

**The Role of Government in
Conflict Resolution Related to
Urban and Regional Development in Korea**

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**The Role of Government in Conflict Resolution
Related to Urban and Regional Development in Korea**

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Abstract

This research started from the recognition that intergovernmental conflicts are inevitable in the process of public policy-making, and that changes in external environments have an influence on the process of conflict management and resolution. As Korean society changed in the 1990s toward democratisation and local autonomy (especially from 1995), the potential grew for intergovernmental conflicts over major urban and regional development projects. The purpose of this research has been to examine the factors influencing the intensity of such conflicts and the variables for conflict resolution related to major regional development projects and environmental issues, and in particular to consider the role of the government in the process of conflict resolution.

A review of the literature on conflict theory and conflict resolution (Chs. 3 -4) identified the key factors influencing conflict origins and management of the process of conflict. It indicated the key variables influencing conflict resolution including the potential for new, more mediating roles in conflict resolution. It suggested that the degree of difficulty in resolving conflicts was related to the intensity of the conflict concerned. Further literature reviews on the introduction of local government autonomy in Korea (Ch.4) and the existing spatial planning system (Ch.5), document the growth of intergovernmental conflicts since 1995. They also verified the need for research into this general problem and provided a specific research scope in relation to major development and environmental projects in Korea so as to promote more effective management and negotiation strategies (Ch.6).

The second stage of the research programme began by defining the requirements of a theoretical framework to be applied in an empirical analysis. Because of the need to investigate complex, time-extensive relationships in the specific context of Korea, the method of comparative case studies was chosen for this purpose. The main elements of the framework (Ch.7) included the factors influencing the intensity of conflict, ways of measuring the degree of intensity and the factors involved in conflict resolution. Three categories of intergovernmental conflicts were chosen for case study, and in order to provide a basis of comparison of the position before and after local autonomy (1995) two cases were examined in each category. The three categories were: nuclear plants at Amyun Island and Yongwang (Ch.8); major transport infrastructure projects at Kyungju and Inchun (Ch.9); and, water resource investment projects at Wichun and Youngwol (Ch.10). The comparative analysis is provided in Chapter 11.

The case study analysis of these major development projects in Korea generally supported the central hypothesis of the relationship between the intensity of a conflict and the relative difficulty in its resolution. After the introduction of local autonomy the intensity of intergovernmental conflicts had become more visible, more intense and more difficult to resolve. Despite central government's role as a direct participant, there was some evidence of an emerging and useful mediation role which could be encouraged and developed further.

The conclusions drawn from this research suggest that the key to developing a successful government role in conflict resolution in Korea will be to ensure a congruence between all elements of the planning framework, full integration and co-ordination between spatial plans or projects, and, the involvement all participants in the process of conflict resolution. There are also important roles for government in establishing new schemes for alternative dispute resolution and mechanisms for balancing between local/regional burdens and national benefits. These should be an integral part of an organisational strategy for continuous improvement in order to maximise the level of social satisfaction and competitive advantages in Korea's regional development. In terms of successful implementations of alternative approaches for conflict resolution, the outcomes for governments and people would be a better performance in conflicts related to urban and regional development.

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Abbreviations

ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution
CPRE: Council for the Protection of Rural England
CEDR: The Centre for Dispute Resolution
CNLDPL: Comprehensive National Land Development Planning Law
CRBP: Capital Regional Basic Plan
DMZ: Demilitarised Zone
EDR: Environmental Dispute Resolution
EIA: Environment Impact Assessment
HSR: High Speed Railroad
IAM: International Airport Motorway
IC: Industrial Complex
I & HDP: Island and Hinterland Development Plans
IGRs: Intergovernmental relations
KCCI: Korea Chamber of Commerce and Industry
KIPO: Korean Institute of Public Opinion
KLAI: Korea Local Administration Institute
LAA: Local Autonomy Act
LGA: Local Government Act
LULUs: Locally Unwanted Land Uses
MHOA: Ministry of Home Office Affairs
MOCPH: Ministry of Culture and Physical Health
MOCT: Ministry of Construction and Transportation
MOE: Ministry of Environment
MOST: Ministry of Science and Technology
NGO: Non- Governmental Organisation
NIMBY: Not in my back yard
NLDP: National Land Development Plan
NPG: Nuclear Power Generator
NPP: Nuclear Power Plant
NWDS : Nuclear Waste Disposal Site
OPM: Office of Prime Minister
PIMFY: Please in my front yard
ROK: Republic of Korea
SEDP: Socio-Economic Development Plan
SOC: Social Overhead Capital
UPA: Urban Planning Act

Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Background

Since 1995, when Korean local government was granted greater autonomy, many difficult issues have emerged in terms of policy conflicts related to environmental problems and regional developments. As a result, some development projects have been delayed, and essential national or regional facilities have not been supplied on time. These conflicts are expected to increase in the future (Kim and Cha, 1997, p.17), and may thus continue to hamper a successful implementation of important national and regional development projects. In spite of these concerns, an appropriate method for conflict resolution in decision-making about the implementation of large-scale development projects in Korea has yet to be provided.

Before 1995 Korea had a centralised government system, so inter-governmental conflicts (IGCs) did not occur as they do today. Even if conflicts occurred, central government could play an important internal role in their solution. Recent political changes, such as democratisation and the establishment of local autonomy in 1995, have led to changes in the relationship between central and local governments, which have become a factor of increasing conflict. After the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, some two hundred conflicts related to regional development projects were identified, which was four times those identified for 1994 (KLAI, 1996). Major national projects in particular (e.g. Younggwang nuclear power plant, Seoul-Pusan high speed railway, Daegu national industrial complex) have been delayed or changed because of intergovernmental conflicts.


A number of major research issues have emerged with these changes in the political environment of Korean society and their consequent conflict issues. Why have intergovernmental conflicts been increasing with local autonomy? What were the basic nature and the particular problems of conflict in regional developments, and what influences and outcomes came from conflicts? What should be the government's role in the process of the conflicts? These questions have come to be important topics of concern to decision-makers in regional development policies, and as a result, the need to understand mechanisms and processes as well as the need to manage intergovernmental

conflicts have become pressing questions. In this context, the requirement is to develop an understanding of the nature of conflicts related to spatial plans and policies, the present mechanisms and processes of conflict resolution being used, as well as exploring the potential of new methods for conflict resolution. In relation to this, it can be helpful to compare theories and experience from elsewhere and to review their methods of dealing with similar sorts of conflict, and to explore some empirical evidence of the process of conflict resolution.

1.2. Environments of Research

In 1995 the Korean government devolved its local administrative powers. This change to local autonomy, which has led to the increase of inter-organisational conflicts in Korea, is the fundamental environment of this study. Of course, the progress of democratisation has also greatly influenced other social conflicts in Korea and contributed to a change in conflictual environments generally. This research consists of three basic components concerned with these environmental and political changes: ‘intergovernmental relations’; the ‘spatial planning system’; and ‘intergovernmental conflicts’ as displayed in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1-1. Environments and components of conflict in Korea after local autonomy



As mentioned above, the two political changes (democratisation and local autonomy) in Korea created a new environment for intergovernmental conflicts.

Democratisation both influenced intergovernmental relations and led to the introduction of local autonomy. The introduction of local autonomy resulted in a radical change of intergovernmental relations (component A). Local government has begun to function on its own, and this implies that its role is being transformed from the role of messenger and delegate of the central government into that of being the policy leader of the local community.

The fundamental change in intergovernmental relations (component A) in turn influenced the system of spatial (regional) planning and development (component B). As intergovernmental relations between central and local governments changed from top-down hierarchical relations into more complex horizontal relations, local governments' and residents' participation in the process of regional planning gradually increased and their position became stronger. In addition the change in intergovernmental relations (component A) created new intergovernmental conflicts (component C) (Kim *et al*, 1997, p.27). After introducing local autonomy, the types of conflict experienced in Korea extended from 'systems conflict' to 'bureaucratic conflict' (see section 6.3.1), and the number and intensity of intergovernmental conflicts began to increase sharply.

Change in the regional planning system (component B) also affected aspects of intergovernmental conflicts (component C). 'Jurisdictional conflicts' related to regional development began to occur (see sections 8.3 and 9.3) and 'interest conflicts' became intensified (see section 10.2). Thus, political changes in Korea in the 1990s (democratisation and localisation) provided a new environment for intergovernmental conflicts related to regional development policy. In this changing environment, the three components have come to develop close relationships with each other. Intergovernmental relations influenced the regional planning system and intergovernmental conflicts, while the regional planning system changed the aspect of intergovernmental conflicts and increased the frequency of conflicts.

Accordingly, it is necessary to set out new methods for resolution of the wide-ranging conflicts faced by many regional development projects in Korea through combining the concepts of regional development, intergovernmental relations and organisational conflict theory. The three components of conflict in Korea form the basic elements of this research: the major interest is spatial conflict stemming from the

relationships of three components. In other words, the subject of this research focuses on intergovernmental conflicts in regional developments and environment projects in Korea. Ultimately, local autonomy has become the basic environment and precondition for conflict components and provides new causes of intergovernmental conflicts. If the relationships between the three basic components can be understood, it may be possible to indicate something of the range of potential areas of conflict in regional development and to suggest some implications for improving conflict resolution.

As mentioned above, with the progress of local autonomy in Korea, the types of conflict have moved from 'systems' conflicts to 'bureaucratic' conflicts. This implies that intergovernmental conflict has increased after the introduction of local autonomy, because 'systems' conflict occurs mainly within an organisation, while 'bureaucratic' conflict takes place between organisations (see section 3.3.1). On the other hand, 'interest conflicts' were the main type of conflicts before the introduction of local autonomy, but 'jurisdictional conflicts' have greatly increased after 1995. As a result, some major national projects were blocked or delayed by such intergovernmental conflicts. Typical of such conflicts were those related to an unwanted facility location (e.g. Younggwang nuclear power plants) (see Chapter 8), the construction of major infrastructures (e.g. Kyungju high speed railway and Incheon international airport motorway) (see Chapter 9), and, water resource projects (see Chapter 10). Since such intergovernmental conflicts are usually related to the interests of localities, where residents and social groups may wish to participate in the conflict process, this often brings about social conflicts which can cause additional social costs and instability. This factor is a main reason to seek appropriate methods to manage and settle a conflict in its early stages.

1.3. Research Purpose

According to Goverde (1992, p.4), conflict can be studied in different ways, which he suggests as three analytical approaches, 'the first way is to consider conflict as an inevitable concomitant of the use of urban space. The second is to regard conflict as a strategy of one or more actors in a process of decision-making, and finally as a result of the dynamic of a policy-network'. Most strategies affecting the process of conflict come from the actors (disputants) in a conflict, and the actors can take the initiative in the

development of the conflict. As will be mentioned in section 1.4, since this research focuses on the dynamics of the process of conflict, it regards conflicts as partly being the relationships between actors' strategies in the process of decision-making, and, partly as dealing with a policy-network related to urban and regional developments.

Public organisations come to participate in conflicts related to regional planning and development, either as direct parties (proponents or opponents) or as third parties. As a result of developing initiatives to deal with these conflicts, public organisations (central government, local governments and governmental agencies) play important roles in the process of conflict, and they have also a great influence on the conflict mediation and resolution. Given the increased number of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea following local autonomy in 1995, there is a need to suggest desirable alternative devices to resolve or redress such conflicts in the processes of urban, regional and national developments, and to consider the desirable role of a mediation service for the effective dispute management.

In this context, the main objective of this research is therefore:

To explore the government's roles in effectively managing and resolving conflicts related to regional developments and environment projects under the system of Local Autonomy in Korea.


The possibility of the application of new conflict resolution methods (including ADR approaches) for conflicts related to regional developments in the system of local autonomy, are included in the Research Objective as specified above.

The structure of the research design (Figure 1.2) for this project has been organised on a hierarchical basis, moving from a general Research Objective to a number of more detailed Research Aims. Each Research Aim is designed to respond to a set of Research Questions. The process of the research study has been to use specified methods and techniques, to seek data and make analyses so as to answer these Research Questions.

In order to accomplish the main Research Objective, six Research Aims have been developed as more specific ways of accomplishing the Research Objective. The Research Aims supply the basic ideas for exploring and establishing the research framework of the

project, and provide the specific focuses for more detailed research design including the processes of literature review, the analyses of actual conflict information and case studies, and drawing out conclusions and recommendations. In particular the literature review process was designed to contribute to providing research Premises for establishing a framework for case studies. The case studies were designed to supply evidence which could be tested against the framework of research Premises and provide ideas and implications for resolving and managing the specific conflicts related to regional developments in Korea. All the Research Aims have been focused on attaining the main Research Objective i.e. understanding the effects of the changing roles of governments in the process of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea.

Figure 1-2. Structure of the research design



The six Research Aims are:

- **Research Aim 1:** to explore the nature of intergovernmental relations and the change of political environments in Korea. (Reported in Chapter 2)
- **Research Aim 2:** to understand the nature and conditions of conflicts and the factors influencing the intensity of conflicts. (Reported in Chapter 3)
- **Research Aim 3:** to review strategies and methods for conflict resolution and the variables influencing conflict resolution. (Reported in Chapter 4)
- **Research Aim 4:** to analyse the actual condition of various intergovernmental conflicts related to regional developments and to examine the present methods for conflict resolution in Korea. (Reported in Chapters 5 and 6)
- **Research Aim 5:** to assess the intensity of conflict through examining the factors influencing the progress of conflict and to analyse the relations between conflict resolution and the variables influencing conflict through case studies. (Reported in Chapters 7-10)
- **Research Aim 6:** to establish methods for conflict management available to Korean society and to explore the implications in terms of identifying desirable roles for the government in resolving conflict. (Reported in Chapters 11 and 12)

Specific Research Questions corresponding to each Research Aim were developed to help establish the research design and to realise the Research Aims.

Research Aim 1: to explore the nature of intergovernmental relations and the changes of political environment in Korea

- **Research Q.1.1:** What is the significance of local autonomy to Korea?
- **Research Q.1.2:** How does local autonomy influence intergovernmental relations in Korea?

- **Research Q.1.3**: Why does the introduction of local autonomy generate intergovernmental conflicts in Korea?

Research Aim 2: to understand the nature and conditions of conflicts and the factors influencing the intensity of conflicts.

- **Research Q.2.1**: How does conflict influence local communities and society?
- **Research Q.2.2**: What is the nature of intergovernmental conflicts and why do they occur?
- **Research Q.2.3**: What are the factors influencing the intensity of conflict, and how do they influence the intensity ?

Research Aim 3: to review strategies and methods for conflict resolution and the variables influencing conflict resolution.

- **Research Q.3.1**: What kinds of strategies are used for conflict resolution?
- **Research Q.3.2**: What are the variables influencing conflict resolution?
- **Research Q.3.3**: Why does the government participate in the process of conflict resolution?
- **Research Q.3.4**: Why are alternative methods for conflict resolution used?
- **Research Q.3.5**: How do the relations between the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution interact?

Research Aim 4: to analyse the actual condition of various intergovernmental conflicts related to regional developments and to examine the present methods for conflict resolution in Korea

- **Research Q.4.1**: How did Korean spatial policy contribute to the occurrence of intergovernmental conflicts?
- **Research Q.4.2**: Why do conflicts related to regional development often occur in Korea?
- **Research Q.4.3**: What are characteristics of regional development conflicts in Korea?

- **Research Q.4.4:** What is the position and condition of the conflict resolution system in Korea?

Research Aim 5: to assess the intensity of conflict through examining the factors influencing the progress of conflict and to analyse the relations between conflict resolution and the variables influencing conflict through case studies

- **Research Q.5.1:** How do the factors influencing the intensity of conflict affect the process of conflict?
- **Research Q.5.2:** What are the relationships between the variables influencing conflict resolution and the outcome of the conflict?
- **Research Q.5.3:** What is the relationship between the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution?

Research Aim 6: to establish methods for conflict management relevant to Korean society and to suggest implications for the government's desirable roles in resolving conflict

- **Research Q.6.1:** What are the important preconditions for introducing new approaches for conflict management in Korea?
- **Research Q.6.2:** What problems does Korean society have in introducing new approaches for the conflict resolution?
- **Research Q.6.3:** How will environments influencing the process of conflict change in the future?
- **Research Q.6.4:** What is the potential contribution of a mediation-based (Alternative Dispute Resolution: ADR) ¹⁾ approach to the management of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea?

These Research Aims and Research Questions represent the basic research interests of this project and supply the fundamental ideas used in establishing the research framework.

¹⁾ ADR implies alternative approaches to court judgements and administrative commands as traditional resolution methods. It includes a variety of procedures for the resolution of disputes in the wide spectrum ranging from mediation to straightforward negotiation (see Section 3.4).

They are deeply concerned with government's role in conflicts related to regional development and environment projects and concentrate on dynamic rather than static factors. Accordingly, the scope of this research is related to the processes of the development of conflict and the processes of conflict resolution. The ideas and information for establishing the Research Aims and Questions have been developed through the reviews of the literature about conflict theory and conflict resolution, through discussions with other authors, and the analysis of the experience related to regional conflicts in Korea. Pondy's (1967, 1972) discussion of conflict types and processes and Lan's (1997) strategies for organisational conflict have been particularly useful for understanding the concept of conflict and generating some elements of the research design.


1.4. Research Methodology

As stated earlier, the three basic components of this research are intergovernmental relations, the spatial planning system, and intergovernmental conflicts in Korea, and this research is carried out under the structure consisting of these basic components. As mentioned in section 1.3: 'Research Purpose', the main objective is to establish the government's roles in resolving and managing effectively conflicts related to regional development and environment under the Local Autonomy in Korea. The research has been carried out in a three-stage process: literature review; case study; and, defining conclusions and suggestions (see Figure 1.3). The research methodology is now introduced by relating the Research Aims and Questions to the specific chapters.

The first Aim was to explore the nature of intergovernmental relations and the change of political environments through the introduction of local autonomy in Korea. Detailed Research Questions related to the definition of local autonomy, the significance of local autonomy in Korea, the change of intergovernmental relations and the relationships between local autonomy and intergovernmental conflicts were developed. The research related to Research Aim 1 is reported in Chapter 2. After the advance of democracy and the introduction of local autonomy in Korea, intergovernmental relations have been greatly changed, changes, which provide the direction of, and surroundings for my research (see Figure 1.2). The political changes (democratisation and localisation) in Korea have directly influenced the spatial system and the environment of conflicts related

to regional developments. In order to understand the nature of organisational conflict and to manage effectively conflicts related to spatial planning, it is necessary to look at the changing state of intergovernmental relations in transition in Korea.

Figure 1-3. Framework for research



The second Research Aim was to understand the nature and conditions of a conflict and to find the factors influencing the intensity of conflict. The Research Questions for this Aim were related to the definition, function and causes of conflict and the factors influencing the intensity of conflict. In answering these questions, the second step (reported in Chapter 3) was to review literature on general theories of conflict, which

provided the basis for identifying the particular concept of intergovernmental conflicts and ideas to establish a more detailed framework for the research.

The third Aim was to review the range of strategies and methods for conflict resolution, and to identify the variables for the conflict resolution. Research Questions were identified which were concerned with the variables and strategies for conflict resolution, the government's role in the process of conflict resolution, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and relations between the intensity and resolution of conflict. This part of the research design was accomplished through reviewing the literature on the conflict management and the process of conflict resolution (reported in Chapter 4), which are basic topics to this research.

In particular, as one of the methods for the conflict resolution, the practice and experience of ADR in other countries was researched. These two Aims mentioned before essentially refer to conflict theory and conflict resolution (Chapters 3 and 4) and underpin the rest of the project and its consideration of circumstances in Korea (Chapters 5 and 6). The two preliminary Aims supply the theoretical knowledge of this research and the bases for establishing Premises for the analytical framework of the case study (reported in Chapters 3 and 4). The main research Premises were formed (see section 7.2) through reviewing literature and research related to factors influencing the intensity of conflict and identifying and assessing the variables for conflict resolution

The fourth Research Aim is to analyse the actual condition of various intergovernmental conflicts related to regional developments and to examine the present methods of conflict resolution in Korea. The Research Questions specified here relate to the relations between spatial policy and conflicts, main causes and characteristics of regional development conflict and the current system for conflict resolution in Korea. Corresponding to this research aim and questions, Chapter 5 deals with the spatial planning system and policy in Korea through the literature review. The change of intergovernmental relations has led to a transformation in the urban and regional planning system. The structure of spatial planning and the problems of current system are analysed, and the causes of conflicts generated from regional policies are examined.

In Chapter 6 the experience of actual conflicts and the methods and system for conflict resolution in Korea are analysed. For this purpose, the change of the conflict

environment and the causes and types of conflicts are explored, and the specific characteristics of conflicts related to regional development and the environment in Korea are also examined. This part of the project also includes the analysis of current problems and the legal, administrative and technical mechanisms used in the solution of conflict in the process of regional development, and experience with ADR in Korea (see Chapters 5 and 6). The results of this part of the study supply some ideas for establishing research premises for more detailed case study inquiries, while they also contribute to evaluating the premises established from the review of literature and provide implications for alternative devices in conflict management in Korea (see Chapters 12).

The next major step in the research process was to develop an analytical framework for the case studies and to understand the survey and analysis of six regional development/environment project cases in Korea. This part of the research task draws mainly on the outcomes of Research Aims 2 and 3 and partly on those of Research Aims 1 and 4. As a method for accomplishing Research Aim 5, the appropriateness of the case study method was evaluated. According to Yin (1988, p.1), case study is used in many situations and has been a common research approach in city and regional planning and political science topics. He (p.13) continues that the use of case study is an appropriate comprehensive research strategy for studies of 'how' and 'why' questions dealing with operational links needing to be traced over time. This research topic is about conflicts related to regional developments, and the research questions of this study are mainly concerned with 'why' and 'how'. For these reasons, the case study approach was adopted in this research.

The theoretical approach for the case study analyses was established through developing a framework of Premises (see section 7.2) which were suggested by the review of literature in Chapters 2-4. The six conflict cases were chosen according to their types and characteristics (see section 7.3), with three categories of regional infrastructure/environmental conflicts in Korea where intergovernmental conflicts had delayed or negated projects essential to national and/or regional development. These categories were: 'Not in my back yard': (NIMBY) (i.e. facilities which no locality wants to have, but which must go somewhere); 'Please in my front yard' (PIMFY) (i.e. facilities which several localities would be pleased to have located in their district or region); and,

water resources investment project conflicts (conflicts where localities want to secure access to water resources outside their district).

The most critical and typical conflicts occurring after the implementation of local autonomy in Korea have been those concerned with NIMBYism and regional selfishness. In this research NIMBY conflicts related to nuclear power, and the PIMFY conflicts were concerned with infrastructure and with water resource conflicts related to the allocation and pollution of water. The case study analysis was undertaken through a qualitative and comparative method (see section 7.4).

First, the five factors influencing the intensity of conflict are analysed by the influence of sub-factors (see section 7.6); the intensity of conflict is then measured by three variables (number of participants; duration; and, number of violent acts) (see section 7.7). Secondly, the analysis of five variables for conflict resolution is dealt with by analysing the influence of sub-variables (see section 7.8). Finally the evaluation of the results and outcomes of conflict are analysed, and the results are compared between two conflict cases (see section 7.9).

Following the introduction to the framework established for the case studies, in order to assess and verify the Premises, and to examine the differences between theories and practices, fieldwork was carried out in Korea to collect information and data about six conflict cases (see section 1.5 and Appendix 5). The case studies are divided into three categories mentioned above: NIMBY conflicts (Chapter 8); PIMFY conflicts (Chapter 9); and, water resource conflicts (Chapter 10).

According to the analytical framework established in Chapter 7, the analysis of the conflict cases depends on the comparison between two cases within same category (Chapters 8-10). At first, in order to understand the nature of the conflict case, the outline of the development of each conflict (including the causes, process and results) is introduced. Then each conflict case is tested against the framework of Premises in terms of the factors influencing the intensity of conflict and the variables for conflict resolution, followed by a comparative analysis between the two conflict cases in each category. In the case studies, the consistency and difference between the Premises and the experience of actual conflict cases are analysed through the use of a quantitative approach. The findings of this analysis provide lessons and suggestions about how to manage conflicts in

regional developments and the direction of regional policies in Korea under local autonomy in the future and provide a link with Research Aim 5.

The fifth Research Aim is to establish a structured view of the present methods for conflict management available for Korean society and to suggest some recommendations for the desirable roles that central and local governments could undertake in resolving a conflict. The Aim thus responds to Research Questions about the preconditions and environments for the government to introduce alternative methods. These Questions are reported on in Chapters 11 and 12. In Chapter 11, the Premises related to the process of conflict and conflict resolution are verified and evaluated through the application of empirical analysis and theoretical test, then they are modified through the process of feedback. The results of the modified premises together with the result of empirical analysis are used to establish the implications and ideas of conflict resolution suitable for Korean circumstance (see section 11.2). Finally, in Chapter 12, in order to manage disputes better and develop sound regional economic and social policies in Korea, some desirable propositions and political implications of a more purposeful approach to conflict resolution are suggested. The possibility of the introduction of alternative plans for the practice of mediation is also suggested.

1.5. The Process of Research

In order to attain the purpose of this research project, consideration has been given to the appropriate processes of research; these include the processes of analysis and synthesis. First, to develop an understanding of the theoretical knowledge and to establish specific Research Aims and Questions, a wide literature review was conducted through considering sources in books, journal articles, reports and web-sites. The subjects considered in the literature review included local autonomy, the Korean physical planning system and conflict theory. In order to compare differences in regional conflicts between Korea and other countries, these materials covered not only Korean experience but also that relating to some developed countries (e.g. USA and UK). Chapters 2, 3 and 4 were mainly prepared through the use of these processes.

The next stage was the collection and analysis of formal and informal data and information in relation to regional conflicts in Korea. These were mainly collected

through reference to Korean government's published official documents, annual reports, statistical handbooks and also to unpublished internal material (e.g. files and documents). Other documentary sources included: newspapers and media sources; magazines; conference reports. In addition a set of personal interviews and discussions were used to cover matters not accessible through documentary and archive sources or to explore issues arising from but not resolved in those sources.

The particular purpose of the six case studies was to evaluate the suggested framework of research related to conflict management and conflict resolution. The empirical research for the case studies was carried out through a period of local fieldwork in Korea. This fieldwork was divided into three processes. First, the published and unpublished information through magazines, newspapers, research reports and the Korean government's internal information and data were sought and reviewed. Secondly, direct information about the conflicts was obtained by in-depth interview with disputants and third parties or authors (see Appendix 4). Finally, if necessary, a visit was made for an 'on the-spot survey' of a particular conflict case (e.g. Wichon and Incheon Kumam cases).

Among the overall research processes in this project, the provision of basic background data for the case studies mainly depended on published information and official documents. For the researcher to understand the mechanisms of conflict at work in the cases more precisely and to achieve a deeper analysis, however, these sources were complemented by in-depth interview with conflict specialists, disputants and stakeholders and, in for two of the case studies, by a local survey visit to the conflict site. The field survey work was mainly conducted by the researcher himself and partly by interested Korean government officials (who wish to remain anonymous for confidentiality reasons) and Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements' (KRIHS) staff (listed in the 'Acknowledgements'), under the supervision of the researcher.

1.6. Structure of the Thesis

This thesis consists of 12 chapters and is divided into five parts. Part I covers the introduction to the research subject and the experience of local autonomy in Korea. Part II presents an analysis of the theoretical study of conflict theory and conflict resolution. Part III provides the contextual background to the Korean spatial planning system and


conflicts related to regional developments in Korea. Part IV contains the empirical core of the thesis and introduces the framework for case studies and the analysis of six conflict cases. Finally, Part V comprises an evaluation of the research Premises and conclusions (see Figure 1.4).

In Part I of the thesis, Chapter 1 has introduced the key issues of this research about intergovernmental conflicts related to regional development and environmental projects in Korea. It also reported on the development and specification of the Research Objective, the Research Aims and their related Research Questions which together represent the direction and scope of this research. It concluded with a review of the process and methodology of the research. Chapter 2 is related to the review of local autonomy and intergovernmental relations in Korea. This chapter is deeply connected with Korean political environments influencing the regional planning system (Chapter 5) and intergovernmental conflicts related to regional developments (Chapter 6). It thus becomes the starting point of this thesis.

Part II comprises the main theoretical part of the study and consists of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 is related to conflict theory which includes consideration of the types, causes, process and actors of conflicts. This chapter is useful for understanding the concept of conflict and mechanisms of intergovernmental conflict. Following Chapter 3, the methods and strategies for conflict resolution are reviewed in Chapter 4 which introduces a discussion of game theory and bargaining, strategies, ADR approaches and consideration of the roles of government. These two chapters (3 and 4) provide the bases of the analytical framework of Premises for the case studies, which is developed in Chapter 7, and also suggest the core idea to review the experience of conflict in Korea explored in Chapter 6.

Part III draws on the previous Chapters 3 and 4, and provides a structured review of Korea's experience of spatial planning, regional development and the emergence of open conflicts. Chapter 5 is concerned with the system of spatial planning and spatial policy in Korea, while Chapter 6 deals with the experience of conflicts related to regional developments in Korea. These two chapters (5 and 6) also provide supporting material in establishing the basic ideas for the framework for case studies which will be used to verify the suggested premises.

Figure 1-4. Structure of the thesis



Part IV is related to the case studies of regional development/environmental conflicts in Korea. Following the review of literature and experience, the theoretical framework for case study analysis is developed and explained in Chapter 7. Three sets of two case studies are examined: NIMBY cases (Chapter 8); PIMFY cases (Chapter 9); and, water resource cases (Chapter 10).

In Part V, the results of the comparative analysis of the six case studies are used to reach an overall evaluation of the Premises in Chapter 11. Finally, some implications for conflict management in future in Korea, are suggested, and conclusions of the research are dealt with in Chapter 12. A list of references and a set of several Appendices are provided at the end of the thesis.

Chapter 2. Local Government and Intergovernmental Relationships in Transition in Korea

2.1. Introduction

Korea is noted for its long history under a centralised government. Uniformity rather than diversity has been the norm in its political life. However, since 1988 Korea has been in a transition from authoritarian rule to political pluralism. In 1995 a new era opened with legislation to establish local autonomy, leading to full implementation in 1998. These two political changes, that is, democratisation and localisation, have resulted in considerable changes in Korean society.

Democratisation in Korea has been largely concerned with political democratisation, through which it has been argued that a more democratic policy process will develop that is both more responsive and more representative. This political change has in turn led to a wider social democratisation. Under the new democratic system, for instance, various groups have increased their demands for participation in the process of policy-making. As Moon (1998, p.82) has commented, 'citizen groups [have] gradually become politically empowered in the course of continuing political democratisation'.

From the standpoint of developing democratic practice, the policy process can be regarded as having been made more responsive and representative if participation has affected the participants, the programmes or the practices of government in general (Garson and Williams 1982, p.100). In a wider and more general sense this development can be seen as part of a '...shift from the traditional ways of involving citizens (on the input side) in elections and referenda to involvement of citizens in outputs (in program planning and delivery)' (Garson and Williams, 1982, p.94). In this way it can be noted that new political voices have emerged throughout Korean society, asking that public programmes become more accountable to them. However, such new demands for citizens' participation have also increased the potential for the occurrence of conflicts between citizens and policy-makers over the supply of new public facilities, for example, industrial parks, nuclear power plants and multi-purpose dams, etc.

The second important factor influencing intergovernmental conflicts is the introduction of local autonomy (localisation) in Korea. The rationale behind the introduction of local autonomy has been to decentralise governmental institutions and administration in order to allow interested and capable citizens to exert more influence on decisions on local government policy. Local government has begun to function on its own basis although only incompletely so far. This implies that the role of local government is being transformed from the role of messenger and delegate of central government into one of policy leader of the local community. As well as the development of new central-local government relationships, a further aspect of the changes is the increased attention given to relations between different local governments (many of which may involve disagreements over public facilities and projects).

The system of local government in Korea has thus begun to change fundamentally, and further changes in intergovernmental relations (IGRs) may be envisaged for the future. Such changes in Korea's institutional environment as the introduction of local autonomy and the increase of new administrative demands will have a profound influence on IGRs over the spatial planning and development issues. One early significant phenomenon has been an increase in intergovernmental conflicts over urban and regional planning and development; these conflicts have presented themselves in varied forms over differing periods of time. To understand this aspect of public organisational conflict in Korea, it is necessary to begin with an examining the local government system under local autonomy, that is, the changes in IGRs which have become the fundamental institutional environment for intergovernmental conflicts.

In the context described in the paragraph above, this chapter aims to describe Korean local government system and IGRs in transition and to explore possible directions for local autonomy in the future. First, the significance of local autonomy and the history of local government in Korea are considered. Secondly, the structures, functions and finance of local government under local autonomy are considered. Next, the changing shape of IGRs (both among local governments, and, between central and local government) and the respective roles of each level of government are examined. Finally, the problems emerging from this analysis and desirable directions for the future of local autonomy in Korea are discussed.

2.2. Local Autonomy

2.2.1. Definition and Types of Local Autonomy

There are many different views about and approaches to the concept of local autonomy (also called 'local self-government'). In this way, the nature and scope of local autonomy may vary according to historical, functional and political situations and the institutional definitions of autonomy may also be very different. Rhodes (1981, p.29), for instance, has stated that 'the concept of local autonomy is both an elusive and emotive one. On the one hand, autonomous local government can be seen as an essential bulwark against the tyranny... On the other hand, it can be seen as highly divisive: a way for parochial local elites to assert their own interests over those of the state'. Kim, B. J. (1995, p.2) has explained local autonomy as an administrative system in which 'local government made up of local residents' representatives within a certain geographical boundary, autonomously carries out local matters'. As a rule, local autonomy implies that local government itself carries out local matters within its legal jurisdiction in the interests of its residents through a self-governing administration that is relatively independent from central government. Relating to this central definition, local autonomy can thus take various institutional forms and express diverse relationships between central and local governments according to particular circumstances.

Clark (1984, [in Park, I.K. 1999, p.38]) has developed the analysis, by proposing a classification of the types of local autonomy based on two dimensions: power of initiation; and, power of immunity. The former means that local government has a right to be able to initiate some actions to accomplish its purpose, the latter implies that local government can take administrative decisions or actions without central government's interference or superintendence. Similarly, Gurr and King (1987, pp.56-65) divided the criteria of local autonomy into two: the right of self-government from central government; and, the right of self-government from internal system. They argued that 'many traditional analyses discuss this question in terms of local government's autonomy from high-level governments. Others emphasise the problem of the autonomy of local governments from local social and economic interests'. According to their model, the types of local autonomy can be divided into four local government types (see Table 2.1). In the case of Type 1, local government has considerable discretion and can actively cope with the conflict

concerned whether with central government or local citizens. Local governments in Types 2 and 3 are in a middle ground, but the one is only weakly autonomous of central government and more influenced by local interests and vice versa. Finally, local government of Type 4 may be pulled in two directions though its doubly weak position and fall back to the position of onlooker and observer.

Table 2-1. Types of local autonomy

Autonomy from central government		Strong	Weak
Autonomy from internal system			
Strong		Type 1 (Strong autonomy)	Type 2 (Middle autonomy)
Weak		Type 3 (Middle autonomy)	Type 4 (Weak autonomy)

Source: Park, I. K. 1999, p.38.

2.2.2. An Evaluation of Local Autonomy

While considering the values and justifications advanced for local autonomy in terms of local knowledge, Sharpe (1970) has argued that ‘local authorities can grasp the inimitable conditions of each locality’, while Widdicombe (1986) has suggested that ‘they can respond corporately to multi-dimensional local issues, and the pluralism with decentralisation can provide political checks and balance, and a restraint on arbitrary government and absolutism’ [in Wilson and game, 1991, p.30]. Clarke and Stewart (1991, p.29) have also asserted, ‘a local authority had the capacity to shape an area, to preserve it, to develop it, to change it, and in doing so to give it a new identity’. Wilson and Game (1998, pp.31-39) pointed out that the advantages ¹⁾ of decentralisation or elected local government were likely to be greater than a combination of central government and local administration.

In relation to the implementation of local autonomy in Korea, Kim, B. J. (1995, p.22) has raised questions about two significant points: democracy and efficiency. In questioning whether local autonomy guarantees democracy, many scholars put the emphasis on the affirmative response, that is to say that local self-government is the most desirable alternative to check central authority or an autocratic state. It provides

¹⁾ The advantages are: building and articulating community identity; emphasising diversity; fostering innovation and learning; responding swiftly, appropriately and corporately; promoting citizenship and participation; providing political education and training; and, dispersing power.

citizens as sovereigns with the opportunity to participate in government and supplies the requisite educational facilities to initiate citizens into the practise of democracy.

Tocqueville (1945, [in Kim, B.J. 1995, p.22]), writing of a well-know institution of American local democracy in the early nineteenth century, said that: 'Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science: they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it'. Bryce (1921, [in Kim, B.J. 1995, p.22]) described the 'relationships among autonomy, democracy and freedom as the best school of democracy,' and stated that '... the best guarantee for its success is the practice of local self-government'.

It is generally accepted that democracy is useful for increasing residents' influence over local government as well as enlarging the opportunity for participation. However, there are some different opinions. First, the freedom of opportunity to participate in local administration does not mean the actual participation. If the turnout rate in municipal elections is very low, a difficulty in local representativeness may develop. Secondly, there may be the possibility of rule by a minority, that is, a local elite assumes the reins of local government instead of a large representation of local voters. Thirdly, and on the contrary, there may also be possibility of majority tyranny. The majority group can act high-handedly, by the force of their numbers disregarding minority groups and interests. The smaller the area and/or the population of a local government, the easier it is for a special group to form the majority. Fourthly, criticisms about the educational function of local autonomy being initiated through citizens learning may be countered by concerns about such learning leading to matters such as 'exclusivism' and 'separatism' which give a very different view of the local interest and involvement to that hopefully produced by local democracy (Hill, 1974, p.24).

In considering whether local autonomy is a guarantee of the efficiency of administration, Kim, B.J. (1995) has suggested that a number of scholars (e.g. John Stuart Mill, Berms, Tiebout) have agreed that decentralisation and local autonomy help to improve the efficiency of the whole administrative system. First, they argue, local autonomy can cope sensitively with operational matters and administrative demands at the local level. When their residents directly elect mayors and chief executive officers and local governments have autonomous administrative power, then local matters are valued above everything else. Secondly, local autonomy can deal

promptly and efficiently with local policies and local administrations. Some cumbersome administrative process working bureaucratically from central government to lower tiers may become an obstacle to dealing rapidly with local matters. Thirdly, local autonomy has the strength of making composite otherwise uncoordinated administrative functions which is helpful for a locality. Fourthly, local autonomy can stimulate participation through citizens' participation, which can enhance administrative efficiency and responsiveness and, perhaps more relevantly to very small numbers/areas, co-production which may help to ensure the provision of public services without financial charges (which implies that local residents perform voluntary public services). Finally, local autonomy inevitably invites competition between local governments, and through such competition, local administration gradually can promote an administrative efficiency.

However, there some counter-arguments have been advanced to the case for local autonomy. On the one hand, local autonomy fosters political and social democratisation and enhances administrative efficiency but, on the other hand, it can be an obstacle to democratisation and efficiency. Under local autonomy, parochial interests may be given precedence over wider problems, and these aspects result in unnecessary intergovernmental conflicts. Etzioni (1969, [in Kim, B.J. 1995, p.20]) pointed out that a decentralised participatory system passed over national interests such as social justice or economic development. Other negative elements relating to local autonomy include, for example: local government officers lacking ability; irrational policy making; a lack of co-operation and even active resistance to national projects; regional egoism; conflict and competition between governments; and a waste of materiel and human resources. Thus there are different reciprocal opinions to be taken into account in an appraisal of local autonomy.

Given these advantages and disadvantages, what answers may be given to those who question whether local autonomy should be introduced in Korea? Generally, there may be two answers. According to Kim, B.J. (1995, p.34), one takes a technical view that the introduction of local autonomy can give more benefit than its non-introduction, which focuses on a harmful influence of excessive centralisation. The second answer is a normative view that political and administrative authority stems from citizens, and that authority should be placed somewhere near citizens or local residents.

2.3. The Effects of Local Autonomy in Korea

The introduction of local autonomy in Korea notified Koreans of various significant political, social and cultural changes in the local level. First of all, it led to the shift of political and administrative power structures, which created inevitably different politics, administrations and cultures among regions. Forming local councils and electing municipal and top administrators has achieved the decentralisation of administrative power. Moon (1998, p.90) argued, 'those two elections are considered a major improvement in Korean political decentralisation. However, the preliminary political decentralisation has not yet been extended to administrative decentralisation, where local governments enjoy administrative and financial independence'.

Secondly, in connection with the decentralisation of power, intergovernmental conflicts between central and local governments or between local and local governments have been greatly changed. Under the centralism of a national government structure, a local chief executive officer (head) appointed by central government could not oppose the central government's authority. However, after the introduction of local autonomy, central government's overwhelming control over local government has virtually become impossible, and a new structure of intergovernmental relations has been created, changing from one based on hierarchical relations to one based on partnership relations.

Thirdly, the number and variety of demands on local administrations have increased rapidly under the Korea's new administrative system. Under the system of direct elections, local residents' demands about local administration have gone on growing and local government's most important role has become that of dealing with the administrative demands of their local residents. Fourthly, with increased demands for more independent (autonomous) regional development, the opportunity has opened up for a full-scale regional competition between local administrations, setting the antagonism of one region against another. Such competition among local governments could lead beneficially to originality and efficiency, while an excessive competition could result in many negative outcomes i.e. conflicts over national, regional and local development priorities.

Although the introduction of local autonomy has changed the political environment and intergovernmental relations in Korea, the residue of centralism seems still to remain. Central government is still influential over the administrative

system and its policy orientation. However, by 1998 a report in the *Korea Herald News* gave some degree of optimism that the new arrangements were taking root: 'Looking over the past three years of local autonomy,' their reporter concluded, 'Korea is witnessing a slow process of decentralisation, which includes problem solving at the local level'

2.4. The System of Local Government in Transition

2.4.1. The Structure of Local Government

According to Keating (1991, p.6), 'autonomy is certainly important, but governing capacity is more than this. It is the ability to formulate policies and to mobilise powers and resources behind their implementation'. In this context, the structure and human resources of local government are very important in understanding the processes of administrative policy and intergovernmental relations.

The substance and authority of local government in Korea are derived from the Korean Constitution. Local governments are given powers over measures within their geographical sphere i.e. the boundaries of local administrative areas. According to Article 117 of the Constitution, local governments are strictly divided into the Executive Office (mayor, governor, executive head) and the Local Assembly (of elected members). That the organisation of autonomous local government has taken the form of the 'strong mayor-council' arrangement can be accounted to the strength of the long-term influence of the centralist political environment in Korea.

Local governments consist of upper-tier and lower-tier authorities which received their local autonomous authority status in the Local Autonomy Act, 1988. The basis for the two-tier system came from the administrative structure developed under the *Chosun* Dynasty (1392-1909). The upper tier governments are divided into two types: 'metropolitan areas' (Seoul and six large cities); and 'provinces' (*do*) (see Figure 2.1).

The arrangements for the lower tier are more complicated than those for the upper-tier governments. The metropolitan areas have wards (*Gu*) and as an exceptional case, some metropolitan areas (i.e. Pusan, Daegu and Woolsan large cities) have counties (*Gun*), while the provinces have local cities (*Shi*) and counties (*Gun*). In addition, to promote the more effective and co-ordinated administration of

local affairs, sub-tier offices are organised under lower-tier governments. Wards in Seoul and Large Cities, and local cities in provinces have villages (*Dong*), and counties in provinces have town (*Eup*) and township (*Myun*) authorities (see Figure 2.2).

Figure 2-1. Map of upper-tier local governments in Korea





Figure 2-2. Structure of local government in Korea (2000)



2.4.2. The Roles and Functions of Local Government

1. *Principal functions*

According to Section 8 of the Local Autonomy Act 1988 (LAA), local governments have responsibilities for the peace and economic prosperity of residents within their jurisdictional territories. The range of local government services covers a wide range. The principal functions are as follows: boundaries of lower-tier local government and supervising local administrations; social welfare services for residents; measures for the promotion of local industry; regional and local development and living environment; promotion of education, culture, physical training and art; and, the civil defence and fire service.

2. *The division of functions between local governments*

According to Section 10 of the LAA 1988, upper-tier governments deal with affairs requiring unified administration in provinces or metropolitan areas, and they carry out the roles of making administrative connections and adjustments between central and lower-tier governments. Lower-tier governments can implement all local affairs except those assigned to upper-tier governments' jurisdictional administration (see Table 2.2).

In Korea, the main difference in function between the different levels of governments does not depend on the type of administrative subject and policy, but on whether the administrative subject in question is related to a wider area or not. If a service is related to two lower-tier governments or more, it falls under the jurisdiction of the upper-tier government. Although each government's function is described in the LAA, the division in practice is very ambiguous and abstract (Kim, B.J., 1995).

pp.106-107). Accordingly, confusion over administrative affairs often occurs between levels of governments, which can itself lead to intergovernmental conflicts.

Table 2-2. The division of functions between upper and lower tier government

Local government	Contents of functions
Upper tier	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Great-sphere affairs spreading over more two lower tiers (e.g. Local road; local river, provincial natural park; wide sewage disposal plant) . Affairs require unification in a province or metropolitan areas (e.g. Statistical research for administration, Provincial development plan) . Connect and adjustment between central and lower tier . Unsuitable affairs for lower tier to carry out (e.g. Civil defence; high school)
Lower tier	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . All of local affairs except upper tier dealing with affairs (e.g. welfare: local industry; county/ward plan; education: primary, middle school) . If a competition takes place between upper and lower tiers, lower tier has the priority in their jurisdiction (LAA Sect.10-2)

Source: LAA, Sect. 10

3. The division of functions in spatial development

The classification of local government functions related to development projects can be identified by reference to the main agencies involved. Central government establishes nation-wide spatial policies and serves for the purpose of national benefits and interests, while local governments deal with benefits limited to their areas such as community services. On the other hand, 'Public and Private Corporations' venture a high degree of capital investment and private industries are concerned with profit gain (ROK, 1992, p.141) (Table 2.3).

Table 2-3. The division of functions and main agencies in development projects

Government		Private-Govermnt Corporation	Private Industry
Central	Local		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Preservation of national land / natural environment . Management of mountain and water resources . Nation-wide railroad and road networks (motorway, national road) . Industrial complex estate . National development plan 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Transportation networks (local road) . Management of provincial natural and municipal park . Water supply and waste treatment . Public housing . Local industrial park . Regional development plan (Town plan; County plan) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Communication . Airport and port . Subway . Industrial estates . Bus terminal 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> . Housing . Leisure and recreational facilities . Tourist facilities . Urban renovation . Landfills

Source: ROK (Republic of Korea), 1992a, p.141

2.5. The Organisation of Local Government ²⁾

2.5.1. The Pattern of Organisation

The relative position and power of local governments depends upon their relationships with central government, and the most influential factor in this equation in Korea is the relationship of the head of the local government to central government. After the implementation of local autonomy, the strengthened position and changed role of the chief executive (e.g. the mayor) have become important variables in intergovernmental relations. In addition, the role of the local assembly has also played an important part in defining the relationships and pattern of local government. Depending on the relative power and status of the head of a local government, the pattern of power relationships in the local government as a whole may be greatly changed. In other words, the value of the balance of power between the local assembly and head of local government becomes an important indicator of the form of a particular local government.

Kim, B.J. (1995, pp.209-210) has suggested that the general form of local government can usually be divided into three types: ‘integrated organisation’; ‘antagonistic organisation’; or, ‘mixed organisation’. Among these forms, the system of Korean local government belongs to the antagonistic organisation ³⁾ which expresses a system of ‘checks and balance’⁴⁾ between the executive office (the head of local government) and the local assembly. This form is such that the local assembly and the executive organisation are strictly separated, so members of the assembly and chief executives are elected with separately from each other, and they are also constituted separately from each other.

According to Kim, B.J. (1995, p.210), such patterns belong to the category of ‘mayor-council model’ as found in the USA. This antagonistic form can also usually be divided into three types: ‘strong mayor-council’ model; ‘weak mayor-council’

²⁾ This section draws substantially on: Kim B. J. (1995), *Korean Local Autonomy* (in Korean). Seoul: Bubmun-sa’ (pp.281-298).

³⁾ Generally the merits of this system are as follows: the prevention of the abuse of power by ‘*checks and balances*’; the prevention of sectionalism; the embodiment of responsible administration; and, the stabilisation of administration. The drawbacks of this system are: the possibility of conflicts between the assembly and the executive; and, an inadequate reflection of different residents’ interests. (Kim, 1995b, p.210)

⁴⁾ . Mayor’s power toward the Assembly: whether mayor has a power to veto a decision of assembly; the right to dissolve the assembly; and, the right of personnel management.

. Assembly’s power toward Mayor: The right to investigate and inspect administrative management; and, the right to hold a vote of no-confidence in the head of the executive (mayor). (L.A.A. 1988)

model; ‘strong mayor with chief administrative officer’ form’ (Wilham, 1985 [in Kim, B. J., 1995], p.211). The position and power of mayor was similar to the chief executive as an administrative officer before the introduction of local autonomy, but after local autonomy local governments have adopted the ‘strong mayor-council model’ type.

2.5.2. The Position of the Head of the Local Government (Mayor/Governor)

In 1995, mayors, governors and county heads were elected ⁵⁾ directly by their local voters under the new LAA (1988). This change in local political environments has greatly reduced central government’s power to influence local administration. The power and position of the head of the local government played the most important part in influencing the patterns of local government and the degree of discretion. After the introduction of local autonomy in Korea, the position and roles of chief executive (head) based on the viewpoint of strong mayor-council system (Kim, B. J., 1995, 281-198) were as follows: the leading representative of the local government; the chief executive officer; the chief of a national local government; and, local political leader.

2.5.3. The Authority of the Head of a Local Government

Local government in Korea belongs to the pattern of the ‘strong mayor-council model’, through which the mayor (governor) gets an advantage in authority over the local assembly and can resort to strong measures in local administration. His/her power can be effectively divided into two parts: one is the mayor’s power toward the local assembly, and the other part is the power of administrative action expressed through the organisation of the local government.⁶⁾

⁵⁾ All elections are dealt with by universal, equal, direct and secret ballot under *the Law for The Election of Public Officials and the Prevention of Illegal Elections*, 1994. The method of election is the *first-past-the-post (Plurality system)* and the elected officials’ term is four years. All Koreans over 20 have a right to vote by ballot. ‘Local Election Management Committees’ are established to conduct the administrative arrangements for elections.

⁶⁾ According to LAA 1988, the head has first the right of requiring an extraordinary session of the assembly to consider a specific subject (LAA 1988, Sects. 39-2); the right of initiative and right of requiring the reconsideration of a policy issue (LAA 1988, Sect 58-1, 85, 98-3); the right of personnel management to make appointments to the posts of director, head of a department and an office clerk (LAA 1988, Sects.83-2); secondly, he she has a wide range of administrative powers: the establishment of regulations about clerical work (LAA88, Sect. 16); the right to execute the self-governing affairs of the government, affairs mandated to a local autonomous body and the affairs entrusted to the chief of local government by law (LAA 1988, Sect. 94); the power to appoint and dismiss the staff of executive office, auxiliary organisation and subordinate offices under laws, ordinances and regulations.

2.5.4. The Role of the Head of a Local Government

As mentioned above, the position and power of the head of local governments may vary, according to the type of organisational arrangements. However, the basic role of head does not greatly differ between countries with similar systems. Kim, B.J. (1995, p.116) has cited Pohlmann's enumeration of the overall role of such a local government head as follows: courtesy representative; chief executive; chief legislator; spokesman for local interests; responsible person for an extraordinary step; guidance person of public opinion; and leading member of a local political party.

In contrast under the traditional system of British local government, Norton (1991, p.147) has, for instance, largely divided the chief executive's role as an appointed administrator into two parts, i.e. the internal role, and, the role concerned with outside world. For the internal role, he pointed out four areas of achievement predominate: providing leadership; securing sound internal and constructive relationships; policy-making, strategy and the planning of policy implementation; and, co-ordination. Relationships with the outside world cover an extremely wide range and vary greatly between individuals and localities. Wilson and Game (1998, p.108) have commented on the chief executive's task to ensure that the policies laid down by the councillors (equivalent of the local assembly members in Korea) was implemented, and that all their reasonable and lawful instructions were carried out.

Kim, B. J. (1995, pp.281-284) has explained the position of the heads of local governments in Korea in the light of the 'strong-mayor system' as follows: they are the representatives of their local government; their chief executive officers; the chief of national local government; and, local political leader. He further divided their role into six categories: initiators of policy issue and answers; policy drivers; restraints on the local assembly; a manager and executive; a manager of local government; and, a mediator of conflicting interest.

Norton (1991) and Wilson *at al* (1995) largely put an emphasis on the internal role of the chief executive in British local government as the 'courtesy' and 'political' functions are carried out by elected councillors, while Pohlmann (1992) and Kim, B.J. (1995) placed an importance on the relationships or roles concerned with outside organisation. These differences reflect deep connections with national cultures and traditions over the pattern of organising local government. The former views relate to an organisation in which the chief executive has overall responsibility for

administering and implementing council policies, and accordingly the elected councillors had the right of policy making. While the latter views related to the antagonistic system with a strong mayor, in which the head of the local government had a right in most policy-making and implementation activities and the local assembly had the right to check the executive office. It is interesting to note that recent changes in British legislation bring localities the opportunity to vote for systems more related to the latter views, but it is too early to say what the result will be.

Since the system of Korean local government belongs to the ‘strong mayor-council model’, an ‘antagonistic’ system, the local government head (mayor) takes charge of executive functions and decision-making, while the local assembly is in the charge of limited functions of control and inspection over the executive office. The role of head can be enumerated as follows: recognition of local policy problems and suggestion of solution; policy driver; restraint to local assembly; manager and executive; manager of local government; mediator of interest conflicts; and, connector with central government.

2.5.5. The Local Assembly

In the system of Korean local government, the role and power of the local assembly are relatively limited and weak. The most important roles are to check executive’s policy-making and implementation, to assess policies and to represent local residents’ opinions. Recently, their influences on the various conflicts related to regional development or environmental issues have been gradually increasing. Important extended roles for local assemblies, however, can include those of being a policy initiator, a guardian of local interests, a mediator for disputes and the solution of civil resentments and policy decisions.


2.6. The Finance of Local Government in Korea

Access to and the availability of self-supporting finance for local government is very important to the successful implementation of local autonomy in Korea. According to Kim, W. (1995, p.285), when local governments depend for revenues on central government, then the central government’s control over the business of each locality obscures the inherent strength of local government and the ability of people in those

cities to determine their own affairs. As a result, the issue of whether local governments are able secure their financial self-sufficiency has influenced successful implementation of local autonomy.

Local revenues in Korea can be largely divided into ‘self-revenues’ and ‘dependent revenues’. Self-revenues consist of local tax and non-tax revenues. Local governments can collect local taxes from residents under the Law on Local Tax, but because the tax rate and subject is set in the law, local governments have no discretion. Non-tax revenue sources include rents, commissions, donations, local loan bonds and the sale/lease of property. On the other hand, dependent revenues are transferred from the central government and are known as ‘money with strings’ (subsidiary local tax), and as ‘money without strings’ (local transfer funds) which contain subsidies for the support of matters central government has entrusted to local government. In the structure of national revenues, the portion of local revenues has rapidly increased since 1990, and was over 50 per cent of the whole national finance in 1994 (see Figure 2.3). The reasons for such an increase were the extension of sources of local taxation, the establishment of a local transfer fund and transfers from some national taxes to local taxes.

Figure 2-3. The portion of local government revenue



Sources: MOF (Ministry of Finance), *Local Financial Yearbook* (1992), Korea.

Although the level of self-supporting finance was quite low in the 1975-85 decade, the proportion of local revenues has greatly increased since 1985 (MOF, 1995). The financial self-sufficiency of local government was recognised as providing far less than the resources required to stimulate local economies in the

provinces, counties and wards. This financial inability of Korean local government can lead to central government intervention in local affairs. Another problem has been an imbalance of local revenues between different local governments, which has had a negative influence on local autonomy taking root. According to Moon (1998, p.91), ‘despite current efforts for local autonomy, many local governments are still constrained by a lack of financial and administrative autonomy.’

As shown in Table 2.4, the extent of financial self-sufficiency appears to be improving although not much. Local governments experienced a relatively stable increase from 57.7 per cent in 1987 to 69.6 per cent in 1992. The provinces and local cities have experienced the largest increases. Nevertheless, the financial need of the provinces and counties is so acute that none of them have sufficient financial means to deal with the implementation of their own policies.

Table 2-4. Degree of financial independence (%)

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Seoul	97.5	97.3	98.1	98.3	98.3	98.3
Large City	84.0	82.0	89.7	83.1	83.4	87.3
Province	32.7	36.4	32.1	33.6	45.1	49.0
Local City	57.8	53.7	68.3	69.2	71.5	74.7
County	25.9	26.8	27.2	28.5	27.3	29.3
Ward	-	-	-	46.0	50.0	51.2
Total	57.7	59.3	63.5	64.8	66.4	69.6

Sources: MOF, Local Financial Yearbook (1992)

2.7. The Changing Nature of Inter-Governmental Relations (IGRs) in Korea

2.7.1. The Definition of IGRs

According to Ashford (1982, p.4), ‘modern administrative government puts a premium on [an] ability to adjust policies in midstream, to redefine spatial units around new goals, and to adjust the size of local units to new functions’. The introduction of local autonomy in Korea has required changes in the whole of society towards a new paradigm in terms of local administration. The identification of appropriate roles between central and local governments is very important for understanding IGRs and intergovernmental conflicts in circumstances such as the transition to operational local autonomy in Korea. All levels of government needed to develop some flexibility and mutual adjustment in local administration. Inter-governmental relations (IGRs) were above all confronted with serious changes which

brought about changes in regional policies and developments as well as in the spatial planning system.

Scholars have defined different views about intergovernmental relations, but their fundamental notions are similar to each other. Anderson (1960) considered IGRs as ‘an important body of activities or interactions occurring between governmental units of all types and levels within the federal system’. Wright (1974 [in Rhodes, 1981, p.76]) explained, ‘the term IGRs alerts one to the multiple, behavioural, continuous and dynamic exchanges occurring between various officials in the political system’. In order to define IGRs, he identified five elements:

- (i) the multiplicity of relationships between all types of governments;
- (ii) the interactions between individuals, especially public officials;
- (iii) continuous and informal relations;
- (iv) the important role played by all public officials, politicians or administrators;
- (v) its policy component, that is, substantive policies such as financial issues.

In summary, IGRs can be defined as a multiplicity of relationships including financial, political and administrative behaviour and exchange occurring in the process of allocation function, resources and power among all units of government.

2.7.2. Models of IGRs

Wilson and Game (1995, pp.115-125) have suggested that IGRs can be divided into three types related to the resource-dependencies involved: (i) the ‘agency’ model; (ii) the ‘power-dependence’ model; and, (iii) the ‘partnership’ model. First, in the agency model, local authorities, as arms or agents of the centre, have a completely subordinate relationship to central government and they have little or no discretion in the task of implementing national policies. Secondly, the power-dependence model is an elaboration of the partnership model, which sees central government and local authorities as more or less co-equal partners. The concept of the partnership model tends to be left vague and imprecisely defined. This model postulates that both central departments and local authorities have resources which each can use against the other and against other organisations as well. It is a model that pays particular attention to bargaining.

The agency model contains some parallels to the 'stewardship' model presented by Chandler (1998). The central concept of the stewardship model lies in the sense that the 'steward' is delegated considerable authority by his master to order his estates. Chandler emphasised the ineffectiveness of agencies representing the world of local governments in their dealing with central government. He (pp.115-125) explained that 'the term "agent" is not entirely appropriate since the centre has always been prepared to allow local authorities a considerable measure of discretion'. However, while these models address the diversity of political activity within various levels of local governments, they largely ignore the policy-making process. Intergovernmental relations are so complex and diverse that no single model is able to provide a complete frame of reference for IGRs.

The contemporary era of public administration may be characterised as one of intense and increased citizen involvement which can become an important factor increasing conflicts in the process of policy making and implementation. In order to understand the process of public policy making and implementation, Henry (1995, pp.295-301) attempted to categorise six types: 'elitism'; 'groups'; 'systems'; 'institutionalist'; 'neo-institutionalist'; and, 'organised anarchy'.⁷⁾ After democratisation and localisation in Korea, the 'elite/mass' and 'traditional institutionalist' models have become more useful for understanding the process of policy making rather than the 'group' and 'system' models.

Ashford (1982, p.17) divided central-local relationships into two forms 'an administrative device for the provision of services in a given area, and a system of local independent bodies, each having its own right and duties', and established structures of relationships based on political and administrative systems to assess

⁷⁾ 1. The 'elite/mass' model may be among the most germane to public administrators. A policy-making/executing elite is able to act in an environment characterised by apathy and information distortion and thereby governs a largely passive mass.

2. The 'group model' is associated with the legislature. The polity is conceived of being a system of forces and pressures acting and reacting to one another in the formulation of public policy.

3. The 'system model' relies on concepts of information theory and conceives of the process as being essentially cyclical.


4. The 'traditional institutionalist' model focuses on the organisation chart of government.

5. A recent stream of public policy literature has surfaced that might best be described as 'neo-institutionalism', and it rests on a considerably more sophisticated analytical plane. This model is concerned chiefly with political institutions, but with an eye toward generating theoretical predictions about policy types related to the branch of government, the polity and typologies of political behaviours.

6. The 'organised anarchy' model includes problems, political and policy stream. When these streams meet, a public policy can result.

whether government is centralised or not (Figure 2.4). The diagram points to major linkages (channels of influence and communication) between levels of government, the political and administrative systems.

Figure 2-4. The sub-national system



Source: Ashford (1982), p.19.

According to the above model, before 1995 when local autonomy was implemented, the structure of IGRs in Korea could be recognised as originating from area **B**. After that, with the advance of localisation and democratisation, the pivotal role in local policy-making has moved from administration into politics, and from national government into local government. It implies that the role of local governments and the National Assembly will gradually increase in future policy-making.

Although there are many models of IGRs, most scholars consider that the topic has been seen simply in terms of centralisation versus localisation. If higher-level governments increase their power, it is assumed that this must be at the expense of lower-level governments. Nonetheless, it is entirely possible for both levels to increase their governing capacity simultaneously. Keating (1991, p.6), for instance, has argued that 'intergovernmental power relationships are reciprocal. Both higher level and local governments enjoy relative degrees of autonomy or dependence on each other, which vary across time and space'.

2.7.3. The Change of IGRs


Discussion of central-local relations in Britain in the 1950s and 1960s was based on the distinction between the 'agent' and 'partnership' models (Rhodes, 1981, p.14). With the advance of localisation, partnership relations have become emphasised among the models of IGRs. Nonetheless, it was also argued that local government was moving from being a partner to being an agent. In other words, pressures toward centralisation were gradually increasing. Rhodes addressed two reasons of centralisation, arguing that 'central government exercise increasingly tight control over capital expenditure...[and, that] central departments have acquired more powers of detailed control'. He (p.22) added, 'local authorities have been caught between the pressures of demand for improved local services, an inflexible tax base and the unpopularity of rate increase. Financial pressures seem to have been critical in tipping the balance of force to the centre.' The consequence of this ambiguity and confusion over the appropriate model assisted the development of a trend towards centralisation.

According to Cullingworth (1997, p.35), 'it used to be common to talk of central-local government relationships as constituting a partnership, but for several reasons, this no longer seems an appropriate description in Britain'. He explained his view of the reasons as follows: (i) the extent of the central government's responsibilities and its power of the purse; (ii) a fundamental change in the place of local government, that is, the provision of 'public goods' rather than re-distributive services; (iii) many functions have been removed from local government; and, (iv) drastic changes in the system of local taxation. This concern for finance is also relevant to the position in Korea.

In the context of Korea, three reasons can be understood for the tension between local autonomy and financial centralisation (see section 2.6): the national insistence on a high level of services; national restrictions on levels of capital expenditure; and, the growing proportion of funds found by central government. Nevertheless, despite the weaknesses inherent in the present structure of local government and the pressure of centralisation, democratisation and localisation have supported moves to decentralisation in IGRs in Korea. Such moves towards localisation imply a decentralisation of administration which can be secured through local autonomy.

The factors of democratisation and localisation have had an important influence on deciding the balance of relations between central and local governments in different countries. As seen in Figure 2.5, IGRs can be divided broadly into five groups based on these two dimensions: 'democratisation' and 'localisation'. In *A* group countries, democratisation based on parliamentary institutions and processes is highly-developed, but central government's power over local governments is relatively strong. Next, in *B* group countries, local autonomy is assured and political and administrative decentralisation is highly-developed. In sharp contrast to this, group *D* comprises autocratic countries such as an absolute monarchy or dictatorship where central government completely controls local governments. Local governments in group *E* countries have a relatively high degree of self administration, but political and administrative democracy are not allowed. With the advance of localisation and democratisation after the introduction of local autonomy, Korean local government may be in the middle of a transition from group *D* to group *B* in the position of a Group *C* type of country. Democratisation in politics and administration in Korea is not perfect yet, and the decentralisation of power is still at an early stage.

Figure 2-5. Position of local government



2.7.4. Intergovernmental Relations in Korea


1. *Functions by level of governments*

Rhodes (1981, p.20) has argued that IGRs are simultaneously 'rational', 'ambiguous' and 'confused'. The functional links between national and sub-national units of

government are rational within a given policy area. Actors in the same policy area at different levels of government share common interests in the development of that policy area. However, the links between policy areas are ambiguous and, when the system is viewed as a whole, the pattern of relationships can be regarded as confused.

In order to prevent this functional confusion, IGRs in Korea have been set out in the Korean Constitution and LAA 1988; these documents include an allocation of functions and powers between the national and local government levels. Central and local governments are legally assigned the right to operate in their own spheres of policy and administration and to formulate and implement their separate programmes without the intervention of other levels of government. Nevertheless, many informal ambiguities and confusions in roles and functions between central and local governments can be observed (Kwon, 1996, p.8) and in practice the formalities of autonomy for both levels are blurred. Such confusions appear to have often occurred in regional development and regional policies (Yun 1997. P.23). In this case, as Garson and Williams (1982, p.92) have mentioned, central government may be called on to step in to assist and intervene in local governments and their political subdivisions; however, such cases seldom involve strong directives or national guidelines which may in themselves deepen conflicts.

Figure 2-6. Distribution of roles among central and local governments



In undertaking its administrative duties, each level of government in Korea has its different functions and roles. Central government engages largely in national policy making, in enacting law and regulations and it supports local governments with

financial and technical assistance. Local governments have substantial service delivery responsibilities. Upper-tier local governments have responsibilities to make decision at the local level and to connect between central government and lower-tier, and they have a role to report over administrative matters to central government. While lower- tier local governments implement the policies decided by central government and the upper-tier, they also formulate policies related to the need of the residents within their jurisdictions (Figure 2.6).

2. Central - Local government

Under the strong presidential system, Korea had a centralised administration system, with a clear vertical/hierarchical relationship which continued in existence until 1995. The power of local government as well as civil society was also limited. The leading policy of promoting economic development over the last 30 years led to an ever more pervasive centralised control. This resulted in the erosion of local government's political and financial base and caused hierarchical IGRs to develop in most administrative fields. With the development of local autonomy from 1988 and 1995, these hierarchical relationships between central and local governments have begun to change basically, and new horizontal and new vertical relationships have begun to build up in the field of economic and spatial developments. Local government's discretion has gradually increased, and local government has also established an increasing responsibility over regional preferences and concerns. Nonetheless, the LAA 1988 still contains hierarchical factors to limit the degree of freedom of local governments and central government retains a broad power to control and manage local governments, because, as mentioned before (see section 2.7.3), there is an ambiguity and confusion in inter-governmental relations e.g. their role and function.

The basic structure and procedures of local autonomy have been introduced in Korea, but have not yet completely reached their full potential. Several factors have checked the full realisation of local autonomy: e.g. (i) the centralism of the national culture; (ii) the lack of local political consciousness; (iii) the conservative methods of the political system and the bureaucracy; (iv) local government's dual status (Local authority/ Local agency for central government); and, (v) the weakness of local finance discussed above.

3. Upper tier - Lower tier government

The structure of inter-local governments relations between upper and lower-tier local authorities in Korea have largely retained their traditional hierarchical relationships. The upper tier of local government has a statutory requirement to provide guidance and exercise control over the lower tier governments within its jurisdiction. These include checking and, if necessary, correcting the lower tiers' decisions and actions (LAA Sect. 156), the right to cancel or suspend of unjust decision (LAA Sect. 157), and the right to report on or inspect specific matters (LAA Sect.158).

According to the LAA 1988, the head of an upper-tier local government has a role in managing and supervising the lower-tiers within his/her jurisdiction. If the head of lower-tier makes an unreasonable decision or his/her dealing is prejudicial to the public interest, the head of upper-tier can ask the head of lower-tier to correct the error. The head of upper-tier can also cancel or put an end to the decision if the head of lower-tier does not correct the decision (LAA 1988, Sects. 157-1). In such ways, Korean IGRs still have some formal and substantial hierarchical aspects and the roles of local government have concentrated on being an agent for central government rather than one of being a partner. The discrepancy of theory and practice of local autonomy causes some confusion in IGRs and may lead to intergovernmental conflicts.

2.8. The Future of Local Autonomy in Korea

2.8.1. Problems to be Solved

There is a saying that 'in Korea, local autonomy is a level of 20 per cent.' Formally, local autonomy has been implemented, but authentic local autonomy has not made much progress in substantive terms. However, when local autonomy was fully introduced in 1995, local governments did not make sufficient preparations for its introduction. They had a lot of problems to do with the environment of and conditions within their localities. They inherited a system of excessive central government, an old-fashioned structure of local government and inadequate financial resources. The poor quality of the existing local public officials, with shortages of management skills, did not help the change (Moon, 1998, p.91). There was also insufficient experience of co-operation with social organisations. Despite these

adverse factors, local autonomy was introduced for political reasons especially because the previous ruling party was now out of power and the new government wanted to move the country more towards democratisation.

Although the idea of local autonomy has been introduced in Korea, central government still has powerful measures to control local governments, and local governments have only the right of self-administration within the limited sphere at their disposal. In order to extend the existing limited boundaries of autonomy and settle an authentic local self-government, there are many things to do in future, and some suggestions are stated below.

1. Reduction of central government power

Central government's power to control and guide local governments and its power of approval of local government actions should be reduced. In preparation for local autonomy and the reduction of central government powers, Moon (1998, p.89) has noted that '115 divisions [ministries, agencies etc.] in the government were eliminated from 1993 to 1994. The reform actions appeared to enhance political support from the public by implementing its initiatives for a clean and efficient government, and to increase political control over the bureaucracy by demonstrating the supremacy of presidential power'. However, the total numbers of staff employed in central government in 1997 was larger than in 1993, and central government has still intervened in the internal affairs of local governments much as before.

2. Enforcement of personnel management

Central government still possesses substantial rights of personnel management. These should belong to local governments directly, who should be able to also engage the full range of staff and organise the structure of personnel management for themselves.

3. Reinforcement of local government financial power

Local government finance in Korea is very infirm. Provinces and lower-tiers local government have received much financial assistance from central government because their self-supporting finance is low. For sound local autonomy to be implemented, a prerequisite is the improvement of the size and security of local government's independent revenues. In order to extend the revenue sources of local governments.

several measures can be considered e.g. establishment of new local charges; a rational re-distribution of revenue sources between central and local governments; equality of local government finances between the less well-resourced counties and provinces and the better off metropolitan areas and the capital region; a transfer of national taxes to local taxes.

4. Restructure and reform of local government

The current structure of local government reflects an era of centralising, hierarchical governmental organisation. With developments in communication and transportation, the structure is not suitable for Korea's new information-oriented and globalised society. A new structure of local government should be introduced to enhance the efficiency of public administration and promote the development of local economies. As mentioned before the current two-tier system often can cause conflicts between upper and lower-tier due to the obscurity of their functions and affairs and the supervisory functions of the upper tier (see section 2.7.4). It can be argued that the two-tier system should be transferred to a one-tier system. Along with this restructuring, the reorganisation of administrative jurisdictions should also be driven forward because of the change in the distribution of population and industry for the last forty years.

5. Self-legislative power

Local government in Korea has a limited right of 'self-legislation' and to make local regulations under the Korean Constitution (Art. 117-1) and LAA 1988 (Sect.15).⁸⁾ However, the right is limited by the requirement for permission to be received through central government administrative decrees and, in practice, is further restricted by legal reservations over the range of matters which may be covered. For complete local autonomy to be established, local governments should be able to exercise these legislative rights by themselves without the intervention of central government.

⁸⁾ The local assembly has the right of establishment of 'self legislation', and the head of local government has the right of establishment of 'local regulation'.

2.8.2. The Future Direction of Local Autonomy

Kim, B. J. (1995, pp.42-43) has mentioned four fundamental conditions for local autonomy to be put in practice in Korea for democracy and administrative efficiency. First, he suggests, local governments must have as large local autonomy powers as possible, such as, the enlargement of self-government administration and finance. Secondly, local governments must be ensured of their independence and autonomy not only from central government, but also from specific interest groups within their regions. This implies preventing minority interests from infringing on the majority's right, while also preventing the majority from infringing the minority's right. Thirdly, Kim suggests that local governments should develop their management abilities based on a spirit of enterprise. Under the local government competition for resources from central government and the private sector, local governments should equip their organisational systems and managerial abilities to maximise services for regional residents. Finally, he thinks, local governments' activities should be under the local control. Although local governments should free themselves from central government's control, they should not use their discretionary powers without local approval.

On the other hand, Moon (1998, p.91) has recommended some necessary measures for further decentralisation and more complete local autonomy. He considered it important to introduce local higher civil service examinations to recruit higher quality public officials for local governments. He also recommended the establishment of sound local finance and a redistribution of functions between central and local governments. The most important factor for a sound local autonomy is financial independence from central government. In addition, recognition of the independent right of personnel management and the employment security of high quality public officials will be prerequisites for the firmer establishment of local autonomy.

The reforms required can be achieved through the re-organisation of administrative systems and structures and the revision of legal systems. However, it is no less than important that local governments overcome the authority and centralism of administration, and that central government gets rid of its traditional bureaucratic and authoritative practices. Local autonomy was introduced with the conviction that it would emerge as the cornerstone of Korean democracy, but there are

still many problems to be solved. Nobody believes that these problems can be solved in a short time. It requires a considerable amount of perseverance and continuous concerns about local autonomy. Although the introduction of local autonomy brought many changes in the system of local government, and local government's power was extended (see Table 2.5), the establishment of an authentic autonomous culture depends upon the efforts of the Korean people.

Table 2-5. Local autonomy and the changing local government system

Contents	Before 1995	After 1995
Structure of local government	Two-tier system - Upper-tier: 15 (Metropolitan: 6; Province: 9) - Lower-tier: 260	Two-tier system - Upper-tier: 16 (Metropolitan: 7; Province: 9) - Lower-tier:
Head of local government	Appointed by central government	Elected by residents
Local assembly	Reserved	Established (1992)
Members of local assembly	-	Elected by residents
Role of local government	Agency of central government	Agency / independent authority
Inter-governmental relations	Authoritarian relations	Democratic pluralism
Contents	Before 1995	After 1995

2.9. Conclusions

In order to adopt a new and more democratic environment, in 1995 the Korean government carried out an administrative reform to downsize central government and reorganise its administrative structures. These efforts to introduce local autonomy were deeply concerned with the decentralisation of central government's political and administrative power and the cultivation of local governments' abilities in public administration. In spite of such efforts, Korean local governments still have many problems to overcome to achieve a real local autonomy, and these problems can often lead to conflicts with central government in administrative policies. Even after the implementation of local autonomy, local government is still being challenged by many administrative and economic matters relating to the welfare of local residents, by their own lack of financial sources and by their relationships with central government. These challenges include:

- excessive controls retained by central government;

- inadequate financial resources;
- the poor quality of public officials and shortages of management skills;
- inadequate means of co-operation with social organisations; and,
- an old fashioned organisational structure and unsatisfactory boundaries.

This research started from a recognition that the introduction of local autonomy in Korea brought about many conflicts related to regional development and environmental projects. Recent political changes (localisation and democratisation) in Korea have created a fertile soil for intergovernmental conflicts. The review of Korea's experience to date conducted in this chapter suggests a Korean-specific 'Premise' for an analytical framework (see section 7.2) which can be used later in this thesis in relation to more detailed case studies (see Chs. 8-10).

Premise E: The larger the degree of discretion and the greater the autonomy of organisations, the greater the likelihood of deep intergovernmental conflicts (see section 7.2).

To establish desirable IGRs, a fuller operational local autonomy and to overcome increasing intergovernmental conflicts, some methods may be suggested. These methods include: a reduction of central government powers (controls, guidance, approvals); the ability of local government to conduct their own personnel management; the reinforcement of local governments' financial powers; a restructuring and reform of local government functions and boundaries; and, new legislative powers for local administrative matters.

Following this starting point and the suggestion of an analytical Premise that political transition can produce intergovernmental conflicts, the literature review and discussion continues in Part II of the thesis to consider the general fields of conflict theory in Chapter 3, and, the methods for conflict resolution and the role of government in conflict resolution in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3. Conflict Theory

3.1. Introduction

Conflict is an everyday experience everywhere. As Minnery (1985, p.3) has stated, 'conflict is multi-dimensional and dynamic. It is ubiquitous in human affairs'. Actually, various types of conflicts occur in different situations: e.g. among the members of a family, between labour and management, political parties, religious groups, formal organisations, neighbours, classes and nations. Among these many kinds of conflicts, Minnery (1985, p.xiv) has suggested that those concerned with urban and regional developments fall 'within the general ambit of the human, or social, sciences'. These urban and regional conflicts may also belong mainly to the category of organisational conflict, because public organisations play an important role in preparing, implementing and controlling most spatial planning and developments. In the 1990s, many of the conflicts with which public administrators were confronted, became much more complex, multifaceted and intense. They cannot be managed well without both an adequate understanding of conflict and various skills for its resolution.

In this chapter, conflict theory concerned with organisational conflict is discussed as the stage prior to discussing the more specific subject of conflict resolution (see Ch.4). The first section deals with the general concept and function of conflict. In the second section the types of organisational conflict that have frequently taken place in the process of regional developments are reviewed. From the literature reviewed, attention is focused on two particularly important contributions that are central to this discussion: Pondy's model of conflict types and Schmidt's conflict types. Finally, the causes and process of organisational conflict are examined.

3.2. The Definition and Classification of Conflict

3.2.1. The Definition of Conflict

Conflict is a general feature of human activity, and it is inevitable in organisations due to the complexity and interdependence of organisational life. The complexity and variety of social conflict mean that the literature on conflict theory and its management contain various definitions. Most literature treats conflict as a negative pathological condition characterised by the lack of co-operation, hostility, struggle, breakdown and

destruction, and accordingly such definitions take a negative point of view of conflict and its functions.

In terms of definitions which focus on the negative nature of conflict, Deutsch (1969, pp.7-8), in an early contribution, stated that 'a conflict exists whenever incompatible activities occur' and defined it as 'an action which is incompatible with another action, prevents, obstructs, interferes with, injures, or in some way makes it less likely or less effective'. In the modern systematic study of conflict, Rapoport (1974, p.8) argued that 'conflict may be no more than a word that expresses our interpretation of a multitude of widely disparate phenomena governed by entirely different principles'. Himes (1980 [in Lan. 1998, p.28]) stated, 'conflict is said to exist when there is a manifest purpose in the struggle for status, power, and resources', and Blalock (1989 [in Lan, 1998. p.28]) regarded conflict as 'the overt hostility between two or more parties'. Klausner and Groves (1994, p.353) explained, 'the concept of conflict denotes some type of incompatibility, disagreement, and opposition among members or groups within an organisation'. Among the many definitions, Nicholson (1970, p.2) gave one which was helpful to this researcher: 'a conflict exists when two people wish to carry out acts which are mutually inconsistent ... they may both want to do the same thing or they want to do different things where the different things are mutually incompatible'.

On the other hand, some authors concentrate on the constructive function of conflict and attach an importance to the dynamic nature and management of conflict. Schmidt and Kochan (1986, p.363), for instance, criticised definitions of conflict which tended to rely on value-laden terminology, whereas they thought a definition should be devoid of value perspective to be useful for analytic purposes. In their scheme they defined 'conflict' as referring 'to overt behaviour arising out of a process in which one unit seeks the advancement of its own interests in relationships with the others'. Buntz and Radin (1983, p.404) defined conflict as conscious opposing behaviour between parties and explained that such behaviour involved deliberate interference by parties who were attempting to change their positions relative to one another.

According to each of these definitions, Blalock, Himes, Birckman and Boulding concentrated on the situation of incompatibility among parties and negative aspects of conflict, while Schmidt and Kochan, Buntz and Radin focused on overt conflictual behaviour in the dynamic process of conflict. In spite of the difference of their

concerns and points, as seen above, most definitions of conflict are similar to each other, using words including ‘desperate’, ‘hostile’, ‘struggle’, ‘incompatible’, ‘disagreement’, ‘opposing’ and ‘inconsistent’. Conflict implies that the situation of incompatibility surrounding certain issues including resources and position should exist and manifest struggling behaviour should also take place. As a consequence, conflict can be defined as a situation in which parties concerned with a certain issue have realised the impossibility of gaining their goal, and thus there is the manifest struggle for each party’s status, power and resources. If a party to a conflict has a negative perception (such as can be found in terms such as, ‘desperate’, ‘struggle’, ‘disagreement’ and ‘opposing’), they will tend to concentrate on negative behaviour (e.g. including even violent action) or negative strategies such as ‘disregarding the other party altogether’ and ‘conquest’. As a result, negative perception and behaviour may have an influence on increasing the intensity of conflict and this suggests an analytical Premise.

Premise C: The more negative the perception of conflict and the more violent the pattern of conflictual behaviour, the deeper the degree of conflict (see section 7.2).

(N.B. The alphabetical identification for the Premises is given according to the sequence established overall in Chapter 7, section 2, and not in the order in which they were developed in Chs.3 and 4)

Usually ‘dispute’ and ‘conflict’ are treated as similar terms. However, some differences can be identified between these words. ‘Conflict’ includes an internal contradiction and psychological confrontation of individual as well as conflict between persons, organisations and masses. However, ‘dispute’ means only social conflict to influence mutually. Conflict may include a situation of incompatibility between the parties concerned (i.e. ‘latent conflict’), but dispute implies that a conflict appears on the outside (i.e. ‘manifest conflict’). The term dispute also implies that an obstacle to the achievement of a certain purpose continues. Drawing on these different interpretations, it can be concluded that conflict includes dispute in a broad sense. However, it seems that most scholars do not make a strict distinction between the terms and, accordingly, this study uses the terms ‘conflict’ and ‘dispute’ interchangeably.

3.2.2. Competition and Conflict

There has been much debate and confusion over the terms 'competition' and 'conflict' (Boulding, 1962; Schmidt and Kochan, 1986; Seiler, 1963; Deutsch, 1969; Fink, 1968). Boulding (1962, pp.4-5) made one of the first distinctions, writing that 'competition in its broadest sense exists when any potential positions of two behaviour units are mutually incompatible. This is a broader concept than conflict. Whereas all cases of conflict involve competition.' He continued, 'conflict may be defined as a situation of competition in which the parties are aware of the incompatibility of potential future positions and in which each party wishes to occupy a position that is incompatible with the wishes of the other'. Seiler (1963, pp.122-123) argued that 'the essential difference between competition and conflict is in the realm of interference, or blocking activities'. In competition, resources may be shared or independent, but the activities of the parties are not perceived by the party's member to be *interdependent* [author's emphasis]. Therefore, parties do not perceive the opportunity for interference. Consequently, competition is the parallel striving of the parties toward their respective goals'.

Fink (1968, p.422) made a distinction between the two concepts by considering the extent of regulation and the participants' behaviour. He described, 'the difference as one of parallel striving (competition) versus mutual interference (conflict) among parties trying to reach a position in which simultaneous occupancy is not perceived to be possible ..., competition is reserved for actions which occur within a set of established rules ..., and conflict is seen as either unregulated interaction, or as the result of a violation of the rules'. Deutsch (1969, p.12) also pointed out that 'the terms, competition and conflict, are often used synonymously or interchangeably due to a basic confusion about difference of the two behaviours'.

In summary, it seems that Boulding concentrated on the situation of potential positions, while Fink, Selier and Deutsch focussed on the difference of process of actors' behaviour. Schmidt and Kochan (1986, pp.360-361) categorised these various opinions into three lines of thought. The first one treats conflict as a subset of competition, that is, competition is a broader concept than conflict. The second one stresses the extent to which behaviour is regulated. Competition involves established rules or institutionalised norms, but conflict is unregulated. The third treats competition and conflict as behaviourally distinctive phenomena. They suggested that

behavioural difference is analogous to the difference between participants in a race and a fight. The former, which is a characteristic of competition the participants do nothing to obstruct the efforts of their opponents, while the latter, behaviour is centred on blocking the efforts of one's opponents to reach their goal.

In conclusion, the term 'conflict' has been usually used to describe a state, while 'competition' has been used to describe a process. Competition is also a broader concept than conflict. Many scholars have tried to distinguish between the two conceptions and making this distinction can help contribute to an understanding of the characteristics of conflict and the adoption of strategies for resolving relevant problems.

3.2.3. Function and Dysfunction of Conflict

The output of conflict may be regarded as 'functional' or 'dysfunctional' for part, all, or none of the parties involved. Traditionally, there is a tendency to view conflict as negative or destructive in social and international conflicts. Nonetheless, as Deutsch (1969, p7) mentioned, 'it has been long recognised that conflict is not inherently pathological or destructive'. Considering how discussion of the nature of conflict can be clarified by the value laden terms 'constructive' and 'destructive', Deutsch (1969, p.10) has suggested that 'a conflict clearly has destructive consequences if the participants in it are dissatisfied with the outcomes and all feel they have lost as a result of the conflict. Similarly a conflict has productive consequences if all the participants are satisfied with the outcome and feel they have gained as a result of the conflict'.

However, most actual conflicts may be resolved with some satisfied and some dissatisfied parties. Accordingly, most conflicts have aspects of being both 'destructive' and 'productive'. This affords a basis for the application of the ethical value 'the greatest good for the greatest number', but it is not easy to identify and measure satisfaction vs. dissatisfaction, and, gains vs. losses in practical situations.

1. *The destructive function*

As mentioned above, scholars' views about the impact of conflict differ. One regards conflict as having potentially destructive effects. According to this view, the most important task of conflict study is to search for reasonable means to ameliorate or remove the cause of conflict (Rapoport, 1962; Fisher, 1964; Frank, 1968, [in Lan, 1997, p.29]). Deutsch (1969, p.18) has noted that: 'a destructive conflict is characterised by

a tendency to expand and to escalate...Expansion occurs along the various dimensions of conflict; the size and number of the issues involved; number of motives and participants; the size and number of the principles and precedents; the costs that the participants are willing to bear; the number of norms of moral conduct; and the intensity of negative attitudes’.

The processes in the intensification of conflict may be said to create a ‘Gresham’s law of conflict’. The harmful and dangerous elements drive out those who would keep the dispute within bounds. Deutsch (p.19) continued: ‘consequently, according to the expansion of the scope of conflict, there is an increasing reliance upon a strategy of power and tactics of threat, coercion and deception. Such a destructive conflict can also be aborted before running its full course if there is a strong enough community or strong third parties who can compel the conflicting parties toward their violence’.

In spite of these destructive qualities, in terms of organisational and social systems, they are not the only relevant aspects. Stern (1976, p.369), for instance, has argued that ‘for any given socio-economic system, some degree of conflict may be highly functional for the long-term viability of the system. At some points, excessive conflict becomes dysfunctional and produces adverse effects on the system. Conflict should thus not be treated as all good or all bad’.

2. The constructive function

Another view regards conflict as an inevitable phenomenon with either positive or constructive potential (Singleton and Henkin, 1989; Buntz and Radin, 1983; Coser, 1956; Simmel, 1955; Stern, 1976; Klausner and Groves, 1994). Simmel (1955, p.14) has noticed that ‘social phenomena appear in a new light when seen from the angle of this sociologically positive character of conflict’, and Coser (1956, p.151) stated that ‘conflict within a group may help to establish or to re-establish unity and cohesion where it has been threatened by hostile and antagonistic feelings’.¹⁾

¹⁾ Deutsch (1969, p.152-154) argues that conflict has at least the following positive functions: first, conflict helps to establish group and personal identities; second, it forces one to test and assess oneself. It stimulates interest and curiosity in others and promotes innovation, change, and progress in groups that are driven to seek a competitive advantage in the conflict; third, conflict is likely to have stabilising and integrative functions for relationships in loosely structured organisation; fourth, conflict is a useful condition for individuals to enjoy freedom to choose their own course of action.

Deutsch (1969, p.19) stressed the positive functions of conflict, commenting that 'many discussions of conflict cast it in the role of the villain as though conflict *per se* were the cause of psychology, social disorder, war'. Singleton and Henkin (1989, pp.7-8) delineated five possible positive functions of conflict for organisations: 'unifying', 'preserving', 'integrative', 'growth' and 'problem-solving functions'.²⁾

If parties value change, creativity, openness of process, honesty, and the like, they will be better placed to appreciate the positive aspects of conflict. The productive consequences of conflict could involve, for instance, the stimulation of creativity, the energising of individuals to activity, changes in power relationships, the provision of opportunities for debate and learning, and the reinforcement of institutional loyalty and commitment through a clarification of goals and values (Buntz and Radin, 1983, p.404).

As mentioned above, conflict can possibly create positive features, such as, discussion, understanding respect and reconciliation. Klausner and Groves (1994, p.367) has argued that 'organisational conflict can be the catalyst for a variety of favourable changes that range from better working conditions to increased productivity, sales or morale'. For the promotion of positive changes, they suggest, first it may impel management to reconsider current procedures, policies and structures. Secondly, it may benefit an organisation to stimulate member to do their best and to produce creative ideas. Conflict also can serve as a safety valve for pent-up frustrations. Therefore, they (p.369) has concluded, the 'consequences [of conflict] may be viewed as positive or negative, or as is most likely to be the case some combination of both. The consequences mostly depend upon the perspective of the person doing the viewing'. Thus it may be concluded that the participants' perceptions over a conflict have an influence on the intensity of conflict.

In relation to organisational conflicts, many scholars have indicated that conflict might result in a variety of positive outcomes within an organisation; that is, they have argued that a positive outcome of conflict was dominant in organisational

²⁾ . Unifying function: conflict makes it possible to get members involved and help to build trust, team spirit and commitment.
 . Preserving function: it involves the confronting of issues, curtailment of hostility, airing of minor antagonisms, and venting of frustrations.
 . Integrative function: it involves the creation of norms, distribution of power, promotion of accommodations between groups and job satisfaction.
 . Growth function: it involves creative ideas, innovation, initiative and job performance.
 . Problem-solving function: it is concerned with focussing attention on problems, increasing the number of alternative solution considered, increasing the exchange of information and improving the quality of the problem-solving process (Deutsch, 1969, p.7).

conflict. Accordingly, in terminology, they preferred to use ‘conflict management’ to ‘conflict resolution’. Resolution has an air of finality, which may imply a view ‘against’ conflict, while conflict management suggests that conflict remains on the potentially creative and positive side of an invisible, but critically an important barrier. Drawing on the review of the discussion in the literature on the productive functions of conflict, it has been proposed that a party (parties) can bring about a conflict for helping to build team spirit and commitment (Deutsch, 1969, p.7), or, for reinforcing an institutional loyalty (Buntz and Radin, 1983, p.404). Taking the analysis a step further, Park (1999, p.33) argued that an ‘unstructured system of parties and internal discord can influence on increasing the intensity of conflict’. In other words, if a party to a conflict is not internally well structured or their internal cohesion is weak, then such a party has a tendency to be more in dispute with another party concerned with the same conflict issue. This is the subject of Premise D.

Premise D: The more well-structured and the more cohesive the party, the lower the degree of conflict (see section 7.2).

Although many scholars place emphasis on the positive function of conflict, if the conflict goes beyond an appropriate level or drags on without progress, the result will have a serious effect on the motivation, energy and efficiency of organisation. It is almost inevitable that a favourable outcome of the conflict will also be accompanied by an unfavourable outcome. This is why conflict management is necessary. The major concern of conflict management is how to control destructive conflicts and how to stimulate constructive conflicts. The positive opportunities that conflict provides are further discussed in Chapter 4 on ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)’. When conflict is being resolved through the ADR approach, the approach may accentuate the need for sound scientific information and a broad knowledge base.

3.3. Types of Organisational Conflict

3.3.1. General Classification of Organisational Conflict

Conflict theory and research are primarily concerned with disagreements about ends, but conflicts can just as easily occur about means, even when ends are shared. In this

context, the distinction between means and ends can provide a framework for examining various types of conflict that can occur in organisational groups. Public organisational conflict may occur at different levels. 'It may be interpersonal (between individuals within the organisation), inter-group or inter-division (among two or more groups or units within the organisation), or inter-organisational' suggest Klausner and Groves (1994, p.355).

According to the relations of disputants, organisational conflict can be divided into various types. Katz (1964, p.107) divided conflict into three categories: functional conflict induced by various subsystems within the organisation; struggle between functional units in direct competition with one another; and, hierarchical conflicts stemming from interest group struggles. Pondy (1967, p.296) proposed three conceptual models of organisational conflict through classifying the relationships between actors (disputants). These were: the 'bargaining model,' which is concerned with interest groups in competition for limited resources; the 'bureaucratic model', which deals with vertical relations of authority and the needs to control; and, the 'systems model', which deals with functional relations and the need to co-ordinate.

Since Pondy's models concentrate on the relationships between the actors (parties) in an organisational conflict, it can be a useful way to examine the nature of public administrative conflict closely and to understand conflicts between inter or intra-organisations. His classification is very similar to Katz's three types. Buntz and Radin (1983, pp.404-405) also used Pondy's model in their study *Managing inter-governmental conflict: the human services*.

Schmidt and Kochan (1986, p.366) also divided conflict into three types. Their typology is based on the location of the blocking (intervening) activity. One implication of this typology is that there may be a need to devise specific strategies for resolving different types of conflict. The first actual blocking behaviour identified by Smith and Kochan can occur at the 'resource attainment stage', which is concerned with conflict between the parties in the process of fulfilling the team goals of having the maximum number of resources or number of facilities. The next blocking behaviour takes place at the 'stage of interdependence of activity', in which the goals are incompatible and resources can be either shared or not, while the activities are interdependent. Finally, blocking behaviour occurs at two further stages, the point of resources sharing, and, the activity stage.

More recently, Lan (1997, p.30) has classified organisational conflicts into four types based on the structural degree of parties in dispute: (i) 'unstructured'; (ii) 'partially structured'; (iii) 'fully structured'; and, (iv) 'revolutionary conflicts'. Most public administrative issues fall in the category of (ii) 'partially structured' conflict with norms, rules, and regulations constraining some of the behaviour, while leaving freedom of choice over other issues to the parties concerned.

Jhen (1995, p.258; 1997, p.531) identified two types of conflict: 'relationship conflict' which is related to interpersonal interactions; and, 'task conflict' in which individuals pursue specific gains. He (1997) stated, 'the former conflict exists when there are interpersonal incompatibilities among group members...while the latter exists when there are disagreements among group members about the content of the task being performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas, and opinions'. This method of conflict type is useful for examining a correlation between conflictual behaviour and productivity within a group.

Among these classifications, the researcher considers that Pondy's model based on actors' relationships as the most important factor in conflict, expresses the character of organisational conflict best of all. Since the aspects of conflict progress and strategies for conflict resolution are different from each other according to their character patterns, this classification is useful for establishing the strategies and understanding governmental conflicts. Schmidt and Kochan's conflict types concentrate on the actual blocking behaviours that characterise conflict and show dynamic progress. They are thus well suited to analyse the process of conflict and disputants' activity. Therefore, these two models (Pondy's, and, Schmidt's) may frame a positive perspective that will guide strategies for improving conflict resolution.

3.3.2. Classification of Conflict in Regional Development

The various classifications of conflict type that can be used for defining social organisational conflicts have been discussed above. The classification of conflict plays an important part in providing a device for conflict settlement as well as in understanding an intrinsic attribute of conflict. Now the review considers which classifications are useful for spatial/regional or environmental conflicts. It examines conflict types by 'content', by 'disputants', and by 'characteristics', and includes those often used in intergovernmental conflicts related to regional development.

Conflicts over regional development issues are different in character from other conflicts, because the period of urban and regional development takes longer to settle and the procedure is severely graded and distinct. The most distinctive point is that spatial conflict is based on a certain place or the location of an existing or proposed facility. Generally conflicts related to regional development have complex characteristics, so the methods of classification are very varied according to the purpose of analysis and research. As the most universal method found, classifications of conflict type by disputants and by content are examined first.

1. *Types by content*

Conflict of interest largely occurs between residents or communities, while conflict of jurisdiction takes place between governments. A conflict of interest does not explain an active behavioural conflict, because as Axelrod (1970, p.13) suggests 'both sides could benefit by accepting some compromise solution which would enable them to restore full co-operation in matters affecting their common interests, thereby saving the costs of an active conflict'. In Korean terms, since the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, conflicts of jurisdiction related to authority and responsibility of local government have been increasing. In relation to regional development, however, conflicts of interest or location often grow towards an active behavioural conflict because there can be a wide difference between disputants in the cost-benefit distribution or in environmental implications. The greater the conflict of interest, the more likely is conflictual behaviour. This conclusion suggests another specific analytical Premise for further case study investigation.

Premise A: The larger the difference of interest, the deeper the degree of conflict (see section 7.2).

Conflict typologies established by reference to the contents (subject issues) of conflicts can be divided into 'conflicts of interest', which are relevant to socio-economic interests, and, 'conflicts of jurisdiction', which are related to the reversion of authority and responsibility. According to Kim (1997, p.31), the former are concerned with local opposition over land use, the location of a facility and the cost of expenses, while, the latter is related to cost sharing, sanction, approval and management.

Sometimes, the cost sharing of public facilities can be included in the conflict of interest type (Table 3.1).

Table 3-1. Classification of conflict by contents

Patterns	Classification of conflict
<u>Conflict of interest</u> (Locational conflict)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - opposition to unwanted facilities - competition of desirable facilities and land use - land use for environmental protection and of public interest purpose - local opposition of development in neighbouring community
<u>Conflict of jurisdiction</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - cost sharing of public facility - management of public facilities - co-operation of construction and building permission

2. Types by disputants

The second method is classification by the different disputants who are involved in a conflict, where Kim (1997) has recently made a very helpful contribution relevant to the study of Korean circumstances. This can be useful for identifying the role of each government involved in an intergovernmental conflict which is the particular interest of this study. The disputant-based typology (Table 3.2) divides into; (i) those conflicts between governments; (ii) those between government and residents; and, (iii) those among residents. The first, intergovernmental conflict type involves vertical conflicts that can be sub-divided into three classes, and horizontal conflicts that can be sub-divided into two classes. The second main type in this classification is a conflict between government and residents (or non-governmental organisations: NGOs), and finally, the third main type is a conflict among residents (or between residents and NGOs).

Kim (1997, p.18) has argued that the participation of local residents or social organisations (NGOs) in intergovernmental conflicts in Korea could lead to more complex situations, because their interaction could introduce the complexity of relations between parties and the wide variety of conflict issues. The greater the number of disputants involved in a conflict, the more difficult is the adjustment of conflicting interests. In Korea many conflicts related to regional developments or policies have usually taken place between public organisations or between organisations and residents, but after the introduction of local autonomy, intergovernmental conflicts count for the most part.

Table 3-2. Classification of conflict by disputants in regional development

Pattern	Class	Sub-class
Inter-government	Vertical conflict	Central government-upper tier Central government-lower tier Upper – lower tier
	Horizontal conflict	Upper – upper tier Lower – lower tier
Government – resident	Government – resident	Central government – resident Upper tier – resident Lower tier – resident
	Government – NGO	Central government – NGO Upper tier – NGO Lower tier – NGO
Resident – resident	Non- governmental organisation (NGO) – resident Resident-resident	

Source: Based upon Kim and Cha (1997), pp.29-30

Depending on the purpose of analysis, the conflict type likely to occur in the process of carrying forward regional developments and policies can be classified in different ways as discussed above. However, it is not so easy in practice as in theory to classify conflicts. Lan (1997, p.30) has recently argued that ‘most of the conflicts that public administrators encounter are the mixed types, or they can be turned into the mixed types by offering alternative compensation for the losing party’. Thus, some conflicts can possess the character of two types, and can shift from one type to other type as the situation of the conflict changes (e.g. change of issues, time and of disputants etc.). Conflicts over regional development issues may be more prolonged than conflicts of other fields, thereby transformation of conflict type often ensues, and aspects of conflict can become more complicated.³⁾ This change can occur through the interference of other party at stage of resource attainment and distribution or at stage of activity.

3.4. Causes of Conflict

3.4.1 General Causes

The causes of conflict are various and can happen anywhere. Conflicts can exist whenever incompatible activities between parties occur. This review now considers

³⁾ The conflict that is called ‘the Bodely barricades’, took place in a small residential area lying to the north of a large industrial city in England in the 1970s. The issue was sparked by a proposal to improve the intersection of a main road. The battle was basically between private householders and public tenants. After the fragmentation of private interests, the actual conflict centred among the owners themselves so that the role of the Council was changed from enemy to arbiter (Robson, 1986, pp. 58-60). This case shows an example that as time passes, the role of concerned disputants can change completely.

the origins of various social conflicts. According to Deutsch (1969, p.8), 'a conflict may arise from differences in information or belief: it may reflect differences in interests, desires or values; it may occur as a result of a scarcity of resources such as money, time, space, position; or it may reflect a rivalry in which one person tries to outdo or undo the other'. Klausner and Gloves (1994, p.355) have argued that 'conflict can break out from disagreement and opposition involving cognition, emotions, behaviours, and goals and the means to achieve them'.

The perception of goal incompatibility is a necessary precondition for either conflict or competition. It means that the goal attainment by one party cannot be achieved without diminishing or preventing the other's goal attainment under the same situation or with equivalent outcomes. Under the constant-sum game, goal incompatibility among parties inevitably leads to a conflict. The existence of incompatible goals motivates conflict, but says nothing about perceived ability to engage in it.

Schmidt and Kochan (1986, pp.364-365) have suggested three preconditions of conflict. The first necessary precondition is the perception of goal incompatibility. The second factor is the availability of resources for the parties involved. The more dependence on a common source that is perceived, the more the party will tend to view their success (goal attainment) as contingent on each other's behaviour. Finally, the interdependence of activities among the parties is important factor for understanding the situation that leads to a conflict among decision-making parties. The pursuit of participants' goals, after the necessary resources have been acquired, is defined as the 'activity stage'. The interdependence of activities where goals are incompatible presents the occasion for potential conflict. Here, it can be presumed that a combination of 'interdependent activity' and 'resources shared' cannot lead to a manifest conflict, but a combination of goal incompatibility and interdependent activity, or, goal incompatibility and resources shared may result in a conflict. The reason is that the goal incompatibility which motivates a conflict between parties, is treated as a prerequisite for conflict. Similarly, goal incompatibility is a critical factor for a conflict, and when it combines with other factors (such as resources shared and interdependent activity) a conflict becomes manifest.

3.4.2. Causes of Intergovernmental Conflicts (IGCs)

Inter or intra-organisational conflict is a common phenomenon. Buntz and Radin (1983, p.406) expressed the view that ‘conflict is inherent in the drive for autonomy on the part of actors and institutions involved’ and Karen (1988, p.256) described ‘conflict is inevitable in groups and organisations due to the complexity and interdependence of organisational life’. According to Charles Ferguson (1986 [in Klausner and Groves, 1994, p.356]), ‘varying life experiences have equipped all of us to see, feel, and appraise things more or less differently, inevitably producing conflict. In addition, the consequences of decisions and policies within organisations affect various groups and sub-units within an organisation in different ways, thus produce opposing positions of the various groups.’ In this way, organisational conflicts are always in existence, because of the intrinsic attribute of the constitution in organisation and structure. As Minnery (1985, p.89) has explained, ‘conflict within organisations may occur over scarce resources, or over jurisdiction; conflict between organisations are common, where the organisations have different goals; conflict with organisations (such as local authorities) by individuals and informal organisations are also common over conservation and environmental issues’.

Examining the direct causes of conflict (Johns, 1983) drew attention to scarcity as a common feature: ‘Scarcity has a way of turning latent or disguised conflict into overt conflict (p.418), a view confirmed later by Minnery’s (1990, p.200) view that ‘scarcity of resources and conditions of competition can produce organisational conflict’. Baron (1985, p.186) argued that restrictions on access to information might be a source of conflict, and that the lack of official communication might lead to a conflict as informal and rumoured information is substituted. Klausner and Groves (1994, p.356) stated that ‘the factors ⁴⁾ that cause organisational conflict are not only psychological or interpersonal; they also can be social structures, stemming from organisational features or the social context in which the organisations operate’. They (p.360) continued that ‘since organisations have a limited amount of resources

⁴⁾ Psychological factors involve aspects of an individual’s personality, while social inter-act ional factors include mis-attributions of motives or behaviour, faulty communications patterns, prejudice and discrimination toward individuals holding certain ascribed status, negative residues of past experiences, erroneous causal accounts or explanations for behaviour, dissimilarity of persons and perceptions of unfairness or inequity. Social structural factors would include the hierarchical or authority relationships, the division of labour, the span of control, the communication patterns, the degree of centralisation within the organisation, statues with their role requirements and demands, and decision-making patterns (Klausner and Groves, 1994, pp.355-360).

available to allocate the various units, and workers in each division want as large a slice of the resource pie as possible, conflict among units is likely’.

Buntz and Radin (1983, pp.404-407) have explained that the source of intergovernmental conflicts (IGCs) was generally an issue that can be characterised as arising due to some structural condition or process event such as political changes. IGCs in human service planning frequently arise out of a discrepancy between the demands on states and their skill or resource capabilities. In relation to regional development or location, Amour (1991, [in Kim, 1995, p. 25]) divided the causes of conflict into three categories: (i) an economic factor related to the equity of cost-benefit; (ii) a technical factor such as a negative effect or the danger of unwanted facilities; and, (iii) political factors concerned with the elimination of the opponent.

In relation to the problem of siting a development project or facility site, Amour (1991, p.10) specified three causes: the ‘not in my back yard’ (NIMBY) syndrome; poor public relations; and, a flawed siting process. Usually, he considered, conflict of interest arises from the scarcity of some resources, and conflicts of value or beliefs come from these differences of values to establish a conflict. The former source emphasises the similarity of the contestants, their common needs and aspirations. The latter source is based on a disagreement. The parties do not value the same things and tend to keep apart.

As mentioned above, the causes of organisational conflict are explained and classified diversely according to different scholars’ interests, points of view and the development of organised studies and some experience. However, the causes of organisational conflict can be summarised as follows: scarce resources, an incompatible goal, organisational relationships, and, jurisdiction. Among these causes, resource sharing and activity interdependent between units (local governments) in wider-area developments may be inevitable, therefore the occurrence of conflict can depend on the degree of goal incompatibility. Hence under the potential situation of resource-sharing and interdependent activities, in order to reduce and prevent such conflicts, the establishment of common goals and consensus building between the parties are very important, and they may be the only method for the reduction of conflict.

3.5. The Process of Conflict

Conflict can be more readily understood if it is considered as a dynamic process. Each conflict can be thought of as having a life cycle. Like an organism, it is conceived and born, it flourishes for a while, and then certain processes bring it to an end under the influences of the surrounding environment. However, all conflicts do not develop through such phases. At the 'conception' stage', proper measures can be brought into play to prevent the birth of conflicts.⁵⁾ A direct negotiation or consensus-building process at the issue stage can often interrupt to expand over the flourishing conflict.

Wright, in a very early contribution, (1951, pp.193-7) divided conflict into four stages: (i) inconsistencies (emerge); (ii) social tensions (condition); (iii) conflict (process); and, (iv) open violence. Stage (iv) may seem unusual for most organisational disputes, but may in fact be an outcome where residents and social groups become involved as parties to a dispute and feel themselves excluded from consideration by the main (intergovernmental parties). Kenneth Thomas (1976, p.40), in another early contribution, stated that conflict is best viewed as a process rather than a static phenomenon, and he also similarly divided this process into four stages. These comprised: (i) frustration; (ii) conceptualisation; (iii) behaviour; and (iv) outcomes. At first, parties are frustrated because one of their goals is not being realised. At the next stage, parties conceptualise the situation, define it as an issue, and consider alternative actions and their outcomes. After these two stages, the parties determine their conflict behaviour. The last stage involves the outcomes of conflict episode.

As mentioned above, conflict usually goes through several phases or stages from the beginning to the end. The first phase is the emergence of an *issue*, which the parties involved perceive the point at issue and show an early reaction from their point of view to a certain issue. At this stage, if the discord among the parties continues without solving the conflict, the situation develops from an *issue* to a *dispute*, which defines the start of the main phase of conflict. Theories and methods of conflict resolution are largely applied this phase. If there is also no resolution of a conflict in this phase, the dispute moves into the state of *impasse*. The opportunity for resolution of the dispute becomes narrower, and the situation may become worse. This phase is

⁵⁾ For example, the 'collaborative process' as a measure of conflict management has been used recently in the UK to prevent the development of conflicts concerned with environmental disputes (Ingram 1998, p. 113).

the area where dissatisfaction about an agreed set of rules or situation of bargaining leads to parties' complete disintegration, and open hostility breaks out.

A hostile behaviour pattern expressed in a conflict is often caused by the uncertainties of the situation, because hostility is often the product of frustration and fear and frustration are often the product of uncertainty. Such uncertainty may often be caused by insufficient or distorted information. In this context, Rangarajan (1985, p.30) explained that hostility usually followed two courses:

- 1) Dissatisfaction → Frustration → Desperation → Violence;
- 2) Dependence → Vulnerability → Fear → Violence.

From these courses, the influence of communication emerges as an important factor related to the mutual trust between parties to a conflict. Such trust is deeply related to the intensity of conflict and this relationship provides the basis for suggesting another Premise for later detailed investigation.


Premise B: The higher the degree of distrust and the more distorted the communication between parties, the deeper the degree of conflict (see section 7.2).

Conflict relationships between two or more individuals (parties) can be analysed as a sequence of conflict episodes as discussed above and the characteristics of the episodes can be more specifically defined. 'Each conflict episode begins with conditions characterised by certain conflict potentials' argued Pondy (1962, p.296). In the same sense that a decision can be thought of as a process of gradual commitment to a course of action, a conflict episode can be thought of as a gradual escalation to a state of disorder. If choice is the climax of a decision, then by analogy, open war (in inter-state disputes) or aggression is the climax of a conflict episode. However, this does not mean that every conflict episode necessarily passes through every stage to open aggression. In some cases, conflict may be resolved by several other alternative courses or processes before hostilities break out.

Pondy in his important early contribution to the study of conflict, on which the discussion now draws in a substantial way (1962, pp.300-6), identified five stages of a conflict episode: (i) latent conflict (condition); (ii) perceived conflict (cognition);

(iii) felt conflict (affect); (iv) manifest conflict (behaviour); and, (v) conflict aftermath. These episodes provide a very useful specification of the progress of a conflict (Figure 3.1), and these episodes are introduced in more detail.

Figure 3-1. The dynamic of a conflict



Source: Pondy, 1962, p.306.

1. *Latent conflict* ⁶⁾

The preliminary conditions of conflict include factors such as a scarcity of resources, policy differences and incompatibility of goal. Sources of organisational conflict are condensed into three basic types of latent conflict: (i) competition for scarce resources; (ii) drives for autonomy; and, (iii) divergence of sub-unit goals. Each of these fundamental types of latent conflict is paired with one of the three conceptual conflict models (mentioned as Pondy's model of conflict).

2. *Perceived conflict*

This stage is one of recognising the cognitive state of individuals. The parties perceive or are aware of a conflict situation. Conflict may sometimes be perceived when in fact no conditions of latent conflict exist; equally, latent conflict conditions may be present in a relationship without any of the participants perceiving the conflict. Two important mechanisms that limit perception of conflict, are the 'suppression

mechanism' and the 'attention focus mechanism'. The former is applicable more to conflicts related to personal values; the latter is related more to organisational behaviour than to personal values.

3. *Felt conflict*

There is an important distinction between perceiving and feeling conflict. For example, *A* may be aware that *B* and *A* are in serious disagreement over some policy, but it may not result in *A* being tense or anxious, and it may have no effect whatsoever on *A*'s affection towards *B*. Felt conflict may arise from sources independent of the three types of latent conflict, but latent conflicts may provide appropriate targets for undirected tensions.

4. *Manifest conflict*⁷⁾

The most obvious of the manifest types of conflict stage is open aggression, but such physical and verbal violence is usually strongly proscribed by organisational norms. Violence as a form of manifest conflict in organisations is rare. The motivations toward violence may remain, but they tend to be expressed in a less violent form. Behaviour can be defined as conflictual if, and only if, some or all of the participants perceive it to be conflictual. The most useful definition of manifest conflict seems to be behaviour which, in the mind of the actor, frustrates the goals of at least some of the other participants. In other words, a member of the organisation is said to engage in conflictual behaviour if they consciously, but not necessarily deliberately, blocks another member's goal achievement.

The interface between perceived conflict and manifest conflict, and the interface between felt conflict and manifest conflict are the pressure points where most conflict resolution programmes are applied. The object of such programmes is to prevent conflicts which have reached the level of awareness or the level of affect from

⁶⁾ Latent conflict is different from unconscious conflict for 'parties may be aware of latent conflict but have suppressed or ignored it, while in unconscious conflict, parties are not aware of the situation of conflict' (Minnery, 1985, p.15).

⁷⁾ Minnery (1985, p.35) defined, 'a manifest conflict as an interaction between two or more inter-dependant but separately identifiable parties, based on an incompatibility of goals of which at least one party is aware, where at least one party actively seeks to achieve its goals or obtain a scarce resource through actions that make it more difficult for the other to do so, or reduce the value of the outcome to the other'. He continued: 'If outside observer convinces at least one party of the incompatibility, then latent conflict may exist. If action ensues by at least one party, manifest conflict exists.'

erupting into non-co-operative behaviour. The availability of appropriate and effective administrative devices is a major factor in determining whether conflict becomes manifest. The mere availability of such administrative devices is not of course sufficient to prevent conflict from becoming manifest. If the parties to a relationship do not value the relationship, or if conflict is strategic in the pursuit of sub-unit goals, then conflictual behaviour is likely.

5. Conflict aftermath

Each conflict episode is one of a sequence of episodes that constitute the relationships among participants. If the conflict is genuinely resolved to the satisfaction of all participants, the basis for a more co-operative relationship may be laid, or the participants in their drive for a more ordered relationship may focus on latent conflicts not previously perceived and dealt with. If the conflict is merely suppressed but not resolved, the latent conditions of conflict may be aggravated and explode in more serious form. The development of each conflict episode is determined by a complex combination of the effects of preceding episodes and the episode environment.

On the other hand, Minnery (1985, p.36) summarised the features of conflict process as follows. First, conflict occurs within a wider social political and economic environment, and if the sources and preconditions do lead to goal incompatibilities, then latent conflict exists and there is a potential for manifest conflict to arise. Secondly, when one or more of the parties becomes aware of these conditions and take action, manifest conflict can then be said to exist. There are many different kinds of conflict action and the strategies chosen to manage them will be influenced by the value the participants place on conflict itself. A number of end states are possible for any conflict situation, depending upon the type of conflict itself and the conflict management process utilised.

Minnery (1985, p.137) also commented in relation to conflicts in the regional planning process, that 'there are two stages where conflict is the most visible. These are decision-taking and implementation of the decision. At these stages latent conflict is most likely to become a manifest conflict, because action is taken and resources are committed'. In contemporary Korean circumstances, as the participation of citizen and social groups in the process of planning is extended, and as the demands of open

administration becomes stronger, conflicts at the stage of decision-taking are on the increase.

Regional planning is concerned with change and the reform of currently inadequate social and physical environments. Resistance or reaction to change from vested interests is usually likely to arise over implementation. As Wilenski (1980, p.72) has stated, implementation cannot be separated out as one aspect of reform, so without implementation, there is no reform. Although many scholars present different definitions of the process of conflict, the analysis above indicates that even the simplest conflict contains the basic parts of a three-stage process: pre-condition; conflict; and, aftermath.

3.6. Actors in Conflict Situations

The actors in a social conflict can be individuals, social groups, formal organisations and political or social institutions. The most important factor in the process of conflict is the interaction between parties, more technically referred to as actors or participants' behaviour. Depending on the actors' behaviour, the processes or aspects of conflict can be greatly different. The actors' behaviour is influenced by personality, by the social system, by rules and procedures, and by the other party's behaviour.

In his early contribution, Deutsch (197, pp. 6-7) categorised actors into three groups: (i) an interested audience to the conflict (observers or onlookers, either sympathetic or nonsympathetic); (ii) parties to the conflict; and, (iii) conflict resolvers (arbitrators, mediators, or facilitators). He focussed on the different roles played by the actors in a conflict. Lan (1997, pp.31-2), in his more recent work, also followed these categories (observer; direct party; and third party), and stated that they corresponded to the nature of the public administration's work. First, the observer's role is analogous to the neutral competency role defined by one school of public administration theorist. Administrators do not participate in dispute. If they are asked by either party in a conflict to pass something on or hand something over, they do it quickly, faithfully, and with no bias against or for either party to the conflict. Other than that, they watch the process and wait for the outcome, with either a sympathetic or unsympathetic heart. In areas where governmental presence is not particularly called for or areas that lie outside of the public administrators' jurisdiction, public administrators should stick to their observer's stance in spite of a temptation to intervene.

The next role is that of being a direct party to a conflict. As Minnery (1985) has mentioned, public authorities establish and implement most spatial development plans and projects in Korea. Accordingly, public bodies have become main actors in the conflicts related to regional development. In these cases, public bodies as proponents of regional development or environmental projects usually participate directly in the conflict. Lan (1997, p.33) has pointed out that 'when public administrators have strong opinions or stakes in a conflict, and it is within the boundaries of law for them to address their concerns, they should rightfully identify themselves as a party to the conflict and exercise their legal position and constitutional right to seek a resolution in their favour'.

Finally, a government (public authority), can participate in a conflict as a third party. Third parties may be classified into two broad categories depending on the degree to which they exert their influence: 'active instigation' (also called real intervention), and, 'passive instigation' (also called potential intervention). The former category refers to a situation in which actions are actually being taken by the third party, whilst the latter refers to a situation in which such actions might be taken. Real intervention as third party intervention may occur in any of the following ways: both sides may invite the third party (mediation); intervention may be invited by one side (the ally, hostage or delegate); the third party may intervene on its own initiative (law courts, authority or command). Public authorities rely on the processes and procedures of public administration to manage their activities under political supervision. Public administration has classically been seen as a technical means of action, emphasising rationality, organisation and management in the pursuit of human co-operation (Waldo, 1948 [in Lan, 1997, p.32]). For this reason, public agencies and administrators have often been called to assume the role of arbitrator to a conflict as a third party.

In urban and regional planning and development issues, the parties (actors) involved are the public authorities or their agents as proponents (and, in intergovernmental conflicts, as opponents), their supporters and opponents, and those affected by its decisions. A varied range of actors as opponents can become involved in a conflict, with the public authorities, residents, social groups, private bodies becoming direct actors in a conflict. Various other actors (e.g. advisers, supporter, observers, third party and indirect stakeholders) can influence the process of a conflict.

These actors play an important role, not only in the development of conflict but also in the process of conflict resolution. However, an initial analysis is required to determine if the public authority's position is as proponent, opponent or as a third party to a conflict as this has a great influence on the situation and resolution of conflict. That is why the public authority (government) is considered as the most important actor in conflicts related to regional development in Korea. The role of the government in conflict connected with regional development in Korea will thus be discussed concretely in Chapter 6.

3.7. Conclusions

This Chapter has introduced and reviewed the literature about conflict theory as a part of the preliminary study of this research. It has helped to develop an understanding of the process of conflict in preparation for the more specific consideration of the significant aspects of major regional development/environmental conflicts in Korea (Chapter 6). It has also contributed to a framework for the analysis of conflict case studies (Chapter 7) through establishing some components for an analytical framework of Premises relating the intensity of a conflict with the difficulty of conflict resolution (see Ch.4 for discussion of conflict resolution Premises). It has been found that conflicts are developed by various factors such as the 'change of disputants' and 'issues', 'social systems', 'relationships', and 'external environments'.

From the review of literature about conflict theory, the following important Premises concerned with factors influencing the intensity of conflict have been identified, and they will be used for establishing an analytical framework for case studies (see section 7.2)

- First, most regional conflicts result from a difference of interests between the parties. 'Interest' and 'locational' conflicts often grow toward an active behavioural conflict and their intensity of conflict grows because of wide differences between disputants in the distribution of costs and benefits or because of the safety aspects of environmental issues. Thus, the greater the conflict of interests, the more likely is conflictual behaviour.

Premise A: The larger the difference of interest, the deeper the degree of conflict.

- Secondly, communication is deeply related to mutual trust. The lack of communication and distorted communication leads to distrust, and this in turn brings about fear and increases the intensity of conflict (see section 7.2):

Premise B: *The higher the degree of distrust and the more distorted the communication between parties, the deeper the degree of conflict.*

- Thirdly, the perception of conflict and the pattern of behaviour have a great influence on the progress and intensity of conflict. If parties to a conflict concentrate on the productive functions of conflict, they will adopt productive approaches in dealing with the conflict (see section 7.2):

Premise C: *The more negative the perception of conflict and the more violent the pattern of conflictual behaviour, the deeper the degree of conflict.*

- Finally, environmental or regional conflicts usually involve residents or interest groups. These conflicts often develop to the 'impasse' stage because the residents or social groups are apt to split and do not have a unified chains of command and control, which increases the intensity of conflict (see section 7.2):

Premise D: *The more well-structured and more cohesive the party, the lower the intensity of conflict.*

The next Chapter is concerned with methods to resolve the intergovernmental conflicts that have been reviewed in this Chapter and to establish the role of [central] governments in the process of conflict resolution.

Chapter 4. Conflict Resolution

4.1. Introduction

At the outset, academic concern with conflict resolution has involved areas of study in sociology, international relations, labour relations and political science, subsequently its field has spread to organisational conflicts including an administrative conflict. Recently, for solving conflicts related to environmental issues or regional developments, various methods including Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) have captured the attention of those in the public and private sector. Nonetheless, 'today's public administration literature is still shy of systematic efforts in the understanding of conflict resolution and its relevance to public administration' (Lan, 1997, p.28).

As mentioned previously in Chapter 3, conflicts derive from limited resources, interdependent, and goal incompatibility between parties. In order to achieve conflict settlement, it is important to remove the causes of conflict. Among the causes of conflict, the goal incompatibility between disputants rather than the limited resources and interdependence has been the main object of conflict resolution. Of course, although an increase in the resources and the interception of interdependence can be the focus conflict resolution, however, it is not easy to change these two conditions within a short time. Accordingly identifying the goals of participants and finding the causes of goal incompatibility has tended to become the first stage in conflict resolution.

It is more important to consider as part of this stage the conditions that lead to the goal difference. Goal difference can arise not only from differences in policy and in the characteristic of organisations, but also in the personality and opinions of participants. Although it is difficult to specify organisational goals which have profound effects on the structure and function of an organisation, this process is necessary for conflict resolution. Negotiation and bargaining in conflict resolution mainly focus on the reduction of goal incompatibility between participants. Various methods by a third party intervention also emphasise the dissolution of goal incompatibility. In spite of using these methods, no conflict is ever resolved irrevocably or totally. Although conflict is indeed an essential and useful element in social life, as Khan and Boulding (1964, p.75) mention, there is, however, a constant

tendency for unmanaged conflict to get out of hand and to become bad for all parties, which is the reason that conflicts should be managed in appropriate ways.

As the structure of society becomes more complex and diverse, the aspects of social conflict also become more complex and varied. Recently, many conflicts have derived from the clash of interests generated in the process of establishing and implementing public policies, particularly related to regional developments and environmental issues. Conflicts of this kind are likely to be connected with many stakeholders and multiple policies, and as a consequence the elements of the conflicts are complex and diverse. Traditional processes for conflict resolution cannot cope efficiently in such circumstance, thus the need of new alternatives becomes pressing.

In accordance with this demand, for resolving environmental disputes, ADR processes were introduced in the United States (US) in the late 1970s. Today it has become central to dispute resolution approaches in many countries. ADR approaches, including mediation have become 'buzz words' used to describe a bewildering array of conflict intervention processes, which have grown beyond the resolution of dispute on a case by case basis, to the institutionalisation of procedures for resolving environmental disputes. Since the use of Environmental Dispute Resolution (EDR) was introduced in the field of environmental and regional development in 1973, the track record of ADR has seen dramatic changes in the conflict resolution.

The aim of this chapter is to explore strategies and methods of conflict resolution and to distil the variables which determine its effectiveness. In this context, the chapter deals with traditional approaches as well as various ADR methods for conflict resolution. First, as the basis of conflict resolution, game theory and bargaining are introduced. The second section refers to various strategies and traditional approaches to conflict resolution, and thirdly recent ADR methods are examined. Finally the government's roles in conflict resolution are discussed. Through the review of literature about conflict resolution, premises related to conflict resolution are established, and these premises are used for formulating a framework for case study analysis (see section 7.2).

4.2. Game Theory and Bargaining

4.2.1. Game Theory

1. *Definition of game theory*

Game theory is regarded as one of the most outstanding scientific achievements and it made a marked impression on scientific research (Rapoport, 1968, von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1964, Porter and Taplin, 1987). Among many attempts to deal with regulated conflicts and to understand strategies for managing conflict, the most important attempt is the theory of game.

Although many scholars (Schelling, 1960; Axelord, 1970; Davis, 1970; Minnery, 1985) have defined game theory from various points of view, they concluded basically that the theory was the action of individuals who were conscious that their actions effect each other, thus their intentions were realised. Game theory can be defined as a theory of rational decision and the best course of action for each participant in conflict situation.

2. *Application of game theory*

At the outset, game theory was seen as an approach to economic problems (Davis, 1970; Rappoport, 1961), and it was seen as a mathematical approach to problems in social science (Luce and Raiffa, 1957; Nicholson, 1970). Game theory was developed to identify optimal behaviour in an ideal free market and in a monopoly situation, and it emphasised the rationality, optimality and artificial condition of perfect information.

Rapoport (1961, p.108) stated, 'games of strategy offer a good model of rational behaviour of people in situations where there are conflicts of interest; a number of alternatives are open at each phase of the situation; people are in a position to estimate consequences of their choices'. He was the first to induce game theory to the study of conflict resolution and treated 'conflict theory as a branch of rational decision-making in game theory'. According to Rapoport's opinion, conflict is a central concept to game theory.

Although game theory has been applied to make a rational decision in various social conflicts, the theory has been selectively useful. 'This model is not useful when decisions are made where the reaction of others are ignored or others are treated as impersonal market forces. This is a modelling tool, not an axiomatic system' (Minnery,

1985, p.158). According to Minnery (1985, p.161), there are three immediate advantages of applying game theory in urban and regional planning and design: 'firstly, it leads to a framework which considers conflict between those involved; secondly, it forces a consideration of bargaining behaviour based on stable value positions; finally, it leads to clarification of the parties involved, the strategies available, and to some estimate of the payoffs of various outcomes'.

3. *Classification of games*

Although games are classified variously,¹⁾ usually the most important distinctions rely on the number of players: games with two players (two-person games)²⁾ and games with more than two players (n-person games). Next, games are divided into constant sum games called zero-sum game and non-constant sum games. The former is that interests of players are diametrically opposed, and it means that whenever one player wins, the other loses so that the total benefit to the two players is zero. The latter is where interests are partially opposed and partially coincident. Thus the non-constant sum games are further differentiated according to whether players can agree on joint strategies or not: co-operative and non-cooperative games. 'Co-operative game theory is axiomatic, frequently appealing to pareto-optimality, fairness and equity. While non-cooperative game theory is economic in flavour, with solution concepts based on players maximising their own utility functions subject to stated constraints' (Rasmussen, 1991, p.29). Games related to most regional conflicts are mainly of non-constant sum game type, but in practice, constant-sum and non-cooperative games are also normal due to disputants' self-interest, and in situations where two persons (proponent and opponent) become to engage in the conflict with time over.

Among various game theories, 'Prisoners' Dilemma' and 'Chicken Games' are very simple and stylised non-zero sum games, which have played a considerable part in the analysis and classification of conflict. The first game is concerned with a non-co-operative game situation, while the second one related to co-operative game situation. By looking at these simple games, 'we can get some insight into their basic

¹⁾ Porter and Taplin (1987, pp.46-7) variously classified games as followings: Real vs Non-real games; Objective vs Subjective games; Competitive vs Non-competitive games; Zero-sum vs Non-zero-sum games; Directive vs Non-directive games; Perfect information vs Non-perfect information games.

²⁾ Davis (1970, p.8) divided two-person game into three categories: zero-sum games of perfect information; general zero-sum games; non-zero-sum games.

structure which will be a help in looking at the nature of more complex conflicts' (Axelroad, 1970, p.61).

4. Limitation of game theory

There are a number of fundamental assumptions underlying game theory: rational players; at least two players; the outcome of sequential moves; a pay-off specified on an interval scale; a termination rule (Porter and Taplin, 1987, pp.47-48). However the above circumstance do not exist in most real life situations. A major shortcoming of game theory is that it is static. The theory cannot say when an agreement will be reached, even if it can be said to predict what the agreement should be. Minnery (1985, p.160) pointed criticisms of game theory as follows: the results are often trivial and might not be reproducible; inference about motivation might be in error; inappropriate generalisations from results abound; games are static, while the realities of conflict are dynamic; game situations are not isomorphic to conflict situation. Porter and Taplin (1987, pp.46-53) also pointed out that the limitation of game theory could come from communication, applicability and inadequacy. Especially most games are non-negotiable and non-zero-sum games. Game theory is adequate in zero-sum games, but it is clearly limited and inadequate in non-zero-sum games.

In spite of these limitations, these should not detract from the overall usefulness of game theory. Game theory gives one sight into the logic of strategic conflict. It is not a behavioural theory rather it described the skeletal form of interaction. Finally game theory is useful in generating insights that have led into other areas which might further explain the situation.

4.2.2. Bargaining and Negotiation

1. Definition of bargaining

The theoretical approaches to bargaining and negotiation have been based on game theory. Bargaining and negotiation are processes happening over a period of time and involving two or more negotiants. Bargaining is usually associated with trade and commerce, while negotiation is generally used for inter-state dealing. But the distinction is not always kept.

Nicholson (1970, p.67) stated, 'the activity whereby two contending parties decide between themselves what actions to take, when some are better for one than for

the other, is called bargaining. When it is done by explicit verbal communication, we refer to it as negotiation'. Bargaining implies a voluntary process of distributing the proceeds from co-operation (Cross, 1965, p.67), and negotiation is explained as 'a process in which explicit proposals are put forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the realisation of a common interest' (Ikle 1964, pp.2-3). From the various definitions of negotiation and bargaining, the following elements are included. The process of negotiation is a voluntary and peaceful process, not subjugation involving violent or disruptive action. It is also assumed that each player (negotiant) has a rational opinion and good sense.

2. Progress and types of bargaining

If two participants in a non-zero sum game agree to co-ordinate their actions, they can normally obtain some outcomes which might bring them mutual benefit. In this case, bargaining for 'give and take' between participants begins to progress. According to Nicholson (1970, pp.67-80), there are usually two problems such as communication and fair bargain ³⁾ in the process of bargaining. The former is related to what degree participants are able to co-ordinate their policies, and the latter is related to several different outcomes which could be chosen.

The actual bargaining over a policy outcome begins at the lower level, and if no agreement is reached, then it is referred to the upper level. If the upper level cannot agree, the President decides. The President unilaterally sets the penalties for the upper level officials who are his subordinates, and they then set the penalties for the lower level officials who are their subordinates. The full sequence is as follows: 1) President unilaterally sets upper-level officials' penalties; 2) Upper-level officials set lower-level officials' penalties; 3) Lower-level officials play a bargaining game to determine the policy outcome; 4) Upper-level officials play a bargaining game to determine the policy outcome if the lower-level officials were unable to agree; and 5) President unilaterally decides the issue if the upper-level officials are unable to agree (Axelrod, 1970, p.132). In Korea most unresolved political conflicts follow such steps. If the subordinates cannot reach an agreement, their bosses must consider the issue. This

³⁾ For explaining the 'Fair bargaining', usually the concept of utility is induced. The procedure of bargaining, which is illustrative of the general 'genre' was developed by J. F. Nash in his '*Rule of Negotiation*' (Nicholson, 1970, p.72) (For more detail about Nash point for the optimum solution, see Nicholson, 1970, pp.71-74).

implies that the initiative of agreement for conflict resolution can move to a third party hand, as the intensity of conflict begins to increase.

Premise I: the more intensive the degree of conflict, the more likely there will be third party intervention (see section 7.2).

Nicholson (1970, pp.82–84) divided aspects of bargaining into four general groups: negotiation and information; the status of final offers; the parties to a conflict; and, knowledge of opponent's reactions. Not all forms of conflict can be described as bargaining situations. The two forms of conflict which do not fit very readily into this bargaining framework, are firstly, games in the everyday sense of the world, and secondly, 'threat conflict'. The former is where people compete under strictly defined rules in games such as football, card game, races and so on. The later form of conflict, which cannot be categorised neatly as a bargaining situation, is threat conflict.

On the other hand, Axelrod (1970, p.121) presented a multilevel model of bargaining in bureaucracies connected with conflict of interest. Bureaucracies are not monolithic organisations rationally pursuing a single goal. Instead they decompose problems and assign different sub-problems to different parts of the organisation. To achieve some degree of co-ordination between the sub-problems, the different parts of a bureaucracy involved in the problem bargain with each other, usually with biases associated with their location in the organisation.

4.3. Strategies and Methods of Conflict Resolution

4.3.1. Strategies for Conflict Resolution

Occurrence of conflict depends on a condition in which each party will benefit in some way from a continuation of the relationship and in which power is shared to some extent. The choice of strategies for conflict management mainly depends upon the value placed on conflict and the relations of the actors. Thus the interdependence and opportunity to influence inter-relationships are key elements in conflict management, perspective, which is deeply related to the previous relations.

In order to reduce or manage conflicts, Minnery (1985, p.142) pointed out that three reactions to perceive conflict could be possible: 'evasion', 'suppression' and 'regulation'. These categories imply a reduction of conflict when it is 'handled', but

potentially it can also be 'handled' by being maintained and deepened. Lan (1997, p.31) explained, 'the strategies for conflict resolution fall into conventional strategies which rely on the expertise and discretion of the judges and administrators, and alternative strategies which are about bargaining and negotiation, not about fairness or social justice'. Conventionally, conflict resolution relies upon the court of law or chief executive's arbitration. Arbitration, punitive sanctions on conflictual behaviour and avoiding conflict escalation are typical tools for conflict resolution. However, the costs of such litigation and dissatisfaction of result have forced individuals and organisations to search for alternative ways to resolve conflicts. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) methods have begun to dominate the conflict resolver's agenda (see section 4.4.3).

Katz (1964, p.108) suggested strategies for dealing with various types of conflicts as follows: (1) Problems can be handled within the institutional structure by maximising informal resources, shifting personnel around, or simply ordering people to co-operate; (2) Setting up additional machinery for handling it. This is typical organisation-type solution to any problem. When the institutional machinery does not function well, add a new piece; (3) Changing the institutional structure so that there is less built-in conflict.

Kilmann and Thomas (1978, p.60) argued that conflict management involved three interrelated steps: recognition, diagnosis and intervention, and they suggested distinct conflict management strategies (interaction management; contextual modification; consciousness raising; selection and training) associated with the four sources of conflict (external process; external structure; internal process; internal structure). In relation to locational conflict, Dear and Long (1978, p.117) stated that five strategies might be available to community groups: exist, voice, resignation, illegal action and formal participation. Their emphasis was laid on groups in opposition to any particular proposal. In judging the efficacy of these strategies, they used the extent to which individuals or groups could influence urban decision-making.

On the other hand, March and Simon (1958, [in Axelrod, 1970, p.123]) suggested useful methods related to conflict resolution in organisations: problem-solving, persuasion, bargaining and politics. In the case of problem-solving, it is assumed that all participants have the same goals, and the decision-problem is to find a solution that satisfies these criteria. In persuasion, the individual goals differ, but are

not taken as fixed. Bargaining takes the goals as fixed, and agreement without persuasion is sought. Politics means a situation like bargaining except that the arena is not taken as fixed by the participants. They continued, ‘problem-solving has no conflict of interest, and persuasion is an attempt to lower the amount of conflict of interest, while bargaining and politics are processes aimed at reaching agreement in the presence of conflict of interest’.

So far, various strategies for conflict resolution have been introduced, and these strategies can be adapted to the every type of conflict. In other words, strategies for ‘bargaining conflicts’ can apply for bureaucratic or systems conflicts. One strategy can apply to a conflict, and two or more strategies can apply to the conflict. Accordingly, each strategy can be used for resolving all types of conflict, but it is very important that the most efficient and appropriate strategy should be introduced. A conflict can be resolved when some mutually consistent set of actions is worked out.

4.3.2. Change of Method

Conflict resolution typically depends upon the court of law or governmental decision. The judge in the courtroom or the decision by autocratic administrator under the role of the law and organisational policy is the final decision-maker, thus they largely leave no room for compromise between disputants. Such methods rely on the expertise and discretion of the judges and administrators, and it can be efficient, effective, and often economical way of resolving conflict. Administrative court, hierarchy of office and unity of command are mechanisms designed for resolving conflict in such a manner (Lan, 1997, p. 31).

According to Gladwin’s (1987, p.33) research,⁴⁾ methods for conflict resolution in the US at the beginning of the 1970s mainly depended upon the judge in a courtroom, but by the end of the 1970s, autocratic decisions had taken the first place (Table 4.1). Why then had the role of autocratic decisions been increasing in environmental disputes and why had the adjudication approach been relatively decreasing? Using complex and technical methods, government officials in bureaucratic organisations with authoritative technical expertise had played an important part in dispute settlement. At the same time, an excessive use of courts had

⁴⁾ These sample cases (366 conflicts) were site specific environmental battles over an industrial facility ever mentioned in either *Chemical Week Magazine* or *European Chemical News* during the period January 1970 to 30 June 1978 (422 weeks of coverage).

led to delay in the process of conflict settlement which had dramatically increased the costs of litigation. The escalating costs of court judgements forced disputants to search for alternative ways to resolve conflict.

Table 4-1. Resolution mechanisms used in US environmental conflicts

Categories		1970-1	1972-3	1974-5	1976-8
Third party	Autocratic decision	25 %	33 %	24 %	41 %
	Adjudication	55 %	44 %	42 %	36 %
	Arbitration/mediation	0	3 %	2 %	2 %
Public	Legislation	6 %	10 %	12 %	9 %
	Vote	2 %	5 %	6 %	11 %
	Public hearing	11 %	16 %	24 %	27 %
Private	Bargaining/negotiation	5 %	18 %	14 %	18 %
	Joint problem solving	12 %	16 %	18 %	11 %
	Private decision	15 %	14 %	0	5 %

Sources: based upon Gladwin (1987), p.33

However according to Moor (1998, p.163), by the end of the 1970s, ‘autocratic decisions were becoming rarer in disputes involving environmental or sustainable development issues. The knowledge and authority of decision-makers was no longer sacrosanct, as information was more widely available and more people had developed expertise or discovered contradictory information’.⁵⁾ Nonetheless as the role of adjudication approach was being reduced, it still remained the most important resolution mechanism. Concurrently with this trend, the involvement of the public grew: public hearing rapidly increased from 11 percent to 27 percent; and citizen voting 2 percent to 11 percent. Furthermore, the importance of bargaining and negotiation also increased. Up to the end of the 1970s, arbitration or mediation by involvement of a third party was rare. These tendencies had a deep concern with a fact that ‘environmental conflict was shifting from ‘regulatory’ to ‘social’ in general character.

As seen on table 4.2, in the 1970s, environmental conflicts moved out of the court room and became to depend on autocratic decisions, reflecting the stronger discretionary power vested in administrative agencies, which became the most frequently employed mechanism of resolution approaches. However as the 1980s progressed, the initiative moved to alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as a typical method for mediation. Nowadays, it has become a mainstream method of dispute

resolution. For the last thirty years, mechanisms for conflict resolution have been changing continuously from court judgement to ADR approach. Such transition has taken place in the US and other countries are following the US model. From the review of strategies for conflict resolution, it has been established that the main approach has become more co-operative and collaborative. The adversarial and autocratic methods of resolving conflicts have become less favoured, because such methods cannot manage and settle conflicts effectively and often lead to party dissatisfaction. In this situation conflict can be made worse, and ultimately conflict resolution can be more difficult. Consequently the following conclusion can be drawn:

Premise H: The more coercive the strategies and tactics used, the more the conflict tends to become aggravated and the more difficult is conflict resolution (see section 7.2).

Table 4-2. The change of mechanisms and methods for conflict resolution

Period	Mechanism for conflict resolution	Methods
Before 1970s	Court Room Adjudication	Traditional and Adversarial Method
1970s	Administrative Decision	Autocratic and Technical Method
After 1980s	Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)	Mediation/Arbitration/Collaborative process/Consensus building/ Stakeholder dialogue

Sources: based upon Gladwin (1987), pp.32-35

4.3.3. Methods of Conflict Resolution

Conflict resolution is as old as conflict itself. Even though some conflicts are good, the word itself has a bias toward bad. Everybody thinks of the problems of conflict not usually in terms of how we get more of them, but how we get less of them.

Accordingly to look at ways in which conflicts are resolved and settled, is very important. This section focuses mainly on techniques of third party intercession and direct negotiation as a transactional resolution method, while various ADR methods are dealt in the next section.

1. *Avoidance*: The first method of ending conflicts is an avoidance or disappearance of one or both parties, which is probably the commonest method. ‘The term “avoidance” has been taken from experimental psychology to denote the ending of conflict by

⁵¹ Moore (1998) saw that the continuum of conflict resolution approaches went ahead in the order of command, decision making, consultative decision-making and co-operative decision-making.

eliminating contact between parties' (Porter and Taplin, 1987, p.20). Boulding (1962, p.308) explained this as where 'the parties to the conflict simply remove themselves or one from another and increase the distance between them to the point where the conflict ceases from sheer lack of contact'. Avoidance always involves putting some kinds of distance between the parties. The distance implies not only physical distance, but also social distance or epistemological distance. According to Rangarajan (1985, p.256), there may be three forms of avoidance: one party may simply remove itself from the conflict field; both parties may remove themselves and; one party forcibly removes the other.

2. *Conquest*: Conquest is the extreme case of forcible removal form of avoidance and the most radical form of conflict termination. 'One of the parties is in effect removed to infinity, or removed from the scene, leaving the victor in sole possession of the field' (Boulding, 1962, p.309). The conquest can take place only where one party is conditionally viable with respect to the other. In spite of a direct negotiation or intervention of a third party, when a dispute does not settle, the party which has more power than the other party often uses the conquest method. Nevertheless, as Porter and Taplin (1987, p.21) stated, 'total conquest is usually an impossibility, for example, a war in which the victor completely exterminates all members of the vanished is a rare event indeed'.

3. *Direct negotiation*: If parties can neither conquer nor avoid each other, the parties have to stay together and live with each other in some form of procedural resolution. When two parties are able to settle their dispute without an outsider's help, a direct negotiation is likely to be established. Direct negotiation can be useful when the conflict level is low.

According to Boulding (1962, p.310), 'direct negotiation or conciliation can lead to reconciliation, in which the value systems of the parties change so that they develop common preferences in their joint field. They both want the same state of affairs or position in the joint field, and so conflict is eliminated'. Reconciliation is the result of conversation, argument, discussion, or debate that leads to convergent modifications of the images of the two parties. Since direct negotiation does not leave behind a residue of dissatisfaction, there is little likelihood that other new conflict

occurs in connection with this residue, or that implementation of agreement is held back.

4. *Third party intervention*: Third party assistance is necessary when the conflict level has increased to such an extent that parties have moved away from the goal agreed by the direct negotiation. Rangarajan (1985, p.257) classified third party intercession based on a wide range of aspects, into four types along a spectrum from conciliation to adjudication. The four methods broadly fall into two distinct classes. In mediation and conciliation, the disputants are persuaded to agree among themselves on the terms of a settlement, while, the disputants agree to accept the terms of a settlement dictated to them by an arbitrator or judge in arbitration and adjudication (see Appendix 3).

Conclusions of third party intervention are compromise and award.

Compromise is the result of a process of bargaining, in which mediation and conciliation may play an important part. In compromise, the value systems are not identical, and parties have different optimum positions in the joint field. However, each party is willing to settle for something less than its ideal position rather than to continue the conflict. Next, an award is the end result in arbitration or legal trial. This settlement is reached because both parties have agreed to accept the verdict of one outside person or agency rather than continue the conflict (Boulding, 1962, p.311). Nevertheless the various procedures are not completely separated in practice. Frequently, both reconciliation and compromise go on together. Similarly in arbitration cases or in court proceedings, there are often elements of both reconciliation and compromise and of bargaining before the award is handed down.

- *Conciliation*: When a third party is requested to aid communication and bargain, but not to arbitrate, there are the methods of conciliation and mediation. These two techniques depending on the persuasion for achieving an agreement, have many things in common. Porter and Taplin (1987, p.29) defined, 'conciliation is the act of a neutral third party instigating interaction and communication by performing the role of middleman, of a go-between, of a bridge over which two parties can begin to negotiate a transaction'.

This is the simplest form of mediation. The conciliation simply tries to clear up misunderstandings. Conflict situation always provide ample opportunity for

unnecessary incompatibility of images. 'A conciliator can both receive and give accurate messages to either of the parties without distortion, and so can achieve a certain reconciliation of images' (Boulding, 1962, p.316). Disputes settled by conciliation leave behind a smaller residue of dissatisfaction, therefore the chances of further conflicts arising from this residue are much less. Conciliation is the cheapest means and economises on time, and it is a useful technique for all types of conflicts. There are two prerequisites: (a) the disputants must have had a close and multi-linked relationship, (b) there must have been mutual trust, at least some time in the past (Rangarajan, 1985, p.257).

- *Mediation*: Mediation is the process whereby two or more parties appoint an independent third party to assist them in reaching a negotiated agreement to resolve their differences. According to Rangarajan (1985, p.259), 'the mediation process is non-binding, although a settlement agreement resulting from mediation usually is binding'. The mediation has more outside pressure than mere conciliation, and it implies a middle position between the parties, but sometimes the solution introduced by the mediator may be a new position altogether that neither party has previously contemplated. Mediation is usually as voluntary, non-binding, 'without prejudice' and confidential (Estates Gazette, 1999, p.117). The essential criteria in the art of mediation are to (1) instigate communication between two parties where immediate contact is difficult or impossible, and (2) to accommodate those parties in reaching voluntarily and by mutual consent a mode of compromise and consensus acceptable to both (Porter and Taplin, 1987, p.30). Mediation may be conceptually and empirically broken down into basic subgroups: initiation; inquiry and investigation; mediation; and, combinations of the above models.

A mediator acts as a catalyst so that interaction and communication may be initiated. Porter and Taplin (1987, p.32) explained the functions of a mediator as follows: to widen the agenda; to introduce new opportunities to exchange bargaining; to put forward salient suggestions; to provide information; to help explore solutions and to create new solutions; to transmit messages; to mobilise outside influence. A mediator, unlike a conciliator, needs not do all his work with both parties present and can meet the disputants individually and put forward different proposals (Rangarajan, 1985, p.261). 'The mediator role may be quite informal or it may be more formalised.

In any case the role is a complex one with a whole spectrum of possible degrees of intervention into the conflict' (Boulding, 1962, p.317). Consequently, an objective of the mediator is to keep up the momentum of the discussions. He helps parties to craft realistic solutions which would bring real and tangible benefits to all parties to the dispute and often bring forward ideas for solutions (Napier, 1998, p.204).

- *Arbitration and adjudication*: In spite of their own and a third party's efforts, when conciliation and mediation are unsuccessful, the procedural conflict tends to take over in the form of arbitration or court proceedings. Both arbitration and adjudication are legal processes resulting in arbitration awards or court judgements.

In arbitration, a preliminary bargain has to be struck in the sense that parties have to agree to submit to arbitration. All the disputants have to agree to subject a dispute to arbitration. An arbitrator differs from a mediator in that the former adjudicates the process, while the latter guides, initiates and directs the process of coming to terms. In brief the arbitrator judges, and the mediator guides. However, at times both may involve the same role or they may be confused by the parties involved. Boulding (1962, p.319) pointed out, 'successful arbitration frequently operates as mediator and conciliator as well, for the closer his award comes to what the parties might have agreed upon in the absence of arbitration, the more satisfied the parties will be, and the better the reputation of the arbitrator'. A disputant can repudiate arbitration awards. In this situation the conflict then moves to a different level.


Judicial decision is a widespread and widely used form of conflict resolution. When both mediation and arbitration fail and if the situation is perceived as a serious threat to the state, then judicial and legal interventions are generally introduced into the situation. Among the options usually found, adjudication has more coercive power behind it than that of arbitration, because the system of punishment, the apparatus of prison and the punishments stand behind the law. Procedures taken in the courts are made more objective by the disputants being represented by lawyers and by decisions being made by judges with no personal interest in the dispute. The sense of fairness plays a major role in the judicial process. Ultimately, a conflict that cannot be resolved by appeals to the existing law may be transferred to the law-making process in legislative assemblies.

4.3.4. Methods by Progress

Appropriate methods for conflict resolution may vary according to the intensity of conflict: 'different intensities of conflicts call for different settlement forum and techniques', ⁶⁾ noted Godschalk (1992, p.369). He defined three intensities of conflict and recommended a conflict management system. If each method of conflict settlement is connected with the degree of conflict, practicable means can be introduced. Figure 4.1 illustrates possible techniques for conflict settlement that may be taken in relation to two dimensions: techniques for conflict settlement and the intensity of conflict.

At the first stage of an issue developing, negotiation and third party intercession may be able to resolve a conflict. As the intensity of conflict increases, however, the possible range of conflict settlement techniques, that is the shaded section in Figure 4.1, is diminished.

Figure 4-1. Techniques of conflict resolution



Source: based upon Godschalk, 1992, p.368

For example, if the degree of conflict is at the point A, the possible range of appropriate techniques lies between mediation and adjudication; should the conflict move to A', the techniques available narrow towards adjudication only with a strong possibility of third party intervention. Consequently, as the intensity of conflict passes

⁶⁾ Godschalk (1992, p.369) argued 'for purpose of designing and operating a conflict management system, a notion of conflict intensity can help decide on an appropriate resolution technique and forum', and continued 'the formality of forums and techniques increases with the intensity of conflict'.

from being a dispute to nearer the stage of impasse, the possible range of techniques for settlement gradually becomes narrower. This process can be expressed in the following way: as the degree of conflict increases (issue→ dispute→ impasse), the range of choice of technique for conflict resolution becomes narrower. Following this approach, it may be concluded that: the intensity of conflict is the critical factor in conflict settlement, and the more intensive the degree of conflict the more difficult is conflict resolution. This conclusion forms the Central Premise to be used in establishing a framework to analyse the six case studies of regional development/environmental projects in Korea, which are reported on later in this thesis (see Chapters 8-11).

Central Premise: The intensity of conflict is the critical factor in conflict settlement, and the more intensive the degree of conflict the more difficult is conflict resolution (see section 7.2).

4.3.5. Character by Methods

Among these various methods, as shown in Figure 4.2, direct negotiation or conciliation and mediation give more satisfaction to parties. For similar reason mediation is superior to arbitration, and arbitration is superior to judicial decision: voluntary, non-coercive and independent consensus is usually more utilitarian and satisfactory to the parties involved. In this context, Porter and Taplin (1987, p32) argued ‘mediation is preferred in all cases to arbitration or judicial decision because mediation implies mutual consensus which is favourable to both parties because of its independent and voluntaristic nature’.

Figure 4-2. Indices by means

Means	Avoidance	Negotiation	Conciliation	Mediation	Arbitration	Judicial
Coercive	Low Pressure	—————▶			High Pressure	
Voluntarist	High intervention	←————			Low intervention	
Satisfactory	High satisfactory	←————			Low satisfactory	
Cost	Cheap	Uncertain	Uncertain	—————▶		Expensive
Time	Short	—————▶			Long	
Legal extent	Low	—————▶			High	

Sources: based on Porter and Taplin (1987)

Consequently, a voluntary decision gives satisfaction to disputants and leads to the high degree of settlement. Here, the compliance rate is proportional to the degree of satisfaction and the level of satisfaction is proportional to degree of implementation. Nevertheless, sometimes the higher the degree of legal basis (compelling power), the higher the degree of implementation of agreements can be. In this case, usually disputants' satisfaction is very low, so new conflicts related to the matter can occur again in the future.

4.4. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Approach for Conflict Resolution

4.4.1. What is ADR? (Definition of ADR)

ADR implies alternative approaches to court judge as a traditional resolution method. 'Common to all ADR procedures is the word "alternative". Actually each ADR procedure is an "alternative" to court adjudication' (Gary, 1999, p.1). This definition interprets ADR in a broad sense which refers to a variety of procedures for the resolution of disputes in the wide spectrum between mediation and straightforward negotiation. According to this definition, because ADR has a very wide range, it is ambiguous in definition and it is difficult to point out a concrete entity. Ingram (1998, p.146) explained, 'there are a number of other terms used: collaborative process; consensus-building; mediation; facilitation; stakeholder dialogue; community problem-solving'. One of the characteristic features of ADR is that the approach includes a varied range of procedures.

The most common form of ADR is mediation which involves the participation of a mediator to assist the parties in a dispute to reach a settlement. Mediation, as a popular ADR method, is a process for resolving disputes with the aid of a neutral whose role includes assisting parties, privately and collectively, to identify the issues in dispute and to develop proposals to resolve the dispute. As mentioned in section 4.3.3, mediation is not a new approach, but is an established method of third party intervention. With new techniques developing, it has been in the spotlight recently.

The reason why mediation has become the main method of ADR is based on the following five elements. First of all, because there is a neutral and impartial facilitator, the parties can trust that they have some safeties and are not being abused by an interested party. Secondly a facilitator or mediator protects the conflictability of

the proceedings. Thus the mediator does not take sides against any party and does not usurp the parties' rights to disclose, or not to disclose information. Thirdly, it requires good faith from the participants. Good faith includes entering into the ADR method with the intention to work towards a resolution and not using the process for outside purposes. Fourthly, all necessary parties needed to resolve the problems can interact with the mediator. Those with full authority to act for the parties must attend so that the parties can work toward resolution (Napier, 1998, pp.203-204).

4.4.2. Emergence of ADR

1. *Start of ADR*

The 1970s was a decade of growing concern about the environment in the US and saw the emergence of ADR processes in environmental disputes. At the beginning of the 1970s disputants in environmental public policy disputes had few meaningful options, other than litigation related to statutes concerned with particular events. The vast majority carried their disputes to court. Naturally, court dockets overloaded, litigation dragged on and the machinery of government stalled (Susskind and Secunda, 1998, pp.16-17). From the mid-1970s, this began to change. A growing number of disputants began to experiment with new approaches of dealing with conflict. In the private sector, interest in processes such as facilitation and mediation to help disputing parties grew and a few disputants also began to use consensus-building techniques.

The first significant environmental dispute to be mediated in this way was a controversy over the proposed location of a flood dam on the Snoqualmie River in the State of Washington in 1973. The mediators initiated and facilitated a dialogue among the opposing parties, and an agreement was forged around plans for the construction of the dam. After that, meaningful experiments with dispute resolution in the public sector commenced in the late 1970s. Environmental disputes provided one of the first arenas in which a mediator began exploring the applicability to public conflict techniques and processes for resolution. In the 1980s, ADR for resolving public disputes have been rapidly growing in the US (Susskind and Secunda, 1998, p.18).

The introduction of ADR process in the UK has been greatly influenced by and benefited from the experience in the US. It was introduced to the UK in the field of neighbour, commercial, family and employment disputes. A mediation approach was used to resolve family issues in the early 1980s, ADR subsequently spread into the

public sectors in the early 1990s. In the UK, the 'Environmental Resolve and Environmental Council' has pioneered ADR in public disputes. In 1991, following a conference which introduced the concept of consensus-building to the UK, the Environmental Council has been running introductory skills and awareness building workshops and consensus-building activity has increased. The development of consensus-building was also linking into government interest in strengthening local democracy. This increased interest from local authorities and communities has provided a positive context for the increased use of consensus-building. The UK is at an exciting innovative and experimental stage in the use of collaborative processes, and this method is used just as often to prevent conflict rather than resolving disputes (Ingram, 1998, p.113).

Environmental and political trends in developed nations have influenced developing countries. Developing nations induced new procedures and mechanisms, and began to adapt more formal approaches to seeking ways of addressing environmental issues and conflicts (Moore 1998, p.167). Until the last half of the 1980s, environmental issues were often seen as local or regional concerns, extraneous to economic growth. The phenomena have however now assumed a global dimension, and is increasingly being seen as intrinsic to economic growth or decline. In addition, international activities such as Local Agenda 21 have also expanded environmental visions and expectations. These trends stimulated developing countries to have an interest in consensus-building approaches and sustainable development, and many developing countries began to adopt ADR process in public sector disputes since the 1990s, but the application of ADR has stayed at an experimental stage.

2. Reasons for the emergence of ADR

Nowadays conflicts in urban and regional developments tend to become complex due to the interposition of environmental issues. Environmental issues, which emerged in the fields of water management, waste disposal and the energy industry, may influence all of fields in related to the development policies. During the last twenty-five years, problems related to environment have increased tremendously at all level-local, regional, national and international affairs.

Before the 1970s, the disputes related to public policy were largely interest struggles or judicial disputes related to administration. Accordingly, a dispute

resolution depended on traditional legislative and administrative options. As environmental problems have developed from the mid-1970s onwards, instead of traditional methods which have limited value in resolving complex environmental issues, an EDR (ADR) approach was introduced in the US.

Why has ADR been introduced in response to environmental issues and regional development disputes? Normally, parties are limited in industrial and organisational conflicts, and usually a triad position including mediator is established. In regional development or environmental conflict, parties to a dispute tend to be indistinct as well as numerous; a concern range covers a wide area; public characteristics are strongly exhibited; a concept of space exists; systematisation between members is not firm; and there are complex issues. According to Moore (1998, p.168), environmental conflicts have different characteristics from other conflicts as follows: involvement of multiple and diverse parties; diverse and incompatible interests; differing appraisals of the situation; contrasting sources, power and leverage; lack of relationships; divergent expectations; confusion over the appropriate forum; unequal levels of knowledge and expertise; different levels of skills; and, the lack of an identified and respected convenor.

As reviewed above, because disputes related to environmental problems and regional developments include many parties and issues, solutions of the problems is very difficult. Under such a situation, court judgements and administrative decisions, have limitations. Too many stakeholders cannot go to law with various interests at once. Eventually they all cannot find satisfaction in the autocratic administrative decision, and are unlikely to accept the decision without their participation in the process of decision-making. Traditional ways of resolving disputes usually result in the parties losing control of the dispute and becoming frustrated and dissatisfied, and relationships can become damaged as parties only talk to each other in hostile environments’.

Following this review, Premises F and G are established.

Premise F: The greater the number of stakeholders and parties involved, the more difficult is conflict resolution.

Premise G: The more complex the issues of conflict and the larger the scale of issues, the more difficult is conflict resolution (see section 7.2).

In order to overcome problems of the adversarial resolution approach and to resolve complex conflicts, a new alternative approach has been introduced. ADR is recognised as an acceptable and mainstream way to resolve a dispute or make a good decision, thus providing a positive climate in which to develop collaborative processes in the public policy area (Ingram, 1998, p.115). Many factors have contributed directly to the growing interest and use of collaborative processes as a means of addressing environmental problems and sustainability. First of all, parties can avoid the lengthy and costly haul through the courts. Secondly, the process cuts short expensive and unpredictable legal procedure with significant savings of time and money. Thirdly, ADR creates a satisfaction through ownership of the settlement.

According to most literature, the main reason that parties to dispute use ADR method is to avoid the delay and high cost of litigation. However, as Lan (1987, p.31) stated, administrative decision is likely to be more efficient, effective and often economical method. Then why has ADR taken a firm root in the scene of environmental conflict since the beginning of the 1980s, instead of an administrative decision or legal judgement? Although the reasons mentioned above influenced the introduction of ADR, more important reason might relate the citizen's awareness of environmental issues and citizen's demands for participation in the process of regional policy decision. Many people have been awakening to the significance of environment, and thus they have taken part in the process of policy-making and implementation of projects related to environmental issues. Decision-making, as Moore (1998, p.163) noted, is no longer an exclusive objective of a few environmental specialists or administrative officials. The large and varied numbers of stakeholders who have become concerned with environmental issues and projects have made ADR into a mainstream method in resolving environmental conflicts.

According to Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.26), 'as the frequency of environmental disputes has grown, the ability of our social, political and legal institutions to resolve them in a timely, efficient and decisive manner has diminished'. They (p.27) continued to argue, 'government seems unable to resolve these disputes satisfactorily; in part because government is often a party to them, ...conventional methods for managing conflict sapped financial resources, took a long time to achieve procedure agreement, did nothing to improve relationship among disputants. It is in this context that new approaches to resolving environmental disputes have arisen'.

4.4.3. The Development of ADR

1. *Various techniques*

At first, ADR in environmental conflict mainly took a form of mediation or arbitration, because ADR was initiated from experiences of commercial, family and industrial disputes. Recently, with the complexity and diversity of society, the progress of local democratisation, and the awareness of citizen participation, ADR methods have gradually changed and developed. New methods are applied for satisfying their various desires because there are many stakeholders to conflicts related to environmental issues or regional disputes. These methods include 'consensus-building', 'joint problem-solving', 'negotiation', 'informal arbitration', 'mediation', 'non-binding mini trials', 'partnering,' 'outlets for emotions', 'enlargement of conflicts to include more players' and 'increasing the stackers' (Lan, 1998, p.31). The mainstream of ADR began to transfer from mediation to collaborative decision-making, and it moves from conflict resolution to prevention of dispute.


2. *Increase of mediated cases*

By the end of 1977 nine disputes had been mediated in the USA and the number of case mediated by ADR methods subsequently rapidly increased.⁷⁾ 'Over the past two decades the use of mediation (ADR) as a tool to resolve environmental enforcement disputes has become increasingly popular and recently, the mediation has been an *ad hoc* choice' (Sipe, 1998, p.275). According to the Centre for Dispute Resolution (CEDR, 1998), it can be used: when business negotiation are in deadlock; in parallel to litigation or arbitration; to achieve consensus in partnership or complex policy disputes; for national or international disputes; to resolve disputes in almost any area of law or business. The illustration in Figure 4.3 is an ADR process bar chart showing changes in the number of cases handled by CEDR⁸⁾ in the UK. Cases of mediation have increased by 80 per cent average annual growth rate over the past three years.

⁷⁾ By the end of 1977, nine disputes had been mediated. Another nine cases were mediated in 1978, and eighteen cases more were mediated in 1979. By mid-1984, mediator and facilitators had been involved in over 160 disputes (Bingham, 1987, p.314).

⁸⁾ CEDR is one of the leading organisations in the field of ADR, dispute management and conflict prevention in the UK (CEDR, 1998).

Figure 4-3. Trend of mediated cases (Sept. 1995-Sept. 1998)



Source: CEDR (1999), Highlight (1997-1998)

3. Institutionalisation of ADR procedure

At the outset, environmental dispute resolution (EDR) has been used on an ad hoc, case by case basis. Entering into the middle of the 1980s, negotiation and mediation procedures have been written into statutes governing environment issues. Even into the early 1980s, most dispute resolution services were offered at low or no cost to the disputants by foundation-sponsored, non-profit private or university-based institutions in the USA. The Ford Foundation, for instance, founded the National Institution of Dispute Resolution (NIDR), one of the organisations most responsible for establishing and guiding the direction of the public conflict resolution field (Susskind and Secunda, 1998, p.21).

The growing public interest in mediation, consensus-building and other innovative processes for managing disagreement produced a demand for training in an energising set of conflict management skills. In the early 1980s mounting dissatisfaction with federal rule making propelled the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS) to recommend agencies to adapt new procedures based on the principles of negotiation. In the latter part of the 1980s, many agencies began implementing collaborative decision-making processes. The Congress enacted the 'Negotiated Rulemaking Action' in 1990 to legitimise this alternative approach to regulatory decision-making, and the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act Public Law (104-552) was enacted in 1990. In accordance with the Act, federal government agencies should introduce ADR approaches and search for methods to apply the Act (*Planning and Policy*, 1999, p.39).

On the other hand, in the UK, Environment Select Committee has encouraged the use of mediation to address dispute relating to tourism and environment (Ingram, 1998, p.117). A few government bodies have initiated research in areas that could benefit from consensus building.⁹⁾ In the middle of such a new tendency, ADR has also been visible in the landscape of litigation procedures, with the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR),¹⁰⁾ which give judges the power to stay proceedings to allow for negotiation and ADR efforts, coming into force in 1999. ADR could potentially become a mainstream process in all judicial proceedings.¹¹⁾ Countries that have established a long experience of ADR seem to have a tendency to institutionalise ADR beyond a case-by-case basis.

4. *Variety of ADR application*

ADR has helped ordinary people to resolve disputes without the expense, uncertainty or anxiety associated with litigation. To date the ADR process has expanded into other fields, thus is frequently employed in almost all dispute fields. Although ADR methods have focused most on interpersonal disputes arising typically between neighbours or among several community members, the range of application of ADR has been widening toward the field of public disputes (*Estates Gazette*, 1998). According to Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.24), 'the activity that characterised the mid-1980s transformed dispute resolution and consensus building in the public sector. The arenas where public dispute resolutions were first introduced also underwent dramatic change'. In this way the use and application of ADR has been considerably increased since EDR was introduced to help resolve environmental disputes. According to Moore (1998, p.183), the range of application now included educational, approval, jurisdictional, cultural, economic, regional and urban development disputes as well as environmental disputes: water development, allocation and use; air quality; land use; development; habitat and species protection; irrigation systems operation; forest management; transportation development, and a range of other issues.

In the United States and in Britain the use of ADR is supported and encouraged by central government. In the USA, for instance, the introduction of ADR is either

⁹⁾ For example, the DOE circulated a consultation document about the possibility of using mediation to resolve planning disputes which would lead to an approval in 1997.

¹⁰⁾ After 26 April 1999, there may even be financial penalties for parties who unreasonably refuse to participate in mediation.

required of federal ministries and government agencies or is encouraged.¹²⁾ Thus the public sector is playing an important part in the growing acceptance of ADR in management practice. Currently eight different departments¹³⁾ in the UK government are running ADR pilot schemes, incorporating ADR clauses into their contracts. 'The ADR debate is no longer a philosophical one of whether or not mediation will become a mainstream tool in the resolution of disputes. It has now proven itself to be a useful technique in the simplest or most complex, bi-party or multi-party disputes whether on a high emotional or purely technical level'¹⁴⁾ (CEDR, 1998).

5. The diffusion of ADR (EDR)

ADR has become a world-wide approach for conflict resolution. It originated in the USA, and has become a rapidly growing professional field in that country; from there it was introduced to European countries. ADR has been since been established and practised in many other countries on an ad hoc basis and is clearly a growing field. In the UK, the demand for consensus-building in the environmental and public policy area has grown dramatically over the last five years. 'Experience to date is most noticeable for the breath and depth of examples, rather than frequent use in one area. Projects are being initiated at all levels and by many sectors' (Ingram, 1999, p.113). Many developing nations have begun to modify their dispute resolution approaches and procedures and adapt western models of conflict management. As Moore (1998, p.160) has commented 'these new social technologies have enabled government agencies, citizens, public interest groups and the private sector to work together to respond to environmental issues and strive for collaborative and mutually acceptable solution'.

As mentioned above, developing countries have more recently been testing the application of ADR in to their regional developments and environmental issues.

¹¹⁾ It reflects the current practice of some judges in the Commercial Court, the Technology and Construction Court and the Central London County Court which have led the way in ADR initiatives.

¹²⁾ In the US in accordance with a federal Memorandum (1998), each government agency is actively to use an ADR approach and is to implement 'Negotiated Rule-making' between interested parties. In the UK, just as ADR is becoming accepted as a case management tool for the judiciary, so too the public sector is taking ADR into the heart of its management structure (CEDR, 1999).

¹³⁾ The DOE is testing the use of mediation in planning actions; the DOTI has incorporated reference to ADR use in government analysis on competitiveness; the DFID has used ADR in a number of its projects and considers ADR as an important part of internal disputes procedures; the Independent Housing Ombudsman Scheme uses CEDR as an independent mediation service, etc.

Because of some characteristics of environmental disputes themselves and world trends regarding public participation and democratisation, many traditional command (i.e. public sector) decision-making models have found it difficult to reconcile different interests and to find fair and mutually acceptable solutions to environmental disputes. Thus the ADR method has been used actively under the name of 'EDR' in the field of environmental conflict and, in fact, almost every nation had introduced a form of EDR by the early 1990s.

Although the application of ADR had not been actively pursued in the public sector, the Third World already had some experience with mediation in civil courts for family and neighbour matters. In China, disputes are resolved almost exclusively through negotiation and conciliation is a preferred way. The Japanese system derived from Germany does not favour litigation because these conditions do not encourage the making up of losses and prefers techniques leading to acceptable compromise solutions. Conciliation and mediation are more the usual way of settling dispute. Thailand is a 'non-litigation country', although the court case-load is fast increasing. The country is keen to pressure the relations between people and shuns from formal litigation. In New Zealand disputes are disposed of either through litigation in the courts, through arbitration or through negotiation (Hwang, 1994).

Many countries have used ADR methods within conflicts of commercial, family or neighbour disputes. On the basis of such experience, each country has taken a growing interest in ADR processes in multi-party disputes, including regional planning and development. Nowadays, the ADR approach is becoming worldwide phenomena covering many different subjects of dispute and contentious issue.

4.4.4. ADR Skills and Techniques

To address, manage, and resolve environmental disputes, various methods including 'dialogue', 'argumentation', 'negotiation', 'contest', 'mock battles', 'mediation' and 'arbitration' are used (Moore, 1998, p.175). Although methods of ADR are very diverse, basically ADR is based on negotiation. In an ADR approach, according to Acland and Hickling (1997 [in Ingram, 1998, p.148]), 'the two basic ingredients are mediation and facilitation. In essence, mediation skills are used to help resolve

¹⁴⁾ In multi-party dispute including planning and development, environmental disputes, public disputes and multi-cultural disputes, the cases mediated by CEDR have risen from 11 per cent in 1997 to 16 per cent of total cases in 1998.

disputes where anger and emotions are running high. Facilitation skills and techniques are used to help large groups of people reach consensus decisions’.

The success of mediation often depends heavily on the skills of the mediator. Ingram (1998, p.148) stated, ‘listening, empathising and questioning are considered essential skills for a facilitator or mediator. The skills are essential for the parties to dispute as well as the mediators’. Facilitation and mediation techniques that aim to enable large groups of people to work together to develop joint plans and reach agreement, have been developed recently. She (pp.148-150) pointed out four examples of basic techniques ¹⁵⁾ that are increasingly being recognised.

On the other hand, Sandman (1987, pp.341-2) introduced new communication methods for ADR resolution. There are a wide variety of all-purpose methodologies for developing means to facilitate interaction, communication, trust and agreement. These methods are tools that are available to anyone interested in making negotiation more likely or more successful. They include: Delphi methodology; role-playing; gaming-simulation; co-orientation; efficacy-building; focus groups; fact-finding; participatory planning; feeling acceptance; school intervention; behavioural commitment; and, environmental advocacy.

Poirier Elliott (1999, pp.216-218) designed and managed a participatory or conflict resolution process in very different ways, depending on the foci of the process in public policy. ‘Processes can adopt a problem-solving focus, a relationship-building focus, both, or neither. The process design can vary considerably by objectives which can include information sharing, knowledge acquisition, problem-solving, visioning, agreement seeking, and community building. These objectives lead to processes that are stylised rhetorical, inter-actional and communicative, or dynamic and transformative’. Many methods of ADR introduced for resolving multiple and complex conflicts mainly emphasise the prevention of conflict rather than settlement of

¹⁵⁾ . *Metaplan*: this is a powerful way for a group to build a joint picture of members’ issues and concerns. Two methods include the use of small pieces of paper or card, pinned or stuck to a wall or screen, and, the use of small, brightly coloured stickers to prioritise lists.

. *Carousel*: this has been developed as an efficient way to generate creativity among a large group of people in a way that ensures that all contribute and build on each other’s ideas. It involves creating a number of subgroups, giving a task, and allotting to each a particular space as its home base.

. *Common-grounding*: This is used to develop consensus on the various solutions. An essential component is a visual presentation of the various solutions and the common ground on flip charts.

. *Management of uncertainty*: Uncertainty is always a factor in any complex situation and the shared management, and resolution of uncertainty is a step towards building a consensus. There are three types: uncertainty about the facts of a situation; uncertainty about what values are involved; uncertainty about related issues and decisions.

conflict. The combined application of these skills and techniques has proved a powerful and successful approach to address complex, multi-party environmental problems.

4.4.5. Why is ADR Important? (Strength of ADR)

Some scholars focus on the merits and benefits of ADR¹⁶⁾ (Wood 1995; Ingram 1998), commenting that it can be “something better”, “more accessible and understandable” to the lay person, less adversarial, expensive and time-consuming, and more likely to produce an outcome that matches the interests of the disputants than litigation or other traditional mechanisms. Ingram (1998, p.138), for instance, argues that the benefits of ADR are likely to be as follows: the cost, delays, loss of control, and anxiety associated with adversarial procedures are considerably reduced; ADR generates a wide sense of responsibility among parties to find a solution that they can all live with; there is a wide sense of ownership for the solution and commitment to its implementation; the process can enhance participatory democracy; a shared understanding of the issues and develops result in parties build trust with one another; relationship are improved and parties develop better decisions. Besides, mediation can be used before, or during, litigation or arbitration proceedings. A mediated settlement allows for imaginative and creative solutions, such as re-negotiation of terms, of give and take, a reappointment on another deal. This is often described as the ‘win/win’ outcome (*Estates Gazette*, 1999, p.117).

Basically the ADR approach establishes co-operative relationships between disputants. Any strengths or benefits of ADR have to include the following elements: an ADR is a voluntarily intercession, so there are few dissatisfactions; it saves time and money because the dispute is resolved within a relatively short period of time; it allows for imaginative solutions and/or creating value, confidentiality and flexibility.

1. *Time and money saving*: Among many benefits, the saving of time and money are the most indicated benefit (Merinitz, 1980; Bingham, 1986; Army, 1987; Wood, 1995; Campell and Floyd, 1996; Ingram, 1998). Resolution through ADR frequently enables the parties to eliminate or minimise the expense of discovery and motion practice and to reach an acceptable resolution earlier in the process.

2. *Wise resolution of differences (Satisfaction of parties)*: Resolution by ADR is suitable for complex conflicts involving many parties and large stakeholders as well as routine disputes. According to Ingram (1998, p.114), ‘traditional consultation and decision-making process leave interested parties and the public not only dissatisfied with the final decision, but also frustrated by the process by which they were reached’. The ADR process generates a wide sense of responsibility and acceptable solution, so that parties have a wide sense of ownership of the solutions and of commitment to their agreement.

3. *Continue better relationships*: Litigation can block the communication between disputants, and it causes further damage to an ongoing relationship, while ADR can improve relationships, which helps in the management of future complex problems. ADR is a way of improving communication and preserving or restoring ongoing relationships.

4. *Creative value and brainstorming future possibilities*: In court-like proceedings, narrow questions or interests are decided within the framework of law. Most courtroom time is spent in ascertaining past facts, not in increasing value or brainstorming future possibilities. Judges’ decisions may not address or satisfy any parties’ interests. While ADR settlement allows for imaginative and creative solutions, and is designed to maximise joint gains for all stakeholders.

4.4.6. The Weaknesses of ADR

Despite the benefits, popularity and universality of ADR discussed above, there are also identified weaknesses. Many scholars have pointed out that the ADR approach has its weak points (e.g. Bingham, 1987; Gladwin, 1987; Susskind and Secunda, 1998), and there are some recognised obstacles to the introduction of ADR approaches (Moore, 1998).

According to Bingham (1987, p.321), although ADR approaches are cheaper and faster than litigation, there is little empirical evidence to support this assertion. He asserted that ‘very little information existed about how long it took either to mediate or to litigate disputes, and also there were several conceptual problems in comparing

¹⁶⁰ According to *Estates Gazette* (1999, p.117), it enumerates the benefits of mediation as speed, cost,

EDR to litigation. Some mediated disputes have been resolved quickly, but voluntary dispute resolution processes are not necessarily fast if the issues are complex'. A more efficient process may not be more desirable if it leads to significantly poorer decisions in the view of one or all of the parties.

Gladwin (1987, p.32) has commented that 'mediation may be appropriate or feasible in only a very small share of the disputes'. He argued that mediation may be best or perhaps only be suited for disputes reflecting low conflict of interest, a sense of shared goals, an absence of precedents at stake, relatively equal distribution of power, a relative lack of time pressure, a common interest in finding the 'correct' or 'best' solution, an acceptance of each party's legitimacy, issues which are relatively concrete, tangible, non-ideological, and negotiable, and a mature phase of conflict.

According to Susskind and Secunda (1998, pp.38-40), EDR solutions are neither precedent-setting nor definitive. These authors have enumerated the perceived weaknesses of EDR and presented some rebuttals to the weakness. At first, EDR can appear expensive in terms of the front-end investment of time required, due to pre-mediation assessment of conflict for effectiveness of mediation. Secondly, stakeholders' suspicion of the process can make them reluctant to participate due to poor understanding about EDR. Thirdly, EDR may be unsuitable in situations involving dramatic asymmetries of power. Moore (1998) has also pointed out that there might be many further problems of ADR, including: the privatisation of public functions; lack of fairness or social justice; not necessarily more efficient or less costly; and, the informal binding feature of ADR.

4.4.7. The Development of ADR in Developing Countries

In the future, it seems that the increasing interest in ADR process will continue, and ADR may play an important role in settling many conflicts concerned with public policies such as the environment, social economy and regional developments. What then are the requirements for further development of ADR methods? In order for ADR to evolve from an interesting idea to a more effective and broadly available option, a number of specific steps must be taken.

According to Moore (1998, p.187), there may be some barriers to implementation of ADR. These include a weak or under-defined legal and regulatory

confidentiality, flexibility and creativity.

environment; resistance by potential parties; and lack of resources such as financial, personnel, skills and technical knowledge. Indeed, Moore (1998, pp.187-191) argues that, 'as the field of EDR grows and matures in the developing world, and innovations and applications increase, a number of issues have emerged that will need be addressed'. Among those he suggests for the development of ADR are: (i) developing appropriate ADR approaches for cultural situations, issues, institutional arrangement and participants that the ADR process is supposed to serve; (ii) governmental agencies to convene parties to a dispute, to initiate a process, provide a relatively predictable system and prepare defined legal and regulatory systems; (iii) the creativity and foresight of practitioners, decision-makers and other stakeholders; and, (iv) reinforcing the resources available to government agencies and public interest groups.

4.4.8. Summary

The ADR approach has proved its value in dispute resolution over the last two decades in developed countries and has obviously been a growing field in the developing world. This voluntary and co-operative approach has already had significant successes in addressing and resolving a wide range of public disputes including the areas of planning, policy development and facility location.

In court-like proceedings, narrow questions or interests are decided within the framework of the law and most time is spent ascertaining past facts, not in creating value or brainstorming further possibilities. Court-based adjudication is explicitly adversarial, and disputes perceived by the respective advocates are "zero-sum". ADR procedures and reviews, however, give superior results to participants, particularly when measured in terms of the satisfaction of the parties. ADR offers better odds that the process is designed to maximise joint gains for all stakeholders. In environmental conflicts, EDR can resolve disputes more efficiently in terms of the time and money expended and in terms of relationships maintained. EDR's integrative processes can be transforming for the parties involved; long-term professional relationships can be enhanced, leading to even greater efficiencies in preventing and/or resolving future disputes. These are significant advantages, since most environmental disputes occur among parties that are likely to be locked into on going relationships.

ADR can be a good alternative to court judgement, but it is not panacea for conflict resolution and has some weak points. As Moore (1998) has pointed out, since

there are some barriers and problems to implementation of ADR (EDR) procedures, public organisations or administrators in developing countries cannot simply adapt existing ADR strategies without thought about the nature of the conflicts with which they are concerned. However, ADR has been a new mainstream approach to resolving environmental disputes and produces solutions that are neither precedent-setting nor definitive. Despite some barriers and obstacles, ADR will continue to grow substantially around world. This trend has been derived from democratisation and decentralisation as well as from practical necessities such as saving of time and money and raising satisfaction levels among disputants.

4.5. The Role of Government in Conflict Resolution

Because spatial planning or policy is largely carried out and established by public organisations (i.e. government), many conflicts concerned with urban and regional development can be categorised as inter-governmental conflicts, while other conflicts primarily involve governments and private sector interests or civil society elements. The procedural responsibilities for spatial plans and policies rests with public bodies (although the focus and content of plans and policies may be open to external advice and influence) and given the issues dealt with such bodies easily become major participants in conflicts related to spatial plans or policies.

What then is/are government's role(s) in the process of conflicts? A lead can be given by the view that a government's role is deeply related to its behaviour, which can be categorised into three types: (i) being an interested audience to the conflict, such as observer or onlooker; (ii) being a direct and involved actor; (iii) being a third party related to conflict resolution functions, such as an arbitrator, mediator or facilitator (Table 4.3).

Table 4-3. Roles of government in conflictual situations

Categories	Roles of government
Audience	Observer, onlooker, assistance, sympathetic or non-sympathetic
Direct actor	Proponent, opponent, supporter
Third party	Facilitator, mediator, arbitrator, authority commander, advisor, communicator, manipulator.

The first role is of government as an outsider to a conflict. 'The observer's role is analogous to the neutral competency role defined by one school of public

administration theorists. In this role, public servants execute the will of the people from their non-partisan stance' (Lan, 1997, p.31). In these circumstances governments do not participate in disputes, they assume a wait-and-see attitude. There can be two aspects to such attitudes. First, the government can take an interest in the concerned conflict and minutely watch the development of the situation. In this case, if the government is asked by either party in a conflict to pass something on or hand something over, it can participate in the conflict quickly, faithfully, and with no biases against either party to the conflict. The role of government moves from a simple observer to a third party such as facilitator or mediator. Secondly, when the government is not a party to a conflict and does not want to be implicated in the conflict. In this case, the government continues to stay outside the conflict, and it may ignore and avoid the conflict. However, if the conflict grows and becomes a social problem, the government often tends to take legal steps rather than provide administrative guidance or mediation for conflict resolution. Although 'the observer's role reinforces the powerless, alienated, 'office boy' image of the bureaucrat'(Rohr, 1978, p.63), it is often 'a more appropriate role for public administrators than other possible alternatives' (Lan, 1987, p.32).

The next role is as a third party. In intergovernmental conflicts, government often takes part in a conflict as a third party. When the progress of direct negotiation for conflict resolution is not smooth, third party intervention can influence the result of conflict in a positive way. In such a context, the government's role, as a third party, is a wide-ranging one, and at the stage of impasse (in Korea at least), central government's intervention can be the sole method for conflict resolution. Lan (1987, p.32) has pointed out that this role was analogous to a public administrators' role as the governor of the state (Table 4.4). When the duties of public administrators call them to act as arbitrators, they work to seek a resolution that will reflect justice, public interest, regime values, trustworthiness, and righteousness, or at minimum, a resolution that will be accepted by the parties to the conflict. This role gives administrators the position and power to deal with strategies such as persuasion, arbitration, value assertion, and value inculcation to resolve the conflict in favour of the desired goals of the community.

The third role is equivalent to the political role of administrators. According to Krislow (1974 [in Lan, 1987, p.32]), 'public administration often represents different

political forces by way of active and passive representation'. When public officials have a strong opinion or stake in a conflict, and the conflict is within the boundaries of their jurisdiction or law for them to deal with as their concern, they should take part in the conflict as direct parties based on their legal, positional, and constructional right to seek a resolution in their favour. Since many governments established spatial plans and implement them, they have an interest in most conflicts concerned with regional or urban development, hence the administrative power of the executive officials needs to be checked by legislative, judicial, and organised interest powers.

Table 4-4. Role of public administrators

Perspectives of public administration	Role of public administration
Managerial approach	Observers of conflict
Legal approach	Arbitrator in conflict resolution
Political approach	Parties to conflict

Source: Lan (1997) p.32

According to Lan (1997, p.33), as a matter of course, few public administrators have been adequately exposed to the skills and rationales of conflict resolution. He (p.31) indicated that formal public administration programmes had very limited course offerings in conflict resolution. Many administrators would adopt a decision rule of conflict avoidance. Rather than actively identifying and analysing conflicts and seeking strategies to resolve them, many had actually given up on their constitutional responsibility. Accordingly, the administrators' role as conflict resolvers was limited and generally they stood in a weak position, frequently using strategies such as avoidance, ignorance suppression and conquest.

However, in fact, when government officials try to promote mediated processes, they often run into suspicions and problems. 'What they propose as a neutral and unbiased consensus building process can be interpreted by the public as anything but that. The public often has little love for government, little trust in city hall, and certainly no inclination to assume that officially sponsored dispute resolution processes will be unbiased' (Forester, 1999, p.467).

Consequently, the mixed functions of public administrators as conflict resolvers, observers and parties to conflict often confuse public administrators themselves as well as complicating the public expectations of them. When local authority planners and developers reach deadlock over a proposed development, there

are four possible outcomes: continuing discussions; appeal to authority; losing interest and walk away; and possibility of ADR method. For relationships between proponents, executives and stakeholders to become less adversarial, new methods must be found to resolve planning and development disputes.

4.6. Conclusions

Like an organism, conflict also goes through characteristic stages of birth, development, flourishing, degeneration and termination. Most strategies and methods for conflict resolution are mainly concerned with the stage of development and flourishing which can be classified into 'issue', 'dispute' and 'impasse'. Usually as the intensity of conflict increases (issue→ dispute→ impasse), the possible range of methods for conflict resolution gradually becomes narrower, and the application of various strategies and methods are more and more restricted. Consequently, conflict resolution becomes more difficult. These conditions form the Central Premise to be used in establishing a framework to analyse the six case studies of regional development/environmental projects in Korea.

Central Premise: *The intensity of conflict is the critical factor in conflict settlement, and the more intensive the degree of conflict, the more difficult is conflict resolution (see section 7.2).*

The techniques in used in regional development conflicts are mostly concentrated on the following basic variables: actors (stakeholders, representatives and outsiders); the conflict issue; and strategies and tactics. Through the review of literature, sub-premises related to these variables for conflict resolution were also formed. At first, it is difficult to resolve multi-parties conflicts related to environmental issues and regional developments through negotiation or bargaining because parties' interests can differ greatly, and the identification of stakeholders is not easy. This finding leads to the suggestion of a Premise about the relationship between the number of actors involved and the difficulty of resolving the dispute satisfactorily:

Premise F: *The more the number of stakeholders and parties involved, the more difficult is conflict resolution.*

Secondly, the issues related to regional development are frequently complex, and the scale of issues is wide. In multi-parties conflicts, many stakeholders generate issues advantageous to themselves, and they have a tendency to increase number of the issues reviewing reconciliation. When the priority of issues is obscure, and when the scale of issue is of national concern, conflict resolution becomes more difficult.

Premise G: *The more complex the issues of conflict and the more large the scale of issues, the more difficult is conflict resolution.*

Thirdly, there are various strategies for conflict resolution, but the most effective and satisfactory methods may well be the less coercive and voluntary strategies, such as consensus building, collaboration and direct bargaining. Strategies concentrating on forcing solutions or disregarding other parties may make conflict resolution difficult.

Premise H: *The more coercive the strategies and tactics, the more the conflict has a tendency to become aggravated, and the more difficult is conflict resolution.*

Finally, time is a critical element in the process of conflict. As a conflict progresses from the stage of issue to the stage of impasse, the opportunity to negotiate directly about matters related to the conflict becomes smaller, while the possibility of third party intervention becomes higher.

Premise I: *The more intensive the degree of conflict, the more likely there will be third party intervention.*

The review of conflict resolution in this chapter will be used as a basis for understanding and analysing methods of conflict resolution in conflicts related to regional development/environment projects in Korea (Chapter 5). The review also supplies the basic knowledge for considering the experience of ADR approaches and central government's role in conflict resolution in Korea (Chapter 6), and further provides some ideas for establishing Research Premises to be used to establish an analytical framework for case studies which explore the variables influencing conflict resolution (see section 7.2).

Chapter 5. The System of Spatial Planning and Development Policy in Korea

5.1. Introduction

The aims of this chapter are to examine the Korean spatial planning system and those policies which have influences on planning conflicts and to provide a basic background of understanding of the experiences of conflict related to regional developments in Korea which will be discussed later in the thesis (Chapter 6). The essential questions to be addressed are: ‘what are the characteristics of regional (spatial) planning in Korea’, and ‘how do these characteristics influence conflicts related to regional developments?’

According to Rydin (1998, p.1), regional planning is a future-oriented, primarily public sector activity, focused on the physical environment. Such characteristics suggest that spatial planning and policy inevitably contain some conflicts within themselves. As Goverde (1992, p.3) has commented, ‘spatial planning and development are concerned with the management of conflicts that are presented in a spatial form’. Usually, the root causes of regional conflict are derived from an irrational distribution of costs-benefits and unbalanced regional developments implemented by governments. In the light of this view, conflicts in regional developments and policies are largely concerned with regional interests and have aspects of intergovernmental conflicts. The introduction of local autonomy in Korea had a great influence on the intergovernmental relations and the environment of regional planning, and consequently these changes supplied a fertile soil for intergovernmental conflicts (Chapter 2).

The major national plans in Korea comprise the *Socio-Economic Development Plan* (SEDP) and the *National Land Development Plan* (NLDP). The former covers the whole fields of national economy and social welfare such as economic development, trade, industrial development, education and labour training, prosperity, science and investment of social overhead capital (SOC). The latter provides spatial guidelines for long-term policies to utilise, develop and preserve the national land. Therefore the plan deals with matters related to spatial policies and developments such as the constructions and supplies of SOC, industrial locations, transportation and information networks, living necessities, environmental management, land use

management and guidelines for regional planning. At a more local level an *Urban Plan* is the basic spatial plans. In addition, there are other spatial plans based on every kind of special laws and administrative plans.

Although regional policy and planning were introduced for balanced regional development in Korea, the policy and planning neither coped with, nor managed the country's regional problems appropriately. These are factors which might partially contribute to conflict over the last four decades. The criticism of past regional policies has been gradually growing after the democratisation and localisation in Korea. In particular the failure of balanced regional development has led to many serious disputes about the future interests between regions or between local authorities. As a result, acute interregional conflicts have given the opportunity for government to reconsider its past policies.

In this chapter, the system of spatial plans, regional policies and the effects of regional development are discussed. At first, in order to understand the spatial system and the character regional developments in Korea, the history of spatial plans, the process and the administrative system of spatial planning related to the NLDP are examined. The next part deals with the success and failure of the past regional policies and developments in Korea under the prerequisite that a regional disparity may be a major cause of interest conflicts. This section can help in understanding the conflicts that take place relating to regional interests and the case studies to be reported on in Chapters 8-10. The final section refers to controversial points in spatial plans and suggests some directions for spatial policy in the future.

5.2. The History of Spatial Planning in Korea

The Korean national planning system was established in the early 1960s when the country's Economic Development Plan was first launched. Until this time Korea was very poor and there was little infrastructure. According to the *Urban District Planning Rule*,¹⁾ 'formal urban planning was established in 25 cities in the 1950s, which secured the housing and residential areas for accommodating a great number of refugees and recovering from Korean War' (Kim *et al*, 1998, p.76). In 1962, Korean government launched the *First Five-Year Economic Development Plan* (1962-1966)

¹⁾ This rule, formulated under the Japanese Colonial Rule era, was used through the 1950s and was only abolished in 1962 when the Urban Plan Act was enacted.

with an emphasis on expanding labour intensive light manufacturing and promoting economic self-sufficiency. From this time the government came to realise the necessity of a master plan for national physical development to carry out industrialisation and economic development and began to implement a new scale of development in the 1960s (ROK, 1992, p.8).

The *Urban Planning Act* (1962), the *Construction Law* (1963) and the *Comprehensive National Land Development Planning Law* (CNLDPL) (1963)²⁾ provided the legal basics for spatial development projects. At first, in order to utilise the endowed national resources more efficiently and to develop the potential of large cities for achieving faster economic growth, the government designed six Special Development Areas from 1965 to 1967 before formulating the National Land Development Plan (NLDP). The *First Comprehensive National Land Development Plan*, which was the substantive start of spatial planning in Korea, was completed in 1971; the target period for the plan was from 1972 to 1981. Since 1972 the National Plans have subsequently been formulated every ten years (Table 5.1).

Table 5-1. The chronology of national development plans

Plans	Finalisation	Period	Major Goals
The 1 st NLDP	1971	1972-81	. Establishment of bases for economic growth
The 2 nd NLDP	1981	1982-91	. Balanced development/ Improvement of social welfare
The Revised 2 nd	1986	1987-91	. Regional Economic Cluster . Improvement of social welfare
The 3 rd NLDP	1991	1992-01	. Regionally decentralised development . Efficient national land use . Improving the quality of living environment . Preparing for unification of Korea

Source: ROK (1991), *The Third Comprehensive National Development Plan* (1992-2001), p.2.

On the other hand, to foster local economy through manufacturing and to decentralise the population and industry of the Seoul capital region, the *Provincial Industry Development Act* (1970), the *Industrial Estate Promotion Law* (1973) and the *Industrial Distribution Act* (1977) were established. In 1978, the *National Land Use*

²⁾ A comprehensive national development plan in accordance with the CNLDPL was not formulated until the early 1970s.

and Management Law (NLUML) was designed to outline broad guidelines for national land use planning.

5.2.1. The First National Development Plan (1972-1981)

Reflecting the socio-economic situation of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the most important goals of the first National Development Plan were to build a foundation for economic growth and to improve the efficiency of land use. In order to achieve such goals, the Plan's authors put their emphasis on establishing large industrial complexes, expanding transportation and communication networks, and enlarging energy supply and water resources.

5.2.2. The Second National Plan (1982-1991)

The Second Plan was finalised in 1981 after the rapid economic growth of the 1970s. To diminish the regional disparities induced by the implementation of the first NDP, the goals of the second Plan were to attain a more balanced regional development and to improve social welfare. For these goals 'the concept of an integrated service delivery area was introduced to provide urban areas and their outlying rural residents with a proper levels of various urban services' (Lee, 1995, p.38).

In order to take into account of changes in socio-economic environments during the early 1980s and to incorporate some of the goals of the *Sixth Five-Year Socio-Economic Development Plan* (SEDP)(1986-1991), the second Plan was modified in 1986. 'The basic goals of the revised plan were the same as the original plan, but initial development strategies of growth pole cities were replaced by balanced regional development strategies and some other strategies including wide-area development, localisation and local autonomy' (ROK, 1992, p.10).

5.2.3. The Third National Plan (1992-2001)

Based on the results of the previous two plans as well as the condition of the country, the third Plan was published in 1991. The major goal of the Plan was to promote a balanced national development: productive and resource conserving land utilisation; enhancement of social welfare and environmental quality; cultivation of a concrete

foundation for national reunification. At present this Plan is being implemented together with the 8th SEDP.

5.3. The Structure of Spatial Plans

Since the CNLDPL was enacted in 1963, the structure of Korean spatial planning has changed with changes in national circumstances. Many new plans have been prepared and the existing structure of planning has been amended. The current system of spatial plans is quite complex; it includes the National Development Plan established on the base of CNLDPL, individual plans under every kind of special law and administrative plans (Table 5.2). The right to prepare major spatial policies and plans (NLDP, designation of special purposed districts and planning related to national interests or those relating to more than two provinces) is concentrated into central government through the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT). Responsibility for other plans is allocated to different establishment authorities (see Appendix 2). In Korea, rather different to the British structure, ³⁾ the MOCT controls most spatial plans.

Table 5-2. Characteristics of spatial plans

Plans		Sphere	Related Law	Organisation	Period
CNLDP	National plan	Country(2 provinces)	CNLDPL	MOCT	10 years
	Special Area Plan	Special area	CNLDPL	MOCT	5-30 years
	Provincial plan	Province(2 cities)	CNLDPL	Governor	10 years
	City/county plan	City, county	CNLDPL	Mayor. Head	10 years
Wide region plan		8 Wide area	RVDL	MOCT. Govr.	-
Capital region plan		Seoul, <i>Inchun</i> , <i>Kyunggi-Do</i>	CRML	MOCT	97-2011
Dev. Promotion District plan		Designated district (22 areas)	RVDL	Governor	98-2003
<i>Jeju</i> island plan		<i>Jeju-Do</i>	JIDSL	Governor	98-2001
Agrarian villages plan		City & County	FAVDSL	Mayor. Head	-
Island & Hinterland Plan		Island & Hinterland	I&HDPL	Governor	-
Urban Master Plan		Designated urban district	TPZA	Mayor. Head	20 years
Urban Plan/ Implementation		Designated urban district	TPZA	Mayor. Head	5years
Western Coastal Zone Plan		Western Coastal Zone	Admi. Plan	MOCT	89 –2001

Source: Based on Yun 1999, p.28

5.3.1. National Land Development Plan (NLDP)

The Korean NLDP is legally based on powers set out in paragraph 2 of Article 120 of *Korean Constitution* and expanded on in the *Comprehensive National Land Development Planning Law* (CNLDPL). According to the Law, the NLDP has

priority over all spatial plans and becomes the fundamental plan of all types of spatial plans. The objectives of the NLDP are to utilise, manage and conserve the national land: to secure an adequate industrial base and good living environment; and, to promote prosperity of the nation and people (CNLDPL Sect.1).⁴⁾ The characteristics of the NLDP can be broadly divided into four aspects: (i) to present master plan for national development for the next ten year period; (ii) to provide direction in long-term and comprehensive policies concerning utilisation and conservation of national land; (iii) to offer guidelines on related plans of both central and local governments; and, (iv) to build a basis for investment in major projects and improvement of related systems.

National development planning in Korea is currently separated into plans for the whole country and plans for local areas. The former include the national plan and plans for districts which have been specially designated by central government, while the latter involves plans for the provinces, for cities and counties (*Gun*) (CNLDPL Sect. 3):

1. *National plan*: After seeking and integrating planning suggestions from local governments and taking national goals and policies into account, the MOCT establishes the National Plan. According to the hierarchical planning system of the NLDP, the National Plan provides development indicators and guidelines for other plans; it also includes detailed programmes of national projects such as transportation, area-wide water supply system, large-scale industrial location. The National Plan thus becomes a fundamental component of special district plans and provincial plans.

2. *Special district plans*: the MOCT designates special districts and prepares plans for them. The specific conditions for designating special district are as follows: areas

³⁾ In the planning system in England, the central government (Secretary of State) provides national and regional planning guidance and does not directly establish plans related to local spatial policy (Cullingworth and Nadin, 1994, pp.60-61) (see Appendix 3).

⁴⁾ In order to accomplish these objectives, the CNLDPL requires a synthesis of physical policies and contents to be achieved in the plan as follows (CNLDPL Sect.2): development of both urban and rural areas, and overall structure and size of human settlement; development and conservation of land, water, and other natural resources; prevention from flood and wind damage, and other natural calamities; industrial location and development; size of facilities needed for an industrial base and economic development and; provision of an adequate supply of basic needs essential for the enrichment of culture, public welfare and recreation.

needed for developments and utilities of natural resources: areas required industrial fostering and disaster prevention; areas needed for the country's interests for national socio-economic purpose. According as the above conditions, the government has designated depressed areas, areas near the Demilitarised Zone (DMZ) and, areas needing development with a special purpose as specially designated areas.

3. *Provincial plans* (Special and Large Cities, Provinces): the governor or mayor as appropriate provide for the preparation of regional plans at the level of metropolitan cities or provinces. These plans express the guidance and requirements of the National Plan at their respective levels and give basic guidelines for local plans (city and county plans). These plans cover the whole provincial area or two counties (*Gun*) or more.

4. *City(Shi)-County(Gun) plans*: these are local plans prepared by the mayors or heads of counties to give shape to a plan for detailed implementation programmes. City and county plans are based on the upper-level plan and are confirmed by decision of the relevant local assembly of the city or county involved, and finally require the approval of the provincial governor.

5.3.2. Urban Planning

The first modern urban planning act was formulated for Korea in 1934 when Korea was under the rule of Japan (MOC ⁵⁾, 1986, p. 841). After the liberation from Japan in 1945, the act continued to be applied. At the beginning of the 1960s, however, as the National Economic Plan was launched, the *Urban Planning Act* 1963 (UPA) was enacted with the object of promoting systemic urban development and rational land. Under the terms of the Act, mayors and heads of counties formulate urban master plans to present a long term (20 years) direction of urban development and devise zoning plans, urban development plans and urban facilities plans (5 years). The UPA applies to the places designated with urban planning districts (561 districts, 14 928.7 km² in 1995), covering 14.1 per cent of the total national territory.

5.3.3. Plans Based on Individual Laws

1. *The Capital Region Management Plan*: This plan is based on the Capital Region Management Law 1982 (CRML) and is formulated on the bases of the indicators and guidelines provided in the national plan. The CRMP is prepared by central government (MOCT) and sets the priorities for other plans under special laws or administrative programs because the capital region possesses special characteristics and political and cultural importance. The primary purpose of the CRMP is to provide effective guidelines for physical development, land use, arrangement of infrastructure targeted for the capital metropolitan area. ‘The First Capital Region Management Plan’ was prepared and made public in 1984, and the second Plan (1997-2001) was formulated in 1997.

2. *Wider Area Development Plans*: With the progress of suburbanisation, the movement of people and goods between large cities and their surrounding areas have increased substantially in the last twenty years. According to the CNLDPL, in order to promote the integrated development of metropolitan cities and their surrounding areas, the upper level government has a right to make wider area development plans. In the second NLDP, the wider area development plan has been designated as a metropolitan area for integrated land use planning (ROK, 1992, p.30), and the third NLDP (1992-2001) has also adopted a wider area development scheme again. Kim and Cha (1996, p.33) have commented that ‘the main idea of the wider area scheme is to establish self-reliant regional economic bases which can play a more active role in the localisation and globalisation era’. The main characteristic of this type of plan is as an operational plan to provide for the supply and development of public utilities and an investment plan for such projects. The Korean government enacted the Regional Balance Development Law (RBDL) to enhance and facilitate the implementation of these plan in 1995.

3. *Development Promotion District Plans and other plans*: These plans are implemented as a balanced development scheme under the RBDL. Development promotion districts are designated in the outer metropolitan and more rural hinterlands

²¹ In 1993, the Ministry of Construction (MOC) was changed into the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT).

by the MOCT, while provincial governors prepare the plans. On the other hand, to improve the settlement environment of islands and hinterlands, governors also prepare provincial Island and Hinterland Development Plans (I & HDP), and mayors or heads of counties prepare county I & HDP under the control of Ministry of Home Affairs. In addition to these plans, the 'Jeju Island Comprehensive Development Plan' (1998-2001) was formulated by the Provincial Governor under the powers of the Jeju Island Development Special Law (1995), to establish the basis for a domestic and international tourist area, the reorganisation of the Island's economic structure and, the preservation of its natural environment. As an administrative plan, the MOCT prepared the 'Western Coastal Zone Development Plan' (WCZDP)(1989-2001) to provide the basis for a balanced regional development and the establishment of an advanced base for trade with China and Pacific Rim Region.

5.4. Problems of Spatial Planning System in Korea

There are a number of problems over spatial planning in Korea. First, the current spatial planning system is inadequate for the present situation. Since the CNLDPL was launched in 1963, there have been no major amendments in the national land plan system, although the environment of spatial planning has greatly changed e.g. the introduction of the Local Autonomy system in the 1990s and rapid progress in the globalisation of the economy and society. With democratisation, interest groups' power on the decision-making of physical development policy has been gradually growing. Therefore the current physical system which is centralised and complex, can not acclimatise itself to the new environmental changes.

Secondly, there are problems over the vagueness of the national physical planning purpose, the lack of clearly defined functions and the role of different levels of plans. The national plan has physical and spatial functions as well as economic and social development functions. Although it is appropriate that the national plan has a priority to strategic plans, policy-oriented plans and the national land use plan, the current National Plan concentrates on establishing detailed indices and fixing development projects. In some aspects, there is no difference from provincial plans. This leads to confusion about the role of physical planning between the different

levels of planning, whose result is conflicts between central and local governments and among local governments.⁶⁾

Thirdly, the spatial planning system is very complex, and plans for similar purposes run in great numbers. Many governmental agencies are involved in establishing and implementing the national plan, and the other spatial plans are also concerned with several departments in central government and local governments. Due to this complexity and the participation of so many agencies and bodies, it is very difficult for the MOCT, which is responsible for national and regional plans, to achieve its responsibilities of co-ordination and overall control (Lee, 1995, p.49). In addition, as Minnery (1985, p.61) has mentioned, the hierarchical structure of development plans allied with the two-tier structure of local government has led to clashes between the upper and lower levels. In some cases, different agencies or local governments prepare plans for the same regional space under different laws. Typical instances of this problem include relations between the capital region plan, the metropolitan (Seoul and Inchun) urban plans and the Gyunggi provincial plan and, relations between wider area and provincial plans. Such complexity of planning system and many involved government agencies often bring about intergovernmental conflicts.

Fourth is the lack of supporting measures to implement spatial plans. There are no allocated funds for the national and regional plans and no compulsory measures to implement the plans (Yun, 1997, p.135). The Economic Planning Board (EPB) has a responsibility for preparing the national budget, while the MOCT, as an agency for formulating and executing the plans, has no such right.

The fifth problem area is the high degree of centralisation of the organisational structure for planning. The CNLDPL empowers central government to prepare and make public a master plan for the national physical development at ten-year intervals. Through the NLDP, the government has attempted to exercise institutional leverage to guide the country's physical development (Lee, 1995, p.29). The government has also directly prepared major plans such as 'National Plan', 'Special Area Plan', 'Capital Region Plan', 'Wider Area Plan' and 'Western Coastal Zone Plan'. In addition, it has

⁶⁾ In Britain, structure plans have increasingly focused on specific land-use problems, rather than broad social and economic objectives. Local plans have embraced wide-ranging social and economic objectives, their proposals nevertheless are primarily about land allocation (Cullingworth and Nadin, 1994, p.52).

the right to approve every kind of local plan including provincial plans, development promotion district plans and urban plans. This centralised system leads to a uniformity of local plans without regard for local characteristics while regional policies have mostly been incorporated into the national development plan. Both these considerations are features of a retrogressive system in the local autonomy era.⁷⁾

The sixth problem is the long-term (10 years) national plan. Such long-term plans cannot deal with rapid changes in the wider environment for planning. It is a particular problem that the national development plan includes detailed projects and investment plans as well as guidelines and indices of development. The criticism is that this form of long-term plan is unsuitable for its purpose, namely, it may be trying to incorporate too much into a specific document. Usually, the plan becomes out of date and tends to lag behind current needs and conditions. Yun (1997, p.250) has pointed out that the period of plan is very flexible in some European countries. Healey (1986 [in Cullingworth and Nadin, 1994, p.55]) recognised similarly 'this call for more flexibility ... [to] reduce administrative discretion in the system by a planning framework which offered more certainly, clarity and consistency to private sector investors'.

The seventh problem is one of continuity between the different components of the planning system. Attempts to advance the role of the national plan have failed because of the different planning time between the national plan and provincial or county plans that can support the implementation of the national plan. In British circumstances it has been argued that the structure plan system has failed because of the different time scales for different public sector activities and uncertainty in recent years over long term investment planning.⁸⁾

The final problem in Korea is an absence of control and monitoring of the national plan. The national plan has in effect often become a 'paper work' plan only, used for its display effect to the public without serious consideration of the means for its implementation.

⁷⁾ In Britain the centralisation of policy-making continued into the 1990s, but as structure plans no longer require central approval. LPAs have more freedom to develop policies, although they have been warned not to adopt policies which conflict with national guidance (Cullingworth and Nadin, 1994, p.53).

⁸⁾ According to Cullingworth and Nadin (1994, p.54). 'Plans have certainly been slow in coming forward to statutory approval and adoption. The first structure plan cycle took fourteen years to complete: over the years 1981 to 1985 the time taken from the submission of structure plans to their final approval averaged 28 months in England. Many of plans were out of date by the time their processing was complete'.

5.5. The Reorganisation of the Spatial Development System

It is expected that the environments of spatial policy will continue to change greatly in Korea in the future; leading elements include: democratisation; localisation; globalisation and national unification. Competition among regions will increase gradually, and conflicts will take place between and among central and local governments as the right of local self-government becomes stronger. The decentralisation of power will lead to calls for changes in the current spatial planning system centred on central government (MOCT). In contrast, economic and social globalisation will progress rapidly in the future, which may require an increase in central government's role in planning and development, because local governments still are very weak in financial and personnel resources. The atmosphere of national unification will also improve as exchanges of people and goods between South and North Korea expand.

In order to respond effectively to greater domestic and international changes, and to provide greater prosperity for people, the spatial planning system including the national development plan should be reorganised. First, in order to prevent confusion between plans, the function of national planning should be clearly defined through integrating each level of plans or similar plans. Secondly, the role of national plan should be changed into an indicative, guiding and information-providing role rather than an investment-oriented role. Thirdly, the spatial planning system should be re-established, so that the consistency can be secured between central, regional and local development plans and land use plans. Finally, and deeply concerned with the decentralisation of planning policy system, the functional independence of lower level governments should be respected, and their participation should be also ensured in the decision-process of the higher level plans. This reorganisation of the planning system could be a method for reducing intergovernmental conflicts surrounding spatial plans or developments.

5.6. The Effects of Regional Planning and Development

5.6.1. Regional Disparity and Regional Development Policy

Under the capitalist system, the pursuit of maximum profits leads inevitably to regional disparities and imbalances of profit between income groups. Such spatial

disparities normally occur because resources such as labour, capital, technique and information, are locationally concentrated in specific 'leading' regions at the expense of other 'lagging' regions. Such forces induce a great concentration of population and capital in particular urban areas. Thus the imbalance between rural and urban areas tends to grow. Some agglomeration costs in growing urban areas may lead to a relocation of employment to adjacent suburban or rural areas or even to other regions where resource costs are less.

Usually, the basic causes of regional disparity may be considered as follows: historical and social surroundings; physical and geographical merits and demerits of region; the development of accumulative economic and scientific techniques; a centralised national plan for economic and administrative efficiency; the potential capacity of regions and their equipped infrastructure; and, social systems and traditional habits (KCCI, 1997, p.22).

Under the above conditions, if regional development projects were located under the mechanisms of the free market, regional disparities would increase because capital and labour usually move to regions where they have a comparative advantage. Although central and local governments have tried to alleviate the disparity through regional policies for the last two decades, they have failed to solve the problem of regional disparities in Korea. Nevertheless, central and local government intervention is needed more than ever, because their intervention can be proper and efficient method for co-ordinating programs and distributing development equity.

5.6.2. Regional Disparities in Korea

Regional disparities can be estimated through the relative distribution of the population and the economic power of different regions. With the advance of industrialisation in Korea, urbanisation has also progressed rapidly with the level of urbanisation already exceeding 80 per cent by the early 1990s. In 1995, the capital region of Seoul covered only 11.8 per cent of the national territory, had twenty million people, amounting to 45.3 per cent of the nation's population. This region stimulated so much by rapid economic development and inward migration during the past three decades (1960-1990) remains so vast in Korean national terms, that it may be many years before the gaps between the developed urban area and the lagging rural area can be closed.

Next, there is a large gulf of financial power among local governments. Basically, the financial power of local government is weak, and that of self-supporting finance (as opposed to centrally-provided funds) is very low. Whether Local Autonomy takes root successfully or not and, whether local governments can carry out their regional policies smoothly or not, rests with the availability of self-supporting revenue. It is essential for the proper expression of the right of self-government and of local autonomy for local governments to have an adequate and secure local revenue base. Although the ratio of local tax has been increasing, it is still only 20 per cent of total tax in the country as a whole (KCCI, 1997, p.23), and the financial self-sufficiency of local governments is far less than required to stimulate the local economy of the different regions. Accordingly most local governments are subsidised from national coffers.

As of 1996, while most local governments had only 30-40 per cent of financial independence in their revenues, the metro-cities, including Seoul city and *Kyunggi* province, had reached over 80 per cent. (Kim, B.J., 1995, p.126) The financial inability of most local governments is so acute that almost all local cities and counties have no real financial means to carry out their regional policies. An imbalance of regional development leads to differences of local finance and exacerbates inequalities in regional development and public investment. This situation is apt to deepen the regional imbalance over time, which can increase the causes of conflicts over regional interests, and which in turn have differential impacts on the local government's self-control of their finance.

5.7. The Significance of Regional Development Policies

Regional development policies may be considered as public endeavours to improve residents' welfare through regional planning and developments. The purpose of regional policies is to achieve specified national policy objectives. In this sense, regional policy can be regarded as 'an important component of a broader and more comprehensive economic policy embracing the whole economy' (Amstrong and Taylor, 1993, p.194). Regional disparities can obstruct the attainment of national policy objectives, such as providing adequate job opportunities for local residents, achieving a satisfactory rate of growth, and distributing income and wealth more equitably.

Since the 1960s, in parallel with the Korean government's drive for economic development and industrialisation, Seoul City began to acquire an enormous momentum for growth and structural transformation. This growth of the national capital has contributed to the generation of regional imbalances elsewhere in Korea, which have served to stimulate the development of new public initiatives and regional policies in Korea. These regional disparities have persisted for the past three decades and impeded the country's sense of national solidarity, having had harmful effects on the efficient operation of national resources and created conflicts between developed and lagging regions. The most significant effects of the disparity are as follows:

1. The substantial regional disparities have caused social dissatisfaction and resentment, most strongly felt by those whose job prospects and living standards are poor.
2. Persistently high levels of unemployment in disadvantaged regions have produced harmful economic and social consequences. Usually if the degree of unemployment in disadvantaged regions could be permanently reduced without leading to a loss of jobs in developed areas, the whole national economy would be better off. Similarly, if disused and derelict land in the depressed areas could be used productively for economic development, the productivity of land use and balanced regional development would be improved.
3. The centralisation of economic growth inflicts severe economic costs in rapidly growing urban areas due to the excess demands for social capital. For example, the traffic congestion resulting from such intensive centralisation is estimated to waste an immense amount of time for the transport of goods and passengers. The Korean government has consistently responded by increasing the supply of social capital, instead of trying to relieve congestion by controlling demands for social overhead capital. This has inevitably resulted in a never-ending spiral in which demand and supply chase each other, which have brought about growing externality costs and increased land prices.
4. In the case of excess demand for labour and resources in leading regions, reducing regional disparities would reap benefits to the whole economy by reducing inflationary pressures. Such inflationary pressures occur because of the intense competition for skilled labour and capital resources, which becomes externally scarce during booms, raising final output prices.

It has been argued that developed countries can secure social and political stability if they pursued regional economic parities through regional policies, such as balanced regional developments (KCCI, 1996, p.28). The requirements of regional development undertaken for national and regional interests include: first, improving the welfare of regional residents, even 'though regional developments are also expressing the goals of national plans or policies; the realisation of regional potential, which will improve all regional conditions under the existing situation of regional resources; promoting sustainable development, including the preservation and management of natural resources; achieving strategic purposes, including efforts to integrate the principal policy directions and objectives of regions with the actions to achieve them.

5.8. A Reconsideration of Regional Development and Policy

5.8.1. Regional Developments under Central Government's Control

First, there must be recognition that it is an essential prerequisite of a national government's responsibilities to ensure equilibrium between groups in the process of making decision over regional policies. Since national and regional development and policies have been introduced in Korea, most regional policies were established and implemented by central government. Accordingly, the methods of regional planning and policies have been top-down in type, and economic efficiency and national effect have been the top priority among the various national policy goals. While regional peculiarities were not fully considered in the process of policy-making, with local residents' wishes being inadequately reflected. The 'Korean experience shows that direct government interventions for growth control are likely to create negative effects rather than to contribute to the balanced spatial distribution of population and industries. ... Many spatial policies or plans tend to lose their usefulness because they pursue overly ambitious goals and objectives' (Kim, Y. W., 1995, pp.74-75).

The centralised system in Korea has caused conflicts and led to failures or difficulties in acquiring the support of local residents in regional policy-making and the implementation of the designated policy. Under such a centralised system of plans and policies established principally from the national point of view, creative

regional developments could not be prepared, and the capability of regions was not cultivated and fully improved. The implementation of local autonomy led to increased demands for local administrative responsibilities and for new regional developments and policies, but the existing spatial planning and policy system has not the capacity nor the appropriate ways to respond to such dramatic changes in its policy environment (see sections 8.3 and 9.3).

5.8.2. Imbalanced Development

For the last four decades the most important goal of Korean regional policy has been a balanced development between regions. The Korean government initiated regional policies to restrict population and industrial growth of metropolises. At the same time, ‘the government has made various efforts to stimulate economic and social development in less prosperous areas’ (Kim, Y.W., 1995, p.69). Nonetheless, the original spatial goal has not been achieved. The concentration of population and industries into metropolises has continued, and the regional imbalance in the country has been growing gradually as the years have advanced. ‘Despite the fact that the government has strongly restricted the location of new manufacturing establishments, the number of manufacturing activities in the capital region has been continuously increasing’ (Kim, Y.W., 1995, p.74).

Some reasons for the failure of the government’s spatial goals can be suggested. First, the spatial goals were undermined by the role of open economics in reshaping the country’s economic geography. Secondly, the plans established by central and local governments were inadequately implemented due to changes in the political, economical and social environments. The priority of policy was determined without a basic principle of social and economic equilibrium, and was often challenged by the theory of economic efficiency or political power. Finally, since local governments’ financial capabilities were very weak, almost all development projects were conducted by central government itself, whose main interest was in national efficiency.

5.8.3. Inadequate Linkages with Other Plans

Regional developments or policies are not only concerned with a specific region. they are related to other regional plans and to national plans. Accordingly, when a spatial

development or policy harmonises with other spatial plans, the goals of development can be accomplished completely. Nevertheless, due to the insufficiency of links with other plans in Korea, many spatial policies and plans have tended to lose their usefulness. According to Kim, Y.W. (1995, p.76), 'spatial policies cannot be successfully implemented if they overlook economic and financial costs involved ... [they] cannot attain the desired objects without an efficient institutional framework to achieve inter-ministerial co-ordination'. So far, there have been no active financial and economic dimensions and no appropriate executive systems for implementation in many spatial plans. Consequently more effort is needed to promote integrated spatial policies and plans so as to stimulate economic and social developments in Korea's less prosperous regions and to control the growth in its large metropolises.

5.8.4. The Lack of Participation of Residents and the Private Sector

It is essential that local residents who recognise the strong and weak points of their regions are able to participate in the processes of regional policy-making and planning. Nevertheless, because central and local governments have tended to initiate regional planning and implementation one-sidedly without residents' full participation until recently, many conflicts have taken place, and thus some plans were not fully implemented or failed to accomplish their purpose. On the other hand, since the governments were the main agencies for regional development, they were usually restricted by administrative regulations and could not be freed from the bureaucratic execution of their administrative tasks. One suggestion to overcome this problem and to provide more capable management and private finance in the future is for the active participation of the private sector.

5.8.5. The Lack of Measures for Conflict Mediation

Conflicts are inevitable in regional policies and development projects. With the inauguration of local autonomy in Korea, previously latent conflicts related to regional developments have begun to change into manifest conflicts. Nevertheless, the system for preventing such conflicts has been inadequate and measures and efforts to promote conflict resolution have been insufficient. If once a conflict related to regional development has started, it has been unlikely that the regional policy or development involved could be efficiently carried out in time and economy. For the

satisfactory accomplishment of regional policies and development with desirable mitigation and with opportunities for the effective and efficient mediation of conflicts, it is necessary to study techniques and to suggest appropriate systems for conflict resolution.

5.8. Conclusions

To date, regional developments in Korea have emphasised rapid economic growth focused on the country's metropolises rather than the balanced development of the whole of the national territory. Naturally this centralised policy and system has led to external cost effects. In addition, the process of policy making did not depend on the enlargement of potential regional capability with the participation of local residents, but rather expressed central government's one-sided development policy (top-down). Regional development projects and programmes were focused only on the supply of physical facilities without a comprehensive overview including social, economic and cultural effects within regions. As a result, such aspects of regional developments could lead to conflicts related to environmental and cultural conservation, NIMBYism, or economic development pressure.

The progress of local autonomy in Korea will require many changes in the structure of the spatial policy and planning system in the future. It is also expected that the decentralisation of regional planning and policy will progress quickly and that residents' participation in the process of regional policy making will sharply increase. In addition to these changes, criticisms about the country's continuing regional disparities also will gather strength. Together, these changes may contribute to the generation and intensification of disputes on matters related to urban and regional developments.

The combination of the inadequacies of the current spatial policy and planning system and the introduction of Local Autonomy system with all its expectations (see Chapter 2) has generated various conflicts related to regional development and environmental projects in Korea. The more detailed causes and characteristics of conflict and the current system in Korea for conflict resolution will be discussed in Chapter 6, which follows.

Chapter 6. Conflicts Related to Regional Development in Korea

6.1. Introduction

Nowadays, conflicts among and within organisations are common features, and they are likely gradually to increase. In particular, conflicts are inherent in the drive for autonomy and democracy. After the introduction of local autonomy in Korea, intergovernmental relations (Chapter 4) and the spatial policy and planning system (Chapter 5) have changed greatly. A number of intergovernmental conflicts, largely concerned with land use activities, spatial development and environment value systems, have emerged in the field of regional policies and development. Such conflicts tend to dwell on negative influences rather than constructive effects on society.

Overall, conflicts related to spatial planning are seen as ‘games’ or ‘debates’ rather than ‘fights’. Formal inter- or intra-organisational conflicts within a defined legal structure are similar to a ‘game’, while the informal person-to person type of conflict, which is generally less visible, is similar to a ‘debate’. Nonetheless, many intergovernmental conflicts often transfer from the status of a ‘game’ to a ‘debate’ or even ‘fight’ when local residents participate in these conflicts. In this context, an analysis of the peculiarity and characteristics of disputes may be a cardinal point in understanding regional development disputes and in suggesting methods for conflict management and resolution in the future.

The main aims of this chapter are to analyse the actual condition of various intergovernmental conflicts related to regional development and to examine the present methods for conflict resolution in Korea. (see section 1.3) In addition, other aims are to verify the Premises (Chapter 7) established through the review of literature (Chapters 3-4) and to identify implications for conflict management in future. In this context, types and characteristics of conflict in the field of regional and environmental disputes are examined, and the possibility of introducing general conflict theory into regional development and environmental disputes in Korea are considered. In addition, the actual conditions of occurrence of conflict and systems for resolving the conflicts are also investigated. Finally, the concept and experience of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) as a promising approach for dispute resolution in Korea is examined.

6.2. Organisational Conflicts in Korea

6.2.1. Trends in Conflicts

Political transformation in Korea has led directly to changes in social mechanisms because the whole of Korean society is under the predominant control of politics. Thus, in connection with changes social mechanisms and the social environment, the different aspects and types of social conflict also undergo a great deal of change. In this context, Korean politics after independence from Japan can be divided into three phases: the 'autocratic', 'democratic' and the 'local autonomic' eras. Table 6.1 shows the predominant type of social conflict in these three eras. This classification is based on political situations, since this method of the division is helpful in exploring the changes of conflictual aspects.

Table 6-1. Transformation of organisational conflict by political era

	Autocratic era (Before 1988)	Democratic era (1988-1995)	Autonomic era (After 1995)
Political environment	Centralisation Military regime	Democratisation	Localisation Decentralisation
Organisational conflict	Intra conflict (Latent conflict)	Intra-governmental (Conflict related to individual interest)	Inter-governmental (Conflict related to social interest)
Conflict type	Systems conflict	Bargaining conflict	Bureaucratic conflict

1. *Autocratic era (pre 1988)*

The autocratic era was represented by a military regime which concentrated on economic development and a strong centralisation, but which lacked political ingenuity. Kim (1994, p.592) has explained that 'this era was characteristic of a narrow range of individual political freedom: executive dominance of the bureaucracy, legislature, and judiciary; limitations on the role and function of political parties; increased role of the military in politics; and, national planning for rapid economic growth'.

The general population, except for the authoritarian elite group, tended to be in passive positions within the political and social system. Under such autocratic government, social dissatisfaction could not be revealed overtly but was concealed, because the strong centralist and authoritarian system could prevent the occurrence of

conflict. Even if a conflict occurred, central government could if necessary deal fully with the conflict by force. Pondy (1967, p.300) noted, 'such latent conflict is role conflict which treats the focal person as merely a passive receiver rather than as an active participant in the relationship'.

Under the autocratic system, organisational conflicts could rarely escalate to the visible and manifest level, and intra-organisational conflicts related to co-ordination and internal disagreements only occasionally took place. As Klausner and Groves (1994, p.360) have stated, if the hierarchical structure within an organisation is very rigid and if workers have little power and autonomy, 'hidden rebellion' rather than 'open conflict', may emerge. This situation is likely to apply to intergovernmental conflicts in Korea before 1988.

2. Democratic era (1988-1995)

The second phase was the political democratic era. The sixth Republic in 1988 continued the process of a long transformation in which 'economic growth and prosperity have been the ingredients needed to pave the way for political changes, which have led to democratisation of the military-authoritarian regime' (Wang, 1994, p.355). Democratisation was extended widely in various fields of Korean society. Social conflicts suppressed during the military era immediately began to emerge. Many conflicts were common in most parts of society, which fermented and amplified social unrest. This phenomenon diminished slowly and steadily with time, and the aspects of conflict shifted from extemporaneous, rough and emotional conflicts to systemic and sustained conflicts. Public disfavour of social unrest reduced immoderate conflictual behaviour, while the public formed systematic interest groups to speak for their common objectives. Aspects of conflict moved slowly from individual interest conflicts to social and public interest conflicts. Such groups formed to speak for wider interests began to express opinions about administrative affairs and public policies, and accordingly, many intergovernmental conflicts began to occur. In order to secure further resources, competition between local governments, or between local governments and central government agencies, greatly increased. In the main, bargaining conflicts related to resource distributions were the predominant part of such conflicts.

Inglehart (1997, p.57) has stated, 'the increasing concerns about environments is a typical phenomenon of post industrialism in western democracies'. The

relationships among citizens, authorities and public policy-makers became increasingly critical over environmental issues at the beginning of the democratic era. In the context of the NIMBY syndrome, Lee and Fitzgerald (1997, p.67) have argued that 'South Korea also illustrates the profound challenge mass mobilisation poses for newly industrialised, democratising nations, environmental concern is proving a major engine driving the momentum towards opening previously closed administrative systems'.

3. Local autonomic era (after 1995)

In 1995, the full introduction of local autonomy gave a variety to the power structure of public organisations. As heads of local governments were now directly elected, the decentralisation of power consolidated over a long time, was rapidly advanced. In addition, a more competitive set of relationships between local governments was established, and intergovernmental conflicts became more complicated and diverse with regard to regional developments and environmental issues.

Before the implementation of local autonomy, central government had powerful and direct control mechanisms in the process of administration: i.e. personnel management; reports; information; sanctions; inspections; approval and authorisation. In addition, the government had indirect methods, such as, financial controls including government subsidies and special grants used as supplementary funds. However, after implementing local autonomy, the system of direct controls was changed fundamentally because local assembly members and heads of local governments were elected directly by residents. The central government no longer had the means of control to deal with local governments through personnel management and administrative intervention. No matter how the central government's control was weakened in intergovernmental conflicts, if the division of functions and duties between them had only been clearly laid down, then conflicts and frictions occurring in the process of administration or implementation could have been greatly reduced. Actually, because these clear divisions were not established, conflicts concerned with powers and responsibilities often arose between the central and local government or between the local executive office and local assembly. Such role-confusion was an important element of inter-governmental conflict, which led to a state of disorder in the process of policy making and policy execution.

Meanwhile, through implementing local autonomy, each locality became more cohesive, and social pressure for conformity within its local region increased. The regional egoism and sectionalism which had began to occur during the democratic era, continued and had a tendency to deepen. Local autonomy led to competition between regions and the growth of regional self-interest. From time to time, these competitive relations resulted in intergovernmental conflicts. Nonetheless, due to the reduction of the central government's control of local government, the central government could not appropriately mediate or influence the incompatibilities, which existed between regions. Conflicts of interest became more severe and diverse.

6.2.2. The Field of Organisational Conflict

Intergovernmental conflicts can occur in almost every field of administration. Local administrative functions are largely divided into local administration, local finance and regional economic/development (see Table 6.2). Among these fields, conflicts related to regional economic and development fields are linked to spatial development conflicts and locational conflicts. As seen in the Table 6.2, disputes related to the siting of unwanted and hazardous facilities was 45.6 per cent of the total, and, regional development disputes was in second place, 23 per cent (KLAI's, 1996, [in Kim 1996, p.57]). Together these two fields (facility location and development conflict) accounted for 68 per cent of all identified intergovernmental conflicts in the immediate period following the introduction of local autonomy. Similarly, according to Kim's (1997, p.58) analysis based on 340 identified intergovernmental conflict cases, conflicts related to land use regulation or facility location amounted to 221 cases, commanding an overwhelming majority (65% in total).

Table 6-2. Fields of inter-organisational conflict

Division	Sub-division	Respondent No.	%
Local Administration	Personnel/organising management	71	13.1
Local finance	Finance/tax system	44	8.1
	Incidence	55	10.2
Regional economic/ Policy	Regional development	124	23.0
	Facility siting	246	45.6

Source: Based on Kim, P.D. (1996), p.57.

Locational conflicts have become the main issue of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea, and can be closely related to the NIMBY syndrome that spread

widely throughout country. Since the NIMBY conflicts were directly connected with residents, the residents often took part in the conflict as directly involved actors. In many cases, the stakeholders in a conflict were very complex, as well as unspecified. Due to these characteristics, the identification of disputants was difficult and the intensity of conflict easily deepened.

6.2.3. The Change of Conflict Space over Regional Interests

According to Rangarajan (1997, p.71), 'the world of conflict is ever-changing and three factors, such as environment, memories of past history and time, exert a significant influence on the negotiating process'. Usually these three factors build up an opportunity for negotiation, and actors and issues in a conflict become active factors influencing the process of conflict within the negotiation space. Accordingly actors and issues can be the most important factors in the resolution of conflict.

In Korea, the implementation of local autonomy has both influenced the conflict environment and greatly changed the structure of the relevant actors. Since experience and skills for discussion and negotiation had not been built up previously, local autonomy led to many conflicts related to regional policies or developments. Because of disputants' excessive adherence to their interests, the degree of conflict became increasingly high. Local governments often joined with their residents so as to reinforce their conflictual power base and to strengthen putting their views to central government or the other disputant. In addition, residents often began to participate in conflicts, because regional policy or environmental issues could be seen to influence the residents' interests directly. As a result, even important national projects with legal procedures were blocked by the mass behaviour of residents. In opposition to such local government resistance, the central government tried to formulate a special law¹⁾ or strictly apply a rule to such cases, which in turn created bureaucratic conflict. After the introduction of local autonomy, the space and factors of conflicts such as disputants, issues and time became enlarged and, gradually, more complicated. Local autonomy created a fertile soil for intergovernmental conflicts and led to bureaucratic conflicts as well.

¹⁾ Under impetus from local government's refusal to sanction the construction of certain projects, the Korean government formulated the '*Special Law for Construction and Supplement of Social Overhead Capital 1995*' to carry forward national projects more smoothly.

The conflict environment prescribes dimensional boundaries in a bargaining space and also makes those negotiating aware of existing bargaining factors including dimensions of issue and the population of negotiants. Conflicts between residents and government often took place in the past, but after introducing local autonomy, conflicts between central and local governments have increased. Local governments increasingly began to participate in conflicts between the central government and residents; that is, it consistently became the rule that that on one side was the central government and on other side were the local government and local residents. In order to resist central government policy more effectively, local governments looked to gain their residents' pressure over to their side. Accordingly, the number of those negotiating in the bargaining space and the divergence of issues became extended; conflict settlement thus became more difficult, because the residents consisted of various interest groups, looking to depend on mass behaviour or, even in some cases, on violent attitudes (see section 8.2). In this context, an agreement is more likely to occur if both sides are organised. Therefore if one side of disputants includes residents (unorganised disputant), then conflict resolution is more difficult, because there is no hierarchy for order or to control power among residents. This conclusion is related to Premise D (see section 7.2).

6.3. The Analysis of Conflict Types in Regional Developments

As the number of public organisational conflicts increased and became more complex, the characteristics of regional development conflicts can be defined in terms of various types (see Chapter 3): 'positions of blocking behaviour', 'relationships of disputants', 'contents of conflict' and 'conflict disputants'.

6.3.1. Conflict Types by Blocking Behaviour and Relationships

As political changes have advanced in Korea from the autocratic to the local autonomic eras, so the conflict models (bargaining, bureaucratic, systems conflicts) based on relationships between disputants have developed a tendency to coexist at the same time. Recently, for instance, conflicts would be likely to shift from a 'bargaining' type of conflict to a 'bureaucratic' conflict, which would have been unthinkable before local autonomy was implemented. In the first year (1995-1996) after the introduction of the local autonomy system, 112 intergovernmental conflicts were

identified (KLAI, 1997).²⁾ Among these conflicts, 59 cases related to regional developments and policies (52.6% of total intergovernmental conflicts). Table 6.3 shows that bureaucratic conflict was the most common (accounting for 69% of sample cases), and the bureaucratic conflicts related to blocking behaviour were numerous. This figure implies that relationships between central and local governments, or between lower and upper-tiers, were not satisfactory. In the hierarchical relationships of the structure of governments in Korean (central-local government; upper-lower tier government), the central and upper-tier governments tended to depend on past methods such as a bureaucratic command, while local or lower tier governments tended to emphasise their discretion or self administration, which often resulted in bureaucratic conflicts.

Table 6-3. Types of conflict in sample cases (1995-1996)

	Total	Type 1	Type 2	Type 3
Total	59 (100%)	19 (32%)	37 (63%)	3 (5%)
Bargaining	14 (24 %)	7	6	1
Bureaucratic	41 (69 %)	12	27	2
Systems	4 (7 %)	-	4	-

Source: Based on KLAI, 1997

6.3.2. Conflict Types by Content

The types of conflict described by their contents can be largely divided into locational and jurisdictional conflicts. According to Kim's (1997, p.63) survey, locational conflicts accounted for 47.1 per cent of the total, while jurisdictional conflicts accounted for 52.9 per cent. Among the locational conflicts recorded, those relating to unwanted facilities were the main category (53 of 80 cases), which showed that environmental conflicts with the NIMBY syndrome had become the most serious intergovernmental problem under the Local Autonomy system. The second largest group consisted of conflicts concerned with opposition to a neighbouring community (17 cases). These mainly were clashes between 'profit and loss' in regional developments. These interest conflicts mainly took place between lower tier governments (Table 6.4).

²⁾ From 1995 to 1996, Korea Local Administration Institute (KLAI) collected a listing of conflict cases through an analysis of press reports in 6 national daily newspapers, 13 local daily newspapers and 4 technical magazines.

Next, in the case of jurisdictional conflicts, there was little difference between conflicts concerned with cost sharing, with the management of facilities and with co-operation problems. Nevertheless, great differences can be observed when considering the relationships between disputants and conflicts. Conflicts related to matters for co-operation, for instance, often occurred among lower-tier governments, while conflicts related to the management of facilities were dominant between central and lower tier governments (Table 6.4). According to Kim and Cha (1997, p.63), jurisdictional conflicts often occurred in the early stage after the introduction of Local Autonomy and derived from the obscurity of functions and roles between the different governments and the lack of a system for co-operation and consultation between them.

Table 6-4. Conflicts by contents (May.1995-May.1997) Unit: No. of conflict (%)

		Central -Upper	Central -Lower	Upper- Upper	Upper- Lower	Lower- Lower	Total
Frequency of conflict		10 (100)	47 (100)	20 (100)	31 (100)	62 (100)	170 (100)
Locational conflict	Unwanted facilities	1	10	5	11	26	53
	Desirable facilities			5	2	1	8
	Neighbour opposition		1	2	2	12	17
	Public interests		1			1	2
	Sub total	1 (10.0)	12 (25.5)	12 (60.0)	15 (48.4)	40 (64.5)	80 (47.1)
Jurisdictional conflict	Cost sharing	1	7	3	8	4	23
	Management	5	19	1	4		29
	Co-operation	3	9	4	4	18	38
	Sub total	9 (90.0)	35 (74.5)	8 (40.0)	16 (51.6)	22 (35.5)	90 (52.9)

Sources: Based on Kim and Cha (1997), p.63

6.3.3. Types of Conflict by Disputants

Establishing conflict types according to the different disputants involved is very often used for classifying intergovernmental conflicts related to regional developments because it usefully explains the relationships between disputants and the characteristics of conflicts. Table 6.5 shows that intergovernmental conflicts accounted for 50 per cent of conflicts related to regional developments in Korea (Kim and Cha, 1997, p.57).³⁾ Even the conflicts between residents and government have properties of inter-organisational conflict, because generally government is the proponent of projects. Porter and Taplin (1987) in '*Conflict and Conflict Resolution*'

³⁾ According to the survey, from May 1995 to May 1997 (2 years) 340 intergovernmental conflicts occurred.

also considered conflicts between persons and formal organisations as inter-organisational conflicts.

Table 6-5. Conflicts related to regional developments (1995-1997)

Type Case No.	Intergovernmental Conflict				Government - Residents	Total
	Total	Central-local	Upper-lower	Local-Local		
Case No.	170	57	31	82	170	340
%	50.0	16.8	9.1	24.1	50.0	100.0

Source: Based upon Kim (1997), p.63

6.4. The Causes of Conflict in Regional Developments

The causes of conflict are essentially based on general factors such as goal incompatibility, resource share and interdependency. In the case of regional development conflicts in Korea, the causes are similarly varied and can be largely divided into two categories as either 'indirect' causes (background causes), or, 'direct' causes (substantial causes) (Kim and Cha, 1997, p.36). The former can be defined as a change of social, political and cultural values, which can be called 'the drift of public opinion' which forms the character of the system and rule of society. Public opinion widely influences conflicts relating to public administration and policies. Usually in these kinds of conflict, the boundary of stakeholders and their spatial range are ambiguous and widespread. The influence of conflicts can be also wide and serious, which can result in social instability. To resolve these conflicts, macro approaches such as the improvement of the legislative framework, continuous social education or the establishment of information systems are required.

In the latter case (direct causes), stakeholders' interests in the projects concerned can be a main cause of conflict. The stakeholders' interest is a balance between costs and benefits, the incompatibility and complexity of policy goals, a clash of jurisdiction and authority, differences of technical perception, regional self-interest, competition for limited resources and rational procedure of decision-making before a conflict develops and worsens. Since these causes can be removed or resolved by resolution strategies, conflict management largely focuses on searching and controlling these causes. Several approaches can be used in the settlement of these conflicts, including direct negotiation, mediation and, ultimately, the use of power.

6.4.1. Reinforcing Local Government's Self-control and Discretion

Local autonomy has influenced the systems of, and has provided the means of, shifting from the centralisation of power and function to their decentralisation in Korea. Therefore, local governments' autonomy has improved and its delegated power has become more significant. From this period, the hierarchical relationship between central and local governments has moved towards a more horizontal one, a change which has been one of main causes of increasing visible conflicts in Korean society. Although Klausner and Groves(1994, p.360) have argued that generally a hierarchical authority structure could create a fertile soil for conflicts, it has been noticeable that after the integrated hierarchical system of central control was weakened in Korea, many more intergovernmental conflicts have occurred than before.

Among the explanations of this turn of events, are first that incompatibilities and disputes may be inevitable between central government decision-makers who continue the habits of the past centralism and local government chief executives who are elected through direct elections and speak out for their localities. Central government officers have been in the habit of dominating local governments and want to continue to control them, but this is not acceptable to the newly elected chief executives and heads of local government. Another important reason has been local authorities' overconfidence and misconceptions over local autonomy. The local authorities believed that they could deal with most affairs concerned with their regions without central government's interference; such misconception have resulted in even national projects based on legal procedures being delayed (Kim, B. J., 1995, pp.4-5).

Secondly, latent conflicts during the authoritarian era began to emerge as visible conflicts after democratisation and localisation. As local governments' self control was reinforced, the function of co-operation and adjustment between local governments became weaker and it became difficult to find new ways to cope with demands of more comprehensive administration. Quite sharp confrontations therefore occurred between local governments over acquiring particular local advantages while dealing with matters of wider administration.

A survey⁴⁾ of the changes in conflicts after the introduction of local autonomy shows clearly the co-relation between the occurrence of conflict and the implementation of local autonomy. According to the survey, most respondents answered that intergovernmental conflicts increased after local autonomy: 47.9 per cent of them felt that there had been a slight increase, while 34.6 per cent of respondents felt that conflicts had greatly increased (Kim,1996, p.56) (see Table 6.6). In this context, we can deduce the fact that the frequency of organisational conflict is in proportion to the degree of the discretion and autonomy of an organisation, which is related to Premise E (Section 7.2).

Table 6-6. The change of conflict occurrence (after 1995)

Increase and decrease	Number of respondents	%
Great increase	191	34.6
Slight increase	264	47.9
No change	70	12.7
Slight decrease	21	3.8
Great decrease	3	0.5
No answer	3	0.5
Total	552	100.0

Source: Based upon Kim (1996) p.56.

6.4.2. Election Pledges and Re-election

After the implementation of Local Autonomy, mayors and heads of local governments became aware of their election pledges and their desire for re-election. As elected officers in local governments, they were responsible to their residents. They thus might consider only their electorate and promote regional policies for action in the future. In order to maintain their popularity with electorates, many elected executive officers often conducted such regional projects without legitimate administrative procedures or regulations. In these cases, they might give rise to many problems among local governments and between central and local governments. The conflicts concerned with Younggwang NNP (see Chapter 8) and Kunpo incinerator projects⁵⁾ were good examples of this type of conflict.

⁴⁾ The Korea Local Administration Institute (KLAII) carried out a survey of local government officials concerned with conflicts, members of local assembly and conflict specialists from 15 May to 15 June 1996. A total of 873 questionnaires were distributed and 552 sheets [63.2 %] were retrieved.

⁵⁾ The conflict related to the construction of Kunpo incinerator in Kyunggi Province resulted from the election pledges of the Mayor of Kunpo. According to his pledges, he would cancel the plan for an

Elected heads of local governments were also aware of what their local residents demanded and took an interest in what the residents wanted in order to be re-elected or elected to higher official positions. After local autonomy, the wall of distrust between local government and residents tended to decay, but not everything worked perfectly. One of the most difficult challenges was how to resolve conflicts of interests between local government and residents and between different local governments. A typical problem was the NIMBY syndrome, which local governments often failed to cope with effectively. In the face of collective opposition from residents, many local governments gave up constructing sewage disposal or waste burial sites in their jurisdiction. Alternatively, they decided on sites located on the outskirts of their region, which led to many conflicts between neighbouring local governments.

In addition, due to the fear of losing the next election, heads of local governments tended to defer decisions and not face up to projects related to conflicts, although they were required to engage in the process of resolving conflicts. Politicians thus always had a tendency to focus on policies that carried favour with the public interest because they could not disregard their electorate's demands. Such conflicts were hidden before the introduction of local autonomy.

6.4.3. Changes in Values and Standards

With democratisation and localisation in Korea, the desire of residents' participation in the decision-making process of regional policies increased, and residents began to demand that central and local governments became more open in their administration. This resulted in increasing conflict between residents and government. Meanwhile, following from residents' higher incomes and education, 'life styles also changed to the pursuit of higher quality in life and the self realisation with originality and diversity' (ROK, 1991, p.19). The preservation of the cultural heritage and the conservation of the environment for future generations therefore became more important values than previously, and the clash between the pressures of development and the demands of conservation increased. The recent increase of environmental conflicts reflects the change of the nation's attitude to its heritage. It means that the

incinerator that had been proposed since 1991. The conflict took place between Kunpo City and the Capital Region Waste Reclamation Committee.

resolution of conflicts between job creation through development and environmental protection lies at the heart of planning.

Typical examples of this type of conflicts can be instanced e.g. that relating to Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railroad (see Chapter 9) and the Dong River Dam (see Chapter 10). In these cases, as disputes involve environmental and cultural issues, the sphere of disputants (especially in stand of opponent) would had a tendency to expand and it can be observed that, recently, in relation to environmental issues, conservationists have tended to have more power than the developer.

6.4.4. Differences of Goals

Policy differences can arise from disagreements about the direction of an organisation's activity and the standard of assessment of projects. Different motivations by different local governments over a development or environmental project leads to goal incompatibilities, and these goal incompatibilities generate disputes among local governments. Minnery (1985, p.21) has stated that 'the concept of the incompatibility of the desired spatial position is central to both geography and urban planning, where one is dealing with land and locations which are unique and cannot be occupied simultaneously by more than one physical entity'. After the implementation of local autonomy in Korea, such goal incompatibility has become an important factor influencing intergovernmental conflicts. The more complex and more varied the functions of local government, the deeper the incompatibility of policy goals is likely to become. Thus the consideration of goals and objectives is an important preliminary stage in both the regional planning process and the conflict management process.

Differences of viewpoint over regional development and environment projects are often exposed between central and local governments as well as among local governments. Central government takes a national viewpoint about plans or developments, while local authorities inevitably take a local stance on behalf of their residents' interests and often have grounds to encourage or discourage development of land in their jurisdictional areas. Local governments in undeveloped regions have a particularly strong interest in developing their areas; but NIMBY issues may also arise over central government projects. Decentralised participatory systems often neglect national interests such as social justice and national economic development. Parochial interests become seen as primary in relation to wider, national problems and

interests, which results in unnecessary intergovernmental conflicts (see section 9.3) when central government cannot accept a local veto.

6.4.5. Increase of Interdependence

Interdependence may be defined as the degree of mutual dependence that two or more groups have for each other for interchanging information and supporting and/or creating a co-operative atmosphere. In the conurbation cities of Korea, transportation developments and the progress of communications has meant that the spatial area of residents' activities has been gradually extended. Thus, the wider range administrative matters, which a local government could not work out by itself, but needed the co-operation of neighbouring local government for carrying the matters forward, have increased considerably. The increase of interdependence or interaction required has resulted in increasing the necessity of joint problem-resolution, and generated another cause of conflict between local governments. Usually in the case of joint problem-resolution, conflicts may often have occurred in the process of communications between each of the parties involved. The more frequent the interaction, the higher opportunities of conflict between parties can become.

For example, in accordance with the increase of inter-dependence, many conflicts concerned with transport networks such as trunk roads and subway developments or more area waste facilities have occurred in Korea. Due to the suburbanisation of the Seoul metropolitan area, travel demands between the central area of Seoul and satellite cities has increased. Accordingly, it was necessary to prepare wider-area transport systems and to construct trunk roads between the regions. However, after implementing local autonomy, the construction of many link roads has been delayed due to conflicts between the concerned local governments (Lee, 199, pp.86-92). The main issues were connected with traffic congestion, the apportionment of costs (and, presumed benefits)) for road construction and the selection of the route of the road.

6.4.6. The Selfish Territorial (Regional Self-interest) Society

As mentioned above, local governments often give precedence to their own local interests rather than central government's view of the national interest or to the expressed common interests of the wider area. Such dispositions have caused many intergovernmental conflicts. The basic causes of regional self-interest derive from

various elements such as the decentralisation of power, the discrepancy between interests, the increase of concerns about environmental issues, the government's inefficient regulation and the scarcity of resources. Recently, although conflicts relating to public values (such as the protection of the environment and ecosystem, the maintenance of sustainability and socio-economic impacts) are increasing, regional self-interests and imbalances of costs-benefits have led to the most acute, destructive and chronic conflicts. These are the majority of regional conflicts in Korea. The main conflicts related to regional self-interest are NIMBYism and the imbalance of costs and benefits.

Typical examples of conflicts caused by putting regional priorities first are the phenomena of the NIMBY or the PIMFY syndromes. Vlek and Keren (1992, [in Wolsink, 1996, p.854]) have stated that 'the NIMBY phenomenon arises when in order to provide public goods, a local facility must be constructed. The disadvantages are all at the local level, and the local residents feel that they are being saddled with the consequences of something that is of benefit to society as a whole. They enjoy few of the benefits and the costs are concentrated in their own area. NIMBY is the result of a social dilemma characterised by a spatial separation of advantages and disadvantages'. Wolsink (1994, p.853) has argued that there were individual interests behind the NIMBY theory. 'As a rule, local opponents make use of environmental arguments, while in reality they are only defending their own interests. Environmental issues are usually more persuasive in a battle against developers. Environmental concerns may be raised but these may actually be secondary issues instead of the real concerns of the community'. Typical examples of recent NIMBY conflicts in Korea have been the Younggwang National Power Plant (NPP) and the Anmyun Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility (NWDF) (see Chapter 8).

Another identified type of NIMBYism covers conflicts concerned with the construction of waste plants or reclaimed wasteland. This kind of self-interest was conspicuous in conflicts between lower-tier governments, and may be associated with the functions of lower-tier authorities to execute established policies rather than the deciding new policies. Dealing mainly with affairs directly connected to daily living matters of residents, as these lower-tier authorities were placed closer to their residents' direct influence, they become in turn more responsive to their views. Accordingly, when NIMBY conflicts took place between local governments, they were apt to be swayed by collective local appeals rather than rational decisions.

The next cause of conflict linked to regional self-interests can be derived from the perception of an imbalance between costs and benefits by a disputant, which reflects an economist's view of decision processes. According to Thurow (1980, p14), 'regions are increasingly reluctant to take on the costs of a project which benefits other sections of the country'. He called this phenomenon 'zero-sum society'. Rydin (1998, p.349) too has noted how 'the distribution of costs and benefits has been emphasised in the accounts of land use planning, country-side policy and heritage conservation'. Almost all regional interest conflicts occurring in Korea were related to the discrepancy between gainers and losers. As Klausner and Groves (1994, p.361) have stated, in such conflicts, as a society becomes more cohesive, there may be increased social pressures for conformity, and consequently the conflicts tended to reach an impasse.

6.4.7. Communication and Openness

Information is important to the understanding of a conflict itself and to the choice of conflict management strategy. Communication is essential to information collection. As a result of poor communication, conflicts can become established, can escalate or deteriorate. Accordingly, communication is an important concept in conflict studies. According to Bernard (1957, [in Minnery, 1985, p.17]), 'the semanticist view of conflict sees tensions, hostilities and aggression as entirely the result of poor communication and inadequate definitions'. Ducsik (1981, p.91) has also stated that 'communication helps to reduce uncertainty and thus to diminish distrust'. The greater the reduction in uncertainty, the more predictable the behaviour of others becomes. This reduces insecurity and promotes order.

Although communications can help to increase mutual understanding, and such understanding can lead to the general reduction of conflict, it is also necessary to point out that if the parties' true positions were in complete opposition, then more open communication may also only exacerbate the conflict. Minnery (1985, p.186) has mentioned that 'there is, however, an ambiguous relationship between communications and conflict. Although conflicts can only be managed if there is some form of communication, communication of demands can lead to enhanced conflict'. He (p.12) continued, noting that in a typical competitive process, 'communication between the conflicting parties is unreliable and impoverished. The

available communication channels and opportunities are not utilised or they are used in an attempt to mislead or intimidate the other party’.

Wilson and Game (1998, p.107) have drawn attention to the general problems of communication and working relationships concerned with communication: ‘the main problem is how to ensure effective and speedy communication between central government and a large number of other bodies whose circumstances, objectives and points of view differ so widely from each other’. Misinformation, misunderstanding and absence of communication could be contributory causes of conflicts at all levels of intergovernmental relations. As mentioned in section 6.4.5, the interactions and interdependence between regions in Korea have increased sharply; however, co-operative systems or relationships for communication among governments were very deficient in Korea, and it can be suggested that this lack has often led to intergovernmental conflicts. The conflict over the Wichon Industrial Complex (WIC) occurred and was aggravated due to poor communications between the local authorities (Daegu and Pusan) who were in dispute. Neither party had directly discussed points at issue in the dispute, although ten years had ran their course since the conflict had begun (see section 10.2).

Insufficient openness in administration decision-making is also counted as a frequent cause of conflicts, which may be related to the lack of a scheme for stakeholder participation. After democratisation in Korea, the growing participation of citizens’ and social groups over environmental issues and the increasing demands for open administration in the process of planning have led to conflicts at the stage of decision-taking. According to Lee (1997, p.67), ‘as elsewhere environmental concern is proving a major engine driving the momentum towards opening previously closed administrative systems’.

Before expanding democracy and implementing local autonomy in Korea, both central and local governments were secretive in deciding administrative policies, and they merely notified residents or other organisations of their decisions. The typical procedure was the ‘decide → announce → defend’ model (Ducsik, 1987), which is a one-sided and top-down form of decision-making. Such habitual practice was reduced after the implementation of local autonomy, and the government made an effort open its public policy through citizens’ participation in the process of decision-making. Nevertheless, the government was likely to prefer secret procedures with regard to hypersensitive matters.

The Anmyun Island case (see section 8.2) and the process of selecting sites for dams⁶⁾ were typical examples of such closed administrative policy-making. The experience of Anmyun Island testified eloquently that the policy decided through closed administrative processes no longer could be tolerated.

6.4.8. Jurisdictional Disputes

Generally, each local government defends its jurisdiction from other local governments and considers various measures for securing new jurisdictions. Jurisdictional disputes frequently occur when rights and responsibilities between public organisations are ambiguous. Klausner and Groves (1994, p.364) have pointed out that ‘ambiguity produces conflicts when parties desire and need a clear delineation of their responsibilities, lines of authority and performance expectations’. One problem is that such jurisdictional disputes cannot be resolved easily by rational negotiations. Generally, such disputes may be settled through the reorganisation of government structures or administrative reforms and the establishment of laws or legal systems.

Examples of jurisdictional conflict recently encountered in Korea, include conflicts referring to the proprietary rights of Yangjae Citizen’s Park between Seoul city and Kangnam Ward in Seoul, and proposals for the enlargement of an area for water resource protection on the basin of Han River between Seoul city and Kyunggi province (KLAI, 1996, p.73).

6. 5. Characteristics of Conflicts Related to Regional Developments

Regional or environmental conflicts have different characteristics from conflicts in the labour, family and international fields. Physical planning is concerned with the management of conflicts that are presented in a spatial form. Due to the increasing competition for the use of scarce land, conflict management has become a major function in regional planning.

⁶⁾ The MOCT announced that it would forward a scheme to construct five or six multipurpose dams in North and South *Kyungyang* province in Korea on 20 September 1999, as a part of the management of water in the basin of *Nakdong* River. However, the MOCT did not open the process of selecting the sites proposed for the reason that residents related to the proposed sites could strongly oppose the construction of dam. The MOCT will negotiate with residents before reaching the final decision on the dam sites. After that, the MOCT has a plan to carry out the publicity work about specific support including regional development projects (*Joongang Daily News*, 1999).

In order to manage conflict efficiently, it is important to understand first the characteristics of conflict. Van der Cammen (1979, [in Henri Goverde, 1992, p.3]) argued that a spatial issue had three characteristics: 'it concerns processes of development, which together constitutes a dynamic system; it concerns spontaneous as well as publicity initiated developments; it concerns a mutual interdependence between the physical and the social component'. According to Henri Goverde (1992, p.3), urban and regional conflicts include the following combination elements of spatial issues: property rights are always involved; property rights are not always congruent with the right to decide about the function of the property; such decisions generally produce a lot of externalities; and, externalities produce new conflicts, which require new political choices to be made. Therefore, conflicts related to spatial plans or developments may typically involve locational issues of facilities, environmental problems, and irrationalities of costs and benefits. The specific characteristics of spatial conflicts in Korea are introduced in more detail below.

6.5.1. Strong Conflicting Interests among Disputants

A dispute in a regional development issue may involve truly irreversible effects, and parties to the dispute consider the possibility of irreversible effect, due to the unique features of ecological systems and limited regional resources. According to Minnery (1985, p.42), regional and urban planning can be described as 'a intervention in the workings of the allocation process for resources in the urban and regional activity system by legitimate public authority to achieve desired future ends, using means appropriate to those ends'. Holsti (1977, p.146) and Baron (1990, p.20) have also focussed on the scarcity of resources and condition of competition in regional conflicts.

Accordingly, while regional development can be described as an implementation of resources, the distributional effects of the relevant decisions and the associated conflict may be deeply related to the allocation of limited resources. With a limited amount of resources, each disputant wishes to gain as large a portion of the resources as possible. Such zero-sum situations are likely to generate strong confrontations. Following the introduction of local autonomy, each local authority has entered into competition in pursuing its own interests, to attract desired facilities or to evade unwanted facilities. The scarcity of resources has contributed to turning latent or disguised conflicts into overt conflicts and they then become acute.

6.5.2. Variety of Conflict Type

With the advance of localisation, local government's role in the processes of establishing or implementing regional plans has been greatly extended. Local governments were no longer the objects of central government control, but became independent bodies to expedite their programmes and to forward schemes for regional development. Regional policies and developments increased and became more varied, and this has made the aspects of conflict become more complex.

The possibility of outsiders' intervention has also greatly increased due to the introduction of localisation and democratisation. Democratisation brought about the appearance of various NGOs, and their activities and influences were gradually extended within Korean society. Currently the intervention of environmental NGOs has become a daily event in the regional and locational conflicts. The intervention of external influences has tended to make relationships between participants more complex, which has resulted in the varied range of conflict types.

6.5.3 A Multiplicity of Issues and Processes

In disputes related to regional developments, one party may focus on community and change, another party on environmental integrity and aesthetics, and yet a third on private property rights and the value of growth. Such different concerns among parties lead to a multiplicity of conflict issues. Rhodes (1986, p.71) has argued that 'the process of policy is considered as the procedure that various interest groups establish the new relationships and make a consensus of interests'. In this context, conflicts in the process of spatial policy are likely to be complex, changeable and inconsistent rather than regular and consistent. Therefore in the process of conflict, the appearance of new participants or a change of issues can have a great effect upon the amplitude of the conflict.

The extent of conflict can be quite different in relation to the number of participants, the degree of their concerns, the nature and availability of information and the character and the timing of participation. Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.29) have commented that 'the effects of regional developments and environmental events have a tendency to open toward wide regions and to link with the outside in terms of spatial concepts. Particularly as to environmental issues, events at one place may cause repercussions in other place at other times. Thus, the consequences of human action are bound to be unpredictable'. As a rule, environmental or social groups can

split easily, because interest groups tend not to be as cohesive as labour unions, a factor which can influence the process of conflict making it more difficult to resolve. Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.40) point out further that 'a NGO involved in a settlement effort may fragment internally over a proposed agreement. The mediator may then be faced with new splinter groups attempting to halt implementation of the parent groups' bargain'. Indeed, this phenomenon occurred within several stakeholder groups in one of the case studies examined later in this thesis, creating a many new stakeholders in an environmental conflict (see Chapter 8).

6.5.4. Uncertainty and Conflict Situations

Different dimensions of uncertainty can have profound consequences for the strength and length of a conflict. In regional or environmental conflicts, for instance, uncertainties over costs and benefits and the difficulty of defining issues, make the conflict situation compared with simpler examples. Parties to a conflict also tend to consider an issue as a more serious problem when they lack accurate information and/or mutual communication (e.g. see section 8.2). Another type of uncertainty is that of identifying the stakeholders of an environmental conflict. According to Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.27), 'a typical environmental dispute may easily include dozens of stakeholders. If their representations do not participate in settlement discussions, the negotiation of a stable agreement may be impossible ... parties to environmental disputes are more numerous and often less obviously identifiable than are the representative of labour and management'. Identifying stakeholders and securing their participation are vital to the success of mediation, because of the possibility that an agreement can be challenged by individual stakeholders or groups excluded in the process (see section 8.3).

Further problems of uncertainties are provided by time horizons and geographical boundaries. Susskind and Secunda (1998, p.30) set out the issues thus: 'as to geographic boundaries, environmental disputes often have none; at best, such boundaries are often ambiguous. The issues of spill-over effects is almost always present. Environmental mediators must often consider the effects of a proposed agreement on parties hundreds of thousands of miles away who are not at the negotiating table'. Time frame issues can range from how long a party will be responsible for remedying any potential negative impacts of a project to issues that simply cannot be quantified, such as the responsibility the current stakeholders owe to

future generations in existing responsible stewardship. Regional and environmental conflicts are not confined to the limits of place of the conflicts, but can spread to wider area. Actually the geographic boundaries were not clearly defined in regional and environmental conflicts such as water use, pollution or nuclear waste facility siting (see Chapters 8 and 10).

6.5.5. Conflict over Land and Land Use

The most distinctive characteristic of conflicts related to regional developments or facility location relates to land use.⁷⁾ Land is in finite supply and is immobile. Minnery (1985, p184) explains ‘generally its occupation by one use, or ownership by one party, prohibited the use or ownership by others. Its value was measured in terms of both intrinsic qualities and relationships to other locations’. This exclusive ownership is a distinct character of conflicts over land use from other conflicts. He continued, ‘as conflicts over land are often zero-sum interactions and are related to the allocation of use and control, the connection between resources conflict and social or political conflict is clear. Inter-organisational conflict between local authorities is often a result of land-based incompatibilities’.

In such zero-sum conflicts, there must be a victor and a loser. Therefore, without an intervention as a third party, conflicts are apt to become aggravated because of the persisting dissatisfaction and frustration of the losing party. Naturally the intrinsic characteristic of land use is to induce the concerned residents’ participation in a conflict. This situation may generate new conflicts, and if so, could make it very difficult to resolve the original conflict. Techniques to manage conflicts in the situation usually depend upon the will of political decision-makers.

6.5.6. Locational Conflict

Locational conflict is strongly related to land use and site-specific disputes over particular projects or plans. ‘Locational conflict’ is regarded as a function of certain imperfection market mechanism resulting from the presence of externality effects.

⁷⁾ According to Bingham (1987, p.315). ‘land use involves neighbourhood and housing issues, commercial and urban development issues, parks and recreation, preservation of agriculture land and regional planning issues, facility siting and transportation’.

spatial monopoly and immobility. Lake (1987, p.iv) has also argued that 'locational conflicts arises from false dichotomies that pervade the facility planning process'.⁸⁾ Most locational conflicts can thus be considered as disputes about the distribution of externality effects. Externalities can be divided into positive and negative effects which occur as a result of locating a specific facility at a certain area. According to Steven (1985, p.80), 'if someone gains this is known as a benefit, utility or positive externality; conversely, if someone loses this is known as a disbenefit, disutility or negative externality'. He classified the co-relation between externality (positive or negative) and distance from facility into three cases including NIMBY, PIMFY and common facilities.

Since 1995, many of the regional conflicts in Korea have been NIMBY rather than PIMFY type facility location conflicts. From the economic point of view, locational conflict may arise from the imbalance between costs and benefits. Thus the one of methods to reduce such conflicts would be form of intervention to attain a more mutually acceptable balance of costs and benefits.

6.5.7. Clash of Interest between Conservation and Development Pressures

Many conflicts related to regional plans and policies resulted from contradictory interests divided between conservation values and development pressure. Since 1995, the main principles of the Korean government's economic policy have been to facilitate a free competition market and to induce sustained economic development by removing every kind of restriction and regulations. The free market and sustained development have brought about development pressures, which generated conflicts with conservation value. A typical case has been conflict over the green belt policy in Korea.⁹⁾ The removal or relaxation of green belts caused heated debates among the concerned residents, local governments and environmental groups (*Korea Daily News* 1999; *Hankyoreh Daily News*, 1999). Conflicts between development pressure in the

⁸⁾ The potential for locational conflict arises from the tendency to separate facility planning and design decisions from the process of facility siting. A second source of discord is the attempted separation of 'objective' science from policy and politics. Facility planners and developers too often seek to portray planning and siting decisions as based on an objective scientific process. The process instead is far from objective and value-free but rather contains innumerable political decisions and value judgements.

⁹⁾ In England, conflict over green belts is typified as a conflict between two lobbies: 'private house-builders essentially speculator on the market for new housing; and the CPRE (Council for the Protection of Rural England), the oldest champion of countryside protection' (Elson, 1986, p.229).

private sector and conservation value for public interest are likely to increase greatly in the future.

6.5.8. Implementation

In labour disputes, unions and management can reach a realisable agreement relatively easily, and the agreement can be implemented smoothly because they can rely upon the next negotiation. As they have responsibilities of continuing to negotiate with each other, the implementation of an agreement rarely comes into question. In contrast conflicts relating to regional and environmental developments consist usually of one round (one-shot game) and contain irregular matters. Since parties to the conflict cannot promise that the next opportunity and the power of influence will last for long, it is difficult to negotiate about conflict issues and to guarantee the implementation of an agreement among the parties.

6.5.9. The Possibility of Outside Intervention

Urban and regional planning activities are undertaken by public authorities, which initiate most urban and regional planning activity and control, direct and prohibit the activity of non-government agencies. The settlement of conflicts is therefore often the responsibility of government (and, ultimately, depending on the issue involved, the courts). In addition, because the nature of planning proposals are deeply linked to public interests, there is the possibility of outsiders' (public agencies) intervention. In order to implement agreements between the parties, the government's approval is usually required, which implies that the implementation of agreement is often not just a matter for the parties concerned. Thus, the government becomes a party to the bargaining process or is at least involved as an observer. Susskind and Secunda (1998, pp.28-29) have observed that 'if the agency in question has not been a party to the bargaining process, it may determine that it cannot both honour the voluntary settlement and fulfil its statutory mandate. Public agencies can deny or qualify the necessary permits and licences or initiate enforcement action, thus frustrating implementation of informally negotiation agreements.'

After local autonomy in Korea, the issues concerned with regional developments had a tendency to shift from compensation of victims or landowners within the damaged district to public values and interests. With this change in focus, the range of stakeholders has increased to involve many unspecified persons in a wide

area as well as landowners directly related to land use. With additional stakeholders taking part in the conflict, the scale of conflict grew and conflict resolution became increasingly difficult. After the late 1980s, as concerns about environmental issues grew, NGOs' and residents' interventions became more conspicuous in regional development conflicts.

6. 6. The Current System for Conflict Resolution

The system of conflict mediation in Korea has focused to date on conflicts between local governments rather than between central and local governments. During the period when the strictly hierarchical administrative system existed, visible conflicts between the central and local governments could rarely take place, and even 'though conflicts occurred, they could be resolved and settled through the central government's various control functions such as approval, supervise, guidance and command. Accordingly, the system for resolving intergovernmental conflicts largely concentrated on conflict resolution between local governments (Kim and Cha, 1997, p.118). The legacy of this historical period has meant that there were few systems or methods for conflict mediation beyond direct negotiation and third party intervention.

6.6.1. Direct Negotiation

Two existing agencies assist in encouraging negotiations over conflict issues arising between two (or more) local governments in Korea: the 'administrative committee', which deals with wider-area affairs concerned with two or more local authorities and, the local self-government association, which negotiates special wider-area business under the provisions of the LAA(1995).

The administrative committee is a very important and frequently used method. Initially, as a consultation organ, it was established to cover specific affairs¹⁰⁾ relating to problems among public organisations over wider-area planning and implementation, joint building and management of public facilities and the interchange over administrative and financial affairs. According to the LAA, 'local governments can constitute an administrative committee for dealing with affairs which are the concern

¹⁰⁾ The subjects for consultation include: the formulation, change and execution of urban plans, the development of housing areas and industrial parks, with road building, water supply and drainage, preventive facility for environmental pollution, resource development and research, with building public facilities and management, wider-area plan and their implementation, and with the exchange of administrative information and the adjustment of administrative and financial affairs.

of two or more local governments' (LAA Sect. 142-1). If the committee cannot reach an agreement on a certain issue, a concerned local government can ask the minister of MOHA or the provincial governor (mayor) to mediate in the affair. By the end of 1995, there were five upper administration committees consisting of 15 upper-tier governments, and 49 lower administration committees consisting of 207 lower-tier governments (including 81.6% of total local governments). Despite the fact that most local governments were included in these committees, their activities had been very mundane. As the years advanced, the number of joint meetings and agenda items laid before the committees greatly decreased (Kim, P. D., 1996, p.19).

According to the LAA, the first members of committee consisted of executive officers of local government, while the local assembly was excluded from the committee. As a result, when the assemblies' approval was sought, they could block endorsement of the committee's agreement. Since the agreement did not carry a legal binding power, it was difficult to provide a satisfactory result in implementing the agreement. Because a committee consists of the same level of local governments, it cannot deal with affairs to take place between upper and lower tiers or central and local governments. Finally, a committee cannot prevent a conflict in advance because it is designed to discuss only manifest conflicts.

While the administration committee retains some usefulness, albeit diminished, the idea of a Local Self-government Association under the LAA (Sect. 149) has become a nominal process. Only the Capital Region Waste Reclamation Committee, established by the cities of Seoul and Incheon and Kyunggi Province in 1991, is still operating.

6.6.2. Third Party Intervention


Currently, methods for third party intervention for conflict resolution in Korea can be distilled into three types: (i) committees for conflict mediation; (ii) central government's administrative mediation or arbitration and, (iii) the court judgements, including administrative litigation, civil suits and constitutional judgements (Figure 6.1).

1. *Committee for mediation*: when conflict between lower-tier governments takes place, the provincial governor concerned can mediate the conflict and establish a local committee for conflict mediation under his/her control. When a conflict is connected with upper-tier governments, the MOHA can also mediate the conflict and establish a

central committee for mediation (LAA 140, 140-2). When the ministry or governor (mayor) mediates an intergovernmental conflict, he/she will work through a committee for consultation. When the committee decides (arbitration) on a conflict settlement, the parties concerned are expected to accept the committee's decision (LAA 140-3,4). On the other hand, as environmental conflicts have sharply increasing and the degree of conflict was becoming deeper, an alternative route lies through the Environmental Dispute Resolution Committees which can be established in the MOE, provinces and metropolitan cities under the Act for Mediation of Environmental Disputes 1995.¹¹⁾

2. *Judgements*: If a conflict is not resolved through a direct negotiation or the committee for mediation, the conflict is brought before the courts for judgement. The parties to the conflict can pursue their interests through administrative litigation over the right of jurisdiction or administrative decision and activity. The parties also can bring the matter to the civil court in order to ask for damages or losses related to the conflict. Finally, when a conflict is concerned with an authorised limit of rights and duties, the constitutional court can judge or issue an authoritative interpretation for the conflict resolution (ROK Constitution, Cl. 111).

Figure 6-1. The current system of conflict resolution



Source: Samsung Economic Research Institute (in Kim and Cha, 1997, p.136)

¹¹⁾ This system, as a pre-stage of the court judgement, can effect saving of money and time for court judgement. In addition, as the committee is based on expert knowledge over environmental matters, it can resolve efficiently the matters

3. *Autocratic command and mediation*: Even after the introduction of local autonomy, central government has a responsibility for controlling and supervising local government. Its departments can mediate conflicts concerned with decisions by a local government. Based on individual special laws, when local governments have incompatible policies in the fields of road and transportation, urban planning, and environment policy, the relevant department of central government can mediate and arbitrate the matter at the request of one or other of the parties involved.

6. 7. The Experience of ADR in Korea

Korea already has some experience of ADR in civil suits and labour disputes. 'Most disputes in private sector are resolved without litigation. However, regarding those serious disputes which require either a formal or informal venue for resolution, whether through the court system or various forms of ADR such as arbitration, mediation or conciliation, 99 per cent of such disputes would be resolved through litigation' (Hwang, 1994). It is a general practice in Korea for lawyers to recommend attempting at some sort of settlement negotiation instead of going to full litigation.

Experience with ADR in Korea has been mainly concerned with private sectors such as family, labour and commercial disputes. There was very little experience in the public sector until the late 1980s. Disputes concerned with environmental issues and regional developments were rare occurrences in Korea in this political era. Skills and techniques used in dispute resolution were therefore undeveloped, and only administrative decisions or judicial decisions had been used at for the resolution of organisational disputes. As the move towards social and political democratisation progressed and as public participation increased in the 1980s, environmental issues in regional developments became an issue of concern among intellectuals. From this time, it became apparent that there was a need for mediation in environmental disputes.

The Environment Conservation Law was enacted in 1990, and the Ministry of Environment (MOE), as a new agency for formulation and execution of environmental policy, was established in 1991. At the same time, the Environmental Dispute Resolution Committee' for resolving disputes, was also established. Environmental Impact Assessment was introduced in every kind of development project. On the other hand, NGOs including 'the Korean Environmental Movement

of Federation' began to be organised, and their influence began to increase in the field of environment issues.

These changes have had an effect on development plans. The environment field in planning became an influential aspect of the Second Comprehensive Development Plan. The Plan included the following basic strategies (ROK, 1992a, p.84): establishment of a comprehensive environmental management program; reinforcement of inter-relationships between developments and environmental conservation policies; international co-operation to preserve ecosystems and the earth's environment; improvement of environmental standards and expand investment in the environment. At this time, Korea experienced a turning point in the process of decision-making on development policies and environmental issues. Methods for conflict resolution began to change. The need of collaborative processes and sustainable development was understood. The promotion and use of EDR by governmental agencies began to take a variety of forms.

The Korean political system had been one of a strongly centralised governmental system for a long time. Democracy and public participation had been blocked in decision-making on environmental and regional policies until 1995, and the role of central government had been absolute. The stronger the central government and the less there is a tradition of democratic participation, the more governments play a primary role. After the introduction of local autonomy, although localisation and democratisation have progressed rapidly in regional developments and policies, the vestiges of bureaucratic or authoritarian behaviour tendencies still exist in Korean society. Nevertheless, as localisation progresses and civil society institutions become stronger, the roles of local government and NGOs will increase in the future.

Although the Korean society is greatly influenced by developed countries' experience of ADR, the experience is limited to matters within specific areas. The ADR available are not extensive and largely depend on third party interventions, such as the committee for mediation or administrative command. To encourage the use of ADR procedures, Moore (1998, p.191) has suggested that 'institutional, judicial and administrative structures should be reorganised to address and resolve environmental problems as well as psychological factors, and historical practice to support co-operative dispute resolution initiatives should be established'.

Fortunately, more recently, ADR approaches in environmental disputes have begun to be introduced in the private sector, and government has also taken an interest in the methods of ADR through the 'Wider-Area Administrative Committee' or 'Environmental Dispute Resolution Committee' (Im, 1999, pp.55-61).

6.8. Conclusions

The analysis of this Chapter suggests that most intergovernmental conflicts in Korea after 1995 have come from differences of approach between the past and its centralised administrative system and the newly implemented system of local autonomy. In this period of transition from one political environment to another, intergovernmental conflicts related to regional development projects and environmental issues have demonstrated a sharp increase in numbers. The causes of these conflicts were mainly concerned with the expression of local/regional interests, cross-boundary effects and administrative jurisdiction which had previously been resolved within the centralised, hierarchical system of public administration. After the introduction of local autonomy, the systems and methods for conflict resolution still mainly depended on administrative commands from upper-tier authorities (local and central) and judicial decisions although some steps have been taken to establish different methods of dispute resolution.

Korea's recent experience of social conflicts may be quite different from that of other countries. The differentiating factors include: the early experience of local autonomy; administrative reform; the co-existence of localisation and centralisation within the spatial policy and planning system; the residue of a disparity within regional development (excessive imbalance of development over environmental interests). Such conditions both created intergovernmental conflicts and were themselves characteristic of the nature of conflicts in Korea. These conflicts thus involved not only universally experienced common causes, but also causes specific to Korea. An analysis of the Korean experience has provided an opportunity to consider the need for appropriate alternatives for conflict resolution. This analysis will be combined with the conclusions from earlier chapters to suggest a set of central research Premises in the next Chapter of the thesis (see section 7.2), and will also be applied in the evaluation of the suggested Premises (see section 11.2).

Chapter 7. A Framework for Case Study Analysis

7.1. Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is first to define an analytical framework comprising a central premise and nine supporting sub-premises (Section 7.2) to be used in a comparative case study analysis (Section 7.3) of six typical major regional/environmental projects in Korea. The discussion then considers the basic method of applying the framework to each case study and the nature of the comparisons between different cases (Sections 7.4 and 7.5). The factors influencing different stages of conflict (i.e. conflict development and conflict resolution) are examined. In terms of conflict development, factors related to the degree of intensity of conflicts (Section 7.6) and the specification of measurements of intensity (Section 7.7) are defined and explored. The factors influencing the process of conflict resolution are examined in Section 7.8. Section 7.9 defines the meaning of several measures (e.g. of 'degree of achievement' and 'receptivity') the outcomes of conflict resolution.

7.2. The Analytical Framework

The basis of a framework to analyse intergovernmental disputes over major regional/environmental development projects in Korea has been established through the literature reviews of conflict theory and resolution methods reported in Chapters 3-4 of this thesis. These reviews suggested that conflicts typically move through characteristic phases of 'conflict initiation', 'conflict development' and 'conflict resolution'. The reviews also suggested that once initiated, the intensity (depth) and development of the conflict can be influenced by certain identified factors and that the intensity of the conflict can similarly influence the degree of difficulty of conflict resolution. In this way, the factors influencing the intensity of conflict can play an important role in supplying major turning points in the overall process of conflict development and resolution.

In understanding the nature and process of a conflict, it is thus very important to evaluate the influence of these factors. The analytical framework developed for this study, brings together a series of factors which focus on the central relationship between the intensity of a conflict and the degree of difficulty of its resolution (see: section 4.3.4). This Central Premise is the reference point for nine further Sub-

Premises, which come together to form the analytical framework. Five of the Sub-Premises are principally drawn from the review of conflict theory in Chapter 3 and are concerned with identifying the factors influencing the intensity of conflict. Four further Sub-Premises are drawn from the literature reviewed in Chapter 4 and part of Chapter 2 (relating to the specific circumstances of Korea) and are concerned with identifying the variables influencing conflict resolution. The relevant sections of Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are indicated immediately after the wording of each Sub-Premise.

The Central Premise

The more intense the degree of conflict, the more difficult is conflict resolution.

(Section 4.3.4)

Premises on Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

- A. *The larger the difference of interest, the deeper the degree of conflict (Section 3.3).*
- B. *The higher the degree of distrust and the more distorted the communication between parties, the deeper the degree of conflict (Section 3.5).*
- C. *The more negative the perception of conflict and the more violent the pattern of conflictual behaviour, the deeper the degree of conflict (Section 3.2.1).*
- D. *The more well-structured and the more cohesive the party, the lower the degree of conflict (Section 3.2.3).*
- E. *The larger the degree of discretion and the greater the autonomy of organisations, the greater the likelihood of deep intergovernmental conflicts (Section 2.9).*

Premises on Variables Influencing Conflict Resolution

- F. *The greater the number of stakeholders and parties involved, the more difficult is conflict resolution (Section 4.4.2).*
- G. *The more complex the issues of conflict and the larger the scale of the issues, the more difficult is conflict resolution (Section 4.4.2).*
- H. *The more coercive the strategies and tactics used, the more the conflict tends to become aggravated, and the more difficult is conflict resolution (Section 4.3.2).*
- I. *The more intensive the degree of conflict, the more likely there will be third party intervention (Section 4.2.2).*

7.3. Reasons for the Case Study Research Method

The analytical framework described above will be used to evaluate the process of local autonomy-related conflicts in Korea. The questions to be used in the evaluation are 'why' and 'how' conflicts have occurred and reached a form of resolution over a period of time. In considering an appropriate methodology for these evaluations, a strong lead is given by Yin (1988), who argues that the use of case study (p.6) is an appropriate comprehensive research strategy (p.13) for studies of 'how' and 'why' questions dealing with operational links needing to be traced over time. Yin (p.13) also argues that case study inquiry benefits from 'the prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis' such as those developed about conflict development and resolution derived from the literature reviews. In terms of research methodology, Yin (pp.1-2) further states that case study inquiry is used in many situations and has been a common research approach in e.g. social science, city and regional planning (i.e. as is under consideration in Korea in the present study), psychology, sociology and political science topics. For these reasons, case study inquiry was considered to be the most suitable approach to test the premises. In view of the different types of regional development/environmental conflicts in Korea, a number of case studies have been undertaken to explore the role of the range of specified factors in the processes of conflict development and resolution, so as to test the framework of premises for their explanatory value.

Yin (p.4) points out that there may be 'exploratory', 'descriptive' or 'explanatory' types of case study, although 'this does not imply that the boundaries between the strategies are always clear and sharp...there are large areas of overlap among them'. Among these strategies, the explanatory type of case study was adopted for this project because these case studies were concerned with 'how' and 'why' questions which, as Yin (p.6) states, deal with operational link needing to be traced over time.

Observation of the various experiences of different cases is an accepted way to gain a better understanding of social processes such as conflicts. In order to examine why and how different social phenomena occurred in similar circumstances, a comparative analysis method is often used in social science research. To provide a structured approach to the multiple examples of regional infrastructure projects in Korea, a comparative case method was adopted. As Vallier (1971, p.4) has commented, '[the] comparative method is how best to treat many different types of

empirical units or societies within a single set of analytical categories'. Because these comparative case studies provide empirical and theoretical lessons of relevance to policy and practice in the constructive management of conflict, they will be used later to develop recommendations for future good practice in Korea.

As mentioned earlier (Ch.2), Korean society has experienced various conflicts in implementing local autonomy during the 1990s, and intergovernmental conflicts have been no exception from these phenomena. The focus of attention in this research and the case studies evaluated is limited to intergovernmental conflicts concerned with environmental/ regional developments. The choice of the comparative cases themselves was based on building up a typology of major infrastructure project conflicts in Korea using the following criteria:

- large-scale environmental and regional projects with nation-wide concerns;
- the types of conflict based on relationships between parties e.g.: central-central department; central-local government; local-local government; and central government-residents (social groups);
- the influence of local autonomy in the initiation and development of conflict; and
- central government intervention in the process and resolution of conflict.

Among conflicts related to environmental and regional development, the most critical and typical conflicts occurring after the implementation of local autonomy

Table 7-1. Main categories of regional development/environment conflict in Korea

Category	Example of conflicts	Main proponent
NIMBY conflicts	Waste disposal facility Sewage disposal Plant Hazardous facility (NPP, NWDF) (Gas station) Social welfare facility	Local governments Local governments Central governments Private sector Local governments
PIMFY conflicts	Wanted infrastructure (Road, railway) Wanted facility (e.g. Technology park, tourist resort)	Central/local governments Local government/private
Water resource conflicts	Dam construction Water pollution Water allocation	Central government Central/local government Local governments

Source: Based on Lee, 1999, p.35, 52.

have been those concerned with NIMBYism and regional sectionalism. (Kim, B.J. 1996, p.9) For the purpose of this research, this type of conflict has been sub-divided into three categories: ‘NIMBY’ conflicts; ‘PIMFY’ conflicts; and, ‘water resource’ conflicts. Table 7.1 describes the three categories and gives examples of the major project types characteristically found in each category. It also indicates the usual main proponent of the project type e.g. local governments characteristically propose the development of sewage disposal plants.

The three basic categories of regional development conflicts are shown in Column 1 of Table 7.2. As mentioned in Chapter 2, local autonomy led to deep changes in intergovernmental relations in Korea and in the role of residents. These changes influenced the nature of regional development conflicts. To compare the influence of local autonomy on the process of conflict, it was decided to select two conflicts in each category, one of which began before and the other of which began after the implementation of local autonomy; these are shown in Column 2 of Table 7.2. (In the ‘water resource’ conflict category, the two cases both in fact happened after the implementation of local autonomy, but both were included as to give consideration to a case where the conflict was principally between central government and national social groups.) Conflicts concerned with a cross-section of central government/local governments/resident relationships are shown in Column 3 of Table 7.2. Because the changing role of central government under local autonomy was a principal interest of this study, central government’s direct or indirect participation as a third party was also used to build up the overall conflict typology and is shown in Column 4 of Table 7.2.

After considering a range of possibilities, the following were selected as specific cases meeting the multiple criteria show in Table 7.2 and are listed below in Column 5 of Table 7.2, and the site of these six conflicts are shown in the map of Figure 7.1.:


- NIMBY conflicts - Anmyun Island Nuclear Waste Disposal Site (NWDS), and, Younggwang Nuclear Power Plant (NNP);
- PIMFY conflicts - The route of Seoul–Pusan High Speed Railroad (HSR) in Kyungju City, and, Incheon New International Airport Motorway);
- Water resource conflicts - Wichon Industrial Complex (IC), and, Dong River Dam.

Table 7-2. Case study typology by categories

Category	Local Autonomy	Conflict Relations	Third party	Conflict case
NIMBY	Before LA	Central-resident	No	Anmyun NWDS
	After LA	Central-local	Yes	Younggwang NNP
PIMFY	Before LA	Central-central	Yes	Kyungju HSR
	After LA	Central-local	No	Inchon IAM
Water resource	After LA	Local-local	No	Wichon IC
	After LA	Central-resident	Yes	Dong River Dam

In order to test and evaluate the framework of nine premises, fieldwork survey on the six conflict cases was carried out through in-depth interviews and documentary and archive information collection in Korea for three months (February-April 2000). (More details of the survey methodology are available in Appendix 5-6)

Figure 7-1. The sites of the six conflict cases




7.4. Method of Analysis

Mutunyagam (1981, [in Minnery, 1985, p.130]) has suggested that, generally speaking the 'elements of conflict analysis include the source, origin, duration, form, intensity, manageability, terminability and environment of the conflict'. Based on these elements, each of the six cases was first analysed individually through the application the framework of nine premises. Secondly, and again using the framework of nine premises, a comparison was made between the two selected cases for each of the three categories. The role of the framework was to allow the relationships between the factors influencing the process of conflict development and conflict resolution to be examined and evaluated. The analysis enabled the identification of major turning points based on an understanding of the changing circumstances and significant events in these processes. Since this study focuses on the process of conflict over time, the stress is put on the analysis of dynamic factors influencing the intensity of conflict and variables for conflict resolution rather than the causes of conflict as static factors. Using Mutunyagam's elements of conflict analysis, each case is analysed to explore how, as the conflict progresses, major issues and each party's strategy changed, how the intensity of conflict influenced conflict resolution, and, what was the effect of the conflict.

7.5. The Process of Case Study Analysis (Fig. 7.2)

In Stage I, in order to understand the characteristics, causes and progress of each conflict, a general narrative account is provided of the origin and progress and resolution of the conflict. The analysis begins with Stage II, when the factors influencing the intensity of conflict such as 'different interests', 'trust and communication', 'structure and internal discord', 'behaviour' and 'external environment' are considered in relation to Premises A-E. Then in Stage III, in order to assess the intensity of conflict of each case, three measures are evaluated: the number of parties or participants; the duration of the conflict; and, the number of conflict behaviour. This stage plays the role of bridge to examine the relationships between the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution, which is concerned with the Central Premise. Next, in Stage IV, the influence variables such as 'stakeholders', 'issues', 'strategies', 'government's role' and 'third party intervention' have had in resolving conflicts are examined in relation to the Premises F-I. In Stage V, the assessments of the two conflict cases in each matching set are compared. After the

Figure 7-2. Process of case study analysis



three sets of case studies have been analysed in this way, a general evaluation is made in Stage VI (reported in Ch.11) of the results of the findings from the case studies. Figure 7.2 shows a flow chart for the analysis for each case study. The appropriate framework Premises (e.g. A...F) are indicated in the appropriate boxes and the appropriate sections of this Chapter (e.g. # 7.4.5) are cross-referenced in the appropriate boxes in the Figure.

7.6. Stage II: The Factors Influencing the Degree of Conflict

According to Schmidt and Kochan (1986), many causes and factors contribute to the occurrence and degree of conflict. They suggest three preconditions for the occurrence of conflict: 'goal incompatibility', 'resources shared' and 'activity interdependence'. According to the relationships between these three elements, various causal factors establish a conflict potential, from which a defined conflict may develop. In the case studies discussed here, the analysis of the preconditions of conflict was excluded because these cases were already in the state of manifest conflict (e.g. Stage I in Fig.7.2). Since these case studies focus on the process of conflict over time, the analysis has put the stress on the factors influencing the intensity of conflict.

The factors influencing the process of conflict identified in the literature review of conflict theory in Chapter 3, can be classified as 'direct' or indirect' factors

Table 7-3. The factors influencing the intensity of conflict and related Premise

Premise/Factors	Sub-factors
A: Differences of interest	Economic interests Social interests Safety and environment
B: Trust/communication	Preceding relationships Technical/Procedural trust Communication
C: Perception Behaviour	Proponent/Opponent Central government Local government Residents/groups
D: Structure/internal discord	Government Resident/groups
E: External environment (surroundings)	Interest groups Press and media Political change: democratisation and localisation

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

according to their relationship with the conflict. The former include: 'difference of interests'; 'mutual trust and communication'; 'structure of party and internal discord'; and 'behaviour pattern'. The latter comprises: 'external environment' such as interest groups, media and political changes. The factors are summarised in Table 7.3.

The analysis involved evaluating the evidence about each factor. When a factor was evaluated to have had an influence on increasing the intensity of conflict, the factor scored (+), and when a factor was concerned with decreasing the intensity of conflict, it has got (-). Where the factor was evaluated as not influencing or having had a neutral influence, the score (0) was recorded. (A similar scoring procedure was used when analysing the variables influencing conflict resolution; a variable evaluated to have and a positive influence on conflict resolution is scored [+], a variable with a neutral or no evident influence is scored [0], and, a variable evaluated as having a negative influence is scored [-].) The scoring system is recorded under each box or table as appropriate; for example, see Box 7.1 below.

The evidence supporting each evaluation is recorded in the case study text. It is recognised that this method although systematic, had a weak point in not reflecting appropriately differences of value between the different factors. However, since it was very difficult anyway to compare the cases through weighting the degree of influence on the intensity of conflict by factors, it was felt that the general advantages of this approach outweighed this disadvantage. These factors are each now introduced in more depth.

7.6.1. Differences of Interest

There can be many differences of interest between disputants in a conflict, such as economic, social, environmental and safety differences. In relation to conflicts over the location of development projects, Dear (1992, p.290) has stated that 'opposition arguments usually express three specific concerns: the perceived threat to property values; personal security; and neighbourhood amenity'. In this study, differences of interest were distilled into three basic categories: economic effects, social images, and, environmental and safety interests (Box.7.1).

One obvious indicator of relative advantages and disadvantages of a project is its economic impact on a community; this is concerned largely with the balance of costs and benefits. If a specific locality is burdened with a considerable cost, or its social form is damaged by a project designed for national interests, then local

residents' opposition can be strong and the degree of conflict may be high. Similarly, an unfair distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with a development project can give rise to conflict between loser and gainer. Usually the existence of widespread public opposition to unwanted facilities can be accounted for by considering the results and effects of each proposal. In the case of LULU projects, the outcome is usually perceived locally as far from favourable. From the local community's perspective, the cost of the facility far outweighs its benefit (Morrel, 1982, p.53). Secondly, social interests may include matters such as social status, honour, personality and maintenance of natural form, which are connected with social value judgements. Since one party's disregard of this matter can cause an adverse emotional escalation in another party, conflicts resulting from this difference may be difficult to resolve. Thirdly, there are differences connected with environment, sanitation and safety. These interests are very important matters of basic concern in human life. When differences on technological perception are added to other basic disagreements, the degree of conflict shows a tendency to increase.

Thus, although the degree of differences of interest is likely to influence the intensity of conflict, their influence depends on the degree of disputants' subjective perception about the conflict, namely whether disputants regard the conflict as a positive process or a negative one. Therefore what disputants think of their interests is an important variable for the degree of conflict.

Box 7.1 Premise A conflict factor: differences of interest

Factor	Sub-factors
Difference of interest	Economic difference Social difference Environmental difference

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

7.6.2. Mutual Trust and Communication

Previous good or bad relationships can become a factor for determining the degree of mutual trust between parties in the process of conflict. As well as the experience of the earlier relationships, the trust built up between parties in the development of conflict or in the process of negotiation can influence the intensity of conflict. Trust or its absence can be especially important in conflict resolution and help in developing expectations for the implementation of agreements. Such mutual trust can be reduced by previous distrust between parties, by exclusion from the decision

making process, by an opposite party's insincere behaviour. and, by problems in communication. 'Trust has a fragile attribute rather than cultivated or consolidated one. Accordingly it is difficult to iron out distrust once established' (Park, 1999, p.17). Especially when the location of a hazardous facility is being considered, distrust may create fear and even lead to violent action. Usually every party expects that other party will trust itself in a negotiation, but it is more usual for them to distrust each other. On the other hand, hostile behaviour expressed in a conflict is created by an uncertainty of the situation, because hostility is often the product of frustration and fear. The frustration and fear are often the product of uncertainty. The uncertainty is caused by insufficient or distorted information (Rangarajan, 1985, p.30). As a result, inter-communication has an important play in establishing mutual trust. The lack of communication and distorted communication can block the sufficient information and create distrust, which usually leads to the deterioration of the situation of conflict.

Box 7.2 Premise B conflict factor: trust and communication

Factors	Sub-factors
Trust (relationship) and communication	Preceding relationships Degree of trust (Technical and Procedural) Communication

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

7.6.3. Perception of and Behaviour over the Conflict

As mentioned in Chapter 3, viewpoints on conflict can be divided into negative and positive. On the one hand, conflict is considered as a social pathology, on the other hand, it is regarded as a normal occurrence inherent in human society. From the former viewpoint conflict is treated as irrational and dealing with self-interest, while from the latter, conflict is regarded as a rational and acceptable. Such different viewpoints on conflict may seriously influence disputants' behaviour and strategies, which in turn may deeply effect not only the degree and progress of conflict but also the opportunities for conflict resolution. If one party with a positive approach to conflict enters into negotiation with another party, the opportunity for conflict resolution will increase to that extent. Alternatively, if parties regard conflict as a negative phenomenon (i.e. as destructive, irrational and unfruitful) they may consider that their achievement can be accomplished through their domination of the opposite

party. In such cases, the parties can express aggressive behaviour patterns toward each other. As a result the intensity of conflict will increase and the parties will find it is very difficult to resolve the conflict. Indeed the conflict can move to an impasse because any negotiating behaviour fails to materialise. Consequently, it can be seen that the disputant's perception of conflict is an important factor that can be a great influence on the development of conflict and the scope for negotiation for conflict resolution.

The pattern of behaviour of parties to a conflict is divided into 'negative' and 'positive'. Although the parties' behaviour pattern has an influence on the strategy of conflict management, it also acts as an important variable in determining the degree of conflict. Various behaviour patterns to cope with conflict have been identified. Deutsch (1969, p.383) lists the patterns generally characterised as negative or positive mechanisms: the former include 'denial', 'repression', 'aggression', 'displacement', 'reaction-formation' and 'sublimation', and the latter include 'dialogue', 'persuasion' and 'compensation'. On the other hand, Dear and Long (1978, pp.115-117) point out that the strategies that the weak party can choose in conflict may include 'exit', 'voice', 'resignation', 'illegal action' and 'formal participation'. If the strong party assumes a firm attitude to conflict, the weak party is apt to take illegal action or resignation. Usually the weak party frequently takes a pessimistic view of its own interests or tends to have a negative judgement about result of conflict, which may lead to violent behaviour due to a vulnerable and fearful perception. Consequently, the parties' pattern of behaviour in response to conflict can change the degree of conflict considerably.

Box 7.3 Premise C conflict factors: perception and behaviour patterns

Factors	Sub-factors
Perception of conflict	Positive (Productive)/Negative(Destructive)
Behaviour pattern (Strong party/weak party)	Positive behaviour/Negative behaviour

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

7.6.4. Structure and Internal Discord of Party to a Conflict

When the parties to a conflict are both very well structured in their internal organisation and concerns, the conflict shows very active nature because each party takes up an active and positive attitude to the conflict. On the contrary, when one or both of the parties are unstructured, the conflict will progress slowly and passively:

conflict resolution also will be delayed and become difficult. If a party is unstructured and not cohesive, new splinter groups can attempt to halt the implementation of the parent group's agreement. In intergovernmental conflicts, most parties are well structured and they have well equipped accesses to resources because the parties to the conflict are public organisation; but in conflicts between governments and residents, the residents' capacity for organisation is usually weak. However, more recently as citizens' interest groups (NGOs) have grown, the capacity for participation in conflicts by residents has improved remarkably. This change has resulted in a basic change in conflict relations between government and residents.

Coser (1956) argued that a party has a tendency to pursue a conflict with an outsider because an external conflict can strengthen internal unity. This implies that an organisation's internal discord or solitary can influence the intensity of conflict. Internal conflict can occur within central and local governments as well as among residents. In the process of policy-making or implementation, conflicts often occur between the legislative body and the administrative departments, and conflicts can take place even among ministries and departments within the central government due to policy differences or department egoism. In local government, there is also scope for conflicts between the local assembly and executive officers such as the mayor.

On the other hand, when there is a considerable imbalance of interests among resident groups, an acute confrontation may break out between losers and gainers, which in turn can have a serious effect on other parties. For instance, one party can get sympathisers in the other party and alliances or splits among parties can be realised in the process of conflict. Such internal discords within a disputant or changes in attitudes to the conflict help to complicate the process of conflict, which in turn may be not helpful to conflict resolution.

Box. 7.4 Premise D conflict factors: structure and internal discord

Factors	Sub-factors
Structure of party/internal discord	Structured/Unstructured Split of party/alliance

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

7.6.5. External Environments

As recently observed (Kim, Y.R.1997, p.304; Shin, 1999, p.35), the role of interest groups and public social groups in environmental conflict is an important factor in

conflict situation. These outside groups are not regarded here as direct parties to intergovernmental conflicts, however their behaviour can sharply influence the progress and degree of conflict. NGOs' (environment groups and citizen's movement groups) activities have increased greatly and the fields of their activities have become wider after the implementation of local autonomy and democratisation. They have played roles of producing and communicating conflict issues, creating alternatives, guarding the government's policy and mediating conflicts in environmental conflicts generally in Korea. Because it is often difficult for residents to organise their opinions, systemise their activities, and have access to specialist and technical references, such outside groups may play roles as leaders on the field of conflict on behalf of local residents.

The next important category of outsider is that of the 'organisation of expression'. With the development of information technology, various types of mass media have a great influence on the leadership and formation of public opinion. Generally the mass media shows a tendency to take a growing interest in negative matters or an intriguing piece of news. Accordingly, they may want a conflict to continue in existence because they can publish lots of news material. And for some conflicts, they may even want the conflict to be deepened rather than to be resolved because of the newsworthy emphasis of the negative aspects of conflict. Ultimately their points of view or comments can seriously affect the progress of conflict in these days of mass media.

The final factor is that of political change such as democratisation and localisation. The implementation of local autonomy in Korea has made local governments compete openly with one another for their regional interests and confront the control of central government, and these considerations have influenced the intensity of conflict in regional developments. In addition, some political parties or members of national assembly also can be outsiders to a conflict and in conflicts involving political issues, and they can intervene in ways which influence the intensity of conflict.

Box 7.5 Premise E conflict factors: external environment


Factors	Sub-factors
External environments (surroundings)	Interest groups Press and media Political change

· implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

7.6.6. Summary of Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

Figure 7.3 shows the summary of the operation of factor influencing the intensity of conflict, which is stage II of case studies. There are five factors that accord with the Premises A-E, and main sub-factors by each factor are summarised. These sub-factors will be assessed in the case studies (Chapters 8-10) and will be compared with the two cases within the same conflict categories.


Figure 7-3. The factors influencing intensity of conflict



7.7. Stage: III: Measuring the Intensity of Conflict

The development and resolution of conflict depends not only upon the substantive issue, but also the intensity of the disagreements between parties. Godschalk (1992, p.369) has concluded that different intensities of conflict call for different settlement forums and techniques. So far we have discussed the factors influencing the degree of conflict. According to the Central Premise in section 7.2, the degree or intensity of conflict is an essential factor in conflict development and resolution. Hence, it is necessary to measure the intensity of conflict so that the Central Premise may be verified through the conflict case analysis. Figure 7.4 shows the summarised stage III of analysis of case studies.

Figure7-4. Measuring the intensity



Several indicators of the intensity of conflict have been suggested: these include: the number of participants; the duration of conflict; the number of acts of violence; the limit of regional effects, and; the number of press reports (Park, 1999, pp.25-26). In this study, the three measures of ‘the number of participants and parties’, ‘the duration of conflict’ and ‘the number and pattern of conflictual behaviour’ were adopted for analysis. The factors related to regional effect and numbers of press reports were ruled out for analysis, because the definition of regional limits in regional development or environmental conflict is very difficult. A further difficulty is that the number of press reports on a conflict can depend on the pressman or newspaper publishing company’s views on matters of concern.

7.7.1. The Number of Parties to A Conflict

The first indicator identified to measure the intensity of conflict in this study is the number of participants to a conflict. Usually, the larger the number of participants or parties in conflict, the greater is the degree of conflict. Although not without its difficulties in analysis, most scholars agree with this opinion and have used this method (Jeon, 2000, p.108; Park, 1999, p.25). The problem lies in how to define the disputants’ participation in a conflict and how to calculate the number of disputants. The parties can include public organisations, local governments, government agencies and social interests groups. The number of participating disputants measured was limited to the manpower mobilised for protest movement such as a demonstration, a meeting and legal or illegal activity. If no numerical value could be identified for the number of disputants participating, then only the number of parties to the conflict was considered.

7.7.2. Duration of Conflict

Next, the duration of conflict can be considered. Sipe (1998, pp.26-7) points that ‘in effect of mediation on settlement rates, as the case gets older there is a reduced

likelihood that the case will settle'. As the duration of conflict becomes longer, the degree of conflict becomes deeper and conflict resolution becomes difficult. ultimately an impasse stage may be reached without a way out being forward. Hence it is to be desired that conflict should be resolved before it progresses into the stage of impasse. Accordingly, the duration of conflict can be used as an indicator for measuring the intensity of conflict.

7.7.3. Number and Pattern of Violent Conflictual Behaviour

The third index is the number and frequency of violent acts. It is assumed that the more frequent and the more violent the conflictual behaviour, the higher is the degree of conflict. The frequency of conflict behaviour was estimated by the total number of protest movement days during a conflict. As a secondary indicator, the pattern of disputants' behaviour including legal and illegal actions (e.g. demonstration, assembly, statement, interview, sit-down strike) was considered.

7.8. Stage IV: The Variables of Conflict Resolution

Factors influencing the intensity of conflict are also related to the conflict resolution because the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution is closely related with each other. For example, the literature review in Chs.3 and 4 has suggested that 'conflict interests', 'communication' and 'trust' can be important variables for both conflict resolution as well as factors influencing the intensity of conflict. Nonetheless, the variables for conflict resolution selected for the analysis are those which are mainly effective at the stage of conflict resolution. They are: 'stakeholders and representatives'; 'number and scale of issue(s)'; 'strategies and tactics'; 'the role of public organisation'; and, 'third party intervention'. In conflicts related to regional development and environment, the role of government is deeply connected with third party as well as direct party. Accordingly in relation to the Premise I, two variables (government's role and third party intervention) are used. These variables are connected with Premises F-I and are summarised in Table 7.4.

The method of analysis on the effect of these factors on conflict resolution was the same as used in 'intensity of conflict' (section 7.6), namely when a factor had a positive influence on the conflict resolution the factor would be (+), otherwise it would be (-) and when it had a neutral or no influence on the conflict, record was (0).

Table 7-4. The variables for conflict resolution

Premises and Variables	Sub-variables
F: Stakeholders and Representatives	Disputants (parties) Representative
G: Issues	Scale of issues Number of issues Identification of issues
H: Strategies/Tactics	Proponent Opponent
I: The role of public Organisations	Central government Local government Government agency
I: Third party intervention	Third party intervention Role of third party Capacity of third party

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.1. Stakeholders and Representatives

Stakeholders and their representatives in the field of conflict are also important factors for settling conflicts. The problems concerned with this factor are: how to identify stakeholders; how to get all the stakeholders round a table for negotiation; and, how to choose representatives and establish a team for negotiation.

As mentioned in Chapter 6, stakeholders related to regional developments or environmental issues are very difficult to define in terms of their spatial boundary and range of time, and these are considerations that can lead to other conflicts. Next, the selection of representatives to participate in negotiation also requires careful choice. Representatives need to speak faithfully for their stakeholders, and in order to do so, should have a good all-round understanding of the issues in the conflict. In addition, representatives also should receive an authority from their stakeholders and should have substantial ability to negotiate. If they do not have such rights, some stakeholders may reject a negotiated agreement. Eventually it can be possible that the agreement becomes waste paper.

Box 7.6. Premise F conflict variables: stakeholders and their representatives

Variables	Sub-variables
Stakeholders/representative	No. of stakeholders Representativeness and authority

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.2. Issues

Usually the more complex the issues in a conflict, the more difficult the conflict resolution becomes. Nonetheless if there is only one fundamental issue in a certain conflict, and each party to the conflict sustains its own position, conflict resolution will be difficult because there would be no opportunity to deal with ‘give and take’ between or among the parties. Accordingly, in such cases it is very important to prepare alternatives that may open the way to bargaining.

The agenda for negotiation should include all issues which stakeholders want to bring before a meeting. Accordingly, in negotiation the issues can include procedural and conditional issues as well as substantive issues. First, the issues related to the conflict need to be defined. Secondly, the issues being defined should be identified by their character (e.g. locational and jurisdictional conflicts). Such identification and simplification of issues will provide valuable aids to making progress in negotiation. Thirdly, the priority among the issues including the classification of main and secondary issues, also should be decided as soon as possible. Each party’s priority on issues may be different to each of the other parties, which may delay the progress of negotiation.

Box 7.7. Premise G conflict variable: issues

Variable	Sub-variables
Issues	Number of issues/ Scale of issues Identification of issues

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.3. Strategies and Tactics

It needs no repetition that the strategies and tactics of the parties to a conflict have an influence on the conflict resolution. Robbins (1998, p.444) suggested nine strategies for conflict management: problem solving; super-ordinate goals; expansion of resources; avoidance; smoothing; compromise; authoritative command; altering the human variable; and, altering the structural variable. Many other scholars have also noted the strategies and tactics for conflict resolution. Kast and Resenzweig (1991, pp.276-278), for instance, classified the strategies for conflict management into: withdrawal; smoothing; compromise; confrontation; and, forcing. Rubin (1994, pp.33-34) divided the strategies into five: domination; capitulation; withdrawal; negotiation; and, third party intervention. In this study, a composite classification of

strategies was used: ‘conquest’; ‘avoidance’; ‘ignore’; ‘withdrawal’; ‘direct dialogue’; ‘third party intervention’; and, ‘alternative methods’. Tactics were explained individually as skills used under a strategy.

Box 7.8. Premise H conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Sub-variables
Strategies and tactics	Strategies (avoid, ignore, withdrawal, direct negotiation, third party intervention) Tactics (Individual methods)

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.4. The Role of Public Organisations

In this study, the role of concerned central government departments, local governments and government agencies for conflict resolution will be examined. As mentioned in Chapter 5, central and local governments play very important roles in the development and resolution of most conflicts related to national and regional development in Korea. At first, when a conflict takes place, the government, as a proponent or opponent, may be a direct party. In this case, the government’s role and behaviour can influence greatly the whole process of conflict. Additionally, central government usually plays a role as a third party (see 7.8.5 below) which can facilitate, mediate and arbitrate the conflict. Otherwise, as an observer, the government does not do anything.

Box 7.9. Premise I conflict variable: the role of public organisations

Variable	Sub-variables
The role of public organisation	Central government Local government Government agency

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.5. Third Party Intervention

Although the direct factors mentioned above could influence greatly the degree of conflict, outsiders surrounding a conflict may also affect the progress of conflict. Among the outside factors, the most important can be the role of a third party. Depending on the individual circumstances of conflict, the third party can include central or local governments, elected officials and specialists, and the roles of third party can include these of arbitrator, mediator, facilitator and technical supporter.

After the 1970s the role of a third party has become an important position in environmental conflict. So far, however, third party intervention hardly occurs in intergovernmental conflicts in Korea.

As a method for conflict resolution, third party intervention can change the situation of negotiation. Such interventions are widely known in conflicts between nations, between labour and management, commercial firms, and, family members. Recently as one approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), the method has been frequently used in intergovernmental conflicts associated with environment and development. When negotiation is at a stalemate, a mediator as a third party, can play an important role in progressing negotiations. A third party's fair and neutral dealing can greatly increase the possibility of successful agreement, particularly when the parties to a conflict have poor negotiating skills. In the Korean case studies, the analysis examined whether or not, there was a third party intervention in the conflict, and, if there was, what was the role of third party. In addition, their qualities such as fairness, speciality and trust were evaluated.

Box 7.10. Premise I conflict variable: third party intervention


Variable	Sub-variables
Third party	Third party intervention Type of intervention Third party's capacity

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

7.8.6. Summary of the Variables for Conflict Resolution

Figure 7.6 shows the summary of the variables for conflict resolution. Five variables including stakeholders, issues, and third party intervention are summarised, which will be examined by considering role of the sub-variables in resolving the conflicts identified in the case studies (Chs.8-10); the result of the analyses will be compared for the two cases within the same issue category (e.g. NIMBY issue).

Figure 7-6. The variables for conflict resolution



7.9. Stage V: Assessment of the Results of the Conflicts

Several measures have been suggested to assess the results of conflicts and the correlation between the factors for conflict resolution and the result of conflict. Pondy (1967, p.308) has suggested three measures to assess the effect of conflict: 'productivity', 'stability' and 'adaptability'. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980, pp.146-151) listed five factors including: 'policy goal attainment'; 'efficiency'; 'constituency satisfaction'; 'clientele responsiveness'; and, 'system maintenance'. However these measures are used mainly for assessing conflicts that occurred within an organisation.

This study, however, focused on social conflicts related to development or environment into account, and measures covering the 'achievement of policy', 'receptivity', 'satisfaction' and 'social stability' were considered by the researcher to be more appropriate. The productivity measure was excluded, because as Jeon (2000, p.109) has mentioned, the estimation of productivity is not easy since an assessment of cost-benefit is very difficult in social conflict. Table 7.5 shows the items for evaluating the outcomes of conflict.

Table 7-5. Items for evaluating the results of the conflict

Items	Methods of assessment
Achievement of policy	Change of project/increase of time-consumption
Receptivity of policy	Reflection of opponents' demands
Satisfaction	Proponent/opponent's satisfaction.
Social stability	The occurrence of new conflict

The first measure, the 'achievement of policy', examines the extent of the achievement of the proposal after settling a dispute. It can be assessed through the degree of change of the project and by the increase of time-consumption. It shows how much of the goal of policy has been accomplished from the proponent's point of view.

Secondly, 'receptivity' indicates the degree of responsiveness to the opponents' desired objectives. In other words, it considers how much the proponent have adapted their policies to the issues leading the process of conflict, what response they have made to opponents' pressures, and, how much elasticity they gave to the scope and nature of their project. Usually a high degree of response leads to a lower degree of achievement of the original policy, but in some cases, the effectiveness of

policy can be raised to a higher level because the proponent's primary plan or policy always does not ensure the optimal goal. Examples of such instances are quite common in locational conflicts where the effectiveness of policy has been often improved and accomplished through accommodating opponents' opinions or desires.

The degree of satisfaction with the conflict settlement depends largely on each party's subjective value; therefore it is very difficult to establish an objective standard for the assessment of each party's satisfaction. Usually under the constant-sum game, if one party's satisfaction is high, other party's one will be low. So in order to increase both or several parties' satisfaction, it is necessary to search for ways to convert the constant-sum game into a non-constant sum game. It would be possible, for instance, to reach an improved alternative through a fully collaborative rather than adversarial process, or, through expanding the resources available for the project and its side effects.

Persons who regard conflict as a negative situation think that conflict injures the stability of society, while persons having a more positive view, stress that conflict creates a new social stability and contributes to solitary within organisations (Coser, 1956, p.152; Buntz and Radin, 1983, p.403; Park 1999, p.41). The deepening of social conflict can lead to a social instability and disturbance of public order and can endanger cohesion and solitary among members within structure. On the other hand, because one conflict can develop the capability and knowledge with which society can deal with similar conflicts, other new conflicts can be reduced, which can contribute social stability. In this study, the degree of occurrence of similar new conflict can be used as an index for measuring the social stability after solving a conflict. Thus a conflict resolution can contribute to social stability.

7.10. Conclusion

This chapter has introduced the methodological and theoretical frameworks for case study analysis focused on the process of conflict over major regional/environmental development projects in Korea. From the review of literature in Chapters 3 and 4 (and to some extent Ch. 2), a 'Central Premise' (Section 7.2) has been suggested, which links the degree of intensity of a conflict with the difficulty of its resolution. Five 'Premises' (A-E) in influencing conflict development (intensity of conflict), and four 'Premises' (F-I) influencing conflict resolution have been further developed to expand on the Central Premise. These premises supplied the basic framework for

analysing case studies, and they will be examined and evaluated through the case studies. Depending on these premises, conflict 'factors' and 'variables' have been selected and described and their use as means of evaluation explained. Finally the effects of conflict have been introduced.

The next Chapters (8-10) of the thesis present the six case studies. Each chapter contains two case studies according to the type of regional/environmental facility dispute. Each chapter follows a similar structure with an introductory narrative about each case followed by an analysis of the case (in relation to the conflict factors and variables set out earlier in this chapter) and a conclusion to the chapter evaluating and analysing the similarities and differences which have been observed. Chapter 8 contains the case studies of the NIMBY type conflict -- Anmyun Island Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility and Younggwang Nuclear Power Plant. Chapter 9 involves the case studies of the PIMFY type conflicts -- Kyungju High Speed Railway and Incheon International Airport Motorway. Finally, Chapter 10 contains the case studies of water resource conflicts -- Wichon Industrial Complex and the Dong River Dam. Chapter 11 examines the general finding of the case studies in relation to the framework of nine Premises, explores the problems and implications revealed in analysis and suggests some revision to the Premises.

Chapter 8. Case study 1: Locational Conflict over Unwanted Facilities (NIMBY)

8.1. Introduction

Following the implementation of local autonomy in 1995, NIMBYism has been the most difficult social phenomenon for the Korean government to solve in the field of spatial policy. Conflicts related to NIMBY issues have frequently led to expressions of regional selfishness and social antagonisms, which can generate social insecurity and commotion. In the comparative case study reported in this Chapter, two conflicts related to nuclear policies were selected from among various possible NIMBY conflicts in Korea, because they brought about turning points in the process of government's policy decision concerned with unwanted facilities and also gave rise to national concerns about the NIMBY syndrome. In addition the two cases were good examples to examine and compare the government's role in the processes of conflict before and after local autonomy.

8.2. The Case of Anmyun Island Nuclear Waste Disposal Site (NWDS)

8.2.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. *Background to the conflict*

In order to provide a stable and adequate energy supply, the Korean government has placed a strong emphasis on developing nuclear power generation and has continued to construct nuclear power plants (NPPs) since 1971. At present (2002), 14 nuclear power generators (NPGs) are operational for commercial purposes and six further generators are under construction. The capacity of Korea's NPGs is just over one third of the total supply of electricity (ROK, 1996, p.229).


The increasing numbers of NPGs led to a growth in the production of radioactive waste as a side product of the generation process and an urgent need for the government to secure a nuclear waste disposal site (NWDS). With the purpose of searching for an appropriate site, the government began work in 1988 on 'The Management Plan for Nuclear Waste'. Eventually three proposed sites were listed. However, the study had been carried out in secret. As soon as the press reported the details of the list, concerned local residents protested strongly. Faced with this

opposition, the government cancelled the plan and searched for new sites. Three further sites, which did not have a densely populated area within an 8 km radius, were announced in 1990. Anmyun Island was one of the three sites (Lee, 1996, p.92).

2. Characteristics of Anmyun Island (Figure 8.1)

Anmyun Island is in the jurisdiction of Taean County, which is itself within Chungnam Province and is located about 240 km south of Seoul. The island was isolated from the mainland until the latter half of the 1980s when the bridge connecting the island and the Korean peninsula was constructed. The island was sparsely populated and had an undeveloped hinterland. Most of its residents were engaged in the traditional occupations of fishing and farming, and therefore considered that they had not shared in the benefit of the recent high economic growth in Korea. Due to the distinctive characteristics of island life and the rural quality of its environment, the local residents' communal consciousness was expressed in a very strong attachment to the place where they lived. As a result, it was easy to translate collective behaviour based on the community into action.

Figure 8-1. Anmyun: Site proposed for the Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility



Because of the many magnificent viewing sites along its seashores, Anmyun Island and its seashore (328,9 km²) had been designated as the Taean National Marine Park (1978), and Chungnam Province had planned (1989) to develop an International Marine Tourist Resort along the shoreline. When the NWDS news was received, the

Island's residents considered that the tourist resort proposal would be aborted by the proposed facility.

3. The start of the conflict

The conflict over the proposal for NWDF began on 2 November 1990, when central government announced its intention to construct 'the Western Sea Science and Technology Research Complex' on the south of Anmyun Island (Figure 8.1). Newspapers reported that the 'government had finished a physical study for the selection of NWDS and that it would finally decide on Anmyun Island as a chosen site at the forthcoming 227th meeting of the Nuclear Power Committee' (*Donga Daily News*, 1990a). On 5 November 1990, according to Lee (1997, p72), 'the residents wasted no time in calling for immediate cancellation of the project. Forty-two local government administrators, along with 40 community leaders who were members of the elementary system in local administration, resigned from their positions in protest'. At the same time, the residents established 'the Boycott Committee on the Construction of NWDS'.

4. The development of the conflict

On 6 November some five thousand local residents participated in a protest march led by members of the Boycott Committee. The protest movement assumed serious proportions with the addition of a formal boycott by six hundred high school students. Twenty other social and political organisations together with communities neighbouring Anmyun Island joined the protest movement. In the course of the protest march, police used tear gas to put down the demonstration. This in turn generated a strong and violent protest movement in response. Faced with the residents' strong protests, the Minister of Science and Technology (MOST) stated at a press interview that the project of 'the Western Sea Science Research Complex' was only at the study stage and that the press report of a proposed NWDS on Anmyun Island was contrary to the facts.

However, the MOST had in fact made certain prior arrangements which implied that the government was planning to go ahead with the construction of the project in any event. Further press reports (e.g. *Donga Daily News*, 1990b) suggested

that the project was the result of earlier consultations with Chungnam Province ¹⁾ and that it had already been decided upon in the 'Nuclear Power Development Plan' (1988) at the earlier 221th Nuclear Power Committee meeting.

Following these press reports and failing to obtain a clear answer to their representatives' questions from the government, the Island's residents became radical and mass mobilisation ensued. On 8 November, an anti-nuclear demonstration brought 12,000 of the Island's 16,000 residents into Anmyun Town square. Two thousand students from 16 schools refused to attend their schools, and most business and public offices were closed. The police again used tear gas to disperse the demonstrating crowds. In opposition to the police action, residents set fire to part of Anmyun Police Sub-station and patrol cars with molotov cocktails, occupied the Anmyun Town Office, and kidnapped five local government officials.

The police sent a force of 2,000 to reclaim the Town Office and took ten Boycott Committee representatives to the police station. Under the stimulus of the police action, the protest demonstration took a sharp turn for the worse and became more violent. A full-scale riot broke out and the whole town was plunged in confusion. In the meantime, a hundred representatives of local social groups and residents organised 'the Taean County Struggle Committee' as the basis for a more systematic opposition movement. Lee and Fitzgerald (1997, p.73) report that 'they [the islanders] strengthened their determination to continue the struggle by whatever means necessary to protest their community ... To that end, a force of [residents] civilian guards numbering 200 was deployed at the village gate'.

When the residents' protests increased, Chungnam Province also joined the opposition. The provincial officials declared themselves to be against the project, claiming that 'there has been no previous official notice or consultation about the NWDF from central government and we have only been consulted over the proposal of research complex for nuclear power. The central government's behaviour in announcing the project one-sidedly without any chance of publicity or consultation with the residents, is to override the wishes of Chungnam Province. We will not

¹⁾ Chungnam Province had agreed that if the government was to create a research park along the Anmyun seashore, the Province intended to offer 7.5km² of provincial land for the Research Park. This agreement, however, was on the basis that the research institute was to study technological know-how for the treatment and disposal of nuclear waste. The Province had negotiated with MOST, and took the position that there was no reason to oppose the construction of a research park on Anmyun Island (*Donga Daily News*, 1990c).

accept the project because it is their [the government's] own project regardless of us' (*Donga Daily News*, 1990c).

Nonetheless the government revealed that the project had actually been pursued at the earnest request of Chungnam Province officials. A later inquiry confirmed that MOST indeed had consulted with provincial officials, winning their agreement before the decision was made. In the face of the strong and violent resistance, Chungnam Province had immediately washed its hands of the secret project and gone over to support its residents. Judging from the Province's behaviour, 'there likely were some misunderstandings between government and province or provincial officials conveniently failed to remember their earlier acquiescence in their desire to distance themselves from the ferociously unpopular proposed NWDF. This served to further deepen mass feelings of suspicion, distrust and betrayal' (Lee and Fitzgerald 1997, p.73).

Confronted with residents' and Chungnam Province's strong resistance, on the evening of 8 November central government decided to cancel the plan for the project. Officials announced in Seoul that the government was talking about formulating a scheme over the research complex project with Chungnam Province, but it would not initiate the construction of NWDF until the misunderstandings of local residents were resolved. On 9 November, the Minister of Science and Technology was moved to a new appointment and the following day the government's decision about the cancellation of the project was announced. At this point the initial conflict began to be pacified.

5. The second conflict and termination

After its initiative to establish a NWDP was frustrated, the government began to undertake a basic survey for potential sites. From this time on, to reduce residents' strong opposition, the government adapted new methods of decision-making on NWDS including open administration, consultation with residents and making connections with regional development projects. Six sites (including Anmyun Island) were selected through the new process, but the government was again confronted with concerned local residents' protest movements, and forced to cancel the sites proposed. The Anmyun Struggle Committee was re-formed on 7 October 1991, and the opposition movement was resumed. The residents held indignation meetings and demonstrations on 31 December 1991 and 7 January 1992. At last in March 1993, the

MOST officially announced that Anmyun Island was excluded from the sites proposed and 4,000 residents celebrated their victory. The crisis thus ended with a complete victory for local residents.

8.2.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

The case study discussion now turns to explore the influence of the conflict factors described and discussed in Chapter 7, Sections 6–9.

1. *Differences of interest*

In economic terms, the Island's residents viewed themselves as scarcely gaining any benefits through the construction of the NWDF. The employment effect would be low because the management of the facility would be accomplished by unmanned automatic systems or skilled external staff brought into the area, while the construction employment would be short term and might also include external labour. Although economic costs, such as the decline in value of real estate and the negative influence over the Anmyun Island tourist resort plan, could be identified and specified, it was difficult to account for potential economic benefits to the Island and its residents. Since the NWDF project was cancelled before the details of scale and time schedule were decided, it was impossible to make any authoritative cost/benefit analysis. The residents then held to their view that the project would cost their community great sacrifices of potential development and property values without any plan to compensate or provide incentives for the community.

Other aspects of the proposal also gave rise to strong feelings. If the NWDF were constructed, then residents in and around the site of facility would have to move to other areas, which meant the dismantling of their common society. The loss of natural form and damage to the regional image were also negative factors. As a rural and island region, with its residents having a very strong sense of a common identity, the damage to Anmyun Island's image was an important matter to the residents. For instance, the Korean Institute of Public Opinion (KIPO) reported that at a national level an NWDF was considered as the most unwanted hazardous facility. (Table 8.1)

Finally, the most important issue was the fear of environmental pollution and accidents happening during the treatment of nuclear waste, which was a factor representing threats to residents' life and health. As Morell (1982, p.22) has pointed

out, ‘opposition is rooted in the fears of major and long-term risk posed by facilities to the health and welfare of the surrounding community’. The fear of being the victim of an environmental disaster was at the heart of the intensive opposition to the NWDF.

Table 8-1. Korean people’s views of unwanted facilities

Unwanted facility	Nation	Residents (within 5 km)	Residents (within 5-20km)
Nuclear waste disposal	42.1 %	63.2 %	57.1 %
Waste reclamation	25.6 %	36.0 %	33.9 %
Gas storage	21.2 %	14.5 %	15.8 %
Crematorium	19.3 %	18.0 %	16.6 %
Waste incinerator	17.4 %	15.7 %	16.3 %
Chemical factory	17.4 %	10.5 %	11.3 %
Nuclear power plant	15.9 %	19.8 %	23.2 %

Source: Korean Institute of Public Opinion (Korean Gallup) (1995) (in Park, 1999, p.60)

Despite the Islanders’ feelings of economic, social and environmental disadvantage, central government’s only interest was in the early construction of the NWDF. It did not therefore prepare programmes to compensate the residents’ heavy burdens and sacrifices. Due to the lack of equilibrium in costs and benefits, the government could not negotiate rationally with the residents in the progress of conflict and initially had to depend on forceful and repressive methods. The great difference of interest between residents and government thus had a strong influence on increasing the intensity of this conflict (Box.8.1).

Box 8.1 Conflict factors: differences of interest

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	Disparity (cost/benefit)	+
Social image and effect	Negative image	+
Environment/safety	Radioactive contamination	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

2. Trust and communication

Before the sudden announcement of the construction of the NWDF, relations between the Island community and the central government were generally neutral and respectful. The government’s approach to decision making through progressing the project in secret ²⁾ and announcing the construction of NWDF under the euphemistic

²⁾ In the Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute’s *Guide Book to the Nuclear Waste Facility Project*, it was stated that the project should be kept secret to the last stage in the process of decision, because

name of ‘the Western Sea Science and Technology Research Complex’, resulted in an immediate distrust between residents and the government. Even after conflict had begun, the government concealed its true intention and gave a false explanation. The relationships took a sharp turn for the worse.

In addition, both the government and Chungnam Province devoted themselves to self-rationalisation over the dispute about whether or not there had been prior consultation between them. This action made the residents disbelieve all the government’s policy information about the project (Lee and Fitzgerald, 1997, p.73). The residents’ distrust toward government and their exclusion from the process of decision-making had a great influence on increasing the intensity of conflict. According to Kim and Hong’s (1992) [in Lee, 1996, p.98] survey of opinions in the island as a whole and in Konam district (immediately adjacent to the proposed NWDF site), residents pointed out that their exclusion from the decision-making process and the practice of secret administration were important causes of conflict. (Table 8.2).

Table 8-2. Local residents’ perceptions of the main causes of conflict

Residents’ response	Anmyun	Konam
Exclusion from the decision-making process	30.1 %	25.0 %
Environmental contamination with radioactive	22.6 %	9.1 %
Residents’ misunderstanding on nuclear power plant	10.8 %	27.8 %
Distrust and dissatisfaction toward government	24.4 %	34.0 %
Negative influence on occupation and regional development	4.9 %	0.0 %
Others	2.7 %	0.0 %
No comments	5.5 %	4.1 %
Total	100.0 %	100.0 %

Source: Kim and Hong (1992), p.134, (in: Lee, 1996, p.98).

Since the residents’ distrust of the government’s policy was very high, negotiations for conflict settlement could not be established. As press reports indicated, ‘Anmyun Island’s residents expressed deeply rooted distrust toward existing political parties, government and institutions with respect to public trust.’ (*Donga Daily News*, 1990e) Such secret decision making processes and the lack of negotiations blocked communications between parties, while miscommunication between central government and Chungnam Province brought the residents’ severe distrust, which deepened the intensity of conflict and also exerted a very negative

the construction of nuclear waste disposal site is a matter considered to be hyper-sensitive to local residents (Lee, 1996, p.96).

influence over conflict resolution (Box 8.2). These were influential factors in the progress of conflict.

Box 8.2 Conflict factors: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	No influence	0
Mutual trust (Technical)	No issue	0
(Procedural)	Secret decision making	+
Communication	Distorted/block/miscommunication	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception and behaviour pattern

The government had a negative perception of the conflict over the NWDS and regarded it as NIMBYism or local selfishness against the national interest. At first the government disregarded the residents' interests in the early stages of the conflict, then it took a stance of toughness toward the residents' protest. The Anmyun Island residents also regarded the NWDS issue as one for combative action. Accordingly, it was very difficult to expect a peaceful settlement of the conflict, because both parties focused on the negative characteristic of conflict and placed themselves in a 'positional conflict'.

According to Lee and Fitzgerald (1997, p.74), 'the governmental bureaucracy solely was responsible for the decisions about the location, design technology, cost/benefit calculations, arrangement and operation nuclear waste facility. No one could challenge the leadership and judgement of the governmental bureaucracy, because it virtually monopolised information and secret for expertise concerning these matters'. Naturally the government considered that residents' challenge should be removed and restrained. The government itself acted in a high-handed manner, using force and its authority to override the residents' wishes. As the conflict grew worse, the government made a late effort to persuade and explain their position so as to bring the residents round to their point of view. Nevertheless, the government's real intentions had not changed fundamentally, and this was revealed in its proposal to forward the project again after the first withdrawal. In response to government's forceful behaviour, the Island's residents made their opposition known with violent behaviour. There were thus no opportunities for the residents to participate or measures introduced to reduce the intensity of conflict; both parties' destructive

behaviour produced an intensive distrust of each other and increased the intensity of the conflict.

Box 8.3 Conflict factors: perception and behaviour pattern

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
<i>Perception of conflict</i>		
Proponent	Negative (destructive)	-
Opponent	Negative (destructive)	-
<i>Behaviour pattern</i>		
Central government	Authority command/force	+
Local government	No influence	0
Residents	Violent, illegal action	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

4. Structure and internal discord

The residents' protest movement was well structured and internal discord never occurred during the conflict. The influence of these factors worked to increase the intensity of the conflict. The government, however, found that what it had hoped would be a local technical issue became a national political issue and the final decision reflected this degree of internal discord.

Box 8.4 Conflict factors: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Government	Semi structured	-
Resident	Well structured	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. External environment

The external environment for the NWDF conflict in 1990-92 had already changed greatly from 1988 when the Korean political environment moved from an authoritarian to a democratic position. As anti-nuclear groups were established and their activity started in earnest, the Korean public's concern about nuclear power increased,³⁾ and social groups began to launch a systematic protest movement which played an important role in mobilising crowds. After that, the conflict issue changed from that of compensation for damage to opposition to the construction of NPG or NWDF. However, in the Anmyun Island case, the activities of NGOs were very weak,

³⁾ Anti-nuclear movement groups often not only produced negative or destructive information, but also supplied the human agency or struggle scheme for systematic opposition demonstrations. They can encourage residents to violent and excessive situations.

because such social groups had not yet taken root and they did not influence the intensity of conflict.

Press comments took a critical attitude towards the government's behaviour, such as its secret administrative processes and breach of faith with Anmyun residents' expectation of a tourist resort (*Donga Daily News*, 1990e). The press and public opinion supporting the residents' resistance had an influence on the government's retreat. Finally, although the conflict took place before local autonomy, the early move towards democratisation can be judged to have influenced the intensity of the conflict.

Box 8.5 Conflict factors: external environments

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Interest groups (NGOs)	Critical to government	+
Press	Negative information	+
Political change	Democratisation	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

8.2.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Number of participants* (Table 8.3)

As soon as the NWDF project became public knowledge, 42 village government officials and 40 community leaders resigned for their positions. Some two thousand students, 80 percent of the local student body, took part in a formal boycott alliance. At same time, 20 social organisations and the local residents established the Boycott Committee against the Anmyun NWDF.

In relation to the number of participants, after the government's announcement of the project, 5,000 residents participated in the first protest demonstration and 12,000 of the Island's 16,000 residents took part in the second demonstration. Part of them also occupied some public offices and went on a sit-down strike. Considering the total population of Anmyun Island, such a degree of participation was very high.

Table 8-3. Scale of participants

Groups/ Residents	Participants' activity	No. of participants
Public/social groups	Resign(officials/community leaders)	42 / 40 people
	Students boycott (schools)	2,000 students (16)
	Boycott committee	20 social groups
Residents	Protest demonstration	1st :5,000 2nd: 12,000
	Occupation Sit-down strike	300 people/ 5,000 people
	Protest assemblies	28 villages/13 communities

2. Duration of conflict

The first phase of the conflict started on 3 November 1990 when central government announced the project and finished on the 10 November when the government cancelled its project. Although the second conflict connected with the project took place because the government actually could not forward its plan without the residents' acceptance, the further duration of conflict would be only 8 days more.

The literature suggests that usually the longer the duration of conflict, the higher the intensity of conflict. Why then was the Anmyun Island conflict so intense although so brief? In spite of the short period involved, the intensity of conflict in this case was like the strength of a nuclear explosion. The conflict immediately developed as a violent situation without the stages of issues, dispute and impasse. What were the reasons for this quickly achieved high intensity of conflict? First, it may be suggested that the conflict issue made the residents very frightened and angry. They believed the facility jeopardised their safety and the right to life. The second reason was the secrecy of the public decision-making process. Since the residents did not have the knowledge and information about NWDF in advance, the government's sudden announcement made the residents who had placed their hope on the tourist resort feel both fear and betrayal.

3. Frequency and pattern of conflictual behaviour (Table 8.4)

There were residents' protest activities every day during the conflict. Large-scale protest demonstrations were held three times; school attendance was boycotted on three days; the unlawful occupation and sit-down strikes took place on two days. Besides resignations, protest visitations, a signature collecting campaign and press interviews were carried out successfully.

The objectors' behavioural patterns included illegal behaviour as well as legal protest movements. The violent behaviour included setting fire to a sub-police station, illegal demonstrations, the occupation of a public facility, kidnapping officials, throwing Molotov cocktails, threatening the demolition of the bridge to the mainland and the formation of residents' guard. The maintenance of public order was nearly impossible and the police used tear gas to disperse the crowds. Such a serious situation was unparalleled in the annals of the history of Korean nuclear industry.

Table 8-4. Patterns of residents' behaviour

Legal action	Protest visiting; Signature collecting campaign; Demonstration; Interview; Negotiation.
Illegal action	Illegal demonstration and assembly; Occupying public facility; Kidnapping; Incendiary fire; Molotov Cocktail; Civil guard.

8.2.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. *Stakeholders and representatives*

The definition and range of stakeholders in this case were relatively clear because the spatial boundary was limited within Anmyun Island. It was not necessary to identify stakeholders (i.e. the residents) individually. The residents' representatives consisted of community leaders and the members of local business and social groups. They could speak with complete confidence for their residents (Lee and Fitzgerald 1997, p.75). Nevertheless, since they were representatives of the opposition movement toward the government's project and did not have the opportunity to negotiate, they did not have a positive influence on conflict resolution.

Box 8.6 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Clear(Anmyun Island residents)	+
Representatives	Local officials/community leaders	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. *Issues*

The key issue relating to the conflict was extremely simple: the safety of the NWDF. It was not necessary to identify issues and establish an order of priority among issues. The scale of the issue was so large that it even attracted the nation's attention.

Box 8.7 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Simple	-
Scale of issue	National concern	-
Identification of issue	More easy	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. *Strategy and tactics*

At the start, the government mainly adopted measures of avoidance, of disregarding the residents' concerns and using a forceful and top-down authority command

approach. However faced with strong resistance, it abandoned its proposal and was obliged to withdraw. On the other hand, the residents continued to use physical force such as demonstration and unlawful assembly. Both parties' strategies removed ways of peaceful settlement. There was no opportunity for negotiation and bargaining to reach a win/win position.

Box 8.8 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Force/withdrawal	–
Opponent	Violent and illegal action/demonstration	–

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisations

Central government was a direct party to the conflict in this case, but was restricted in its opportunities for negotiation with the residents, because the residents distrusted its motives, regarded it as an enemy and refused to deal with it. In the face of continuing well-publicised mass opposition, including violent resistance from local citizens, the government had neither the ability to resolve the conflict and nor to sustain its project any longer.

Chungnam Province's role was rather more complex. On one hand, when the government's secret project became public knowledge, Chungnam Province lost no time in declaring its opposition. On the other hand, Chungnam played the role of intervenor to persuade residents and help them understand through dialogues and social meetings (*Donga Daily Newspaper*, 1990e). Such dual behaviour came from its administrative status, in which local government performed not only the role of central government's agent but also that of being the residents' messenger. Under the autocratic system, Chungnam Province's attempt at an alliance with Anmyun Island residents was an exceptional behaviour. Due to the seriousness of the issue, the Province seemed to realise that it could not persuade Anmyun Island's residents. Consequently there was no administrative buffer zone to mediate the clash between residents and government, and this itself had a negative influence on conflict resolution.

Box 8.9 Conflict variables: the role of public organisations

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	. MOST: project proponent - force/ignorance/debate (with social groups) - secret process	-
Local government	. Chungnam Province: opponent /third party - opponent (to central government) - facilitator (to residents)	-
Government agency	. Atomic Power Research Institute: planner - persuasion (to residents)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. Third party intervention

Although Chungnam Province had a potential opportunity to undertake mediation, it did not actively intervene for the settlement of conflict. Accordingly there was no neutral third party to mediate the dispute. Since there were no appropriate tools such as negotiation, mediation, facilitation and arbitration to settle the conflict, the conflict moved over the stage of impasse into a violent situation. No one could intrude upon the conflict because the residents' emotion took a sharp turn for the worse.

Box 8.10 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party	Chungnam Province (support residents)	-
Third party's role	No neutral third party intervention	-
Capacity of third party	No third party	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

8.3. The Case of Younggwang Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs)

8.3.1. Outline of the Conflict


1. Background

Located on the coastal zone of the Western Sea, Younggwang County, a part of Chunnam Province had a population of 68,600 in 1995. Its residents were largely engaged in inshore fisheries in the neighbouring waters. A traditional fishing and agrarian area, the County had been faced great changes after 1981 when the construction of the first NPGs (Nos. 1 and 2) had started.

Although Younggwang NPG No.1 was operational in August 1986, the first NPP conflict had occurred a year earlier when Younggwang residents took part in movements for compensation for damage to their fish farms. The beginning of

conflict was thus largely concerned with residents' economic interests rather than opposition to the construction of NPPs. However, in 1986 the Chernobyl accident occurred in the Soviet Union and in 1988 several accidents took place in Korea's NPPs.⁴⁾ These accidents gave rise to nation-wide concerns about NPP safety and caused national anti-nuclear groups to be established. Younggwang residents began to campaign against NPPs Nos 3 and 4 under construction at the time. Meanwhile, in 1991 central government issued its 'Long Range Plan for Supply and Demand of Electric Power', under whose provisions it endorsed the construction of two further NPPs at Younggwang (Nos. 5 and 6) (see Figure 8.2).

Figure 8-2. Location of Younggwang NPPs (1-6 Generators)



2. Start of the conflict

The conflict related to Younggwang NPPs Nos. 5 and 6 began in July 1993 when the government held an explanatory meeting with local residents, representatives of fishermen, the local authority and members of the Local County Assembly (established in 1991). The first instance of conflictual behaviour occurred in October 1993 when a meeting of two thousand residents was held under the auspices of the Younggwang County Countermove Committee against NPP. Meanwhile, the Korean Electric Power Company (KEPCO)⁵⁾ had commissioned an Environmental Impact

⁴⁾ Including: leak of Deuterium Oxide, illegal nuclear waste reclamation and suspension of operations.

⁵⁾ KEPCO is a monopoly national enterprise that builds electric power plants and exclusively produces and sells electricity.

Assessment (EIA) of the site for the proposed NPPs and submitted it for public inspection and a public hearing in 1994. At this time, four generators were already operating or under construction at Younggwang. Local residents had already had an experience of some damage from thermal discharge generated from NPGs Nos. 1 and 2. In addition, since several problems⁶⁾ connected with the safety of NPP had already occurred in the late 1980s-early 1990s, the residents strongly opposed the proposal to add a further 2 plants in the locality. In 1994 (i.e. before local autonomy) 'the Local [County] Assembly had established Younggwang County Committee for Counter-plan to NPP with social groups and started a full scale protest movement against the construction of Nos. 5 and 6' (Park, 1999, p.64).

Environmental groups and fishermen argued that measures for the reduction of thermal discharges were imperfect and the ground of the site No.5 consisted of an earthquake crushing zone which could threaten the safety of the NPPs. In addition, they insisted that KEPCO did not listen sufficiently to residents' opinions, and central government's incentive projects (such as regional developments within the area) were insufficient. However, after the Ministry of Industry and Energy (MOIE) had completed its consultation with the Ministry of Environment (MOE) over the results of the EIA, KEPCO subsequently applied to Younggwang County for a building permit to construct NPPs Nos. 5 and 6, which was issued on 22 January 1996 (Park, 1999 p.69).

3. The development of the conflict

Younggwang County's building permit gave rise to a storm of indignation by local residents. Arguing that the building permit issued by Younggwang County should be cancelled, several protest groups occupied the Younggwang County Office and held a demonstration in front of the Office Gate. Faced with strong opposition from social groups and residents, the executive head of the County then cancelled the building permit after only eight days, giving the reason that the County could not carry out its' administrative activities due to the residents' collective demonstration. KEPCO argued that 'it was unfair that the permission issued through lawful procedure, was cancelled on account of residents' opposition' (Park, 1999, p.84). The company

⁶⁾ Problems associated with NPG Nos. 1-4 included: a break down and radioactive leakage accident, damage to nuclear fuel pole, damage to fishery products and destruction of ecosystem, birth of deformed children, etc. occurred successively in 1988-1995. (Park 1999, p.59, 77-79)

immediately referred the County's decision to the Board of Audit and Inspection (BOAI) for judgement, arguing that the County's cancellation was groundless in law. From this time, the dispute between central government and Younggwang County continued in existence for eight months.

4. The process of conflict and prospect of resolution

The conflict between Younggwang County and central government came to be a national concern. Citizens' groups asked the government to cancel the construction of NPPs Nos. 5 and 6, while the government called upon Younggwang County to withdraw its cancellation of the building-permit. With the intensity of conflict increasing, the government took a firm attitude toward Younggwang County and the need to respond to the BOAI's decision. As soon as it had received KEPCO's request, the BOAI conducted a split location investigation in order to collect residents', the County's and KEPCO's opinions, and on 5 July 1996 judged the County's cancellation to be an unlawful administrative measure. When the BOAI's decision became known to the public and to anti-nuclear groups, there were demonstrations everyday at the front of the County Gate. Younggwang Local Assembly also organised a signature-collecting campaign against the construction of NPP Nos. 5 and 6, and submitted a petition to KEPCO and the MOIE signed by about 20,000 people.

KEPCO meanwhile began to negotiate with the opposing parties for the conflict resolution⁷⁾ and suggested improvements to NPP safety, compensation for damage to the fishery by surveying thermal discharges, a plan for improved regional development projects and the establishment of a private environmental supervisory organisation. On the other hand, after hearing the BOAI's decision, Younggwang County also held conferences with the Local Assembly, environmental groups and residents to explain KEPCO's suggestions and the BOAI's final judgement. Younggwang County eventually withdrew its cancellation of the building permit on

⁷⁾ KEPCO had meetings for conciliation with the Local County Assembly no less than eight times (Park, 1999, p. 85).

17 September 1996, and the conflict began quickly to calm down, although environmental groups and residents continued to resist the decision.

8.3.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Difference of interest*

According to KEPCO, the development of NPGs 5 and 6 would lead to the employment of 3,000 local residents, the payment of local tax would provide 33 per cent of the County's local tax revenues and regional development projects could be carried out (KEPCO, 2000), while the economic costs would be largely concentrated on net losses to fishermen's incomes. The thermal discharge generated from NPG could increase the temperature of water and cause the Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) to increase near the discharge area, which could damage to local sea farms (seaweed and shellfish) and consequently could lead to a decline in revenues (Park 1999, p.98). Accordingly the main economic issue was how to compensate the fishermen for this damage and how to mitigate the thermal discharge. However, it was very difficult to define the spatial range of damage and to calculate the degree of damage, and without their resolution these matters increased the intensity of conflict.

Social issues did not have much influence on the intensity of conflict in the case of the Younggwang NPPs. KEPCO had already expropriated the site for the NPPs and four NPGs were already on site, and there were no problems about the displacement of residents and damage to the regional image.

The next issue was the environmental impact of further construction at the site and the safety of NPGs. As mentioned earlier, the discharge of cooling water could lead to a further increase in the temperature of seawater and it was argued that this could deal the marine ecosystem a fatal blow (Citizen Environmental Research Institute, 1998). KEPCO, however, insisted that it could effectively mitigate the effects of increased thermal discharges through the installation of a cooling lagoon. The main issue thus became the safety of NPG. According to KIPO's survey in 1995 (Table 8.5), 76.3 per cent of Younggwang residents believed that NPP was not a safe method of electric generation (Park, 1999, p.103). The County's residents had already experienced personally the type of damage which might be involved, and the Chernobyl accident and the Crushing Zone of the site for No. 5 stimulated their concern over the safety of NPP. These factors increased the intensity of the conflict.

Table 8-5. Younggwang residents' perception on the safety of NPG

Year	Safe	Acceptable	Dangerous	No comment
1989	6.5 %	23.0 %	70.5 %	0.0 %
1995	19.4 %	-	76.3 %	4.4 %

Source: KIPO 1989, 1995, (in Park, 1999, P.103)

As a consequence of these arguments, the local residents insisted that the costs of the construction of NPP were greater than the benefits. Responding to these points, the government took the position that if there were excessive local costs for the national project, the matter could be resolved through negotiations for compensation. The government's preferred interest was to build the NPPs within a given period of time rather than environment and safety. On the other hand, the County head had an electoral interest in the next election and he stood at the side of his residents. These differences between the main disputants' interests played an important part in increasing the intensity of conflict.

Box 8.11 Conflict factors: differences of interest

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic interests	Disparity	+
Social interests	Negative image	+
Environment and safety	Radioactive and thermal discharge	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. Trust and communication

Relationships between local residents and the government were quite tense, because the existing disputes surrounding NPGs Nos. 1-4. Such tension basically came from distrust over the technology of and information about NPGs. What information the residents received, where they received it from and how much they trusted it, greatly influenced the direction of conflict. A survey of Younggwang residents' opinions by the Korean Institute of Public Opinion (KIPO) showed that the trust toward government was quite low, while trust toward anti-nuclear groups or expressions was very high (Table 8.6). Because the anti-nuclear groups and press largely supplied negative information about the government's NPG policy, there was a strong possibility that the residents would show negative behaviour toward the government and increase the intensity of conflict without any clear supply of positive information from the government and KEPCO.

Table 8-6. Younggwang resident's trust toward information sources (1995)

Source	Site on NPG	Site near NPG	Average
NPG Industry	12.2 %	11.5 %	11.6 %
Government	8.8 %	9.6 %	9.5 %
Scientist	17.4 %	15.3 %	15.6 %
Environment/Anti-nuclear group	21.6 %	16.5 %	17.2 %
Newspaper/Board	19.3 %	17.5 %	17.7 %

Source: KIPO 1989, 1995, (quoted in Park, 1999. p. 105)

In relation to NPG safety, the residents distrusted the government's information, while they trusted environmental groups' or research institute's information. The lack of trust toward KEPCO, the proprietor of NPG project, is shown in Table 8.7 (KEPCO has got only 6.5 per cent in relation to trust), demonstrating how difficult it was for a direct party to acquire trust from another party. Actually the residents and environmental groups continuously posed questions about the safety of NPGs site and the government's device for the reduction of thermal discharge. Consequently, the result of the degree of technical distrust toward government and KEPCO was to encourage an increasing intensity of conflict.

Table 8-7. Trust on the information of NPG safety

Environmental Group	KINS*	Univ./research institute	Central government	KEPCO	No Answer
31.0%	23.7%	17.7%	11.0%	6.5%	10.1%

Sources: Park, 1999, p.106

* Korea Institute for Nuclear Power Safety

On the other hand, since the project depended on the published *Long Range Plan for Supply and Demand of Electric Power*, procedural and secrecy problems did not occur. Only when concerned with compensation did residents argue that central government did not disclose the result of survey about the potential damage to the fishery so reducing the limits of compensation.

In order to reduce distrust, the government held conferences and explanatory meetings with the residents; each party's intention or opinion was communicated directly. The government did not give itself the opportunity to discuss issues about the environment with social groups, because it intentionally used dodging tactics, such as the exclusion of the group's participation in the process of compensation for damage and environment impact assessment, which resulted in an increase of the intensity of conflict.

Box 8.12 Conflict factors: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	Bad relationships	+
Technical trust	Discharge thermal/safety of site	+
Procedural trust	Open process/partly close	-
Communication	Partly block	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

3. Perception of and behaviour in the conflict

The government considered that construction of NPP was a very important national project, and placed most priority on the accomplishment of construction without delay. Accordingly, it regarded the conflict as an obstacle in the progress of project and over rode the wishes of the environmental groups. Opponents also concentrated on destructive actions rather than constructive alternatives.

As conflicts related to NPPs had often occurred since the 1980s, the government changed the previous procedures and methods. It adopted many parts of the residents' desires. It submitted the result of EIA to public inspection and held a public hearing on the result. In spite of the government's efforts to improve the decision-making process, Younggwang residents considered that the government's basic behaviour had not changed because it had disregarded the environmental groups, repressive and exclusive behavioural forms during the conflict.⁸⁾

On the other hand, Younggwang County showed deceitful behaviour. It did not intervene actively in the conflict and assumed a wait-and see attitude at the beginning. However, after the implementation of local autonomy, the County could not look away from the residents' demands. In particular the Head of the County's administration pledged publicly during his election that he opposed the construction of NPP Nos. 5 and 6. (KLAI, 1996, p.35) Nonetheless, following the election, he approved the building permit on the grounds that the NPPs were essential to the national energy policy. However, confronted with the residents' strong protests, he then reversed his decision (i.e. building permit) and took an active position against the government's position i.e. rejecting the BOAI's judgement against his rescinding the earlier approval. Such behaviour would have been impossible before local autonomy. However, after nine months, he formally withdrew the cancellation of building permit.

⁸⁾ The government did not issue a public meeting approval nor take part in the public hearing held in October 1996 under the auspices of Younggwang Anti-Nuclear Groups, and arrested 3 people during an assembly for the anti-nuclear movement in March, 1996 (Park 1999, p. 84).

Younggwang County's attitude to the construction of NPG can be described as one of utter confusion: 'opposition - building permit award - cancellation - opposition rescinding the cancellation', which contributed to increasing the degree of conflict.

Box 8.13 Conflict factors: perception and behaviour patterns

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Negative	-
Opponent	Negative	-
Central government	Persuasion/authority	+
Local government	Reject/protest	+
Residents/social groups	Negotiation/ protest	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

4. Structure and internal discord

Although residents' protest movements were not systematic before the social groups' intervention, as the conflict began to develop, residents' groups began to make preparations for movement against the government's plan. However, there was to be internal discord between residents and between resident and social groups. A notable aspect was a group of residents who asserted that the NPG project would facilitate regional development, and who supported the project and confronted other residents opposed to the project (KCCI, 1997, pp.35-36). This discord made it difficult for the government to negotiate with residents and raised the intensity of conflict.

Box 8.14 Conflict factors: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (government/residents)	-
Internal discord	Split/discord	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

5. External environment

Many outsiders including environmental and social interest groups were involved in the Younggwang NPP issue.⁹⁾ They threw their full support behind the County's cancellation of the building permit and raised the degree of conflict by taking a leading role in rallying the citizen's movement. On 25 July 1996, some 20 social groups established 'The Emergency Countermeasure Committee for Opposition to Younggwang NPPs' and supported the Younggwang Anti-Nuclear Association's activity. Citizens usually acquired their knowledge about NPG through the mass

⁹⁾ Chunnam Environment Movement Federation, YMCA, Peasant Movement Groups etc.

media which generally reported on negative events or accidents related to NPG.¹⁰⁾ The mass media was also thought to have had an influence on the residents' protest movement against the project. Nevertheless, the press generally assumed a critical attitude toward Younggwang County's behaviour¹¹⁾ with regard to the building permit question. In their editorial columns they argued that the NPP project, as a matter of important national policy, should not be blocked due to local government's regional selfishness. Press reports drew national attention to the NPP issue and were helpful to the central government's case and creating a public opinion unfavourable to Younggwang County.

Box 8.15 Conflict factors: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	Environmental groups (local/national)	+
Press	Support government	-
Political change	Local autonomy	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

8.3.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Number of participants*

At the outset, MOIE as a proponent, and local residents, social groups and Younggwang County, as opponents, participated in the conflict. The social groups involved 15 local interest groups and 20 external social groups. After the issue changed to the question of the building permit, the BOAI was involved both as a third party and as a direct party. On the other hand, the main actors in the protest movements were the anti-nuclear groups and local residents. A total of fifty thousand people took part in the protest movement during the period of conflict and the average number of participants on any individual protest was 500-1000 people (Park, 1999, p.91).

¹⁰⁾ According to Seoul University's Population and Health Research Institute's survey, 57 percent of nation had a negative image toward NPG, and 66 percent pointed out that such negative image was formed through newspaper reports (MOST, 1997, p.294).

¹¹⁾ A review of editorials in 9 national daily newspaper from 1 January to 31 December 1996, showed that 22 of 24 were critical of Younggwang County's behaviour (Park, 1999, p.121).

2. Duration of conflict

The first conflictual behaviour occurred in June 1993, and was carried out by local fishermen and environmental groups asking for the cancellation of the construction of any additional NPGs. The later conflict between central and local government occurred in February 1996 when the head of Younggwang County cancelled the building permit (NPG. Nos. 5 and 6). From this point, the conflict was sharply aggravated and became a national issue, being sustained for nine months and only ending in September 1996, when the County Head rescinded the cancellation of the building permit.

3. Frequency and pattern of conflictual behaviour (Table 8.8)

Conflictual behaviour was carried out through a range of methods from legal actions such as manifesto, press interviews and a signature campaign, to illegal demonstrations including an act of violence. However, most protest activities were conducted within the legal framework. Although the frequency of conflictual behaviour was not high, after the County cancelled the building permit, actions by social groups occurred quite regularly.

Table 8-8. Patterns of residents' behaviour

Legal action	Manifesto, press interview, propaganda bill, assembly/demonstration, signature campaign, public hearing, administrative litigation.
Illegal action	Demonstration, use of autonomy (BOAI judged an illegal action)

8.3.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. Stakeholders and representatives

Stakeholders were limited to the area around the proposed NPPs, but the boundary of the facilities' influence was not clear. Because the different balances of damage and advantage to stakeholders' interests, some were in favour of the construction of the project while others were against. The identification of stakeholders was not easy, because so many individual households and interests were involved; the selection of representatives was also difficult because the representatives' main concerns were different from each other. Accordingly, with coincided opinion, it was difficult for the representatives to cope with and negotiate with the government.

Anti-nuclear groups and the Younggwang County Local Assembly led the protest movements, but because they could not fully speak for fishery interests, they had a limited ability to negotiate on these matters. On the other hand, stakeholders in relation to the building permit question were clear and each party's representative could play its role fully. The environmental groups in Chunnam Province intervened in the conflict on the side of Younggwang County residents.

Box 8.16 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detail aspect	Assessment
Stakeholders Representatives	Vague stakeholders	—
	Environmental groups	—
	Local government	—

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

The conflict issues were quite complex in this case. At first, the major issue was one of compensation for damage, that is, the amount of indemnity and the range of compensation for damage to fisheries. The next issue was about the reduction of thermal discharges from NPGs and security and safety of NPGs. The final issue was the scale of support for regional development projects. These several issues made it possible to bargain about alternatives, which had a positive effect in helping in to resolve the conflict. On the other hand, in the conflict between the anti-nuclear groups and the government, the safety of NPGs was the most important issue. These groups continuously raised questions about the safety of NPGs including technical and geographical matters and asked for the cancellation of the construction of additional generators. This matter brought a positional conflict, which had a negative influence on conflict resolution.

Finally, in connection with the building permit, the issue was whether Younggwang County's countermand was legal or not. Central government considered the County's behaviour to be illegal, while the County claimed that it was obliged to do as it had because of its residents' protest. Since there was no room for compromise, the central government used the methods of legal processes and procedures to resolve the conflict. Although the complexity of the issues involved in this case made it difficult to identify them easily, in contrast the number of issues involved made it possible to establish alternatives for bargaining.

Box 8.17 Conflict variables: Issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Complex (Safety/compensation/legality)	+
Scale of issue	National concern	-
Identification	Difficult	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

Central government used a ‘carrot and stick’ strategy. On one hand it negotiated with residents for a successful accomplishment of the project; on the other hand it disregarded social groups’ demands and opinions and eliminated their intervention in the process of deciding on the project. Drawing a distinction between the residents and the social groups, the government tried to segregate them.¹²⁾ Toward Younggwang County, the government used firm administrative action, asking the BOAI for a judgement on the propriety of this step and at the same times preparing administrative litigation. Nevertheless, the government also negotiated with Younggwang County Assembly for help in understanding its residents’ intentions, while its concessions over an observation body for pollution discharges and regional development projects provided the County with a line of retreat so as to rescind the cancellation of the building permit.

At the outset Younggwang County was an observer and onlooker. With the residents’ protests increasing, the County stood against central government through its rejection of the building permit, but this move was frustrated by the central government’s firm response. The County then retreated from the ground of the conflict. The timing of this conflict during the implementation of local autonomy, suggests that although the Korean political environment had changed greatly with localisation, central government could still exercised its influence over local government policies and administration through an administrative supervisory right. In particular, this type of bureaucratic conflict demonstrated that even with local autonomy, in dispute with the central authorities local authority basically needs to act correctly within legal and administrative systems. Local autonomy in Korea is not an absolute matter, but is constrained by central government’s views of the national interest in decisions which have considerable local impacts.

¹²⁾ The government declined to participate in public hearings held under the auspices of an anti nuclear group, nor did it authorise a notice of assembly; indeed it arrested three persons at the meeting place.

Box 8.18 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Persuade/force/ignore	+
Opponent (local government/ residents/social groups)	Confrontation/withdrawal/ dialogue/demonstration	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisations

As mentioned before (Section 8.3.1), this conflict could be distilled into two parts: (a) the conflict related to NPG construction; and, (b) the building permit conflict. In the former conflict, MOIE and KEPCO were direct parties. They negotiated directly with the residents for compensation for damage, but treated environmental groups opposing the construction of NPG coldly and stiffly, because the implementation of the project was their first objective and a legal action carried out through law and administration. On the other hand, BOAI carried out a third party role, but it became a direct party after Younggwang County refused to execute its' judgement.

Younggwang County could have been in the position to mediate the conflict, but it only watched the development of the conflict situation at the beginning stage. After the implementation of local autonomy, the County became direct party to the conflict with the building permit as a key consideration. The County formed an alliance with its residents and withheld its assistance from central government over administrative procedures. This would have been unimaginable behaviour before the political situation changed. As the local government had aligned with citizen movement groups and supported their activities, the conflict began to escalate and came to be more complicated. Consequently, the County did not play a role of mediator, but through taking a provocative attitude toward the BOAI's decision, itself became a party to the conflict.

Box 8.19 Conflict variables: the role of public organisations

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central gov't	* MOIE (proponent): force/disregard (to social groups); persuasion (to residents)/open process	-
	* BOAI (third party → direct party): arbitrator/direct disputant to county	+
Local gov't	* Younggwang County(opponent): opposition	-
	* Chunnam Province: neutral position	0
Gov't agency	* KEPCO (business proprietor): persuasion (to resident and social groups)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. *Third party intervention*

The BOAI participated in the conflict as a role of third party. It had the right to judge matters about administrative procedures and its role was similar to that of an arbitrator rather than a true mediator. Despite the BOAI's decision to rescind the cancellation of the building permit, Younggwang County rejected their decision and resisted stubbornly. After that, the BOAI became a direct party to the conflict rather than a third party. As a result, there was not a third party that could initiate a negotiation and help technical problems as the MOIE had supported its agency, KEPCO.

Box 8.20 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party	BOAI	+
Third party's role	Arbitrator	+
Capacity of third party	No neutral and special third party	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

8.4. Comparison of the Analysis of the Two Case Studies

8.4.1. Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

Table 8.9 provides a summary view of the analysis of the factors influencing the intensity of the conflicts in the two NIMBY case studies. It reveals that as a general point, most of the factors played some part in increasing the intensity of the conflicts. In both cases the intensity was increased by the operation of the 'differences of interest' factor in economic and social terms, and, in the parties' views about safety issues concerned with potential radioactive waste and thermal discharges. The 'external environment' factor also contributed to increasing the intensity on both cases, although in Younggwang the effect of the press and media coverage acted as a more moderating influence. Other factors increasing intensity included the secrecy of government decision-making ('trust and communications) in the Anmyun Island case, and the establishment of local autonomy in the Younggwang case. In terms of the factors whose influence were to diminish the intensity of conflict, the 'perception of conflict' factor in terms of previously respectful and non-conflictual relationships could be found in both cases as was the well-structured nature of central government. Different operation of the factors was revealed over 'trust and communication', where the lack of trust of the top-down procedures of central government increased the intensity on Anmyun, whereas in the Yanggwang case there was a greater degree of technical and procedural trust and communication between the disputants.

Table 8-9. Factors influencing the intensity of conflict

Factors	Sub-factors	Anmyun case	Younggwang case
Differences of interest	Economic	+	+
	Social	+	+
	Safety	+	+
Trust/communication	Technical trust	0	-
	Procedural trust	+	-
	Communication	+	+
Perception/behaviour	Proponent	-	-
	Opponent	-	-
	Central Government	+	+
	Local Government	0	+
	Residents/groups	+	+
Structure/internal discord	Government	-	-
	Resident/groups	+	+
External environment (surroundings)	Interest groups	+	+
	Expression	+	-
	Political change	+	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

As a whole, the influence of the factors forcing the intensity of conflict was similar to each other in both cases, but factors alleviating the intensity were more effective in the Younggwang case than in the Anmyun case. In addition, central government's procedural problems and the residents' anxiety on radioactive contamination in Anmyun case removed the opportunity to negotiate, and strongly increased the overall intensity of conflict. Judging from this analysis, the intensity of conflict in Anmyun could be higher regarded as being higher than the case of Younggwang.

8.4.2. Comparison of the Degree of Conflict Intensity

The three indicators of the degree of intensity of conflict (Ref. Ch. 7.7.1) are the number of parties, the relative duration and the frequency and pattern of violent conflictual behaviour. Comparing the number of participants in these two conflicts provides rather inconclusive evidence. On the one hand the Anmyun case could be assessed as a more intense conflict than that at Younggwang. On the other hand, as the number of parties in Younggwang case was more than in the Anmyun case, then this could be assessed as the more intense. Next, comparing only the duration of conflict, the degree of conflict in Younggwang case could be considered as higher than one of Anmyun case, because the former was far longer than the latter. Finally, comparing the type and amount of conflictual behaviour, the violent behaviour used for the protest movement in every respect in the Anmyun case and its frequency (even

over a relatively short duration) was far higher in the Younggwang case. Overall, the degree of intensity of conflict in both cases can be considered as broadly similar, but having different characteristics. In Anmyun, there were many participants and a considerable amount of violent behaviour although over a short period; in Younggwang, there were more formal parties involved over a much longer period, although the pattern of behaviour involved protests were not generally so violent.

8.4.3. Results of the Analysis of Variables Influencing Conflict Resolution

Table 8.10 provides a summary of the analysis of the operation of the variables influencing conflict resolution in the two NIMBY case studies. The variables include the complexity of the conflict issue(s), the strategies and tactics used by the disputants, the role of public organisations, the contribution of third party intervention, and the involvement of stakeholders and their representatives.

Table 8-10. Variables for conflict resolution

Variables	Sub-variables	Anmyun	Younggwang
Stakeholders (Actors)	Disputants	+	-
	Representative	-	-
Issues	Number of issues	-	+
	Scale of issues	-	-
	Identification of issues	+	-
Strategy/Tactic	Proponent	-	+
	Opponent	-	+
Government's role	Central government	-	-
	Local government	-	-
	Government agency	0	+
Third party	Third party intervention	0	+
	Role of third party	0	+
	Capacity of third party	0	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

In the Anmyun case, none of the variables (except 'identification of issues' and 'definition of disputants') was assessed as having made a positive contribution to the resolution of the conflict. The single issue nature of the dispute made 'give and take' between parties impossible and each party sustained a 'positional conflict' position. Both parties' strategies, for example forcing and violent behaviours, provided strong-blocks against opening up an opportunity for negotiation and the situation for third party to intervene. Consequently, the conflict was plunged into an extremely confused situation and was ended by one party's withdrawing completely.

On the other hand, in the case of Younggwang, there was an open opportunity for the parties to negotiate and to communicate with each other, not only because the intensity of conflict was lower, but also because the central government's behaviour was relatively milder than in the Anmyun case. Accordingly, the parties could suggest alternatives to solve the problems discussed in negotiation. There were some reasons that the conflict was resolved peacefully. The first reason was the BOAI's intervention. The BOAI's decision that the Younggwang County's cancellation of the building-permit was unlawful, left the County in a weak position and it had to bow to the BOAI's authority. The second reason was that national public opinion had largely considered the County's protest as regional selfishness, because the County had opposed a national policy established through a proper legal process. Public opinion also regarded the County's behaviour unfavourably, because the County head had his mind more on re-election than on his legal and administrative responsibilities and providing leadership to his locality. Thirdly, the County considered that it had achieved a useful concession with the establishment of the private supervisory organisation to observe problems generated by the power plants.

Comparing these two cases, it can be concluded that the Anmyun case had more negative conflict resolution variables than the Younggwang case. It was impossible for the Anmyun conflict to be resolved through peaceful negotiation because important factors including 'issue', 'strategies' and 'communication' had negative impacts on the conflict resolution process. With regard to the central government's strategies, in the Anmyun case, the MOST had continuously prepared the project in secret and used forceful tactics such as police action and non-negotiable decisions.

However, in the Younggwang case, the MOIE opened the decision-making process and adopted strategies of persuasion and force. The BOAI also played the role of a third party (arbitrator). Other local governments (counties) related to the disputes played different roles in the two cases and provided interesting insights into the pre-local autonomy position (Anmyun) and the period bridging the introduction of local autonomy in Korea. In the Anmyun case, Taean County stood aside from the conflict as an observer, but Younggwang County under its politically-aware head, and very unusually for the time, joined with local residents against the views of the central government. The two Provinces (Chungnam and Chunnam), however, did not

actively intervene in the conflicts (although Chungnam's position was complicated by its earlier secret discussions about the NWDF and some degree of sympathy with its residents), because they had no right of decision-making and did not want to be involved in such complicated conflicts. Consequently the Anmyun case was more difficult to resolve conflict than the Younggwang case.

8.5. Evaluation of the Results of Conflict

Table 8.11 summarises the analysis the results of the two NIMBY case study conflicts. The table provides a qualitative measure of the outcomes of the conflict as resolved in practice. It examines the relationships between the intensity of the conflicts and the degree of achievement of the original policy/project objectives.

Table 8-11. Analysis of results

Items		Case of Anmyun	Case of Younggwang
Achievement of policy		Very low	High
Receptivity of policy		High	Middle
Satisfaction	Proponent	Very low	High
	Opponent	High	Middle
Social stability		Middle	High

8.5.1. Achievement of Policy/Development Project

In the Anmyun Island case, the government withdrew its own plan due to the full-scale violent opposition of local residents. The government's policy was fully frustrated and it still (2001) cannot decide on a proposed site for the NWDS. The profound national problem on high-level radioactive waste produced from NPPs remains unsolved. Hence, the achievement of the government's policy was very low.

In the Younggwang case, an evaluation of the achievement of conflict can be divided into two parts. First, the government agreed to spend additional funds on decreasing thermal discharges. Secondly, due to the long period of dispute over the issue of the cancellation of building permit, the completion of the plant was delayed. At the outset of the dispute, the date of start of construction was December 1995, but on account of Younggwang County's blocking behaviour, the work was started on June 1996, nine months behind the schedule. The direct cost due to this delay was estimated over 200 billion Korean *Won*, with an indirect damage being the effect of an electric power shortage in 2001.

Nonetheless, the government's additional expenses such as added costs for elevation of thermal discharge and the compensation for the fishery damage, contributed to diminishing the possibility of conflict occurring in the future and would go far toward the protection of environment. As a result it had an effect on cutting down added expenses in the long term and so the government's policy achievement could be regarded as being relatively high.

8.5.2. Receptivity

Central government officials in Seoul, the Korean national capital, announced that government would not initiate the construction of NWDF in Anmyun Island. The government's full submission gave the local residents a complete victory. The local residents' full request was accepted. From the residents' viewpoint, the receptivity was very high.

In the Younggwang NPP case, the 'Private Supervisory Organisation for the Protection of the Environment' and the means proposed for the reduction of thermal discharges contributed to promote an adaptability of policy. The inauguration of the supervisory organisation would contribute to raising objective transparency in operating the NPGs and in facilitating the information flow about NPGs. As a result, the organisation would help the regional community to acclimatise itself easily to the new circumstances. Next, the adoption of a new technique for decreasing thermal discharge could raise the adaptability of the community. Accordingly, the receptivity of the policy outcome seemed to be relatively high.

8.5.3. Satisfaction

Because the Anmyun residents obtained a firm promise that central government would not initiate the project, the degree of their satisfaction was high. Nonetheless, if it was true that if the project had really been the science and research complex as the government had first announced, then local residents might have felt that compensation, such as the construction of new connection bridge between Anmyun Island and mainland and regional developments, should be sought rather than outright opposition. The central government's satisfaction must thus be counted as being very low.

In the Younggwang case, the start of construction was delayed about nine months, but the project could be constructed without alteration. The proponent's satisfaction was thus high. While residents' demands for the cancellation of the project was not accepted completely, instead, they could establish the supervisory organisation and also gained the government's promise to prepare the means for the reduction of thermal discharges together with compensation for fishery damage, which gave them sufficient consolation. However, the environmental groups remained displeased at the potential lack of safety involved in the construction of more NPGs. Younggwang County seemed to be satisfied with the results of agreement because a new method and organisation was introduced.¹³⁾

8.5.4. Social stability

The process of conflict over the Anmyun NWDF case did not contribute to social stability. Although the conflict brought about a change in the government's policy, such as residents' consultative meeting and open administration, conflicts related to the selection of NWDS have continued to occur both one more for the Island and elsewhere on a continuing basis.¹⁴⁾ On account of this conflict, the possibility of conflict connected with the selection of a NWDS began to increase in other regions.

In the Younggwang NPP case, the conflict between residents and government has been settled for the present. The government's decision took account of many of the residents' wishes and some measures were agreed in the process of conflict. These factors should contribute to prevent a re-occurrence of the dispute in future (or, at least, provide some basis of trust over technical and procedural matters which will serve to diminish the intensity of a resumption of conflict) (Park, 1999, p. 129-130). Nevertheless, when the NPGs Nos 5 and 6 become operational after completion, as has been seen in the experience of damage from Nos. 1-4, the seeds of new conflict may break out again if there are technical and waste discharge problems.

13) The head of Younggwang County said 'the residents who oppose to the project are minimum fishery. They worry about the safety of NPGs and the loss of stabilisation of livelihood. The residents understand that the construction of NPGs as an important national project should be carried out'. He wanted KEPCO to take legal step without reapplication for building permit or ask for cancellation of the County's administrative behaviour. That was why the residents would not be in great reaction against the legal judgement. (Interview with Younggwang County, 27.3.2000)

14) After Anmyun Island's conflict, Youngil Gun (Nov. 1991), Yangsan Gun (Apr. 1993), Kosung Gun (Jun. 1993) and Inchun Gulup Island (Nov. 1994) were proposed for a NWDS, but the selection of site still remains undecided at the time of writing (2002).

The conflict related to the building permit can be considered to have influenced a reduction in the probability of similar conflicts in future. The County bowed to the BOAI's authority and judgement, and this has had an influence in suppressing local governments' indiscreet behaviour. In addition, after the BOAI's decision, the residents' protest movements sharply decreased and the residents regarded the construction of NPGs as a settled fact. Consequently, the conflict had a certain degree of positive influence on the social stability.

8.6. Conclusions and Findings

8.6.1. Conclusions

The early 1990s conflict over the proposed Anmyun Island NWDF overwhelmed any previous conflicts in the scale of participants and the strength of protest movements involved (Lee and Fitzgerald, 1997, p.68). Even 'though local autonomy had not been implemented at this time, how was it possible for such a large-scale resistance in which local officials took part to occur? How was it possible that the large-scale resident mobilisation was realised within such a short period of time? First, as mentioned in the geographical characteristic of the Island, the consciousness of local community was very strong. Secondly, as a conflict issue, the residents saw the construction of NWDF as being a life-threatening matter. Therefore, all the residents could act in union without a discord among them and protest strongly against the central government. Finally, there was leadership to lead the residents' forcefully because local officials, social groups, and community leaders participated in the movement, hence the power of the residents' mobilisation would be far more powerful. Both parties (government and residents) directly clashed with each other and there was no buffer or third party. The conflict suddenly burned out.

On the other hand in the case of Younggwang NPP, there had already been many conflicts relating to the previous construction of NPGs Nos.1-4 and this influenced the process of conflict over Nos. 5-6. In addition, the implementation of local autonomy during the process of the conflict, together with the intervention of social groups resulted in an escalation of the conflict. Although the Younggwang conflict continued for three years and was quite complex in its nature, the conflict finished in relative peace. The proponent's recommended project could be constructed

without alteration, and although local residents received some further benefits from the decision, the social groups' remained dissatisfied.

Comparing the two cases, the great difference in the factors influencing the intensity of conflict and its resolution was in central government's behaviour and attitude. In the Anmyun case the government planned its project in secret and used forceful tactics to try and achieve its objective. While in the Younggwang case, the government took the project forward through an open planning approach, and although it used forceful behaviour, it also tried to negotiate with opponents and respond to local resident's requests. Consequently this difference of approach in the central government's behaviour and role was important in the different results of the conflicts resolution.

8.6.2. Findings

1. In selecting sites for hazardous facilities, the most important point in achieving policy objectives in the process of location planning is whether or not local residents' will accept the proposal. Policy makers first need to find out about the concerns and opinions of residents of possible sites before making specific proposals that may otherwise become the core of conflict. In order to gain residents' acceptance, the establishment of mutual trust through opportunities for participation and open administration was very important.
2. Proposals for the development of nuclear facilities easily give rise to fear and other emotional responses among local residents near the suggested locations, and residents are apt to consider the location of such a hazardous facility would bring a bad image to their community. Conflict over such proposals might imply a collective self-regard based on the interest of local residents at the expense of putative national interests and national disregard of local concerns and interests. Such conflicts could easily develop as a violent situation. To resolve this type of locational conflict it is very important to couple costs and benefits at the outset.
3. In these locational conflicts, the main issues influencing the conflict were the need for a careful attention to local residents' reasonable concerns and interests, the involvement of politicians, regional identity and environmental consequences rather than economic efficiency, technical suitability and regional condition.

4. In such conflicts, the number as well as the characteristics of main issues involved can be important in leading to different results. For instance, in the Anmyun case, there was a simple single main issue directly concerned with health and safety concerns; other issues were quite minor in comparison. So the residents could concentrate their attention and campaigning on the one issue. In Younggwang case, however, although health and safety were the principal conflict issues, the future economic damage resulting from environmental pollution, was another concern of residents (especially the fishermen's sub-group). Therefore, it is possible for the government to bargain with different residents depending on their interests.
5. In the process of preliminary decision-making, the NWDF facility proposed for Anmyun Island was carried out in secret by central government. Even after the public knew of the proposal, the government tried to keep the matter secret and to provide misleading information. Such behaviour brought about strong protests from the residents. In the Younggwang NPP case, the project had been designed according to *The Plan for Supply and Demand of Electric Power for an established nuclear site*. KEPCO and the MOIE prepared to discuss and negotiate more openly and provide information, while the residents were more willing to regard the project as an established fact and still press for their concerns to be recognised. Comparing the two cases, we can find that the government's behaviour in the process of decision-making affected the direction of the conflicts.
6. As a surrounding general condition, the introduction of local autonomy in Korea can be seen to have had an influence on the conflictual situation in the two cases. The Anmyun case was not influenced by the localisation of public responsibilities involved in local autonomy, because the conflict took place before local autonomy was launched. On the other hand, in the Younggwang case, local autonomy had on the whole a negative influence on the process and the resolution of conflict. The Anmyun case can thus be classified as belonging to the type of bureaucratic conflict and the Younggwang case can be classified as a mixed bureaucratic and systems type conflict.
7. Under the circumstances of an imbalance of power, the weaker party was apt to use violent behaviour (Anmyun case). The stronger party's perception of the political and social costs of maintaining its proposal and its ultimate willingness to give up its position was very important for the peaceful resolution of the conflict. In the

conflict between central and local governments, local governments usually felt inferior in their powers and often tried to mobilise their local citizens, making it more difficult to resolve the conflict (e.g. Younggwang case). Therefore, the attitude of -- or the strategies followed by -- central government in the early stages of conflict had an influence on the future direction of the conflict. This suggests that if central government had taken a more positive view of conflict and been more willing to adopt an active approach to conflict management in the early stages of disputes, then the resort to violent expressions of behaviour would have been diminished.

Chapter 9. Case Study 2: Development of Infra-Structure (PIMFY)

9.1. Introduction

The implementation of Local Autonomy in Korea led to an intensive inter-regional competition in relation to regional developments. With the increase of NIMBYism, recently the PIMFY syndrome (e.g. competition for inducing desirable facilities) also has become social problems. Such regional competition surrounding large national projects often obstructed proper supplements of infra-structure that are essential to the national economy and linkage effect, and as a result it caused social unrest and national economic costs. To examine the way of the government handling the conflicts and the strategies used by the parties to the conflicts, this Chapter deal with two PIMFY cases (Kyungju High Speed Railway and Incheon International Airport Motorway). Although these conflicts were concerned with the construction of infra-structure, they were quite different from each other as for the third party intervention and conflict types. (See section 7.3) The Kyungju case was related to the conflict between departments within central government, and the Incheon case was concerned with the conflict between central and local governments (lower-tiers).

9.2. Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railway (Block of Railway Track in Kyungju City)

9.2.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. *Background of conflict*

In order to resolve the traffic congestion between Seoul and Pusan, Korean government decided to construct a high speed railway (HSR) and in July 1989 established 'the Committee for the Construction of Seoul-Pusan HSR' which formulated a basic plan and deliberated on the matters concerned with the projects. In June 1990, the government announced a basic route going through Kyungju City.¹⁾ According to this route, the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) prepared the detailed route going through Hyungsan River in Kyungju City at the seventh arrangement committee in April 1992. The government confirmed the final plan and decided to construct Kyungju station at Buknyuk field, which was 4 km


¹⁾ Kyungju City was the capital of the Shilla Dynasty which flourished from 57 BC to 935 AD. The city has various historical sites and cultural properties.

away from Kyungju City, in June 1992²⁾, and Kyungju citizens also gave their approval to the plan.

2. Beginning of the conflict

After the route was decided, the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau (CPPB) in the Ministry of Culture and Physical Health (MOCPH) asked the MOCT to send a blue print of the route on 4 November, and the MOCT sent the blue print to the CPPB on 18 November 1992. As soon as the CPPB received the material, it demanded the MOCT to re-consider the route for surveying over the cultural properties around the area of the route in December 1992.³⁾ Meanwhile, the MOCT dealt with a survey for cultural properties within Kyungbuk Province for 4 months from February 1993 and concluded that the Hyungsan River route was an appropriate route for the conservation of the cultural properties.⁴⁾ However, the CPPB asserted that the survey insufficient for the conservation of the cultural properties and the MOCT did not consider the characteristics of historical city and the sight of the relic areas. The CPPB asked the MOCT to change the original route into the Kumchon route that would go around Kyungju City. (Figure 9.1)

<Figure 9-1> High speed railway route



²⁾ Since the areas around this route were already dealt with a readjustment of arable land, the government passed a judgement that the possibility of buried cultural properties was lessened.

³⁾ According to the 'Act for Cultural Property Preservation', the minister of MOCPH has the right to issue permissions for excavation of cultural property. Nobody can execute a construction work without the permission for excavation of relics from the MOCPH.

⁴⁾ Summary of the project (Seoul - Pusan High Speed Railway)

. Total length: 471.6km (Section of Kyungju city: 56.9km)/ Designed speed: 300 km/hour

. The route of Kyungju: Original plan - Hyungsan River route/ Changed plan - Kumchon route

. The period of construction: 1 stage (Seoul-Daegu): 1992-2004; 2 stage (Daegu-Pusan): 2004-2010

. Total cost: \$ 14 billion (Resource: Lee, 1999b, p.216)

3. *Development of the conflict*

Confronted with the MOCPH's strong protest, the MOCT constituted 'the Construction Committee for Conservation of Cultural Property and Management of the Property' in 1995. However, the MOCPH informed the MOCT that the permission for the relic excavation in Kyungju region, issued in 1991, was cancelled in August 1995 and asked again the MOCT to adapt the Kumchon route through an official document. As the conflict became known to the public, protest movements against the MOCT's plan (Hyungsan route) began to spread to academic, cultural and religious worlds. In addition, 'the secretary-general of UNESCO mentioned that if the route went through Kyungju City, it might be very difficult for the city to be designated as an area of world cultural inheritance' (*Donga Daily News*, 1995a).

As protest movements spread and continued, the MOCT suggested that it could change the original plan into an underground route. However, cultural worlds argued that the underground route also could destroy the cultural properties, and 69 social interest groups including the Korean Federation for Practice of Economic Justice, began to hold assemblies and conferences against the MOCT's plan (*Donga Daily News*, 1995b). As the conflict grew, the Office of Prime Minister (OPM) and the Presidential Secretariat intervened to adjust the conflict between the two ministries. After researching the matter for nine months, the OPM decided to change the Hyungsan route to the new route (MOCPH's suggestion) in June 1996 (*Donga Daily News*, 1996d). Following the decision, the government decided to construct Kyungju Station at Hwachon area where only few cultural properties were deposited, and this plan could conserve the sight of the historical city. After the public hearing of Kyungju citizen, the government decided the final plan in January 1997 (Lee *et al*, 1999, p.214).

9.2.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Difference of interests*

This conflict was a clash between the development and the conservation. The MOCT had an interest in economic effects. The route passing through Kyungju City had advantages in attracting tourists and in connecting with the existing Southeast railway. (see Figure 9.1) In addition, if the original route were changed to the around route, an

extra cost and time wastes would be considerably large because of the prolongation of the construction period.⁵⁾

On the other hand the opponent parties placed an emphasis on the value of the cultural property. The MOCPH asserted that if the cultural property were damaged once, its restoration would be impossible forever. Accordingly the original route should be changed for the preservation of property. The MOCPH also pointed out that the route going around Kyungju City could reduce the length of rail track because the degree of the curvature became smaller.⁶⁾ (see Figure 9.1) Such differences of the major concerns had an decisive effect to increase the intensity of conflict.

Box 9.1 Conflict factor: difference of interests

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	Delay of completion/extra costs/tourist's inconvenience	+
Social image and effect	Damage of historical city/destruction of cultural property	+
Environment/safety	No issue	0

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. Trust and communication

Until the beginning of 1990s, the top priority of the government's policy was an economic development and the opposition to development projects hardly occurred. Therefore there was no problem of the preceding relationships between the MOCT and the MOCPH. In relation to the technical trust, each party argued about the method and result of the survey on the spread of cultural property in the process of conflict. While in procedural trust, since the MOCPH did not interpose an objective to the route at the early stage and asked for changing the route after the government's plan was decided, the MOCT had a doubt about the MOCPH's true intention. However basically this matter did not exert a bad influence upon the mutual trusts.

As this conflict occurred between the departments within the central government, the exchange of each party's opinion was conducted through the public conferences and official documents. Therefore, there was neither a distortion nor an interception of the communication. Each department's intention and opinion were

⁵⁾ The MOCT expected that the duration of construction would need 3 more years, and the extra costs would reach the maximum of 3-4 billion Korean Won (*Donga Daily News*, 1995b).

⁶⁾ Hyungsan route (MOCT): The length of rail track- 68.0km; construction costs- 1 870 billion Won
 Whachon route (MOCPH): The length of rail track-58.9km; construction costs- 1 590 billion Won
 (Lee *et al.*, 1999, p.215).

communicated and understood correctly. In relation to social groups, each party's true intention was often distorted, because a direct dialogue was not carried out. However, because the MOCPH could fully speak for the outsider's opinion, the communication was basically smooth.

Box 9.2 Conflict factor: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	Good/no previous dispute	-
Mutual trust (Technical)	Distrust of survey over property	+
(Procedural)	No issue	0
Communication	Official documents/public conference	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception on the conflict and the pattern of behaviour

The MOCT considered the conflict as a troublesome phenomenon and tried to avoid the clash. However, after the conflicts became manifest, the MOCT explained actively its plan and persuaded the opponents including the MOCPH. The MOCT's behaviour making an opportunity to find a constructive alternative had a positive influence on the conflict process and resolution. While, the MOCPH did not consider the dispute as a destructive measure, but regarded it as a good opportunity to enhance national concerns about the cultural property and to renew a policy for the conservation of cultural property.

Basically there were no negative behaviours such as authority commands or forces and disregard, because of the conflict between departments within the central government. Legal and formal administrative procedures and bureaucratic behaviours were used. In consequence, it was no possibility that the parties' behaviours could increase the intensity of conflict. Only social groups' protest movement raised the intensity, but their activities were conducted by lawful means.

Box 9.3 Conflict factor: perception on conflict and pattern of behaviour

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Perception (proponent)	Negative (troublesome)→ positive	+
(opponent)	Positive (conservation of cultural property)	-
Behaviour (proponent)	Formal dialogue/conference	-
(opponent)	Formal dialogue/conference (MOCPH),	-
	Protest movement (social groups)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

4. *Structure and internal discord*

As the major parties were departments in central government, the parties were well structured. Despite the increased opponents, the discordance among them or the split of them did not occur, therefore they could concentrate their demands on the conservation of the cultural relics. Only some discords between social groups took place, the MOCPH could deal fully with this matter. Therefore this factor decreased the intensity of the conflict.

Box 9.4 Conflict factor: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (both sides)	-
Internal discord	No discord	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. *External environment*

As seen Chapter 2, the political democratisation led to the democratisation in various fields of the Korean society, and various social groups began to ask for their participation in the process of policy-making. The government became to regard their opinions as an important factor and could not override their wishes. In this context, the government cancelled the original route and adopted an alternative route that social groups requested, despite the damage afflicted on the consistency and trust of the government's policy. The political democratisation had an influence on increasing the intensity of the conflict.

There were many interest groups that resisted the MOCT's plan. As the environmental or the cultural conservation got an advantage over the developments since the end of 1980s, social groups' roles and right to speak were gradually increasing in the process of decision making. If the MOCPH alone protested the MOCT's plan, it might have not achieved its purpose. At the outset the MOCT considered the groups as a troublesome question and disregarded their demands. As their protest movement spreading and increasing, the public opinion aligned itself with the movement and the MOCPH could make further its effort to preserve the cultural property. The social groups' activity was an important factor to increase the intensity of conflict.

After the conflict became manifest, press reported the matter day after day, and this aroused national concerns. Although they dealt with well-balanced reports

and comments, they criticised the fact that the original route was decided without a sufficient investigation over the cultural property within Kyungju City. Somehow or other, their reports contributed that the conflict became to change a national issue.

Box 9.5 Conflict factor: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	National NGOs (social/cultural groups)	+
	Local social groups	+
Press	Press (neutral reports)	0
Political change	Democratisation	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

9.2.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Scale of participants and parties*

The main parties were the MOCT as a proponent and the MOCPH as an opponent. After public knew the discordance of policy within the central government, parties began to expand into outsiders. Since the issue attracted a national concern, various national social groups participated in the dispute. Following the participation of the ‘Management Committee for Cultural Property’, 69 national social groups⁶⁾ took part in the protest movements against the MOCT’s plan. In opposition to this protest movement, Kyungju citizen and local social interest groups (30 bodies), having direct interests in the project, thrust themselves into the conflict (*Donga Daily News*, 1995a). For the protest movements, the large-scale demonstrations that ran into 15,000 people were held in Seoul twice. In opposition to this, 5000 Kyungju citizens also had meetings to support the MOCT’s plan.

2. *Duration of the conflict*

The HSR case continued for 5 years. After the government deciding the final route, the MOCPH surveyed the cultural relics around the route and asked the MOCT to change the route in 1992. From this time, the tedious conflict started, and it continued till the beginning of 1997 for 5 years.

⁶⁾ They were Cultural organisations (8) Academic organisations (15) Religious Bodies (29) Citizen movement groups (16)

3. Frequency and conflictual behaviour (Table 9.1)

Since the conflict took place between the central departments, the conflictual behaviour relied on the formal meetings such as official conferences, documents and notices. After the OPM intervened, the joint council was held for the reconciliation. With the dispute increasing, social groups used largely critical statements, press interview, assembly and symposium which accounted 20 times.

Table 9-1. Frequency of conflictual behaviour (1992-1996)

Action	Number and scale
Official notes of protest (MOCPH)	7
Statements/press interview	6
A signature-collecting campaign	2 times (170,682 people)
Seminar and conference	3
Large scale assembly/meeting	2 times (15,000 people)

9.2.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. Stakeholders and representatives

The disputants to the conflict increased with the conflict developing, and the identification of stakeholders was quite difficult because the issue was the protection of the cultural property in which the whole nation took interest. As the intensity of conflict increasing, *circa* 67 social groups, as opponents, and Kyungju citizens, as supporters, were involved. In special, the sphere of opponents spread to cultural, academic and religious worlds, which made it difficult to resolve the conflict. As representatives of disputants, the two concerned departments could speak fully for each party's position and hold themselves responsibility for their policies, which could influence positively the conflict resolution.

Box 9.6 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Wide/vague	-
Representatives	Central government (NOCPH)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

The main issue was the preservation of cultural property in Kyungju City. New issues did not appear in the progress of the conflict and accordingly there is no need to

identify the conflictual issues. Although there was one main issue, the actual negotiation for the problem solving could be possible. because the parties to the conflict made an establishment of alternatives to solve the problem. If opponents stayed at a positional conflict demanding the cancellation of project without suggesting any alternatives, the conflict might be plunged into an impasse situation. At the first stage of negotiation, since the two parties adhered to each position. the conflict dragged interminably on the bored dispute of attrition which led to the OPM's intervention. After the third party intervention, the conflict changed into a principle negotiation for the substance of issue, and they found a clue of resolution.

Since the conflictual issue was concerned with the conservation of cultural properties, the scale of issue was nation wide. Accordingly the government felt political burdens tried to resolve this conflict as soon as possible, but it took 5 years to settle the conflict, because the difference of parties' interests was huge. Judging from the conflict issue, because there was only one issue concerned with the conservation of the cultural properties and new issues did not appear, this variable influenced positively the conflict resolution.

Box 9.7 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Simple (conservation of property)	-
Scale of issue	Nation wide	-
Identification of issues	More easy	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

At the outset, both parties held formal and informal negotiations through a steering meeting. As the issue grew to a dispute situation, they adopted high-profile tactics such as a joint committee and formal conference consisting of officials and non-governmental delegates. In the meantime, the MOCPH tried to use outsiders' assistance through the alliance with semi-official groups for consulting about technical matters. In spite of the many official meetings, as the dispute did not settle, two parties asked the OPM to mediate the matter. Consequently the conflict was settled through the third party intervention which played an important role for the conflict resolution.

On the other hand, dissident social groups and local residents made use of forcing strategies such as large-scale open-air meetings or public statements which

could put pressures upon central government, which seemed to become an effective pressure toward the government.

Box 9.8 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	High profile tactics/ formal meetings	+
Opponent (MOCPH) (social groups)	Formal dialogue	+
	Forcing (every kinds of protest behaviours)	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisation

The MOCT, as proponent and the MOCPH, as an opponent, in central government took part in the conflict, and each departments did its best for its own interests. The MOCPH's participation led to the wide protest activities of social and cultural groups, which became a momentum of the conflict and played an important part in increasing the intensity of conflict. The two departments tried to resolve the conflict through a direct negotiation, but because a viewpoint between the conservation and the development was substantially different, the intensity of the conflict was increasing, and the conflict was transferred to the OPM's hand. The OPM, as a third party, participated in the conflict to mediate different opinions between the two departments, however it was not a simple facilitator or mediator but was rather an arbitrator because the OPM's decision had a compelling power. In consequence, the OPM's mediation played an important role in settling the conflict. In the process of this decision making, Korea Transportation Institute (KOTI) as the government's agency, planed the detail route supplied information about the project. On the other hand, Kyungju City, having direct interests to the conflict, only observed the progress of conflict and did not participate directly in the conflict and the conflict resolution.

Box 9.9 Conflict variables: the role of public organisation

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	. MOCT(proponent): debate/open process . MOCPH (opponent): official process . OPM (third party):joint committee . Kyungju City (observer)	+
Local government	. Korea Transportation Institute (planner):	0
Government agency	Persuasion (to residents)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

Provided that the city presented its opinion to support the MOCT's plan through its citizens' mouth.

5. *Third party intervention*

The OPM had played a role of the third party. At the beginning stage, the OPM, as a mediator, initiated largely joint meetings and took professional advice. Although the joint meetings under the presidency of the OPM were held 6 times, both sides' viewpoints stood against each other's one, and they did not reach a conclusion. As the conflict issue spread nation-wide, the OPM consulted with the Presidential Secretariat, and the secretariat, felt a political burden, decided to change the original route. According to this decision, the OPM, as an arbitrator, cancelled the original route and decided the new route going round Kyungju City.

Besides, in the process of conflict, research institutes, experts, and foreign research organisations were involved. They took part in the matter for supporting each party's propriety or providing advice and suggestions as required, so they were each party's supporter rather than a neutral third party.

Box 9.10 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party's role	Mediator→Arbitrator/ Supporter	+
Capacity of third party	No neutral and special third party	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

9.3. Incheon International Airport Motorway (IIAM)

9.3.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. *Background of the conflict*

In the preparation for the increased demands of air transport for the coming century, Korean government constructed Incheon International Airport (IIA) serving as a hub-airport for Northeast Asia at Youngjong Island. (Figure 9.2) Correspondingly the government decided to build the Incheon International Airport Motorway (IIAM)⁷⁾ that

⁷⁾ Project summary Location: Koyang City, Kyunggi Province – Choong Ward, Incheon City
 Length: 40.2 km (Main: 36.5 km, Branch : 3.7km) Lanes: 6-8 lanes (width: 30.6m - 37.8m)
 In & out: 7 (4 JCT + 3 IC) Total construction cost: \$ 1.4 billion
 Construction period: 29 November 1995 – 28 November 2000 (5 years)
 (Resource: The New Incheon International Airport Freeway Co., 1999)

would serve as a major link to the airport and contribute to meeting the air transport demands in the capital region. In 1991 the government finished a feasibility study about the motorway and carried out a facility design from 1991 to 1994. The 'the Private Capital Inducement Act on SOC' was enacted in 1994, and the motorway was designated as the first private capital inducement facility project following the establishment of the Act. After public notification of the project, the ground-breaking ceremony was held in December 1995 (Kwon, 1996, p.37).


2. Beginning and development of the conflict

The designed route of motorway passed through Seo and Kaeyang Wards in Incheon City, which would divide the Wards into two parts. Seo Ward asked the MOCT to build an interchange at Kumam within its jurisdiction so that its residents could use the motorway, and Kaeyang Ward also asked for the development of technology industrial park in its greenbelt area.

The MOCT refused Seo Ward's demand for the reason that if the Kumam interchange was constructed, many vehicles for attending and leaving offices would cause a confirmed traffic jam, and consequently the new airport might fail in its duty as an international hub airport. Regarding to this, Seo Ward blamed that the central government overrode the wishes of the local government, and it also withheld an approval to the application for the change of land use in May 1996. The MOCT also did not accepted Kaeyang Ward's demand because the development of greenbelt in the capital region could bring the growth of city and the concentration of population and industry.

Faced with the MOCT's rejection, Kaeyang Ward disapproved immediately the change of land use in its greenbelt area for the construction of Incheon IAM applied by the New International Airport Freeway Co. The ward asserted that it did not fit in well with the principle of equality that the central government asked local authority to change the land use for the construction of motorway in the greenbelt, and it did not admit the construction of the technology industrial park for the regional economic development. Following Kaeyang Ward's behaviour, Seo Wards also rejected to permit the change of land use in its jurisdiction.

<Figure 9-2> The route of Incheon IAM



For coping with these oppositions, the MOCT began to prepare 'the Special Law for the Construction of National Project' including that the local government could not intervene in carrying forward national projects (*Donga Daily News*, 1996d; Lee, 1999b, p.232). The MOCT's intention to establish the special law led to other local governments' reaction.⁸⁾ Faced with local governments' protests, the MOCT explained to the wards that when other accesses to the airport were built in the future, the construction of an interchange could be considered then, and the restriction of industrial location in the capital region would be relaxed. The press began to report that a national policy project was blocked due to regional interests or selfishness and public opinion moved to support the MOCT's position. Consequently, the wards felt pressure from the public opinion, accepted the MOCT's suggestion and the conflict was resolved in 1997.

9.3.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Difference of interests*

The case of Incheon IAM was the conflict between local interests and national benefits. From the viewpoint of national benefits, 'central government placed a priority on securing the function of the new airport as a hub-airport for Northeast Asia in its early stage and considered that a convenient and smooth traffic between the airport and Seoul was the key point' (Interview with the MOCT official, March 2000). The

⁸⁾ 'Nation-wide upper tier assembly committee' consisting 15 upper tier local governments presented their opposite opinion to the MOCT's proposal in 10 May 1996 to enact the special law (*Donga Daily News*, 1996b). After that settlement, the main issue of the conflict shifted from permitting certain land uses in the Green Belt to special legislation for national project.

MOCT insisted that important national projects or national interests should not hindered by a regional selfishness.

On the other hand, the two wards concentrated on their regional damages to come from the construction of the motorway. Without an interchange in the region, the local residents could not use the road, and the road would be an inconvenience to the residents. The wards therefore asked for some compensation for local damages and losses. They asserted that even the most important national projects should coincide with the local residents' interests in some degrees (Lee, 1999b, p.233; KCCI, 1997, p.45). Especially with the newly implemented Local Autonomy, the heads of the wards could not help responding to their residents' views and speaking for their interests. As a result, this social difference was the main issue of the conflict and became its decisive factor. On the other hand, issues concerned with the environment and safety did not raise problems in this case.

Box 9.11 Conflict factor: difference of interests

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	National interests (traffic jam/additional costs), local interests(Interchange/regional economy)	+
Social image and effect	Damage regions (divide into two parts)	+
Environment/safety	No issue	0

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. Trust and communication

Parties did not have an opportunity to clash into each other surrounding development projects before, so previous relationships were not bad. In relation to this project, technical and procedural problems between the central and the local governments did not take place. Accordingly there was no problem in association with mutual trust at the beginning stage, because the central government had many 'Know how' and carried out the project by a lawful process (see Section 9.3.1). With the conflict developing, the issue of the conflict moved to the enactment of new special law which included the provision to exclude other local governments' intervention in the process of the national projects (KCCI, 1997, p.45; *Donga Daily News*, 1996b). At this time, although other local governments indicated their distrust toward the government's intention, the distrust was solved through dialogue and conferences, and the local governments accepted the revised bill, 'the New International Airport Construction

Promotion Act'.⁹⁾ Consequently the distrust over the technical and procedural issues did not occur and diminished the intensity of conflict.

'Communication was smooth because the local governments that could speak for their residents' interests was the main parties, and the local residents did not participate directly in the dispute' (interview with the MOCT official, March 2000). Nonetheless, as the two wards could not stand comparison with the MOCT in the aspect of administration powers and human resources, their opinion and assertion were often disregarded by the MOCT. Therefore, on one hand they took part in the negotiation with the MOCT, on the other hand, they appealed to the local residents and the public opinion. The latter method could distort their true intentions.

Box 9.12 Conflict factor: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	No previous dispute	-
Mutual trust (Technical)	Trust 'know-how'	-
(Procedural)	Open process	-
Communication	Informal meetings, no direct dialogue	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception on the conflict and pattern of behaviour

The MOCT regarded the conflict as a negative phenomenon and thought that the conflict would be obstructive in carrying out national projects. In this context, the MOCT tried to use 'command' and 'disregard'. As a next step, it attempted to use a coercive measure such as an enactment of the special law to restrict the local governments' right concerned with sanction in national projects. Such behaviour caused the reaction of local government and raised the intensity of the conflict. The local governments (*Seo* and *Kaeyang* Wards) intended to use the conflict as an opportunity to highlight their regional problems. For their regional interests, the local governments rejected the co-operation in the process of the construction. The local governments' action induced the government's strong countermove to enact the new law and made the conflict complicated. In the result, each party's negative perception and behaviour brought about the emotional escalation and influenced the intensity of the conflict.

⁹⁾ This revised Act includes a provision that eliminates application of 26 concerned administrative laws from the process of the project.

Box 9.13 Conflict factor: perception on conflict and pattern of behaviour

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Perception (proponent)	Negative	+
(opponent)	Negative	+
Central government	Negative (disregard/legislation), Positive (dialogue/alternatives)	+
Local governments	Negative (refuse support/ blocking)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

4. Structure and internal discord

Since parties were the central government and the local governments, there were no problems in their structure and internal system.

Box 9.14 Conflict factor: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (both sides)	-
Internal discord	No discord	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. External environment

The introduction of the LA effected greatly the progress of the conflict. Recently local governments' competitive regional developments or selfishness often clashed against national policies or plans, which became an important factor between the central and the local governments. As the heads of wards were elected directly by their residents, they had interests in the residents' demands and regional developments, which were factors likely to increase the intensity of the conflict.

Next, there were no social interest groups and residents' intervention. Press criticised the local governments' behaviours as a regional selfishness and apprehended that such behaviours could exert a bad influence on the national project. Recently although press has often stood on the side of opposition to many other development projects of government, they assumed a friendly attitude toward this project, because they recognised the importance of the construction of IIAM.

Box 9.15 Conflict factor: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	No intervention	0
Press	Critical to local governments	-
Political change	Local autonomy (elected mayors)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

9.3.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Scale of participants and parties*

The MOCT and the two wards in Incheon City were major parties to this dispute. In the progress of the conflict, neither interest groups nor local residents directly join in the conflict, although the local residents made their view known to the head of their local wards. However, other local government added their intervention in relation to the proposal for the special law, but they did not influence the conflict situation. As a result, the number of parties and the scale of disputants can be regarded as small in overall number.

2. *Duration of the conflict*

The conflict related to IIAM continued from 1996 when the local governments vetoed the change of land use for the construction of motorway until 1997 when the MOCT amended the existing law, through 'the New International Airport Construction Promotion Act' instead establish a new special law. Then the two wards accepted the government's suggestion. The total duration of the conflict was one year and three months.

3. *Frequency and conflictual behaviour*

There was no illegal or violent behaviour because the major disputants were the public organisations and the residents did not take part in the conflict. Largely press interviews or critical statements were the main measures, and the central government intended to use forcing methods such as litigation and legislation. Eleven separate instances of conflictual behaviour by the local governments were identified, but considering the duration of the conflict, the frequency of the conflictual behaviour was relatively low.

9.3.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. *Stakeholders and representatives*

Because the conflict eventually concerned only the MOCT and the two local governments, the number of stakeholders has small and clear. After the new issue appeared, other local governments, 15 wards and counties in the capital region,

presented opposite opinions toward the MOCT's policy (*Donga Daily News*, 1996b), but they did not directly participate in the conflict. The residents or social groups did not take part, so there was no need for the definition of stakeholders for a negotiated settlement; There was also no need to identify separately any sets of representatives.

Box 9.16 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Narrow (within the two locality)	+
Representatives	Local governments	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

At the outset, the issues were concerned with the construction of the Kumam interchange and the technology industrial park. As the conflict developed, the new issue associated with the enactment of special law was generated, which caused an expansion of stakeholders. Though there were three main issues, because parties could not deal with 'give and take', the range of selection over the issue was not wide. However since the wards' demand was the compensation for their regional damages, it is possible to make negotiable alternatives. The MOCT that had an initiative of the project, suggested an alternative method, and the conflict could be settled as the two wards accepted the MOCT's suggestion. Since the scale of conflict issue was limited within the local level, this factor did affect positively the conflict resolution, but the identification of the issues was very difficult because the difference of each party's position was complex.

Box 9.17 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Complex (interchange/industrial park/ traffic jam)	+
Scale of issue	Local wide	+
Identification of issues	Obscure	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

Central government that had a negative conception over the conflict, used negative strategies such as authority commands and disregard at the first. As the conflict escalated, the MOCT made feint strategies, for example, new legislation and direct negotiation. Faced with the MOCT's strong reaction, the wards tried to join with their

residents and to spread the issue. However, the conflict became calmer after agreement has reached to revise the law for the new international airport, which led to a friendlier relationship. The MOCT produced opportunities for quick dialogues and put forward persuasive arguments for the smooth progress of the project. The MOCT's diversionary activities protected the collective protest of local governments and realised peaceful and satisfactory agreements. Consequently, the MOCT's 'carrot and stick policy', i.e., legislation and dialogue proved effectual.

Box 9.18 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Feint strategy (forcing/legislation/dialogue), High profile tactics (persuasion/alternative)	+
Opponent	Confrontation (blocking behaviour)	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisation

The MOCT, as a proponent, was in a position to reduce the degree of conflict because it needed to construct the motorway as soon as possible, and actually it took the leadership in resolving the conflict. The MOCT adopted a feint operation for the conflict resolution. On the contrary, as opponents, Seo and Kaeyang Wards triggered the conflict and played an important role to increase the degree of conflict. Incheon Large City could play a role of mediator, but it stood at the side of regional interests and delivered the local governments' common opinion against the establishment of special law. However it sustained the position of onlooker.

Box 9.19 Conflict variables: the role of public organisation

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	. MOCT(proponent): force/persuade/legislation	+
Local government	. Seo and Kaeyang Wards(opponent): reject to assistance/try to ally with residents . Incheon City: neutral position	- 0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. Third party intervention

There was no third party intervention to facilitate a negotiation or to mediate the dispute. A third party could not intervene the conflict, since the central government considered that it could fully manipulate the local governments (lower tiers).

Box 9.20 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party's role	Observer	0
Capacity of third party	No neutral third party	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

9.4. Comparison of the Analysis of the Two Case Studies

9.4.1. Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

Table 9.2 shows a summary view of the analysis of the factors influencing the intensity of the conflict in the two PIMFY case studies. In the relation to the roles of factors in the process of conflict, the great difference between the two cases can be found. At first, the difference of interest played a part in increasing the intensity in both cases. In the Kyungju HSR conflict, a compromise was not easy, because the parties' differences about value conception related to economic and social interests were larger. While in the case of IIAM, the uncoupling of cost and benefit in economic interests played a role to increase the intensity of conflict. The factors related to the technical trust and external environments including social groups' intervention and democratisation, had an influence on increasing the intensity of

Table 9-2. Factors influencing the intensity of conflict

Factors	Sub-factors	HSR case	IIAM case
Difference	Economic	+	+
	Social	+	+
	Safety	0	0
Relationships	Relationships (resident) (social group)	-	-
Trust	Technical trust	+	-
	Procedural trust	0	-
Communication	Communication	-	+
Perception	Proponent	+	+
	Opponent	-	+
Behaviour	Proponent	-	+
	Opponent	-	+
Structure 'internal discord	Structure	-	-
	Internal discord	-	-
External environment (Surroundings)	Interest groups (national)	+	0
	(local)	+	0
	Expression (national)	0	-
	(local)	0	0
	Political change	+	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

conflict in the HSR case. In the IIAE case, since both parties' views about the conflict was negative, they adopted offensive tactics such as force, disregard, blocking, which affected to increase the intensity of conflict. The introduction of Local Autonomy also contributed to increasing the intensity.

On the other hand, factors decreasing the intensity of conflict were the structure and relationships between disputants in both cases. In the Kyungju HSR case, the communication and parties' behaviour played to diminish the intensity of conflict, while the trust concerned with technical and procedural issues and press' role had an influence on decreasing the intensity.

As a whole, although both cases were similar to each other in the number of factors increasing and decreasing the intensity of conflict, the actual degree of conflict might be quite different. Generally social groups' or residents' intervention frequently increased the intensity of conflict (Younggwang and Dong River dam cases: see sections 8.3 and 10.3). From this point of view, it was possible to anticipate that because social groups and Kyungju residents involved in the HSR conflict, the intensity of conflict would be deeper, and the conflict resolution would be more difficult than in the IIAM case.

9.4.2. Comparison of the Degree of Conflict Intensity

The intensity of conflict in the HSR case was higher than the IIAM case in all indicators such as the constituent situation of parties, the duration of conflict and the patterns of behaviour. Although the factors influencing the intensity of conflict were similar to each other, the assessment of the intensity was quite different. This result revealed that the intensity of conflict was depended on the relationships of disputants and external environments (social groups' intervention) which led national concerns. It was in certain degree of accordance with the analysis of factors influencing the intensity of conflict. Consequently, the intensity of conflict in the case of HSR that had more factors increasing intensity was higher in the case of IIAM. From this fact, it can be considered that the conflict resolution in the HSR case would be more difficult the IIAM.

Table 9-3. Comparison of intensity

Items	KHSR	IAM
Scale of parties	Central government (MOCT, MOCPH and OPM) National social groups (67 Bodies) Kyungju Citizens (30 local social groups)	Central government (MOCT) Local governments (Seo Kaeyang Wards) Inchon City
Duration	1992. 4 – 1997. 1(5 years)	1996 – 1997 (1year 3 months)
Pattern of Behaviour	MOCPH: legal action (meetings, Conference, joint committee) Social groups: Signature campaign, public Statement, assembly, public hearing)	MOCT: legislation, informal conference. Local government: reject permission, collective protest.

9.4.3. Results of the Analysis of Variables Influencing Conflict Resolution

Table 9.4 provides a summary of the analysis of the operation of the variables influencing conflict resolution in the two PIMFY case studies. The number of positive variables influencing conflict resolution was similar, but negative variables in the HSR case were more than the IIAE case. Although the priority and importance of factors were different from each other, the issue of conflict was important variables influencing the conflict resolution in both cases. Generally when an issue in conflict was concerned with safety or conservation of culture, the conflict tended to become a national concern and led to outsider's intervention (Younggwang NPP and Dong River Dam cases: see Sections 8.3 and 10.3). The national people took interest in the case of HSR, and naturally social groups participated in the conflict, which made increase the number of stakeholders and difficult in resolving the conflict. On the other hand, the local government's interests in the IAM case was considered as a regional self-interest and hence did not attract national attention and did not receive supports from social groups and nation. Therefore, the proponent could push its plan in spite of opponent's protest. The results of conflicts were entirely different due to the fundamental difference of issue between the two cases.

In the HSR case, despite the third party intervention, the conflict was spun out for five years because the scale of issue was nation wide, and stakeholders were also wide and obscure. The proponent's original proposal was cancelled by outsider's (Presidential secretariat) political influence. Consequently the concerned issues had a negative influence greatly the conflict resolution. On the other hand, in the case of IIAE although there was no third party intervention, the conflict resolution was easier than the HSR case, because both parties could negotiate directly by alternative issues and the scale of issue was limited to the Ward area. As seen at the section 9.4.2. the intensity of conflict in the HSR case was deeper than the IIAE case, and as a result it

was possible to expect that the conflict resolution of the HSR case was more difficult than the IIAM case.

Table 9-4. Variables for conflict resolution

Variables	Sub-variables	HSR case	IIAM case
Stakeholders (Actors)	Stakeholders	-	+
	Representative	+	+
Issues	No. of issues	-	+
	Scale of issue	-	+
	Identification	+	-
Strategy/Tactic	Proponent	+	+
	Opponent	+	-
Role of public organisation	Central government	+	+
	Local government	0	-
Third party intervention	Role of third party	+	0
	Capacity of their party	-	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

9.5. Evaluation on the Result of Conflict (Table 9.5)

9.5.1. Achievement of Policy/Development Project

In the HSR case, the proponent's plans including the original and alternative route (underground route) were fully called off, and the block of railway track in Kyungju City completely changed. As the route was changed, the period of construction lengthened, and the time of completion was put off for three years. Therefore, the facility design for the new route required the additional costs (3-4 thousand billion Korean Won). (*Donga Daily News*, 12 June 1996e) From this point of view, the achievement of the proponent's policy would be very low. Nonetheless, from the national point of view, the policy for the conservation of cultural property was achieved to some degree. This conflict was an event as a turning point to consider a sustainable development and importance of cultural value in future. According to an official of MOCT, 'this conflict was the first event that a national project was delayed and changed because of the conservation of cultural property and historical city.' (Interview with official of the MOCT, March 2000)

In the IIAM case, the MOCT could conducted its plan without a change and delay, and it could establish the revised law for the construction of IIA. The achievement of government's policy was very high. In conflicts between the central

and local government, the central government has achieved largely its purposes or opinions. (Younggwang case: see Section 8.3)

9.5.2. Receptivity

In the HSR case, the receptivity was very high because the MOCPH and social groups' demands were accepted. In contrast, the receptivity in the IIAM case was low, because the local governments failed to their desires such as the construction of interchange and the technology industrial park. However, some part of their demands could be reflected in the policy. 'The central government promised that the construction of the Kumam interchange could be positively considered in future and reflected the local government's demands concerned with the development of capital region in the special law' (interview with MOCT's official, March 2000).

9.5.3. Satisfaction

In the Kyungju HSR case, the degree of the MOCT's dissatisfaction was high because the period of construction was expanded, and also considerable additional costs were required. Nevertheless, the MOCT got some satisfactions since the new route went through Kyungju City as the MOCT's intention, and a new conflict related to the damage of cultural property could be intercepted. Kyungju citizens also satisfied the result of conflict resolution because the route did not exclude the city and could minimise the destruction of cultural property. While, the MOCPH and social groups expressed their satisfaction at the result. Their demands and opinions were fully accepted.

In the IIAM case, the MOCT's satisfaction was high. It could persuade the local governments without changing and delaying the project and also could enact the revised special law. While, the local governments had some dissatisfaction to the result because their demands were not accepted immediately. However, they got the central government's promise to construct the interchange for them in future.

9.5.4. Social Stability

The both conflicts seemed to contribute greatly to the social stability. To begin with, In the HSR case, if the construction of railroad track were carried out as the original route, many disputes associated with the destruction of cultural property would occur continuously in the course of construction. In advance, the MOCT could prevent

potential problems in its policy through the conflict which could minimise the damage of cultural property. After the conflict being resolved, any conflicts associated with the matter did not occurred. Consequently it could be seen that the conflict contributed greatly to the social stability.

In the conflict related to the IIAM case, with taking this opportunity, the central government could revise the special law for the construction of IIA and blockade local governments' intervention in the process of national projects. Actually after the conflict settled, the two concerned local governments had no objection to the project up to now. In the future, the possibility of conflict related to national projects may be reduced considerably.

Table 9-5. Analysis of results

Items		Case of HSR	Case of IIAM
Achievement of policy		Low	High
Receptivity of policy		High	Low
Satisfaction	Proponent	Middle	High
	Opponent	High	Middle
Social stability		High	High

9.6. Conclusions and Findings

9.6.1. Conclusions

Comparing the result of two conflict cases, the more the negative factors influencing the intensity of conflict, the intensity assessed by three indicators were higher, and the conflict resolution was more difficult. The difference of variables for conflict resolution also greatly effected the conflict resolution, and the result of conflict was different from each other. The most important causes of different result could be divided into following three factors.

The first factor was conflictual issue. Usually a nationalisation of issue was very typical method for pressing a proponent's of project in environmental conflict. In order to accomplish this purpose, usually parties appealed and generated issues concerned with the conservation of environment and cultural property or safety which was deeply related to public interests. Such strategy made it possible to get a support from nation, and often opponents used this method for applying a pressure to other side (Wolsink, 1994, p.853). The great difference of two cases was found in this

point. Since the HSR case had an issue related to the cultural conservation, the conflict attracted national concerns, and opponents could take the initiative in the conflict. As a result opponents got fully their purpose. On the other hand, in the case of IIAM opponents failed to nationalise the conflictual issues, and the issues stayed at the regional position. Consequently proponent could accomplish its original project, and opponents failed to get fully their purposes.

The next important factor was a third party intervention. Usually when a conflict is in the impasse situation, or when an imbalance of power between parties is very large, the third party intervention is very useful method to mediate properly parties' interests. In the case of HSR, the third party intervention played decisively a role for the conflict resolution. However, in the IIAM case, a third party did not intervene, and the conflict was result in weak parties' (local governments) failure.

Finally depending on the types of conflict, parties' strategies and behaviour were quite different from each other. Since the HSR case could be involved in systems conflict, parties to the conflict focussed on direct negotiations and joint meetings, and third party intervention was relatively easy. On the other hand, although the IIAM case also had a nature of systems conflict, basically it belonged to a bureaucratic conflict related to authority relation. As a result the central government used authority controls and at last, as Pondy (1967, p.314) stated, the subordinate (local government) has surrendered to a superior's (central government) legitimacy to exercise discretion through a legislation.

9.6.2. Findings

Through the review of conflict progress and analysis of conflict factors and variables, major points could be found as followings.

1. The nature of conflict issue had a great influence on the conflict progress and resolution. Commonly a conflict connected with a value system tended to become serious (Kyungju HSR case).
2. In a conflict between residents and government, the capability of residential mobilisation and the combination of residents and social groups greatly influenced the direction of conflict. The stronger the residents' power, the degree of success in gaining their purpose was higher. In the conflict between central and local governments (bureaucratic conflict), largely the central government had an initiative

in dealing with the conflict and also had a clue to resolve the matter concerned with the conflict (Inchon IAM case).

3. In a conflict related to local residents, government thus far largely relied on political decisions of government for conflict resolution rather than rational negotiations or ideas (Anmyun and Tong River dam cases: see sections 8.2 and 10.3). The conflict settled by the political reason could occur again when surrounding environments changed (Kyungju HSR case). In the conflict between central and local governments, the methods for conflict resolution relied on forcing and authority commands showing in bureaucratic conflict types. After implementing Local Autonomy, the methods began to change from authority commands to persuasions or dialogue, but the residue of previous methods (authority command) still remained. Central government had powers to control and to manage local governments over matters concerned with national administrations and policies. Actually the imbalance of power and personal resources still remained between them, and as a result local governments bowed to central government's authority in arguments or disputes. In order to overcome such inferiority of strength, local governments often tried to ally with their residents.

4. When there was an imbalance between the parties' power, a third party intervention was necessary. Nonetheless in the conflict central and local governments, it was difficult that a third party intervened for resolving the conflict. The central government did not want the third party intervention because the government thought it had a sufficient power and resources to control local governments (Inchon IAM case). However, in the case of conflict between the same level governments, a third party intervention had a great influence on the conflict settlement. Usually in intergovernmental conflicts, the OPM, as a third party, played an important role. While the contrary civilian or private organisations' intervention for facilitating or mediating conflicts was nearly shut out, because usually officials disliked the outsider's intervention. It showed that the Korean bureaucracy still had a priority and monopolises information in administrative policies (Kyungju HSR case).

5. In intergovernmental conflicts, most unresolved conflicts moved to the OPM's hand, which showed that an administrative decision-making was carried largely out

by the hierarchical and bureaucratic measures (Kyungju HSR case). The OPM was not a neutral third party rather arbitrator. Although the OPM used joint meetings to facilitate a bargaining, it largely depended on authority commands. The government's direct confrontation with opponents frequently resulted in increasing the intensity of conflict, because there was no buffer party to mitigate them (Anmyun case: see section 8.2).

6. Regardless to the types and situations of conflict, most parties adapted negative strategies or tactics. For examples, forcing, disregard and conquest were universal in hierarchical intergovernmental conflicts (Inchon IAM case).

7. According to Tong (1994) [in Moon, 1998, p.78], civil society is defined as 'a self-organisation of society through the creation of autonomous, voluntary, NGOs, occupational and professional associations, independent news media and political organisations'. The civil society refers to the non-governmental and social forces rather than politicians and bureaucrats in a society. In recent years, the role of NGOs has played an important part in environmental conflicts. Their roles were issue generators, information providers, alternative providers, monitors and mediators. In Korea, they largely played parts in contributing to generate issues and provide information in environmental conflicts, while the role of mediator and alternative provider might be relatively weak. Usually if environmental groups or social groups took part in a conflict, the conflict would tend to magnify to the size of nation-wide matter, because the groups continuously generated new issues and provided negative information concerned with the conflict (Kyungju HSR case).

8. In order to carry out development or environment policies, the government should regard the interest groups as not only sources of citizen movement but also co-operative partners over the decision-making of its policy. In the transition to democratisation and localisation, local governments were likely suffered from inadequate resources and they needed the NGO sectors to share the burden. NGOs engaged increasingly in decision-making processes with local governments. Accordingly the more democratic and localised the local governments, the informal associations should be seen as partners rather than opposite groups (Kyungju HSR case).

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Chapter 9. Case Study 2: Development of Infrastructure (PIMFY)

9.1. Introduction

The recent implementation of local autonomy in Korea has led not only to the growth of NIMBY-related conflicts, but also to inter-regional competition and conflicts over the location of new and desirable regional developments -- the PIMFY (Please In My Front Yard) syndrome. Such competition over large national projects has been criticised as obstructing additions to the country's stock of infrastructure regarded as essential to the national economy and for their regional linkage effects. Such conflicts have generated social unrest and national economic costs. To examine the way **that** the government has handled such conflicts and the strategies used by the parties to the conflicts, this Chapter deals with two PIMFY cases (Kyungju High Speed Railway and Incheon International Airport Motorway). Although these conflicts were concerned with the construction of infrastructure, they differ from each other in their conflict types (see, section 7.3) and the nature of the third party intervention. The Kyungju case was related to the conflict between departments within central government, and the Incheon case was concerned with the conflict between central and local governments (lower-tiers).

9.2. Seoul-Pusan High Speed Railway (Section of Railway Track in Kyungju City)

9.2.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. *Background to the conflict*

In order to resolve problems over traffic congestion between Seoul and Pusan, the Korean government decided to construct a high speed railway (HSR). In July 1989 it established 'the Committee for the Construction of Seoul-Pusan HSR' which deliberated on matters concerned with the projects and formulated a basic plan. In June 1990, the government announced an outline route which would pass through Kyungju City.¹⁾ Subsequently (seventh meeting of the arrangement committee in April 1992), the Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT) prepared a detailed route crossing the Hyungsan River in Kyungju City. The government

confirmed this as the final planned route and in June 1992 ²⁾ decided to construct Kyungju Station at Buknyuk Field sited four kilometres from Kyungju City. The citizens of Kyungju City also gave their approval to this plan.

2. The start of the conflict

Some months (4 November) after the government had announced their decision on the final planned route, the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau (CPPB) of the Ministry of Culture and Physical Health (MOCPH) asked the MOCT to send a blue print of the route, which the MOCT did on 18 November 1992. On receiving and studying the material, the CPPB asked the MOCT in December to re-consider the detailed route, taking into account the need to survey the cultural properties around the area of the route.³⁾ In response the MOCT undertook a survey for cultural properties within Kyungbuk Province for 4 months from February 1993, and concluded that the Hyungsan River route was an appropriate route for the conservation of cultural properties.⁴⁾ However, the CPPB replied that the survey was inadequate for the conservation of the cultural properties and that the MOCT had not considered the characteristics of the historic city and the protection of views of the areas of relics. They asked the MOCT to change the original route into the Kumchon route that would go around Kyungju City to the south-east. (Figure 9.1)

3. Development of the conflict

Confronted with the MOCPH's strong protest, the MOCT constituted 'the Construction Committee for Conservation of Cultural Property and Management of the Property' in 1995. However, in August 1995 the MOCPH informed the MOCT that their permission for archaeological excavations in the Kyungju region, issued in

¹⁾ Kyungju City was the capital of the Shilla Dynasty which flourished from 57 BC to 935 AD. The city has various historical sites and cultural properties.

²⁾ Since the areas around the June 1992 route had already been the subject of a readjustment of arable land, the government had judged that the possibility of damaging buried cultural properties was unlikely.

³⁾ According to the 'Act for Cultural Property Preservation', the minister of MOCPH has the right to issue permissions for excavation of cultural property. Nobody can execute a construction work without the permission for excavation of relics from the MOCPH.


⁴⁾ Summary of the project (Seoul - Pusan High Speed Railway)

. Total length: 471.6km (Section of Kyungju city: 56.9km) Designed speed: 300 km hour

. The route of Kyungju: Original plan - Hyungsan River route Changed plan - Kumchun route

. The period of construction: stage 1 (Seoul- Daegu): 1992 - 2004; stage 2 (Daegu- Pusan): 2004 - 2010

Figure 9-1 High speed railway route



1991, was cancelled and again asked the MOCT to adopt the Kumchon route as official policy. As the conflict became known to the public, protest movements against the MOCT's plan (the Hyungsan route) began to spread to academic, cultural and religious worlds. In addition, 'the secretary-general of UNESCO mentioned that if the route went through Kyungju City, it might be very difficult for the city to be designated as an area of world cultural inheritance' (*Donga Daily News*, 1995a).

As protests continued and spread, the MOCT suggested that it could change the original plan for a surface railway into an underground route. However, cultural interests argued that the underground route could also destroy cultural properties. Some 69 social interest groups, including the Korean Federation for Practice of Economic Justice, began to hold assemblies and conferences against the MOCT's plan (*Donga Daily News*, 1995b). As the conflict grew, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the Presidential Secretariat intervened in the conflict between the two ministries. After researching the issues for nine months, the OPM decided in June 1996 to change the Hyungsan route to the alternative proposed by the MOC PH (*Donga Daily News*, 1996d). Following this decision, the government decided to construct the new station for Kyungju at Hwachon, where only few cultural properties were located where views of the historical city would be protected. After the public hearings for the citizens of Kyungju to express their opinions, the government finally decided on the plan for the revised route in January 1997 (Lee *et al*, 1999, p.214).

. Total cost: \$ 14 billion (Lee, 1999b, p.216)

9.2.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

The case study discussion now turns to explore the influence of the conflict factors described and discussed in Chapter 7. Sections 6-9.

1. *Difference of interests*

This conflict was a clash between development and conservation. The MOCT had an interest in economic effects of its chosen route passing through Kyungju City, which would have advantages in attracting tourists and in connecting with the existing Southeast railway (see Figure 9.1). In addition, if its original preferred route were changed to the MOCPH alternative route, extra cost and time delay would be incurred because of the prolongation of the construction period.⁵⁾

On the other hand the opponent parties placed an emphasis on the value of historic cultural property. The MOCPH asserted that if the cultural property were damaged once, its restoration would be impossible and, accordingly, the original route should be changed. The MOCPH also pointed out that its suggested alternative route going round Kyungju City to the south-east would reduce the length of rail track because the degree of the curvature would be smaller⁶⁾ (see Figure 9.1). Such differences about the major concerns of the two parties had a decisive effect in increasing the intensity of conflict.

Box 9.1 Conflict factor: difference of interests

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	Delay of completion/extra costs/tourist's inconvenience	+
Social image and effect	Damage of historical city/destruction of cultural property	+
Environment/safety	No issue	0

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. *Trust and communication*

Until the beginning of the 1990s, the Korean government's top policy priority had been economic development and opposition to development projects hardly occurred. Therefore, there was no problem in previous relationships between the MOCT and the MOCPH. However, in relation to technical trust, each party had argued about the

⁵⁾ The MOCT expected that the duration of construction would need 3 more years, and the extra costs would reach the maximum of 3-4 billion Korean Won (*Donga Daily News*, 1995b).

⁶⁾ Hyungsan route (MOCT): The length of rail track- 68.0km; construction costs- 1 870 billion Won
Whachon route (MOCPH): The length of rail track-58.9km; construction costs- 1 590 billion Won
(Lee *et al.*, 1999, p.215).

methods and results of the survey of cultural properties in the area which was undertaken during the process of the conflict. In terms of procedural trust, the MOCT had its doubts about the MOCPH's true intentions, since the MOCPH had not objected to the route at an early stage and had only asked for the route to be changed after the June 1992 route had been decided. Nevertheless, it can be judged that basically this matter did not exert a negative influence upon the mutual trusts.

As this conflict occurred between two ministries of central government, the exchange of each party's opinion was conducted through public conferences and official documents. Therefore, there was neither a distortion nor an interception of the communication. Each ministry's intentions and opinions were communicated and understood correctly. In relation to social groups, each party's true intention was often distorted, because there was no direct dialogue, although, because the MOCPH could speak fully for the opinions of non-governmental interests, communication between the parties involved was basically straightforward.

Box 9.2 Conflict factor: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	Good/no previous dispute	-
Mutual trust (Technical)	Distrust of survey over property	+
(Procedural)	No issue	0
Communication	Official documents/public conference	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception and behaviour pattern

The MOCT considered the conflict as a troublesome phenomenon and tried to avoid the clash. However, after the conflict became manifest, the MOCT explained its plan quite actively to its opponents including the MOCPH. The MOCT's behaviour of making an opportunity to find a constructive alternative had a positive influence on the conflict process and resolution. The MOCPH did not consider the dispute as a wholly negative issue, but regarded it as a good opportunity to enhance national concerns about the cultural property and to renew a policy for the conservation of cultural property.

Basically there were no experiences of negative behaviour, such as authority commands, use of force and disregard of opponents, because the conflict was essentially conducted between ministries within the central government. Legal and formal administrative procedures were used through the accepted norms of

bureaucratic behaviour. In consequence, there was no possibility that the parties' behaviour could increase the intensity of conflict. Only protests by social groups raised the intensity somewhat, but their activities were conducted by lawful means.

Box 9.3 Conflict factor: perception on conflict and pattern of behaviour

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Perception (proponent)	Negative (troublesome)→ positive	+
(opponent)	Positive (conservation of cultural property)	-
Behaviour (proponent)	Formal dialogue/conference	-
(opponent)	Formal dialogue/conference (MOCPH), Protest movement (social groups)	- +

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

4. Structure and internal discord

As the major parties to the conflict were ministries of the central government, they were internally well structured and organised. Despite the involvement of a number of social groups as opponents, there was little discord among them or any split within any of them, therefore, they could focus their demands on the conservation of the cultural relics. The MOCPH was able to deal fully with any minor discord between the social groups. Therefore this factor decreased the intensity of the conflict.

Box 9.4 Conflict factor: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (both sides)	-
Internal discord	No discord	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. External environment

As outlined in Chapter 2, Korea's move towards political democratisation led to the democratisation in various other fields of Korean society, and different social interest groups began to ask for their participation to be taken into account in the process of policy-making. The government became to regard their opinions as an important factor and that it could not override their reasonable arguments and wishes. In this context, and given the amount of external support for the MOCPH's position, the government agreed to cancel the original MOCT route and adopted an alternative route that social groups requested as suggested by the MOCPH, despite the damage afflicted on the consistency and trust of the government's policy. Thus, political democratisation had an influence on increasing the intensity of the conflict.

Many interest groups supported the MOCPH's resistance to the MOCT's plan. As the environmental and/or cultural conservation became more widely supported over against the economic development priority from the end of the 1980s, social groups' expression of their roles and right to speak in the process of decision making gradually increased. If the MOCPH had opposed the MOCT plan on its own, it might have not achieved its purpose. At the outset the MOCT considered the social groups as a troublesome question and disregarded their viewpoints. As their protest movement increased and spread, public opinion aligned itself with them and with the MOCPH. However, local residents and interest groups in Kynugju City, who favoured the MOCT plan, also organised meetings and otherwise expressed their support. Thus the activity of social groups was an important factor in increasing the intensity of conflict.

After the conflict became manifest, the press reported the matter day after day, and this aroused national concerns. Although they provided well-balanced reports and comments, they criticised the fact that the original route was decided without an adequate investigation about the extent of cultural property within Kyungju City. In this way, their reports contributed to the conflict being recognised as a national issue.

Box 9.5 Conflict factor: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	National NGOs (social/cultural groups)	+
	Local social groups	+
Press	Press (neutral reports)	0
Political change	Democratisation	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

9.2.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Scale of participants and parties*

The main parties to this conflict were the MOCT as proponent and the MOCPH as opponent. After public learned of the difference of opinion within central government, other outside parties began to expand into the conflict. Various national social groups participated in the dispute and the issue attracted national concerns. Following the involvement of the 'Management Committee for Cultural Property', some 69 national

social groups ⁷⁾ took part in the protests against the MOCT's plan. In opposition to this protest movement, the residents of Kyungju City and local social interest groups (30 bodies), having direct interests in the original June 1992 route as a PIMFY issue, thrust themselves into the conflict (*Donga Daily News*, 1995a). The protest movements to MOCT's plan twice held large-scale demonstrations attracting up to 15,000 people in Seoul. In opposition to these events, 5,000 Kyungju citizens also had meetings to support the MOCT's plan.

2. Duration of the conflict

The HSR case continued for 5 years. After the government first made its decision on the preferred route in mid-1992, the MOCPH surveyed the cultural relics around the route and asked the MOCT to change the route later that year. From this time, the tedious conflict started, and it continued till the beginning of 1997 for 5 years.

3. Frequency and conflictual behaviour (Table 9.1)

Since the conflict took place between the central departments as proponent and opponent, conflictual behaviour was expressed in the formal meetings, such as official conferences, documents and notices. After the OPM intervened, a joint council was held to promote reconciliation between the parties. With the dispute increasing, social groups supporting the MOCPH used largely critical statements, press interview, assembly and symposium which accounted 20 times; local meetings were organised by supporters of the MOCT in Kyungju City.

Table 9-1. Frequency of conflictual behaviour (1992-1996)

Action	Number and scale
Official notes of protest (MOCPH)	7
Statements/press interview	6
A signature-collecting campaign	2 times (170,682 people)
Seminar and conference	3
Large scale assembly/meeting	2 times (15,000 people)

⁷⁾ They were Cultural organisations (8), Academic organisations (15), Religious Bodies (29), and Citizen movement groups (16).

9.2.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. *Stakeholders and representatives*

The number of disputants to the conflict increased with the development of the conflict. Because the conflict issue was the protection of cultural property, the whole nation eventually took an interest in it. This made the identification of stakeholders by the researcher quite difficult. As knowledge spread about the issue and the intensity of conflict increased, *circa* 67 social groups became involved as opponents of the MOCT plan and many individual Kyungju citizens became involved. In particular, the spread of opposition to cultural, academic and religious groups, which made it difficult to resolve the conflict favourably the MOCT. As representatives of disputants, the two concerned central government ministries could speak fully for each party's position and hold themselves responsible for their policies, which could be regarded as having a positive influence on conflict resolution.

Box 9.6 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Wide/vague	-
Representatives	Central government (NOCPH)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. *Issues*

The main conflict issue was the preservation of cultural property in Kyungju City. No new issues appeared during the progress of the conflict and accordingly there is no need to identify further conflict issues in this case. The actual negotiations for problem solving were helped by the parties to the conflict providing alternatives to resolve the issue. If the opponent had taken a position demanding the cancellation of the HSR project without suggesting any alternative, the conflict would have reached an impasse. At the first stage of negotiation, since the two parties adhered to their own positions, the conflict dragged on leading to the OPM's intervention. After this third party intervention, the conflict changed into a principled negotiation about the substance of the issue.

Since the conflict issue was concerned with the conservation of cultural properties, the scale of the issue was nationwide at one level (although the cultural relics at issue were located at a local level). Accordingly, the government felt a

political responsibility to try to resolve this conflict as soon as possible. In fact, it took five years to settle the conflict, because the differences between the parties were so great. Considering the evidence on influence of the issue on the conflict, because there was only one issue involved and new issues did not appear in the process of the conflict, this variable can be judged to have had a relatively positive influence on conflict resolution.

Box 9.7 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Simple (conservation of property)	-
Scale of issue	Nation wide	-
Identification of issues	More easy	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

At the outset of the conflict, both main parties held formal and informal negotiations through a steering meeting. As the issue grew to a dispute situation, they adopted higher-profile tactics such as a joint committee and a formal conference consisting of officials and non-governmental delegates. In the meantime, the MOCPH tried to use outsiders' assistance through an alliance with semi-official groups to consult over technical matters. As the dispute did not reach a conclusion in spite of many official meetings, the two parties asked the OPM to mediate over the matter. Consequently the conflict was settled through third party intervention, which thus played an important role in conflict resolution.

On the other hand, dissident social groups and local residents made use of forcing strategies, such as large-scale open-air meetings or public statements, to put pressure upon central government, which seemed to be quite effective tactics in view of the eventual decision.

Box 9.8 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	High profile tactics' formal meetings	+
Opponent (MOCPH)	Formal dialogue	+
(social groups)	Forcing (every kinds of protest behaviours)	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. *The role of public organisation*

Two central government ministries – the MOCT, as proponent. and, the MOCPH, as an opponent -- took part in the conflict; each ministry did its best for its own interests. The MOCPH's participation led to the wider-range protest activities of social and cultural groups, which became a part of the momentum of the conflict and played an important part in increasing the intensity of conflict. The two ministries tried to resolve the conflict through direct negotiation, but because the difference of opinion between conservation and development was so great, the intensity of the conflict increased, and the conflict was referred to the OPM. The OPM, as a third party, participated in the conflict to mediate the strongly held different opinions between the two ministries. However, the OPM was not a simple facilitator or mediator, but was rather an arbitrator because the OPM's ruling would be effectively binding on both parties. In consequence, the OPM's mediation played an important role in settling the conflict.

In the process of this decision-making, the Korea Transportation Institute (KOTI) as a government agency, planned the detail route and supplied information about the project. On the other hand, although Kyungju City had direct interests in the conflict, the local government only observed the progress of conflict and did not participate directly in the conflict and its resolution.

Box 9.9 Conflict variables: the role of public organisation

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	. MOCT(proponent): debate/open process . MOCPH (opponent): official process . OPM (third party):joint committee . Kyungju City (observer)	+
Local government	. Korea Transportation Institute (planner):	0
Government agency	Persuasion (to residents)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. *Third party intervention*

The OPM had played a role of the third party. At the beginning of this process, the OPM, as a mediator, initiated some joint meetings and took professional advice. Although six joint meetings were held under the presidency of the OPM, both sides maintained their original viewpoints and no conclusion was reached. As the conflict issue spread nation-wide, the OPM consulted with the Presidential Secretariat, which recognised the political responsibility of needing to decide about changing the

original route. According to this decision, the OPM, as an arbitrator, cancelled the original route and decided on the new route going round Kyungju City to the south-east.

Besides the parties directly involved in the process of conflict, a number of research institutes, experts, and foreign research organisations were also involved. They took part in the matter by supporting one or other of the parties or through providing advice and suggestions as required. In this sense, they should be regarded as supporters of the parties involved rather than as neutral third parties.

Box 9.10 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party's role	Mediator→Arbitrator/ Supporter	+
Capacity of third party	No neutral and special third party	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

9.3. Incheon International Airport Motorway (IIAM)


9.3.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. Background to the conflict

In preparation for the increased demand for air travel in the coming century, the Korean government constructed Incheon International Airport (IIA) on Youngchong Island to serve as a hub-airport for Northeast Asia (Figure 9.2). It also decided to build the Incheon International Airport Motorway (IIAM)⁸⁾ to serve as a major link to the airport and so contribute to meeting air transport demands in the capital region. In 1991 the government completed a feasibility study for the motorway and undertook the necessary design work from 1991 to 1994. ‘The Private Capital Inducement Act on SOC’ was enacted in 1994, and the motorway was designated as the first private capital inducement facility project. After public notification of the project, the ground breaking ceremony was held in December 1995 (Kwon, 1996, p.37).

⁸⁾ Project summary -- Location: Koyang City, Kyunggi Province - Choong Ward, Incheon City
 Length: 40.2 km (Main: 36.5 km, Branch : 3.7km) Lanes: 6-8 lanes (width: 30.6m - 37.8m)
 In & out: 7 (4 JCT + 3 IC) Total construction cost: \$ 1.4 billion
 Construction period: 29 November 1995 - 28 November 2000 (5 years)
 (Resource: The New Incheon International Airport Freeway Co., 1999)

Figure 9-2 The route of the Incheon IAM



2. Beginning and development of the conflict

The designed route of the motorway passed through Seo and Kaeyang wards in Incheon City, which would have the effect of dividing the wards into two. Seo Ward asked the MOCT to build an interchange at Kumam (Fig. 9.2) within its jurisdiction so that its residents could use the motorway, and Kaeyang Ward also asked for the development of an industrial technology park in its greenbelt area. The MOCT refused Seo Ward's demand for the reason that if the Kumam interchange was built, the many vehicles travelling to and from the offices in the Ward would cause such traffic congestion that the new airport might fail in its role as an international hub airport. Seo Ward in response blamed the MOCT for not endorsing the wishes of its local government and withheld its approval to the application for the change of land use in May 1996.

The MOCT also rejected Kaeyang Ward's request because the development of greenbelt in the capital region could bring further growth to the city and contribute to increasing its already large concentration of population and industry. Faced with this decision, Kaeyang Ward immediately disapproved the application by the New International Airport Freeway Co for the change of land use in its greenbelt area for the construction of Incheon IAM. The Ward asserted that the application did not fit in well with the principle of equality with the central government wanting local authority to change the land use for the construction of motorway in the greenbelt, but not agreeing to the construction of the technology industrial park for regional economic development. Following Kaeyang Ward's behaviour, Seo Ward also refused to permit the change of land use in its jurisdiction.

The MOCT's response to this opposition to its plans was to prepare 'the Special Law for the Construction of National Projects', stating that the local government could not intervene in carrying forward national projects (*Donga Daily News*, 1996d; Lee, 1999b, p.232). However, the MOCT's intention to establish the special law led to reactions from other local governments.⁹⁾ Faced with these local government protests, the MOCT explained to the wards that when other accesses to the airport were built in the future, the construction of an interchange could be considered then, and the restriction of industrial location in the capital region would be relaxed. From this point the emphasis in press reports of the conflict began to express the view that a national policy project was being blocked due to local-self interest or selfishness. Public opinion thus began to move to support the MOCT's position and, consequently, the wards felt pressure from public opinion. They accepted the MOCT's suggestion and the conflict was resolved in 1997.

9.3.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Difference of interests*

The Incheon IAM was a conflict between local interests and national benefits. From the viewpoint of national benefits, the 'central government placed a priority on securing the function of the new airport as a hub-airport for Northeast Asia in its early stage and considered that a convenient and smooth traffic between the airport and Seoul was the key point' (Interview with MOCT official, March 2000). The MOCT insisted that important national projects or national interests should not be hindered by regional selfishness.

On the other hand, the two wards concentrated on the potential damage to their areas from the construction of the motorway. Local residents could not use the road without an interchange, and the motorway itself would be an inconvenience to the residents. The wards therefore asked for some compensation for local damage and losses. They asserted that even the most important national projects should coincide with the local residents' interests to some degree (Lee, 1999b, p.233; KCCI, 1997,

⁹⁾ 'Nation-wide upper tier assembly committee' consisting 15 upper tier local governments presented their opposite opinion to the MOCT's proposal in 10 May 1996 to enact the special law (*Donga Daily News*, 1996b). After that settlement, the main issue of the conflict shifted from permitting certain land uses in the Green Belt to special legislation for national project.

p.45). With the newly implemented local autonomy particularly in mind, the heads of the wards could not help responding to their residents' views and speaking for their interests. As a result, this social difference was the main issue of the conflict and became its decisive factor. On the other hand, issues concerned with the environment and safety did not raise problems in this case.

Box 9.11 Conflict factor: difference of interests

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	National interests (traffic jam/additional costs), local interests(Interchange/regional economy)	+
Social image and effect	Damage regions (divide into two parts)	+
Environment/safety	No issue	0

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. Trust and communication

The parties to the IIAM conflict had no previous experience of disputes over development projects, so the basis of their previous relationships was quite good. In relation to the IIAM itself, there were no technical and procedural problems between the central and the local governments. Accordingly, here was no problem with mutual trust between the parties at the initial stage of the conflict because the central government had good quality technical 'know how' about the project and had carried out its preparation by a lawful process (see Section 9.3.1). With the conflict developing, the issue of the conflict moved to the enactment of new special law which included the provision of excluding other local governments' intervention in the process of national projects (KCCI, 1997, p.45; *Donga Daily News*, 1996b). At this time, although other local governments indicated their distrust of the government's intentions, this problem was solved through dialogue and conferences and the local governments accepted the revised bill, 'the New International Airport Construction Promotion Act'.¹⁰⁾ The presence of this degree of trust over technical and procedural issues acted to diminish the intensity of the conflict.

'Communication [between the parties to the conflict] was smooth because the local governments that could speak for their residents' interests were the main parties, and the local residents did not participate directly in the dispute' (interview with the MOCT official, March 2000). Nonetheless, the two wards could not compare with

the MOCT in terms of their administrative powers and human resources and their opinions and arguments were often disregarded by the MOCT. Therefore, on one hand they took part in negotiations with the MOCT, on the other hand, they appealed to local residents and public opinion.

Box 9.12 Conflict factor: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	No previous dispute	-
Mutual trust (Technical)	Trust 'know-how'	-
(Procedural)	Open process	-
Communication	Informal meetings, no direct dialogue	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception of the conflict and pattern of behaviour

The MOCT regarded the conflict as a negative phenomenon and thought that the conflict was obstructing its duty to carry out national projects. In this context, the MOCT tried to use 'command' and 'disregard' behaviour. As a further step, it attempted to use a coercive measure i.e. an enactment of a special law to restrict local governments' rights concerned with local aspects of national projects. Such behaviour caused an adverse response by other local governments and raised the intensity of the conflict. The local governments involved used the conflict as an opportunity to highlight their local/regional problems. For reasons of self-interest, they rejected the track of co-operation in the process of the construction of the IIAM. Their action induced a strong countermove by the central government ministry involved to enact a new law and made the conflict more complicated. As a result, each party's negative perception and behaviour brought about an emotional escalation and influenced the intensity of the conflict.

Box 9.13 Conflict factor: perception on conflict and pattern of behaviour

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Perception (proponent)	Negative	+
(opponent)	Negative	+
Central government	Negative (disregard/legislation), Positive (dialogue/alternatives)	+ -
Local governments	Negative (refuse support/ blocking)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

¹⁰⁾ This revised Act includes a provision that eliminated the application of 26 specified administrative laws from the process of the project.

4. *Structure and internal discord*

Since the parties to the conflict comprised a central government ministry and local governments, there were no problems connected to their internal structure and systems influencing the length or strength of the conflict.

Box 9.14 Conflict factor: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (both sides)	-
Internal discord	No discord	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. *External environment*

The introduction of local autonomy in 1995 greatly affected the progress of the IIAM conflict. As the heads of wards were elected directly by their local residents, they had interests in responding to the residents' views and concerns for additional regional developments, which were factors likely to increase the intensity of the conflict. There were no particular social interest groups' and residents' interventions in the IIAM conflict. The press in the latter stages of the dispute criticised the local governments' behaviour as one of regional selfishness, which could exert a bad influence on the national project. Recently, although the press has often stood on the side of opposition to many other government development projects, they assumed a friendly attitude toward this project, because they recognised the importance of the construction of IIAM.

Box 9.15 Conflict factor: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	No intervention	0
Press	Critical to local governments	-
Political change	Local autonomy (elected mayors)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

9.3.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Scale of participants and parties*

The MOCT and the two wards in Inchon City were the major parties to this dispute. In the progress of the conflict, neither interest groups nor local residents directly joined in the conflict, although local residents made their views known to the heads of

their local wards. However, other local government did add their intervention in relation to the proposal for the special law, but they did not particularly influence the process of conflict. As a result, the number of parties and the scale of disputants can be regarded as small in overall number.

2. Duration of the conflict

The conflict related to IIAM lasted from 1996 when the local governments vetoed the changes of land use for the construction of motorway until 1997 when the MOCT amended the existing law, through 'the New International Airport Construction Promotion Act' instead of establishing a new special law. Then the two wards accepted the government's suggestion. The total duration of the conflict was one year and three months.

3. Frequency and conflictual behaviour

There was no illegal or violent behaviour because the major disputants were the public organisations and local residents and social groups did not take part directly in the conflict. Press interviews and critical statements were the main measures used by the wards to give their public views. The central government, however, decided that it would use forcing methods such as litigation and special legislation. Eleven separate instances of conflictual behaviour by the local governments were identified, but considering the duration of the conflict, the frequency of the conflictual behaviour was relatively low.

9.3.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. Stakeholders and representatives

Because the conflict eventually concerned only the MOCT and the two local governments, the number of stakeholders was small and clearly defined. After the new issue of the proposes special law appeared, other local governments, 15 wards and counties in the capital region, expressed their opposition to the MOCT's policy (*Donga Daily News*, 1996b), but they did not directly participate in the conflict. Neither residents nor social groups took part, so there was no need for the definition of stakeholders for a negotiated settlement; there was also no need to identify separately any sets of representatives.

Box 9.16 Conflict variables: stakeholders and representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Narrow (within the two locality)	+
Representatives	Local governments	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

At the outset, the issues were concerned with requests for the construction of the Kumam interchange and a technology industrial park. As the conflict developed, a new issue associated with the enactment of a special law was generated, which caused an expansion of the stakeholders involved. However since the wards' demands were the compensation for damage as they saw it to local interests, it was possible to make negotiable alternatives. The MOCT, whose project the IIAM was, suggested an alternative method and the conflict was settled as the two wards accepted the MOCT's suggestion. This alternative also covered the issue concerning the wider area local governments' concerns. Since the scale of conflict issue was limited within the local level, this factor affected conflict resolution quite positively, but the identification of the issues was very difficult because of the complexity caused by the difference of each party's position.

Box 9.17 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Complex (interchange/industrial park/ traffic jam)	+
Scale of issue	Local wide	+
Identification of issues	Obscure	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

Central government had quite a negative view of the conflict and at the beginning used negative strategies such as authority commands and disregard. As the conflict escalated, the MOCT made feint strategies, for example, new legislation and direct negotiation. Faced with the MOCT's strong reaction, the wards tried to join with their residents and to spread the issue. However, the conflict became calmer after agreement was reached to revise the law for the new international airport, which led to a friendlier relationship. The MOCT produced opportunities for quick dialogues and put forward persuasive arguments for the smooth progress of the project. The

MOCT's diversionary activities protected the collective protest of local governments and realised peaceful and satisfactory agreements. Consequently, the MOCT's 'carrot and stick policy', i.e., legislation and dialogue proved effective.

Box 9.18 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Feint strategy (forcing/legislation/dialogue), High profile tactics (persuasion/alternative)	+
Opponent	Confrontation (blocking behaviour)	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisations

The MOCT, as the proponent, was in a position to reduce the degree of conflict in this case, because it needed to construct the motorway as soon as possible and it actually took the leadership in resolving the conflict. The MOCT adopted a feint strategy for conflict resolution. As opponents, Seo and Kaeyang Wards triggered the conflict and played an important role in increasing the degree of conflict. Inchon Large City could have played the role of mediator, but it stood at the side of regional interests.

However, while sustaining the position of onlooker, it did deliver the local governments' common opinion opposing the establishment of special law.

Box 9.19 Conflict variables: the role of public organisation

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	. MOCT(proponent): force/persuade/legislation	+
Local government	. Seo and Kaeyang Wards(opponent): reject to assistance/try to ally with residents . Inchon City: neutral position	- 0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. Third party intervention

There was no third party intervention to facilitate a negotiation nor to mediate the dispute. A third party was not needed to intervene in the conflict, since the central government considered that it could fully manipulate the local governments (lower tiers).

Box 9.20 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party's role	Observer	0
Capacity of third party	No neutral third party	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

9.4. Comparison of the Analysis of the Two Case Studies

9.4.1. Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

Table 9.2 shows a summary view of the analysis of the factors influencing the intensity of the conflict in the two PIMFY case studies. A great difference between the two cases can be found in relation to the roles of various factors in the process of conflict. Differences of interest between the parties played a part in increasing the intensity of conflict in both cases. In the Kyungju HSR conflict, a compromise was not easy, because the parties' differences about value conception related to economic and social interests were larger, while in the case of the IIAM, the uncoupling of cost and benefit over economic interests increased the intensity of conflict. The factors related to technical trust and external environments, including social groups' intervention and democratisation, also had an influence on increasing the intensity of conflict in the HSR case. In the IIAM case, since both parties' views about the conflict were negative, they adopted offensive tactics such as force, disregard and blocking, which produced the effect of increasing the intensity of conflict. The introduction of local autonomy is also regarded as contributing to an increase in the intensity of conflict.

Table 9-2. Factors influencing the intensity of conflict

Factors	Sub-factors	HSR case	IIAM case
Difference	Economic	+	+
	Social	+	+
	Safety	0	0
Relationships	Relationships (resident) (social group)	- 0	- 0
Trust	Technical trust	+	-
	Procedural trust	0	-
Communication	Communication	-	+
Perception	Proponent	+	+
	Opponent	-	+
Behaviour	Proponent	-	+
	Opponent	-	+
Structure/internal discord	Structure	-	-
	Internal discord	-	-
External environment (Surroundings)	Interest groups (national)	+	0
	(local)	+	0
	Expression (national)	0	-
	(local)	0	0
	Political change	.	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

On the other hand, internal structure and relationships between disputants were factors decreasing the intensity of conflict in both cases. In the Kyungju HSR case, communication and the parties' behaviour helped to diminish the intensity of conflict, while the trust concerned with technical and procedural issues and role of the press also had an influence on decreasing intensity.

As a whole, although cases might be found which are similar to each other in the number of factors increasing and decreasing the intensity of conflict, the actual degree of conflict might be quite different. Generally, in the cases considered so far, social groups' or residents' intervention frequently increased the intensity of conflict (Younggwang and Dong River dam cases: see sections 8.3 and 10.3). From this point of view, it was possible to anticipate that because social groups and Kyungju residents involved in the HSR conflict, the intensity of conflict would be deeper, and the conflict resolution would be more difficult than in the IIAM case.

9.4.2. Comparison of the Degree of Conflict Intensity

In all indicators e.g. the constituent situation of parties, the duration of conflict and the patterns of behaviour, the intensity of conflict in the HSR case was higher than the IIAM case. Although the factors influencing the intensity of conflict were similar to each other in each case, the assessment of the intensity was quite different. This result revealed that the intensity of conflict depended on the relationship between disputants and external environments (e.g. social groups' intervention), which led national concerns. Consequently, the intensity of conflict in the HSR case with its larger number of factors increasing intensity was higher in the case of IIAM. From this evaluation, it could be considered that conflict resolution in the HSR case would be more difficult than the IIAM.

Table 9-3. Comparison of intensity

Items	KHSR	IIAM
Scale of parties	Central government (MOCT, MOCPH and OPM) National social groups (67 Bodies) Kyungju Citizens (30 local social groups)	Central government (MOCT) Local governments (Seo Kaeyang Wards) Inchon City
Duration	1992. 4 – 1997. 1 (5 years)	1996 – 1997 (1 year 3 months)
Pattern of Behaviour	MOCPH: legal action (meetings, Conference, joint committee) Social groups: Signature campaign, public statements, assemblies, public hearings)	MOCT: legislation, informal conference. Local government: reject permission, collective protest.

9.4.3. Results of the Analysis of Variables Influencing Conflict Resolution

Table 9.4 provides a summary of the analysis about the operation of the variables influencing conflict resolution in the two PIMFY case studies. The number of positive variables influencing conflict resolution was similar, but the negative variables in the HSR case were more than in the IIAM case. Although the priority and importance of factors were different from each other, the issue of conflict was the significant factor influencing conflict resolution in both cases. Generally, when a conflict issue was concerned with safety or the conservation of culture, the conflict tended to become a national concern and led to outside intervention (Younggwang NPP and Dong River Dam cases: see Sections 8.3 and 10.3). National interests became **to be** involved in the case of the HSR and, social groups naturally participated in the conflict, which increased the number of stakeholders and the difficulties of resolving the conflict. On the other hand, the two local governments' interests in the IIAM case were considered as a regional self-interest and hence neither attracted national attention nor received support from social groups and national interests. Therefore, the proponent could push its plan in spite of opponent's protest. The results of conflicts were entirely different due to the fundamental difference of issue between the two cases.

Table 9-4. Variables for conflict resolution

Variables	Sub-variables	HSR case	IIAM case
Stakeholders (Actors)	Stakeholders	-	+
	Representative	+	+
Issues	No. of issues	-	+
	Scale of issue	-	+
	Identification	+	-
Strategy/Tactic	Proponent	+	+
	Opponent	+	-
Role of public organisation	Central government	+	+
	Local government	0	-
Third party intervention	Role of third party	+	0
	Capacity of their party	-	0

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

In the HSR case, despite third party intervention, the conflict was spun out for five years because the scale of the issue was nationwide and the stakeholders were also wide and not easy to identify clearly. The proponent's original proposal was eventually cancelled by an outside interest's (Presidential Secretariat) political

influence. Consequently, the issues concerned can be said to have had a considerable negative influence on conflict resolution. On the other hand, in the case of IIAM although there was no third party intervention, conflict resolution was easier than in the HSR case, because both parties could negotiate directly by reference to alternative possibilities and the scale of the issues was limited to the ward areas. As seen at section 9.4.2, the intensity of conflict in the HSR case was deeper than the IIAM case, and as a result it is possible to expect that the conflict resolution of the HSR case would be more difficult than the IIAM case.

9.5. Evaluation of the Result of Conflict (Table 9.5)

9.5.1. Achievement of Policy/Development Project

In the HSR case, the proponent's plans including the original and the underground alternative route were called off, and the route of railway track through Kyungju City was completely changed. As the route was changed, the period of construction lengthened, and the time of completion was extended by three years. Therefore, the design for the new route required additional costs (3-4000 billion Korean Won) (*Donga Daily News*, 12 June 1996e). From this point of view, the achievement of the proponent's policy would be very low. Nonetheless, from the national point of view, the policy for the conservation of cultural property was achieved to some degree. This conflict was a turning point event for central government to consider sustainable development and the importance of cultural value in the future. According to an official of MOCT, 'this conflict was the first event that a national project was delayed and changed because of the conservation of cultural property and historical city.' (Interview with a MOCT official, March 2000)

In the IIAM case, the MOCT could conduct its plan without change or delay, and it could establish the revised law for the construction of IIA. The achievement of the government's policy was very high. In conflicts between the central and local government, the central government has achieved largely its purposes or sustained its opinions. (Younggwang case: see Section 8.3)

9.5.2. Receptivity

In the HSR case, the degree of receptivity was very high because the MOCPH and social groups' demands were accepted. In contrast, the degree of receptivity in the

IIAM case was low, because the local governments (wards) failed to receive the award of their requests, such as the construction of the interchange and the industrial technology park. However, some part of their demands could be reflected in the policy. ‘The central government promised that the construction of the Kumam interchange could be positively considered in future and reflected the local government’s demands concerned with the development of capital region in the special law’ (interview with MOCT’s official, March 2000).

9.5.3. Satisfaction

In the Kyungju HSR case, the MOCT’s dissatisfaction was high because the extended period of construction and the considerable additional costs required. Nevertheless, the MOCT got some satisfactions since the new route went through Kyungju City as was its’ intention and a further conflict related to the damage of cultural property was avoided. The citizens of Kyungju were also satisfied at the result of the conflict resolution because the route did not exclude the city and minimised the destruction of their local cultural property. The MOCPPH and social groups were also satisfied at the result as their demands and opinions were fully accepted.

In the IIAM case, the MOCT’s satisfaction was high. It could persuade the local governments without changing and delaying the project and also could enact the revised special law. The local governments were dissatisfied to some extent at the result because their demands were not accepted immediately. However, they did receive central government’s promise to consider constructing the interchange in the future.

9.5.4. Social Stability

Both conflicts seemed to contribute greatly to social stability. To begin with, in the HSR case, if the construction of railroad track had been carried out on the original route, disputes associated with the destruction of cultural property would have occurred continuously during the course of construction. Thus, although its project was delayed and was more expensive, the MOCT benefited by being able to prevent potential social stability problems and conflicts over potential or actual damage to cultural property. The conflict resolution meant that future conflicts associated with the HSR were avoided and it could be seen that the outcome of the conflict contributed greatly to the social stability.

In the conflict related to the IIAM case, through taking this opportunity and developing its conflict strategy, the central government could both revise the special law for the construction of IIA and block local governments' intervention in the process of national projects. Actually, after the conflict was settled, to the researcher's best knowledge, the two concerned local governments have had no objection to the project up to the present time. In the future, the possibility of central-local conflicts related to national projects may be reduced considerably.

Table 9-5. Analysis of results

Items		Case of HSR	Case of IIAM
Achievement of policy		Low	High
Receptivity of policy		High	Low
Satisfaction	Proponent	Middle	High
	Opponent	High	Middle
Social stability		High	High

9.6. Conclusions and Findings

9.6.1. Conclusions

Comparing the result of the two PIMFY conflict cases, the more the negative factors influencing the intensity of conflict, the higher were the three intensity indicators and the more difficult was the resolution of the conflict. The difference between the variables for conflict resolution also greatly affected the resolution of the conflict and the conflict outcome differed in each case. The most important causes of these different results could be divided into the following three factors.

The first factor was the conflictual issue(s). In an environmental conflict, a typical method for an opponent to bring pressure on the proponent is to locate the issue at a national rather than local or regional level (Wolsink, 1994, p.853). In order to accomplish this shift in level, the opponent parties worked to establish and generate issues concerned with the conservation of environment and cultural property or safety which were deeply related to public interests. Such a strategy made it possible to get other support from nation interests. The great difference between the two PIMFY cases was found in this point. Since the HSR case had an issue related to the cultural conservation, the conflict attracted national concerns, and opponents could take the initiative in the conflict. As a result the MOCT's opponents fully achieved their

objective. On the other hand, in the case of the IIAM, the opponents failed to raise the conflict issues to the national level and they stayed at the regional level. Consequently, the proponent was able to accomplish its original project, and the opponents failed to achieve their purposes (although they were left with some hope for future action).

The next important factor was that of third party intervention. Usually, when a conflict is in an impasse or when an imbalance of power between parties is very large, third party intervention is very useful method to mediate properly between the different parties' interests. In the case of HSR, third party intervention played a decisive role in conflict resolution. However, in the IIAM case, a third party did not intervene, and the conflict resulted in the failure of the weaker parties' (local governments) in the short-term at least.

Finally, depending on the types of conflict involved, the parties' strategies and behaviour were found to be quite different from each other. Since the HSR case could be classified as a form of systems conflict, the parties to the conflict were able to focus on direct negotiations and joint meetings, and third party intervention was relatively easy. On the other hand, although the IIAM case also had something of the nature of systems conflict, basically it belonged to the bureaucratic conflict type, related to the relationships between the authorities involved. As a result the central government used its higher authority controls and, as Pondy (1967, p.314) has stated, the subordinate (local government) surrendered to a superior (central government) legitimacy to exercise discretion through legislation.

9.6.2. Findings

A review of the progress of the PIMFY case study conflicts and an analysis of conflict factors and variables suggests the following major points:

1. The nature of the conflict issue had a great influence on the progress and resolution of the conflict. A conflict connected with a value system tended to become serious (e.g. Kyungju HSR case).
2. In a conflict between residents and government, the capability of residential mobilisation and the combination of residents and social groups greatly influenced the direction of conflict. The stronger the residents' power, the higher was the degree of

their success in gaining their purpose. In the conflict between central and local governments (bureaucratic conflict), the central government largely has the initiative in dealing with the conflict and also has the opportunity to resolve the matter concerned with the conflict (e.g. the Incheon IAM case).

3. In a conflict related to local residents, central government ministries largely relied on political decisions for conflict resolution rather than undertaking rational negotiation or putting forward new ideas (e.g. the Anmyun and Tong River Dam cases: see sections 8.2 and 10.3). The conflict settled by political decision could easily occur again if surrounding environments changed (e.g. the Kyungju HSR case). In the conflict between central and local governments, the methods for conflict resolution relied on forcing and authority command strategies, typical of bureaucratic conflict types. After the implementation of local autonomy in 1995, the methods used began to change from authority commands to persuasion or dialogue, but the residue of previous methods (authority command) still remained. Central government had powers to control and to manage local governments over matters concerned with national administration and policies. Actually, the imbalance of power and personal resources between the two levels still remained so great that local government has little choice but to bow to central government's authority in arguments or disputes. In order to overcome such inferiority of strength, local governments often tried to ally with their residents or raise the conflict issue to a national level.

4. When there was a balance between the powers of the parties and no progress was possible, third party intervention became necessary. Nonetheless, in the conflict between central and local governments, it was difficult for a third party to intervene to resolve the conflict. The central government did not want the third party intervention because the government thought it had the necessary authority and resources to control local governments (e.g. the Incheon IAM case). However, in the case of conflict between governments of the same level, then third party intervention had a great influence on the conflict settlement. Usually in inter-departmental conflicts, the OPM, as a third party, has played an important role (although the Presidential Secretariat has also been important). On the contrary, civilian or private organisations' intervention for facilitating or mediating conflicts was more or less excluded, because usually officials disliked and would not accept outside intervention.

This showed that in official thinking, the traditional Korean bureaucratic procedures still took priority and that the ministries would still monopolise information over administrative policies (e.g. the Kyungju HSR case).

5. Most unresolved interdepartmental conflicts moved to third party intervention in the form of the OPM, demonstrating that administrative decision-making was carried largely out by the hierarchical and bureaucratic measures (e.g. the Kyungju HSR case). The OPM was not a neutral third party, rather it was a powerful arbitrator. Although the OPM used joint meetings to facilitate bargaining, it has largely depended on authority commands. The government's direct confrontation with opponents frequently resulted in increasing the intensity of conflict, because there was no buffer party to mitigate them (e.g. the Anmyun Island case: see section 8.2).

6. Regardless of the types and situations of conflict, most parties adopted negative strategies or tactics. For examples, forcing, disregard and conquest were universal in hierarchical intergovernmental conflicts (e.g. the Incheon IAM case).

7. According to Tong (1994) [in Moon, 1998, p.78], civil society is defined as 'a self-organisation of society through the creation of autonomous, voluntary, NGOs, occupational and professional associations, independent news media and political organisations'. Civil society thus refers to the non-governmental and social forces rather than politicians and bureaucrats in a society. In recent years, the role of NGOs has played an important part in environmental conflicts in Korea. They have become issue generators, information providers, providers of alternatives, monitors and mediators. In Korea, they have contributed to the generation of issues and to providing information in environmental conflicts, while their role as mediator or provider of alternative ideas or opportunities has been relatively weak. Usually if environmental groups or social groups took part in a conflict, the conflict would tend to develop to the scale of a nation-wide matter, because the groups continuously generated new issues and provided negative information concerned with the conflict (e.g. the Kyungju HSR case).

8. In order to carry out its development and environmental policies better, the government should regard the interest groups as not only expressions of citizens'

movements, but also as potential co-operative partners in decision-making over its policies. In the transition to democratisation and localisation, local governments have suffered from inadequate resources and they also need the NGO sectors to share the burden; the NGOs, on the other hand, need to engage increasingly in decision-making processes with local governments and not just act as opponents to policies.

Accordingly the more democratic and localised the local governments become, the more informal associations should be seen as partners rather than opposition groups (e.g. the Kyungju HSR case).

Chapter 10. Case Study 3: Water Resources and Pollution

10.1. Introduction

This Chapter deals with conflict cases related to water resources and pollution. The demand for water has sharply increased in recent decades as Korea has progressed towards an industrial and urban society and the number of conflicts over water resources has also grown in number. Water is expected to become an ever more scarce resource in the future and conflicts related to water resources will increase further. With a corresponding need for government strategies for conflict management, the two conflict cases (Wichon Industrial Complex and Dong River Dam cases) discussed in this chapter are expressions of these national concerns. The length of the conflicts before and after the implementation of local autonomy allows both the government's involvement and the influence of political change to be examined.

10.2. The Daegu Wichon Industrial Complex (WIC)

10.2.1. Outline of the Conflict


1. *Background*

The two cities of Pusan and Daegu are both located within a vulnerable part of the basin of the Nakdong River (Figure 10.1), and have a history of frequent disagreements about the allocation of water resources and water pollution. In 1990, for instance, the River was contaminated by an accident when phenol spilled from the Gumi Industrial Complex located 20 km north of Daegu. Pusan's citizens, whose drinking water came from the upper Nakdong River catchment, suffered greatly from this accident for ten days (*Joongang Daily News*, 1991; *Donga Daily News*, 1991).

At the beginning of the 1990s, Daegu's manufacturing industry consisted of light industries such as textile, dyeing and the manufacture of glass, but these manufactures had declined to the status of low value added sectors and Daegu's regional economy had begun to deteriorate (Soh, 1999, p.190). In order to cope with this emerging difficult situation, the City drew the conclusion that the construction of a National Industrial Complex (NIC) was a prerequisite for its economic regeneration, and decided to construct such an industrial complex at Wichon to the south of Daegu

(Figure 10.1). However, the citizens of Pusan who had a clear recollection of their bitter experience over the Gumi pollution incident, immediately declared themselves against the construction of the WIC only 120 km up the river, as they feared it would pollute their water resources.

Figure 10-1. The Nakdong River, Pusan, Daegu and the site of the proposed Wichon Industrial Complex



2. The beginning of the conflict

This conflict began with Daegu's 1991 decision to develop an industrial complex and with Pusan's citizens making their opposition known. However, no early progress was made with the scheme until the election of the first mayor of Daegu in June 1995, when the City asked the Ministry of Construction and Transport (MOCT) to designate a large-scale NIC at Wichon. The MOCT asked Daegu to submit a specific development plan, since it felt that the need for the construction of the Industrial Complex was an urgent priority (Kim, 1996, p.37). The City of Pusan started a movement against the project arguing that the Complex would worsen water quality on the Nakdong River. From this time, the conflict between two cities began in earnest.

3. The development of the conflict

As soon as the conflict began, the mayor of each city showed a sensitive responsiveness to his local residents' preferences over the project. Daegu began a movement for the designation of the NIC; Pusan led the movement against its construction. Since the two local governments led the conflict, local social groups

were easily united in each city, and the intensity of conflict gradually increased (Soh, 1999, p.190). Pusan confirmed its inflexible opposition to the construction of the WIC through a vigorous citizen campaign including citizen indignation meetings, visits to Daegu City Hall to protest, a signature-collecting campaign, and informal demonstrations and conferences (KCCI, 1997, pp.51-58). Daegu City initially exercised restraint toward Pusan's protests and kept watch over the speeches and behaviour of its own representatives and officials as it wanted to implement the project quickly. However, as Pusan increased the degree of its protest, Daegu also began to respond more strongly.

In order to relieve the intensity of the conflict, the two cities held joint forums in each city, but each side only affirmed its firm position on the project and failed to move forwards to agreement. Afterwards, both cities plunged into activities promoting and publicising their own position. They began to concentrate on lobbying central government and members of the National Assembly, while Daegu also began litigation to speed up decision-making (Kim, 1996c, p.40). However, as arguments for and against the construction of the WIC grew in strength and continued in confusion, Daegu asked the government to mediate and resolve the matter quickly (Kim, 1996c, p.41).

Responding to the request for mediation, the government decided to prepare a 'Plan for the Water Management of Nakdong River' including the construction of WIC. However this plan resulted in the enlargement of the number of stakeholders.¹⁾ The residents of Deagu and Pusan continued their stand against each other and the public hearing of the plan was disrupted by each city's residents' protests (Soh, 1999, p.196). At the same time, to secure sources of drinking water for Pusan's citizen, the government constituted the 'Committee Assigned to Evaluate the Quality of Water on the Nakdong River' in 1997 and later held three briefing sessions on the results of assessment.

Despite these steps, the government was unable to decide its policy and continued to postpone its decision on the plan; this caused the antagonism between the two cities to increase even more. The position at the time of writing (2001) has not changed from that position of stalemate.

¹⁾ The stakeholders spread to Kyungbuk and Kyungnam Provinces within the basin of Nakdong River.

10.2.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Differences of interest*

By the mid 1990s the position of manufacturing industry in Daegu City had fallen back from its previous strength, and its Gross Regional Domestic Production (GRDP) was the lowest among all 15 upper tier local governments in Korea. Hence, Daegu keenly felt the need for the construction of an industrial complex to re-activate its regional economy. On the other hand, the city of Pusan was already using about 2.5 million tons of water a day from the Nakdong River. If the project went ahead, Pusan would need to secure clean water from other new sources or to set up a purification plant for drinking water, which would be a burden on its economy. This difference of economic interests was a major factor in increasing the intensity of conflict.

Issues about environment and safety were also of importance. Pusan regarded the WIC as a major source of water pollution and potentially harmful factor for its citizens' health and life. It believed that the WIC would have a serious negative influence on the ecosystem of the Nakdong River. Soh (1999, p.192) reported that 'Pusan citizens considered a water problem as the most serious matter and upset whenever the issue over the WIC was commented on. The construction of inland industrial complex ought to be reconsidered, and a medium and long term plan for the conservation of water on the Nakdong River must be established as soon as possible.' On the contrary, Daegu considered that the WIC could help to improve and protect the environment of Nakdong River. A City official insisted 'the construction of the complex would contribute to the improvement of the quality of water on the Nakdong River. If the complex could accommodate factories located individually in city or at eight separate local industrial parks, we could use advanced technology systematically and collectively to control their discharges and monitor their discharge of pollutants. As a result, the project would have a positive influence on the quality of water on the River' (Interview with Daegu City official, April 2000). This issue over environment and safety was critical to the conflict and increased its intensity. Finally, the social interest groups were not greatly involved and did not increase the intensity of the conflict.

The consequence of these differences was that Daegu could not escape from its worst regional economic depression and Pusan could not allow further change for the worse because of the threat to its drinking water. Soh (1999, p.199) concluded

that ‘there was an acute clash between economic right to live and environmental right to live.’

Box 10.1 Conflict factors: differences of interest

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic differences	Uncoupling cost/benefit	+
Social image and effect	No issue	0
Environment/safety	Drinking water quality/WIC plan	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

2. Trust and communication

Pusan had no confidence in Daegu’s plan for the prevention of water pollution. The previous environmental accidents such as leaking of phenol had led to the formation of its distrust (Park, 1996, p.32). After the accident, the government promised to establish a drastic counter plan for the prevention of water pollution and supply clean water for Pusan citizens, but the promise had not been properly implemented and remained unfulfilled.²⁾ Indeed, the quality of water on the Nakdong River, had gradually deteriorated³⁾ and Pusan’s citizens had come to distrust the government’s environmental policy.

In this context, Pusan did not accept Daegu’s plan and also raised technical and economic questions about the prevention of water pollution. It argued that Daegu’s prevention plan included only the control of Biological Oxygen Demand (BOD) and would not remove heavy metals generated by manufacturing industry. Such risk perceptions of and uncertainties about Daegu’s environmental policy and technological system created a new distrust and acted to increase the intensity of the conflict. Daegu City also had its doubts about Pusan’s true intentions, because Pusan had refused to participate in joint-meetings or an explanatory conference but only led protest movements. ‘Even more, each city’s strategic behaviour induced mutual

²⁾ The government’s failed promises included: an increase of pollutants in the basin of Nakdong River; a lack of facilities for the prevention of pollution; dissatisfaction with the supervisory system and organisation for water management; and, a lack of water supply being maintained during the dry season

³⁾ The change of water quality in the Nakdong River (Place: Mulkum) (BOD mg l)

	1984	1986	1988	1990	1992	1994	1996	1998
Highest	7.4	4.5	4.6	3.8	4.8	6.5	6.9	4.4
Lowest	2.6	2.9	2.5	2.0	3.0	2.6	3.2	1.7
Average	3.7	3.6	3.9	3.0	3.3	4.6	4.8	3.0

Source: OPM, MOE, MOCT and 6 local governments (1999). ‘The Comprehensive Plan for the Water Management in the Basin of the Nakdong River’ (Sept. 1999).

distrust and payment of the “*cost of betrayal*” in the prisoner’s dilemma` (Soh, 1999, p.200-201).

As strategic positions, the demands made by each city can be considered as excessive and unreasonable with some veiling of sincerity and real intentions, attitudes which caused mutual distrust to increase. In the long run, this distrust was influential in increasing the intensity of conflict and became an important obstacle to resolving the conflict. On the other hand, Pusan did not raise an objection about the procedure adopted by Daegu for the plan for the WIC, because Daegu had developed the project correctly and had forwarded its proposal officially to Pusan for comments in the course of project preparation. Accordingly, procedural trust can be regarded as an influence to diminish the intensity of conflict.

After a joint meeting was ended by Pusan, communication between the two cities was blocked. Each city emphasised its lobbying of central government and use of political influence; there were no direct negotiations. This lack of mutual communication brought misunderstanding, and each party’s true intention was often distorted. In this way the relationship between the two cities became entangled with the problem and contributed a negative influence to the progress of the conflict.

Box 10.2 Conflict factors: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Preceding relationships	Phenol accident	+
Mutual trust (Technical)	Pollution-preventive system (distrust)	+
(Procedural)	No issue	0
Communication	Lack of communication (no dialogue)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

3. Perception and behaviour patterns

The two cities regarded the conflict as being caused through regional self interest by the other side. Their actions reproduced negative effect such as combative behaviour, distrust and destructive concepts on a progressive scale as the dispute continued, rather than focusing on maximising the positive effects of conflict. Since they became confirmed in this positional bargaining, they would not or could not find measures for conflict resolution. Indeed, they tried to find pretexts from the other side’s behaviour or proposals to enlarge the conflict. Pusan especially can be seen to have focused on the negative aspects of conflict without the intention of entering into bargaining, thereby making conflict resolution so difficult.

On the other hand, since central government also regarded the conflict as a negative phenomenon, its original attitude of ignoring and avoiding the conflict, presented a missed opportunity to mediate the conflict at an early stage. 'If the MOCT did not miss opportunity to designate the WIC at early stage, the project would be accomplished easily. I think central government's neglected attitude made the resolution of the project go the wrong way' (Interview with Daegu City official, March 2000). All parties, including the third party, considered the conflict as a destructive phenomenon and none negotiated actively for a peaceful agreement.

Next in considering the conflict's behaviour patterns, the MOCT had a responsibility for designating national industrial complexes but, faced with the two cities' acute opposition, it did not make a policy decision and indeed spent time running about in confusion. Consequently, it became involved in a policy dilemma. The MOE was responsible for controlling the quality of water on the Nakdong River and should have dealt speedily with the EIA of the construction of the WIC, but it also failed to define its position and, by taking both cities' feelings into account because the matter was so sensitive, did little to contribute to conflict resolution.

Since several local governments took part in the conflict, and the two relevant policy-making departments of central government had only contributed to the confusion, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) was eventually placed in charge of policy-making. Although the right of decision-making was transferred from the MOCT to the OPM, the same behavioural pattern, such as 'dodging' tactics, continued, because although the conflict had already been recognised as a political issue, it was ultimately an administrative affair. Central government, as decision-maker and mediator thus failed to discharge its duty and role. Meanwhile, the intensity of conflict continued to increase, and no one could any longer persuade both sides.

In order to not aggravate Pusan's citizens, Daegu acted prudently to promote the successful establishment of the WIC. It tried very hard to meet Pusan's requirements⁴⁾ and to hold a dialogue with Pusan. Nevertheless, as Pusan was so stiff and unbending in its attitude of opposition, Daegu, feeling that it had done its best,

⁴⁾ According to Daegu City, Daegu explained that all the matters requested by Pusan were reflected in its' plan as follows (Daegu, Internal data, 1999): (a) Reduction of the scale of the Complex. (b) Change of manufacturing type (Low pollution industry: electronic, automobile, fashion industry). (c) Adoption of a recycling system for waste water and the construction of a buffer storage pond. (d) Closing eight existing industrial parks within Daegu City

became extremely distrustful of Pusan and took an increasingly hard line position on its proposal. Daegu stated that if the central government did not designate the WIC, Daegu was willing to institute administrative litigation and, in ultimately, to develop Wichon as a local industrial complex.⁵⁾ Daegu also threatened Pusan by suggesting it would cancel its plan to invest in sewage disposal plants (Kim, 1996, p.40; KCCI, 1997, p.54). Pusan had strongly opposed the WIC project from the outset and firmly remained in this position due to its' distrust of the government's environmental policy.

The two cities hostility to each other was expressed in active behaviour such as organising assemblies for the sake of opposition and boycotting conferences to consider environmental impacts. This behaviour produced unproductive and exhaustive patterns, which led to the consumption of time and energy. In addition, local social groups and residents participated in the conflict and undertook collective protests to support their city's position, which served increased the intensity of conflict. Nonetheless, they did not use illegal actions because they were under the control of their local governments.

In summary, central government did not perform its role as mediator and decision-maker and avoided its responsibility. Each regional party adopted negative behaviour including disregard, exclusion and threats. In order to gain advantage, each party also falsely expressed its preferences or inflated its requirements. Such negative strategic and behaviour had clear influences increasing the intensity of conflict.

Box 10.3 Conflict factors: perception and behaviour patterns

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Perception	Proponent: negative (destructive)	+
	Opponent: negative (destructive)	+
Behaviour	Daegu: persuasion→ repression	+
	Pusan: negative (protest/refuse)	+
	Resident/community groups: protest movement	+
	Central government: negative (avoid/disregard)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

4. Structure and internal discord

Although many local social groups (Pusan: 180, Daegu: 150) and residents took part in the conflict, each party was structured well because the two local governments

⁵⁾ The head of a local government can designate a local industrial complex under powers contained in the *Act on Industrial Location*, 1978, with a limit of 3.3 km²

were leaders of the conflict, and any internal discord or splits of party were avoided. This factor had an influence on decreasing the intensity of conflict.

Box 10.4 Conflict factors: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Well structured (both sides)	-
Internal discord	No discord	-

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

5. External environment

With the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, the mayors of the two cities had to pay regard to their own residents' views. Since the two cities were leading the conflict, the protest movements in each locality could be easily called together and almost all local community social groups were involved. As a result, as they became active supporters of each city's opinion, the intensity of conflict continued to increase.

Since the conflict had the strong characteristic of the pursuit of regional self interest, national NGOs, as possible third parties or outsiders, hesitated to take part in the conflict. Similarly, the national press reported the matter passively and did not exercise influence upon the progress of the conflict. Press comments on this question were neutral in their tenor when reporting the assertions of both sides, seeking not to offend either city in a difficult political situation. Nonetheless, the local papers in each city produced reports about this matter almost every day during the peak of conflict.⁶⁾ Consequently, among outside factors, national NGOs and press did not influence the intensity of conflict, but the local press and interest groups were enlisted to support their cities. These local interests groups and papers came to play roles of direct disputants and so increasing the intensity of the conflict. In addition, the political changes related to the local autonomy had an influence on the conflict.

Box 10.5 Conflict factors: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs	National NGOs (no participation)	0
	Local NGOs (direct disputant)	+
Press	National press (neutral reports)	0
	Local papers (direct disputants)	+
Political change	Local autonomy (elected mayors)	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral-no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict.

10.2.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Number of participants*

At the start of this conflict, the two direct parties were the Cities of Daegu and Pusan. As time went on, Kyungnam Province aligned itself with Pusan and Kyungbook Province stood by Daegu's position (see Section 10.2.1). The MOCT, the MOE and the OPM, as mediator and designator, also participated. Thus this conflict involved so many local governments, central government agencies and departments and so wide an area as had never occurred before in Korea.

Many other disputants, including 150 social groups in Pusan and 130 social groups in Daegu, also participated in the WIC conflict. There are two reasons to be considered when explaining why so many social groups took part in the conflict. The first reason was that the two local governments (Pusan and Daegu) led the conflict and could easily mobilise these movements. Secondly, since the issue was concerned with water management in the wider scale area, the whole population of the Nakdong River Basin felt an interest in taking part in the dispute.

2. *Duration of conflict*

Although the first opposition of Pusan to the WIC proposal occurred in 1991, the more intense phase of conflict began in 1995 when local residents directly elected their mayors. With the duration of conflict becoming longer, the conflict grew to express regional resentments and in the long run has developed into an impasse. Although the conflict had continued for last ten years, no one has yet found a means to resolve the dispute, which still continues at the time of writing in 2001/02.

3. *Frequency and pattern of conflict behaviour*

In comparison with the long period of ten years conflict, the actual instances of recorded conflict behaviour were a small in number. Most physical conflict behaviour such as assembly and demonstration happened from 1995 to 1997. Each party's conflict behaviour remained within the scope of rather mild and legal activities, mainly relying on an exchange of charges and counter-charges, indignation meetings and campaigns to collecting signatures. Although physical action took place when a public hearing was held, other types of illegal and violent behaviour did not appear.

⁶⁾ From 1995 to 1996, the *Daegu Daily Mail News* reported on this matter 800 times and the *Pusan Daily News* reported on it 900 times (Soh, 1999, p.199)

The reason for this may be, first, that the issue was not concerned with a specific property or the health of specified persons, but with the interests of many and unspecified persons. Secondly, since the sphere of conflict was on such a wide scale, neither party had the opportunity to clash directly. Lastly, the parties could not adopt illegal measures, because of the official nature of the local governments as leaders in the conflict. After the 'Committee for Counter Plan on the WIC' was established in the OPM, the nature of the conflict shifted from engaging local citizens' movements to lobbying activity through the two local governments' political power. Judging from the frequency and pattern of behaviour, the intensity of conflict was quite low.

10.2.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. *Stakeholders and representatives*

As the WIC conflict developed, the main issue shifted from the construction of the industrial complex to water management on the River. The number and range of stakeholders became enlarged including many unspecified individual persons within the basin of Nakdong River. What had been a simple-party composition conflict turned into a multi-party composition. The wide and dispersed nature of the stakeholders to this conflict was a negative influence on conflict resolution. It was very difficult to generate the measures and potential outcomes with which all stakeholders could feel satisfied, and this in turn became an obstacle to conflict resolution.

The two city governments were main party representatives leading the conflict and could fully advocate their respective regional interests. However, the two Cities' views had an influence on a wide range of local people of all social standing in their areas. As Soh (1999, p.198) has commented, 'under the Korean society that bureaucratism give fully play to its power, the two local governments had an important part in protest movements, which become an factor to organise well all citizen who had a different opinions'. The two Cities as representatives could have had a positive influence on resolving the conflict, however, through drawing in a wider range of stakeholders, they did not make this contribution.

Box 10.6 Conflict variables: stakeholders and their representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Wide/vague	-
Representatives	Local governments	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

The principal issue in the conflict was the potential contamination of water on the Nakdong River by the construction of the WIC. The secondary issues were the plan for reduction of pollutant and the scale of the WIC. Pusan asserted that the measurement of BOD as the only index for degree of pollution was insufficient and it required further measures to remove heavy metals. Pusan also argued 'if the large-scale complex over 10 km² were constructed at the upper place of its water catchment, it would contaminate its drinking water and jeopardise Pusan citizens' safety' (Soh, 1999, p.189). At first, the scale of issue was a regional issue, but as the range of stakeholders spread to the whole basin of Nakdong River, the scale extended to one of national concern. This extension of scale made it more difficult to solve the conflict.

While it was easy to identify the conflict issues and although there were some deliberations on alternatives, each city's main concern was whether the WIC should be constructed or not. In other words, the two cities stayed at their initial positional conflict bases, and it became very difficult to negotiate for bargaining or alternatives.

Box 10.7 Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issue	Main (construction of WIC) /secondary (pollution prevention)	-
Scale of issue	Regional → national concern	-
Identification of issues	More easy	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

At the beginning, Daegu had attempted to override Pusan's position and put down its opinions in the process of establishing the project. Faced with Pusan's resistance, Daegu tried to find a solution to the problem through dialogue and persuasion, because it felt the need to resolve the matter as soon as possible. When this did not help, Daegu used high profile tactics and asked a third party (OPM) to intervene in the conflict. Pusan declined to conduct a dialogue directly with Daegu and adopted the

strategy of forcing. However, as Pusan's protest movements continued, Daegu also placed reliance on lobbying the central government and the national political machinery and turned round to try its strength against Pusan's forcing strategy. It continued to focus on protest movements, such as: taking advantage of citizens' social groups; lobbying; statement of blame; and, visiting protests. Each city met force with force. There were no peaceful and constructive strategies for resolving the conflict.

Box 10.8 Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	High profile tactics/ Forcing (threaten)	+
Opponent	Forcing (every kinds of protest behaviours)	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisations

The major disputants in the WIC conflict were Daegu and Pusan Cities, with the MOCT, the MOE and the OPM as concerned central departments. To begin with, Daegu (proponent) and Pusan (opponent) played roles as detonators and accelerators of the conflict, and organised their residents and social interest groups as sources of conflict movement support. In the long run, the two local governments had definite negative influences on the resolution of conflict.

Although the MOCT had a right to designate NICs and intervened to mediate in the conflict, it did not manage this well and spent time without decision-making. Indeed, its intervention resulted in delays in decision-making, which produced a negative influence increasing the intensity of conflict. Even more, as the conflict deteriorated and spread to political issues, the right of decision-making over the project passed into the hand of the OPM. As a result, the MOCT was deprived of its role in the policy of WIC. The MOE had a responsibility for overseeing the EIA for the project, but because it also recognised the difficulties of the situation, it withheld an announcement of its opinion.

Box 10.9 Conflict variables: the role of public organisation

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Local government	Daegu: proponent (persuasion/confrontation)	-
	Pusan: opponent (protest movement)	-
Central government	MOCT: third party decision maker	-
	MOE: observer (EIA)	()
	OPM: third party	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. Third party intervention

When the OPM was placed in charge of arbitrating between the two cities, it prepared 'The Plan for Water Management in the Nakdong River', including the matter of WIC. However the Plan did not suggest how to settle the conflict and only resulted in increasing the numbers of issue and enlarging the scope of stakeholders. The OPM was hesitant about making a decision for political reasons, and shifted the responsibility for the decision to the ruling party. However, because of the need to consider the political power of the two cities, the ruling party did not give a ready answer. Thus, in order to escape political responsibility, many concerned central organisations imputed the right of decision-making to each other, thereby plunging the central government into a 'policy dilemma' where no organisation could either decide the matter or resolve the conflict. Consequently local governments, as disputants, and the central government, as third party, could not find a solution to the conflict.

One effort was made by a third party to reduce the level of distrust which had developed over technical issues. The MOCT established an 'experts group' to evaluate Daegu's counter-plan for the prevention of water pollution, but the group did not supply a solution to the problem of distrust, because this barrier had originated in deeper mutual distrust between the parties and severe differences of perception about the issue. Apart from this MOCT intervention, Daegu (1999) did attempt to bring in neutral technical experts to participate in the assessment of environmental pollution. However, since Pusan City distrusted the results of the research by the Pohang Steel Company's (POSCO) Institution and Algon Institute in the USA, their report did not provide a key to solve the differences between the two parties.

The difficulties faced in the WIC case suggest that third party intervention was very difficult when there was no mutual communication. As Korean society was unfamiliar with third party intervention and did not have a system for neutral or special mediation beyond the central government, the two cities concentrated on point scoring rather than looking for third party assistance and intervention for negotiation or resolution. If there had been a neutral and professional third party which could initiate a dialogue, it might have been easier for the government to decide its policy.

Box 10.10 Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party	OPM/Research institute	-
Third party's role	Facilitator/ Supporter	+
Capacity of third party	No neutral and special third party	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.


10.3. The Dong River Dam (Youngwol Dam)

10.3.1. Outline of the Conflict

1. Background

In 1990 a full half of Youngwol County in Kangwon Province was submerged under water due to floods in the basin of the Han River. After that dreadful incident, the County's residents asked central government to build a dam for flood prevention. The government subsequently decided to construct Youngwol Dam (Dong River Dam: DRD) on the Dong River Fig. 10.2), a branch of the Han River. From 1991 to 1992, the MOCT, which was also responding to the shortages of water resources in the Korean capital region,⁷⁾ prepared a feasibility study for the construction of a multi-purpose dam and prepared a basic plan in January 1996. However, no action had been taken to implement the project by the summer of 1996, when another great flood took place in the capital region in the basin of Han River. The MOCT officially announced its plan to construct the DRD and notified the public of the construction

Figure 10-2. Dong River Dam Site



⁷⁾ The government expected the shortage of water supply would be 1.1 billion ton in 2011 (MOCT, 2000).

site in 1997. Since that time, social groups such as the Conservation Committee for Wooi Ridge and the Korean Environmental Movement Federation began to advocate conservation objectives for the Dong River because the site of the dam would flood a snake-shaped valley with fine scenery and wild animal life.

2. Development of the conflict

From the time of the feasibility study to the time of public notification (1990-1997), Youngwol County's residents had accepted the idea of the construction of a dam and also had expressed an interest in compensation payments for the area to be flooded. Only Jungsun County in the upstream part of the river had protested about the construction of the dam.⁸⁾ After the government had organised a series of six meetings to explain their proposals, Jungsun County had also agreed to the project in 1996 (MOCT, 2000).

The Ministry of Environment (MOE) carried out an EIA in 1997, and environmental groups asked the central government to assess the problems they saw as being caused by the destruction of the natural ecosystem quite rigorously. They also persisted in raising the question of the safety of the dam, because the site consisted of limestone (Choi, 1999, p.2). From this time, local residents' attitudes began to change into one of opposition. Youngwol County Assembly declared its opposition and asked the MOCT to cancel the project. The Assembly, joining with its residents, led an indignation meeting for the opposition movements. In 1999, Kangwon Province also made clear its' opposition. Despite these local governments' strong opposition, the MOCT was inclined to carry out forward the project for the benefits of its role in the prevention of floods and in securing of water resources.

While the opposition to the project was building up, members of the Cultural Property Preservation Committee in the MOCPPH made an on the-spot survey. They pointed out that there would be the possibility of a ground collapse, because the site consisted of limestone and was also an earthquake zone. Further, they argued, a precipitation of organic matter could cause the pollution of drinking water. They suggested that this area should be conserved as a designated cultural property for conservation of natural ecosystem and also asked the MOCT to cancel the project. In

⁸⁾ The County argued that 'it would be isolated from outside regions: considerable amounts of its land would be submerged: the increased foggy days would change the climate around the dam: when it was flooded, there would be a counter-flow of water'. (Lee et al., 1999, p.59)

addition, the MOE indicated following problems in its EIA report (MOE, 1997): first, the construction would cause deterioration in the quality of water because of the break of flow of water within the dam; secondly, the construction would destroy the habitats of wild animals; finally, if the limestone area was submerged, the underground structure would change, and the destruction of the environment could grow more serious.

As a confrontation between departments in the central government took place, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) intervened to mediate in the conflict. A Joint Investigation Committee of Government and People was established in the OPM in August 1999 to examine the feasibility study of the project. Meanwhile, environmental and social groups continued to conduct a national campaign against the project and held a street rally everyday.⁹⁾

Faced with protests and problems, the OPM ordered the MOCT to reconsider the project completely. Consequently, following the Joint Committee's investigation and findings, the government announced the cancellation of the project in March 2000. Despite the cancellation, as the MOCT continued to promote a flood control dam as an alternative, environmental groups continued to react strongly and asked the government to cancel the project completely. The MOCT concluded that the construction of dam is impossible and in 2000 was searching for alternatives.¹⁰⁾

On the other hand, land owners and residents who could not exercise rights on their property for the previous ten years reacted strongly against the cancellation of dam and asked that their loss be fully compensated. They argued that on the assumption of the construction of dam, the government had not invested in infrastructure such as the construction and management roads, the improvement of housing and supplying of new public facilities, and placed restrictions on the exercise of property right. '1800 of the residents in the expected submerged area stood against the environmental groups asking the groups to provide compensation for their damages with the cancellation of the project. If the groups would not prepare a satisfactory compensation device, they stated that they would block outsiders from

⁹⁾ The Catholic Clergy for Realisation of Justice held a special prayer mass and candle-light march to demand the scrapping of the project and Korean Federation for Environment Movement led a movement for indignation meetings of the County people and cultural events against the project.

¹⁰⁾ Prevention of floods through tree planting ("the green dam") linked with the operation of existing dams; replacing outworn and leaking pipes, etc. to help in water supply. (*Donga Daily News*, 2000)

entering the Dong River' (*Joongang Daily News*, 2000). The residents thus suffered from the disadvantage of receiving censure from both sides -- from the government and from social groups.

10.3.2. Analysis of the Conflict Process and Influence

1. *Differences of issue*

The conflict was basically a dispute between development and conservation. The MOCT and the Water Resource Development Company (WRDC) explained the following points with regard to their concerns (Choi, 1999, p.39):

- ❖ Resolve the shortage of drinking water with supply of 367 million tons a year;
- ❖ Prevent flooding with control capacity water of 6.9 billion tons;
- ❖ Produce 126 million kWh/year of electric power;
- ❖ Secure maintenance water during the dry season; and
- ❖ Employment during the construction of dam (650,000 man-days a year)

On the other hand, social and environmental groups emphasised the public interests of the project and the damage to environmental values. Against the MOCT's view, they insisted that the dam (capacity: 6.9 billion ton) could not control a flood in the lower stream of the Han River and that the water of dam would be not suitable for drinking water because of contaminated water from many mines located upstream. With regard to the shortage of drinking water, they argued if the government concentrated on decreasing the ratio of leaking water, the existing dam on the Han River could cover the shortage of water, and the project would generate a social cost of 111 billion (Korean Won) a year¹¹⁾ (Song *et al.*, 1999, p.5). Such basic differences between proponent and opponents increased the intensity of conflict.

The next issue was a social concern. With the construction of the dam, 1800 residents within the area to be flooded would have to move, and 22.7 km² of farmland would be submerged, consequently their community would collapse. In addition, some areas nearby the River would become isolated from outside regions. Although the social damage would be very large, at first stage the government had not thought of appropriate alternatives except some material compensation for residents within site. However, after the government fully persuaded these residents through its six

¹¹⁾ Kwak (1999 (in: Song *et al.*, 1999, p.5) put the cost-benefit balance as follows: net benefit (-111.2bn Won) = social benefit (115 bn Won) - social cost (226.8 bn Won)

meetings, the residents accepted government's proposal. As a result, this uncoupling conception about social destruction did not influence the intensity of conflict.

Thirdly, there was a conflict issue over problems of environment and safety. The environmental groups asserted that the construction of the dam would destroy the ecosystem around the dam and cause a degree of climate change because the number of foggy days could be increased. In addition, they argued 'the dam could lead to water pollution with the increase of organic materials' (Song et al., 1999; *Donga Daily News*, 1999). The WRDC, however, insisted that the dam would create a new environment and could improve the quality of water during a period of water shortage. The environmental groups also had a question about the safety of dam, because the area of site consisted of limestone, and because many limestone caves and grottoes (200 places) were distributed around the site. They argued that following construction the underground structure would change, and water in the dam would leak through caves and grottoes, which could cause a ground collapse. However, the WRDC explained 'many dams in the world had been constructed on the site of limestone, and because limestone was a kind of stone, dams on the stone were safe and stable' (Choi, 1999, p.39). A MOCT official commented to the researcher that 'environmental groups seemed to confuse limestone and plaster. There is a clear distinction between them. Such a wrong information was propagated to residents and nation, which made the residents and nation believe that the dam would be constructed on plaster. Definitely, limestone is a hard stone which only 2-3 mm of the stone was eroded by water for 100 years' (Interview of MOCT official, 12 March 2000). This was to emerge as the main issue between the central government and environmental groups, and became a decisive factor in raising the intensity of conflict.

In summary, the conflict issues expanded from flood prevention to the security of water resources, problems over the quality of water and the demolition of a natural ecosystem. These differences of economic and environmental interest were causes of increases in the intensity of the conflict.

Box 10.11 Conflict factors: differences of interest

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Economic difference	Between government and groups (large)	+
Social difference	Compensation for damage	0
Environment/safety	Destruction of ecosystem/limestone zone	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

2. Trust and communication

There were no previous problems over this issue to influence the relationships between the government and residents. The residents put their confidence in the government's plan and the WRDC's technical 'know-how', because the WRDC had accumulated much experience in dam building and water storage techniques and because they recognised the need for flood prevention. However, in the process of EIA, the social interest groups participated in the conflict, and problems associated with environment and safety that emerged, served to destroy their trust of the government's policy at that time.

On the other hand, since environmental interest groups had become established in Korea in the 1980s, the relationships between the government and environmental groups had always been hostile over environmental issues. In this case, they confronted each other over all the different environmental issues concerned with the Dong River dam. As a result, the government did not make relevant answers to questions raised by the groups and the groups in return distrusted the government's policy. This distrust blocked an opportunity for good understanding and direct communication, which result in increasing the intensity of conflict.

The processes of planning for the dam project and the notification of the area expected to be involved were both carried out in the open. Early problems between the government and residents were resolved before the escalation of conflict through a public hearing and a number of explanatory meetings on the safety of the dam. Accordingly, there was not a procedural conflict issue in this case. However, the government assumed a rather negative attitude in communicating with social groups and excluded the groups in the process of decision-making. This lack of communication generated more distrust, which was influential in increasing the intensity of conflict.

In summary, the technical and procedural trust was high in spite of social groups' dissatisfaction. However, after the issue related to the environments and safety occurred in earnest, communications between the major disputants did not go on smoothly, and this generated distrust over the government's plan and increased the intensity of conflict.

Box 10.12 Conflict factors: trust and communication

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Relationship	Good (to resident)	-
	Hostile (to social group)	+
Mutual trust	Technical trust (store of know-how)	-
	Procedural trust (open and official)	-
Communication	Blocked direct communication	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

3. Perception and behaviour pattern to the conflict

The government's perception of the conflict was negative. Therefore when social groups (NGOs) raised environmental issues, the government disregarded their arguments. However, as public opinion gradually changed and new issues were generated, the government had to take more of a pro-active approach toward the situation, and began to debate with the NGOs on theoretical and technical issues. The NGOs, however, had no understanding of the potentially positive aspects of this conflict and focused on making demands for the cancellation of the project. As a result, although both parties could in fact deal with problems through discussion and dialogue, they did not try to look for ways to solve them together, because each party basically considered conflict as destructive phenomena.

The MOCT's behaviour can be divided into two kinds: toward the residents and, toward the environmental social groups (NGOs). In the case of the former group, the Ministry's behaviour was neither coercive nor aggressive. Although Jungsun County residents held an assembly against the project, the government continued with the project because they regarded such protests as trivial and the residents' interests could receive compensation for any damage. The MOCT put their stress on a strategy of persuasion through direct dialogue and dealt flexibly with the residents, because they recognised that the residents' agreement and approval were crucial for the project. The MOCT's behaviour in their relations with the residents was therefore both active and positive.

On the other hand, the MOCT thought that the NGOs had not been invited to contribute opinions on this matter and that their intervention had interrupted the progress of the project. It continuously ignored their opinions and appeals and took a firm attitude toward them. Faced with such attitudes, the environmental groups stubbornly insisted on pressing their demands. These factors contributed to raising

Youngwol County in the lower part of the river wanted the dam to be constructed. because of their experience of floods in 1990. Nonetheless, as the project became an impending national issue, some Youngwol local residents began to oppose the project,¹²⁾ although the residents in the Dam site demanded that the dam should be constructed without a day's delay. This discord made it difficult to negotiate conflictual issues and increased the intensity of conflict (*Joongang Daily News*, 11 June 2000).

Box. 10.14 Conflict factors: structure and internal discord

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Structure	Structured (proponent)/semi-structured (opponent)	-
Internal discord	Internal discord	+

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

5. External environment

After the implementation of local autonomy, Youngwol County Assembly declared itself against the project and Kangwon Province also expressed its opposition, but they did not play an important part in the process of the conflict. Consequently the implementation of local autonomy did not influence the intensity of the conflict either way, because the main issue was not related to local residents' interests or to local administrative matters.

At the beginning of the conflict, there was no intervention by outsiders because the issue of the conflict was limited to compensation for residents' mental or material damages. However, after social and environmental NGOs participated in the conflict, the main issue moved onto the destruction of the environment and safety associated with a basic question about the construction of dam. These groups had experience, information and knowledge about environmental issues together with the capacity for organisation. Accordingly, they could continue to raise questions about

¹²⁾ According to a survey (24 May – 25 May 1999) of local residents (1,004 people responded), 76.9 per cent of residents opposed the construction of Dam, 74.2 per cent thought that the Dam would not help the regional economy and, 63.4 percent considered that the dam could threaten their safety (Park, 1999b). On the other hand, according to a national survey (11 March – 13 March 2000) (1000 people), 66.5 per cent opposed the project: the problems of the Dam were thought to be (i) the destruction of the ecosystem (40.7%) and the safety of the Dam (24.1%) (*Hankook Daily News*, 2000).

economic, social and technical issues and turned the overall conflict issue from a minor problem of compensation for residents' damages into the environmental ecosystem and the safety of dam. Naturally, their activities contributed to changing the residents' attitudes over the project into one of opposition and turning the issue from one concerned with a regional, medium-sized dam into a national issue, and this raised the intensity of the conflict in the long run. At this stage, therefore, they moved from being interested outsiders to being direct parties to the conflict.

Press attitudes also changed with time. They did not give much coverage to the conflict until it became a national issue. From 1997, however, press comment began to take a critical attitude to the government's decision, with reports on the issue in newspapers almost everyday.¹³⁾ The government was dissatisfied with such press attitudes, as an interview with a Ministry official (MOCT, March 2000) demonstrated:

'The MOCT supplied press much information about the dam, and explained innumerable about the issue of safety and environment problems. Nonetheless, the press made reports on assertions of environmental groups without mentioning about the government's explanation. Besides, because they slandered the fact through editing a broadcast interview, we asked them for a live broadcast interview. Like this, the speech discriminated against the government's policy and perverted the truth, consequently supplying the nation a distorted or misguided information.'

Leaving aside the question of the accuracy of the press reports, the attitude of press had an affect on increasing the degree of conflict and played an important role in involving national concerns into the conflict.

Box 10.15 Conflict factors: external environment

Factors	Detailed aspects	Assessment
NGOs' intervention	Generate issues/ lead opposition movements	+
Press's reports	Critical reports/national issue	+
Political change	No influence	0

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

10.3.3. Analysis of the Intensity of Conflict

1. *Participants*

At the outset, the main parties were the MOCT and residents within the dam site.

From 1997 when the MOE carried out the EIA over the construction of the dam, a

full-scale conflict started and the number and type of parties began to increase. The MOE, environmental and social groups (70 bodies), residents and Kangwon Province took part in the opposition party, and in order to mediate the conflict between the MOE and the MOCT, the OPM also participated in the conflict.

As the conflict developed, the residents who were relatively weak in their capacity for organisation took a less important part and were replaced as major participants by 70 NGOs of national interest groups who became major direct parties to the conflict, leading protest movements and generating new issues. The participation of so many national environmental groups had never been experienced before in Korea. However, local residents' movement was a passive resistance in comparison with the groups' activities because the main stage of conflict moved to Seoul, and the method of protest movement depended on the conference, cultural performance and statement rather than demonstration or assembly. Accordingly collective protest activities did not often occur.

2. Duration of the conflict

The conflict lasted from 1991 to 2000. From 1991 to 1996, the conflict related to the local residents' damage remained at a low level. It was not until 1997 that the conflict related to environmental issues occurred in earnest. Accordingly the first half duration (6 years) of conflict could be considered as a period of latent conflict. From this situation, the main factors influencing the intensity and development of conflict was not the simple duration of conflict, but rather were the environmental issue and were party's [the residents] capacity for organisation.

3. Frequency and pattern of conflictual behaviour

Spreading over 10 years, the frequency of conflict was not high. Only from 1997 to 1999, the frequency had been increasing rapidly (total 57 protest movements) (Table 10.1). The protest movements such as street rallies, candle-light marches, conferences, opposition statements, protest cultural events and demonstrations continued to be held by social groups and residents and each party used the exchange of charges and counter-charges or press interview.

¹³⁾ From April 1997 to March 2000, eleven national daily newspapers made 350 reports on the Tong River Dam; these were mainly critical reports on the government's plan and its policy. (KFEM, 2000)

Table 10-1. Frequency of protest movement (August 1997 - March 2000)

Protest movement	Times
Protest statements/ Press interview	16
Assembly and demonstration	11
Conference, forum and meeting	13
Cultural events/ Street campaign	13
Others(Candle light, signature collecting,)	4
Total	57

Sources: KFEM, 1999. http://kfem.or.kr/kfem/donggang/damsympo/damsympo_11.html

However opponents did not use illegal or violent behaviour, because the residents did not protest strongly against the project at the start. In addition external social, academic and religious groups led the conflict, and the problems concerning them related to technical and economic issues or social and environmental effects. The main issues were presuppositions about the future, which did not cause violent behaviour. If the main issue at the outset had been concerned with the residents' right to live on their land, the residents' behaviour could well have been violent.

10.3.4. Variables for Conflict Resolution

1. *Stakeholders and representatives*

After nation-wide protest movements started, the stakeholders expanded from the residents within Jungsun and Youngwol County to many and unspecified persons. Because the stakeholders then became complex and unclear, the negotiation for conflict settlement became more difficult. As the major opponent changed, the role of representative also greatly changed from the role of expressing residents' interests to those of the conservation of environmental values. Social groups did not speak for concerned local residents' interests, but rather for the value of wider public interests. Accordingly their representativeness of regional opinion has to be regarded as very weak.¹⁴⁾ Nevertheless, these groups introduced the conflict to nation-wide concerns and also had a sufficient representation and capability over environmental problems.

¹⁴⁾ It was proved through the fact that the residents in Dam site blamed and resisted the social groups' behaviour during the protest movements or after conflict resolution (*Joonang Daily Newspaper*, 2000).

Box 10.16. Conflict variables: stakeholders and their representatives

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Stakeholders	Limited resident social group nation (wide/vague)	-
Representatives	Social groups	+
	Residents	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

2. Issues

The change of issue was the main obstructive factor in resolving the conflict. If the issue remained the residents' compensation, the conflict could have been easily resolved. However, as the major party changed, new issues were generated continuously and the range was expanded: economic compensation and immigration → conservation of ecosystem and environmental value → safety of dam → security of water resource and prevention of water pollution → construction of alternative dam. Although the many issues supplied an opportunity for the parties to produce alternatives for bargaining, there was no a room for compromise because each party adhered to its position, and the differences of view and perception between the parties were wide. The change of issue led to the enlargement of scale of issue, which had a negative influence on the conflict resolution. Due to the differences of opinion over every issue, conflict resolution became too difficult. Because of the complexity of the issues, it was difficult to identify the issues, which made each party limit their full attention to the basic matter, i.e. the construction of dam, without considering alternatives and other issues.

Box 10.17. Conflict variables: issues

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Number of issues	Safety/destruction of ecosystem/ water management/ compensation (complexity)	+
Scale of issues	Regional issue → national issue	-
Identification	Difficult	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

3. Strategies and tactics

After environmental issues increasingly came to the fore, the MOCT changed its strategies. It threw away negative strategies such as avoidance, executive order and disregard, and it tried to hold publicity works or dialogue with other party. However,

no actual and productive negotiations were undertaken and constructive strategies such as joint fact finding, collaborative decision and problem-solving were never used. Since the government thought that only its own opinion and theory were right and it was displeased with the challenge toward its professionalism and responsibility, it was impossible for it to adopt constructive strategies. In the same way, NGOs were also absorbed in developing their logic for protest without presenting constructive alternatives. They led direct conflictual behaviour in league with the concerned residents and put pressure upon the government with various protest movements such as a street rally, letter-writing campaigns to planners, politician and the media, demonstrations, cultural events against the project, county people held indignation meetings, special prayer mass and candle-light marches. However, they did not employ violent or illegal means. These various strategies were very effective in pressing the government and greatly influenced the direction of conflict resolution. Consequently although the MOCT's strategies partly depended on a dialogue at the outset, basically it adopted passive methods such as a disregard and avoidance, which brought a reproduction of conflict rather than conflict settlement.

Box 10.18. Conflict variables: strategies and tactics

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Proponent	Dialogue/avoid/their party/withdrawal	+
Opponent	Negotiation/confrontation/demonstration	-

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

4. The role of public organisations

The MOCT, as proponent, was a direct disputant and tried to negotiate with the residents in order to compensate their claims for damage. It also tried to publicise the necessity and positive effects of the dam to residents. On the other hand, the MOE's participation through the process of EIA provided the momentum to increase the intensity of conflict. After its participation, the environmental groups began to have an interest in the project, which resulted in the enlargement of disputants and complexity of issues.

Although Kangwon Province mildly supported the construction of dam at the outset, assuming the attitude of an onlooker, it stood opposite side of the project after the conflict become a national issue. Lower tiers of local government, Youngwol and Jungsun Counties, at the beginning stage, actively dealt with the matter for their local

residents' interests, but in the process of conflict, they took a step backward from the conflict, because the conflict changed into one related to environmental issues that local governments could not actively intervene over. Thus they did not contribute to increasing the intensity of conflict.

Box 10.19. Conflict variables: the role of public organisations

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Central government	MOCT/MOE (disputants), OPM (third party)	+
Local government	Kangwon Province (observer)/ Jungsun, Youngwol (disputant)	-
Government agency	WRDC (project executive)	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

5. Third party intervention

The OPM actively played a role of third party, which had an influence on the conflict resolution. It organised many conferences and joint meetings with specialists of academic world and members of social groups. Taking political pressure into account, the OPM decided to cancel the construction of the Dong River dam and recommended that the MOCT reconsider the project. In this case, the OPM's role was different from that of being a mediator, a neutral third party, because it did not facilitate or mediate between the MOCT and social groups, but rather directly played a role of decision-maker, as arbitrator.

Box 10.20. Conflict variables: third party intervention

Variables	Detailed aspects	Assessment
Third party	OPM(Joint Committee)	+
Third party's role	Arbitrator	+
Capacity of third party	Authority/special knowledge	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

10.4. Comparison of the Analysis of the Two Case Studies

10.4.1. Factors Influencing the Intensity of Conflict

Table 10.2 shows a summary view of the analysis of the factors influencing the intensity of conflict in the two water resources case studies. Many factors contributed to increasing the intensity of conflict in both cases. The different issues concerned with economic terms and environmental issues water pollution and ecosystem played important roles increasing the intensity of conflict. The disputants' behaviour pattern

and communication also produced a negative influence in the process of the conflict in the two cases. In the Wichon case, previous relationships between Daegu and Pusan, and technical trust had an influence on increasing the intensity of conflict, while in the Dong River dam case these factors did not influence an increase in intensity. On the other hand, in regard to external environments, political change (local autonomy) in the WIC case contributed to increasing the intensity of conflict, but in the Dong River dam case, local autonomy did not influence the process of conflict as the conflict eventually occurred between the central government and social groups. Social groups and press intervention enlarged and aggravated the two conflicts. In the Wichon case, each locality's social groups and press took part in the conflicts by supporting their local governments, while in the Dong River case, national social groups and press participated in the conflict, and this supplied the opportunity to lead a national concern. In addition the residents, as a party to the conflict, split into Youngwol and Jungsun County, residents on the site and the rest of residents, which contributed to increasing the intensity of conflict.

In terms of the factors diminishing the intensity of conflict, in the Wichon case, each party was well-structured and internal discord did not occur in the process of conflict. In the Dong River dam case, previous relationships were moderate, and technical and procedural trust was a greater degree. Although this conflict continued in existence after the implementation of local autonomy, the political changes

Table 10-2. Factors influencing the intensity of conflict

Factors	Sub-factors	Wichon case	Dong River case
Difference	Economic	+	+
	Social	0	+
	Safety	+	+
Relationships/Trust/ Communication	Relationships (resident)	+	-
	(social group)	0	+
	Technical trust	+	-
	Procedural trust	0	-
Behaviour	Communication	+	+
	Central Government	+	+
	Local Government	+	0
Structure/internal discord	Residents/groups	+	+
	Government	-	-
External environment (Surroundings)	Resident/groups	-	+
	Interest groups (national)	0	+
	(local)	+	0
	Expression (national)	0	+
	(local)	+	0
Political change	+	0	

+ implies a factor increasing the intensity of conflict; 0 implies a neutral no effect; - implies a factor diminishing the intensity of conflict

related to local autonomy did not affected the conflict, because the dispute was between central government and social groups rather than between central and local government. As a whole, although there was little difference between the both cases, the intensity in the Wichon case could be estimated as being was little higher than the Dong River case because the it involved emotional factors such as regional competition and interests and political factors which obstructed a rational decision.

10.4.2. Comparison of the Degree of Conflict Intensity

Depending on the number of parties and participants involved and the amount of recorded conflictual behaviour incidents, the intensity of conflict in the Wichon case can be regarded as higher than in the Dong River case, although the duration and behaviour pattern was similar to each other. Comparing indicators, the intensity of conflict in the Wichon was high, however in the Dong River case, national social groups that had large-scale structures and influences, took part in the conflict and the frequency of behaviour also was very high considering the duration of earnest conflict (1997-2000). On the whole it could be considered that the intensity of the Wichon case was greater than the Dong River case. (Table 10.3)

Table 10-3. Comparison of intensity

Items	WIC	DRD
No. of party	Local social groups: 280 Central government: 3 bodies Local governments:4 upper tiers	National social groups: 70 Central government: 3 bodies Local governments: 2 counties Government agency: 1
Duration of conflict	1991-present	1991-2000 (10 years)
No. of behaviour Pattern of behaviour	80 times Demonstration/statements/assembly/ protest visiting	57 times Conference/statement/cultural events/demonstration

10.4.3. Results of the Analysis of Variables Influencing Conflict Resolution

Table 10.4 provides the summary of the analysis of variables on the conflict resolution in the two water resources case studies. In the Wichon case, most variables had a negative influence on the conflict resolution. Since the representative of disputants consisted of each local government, they can be regarded as speaking for their residents and being able to negotiate directly with the other side. Nevertheless because they concentrated on the dispute rather than negotiation, the conflict resolution became more difficult. The proponent's strategies, such as persuasion and

receptivity of other side's demands, contributed to the negotiation, but the opponent's basic distrust toward the proponent's policy interfered with the progress of conflict resolution. Consequently, the conflict plunged into a 'policy dilemma' and defied solution.

On the other hand, the Dong River dam case displayed better conditions for resolving conflict than the WIC case. In spite of the NGOs' intervention, and because the third party (OPM) played its role fully, the conflict could be settled. Especially since the main issues were not connected directly with the residents' interests, and the conflict was not an antagonism between local governments or among residents, it was easier for the OPM to decide policy and exercise selective political judgement. Comparing these two cases, the Wichon case had more negative variables than the Dong River dam case. In particular the factors at Wichon concerned with alternatives of issue and third party intervention brought different results between the two cases.

Table 10-4. Variables for conflict resolution

Variables	Sub-variables	Wichon	Dong River
Stakeholders (Actors)	Disputants	-	+
	Representative	+	+
Issues	No. of issues	-	+
	Scale of issues	-	-
	Identification	+	-
Strategy/Tactic	Proponent	+	+
	Opponent	-	-
The role of government	Central government	-	+
	Local government	-	-
	Government agency	0	-
Third party	Public organisation	-	+
	Role of third party	-	+
	Capacity of their party	+	+

+ implies a positive influence on conflict resolution; 0 implies a neutral/no effect; - implies a negative influence.

10.5. Evaluation of the Results of Conflict

10.5.1. Achievements of Policy/Development Project

It is too early to estimate the result of conflict in the Wichon case because the conflict has not been resolved yet. However judging from the progress of conflict so far, since Daegu had not completely achieved its purpose, it was dissatisfied with the progress of conflict. Therefore if the central government did not designate Wichon as a National Industrial Complex, Daegu wanted to develop the place as a Local Industrial

Complex. While, in the case of Dong River dam, the MOCT met with defeat, because the plan was completely cancelled, the achievement of the project was also very low.

10.5.2. Receptivity

Pusan gained many benefits from the process of conflict, which included the reduction of scale of the Wichon Industrial Complex (from 10 km² to 6.6 km²), a facility for protection against environmental pollution and the constitution of Supervisory Organisation on pollution. Nonetheless, Pusan still asked Daegu to cancel the project completely and continued to deny an opportunity for negotiation so as to reach conflict settlement. So far, the receptivity of policy had been very high because Pusan had successfully obstructed the construction of Wichon Industrial Complex, however according to the development of conflict in future, the receptivity may come to be different. On the other hand, in the Dong River dam case the residents and social groups' demands were fully accepted, and the original form of the Dong River could be retained. The receptivity was thus very high.

10.5.3. Satisfaction

Daegu experienced a marked decline in policy satisfaction, because the project was delayed and its regional economy continued getting worse. Although Daegu spent considerable costs to improve the quality of water on the Nakdong River, it could not initiate its proposed project. In relation to satisfaction, Pusan said that the residents on the upper stream polluted water on the river, but 'Daegu raised its sewage disposal rate to 90 percent by 1998 through enormous investments, while Pusan and Kyungnam's sewage disposal rate is only 45 percent. They had far more responsibility for the water pollution. Speaking plainly, they were out of the question about the water pollution, they had a secret intention to retard the construction of WIC with addressing the issue' (Interview to Daegu City official, April 2000). On the other hand, Pusan had a certain degree of satisfaction. Its demands were mainly accepted as well as it has blocked the project itself until now.

In the case of Dong River dam, because of the cancellation of the project, the MOCT should have made an alternative plan for the security of water resources and the prevention of flood on the basin of Han River so as to promote conciliation between the parties. Instead the government lost policy consistency and reliability in the water management policy. On the other hand, the social groups and most

residents expressed their satisfaction about the cancellation of dam, but the residents within the submerged site were discontented with the government's decision.

10.5.4. Social Stability

The Wichon case did not contribute to social stability. Although, the conflict related directly to the project concealed itself, a new conflict surrounding the 'Plan for Management of the Water on Nakdong River' occurred, and the final decision on the plan was unlikely to be easy. When the government's plan was referred to a public hearing, the concerned residents' resistance was very strong. Even though the two cities reached an agreement about the WIC project, there were still some possibilities that conflict could occur continuously during the operation of the WIC. 'Daegu said that it would build a perfect 'Water Waste Disposal Plant' and establish an Environmental Supervisory Committee to monitor environmental problems. But the operation of the facility would need much cost, which could be a burden on occupying factories. Under the situation, would Daegu be willing to exert to improve the quality of water?' (Soh, 1999, p.192) Judging from these statements, the conflict related to environmental issues might continue to occur even after the completion of the construction of the project.

In the case of Dong River dam, as the MOCT considered an alternative plan, NGOs proclaimed that they could not accept any project, whether the proposed dam was for multiple purposes or not. Besides these issues, the residents within the dam site asked for compensation for their mental and material damages for the past ten years. Nevertheless, this conflict contributed to a degree of social stability because it made the government reconsider its policy about the development of water resources, a re-thinking which could help prevent a similar conflict emerging in the future.

Table 10-5. An analysis of results

Items		WIC case	DRD case
Achievement of policy		Low	Very low
Receptivity of policy		High	High
Satisfaction	Proponent	Low	Very low
	Opponent	High	High
Social stability		Middle	High

10.6. Conclusions and Findings

10.6.1. Conclusions

Comparing the two cases, although the factors influencing intensity and variables for resolution were similar to each other, the results of the conflicts were quite different. Why then was the result of conflict resolution different?

The most important factor was the political factor. In the Wichon case, central government was plunged into a policy dilemma, because both cities were important strategic regions in a political sense (Soh, 1999, p.196). Even though the government was in a position to make a policy decision about the WIC, because one or all of the cities was sure to reject its decision, the government decided to delay a decision. On the other hand, in the Dong River dam case, political considerations accelerated the government's decision. After the key issue moved to the future of the ecosystem and safety, public opinion inclined gradually to social groups' opinions and became critical to the government's plan. The government felt the need to solve the conflict as soon as possible before the General Election in 2000. Such different political situations produced different results to generally similar types of conflict.

The next important differentiating factor was that of outsiders' (social groups) intervention. In both cases, social groups played important roles in the progress of conflict, but in the Dong River case national social groups took part and succeeded in bringing national concern and support, while in the Wichon case local social groups in the two cities were also active participants, but were considered as expressions of regional selfishness thus failing to bring support of public opinion. The support of public opinion support thus emerges as a very important factor in the conflict process under conditions of democratisation and local autonomy.

Finally the difference can be related to the conflict type based on the relationships of disputant. It was difficult to resolve a conflict between local governments (Daegu and Pusan), because the conflict would be inevitably connected with local residents' interests, and as a result any local governments could not yield to the other side. However, since the DRDam case was not a conflict between regions, conflict resolution was relatively easy because of the government's decision to make a concession.

10.6.2. Findings

1. When the power of parties is in balance, or when regional interests and competition exist between them, the intensity of conflict is usually very high and conflict resolution is difficult (Wichon case).
2. If the conflictual issue is concrete, the selection of alternatives becomes difficult, and if a positional conflict is added to this, the conflict resolution becomes more difficult.
3. Because a party's viewpoint to conflict can be changed, it is very important that a mediator makes a timely intervention for help resolve the conflict. If, for example, decision-makers miss an opportunity and enter into a 'policy dilemma', or, if new variables change the conflict situation, then decision-making will become more difficult.
4. In the case of conflict related to many and unspecified persons, the frequency of physical and violent behaviour are relatively low, while the intervention of political machinery can be included and the duration of conflict tends to drag interminably on, hence the conflict resolution can become more difficult. A typical example is a conflict related to water resources. Unspecified people in widely ranging areas have interests in the issue concerned with water resources because a river or lake can play a role of medium that connects many regions.
5. Recently in the process of policy making, NGOs' right to speak became increasingly strong in Korea. They began to exert a large influence over environmental policy debates. When the government and NGOs consider other side as a constructive partner in establishing policies, environmental conflict can greatly decrease (Dong River case).
6. The prolongation of duration could function as a pressure on proponents, which encourages the proponent to find new alternatives or to accept an opponent's demands. In some cases, with the lapse of time, environmental factors surrounding the conflict

may change, which can reduce the intensity of conflict or bring about the automatic disappearance of conflict (Wichon case).

7. Central government usually regarded conflict as a negative phenomenon. It displayed an attitude of ignoring and avoiding the conflict, thus missing a good opportunity to mediate early in the conflict. If government had put an emphasis on the positive aspects of conflict, conflicts inevitably occurring in the process of policy-decision, the difficulties could have been resolved far more easily. The perception of conflict could change the pattern of conflict.

8. In intergovernmental conflicts, proponents of project held a key to solve the conflict. Therefore the higher the degree of proponent's acceptance and the higher openness of the decision-making process, the opportunity for conflict resolution is higher. Because proponents were usually focused on the accomplishment of the proposal in hand, their interest moved towards reconciling their interest and the other side's interest and tended to show a more negotiative attitude to the opponents. Nonetheless, if the other side stuck to its position, the scope for a negotiated conflict resolution tended to beat a halt with neither side taking a step forward (Wichon case).

9. If a conflict included political issues or value factors, it seems that the conflict is at risk of moving to a passive stage and conflict resolution would become more difficult. When competition factors between regions were included in a conflict, political factors were apt to intervene in the conflict. In this case, political issues or considerations were a priority over technical or theoretical issues in the process of conflict resolution. If an inter-regional conflict included political factors, government would hesitate to intervene and its strategies would be not clear and powerful. Consequently the conflict dragged on so much that it was difficult to resolve the conflict (Wichon case). Henry (1995, p.300) has explained that a bargaining process can develop consensus in political conflict, while in policy conflicts, consensus can be generated by the use of persuasion and rational argumentation among the participants. Many conflict cases in the Korean society were resolved through political bargaining processes rather than rational argumentation. As a result if a political situation changes, then an apparently resolved conflict may often re-occur.

Chapter 11. Evaluation of the Premises

11.1. Introduction

The three previous chapters (Chs 8-10) have analysed six conflict cases in Korea organised into three categories of regional development project and environmental issues (NIMBY, PIMFY and water resources). Each chapter compared two conflict cases. The analysis and comparisons were structured according to an analytical framework of Premises developed in Chapter 7. The Research Premises consist of one central Premise and nine Sub-Premises (see section 7.2). The central Premise refers to relationships between the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution. The nine Sub-Premises involve five premises related to factors influencing the intensity of conflict (see section 7.6) and four premises connected with variables influencing conflict resolution (see section 7.8).

The purpose of this Chapter is to make an overall evaluation of the analytical framework of Premises by using the results of the analyses of the case studies. Following this brief introduction, the main part of the Chapter (Section 11.2) consists of an examination of the findings of the case studies in relation to each of the Premises in turn. In general the examination shows that the evidence is in accordance with the Premises (which in turn link back to the study of the literature on conflict theory and the experience of Korea). In addition, where the evidence is not fully supportive of the Premises, some suggestions are made developing new or amended premises through further research on regional conflict in Korea.

11.2. An Evaluation of Ten Premises Relating to Conflicts in Korea

Chapters 8-10 have examined the relationships between the intensity of conflict and conflict resolution, government's role in the process of conflict, and outcome and influence of conflict through the lens of conflict type and conflict issue in six Korean case studies. It was found that due to the different conflict types and issues, the various parties to these conflicts formulated distinctive strategies that were closely associated with the intensity of conflict and with opposite parties' behaviour, which had a great influence on the progress and direction of conflicts. This finding implies that while conflict situations and environments might be different for every conflict cases, because a consistent set of factors and variables influence the processes of

conflict reasonable comparisons can be made between the cases and their evidence tested against a general analytical framework.

Generally, it was found that the evidence of most conflicts in the case studies corresponded with the suggested premises derived from conflict theories examined through the review of literature. Each premise is now examined against the analysis of the case studies (for more detailed structure of Premises, see section 7.2).

Central Premise: The more intensive the degree of conflict, the more difficult is conflict resolution.

The Central Premise in the analytical framework relates the intensity of conflict with conflict resolution. The result of the analysis of the six conflict cases mostly supported this premise. As emotions escalated and the intensity of the conflict in four cases increased beyond the limits of conventional social behaviour, violent behaviour actually occurred between parties. Such conflicts involving violent behaviour could reach an impasse situation or policy dilemma in which the government could not decide which decision to make. In the Wichon case (see section 10.2), for instance, each party's emotion escalated with the passage of time and the intensity of conflict gradually increased. Because of the sharp confrontation between the two parties, decision-makers could not decide on a policy about the construction of the industrial complex and so were plunged into a 'policy dilemma'. Conflict resolution became more difficult, and the position at the time of writing (2001) has not changed from that stalemate. In the cases of the Kyungju high speed railway (see section 9.2) and the Dong River dam (see section 10.3), as the intensity of conflict increased, the parties to the conflicts could not resolve the conflicts. However, the process was mediated by the intervention of a third party (the Office of Prime Ministry: OPM) and an outcome reached.

In most conflict cases, it was found that direct negotiations were blocked with increases in the intensity of conflict, and consequently, conflict resolution became more difficult. However, as in the Anmyun case, an extremely high intensity of conflict could facilitate the termination of a conflict, because one of parties felt such a fear that they would surrender to other party's forceful position. Nonetheless, since normal negotiation or discussion for conflict resolution did not exist in such a conflict, this could be regarded as conflict 'settlement' rather than conflict 'resolution'. This

outcome was confirmed by the fact that a second conflict occurred again on this matter after only one year (see section 8.2).

Premise A: The larger the difference of interest, the deeper the degree of conflict.

Many conflicts related to regional developments basically occur due to an uncoupling of costs and benefits, in other words, a difference of viewpoints between the concerns of the different parties. As Wolsink (1994, p.854) has argued, 'the disadvantages are all at the local level, and the local residents feel that they are being saddled with the consequences of something that is of benefit to society as a whole'. As was seen in the NIMBY conflicts of the Anmyun and Younggwang cases, where the difference of interests between parties was large, and the conflict issues were connected with residents' safety and health, the conflict developed into violent behaviour and/or developed into a stage of impasse. As a result the conflicts developed to an explosive intensity and could not be resolved through peaceful methods (see sections 8.2 and 8.3).

The cases of the PIMFY conflicts and the water resource conflicts also displayed evidence in conformity with this Premise. The difference of interests between the parties influenced an increase in the intensity of conflicts in the Kyungju case related to PIMFY conflicts and the Wichon and Dong River cases related to water resources (see sections 9.2, 10.2 and 10.3). Consequently, it can be concluded, that in most conflicts, the larger the deviation between cost and benefit among disputants, the deeper the intensity of conflict and the more difficult it is to achieve conflict resolution.

Premise B: The higher the degree of distrust and the more distorted the communication between parties, the deeper the degree of conflict.

Communication between parties was found to be a particularly big problem in conflicts over the location of a hazardous facility. Usually the proponent prepared the project for a new facility in secret and blocked the lines of communication with most potential stakeholders. Such lack of communication and secret processes resulted in local residents' fear and, in turn, led to violent behaviour or the emergence of a policy dilemma for the proponent. Decision making about NIMBY facilities was found to have progressed in secret without communications with outside stakeholders

(Anmyun and Wichon cases: see sections 8.2 and 8.3). However, because each party could communicate smoothly with other parties in the case of Inchon and Kyungju, these conflicts have been terminated through a peaceful dialogue (see sections 9.2 and 9.3). Although the difference of interest was large in the Kyungju case, official communications and dialogues helped to settle the conflict. In contrast to the cases of the NIMBY development projects, in the PIMFY facilities' cases the processes of policy decision making were far more open to the public. As seen in 'prisoner's dilemma' theory, communication was an important factor in the development of conflicts. The evidence found in all of the six conflict cases examined was found to support Premise B.

Premise C: The more negative the perception of conflict and the more violent the pattern of conflictual behaviour, the deeper the degree of conflict.

In the cases studies, when the parties to a conflict had a negative perception of a conflict, they (especially the proponent) usually used low profile strategies, and opponents displayed forms of negative behaviour in the process of conflict. Generally, the perception of conflict influenced the direction of the conflict process, and the pattern of conflictual behaviour played an important factor in increasing the intensity of conflict. Most disputants (particularly opponents) considered conflict as a way to achieve their ends, and they adopted methods of offensive and even violent action to achieve their ends rather than participating in a dialogue for bargaining. The proponent themselves often used negative strategies because they also regarded conflict as a troublesome thing in the process of developing their project. Such negative perceptions led to negative actions, and these actions generated a fear and sense of unrest from one party to each other, which in turn affected in increase in the intensity of conflict.

The turn from offensive methods to violence in a number of the case studies is interesting as it represents a feeling of deep fear or powerlessness among the opponent stakeholders. As Rangarajan (1985, p.30) has mentioned, 'when a party feels a fear or desperation in the process of conflict, it tries to adopt a violent behaviour'. In the cases of Anmyun Island and Younggwang, violent behaviour blocked communication between parties, which in turn produced distrust and fear that led to violent behaviour again (see sections 8.2 and 8.3). It was observed that a weak

party in a conflict would especially tend to use collective/offensive actions and turn to violent behaviour to increase the intensity of conflict and put pressure on the other party. On the other hand, in the cases related to PIMFY conflicts, violent behaviour did not occur, largely for the reason that the proponents, as the providers of public facilities, took the initiative to try and make positive steps to encourage the progress of the project (for the Incheon case, see section 9.3).

Premise D: The more well-structured and more cohesive the party, the lower the intensity of conflict

The evidence from the case studies with respect to this Premise was varied. In some cases (Kyungju and Incheon cases) it was supportive, but in other cases (Anmyun Island and Younggwang cases) it was not. In the former cases, both main two parties (proponent and opponent) were public organisations (i.e. intergovernmental relations), but in the latter cases one side (the opponents to a proposal) included social groups and residents. The Premise implies that the intensity of a conflict depends on the structure and cohesion of the parties to a conflict. In former cases, since the parties were well structured and cohesive, they contributed positive aspects to the process of conflict, including the unification of their agendas, the simplification of the presentation of their cases and the efficiency with which they managed their roles in negotiation.

On the other hand, the latter cases (Anmyun Island and Younggwang) both had a less strictly defined intergovernmental focus and had more significant pre-Local Autonomy backgrounds than the other cases. While parties to these conflicts also included organised bodies (e.g. social groups) and spontaneous groups of residents, they were often weaker in their cohesion because of the differences in their particular interests in the conflict. Given their lack of effective power, in order to attract support from local residents, some of the parties to the conflicts would conduct systematic offensive behaviour and concentrate on demonstrations and protest meetings. In particular, it was found that the presence of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in these cases tended to increase the intensity of conflicts related to environmental issues, which made it hard to resolve the conflict in a short time, and brought negotiations to a standstill. The involvement of NGOs in other case could also generate new issues and spread the scale of the conflict (for the example of the Dong River case, see section 10.3). In relation to internal discord

within the parties to a conflict, it can be concluded from an examination of the case studies, that an agreement was more likely reached if both sides were well organised. However, if one side (particularly social groups and residents) was unstructured or split, then conflict resolution and agreement were more difficult to achieve.

Premise E: The larger the degree of discretion and the greater the autonomy of organisations, the greater the likelihood of deep intergovernmental conflicts.

Klausner and Groves (1994, p.360) have argued that a 'hierarchical authority structure can create a fertile soil for conflict... another causes of organisational conflict rooted in the authority structure is the feeling among subordinates'. However, little organisational conflict occurred in authoritarian era in Korea because central government could press its views on local agencies and administrations in a 'top-down' manner (Section 6.2.1), while more conflicts often occurred in the local autonomy era when the newly-democratic local governments began to speak openly for their residents' interests and opinions. This opening also allowed social groups to become more involved in inter-governmental conflicts. Accordingly, the number of conflicts greatly increased after local autonomy (Lee, 1999, pp31-35). In contrast to Klausner and Groves's opinion, decentralisation and localisation created a fertile soil for conflict in Korea. In the case studies, Younggwang Nuclear Power Plant, Wichon Industrial Complex and Inchon International Airport Motorway conflicts were deeply connected with the implementation of local autonomy (see sections 8.3, 9.3 and 10.2).

As the level of local autonomy has progressed in Korea, attempts to continue the behaviour of bureaucratic or authoritarian command through seriously offending the other side may themselves create the conditions for the initiation of conflict. The establishment of local autonomy and the decentralisation of the mechanisms of power in decision-making process have been facilitated by shift from a monopolistic market to a free, open market, which has produced fertile soil to expedite the birth of competition and conflict between local governments. As mentioned above, the introduction of Local Autonomy led to more bureaucratic conflicts in Korean society. As a result the deeper the bureaucratic conflict became, the more difficult became conflict resolution. In order to create co-operative intergovernmental consensus, it is suggested that a building method achieved through partnerships can help to settle and

alleviate conflicts. Namely, it is argued that democratisation in the process of spatial policy and planning is also an important factor in the 'localisation era'.

Premise F: The greater the number of stakeholders and parties involved, the more difficult is conflict resolution.

The evidence analysed in the case studies generally supported this Premise. As seen in the cases of the Dong River dam and the Wichon Industrial Complex, the number and diversity of stakeholders led to a range of conflictual issues being identified and even the creation of new issues (see section 10.3). When the conflictual issues examined in the case studies involved environmental problems, and residents or social/ interest groups took part in conflicts, the sphere of conflicts was extensive as well as obscure. Among the six cases, many unspecified persons were particularly involved in the conflicts related to water resources. In these situations, it was difficult to induce an agreement that satisfied all of stakeholders, and thus conflict resolution became more difficult. Accordingly, it may be suggested that negotiators need to identify the stakeholders as soon as possible in conflicts including many stakeholders and should make an effort to encourage all the stakeholders to participate at the negotiation table. The more various and complex are the stakeholders to a conflict, the deeper the degree of conflict and the more difficult is the conflict resolution.

Premise G: The more complex the issues of conflict and the larger the scale of the issues, the more difficult is conflict resolution.

A refutation of this Premise seemed to be revealed in the analysis of case studies. On the one hand, when the conflict was limited to a single issue, the parties never made mutual concessions and tended to stick to their original positions in the conflict. As a result, conflict resolution became more difficult. This was especially the case when the issue was concerned with primary human rights (e.g. to live in safety) and fundamental economic rights. In such cases, the single issue itself could act as an obstruction to negotiation for conflict resolution. As was seen in the Anmyun case, conflict could reach an impasse in such circumstances and then escalate to a riot in a short time, because there were no alternatives for the parties to negotiate about, only one issue that neither side could concede (see section 8.2).

On the other hand, even though the difference of interests was large, and the intensity of conflict was high, when there were several related conflictual issues, the parties to a conflict could deal more easily with their interests through negotiations (give and take), and the conflict could be resolved (Inchon case, see section 9.3). However, in most cases (e.g. the Younggwang, Wichon and Dong River dam cases) the complexity of the issues in the conflict made conflict resolution more difficult. This was especially so when the main issue was concerned with a matter about which none of the parties could not give way to the other side (Wichon case). It was also important when opponents' interests were complicated with each other, and new issues were continuously generated (Dong river case) so that negotiations for conflict resolution could not reach a successful conclusion. Accordingly, it can be suggested that the structure of issues involved in a conflict should be identified at an early stage, and that it can be helpful to suggest alternatives to the main issue and related mitigating options.

Next, in relation to the scale of the conflict issue, when a conflict issue was of concern to many unspecified people spread over a large area (Wichon case) or of national concern over scenic quality and ecosystem protection (Dong River dam case), the intensity of conflict was high, and conflict resolution became difficult. This phenomenon was found to be prominent in conflicts related to environmental projects and water resources. However, as seen in the Dong River dam case, when national political power structures intervened in this kind of conflict, the conflict connected with nation-wide issue seemed to be resolved quickly. In this case, as the scale of conflict became wider, the proponent's (Central government: Ministry of Construction and Transportation) position became weak, and its political burden increased, while the opponent's (i.e. the social groups) position tended to have an advantage (see section 10.3). The conflict was resolved by the proponent's decision on political grounds rather than a decision reached by rational negotiation or mutual agreement.

Consequently Premise G could be considered in two aspects: in relation to the number of issues in a conflict, the evidence from the case studies might partly accord with the Premise. However, in some other cases, quite different phenomena were found; in relation to the relationship between the scale of the conflict issue and the difficulty of conflict resolution, most of the conflict case evidence was found to be in accordance with the Premise.

Premise H: *The more coercive the strategies and tactics used, the more the conflict tends to become aggravated and the more difficult is conflict resolution.*

The findings of the case studies suggested that strategies and tactics were the most important factors for resolving conflicts. Premise H, which deals with these aspects, is deeply related to Premise C: *The more negative the perception of conflict and the more violent the pattern of conflictual behaviour, the deeper the degree of conflict.* When the parties to a conflict included flexible and voluntary elements in their strategies and tactics for negotiating conflict resolution, they could more easily reach an agreement (for the example of the Inchon case, see section 9.3). If one party used negative strategies or tactics such as ‘disregard’, ‘conquest’ and ‘avoidance’, the other party/ies tended to adopt more coercive strategies and tactics in response. In addition, if the parties to a conflict felt that they had no alternatives and kept with their original position, then conflict resolution would also become more difficult (Wichon case, see section 10.2). This ‘positional’ conflict was found generally to have blocked various alternatives and appropriate strategies for conflict resolution from having been considered by the parties. When, however, they moved from positional negotiation to ‘principal’ negotiation (i.e. focusing on fundamental issues but allowing some options to emerge), and when one party considered other party as a potential partner for conflict resolution, then more creative strategies and tactics could be adopted. (Kyungju and Inchon cases, see sections 9.2 and 9.3). Consequently, when one party adopted strategies, which concentrated on methods such as ‘forcing’, or ‘disregarding’ the other party’s interests, the result made the conflict resolution more difficult.

Premise I: *The more intensive the degree of conflict, the more likely there will be third party intervention.*

Although most parties tried to negotiate at the beginning stage of the inter-governmental conflicts reviewed in the six case studies, most conflicts then developed towards an impasse and sometimes they even plunged into social disorder without a conflict settlement being reached. In these cases, the opportunity of a third party intervention was increased (Kyungju, Wichon and Dong River Dam cases: see sections 9.2, 10.2 and 10.3). After the implementation of Local Autonomy, as local governments concentrated on their regional interests and competition between local

governments became more intense, many conflicts could not be resolved through direct negotiations. As a result third party interventions, such as departments in central government and the Office of the Prime Minister, were often introduced to help resolve intergovernmental conflicts. The evidence from most of the six conflict cases thus supported the argument of Premise I.

So far, the evidence from the six case studies has been considered against the propositions set out in the framework Premises relating several factors to the intensity of conflicts and several variables to the difficulty of resolving conflicts, and, intensity to difficulty. The evidence has mostly been found to be in accordance with the Premises, but a part of the premises D and G (see section 7.2) did not explain the phenomena which had occurred in some cases. The main reasons for this finding can be looked for in the many different factors which had an influence on the development of conflict and conflict resolution in these cases. An important aspect was the changeable nature of their external environments, such as political and social power, which had played an important role in the process of conflict.

The analysis of the six conflict cases supplied an opportunity to test the suggested Premises; at the same time, it has allowed the researcher to develop the following secondary premises:

1. The longer the duration of conflict, the deeper the degree of conflict.

Evidence for suggesting this new premise was found in most of the conflict cases, but there were some exceptions. First, when the duration of the conflict becomes longer, the environments surrounding the conflict can change, and then the original issue may be more easily resolved by these changes or the issue itself can become insignificant to the parties (or, one of them). Secondly, the concern felt by disputants about a conflict issue can become weaker with the passage of time. (e.g. the Wichon case) An open conflict may thus conceal itself in the parties' indifference and will change into a latent conflict. Even if the status of the conflict issue between the parties changes to that of a trifling disagreement, the open conflict may resume anytime. Thirdly, if one party's power is very considerable and that party is not interested in negotiation, or if one party's violent behaviour is beyond control, then the other side can withdraw itself from the conflict. (e.g. the Anmyun Island NWDF case) In this case, although the intensity of conflict is very high, the conflict can be settled in a relatively short span of time. Despite these exceptions, time was found to be a

critical factor in conflict resolution. As the periods of negotiation and conflict lengthen so the intensity of conflict increases, and conflict resolution becomes more difficult.

2. The more complex and more various the functions of local government, the deeper the incompatibility of policy goals is likely to become.

With the progress of localisation and democratisation in Korea and the effects of globalisation, the functions of local governments have become varied and wide-ranging. New additional functions create new intergovernmental relations and the raise the possibility of increasingly incompatible policy goals emerging between different local governments, which can in turn generate intergovernmental conflicts. This type of incompatibility is increasing because each local government now emphasises its own administrative issues and self-interests, and regionally selfish or exclusive behaviour can frequently occur in spatial developments (Inchon international airport motorway case). However, with the promotion of rational debate among local governments, there are also opportunities to recognise the benefits of mutual action and discourage potential conflict issues from becoming active disputes.

3. The less the interdependence between parties, the fewer are the opportunities for conflict between parties.

Nowadays with the urbanisation of the metropolitan area and the development of transportation, the interdependence between metropolitan core cities and the surrounding areas have been increasing quickly in Korea. These changes frequently give rise to disputes in many fields between the local governments concerned, including disputes over regional development projects. In this situation, if the interchange of accurate information or mutual understanding between public organisations were blocked, then the opportunities of conflicts would increase. In the same vein, Song (1996, p.69) states that a reduction in interregional movements of goods and persons could decrease the opportunities of interregional conflicts. In particular, conflicts related to wide-ranging facilities over large land areas, have been increasing between neighbouring local governments in Korea. (See Chapter 6) These

phenomena show that the interdependence between local governments can influence incidents of conflict.

4. The rate of compliance of the parties concerned is in proportion to the level of their satisfaction with the results of the conflict resolution.

If the parties to a conflict reach a high level of satisfaction during the process of negotiation and resolution, then the extent of their compliance to the results of the resolution and their degree of implementation is more likely to be high. In disputes concerning regional developments, the most significant factor for the likelihood of success in implementing agreements may be whether the parties possess the authority to approve the decision and the party's voluntary agreement to the decision. This supplementary premise is derived from the evidence of the conflict situation in Korea in the light of the result of the six case studies. It was found that the stronger the power of proponents and arbitrators to compel parties to a dispute to reach an agreement, then the higher the degree of agreements reached such cases. However, it was also found that conflict was apt to be resumed in such cases, because the other side still felt dissatisfied with some aspect of the agreement or the results (Anmyun Island case). Therefore, it is suggested that a method for conflict resolution focusing on direct negotiation would be more desirable rather than a strong third party intervention in an arbitration or adjudication.

5. A conflict can contribute to the increase of the same kind of conflict elsewhere and the reduction of social stability.

As was seen in some of the case studies (e.g. the Anmyun Island and Younggwang cases), the existence of previous conflicts did not contribute to the reduction of the similar conflicts, but rather it instigated other conflicts related to regional interests or conflicts involving residents. In effect, this is a domino phenomenon where a specific conflict leads to other similar conflicts. The same effect took place in the NIMBY case study conflicts related to regional interests and the location of hazardous facilities. The reason for this happening can be found in the dominance of emotional motives rather than rational dialogue or discussion in the process of such conflicts. For instance, in relation to location of the Younggwang Nuclear Power Plants and the Anmyun Nuclear Waste Disposal Facility, earlier conflicts almost always have

negative influences on the next project to be proposed. Thus the greater the difference of interests between parties and the higher the intensity of conflict, the less likely will rational methods effect conflict resolution and the greater will be the likelihood of the conflict resulting in a deadlock. Nonetheless, some scholars, for instance Park (1999 p.41), have argued that previous conflicts could reduce other new similar conflicts because a society could develop a capability and 'know how' to deal with similar conflicts through the previous conflicts. However, this learning experience was not found in the cases studied in this research.

11.3. Conclusions

From the analysis of the six case studies in Korea, it was found that the environments and factors surrounding conflicts related to regional developments had different influences on the process of conflicts. As a result, even though the types and issues of conflicts were similar to each other, the progresses of conflict and outcomes were varied. In particular, the constituency of actors (disputants) involved was found to be the most important factor in the process and resolution of conflicts leading to different outcomes. Accordingly, although the analysis of the case studies provided evidence for the most part on accordance with the suggested analytical framework of Premises developed from the literature and Korean experience, some exceptions to the Premises were identified (see section 11.2). These were Premise D, which related to the internal structure and cohesion of the parties to a dispute, and, Premise G, which was concerned with the complexity of conflict issues. In order to find out the reasons why the two Premises could not fully explain the phenomena that occurred in some conflict case in Korea, it is necessary to modify the Premises by undertaking further study.

Following this overall evaluation of the framework of Premises against the case study evidence, the next and final Chapter in this thesis, Chapter 12, will review the research purpose including Research Objective and Research Aims and some implications for conflict management and resolution will be suggested. Finally, some recommendations for practice and research will be stated as a part of the conclusion.

Chapter 12. Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations

12.1. Introduction

Chapter 12 draws together the conclusions of this research project on the processes of conflict management and resolution. The particular focus of the project has been intergovernmental conflicts over major infrastructure projects in Korea following local autonomy in 1995. The Research Objective and Research Aims developed for the project were achieved through the process of literature review and through case studies. A set of suggested Premises drawn from the literature review and Korean experience was structured as a more specific analytical framework. This framework has been examined and evaluated through six comparative case studies of typical intergovernmental conflicts over development project in Korea. Some recommendations for improving practice in Korea are also suggested.

This chapter begins (Section 12.2) with a review of the purposes of this research and an evaluation of the achievement of the research purpose and some further study for its better achievement is proposed. Next (Section 12.3), according to the general evaluation of the framework of Premises (see, Section 11.2), some implications for conflict management in Korea are considered. These implications help supply ideas for the improving the future direction of conflict management and the government's roles in intergovernmental conflicts. The final part of the chapter (Section 12.4) makes recommendations for practice and research in Korea. It suggests alternatives and opportunities for conflict management, seeking new paradigms for dealing with conflicts related to regional developments and environmental projects.


12.2. The Review of Research Purpose

The main objective of this research has been to explore the government's roles in effectively managing and resolving conflicts related to regional developments and environment projects under the system of local autonomy in Korea (Section 1.3). In this context, the research aimed to explore the nature of intergovernmental conflicts and propose policy alternatives for the effective conflict management and recommendations to overcome the diffusion of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea after 1995 when the local autonomy system was fully introduced. A number of

Research Aims were defined to construct the research framework and to accomplish the Research Objective (for the specification of the Research Aims and Research Questions, see section 1.3).

- Aim 1 was to explore the nature of intergovernmental relations and the change of political environment under local autonomy in Korea.
- Aim 2 was to understand the nature and condition of conflict and to find the factors influencing the intensity of conflict.
- Aim 3 was to review strategies and methods for the conflict resolution, and to find variables for conflict resolution.
- Aim 4 was to analyse the actual condition of various intergovernmental conflicts and to examine the present methods of conflict resolution in Korea.
- Aim 5 was to evaluate the premises related to intergovernmental conflicts in transition in Korea through the case study analysis and to suggest implications for the government's desirable roles in resolving conflict and, finally
- Aim 6 was to explore in more detail the potential contribution of a mediation-based (Alternative Dispute Resolution: ADR) approach to the management of intergovernmental conflicts in Korea. The each Research Aim was accomplished by the research framework suggested in section 1.3 (Figure 12.1).

Figure 12-1. The process for research purpose



Each of these aims was concerned with the government's role in the place of conflicts related to regional developments. Accordingly, the research concentrated on establishing and examining the government's roles as disputant and as mediator. In order to accomplish the Research Aims, the whole process of this research concentrated on answering particular Research Questions related to each Research Aim.

Research Aim 1 was achieved through reviewing the literature and experiences of local autonomy in Korea (see Ch.2). It was difficult to make an assessment about the influence of local autonomy on intergovernmental relations, and the researcher feels that the assessment was rather limited, because the period of Local Autonomy in Korea has been relatively short and new legislation and administrative reform is now on going. However, it was found that Local Autonomy had already created many conflicts related to regional developments. Although these conflicts obstructed and delayed the supply of appropriate infrastructure and public facilities, on the other hand, the process of conflicts could lead to more acceptable outcomes and more appropriate social agreement (Kim and Cha, 1997, p.178). The conclusion of this review of literature and experience was that under the system of local autonomy in Korea, matters such as 'roles', 'right' and 'jurisdiction' needed to be clarified and identified as parts of established procedures. In this way they could filter and mediate various opinions and issues to establish a more rational and efficient system of intergovernmental relations,

Research Aim 2 was achieved through a review of conflict theory in various fields and countries (see Ch.3), while the factors influencing the process of conflict were examined in the case studies (see Chs. 8-10). It was found that there was comparatively little literature about public organisational conflict. As Lan (1997, p.28) has mentioned, today's public administration literature is still shy of systematic efforts in the understanding of conflict and its relevance to public administration. In spite of such limitations, the researcher concluded that many studies and theories in other conflict fields could be applied to intergovernmental conflicts.

Through the literature review, it was found that many factors related to actors' (disputants) individual personality had an influence on the intensity of conflict. However, an in-depth analysis of the relations between actors' personality and conflict process was not carried out in this research project, because of the very large number of stakeholders and individual persons who were involved in

intergovernmental conflicts in Korea. In addition, because factors influencing the intensity of conflict and the degree of their influence were so varied, it was very difficult to select the factors for the analysis in this research and to measure the value of the factors in the process of conflict. In this research, therefore a simple comparative assessment by each sub-factor was adopted without specifying the measurement of numerical values for the analytical factors (see section 7.6). However, this aspect of research could be the subject of further study, together with studies to identify the factors influencing conflict more specifically and to establish more precise measures which evaluate their influence on conflicts.

Research Aim 3 was also achieved by undertaking a review of the literature about conflict resolution (see Ch. 4) and case studies. The researcher divided the topics of the development of conflict and conflict resolution in this research. However, this division proved to be very difficult to manage in practice, because the development of conflict also could be a stage of conflict resolution. As mentioned in Section 7.8, most factors influencing the intensity of conflict also affected the process of conflict resolution, and therefore it was difficult to identify specific separate variables influencing conflict resolution. Accordingly, it was only possible to consider a limited number of variables that only affect conflict resolution in this research.

Research Aim 4 was concerned with the experience of conflicts under the Korean spatial planning system (see Chs. 5-6). The causes and characteristics of conflict in Korea were similar to those of other countries', but particular aspects of the spatial policies conducted by the Korean government provided a fundamental reason for conflicts related to regional developments. In addition, political environments were found to greatly influence the process of conflict and its resolution. For this reason, it appeared that conflict resolution was not accomplished through a rational dialogue between parties to a conflict, but rather was resolved by a third party intervention or the exercise of political power by the ruling party. Conflicts resolved by such methods often resumed when the political environment was changed. Although political power as exercised by the ruling party was recognised as an important factor influencing conflict resolution, the research did not deal with this matter. Further study about the relations between political power and conflict resolution will be needed in the future.

Research Aim 5 was to analyse factors and variables in the process of conflict through case studies. In order to examine the relationships between factors and the intensity of conflict, and to assess the influence of variables in resolving conflicts, a simple form of comparative analysis was used in this research (see Chs.7-10 and Ch.11). Through the analysis of case studies, it was found that the selected factors influencing the intensity of conflict were deeply connected with the intensity of conflict, and the relationships between the intensity and conflict resolution generally had an influence on the conflict resolution.

In the process of conflict, most factors had an influence on increasing the intensity of conflict, especially the 'external environments' factor, (i.e. the influence of political changes and social groups) came to be more important factors after the introduction of local autonomy. Besides, 'structure' and 'internal discord' factors were not found to influence greatly the intensity of conflict because the cases were concerned with intergovernmental conflicts (see Chs. 8-10). In the analysis of variables influencing conflict resolution, stakeholders' strategies and tactics were found to be the most important variable in resolving conflict. However, when the conflict plunged into an impasse stage, the role of a third party or government intervention played a decisive role in conflict resolution (see Sections 9.2 and 10.2).

On the other hand, the results of the analysis of factors and variables in the case studies ran counter to two of the Premises (D and G) developed from the literature reviews (see Section 11.2). In relation to Premise D relating the degree of internal structure of the disputants to the intensity of the conflict, the different case studies produced different results. When both parties to the dispute were public organisations, the evidence of the conflicts accorded with the proposed Premise (Kyungju, Inchon and Wichon cases; see Sections 9.2, 9.3 and 10.2). However, when one side included well-structured social groups or when residents took part in a conflict, the intensity of conflict became higher (Anmyuan Island, Younggwang and Dong River Dam cases; see Sections 8.2, 8.3 and 10.3). Thus Premise D would seem to be dependent on the characteristics of the parties to a conflict, suggesting that further study about relations between structure and the intensity of conflict is necessary.

As to Premise G, relating the complexity and scale of issues involved in a conflict to the difficulty of conflict resolution, the evidence from most of the conflict cases was in accordance with the Premise. However, in the Anmyun Island case,

where the conflict issue itself was limited in its complexity, the evidence suggested that conflict resolution in fact became more difficult. This could be explained by the nature of the conflict issue as being one of the residents' basic human rights to health and safety, and thus being very strongly felt, and that the conflict originated before local autonomy. An additional aspect was the lack of opportunity for 'give and take' between the parties to the conflict, which a more complex issue (e.g. the proposal was simply for the nuclear waste re-processing plant, with no associated compensating regional employment projects) would have allowed (see Section 8.2) The case study evidence then suggests that Premise G holds for most conflict cases, but where the issue is simple and very strongly felt by residents (and possible social groups) as disputants, then it needs modifying. The implication of this finding is that at an early stage in the conflict process it is important to identify the simplicity/complexity of the issue(s) and the strength of the residents' feelings.

Finally, Research Aim 6 was to explore in more detail the introduction of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in Korea and government's role in conflict resolution. This aim was researched (see Ch.4) through the process of literature review and empirical study. The concept of ADR was found to be wide and vague because it involved various methods, so it was impossible to research fully about the whole range of ADR approaches. This research therefore focussed on ADR approaches based on mediation methods.

The conclusion was reached that further study about collaborative processes for conflict resolution, which have begun to be adopted in public sector disputes (the special focus of this project) in several different countries, is needed in the future. As mentioned before (Section 3.4.2), the experience of ADR approaches in developing countries has been mainly limited to private sector disputes. Recently, however, in the experience the ADR approach in public sector disputes in more developed countries', particularly in regional development and environment projects, has greatly affected applications of the approach in developing countries. As Moore (1998, pp187-191) has mentioned, some preconditions are required for the successful introduction of ADR. These are, he suggested: a culturally appropriate ADR and related procedures; a defined legal/regulatory environment; a perception of potential parties; resources being provided on the part of government agencies and interest groups. At present, Korean society satisfies these preconditions, which may promise well for the future successful application of ADR approach. The most important pre-

conditions, however, are the government's intention for the introduction of the approach and the government's role as mediator, matters which will be mentioned further in Section 12.4.

12.3. Implications for the Resolution of Intergovernmental Conflicts

12.3.1. Establishment of New Intergovernmental Relations and the Role of Government

As seen in Chapter 2, Local Autonomy has produced many opportunities for intergovernmental conflicts. With the decentralisation of political and administrative power in Korea, local governments have received both electorally-representative mayors and assemblies and more discretion over local affairs. They have also begun to pursue their particular local interests within and their regional interests beyond the limits of their own jurisdictions. On the other hand, financial power has been even more centralised, with the financial dependence of the new local governments on central government being even higher than before. In accordance with these phenomena, intergovernmental conflicts, especially conflicts between central and local governments, have become more complicated and acute.

In relation to political and administrative powers, the past bureaucratic and administrative top down command approach is no longer admissible in intergovernmental conflicts in Korea. As a result, it is necessary to establish new intergovernmental relations on a more equal footing. Although central government now has a good opportunity to mediate or control many conflicts between local governments through the centralisation of financial power, at the same time, central government's financial support is apt to impair local autonomy. In order to settle or resolve intergovernmental conflicts more efficiently, central government needs to concentrate on the role of facilitator or mediator for conflict resolution rather than as an administrative or political 'controller' through providing or withholding financial support. In addition, central government needs to consider local government and residents (including interest groups) as partners in establishing and implementing regional policies.

12.3.2. Introduction of Prior Consultation System

Inter-dependence and interaction among local governments have been increasing after local autonomy. These relationships can contribute not only to increasing the mutual-understand but also mutual struggles between governments. As a result of this increase of interaction, there is scope for intergovernmental conflicts to continue to increase sharply in the future. Under circumstances of this increase in interaction, it is necessary to establish a system for prior consultation over potentially conflictual issues and to provide authority to consolidate co-operation among inter-regional bodies on a legal basis. In addition, there is a need to introduce area-wide planning where it does not already exist so that the spill-over effects of large projects outside one local government area into another can be jointly considered. The range of a certain service or the effect of a certain plan can spread outside the local boundaries of control. In order to solve or mediate a matter concerned with two or more regions, joint planning can be introduced and in this case, central government can supply the financial incentive or technical 'know how' to the concerned local governments.

12.3.3. The Harmonisation of Regional Interests and a Fair Share of Burdens

Many conflicts can be seen to come from an irrational compensation scheme, i.e. an imbalance between costs and benefits. This is no less true in Korea in terms of regional development projects. It is suggested that a scheme for 'fair shares' between different parties and a rationalised system of compensation should be introduced. First of all, common burden-sharing (balancing of benefits and burdens), an equilibrium in the distributions of facilities and an auction system for the location of facilities can be included in the 'fair shares' category. Next, in relation to locational conflicts, the principle of full compensation for negative externalities generated from regional development projects and investments needs to be fixed, and various compensatory options for regional developments considered and agreed.

12.3.4. Democratisation and Participation in the Policy Decision-Making

The present main methods of planning are one-sided and a rigid centralised distributive mechanism. The centralised one-sided system can create conflicts and can aggravate the conflict situation. Regional planning processes should be opened, and regional policies need to be clear. First, an open-door policy over information related to developments or policies at the early stage should be introduced. This

early open policy should be high profile and can help to serve the objective of transparency in planning and development projects, which can lead to mutual trust and hence could make a dialogue and compromise possible.

In order to prevent conflicts related to regional planning, stakeholders' participation in the process of decision making should be encouraged, and all concerned stakeholders should be invited to the negotiating table. The participation of concerned local governments is a prerequisite for agreement and implementation of the agreement, especially when considering the introduction of policies or developments related to more than one administration. Such early opportunities for participation can facilitate the sharing of technical and professional information and contribute to changing from a 'top-down' to a 'bottom-up' approach in decision-making process. Such professional support or common ownership of technical information is very important to improve mutual understanding and facilitate reasonable negotiations.

12.3.5. The Decentralisation of the Planning System

According to Goverde (1992, p.16), 'when the executive part of the government is a major participant in the social conflict, the role of manager of these conflicts is quite often allocated to the judicial power'. Generally the role of arbiter is difficult to play when the governmental institutions involved in an issue are mainly pursuing their own institutional interests. While, the role of manager of conflicts is easier to play if the institution is only slightly involved as an initiator and intervener in concerned fields. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the current planning system in Korea is centralised, and central government participates directly and indirectly in conflicts related to regional developments. Accordingly the government could not appropriately play the role of mediator in many regional developments if such conditions continued, and the government's opportunities to act as a mediation service will become more difficult. It would be desirable therefore for concerned parties negotiate directly with each other, with the parties' exercising self-control under central government's guidelines, and a joint committee for planning should be used for controlling and supervising the planning or development policy.

12.3.6. The Introduction of Systems for Conflict Resolution

Conflict is a result of political, social and cultural interaction, and hence the characteristics of conflicts are quite varied. Consequently it is most important to introduce and apply a suitable technique and system for the Korean situation in which democratisation is still at an infant stage and dialogue between social groups is also just beginning as a usual part of decision-making processes. From the findings of this research it is therefore suggested that more adequate and modern techniques should be used to alleviate and settle the conflicts and that they should be related to the general types and stages of conflict which have been observed. These more adequate and modern techniques include: 'negotiation for negotiation' (pre-negotiation); direct negotiation; activation of a citizen voting system; the involvement of neutral mediator or specialist assistance; and, various alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methods

Direct negotiation is an ideal method for resolving conflicts. Nonetheless, when the parties to conflict have no dialogue techniques, the intervention of a professional mediator can be a useful method to facilitate a dialogue or to resolve a conflict. To set a standard for better methods, it is necessary to relate the methods to the main characteristics of the political and administrative system within which they will be used. Recently the application of ADR using a third party has been increasing in conflicts related to spatial developments or environment issues in Korea (Ch.4) and some experience has been gained. However, much time and endeavour are generally required for new systems or techniques to become settled into a society's usual workings. Accordingly, the Korean government needs to give urgent attention to formulating a policy for ADR and intergovernmental conflict resolution and making careful arrangements for its systematic introduction.

12.3.7. A Change of Perception of Conflicts

Conflict has been regarded as social pathology, and guided by this perception, the Korean central government thought that conflict should be removed from society as soon as possible and it depended on the mediation through superior offices' authority. However, this method could not cope actively with various social interest conflicts, and usually the concerned parties remained unsatisfied. This research, however, has explored alternative views of such conflicts which do not understand them as pathological but as possibly quite necessary and useful in a more democratic society.

Accordingly, first of all the government needs to change its' perception of this type of conflicts. Recently many researches have concentrated on the positive functions of conflict which reflects such changes of perception. The opportunity to reach constructive results for conflict resolution can be increased under this situation, and the parties to conflicts can also deal actively with the concerned matters. As a result, the parties' satisfaction tends to be higher.

On the other hand, dynamic and transformative methods have begun to be emphasised in discussions on the participatory and consensus building process in public policy. In accordance with this change, the Korean government needs to prepare and supply various programmes and education systems for spreading negotiation techniques. At the same time, in order to cultivate a neutral and professional mediating position, as Moore (1998, p.187) mentioned, the government needs to consider the introduction of an appropriate system according with the circumstances of Korean society.

12.3.8. Efficient Use of the Existing System

Although the introduction of new systems is important, because the change of perception through education or the introduction of a new system cannot be accomplished quickly, what is even more important is how existing systems and institutions should be handled. As been seen before (Section 6.6), the existing direct negotiation system for conflict resolution is the 'wider administrative committee', but in practice such committees' activity has been negligible. It is therefore necessary to consider a plan for making more practical and more efficient use of this mechanism from all angles, including e.g. membership, agenda, the nature of agreement (i.e. binding), and, the means of implementation.

12.4. Recommendations for Practice and Research

The purpose of this research is to examine the main characteristics of various conflicts related to spatial developments or environmental issues and to propose policy alternatives for the effective conflict management and recommendations under Local Autonomy in Korea (see section 1.3).

The conflicts related to spatial developments are derived from various and complex causes, and they are connected with diverse interests and many stakeholders. The main issues at stake are, for example, land use, social impact and human

environment. Such concerns have been rapidly increasing as central matters in contention. In other words, conflicts are related to the overall quality of human life or common interests and in Korea, the type of conflicts has tended to shift from regulatory conflicts to social conflicts. Due to their characteristics, spatial conflicts cannot be easily resolved or prevented only through the improvement of institutional frameworks or policy tools, and frequently such conflicts reach the stage of impasse. As a result, new, multiple approaches for conflict resolution are needed to deal with these characteristics. Some recommendations for practice and research are now suggested.

- First, in company with the change of basic conflict concerns to ‘social’ conflicts, the focus on regional and environmental disputes in Korea tends to be shifting from the resolution of existing problems to the problems of potential impact and from ‘Band-Aid’ remedies to preventive measures. In this way, the preliminary prevention of conflict is regarded as more efficient than methods and systems dealing with the process and aftermath of conflicts. From this point of view, the various collaborative processes used in the UK are good examples of such trends (see Ch. 4). As an approach of this kind, ADR has come to be dominant in conflicts related to the public sector in developed countries. This trend has only begun to be introduced in Korean society, but the experience is still early.

To encourage the active application of ADR in the public sector in Korea, as recommended in section 12.2, first, intergovernmental relations need to correspond more closely to the political changes (democratisation and localisation) which have recently taken place in the country. It is necessary that government should prepare methods. In particular, the decentralisation of the planning system from central government to local governments and the establishment of partnership ways of working between public organisations should be agreed. Secondly, the government needs to make a considerable effort (e.g. in terms of education, of providing a working system and finance for the development of ADR service providers and professionals) to introduce the ADR approach to intergovernmental disputes. Thirdly, research is urgently needed in order to develop various methods of ADR approach which would be applicable to Korean society and to study specific topics about ADR including collaborative processes.

- Secondly, most conflicts in spatial developments are usually recognised as constant-sum (zero-sum), and the game often leads to non-cooperative situation which induces for the disputants to make a worse choice than they can make in a cooperative situation (see Ch. 4). It is quite difficult to manage and settle a conflict in zero-sum game, because the zero-sum game is a world of merciless and irreconcilable conflict. Therefore, first of all it is important to convert a constant-sum situation to non-constant sum game through enlarging the disputant's rewards. In most conflicts related to regional development, 'integrative negotiation' can be used. For such negotiations, the disputants' 'common interests', 'shared interest' and 'joint interest' should be found and realised (Lee, 1989 [in Woo, 1994, p105]). Under such a non-constant sum game, a non-cooperative game associated with regional self-interests can often shift to a cooperative game through an appropriate system of pay-off, sufficient communication and third party assistance.

Consequently, this process implies a preferred method to achieve equity and fairness and to promote common profits between the regions concerned with a conflict. Because most interest conflicts come from the separation of benefits and burdens, (Woo, 1994, pp.19-20) a system for establishing equilibrium between costs and benefits needs to be established. Nevertheless, in fact this will be difficult to achieve in Korea as a political decision process rather than a decision process through a 'game', such as rational negotiation for resolution of conflict, is prevalent. However, the more recent changes of political power and environment in Korea have greatly influenced the process of decision-making in regional policy and development, and it also has an important and potentially encouraging influence on the process of conflict and conflict resolution.

- Thirdly, it is necessary to change general perceptions of Koreans of conflicts as being negative, destructive and pathologic to a more positive and constructive atmosphere. This includes changes in policy and planning environments, including an acceptance of prior consultation, of participation from an early stage, of an openness of administration. In order to move away from the negative and pathological perceptions of intergovernmental conflicts, various institutional systems or educational programmes to need to be established to encourage more positive and accepting perceptions. The Korean government has a central responsibility for preparing these programmes. Conflicts are not meant to be denied, but to be

rationally treated for the equitable and efficient management of spatial development and policy. According to Kim and Cha (1997, p.186), 'when conflicts are resolved and settled through democratic process and direct negotiation of parties to conflict, the conflict can contribute to a positive social function'. In addition, the establishment of systems or environments for rational negotiation and discussion are required.

- Fourthly, in accordance with efforts to change the negative perception of intergovernmental conflicts, the Korean government should develop an emphasis the democratisation of development administration i.e. endogenous development. The system of development planning and intergovernmental relations over spatial planning issues needs to change from a 'top-down', hierarchical structure into one of co-operative partnerships. The decentralisation of the planning system not only could reduce the central government's unnecessary intervention, but also could accord with local autonomy and democratisation. In this way, when central government has prepared guidance for overall harmonisation of regional developments and policies in Korea, and when local governments have been granted the actual responsibilities to establish specific regional developments and policies, conflicts between central and local governments would be considerably reduced.

The summary of recommendations is showed in the box below.

Box: Recommendations for practice and research


1. More efficient methods for managing and resolving disputes related to regional and environmental disputes in Korea are needed: decentralisation of planning system; government's effort for introducing new approaches including ADR; study about the new approaches.
2. The effort of changing from zero sum game to non zero sum game and from non-cooperative game to cooperative game are needed through equity and fairness of common profits.
3. It is necessary that general perceptions over conflicts change from a negative, destructive and pathologic atmosphere to a positive and constructive atmosphere.
4. Government needs to emphasise on the democratisation of development administration and re-establish intergovernmental relations.

12.5. Seeking New Paradigms for Conflict Management and Resolution in Korea

As systems or methods using techniques and skills for conflict management are improved and developed, each country has tried to introduce them in spatial conflicts. However, as Fisher and *at al* (1992, p.22) have commented, ‘conflict lies not in objective fact, but in people’s heads’, and the ‘people’s problems all fall within one of these categories such as perception, emotion and communication’. Their points emphasise that subjective factors concerned with actors including disputants and third parties are more important than methods and systems for resolving conflict or conflictual issues. Accordingly the provision of management, training and education for actors can be useful for preventing conflicts, managing them more constructively and reaching more generally beneficial resolutions. Nevertheless, there is no denying that this factor is subject to the influence of changes in the social and value systems and environmental surroundings of each society.


Consequently, faced with challenges of internal and external changes, central and local governments need to seek new paradigms for dealing with conflicts related to regional developments or environments. They should initiate various methods aimed at enhancing the effect of conflict resolution and improving governmental performance in regional and environmental policies. Although some implications were suggested in Section 12.2, these were only the start of the research required to improve conflict management and resolution. In order to advance the practical implementation of the suggestions in Korea, further research studies are necessary: e.g. a system for the fair share of costs; for the introduction of alternative methods for conflict resolution; and, efficient measures for using the existing system. It will be evidence of the government’s seriousness in implementing new paradigms that it is also prepared to support such studies.

Appendix 1. Structure of spatial plan in Korea



- * (1) MOCT: the Ministry of Construction and Transportation.
 (2) SDAP: Special Designated Area Plan
 (3) FAVSZDV: Fishing and Agrarian Villages Settlement Zone Development Plan
 (4) Jeju ICDP: Jeju Island Comprehensive Development Plan
 (5) CRBP: Capital Region Basic Plan. (6) CRMP: Capital Region Management Plan

Appendix 2. The Planning Framework in England



Source: Cullingworth (1994).

Appendix 3. Third party intercession: four techniques compared

Aspect of Third Party	Persuasion		Dictation	
	Conciliation	Mediation	Arbitration	Adjudication
When used	After dispute	Before, during and after violate	Prior agreement before dispute arise	After other methods fail
Acceptance by Disputants	Voluntary Attendance	Voluntary	Voluntary prior acceptance	No need for all disputants to agree
Aim of disputants	To avoid total Breakdown	To avoid violent Unilateral action	To avoid violent	To establish right by law
When reject	Little goodwill	Acceptable mediator Cannot be found	If half way point between last positions unacceptable to one disputant	Cannot be reject in domestic dispute
Emotion state of Dispute	Enough goodwill to seek conciliation	Some goodwill Helps	Objective	Goodwill Unnecessary
Nature of Decision	Harmonising	Middle position	At least half way between last position	Unpredictable
Selection of Person	Service may be Taken advantage of	Mediator chosen by Mutual consent	Arbitrator selected by mutual consent or equal number by each disputants with umpire	No choice
Qualification Of person	More concerned with Human relationships and psychology	Expert knowledge not Essential but basic Knowledge necessary	Has to have expertise	Legal background
Remit	Determined by conciliator and disputants	Within bargaining Space	Strictly limited	Prescribed by legal System
Privacy	Strictly private	Mostly private	Hearing private/ Decision public	Public
Time	Uncertain	Uncertain	Quicker than Adjudication	Long
Cost	Most cheap	Cheap	Expensive	Most expensive
Compliance	High probability of Compliance	Depends on residues of dissatisfaction	High in bind arbitration reputation rare	Backed by sanctions
Nature of decision	Reconciliation main aim not decision (amicable)	Can only suggest (recommendation)	Binding award mostly judicially enforceable	Decision binding and non-compliance subject to penalties (coercive power)
Next step	Recourse to law	Strike or disruptive Action	None in a few case Courts	Hierarchy of courts
Parties present	Both parties present	Can meet the Disputants Individually	Both parties present	Both parties present

Source: Rangarajan (1985), pp. 258-9

Appendix 4. Summary of the survey method for a case study

The case study survey is divided under two sections. First, is the published and unpublished documentary information, which is collected through a literature search, finding research articles, newspaper reports, journal and government's reports and internal, unpublished materials. The second part of the survey is information about the conflict which will be directly obtained through individual, in-depth interviews with the representatives of disputants and mediators (Appendices 5, 6 and 7). The former material will be largely used for the case studies, nevertheless, when it is inadequate, the latter sources will be drawn on and put to practical use as supplementary material. This data sought in this survey focussed on the following items.

1. History and background of the conflict

- 1) Date of occurrence (emergence) (date of manifest conflict)
- 2) Location of the conflict
- 3) Diary of the conflict
- 4) Outline of the conflict.
- 5) Background to the conflict (history and situation before conflict)

2. Participants

- 1) Disputants (Proponent/ opponent)
- 2) Mediator (Third party)
- 3) Advisor (technical and procedural assistance)

3. Causes and issues

- 1) Causes of conflict (e.g. unbalance of interest, difference and distrust of technical recognition, dispute of jurisdiction, exclusion of participation in decision- making)
- 2) Issues:
 - (1) Central and secondary issues
 - (2) Changes in the issue over time
 - (3) The scale of the issue (spatial sphere, numbers of issues)

4. Types of conflict

- 1) The stage or location of blocking behaviour (Schmidt's model)
- 2) The relationship between disputants (Pondy's model)
- 3) Relation between the body concerned with conflict (Central-Local; Local-Local,

Central-NGO; Local-NGO)

5. Methods and tactics for conflict resolution

- 1) Type of tactics used by disputants (Governmental legal action, Administrative action, Private legal action, Demonstration, Petition/referenda, Lobbying, Press campaign, Violent action)
- 2) Methods of negotiation used
- 3) Forms of communication used
- 4) Major methods or techniques of resolution used ('Conquer', Avoid, Vote, Public hearing, Governmental decision, Adjudication, Arbitration, Mediation, Bargain and negotiation, Joint problem-solving, Private decision)
- 5) Obstacles to conflict resolution
- 6) Proposed options or compensation
- 7) Openness towards outside information
- 8) Exclusive stakeholders at the table of negotiation

5. Process of conflict (In relation to history)

- 1) Analyse the process of conflict over time (Setting scene, progress and outcomes)
- 2) Duration of the conflict
- 3) Factors influencing the duration of the conflict
- 4) Major events during the conflict

7. Aftermath and other information

- 1) Implementation of settlement (What has happened since settlement of conflict?)
- 2) Influence of conflict (Economic/ environmental costs and benefit)
- 3) Implications from the conflict

Appendix 5. Sources surveyed

1. Survey of documentary records

- 1) Information sought: National Newspapers (Donga, Joongang, Chosun, Kookmin and Maeil Economic Daily News etc.): Research reports; Journals (e.g. Korean Administration Review), published Government reports and unpublished internal data
- 2) Organisations visited to read and collect documents: Office of Prime Minister (OPM); Ministry of Construction and Transportation (MOCT); Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST); Seoul University Library; the National Parliament Library; the Korea Research Institute for Human Settlements (KRIHS); the Korea Local Administration Institute (KLAI); the Korea Train Express; the Korea Electric Power Company (KEPCO).

2. In-depth interviews (See: Appendix 7 for details of the questions asked)

- 1) Survey Period: February 2000 –April 2000
- 2) Disputants and Mediators Interviewed
 - (1) Younggwang NPP: MOST; KEPCO; and, Younggwang County.
 - (2) Anmyun Island Waste Disposal Facility: MOST; and, KAERI (Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute)
 - (3) Kyungju HSR: Ministry of Construction and Transportation; Ministry of Culture and Tourism ¹⁾; and, Cultural Property Association
 - (4) Inchon IAM: MOCT; and, Inchon City Government
 - (5) Wichon IC: Daegu City Government; Pusan City Government; OPM; and MOCT
 - (6) Dong River Dam: MOCT; OPM; Korean Environmental Movement Federation
- 2) Categories of Persons Interviewed:
 - (1) Disputants: 11 people (Government officials: 5; NGO members: 4; Residents: 2)
 - (2) Mediators: 5 people (Central government officials)
 - (3) Specialists: 3 people (Author related to the conflict cases)

3. On the spot field surveys

These site visits were made to help the researcher establish a more specific knowledge of the location of the projects involved, so as to understand the conflict issues better. The visits included visits to the sites involved and informal meetings and discussions with residents around the sites.

- 1) Wichon Industrial Complex site (24-25 March)' (2) Inchon International Airport Motorway Interchange: Kumam site (27 March)

Appendix 6. Covering letter

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To whom it may concern

I am writing to inquire about your opinion on the conflict related to OOO (e.g. Anmyun Island Nuclear Waste Facility Siting) and ask for your assistance.

I am a research student for PhD in Liverpool University and have studied on conflict in the regional development or environment relations field. My supervisor is Dr. D. Massey.

Although conflicts have both constructive and destructive functions, most conflicts may be incline to the latter. In such case, they constitute several problems such as increasing distrust and uncertainty, inconvenience and inefficiency due to the lack of infrastructure.

After introducing local autonomy in Korea, many conflicts concerned with regional development or environmental issues have been taking place in several places and the aspects have been becoming more complicated. Often national important projects have been delayed and changed because of these kind of conflicts. Thus we have accounted for the heavy social costs and have stood up to many trials. Therefore the need of understanding mechanisms and processes as well as management of conflicts has become a pressing question.

In relation to this matter, I have collected the materials and data about regional conflict in Korea. As a part of the processes, I have planned to interview people in charge of the conflicts. This survey aims to examine the cause and effect of conflict, and the major characteristics of various disputes in the field of regional development and to propose recommendations for the effective dispute management in the Korean society. Therefore these materials of in-depth interview will be only used for research purpose to establish study frame and to suggest alternative measures.

Even if you have your hands full with your business, please arrange the hours for this interview.

I am more obliged to you.

Yours faithfully,

Mr. Hyung-Seo Park

¹ After 1997 the MOC PH was transferred to the MOCT (Ministry of culture and Tourism)

Appendix 7. Questionnaires for in-depth interview

1. Questionnaire for disputants

A. Disputant (conflict party)

1. What was your position in the conflict?

Proponent of project

Opponent of project

Support of project

Other _____

2. Who participated in this conflict in addition to your party?

3. Have there been conflicts between major disputants over other issue?

Yes

No

3-1. If yes, what was it about?

4. What was the balance of power between major parties?

Equity

Unbalance

Subordinate relationship

B. Cause and issue of conflict

1. What did you think was the major cause of the conflict?

Imbalanced interest

Technical difference

Exclusion from participation

Other _____

2. Did your party expect the conflict would take place?

Yes

No

2-1. If yes, what did you do about it?

3. What was the central issue?

3. If there were any secondary issues, what were they?

5. Were there any changes of issues in the course of time?

Yes

No

5-1. If yes, what were they?

C. Process of conflict

1. When did the conflict start?

2. Has the conflict been settled?

Yes No

2-1. If yes, when was it settled?

3. What influenced the duration of conflict?

4. What was the relationship between your party and other parties at outset?
(1) Co-operative (2) Competitive (3) Hostile (4) Neglectful (5) Other _____

5. What happened to the relationship change over in the course of time?
(1) Co-operative (2) Competitive (3) Hostile
(4) Neglectful (5) Same (6) Other _____

6. Was there any change of party (disputant)?

Yes No

6-1. If yes, what change was it?

Decrease/Secession of parties Addition of parties
Coalition Split of parties Other _____

D. Tactic for resolution

1. What was type of methods did you use in the progress of conflict?
(1) Legal action (2) Administrative action (3) Private legal action
(4) Demonstration (5) Petition/referendum (6) Lobbying
(7) Press campaign (8) Violence/Direct action
(9) Signature-collecting campaign (10) Other _____

2. What was the method for conflict resolution?
(1) Explanation (2) Public meeting (3) Exhibition (4) Conference
(5) Workshop (6) Direct dialogue (7) Public inquiry (8) Persuasion

3. Whom did your party consult with?

E. Negotiation for conflict resolution

1. How did your party choose your representative?

- (1) Election (2) Official in charge (3) Expert on issue (4) Expert in negotiation
(5) Member of NGO (6) Member of local assembly (6) Other _____

2. What was the channel of communication between parties involved?

- (1) Direct negotiation (2) Media (3) Third party (4) Informal route
(5) letter (6) Others ()

3. How was the communication between parties?

- Accurate and speedy Accurate but slow
Speedy but distorted Distorted and slow

3-1. If the communication was distorted or slow, what were the reasons?

4. Did your party propose any option to opponent in negotiation?

- Yes No

4-1. If yes, what was that?

5. Did the options influence conflict settlement?

- Yes No

5-1. If not, why do you think so?

6. Were there exclusive stakeholders at the negotiating table?

- Yes No

6-1. If yes, why were they excluded?

Who were they?

F. Third party

1. Was there any assistance of a third party for dispute resolution?

- Yes No

1-1. If yes, who was the third party?

1-2. What was the major role of the third party?

2. Do you think a mediator was helpful for dispute resolution?

Yes No

2-1. If not, what was the reason?

3. In the process of negotiation, was there a change of the third party?

Yes No

3-1. If yes, what were the reasons?

4. Did your party receive help an additional expert during negotiation?

Yes No

4-1. If yes, who and what role was?

G. Outcome and aftermath

1. If the conflict was resolved, how did you assess the outcome of conflict resolution?

The best The second best (although feeling something wanting)

Dissatisfaction Despair

2. Did you think that the agreement would be implemented well?

Yes No

2-1. If not, why did you think so and how could it be handled better?

3. What has happened since resolved?

4. What was the implementation of settlement guaranteed by?

5. What do think is the most important in the process of conflict resolution?

6. Finally do you have an additional suggestion or other point for the dispute resolution?

Date: _____

Venue: _____

2. Questionnaire for Mediator

1. What was your status in the conflict?

Government official

Specialist of negotiation

Specialist of conflict issue

Member of assembly

Lawyer

Member of NGO

Others _____

2. Did you have experiences of mediation before?

Yes

No

2-1. If yes, how have you performed?

2-2. What kinds of conflict were they?

3. What methods did you use for conflict resolution?

(1) Open discussion at table

(2) Personal contact and persuasion

(3) Joint problem-solving

(4) Arbitration

(5) Education/Advice

(6) Small group's argument

(7) Other _____

4. With a change of situation, was there any change of third party?

Yes

No

4-1. If yes, by whom to whom was it changed?

4-2. What was the reason?

5. Did you have prior knowledge about the conflict issue?

Yes

No

6. What did you do at the first step as mediator?

(1) Ground rule (2) Time schedule (3) Collect information

(4) Identify stakeholders (5) Other _____

7. What do you think of the causes of conflict?

7-1. In the case of conflict between central and local government

Local autonomy and regional self-interest

Insufficient pre-discussion on the issue

Central government's magisterial instruction

Duplication and ambiguity of jurisdiction

Other _____

7-2. In the case of conflict between local and local government

Regional self-interest Inequity of charge in finance

Insufficient pre-discussion Lack of ability of superior organisation's mediation

Increase of interdependent relationship Others _____

7-3. In the case of conflict between central/local and resident

Change of resident's sense of value Scheme of resident's participation

Difference of technical perception on issue Mistrust

Increase of NGO's participation Others _____

8. As mediator, what was the most difficult during intervention?

(1) Technical and special knowledge (2) Technique for negotiation

(3) Arrange of time (4) Picture of fact (5) Others _____

9. Agreement or compromise of conflict is no implementation. Goal of conflict resolution is accomplished by the implementation of agreement. In order to implement the agreement, what means have been used?

10. What do you think was the most important factor to check the resolution of conflict?

(1) Too much self-interest (2) Deficit of mutual communication and distrust

(3) Intervention of outsider (4) Difference of perception on conflict issue

(5) Other _____

11. Do you think implementation of local autonomy influences the increase of conflict related to regional development?

Yes No

11-1. If yes, what do you think is the major cause?

12. In developed countries, Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) approaches have been widely used. What do you think about the application of such approaches for Korean society?

13. In developed countries, many professional mediators are active. What do you think about the introduction of this system in Korean society?

14. Finally, for the efficient conflict resolution, what do you think is a pressing question in the Korean society? Other suggestions?

Date: _____

Venue _____

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