AN EXAMINATION OF THE ROLE OF THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR IN LOCAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REGENERATION

MERSEYSIDE: A CASE STUDY

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Karen Anne Leeming

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This thesis is dedicated to my dear husband Dave who has shown endless patience and understanding, and also to our cat Fluff who insisted on helping with the typing.

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

CCT	Compulsory Competitive Tendering
CDP	Community Development Project
CDS	Co-operative Development Services
CEWTEC	Cheshire, Ellesmere Port and Wirral Training and Enterprise Council
CNS Project	Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project
COMTECHSA	Community Technical Services Agency
COS	Charity Organisation Society
CSO	Central Statistics Office
DfE	Department for Education
DLO	Direct Labour Organisation
DoE	Department of the Environment
DoETR	Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions
DTI	Department of Trade and Industry
EU	European Union
EW	Electoral Ward
GOs	Government Offices
GOM	Government Office for Merseyside
HAG	Housing Association Grant
HAT	Housing Action Trust
IROs	Integrated Regional Offices
JSA	Job Seekers Allowance
LCRS	Liverpool Central Relief Society
LCVS	Liverpool Council for Voluntary Service
LETS	Local Exchange Trading Scheme
LTU	Long Term Unemployed
MDC	Merseyside Development Corporation
MHA	Maritime Housing Association
NCVO	National Council for Voluntary Organisations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
ONS	Office for National Statistics
SPCK	Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge
SRB	Single Regeneration Budget
TEC	Training and Enterprise Council

Southport

Merseyside county boundary
District boundary

SEFTON

Kirkby

ST. HELENS
St. Helens

KNOWSLEY

Liverpool

Birkenhead

LIVERPOOL

Halewood

WIRRAL

River Mersey

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
Figure 1.1   Merseyside Local Authority Districts

Chapter 1: 'Setting the Scene'

For goodness' sake tell us some more...Don't try to be too concise - give us a detailed account of it from every point of view, geographical, sociological, political, legal - in fact, tell us everything you think we'd like to know, which means everything we don't know already.

More (1516, 1965 translation p68)

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is an extension of the renewed interest in the role of spatiality in the development of political, cultural, social and economic processes (Gregory and Urry, 1985; Agnew and Duncan, 1989; Meegan, 1993, 1998) that has emerged through perceived changes in local urban political structures and in particular, the so-called 'hollowing out of the state'(Jessop, 1994a; 1994b). Within the debates concerning this restructuring of social and economic processes and the methods by which society is governed, the relationships and activities of the voluntary sector have been thrown into relief as an area of increasing importance (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). This research is in acknowledgement of that importance.

The focus of the research is an examination of the role that the voluntary sector plays in social and economic regeneration. It is utilising Merseyside as a case study area because there is a long history of both social and economic decline and voluntary sector activity within the region (see section 1.5 and chapter 2 below). The study has five main research aims; first, to provide a profile of the voluntary sector on Merseyside, secondly to explore the relevance of local culture in effective welfare and social service provision, thirdly to explore the needs and concerns of voluntary sector organisations and the motivations of volunteers, fourthly to place the sector within a theoretical framework in order to understand the voluntary sector role and fifthly to assess the role of the sector in regeneration strategies.

This first chapter 'sets the scene' with section 1.2 examining the local impacts of global changes. Section 1.3 reviews the conceptual and practical differences between urban government and urban governance and discusses effects that this possible evolution from government to governance may have had upon the voluntary sector.

Section 1.4 discusses the effects of urban policy on the sector over the past thirty[1] years with the final section 1.5 giving a profile of the Merseyside case study area. Chapter two examines the various definitions of what constitutes the voluntary sector and gives a history of the development of the sector both in a national and in a Liverpool context. This chapter also outlines various theoretical approaches including, what the authors in the debate call, urban regime theory. Chapter three discusses the research questions and the differing methodologies adopted and chapter four attempts to give a profile of the Merseyside voluntary sector using a mapping procedure and a postal questionnaire. Chapter five analyses the relevance of local culture to the efficient provision of economic and social services and chapter six examines the problems of voluntary sector agencies and the motivations of volunteers. Chapter seven, linking back to the theoretical discussion in chapter two, is an analysis of urban regime formation in Liverpool over the past three decades and the part that the voluntary sector has played within those formations. The final chapter brings together the conclusions drawn from the other chapters.

1.2 Impacts of the Global Economy

The transition from national economies into a global economy[2] is a debatable point. For some, it started with the spread of transnational companies during the period 1950 to 1970, for others, it dates from the early 1970's and the break up of the system outlined in the Bretton Woods Treaty (cf. Amin, 1994b; Amin and Thrift, 1995; Dicken, 1992; Featherstone, 1990; Robertson, 1992). However, regardless of when globalisation[3] 'started' it is now a recognisable phenomenon and will remain so for the foreseeable future.

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[1] Thirty years or three decades has been adopted as a benchmark for the analysis of the effects of urban policies on the voluntary sector, the mapping procedure detailing changes in the Merseyside voluntary sector and the evolution of urban regimes in Liverpool as it covers the period discussed in the first section of this chapter, the change from national economies to a global economy.

[2] Although global economy and international economy are often used as interchangeable terms they are not synonymous. International trade has been a facet of national economies for centuries albeit in exotic goods, raw materials or foodstuffs. Globalisation is an intensification of internationalisation with some form of 'functional integration between internationally dispersed economic activities' Dicken, 1992, p1).

[3] The works of some academics such as Hay (1994) and Archibugi and Michie (1995) advise caution in accepting 'globalisation' as a given fact. Lovering (1997) calls it the 'Simple Story' and suggests that it has been accepted too wholeheartedly by academics and politicians, however, he does not actually present an alternative theory just variations on the same theme.

Until recently, the plants, firms and industry that made up the production process were essentially nationally based (Hobsbawm, 1979) but recent developments in technology have changed communication links, transport, corporate organisation, finance, banking, insurance and the production process. This has resulted in the production process changing from on-site or near-site component production and assembly to multi-site production and assembly which is more responsive to consumer tastes and needs. This increasing fragmentation of the production process means that 'the traditional international economy of traders is giving way to a world economy of international producers' (Root, 1990, p7).

This increasingly complex pattern of fragmentation and geographical relocation has led to the emergence of new industrial regions, most notably in the east, and the decline of traditional industrial areas. This 'deindustrialisation' of traditional industrial areas first became apparent in the 1970's when industrial contraction and factory closure led to the highest rates of unemployment in the Western industrialised countries since the 1930's world depression (Dicken, 1992). Almost thirty years later global economic development still continues to be characterised by uneven development at the regional level and continuously high unemployment levels are highlighting the inability of the welfare system to cope (Amin, 1994b, Storper and Walker, 1989). The recovery that has occurred since the latter part of the 1990's has not been widespread and there has been a continued shift from manufacturing based employment into service based employment. Formerly prosperous regions and cities are experiencing an accelerated rate of unemployment and population decline which is creating major stresses within the social fabric of these areas. One of the major factors in this acceleration is the increased mobility of capital across national boundaries which has dramatically hastened the rundown of declining industries (Cooke, 1989; Walker and Cooke, 1989) enabling new capital investment to be mothballed before it is fully utilised - for example, in January 1998 Hyundai shelved a £2 billion microchip plant in Dunfermline with a loss of 2,000 jobs and in July 1998 Seimens abandoned a 15 month old microchip plant on North Tyneside with a loss of 1,100 jobs (Eastham, 1998). Across Europe, Central Government policies appear to be powerless and unable to cope with the sheer scale and pace of localised decline. There is a widespread acceptance both inside and outside academia (although there are some who are not completely

convinced, see, for example, Hirst and Thompson, 1992) that these developments on the macro economic scale are the source of the problems that have emerged at the micro level - social and economic problems are the symptoms, globalisation is the disease

(Ineffectuality in dealing with the decline of once industrialised areas has in recent years prompted development initiatives that are focusing purely on the local level (Fainstein, 1987; Muegge et al, 1987 and Stöhr, 1990) and the United Kingdom is proving to be no exception to this tendency (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Michie, 1992) as one of the major consequences of globalisation has been increased pressure on Central Government resources which, within the United Kingdom, has resulted in a variety of political tactics especially aimed at those areas that have not experienced economic revival. These range from regions having to justifying their need for central government funds by competitive bidding within a funding programme such as the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) and the now defunct City Challenge (Keating, 1993) to, more recently, the active encouragement of unemployed people into training or jobs by threatening benefit cuts through the Welfare to Work scheme. This has had the net result of refocusing political, economic and social strategies back to the local level in order to develop proactive economic strategies. Increasingly Government funding is only forthcoming when the local authority of a depressed area can demonstrate that it has developed partnership links with the private sector - and increasingly the voluntary sector (Lassar, 1990) - and that it has an overall structural plan that is endorsed by the other partners. This means that not only is an increasing importance placed on the skills and abilities of the practitioners of local politics to negotiate with supraregional and multinational capital but there are also major changes in the forms of public-private collaborations (Mayer, 1994) a 'rolling back of the local government state' (Duncan and Goodwin, 1988, p106) and an increasing dependence on the voluntary sector to 'carry the can' (Raphael and Roll, 1984, p7).)

1.3 Urban Government and Urban Governance

Over the same time period discussed above there has also been a dramatic change in the nature of urban politics in the United Kingdom (UK) that is most usually depicted in the literature as a movement from urban government to urban governance.

(cf. Cochrane, 1991, 1996; Garside, 1998; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Hall and Hubbard, 1996; Harding, 1991, 1994,1995; Harvey, 1989; Hay, 1995; Hay and Jessop, 1995; Jessop, 1991, 1994a, 1994b, 1995b; Jones, 1997; Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Mayer, 1994, 1995; Paddison, 1997; Painter, 1995; Painter and Goodwin, 1995; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Stoker, 1995, 1996, 1997; Tickell and Peck, 1995, 1996).

Harvey (1989), was one of the first to theorise this alteration in the political decision making structures and he identified urbanisation as playing a key role in the social changes that were occurring throughout the 1970's and 1980's. Harvey argued that there was an increasing need for innovative approaches in combating the economic stagnation afflicting deindustrialising regions. Urban government structures had to adapt and it was this process of adaptation that has led to the change from government to governance. Harvey, (1989), was also one of the first to posit that governance has a much deeper theoretical meaning than government as it focuses on the growing trend towards coalition and collective action involving a plurality of governmental and non-governmental actors in authoritative decision making in the modern state whereas government is more usually used to refer to the formal institutional structures and decision making processes.)

Increasingly urban policy formation is focusing upon local economic development strategies in these deindustrialising regions as an engine of regeneration and a way forwards out of decline and, in some regions, such as Merseyside, the voluntary sector is emerging as a key player within these strategies. Additionally, there has also been the creation of a number of quasi-public organisations, such as Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) and the now defunct Urban Development Corporations (UDCs), who are/were ostensibly sensitive to business needs but locally accountable and often referred to as either the 'Quangocracy' (Council for Local Democracy, 1995) or the 'New Magistracy' (Stewart and Davis, 1994). Many of these non-elected institutions are now rivalling local authorities in terms of financial support from central government (Garside, 1998). This move is one which some local authorities view as an attempt to: 'usurp the power we had been democratically elected to hold' (ex-Liverpool Labour city councillor interviewed in 1997) which has led to conflictual relationships with the central state. There is a growing body of evidence that suggests

that this has in fact been the case and that local authorities are being by-passed altogether (Cochrane, 1993; Council for Local Democracy, 1995; Local Government Information Unit, 1995). In some areas such as housing, education and health the local authority is no longer the sole provider of services and this has had a profound effect on the socially excluded as they have limited access to the 'market place' and so are more dependent on the state. If their access is limited their choices as social consumers are restricted. It is, in effect, a decommissioning of democracy.

From the late 1970's, within the UK, the state's relationships with society underwent a shift as the economic and social problems caused by the rapid erosion of the manufacturing base culminated in widespread public sector strikes during the 1978-1979 'winter of discontent'. The resultant political crisis paved the way for Margaret Thatcher and her brand of politics. The Thatcher Experiment or, more succinctly, Thatcherism espoused the free market principle as the way forward and placed the emphasis on the individual over the collective (Bédarida, 1991) as she contended, for example, that '...there is no such thing as society' (quoted by Campbell, 1993, p150) and that '...consensus seems to be the process of abandoning all beliefs, principles, values and policies' (quoted by Kavanagh, 1987, p7). These principles were carried over into the public sector which essentially redefined the social rights of state welfare and quasi-markets were introduced as a means of resource allocation and distribution (Cochrane, 1993; Paddison, 1997).

The impacts of these economic and political shifts have not been equal throughout the country some regions have been more affected than others 'with Liverpool...usually seen to have the most acute interplay of problems' (Lawless, 1991, p16). The social and geographical dimensions to these shifts have meant that those who have been hardest hit by the negative aspects have been working class males, women, the elderly, the disabled, immigrants without access to the formal labour markets and politically disenfranchised youth, especially those without work experience who live in the industrial cities of the north (Campbell, 1993; see also chapters 4 and 5 below for an extended discussion of the voluntary sector's role in ameliorating the problems of these groups on Merseyside). This is not denying the existence of socially excluded groups in other areas of the country, it is just that there are greater numbers of them in cities

and they are spatially concentrated which magnifies the problems and places a greater burden on the welfare state. It has therefore been the cities where the restructuring processes have had their greatest impact and this has reawakened an interest in 'place politics' (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Garside, 1998; Paddison, 1997) and, in an increasingly insecure and fragmented world, community action to embrace and defend individual local communities from external depredation (see chapters 4, 5 and 7 below).

The responses of local state agencies in tackling the restructuring problems have also shown a great variability as they attempted to fulfil the dual role of being, on the one hand, the primary vehicle of welfare provision and on the other, the primary vehicle of limiting the access of its citizens to that provision. In some cities, and Liverpool is one of the best known examples (Parkinson, 1985, 1990), this has led to the direct political confrontation between central and local government. In Liverpool, in the mid 1980's, this took the form of conflict between an extremist Left-wing city council which believed that as the public sector was the largest employer in the city it was the greatest engine for job growth and a Right-wing Central Government who were attempting to cut welfare provision in order to reduce dependency on the state (see 1.5 below).

As there was and is variability in restructuring processes and responses to them, so there is a plurality of theorisations of the changes in urban governance. In 1989 David Harvey characterised the changes as a result of a move from urban managerialism whereby local authorities provided social services, to urban entrepreneurialism whereby the reconstitution of local services and some of those provided by the central state through privatisation and compulsory competitive tendering has changed their role to facilitators or enablers. However, Jessop (1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b) describes them more as a move from a Keynesian welfare state of collective consumption to a 'Schumpeterian' workfare state in which the aims are 'to promote product, process organisational and market innovation in open economics in order to strengthen as far as possible the structural competitiveness of the national economy' and 'to subordinate social policy to the needs of labour market flexibility and/or to the constraints of international competition' (Jessop, 1992, quoted by Cochrane, 1993,

p95). Others have varyingly described the changes as institutional searching (Peck and Tickell, 1994), destatisation (Macleod, 1995), contested governance (Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Meegan 1998) and multi-level governance (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk, 1996; Marks and McAdam, 1996). What all of the theorisations have in common is that they identify four particular trends of urban governance. The first is that there is an increased emphasis on 'locality' both as a unifying social strategy and as a means to promote and demonstrate 'partnership' as a tool to draw down external funding (see also chapter 7 below). The second is the fragmentation of agencies within the city that are promoting and delivering these strategies. The third is the focus on local economic development as opposed to social consumption regardless of whether local communities have the capacity to follow and endorse the strategy. And, the fourth is the recognition that cities do not exist within a vacuum, they have to position themselves within the changing global environment (see Fainstein, 1994; Kanter, 1995). The focus of these 'New Urban Politics' (Cox, 1991; 1993) is the proliferation of pro-active development strategies that demand a close working relationship between the local state agencies, the private sector and increasingly the voluntary sector (see chapter 7 below) in promoting the city's economy. These strategies have focused on place marketing or 'boosterism'(Boyle and Hughes, 1991), the promotion of new forms of economic activity such as urban tourism and cultural industries (cf. Mayer 1992; Stöhr, 1990; Urry, 1995) in addition to the more traditional manufacturing industries and the co-ordination of agencies who are able to fulfil the needs of potential investors whether they be for a trained workforce or a bespoke factory unit. In the old industrial cities the strategies have generally meant that there has been massive capital expenditure on large-scale 'flagship' projects that promote culture, tourism, specialist shopping or conference facilities, in the belief that the benefits would 'trickle down' to the disadvantaged (Boyle and Hughes, 1991). Critics of these strategies, including local authorities, pointed out that this 'bricks and mortar' approach benefits those people who are already considered to be urban elites and does very little to alleviate the problems of the socially excluded and, that those local authorities who were themselves attempting to develop and implement strategies to tackle multiple deprivation (Mayer, 1995) were seen as a threat to the 'enterprise society' culture being fostered by Central Government.

Although recent initiatives are attempting to encourage socially disadvantaged communities to participate in the decision making processes that affect them, such as City Challenge, the SRB, Priority Estates and through European programmes such as Objective One via 'partnerships', there is a great deal of scepticism amongst both community leaders and researchers (cf. Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997; Foley *et* al, 1997; Lloyd and Meegan, 1996) who are following the development of these initiatives. The bulk of the scepticism is due to the fact that in the past, for the majority of initiatives, the process of inclusion has never proceeded past the rhetorical stage and in some, such as the Urban Development Corporations, communities and community involvement in decision making processes were specifically excluded - although there was some community involvement in several at a later date when boundaries were extended (see Meegan, 1993, 1998). Indeed this research indicates that many community groups are at a distinct disadvantage during this 'empowerment' process as they find that the public and private sector:

> ..speak a different language, mainly made up of jargon that they throw around to make themselves look important and us to look thick.
> (The chairwoman of a community group in Kirkby, interviewed in 1997).

Additionally, the inexperience of many community groups in dealing with bureaucracy and funding deadlines ensures that they often cannot take advantage of what is on offer when it is on offer:

> '...we've missed the boat a few times because we couldn't get our act together, but, we *will* make it in the end because we *have* to. We've been trying for years for community representation and accountability, they've given it to us now and they're sitting back and just hoping we're going to fail so they can turn around and say 'see, you're not capable of handling it, we've always said it was best left to the experts'. So we *can't* fail'
> (The spokeswoman for a community forum in Wirral, interviewed 1996).

Nevertheless, regardless of whether the participation process proves to be a complete success or not, it is the fact that there is now a political infrastructure in place to support that inclusion that epitomises the changes from urban governing when communities are told, albeit by democratically elected representatives, what is going to happen, to urban governance where there appears to be a growing space for local community groups to help decide what is going to happen. Additionally there are

indications that public policy which grows from the community in this fashion has a greater chance of succeeding (Clarke, 1996).

1.4 UK Urban[4] Policy and the Voluntary Sector

1.4:1 *Introduction*

After the establishment of the post-war welfare state the voluntary sector was considered to be marginal to state provision (Butcher, 1995; Poole, 1960). In recent years, however, there has been a shift in the perceptions of the state with regard to the voluntary sector as the shortcomings of the welfare system and the economic infrastructure have become more apparent, and there has been an active encouragement of voluntary sector service provision by successive alterations to public policy. These alterations have also ushered in the 'change' from government to governance discussed in the above section. This next section examines key policy changes over the past three decades and assesses the consequences, if any, for the voluntary sector[5].

1.4:2 *The 1970's*

1.4:2a *The Urban Programme*

During the 1960's there was a growing awareness by Central Government that at a time of so-called "full employment", there was an increasing proportion of inner city residents becoming dependent on welfare and that existing policies were not helping them. Policies that were specifically aimed at urban areas did not exist until 1968 when Enoch Powell's "Rivers of Blood" speech acted as a catalyst forcing the introduction of the Urban Programme (UP) (Lawless, 1988). The UP targeted those inner cities that could demonstrate 'special social need' and was distributed on needs-based allocations formulas (Oatley, 1998). However, what that 'special social need' consisted of was very ill-defined and eventually became associated with multiple deprivation (Edwards and Batley, 1978) that appeared to be centred around race issues

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[4] This research recognises that there are many theoretical problems with the designation 'urban' (cf. Castells, 1977; Dunleavy, 1982; Johnston, 1990; Pacione, 1990a; Saunders, 1985) as social, political and economic processes are not bound by arbitrary spatial boundaries. However, for the purposes of this research 'urban' is taken to mean large, dense population settlements.)
[5] Chapter seven gives a detailed history of the fortunes of the Liverpool voluntary sector over the same time period.

(Atkinson and Moon, 1994a). Unfortunately, although the programme had a very broad remit the funding did not match it and the majority of projects tended to be small scale, for example, advice schemes, day nurseries and playschemes, and run by the voluntary sector on a shoestring budget - it was one of the first public policies that encouraged local authorities to involve the voluntary sector in regeneration strategies (Church and Hall, 1989). Any projects that tried to tackle regeneration issues were often pared back to the bare minimum or cancelled altogether with the net result of there being little real impact on the day to day life of people, especially ethnic groups, living in deprived urban areas (Eyles, 1989; Stewart and Whitting, 1983).

The *Inner Urban Areas Act* (1978) marked a sea-change in urban policy in that central government recognised that although there was a pressing need to revive the inner cities, this would only be achieved by long term policies geared to changing their image and nature caused by years of neglect, employment decline and loss of hope by residents (Department of the Environment (DoE), 1986). This revival was to be achieved by attracting in private investment by schemes which "should be framed so as to produce as great a visual impact as possible" (Ministerial guidelines on the Urban Programme, 1981). Essentially this was the beginning of the 'bricks and mortar' and 'trickle down' approach to regeneration that was so espoused by Thatcherism in the 1980's. It was considered that tangible improvements to the physical environment would help to entice private investment into the inner cities whilst also providing an environment which was pleasant to live and work in (DoE, 1986). The Act also specified that the UP spending was to now be organised through locally-based partnerships of private and public and voluntary organisations (Deakin and Edwards, 1993; Lawless, 1989). Partnership is a theme that has been continually emphasised in urban policy to date.

After 1986 the numbers of areas eligible for funding under the UP were reduced, in effect this meant that the Urban Programme was discontinued outside the major conurbations. Tighter monitoring of projects was introduced and greater emphasis was placed on the funding of projects with an economic focus which had a major impact on the voluntary sector whose projects tended to be socially oriented. Until the mid-1980's the funding for the voluntary sector had grown consistently under the UP

initiative (Jacobs, 1989) and it was the greatest source of Central Government funding available for voluntary sector groups (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). Additionally, it was seen by many as a relatively secure and flexible funding source (Hodson, 1984). Although under the new guidelines the voluntary sector lost funding in real terms, the UP remained a major source of funding until the announcement of its gradual rundown in 1992.

1.4:2b *The Community Development Project*

A second category of central government initiatives was introduced during the late 1960's and early 1970's in order to identify economic, social and environmental problems and to co-ordinate effective policy responses (Eyles, 1989). This second group of strategies was spearheaded by the Community Development Project (CDP). This was the first urban policy to have community work built in as a major component (Green and Chapman, 1992). The project was launched in 1969 and was viewed as an experimental approach to meeting the needs of those living in areas of high social deprivation as it was neighbourhood based (Foster and Hodgson, 1979).

Twelve projects, including one in Liverpool, were eventually set up throughout the country. The communities were selected because they fulfilled criteria determined by the Home Office that indicated the existence of severe social problems and they also had local authorities who were willing to support a CDP (Specht, 1976). Each CDP had an action team and a research team who were based at a local university or polytechnic. The researchers remit was to identify the social problems of an area, the action team would then implement strategies to ameliorate them and the researchers would monitor the results. Each project was to run for 5 years and the total cost was approximately £5 million (Green and Chapman, 1992).

The foundation of the guidelines by which the CDP's were to operate were based on three assumptions made by the Home Office. These were:

i)   It was the "deprived" themselves who were the authors of their own misfortunes, called "social pathology";

ii)   that social problems would best be solved by forcing the "deprived" to overcome their apathy by promoting self-help;

iii)   that locally based research could be utilised to influence and change local and governmental policy

(Foster and Hodgson, 1979).

However, within a very short space of time, all of the CDP's rejected the "social pathology" diagnosis of the Home Office as being at the root of inner city problems and argued instead that "[p]overty is seen to be a consequence of fundamental inequalities in our present political and economic system" (CDP, 1975, p1). Essentially the alternative model they proffered was that the deprived regions were not deviant from 'normal' society but were the product of capitalism. This diagnosis by the CDP teams fired their idealism and led to many of them becoming devoted to changing things at the macro-level. This Marxist stance with its 'whiff' of socialism led the Government to reject much of the CDP's research. Some examples of the CDP's research findings were that it was the withdrawal of large companies - whether national or multinational - that resulted in unemployment levels rising and not the withdrawal of small firms from the inner city (Cochrane and Dicker, 1979); that competitive take-overs resulting in the concentration of capital into fewer larger corporations leaves the workforce very vulnerable to strategic, international investment decisions (CDP, 1974); that decisions made by private capital and the state were directly responsible for the present situation (Moor, 1974; CDP, 1977a, 1977b).

The CDP programme was short-lived because of the political implications. However, the ideas generated by the CDP were taken further, in a politically more moderate vein, by other major research initiatives such as the DoE Inner Areas studies (1974-76) and led to the acknowledgement by Central Government that the major cause of inner city problems was structural decline due to globalisation (DoE, 1977). However, this did not make it any easier to formulate policies to target deprived communities and the 1970's ended with the recognition that urban problems had to be placed in a local context and that Central Government policy could only "set the parameters for urban regeneration" (Eyles, 1989, 374).

The impact that the CDP had on the voluntary sector was that, for the first time in public policy, the sector's contribution to community life was assessed (Centre for

13

Environmental Studies, 1975) and the sector was seen as a valuable resource to both creating community spirit and to help ease the strain on the welfare state by:

> ...generating a fund of voluntary social welfare activity and mutual help amongst the individuals, families and social groups in the neighbourhood, supported by voluntary agencies.
> (CDP: Objectives and Strategy, 1970 quoted in CDP 1977b, p60).

1.4:3 *The 1980's*

During the 1980's it is almost impossible to detach urban policy from the political and economic context. From the late 1970's a slowing down of the national economy had meant an increased discrepancy between available revenue and expenditure demands which led to the economic problems of the inner cities being seen as part of the national economic weaknesses (Pickvance, 1986). By the end of 1979 the condition of the economy was deteriorating rapidly. This coincided with a new Conservative Government in May 1979 under the leadership of Margaret Thatcher and heralded the introduction of what has since been labelled 'Thatcherism', (cf. Gamble, 1994; Hall and Jacques, 1983; Keegan, 1984; Riddell, 1983).

Until the mid 1970's there had been enormous growth in public expenditure which far exceeded any expansion in the economy (Eyles, 1989) and the new Government considered "public expenditure...[to be] at the heart of our current difficulties" (White Paper on Public Expenditure, November 1979, p1). It called for permanent and deep cuts in public expenditure in order to lay a foundation for long-term economic revival and prosperity (Gamble, 1994). The Thatcher government placed its faith in the private sector and the free market economy and this had profound effects on its policies for deprived inner city areas.

The government had four broad approaches which it outlined more fully in the programme *Action for Cities* (1988a). The first was to encourage businesses both existing and new, the second was to improve job prospects, training and motivation for the unemployed, the third was to tackle the physical environment and the fourth was to tackle crime. It was thought that the latter two would make the inner cities more attractive places to live and work. In the meantime (1979) the government was committed to reducing public spending by £1.5 billion immediately and by a further £1

billion by squeezing planned future expenditure (Gamble, 1994) in an attempt to make progress towards fiscal balance. This meant that during the 1980's, urban policy was ineluctably bound by the economic and political climate.

The country was ready for a change of economic and political direction at this time because although there had been a growth in Governmental programmes and policies in varying attempts to ameliorate social problems they had failed. The state had expanded, taxes had increased yet the problems were just as severe as they had ever been (Eyles, 1989). The Thatcher government believed the way forward was to "roll back the state" and this was to be achieved by pursuing strong monetarist policies.

These policies were pursued throughout the period 1979-1981, during the deepest recession since 1945. High interest rates and rising oil prices pushed sterling ever higher. This led to the competitive stance of UK companies declining by 35-45% which led to increased redundancies, closures and bankruptcies (Gamble, 1994). This put increased pressure on public expenditure at a time when it was also being squeezed by Central Government. Some of the methods utilised by the Government were: a sharp rise in prescription charges; the slashing of regional aid; the abolition of the Parker Morris standards for the building of new council housing; higher charges for school meals and the raising of council rents. The majority of these cutbacks hit those who could least afford them - those in economically and socially deprived regions - who were trapped in a vice. On the one hand the State's policies were squeezing them further into poverty and on the other hand, the reductions in funding to agencies that were attempting to deal with the problems of poverty, essentially the voluntary sector and the churches, meant that there were increasingly fewer avenues of recourse (The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury's Commission on Urban Priority Areas, 1985).

Eventually, the cut-backs combined with harsh monetarist policies and rising unemployment levels - especially amongst ethnic minorities - contributed to the eruption of violent rioting in several of the major inner cities such as St. Paul's in Bristol, Toxteth in Liverpool and Brixton in London in 1981. Many of those involved lived in conditions of extreme economic and social deprivation and had rioted because

they believed it was the only way to "get attention and help from the Government" (private communication, Merseyside Urban Forum seminar, 1995).

The riots in Liverpool led to the formation of the Merseyside Task Force in 1981 by Michael Heseltine. This brought together different government departments in an attempt to co-ordinate policies and resources in the region with a view to social and economic regeneration. From 1986 to 1988 a further 17 Task Forces were introduced in other parts of the country. These later Task Forces were to focus existing resources into small inner city areas of deprivation and were not linked to the original Merseyside Task Force which was concerned with regional development and co-ordination. There has been some criticism that the staff seconded to the later teams displayed little knowledge, both of the areas within which they operated or of the skills necessary to successful implementation of initiatives (Church and Hall, 1989; Lawless, 1988; Mawson, 1990). There was also little partnership with those voluntary sector agencies and organisations that were already working within the target areas (Centre for Environmental Studies, undated; Parkinson and Wilks, 1986).

One of the most interesting aspects of urban policy during the 1980's was the way in which Central Government remained wedded to the concept of 'partnerships' despite the failure of many early partnerships to form coherent strategies or to give priority to economic development (Nabarro, 1980; see also chapter 7 below). The partnership scheme was initially part of the 1968 Urban Programme and was introduced as a way to co-ordinate urban strategies within seven areas - although this was later broadened to include others. Local authorities also remained loyal to this programme despite the lack of Central Government funding or commitment as they saw it as a way to provide both the resources and the justification for schemes that would usually be impossible to provide, both financially and politically (Eyles, 1989).

The reason that the 'partnerships' aspect is so interesting is that throughout the 1980's, the majority of urban policy (a notable exception being the Urban Programme) was geared towards physical regeneration strategies such as the UDCs[6], the Urban

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[6] (see Brownill, 1990; Church and Hall, 1989; CLES, 1990a, 1990b; Deakin and Edwards, 1993; Dean, 1991; Imrie and Thomas, 1993a, 1993b, 1995; Lawless and Brown, 1986; Meegan, 1993, 1998; O'Toole, 1995; Parkinson, 1989).

Development Grant (Bull, 1991; Church and Hall, 1989; DoE, 1988b; Lawless, 1988), the Urban Regeneration Grant and the Derelict Land Grant (Church and Hall, 1989; Lawless, 1988) in a hope that the benefits to be gained from these initiatives would 'trickle down' to socially deprived areas, with social regeneration being virtually ignored. The latter three of these initiatives were amalgamated in the 1988 *Action for Cities* document into the City Grant which was then given to private sector capital development projects that needed funding aid in order to be executed and which benefited run-down inner city areas.

The critics of 'trickle down' pointed to the statistics which showed that unemployment still remained high in the areas targeted by these initiatives (Lawless, 1988) and, that of the jobs that were created, it was not necessarily the unemployed and the poor residents of the inner city areas who benefited (Imrie and Thomas, 1993; Martin, 1989; Turok, 1992). Although the overall policy aims were to include tackling unemployment and improving the living conditions of socially excluded residents, in effect the most successful efforts were those encouraging new enterprises - regardless of who profited (Robson, 1991). This strategy also highlighted the fact that 'partnerships' essentially meant the public and private sectors, the voluntary sector had little input[7]. Additionally, the voluntary sector was also finding it more difficult to obtain grants from local authorities because the local authorities own funding streams were experiencing increasing pressure.

From 1981 Central Government loosened its hold on the monetary supply and this, combined with a recovery in the world market due to the USA pursuing supply side economics to reinflate its economy, created a boom which brought down unemployment to very low levels in some parts of the country. This allowed Central Government to make tax cuts and concessions in the belief that these would give the incentives needed to revive enterprise. To help counterbalance this it made cutbacks in local authority spending (Gamble, 1994).

Earlier attempts to control local spending - through grant penalties - had failed, so Central Government tried ratecapping. It drew up a list of councils considered to be

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[7] This was the opinion that was endorsed by many of the interviewees who expressed an opinion on this period during the course of this research.

overspending and then placed a ceiling on the amount by which they could legally increase their local property taxes. This caused a deterioration in the relationships between Central and Local Government - (see chapter 7 below for an account of the relationship between Central Government and Liverpool City Council at this time). The problems came to a head in 1986 with the abolition of the Greater London Council and the six metropolitan councils. By 1987 Central Government hostility was such that a new range of measures were introduced to limit the power and responsibilities of local authorities, including the opportunity for schools and council estates to opt out of local authority control (Gamble, 1994). In addition, in December 1987, four mini-urban corporations were established to be run along similar lines as the UDCs, but with less funding from central government, which extended the number of inner-city regions with a central rather than local focus (Stewart, 1987).

During the period January 1982 to July 1987 unemployment stayed above 3 million and there was also a sharp rise in the number of long-term unemployed (Gamble, 1994). This put added pressure on local authorities as policies and initiatives such as the 1980 Housing Act, Estate Action (1985), and Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) (1988)[8] to name but a few, reduced the role of local authority strategic planning and increasingly fragmented their service provision, which made tackling the problems of the socially excluded even more difficult. The impact upon the voluntary sector was equally devastating with many organisations suffering drastic cutbacks in funding and resources. Nevertheless, even during this bleak period, there were two areas of voluntary sector activity that directly benefited from the line that Central Government policy was taking.

The first area was services for the unemployed. According to Moon and Richardson (1984) it was the voluntary sector that pioneered specialised services for the unemployed. Throughout the 1980's Central Government invested massively in the voluntary sector organisations working in this area via employment training, youth training and the community programme (see also Kendall and Knapp, 1996). This investment coincided with the high levels of unemployment sustained throughout the

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[8] Although it must be noted that CCT had been introduced by the earlier 1980 Local Government Land and Planning Act, this Act had so many loopholes that local authorities were able to circumvent it. The 1988 Act closed the loopholes and extended the numbers of services subjected to CCT.

middle of the 1980's and so could be seen as an attempt by Central Government to deal with the problem. Additionally, as 'trainees' were not included in the unemployment figures, it was a way to deflate the headline figure and make the unemployment figures lower than they otherwise would have been (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). Although the voluntary sector had pioneered activity in this area, much of its activities could not be quantifiably measured under the standards introduced by Central Government in the late 1980's. This meant that it began to lose ground to those private sector agencies who provided activities with measurable outcomes (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). The introduction of the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in 1989 were the death knell for many voluntary sector training providers. This was because it was the TECs who granted the contracts and their criteria was very different to previous criteria. This prompted vociferous opposition to the TECs from many of the voluntary sector providers (see chapter 6 below) which was discounted, leading to private sector providers - who reacted faster - winning a greater share of the 'market' (Palmer, 1990).

The second area of growth was housing (see also chapters 4, section 4.2 and 7, section 7.2 below). Legislation has continually been directed towards reducing the State's provision of housing, with housing associations and co-operatives (both non-profit making organisations) seen as the major alternatives (Clapham, 1996). Housing associations have been promoted by Central Government since 1974 when the introduction of the Housing Association Grant (HAG) allowed housing association officers to set fair rents, with the HAG making up the shortfall between the actual cost of housing provision and the rents that people could afford. On average, HAGs accounted for at least 80% of a scheme's total costs (Balchin, 1996; Malpass and Murie, 1994), ensuring a large expansion in the numbers of housing associations.

The 1988 Housing Act launched Housing Action Trusts (HAT's) and Estate Action. These were both aimed at municipal housing estates in difficulties. Their remit was to make ready estates for sale to private landlords or housing associations. In addition, tenants were also encouraged to form housing co-operatives that would receive housing association grants directly and provide maintenance and repair services, thus further decentralising housing management and distancing the role of the local

authority in housing provision but strengthening the role of the voluntary sector
(Harrison, Hoggett and Jeffers, 1995). However, the same Act reduced the HAG to
75% which meant that rents had to rise to cover the shortfall.

Local authorities did retain a measure of control over housing associations' and
housing co-operatives' activities by the selective withholding of planning permission,
however, even this strategy could be circumvented as, for example, in Liverpool when
a community group lobbied for inclusion into the boundaries of the MDC where the
local council had no planning authority (Meegan, 1993, 1998).

Throughout the 1980's the voluntary sector experienced a strange duality. On the one
hand, it was supported by the political Left who upheld grass-roots participation, local
democracy and greater self-determination (Donnison, 1984) - although this was not
always the case (see chapter 7 below). On the other hand, it was supported by the
political Right who claimed that voluntary sector activities were 'cornerstones of
democracy' (Pacione, 1990b, p198) helping to promote self-sufficiency and thus
support the capitalist system (Pacione, 1990b). This support was fairly constant at a
time when the two political factions, epitomised by local authorities and Central
Government, were often at odds with each other. Additionally, although the sector
may have not received the amount of funding the rhetoric seemed to imply it should,
this support ensured that its place on the political agenda was more secure.

1.4:4 *The 1990's*

1.4:4a *City Challenge*

In November 1991, Margaret Thatcher was de-selected as the leader of the
Conservative party and John Major became her successor, heralding an era of a more
conciliatory stance by Central Government. However, prior to her departure, Mrs
Thatcher endorsed one of the first major Central Government initiatives of the 1990's,
'City Challenge', which was introduced in May 1991 by Michael Heseltine. It was
essentially a competition for regeneration funds amongst the local authorities in the 57
designated urban priority areas. The first round of bids in 1991 established 11 City
Challenge areas which were to come into being in 1992 and involved an amount of
£37.5 million for each authority spread over five years. Each authority had to design

an action plan for the regeneration of an area and have it approved by ministers. It had to demonstrate co-operation and partnership between the local authorities, local business, residents, voluntary agencies and public agencies. The overall aim was to attract private investment to secure new jobs.

Approval of the action plan meant that the local authority entered a five year agreement with the DoE to tackle some of the worst social conditions within each region. Most of the City Challenge areas were either in, or adjacent to, city centres. Each plan also had to show what the expected specific outcomes would be for each initiative undertaken, for example, how many jobs would be created or people trained (DoE, 1994; Edwards, 1995). The funds were top-sliced from seven DoE-controlled inner city and housing programmes. In addition, preferential allocation of other DoE controlled funds such as Estate Action were given to City Challenge authorities. The programme focused on infrastructure, environmental work and site preparation for the public sector as well as local training and improvements to housing. It appeared to be a programme that offered a more impartial approach to urban regeneration than previous programmes such as the UDCs as it offered a forum for the local authorities and residents. Initially, the competitive approach actually promoted centralisation as Central Government provided the focus for the City Action Teams (initiated in 1985), the Task Forces, and it also decided what the Urban Programme spent its resources on. Other worries regarding the initiative were: funding was not allocated on a rational basis - deprivation indices were ignored - all authorities received the same amounts; the problems considered by potential investors and residents as the most crucial to its regeneration would not be tackled first; and, that it was unlikely that residents concerns with low cost housing, jobs and visual improvements would coincide to any great extent with potential investors (Atkinson and Moon, 1994a, 1994b). Nevertheless, the interim report (Russell, Dawson, Garside, Parkinson and the DoE, 1996) indicates that although there are some problems, many of the City Challenge areas had met their financial targets, had retained or created jobs and had engaged the local community because:

The diversity of local needs, circumstances and opportunities were recognised and priorities were not central government driven, but by local partners defining an end-vision and linking in specific programmes, projects and resources to it in a strategic way.

(p3.).

Although a final evaluation report assessing the impact of City Challenge in its entirety was not available at the time of writing, the final report for Liverpool City Challenge was (Russell, 1997) and in Liverpool at least, the profile of the voluntary sector in political decisions was raised immensely by this initiative by, for example, having a prominent member of the voluntary sector as the chairman (see also chapter 7 below for a detailed discussion).

1.4:4b *The Single Regeneration Budget*

In November 1993 the DoE published *Building on Success*. This document announced the SRB. The SRB brought together 20 urban projects, pooling the resources of five departments - DoE, Home Office, Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Employment Department (Training, Enterprise and Education Directorate) and the Department for Education (DfE). This initiative was intended to make government departments and initiatives 'more responsive to local needs and acceptable to local people' and this 'signal[led] an important shift from the centre to the localities' (John Gummer, quoted in Wilson and Game, 1998, p113). The combined budget for 1994 was £1.4 billion and it was/is co-ordinated by the cabinet Committee for Regeneration (called EDR). Administration of most of the SRB is by 10 Integrated Regional Offices for England (IROs) which also unify locally the DoE, DfE, DTI and Department of Transport. Partnership is promoted through the bidding process of the SRB which also defines a role for local authorities. This initiative is seen as a victory for those who have accused the government of "short termism" in its urban policies (DoE, 1994; Edwards, 1995; Randall, 1995). The money available under the SRB came onstream in April 1994 and is available primarily but not exclusively to Inner Area authorities. The decision as to whom will obtain SRB funding is done on a project bid basis which must also demonstrate partnership arrangements. All successful bids need to fulfil one or more of the avowed SRB objectives (Edwards, 1995) which are:

☐ Enhancement of employment opportunities, education and skills of local people especially the young and disadvantaged and promotion of equality.

- [ ] The encouragement of sustainable economic growth and wealth creation by improving the competitiveness of the local economy including the support of business.

- [ ] To improve housing by better maintenance and management, greater choice and physical improvements.

- [ ] To promote initiatives of benefit to ethnic minorities.

- [ ] To protect and improve the environment and infrastructure and the promotion of good design.

- [ ] To enhance the quality of life for local residents including health, sports and culture

(DoE, 1993).

Although this approach dropped the "threats to remoralise inner-city residents and turn their dependency into dynamism" (Edwards, 1995, p700) there were still inherent problems. For example, the ten IROs are now actually called Government Offices (GOs) and this emphasises that they are outposts of Central Government rather than local offices (Wilson and Game, 1998). Also, that the bidding process was not conducive to the production of a coherent and sound urban strategy regardless of the partnerships and associations each bid had to demonstrate. This was because there was no real 'yardstick' by which local authorities could gauge how successful a particular bid was likely to be. This ensured that initiatives were still granted on a piecemeal basis. Also, as the bids theoretically only had to meet one objective other objectives would be unmet by default (Edwards, 1995).

Although it is clear that the 'top down' property-led approach is still dominant in this initiative, it has still had a major impact upon the voluntary sector in the area relating to partnership (see chapters 6 and 7 below) . It would appear that unlike the 'partnership' aspects of public policy during the 1970's and 1980's, the 'bid sifters' of the Government Offices are committed to the partnership approach and bids that demonstrate a high degree of partnership between the local authority, private sector and voluntary sector are favoured[9] and that 'best practice' models are beginning to

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[9] This research has accumulated a great deal of anecdotal evidence to support this. For example, bids that were initially refused and then resubmitted demonstrating the support of various partners, were agreed. Additionally, every single agency interviewed in Liverpool for this research stated that they

emerge. Also, as the SRB has matured, more voluntary sector agencies and community groups have emerged as leaders in SRB partnerships rather than as partners (Liverpool Link, 1996).

1.4:4c *New Labour*

In May 1997, the Labour Party under the leadership of Tony Blair had a landslide victory in the general election. Their General Election manifesto, *New Labour - Because Britain Deserves Better*, continued with the theme of partnership and promised that the powers would be in place to develop partnerships:

> Local decision-making should be less constrained by central government, and also more accountable to local people...[councils] should work in partnership with local people, local businesses and local voluntary organisations. They will have the powers to develop these partnerships.
> <div align="right">(Quoted in Wilson and Game, 1998, p361).</div>

The new Government 'hit the ground running' and in the 16 months it has been in power has introduced a raft of consultation documents[10] geared towards halting social and economic decline. These include *Sustainable Development: Opportunities for Change*, February 1998, a document which sets out the Government's vision of sustainable development and how it might be achieved; *Community Based Regeneration Initiatives Consultation Paper* (the next version of which is due), defining what community based initiatives are, what support they have, how effective they are and how the Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (DoETR) (formed by a merger of the DoE and the Department of Transport in June 1997) should support and promote them; White Paper on *Sustainable Growth, Competitiveness and Employment in the English Regions*, December 1997, concerning building partnerships; White paper *Excellence in Schools*, July 1997, regarding homework, parental involvement and education/business/work related learning; Green Paper, *The Learning Age*, February 1998; and *Welfare to Work* proposed in 1997, consisting of a series of measures to combat long term unemployment. The Government declares that is is firmly committed to the "bottom-up" partnership approach and this stamp of approval is clearly seen in the recent Working Paper on

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felt that they were fully informed about every bid on which they were a 'partner' and that they felt, for the first time, 'partnership' was a reality (see also chapter 6 below).
[10] This section is indebted to the Central Policy Unit, Liverpool City Council.

Community-Based Regeneration Initiatives (DoETR, 1998a) which states on page 2 that:

> The Government is convinced that the "bottom-up" approach to regeneration is the right one.

The Discussion Paper on *Regeneration Programmes - The Way Forward* (1998b) also endorses this strategy and states that:

> The Government's regeneration policy and programmes are part of the drive to tackle the combination of local needs and priorities associated with poverty and deprivation (p2).

The recent announcement that regeneration initiatives are to be focused on 17 of the most "socially-deprived" area in the UK in the *New Deal for Communities*, is the latest reflection of this policy commitment.

Clearly all of the above mentioned policy documents, as well as a few others such as the proposed abolition of CCT, are going to impact heavily on the voluntary sector in one way or another, as the voluntary sector is the engine of the "bottom-up" approach. However, it is *Welfare to Work* that has captured the attention of the general public because of the measure *New Deal for Young People*. This targets people aged 18-24 who have been unemployed for 6 months or more and who are claiming Job Seekers Allowance (JSA). The aim of the measure is to get these people into permanent employment and offers four options, all of which contain a measure of education or training. The options are: subsidised employment, full-time education, training on the Environmental Task Force, or placement with a voluntary sector organisation. Although the scheme has now passed the pilot stage there are some voluntary sector organisations on Merseyside which still have reservations, even though they welcome the fact that they are being considered as an option on par with the other options, a consideration that has not always occurred in the past. These reservations cover four areas of concern. First, the amount of bureaucracy the scheme entails is likely to be off-putting for a number of voluntary sector organisations - especially the smaller ones or ones heavily reliant on volunteers. Second, there is the fear that if a candidate 'runs through' all the other options, they will end up in a voluntary sector organisation by default and voluntary sector organisations need willing participants not ones who are being coerced. Third, there is the problem that this initiative is aimed at getting people

into permanent employment and voluntary sector *paid* employment is difficult to obtain. Indeed, during the course of this research it became clear (see chapters 3 and 6 below) that much paid work is on a short-term contract basis and often highly skilled workers are 'between contracts'. Finally, and possibly more problematical, there is the fear that if the voluntary sector does not prove successful in delivering the initiative, it may be sidelined as a service provider.

1.4:5 *Some Conclusions with Regard to Urban Policy*

Although this analysis has only highlighted selected urban policies of the past three decades an emergent trend can be identified: urban policies have increasingly acknowledged the need to incorporate the voluntary sector in regeneration issues whether they be social or economic - although their effectiveness in actually translating this to reality is another matter altogether. This acknowledgement has led to there being, in some regions, a growing acceptance of the voluntary sector as a valid alternative to the private and public sector - an *almost* equal partner. This is not the case throughout the UK as some regions operate with a minimal or non-existent voluntary sector (communication from Chief Executive, Liverpool Council for Voluntary Service (LCVS) 1998; see also Russell *et al.*, 1996), and there are many problems associated with 'partnerships' (cf. Duffy and Hutchinson, 1997, Foley *et* al., 1997; Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Moore, 1995). Additionally, innovative urban policy is not always grounded within local needs and resources (NCVO, 1992). However, in those regions where there is a strong voluntary sector in place, there are indications that it is increasingly being treated as on a par with the private and public sectors. Perhaps finally, in these areas at least, this is a tacit recognition that each sector has strengths and weaknesses and when they work together in a true partnership the weaknesses can be minimised and the strengths can be exploited creating a holistic synergy that will eventually benefit the region concerned. For a region such as Merseyside, with its myriad of social and economic problems (see section 1.5 below), partnership is proving to be a formidable instrument in tackling these problems.

1.5 The 'Problem' with Merseyside

The hub of Merseyside is the city and port of Liverpool, and the 'inner city' problems that have been identified by so many authors (see, for example, Cox, 1973; Harloe et al, 1977; Harvey, 1973; Herbert and Smith, 1989) have been with this city for at least a century. The idiosyncratic culture of 'working-class' Merseyside and its particular social problems rest on the fact that the whole economy of Liverpool - and to a lesser extent Wirral and Sefton - has been based on and around the port (also see chapter 5 below).

Prior to the development of the port facilities Liverpool had no association with the economy of the surrounding area (Simey, 1992). Afterwards, its economy and infrastructure were based almost completely on the movement and storage of goods. The port developed rapidly because of its geographical position - it was in the ideal position for the industries of Lancashire and Cheshire to export their manufactured goods from and, for the importation of raw materials from the New World and the Colonies, an economy based on the slave trade (Meegan, 1995; Middleton, 1991). It was this rapid expansion that heralded the beginning of its problems. It grew from a population of 4,240 in 1700 to 222,954 by 1841 (Simey, 1992) - although this was also due in part to the Irish diaspora following the 1840's 'potato famines' in Ireland (Meegan, 1995). And, it was the sheer pressure of numbers that ensured the majority of the populace lived in appalling conditions as the whole social infrastructure was placed under intolerable stress. Additionally, many of the immigrants were used to extreme poverty and were willing to work for a pittance which ensured they remained in poverty whilst the merchants became richer, further inflaming antagonism towards both new immigrants and the employers (Smithers, 1825).

During this same period the amount of shipping the port dealt with also increased enormously (from around 12 ships to 4,000 (Simey, 1992)) - which meant swift expansion of the economy. However, employment remained extremely uncertain and generally casual (Smith, 1986). Nevertheless, there was work available, and this, combined with Liverpool's geographical position as a primary port for those embarking on emigration to the New World, encouraged massive migration in to the city and its environs from the rest of the country and from Europe - Ireland in

particular (Lane, 1997; Meegan, 1995; Prestwich and Taylor, 1990). Many of those intending to emigrate found that they were unable to do so for one reason or another and this led to a serious problem with housing. Families were forced to live in cellars, courts and tunnel houses. In contrast, the merchants, bourgeoisie and professional classes lived in large airy houses in the suburbs (Smith, 1986) - away from the 'stink of the city'. This spatially differentiated existence was partly upheld by the infamous dock labour scheme which remained in force until the 1940's whereby dockers were hired from 'stands' to work on a daily, sometimes hourly, basis (Lane, 1997). This treatment has left an indelible imprint on the psyche of the working classes and has no doubt contributed to the feud cum siege mentality of many citizens that exists to this day (see also chapter 5 below).

Although Liverpool was at the forefront of public health policy implementation throughout the Nineteenth Century[11], the majority of the population continued to live in intolerable circumstances. Generally this was because high birth rates together with potential emigrants - who continued to pour into the city until the turn of the century - more than offset the high mortality rates of the poorest. The result was a growth rate of over 20 per cent per decade (Lawton, 1986).

The problems associated with a large, economically poor population became compounded after the First World War due to the global restructuring of trade. The war had led to a scarcity of manufactures for export which led to the importing countries initiating indigenous industries to replace the lack. After the war, these indigenous industries flourished and the need for imported manufactures radically decreased which led to less trade for the Port of Liverpool, massive recession and severe unemployment throughout the 1920's (although there was an improvement in the last few years of the decade) and catastrophic unemployment in the 1930's - see Table 1.1 below (Poole, 1960).

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[11] In many ways it was a leader. For example, the city council employed Doctor Duncan, the first Medical Officer of Health in the country, and built the first municipal housing. However, these were not altogether altruistic moves but rather an attempt to forestall plans by Central Government to force health measures by legislation, and thereby interfere in local economic and social policies - an act the council considered impertinence (Simey, 1992).

Unemployment during the 1930's was not only high, but affected the population for longer, a problem that has not abated to the present day (see Central Statistics Office (CSO), 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996; Office for National Statistics (ONS), 1997, 1998). For example, in 1936, unemployment affected 25% of the insured population of Liverpool, whereas in Wolverhampton it was 9.4% and in Birmingham and Coventry it was only 5% and 4.7% respectively (Poole, 1960).

Table 1.1 Unemployment
Figures for the 1930's

Date	Official Unemployment Figures
1930	55,298
1931	87,051
1932	92,173
1933	97,805
1934	91,021
1935	91,614
1936	88,206

Source: Poole, 1960

The port's economy rallied during the Second World War as trade focused on the Atlantic in attempts to break the shipping embargoes in the Channel. However, this renaissance attracted the attention of Germany's bombers whose raids caused massive infrastructural damage around the docks, compounding the already severe housing shortages. For example, during 'May Week' in 1941, the city was bombed continuously for seven nights in succession destroying over 6,000 houses and damaging another 125,000 (Middleton, 1991). This led to the 1944 Merseyside Plan which was devised in an attempt to revitalise the area by moving both population and industry away from the city centre core - building on an exodus that had started several decades before (Lawton, 1982). This was achieved by slum clearance and then decanting large sectors of the population into poorly planned and poorly built municipal housing estates in the suburbs. This may have partly solved the housing problems, but it just meant that the existing social and economic problems of these people were removed from the city and then exacerbated by physical and social isolation created by poor transport and the rupturing of family ties - once again, these problems are still prevalent (see chapter 5 below).

After the Second World War, the port continued its decline. The focus on port based activities had meant that the provision of employment was dominated by large firms who generally employed casual, semi- and unskilled workers (Cornfoot, 1982; Lane, 1997). This meant that the region had not historically built up a base of skilled manufacturing workers who could readily switch into other areas of growth. In addition, those working outside port-based activities tended to be employed in distributive and food processing trades which were attractive to national and multinational companies looking to expand their holdings. Once absorbed, these industries became particularly vulnerable to rationalisation and centralisation which led to closures and many job losses (Parkinson, 1990). This 'branch plant' economy extended also to the small manufacturing base of the region and was exacerbated by the growth of the car industry during the 1960's. This growth initially helped to ease the immediate problems but reinforced the dependence on external employers who were not accountable to local economic conditions, but to national and international markets (Lloyd, 1979). One of the major 'problems' with Merseyside and Liverpool in particular is that the manufacturing sector is dominated by non-locally controlled employers. For example, in 1965, 51 per cent of the manufacturing firms in Liverpool were not controlled locally; ten years later this had risen to 70 per cent and by the 1980's only one of the 20 largest employers in the region was locally controlled (Parkinson, 1985). Because these companies are subject to strategies that are formulated with international and national trends in mind, strategies that have no local affiliations or accountability, it leaves these plants extremely vulnerable to 'rationalisation' measures which can disproportionately affect their suppliers. These are usually small locally based firms dependent on the larger companies for the majority of their business. Between a five year period, 1979 to 1984, Liverpool lost 40,000 manufacturing jobs, almost half of those in the sector, in this manner (Parkinson, 1985).

The structural, economic and social problems were exacerbated by the activities of Liverpool City Council during the 1970's and 1980's, the ramifications of which were felt across Merseyside because in the eyes of many people Liverpool was, and is Merseyside. The 'power politics' played out in the city during this time were a legacy of the manufacturing and service sectors being so weak. This meant that there was -

and still is - a heavy reliance on public sector employment which gave the council unprecedented leverage over its workforce, eventually amounting to playing politics with people's livelihoods (see chapter 7 below for a full discussion). During the same period of time, although there were similar social and economic problems within other large cities in the UK, they did not suffer to the same extent or over such a prolonged period of time as did Liverpool and this was partly due to the historical forces that were in place such as a poor education and skills base, dependence on the port and a small manufacturing sector, and partly due to the political machinations of the local councillors (cf. Lloyd and Meegan, 1996; Meegan, 1993, 1998; Parkinson, 1985, 1990; Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993).

The speed with which the 'old' industrial base was eroded in the UK from the early 1970's was frightening - on Merseyside although the process had begun much earlier in the 1930's, the 1970's saw an acceleration of the problem (Parkinson, 1990). At the same time as the erosion of the manufacturing base in the UK there was a growth in the service sector which led to a growing polarisation between flourishing and declining sectors manifesting itself most obviously within the city environment with the growth in retail and leisure facilities - although Merseyside bucked the national trend and there was actually a contraction of the service sector in the 1970's. By the early 1980's, approximately 12.2% of Merseyside's income was based on benefits with one job being created for every £106,000 of benefits (Moore, 1995).

Unlike the majority of British cities, the Labour party did not take power in Liverpool until the mid 1950's and then they had to share control of the city with the Conservative party until the mid 1970's (Parkinson, 1985). Historically, this was due to there being large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers, an absence of unions for skilled craftworkers and religious tensions between the working class Protestants and Irish Catholics. These divisions combined with a tradition of electing right-wing Members of Parliament whilst the local constituencies were more left-wing meant that there was constant ideological conflict within the Labour party (Parkinson, 1985, 1990) which meant that their hold on the city was slight. This hold was broken in the 1973 elections by the Liberal party, who emerged unexpectedly by taking seats from Labour and the Conservatives. They managed to do this because Labour

councillors were seen as being too old and out of touch with their constituents as well as presiding over the inner city clearance that had broken up communities and sent the population into high rise flats in peripheral estates (Parkinson, 1985, 1990).

The Liberals made housing their platform in order to retain votes and the 1974 Housing Act gave them the funds to start on their programme. However, the housing programme was initiated at the cost of other public services as the Liberals commitment to minimal rates rises meant that there were fewer and fewer funds available for other services such as repairs. With hindsight, it appears that the Liberals (allied with the Conservatives) were more concerned in retaining their seats than sound fiscal planning (Parkinson, 1985). They raised council rents yet used any stratagem they could to minimise rates rises in order to appeal to the private home owner. For example, they borrowed money for council repairs which added to the city's long-term debt and used the extra money allotted to them from the rate support grant to actually cut rates. This state of affairs continued over the next decade when the majority of councils in the city were either coalition, hung or minority administrations that could not decide on how to rationalise cumbersome, expensive and inefficient services such as education provision, waste collection and management and the direct labour organisation (DLO) which maintained council housing (Parkinson 1985, 1990). This need for rationalisation was paramount as the population was declining radically - it is estimated that the population fell by 40.4% during the period 1931 to 1981 (Brown and Ferguson, 1982) - and the social and economic problems arising from global and national restructuring called for a strong coherent leadership that would tackle the problems effectively.

During the latter half of the 1970's and early 1980's the Labour party in the city became increasingly left-wing because the industrial restructuring that had impacted so heavily on the city had left workers frustrated and cynical (Meegan, 1988a) and more open to 'confrontational politics or at least to those that 'put the interests of Merseyside and Merseysiders first'' (Meegan, 1989b p93). This enabled the extreme left-wing, the so-called Militant Tendency, to come to the forefront of local politics. Militant were led by Derek Hatton, the deputy leader of the council and Tony Byrne who decided policy and, although as a group it remained a minority within the council, it wielded enormous power as it not only had the broad support of the rest of the

Labour party but also a large number of the council's employees including the DLO (Parkinson, 1985, 1990).

The artificially low public spending by the Liberals' had had another unexpected cost when the Conservatives took over Central Government in 1979 and reformed the grant system. The new system allocated money on the basis of historical spending patterns - and Liverpool's were low due to the Liberals raiding the Council's reserves in order to bolster the low public spending budgets. This meant that the grant to Liverpool was cut and continued to be cut each year. By the time the Labour party took over the city in May 1983 the city had lost £270 million pounds in grant aid (Parkinson, 1985) which had exacerbated already entrenched problems. The Labour party's solution was to set a deficit budget and force the Government to come to its aid as, if the Government refused then the city would be bankrupt.

Liverpool's officials had several reasons for disputing the new grant system. Firstly, the city councillors (regardless of their reasons) had behaved 'responsibly' during the 1970's and had not imposed massive rate increases to build up financial resources as had other cities and so their perceived financial needs were artificially low. When Central Government introduced the grant they arbitrarily decided to base the amounts given on the expenditure levels of one financial year, 1978/79 and told all authorities to cut back expenditure to less than this year. Liverpool councillors argued that the city was being unfairly penalised for being financially 'responsible'; however, they did comply with the Government and cut back on expenditure although this meant that they had to make further cutbacks in the 1980's. This was solely due to the fact that the authority had tried to keep to budget targets whereas other cities in similar situations had refused to comply and had consistently overspent. This had led to a revision of the system whereby their targets were made more generous and Liverpool's was cut once again. The unfairness of the system was compounded because Liverpool was also penalised for overspending the Government's assessment of need figure. This was based on population figures and Liverpool's had fallen dramatically and so the Government's assessment was that it would need to spend less and so reduced its grant accordingly. However, the authority argued that the remaining population was socially vulnerable and so more expensive to provide for and additional to that, historical social

commitments made for a large population cannot be suddenly terminated (Parkinson, 1985).

Although there was initially some sympathy within Whitehall to the city's plight this was soon lost when Militant used the state of the city's finances to manipulate a series of confrontations with Central Government with the sole intention of bringing it down. As one Liberal ex-councillor (interviewed in 1996) put it: 'they thought the revolution was going to start in Liverpool and that they were going to lead it'. This obviously did not happen and the wrath of Margaret Thatcher was brought fully to bear on the city and eventually Militant were ousted. Since then the Labour council has taken a more conciliatory line with Central Government. However, the city still has major financial problems and has consistently had the highest council tax in the country with what could be argued as some of the poorest services.

These inadequacies of local government and administration epitomised by the financial fiascos of the 1970's and 1980's combined with the lack of a powerful local business leadership and the constant emigration of the more educated, skilled and trained has meant that the region has depended heavily on external resources, obtained from Central Government and European Union initiatives, in tackling its problems.

One of the major initiatives in Merseyside during the 1980's and 1990's was the Merseyside Development Corporation (MDC) which was initiated in 1981. Its remit was to reclaim derelict industrial and dock land on both sides of the River Mersey. 92% of the land was publicly owned, with the Mersey Docks and Harbour Company having 75%, British Rail 10% and the Liverpool, Sefton and Wirral local authorities owning the rest. The MDC had a mammoth task because 80% of the land initially designated to it was derelict, almost double the amount of the London Docklands Development Corporation. Additionally, approximately a quarter of the area was heavily silted and polluted docks where the river system had been allowed to re-establish and in the process had deposited silt, mud and sewage up to thirty feet deep overlooked by dilapidated warehouses (Meegan, 1993,1998).

Most of the area is severely degraded, being non-operational docks and back-up land, demolished goods yards and sidings, part-cleared tank farms and petroleum stores, or is land in the process of reclamation by land fill using commercial and domestic waste. The overall impression is of severe degradation, inaccessibility, danger to the public and much vandalism.

(Merseyside Development Corporation, 1981, p5, quoted in Meegan, 1998).

The MDC initiated two 'flagship' projects, the 1984 Garden Festival and the Albert Dock which opened in 1988 and marked the end of the MDC's first phase and the completion of what had been one of Europe's largest reclamation projects. Later phases of the MDC whilst still containing a number of 'flagship' physical regeneration projects such as the Twelve Quays International Technology Campus on the Birkenhead waterfront, had a more 'social' aspect, for example, a large number of residents were included when the boundaries were extended in 1988 and the MDC became a supporter of social housing. Also the MDC became involved in 'place marketing' or 'boosterism' and indigenous small firms were encouraged. Additionally, local unemployed residents were targeted to fill jobs created by inward investment, however, this only highlighted the depressed state of the local labour market as the 161 jobs that were available in the first recruitment phase attracted 2,850 applicants (Meegan, 1998).

Merseyside has continued to play these "politics of declining regions" (Markusen, 1989) fairly successfully because its problems *are* severe. When the first round of successful City Challenge bids were announced in 1991, two of the five boroughs that constitute Merseyside were successful, Liverpool and Wirral. Sefton, another of the boroughs was successful in the second round in 1992 - see section 1.4:3 above for the details of the programme and chapter 7 below for details on how it affected Liverpool's voluntary sector. Other Central Government funding has included: Regional Aid approved in December 1995 to the amounts of £11.5 million to build the Media Factory to aid local media enterprises, £5.3 million to Lairdside to redevelop the Cammell Laird site in Birkenhead and £6 million to develop the A5036 corridor between Bootle Docks and the motorway network; Safer Cities SRB funding of £78 million in the first round of 1994 and £87 million in 1995 second round; and a share of the £58 million allotted to the five prototype Employment Zones in 1998. Merseyside has also been granted 14.8 million ECU from the European structural funds under the

URBAN initiative to enhance the prospects of local people and to raise their levels of income and from the European Union (EU) structural and social funds in conjunction with Central Government to the tune of £1.2 billion under the Objective One initiative to co-ordinate funding within a programme to:

> ...establish Merseyside as a prosperous European City Region with a diverse economic base, which provides access to employment for all sections within the local community, which develops its people, their skills, talents and well-being, and emphasises its role as a Gateway between Europe and the rest of the world, establishes it as a Region of learning, arts and cultural excellence and innovation, and establishes it as a Region of environmental excellence that supports a high quality of life.
>
> Single Programming Document, United Kingdom, Merseyside, 1993, p25.

This programme is set to continue for another five years because of the intractability of the region's problems. For example, the population of Merseyside continues to fall, between 1981 and 1995 by more than 6% and between 1991 and 1996 by 2% compared with population growth in the North West of 1% over the same periods and 4% and 2% respectively for the UK; the economic activity rate among people of working age in Merseyside is consistently the lowest in all of the regions (ONS, 1997, 1998); Merseyside consistently has the highest percentage of live births outside marriage; the unemployment rate is consistently the highest in the country and is always at least a third higher than the UK average; long-term unemployment as a percentage of claimant unemployed is the highest in the country; and it has - almost always - the highest numbers of school leavers leaving school without any graded results (CSO, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996; ONS, 1997, 1998). The 'problem' with Merseyside is that the historical factors combined with the effects of global and national restructuring means that there are so *many* spatially concentrated problems which require concerted, consistent, cohesive and collaborative action, and the rest of this thesis will explore the role of the Merseyside voluntary sector within this framework.

Chapter 2: Definitions, History and Theoretical Context

2.1 Introduction

This chapter contains four sections. The first section examines the question of defining the voluntary sector and the problems that this entails, it also details the definition utilised for this research and the reasons behind the decision. The second section gives a history of the voluntary sector in the UK and the third section outlines the history of the voluntary sector in Liverpool. The final section details various theorisations of the voluntary sector and the theoretical context utilised for this research.

2.2 A Question of Definition

Accepted convention divides organisations into two broad sectors - the public and the private or the market and the state. These two sectors have formed the basis of the majority of academic analysis of capitalism. However, there is a third sector of institutions, both simple and complex, that occupy an identifiable position outside the accepted parameters of the public and private sectors that is varyingly and interchangeably defined as the voluntary and/or community sector or, more recently, the 'third sector' (cf. Evers, 1995; James, 1997; Salamon and Anheier, 1992). How to define this sector is a question that researchers into the voluntary sector have been wrestling with for at least half a century. The major difficulty is that researchers consider that the plethora of differing organisations, ideologies, motivations and activities, and the constraints, conditions and complexities that these impose on the relationships between the sector and the state make a standardised definition very difficult if not impossible (Johnson, 1981; Marshall, 1996) - it is a 'loose and baggy monster' (Kendall and Knapp, 1995, p66). This is allied with another major definitional problem which stems from the terminologies used to describe the sector. These range from the 'voluntary' sector, through 'non-profit' to 'third sector' and all points in between. The problem with the varying terminologies is that they all only describe a part of the sector, they do not cover every aspect and so are misleading (see Salamon and Anheier, 1992, for a detailed discussion) and it is this weakness that has encouraged the use of the term 'third' sector. However, there are also difficulties with this term, for example, of the public and private sectors which is the first and which the

second sector, are they interchangeable and if *they* are then why cannot this also apply to the 'third' sector and it become the 'first' sector? There are also suggestions of inferiority associated with the term, if there are three sectors and the voluntary sector is always the 'third' sector it is like running a race with three competitors and always coming last. Additionally, with the rise in the numbers of quangos, there is a possibility that a new sector is evolving that is neither public, private or voluntary and so may upset the hierarchical structure inferred by the term 'third'. It is because of these difficulties with the term 'third sector' that this research has continued to use 'voluntary sector' as a blanket term to refer to the activities of communities and community based organisations, charities, non-profit organisations, religious institutions, voluntary organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In other words all of those agencies and organisations that are not readily recognisable as fitting into the public or private 'sectors', whilst at the same time recognising that there are also problems with this nomenclature. For example, 'voluntary sector' focuses attention on the contributions that volunteers make to the sector, but many organisations included within the sector may have no volunteers at all, only paid staff, and there are large numbers of volunteers who are either organised by or are working on behalf of statutory agencies (Darvill and Munday, 1984; Davis Smith, 1996; Salamon and Anheier, 1992). There is a definitional problem supported by the research reported in this thesis which found that generally, the larger an organisation was, either in terms of the numbers of people working for it or by income, the fewer, if any, volunteers it had working for it (see chapter 4 below for details) and, that many community businesses, training and credit unions were run by people seconded to them from the public sector. There is another problem in that some community groups protest that the community sector and voluntary sector are two separate entities because:

> ...we *live* our work in the community sector, you *choose* your work in the voluntary sector.
>> (Community development worker in Kirkby, comment made during a Merseyside Urban Forum seminar, 1996).

The implication is that community sector workers are involved to better their own lives whereas voluntary sector workers are involved to better other people's lives.

Nevertheless, whilst acknowledging these shortcomings this research will still refer to the sector as the 'voluntary sector'.

A second argument regarding the non-definition of the voluntary sector is that it does not have the social and economic influence and power of the other two sectors and so has not attracted the serious attention of theoreticians (Salamon and Anheier, 1992). Thankfully, there are some researchers within the voluntary sector, (see for example, Salamon, 1992; Salamon and Anheier, 1992) who have identified the major weakness in this discourse surrounding the voluntary sector which is that the private sector is just as eclectic as the voluntary sector with large portions of it having very little power or influence, yet this has not stopped the development of the 'private sector' as an identifiable unifying abstract concept and a powerful analytical and theoretical tool. Salamon and Anheier (1992, p127) ask "How much similarity is there, after all, between a sidewalk hot dog stand and the IBM Corporation, or between an insurance company and a winery?". The inference is that there is not much and that this has not been a problem in theoretical arguments concerning the private sector and so should not be a drawback in theorising the voluntary sector. Whilst agreeing with their sentiment, it is still necessary to point out that the private sector does have one unifying characteristic that they appear to have overlooked and this is that economic activity is stimulated by the necessity to accumulate capital in the form of profit, in the case of large, stock market quoted companies to satisfy the shareholders, and in the case of other companies to support the lifestyles of the managerial staff and employees - how this is done and how the profits are distributed is irrelevant to this one fact. The difference with the voluntary sector is that there does not appear to be any one factor that can be drawn on in the same way - although Marshall (1996) suggests that mediation could be the common thread. Motivations of organisations within this sector vary from altruism through the wish for personal power to the wish to make money to either further the activities of the organisation or to stimulate a local economy. However, although there may not be a unifying activity, this should not be considered to be a drawback to the development of a definition, it just means that the definition needs to be flexible enough to account for this.

Salamon and Anheier (1992) take on this problem and outline four possible definitions of the voluntary sector and assess them for flexibility. The first is the legal definition. Under this form of definition a voluntary agency is whatever the law of a particular country defines it as. The problem with utilising a definition obtained in this manner though is that it is unlikely to cross national boundaries and that usually legal definitions are bound up in case law peculiar to the country concerned. Additionally, not all voluntary sector organisations will be encompassed by the law. For example, in the UK the law only specifically applies to charities, which form only a part of the sector, the law is not so clear cut on other forms of voluntary sector organisation (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; see also, Communication from the Commission, 1998).

The second definition is an economic or financial one that is utilised by the United Nations System of National Accounts, a system adopted by countries world-wide to report on national income. Under this system a voluntary sector organisation is one that receives more than half of its income from the dues and contributions of members and supporters. If more than half is received from services or goods, then it is considered to be an 'enterprise' or private sector and if more than half is received from government grants then it is considered to be part of the government or public sector. Under this definition the majority of the organisations usually considered to be voluntary sector would simply disappear from the sector because of their funding arrangements and so the sector would only be a shadow of what it was in reality.

The third definition is functional based on the activities of an organisation; however, this lacks rigour as categories may be ambiguous, may not translate fully over national boundaries and may change over time.

The final definition is a structural/operational one which emphasises the basic structure and operation of an organisation and is the definition that Salamon and Anheier believe has the most advantages for cross-national work. It evolved from the work undertaken by the Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project (CNS Project), which was launched in the USA in 1990, to assess what constitutes the voluntary sector, how it is financed and the links between the sector and the state and private business. Twelve other countries including the UK are involved with the project (Kendall and Knapp, 1996).

Under this definition an organisation has to reasonably fulfil five criteria in order to be considered to be a voluntary sector organisation and these criteria are:

- **Formal**. The organisation needs to be institutionalised to some extent. It need not be as formal as a constitution or charter of incorporation, it may be regular meetings, rules of procedure, officers or some degree of organisational stability.

- **Private**. Neither part of government nor with a board dominated by government officials.

- **Non-profit distributing**. Profits may be accumulated during a given year, but must be ploughed back into the mission of the agency and not distributed to members or board.

- **Self-governing**. Control their own activities and not be controlled by external entities.

- **Voluntary**. Have a meaningful degree of voluntary participation whether it be income, volunteer workers or a volunteer board.

(Extracted from Salamon and Anheier, 1992, p135-136).

The EU Commission would appear to agree with the above definition as a recent document (Communication from the Commission, 1998) identified voluntary sector organisations having almost exactly the same characteristics, the only difference being that rather than the category 'voluntary' the Commission identifies 'public good' as being a necessary component of designation, a category dismissed by Salamon and Anheier (1992, p138) as being 'too depend[ent] on the eye of the beholder'. On the face of it, Salamon and Anheier's definition appears to be the most encompassing, however, there are still some major problems with it which they identify. This definition is meant to be cross-national, but, in those countries where a strong government representation on an organisation's board is normal, such as Japan, or those organisations who receive the majority of their funding from government sources - often the case with voluntary sector organisations reliant on contract work in the UK - then those organisations would fail to register on the second criterion. Salamon and Anheier suggest that these organisations should be interviewed further as this would uncover anomalies, but in effect this negates the whole point of the exercise which was to produce a universal formula. Additionally, Salamon and Anheier also note that

there is a problem with community based development organisations and co-operatives as they would run foul of the non-profit distributing criterion and suggest that 'it would probably make sense to treat them as part of the non-profit sector' (p140). These two groups play an extremely important part in the regeneration strategies of disadvantaged communities within the UK (see chapter 5 below) and loans co-operatives or credit unions as they are more usually known are prevalent in many countries, especially the United States of America (USA) and Ireland (McKillop, Ferguson and Nesbitt, 1995) and yet are precluded by this definition. So, whilst agreeing with the authors that this structural/operational definition does have a great deal of merit, the fact that it would exclude some of the most important forms of voluntary sector agencies involved in social and economic regeneration has meant that it was not adopted for this research. Although it must be noted that with the benefit of the rather free interpretation of the structural/operational definition to include most housing associations and many community businesses made by Kendall and Knapp in 1996 - the UK research team in the CNS Project - the vast majority of the organisations considered to be 'voluntary sector' under the definition utilised for this research would have come under the structural/operational umbrella.

The working definition that this research utilised to assess whether an organisation belonged to the voluntary sector was: 'any person or body of persons who are not established for profit, who are not part of the Government and are self-governing and who are working for a public or common good or benefit'. Although this definition is more wide-ranging than the one utilised by the CNS project, it still allows for the exclusion of certain groups in order to make analysis manageable. Nevertheless, there are still problems with it, for example, although the word 'established' excludes individuals who perform tasks for neighbours, family and friends from the sector, and allows for those organisations with only a single representative or for very small organisations who may not have a formal structure - such as self-help groups who meet intermittently, there is still an argument as to what degree a single person can actually constitute a voluntary sector organisation. The counter-argument to this is that it is often one person who provides the impetus for activity and some of the voluntary sector 'organisations' researched in this thesis were at this initial stage. Whether they will expand or collapse through indifference only time will tell but, it

must be noted, that there are a number of well-established organisations on Merseyside that were initiated by either one person or a very small number of people. Examples covered by this research ranged from community groups to a toy library and several medical charities. Additionally, there were also a number of national organisations whose formal representation on Merseyside was through a single individual who would also have been excluded if the definition had been limited to a 'body of persons'.

A second problematical area is tied to the notion of 'self-government' in that it is unlikely that any particular voluntary agency has absolute self-government. This is due to the restrictions of funding regimes, the impacts of legislation and the vagaries of local authorities. So, in the context of this definition, 'self-government' is taken to be a relative term.

One advantage of this definition is that it excludes bodies such as the Police Authority who are part of the Government yet allows for the inclusion of the majority of housing associations and many community businesses. Established community businesses that become self-sustaining, profit-making organisations usually pass from the voluntary sector into the private sector, although there may be exceptions such as organisations established to distribute profits 'for the good of the community' (deciding what constitutes 'for the good of the community' and who decides it is another matter altogether). This looser definition also allows for the inclusion of agencies such as credit unions into the voluntary sector as it would be difficult to dispute that they seek to act for the good of the community in those areas where they are established (see chapter 5 below) and essentially they are non-profit making as members are paid a dividend based on the number of loans rather than a set rate of interest. The definition utilised for this research is very similar to the one utilised by the Liverpool Council for Voluntary Service (LCVS) which was taken from the 1985 Housing Act for the same reasons outlined above.

The question of definition is extremely complex; however, it is also an extremely important one because it has far reaching ramifications. In the above discussion, the various definitions include or exclude different types of voluntary sector agency and this can have serious implications when assessing, for example, the levels of funding

the sector accesses. This particular problem is highlighted in chapter 4 below when comparing the results from this research to the results obtained from the research of Shore, Knapp, Kendall and Carter (1994). It also has implications as to how the voluntary sector is consolidated into the wider social, economic and political theorisations discussed in detail in section 2.5 below.

2.3 A History of the UK Voluntary Sector

The above section outlined the multiplicity of problems involved in a definition of what constitutes a voluntary sector organisation. These difficulties have arisen because of the complexity of the sector which in turn is due to its long history, a history that, in the UK at least, predates capitalism by centuries. This next section details a history of the voluntary sector within the UK, outlines major developments within the sector and attempts to place them in a political and socio-economic context whilst acknowledging that this is only a very 'broad brush' account.

2.3:1 *Origins*

Little is known of the development of the voluntary sector before the late Middle Ages although Gosden (1973) describes how some friendly societies claim a history going back to 55AD and Rubin (1991) describes the founding of hospitals, such as the St. John the Evangelist in Cambridge by a group of burgesses, throughout the 12th and 13th centuries. By the late Middle Ages, however, philanthropic activity such as alms giving and care of the poor usually in the form of the 'dole' which was a gift of money or food, was almost completely the province of the Catholic church (Bruce, 1961; Hetherington, 1963). These doles were distributed indiscriminately which had particular social consequences (Jordan, 1959). According to Whelan (1996), structural changes in the national economy at this time, especially in agriculture whereby arable land was turned over into pasture, had meant that there were bands of unemployed men roaming the countryside looking for work. For some, the attraction of the dole meant that they had no need to work even though they were capable and they became the 'lustie beggars' of the sixteenth century and a threat to law and order. Plagues, wet summers and poor harvests during the years 1594-1597 (Bruce, 1961) and wars also contributed to the breakdown of the social and economic systems as manors

decayed and could no longer provide support for families (Whelan, 1996). In addition to these problems, the dissolution of the monasteries and the confiscation of their property by Henry VIII ensured that there was no effective welfare system which 'spawned a new kind of poor with which the sixteenth century sought to deal in an amazed and awkward incertitude' (Jordan, 1959, p55).

The Act for the Relief of the Poor which was passed in 1597 was an attempt to tackle the problem of 'lustie beggars' whilst at the same time, ensure that people no longer starved in the streets thereby stopping the possibility of revolution (Bruce, 1961; Kriedte, 1983; Pollard, 1981). The Poor Law ensured that every parish authority could raise a local tax or 'rate' and use it to employ the poor and unemployed and to apprentice their children (Bruce, 1961; Whelan, 1996).

The Provision of Abiding Places Act of 1598 ensured that all parishes had provision for three classes of the poor. Those who could not work through either age or infirmity were to be housed in 'Impotent Poorhouses', those who could work in 'Able-bodied Poorhouses' and 'unregenerate idlers' in 'Houses of Correction'; usually all three were under one roof (Bruce, 1961). Although the parish was used as the administrative unit of the Poor Law, clergymen and the church were not mentioned in the Act marking a critical transition from the church as providers to the poor, to secular institutions (Whelan, 1996). However, regardless of these institutions, private charitable action, either directly or by bequest did more for the poor (Bruce, 1961; Jordan; 1959; Whelan 1996) via the 1597 statute of charitable trusts which allowed a deed of trust bequeathed to good works to continue in that purpose in perpetuity (Jordan, 1959; Whelan 1996). The purpose of this statute was to encourage civic responsibility in private citizens as a way to solve social problems and it was very successful with a fourfold expansion in relief during a period when the population, at the most, only doubled (Whelan, 1996).

Religious and political upheaval were prevalent throughout the 17th century. Charles I's attempt to govern without Parliament culminated in the English Civil War (1642-1648) between the Anglican "Royalists" or "Cavaliers" and the Church's Puritan "Parliamentarians" or "Roundheads". Religious intolerance veered one way and then

another throughout the period and an element of peace was only introduced when Charles II was restored to the throne in 1660 (Hughes, 1995). The Civil War marked the diminution of care of the poor as the Tudor system fell into decline due to pressures brought about by the war (Ware, 1989). This lack of care hardened into a change in attitude after the Civil War when the puritan ethic came to the forefront whereby worldly goods were seen as a sign of moral worth, the poor had no worldly goods therefore they had no morals and were deserving of reproach (Bruce, 1961). This became enshrined in law in the 1662 Act of Settlement and Removal whereby anyone not in the possession of property and who was living outside their own parish and unable to guarantee that they would not become a charge on the parish in which they were currently residing was removed to their native parish which was legally obliged to provide relief. Settlement or guarantee of relief was obtained by birth, marriage, apprenticeship, living in a parish for a set period or by being in continuous employment for 12 months. To save the rates the poor were discouraged to marry, employment was curtailed before 12 months were up and cottages were destroyed (Bruce, 1961).

The next major development in the care of the poor was the principle of associated philanthropy which emerged late in the 17th century. Prior to this development, charitable works were the perquisite of wealthy benefactors, usually deathbed gifts to found a hospital, school or almshouse. This new principle pooled the limited resources of many individuals to achieve the same goal (Whelan, 1996). The first organisation to benefit from this new approach was the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge (SPCK) which encouraged clergy and congregations throughout the country to initiate charity schools for the education of the poor. The guiding principle of a central committee co-ordinating activities became a blueprint for subsequent enterprises and, of the five new teaching hospitals that were initiated in London during the period 1720-1745, four of them were built by utilising these two principles (Owen, 1965; Whelan, 1996).

2.3:2 *Industrial Revolution*

The 18th century ushered in a more peaceful time during which the population of England and Wales grew by nearly 50%, from 6 million in 1741 to almost 9 million in

1801. The 19th century saw the population increase even faster, it doubled to 17.9 million by 1851 and doubled again to 36.1 million by 1911 (Lawton, 1986). The rise in population coincided with the start of the Industrial Revolution in the late 18th century. This meant that not only were there increasing pressures on food resources due to the increase in population, but, the population was becoming concentrated in those areas where industry was based, namely the northern coalfields, and so there were fewer people left on the land to produce food (Overton, 1986). The 1790's also saw a series of bad harvests and this combination of factors led to massive rises in the price of food, especially bread (Bruce, 1961). Additionally, the French Revolution (1789-1799) was sowing seeds of insurrection in the population and there was a real possibility of a similar revolution happening in the UK (Owen, 1965). These pressures meant that by 1802, one in ten of the population was on relief (Golding and Middleton, 1982) and, in some agricultural areas in southern England, which were under the Speenhamland system whereby wages were supplemented according to bread prices and the size of family, this rose to over 20% of the population (Marshall, 1978). The pressures on the welfare system caused it to collapse under the burden and led to the complete reformation of the English Poor Laws in 1834 (Bruce, 1961; Levitt, 1986).

The new system replaced the parish based administration by a national system of administration based on Boards of Guardians and a number of parishes were amalgamated (Levitt, 1986), an alteration that began the shaping of the modern English government (Bruce, 1961). The new system was viewed with admiration by other European governments as it united 'public health and welfare services under a single ministry while allowing scope for local initiative' (Weindling, 1991, p194). The system was far more ruthless than previous ones and the guiding philosophy was that pauperism amongst the able-bodied was due to moral failure and should not be encouraged by the state, provision should only be given under such harsh conditions that the able-bodied poor would need to be totally devoid of hope to accept relief (Martin, 1971). The conditions in the workhouses for able-bodied people were so bad that many people took to the road rather than endure them. They reasoned that although they might starve slowly on the road, there was still the possibility of finding work, somewhere, whereas if they entered the workhouse they would almost certainly die quickly due to malnutrition, disease, ill-health, ill-treatment and overwork (Martin,

1971). The Poor Law commissioners had assumed that if relief such as the Speenhamland system ceased then agricultural wages would rise; however, it did not happen and more people left the land to work on transport links or in factories. Changes in agricultural practices and foreign competition later in the century drove even more into the expanding cities exacerbating the problems there (Bruce, 1961; Overton, 1986).

The authors of the *Poor Law Report* which led to the 1834 Poor Law assumed that private charity would support the proposed system and alleviate 'cases of real hardship' (Bremner, 1994, p101). However, the authors did not favour the forms of charity that had been the vogue in previous centuries as it was believed that they encouraged 'pauperism' or 'welfare dependency'. Additionally, the four Commissions established by Parliament to investigate charities during the period 1819 to 1834 found that in a number of instances the funds belonging to charities had gone missing, were misappropriated or were used for purposes other than those for which they had originally been intended. This finding in turn inspired Parliament to create a permanent charity commission in 1853 to correct abuses and to give closer supervision (Bremner, 1994; Cohen, 1949).

The moralising thesis that underlay the 1834 Poor Law, combined with the more tolerant attitude of other welfare reformers, resulted in a massive surge in welfare activities throughout the country and the nineteenth century became the 'great age of philanthropy' (Whelan, 1996, p14). "For the cure of every sorrow...there are patrons, vice-presidents and secretaries...for the diffusion of every blessing...there is a committee" (Sir James Stephen, 1849, quoted in Whelan, 1996, p15). Activities included soup kitchens, schools, hospitals, provision of medical services, movements for the improvements of industrial working conditions and housing, compulsory education, district visiting to 'channel relief to the most necessitous of the poor' (Owen, 1965, p141), charities for the reclamation of prostitutes and drunkards and the saving of drowning persons, friendly societies, trade clubs and many many more (Bruce, 1961; Owen, 1965; Whelan, 1996). Indeed, the UK was 'overrun with philanthropy' (Whelan, 1996, p14) with the voluntary sector employing an estimated 20,000 paid female workers, half a million full-time female volunteers (Whelan, 1996)

and with a combined income that was more than the income of the governments of several European nations (Owen, 1965). However, all of this activity did not mean that the recipients were grateful. There is strong evidence that many took exception to the moralising 'interference' or 'ill-informed and ill-inspired meddling' (Simey, 1992, p58) of middle class women, especially when visited by four or five different agencies in one week (Bremner, 1994; Owen, 1965; Simey, 1992).

This duplication of effort had been noted by many and, in 1869, the Charity Organisation Society (COS) or the London Society for Organising Charitable Relief to give it its original title, was initiated to tackle the co-ordination of charitable efforts in London. However, the COS never fulfilled its avowed intentions as it did not organise the charities in London, the Poor Law authorities and voluntary agencies did not adopt its philosophy and it did not 'establish itself as a kind of super clearing-house for metropolitan charities' (Owen, 1965, p216). Indeed, as time progressed, the COS' 'grasp of social and political realities became more and more tenuous' (Owen, 1965, p216).

According to Bremner (1994), modern philanthropy emerged between 1885-1915 as the multi-millionaire entrepreneurs of the Industrial Revolution sought ways to dispose of surplus wealth. The sheer amounts of money involved and the social and often geographical distance these benefactors were from the poor meant that individual 'acts of kindness' were out of the question and so they favoured large-scale investment in education, research and cultural institutions. This also coincided with changes in the lot of the working classes as various Acts of Parliament improved their living and working conditions - although for the very poor, things stayed much the same (Bruce, 1961). For example, the housing problems of the cities were eased due to a combination of improvements in transport and the introduction of workmen's (sic) fares by the Cheap Trains Act of 1883 - which enable towns and cities to spread out - and, housing associations, formed to let out decent homes at a modest amount (Bruce, 1961) as well as other forms of activity geared towards the improvement of working class homes such as the introduction of sanitation and running water (Bruce, 1961; Owen, 1965; Whelan, 1996). Additionally, the standards laid down in the Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909, which consolidated all previous legislation, were the best

in the world and played a major part in the improvement of national health (Bruce, 1961). However, some of the above mentioned philanthropists pre-empted the Act and built their own model villages such as Bournville (1879), Port Sunlight (1888) and Letchworth Garden City (1903) to house their factory workers. These villages were designed to have low-density, good quality housing interspersed with parks, gardens and open spaces to provide light and fresh air and 'healthy' leisure facilities such as allotments and cricket pitches; public houses were frowned upon and so were not provided within the confines of the villages (Cherry, 1988).

2.3:3 *Voluntary Action versus the State*

Around the beginning of the twentieth century, successive Acts of Parliament - such as the Eight Hour Day (1908) and the Shops Act (1911), which granted early closing and a weekly half-holiday - ensured that the employed working classes were now in possession of something only previous enjoyed by the middle and upper classes - leisure time - and a number of new voluntary agencies emerged in response such as working men's clubs, choirs and bands (Bruce, 1961). In addition, there was the development of clubs for boys and girls, training organisations for young people such as the Boys Brigade and the Girl Guides, the growth of building societies and the movement of women into politics via organisations such as the Women's Co-operative Movement and the suffragette movement (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Simey, 1992).

It was also around the turn of the century that the term 'unemployment' began to be used when the hard winter of 1895 produced a Select Committee on Distress From Want of Employment, a clumsy title that reveals it was an unfamiliar concept (Bruce, 1961, p159). Nevertheless, clumsy or not, the findings of this committee ensured that the term and the concept soon became common coinage as it revealed that there was a large pool of labour that was chronically underemployed, consisting of unskilled males who were seasonal and part-time workers and yet would do anything to avoid the stigma of pauperism as defined by the Poor Law (Bruce, 1961; Owen, 1965). The turn of the century saw an upswing in the numbers of unemployed as UK industry stagnated in the face of foreign competition and there were a number of 'hunger marches' to alert the rest of the population to their plight (Bruce, 1961). Parliament finally acknowledged that the voluntary sector could not cope with the pressures of providing

relief to such large numbers, although it had made valiant efforts, and ushered in the 1905 Unemployed Workmen Act which marked a turning point in social care as it determined that relief would be administered by the state - although initially the state was heavily reliant on the voluntary sector to provide the funding for this relief (Bruce, 1961; Owen, 1965). The Act was confirmed by the new Liberal Government in 1906 who also voted it £200,000 of Treasury money and by doing so confirmed that unemployment was now a national responsibility (Bruce, 1961).

Pensions Acts followed swiftly (1908 and 1911) and the National Insurance Bill in 1911 whereby workers were insured against sickness and unemployment. Trade Unions and Friendly Societies had attempted something of the sort in the past but had been unsuccessful (Martin, 1971). The contributions were called 'Ninepence for Fourpence' as the employee paid 4d, the employer paid 3d and the government paid 2d (Bruce, 1961). Although the voluntary sector was still at the forefront of relief in many areas, the state was making great strides in co-ordinating and nationalising aspects of welfare. It was also around this time that a new voluntary sector organisation emerged that would eventually fulfil the need to co-ordinate voluntary sector activities within a region - the local Councils for Voluntary Aid, who evolved over time into Councils for Voluntary Service (Poole, 1960).

After the First World War there was a major slump (see also chapter 1, section 1:5) and as the numbers of unemployed escalated the national insurance system collapsed and welfare reverted back to the Poor Law system. As the crisis worsened a means test was introduced (Martin, 1971). By September 1932 there were between six and seven million people on the 'dole' (Martin, 1971) and the vast majority of charitable effort was absorbed by the problems associated with unemployment, with unemployment clubs a fixture in many parts of the country (Bruce, 1961; Poole, 1960). The crisis did not end until the Second World War (Martin, 1971).

After the Second World War the state emerged as the major provider of welfare in the UK following the Beveridge Report of 1942 which detailed the need for five freedoms: the freedom from want, relieved by benefits; the freedom from disease, relieved by a National Health Service; the freedom from ignorance, by the provision of free education; the freedom from squalor, by the provision of decent municipal housing and

good town planning; and, the freedom from idleness, by full employment (Martin, 1971). The majority of these 'freedoms' were enshrined within a series of Acts of legislation that cumulatively came to be called the 'welfare state'. The first was The Education Act of 1944 which established the universal right to free secondary education, funded by central and local government and which consisted of local authority run schools as well as voluntary schools. The National Health Service Act (1946) followed and established the universal right to medical attention. Central government directly funded and ran the service and most of the existing voluntary hospitals were brought under the wing of the NHS via nationalisation. The Family Allowances Act (1946) granted a set amount for each child to all families to help provide food and clothing for children. The National Insurance Act (also 1946) simplified the previous system. Insurance was paid at a flat rate by both employer and employee and was administered by central government. The National Assistance Act of 1948, repealed the existing Poor Law legislation and created a single allowance that was available to all unemployed people whose financial resources were below a level set by Parliament. This Act also ensured that local authorities provided residential care for the elderly. The 1948 Children Act emphasised the need for all children to have a family or a substitution for a family and the Act provided a service that would ensure this for children without a normal home life (Bruce, 1961; Martin, 1971; Owen, 1965).

The sum total of all of these Acts was that the voluntary sector became what Owen (1965, p527) called the 'junior partner in the welfare state'. However, this did not happen immediately; after each Act there was a hiatus and many voluntary agencies 'were unable to discover whether it was their duty to cease their activities, to continue them until such a time as statutory authorities were ready to take over, to continue on a diminished scale or to continue and expand' (Poole, 1960, p78). This was a period of real concern to the voluntary sector because the general population now believed that the sector was no longer necessary as provision was now assigned to the state and funding through donations dropped dramatically. And yet, paradoxically, there was an increase in demand for voluntary sector services to ameliorate resettlement and peace time adjustment problems and to provide personal services other than residential care (Poole, 1960). Additionally, although many of the voluntary sector's activities had been taken over by the state, there were still many other areas where the state had

made no impact whatsoever. For example, those organisations concerned with neighbourhood and group work, including youth work, found that rather than their activities becoming superfluous, there was instead a plethora of new opportunities opening in front of them due to the housing drive which was creating new communities; they were only limited by funding or rather the lack of it (Poole, 1960). Conservation organisations such as the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and the National Trust also continued with very little change as did the Royal National Lifeboat's national rescue service (Kendall and Knapp, 1996; Taylor and Lansley, 1992). As time progressed and the voluntary sector adjusted to the realities of the 'welfare state', many other organisations found that state provision in their areas of expertise meant that their own resources were freed up and could be spent on research and training rather than upkeep which meant that they continued, albeit in an altered capacity (Owen, 1965). Also, the expanded role of the state meant that there was a new demand for advice and informational services to negotiate the new legislation and improve the quality of public services (Taylor and Lansley, 1992; also see chapter 5 below).

Central Government recognised that the new legislation would have enormous implications for the voluntary sector and Lord Nathan chaired a Royal Commission to consider these. The findings of the Commission led to the Charities Act of 1960 which consolidated previous legislation, set up a central register of charities, allowed the Commission to pool the resources of small charities for joint investment and gave the Charity Commission jurisdiction over fund-raising or 'collecting' charities as well as the endowed ones (Owen, 1965).

By the 1960's it was obvious that the welfare state had not eradicated poverty and new groups began to emerge to campaign for a betterment in the lot of the poor (Owen, 1965). The 1960's was also a time of social movements such as feminism, civil rights, the consumer, environmental and the peace movements which all gave rise to another swathe of voluntary sector organisations. These new organisations gave the voluntary sector a new image as they were not linked to the philanthropic and paternalistic traditions of the past (Younghusband, 1978) and there was a growth in local and Central Government funding of the sector throughout the 1960's and 1970's, even

though there were some Labour local authorities that still distrusted the sector, and some Conservative local authorities which expected it to pay for itself (Taylor and Lansley, 1992).

Although the voluntary sector benefited from the post-war boom, by the 1970's unemployment started rising again (see chapter 1 above), leading to a change in the philosophy of the Government to viewing a 'rolling back of the state' as the only way forward in welfare provision (see chapters 1, 4, 7 and 8) and a large number of measures such as CCT and 'opting out' legislation in education, housing and health have been introduced to further this aim (Taylor and Lansley, 1992). The remainder of this research concentrates on the impacts that this 'rolling back of the state' has had on the Merseyside voluntary sector over the past three decades and what conclusions can be drawn for the future.

2.3:4 *Conclusions*

It will be obvious to anybody with even a cursory knowledge of the voluntary sector that the history discussed in this chapter is incomplete. It has not discussed political movements, other than in a general sense or dwelled upon the individuals who pushed hard for social changes such as Octavia Hill, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Charles Booth and Dr Thomas Barnardo to name but a few, whose work led to much of the legislation that was passed throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or discussed the works of individual philanthropists such as Lord Shaftesbury. Its intention instead, was specifically to give a flavour of the long history of the voluntary sector in the UK, the social and economic complexities, developments and pressures surrounding it and how these formed and informed the present day voluntary sector. The next section moves downwards in resolution to the local scale. Although this research is based on the Merseyside voluntary sector, the development of the sector, and therefore the history of it belongs to Liverpool. That is where it all started and that is where the majority of the present voluntary sector is still based (see also chapters 3 and 4 below).

2.4 The Liverpool Voluntary Sector

Liverpool holds a unique position in the history of the UK voluntary sector as it demonstrated a very high degree of organised voluntary effort from an early stage in its development as a city (Owen, 1965). This organisation meant that it became a source of ideas, practices and techniques that powerfully influenced the voluntary sector in the rest of the country and whilst Owen admits that although it is too much to suggest that 'what Liverpool thinks today, the rest of the country will think tomorrow' (1965, p454) he does demonstrate that a number of important nineteenth and twentieth century voluntary sector principles and techniques originated in the city.

As chapter one, section 1.5 details, prior to the industrial revolution the population of Merseyside was only small and so had not attracted the types and numbers of charities that older and larger centres of population had (Owen, 1965). However, with the advent of the industrial revolution, it soon became apparent that philanthropy was a necessary adjunct, essential in bolstering the nascent socio-economic system that underpinned the new industrialism. As it was the port and port activities that dominated the local labour market the employers had little social contact with employees and had little need to maintain a stable relationship with the workforce as there were always people clamouring for the jobs that were available and usually at a lower rate of pay (Lane, 1997; Meegan, 1995; Owen, 1965; Simey, 1992, see also chapter 1, section 1.5 and chapter 5, section 5.2) which meant that there was desperate need for relief. For example, between 1885-1886 of the applicants for relief, almost 21% were dockers and 13% porters (Central Relief Society Annual Report, 1885-1886, p6 quoted in Owen, 1965, p454).

Throughout the early part of the nineteenth century there was little to distinguish the Liverpool voluntary sector from that of the rest of the UK[1]. There were similar institutions and similar individual devoted efforts such as those of the Reverend John Hamilton Thom who persuaded his wealthy congregation to establish a Domestic Mission and to appoint a Minister to the Poor, the Reverend John Johns. Together they brought to the attention of their sponsors that the conditions of life in the 'Other

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[1] With some notable exceptions such as the Liverpool Night Asylum (1830) and Kitty Wilkinson's campaign for wash-houses and public baths in the early 1830's (Owen, 1965).

Liverpool' were due to the failure of society to provide a physical minimum for civilised living and not through moral turpitude (Owen, 1965; Simey, 1992). There was also the same public opinion that 'poverty had somehow got out of hand, and called for emergency measures' (Simey, 1992, p32).

As bad as things were for the poor of Liverpool in the early part of the nineteenth century, they took a turn for the worse in the 1840's when a succession of poor potato harvests in Ireland led to a flood of Irish immigrants into the city. During the winter of 1846 to June of 1847, it was estimated that 300,000 Irish immigrants entered the city with between 60,000 to 80,000 remaining which created chaos given the already strained resources of the city (Simey, 1992, p41). Eventually, cholera broke out and even though Liverpool had appointed the first Medical Officer of Health in the country, Dr Duncan, in 1846, he had little effect on the ensuing crisis during which many, including the Reverend Johns who contracted the disease during his visits to the sick, died (Simey, 1992). Voluntary sector activity throughout this period and the next decade was widespread and very much individualistic effort, a hotchpotch of agencies that appeared incapable of sustained relief and it became very clear that the sector could not cope with the sheer scale of poverty; the needs of the population were too great, with some obtaining aid from several organisations and others not receiving anything (Simey, 1992). The disorganisation was rife even in the work of the three major relief agencies, the District Provident Society, the Stranger's Friend Society and the Charity Society, who also duplicated and overlapped each others' efforts (Owen, 1965; Simey 1992).

One of the first innovatory schemes devised to improve the lot of the poor was the Liverpool District Nursing Society. This was founded by William Rathbone as a memorial to his wife who died in 1859 and was intended as a nursing service for the poor. Rathbone had major problems in starting the service as there was a shortage of good nursing staff. He appealed to Florence Nightingale for advice and she suggested that he start his own training school. The Liverpool Training School was built at Rathbone's expense and trained nurses for the new service, the infirmary and for private patients and was the start of the district nursing association. The new service

was up and running by 1865 and greatly strengthened the case for those who were calling for adequate medical care for the nation's poor (Owen, 1965; Simey 1992).

Liverpool's claim to being the first organised voluntary sector probably came about through serendipity rather than innovatory practices as there were voluntary sector workers in a number of the major cities throughout the UK that were calling for similar measures around the same time (Owen, 1965). Nevertheless, the Liverpool Central Relief Society (LCRS) which was formed in 1863 did predate the COS by a number of years. Unlike the COS, the Liverpool society did not envisage itself as a holding company or clearing house but rather a relief agency that would dispense funds after full investigation into the circumstances of the applicant, thus exposing fraudulent claims (Owen, 1965; Simey, 1992). There is no doubt that the LCRS helped many individuals over the years but, 'the problem of removing poverty and suffering remain[ed] as great as ever' (Simey, 1992, p138).

1909 saw the advent of the Liverpool Council of Voluntary Aid which was believed to be the only one of its kind at the time (Simey, 1992), however, it was actually the third. The first was a Council for Social Welfare in Stepney which did not prosper and the second, also a Council for Social Welfare, in Hampstead did (Poole, 1960). These Councils built upon the slightly earlier Guild of Help movement which 'sought to gather into a well-organised body 'all in the community who have the desire and more or less capacity for social service'' (Brasnett, 1969, p6). Nevertheless, it was the Liverpool model that was disseminated and used in the rest of the country and elsewhere in the world (Owen, 1965). Its purpose was to further the aims of Liverpool charities and co-ordinate their activities. It had gained the support of the LCRS and set up a central register of cases in order to foster co-ordination and by the mid-1930's had records of approximately 170,000 cases, had absorbed the LCRS in 1932 and had renamed itself as the Liverpool Council for Social Service in 1935 (Owen, 1965).

The Council has an impressive record of innovatory services. One of the most important was and is the provision of financial services to local voluntary sector agencies and funding for special grants for capital expenditure and new activities 'as a primer of the pump [which] has been a major factor in the endless succession of new

schemes, ideas and services which have originated in Liverpool' (Poole, 1960, p44). The Council also introduced the seven year covenant which tried and tested Section 20 of the 1922 Finance Act which provided income tax and super-tax relief on covenanted subscriptions to charities over a period of more than six years. Where the Council's scheme differed from the one envisaged in the Act was that the donation could be sub-divided at the donor's discretion and paid to a number of charities. The scheme was found to be legal and was quickly adopted by other Councils of Social Service (Owen, 1965; Poole, 1960). 1921 also saw the beginning of the Council acting as trustee to other charities when it became incorporated. Six years later it became a charitable trust corporation administering charitable trusts and funds and, much later, it developed the Personal Charitable Trust for donors with capital and who wished the interest to go to charity (Liverpool Council for Voluntary Service, 1996).

The Council (which changed its name to the Liverpool Council for Voluntary Service (LCVS) in 1974) has not just operated as a funding and co-ordination agency, it has also initiated and promoted new services. For example, it started its own Personal Service Committee which evolved into the Personal Service Society or PSS which in turn initiated an Old People's Welfare Committee which was in time to provide the model for the Age Concern movement, and the bureaux of information that became the basis of the Citizens' Advice Bureaux. More recently LCVS introduced the Merseyside Volunteer Bureau which matches volunteers to voluntary work (LCVS, 1996; Owen, 1965; Poole, 1960; Simey 1992).

The Liverpool voluntary sector is as diverse and innovative as it has always been with a wide variety of agencies that include housing associations, credit unions, community groups, arts groups, organisations for young people, organisations for older people, agencies aimed at regeneration, training organisations and playgroups, to name a few. Two organisations that date from the 1970's are the Co-operative Development Services (CDS) and the Community Technical Services Agency (COMTECHSA). CDS is concerned with housing and, dependent on the needs of the client, will explain the realities a housing co-operative or association faces, suggest design alternatives, advise or provide technical services and manage an estate when built if necessary (Middleton, 1991). COMTECHSA has a wider remit and will offer its services free to

organisations without funding although it will claim them back at a later date if funding becomes available. Its director, Leslie Forsyth, was a key actor in initiating a nationwide association of Community Technical Aid Centres (ACTAC) in 1983 which now has over 100 members (Middleton, 1991).

The sheer vitality of the Liverpool voluntary sector was exemplified in 1989 when the BBC ran a nationwide competition, 'It's My Town' for community projects aimed at improving the quality of life - they received more entries from Liverpool than from any other city (Middleton, 1991). Building on this tradition, one of the most recent additions to community regeneration strategies have been the Pathways groups (see chapter 7 below) ushered in under Objective One to promote partnership in regeneration strategies. They are seen as a possible blueprint for future regeneration activities.

2.5 Theorising the Voluntary Sector

Although there is a large body of literature representing a long academic interest in the activities and roles of the voluntary sector, until recently very few of the mainstream theoretical developments had attempted its incorporation. The vast majority of modern economic, social and political theory has utilised a public-private sector model as the basis for theoretical and analytical debate. This is despite the fact that the major social and political thinkers of the late 19th and early 20th century, such as Herbert Spencer and Beatrice and Sidney Webb, were preoccupied with the refinement of theory relating to the provision of social need to incorporate charity and self-help (Lewis, 1995).

In general, voluntary sector literature focuses on three main areas: the role of the voluntary sector, utilising empirical data to formulate conclusions but without any attempt to theorise (see, for example, Elsdon, Reynolds and Stewart, 1995; Morrison and Parker, 1994); issues in, and the organisation of, voluntary sector agencies with some theorisation, but with its focus on what motivates volunteers or how an agency functions albeit without relating this to external society (see Batsleer, Cornforth and Paton, 1992; Billis, 1993); and historical reviews of charity and the voluntary sector (see Bruce, 1961; Owen, 1965; Simey, 1992; Simey, 1996; Whelan, 1996). However,

there is a small but growing body of literature that is geared towards theorising the voluntary sector (cf. Hula, Jackson and Orr, 1997; James, 1987, 1997; Kendal and Knapp, 1996; Weisbrod 1975; 1977). Kendall and Knapp's (1996) book *The Voluntary Sector in the UK* is slightly different in that it is linked to a major international study of the voluntary sector and attempts to cover far more ground than is usual. It gives an historical outline of the sector and analyses the sector in relation to current social, economic and political events and the next section of this chapter is deeply indebted to Kendall and Knapp's clear outlining of the history of the theoretical debates that have dominated academic interest in the sector in recent years.

2.5:1 *Outlining the Theoretical Debates*

Economic theory has proved a rich seam to mine in pursuit of theoretical understanding of the voluntary sector. During the 1980's the attractive theories of the American academics Weisbrod, James, Hansmann and Ben-Ner ensured that the voluntary sector was also probably given the highest profile it had ever received by theoreticians (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). Weisbrod (1975, 1977) initiated the interest by expanding orthodox economic theory to incorporate the voluntary sector by considering it to be an efficient response to market 'failure'. The supply and demand mechanisms of the private sector break down in certain cases where 'goods' (or services) are 'jointly consumed, non-excludable and non-rival - in part because of the so-called free-rider problem, wherein the benefits of consumption can be reaped without paying' (Kendall and Knapp, 1996, p12). The State or public sector is then directed to fulfil these kinds of need via the ballot box. Although the State may want to, and may try to, fulfil the demands that arise through this 'market failure' it is unable so to do because of the scarcity of resources and so this joint 'failure' allows for the presence of a third sector to fulfil the residual demand as *'extra-governmental providers of collective consumption goods*. They will 'supplement' the *public* provision (which can be zero) and provide an alternative to the *private*-sector provision of private-good substitutes for collective goods' (Weisbrod, 1975, p182, author's italics) - in other words, it is an efficient response to fill the 'gaps' that the other two sectors leave. However, this analysis leaves the supply side undertheorized - an omission that James (1987) attempted to rectify. She argues that 'excess demand

and differentiated demand for externality-yielding goods' (1997, p2) may not be the only reason for the existence of a voluntary sector. And, supported by extensive evidence, she concludes that other contributing factors are personal and political power, religion and the pursuit of profit, albeit disguised under a non-profit bushel.

Voluntary sector organisations are constrained both by law and by constitution on how they distribute net earnings and this, according to Hansmann's (1980) 'contract failure' theory, makes them appear more 'trustworthy' to consumers than for-profit organisations because it is assumed there is only an altruistic intent. Therefore, once again, the non-profit organisations provide an effective solution because if they act in accordance with consumer expectations, they are saving society the monetary costs of either monitoring for-profit organisations or the costs incurred by their exploitation of the consumers. Ben-Ner and Van Hoomissen (1993) take the macro-economic approach a stage further with their 'stakeholder theory' of non-profit organisations. These organisations are portrayed as providing 'trust goods' and 'collective goods' both for their own benefit and also for 'non-controlling stakeholders' who do not participate directly in the governance of the organisation. This means that the organisations are both demanders and suppliers and therefore it is not in their interests to cut corners; this attracts the non-controlling stakeholders.

It is probably fair to say that the majority of these theories outlined above have a strong whiff of economic determinism about them and this has led rise to responses from other fields, most notably from political and social theorists, who dispute that the voluntary sector is this simplistic. The sector has a far more complex and dynamic structure than the economic theorists allow for.

Kendall and Knapp (1996) identify four major themes within this latter literature, two of which deal with organisational relationships with society and the other two which deal with their relationships with the state. The first, developed by Salamon (1987, 1995) and Kuhnle and Selle (1992) argues that the voluntary sector is not in competition with the public and private sectors, neither is it a 'gap filler', but rather it has evolved in a relationship of mutual dependence and co-operation. So much so that the State in many countries is the major funder and regulator of the sector. However,

as with the public and private sectors, the voluntary sector is not faultless, it displays weaknesses such as amateurism, paternalism, particularism and insufficiency - amongst others - which prompts state intervention via regulation (Kendall and Knapp, 1996). The problem with this approach, when applied to the UK, is that it does not explain why, if there is this discrete and co-dependent evolution that is not a response to 'gap filling', the numbers of voluntary agencies have fallen each time the Central Government has increased its welfare provision (Poole, 1960). Nor why, when State provision has failed, the numbers of organisations have increased (Owen, 1965; Simey 1992). It also effectively ignores the continuing rise of the contract culture within voluntary sector funding provision which is leading to a major alteration of funding regimes. This has meant that increasingly, the sector is having to adopt a more 'professional' approach in order to 'bid' for funding - either against other voluntary organisations or private sector companies and that rather than being independent, voluntary sector operations are often dictated by the terms of the contract (see chapter 6 below). In this respect it could be said to be adapting a 'market approach' in that it is having to respond to market-mediated strategies which usually result in either the lowest bid being accepted, which may either have a detrimental effect on the quality of the programme offered, or, proposed programmes being squeezed so that the state is only funding basic provision with anything extra being funded from the organisation's funds from elsewhere/ Increasingly it is becoming difficult to identify the differences between the organisational structures, ethos and management style of many of the larger voluntary sector organisations and those who are defined as private sector, as competition for contracts and funding is becoming the norm.

This approach also ignores the fact that politics matter in the relationship between the voluntary sector and local and Central Government. For example, left wing politicians often show hostility towards the voluntary sector (Lees and Mayo,1984) as it 'deprives people of jobs' (comment by ex-councillor (Liverpool Labour)). If a local council becomes dominated by this type of politics - as did Liverpool in the 1980's - regardless of what the wishes of Central Government are, co-operation and mutual dependence can soon be destroyed and life can be made very hard for agencies who are dependent on the state for either funding, offices or contracts (see chapter 7 below).

A second theme that Kendall and Knapp (1996) have identified in the relationships between the voluntary sector and the state is that the voluntary sector forms a buffer between the State and society by providing for those needs which cannot be fulfilled either by the State or by the for-profit sector (Seibel and Anheier, 1990). Seibel (1990) takes this argument further by postulating that the State fosters a strong voluntary sector in order to be seen to be attempting to solve intractable problems. However, this argument assumes the voluntary sector to be a passive recipient of state funding, intervention, regulation and direction. If this was indeed the case then innovation would be stifled and all of those areas with intractable social and economic problems would have a strong voluntary sector that was backed by the State in order to deflect any criticism of the State's handling of the problems. However, in many areas this is patently not the case. For example, this research has found that although Liverpool has a very strong voluntary sector as a whole, this strength is not equally distributed throughout the borough, there are areas of multiple deprivation that have an extremely weak voluntary sector or where the State only supports selected agencies. This holds true for the other boroughs in Merseyside, where some of the most deprived areas have the weakest voluntary sectors. Additionally, some of the most innovative ideas that have emerged from the voluntary sector have caused direct conflict with the State, and the lives of some of the great reformers such as Lord Shaftesbury are littered with examples. Often 'so-called' intractable problems are solely due to inertia by the State or by its officials and many voluntary sector groups only find acceptance and support when either the officials change or the directives of the State change - a strange sort of fostering (see chapter 7 below).

A third theme is one based on how the voluntary sector relates to society. Salamon and Anheier (1994) argue that there are three factors that contribute to a strong voluntary sector which are: the existence of a common law legal system which allows the right of association, an educated urban middle class which denotes economic development and a decentralised political system. These three factors then create a greater "social space" encouraging the voluntary sector to flourish. Again, other than on the macroscale, it is difficult to square this theory with what is actually happening in the UK.

The UK does have a common law legal system, it does have an educated urban middle class - witness most of the new Labour government - and ostensibly the political system is decentralised via the local authorities and, the voluntary sector *is* strong ergo the theory is correct. However, when looked at on the micro or local level it is much harder to demonstrate. For example, the decentralisation of political power is a fallacy. The past two decades of government have concentrated on *centralising* political power and decision making. Local authorities that flouted Central Government were penalised by rate capping and cuts to Central Government funding. And, although there is a now a Government that is supposedly committed to devolving power to local regions, other than the Scottish Parliament and the Assembly for Wales, things look set to continue in much the same manner as they have in recent years, with Regional Development Agencies taking over where Government Offices left off. A second example of the theory's failure on the micro level is that it presupposes a strong voluntary sector is dependent upon an educated urban middle class. On Merseyside, some of the areas of strongest voluntary and community action are in deprived areas where a high proportion of the population is poorly educated, unskilled and unemployed. In many of the suburban areas where the educated urban middle class live, there is a paucity of voluntary action other than that focused around the local churches or schools. It would appear then that the proponent of this theoretical analysis need to identify and acknowledge that its scale of resolution is macro-level and far more work needs to be done on it before it can be applied to the meso- or micro-levels.

The final theme that Kendall and Knapp (1996) identify is also based on the voluntary sector's relationship with society and concerns the notion of 'elites'. Some theorists, such as Williams (1989), Wolch (1990) and Beckford (1991), who argue from a Marxist or Neo-Marxist perspective, consider that philanthropy is either an expression of social control by a group of elites who effectively block social progress and that this effectively mirrors the capitalist system, or that it dispenses well-meaning palliatives that have the result of sustaining the system at the expense of the poor. However, it is difficult to understand how this theorisation could account for a large proportion of the British voluntary sector. Organisations such as pressure groups and community groups would appear to sit firmly outside this viewpoint. It is hard to see how, for

example, the 'elitist' volunteers in a mother and baby group or a talking book group or a hobby club could be exerting social control and blocking social progress. Even if the voluntary sector in any shape or form did not exist, it is unlikely that the increase in social and economic pressures would lead to a destruction of capitalism or even to revolution. What would probably happen is that the majority of law-abiding citizens who are trapped by circumstances beyond their control would become even more disempowered and disillusioned. This form of theorisation avoids considering the possibility that voluntary action can empower people and give them the confidence to take on issues that may seem insurmountable and win, and, that rather than hindering social progression, voluntary action can further it.

2.6 Regime Theory

One of the key themes in this research is the correlation between power relationships and marginalisation of particular sections of the population, such as the long-term unemployed (see chapter 5 below). An analysis of power relationships is crucial in the illustration of the importance of structure and agency in shaping the choices, constraints and strategies that the voluntary sector adopts to both continue its work and to how that work is actually conducted (see sections 2.3 and 2.4 above and, chapters 6 and 7 below). Theorisation of those relationships and changes is more problematic, as the section above has indicated, with no one theory seeming able to incorporate the 'loose and baggy monster'(Kendall and Knapp, 1995, p66) that is the voluntary sector. However, there is one theory, urban regime theory, which has emerged from the US literature and is perceived to have a more flexible and robust conceptual framework that allows for a plurality of outcomes as it allows for both historicity and for future developments (cf. Elkin, 1985, 1987a, 1987b: Fainstein *et al.*, 1986; Kantor, Savitch and Haddock, 1997; Lauria, 1997; Logan, Whaley and Crowder, 1997; Orr, 1992, 1993; Orr and Stoker, 1994; Rittberger, 1993a; Stone, 1987, 1989; Stone and Sanders, 1987) and is sparking interest as a way to conceptualise the voluntary sector (see, for example, Hula, Jackson and Orr, 1997; Salamon, 1987, 1995; Salamon and Anheier, 1997).

The initial work on Regime theory was by Elkin (1985; 1987a, 1987b) and Stone (1987; 1989). They drew on earlier research that had attempted to place the city into a

broader context (Ward, 1995a). Stone (1989, 6) defines a regime as '*the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out governing decisions*' (author's emphasis). These arrangements are necessary to '*manag[e] conflict* and *mak[e] adaptive responses* to social change' (author's emphasis). Stone stresses that 'to be effective, governments must blend their capacities with those of various nongovernmental actors' (1993, p7) and that the major functionaries in regimes are business interests and local politicians, although others such as the voluntary sector and church leaders may take part (1989).

Unlike some of the theorisations of the voluntary sector detailed above, cross-national comparisons utilising urban regime theory have compiled evidence to show that 'politics matter' and that within the political process there are a plurality of interests that combine to form a ruling coalition (Judd and Parkinson, 1990; Keating, 1991; Logan and Swanstrom, 1990; Rittberger, 1993a; Strom, 1996). To sustain the capacity to govern, coalitions alter, with ideology playing an important part in coalition formation and coherence (see chapter 7). Participants may remain within coalitions that do not match all of their own interests because more of those interests may be met from within the coalition than from outside it. However, regimes are not formed because one faction imposes its interests on the others, but because all the concerned parties perceive the regime to serve their own interests best, there is no single focus or hierarchy (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994). For example, a particular faction may not be able to mobilise resources to the same extent that a coalition with others could - in other words they are strategic partnerships formed to further the interests of the participants:

> Policy making is thus not simply a matter of choosing a reasonable course of action; it is shaped by the composition of the governing coalition, the terms that underlie the co-operation of coalition members with each other, and the resources they are capable of assembling.
> (Stone, Orr and Imbroscio, 1991, p224).

Stone (1989, 9) argues that 'urban regimes are perhaps best studied over time' in order to assess how and why different regimes emerge. DiGaetano and Klemanski (1994) argue that regimes emerge because of unique local circumstances and specific legislation that coincide at a particular time, they are not homogenous as suggested by

the USA literature (cf. Elkin, 1987a, 1987b; Fainstein and Fainstein, 1986) - in other words regimes are time **and** space specific. Regime theory also stresses the importance of historical and cultural factors that influence those in the public sector who form coalitions with those in the private sector (Ward, 1995a; 1995b, see also chapter 7) and is critical of a perceived bias towards the interests of business which is defined solely as growth (Elkin, 1987a, 1987b; Stone, 1989).

One of the major theoretical problems with regime theory is that it was developed to interpret the governance or governing conditions within cities in the USA, which are very different to cities in the UK. For example, US cities have a very high degree of political, economic and social autonomy unlike their British counterparts and so it is very difficult to translate the theory wholesale to analyse British and most other European cities (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Harding 1991, 1994; Keohane, 1993; Rittberger, 1993b). The primary reason being that within the USA, the structure of government is far more decentralised than within Europe, and the strong public sector is fiscally independent and is used to working in partnership with the private sector to compete for funding (Cox and Mair, 1988). Additionally, the role of the private sector in 'growth coalitions' (Logan and Molotch, 1987) in the UK is much weaker than in the USA where it has had an influential role in 'shaping the urban system' (Logan and Molotch, 1987, p52). Within the UK, during the 1980's and 1990's the prerequisites for regime formation were essentially imposed by the increasingly centralist policies of the national government and, although there are signs of a sea-change in viewpoint from the Labour Government elected in May 1997, as yet these are only signs (see chapter 1 above). However, this top-down approach to urban regime formation is very different to the bottom-up reading of the US experience (Stone, 1989).

During the past few years attempts have been made to reconcile these differences by developing regime theory further (cf. DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Lauria, 1997; Rittberger, 1993a). This work has focused on particular characteristics identified as being of importance to the theory: regime formation - the processes underlying the formation of a regime; regime sustenance - how stable regimes are and

why; and regime 'characteristics' - the outcome of regimes as defined by identified typologies (Ward, 1995a; 1996).

The two basic criteria for regime formation are, that resources and the willingness to utilise those resources are not equally distributed (Stone, 1989). However, if a regime is to avoid being challenged it must present a united front to both the electorate and funding authorities and so must ensure co-operation amongst its members (Ward, 1995a) which means that they must be flexible and contain enough institutions and members to enable governing decisions to be carried out in an efficient manner. This flexibility ensures that the regimes are heterogeneous and are thus the product of 'local' conditions as they can operate policies of inclusion and also exclusion (DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994).

Analysis of regime sustainability has proven to be a problem as the typologies exemplified by researchers such as DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993b), and Keating (1991) focus on creating 'new' typologies for each individual local circumstance ignoring the wider political context which may in effect be forcing the regime formation thus reinforcing the empiricist critique of the theory (Ward, 1995a).
A number of academics have described regime characteristics (see Ward, 1995a for a full description of all typologies, see also chapter 1, section 1.3). These range from the 'entrepreneurial' regimes of Stone (1987, 1989) and Elkin, (1987) - also called by various other names by other academics (cf. DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Stone, Orr and Imbroscio, 1991) - which effectively 'sell' the locality and thus promote growth, usually measured by physical regeneration within the locality, on through the 'growth management' regimes of DiGaetano and Klemanski (1993a), through the 'symbolic' (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994) or 'progressive' regimes (Stone, 1987) that concentrate on community regeneration, to the 'caretaker' (Stone, 1987, 1989; Stone, Orr and Imbroscio, 1991; DiGaetano and Klemanski, 1993a) or 'organic' regimes (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994) that maintain the status quo and leave economic regeneration to others. However, other than providing *descriptions* of a regime at a specific moment in time, they have not been developed further so as allow for a more abstract theorisation of the regime formation processes that could be applied internationally.

Cox (1991) has detailed the problems with urban regime theory and these can be summarised into four general points. Firstly, the empiricist nature of the theory; there is a heavy reliance on case studies by which it is assumed that the abstract can be 'read off'. Secondly, the typologies such as those outlined above, focus almost completely upon the economic roles of regimes; little attention is given to the conditions and causal processes in which the regimes actually form, what Cox (1991) calls 'local dependency' (see also, Cox and Mair, 1988; 1989). Thirdly, Cox notes that regimes need to be embedded 'within a theoretical construction of the state, society and consciousness under capitalism' and fourthly (Cox, 1993), the number of dualities present in the theory such as global-local that are used without challenge indicates an under-theorisation as politics are reduced to the local level suggesting local autonomy - patently a concept with no validity within the UK. Cox's ideas have been rebutted by other theorists as merely exchanging one language for another (Fainstein, 1991; 1994), placing too much emphasis on politics and economics and ignoring the role that culture, ethnic tensions, market pressures, political conflicts, social welfare and possibly personal security have to play in regime formation (Logan, Whaley, Crowder, 1997; Sites, 1997; Stone, 1991). However, regardless of these rejoinders, the central fact remains in that urban regime theory does not address the causal processes by which regimes are formed, it is not enough to keep widening the definitions and typologies or pointing out the faults, there needs to be a more abstract level of theorisation (Ward, 1995a). Nevertheless, the theory is still a useful tool in examining the changes in Liverpool over the past decades as it emphasises 'the way governmental and non-governmental actors work across boundaries'(Stoker and Mossberger, 1994, p196) as the form of urban government alters and shifts and 'a crucial dimension to regime formation is the way local elites are able to manage their relationship with higher levels of government and the wider political environment" (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994, p199). As will be argued below, for Liverpool, these two points have had major impacts on the success and failure of certain regimes as the combination of almost Machiavellian manoeuvrings of key actors within the local political system, anti-local authority legislation and an antagonistic Central Government clearly demonstrates the shifting of coalitions in order to retain a political

power base. This was a crucial case of not who governed but, of who had the capacity to act and why (Leitner, 1992).

In recent years, a number of researchers have attempted to address the problems in applying urban regime theory outlined above (cf. Feldman, 1997; Goodwin and Painter, 1995; Hay and Jessop, 1995; Jessop, 1990, 1991, 1992a, 1992b, 1993,1994a, 1995b, 1997; Painter, 1995, 1997) and this thesis is an extension of the Jessop arguments outlined in the above literature.

Jessop (1997, p52) has argued that a neo-Gramscian approach could amend the problems of resolution and theoretical analysis in that:

> political, intellectual, and moral leadership [is] mediated through a complex ensemble of institutions, organizations, and forces operating within, oriented toward, or located at a distance from the juridico-political state apparatus.

And, Jessop proposes eight 'lessons' that need to be addressed by researchers utilising urban regime theory; these have been adopted in the theoretical analysis of this research in chapter 7 below.

The first point concerns the way in which the local economy is constituted 'as an object of economic *and* extra-economic regulation' (p60). This entails examining a 'local economy versus its supralocal economic environment' and 'the local economy versus its extra-economic local environment' (p60). This latter term refers to 'civil society'. The first distinction is based on the idea that within global economic development there is still room for manoeuvre and control of some of the conditions at the local level. The second distinction concerns the range of activities that need to be co-ordinated to form any given economic strategy. In essence Jessop is suggesting a broadening of the application of urban regime theory to fully include non-governmental or private sector key actors, and as this thesis has focused on that very element, the voluntary sector, this has been its intention from the outset, to highlight the necessity of incorporating this sector fully into urban regime theory. Additionally, as it places importance upon the role of a 'local' economy, this needs to be defined from the outset. For this thesis, the local economy to be examined in chapter 7 below, will be

that of the city of Liverpool, as not only has it the largest economy within Merseyside, but it also has the greatest concentration of population, and voluntary sector activity.

The second area that Jessop feels needs to be addressed derives from the concerns of regulation approach regarding theorisation. *Very* briefly, regulation theory is a recent attempt to explain the vagaries of capitalism and its inherent tendencies to expansion and crisis. Unlike other theories, regulation theory focuses on the national economy rather than the international economy. It sees the structure of each national economy and its concomitant internal relations as the primary building block. Thus, the international economy is the result of the relationships between individual nations rather than the result of a world system that determines national economies (Harris, 1988).

The theoretical framework of the theory was developed in France during the 1970's. The first published work (in English) on the theory was by Aglietta in 1979 and it was presented as a cohesive and coherent new approach to the study of capitalist economies (cf. Aglietta, 1979; Brenner and Glick, 1991; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992; Peck, 1996).

From the standpoint of the regulationists, capitalism '...is a contradictory and crisis-ridden economic system which requires some form of institutional regulation for its continued reproduction' (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992, p84). However, it is not the mode of production - that is, the form of production at any one time such as the mass production techniques of Fordism - that provides this regulation but the socio/political relationships and their struggles with each other and the mode of production at that particular time. These form an uneasy alliance with each other which changes after each structural crisis creating a new regulatory institution that heralds a new phase of capitalistic growth.

Regulationists define the successive periods of capitalistic growth as a series of developments based on regimes of accumulation and social modes of regulation. A regime of accumulation is viewed as a fairly stable relationship between production and consumption that can be reproduced (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992). Each regime of accumulation encompasses all of the interrelated element of production from its spatial

organisation, investment and its limits, wage and labour levels, product demand and markets to the function of non-capitalistic modes of production within the capitalist system. Regulationists also assert that each national economy may have its own pattern of growth within each separate regime of accumulation that is dependent on its role within the international division of labour. The regulator of the economic relations between the individual nations is the international financial system (Aglietta, 1979).

Jessop asserts that the fact that the supralocal economic environment and the extra-economic local environment are far more complex than any one individual local actor can understand or control, as this would require the means to influence the interaction of causal mechanisms over time and space. So, attention must be directed towards 'demarcating a local economic space with an imagined community of economic interests from the seamless web of a changing global-regional-national-local context' (p61). Jessop also notes that there is no reason why economic rhythms should coincide with the rhythms of local government and governance.

The third point also relates back to the regulation approach in the form of the neo-Gramscian concept of an accumulation strategy. The struggles between the economy and the *social* modes of economic regulation play a major role in modes of growth from the global level to the local level. Because the 'different structural forms of the capitalist economy (the commodity, money, wage, price, tax and company forms) are generic features of all capitalist economic relations and are unified only as modes of expression of generalised commodity production, any substantive unity that characterises a given capitalist regime in a given economic space must be rooted elsewhere' (p61). Accumulation strategies fulfil this role in that they determine particular economic growth models within a spatial context and define the extra-economic preconditions and the general strategy needed to bring the growth model to its realisation. For example, Fordism has been identified as a particular accumulation strategy and it has particular functions, production and consumption modes, discourses and societal structures associated with it. The past three decades have seen the changing economic, political and societal structures (discussed in chapter 1 above) as signifying the emergence of a new accumulation strategy that is usually identified as post-Fordist or 'flexible specialisation' (cf. Amin, 1994a; Benko and Dunford, 1991;

Bonefield, 1987, 1993; Goodwin, Duncan and Halford, 1993; Goodwin and Painter, 1996; Hirst and Zeitlin, 1992; Jessop, 1988, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1995b; Jones, 1997; Peck and Tickell, 1992; Tickell and Peck, 1992, 1995).

Jessop's (1997) fourth point identifies 'the need to examine the relationship between local accumulation strategies and prevailing hegemonic projects' (p62) such as the Thatcherist pursuit of a free-market economy. Jessop describes the hegemonic project as being a unifying force that brings together a number of diverse social forces through self-interest, reinforcing one of the prevailing characteristics of urban regime theory in that the actors partake because they perceive that their wider interests will be served in so doing.

The fifth point that Jessop argues is that the 'institutional ensembles involve specific forms of strategic selectivity' (p62). This recognises that although 'Structural constraints always operate selectively: They are not absolute and unconditional but always temporally, spatially, agency and strategy specific' (p63). This is an important part of understanding the durability of urban regimes as it reflects on the features of the labour process, the regime of accumulation and the social mode of regulation and their interactions and the constraints that these put upon the ability of a particular urban regime to pursue a successful economic strategy.

The sixth area that Jessop identifies is 'more clearly neo-Gramscian and concerns the scope of such power structures'(*that are underpinning urban regimes*). And, '[i]t is important to examine how urban regimes operate through a strategically selective combination of political society *and civil society*, government and *governance* (*author's italics*), "parties" and partnerships. In this way one could show how some urban regimes can be linked to the formation of a local hegemonic bloc (or power bloc) and its associated historical bloc' (p64). This latter point has informed a major part of this thesis, in that it argues throughout that civil society, in the form of the voluntary sector has had a major impact in regime formation and dissolution in Liverpool and that partnerships between the public-private-voluntary sectors have demarcated a change towards governance.

The seventh point is that the prevailing urban regime must possess a variety of mechanisms and practices to ensure its survival and the success of its particular local economic strategy. This point implies that not all urban regimes are necessarily pro-growth strategies, and is particularly applicable to understanding the urban regimes operating within Liverpool in the 1970's and 1980's.

The final point cautions researchers not to assume that an 'urban regime can exist in isolation from its environment' (p64). Essentially, this means that to understand an urban regime, all of the previous areas of discussion must be assimilated as urban regimes do not exist in a vacuum, the actors are influenced by the local, national and international political, economic and social developments as well as the more prosaic such as 'getting up out of the wrong side of the bed', and so perhaps, not all coalitions or decisions can be rationally accounted for.

Chapter 7 below attempts to put Jessop's 'lessons' into practice when assessing the role of Liverpool's voluntary sector within the prevailing urban regimes of the past three decades.

Chapter 3: Research Questions and Methodology

Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the Act
Falls the Shadow

T.S. Eliot: *The Hollow Men*

3.1 Research Approach

The shadow in this case was which research methodology would be adopted. And, after due consideration of the merits and demerits of both intensive and extensive research designs (see Sayer, 1992; Sayer and Morgan, 1988) a combination of the two was adopted. Extensive research design looks for regularities and common patterns within a population as a whole by employing large scale surveys, formal questionnaires, standardised interviews and statistical analysis and, some of the research questions of this study were tackled utilising these techniques - see 'Mapping of the Voluntary Sector' (section 3.3:2 below) and 'Structured Postal Questionnaire Survey' (section 3.3:4 below). However, this form of research often fails to explain the processes that have formed the revealed patterns (Sayer and Morgan, 1988) and so lacks analytical power. A way to remedy this is to study individual agents during interactive interviews and then to use qualitative analysis in order to understand the relationships between agencies and the structures within which they operate (see Alasuutari, 1995; Briggs, 1986; Dey, 1993; Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, 1992; and Strauss, 1987) - an intensive research design.

It was the contention of this research that the relationships between agencies and the predominant urban regime were extremely fluid and dependent on the priorities of the leading actors and were, therefore, only contemporary to the prevailing political, social and increasingly economic, climate. And, as outlined above, that it was unlikely that the fluidity of these relationships would be revealed by extensive research methods and so an intensive research programme in the form of detailed semi-structured interviews, informal interviews and vignettes was adopted. The research findings are discussed in chapters 4 to 8 below.

The research started with a very broad question of 'what role does the voluntary sector play in economic and social regeneration?' and this sparked a number of separate questions that needed to be explored in order to begin to define what this role entailed. The majority of the research questions that emerged and that are detailed below were identified during the initial stages of the research when the preliminary data were analysed utilising a grounded theory approach.

3.2 Grounded Theory

Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss initiated and developed 'a **systematic** set of **procedures to develop** an inductively derived grounded **theory** about a **phenomenon.**' (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p4, authors' emphasis). It is a methodology that is particularly suited to a broad based, unstructured research question as it is essentially a refining process in which more specifically theoretical and conceptual questions arise as the research progresses.

Grounded theory is initiated by analysis of data, but is not merely the organisation of data to *prove* a theory, but the organisation of the myriad of ideas that emerge from intensive data analysis. Once core concepts have emerged this generates further research which can then be used to either intensify the density of the original concepts and theory or to disprove them.

Central to grounded theory's approach to data exploration is the coding procedure. This consists of three forms of coding: open; axial; and selective. Open coding is the basic analytical technique and involves intensive analysis of the data in order to label similar events and incidents and to group them to form categories. Axial coding involves inductive and deductive reasoning when relating sub-categories to a specific category. It involves a similar process to open coding but is more focused. Selective coding selects the core category and systematically relates all of the others to it, validating and intensifying the relationships to draw out an analytical and theoretical 'storyline' (see Glaser, 1978; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Robson 1993; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990).

For example, the question that drove this research is very broad and unstructured and the starting point of the study was to estimate the numbers and types of agency and their distribution, which involved mapping them. A number of questions arose from the mapping procedure which then informed the shape of the postal questionnaire and then more questions arose from the analysis of the postal questionnaire. In each case the questions led to a number of ideas being generated which in turn indicated the direction for future research in the shape of semi-structured interviews, informal interviews and vignettes which were then in turn analysed in order to strengthen, quantify or dismiss the earlier concepts. This approach is very different to quantitative research (and some qualitative research) which starts with a number of questions or hypotheses which the research will then either prove or disprove. In this case the research questions arose from the analysis of the collected data, and the concepts that these gave rise to were then interwoven in order to provide an answer to the original question.

3.3 Research Questions and Methodologies

3.3:1 *Composition of the Voluntary Sector on Merseyside*

Many of the initial research questions for this study were in the nature of an audit of the voluntary sector in order to gain a clearer picture of what its composition was on Merseyside. The primary questions were:

> **what was the scale and scope of the sector on Merseyside and were there any spatial concentrations?**
> **how much income did the sector generate and from whom?**
> **who worked in the sector, by gender, class and ethnicity? And,**
> **what was the predominating economic background of volunteers?**

Other questions that were not quite as factual as these but could be answered utilising similar techniques were:

> **what were an agency's affiliations?**
> **what networks did they belong to?**
> **had the types and numbers of agencies within the sector altered very much in recent years?**

At this stage, there were also several, more subjective, questions which needed to be researched in a different manner to the ones above, and it was expected that more of

both types of question would arise as the research progressed. The first of the subjective questions were:

> **how does the voluntary sector 'knit' cultural aspects of the community into a functioning local political economy?**
> **what were the key motivations of the actors involved (were agencies, organisations and groups based on genuinely philanthropic principles or were they vehicles for the 'power hungry')?**
> **in what ways did the sector benefit local communities and could this be extended to cover larger regions? And,**
> **to what extent could effective localised voluntary service activity be translated to other localities?**

Sorting the questions in this way enabled the research strategy to be shaped and for the initial part of the study - estimating the scale, scope, spatial concentrations, economic standing and worker profile of the sector - several quantitative techniques were adopted.

The first part of the research strategy, which was designed to estimate the scale, scope and spatial concentrations of the sector, was the mapping of individual agencies, organisations and groups onto an electoral ward map of Merseyside. This was done in order to both indicate the types of agencies within a reasonably small area and the actual numbers. Additionally, it would also enable some analysis of the sector, utilising economic and social deprivation data, at a fairly local level. Initially, the intention was to map **all** of the voluntary organisations on Merseyside in order to obtain as much information as possible, however, this proved to be an extremely difficult task not least because of the working definition of a voluntary sector organisation this research adopted which was, as already noted in chapter 2:

Any person or body of persons who are not established for profit, who are not part of the Government and are self-governing and, who are working for a public or common good or benefit.

Although this definition is fairly wide-ranging it did exclude bodies such as the Police Authority, Probation Service and Community Service Unit. Additionally, it also excluded individuals that performed tasks for neighbours, friends and relatives. As already noted earlier, however, the advantage that this particular definition had was that the more informal community groups could be brought into the analysis as well as

the more familiar agencies as inclusion was one of the targets of the research[1].
However, it was the community groups that proved to be the most difficult to tabulate.

There were two parts to this problem and the first was that although many of the
individual electoral wards within Merseyside have a plethora of associations ranging
from parent/teacher associations to bat conservation groups, many of the groups lack
stability. There is a constant succession of new groups which last only for short
periods of time which makes it very difficult to keep track both of the numbers of
agencies and where they are based. This means that in order to gain a 'snapshot'
picture of all voluntary organisations at a particular point in time, there would need to
be a detailed investigation made by several researchers. It is this need for saturation
coverage that is the second part of the problem as the fundamental basis of this
research initiative is that it would be undertaken by an individual researcher. Other
researchers have found similar difficulties with this form of saturation coverage (see
Elsdon, Reynolds and Stewart, 1995). So, in order to retain the community groups in
the analysis, the mapping aspect had to be approached in a different manner.

Merseyside consists of five boroughs; Knowsley, Liverpool, St. Helens, Sefton and
Wirral. The history of voluntary sector participation in each borough is very different,
ranging from minimal involvement in Knowsley, St. Helens and Sefton to a long and
extensive involvement in Liverpool - with Wirral somewhere in the middle (see
chapters 2 and 4 below). Every year since 1977 the Liverpool Council for Voluntary
Service (LCVS) has produced a handbook of social services, both statutory and
voluntary, on Merseyside, with the main focus on Liverpool. The information is
gained by fresh questionnaires for each edition utilising the extensive networks of
LCVS - in addition, others who may not form part of an LCVS network can apply for
inclusion by completing a questionnaire. There is a high rate of return, with 98% for
the 1995 version. As the agencies contained within the handbook are a solid cross-
section of the existing voluntary sector[2] they can be considered to be a representative

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[1] See chapter two on why this was an aim.
[2] The realisation and acknowledgement that this was a representative source occurred over a period
of time through two primary sources. Firstly, through the 'shadowing' aspect of the research -
discussed below and, secondly, through access to voluntary sector representatives gained as a member
of the steering committee of the Merseyside Urban Forum (MUF). (The Merseyside Urban Forum
meets once a month to exchange information on social and regeneration issues, initiatives and

sample of the total number of agencies and made a very solid starting point for the mapping exercise. In addition to this source, other community groups and voluntary agencies on Merseyside that were known to be in existence at the time but not listed in the handbook were also plotted. This latter information was gained from a variety of sources including the Merseyside Urban Forum (see footnote 2 above), lists of agencies from the other Merseyside boroughs, conferences, seminars and personal knowledge. One of the major difficulties faced was who to include and who to exclude, for example was every single Brownie Group included or just the umbrella body? The eventual outcome of this question was that if a separate list of groups or agencies could be obtained then the various groups were plotted individually, if not then just the umbrella body was plotted. When the information was mapped, the spatial concentrations of agencies and groups proved to reflect the estimated[3] levels of involvement present in each borough.

3.3:2 *The Mapping of Voluntary Agencies*

The computer package utilised to map the agencies was the Schools Census Analysis and Mapping Package Release 2 (SCAMP-2) which requires either known data quantities for each electoral ward or grid references so that data may be pinpointed within a boundary map. As the numbers of agencies within each electoral ward were not initially known, the data had to be pinpointed first to enable a count to be made. This component of the research involved several stages. Firstly, the full addresses of the non-LCVS handbook agencies had to be found. Then secondly, the names and addresses of voluntary agencies had to be extracted from the LCVS handbook ignoring the statutory agencies. The addresses were necessary in order to obtain a grid reference for each agency, organisation or group. The next stage was to 'find' any 'missing' agencies.

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activities and its members comprise of representatives who are key actors in local voluntary sector networks across Merseyside). Access not only includes those voluntary sector representatives who are members of the MUF, but a large number of others who attend the regular meetings, seminars and conferences the MUF hold. Both of these sources have provided unique insight into the types of agencies that compose the voluntary sector on Merseyside and thus lead to this conclusion. In addition to this, the majority of the chief executives of the other CVSs on Merseyside who were consulted as to its suitability agreed that, although it did not have every agency listed, it was representative of both the numbers and types of agency within each borough.
[3] Made by officers of various CVSs.

Missing agencies took several forms. Some were missing because they came under a banner headline. For example, the separate Salvation Army centres were only listed as "Salvation Army Evangelical Centres" with a central telephone number. In a case such as this, a full list of the local centres was obtained from the head office of the agency concerned. Other agencies were 'missing' because they only gave a name and telephone number. The majority of the ones who could be contacted willingly gave a full address - the only exceptions were refuges for battered women which, given this role, is understandable. Those who could not be contacted or were unwilling to give an address (and there were very few in these two groups - less than ten altogether) were given an allotted postcode based on their telephone number. This was done by comparing the first three digits with the British Telecom Local Information Codes which gave an area exchange. They were then assumed to have an address on the main thoroughfare of that district. Postcodes for these agencies and for those with incomplete addresses were obtained utilising postcode books or in a few cases by contacting the postcode helpline. Altogether, over a thousand agencies were plotted using this technique.

Once a postcode for each agency was obtained it was run through the POSTZON file which was made available through the Post Office and Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) Data Archive via the MCC Cray Superserver at Manchester Computing Centre at the University of Manchester. This file gave a grid reference for each postcode. When the name of the agency and the grid reference was input into a Windows Notepad .sym file the SCAMP-2 package translated it into pinpoint data. Data within each electoral ward was then counted and entered in a Windows Notepad .csv file which SCAMP-2 translated into a proportional map.

As the LCVS handbook was divided into separate sections such as Health Services, Housing Services and Services for Older People, and because it was known what the major activities of the non-LCVS handbook agencies were, it was possible to input the grid reference data in separate batches and formulate maps for each type of voluntary agency and then to total all of the batches to give an overall map. This technique not only showed what the representative concentrations of all agencies was within each electoral ward, but also the representative concentrations of each type of agency within

a ward. However, this technique proved to be impractical in assessing the scale of activities of an agency as there was no indication of agency size or whether its activities were purely local, regional, national or international.

The mapping technique was also used to assess whether the types and numbers of agencies within the sector had altered to any great extent over recent years and whether any changes could be linked into changes in urban policy. This part of the analysis was based solely upon the LCVS handbook because although there were lists available of agencies not recorded in it, the majority of the lists were undated and so it was difficult to determine when the agencies had come into existence or when they had closed, whereas the handbook gave a consistent snapshot across the sector each year for approximately 20 years.

As the mapping procedure was time consuming, it was necessary to choose the 'snapshot' years judiciously and one way to do this was to target one particular sector. Adequate housing has been a problem on Merseyside for over one hundred and fifty years (see chapter1, section 1.5 above and chapter 7 below) and so, as voluntary sector housing is a major source of social housing on Merseyside, it was chosen as a base-line guide. As several pieces of legislation had been passed in 1980 and 1988 (see chapters 1, section 1.4:3, and 4, section 4.2 below) that could have possibly had major repercussions for this sector, it seemed appropriate to choose dates around these years as well as 1995 (as this was the year that had already been mapped, it was a relatively simple process to reconfigure the maps to just show the data from the LCVS handbook). The dates of 1978 and 1986 were chosen with the view that as they were dates prior to the above mentioned legislation they would give a clearer picture of the sector than dates immediately after it as the sector would not be distorted by the pressures of the new legislation. There was also the additional benefit that by the 1986 date, the housing sector would have adopted and adapted to the 1980 legislation and by the 1995 date would have done the same for the 1988 legislation. As each of the comparison dates were in a different decade to the others, it was expected that any major changes in other areas of the voluntary sector activity would also be highlighted, which could indicate areas for future research. When the comparison maps were completed, however, they showed that there had not been any dramatic changes in the

overall composition of the voluntary sector over the three decades, but, comparison maps of the separate areas of voluntary sector did bring *some* anomalies to light, including one in the housing sector. The details of these anomalies are discussed in chapter 4 below.

The mapping technique proved to be a very time consuming project and proved not to be a very appropriate means to analyse the activities of large voluntary sector organisations - for example, the large organisations do not confine their activities to one particular ward and, the economic and social profile of the ward in which they are situated may have little bearing on their particular activities. Nevertheless, the mapping exercise did prove to be useful in that it established which wards had concentrations of agencies and what their primary activities were. It also proved to be useful in that the anomalies helped to signpost areas of the voluntary sector that needed a more in depth investigation.

3.3:3 *'Shadowing'*

At the same time as the mapping was being undertaken , a second, qualitative, technique had also been adopted, primarily to explore the question of 'how the voluntary sector 'knits' cultural aspects of the community into a functioning local political economy'. And, linked to this were several other research questions that could also be researched in the same manner:

> **in what ways does the sector benefit local communities and can these benefits be expanded to cover larger regions?**
> **to what extent can effective localised voluntary service activity be translated to other localities?**

The method adopted to research these particular questions was to focus on smaller areas within each Merseyside borough and then, by gaining access to voluntary agencies and networks, to analyse them. The key problem here was how to gain access.

Merseyside had been (and still is) designated an Objective One region by the European Commission in 1993. The programme proposed to utilise key forces within the Merseyside economy and society to act as 'drivers for change'. Five key drivers were identified and the fifth of these was 'The People of Merseyside' which is also known as

'Pathways to Integration' or, more simply, Pathways (see also chapter 7 below). In recognition of this, the LCVS employed a freelance consultant to develop voluntary sector activity in local economic and social regeneration. This development process was necessary in order to integrate organisations within an area so they were eligible to bid for monies from the European Social Fund (ESF) and European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) which were made available by the Objective One programme.

The Pathways areas were ideal for an in-depth study as they were attempting to consolidate their activities in a more holistic manner - albeit in an attempt to further their ability to draw in external funding - and they were having varying success. To gain access to these newly formed Pathways areas, permission was gained from the LCVS and the consultant to 'shadow' her thus giving a unique insight into this development process[4]. Not only did this shadowing provide some basic information on how the voluntary sector operated within the Pathways areas, but also gave some insight into the types of problems that were being encountered by those who were attempting to find a course of action that involved both local communities and the voluntary sector in mobilising the long term unemployed and never employed. It also allowed privileged access to the key actors in the local voluntary sectors as well as to some of those in local government, the regional arms of central government and the private sector and it produced some informal interviews and vignettes. Nevertheless, it was a strategy that had to be dropped after a fairly short time.

The abandonment of this strategy was due to the misconceptions that organisations in the Pathways areas were beginning to form about the research. When these areas had been designated five years ago, the strategy plan ensured that the organisations within them were under no illusions, that they were in competition for funding with other Pathways areas. So, many of the people in these communities who became involved with Pathways became increasingly aggrieved that it was thought that they needed a consultant to tell them how to put together a partnership strategy committee in order to be able to place a bid. This was especially the case as they considered the funding of the consultant came from 'their' money and, increasingly it was believed that the

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[4] This was made possible by the recommendation of one of my supervisors, Professor Peter Lloyd.

research represented in this thesis was being funded from the same source. Due to increasingly aggressive comments, which included:

> "It's all right for you, you're getting paid a good screw to just sit there and see us perform and we can't even get a couple of hundred to mend the roof".

> "I'm getting sick and tired of her doing these seminars, I've been to three and they're all the same, she doesn't tell us anything we don't know already. She's not bothered about community development, she just wants her whack out've our money. How much're you gettin' out've it?"

> "Don't you feel ashamed? You're stealin' money that belongs to this community."

It was felt that discretion was needed as this misconception was getting in the way of the research and so the shadowing was discontinued but it did give a privileged introduction to the voluntary sector on Merseyside and a view of the highly contested nature of its activities - albeit rather painfully. However, this did mean that many of the research questions were not fully explored until approximately eighteen months later - after the structured postal questionnaire had been analysed and key voluntary sector actors had been identified - by which time the Pathways areas had been consolidated, and many of the original problems they had experienced had either been forgotten or were not known, as there were new personnel in place.

3.3:4 *Structured postal questionnaire survey*
It became increasingly clear during the mapping process and whilst shadowing the consultant, that although these techniques had provided some excellent general indications, there was a lack of the details necessary for a close analysis. Additionally, in order to answer the research questions that would give a profile of the voluntary sector, a large amount of information needed to be obtained over a short period of time which would provide a 'snapshot' overview of the sector.

According to the Chief Executive of LCVS, it is extremely difficult to ascertain exactly how many voluntary agencies and community groups are operating within Merseyside because firstly, there are definitional problems of what constitutes a voluntary sector organisation and secondly, any building or body of trustees administering a building as

a place of worship is exempt from registration under the Charities Act and is just assumed to be a charity. This means that LCVS operate on a 'guestimate' figure of a thousand charities and voluntary organisations that are established for charitable purposes and four thousand other voluntary organisations. These figures are based on the numbers of registered charities, mailing lists, personal contacts and directories of agencies. As it would have been impossible to get detailed information from all of these in a short period of time, if in fact they could have all been identified, the profile needed to be based on a representative sample which was already available via the mapping process. The simplest way to target a lot of agencies simultaneously appeared to be a structured postal questionnaire survey and the key questions that needed to be tackled were:

who worked within the sector: by gender, class and ethnicity?
did the sector offer opportunities to groups excluded from the local labour
market? (This could be assessed by analysing the economic background of
volunteers).
how much funding did the sector attract and what proportion did this form
of the regional economy?
how aware was the sector of the differing forms of funding? There were
two ways of assessing this. Firstly, by the number of funding sources that
agencies drew upon, and secondly, by how aware they were of Objective
One and Pathways, which at the time were one of the most recent new
sources of funding.

As well as providing an audit of the sector, the questionnaire was also intended to be used as a guide as to which agencies could be targeted to provide more in-depth information on specific areas. One example would be as to whether the sector offers opportunities for groups of people excluded from the labour market. So if, for example, an agency or organisation had a high proportion of long-term unemployed or never employed people as volunteers it would be a possible candidate for further research. In order to ascertain which agencies would be available, the final question asked them to indicate whether they would be available for a further more detailed interview. Additionally, it was expected that this more in-depth research would provide the information necessary to a theoretical analysis

In order to ensure as high a return rate as possible, experience gained from contact with voluntary organisations suggested that the questionnaire needed to be short and

the questions needed to be unambiguous. Additionally, as many agencies were very sensitive about certain issues such as funding, numbers of workers and their backgrounds, they would feel more comfortable giving information that fell between a range rather than give a specific answer, which is why the questionnaire was designed with that format even though it did affect the final analysis to a certain extent.

The questionnaire design was based on the experiences of other researchers (see, for example, Hoinvill, Jowell and Associates, 1977; Robson, 1993) and piloted in May 1996 to a wide group of people who had been involved in the voluntary sector for many years. The pilot group included Liverpool, Sefton and Wirral Councils for Voluntary Service, several community trusts, several community groups and a spokesperson for the Churches. All of the people contacted responded enthusiastically and made many extremely helpful suggestions on rewording and additional questions. A major issue that was brought to the forefront by the pilot study was that there was a strong sensitivity to the terminology surrounding unemployment. As stated earlier, one of the aims of the study was to ascertain the economic background of volunteer workers and the format decided upon was similar to that used for the National Census. However, there were several strong objections to the appellation 'unemployed'. Many agencies explained that the majority of the unemployed people that they dealt with did not see themselves as unemployed, they considered that they were 'between work'. This appears to be a fine distinction but it has to do with the self-respect of the people who are in this situation. Many of them considered unemployment to be a very degrading situation with connotations of dependence and helplessness. The people that these agencies were in contact with considered that they were not in that situation, they were in charge of their lives and so whilst many of the jobs that they did were menial, poorly paid and short term, for example, they might be shelf-stackers over the Christmas period, till relief in a supermarket at another time of year and holiday relief at another, they were not unemployed as such, they were just between contracts and so considered themselves to be free-lance. Indeed, although it was difficult to obtain a formal interview with an unemployed volunteer worker, many of them did agree to informal interviews and confirmed that this was in fact the case.

These issues, changes in terminology and additional questions were then incorporated into the final questionnaire format (see Appendix one). All of the agencies involved in the pilot questionnaire also agreed to complete the revised one and were all willing to participate in any further research.

After the questionnaire had been piloted, it was then sent to all of those agencies identified from the LCVS handbook and to as many groups as possible from the Pathways areas[5] (see section 3.3:3 above and chapter 7 below) during June 1996. Again, in order to facilitate a response, each questionnaire included a tailored covering letter, they were addressed to a specific person, the envelopes were typed but stamps were used rather than franking and a self-addressed envelope was included. As finances precluded follow up letters, reminders were made in a different manner. For several months after the questionnaires were dispatched all voluntary sector conferences, seminars and meetings pertaining to Pathways groups or situated in the Pathways areas were attended in order to familiarise the groups concerned with the researcher and if necessary a second questionnaire and a general covering letter were supplied. Personalising the questionnaire in this way increased the response rate by approximately 10 per cent.

According to contacts within the Merseyside voluntary sector who have had occasion to resort to questionnaires, a response rate of 20% to 30% is considered very good, and the Liverpool voluntary sector survey made by Shore et al. (1994) would appear to confirm this as they had a final response rate of 30.6%. However, utilising the methods outlined above significantly improved upon this and a return rate of just under 55% with just under 49%[6] being usable was achieved. The completed

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[5] As the focus of this research was the impact of voluntary sector strategies on economic and social regeneration and the Pathways areas had been identified as prime sites for these strategies, it was decided to concentrate upon these areas as resources were limited. Additionally, advice from voluntary sector workers suggested that those groups least likely to complete and return the questionnaire were community groups unless they knew the sender personally and due to the 'shadowing' the majority of my community group contacts were within the Pathways areas.
[6] 703 questionnaires were dispatched with 384 questionnaires returned giving a response rate of 54.6 per cent. However, 42 of the returned questionnaires were unusable for a variety of reasons. 22 came back as marked as 'gone away' or 'no longer at this address', 1 was a statutory agency that had slipped through the checking procedures, 1 had a policy to only give responses to statutory agencies because of resource pressures, 5 had changed status from voluntary organisations to private organisations, 1 was a private company that had slipped through the checking procedures and the remaining 12 had forwarded the questionnaire to their local head office who answered for the

questionnaires were then coded and analysed utilising the EPI-INFO data handling package. Details of this analysis can be found in chapter 4 below.

In order to maximise the amount of computer analysis of the data, the majority of the questions were closed whereby the respondents either answered yes, no or unsure or they chose a specific category. These questions were very easily coded, the problems arose with the two questions where it was possible to also give an open answer. The first question involved was question 5 which asked 'how much income does your organisation have per year?' and there were 12 precoded categories with an additional 25 identified during the computer coding stage. The problem was that although the majority of replies fell within either the precoded or, one of approximately ten additional categories that were identified very early in the coding process, very occasionally a reply would fall outside these ranges and so all of the replies would have to be recoded in order for it to be accommodated. This problem could have been easily overcome with a bit of foresight in that there should have been a precoded list for figures over one million pounds.

For question 8, 'Do you or any of your colleagues belong to or sit on..' and there then followed a number of panels and committees, there were 9 precoded categories and a further 81 were identified during coding (see appendix 2 for a full list). However, unlike question 5, these categories were not mutually exclusive and so the coding procedure was not disrupted to the same extent, each new category was just assigned the next number in the coding list. Where this was time consuming was when agencies only gave initials or a shortened version of the name and these had to be checked back to existing categories so that they were not double counted.

One of the things that was overlooked whilst preparing the questionnaire and during the pilot study was that those questions that asked for an amount to be given did not include a category for nil or none. This did have an effect on the analysis as it was possible that some agencies would have completed this category and so the analysis

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activities for the whole agency on Merseyside. This meant that of the 384 returned questionnaires, 342 or just under 49% were usable for the purposes of this analysis.

had to make allowances for this. This reduction in effective answers is discussed in greater detail in the analysis of these questions in chapter 4 below.

Even though the postal questionnaire survey had its faults it still proved to be a very valuable method of gaining information because not only did it have a high response rate, but the actual quality of the returns was very high. And, although this was essentially a quantitative data analysis to gain 'facts' about the voluntary sector, there was some leeway which allowed the data to be tentatively explored using open and axial coding techniques of grounded theory. It was this latter exploration of the data which changed the focus from housing agencies to agencies dealing with employment and urban policy (see chapter 4 below for a full list of agency activity typologies). The analysis appeared to show that in this latter area of voluntary sector activity, some of the greatest numbers of long-term unemployed working as volunteers were doing so for agencies within this particular sector. As described above, one of the questions that this research intends to address is whether the voluntary sector offers opportunities to groups excluded from the local labour market and so the 'employment and urban policy' sector appeared to offer more scope to explore this question than 'housing'. This exploration took the form of a series of semi-structured interviews conducted with as many agencies as possible within this particular sector as well as a number of volunteer workers.

3.3:5 *Semi-structured interviews*

Although the semi-structured interviews that were undertaken had the form of an open ended interview, there were heads of discussion common to all of them that covered a variety of topics from the history of an agency to the interviewee's personal views on the voluntary sector (see appendix 3 for details). This strategy was adopted in order to gain:

> ...greater accuracy and validity because it allows a more comprehensive and detailed elucidation of the interplay among strategy, history and circumstances.
> Schoenberger, 1991, p184.

And:

> ...to probe deeply, to uncover new clues, to open up new dimensions of a problem and to secure vivid, accurate, inclusive accounts from informants based on personal experiences.
> Burgess, 1982, p101.

This was important because these insights were necessary to the development of the theoretical context of the research as well as providing insight into the factual evidence that had already been gathered and analysed.

Contacting those agencies for interview was a simple matter as the final question on the postal questionnaire had asked if they would be willing to participate further in the research and approximately 70% of those who completed and returned the questionnaires agreed that they would. Within the 'employment and urban policy' sector, there were 34 agencies who were sent the questionnaire (during the original mapping procedure there were 37, however, 3 had closed in the approximately six months period between the mapping procedure and the implementation of the questionnaire) and 22 of the agencies completed and returned it - which was one of the highest return rates for an individual sector. Of those returned, 20 or 91% had agreed to further interview and eventually senior officials from 19 of the agencies were interviewed (during the seven months period of questionnaire return and contact another agency had closed).

Each interview was conducted utilising an aide-memoire with the heads of discussion tailored to the interview. This was done because some of the agencies had already provided information such as audited accounts when they had returned the questionnaire and so it was unnecessary to ask certain questions. For some agencies additional questions were required because a few of their questionnaire answers had been ambiguous. As each interview was transcribed, it was tabulated and analysed using grounded theory procedures. This led to a number of similar themes emerging and so the number of interviews was extended to cover other sectors in order to investigate whether these themes were particular to the urban policy and employment sector or whether they were themes common to the whole of the voluntary sector. Altogether, 30 agencies were formally interviewed, all of the interviews had both a taped and a written recording made (except three, all conducted on the same day, when the tape recorder failed to operate!) and the average interview lasted for two hours.

Additional to the interviews with agencies, a series of interviews were held with volunteer workers. Access to this group was more problematical and heavy reliance was placed on contacts within voluntary sector agencies providing the names of people who would possibly agree to be interviewed. Some interviews were fortuitous in that an informal conversation with someone led to the realisation that they were a volunteer and so they were requested to do a more formal interview, other volunteers were then contacted using this person's knowledge. Although, the majority of the volunteer worker interviews were with those within the 'employment and urban policy' sector, a number of interviews were with volunteer workers outside this sector. Altogether, 30 voluntary worker interviews were conducted lasting, on average, half an hour. A sizable number of these volunteers, however, were averse to being taped and in the event only approximately half of the interviews had both a taped and written record made.

Of all of the methods adopted for this research, the semi-structured interview unquestionably provided the most information. Although a lot of this information was subjective as personal opinions were actively sought rather than the 'party line', there was also a welter of detail that was backed by audits, published information and copies of funding bids. Additionally, by targeting one particular sector, much of the information that could have been labelled as 'subjective' was reinforced by the experiences of several other agencies, often with no contact with each other and in different boroughs all of which allowed for extensive triangulation. The only drawback for this method was that it was extremely time consuming. Interviews had to arranged and conducted, they then had to be transcribed in as full a detail as possible - each two hour interview taking on average 12 hours to transcribe (see Robson, 1993) - and then coded according to grounded theory procedures.

The research ethics adopted for this thesis were that the participants would be aware of their participation, they would not be knowingly misled regarding that participation, and that participating individuals would be protected (see Robson, 1993 for a full discussion). A key example of the need to adopt research ethics arose around the issue of confidentiality. Although all of the interviewees left the decision on whether a quote was confidential or not in the hands of the researcher, it was decided that when

quotes were utilised within the research, actors and organisations, in the majority of cases, would not be specifically named. This decision resulted from some of the concerns of the interviewees who were worried that any quotes that criticised specific funding sources could result in termination of funding from those sources. Additionally, it was also possible that there could be other unforeseen adverse consequences as a result of some of the more forthright opinions that were expressed. This confidentiality was also extended to the final technique that was adopted by this research and that was the informal interview and the recording of vignettes.

3.3:6 *Vignettes*

Vignettes have been collected throughout the life of this research in a field notebook from conferences, seminars and informal interviews with actors within the voluntary sector. Any quotes from this source have been authorised by the actors concerned, indeed, they often took great pains to ensure that their viewpoints were transcribed verbatim by checking the transcription. They are used within the research to highlight or illustrate a point. Some of the opinions of residents, young people and 'service users' could only be obtained in this manner as, although there were a huge number of people willing to express their opinions in the most forthright manner, very few of them were willing to be taped or interviewed in a more formal manner. Additionally, with some of the groups interviewed, such as the young people described in chapter 5 below, it was simply a matter of taking advantage of the situation at that particular time in such a way that encouraged them to give their opinions and, given their dislike of authority figures, it was unlikely that they would respond favourably to a tape recorder and formal questionnaire whereas they were quite willing to 'chat' about their problems.

The vignettes and informal interviews have formed and informed this research as they have not only provided the information needed to form a knowledge base but have also buttressed the analyses of the data produced by the other methods outlined above.

Chapter 4: A Profile of the Merseyside Voluntary Sector

4.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses the information gained from the mapping technique and structured postal questionnaire methods described in chapter 3 above. Where necessary, the discussion includes supporting information gained from other sources. Section 4.2 below, examines some selected maps of particular areas of the Merseyside voluntary sector at specific times in the past three decades - see chapter 3, section 3.3:2 above for an explanation of the date selection - and draws out some conclusions. Section 4.3 below analyses the postal questionnaire that was taken in June/July 1996. The findings are presented under five themes which are: size; gender; ethnicity; volunteers; and income. Because of the nature of the questionnaire, many of the findings are qualified, and the details of these qualifications are attached to the relevant tables which are to be found in Appendix 4 below. The final section, 4.4 below, brings together the findings of section 4.3 to present a summary profile of the Merseyside voluntary sector.

4.2 Mapping the Voluntary Sector

4.2:1 *General Overview of the Merseyside Voluntary Sector*
As already noted in chapter three, section 3.3:1 above, one of the initial aims of this research was to assess which electoral wards (EWs) held the highest concentrations of voluntary sector agencies, and Figure 4.1 below gives the result of this exercise (see chapter 3, sections 3.3:1 and 3.3:2 above for details of how these figures were obtained). It is apparent from the map that within each borough, the densest concentration are within town centres (see figure 1.1 above for borough details), and that the Liverpool borough has the greatest concentrations, which chimes well with the histories given in chapter 1, section 1.5 and chapter 2, section 2.4 above. Additionally, when the sector is 'mapped' over time (figures 4.2; 4.3; and 4.4 below), it is also clear that there has been relatively little change in either the numbers of agencies or in their geographical concentrations. This would appear to confirm, that the LCVS 'guestimate' figure (detailed in chapter 3, section 3.3:4 above) of a fairly constant number of 5,000 Merseyside voluntary sector agencies, is correct.

Figure 4.1: Sample of Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies 1995.
Source: After LCVS Take it From Here 1978, Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.2: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Listed in Take it From Here, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.3: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.

Numbers of Agencies

0.00 –	0.00	☐
1.00 –	15.00	▨
16.00 –	30.00	▨
31.00 –	45.00	▨
46.00 –	60.00	▨
61.00 –	75.00	▨
76.00 –	90.00	▨
91.00 –	105.00	▨

Figure 4.4: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.

Numbers of Agencies

0.00 –	0.00	☐
1.00 –	15.00	▨
16.00 –	30.00	▨
31.00 –	45.00	▨
46.00 –	60.00	▨
61.00 –	75.00	▨
76.00 –	90.00	▨
91.00 –	123.00	▨

After this initial mapping procedure had been completed, all agencies were then categorised according to their primary activity, and all further analysis in this thesis is based upon these categorisations, which were:

- Services for Young People

- The Law, Probation and Aftercare

- Advisory and Social Services

- Health Services

- Employment and Urban Policy

- Housing Services

- Accommodation Services

- The Environment

- Services to the Community

- Training and Education for Adults

- Services for Older People

- Services for People with Physical Disabilities

- Mental Health

- Services for People with Learning Disabilities

- Consumer Affairs

By categorising the agencies in this manner it was possible to 'map' each sector over the time-period to observe any changes. Although the majority of sectors proved to have changed very little, the maps did highlight substantial changes in two of these: Mental Health; and Services for Older People (see figures 4.5 to 4.10 below). They also showed that there appeared to have been little change in the Housing category. This was an unexpected finding as this sector had been chosen as a base-line guide (see chapters 1, section 1.4:3, and 3, section 3.3:2 above) precisely because it *was* expected to show change over the time-period (see figures 4.11 to 4.13 below).

Figure 4.5: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Mental Health Service Agencies Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.6: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Mental Health Service Agencies Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.7: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Mental Health Service Agencies Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.8: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Providing Services for Older People Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.9: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Providing Services for Older People Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.10: All Merseyside Voluntary Sector Agencies Providing Services for Older People Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.11: All Merseyside Non-Profit Making Housing Services Listed in Take it From Here, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.12: All Merseyside Non-Profit Making Housing Services Listed in Take it From Here, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.

101

Figure 4.13: All Merseyside Non-Profit Making Housing Services Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.

Numbers of Agencies

0.00 –	0.00	□
1.00 –	3.00	▨
4.00 –	6.00	▩
7.00 –	9.00	▨
10.00 –	12.00	▨

4.2:2 *Mental Health Services and Services for Older People*

The increased numbers of agencies within the Mental Health and Services for Older People categories were attributed to the 'Care in the Community' Government programme launched in 1981 (Milligan, 1998). The programme was a product of the dissatisfaction that had been growing regarding the existing policies and practices for those who had long-term care needs, especially in the treatment of people with mental health problems (Corp, 1996). For forty years there had been a progressive closure of mental institutions with the former patients supposedly receiving 'community care'. In practice, the majority were placed in domestic environments without adequate support mechanisms (Corp, 1996). *The NHS and Community Care Act* 1990 positively encouraged the promotion of an independent sector, consisting of private and voluntary providers working in conjunction with the public sector (Deakin, 1996; Essex, 1996), in order to cap the exponentially rising social security spending on long-term care for the elderly (Henwood, Wistow and Robinson, 1996). The 1990 *NHS and Community Care Act* put in place the legislation that phased in 'Care in the Community' over a period of three years. However, it made no attempt to

consolidate previous legislation and there was no single government department with overall responsibility for it (Corp, 1996). There is increasing evidence that the brunt of 'Care in the Community' services has fallen on individuals looking after family members and the voluntary sector, who both provide care services and support services for individual carers (Corp, 1996; Court, 1996; Deakin, 1996; Henwood, Wistow and Robinson, 1996; Milligan, 1998). Although Care in the Community was a specific mental health programme it did impact on a number of elderly people who had lived in mental hospitals for a number of years, and who were being moved out into the 'community' and requiring services ranging from accommodation to social activities. So, it is unsurprising that not only did the numbers of agencies providing mental health services increase from 7 in 1978 to 20 in 1995, but that those providing services to the elderly have risen from 28 in 1978 to 38 in 1995. It is also suggestive that although there has been a geographical expansion of services, they remain concentrated around the Liverpool city centre and the outer municipal estates such as Speke, Kirkby and Litherland, all areas of multiple deprivation.

4.2:3 *Housing*

Chapter 1, section 1.4:3 described the changes in housing legislation that led to the belief that the Housing category maps would show an increase in numbers of agencies and thus provide a suitable base-line guide. As the maps did not do so, further analysis was necessary. First, the Housing category was divided into housing associations (figures 4.14 to 4.16 below) and housing co-operatives (figures 4.17 to 4.19 below), and mapped in order to assess whether one form of organisation had grown to the detriment of the other. As the maps display (figures 4.14 to 4.19 below), this is not in fact the case, the numbers of housing associations have remained steady, whereas the numbers of housing co-operatives first rose and then declined. Further investigation, utilising different sources of information, have shown that there are four factors that need to be taken into consideration to explain these 'losses'.

The first factor is that these maps are not fully inclusive, there are a number of housing associations and co-operatives that are not listed in the LCVS directory, additionally, there are a number of agencies that are listed in one of the directories and not others and yet are still in existence.

**Figure 4.14: All Merseyside Housing Associations Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.**

Figure 4.15: All Merseyside Housing Associations Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.16: All Merseyside Housing Associations Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.


Figure 4.17: All Merseyside Housing Co-operatives Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1978) Liverpool, LCVS.

Figure 4.18: **All Merseyside Housing Co-operatives Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1986) Liverpool, LCVS.**

Numbers of Agencies

0.00 – 0.00	□
1.00 – 3.00	▨
4.00 – 6.00	▨
7.00 – 9.00	■
10.00 – 12.00	▨

Figure 4.19: **All Merseyside Housing Co-operatives Listed in <u>Take it From Here</u>, (1995) Liverpool, LCVS.**

Numbers of Agencies

0.00 – 0.00	□
1.00 – 3.00	▨
4.00 – 6.00	▨
7.00 – 9.00	■
10.00 – 12.00	▨

The second factor is that the maps do not give any indication of the size or scope of the agencies concerned or of the direction their development has taken. For example, a number of housing associations have consolidated their concerns into one head office and yet have expanded their field of influence considerably. One example, the Maritime Housing Association (MHA) controlled 300-400 units in 1974, by 1996 this had expanded to over 3500 units. In addition, the MHA expanded its field of influence to incorporate the whole of the North West rather than just Merseyside[1]. Linked to this factor is the probability that a substantial number of agencies are 'hidden' and so do not show up in the statistics. For example, a number of co-operatives are managed by another agency, such as CDS (see chapter 2, section 2.4 above). A number of these 'managing' agencies do not list the individual housing co-operatives that they administer and so they disappear from the statistics and are 'lost'.

The third factor is to do with local politics. As was detailed in chapter 1, section 1.5 above, housing has always been a major problem on Merseyside and during the 1970's and 1980's it was also politicised (see chapter 7, section 7.2 below for a detailed discussion) with a number of housing co-operatives municipalised. There is a body of evidence that demonstrates that there was a rapid growth in the numbers of housing co-operatives and associations on Merseyside until the mid 1980's (CDS, 1987; McDonald, 1985; Middleton, 1991). This is linked to the adoption in Liverpool in 1974 of a housing association based area renewal strategy (CDS, 1987) that took advantage of the large grants available under the Housing Association Grant (HAG) scheme - there was desperate need for housing in the city, the city council could not access the HAG but housing co-operatives could and so were encouraged. However, these schemes aroused a great deal of political controversy during the 1980's, especially among the extreme Left (Meegan, 1989a,1989b; see also chapter 7, section 7.2:3 below), and this led to the municipalisation of seven housing co-operatives and operational deadlock for a number of others which meant that although the sector grew during the period 1978 to 1986, there was a slowing of this growth when the Labour city council was dominated by the policies of the Militant Left wing and set in motion a municipal scheme for housing provision (see chapter 7, section 7.2:3 below). This slow-down was because one of the side-effects of the council's housing scheme was a

---

[1] Details were obtained from a MHA staff member and the MHA Ltd Annual Report 1994/95.

reduction in funds available to voluntary agencies, including housing associations, leading to Central Government top-slicing £9 million from the city's housing budget and handing it directly to the housing associations in 1984 (Parkinson, 1985) ensuring that they did not collapse.

The final factor is to do with changes in legislation, and in particular the way in which the HAG funding system was altered in the 1988 Housing Act. As explained in chapter 1, section 1.4:3, the 1988 Housing Act fixed the HAG rather than the rents which led to, according to one housing official who audited the books of many housing associations and co-operatives, large rent rises in many cases and this ultimately caused a decline in numbers as the majority of housing agencies could not sustain both services and low rents. It is possible that the housing co-operatives were hit harder by the alteration as they were generally smaller than the housing associations and had fewer resources from the outset.

Although the initial mapping of the non-profit housing services above appears to indicate that there has been a decline in agency numbers over the past three decades, this further investigation has shown that this is not in fact the case. There may have been a 'slowing down' of their activities during the 1980's due to local political conditions and changes in legislation, but, their numbers and ranges of activity have in fact grown (see, for example, chapter 5); it is just that these factors are not apparent within the actual mapping process.

Mapping the Merseyside voluntary sector, in one way, has proved to be a useful exercise. It has helped to confirm where the concentrations of voluntary sector organisations are, and the constancy of their numbers, and additionally it has helped to pin-point areas of further research. However, the exercise has also highlighted a number of the technique's limitations in that: it gives no idea of the range, scope or size of an organisation; it is highly dependent on consistently accurate data - which is a problem when dealing with historical data; and it is extremely time consuming.

4.3 Analysing the Merseyside Voluntary Sector

4.3:1 *Introduction*

This analysis of the Merseyside voluntary sector is based on the structured postal questionnaires discussed in chapter 3 above, and is bolstered by information obtained

during interviews with both agencies and active volunteers. The overall response rate for the questionnaire was 54.6% of which, just under 49% were suitable for analysis (see Appendix 4, table A4.1 and note 6 page 88 for the numbers of questionnaires sent and received in each category of agency activity). For the majority of this analysis the agencies are desegregated into the categories of activity listed in section 4.2 above. The analysis focuses on five specific areas: size; gender; ethnicity; volunteering; and income.

4.3:2 *Size*

The total numbers of paid and unpaid workers within this sample of the Merseyside voluntary sector were calculated as 13,700 (see Appendix 4, table A4.2). Of these, it was estimated that 64% were female and 36% were male. The number of paid workers were calculated as being 6,903. Of these, it was estimated that 74% were female and 26% were male. The number of volunteer workers were calculated as being 6,797 of which 61% were female and 39% were male.

In 1993, Shore, Knapp, Kendall and Carter made a similar survey of Liverpool's voluntary sector. They estimated that the 298 voluntary agencies in their sample, were supported by nearly 10,000 volunteers, with 3,000 committee volunteers and over 4,000 paid staff which differs from these findings of 327 agencies supported by 6,797 volunteers and 6,903 paid staff. The implication of the comparison is that either the numbers of volunteers have dropped and the numbers of paid workers have risen in the interim or, this analysis has overestimated the numbers of paid workers and underestimated the numbers of volunteers within the sector. However, there are three other possible explanations for the differences in the figures - notwithstanding the fact that the figures in the earlier study were based on actual numbers and the ones in this analysis are estimates.

The first factor is that the two studies have not adopted the same definition of what constitutes a voluntary sector organisation. This means that in both cases certain groups of organisations were excluded and that these were not necessarily the same organisations or the same *size* organisations.

A second, important factor, did not emerge until the later interview stage and this was that many organisations did not consider volunteers as 'workers' unless they were present full-time which meant that they had underestimated both the numbers of workers and the numbers of volunteers with their agencies. Additionally, many of those interviewed confirmed that they had also not included committee or executive members who were volunteers and, as many of them had an entirely voluntary executive committee, this greatly increased the numbers of volunteers within these agencies.

These later interviews also uncovered a third factor in that the funding regime of many organisations had changed with the advent of City Challenge, Objective One, and latterly, SRB. At least a third of the organisations that were formally interviewed and a much larger proportion of organisations that were informally interviewed indicated that, as funding had become available through the above mentioned regimes, people who had been voluntary workers had then been taken on in a formal capacity. Many people were very wary of conceding that this had happened because of the Equal Opportunities Act and the legal requirements that the Act placed upon them to advertise posts as they became available. However, several made comments such as:

> You can get round it. You advertise - usually in obscure places - so that you fulfil the meaning of the Act, and then you appoint the person who's been doing the job for the past year or so on a voluntary basis anyway. Why shouldn't they be rewarded for their loyalty?
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

> ...if we had a volunteer who was capable and a vacancy arose then yes, they would be strongly considered to fill the post.
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

> The other one was already the treasurer of ...and we thought we wouldn't get no-one better than her anyway, so she moved up from her role to a paid position.
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

> ...we recruit in accordance with the law and its requirements...a person was sitting here *(working voluntarily)* and the job was offered *(the same job as the person was doing voluntarily)*. They had to apply for that job following open recruitment practices. *(The person got the job)*.
>
> (Interview extract, 1996).

> We train them up and take them on.
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

The converse also happened whereby paid workers, when their funding ran out, continued to do the same job as a voluntary worker.

> ...her funding ran out and, she's amazing, she's just carried on.
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

> (*Paid worker*) is about to become a volunteer for us because the funding's finished. However, if we get more, she'll be taken on again in a paid capacity.
>
> (Interview extract, 1996).

> It never ceases to amaze me how committed people are to their jobs. (*Paid worker*) and (*paid worker*) had funding for 3 years from the council, that's finished now, but they've continued working for us part-time - well they've got to earn a living - because they're so committed to the kids. If we can get any more funding then they'll definitely get it.
>
> (Interview extract, 1997).

These comments, however circumspect, suggested that the boundaries between paid work and voluntary work were very flexible and could change very easily (cf. Paton 1992) and that these factors in any combination could both account for the differences in numbers of paid and voluntary workers between the two studies, and throw light on the role of the voluntary sector.

4.3:3 *Gender*

Almost 63% of the sample had a predominantly female workforce (51% or more). Overall, however, 60% of the sample had a male manager, chief executive or managing director. When the size of workforce was compared, female chief executives, managers or managing directors were outnumbered in every category, especially in those agencies with over 100 workers when there was a pronounced differential. Additionally, in those workforces that were predominantly male, female leaders were almost exclusively confined to agencies with 50 or fewer workers.

Nevertheless, what cannot be assumed is that the sphere of influence is less for those agencies fronted by a female. Interviews and vignette collection have confirmed that some of those agencies with a small workforce have a far greater sphere of influence than some of those with a large workforce. For example, two of the agencies in the sample that had a small workforce, and were fronted by a female chief executive had multi-million pounds budgets. One had only four workers, two paid and two voluntary

and was the head office of a national agency and the second had nine workers, six paid and three voluntary and was the regional office of a national agency. Whereas, another two agencies in the sample that had large workforces and were fronted by a male had small budgets and were active over much smaller areas. The first, which had eighty two workers, who were all volunteers, and a budget of just over £1,000, was confined to Merseyside and the second, which had a hundred and fifteen workers, ninety two of whom were volunteers, and a budget of £3,000, was based solely within Liverpool.

Attempting to discover whether there were sectors that attracted either mostly female or mostly male workforces proved to be difficult as there were several ways in which this could be calculated - number of agencies, as a percentage share of the sector, or the total number of workers.

Table A4.4a (Appendix 4) illustrates that the greatest number of agencies with a predominantly female workforce were congregated in the Advice and Social Services sector. This was also true of those agencies with a predominantly male workforce (table A4.4b, Appendix 4) although not to anywhere near the same numbers, with only 12 as opposed to 65.

When the number of agencies as a percentage share of each individual category were considered this changed, and agencies with a predominantly female workforce were congregated in Housing Services, where they constituted 81% of the sector, Accommodation Services, where they constituted 79%, and Services for those with Learning Disabilities where they constituted 75%. For those agencies with a predominantly male workforce the Training and Education for Adults sector was the most important where they constituted 50% of the sector and, much lower down the scale, the Employment and Urban Policy, and The Environment sectors, where they constituted 27% of both sectors (a point of note is, that the majority of agencies in the latter two sectors indicated that they had a balanced workforce).

When the numbers of female and male workers were compared (see Appendix 4, tables A4.4c to A4.4f), for those agencies with a predominantly female workforce, the greatest number of female workers in one activity category, an estimated 1,858, were based within the Advisory and Social Services sector with a further 1,007 providing

Services for Young People. For those agencies with predominantly male workforces, the greatest number of male workers in one category, 430, were to be found in the Services for Young People sector with 180 providing Services to the Community. These calculations produced slightly different results to the number of agencies as they allow for the fact that a predominant workforce, unless its gender is 100% female or male, has members of the other gender as well. It is a subtle difference but it does produce a slightly different picture. This slight difference can be accounted for by the size of the workforce. A large number of agencies with a small number of workers in each agency could produce a similar result to a small number of agencies with a large number of workers in each agency. Nevertheless, what does emerge, whichever way it is calculated, is that females tend to be concentrated in the so-called 'caring' sectors and males tend to concentrated in sectors in which there is some form of authority or 'power' base indicating that traditional gender roles are being replicated within the voluntary sector (see also 4.3:5 below).

4.3:4 *Ethnicity*

Of the total number of workers within the sample, an estimated 11,917 were 'white' with only an estimated 1,783 coming from **all** of the other racial backgrounds. Of the other ethnic groupings, 'black[2]' had the greatest number of workers at 693, then 'Asian' with 617 workers, and the smallest group was 'Chinese' with 473 workers. Only 19 agencies had a workforce with more than 25% black workers, merely 3 agencies with more than 25% Chinese workers, and just 2 agencies with more than 25% Asian workers.

Overall the types of agency most likely to employ Asians, Blacks or Chinese in either a formal or informal capacity were those who were providing Services for Young People, Advisory and Social Services and Housing Services. However, what is interesting to note is the disparities within these sectors relating to the numbers of voluntary workers to paid workers. For the sector providing Services to Young People, the voluntary workers greatly outweighed the numbers of paid workers for all

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[2] This researcher recognises that there are many different racial groupings within each of the designated 'Asian', 'Black' and 'Chinese' categories on the questionnaire, however, under advisement of the pilot study group, racial sectors were restricted to encourage the return of questionnaires.

three of the non-white ethnic groups. There were an estimated 101 Asian voluntary workers to 36 paid workers, 137 Black voluntary workers to 31 paid workers and 82 Chinese voluntary workers to 9 paid workers. This was completely reversed within the Housing Services sector with an estimated 84 paid Asian workers to 18 volunteers, 83 paid Black workers to 16 volunteers and 78 paid Chinese workers to 16 volunteers. For those in the sector providing Advisory and Social Services the split between voluntary and paid workers was approximately equal except for the Chinese workers where there were an estimated 78 paid workers to 36 volunteers. These figures probably reflect the types and amounts of funding available to agencies. Housing services tend to attract substantial sums of money and so are more able to employ workers than the other two sectors. Additionally, interviews with several housing agencies suggested that another major factor was that the types of housing required for each racial grouping differed, and so it was important that the paid workers fully understood the needs and requirements of the people they were building or renovating houses for, and the best way to do this was to employ somebody of the same racial background - after all due consideration to the Equal Opportunities Act of course.

Another, perhaps surprising point of note was that of all of those agencies with non-white people forming more than 25% of their workforce, only 36% of the agencies could be readily identifiable as catering to a specific non-white ethnic group or groupings such as multi-cultural societies, this figure also included the Housing Services category. Many of the agencies that were interviewed acknowledged that there was a problem in recruiting ethnic minorities either in a formal or informal capacity. Many said that they had found particular problems in attracting volunteers from ethnic minority backgrounds regardless of whether they had seriously targeted them or not. Comments ranged from:

> They're not interested so we don't bother. *(From an agency that had not made any specific attempts to target volunteers from ethnic minorities)*

> We've tried and tried and tried. We'd love more people from ethnic minorities but we don't seem to be able to attract them. We've tried all kinds of different adverts and posters but we've still got very few. Have you got any ideas? *(From an agency that works within a ward with a high concentration of ethnic minorities and which produced a variety of advertisements it had run in various publications as proof of its commitment.)*

They're completely disaffected, they've been promised so much, time and time and time again, and then they've been crapped on. Do you wonder they think volunteering is just another cop out? *(An agency that worked very closely with ethnic groups but still had problems attracting volunteers)*

It doesn't really apply here because there's hardly any ethnics in the area. *(An agency bordering upon a ward with a high ethnic population)*

Although some of the comments above border on racism, there is an element of truth within all of them. One of the things that many agencies and many individuals emphasised, whether in formal or informal interview, was the tribal aspect of many areas - and this applied equally to those areas considered 'white'. This 'tribalism' meant that many young people found it difficult to even envisage moving outside the boundaries of their familiar world. Poor educational attainment, poor job prospects and subsequently poor *life* prospects meant that *generally* those that fell within these parameters had a different view of citizenship to the one envisaged by politicians. Instead of the highly publicised version of what the individual owes to society, the people living in these areas felt that 'society' had no use for them and so had confined them to dilapidated housing in specific areas such as sink estates as the 'twentieth century equivalent to transportation - out of sight, out of mind' (comment made by a young community worker). They were not wanted for cheap labour in factories, docks and shipyards, so they were ignored and confined, and if they were of an ethnic minority this was compounded because of colour prejudice within the wider community.

Three additional reasons emerged from the interviews as to why there were low participation rates amongst ethnic minority groups, and they were all cultural. First, certain groups have a high community solidarity. There is the feeling within these groups that problems should be shared by the immediate family and close friends, not strangers, and so they neither welcome voluntary sector agencies or volunteers unless they are exclusively of their own racial background. The second reason was that it would be very difficult for women coming from certain racial backgrounds and/or religions to become volunteers as they would come into close contact with men who were non-family members, and from other racial backgrounds and religious groups.

The third reason was to do with communication and how words have different meanings in other societies:

> I went to one of the Muslim societies within the city to give a talk on volunteering and I was told, before I went into the room to talk about volunteering for forty minutes, not to use the word volunteering because in North East Africa volunteering means one thing and one thing only, it's military conscription and I had a room full of young men - because I wasn't allowed to talk to the women - and if I'd gone in and said 'would you like to become a volunteer?' they'd have been out the door. So, we have a concept of what volunteering is and it's not universal.

and

> ...the word 'ethnic' to a Muslim, means non-believer. So, you call a Muslim an 'ethnic minority' and you're insulting them. So, we've changed our forms to 'racial and cultural backgrounds' which will upset someone else.
> (Both quotations from a voluntary agency manager, interviewed 1998).

The Merseyside EWs with the highest ethnic minority populations are all found within Liverpool. Granby[3] has the highest comprising of 17.8% Black, 3.3% Asian and 2.7% Chinese, Abercromby is next with 8.5% Black, 2.7% Asian and 5.6% Chinese and then is Arundel with 6.5% Black, 2.6% Asian and 2% Chinese. These three wards contain over 40% of Liverpool's non-white population. Unsurprisingly perhaps, when the agencies in the sample were mapped to identify the wards in which they were situated, the highest proportion with some ethnic minority workers within their workforces were to be found in Abercromby. The real surprise was that Everton was the next highest ward as it has a low ethnic population. However, this can be explained by its proximity to Abercromby and several agencies confirmed that they did draw part of their workforces from Abercromby.

Altogether there were 23 agencies whose workforces had an ethnic minority component of more than 25%. Of these, 9 were in Abercromby, 6 were in Granby and 6 were in Everton, however, of the 10 agencies where the ethnic minority component was more than 51%, nine of the agencies were based in the Abercromby and Granby EWs.

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[3] Central Policy Unit, 1993, Key Statistics in Liverpool Wards 1971, 1981, 1991, Central Policy Unit, Liverpool City Council.

4.3:5 *Volunteers*

Female volunteers are found in a wide variety of agencies, from small ones to large ones and they predominate in almost every sector with the largest numbers being in those sectors that provide Services for Young People, Advisory and Social Services, Services for Older People and Services for People with Physical Disabilities (see Appendix 4, table A4.5a). Additionally, all of those agencies with a completely voluntary workforce that was predominantly female were confined exclusively to these 'caring' categories.

Male volunteers were far fewer in almost every category (see Appendix 4, table A4.5b). However, although their greatest *numbers* were found in those sectors providing Services to Young People, and Advisory and Social Services, they actually *predominated* in two different sectors; The Environment, and Services to the Community. Of those agencies with completely voluntary workforces that were predominantly male, the only points of note were, that they tended to be agencies with relatively small workforces of 50 or below and that both of those agencies in The Environment category were solely reliant on volunteers (see below and chapter 6, section 6.3).

It is hardly surprising that the greatest number of both female and male volunteers were found in those categories providing Services to Young People and Advisory and Social Services as these two categories had the highest numbers of agencies within them. What is interesting are the other categories where there were high numbers of female or male voluntary workers. For example, almost every single agency providing Services for People with Physical Disabilities had a completely voluntary workforce. Additionally, the majority also operated with an income of under £20,000. Informal interviews with volunteers that worked within these two sectors suggested that the majority of them became involved due to members of their own families needing the services of these agencies as State provision proved to be patchy or non-existent. This was especially true of those that lived in fairly affluent areas. Comments included:

> ...because my mother lives in Heswall, I was told she was not a priority case.
> (Wirral 1996).

I kept getting the run around. I seemed to spend half my life trying to get people in the social services department to even acknowledge that my father was entitled to some help and then they said that they couldn't do anything because their resources were stretched to the limit. My God, he fought in the war and was nearly killed, he's paid tax all of his life and now when *he* needs the state he's an inconvenience.

(Liverpool 1995).

If you've got a disabled child you can get some help from the state but it's very limited. If you want them to reach their full capacity you've got to explore other avenues.

(Wirral 1997).

...the place where he was last wasn't doing anything to help him, they just seemed to assume that because he can't walk, he can't think. He's a different child since he's been coming here.

(Knowsley, 1996).

When social services departments were contacted to ascertain as to whether they were 'redlining' services based on economic factors, with the exception of one department, they denied that this was the case, and that all citizens were treated on an equal basis although another one did admit tacitly that it was possible that people in economically disadvantaged areas were prioritised. The authority that admitted it had in the past prioritised services was Sefton, although it would have been difficult for them to deny that they had followed this practice given that for a number of years they have flouted central government's rules on payment for care for the elderly. These rules state that once an elderly person's assets are reduced to £10,000 the local authority should pay for nursing home fees. Sefton, reduced this limit to £1,500 - the price of a funeral. In 1996 they were forced by court action to obey the law (Ham, 1997).

There has also been the suggestion[4] that Liverpool local authority has adopted similar tactics in dealing with the elderly by delaying their funding assessments. It stated that in 1997 more than 300 people were on the council's waiting list for funding and produced several case studies as proof. One example was an 83 year old woman who took the council to court to pay for her nursing home fees. She had been assessed and was in a nursing home with less than £10,000 at the time of the case, by the time the programme was aired she had less than £500 remaining, had been added to the waiting

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[4] Mrs Cohen's Money, Channel 4, 28 February 1998.

list with no idea when funding would be available. The programme stated that Liverpool council denied there were any delays and that most assessments arrived before assets fell below £16,000. They would not comment on waiting lists for funding.

It would appear that the official line and the actual experiences of those that need these services are vastly different. Indeed research in Scotland by Christine Milligan at the University of Strathclyde has found that increasingly 'Care in the Community' is a euphemism for care by the family. And, in many cases this has exacerbated an already stressful situation as family income falls - due to a carer either leaving work or shortening the hours that they do work. Additionally, as there is little respite care offered many carers feel an increasing sense of isolation. Christine Milligan's research has also shown that there is an increase in health problems, both physically, as many carers of elderly people are elderly themselves, and mentally, in those people who are acting as carers.

This lack of state funding for these two sectors has meant that increasingly the voluntary sector is having to 'plug the gaps' in provision. Over a period of time, 1978 to 1995, the numbers of agencies offering services to the elderly has increased (see also section 4.2 above), especially in Sefton and Liverpool. Similarly the numbers of agencies offering Services to People with Physical Disabilities has also increased (LCVS, 1978; 1986; 1995). Some of the people who were caring for an elderly or physically disabled relative and used the services of a voluntary agency stated that they became volunteers because it alleviated the sense of isolation and powerlessness that they felt.

> ...I just used to bring him to the centre, now I volunteer because it's good to feel you're not alone out there, the people here know what you're going through because they've gone through it themselves.

> I suppose I got involved because of my mum, it was driving me mad just staying in the house day in, day out. When we found out about this place it was great because you're mixing with people in the same boat. I bring my mum to the centre every day and she loves it. *I'm not a volunteer* (my italics). I just cook the dinners, I had to do it because the woman who used to do it - well she could burn water.. *This from a woman who had donated two hours of her time every day for the past two years to cook, serve and clear up the lunches for over 30 pensioners.*

The sense of camaraderie is fantastic, I think that's probably why I became a volunteer.

For the volunteers within The Environmental sector, the reasons for volunteering appeared to be more prosaic (see also chapter 6, section 6.3). Many of the volunteers interviewed both formally and informally stated that it was either because they wanted a paid job or because it was taking the place of a paid job. Comments ranged from:

> It's not enough nowadays to have a degree in an environmental subject to get a job in the area, you've also got to show that you've got a proven track record of volunteering. *(23 year old female).*

> At the end of the day I want to work for Friends of the Earth and they're very choosy, you need volunteering experience as well as paper qualifications. *(A 21 year old male).*

> Years ago you could get a job *(with an environmental agency)* just by showing it was a hobby or you were really interested in it - that's how my dad got his. Then it got tougher, Green Peace and Friends of the Earth made it fashionable so they started asking for qualifications in the subject. Now you've got to have a degree and show that you've done loads of volunteering as well. I'm doing science A-levels, then I plan to do a degree in either Earth Sciences or Estate Management - something along those lines, in the meantime I'm doing as much volunteer work as I can - and I'm asking people to write letters for me accrediting the work, so I prove I'm committed. *(A 16 year old male who had been volunteering for two years and wanted to work for the RSPB, explaining his career plan).*

> It's a job. I should say, it takes the place of a job. I was made redundant, I'm nearly sixty, what chance have I got getting another, even though they are supposed to be short of engineers? So now, it's my job. *(A male in his late 50's)*

It was comments such as the latter one that prompted further investigation into the economic backgrounds of voluntary workers in the sample in order to examine whether there were sectors in which a particular economic background was overrepresented or underrepresented.

Appendix 4, table A4.6, shows that in those agencies where the workforce comprised more than 25% volunteers there were three economic backgrounds that predominated. These were 'Long-Term Unemployed' (LTU), 'Looking after the Home/and or Family' (Homemaker) and 'Retired'.

In total, over 20% of the sample base were reliant on LTU as voluntary workers. The greatest numbers were in the Advisory and Social Services, Employment and Urban Policy, and Services to the Community sectors. Within the sample, the majority of LTU volunteers were male.

Over 15% of the sample base were reliant on Homemakers as voluntary workers. The greatest numbers were in the Advisory and Social Services, Services for Young People, Law, Probation and After-care, and Services for People with Physical Disabilities sectors although the numbers were not as great as the LTU.

Retired voluntary workers comprised over 17% of the sample base. The greatest numbers were within the Services for People with Physical Disabilities, the Environment, and Services for Older People categories with the latter sector proving to rely heavily on this group for voluntary workers.

There were some other points of interest that emerged. For example, those volunteers who are considered to be Disabled or Long-Term Sick tend to work within the Services for those with Physical Disabilities, Mental Health Services and Advisory and Social Services categories. Those voluntary workers who are in Education are concentrated in the Training and Education for Adults category, and the majority of agencies heavily dependent on volunteers who were long-term unemployed, retired, disabled or long-term sick were based in areas of social deprivation with high levels of unemployment.

There were very few Self-Employed or Free-Lance workers who were also volunteers within the sample. With these latter groups it is probably because they needed to spend a great deal of time in obtaining paid work. Several agencies confirmed that they had seasonal drops in volunteers that coincided with Christmas, Easter and mid-summer, the times of year that could impact fairly heavily on these two groups.

One explanation for the concentration of certain kinds of volunteers in certain sectors lies in the comments quoted earlier in this section of the chapter, namely that they identify with the services and the people who are both using and providing the services rather than volunteering because it is an extension of a hobby - although undoubtedly

this does occur. This identification may occur through the use of a service which then also becomes social or it may occur because of an *expected return* such as long-term unemployed volunteers gaining training and experience:

> The TEC's rubbish and so are their training courses. At least here I'm actually doing something useful and if I get a job they'll give me a good reference. *(A 17 year old female participant of a voluntary sector training scheme).*

The *apprenticeship* aspect of many of The Environment volunteers comments would also be included as an expected return as would more negative aspects such as feeling powerful or sanctimonious. Whilst it is relatively easy to encourage volunteers to talk about how or why they started volunteering it is far more difficult to get any of them to admit that there are more negative aspects which may have also played a part.

4.2:6 *Income*

The aggregate estimated income for the sample group was £208,993,372. This relatively high figure came from the fact that there were 31 agencies within the sample with an income of over a million pounds per annum and who provided actual figures - usually in the form of accounts[5]. This contrasts greatly with the Shore et. al. study which had a figure of over £69 million. However, there are four reasons as to why there is such a disparity in the figures.

Firstly, unlike this study, the Shore et. al. study did not include housing associations or co-operatives. This group of agencies often has an income measured in millions of pounds and has likely had the greatest impact on the figures. Secondly, there were two agencies within the sample that were head offices, and so although both of them measured their income in millions of pounds all of this was presumably not being redistributed within the local economy, but being sent to branch offices throughout the country. Thirdly, although precautions were taken to avoid double-counting, given the complexities of funding regimes, it is inevitable that some has occurred. And finally, the advent of Objective One has pulled in other funding sources to agencies in the area

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[5] Agencies that did not give figures were allotted a median figure within the band they had indicated that their income fell except for those who had indicated their income was over a million pounds but had not specified the figure. This group were assumed to have an income of one million pounds.

which has increased revenue to some agencies since the Shore study. The next section looks at the funding regimes available within each borough in some depth.

Table 4.1: Voluntary Sector Funding Regimes

The Percentage of Agencies within each Merseyside Borough with Income from each Funding Category					
Funding Category	Knowsley	Liverpool	Sefton	St. Helens	Wirral
European Union Grant	5	16	11	6	6
Central Government Grant	32	25	39	22	13
Local Authority Grant	53	49	56	39	37
Health/Social Services Grant	16	81	11	22	24
Charitable Trust Grant	16	70	17	22	20
Lotteries Commission Grant	11	87	17	3	9
Donations	79	43	50	53	63
Contracts	5	43	11	3	15
Local Fund-raising	42	80	44	56	56
Other	26	60	39	28	30
Not Funded	-	76	6	3	6

As table 4.1 illustrates, those agencies based within **Knowsley** demonstrated the highest dependence on donations as a source of funding out of all of the boroughs. However, these agencies also had a high dependency upon Central Government grants - more than half of which were to victim support scheme agencies within the Law, Probation and After-care category, suggesting that Central Government considers these schemes as too important to be left to the vagaries of funding which usually beset the voluntary sector - and Local Authority grants.

More than half of the **Knowsley** agencies that responded to the questionnaire were in the Advisory and Social Services category. However, only 10% of the agencies received funding via a health or social services grant. The majority - 70% - received funding from donations and 60% from local authority grants. This sector also had the only Lotteries Commission grant.

The only **Knowsley** agencies with a European Union grant or a contract (and there were only one of each) were in the Employment and Urban Policy category. Agencies within this particular category also demonstrated the greatest diversity of funding sources. Overall, 58% of the agencies based in **Knowsley** had funding from three or more sources[6]

Liverpool agencies (table 4.1 above) had a much greater degree of support from certain of the funding regimes than any other borough. This was especially true of grants from the Health Authority and/or Social Services, the Lotteries Commission, Charitable Trust Grants, Contracts and Other sources and this is probably a reflection of the strength of the Liverpool voluntary sector as discussed in chapter 2, section 2.4 above.

Those **Liverpool** agencies receiving support from the majority of the funding sources were those in the law, probation and aftercare, housing and training and education for adults sectors, which again, is probably a reflection of the importance placed upon these particular categories in regeneration strategies both locally and nationally.

Those **Liverpool** agencies most likely to be in receipt of a EU grant were within the Employment and Urban Policy category, however, these agencies were also the least likely to receive a local authority grant. The majority of those agencies that provide services for people with physical disabilities, mental health services and services for people with learning disabilities receive funding from the Charities Commission, Contracts, Health and Social Services and the Lotteries Commission.

Of the agencies based in **Liverpool** 88% received funding from four or more sources, with the majority of these receiving funding from five or more, suggesting that not only do Liverpool agencies have access to more resources than agencies within the other boroughs, but their actual funding regimes are more complex.

There was little support from the formal funding regimes for agencies throughout **Sefton** (see table 4.1 above). For example, there was only one Lotteries Commission

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[6] The section designated as 'Other' counts as one source of funding.

grant and this was to an agency within the Law, Probation and Aftercare category. There were only two EU grants which were both to agencies within the Advisory and Social Services sector. Other than these two grants from a 'formal' funding regime, the majority (53%) of agencies within this sector had to rely on donations and local fund-raising which is possibly a reflection of the condition of the local authority's finances, see section 4.3:5 above. Of those agencies based within **Sefton**, less than half received funding from three or more sources.

The agencies based within **St. Helens** (table 4.1 above) had low levels of support from all of the funding sources. The source that supported most agencies was the local authority, but even this source only provided funds for 56% of the agencies based within the borough. 6% were not funded at all - they relied completely on volunteer activity and just 11% were funded by grants from the EU, Health/Social Services and Contracts. Lotteries Commission grants were also very few in this borough with only 17% receiving funding from this source.

Very few of the agency categories were represented by more than one agency in **St Helens** which made analysis very difficult if not impossible (see chapter 6, section 6.2:3 for possible reasons why this is so). However, some important points can be brought out. First, the Employment and Urban Policy sector was not represented at all and, when compiling the list of agencies to send the questionnaire to none were identified. This either suggests that there is not a need for this type of agency or, they are very small, and so difficult to identify. In total, 56% of the agencies based in **St. Helens** received income from three or more funding regimes.

Those agencies based within **Wirral** (table 4.1 above) also demonstrated low levels of support from formal funding regimes. The majority of funding was from donations and local fund-raising. A large number of the local authority grants were concentrated into the Advisory and Social Services category where this funding regime provided an income stream for 53% of the agencies. In **Wirral** just over half of the agencies receive funding from three or more sources.

In some ways it is very difficult to state categorically that certain funding regimes favoured certain sectors. First, in this study, the monetary value of each grant, donation, contract etc. was unknown. For example, a particular funding regime may make only two grants available in one sector and fifty in another, however, if the two grants have a greater monetary value than the fifty, which is the sector that has benefited the most, is it the one that has gained the most monetary resources or is it the sector in which a large number of agencies have been supported? As the monetary values were not available for this study, the criteria for greatest benefit in this analysis was considered to be the latter. This led to the second difficulty, which was that the sectors varied in size quite dramatically, and so the results were skewed in some cases. For example, a high percentage of each funding source[7] - and in many cases the highest percentage - was focused within the Advisory and Social Services category, however, as the numbers of agencies within this sector are by far the greatest in each of the boroughs this result is inconclusive. Nevertheless, if this category is largely disregarded as an extreme - as well as the very small categories such as consumer affairs with only two agencies, for the same reasons - some interesting results do emerge from those categories that fall somewhere in between the two extremes.

The greatest proportion of the EU funding regime - 24% - (and this is greater than the proportion in the Advisory and Social Services sector which had only 19% of this funding source) was concentrated in the Employment and Urban Policy category. This would appear to support the avowed intentions of the European Parliament, via all of the differing Objectives, to tackle unemployment.

The greatest proportion of the central government funding source was concentrated into two sectors, the Law Probation and Aftercare with 22%, and Housing Services with 20% - the Advisory and Social Services category was third with 13%. Again, the remainder of this funding source was fairly evenly dispersed throughout the other sectors except for the Mental Health, Services for People with Learning Disabilities and Consumer Affairs categories where there was no funding from this source.

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[7] In this context this means as a proportion of grants etc. available from a particular funding source and not as a specific monetary value. The figure is as a result of dividing the number of agencies within a sector that have funding from a particular source by the total number of agencies that that source funds and then converting the figure to a percentage.

There was one category that received good levels of support from all of the funding regimes - Services for Young People. The greatest numbers of grants from all of the funding regimes were concentrated into this sector.

Interestingly, within the funding category labelled 'Other' agencies listed a further nine funding sources: these were funding via businesses run by the agencies, loans, accommodation charges, housing corporation grants, CEWTEC (Cheshire, Ellesmere Port and Wirral Training and Enterprise Council), SRB, legal aid franchises, housing association grants and sales of services. These sources had a fairly equitable dispersion throughout the sectors.

These findings suggest that overall on Merseyside, there are only two funding sources that favour particular categories. EU funding is concentrated into the Employment and Urban Policy category and central government funding is concentrated into the Law, Probation and Aftercare, and the Housing Services categories.

At this juncture it is also important to note that 17% of the base study group had an annual income of over half a million pounds and 79% of these were based in Liverpool with 3% in Knowsley, 7% in St. Helens, 2% in Sefton and 9% in Wirral. The same disparity holds when agencies with an income of over £1 million are compared. 13% of the study group were in this category and again, 79% were based in Liverpool, with 5% in Knowsley, 9% in St. Helens, 2% in Sefton and 5% in Wirral.

This analysis has illustrated that there is a great difference in access to funding regimes throughout the Merseyside boroughs, with those agencies based in Liverpool having recourse to a greater diversity of funding sources, resulting in a greater financial complexity. This is supported by the analysis of how many agencies within each borough rely on three or more of the different funding regimes. In Knowsley it is 58%, in St. Helens it is 56%, in Sefton it is 44% and in Wirral it is 52% compared to 88% in Liverpool who rely on **four** or more. Additionally, when monetary amounts are considered, the majority of agencies (79% in both cases) who have an annual income of over £1/2 million pounds or over £1 million are based in Liverpool.

4.4 A Profile of the Merseyside Voluntary Sector

On the basis of the preceding analysis, it is possible to characterise the Merseyside voluntary sector as follows:

4.4:1 Size

The figures obtained from the 327 agencies that gave employment figures suggested that the agencies were supported by 6,797 volunteers and 6,439 paid staff. However, the figures for voluntary workers may have been underestimated and the numbers of paid workers overestimated due to a variety of factors including agencies discounting volunteers as workers, not including voluntary executive committee members in their counts and a certain amount of fluidity between the voluntary and paid workforces. The voluntary sector on Merseyside is LARGE.

4.4:2 Gender

Although the formal and informal workforces of the sample were predominantly female, there were fewer female chief executives and they generally headed smaller workforces than their male counterparts. However, size of workforce proved not to be suggestive of the size of the sphere of influence of an agency with some agencies with a small workforce having a larger sphere of influence than some of those agencies with a large workforce.

There were a third more female volunteer workers than male, however when paid employment was considered the numbers of female workers was almost double that of male workers.

Predominantly female workforces dominated twelve of the fifteen categories (there were six categories where these workforces compromised 70% or more of the category). Although the greatest numbers of agencies and estimated numbers of women were found within the Advisory and Social Services category, other categories such as Housing Services and Accommodation Services were also important.

Predominantly male workforces did not dominate any sector and although the greatest number of agencies were within the Advisory and Social Services category, the

estimated greatest number of men was found within the Services for Young People category, with the categories dealing with the Training and Education of Adults, Employment and Urban Policy and The Environment also being important to this group.

The Merseyside voluntary sector is an area in which WOMEN feature strongly.

4.4:3 Ethnicity

Other than White, the largest racial grouping within the sample was Black, the next largest was Asian with the smallest being Chinese. The types of agency most likely to employ these latter three groups in either a formal or informal capacity were those providing Services to Young People, Advisory and Social Services and Housing Services. Those agencies most likely to offer paid employment to all three racial groupings were those providing Housing Services. For the Chinese, however, those agencies providing Advisory and Social Services were almost as important.

The two Merseyside EWs with the highest proportions of non-white populations are found within Liverpool - Granby and Abercromby. Within the sample, the greatest numbers of agencies employing non-white people in a formal or voluntary capacity were also located within these two wards.

The Merseyside voluntary sector has important ethnic involvement, but it is in PARTICULAR SECTORS located in PARTICULAR AREAS.

4.4:4 Volunteers

Female volunteers were found within a wide variety of agencies, from small ones to large ones and they predominated almost every sector with the largest numbers being in those sectors that provide Services for Young People, Advisory and Social Services, Services for Older People and Services for People with Physical Disabilities. All of those agencies with a completely voluntary workforce that was predominantly female were confined exclusively to these 'caring' categories.

Male volunteers were far fewer in almost every category. However, although their greatest *numbers* were found in those sectors providing Services to Young People and Advisory and Social Services, they *predominated* in two different sectors, The

Environment, and Services to the Community. Agencies with completely voluntary workforces that were predominantly male, tended to have relatively small workforces of 50 or below.

There were three economic backgrounds that predominated in volunteering in the sample. These were 'Long-Term Unemployed', 'Looking after the Home/and or Family' and 'Retired'. The greatest numbers of Long-Term Unemployed volunteers, who tended to be male, were in the Advisory and Social Services, Employment and Urban Policy and Services to the Community categories. The greatest numbers of those volunteers Looking after the Home/and or Family were in the Advisory and Social Services, Services for Young People, Law, Probation and After-care, and Services for People with Physical Disabilities. The greatest numbers of Retired volunteers were within agencies providing Services for People with Physical Disabilities, the Environment and Services for Older People categories with the latter sector proving to rely heavily on this group for voluntary workers.

The majority of agencies heavily dependent on volunteers who were Long-Term Unemployed, Retired, Disabled or Long-Term Sick were based in areas of social deprivation with high levels of unemployment.

Volunteering is still important and at present it provides real opportunities for so-called 'socially excluded' groups, as it offers INCLUSION, however there are some SECTORAL DIFFERENCES beginning to emerge.

4.4:5 Income

The aggregate estimated income for the sample group was £208,993,372 although this will inevitably include some double-counting. The analysis demonstrated that there was a wide diversity of funding regimes in comparable agency sectors within the different boroughs. Liverpool agencies had the greatest support from formal funding regimes such as Central or Local Government grants whereas agencies within the other boroughs relied heavily on donations and fund-raising - informal funding regimes. Additionally, the majority of those agencies with a large income of over £500,000 were based within Liverpool.

The Merseyside voluntary sector is VERY IMPORTANT ECONOMICALLY with an estimated £209 million for less than 350 agencies, if calculated for Merseyside as a whole, this represents a figure anywhere between £209 million and almost £3,000 million[8]

So overall, Merseyside's voluntary sector is very important in scale, scope and the opportunities it offers to socially excluded groups.

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[8] The preceding analysis shows that the figure of £209 million is a reasonable estimate of the total income of the respondents to the questionnaire who in turn represent approximately 7% of all of the voluntary organisations on Merseyside. Using these figures as a base line, calculations give a figure of £2,985 million for the whole of the voluntary sector. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the respondents to the questionnaire are truly representative of the rest of the Merseyside voluntary sector as they included a large number of agencies with an income of over £100 thousand - a finding that is unlikely to directly translate to the rest of the Merseyside voluntary sector. However, it must also be noted that, although the study did include a large number of agencies with a substantial income, there were a number of agencies - some with multi-million pounds income - who did not respond which is why the figure given above is so wide-ranging.

Chapter 5: Does Culture Matter?

...whether it be Scottie or whether it be Greatie (*the Scotland Road, Great Howard Street area of Liverpool*), you know each has got and has had for the last hundred and fifty years, a unique population with a unique culture...they are fundamentally different cultures and there is a long memory here. You know there are plenty of people here whose families go back four, five, six generations within a couple of streets where they live now...and one of the reasons why we succeed is that people will tell us all their working experience and not just the working experiences they might wish to share with the Employment Service. We've got to be from the street if you like, it's the whole nature of [it] it's what makes it work.

> (Community development manager, interviewed 1997).

...we've made a real effort to ensure that our services are as open as possible and I think that we're used by every single section of the community who live in (*area of Wirral*)...It's about giving people some control over their lives...We're not here to moralise, we're not here to judge, we're not here to police the system either...I'm not going to judge people that are living in poverty.

> (Advice centre worker, interviewed 1997).

...Each area is definitely different...and you do feel that difference when you go from one to the other, there's a different feel. In Wirral there is still this village feel...Like if you go to Bootle, you get a different feeling again. It's difficult to pin down what it is, presumably it's the life histories of the people in the area. So, we have a split culture really, we're community minded and we'll allow for a lot of mistakes and a lot of the problems that happen on the community ground but [not] the commercial one.

> (Credit union development manager, interviewed 1997).

...You've got to make it user friendly, it's got to be welcoming and I think you can put barriers up without realising you're putting them up and if it sounds a bit too grandiose and above them, they vote with their feet and they go somewhere else.

> (Enterprise centre manager, interviewed 1997).

5.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is upon those Merseyside communities considered to be economically and socially deprived (Knowsley Metropolitan Borough 1993; Metropolitan Borough of Wirral, 1991; Shepton, 1994a, 1994b) and some of the voluntary sector agencies that service them in order to ascertain whether allowing for a community culture or 'a particular way of life' (Williams, 1983, p90) is necessary for the efficient provision of economic and social services. Although the initial historical

analysis focuses upon the docklands of Liverpool, it applies equally to communities elsewhere on Merseyside. As, not only did similar types of docklands communities emerge in Birkenhead and Wallasey on the Wirral, albeit not to the same geographical extent, but, many of the residents of Liverpool docklands communities were relocated to outer estates and new towns in other Merseyside boroughs during slum clearances and redevelopment initiatives and they helped to shape the culture of these communities also. The chapter discusses a number of different aspects and problems of deprived communities on Merseyside and illustrates how voluntary sector agencies utilise different techniques to either side-step or combat them.

5.2 Community Culture and the Voluntary Sector

5.2:1 *The Historical Component*

In his history of the city's development, Tony Lane (1997) holds 'respectability' up as the chief suspect for certain characteristics emerging very early in the psyche of the dockland population. During the Nineteenth Century, those workers who were on a steady income and could afford to pay a regular rent for decent housing moved away from the docks and the dock environs into the new terraced housing that was being built. Thus they achieved respectability. The remaining docklands population - which was of a considerable size, almost a quarter of a million people by 1901 (Lane, 1997) - were considered to be disreputable - often condemned as the 'undeserving poor' (Simey, 1992) - and were crammed into extremely poor quality housing, much of it condemned as unfit for human habitation. Additionally, as the vast majority of the population were unskilled they could only find casual labouring jobs either on the docks or as seafarers. The system of employment for these jobs was such that income was erratic as work, and therefore money, was only available when ships were in dock. Workers were hired from 'stands' along the waterfront for specific jobs such as the unloading of a ship and each shipping company had its own stand. Jobs often lasted only a few hours and were poorly paid and dangerous (Lane, 1997). The competition for jobs was high as continual influxes of unskilled immigrants from Ireland and Europe settled in the dock areas and drove wages downwards. The uncertainty of income meant that other means of survival, often illegal, were in operation and included, pilfering, smuggling and theft. All of which meant that the dockland

populations formed tight communities based on religion or ethnicity with a strong distrust of other nearby communities and any type of official. For over a century, other than improvements to the housing, these communities remained virtually untouched and the dichotomous characteristics of distrust and egalitarianism - which emerged because firstly the docks had exerted a cosmopolitan influence on the docklands populace and secondly because all of the people within the area had similar incomes and life strategies - became embedded within the communities. This dualism is interpreted by some as truculence or brashness and by others such as Lane (1997) as 'natural democracy'. He quotes many examples which indicate that the outcome of this dichotomy is that within Liverpool respect is earned and not automatically granted, a legacy that is still very much in evidence today:

> ...well we heard that this big German boss was coming over to look at the factory and that we all had to be on our best behaviour because he was really important, well it was a red rag to a bull wasn't it?...some of the lads in the paint shop, they could do anything with a few odds and ends, the stories I could tell you, anyway, as I say this German boss was coming over and these guys made up a load of Nazi SS uniforms, armbands, peaked caps, medals, the lot, all out of cardboard and paper but you wouldn't have known, they looked real. Anyway when we knew he was coming down on the floor we all got dressed up and then lined up, you know like for an inspection, then when he appeared we gave the Nazi salute and all started shouting 'sieg heil' and 'heil Hitler'. In some ways, when I think back on it now, we were really lucky because he roared with laughter - our bosses were absolutely steaming, I think they'd have liked to sack the lot of us on the spot, but he thought it was funny. We shouldn't have done it, we knew that at the time, he'd done nothing to us but they got us so mad wanting us to kow-tow...
>
> <div align="right">Car factory worker, interviewed 1998).</div>

5.2:2 *Through the Door*

Voluntary sector organisations within Merseyside are very aware that this 'democratic' and distrustful attitude can make it very difficult to engage with the residents of an area and several interviewees admitted that they had to both alter their own attitudes as well as, in some cases, changing office practices in order to appear welcoming to their client group:

> ...my nameplate read Mr (*Name*), I'd worked in the private sector and everyone was called by their title, I can laugh about it now, but it wasn't funny at the time, but every time anyone came to see me it was either 'Oh, I'm sure that *Mr (Name)*, is far too busy to see me' really sarcastically, or it was 'what's your name, I can't talk to a Mr'. They really didn't like it, they thought I was giving

myself airs and graces when I wasn't much better than they were. I soon dropped it and used my first name.

(Community development worker, interviewed 1997).

...you've got to be careful, if they think you're being funny, you know, looking down on them or talking to them as if they'd just got off the boat, they won't come back and not only that they tell all their mates, neighbours, family, anyone, that you're useless or a big head, it's like walking on eggs.

(Community based economic development manager, interviewed 1997).

...When you build something in an area like this and you call it an enterprise centre, people run a mile, and I'd been sat here for a number of weeks before the first person came through the door. When you make it more user friendly and it's more of a community centre and they can see what's going on and they can get involved with what's going on...if you go out there now and you ask where the (*Name*) Enterprise Centre is, they'd probably be facing it and they wouldn't know where it was, we changed the way we operated and they don't think of it like that.

(Enterprise centre manager, interviewed 1997).

A large proportion of the community based voluntary agencies interviewed both formally and informally as part of this research attempted to mirror the communities in which they were based by fostering an egalitarian attitude within their own organisation. Some were non-hierarchical with all paid workers having equal status - however, this courtesy did not always extend to voluntary workers who, in a few cases, were viewed as unnecessary or a nuisance. It should also be noted that almost all of those who held this viewpoint had not been in position for very long and had previously been employed in the private or public sectors. Other agencies had a non-obvious hierarchy with, for example, an open plan room and an office that any member of staff could use, not just the manager.

In many communities the difference in atmosphere between public agencies and the voluntary sector agencies was often very noticeable. The former tended to be more formal offices, usually with a counter and a bell to summon a member of staff and often with grilles, bars or security doors in place. And, in some, residents were forced to conduct, often quite intimate business, through the thickness of security glass which gave a definite feeling of 'them and us'. By contrast, of the thirty voluntary sector agencies interviewed formally, only one had a security door in place during opening hours. The rest had an 'open door' philosophy with a member of staff available at a

desk who could either help immediately or who would book an appointment with another member of staff if the problem required a different expertise. Waiting rooms tended to have easy chairs and low tables with magazines, even the very shabby offices of those operating on a shoestring budget. The outcome of this was that the atmosphere in the voluntary sector offices was very different to that in the public sector offices. This was not accidental; it was entirely deliberate on the part of the voluntary sector agencies in order to encourage people through the doors and to use the services on offer:

> ...we agreed when I started that we wanted a shop front so that people could walk in off the street, we didn't want a corner of an office up a flight of stairs, around a corner, whatever...and it works. A nice pedestrianised area, people walk in in passing and they're not confronted the minute they walk through the door...I mean the whole layout of the office, the way that we designed it was that you weren't confronted the minute you walked through the door. We've wasted a lot of space having a massive reception but people come in...They're not coming in and being leapt on and it's worked so far. The subdued lighting, the orange wallpaper and all the rest of it, we tried to make it as welcoming as possible.
>
> (Voluntary agency manager, interviewed 1998).

> ...often people just come in for a chat, I suppose in some ways they treat it like a social club, we don't mind because it means that they trust us and they recommend us to other people...often they end up volunteering for us.
>
> (Extract from a conversation with an advice worker, 1996).

5.2:3 *Capturing the Disenchanted*

In 1991, Liverpool was the third most deprived local authority in the country (Liverpool Social Partnership in Drugs Prevention, 1996), in 1998 it had risen to head the table (with all of the other Merseyside local authorities being included within the worst 54) (DETR, 1998c). In recent years the economic problems of Merseyside have also been noted by the European Union culminating in Merseyside being designated an Objective One region from 1994. Under this initiative, the EU allocated £600 million of funding to aid regeneration, matched by £600 million from central government under a programme intended to last five years. That designation has now been extended until at least the year 2006 with a further £600 million of European structural and social funding earmarked for investment (Kirby, 1998). Although the region has benefited from physical regeneration under the auspices of initiatives such as Objective

136

One, City Challenge and the Merseyside Development Corporation there has been a continued contraction of employment in the region ensuring the out migration of some of the best qualified and skilled residents - in 1996 Merseyside had a net outflow of population of over 10,000 people, one of the largest exoduses in the country (Norris, 1998). Over the past decade there has been an increase of part-time work in the region and a fall in male full time employment - in Liverpool there has been a drop of 25% - and the official rate of unemployment in the Liverpool Travel To Work Area is almost double the national average, as is the number of school leavers without any qualifications whatsoever (Liverpool City Council, 1997). To combat the economic trends the city council have essentially adopted a two-pronged strategy, firstly, to 'establish the City and its region as a base for globally competitive business and economic activity' (Liverpool City Council, 1997, p7) and community based economic development (CBED). The voluntary sector is playing a major role in both of these areas with key members of the voluntary sector sitting on the panels and committees of major economic initiatives - the impact of which is discussed in chapter 7 - and the establishment of economic development agencies - which are often linked to training and education agencies - in the majority of the most deprived communities as defined under the Pathways initiative.

Two of the greatest barriers to employment for people in these communities are low educational and skills levels. Conversations with several groups of young teenagers suggested that in large part this was due to the fact that they were disillusioned with the educational system because they felt that it was irrelevant to getting a job and so they played truant. They indicated that there were two main reasons in the majority of cases for continual truanting. Firstly, peer pressure, especially in young teenage boys, was a strong factor. As a group they tended to think that they were already adult and so had no need for further schooling - some of the boys were as young as 12 - although, when talked to individually, some of them indicated that they would have liked to return to school but could not because they felt that they would have 'lost face' both with their friends and within the school as they would have been behind in the classwork and so 'look stupid'. The second reason was exclusion from school. Regardless of what the original problem had been to cause the exclusion, the majority

of the children that fell into this category took no responsibility for their behaviour and considered that it was the teacher who had acted inappropriately to cause their exclusion. When the exclusion period had expired, they had not returned because they felt that they were hated by the teachers who blamed them unfairly for problems in the classrooms. Disrupted schooling, family problems, and disillusionment regarding the future all meant that many of these children had limited educational attainments, with some being completely illiterate and innumerate.

There are a number of voluntary agencies that are working to rectify these problems and many of the representatives who were interviewed continually reiterated that although young people in these communities often had 'an attitude problem' in that they were arrogant, insolent and unrealistic in their expectations - for example, one eighteen year old who had no qualifications and limited communication skills was found a job that paid £120 per week, more than double what he was receiving in benefit, but he refused it saying that he wouldn't work for less than £200 per week - this often masked a huge lack of self-confidence and self-worth. Many believed that the more functional education and training courses that were on offer by the local colleges and Training and Enterprise Councils did not tackle these basic problems because of their strict funding regimes. Additionally, although there are a number of community colleges throughout the county, this particular group of people were unlikely to enter them because of their prior experiences with the education system. To get them to enter a programme requires a great deal of effort and in some cases a pre-programme course covering basic literacy and numeracy in order for them to be able to join the main course.

> ...what we find is people have opted out of formal education at an early age because they're perceived as being...there's no hope for them, there aren't any employment opportunities - so they perceive, anyway they tend to think of going to college as going back to school and rebel against that. They've opted out of school once - we sort of fit into the middle, we can attract them whereas a college can't remotivate them, educate them to an acceptable level and persuade them to take up further and higher education, not necessarily by going to college but we've had a number go onto university courses as well and one or two others have got involved with the voluntary sector. Some of the NVQs we've run, we've started off because of our relationship with local employers and we've been able to put some of our long term unemployed on work placement, paying them a training allowance while they were undergoing training, support them in the workplace and at the end of the course when they've succeeded in

finishing the course, in several instances the employer has kept that person on in an employed position. So, we've identified jobs that were never going to be advertised, that employers possibly didn't even realise they had vacancies for and because these people have been in the right place and they've made themselves useful and worthwhile employees, although they were only training to start with, once the time has come to take that person away the business has suffered as a consequence and so the person has been taken on. So, we've been quite successful in getting people into jobs.

(Manager of a community trust, interviewed 1997).

...a lot of the work is developmental so you are helping people to build their confidence and their skills bases and feel more confident in themselves...I suspect that it comes down to that there is often a distrust in communities of, especially initially, public and the private sector agencies and that (*agency*) provides, as it were, support with a friendlier face, a less bureaucratic face. But, that is almost a difference in style rather than substance.

(Chief Executive of a CVS, interviewed 1997).

...Young people leave school and don't expect to get a job. They have low expectations, they have no idea what they want to do and the majority are bounced from one training scheme to another. Some of these people are third or fourth generation unemployed and their only experience of work is that done on the side - the black economy - in order to keep the family's head above water. So it's extremely difficult to motivate them because there may never have been a work ethic with their homes or the homes of friends. There's a real need to reach these disaffected people earlier especially young people. We try to target them when they're still in school and we go in at year 10 when they're about 15 which is still probably too late, some people think we should be targeting them at age 6 or 7 but we've got limited resources and we have to start somewhere. A great example is (*youth worker*) in Toxteth, he deals with excluded schoolkids. He really cares about them and always walks around in a track suit and trainers so he doesn't look authoritarian because these kids have real problems with authority figures. Nevertheless, although he loves them and supports them and gives them the time they need he can also discipline them and they listen. All kids need boundaries and he gives them to them because he wants to ensure they will do something with their lives. It's a difficult and often thankless task because when they've gone as far as these kids its extremely difficult to pull them back into society.

(Community industry manager, interviewed 1997).

At the other end of the age scale are those who perhaps once worked in one of the factories or on the docks and when made redundant found it difficult to get another job. There is a different problem with this group, who are generally male and over 40. Firstly because their perceptions of what a constitutes a 'job' is geared towards a well-paid, full-time manufacturing job and in the last 25 years these have been in increasingly short supply and secondly, those that are willing to apply for part-time

service jobs often find that they are not considered seriously by employers because of the perceptions certain *employers* had about what constituted a 'man's job'. For example, one man applied for a part-time job packing biscuits in a food factory and was told it was 'women's work', another was rejected for part-time work at a cleaning agency because the employer argued that he would get no job satisfaction and a third found that his motives were being questioned when he applied for a job working with children. In many ways this is the most difficult group to tackle because of the prejudices that surround it, nevertheless this has not stopped voluntary sector agencies from trying:

> ...it's one of my priorities to get these men into some kind of work because I've been there. I was made redundant from Ford's and it took me a long time to get another job - 10 years. You get told you're too old, you're not flexible enough, the job doesn't pay enough...that's one of the goals that we have here, we're attracting a lot of business into the area and we're going to make sure that the people of the area get the jobs.
>
> (CBED manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...It's the skills, they say they haven't got the skills and that's quite true, they haven't got the skills needed. Having said that I think a number of companies that are looking to locate in this area would be willing to train up and obviously that would be part of the package that would be offered to a potential inward investor. So, they're not building factories and expecting companies to come in, they're built to demand, so there won't be any waste of resources. So a company will come in and say, 'we like that site, we require X amount of space and we need this number of people' and they need to work with all the various agencies to ensure they can equip that sort of workforce.
>
> (CBED Manager, interviewed 1997).

What is interesting to note with the varying CBED agencies is their different approaches to the problem. At one end of the scale are those agencies who consider that they should provide a complete package, they attract businesses into their community by building bespoke factory or business premises, they help put together the financial packages and then, hopefully, recruit, train and provide a local workforce. They also encourage and develop small and medium sized businesses whether they be privately or community owned. At the other end of the scale are those agencies who operate on the microscale by either encouraging local people to become entrepreneurs in their own right or in order to develop a community business. It is this latter group that probably have the most difficult task as they tend to be in densely residential areas that have high levels of unemployment and that have little available land for business

expansion. This reduces their competitiveness when applying for grants which restricts their operations, and yet they are expected to supply similar results to the CBED agencies that have been in operation for over a decade, if they do not their grants are restricted or not forthcoming - a vicious circle.

5.2:4 *The Alternative Economy*

...the Dock Road was opened up mainly because...we used to have gangs of young lads around here and they were called the Baking Boys or the Baking Mob. Baking as in earning your bread. This is your baking to get you through your life and your kids and your family, you're surviving because what they used to do is they'd hang around (*name of*) Road and (*name of*) Street by all the different traffic lights and they'd see a van coming up like a big Lewis's van or a big named van from the shops, push the button and the van'd have to stop at the lights. And, whilse one or two of them'd be crossing the road you'd have twenty or thirty of them at the back of the van taking carpets, couches, washing machines, all kinds, then running down the road and selling them and making their money on them...It ended up getting that bad you had companies who were riding shotgun in their wagons, I mean they had two fellas in the back of the vans with shotguns, so as soon as them shutters were opened up, they just pointed the shotguns and said 'don't touch the van, don't touch nothing' and they all run and then the van'd carry on.

(Community council member, interviewed 1997).

...and for a lot of people, they've never held a bank account so of course, they're unemployed, assuming they may be in council property, they're subject to status. Always have been always will be, but not in the credit union, this is a completely different concept. So, they walk into the credit union and 'yes you can join our bank, yes you only have to pay a pound, if you want to save three pound a week that's fine, we'll take that off you'. Very slowly but surely you see the book building up and then after 12 weeks they can have their first loan, double what they've saved so that only 50% is at risk. And, they get their first loan and they're paying it back, 1% on the reducing balance and as their loan is coming down their savings are still going up. Assuming a loan was three fifty a week and they've been used to paying a fiver a week into their savings, the loan is three fifty plus interest so there might be one pound and coppers going into their shares. So, by the time their loan's paid off their money's doubled again, so they can have double that again. Provided that they can manage within their own budget, they're always going to be buying things that they need. It saves catalogues - and you know how extortionate they are, it saves the likes of Provident - extortion, legal extortion, money lenders - illegal extortion, handing over books. It gives them back dignity do you see? We all have to get back to saving because only those people with an income can save, those without an income can't and so it perpetuates debt. Here in the credit union we're taking them out of debt...

(Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

These are two different sides to the alternative economy but linked together in that for many of the people who live in these communities, access to finance is a major problem. For some, criminal activities may be the norm and what is expected of them, but others get embroiled as a result of limited options. For example, someone who is on benefit and needing a small loan often cannot resort to mainstream financial institutions such as banks or building societies as they often do not have a bank account and these institutions do not make loans for small amounts - they usually give an overdraft facility. Their options are usually narrowed to those companies that will give small loans but insist that the money is spent in certain retail outlets - whose prices are often inflated - or loan companies charging exorbitant amounts of interest. In 1991-92 the Citizens Advice Bureaux dealt with almost 2 million debt related inquiries, an increase of almost 16% on the previous year. Many of these inquiries related to annual percentage interest rates (APR) in excess of 25 per cent and in some low income households APRs of over 1,000 per cent (SCUDA, 1996). For many low income households spiralling debts force them into loans from illegal moneylenders who then charge extortionate rates of interest ensuring that it is unlikely that the debts will ever be cleared in the normal run of things. There are also a number of illegal moneylenders who use loans as a means to entrap the desperate so they can then offer an a way of paying off their debts by illegal activities one of the more usual being cheque book and cheque card fraud, also known as 'kiteing'.

Many of the voluntary sector advice agency interviewees detailed similar scenarios to the one outlined above for people that they had either helped in the past or were in the process of helping in the present. They suggested that the reason that they had been approached for help was that often people were loath to contact authority figures such as the police or social services because they felt that there would be a lack of sympathy with their plight, whether this was in fact the case or not, and that they may get into further trouble. Another reason was that they were assigned to a particular person who would deal with their problem from start to finish including going through their case, advising them who to contact, and supporting them during interviews and court appearances if necessary. This is a similar service to the 'case officer' approach of the social services; however, as already argued in this chapter in section 5.2:2, social services do not have a shop front presence in communities where they are available to

people 'walking in off the street', their organisational structure is more formal and this can act as a barrier. Another barrier which is not as apparent is that there is a belief[1] that the social services dealt with 'problem families' not families with problems and so there was a stigma attached to being associated with them that people wanted to avoid. It appears that the Merseyside local authorities have either recognised that they have advice service delivery problems in these communities and so support alternative delivery mechanisms, or that they have not got the funding to support separate advice delivery mechanisms and place reliance on the voluntary sector to 'fill the gap' as often voluntary sector agencies are the only advice services in place. It is also interesting to note that it was similar work in Liverpool during the 1930's that led to the emergence of the Citizen's Advice Bureaux in the first place.

The second quote outlines how a credit union works. Credit unions provide an access to saving and borrowing facilities, and therefore a way out of debt, that is slowly becoming more common both within Merseyside and the United Kingdom as a whole as it provides one of the most inexpensive forms of credit available. The first credit union was established in Germany after a crop failure and famine in 1846 and since then has become well established in countries across the world. For example, in Ireland almost 23 per cent of the population belong to a credit union whereas in the UK in 1995 it was less than 1 per cent (McKillop, Ferguson and Nesbitt, 1995) but this number is growing and of the 620 credit unions that were in place in 1997, 114 were in the North West[2]. Credit unions are financial co-operatives that are managed on a voluntary basis and limited by guarantee. Until the 1996 Credit Union Deregulation Act the members of a credit union had to have a common bond, usually it was a community with defined boundaries, a shared workplace or place of worship and the common bond had to be confirmed by the Credit Union Registry before the credit union was allowed to operate. After the 1996 Act the onus was laid upon the officers within the individual credit unions to define the bond and once agreed by three serving officers the Registry had to accept it. Credit unions encourage savings and will take

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[1] This information was obtained by informal conversations with groups of voluntary sector agency 'clients'.

[2] Information provided by Merseyside based credit unions.

any amount - usually the minimum limit is a pound - then when the saver has been with the credit union for twelve weeks they can take out their first loan.

Although every credit union representative interviewed was extremely enthusiastic about the services they offered, there are some major problems with the system that need to be addressed. Some of these problems may be solved if the size of credit unions were greatly expanded from the 5,000 members that the Credit Union Registry usually limits them to. One of the major problems in the establishment of a credit union is the recruitment of volunteers to run it. This problem is especially acute in areas of deprivation because the low skills and educational levels mean that residents lack the self-confidence to operate what is in effect a bank. Although many of the credit unions are supported by credit union development agencies, these officers cannot be in place all of the time. If the boundaries were extended, for example, borough wide then willing volunteers could be assigned to areas where there were shortages as several agencies asserted that once the credit union was up and running then more people showed an interest in becoming involved. Additionally, taking Merseyside as an example, some credit unions - usually those who are workplace based or situated within relatively wealthy neighbourhoods - have a surplus of assets whereas others, especially those trying to establish or situated in extremely deprived areas, have very few, which restricts their lending capacity. If there were one credit union with branches within communities then this would no longer be a problem as the assets would be communal and so could be assigned to the areas that were in most need. The savers would not be penalised as the dividend on their savings is based on the interest received from the loans. There is one credit union running as a pilot project - Southport Community Credit Union - that hopes to prove that these problems can be ameliorated by enlarging the membership. This credit union covers the whole town of Southport and so has a potential membership of 37,200 people and so, theoretically at least, is the largest community credit union in England and Wales (SCUDA, 1996). If it succeeds it may well be the model for credit unions of the future.

There is also another problem with credit unions in that in deprived areas there are a large number of people in a morass of debt who literally cannot afford to save any money at all. These people are the ones who most desperately need to access the type

of inexpensive loan system that the credit unions offer but who are barred because they are not in the position to save. As the law stands at present, before they can borrow they must have savings, if the law were changed to allow them to borrow first without the savings then this could be the first step on the ladder to balancing their income as the payments made to illegal moneylenders would be greater than the payments they would make to a credit union for a loan to clear their debts. Although a number of credit unions expressed the view that this was one of the best ways forward in debt management, they were restricted in law from practising it.

A third aspect to the alternative economy is benefit fraud and one area in particular that has been targeted by central government in recent years are those people who are claiming unemployment benefit whilst working in paid employment. As the benefit rules have tightened and the government has encouraged 'hit' squads to target grey areas of the economy that are renowned for 'no questions asked' employment such as minicab driving and agricultural work, many of the economic development agencies have noticed an increase in the numbers of inquiries on how to become self-employed:

> ...The scallies and the criminals all live here, the unemployment rate is 29% - all working on the side, everybody knows that. It's getting quite tight in the benefit service now, they're getting a bit of hassle and... [they] come in here from time to time saying 'I've got this business I've got in mind' and you can tell that they've been doing it for the last two years and they say 'I want to go legit, how do I do it?' Now, we have a bit of a problem here, do we tell the Employment Service or do we help the person? And, I suppose, it comes down to...because the fact that they've come through the door means that they want to go legit, they need help so we'll go out of our way to help them.
> (CBED manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...the more the rules tighten the more 'entrepreneurs' we get.
> (CBED manager, interviewed 1998).

Many of the CBED and advice agency managers felt that a large proportion of those who were claiming benefit and working fell into three categories. Firstly, those who found the welfare system complex and bureaucratic, for example, it requires people to sign on and sign off for as little as a day's work so people did not bother for the odd day's work here and there. Secondly, those who feared losing the standard of income they already had under the benefit system - for example, if they took a job and then found that they were in a worse situation than before when extra costs such as

travelling were taken into account - this was often the case with poorly paid jobs or jobs with erratic hours and payment such as minicab driving. In these situations they often remained on benefit for a few weeks until they had settled into the job to ensure that if they did resign they would not lose the level of benefit that they already had - if they came off benefit immediately and then resigned at a later date then it was unlikely that they would re-enter the benefit system at the same level. The third reason was debt, a sizeable proportion took on a job as means to pay back debts, usually the jobs were low-skilled, poorly paid with erratic hours such as office cleaning. In addition to these categories there was also another tranche of clients who were treated by the authorities as if they *were* committing benefit fraud even when they were not and so were constantly battling to maintain benefits, these were often people who were ill or had a disability that prevented them from working which increased their vulnerability. The vast majority of the agencies felt that there were a lot of grey areas concerning benefits and that often people were given misleading or incorrect advice which worsened their situation. Criminalising the process is not helpful because it does not go both ways, if someone works for the odd day and still claims benefit they are a 'criminal' because they are committing fraud and sanctions can be made against them, however, if someone in the benefits agency wrongly advises a client on benefit entitlement and that client subsequently fell into debt because of that advice it is just a mistake. Many of the voluntary sector advice agency staff felt that for these reasons it was important that they were not seen to be part of the 'policing system' and that they would always act in the client's best interests rather than in those of the welfare system:

> ...and I think that what I would always want to make clear is that we don't see benefit agency staff as the enemy, we see the benefit agency and its policies as the enemy.
>
> (Senior advice worker, interviewed 1997).

> ...We're here to fight for clients, often people who are poor, disadvantaged, against the statutory agencies, the benefit agency, the local authorities, housing benefit and finance - the gatekeepers really. And so our work puts us into conflict with local authorities, the benefit agency and so on...health authorities. For that reason, I don't believe that it's appropriate to provide those services directly within a local authority or within the benefit agency or within the health authority. It might be appropriate to establish links and networks or even for them to offer us facilities but I think that we need to be independent, not least for

the clients to feel some confidence in that independence. If I have to go to a
court, or to a tribunal and say in a tribunal that a council officer has lied to a
tenant and it has caused a debt then I think if I worked for that local authority I
might have to think long and hard about making that statement. While I work in
the voluntary sector I can say that with impunity. At the end of the day we're
here to represent no-one but the client.

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

5.2:5 *Tempering Expectations*

Sometimes one of the most important functions a voluntary sector organisation can
have is to temper the unrealistic expectations that some community leaders engender
within their community, and recently this has been especially associated with
community based economic development (CBED). These unrealistic expectations are
usually the result of over-enthusiasm on the part of community leaders, which can be
so great that it overrides their own innate knowledge of their community's culture,

CBED is a voluntary sector strategy that was originally adopted by local Labour
authorities as an alternative to the free market policies advocated during the 1980's
(Parkinson, 1989; and Nevin and Shiner, 1995a, 1995b). This once radical alternative
has now become a major plank of local economic and social regeneration.
Increasingly, policy development has meant that these initiatives are seen to be
'community' based although little effort has been given to defining what is actually
meant by the word 'community' (Mayo, 1994). And, these strategies are based on the
assumption that people in their own communities, regardless of their marginalisation,
can help themselves into the mainstream economy and in doing so contribute to the
redevelopment of their community. CBED usually takes the form of community
businesses which Hayton (1996) defined as meaning a trading organisation with certain
characteristics:

- it creates jobs for residents of a particular area usually having high levels of
  unemployment and social deprivation. The area of benefit is defined in the
  articles and memorandum of association of the business;

- these jobs are eventually to be self-financing (or sustainable) in so far as
  costs are covered by trading income;

147

- ownership and control of the business is vested in those living within the area of benefit; and

- trading profits are to be either reinvested or used in ways which benefit local residents

<div align="center">(Hayton, 1996, p4)</div>

There are some communities on Merseyside that have had spectacular successes with CBED, one of the most notable being the Eldonian Village in North Liverpool detailed in the following vignette.

The Eldonian community is in the north of the city and is well over one hundred and fifty years old and it has long advocated the need to view housing, jobs and social welfare as 'part of the same package'. It was founded by Irish Catholic immigrants and the majority of the male population worked either on the nearby docks or in dock related industries. Until recently, housing was generally poor quality, high density tenements.

From the 1940's to the 1980's there was a planned demolition programme in the area and the residents were dispersed into peripheral estates and new towns. This was due to the decline of the docks and dock related activities, upheaval and demolition caused by the building of the second Mersey tunnel and the Liverpool ringroad, bomb damage to housing and general population decline.

The residents of a few streets around the Our Lady of Eldon Street church did not want to move away from the area, they wanted to stay together as a community, and so they formed a housing co-operative with the backing of the then Liberal city council. When the Militant Tendency took control of the council in the 1980's this co-operative was municipalised as were others in the city and the residents literally 'took on the council' in order to remain where they were (see chapter 1, section 1.5 above and chapter 7, section, 7.2:3 below). The outcome of the continued battling with the council throughout the eighties was that the Eldonians, as they became known,

resurrected their housing association - which now manages around 500 properties, they received the backing of central government for their proposed redevelopment of the area and, the boundary of the Merseyside Development Corporation was extended to include the community and so by-pass the need to apply to the council for planning permission for the redevelopment.

This tempering process that the residents had gone through and their success in the redevelopment of their housing meant that they strongly identified with their community and this gave them the confidence to branch out into other areas. In addition to the Community Based Housing Association, they developed the Community Trust to foster social welfare, community events and activity groups and the Development Trust to foster social infrastructure, community businesses, employment and training strategies, project development and fund-raising activities.

The first actual community business was the Eldonian Garden Market Centre. Unfortunately, although the capital was available to initiate the project and to take it through its first year, business acumen was lacking and no thought had been given to future revenue. The people involved had assumed that if the community owned the business they would retain all of the profits to be used for the community's benefit. What they had failed to realise was that they also would have to accept all of the risks and the losses. Enthusiasm took the place of experience and within a very short space of time the business was in trouble. Luckily, a businessman from Birkenhead on the Wirral, who was looking for an outlet in Liverpool became interested and took over 75% of the business and retained the existing employees who were local. The Eldonians learned their lesson from this and since then every other business has been in partnership with other organisations in order to both spread the risks and to bring in outside experience in areas where they have little or none.

Their next scheme was a purpose built residential care home with 30 bed spaces for frail elderly people in the area that required some degree of nursing. This was undertaken in partnership with a larger association with experience in this field who also supplied a skilled manager. The home was planned in order to enable the

residents to stay in the area close to family and friends. Although this scheme was established by and is run by the Community Trust this is a community business in the fullest sense. It was established for the benefit of local people, between 40 to 50 local people are employed by the home as auxiliary staff and it is also used as a training centre for local people who want to enter this form of employment.

A third scheme is the Eldon Woods Day Nursery which was built in conjunction with the Littlewoods Pools Organisation and the building is jointly owned. The Eldonians manage the building and provide all of the staff other than the manager. The nursery also offers training in childcare. Of the 50 childcare places, 20 are taken by employees of the Littlewoods Pools Organisation, 20 are taken by civil service staff and 10 are taken by local residents at a subsidised rate. Apparently the demand for childcare places is so high that plans are being considered to either extend the existing nursery or to build a second.

The only business that is completely owned by the community is the village hall. Mainly because in the words of one of the interviewees; "we had experience in drinking and we had experience in how to manage pubs, we just put the two together". The Hall acts as a focal point for the social activities of the Eldonian Village and is also run as a conference centre.

In addition to the community businesses and the paid administrative employees, the Community Based Housing Association also has some other employees including 2 gardeners, 3 cleaners and 4 security staff. Some of these are paid for by a service charge levied on each household and others from current surpluses and may form the basis of future community businesses. Additionally, the Eldonians are willing to make concessions if it will enhance future prospects. For example, they gave free office space to a factory that was setting up nearby solely to facilitate employment prospects for local residents. The Eldonians are continually looking for new opportunities and this combined with their proven track record makes it relatively easy for them to both raise funding and to find private sector partners - avenues that are not necessarily open in other areas.

The second vignette is of a completely different kind of community, not a 'natural' one but one that was designated a 'community' in response to a funding initiative. The leaders of this community have openly acknowledged, at many seminars and conferences throughout Merseyside, the major structural, economic and social problems that the area has to contend with, and yet when embarking on their CBED strategy, they appeared to 'forget' them or ignore them.

The community is in the east of Liverpool and very close to the Knowsley borough boundary. It is not a natural community, it is a partnership area that was designated a community to take advantage of Objective One funding in 1993. It covers three estates, and it contains 7,000 houses and 20,000 residents. The majority of the housing is municipal and the little private housing is generally ex-council housing that was bought under the 'right to buy' of the 1980 Housing Act. Prior to it becoming a Partnership area it was divided into three 'tribal' areas that did not interact. It has high unemployment, few amenities, poor transport links and few links with the private sector as it is mainly a residential area.

Although there has been some renovation of housing in the area, it is still not finished. There are poor communications with the various council departments and this has caused waste of public monies and, in one particular instance, has led to a drop in profits of local retail businesses.

The community has been awarded an SRB grant of £3.5 million to refurbish four local shopping parades in an attempt to both provide a focus for the community and to also stop the existing businesses from collapsing and thus losing a further 125 jobs. Ideas that came from one of the focus groups of the partnership led to it attracting funding for two years from the Liverpool City Council CBED initiative in order to bring feasibility studies into reality. This led to the formation of an Economic Development arm and a manager was put in place. In effect, the feasibility studies were of little use because they were made by people who, although they understood the problems of the community intimately, had little experience in how to solve them financially, and

enthusiasm took the place of proper research. A perfect example of this was the feasibility study on a childcare community business.

The statistics for the areas show that although just under 9% of the population is under 4 years of age, that is around 1800 children, there are only 9 registered childminders. The majority of childcare was done by a group of women who were working at least 37 hours a week in a voluntary capacity. The feasibility study indicated that these women could be trained to NNEB standard, become childminders, and cater for not only day care but pre-school and after school care as well. The only problem was that nobody had consulted the women properly and when the economic development manager approached them to organise their childminding in a formal capacity with training, recognised qualifications and a wage, they 'ran for the hills'. What had been grossly underestimated was the women's lack of confidence; many of them had either been non-attenders at school or they had done poorly and had left with few or no qualifications and the thought of studying for a qualification had terrified them. It took a long time to persuade some of the more confident of the women to enter a training programme in order to encourage the others which in its turn has highlighted a desperate need for training within the partnership area.

Another area of economic development that has been highlighted is the lack of facilities for businesses other than retailers. The economic development organisation is actively encouraging local people to become entrepreneurs and is giving and arranging business advice. However, if the entrepreneur decides to go ahead and requires premises there are none. This has led the Partnership to approach the owner of an underused area as a possible site for workshops and managed workspace. This was apparently successful. However, at this time, almost two years after the initial interview with the development manager, there is little sign of action on the proposal and without these buildings and workshops it is unlikely that any community businesses will be successful as there are very few areas within the Partnership for them to locate.

What all of this has meant is that although the manager had been in place for approximately 18 months at the time he was interviewed, the vast majority of this time had been spent setting the company up properly, reorganising the ideas and the strategies of the CBED task group, organising surveys, breaking down barriers within the partnership community and becoming recognised as a focal point for information exchange. And, whilst some of the projects have now been initiated, it will be a long time in the future before they become self-sufficient.

What these two vignettes illustrate is that if a successful economic or social strategy is to be accomplished, not only do the physical attributes of the community, such as the amount of land available for building, or the types of building available for renovation, need to be incorporated, but also that the 'culture' of the community needs to be allowed for. In some ways it could be argued that this latter factor is even more important as it does not matter how many buildings or workshops are in place if the people within the area do not have the confidence to go and use them.

5.3 Conclusions

The predominant culture of all of these communities is one of poverty, and the way of life that that engenders combined with a profound distrust of authority figures. Although this distrust has historical roots, the actions of the local authorities (see chapter 1, section 1.5 above, and chapter 7, section 7.2 below) and the police (see Scarman, 1981), whether intentional or not, have reinforced it. There is no doubt that it is in the best interests of the voluntary sector agencies to foster the belief that they are more trusted within these communities and that they respond more flexibly and dynamically to the needs of the residents than the local authorities, however, it does appear that this belief is rooted in reality if the comments of the service users are to be given credence. One of the most significant examples are those successful CBED organisations offering welfare and social facilities such as care for the elderly within their own community or childcare provision. However, whether accounting for the culture of a community aids in the efficient provision of *all* economic and social services is a debatable point as there are a number of services that can be provided efficiently regardless of the community culture such as healthcare, benefits, fast and

reliable housing repairs and refuse disposal to name but a few. Additionally, very few voluntary agencies have the resources needed to deal with everyone that may want to use their services and so their service provision is limited. Nevertheless, what this chapter has illustrated is that often the voluntary sector's role is as a negotiator and facilitator, steering clients through breakdowns in service provision and bridging the gap between communities and authority figures, and that to do this effectively the way of life of a community does need to be taken into account if they are to feel part of the process and not part of the problem.

Chapter 6: Voluntary Agencies and Volunteers

6.1 Introduction

This chapter both expands on certain aspects of Merseyside voluntary sector agencies and volunteers discussed in chapters 4 and 5 above, and introduces and examines some new aspects. Section 6.2 explores some particular problems that voluntary sector agencies are experiencing, with section 6.2:1 focusing on how specific changes in funding mechanisms have impacted on individual agencies. Linked to this in section 6.2:2 is an examination of successful funding bid strategies. Section 6.2:3 focuses on aspects of 'partnerships' which are also explored further in chapter 7 below. Section 6.2:4 comments on some aspects of legislation not covered in chapters 1 and 4 above, and 7 below, and section 6.2:5 explores 'the way forward' or the possible directions that the voluntary sector may take in the future. Section 6.3 changes the focus from voluntary sector agencies to the volunteers themselves and describes the volunteering 'career' routes some of them have taken. It also explores further the question of 'why do people become volunteers?' The final section, 6.4, draws out the conclusions from the preceding discussion.

6.2 Voluntary Sector Agencies

6.2:1 *Funding*

This section builds on the funding patterns and funding regimes experienced by agencies already discussed in chapter 4 above. Many of the agency officers that were interviewed have been called a 'training agency manager' or an 'advice centre manager' although this may not actually be in their agency title but it does describe the majority of their activities. This was done in order to protect their anonymity, as funding is an extremely sensitive issue for many agencies. Additionally, unless specified otherwise, each 'training agency manager' or 'advice centre manager' is from different organisations

As indicated in the above paragraph, for the vast majority of agencies who were interviewed, funding was a primary source of stress and this was due to the increasing numbers of competitive bidding structures, and the continual need for agencies to

demonstrate 'additionality' when bidding for funding. This meant that existing projects often found it difficult to maintain funding and therefore standards, and many agencies felt as if they were wasting resources because they were having constantly to alter existing programmes in order to present them as new to maintain the funding levels needed:

> ...you're always aware when a particular pot of money is due to run out thinking 'well how are we going to continue that service when that runs out and we can't get the same amount of money in?' It's always there at the back of your mind but obviously you can't become totally obsessed by the funding otherwise you don't do the job... I know, for the groups who we help, funding is the biggest bugbear and the most distressing thing for groups is that funders, on the whole, are always looking for innovation. There aren't many pots of funding out there that say 'We're looking for existing projects that have been running for years and seem to be doing a good job'... they prefer on the whole pump priming, innovative projects that they may fund for three years and then, if you're good, you'll get funding from elsewhere - unspecified and it is a difficulty. Central Government has cut its support of the voluntary sector so radically that there are very few sources of funding anymore which are long term and you can rely on.
>
> (CVS chief executive, interviewed 1997).

> It's very difficult to have any consistent plan if you never know if the funding's going to be there or not.
>
> (Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

> The greatest problem? There's only one problem, it's money, financial insecurity. Though the staff don't know it or aren't aware of it when they come here, shortly after they start here, it dawns on them that we haven't got a bottomless pit of money that they can dip into for resources. It would be nice to constantly update the information technology systems we have, buy textbooks and fancy equipment that perhaps other agencies have. If we haven't got it then basically we have to do without it. The other thing is, of course, that because there's so much European funding involved that most of the contracts of employment are short term contracts and it's very difficult with limited financial resources, short term contracts, lack of resources, to attract people of the right calibre to deliver the training we try to, which is difficult enough as it is in the circumstances we live under. But we do try to get good quality people as well and that's not always possible so it feeds on down the line.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

For training agencies, the problems with funding were often compounded by the particular client groups that they served. These clients (as discussed in chapter 5 above) were usually disaffected before they began a course and had to be handled extremely sensitively otherwise they would discontinue attendance. For example:

Without a doubt it's got to be the one (*change*) that's shifted the funding from being on a course to qualifications and jobs. For example, on adult training we used to get, say £30 per week for thirty weeks which equalled £900 and then on top of that we'd get payment for the qualification and if they got a job (*approximately £600*) which roughly equalled £1,500. Now we get £250 when they start a course plus £200 per qualification and £850 per job which is £1,300. The money available to train people has dropped and there is less up front which means that we are continually working in arrears and we're having to try and access employers to donate money to fill the gap because they still need the same resources and materials when they're training... because this is a particularly difficult client group, they may drop out of a course and if it's near the end then that money we've invested in them has gone down the drain because we're no longer paid by the weekly attendance.

<div align="right">(Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).</div>

This shift in funding to becoming output driven was instigated by the TECs and has subsequently been adopted by a number of other funding sources as it is perceived to have more financial legitimacy because it produces measurable results. However, there are indications that this route is leading to a loss of much of the 'additionality' provided by courses and that there is a reduction in the number of options available for those people who have the lowest numeracy and literacy skills. As already discussed in chapter 5 above, many voluntary agencies are prepared to finance and to enrol people on pre-course training to ensure that they will have the skills necessary to complete the course. Under the new system, voluntary sector training agencies assert that this is becoming increasingly difficult to do because of the increasing participation of new agencies such as private companies and educational establishments in providing training courses:

...established ones do have problems. For example, (*name of organisation*) has diminished over the years - which is ironic given the prison population is rising...(*name of organisation*) in Liverpool is only operating at 30% of the level it was at three years ago and South Wirral has closed...there's a strong argument for it being the plethora of training agencies that are springing up all over the place. They often win contracts from the TEC because they're cheaper but they don't necessarily deliver the goods. For example, the TEC stated a couple of years ago that they were going to shrink the base they allotted training contracts to, this would have meant that contracts would have almost always gone to agencies with a proven track record. Instead they've expanded their suppliers over that same period which has diluted the service provided by those same agencies and, the services provided by the new agencies is not always as comprehensive, supportive or as good.

<div align="right">(Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).</div>

Part of the problem with this increased participation is that the newer provision agencies are not willing to expend precious resources on simply ensuring that a candidate has the requisite skills to join a course. This type of pre-course training is not offered because in many instances it does not lead to a measurable output such as a qualification or job and because of the output driven funding arrangements, funding agencies such as TECs are reluctant to commit finances to these kinds of courses. So essentially, these newer providers 'cherrypick' the candidates who are most likely to finish a course in order to maximise the chances of the agency receiving the full funding allowance:

> So, in that respect it's tightened up what was very loosely called [the] 'bums on seats' system, what it's also done - although I don't suppose it was ever planned to do - is not only can people not find employment anymore, they can't find training places. Because, unless they are assessed and have the ability to do whatever course they're interested [in]...they can't get on a course. So, unless they've got quite a good standard of education, for example, they couldn't go on some of these courses and so they're prevented from going on the training of their choice...they (*the new private sector training agencies*) don't take to dealing much with youth, it's been mainly adults.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Even when funding had been granted, some agencies felt that the calculation of future funding needs - especially by TECs - was particularly capricious:

> ...we have a pre-vocational pilot...it's set out for those adults who can't access mainstream training straight away, they may have low confidence or problems that need additional support and guidance before embarking on a traditional programme. When we were given the contract it stipulated that we must have evidence of progression for the client and there were varying things we had to complete to show this. Last year, if everything went right, we received £1,920 for each individual which covered our costs. This year, nothing on the course has changed, we offer the same package, the same resources, the same support and guidance, yet we only receive £850 per individual, which doesn't cover our costs...[because] according to the TEC...last year was a pilot study and this year it's not - don't ask me to explain the reasoning.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

This particular manager went on to explain that this was standard practice and had happened before, which meant that although they could fund the shortfall from other sources of funding in 1997, in 1998 the course would either have to be drastically modified to 'fit' the funding available (and therefore become worthless as it would not be addressing the needs of the client group) or, would have to be dropped completely

and a new package put together. This also had major implications for the operational structure of the agency.

Many of the training agencies operate with a minimal number of staff, for example, several agencies had only a manager and two or three other members of staff who were trainers and everything was geared to delivering one or two courses. Changing the courses often meant restructuring the working practices of the staff to suit the funding, and this was not always possible. The particular agency officer quoted above was more fortunate in that his agency had 27 paid staff members spread over four sites on Merseyside and this allowed a small amount of leeway in how they operated.

Several agencies attested that the problems that 'arrears funding' had caused were so great that they avoided bidding for funding from the particular organisations with that form of operating structure:

> The reason that we haven't contracted with the TEC is that up to quite recently the TEC used to pay on training weeks and then every month you used to invoice the TEC for the number of trainees by the number of weeks that they'd done on whatever training course they were on. It no longer runs like that, it's what they call a starts and outputs system in that you get a small percentage of the fees, probably two or three weeks into a person starting training with you, you don't get anything else at all until they succeed in either the qualification, finding a job or moving on to further education. That system is not really for us, it could create serious cash flow problems for us, and so, for that reason and that reason alone, we've tended to stay away from TEC contracts.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> We're too small, we can't afford to take people on and hope that they will finish the course so we will get paid, it's just too risky. If we did that and no-one finished we would go bankrupt. So we avoid the TEC and Europe (*European funding programmes*) and get funding from wherever we can. It's far more work for us chasing the funding, but at the end of the day it means we can offer a good service to our client group (*young people with behavioural and educational problems*) rather than the really pared back one we'd have to do if the funding was paid in arrears.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1996).

> The major problems with it, because - I think the thing is as everybody knows - most of the European funding is payable in arrears and that's a massive problem for a voluntary organisation with no banked resources because we do have a cash flow problem. And also the level of administrative proof of the work actually turned out that the level of bureaucracy was so heavy that it really wasn't worth the money.
>
> (Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Increasingly agencies are finding that they can no longer just put a proposal together and bid for the complete funding package from one source, they find that they are only 'allowed' to bid for half the amount needed because they are supposed to have secured the other half from a different funding source, and this is especially true of European funding initiatives - a device known as matched funding. This has caused immense problems for many agencies but they are particularly acute for new agencies and small agencies who may not have the same levels of resources or contacts that large, established and/or well-known agencies do. This is because as more and more funding organisations utilise this strategy it becomes increasingly difficult to access the initial amount of funding needed to use as a 'match'.

> ...of course, the crux of the whole matter is that you've got to have matching funding and if you're not in the game already you're just not going to get matching funding. And so you've got to have your foot in the door to start with, you have to know someone, you've got to be getting funding from somewhere before you can even consider an application and for most people the only place for funding is the local authority. So, if you're not in the local authority voluntary sector group anyway you're not in it.
>
> (Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...and all the other borough councils are putting programmes on for themselves. The Employment Services are putting programmes on for themselves, matched funding from their own funds. The voluntary sector can't get access to those funds for matched funding.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Increasingly voluntary sector organisations are having to find ways to circumvent the need for actual funds to provide the match in order to remain in operation. For example, several organisations have used the salaries of officers working for local authorities as the 'match', others have used the salaries of university lecturers and researchers and consultants involved in their projects, and the National Council for Voluntary Organisations (NCVO) is attempting to produce a formula that will allow the services of volunteers to be calculated in monetary terms so that they can be used for matched funding purposes. However, even when funding was forthcoming, the majority of agencies found that their problems did not cease as the administration details needed to access the funding and the demands for audit trails caused new pressures:

Funding is a minefield. The problem with ESF (*European Social Fund*) is it's fine when you get 'okay you've got it' (*the agreement by the funding body*) you don't really get (*understand*) all of the admin. which is horrendous because you're supposed to have an audit trail even if it's in kind, not financial, but in kind, you're supposed to have an audit trail. But, for the first couple of years we were kind of floundering, we looked at what they'd sent us and it (*the documentation*) said 'this works', but it doesn't work and you've got to keep records of everything, your time - we have to fill in time-sheets showing how much time we've spent on ESF. So, if we do get audited by European sections you've got everything in place. It's horrendous, horrendous.

(Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

We found that we were spending more time proving that we'd done the job than we were actually spending doing the job because the proofs and the documents that were required by EC funding (*European Community*) agencies were just outrageous and were a total waste of time. Not least because the criteria that they used for determining whether your project was a success or not had changed during the course of our project. At one point we bid with one of our sister centres in Kirkby, and at one point there was the suggestion that Kirkby and possibly this centre would have to pay back all its funding because we hadn't monitored - I think - the proportion of the male/female breakdown amongst black people. Now we had monitored the male/female breakdown and we had monitored the ethnic backgrounds, they'd not asked us to do that (male/female breakdown amongst ethnic backgrounds) and then, at some point afterwards [the funding body] attempted to impose that criterion. Because we couldn't meet it, because nobody had done the work, they suggested we'd have to repay. It was a really bad experience, and we were exonerated completely in the end because we showed that we'd done everything they'd asked us to. But it was so much of a headache that we've been put off ever bidding subsequently.

(Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

The major problem is that there is no standardised procedure that is applicable to all funding bodies. This means that agencies are often having to produce several different kinds of audit trail and utilise several different kinds of administration techniques for the same project. If the tracking procedures were standardised then agencies would only have to produce one audit trail, utilise one form of administrative technique, and then give copies to the relevant funding bodies.

There were three other concerns surrounding funding that emerged during this research: changes in local authority charging structures; an increased need to demonstrate 'professionalism' in increasingly straitened circumstances; and the exclusion of voluntary sector staff from public sector customary benefits when presenting funding or contract bids.

Several organisations who had been successful in obtaining non-local authority funding had subsequently found that they were either being charged by their local authority for services that had previously been provided freely or, if they were situated within a public building, that their rent had been increased, sometimes quite substantially, or that local authorities were actually bidding from the same funding streams to cover shortfalls in their own finances:

> ...that's what happened with the rent to be honest. You know when social services started with this ten thousand for the rent, we tried to negotiate. We've never refused a meeting with them, we've rang up...and they're always [asking] 'well can't you get a grant from somewhere?' So they want ten thousand and an easy option for us would have been to go to SRB and say '...you can't work without the community, we're the community and we need ten thousand a year'. Whatever way they may have done it, they may have been able to earmark out of each year's budget ten thousand for (*name of agency*) to stay here, but that was the soft option because...what happens in the year 2000?...I think that it's only because we got SRB that they've come heavy on us...our portion of upkeep for this building [has obviously been in someone's budget] and yet now they're saying 'oh no', and it's because SRB's here I think. They've hit us and said 'bang, we want ten grand a year' (*an increase of 400 per cent*).
>
> (A community council leader, interviewed 1997).

> ...every time I go to the council for advice now, they try and charge me. It's because they think we're loaded (*have large financial reserves*) they don't seem to realise that the money we got was for certain projects and definitely not to bolster their finances. It's a real cheek really because we actually used the services of several officers as matched funding on the bid and now they seem to think that the money belongs to them, they don't seem to understand that they said that they were providing *us* with that money, not the other way round.
>
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1996).

> I think the senior officers and more professional people realise what's going on, often I think the voluntary sector, to be honest your grassroots volunteer doesn't appreciate the complexity of what's happening and doesn't realise that what's often happened...is in some central government funded projects, a lot of the money is siphoned off to make up local authority spending, to cover local authority spending basically. So, what often are put forward as voluntary sector bids are really in fact, local government projects which they can't fund from their own revenue, whether that be...it can be a whole number of things, almost anything including housing projects and all sorts of things get rejigged with some voluntary sector input and they're put forward as a partnership bid whereas the reality is it's a local authority bid. You see some large cases of that, I think (*name of town*) did a really big one, where they had this whole complex built, this business complex and I think in reality the community had like two rooms in the back. And so the rest had 50,000 square feet, you know this type of thing and that's quite common.
>
> (Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

The second issue is that whilst it is becoming increasingly difficult for voluntary sector agencies to access stable funding streams, at the same time the sector as a whole is expected to become more 'professional' in order to handle contract work:

> I mean I suppose it would be fair to say we ducked and dived as many other voluntary organisations have had to in the last 5 or 10 years. Funding has got progressively tighter. Our budget as an organisation has fallen in the last 6 or 7 years, year on year, every single year and so we're actually in absolute terms and obviously relative terms receiving less today than we were 6 or 7 years ago and while the service has become more complex, more professional and it is better used, it's provided by less people, there is much more pressure, both on staff and volunteers and, I think perhaps the most obvious sign of that lack of funding is in the building, you've only got to look around you to see that we're working in a pig sty and the reason for that is that lack of resources.
> (Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

The advent of local authority contractual work through CCT is an important development for several reasons. First, there is the danger that contract work will constrain the independence of the voluntary sector as it effectively becomes an 'agent of the State' (Waine, 1992, p86), and divert the sector from more innovative and consumer responsive areas (Taylor, 1992). Additionally, research has shown that those agencies heavily reliant on governmental funding have found that they are unable to refuse changes to their funding programmes by local authorities because purchasers now 'call the shots' (Lewis, 1996). Secondly, in the past the voluntary sector has proven to be weak when accountability is called upon (Leat, 1996), however, as their standards of performance will be more closely monitored by the contract system, the sector will have to obtain the full range of professional skills possessed by State welfare and social service providers (Deakin, 1996). This could have repercussions on the usage of volunteers as service providers in that they may be excluded from service provision or alternatively they may become a professional but inexpensive alternative to paid professional staff (Russell, Scott and Wilding, 1993; Russell and Scott, 1996).

The final issue concerns the working conditions of people in paid employment within the voluntary sector. Many of the services that are now contracted out to voluntary sector organisations were once the province of the local authority whose officers had a regular salary and occupational pension; this is often not the case for voluntary sector workers:

I've got a mortgage, I've got a pension and I do what many other workers in those situations do, I tell people I've entered into contracts with I've got permanent employment. And it's as simple as that, there's nothing else I can do...(*the lack of security*) it keeps you awake at nights.

(Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Provided we're managing, that's it - no pensions whatsoever, it was never built in at the beginning which was wrong, they should have been.

(Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

Often you can't find the money to pay wages never mind pensions.

(Training agency manager, interviewed 1996).

I tried for a mortgage telling the truth, I was only on a short-term contract but it was renewable, they laughed at me. So I went somewhere else and lied and got it. We've managed to keep the payments going because when I can't get a job my wife does temporary work and I look after the kids - we can't afford day-care for three kids under five - but God, it's a nightmare. And pensions? we've got nothing but the state, I think we've got a miserable old age coming if I can't get something full-time with a regular income soon.

(Advice worker on a short-term contract, interviewed 1996).

There is a strong belief amongst the interviewed officers that as more and more of the welfare state is devolved away from local authorities, the burden in the main will be passed onto the voluntary sector whose workers, in general, do not have the same financial compensations that the present social and welfare service providers enjoy. Many of the officers confirmed that when they had attempted to allow for the 'going rate' for a job or included pension provision within a bid for a contract it had either been cut or the contract had gone to another agency. Many found this trend worrying for the future as they believed that more and more private sector agencies would spring up and fight for the same contracts pressurising wages and standards of service even further.

6.2:2 *Bids*

We danced to their tune when the bid was begun;
the local authority, the SRB and GOM.
And when we got the money, when the bid had been agreed,
*we changed it once again into what we **really** need.*
Chorus:
The bidding round, wherever you may be,
is here once again and we're sure you will agree
you have to shape your bid if you want your agency
to survive the funding nightmare of the sector voluntary.
(With sincere apologies to 'The Lord of the Dance').

As discussed in detail in section 6.2:1 above, competitive bidding for funding is fast becoming the normal way of life for voluntary sector agencies. When funding streams become available the bidding structure is usually such, that certain criteria have to be fulfilled in order for a bid to be considered. Many of the agency officials interviewed declared that they would not 'shape a bid' to fulfil the funding criteria. They stated that they would prepare a structural plan for a planned programme and then would submit that as a funding bid - they would not compromise themselves, their agencies or their programmes in the name of funding. However, there were just as many, if not more, agency officials who were completely cynical about the whole funding process and who stated openly that they would look at who was offering the funding and what the criteria were and then they would 'shape their bid' to fit the demands of the funding regime. Often, after they had received the funding, they would continue with their original plans and rely on being able to justify the programme changes at a later date:

> [A good bid is] one that is tailor made to meet the criteria set down [and we fit the bid to the money available because]... It's better to ask for forgiveness rather than permission. So we tend to...I mean if you've ever looked at forms you'd see you've basically got a tick list and what you do is that you go through the form and you say 'Oh yes, we met that, that and that' and you come to the end of it and if you don't get past that form stage then no-one will come and visit you. Then once you've got past that form stage, they'll come and visit you and you can say, 'what we mean by this is, in the broader sphere...'(*justification why the proposed bid was altered*) but, once they see what's going on they're more likely to say 'well we can probably argue that point, but given what you've got we think it might succeed'...I mean the primary aim of filling in grant applications is to come and get them to visit us.
> (Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> To be totally cynical about it, [a good bid is] one which hits all the buttons which the funding agency is looking to have pushed. It's as simple as that. In a sense it's exactly like writing a job application, you put yourself in the shoes of the recipient and just try and hit as many balls as you can on the way down [and] I would fit the presentation of the bid to the requirements of the regime.
> (Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...bids are more likely to be successful if you've got some leverage over some people for some reason or other - whatever that might be it's always helpful. But, it is quite cut-throat, you operate on two levels. You operate on the strictly written level which meets all the criteria and it has all the worthy causes and all the grand vision and that's fine. But, behind the scenes it's a matter of survival quite often and you've got to lean on people where you can, and get support

where you can, and make promises where you can which obviously don't appear in the bid. But, I think that's the reality of the situation.

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

It's also interesting to note that a number of officials believed that practically regurgitating verbatim the technical language used within the funding criteria was a strong facet of successful bidding strategies:

A good bid...jargon. It's extremely difficult to state your case. You know how good it is but it's trying to get it across in language they speak because there's so many keywords and buzz words like 'contributing to the overall economic regeneration of Merseyside' etcetera, because you have to pick out certain points that...they say 'use these points' so you have to pick these points out and say 'yes, this is value for money because...' etcetera. It's difficult, I mean I think I've mastered it now, but you can never be sure whether you've mastered it or not.

(Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Jargon, jargon, jargon. It works, I'm the proof.

(Development agency manager, interviewed 1996).

Use the jargon, get the cash. Most of it's meaningless anyway, you can get away with murder - subsidiarity is one of the better ones, because they throw all these terms around and I'm convinced they don't know what they mean by them.

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

It appears that once an agency has found the 'winning formula' in writing bids they can be extremely successful in obtaining funding. In many cases these successful bids are written by local authority or other public sector figures who are on secondment to an agency and who then train others within the organisation. This is one of the worrying factors of competitive bidding. If there is a 'winning formula', then an organisation can acquire funding for a very poor project, whereas, another organisation with an excellent project but without the requisite skills in bid writing may find that they are being constantly sidelined. A possible area for future research would be to track down which agencies are receiving this form of funding and the types of project that it is being used for to see if there really is an identifiable pattern of success.

6.2:3 *Partnerships*

Chapter 7 discusses in depth how many of the new funding streams, especially those from Central Government and the European Union, are requiring an element of

partnership between the public, private and voluntary sectors. On Merseyside, 'partnerships' have been a fundamental part of regeneration strategies since the early 1990's with the advent of Objective One funding and the subsequent Central Government funding merger that formed SRB[1]. However, voluntary sector agencies experiences of 'partnership' differ widely throughout the county:

> ...we were all fighting our individual battles and getting nowhere, so we pooled our knowledge and expertise with other agencies in the same sector...and this combination gave us more power than we had individually which meant the people like the council, the TEC and government ministers had to listen to us.
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> I think everybody's looking for partnerships, apart from the fact for funding we need partnerships. At one time it was only face value and now it isn't, we are actually utilising each other's services which is great.
> (Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...slowly things then began to get organised and the local steering group built up and local forums, the councillors started to take an interest, the voluntary organisations started to take an interest and the beauty of it, of course, is that it's community led. That's what it says on the paper. That's not what happens in reality...what happens in reality is that you're in Driver 5 (*an Objective One funding stream*) which is 'Action for the People of Merseyside' and you're in the same Driver as the Training and Enterprise Council, the Universities, the colleges, the council. They all put bids in that have supposedly been through the consultation process with the communities and haven't. For example, (*Name*) Community College, because they've got the word community in their title, that means that they've consulted with the community, that's what they think...so the first year they sort of steamrollered the whole thing.
> (Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

> Most of the big bids, most of the big SRB...most of the funding all have to have a big community participation element in it now. The government demands it. To be fair, I genuinely say that is more or less just a sham. Most of my experience of that is they get a committee of local activists and this committee is taken to represent the local community and there is an election process. But again it's a bit shallow. In reality, I think most of the important decisions on big bids are made by senior players long before there is any publicity or debate about the matter. And I think that is probably true across the country and often what happens is...what comes before the elected committees or community committees it will just say a 'commercial concern' and often will have no name and often have no amounts it will just have a rough outline of what it is and they just rubber stamp it and they don't know the detail. These big projects the [decisions] are made by the executive which is mainly made up of the senior officers in consultation with the central Government Office for Merseyside

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[1] Although 'partnership' is a term that has been bandied about since the early 1970's it is only in recent years that it has assumed the central focus of funding strategies.

officers. So what the actual voluntary sector gets involved in is really the small stuff and they do have a certain amount of flexibility in that. I think it would be fair to say there's a tendency to...well it's not bribery as such, but they will tend to concede on small projects which they would normally not concede on just for the sake of their co-operation. So, you may find occasionally, strange projects may be funded... As to [the] kind of pay (*bribery*) for their co-operation in larger projects, it's difficult to say...

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

I don't think I'm fully included. I'm included to help the overall bid and often as a reward they may give me a bit of funding, but I'm not included in the main decisions because I'm in the voluntary sector...the major decisions are done by the key players...the very senior directors of the relevant departments and sometimes one or two other outside commercial interests and Government Office (*GOM*).

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

...officers views about the way, particularly how economic regeneration should be managed, are always, certainly in this area in my experience, have always been top-down economic regeneration solutions, not grass-roots. And, when members have become involved in empowering communities they've been stamped on...you take a step back and say 'is this really about community control of economic regeneration?', clearly it's not, it's about putting people in who are pliable or who, it's got to be said, inadequate. Local authority officers have been able to manipulate them while these schemes have been running, elected members have been marginalised and I have a deep suspicion of the role of officers in that marginalisation...community organisations out of their depth, elected members with an agenda of their own, no real contact between those groups.

(Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

...it's exacerbated in the case of (*name of area*) because the director of the partnership is not particularly community friendly, he comes from a background which hasn't...had a great deal of community involvement. To this guy, it's probably fair to say, the community is something that he has to put up with.

(Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).

The reason that there are extensive quotes from agency officers in this section is to exemplify the different partnership experiences of voluntary sector agencies *throughout* Merseyside, and this was done to emphasise the point that, without exception, those agency officers that were the most positive regarding partnerships, who felt that they were included in all of the aspects, and who believed that forming the partnerships had given them a position of strength, were found in Liverpool. Not one agency official interviewed in any of the other boroughs gave the same impression and the majority were convinced that 'partnership' meant that the local authority took control of a

programme and 'threw crumbs' to the voluntary sector as and when necessary - the quotes above reflect this, all of the positive ones are from Liverpool agencies and all of the negative ones are from agencies within the other boroughs. This variation is probably a reflection of the relative strengths of the sector within each borough and reinforces the point that 'partnerships' need to be examined critically, and not taken at 'face value'. Some of them work and some of them do not, they have to be put into context.

There is no doubt that the Liverpool voluntary sector is one of the oldest, most numerous and strongest in the country (Simey, 1992, 1996; Owen, 1965) whereas in the other Merseyside boroughs the voluntary sector ranges from fairly numerous to practically non-existent. Of the other boroughs, the Wirral has the most[2] agencies, however, they are not knitted together in the way that the Liverpool organisations are and this may be a reflection of the fact that Wirral CVS is only a recent construction (see Lansley, 1996). Sefton has the next highest numbers, however the borough encompasses such economic, social and cultural disparities - for example, the borough contains the town of Southport, one of the wealthiest areas on Merseyside with an extremely high proportion of the population being retired, but it also contains Bootle, one of the most deprived areas on Merseyside with high proportions of young people (Sefton Borough Council, 1993) - that the majority of agencies are situated within 'strongholds' and there is little contact between areas - although there are signs that this is beginning to change. The voluntary sectors in Knowsley and St Helens are almost non-existent as in both cases there has been a complete lack of interest by the local authorities in developing the sector, and, in the former borough there have been some extremely acrimonious battles between the local authority and the voluntary sector leaving many agencies very embittered towards the local council and not trusting either its motives[3] or its probity. There are signs that this is beginning to change as both of these local authorities are realising that in order to access funding they need to show that partnership with the voluntary sector has been embraced and is

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[2] This is the considered opinion of the chief executive of LCVS and the findings of this research back that opinion.
[3] This information was obtained from informal conversations with a number of voluntary agency officials in Knowsley who wanted to remain unidentified as their distrust of the local authority officials was so great.

an ongoing concern. In the case of St Helens this has meant practically rebuilding the sector from scratch. It is suggestive to note that the most negative comments regarding partnership, both on and off the record, were from agencies in these latter two boroughs.

6.2:4 *Legislation*

Central Government legislation has the potential to impact greatly on the voluntary sector, for example see chapter 4 above regarding 'Care in the Community' and chapters 4 above and 7 below regarding housing legislation. Many agencies also referred to employment legislation as having a detrimental impact as it often increased the pressures on voluntary sector resources:

> ...there've been so many negative pieces of legislation over the last 16 or 17 years, we've kind of been through them all. Abolition of single payments under income support was pretty grim, poll tax was pretty awful, new incapacity benefit rules have been bad, rules on availability for work, the JSA and stuff has been pretty grim as well. Benefit changes in general have probably had the biggest impact on the way that we work because they force people to become timewasters. They just call in so that they can get their card or whatever signed. This takes resources away from the people who really need our services.
> (Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...I think potentially [the greatest impact on the agency has come from] the whole Welfare to Work, New Deal package. Prior to that I suppose, in a sense, one would say the introduction of the SRB because without that area based focus we would have found it difficult to get funding to match against Europe. We would have had difficulty getting European funding because we would have had difficulty getting matched funding. In an adverse sense, probably job seekers allowance because it's meant that we have a lot of time wasters coming in here just to say that they've been here. They get an acknowledgement from us that they've been down here so that they can take it back to the Employment Service and that's all right then, they're seeking work.
> (Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).

Essentially, Central Government often relies on the goodwill of the general public and the voluntary sector in particular to ensure that the enactment of policies goes through with the minimum of trouble. Occasionally, and the 'poll tax' legislation is a case in point, either the goodwill is stretched too far or the legislation is so unfair that it is opposed on so many levels until it is eventually changed. However, this fairly quiet form of 'revolution' only happens on a very infrequent basis in the UK and so, in most

cases, the increased pressures caused by legislation are absorbed. However, the new forms of funding regime aimed at cutting back financial resources to the voluntary sector may have increased its instability and so reduced its ability to absorb extra pressures.

6.2:5 *The Future?*

Three key findings emerged from the interviews which were: there appears to be the potential for universal expansion of the voluntary sector; there is a greater selectivity in who can actually participate in volunteering; selectivity reduces the options of those in economically and socially deprived areas

The first key finding taken from these interviews was the conviction that *all* sectors within the voluntary sector as a whole were expanding. Some agency officers believed it was only certain aspects that were expanding, such as housing, and refuted expansion in other sectors. Other officers refuted these beliefs and asserted that different sectors were expanding:

> ...I think more of the social services role is being taken over by the voluntary sector, the home helps and the day to day care because I think that is more effectively done on the voluntary level. Obviously my own sector, credit unions, are expanding. I think that the sectors that are going to change are probably around social services and education and of course our own, at the community financial level. I think it's too costly for social services to deliver the service [and] you really can't pull the wool over the eyes of the local tenants groups as you can the visitor from social services or whatever. They tell them all sorts of stories...you can't do that with locals, the local tenants groups know...everybody who's working here and working there informally, they know all that you see and so they are the best police for any kind of funding.
>
> (Credit union manager, interviewed 1997).

> ...the big expansion that I've seen...has been in the sector of the voluntary sector that deals with substance misuses. Problems of drugs misuse have come higher up the...well have increased and come higher up the agenda. The amount of services for people who either have a substance misuse problem themselves or are related to people with substance misuse problems has grown enormously in the last 10 years. I think the misuse of drugs has grown from the 1960's and I also think that perhaps the nature of drug misuse may have changed. Although I don't know, I wonder whether in the 1960's, drugs misuse was more recreational, because the 1960's and the 1970's were quite optimistic times and there were jobs there for the ones that wanted them - and this is just a personal thought - but whether the problems have been more serious in the 90's and

80's...[because] people have seen drugs as an escape route from intolerable social situations.

<div align="right">(CVS chief executive, interviewed 1997).</div>

I think the voluntary sector is blurring at the edges. It's a totally different animal to what it was ten years ago and any organisation that doesn't make that transition will die. I think the differences between large chunks of the voluntary sector and the private sector, other than the base profit motive, are going to become less and less apparent and I think that all voluntary sector organisations are going to have to get themselves onto normal business and commercial footing. The only difference will be that they don't distribute profits to members...I think that the whole concept of intermediate labour market projects within the Welfare to Work programme, should offer very significant opportunities. Hopefully, the new government will not be squeezing the voluntary sector as hard as they have been in the past. With another hat on, I sit on the board of a victim support scheme, for instance where we have seen greater and greater demands being made over the last five years on our staff and volunteers, with salary increases that were pegged at one per cent and then nothing and are currently frozen. So, one would hope that the Labour government would be a little bit more sympathetic to the voluntary organisations which they rely on to do an awful lot for them. In terms of growth sectors, I think possibly if one looks beyond the Liverpool context then the whole area of CBED (*Community Based Economic Development*) will be a growth sector. I think Liverpool's already there, it's got enough, and some would say more than enough, CBED's already. But clearly there's a lot of areas, even on Merseyside that are relatively underdeveloped in CBED terms.

<div align="right">(Development agency manager, interviewed 1997).</div>

Essentially, knowledge of expanding areas depended on the experiences of the officers being interviewed and when these were taken as a whole it came across very strongly that there was the potential for expansion in all areas. So, whither the future? It is likely there will be increased devolution of welfare and social services, primarily to the voluntary sector leading to expansion in these areas; the complete removal of housing from the municipal sphere and therefore the expansion of housing associations and co-operatives; as the public becomes more educated regarding environmental issues and with the advent of Agenda 21 and the Welfare to Work environmental taskforce option, there will be an expansion of environmental agencies; as employers now require education **and** experience there will be an increase in training agencies; and finally, as people in deprived areas become more aware that there are other lending options to high interest credit then there will be an expansion in credit unions and Local Exchange Trading Systems (LETS).

<div align="right"></div>

The second key finding regarding the future of the voluntary sector emerged from the concerns raised by several of the volunteers that were interviewed, and this was that organisations working in certain areas, where there are a plethora of volunteers, are becoming as selective as private sector organisations in their recruitment practices.

Voluntary sector organisations working in the environmental and developmental sectors, especially those with overseas projects, have extremely rigorous recruitment criteria that demands a demonstration of either long-term voluntary work or professional experience. Many of them require a potential volunteer to submit a c.v. before sending out an application form, then they interview the volunteer candidate and then when the volunteer candidate is selected they are expected to pay substantially for the privilege of working on one of the organisations schemes. For overseas projects this is understandable, because the volunteer is covering the expenses incurred such as the flight and accommodation, however several volunteers who had worked on projects in the UK, were lodged in very basic accommodation and were charged two and a half thousand pounds to work on a six week project. These volunteers felt that they were being abused by the organisations concerned because they felt that they were being charged such high rates *because the organisation could*. There were so many people wanting to enter these two fields in a paid capacity that employers usually demanded high educational achievement, coupled with either a history of long-term volunteering in that particular field or professional experience, and, certain agencies were taking advantage of that fact when recruiting volunteers.

Another point to be made regarding these recruitment strategies is that they preclude the participation of a large number of people in socially and economically deprived areas who either have not got the educational standards required or who cannot access funding on the scale requested, thus restricting their options further.

6.3 Why do People Become Volunteers?

There are many different reasons why people do voluntary work. It is usually very difficult to pinpoint the exact reason why people volunteer because, for many, it is a complex issue. However, this research found that generally, most people had a primary motivation in becoming a volunteer and that this could be placed into one of four

categories: 'social entrepreneur'; altruistic; employment; or 'apprenticeship'. Each category discussion is 'flavoured' by a number of quotes from volunteers.

6.3:1 'Social Entrepreneurs'

The term 'social entrepreneur' is used to describe those community leaders who not only instigate community action but also become the centre of a vortex of activity (Eisenschitz and Gough, 1993; Hutton, 1997; Jacobs, 1992; Leadbeater, 1997; Stoker and Young, 1993). During the course of this research a large number of voluntary workers could clearly be so described. Often the reason for their initial involvement had centred around housing issues such as proposed housing clearance - leading to the formation of housing co-operatives, or poor maintenance - leading to the formation of tenants' associations and community groups. As the group leaders - the social entrepreneurs - gained knowledge and experience they were able to extend their activities into other areas such as local politics (see quotes below and chapter 7) and they then used the political platform to improve their local community facilities and services:

> Well, we started off as I said as a tenants' association, it was mainly tenants' rights. We started off by wanting small things done on the estate. Instead of going for big out of reach things we thought the best thing to do was to go for small things so people could see something was getting done like improve the grass cutting, get the verges spade edged, make sure there was litter collection on the estate, little things like that and then we built up onto bigger things. There was tree planting and then, like I say, we went on to bigger things like the estate action scheme. But, as we were going along doing the tenant's side of things people started saying to us 'why don't you do a coach trip, why don't you have bingo?' So we gradually got involved in the social side of things as well so we changed the name from the tenant's association to a community association and applied to become a registered charity because the social side of things were taking over the tenant's right side... The resource centre, that came about...All our association stuff was based in the house here. We had a desk, a p.c. (*personal computer*), a typewriter, then a photocopier appeared and I drew the line when Alan come struggling in one day with a filing cabinet and everything was down that end of the room and I said 'that's it, that's it' and at the time (*name of* ward) Community Association had a shop, one of the shop fronts that you see in the row by the resource centre there. So, we said 'can we come in and share with you?' They said 'that's fine' and we came in and shared with them but within a few months we realised it wasn't working because we'd outgrown it and what we had going on was too much and Upton had stuff going on as well. So, we asked the council if we could have a shop as well and they moved us into one of the other shop fronts and we were in there a year or so and the idea to apply for estate action funding came about and we surveyed the entire

estate 'what would you see as priorities for the estate?' And, the things that came out on top were central heating, security and, as a surprise to us, a resource centre. A better one than the one we had in the shop.

I don't really know (*why she started volunteering*) because when I started I was working full-time so it's not as though I was a bored housewife needing something to do. I just like doing it, I'm a doer I'm not one for sitting around, I like to be up and doing things.
(Both quotes from a 37 year old mother of four children, interviewed 1997).

(*describing how somebody became involved in local politics*)...he got to be working more and more closely with the ward councillors, you know with issues that people were bringing to him. So he started taking up and liaising with the councillors and the council on issues of anything to do with tenants, tenancy agreements, rent arrears, trouble with neighbours, general maintenance of the estate. People coming to (*Name*) with that sort of thing, so when he actually got elected he'd built up a good relationship with people, especially on this estate and people from other estates were coming in as well and asking him things because he covers (*the names of four local wards*). Yes and that's another thing that we offer people, is they can get in touch with one of the ward councillors every day you know, between like nine and one and they know where to go, they can just call into the centre and (*Name*)'s there.
(Wife of a local councillor, interviewed 1997).

6.3:2 Altruistic

Many of the volunteers said that they were working in voluntary capacity because they 'loved people' and got 'a buzz' from helping someone. The majority of these 'altruistic' workers were based in advice centres or provided some sort of social service such as driving elderly people to day centres or taking children with mental health problems on day trips or visiting people in their homes. One woman said that the reason that she had become involved with credit unions was that she saw this particular kind of organisation as a way to help many of them who were in financial difficulties and that although she has now been working with credit unions for approximately ten years, she still received immense pleasure from helping someone out of debt. This type of volunteer preferred working with closely with the client group rather than undertaking other activities, such as administration or fund-raising.

I volunteered when I was out of work for the CAB, it was brilliant, I loved it, I'd have loved a paid job in the CAB because every time somebody went out, they went out happier than when they'd come in and you knew you'd helped them, you know. And, you knew you were bringing extra money into their house. It was a great feeling knowing you'd helped somebody
(Development worker, interviewed 1997).

...The reason now is that I just need something to do, but beforehand I used to get a buzz, I really get a buzz from helping people. I'm nosy and the only way to find things out is to do things like that. But, I do get real pleasure from helping people. Basically I love people, I think they're great, even right down to the worst ones.

(41 year old voluntary worker, interviewed 1997).

6.3:3 Employment

A number of volunteers regarded voluntary work as a viable alternative to paid employment. For example, one volunteer worker explained that he had been made redundant in his early 50's and had found it difficult to find another source of paid employment and so he became a voluntary worker for several organisations associated with his hobby of biology. Over the years he has become an acknowledged expert in his field and is now able to contract his services to other agencies for payment, something he had not foreseen when he began as a volunteer. Additionally, a number of volunteers who had mental or physical health problems had found fulfilling 'employment' in the voluntary sector despite it being unavailable to them in paid employment. The recent Welfare to Work legislation (see chapter 1 above and chapter 7 below) would also appear to endorse this.

...they created a job for themselves. That's why they came. So, whether you call them volunteers in the strictest sense of the word, I'm not quite sure.

(Training agency manager, interviewed 1997).

...we've got people, and I'm thinking about specific examples, who have perhaps been unable to hold down a permanent paid job but are able to come and work in this environment because it's so flexible. The test for whether you're fit for work is quite mechanical nowadays, can you sit in a chair for so long, can you stand up, can you do this can you do that. Well, you know, there's a tremendous degree of flexibility in the way that people work here, they're able to come and go as they please. The irony in that is that people give us, quite regularly, people come in 5 days a week and they'll be in from 10 o'clock in the morning till four o'clock in the afternoon and they give a greater commitment when there are special things going on, distant strikes, demonstrations. But we've had volunteers and for instance, during the (name of company) dispute that we supported in (name of area), giving 60 to 70 hours a week, week in week out. And some of those volunteers wouldn't have held a normal job. We've been successful as well in attracting volunteers who in the past might have had some problems with their emotions or mental health illnesses or disabilities. So, for instance, we've got one person who works here now as a full time volunteer who was placed here temporarily by a local community organisation dealing with mental health issues and that person came here and was doing a couple of days a week helping out and we were able to offer them

encouragement to come and do some training with us and they now work permanently with us. And it's not the first, it's happened with other people.

(Advice agency manager, interviewed 1997).

6.3:4 'Apprenticeships'

Section 6.2:5 above discusses how young people experience difficulty finding paid employment if they have not got working experience and so they try and 'apprentice' themselves to a voluntary organisation in order to obtain this. Almost every single young person interviewed either formally or informally for this research stated that gaining experience was the single overriding factor that had driven them to become voluntary workers. There may have been other factors involved as well, such as they enjoyed meeting people, or it was the extension of a hobby, but for the majority the priority was finding paid employment and volunteering was a route to achieve that goal. Several managers of volunteer bureaux also commented on the growing numbers of people viewing the voluntary sector as an apprenticeship into paid employment and stated that the trend was increasing, especially for young people.

> The younger ones come in often to put it down on their CV's. There's an element of that, so when they're applying for jobs they can say that they are active, and it does help, it does actually help them. So I do, not many, but I do get a few requests for references every so often. And also some of them are living in the communities and they're interested. It is a particularly community based organisation, but, it does tend to be more women than men. The men you have tend to be retired, I think that's probably true of most voluntary groups. Even my experience of other groups, which has mainly been tenants groups, the vast majority are women, I would say at least 75% involved are women.
>
> (Advice centre manager, interviewed 1997).

> It does help your CV, because if you're just sitting at home and doing nothing people are going to look at that, but if you're volunteering and you're doing this that and the other I definitely think it does help. A lot of people choose that to get experience.
>
> (Community development worker, interviewed 1997).

> ...it's a good way of getting experience for work. It's the times isn't it? People need to have experience to get a job but how do they get the experience?
>
> (volunteer worker in his 50's, interviewed 1997).

...I know I'm into politics and international development and if I can get into them from any angle I will, because it's all about getting experience in those fields because they are extremely difficult to get into in a paid capacity. So the more volunteer experience you can rack up then the better it is. They are the main reasons why I volunteer. Interest, experience, c.v. points.

(22 year old voluntary worker, interviewed 1997).

6.4 Conclusions

It should be clear from the above discussion that there are a number of, often inhibiting, pressures shaping the voluntary sector. There is an increasingly competitive climate surrounding funding regimes and this is making funding more difficult to obtain. Additionally, the complex financial administration that is an integral part of this form of funding is bringing additional pressures, especially to those small or new agencies without sophisticated administrative facilities in place.

Other concerns have been raised regarding the role of the local authorities in that local authorities may be looking for ways to obtain payment for services from those agencies that have received non-local authority funding, and that local authorities are expecting highly 'professional' social and welfare services from the voluntary sector at a lower financial cost.

It has also been highlighted that the vast majority of legislation has implications for the voluntary sector in one way or another. Additionally, the legislative developments devolving social and welfare services away from local authorities are offering the potential for expansion in all areas of voluntary sector activity.

The key points to be drawn out from the discussion regarding volunteers is that popular or 'fashionable' voluntary sector activities can create a glut of potential volunteers and this enables organisations to adopt private sector criteria when recruiting. And, that there were four main reasons why people became volunteers: they were either a 'social entrepreneur' creating benefits for the local community; they were 'altruistic' and liked helping people; they used the sector as an alternative to employment for varying reason; and, that there were an increasing number of young people viewing the voluntary sector as an 'apprenticeship' that would eventually lead into paid employment.

Chapter Seven: Urban Regimes and the Voluntary Sector in Liverpool

7.1 Introduction

Central to the debate on the voluntary sector's role in social and economic regeneration is how sensitive local political arrangements are to the inclusion of non-statutory or private interests in policy making decisions. As was discussed in chapters 1 and 2 above, until very recently, there has been a general sidelining of the voluntary sector throughout public policy formulation in favour of the ubiquitous two-sector 'public' and 'private' models such as 'trickle down' which has meant that not only has the sector remained largely hidden from view but has also effectively been prevented from engaging in any of the debates as its importance has been largely downplayed (Salamon and Anheier, 1997).

Jessop (1997) called for the need to demarcate the local economy when applying urban regime theory, and so, as was discussed in chapter 2, section 2.5, this chapter will examine the role of the voluntary sector within Liverpool's urban regimes over the past three decades. This role will be discussed in terms of governing capacity and the effective inclusion of social interests within the local political agenda whilst attempting to incorporate developments happening on the wider national and international, political and economic fronts in order to incorporate the remainder of Jessop's 'lessons' for urban regime theory practitioners.

Section 7.2 below focuses on regime formation within the city of Liverpool, the capabilities of the elected urban elites in shaping the economic and social development of the city, and their effectiveness in mobilising and utilising available resources. This section also examines whether social interests were, and are, included in this development in the form of unelected urban elites such as voluntary sector representatives, or whether they were, and are, ignored or bypassed in favour of other more powerful urban elites such as private sector interests. The conclusions to be drawn from this analysis are discussed in section 7.3 below.

7.2 An Urban Regime Approach to Theorising the Role of Liverpool's Voluntary Sector

7.2:1 *Introduction*

Liverpool is a classic location to examine the importance of leadership within urban regime formation and its impacts upon urban transformation as for the past three decades it has experienced massive economic decline combined with a lack of continuity and stability amongst its political, social and economic leaders (Parkinson, 1990). The structural, economic and social problems have been, and still are, so great (see chapters 1, 2 and 5 above and sections 7.2:2 to 7.3 below) that a newspaper reporter wrote in 1982:

> They should build a fence around [Liverpool] and charge admission. For sadly, it has become a 'showcase' of everything that has gone wrong in Britain's major cities.
>
> (Daily Mirror, 11 October 1982, quoted in Lane, 1997, pxiii).

Although, many of the problems referred to by the reporter were the result of global and national economic restructuring (see chapter 1), some of the problems were unquestionably 'home grown' and the result of the inadequacies of the Liverpool political leadership throughout the 1970's and 1980's (cf. Crick, 1986; Parkinson, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1990; Parkinson and Bianchini, 1993). It is possible to periodise the differing formations of political leadership in the past three decades and the resultant urban regimes into three distinct eras: the Liberals and their 'warm, woolly noises'; Militant; and Labour to Liberal, Liverpool City Council to date, with each era discussed individually below. Section 7.2:2 gives a very brief outline of the city's political history and the role of the voluntary sector prior to these eras.

7.2:2 *The Politics of Liverpool Until 1973*

The politics of Liverpool have always seemed impenetrable to outsiders as until the late 1980's they have not followed the pattern of the other North of England cities. This was primarily the result of the local labour market which was dominated by two forms of occupation: casual, unskilled and low paid dock work and clerical work (see chapter 1, section 1.5 and chapter 5, section 5.2:1, also Lane, 1997; Meegan, 1995;

Smith, 1984, 1986) and the religious divides, with the Catholic dockers concentrated in the north of the city and the generally more skilled Protestant workers in the south.

The Protestant community supported the Conservative party which opposed Home Rule for Ireland, supported the established churches and constitution and were against Catholicism. The Catholic community, in contrast, supported the Irish National League which became the United Irish League in 1898 and had the only Irish Nationalist MP that was elected outside Ireland. The third element in the political patchwork of the city was the Liberal party to which many of the city's merchant élite, including the large philanthropic families such as the Holts and the Rathbones, belonged. These divisions meant that the city had an almost continuous Conservative administration for over a century because:

> The Liberal merchant élite in general neither worked hard at elections nor saw the need to do so. They would oppose those whom they believed to be unprincipled and depraved, such as councillors who served the drink interest, but they were ready to make exceptions in the case of those who, though Tory, were independent gentlemen like themselves. To raise an electoral army or radical working men against the latter was unthinkable.
>
> (Waller, 1981, p13)

The stranglehold that the Conservatives had on Liverpool's politics was broken when the accelerated break up of communities during slum clearances in the 1950's and 1960's, resulted in a Labour victory in 1955 (Lane, 1997; Meegan, 1995).

Labour had not gained a foothold in the city until just before the First World War when it targeted several wards away from the port which either had populations who disagreed with the militantism of the Protestants and therefore the Conservatives or, large Irish populations who were willing to vote Labour in the absence of an Irish Nationalist candidate. When the Irish Free State emerged in 1922 this led to the eventual collapse of the Irish Nationalist Party which then became a Catholic party that was eventually taken over by the Labour party. This transfer of membership from the Irish Nationalist Party to the Labour party meant that all of the Catholic wards in the city now supported Labour (Lane, 1997). The decline of Liberalism also aided the growth of the Labour party as members switched allegiance (Waller, 1981). From 1955 to 1973 there was no period of sustained political stability as political power

within the city constantly fluctuated between the Conservative and Labour Parties with a small number of Liberals making up the balance (Parkinson, 1990). This political instability did not bode well for the city's long term future.

As chapter 2, section 2.4 discussed, Liverpool's voluntary sector was at first, philanthropic, disorganised and uneven, with duplication and overlapping projects in some areas and none at all in others. Towards the end of the 1920's this began to change as the effects of the Liverpool Council for Voluntary Aid's (initiated in 1909, and now the LCVS) co-ordination and organisation of agencies in order to promote social and economic regeneration were felt. The activities of the voluntary sector during this period *were* generally recognised by the political leaders (see Poole, 1960; Simey, 1992, 1996), and undoubtedly some of the leading lights of the voluntary sector did influence political decisions as a number of them were either the heads of, or the scions of, the most influential families within the city. However, it would be incorrect to infer from this that these key players represented the whole of the voluntary sector or that the rest of the voluntary sector wanted to be represented by these people.

After the inception of the Welfare State legislation, the Liverpool voluntary sector was hit by funding problems (Poole, 1960); nevertheless, it remained very active, organised and geared towards social and economic regeneration strategies. Unfortunately, these strategies tended to be piecemeal because of funding restrictions, which meant that the sector made no real inroads into solving the city's problems.

7.2:3 The Liberals and Their 'Warm Woolly Noises'

In 1973 elections were held for the new Liverpool District Council to take office in 1974. Under the leadership of Trevor Jones - also known as 'Jones the Vote' - the Liberal party had a landslide victory in Liverpool. This was the first time that the Liberal Party had ever won a city or the control of a city and it was due to two factors. The first, was that there had been a reorganisation of local government which had meant that all of the ward seats were contested rather than one out of the three in each ward that occurred in normal years (Crick, 1986; Parkinson, 1985). The second, were related to the two policy pledges the Liberals had made - to diversify housing provision

in the city and to minimise rate increases, if not lower them - which attracted both Conservative and Labour voters. The Liberals' avowed intent was to:

> ...further community politics and development which meant giving us, the community a say, and by the community I mean the voluntary sector as well. They were supposed to be welcoming us with open arms.
>> (A community development worker interviewed 1995).

In other words not only did the Liberals consider the voluntary sector as part of their overall strategy but they supposedly welcomed their contribution to the social and economic well-being of the city; they were proposing an inclusive urban regime based upon the private, public and voluntary sectors:

> ...they made warm, woolly noises about the voluntary sector
>> (Chief Executive, LCVS, interviewed 1998).

Prior to the Liberals taking control of the council, the housing programme had concentrated on demolishing slum areas and decanting the population into high-rise flats in overspill perimeter estates and new towns and in the process badly damaging or completely destroying many of the old inner-city communities. Under the Liberals, the focus changed to renovation and rehabilitation of existing dwellings and new build within the city in an attempt to diversify the housing stock from being primarily municipal. The 1974 Housing Act provided the funding and housing associations and co-operatives were given a major role. However, the downside to this activity was that it was primarily based within wards that the Liberals actually held or hoped to hold after future elections (Parkinson, 1985). Those people living in areas with few Liberal voters found it extremely difficult to get accepted into the programme because there:

> ...was little political gain for the Liberals. If they spent huge amounts of money (*name of community*) it wouldn't have made any difference we'd still have all voted Labour because that's what we'd always done.
>> (Housing co-operative manager interviewed 1997).

Additionally, in some wards the council actively sought to stop tenants forming housing co-operatives by blocking applications, not fully disseminating information and suggesting that they were being elitist because they wanted to both escape the run down tenements they lived in and remain together as a community.

...I was on the top floor, three kids under five...[and] they'd keep turning the bloody water off...they used to put those bowser things in Dingle Block. Well I lived in Dingle Mount so it was across the main road...we used to undo the pram then, you know, take the body of the pram off and we used to have this bin I used to put me washing in. We had to take the washing out, go over to Dingle Block and fill it up. I lived on the top landing...and we'd have to bang the pram up with the water in and when you got to the top you'd be screaming because there'd be no water in it...just to get a bottle (*for the children*)...But, we had a bad time when we first started off...we even had the Liberal councillors calling us elitist because we wanted to form a co-op (*even though co-operatives were being actively encouraged within predominantly Liberal wards*) because we were like marching and fighting for our corner because we wanted a house with a garden...Me and a gang of women marched down to the Town Hall - it was before we even knew what a co-op was but we didn't think it was possible - I'll never forget it, my knees wobbled...all these mad screaming women had all these placards. I think we even made a spelling mistake...the Liberals, whoooh... (*shivering and indicating discussing the period in question brought back bad memories*)

        (A community council and housing co-operative leader, interviewed 1997).

Intercession by a Conservative Member of Parliament ensured that this particular housing co-operative eventually received funding and resources from the council. Others were not so lucky:

...we couldn't get anyone to listen to us and even our Labour councillor didn't want to know, he was too busy playing politics.
        (A member of a tenant's association, interviewed 1996).

It wasn't until the late 80's we really got off the ground. The Liberals didn't want to know and, well you know all about Militant, we were like a red rag to a bull with them. I suppose with the Liberals it was because we were all traditional Labour supporters so they weren't interested and with the Militant it was 'you elected us so shut up and do as you're told'.
        (A member of a housing co-operative, conference seminar 1996).

The other major plank of the Liberal administration was that they would keep the rates down and this had enormous financial repercussions during the 1980's when spending records from the 1970's were used as the basis for cuts in financial support from Central Government. This was because the only realistic way that the rates could be reduced was to cut spending on local services (Parkinson, 1985). Additionally, after the 1973 landslide, the Liberals continued to lose seats to the Labour Party in each of the elections bar one, which meant that the city was at the mercy of coalition administrations that were driven by political expediency rather than local needs.

Oppositionalist tactics meant that many of the reforms that were necessary such as tackling the over provision in the education system and the restructuring of the direct labour organisation were never tackled. This was because the committees charged with dealing with the issues had their findings overturned in full council when political rather than fiscal expediency took over. It was:

> ...the ritual humiliation of the committee chairman as he was done in by the council.
>
> (Chief Executive, LCVS, interviewed 1998).

Up to 1980, there were several years in which the Labour party was the largest party, however they never had an absolute majority and so budgetary decisions were dictated by the Liberal-Conservative alliance which were constantly geared to keeping the rates down. Inevitably, the effort to keep the rates down brought the city closer to the brink of financial disaster as the city's assets were eroded away. In 1980, there was a turning point as Labour took charge of the council and Central Government grant cuts began to bite. The Liberals' refusal to raise the rates or rents meant that the Central Government's assessment of the city's grant needs was always far too low because it was based on the artificial budgets of the Liberals. In order to maintain services at the existing levels the rates needed to increase by 50 per cent. When this was presented to the council, the first proposed amendment to the budget was brought by Derek Hatton who was a member of the Labour Group. He laid the city's budgetary problems at the Government's door and proposed only a 13 per cent rise. The Labour Party rejected this and eventually after much wrangling with the Liberals and the Conservatives the 50 per cent increase was agreed only for Labour to pay the price in the following elections by losing six seats, thus ensuring that the Liberals ran the council for the next three years (Parkinson, 1985).

This political battle also had severe repercussions on the voluntary sector in the following year as fiscal necessity meant that their grants were frozen at 1980 levels. Many of the organisations were depending on their grants being increased for massive rises in unemployment levels meant that their resources were being stretched to the limits:

...we could cope with 20 (*unemployed people*), but fifty, a hundred? No way, for one thing we didn't have the room or the resources. Instead of giving a good service for a few people, we were reduced to rationing which meant a really crap service that I'm not sure did any good at all.

(Community development worker interviewed 1995).

The funding crisis came to a head when the city council met to discuss voluntary sector grants and there was a demonstration in the public gallery that was anti-Liberal and anti-Tory which led to Sir Trevor Jones to announce that some groups were political and so did not deserve public money. He is quoted by Craig (1981, p6) as saying:

Why should I recommend we spend more money on groups who spend much of their time turning out propaganda critical of the people who fund them?...If you bite the hand that feeds you, don't be surprised if it stops giving you food.

Under this cloak of righteousness, he appeared to be totally oblivious to *why* many of the groups were being 'political' and castigating the council. It essentially came down to three factors: poor links with the community; poor links with Central Government and poor links with the private sector. The urban regime was not a partnership, it was the local council dictating terms to the voluntary sector and virtually ignoring the private sector. The poor links with the private sector were dramatically demonstrated after two economic bombshells were dropped in 1973. The first was the oil crisis and the resultant oil industry recession that followed it, and the second was when Britain joined the Common Market, and so turned its attention to the Continental rather than Atlantic trade. Many of the large non-Merseyside based firms who had put branch plants in the region during the 1950's and 1960's embarked on programmes of disinvestment, industrial contraction, rationalisation and closure. The massive unemployment this caused - at 27%, double the national average - was partially masked by expansion of the public sector which left the city's economy highly vulnerable to central government policy decisions (Parkinson, 1990). Many of the groups were the only voice that their communities, devastated by unemployment and clearance programmes had, and even this, many felt, was a 'voice in the wilderness'.

...you only have to look at Tate and Lyle's, we tried everything to get the council involved in keeping them here, demo's, letters, trade union's, everything, but they weren't interested, 'there's nothing we can do, it's like this everywhere' that's all we got. Well, they didn't sink into apathy in London did they? They fought, they won, we lost, what can you do when your own council's not listening?

(community development worker interviewed 1995).

...the council was a shambles, the city was a shambles, we just were trying to make them see reason but they didn't want to know. All's they said was 'shut up or you'll get the chop' and they meant it.

(ex-trade unionist interviewed 1997).

After freezing the grants the Liberals then decided to review the types of voluntary groups that were receiving them. If they approved of the work that a particular organisation was engaged in then they continued their grant support and, in some cases increased it; if they did not approve they axed their grant support which in effect meant that they closed the organisation down as many were completely reliant on the council for funding. During this period Liverpool Council for Voluntary Services, which is an umbrella organisation giving support, advice and information to voluntary groups, campaigned vigorously for grants not to be cut which caused them to be effectively sidelined by the council in the decision making process:

Whilst it is accepted that a large number of voluntary groups work effectively, there are some which do not...I'd hoped your organisation could have helped us assess which groups are effective but that doesn't seem possible in view of that attitude displayed by leading officials, both at the council meeting and in press statements.

(Extract from Sir Trevor Jones' letter to LCVS quoted by Craig, 1981, p6).

By funding voluntary groups, Sir Trevor had, in effect, created more political enemies because many of the groups were in the working class areas that were experiencing directly the harsh realities of the lack of any political will to create a coherent restructuring plan under a pro-growth urban regime, and who were vociferous in their complaints about that lack.

7.2:4 *The Militant Tendency*

The increasing disillusionment with the Liberals and by default the Conservatives meant that the Labour Party continued to gain seats with each election. Additionally,

after Derek Hatton had challenged the 1980 budget with his move that there be 'no cuts in jobs or services' he had taken his Militant strategy to the district Labour party and managed to get it adopted as the group policy. As Militant gained strength within the party it adopted the 'no cuts in jobs or services and no rent and rate rises to compensate for Tory cuts' as the official Labour policy, ensuring a clash with Central Government when they gained control of the city (Parkinson, 1985). This was an extremely appealing policy to many of the Liverpool voters on several grounds. First, with the decline of the private sector within the city, the major employer was the council itself. Employees of the council who lived in constant fear of losing their jobs due to the limited spending by the Liberals on services and due to cuts in some areas meant that the party that was going to guarantee those jobs would get their support in the elections. Additionally, voters living in municipal housing would also support the policy as their rents had been continually raised under the Liberals, usually after the local elections rather than before to avoid jeopardising the Liberal votes in those areas.

Slowly the city changed from political sectarianism to class-based distinctions which left the Conservatives squeezed out as the Protestant and Catholic working class turned towards the Labour party and eventually voted them in with a majority in 1983. When the Labour Party took control of the council it had two main objectives in mind. The first was to reverse the Liberals' policy over housing and to renovate and expand the public housing sector. The second was to expand the public sector as it was the major employer within the city. It was these two policies that led the council into direct conflict with not only central government as the council, in an attempt to force the government into supplying more public funding, threatened to bankrupt the city, but also to alienate the private and voluntary sectors. Once again, the city's leaders were shaping an urban regime without partners in either the private sector (a necessary part of successful regime formation, see chapter 2, section 2.5:2) or the voluntary sector.

The alienation of the voluntary sector began immediately after the Labour Party took control of the council and started implementing its plans to extend the numbers of municipal housing schemes to the exclusion of every other sort of housing tenure available such as private ownership and housing associations and co-operatives.

Although it had been the Labour party that had been elected, it was the Militant Tendency within the party that dictated policy and it had stated that the council's intention was to build one thousand municipal homes within 12 months. However, what they failed to tell the voters was that this pledge would be achieved by 'creative accounting'. The vast majority of the homes that they claimed they had built as a response to public need would have been built anyway under the previous administration (Crick, 1986; Middleton, 1991; Parkinson, 1986a, 1986b).

Within the city there were a number of housing co-operatives for whom the previous administration had agreed to build or renovate homes. The plan was that on completion of the programme the relevant housing co-operatives would buy the homes from the council and then manage them completely. The programme was devised in this way so that the council could take advantage of VAT laws, in effect it was cheaper for the council to build houses than a housing co-operative or association as it did not have to pay the tax. The Labour council reneged on these agreements and instead decided that the housing would remain under municipal control rather than allowing the co-operatives to buy the houses once they were ready for occupation. According to several housing co-operative managers in the city, by doing this the council gained somewhere in the region of 700 houses in one fell swoop. The council also bought a new-build scheme which meant that within 3 months of taking control they had 'achieved' their target of one thousand new council homes. The overbearing manner in which the council decided what was 'for the good of the people' and the scaremongering and 'bully boy' tactics that were adopted by it antagonised and estranged the council from its electorate even as those self-same voters were voting them back into power (Meegan, 1989).

The people who were organising and managing the housing co-operatives realised immediately that both their jobs and the co-operatives were in jeopardy from the Militant Tendency and so acted accordingly.

> ...Militant Tendency won the elections in May 1983, the first I knew of the election results was when we got the train at half six the next morning to go to London for a meeting with the Housing Corporation at the DoE. And, as we were sat down at the breakfast table in the restaurant car, (*Name of his line manager who was also the manager of a housing development service*) lurches onto the train at the last second clutching an early edition of the Daily Post. She

scanned the election results, sat down opposite me and said, 'well, it's been nice working with you'. Tony Byrne, shortly afterwards [told] her that he'd 'run her out of this town on a f****** rail' which made it quite clear what the administration thought of our organisation and all our schemes were scrapped. So, people were paid out of decorating allowances for our tenants for six months while...we went out and drummed up three or four new co-ops (*in Knowsley*) which I then went off and built.
(Chief Executive, LCVS, who was working for the above mentioned housing development service in 1983, interviewed 1998).

For many members of housing co-operatives it took a great deal of courage to remain within the co-operatives as they felt that they were being selectively targeted and intimidated by council employees - often members of the city council's static security force which was locally known as 'Hatton's Army'. According to the housing co-operative managers that were interviewed during this research, the form that the targeting took depended on the relative strength of the housing co-operative in question, and there were two general techniques utilised. The first, it was alleged, was applied if the co-operative was already formed and was already involved in the building process, and saw the co-operative member offered a prime property in a salubrious area. Accompanying the offer would be threats, such as that this would be the only offer of another property that they would get because the housing co-operative was going to be destroyed and, the property that was being built for the co-operative was going to be allocated to other, more needy people. It was also alleged that they also used other intimidation tactics such as silent phone calls, and faeces through the housing co-operative members' letterboxes. These tactics were designed to frighten the co-operative members into leaving the co-operative and were very effective in some areas, leading to the break up of many co-operatives. Some communities refused to bow down to the intimidation and tried to come to some arrangement with the council but to no avail:

...the[y] were told 'well no, we're just going to demolish your houses and you'll go where you're told to go'. Now this was at the same time there was a struggle going on in the ward because obviously the community didn't just lie down, they actually went to the local ward. Most of them were apathetic politically but they decided to get involved because it was obviously affecting their area and they wanted to see who these people was on the ward council who had this power to change things. So they went along and it was the time of the bully boy tactics, so they were physically, verbally abused, threatening phone calls, bouncers on the door spitting at people as they walked in and there was about four or five of

the community that went. After three or four meetings - I mean every time they stood and tried to talk they were heckled down - ...they found out that the ward party was actually run by eight to nine activists who, you know, didn't really live in the area, didn't have a concern, but they used the 'bums on seats' approach. So, whenever there was an important meeting they'd have twelve people there, you know. So, after about three or four months, the community leaders got the community together and one night 120 people went down and joined the ward Labour party - it's physically still the biggest ward. Second meeting after that, when we were allowed to vote, they voted out all the existing committee and voted in their own people, voted in that the council should reverse the policy in this area for this (*the new committee voted to retain the housing co-operatives in the area, thus reversing the policy of the previous committee*), went back to Tony Byrne and Derek Hatton and said 'right, we're now the ward Labour party and listen to us' and they said 'no, you'll now have to take over the constituency' which is a number of wards put together which is a lot more difficult - although they did try it, they did try to take over the constituency. And, that's when they started putting the dossier together on Derek Hatton and Tony Byrne, the dossier that went down to London.

(Housing Association Manager, interviewed 1997).

The second technique, it was alleged, was usually applied when a co-operative had either just been newly formed or was just starting to undergo the process of formation whereby tenants who were *not* in the housing co-operative were offered high quality alternative accommodation and when the housing co-operative members asked if they could have a similar property they were told that it was not available to them because they were members of a housing co-operative:

They hated us. He (*Derek Hatton*) was a playboy, we still call him that - a playboy, you know. We still call him that because of the time we had with him because...they didn't want to know us...they put a CPO (*Compulsory Purchase Order*) order on the tennies (*tenements*) and we're all like that (*strongly protesting that the CPO was unjust*), 'we're in the co-op'. We weren't getting the houses because we were in the co-op. Ohh it was terrible. It was like we were blamed, they were punishing us for being a part of this co-op which was like a pipe dream, we didn't think it would ever work.

(A community council and housing co-operative leader, interviewed 1997).

It was not just housing associations and co-operatives that were having problems with the council. For some, the Militant Tendency were left-wing extremists:

...who regarded the voluntary sector as aiding and abetting the processes of capitalism *and* central government and so therefore needed to be scourged off the face of the planet.

(ex-Liberal councillor, interviewed 1997).

Again this took the form of threats, cuts in funding and notices to quit for voluntary sector organisations that were based in council owned buildings who were viewed to be 'co-operating' with Central Government:

> Well, voluntary workers were doing tasks that belonged to the workers weren't they? And, I mean we have the letter...asking you what premises you rented from the city. The implication was that 'if you involved yourself in that programme (*instigated by Central Government*) don't think you're going to be renting premises from the city'.
>
> <div align="right">(A senior voluntary sector manager interviewed 1997).</div>

> They cut our funds, they tried to kick us out from our premises, we had to run the gauntlet of Hatton's army whenever we turned up at meetings, we'd get threatening phone calls - it was a nightmare, in some ways I don't know how we survived, but we did. It must have been sheer pigheadedness.
>
> <div align="right">(Community development worker interviewed 1995).</div>

> ...there was a lot of politics going on in the area, there was this idea of 'we're going to break this community group'...but we'd got to all the people beforehand and just said 'don't listen to them, don't listen to them at all, we'll fight them as long as we can'.
>
> <div align="right">(Housing association worker interviewed 1997).</div>
> They hated us...that's it in a nutshell, pure hatred. They hated everybody who didn't agree with them and what they were saying, they lived off hate. Of course we were vulnerable because all of our funding came from them...that soon stopped, they decimated us.
>
> <div align="right">(Voluntary sector worker interviewed 1996).</div>

The only areas of the voluntary sector that were supported by the city council were those that were not politically contentious such as sheltered housing schemes. Every other sector from those providing social services to those providing care for the elderly suffered either swingeing cuts or complete withdrawal of funding. For example, one organisation that offered social services had to take out a two million pounds overdraft in order to continue to function. However, the determined attack on the sector by the Militant Tendency had one important and long lasting effect in that those agencies that managed to survive determined that they would radically diversify their income streams so that their existence could never be threatened by a city council in a similar manner ever again.

In addition to freezing out the voluntary sector, the Labour council launched its attack on Central Government based on the unfairness of the spending cuts which had been imposed on the city as a result of the low spending on services by the Liberals over the

previous decade. To be fair, in many ways it had a valid case, the city's fiscal affairs were in dire straits because of the short termism of the previous administration. Central Government made a tacit acknowledgement of this and in the first year, 1984, the council had some success in gaining extra funding when the government allocated a small amount to the city. However, this was not forthcoming in later years as it was considered to be counter-productive to fiscal responsibility. The main reason it was withheld was that instead of accepting the money and exploiting the sympathy of the Home Secretary for the city's plight, the Militant Tendency jubilantly proclaimed the decision as a 'victory' against the Central Government - a patently counterproductive and politically naive tactic as they only succeeded in infuriating the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher thus ensuring that extra monies would not be forthcoming in future years. Future deficits in the budget were covered by creative accounting techniques whereby money was diverted from capital resources to revenue streams to pay employees salaries, and capital expenditure was financed by loans from foreign banks which was storing up serious financial liabilities for the future (see Crick, 1986; Parkinson, 1985; 1986a; 1986b; 1988 and 1990).

The problems that Central Government were having with the city's administrators meant that it was sympathetic to representation from one particular area of Liverpool's voluntary sector, housing associations and co-operatives. This was because housing associations and co-operatives were organisations at the heart of Central Government legislation aimed at reducing municipal housing provision. They were also a means by which the municipal housing policy of the Militant city council could be circumvented.

For example, when the city council axed funding to housing associations in 1983, the Government responded by top slicing £9 million from the city's housing budget and handing it directly to the housing associations in 1984 (Parkinson, 1985). When the city council refused planning permission to the Eldonian Housing Co-operative to redevelop the Tate and Lyle industrial site the latter lobbied the Secretary of State and eventually they were incorporated into the MDC's area when its boundaries were extended in 1988:

...Now at this time, I think we were just in some ways lucky in the fact that the government was trying to say to these councillors who were holding a gun to their head through setting illegal budgets, through, in some ways orchestrating riots, they were saying 'well look, we can channel money for things like housing without going through the local authority, we can do it directly with people'. And, I think we just happened to be there at the right time.

<div align="right">(Housing Association Manager, interviewed 1997).</div>

The Militant Tendency driven Labour council not only angered Central Government and estranged the voluntary sector locally, but also managed to alienate the private sector as well which had repercussions for the Merseyside Development Corporation. The MDC had been established in 1981 to reclaim the disused dock and industrial areas on the riverfront (see chapter 1 above) and, part of its strategy was to lever in private investment to the reclaimed and renovated areas but this proved to be a difficult task under the Militant Tendency (see, for example, the Financial Times, 1986; Meegan, 1993; and Parkinson, 1990). This was partly due to the council's determined concentration of resources into the working class areas most likely to vote for them in future elections. The policy of building housing and leisure facilities was endorsed by the large construction and building firms that were benefiting from it, but by few others. However, the municipal housing policy combined with the almost total neglect of other areas of economic activity such as retailing, manufacturing, tourism and cultural industries and the neglect of small businesses meant that the private sector felt very insecure and so was loath to increase investment in the city:

...we sent out a brochure to everybody, all the heads of businesses to say, you know, we've created this wonderland in Liverpool how about coming up here and investing some money? And the reply was devastating...a distressing number of these captains of industry took the trouble to write to us and they said 'no we're not expanding at the moment, we're not investing. *But*, if we were, the last place we would come to would be Liverpool'...the council had changed, suddenly it had become a Militant left-wing council...Deggsy (*Derek Hatton*) was one of the biggest factors in deterring investment here because investors these days can go anywhere in the world...and they are certainly not going to go to a place where the local administration is a bit dodgy, where they say 'we're going to set up an independent anarchic state'. It's just bad news.

<div align="right">(An estate agent for a business park interviewed 1997).</div>

By 1986, the council's relationships with the private and voluntary sectors and Central Government had reached their lowest point and it appeared that it was impossible to break the deadlock as the Labour party had continuous electoral victories based on its

housing policy combined with political confrontation. The urban regime was breaking down from the pressures of its anti-growth strategy.

The impasse was finally broken by a variety of external forces. First, the Militant Tendency had become an outlawed organisation within the national Labour party because of the immense damage it was causing to the national electoral chances of the Labour party and so, in 1986 the national Labour leadership suspended the Liverpool Labour party and then expelled those who were the leading lights of the Militant Tendency for their membership of the organisation. 1987 hammered another nail into the Militant Tendency's coffin when the House of Lords finally confirmed the view of the district auditor that the Labour councillors had not protected the fiscal interests of the city and disqualified 47 of them from office. The 47 councillors (also known locally as the 47 'heroes and martyrs') were replaced by other more moderate Labour councillors who attempted to maintain the Militant Tendency's polices whilst repairing relationships with the private and voluntary sectors and Central Government (Crick, 1986; Parkinson, 1990) and thus embarking on a new urban regime that was very different to the ones preceding it.

The new Labour council changed its strategy from focusing on municipal services to exploitation of leisure and tourism industries that were beginning to form around the riverfront areas such as the Albert Dock, one of the MDC's showcase initiatives. Additional to this, it recognised that the city centre was also a prime site for the development of retail and commercial properties and, by spending the money available to it under the Urban Programme, somewhere in the region of £20 million pounds, on city centre improvements rather than supporting the housing and environment policies of the previous administration, they signalled that confrontation was out and partnership was in (Parkinson, 1990).

7.2:5 *Labour to Liberal, Liverpool City Council to Date.*

Since the expulsion of the 47 Labour councillors for their involvement with the Militant Tendency, Liverpool has had every conceivable hue of Labour administration. However, control has never fallen back into the hands of the extreme left-wing faction, it has remained in the hands of moderates but has been effectively, a hung council

because of the schisms within the Labour party. Ironically, it is because there is also deep factionalisation between the Liberal Democrats (the other major party represented on Liverpool city council) and the Liberals that there has been a continuous Labour administration as the Labour party has only held a majority for two of the years in the period 1987 to 1998. The May elections in 1998 saw a switch from Labour to the Liberal Democrats who now have a majority on the council. This moderate leadership recognised that divisive and confrontational politics had not worked and that partnership between public and private agencies - and latterly voluntary agencies - was the key to social and economic regeneration so they embarked on an inclusive urban regime embracing key actors from all three sectors. This was a fortuitous realisation given that this is also a key theme within the majority of new Central Government funding streams.

As argued in chapter 1 above, since the late 1980's legislation has increasingly been geared towards economic and physical regeneration and has demanded that local authorities demonstrate a high commitment to fostering partnerships in order to be able to draw down funding from new initiatives. Central Government had been wedded to this concept since the late 1960's - probably in an attempt to keep administrative costs down - despite the failure of many early partnerships in forming coherent strategies or giving priority to economic development (Nabarro, 1980). The partnership scheme was initially part of the 1968 Urban Programme and was introduced as a way to co-ordinate urban strategies within seven areas - although this was later broadened to include others. In these earlier pieces of legislation the notion of 'partnership' is more wishful thinking rather than an actuality; the later pieces of legislation demand the actuality.

The voluntary sector in Liverpool, which had been neglected by the local authority in the 1970's, attacked by it in the 1980's - forcing the sector to retreat and regroup - has gone on the offensive in the 1990's ensuring that it has been increasingly involved in these political partnerships, and fully participating in the urban regime. There are six reasons for this. First, by diversifying their funding streams some of the larger voluntary sector organisations are now in the position where they can become completely independent of the city council if necessary, and so can follow the needs of

their organisation rather than the dictates of the city council. Additionally, they also feel freer to criticise the actions of the city council as they are no longer 'biting the hand that feeds them'.

Secondly, many of those voluntary organisations that do receive city council funding receive it in the form of contract payments. There is a huge difference between a grant regime and a contract regime. For the former it is unlikely there would be any penalties for the council if the grant is withdrawn or withheld, however, as a contract has fixed terms, if the council defaults it can be sued which puts the voluntary organisation in a position of power.

A third reason is that the city's finances are still extremely precarious and voluntary sector activity has taken some of the pressure off as agencies not only furnish a great deal of service provision but may also have access to funding streams that are not open to the city council such as the National Lotteries Charity Board.

Fourthly, the major umbrella organisation of the voluntary sector in Liverpool, the LCVS, acquired a new Chief Executive in 1987 who is still in position and so has consolidated the position of LCVS over a decade. By his own admission (and in the opinion of many other voluntary sector workers), this Chief Executive is a consummate networker and is completely at home with the Machiavellian intricacies of the political system in Liverpool. He has manipulated it to such an extent that a large number of political decisions are referred directly to the people they will affect for their comments and approval, something completely unheard of in administrations prior to his appointment.

A fifth reason is that according to key actors within the voluntary sector, the city now has better politicians who are more able to understand the importance of the voluntary sector's activities in the city's viability.

The final reason is that the voluntary sector has directly benefited from recent initiatives and through major pieces of recent legislation encouraging the privatisation of local authority services and housing. Some voluntary sector workers in Liverpool consider that the latter factor is the only reason that the sector has gained such

prominence in political coalitions but this is a questionable argument for if this were the case then the sector would have equal prominence in all of the other Merseyside boroughs and, this is patently not the case. This is not to deny that they have not played a major role in gaining the political leadership's acceptance of and support for the voluntary sector because it has. However, if the other factors were not in place then it is unlikely that the sector would have been able to have taken such swift and complete advantage of both initiatives and legislation as they were introduced.

For example, successive Housing Acts have strengthened the position of Liverpool's housing associations and co-operatives, so much so that several housing associations have greatly expanded and are now operating on a regional rather than local basis (see chapter 4). The 1996 Housing Act based on the White Paper, *Our Future Homes* (DoE, 1995) amongst other things, extended the 'right to buy' of the 1980 Act to housing association tenants and replaced the Housing Association Grant (HAG) with the Social Housing Grant (SAG). The end result of this Act is that municipal housing has been further reduced (Balchin, 1996) and housing provision within the voluntary and private sectors have been encouraged to expand. However, the legislation did not go as far as it could as it did not implement the 1995 White Paper proposal that encouraged the transfer of all municipal stock to housing associations, Housing Investment Trusts or new local housing companies. It is possible that there is no real need to enshrine this in legislation as local authorities become increasingly used to handing over control of housing to third parties. Indeed, the new Liberal Democrat administration in Liverpool is actively considering the transfer of all Liverpool council houses to housing association control, thus bringing an end to municipal housing in the city much to the chagrin of Labour councillors and union leaders (Neild, 1998).

One of the first Central Government initiatives to help embed the voluntary sector within political coalitions was City Challenge. Two of the eleven City Challenge Areas were in Merseyside boroughs, Liverpool and Wirral, highlighting the problems within the region, and a third borough, Sefton, was included in the second round. City Challenge emphasised:

- The need for more effective coalitions of local actors.

- The need for local authorities to play a significant part in such coalitions as enablers and facilitators.

- The need for local communities to play a part and the need for capacity building.

(Russell, et.al., 1996, p2).

It was a departure from previous initiatives in that it was committed to ensuring that the benefits would be evenly distributed throughout the target region, a strategy of empowerment for disadvantaged groups that in Liverpool became known as the 'Equity Agenda' (Russell, 1997). The delivery mechanism of the programme was through partnerships consisting of the local authority, public, private and voluntary sector bodies, and it recognised that the local authority held a key strategic position within these partnerships rather than sidelining it or bypassing it as had happened with legislation on housing. Additionally, the end result of the programme was not Central Government driven, it was left to the individual authorities to decide what the aims were based on both their circumstances and the opportunities available to them. The new administration were also keen to foster good relationships with the private and voluntary sectors in order to further these aims and attempted to be inclusive although it did have reservations:

> ...well, the council had such a bad press with the local community and the voluntary sector, they were skint, the private sector hated them and Central Government had no time for them either...They didn't really want to go into partnership with anyone else because they thought they were the elected members and so should make all the decisions...they were very wary of us but they realised they had to get on with it if they wanted the dosh. Now they're grateful. Once they realised that we were there to do a job - and we're doing a damn good one I might add - and we knew what we were talking about, they were grateful.
>
> (Community development worker interviewed 1995).

As the council's officers and councillors became more used to consulting with voluntary sector representatives they came to value their opinions and experience (Russell 1997 and the opinion of several key actors within the Liverpool voluntary sector). It also helped that although the City Challenge board initially consisted of three local authority representatives, another three from other public agencies, three

from the private sector and three from the voluntary sector, when the position of Chair fell vacant after three years it was a voluntary sector representative - the Chief Executive of LCVS - who was elected to the position and another voluntary sector representative was elected to fill the position that he had vacated which meant that there were effectively, four voluntary sector members. Additionally, although Liverpool's strategy was essentially physical regeneration, members of the voluntary sector also held key positions within this area such as in the redevelopment of Blackburne House centre for women (Russell, 1997).

In 1990, the Women's Technology Scheme was so successful it needed to move premises, and Blackburne House, which was a derelict building at the time, was identified as having the most potential. The Women's Educational Training Trust was formed to raise the funding for redevelopment and to manage the building and between 1991 to 1994 raised £3 million. The listed building has now been restored and offers a wide variety of educational, training and leisure facilities to women (Liverpool Link, March/April 1997).

The goals that had been set by the 'Equity Agenda' focused on ensuring that disadvantaged groups and residents within the area received some benefits from City Challenge and that the role of the voluntary sector was extended by:

- securing for them maximum financial benefit;

- securing for them maximum influence and control over policy;

- equipping voluntary and community organisations with the information, skills and resources necessary for them to contribute to urban renewal themselves.

- promoting their achievements in urban policy regionally, nationally and internationally.

(Russell, 1997, p79).

According to Russell's evaluation, although the goals were not wholly achieved, major progress had been made on some, and some progress had been made on all of them. Additionally, when some of the capital expenditure on buildings such as Blackburne House were included, the voluntary sector had secured almost half of the £37.5 million

of the City Challenge spend which was probably due to the considerable influence the sector had achieved over City Challenge policy.

The goodwill towards the voluntary sector that had been generated by City Challenge was capitalised upon when Merseyside was designated an Objective One region by the European Union. In 1985, the member states of the European Union (EU), then the European Community, entered into a specific commitment for economic and social cohesion by reducing disparities. The principle means by which this commitment is fulfilled is through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the European Social Fund (ESF). The EU concentrates structural funds into specified priorities or "objectives". Objective One areas are those regions where development is lagging behind the rest of the community. Objective Two areas are old industrial regions in decline and Objective Five B areas are rural regions. Of the regional funds (Objectives One, Two and Five B combined), 80% are concentrated into Objective One regions as is a considerable part of other available funding (Hall and Van der Wee, 1992). When Merseyside was given Objective One designation it was the first time it had been given to a region, all other Objective One areas were countries. Under the directive Merseyside was to be given £1.2 billion over five years, 1993-1998 in an attempt to establish a diverse economic base that would ensure future prosperity (see the quote from the Single Programming Document in chapter 1, section 1.5).

What was interesting about this programme was that in addition to the more usual initiatives aimed at encouraging the different business sectors in the region there was also an initiative to actively encourage the participation of the 'People of Merseyside'. This was the most innovative part of the programme as it included measures usually considered 'social' within an economic context and once again, the people who were best placed to ensure that the initiative succeeded were from the voluntary sector.

The 'Action for the People of Merseyside' or 'Pathways' measure promised a package of economic and social support for specific communities within the Merseyside region where the poorest 35% of the population - as defined by economic indicators - were located . It focused upon education, skills, training, jobs, better quality of life and promoting community involvement by allowing it to help in providing its own solutions

to economic and social problems via voluntary and community organisations. There were originally 12 areas in Liverpool that were targeted for the strategy but over time some of these have merged to form 7 much larger areas. Each of the areas has had to devise a long term area strategy aimed at stimulating economic and social regeneration with a board consisting of members of the private, public and voluntary sectors. Although this is similar to the brief for City Challenge, it has proved much more difficult to put into place. Firstly, many of the Pathways areas are not natural communities, they are just areas of acute deprivation with a boundary line drawn around them for the sake of convenience.

An example of this is the Liverpool East Area Partnership which covers the majority of Dovecot, parts of Croxteth and parts of Deysbrook and has approximately 20,000 residents. Prior to it becoming an Objective One Partnership area the three 'tribal' areas did not interact and it took a long time before they did to any extent. They were effectively forced into coalition or partnerships with other groups in order to access funding.

Another reason for difficulties is that some of the Partnership areas have very weak public sector links which has meant that they do not have the same access to resources and experience as others. For example, the Speke Garston Partnership has Liverpool Airport, a major industrial estate, Garston Docks, a large greenfield site that is being redeveloped as the Estuary Commerce Park which has already attracted inward investment of £53 million, another industrial estate - the £200 million Boulevard Industrial Park - and access to national and multinational companies all either within its boundaries or nearby. Compare this to the Liverpool East Area Partnership where the major employers are four parades of small shops and a bingo hall.

Objective One funding looks set to continue for Merseyside for another five years as its economy is still lagging behind the rest of the EU community and, although a final assessment of the first programme has not yet been produced some things are already clear. First, this initiative has embedded leading actors of the voluntary sector firmly within the Liverpool political system. Secondly, because the initiative forced participants to agree on area strategies it has meant that over-capacity and duplication

of effort has been reduced within the Partnership communities, which has often meant that funding has been freed up for other projects. Thirdly, those communities that were already in a strong position because of resources within the community or because the community was already tightly knit with a strong infrastructure or because there were 'social entrepreneurs' (see chapter 6 above) in place who could move quickly and decisively have benefited the most as they were the best placed to write successful bids. And finally, it has broken down some of the tribalism that is endemic in Liverpool, it has not obliterated it by any means, but it has at least ensured that many of the community groups are at least discussing options with each other, mainly because it is usually the only way that they can obtain funding from the programme.

These partnerships have been further strengthened and extended with the advent of the Single Regeneration Budget in 1994 in which twenty central government grant initiatives were amalgamated. This initiative was seen as a victory for those who have accused the government of 'short termism' in its urban policies (DoE, 1994; Edwards, 1995; Randall, 1995) as its agenda is very similar to that of Objective One. As Merseyside is the only region with both of these initiatives in place at the same time it was probably inevitable that the impact of these particular funding regimes has been that the community and voluntary sectors have taken a lead role in local regeneration. This is so much so that two Liverpool Partnership areas have bypassed the usual local authority lead in funding bids and have 'won' SRB funding in their own right. Although having said this, they have not in fact 'disowned' the local authority, it is just that their access to power has grown and they have taken advantage of it. They still remain in close contact with the council as their power base is not exclusive, they still need the co-operation and goodwill of the council to implement many of the projects as the council holds the final control - the granting or withholding of planning permission.

Since 1997 there have been major political changes in both the UK as a whole and within Liverpool itself. In May 1997, New Labour, under the leadership of Tony Blair, won the general election by the largest margin this century. However, the new Labour government has not reversed the direction that urban policy had taken under the Conservative party, rather it has reinforced it and taken it much further than the

Conservative government with the partnership theme forming a key component of all the legislation that has been passed since they took office. This partnership and "bottom up" approach has recently been reinforced by the recent DoETR Working Paper on "Community-Based Regeneration Initiatives" (DoETR, 1998a) and the Discussion Paper on "Regeneration Programmes - The Way Forward" (DoETR, 1998b) (see chapter 1 above).

In Liverpool, the Liberal Democrat party won the local elections in May 1998 with a clear majority. Again, they too appear to be forwarding the Partnership agenda which would mean that the voluntary sector would remain near to or at the heart of political decisions affecting economic and social regeneration. There are also several reasons why it is unlikely that the voluntary sector - regardless of what political decisions are made by the new administration - would ever be sidelined to the extent it was during the wilderness years of the 1970's and 1980's.

First, many of funding initiatives from Central Government and the European Union are structured in such a way so as to encourage the voluntary sector to be an active and equal partner and funding is not forthcoming if they are not. Second, many of the larger organisations and umbrella organisations have funding that is independent of the council and so cannot be held in check by the threat of the withdrawal of funding and thirdly, the voluntary sector is so embedded within the political infrastructure it would be difficult to disentangle it without losing a large part of the service provision.

There is still a danger that the new administration will recreate some of the fundamental problems that beset the city for so many years and this is due to the Liberal Democrats' political ideology. The Liberal Democrats were elected on the promise of freezing the council tax in 1999 and so there is the danger of a new reductionist policy of 'how does this help to freeze the council tax?' They have already promised that they will freeze or cut the amount of land sales - which has helped to balance the city's budget since 1987. The reason for this is that the remaining types of land that could be sold profitably are in suburban areas where the population voted Liberal Democrat in this election but who are traditionally Conservative voters who would revert back if they thought their interests were not

being looked after. It would appear that if these two contradicting policies are to be managed there must be deep cuts in the budget elsewhere and even though the council has indicated that it wants to maintain a warm relationship with the voluntary sector, a number of key actors in the voluntary sector feel that voluntary sector grants will be under threat next year. At present the administration is too new to predict whether it will be a pro-growth, expansionist and inclusive regime or whether it will revert back to the anti-growth, reductionist and exclusionist regimes of the 1970's and 1980's. Once again Liverpool's politics are in a state of flux.

7.3 Conclusions

In brief, from the 1970's there have been fundamental changes in the power relationships in Liverpool between the public and voluntary sectors as a result of changes to the local, national and international political and economic regimes. During the 1970's and the early 1980's, although Liverpool was operating with an escalating economic crisis and poor leadership it was undoubtedly an *elected* leadership. Both the Liberal administration and the Militant Tendency-led Labour administration controlled the political process and they *governed* the city. The form of government demonstrated by the city council throughout the period, which spanned almost two decades, ensured that the local problems brought on by a combination of short-termism and reductionist strategies at the local level and major economic and political restructuring at the national and international level worsened and in addition gave the city, whether deserved or not, a reputation of incompetency, self-pity and bloody-mindedness (see, for example, Meegan, 1995). Throughout this period the voluntary sector was essentially sidelined, first by the Liberal administration and then latterly by the Militant Tendency-influenced Labour administration. The reason given by the Liberal administration for this lack of support was that funding was not available. The Labour administration eschewed niceties and declared all out war bringing the sector almost to the point of collapse. Within the context of regime building, Liverpool city council could be seen as an *anti-regime* oligarchy, in that it did not embrace pro-growth strategies and its urban regimes were dictated by a small elite class that discounted partnership with the private and voluntary sectors as irrelevant to each regime's overall strategies. The Liberal party's strategy was geared to them remaining

in power, The Labour party's strategy was based on defying Central Government, and for both of these urban regimes, success did not necessarily mean the support of actors outside the local political scene; they did not feel the need to court political coalitions with the private and voluntary sectors.

The expulsion from office of the Labour councillors in 1987 not only saved the city from bankruptcy, it also saved the voluntary sector as more moderate candidates with less hostile views of the voluntary sector replaced them in the local elections. This also heralded the beginning of *governance* within the city as the different factions were encouraged by the council to form partnerships to signal the end of hostility towards Central Government, and to access funding streams. There has also been a sea-change in the attitude of the city council to the voluntary sector. The voluntary sector has gone from strength to strength and has become increasingly involved within the political decision making process as a result of strong leadership of key actors within the voluntary sector, increasingly favourable legislation geared towards the voluntary sector and the advent of major new funding streams that only the voluntary sector can access. It is now in the position whereby it is in the city's best interests to cultivate the sector.

In many respects the above history exemplifies the problems that many theoreticians have with regime theory (see Feldman, 1997; Ward, 1995a). First, although one of the basic tenets of the theory is that coalition regimes are formed by local politicians in conjunction with key actors from a *plurality* of interest groups (Stone and Sanders, 1987; Stone, 1989), the majority of empirically grounded research has been overly concerned with relationships and coalitions between the private and public sectors. This has meant that a whole host of other actors from what could be termed 'civil society' which includes the voluntary sector have been ignored (Salamon and Anheier, 1997). However, as this history shows, in at least one city undergoing deindustrialisation, key actors within the voluntary sector may play an equal if not more important role than those from the private sector; that is, the voluntary sector needs to be seen as part of urban regimes.

There are seven points that have been highlighted by this analysis. The first is that although other cities may function either without or with only a very limited voluntary sector, in Liverpool it is vital to the economic and social survival of the city as it not only picks up the pieces when organisations within the private sector - especially those with few local affiliations - rationalise or close down plants but, it is also a major employer. This heavy reliance on the voluntary sector for service provision is due to the economic and social history of the city which has left it with a legacy of debt and high levels of unemployment which mean that although the city has the highest council tax in the country, the actual tax base is relatively constrained, and so the city's finances are continually stretched and forming partnerships and coalitions with the voluntary sector is a way out of the dilemma:

> ...They could close down all the grant aided things [but] it would mean disembowelling all their youth service, it would mean losing almost all their care in the community provision, it would mean wrecking the city care plan and the city health plan, but they could do it...for example, in Liverpool, local authorities, public agencies generally are very bad at economic development because they're not light on their feet, so Liverpool's economic development strategy is very largely delivered by grant aid to voluntary organisations. In the youth service, as I say, something like 80 per cent, 90 per cent of the youth service is provided by the voluntary sector using grant aid...[also] there are whole new rafts of money that only the voluntary sector can access...So, it's advantageous to the city in terms of pulling in resources to have something run by a voluntary organisation where the city council's expenditure or interest can be subsidised by somebody else
>
> (Chief Executive, LCVS, interviewed 1998).

The second point is that regime theory is based on local or municipal authorities supporting economic growth strategies and forming coalitions in order to fulfil that aim and this does not translate well to the United Kingdom and in particular Liverpool. During the 1970's and 1980's the strategies of Liverpool City Council were not geared towards economic growth - despite the claims to the contrary - the strategies were dictated by politics. For the Liberal administration the aim was to stay in control of the council and the sum total of all its economic strategies was to diversify housing and to keep the rates down, whilst ensuring municipal services such as street cleaning and rubbish collection continued for electoral advantages. In the mean-time it ignored the fact that it was storing up major budgetary problems for the city and that industry and

employment in the region was collapsing. Any real pro-growth economic strategies were either subsumed into the main policy agenda where they were quietly ignored, or they never made it past the full council approval.

It was a similar story for the Militant Tendency-influenced Labour administration. Ostensibly they did have an economic strategy but because it was essentially employment by the local authority or through investment in housing, it was based on consumption and not long-term economic development. Additionally, it was unsustainable, the city could not fund it (Parkinson, 1985, 1990), it was a poor pro-growth economic strategy. Combined with this, the administration also had an ideological political agenda that it followed until the city was brought to the brink of bankruptcy - a strange, to say the least, pro-growth strategy.

The third point is that when the focus of the city's administration changed from the anti-growth, reductionist and exclusionist regimes of the 1970's and 1980's to the more pro-growth, expansionist and inclusive regimes in the 1990's it was not due to local conditions. Effectively, the partnership or coalition conditions necessary to promote a pro-growth regime and strategy were imposed by external structures such as Central Government and the European Union in order for the city to access funding streams. This is a more nuanced 'top down' *and* 'bottom up' approach which implies that there are more levels of resolution within British urban regimes compared to the 'bottom up' regimes identified within the US literature.

Additionally, a fourth point is that the case studies from the US show that the local state plays a lesser role than in the UK and so there are more opportunities for business-led or public-private partnerships, and although the regimes that arise are based on particular local circumstances and are heterogeneous, those circumstances occur in all of the case studies (Ward, 1995, 1996). However, within the UK many urban regimes are enforced and reinforced by Central Government and EU legislation and initiatives, and the legal system, and the combination of these factors tends to produce circumstances that are particular to the city in question; there is a patent lack of the heterogeneity assumed in the US literature.

Urban regime theory, as already discussed, is concerned with the capacity to govern, and coalition building is at the heart of the urban regime approach as the basic assumption of the approach is that the effectiveness of local government is dependant on the co-operation of nongovernmental actors. Stone (1989) argues that:

> What is at issue is not so much domination and subordination as a capacity to act and accomplish goals. The power struggle concerns, not control and resistance, but gaining and fusing a capacity to act - power to, not power over (p9).

This is the case because:

> Instead of the power to govern being something that can be captured by an electoral victory, it is something created by bringing co-operating actors together, not as equal claimants, but often as unequal contributors to a shared set of purposes (p9).

The problem with this approach is that there is the implicit assumption that urban regimes always take the form of a coalition between 'consenting' actors, and the fifth point to note is that this is not always the case, some actors are excluded. For example, this assumption of a coalition between 'consenting' actors was patently not the case in Liverpool during the 1970's and 1980's when minority, *but democratically elected,* interests ran roughshod over the majority of non-elected local actors. Within much of the US literature there is also the assumption that regimes form to further the interests of the city concerned, they are pro-growth. Even when anti-regimes are identified, they tend to be explained as a method to control *further* growth (see for example, Donovan and Neiman, 1992; Protash and Baldassare, 1983). Additionally, these anti-growth regimes are identified as being the province of the educated middle-classes rather than a proletarian city's local government. Logan, Whaley and Crowder (1997, p613) describe the findings of one such study as:

> ...antigrowth movements are more likely to emerge in areas where residents have higher levels of education, income, and occupations in professional and high-tech professions. They linked these factors to the emergence of a *new political culture* (authors' italics) that emphasises social issues and consumption over fiscal issues and, therefore, places importance on the protection of the local environment and quality of life over economic development.

This description of the emergence of an anti-regime through community mobilisation does not explain the types of anti-regime experienced in UK cities such as Liverpool - that is not to say that this form of anti-regime does not exist within the UK, it does,

and is often known as 'Not In My Back Yard'. However, the forms of anti-regimes described in the history above are far more destructive than a mobilisation to prevent further economic growth, because they are based on political ideology that precludes growth in the first place.

The sixth point, and one that was mentioned earlier (see chapter 2, section 2.5:2 above), is that cities within the UK are not self-managing and neither do they have the fiscal and political autonomy that is inherent in all US cities. This is especially true of deindustrialising, post-Fordist northern cities with weak private sectors such as Liverpool. As the history above has detailed, the success and failure of urban regimes in the city has often been the product of extra-local forces - a dimension that needs to be encompassed by regime theory if it is to develop any analytical rigour. To study an urban regime within the single context of pro-growth strategies based around coalitions between the public and private sector is flawed when applied to UK cities such as Liverpool because again, as the history above exemplifies, there have been so many other extra-local factors involved in the development of the city. Additionally, the voluntary sector has and is playing an extremely important role within that development, a sector whose contribution to the stability of urban regimes is generally downplayed or ignored within the US literature.

The final point, and one that relates to the third point, is a problem with the scale of urban regime theory. Although urban regime theory is a useful tool at the micro-level it does not translate upwards to the next level of resolution of theoretical analysis, even when analysed in a broader fashion such as in the discussion above, and this is because it is still too focused upon economic regimes that are regulated by local political circumstances. There is no real allowance for economic urban regimes that may be operating outside this structure, and the obvious one that springs to mind is the MDC.

As discussed in chapter 2, this thesis, adopted Jessop's (1997) 'lessons' in analysing the Merseyside voluntary sector's role in Liverpool's urban regimes. From the outset it has argued that local economies (and their concomitant urban regimes) do not exist in a political, social and economic vacuum - 'lessons' one, six and eight, and that social and economic problems at the local scale are often a reflection of macro-level

adjustments - 'lessons' two, three and four. It has demonstrated (in chapters 1, section 1.5 and 7, section 7.2 above) the weaknesses of particular urban regimes in not properly identifying structural constraints which led to their dissolution - lesson 'five', as they did not have the necessary mechanisms and practices in place to circumvent these constraints and so sustain their particular regime - 'lesson' seven. The lessons have been learned and utilised but, can their adoption contribute to the wider understanding of urban political, social and economic structures?

Well, it would appear so, but with difficulty. Even after adopting the approach suggested by Jessop there are still problems relating urban regime theory to a macro-level theory such as the one that Jessop suggests and, to be fair, Jessop has recognised that his proposal does have its shortcomings (see also Jones, 1997). The first is that there is a definitional problem with 'local economy'. It is extremely difficult to demarcate where the local, regional and national economies begin and end and boundary definitions are therefore arbitrary. For example, for the discussion of urban regimes in Liverpool, the boundary definition for the local economy was assumed to be the 'city' itself. However, even demarcating where the 'city' begins and ends is fraught with difficulties as the boundary lines drawn by planning departments do not have the effect of halting economic exchanges.

The second problem is that this rereading of urban regime theory still very much highlights the priority of economic governance and, as Jessop acknowledges, not all urban regimes consider this to be of prime importance. In Liverpool, as discussed earlier, during the 1970's the urban regime formed by the ruling Liberal party was concerned with holding on to political power rather than the promotion of economic growth. During the 1980's, Liverpool's governing regime was driven by political ideology.

Although this study has identified a number of problems with utilising an urban regime theory approach to understanding local changes, the theory is still an extremely useful tool in which to unpick the political fabric of an urban regime. It has demonstrated that 'locality' matters in the shaping of urban regimes because each urban regime has its own unique mix of historical and contemporary factors. Additionally, it has also

demonstrated that further reconceptualisation of urban regime theory is necessary in order for it to be combined with other, more abstract macro-theories such as Jessop's neo-Gramscian approach.

Chapter 8: The Role of the Merseyside Voluntary Sector in Social and Economic Regeneration

8.1 Introduction

This chapter is presented in two sections. In the first, 8.2, the Merseyside-specific research questions outlined in chapter 3 are revisited and assessed. In the second section, 8.3, the discussion moves up a resolution to the national scale and examines the role of the voluntary sector in social and economic regeneration more generally, using the findings from the Merseyside study.

8.2 Research Questions and Their Results

Chapter 4 above, reviewed the results obtained from a semi-structured postal questionnaire and from a mapping procedure, and utilised these results in drawing together a profile of the voluntary sector based on the research questions outlined in chapter 3 above.

The first research question was:

what was the scale and the scope of the sector on Merseyside and were there any spatial concentrations?

This question proved to be too complex to be answered by the mapping exercise discussed in chapter 4 above, and has been explored throughout the thesis. Drawing these discussions together it can be noted that the Merseyside voluntary sector, is one of the oldest and largest in the country (with an approximate 5,000 agencies) and, its scope has extended to at least national boundaries as it has been an innovator of projects, ideas and working practices that have been adopted throughout the country. Examples of this innovatory role would include the structure of LCVS and the advent of Citizens' Advice Bureaux which were based on a Liverpool advice agency concept. The sector *is* spatially concentrated with the greatest numbers of agencies in and around the city centre electoral wards of the Liverpool borough - a reflection of the history of the voluntary sector within Liverpool (see chapter 2 above).

The next research question was:

how much income did the sector generate and from whom and what proportion did this form of the regional economy?

Chapter 4, section 4.2:6, gives a detailed analysis of how a figure of nearly £209 million was arrived at, and how this compared to the findings of another study. This funding came from a wide variety of sources with governmental grants from Local, Central and European Government providing some income for the majority of agencies, however, the structure of the questionnaire precluded analysing the actual amounts available from each of the funding regimes. What was highlighted by the analysis, was that many agencies, and especially those based in Liverpool, operated with a plurality of funding streams, emphasising the innovatory nature of the voluntary sector which has important implications when attacking endemic social and economic issues.

Linked to the above question was:

how aware is the sector of the differing forms of funding?

The analysis given in chapter 4, section 4.2:6, suggests that this awareness is linked to the types and forms of networks that agencies are involved in. The discussion in this section illustrates that agencies within the Liverpool voluntary sector access a much wider variety of funding regimes than those in the other Merseyside boroughs. The Liverpool agencies also have greater experience of networking with other agencies suggesting that they are more likely to hear of a possible funding regime as, and when it becomes available. These findings were confirmed during the later interviews, with all of the Liverpool agencies aware of recent funding initiatives including very small community groups. However, in the other boroughs very few agencies had the same levels of funding knowledge which suggests that networking is an important source of accessing funding information.

The fourth research question was:

who worked in the sector by gender, class and ethnicity?

Chapter 4 above, section 4.3:3, discusses the gender of the sample group, and section 4.3:4 discusses ethnicity. The findings of these two sections were: that there was a predominance of women in voluntary sector workforces. Females outnumbered males by almost 100% in paid employment, however, there were only a third more female volunteers than male. It also emerged that female voluntary sector workers, whether paid or unpaid, were gathered in those areas of activity that could be termed 'caring' - which may have been a result of personal circumstance, whereas male voluntary workers were congregated in those areas of activity that had elements of authority or 'power' associated with them. This would appear to indicate that gender roles within the voluntary sector are a replication of those in society in general.

The question of ethnicity highlighted the fact that the majority of the voluntary sector workers in the sample, whether in a paid or unpaid capacity, were white. There were small numbers of black people working within the voluntary sector but they tended to be concentrated into agencies within wards with high ethnic minority populations. The low participation rates amongst ethnic groupings other than white may have been due to cultural or religious reasons.

The question of class was extremely difficult to assess as it aroused such strong feelings. The question was removed from the pilot questionnaire because of this and so this aspect has not been explored except to note that the vast majority of 'employment and urban policy' agency officers interviewed, appeared to be middle-class and were usually white males.

One of the key aspects of this research was to explore whether the voluntary sector offered opportunities to groups excluded from the local labour market, as exclusion from employment is a major factor in social and economic decline. It proposed to do this by examining the economic backgrounds of the volunteers in the survey. From the analysis (chapter 4 above, section 4.3:5), emerged three predominant volunteer worker economic backgrounds. These were: people who were long-term unemployed; were looking after their home and/or family; or who were retired. The majority of the long-term unemployed volunteers were concentrated in agencies within the 'employment and urban policy' area of the voluntary sector. Later interviews (see chapter 6 above)

confirmed that many long-term unemployed people are using the voluntary sector to gain experience or training in order to enter into paid employment at a later date as were increasing numbers of young people. In effect, the sector was being treated as an apprenticeship scheme. This is something that has been capitalised on in the recent Welfare to Work initiative of Central Government. These interviews also highlighted the fact that there were a number of people with mental health problems or physical problems who were also working within the voluntary sector as, unlike the private sector, it could accommodate their needs. All of this indicates that the voluntary sector does offer opportunities to excluded groups that may not be available in other sectors, however, this may be changing - see section 8.3 below.

The final of these related research questions was:

had the types and numbers of agencies within the sector altered very much in recent years?

The mapping procedure detailed in chapter 4 above (section 4.1), suggested that it had not, or at least not in any great detail. However, the LCVS work on a 'guestimate' figure of there being approximately 5,000 agencies on Merseyside at any one time and that these agencies are constantly changing. Indeed, during the six month period between the finishing of the mapping procedure and the posting of the questionnaire, over fifty of the sample agencies had either closed or moved address. But, having said this, the individual areas of activity must have remained fairly stable over the past thirty years because generally the maps showed very few differences in the numbers of agencies when mapped by area of voluntary sector activity. There were two areas that showed a pattern of growth in both the numbers of agencies and their distribution, and this could be traced to changes in legislation, and one area (housing) demonstrated an apparent contraction over the years. However, further research found that this was not actually the case, and the apparent anomaly was due to a combination of factors such as amalgamation and smaller organisations being taken 'under the wing' of large associations (see chapter 4 above, section 4.1).

As the above summary of the research questions and the results obtained to those questions show, the first research aim was completed and a profile of the voluntary sector was obtained. It is important that these 'profiles' occur on a regular basis in

order to assess the relative importance of the voluntary sector as both an engine of economic growth and as a major employer, for the sample group utilised for this research proved to have both significant numbers of workers, both paid and unpaid, and an estimated income that forms a significant proportion of the region's gross domestic product.

8.3 The Role of the Voluntary Sector in Local Social and Economic Regeneration

The voluntary sector in Britain has an important and growing role in social and economic regeneration in disadvantaged areas, and this thesis has five general points concerning this importance.

The first is that on Merseyside alone, the estimated combined income of less than 350 agencies was almost £209 million, if there *are* 5,000 agencies then the figure could possibly be as high as £3,000 million pounds. On Merseyside alone, the study identified at least 11 different types of funding stream including one 'catch-all' category which may have contained many more. The very complexity and innovative mixing of funding sources may be an indication of the genesis of a 'social economy' (discussed in more detail in the second point below). Clearly the voluntary sector is very important, not just in spending power, but also because of its engagement in a wide range of activities across the whole economic and social spectrum. Again, the Merseyside study reflected this in the 15, very broad, categories listed in chapter 4, section, 4.2:1 above, confirming that the sector has permeated almost every aspect of public and social life.

The second point is that this growing importance is clearly linked to global and national economic trends, such as the collapse of employment systems, which were outlined in the Delors White Paper of 1994, Growth, Competitiveness and Employment which argues that the overall scale and growing localisation of unemployment is threatening the competitiveness and social cohesion of the European Union. This has highlighted a desperate need to find new sources of employment and economic activity, but where are these new activities going to come from? Research suggests that what is certain is that the voluntary sector will be heavily involved, it is in

the vanguard of the development of what is being called the 'social economy' (Amin and Thrift, 1995; Hirst, 1994) in which the 'voices' of the socially, politically and economically excluded can be heard. Economically depressed areas *are* depressed because of the failure of the formal economy in providing enough jobs, and the social economy offers an alternative route out of this economic depression via the development of local and community initiatives such as CBED. Community businesses with a large or expanding market have the potential for increasing its workforce and successful initiatives may even act as an impetus for larger scale inward investment enhancing employment prospects within the community. The Merseyside study has demonstrated that this has happened in some of the partnership areas. Additionally, the fact that business advice and resources are available within the community may encourage community members to become entrepreneurs and take the plunge into self-employment. It may also persuade some potential entrepreneurs with poorly thought out business plans to rethink their strategies and therefore limit the numbers of business failures. However, although these strategies offer enormous potential, the Merseyside study identified four problems that need to be addressed, either by legislation, further research or by a restructuring of CBED strategies.

The first problem is that the social entrepreneurs providing the initial impetus, and that rise *in situ* do not have the same infrastructure in place as business entrepreneurs and so they end up 'reinventing the wheel' time and again. There needs to be an advice structure in place to help ideas come to fruition. Advisors are needed who can disseminate information about 'best practice models' and who have the imagination and flair to tailor them for local conditions. However, having said that, there are structures in place for 'professional' social entrepreneurs but, this is not necessarily the same thing, as these people may not have the same commitment to an area as a resident and may move on without developing a strategic plan, leaving the community to start all over again, and with someone else. Possibly the best way to provide this information would be in the form of a 'one stop shop' which could co-ordinate activities.

The second problem is that there needs to be a recognition by funding bodies that community businesses are different in conception to private enterprise, and

consequently allowances need to be made for the integration and building of community relations. Unrealistic timescales for outputs will just lead to failure and further disenchantment by the host community.

Conversely, communities need to accept that the goal of any business is to be self sustaining. If a community business is solely dependent on funding arrangements that effectively subsidise the business then there is the strong probability that when the funding stops the business will fail. However, if Central Government is promoting social economy strategies such as CBED because of the benefits it brings regarding social cohesion, then it should be prepared to subsidise it.

The third problem is that more work needs to be done on the effects of displacement. Are subsidised community businesses undercutting legitimate businesses that are already within an area? In the two case studies outlined above it is highly unlikely but nevertheless it is still a possibility in other areas, and there is some anecdotal evidence that this research uncovered that this may have in fact happened in several other Merseyside 'partnership' areas.

The final problem is that funding for *advice* on CBED initiatives is spread very thinly throughout the region, and that those areas that are more organised are better served than newer partnership areas. This means that the expertise required by fledgling businesses is often unavailable as and when it is needed. This could lead to missed opportunities, bad business decisions and in extreme cases the folding of the business.

There is great potential in community based economic development but it is naive to expect that small community businesses can supply the same employment opportunities as a large, labour intensive business . It needs to be properly resourced, and funding bodies need to recognise that it is a long-term strategy and that it may be many years before there are tangible results. Additionally, the outcomes of these initiatives are not going to be the same everywhere. Investment in one area may produce a plethora of economically successful businesses but the same investment in another may produce very little - CBED is not a quick fix.

The social economy, however, is not just:

...measured the way that one measures capitalism, in terms of salaries, revenues etc., but its outputs integrate social results with indirect economic gains.

Thierry Jeantet, 1986: quoted in Rifkin, 1995, p242).

One of the most important of these is the inclusion of groups more usually excluded from the formal economy, such as the long-term unemployed. The Merseyside study has laid to rest the myth that the long-term unemployed do not want to work, the sheer numbers involved within the voluntary sector demonstrate clearly that there is a wish and a need to work in many people, and if they cannot access the formal economy they will work in some other capacity. The Delors paper mentioned earlier outlines very clearly the links between unemployment and the breakdown in social cohesion, and so, by encouraging the participation of excluded groups, the magnitude of the role that the voluntary sector plays in aiding social cohesion cannot be underestimated.

The third point to come from the research in this thesis is that urban regime theory is a useful, although limited, tool in understanding the emerging role of the voluntary sector in social and economic regeneration. It has also shown that some of these limitations can be overcome by adopting the wider approach advocated by Jessop in his neo-Gramscian approach to regime theory. Although this research puts Jessop's theory into practice, there needs to be much more comparative empirical research to 'flesh out' Jessop's recommendations, not least to explore the role of 'locality' - that is, the unique mix of economic, political, social and cultural processes and systems - in shaping the working of urban regimes.

The fourth point is that this research has exemplified the huge diversity of Kendall and Knapp's 'loose and baggy monster'. It has charted the voluntary sector from small community groups fighting for survival , through the more traditionally accepted organisations, to, the more recent, community based businesses. It has shown that even though there are huge differences in the composition of agencies, their goals and their stability, they all have their part to play in social and economic regeneration linking into the final point which is that the growing, and unstoppable importance of the voluntary sector in economic and social regeneration is underpinned by the very experience of the voluntary sector on Merseyside, especially in Liverpool. This is a very important point to make because from the outset this research set out to examine

the *Merseyside* voluntary sectory, and what it has found is that the Merseyside voluntary sector is completely dominated by the Liverpool voluntary sector. It has more income, more funding streams, more workers and more influence than the voluntary sectors in the other Merseyside boroughs. Additionally, it has weathered the last couple of decades in a hostile political climate, and yet has still come through, if anything, stronger than before emphatically illustrating that the voluntary sector is here to stay in economic and social regeneration.

In conclusion, if a vibrant, diverse and strong voluntary sector can emerge from Merseyside with all *its* economic, social and political problems then the question that begs to be asked is: what is the potential for the rest of Britain and Europe?

APPENDIX 1

VOLUNTARY SECTOR POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY

1. Is your particular agency (Please tick only one)?

A national organisation ☐ 1

A regional organisation (one based only in Merseyside) ☐ 2

A borough organisation (one based solely in one borough, for example, Wirral) ☐ 3

A local organisation (for example, a community group, tenants' association etc.) ☐ 4

2. Is your agency part of a national organisation?

Yes ☐   No ☐

If yes, is it allowed to act independently on local issues?

Yes ☐   No ☐   Unsure ☐

3. How is your agency funded (please tick all that apply)?

European Union grant ☐

Central Government grant ☐

Local authority grant ☐

Health/social services ☐

Charitable Trust grant ☐

Lotteries Commission grant ☐

Donations ☐

Contracts ☐

Local fundraising (for example, raffles) ☐

Other ☐

Not funded ☐

4. Is your funding secured?

Yes ☐   No ☐   Partly ☐

If yes, how long is it secured for?   1yr ☐ 1   2yr ☐ 2   3yr ☐ 3   longer ☐ 4

5. How much income does your organisation have per year?

Under £500	£501-£2000	£2001-£5000	£5001-£10,000	£10,001-£20,000	£21,000-£50,000
☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5	☐ 6
£51-100,000	£101-£250,000	£251-£500,000	£501-£750,000	£751-£1,000,000	Over £1,000,000
☐ 7	☐ 8	☐ 9	☐ 10	☐ 11	☐ 12

If over £1,000,000 please state amount £...

6. **How many workers do you have?**

1-5 ☐ 1   6-15 ☐ 2   16-30 ☐ 3   31-50 ☐ 4   51-100 ☐ 5   Over 100 ☐ 6

7. **What proportion of these are volunteers (i.e. unsalaried)?**

Less than 25% ☐ 1   25%-50% ☐ 2   51%-75% ☐ 3   76%-99% ☐ 4   100% ☐ 5

8. **Do you or any of your colleagues belong to or sit on (Please indicate all those that apply)?**

Local Strategic Partnership ☐
The Monitoring Committee ☐
The Merseyside Network for Europe ☐
A City Council sub-committee ☐
Informal Advisory Groups ☐
Merseyside Urban Forum ☐
A City Challenge Working Group ☐
A Community Council ☐
Other (please specify) .... ☐

9. **Are you aware of what Objective One status for Merseyside actually means?**

Yes ☐ 1   No ☐ 2   Unsure ☐ 3

10. **Do you know what "Pathways to Integration" is?**

Yes ☐ 1   No ☐ 2   Unsure ☐ 3

11. **Do you know where to get information on Objective One and "Pathways" from?**

Yes ☐ 1   No ☐ 2   Unsure ☐ 3

12. **Does your organisation have regular contact with other voluntary organisations?**

Yes ☐ 1   No ☐ 2

13. **What proportion of all of your workers belong to the following ethnic groups ?**

	Less than 25%	25 -50%	51%-75%	More than 75%	100%
Asian	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Black	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Chinese	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
White	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5

14. **What percentage of all of your workers are?**

	Less than 25%	25%-50%	51%-75%	Over 75%	100%
Female	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Male	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5

15. **What percentage of your volunteer workers are?**

	Less than 25%	25%50%	51%75%	Over 75%	100%
Full-time worker elsewhere	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Part-time worker elsewhere	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Self-employed	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Freelance	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Long-term unemployed	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
In education	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Disabled or long-term sick	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Looking after home and/or family	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
Retired from paid work	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5
No records kept	☐ 1	☐ 2	☐ 3	☐ 4	☐ 5

16. **Is your Chief Executive/Manager/Director?**

Female ☐

Male ☐

17. **Would you consider taking part in a more detailed interview in which your personal opinions on how the voluntary sector can help the regeneration of Merseyside would be sought?**

Yes ☐

No ☐

Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire,
all information will be treated confidentially

APPENDIX TWO

Age Concern
Alcohol Working Party
Area Child Protection
Committee
Bootle Council of Churches
Cancer Support
Carers' Group
CEWTEC
Chamber of Commerce
Channel D - Multi Agency
Forum
Children's sub-group of Joint
Care
Citizen's Advice Bureau
College Board
Community Health Council
Community Works
Conservation Groups
Crime Prevention Panel
CVA
CVS Executive
Development Trust
Association
Dingle 2000
Early Years Forum
Footpath Liaison Groups
Groundwork Trust Forum
Health Authority Trust
Health Forums
Hospice and Health Authority
Committees and Working
Groups
Housing Association Board
Industrial Tribunals

IRISI Voluntary Sector
Working Group
JCC
Joint Housing Forum
LCVS Consortium
LEAP
LEDA
Liverpool Association for
Specialised Play
Liverpool Community Rights
Liverpool Education Guidance
Network
Liverpool Liaison Group for
V.S.O.
Localities Group
Local Community Forum
Local Groups
Local Housing Association
Organisations
Membership Contributions
Committees
Mencap Committee
Mental Health Consortium
Merseyside Co-ordinating
Committee
Merseyside Basin Campaign
Merseyside Economic Forum
Merseyside Welfare Rights
MT 2000
National Federation of
Housing Associations sub-
committee
National Health Service
Advisory Committee

North West Ramp Training
and Development Committee
North West Sports Council
NWAB
Partnership sub-groups
Pathways
Planning Team
Project Management
Committees
Review Board of the Health
Service
Safer Cities Partnerships
Safer Merseyside Initiative
School Governing Committee
Sefton CVS
Sexual Health Advisory Group
Social Security Tribunals
Single Regeneration Budget
Committee
South Mersey Bus Forum
SS Help
Supported Housing Forum
Town Council
Transfer Technology Forum
Trustees of Merseyside Play
Action Council
Unknown
Voluntary Religious Bodies
Walking Groups
Welfare Organisation
Committees
Wirral Council
W.O.C.
Y.O.C.
Youth Exchange Committee

APPENDIX 3

Semi-Structured Interview Proforma

Questionnaire Number:

Contact Name:

Organisation:

Agency Type:

National:

Funding Regimes:

Security of Funding:

Income:

Number of Workers:

Percentage Volunteers:

Panels and Committees:

Objective One and Pathways:

Regular Contact:

Ethnic Groupings:

Percentage Female/Male:

Volunteer Economic Background:

Chief Executive etc.

1. Could you give me a brief history of your agency?

2. One of the main things I am interested in is how you fund your agency. I see you are funded by --------. Could you tell me what the 'other' is and the amounts involved from these sources.

- Could you tell me how you find out about the various funds (mechanisms/regimes) that are available

- has this changed over time?

- Do you have a person ('professional') who just fundraises.

- Exact income (for those who have unspecified funds).

- I notice that you have either a health/social service grant (high proportions in Liverpool), is this for providing contracted services.

- I notice that your funding is secure, who is guaranteeing this funding and how long is it guaranteed for (is this due to either government or private contracts or is it funding from your head office).

- Have you ever 'bid' or been consulted in a bid for funding, was it successful. Was it a highly localised one or covered a wide area.

- Did you consider that you were fully included in all aspects of the bid.

- What do you think constitutes a 'good bid'. What type of project do you consider would attract funding.

- Do you think that best practice models can be transferred to other areas.

3. I am also very interested in the types of volunteers that you attract to your agency. Do you think that there is a reason why you have attracted so many ----- ------ as volunteers?

- Why do you think so many LTU volunteer (training, references, experiences, apprenticeship).

- Do you have a high turnover of volunteers.

- Do you recruit for formal positions from 'known' volunteers - a testing ground.

- Do you have seasonal surges if so, how do you cope.

- Could you tell me the exact number of worker/volunteers.

- Do you find that your volunteers are mainly female/male. How does this compare with your formal staff.

- Are your volunteers local or from other areas.

- Are the ethnics volunteers or part of the formal workforce.

- Do you have positive discrimination or 'active' recruitment.

4. On your questionnaire I noticed that your agency is represented in informal advisory groups and/or other groups. Are these external to your agency?

- Only for agencies that sit on panels in no other category.

4. On your questionnaire I noticed that your agency is not represented on any panels or committees yet you maintain regular contact with other agencies - how is this done?

- Is it only agencies within the same field.

4. On your questionnaire I noticed that your agency is represented on various panels and committees yet you do not maintain regular contact with other agencies. Are these internal?
- Or are they 'expert witnesses' on committees that contain no other vol sector member.

5. I also noticed that your agency is unaware of what Objective One and/or Pathways is. Do you know why?

- Especially for agencies in Pathways areas.

- Or Is it that you don't consider relevant to your organisation - only applicable to 'inner city' areas.

5. I also noticed your agency is aware of the Objective One and Pathways initiatives. Could you tell me how you obtained this information.

- networking, post etc.

6. How large is the sphere of influence of your agency?

- is it expanding, what is controlling it.

7. Do you think that there is an optimum scale or scope to your activities or those of the voluntary sector in general?

- Do you think certain sectors are expanding. Which ones and why.

8. Do you think that your agency has a particular culture?

9. Do you consider that the community it serves has an identifiable culture?

- how do you accommodate this within your agency?

10. Do you think your agency aids in social/economic regeneration. Why/how?

- in what way does it differ from the private/public sector.

- is this the same for the voluntary sector as a whole.

11. What do you think are the greatest problems that your agency has faced and is facing?

- how did you overcome them/are overcoming them.

12. Has your relationship with other agencies changed over the years/months?

- What do you consider the causes to be.

- coalition formation due to local gov. influence or national policies.

13. Has your relationship to the local council and other official bodies changed over the years/months.

- What do you consider the causes to be.

- coalition formation due to local gov. influence or national policies.

- have you found that certain rules still apply even when the conditions that initiated them have changed or disappeared -if so which ones and why.

14. What do you consider to be the most important piece of legislation/change in local authority/change in funding regime etc. to have affected your agency?

- Positive or detrimental.

15. Is there anything you can think of that I should have asked and haven't or is there anything you particularly wanted to tell me but it didn't fit the questions I have asked.

<u>Confidential Details</u>

Funding per annum (1996-1997)

£000   SRB

£,000

Staff:

Staffing Ratios:

Volunteers:

Volunteer ratios:

Volunteer economic background:

APPENDIX FOUR

Table A4.1: Agency Categories

Agency Category	Number of questionnaires sent	Number of questionnaires received[1]	% of questionnaires received
Services for Young People	63	42 (37)	67
The Law, Probation and Aftercare	28	24 (22)	86
Advisory and Social Services	210	100 (92)	48
Health Services	50	23 (19)	46
Employment and Urban Policy	38	26 (22)	68
Housing Services	38	23 (21)	61
Accommodation Services	29	20 (14)	69
Environment	20	14 (12)	70
Services to the Community	42	24 (22)	57
Training and Education for Adults	13	8 (7)	62
Services for Older People	39	15 (14)	38
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	88	42 (37)	48
Mental Health	19	10 (10)	53
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	18	11 (11)	61
Consumer Affairs	8	2 (2)	25
Total	703	384 (342)	55

[1] *Figures in brackets denote the number of usable questionnaires received in each category.*

Table A4.2: Estimated Numbers of Paid Workers and Volunteers

Size of Workforce (numbers of paid & unpaid workers)	Numbers of Paid Workers for all Agencies	Numbers of Volunteers for all Agencies	Total
3	136	74	210
11	588	501	1089
24	704	712	1416
41	807	628	1435
75	858	1092	1950
200	3810	3790	7600
Total	6903	6797	13700

Advice given at the pilot stage suggested that agencies were reluctant to give actual figures but would be prepared to use bands of figures. This suggestions was adopted but has resulted in a loss of accuracy as the figures are now 'guestimates'. In table A.2 above, the category 'size of workforce' represents the mean figure of each of the bands given in question 6: 'how many workers do you have? 1-5; 6-15; 16-30; 31-50; 51-100'. For the band 'over100' the figure of 200 was adopted based on later interview information.

The numbers given in the categories 'paid workers and 'volunteers' have been estimated utilising the above calculations and the answers given to question 7: 'what proportion of these are volunteers (i.e. unsalaried); less than 25%, 25-50%; 51-75%; 76-99%; and 100%. Once again a mean figure was adopted. A small number of agencies refused to give any information in these categories and so the estimates are based on 327 questionnaires.

A working example of the calculation is:

If an agency indicated that they had a workforce of between 16-30 people, it was estimated that the actual number was 24 (the mean figure). If they indicated that between 51-75% of these were volunteers, it was estimated that the actual percentage was 63% (the mean figure). This gave a figure of 9 paid workers and 15 volunteer workers giving a total workforce of 24 people. These figures were calculated for each individual agency and the totals are given above.

A similar calculation was utilised to estimate the numbers of male and female paid workers and volunteers and the numbers of ethnic paid workers and volunteers.

Table A4.3: The Number of Agencies with a Predominantly Female or Male Workforce in each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Predominant Workforce			
	Female (number of agencies)	As a % share of the Sector	Male (number of agencies)	As a % share of the sector
Services for Young People	20	54	7	19
Law, Probation and Aftercare	15	68	1	4.5
Advice and Social Services	65	71	12	13
Health Services	11	58	3	16
Employment and Urban Policy	8	36	6	27
Housing Services	17	81	-	-
Accommodation Services	11	79	2	14
Environmental Services	4	36	3	27
Services to the Community	11	52	4	19
Training and Education for Adults	3	50	3	50
Services for Older People	11	73	3	20
Services for those with Physical Disabilities	21	55	4	10.5
Mental Health Services	7	70	1	10
Services for those with Learning Disabilities	9	75	2	17
Consumer Affairs	2	100	-	-

Table A4.4a: The Number of agencies in Predominantly Female Workforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	2	6	1	4	1	5	19
Law, Probation & After-care	2	5	7	1	-	-	15
Advisory & Social Services	13	20	12	7	5	7	64
Health Services	1	3	3	2	1	1	11
Employment & Urban Policy	2	4	1	-	1	-	8
Housing Services	4	3	1	1	1	5	15
Accommodation Services	4	-	5	1	-	-	10
Environmental Services	1	1	-	2	-	-	4
Services to the Community	4	2	2	2	-	-	10
Training & Education for Adults	-	-	2	2	-	-	4
Services for Older People	1	1	4	-	3	2	11
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	5	5	2	-	4	3	19
Mental Health Services	2	2	-	2	1	-	7
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	3	2	1	-	1	2	9
Consumer Affairs	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Total Number of Agencies	44	55	42	24	18	25	208

Table A4.4b: The Number of agencies in Predominantly MaleWorkforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	1	2	-	1	-	3	7
Law, Probation & After-care	-	-	1	-	-	-	1
Advisory & Social Services	1	6	1	2	1	-	11
Health Services	-	2	-	-	-	1	3
Employment & Urban Policy	2	2	-	1	-	1	6
Housing Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Accommodation Services	-	-	1	1	-	-	2
Environmental Services	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
Services to the Community	3	-	-	-	-	1	4
Training & Education for Adults	1	1	-	1	-	-	3
Services for Older People	1	2	-	-	-	-	3
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	-	2	-	-	1	-	3
Mental Health Services	-	1	1	-	-	-	2
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Consumer Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Number of Agencies	10	21	4	6	2	6	49

Table A4.4c: Estimated Numbers of Female Workers in Predominantly Female Workforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	6	52	15	113	47	774	1007
Law, Probation & After-care	4	48	106	36	-	-	194
Advisory & Social Services	32	194	182	220	300	930	1858
Health Services	3	25	60	62	47	174	371
Employment & Urban Policy	6	33	21	-	47	-	107
Housing Services	12	24	15	26	65	726	868
Accommodation Services	8	-	81	26	-	-	115
Environmental Services	2	7	-	62	-	-	71
Services to the Community	11	18	36	62	-	-	127
Training & Education for Adults	-	-	42	62	-	-	104
Services for Older People	2	10	84	-	160	348	604
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	14	51	42	-	225	474	806
Mental Health Services	6	17	-	71	47	-	141
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	8	19	21	-	65	252	365
Consumer Affairs	-	10	21	-	-	-	31
Total Number of Agencies	114	508	726	740	1003	3678	6769

Table A4.4d: Estimated Numbers of Female Workers in Predominantly Male Workforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	1	8	-	5	-	222	236
Law, Probation & After-care	-	-	9	-	-	-	9
Advisory & Social Services	1	24	3	20	28	-	76
Health Services	-	8	-	-	-	74	82
Employment & Urban Policy	1	5	-	15	-	74	95
Housing Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Accommodation Services	-	-	9	15	-	-	24
Environmental Services	1	5	-	-	-	-	6
Services to the Community	3	-	-	-	-	26	29
Training & Education for Adults	1	4	-	15	-	-	20
Services for Older People	0	8	-	-	-	-	8
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	-	8	-	-	28	-	36
Mental Health Services	-	4	3	-	-	-	7
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Consumer Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Number of Agencies	8	75	24	70	56	396	629

Table A4.4e: Estimated Numbers of Male Workers in Predominantly Female Workforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	-	14	9	51	28	226	328
Law, Probation & After-care	2	7	62	5	-	-	76
Advisory & Social Services	7	26	106	67	75	470	751
Health Services	-	8	12	20	28	26	94
Employment & Urban Policy	-	11	3	-	28	-	42
Housing Services	-	9	9	15	10	274	317
Accommodation Services	4	-	39	15	-	-	58
Environmental Services	1	4	-	20	-	-	25
Services to the Community	1	4	12	20	-	-	37
Training & Education for Adults	-	-	6	20	-	-	26
Services for Older People	1	1	12	-	65	52	131
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	1	4	6	-	75	126	212
Mental Health Services	-	5	-	11	28	-	44
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	1	3	3	-	10	148	165
Consumer Affairs	-	1	3	-	-	-	4
Total Number of Agencies	18	97	282	244	347	1322	2310

Table A4.4f: Estimated Numbers of Male Workers in Predominantly Male Workforces within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	over 100	Total
Services for Young People	2	14	-	36	-	378	430
Law, Probation & After-care	-	-	15	-	-	-	15
Advisory & Social Services	2	42	21	62	47	-	174
Health Services	-	14	-	-	-	126	140
Employment & Urban Policy	5	17	-	26	-	126	174
Housing Services	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Accommodation Services	-	-	15	26	-	-	41
Environmental Services	2	17	-	-	-	-	19
Services to the Community	6	-	-	-	-	174	180
Training & Education for Adults	2	7	-	26	-	-	35
Services for Older People	3	14	-	-	-	-	17
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	-	14	-	-	47	-	61
Mental Health Services	-	7	21	-	-	-	28
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	-	10	-	-	-	-	10
Consumer Affairs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total Number of Agencies	22	156	72	176	94	804	1324

Table A4.5a: Estimated Number of Female Volunteers within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	Over 100	Total
Services for Young People	6	32	3	78	80	1127	1326
The Law, Probation & Aftercare	-	43	106	23	-	-	172
Advisory & Social Services	19	66	163	146	275	306	975
Health Services	3	24	8	12	7	174	228
Employment & Urban Policy	1	21	22	2	90	19	155
Housing Services	1	4	6	-	10	124	145
Accommodation Services	-	-	11	12	-	78	101
The Environment	2	8	-	8	-	87	105
Services to the Community	1	6	26	9	-	4	46
Training & Education for Adults	-	12	-	16	-	-	28
Services for Older People	-	19	18	-	72	325	434
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	11	53	42	24	112	101	343
Mental Health Services	-	8	-	77	-	-	85
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	1	26	20	-	10	38	95
Consumer Affairs	-	6	-	-	-	-	6
Total	45	328	425	407	656	2383	4244

Table A4.5b: Estimated Number of Male Volunteers within each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

Agency Category	Size of Workforce						
	1-5	6-15	16-30	31-50	51-100	Over 100	Total
Services for Young People	-	15	-	77	68	717	877
The Law, Probation & Aftercare	-	15	68	13	-	-	96
Advisory & Social Services	3	32	92	103	212	204	646
Health Services	-	18	1	6	4	126	155
Employment & Urban Policy	1	18	7	4	66	11	107
Housing Services	1	2	5	-	2	41	51
Accommodation Services	-	-	4	6	-	78	88
The Environment	3	15	-	4	-	87	109
Services to the Community	1	8	20	3	-	26	58
Training & Education for Adults	1	5	-	5	-	-	11
Services for Older People	-	13	3	-	14	49	79
Services for People with Physical Disabilities	1	21	6	23	74	63	188
Mental Health Services	-	11	3	29	-	-	43
Services for People with Learning Disabilities	-	7	13	-	2	22	44
Consumer Affairs	-	1	-	-	-	-	1
Total	11	181	222	273	442	1424	2553

Table A4.6: The Economic Status of Volunteer Worker Within Each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

	The Number of Agencies with Volunteer Workers Comprising below or above 25% of their workforce Within Each Economic Status Category.									
	Full-time elsewhere		Part-time elsewhere		Self-employed		Freelance		Long-term Unemply.	
Agency Category	<25	25>	<25	25>	<25	25>	<25	25>	<25	25>
Services for Young People	5	14	11	4	9	1	5	1	7	6
Law, Probation & After-care	10	5	10	3	8	-	5	1	6	6
Advisory & Social Services	25	15	27	14	21	-	17	1	21	20
Health Services	4	3	3	3	3	-	2	-	2	5
Employment & Urban Policy	6	-	4	-	2	-	1	1	6	9
Housing Services	1	-	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	1
Accommodation Services	5	-	2	-	1	-	1	-	-	2
Environmental Services	3	2	4	-	4	-	4	-	4	2
Services to the Community	5	2	2	1	2	1	-	3	2	9
Training & Education for Adults	2	1	3	-	1	-	1	-	2	1
Services for Older People	2	2	6	1	3	-	1	1	1	2
Services for those with Physical Disabilities	16	8	14	-	6	-	3	-	9	2
Mental Health Services	1	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	4	3
Services for those with Learning Disabilities	3	1	4	-	-	-	2	-	4	2
Consumer Affairs	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
Total	108	30	92	29	62	2	43	8	69	70

Table A4.6 continued: The Economic Status of Volunteer Worker Within Each Voluntary Sector Activity Category

	In Education		Disabled or long/term sick		Cares for home/family		Retired	
	The Number of Agencies with Volunteer Workers Comprising below or above 25% of their workforce Within Each Economic Status Category.							
Agency Type	<25	25>	<25	25>	<25	25>	<25	25>
Services for Young People	9	4	6	1	5	9	7	4
Law, Probation & After-care	8	5	8	1	5	6	10	6
Advisory & Social Services	24	5	24	10	17	15	31	18
Health Services	5	4	2	2	3	3	6	1
Employment & Urban Policy	1	-	2	2	4	2	6	-
Housing Services	1	-	-	1	-	1	1	2
Accommodation Services	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1
Environmental Services	3	1	5	-	4	1	2	3
Services to the Community	4	2	2	1	3	1	3	1
Training & Education for Adults	1	3	3	-	1	1	1	1
Services for Older People	4	-	2	2	1	4	3	7
Services for those with Physical Disabilities	4	2	5	8	3	7	12	12
Mental Health Services	2	3	2	3	2	1	-	3
Services for those with Learning Disabilities	3	1	2	1	1	1	3	2
Consumer Affairs	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Total	70	30	63	32	50	53	85	60

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