbolic statements that attempt to develop a new German national identity that links past and future, universal and particular, and cosmopolitan with national. In part this is what makes the choice of Norman Foster significant.

The influential German architectural journal *Bauwelt* suggested that the reconstruction was a symbol by which Germany was pronouncing a renewed significance, a sense of 'being somebody again' (cited in Wise, 1998: 129). The question to be addressed of course is who were they being. In recasting the debate over the nationality of the architect as one between particularism and universalism it becomes clear that the German state is making the building associated less with a particularly German national code and more with a universalized, in this case broadly 'European', identity. This is of course in direct contrast to what states often wanted to do in the nation-building era of European modernity, as was argued in Part One. Reflecting on this shift the then President of the Bundestag said that '[t]he architecture of power has been replaced with an architecture of openness and freedom, appropriate to our vision of Germany as a truly democratic society' (Süssmuth, 2000: 8).

Further developing this idea it can be argued that the wrapping of the Reichstag by Bulgarian artist Christo was a hugely significant event, as it brought a new symbolism to a building already heavily loaded with meanings. Christo's covering the building in over a million square feet of silver fabric was in many ways was indicative of the German state's

[141] *The Guardian*, 11.4.99

desire to present a democratic and progressive face to the rest of the world and to signal the rebirth of a 'new' Berlin. During a discussion on the controversial plan in parliament the Green MP Konrad Weiss suggested that the wrapping 'enables us to see in another light and newly, perceptually experience this central and ambivalent place in German history.' He also added that 'the wrapping of the Reichstag will remind us of the limits of our perceptions and how uncertain our knowledge is.... it will cut into the history of this building and.... it will be a peaceful, a productive turning point' (Weiss, 1994: 1). Hinting at the contestation surrounding the whole reunification project Chancellor Kohl and some other conservative ministers tried to prevent the wrapping, arguing that the Reichstag was too important a national symbol to treat in such a 'facetious' way. Wolfgang Scäuble, the Christian Democrats' Parliamentary Leader, underlined this perspective when he said '[s]tate symbols, symbols in general, should unite people, bring people together. Wrapping the Reichstag would, however, not unite people it would polarize them. Too many people would not be able to understand and accept it' (Schäuble, cited in Ladd, 1997: 94). Supporters of the project argued that this was missing the point; Christo himself has said that it was precisely *because* the building was so important that it should be wrapped. Pawley agreed with these sentiments, believing that the Reichstag had become a 'strangely demythologized landmark' and celebrated the 'catharsis' (Pawley, 2000: 57) that the wrapping had achieved. During the wrapping over 5 million people visited the building (Ladd, 1997). When the fabric was removed Foster began his reconstruction.

Clearly then the Reichstag is a building that has great significance due to its many historical and symbolic associations. At this stage it should perhaps be stated that these associations are not necessarily due to anything inherent in the building's aesthetic, although Foster's extension can perhaps be seen to offer some symbolic architectural references, which are assessed below. As much as the outward appearance, or the architectural form that the building takes, the remarkable history of the Reichstag building

is central to understanding its key role for German national identity. Generally Foster was adamant that the building should not 'keep any secrets,' adding that the issue that emerged most strongly from initial meetings with the Bundestag's Building Committee was that the building should be open and transparent (Foster, 1999a). Indeed the design brief for the building stated that the winning entry should 'express the joy of communicating and a closeness to the citizen.' Again, it becomes evident that the cultural discourse into which the design has been inserted is one of accessibility and transparency, reflecting some of the dominant motifs in contemporary European culture.

The design competition stated that to win the commission architects should engage with 'the changing historical fortunes of the building, its symbolic significance and its future function' (in Foster, 1999c: 23). Interestingly Foster's original submission did not include a dome at all – it was a 'glass umbrella' that was to swoop out over public space. This original design was to prove too expensive, and Rita Süssmuth (President of the Bundestag at the time) suggested that a design 'more modest, more pragmatic, [and] in keeping with the political mood' (Foster, 1999c: 32) would be more appropriate. It is relevant that Wallot's original building had a dome on top of it too, although this was for aesthetic effect only and served no practical uses at all. Some conservative MPs wanted Wallot's dome to be replaced exactly but Foster called this an 'empty historicist gesture.... [f]undamentally at odds with the whole ethos of the scheme' (Foster, 1999e: 130). The glass cupola added to The Reichstag has, according to Foster, connotations of transparency and democracy, as '[t]he new cupola can be read at many functional and symbolic levels. It signals renewal; it is fundamental to the Reichstag's daylighting and natural ventilation strategies; and crucially it is a new public space' (Foster, 1999e: 130). Although not in his original design[142] then, Foster came to conceive of his dome as 'communicating the themes of lightness, transparency, permeability and public access.... A 'lantern' with all the

[142] Calatrava actually accused Foster of plagiarism as his design that was awarded joint first place had a dome on top. Foster has since pointed out that Calatrava's dome served no purpose either, just like Wallot's original structure.

architectural and metaphorical associations which that term implies' (Foster, 1999d: 87). To exacerbate this effect of 'light' and 'democracy' beams originally were sent out 4kms into the Berlin sky, 'creating a new symbol of Parliament and an ethereal landmark that can be seen all over Berlin' (Foster, 1999e: 143). However, this type of lighting proved to be confusing for air traffic, so the dome is now lit in a more subdued fashion. Foster has called the glass dome a 'lighthouse of democracy' (in Wise, 1998: 129), further reinforcing his claim that his rebuilding attempted to banish any 'secret domains' (Foster, 1999d: 86).

As was suggested in the previous chapter, domes have not always had these connotations. Since Brunescelli designed the first dome in Florence in the mid-15th century, domes have carried with them connotations of power, elitism and high culture – it is perhaps these connotations that account for the many parliament and government buildings around the world that have domes. Foster has tried to renegotiate these understandings however, by making the dome on the Reichstag an open space for 'the people.' Again, it is an interesting point of comparison that Foster has attempted to use architectural symbolism to achieve what Wallot actually wrote on the building; the degree to which Foster has been successful depends on the extent to which 'the public' the building is symbolically devoted to appreciate the building's architectural motifs (again, see Chapter Seven). Foster's dome, although not necessarily 'functional' in the strict modernist sense of the term, is a public viewing chamber that is open to the public – the people can stand above the politicians debating in chambers below.[143] Foster himself suggested that the reasoning behind the viewing gallery was to reinforce the democratic ideal of the public as masters, politicians as servants, again referring to the Reichstag's tumultuous social and political history. Foster did not want the public to feel detached from the political debates in the parliament; he also claims that the redesigned Reichstag dome 'has been adopted as a popular symbol of the new Berlin.... an accepted icon' (Foster, 1999e: 127). It is fair to say this as the dome has

[143] This is not the only example of this type of symbolism being utilized in the architectural design of parliament building. The 'Capitol' in Canberra allows the public to walk on top of the building on a grassy area while parliament sits.

become something of a popular icon on beer bottles, nightclub signs, the S-bähn interior as well as the usual postcards, t-shirts and so on. It is perhaps interesting to note that it is usually only Foster's extension to the Reichstag that appears on these items, and not the whole building, which seems to suggest that the dome is considered a building in its own right.

The decision to leave the anti-German, Cyrillic graffiti chalked on the wall by the invading Red Army in 1945 is another clear attempt to engage with this past, as is the decision to leave bullet holes and shrapnel in the stone walls. Mary Fulbrook considers the liberation of Berlin by the Red Army a 'state-supported myth' that was central to legitimization of the East German communist regime (Fulbrook, 1999: 234). Although not the place to go into this argument in detail, I did argue in Part One that the preservation of such artefacts presents a certain aspect of a nation's history, and even more than this illustrates how decisions made about politically charged architecture can rarely be considered neutral. Engel (1999) says that the whole interior 'above the height of a man' was covered with graffiti, some of which did no more than leave a name or a date in the ruined building. He says that you could tell whether it was a soldier of an officer that made the marks as the officers used crayons that they had for marking map position, while the soldiers had to make do with charcoal. It is clear from the content of these writings that the invading army saw the building as symbolic of the Germany nation. The 'collective historical memory' identified in Chapter One as so central to nation building is important in presenting, or equally forgetting, certain aspects of a nation's past and is again evident in the decision to preserve the scrawls in the Reichstag. The graffiti is what Foster himself has called 'visible memories of the building's past' (Foster, 1999b: 13). They also show that the German state did not necessarily want the whole building to be 'sanitized' version of their national identity. Buchanan (1999) argues that the decision to leave this intact is easier

taken by a foreign architect, and this claim underlines the significance of the German state choosing Foster to redesign the building in the first place.

Although the areas in which the graffiti is written is not always open to the public, what will the German people make of the decision to leave these scrawls? 'Will misguided national perceptions mean that some people will be interested only in a literal understanding of the inscriptions themselves, and regard the chisel marks on the broken cornices and door surrounds as unsightly scars which ought to be removed, having no merit other than their ugliness?' (Engel, 1999: 127). The next chapter develops these ideas and suggests that it is precisely *because* architecture is located in wider discourses by the architects and everyone else that they come to mean anything anyway. Does the decision to leave the graffiti need to be explained by the architect or by politicians to be understandable? Even in this preservation though there is controversy inherent within the tension between past and future. As well as the view being presented here, namely that the conservation of the graffiti is part of a reflexive reconstruction of a more universalized post-national identity, it could also be suggested that the conservation of the graffiti 'might be interpreted as verging on collective self-abasement.... to erase the past with a seamless restitution of historical detail is one thing; not to clear up what are merely territorial markings are another' (Buchanan, 1999: 172). This further underlines the point made in Part One, namely that a selective amnesia is vital for state constructions of national identity. What *is* very different in this case though is that this graffiti is essentially a monument to a nation's defeat, and by choosing to maintain it Foster (and the German state) choose to draw attention to the nation's defeat. Again, we can detect a shift from the aims of state-led buildings in the past, which frequently celebrated wartime victories while 'covering up' (literally and metaphorically) such loses. I would argue that it is the more reflexive relationship between past and future – here illustrated by the decision to leave graffiti – that situates Foster's reconstruction of the Reichstag as a post-national project.

The sculpture of an Eagle that overlooks the Reichstag's debating chamber is another heavily loaded political symbol that came to articulate some of the tensions between past and future and universalism and particularism.[144] The controversy generated over the potential redesigning of the Eagle, one of the key symbols of German national identity (see Chapter Two), is in some ways indicative of the project itself, but with a different outcome this time: after much heated discussion the 1952 design by Ludwig Gies stayed. Before this was decided upon though Foster was asked to redesign the Eagle, and during his research it became apparent that there have been hundreds of Eagles used over the years, with each one projecting the specific aims and aspirations of the German state of the time (Foster, 1999g: 214). Throughout the dissertation it has been argued that architecture is one way of 'reading' a state's definition of a national identity, and Foster felt that the Eagle was another important state-controlled symbol that has contributed significantly to the construction of the German nation code through its 'mood and character.' Historically the design of the eagle - whether aggressive, with prominent beaks and talons, lithe, plump, turkey-like and placid – has intimated the aspirations of the government.

Even the type of stone that was to be used in the rebuilding project became a highly charged 'political' issue. Foster wanted to use French stone, as it is more 'durable' than the German stone. After much pressure from the German stone lobby Foster used predominantly Bavarian stone and some Spanish. This is an example of how frequently debates that go far beyond the control of the architect become focused on his or her project. For example, Foster's decision to use French stone was, he claimed, purely pragmatic; however it soon became apparent that the choice of foreign stone for the national parliament building symbolized many of the German stone lobby's discontents. He concluded that the controversy around the stone had ended in an international effort, as Polish craftsmen were responsible for the installation of the politically charged building

[144] Foster has said 'that the 'story of the design of that eagle would fill a book' (Foster, 1999g: 212).

material (Foster, 1999a).[145] The choice of stone for the parliament building is also significant when developing the Frampton's argument (1983) that the use of local materials is one of the key ways a building can be 'rooted' into a region or a nation. The discourse of Critical Regionalism would see the privileging of foreign stone over a local material (whether due to cost, durability, aesthetics etc.) as an example of universalizing tendencies destroying particularistic reference points.

Another textual element of Foster's design that engages with the original building is the flower garden in one of the courtyards, which is visible from the rooftop (see Photo 8, Appendix). The Gothic script in the flowerbed reads 'der Bevolkerung' which translates to 'the population,' a much more general statement without the excessively nationalistic connotation of the 1916 inscription 'Dem Deutschen Volk' (to the *German* people – emphasis added). Again we are again confronted with a motif that is orientated less specifically to the German nation code and more to a post-national type of identity. It may be reading too much into Foster's inscription (see Chapter Seven) to suggest that the more recent dedication is somewhat at odds with the 'Nationalstaatsprinzip' principle of German citizenship that maintains 'blood ties' as vital, but these questions are raised in the mind of anyone viewing the building. Again we can see Foster's inscription as perhaps indicative of the more post-national nature of the building generally, and the less particularly German dedication can perhaps be considered as part of a dialogue with the nationalistic script which was intended as a war-time call-to-arms.

In keeping with the ethos of the 'High-Tech' style the building relies on natural light sources where possible and is 'green.' As I said in the previous chapter this ecological awareness characterizes the style of High-Tech. The heating and cooling systems are run by rapeseed vegetable oil – economical fuel, and heat-recovery systems reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 90%. The Reichstag is the 'first ecologically responsible parliament

[145] In keeping with the Reichstag's history of struggle, the building itself became the focus of demonstrations about the use of illegal foreign labour in the German construction industry.

building anywhere in the world' (Pawley, 2001: 235). The Dome of the building allows natural light to filter in, and regardless of the symbolic associations the dome may or may not be seen to carry (see Chapter Seven) it does solve some problems of a more pragmatic nature for the MPs using the building in terms of lighting: in Bonn the TV cameras reflected too much light off politician's heads, and the cone that runs through the centre of the dome spreads the light from the edges of the room into the middle, resolving this problem. There is also a funnel that allows heat from the pressroom and the debating chamber to be released out of the dome's open top (see Photo 11, Appendix).

Representing the Holocaust: The Jewish Museum

'This history is not over' (Libeskind, 2001: 28)

It could be suggested that Libeskind's wider project in Berlin is in many ways comparable to that of Rogers' and Foster's in London, as was described in the previous chapter. Although initially an architectural theorist rather than a practitioner,[146] Libeskind has become extremely influential in architectural debates both in Berlin and globally. As well as the recently opened Imperial War Museum in Salford (July, 2002), Libeskind has also built the Felix Nussbaum Museum in Osnabrück, Germany (1998) and has also won the commission to design the spiral extension to the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. As well as designing such high profile buildings around the world, Libeskind has also written and spoken very widely on the broader theoretical issues directly associated with his architecture. These texts and interviews have primarily been a way of making explicit

[146] For example see his early writings on theory (2001). Libeskind did not actually build anything until 1998 when his Felix Osabaum Museum in Dessau was completed.

the link between symbolism and the built environment. From these writings it is clear that Libeskind is well aware that his work is situated in a political context.

With a project such as the Jewish Museum in Berlin, sociologically pertinent questions emerge about how to represent the Holocaust aesthetically: is space the best way for architecture to symbolize such huge loss? Adorno famously suggested that poetry after the Holocaust was barbaric, and one presumes the same could be said of architecture.[147] For present purposes however it is the ambiguous role of state-led architecture that is of interest. Libeskind is explicit about what his architecture here is supposed to do: '[t]his experience is no longer an abstract one, having been incorporated in the space of architecture; something that cannot be described in words or texts, but now belongs to the city and the museum' (Libeskind, 2001: 24). Libeskind is thus making extremely bold claims about the ability of architecture to represent the Holocaust, although the relative importance of the actual built structure as opposed to the discourse surrounding the architectural project is questionable (see Chapter Seven). Another state-led architectural project struggling with the problem of representing the Holocaust aesthetically is Peter Eisenmann's 'Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe.' It is the very 'presence of absence' described by Libeskind that Eisenmann's as yet unfinished design for the Holocaust memorial[148] near the Brandenburg Gate attempts to achieve. Designed as a memorial only for the Jewish victims of the Nazi holocaust – in itself a hugely contentious decision – this project is one of many state-funded Holocaust memorials in Berlin. Eisenmann's project plans to use space in a very stark way, with '4,000 concrete slabs arrayed like a vast burial ground, or an undulating bed of nails for the German conscience' (Wise, 1998: 153). Again this raises sociological questions about architecture and representation (again see the following chapter), but as is the case with the Jewish Museum

[147] For more on social theory and the holocaust see Bauman (1990) or Fine and Turner (2000).
[148] It is interesting to note that Libeskind also entered the competition to design this memorial.

this is clearly a monument to victims and not, as was the case in the age of nation-building, to 'heroes.'

I believe that Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum is an example of state-led landmark architecture in a post-national context that displays tensions between culture and politics, nation and state, universalism and particularism, and past and future. Libeskind's inspiration for his design was a map of pre-war Berlin, on which he proceeded to plot the settlements of the city's Jewish population of some 185,000. His museum on the former site of the Berlin Wall at Lindenstrasse posed many problems both practically and in terms of representation. For example, the 'particularistic' architectural devices of the nation code are clearly not suitable for this building, and accordingly the flags and overt symbols synonymous with national architecture are absent, with empty spaces in their place. For Libeskind how we develop a collective memory is a deeply political concern, a theme that permeates much of his written work, and, he would argue, his buildings. To reiterate, he has argued that any kind of Jewish memorial in Berlin must paradoxically reflect the 'permanent presence of absence' - a 'presence in the city even though you don't see it in an obvious way but it is there, it's part of the void which the city also carries in its own absence.'[149]

He suggests that the three central ideas that formed the basis of the design were:

> The impossibility of understanding the history of Berlin without understanding the enormous intellectual, economic, and cultural contribution made by Jewish citizens.... The necessity to integrate physically and spiritually the meaning of the holocaust into the consciousness and memory of the city of Berlin.... [and] that only through the acknowledgement and incorporation of this erasure and void of Jewish life in Berlin can the history of Berlin and Europe have a human future (Libeskind, 2001: 23).

[149] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at: www.abc.net.au/arts/architecture/berlin3.htm

Libeskind also suggests (2001) that the building's spatial organization creates a sense of 'disrupted tradition.' It is significant that the original competition stated that that the entrance to the museum should be through the Kollegienhaus, a built expression of Berlin's somewhat decadent baroque history (see Photo 12, Appendix). Libeskind met this criterion by connecting the two buildings not, as did all other entries, by a ramp, but rather via an underground passage. The reasoning behind this, Libeskind suggests, is that '[e]verything has changed and this is a totally different Berlin to the Berlin of 1933. The challenging aesthetic of the Jewish Museum is exacerbated by its proximity to the Baroque museum, and Libeskind wanted to create a 'conscious tear'' (James-Chakraborty, 2000: 119) in the urban fabric to represent the void left in the city by the absence of its Jewish population. So, by juxtaposing the two cultures together, the old Berlin and the old Jewish tradition, 'one is reconnecting the two cultures to the present time, but at the same time saying something new about the Berlin of today and tomorrow.... Berlin is a very Baroque city. So the museum is about Berlin, and not exclusively concerned with the Holocaust. There is something deliberately ambiguous about the building: as wrenching as the history of this city.'[150] This history, asserts Libeskind, is not neutral, so it follows that 'neutral architecture is perhaps appropriate for non-events' (Libeskind, 2001: 28). This statement can be contrasted with Rogers' claim that the Dome should not be 'over-read' and that it was simply a functional tent. Libeskind attempts to integrate symbolism and meaning into his building, both by designing in motifs then by explaining their 'correct' interpretation (see the next chapter). The Jewish Museum relies on space and design tricks to serious historical effect. 'The museum will be a permanently disorientating and reorientating experience to make the historical experience more intensely concentrated. It is the exposing of things which are irreconcilable.'[151]

---

[150] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at: http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/carldl.html

[151] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/carldl.html
This quote is reminiscent of the Frankfurt School's work on contradiction and dialectics in modernity: Adorno said that 'beauty today can have no other measure except the depth to which a work resolves

Libeskind has designed the museum as a series of sensory challenges, which have the cumulative effect of disorientating the visitor. The architect has designed ruptures and disjuncture into the fabric of the building, with Libeskind's design tricks having the desired effect; in attempting to represent Jewish experience in such a way 'Libeskind is virtually alone among architects building today in Berlin in the trust he puts in architectural form and the spaces it shapes to create an emotional rather than a rationally ordered environment' (James-Chakraborty, 2000: 120). The way the building elicits an emotional response is by linking space to identity and historical experience via a range of slight misalignment of walls, sloping floors, plays of dark and light, and angular, slashes of windows. The building itself juts out of the street line, disrupting the flow of the neighbouring buildings and creating a 'tear' in the urban fabric of Berlin. The five story building is organized around empty spaces, what Libeskind calls 'voids' that cut through the corridors, but rather than offering access they deny it. The voids are closed off spaces into which visitors can see, but have no access.

Perhaps the most moving space in the Jewish Museum is the Holocaust Void, a ninety foot high concrete bunker which is lit only through a small opening at the very top (see Photo 13, Appendix). Although noise from the street filters in through a small slit at the top of the bunker, the room is otherwise totally sealed, with entrance and exit only through a heavy black door that slams shut behind the visitor. Inside the dark space the only thing on any of the concrete walls is a ladder, which starts about 15 feet up, too high to reach. It is arguably by confronting the visitor with such radical spatial experiences that Libeskind attempts to force some reflection of the Jewish experience in Berlin. Filler suggests that this space is 'the definitive statement on the Holocaust in architectural form' (Filler, 2000: 5) and we can certainly appreciate that Libeskind has attempted to create an experience for the visitor that utilizes space in very direct, emotive way. This technique allows the

---

contradictions. A work must cut through the contradictions and overcome them, not by covering them up, but by pursuing them' (Adorno, cited in Heynen, 1999: 1).

architect to avoid any of the misappropriations of his symbolism, using architectural techniques to achieve a serious, monolithic effect.

The windows of the museum are an important part of the symbolism in the wider project (see Photo 14, Appendix). Libeskind designed the scar-like windows as links to the pre-war addresses of prominent cultural figures, such as Mies van der Rohe and Walter Benjamin, and sites of social interest and Jewish settlements on a map of Berlin: Libeskind sees the windows as the 'writing of the addresses by the walls of the museum itself' (Libeskind, 2001: 27). In fact the whole building is designed around this imaginary map of Berlin, as Libeskind has 'built the museum on the basis of addressing points, for example of connections between Berliners and Jews who lived around the Lindenstrasse' (Libeskind, 1999: 28). Libeskind plotted 60 of these significant locations 'tracing apocalyptic Berlin' through his building.[152] With this information, the effect of the windows and the plan of the building emphasize the historical importance of Jewish cultural life in Berlin, but unless Libeskind had been active in disseminating this interpretation then this meaning would remain 'hidden' (see Chapter Seven).

Of course, from winning the competition to design the museum in 1987 a huge amount had changed in Germany's political climate: '[t]here were seven changes of government, six name changes to the museum, five senators of culture, four museum directors, three window companies, two sides of a wall, one unification.'[153] The Jewish Museum costing about 77 million DM (about $43m at 1999 rates) was delivered very slightly over budget. The building attracted a huge amount of attention, and many thousand of people. Libeskind has claimed that when the building was free of exhibitions 'the emptiness dominated, and in that way the effect of the building was to concentrate too much on the extinguishing of Jewish culture' adding, perhaps somewhat ironically that 'it is not a Holocaust museum, after all' (Filler, 2001: 3).

[152] According to Schneider (1999: 38) Libeskind also alludes to a fragmented Star of David in his early sketches of the plan.
[153] Libeskind in an interview with Suzie MacKenzie in *The Guardian*, 4/5/2001.

The city of Berlin has been fundamental to expressions of Germany's past. As was in case with London, but for historically different reasons (Braunfels, 1988), the image of the nation is projected onto the capital. Of course, and as was suggested in Part One, although an abstract construction, representations of the nation frequently find a cultural, and in this case spatial, expression. This backs up the earlier argument that the nation has historically been constructed as an abstract space, whereas the city has been based on *lived* space (see Chapter Three). The capital city is key. Berlin is 'embracing a universal architectural language as a way of estranging itself from a contaminated past in order to strengthen an allegiance to the city' (Grezner, 2000: 220).

On a number of occasions Libeskind has said that he feels tradition and revolution are closely related, and that would seem to be the case in this building, where the architect has tried to develop a reflexive relationship between past and future. Libeskind felt strongly that his building should not only be a memorial, and that 'it is not a project that looks backwards. It looks forward to a continuing relationship between the Germans and the Jews.'[154] In this sense this is an optimistic piece of architecture, that attempts to be a built expression of an reflexively constituted collective identity that remembers the past but looks to the future: '[t]his architecture provides the spaces for the involvement and participation of the public in an institution that communicates that Jewish culture, despite these tragic events, has a vital future in the capital of Germany' (Libeskind, 2001: 28).

[154] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/car1dl.html

Conclusion

'[W]hat kind of official architecture is appropriate for a country whose past has rendered patriotism suspect and whose expressions of national pride have, as a result, been consigned to the soccer field' (Wise, 1998: 11).

Fulbrook has suggested that German national identity has been self-consciously 'dissected, divided, and reconstructed' (Fulbrook, 1999: 7). The examples above illustrate that state-led, landmark architecture has played a vital part in these renegotiations in Berlin. The two main projects assessed in this chapter show that state-led architecture in German is inevitably situated in a complex web of highly charged discourses about national identity. Accordingly many of the theoretical issues addressed elsewhere in the dissertation have been given a tangible form by these two building projects in the German capital. Daniel Libeskind sums up the ambivalence surrounding both the Reichstag and the Jewish Museum by calling for the 'non-identity' of Germany, adding that he does not think the concept of the nation, and more specifically national architecture, is 'relevant' anymore (Libeskind, cited in Leach, 1999: 135). Libeskind's notion of a German 'non-identity' could be recoded as a desire to move away from the particularistic forms of national identity and towards a more universal, post-national identity.

For example both buildings display tensions between past and present, which are central to many debates about German national identity generally (Fulbrook, 1998; Habermas, 2001). Tensions between universalism and particularism are also clear here. With the Reichstag a British architect building in a 'British' or at least a non-German style shows this, as does the decision to leave the graffiti and the architectural symbolism, whether we believe it or not. Much of the symbolism of these two buildings is assessed further in the next chapter. This chapter has argued that both buildings assessed here display some of the tensions inherent in state presentations of a post-national identity. In the Jewish museum

particularistic references to nation are also wholly inappropriate, and Libeskind certainly dealt directly with the questions of collective identity through his work, writing a great deal explaining the symbolism of the building (see the next chapter). The very fact that the Jewish Museum was built says something for the political context in Germany (James-Chakraborty, 2000).

Although perhaps not displaying the characteristics of Critical Regionalism Frampton described, architecturally speaking it is clear that both the Reichstag and the Jewish Museum *are* rooted in place, as they attempt to engage with the specificities of Berlin and the German nation generally. Whether they succeed or not depends a great deal on the interpretation of the buildings. It is perhaps the *attempt* to engage with the particular, complex social, political and cultural contexts in which this architecture was designed and built in that makes these two projects rooted in place. Foster has said that the Reichstag has been his strongest 'contextualized' commission to date (Foster, 1999a). It is by engaging with these specifics of time and place that Foster asserts that '[c]ollective memories are embedded in the building's fabric' (Foster, 1999: 208). As would perhaps be expected in this environment the architects concerned with these projects have worked very hard to manage these meanings; this question is addressed in the next chapter.

Chapter Seven: National Identity and Architecture: Contested Discourses

Introduction

It has been argued in the previous two chapters that the Reichstag, the Jewish Museum and the Millennium Dome articulate some of the wider social, cultural and political tensions of the state projects of which they are a part. As a result of this, these buildings have provided a focus for otherwise disparate debates on the state, the nation, and other collective identities. This chapter assesses how far the architecture that is actually built relates to the aims and aspirations of the state project. From the examples of Gothic and Modernism in Chapter Two we can see that the meanings associated with styles have always been highly negotiated and very heavily dependent on context. Accordingly symbolism within architecture has long been a contentious issue, with architectural styles and motifs developing different meanings across time and space. What is of sociological interest, and provides a central focus of this chapter, is the extent to which these meanings can be managed by social actors so as to align a specific building with certain state values. In this chapter architecture is considered as a space of cultural contestation and conflict. Do architects hold the power to define legitimate forms of cultural identities and worth through their work? The Reichstag, the Jewish Museum, and the Millennium Dome are all situated within highly contested discourses of nation, state, and post-national identity, but to what extent have the respective architects been effective in situating their buildings in an appropriate 'political' position? Why do architects try to manage the meanings associated with their buildings and how successful are they in doing so? Why does architecture frequently provide the focus for these broader, more abstract debates around national identities?

Symbolizing What? The Reichstag, the Jewish Museum, and the Millennium Dome

'The box with the flag in front of it is replaced by a building that is a flag itself' (Vale, 1992: 54)

This dissertation has argued that architecture is increasingly acknowledged as a carrier of social meaning, as a way that societies come to understand themselves culturally (also see, for example Vale, 1992; Stevens, 1998; Heynen, 1999). This self-understanding is possible because architecture is a way of representing materially, often literally 'in concrete,' the central ideas, aims and sentiments of a given epoch of history or of a particular nation-state. It is in this way that architecture can give abstract historical trends and aspirations a tangible reality. Indeed, the artist and architectural critic John Ruskin (1819-1900) went so far as to suggest that we 'cannot remember' without architecture (Ruskin, 1992). So, it has also been argued that designing buildings is a way to represent the social symbolically, and as such provides a potential way of 'reading' societies.[155] Extending this idea, it was also established in Part One that the development of national styles in architecture was often the outcome of tensions characteristic of modernity, for example stresses between universalism and particularism. In this case styles with pretensions towards universalism, such as Gothic, neo-Classicism, and Modernism, had their form adapted to particular contexts and 'national styles' of building emerged.

Such styles came to be loaded with meanings, which were not necessarily derived from the architecture itself. It was more likely that these understandings had developed from

[155] The idea of the design competition gives architecture some of its distinctiveness as a profession. As one of the mainstays of architects' practice, competitions are representations, ways of reflecting society as it is or projecting an image of how it should be – it is this that makes architecture an inherently normative endeavour with great potential to codify collective identity projects. For more on architectural competitions see Larson (1996) and Stevens (1998).

historical and symbolic associations that states, architects and other cultural elites had attached to these building styles. This process of linking political meaning to the built environment has a long lineage and continues to be a concern for politicians the world over. For example, it was the then leader of Tanzania, Julius Nyere, who after leading Tanzania to independence in 1985 said that 'we [Tanzania] have to build in a manner which is within our means and which reflects our principles of human dignity and equality as well as our aspirations for our development' (Nyere, cited in Vale, 1992: 151). As has been illustrated by some of the examples used earlier on in this dissertation, architecture remains an important expression of a state's aims and intentions; the architectural and sociological questions that emerge from Nyere's sentiments are linked to the notion of representing an abstract (in this case democracy) in 'reality' (in this case in architecture). The problem of how to reflect these values in a building also reveals something of the tension between culture and politics.

It can now be established that the buildings assessed in Chapters Five and Six demonstrate a new, broadly post-national repertoire of symbols that are more in keeping with dominant contemporary political discourses such as transparency, openness, cosmopolitanism and reflexivity. Instead of actually etching text onto buildings or loading the architecture with ostentatious ornamentation to signify national victories, as was often the case in modernity, these designs use more symbolic architectural associations in an attempt to convey ideas of, for example, democracy. It is also clear from earlier chapters that architecture, as is national identity, is a discursive medium. In other words, architecture requires meaning to be attached to otherwise free-floating, 'meaningless' symbols and styles. Of course, agreement about architectural styles, motifs or specific buildings is seldom reached, with a central reason for this being that architectural critics, people who use the buildings, and architects all have opinions on the relative worth and meanings of architecture. So, from a sociological perspective, buildings can best be understood by being

situating in their wider social settings. Clearly the three buildings assessed in the previous two chapters exist in highly politicized contexts.

In this chapter I assess how far the architects responsible for the Reichstag, the Jewish Museum and the Millennium Dome are aware of the broader political and cultural contexts in which their work exists. Foster, Libeskind, and perhaps to a lesser extent Rogers, have all been very active in negotiating the meanings that their highly charged buildings convey. The fact that these architects have been required to situate their buildings in complex discourses around, for example national identity, is illustrative of the central role architecture now occupies in debates on collective identities. As architecture has become an increasingly significant expression of collective identity then so architects have had to reflexively ground their work in terms of such identity projects.[156] Without offering an interpretation of their own buildings architects are in danger of leaving the interpretation of their work 'open,' and when this is the case their architecture can easily come to have undesirable connotations. In short we can see that 'meaning in the [built] environment is inescapable, even for those who would deny it or deplore it' (Jencks, 1980a: 7).

Pierre Bourdieu has written widely on the links between cultural artefacts and identity. The nature of Bourdieu's study, sometimes referred to as the 'sociology of culture,' moves away from more traditional definitions of culture often used in the social sciences. As a result of its critical approach to culture Bourdieu's work contributes to our understanding of how power and authority function in the cultural sphere (for example see Bourdieu, 1989), as well as clarifying the role institutions have in constituting and reproducing culture (for example see Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977). By using Bourdieu's framework to view architecture, the central question becomes: who has the power to attach dominant meanings to otherwise free-floating architectural motifs? On this question Bourdieu has affirmed that '[e]very power to exert symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to

[156] Reflexivity means an awareness of one's relationship to the creation of knowledge. In this context reflexivity can be taken to mean that architects are aware of their position in the codification and construction of collective cultural identities.

impose meanings and to impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to these power relations' (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1977: 4). Bourdieu also suggests that the more this process of symbolic violence is hidden from sight and left unchallenged, then the more powerful it is in reproducing dominance.

Crucially then it is against the assumed backdrop of freedom, autonomy and neutrality that architects are involved in the creation and the reproduction of cultural identities; indeed Bourdieu argues that it is the very *latency* of such symbolic violence that imbues it with legitimacy. For Bourdieu the only way actors are made aware of any type of social reality is through the internalization of culture (via the mediating influence of the *habitus*[157]). The only way cultural legitimacy is conferred, and thus reproduced, is with reference to 'an absolute index of intrinsic worth' (Jencks, 1993: 13). It is the very mystification of this index and its subsequent acceptance that are the general concern of Bourdieu's writings. So, by conceiving of architecture as a field of symbolic conflicts over power and identity, coupled with the other observations that Bourdieu has made on taste and judgement, we can conclude that architects have a very complex culture terrain to negotiate when designing buildings that claim to represent collective identities, especially at the level of the nation.

Developing this idea, I would argue that of the three architects responsible for the buildings considered earlier in Part Two, it is Daniel Libeskind who is most aware of the politically loaded nature of his architecture. Libeskind's increased reflexivity can be explained as the context in which he has had to situate his building necessitates such an

[157] *Habitus* basically describes a cultural socialization process whereby dominant ideologies (which are inherently part of the social) become internalised, understood and ultimately literally embodied by individual agents. Stevens has adopted this concept for his study of architectural professions, and has concluded that 'The central function of the discipline of architecture is to produce instruments of taste' and as a result architects' success 'owes *at least* as much to their social background and to the social structures within which they are embedded as it does to their native talent' (Stevens, 1998: 2-3). Bourdieu would certainly suggest that this is the case, as taste is one of those things that is included in the category of embodied cultural capital, *habitus*, and ultimately then is a product of agency.

approach to architecture and collective identity. However, regardless of why he has been so sensitive to situation, Libeskind's writings and interviews provide clear examples of how architects working on landmark, state-led buildings often attempt to control the symbolic discourses that exist around their work. Libeskind realizes that his architecture is *not* neutral and that the Jewish Museum had to be more than a functional response.[158] Consequently he engages fully with the meanings that are potentially attached to his work. Libeskind's written work and interviews underline that architecture is a political statement with the potential to codify collective identities. In the case of the Jewish Museum Libeskind was obviously not designing a building to represent a German national identity, so accordingly the devices and symbolic discourses employed by Libeskind are often post-national in nature.

Libeskind has suggested that in the case of the Jewish Museum his architecture 'speaks a visible language' (Libeskind, cited in Spens, 1999: 42). Extending this metaphor I would argue that the language spoken by Libeskind's architecture is always in need of translation; because it is foreign to all but a few Libeskind himself becomes the translator. Leaving aside this metaphor, it is remarkable to consider that Libeskind has frequently tried to play down the symbolic value of his architecture, having once said of the Jewish Museum in an interview: 'You shouldn't worry about superficial issues such as form. What is important is the experience you get from it.'[159] Of course this protestation sounds a little hollow when we consider how much symbolism is invested in the building and the meanings Libeskind himself has attached to the form of the Jewish Museum. In the same interview Libeskind said of that 'the interpretation is open' – again this seems to go against a great deal of evidence to the contrary. I would also therefore disagree with the interviewer who claimed that in the case of the Jewish Museum 'Libeskind [has] left the viewer to weave meaning

[158] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at: www.bton.ac.uk
[159] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at: www.bton.ac.uk

into the space.'[160] With this particular building the very opposite is quite often true; Libeskind has been particularly active in offering 'strong' readings of what the museum, and the spaces within, mean. For example in explaining that the axis of exile should make visitors think of a certain thing, Libeskind is translating the supposedly 'visible language' that his architecture already speaks. This is not to say that Libeskind has had any input into what the display and gallery spaces were *actually* used for, but more was attempting to use the spaces of his architecture to situate his building in what he considered an appropriate political position.

The case of the windows of the Jewish Museum is also illustrative of this general trend (See Photo 14, Appendix). Libeskind has written that the design for the windows on the museum emerged from joining the pre-war sites of significant cultural figures and Jewish settlements on a map of Berlin (see the previous chapter). Given this explanation we can see that this aspect of the building further develops a close relationship between what is built and what it purports to represent. However, without Libeskind's explanation of the windows' design, it is improbable that the viewer of or visitor to the museum would be able to grasp this meaning. So, although certainly in keeping with the radicalised aesthetic of the building, without knowledge of Libeskind's own interpretation the window slits do little to locate the building into the history of the Jewish population of Berlin. In offering a 'strong' interpretation of this aspect of his building, Libeskind firmly grounds the Jewish Museum into the history of the Jewish communities of Berlin: the windows come to provide a spatial representation of the communities fatally disrupted by the Holocaust. There are also many other crosses on the zinc façade of the building, which, according to the museum's official pamphlet, make one 'feel compelled to think about the links between the cross and destruction. You wonder about the connections between the church and the holocaust' – again one does wonder about the connections when prompted to do so.

[160] From 'Rebuilding the Rubble', an interview with Daniel Libeskind in *The Guardian* 29.02.02

Filler (2001) supports of these arguments about the Jewish Museum when he says that '[n]one of Libeskind's allegorical references is readily apparent to the average viewer without prior knowledge of the architect's intentions.' Of course this is true of most architectural symbolism, but when the 'hyper-cleverness' (Filler, 2001) of Libeskind's references becomes apparent (i.e. when we are told what they mean) the result is to further ground his work to place and context. This underlines the point being developed here: architecture is discursive and relates to any given identity only to the extent that link can be made apparent. When designing buildings that purport to represent an identity, architects frequently need to be active in disseminating the meanings they feel to be appropriate. These messages often only have a tenuous relation to what is actually built.

Sometimes the information about the Jewish Museum provided by Libeskind does not necessarily answer the question of what the relationship between space and identity actually is. Inside the Museum there are numerous information points that remind us of the voids the building is organized around. One such text tells the visitor that 'the building is cut through by a tall space that has little in it. His building invites us to ask what this means.' There are many other symbolic aspects of the Jewish Museum where Libeskind has attempted to control the meanings of his work more overtly. Although the numerous design tricks employed by Libeskind, such as the stairs that lead to a wall, the numerous dead-ends, sloping floors, and his clever plays with light and shade, *may* make us reflect on the Jewish experience of alienation, the architect ensures we do just this by framing his work explicitly in these terms. For example, and again according to the official museum pamphlet, the seven voids - the inaccessible darkened spaces that interrupt the corridors - refer to the removal of the Jews from the continuum of German culture. The Garden of Exile alongside the building (see Photo 13, Appendix) is accompanied by the following text, written in both German and English: 'Here architect Daniel Libeskind asks us to think about the disorientation that exile brings.' When this information is coupled with the fact

that the 49 pillars represent the formation of the Israeli state and that the central pillar contains soil from Israel, then again we are aware that the building has strong representation links with the Jewish experience.

Norman Foster has also worked hard to manage the meanings attached to the reconstruction of the Reichstag in order to engage his architecture in a dialogue with German national identity. A key distinction between Foster's work at the Reichstag and the other two projects assessed in Part Three is that in this case the architect was working on a building that already existed. Foster's project was negotiating an already existing piece of architecture that also had a huge amount of symbolic connotations – Foster was certainly not working on a 'clean slate' as it were. The complex nature of these associations (see Chapter Six) meant that Foster had to actively engage with both the building's history and its future to make the project a 'success.' From his written work and many interviews[161] on the topic it is clear that Foster was highly reflexive in his work, well aware of the position that he and his architecture occupied in complex renegotiations of Germany's national identity. The Reichstag building is a symbolic, at some level, literal redesigning of the state, so as such was inevitably bound in many complex discourses about national identity, the relationship between past and future, and universalism and particularism. Chapter Six showed how Foster has tried to symbolize these tensions within his architecture. Indeed, in some senses, the Reichstag serves as much as a national memorial as it does a national parliament. The degree to which it is 'successful' as a 'memorial' depends very much upon the extent to which we believe the architectural symbolism attached to the building by Foster. How much should we invest in architects' interpretations of their own building?[162]

---

[161] Foster and his reconstruction project featured heavily in the film 'Berlin Babylon' which was about the central role that architects and their architecture has played in the reunification project.

[162] Of course, the extent to which landmark state-led buildings can be understood purely as an expression of an individual architect's aesthetic preferences or stylistic strengths is debatable, and '[t]he chance to design a parliament building or a new city may be treated by the architect chiefly as an opportunity to reiterate the ongoing formal preoccupations of a highly personal oeuvre, to such an extent that the public issues of symbolism are not rigorously explored' (Vale, 1992: 52). Stevens has looked more closely at this question, suggesting that a 'sociology of architecture' framework has been slow to develop primarily because

Foster has made a number of bold claims about how 'the new work [the Reichstag] is itself multi-layered and identifiably locked into the history and culture of its own times, the age of reunification and European integration' (Foster, 1999g: 208). It is interesting to compare this rhetoric with Rogers' lack of interpretation of his Dome. Rogers' and Davis' attempts to situate their work as a functional building as opposed to a symbolic statement, and practical and not expressive can perhaps be read as a way to depoliticize what was from the outset a controversial commission. The Dome had come to signal the end of a modernist state project, which can be contrasted to Foster's attempts to situate the Reichstag as central not only to a new Berlin, but also to a new Europe.

'Where the dominant ideology is democratic, popular regard for human dignity is a factor that tends to eliminate many of the prestige devices used in despotisms and autocracies as means of widening the gap between elite and non-elite' (Lasswell, 1979: 40). The public space above the politicians' heads is, Foster tells us, a spatial way to remind both politicians and the public of democratic principles. Foster has written that you can look down on the politicians debating, but that is not actually the case: when on the roof of the Reichstag the view beneath is refracted by mirrors and no clear view is available below. More than this, there is actually a Press Room located directly below the Reichstag's dome, so is it actually the media that the German Bundestag is subservient to? Although clearly a facetious claim, is this any more so than Foster claiming democracy just because of the spatial layout of a parliament? However, once the architect claims such symbolism is important, when the built reality is different to the one he or she describes then problems emerge. The example of the 'viewing platform' at the Reichstag does support a central claim of this chapter, namely that the symbolic values that become attached to a building are often detached from what is actually built. As Bonta observed in the late 1970s 'the

---

architecture has hitherto been considered as 'art.' Again we can see that there is a great deal of potential to extend Bourdieu's work on 'distinction' and art to the field of architecture (Stevens, 1999).

meaning of architecture can be removed – and sometimes even dissociated – from what architecture actually *is*' (Bonta, 1979: 14 – emphasis in original).

As was addressed in Chapter Six many of the practical aspects of the Reichstag reconstruction came to be highly contested, symbolic struggles over identity. As well as controversy about the overall design, Foster's project became embroiled in concerns about many aspects of his architecture, both practical and symbolic. During the reconstruction Foster was well aware of the politically loaded nature of almost every design decision he made, as is evidenced, for example, by his observation that '[c]olours inevitably carry political overtones and I was afraid that we might become mired in an endless debate about which were acceptable' (Foster, 1999g: 212-3). As with many of the design choices on the Reichstag, such as the type of stone used, the shape of the Eagle's beak, or the shape of the cupola, what initially may have been a pragmatic choice or an aesthetic preference became a symbolical decision about an unrelated discourse. In the case of the choice of stone, issues of labour rights, immigrant labour and protectionism all came to the fore. The shape and function of the cupola came to express tensions such as the past's relationship to the future, and for present purposes, architecture's relationship with a 'new' Germany.

So, as much as architects may claim that they do not necessarily try to send political messages through their buildings I have argued that it is clear that often their work is inextricably linked to complex political discourses. Frequently these issues are of such a contested nature that the job of the architect in situating the building in terms of collective identity becomes a very difficult one. When presenting to the competition judges, Foster says he felt it important to 'remove the 'symbolic charge' from our proposals and focus instead on democracy' (Foster, 1999d: 65). Here we are presented with an oxymoron: how is it possible for Foster to 'remove symbolic charge' from a building proposal while at the same time claim his architecture is 'democratic'? This is primarily the reason Daniel

Libeskind believes that 'architecture could also get lost - because it is not a very expressive medium.'[163]

Overall on the Reichstag it is clear that much of the symbolism employed by Foster is highly ambiguous. Often with the Reichstag project it is still 'unclear whether the agreed meanings will be those the public decides ring true, or those it is persuaded to ascribe as intended and therefore correct' (Buchanan, 1999: 170). Offering an intentionally spurious interpretation about the vent in the Reichstag 'sucking up the politicians' hot air', I would support Buchanan's notion of 'the impossibility of avoiding the symbolic, especially on a building like the Reichstag. No matter what functional intention determined its forms, people will inevitably seek and attach meanings to them, and so the architect must anticipate and shape these too' (Buchanan, 1999: 173). This claim is certainly supported by the efforts made by the three architects assessed above.

The Reichstag has had many different associations over its chequered history, with only some of these symbolized or reflected in the architectural style of the building. The most an architect can realistically claim is that their work signals intent to engage with the primarily discursive nature of the bonds of a given collective identity (see Part One). Very few people in the population would, for example, know how to interpret the deconstructive aesthetics of some postmodern buildings or necessarily equate a dome with progress or democracy. But as some architects purport to represent nations in their work, then the question becomes: why do some buildings become an effective focus for discourses of collective identity? Libeskind believes that representative architecture should 'speak directly' to the citizens it represents as 'I [Libeskind] don't think it can be left to the words of the architect. I think they have to see it and there has to be a visceral and carnal understanding. They have to have a theoretical understanding as well. They understand

[163] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/car1dl.html

'how' but they don't understand 'why.' In some ways it is easier for non-architects to understand. Normal people don't have a problem.'[164]

Although the meanings attached to architecture varies considerably with time/space, for the main part buildings do not actually change the way that they look. From Bonta's work (1979) we can see that it is the interpretation, rather than what is actually built, that varies. Bonta uses Ludwig Mies Van der Rohe's Pavilion at the Barçelona Expo in 1929 to illustrate this point, tracing reviews of the pavilion through from when it was first built until the time he was writing (just over 50 years). The changing interpretations of the building and the motifs it employs are illuminating. Bonta uses this case study to demonstrate how an 'architectural orthodoxy' of opinion develops. Bonta decides that Mies' architecture cannot, as some critics claim, speak for itself, but rather that 'value judgements originate and disappear with time' (Bonta, 1979: 138). From a philosophy of science perspective Kuhn's work on paradigms is an important supplement to Bonta's initial framework. Kuhn's *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (1962) contained the central contention that the interpretation of the results of scientific enquiry differs according to which paradigm the scientific community is operating within. Linking this notion explicitly to this part of the dissertation we can see how significant the architectural community is for the development of a 'canonical' interpretations, as 'the interpretation of a single work is affected by interpretations of other works taking place within the same social or historical context' (Bonta, 1979: 65). A key sociological question centres on how far the architect responsible for the building is also responsible for the interpretation of her or his own architecture. By offering a pre-emptive interpretation is an architect able to control the meanings associated with her or his building?

Certainly the associations that buildings have are very flexible, as was illustrated by the example of Gothic in Chapter Two. Symbolism depends on how the person viewing the

[164] From an interview with Daniel Libeskind at http://www.bton.ac.uk/archid/carldl.html

building interprets it, so is ultimately subjective. This is further evidenced in the case of Berlin, where both the Nazis and communists adopted classicism as 'theirs', building many significant monuments in the style (see Chapter Seven). This commonality further underlines Bonta's argument (1979) that interpretation of styles and buildings changes across time and space; it is also this point that makes sociological inquiry into the ability of the architect to manage the meanings of their buildings necessary. 'Architecture is also a language and I believe that we politicians must ensure that this language, like the language of politics in general, does not become empty jargon that no one wants to see or hear' (Scheel, cited in Wise, 1998: 32). Architects working on state commissions then must endeavour to make their language, architectural and spoken, meaningful. In the cases assessed here this has meant relating architecture to a specific national or collective identity.

This dissertation has argued that representing collective identity in the built environment has long been a challenge for architects. Of course the ways in which this is achieved have varied greatly, and it does see that 'recent parliament buildings have sought to embody democracy in architecture itself, rather than in surface embellishments' (Buchanan, 1999: 164). This is certainly the case with the Reichstag, which offers a clear comparison of two techniques: Wallot's ostentatious motifs and script can be contrasted with Foster's attempt at a 'critical reconstruction.' Although clearly '[e]quilateral triangles do not necessarily make for equilateral politics' (Vale, 1992: 125) many architects seem to be claiming just this: Foster's glass cupola does not guarantee democratic politics any more than the twelve yellow masts on Rogers' Millennium Dome meant that this project was to 'embrace' British communities. In an attempt to simplify this problem of representation architects sometimes attempt to use their buildings to communicate more directly. Vale offers the example of the Parliament House in Papua New Guinea (designed by Hogan and opened in 1984) which has: 'All power belongs to the people – acting through their elected

representatives' tiled on the façade. Even textual messages such as this one often reveal a tension between culture and politics, as in this case, as well as raising serious questions about the tradition linguistic of cultures in Papua New Guinea; Vale suggests that the inscription is more to do with the Western tourist industry than democratic citizenship (Vale, 1992: 165-189). These debates about how to best represent and symbolize democracy in architecture find an unlikely contributor in Albert Speer. Although very effective at controlling the symbolism associated with his projects, Speer concluded that '[c]olumns do not stand for dictatorship, nor glass for democracy. Architecture in a democracy should be diverse, not pompous; self-confident not bombastic; modest but not cheap.... [t]o build in a democracy means to build for and with the citizens, not against them' (Speer, cited in Wise, 1998: 37-8).

I have argued that the choice of a foreign architect to design such a landmark, state-led building is hugely significant. In the case of the Millennium Dome we can suppose that the choice of a foreign architect, a further expression of a universalising tendency, would have been very controversial. However, by awarding the contract to design the Millennium Dome to a well-established, politically well-connected British architect it could be suggested that state missed an opportunity to underline their commitment to a multi-cultural, diverse society. The commissioning of a foreign architect to design a nationally significant, state-funded building can be linked to wider theories of multiculturalism and cultural hybridity. As architecture is on the whole such a white, male-dominated, middle-class profession (Stevens, 1998), the choice of designer can potentially send out a signal of a state's broader commitment to multiculturalism or cultural diversity. The incorporation of foreign styles has a very different meaning in a postcolonial context such as Papua New Guinea than it would have in Germany, for example. It can be suggested that the 'incorporation of foreign patterns is usually motivated by more complex value perspectives than the unconsciousness demand to remodel the self in the image of those who are

perceived as powerful' (Lasswell, 1979: 53). If we take this quote as meaningful then the German state, if not trying to remodel itself on the more powerful, was trying to align itself with a more European and less distinctly German identity. I would suggest the fact that none of the top German architects (such as Helmut Jahn for instance) were even shortlisted to redesign the Reichstag reinforces this point.

Frampton, the leading advocate of Critical Regionalism, claims that building materials can also carry different connotations, providing a way to contextualize architecture. However, in keeping with the general argument of this chapter, even the meanings attached to certain building materials can also vary greatly. Glass is one material which can come to connote very different meanings across time and space. Because of its literal transparency glass is often considered a symbol of openness, accessibility and democracy, as is the case with Foster's dome extension to the Reichstag. However, another reading of the same material is that glass symbolizes fascism, as it breaks down the distinction between public and private, making everything visible and nothing private (for example this 'transparency' was central to Jeremy Bentham's plans for the Panopticon that so fascinated Foucault (1979)). Of course, as was illustrated by the buildings assessed earlier in Part Three, the meanings buildings develop are often dependent to a large extent on what they are to be used for. This point about context being vital to interpretation is further underlined in the aforementioned case of Berlin, where neo-classicism was used on state buildings by both Communist and Nazi regimes.

Richard Rogers is another politically influential architect, and is currently Head of the Urban Regeneration Task Force, chairman of the Architecture Foundation and former chairman of the Arts Council. Resultantly he is aware of the political role that state-led architecture can come to play. Rogers is often referred to in the media as the government's 'champion' for architecture, and, having been proclaimed a 'visionary' by Downing

Street,[165] has aligned himself squarely with the New Labour political project. He has written that the Conservative party neglected architecture while in office and that the 'the good news is that Labour recognises that the built environment has a huge impact on our quality of life.'[166] However, it could be suggested that Rogers was less active than the other two architects in attempting to manage the meaning of his architecture in the case of the Millennium Dome. Rogers granted relatively few interviews on the Millennium Dome and has written nothing of a systematic nature on the subject, in stark contrast to both Foster and Libeskind, who have been very active in disseminating symbolic interpretations of their work (see Chapters Five and Six). In one interview on the Dome, Rogers' plea that the architecture represented a functional solution to a 'simple problem' (see Chapter Five) is reminiscent of the claims made by the architects of the Crystal Palace and the Festival Hall for earlier state-led events. Judged purely on this criterion Rogers' building can be considered a success, as it enclosed the exhibition and also arrived 'under budget and on time.'[167] The High-Tech Style pioneered by Rogers and Foster in their Team 4 days was particularly appropriate for this commission, as the exposed structures allowed for a huge space inside. We are reminded that a key factor for how such a national festival is perceived is what actually fills the space that the architect has created; in this case this question was clearly outside of Rogers' control. What is also evident is that the complex discourses which surround the event are as significant as the actual building itself; in the case of the Millennium Dome the way that the project was interpreted was highly contingent on the broader party political context of which it was an expression. Rogers has written in the past that: 'Nations, states.... and buildings are quarries of information giving off signals that can be read' (Rogers, 1985: 11), undermining the idea of architecture as a neutral, apolitical endeavour. In fact Rogers himself has been critical of the unwillingness of British politicians from any party to engage with issues of architecture and its relation to

[165] See, for example *The Guardian*, 04.08.00
[166] Rogers in *The Observer*, 28.01.01
[167] From Richard Rogers Partnership at www.richardrogers.co.uk

identity. He has written that 'politicians' unwillingness to talk about architecture is so total that it goes almost unremarked. Sometimes it feels like there is a conspiracy of silence.'[168]

Certainly from a sociological perspective it is clear that the Millennium Dome became mired in many debates that went far beyond what was actually built (see Chapter Five). The cost of the project, scepticism about the millennium celebrations, cynicism about the New Labour political project generally, and ambiguity surrounding Britain's place in Europe all led to the Millennium Dome symbolizing a sense of 'crisis' in the British state project. Rogers' protestations that the Dome should not be over-read as it was a functional response to a design problem ring hollow when we consider that 'everything that can be seen or thought about takes on a meaning, or position within a signifying system' (Jencks, 1980a: 7). The position that the Dome took on became unattached to the architecture. Even though architecture was seldom the main grievance, with the case of the Millennium Dome the evidence in this dissertation is that architecture became a symbolic site for contestation around collective identity projects.

The Politics of Building: Architecture and National Identity

'All buildings are politically engendered, but some buildings are arguably more political than others' (Vale, 1992: 274).

Architecture has become such a significant focus for identity debates as it 'expresses the will to build and rebuild, that is to engage and represent the world as a continuous opportunity for reconstruction' (Grezner, 2000: 219). As sociologists it is important to question what the aims of such symbolic reconstructions are, and how buildings come to have any 'meanings' (at least in Schutz's ([1954] 1972) sense of a social reality). If, as is

[168] From Rogers in *The Independent*, 02.04.01

suggested in this dissertation, architecture has become a significant focus for debates around collective identity, then architects must take this into account when designing buildings that purport to represent nations or other cultural communities. Again, this highlights a tension between architecture and politics, as '[q]uestions about the formal depiction of political ideals raise issues relating to ideals of cultural pluralism as well' (Vale, 1992: 278). As well as architectural issues about symbolism and diversity, we are also left to pose a more sociological question about why buildings continue to provide a focus for debates on the nation. The buildings assessed earlier in Part Three of the dissertation have all attempted to come to terms with issues which I have suggested can often be recast as a negotiation between broadly post-national identities in a national state context. These buildings have all, to some extent, struggled with representing openness, diversity and cosmopolitanism. I have argued that contemporary nations tend to be divided along more lines than at any time before. Fragmentation along sexual, ethnic, class, education, occupation and religious lines has meant that the idea of a culturally bounded, homogeneous nation have become difficult for the state to legitimate. Architecture is undoubtedly becoming an important aspect of identity expression, but how can diversity be represented in architecture?

Recently the architecture critic Hugh Pearman, writing about contemporary styles, has concluded that '[n]obody has the faintest idea. There is no consensus. There is no recognisable style to start the 21st century, in the way we can recognise the 1800s or the 1900s by their buildings.'[169] The styles that characterized the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of nation building also had coherent values attached to their aesthetic, at least in a national context (see Chapter Two). Today the wide range of styles that coexist, coupled with the continued desire of states, especially given the lead of post-Guggenheim Bilbao, to create landmark buildings that are radically plural in both style and meaning. This

[169] Hugh Pearman in *The Sunday Times*, 22.09.02

increased 'openness' of styles and their meanings has led to a greater potential for architecture to reflect and represent a whole range of collective identities, providing of course that the appropriate interpretation of a building can become the dominant one. In such cases it is not always the buildings themselves that are political, as buildings themselves evidently do not engage in social issues – rather it is the symbolism attached to architecture that means it takes on a political dimension.

From the buildings assessed earlier in Part Three we can see that architects and states have tried to manage the architecture's meaning to 'fit' their priorities and aims, as was ever the case. How far these meanings have in common with what is actually built is debatable; these three buildings may well take on new meanings as time goes by, as was the case with the Barçelona Pavilion (Bonta, 1979). In other words 'though political symbols may impress us as having 'always' had the same connotative signification and societal meaning – because their representational form (as signifiers) stays the same – it is nevertheless far from uncommon for the same symbolic material to change its functions and connotations over time, and even at the same temporal intersection to imply different meanings to different groups' (Hedetoft, 1995: 122).

If, as suggested above, it is not possible to make authoritative truth claims about the aesthetic 'worth' of architecture[170] then how are we as sociologists to understand the increasingly central role that architecture plays in the contemporary post-national state project? Historically the 'expansion of a new regime, or of a new system of authority and control, usually results in alteration of the physical environment.... Hence, the elite of a nation-state.... tries to create symbols capable of setting it apart from older symbols of

[170] It was suggested above that a central reason for architecture being such a contested discourse is that architects, critics and the general public have opinions on, criticize, use and conceptualize the very same buildings. This prompts the question of whether or not it is possible to maintain which architecture is 'good,' and which is not. Associated questions emerge around the evaluation of architecture: is taste something that cannot (and should not) be argued about, or is it possible to say, once for all, which architecture is of good quality and which is not? Is taste a subjective and highly individual aspect, or can it be explained from sociological point of view? I believe that there is great potential to use Bourdieu's *Distinction* to address some of these issues. Gary Stevens uses Bourdieu's work to assess architecture as practice, and it would certainly be possible to extend his excellent survey to address specific buildings or architectural styles in terms of 'cultural capital.'

authority... and to emphasize the existence of a brave new identity that enjoys excellent prospects for its values and institutions' (Lasswell, 1979: 13-14). It is a central contention of this dissertation that as states come to terms with their new roles in a more globalized, less nationally-bounded world, architecture undoubtedly has potential not only to reflect new aims and aspirations, but also to *create* new perceptions of nations.[171] As states such as Britain move away from colonial, imperial pasts and try to represent multicultural, post-material, and post-industrial values then so the architecture that such states build represents this shift. In the nation-building era of modernity state architecture was tied to discourses of power, colonial arrogance and nationalism, whereas political architecture in Europe is now dominated by debates of transparency, access, openness and cosmopolitanism.

However there do seem to be some generalized stylistic things that contribute to 'successful' state-led buildings. For example, easily recognizable and reproducible silhouettes are very important for the 'landmark' status of buildings, as is evidenced in many designs (Vale, 1992). Where a recognizable image of a building does not already exist, there is a pressure to create one. These landmark buildings 'must have a memorable and easily reproducible silhouette yet must not be openly derived from any one architectural source, unless it is a source that the sponsoring government wishes unabashedly to represent' (Vale, 1992: 285). For example, in the case of the Jewish Museum, a readily reproducible and recognizable silhouette does not exist, so the plan view of the building is used for marketing purposes. If this is true then it is only to be expected that political rulers want to put their 'stamp' on the way buildings look, especially buildings in the capital and especially government buildings. The development of capital cities continues to reflect the historical 'phase of active consolidation of a nation-state or empire, [when] the most conspicuous architectural result is the accentuation of the primacy of the capital city' (Lasswell, 1979: 11).

[171] Architecture has also played a central role in many European Capital of Culture bids.

There is some potential to develop one of Durkheim's ideas for thinking about architecture's potential to codify national identity.[172] Although Durkheim's work is generally concerned with the problems posed for social integration in differentiated and complex industrial societies, it is in his writing on pre-industrial, traditional societies we find a theory useful for understanding the role of architecture. The totem, Durkheim suggests, 'is the flag of the clan' (Durkheim, [1915] 1985: 220). This means that the totem is comparable to a flag – it 'stands in' for a social reality. Durkheim believed that the totem was in itself an inherent social reality, a manifestation of social relations. Durkheim argued that such codifications are functionally necessary for the maintenance of social order, as they reflect and reinforce *conscience collective*. It is possible to extend this idea by suggesting that totems do not only reflect or reinforce a given order, but that they actually contribute to the creation or construction of social identities (see Part One). In this sense it is possible to consider landmark, state-led architectural projects as totems, which both reflect and help to develop collective identities.

These questions of how to represent collective identities more inclusive than national identity in architecture lead us back to debates around Critical Regionalism. Although Frampton can be criticized for assuming that some architecture has inherent meanings that 'root' them into a place or region, his work does offer the potential to start to think about how to represent diverse identities in the built environment. Throughout this dissertation I have suggested that architecture has had, and continues to have, a significant role in reflecting and constructing social identities. Frampton has also suggested that architecture provides a realistic basis for the building of communities, therefore offering a key strategy for cultural resistance (Frampton, 1979, 1983, 1990). Although critical of the 'heroic,' utopian aspirations of modern architects, architectural theorists such as Frampton and Heynen (1999) believe that architecture that is rooted into place provides a key strategy for

[172] I am grateful to Roger Sibeon for a conversation about Durkheim's work on totem.

cultural resistance, as it can offer a codification for various types of marginalized identities. Linking this to the argument to the dissertation more widely, it can also be claimed that '[t]hough national identity may be promoted through attempts to demonstrate architectural evidence of cultural uniqueness, such identity may be forged oppositionally as well' (Vale, 1992: 51).

When discussing the 'mass-production' or 'invention' of traditions in nineteenth and twentieth-century Europe, Eric Hobsbawm has written that 'a changing society made the traditional forms of ruling by states and social or political hierarchies more difficult or even impracticable. This required new methods of ruling or establishing bonds of loyalty' (Hobsbawm, 1983b: 263). It can be tentatively suggested that today we are witnessing, to some degree, a 'changing society' and that the state is accordingly in the process of trying to develop a new, post-national language of symbols to articulate 'new' types of collective identities and citizenships. I have argued that landmark architecture will be a significant 'symbol' in the post-national language of European states. Indeed this dissertation has argued that, just as in modernity when states used landmark architecture to reflect their modernizing aims, today a post-national spatial repertoire of citizenship codes is emerging. I have presented the argument that architecture is at the forefront of a new symbolic language, as is evidenced by the three architectural projects assessed in Part Three. The role of the state in creating such post-national symbols (and ultimately identities) is obviously a very ambiguous one.

The emergence of post-national 'European identity' projects poses some interesting general questions regarding political symbolism. As Ulf Hedetoft points out various agencies and institutions of the EU have made sustained efforts to create a political symbol for the union (Hedetoft, 1995: 124). The EU Flag,[173] an official anthem, twinning arrangements, sporting events, the Euro, and EU passports all exist in the hope that some of

[173] Rem Koolhaas, the leading Dutch architect, has recently designed an 'unofficial' EU flag, which resembled a brightly coloured barcode. Koolhaas suggested that this design better represented the diversity inherent in the member states than does the official flag.

this will take root in the popular consciousness and provide a minimal European cultural identity. Such post-national identity projects can be seen to mimic some of the methods employed by states when constructing the cultural identities of nations in modernity. A central claim of this chapter is that architecture has the potential to play an important part in the reflexive constitution of such post-national identities. Jencks (1980b) offers the suggestion that the most effective type of architecture for symbolizing diversity is that in which the meanings are to some extent left open, giving buildings the ability to represent plural identities. This strategy offers an interesting alternative to what Foster and Libeskind, and to a lesser extent Rogers, have actually done with the discourses around their buildings.

Roche has also written on the role of mass culture for European citizenship identities. He points out that 'EU policy makers claim that a distinctive 'European' 'heritage' and set of values exist and that there is a distinctive modern 'European model'' (Roche, 2001a: 79). This focuses attention on how this, supposedly distinctive, European heritage is expressed. Of course, more than the development of a common history (see Chapter One) the EU is concerned with the shaping of a common future. As Roche also points out the 1992 Maastricht Treaty of union gave the EU the right to act in the sphere of culture, necessitating the Union promotes 'common heritage' while respecting national diversity (Roche, 2001a: 84). Again we can see stresses between universalism and particularism emerging here. The relationship between national cultures and an overarching European culture is beset with tensions, with official attempts towards Europeanization hampered by, for example, the lack of a common language. It was suggested earlier on in the dissertation that the development of symbols of European cultural identity such as passports, anthems and flags, mirrors the emergence of national cultural symbols in modernity. Architecture was a significant site for the development of national cultures in this epoch, and is proving to be so in a new age of Europeanization.

Globalization has ushered in new ways of thinking about the role of the architect and architecture in society. Increasingly architecture is perceived not only, as in earlier epochs, as a state-driven codifier of nationality, but also as a way of articulating cultural resistance to the homogenizing project of cultural globalization or 'McDonaldization.' Manuel Castells is one such theorist for whom architecture represents a way to 'root culture into people' (Castells, 1996: 423). This explicitly means a move away from architecture that constructs legitimacy for economic globalization (as was the case with the International Style of modernism), turning away from the market forces that for many are the driving force behind globalization. However, this shift to an 'architecture of resistance' is made more difficult not only because the architectural profession is particularly dependent on corporations for its commissions, but also because architecture has a tendency to adopt economic models of practice (Larson, 1996). As a result of this architecture frequently becomes closely linked with the economy, as was the case in the 1980s when the International Style of architecture became synonymous with free-market capitalism. The survival of architecture as a profession is to some extent dependent on the capitalist economy for commissions, so the potential for cultural resistance against the more universalising tendencies of globalized capital would appear to be limited. As a result of this Castells suggests a new, architectural uniformity has been established with the advent of the network society. According to Castells the flows of information and communication which have come to dominate the economy operate as an open, net like structure organized around 'nodes.' These nodes (cities such as New York, London, Tokyo, Sydney, Toronto etc.) are characterized by a symbolically similar architecture to the extent that 'architecture escapes from history and culture of each society and becomes captured in the new imagery, a wonderland world of unlimited possibilities that underlies the logic transmitted by multimedia' (Castells, 1996: 417). Castells sees an 'overimposed postmodern monumentality' as the architectural trend that links the corporate headquarters of the 1980s

(in the International Style) with the buildings that characterize the nodes or key cities of the network society.

Conclusion

'It is right to interpret buildings against frames of reference broader than their immediate physical surroundings' (Bonta, 1979: 174).

The relationship between architecture and the nation-state can no longer be taken for granted. Nevertheless the state certainly has a continued interest in architecture, although no longer with the same degree of mastery. Instead of grandeur and pomposity, the new architectural discourses are of transparency, accessibility and, perhaps most importantly, a reflexive approach to representing collective identities. Landmark public buildings commissioned by governments undeniably still have political purposes but contemporary architecture is not so readily coded around national identity, leading to tensions emerging around state-led architectural projects. Nowhere are these ambiguities more clear than in the examples of the Millennium Dome in London, and the Reichstag and Jewish Museum in Berlin, as these buildings all articulate tensions and renegotiations between nation and state, universals and particulars, past and future, and national identity and cosmopolitanism. For this dissertation it is the *symbolic nature* of these projects rather than aesthetic merit or otherwise that is of concern. My central contention is that the symbolic construction of these and other major buildings is located in a wider cultural discourse that is not easily mastered by political agency and has become an opened discourse. This chapter has concluded that the symbolic construction of these and other major buildings is located in a wider cultural discourse that is not easily mastered by political agency and has become an opened discourse.

In the same way that national identities are dependent on a re-evaluation and amnesia (see Part One), the meanings attached to architecture that symbolizes such identities are also fluid. 'In a living state organism, people are always trying to reinterpret political symbolism' (Braunfels, 1988: 321) and this dissertation has argued that architecture provides a significant way of renegotiating collective identities. The previous two chapters have assessed the role of state-sponsored architects to attempts of 'rebrand' aspects of London and Berlin (and by association Britain and Germany). These buildings provide clear examples of state-led, landmark projects that are inextricably linked to discourses of the nation. In this chapter I have argued that the extent to which these buildings are accepted as symbols of the nation depends a great deal on the extent to which the architect can align her or his built form with more abstract discourses. Social actors use and reflect on the built environment in a range of ways, all the time ascribing meaning to the buildings around them (Mai, 1997). When accepting, or perhaps even entering, a commission for a landmark state-led architectural project, architects are essentially engaged in 'sociological' debate; the extent to which they manage to situate their buildings within such discourses is the key as to whether or not the building can be judged as 'successful.' Significant state-funded projects exist within a whole range of complex negotiations around identity, so increasingly contingency plays a major factor in how they are perceived. Daniel Libeskind, one of the most active architects in terms of written material on his own work, would seem to be being inconsistent when he concludes: 'Whatever an architect says about his work may only seem a redundant commentary on what is obviously built' (Libeskind, 2001: 24). Of course, many of the debates that focus on landmark architecture go far beyond what is actually being built. In the case of the Millennium Dome for example, the discourses that surrounded the project were frequently so disparate and complex that they can never be resolved or even fully addressed in one architectural project.

However I would suggest that architecture is itself becoming a more discursive medium, which means it can provide a focus for many abstract debates around collective identity projects. As the city and mass culture have become significant sites for contemporary citizenship (Isin and Wood, 1999) citizens are increasingly aware of how the collective identities they are a part of are shaped by cultural symbols. This increased reflexivity around identity projects has ironically led to further contestation around state-led cultural projects which many citizen groups feel to be top-down, unrepresentative and irrelevant (Stevenson, 2001). The aforementioned contestation between universal, modern architecture such as the International Style, and regional architecture has, over the last decade or so, been recast as negotiations between the global and the local. The sites of these contestations are now situated both in real and 'virtual' places where the global and the local intersect - these are the new political spaces in which identities are formed (Part Two).

Conclusion: Post-National Identity and Architecture

'Look and see the constant flaggings of nationhood.... [t]heir unobtrusiveness arises, in part, from their very familiarity' (Billig, 1995: 174)

This dissertation has set out to assess what role the state, and more specifically the landmark architectural projects of the state, has to play in the codification of contemporary national identities. Architecture has had, and indeed continues to have, a vital role in shaping the collective social imagination by helping us to recognize the society in which we live. I have concluded that architecture plays an increasingly ambivalent role in the state project today. It was outlined in Part One that at the time of extensive nation-building in the European context architecture played a central role in the codification of national cultures, with states often using landmark buildings to reflect a national identity and to help 'create' an historical narrative of memory. Many of the great European buildings of the period 1850 to 1914 testified to the self-confidence of the nation-states, with imperial powers often using buildings to give a tangible, built form to otherwise abstract aims and values. Indeed the social transformations of modernity often found their clearest, most 'concrete' expression through architecture, which represented the abstract discourses of the modern project with an expressive cultural code.

Central to any analysis of modernity is the development of the nation-state, which in many ways can be considered the institutional expression of the modern age. For the reasons suggested above, nation-state building often found an attendant architectural expression. Accordingly in Chapters One and Two I argued that architecture was central to the cultural self-understanding and self-definition that was so vital to the nation-state in modernity. However, as has also been illustrated, the relationship between architecture and the nation-state can no longer be taken for granted. Processes associated with globalization have impacted not only on the role and relevance of the nation-state; the state's potential to

codify the nation culturally or aesthetically has also been compromised to a large degree. As Part Three demonstrated, European states still have a continued interest in architecture, but crucially this is often without the same degree of control over styles and meanings that they once exercised. One reason for this diminished control is because clearly differentiated national architectural styles do not exist to the same extent they once did. Contemporary architecture is characterized by a plurality of different styles, with the absence of a dominant architectural 'ism' in contemporary building and theory indicative of this radical diversity. High profile architects increasingly work in a transnational context, and as their designs take influences from many styles and countries their buildings are often removed from particularistic references to dominant, state-led, national cultures. Other changes within the architectural profession have made the imposition of national styles difficult; instead of grandeur and pomposity, the new architectural discourses are of transparency, accessibility, cosmopolitanism and a more reflexive approach to the codification and creation of collective identity. This shift in architectural discourses mirrors the contemporary European political scene, offering further evidence for the claims made above about architecture as a key form of political representation. So, although landmark public buildings commissioned by governments undeniably still have political purposes for the main part contemporary architecture does not have a style (or general discourse) that is readily coded around a particular national identity. I have suggested that in some cases this has led to tensions emerging around state-led architectural projects. However, even with the absence of a coherent style to employ, states still demonstrate a strong desire to codify the nation architecturally. Since the construction of the Guggenheim Museum in Bilbao, states have been reminded of the very tangible, often economic, benefits of landmark architectural project. As well as the symbolic importance of signalling, for example, a new, progressive nation, many state-led architectural projects have proved to be catalysts for the local economy.

It has been also been a contention of this dissertation that the cultural role of the state in broadly 'post-national' conditions is frequently an extremely contested one, as is often evidenced by large-scale national projects conceived of in such contexts. Regardless of this diminished control over codes, and as was also the case in modern conditions, states and other elites still actively try to use such cultural artefacts to create or supplement national identities. The premium placed on large-scale cultural projects reflects the state's continued interest in culture as a way to integrate populations (Roche, 2000, 2001a; Gellner, 1987, 1994). Mass culture in general is now a highly politicized sphere and, due to processes associated with globalization, national cultures are under many pressures both from 'above' and 'below.' This is further evidenced as contemporary states are increasingly likely to find challenges to their legitimacy from the 'inside' as the 'outside,' and national identities and nationalisms are frequently mobilized *against* the state in globalized conditions of action (see Chapter Three).

This shift can be recast as the move from jingoism in modernity to xenophobia in globalized conditions. It is partly because of this move that we have witnessed a fragmentation of national identities, with many new challenges to and reappropriations of the nation code. The ability of the state to control and stabilize collective identities is increasingly being called into question at a time when 'in Western democracies, government measures promoting social integration are now joined with a discourse on cultural recognition' (Kastoryano, 2002: 85). The reinvention of state-driven collective identities in an era of immigration and contact with many, diverse cultures has meant that the stability of such identities rests heavily on the ability of the government to represent and symbolize diverse cultures in an appropriate and significant way. It can also be concluded that in granting recognition to certain groups in such projects, states are inevitably involved in the politicisation of certain identities (also see Kastoryano, 2002).

Adding further to the already contested nature of the nation-state, the city has become an influential site for the creation and representation of contemporary collective identities. Section Two showed how, again in part due to globalizing pressures, ironically new national identities and nationalisms often have a strong anti-state bias. The concern of such groups is often that the state cannot adequately represent the diversity and difference that is now inherent in many nations. Such anti-state movements also frequently highlight the extent to which the state lacks the ability to support the particularistic identities of the nation against the more universalizing tendencies inherent in economic and cultural forms of globalization. I have argued that in the globalization literature the city is increasingly viewed as the primary site for the acting out of collective identities, and as such the city provides a centrally important 'new space' in which citizenship is developed, contested and codified. Many of the economic, political, social and cultural roles now carried out by cities were once within the remit of states, and there is much evidence for a resurgence of the city under globalized conditions of action (Castells, 1996, 1997; Sassen 2001). Cities such as London and Berlin have increasingly come to offer the strongest representation of the nation. Indeed the British and German examples (Chapters Five and Six) illustrate that within globalized conditions of action there are often numerous tensions between the nation, the state, and capital cities. For example in Chapter Five I argued that British identity is increasingly London-centric due to the clustering of cultural, economic and political power there, and that the city is increasingly the focus of definitions of the British nation. Of course historically capital cities have often provided the state with an identity, but what has changed today is that cities such as London and Berlin are becoming detached from the nation and the region. Increasingly the clustering of national cultural capital, such as in this case large-scale, state-led landmark building projects, means that the identity of these cities has evermore influence on their respective national identities.

I believe that the ambiguity around contemporary 'post-national' state-led architectural projects is evident in the three main architectural examples I have used to illustrate these more theoretical debates. Libeskind's Jewish Museum, Foster's extension to The Reichstag, and Rogers' Millennium Dome all articulate tensions addressed throughout the dissertation. I have argued that these monumental architectural projects have given a built expression to the ultimately contested nature of contemporary British and German nations respectively, while at the same time often exposing the diminished potential of the state to represent diverse, dynamic populations in a suitable way. For example I have suggested that the Millennium Dome can be read as a monument to the British state's inability to define the nation code authoritatively – although as was suggested in Chapter Seven, this is just one 'reading' of this building among many others. Various perspectives have stressed that the Dome is a testament to the New Labour government and the 'spin' with which it is associated, to the colonization of politics by the economy, to bad design, to racism, and to political arrogance. What we can certainly agree upon is the sociological significance of such landmark buildings; many discourses of the nation, the state, the city (and their associated collective identities) have centred on the Millennium Dome project. In this case architecture has acted as a metaphor for a wide range of significant debates about the nation, with this contested 'mega-event' (Roche, 2000) reflecting the difficulty inherent in contemporary state codifications of diverse, fragmented, nations.

Another contention of this dissertation concerns the symbolic relationship between architecture and national identity. In Part Three it was argued that architects working on politically highly charged, state-funded projects are increasingly likely to attempt to offer an authoritative reading of their own building. The highly politicised nature of state commissions means that the high profile architects designing such works must be acutely aware of how their building relates to a given cultural identity. Chapter Seven showed how Libeskind, Foster, and Rogers have tried to manage the politically loaded meanings of their

architecture by offering pre-emptive symbolic interpretations of their building's styles and motifs. I have claimed that these architects are well aware of the complex discourses of collective identity within which their work is located. Although these architects' writings and interviews can be seen to offer us some 'clues' to a building's meanings I have also argued in Chapter Seven that it is primarily the *symbolic nature* of these projects rather than the aesthetic associations of what is actually built that is of sociological concern. As was also demonstrated in the previous three chapters, the universalistic notion of European civilization is no longer appropriate for the contemporary European society, as such cultural representations reproduce problems of ethnocentricism. Moving the focus to space and away from history and culture might offer one possible route to post-national European identities that are also sufficiently rooted in 'real' social practices to be meaningful. Such questions also lead on to broader debates about the potential of architecture to be 'representative' and to codify abstract identities in a suitably diverse way.

The contention of the previous three chapters has been that the symbolic construction of these, and other major state-led buildings, is located in a wider cultural discourse that is not as easily mastered by political agency as it once was. It can be suggested that to some extent at least, architecture has become an opened discourse, as was demonstrated by the huge amount of public and media interest, and controversy, that more often than not surround such commissions. Of course this is not to say that oppositions and contestations around such architectural projects did not exist in the past. Many of the tensions surrounding the Millennium Dome for example were very similar to the discussions in the nineteenth century that surrounded the building of the British Houses of Parliament, The Crystal Palace, and The Festival Hall project in the mid-twentieth century. What *is* different today however is the role that the state plays in defining the nation - often these discourses have very different aims and express different sentiments than did comparable commissions created in modernity. New debates in architecture, mirroring those in politics,

have tended to focus on cosmopolitanism, transparency, reflexivity, openness and access as opposed to the older debates of nation building, war and conquests, religion, and myopic tradition.

I have also contended that although subjective debates about what constitutes 'good' or 'bad' architecture will always go on, the sociologically pertinent question is how and why landmark, state-funded buildings come to symbolize the nation. The reading of architecture generally is problematic. 'Death of the author' discourses have also impacted on architectural theory, with the notion of multiple truths rendering the architect's reading of the symbolism in their building as just one amongst many. Architects, and the states for which they are working, cannot totally 'manage' the broader context in which their buildings are interpreted. It is interesting that the designers considered in Part Three of this dissertation have been very active in disseminating their interpretations of their respective buildings, although ironically they are less able to manage these readings than were their counterparts a hundred years ago. As well as these 'death of the author' debates I would argue that this diminished control is also partly because orthodoxies of national architectural styles do not exist to the same extent anymore, certainly not in a European context anyway. Increasingly architects are working in international or transnational contexts, and in some instances this has led to ahistorical, placeless designs. Ironically though, when designing such an iconic state commission, architects are under a huge amount of pressure to explain their representation of the nation. Resultantly when an architect is designing a building to 'symbolize the aims of political leaders, his or her protestations of political disinterest sound either hollow or insincere' (Vale, 1992: 274). Following on from this point I have argued that by their very nature the buildings assessed in this dissertation are symbolically bound up with questions of nation, state and culture and as a result are deeply politicized discourses.

So, in short it has been argued in this dissertation that state-led architecture often reflects the aims, aspirations and agendas of a government. The iconic nature of many state buildings around the world, and their subsequent dissemination, has meant that often architecture has an increasingly important role in representing the nation. As well as having had a role in the development of collective national memories and identities in modernity, architecture has potential to shape or reflect a common future too. This is clearly illustrated by the many debates that continue to be associated with landmark architectural projects all over the world. For example the Norman Foster designed British National Stadium to replace Wembley has generated a huge amount of controversy about where and how it should be built, and how much it should cost. In Berlin Peter Eisenmann's as yet unfinished 'Monument to the Murdered Jews of Europe' has also been hugely controversial, as, for very different reasons, has been the redevelopment of Potsdammer Platz. It can be suggested that the symbolic importance of such landmark architecture is now quite widely understood. The attack on the World Trade Centre illustrated how those buildings had come to symbolize free-market capitalism, 'freedom,' and certain other American values; Foster has been shortlisted for the rebuilding of this area. What such architecture comes to represent can have very little to do with the actual aesthetics of the building, and perhaps this was more to do with what it houses. This is why this work has been concerned with situating architecture in its political, social and cultural contexts.

Ulrich Beck asserts that 'architecture is politics with bricks and mortar' (Beck, 1998: 115) and undoubtedly from the perspective of social theory we can see that architecture has an important role to play in the shaping of social and political imaginations. It is precisely because architecture offers society the capacity to transcend pure functionality and reflexively reconstitute space that gives architecture such a privileged role in reflecting cultural identities. Daniel Libeskind speaks of the 'need to resist the erasure of history, the need to respond to history, the need to open the future' (Libeskind, cited in Leach, 1999:

127) - it is perhaps this reflexive relationship between the past and the future that best characterizes state-led, post-national identity projects. I have suggested this tension is central to many landmark architectural projects in Europe today. It is clear that architecture is not only responsible for shaping collective memories, but it also provides a cultural potential for the expression of new identities; as such architecture can be an important space for the reflection (and creation) of reflexive post-national identities. It is this potential that situates architecture at the forefront of a post-national symbolic language.

At a time when social theory has become preoccupied with what any 'European identity' may look like in the face of the persistence of national identities and the re-emergence of regional identities, the EU has been active in attempts to shape such an identity through culture. The EU's attempted development of a cultural form is reminiscent of the quest by states to create a national identity in conditions of modernity as assessed in Part One. This research has suggested that cultural symbols are vital for the development of coherent collective identities, initially for the construction of any such code and subsequently for its maintenance and stabilization. This argument obviously resonates with the current European political climate, in which the EU is increasingly concerned with what has become known as 'cultural policy' (Shore, 2000; Roche, 2001a). These policy statements can be considered 'symbolic initiatives' (Sassatelli, 2002: 435) that attempt to foster some sense of European identity. As is to be expected, which symbols should be used to this end is a matter of much disagreement. In fact on this point, Cris Shore has written in detail about the cultural strategies employed by the EU and is not even convinced that cultural identity can be created by such policy making (Shore, 2000). The EU is certainly in the highly ambiguous position of having to attempt to define a European cultural identity that is not so universal so as to be meaningless and not so particularistic to be exclusive (see Part One). This quest for a cultural form for the institution is very problematic in a number of respects, not least because any culture constructed by the EU is not a representative

European identity (Burgess, 2002). However, even given this vital consideration, the EU is still embarking on a post-national identity project that aims to contribute to the development of national cultures while at the same time 'bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore' (Commission of the European Communities, 1992). According to most EU policy makers this 'common cultural heritage' or European identity must be created by cultural policies, and often with reference to the ambiguous theme of *unity in diversity* (Delanty, 2003).

Indeed, ever since The Declaration of European Identity of 1973, which was signed by the then nine member states, the EU has always been interested in developing and codifying an official European identity (Stråth, 2002). The purpose of this exercise has unambivalently been to attempt define the political structure of the EU in relation to the external world. These attempts at defining an official identity have ranged from this formal declaration of 'The European Identity', a proliferation of designs of flags, anthems and official colours, all broadly in the recognition of 'unity in diversity', the theme of city design and architecture has frequently figured in the EU's project of identity construction. The emphasis on cultural policy undoubtedly reflects a shift towards a more reflexive kind of European identity in line with the growing recognition that the European Union must address social and cultural, as well as political, concerns.

In this dissertation I have argued that architecture is increasingly becoming an important discourse for the representation and construction of post-national identities, with the increasingly reflexive dimension in landmark building projects key to this centrality. Given this backdrop it is reasonable to suggest that architecture could play a significant role in the EU's quest for a cultural form, with current developments around architecture suggest that it is capable of contributing significantly to debates on 'Europeanization'. In Part Three I demonstrated the connection between some landmark architectural projects and post-national identity construction, in particular with reference to a pluralized and reflexive

European identity. While nowhere suggesting the existence of a single European identity or an emergent 'European style' of architecture that codifies such an identity, my argument has been that architecture in Europe is frequently a medium for the communication of post-national identities. Certainly the examples in Chapter Five and Six illustrate the argument that architecture in Europe is an increasingly reflexive discourse, with architects ever more aware of the role of their work in relation to collective identities. It is this sense of reflexivity in architecture that is particularly evident in new landmark buildings in Europe today.

This dissertation has supported Kultermann's claim that 'European architecture is a unique symbol of contemporary transformations typical of our time and possibly the near future' (Kultermann, 1994: 286). There is the suggestion that landmark architecture can come to act as a 'metaphor' for the society in which it exists, so accordingly architects must negotiate the privileging of one identity over another. Although postmodern architecture may have well have had this aim at the centre of its project, all too often the design of these buildings degenerates into an identity-less genericity, ironically reminding us of the 'placelessness' of much modernist architecture. Castells articulates his fear about the possible emergence of a 'new International Style' that instead of rooting itself into people and their cultures 'builds the new masters' palaces.' Architecture in the New Europe clearly has a role to play and must begin to see itself as a component of a wider, more discursive form of cultural citizenship that articulates the many tensions within global and local identity projects.

Appendix

Table One

Architecturing Nineteenth-Century Nations: Key British and German Buildings 1800-1900

Building	Location	Architect	Note
Altes Museum (1823)	Berlin	Schinkel	Hugely influential neo-classical museum. Designed as a symbol of Berlin as a new capital and modelled on Rome's Pantheon.
Schauspeilhaus (1821)	Berlin	Schinkel	Monumental neo-classicism, surrounded by other grandiose buildings.
Walhalla (1842)	Munich	Klenze	Self-consciously 'national' architecture modelled on Rome's Pantheon and the Propylaeum of Athens. A bombastic monument to German unity.
Crystal Palace (1851)	London	Paxton	Hugely influential modernist structure built to house the Great Exhibition. A monument to progress and industrial revolution, this glass and iron building integrated architecture and engineering.
Albert Dock (1845-1860)	Liverpool	Hartley	Warehouse complex that transformed the world's first enclosed commercial dock. Revolutionary structural techniques employed in construction.
Houses of Parliament (1868)	London	Barry, with Pugin	Built in 'English Gothic' and one of the most recognizable parliament buildings in the world thanks to the incorporation of the clock tower that houses 'Big Ben'. The Palace of Westminster, its official name, was rebuilt by Barry after a fire.
Albert Hall (1868)	London	Fowke	Neo-classical monument to Prince Albert designed by an engineer. Roman references throughout the building, including the frieze design celebrating Britain's part in 'civilization's' achievements in arts, science and industry.
Rathaus (1869)	Berlin	Waesenmann	High renaissance style and a fitting symbol of Berlin's status at this time.
Siegessäule (1873)	Berlin	Stack	Famous neo-classicist column, built to commemorate military victory. Gold goddess of victory atop the column, whose shaft is built from captured cannons.
Midland Grand Hotel (1874)	London	Scott	Grandiose, elaborate Gothic hotel, 'an essay in extravagance' (Wilkinson, 2000: 142). Fine example of Victorian historicism.
Reichstag (1894)	Berlin	Wallot	The architect attempted to forge a distinctly 'German style' after bemoaning the absence of one. The building, a bombastic mix of styles, has had a turbulent history and is seemingly inextricably linked to broader German social and political debates.

Table Two

Significant Buildings in Germany and UK (Berlin and London), Constructed 1980-2000

Building	Location	Architect	Note
Lloyds of London (1986)	London	Rogers	Radical but functional high-tech building. As all the serviceable parts are external, the space inside the building is maximized – a feature of high tech design.
Sainsbury Extension, National Gallery (1987)	London	Venturi & Scott-Brown	A building remembered for prompting the intervention of Prince Charles, after which the more radical, original post-modern design was replaced by conventional neo-classical pastiche and parody.
Podsdammer Platz (1990-present)	Berlin	Various	Huge development on a previously derelict site in the centre of Berlin. Initial development was funded by the Daimler-Benz corporation. Comprises office space, housing, shopping centres and other types of public and private uses. Many architects, including Renzo Piano, have designed here, although the master plan was by Hilmer and Sattler.
Canary Wharf Tower (1991)	London	Pelli	For a time the tallest building in Europe (803ft) this post-modern take on the international style symbolizes capitalist finance more than any other recently constructed piece of architecture in Britain.
Sony Centre (1997)	Berlin	Jahn	Centrepiece of the Podsdammer Platz development. Funded by the Sony corporation, the structure houses office space, a cinema, a hotel and other public spaces. Jahn envisaged a this as a 'high tech village'.
British Embassy (2000)	Berlin	Wilford	Sandstone building with bright postmodern features. The £18m building was opened by the Queen, who reportedly said 'I understand some people like it' about the building.

Table Three

Key Lottery-Funded Architecture in UK Cities since 1990

Building	Location	Architect	Note
Tate Modern (2000)	London	Herzog & Mueron	Swiss architects' £134m conversion of Scott's Bank Side Power Station (1952). Huge reconstruction that entailed designing a new space within the existing walls. Funded by the Millennium Commission in the main, but with some private donations.
Millennium Bridge (2000)	London	Foster	High-Tech bridge across the Thames, which had to be closed due to 'wobbling'. Millennium Commission funded.
The Lowry (2000)	Salford	Wilford	Won 'Building of the Year' award. Bright, popular exhibition and performance space on Salford Quays. Cost £106m.
Gateshead Millennium Bridge (2001)	Gateshead	Wilkinson Eyre	£22m opening bridge, funded mainly with Millennium Commission money and partly by the European Regional Development Fund.
Baltic Centre (2002)	Gateshead	Ellis Williams	£46m 'art factory' project, with no permanent exhibitions. The converted 1950s flourmill doesn't show work previously displayed in London, adding to its regional characteristics.
Manchester Art Gallery (2002)	Manchester	Hopkins	£35m renovation of Victorian Gallery, with new wing also added. Funded by a National Lottery Heritage Grant.
Urbis (2002)	Manchester	Simpson	£38m, glass-clad 'museum of the city', which is only the architect's second new building.
Downland Gridshell (2002)	Chichester	Cullinan	Remarkable wooden 'gridshell' structure, which houses a craft museum. Organic £1.5m structure that is close to the notion of Critical Regionalism.
Imperial War Museum (2003)	Salford	Libeskind	Libeskind's first British commission, a visually challenging building on Salford Quays. The design is based on a fragmented Globe.
Welsh Millennium Centre (2004/2005)	Cardiff	Thomas	Controversial replacement to Hadid's troubled Welsh Opera House. The £70m project features slate and other local materials.

Table Four

European City/Capital of Culture: Winning Cities and Key Buildings 1994-2004

Year	City	Building	Architect	Note
1994	Lisbon	Belém Cultural Centre	Gregotti	'Cultural centre', including theatre, museum and restaurant. The complex recalls stark modernism – geometrically shaped with harsh brick exterior.
1995	Luxemburg	European Court of Justice	Perrault	Rectangular exterior recalls modernism, but the glassy feel and pipes on the exterior give postmodern high-tech feel. Designed by the architect of Barcelona's *Camp Nou* stadium.
1996	Copenhagen	Danish Design Centre	Larsen	Mixed use exhibition venue, which *showcases new* Danish design. Bright building with a hint of high-tech style.
1997	Thessaloniki	The White Tower	Unknown	The city's landmark building, dating from 15th century. Once a prison and watchtower, now a museum of the city's history from 300AD.
1998	Stockholm	Museum of Modern Art	Moneo Vallés	Post-modern, but understated museum in a broadly 'vernacular' style', incorporating wood.
1999	Weimar	Goethe National Museum	Augustus	Reconstructed museum, which provided the architectural centrepiece to Weimar's bid.
2000	*			
2001	Porto	House of Music	Koolhaas	Diamond shaped concert hall, which due to construction problems, was not opened until 2002.
2001	Rotterdam	Kunsthall	Koolhaas	Exhibition hall which housed many of the central displays for the ECC. Relatively restrained modernist structure in glass and steel.
2002	Bruges	Concert Hall	Robbreacht & Daem	1200 seat concert hall clad in terracotta tiles, which opened before it was completely finished. The hall rests on springs to dampen external noise.
2002	Salamanca	Plaza Mayor	Various	Square formerly used for bullfights but now a regenerated plaza with shops and other tourist attractions.
2003	Graz	Stadthalle	Kada	Multi-use building with offices and covered public space.
2004	Genova	Galata	Consuegra	Part of the general redevelopment of the port area, this building has a

				hint of the postmodern, with many nautical references.
2004	Lille	EuraLille	Koolhaas	1 Million Square Metre urban development including business and residential space, hotels and railway station. The Grand Palais is the development's centrepiece.

In 2000 the Capital of Culture was awarded to 9 cities: Avignon, Bergen, Bologna, Brussels, Helsinki, Cracow, Reykjavik, Prague, Santiago de Compostela. Although no permanent buildings were erected to specifically celebrate the award in any of these 9 cities a temporary architectural sculpture was installed in each city. The *Kides* (crystals) were designed by Finnish architects Leppänen and Butter, with sound design provided by Sandell. The crystals resembled huge ice cubes, with the light source inside the crystal responding to the touch of human hands – the intensity of the light growing as the number of people touching it increased.

Photo 1: Festival Hall

The first high-profile, piece of modernist public architecture funded by the British state.



Photo 2: 'Brutalism' on the South Bank

These buildings on the South Bank of the Thames demonstrate the drab, weathered concrete characteristic of the British style of 'Brutalism', which was a particularization of modernism.

Photo 3: The Millennium Dome
The vast structure as seen from the Thames.

Photo 4: Millennium Dome (Mast Detail)
The structural masts that Mike Davis, of Richard Rogers Partnership, suggested were 'inclusive'. Regardless of their symbolic value (or otherwise) these suspension masts allowed the lightweight cover, which actually weighed less than the air inside it, to remain free of internal supports.

Photo 5: Re-Building Berlin

The view east from the roof of the Reichstag – the cranes at Potsdammer Platz show that even in 2002 much of the centre of Berlin still resembles a building site.

Photo 6: The Reichstag as Monumental Architecture

The bombastic nature of the original Reichstag is in keeping with much national architecture of this period. The mismatch of Neo-Classical, Gothic and Roccoco are indicative of the lack of a distinctly 'German' style at the time, a fact bemoaned by Paul Wallott, the original architect.

Photo 7: 'Dem Deutschen Volke' – To the German People

This nationalistic expression was added to the building's entrance in 1916 as a rallying, patriotic call-to-arms.

Photo 8: Der Bevolkerung - To the Population

There is a less specifically 'German' sentiment in this installation than that presented by the Gothic script over the entrance (see Photo 4)

Photo 9: Foster's Dome Extension to the Reichstag
The dome has a 'double-helix' spiralling around the inside, which acts as a runway for the public.



Photo 10: The View From Inside the Dome
Foster has suggested that the 'transparency' of this view into the debating chamber is a representation of democracy.



Photo 11: Funnel at the Dome's Top

Foster designed the funnel as a way of making the heat emissions from the debating chamber below as environmentally friendly as possible, but can it, as Buchanan (2000) suggests, also be read as an indictment of the 'hot air' that is produced beneath?

Photo 12: The Entrance to the Jewish Museum

Visitors to the Jewish Museum have to pass through the entrance of the Baroque Kollegienhaus, a reminder of Berlin's often decadent history. Libeskind's extension to the Museum juts into the street line at the right of the picture.

Photo 13: The Holocaust Void

The Holocaust Void is large the concrete bunker to the left of this picture. The Garden of Exile is to the right.



Photo 14: Jewish Museum (Window Detail)

The angular strip windows are, according to Libeskind, designed around the result of joining the pre-war addresses of Berlin's significant cultural figures on a map.



Photo 15: Explaining the Memory Void

The Jewish Museum has many such signs explaining the symbolism of Libeskind's architecture.

Bibliography

Adorno, T. W., and Horkheimer, M. ([1949] 1979) *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. London: Verso.

Albrow, M. (1996) *The Global Age: State and Society Beyond Modernity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Alibhai-Brown, Y. (2002) *Who Do We Think We Are? Imagining the New Britain*. London: Penguin.

Anderson, B. (1983) *Imaginary Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.

Appaduri, A. (1990) 'Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Appleyard, B. (1985) *Richard Rogers: A Biography*. London: Faber.

Arnason, J. P. (1990) 'Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Atkinson, H. and Wilks-Heeg, S. (2000) *Local Government From Thatcher to Blair: The Politics of Creative Autonomy*. London: Polity Press.

Baker, F. (2000) 'Mythos Reichstag' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Baudrillard, J. (1970) *The Consumer Society: Myths and Structures*. London: Sage.

Bauman, Z. (1973) *Culture as Praxis*. London: Routledge.

Bauman, Z. (1990) *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bauman, Z. (2001) 'Wars of the Globalization Era', *European Journal of Social Theory* 4(1): 11-28.

Bayley, S. (2001) 'Domed to Failure' at: www.packer34.freeserve.co.uk/mandelson.htm (first accessed 09/01)

Beck, U. (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. London: Sage.

Beck, U. (1999) 'The Open City: Architecture and Reflexive Modernity' in *Democracy Without Enemies*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Behlmer, G. K., and Leventhal, F. M. (eds.) (2000) *Singular Continuities: Tradition, Nostalgia, and Identity in Modern British Culture*. London: Stanford University Press.

Benjamin, A. (2000) *Architectural Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

Berger, P. and Luckmann, T. (1971) *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin.

Bhabha, H. (ed.) (1990) *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge.

Billig, M. (1990) 'Collective Memory, Ideology and the British Royal Family' in Middleton, D., and Edwards, D. (ed.) *Collective Remembering*. London: Sage.

Billig, M. (1995) *Banal Nationalism*. London: Sage.

Blommaert, J. (1996) 'Language and Nationalism: Comparing Flanders and Tanzania', *Nations and Nationalism* 2 (2): 199-222.

Bobbio, N. (1995) *The Age of Rights*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bonta, J. P. (1979) *Architecture and its Interpretation*. London: Lund Humphries.

Boyer, C. M. (1994) *The City of Collective Memory: Its Historical Imagery and Architectural Entertainments*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Braunfels, W. (1988) *Urban Design in Western Europe: Regime and Architecture, 900-1900*. London: University of Chicago Press.

Breuilly, J. (1982) *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Broadbent, G., Bunt, R., and Jencks, C. (eds.)(1980) *Signs, Symbols, and Architecture*. Chichester: John Wiley.

Brubaker, R. (1996) *Nationalism Framed*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Buchanan, P. (1999) 'When Democracy Builds' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Burns, J. (2000) *Barça: A People's Passion*. London: Trafalger Square.

Burns, T. (1999) 'The Evolution of Parliaments and Societies in Europe: Challenges and Prospects', *European Journal of Social Theory* 2(2): 167-194.

Butler, J. (1997) *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performance*. London: Routledge.

Calinescu, M. (1987) *Five Faces of Modernity: Modernism; Avant-Garde; Decadence; Kitsch; Postmodernism*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Cannadine, D. (1983) 'The Context, Performance and Meaning of Ritual: The British Monarchy and the 'Invention of Tradition', c.1820-1977' in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Castells, M. (1994) 'European Cities, the Informational Society, and the Global Economy', *New Left Review* 204: 18-32.

Castells, M., and Hall, P. (1994) *Technopoles of the World*. London: Routledge.

Castells, M. (1996) *The Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (1997) *The Power of Identity*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (1998) *The End of Millennium*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Castells, M. (2001) *The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Childs, P. (1997) 'Place and Environment: Nation and Region' in Childs, P. and Storry, M. (eds.) *British Cultural Identities*. London: Routledge.

Colquhoun, A. (1997) 'The Concept of Regionalism' in Nalbantoğlu, G. B., and Wong, C. C. T. (eds.) *Postcolonial Spaces*. New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Connolly, W. E. (1995) *The Ethos of Pluralization*. Minneanapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Connor, W. (1984) *The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Cohen, A. (1986) *Symbolizing Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Cohen, A. (1989) *The Symbolic Construction of Community.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Crick, B. (ed.) (1991) *National Identity: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Crick, B. (1991) 'The English and the British' in Crick, B. (ed.) *National Identity: The Constitution of the United Kingdom.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Crilley, D. (1993) 'Architecture as Advertising: Constructing the Image of Redevelopment' in Kearns, G. and Philo, C. (eds.) *Selling Places: The City as Cultural Capital, Past and Present.* Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Davis, D. (1990) *The Museum Transformed: Design and Culture in the Post-Pompidou Age.* New York: Abbeville Press.

Davies, C. (1991) *High Tech Architecture.* London: Thames and Hudson.

Delanty, G. (1996) 'Beyond the Nation-State: National Identity and Citizenship in a Multicultural Society - A Response to Rex', *Sociological Research Online,* 1(3) at: www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/3/1.html (first accessed 04/06/98)

Delanty, G (2000) *Modernity and Postmodernity: Knowledge, Power and the Self.* London: Sage.

Delanty, G. (2001) 'National Identity: Beyond Nation and State' in Ritzer, G., and Smart, B. (eds.) *Handbook of Social Theory.* London: Sage.

Delanty, G. and Jones, P. (2002) 'European Identity and Architecture', *European Journal of Social Theory* 5(4): 453-466.

Delanty, G. and O'Mahony, P. (2002) *Nationalism and Social Theory.* London: Sage.

Delanty, G. (2003) *Community.* London: Sage.

Delanty, G. and Isin, E. (eds.) (2003) *Handbook of Historical Sociology.* London: Sage.

Derrida, J. (1994) 'Letter to Peter Eisenman' in Lillyman, W., Moriary, M., and Neuman, D. (eds.) *Critical Architecture and Contemporary Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Durkheim, E. ([1933] 1964) *The Division of Labour in Society*. London: Free Press.

Durkheim, E. ([1915] 1985) *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. London: Allen and Unwin.

Elias, N. (1982) *State Formation and Civilization*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Ellin, N. (1996) *Postmodern Urbanism*. London: MIT Press.

Engel, H. (1999) 'The Marks of History' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Evans, K. (2002) 'Introducing Information Communication Technology into Marginalized Neighbourhoods: An Exploration of the Digital Divide' Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Salford.

Evans, R (1987) *Rethinking German History*. London: Harper Collins.

Falk, R. (1995) 'The World Order Between Inter-State Law and The Law of Humanity: The Role of Civil Society Institutions' in Archibugi, D. and Held, D. (eds.) *Cosmopolitan Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Faulks, K. (1998) *Citizenship in Modern Britain*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Featherstone, M. (ed.) (1990) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Feldmeyer, G. G. (1993) *The Politics of Memory: The New German Architecture*. New York: Rizzoli.

Filler, M. (2001) 'Into the Void' in *The New Republic Online* at: www.thenewrepublic.com/100101/filler100101.html (first accessed 04/02)

Findlay, M. (1999) *The Globalization of Crime: Understanding Transitional Relationships in Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fine, R., and Turner, C. (eds.) (2000) *Social Theory After the Holocaust.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Firth, R. (1973) *Symbols Private and Public.* London: Unwin and Allen.

Fladmark, J. M. (ed.) (2000) *Heritage and Museums: Shaping National Identity.* Shaftsbury Press: Donhead

Forty, A. (1980) 'The Modern Hospital in England and France: The Social and Medical Uses of Architecture' in King, A. D. (ed.) *Buildings and Society.* London: Routledge.

Foucault, M. (1970) *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences.* London: Routledge.

Foucault, M (1979) *Discipline and Punish.* London: Penguin Press.

Foucault, M. (1985) 'Space, Knowledge, and Power' in Rabinow, P. (ed.) *The Foucault Reader.* London: Penguin Press.

Foster, N. (ed.) (1999a) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999b) 'Preface' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999c) 'The Reichstag as World Stage' in Foster, N. (ed.) (1999a) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999d) 'Architecture and History' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999e) 'Architecture and Democracy' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999f) 'Architecture and Ecology' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Foster, N. (1999g) 'Architecture as Art' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Frampton, K. (1983) 'Towards Critical Regionalism: Seven Points for an Architecture of Resistance' in Foster, H (ed.) (1983) *Postmodern Culture: The Anti-Aesthetic*. London: Pluto.

Frampton, P. (1992) *Modern Architecture: A Critical History*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Friedman, J. (1994) *Cultural Identity and Global Process*. London: Sage.

Fulbrook, M. (1999) *German National Identity After the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Geertz, C. (1973) *The Interpretation of Culture*. New York: Basic Books.

Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gellner, E. (1987) *Culture, Identity and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gellner, E. (1994) *Encounters With Nationalism*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Gellner, E. (1997) *Nationalism*. New York: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

Germain, R. D. (ed.) (2000) *Globalization and its Critics: Perspectives from Political Economy*. London: Macmillan.

Ghirado, D. (1996) *Architecture After Modernism*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Giddens, A. (1985) *The Nation State and Violence*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giddens, A. (1991) *Modernity and Self Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Giesen, B. (1998) *Intellectuals and the German Nation: Collective Identity in an Axial Age*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giesen, B., and Junge, K. (2003) 'Historical Memory' in Delanty, G., and Isin, E. (eds.) *Handbook of Historical Sociology*. London: Sage.

Giroux, H. (1995) *National Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism*.

Gloag, J. (1975) *The Architectural Interpretation of History*. London: A & C Black.

Graham, B., Ashworth, G. J., and Tunbridge, J. E. (2000) *A Geography of Heritage: Power, Culture and Economy*. London: Arnold.

Greenfield, L. (1992) *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Greenfield, L. (1996) 'Nationalism and Modernity' in *Social Research*, 63 (1): 3-41.

Greenhalgh, P. (1988) *Ephermeral Vistas: The Expositions, Universelles, Great Exhibition and World Fair, 1851-1939.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Grezner, E. (2000) 'Setting the Stage for a New Germany: Architecture and the Scene of Berlin', *Area* 4(6): 219-242.

Habermas, J. (1987) *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, J. (1989a) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, J. (1989b) 'Modern and Postmodern Architecture' in *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1991) 'Yet Again: German Identity – A Unified Nation of Angry DM-Burghers' in *New German Critique*, 52: 84-101.

Habermas, J. (1994) *The Past as Future.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Habermas, J. (1998) 'The European Nation-State and the Pressures of Globalization', *New Left Review* 235: 46-59.

Habermas, J. (2001) *The Post-National Constellation: Political Essays.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hall, J. (1998) *The State of the Nation: Ernst Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hall, J. (2000) 'Globalization and Nationalism', *Thesis Eleven,* 63. pp63-79.

Hannerz, U. (1990) 'Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity.* London: Sage.

Hansard, L. (1998) 'Architecture and Design in Public Buildings' *The House of Lords,* 12 January 1988 at:

www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldhansrd/vo980112/text/80112-07.htm#80112-07_spnew6 (first accessed 07/01/02)

Harbison, R. (1990) *The Built, the Unbuilt, and the Unbuildable: In Pursuit of Architectural Meaning.* London: Thames and Hudson.

Hargreaves, J. (2000) *Freedom for Catalonia? Catalan Nationalism, Spanish Identity and the Barçelona Olympic Games.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Harman, C. (1999) 'Globalisation: A Critique of a New Orthodoxy', *International Socialism* 77 (Winter).

Harvey, D. (1990) *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Harvey, D. (2001) *Spaces of Hope.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Hatton, P. (1992) 'Ruskin and Architecture: The Argument of The Text' in Wheeler, M. and Whiteley, N. (eds.) *The Lamp of Memory: Ruskin, Tradition and Architecture.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Hedetoft, U. (1995) *Signs of Nations: Studies of Political Semiotics of Self and Other in Contemporary European Nationalism.* Dartmouth: Aldershot.

Hedetoft, U. (1999) 'The Nation-State Meets the World: National Identities in the Context of Transnationality and Cultural Globalization', *European Journal of Social Theory.* 2 (1): 71-94.

Heidegger, M. (1971) *Poetry, Language, Thought.* New York: Harper and Row.

Held, D. (1995) *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Heynen, H. (1999) *Architecture and Modernity: A Critique.* Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Hillier, B. (1996) *Space is the Machine.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T. (eds.) (1983) *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1983a) 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions' in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1983b) 'Mass-Producing Traditions: Europe, 1870-1914' in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990) *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holt, R. J. (1998) *Globalization and the Nation-State.* London: Macmillan.

Hirst, P. and Thompson, G. (1996) *Globalization in Question.* London: Polity Press.

Isin, E., and Woods, P. (1999) *Citizenship and Identity.* London: Sage.

James, P. (1996) *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community.* London: Sage.

James-Chakraborty, K. (2000) *German Architecture for a Mass Audience.* London: Routledge.

Jameson, F. (1984) 'Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism' *New Left Review* 146: 53-92.

Jameson, F. (1985) 'Architecture and the Critique of Ideology' in Ockman, J. (ed.) *Architecture, Criticism, Ideology.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Jameson, F. (1999) 'Notes on Globalization as a Philosophical Issue' in Jameson, F. and Miyoshi, M. (eds.) *The Cultures of Globalization.* Durham: Duke University Press.

Jencks, C. ([1977] 1991) *The Language of Post-Modern Architecture.* London: New Academy Editions.

Jencks, C. (1980a) 'Introduction to Section 1' in Broadbent, G., Bunt, R., and Jencks, C. (eds.) *Signs, Symbols, and Architecture.* Chichester: John Wiley.

Jencks, C. (1980b) 'The Architectural Sign' in Broadbent, G., Bunt, R., and Jencks, C. (eds.) *Signs, Symbols, and Architecture*. Chichester: John Wiley.

Jenkins, B., and Sofos, S. A. (eds.) (1996a) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.

Jenkins, B., and Sofos, S. A (1996b) 'Nation and Nationalism in Contemporary Europe: A Theoretical Perspective' in Jenkins, B. and Sofos, S. A. (eds.) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.

Jodidio, P. (2001) *Sir Norman Foster*. London: Taschen.

Jones, P. (2003) 'Architecturing Modern Nations: Architecture and the State' in Delanty, G., and Isin, E. (eds.) (2003) *The Handbook of Historical Sociology*. London: Sage.

Kastoryano, R. (2002) *Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany*. Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Kearney, H. (1991) 'Four Nations or One?' in Crick, B. (ed.) *National Identity: The Constitution of the United Kingdom*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Kidson, P., Murray, P., and Thompson, P. (1962) *A History of English Architecture* London: Harrap.

King, A. D. (ed.) (1980) *Buildings and Society: Essays on the Social Development of the Built Environment*. London: Routledge.

King, A. D. (1990) 'Architecture, Capital and Globalization' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

King, Anthony. (1997) *The End of the Terraces: The Transformation of Football in the 1990s*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.

Klein, N. (2000) *No Logo*. London: Flamingo.

Knischewski, G. (1996) 'Post-War National Identity in Germany' in Jenkins, B and Sofos, S. A (eds.) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.

Kolb, D. (1990) *Postmodern Sophistications: Philosophy, Architecture and Tradition.* Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Kostof, S., Castillo, G., and Castillo, G. (1985) *A History of Architecture: Settings and Rituals.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuhn, T. S. (1962) *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kultermann, U. (1994) 'The Context of Tradition and Cultural Identity: Regionalism and Contemporary European Architecture' in Lützeler, P. M. (ed.) *Europe After Maastricht.*

Kumar, K. (2000) 'Nation and Empire: English and British National Identity in Comparative Perspective', *Theory and Society* 29(5): 575-608.

Kymlicka, W., and Norman, W. (eds.) (2000a) *Citizenship in Diverse Societies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kymlicka, W., and Norman, W. (2000b) 'Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts' in Kymlicka, W. and Norman, W. (eds.) *Citizenship in Diverse Societies.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ladd, B. (1998) *The Ghosts of Berlin: Confronting German History in the Urban Landscape.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Langer, C., and Stelglich, U. (1995) 'Interview with Daniel Libeskind', *Architronic: The Electric Journal of Architecture* at http://architronic.saed.kent.edu/v5n2/v5n2.05.html (first accessed 03/01)

Larson, M. S. (1993) *Behind the Postmodern Façade: Architectural Change in Late-Twentieth Century America.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Lasswell, H. D. (1979) *The Signature of Power: Buildings, Communication, and Policy.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books.

Lea, J., and Young, J. (1990) 'The Drift to Military Policing' in *What is to be Done about Law and Order?* London: Penguin.

Leach, N. (ed.)(1999a) *Architecture and Revolution: Contemporary Perspectives on Central and Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.

Leach, N. (1999b) *The Anaesthetics of Architecture*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Leyshon, A., and Thrift, N. (1997) *Money Space: Geographies of Monetary Transformation*. London: Routledge.

Libeskind, D. (2001) *Daniel Libeskind: The Space of Encounter*. London: Thames and Hudson.

Lillyman, W., Moriary, M., and Neuman, D. (eds.) (1994) *Critical Architecture and Contemporary Culture*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lister, R. (1998) 'Citizenship and Difference: Towards a Differentiated Universalism', *European Journal of Social Theory* 1(1): 71-90.

Llobera, J. R. (1996) 'The Role of Historical Memory in (Ethno) Nation-Building' *Goldsmiths Sociology Papers* London: London University Press.

Lunn, K. (1996) 'Reconsidering 'Britishness': The Construction and Significance of National Identity in Twentieth-Century Britain' in Jenkins, B and Sofos, S. A. (eds.) *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.

Lyotard, J. F. (1994) 'A Postmodern Fable on Postmodernity, or: In the Megalopolis' in

Mai, U. (1997) 'Culture Shock and Identity Crisis in East German Cities' in Öncü, A. and Wayland, P. (eds.) *Space, Culture and Power*. London: Zed Books.

Markovich, N., Preiser, W., and Sturm, F. (eds.) (1990) *Pueblo Style and Regional Architecture*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Marr, A. (2000) *The Day Britain Died*. London: Profile.

Marshall, T. H. ([1950] 1963) *Citizenship and Social Class*. London: Pluto Press.

Mayhew, L. (1995) *The New Public*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

McGuigan, J. and Gilmore, A. (2001) 'Figuring Out the Dome', *Cultural Trends*. 39: 39-83.

McGuigan, J. and Gilmore, A. (2002) 'The Millennium Dome: Sponsoring, Meaning and Visiting', *International Journal of Cultural Policy*. 8(1): 1-20.

McShane, D. (1997) 'Architecture Bill' *Planning (Consequential Provisions) (Scotland Bill, Lords)* at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199697/cmhansrd/vo970214/debtext/70214-21.htm#70214-21_spnew4

Meyer, B., and Geschiere, P. (eds.) (1999) *Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of Flow and Closure*. London: Blackwell.

Michl, J. (2000) 'Form Follows What? The Modernist Notion of Function as a *Carte Blanche*' at: http://geocities.com/athens/2360/jm-engfff-hai.html (first accessed 09/00)

Middleton, D., and Edwards, D. (ed.) (1990) *Collective Remembering*. London: Sage.

Miller, D. (2000) *Citizenship and National Identity*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Modood, T. (2000) 'Anti-Essentialism, Multiculturalism, and the 'Recognition' of Religious Groups' in Kymlicka, W., and Norman, W. (eds.) *Citizenship in Diverse Societies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mosse, G. L. (1994) *The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich*. London: Cornell University Press.

Mumford, L. ([1937] 1996) 'What is a City?', in LeGates, R. T. and Stout, F. (eds.) (1996) *The City Reader*. London: Routledge.

Nairn, T. (1977) *The Break-Up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. London: New Left Books.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1996) *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Nyberg, F., and Seif, F. (1990) 'Ritual and Regional Genesis of Architecture' in Markovich, N., Preiser, W., and Sturm, F. (eds.) *Pueblo Style and Regional Architecture.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

O'Mahony, P., and Delanty, G. (2001) *Rethinking Irish History: Nationalism, Identity and Ideology.* London: Palgrave.

Öncü, A. and Wayland, P. (eds.) (1997) *Space, Culture and Power.* London: Zed Books.

O'Neill, J. (1990) 'AIDS as a Globalizing Panic' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity.* London: Sage.

Pakulski, J. (1997) 'Cultural Citizenship', *Citizenship Studies.* 1 (1): 73-86.

Parekh, B. (1991) 'British Citizenship and Cultural Difference' in Andrews, G. (ed.) *Citizenship.* London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Pawley, M. (1999) 'The Rise and Fall of the Reichstag' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Pawley, M. (2001) *Norman Foster: A Global Architecture.* London: Thames and Hudson.

Pearce, M. and Stewart, G. (1992) *British Political History 1867-1990.* London: Routledge.

Pearman, H. (2002) 'Millennium Architecture Mission' *British Council* at www.britcoun.org/arts/design/architecturehugh.htm (first accessed 06/02)

Poggi, G. (1978) *The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction.* London: Hutchinson.

Powell, D. (2002) *Nationhood and Identity: The British State.* London: I B Tauris.

Rabinow, P. (1986) *The Foucault Reader.* London: Penguin.

Rappoport, A. (1990) 'On Regions and Regionalism' in Markovich, N., Preiser, W., and Sturm, F. (eds.) *Pueblo Style and Regional Architecture.* New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Renan, E. (1990) 'What is a Nation?' in Bhabha, H. (ed.) *Nation and Narration.* London:

Routledge.

Rex, J. (1996) 'National Identity in the Democratic Multi-Cultural State', *Sociological Research Online*, 1(2) at: www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/1/2/1.html (first accessed 04/06/98)

Ricouer, P. (1974) *The Conflict of Interpretations*. Evanstown, Ill.: Northwestern University Press.

Ritzer, G. L. (1996) *The McDonaldization of Society*. London: Pine Forge Press.

Robbins, K. (1993) *History, Religion and Identity in Modern Britain*. London: Hambledon.

Roberston, R. (1992) *Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage.

Roche, M. (1998) 'Mega-Events, Culture and Modernity: Expos and the Construction of Public Culture', *The International Journal of Cultural Policy*. 1-31.

Roche, M. (2000) *Megaevents and Modernity: Olympics, Expos and the Growth of Global Culture*. London: Routledge.

Roche, M. (2001a) 'Citizenship, Popular Culture and Europe' in Stevenson, N. (ed.) *Culture and Citizenship*. London: Sage

Roche, M. (2001b) 'Modernity, Cultural Events and the Construction of Charisma Mass Cultural Events in the USSR in the Interwar Period', *Cultural Policy* 7: p493-520.

Roche, M. (2002) 'Social Citizenship: Grounds of Social Change' in Isin, E., and Turner, B. (eds.) *Handbook of Citizenship Studies*. London: Sage.

Rocker, R. ([1937] 1946) *Nationalism and Culture*. Los Angeles: Rocker Publications Committee.

Rogers, R. (1985) *Richard Rogers and Architects*. London: Academy Editions.

Rogers, R., and Fisher, M. (1992) *A New London*. London: Penguin Books.

Rudofsky, B. ([1964] 1981) *Architecture Without Architects*. London: Academy Editions.

Rugman, A. (2001) *The End of Globalization*. London: Random House.

Ruskin, J. ([1849] 1992) 'The Lamp of Memory' in Wheeler, M., and Whiteley, N. (eds.) *The Lamp of Memory: Ruskin, Tradition and Architecture*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Russell, J. et al (1999) *Pioneering 'British High-Tech'*. London: Phaidon.

Sassen, S. (1996) *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sassen, S. (2001) 'Locating Cities on Global Circuits', *Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network*. Research Bulletin 46 at: www.ibro.ac.uk/gawk/rb/rb46.html (first accessed 08/01)

Schmidt, W. (1993) 'The Nation in German History' in Teich, M., and Porter, R. (eds.) *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scholes, P. A. (1954) *'God Save the Queen': The History and Romance of the World's First National Anthem*. London: Penguin.

Schutz, A. ([1954]1972) *The Phenomenology of the Social World*. London: Heinemann.

Scruton, R. (1977) *The Aesthetics of Architecture*. London: Methuen

Sibeon, R. (1999) 'Anti-Reductionist Sociology', *Sociology* 33(2): 317-334.

Sibeon, R. (2000) 'Governance and the Policy Process in Contemporary Europe', *Public Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory* 2(3): 289-311.

Sibeon, R. (2003) 'Governance, Politics and Diversity: Some Ontological, Epistemological and Practical Considerations.' Manuscript.

Skeggs, B. (2002) 'Becoming Cultural' (manuscript).

Smith, A. D. (1990) 'Towards a Global Culture' in Featherstone, M. (ed.) *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity*. London: Sage.

Spens, M. (1999) 'Jewish Museum, Berlin, Germany', *The Architectural Review* April: 42-44.

Shore, C. (2000) *Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration.* London: Routledge.

Smith, A. (1986) *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Smith, A. (1991) *National Identity.* London: Penguin.

Smith, A. (1995) *Nations and Nationalism in the Global Era.* Cambridge: Polity Press

Smyth, G (1997) *The Novel and The Nation.* London: Pluto Press.

Soja, E. (1989) *Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory.* London: Verso.

Soja, E. (1996) *Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other Real-and-Imagined Places.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Stehr, N. (1994) *Knowledge Society.* London: Sage.

Stern, R. (1994) 'The Postmodern Continuum' in Lillyman, W., Moriary, M., and Neuman, D. (eds.) Critical Architecture and Contemporary Culture. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stevens, G. (1998) *The Favored Circle: the Social Foundations of Architectural Distinction.* London: MIT Press.

Stråth, B. (2002) 'A European Identity: To the Historical Limits of the Concept', *European Journal of Social Theory.* 5(4): 387-401.

Strom, E. (1996) 'In Search of the Growth Coalition: American Urban Theories and the Redevelopment of Berlin', *Urban Affairs Review* 31(4): 455-481.

Strydom, P. (2000) *Discourse and Knowledge: The Making of Enlightenment Sociology.* Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.

Süssmuth, R. (1999) 'Foreword' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Sutton, I. (1999) *Western Architecture.* London: Thames and Hudson.

Tafuri, M. ([1976] 1999) *Architecture and Utopia.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Teich, M., and Porter, R. (eds.) *The National Question in Europe in Historical Context.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thierse, W. (1999) 'Foreword' in Foster, N. (ed.) *Norman Foster: Rebuilding the Reichstag.* London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Thompson, K. (2001) 'Cultural Studies, Critical Theory and Cultural Governance', *International Sociology* 16(4): 127-136.

Thorne, R. (1980) 'Places of Refreshment in the Nineteenth-Century City' in King, A. D. (ed.) *Buildings and Society.* London: Routledge.

Thornley, A. (2000) 'Dome Alone: London's Millennium Project and the Strategic Planning Deficit', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 24 (3).

Tomlinson, J. (1999) *Globalization and Culture.* Cambridge: Polity.

Toulmin, S. E. (1992) *Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Touraine, A. (1998) 'Sociology Without Society', *Current Sociology.* 46 (2): 119-143.

Trevor-Roper, H. (1983) 'The Invention of Tradition: The Highland Tradition of Scotland' in Hobsbawm, E., and Ranger, T. (eds.) *The Invention of Tradition.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tschumi, B. (1994) *Architecture and Disjunction.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Tzonis, A., and Lefairve, L. (1992) *Architecture in Europe Since 1968: Memory and Invention.* London: Thames and Hudson.

Urry, J. (1990) *The Tourist Gaze: Leisure and Travel in Contemporary Societies.* London: Sage.

Urry, J. (1998) 'What is Globalisation' (draft) *Department of Sociology, Lancaster University at:* http:/www.lancaster.ac.uk/sociology/soc031ju.html (first accessed 12/99)

Urry, J. (2000) *Sociology Beyond Societies: Mobilities for the Twenty-First Century.* London: Routledge.

Uzzell, D. L. (1989) *Heritage Interpretation.* London: Belhaven.

Vale, L. J. (1992) *Architecture, Power and National Identity.* London: Yale University Press.

Weber, M. (1947) *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.* New York: Free Press.

Webster. F. (1997) 'Manuel Castells and the Information Age: a Preliminary Critique' from an unpublished paper presented at Conference on Understanding Information Technology, Globalization, and Changes in the Nature of Work at University of Alberta, July 23-25, 1997.

Weiss, K. (1994) 'Speech to the 211th Session of German Parliament, Bonn, February 25, 1994' at: www.bln.de/k.weiss/te_wrapp.htm (first accessed 02/00)

Wellmer, A. (1991) *The Persistence of Modernity: Essays on Aesthetics, Ethics and Postmodernism.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Whyte, I. B. (2001) 'Hitler's Berlin' in Schaffer, E. S. *Comparative Criticism 23* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wheeler, M., and Whiteley, N. (eds.) (1992) *The Lamp of Memory: Ruskin, Tradition and Architecture.* Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Wilkinson, P. (2000) *The Shock of the Old.* London: Macmillian.

Winner, D. (2001) *Brilliant Orange: The Neurotic Genius of Dutch Football.* London: Bloomsbury.

Wise, M. Z. (1998) *Capital Dilemma: Germany's Search for an Architecture of Democracy.* New York: Princeton Architectural Press.

Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., Leibhart, K., Hofstätter, K., and Kargl, M. (1999) *The Discursive Construction of National Identity.* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Worpole, K. (2000) *Here Comes the Sun: Architecture and Public Space in Twentieth-Century European Culture.* London: Reaktion.

Zernatto, G. (1944) 'Nation: The History of a Word', *Review of Politics* (6): pp351-366.

Znamierowski, A. (2000) *Flags Through the Ages*. London: Southwater.

Zolo, D. (1997) *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Zukin, S. (1995) *The Culture of Cities*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Websites

- BBC Special Report: 'Why Do We Build to Celebrate the Millennium' at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/special_report/1998/millennium_Dome/60378.stm (first accessed 12/98)

- Campaign for Architecture and the Built Environment (Cabe) at: www.cabe.org.uk (first accessed 09/00)

- Fuel Protest Website at: www.fuel-protest.com (first accessed 09/99)

- 'In the Mind of the Architect', interview with Richard Rogers at: www.abc.net.au/arts/architecture/rogers.htm (first accessed 05/01)

- *The Millennium Dome*, The Department for Culture, Media and Sport at: www.culture.gov.uk/millennium/Dome.html (first accessed 11/01)

- *The Millennium Dome First Report*, The House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (1996) at: www.parliament.thestationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm19967/cmselect/cmcumeds/430i/cu0101.htm (first accessed 11/01)

- *The Millennium Dome Second Report*, The House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (1997) at: www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0202.htm (first accessed 11/01)

- *The Millennium Dome Third Report*, The House of Commons Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport (1999) at: www.parliament.the-stationeryoffice.co.uk/pa/cm1999/cmselect/cmcumeds/340ii/cu0303.htm (first accessed 11/01)

- 'The Millennium Factor: First Page on the Dome', at: www.users.globalnet.co.uk/~weirds/newDome1.htm (first accessed 12/98)

- The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, at: www.odccp.org/palermo/newtool.html (first accessed 21/11/01)

- Runnymede Trust Commission's Report 'On the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain' at: http://www.runnymedetrust.org/meb/TheReport.htm (first accessed 02/02)

- The Zapatistas and Direct Democracy. 'Marcos' letter to Ernesto Zedillo, President of Mexico', at: http://flag.blackened.net/revolt/mexico/ezln/marcos_zedillo_dec94.html (first accessed 07/01)

Newspapers

The Daily Mail, 4th April 2002

The Daily Mail, 30th May 2002

The Daily Mirror, 10th April 2002

The Daily Express, 6th April 2002

The Guardian, 11th April 1999

The Guardian, 26th July 1999

The Guardian, 12th April 2000

The Guardian, 26th June 2000

The Guardian, 26th October 2000

The Guardian, 3rd November 2000

The Guardian, 7th November 2000

The Guardian, 4th May 2001

The Guardian, 3rd May 2002

The Observer, 8th August 1999

The Observer, 1st September 2000

The Sunday Telegraph, 20th December 1998

The Sunday Times, 26th December 1999

Richard Rogers in *The Observer*, 28.01.2001

Richard Rogers in *The Independent*, 02.04.01