

THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL  
ECONOMIC AID TO  
INDEPENDENT AFRICA


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ABSTRACT

Since its inception in the post Second World War era, foreign economic aid has evolved into a major component of the study of international relations between the developed and the developing world. During this time, the wide range of literature focussing upon this flow of resources has been surrounded with controversy. The distribution of economic assistance to low income countries has been contrastingly categorised as a positive contribution towards political and economic development, or as a weapon of systematic subjugation of the Third World. Surprisingly however, analysis of the capacity of aid to establish political influence has been neglected. This is especially the case in the African political context.

The aim of this thesis has been to undertake such an analysis and to examine the extent to which the major flows of bilateral concessional finance to Africa are commensurate with the development of the donors' political influence. In this respect, assistance from Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arab states has been viewed in terms of a number of specific areas of foreign and domestic African policy, which are mutually recognised to be of concern to these major powers. Particular consideration was given to the extent to which economic aid can be viewed in terms of African voting behaviour from selected resolutions in the General Assembly of the United Nations. At the same time, where appropriate, reference was made to the availability of military facilities for foreign personnel on the continent; the incidence of African nationalisation of international investment,

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and Africa's formal diplomatic contacts with the outside world.

This research has revealed variations in the extent to which each donor was able to secure political influence on the continent. Certainly, it was not possible to establish a simple quantifiable relationship between economic assistance and influence, in which the donor with the heaviest commitment attained the optimum political return. In this respect, it is noticeable that the relatively limited Chinese program seems both to have helped Peking break out of international diplomatic isolation and can be associated with African support in her bid to enter the United Nations.

Although Britain, France, the United States and the Soviet Union have, on occasion, attempted to associate their aid programs with the availability of military facilities and the incidence of nationalisation, it is noticeable that African antipathy towards a foreign military presence, together with the use of nationalisation to control the economy, have developed in the 1970s, largely irrespective of the flow of economic assistance.

On the whole, the African members of the United Nations reacted in a manner consistent with international ideological conflicts. Such a pattern of voting can, at times, be significantly related to economic aid from the Eastern powers. This is especially the case for early Soviet and Chinese programs, although assistance from the oil rich Arab states can be more easily associated with a pattern of support for the East rather than the West. London, Paris and Washington could secure some measure of political return in areas of Africa where their finance was unchallenged by Soviet, Chinese or Arab assistance. However,

in countries of political, strategic or economic importance, which tended also to have developed aid relations with Eastern donors, African attitudes have been more favourably disposed towards Moscow, Peking and Egypt. Recently, it has become difficult to ascertain the relationship between aid and African voting behaviour, although it is still noticeable that the major recipients of assistance continue to support the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arab states.

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
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

# AFRICA



Foreign aid, in the complex form it exists today, evolved primarily in the decade following the Second World War. Under the auspices of the Marshall Plan, the United States extended grants to the value of \$17 billion to help rebuild a Western Europe whose economic infrastructure was shattered by the war and possibly threatened by Soviet expansionism. However, following the communist takeover of China in 1949 and the Korean conflict in 1950, Washington and Moscow began to utilise bilateral aid to establish positive relations with low income countries. The majority of states in the less developed world quickly discovered that political independence did not go hand in hand with economic success. Invariably, these countries were faced with a huge number of problems, including those arising from insufficient qualified manpower, capital resources and technical expertise. This made trying to 'catch up' with the developed world all the more difficult. Confronted with such difficulties, foreign economic assistance became regarded as a major determinant of successful political and economic development. Moreover, in such an atmosphere, a number of authors recognised that economic aid may be utilised as an instrument for achieving the donors' overseas aims and ambitions<sup>(1)</sup>.

However, much of the early literature focussed upon aid allocations to Europe, South East Asia, and later Latin America<sup>(2)</sup>. Substantial economic aid to Africa did not develop until the later 1950s and early 1960s. It grew quite naturally out of the disintegration of colonialism and the consequent desire of the major powers to maintain, or establish, their influence on the continent. During the immediate post-colonial years, bilateral assistance served as a continuing link between London, Paris and their former dependencies. At the same time, the United States and the Soviet

Union, as the major protagonists of two contrasting systems of economic and political organisation, were interested in using aid to guide African political development. In later years, Communist China was anxious to establish her position as a major political power and donor of concessional finance to the continent. In addition, those Arab states enriched by the increasing value of their oil reserves, became aware of the potential of economic aid in their search for African support against Israel.

However, despite the fact that no other continent provides a field of study in which six major donors can be analysed, the amount of aid literature focussing specifically upon Africa has been very limited. More importantly, there has been little analysis of the extent to which economic assistance from each of these donors is commensurate with political influence in Africa. This is surprising since the continent has become an arena wherein the major international powers have sought to develop a positive image. The newly independent states offered the developed world the opportunity to establish relations in an area which may be profitable in the context of both military strategy and international investment. Moreover, with the influx of large numbers of African states into the United Nations, the ability to secure African voting support could be crucial in the debates of the General Assembly.

It is the intention of this study to analyse the distribution of bilateral economic aid to the continent in terms of the development of political influence. Since the movement towards independence in Africa was both brief and successful, an opportunity is provided to analyse the interaction of aid and influence within a clearly delineated timespan. At the same time, the large number of independent countries and the political, economic

and geographic disparities between African states, offer a framework for donor-recipient investigation within a wide and varied context. This research will focus upon the flow of concessional finance from Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Arab states to forty-one independent countries in the years from African independence up to 1976. The rest of this chapter will be concerned with a review of the literature relevant to this study in order to illustrate more fully the need for an investigation of the political ramifications of economic aid to Africa.

#### ECONOMIC AID IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In one of the early studies of foreign economic aid, H Morgenthau, A Political Theory of Foreign Aid (1962), commented:

"of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proved more baffling both to understanding and action than foreign aid". (3)

Over the years since Morgenthau wrote these words, there has been no shortage of writers attempting to develop their own ideas on the flow of economic assistance in international relations<sup>(4)</sup>. One of the earliest groups argued the case for aid as a humanitarian transfer of resources based on a principle of international welfare. In 1966, R Robinson, International Co-operation in Aid, summarised the findings of the Cambridge Conference on Development Problems when he stated:

"This conference has no doubt. The growth of a system based largely on official aid, in which private enterprise still plays an important role is an enormous stride forward in world history. It offers the first chance

of international co-operation to organise the mutual economic and political interests of developed and underdeveloped countries rationally and constructively". (5)

T Sumberg in, Foreign Aid as Moral Obligation (1974), also emphasised the beneficial effects of concessional finance and argued that, "rich nations should help poor ones out of a sense of obligation and not only in self interest"<sup>(6)</sup>.

However, the number of studies which have concluded that the pursuit of economic development has been the overriding motivation of assistance to the less developed world is more limited. H B Chenery and A Strout, Foreign Assistance and Economic Development (1966), interpret the flow of aid as one of concessional finance designed explicitly for development purposes. They have argued that, in providing a concessional supplement to foreign exchange holdings and domestic savings, aid can increase investment and accelerate development.

This opinion has been countered by P Bauer, Dissent on Development (1971), who has argued that although assistance may be guided by the desire to alleviate economic weakness in the less developed countries, it is a most ineffective instrument in this regard. He believes that foreign economic assistance is a 'system of doles' which may actually exacerbate the recipient's problems by reducing savings, creating debt service difficulties and diverting attention away from that institutional framework which he considers to be essential to development. In this respect, Bauer concurs with M Friedman, Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives (1958):

"The objectives of foreign economic aid are commendable. The means are, however, inappropriate to the objectives. Foreign economic aid, far from contributing to rapid economic development along democratic lines, is likely to retard improvement in the well

being of the masses, to strengthen the government sector at the expense of the private sector, and to undermine democracy and freedom. The proponents of foreign aid have unwittingly accepted a basic premise of the Communist ideology that foreign aid is intended to combat. They have accepted the view that centralised and comprehensive economic planning and control by government is an essential requisite for economic development. This view is contradicted by our own experience and the experience of every other free country". (7)

Nevertheless, to a large extent, all these studies are in implicit agreement that the possible benefits to the recipient are not to be ignored.

There is a further large body of opinion which believes that the flow of economic assistance should be viewed as a weapon of systematic subjugation, employed by the developed world against the low income states. Such writers as S Weissman, The Trojan Horse (1974), and H Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (1970), have generally interpreted aid in imperialistic and exploitive terms by which it is utilised by one group of countries to impose dependency upon others<sup>(8)</sup>. Certainly T Hayter, Aid as Imperialism (1970) who argues that this characterisation applies equally to multilateral as well as bilateral aid, leaves the reader in no doubt:

"I believe, now, that the existence of aid can be explained only in terms of an attempt to preserve the capitalist system in the Third World. Aid is not a particularly effective instrument for achieving this; hence its current decline. But in so far as it is effective, its contribution to the well-being of the Third World is negative, since it is not in their interest that exploitation should continue. Any contributions to their well-being which may arise through aid are incidental to its main purposes, and must be balanced against its generally, negative effect. Aid can be regarded as a concession by the imperialist powers to enable them to continue their exploitation of the semi-colonial countries". (9)

Hayter's thesis is that aid, whether from government departments or multilateral agencies, is based upon ideology. In particular, Western governments consciously, and aid staff perhaps sub-consciously, are guided by the ideological framework of Western capitalism. In such an atmosphere, economic assistance is primarily 'a weapon' of the donor's foreign policy.

The radical arguments of this group of authors emphasise completely the exploitive role of the aid giving process. In contrast, a number of authors have argued that, whilst aid must be regarded as a possible means whereby the donor can pursue his foreign policy interests, it is also an international transfer of resources which must be made acceptable to the recipients' needs. One of the early proponents of this point of view was E S Mason who, in Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy (1964), commented that

"To discuss foreign aid as an instrument of foreign policy implies that foreign aid programs are shaped with the interests of the aid-giving countries primarily in mind. I believe that, on balance, this is true not only for the United States but for the foreign aid programs of other countries. But the term "interests" covers a wide spectrum of concerns, and, of course, it does not follow that because the interests of the aid-giving countries are served, the best interests of the aid-receiving countries are thereby denied". (10)

In the years that followed, such writers as J M Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (1968) and H Knorr, Power and Wealth (1973) have emphasised the view that there is no reason to assume that, by pursuing the interests of the donor, the recipient's requirements are also negated<sup>(11)</sup>. Within this context, Joan Nelson distinguishes some criteria which influence the allocation of American assistance. These are, a) the importance of the recipient in terms of United States interests; b) the ability of the country to use aid effectively; c) the availability of required

resources from other countries.

A number of quantitative studies have attempted to identify the objectives behind aid allocations. In 1969, Maskatsu Kato, A Model of US Foreign Aid Allocation, has endeavoured to develop a model of US foreign aid distribution by means of multiple regression model. Five foreign aid objectives are identified, under which are selected thirteen variables for regression analysis. He concludes that American military aid was motivated by the strategic importance of the recipient, while economic assistance was distributed in relation to the level of economic development. A similar study by E Wittkopf, Western Bilateral Aid Allocations (1972), is a comparative analysis of the attributes of recipient states and the level of aid received from the United States, France and West Germany. However, both these studies employ a relatively limited time period (1961, 1964 and 1967) and they have been criticised for failing to evaluate their findings in more general terms.

More recently, there have been several similar but more sophisticated studies of British, German and American assistance in the 1960s by McKinlay and Little<sup>(12)</sup>. These have confirmed the foreign policy motivation behind aid programs. Employing regression analysis on a set of variables chosen to represent 'the donor interest' and 'recipient-need' models of the allocation of aid, McKinlay and Little have demonstrated that the amount of assistance distributed to a recipient was dependent upon its political and/or economic usefulness to the donor. This was reflected in what the authors term the 'power capabilities' of the recipient states.

It is possible to discern a number of themes in the

literature on economic aid. One set of authors has been concerned to analyse the utility of assistance in the search for economic development. A separate body of literature has focussed more upon the extent to which the flow of economic assistance has led to the exploitation of the less developed world. However, a number of publications have stressed that, whilst the donor's aims and ambitions are uppermost in international aid relations, this is not necessarily concomitant with a wholeheartedly negative interpretation of the role of receiving concessional finance. Recent studies have confirmed that the distribution of economic assistance is primarily a function of the donor's foreign policy process<sup>(13)</sup>. Such an approach provides the framework for a consideration of the ability of aid to develop spheres of political influence.

#### AID AND INFLUENCE IN AFRICA

In 1976, Robert Legvold, Soviet and Chinese Influence in Black Africa, stated that:

"Next to no rigorous thinking has been done on the problem of influence in international politics. Even less have foreign policy specialists wrestled with the problem of devising a conceptual scheme for analysing or criteria for evaluating one nation's influence over another". (14)

In this, largely negative article, Legvold did note the early attempts made by J D Singer, Inter-Nation Influence: a Formal Model (1963) and J G March, An Introduction to the Theory and Measurement of Influence (1955), but rightly stated that these publications offered no more than a very general introduction to the concept. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to assume

that the concept of political influence in the foreign policy process has been ignored in the literature of international relations. Legvold emphasises the need to view political influence in terms of the anticipated 'payoffs inspiring Soviet and Chinese policy'. Extending this interpretation to other major powers, a number of authors have attempted to analyse the relationship between high and low income countries in terms of United Nations voting behaviour. An early work by T Hovet, Bloc Politics in the United Nations, 1960, identified nine regional groups in the General Assembly, including an African caucusing group for the period 1946-58. However, only nine African states were independent members at this time and, for a consideration of the effect of the new nations in this international assembly, David Kay's book, The New Nations in The United Nations, 1960-67, appeared a decade later. He has grouped the multitude of issues dealt with by the General Assembly into five sections: economic development, decolonisation, East-West issues, U.N. Organisational questions, and human rights. Agreements between the major powers and Africa on these issues were briefly analysed.

There have been very few publications which have dealt specifically with foreign aid and voting at the United Nations. A paper by E Wittkopf, Foreign Aid and UN Vote: A Comparative Study (1973), was concerned with the extent to which aid was an instrument of influence in the General Assembly. His hypothesis was that,

"the larger the agreement in General Assembly voting exhibited by a developing state with a foreign aid donor, the greater will be the amount of aid it receives from that donor". (15)

He concluded that the hypothesis was only accurate for the United States and for other donors in individual years, such as the Soviet

blot in 1964. However, Wittkopf does not provide a separate analysis for economic aid to African recipients and his conceptual framework is weak. No attempt is made to isolate resolutions where support by the recipient is representative of a position of agreement with the donor. In this respect, the most useful study of United Nations voting behaviour is provided by R Kochan, S A Gitelson and E Dubek, Black African Voting Behaviour in the United Nations on the Middle East Conflict: 1967-72, published in 1976. In an attempt to analyse Sub-Saharan African support for the Arab states over a six-year period, the authors isolated only those resolutions specifically endorsed by Egypt. They were thus able to establish a numerical record of how African states voted on certain issues and determine the meaning of these votes in terms of their 'operational significance'. However, only slight attention was given to the role of foreign aid in determining voting behaviour. This research will focus upon the voting characteristics of African states in terms of receipts of assistance from the major powers by employing a similar, but more extended, framework in an endeavour to isolate the interaction of aid and influence in the General Assembly.

J N Rosenau, Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, (1966), has pointed out that political influence, within the context of a foreign policy relationship, may be manifested in certain 'issue areas'. In addition, A Z Rubinstein, Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis (1976), states that:

"to be useful operationally, the concept of influence should be used in as limited and specific a sense as possible, in the context of normal diplomatic transaction". (16)

In this context, I Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa (1977), has interpreted foreign policy influence on the continent in terms of strategic military penetration by the major developed powers. Although he isolates foreign aid as one of the 'weapons' in this 'bid for influence', Greig does not attempt to investigate in any depth the instrumental rôle of economic assistance in the development of strategic ties. P Lellouche and D Moisi, French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilization (1979) have traced French attempts to maintain military contacts with their former African dependencies and have briefly noted any possible links with military and economic aid. More recently, a paper by McKinlay and Little, The US Aid Relationship, (1979), employed American and Soviet security links as variables in their test of the 'donor interest' model on American aid allocations. Their findings that the United States has rewarded states with strategic ties are noted.

Although there was a provision written into the United States Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 that aid would be withheld from any country who nationalised the property of American citizens without adequate compensation, there has been no investigation into the extent to which expropriation of foreign owned investment may affect African aid receipts. David Tobis, Foreign Aid: the Case of Guatemala (1971), traced the development of American aid to this Latin American state and noted that the loans were primarily designed to protect American private investment. In addition, Joan Nelson (1968) discussed this issue with regard to American assistance as a whole, and R Emerson, Africa and United States Policy (1967), made references towards Africa's 'hostility towards alien capital' (17). However, there has been no thorough analysis

of Africa's attitude towards the role of private investment and the possible ramifications for the flow of economic aid to the continent.

There have been a number of studies dealing generally with Africa's relations with the developed world in which economic aid is regarded as one facet of international relations. Two notable examples are W Nielsen, The Great Powers and Africa (1969), and A Mazrui, Africa's International Relations (1977). Both of these authors apply a descriptive framework to a wide range of historical, economic, cultural, military and political contacts between the major powers and the continent. However, no attempt is made to isolate the role of economic assistance in Africa's foreign affairs.

An early study which does attempt to provide a comparative insight into the flow of aid is K Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China: An Analysis (1964). This rather dated work deals primarily with the ideology and strategy behind the Communist programs of foreign aid. More recently, G T Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa (1980), has considered the role of aid to the continent as one aspect of the increasing tension between Moscow and Peking. He has noted the transformation in Chinese-African relations since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and analysed developments in the flow of aid from these two communist powers. However, although this brief study provides an insight into Soviet and Chinese strategies for the continent, Yu's approach does not attempt to consider in any depth Africa's political reaction to concessional finance from these two donors. Other comparative publications tend to concentrate upon the ideological conflict between the United States and Soviet

Union. R. S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid (1970) is a good example of this literature. He provides a discussion of the motivations for aid from Washington and Moscow and analyses both the magnitude and scope of the programs. While the emphasis in these publications is on economic aid, other economic relations with the less developed world are also discussed. However, in general terms, these studies lack a conceptual and theoretical basis and, in a similar fashion to the majority of literature on foreign aid, they include the African continent within an overall consideration of the developing areas.

Academic analyses of aid specifically in the African context have been confined primarily to a few studies of individual donors. Amongst the relatively recent works, E. C. Chibwe, Arab Dollars for Africa (1976), is a very general discussion of African aid relations with the oil rich Arab states in the early 1970s. Unfortunately, Chibwe's statistical evidence is weak and the author adopts a very descriptive approach to a consideration of these relatively new donors of assistance to the continent. Although the religious and ethnic bias inherent within Arab-African aid is noted, little attempt is made to discuss the role of this finance in terms of African international relations. W. I. Jones, The Search for an Aid Policy (1976), provides an historical insight into the development of the United States' assistance program on the African continent. Jones also considers American public attitudes towards aid relations with Africa and emphasises the need to secure a popular mandate for the program. However, he is not sure whether foreign assistance should be publicised in terms of its 'strategic concerns, commercial concerns, philanthropic concerns, or development concerns'. Unfortunately, Jones' general descriptive approach tends to treat the continent as a whole with little attempt made to

investigate commitments to individual recipients,

A related criticism can be made of B R Stokke, Soviet and Eastern European Trade and Aid in Africa (1967), and C. Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa (1976). Both these authors analyse aid as one aspect of the economic relations which have developed between Africa and the centrally planned economies, but neither of them adequately differentiates between total receipts from the Soviet Union, Communist China and Eastern Europe<sup>(18)</sup>.

There have only been three studies which have attempted to analyse all the major donors of assistance to the continent. A useful, though limited introduction to the primary sources of concessional finance to Africa was presented in 1965 by I.M.D. Little, Aid to Africa. In 1972, Paul Streeten, Aid to Africa - A Policy Outline for the 1970s, attempted to update this introduction. Streeten describes the character of the French, German, British and American programs and also considers the distribution of assistance from the Eastern bloc countries. However, the critical evaluation of the donors' policies and attitudes is scant although he does note significant trends in the volume of resource transfers to Africa. A major problem with this work is that it combines figures for assistance from all the centrally planned economies. Finally, and more recently, Guy Arnold, Aid in Africa (1979), has produced an informative, but purely descriptive consideration of the contemporary flows of assistance to the continent. Unfortunately, this work has little theoretical or analytical framework and, by the author's own admission, poses many more questions than it answers.

SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESIS

Since the early 1950s, foreign economic aid has been developed on such a scale that it now has an integral role in bilateral relations between the developed world and low income countries. During this time, it has been separately categorised in a number of different ways, ranging from an humanitarian transfer of resources, through to an instrument of extended colonialism and dependence upon the donor. The former has provided the basis for a set of theories in which aid is provided because of its mutually-expected benefit to the recipient. However, such explanations have come under increasing criticism over the last two decades and there is now considerable agreement that the donor's decision to distribute economic assistance is a function of foreign policy, in which political criteria are used to determine the flow of concessional finance to individual recipients.

The literature on foreign aid to the less developed world is exhaustive and existing studies have extended our knowledge of this instrument of foreign affairs. However, analysis of the political ramifications of economic assistance specifically to Africa has been surprisingly neglected.

The general hypothesis of this study is that major flows of economic aid to independent Africa are commensurate with the development of the donor's political influence. In this respect, it is intended to analyse a number of specific areas of foreign and domestic African policy which are mutually recognised to be of concern to the donor. This will involve an investigation into the extent to which economic assistance can be viewed in terms of African voting patterns upon selected issues in the United Nations. Additionally consideration will be given, where appropriate, to the

availability of facilities for foreign military personnel on the continent; the incidence of African nationalisation of international investment, and Africa's formal diplomatic contacts with the outside world. Existing aid studies have either ignored this approach or analysed similar criteria outside the African context. Others have incorporated data for African recipients within a general analysis of assistance to the less developed world or confined their investigation to one or two donors only. This research will focus upon the interaction of aid and influence from six major donors to forty-one independent recipients in Africa. In this way, it is the intention to consider the extent to which major flows of concessional finance to the continent can be viewed in terms of the political benefits to donors.

#### OUTLINE

Chapter Two will discuss the conceptual framework and methodology of this research. Chapters Three to Eight will provide an individual analysis of economic assistance from each donor, considering the size of each program and the extent to which it can be associated with the development of political influence. The final chapter will provide a comparative insight into the relationship between aid and voting. The distribution of concessional finance from each donor will be analysed in terms of its association with a broader framework of African behaviour at the United Nations. At the same time, consideration will be given to the extent to which it is possible to discern an ideological pattern between aid and voting performance.

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"it is well known that donors give aid for a variety of reasons, including political self-interest, the sense of obligation arising from former colonial ties, and economic self-interest in addition to the humanitarian motive, and that the salience of these reasons will vary between countries and over time. These factors are captured by McKinlay and Little's 'donor-interest model' and no investigation, or challenge to the validity, of that model is attempted here." (p. 248)
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17. R. Emerson, Africa and US Policy, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 35
18. Stevens does not differentiate between these donors because he only utilised United Nations statistics which amalgamate all aid from the 'centrally planned economies'. Additional donor studies of assistance to the continent include, for example, E. C. Hutchinson, American Aid to Africa, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 394 (July 1964), pp. 65-74; D. Randall, US Aid to Africa, Current History, 51:229 (July 1966) pp. 194-235; D. E. Albright, Moscow's African Policy of the 1970s in D. E. Albright eds., Africa and International Communism, Macmillan, 1980, pp. 35-67.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMWORK

The purpose of this chapter is to operationalize the concepts of aid and political influence within the African context, and thence to outline the methodological framework of this research.

#### OPERATIONALISATION OF THE CONCEPTS

##### Aid

Few concepts within the field of international relations have been utilised in such a haphazard fashion as 'aid': the term has been employed to encompass a variety of economic, technical and humanitarian activities. To quote the Jeanneney Report, which appeared in 1963, 'L'aide est une notion ambiguë et sa mesure chiffrée malaisée'<sup>(1)</sup>. Amongst the type of resource transfers broadly categorised as 'aid' can be found:

- (a) Flows of goods which move under normal trade arrangement and are conducted by private organisations;
- (b) Donations from charities and voluntary organisations;
- (c) Technical assistance by which the donor commissions field experts to evaluate programs and policies, or to train indigeneous personnel for various technical functions;
- (d) Grants and loans on a wide variety of terms and conditions<sup>(2)</sup>.

This is by no means a complete list but illustrates what can be a major definitional problem for comparative analysis. The term has included such activities as reconstructing the economies of war-devastated nations, promoting economic growth, providing stability to the governments of developing countries, and providing

famine or disaster relief. Implicit in many of the definitions of aid is the notion of intent. Specifically a transfer of resources may only warrant the label 'aid' provided it is governed by the intention to promote development. However, such an approach may create considerable semantic problems in attempting to discern the donor's motives.

To a large extent, this research does not need to isolate the definitional parameters of economic aid. What is needed is a standardised assessment of the 'aid component' of flows of resources from high to low income countries<sup>(3)</sup>. Such a standardisation is provided by the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which defines the flow of official economic resources as:

"all resources made available to, or for the account of less developed countries and multilateral agencies for economic and social developments, relief, welfare and related purposes by the central governments, central monetary institutions, local governments and agencies of central and local governments of donor countries" (4)

For the purposes of this research, the working definition of economic aid will utilise these guidelines.

### Influence

Any study incorporating the notion of political influence must isolate those aspects of the concept which are most relevant to the analysis. As A.Z. Rubinstein recognises, it is not possible to call upon a set of inviolable criteria which are unquestionably symptomatic of influence.

"To develop indicators that relate only, or even predominantly, to influence is a major undertaking because of the paucity, even under the best of circumstances and data availability, of 'pure' indicators, that is, those which reflect on the phenomenon being studied and not on other phenomena as well" (5).

This thesis does not claim to develop a theory of political influence which is applicable to every element of international relations<sup>(6)</sup>. Rather, it will focus upon those aspects of the concept which are the most pertinent to the study of aid and which are most useful, operationally, within the African context.

It is necessary to identify occasions when the recipient develops his foreign or domestic behaviour in a manner congenial to the donor. This involves consideration of issues in which agreement does not merely represent the joint interests of the two parties - in such a situation, the extent to which the donor is exercising political influence may be difficult to evaluate.

It is therefore intended to study influence in terms of United Nations voting behaviour on selected issues, African nationalisation of foreign investment, the availability of facilities to the donor's military personnel, and formal diplomatic contacts between African states and the outside world.

(a) United Nations Voting Behaviour

The General Assembly of the United Nations is the major forum where international tensions are frequently the subject of debate and where participating powers continually operate to gain

voting support for their respective positions. To those countries who gained their independence after the Second World War and to those who are not major international economic powers, this Assembly provides a major contact with other states. Moreover, in many respects, their foreign policies revolve around the proceedings of the United Nations. This study is based upon African voting behaviour towards resolutions which are primarily of concern to the donor rather than the recipient, and where African support can therefore be construed as favourable, or unfavourable, to the donor's expectations. In this way, it is possible to impute operational significance to African voting in the United Nations, interpreting it as an indicator of political influence.

(b) Nationalisation of Foreign Investment Interests.

Nationalisation represents a radical political choice from a wide variety of options available to a host government wishing to restrict the activities of a foreign investor<sup>(7)</sup>. In this respect, African policies of expropriation can be regarded as a positive rejection of foreign-owned resources. International investment within a low-income country may offer certain donors the opportunity to profit from trade and investment links, and provide them with an additional medium by which to establish influence on the continent. Britain, France and the United States are anxious to guide Africa's economic and political development within a capitalist framework, in which foreign investment is not penalised. By contrast, the Soviet Union is a leading exponent of a system of economic management by the

state and encourages African nationalisation of foreign-owned assets. In this respect, the extent to which African states allow or oppose international investment within their boundaries can be taken as an indicator of ideological influence on the continent.

(c) The Availability of Military Facilities

Political influence will be analysed in the context of international military policy. This is indicated by the availability of facilities for British, French, American and Soviet military personnel. This study will focus primarily upon the provision of base rights but will also consider over-flight, landing and training agreements arranged between African states and these powers.

It is recognised that a foreign military presence may reflect an unstable political elite in need of overt international support to stay in power. Nevertheless, even within such a context, the opportunity or 'request' to become involved in domestic African politics is a symptom of close political contact and influence. It should be emphasised that any African state providing access to foreign military personnel would be extending this facility in the face of considerable international and continental opposition<sup>(8)</sup>. In such an environment, the presence of British, French, American or Soviet troops can be regarded as a substantive measure of political influence in the host country.

(d) Diplomatic Recognition of Peking and Tel Aviv

In the analysis of Chinese and Arab aid to the continent, political influence will incorporate an investigation of Africa's formal diplomatic contacts with Peking and Tel Aviv respectively. This is an interpretation of the concept of influence primarily in terms of bilateral foreign policy concerns of major powers outside the African continent. Both Communist China and Israel are relatively new and controversial state systems, anxious to establish their position within the framework of international relations. Peking endeavoured to broaden her overseas contacts in the face of considerable American hostility, especially in the 1960s, whilst the Arab states have applied substantial pressure upon African leaders to support their cause in the Middle East conflict and to diplomatically isolate Israel. Within such an environment, African diplomacy towards Communist China and Israel can be interpreted as a measure of international influence.

THE DATA

In order to test the hypothesis that economic aid is consistent with the development of political influence amongst African states, the data will be analysed in several ways.

(a) Donors

This study will focus upon six donors of economic aid to the continent. These are Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arab states. This

framework does not necessarily account for all sources of assistance but it does incorporate the primary bilateral flows of concessional finance to Africa<sup>(9)</sup>. In addition, analysis of Africa's aid relations with these donors encapsulates the major participants in the continent's political and economic development.

(b) Recipients

Forty-one independent recipient states will be analysed, all of which were accepted as member states of the United Nations by 1976. Mainland African states not included are Angola and Guinea-Bissau which secured independent status in 1975 and 1974 respectively and for which reliable data is not available. The Republic of South Africa is excluded from this study since it is not classed as a developing country by the O.E.C.D. and is not in receipt of official economic aid.

A number of African countries have adopted different names in the years since their independence up to 1976. In order to avoid confusion, these changes are noted but the original terms are maintained in the analysis<sup>(10)</sup>.

(c) Time Period

The interaction of aid and influence will be analysed in two time periods during the years from African independence up to 1976. The year of independence represents the natural starting point for the development of aid relations. African states which secured independence prior to the Second World War will be

considered from the year when they were first in receipt of assistance. The decision to limit the study to 1976 was based on availability of comparable and reliable data. (See Appendix I)

For Britain, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, the flow of aid will be considered in the years from African independence up to 1969, and the period from 1970 to 1976. Arab finance to the continent will focus upon the years up to 1973 and the period from 1974 to 1976. Justification for this framework is provided within each analysis but, in general terms, each division signifies a transformation in relations with the continent due primarily to changes in leadership or adjustment in the donor's foreign affairs. Although a comparative study of aid between the two periods must be tempered by an awareness of their contrasting duration, this structure facilitates an analysis of trends within the overall flow of finance and permits an investigation into the causal nature of the relationship between aid and influence.

(d) Economic Aid

The primary source for data on British, French, American and Arab economic aid is provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. This organisation does not analyse assistance from Communist China and the Soviet Union in the same depth but comparable figures are obtainable from other sources, including the Development Assistance Committee of the O.E.C.D. and the United States Department of State. Figures for dollar values of net official development assistance were selected and these take into account the terms and conditions of each loan and

repayments on earlier transactions<sup>(11)</sup>.

Disbursements rather than commitments of bilateral aid were chosen for analysis. This is because the former provide a more suitable data base for comparison; because many donors plan on the basis of 'likely' disbursements and fashion their commitments accordingly; and because disbursements are actual aid flows in contrast to commitments which are sometimes not fulfilled.

(e) United Nations Resolutions

This study is based upon the voting record of African states in the United Nations from 1950 to 1976. In all cases, the plenary vote alone was utilised as the General Assembly is the central forum in which African members can compete equally. Votes which were recorded at committees or other United Nations agencies are excluded, as are votes which were duplicated by similar resolutions on the same issue<sup>(12)</sup>.

The focus is on resolutions endorsed by, and in the interests of the donor and does not include debates which were of specific concern to the African continent. For the British, French, American and Soviet studies, this incorporated resolutions on a wide range of political and security issues. Arab political influence in this international forum is viewed in terms of African voting behaviour on debates concerned with the Middle East conflict. The Chinese analysis incorporates the resolutions on the question of Peking's membership of the United Nations, and, from 1971 when Peking entered the General Assembly, resolutions concerning Korea, Asia and the Far East. All these votes have been selected in order to determine the operational significance

of the African voting performance, i.e. the extent to which a vote was considered to be favourable or unfavourable to the donor's expectations.

The substantive voting options open to members of the General Assembly are more varied than they are in some legislative assemblies. In the United Nations, a delegate may approve, disapprove or opt for a third choice and formally abstain. Member states not present to vote are listed as absent. To a certain extent, it could be argued that the decision not to attend the debate should be associated with abstention. However, this research follows the logic of A. Lijphart, Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal, (1963), who treats absentees as missing data. Also in accord with Lijphart's model of U.N. voting, abstention will be regarded as an agreement, in part, and will be calculated as partly (50% weight) in favour of the resolution<sup>(13)</sup>. An index of agreement between African states and the major powers is calculated by giving votes in favour or against double the 'value' of abstention votes. Since votes for and abstentions have a common operational significance, it becomes possible to identify clusters of African states which demonstrate similarity in voting behaviour. For each donor, three clusters are defined, representing those pro, those anti, and those uncommitted:

(1) Cluster A: includes those African states whose voting performance is assessed to be consistently unfavourable to the donor's expectations. This cluster incorporates states whose score of hostile votes is at least 60% of the maximum possible hostile score.

(2) Cluster B: includes those African states whose voting performance is assessed to be consistently favourable to the donor's expectations. This cluster incorporates states whose score of votes in favour plus abstentions (weighted  $\frac{1}{2}$ ) represents at least 60% of the maximum favourable score.

(3) Cluster C: includes all other African states whose voting scores satisfied neither of the above.

This analysis is applied to a study of the aid and influence of each donor in the United Nations. In addition, where African states in Cluster C are in receipt of economic assistance, further analysis of the voting performance of these states is undertaken<sup>(14)</sup>. Whilst the voting behaviour of delegates in Cluster C is generally assessed as uncommitted, it is unlikely that an abstention vote was always recorded. As a result, it may be possible to discern a tendency to concur or oppose the major powers by analysing the direct votes of these states. The following subdivisions may emerge within Cluster C:

(1) Cluster Ca: includes African states who tend towards abstention but, on the occasions when they vote otherwise, cast at least 60% of such votes against the resolutions.

(2) Cluster Cb: includes African states who tend towards abstention but, on the occasion when they voted otherwise, cast at least 60% of such votes in favour of the resolutions.

(3) Cluster Cz: includes African states whose direct votes neither consistently favour nor oppose the resolutions. The relationship between aid and voting is displayed in both time periods for each donor using crosstabulations, associated chi-squared tests, and Pearson correlation coefficients. A significance level of 0.05 is used for the chi-squared tests. Changes in aid and voting in the two time periods are also examined in order to provide some insight into the possible causal nature of the relationship. In the concluding chapter a similar analysis is used to display the pattern of aid distribution from all donors and the overall nature of African voting.

(f) Nationalisation

The primary sources for data on African nationalisation of foreign-owned investment include the US Department of State and the African Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series. The incidence of expropriation<sup>(15)</sup> will be viewed in terms of British, French and American investment and will be considered in the light of the respective aid programs. The possibility of an association between Soviet aid to the continent and African nationalisation of foreign-owned resources will also be analysed. An examination of the fortunes of international investment on the African continent is not suitable as a criterion of Chinese and Arab political influence whose involvement or interest in African expropriation is relatively limited.

(g) Military Facilities

Information and data on the availability of facilities for British, French, Soviet and American troops has been acquired from sources including the London Institute for Strategic Studies and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. It is intended to examine the extent to which recipients extending military facilities to these powers disproportionately benefitted from economic aid. This analysis is not appropriate for the Chinese and Arab donors, who have made little attempt to acquire facilities for their troops.

(h) Diplomatic Recognition

Formal African diplomatic contacts with Peking and Tel Aviv will be analysed in terms of the distribution of the Chinese and Arab programs respectively. Primary sources for this information include releases from the New China News Agency and the European publications, Africa South of the Sahara, The Middle East and North Africa, and Africa Research Bulletin.

(1) Economic Indicators

The flow of aid to the continent will briefly be analysed against a number of economic variables, specifically the recipient's GNP, size of population and GNP per capita. Statistics are primarily drawn from United Nations sources and figures for 1966 and 1973 are adopted to represent each time period. Using Pearson correlation coefficients, donors' aid priorities can be

related to the relative economic needs of the African recipient<sup>(16)</sup>.

#### SUMMARY

The research will integrate both quantitative and substantive data to test the general hypothesis relating aid and political influence in Africa. The following six chapters will consider economic aid from each of the major donors in terms of African voting patterns in United Nations. Additionally, the British, French, American and Soviet programs will be analysed in terms of the availability of facilities for foreign military personnel on the continent, and the incidence of African nationalisation of international investment. Chinese and Arab assistance will also be considered in the light of Africa's formal diplomatic contacts with Peking and Tel Aviv respectively.

CHAPTER TWOREFERENCES

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4. OECD, The Flow of Financial Resources to Less Developed Countries, 1960-1964, Paris, pp 167-173.
5. A.Z. Rubinstein, Assessing Influence as a Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis, in A.Z. Rubinstein eds., Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World, New York, Praeger, 1975, p 18.
6. For example, no attempt is made to integrate the work of P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. According to these authors, influence may be inferred from political decisions which were not taken by virtue of opposition within the hierarchy of power. Such an interpretation is extremely difficult to evaluate empirically and has been avoided in this study.

7. For a consideration of relations between international investors and governments of the less developed world see, for example, R. Vernon, Conflict and Resolution Between Foreign Direct Investors and Less Developed Countries, Public Policy, 17, 1968, pp 335-351; E. Penrose, International Economic Relations and the Large International Firm, in E.F. Penrose and P. Lyon eds., New Orientations: Essays in International Relations, London, Cass, 1970; J. Spero, The Politics of International Economic Relations, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1977.
8. This dislike of a foreign military presence by African heads of state was particularly witnessed in 1960 when Sekou Toure of Guinea refused permission for Cuban bound Soviet planes to refuel at Conakry airport. For further consideration of African attitudes towards foreign troops see, for example, C. Clapham, Sub-Saharan Africa, in C. Clapham eds., Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1979, pp 76-110.
9. Donors not incorporated within this research include, West Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, the East European states and Japan.
10. African states whose names have been changed include: Dahomey (Benin); Central African Republic (Central African Empire); Madagascar (Malagasy Republic); Egypt (formerly: United Arab Republic); Zaire (formerly: Congo-Kinshasa).

Note also that references to Francophone and Anglophone Africa are based upon ex-colonial connections rather than linguistic divisions. Thus, Egypt is not incorporated within the Anglophone states but is categorised in the 'other' grouping.

11. Official development assistance is defined by the O.E.C.D. as:

"those flows to developing countries and multi-lateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests:

- a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective
- b) it is concessional in character and contains a great element of at least 25% (the face value of a financial commitment less the discounted present value of the required amortization plus interest payments)."

Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-1975, Paris, 1977, p.XI.

12. For further consideration of these exclusions, see, for example, H.R. Alker and B.M. Russett, World Politics in the General Assembly, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965; D.A. Kay, The New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-67, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970.
13. A. Lijhart, The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal, American Political Science Review, 57.4 (Dec 1963) pp 902-917.
14. Similar methodology is employed by R. Kochan, S.A. Gitelson, and E. Dubek, Black African Voting Behaviour in the United Nations on the Middle East Conflict, in M. Curtis and S.A. Gitelson eds., Israel in the Third World, New Jersey, Transaction New Books, 1976, pp 289-317.
15. A number of authors make a distinction between expropriation and nationalisation. The former refers to a government decree which authorises the takeover of a specified company. Nationalisation is usually much more wide-sweeping and is directed against a whole sector of the economy. Such distinctions have not been utilised in this research. For a more detailed definitional account see, G.C. Christie, What Constitutes a Taking of Property under International Law, British Yearbook of International Law, Volume XXXVIII; S. Friedman, Expropriation in International Law, London, Stevens and Sons, 1953; G. White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property, London, Praeger, 1957.
16. No attempt is made to enter into a thorough test of the recipient need model by also incorporating the economic variables introduced by McKinlay and Little. These included, per capita GDP; per capita calorie consumption; number of doctors per hundred thousand population; role of growth of real per capita GDP and gross domestic fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. Nevertheless, McKinlay and Little's findings that there is no support for the 'recipient-need' model are noted. R.D. McKinlay and R. Little, the US Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and the Donor Interest Models, Political Studies, Volume XXVII, No 2, June 1979, pp 236-251.

CHAPTER THREE

ECONOMIC AID FROM BRITAIN

Political and economic relations between Britain and the African continent have been dominated by the period of colonial rule. During the twentieth century, British metropolitan influence was established over at least seventeen African territories<sup>(1)</sup>. However, on March 6th 1957, Ghana became an independent state within the Commonwealth and, over the following eleven years, every one of Britain's mainland dependencies (excepting Rhodesia) attained national sovereignty. In this respect, London maintained political influence on the continent up to 1957 through the medium of colonial administration and indirect government<sup>(2)</sup>. In the post colonial state, she has been forced to rely upon less immediate techniques. Nevertheless, as Christopher Clapham pointed out in his consideration of foreign policy making by African governments,

"in some cases, independence was made possible only by continuing dependence on the colonial power for financial aid, technical skills, and military support". (3)

It is the intention of this chapter to examine the extent to which economic aid has been successful in maintaining a sphere of political influence for the Western European State.

#### POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Political influence will be analysed in terms of the voting behaviour of African states on United Nations' resolutions drafted with the explicit support of the United Kingdom. To a certain extent, the importance that Britain attaches to the proceedings of this international assembly was witnessed in the late 1950s when British troops were withdrawn from Suez, primarily as a result of international pressure highlighted in the debates of the

General Assembly<sup>(4)</sup>. The support, or opposition, which individual African states attach to resolutions endorsed by the United Kingdom will provide an insight into Britain's image and influence throughout the continent. In addition, reference will be made to the incidence of African nationalisation of British-owned resources and investment interests. The degree to which states threaten the role of British foreign investment within their domestic economic planning provides a negative indicator of her status within Africa.

At the same time, the study will focus upon the availability of facilities for British military personnel. Hanrieder and Auton, in their discussion of Britain's foreign policy, pointed out that, despite granting independence to the majority of her colonies, London seemed anxious to cling to the illusion of military influence. "London, quite simply, attempted to maintain the (military) capabilities of a global power"<sup>(5)</sup>. The extension of facilities to British troops will be regarded positively in terms of political alignment.

Finally, it should be noted that Anglo-African relations from the 1960s tended to be dominated by the question of independence for the white minority regime in Rhodesia. Having failed to reach agreement with the Labour Government in the early 1960s, Ian Smith and the Rhodesian Front, announced a 'Unilateral Declaration of Independence' (UDI) for the Central African State in November 1965. Britain's role in this contentious area of African politics was not without its critics. In this respect, consideration will be given to the reaction of individual African states to London's handling of the Rhodesian issue and the ramifications for the aid program.

BRITAIN'S AID PROGRAM

The analysis of British economic aid to Africa can be divided into two periods. Before 1969, Britain's foreign affairs were guided by Conservative Governments under Macmillan and Home, and a Labour Government under Wilson. In 1970, relations with the continent underwent a transformation with the election to office of Edward Heath. As Colin Legum remarked in 1971:

"Under the Labour Administration of Mr Harold Wilson, Britain's policy towards Africa was often ambiguous and sometimes contradictory; this is quite different from the policy pursued by the Conservative administration under Mr Heath. Tory policy towards Africa is unambivalent and clear. Unlike Mr Wilson, Mr Heath and his Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-Home did not much mind how their policies looked to Africa, the third world or the United Nations: what was important to them was that their conception of British interests should be put first, and in the phrase so often repeated by Mr Heath in his talks with Commonwealth leaders 'Britain cannot be pushed around'". (6)

In the years up to 1969, the aid program to Africa totalled \$1294.9m and encompassed thirty recipient states. From 1970 to 1976, the different attitude pursued by the British Administration coincided with a decline in assistance to the continent by an average of over \$17m per annum. In total, London distributed \$785.7m to thirty-six countries in the 1970s<sup>(7)</sup>.

London's concessional finance was initially directed exclusively to the colonies and was handled by the Colonial Office. When economic aid began to be given on a significant scale to independent countries, the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office became involved. In October 1964,

the Ministry of Overseas Development was established and, headed by a Minister of Cabinet Rank, assumed responsibility for Britain's bilateral assistance program. This finance is distributed in both grant and loan form. The loans mature, on average, after a period of twenty-five years, at an interest rate of just over 4% and with a grace period of up to seven years<sup>(8)</sup>.

#### ANGLO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

In September 1963, the Chief Secretary of the Treasury presented a White Paper to Parliament, entitled, 'Aid to Developing Countries'. This document outlined the long term prospects for British economic assistance and stated that:

"The geographical distribution of our aid expenditure is influenced by our history. Our aid program can be said to have started as part of the discharge of our responsibilities to the dependent territories ... Having helped these countries to political independence, it is a natural and fitting continuation of the earlier relationship that we should now assist them in their efforts to achieve balanced and self sustaining economies". (9)

The geographical distribution of economic assistance during this period does show, as the White Paper forecast, a strong bias towards those African states formerly dependent upon Britain:

TABLE 1

BRITISH ECONOMIC AID FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

| <u>NORTH</u> | <u>\$m</u>      | <u>EAST</u>                 | <u>\$m</u>   |
|--------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|--------------|
| Algeria      | -               | Burundi                     | -            |
| Egypt        | 8.9             | Ethiopia                    | 2.8          |
| Libya        | 48.0            | Kenya                       | 247.8        |
| Morocco      | 0.3             | Rwanda                      | -            |
| Tunisia      | <u>0.2</u>      | Somalia                     | 15.2         |
|              | \$57.4m         | Sudan                       | 22.8         |
|              |                 | Tanzania                    | 156.9        |
|              |                 | Uganda                      | <u>114.8</u> |
|              |                 |                             | \$560.3m     |
|              |                 |                             |              |
| <u>WEST</u>  |                 | <u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |              |
| Cameroon     | 10.9            | Botswana                    | 53.3         |
| Chad         | -               | C.A.R.                      | 5.5          |
| Dahomey      | -               | Congo                       | 0.1          |
| Gambia       | 13.6            | Eq. Guinea                  | -            |
| Ghana        | 41.7            | Gabon                       | -            |
| Guinea       | -               | Lesotho                     | 41.0         |
| Ivory Coast  | 0.2             | Madagascar                  | 0.2          |
| Liberia      | 1.0             | Malawi                      | 142.6        |
| Mali         | 0.2             | Swaziland                   | 16.2         |
| Mauritania   | 0.1             | Zaire                       | 2.1          |
| Niger        | 0.1             | Zambia                      | <u>138.0</u> |
| Nigeria      | 161.5           |                             | \$399.0m     |
| Senegal      | 0.3             |                             |              |
| Sierra Leone | 48.6            |                             |              |
| Togo         | -               | Total program:              | \$1294.9m    |
| Upper Volta  | -               |                             |              |
|              | <u>\$278.2m</u> | % Regional Share:           |              |
|              |                 | North                       | 4.4%         |
|              |                 | West                        | 21.5%        |
|              |                 | East                        | 43.3%        |
|              |                 | C & S                       | 30.8%        |

Sources: O.E.C.D., The Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1960-64, 1965, 1966-67, 1968, 1969-75, Paris; Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Annual Reviews, Paris.

# AFRICA

BRITISH AID RELATIONS FROM  
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969.



- RECIPIENTS OF BRITISH AID
- NATIONALISATION
- ✈ MILITARY BASE FACILITIES
- ✱ MINOR MILITARY FACILITIES
- A VOTING OPPOSITION
- B VOTING AGREEMENT
- C UNCOMMITTED



It would be erroneous to assume that the relative absence of concessional finance to the strategic, economically and politically important Mediterranean states reflected an unwillingness to utilise aid to establish British political influence. A number of studies have discounted ideas that London's aid philosophy was guided by philanthropic concern<sup>(10)</sup>. For example, Auton, in his consideration of British foreign policy in the post-war decades, concludes that her commitments to the Third World reflected a desire to cling to the illusion of global power despite obviously shrinking resources. The paucity of assistance to North Africa reflected, partly, the British Government's inability to enter into large scale aid competition in an area of the continent where her image was previously tarnished by the Suez conflict with Egypt. But, more pertinently, the nature of the allocation to this region of the continent was symptomatic, as the 1963 White Paper suggests, of a notion that assistance could be most influential in the former dependencies. This excluded North Africa where there was no tradition of British colonialism.

BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE  
UP TO 1969

Analysis of African behaviour in the General Assembly during this period does not reveal a direct connection between the distribution of aid and voting response, (See Table 3). Twenty-one states consistently supported the United Kingdom (Cluster B), fourteen of whom were in receipt of \$335.6m. This represents less than 26% of the program. At the same time, Mali firmly opposed Britain (Cluster A) in the resolutions drafted with London's support and yet was in receipt of assistance, albeit only \$0.2m. Moreover,

TABLE 3

BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE UP TO 1969CLUSTER B (60% Pro UK)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Botswana     | 12         | 3           | 1            | 16           | 53.3             |
| Cameroon     | 17         | 3           | 17           | 37           | 10.9             |
| C.A.R.       | 24         | 5           | 8            | 37           | 5.5              |
| Chad         | 20         | 3           | 13           | 36           | -                |
| Dahomey      | 27         | 3           | 5            | 35           | -                |
| Eq. Guinea   | 4          | 0           | 3            | 7            | -                |
| Gabon        | 25         | 4           | 3            | 32           | -                |
| Gambia       | 12         | 4           | 0            | 16           | 13.6             |
| Ivory Coast  | 28         | 5           | 6            | 39           | 0.2              |
| Lesotho      | 12         | 3           | 1            | 16           | 41.0             |
| Liberia      | 38         | 6           | 4            | 48           | 1.0              |
| Madagascar   | 30         | 4           | 5            | 39           | 0.2              |
| Malawi       | 18         | 4           | 2            | 24           | 142.6            |
| Niger        | 29         | 4           | 5            | 38           | 0.1              |
| Rwanda       | 19         | 4           | 3            | 26           | -                |
| Senegal      | 18         | 6           | 16           | 40           | 0.3              |
| Sierra Leone | 15         | 4           | 17           | 36           | 48.6             |
| Swaziland    | 7          | 2           | 0            | 9            | 16.2             |
| Togo         | 25         | 4           | 10           | 39           | -                |
| Upper Volta  | 19         | 4           | 10           | 33           | -                |
| Zaire        | 23         | 4           | 5            | 32           | <u>2.1</u>       |
|              |            |             |              |              | \$335.6m         |

CLUSTER A (60% Anti UK)

|         |   |    |   |    |     |
|---------|---|----|---|----|-----|
| Algeria | 7 | 18 | 4 | 29 | -   |
| Mali    | 8 | 23 | 6 | 37 | 0.2 |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|            |    |    |    |    |              |
|------------|----|----|----|----|--------------|
| Burundi    | 6  | 11 | 9  | 26 | -            |
| Congo      | 13 | 16 | 2  | 31 | 0.1          |
| Egypt      | 8  | 21 | 20 | 49 | 8.9          |
| Ethiopia   | 17 | 9  | 23 | 49 | 2.8          |
| Ghana      | 8  | 12 | 29 | 49 | 41.7         |
| Guinea     | 6  | 25 | 16 | 47 | -            |
| Kenya      | 6  | 5  | 11 | 22 | 247.8        |
| Libya      | 11 | 7  | 27 | 45 | 48.0         |
| Mauritania | 13 | 16 | 5  | 34 | 0.1          |
| Morocco    | 11 | 15 | 18 | 44 | 0.3          |
| Nigeria    | 11 | 8  | 19 | 38 | 161.5        |
| Somalia    | 10 | 10 | 14 | 34 | 15.2         |
| Sudan      | 10 | 19 | 20 | 49 | 22.8         |
| Tanzania   | 6  | 12 | 7  | 25 | 156.9        |
| Tunisia    | 11 | 10 | 26 | 47 | 0.2          |
| Uganda     | 7  | 12 | 7  | 26 | 114.8        |
| Zambia     | 7  | 12 | 5  | 24 | <u>138.0</u> |
|            |    |    |    |    | \$959.1m     |

seventeen states remained largely uncommitted in the United Nations, (Cluster C), of all whom, with the exception of Burundi and Guinea, benefitted from British concessional finance to a total of \$959.1m - the equivalent of over 74% of the program.

Crosstabulation of aid and African voting provides little evidence of a positive relationship between the two variables,

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | AFRICAN STATES NOT<br>IN RECEIPT OF AID<br>UP TO 1969 | AFRICAN STATES<br>RECEIVING AID<br>UP TO 1969 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 1<br>(50.0)   | 1<br>(50.0)                                   | 2  |
| Cluster E<br>(Uncommitted) | 2<br>(11.8)   | 15<br>(88.2)                                  | 17 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 7<br>(33.3)   | 14<br>(66.7)                                  | 21 |
|                            | 10<br>(25.0)  | 30<br>(75.0)                                  | 40 |

Chi Square = 3.03268 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.2195

The value of chi-squared is only significant at a level beyond 0.2 which does not indicate an association between the distribution of British assistance and the pattern of African voting.

To a large extent it would appear that African states who failed to endorse Britain's position in the General Assembly were more likely to acquire her economic assistance. Nineteen states failed to support the United Kingdom during this period, of whom sixteen were in receipt of aid. This should be compared with aid finance to states in Cluster B, one-third of whom did not

benefit from the program. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting confirm that the program did not favour states who voted with London (Correlation - 0.2128).

This trend is maintained if further consideration is given to the pattern of aid and voting for states in Cluster C. Whilst these countries were largely uncommitted in their voting behaviour, there were many occasions when they registered a direct vote either in support or opposition:

TABLE 4

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C BETWEEN DIRECT VOTES

| <u>Cluster Ca</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid</u> |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------|
| Egypt             | 8          | 21          | \$ 8.9m    |
| Ghana             | 8          | 12          | \$ 41.7m   |
| Guinea            | 6          | 25          | -          |
| Sudan             | 10         | 19          | \$ 22.8m   |
| Tanzania          | 6          | 12          | \$156.9m   |
| Uganda            | 7          | 12          | \$114.8m   |
| Zambia            | 7          | 12          | \$138.0m   |
| <u>Cluster Cb</u> |            |             |            |
| Ethiopia          | 17         | 9           | \$ 2.8m    |
| Libya             | 11         | 7           | \$ 48.0m   |
| <u>Cluster Cz</u> |            |             |            |
| Burundi           | 6          | 11          | -          |
| Congo             | 13         | 16          | \$ 0.1m    |
| Kenya             | 6          | 5           | \$247.8m   |
| Mauritania        | 13         | 16          | \$ 0.1m    |
| Morocco           | 11         | 15          | \$ 0.3m    |
| Nigeria           | 11         | 8           | \$161.5m   |
| Somalia           | 10         | 10          | \$ 15.2m   |
| Tunisia           | 11         | 10          | \$ 0.2m    |

Cluster Ca: includes African states who revealed a general tendency towards abstention votes, but on occasions when they expressed a direct vote, cast at least 60% of such votes against the United Kingdom

Cluster Cb: incorporates Ethiopia and Libya whose direct votes primarily supported London

Cluster Cz: includes African states who preferred to remain generally uncommitted.

Ethiopia and Libya, the only two countries in Cluster C whose representatives revealed a tendency to endorse the United Kingdom, were in receipt of \$40.8m. This is the equivalent of less than 6% of British aid to states in Cluster C, and represents less than 4% of the total program. Moreover, over 70% of Britain's economic assistance to the continent was disseminated to African states who failed to support the donor, either consistently or tentatively, in the debates of the United Nations. However, it would be erroneous to conclude that London automatically favoured states for their lack of support. The absence of concessional finance to Guinea, Burundi and Algeria refutes this idea. Rather it would seem that the inherent bias of the program towards the former dependencies was maintained despite the absence of voting support from certain ex-colonies.

#### DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

##### BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF RESOURCES UP TO 1969

British investment remained largely unaffected by nationalisation on the continent during this period. The only two notable cases feature the governments of Tunisia and Tanzania.

On May 12th, 1964, all foreign-owned agricultural property in Tunisia was expropriated. The most sizeable claim involving a United Kingdom national included property valued at over \$78,000. In Tanzania, the National Bank of Commerce Act of 1967 established the National Bank of Commerce as the sole commercial bank in Tanzania and acquired 100% of the Tanzanian assets and liabilities of the country's nine commercial banks. The primary British interests expropriated were the holdings of Barclays Bank. Also in 1967, the Insurance

(Vesting of Interest and Regulations) Act provided for the compulsory acquisition of foreign-held shares by the National Insurance Corporation. British investment which was affected by these measures included the companies of Eagle Star, Mercantile and General Insurance, and Provincial Insurance<sup>(11)</sup>.

The attempt to discern an association between British aid policy and the incidence of African nationalisation must be circumspect. Tunisia has no colonial connection with the Western European donor and was in receipt of only \$0.2m during this period. However, it is noticeable that the North African government did acquire this finance following the expropriation measures of 1964. In this respect, it would appear that the nationalisation of British resources did not automatically exclude future receipts of economic aid. Nor did substantial flows of assistance to President Nyerere of Tanzania protect British interests in East Africa. In the years from independence up to the nationalisation program of 1967, London distributed \$150.5m to Tanzania, although it should be noted that, after 1967, receipts of aid fell from an annual average of \$24.8m (pre 1967) to \$2.6m (1967-69).

#### BRITISH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES UP TO 1969

At intervals during the 1960s, British military personnel were present in substantial numbers in ten independent African countries. In Cameroon, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda and notably Libya, which was not formerly dependent upon Britain, troops were allowed access to base facilities. In Nigeria, Malawi, Sudan, and Zambia, military arrangements with the Western European state were primarily confined to overflight, staging and

training facilities<sup>(12)</sup>. Throughout this period, these states dominated their respective regional allocations and, in total, were in receipt of \$1059.5m. This is the equivalent of over 81% of the aid program to the continent. However, the offer of military facilities may not have been an automatic guarantee for large scale British assistance. Up to 1969, Cameroon and Swaziland acquired only \$10.9m. and \$16.2m respectively. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that all the major beneficiaries of economic aid during this period, who were able to negotiate in excess of \$100.0m., can be included within the group of independent African states who were prepared to tolerate a British military presence.

#### BRITISH AND RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE

Following U.D.I. in November 1965, Ian Smith declared a state of emergency throughout Rhodesia, by which government officials were vested with wide powers of arrest, search, interrogation, censorship and detention without trial<sup>(13)</sup>. Twelve months later, it became apparent to many black African states that Britain was not prepared to take military action against the illegal regime. Bitterly recalling instances when British military power had been promptly used to suppress black uprisings, the OAU Council of Ministers in December 1966 threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Britain unless she adopted a more radical solution to Smith's regime.

In reality only nine out of the thirty-six members of the OAU subsequently broke off diplomatic relations with London. These were Egypt, Tanzania, Sudan, Guinea, Algeria, Congo, Mali, Mauritania and Somalia. Of these nine states, it is noticeable

that Guinea and Algeria were not in receipt of any British economic aid; Congo-Brazzavile, Mali and Mauritania in total garnered only \$0.4m, whilst Somalia had received no British assistance since 1963. Moreover, following Tanzania's decision to break off diplomatic relations, Britain suspended a previously arranged aid agreement to the East African State<sup>(14)</sup>. In total, throughout the 1960s, these nine African states received \$204.2m. worth of aid - the equivalent of less than 16% of Britain's total continental assistance. The diplomatic breakdown formally lasted for 18 months. In December 1967, Egypt and Somalia re-established diplomatic relations with Britain; Sudan resumed relations on January 25th, 1968; Guinea on February 20th, Algeria, Congo -Brazzavile, Mauritania and Mali on 10th April, of the same year. Tanzania, more reluctant than the rest, eventually accepted Britain's pledge that her Rhodesian policy would be governed by NIBMAR (No Independence Before Majority Rule) and restored diplomatic relations on July 4th, 1968<sup>(15)</sup>.

In contrast, Zambia's reaction to Britain's Rhodesian policy was relatively benevolent. As a 'front-line' state bordering Rhodesia, the Zambian economy was the most likely to suffer by Britain's policy of economic sanctions against Rhodesia. Zambia was critical of Britain's failure to find a radical solution to Ian Smith's illegal regime, but it is noticeable that this former British protectorate and large scale beneficiary of British aid, did not cut off diplomatic relations with London. In December 1966, the Zambian Foreign Minister, Mr Kapwepwe addressed the United Nations Security Council. He denounced the sanctions proposals made by Britain as; "totally ineffective and unworkable ... Britain's bankrupt Rhodesian policy was wrecking the Zambian

economy, and the offer of £14m in aid was highly inadequate. We shall ask Britain to pay a fair and equitable compensation in time"<sup>(16)</sup>. In the three years following UDI, Zambia received \$26.8m, \$40.1m and \$25.2m in economic aid from Britain.

The decision by the Zambian Government not to cut off diplomatic relations with Britain (and to maintain facilities for British military personnel), despite the crippling effects of economic sanctions, should be seen in the light of Britain's intrinsic importance as a provider of aid to Zambia.

TABLE 5

BRITISH AID TO ZAMBIA 1964-69

| <u>Year</u> | <u>British Aid</u> | <u>As % of total OECD<sup>(17)</sup><br/>aid to Zambia</u> |
|-------------|--------------------|--|
| 1964        | 20.6m              | 100%   |
| 1965        | 12.1m              | 91.7%  |
| 1966        | 26.8m              | 73.3%  |
| 1967        | 40.1m              | 58.8%  |
| 1968        | 25.2m              | 54.7%  |
| 1969        | 13.2m              | 73.3%  |

Sources: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1960-64, 1965, 1966-67, 1968, 1965, 1975, O.E.C.D., Paris

British economic aid totally dominated Zambian receipts of Western assistance in the time from independence to 1965 when Smith declared UDI for Rhodesia. In 1966 and 1967, criticism of London's handling of the Rhodesian issue was at its most bitter and nine African states cut off diplomatic relations with Britain. During this period Zambia began to receive aid from other Western donors and British assistance increased dramatically - in 1967 alone, Zambia was in receipt of \$40.1m worth of British aid.

Understandably, the Zambian Government was anxious not to associate herself too closely with the most vehement African critics of the country which was still the major provider of assistance. In 1968, the nine African states restored diplomatic relations with Britain. In the same year, British aid to Zambia was reduced in both real terms, and as a percentage of total Western aid. In 1969, British economic aid to Zambia was further reduced but it is interesting to note that flows of assistance from other Western donors almost disappeared.

Thus, Britain's recognition of Zambia's hardship was most evident when criticism of London's Rhodesian policy was at its highest and Britain was in competition with other aid donors. However, from 1968, this criticism and competition was beginning to wane. The nine African states restored diplomatic relations and it would appear that Britain no longer deemed it necessary to pay such a high price to maintain political influence in Zambia.

#### BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1969

The importance of enduring personalities upon the foreign policy making process within Africa has been recognised by Christopher Clapham. He noted that the institutional structure of African political life was, in most cases, so fluid that, 'the personalities of individual leaders may be an important influence on foreign policy, especially in the areas of declaratory and formal diplomatic postures which are directly subject to the leader's control'<sup>(18)</sup>. To a certain extent, it would appear that the flow of British assistance

was not entirely unreceptive to the political climate. Six African states received in excess of \$100.0m during this period - Kenya, Tanzania, Nigeria, Uganda, Malawi and Zambia. With the sole exception of Nigeria, all of these major beneficiaries have been governed by leaders who have enjoyed sustained period of office in the 1960s<sup>(19)</sup>.

The annual distribution of assistance to individual recipients has been consistent and relatively inflexible in the years up to 1969. However, four states were able to negotiate large increases, in excess of 100% over a twelve months period:

TABLE 6

AID INCREASES AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1969

| <u>Name</u> | <u>% Increase</u> | <u>Aid</u>     | <u>Year</u>        | <u>Nature of Political Change</u>      |
|-------------|-------------------|----------------|--------------------|--|
| Ghana       | 1489%             | \$0.9m-\$14.3m | 1967-68            | Coup in 1966 and abortive coup in 1967 |
| Nigeria     | 1230%             | \$2.0m-\$26.0m | 1963-64<br>1964-65 | 1963 is first year as republic         |
| Cameroon    | 1733%             | \$0.3m-\$5.5m  | 1960-61            | First year of independence             |
| Ethiopia    | 500%              | \$0.1m-\$0.6m  | 1964-65            | No change                              |

Sources: Africa, South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Exeter

Only the increase in aid to Ghana coincided with a change in African political leadership. In 1966, President Nkrumah was ousted from office by a military coup led by Emmanuel Kotoka, who himself was killed twelve months later in an abortive counter-coup. Until his overthrow by military officers, Nkrumah was very

critical of the British policies in Africa and during the years from independence up to 1966, the West African state was only in receipt of an annual average of \$1.9m in aid. In the period following his removal (some commentators say with tacit British support)<sup>(20)</sup>, Ghana's receipts increased to an annual average of \$9.4m.

The history of aid relations with Ghana in the late 1960s does illustrate that London was, on occasion, prepared to react in support of new political movements on the continent. However, on the whole, it would appear that positive, large-scale aid contacts with the Western European donor were more contingent upon continuity and political stability within the recipient states.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS UP TO 1969

Analysis of the economic characteristics of the major beneficiaries of aid during this period provide little discernible evidence that the program was determined by the recipient's economic position.

TABLE 7: Major Beneficiaries and Economic Indicators

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid</u> | <u>GNP</u><br><u>(\$m)</u> | <u>Population</u><br><u>(m.)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------|----------------------------|----------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Nigeria     | \$161.5m   | 3992                       | 49.9                             | 80                    |
| Kenya       | \$247.8m   | 1205                       | 9.8                              | 123                   |
| Tanzania    | \$156.9m   | 136                        | 1.7                              | 80                    |
| Uganda      | \$114.8m   | 939                        | 7.7                              | 122                   |
| Malawi      | \$142.6m   | 284                        | 4.0                              | 71                    |
| Zambia      | \$138.0m   | 1315                       | 3.8                              | 346                   |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks, 1968-69; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971; UN Demographic Yearbooks; IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

Relatively equal amounts of assistance flowed to Zambia and Tanzania whose economic positions were very dissimilar. On the whole, Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal that the relationship between aid and recipient population is barely significant (Correlation 0.2608), whilst the size of the recipient's GNP was even less instrumental upon the direction of the program (Correlation 0.2039). Certainly, it would be difficult to argue that British assistance to Africa was dictated by the desire to alleviate economic weakness on the continent during this period. Analysis of aid and recipient GNP per capita reveals that the program ignored the dictates of economic need as witnessed by the level of GNP per capita (Correlation 0.0215)<sup>(21)</sup>.

#### BRITISH AID AND INFLUENCE UP TO 1969

##### Overview

The historical bias of the aid program in the years up to 1969 was self evident. From a total of \$1294.9m., the equivalent of almost 93% was disseminated to the former dependencies. In general, concessionary finance was directed towards those states where British 'involvement' was not without precedent and favoured those leaders, irrespective of economic need, who could claim enduring associations with the ex-metropolitan authority.

However, in terms of the utility of this aid in establishing or maintaining political influence on the continent, the evidence is far from conclusive. On the one hand, the program did favour many of the states which provided a network of facilities for British troops. On the other hand, there is little evidence to

assume that British assistance was instrumental in determining the pattern of African voting at the United Nations. The vast majority of a largely inflexible program was distributed to states who were unwilling to vote with the United Kingdom in the General Assembly. In addition, whilst the incidence of African expropriation of foreign resources was limited during the 1960s, it was apparent that British aid was neither successful as a safeguard for her investment, nor was it utilised as a sanction against nationalisation.

It should be noted that the program largely overlooked or failed to influence a number of African countries of general strategic, political and economic importance on the continent. With the exception of Libya, British economic aid relations with the Mediterranean states of North Africa were limited. In East Africa, assistance to Tanzania failed to counteract the introduction of Nyerere's independent political and economic philosophy. At the same time, the potential impact of aid to Africa generally suffered amongst the Anglophone community as a result of London's ambivalence towards the white minority regime in Rhodesia. The ramifications of these 'failings' emerged towards the end of the decade when a number of African states felt sufficiently disillusioned to join Egypt and Tanzania in suspending diplomatic relations with Britain.

TABLE 8


BRITISH ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>NORTH</u> | <u>\$m</u> | <u>EAST</u>                 | <u>\$m</u>  |
|--------------|------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Algeria      | 3.3        | Burundi                     | -           |
| Egypt        | 17.4       | Ethiopia                    | 25.0        |
| Libya        | -          | Kenya                       | 154.1       |
| Morocco      | 0.3        | Rwanda                      | 0.1         |
| Tunisia      | <u>1.9</u> | Somalia                     | 3.1         |
|              | \$22.9m    | Sudan                       | 27.1        |
|              |            | Tanzania                    | 27.8        |
|              |            | Uganda                      | <u>27.5</u> |
|              |            |                             | \$264.7m    |
| <br>         |            |                             |             |
| <u>WEST</u>  |            | <u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |             |
| Cameroon     | 4.6        | Botswana                    | 55.4        |
| Chad         | -          | C.A.R.                      | 0.2         |
| Dahomey      | 0.5        | Congo                       | 0.4         |
| Gambia       | 14.5       | Eq. Guinea                  | -           |
| Ghana        | 41.7       | Gabon                       | 0.4         |
| Guinea       | -          | Lesotho                     | 37.7        |
| Ivory Coast  | 4.4        | Madagascar                  | 1.1         |
| Liberia      | 1.2        | Malawi                      | 124.1       |
| Mali         | 6.5        | Mozambique                  | 0.1         |
| Mauritania   | 0.1        | Swaziland                   | 26.2        |
| Niger        | 3.1        | Zaire                       | 1.5         |
| Nigeria      | 67.7       | Zambia                      | <u>97.4</u> |
| Senegal      | 1.4        |                             | \$344.5     |
| Sierra Leone | 6.5        |                             |             |
| Togo         | 1.0        | Total Program:              | \$785.7m    |
| Upper Volta  | <u>0.4</u> | % Regional Share:           |             |
|              | \$153.6m   |                             |             |
|              |            | North                       | 2.9%        |
|              |            | West                        | 19.6%       |
|              |            | East                        | 33.7%       |
|              |            | C & R                       | 43.8%       |

Sources: O.E.C.D., Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1969-75, 1976-79, Paris;  
Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Annual Reviews, O.E.C.D., Paris.

# AFRICA

BRITISH AID RELATIONS  
FROM 1970 TO 1976.



● RECIPIENTS OF BRITISH AID

⊙ NATIONALISATION

A VOTING OPPOSITION

✈ MILITARY BASE FACILITIES

B VOTING AGREEMENT

C UNCOMMITTED

ANGLO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

The General Election of 1970 replaced a Labour Government under Wilson with a Conservative Administration under the Premiership of a tough talking Edward Heath. In announcing the new style of British policy with the Commonwealth and the Third World, Heath declared in a speech in Islamabad in January 1971 that Britain would not allow herself "to be pushed around as was the case under the previous Prime Minister. I have made it clear that British policies are to be determined by British interests ... we seek to strengthen our country so that we can play an effective part in the world; so that we can contribute to the advance and betterment of the world". This speech outlined the basic philosophy of British policy towards Africa, and, together with the economic problems which beset the European state in the 1970s, provided the background to a reduced British aid commitment<sup>(22)</sup>. During this period, \$785.7m. was distributed to thirty-six recipient states. This represents an overall reduction of 39% on the previous assistance program and an average annual reduction of over 13%. Taken into consideration with rising inflation and the fourfold increases in the price of Arab oil in 1973, the real importance of British aid to Africa diminished considerably.

Britain's former dependencies accrued \$707.7m., which was the equivalent of more than 90% of total aid to the continent. The geographical distribution of the program reveals that London's attention became increasingly focussed upon the ex-colonies in Central and Southern Africa. Of \$344.5m., (over 43% of total aid) committed to this area of the continent,

Botswana, Leotho, Malawi, Swaziland and Zambia garnered \$340.8m. This compares favourably with the \$264.7m distributed to East Africa whose demotion as major regional beneficiary was symptomatic of deteriorating relations with Tanzania and Uganda in the 1970s. In West Africa it would appear that London attempted to disseminate a limited amount of aid amongst a large number of recipients. With the exception of Chad, all the states of West Africa were in receipt of assistance, but the region as a whole acquired only \$153.6m., or less than 20% of the total program. At the same time, following the disruption of relations with the new Libyan leader Colonel Al-Quadhafi, who came to power by military coup in 1969, aid to North Africa amounted to only \$22.9m; the equivalent of less than 3% of total assistance to the continent.

BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

From 1970, twenty-three African states consistently supported the United Kingdom in the General Assembly, all of whom, with the sole exception of Chad, were in receipt of economic aid. In total, London distributed \$499.4m to the 'supporters' of Cluster B. This represents over 63% of the assistance program. In this respect, it would appear that Britain was prepared to provide finance to states who endorsed her position at the United Nations. However, crosstabulation of the distribution of aid and total African voting behaviour questions the overall influence of concessionary finance from the Western European state:

TABLE 9

BRITISH ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA FROM 1970 to 1976CLUSTER B (60% Pro UK)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Botswana    | 12         | 3           | 3            | 18           | 55.4             |
| Cameroon    | 9          | 3           | 8            | 20           | 4.6              |
| C.A.R.      | 7          | 2           | 8            | 17           | 0.2              |
| Chad        | 12         | 1           | 7            | 20           | -                |
| Dahomey     | 13         | 4           | 3            | 20           | 0.5              |
| Ethiopia    | 11         | 3           | 6            | 20           | 25.0             |
| Gabon       | 16         | 1           | 3            | 20           | 0.4              |
| Gambia      | 14         | 1           | 1            | 16           | 14.5             |
| Ghana       | 9          | 4           | 6            | 19           | 41.7             |
| Ivory Coast | 17         | 0           | 3            | 20           | 4.4              |
| Kenya       | 10         | 3           | 6            | 19           | 154.1            |
| Lesotho     | 17         | 1           | 2            | 20           | 37.7             |
| Liberia     | 18         | 0           | 3            | 21           | 1.2              |
| Madagascar  | 14         | 5           | 1            | 20           | 1.1              |
| Malawi      | 12         | 0           | 7            | 19           | 124.1            |
| Morocco     | 17         | 2           | 2            | 21           | 0.3              |
| Niger       | 13         | 1           | 3            | 17           | 3.1              |
| Rwanda      | 12         | 3           | 4            | 19           | 0.1              |
| Swaziland   | 14         | 0           | 0            | 14           | 26.2             |
| Togo        | 13         | 4           | 2            | 19           | 1.0              |
| Tunisia     | 9          | 2           | 10           | 21           | 1.9              |
| Upper Volta | 8          | 3           | 8            | 19           | 0.4              |
| Zaire       | 12         | 1           | 7            | 20           | <u>1.5</u>       |
|             |            |             |              |              | \$499.4m         |

CLUSTER A (60% Anti UK)

|            |   |    |   |    |             |
|------------|---|----|---|----|-------------|
| Guinea     | 6 | 12 | 1 | 19 | -           |
| Libya      | 6 | 12 | 2 | 20 | -           |
| Mozambique | 0 | 1  | 0 | 1  | 0.1         |
| Somalia    | 5 | 12 | 1 | 18 | 3.1         |
| Tanzania   | 6 | 13 | 2 | 21 | 27.8        |
| Zambia     | 7 | 12 | 1 | 20 | <u>97.4</u> |
|            |   |    |   |    | \$128.4m    |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|              |    |    |   |    |             |
|--------------|----|----|---|----|-------------|
| Algeria      | 5  | 11 | 3 | 19 | 3.3         |
| Burundi      | 8  | 8  | 4 | 20 | -           |
| Congo        | 7  | 10 | 2 | 19 | 0.4         |
| Egypt        | 8  | 10 | 1 | 19 | 17.4        |
| Eq. Guinea   | 6  | 9  | 1 | 16 | -           |
| Mali         | 8  | 11 | 1 | 20 | 6.5         |
| Mauritania   | 6  | 10 | 1 | 17 | 0.1         |
| Nigeria      | 9  | 6  | 5 | 20 | 67.7        |
| Senegal      | 10 | 6  | 5 | 21 | 1.4         |
| Sierra Leone | 9  | 6  | 4 | 19 | 6.5         |
| Sudan        | 7  | 10 | 2 | 19 | 27.1        |
| Uganda       | 8  | 8  | 5 | 21 | <u>27.5</u> |
|              |    |    |   |    | \$157.9m    |

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | STATES WHO DID NOT<br>RECEIVE AID 1970-76 | STATES WHO DID RECEIVE<br>AID 1970-76 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---------------------------------------|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 2<br>(33.3)                               | 4<br>(66.7)                           | 6  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 2<br>(16.7)                               | 10<br>(83.3)                          | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 1<br>(4.3)                                | 22<br>(95.7)                          | 23 |
|                            | 5<br>(12.2)                               | 36<br>(87.8)                          | 41 |

Chi Square = 4.05048 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.1320

The broad scope of the program from 1970 means that, of eighteen states who consistently opposed London, or remained uncommitted in the debates, fourteen were in receipt of British finance. In other words, over 77% of the African states who failed to vote with the United Kingdom benefitted from her economic assistance during this period. The flow of aid to these states amounted to \$286.3m., which represents over 36% of the program. Moreover, the value of chi squared is only significant at a level beyond 0.1 which provides little evidence of a positive relationship between aid and voting. Twelve African states, accruing a total of \$157.9m., remained largely uncommitted in the General Assembly (Cluster C). Further consideration of the voting behaviour of these states reveals that the British donor did not necessarily 'demand' even an indication of support from her recipients.

TABLE 10

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C BETWEEN 'PRO' AND 'ANTI' DIRECT VOTES, 1970-76

Cluster Ca

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| Algeria     | 5          | 11          | 3.3              |
| Eq. Guinea  | 6          | 9           | -                |
| Mauritania  | 6          | 10          | 0.1              |
|             |            |             | \$3.4m           |

Cluster Cb

|              |    |   |         |
|--------------|----|---|---------|
| Nigeria      | 9  | 6 | 67.7    |
| Senegal      | 10 | 6 | 1.4     |
| Sierra Leone | 9  | 6 | 6.5     |
|              |    |   | \$75.6m |

Cluster Cz

|         |   |    |         |
|---------|---|----|---------|
| Burundi | 8 | 8  | -       |
| Congo   | 7 | 10 | 0.4     |
| Egypt   | 8 | 10 | 17.4    |
| Mali    | 8 | 11 | 6.5     |
| Sudan   | 7 | 10 | 27.1    |
| Uganda  | 8 | 8  | 27.5    |
|         |   |    | \$78.9m |

Cluster Ca incorporates African states who revealed a general tendency towards abstention but also cast more than 60% of their direct votes against U.K.

Cluster Cb includes recipients whose direct votes were in accord (at least 60%) with London

Cluster Cz represents states who preferred to balance their direct votes neither in support nor opposition to the United Kingdom

With the exception of Chad, all the states who displayed a willingness to support, either consistently or tentatively, the British donor in the United Nations, were not ignored by the aid program. The states in Cluster B and Cluster Cb were in receipt of \$575.0m., which represents 73.2% of total British aid to the continent. However, it is also apparent that African countries which failed to adopt a position of support did not necessarily 'suffer' from suspension or

disruption of aid relations with the Western European donor. To a large extent, therefore, the sweeping focus of British assistance in the 1970s encompassed, albeit with small amounts on occasion, the majority of African states, irrespective of their behaviour in the international assembly.

#### DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

#### Aid and African Expropriation of British Resources from 1970 to 1976

Analysis of the expansion of the public sector on the continent, at the direct expense of British investment, reveals that economic aid was an ineffectual safeguard from nationalisation in the 1970s. Seven states expropriated British interests during this period, all of whom were in receipt of economic assistance from London.

TABLE 11

#### NATIONALISATION AND AID

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Year</u> | <u>Type</u>              | <u>Aid (1970-76)</u> |
|--------------|-------------|--------------------------|----------------------|
| Ghana        | 1970        | Mining                   | \$ 41.7m             |
| Sierra Leone | 1970        | Mining                   | \$ 6.5m              |
| Uganda       | 1970        | Comprehensive            | \$ 27.5m             |
| Zambia       | 1970        | Comprehensive            | \$ 97.4m             |
| Sudan        | 1970        | Chemical and<br>Banking  | \$ 27.1m             |
| (1) Kenya    | 1970        | Banking and<br>Petroleum | \$154.1m             |
| Nigeria      | 1972        | Petroleum                | \$ 67.7m             |

(1) Compensation paid

Sources: L L Rood, 'Nationalisation and Indigenisation in Africa: Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 3, (1976), pp 427-447; Africa Freedom Annual, 1977, South African Freedom Institute; Africa: Research Bulletin, Exeter; International Legal Materials, XI, 1, January 1972

From 1970, these seven states were in receipt of \$422.0m., which represents over 53% of Britain's total aid to the continent. Thus, despite Heath's statement in the early years of his Administration that the United Kingdom 'would no longer be pushed around', many African leaders displayed an ability to both nationalise British investment and negotiate aid from London. It is noticeable that Kenya, Zambia and Nigeria were amongst the four largest recipients of aid during this period. In this respect, although Kenya did provide compensation to British investors, it should be pointed out that Malawi was the only major beneficiary not to threaten the donor's investment interests with nationalisation.

#### BRITISH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES FROM 1970 to 1976

Three African states extended facilities to British military personnel during this period. Defence agreements were maintained with Kenya up to 1976 and with Uganda and Madagascar for very brief periods in the early 1970s<sup>(23)</sup>. The agreement with Kenya is in accord with the East African country's status as the largest beneficiary of British economic aid. From 1970 to 1976, under the leadership of President Kenyatta, Kenya was in receipt of \$154.1m worth of British aid - the equivalent of over 58% of assistance to East Africa and almost 20% of the continental aid program. The brief military agreement with Madagascar in 1971 may be seen in the light of an incremental increase in economic aid after 1969. The short term facilities offered by President Amin of Uganda, on the other hand, were overshadowed by the disruption of relations between Uganda and

Britain in 1972 and did little to counteract the overall decline in British aid relations which were suspended in 1973<sup>(24)</sup>.

On the whole, however, it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between assistance and military facilities, especially within the context of a reduced aid program which would have done little to counteract the general African resistance to a foreign military presence. Aid to Madagascar was, by no means, substantial whilst a number of major beneficiaries of the program firmly resisted the notion of a British military presence.

#### BRITAIN AND RHODESIAN INDEPENDENCE

Despite the election to office of a new Conservative Government in 1970, Britain continued to feel some responsibility for the situation in Rhodesia... In 1971, Heath reopened a dialogue with Ian Smith and in November of the same year, twenty-one Afro-Asian members of the United Nations moved a resolution to demonstrate their concern about the way in which the negotiations were being conducted. The resolution insisted that any settlement must be worked out, 'with the fullest participation of all nationalist leaders representing the majority people of Zimbabwe and must be freely endorsed by the people'<sup>(25)</sup>. The resolution was adopted with 102 in favour, nine abstentions and three opposed: significantly this trio comprised Britain, South Africa and Portugal (the last major coloniser of the African continent). In line with African misgivings, Britain did not show any support for tougher sanctions against Rhodesia. In February 1972, she vetoed a United Nations Security Council recommendation to organise a conference of black and white Rhodesians in order to

develop a constitutional settlement: Lord Caradon's proposals for appointment of a United Nations' Commissioner for sanctions were also rejected by London. In addition, in September of the same year, Britain abstained from a Security Council Resolution which was critical of an American decision to lift the embargo on chrome and other important minerals to Rhodesia<sup>(26)</sup>.

From 1974, the Labour Government under Wilson slightly improved Britain's image by displaying a readiness to consult more closely with black African leaders over the question of Rhodesia. Nevertheless, Britain continued to refuse to send a military expedition to the Central African state and was anxious not to be identified with any of the black liberation forces acting against Ian Smith's regime. Moreover, as the 1970s progressed, it would appear that Britain was withdrawing from any responsibility to compensate the Zambian Government for economic hardships incurred by the imposition of sanctions against the illegal regime:

TABLE 12

BRITISH AID TO ZAMBIA 1970-76

| <u>Year</u> | <u>British Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>As % of total OECD<br/>Aid to Zambia</u> |
|-------------|--------------------------|---|
| 1970        | 5.2                      | 53.1%                                       |
| 1971        | 12.7                     | 72.2%                                       |
| 1972        | 9.8                      | 59.0%                                       |
| 1973        | 13.3                     | 33.0%                                       |
| 1974        | 18.8                     | 36.2%                                       |
| 1975        | 21.2                     | 31.4%                                       |
| 1976        | 16.4                     | 29.5%                                       |

Sources: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1969-75, 1976-79, O.E.C.D., Paris

By 1976, Britain's reduced program was providing less than one-

third of the total aid flowing from donors in the OECD to the hard pressed Zambian economy<sup>(27)</sup>.

BRITISH ECONOMIC AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM 1970 to 1976

A decline in total aid to the continent after 1969, combined with an increase in the number of recipients, helped to reduce the number of large-scale beneficiaries during this period. In the years from 1970 to 1976, only Kenya and Malawi were able to negotiate commitments from Britain in excess of \$100.0m., whilst Zambia acquired \$97.4m. All of these states maintained relatively stable political systems which facilitated the maintenance of positive aid agreements with the British donor - Presidents Kenyatta, Banda and Kaunda enjoyed sustained political careers throughout the 1970s in Kenya, Malawi and Zambia respectively.

Elsewhere on the continent, aid commitments seemed to be unaffected by the general instability of African political life. As has already been noted, the program was relatively limited and the majority of annual receipts to individual states were confined to less than \$1.0m. There were four notable occasions when more substantial injections of finance increased annual receipts by more than 100%:

TABLE 13

Aid Increases and Political Change

| <u>Name</u> | <u>% Increase</u> | <u>Aid</u>       | <u>Year</u>        | <u>Nature of Political Change</u> |
|-------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Lesotho     | 393%              | (\$1.5m-\$7.4m)  | 1970-71            | Constitution suspended            |
| Ethiopia    | 118%              | (\$1.1m-\$2.4m)  | 1970-71            | No change                         |
| Sudan       | 389%              | (\$2.7m-\$13.2m) | 1974-75<br>1975-76 | Abortive coup 1975                |
| Tanzania    | 270%              | (\$2.0m-\$7.4m)  | 1974-75            | No change                         |

Sources: Africa, South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979

None of these increases can be directly attributed to change in African political leadership, although they did coincide with new British Administrations. To a large extent, the program to the continent as a whole was inflexible. The one notable exception to this consistency was as a result of the overthrow of President Milton Obote of Uganda by General Amin in 1971. At first, the coup was warmly received by the British government which had begun to look upon Obote as a negative influence within the Commonwealth. Colin Legum, writing in 1972, noted that the British Government displayed

"undisguised satisfaction when it received the news of the overthrow of President Obote and the accession to power in Uganda of General Idi Amin. Although the Government made no public statements, its subsequent policies showed how much it welcomed this move as being consistent with its own desires and interests in the continent". (28)

In 1971 and 1972, Britain committed \$15.8m in economic aid to help establish the new military regime. At the same time, extensive plans were made for a British military presence in Uganda. However, in the latter months of 1972, relations with

Amin deteriorated when the Ugandan President forcefully expelled British Asians from Uganda - many of whom were finally accepted into Britain. Britain immediately cancelled a loan of £10m together with her technical aid program valued at £1.7m per annum. Within twelve months British economic aid to Uganda was terminated.

Despite the British decision to accept the majority of Asians expelled from Uganda, it is noticeable that Heath was unable to attract much African support against President Amin. Apart from Presidents Nyerere (Tanzania), Kaunda (Zambia), and Banda (Malawi), the major beneficiaries of Britain's aid during this period, there was little public expression of African disapproval of Amin. Moreover, it is apparent that only Dr. Banda of Malawi openly praised British policy towards Amin of Uganda<sup>(29)</sup>.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970 to 1976

There is some indication that British aid in the 1970s may not have been blind to the economic needs of the recipient. Analysis of the economic characteristics of the three major beneficiaries reveals that the program did not automatically favour the most powerful states on the continent.

TABLE 14

MAJOR RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (m)</u> | <u>Population (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Kenya       | 154.1            | 2220           | 12.5                  | 178                   |
| Malawi      | 124.1            | 540            | 4.8                   | 113                   |
| Zambia      | 97.4             | 2330           | 4.6                   | 507                   |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks, 1970-77; UN Demographic Yearbooks, 1970-77

At the same time, aid to those African states deemed by the OECD to number amongst the twenty-nine least developed nations of the world, amounted to \$353.0m<sup>(30)</sup>. This was the equivalent of almost 45% of total British assistance to the continent. Moreover, the program neither ignored countries with large populations (Correlation 0.2361) nor significantly favoured recipients with a high GNP (Correlation 0.1458).

However, on the whole, it would be erroneous to assume that London was motivated solely by considerations of Africa's economic needs. Whilst aid did not focus upon states with a high GNP per capita (Correlation -0.0992), the distributive pattern of the program was not sufficiently significant to indicate a strong relationship between finance and poor economic position. Nevertheless, it could be argued that, within the context of a reduced program which favoured the former dependencies, British economic aid did not entirely ignore the less developed areas of Africa.

ANGLO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the decade following African independence, the British donor displayed a desire to maintain contacts with her erstwhile dependencies upon the continent. In a program of \$1294.9m, the former colonies were in receipt of \$1198.9m, which represents over 92% of total assistance up to 1969. The major beneficiaries of this aid were located South of the Sahara, where six states received in excess of \$100.0m. From 1970, Britain's aid commitments to the continent were reduced by an annual average of over 13%, although the bias towards states with an historical association with the donor was largely maintained. During the 1970s, the former colonies received \$707.1m, or over 90% of total aid. Nevertheless, the reduction in total assistance to the continent was not without implications as witnessed by changes in the regional distribution of the program:

TABLE 15Comparative Regional Allocations

|                       | <u>British Aid up</u><br><u>to 1969</u> | <u>% of Program</u> | <u>British Aid from</u><br><u>1970 to 1976</u> | <u>% of</u><br><u>Program</u> |
|-----------------------|---|---------------------|--|-------------------------------|
| North                 | \$ 57.4m                                | 4.4%                | \$ 22.9m                                       | 2.9%                          |
| West                  | \$278.2m                                | 21.5%               | \$153.6m                                       | 19.6%                         |
| East                  | \$560.3m                                | 43.3%               | \$264.7m                                       | 33.7%                         |
| Central &<br>Southern | \$399.0m                                | 30.8%               | \$344.5m                                       | 43.8%                         |

In the years after 1969 deteriorating relations with Tanzania and Uganda led to a considerable reduction in commitments to East Africa. As a result, Central and Southern States assumed a prominent position in the focus of the program in the 1970s.

West Africa's share of total aid remained relatively constant in all the years from African independence up to 1976. In addition, London continued to refuse to compete for influence through large scale economic assistance to North African states, irrespective of their strategic, political and economic importance.

#### BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

In the years up to 1969, twenty-one African states consistently voted with Britain in the United Nations, fourteen of whom garnered in total less than 30% of the aid program. From 1970, a larger proportion of aid was allocated to the states in Cluster B but only within the framework of a much reduced program. Twenty-three states consistently supported the United Kingdom in the second time period, all of whom, with the exception of C.A.R., were in receipt of assistance totalling \$499.4m, or over 63% of British finance to the continent. However, it is difficult to establish a positive relationship between aid and voting behaviour in either period. Despite the increased allocation of aid to her 'supporters' from 1970, it should also be noted that Britain provided assistance to a large number of states who consistently opposed London. Moreover, the extent to which the voting behaviour of African states in the 1970s was a 'response' to the earlier aid program must be doubted. Cross-tabulation of assistance up to 1969 and voting from 1970 provides little evidence of such a causal relationship:

TABLE 16

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

From Independence up to 1969

1970-76

| Country      | Aid (\$m) | %    | UN Vote | Aid (\$m) | %    | UN Vote |
|--------------|-----------|------|---------|-----------|------|---------|
| Algeria      | -         | -    | A       | 3.3       | 0.4  | C       |
| Egypt        | 8.9       | 0.7  | C       | 17.4      | 2.2  | C       |
| Libya        | 48.0      | 3.7  | C       | -         | -    | A       |
| Morocco      | 0.3       | *    | C       | 0.3       | *    | B       |
| Tunisia      | 0.2       | **   | C       | 1.9       | 0.3  | B       |
| Cameroon     | 10.9      | 0.8  | B       | 4.6       | 0.6  | B       |
| Chad         | -         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Dahomey      | -         | -    | B       | 0.5       | 0.1  | B       |
| Gambia       | 13.6      | 1.1  | B       | 14.5      | 1.8  | B       |
| Ghana        | 41.7      | 3.2  | C       | 41.7      | 5.3  | B       |
| Guinea       | -         | -    | C       | -         | -    | A       |
| Ivory Coast  | 0.2       | *    | B       | 4.4       | 0.6  | B       |
| Liberia      | 1.0       | 0.1  | B       | 1.2       | 0.2  | B       |
| Mali         | 0.2       | *    | A       | 6.5       | 0.8  | C       |
| Mauritania   | 0.1       | *    | C       | 0.1       | *    | C       |
| Niger        | 0.1       | *    | B       | 3.1       | 0.4  | B       |
| Nigeria      | 161.5     | 12.5 | C       | 67.7      | 8.6  | C       |
| Senegal      | 0.3       | *    | B       | 1.4       | 0.2  | C       |
| Sierra Leone | 48.6      | 3.8  | B       | 6.5       | 0.8  | C       |
| Togo         | -         | -    | B       | 1.0       | 0.1  | B       |
| Upper Volta  | -         | -    | B       | 0.4       | 0.1  | B       |
| Burundi      | -         | -    | C       | -         | -    | C       |
| Ethiopia     | 2.8       | 0.2  | C       | 25.0      | 3.2  | B       |
| Kenya        | 247.8     | 19.1 | C       | 154.1     | 19.6 | B       |
| Rwanda       | -         | -    | B       | 0.1       | *    | B       |
| Somalia      | 15.2      | 1.2  | C       | 3.1       | 0.4  | A       |
| Sudan        | 22.8      | 1.8  | C       | 27.1      | 3.5  | C       |
| Tanzania     | 156.9     | 12.1 | C       | 27.8      | 3.5  | A       |
| Uganda       | 114.8     | 8.9  | C       | 27.5      | 3.5  | C       |
| Botswana     | 53.3      | 4.1  | B       | 55.4      | 7.0  | B       |
| C.A.R.       | 5.5       | 0.4  | B       | 0.2       | *    | B       |
| Congo        | 0.1       | *    | C       | 0.4       | 0.1  | C       |
| Eq. Guinea   | -         | -    | B       | -         | -    | C       |
| Gabon        | -         | -    | B       | 0.4       | 0.1  | B       |
| Madagascar   | 0.2       | *    | B       | 1.1       | 0.1  | B       |
| Malawi       | 142.6     | 11.0 | B       | 124.1     | 15.8 | B       |
| Lesotho      | 41.0      | 3.2  | B       | 37.7      | 4.8  | B       |
| Swaziland    | 16.2      | 1.2  | B       | 26.2      | 3.3  | B       |
| Zaire        | 2.1       | 0.2  | B       | 1.5       | 0.2  | B       |
| Zambia       | 138.0     | 10.7 | C       | 97.4      | 12.4 | A       |
| Mozambique   | -         | -    | -       | 0.1       | *    | A       |

\$1294.9m

\$785.7m

Cluster B (21) \$335.6m (14) 25.9%  
 Cluster A ( 2) \$ 0.2m ( 1) \*  
 Cluster C (17) \$959.1m (15) 74.1%

Cluster B (23) \$499.4m (22) 63.6%  
 Cluster A ( 6) \$128.4m ( 4) 16.3%  
 Cluster C (12) \$157.9m (10) 20.1%

\*less than 0.1%

VOTING 1970-76

| COUNT<br>(Row %)                                      | CLUSTER A<br>(60% Anti) | CLUSTER C<br>(Uncommitted) | CLUSTER B<br>(60% Pro) |    |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----|
| African states not<br>in receipt of aid<br>up to 1969 | 2<br>(18.2)             | 3<br>(27.3)                | 6<br>(54.5)            | 11 |
| African states<br>receiving aid up<br>to 1969         | 4<br>(13.3)             | 9<br>(30.0)                | 17<br>(56.7)           | 30 |
|   | 6<br>(14.6)             | 12<br>(29.3)               | 23<br>(56.1)           | 41 |

Chi Square = 0.15620 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.9249

Eleven states did not receive British economic aid in the first time period, of whom six consistently voted with the United Kingdom from 1970. In addition, barely 57% of the recipients of the 1960s program 'responded' to assistance with support in the 1970s. The value of chi squared is only significant at a level beyond 0.9 which provides no indication of a relationship between African behaviour as a simple reaction to previous concessionary finance.

Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a limited association between aid and voting if consideration is given to the ability of African states to maintain their share of the program from one time period to another:

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | States whose aid<br>as % of program<br>decreased | States whose aid<br>as % of program<br>increased | States who<br>did not<br>receive aid |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|--------------------------------------|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 3<br>(50.0)                                      | 2<br>(33.3)                                      | 1<br>(16.7)                          | 6  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 3<br>(25.0)                                      | 7<br>(58.3)                                      | 2<br>(16.7)                          | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 2<br>(8.7)                                       | 20<br>(87.0)                                     | 1<br>(4.3)                           | 23 |
|                            | 8<br>(19.5)                                      | 29<br>(70.7)                                     | 4<br>(9.8)                           | 41 |

Chi Square = 8.29643 with 4 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0813

Twenty-three states consistently supported the British donor in the 1970s, of whom twenty increased their share of the aid program. In addition, of eight African states whose allocation of total assistance declined, only two voted with Britain after 1969. The value of chi squared is 8.29 which provides some evidence, albeit not very significant, of a pattern between voting behaviour and the allocation of aid. However, it must be noted that the nature of this relationship is limited especially within the context of a reduction in total aid in the 1970s. In this respect, it should merely be stressed that the majority of African states who voted with the British donor were able to negotiate an increase in their share of the program.

#### BRITISH AID AND NATIONALISATION

Although only two states introduced policies which threatened British investment in the 1960s, these incidents served

to emphasise that British economic aid was neither a safeguard from expropriation, nor employed as a sanction against nationalisation. Algeria acquired assistance in the years following the compulsory acquisition of British resources, whilst Tanzania was a major beneficiary of London's aid up to Nyerere's policy of indigenisation. In the years from 1970, it was apparent that many African states were unprepared to safeguard foreign owned resources, irrespective of receipts of aid. Seven states expropriated British investment, all of whom garnered British finance during this period. Kenya and Zambia, accruing \$154.1m and \$97.4m. respectively, were amongst the largest beneficiaries of the program in the 1970s and, in total, the African states involved in expropriation acquired \$422.0m in aid from London. Bearing in mind that the vast majority of the nationalisation policies were introduced in, or near to, 1970, it is worthwhile noting Britain's reaction in terms of aid distribution from 1970, as compared with assistance up to 1969, when these African states did not expropriate British investment.

TABLE 17

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHANGES IN BRITISH AID TO AFRICAN STATES INVOLVED IN NATIONALISATION

| Name         | <u>British aid up to 1969</u> | <u>% of Program</u> | <u>British aid from 1970-76</u> | <u>% of Program</u> |
|--------------|-------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|
| Ghana        | \$ 41.7m                      | 3.2                 | \$ 41.7m                        | 5.3                 |
| Sierra Leone | \$ 48.6m                      | 3.8                 | \$ 6.5m                         | 0.8                 |
| Uganda       | \$114.8m                      | 8.9                 | \$ 27.5m                        | 3.5                 |
| Zambia       | \$138.0m                      | 10.7                | \$ 97.4m                        | 12.4                |
| Sudan        | \$ 22.8m                      | 1.8                 | \$ 27.1m                        | 3.5                 |
| Kenya        | \$247.8m                      | 19.1                | \$154.1m                        | 19.6                |
| Nigeria      | \$161.5m                      | 12.5                | \$ 67.7m                        | 8.6                 |
| Total        | \$775.2m                      | 60.0%               | \$422.0m                        | 53.7%               |

In absolute terms, the size of the British aid program to the continent was reduced and, indeed, total aid disseminated to these eight states dropped after 1969 from \$775.2m to \$422.0m. from 1970 - a reduction of \$353.2m. However, in terms of the share of the total aid program accumulated by these African states, there is little disparity in London's aid relations with these African countries. In the years up to 1969, these eight states left British investment unaffected by nationalisation and garnered 60% of British aid to Africa. After 1970, and the introduction of nationalisation, the same eight states were in receipt of almost 54% of Britain's aid program. Thus, it would appear that they were largely able to maintain their substantial share of Britain's economic aid to Africa, irrespective of introducing legislation which weakened the donor's investment interests. Indeed, despite Edward Heath's statement in 1970 that Britain 'would no longer be pushed around', four of these states were able to increase their share of Britain's aid to the continent of Africa.

#### BRITISH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES

The desire to maintain close relations with the former dependencies in the years following African independence, helped London to maintain a network of facilities for her military personnel in the 1960s. With the exception of Libya, all of the African states entering military agreements with London during this period were ex-British colonies. Moreover, the vast majority of these agreements were matched with substantial receipts of economic aid. The ten African states involved were able to negotiate aid from the Western European donor in excess of \$1059m.,

which was the equivalent of almost 82% of the total program.

By the 1970s, however, such facilities were confined to three states. A combination of factors served to reduce Britain's military options on the continent. The removal of political personalities who had been associated with the former colonial authority and the increasing African anxiety towards the notion of a foreign military presence did little to encourage British troops in Africa. At the same time, it should be noted that the decline in the availability coincided with a reduction in the size of Britain's aid to the continent. Whilst the program never ignored the claims of states who had military contacts with London, Kenya, Madagascar and Uganda were in receipt of only \$182.7m. in the 1970s. Within the context of a general antipathy towards foreign military personnel on the African continent by 1970, the reduced aid program was largely inadequate in persuading the vast majority of states to forsake their military independence.

#### CONCLUSION

In the years up to 1970, the distribution of British aid to Africa displayed a considerable historical bias. The assistance program largely avoided 'non-traditional' areas, such as North Africa, regardless of their strategic, political or economic importance. It would appear that London favoured aid contacts with enduring political leaders in the former dependencies, many of whom displayed a willingness to extend facilities to British military personnel during this period. However, on the whole, the program was limited in its ability to establish a

sphere of political influence on the continent. There is little evidence to assume that concessionary finance was instrumental in determining African voting behaviour in the United Nations up to 1969. At the same time, although there were few examples of expropriation, there was no absolute guarantee that recipients would not threaten British investment with nationalisation. In general terms, London's halting policies over the issue of Rhodesian independence, and the overall pattern of aid distribution, did little to develop a positive image of the British donor, especially amongst the majority of states in North Africa.

From 1970, Britain's foreign policy stance became less ambiguous and her aid program more limited. Faced with a reduction in London's commitments, it is apparent that assistance had little obvious bearing upon the pattern of African voting in the General Assembly during this period. However, there is evidence that changes in Britain's aid priorities after 1969 were not independent of African behaviour at the United Nations. The vast majority of states who voted with the United Kingdom in the 1970s were able to garner an increased share of the total program. However, it must be noted that the reduction in the flow of finance to the continent coincided with a decline in Britain's political fortunes in Africa. Her military presence was affectively confined to Kenya during the 1970s and British investment suffered an increasing number of setbacks through African nationalisation.

To a certain extent, the reduced aid commitment may have been symptomatic of an unwillingness, or inability, to compete with other donors for influence in African states with no British colonial connection. In 1970, London's withdrawal as

a major donor was intimated in a Conservative Party document considering Britain's relations with the third world:

"We have accepted the UNCTAD target for aid to developing countries, and will increase the British programme AS NATIONAL PROSPERITY RETURNS. We will re-examine the objectives and performance of the programme so that the maximum mutual advantage is gained". (31)

The overall decline in aid has done little to improve Britain's position especially when it would appear that African states who introduced nationalisation measures against British investment in the early 1970s were largely able to retain their share of the program. Moreover, although British assistance after 1969 displayed some awareness of the economic needs of the continent, London's image in certain strategic and politically important areas of Africa has not been improved by her handling of the Rhodesian issue.

REFERENCES

1. Ghana, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Tanganyika, Uganda, Zanzibar, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Gambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to become Tanzania. Other dependencies include the Sudan, an Anglo-Egyptian condominium; the British Cameroons, part of which joined Nigeria and part of the Republic of Cameroon; Togoland, which became part of Ghana; and Rhodesia.
2. The doctrine of 'indirect rule' was defined by its greatest exponent, Lord Lugard. For detailed consideration of this concept, see 'The Rise of Our East African Empire: Early Efforts in Nyasaland and Uganda', Vol. 2, F. Cass, 1968.
3. C Clapham, Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, Saxon House, 1980, p. 79
4. For further details of the Suez crisis and the international pressure which was brought to bear upon the United Kingdom, see, for example, R R Bowie, Suez 1956, New York, 1974; The resolutions considered were those drafted with the explicit support of the United Kingdom and included topics under the Political and Security headings of:
  - (a) Disarmament and related matters
  - (b) the strengthening of International Security
  - (c) the Question of Peace Keeping Operations
  - (d) Questions concerning the Use of Atomic Energy
  - (e) Situation in the Middle East
  - (f) Situation in Cyprus
  - (g) Questions relating to the Organisation of the United Nations and the Membership of the United Nations
  - (h) Questions of Promoting the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor
5. W F Hanrieder and G P Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1980, p. 262. The authors point out that Britain retained a feeling of continuity with her former overseas dependencies because the dissolution of the British Empire took place without any major crisis or 'cathartic shock'.
6. C Legum, 'Britain's Year in Africa', in eds., Africa Contemporary Record 1971-72, Holmes and Meler, London, 1972, A90.
7. Although Ghana secured independence in 1957, all other

British colonies only gained their independence in the 1960s. If 1961 is regarded as the first year of independence for the vast majority of states, annual receipts averaged \$129.5m during this period. This should be compared with an annual average of \$112.2m during the years from 1970 to 1976.

8. Since 1961, approximately 75% of British economic aid to the less developed world has been distributed on a bilateral basis. From 10th June 1975 the Foreign Secretary became technically Minister of Overseas Development while the Minister for Overseas Development took day to day charge of the Department (which ceased to be a separate Department on 5th May 1979).

For details of the terms and conditions of British economic aid, see What is British Aid?, Ministry of Overseas Development, Central Office of Information 1976. In this context, the 'grace period' refers to the early years of the agreement when repayment is not requested.

9. HMSO, Cmnd. 2147
10. See for example P Jalee, The Pillage of the Third World, New York, Monthly Review Press 1969; J White, The Politics of Foreign Aid, London, Bodley Head, 1974; R McKinlay and R Little, 'A Foreign Policy Model of the Distribution of British Aid 1960-70', British Journal of Political Science, 8 (1978), pp. 313-332; G Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, OECD, Paris, 1964
11. See, US Department of State Report on Nationalisation since 1960, International Legal Materials, 1972, pp. 84-114; also, African Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Exeter, 1967.
12. See Annual Publications of The Military Balance, Institute for Strategic Studies, London; Stockholm International Peace Research Unit, Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmaments, Stockholm, Almquist, 1968-72.
13. For a detailed consideration of events surrounding Rhodesian independence, see D Smith, Rhodesia the Problem, Maxwell, 1969.
14. See African Research Bulletin, Economic Financial and Technical Series, 1966, Exeter, pp. 515a-517a
15. 1968 generally witnessed an improvement in Britain's formal relations with Africa. Relations with Ghana improved rapidly following the overthrow of Nkrumah. In addition, relations with Somalia (re-established in December 1967) became more cordial as a result of a delegation to Britain by Somalia's Prime Minister in May 1968.

16. Quoted from African Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, 1968, Eketer, 630 A/B
17. This, of course, does not include aid to Zambia from non-OECD donors, for example, USSR and Communist China.
18. C Clapham, *op.cit.*, p. 89. The general instability of African politics was illustrated by A Lewis in 1965 who pointed out that, of eleven African states who had started independence with a two, or multi party system, nine had developed into one party states. See P C Lloyd, Classes, Crisis and Coups, Paladin, 1973.
19. The leaders who negotiated in excess of \$100.0m in aid were President Kenyatta of Kenya, President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Obote of Uganda, Dr Banda of Malawi, President Kaunda of Zambia.
20. For a consideration of the events surrounding the coup in Ghana in 1966, see D Austin, Ghana Observed, Manchester University Press, 1976; R Luckham and D Austin, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana, 1966-72, London, 1976; V T Le Vine, Political Corruption: the Ghana Case, Stanford, California, 1975.
21. Guy Arnold, in his study of aid in Africa, makes the point that Commonwealth countries on the African continent tended to be large in size and more economically developed than their Francophone counterparts. The implications of this are more closely analysed in the chapter on French aid. See G Arnold, Aid in Africa, Kogan Page, 1979. In addition, for a consideration of British aid policy and the economic needs of the recipient, see R Little, *op.cit.*
22. Some academics, in noting the reductions in the British aid program, argued that the rise in the price of oil, and subsequent balance of payments difficulties, should not be used to cut back the assistance program. See, for example, H W Singer, A Note on the Implications of the Oil Price Increases for British Aid Policy, Bulletin of the Institute of Development Studies, Volume 6, No 2, (October 1974), pp. 109-115.
23. The Military Balance, *op.cit.*
24. See later discussion of the Ugandan Asian issue.
25. C Legum, eds., Africa Contemporary Record 1971-72, Holmes and Meier, London, 1972, A95. See also, UN Yearbook 1972.
26. C Legum, eds., Africa Contemporary Record 1972-73, Holmes and Meier, London 1973, C24-25.
27. For a discussion of the detrimental effects of sanctions

- against Rhodesia on the Zambian economy, see R Hall, The High Price of Principles; Kaunda and the White South, New York, 1970; C Elliott, Constraints on the Economic Development of Zambia, New York 1972; T M Shaw, Dependence and Underdevelopment: The Development and Foreign Policies of Zambia, Athens, Ohio, 1976. African criticism of British policy towards Ian Smith's regime in Rhodesia would have been all the more acrimonious in the light of the enduring trickle of British aid to the illegal regime. From 1970 to 1976, Rhodesia was in receipt of \$9.1m worth of assistance, albeit from agreements negotiated before 1965. See, OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries 1969-75, 1976-79, Paris, 1977
28. C Legum, eds., op.cit., 1971-72, A95. For further details of the Ugandan Asian issue, see T Melady and M Melady, Uganda: The Asian Exiles, Maryknoll, New York, 1976; M Twaddle, Expulsion of a Minority: Essays on Ugandan Asians, London, 1974.
29. C Legum, eds., ibid., A95.
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31. C Legum, eds., Africa Contemporary Record 1970-71, Holmes and Meier 1971, A76.

CHAPTER FOUR

ECONOMIC AID FROM FRANCE

In 1958, de Gaulle was returned to power during the threat of military insurrection in France and in the wake of the crisis in Algeria<sup>(1)</sup>. At that time, only the former protectorates of Morocco and Tunisia had attained independence and, to a large extent, the philosophy of French colonialism was founded on the principles of 'direct rule' and 'political assimilation'. Political authority radiated from Paris, whilst little attention was given to indigenous African institutions. E A Boateng, in his study of colonialism in Africa, noted that the idea of assimilation was based upon French cultural arrogance, as evidenced in their belief that little of the native cultural life of their colonies needed to be preserved or protected:

"The French believed themselves to be heirs of the Roman tradition of empire and saw their mission as that of a superior race with a duty to extend the benefits of their civilization to the backward inhabitants of their colonies and to reward them with French citizenship when they showed sufficient evidence of having embraced their civilization". (2).

By 1961, fourteen French colonies had been 'granted' their independence. The one notable exception to this tradition was the former West African colony of Guinea which alone in 1958 voted 'NO' in the referendum to decide whether to join France and her colonies in the creation of a new French Community.

The events surrounding the referendum of 1958 go a long way towards determining the influential nature of Franco-African economic aid in the 1960s. In attempting to achieve a satisfactory and peaceful institutional arrangement for the management of the African territories, de Gaulle devised a massive referendum offering them the choice of complete severance from France, or joining with the European power in a new French Community. In proposing the idea of a 'Community' de Gaulle was counting on the fact that most

of the African states were manifestly ill prepared for independence in view of the degree of integration with France which had taken place in their economic, political and cultural systems. Indeed, only Sekou Touré of Guinea voted for separation from France in September. French administrators and aid promises were immediately withdrawn:

"Guinea paid heavily for it. De Gaulle was a man who, above all else, was inclined to take his own words seriously. He had said that a vote for independence was a vote for total severance. He proceeded to implement this in the case of Guinea. French facilities, French personnel, French equipment were pulled out of Guinea, lock, stock and barrel. It is reported that even telephones were pulled out of walls and taken away to France". (3)

The nature of this break with Guinea had widespread ramifications for Franco-African relations. As a result of the 1958 vote, the African states which elected to join the French Community included, Senegal, Mali, the Ivory Coast, Dahomey, Upper Volta, Niger, the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Chad, Madagascar, Mauritania and the UN trusteeships of Cameroon and Togo. To a large extent, the cultural arrogance was perpetuated and reflected in the French aid program to post colonial Africa. In 1963 a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the government and headed by Professor Jean-Marcel Jeanneney, was set up in order to consider French aid policies vis a vis the less developed world<sup>(4)</sup>. Among the reasons for a French assistance program, the Commission's Report emphasised the simple duty imposed by human solidarity and France's need - "le besoin de rayonnement" - to diffuse a civilisation and culture which is of universal validity. That France has structured her aid program to implement these ambitions is not in question. Numerous studies have been published to show the cultural, educational and linguistic bias of French aid<sup>(5)</sup>.

However, little attention has been devoted to examining the extent to which French assistance has been used to foster her image abroad in terms other than cultural. The Jeanneney Commission did concede that certain diplomatic advantages may accrue from a policy of co-operation with the less developed world:

"France may derive diplomatic advantages from good relations with developing countries, who are increasingly concerned with what is said and done on their behalf and whose support may be valuable either in regional arrangements or in world debates ...

Although strategic needs are being changed by science. France may still gain defence arrangements from the goodwill of the countries of the Third World: not, as in the past, in the supply of manpower but in intercontinental facilities for telecommunications and transport". (6)

This chapter specifically considers the role of French assistance in establishing such 'diplomatic', 'strategic' and political advantages on the African continent.

#### POLITICAL INFLUENCE

The development of French political influence will be viewed in terms of African voting support for resolutions, drafted with the support of the Western European donor, in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It should be noted, however, that there was, at least during de Gaulle's Administration, an element of French antipathy towards the proceedings and effectiveness of the United Nations. As one international relations commentator has stated:

"De Gaulle was supremely contemptuous of the United Nations, especially of the world organisation's capacity to deal with the situation in Algeria ...

the United Nations as a body was a symbol of bigger things than it could accomplish. It was an aspiration. De Gaulle's vision of the world did not include such global supranationality". (7)

However, it would be erroneous to assume that African states did not identify their relationship with the Western European state in terms of agreement with, or opposition to, resolutions endorsed by Paris. Nevertheless, as a result of this indifference, analysis will also be made of the incidence of African nationalisation of French owned property and investment. The 'cultural arrogance' displayed in her relations with the African continent not surprisingly extends to the maintenance and protection of French economic interests. In this respect, African expropriation of French based investment will be regarded as a negative indicator of political influence.

At the same time, consideration will be given to the availability of facilities for French military personnel on the African continent. In direct contrast to the decolonisation process elsewhere in Africa, de Gaulle's policy of independence with 'co-operation' did not necessarily signify the end of a French military presence. Rather, it resulted in the readjustment of that presence. In the words (interpreted) of Guy de Carmoy in his 1967 study, 'Les Politiques Etrangères de la France':

"General de Gaulle's ambition is to lead, in the name of France, a world policy. Co-operation is in his eyes an instrument of power, rather than a duty of solidarity". (8)

African states which extend facilities to the French military can be viewed positively in terms of political influence.

FRENCH AID PROGRAM

Analysis of French economic aid relations is divided into two: the program in the years from African Independence up to 1969, when French affairs were primarily guided by de Gaulle; and the post de Gaulle era from 1970 to 1976. Any study of French international relations incorporating the post war years must emphasise the importance of 'Le General'. As Ali Mazrui noted in his consideration of Africa's international relations:

"There are times in the history of nations when focusing on personalities is one effective way of capturing the dominant moods of the age. In times characterised by high ideals and great emotions, the focus on symbolic leaders becomes a particularly fruitful approach towards understanding the basic areas of political interaction ... to study de Gaulle from 1958 to 1969 as a presence behind Francophone Africa is to capture the centrality of his influence as the architect of France's role in the post imperial age". (9)

During the period of de Gaulle's administration, at least \$2941.0m. worth of French economic aid was distributed to twenty-three states. This large program was itself increased from 1970 to 1976 when twenty-five African countries were in receipt of \$3316.5m.

Since African independence, the major co-ordinating agency for the economic aid program has been the Caisse Centrale de Cooperation Economique (Central Bank of Economic Co-operation). This institution acts as the paying agent for a number of investment funds, the most notable of which are F.A.C. (Fonds d'Aide et de Cooperation); FIDES (Fonds d'investissement pour le developpement economique et social); and FIDOM (Fonds d'investissement pour les departements d'outre-mer)<sup>(10)</sup>. The financial terms of French

TABLE 1

## FRENCH AID TO AFRICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

| <u>NORTH</u>    | <u>\$m</u>   | <u>EAST</u>                             | <u>\$m</u>      |
|-----------------|--------------|---|-----------------|
| Algeria         | 1318.8       | Burundi                                 | 3.0             |
| Egypt           | 13.1         | Ethiopia                                | -               |
| Libya           | 5.2          | Kenya                                   | -               |
| (2) Morocco     | 261.8        | Rwanda                                  | 2.0             |
| (2) Tunisia     | <u>157.3</u> | Somalia                                 | -               |
|                 | \$1756.2m    | Sudan                                   | -               |
|                 |              | Tanzania                                | -               |
|                 |              | Uganda                                  | -               |
|                 |              |   | <u>\$5.0m</u>   |
| <br>            |              |   |                 |
| <u>WEST</u>     |              |   |                 |
| (1) Cameroon    | 95.8         | Botswana                                | -               |
| (1) Chad        | 69.1         | (1) C.A.R                               | 65.8            |
| (1) Dahomey     | 53.8         | (1) Congo                               | 69.3            |
| Gambia          | -            | Eq. Guinea                              | -               |
| Ghana           | 7.2          | (1) Gabon                               | 49.0            |
| (1) Guinea      | -            | Lestho                                  | -               |
| (1) Ivory Coast | 148.2        | (1) Madagascar                          | 164.7           |
| Liberia         | -            | Malawi                                  | -               |
| (1) Mali        | 48.0         | Swaziland                               | -               |
| (1) Mauritania  | 36.8         | Zaire                                   | 12.3            |
| (1) Niger       | 84.7         | Zambia                                  | -               |
| Nigeria         | -            |   | <u>\$361.1m</u> |
| (1) Senegal     | 187.7        | Total program:                          | \$2941.0m       |
| Sierra Leone    | -            | Regional Share: (excluding (1) and (2)) |                 |
| (1) Togo        | 22.0         |   |                 |
| (1) Upper Volta | <u>65.4</u>  |   |                 |
|                 | \$818.7m     |   |                 |

(1) Separate aid figures for these states are not available from 1960 to 1964. Annual totals, excluded from the above table are:

|      |          |
|------|----------|
| 1960 | \$280.0m |
| 1961 | \$276.0m |
| 1962 | \$288.0m |
| 1963 | \$294.0m |


(2) Separate figures for Morocco and Tunisia unavailable up to 1961. Total up to 1961 = \$29.2m. which has not been included in above.

Sources: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1960-64, 1965, 1966-67, 1968, 1969-75, Paris; Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, O.E.C.D., Paris; T Hayter, French Aid, Overseas Development Institute, London, 1966

|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| North | 59.7% |
| West  | 27.8% |
| East  | 0.2%  |
| C & S | 12.3% |

# AFRICA

FRENCH AID RELATIONS FROM  
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969.



- RECIPIENTS OF FRENCH AID
- A VOTING OPPOSITION
- B VOTING AGREEMENT
- C UNCOMMITTED
- ✕ MILITARY BASE FACILITIES
- ✦ MINOR MILITARY FACILITIES
- ⊙ NATIONALISATION

economic assistance do vary slightly accordingly to whether the countries are 'traditional recipients' or not. On average, loans are offered for fifteen years, at an interest rate of 4% with a grace period of 3½ years<sup>(11)</sup>.

An important element in the administration of French aid is the financial dependence of many of the recipients in their affiliation to the Paris-based Franc Zone. Economic assistance is a major component of this medium of foreign exchange and has encompassed the majority of 'traditional recipients'<sup>(12)</sup>. Although liberalised in 1967, the Franc Zone remained something of a financial freak, heavily tying its members to a centralised system without parallel in Anglophone Africa. The hold which Paris maintains over many black African recipients via the medium of the Franc Zone was especially evident in 1968 when France twice imposed exchange controls. The African Franc Zone states had no option but to apply exchange controls also, or find themselves being used as a back door drain by speculators, anxious to get rid of francs<sup>(13)</sup>.

#### FRANCO AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

French aid to independent Africa has, since its inception in the late 1950s, comprised one of the largest bilateral flows of financial assistance to the less developed world. The distribution of this program has also been one of the most predictable, having been dominated by the history of French colonisation of the continent. In the years up to 1969, when the majority of African states received their independence, the primary condition for receiving substantial French assistance

seems to have been French ex-colonial status. Economic aid to Sub-Saharan Africa during this period totalled \$1184.8m., of which a mere \$24.5m was distributed to countries without a cultural or historical link with Paris. At the same time, the former North African dependencies of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria accrued \$1767.1m, or 99% of overall aid to the region. In total, Francophone Africa was in receipt of \$2898.2m worth of assistance from the European donor up to 1969, which is the equivalent of 98.5% of the program.

In regional terms, it is apparent that de Gaulle wished to maintain close association with North Africa. Despite the acrimonious nature of Algeria's move to independence, aid relations with this area of the continent were carefully maintained and the region as a whole was in receipt of over 43% of the total program. This imbalance should be seen in the light of de Gaulle's political and strategic aspirations in Africa as a whole. To a large extent, disruption of relations with these Mediterranean states may have seriously compromised French policies throughout the continent<sup>(15)</sup>. At the same time, the large number of Frenchmen in these former colonies, and their proximity to France, provided them with a special political and cultural significance for Paris, whilst the large deposits of oil and natural gas in this region attracted French investment interests throughout the 1960s.

Elsewhere on the continent, the regional emphasis of the program was determined by former colonial connections. The predominantly French West African states were in receipt of \$818.7m, or 27.8% of total assistance; and the four Francophone countries in Central and Southern Africa increased regional receipts to

\$361.1m., which is the equivalent of 12.3% of the program.

Assistance to East Africa, where France had little history of colonisation, amounted to a mere \$5.0m.

TABLE 2

## FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING FROM INDEPENDENCE UP TO 1969

CLUSTER B (60% Pro)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Botswana    | 8          | 3           | 1            | 12           | -                |
| Cameroon    | 11         | 3           | 16           | 30           | 95.8             |
| C.A.R.      | 22         | 5           | 6            | 33           | 65.8             |
| Chad        | 15         | 3           | 12           | 30           | 69.1             |
| Congo       | 17         | 10          | 2            | 29           | 69.3             |
| Dahomey     | 22         | 4           | 3            | 29           | 53.8             |
| Eq. Guinea  | 2          | -           | 3            | 5            | -                |
| Ethiopia    | 15         | 5           | 20           | 40           | -                |
| Gabon       | 17         | 6           | 3            | 26           | 49.0             |
| Ivory Coast | 21         | 8           | 3            | 32           | 148.2            |
| Kenya       | 9          | -           | 9            | 18           | -                |
| Lesotho     | 9          | 4           | 1            | 14           | -                |
| Liberia     | 26         | 9           | 4            | 39           | -                |
| Madagascar  | 22         | 6           | 4            | 32           | 164.7            |
| Malawi      | 12         | 7           | 2            | 21           | -                |
| Niger       | 22         | 6           | 3            | 31           | 84.7             |
| Rwanda      | 15         | 4           | 3            | 22           | 2.0              |
| Senegal     | 17         | 3           | 12           | 32           | 187.7            |
| Somalia     | 13         | 4           | 11           | 28           | -                |
| Swaziland   | 5          | 2           | -            | 7            | -                |
| Tanzania    | 9          | 4           | 5            | 18           | -                |
| Togo        | 19         | 7           | 5            | 31           | 22.0             |
| Uganda      | 8          | 4           | 8            | 20           | -                |
| Upper Volta | 12         | 6           | 8            | 26           | 65.4             |
| Zaire       | 15         | 7           | 4            | 26           | 12.3             |
| Zambia      | 9          | 5           | 5            | 19           | -                |
|             |            |             |              |              | <u>\$1089.8m</u> |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|              |    |    |    |    |                  |
|--------------|----|----|----|----|------------------|
| Algeria      | 10 | 11 | 2  | 23 | 1318.8           |
| Burundi      | 7  | 6  | 8  | 21 | 3.0              |
| Egypt        | 9  | 16 | 15 | 40 | 13.1             |
| Gambia       | 7  | 6  | 0  | 13 | -                |
| Ghana        | 9  | 9  | 22 | 40 | 7.2              |
| Guinea       | 8  | 20 | 12 | 40 | -                |
| Libya        | 5  | 9  | 23 | 37 | 5.2              |
| Mali         | 9  | 16 | 5  | 30 | 48.0             |
| Mauritania   | 13 | 10 | 4  | 27 | 36.8             |
| Morocco      | 10 | 10 | 15 | 35 | 261.8            |
| Nigeria      | 10 | 5  | 16 | 31 | -                |
| Sierra Leone | 7  | 4  | 17 | 28 | -                |
| Sudan        | 10 | 15 | 15 | 40 | -                |
| Tunisia      | 9  | 5  | 24 | 38 | <u>157.3</u>     |
|              |    |    |    |    | <u>\$1851.2m</u> |

FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO 1969

Analysis of aid and African voting behaviour in the General Assembly during this period does not reveal an overwhelmingly positive recipient response. Whilst no African state consistently opposed France in the international assembly, it is apparent that economic assistance from the Western European donor was unsuccessful in determining the pattern of African voting. Of twenty-six states who voted with Paris, fourteen were in receipt of concessional finance totalling \$1089.8m which is the equivalent of only 37% of the total program. This should be compared with \$1851.2m worth of assistance, or 63% of total aid to the continent, which flowed to nine, out of fourteen, states who remained uncommitted. Crosstabulation of total French aid and African voting up to 1969 provides little evidence of a significant relationship:

| COUNT<br>(Row %)              | AFRICAN STATES<br>NOT IN RECEIPT<br>OF AID UP TO 1969 | AFRICAN STATES<br>IN RECEIPT OF<br>AID UP TO 1969 |    |
|-------------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)    | 5<br>(35.7)   | 9<br>(64.3)                                       | 14 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro France) | 12<br>(46.2)  | 14<br>(53.8)                                      | 26 |
|                               | 17<br>(42.5)  | 23<br>(57.5)                                      | 40 |

Corrected Chi Square = 0.09106 with 1 degree of Freedom  
Significance = 0.7628

Almost 40% of African states who were in receipt of French aid failed to consistently support the donor in the General Assembly. Included amongst these 'uncommitted' (Cluster C) nations were the North African states of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia who alone benefitted to a total of \$1737.9m in economic aid. Moreover, when the chi-square test is applied to the analysis of aid and African voting performance, the value of chi square is 0.7628 which does not support the idea that French assistance was influential in the General Assembly during this period.

This lack of response by recipients of French finance may, in part, be symptomatic of de Gaulle's aversion to the United Nations - an attitude which some commentators have argued denied France an influential role in the General Assembly. In 1969, Kaye Whiteman summarised this aspect of de Gaulle's foreign affairs by stating that "France was proud of the fact that African states followed their own interest in voting at the United Nations on the Middle East"<sup>(16)</sup>. De Gaulle may have been unconcerned about the level of African support in the General Assembly debates, but it should be noted that the 'show of independence' was insufficient to cultivate an African caucus of consistent voting opposition to Paris.

To a certain extent, the pattern of aid and African voting is maintained when further analysis is made of the direct votes of states in the generally uncommitted, Cluster C:

TABLE 3

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C BETWEEN DIRECT VOTES

| <u>Cluster Ca</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| Egypt             | 9          | 16          | 13.1             |
| Guinea            | 8          | 20          | -                |
| Libya             | 5          | 9           | 5.2              |
| Mali              | 9          | 16          | 48.0             |
| Sudan             | 10         | 15          | -                |
| <u>Cluster Cb</u> |            |             |                  |
| Tunisia           | 9          | 5           | 157.3            |
| Nigeria           | 10         | 5           | -                |
| Sierra Leone      | 7          | 4           | -                |
| <u>Cluster Cz</u> |            |             |                  |
| Algeria           | 10         | 11          | 1318.8           |
| Burundi           | 7          | 6           | 3.0              |
| Gambia            | 7          | 6           | -                |
| Ghana             | 9          | 9           | 7.2              |
| Mauritania        | 13         | 10          | 36.8             |
| Morocco           | 10         | 10          | 261.8            |

Cluster Ca includes African states who revealed a general tendency towards abstention but, on the occasions when they did vote otherwise, cast at least 60% of such votes against France

Cluster Cb includes states whose direct votes proportionately (at least 60%) favoured France

Cluster Cz includes African states who neither favoured nor opposed France in the United Nations

Only \$66.3m was distributed to African countries who displayed a tendency to oppose France within an overall uncommitted voting pattern. This is the equivalent of only 3.6% of economic assistance to recipients in Cluster C, and represents a mere 2.3% of the total program during this period.

In general terms, therefore, there is no evidence to assume that French aid was instrumental in determining the nature of African voting in the General Assembly debates up to 1969. However, it is also apparent that little of the program was utilised to finance African states who consistently or tentatively opposed

the Western European donor.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

FRENCH AID AND NATIONALISATION UP TO 1969

TABLE 4

AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF FRENCH RESOURCES UP TO 1969

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Year of First Expropriation</u> | <u>Type</u>   | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>Year of First Aid</u> |
|-------------|------------------------------------|---------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) Morocco | 1964                               | Petroleum     | 261.8            | 1957                     |
| (1) Tunisia | 1964                               | Agriculture   | 157.3            | 1957                     |
| Guinea      | 1961                               | Mining        | -                | -                        |
| Mali        | 1967                               | Comprehensive | 48.0             | 1960                     |

(1) Satisfactory compensation paid

Sources: Africa Research Bulletin, Economic Financial and Technical Series, Exeter, 1964-70; International Legal Materials, XI, 1, January 1972; Africa Freedom Annual 1977, Southern African Freedom Institute.

The substantial amounts of French investment and property controlled and owned by ex-patriot communities and French multinational corporations in the former colonies were largely unaffected by policies of African expropriation. The extent to which this 'protection' was a consequence of French economic assistance is difficult to discern. Of the twenty-three recipients of the aid program during this period, only Tunisia, Morocco and Mali have taken measures against French investment interests. Since these three states had previously been in receipt of aid finance from Paris, it is apparent that such assistance was not an automatic guarantee of long term security. However, it is noticeable that, following the threat of suspension of French assistance, both Morocco and Tunisia paid compensation in full to the French owners. Moreover, President Bourguiba of Tunisia, in an effort to re-establish cordial relations with de Gaulle, announced in

March 1966 that:

"nationalisation of foreign land had been forced on Tunisia by her economic difficulties, as a measure to counter the imminent risk of bankruptcy, and that the way in which it had been carried out could be put down to my inexperience". (17)

This statement, given at a press conference, was regarded as the kind of public gesture being sought by de Gaulle as a prerequisite to renewed aid co-operation.

The action taken by Mali was symptomatic of the country's general economic difficulties during this period. In 1962, Mali had withdrawn from the Franc Zone and created a separate Malian currency. However, within a few years, the economy was near to collapse and in 1967 the Financial Times reported:

"The main problems facing the country included stagnation of production, a sharp increase in indebtedness abroad, a steady fall in the value of the Mali franc (compared with the relatively strong position of the CFA Franc, which was guaranteed by France) and growing difficulties in the running of the State sector of the economy". (18)

Encouraged by the promise of French economic aid (a promise which was fulfilled as aid to Mali was increased by 43% over a twelve months period from 1967), the Malian Government agreed to reverse its financial policies. Further nationalisation programs were suspended and the Malian Finance Minister agreed to devalue the Malian Franc by 50% as a first step towards returning to the Franc Zone. It is interesting to note that the French Government in a statement on May 7th, stated that the move constituted "a decisive step towards the convertability of the Malian currency", whilst the Malian Finance Minister described it as "a punishment for our mistakes and weaknesses" (19).

The wholesale expropriations of French investment by the Guinean Government between 1961 and 1963 merely provided

further evidence of the breakdown in relations between France and Guinea since Touré's decision not to join the French Community in 1958. Throughout this period, the West African state was not in receipt of economic assistance.

The expropriation of French resources by African aid recipients was not unknown during de Gaulle's administration. However, it was a relatively rare occurrence and was undertaken by African leaders in the firm knowledge that France would not automatically continue to provide concessional finance to the recalcitrant states. As a result, only Sekou Touré of Guinea introduced any lasting nationalisation program of French interests without providing adequate compensation, and this was a continuation of discordant relations between the two countries since 1958. The vast majority of recipients of French economic aid up to 1969 preferred to maintain cordial relations with Paris and leave French owned investment unscathed.

#### FRENCH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES UP TO 1969

Eight African states extended base facilities to French military personnel during this period:

TABLE 5

#### AID AND MILITARY BASES <sup>(20)</sup>

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|----------------|------------------|
| Tunisia        | 157.3            |
| Morocco        | 261.8            |
| Senegal        | 187.7            |
| Ivory Coast    | 148.2            |
| Mali           | 48.0             |
| Chad           | 69.1             |
| Cameroon       | 95.8             |
| Madagascar     | 164.7            |

These states were in receipt of economic aid totalling \$1132.6m., which is the equivalent of over 38% of the total program.

This should be compared with assistance to eight African leaders who signed bilateral defence agreements (accord de defense) in the early 1960s which provided for French military intervention - conditional upon the request of the local government and at the approval of the French authorities<sup>(21)</sup>. These African states, including Niger, Upper Volta, Mauritania, Togo, Dahomey, C.A.R., Congo and Gabon were in receipt of \$446.8m., or 15.2% of the total program.

To a certain extent, however, it is difficult to determine whether military facilities were made available by certain African states because of the colonial association with Paris, or whether the French military were granted access because of the nature of economic assistance. On the one hand, it is apparent that all African states who made available base rights were in receipt of substantial sums of aid. On the other hand, French concessional finance was no guarantee for military facilities as witnessed by their absence in the recipient states of Algeria, Zaire, Rwanda, Egypt and Libya. Moreover, Algeria specifically denied France base facilities during this period despite being the largest beneficiary of French assistance. Nevertheless, as far as de Gaulle was concerned, 'co-operation' was intended to provide more than just economic aid. Pierre Lellouche, in his analysis of French policy in Africa, has pointed out that the true aim of 'co-operation' was ...

"to maintain privileged links in spite of international sovereignty. In this context, the defense agreements were an essential part of the complex network of economic, cultural and political pacts between the Metropole and its ex-colonies". (22)

This was especially evident up to 1964 when there was a series of military interventions into 'domestic African' politics by French troops. In Cameroon in 1960 and 1961; in the Congo in 1960 and 1962; in Chad between 1960 and 1963; in Mauritania in 1961; in Niger in 1963 and in Gabon in February 1964, de Gaulle employed French troops to preserve the viability of friendly recipient regimes and to retain French rights to intervene. From 1964, the French President was more selective in approving such military actions and the military were only similarly involved in two recipient states - the Central African Republic in 1967 and Chad from 1968<sup>(23)</sup>. In this respect, it could be argued that military agreements, signed with many former colonial states, were often reinforced by economic aid and helped to establish and maintain the notion of a French military presence on the continent.

#### FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1969

During this period, the distribution of French economic assistance to individual African states was largely sustained and consistent despite the general character of African political instability. Nevertheless, there were a number of occasions when receipts increased by over 100% within a twelve months period:

TABLE 6Aid and Political Change

| <u>Name</u> | <u>% Increase</u> | <u>Aid</u>        | <u>Year</u> | <u>Nature of Political Change</u>     |
|-------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| Morocco     | 137%              | (\$12.5m-\$29.6m) | 1961-62     | King Hassan II succeeds Mohammed (V)  |
| Ghana       |                   | (\$0m-\$2.8m)     | 1967        | First year of new military government |
| Mauritania  | 108%              | (\$3.7m-\$7.7m)   | 1966-67     | Withdrawal from French Community      |
| Zaire       |                   | (\$0m-\$1.7m)     | 1966        | First year of Mobutu's government     |
| Burundi     |                   | (\$0m-\$0.5m)     | 1966        | Two changes of government             |
| Rwanda      |                   | (\$0m-\$0.3m)     | 1966        | No change                             |

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Exeter

With the sole exception of Rwanda, injections of French aid finance to these states coincided with a change in political leadership and policy. In this respect, it would seem that de Gaulle was occasionally prepared to utilise aid to attempt to establish a position of influence with incoming political leaders. This was especially the case in areas of the continent where France had little history of colonisation and there was a need to 'sell' a positive image of the Western European donor. It should be noted that only Morocco and Mauritania in Table 6 are former French dependencies.

Elsewhere on the continent, however, the basic criterion for substantial and sustained receipts of economic aid was a traditional link with Paris.

RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS UP TO 1969

There is little evidence to assume that French aid program specifically took into consideration the economic position of the recipients. Analysis of all the states accruing in excess of \$100.0m. reveals a broad spectrum of economic strength and weakness:

TABLE 7: Major Recipients and Economic Indicators

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Population (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 1318.8           | 3175             | 12.6                  | 252                   |
| Morocco     | 261.8            | 2623             | 14.1                  | 186                   |
| Tunisia     | 157.3            | 90               | 0.4                   | 225                   |
| Ivory Coast | 148.2            | 858              | 3.9                   | 220                   |
| Senegal     | 187.7            | 756              | 3.6                   | 210                   |
| Madagascar  | 164.7            | 558              | 6.2                   | 90                    |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1969; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971, pp. 8-9; IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

Madagascar and Tunisia, who received similar sums of assistance from their former metropolitan authority during this period, were in very dissimilar economic positions. Moreover, it is difficult to argue that the program was motivated by the desire to alleviate economic weakness on the continent. Algeria, which was by far the largest beneficiary of French aid during these years, has the highest level of GNP per capita of all these recipients.

Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal a significant relationship between total receipts of aid and the level of recipient GNP (Correlation 0.3439); but no connection between total French assistance and African population (Correlation 0.0807). To a certain extent, this may be symptomatic of the economic character

of many areas of Francophone Africa. As Guy Arnold, in his discussion of Aid in Africa noted,

"Since 1960 France, in neo-colonial terms, has had a clear advantage over Britain in Africa because the successor states to the French African Empire (with the exception of the Maghreb countries) were smaller in size and less developed economically, than were those in what became Commonwealth Africa. This was partly by design and also as a result of France's colonial re-organisation of French West and Equatorial Africa in the period following the Second World War. The relatively small populations and economic weakness of the Francophone states has made them much more vulnerable to outside (French) manipulation". (24).

On the whole, however, the nature of French aid to Africa was not dictated by the character of recipient economics. Correlation of total assistance to the continent and the level of recipient GNP per capita provides little indication of an association between the two variables (Correlation 0.1633).

#### FRENCH AID AND INFLUENCE UP TO 1969

##### Overview

The inherent bias of the French economic aid program towards former dependencies was largely a consequence of de Gaulle's general policies towards post colonial Africa. In this respect, aid relations were determined by a philosophy of 'cultural assimilation' by which the metropolitan authority attempted to maintain a role in the affairs of her colonies after independence. Not surprisingly, recipients with an historical association represented much more fertile ground in de Gaulle's ambition of developing French influence in the Third World<sup>(25)</sup>, and it is evident that 'Le General' pursued a common policy and timetable for many of these countries - eight were granted

their independence on two days in 1960.

With the sole exception of Guinea, economic aid flowed to all of the former dependencies and less than 2% of the total program was utilised by non-Francophone states. As a result, there are difficulties in accurately discerning whether African attitudes to Paris are a consequence of either French assistance or French history. Certainly there is little evidence to assume that the pattern of African voting at the United Nations was determined by the aid program during this period. Nor was economic assistance an automatic guarantee for comprehensive military facilities and the non-expropriation of French investment. However, it is possible that de Gaulle was not perturbed by the lack of recipient voting support in the General Assembly. At the same time it is apparent that he was not prepared to continue to provide concessional finance to African states, irrespective of a French colonial connection, who nationalised French investment interests without adequate compensation. In addition, African states who extended base facilities to French military personnel benefitted from substantial sums of economic assistance - five of the recipients offering base rights received in excess of \$100.0m. In general, it could be argued that Franco-African affairs were primarily established by historical association and, in many cases, developed by sustained aid agreements.

In regional terms, the program favoured the former colonies in North Africa, partly in the hope that their influence would maintain France's image throughout Francophone Africa. Elsewhere on the continent, there is evidence to believe that injections of economic assistance were used to win new friends

amongst incoming political leaders. However, on the whole, such aid contacts in previously 'unexplored' areas of Africa were limited up to 1969.

#### FRANCO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

In the years following de Gaulle's departure from the political scene, economic aid to Africa broadened its focus. From 1970 to 1976, the Western European donor distributed \$3316.5m to twenty five recipient states. This represented an increase of 12.8% upon the earlier assistance program. To a large extent, this increase was symptomatic of an invigorated French interest in the less developed world. In the early 1970s, de Gaulle's immediate successor, Georges Pompidou, launched a series of diplomatic visits to the former colonies in Black Africa<sup>(26)</sup>. In addition, from May 1974, the new President Giscard D'Estaing provided further impetus to French relations with the Third World via a campaign for a 'New International Economic Order'.

During the 1970s, the aid program largely maintained its bias towards the former dependencies. The ex-French colonies on the African continent garnered \$3111.7m, which is the equivalent of almost 94% of the total program. There were only seven non-Francophone recipient states who acquired a total of \$204.8m<sup>(27)</sup>. However, it is apparent that there were more fundamental changes in the regional distribution of French assistance. North Africa no longer dominated receipts to the continent, being able to acquire \$1217.6m., or over 36% of total aid. The Francophone states of West Africa assumed the largest share of the program, being in receipt of almost 43% of the French program. Other

TABLE 8


FRENCH AID TO AFRICA FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>NORTH</u>    | <u>\$m</u>   | <u>EAST</u>                     | <u>\$m</u>      |
|-----------------|--------------|---------------------------------|-----------------|
| Algeria         | 566.1        | Burundi                         | 24.9            |
| Egypt           | 49.7         | Ethiopia                        | 0.8             |
| Libya           | 6.0          | Kenya                           | -               |
| Morocco         | 350.0        | Rwanda                          | 31.6            |
| Tunisia         | <u>245.8</u> | Somalia                         | -               |
|                 | \$1217.6m    | Sudan                           | -               |
|                 |              | Tanzania                        | -               |
|                 |              | Uganda                          | -               |
|                 |              |                                 | <u>\$57.3m</u>  |
| <br><u>WEST</u> |              | <br><u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |                 |
| Cameroon        | 195.3        | Botswana                        | -               |
| Chad            | 155.5        | C.A.R.                          | 106.6           |
| Dahomey         | 62.0         | Congo                           | 131.7           |
| Gambia          | -            | Eq. Guinea                      | -               |
| Ghana           | 3.5          | Gabon                           | 137.1           |
| Guinea          | 0.4          | Lesotho                         | -               |
| Ivory Coast     | 247.7        | Madagascar                      | 156.8           |
| Liberia         | -            | Malawi                          | -               |
| Mali            | 116.5        | Mozambique                      | -               |
| Mauritania      | 32.3         | Swaziland                       | -               |
| Niger           | 165.0        | Zaire                           | 88.3            |
| Nigeria         | -            | Zambia                          | -               |
| Senegal         | 246.3        |                                 | <u>\$620.5m</u> |
| Sierra Leone    | -            |                                 |                 |
| Togo            | 50.9         | Total program:                  | \$3316.5m       |
| Upper Volta     | <u>145.7</u> | % Regional Share:               |                 |
|                 | \$1421.1m    |                                 |                 |
|                 |              | North                           | 36.7%           |
|                 |              | West                            | 42.9%           |
|                 |              | East                            | 1.7%            |
|                 |              | C & S                           | 18.7%           |

Sources: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Less Developed Countries, 1969-75, 1976-79, O.E.C.D., Paris; Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, O.E.C.D., Paris.

# AFRICA

FRENCH AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 TO 1976.



- RECIPIENTS OF FRENCH AID
- ⊙ NATIONALISATION
- b VOTING AGREEMENT
- ✈ MILITARY BASE FACILITIES
- c UNCOMMITTED
- + MINOR MILITARY FACILITIES

areas of the continent, where France had little previous colonial connection, occupied a low position in the aid priorities.

Despite the increase in assistance, Franco-African economic relations during this period were relatively unstable. Financial links between Africa and France suffered a setback within three months of de Gaulle's departure when, in August 1969, the devaluation of the Franc brought African criticisms of the Franc Zone to a head. African Heads of State, although exposed to central financial control from Paris via the Franc Zone, were not consulted on the devaluation and some doubted whether it was in their African countries' interests<sup>(28)</sup>. Disillusionment with France's arbitrary control of many African currencies grew throughout the 1970s, despite the expanding economic aid program. By 1976, as a result of the actions of such African leaders as President Ould Dadda of Mauritania, who established a separate Mauritanian currency in 1974, the number of states in the Franc Zone had dwindled to twelve - C.A.R., Dahomey, Cameroon, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, Mali and the Congo.

#### FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1970 TO 1976

From 1970 to 1976, twenty-nine states consistently endorsed (Cluster B) General Assembly resolutions drafted with explicit French support. A further twelve African states did not oppose Paris but were relatively uncommitted (Cluster C) in the United Nations. To a large extent, the absence of sustained African opposition during this period undermines the significance of the analysis of aid and voting behaviour.

TABLE 9

FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING FROM 1970 to 1976CLUSTER B (60% Pro France)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Botswana     | 13         | 4           | 3            | 20           | -                |
| Burundi      | 13         | 6           | 4            | 23           | 24.9             |
| Cameroon     | 13         | 3           | 7            | 23           | 195.3            |
| C.A.R.       | 8          | 0           | 9            | 17           | 106.6            |
| Chad         | 17         | 0           | 5            | 22           | 155.5            |
| Dahomey      | 15         | 4           | 3            | 22           | 62.0             |
| Ethiopia     | 14         | 3           | 4            | 21           | 0.8              |
| Gabon        | 18         | 0           | 3            | 21           | 137.1            |
| Gambia       | 18         | 0           | 1            | 19           | -                |
| Ghana        | 12         | 4           | 6            | 22           | 3.5              |
| Ivory Coast  | 18         | 0           | 4            | 22           | 247.7            |
| Kenya        | 13         | 3           | 5            | 21           | -                |
| Lesotho      | 19         | 1           | 3            | 23           | -                |
| Liberia      | 18         | 0           | 4            | 22           | -                |
| Madagascar   | 19         | 3           | 1            | 23           | 156.8            |
| Malawi       | 10         | 1           | 9            | 20           | -                |
| Morocco      | 18         | 2           | 1            | 21           | 350.0            |
| Mozambique   | 2          | 1           | 0            | 3            | -                |
| Niger        | 15         | 0           | 4            | 19           | 165.0            |
| Nigeria      | 13         | 6           | 3            | 22           | -                |
| Rwanda       | 13         | 4           | 3            | 20           | 31.6             |
| Senegal      | 14         | 5           | 4            | 23           | 246.3            |
| Sierra Leone | 13         | 5           | 4            | 22           | -                |
| Swaziland    | 14         | 0           | 2            | 16           | -                |
| Togo         | 14         | 4           | 3            | 21           | 50.9             |
| Tunisia      | 14         | 2           | 7            | 23           | 245.8            |
| Uganda       | 13         | 7           | 3            | 23           | -                |
| Upper Volta  | 14         | 2           | 5            | 21           | 145.7            |
| Zaire        | 14         | 0           | 6            | 20           | 88.3             |
|              |            |             |              |              | <u>\$2413.8m</u> |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|            |    |    |   |    |                 |
|------------|----|----|---|----|-----------------|
| Algeria    | 9  | 9  | 2 | 20 | 566.1           |
| Congo      | 12 | 9  | 1 | 22 | 131.7           |
| Egypt      | 12 | 9  | 1 | 22 | 49.7            |
| Eq. Guinea | 10 | 8  | 1 | 19 | -               |
| Guinea     | 10 | 10 | 1 | 21 | 0.4             |
| Libya      | 10 | 10 | 1 | 21 | 6.0             |
| Mali       | 13 | 10 | 0 | 23 | 116.5           |
| Mauritania | 11 | 8  | 0 | 19 | 32.3            |
| Somalia    | 10 | 10 | 0 | 20 | -               |
| Sudan      | 12 | 8  | 1 | 21 | -               |
| Tanzania   | 11 | 11 | 1 | 23 | -               |
| Zambia     | 12 | 10 | 0 | 22 | -               |
|            |    |    |   |    | <u>\$902.7m</u> |

Nevertheless, it should be noted that states who supported France acquired \$2413.8m., which compares favourably with aid to the uncommitted recipients of Cluster C who garnered \$902.7m. However, crosstabulation of French assistance and voting patterns provides little evidence of a positive relationship between the distribution of concessional finance and African behaviour in the United Nations.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)              | AFRICAN STATES NOT<br>IN RECEIPT OF AID<br>1970-1976 | AFRICAN STATES IN<br>RECEIPT OF AID<br>1970-1976 |    |
|-------------------------------|--|--|----|
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)    | 5<br>(41.7)  | 7<br>(58.3)                                      | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro France) | 11<br>(37.9)   | 18<br>(62.1)                                     | 29 |
|                               | 16<br>(39.0)   | 25<br>(61.0)                                     | 41 |

Chi Square = 0.04978 with 1 degree of Freedom  
Significance = 0.8235

Sixty two per cent of states who consistently voted with France were in receipt of aid from the Western European donor. The value of chi squared is only significant at a level of 0.8235 which, with one degree of freedom, provides no indication that economic assistance and the pattern of voting behaviour in the United Nations were associated during this period. At the same time, Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting reveal that France did not disproportionately favour her African support (Correlation 0.1096).

The absence of voting opposition is emphasised if further analysis is made of the direct votes of states in Cluster C:

TABLE 10REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C VOTES 1970 to 1976

| <u>Cluster Cb</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| Sudan             | 12         | 8           | -                |
| <u>Cluster Cz</u> |            |             |                  |
| Algeria           | 9          | 9           | 566.1            |
| Egypt             | 12         | 9           | 49.7             |
| Equatorial Guinea | 10         | 8           | -                |
| Guinea            | 10         | 10          | 0.4              |
| Libya             | 10         | 10          | 6.0              |
| Mali              | 13         | 10          | 116.5            |
| Mauritania        | 11         | 8           | 32.3             |
| Congo             | 12         | 9           | 131.7            |
| Somalia           | 10         | 10          | -                |
| Tanzania          | 11         | 11          | -                |
| Zambia            | 12         | 10          | -                |

Cluster Cb includes Sudan whose direct votes were primarily (60%) in favour of France.

Cluster Cz includes African states who neither favoured nor opposed Paris in the United Nations.

With the sole exception of Sudan, which displayed a tendency to support France in the General Assembly, all the African representatives in Cluster C remained completely uncommitted, irrespective of receipts of economic aid.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUESTABLE 11FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF RESOURCES FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Year of Expropriation</u> | <u>Type</u>      | <u>Aid 1970-76 (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Morocco     | 1970                         | Property         | 350.0                    |
| Algeria     | 1970                         | Petroleum        | 566.1                    |
| Mauritania  | 1974                         | Mining           | 32.3                     |
| Togo        | 1974                         | Mining           | 50.9                     |
| Dahomey     | 1970                         | Stevedore & Dock | 62.0                     |
| Congo       | 1970                         | Agriculture      | 131.7                    |
| Uganda      | 1970                         | Comprehensive    | -                        |
| Madagascar  | 1976                         | Comprehensive    | 156.8                    |

Sources: L L Rood, Nationalisation and Indigenisation in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 3, (1976), pp. 427-447  
Africa Research Bulletin, Exeter; International Legal Materials XL,I, January 1972

In 1970 President Pompidou introduced new legislation to guarantee French private investment against 'political risks' particularly in the event of nationalisation; and he expressed the hope that these new regulations would encourage French private interests to invest more in Africa. However, it is apparent French investment in Africa was at risk from expropriation in the 1970s. Within a month of de Gaulle's departure from politics, Dahomey announced the nationalisation of four French companies involved in stevedore and dock services - Societé Commerciales des Posts de l'Afrique; Societé Ouest Africaine d'Enterprise Maritime; Delmas, and Transcap. These companies alone had derived 60 million C.F.A. monthly from their operations in the West African state. Over the next seven years, a further seven African countries introduced domestic measures leading to the nationalisation of French interests. With the sole exception of Uganda, all of these states were in receipt of substantial sums of French economic assistance during this period. Algeria<sup>(29)</sup> and Morocco were the two largest recipients of aid, whilst Congo and Madagascar were leading beneficiaries in Central and Southern Africa. In addition, Togo and Mauritania both received consistent, if unspectacular sums of economic assistance in the years leading up to nationalisation. In total, these states acquired \$1349.8m which represents over 40% of the total program.

In this respect, African recipients of French concessional finance were no longer willing to 'protect' French investment in the manner in which they had done during de Gaulle's period of office. Nor was it the case that nationalisation measures had repercussions, in terms of suspended economic aid from Paris, in the 1970s. It is interesting to note that only in the cases of

Mauritania and Madagascar can expropriation be attributed to the radical policies of new regimes and, even here, French finance continued unabated. The other incidents indicate more the waning in popularity and influence of French investment during the post de Gaulle administration within relatively prevailing African governments.

#### FRENCH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES FROM 1970 to 1976

The period from 1970 to 1976 witnessed a considerable decline in the French military presence on the continent. Three African states extended base facilities to France - Senegal, Ivory Coast and Madagascar - and an additional three black African countries maintained defence agreements with Paris during this period - the Central African Republic, Gabon and Togo. It should be noted that these six states were in receipt of \$945.4m., which is the equivalent of 45% of total assistance to Sub Saharan Africa. Moreover, Senegal, the Ivory Coast and Madagascar, who allowed French troops access to military bases, were the largest beneficiaries of French concessional finance within the regions of West and Southern Africa. In this respect, it would seem that Paris was not slow to provide assistance to Sub Saharan African states who maintained military contacts with the former metropolitan authority. However, it is not possible to discern a similar relationship with Franco-North African relations. In this region of the continent, Francophone recipient states firmly resisted the notion of base facilities for French military personnel in the 1970s. Moreover, this stand was taken by Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, despite the fact that they acquired 78.5%

more assistance than their three Sub Saharan counterparts who did accommodate French military ambitions during this period.

In general terms, it would appear African recipients of aid attained a considerable measure of military independence during this period. French troops were involved in overt military operations on the continent on only one occasion. Moreover, this 'operation', in Chad up to 1971, had its origins under de Gaulle's administration from 1968.

FRENCH ECONOMIC AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM 1970 to 1976

France substantially increased the size of its aid to individual African countries (over a twelve months period), on nine occasions during this period:

TABLE 12

AID INCREASES AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

| <u>Country</u> | <u>% Increase</u> | <u>(Aid \$m)</u>   | <u>Year</u> | <u>Political Change</u> |
|----------------|-------------------|--------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Egypt          | 475%              | (\$4.0m-\$23.0m)   | 1974/75     | The Arab/Israeli War    |
| Morocco        | 219%              | (\$33.9m-\$108.1m) | 1974/75     | Arab/Israeli War        |
| Mali           | 105%              | (\$8.3m-\$17.0m)   | 1971/72     | No change               |
| Mauritania     | 210%              | (\$2.1m-\$6.5m)    | 1972/73     | No change               |
| Togo           | 224%              | (\$2.1m-\$6.8m)    | 1971/72     | No change               |
| Zaire          | 171%              | (\$8.4m-\$22.8m)   | 1973/74     | No change               |
| Cameroon       | 163%              | (\$9.9m-\$26.0m)   | 1971/72     | New constitution        |
| Burundi        | 132%              | (\$1.9m-\$4.4m)    | 1973/74     | New constitution        |
| Rwanda         | 135%              | (\$5.1m-\$12.0m)   | 1974/75     | No change               |

Sources: Africa, South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World; Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Exeter.

None of the increases in assistance of 100% or more coincided with a radical change in African political leadership. The general

escalation in 1974 and 1975, as witnessed in aid to Egypt, Morocco, Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda may have been symptomatic of D'Estaing's interest in his program for a 'New International Economic Order'. At the same time, economic assistance to North Africa and the African members of the Arab League was, in part, a consequence of French support for the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict, following the fourfold increase in the price of oil in 1973<sup>(30)</sup>.

Fourteen African states accrued in excess of \$100.0m during this period, including all the Francophone, North African states of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. Elsewhere on the continent, it would appear that the major beneficiaries of French aid included those countries whose leaders kept their African economies within the controls of the Paris based Franc Zone. Of the twelve remaining members of this international monetary union in 1976, nine were in receipt of aid in excess of \$100.0m during the 1970s<sup>(31)</sup>.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970 to 1976

Analysis of the economic characteristics of the major recipients of aid during this period provides little evidence that the program was dictated by economic indicators.

TABLE 13

MAJOR BENEFICIARIES AND ECONOMIC INDICATIONS, 1970-76

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (m)</u> | <u>Pop. (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|----------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 566.1            | 8220           | 14.7            | 559                   |
| Morocco     | 350.0            | 5250           | 15.9            | 330                   |
| Tunisia     | 245.8            | 2760           | 5.3             | 521                   |
| Cameroon    | 195.3            | 1440           | 6.9             | 209                   |
| Chad        | 155.5            | 370            | 3.9             | 95                    |
| Ivory Coast | 247.7            | 2340           | 6.1             | 384                   |
| Mali        | 116.5            | 400            | 5.4             | 74                    |
| Niger       | 165.0            | 470            | 4.3             | 109                   |
| Senegal     | 246.3            | 1290           | 4.7             | 274                   |
| Upper Volta | 145.7            | 540            | 5.6             | 96                    |
| C.A.R.      | 106.6            | 300            | 1.7             | 176                   |
| Congo       | 131.7            | 490            | 1.3             | 377                   |
| Gabon       | 137.1            | 630            | 0.5             | 1260                  |
| Madagascar  | 156.8            | 1320           | 8.3             | 159                   |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks, 1970-76; World Bank National Yearbooks, 1970-76; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Development Countries, 1969-75, OECD, Paris, 1977

Pearson Correlation Coefficient of total French assistance and recipient GNP (Correlation 0.2503) indicates that aid did not automatically favour the economically weak African states. However, Paris did not ignore the claims of the least developed areas of the continent. Of the eighteen African states in OECD's category of least developed countries in the Third World, nine were in receipt of \$808.6m worth of French finance; which is the equivalent of 24.4% of the total program<sup>(32)</sup>. Nevertheless, with the sole exception of a mere \$0.8m to Ethiopia, this assistance was confined to Francophone states. In this respect, it could be argued that President D'Estaing's conception of the 'New International Economic Order', as viewed by the flow of concessional finance to Africa, did not extend to areas of the less developed world

without a former colonial connection. Correlations of total aid to the continent in terms of recipient GNP per capita (Correlation 0.0705) reveal that, in general during the 1970s, considerations of economic need were not uppermost in the French donor's aims and ambitions.

FRANCO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the period from African independence up to 1969, de Gaulle co-ordinated an aid program totalling at least \$2941.0m. to twenty-three recipient states. The distribution of this assistance was uncompromising in its bias towards the former dependencies of the Western European power, and relatively minor sums of finance flowed to the non Francophone areas of the continent. The 1970s witnessed a program which was larger (\$3316.5m) and not quite so limited in scope - non Francophone Africa accrued 6.2% of total French aid during this period. At the same time, the geographical distribution of economic assistance after de Gaulle displayed some changes in the regional emphasis:

TABLE 14

COMPARATIVE REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

|                       | <u>French Aid up to 1969</u> | <u>% of Program</u> | <u>French Aid 1970-76</u> | <u>% of Program</u> |
|-----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|---------------------|
| North                 | \$1756.2m                    | 59.7                | \$1217.6m                 | 36.7                |
| West                  | \$ 818.7m                    | 27.8                | \$1421.1m                 | 42.9                |
| East                  | \$ 5.0m                      | 0.2                 | \$ 57.3m                  | 1.7                 |
| Central &<br>Southern | \$361.1m                     | 12.3                | \$ 620.5m                 | 18.7                |

East Africa, where France had no history of colonisation, continued to remain low in aid priorities. However, from 1970, it would seem

that West African states increased their share of the total program at the expense of North African recipients.

To a certain extent, the removal of de Gaulle's authoritative personality from international relations, together with the growing economic importance of North African oil reserves in the 1970s, dissipated the traditional link between these North African states and their former metropole. As a result, these relatively large, economically developed and strategically placed Mediterranean states became less dependent upon French finance and influence.

#### FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

De Gaulle's relative disinterest in the operations of this international assembly was largely reflected in the voting pattern of independent African states. Moreover, although from 1970, de Gaulle no longer dominated foreign affairs, there is little evidence to believe that an increased French aid program was instrumental in determining African voting behaviour in the General Assembly. To a certain extent, the absence of consistent voting opposition to Paris in the second time period undermines the significance of the analysis between concessional finance and voting. Crosstabulations of aid and voting fail to indicate an association between the two variables in all the years up to 1976. In addition, it is difficult to discern a level of significance if comparative analysis is made of changes in voting behaviour and the allocation of assistance between the two time periods.

TABLE 15

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF FRENCH AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

| Country      | From Independence to 1969 |      |         | 1970-76   |      |         |
|--------------|---------------------------|------|---------|-----------|------|---------|
|              | Aid (\$m)                 | %    | UN Vote | Aid (\$m) | %    | UN Vote |
| Algeria      | 1318.8                    | 44.8 | C       | 566.1     | 17.1 | C       |
| Egypt        | 13.1                      | 0.4  | C       | 49.7      | 1.5  | C       |
| Libya        | 5.2                       | 0.2  | C       | 6.0       | 0.2  | C       |
| Morocco      | 261.8                     | 8.9  | C       | 350.0     | 10.5 | B       |
| Tunisia      | 157.3                     | 5.4  | C       | 245.8     | 7.4  | B       |
| Cameroon     | 95.8                      | 3.3  | B       | 195.3     | 5.9  | B       |
| Chad         | 69.1                      | 2.4  | B       | 155.5     | 4.7  | B       |
| Dahomey      | 53.8                      | 1.8  | B       | 62.0      | 1.9  | B       |
| Gambia       | -                         | -    | C       | -         | -    | B       |
| Ghana        | 7.2                       | 0.2  | C       | 3.5       | 0.1  | B       |
| Guinea       | -                         | -    | C       | 0.4       | -    | C       |
| Ivory Coast  | 148.2                     | 5.0  | B       | 247.7     | 7.5  | B       |
| Liberia      | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Mali         | 48.0                      | 1.6  | C       | 116.5     | 3.5  | C       |
| Mauritania   | 36.8                      | 1.3  | C       | 32.3      | 1.0  | C       |
| Niger        | 84.7                      | 2.9  | B       | 165.0     | 5.0  | B       |
| Nigeria      | -                         | -    | C       | -         | -    | B       |
| Senegal      | 187.7                     | 6.4  | B       | 246.3     | 7.4  | B       |
| Sierra Leone | -                         | -    | C       | -         | -    | B       |
| Togo         | 22.0                      | 0.7  | B       | 50.9      | 1.5  | B       |
| Upper Volta  | 65.4                      | 2.2  | B       | 145.7     | 4.4  | B       |
| Burundi      | 3.0                       | 0.1  | C       | 24.9      | 0.7  | B       |
| Ethiopia     | -                         | -    | B       | 0.8       | *    | B       |
| Kenya        | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Rwanda       | 2.0                       | 0.1  | B       | 31.6      | 1.0  | B       |
| Somalia      | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | C       |
| Sudan        | -                         | -    | C       | -         | -    | C       |
| Tanzania     | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | C       |
| Uganda       | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Botswana     | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| C.A.R.       | 65.8                      | 2.2  | B       | 106.6     | 3.2  | B       |
| Congo        | 69.3                      | 2.4  | B       | 131.7     | 4.0  | C       |
| Eq. Guinea   | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | C       |
| Gabon        | 49.0                      | 1.7  | B       | 137.1     | 4.1  | B       |
| Madagascar   | 164.7                     | 5.6  | B       | 156.8     | 4.7  | B       |
| Malawi       | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Lesotho      | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Swaziland    | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | B       |
| Zaire        | 12.3                      | 0.4  | B       | 88.3      | 2.7  | B       |
| Zambia       | -                         | -    | B       | -         | -    | C       |
| Mozambique   | -                         | -    | -       | -         | -    | B       |
|              | \$2941.0m                 |      |         | \$3316.5m |      |         |

\*less than 0.1%

Cluster B (26) \$1089.8m (14) 37%      Cluster B (29) \$2413.8m (18) 72.8%  
Cluster C (14) \$1851.2m (9) 63%      Cluster C (12) \$902.7m (7) 27.2%

As has already been noted, French aid was not instrumental in determining the nature of African voting in the years up to 1969. It would also appear that this program did not significantly influence changes in African behaviour at the United Nations between the two time periods.

VOTING CHANGES BETWEEN THE TIME PERIODS

| COUNT<br>(Row #)   | Cluster C-C | Cluster B-C | Cluster C-B | Cluster B-B  |    |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----|
| African States<br>NOT in receipt<br>of aid up to<br>1969 | 2<br>(11.8) | 4<br>(23.5) | 3<br>(17.6) | 8<br>(47.1)  | 17 |
| African States<br>receiving aid<br>up to 1969            | 5<br>(21.7) | 1<br>(4.3)  | 4<br>(17.4) | 13<br>(56.5) | 23 |
|  | 7<br>(17.5) | 5<br>(12.5) | 7<br>(17.5) | 21<br>(52.5) | 40 |

Cluster B = 60% Pro France

Cluster C = Uncommitted

Chi Square = 3.60005 with 3 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.3080

Seven states moved towards a position of consistent support for Paris, whilst previously being uncommitted, in the second time period (Cluster C-B), but only four had previously been in receipt of aid. Having crosstabulated all voting changes in terms of the first aid program, the value of chi square is only significant at 0.3080. In this respect, there is little evidence to believe that African states changed their voting behaviour in response to earlier receipts of French assistance. Furthermore, despite changes in the regional emphasis of French aid from 1970, it is apparent that the pattern of African voting remained

unaffected by the program from the Western European donor. Twenty-nine states consistently voted with Paris in the 1970s of whom only 55% experienced an increase in their share of total French assistance to the continent.

To a certain extent, some indication of a possible association between French aid and African voting is provided by crosstabulating the distribution of the program in the 1970s with changes in the pattern of voting between the two time periods.

VOTING CHANGES BETWEEN THE TIME PERIODS

| COUNT<br>(Row %)                                   | Cluster C-C | Cluster B-C | Cluster C-B | Cluster B-B  |    |
|--|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----|
| African States<br>NOT in receipt<br>of aid 1970-76 | 1<br>(6.7)  | 4<br>(26.7) | 3<br>(20.0) | 7<br>(46.7)  | 15 |
| African States<br>receiving aid<br>1970-76         | 6<br>(24.0) | 1<br>(4.0)  | 4<br>(16.0) | 14<br>(56.0) | 25 |
|  | 7<br>(17.5) | 5<br>(12.5) | 7<br>(17.5) | 21<br>(52.5) | 40 |

Cluster B = 60% Pro France

Cluster C = Uncommitted

Chi Square = 5.70412 with 3 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.1269

Five states withdrew their support from Paris in the 1970s (Cluster C-B) of whom four did not benefit from aid in the second time period.

In a similar fashion, almost 67% of African states who maintained their support for Paris after de Gaulle (Cluster B-B), received aid finance from the French donor from 1970. However, when consideration is given to the total nature of aid and voting changes, it is not possible to establish a positive relationship.

The value of chi squared is only significant at the 0.1269 level which provides insufficient evidence of an association between African behaviour at the United Nations and the French program.

#### FRENCH AID AND NATIONALISATION

Receipts of French economic assistance have never provided an absolute guarantee against the threat of nationalisation of French investment. However, it is apparent that de Gaulle was not slow to recognise the sanction of suspended aid relations against African states who expropriated French resources. As a result, with the possible exception of Mali, recipients of concessional finance in the period up to 1969 rarely nationalised French investment interests, and never did so without providing adequate compensation.

In the years following de Gaulle's Presidential term of office, investors had less cause to expect similar protection, irrespective of the focus of the French aid program. From 1970 to 1976, eight African states introduced domestic measures leading to the expropriation of French owned resources. Seven of these states were in receipt of aid to a total of \$1304.8m, which represents over 39% of the program to the continent. In other words, almost 40% of French assistance to Africa was distributed to states who did not feel that their status as recipients obliged them to ignore French investment in policies of nationalisation.

#### FRENCH AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES

Whilst it is difficult to determine the precise significance

of economic aid in developing a network of facilities for French military personnel, it is apparent that Paris was not slow to provide finance to African states which maintained military contacts with the Western European donor. Prior to 1970, de Gaulle certainly endeavoured to maintain military access to the former dependencies. Eight states on the continent allowed the former metropolitan power access to base facilities during this period and they were in receipt of \$1132.6m. In addition, eight African leaders signed bilateral defence agreements with Paris and they acquired \$446.8m. in economic aid. Moreover, during the 1960s, de Gaulle vigorously defended his right to involve his troops in the domestic politics of Francophone recipient states.

By the 1970s, the French military had access to base facilities in only three Sub-Saharan African countries; and a further three states maintained defence agreements with Paris. It must be emphasised that, unlike the first time period, these military contacts only applied in African states South of the Sahara. More importantly, whilst these states were not ignored in terms of French economic aid (being in receipt of 45% of total assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa), it is apparent that many major beneficiaries, including those in North Africa, established a notion of military dependence following de Gaulle's departure. In 1964, 40,000 French troops were deployed on the African continent. By the mid 1970s the number of military personnel had declined to 10,000<sup>(33)</sup>. In addition, French troops were involved in overt military operations on the continent on only one occasion in the second-time period, as compared to at least eleven similar interventions in the 1960s. Moreover, the 'operation' in Chad up to 1971 had its origins under de Gaulle's Administration from 1968.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the years from African independence up to 1976, Franco-African aid contacts have been dominated by colonial history. This was especially noticeable during de Gaulle's management of international affairs when barely 1.5% of the aid program was distributed to non Francophone states on the continent. Tamar Golan, in commenting upon this period in Franco-African relations, noted:

"Factors characterising France's colonial relationships were the towering personality of De Gaulle and his unique role in the de-colonisation process ... The term 'Special Relationship' came to replace 'direct rule' in an attempt to keep pace with the new nature of relationships between France and her former dependencies. Coined during the Gaullist period, the term carried the unmistakable mark of the General. It did not just imply a paternal obligation on France's part to guide (sometimes quite firmly), assist and maintain a sense of responsibility towards her former colonies; it also did not require only obedience, trust and sharing on the part of the former colonies. The 'Special Relationship' was also intended to apply among members of the family who were required to support each other in the face of the hostile outside world". (34)

The former dependencies certainly represented the most fertile ground for de Gaulle's aims and ambitions. At the same time, such contacts, when reinforced by substantial sums of economic aid, undoubtedly encouraged the development of military facilities for French personnel, and helped to safeguard the vast majority of French investment on the continent.

By the 1970s, however, despite an increase in the size of the aid program, the term, 'special relationship' was no longer applicable to France's relations with some of her recipients. Traditional, cultural and historical links with the Western

European power may still have been the major criteria for receiving economic aid, but they were no longer the universal ones. The proportion of French assistance which was extended to non Franco-phone Africa increased in the 1970s to over 6%. Moreover, the regional emphasis of the program was changed and appears to have lost some of its pervasive nature. This was especially noticeable in North Africa after de Gaulle, where a French military presence was positively discouraged and French investment was expropriated in considerable measure. Not only did French aid continue to have little effect upon the nature of African voting at the United Nation but, even in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is noticeable that recipient states were less prepared to maintain the ready access of base facilities to French military personnel; to guarantee French resources from nationalisation measures; and to subscribe to the centralised control of the Franc Zone.

French political influence may have still prevailed after de Gaulle, particularly in Francophone areas of black Africa, where economic and political weakness necessitated a degree of dependence upon the former metropolitan authority. The French economic aid program did not ignore these states, but neither did it disproportionately favour them.

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The Commission concluded that French aid to Africa should not necessarily increase at the expense of French assistance to other parts of the world. These recommendations were published at the same time that M Cartier, publisher of Paris Match, printed a number of articles critical of French foreign aid. On February 29th, March 3rd and March 14th of 1964, he argued that such finance would be better devoted to France's own needs - 'Garonne not Gabon' was the main theme.
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Resolutions analysed in this research were those drafted with support and included topics under the Political and Security headings of:

- a) Disarmament and Related Matters
- b) Questions Concerning the Use of Atomic Energy
- c) Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
- d) Strengthening of International Security
- e) Questions Relating to Asia and the Far East
- f) Questions Concerning the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor
- g) Questions Relating to the Organisation of the

the United Nations and the Membership of the United Nations  
h) Other Political and Security Questions

8. Guy de Carmoy, Les Politiques Etrangères de la France, Paris, eds., de la Table Ronde, 1967
9. A Mazrui, op.cit., p. 41
10. For a more detailed discussion of the administration of French economic aid, see T Hayter, (1966), op.cit., G. Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, O.E.C.D., 1964; Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, 1974, Paris
11. Development Co-operation: 1975 Annual Review, D.A.C., Paris. In the context of aid, the term 'grace period' refers to the initial years of the agreement when repayment is not requested.
12. For a more detailed discussion of the integrated economic relationship between France and the members of the Franc Zone, see T Hayter, op.cit., Members of the Franc Zone: Cameroon, C.A.R., Chad, Dahomey, Congo, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Upper Volta. Between 1958 and 1973, Guinea, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and Madagascar left the zone.
13. See W F Hanrieder and G P Auton, The Foreign Policies of West Germany, France and Britain, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1980, pp. 97-166
14. This includes the \$29.2m in economic aid distributed to both Morocco and Tunisia up to 1961.
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18. Financial Times, December 1967
19. Keesings Contemporary Archives, Longman, London

20. See P. Lellouche and D. Moisi, French Policy in Africa: A Lonely Battle Against Destabilisation, International Security, Spring 1979, Vol. 3., No 4, pp. 108-134
21. This bilateral defence agreement theoretically provided for French military intervention, conditional upon the request of the local government and at the approval of the French authorities.
22. P. Lellouche et al., op.cit., p. iii
23. See Nielson, The Great Powers and Africa, Praeger, New York, 1969
24. G. Arnold, Aid in Africa, Kogan Page, London, 1979, p. 51
25. For an analysis of de Gaulle's foreign policies, see A. Hartley, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle, Boston, Mass., Little, Brown and Co., 1965; W. Kulski, De Gaulle and the World: the Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York, 1966
26. For details of these visits and the ramifications for Franco-African relations, see G. Varley, France's Year in Africa, 1971, in C. Legum eds., Africa Contemporary Record 1971-72, Holmes and Meier, 1972
27. Zaire has some linguistic links with France and so, in one sense, the number of non Francophone recipient states is six. However, for the purposes of this study, Francophone Africa implies states with former colonial connections.
28. In 1970, Kaye Whiteman, whilst commenting upon African criticism of the French Government's decision to devalue the Franc, posed the rhetorical question: 'Would such frank criticism have been voiced if the General had still been in power?' C. Legum eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-70, Holmes and Meier, 1970, A39
29. In addition, the Algerians cancelled an order with the French Company Renault-Saviem, for the purchase of 5,500 lorries and awarded the contract to the Swedish firm Volvo. In the same year, the French company, CIT-Alcatel were refused a contract for telephonic equipment and preference was given to a Spanish subsidiary of ITT. By November 1975, economic relations were sufficiently acrimonious to warrant a rupture of relations between the oil company Elf-Erap and Algeria.
30. In addition, the French arms industry benefitted substantially from the sale of arms, notably Mirages, to both Egypt and Libya; whilst friendly links with the latter were maintained throughout the 1970s by an exchange of visits between the Libyan and French Heads of State.

31. African states in the Franc Zone who garnered in excess of \$100.0m in the 1970s were Cameroon, Mali, C.A.R., Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta.
32. Recipients of French aid included amongst the O.E.C.D's category of the least developed states of the world were: Burundi, C.A.R., Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Rwanda and Upper Volta. See Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977
33. Estimated figures by Rene Bachman and published in Nouvel Observateur, 22nd May, 1978
34. C Legum eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, Holmes and Meier, 1976, A97

CHAPTER FIVE

ECONOMIC AID FROM THE UNITED STATES

Africa has not always been at the forefront of American foreign policy concerns. Up to the late 1950s and early 1960s, Washington generally endorsed the African policies of her NATO allies, the colonial powers of Britain and France. The continent as a whole remained low on American international priorities and occupied a similarly low position in her share of the total US budget <sup>(1)</sup>. However, during President Eisenhower's second term in office, when it was apparent that the colonial administration of the continent was beginning to decline, American policy towards Africa became a little more positive. In 1957 Vice President Nixon attended the independence ceremonies in Ghana and, in 1958, Congress authorised the establishment of a separate Bureau of African Affairs under the auspices of its own Assistant Secretary of State.

On the whole, however, American policy towards Africa lacked purpose and co-ordination prior to 1960, whilst her association with the former colonial powers did not always win her friends on the continent. In the forum of the United Nations General Assembly Washington consistently allied herself with the Western European states on issues such as colonialism, apartheid and South Africa. Moreover, in 1960, with the introduction of a resolution calling for the 'Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', the United States was only one of nine countries to withhold support (89 for, 0 against and 9 abstentions) to the motion of immediate independence for all states. Such an association cost the USA any effective chance of a 'natural leadership' of the Afro-Asian member states <sup>(2)</sup>. With the rapid introduction of the new African states into the United Nations in the early 1960s, the USA could no longer automatically control

a majority vote in the General Assembly. By 1963, there were at least thirty-three African states whose potential support was crucial in the General Assembly debates. As a result, the need to establish American influence over these states began to assume a new importance.

The election to office of President Kennedy in 1960 led to a further overhaul of relations with Africa and marked the reappraisal of the political and strategic significance of this continent. To a certain extent, the new Administration sought to fulfil American aims and ambitions in Africa by providing the newly independent nations with economic assistance. In 1964, a former official of the Agency for International Development stated:

"We aid Africa because it is in the US interest to hasten and encourage the development of the continent along constructive political, economic and social lines ... and to help countries which desire to remain independent and substantially free from subversion, domination and control ... A further reason for aiding Africa is a strategic one, namely to facilitate maintenance of US strategic facilities in a number of countries on the continent". (3)

In this respect, the rhetoric of American economic assistance seems to have been guided, at least in the early 1960s, by a mixture of altruism and self interest. Within this context, it is the intention of this Chapter to examine the extent to which aid has been successful in fulfilling US aims and ambitions, and in developing Washington's political influence in Africa.

#### POLITICAL INFLUENCE

The ideological conflict between the United States and USSR is clearly reflected in their opposition over certain issues

debated in the United Nations. As a result, the international community of the General Assembly provides a platform for discerning, if not international alliances, then certainly areas of political influence. It is intended to examine the development of American political influence in terms of the voting performance of African members at the United Nations. The voting analysis will be made not only in relation to the degree of agreement with the United States, but also in terms of the operational significance of these votes to the aims and ambitions of the United States. In this respect, this study will focus on General Assembly resolutions, drafted with the explicit support of the United States, in direct opposition to the Soviet Union. A high degree of concurrence by African States will be regarded as a positive index of American political influence.

At the same time, reference will be made to the incidence of African nationalisation of American owned investment and property. African attitudes towards United States' investment interests are of importance as a reflection of support in the capitalism versus communism debate. Moreover, the United States has often proclaimed a link between the strategy of their economic aid programs and the position of American private investment in the less developed world<sup>(5)</sup>. In 1972, in a White House Policy statement entitled, 'Economic Assistance and Investment Security in Developing Nations', President Nixon announced:

"When a country expropriates a significant United States interest without making reasonable provision for such compensation to United States citizens, we will presume that the United States will not extend new bilateral economic benefits to the expropriating country unless and until it is determined that the country is taking reasonable steps to provide adequate compensation or that there are major factors

affecting United States interests which require continuance of all or part of these benefits ... The US fully respects the rights of others, but it will not ignore actions prejudicial to the rule of law and legitimate US interests ...

A principle objective of foreign economic assistance programmes is to assist developing countries in attracting private investment ... A sort of symbiosis exists - with government aid efforts not only speeding the flow, but actually depending for their success upon, private capital both domestic and foreign. And, of course, from the investor's point of view, foreign private investment must either yield financial benefits for him or cease to be available". (6)

This study will consider the extent to which this attitude conforms with the reality of American aid relations on the continent. Naturally, African nationalisation of American-owned private investment will be regarded as a negative indicator of the spread of United States' political influence.

Finally, this analysis will take into consideration the extent to which African recipients have made available facilities for American military personnel. Although it is recognised that, by the 1960s, the notion of a network of overseas military bases was outmoded in some circles as a strategic concept, overseas bases and the presence of US military personnel maintained their importance for a variety of political and economic reasons<sup>(7)</sup>.

In the US Air Force Magazine of May 1960, it was aptly pointed out that, 'expenditure in connection with construction or operation of our bases is a form of economic aid and moreover, a form that is palatable to Congress'. Even more importantly, the United States was anxious to maintain her bases overseas for political and psychological reasons. In the words of Major General D O Smith, UN Bases abroad are regarded as a 'valuable and necessary feature of a grand design for free world survival'<sup>(8)</sup>. In this respect, the granting of facilities to American military personnel

is a substantive measure of political influence on the African continent.

#### THE UNITED STATES AID PROGRAM

The study of American-African aid relations is divided into two time periods: the years from African independence up to 1969; and the years from 1970 to 1976. On the one hand, this division permits an analysis of the political development of United States' economic aid in what comprised the first decade of independence for many African states. On the other hand, this outline also emphasises the reconsideration of Afro-American relations undertaken from 1970 by both President Nixon and Congress. Aaron Segal, in his study of American foreign policy on the African continent noted that 1970 marked the year when,

"the Nixon administration sought to define its African policies and bring some order into a confusing and complex array of aid, trade and military commitments". (9)

In the same year, the American President met leaders from ten African states and commissioned a series of African tours by the Assistant Secretary of State of the Bureau of African Affairs, David D Newsom. Congress also mirrored this Executive interest in the continent by convening a series of Hearings entitled, 'United States' Policy towards Africa for the 1970s''.

Preliminary consideration of United States' economic aid in the two periods reveals a decline in African receipts from 1970. In the years from independence up to 1969 the United States distributed the cast total of \$4354.0m in bilateral assistance to thirty-eight independent states. From 1970 to 1976, the American program to African totalled \$1908.0m to thirty-six recipient

states. This represents an average annual reduction of approximately \$162.0m. (10)

American economic aid loans have, over the years, been offered at varying rates of interest. Since the 1950s, however, there has been a noticeable 'hardening' of the terms of assistance. The most common contemporary loan is offered for a period of up to forty years, with a grace period of one or two years, at an interest rate of up to six per cent (11). To a certain extent, the changing character of United States economic assistance is due to the fact that the aid program as a whole is subject to considerable domestic pressures. American aid is dependent upon Congressional opinion and action. The aid budget requires annual Congressional sanction and this is occasionally only granted grudgingly (12).

At the same time, the administrative framework governing the implementation of the US economic assistance program places some constraints on the executive's ability to disseminate concessionary finance wherever it deems necessary, and for whatever reasons it considers to be suitable. In the years since the inauguration of American economic aid to the less developed world, the program has been checked, restructured and reorganised by a multitude of institutions, committees and reports. There has been a plethora of institutions whose primary role was to administer post-war economic assistance; for example, the Economic Co-operation Administration; the Technical Co-operation Administration (1950); the Mutual Security Agency (1951); the International Co-operation Administration (1955); and the Agency for International Development (1961) (13).

TABLE 1


US AID TO AFRICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

| <u>NORTH</u> | \$m          | <u>EAST</u>                 | \$m         |
|--------------|--------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| Algeria      | 163.4        | Burundi                     | 4.6         |
| Egypt        | 1062.2       | Ethiopia                    | 181.9       |
| Libya        | 183.4        | Kenya                       | 46.6        |
| Morocco      | 603.3        | Rwanda                      | 8.1         |
| Tunisia      | <u>550.1</u> | Somalia                     | 61.9        |
|              |              | Sudan                       | 110.3       |
| TOTAL        | \$2562.4m    | Tanzania                    | 69.2        |
|              |              | Uganda                      | <u>28.6</u> |
| <u>WEST</u>  |              | TOTAL                       | \$511.2m    |
| Cameroon     | 27.7         |                             |             |
| Chad         | 7.1          | <u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |             |
| Dahomey      | 10.1         | Botswana                    | 6.0         |
| Gambia       | 1.1          | CAR                         | 3.1         |
| Ghana        | 215.1        | Congo                       | 4.0         |
| Guinea       | 87.4         | Eq. Guinea                  | -           |
| Ivory Coast  | 31.6         | Gabon                       | 7.2         |
| Liberia      | 213.7        | Lesotho                     | 4.0         |
| Mali         | 18.4         | Madagascar                  | 8.5         |
| Mauritania   | 0.1          | Malawi                      | 15.4        |
| Niger        | 15.1         | Swaziland                   | -           |
| Nigeria      | 215.5        | Zaire                       | 277.8       |
| Senegal      | 28.7         | Zambia                      | <u>16.7</u> |
| Sierra Leone | 41.0         | TOTAL                       | \$342.7m    |
| Togo         | 13.3         |                             |             |
| Upper Volta  | <u>11.8</u>  |                             |             |
| TOTAL        | \$937.7m     | TOTAL =                     | \$4354.0m   |
|              |              | <u>Regional Share:</u>      |             |
|              |              | North                       | 58.9%       |
|              |              | West                        | 21.5%       |
|              |              | East                        | 11.7%       |
|              |              | Central &<br>Southern       | 7.9%        |

Sources: United States' Agency for International Development 1948-64, Washington 1965; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1960-64, 1965, 1966-67, 1968, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris.

# AFRICA

AMERICAN AID RELATIONS FROM  
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969.



- RECIPIENTS OF AMERICAN AID
- NATIONALISATION
- A VOTING OPPOSITION
- B VOTING AGREEMENT
- C UNCOMMITTED
- ✈ MILITARY BASE FACILITIES

AMERICAN-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE UP TO 1969

Economic aid contacts with the African continent were formally established in 1953 with financial flows of \$1.2m and \$1.6m to Ethiopia and Libya respectively. By 1969, this had developed into a total program of \$4354.0m to thirty-eight independent African states. However, the progression of United States aid relations with Africa during this period was by no means smooth and uncomplicated. In the early years, before the onrush of African independence, America's economic assistance program was largely guided by the doctrine of containment of communism<sup>(14)</sup>. Such a 'philosophy' favoured North and East African recipients, including Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and the independent West African state of Liberia.

The early 1960s witnessed an increase in the aid program as the growth of African independence developed both the number of potential recipients and the political and strategic importance of the continent as a whole. At the same time, the administration of US aid did not drastically deviate from the strategy of the 'containment of communism'. President Kennedy's policies were based on the idea that it would be in America's best interests to provide the newly independent African nations with sufficient economic aid to discourage them from seeking Soviet assistance. Thus, in 1962, US aid to Africa 'peaked' with an annual distribution of \$553.0m involving twenty-seven recipient states.

In the years following 1962, American's foreign aid policies came under increasing domestic pressure. In Africa, the massive outlay by the United States in the Congo, in addition to the much publicised injections of finance to Ghana, Guinea and

Egypt - all of whom were receiving substantial Soviet assistance at the same time - led to considerable domestic criticism of the United States' program. During 1963, the Clay Committee was appointed in order to examine America's foreign aid program to the less developed world. Its final report criticised the Administration for trying, 'to do too much in too many countries', recommended a reduction in US assistance and especially singled out Africa as

"An area where the Western European countries should logically bear most of the necessary aid burden ... In the light of its other responsibilities, the United States cannot undertake to support all the African countries, especially when their ties with other Free World nations are largely elsewhere". (15)

In general terms, the ramifications of the Clay Report included a reduction in the total United States aid budget of \$1.7bn, for 1964<sup>(16)</sup>. On the whole, however, the Clay Committee's recommendations were never fully implemented in Africa, and, although US assistance to the continent dropped from the 'peak' of 1962, economic assistance continued to play a predominant role in Afro-American international relations. Indeed, it was noticeable that, amongst the exceptions to 'cut-back' recommended by the Clay Committee were several bilateral programs in North and East Africa. These exceptions were sanctioned by virtue of their 'proximity' to the Soviet perimeter'<sup>(17)</sup>.

The period from 1966 to 1969 saw a gradual decline in US aid to the continent. This development was generally in accord with the recommendations of an additional report by E. Korry, who was commissioned by President Johnson in 1966 to prepare a study of US aid to Africa. Set at a time immediately following the escalation of American intervention in Vietnam, it is apparent Korry was constrained by a set of global political

assumptions which did not entirely favour involvement in Africa<sup>(18)</sup>  
Thus, between 1966 and 1969, United States aid to Africa declined from an annual total of \$436.0m to \$256.0m respectively.

In general terms, in the period up to 1969, the United States economic aid program to Africa was vast and comprehensive. With the exceptions of Equatorial Guinea and Swaziland, every independent African state was in receipt of some measure of American assistance. However, it would appear that the program as a whole favoured those states whose power, influence and strategic position in international affairs was perceived to be important by Washington. In regional terms, the largest beneficiaries of United States' aid were the five, recipient North African states bordering the Mediterranean, who accrued \$2562.4m., which represents over 58% of total American aid to the continent up to 1969. The Central and Southern African states, on the other hand, were only in receipt of \$324.7m. (less than 8% of the program), of which \$277.8m was distributed to Zaire alone in a relatively unsuccessful attempt to preserve American influence following the secessionist struggle in Katanga<sup>(19)</sup>.

To a certain extent, the recommendation of the Clay Report, that Western Europe held responsibility for their former dependencies on the continent, was reflected in the geographical distribution of the American program. Aid to Francophone Africa amounted to \$1490.2m., or over 34% of total assistance during this period. Anglophone Africa acquired \$769.5m., which was the equivalent of less than 18% of overall concessional finance. In other words, over 48% of the total program was allocated to states where neither Britain nor France could claim longstanding traditional or historical contacts.

TABLE 2

US AID AND AFRICAN VOTING UP TO 1969CLUSTER B (60% pro US)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst</u> | <u>Tot</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u>        |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|-------------------------|
| Botswana     | 12         | 2           | 1           | 15         | 6.0                     |
| Cameroon     | 15         | 1           | 18          | 34         | 27.7                    |
| C.A.R        | 22         | 5           | 8           | 35         | 3.1                     |
| Chad         | 18         | 2           | 13          | 33         | 7.1                     |
| Dahomey      | 27         | 3           | 4           | 34         | 10.1                    |
| Eq. Guinea   | 3          | -           | 2           | 5          | -                       |
| Gabon        | 23         | -           | 6           | 29         | 7.2                     |
| Gambia       | 13         | 2           | -           | 15         | 1.1                     |
| Ivory Coast  | 27         | 3           | 6           | 36         | 31.6                    |
| Lesotho      | 12         | 2           | 1           | 15         | 4.0                     |
| Liberia      | 48         | 1           | 7           | 56         | 213.7                   |
| Madagascar   | 29         | 1           | 7           | 37         | 8.5                     |
| Malawi       | 19         | 2           | 1           | 22         | 15.4                    |
| Niger        | 28         | 3           | 5           | 36         | 15.1                    |
| Rwanda       | 18         | 4           | 1           | 23         | 8.1                     |
| Senegal      | 16         | 7           | 14          | 37         | 28.7                    |
| Sierra Leone | 14         | 1           | 18          | 33         | 41.0                    |
| Swaziland    | 7          | -           | 1           | 8          | -                       |
| Togo         | 25         | 1           | 10          | 36         | 13.3                    |
| Upper Volta  | 18         | 3           | 9           | 30         | 11.8                    |
| Zaire        | 24         | 3           | 3           | 30         | 277.8                   |
|              |            |             |             |            | <u>\$731.3m (16.8%)</u> |

CLUSTER A (60% anti US)

|            |   |    |    |    |                        |
|------------|---|----|----|----|------------------------|
| Algeria    | 1 | 21 | 4  | 26 | 163.4                  |
| Burundi    | 1 | 14 | 8  | 23 | 4.6                    |
| Congo      | 8 | 19 | 2  | 29 | 4.0                    |
| Guinea     | 1 | 28 | 16 | 45 | 87.4                   |
| Mali       | 2 | 26 | 6  | 34 | 18.4                   |
| Mauritania | 7 | 19 | 5  | 31 | 0.1                    |
| Tanzania   | 1 | 14 | 7  | 22 | 69.2                   |
| Zambia     | 1 | 14 | 5  | 20 | 16.7                   |
|            |   |    |    |    | <u>\$363.8m (8.4%)</u> |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|          |    |    |    |    |                          |
|----------|----|----|----|----|--------------------------|
| Egypt    | 2  | 26 | 29 | 57 | 1062.2                   |
| Ethiopia | 15 | 13 | 29 | 57 | 181.9                    |
| Ghana    | 8  | 14 | 35 | 57 | 215.1                    |
| Kenya    | 2  | 7  | 10 | 19 | 46.6                     |
| Libya    | 10 | 7  | 35 | 52 | 183.4                    |
| Morocco  | 9  | 15 | 26 | 50 | 603.3                    |
| Nigeria  | 6  | 9  | 20 | 35 | 215.5                    |
| Somalia  | 5  | 10 | 14 | 29 | 61.9                     |
| Sudan    | 6  | 23 | 26 | 55 | 110.3                    |
| Tunisia  | 20 | 10 | 25 | 55 | 550.1                    |
| Uganda   | 2  | 11 | 9  | 22 | 28.6                     |
|          |    |    |    |    | <u>\$3258.9m (74.8%)</u> |

UNITED STATES AID AND AMERICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO 1969

Despite the comprehensive nature of the American aid program during this period, there is little evidence to assume that this assistance was instrumental in determining the pattern of African voting in the United Nations. Analysis of resolutions drafted with the explicit support of the United States, in direct opposition to the Soviet Union, reveals that twenty-one states consistently voted with the United States, eight opposed Washington (Cluster A) and a further eleven preferred to remain uncommitted (Cluster C). To a large extent, the broad focus of the program during this period, in which only two states were not in receipt of aid, undermines the significance of the crosstabulation between aid and voting. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that the only two states not to benefit from aid during this period consistently voted with the American donor.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | African States<br>not receiving aid<br>up to 1969 | African States<br>in receipt of<br>aid up to 1969 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 0<br>(0.0)  | 8<br>(100.0)                                      | 8  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 0<br>(0.0)  | 11<br>(100.0)                                     | 11 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 2<br>(9.5)  | 19<br>(90.5)                                      | 21 |
| Column<br>Total            | 2<br>(5.0)  | 38<br>(95.0)                                      | 40 |

Chi Square = 1.90 with two degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.3858

Recipients who concurred with the United States were able to garner \$731.3m. This represented a mere 16.8% of total aid to the continent and should be compared with the distribution of \$3258.9m

- or 74.8% of the program - to the eleven African states who remained relatively uncommitted in the debates. In addition, the eight African states who consistently voted against Washington were in receipt of aid to a total of \$363.8m. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the American program and the nature of African support reveal that the program seemed to discriminate against states who voted with the Western donor (Correlation -0.2368). In this respect, it would not be surprising if the total program from Washington appeared to be incapable of developing a positive image for the United States.

The propensity of African States in Cluster C to dominate the distribution of total assistance to the continent demands further investigation. Whilst the most prevalent voting characteristic of these eleven states was their relatively uncommitted performance, the record of abstention votes was not absolute. Thus, it is possible to redistribute states in Cluster C according to the level of support for, or opposition to, the United States on the occasions when they registered a direct vote.

TABLE 3

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C BETWEEN 'PRO' AND 'ANTI' VOTES UP TO 1969Cluster Ca

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| Egypt       | 2          | 26          | 1062.2           |
| Ghana       | 8          | 14          | 215.1            |
| Kenya       | 2          | 7           | 46.6             |
| Morocco     | 9          | 15          | 603.3            |
| Nigeria     | 6          | 9           | 215.5            |
| Somalia     | 5          | 10          | 61.9             |
| Sudan       | 6          | 23          | 110.3            |
| Uganda      | 2          | 11          | 28.6             |
|             |            |             | <u>\$2343.5m</u> |

Cluster Cb

|         |    |    |              |
|---------|----|----|--------------|
| Tunisia | 20 | 10 | <u>550.1</u> |
|         |    |    | \$ 550.1m    |

Cluster Cz

|          |    |    |              |
|----------|----|----|--------------|
| Ethiopia | 15 | 13 | 181.9        |
| Libya    | 10 | 7  | <u>183.4</u> |
|          |    |    | \$ 365.3m    |

Cluster Ca: Comprises African states which revealed a general tendency towards abstention votes, but on the occasions when they expressed direct votes, cast more than 60% in opposition to US

Cluster Cb: Comprises Tunisia, which revealed a general tendency towards abstention, but on other occasions cast more than 60% of their votes in favour of US.

Cluster Cz: Comprises Ethiopia and Libya who preferred to balance their direct votes neither in favour of, nor in opposition to, US

Over 70% of these African states displayed an inclination to vote against the American donor, irrespective of the flow of assistance. The vast majority (71.9%) of concessional finance to states in Cluster C was distributed to those countries whose direct votes were predominately cast in opposition to the Western donor (Cluster Ca). Moreover, whilst it should be noted that Tunisia (Cluster Cb) was in receipt of a substantial sum of American aid, this North African state was by no means the largest beneficiary. In this

respect, both Egypt and Morocco, whose direct votes did not favour the United States, were able to negotiate considerably more assistance from Washington. To a certain extent, this provides further confirmation that the distribution of the American program cannot directly be associated with the pattern of African voting support at the United Nations.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN RESOURCES  
UP TO 1969

TABLE 4

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Year of<br/>Expropriation</u> | <u>Type of<br/>Investment</u> | <u>Aid up<br/>to 1969</u> | <u>Year of<br/>First Aid</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------|------------------------------|
| Egypt       | 1961                             | Textile                       | \$1062.2m                 | 1955                         |
| Tunisia     | 1964                             | Private                       | \$ 550.1m                 | 1957                         |
| Tanzania    | 1967                             | Banking and<br>Insurance      | \$ 69.2m                  | 1961                         |
| (1) Malawi  | 1968                             | Private                       | \$ 15.4m                  | 1964                         |
| Algeria     | 1967                             | Petroleum                     | \$ 163.4m                 | 1962                         |

(1) Full compensation paid

Sources: 'US Department of State Report on Nationalisation, Expropriation, and other Takings of US Property since 1960', Research Study RECS-14, November 30th 1971; J F Truitt, 'Expropriation of Foreign Investment: Summary of Post World War II Experience of American and British Investors in Less Developed Countries, Journal of International Business Studies, (Fall 1970), pp. 21-43

Five African governments expanded the public sector at the direct expense of American owned investment. All were in receipt of United States economic assistance prior to the year of nationalisation and, in the period up to 1969, these states accrued a total of \$1860.3m., the equivalent of over 42% of the American program. In this respect, economic aid from the United States was apparently not instrumental in preventing African expropriation of donor-

based investment.

However, it should be noted that these African states did not confine their policies of nationalisation to American investment alone. This is most evident in Algeria and Tanzania, the latter being part of President Nyerere's general economic philosophy of self-determination at the expense of foreign based resources<sup>(20)</sup>. In this respect, American economic assistance failed to safeguard United States investment in a widespread program of expropriation. It would be erroneous to assume that African states wishing to maximise economic aid from the United States should nationalise American interests on the continent. The ability of certain states to benefit from American assistance is not due to their propensity to introduce domestic economic programs which are detrimental to this Western donor. Rather, it is dependent upon Washington's perception of the economic and political significance of these states to Washington's aims and ambitions<sup>(21)</sup>. Substantial United States economic aid was distributed to these African states (especially those North African countries bordering the Mediterranean) despite their nationalisation policies not because of them. It is noticeable that the Government of Malawi was in receipt of relatively minor sums of American aid (\$15.4m) and was the only one of these five recipient states to quickly offer full compensation to American investors. In other words, the strategic and political importance of this Southern African state was insufficient to provide her with the confidence of immunity from American censure - following a program of nationalisation without compensation.

UNITED STATES AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES UP TO 1969

American military personnel were granted access to base facilities in five African countries during this period: Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Liberia and briefly in Zaire. In Libya a substantial military force was stationed at the Wheelus Air Base throughout the period up to 1969. Also in North Africa over 1500 American troops were garrisoned at the Kenitra Air Base in Morocco which formed part of the Strategic Air Command. An official withdrawal from Morocco was scheduled for 31st December 1963, although it is apparent that a large number of personnel remained throughout the 1960s to assist the Moroccans in training and use of the communications relay station. Elsewhere on the continent during this period, American personnel were based at the Monrovia Harbour and the Robert Fields Airport in Liberia<sup>(22)</sup>, and a communications relay station near Asmara in Ethiopia. In addition, there was an American military presence in Zaire, following the outbreak of civil strife in 1964. United States economic assistance to these five states in the year up to 1969 amounted to \$1460.lm., which represents over 33% of total American aid to the continent. In this respect, it would appear that the granting of military facilities to the United States did not prove to be detrimental to these African states, as measured in receipts of American aid. However, it is not possible to establish a direct connection between assistance and recipient response in terms of military access. By the 1960s, there was a large measure of African antipathy towards the idea of a foreign military presence and such large scale recipients as Algeria, Tunisia, Nigeria, Ghana and Egypt, who

garnered \$2204.5m in aid from the United States, resisted any American overtures for base facilities. Indeed, President Nasser of Egypt, the largest beneficiary of United States' economic assistance up to 1969, called for the withdrawal of all foreign military bases from the African continent in 1964<sup>(23)</sup>.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1969

Despite the general level of instability within African political life during this period<sup>(24)</sup>, American aid relations with individual recipients remained relatively constant. During this period, Mauritania was the sole African state to receive United States' aid in one year only. For the majority of other recipients, concessional finance was distributed regularly and in successive years. However, there have been a number of occasions when substantial increases in American assistance have coincided with changes in political leadership on the African continent. Analysis of United States' economic aid distribution during this period reveals eight occasions when American assistance increased by over 100% in a twelve month period. It is noticeable that, for five of the African states concerned, such injections of aid finance have followed a change in political leadership.

TABLE 5: INCREASES IN AID AND POLITICAL CHANGE

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>%Increase</u> | <u>Aid</u><br><u>(\$m)</u> | <u>Year</u> | <u>Nature of Political</u><br><u>Change</u>   |
|--------------|------------------|----------------------------|-------------|---|
| Algeria      | 210              | (\$7.4m-<br>\$23.0m)       | 1965-66     | Boumedienne ousts Ben Bella in military coup (1965)                                   |
| Ghana        | 315              | (\$8.0m-<br>\$33.2m)       | 1964-65     | No change but President Nkrumah overthrown by coup in 1966                            |
| Guinea       | 103              | (\$11.0m-<br>\$22.4m)      | 1964-65     | No change in leadership but relations with France suspended                           |
| Liberia      | 110              | (\$12.0m-<br>\$25.2m)      | 1964-65     | No change   |
| Sierra Leone | 333              | (\$3.0m-<br>\$13.0m)       | 1964-65     | Premier Milton Margai dies and is succeeded by his half brother Albert Margai in 1964 |
| Kenya        | 553              | (\$2.0m-<br>\$12.6m)       | 1964-65     | Kenya is declared a Republic in 1964 and Kenyatta becomes first President             |
| Sudan        | 7625             | (\$0.4m-<br>\$30.9m)       | 1958-59     | General Ibrahim Abboud siezes power in military coup in 1958                          |
| Zaire        | 2033             | (\$3.0m-<br>\$64.0m)       | 1961-62     | Civil War (1960-61)   |

Source: Africa, South of the Sahara, Europe Publications, London; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Africa Research Ltd., Exeter, Annual Index.

It would appear that the United States was attempting to establish political influence in certain areas of the continent by extending substantial sums of assistance to new political leaders. Such a strategy can be seen as an extension of President Kennedy's notion that it would be in America's best interests to provide the newly independent African nations with sufficient economic aid to prevent them from seeking Soviet assistance. However, the success of such an aid policy must be questioned when only three of these states consistently supported the United States up to 1969. (See Table 2).

It should be noted that the three largest long term

beneficiaries of United States' aid during this period where the North African states of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, whose political leadership displayed characteristics of durability and continuity up to 1969 under President Nasser, King Hassan II and President Bourguiba respectively. These three states alone accrued a total of \$2215.6m., which represents over 50% of total American assistance to the continent.

Thus, on the one hand, it could be argued that injections of United States' aid finance have been 'acquired' by African states as a result of changes in political leadership. In this respect, Washington has attempted to exploit African political instability by selectively buttressing incoming leaders with substantial sums of economic aid. On the other hand, the major long term beneficiaries of her assistance have not been forced to rely upon such drastic measures. On the contrary, these states are notable for having relatively stable political leaders who displayed an ability to capitalise upon their countries' strategic and political significance within international affairs.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS UP TO 1969

Given the regional distribution of American economic aid (see Table 1) it is not surprising that there is little evidence that the American assistance program was distributed simply according to the level of economic need. To a large extent, it would seem that the flow of concessional finance from Washington largely favoured those African states in a relatively strong economic position (25).

Ten African countries received in excess of \$100.0m during

this period, of which few could argue that they owed their dominant position in the program to low economic status:

TABLE 6

MAJOR RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Pop. (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 163.4            | 3175             | 12.6            | 252                   |
| Egypt       | 1062.2           | 4816             | 30.1            | 160                   |
| Libya       | 183.4            | 1088             | 1.7             | 640                   |
| Morocco     | 603.3            | 2623             | 14.1            | 186                   |
| Tunisia     | 550.1            | 90               | 0.4             | 225                   |
| Ghana       | 215.1            | 2296             | 8.0             | 287                   |
| Liberia     | 213.7            | 231              | 1.1             | 210                   |
| Nigeria     | 215.5            | 3992             | 49.9            | 80                    |
| Ethiopia    | 181.9            | 1502             | 23.1            | 65                    |
| Sudan       | 110.3            | 1410             | 14.1            | 100                   |
| Zaire       | 277.8            | 1098             | 18.3            | 60                    |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1969; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971, p. 84., IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

On the whole, it would appear that the total flow of American assistance to the continent favoured large African states with a high GNP. Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal a very significant relationship between aid and levels of GNP (Correlation 0.7047) and population (Correlation 0.5235). Moreover, there is no evidence to assume that Washington developed the program to mirror Africa's economic needs and distributed assistance relative to recipient GNP per capita (Correlation 0.1676).

AMERICAN AID AND INFLUENCE UP TO 1969OVERVIEW

Although Africa has never received the largest share of total American economic assistance, the United States is one of the largest donors of aid to the continent. In a program totalling \$4534.0m., and encompassing thirty-eight independent recipients, American-African aid contacts up to 1969 can safely be characterised as comprehensive.

However, the ability of this vast amount of concessional finance to establish a sphere of political influence seems to have been limited. It is apparent that a very substantial share of economic aid was distributed to African states who failed to consistently support the United States in the General Assembly and who pursued policies which were unpopular in Washington. Thus, only \$731.3m worth of American assistance, the equivalent of less than 17% of the total aid program, was distributed to African states who consistently voted with the Western donor.

Moreover, the five African states which introduced domestic programs of nationalisation, involving the expropriation of American investment, numbered amongst the largest beneficiaries of the program up to 1969. In addition, whilst Washington did not neglect those African states which extended base facilities to her military personnel, it cannot be argued that the United States' aid program as a whole was widely successful in eroding African resistance to a foreign military presence.

Nevertheless, it should not be concluded from the analysis of aid during this period that those African states wishing to maximise flows of American assistance should simply

adopt anti-United States foreign and domestic postures. Such a strategy would be self-defeating for the majority of African countries who are of minor strategic and political importance. It would appear that a large proportion of economic aid from the United States to the African continent was neither based on altruism nor was used to punish states for their behaviour. The relatively limited nature of aid to Washington's impoverished supporters in Central and Southern Africa alone refutes such suggestions. Rather, the distribution of assistance operated on the basis of Washington's strategic and political perceptions - in other words, the degree of political and strategic importance the donor perceived in the recipient. To a large extent, this was implied in the recommendations of the Cláy Committee and witnessed in the dominant position of North Africa in the overall program. However, in terms of establishing a sphere of political influence upon the African continent, it would appear that the philosophy governing the program up to 1969 has not been very successful. In part, this is due to the African image of this Western donor. Although the United States has no history of colonisation in Africa, Washington's close association with the former colonial powers in Western Europe did little to endear her to a continent which was not entirely free from colonial administration in the 1960s.

Perhaps because of the desire to fight her unpopular image on the African continent, the United States has been more prepared to maintain aid relations with states which have adopted postures inimicable to American interests. Thus, possibly with the proviso that governments should not be over-zealous in their condemnation of the United States<sup>(26)</sup>, certain

African states seem to have been able to act in the knowledge that the American donor would not be too reactionary in its approach to unpopular policies. In addition, it is apparent that the United States has frequently attempted to establish new 'friends' in Africa through a policy of providing rapid injections of aid finance to incoming political leaders. However, the utility of such a policy in establishing long term political influence is limited on a continent where political stability is the exception rather than the rule.

#### AMERICAN-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

The years after 1969 witnessed a decline in economic aid to the African continent. From 1970 to 1976, the Western donor distributed \$1908.0m, to thirty-six recipient states. This represents an average annual reduction of over 37% on previous American concessional finance to independent Africa. To a certain extent, this is symptomatic of the reassessment of African aid policy by the Nixon administration. In the light of the relatively negative character of American-African aid relations up to 1969, it would seem that Washington was sensitive to the claims of a former United States ambassador to Senegal that her economic assistance was extended to her opponents and ignored her friends<sup>(27)</sup>. The reduction in American aid is also a consequence of deteriorating relations with certain North African states following Washington's overt economic and political support for the state of Israel in the Middle East conflict. By 1970, aid relations with Libya had been terminated following a successful military coup by Colonel Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi.

TABLE 7

UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AID FROM 1970 to 1976

\$m

| <u>North</u>    |          | <u>East</u>                     |           |
|-----------------|----------|---------------------------------|-----------|
| Algeria         | -        | Burundi                         | 3.0       |
| Egypt           | 372.0    | Ethiopia                        | 151.0     |
| Libya           | -        | Kenya                           | 56.0      |
| Morocco         | 203.0    | Rwanda                          | 9.0       |
| Tunisia         | 150.0    | Somalia                         | 24.0      |
|                 | \$725.0m | Sudan                           | 16.0      |
|                 |          | Tanzania                        | 111.0     |
|                 |          | Uganda                          | 16.0      |
|                 |          |                                 | \$386.0m  |
| <br><u>West</u> |          | <br><u>Central and Southern</u> |           |
| Cameroon        | 28.0     | Botswana                        | 30.0      |
| Chad            | 18.0     | C.A.R.                          | 2.0       |
| Dahomey         | 13.0     | Congo                           | -         |
| Gambia          | 5.0      | Equatorial                      | -         |
| Ghana           | 89.0     | Guinea                          | -         |
| Guinea          | 31.0     | Gabon                           | -         |
| Ivory Coast     | 12.0     | Lesotho                         | 22.0      |
| Liberia         | 64.0     | Madagascar                      | 7.0       |
| Mali            | 47.0     | Malawi                          | 23.0      |
| Mauritania      | 21.0     | Mozambique                      | 9.0       |
| Niger           | 54.0     | Swaziland                       | 8.0       |
| Nigeria         | 141.0    | Zaire                           | 65.0      |
| Senegal         | 32.0     | Zambia                          | 7.0       |
| Sierra Leone    | 22.0     |                                 | \$173.0m  |
| Togo            | 11.0     |                                 |           |
| Upper Volta     | 36.0     |                                 |           |
|                 | \$624.0m |                                 |           |
|                 |          | TOTAL =                         | \$1908.0m |


Regional Distribution:

|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| North | 38.0% |
| West  | 32.7% |
| East  | 20.2% |
| C & S | 9.1%  |

Sources: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, 1976-79, O.E.C.D., Paris

# AFRICA

AMERICAN AID RELATIONS  
FROM 1970 TO 1976.



-  RECIPIENTS OF AMERICAN AID
-  NATIONALISATION
-  MILITARY FACILITIES
- A VOTING OPPOSITION
- B VOTING AGREEMENT
- C UNCOMMITTED

Renowned for his anti-Israeli Arab radicalism, this new North African personality completely disassociated Libya from the United States, whose foreign policy he deemed to be pro-Jewish. Within twelve months of seizing power, Qaddafi had ordered all American military and aid personnel to leave Libya. Thus, from 1970, North Africa no longer entirely dominated the United States economic assistance program to Africa. The recipient states of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia, in the North accrued \$725.0m in aid finance, the equivalent of 38% of the total program. This is comparable with assistance to West Africa, which totalled \$624.0m., or over 32% of United States aid during this period. States in independent East Africa garnered \$386.0m (20.2%) whilst Central and Southern Africa continued to benefit from relatively minor sums of concessional finance, being in receipt of \$173.0m., or barely 9% of the total program.

A further consequence of the deteriorating relations between the United States and certain North African countries during these years, was an increase in Anglophone Africa's share of American assistance. From 1970, states with a former British colonial connection accrued \$546.0m., or over 28% of total aid to Africa. Their Francophone counterparts were in receipt of \$623.0m or less than 33% of the program during this period.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN VOTING FROM 1970 to 1976

Despite a reduction in the overall size of the program after 1969, there is evidence to believe that aid was more positively linked to the pattern of African voting in the 1970s. Cross-

UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN VOTING 1970-76CLUSTER B (60% pro US)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst</u> | <u>Tot</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------------|
| Botswana    | 10         | 3           | 2           | 15         | 30.0             |
| C.A.R.      | 8          | 1           | 6           | 15         | 2.0              |
| Chad        | 8          | 2           | 6           | 16         | 18.0             |
| Dahomey     | 12         | 4           | 1           | 18         | 13.0             |
| Gabon       | 14         | 1           | 2           | 17         | -                |
| Gambia      | 11         | 2           | 1           | 14         | 5.0              |
| Ghana       | 9          | 2           | 5           | 16         | 89.0             |
| Ivory Coast | 18         | 0           | 0           | 18         | 12.0             |
| Kenya       | 7          | 3           | 6           | 16         | 56.0             |
| Lesotho     | 17         | 0           | 0           | 17         | 22.0             |
| Liberia     | 18         | 0           | 0           | 18         | 64.0             |
| Madagascar  | 12         | 5           | 0           | 17         | 7.0              |
| Malawi      | 14         | 0           | 2           | 16         | 23.0             |
| Morocco     | 13         | 2           | 3           | 18         | 203.0            |
| Niger       | 11         | 1           | 4           | 16         | 54.0             |
| Rwanda      | 10         | 3           | 3           | 16         | 9.0              |
| Swaziland   | 14         | 0           | 0           | 14         | 8.0              |
| Togo        | 9          | 4           | 3           | 16         | 11.0             |
| Tunisia     | 6          | 2           | 10          | 18         | 150.0            |
| Upper Volta | 8          | 4           | 4           | 16         | 36.0             |
| Zaire       | 10         | 1           | 5           | 16         | 65.0             |

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 \$877.0m (46%)
CLUSTER A (60% anti US)

|            |   |    |   |    |       |
|------------|---|----|---|----|-------|
| Algeria    | 3 | 14 | 1 | 18 | -     |
| Congo      | 3 | 12 | 1 | 16 | -     |
| Egypt      | 3 | 12 | 1 | 16 | 372.0 |
| Eq. Guinea | 2 | 11 | 1 | 14 | -     |
| Guinea     | 2 | 13 | 1 | 16 | 31.0  |
| Libya      | 3 | 14 | 1 | 18 | -     |
| Mali       | 3 | 13 | 1 | 17 | 47.0  |
| Mauritania | 2 | 12 | 1 | 15 | 21.0  |
| Mozambique | 0 | 1  | 0 | 1  | 9.0   |
| Somalia    | 1 | 14 | 1 | 16 | 24.0  |
| Sudan      | 2 | 12 | 2 | 16 | 16.0  |
| Tanzania   | 2 | 14 | 2 | 18 | 111.0 |
| Zambia     | 3 | 13 | 1 | 17 | 7.0   |

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 \$638.0m (33.4%)
CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|              |   |   |   |    |       |
|--------------|---|---|---|----|-------|
| Burundi      | 4 | 9 | 4 | 17 | 3.0   |
| Cameroon     | 5 | 5 | 7 | 17 | 28.0  |
| Ethiopia     | 6 | 5 | 6 | 17 | 151.0 |
| Nigeria      | 5 | 7 | 5 | 17 | 141.0 |
| Senegal      | 7 | 6 | 5 | 18 | 32.0  |
| Sierra Leone | 5 | 7 | 4 | 16 | 22.0  |
| Uganda       | 4 | 9 | 5 | 18 | 16.0  |

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 \$393.0m (20.6%)

tabulation of total assistance to the continent and African behaviour in the United Nations reveals that over 95% of those who concurred with Washington were in receipt of finance, whilst over 30% of those who consistently opposed the Western donor were ignored by the program.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | States who did<br>not receive US<br>aid 1970-76 | States who did<br>receive US aid<br>1970-76 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 4<br>(30.8)                                     | 9<br>(69.2)                                 | 13 |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 0<br>(0.0)                                      | 7<br>(100.0)                                | 7  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 1<br>(4.8)                                      | 20<br>(95.2)                                | 21 |
|                            | 5<br>(12.2)                                     | 36<br>(87.8)                                | 41 |

Chi square = 6.24 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0441

With the sole exception of Gabon, every African state in agreement with the United States was in receipt of assistance. In total, the recipients in Cluster B acquired \$877.0m which was the equivalent of 46% of the program. In contrast, Algeria, Congo, Libya and Equatorial Guinea, who voted against the Western donor, did not benefit from assistance. The nine African states who were able to negotiate aid agreements with Washington, despite opposing her in the United Nations, garnered \$638.0m, which represents over 33% of total aid.

On the whole, it would appear that aid and voting were not independent of each other in the 1970s. The value of chi square is significant at a level beyond 0.0441 and, within the context of a more circumspect program, this provides an indication of a

relatively positive relationship between economic assistance to the continent and African voting behaviour. However, there is little evidence to believe that the program disproportionately favoured those states who agreed with Washington. The twenty recipients who consistently supported the donor (Cluster B) at this time could only acquire 46% of the total program. In addition, Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting in the 1970s do not reveal evidence of bias in favour of voting support (Correlation  $-0.0462$ ).

Seven African countries remained generally uncommitted in the United Nations during this period (Cluster C). All of these states were recipients of American aid and, in total, they garnered \$393.0m., which represented over 20% of the program. If further examination is given to the nature of the direct votes of states in Cluster C, it would appear that the character of the relationship between aid and voting is not intrinsically challenged.

TABLE 9

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C BETWEEN 'PRO' AND 'ANTI' VOTES FROM  
1970 to 1976

Cluster Ca

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| Burundi     | 4          | 9           | 3.0              |
| Uganda      | 4          | 9           | <u>16.0</u>      |
|             |            |             | \$29.0m          |

Cluster Cz

|              |   |   |             |
|--------------|---|---|-------------|
| Cameroon     | 5 | 5 | 28.0        |
| Ethiopia     | 6 | 5 | 151.0       |
| Nigeria      | 5 | 7 | 141.0       |
| Senegal      | 7 | 6 | 32.0        |
| Sierra Leone | 5 | 7 | <u>22.0</u> |
|              |   |   | \$374.0m    |

Cluster Ca: Comprises Burundi and Uganda who revealed a general tendency towards abstention votes, but on the occasions when they expressed direct votes, cast more than 60% against Washington

Cluster Cz: Includes those states who preferred to balance their direct votes neither in favour nor against Washington

The vast majority of assistance to states in Cluster C was distributed to those African countries who were completely uncommitted from 1970. Moreover, it is noticeable that the two recipients of relatively minor amounts in Cluster C namely Burundi and Uganda, were the only countries whose direct votes predominantly opposed the United States (Cluster Ca).

Thus, whilst American economic aid to Africa in the 1970s was not instrumental in establishing a total level of African support in the United Nations, it is apparent that relatively limited sums of United States assistance were distributed to countries who opposed, either consistently, or tentatively, the Western donor.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUESUNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF AMERICAN RESOURCES  
1970 to 1976

Eight independent African states introduced measures which led directly to the expropriation of American property and investment during this period.

TABLE 10AID AND NATIONALISATION

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Year of Expropriation</u> | <u>Type of Investment</u>         | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| Ghana       | 1970                         | Mining                            | 89.0             |
| Libya       | 1970, 71 & 73                | Petroleum and Banking             | -                |
| Somalia     | 1970                         | Petroleum, Banking, and Food      | 24.0             |
| Sudan       | 1970                         | Banking and Insurance             | 16.0             |
| Uganda      | 1970                         | Banking, Insurance, and Petroleum | 16.0             |
| Zambia      | 1970                         | Mining                            | 7.0              |
| Algeria     | 1970/71                      | Petroleum                         | -                |
| Tanzania    | 1971                         | Textile                           | 111.0            |

Sources: D M Ray, The Causes of American Expropriation Abroad; Stafford Journal of International Studies, 11, (Spring 1976), pp. 122-152; L L Rood, Nationalisation and Indigenisation in Africa, Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 3 (1976), pp. 427-447; United States: Department of State Statement on Foreign Investment and Nationalisation, December 30th, 1975

Of these eight major actors in African affairs, Algeria and Libya did not receive any assistance from the United States, whilst the remaining six states garnered \$263.0m., which represents less than 14% of the total aid program from 1970 to 1976. In this respect, it would appear that President Nixon's 'threat' to look unfavourably upon less developed countries who expropriated American overseas investment was partly reflected in the distribution of Washington's economic aid to Africa.

However, it is difficult to determine the precise nature

of a relationship between United States' assistance and African nationalisation. On the one hand, the Nixon administration never wholeheartedly invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment upon American-African aid relations. Passed in 1962, the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act provided for the suspension of aid to countries that expropriated property, or concerns owned 50% or more by American interests, and that failed to take "appropriate steps" under international laws to make full and satisfactory compensation<sup>(28)</sup>. At the same time, Tanzania was able to nationalise American investment and yet receive \$111.0m in the 1970s. Nevertheless, with this exception, it would seem that from 1970, Washington was not overly anxious to 'reward' with large scale aid finance, those African states who threatened American overseas interests.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES FROM 1970 to 1976

During the years from 1970 to 1976, the availability of facilities for American military personnel on the African continent was limited. In Ethiopia, approximately 1,700 United States' troops were stationed at the radio communications base near Asmara in Eritrea, otherwise named the Kagnev Communications Centre<sup>(29)</sup>. In addition, under less formal arrangements, American military personnel were allowed access to communication bases in Morocco<sup>(30)</sup>. Elsewhere, the United States held various types of security assistance agreements with African states but such arrangements did not incorporate the ready availability of base facilities<sup>(31)</sup>.

Both Morocco and Ethiopia were large scale recipients of

economic assistance from Washington during the 1970s. The North African state garnered \$203.0m., the equivalent of 28% of the total regional allocation, whilst Ethiopia dominated receipts of American aid in East Africa, acquiring \$151.0m., which represented over 39.0% of the regional program (see Table 7).

However, on the whole, it is not possible to establish a consistent relationship between United States assistance and a recipient response in military terms. Whilst Morocco and Ethiopia number amongst the largest beneficiaries of American economic aid to Africa, there are a number of recipient states who garnered equivalent sums of concessional finance from the Western donor, but who resisted the notion of a foreign military presence. In this respect, it would appear that Washington was prepared to distribute substantial amounts of aid to African governments who accommodated the United States military aspirations, but not automatically to the detriment of economic assistance to all other states on the continent.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 1970 to 1976

For the vast majority of African states, aid relations with the United States remained relatively constant during the 1970s. Of the thirty-six recipients of the American program, only the Central African Republic and Mozambique were unable to renew aid agreements with Washington for more than one year. The Central African Republic received \$2.0m in 1972 only, and no further aid was forthcoming once Bokassa declared himself President for life. Mozambique secured an aid agreement for \$9.0m., from the United States in 1976 in what was the first full year of

independence for the South African state.

There were fourteen African recipients who were able to increase receipts of American aid by more than 100% over a twelve months period.

TABLE 11

AID INCREASES OF MORE THAN 100% 1970-76

| <u>Name</u> | <u>% Change in Aid</u> | <u>Year of Change</u> |
|-------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Egypt       | 110% (\$40m-84m)       | 1974-75               |
| Cameroon    | 400% (\$1m-5m)         | 1974-75               |
| Chad        | 500% (\$1m-6m)         | 1973-74               |
| Ghana       | 300% (\$1m-4m)         | 1974-75               |
| Guinea      | 300% (\$1m-4m)         | 1972-73               |
| Mali        | 143% (\$7m-17m)        | 1973-74               |
| Niger       | 110% (\$10m-21m)       | 1973-74               |
| Senegal     | 133% (\$3m-7m)         | 1972-73               |
| Kenya       | 175% (\$4m-11m)        | 1973-74               |
| Somalia     | (\$0-5m)               | 1974-75               |
| Tanzania    | 230% (\$10m-33m)       | 1974-75               |
| Zaire       | 325% (\$4m-17m)        | 1974-75               |
| Zambia      | 400% (\$1m-5m)         | 1974-75               |
| Ethiopia    | 130% (\$10m-23m)       | 1970-71               |

In contrast with similar changes in American aid up to 1969, increases in assistance from 1970 to 1976 cannot primarily be attributed to dramatic changes in African political leadership. With the possible exception of Niger, whose increase in economic aid from the United States between 1973 and 1974 coincided with a successful military coup by Lieutenant Colonel Seyne Kountche, none of these states have acquired substantial injections of aid finance as a result of a dramatic overhaul of their executive. Rather, it would appear that many of these increases in United States' assistance can be attributed to successful appeals for emergency aid from African states suffering from the Sahel drought<sup>(32)</sup>.

Thus, unlike the United States aid program up to 1969, it would seem that Washington's attempts to establish positive aid relations on the African continent from 1970 no longer incorporated a policy of short term injections of substantial

concessional finance to incoming political figures.

UNITED STATES AID AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS FROM 1970 to 1976

United States economic aid in the 1970s did not entirely ignore the claims of impoverished African States. In a limited sense, Washington responded to the appeals for foreign assistance by African countries whose economic survival was threatened by the Sahel drought. At the same time, the United States distributed \$611.0m., the equivalent of over 32% of the total aid program, to the eighteen African states who were included in the catalogue of 'Least Developed Countries in the Third World' drawn up by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development<sup>(33)</sup>.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that the program from 1970 to 1976 was dictated by any altruistic economic considerations. The six African countries who received in excess of \$100.0m during this period include both the relatively strong states North of the Sahara and the weaker economic systems of Ethiopia and Tanzania.

TABLE 12

MAJOR RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970-76

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Pop. (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Egypt       | 372.0            | 9180             | 35.6            | 258                   |
| Morocco     | 203.0            | 5250             | 15.9            | 330                   |
| Tunisia     | 150.0            | 2760             | 5.3             | 521                   |
| Ethiopia    | 151.0            | 2360             | 26.5            | 89                    |
| Nigeria     | 141.0            | 12750            | 71.3            | 179                   |
| Tanzania    | 111.0            | 1810             | 14.0            | 129                   |

Sources: World Bank, National Yearbooks 1970-76; UN Statistical Yearbooks 1970-76; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75; O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977

The program as a whole can be associated with both recipient GNP (Correlation 0.5734) and population (Correlation 0.6135). However, in general terms, the economic needs of the recipient do not appear to have been a high priority for Washington's assistance to Africa. Certainly there is insufficient evidence to assume that the program can be significantly associated with the recipient's GNP per capita (Correlation -0.1059). In this respect, American aid neither ignored the less developed areas of the continent nor disproportionately favoured them.

#### AMERICAN-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

During the period up to 1969, it would seem that Washington believed that positive aid relations with the African continent were dependent upon a readiness to provide huge injections of concessional finance to newly independent states. In an economic aid program without parallel in Africa during this period, the United States distributed \$4534.0m to thirty-nine recipients, with particular focus being given to Northern States of the continent whose borders controlled the Southern shores of the Mediterranean. However, by the late 1960s, it was apparent that substantial sums of assistance had been acquired by recipients who were not wholehearted in their support for the Western donor. By 1970, America's foreign relations with Africa were coming under increasing executive and legislative scrutiny. Over the following seven years, \$1908.0m was disseminated to thirty-six recipient states and the program as a whole became more circumspect and considered. To a certain extent, this 'transformation' was exhibited in the regional

distribution of the American program:

TABLE 13

COMPARATIVE REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

|                       | <u>United States Aid<br/>up to 1969 (\$m)</u> | <u>% of<br/>program</u> | <u>United States Aid<br/>1970-76 (\$m)</u> | <u>% of<br/>Program</u> |
|-----------------------|---|-------------------------|--|-------------------------|
| North                 | 2562.4  | 58.9                    | 725.0                                      | 38.0                    |
| West                  | 937.7   | 21.5                    | 624.0                                      | 32.7                    |
| East                  | 511.2   | 11.7                    | 386.0                                      | 20.2                    |
| Central &<br>Southern | 342.7   | 7.9                     | 173.0                                      | 9.1                     |

In the second period, Western and Eastern states began to receive a larger share of the program and North Africa no longer remained completely unchallenged as the primary area of American-African aid relations. However, it should be noted that the 'transformation' was by no means comprehensive. The relatively impoverished states of Central and Southern Africa continued to occupy a low position in United States aid priorities.

UNITED STATES AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

Crosstabulation of the distribution of economic aid and the pattern of African voting in the United Nations both before and after 1969, reveals that the more limited, but cautious nature of American assistance in the second time period appears to be more closely associated with voting performance. Twenty-one African states consistently supported the United States in the General Assembly up to 1969, of whom nineteen were in receipt of \$731.3m. This represented less than 17% of total aid during this period. At the same time, eight African countries consistently voted against Washington whilst receiving \$363.8m and a further

TABLE 14

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

| Country        | Aid<br>(\$m)     | %     | UN Vote | Aid<br>(\$m)     | %        | UN Vote |
|----------------|------------------|-------|---------|------------------|----------|---------|
| Algeria        | 163.4            | 3.8   | A       | -                | -        | A       |
| Egypt          | 1062.2           | 24.4  | C       | 372.0            | 19.5     | A       |
| Libya          | 183.4            | 4.2   | C       | -                | -        | A       |
| Morocco        | 603.3            | 13.9  | C       | 203.0            | 10.6     | B       |
| Tunisia        | 550.1            | 12.6  | C       | 150.0            | 7.9      | B       |
| Cameroon       | 27.7             | 0.6   | B       | 28.0             | 1.5      | C       |
| Chad           | 7.1              | 0.2   | B       | 18.0             | 1.0      | B       |
| Dahomey        | 10.1             | 0.2   | B       | 13.0             | 0.7      | B       |
| Gambia         | 1.1              | *     | B       | 5.0              | 0.3      | B       |
| Ghana          | 215.1            | 4.9   | C       | 89.0             | 4.7      | B       |
| Guinea         | 87.4             | 2.0   | A       | 31.0             | 1.6      | A       |
| Ivory Coast    | 31.6             | 0.7   | B       | 12.0             | 0.6      | B       |
| Liberia        | 213.7            | 4.9   | B       | 64.0             | 3.4      | B       |
| Mali           | 18.4             | 0.4   | A       | 47.0             | 2.4      | A       |
| Mauritania     | 0.1              | *     | A       | 21.0             | 1.1      | A       |
| Niger          | 15.1             | 0.3   | B       | 54.0             | 2.8      | B       |
| Nigeria        | 215.5            | 4.9   | C       | 141.0            | 7.4      | C       |
| Senegal        | 28.7             | 0.7   | B       | 32.0             | 1.7      | C       |
| Sierra Leone   | 41.0             | 0.9   | B       | 22.0             | 1.1      | C       |
| Togo           | 13.3             | 0.3   | B       | 11.0             | 0.5      | B       |
| Upper Volta    | 11.8             | 0.3   | B       | 36.0             | 1.9      | B       |
| Burundi        | 4.6              | 0.1   | A       | 3.0              | 0.2      | C       |
| Ethiopia       | 181.9            | 4.2   | C       | 151.0            | 7.9      | C       |
| Kenya          | 46.6             | 1.1   | C       | 56.0             | 2.9      | B       |
| Rwanda         | 8.1              | 0.2   | B       | 9.0              | 0.5      | B       |
| Somalia        | 61.9             | 1.4   | C       | 24.0             | 1.3      | A       |
| Sudan          | 110.3            | 2.5   | C       | 16.0             | 0.8      | A       |
| Tanzania       | 69.2             | 1.6   | A       | 111.0            | 5.8      | A       |
| Uganda         | 28.6             | 0.7   | C       | 16.0             | 0.8      | C       |
| Botswana       | 6.0              | 0.1   | B       | 30.0             | 1.6      | B       |
| C.A.R          | 3.1              | 0.1   | B       | 2.0              | 0.1      | B       |
| Congo          | 4.0              | 0.1   | A       | -                | -        | A       |
| Eq. Guinea     | -                | -     | B       | -                | -        | A       |
| Gabon          | 7.2              | 0.2   | B       | -                | -        | B       |
| Madagascar     | 8.5              | 0.2   | B       | 7.0              | 0.4      | B       |
| Malawi         | 15.4             | 0.4   | B       | 23.0             | 1.2      | B       |
| Lesotho        | 4.0              | 0.1   | B       | 22.0             | 1.1      | B       |
| Swaziland      | -                | -     | B       | 8.0              | 0.4      | B       |
| Zaire          | 277.8            | 6.4   | B       | 65.0             | 3.4      | B       |
| Zambia         | 16.7             | 0.4   | A       | 7.0              | 0.4      | A       |
| Mozambique     | -                | -     |         | 9.0              | 0.5      | A       |
| <b>TOTAL</b>   | <b>\$4354.0m</b> |       |         | <b>\$1908.0m</b> |          |         |
| Cluster B (21) | \$731.3m         | 16.8% |         | Cluster B (21)   | \$877.0m | 46.0%   |
| Cluster C (11) | \$325.9m         | 74.8% |         | Cluster C (7)    | \$393.0m | 20.6%   |
| Cluster A (8)  | \$363.8m         | 8.4%  |         | Cluster A (13)   | \$638.0m | 33.4%   |

\*less than 0.1%

eight recipients, who accrued \$2343.5m, revealed a general tendency towards anti-American positions within a general framework of abstention (Cluster Ca). In other words \$2707.3m worth of American economic aid was disseminated to African states who, consistently or tentatively, voted against the United States - this represents over 62% of the total assistance up to 1969. In contrast, whilst the program from 1970 did not disproportionately favour support for the United States in the General Assembly, it is noticeable that Washington only provided \$667.0m, or 35% of total aid during this period to states who consistently or tentatively opposed her position.

However, the analysis so far provides limited insight into the causal relationship between aid and recipient voting. This may be elucidated by a more detailed comparative study of changes in the level of voting support and the allocation of aid between the two time periods.

As has already been noted, there is little evidence to assume that American aid was instrumental in determining the level of African voting support up to 1969. However, it would also appear that the nature of this aid allocation was not influential in establishing the pattern of African voting from 1970

VOTING 1970-76

| COUNT<br>(Row %)                                  | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti) | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro) |    |
|---|-------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------|----|
| African States not<br>receiving aid<br>up to 1969 | 2<br>(66.7)             | 0<br>(0.0)                 | 1<br>(33.3)            | 3  |
| African States<br>receiving aid<br>up to 1969     | 11<br>(28.9)            | 7<br>(18.4)                | 20<br>(52.6)           | 38 |
| TOTALS  | 13<br>(31.7)            | 7<br>(17.1)                | 21<br>(51.2)           | 41 |

Chi square = 2.00244 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.3674

Thus, over 34% of African states who voted against the United States in the 1970s had previously been in receipt of American economic aid. Indeed, barely 53% of the African countries who had benefitted from assistance up to 1969, supported the Western donor from 1970. In this respect, it would appear that the voting performance of African states was not a response to earlier aid allocations from Washington.

The nature of the relationship, between aid and changes in the pattern of African support should be analysed in terms of Washington's aid priorities in the 1970s. Thus, it would appear that there is an association between voting and changes in the allocation of assistance in the second time period.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)                        | States whose aid<br>as a % of Program<br>decreased after<br>1969 | States whose aid<br>as a % of Program<br>increased after<br>1969 | States who<br>received no<br>aid in both<br>periods |    |
|---|--|--|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(Anti)<br>(1970-76)        | 8<br>(61.5)  | 4<br>(30.8)  | 1<br>(7.7)  | 13 |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)<br>(1970-76) | 0<br>(0.0)   | 7<br>(100.0)   | 0<br>(0.0)  | 7  |
| Cluster B<br>(Pro)<br>(1970-76)         | 7<br>(33.3)  | 14<br>(66.6)   | 0<br>(0.0)  | 21 |
|   | 15<br>(36.6)   | 25<br>(61.0)   | 1<br>(2.4)  | 41 |

Chi square = 10.793 with 4 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0290

Between the two time periods, twenty five recipients managed to increase their share of the American aid program, of whom only four consistently voted against the Western donor in the General Assembly. In other words, only 16% of the states who negotiated an increase in their allocation of economic assistance opposed the United States in the 1970s. This contrasts vividly with the voting performance of states whose aid as a proportion of the total program decreased, over 61% of whom opposed Washington from 1970 (Cluster A). Moreover, the chi square test of the total allocation of aid and voting reveals a relationship significant at a level beyond 0.0290, providing evidence of an association between the two variables.

It is noticeable that, included amongst the group which experienced a reduction in aid are the strategic and politically important North African states (see Table 13). To a certain extent, their decline in the share of the American program may be

indicative of the reassessment by Washington of African aid relations following the negative results of United States assistance up to 1969. In this respect, it would seem that the Nixon administration was no longer prepared in the 1970s to maintain an African assistance program which solely concentrated upon the important strategic states on the continent, irrespective of recipient behaviour. At the same time, it was apparent by 1970 that it would be very difficult to improve the American image in the Arab states of North Africa following Washington's support for Israel in the Middle East conflict.

Thus, the huge aid program up to 1969 cannot realistically be associated with the African voting performance at any time. Nevertheless, the more considered, albeit limited, approach from 1970, which led to a reduction in the overall bias of aid to North Africa and increasing focus upon certain states in the West and East, provides more justification for a little American optimism. Whilst this program was never capable of developing a comprehensive level of African support, it did tentatively challenge the negative character of United States-African aid relations in certain areas of the continent.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND NATIONALISATION

Although the United States has never invoked the Hickenlooper Amendment upon African recipients who nationalised American investment, there was, from 1970, a noticeable hardening of attitude towards the incidence of expropriation. In the years up to 1969, all five African states who 'acquired' American

interests were, at the same time, able to benefit from substantial sums of economic assistance. During this period, these countries were in receipt of \$1860.3m., the equivalent of over 42% of the total program. In this respect, Washington seemed determined to maintain aid relations with certain African states irrespective of their anti-American policies.

From 1970, however, it would appear that the United States was less willing to adopt such a 'benevolent' attitude and this was reflected in the distribution of her economic assistance. Eight African states applied nationalisation measures against American overseas investment in the 1970s. Algeria and Libya did not receive any aid and the remaining six states were only able to garner the sum of \$263.0m, which represents less than 14% of the total program in the second time period.

#### UNITED STATES AID AND TIME AVAILABILITY OF MILITARY FACILITIES

The number of base facilities at the disposal of American troops on the African continent steadily declined in the post war years. In the period up to 1969, Ethiopia, Libya, Morocco, Liberia and for a while, Zaire, were incorporated within the network of the United States overseas stations. By the 1970s, such African contacts were confined to Ethiopia and Morocco.

It is difficult to establish the extent to which such facilities were conditioned by the availability of American economic assistance. Certainly, Washington's aid program did not ignore those African states who afforded her the use of military bases. In this respect, the reductions in total assistance to the continent from 1970 would have done little to encourage a

large American military presence. However, on the whole, there is little evidence to assume that vast quantities of United States' concessional finance were able to establish military satellites throughout Africa. Indeed, the majority of large scale beneficiaries of Washington's assistance in all the years up to 1976 firmly resisted the notion of an American military presence on the continent<sup>(34)</sup>.

### CONCLUSION

The history of the United States' economic assistance to Africa in the years from independence up to 1976 refutes the notion that positive aid relations are merely a quantitative function of vast injections of aid finance. Despite a huge program totalling \$4354.0m to thirty-eight states up to 1969, Washington's political influence on the continent remained limited. Considerable proportions of her aid were distributed to states who failed to vote with the United States in the General Assembly, whilst countries who nationalised American investment during this period dominated total African receipts of assistance.

The negative character of United States aid relations on the continent during these years was partly a consequence of Washington's close association with the former colonial powers of Africa; and partly a result of the nature of American political aspirations on the continent. It would appear that recipients who were perceived to be of importance in international affairs were able to garner substantial sums of assistance. According to the recommendations of the Clay Committee and the overall character of the program, these included a number of North African

states bordering the Mediterranean. However, the political and strategic importance of these states also seemed to provide them with the confidence and ability to adopt a relatively independent attitude towards their North American donor. In this respect, it should be emphasised that a large proportion of economic aid favoured certain African countries up to 1969 not because of, but despite, their negative attitudes. At the same time, Washington unsuccessfully attempted to capitalise upon the inherent political instability of the African continent by providing huge inputs of assistance to newly independent states and incoming political leaders. This policy seems to have been pursued regardless of its limited utility for the long term development of political influence.

However, the program from 1970 displayed elements of careful scrutiny and control. Economic aid from Washington was still largely determined by political considerations, rather than criteria of recipient economic need but the distribution of \$1908.0m., appeared to be more closely matched to recipient behaviour. It is significant that receipts of American aid and African voting patterns at the United Nations were not independent of each other from 1970 to 1976. In addition, with the exception of Tanzania, states who expanded the public sector at the expense of American investment interests were not generally amongst the major beneficiaries of assistance in the 1970s. It is also apparent that the United States had moved away from the unsuccessful policy of providing substantial injections of finance to incoming political personalities.

To a large extent, therefore, the smaller but more circumspect nature of Washington's aid to Africa in the second

time period, concentrated less upon states who were overtly anti-American in their foreign and domestic policies. Nevertheless, the extent to which the program was able to establish a sphere of political influence on the continent was, in overall terms, limited. American aid still did not disproportionately favour her supporters in the General Assembly and Washington was unable to either establish comprehensive facilities for her military personnel or to prevent African nationalisation of American-owned investment. In this sense, it could be argued that American assistance no longer automatically favoured those who did not support her from 1970, but neither would it appear overwhelmingly successful in establishing new friends.

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2. For further details see D Kay, New Nations in the United Nations, 1960-67, New York, Columbia University Press, 1970; C Hoskyns, The African States and the United Nations, International Affairs, 40:3 (July 1964), pp. 466-380
3. As quoted in Africa Report, December 1964, p. 8
4. The resolutions considered were those drafted with the explicit support of the United States, in direct opposition to the Soviet Union, and included topics under the Political and Security headings of
  - a) Disarmament and Related Matters
  - b) Strengthening of International Security
  - c) Review of the Question of Peace Keeping Operations
  - d) The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
  - e) Questions Concerning the Use of Atomic Energy
  - f) Questions Relating to Asia and the Far East
  - g) Questions Relating to the Middle East
  - h) Questions Concerning Latin America
  - j) The Situation in Cyprus
  - k) Questions Relating to the Organisation of the United Nations and the Membership of the United Nations
  - l) Questions Concerning the Peaceful Uses of the Sea Bed and Ocean Floor
  - m) Other Political and Security Questions
5. The Hickenhooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, passed in 1962, provides for the suspension of assistance to countries who expropriate investment with an American interest. See International Legal Materials, 1972, pp. 84-111.

For an example of the use of foreign aid to foster American private investment in the recipient state, see D Tobis, Foreign Aid: the Case of Guatemala, in Fann and Hodges, eds., Readings in US Imperialism, F Porter Sargent, 1971, pp. 249-257.

The question of aid and private investment is incorporated in the assertion by R S Walters that, through economic assistance, the United States is indirectly attempting

"to promote the acceptance of basic Western values in the Third World". R S Walters, American and Soviet Aid, A Comparative Analysis, Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970

6. Quoted in Keesings Contemporary Archives, 1971-72, London. Ref 25183A
7. The leader column of the New York Herald Tribune of 10th April 1969 predicted the demise of America's overseas bases:

"The bases were built to carry out the Truman Administration's policy of containment ... In recent years, the development and growth of a whole family of missiles, sometimes with spectacular success, have made the United States and its allies dependent upon these bases".

However, one year later, the New York Times, extolled the virtues of overseas bases (8th November 1962) "US bases overseas have tremendous political and psychological significance".

8. New York Times, 8 November 1962. For a further discussion of the military objectives of United States foreign economic aid see J M Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy, Macmillan, 1968; H A Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices, New York, Praeger, 1965.
9. Segal and P Allen, Africa, Scribener, 1975
10. This approximation is made on the basis that the first time period is, on average, of ten years duration. Consideration is given to the fact that American aid to Africa was first established in 1953, but it should be noted that the program did not develop in any worthwhile sense until the 1960s and some African recipients did not attain independence until 1966 (See Appendix I).
11. Within this context, the term 'grace period' signifies the early period of the agreement when no repayment is necessary. See, Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Annual Reviews, Paris. For details of earlier terms and conditions of American aid, see G Ohlin, Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered, O.E.C.D, 1964; J D Montgomery, The Evolution of US Foreign Aid, Current History, 50: 298 (June 1966), pp. 322-363

For a general consideration of American aid, see P G Clark, American Aid for Development, New York, Praeger, 1972

12. For example, in 1978, President Carter approached Congress with a request for \$8,400, to cover the aid bill. This estimate was slashed by 13% by Congressional Committee.
13. The effect of these frequent reorganisations was noted in 1966 by I W Moomaw:
- "In the years since the beginning of Point Four, ten different directors have been in charge. No other area of government has been so frequently surveyed and changed. Eight Presidential Committees have scrutinised it. Three Administrations have completely overhauled it ...".
- Quoted in The World Food Problem, Washington D.C., 1967, p. 117
14. President J F Kennedy, Special Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, March 22, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, US Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1962. For a discussion of this strategy, see, for example, R Emerson, Africa and US Policy, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice-Hall, 1967; G Liska, The New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1964
15. L D Clay, Committee to Strengthen the Security of the Free World, Report to the President of the United States, Washington D.C., March 20th, 1963
16. In the aid budget proposal of 1964 for \$4.9 billion, Congress actually sanctioned \$3.2 billion.
17. For a further discussion of the Clay Report, see H Kitchen, eds, Africa: From Mystery to Maze, Lexington Books, D C Heath and Company, 1976
18. The Korry Report made a number of recommendations, the most important of which was that the US should concentrate its African economic aid program on a selected list of ten countries.
19. W I Jones in Kitchen, eds., op.cit., states that US distributed \$231.0m in aid to Zaire during the first three years of independence. Jones does not cite a reference for this figure, which can only be an approximation of both economic aid and military assistance. OECD figures for US economic aid to Zaire during this period are \$140.0m.
20. This is primarily embodied in Nyerere's Arusha Declaration of 1967. For further details see Issa G Shivji, The Mixed Sector and Imperialist Control in Tanzania, in P C Gutkind and P Waterman (eds),

African Social Studies, Heinemann, 1977, pp. 207-218

21. This assessment emphasises the findings of R D McKinlay and R Little who, in their analysis of US aid relations with the Third World, conclude:  
 "Since the Second World War, the US has been preoccupied with the question of global security. Our findings suggest that this preoccupation has extended to the area of aid allocation. In other words, the amount of aid allocated by the US is determined by the importance of the recipient in the power structure of the international system. The US therefore appears to allocate aid on the basis of a realist view of international relations".
- R D McKinlay and R Little, The US Aid Relationship: A Test of the Recipient Need and Donor Interest Models, Political Studies, Volume XXVII, No 2, June 1979, pp. 236-251
22. The harbour was constructed with the help of a \$12.5m loan from the US, whilst the airport was constructed near the HQ of the US owned Firestone Rubber Company, and was one of two bases constructed by the Allies during the war. The acquisition of strategic facilities with the help of US assistance continued throughout the 1950s, coming to a peak in 1959 with the signing of the Mutual Defence Agreement.
- For further discussion of the strategic and military contacts in Africa, see I Greig, The Communist Challenge to Africa, New Goswell Printing Co., Ltd., 1977
23. See, for example, Nissim Rejwan, Nasserist Ideology Its Exponents and Critics, New York, J Wiley, 1974
24. See note 21 of Soviet Chapter
25. See also, R D McKinlay and R Little, op.cit.
26. To a certain extent, this was the case with Tanzanian-United States Aid Relations following Washington's refusal to finance a proposed railway between Tanzania and Zambia.
27. Attributed to Mercer Cook, former American Ambassador to Senegal, by W I Jones, op.cit., p. 368
28. International Legal Materials, op.cit., p. 87
29. The Arms Trade with the Third World, Stockholm International Peace Resources Institute, New York, 1971
30. The Military Balance 1971-72, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, 1972

31. By 1976, the US was providing significant military aid to Morocco, Tunisia, Ethiopia and Zaire. See G Arnold, Aid in Africa, Kogan Page, 1979
32. For a consideration of the economic ramifications of the Sahel drought, see C Legum, eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1975-76, London, 1976, pp. C132 et seq
33. This is an internationally recognised list published by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, African recipients of American aid included in the list are: Botswana, Dahomey, Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta. O.E.C.D. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-1975, Paris, 1977
34. It should be noted that US was not alone amongst the major donors of aid to Africa in experiencing resistance to foreign military bases. See British, French and Soviet Chapters

CHAPTER SIX

ECONOMIC AID FROM THE SOVIET UNION

Soviet economic aid relations with independent Africa date back to the post Stalanist 1950s. Up until this period, Soviet political interest in the African continent was largely confined to that of delegated responsibility to minor communist groups in the colonies<sup>(1)</sup>. However, from 1955 onwards, Kruschev developed a more positive Soviet attitude towards the less developed world. In the late 1950s, economic aid relations were established with the independent states of Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea and Ghana; but it was not until 1960, 'the great year of African independence', that Moscow began to develop a comprehensive programme of international relations on the continent. Alvin Z. Rubinstein in his study of the Soviets in the United Nations<sup>(2)</sup>, has noted that this period witnessed a dramatic change in Moscow's attitude towards the developing countries. In 1960 alone, sixteen new African states entered the United Nations, increasing the size of the African vote in this international assembly to twenty-four. In this new situation, the Soviet Union became increasingly aware of the African caucus in the debates affecting East-West relations.

At the same time, it should be emphasised that, despite the periodic overtures for peaceful co-existence between the United States and the Soviet Union, it has always been valid to analyse East-West international relations in terms of a competition for influence. Foreign affairs with independent Africa are no exception in this regard. This chapter explores the extent to which the Soviet Union has utilised economic aid in this 'competition for influence' on the African continent.

POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Soviet political influence will be analysed in terms of African voting support for United Nations General Assembly resolutions, drafted with the explicit support of USSR, in direct opposition to the United States. The voting analysis will be made not only in terms of the degree of concurrence with the Soviet Union but also in terms of the operational significance of these votes to the expectations of the USSR at the United Nations<sup>(3)</sup>. A high degree of agreement in this regard can be used as an index of political influence and alignment.

At the same time, reference will be made to the incidence of African expropriation of foreign owned investment and property. When Moscow first began to establish aid relations with the newly independent states, Soviet theoreticians were anxious to assess the economic policies of some Third World governments in political terms<sup>(4)</sup>. At the 1958 Conference on State Capitalism in the Underdeveloped Countries, convened by the Institute of Oriental Studies, it was proclaimed that:

"state capitalism was objectively progressive in the underdeveloped world when it was harmful to the interests of imperialism and coincided with the interests of the people". (5)

Moreover, three years later at the First UN Conference on Programming for Economic Development held in Delhi, the Russian delegates strongly advocated 'nationalisation of foreign and domestic private property as the optimal method of diverting into development investment the enormous private profits accrued by foreign companies'. Nationalisation without compensation is actively encouraged by the USSR and the Soviet academic and daily press are not slow to applaud states who introduce such measures<sup>(6)</sup>. Thus, whilst it is impossible

to argue that Moscow is responsible for the exploitation of foreign owned resources, the introduction of such direct state ownership by African states will be analysed in terms of ideological and political concurrence with the Soviet Union.

Finally, this analysis of Soviet political influence will take into consideration the availability of military facilities for Soviet personnel on the African continent,

### SOVIET AID PROGRAM

The dynamics of Soviet aid will be divided into two time periods: the period from African independence up to and including 1969; and the years from 1970 to 1976. This framework stresses the relatively restrained nature of Soviet relations with the less developed world in the 1970s. To a certain extent, this 'restraint' was instigated by a number of developments in Soviet foreign policy towards the end of the 1960s, including the hardening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and reaction to the development of the first Nixon Administration in the United States <sup>(7)</sup>. John A Armstrong, in his consideration of Soviet foreign affairs, notes that changes in American foreign policy after 1969 led to a transformation in Soviet attitudes:

"the oligarchy ruling the USSR seems to have been sufficiently impressed by the need for symmetrical agreements with the United States to have initiated a real though tentative departure in Soviet foreign policy". (8)

In the years up to 1969, bilateral aid from the Soviet Union to independent Africa totalled \$2011.0m to nineteen recipient states. The aid program from 1970 to 1976 involved \$1317.0m to twenty African states.

Soviet economic aid to the less developed world has been administered since 1957 by the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. This is an independent agency directly responsible to the USSR Council of Ministers<sup>(9)</sup>. The vast majority of Soviet assistance is distributed in the form of loans at a 2½% rate of interest, with a repayment period of twelve years. Repayment is either in the form of exports to the correctly agreed value or in convertible currency into a special account. In the latter case, the USSR, may pledge to use the money for the purchase of additional goods from the aid recipient<sup>(10)</sup>.

#### SOVIET-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

The first major breakthrough for the Soviet Union was characterised by an aid agreement with Egypt in 1957 for \$175.0m. This agreement was of considerable propaganda value to Moscow since it was offered to Egypt following the refusal of the United States, the United Kingdom, and consequently the World Bank, to fulfil promises of economic assistance for the proposed High Dam at Aswan.

Less than two years later, Moscow had gained a second 'foothold' on the continent via the former French colony of Guinea. Once again, the Soviet Union seized an opportunity arising from a breakdown in aid relations between an African country and the West. When President Sekou Touré of Guinea voted 'NO' to the idea of a French Community in 1958, De Gaulle's reaction was to immediately break diplomatic relations and terminate all French economic assistance to the former colony. Within twelve months, Moscow had offered

TABLE 1

SOVIET AID TO AFRICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

| <u>NORTH</u> | \$m       | <u>EAST</u>                   | \$m       |
|--------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| Algeria      | 232.0     | Burundi                       | -         |
| Egypt        | 1002.0    | Ethiopia                      | 102.0     |
| Libya        | -         | Kenya                         | 48.0      |
| Morocco      | 44.0      | Rwanda                        | -         |
| Tunisia      | 34.0      | Somalia                       | 66.0      |
|              |           | Sudan                         | 64.0      |
|              |           | Tanzania                      | 20.0      |
|              |           | Uganda                        | 16.0      |
|              | <hr/>     |                               | <hr/>     |
|              | \$1312.0m |                               | \$316.0m  |
|              |           |                               |           |
| <u>WEST</u>  |           | <u>CENTRAL &amp; SOUTHERN</u> |           |
| Cameroon     | 8.0       | Botswana                      | -         |
| Chad         | -         | C.A.R.                        | -         |
| Dahomey      | -         | Congo                         | 10.0      |
| Gambia       | -         | Eq. Guinea                    | -         |
| Ghana        | 93.0      | Gabon                         | -         |
| Guinea       | 168.0     | Madagascar                    | -         |
| Ivory Coast  | -         | Malawi                        | -         |
| Liberia      | -         | Lesotho                       | -         |
| Mali         | 60.0      | Swaziland                     | -         |
| Mauritania   | 3.0       | Zaire                         | -         |
| Niger        | -         | Zambia                        | 6.0       |
| Nigeria      | -         |                               | <hr/>     |
| Senegal      | 7.0       |                               | \$16.0m   |
| Sierra Leone | 28.0      |                               |           |
| Togo         | -         |                               |           |
| Upper Volta  | -         |                               |           |
|              | <hr/>     |                               |           |
|              | \$367.0m  |                               |           |
|              |           | TOTAL PROGRAM:                | \$2011.0m |
|              |           | Regional Share:               |           |
|              |           | North                         | 65.2%     |
|              |           | West                          | 18.3%     |
|              |           | East                          | 15.7%     |
|              |           | C & S                         | 0.8%      |

Sources: Kurt Muller, The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China, New York, Walker, 1967; US Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade, 1971; C Stevens, The Soviet Union and Black Africa, Macmillan, London, 1976; Development Co-Operation, O.E.C.D., Paris.



alternative finance and aid to the value of \$57.0m.

As a result of these, and other aid agreements, a climate of goodwill was established during the late 1950s and early 1960s<sup>(11)</sup>. The Soviet Union displayed a readiness to establish herself as an alternative source of finance to the West. Soviet aid officials seemed to be primarily guided by the 'political effectiveness' of the projects and Moscow was quick to apportion blame for the economic problems confronting Africa firmly in the lap of colonial imperialism<sup>(12)</sup>. Thus, under a slogan of 'revolutionary democracy', which did not prohibit the provision of assistance to non-Communist states, the Soviet assistance program rapidly developed in the early 1960s. By 1964, Moscow had distributed \$1762.0m to fifteen independent African states - the equivalent of 87% of total Soviet aid to the continent in the years up to 1969. To a certain extent, this is due to the vast injections of concessionary finance to Egypt in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the period up to 1964, this strategically important African state was in receipt of all the \$1002.0m allocated to Egypt before 1970. Indeed, it is apparent that there was a certain re-appraisal of Soviet foreign aid after 1964. Robert Legvold, in his study of Soviet-African relations in the 1960s, notes a much more conservative approach by Brezhnev and Kosygin as a reaction to Khrushchev's, "casual, diffuse, sometimes prodigal use of economic assistance"<sup>(13)</sup>. At the same time, underlying the new policy was Moscow's awareness that she was beginning to face a repayment problem in Africa. Egypt proved unable to begin repayments in 1964 and Mali's interest payments had to be cancelled and the debts deferred in 1965<sup>(14)</sup>. Thus, from 1965 to 1969 Soviet African aid relations lost impetus,

with only a further \$249.0m distributed to ten recipient states.

The geographical distribution of Soviet aid up to 1969 reveals a considerable bias towards African states with neither French nor British colonial ties.

TABLE 2

CULTURAL/HISTORICAL DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET AID UP TO 1969

| <u>Francophone</u> | <u>\$m</u> | <u>Anglophone</u> | <u>\$m</u>  | <u>Others</u> | <u>\$m</u>    |
|--------------------|------------|-------------------|-------------|---------------|---------------|
| Algeria            | 232.0      | Ghana             | 93.0        | Somalia       | 66.0          |
| Congo              | 10.0       | Sudan             | 64.0        | Ethiopia      | 102.0         |
| Mali               | 60.0       | Kenya             | 48.0        | Guinea        | 168.0         |
| Mauritania         | 3.0        | Tanzania          | 20.0        | Egypt         | <u>1002.0</u> |
| Morocco            | 44.0       | Uganda            | 16.0        |               |               |
| Senegal            | 7.0        | Zambia            | 6.0         |               | \$1338.0m     |
| Tunisia            | 34.0       | Sierra Leone      | <u>28.0</u> |               | (66.5%)       |
| Cameroon           | <u>8.0</u> |                   |             |               |               |
|                    |            |                   | \$275.0m    |               |               |
|                    | \$398.0m   |                   | (13.7%)     |               |               |
|                    | (19.8%)    |                   |             |               |               |

It should be noted that the major beneficiaries of Russian aid encompass those African states, regardless of language, who tended to adopt a more positively independent approach to their former metropolitan states. Thus, four of the largest recipients of the Soviet aid program up to 1969, Egypt, Algeria, Guinea and Ghana, (being in receipt of over 74% of the total program), are notable for having forthright political leaders who were prepared to confront the Western powers. Indeed, as already been noted, in some cases such a 'confrontation' acted as a catalyst for the development of Soviet African aid relations in the late 1950s.

In regional terms (see Table 1), the recipient states of North Africa dominated Soviet aid distribution to the continent, accruing \$1312.0m., or over 65% of the total program. This provides stark contrast with Soviet assistance to Central and Southern

Africa, where only two recipients benefitted to a total of \$16.0m., or less than 1% of the program up to 1969. To a large extent, this substantial imbalance reflects the relative importance of North African states to the political ambitions of the USSR during this period. Strategically, all the states of North Africa are central to the shipping lanes in the Mediterranean whilst Algeria and Egypt, notably the two largest beneficiaries of Soviet aid, are major political forces both in African and the Middle Eastern affairs.

The areas of West Africa and East Africa were in receipt of relatively equal proportions of the total Soviet program to the continent, garnering 18.3% and 15.7% respectively.

#### SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO 1969

Analysis of draft resolutions ratified in the General Assembly by the Soviet Union, in direct opposition to the United States, indicates a strong relationship between African voting support and the distribution of Soviet assistance. In the years up to 1969, twenty African states consistently supported the USSR (Cluster B) in the United Nations. Sixteen of these states were in receipt of economic aid to a total of \$1873.0m., the equivalent of over 93% of the Soviet program. At the same time, none, of the seven African states who consistently opposed the USSR benefitted from Soviet economic assistance. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting provide significant evidence that economic assistance and support were associated during this period (Correlation 0.3431). Moreover, crosstabulation of aid and voting emphasises the nature of an association:

TABLE 3

SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING FROM INDEPENDENCE UP TO 1969CLUSTER B (60% Pro USSR)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|------------------|
| Algeria     | 36         | -           | -           | 36           | 232.0            |
| Burundi     | 26         | 1           | 5           | 32           | -                |
| Congo       | 27         | 4           | 8           | 39           | 10.0             |
| Egypt       | 49         | 3           | 1           | 53           | 1002.0           |
| Eq. Guinea  | 2          | 1           | -           | 3            | -                |
| Ghana       | 29         | 3           | 16          | 48           | 93.0             |
| Guinea      | 42         | -           | 1           | 43           | 168.0            |
| Kenya       | 16         | -           | 13          | 29           | 48.0             |
| Libya       | 25         | 5           | 16          | 46           | -                |
| Mali        | 42         | -           | 1           | 43           | 60.0             |
| Mauritania  | 34         | 3           | 4           | 41           | 3.0              |
| Morocco     | 35         | 2           | 10          | 47           | 44.0             |
| Nigeria     | 23         | -           | 21          | 44           | -                |
| Senegal     | 18         | 8           | 17          | 43           | 7.0              |
| Somalia     | 33         | -           | 6           | 39           | 66.0             |
| Sudan       | 46         | -           | 2           | 48           | 64.0             |
| Tanzania    | 27         | -           | 6           | 33           | 20.0             |
| Tunisia     | 24         | -           | 23          | 47           | 34.0             |
| Uganda      | 20         | 1           | 10          | 31           | 16.0             |
| Zambia      | 19         | -           | 6           | 25           | 6.0              |
|             |            |             |             |              | <u>6.0</u>       |
|             |            |             |             |              | \$1873.0m        |

CLUSTER A (60% Anti USSR)

|           |   |    |    |    |   |
|-----------|---|----|----|----|---|
| Botswana  | 1 | 14 | 2  | 17 | - |
| Gambia    | - | 18 | -  | 18 | - |
| Lesotho   | 2 | 17 | 4  | 23 | - |
| Liberia   | 5 | 32 | 13 | 50 | - |
| Malawi    | 1 | 21 | 4  | 26 | - |
| Rwanda    | 9 | 22 | 2  | 33 | - |
| Swaziland | - | 8  | 3  | 11 | - |

CLUSTER C (Largely Uncommitted)

|              |    |    |    |    |          |
|--------------|----|----|----|----|----------|
| Cameroon     | 11 | 8  | 21 | 40 | 8.0      |
| C.A.R.       | 9  | 17 | 15 | 41 | -        |
| Chad         | 13 | 11 | 18 | 42 | -        |
| Dahomey      | 9  | 20 | 10 | 39 | -        |
| Ethiopia     | 20 | 11 | 22 | 53 | 102.0    |
| Gabon        | 10 | 21 | 7  | 38 | -        |
| Ivory Coast  | 10 | 23 | 9  | 42 | -        |
| Madagascar   | 10 | 25 | 8  | 43 | -        |
| Niger        | 10 | 19 | 10 | 39 | -        |
| Sierra Leone | 8  | 7  | 25 | 40 | 28.0     |
| Togo         | 10 | 21 | 9  | 40 | -        |
| Upper Volta  | 13 | 17 | 12 | 42 | -        |
| Zaire        | 14 | 17 | 3  | 34 | -        |
|              |    |    |    |    | <u>-</u> |
|              |    |    |    |    | \$138.0m |

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | African States not<br>in receipt of aid<br>up to 1969 | African States<br>receiving aid<br>up to 1969 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 7<br>(100.0)  | 0<br>(0.0)                                    | 7  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 10<br>(76.9)  | 3<br>(23.1)                                   | 13 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 4<br>(20.0)   | 16<br>(80.0)                                  | 20 |
|                            | 21<br>(52.5)  | 19<br>(47.5)                                  | 40 |

Chi Square = 17.91401 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0001

Although Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Nigeria could testify that voting agreement with Moscow was not an automatic guarantee for Soviet assistance, it is apparent that only 15% of African states who failed to endorse the Soviet Union were able to garner concessional finance. The value of chi squared is 17.91 which indicates a significant relationship between aid and the pattern of African voting during these years.

Thirteen African countries remained relatively uncommitted in the United National General Assembly (Cluster C), three of whom benefitted from Soviet finance. Whilst the most fundamental characteristic of the voting record of these states is the general tendency towards abstention, the record of such votes was rarely absolute. In the vast majority of cases, the African states in Cluster C also voted either in support of, or in opposition to, the Soviet Union. It is thus possible to further refine states in Cluster C, by looking at the balance of non-abstention votes.

TABLE 4

REDISTRIBUTION OF CLUSTER C RATIO BETWEEN 'PRO' and 'ANTI' DIRECT  
VOTES UP TO 1969

Cluster Ca

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|-------------|------------|-------------|------------------|
| C.A.R.      | 9          | 17          | -                |
| Dahomey     | 9          | 20          | -                |
| Gabon       | 10         | 21          | -                |
| Ivory Coast | 10         | 23          | -                |
| Madagascar  | 10         | 25          | -                |
| Niger       | 10         | 19          | -                |
| Togo        | 10         | 21          | -                |

Cluster Cb

|          |    |    |       |
|----------|----|----|-------|
| Ethiopia | 20 | 11 | 102.0 |
|----------|----|----|-------|

Cluster Cz

|              |    |    |      |
|--------------|----|----|------|
| Cameroon     | 11 | 8  | 8.0  |
| Chad         | 13 | 11 | -    |
| Sierra Leone | 8  | 7  | 28.0 |
| Upper Volta  | 13 | 17 | -    |
| Zaire        | 14 | 17 | -    |

Cluster Ca: includes African states which revealed a general tendency towards abstention votes, but on occasions when they expressed direct votes, cast at least 60% of such votes against the Soviet Union

Cluster Cb: includes Ethiopia whose direct votes were cast predominantly (60%) in favour of the Soviet Union

Cluster Cz: includes African states who preferred to balance their direct votes neither in support nor opposition to the Soviet Union.

Thus, three of the states appearing in Cluster C were in receipt of Soviet aid totally \$138.0m; the equivalent of 6.9% of the Soviet program up to 1969. It is notable that none of these recipient states appears in voting Cluster Ca, whose direct votes were predominantly cast in opposition to the USSR. Indeed, the largest beneficiary of Soviet aid in Cluster C. Ethiopia, who received \$102.0m during this period, cast more than 60% of its direct votes in favour of its aid donor. Sierra Leone and Cameroon,

in receipt of \$28.0m and \$8.0m respectively, remained relatively uncommitted in the General Assembly and neither favoured nor opposed the USSR.

A vast majority of Moscow's aid (93.1%) was distributed to states who consistently supported the USSR. No Soviet assistance was disseminated to African states who consistently opposed Moscow in the General Assembly. At the same time, of the three recipient states who remained relatively uncommitted in their voting returns, none displayed a tendency to consistently oppose the Soviet Union on the occasions when they registered a direct vote.

#### DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

#### SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN RESOURCES UP TO 1969

In the years from independence to 1969, nine African countries have introduced policies of nationalisation of foreign owned investment and resources.

As table 5 indicates, seven recipients of Soviet aid nationalised foreign firms. These seven African states dominated Soviet aid to the continent, receiving \$1560.0m, the equivalent of over 77% of the total program in the years up to 1969. It would thus appear that the majority of African states who introduced such domestic measures were able to benefit from Soviet assistance.

However, it would be erroneous to assume an automatic connection between receipts of aid from Moscow and recipient response in favour of nationalisation. Only seven states from a total of eighteen recipients of the Soviet program were involved in the expropriation of foreign resources during this period, whilst two states involved in such domestic measures were not in receipt of any Soviet financial assistance.

TABLE 5

Soviet Aid and African Nationalisation from African Independence  
up to 1969

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Year of First Expropriation</u> | <u>Country of Origin</u> | <u>Soviet Aid (up to 1969)</u> | <u>Year of First Aid Agreement</u> |
|----------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Egypt          | 1961                               | US                       | \$1002.0m                      | 1957                               |
| Tunisia        | 1964                               | US, UK, FRA(1)           | \$ 34.0m                       | 1961                               |
| Morocco        | 1964                               | FRA(1)                   | \$ 44.0m                       | 1966                               |
| Algeria        | 1967                               | US                       | \$ 232.0m                      | 1963                               |
| Guinea         | 1961                               | FRA                      | \$ 168.0m                      | 1959                               |
| Mali           | 1967                               | FRA                      | \$ 60.0m                       | 1961                               |
| Tanzania       | 1967                               | UK, US                   | \$ 20.0m                       | 1966                               |
| Malawi         | 1968                               | US(1)                    | -                              | -                                  |
| Zaire          | 1966/67                            | Belgium(1)               | -                              | -                                  |

(1) Satisfactory compensation immediately paid

Sources: US Department of State Report on Nationalisation, Expropriation and other Takings of US Property since 1960, Research Study RECS-14 of November 30th, 1971; Africa Research Bulletin, Economic, Financial and Technical Series, Exeter.

At the same time, whilst all economic aid is channelled through (and therefore increases the size of) the public sector<sup>(15)</sup>, there is little evidence to suggest that Moscow consistently utilised economic aid to immediately reward or encourage expropriation policies on the African continent. In one case, there is a six year delay between the first receipts of Soviet aid and nationalisation measures.

To a large extent, the concentration of Soviet assistance within the eight recipients who nationalised foreign owned investment and resources confirms the earlier observations that the Soviet aid program up to 1969 favoured those African states

who were prepared to 'confront' the developed countries of the Western World. Within this context, it is noticeable that Malawi and Zaire, the only two African states to introduce nationalisation but not to benefit from Soviet economic aid, were amongst those states who quickly negotiated satisfactory compensation agreements with the respective foreign companies in an attempt not to alienate further Western investment.

#### SOVIET AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES UP TO 1969

Soviet military personnel on the African continent during this period have primarily utilised facilities in Egypt, Algeria and Somalia.

Moscow first established a 'relationship' with Egypt as early as 1956 during the Suez crisis and this was maintained throughout the 1950s and early 1960s by vast injections of Soviet aid finance. In 1967, the antagonisms of the Six Day War against Israel rejuvenated Egyptian links with the Eastern European state as the Arabs sought to maintain their supplies of military hardware. Thus, by the late 1960s, Soviet military personnel had gained access to the ports of Alexandria and Said; and to Sollum and Marsh Mattah. In 1969 it was estimated that approximately 14,000 Soviet military advisers were present in Egypt<sup>(16)</sup>.

In 1968, 1500 Soviet troops were based in Algeria, primarily utilising the facilities at Mers-el-Kabir<sup>(17)</sup>. In addition, in 1966 it was reported that in excess of 250 Soviet advisers were stationed in Somalia and, towards the end of the 1960s, Soviet warships frequently gained access to facilities in the three Somali ports of Berbera, Mogadishu and Kissimayo<sup>(18)</sup>.

It is not possible to provide positive evidence of a direct connection between the granting of facilities to Soviet military personnel and receipts of Soviet economic aid. In the cases of Egypt, Algeria and Somalia, economic assistance was agreed by Moscow prior to the recipients' offer of military facilities. However, new aid agreements were not forthcoming whilst the Soviet military were afforded access on African territory. This is especially notable with regard to Soviet-Egyptian relations in the 1960s. Nevertheless, it should be noted that these three African states were in receipt of a total of \$1300.0m in the years up to 1969. This is the equivalent of over 64% of total Soviet aid to African during this period.

Elsewhere on the continent, facilities for the Soviet military were more limited. Military agreements were established with Guinea, Sudan and Mali but they did not lead to the development of a substantial military presence. Indeed the USSR was denied overflight and landing rights at the Guinean airport of Conakry (earlier lengthened by the Russians) during the Cuban missile crisis<sup>(19)</sup>. This was despite the fact that Guinea was one of the first African countries to receive aid from USSR. To a large extent, this reflects the relative inability of economic assistance to overcome the generally widespread African unpopularity of a foreign military presence.

#### SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1969

It has already been noted that the Soviet-African aid program was first established as an alternative to Western donors. In this respect, it is not surprising that the African

states which benefitted most from her assistance were those whose leadership displayed a readiness (and ability) to adopt a relatively independent attitude towards the developed countries of the Western world. Thus, the three largest beneficiaries of Soviet assistance during this period were Egypt, Guinea and Algeria, who, under the forthright leadership of Presidents Nasser, Sekou Touré, Boumedienne & Bella respectively, garnered \$1294m worth of Soviet aid during this period.

It is noticeable that Algeria and Guinea were forced to struggle for their independence against Western intransigence, whilst Egypt, and the major Eastern beneficiary of Soviet finance, Ethiopia, number amongst the tiny minority of African states who could claim independent status prior to the Second World War.

Moreover, it would appear that Moscow was unwilling to negotiate successive aid agreements with African countries whose leadership did not display some element of continuity. On a continent where enduring political personalities are the exception rather than the rule<sup>(20)</sup>, this resulted in a limited number of multiple aid agreements with individual African states. Of the nineteen recipients of Soviet aid in the years up to 1969, only seven states were able to negotiate aid agreements with Moscow in more than one year; and only Mali and Sudan were able to renegotiate aid with the USSR after a change of political leadership. In this respect, Soviet-African aid relations up to 1969 were predominantly 'one-shot' agreements usually established before 1966. To a certain extent, this may be indicative of a degree of Soviet caution, in so much as the USSR was generally unwilling to maintain aid relations

with African states whose leadership was unstable and therefore potentially uncommitted in its long term support of Moscow.

TABLE 6

RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS UP TO 1969

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>(\$m)</u><br><u>Aid</u> | <u>(\$m)</u><br><u>GNP</u> | <u>Pop (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|--------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria      | 232.0                      | 3175                       | 12.6           | 252                   |
| Egypt        | 1002.0                     | 4816                       | 30.1           | 160                   |
| Morocco      | 44.0                       | 2623                       | 14.1           | 186                   |
| Tunisia      | 34.0                       | 90                         | 0.4            | 225                   |
| Cameroon     | 8.0                        | 594                        | 5.4            | 110                   |
| Ghana        | 93.0                       | 2296                       | 8.0            | 287                   |
| Guinea       | 168.0                      | 288                        | 3.6            | 80                    |
| Mali         | 560.0                      | 282                        | 4.7            | 60                    |
| Mauritania   | 3.0                        | 143                        | 1.1            | 130                   |
| Senegal      | 7.0                        | 756                        | 3.6            | 210                   |
| Sierra Leone | 28.0                       | 360                        | 2.4            | 150                   |
| Ethiopia     | 102.0                      | 1502                       | 23.1           | 65                    |
| Kenya        | 48.0                       | 1205                       | 9.8            | 123                   |
| Somalia      | 66.0                       | 125                        | 2.5            | 50                    |
| Sudan        | 64.0                       | 1410                       | 14.1           | 100                   |
| Tanzania     | 20.0                       | 136                        | 1.7            | 80                    |
| Uganda       | 16.0                       | 939                        | 7.7            | 122                   |
| Congo        | 10.0                       | 108                        | 0.9            | 120                   |
| Zambia       | 6.0                        | 1315                       | 3.8            | 346                   |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbook; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971, pp. 8-9; UN Demographic Yearbooks, IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

It is evident that a significant proportion of Soviet economic aid was distributed to states whose GNP was high, relative to other areas of the continent (Correlation 0.6642). There is also an association between the Soviet program and the size of recipient population (Correlation 0.4365). On the whole, there is little evidence to assume that Moscow's economic assistance

to Africa was motivated by the economic needs of the less developed continent. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and recipient GNP per capita reveal that receipts cannot be significantly associated with this economic variable (Correlation 0.0286). To a large extent, this is also evident in the regional bias of the program during this period where North African states benefitted to a much greater degree than the relatively impoverished states of Central and Southern Africa.

### SOVIET AID AND INFLUENCE UP TO 1969

#### Overview

Soviet aid relations with Africa were established in the Cold War environment of the late 1950s and early 1960s when Moscow was anxious to develop a sphere of influence amongst the Third World members of the United Nations, as a counter to the overtures of the United States and Western Europe. This was clearly illustrated in the nature of Soviet economic assistance to Egypt and Guinea, where valuable propaganda was gained by Moscow in offering aid to states who had been refused Western finance. In the period up to 1969, the Soviet Union distributed a total of \$2011.0m to nineteen independent African states. This aid was seemingly associated with the degree of African voting support at the United Nations. Sixteen recipient states, garnering \$1873.0m., consistently supported the USSR in the General Assembly; with the remaining aid being distributed to African states who, whilst largely remaining uncommitted in their voting, also tended to favour Moscow on the occasions when a direct vote was registered. In other words, 93% of the total Soviet aid program was disseminated

to African states who consistently supported the USSR in the United Nations, whilst no economic assistance was given to states who consistently opposed her. In addition, correlation and crosstabulation tests of Soviet aid and African voting performance up to 1969 add strength to the conclusion that economic assistance from Moscow and African support were not unconnected during this period.

However, consideration of African nationalisation and the accessibility of facilities for Soviet military personnel on the continent reveals a more limited relationship between Soviet aid and political influence. In the years up to 1969, seven recipient states extended state economic management at the expense of foreign investment; whilst only three African states afforded the Soviet Union access to major military facilities within their borders. Thus, within a total aid program encompassing nineteen African states, it is apparent that the level of recipient 'response' was by no means comprehensive. Nevertheless, it should be noted that those African leaders who did conform with Soviet aims and ambitions in these terms number amongst the major beneficiaries of Moscow's aid to Africa in the years up to 1969. At the same time, the six African states who, to a greater or lesser extent, tolerated a Soviet military presence within their borders, were amongst the minority of African recipients who were able to negotiate successive aid agreements with the USSR.

Thus, in general terms, it would appear that Soviet-African aid relations were not independent of African voting support at the United Nations up to 1969. At the same time, those African leaders who were prepared or equipped to introduce

measures which favoured Soviet ambitions on the continent, and who were able to remain in a position of political power, benefitted most from the Soviet program.

#### SOVIET-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

In the years from 1970 to 1976, a total of \$1317.0m was distributed to twenty African states. In comparison with the program prior to 1970, this represented an annual average reduction of \$13.0m<sup>(21)</sup>. To a large extent, this may be viewed in the light of what some commentators saw as a more 'pragmatic' approach to Soviet-African relations in the 1970s. In his study of the Soviet Union in Africa, William Gutteridge describes the late 1960s as a 'watershed' in Soviet policy towards the African continent:

"The first ten years of substantive Soviet contact with Africa saw a radical evolution of perceptions and goals. The optimistic assumption that countries like Guinea would rapidly become recognisable socialist states had disappeared. But the failure to establish communist regimes was compensated for by the realisation that it was possible to damage or modify the influence of Western powers without necessarily realising any local ideological gains ... thereafter the emphasis was not so much on cultivating ideologically promising countries but on countries that were of practical importance". (22)

To a large extent, William Gutteridge's findings are substantiated in the nature of Soviet aid distribution from 1970. The politically and strategically important states of North Africa dominated the Soviet aid program and, with the possible exceptions of assistance to Guinea, Mali and Somalia, the Soviet Union was content to distribute relatively minor sums of economic assistance elsewhere on the continent. West and East African

TABLE 7

SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>NORTH</u> | \$m       | <u>EAST</u> | \$m      |
|--------------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| Algeria      | 483.0     | Burundi     | -        |
| Egypt        | 548.0     | Ethiopia    | 4.0      |
| Libya        | -         | Kenya       | -        |
| Morocco      | 44.0      | Rwanda      | -        |
| Tunisia      | 48.0      | Somalia     | 88.0     |
|              | \$1123.0m | Sudan       | -        |
|              |           | Tanzania    | -        |
|              |           | Uganda      | -        |
|              |           |             | \$92.0m  |
| <br>         |           |             |          |
| <u>WEST</u>  |           |             |          |
| Cameroon     | -         | Botswana    | -        |
| Chad         | 2.0       | C.A.R.      | 2.0      |
| Dahomey      | 5.0       | Congo       | 5.0      |
| Gambia       | -         | Eq. Guinea  | 1.0      |
| Ghana        | 4.0       | Gabon       | -        |
| Guinea       | 36.0      | Lesotho     | -        |
| Ivory Coast  | -         | Madagascar  | -        |
| Liberia      | -         | Malawi      | -        |
| Mali         | 30.0      | Mozambique  | 3.0      |
| Mauritania   | 2.0       | Swaziland   | -        |
| Niger        | 2.0       | Zaire       | -        |
| Nigeria      | 7.0       | Zambia      | -        |
| Senegal      | 2.0       |             | \$11.0 m |
| Sierra Leone | -         |             |          |
| Togo         | -         |             |          |
| Upper Volta  | 1.0       |             |          |
|              | \$91.0 m  |             |          |

Total Program: \$1317.0m

## % Regional Share:


|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| North | 85.3% |
| West  | 6.9%  |
| East  | 7.0%  |
| C & S | 0.8%  |

Sources: US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, Washington D.C., August, 1977; Development Co-operation, O.E.C.D. Paris; D Rees, Soviet Strategic Penetration of Africa, Conflict Studies, November, 1976

# AFRICA

SOVIET AID RELATIONS

FROM 1970 TO 1976.



-  RECIPIENTS OF SOVIET AID
-  NATIONALISATION
-  VOTING AGREEMENT
-  UNCOMMITTED
-  MILITARY FACILITIES

recipients received only \$91.0m and \$92.0m. respectively, whilst Central and Southern states were in receipt of a mere \$11.0m from 1970 to 1976. Moreover, thirteen African recipients of the Soviet aid program during this period were in receipt of assistance totalling only \$40.0m. The four North African recipients of Soviet aid on the other hand, were in receipt of \$1123.0m; the equivalent of over 85% of the total African program.

This regional bias is reflected in the distinctions which may be drawn from the distribution of Soviet economic aid in terms of history or language. Thus, from 1970 to 1976, the Francophone states of Africa, including Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (North of the Sahara), acquired \$626.0m; whilst Ghana and Nigeria, together being in receipt of only \$11.0m, were the only former British dependencies to negotiate with Moscow.

#### SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 1970 to 1976

In the years from 1970 to 1976 the level of African support for USSR was overwhelming. Thirty-seven states consistently supported (Cluster B) Moscow in General Assembly resolutions, drafted with the explicit support of the Soviet Union in opposition to the United States. All twenty recipients of Soviet aid during this period fall in Cluster B and only four states, none of whom were in receipt of economic aid, remained uncommitted in their voting (Cluster C).

In the context of such an overwhelming degree of African support, it is difficult to establish significance between aid and voting behaviour. On the one hand, it could be argued that all Soviet economic assistance from 1970 was distributed to states

TABLE 8

SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING 1970-76CLUSTER B (60% Pro USSR)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst</u> | <u>Tot</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|-------------|-------------|------------|------------------|
| Algeria      | 49         | -           | -           | 49         | 483.0            |
| Botswana     | 27         | 3           | 12          | 42         | -                |
| Burundi      | 43         | -           | 5           | 48         | -                |
| Cameroon     | 39         | -           | 8           | 47         | -                |
| C.A.R.       | 15         | 4           | 18          | 37         | 2.0              |
| Chad         | 36         | 3           | 9           | 48         | 2.0              |
| Congo        | 43         | 7           | 1           | 44         | 5.0              |
| Dahomey      | 30         | 7           | 8           | 45         | 5.0              |
| Egypt        | 49         | -           | -           | 49         | 548.0            |
| Eq. Guinea   | 38         | -           | 1           | 39         | 1.0              |
| Ethiopia     | 29         | -           | 18          | 47         | 4.0              |
| Gabon        | 19         | 8           | 9           | 36         | -                |
| Gambia       | 21         | 7           | 5           | 33         | -                |
| Ghana        | 34         | -           | 13          | 47         | 4.0              |
| Guinea       | 48         | -           | -           | 48         | 36.0             |
| Ivory Coast  | 24         | 8           | 18          | 50         | -                |
| Kenya        | 32         | 1           | 16          | 49         | -                |
| Libya        | 44         | -           | -           | 44         | -                |
| Madagascar   | 33         | 9           | 6           | 48         | -                |
| Mali         | 49         | -           | 1           | 50         | 30.0             |
| Mauritania   | 48         | -           | -           | 48         | 2.0              |
| Morocco      | 43         | -           | 5           | 48         | 44.0             |
| Mozambique   | 13         | -           | -           | 13         | 3.0              |
| Niger        | 33         | 5           | 7           | 45         | 2.0              |
| Nigeria      | 42         | -           | 5           | 47         | 7.0              |
| Rwanda       | 31         | 9           | 7           | 47         | -                |
| Senegal      | 45         | 2           | 1           | 48         | 2.0              |
| Sierra Leone | 34         | 1           | 9           | 44         | -                |
| Somalia      | 48         | -           | -           | 48         | 88.0             |
| Sudan        | 49         | -           | -           | 49         | -                |
| Tanzania     | 50         | -           | -           | 50         | -                |
| Togo         | 30         | 3           | 12          | 45         | -                |
| Tunisia      | 43         | -           | 7           | 50         | 48.0             |
| Uganda       | 45         | -           | 4           | 49         | -                |
| Upper Volta  | 30         | 2           | 13          | 45         | 1.0              |
| Zaire        | 28         | 5           | 12          | 45         | -                |
| Zambia       | 49         | -           | -           | 49         | -                |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|           |    |    |    |    |   |
|-----------|----|----|----|----|---|
| Lesotho   | 21 | 13 | 12 | 46 | - |
| Liberia   | 20 | 18 | 8  | 46 | - |
| Malawi    | 3  | 18 | 26 | 47 | - |
| Swaziland | 8  | 13 | 12 | 33 | - |

who consistently lent their support to the USSR in the General Assembly. On the other hand, it should be noted that 46% of the supporting states in Cluster B did not receive any Soviet aid during this period. The tentative nature of such findings is borne out in the crosstabulation and chi-squared test of African voting performance and Soviet aid distribution from 1970 to 1976:

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | States who did<br>not receive aid<br>1970-1976 | States who did<br>receive aid<br>1970-1976 |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|----|
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 4<br>(100.0)                                   | 0<br>(0.0)                                 | 4  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 17<br>(45.9)                                   | 20<br>(54.1)                               | 37 |
|                            | 21<br>(51.2)                                   | 20<br>(48.8)                               | 41 |

Raw Chi Square = 4.22 with 1 degree of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0399

Corrected Chi Square = 2.34 with 1 degree of Freedom  
Significance = 0.1265

Whilst the raw chi squared analysis reveals a significant difference between observed and expected values of aid and recipient voting, the absence of African disagreement and the limited size of the abstention vote, questions the validity of such 'raw' results. Fifty per cent of the valid cells in the above crosstabulation have an expected cell frequency of less than 5.0 and, once allowance within the test is made for this, the corrected value of chi-squared reveals a substantially reduced level of significance between aid and recipient voting support.

In this respect, it is difficult to assess with any accuracy whether the overwhelming African support at the United

Nations. was associated with Soviet aid relations on the continent; or whether such a degree of support would have been forthcoming regardless of the Soviet aid program from 1970. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting during this period reveal some evidence of a limited association between economic assistance and support in the General Assembly (Correlation 0.2595). However, later analysis of aid distribution and voting between the two time periods may provide a further insight into the nature of this relationship. At the moment, it should simply be noted that Moscow did not distribute any economic assistance to the states of Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi and Swaziland, who failed to support USSR with any consistency from 1970 to 1976.

#### DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

#### SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN EXPROPRIATION OF FOREIGN RESOURCES FROM 1970 to 1976

The use of nationalisation as a means of economic control became more widespread in Africa during the 1970s. From 1970 to 1976, eighteen African states introduced substantial domestic programs of nationalisation involving the expropriation of foreign investment and property interests.

TABLE 9Soviet Aid and African Nationalisation

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Year</u> | <u>Investment</u>   | <u>Soviet Aid (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|-------------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| Libya        | 1970        | US                  | -                       |
| Morocco      | 1970        | France              | 44.0                    |
| Algeria      | 1970        | France, US          | 483.0                   |
| Ghana        | 1970        | Britain, US         | 4.0                     |
| Nigeria      | 1972        | Britain             | 7.0                     |
| Sierra Leone | 1970        | Britain             | -                       |
| Mauritania   | 1974        | France              | 2.0                     |
| Togo         | 1974        | France              | -                       |
| Dahomey      | 1970        | France              | 5.0                     |
| Zaire        | 1973        | Belgium             | -                       |
| Congo        | 1970        | France              | -                       |
| (1) Kenya    | 1970        | Britain             | -                       |
| Uganda       | 1970        | Britain, US, France | -                       |
| Zambia       | 1970        | Britain, US         | -                       |
| Sudan        | 1970        | Britain, US         | -                       |
| Tanzania     | 1971        | US                  | -                       |
| Madagascar   | 1976        | France              | -                       |
| Somalia      | 1970        | US                  | <u>88.0</u>             |
|              |             | TOTAL               | 638.0                   |

(1) Compensation paid

Sources: L L Rood, 'Nationalisation and Indigenisation in Africa' Journal of Modern African Studies, 14, 3, (1976), pp. 427-447, US State Department, Department of Intelligence and Research, 'Disputes Involving US Foreign Direct Investment up to July 31st 1973, Washington US State Department; D M Ray, 'The Causes of American Expropriation Abroad', Stafford Journal of International Studies II, (Spring 1976), 122-152; Africa Freedom Annual, South Africa Freedom Institute, 1977.

There is little evidence to assume that African expropriation of foreign (Western) resources was linked to receipts of Soviet economic aid during the 1970s. Less than half the African states who introduced such policies benefitted from Soviet assistance from 1970 to 1976 and they garnered less than 50% of the total

Soviet program during this period.

In other words, at least ten African states could testify to the fact that aid was not forthcoming as a result of nationalisation, whilst eleven African countries were in receipt of a total of \$679.0m in Soviet aid and without feeling the need to introduce such policies in the 1970s. Thus, whilst the USSR was unlikely to discourage African governments who wished to develop economic policies which broadly conformed with Soviet economic principles, it would appear that aid from Moscow was not contingent upon the expropriation of foreign owned resources.

#### SOVIET AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES FROM 1970 to 1976

Facilities for Soviet military personnel were established within the borders of two economic aid recipients in the 1970s. In 1973 permission was granted by the Guinean Government of Sekou Touré for Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft to use the airport at Conakry. According to the magazine, West Africa (March 1974) this concession was of considerable value to the USSR since it enabled planes to monitor the movement of shipping using the Cape route between the South Atlantic and the Indian Ocean<sup>(23)</sup>. In July of the following year, the Belgian Defence Minister, Monsieur Paul Van Den Boeyants, was quoted in the same magazine as saying that Soviet warships also were using 'bunkering' facilities in the area of Conakry.

In 1975 it was reported that the Soviet Union had free access to all Somali airfields whilst her navy was able to utilise facilities in the Southern Somali port of Kisabu<sup>(24)</sup>. In addition, in June of the same year, Mr James Schlesinger, the US

Defence Secretary, presented evidence of the existence of a large Soviet missile base at Berbera<sup>(25)</sup>.

However, elsewhere on the continent, facilities for Soviet military personnel were sparse. By 1976, Soviet military technicians were present in Equatorial Guinea, Libya and Mozambique<sup>(26)</sup>, but generally speaking, evidence of the ability of Soviet aid to overcome the xenophobic resistance of African states to the notion of a Soviet military presence was limited. Thus, whilst it should be noted that Guinea and Somalia, who granted concessions to the Soviet military, were major beneficiaries of Soviet aid within the respective regions of West and East Africa, the vast injections of aid finance to states in North Africa did not result in military facilities in this area from 1970 to 1976. To a certain extent, it would appear that the strategic and political importance of North African states, which afforded them the ability to attract substantial sums of economic assistance, consequently granted them a degree of independence to resist any proposals for a major foreign military base.

Thus, with the possible exceptions of Guinea and Somalia, there is little evidence of a connection between the flow of Soviet economic aid and African 'response' in terms of military facilities.

#### SOVIET ECONOMIC AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP FROM 1970 to 1976

In the years up to 1969, four African states received aid in excess of \$100.0m from Moscow and more than half the recipients acquired more than \$30.0m. From 1970, Moscow's

preference for 'one-shot' agreements continued but the total number of large scale recipients declined. In the years from 1970 to 1976 only Guinea, Mali and Somalia, in addition to the four North African recipients, were in receipt of Soviet aid to the value of \$30m. or more. One of the common characteristics of these seven large scale recipients is the sustained and durable nature of their political leadership. In this respect, the leadership of each of these African states has remained stable from 1970 to 1976.

TABLE 10

Major Beneficiaries and Political Leadership

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>Leadership</u>        |
|----------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Algeria        | 483.0            | Pres. Houari Boumedienne |
| Egypt          | 548.0            | Pres. Anwar Sadat        |
| Morocco        | 44.0             | King Hassan II           |
| Tunisia        | 48.0             | Pres. Habib Bourguiba    |
| Somalia        | 88.0             | Pres. Siad Barre         |
| Guinea         | 36.0             | Pres. Sekou Touré        |
| Mali           | 30.0             | Pres. Mousse Traore      |

To a certain extent, it would seem that the continuity derived from the persistence of these African leaders has facilitated Soviet attempts to establish positive aid relations on the continent. This is especially the case in North Africa where the relative absence of political turmoil has coincided with vast injections of Soviet aid finance.

It would be erroneous to assume that Soviet relations with these major beneficiaries has constantly been smooth and trouble free. This is clearly not the case<sup>(27)</sup>. Nevertheless, it is apparent that Moscow was more willing to provide substantial

sums of aid to familiar African personalities whose policies were likely to be favourable to USSR.

TABLE 11

RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1970 to 1976

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Popn. (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 483.0            | 8220             | 14.7             | 559                   |
| Egypt       | 548.0            | 9180             | 35.6             | 258                   |
| Morocco     | 44.0             | 5250             | 15.9             | 330                   |
| Tunisia     | 48.0             | 2760             | 5.3              | 521                   |
| Chad        | 2.0              | 370              | 3.9              | 95                    |
| Dahomey     | 5.0              | 340              | 2.9              | 117                   |
| Ghana       | 4.0              | 2990             | 9.4              | 318                   |
| Guinea      | 36.0             | 560              | 5.2              | 108                   |
| Mali        | 30.0             | 400              | 5.4              | 74                    |
| Mauritania  | 2.0              | 260              | 1.3              | 200                   |
| Niger       | 2.0              | 470              | 4.3              | 109                   |
| Nigeria     | 7.0              | 12750            | 71.3             | 179                   |
| Senegal     | 2.0              | 1290             | 4.7              | 274                   |
| Upper Volta | 1.0              | 540              | 5.6              | 96                    |
| Ethiopia    | 4.0              | 2360             | 26.5             | 89                    |
| Somalia     | 88.0             | 260              | 3.0              | 87                    |
| C.A.R       | 2.0              | 300              | 1.7              | 176                   |
| Congo       | 5.0              | 490              | 1.3              | 377                   |
| Eq. Guinea  | 1.0              | 80               | 0.3              | 267                   |
| Mozambique  | 3.0              | 2690             | 9.2              | 292                   |

Sources: World Bank National Yearbooks, 1970-76; United Nations Statistical Yearbooks, 1970-76; United Nations Demographic Yearbooks, 1970-76; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977

As in the years up to 1969, it is apparent that the Soviet aid program from 1970 to 1976 was not governed by the simple criteria of recipient economic need. In relative terms, the major African beneficiaries of economic assistance from Moscow were not economically disadvantaged. Moreover, analysis by Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveals a significant relationship

between total Soviet aid to Africa from 1970 to 1976 and the economic indicators of GNP (0.5613) and, to a more limited extent, population (Correlation 0.3102).

It would appear that the Soviet program was not governed by philanthropic concern based on relative economic weakness. Certainly, there are no indications of a significant association between assistance and GNP per capita (Correlation 0.0368). In addition, in the years from 1970 to 1976, less than 13% of the total assistance program from Moscow was distributed to those African states considered by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to be amongst 'the most least-developed states' of the world<sup>(28)</sup>. To a large extent, this conforms with the 'pragmatic' approach of the Soviet aid program which overwhelmingly favoured the political, strategic and economically important areas of the continent.

#### SOVIET-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the years from independence up to 1969, the Soviet Union distributed a total of \$2011.0m. to nineteen independent African states. The program as a whole was established as an alternative source of assistance to Western aid finance and displayed a tendency to favour those African states who were prepared to question their dependence upon the West. From 1970, Soviet economic credits were extended to twenty African states in a program totalling \$1317.0m. The distribution of this second program emphasised the bias towards the states of North Africa.

TABLE 12

COMPARATIVE REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

|                       | <u>Soviet Aid up<br/>to 1969</u> | <u>% of<br/>Program</u> | <u>Soviet Aid<br/>from 1970-<br/>1976</u> | <u>% Of Program</u> |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|---|---------------------|
| North                 | \$1312.0m                        | 65.2                    | \$1123.0m                                 | 85.3                |
| West                  | \$ 367.0m                        | 18.3                    | \$ 91.0m                                  | 6.9                 |
| East                  | \$ 316.0m                        | 15.7                    | \$ 92.0m                                  | 7.0                 |
| Central &<br>Southern | \$ 16.0m                         | 0.8                     | \$ 11.0m                                  | 0.8                 |

In the years from 1970 to 1976, North African recipients increased their share of total Soviet aid, seemingly at the expense of assistance to West and East Africa. The Central & Southern States of Africa continued to remain low in Soviet aid priorities, garnering less than 1% of total aid in both time periods. Thus it would appear that, from 1970, the USSR was anxious to maintain positive and sustained aid relations with the strategic and politically important states in the Northern region of the continent; possibly in the hope that such a policy would also prove to be influential elsewhere in Africa.

SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

Comparative analysis of the distribution of Soviet economic aid and African voting performance reveals that the increase in North Africa's share of the program from 1970 coincided with a rise in the level of African voting support at the United Nations. In the years up to 1969, twenty African states consistently supported Moscow (Cluster B), of whom sixteen were

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOVIET AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

| Country        | FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1969 |       |         | 1970-76        |           |         |
|----------------|---------------------------|-------|---------|----------------|-----------|---------|
|                | Aid<br>(\$m)              | %     | UN Vote | Aid<br>(\$m)   | %         | UN Vote |
| Algeria        | 232.0                     | 11.5  | B       | 483.0          | 36.6      | B       |
| Egypt          | 1002.0                    | 49.8  | B       | 548.0          | 41.6      | B       |
| Libya          | -                         | -     | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Morocco        | 44.0                      | 2.2   | B       | 44.0           | 3.3       | B       |
| Tunisia        | 34.0                      | 1.7   | B       | 48.0           | 3.6       | B       |
| Cameroon       | 8.0                       | 0.4   | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Chad           | -                         | -     | C       | 2.0            | 0.2       | B       |
| Dahomey        | -                         | -     | C       | 5.0            | 0.4       | B       |
| Gambia         | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | B       |
| Ghana          | 93.0                      | 4.6   | B       | 4.0            | 0.3       | B       |
| Guinea         | 168.0                     | 8.4   | B       | 36.0           | 2.7       | B       |
| Ivory Coast    | -                         | -     | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Liberia        | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | C       |
| Mali           | 60.0                      | 3.0   | B       | 30.0           | 2.2       | B       |
| Mauritania     | 3.0                       | 0.1   | B       | 2.0            | 0.2       | B       |
| Niger          | -                         | -     | C       | 2.0            | 0.2       | B       |
| Nigeria        | -                         | -     | B       | 7.0            | 0.5       | B       |
| Senegal        | 7.0                       | 0.3   | B       | 2.0            | 0.2       | B       |
| Sierra Leone   | 28.0                      | 1.4   | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Togo           | -                         | -     | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Upper Volta    | -                         | -     | C       | 1.0            | 0.1       | B       |
| Burundi        | -                         | -     | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Ethiopia       | 102.0                     | 5.1   | C       | 4.0            | 0.3       | B       |
| Kenya          | 48.0                      | 2.4   | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Rwanda         | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | B       |
| Somalia        | 66.0                      | 3.3   | B       | 88.0           | 6.7       | B       |
| Sudan          | 64.0                      | 3.2   | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Tanzania       | 20.0                      | 1.0   | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Uganda         | 16.0                      | 0.8   | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Botswana       | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | B       |
| C A R          | -                         | -     | C       | 2.0            | 0.2       | B       |
| Congo          | 10.0                      | 0.5   | B       | 5.0            | 0.4       | B       |
| Eq. Guinea     | -                         | -     | B       | 1.0            | 0.1       | B       |
| Gabon          | -                         | -     | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Madagascar     | -                         | -     | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Malawi         | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | C       |
| Lesotho        | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | C       |
| Swaziland      | -                         | -     | A       | -              | -         | C       |
| Zaire          | -                         | -     | C       | -              | -         | B       |
| Zambia         | 6.0                       | 0.3   | B       | -              | -         | B       |
| Mozambique     | -                         | -     | -       | 3.0            | 0.2       | B       |
|                | 2011.0                    |       |         | 1317.0         |           |         |
| Cluster B (20) | \$1873.0                  | 93.1% |         | Cluster B (37) | \$1317.0m | 100%    |
| Cluster C (13) | \$ 138.0                  | 6.9%  |         | Cluster C ( 4) |           |         |
| Cluster A ( 7) |                           |       |         |                |           |         |

in receipt of Soviet assistance to a total of \$1873.0m.; the equivalent of over 93% of the Soviet aid program during this period. From 1970, African voting agreement with the USSR rose to overwhelming proportions with the result that 100% of Soviet aid to Africa was distributed to states which consistently supported Moscow in the General Assembly. The significance of such voting support in terms of Soviet aid distribution is discernable but must be analysed with some caution. Crosstabulation of aid and African voting support in the first time period does indicate a significant relationship up to 1969; but, from 1970, the limited nature of African voting opposition, from both recipient and non-recipient alike, undermines the significance of the crosstabulation in the second time period.

Nevertheless, further insight into the nature of Soviet aid to Africa and recipient voting patterns can be provided by analysing changes in the pattern of voting and aid allocation between the two time periods.

The nature of the association between Soviet assistance and African voting can be analysed in terms of aid and adjustments in voting performance both before and after 1969. Crosstabulation of Soviet economic aid in the first time period and changes in the nature of African behaviour in the United Nations provides some indication of the causal relationship between aid and support.

Voting Changes

| COUNT<br>(Row #)   | Cluster A-C        | Cluster A-B        | Cluster C-B         | Cluster B-B         |    |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------|----|
| African states<br>not in receipt<br>of aid up to<br>1969 | 4 states<br>(19.0) | 3 states<br>(14.3) | 10 states<br>(47.6) | 4 states<br>(19.0)  | 21 |
| African states<br>in receipt of<br>aid up to<br>1969     | 0 states<br>(0.0)  | 0 states<br>(0.0)  | 3 states<br>(15.8)  | 16 states<br>(84.2) | 19 |
|  | 4<br>(10.0)        | 3<br>(7.5)         | 13<br>(32.5)        | 20<br>(50.0)        | 40 |

Chi square = 17.91401 with 3 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0005

Cluster A (60% Anti)  
Cluster B (60% Pro)  
Cluster C (Uncommitted)

There is evidence to believe that the level of African support in the 1970s can be associated with the earlier pattern of aid and voting. Nineteen states were in receipt of assistance in the first time period, of whom sixteen maintained their support with Moscow in the years from 1970. In other words, almost 85% of the recipients of Soviet finance up to 1969 continued to vote with the donor in the second period. More importantly, perhaps, of seventeen states who had not voted with Moscow and had not received assistance, none voted against the USSR in the 1970s, and thirteen moved to a position of consistent support. It is possible that these states were 'reacting' to the earlier association between voting support and economic aid. The value of chi squared is significant at a level beyond 0.005 which indicates that African behaviour in the United Nations in the 1970s may have been a 'response' to earlier aid allocations.

Given the contrasting duration of the two time periods it is interesting to note the extent to which African voting

behaviour was influenced by the ability of recipients to maintain their share of the program. Twenty states voted for the Soviet Union in both time periods, of whom seven increased their share of the Soviet program after 1969; eleven states experienced a decrease in aid, and two states were not in receipt of Soviet assistance at any time (see Table 13). Thus, the majority of African states who consistently supported Moscow in both time periods, did so despite a reduction in their share of the Soviet aid program from 1970. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the North African states of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia number amongst those consistent supporters of USSR who increased their share of the program. In this respect, Moscow remained anxious to continue positive aid relations with the politically and economically important states in the North, possibly in the hope that this would have ramifications for the level of support and influence elsewhere on the continent.

Thus, for the majority of African states, a reduction in the share of Soviet aid from 1970 was an insufficient reason to withdraw support for Moscow at the United Nations. Indeed, to a certain extent, the high level of consistent voting support for USSR should be analysed in terms of the earlier pattern of aid and voting.

#### SOVIET AID AND NATIONALISATION

Whilst there has never been a direct connection between the distribution of economic aid and the incidence of recipient expropriation of foreign-owned resources, it was noticeable in the years up to 1969 that the vast majority of states

who did introduce nationalisation measures numbered amongst the major beneficiaries of Soviet assistance. The seven recipient states who expanded state economic controls at the expense of Western investment interests dominated Soviet-African aid, accruing \$1560.0M.; the equivalent of over 77% of the total program during this period. In addition, the two African states, Malawi and Zaire, who introduced such policies and yet did not receive economic aid, noticeably agreed adequate compensation for foreign investors in their anxiety not to discourage economic relations with the West. In this respect, whilst Soviet economic assistance did not act as a catalyst for wholesale African nationalisation, it was provided to African states who chose to introduce such policies in the face of Western opposition.

However, from 1970, it is apparent that Moscow was not capable of providing similar 'guarantees'. In part, this is due to the more widespread African use of nationalisation as a means of economic management after 1969, which the Soviet program could not mirror. It is also symptomatic of the more pragmatic approach of Soviet aid in the second time period, which seemed to place more emphasis on the strategic and political importance of recipient states, rather than on their propensity to expand the state sector and conform with Soviet economic philosophy.

#### SOVIET AID AND MILITARY FACILITIES

The ability of the USSR to negotiate major facilities for her military personnel was limited in all years up to 1976. It is apparent that, during the periods when such facilities have been available on the African continent - in Egypt, Algeria and

Somalia in the period up to 1969; and in Somalia and Guinea from 1970 - substantial Soviet assistance has been forthcoming. However, such concessional finance was not necessarily coterminous with the decision to grant such facilities for Soviet military personnel.

On the whole, there is little evidence of a direct and comprehensive relationship between economic aid and the availability of military facilities on the continent. To a large extent, it would seem that African intransigence to the notion of a Soviet military presence was pervasive, with or without the 'encouragement' of substantial concessional finance.

#### CONCLUSION

In terms of African voting agreement at the United Nations, the level of Soviet political influence on the African continent has been substantial. The extent to which this influence has been contingent upon economic aid from Moscow is by no means clear cut. Soviet-African aid relations were established in the late 1950s and early 1960s in a positive atmosphere. Primarily, this was due to the fact that Moscow was perceived to be offering economic assistance to states whose leadership had rejected, or been refused, Western-based finance. Thus, during the years up to 1969, the aid program seemed to favour those African states, especially but not exclusively in the North, who were prepared to adopt policies, such as nationalisation, which did not favour the developed countries of the Western world. At the same time, analysis of African voting patterns at the United Nations provides strong indications that the distribution of Soviet aid and the level of support for Moscow were not independent of each

other up to 1969. Thus, whilst Soviet assistance was not overwhelmingly successful in establishing comprehensive facilities for her military personnel on the continent, Moscow had much reason to be generally satisfied with the positive nature of African aid relations during these years.

To a large extent, this was facilitated by the fact that the assistance program was administered by a single, closely controlled agency whose centralised character permitted a high degree of continuity and planning. As a result, the USSR was able to match political, economic, strategic, and, to a certain extent, philosophical objectives with the flow of aid in a very efficient fashion, as witnessed in its bias towards African leaders who were able to remain in positions of power on this politically unstable continent. Thus, in 1970, in his study of shifts in Soviet foreign policies towards the less developed areas, R A Yellon was able to comment that in the first ten years of Soviet economic assistance, "decisions were so much politically inspired that little account was taken of the economic factors that would govern the actual implementation of that assistance"<sup>(28)</sup>.

This pragmatic approach was emphasised even more from 1970 as the flow of Soviet economic aid to the strategic and politically important states increased in even larger proportions. However, the aid program to the continent as a whole was limited after 1969 and it becomes more difficult to reconcile this with the overwhelming level of African voting support in the 1970s. Nevertheless, it is significant that this high degree of support may be associated with the pattern of aid relations up to 1969. In this respect it would appear that African states were influenced by the character of the earlier Soviet program.

It is also apparent in the 1970s that Moscow was no longer able to provide aid to the majority of African states who expropriated foreign-owned investment in programs of nationalisation. Nevertheless, she did ensure that the share of the Soviet assistance program to the strategic, economic and politically important states was largely maintained. Whilst this was never capable of overcoming general African resistance to the idea of a Soviet military presence on African soil, it was possibly instrumental in the maintenance of political influence with the continent as a whole.

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  - b) The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space
  - c) Questions Concerning the Use of Atomic Energy
  - d) The Strenghtening of International Security
  - e) The Question of Peace-Keeping Operations
  - f) Questions Concerning the United Nations Charter
  - g) Questions Concerning Asia and the Far East
  - h) Questions Concerning Latin America
  - i) Questions Relating to the Middle East
  - j) The Situation in Cyprus.
  - k) Questions Relating to Membership of the United Nations
  - l) Other Political and Security Questions
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Note also that Armstrong upholds this interpretation in 1976 whilst reflecting upon, 'Developments in East-West Relations' in Survey, Autumn, 1976, Vol. 22, No 3/4
- "The critical test of Soviet intentions, in the short term, was the regimes' willingness to respect the territorial status quo. In a series of incidents during 1970-72, the USSR appeared to accept this delimitation, whilst it continued to seek clients among dissatisfied developing nations, the USSR seemed to be warning its clients that they should not use the Soviet supplied weapons to attack American clients".
9. Prior to 1957 the administrative agency for Soviet economic aid was the Chief Administration for Economic Relations with the Peoples Democracies.
10. For an example of such agreements, see, 'Agreement on Economic and Technical Co-operation between the USSR and the Somali Republic, 2nd June 1961', UN Treaty Series, Vol 457:263; Article 8.
11. Note also the experience of Ghana, which, during the first two or three years of independence took little interest in the Soviet Union, largely because there seemed to be no pressing reason for the African state to branch out from the established (Western) contacts. By 1960, however, the situation began to alter as it became apparent that the United States and the United Kingdom were reticent to meet all of Ghana's financial demands. In 1960, Botsio took up a long standing invitation to visit Moscow and, four months later, the two countries signed an agreement on economic and technical co-operation.
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"Guinea was then (1960) virtually without important international friends besides the Soviet Union and its allies, so that the Soviets could expect that its leverage over the recipient government might be strong enough to secure access to the field (Conakry) for its military aircraft, if not on a regular basis at least at times of crisis".  
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CHAPTER SEVEN

ECONOMIC AID FROM COMMUNIST CHINA

Although formally established in 1949, the People's Republic of China displayed little interest in the African continent until the mid 1950s. The immediate foreign policy concerns of the Communist regime lay with attaining secure borders and obtaining the maximum amount of international recognition. Relations with the distant, predominantly colonised continent of Africa could provide little benefit in either regard. Tentative contacts were made in April 1955 at the Asian-African conference in Indonesia (Bandung), but the years from 1957 represent the major intensification of Sino-African relations. Following the examples of Ghana and Guinea, which gained independence in 1957 and 1958 respectively, there was a positive rush of African nations attempting to break away from colonial status. Between 1960 and 1965, twenty-eight African colonies gained their independence, the majority of which were quickly accepted into the General Assembly of the United Nations. To a large extent this development coincided with Peking's attempts both to break out of the international isolation imposed by Washington and her desire to pursue a foreign policy framework independent of the Soviet Union<sup>(1)</sup>. As a result, Africa represented developing potential for Communist China not only to gain support for representation at the United Nations but also to increase her diplomatic contacts with the outside world. This chapter will consider the extent to which economic assistance has been utilised to further these aims and develop a sphere of Chinese political influence amongst the independent African nations.

## POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Political influence will be primarily measured in terms of African support for Communist China in the General Assembly of the United Nations. This analysis will include:

1. African voting positions on draft resolutions from 1950 to 1971 concerning the question of Chinese Representation in the United Nations<sup>(2)</sup>.
2. African voting positions from 1971 (when Peking was finally accepted into the United Nations) on Chinese sponsored resolutions in the debates on Korea, Asia and the Far East.

At the same time, reference will be made to the maintenance or suspension of formal diplomatic relations between the Peoples Republic of China and Africa. Peking's attempt to establish a role in international politics, as mirrored in the development and maintenance of formal diplomatic contacts, represents an element of political influence specific in kind to the Communist Chinese program. Other determinants of political influence commonly used in this research, namely the availability of military facilities to the aid donor, and the incidence of African expropriation of foreign investment and property, are inapplicable to the notion of Chinese influence on the African continent.

## CHINA'S AID PROGRAM

This analysis of assistance is divided into two time periods: the years from African independence up to 1969, and the years from 1970 to 1976. This division places emphasis upon the rejuvenated character of Sino-African aid relations in the 1970s,

following the internal preoccupation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. As David E Albright has noted in his study of Africa and international communism:

"China's turn 'inward' during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution temporarily halted its budding African policy, and the Peoples Republic of China did not return to Africa as a major actor until 1970". (3)

In the years up to 1969 , Peking's bilateral assistance to Africa totalled \$470.4m to thirteen independent states. The years from 1970 witnessed an invigorated aid program to the continent in which \$1876.4m was distributed to twenty-eight states.

Statistics published by the United Nations suggest that China falls into the lower one-third of the world's nations in terms of the usual measures of economic development<sup>(4)</sup>. On this basis, it could be reasonably anticipated that she would be more interested in receiving aid in order to strengthen her own economic growth, rather than in establishing an aid giving program of her own. Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of her aid is in the form of donations, or under low interest, or non-interest provision with long term repayment conditions. In the case of relatively large loans, China has offered recipients a grace period of ten years; only after this period does repayment begin, the instalments usually being distributed over 20 years. In 1964, the Peking Languages Press published a tract entitled Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism in which Chou En-lai stated:

"The aid China offers to all friendly new emerging countries is based on socialist principles and the principle of respecting the sovereignty of the countries concerned. It never takes the form of the export of capital, direct investment and profit seeking. It consists of providing economic and technical assistance to the governments of these

countries and helping these countries develop their own national economies". (5)

All Communist Chinese economic aid agreements contain a unique clause that Chinese aid technicians shall be paid in accordance with the standards of the receiving country. As the standard of living in most developing countries is low, the cost of salaries and wages involved in a Chinese aid project will be comparatively less than when economic assistance is offered by other donors. Since these wage costs are a substantial proportion of any assessment of economic aid, Chinese concessional finance can, in this respect, be more 'valuable' than aid offered by other donors.

#### SINO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

Peking's first economic aid agreement with an African state was announced in 1956, by a loan of \$4.7m to Egypt. However, Sino-African aid relations did not reach significant proportions until after 1960, peaking in 1964 with an annual total of \$199.2m to six African states. The importance of this period in China's aid relations is witnessed by the fact that the largest beneficiaries of Peking's assistance all established aid relations with the Communist state before 1965. From 1966 to 1969 the domestic concerns of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, occupied Peking's attention. Without question, this was a time of retreat and withdrawal from international activism and, during these years, less than 6% (\$27.8m) of the total Chinese aid program was utilised to establish new aid contacts on the African continent<sup>(6)</sup>.

The geographical distribution of Peking's economic aid up to 1969 does not immediately reveal a substantial historical or

TABLE 1

CHINESE AID TO AFRICA FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969

| <u>NORTH</u> | \$m      | <u>EAST</u> | \$m         |
|--------------|----------|-------------|-------------|
| Algeria      | 55.0     | Burundi     | -           |
| Egypt        | 94.7     | Ethiopia    | -           |
| Libya        | -        | Kenya       | 18.0        |
| Morocco      | -        | Rwanda      | -           |
| Tunisia      | -        | Somalia     | 23.0        |
|              |          | Sudan       | -           |
|              | \$149.7m | Tanzania    | 58.9        |
|              |          | Uganda      | <u>15.0</u> |
|              |          |             | \$114.9m    |

| <u>WEST</u>  |          | <u>CENTRAL &amp; SOUTHERN</u> |             |
|--------------|----------|-------------------------------|-------------|
| Cameroon     | -        | Botswana                      | -           |
| Chad         | -        | C.A.R                         | 4.1         |
| Dahomey      | -        | Congo                         | 26.4        |
| Gambia       | -        | Eq. Guinea                    | -           |
| Ghana        | 42.0     | Gabon                         | -           |
| Guinea       | 70.0     | Madagascar                    | -           |
| Ivory Coast  | -        | Malawi                        | -           |
| Liberia      | -        | Lesotho                       | -           |
| Mali         | 35.5     | Swaziland                     | -           |
| Mauritania   | 4.0      | Zaire                         | -           |
| Niger        | -        | Zambia                        | <u>23.8</u> |
| Nigeria      | -        |                               | \$54.3m     |
| Senegal      | -        |                               |             |
| Sierra Leone | -        |                               |             |
| Togo         | -        |                               |             |
| Upper Volta  | -        |                               |             |
|              | \$151.5m |                               |             |

Total program: \$470.4m

Regional Share:

|       |       |
|-------|-------|
| North | 31.8% |
| West  | 32.2% |
| East  | 24.4% |
| C & S | 11.6% |

Sources: W Bartke, China's Economic Aid, Hurst & Co., London, 1975; US Department of State, Communist States and Developing Countries: Aid and Trade, Washington D.C., 1976; Development Co-operation, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, Annual Reviews

# AFRICA

CHINESE AID RELATIONS FROM  
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1969.



RECIPIENTS OF CHINESE AID



DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED  
WITH PEKING

A VOTING OPPOSITION

B VOTING AGREEMENT

C UNCOMMITTED

cultural bias. Of the thirteen beneficiaries during this period five were former French colonies in receipt of \$125.0m, the equivalent of 26.6% of the total aid program; the five recipient states with British historical connections garnered \$157.7m., or 33.5% of China's aid to Africa. To a certain extent, this slight imbalance may be indicative of the propensity of the Anglophone states to adopt a more critical and independent political attitude towards the former metropolitan power than do their Francophone counterparts. With the exception of the Maghreb countries, Francophone African states tend to be relatively small in size and more dependent in economic and political terms upon their former colonial power<sup>(7)</sup>. Chinese support for the more independent line adopted by Anglophone Africa would be in accord with the philosophy of China's Economic and Technical Co-operation with Friendly Countries, outlined by Chin Yi-Win:

"The Chinese People, on their part, regard it as their internationalist duty to support the just struggles of the oppressed nations and people of the world and help friendly countries develop their national economies independently and self-reliantly". (8)

Further indications that China's economic aid to the African continent up to 1969 favoured those states whose leaders were prepared to adopt a more independent philosophy is evident in the fact that Egypt and Guinea are the two major beneficiaries during this period. Under President Nasser, Egypt became a major proponent of the need for African states not to become economically and politically dependent upon the capitalist West. In addition, in 1958, President Sekou Touré of Guinea completely severed all contacts with France by voting 'NO' in de Gaulle's referendum asking the African colonies to join a new French Community. Of all the

French colonies on the African continent, Guinea was the only one to reject de Gaulle's proposal. All French aid and administrative personnel were immediately withdrawn from the West African state and, thereafter, Guinea was largely isolated from both France and Francophone Africa. Relations between Guinea and the People's Republic of China, on the other hand, flourished. In the years up to 1969 this West African state became the largest Francophone recipient of Chinese economic aid being in receipt of \$70.0m., or nearly 15% of aid to the continent as a whole<sup>(9)</sup>.

In regional terms (see Table 1), the states of Central and Southern Africa received proportionally less economic aid from Peking than other areas of the continent. The Congo, Central African Republic and Zambia were in receipt of \$54.3m, the equivalent of less than 12% of the total Chinese aid program up to 1969. This could be compared with the two North African recipients of Algeria and Egypt who, during this period, garnered \$149.7m., of over 31% of Peking's economic assistance to the continent. Although there is little evidence of a 'regional emphasis' to total Sino-African aid up to 1969, this imbalance may reflect the relative insignificance of Central and Southern Africa to China's political ambitions during this period.

#### CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS UP TO 1969

Immediate analysis of African voting behaviour in the General Assembly up to 1969 reveals a strong relationship between receipts of aid from the People's Republic of China and support for Peking. On the Question of Chinese Representation at the United Nations, every one of the recipients of Chinese economic aid,

TABLE 2

CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING UP TO 1969CLUSTER B (60% Pro PRC)

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid</u>  |
|-------------|------------|-------------|--------------|--------------|-------------|
| Algeria     | 7          | -           | -            | 7            | 55.0        |
| Burundi     | 5          | 1           | 1            | 7            | -           |
| Congo       | 5          | 3           | 1            | 9            | 26.4        |
| Egypt       | 13         | 1           | 3            | 17           | 94.7        |
| Ghana       | 10         | -           | 2            | 12           | 42.0        |
| Guinea      | 9          | -           | -            | 9            | 70.0        |
| Kenya       | 5          | -           | -            | 5            | 18.0        |
| Mali        | 9          | -           | -            | 9            | 35.5        |
| Mauritania  | 5          | 2           | 1            | 8            | 4.0         |
| Morocco     | 10         | -           | 2            | 12           | -           |
| Somalia     | 8          | -           | -            | 8            | 23.0        |
| Sudan       | 12         | -           | -            | 12           | -           |
| Tanzania    | 7          | -           | -            | 7            | 58.9        |
| Uganda      | 7          | -           | -            | 7            | 15.0        |
| Zambia      | 5          | -           | -            | 5            | <u>23.8</u> |
|             |            |             |              |              | \$466.3m    |

CLUSTER A (60% anti PRC)

|             |   |    |   |    |               |
|-------------|---|----|---|----|---------------|
| Botswana    | - | 3  | 1 | 4  | -             |
| Cameroon    | - | 6  | 3 | 9  | -             |
| C.A.R.      | 1 | 6  | 2 | 9  | 4.1           |
| Chad        | - | 6  | 4 | 10 | -             |
| Dahomey     | - | 6  | 2 | 8  | -             |
| Eq. Guinea  | - | 2  | - | 2  | -             |
| Gabon       | - | 8  | 1 | 9  | -             |
| Gambia      | - | 5  | - | 5  | -             |
| Ivory Coast | - | 7  | 2 | 9  | -             |
| Lesotho     | - | 4  | - | 4  | -             |
| Liberia     | - | 17 | - | 17 | -             |
| Madagascar  | - | 8  | 1 | 9  | -             |
| Malawi      | - | 5  | - | 5  | -             |
| Niger       | - | 7  | 2 | 9  | -             |
| Rwanda      | - | 6  | 1 | 7  | -             |
| Swaziland   | - | 2  | - | 2  | -             |
| Togo        | - | 6  | 3 | 9  | -             |
| Upper Volta | - | 7  | 2 | 9  | -             |
| Zaire       | - | 6  | 1 | 7  | -             |
|             |   |    |   |    | <u>\$4.1m</u> |

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|              |   |   |   |    |   |
|--------------|---|---|---|----|---|
| Libya        | 1 | 4 | 7 | 12 | - |
| Nigeria      | 5 | 4 | - | 9  | - |
| Ethiopia     | 8 | 7 | 2 | 17 | - |
| Senegal      | 3 | 4 | 2 | 9  | - |
| Sierra Leone | 3 | 4 | 1 | 8  | - |
| Tunisia      | 2 | - | 9 | 11 | - |

with the sole exception of the Central African Republic, consistently voted in favour of Peking (Cluster B). This central African recipient voted for Communist China in one year only - 1969 which is the same year she acquired a loan to the value of \$4.1m; <sup>(10)</sup>. Nevertheless, in total, over 99% of Peking's aid to Africa during this period was allocated to states who endorsed her position in the General Assembly. Crosstabulation of aid and African voting during this period provides evidence of a positive association.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | African States<br>Not in Receipt<br>of aid up to 1969 | African States<br>Receiving Aid<br>up to 1969 |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 18<br>(94.7)  | 1<br>(5.3)                                    | 19 |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 6<br>(100.0)  | 0<br>(0.0)                                    | 6  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 3<br>(20.0)   | 12<br>(80.0)                                  | 15 |
|                            | 27<br>(67.5)  | 13<br>(32.5)                                  | 40 |

Chi Square = 24.74134 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Of twenty-five African states who failed to endorse Peking's bid for membership of the United Nations, only one was able to negotiate with Communist China. Moreover, although Burundi, Morocco and the Sudan could testify that a consistent voting position in favour of Peking was not an automatic guarantee of economic assistance, Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal a strong overall association between the Chinese program and African support in the General Assembly (Correlation 0.6300). Within the context of a limited program, therefore, it would

appear that assistance and voting behaviour were not unconnected. The value of chi squared is significant at a level beyond 0.00 which provides substantial evidence of a positive relationship between aid and African voting.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

TABLE 3

CHINESE AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION UP TO 1969

| <u>Recipients</u> | <u>First Aid</u> | <u>Relations Established<br/>(as at 31st of Dec.)</u> |
|-------------------|------------------|---|
| Algeria           | 1963             | 1962  |
| Burundi           | -                | 1963  |
| C.A.R.            | 1965             | 1964  |
| Congo             | 1964             | 1964  |
| Dahomey           | -                | 1964  |
| Egypt             | 1956             | 1956  |
| Ghana             | 1961             | 1960  |
| Guinea            | 1960             | 1959  |
| Kenya             | 1964             | 1963  |
| Mauritania        | 1967             | 1965  |
| Mali              | 1961             | 1960  |
| Morocco           | -                | 1958  |
| Somalia           | 1963             | 1960  |
| Sudan             | -                | 1953  |
| Tanzania          | 1964             | 1964  |
| Tunisia           | -                | 1964  |
| Uganda            | 1965             | 1962  |
| Zambia            | 1967             | 1964  |

Sources: New China News Agency

In the years up to 1969, eighteen independent African states established formal diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, of which thirteen were in receipt of assistance during the same period.

The test of a possible relationship between diplomatic recognition and Chinese economic assistance should perhaps consider the time lapse between the first receipts of aid and the date of formal recognition. It is apparent that nine of these African states were in receipt of their first Chinese economic aid within twelve months of establishing relations with Peking. The few remaining recipients - Somalia, Uganda, Mauritania and Zambia - first received aid from China within a maximum of three years of establishing formal diplomatic contact. Indeed, as far as Algeria and the Congo were concerned, economic aid was reportedly offered prior to official recognition<sup>(9)</sup>. It is interesting to note that, in 1964, when Chinese aid to Africa was at its 'peak' with an annual distribution of \$199.2m (representing over 42% of the total program up to 1969), Peking's diplomatic contacts with African states were also at their highest. In other words, seventeen African states (the largest number during this period) recognised Peking during the year when Chinese economic aid to the continent was at its highest. Moreover, it should also be noted that four years later (1968), when China was preoccupied with the domestic concerns of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, her annual aid distribution plummeted to a total of \$6.0m and, in the same year, the number of states excluding diplomatic recognition to Peking dropped to thirteen.

Only two recipients of Chinese economic aid - the Central African Republic and Ghana - did not maintain diplomatic relations with Peking throughout the years up to 1969. In both cases the suspension of relations with the Peoples' Republic of China was due to a radical change in leadership - in January 1966,

President Dacko of the Central African Republic was deposed by a military coup led by Colonel Bokassa. The new leadership immediately accused China of supporting armed revolt in the Republic; broke off its relations with Peking and transferred recognition to Taiwan. In February 1966 President Nkrumah of Ghana was overthrown by a military coup whilst he was in Peking consulting with Chinese leaders. In November of the same year, the new regime suspended diplomatic relations with Peking<sup>(11)</sup>. In both these cases, Chinese aid was immediately curtailed.

The durability of diplomatic contacts between Peking and non-recipient African states was limited. Five African states extended formal diplomatic recognition to Peking without receiving economic aid from China in the years up to 1969 - Burundi, Dahomey, Sudan, Morocco, and Tunisia. However, within three years of recognising Peking but not acquiring Chinese economic assistance, Burundi, Dahomey and Tunisia had broken relations. Indeed, Dahomey and Tunisia transferred recognition from Peking to Taiwan as the true representative of the Chinese people<sup>(12)</sup>.

To a certain extent, therefore, it would appear that formal contacts of the Peoples' Republic of China and receipts of Chinese economic aid are not entirely unconnected. The close proximity of aid receipts and the date of recognition for the majority of African recipients and the relative durability of diplomatic relations between Peking and African recipients suggests an awareness of the utility of aid in maximising international recognition for the communist state. Aid may not have automatically been presented to African states which formally recognised the People's Republic of China but, where such aid was forthcoming, diplomatic

relations were largely sustained throughout the years up to 1969<sup>(13)</sup>. For Ghana and the Central African Republic, where this was not the case, successful military coups were instrumental in breaking the diplomatic ties between recipient and donor.

#### CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP to 1969

It has already been noted that Chinese economic aid to Africa during this period largely favoured those states whose leadership displayed a relatively independent political spirit. In this respect, it is not surprising that the four largest beneficiaries of Peking's aid up to 1969 were Egypt, Guinea, Tanzania and Algeria, which were under the respective control of such politically dominant and forthright leaders as Nasser; Sekou Touré; Nyerere; Ben Bella and Boumedienne. During this period, these four states alone were in receipt of \$278.6m which is the equivalent of over 59% of the total program.

It is interesting to note that, with the sole exception of the Congo, Peking has negotiated aid agreements with only one African leader in each recipient state. In other words, Peking has only undertaken successive aid agreements with African states whose leadership has remained unchanged: with Egypt in 1956, 64 and 1969 when Nasser was President; with the Algerian Government in 1963, 65 and 1967 when Boumedienne was prominent; with Nkrumah's Ghana in 1961 and 1964; with President Keita of Mali in 1961, 64 and prior to the coup in 1968; and with Nyerere's Tanzania between 1964 and 1966. To a certain extent, this may be indicative of the cautiousness of Sino-African aid up to 1969, in so much as Peking was only prepared to maintain aid relations

with African statesmen whose foreign policy response was known to be favourable to the Peoples' Republic of China. In this way, Chinese aid to Africa may have been limited in scope but nevertheless facilitated a positive recipient response.

TABLE 4

RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Population (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita (\$)</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Algeria     | 55.0             | 3175             | 12.6                  | 252                        |
| Egypt       | 94.7             | 4816             | 30.1                  | 160                        |
| Ghana       | 42.0             | 2296             | 8.0                   | 287                        |
| Guinea      | 70.0             | 288              | 3.6                   | 80                         |
| Mali        | 35.5             | 282              | 4.7                   | 60                         |
| Mauritania  | 4.0              | 143              | 1.1                   | 130                        |
| Kenya       | 18.0             | 1205             | 9.8                   | 123                        |
| Somalia     | 23.0             | 125              | 2.5                   | 50                         |
| Tanzania    | 58.9             | 136              | 1.7                   | 80                         |
| Uganda      | 15.0             | 939              | 7.7                   | 122                        |
| C.A.R.      | 4.1              | 165              | 1.5                   | 110                        |
| Congo       | 26.4             | 108              | 0.9                   | 120                        |
| Zambia      | 23.8             | 1315             | 3.8                   | 346                        |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks, 1958-69; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971; IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

There is little reason to believe that Peking's aid to Africa was solely motivated by the desire to eradicate economic weakness. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of the distribution of assistance and recipient economic indicators reveal that the program favoured African states with a relatively high GNP (Correlation 0.4648) but cannot be associated with size of population (Correlation 0.2137). Moreover, it is apparent that Communist China did not increase her aid commitments in proportion to the economic needs of African states, as witnessed in terms of GNP per capita (Correlation 0.0240).

AID AND INFLUENCE UP TO 1969OVERVIEW

If it was possible to establish a direct and immediate correlation between the quantity of economic aid and the dissemination of political influence, it would be safe to assume that, in the years up to 1969, Communist China would be at a disadvantage. In comparison with other major donors of assistance to Africa, China's aid could never be influential lacking the basic economic capacity to compete. In the years up to 1969, Peking extended \$470.4m. worth of economic aid to thirteen independent African states. During the same period, for example, the American aid program to Africa totalled \$4354.0m to thirty-eight recipient states. However, it would appear that the ability of foreign aid to establish spheres of political influence on the African continent is not simply a quantitative correlation. To a large extent, the limitations on China's economic capacity to provide huge amounts of aid in bulk have led her to develop her aid program selectively and this would seem to have provided positive results at least up to 1969. There is a strong relationship between receipts of Chinese aid, recipient voting performance in the United Nations and diplomatic recognition. With the sole exception of the Central African Republic, each of the recipients of Peking's aid consistently voted for the Peoples' Republic of China in the United Nations debates on the Representation of the Chinese People. In other words, over 99% of the aid program was distributed to African states which adopted a pro-Peking perspective.

At the same time, a consideration of the overall proximity of first receipts of aid and the date of formal

recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China, together with durability of diplomatic contacts between Peking and beneficiaries of her assistance, suggests an awareness by donor and recipient alike, that diplomatic recognition may have financial ramifications.

China's economic aid program to Africa up to 1969 was relatively limited. However, it is apparent that those African leaders who were prepared to accept Peking in the framework of international relations, and who were able to remain in a position of power over a number of years despite the inherent instability of African political life, benefitted most from the Chinese aid program. Moreover, by extending concessional finance primarily to leaders whose foreign policy outlook was known to be favourable to the political ambitions of the Peoples' Republic of China, Sino-African aid relations would appear to be linked with positive recipient behaviour in terms of both United Nations voting patterns and diplomatic recognition up to 1969.

#### SINO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

The year 1970 witnessed a new direction and increased activity in Sino-African aid relations<sup>(14)</sup>. Having brought the domestic disorder of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution largely under control, Peking's efforts to invigorate her international relations with the Third World were reflected in a comprehensive economic aid program to Africa. In 1970 alone, a total of \$460m was distributed to the continent - the equivalent of almost 98% of Sino-African aid in all the years prior to 1970. In total, in the years from 1970 to 1976 China distributed \$1876.4m worth of economic assistance to twenty-eight independent African states.

TABLE 5


CHINESE ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>NORTH</u> | \$m         | <u>EAST</u>                 | \$m             |
|--------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------|
| Algeria      | 40.0        | Burundi                     | 20.0            |
| Egypt        | 28.0        | Ethiopia                    | 84.0            |
| Libya        | -           | Kenya                       | -               |
| Morocco      | 32.0        | Rwanda                      | 20.0            |
| Tunisia      | <u>97.0</u> | Somalia                     | 111.0           |
|              | \$197.0m    | Sudan                       | 82.0            |
|              |             | Tanzania                    | 305.0           |
|              |             | Uganda                      | -               |
|              |             |                             | <u>\$622.0m</u> |
| <br>         |             |                             |                 |
| <u>WEST</u>  |             | <u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |                 |
| Cameroon     | 71.0        | Botswana                    | -               |
| Chad         | 50.0        | C.A.R.                      | -               |
| Dahomey      | 46.0        | Congo                       | 40.0            |
| Gambia       | 17.0        | Eq. Guinea                  | -               |
| Ghana        | -           | Gabon                       | -               |
| Guinea       | 30.0        | Lesotho                     | -               |
| Ivory Coast  | -           | Madagascar                  | 66.0            |
| Liberia      | 10.0        | Malawi                      | -               |
| Mali         | 30.0        | Mozambique                  | -               |
| Mauritania   | 60.8        | Swaziland                   | -               |
| Niger        | 52.6        | Zaire                       | 115.0           |
| Nigeria      | 3.0         | Zambia                      | <u>290.0</u>    |
| Senegal      | 49.0        |                             | \$511.0m        |
| Sierra Leone | 30.0        |                             |                 |
| Togo         | 45.0        |                             |                 |
| Upper Volta  | <u>52.0</u> |                             |                 |
|              | \$546.4m    | Total Program =             | \$1876.4m       |
|              |             | Regional Share:             |                 |
|              |             | North                       | 10.5%           |
|              |             | West                        | 29.1%           |
|              |             | East                        | 33.2%           |
|              |             | C & S                       | 27.2%           |

Sources: W Bartke, ; China's Economic Aid, Hurst & Co., London, 1975; Development Co-operation, O.E.C.D., Paris; US Central Intelligence Agency, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, ER 77-10296, Washington D.C., 1976

# AFRICA

CHINESE AID RELATIONS  
FROM 1970 TO 1976.



RECIPIENTS OF CHINESE AID.



DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ESTABLISHED  
WITH PEKING

B VOTING AGREEMENT

C UNCOMMITTED

The geographical distribution of Chinese economic aid during this period does not reveal a marked historical or cultural bias.

TABLE 6

HISTORICAL DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE AID FROM 1970 to 1976

| <u>Ex French</u> |                | <u>Ex British</u> |                 | <u>Other</u> |                 |
|------------------|----------------|-------------------|-----------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Algeria          | \$40.0m        | Gambia            | \$17.0m         | Egypt        | \$28.0m         |
| Morocco          | \$32.0m        | Nigeria           | \$ 3.0m         | Guinea       | \$30.0m         |
| Tunisia          | \$97.0m        | Sierra Leone      | \$30.0m         | Liberia      | \$10.0m         |
| Dahomey          | \$46.0m        | Sudan             | \$82.0m         | Togo         | \$45.0m         |
| Chad             | \$50.0m        | Tanzania          | \$305.0m        | Burundi      | \$20.0m         |
| Cameroon         | \$71.0m        | Zambia            | <u>\$290.0m</u> | Ethiopia     | \$84.0m         |
| Mali             | \$30.0m        |                   |                 | Rwanda       | \$20.0m         |
| Mauritania       | \$60.8m        |                   | \$727.0m        | Somalia      | \$111.0m        |
| Niger            | \$52.6m        |                   |                 | Zaire        | <u>\$115.0m</u> |
| Senegal          | \$49.0m        |                   |                 |              |                 |
| Upper Volta      | \$52.0m        |                   |                 |              | \$463.0m        |
| Congo            | \$40.0m        |                   |                 |              |                 |
| Madagascar       | <u>\$66.0m</u> |                   |                 |              |                 |
|                  | \$686.4m       |                   |                 |              |                 |

Recipient states with a British historical connection were in receipt of over 38% of total Chinese aid to Africa during the 1970s, whilst their French counterparts benefitted from the wider focus of Peking's aid to a total of \$686.4m or over 36% of the program. To a certain extent, this is indicative of the ability of both Peking and Francophone Africa to adopt a more positive attitude towards each other in the 1970s, following French diplomatic recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China. Moreover, due to the intensification of Sino-Soviet rivalry in the 1970s, the anti-Western character of Peking's foreign policy outlook was reduced<sup>(15)</sup>. In this respect, the former French colonies of the African continent would possibly find it easier to establish aid relations with Peking.

The increase in the number of Francophone recipients of Chinese aid in the 1970s is reflected in the regional distribution,

There are fourteen West-African recipients of economic aid accruing \$546.4m., or 29.1% of the total program. The six recipients of East Africa garnered the largest share of Peking's assistance to the continent, being in receipt of \$622.0m., or 33.2% of the total program. At the same time, aid to Central and Southern states amounted to \$511.0m., the equivalent of 27.2% of the total.

To a large extent, the considerable injection of concessional finance to West and East Africa was due to the agreement in 1970 to build a railway linking Tanzania and Zambia, and undertake related projects with Chinese aid, at a cost totalling more than all previous assistance to Africa. The Tan-Zam Railway project, as it has come to be known, is one of the single most expensive aid commitments undertaken by any donor and attested to a new impetus in Peking's foreign aid program in the 1970s. The project was a demonstration to African nations that Peking was willing to extend a helping hand whilst, at the same time, ensuring China a base of operations on the continent. Indeed, her interest-free loan for the railway was all the more spectacular due to the fact that previous requests from Tanzania for Western sponsors had been rejected by the World Bank, United Kingdom and Canada, each of whom claimed it was unfeasible. George T Yu in his study of the role of the railway in Sino-African relations noted that:

"China was giving support, real and symbolic, to the larger forces of change in Africa. China's symbolic role can be suggested in relation to its desire for international recognition, a major foreign policy objective. Namely construction of the railway constituted a symbol of China's capabilities and power". (16)

Thus, its importance extended beyond the immediate relationship between Tanzania, Zambia and China, and established the character of Sino-African aid relations in the 1970s.

TABLE 7

CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING 1970-76CLUSTER B (60% Pro PRC)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Pro</u> | <u>Anti.</u> | <u>Abst.</u> | <u>Total</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|
| Algeria      | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 40.0             |
| Burundi      | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 20.0             |
| Botswana     | 3          | 1            | 1            | 5            | -                |
| Cameroon     | 1          | -            | 2            | 3            | 71.0             |
| Congo        | 6          | -            | -            | 6            | 40.0             |
| Egypt        | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 28.0             |
| Eq. Guinea   | 6          | -            | -            | 6            | -                |
| Ethiopia     | 3          | 1            | 1            | 5            | 84.0             |
| Guinea       | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 30.0             |
| Ghana        | 4          | 1            | -            | 5            | -                |
| Libya        | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | -                |
| Mali         | 6          | -            | -            | 6            | 30.0             |
| Madagascar   | 5          | 2            | -            | 7            | 66.0             |
| Mauritania   | 6          | -            | -            | 6            | 60.8             |
| Morocco      | 2          | 1            | 1            | 4            | 32.0             |
| Mozambique   | 1          | -            | -            | 1            | -                |
| Nigeria      | 4          | -            | -            | 4            | 3.0              |
| Rwanda       | 4          | 2            | -            | 6            | 20.0             |
| Senegal      | 4          | -            | 1            | 5            | 49.0             |
| Sierra Leone | 4          | 1            | -            | 5            | 30.0             |
| Somali       | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 111.0            |
| Sudan        | 6          | -            | -            | 6            | 82.0             |
| Tanzania     | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 305.0            |
| Togo         | 5          | 2            | -            | 7            | 45.0             |
| Uganda       | 3          | -            | 1            | 4            | -                |
| Zambia       | 7          | -            | -            | 7            | 290.0            |

\$1436.8m

CLUSTER A (60% anti PRC)

|             |   |   |   |   |       |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|-------|
| C.A.R.      | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | -     |
| Chad        | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | 50.0  |
| Dahomey     | 2 | 3 | - | 5 | 46.0  |
| Gabon       | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | -     |
| Gambia      | - | 5 | - | 5 | 17.0  |
| Ivory Coast | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | -     |
| Lesotho     | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | -     |
| Liberia     | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | 10.0  |
| Malawi      | - | 4 | 1 | 5 | -     |
| Niger       | 1 | 3 | 1 | 5 | 52.6  |
| Swaziland   | - | 5 | - | 5 | -     |
| Zaire       | 1 | 4 | 1 | 6 | 115.0 |

\$290.6m

CLUSTER C (Uncommitted)

|             |   |   |   |   |      |
|-------------|---|---|---|---|------|
| Kenya       | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | -    |
| Tunisia     | - | - | 4 | 4 | 97.0 |
| Upper Volta | 2 | 2 | 1 | 5 | 52.0 |

\$149.0m

CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1970 to 1976

By 1970, the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations was still not resolved. However, the 1970 debate produced for the first time a simple majority within the General Assembly in favour of Peking's admission<sup>(17)</sup>. In the following year, the People's Republic of China secured a resounding victory which was achieved despite American efforts to maintain Taiwan as the only United Nations representative of the Chinese people. It was reported that the US Secretary of State:

"personally received and talked to more than ninety Foreign Ministers and leaders of delegations to the United Nations while President Nixon telephoned several Heads of State to ask for support. American efforts did not stop there as US diplomats threatened to cut off aid from those other countries which refused to co-operate". (18)

As a final effort, US delegates at the United Nations vainly attempted to utilise a procedural device to keep Taiwan in the United Nations. Nevertheless, the Albanian resolution calling for the admission of Peking in place of Taiwan produced seventy-six votes in favour of the Peoples' Republic of China, including the support of twenty-six African states.

It is possible that these successes of the early 1970s were not unassociated with Sino-African aid relations. Following the 1970 vote, Peking intensified her efforts to seek closer co-operation with Africa and the Third World, whilst systematically thanking (in both formal and, in some cases, financial terms) all those states which had already 'supported the restoration of the Peoples' Republic of China'. In 1970 and 1971, China signed aid agreements with African states to the value of \$773.5m., the equivalent of over 41% of Peking's total aid program from 1970 to 1976. In

addition to the vast injections of concessional finance to Tanzania and Zambia, new economic aid agreements were signed with Mauritania (\$23.5m), Algeria (\$40m), Mali (\$20m), Ethiopia (\$80m), Somalia (\$110m), the Sudan (\$75m), and Sierra Leone (\$20m). Moreover, Pearson Correlation Coefficients of China's program and African voting in the 1970s reveals evidence of a relationship between assistance and support in the General Assembly (Correlation 0.2728). Twenty-six states consistently voted with Peking (Cluster B) during this period, of whom twenty were in receipt of aid to a total of \$1436.8m or over 76% of the program.

However, crosstabulation of assistance and the overall pattern of African voting at this time does not reveal a clear relationship.

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | African States Not<br>in Receipt of Aid<br>1970-76 | African States in<br>Receipt of Aid<br>1970-76 |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 6<br>(50.0)  | 6<br>(50.0)                                    | 12 |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 1<br>(33.3)  | 2<br>(66.7)                                    | 3  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 6<br>(23.1)  | 20<br>(76.9)                                   | 26 |
|                            | 13<br>(31.7)                                       | 28<br>(68.3)                                   | 41 |

Chi Square = 2.75239 with 2 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.2525

It would appear that Peking did not necessarily ignore states who consistently voted against her during this period (Cluster A), 50% of whom were able to acquire \$290.6m., the equivalent of 15.5% of total aid to the continent. On the whole, African countries who failed to endorse Communist China in the United Nations were in

receipt of \$439.6m in aid from Peking. This is reflected in the value of chi squared which is only significant at a level beyond 0.2525 and provides little indication of a strong relationship between assistance and the overall pattern of voting in the 1970s. Moreover, further analysis of the direct votes of both Tunisia and Upper Volta, who were generally uncommitted (Cluster C) in the United Nations but garnered \$149.0m reveals that they neither tentatively favoured nor opposed Communist China.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

TABLE 8

CHINESE AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION 1970-76

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Year of Recognition<br/>(as at 31st Dec)</u> | <u>Aid (First Receipts)</u> |
|--------------|---|-----------------------------|
| Ethiopia     | 1970  | 1971                        |
| Cameroon     | 1971  | 1973                        |
| Nigeria      | 1971  | 1972                        |
| Libya        | 1971  | -                           |
| Rwanda       | 1971  | 1973                        |
| Senegal      | 1971  | 1973                        |
| Sierra Leone | 1971  | 1971                        |
| Chad         | 1972  | 1973                        |
| Madagascar   | 1972  | 1973                        |
| Togo         | 1972  | 1972                        |
| Zaire        | 1972  | 1973                        |
| Upper Volta  | 1973  | 1973                        |
| Gabon        | 1974  | -                           |
| Gambia       | 1974  | 1975                        |
| Niger        | 1974  | 1974                        |
| Botswana     | 1975  | -                           |
| Mozambique   | 1975  | -                           |

Sources: Compiled from the New China News Agency

In the years from 1970 to 1976 Peking established new diplomatic relations with seventeen independent African states. Thirteen of these states were in receipt of Chinese economic assistance within two years whilst the vast majority (ten states) first benefitted from Chinese aid within twelve months of the date of formal recognition. The proximity between diplomatic contact and primary receipts of economic aid from the Peoples' Republic of China would suggest that the two events may not be unrelated. Indeed, a number of aid agreements in the 1970s were finalised at the same time as diplomatic relations were established. On July 29th 1971, Sierra Leone recognised Peking; on the same day, under the same agreement, a loan of \$20.0m was arranged.

Nevertheless, four African states could testify that diplomatic recognition was not an automatic guarantee of Chinese finance during this period. However, it should be noted that Libya's oil reserves negated her need for economic assistance, whilst the absence of aid to Botswana and Mozambique, who established relations with Peking in 1975, may be a function of the upper limits of this study. In this respect, it should merely be emphasised that aid to these states was not forthcoming by 1976.

#### CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 1970 to 1976

For the majority of states, receipts of Chinese aid in the 1970s were confined to 'one-shot' agreements which were rarely renewed in successive years. However, twelve African countries were able to negotiate with Peking on more than one occasion during this period.

TABLE 9

AGREEMENTS AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Aid Agreements</u> | <u>Political Change</u>                 |
|----------------|-----------------------|---|
| Tunisia        | 1972 & 1976           | No change - Pres. Habib Bourguiba       |
| Mali           | 1970 & 1973           | No change - Pres. Moussa Traore         |
| Mauritania     | 1971 & 1974           | No change - Pres. Ould Daddah           |
| Nigeria        | 1973 & 1974           | No change - <i>General Yakubu Gowon</i> |
| Sierra Leone   | 1971 & 1973           | No change - Pres. Siaka Stevens         |
| Upper Volta    | 1973 & 1974           | Premier Ouedraogo deposed in 1974       |
| Ethiopia       | 1971 & 1974           | Emperor Haile Selasse deposed in 1974   |
| Somalia        | 1971 & 1974           | No change - Pres. Muhammed Siad Barré   |
| Sudan (19)     | 1970, 71 & 1974       | No major change - Pres. Jafa al-Numeri  |
| Tanzania       | 1970 & 1974           | No change - Pres. J Nyerere             |
| Congo          | 1972 & 1973           | No change - Pres. Ngouabi               |
| Zambia         | 1970, 73 & 1974       | No change - Pres. K Kaunda              |

Sources: Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Exeter,; Africa, South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London.

With the possible exceptions of Upper Volta and Ethiopia, where executive changes occurred in the same year as the final aid agreement, Peking has only repeatedly negotiated assistance in the 1970s to recipients whose leadership has remained unchanged. In other words, despite the broader focus of the program from 1970, it is apparent that China was only prepared to maintain aid relations with familiar personalities whose foreign policy outlook was likely to be favourable to China's political ambitions. It should be noted that not one of these recipients consistently voted against Peking in the United Nations during this period (Cluster A) and all, with the exceptions of Tunisia and Upper Volta, consistently voted in favour of the Chinese aid donor (Cluster B). These twelve recipient states dominated Peking's aid program to Africa, accruing a total of \$1184.8m., the equivalent of over 63% of

Sino-African assistance from 1970 to 1976. In this respect, therefore, it could be argued that one of the pre-requisites for substantial (excepting Nigeria) and sustained receipts of Chinese economic aid was a durable leadership with a positive attitude towards Peking in the General Assembly. None of the recipients of aid who consistently voted against Peking in the United Nations (Cluster A) were able to negotiate more than one aid agreement with China.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1970-1976

Analysis of the economic characteristics of the major beneficiaries of aid (in excess of \$100.0m) during the 1970s reveals that Peking no longer favoured African states in a relatively strong economic position.

TABLE 10

#### MAJOR RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Population (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita (\$)</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
| Somalia     | 111.0            | 260              | 3.0                   | 87                         |
| Tanzania    | 305.0            | 1810             | 14.0                  | 129                        |
| Zaire       | 115.0            | 3130             | 23.4                  | 134                        |
| Zambia      | 290.0            | 2330             | 4.6                   | 507                        |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks 1970-77; UN Demographic Yearbooks 1970-77; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977

It is apparent that China's involvement in the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway Project during this period removed the focus of the program away from the more developed areas of the continent. Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal that aid neither favoured recipients with a high GNP (Negative Correlation - 0.0179) nor with a large population (Correlation 0.0492). At the same time, Peking

distributed a total of \$882.6m to the eighteen African states (including Tanzania and Somalia) categorised by the OECD to be amongst the least developed countries in the world<sup>(20)</sup>. This represents over 47% of the total Chinese program.

However, it would be erroneous to assume that aid from Communist China during this period was determined by the level of GNP per capita (Negative Correlation -0.1059). In this respect, Peking's assistance did not necessarily ignore the economic needs of the continent but the program was not significantly dictated by such criteria.

#### SINO-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In comparison with Sino-African aid in the years up to 1969, the Chinese assistance program from 1970 to 1976 was substantially more comprehensive and ambitious. In the first period, Peking distributed a total of \$470.4m. to thirteen independent African states. The program as a whole favoured the more 'independent' and Anglophone nations and a few ex-French colonies whose relations with their former metropolitan power had been acrimonious. From 1970, on the other hand, Sino-African aid was characterised by a relatively huge program totalling \$1876.4m to twenty-eight recipient states. This increase in the number of recipients largely encompassed the countries of former French West Africa, with the result that the imbalance in favour of Anglophone Africa was much reduced.

Comparative analysis of the regional distribution of Chinese aid to Africa also provides a number of contrasts:

TABLE 11COMPARATIVE REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

|                       | <u>CHINESE AID UP<br/>TO 1969</u> | <u>% Of<br/>PROGRAM</u> | <u>CHINESE AID<br/>1970-76</u> | <u>% of<br/>PROGRAM</u> |
|-----------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|-------------------------|
| North                 | \$149.7m                          | 31.8                    | \$197.0m                       | 10.5                    |
| West                  | \$151.5m                          | 32.2                    | \$546.4m                       | 29.1                    |
| East                  | \$114.9m                          | 24.4                    | \$622.0m                       | 33.2                    |
| Central &<br>Southern | \$ 54.3m                          | 11.6                    | \$511.0m                       | 27.2                    |

In the years from 1970 to 1976, all four areas of the continent were in receipt of increased amounts of Chinese aid. However, the states of East Africa and Central and Southern Africa vastly improved their share of total aid, being in receipt of 33.2% and 27.2% respectively. These increases seem to have been made largely at the expense of the recipient states of North Africa whose share of the program was reduced from a dominant 31.8% in the years up to 1969, to a relatively minor proportion of 10.5% from 1970. To a large extent, this reflects the growing importance of Central & Southern Africa and East Africa in Peking's aid relations, as witnessed in the massive injection of concessional finance to the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway Project. Indeed, these two recipients, together, accounted for over 31% of the total Chinese aid program to Africa from 1970 to 1976. The states of West Africa, on the other hand, largely maintained their share of the Chinese aid program, although there was an increase in the number of West African recipients, (predominantly French) from four in the years up to 1969, to fourteen after 1970.

TABLE 12

## COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

| From African Independence<br>up to 1969 |           |      |         | 1970-76        |          |         |       |
|---|-----------|------|---------|----------------|----------|---------|-------|
| Country                                 | Aid (\$m) | %    | UN Vote | Aid (\$m)      | %        | UN Vote |       |
| Algeria                                 | 55.0      | 11.7 | B       | 40.0           | 2.1      | B       |       |
| Egypt                                   | 94.7      | 20.1 | B       | 28.0           | 1.5      | B       |       |
| Libya                                   | -         | -    | C       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| Morocco                                 | -         | -    | B       | 32.0           | 1.7      | B       |       |
| Tunisia                                 | -         | -    | C       | 97.0           | 5.2      | C       |       |
| Dahomey                                 | -         | -    | A       | 46.0           | 2.5      | A       |       |
| Cameroon                                | -         | -    | A       | 71.0           | 3.8      | B       |       |
| Chad                                    | -         | -    | A       | 50.0           | 2.7      | A       |       |
| Gambia                                  | -         | -    | A       | 17.0           | 0.9      | A       |       |
| Ghana                                   | 42.0      | 9.0  | B       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| Guinea                                  | 70.0      | 14.9 | B       | 30.0           | 1.6      | B       |       |
| Ivory Coast                             | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Liberia                                 | -         | -    | A       | 10.0           | 0.5      | A       |       |
| Mali                                    | 35.5      | 7.5  | B       | 30.0           | 1.6      | B       |       |
| Mauritania                              | 4.0       | 0.9  | B       | 60.8           | 3.2      | B       |       |
| Niger                                   | -         | -    | A       | 52.6           | 2.8      | A       |       |
| Nigeria                                 | -         | -    | C       | 3.0            | 0.2      | B       |       |
| Senegal                                 | -         | -    | C       | 49.0           | 2.6      | B       |       |
| Sierra Leone                            | -         | -    | C       | 30.0           | 1.6      | B       |       |
| Togo                                    | -         | -    | A       | 45.0           | 2.4      | B       |       |
| Upper Volta                             | -         | -    | A       | 52.0           | 2.8      | C       |       |
| Burundi                                 | -         | -    | B       | 20.0           | 1.0      | B       |       |
| Ethiopia                                | -         | -    | C       | 84.0           | 4.5      | B       |       |
| Somalia                                 | 23.0      | 4.9  | B       | 111.0          | 5.9      | B       |       |
| Rwanda                                  | -         | -    | A       | 20.0           | 1.0      | B       |       |
| Kenya                                   | 18.0      | 3.8  | B       | -              | -        | C       |       |
| Sudan                                   | -         | -    | B       | 82.0           | 4.4      | B       |       |
| Tanzania                                | 58.9      | 12.5 | B       | 305.0          | 16.3     | B       |       |
| Uganda                                  | 15.0      | 3.2  | B       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| C.A.R.                                  | 4.1       | 0.9  | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Congo                                   | 26.4      | 5.6  | B       | 40.0           | 2.1      | B       |       |
| Eq. Guinea                              | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| Botswana                                | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| Gabon                                   | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Madagascar                              | -         | -    | A       | 66.0           | 3.5      | B       |       |
| Malawi                                  | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Lesotho                                 | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Zaire                                   | -         | -    | A       | 115.0          | 6.1      | A       |       |
| Zambia                                  | 23.8      | 5.0  | B       | 290.0          | 15.5     | B       |       |
| Swaziland                               | -         | -    | A       | -              | -        | A       |       |
| Mozambique                              | -         | -    | -       | -              | -        | B       |       |
| Cluster B (15)                          | 466.3     | (12) | 99.1%   | Cluster B (26) | \$1436.8 | (20)    | 76.6% |
| Cluster A (19)                          | 4.1       | (1)  | 0.9%    | Cluster A (12) | \$ 290.6 | (6)     | 15.5% |
| Cluster C (6)                           | -         | -    | -       | Cluster C (3)  | \$ 149.0 | (2)     | 7.9%  |

CHINESE AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

In the years up to 1969, there was a very strong association between Chinese assistance and the overall pattern of African voting. During this time, the vast majority of states who endorsed Peking in the United Nations benefitted from her aid, whilst only one recipient failed to consistently support Communist China. However, from 1970, the relationship between aid and voting was by no means as clear. Although the relatively large program continued to favour those states who supported Peking in the General Assembly, eight countries were able to acquire concessional finance without endorsing Communist China. These states were in receipt of \$439.6m during this period, which represents over 23% of total aid to the continent.

To a certain extent, it could be argued that this disassociation between aid and voting was merely a function of the broader focus of the program. However, further insight into the nature of this relationship may be provided by analysing changes in the nature of African voting between the two periods and the pattern of the aid program in the years up to 1969.

Less than 41% of the states who did not receive assistance in the first time period changed to a position of support for Peking in the United Nations, whilst over 84% of the beneficiaries of previous Chinese finance continued to endorse Peking. In this respect, changes in the voting performance of these African states after the Cultural Revolution may be interpreted as a 'response' to the earlier distribution of assistance. Thus, the extended program of the 1970s encompassed recipients whose lack of voting support in the second period may have been symptomatic of the pattern of earlier aid from China.

CHANGES IN AFRICAN VOTING BETWEEN THE TIME PERIODS

| COUNT<br>(Row %)   | Cluster A-A  | Cluster C-A | Cluster C-C | Cluster B-C | Cluster A-B | Cluster C-B | Cluster B-B  |    |
|--|--------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|--------------|----|
| African States<br>not in receipt<br>of aid up to<br>1969 | 11<br>(40.7) | 1<br>(3.7)  | 1<br>(3.7)  | 0<br>(0.0)  | 6<br>(22.2) | 5<br>(18.5) | 3<br>(11.1)  | 27 |
| African states<br>in receipt of<br>aid up to<br>1969     | 1<br>(7.7)   | 0<br>(0.0)  | 0<br>(0.0)  | 1<br>(7.7)  | 0<br>(0.0)  | 0<br>(0.0)  | 11<br>(84.6) | 13 |
|  | 12<br>(30.0) | 1<br>(2.5)  | 1<br>(2.5)  | 1<br>(2.5)  | 6<br>(15.0) | 5<br>(12.5) | 14<br>(35.0) | 40 |

Chi Square = 25.07665 with 6 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0003

Cluster A = 60% Anti  
Cluster B = 60% Pro  
Cluster C = Uncommitted

## CHINESE AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

Formal diplomatic contacts with the Peoples' Republic of China were not necessarily an automatic guarantee of assistance but it should be noted that, for the majority of African states, recognition of Peking's status closely coincided with receipts of Chinese aid. In the years up to 1969, thirteen countries first benefitted from concessional finance within a maximum of three years from the formal date of diplomatic contact. Indeed, nine of these recipient states received Chinese assistance within twelve months of establishing relations.

From 1970 to 1976, Peking largely maintained this flow of aid to her new diplomatic contacts on the African continent. New relations were established with seventeen independent states during this period; thirteen of whom benefitted from Chinese economic aid. Ten of these recipients first benefitted from Peking's assistance within twelve months of establishing diplomatic contact with the Peoples' Republic of China.

The close proximity of primary aid agreements and formal diplomatic recognition would suggest that the two events are not unconnected. Moreover, for the vast majority of African states, it would appear that where diplomatic relations with Peking coincided with receipts of Chinese assistance, formal contacts assumed a relatively sustained and durable character.

## CONCLUSION

In some respects, the Sino-African aid program has been an accurate measure of China's external commitment and international

perspectives over a period of two decades. China's aid has mirrored the changing nature of her foreign policy; from the years up to 1966 when Peking first sought to break out of the international isolation imposed by the United States; through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution from 1967 to 1969 when China's preoccupation with domestic concerns led to a reduction in aid to Africa; up to her re-emergence into international activism in the 1970s, as witnessed by the huge Tanzanian-Zambian Railway Project.

In the years up to 1969, Peking distributed limited amounts of aid to the continent but quickly gained a reputation for providing assistance which attempted to fulfil the recipient's requirements. For example, Chinese aid technicians were under explicit instructions to maintain a lifestyle in accordance with the indigeneous African population. Moreover, Peking was careful not to negotiate successive aid agreements with African leaders whose foreign policy outlook, both in diplomacy and in the United Nations, was unfavourable to the Peoples' Republic of China. As a result, there is evidence to assume that China's aid program was not unassociated with the development of political influence in Africa, at least in the first time period.

From 1970, as Sino-African diplomatic contacts increased, the program widened its focus and, in 1971, Peking was finally accepted into the United Nations with a substantial degree of African support. Throughout this period, Communist China continued to favour African states who consistently supported her in the General Assembly. However, it is also apparent that a number of states were able to acquire concessional finance from Peking whilst not endorsing her position at the United Nations. To a certain extent, this lack of support may have been a function of

the distributive pattern of earlier Chinese aid. Nevertheless, it is noticeable that none of the recipients who voted against this donor in the 1970s were able to negotiate more than one aid agreement with China.

Despite a reputation for providing assistance which was commensurate with the needs of the recipient, there is little evidence to assume that the program was determined solely by the economic requirements of the continent. This was certainly the case in the years up to 1969 when Peking favoured African states which were not noted for their relatively low economic status. From 1970, however, China's involvement in the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway link hallmarked a flow of finance which may not have been motivated by philanthropic concern, but, nevertheless, did not necessarily ignore some less developed areas of the continent.

REFERENCES

1. For more detailed discussion of the Sino-Soviet rift, see, W E Griffith, The Sino-Soviet Rift, Cambridge; M.I.T. Press, 1964; J Gittings, Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute, London, Oxford University Press, 1968; H C Hinton, The Bear at the Gate, Washington D.C., American Enterprise Institute, 1971.

George T Yu, in his study of Sino-Soviet competition in Africa, has pointed out that the attempt to maximise international support was a mainspring of Sino-African relations:

"In the wake of the Bandung Conference of Afro-Asian states in 1955, the PRC launched an effort in Africa, similar to its diplomatic offensive in South and Southeast Asia, to win increased international recognition and support as a means of breaking out of the political 'encirclement' that the United States has attempted to establish".

G T Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa, in D Allbright, eds., Africa and International Communism, Macmillan, London, 1980, p. 168

2. Up to 1960, the issue of Chinese Representation at the United Nations was considered a procedural matter and required only a simple majority. From 1961 to 1971, the issue was debated as an 'important question' in the General Assembly and the transfer of the seat from Taiwan to Peking required a two-thirds majority.
3. G T Yu, op.cit., p. 172
4. World Bank Atlas, Washington D.C., International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1972. In some surveys, China has been numbered amongst the world's poorest nations. In October 1959, the Government was forced to ask the Chinese people to alternate liquid meals with solid meals.
5. During a tour of Africa in 1963 and 1964, Chou En-Lai enlarged upon the 'Eight Principles' which governed Chinese economic aid to Africa. For details of these Eight Principles, see Afro-Asian Solidarity Against Imperialism, Peking Languages Press 1964
6. Note that in 1967, all Chinese Ambassadors, with the exception of the Ambassador in the United Arab Republic (Egypt), were summoned to Peking. Officially, they were recalled in order to participate in the Cultural Revolution, but in fact, they faced various bitter attacks and accusations from the Red Guards. For further

details of the Cultural Revolution and its ramifications; see E Wheelwright and B McFarlane, The Chinese Road to Socialism, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1971.

7. Guy Arnold, Aid in Africa, Kogan Page, 1979, notes that the former French colonies in Africa were less developed economically and more quiescent about European interference on the African continent than the former colonies of Britain. See chapter on French Aid.
8. Chin Yi-Wu, China's Economic and Technical Co-operation with Friendly Countries, Peking Review Press, 1974.
9. It should further be noted that Algeria, the second largest beneficiary of Chinese aid to Francophone Africa fought against France for its independence. Moreover, financial credits were reportedly extended to the Provisional Government in Algeria prior to independence in 1962. See J F Copper, China's Foreign Aid, Lexington Books, Canada. To a certain extent, Peking was endeavouring through her economic aid program, to replace the Soviet Union as the primary supporter of revolutionary ideals. The attraction of such a policy in for example, Tanzania and Nkrumah's Ghana was, however, not also conducive to cordial relations with some Francophone African states. Thus, the Governments of Cameroon and the Congo, where Peking was supporting revolutionary groups, were quite decisive in their reaction to this particular aspect of China's foreign policies. In July 1963, President Ahidjo of the Cameroon said that China was one of the states supporting terrorism in Cameroon. "We have proof, for Cameroon terrorists are in Communist China. As long as that situation exists, we shall vote against Communist China's admission to the United Nations". (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Part IV, No. 1292, 5th July, 1963). Indeed, the voting records of the United Nations do give an indication that Francophone African countries shared similar ideas in the early 1960s. Whilst 9 had voted against Peking in 1961, sixteen voted against her in 1962, primarily due to the mass defection of African states who had previously abstained. However, to a certain extent, this body of anti-Peking feeling amongst Francophone Africa lost its momentum from 1964 following De Gaulle's recognition of the People's Republic of China.
10. It should also be noted that in the year following the aid agreement with China, President Dacko was overthrown by a military coup instigated by Jean Bedel Bokassa. Thus, from 1966 the foreign policy outlook of the C.A.R. was guided by a man who possibly associated Chinese economic assistance with his political oponent.
11. The New York Times, October 26th, 1966. For further details of political instability in Ghana and C.A.R., see, D Austin and R Luckham, Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana.

1966-1972, London, 1976; K Nkrumah, Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah, New York, 1971. For C.A.R., see P Kalck, Central African Republic, London, 1971.

12. It should be noted that in the case of Burundi and possibly Dahomey, changes in African leadership were largely instrumental in disrupting diplomatic relations with Peking.
13. Moreover, it should be noted that such relations were maintained throughout the retreat from international activism during the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1969.
14. For details of the Cultural Revolution, see Wheelwright and McFarlane, *op.cit.*
15. In accordance with the de-escalation of the anti-Western character of Peking's foreign policy, note the visit of President Nixon in the early 1970s.
16. G T Yu, *op.cit.*, p. 51. President Nyerere of Tanzania received the offer of Chinese economic aid for the Tan-Zam Railway Project only after the proposal had been rejected by Canada, Britain and the World Bank. A number of commentators have pointed out the significance of this and its positive implications for China's overall image in Africa. See, for example, C Adie, China's year in Africa, in C Legum, eds, Africa Contemporary Record, London. Rex Collings, 1970-71; G T Yu, China's Aid to Africa: The Tanzania-Zambia Railway Project in W Weinstein eds., Chinese and Soviet Aid to Africa, London, Praeger, 1975; S Paine, China's Economic Relations with Less Developed Countries in D Nayar eds., Economic Relations between Socialist Countries and the Third World, Macmillan, London, 1977, pp. 208-263.
17. This was not sufficient for Peking to replace Taiwan in the United Nations in 1970 as the United States had earlier introduced a resolution that the Question of Chinese representation at the UN be considered an 'important' one and thus require a two thirds majority. It is interesting to note that, following the 1970 vote, the Communist Chinese breakthrough prompted the US to review her tactics, in order to see whether Taiwan would be allowed to retain her seat in the General Assembly even if Peking entered and took over the Security Council seat. However, this suggestion was rejected by both Taiwan and Peking.
18. Ogunswano, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-1971, Cambridge University Press, London, p.254
19. An abortive coup did replace Nueri in 1971 but for a few days only, following which Nueri was elected President. For details, see, P K Bechtold, Politics in the Sudan: Parliamentary and Military Rule in an

Emerging African Nation, New York, 1976

20. African recipients categorised by the O.E.C.D. to be amongst the least developed countries of the world are: Burundi, C.A.R., Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Upper Volta. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977, p. 285.

CHAPTER EIGHT

ECONOMIC AID FROM THE ARAB STATES

To a large extent, Arab influence with the black African world can be viewed as the inverse of African-Israeli relations. The arrival into the international community of a number of newly independent African states in the late 1950s and early 1960s coincided with the development of United Nations debates upon the Middle East conflict. In this respect, both the Arabs and Israel have been anxious to gain African support for their respective positions. On the one hand, Israel has been anxious to establish her own system as a model for other nations seeking rapid development, and in this regard, she was able to develop strong, positive relations with Ghana as early as 1957<sup>(1)</sup>. On the other hand, the Arabs have attempted to cultivate African opposition to the State of Israel by drawing attention to: the plight of the Palestinian refugees; Israel's contacts with the white minority regime in South Africa; and the need for continental solidarity with Egypt in the Middle East Wars of 1967 and 1973. However, it is also apparent that both the Arabs and the Israelis have attempted to draw upon the promise of aid finance to bolster the nature of black African support.

From 1957 to the early 1970s, moderate sums of economic assistance from Israel to Africa remained unchallenged by any substantial competition from the Arab countries. However, by 1973, following the fourfold increases in the price of oil, Arab diplomatic initiatives on the continent were increasingly buttressed by the promise of aid revenue. "We have not forgotten our poverty ... we will share our wealth", declared H H Sheik Zayed on being inaugurated as the First President of the United Arab Emirates<sup>(2)</sup>. Such sentiments justified considerable optimism in the African world and promised to mark the emergence of the Arabs

as important donors of economic aid. Since the Arab nations had all, at one time or another, suffered from the hardships of economic dependency, there was an expectation amongst African states in the early 1970s that their Arab 'brothers', with their newly found wealth, would revolutionise what was regarded as the neo-colonial relationship imposed upon the aid-giving scene by some traditional donors. Moreover, as continental neighbours of political and strategic importance, the Arab nations were eager to maintain the support of the African states; while these same African countries were quick to point out that they have a good case as recipients of this Arab money to help offset the crippling costs of oil price rises<sup>(3)</sup>.

It is the intention of this Chapter to examine the extent to which the availability of economic assistance, principally from the Arab world, has been instrumental in determining the level of African support in the Middle East conflict.

#### POLITICAL INFLUENCE

Political influence will be analysed in terms of the reaction within Africa to the Middle East conflict. This will primarily be judged in terms of African voting behaviour to United Nations General Assembly resolutions drafted with the explicit support of Egypt in direct opposition to Israel. The struggle against Israel has been the 'primary Arab issue' in their foreign affairs since the inception of the State of Israel, and as such, the Middle East debates in the United Nations provide an ideal forum for determining support or opposition to the Arab cause. In 1976, Tripoli Radio Home Service

emphasised:

"Arab relations with the States of the World depend on the extent of the support these States give to Arab national issues in particular and international liberation and humanitarian issues in general. The establishment of friendship and co-operation between the two sides cannot be in the interest of one party at the expense of another. Proceeding from this premise ... our political relations with the world depend mainly on the world's attitude towards the primary Arab issue and the other Arab national issues". (4)

A high level of concurrence with the resolutions will be regarded as a positive measure of Arab political influence on the continent.

At the same time, account will be taken of diplomatic contacts between Israel and independent Africa. Since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963, the Arabs have placed increasing pressure upon their African 'brothers' to give a positive indication of continental solidarity by breaking diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv. The nature of the Middle East conflict provides a good opportunity to consider bilateral relations as a measure of political influence on the continent. As Susan Gitelson argues:

"Bilateral foreign-policy concerns may also dominate the choice of whether or not to break relations ... relations may be affected by an intervening variable, such as a global war or a conflict in another subordinate state system. The effect may be to force the leaders of the small state to choose between two rival countries or blocks with whom it has established relations". (5)

In this respect, the development of Arab influence can be viewed in terms of African rejection of diplomatic contacts with Israel.

Finally, this analysis will consider the nature of resolutions adopted by the participating members of the Organisation of African Unity. In a desire to establish a continental perspective on international affairs, and to fulfill 'the dynamic

propulsion towards the establishment of a unified African approach', all member states of the O.A.U. are required to vote on matters of political and economic concern to the continent<sup>(6)</sup>. During the O.A.U. sessions of the later 1960s and 1970s, various aspects of the crisis in the Middle East have been put to the vote. The nature of the resolutions adopted by the organisation will therefore be a worthwhile guide to the influence of the Arab states over African members<sup>(7)</sup>.

#### ARAB AID PROGRAM

In order to help determine the relationship between aid and political influence, this study will be divided into two time periods: the years from African independence to the October War of 1973, and the period after the War up to 1976. This framework focuses attention upon the nature of African relations both prior to the emergence of the oil producing Arab states as potential, large scale aid donors, and following their accumulation of surplus revenue in the 1973 increase in oil prices. At the same time, this division permits a comparative analysis of African reactions to the Middle East hostilities of 1967 and 1973.

In the first time period, Arab economic aid to Africa amounted to \$695.3m. to fourteen recipient states; of which \$652.0m. was distributed to Egypt alone. In the years after the Yom Kippur War, \$5261.5m. was disseminated to twenty-nine African States, with Egypt being in receipt of \$3937.4m.

Eight oil-producing countries have been involved in the program of economic assistance. These are Algeria, Iran,

Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia<sup>(8)</sup>. The financial terms and conditions of this concessional finance tend to vary from donor to donor but, on average, over 56% of this aid was in the form of grants. Loans are extended for approximately fifteen years, with a grace period of 4½ years, and at a rate of interest of 2.4%<sup>(9)</sup>.

#### AID RELATIONS FROM AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE UP TO 1973

Africa's relations with the conflicting powers of the Middle East, prior to the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967, were characterised by a desire to maintain a degree of friendship with both sides and not to be dragged into the heart of the hostilities. Indeed in the decade from 1957, when President Nkrumah of Ghana established cordial relations with Israel, the vast majority of African states regarded the Jewish state as a helpful and useful friend. To a certain extent, they looked upon Israel as a goal towards which they could aim; providing an image of a new and successful state which was persevering in the struggle for national identity. In 1963, Tom Mboya upon returning to Kenya from a visit to Israel, noted:

"New African States have naturally shown great interest in Israeli experiments with co-operatives ... Any African who tours Israel cannot fail to be impressed by the achievements made in such a short time from such poor soil and with so few natural resources. We all tended to come away most excited and eager to return to our own countries and repeat all these experiments". (10)

At the same time, cordial relations were not merely based upon admiration. The Israelis embarked upon a careful, if limited, series of economic and technical assistance agreements with the newly independent states of Sub-Saharan Africa. Between 1958 and

TABLE 1

ARAB AID TO AFRICA FROM INDEPENDENCE TO 1973 (\$m)


| <u>NORTH</u>       |          | <u>EAST</u>                 |          |
|--------------------|----------|-----------------------------|----------|
| * Algeria          | 7.7      | Burundi                     | 1.0      |
| * Egypt            | 652.0    | Ethiopia                    | -        |
| * Libya            | -        | Kenya                       | -        |
| * Morocco          | -        | Rwanda                      | -        |
| * Tunisia          | 6.9      | *Somalia                    | 4.0      |
|                    |          | *Sudan                      | 3.3      |
|                    |          | Tanzania                    | -        |
|                    |          | Uganda                      | -        |
|                    | <hr/>    |                             | <hr/>    |
|                    | \$666.6m |                             | \$8.3m   |
| <br>               |          | <br>                        |          |
| <u>WEST</u>        |          | <u>CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN</u> |          |
| Cameroon           | -        | Botswana                    | -        |
| Chad               | 5.4      | C.A.R.                      | -        |
| Dahomey            | -        | Congo                       | -        |
| Gambia             | -        | Eq. Guinea                  | 5.0      |
| Ghana              | -        | Gabon                       | -        |
| Guinea             | -        | Lesotho                     | -        |
| Ivory Coast        | -        | Madagascar                  | -        |
| Liberia            | -        | Malawi                      | -        |
| Mali               | 0.7      | Swaziland                   | -        |
| *(1973)*Mauritania | 4.7      | Zaire                       | -        |
| Niger              | 2.8      | Zambia                      | 0.3      |
| Nigeria            | -        |                             |          |
| Senegal            | 0.5      |                             | <hr/>    |
| Sierra Leone       | -        |                             | \$5.3m   |
| Togo               | 1.0      | TOTAL PROGRAM =             | \$695.3m |
| Upper Volta        | -        | REGIONAL SHARE:             |          |
|                    |          | North                       | 95.9%    |
|                    |          | West                        | 2.2%     |
|                    |          | East                        | 1.2%     |
|                    |          | Central & Southern          | 0.7%     |
|                    | <hr/>    |                             |          |
|                    | \$15.1m  |                             |          |

\*Afro Arab states as defined by membership of the Arab League

Sources: Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows, 1960-1964, 1965, 1966-67, 1968, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris; Development Co-Operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Annual Reviews from 1969, Paris; Chibwe, Arab Dollars for Africa, Croom Helm, 1976, United Nations Statistical Yearbooks, 1960-69, New York.

# AFRICA

ARAB AID RELATIONS FROM  
AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE TO 1973.



- RECIPIENTS OF ARAB AID
- ★ DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL SUSPENDED
- a VOTING OPPOSITION
- b VOTING AGREEMENT
- c UNCOMMITTED

1966; Tel Aviv extended small loans to eight African states:

TABLE 2

Israel's Economic Aid 1958-66 (\$ Thousands)

| <u>Name</u>  | <u>Amount</u> | <u>Name</u> | <u>Amount</u> |
|--------------|---------------|-------------|---------------|
| Nigeria      | \$8,400       | Tanzania    | \$3,200       |
| Sierra Leone | \$1,100       | Kenya       | \$2,800       |
| Ghana        | \$4,000       | Madagascar  | \$2,000       |
| Liberia      | \$3,000       | Ivory Coast | \$1,500       |

(Sources: Economist, 8 Jan, 1966; Rivlin, Africa and the West, New York, Praeger, 1962)

By 1970, Israel was administering technical assistance in one form or another to twenty-six African states. Thus, it would appear that Israeli assistance during this period, unchallenged as it was by any substantial competition from the Arab states, contributed to Israel's positive image on the continent. Her programs, whilst on a scale in keeping with her limited capabilities, were favourably received in many areas of the continent<sup>(11)</sup>.

During this period, Israeli-African relations can be viewed as an indicator of Arab standing in Africa. The positive image established by Tel Aviv contrasted sharply with the relatively ineffectual position of the Arab states. In an endeavour to mobilise support against Israel, but to do so without risking continental unity, they attempted to involve Sub-Saharan African states in the Palestinian issue. However, it is apparent that in the frequent African conferences throughout the 1960s, the Arab diplomatic machine was unsuccessful. As Benjamin Rivlin and Jacques Fomerand noted in their study of Israel in the Third World:

"Black Africans resented the intense Arab hostility towards Israel being made an issue at

African conferences. They viewed Arab efforts as an attempt to involve them in a matter alien to them, and as a threat to their independence in that it challenged their right to have good relations with Israel". (12)

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the majority of African states never wholeheartedly accepted Yasir Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, as a Head of State, and they refused to consider the Palestine problem as a political, as well as a humanitarian, issue.

However, the outbreak of the Six Day War in 1967 transformed African perspectives of the Middle East conflict. It was at this juncture, when Israeli troops first threatened African territory in Egypt, that opinion over the Middle East became more divided. More precisely, it was at this point that the African states were forced, under relentless Arab pressure, to express an opinion on the conflict in the United Nations and the O.A.U. African states could no longer avoid getting involved in the Arab-Israeli dispute, if only to express an opinion through their votes. By the 1970s, Israel's image on the continent was coming under increasing pressure and it was apparent that a number of states were moving towards the Arab position<sup>(13)</sup>. Moreover, this transformation coincided with the development of the Arab aid program to Africa.

In the years up to 1973, the oil producing Arab states distributed \$695.3m. to fourteen independent states. However, it should be noted that Egypt alone received \$652.0m., whilst a further \$26.6m. was disseminated to the other five African members of the Arab League (see Table 1). In other words, over 97% of the total program was allocated to African states who were directly affiliated in ethnic and political terms, to the donors.

Moreover, with the exception of \$6.4m. worth of assistance to Burundi, Equatorial Guinea and Zambia, all Arab economic aid to Africa flowed to recipients whose predominant religion was Islamic.

The ethnic and religious characteristics of this program naturally determined the regional distribution of Arab assistance. The overwhelmingly Arab states of North Africa dominated the program as a whole being in receipt of \$666.6m., the equivalent of 95.9% of total aid to the continent. West and East African recipients accrued \$15.1m. and \$8.3m. respectively, whilst the predominantly Christian states of Central and Southern Africa could only total \$5.3m., or 0.7% of the program.

ARAB AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM INDEPENDENCE  
UP TO 1973

Analysis of General Assembly resolutions on the Middle East conflict reveals evidence of a strong relationship between the nature of African voting and the cautious distribution of Arab economic aid during this period. All of the fourteen recipients of assistance consistently voted with the Egyptians (Cluster B). In other words, not one dollar of Arab concessional finance was allocated to states who failed to support their cause in the Middle East debates. Crosstabulation of aid and voting behaviour emphasises the nature of this association.

TABLE 3

ARAB AID AND AFRICAN VOTING UP TO 1973Cluster B (60% Pro Arabs)

| <u>NAME</u>  | <u>PRO</u> | <u>ANTI</u> | <u>ABSTAIN</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>AID (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|
| Algeria      | 47         | -           | -1             | 48           | 7.7              |
| Burundi      | 30         | -           | 8              | 38           | 1.0              |
| Cameroon     | 26         | -           | 13             | 39           | -                |
| Chad         | 23         | 4           | 13             | 40           | 5.4              |
| Congo        | 30         | 1           | 3              | 34           | -                |
| Egypt        | 44         | -           | -              | 44           | 652.0            |
| Eq. Guinea   | 18         | 1           | -              | 19           | 5.0              |
| Ethiopia     | 16         | 1           | 27             | 44           | -                |
| Ghana        | 17         | 2           | 24             | 43           | -                |
| Guinea       | 40         | -           | 1              | 41           | -                |
| Kenya        | 19         | 1           | 20             | 40           | -                |
| Libya        | 39         | -           | 2              | 41           | -                |
| Mali         | 41         | -           | 1              | 42           | 0.7              |
| Mauritania   | 40         | -           | -              | 40           | 4.7              |
| Morocco      | 40         | 1           | 1              | 42           | -                |
| Niger        | 18         | 5           | 13             | 36           | 2.8              |
| Nigeria      | 30         | -           | 12             | 42           | -                |
| Senegal      | 30         | 2           | 10             | 42           | 0.5              |
| Sierra Leone | 17         | 2           | 17             | 36           | -                |
| Somalia      | 39         | -           | 1              | 40           | 4.0              |
| Sudan        | 44         | -           | -              | 44           | 3.3              |
| Tanzania     | 36         | -           | 4              | 40           | -                |
| Togo         | 13         | 5           | 19             | 37           | 1.0              |
| Tunisia      | 43         | -           | 1              | 44           | 6.9              |
| Uganda       | 28         | 1           | 11             | 40           | -                |
| Upper Volta  | 14         | 6           | 17             | 37           | -                |
| Zambia       | 32         | -           | 6              | 38           | <u>0.3</u>       |
|              |            |             |                |              | \$695.3m         |

Cluster A (60% Anti Egypt)

|         |   |    |   |    |   |
|---------|---|----|---|----|---|
| Liberia | 8 | 23 | 2 | 33 | - |
|---------|---|----|---|----|---|

Cluster C (Uncommitted)

|             |    |    |    |    |   |
|-------------|----|----|----|----|---|
| Botswana    | 5  | 9  | 12 | 26 | - |
| C.A.R.      | 9  | 3  | 25 | 37 | - |
| Dahomey     | 12 | 11 | 13 | 36 | - |
| Gabon       | 13 | 8  | 11 | 32 | - |
| Gambia      | 9  | 8  | 4  | 21 | - |
| Ivory Coast | 12 | 10 | 21 | 43 | - |
| Lesotho     | 6  | 12 | 15 | 33 | - |
| Madagascar  | 15 | 15 | 9  | 39 | - |
| Malawi      | 1  | 21 | 15 | 37 | - |
| Rwanda      | 14 | 12 | 10 | 36 | - |
| Swaziland   | 6  | 5  | 9  | 20 | - |
| Zaire       | 14 | 7  | 15 | 36 | - |

UP TO 1973

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | AFRICAN STATES NOT<br>RECEIVING AID | AFRICAN STATES IN<br>RECEIPT OF AID |    |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | 1<br>(100.0)                        | 0<br>(0)                            | 1  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 12<br>(100.0)                       | 0<br>(0)                            | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 13<br>( 48.1)                       | 14<br>(51.9)                        | 27 |
| TOTAL                      | 26<br>( 65.0)                       | 14<br>(35.0)                        | 40 |

Chi Square = 10.37037 with two degrees of freedom  
Significance = 0.0056

When the chi square test is applied to the crosstabulation, the value of chi squared is significant at a level beyond 0.0056 indicating that aid and voting may not be unconnected.

However, receipts of Arab assistance were not the sole catalyst for voting support. Thirteen African states in Cluster B were not in receipt of Arab aid up to 1973, whilst the correlation between aid and voting support at this time is not very significant (correlation 0.2040). To a certain extent, the behaviour of these non-recipient supporters may have been determined by the potential for future Arab finance<sup>(14)</sup>. Nonetheless, it must be stressed that all African states who did not consistently endorse the Arab position did not, in turn, receive economic assistance. In this respect it could be argued that, whilst support for the Arabs in the Middle East debates was no guarantee of a share of their aid, failure to support Egypt most certainly resulted in exemption from the program.

DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUESARAB AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL UP TO OCTOBER 1973TABLE 4

| <u>NAME</u> | <u>DATE OF BREAK WITH ISRAEL</u> | <u>AID (\$m.)</u> | <u>DATE OF FIRST AID</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Guinea      | June 12, 1967                    | -                 | -                        |
| Uganda      | March 30, 1972                   | -                 | -                        |
| Chad        | November 28, 1972                | 5.4               | 1973                     |
| Congo       | December 31, 1972                | -                 | -                        |
| Niger       | January 4, 1973                  | 2.8               | 1973                     |
| Mali        | January 5, 1973                  | 0.7               | 1973                     |
| Burundi     | May 16, 1973                     | 1.0               | 1973                     |
| Togo        | September 21, 1973               | 1.0               | 1973                     |
| Zaire       | October 4, 1973                  | -                 | -                        |

Yom Kippur War                      October 6, 1973

Sources: M Curtis and S A Gitelson (eds), Israel in the Third World, Transaction New Books, New Jersey, 1976

In the years up to 1967, thirty Black African states attained independent status and established cordial diplomatic relations with Israel<sup>(15)</sup>. Fuelled by small amounts of assistance from Tel Aviv, the majority of these states regarded Israel 'as a valuable partner for Africa'<sup>(16)</sup>. However, the outbreak of the Six Day War in June 1967 forced the African states to review their contacts with the Middle East. Nevertheless, despite the Arab demands for concerted and positive action against the Jewish state, the African nations did not react with one 'continental' voice to Israel's invasion of Sinai. Guinea was the only country to immediately sever diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv and express

full support for the Arab cause. This was the only occasion up to 1973 when an African state can be said to have severed diplomatic contacts with Israel without the prospect of Arab finance. During this period, eight other African states took similar action against Tel Aviv, of whom five were in receipt of Arab aid within twelve months. Colin Legum, in his study of African affairs during the 1970s, emphasised that states which rejected contacts with Israel at this time did so with an awareness of the potential Arab wealth.

"President Amin of Uganda visited Cairo with an appeal for aid; he was directed to Tripoli. Col. Gaddafi made clear to him - as he does to all foreign visitors - Libya's interest in assisting anybody ready to join the Arab cause for the restoration of Palestinian rights. Gaddafi, a serious revolutionary leader with committed ideals, is ready to use his Treasury for the attainment of his objectives". (17)

For at least five of the states which broke diplomatic relations with Israel during this period, the proximity of first receipts of aid from the Arab states suggests an awareness that bilateral relations with Tel Aviv may have financial ramifications.

However, it is not possible to establish a comprehensive and immediate connection between the severance of relations and receipts of Arab assistance. The Central African states of Congo and Zaire were not automatically "rewarded" with Libyan finance for their actions against Israel<sup>(18)</sup>. In addition, the five African states who were in receipt of Arab finance, only benefitted to a total of \$10.9m., which is the equivalent of less than 2% of the program. In this respect, it is not surprising that, in spite of the Libyan campaign for African solidarity in the Middle East conflict, the majority of Black African states did not enter into a stampede to break relations with Tel Aviv.

THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

In the early 1960s, prior to any promises of aid, the Arab states found it difficult to involve the O.A.U. in the Middle East dispute. Vincent Thompson, in his analysis of African unity, cited the speech of President Bourguiba of Tunisia before the 1964 meeting of the Organisation, as proof of the Arab's dissatisfaction with Black African intransigence. The Tunisian leader was quoted as saying: "Africans could not continue to speak of African unity while they ignore the plight of their bretheren in the North of the continent who were fighting the Israeli's". (19)

It was not until after the Six Day War that the O.A.U. first passed a resolution which was critical of Israel. At the 5th Session in Algiers in 1968, the members of the O.A.U. came under relentless pressure from Egypt and other Arab associates to pass a resolution;

"calling for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5th June 1967, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution 242 of 22nd November, 1967, and appealing to all Member States of the Organisation of African Unity to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of that resolution". (20)

However, Arab demands that the O.A.U. should adopt a more aggressive anti-Israeli stance, (ultimately involving severing relations with Israel), were still largely resisted. Indeed, it is noticeable that up to the 8th O.A.U. Summit Meeting in Addis Abbaba in 1971, most bilateral arrangements between black African states and Israel were not disturbed. There was still a prevailing opinion within the O.A.U. that the Organisation should remain above the conflict in the Middle East. As late as 1971 it was apparent that, within both the U.N. and the O.A.U., Israel was not without

African friends. In June 1971, the O.A.U., attempted to take a more active role by appointing a Committee of 'Ten Wise Men' to act as mediators in the conflict. The fact that the O.A.U. felt capable of playing a mediatory role between the Arabs and Israelis accurately reflects the largely neutral African position at this time. The Mission was accepted by both Israel and Egypt and became operational in November 1971. It is not within the scope of this study to discuss the detailed reasons for the Mission's failure in successfully mediating between the Arabs and the Israelis; but it is necessary to point out that the Mission firmly placed the blame for the failure on the obduracy of the Israelis. The June 1972 O.A.U. Summit at Rabat showed a clear shift in the African position when, without a single vote in opposition, 'the toughest anti-Israeli resolution on record' (Legum 1973) was passed:

"Considering the substance of the Egyptian and Israeli replies to the memorandum of the O.A.U. Committee of Ten: Congratulates Egypt for its co-operation with the Committee of Ten, its positive attitude and its continuous efforts for the restoration of peace in the region; Deplores Israel's negative and obstructive attitude which prevents the resumption of the Jarring Mission; Reaffirms in the name of African solidarity its effective support to the Arab Republic of Egypt in its legitimate struggle to recover totally and by every means its territorial integrity; Urges all member states of the O.A.U. to give Egypt every assistance and calls on all members of the U.N. Organisations to intensify their actions, in both international forums and the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, to take all initiatives for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel from the Arab territories and the condemnation of Israel's attitude which impedes the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 based on the U.N. Charter which forbids under any pretext, the acquisition of the use of territories under force". (21)

It was evident that many of the leaders of the O.A.U. were considerably dismayed, by Israel's attitude. The result was an erosion of pro-Israeli sentiment in Africa which accordingly made the Arab calls for a firm and concerted action against Israel more effective. Nevertheless, although this resolution was more demanding than previous ones, it did not really fulfil Libyan expectations who had campaigned for more militant action.

Jake C Millar, in his study of African-Israeli relations, notes that, 'in spite of the passage of the resolution, many delegates left Addis Ababa dissatisfied - some because they felt that the O.A.U. was unwilling to commit itself fully to the cause, and others because they believed they were being overly pressured' (22).

#### ARAB AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP UP TO 1973

Given the limited nature of Arab aid up to 1973, it is difficult to assess whether the program was determined by the degree of political stability within recipient states. As has already been noted, the overwhelming characteristic of economic assistance from the oil-producing states of the Middle East was the bias towards recipients with ethnic and religious affiliation to the donors. In this respect, it is not surprising that the major beneficiaries were the Islamic Arab leaders of North Africa whose support against Israel at this time was unflinching - President Boumedienne of Algeria, President Sadat in Egypt and President Bourguiba of Tunisia.

Elsewhere in the continent, the Arab donors undoubtedly

took into consideration the relationship between individual African personalities and Tel Aviv. It is noticeable that Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (who was anxious about Arab policy in the Red Sea and Arab support for the Eritrean Liberation Front<sup>(23)</sup>), and President Mobutu of Zaire (who had signed a new military agreement with Israel in 1970)<sup>(24)</sup>, did not receive Arab economic assistance. Both of these leaders had been included in the O.A.U. Committee of Ten Wise Men in 1971 for their relatively pro-Israeli sentiments, in order to balance the political complexion of the mediating mission.

ARAB AID AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS UP TO 1973

TABLE 5

Recipients and Economic Indicators

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Popn (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 7.7              | 3175             | 12.6            | 252                   |
| Egypt       | 652.0            | 4816             | 30.1            | 160                   |
| Tunisia     | 6.9              | 90               | 4.0             | 23                    |
| Chad        | 5.4              | 238              | 3.4             | 70                    |
| Mali        | 0.7              | 282              | 4.7             | 60                    |
| Mauritania  | 4.7              | 143              | 1.1             | 130                   |
| Niger       | 2.8              | 288              | 3.6             | 80                    |
| Senegal     | 0.5              | 756              | 3.6             | 210                   |
| Togo        | 1.0              | 470              | 4.7             | 100                   |
| Burundi     | 1.0              | 165              | 3.3             | 50                    |
| Somalia     | 4.0              | 125              | 2.5             | 50                    |
| Sudan       | 3.3              | 1410             | 14.1            | 100                   |
| Eq. Guinea  | 5.0              | 72               | 0.3             | 240                   |
| Zambia      | 0.3              | 1315             | 3.8             | 346                   |

Sources: U.N. Statistical Yearbooks; U.N. Yearbook of National Accounts. 1971; I.M.F. World Bank Atlas, 1965-72.

As a result of the overwhelming dominance of Egypt in receipts of Arab aid, the program may seem to have concentrated upon heavily populated African states with a relatively high GNP. Pearson Correlation Coefficients reveal a significant relationship between assistance and recipient GNP (Correlation 0.5815) and population (Correlation 0.3969). However, there is little evidence to assume that Arab aid relations with the continent as a whole were dictated by such considerations. The remaining recipients of Arab finance exhibited various degrees of economic strength and weakness. Moreover, aid cannot be associated with Africa's economic needs, as witnessed in terms of GNP per capita (Correlation 0.0242). In this respect, the majority of African states, who may have been looking to the Middle East to develop a program of assistance to alleviate economic weakness throughout the continent, would have been disappointed during these years.

#### ARAB AID INFLUENCE UP TO 1973

##### Overview

Throughout the 1960s, Israeli aid was unmatched by anything the Arabs had to offer and was sufficient to help Tel Aviv establish a number of positive African contacts. During this period Arab pressures on their African 'brothers' to take a critical stand against the Jewish state were largely resisted. Even following Israel's occupation of African soil in the war of 1967, only Guinea severed diplomatic relations with Israel. Although the failure of the 'Ten Wise Men' to mediate successfully between the two sides in 1971 upset some leaders of the O.A.U., it is noticeable that not one African state broke with Tel Aviv as a

direct result of the lack of Israeli co-operation.

It is not surprising that the relatively minor aid from Tel Aviv in the 1960s was instrumental in fostering a positive image in Africa. Like most newly independent nations, the African countries were faced with the numerous dilemmas of economic development and the need for outside help which would not impose exaggerated economic and political dependence. Nonetheless, this assistance, due to the very nature of Israel's capabilities, was always moderate in scope, and it became increasingly less significant in comparison with the growing needs and demands of the less developed continent. This reality was well understood by some Arab states, particularly Libya, who made it clear that financial aid could be available in exchange for African political support in the Middle East conflict.

However, analysis of Arab-African aid relations in the early 1970s provides confirmation of the fact that the dissemination of political influence through economic assistance is not necessarily a quantitative function. In comparison with many other flows of economic assistance to the continent, Arab assistance up to 1973 was very limited. In a program totalling only \$695.3m. to fourteen states the African focus of Arab aid can safely be characterised as narrow and cautious. With the sole exception of Egypt, all the recipients garnered less than \$8.0m. Nevertheless, it would appear that this concessional finance was partly instrumental in determining the pattern of African voting at the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity. Due to the limited nature of this finance, observations of this nature can only be tentative but it should be noted that all the recipients of Arab assistance consistently voted with Egypt in the General

Assembly, whilst Israel's bilateral relations with independent Africa were showing signs of deterioration in the 1970s at the prospect of Arab finance.

To a certain extent, the ability of this aid to establish positive relations amongst a number of states on the continent may be a consequence of the political considerations governing the program. There was an inherent bias towards African states who are both members of the Arab League and whose religion is primarily Islamic. Certainly, there is little evidence to assume that the program was allocated on the basis of economic need; nor did it incorporate any African state who failed to support the Arab cause.

#### ARAB-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS FROM 1974 to 1976

In October 1973, fresh hostilities broke out between Israel and the Arab states in a war which once again threatened Egyptian, and hence African, territory. At the same time, the Arab states quadrupled the price of oil and thereby automatically raised their source of revenue for economic aid programs. In this respect, the October War promulgated the Arab use of oil finance as a major political weapon. Over the following three years \$5,261.5m. was distributed in economic aid to twenty-nine African states. This represented a vast increase upon Arab-African aid before 1974. In the light of this escalation, it would be difficult for African states not to be mindful of the Arab oil power in their reaction towards the Middle East conflict. To a large extent, African countries had reasons to be optimistic of becoming beneficiaries of the new liquid wealth. In the past,





the Arab states, and Libya in particular, had rewarded African states for opposition to Israel and there was little reason to suppose that support for the Arab cause from 1974 would go 'unrewarded'. African leaders also hoped that their Arab brothers and continental neighbours would be sympathetic to pleas for help since they too had suffered from the disadvantages of being recipients of aid, often with 'colonial' impositions. A relatively typical African view at this time was that expressed on Radio Kaunda, Nigeria on 11 February 1974:

"Paradoxically, the developing countries who are in solidarity with the Arabs, the major world oil producers are the worst casualties of their own oil weapon ... What the Third World countries really need now is money to offset the oil increases. And where is that money going to come from? ... It is only from the Arab brothers that adequate help can come ... The poor countries of the World have shown great solidarity at great cost with the Arabs during the latter's hour of dire need. Now is their hour of need. And the saying that one good turn deserves another in the same measure, if not worthless, must be remembered and practicalised immediately. Professions of brotherhood and solidarity should not end at the rostrum of the O.A.U. but in deeds". (25)

It was evident that the promise of aid from the Arabs was not far from African thoughts. However, the geographical distribution of this invigorated program maintained the cultural, religious bias towards Arab and Moslem communities on the continent.

The Arab donors distributed 98.0% of the total program to recipients whose predominant religion was Islamic; whilst less than 0.6% was allocated to their Christian counterparts on the African continent. At the same time, it is apparent that membership of the Arab League (see Table 6) was a prerequisite for substantial sums of assistance. The eight Arab states garnered \$5010.1m., which is the equivalent of 95.2% of total aid to Africa. This religious and ethnic bias was, once again, reflected in the regional

TABLE 7

Arab Aid and Religion 1974-76

| <u>ISLAMIC</u> | <u>AID</u> | <u>CHRISTIAN</u> | <u>AID</u> | <u>MIXED</u> | <u>AID</u> |
|----------------|------------|------------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| Algeria        | \$ 58.5m   | C.A.R            | \$ 0.2m    | Cameroon     | \$19.4m    |
| Egypt          | \$3937.4m  | Congo            | \$ 4.2m    | Dahomey      | \$ 5.5m    |
| Morocco        | \$ 150.4m  | Eq. Guinea       | \$13.0m    | Togo         | \$6.3m     |
| Tunisia        | \$ 92.0m   | Gabon            | \$ 1.5m    | Upper Volta  | \$ 4.9m    |
| Chad           | \$ 11.5m   | Zambia           | \$ 0.8m    | Ethiopia     | \$ 2.5m    |
| Gambia         | \$ 3.5m    | Burundi          | \$ 2.1m    | Tanzania     | \$ 0.2m    |
| Guinea         | \$ 27.1m   | Kenya            | \$ 8.4m    | Uganda       | \$35.5m    |
| Mali           | \$ 36.2m   |                  | -----      | Mozambique   | \$ 1.1m    |
| Mauritania     | \$ 181.8m  |                  | \$30.2m    |              |            |
| Niger          | \$ 19.0m   |                  |            |              | -----      |
| Senegal        | \$ 48.2m   |                  |            |              | \$75.4m    |
| Sierra Leone   | \$ 0.3m    |                  |            |              |            |
| Somalia        | \$ 148.6m  |                  |            |              |            |
| Sudan          | \$ 441.4m  |                  |            |              |            |
|                | -----      |                  |            |              |            |
|                | \$5155.9m  |                  |            |              |            |

Sources: United Nations Demographic Yearbooks, 1970-76

distribution of Arab-African assistance. North African states dominated the program, being in receipt of \$4238.3m., or over 80% of total aid finance. In addition, substantial sums to the East African members of the Arab League, Sudan and Somalia, boosted regional receipts to 12.1% of the program. Twelve West African recipients accrued only \$363.7m, or less than 7% of Arab finance, whilst Central and Southern countries received a mere \$20.8m., which represents 0.4% of total assistance.

Thus, whilst the program from 1974 encompassed twenty nine African recipients, it is apparent that black African states with neither ethnic nor religious affiliations to the donors remained low in Arab aid priorities.

#### ARAB AID AND AFRICAN VOTING IN THE UNITED NATIONS FROM 1974 to 1976

In the years following the Yom Kippur War, the level of support for the Arab cause was, with the sole exception of Malawi, total. On the eve of the 1974 General Assembly debate on the Middle East, Yosef Tekoah, Israel's ambassador to the United Nations acknowledged the diplomatic isolation of Israel when he observed:

"The Palestine Organisation has the delegations of the 20 Arab states at its disposal and the Arab states are the moving force in the non-aligned group which comes close to 100 countries; in addition the Soviet group is going along with the Arabs ... (Facing such an impressive numerical majority) there is only one Jewish state". (26)

The session, in which the Palestine Liberation Organisation held observer status, was disastrous for the Israelis. Speakers from all over Africa seemed to be competing with each other in extolling the virtues of the Palestinians as freedom fighters, and in

TABLE 8

ARAB AID AND AFRICAN VOTING 1974 to 1976Cluster B (60% pro Arab)

| <u>NAME</u>  | <u>PRO</u> | <u>ANTI</u> | <u>ABSTAIN</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> | <u>AID (\$m)</u> |
|--------------|------------|-------------|----------------|--------------|------------------|
| Algeria      | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 58.5             |
| Botswana     | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | -                |
| Burundi      | 24         | 0           | 0              | 24           | 2.1              |
| Cameroon     | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 19.4             |
| C.A.R.       | 13         | 0           | 0              | 18           | 0.2              |
| Chad         | 23         | 0           | 0              | 23           | 11.5             |
| Congo        | 24         | 0           | 0              | 24           | 4.2              |
| Dahomey      | 23         | 0           | 0              | 23           | 5.5              |
| Egypt        | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 3937.4           |
| Eq. Guinea   | 21         | 0           | 0              | 21           | 13.0             |
| Ethiopia     | 22         | 1           | 0              | 23           | 2.5              |
| Gabon        | 14         | 2           | 0              | 16           | 1.5              |
| Gambia       | 18         | 1           | 0              | 19           | 3.5              |
| Ghana        | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | -                |
| Guinea       | 23         | 0           | 0              | 23           | 27.1             |
| Ivory Coast  | 19         | 5           | 0              | 24           | -                |
| Kenya        | 24         | 1           | 0              | 25           | 8.4              |
| Lesotho      | 23         | 2           | 0              | 25           | -                |
| Liberia      | 14         | 4           | 3              | 21           | -                |
| Libya        | 19         | 0           | 0              | 19           | -                |
| Madagascar   | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | -                |
| Mali         | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 36.2             |
| Mauritania   | 24         | 0           | 0              | 24           | 181.8            |
| Morocco      | 24         | 0           | 0              | 24           | 150.4            |
| Mozambique   | 16         | 0           | 0              | 16           | 1.1              |
| Niger        | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 19.0             |
| Nigeria      | 21         | 0           | 0              | 21           | -                |
| Rwanda       | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | -                |
| Senegal      | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 48.2             |
| Sierra Leone | 23         | 1           | 0              | 24           | 0.3              |
| Somalia      | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 148.6            |
| Sudan        | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 441.4            |
| Swaziland    | 4          | 8           | 1              | 13           | -                |
| Tanzania     | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 0.2              |
| Togo         | 21         | 0           | 0              | 21           | 6.3              |
| Tunisia      | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 92.0             |
| Uganda       | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 35.5             |
| Upper Volta  | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 4.9              |
| Zaire        | 24         | 0           | 0              | 24           | -                |
| Zambia       | 25         | 0           | 0              | 25           | 0.8              |

Cluster C (Uncommitted)

|        |   |    |   |    |   |
|--------|---|----|---|----|---|
| Malawi | 1 | 22 | 1 | 24 | - |
|--------|---|----|---|----|---|

denouncing Israel as an imperialist aggressor<sup>(27)</sup>.

All the recipients of Arab economic aid consistently voted with Egypt from 1974; whilst Malawi, the only uncommitted African state, was ignored by the Arab program. However, it is not possible to establish a direct relationship between aid and African voting behaviour. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of aid and voting during this period provide little evidence of an association between assistance and voting support (Correlation 0.0780). Certainly, support for Egypt in the Middle East debates was not an automatic guarantee of Arab concessional finance. Crosstabulation of the distribution of aid and African voting behaviour from 1974 reveals that eleven states which consistently endorsed the Egyptian position in the United Nations did not benefit from assistance:

| COUNT<br>(Row %)           | 1974-76                             |                                     |    |
|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----|
|                            | AFRICAN STATES NOT<br>RECEIVING AID | AFRICAN STATES IN<br>RECEIPT OF AID |    |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | 1<br>(100.0)                        | 0<br>(0)                            | 1  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | 11<br>(27.5)                        | 29<br>(72.5)                        | 40 |
|                            | 12<br>(29.3)                        | 29<br>(70.7)                        | 41 |

Corrected Chi Square = 0.21281 with 1 degree of freedom  
Significance = 0.6446

To a large extent, the overwhelming nature of African support undermines the significance of the crosstabulation, but it can be noted that over 27% of the states in Cluster B were not in receipt of Arab finance. Chi Square analysis of total assistance and African voting provides no evidence of a relationship between the two variables (Significance = 0.6446).

Thus, it is difficult to determine whether the distribution of aid had any bearing upon the level of African support in the General Assembly. However, it should not be assumed that the prospect of Arab assistance was not instrumental upon voting behaviour. Whilst the nature of this relationship is also difficult to ascertain, some indication is provided by the character of Afro-Arab relations in 1975 and 1976. As has already been noted, it was natural that the Africans in 1974 should look to the new rich for aid as well as guaranteed oil supplies. On the one hand, their high energy costs were directly a consequence of the Arab price rise. On the other hand, African states could not expect to receive aid from Israel or from 'traditional' donors who also had to grapple with the effects of increased oil prices. However, by late 1975 and 1976, it was apparent that African support was not proving as economically beneficial as they had hoped. In March 1975, Jeune Afrique noted:

"The present relative meagreness of Arab financial participation in the development of black Africa ... shows that the urgent measures needed in order to combat the difficulties are essentially political ... Psychologically, the Africans have the feeling rightly or wrongly, that the Arabs do not trust them ... Africans are convinced that an Afro-Arab dialogue will be constructive only if it takes place without and with no psychological restrictions. For the Arab countries are also a part of the Third World and should, therefore, feel close to the African countries and more sensitive to their problems and preoccupations". (28)

There can be no doubting the disappointment among some black African states at the lack of response to their economic needs. In the General Assembly debate of 10th November, 1975, a resolution equating Zionism with racialism was opposed by five African states - Ivory Coast, Liberia, Malawi, Swaziland and the Central African Republic - whilst an additional eleven

states abstained - Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Sierra Leone, Togo, Upper Volta, Zaire, Zambia, Botswana, Ethiopia and Gabon.

It should be noted that eight of these states were not in receipt of Arab aid during this period, whilst the remaining eight states accrued only \$24.9m., the equivalent of a mere 0.5% of the total assistance program.

#### DONOR SPECIFIC ISSUES

#### ARAB AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL FROM OCTOBER WAR, 1973 TO 1976

TABLE 9

| <u>NAME</u>              | <u>DATE OF BREAK WITH ISRAEL</u> | <u>AID (\$m)</u> | <u>DATE OF FIRST AID</u> |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Dahomey                  | October 6, 1973                  | 5.5              | 1974                     |
| Rwanda                   | October 9, 1973                  | 8.4              | 1975                     |
| Cameroon                 | October 15, 1973                 | 19.4             | 1975                     |
| Eq. Guinea               | October 15, 1975                 | 13.0             | 1973                     |
| Upper Volta              | October 18, 1973                 | 4.9              | 1974                     |
| Tanzania                 | October 18, 1973                 | 0.2              | 1975                     |
| Madagascar               | October 20, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Central African Republic | October 21, 1973                 | 0.2              | 1975                     |
| Sierra Leone             | October 22, 1973                 | 0.3              | 1974                     |
| Ethiopia                 | October 23, 1973                 | 2.5              | 1974                     |
| Nigeria                  | October 25, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Zambia                   | October 25, 1973                 | 0.8              | 1973                     |
| Gambia                   | October 25, 1973                 | 3.5              | 1974                     |
| Ghana                    | October 27, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Senegal                  | October 27, 1973                 | 48.2             | 1973                     |
| Gabon                    | October 29, 1973                 | 1.5              | 1976                     |
| Kenya                    | November 1, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Liberia                  | November 2, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Ivory Coast              | November 8, 1973                 | -                | -                        |
| Botswana                 | November 13, 1973                | -                | -                        |

Sources: M Curtis and S A Gitelson, eds., Israel in the Third World, Transaction New Books, New Jersey 1976; S A Gitelson, Why do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers? Lessons from the African Experience, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 18, No. 4, December 1974, pp. 451-485.

Following the war of October 1973, the Arabs once again attempted to exploit the issue of Israeli occupation of African territory.

Possibly taking into account the more practical considerations of Arab oil power, many African states deemed that the risks of not siding with the Arab cause were too great. It is noticeable that the majority of these states, who severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv after the Yom Kippur War, received Arab aid during this period. This is especially apparent for states who rejected Israel as soon as hostilities broke out in October. Moreover, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland who maintained bilateral relations with Tel Aviv did not receive any Arab assistance.

However, it should be noted that the relationship between a rejection of Israel and Arab aid is by no means complete for black Africa. Six of these states who severed relations during this period were not in receipt of assistance from the Arab states. In addition, analysis of the quantity of aid flowing to the states in Table 9 reveals why there was an element of bitterness in certain Afro-Arab relations by 1975 and 1976. The twenty states who withdrew their representatives from Tel Aviv in the Autumn of 1973 were in receipt of \$108.4m. worth of assistance from the Arab donors. This is equivalent of 2.1% of the total program to Africa. In this respect, it would appear that substantial sums of assistance were only distributed to African leaders who were members of the Arab League and whose attitude towards Israel had always been negative.

#### THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

In November 1973, one month after the Yom Kippur War, an extraordinary session of the O.A.U. Council of Ministers was held in Addis Ababa. For the first time, the Organisation passed

resolutions equating Zionism in Israel with apartheid in South Africa<sup>(29)</sup>. Colin Legum, in his analysis of African affairs during this period, notes that this continental solidarity against Israel was a consequence of certain practical considerations:

"For many of these major African states the decision to break had less to do with the merits of the dispute, and still less with a firm commitment to uphold the Arab cause, than with their own national interests and, flowing from this, with their wider African associations. It is this close interconnection of practical interests which produces the dynamic drive towards the adoption of an African stand". (30)

Within a couple of years, African disappointment at the absence of comprehensive 'practical' developments in Afro-Arab economic co-operation was reflected in the O.A.U's Twelfth Assembly of Heads of State at Kampala in July 1975. The meeting was attended by Yasir Arafat, the leader of the Palestine Liberation Organisation, who despite the objections of Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Liberia, was accorded the status of a Head of State. Spearheaded by President Gaddafi of Libya, a resolution was proposed calling for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. Six of the eight African members of the Arab League had come to Kampala and it was evident that these African members expected the O.A.U. to endorse this call for Israel's ultimate diplomatic isolation. However, the Arab delegates were clearly disappointed when, in the acrimonious debates which arose, the proposal was rejected. Instead, the Assembly adopted a much milder resolution, 'expressing its solidarity with the Paelstinian people'. Moreover, even the demands of this amended version were watered down to a large extent by the action of Zaire, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Senegal and Liberia, who all formally tabled reservations to this resolution.

ARAB AID AND AFRICAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 1974 to 1976

As has already been noted, there is considerable evidence to assume that the major beneficiaries of economic aid owed their substantial receipts to ethnic and religious considerations. Seven states accrued in excess of \$50.0m., all of whom were Islamic, African members of the Arab League - Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Mauritania, Somalia, and Sudan. At the same time, positive relations were aided by durable and sustained political leadership within these recipient states. Throughout this period, the political personalities at the head of these African countries remained unchanged.

TABLE 10: Major Requirements and Political Leadership

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>Leader (1974-76)</u>  |
|----------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| Algeria        | 58.5m            | Pres. Houari Boumediene  |
| Egypt          | 3937.4m          | Pres. Anwar Sadat        |
| Morocco        | 150.4m           | King Hassan II           |
| Tunisia        | 92.0m            | Pres. Habib Bourguiba    |
| Mauritania     | 181.8m           | Pres. Moktar Ould Daddah |
| Somalia        | 148.6m.          | Pres. Siad Barré         |
| Sudan          | 441.4m           | Pres. Jafar-al-Numeri    |

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara, Europa, London, 1977;  
Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell,  
London, 1979

These seven recipients enjoyed sustained aid relations with the oil producing Arab donors and accrued over 95% of the total program. Elsewhere on the continent, aid to the predominantly Christian states of Central and Southern Africa was limited; none of the recipients in these areas of the continent being able to negotiate more than one, minor agreement with the Arabs. In West and East

Africa, aid relations were more sustained. Four states were able to garner an increase in assistance of more than 100% over a twelve months period - Mali, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. For three of these states, such increases coincided with a radical change in executive arrangements.

TABLE 11

Aid Increases and Political Leadership

| <u>Country</u> | <u>% Increase</u> | <u>Aid</u>       | <u>Year</u> | <u>Political Change</u> |
|----------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------------------|
| Mali           | 282%              | (\$8.7m-\$24.5m) | 1974-75     | New Constitution (1974) |
| Niger          | 1410%             | (\$1m-\$14.1m)   | 1974-75     | Military Coup (1974)    |
| Senegal        | 910%              | (\$1m-\$9.1m)    | 1975-76     | No change               |
| Upper Volta    | 457%              | (\$0.7m-\$3.2m)  | 1974-75     | Military Coup (1974)    |

Sources: Africa South of the Sahara, Europa Publications, London, 1977; Political Encyclopaedia of the Third World, Mansell, London, 1979; Africa Research Bulletin, Political, Social and Cultural Series, Exeter.

In this respect, the oil-rich states of the Middle East were occasionally prepared to 'reward' incoming political personalities; possibly in an endeavour to secure areas of political influence. It should be noted that this practice was introduced at a time when the Arab image was becoming tarnished in certain areas of the continent. By 1975, some African leaders, who didn't owe their affiliation to the Arab cause through membership of the Arab League, were expressing disquiet over the paucity of economic assistance. These increases are possibly symptomatic of a small scale attempt by the Arabs to capitalise upon African political instability and alleviate this disquiet. Nevertheless, it is apparent that this policy was only pursued in African states with a strong Islamic community (see Table 7).

In this respect, Arab aid relations maintained their cultural and religious character.

#### RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1974-76

The imposition of the oil embargo in 1973, and the fourfold increase in the price of oil dramatically affected the fortunes of the less developed world. Having ignored African appeals for a differential oil price, the Arab sanctions had a number of damaging implications for the African economy. However, there is little evidence to assume that Arab economic assistance to the continent was dictated by considerations of recipient need. Aid receipts did not increase relative to a declining level of recipient GNP per capita (Correlation between total aid from 1974 and GNP per capita = 0.0242). At the same time, the major beneficiaries of the Arab program were not, with the possible exception of Somalia, noted for their low economic status.

TABLE 12

#### Major Recipients and Economic Indicators 1974 to 1976

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (m)</u> | <u>Pop (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> | <u>(1975 Figs)</u> |
|-------------|------------------|----------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------|
| Algeria     | 58.5             | 13110          | 15.7           | 835                   |                    |
| Egypt       | 3937.4           | 11350          | 37.1           | 306                   |                    |
| Morocco     | 150.4            | 8400           | 16.7           | 501                   |                    |
| Tunisia     | 92.0             | 4380           | 5.6            | 782                   |                    |
| Mauritania  | 181.8            | 450            | 1.3            | 346                   |                    |
| Somalia     | 148.6            | 340            | 3.2            | 106                   |                    |
| Sudan       | 441.4            | 4310           | 15.6           | 276                   |                    |

Sources: United Nations Statistical Yearbooks, 1974-76;  
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows  
to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris.

On the whole, it would appear that Arab economic aid flowed to African

states with a relatively high GNP (Correlation = 0.5815) and Population (Correlation = 0.3969). Moreover, the reluctance of the oil producing Arab states to compensate certain areas of Africa for hardships incurred by increasing energy costs is reflected in the amount of assistance distributed to the eighteen African states who were internationally recognised as being amongst the 'least-developed countries' of the world<sup>(31)</sup>. These states accrued \$738.2m. of which the Arab League members of Somalia and Sudan were in receipt of \$590.0m. In other words, only 14.0% of the total aid program was disseminated to the least developed areas of the continent.

#### ARAB-AFRICAN AID RELATIONS: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the period up to the October War of 1973, Arab economic aid to the African continent was very limited. During the 1960s, no assistance was forthcoming from the oil producing states of the Middle East and, when the program was developed in the 1970s, only \$695.3m. was distributed to fourteen recipient states. This aid overwhelmingly favoured Islamic African members of the Arab League especially in the Northern region of the continent. In the years from October 1973, assistance continued to favour those African states with religious and ethnic affiliations to the donors, although the program as a whole escalated to a total of \$5261.5m. to twenty-nine recipients.

TABLE 13Comparative Regional Allocations

| <u>Arab Aid up to</u><br><u>1973</u> | <u>% of Program</u> | <u>Arab Aid from</u><br><u>1974-1976</u> | <u>% of Program</u> |       |
|--------------------------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------|-------|
| North .....                          | \$666.6m            | 95.9%                                    | \$4238.3m.          | 80.6% |
| West .....                           | \$ 15.1m            | 2.2%                                     | \$ 363.7m.          | 6.9%  |
| East .....                           | \$ 8.3m             | 1.2%                                     | \$ 638.7m.          | 12.1% |
| Central &<br>Southern ...            | \$ 5.3m             | 0.7%                                     | \$ 20.8m.           | 0.4%  |

North Africa continued to dominate the program whilst substantial amounts of aid to the Arab League Members, Somalia, Sudan and Mauritania in the second time period, increased East and West Africa's allocation. The predominantly Christian states of Central and Southern Africa, however, consistently remained low in the priorities of Arab donors.

## ARAB AID AND AFRICAN VOTING

TABLE 14

## Comparative Analysis of Arab Aid and African Voting

| Country      | From Independence to 1973 |         |         | 1974 to 1976 |      |          |      |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------|---------|--------------|------|----------|------|
|              | Aid (\$m)                 | %       | UN Vote | Aid (\$m)    | %    | UN Vote  |      |
| Algeria      | 7.7                       | 1.1     | B       | 58.5         | 1.1  | B        |      |
| Egypt        | 652.0                     | 93.8    | B       | 3937.4       | 74.8 | B        |      |
| Libya        | -                         | -       | B       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Morocco      | -                         | -       | B       | 150.4        | 2.9  | B        |      |
| Tunisia      | 6.9                       | 1.0     | B       | 92.0         | 1.8  | B        |      |
| Cameroon     | -                         | -       | B       | 19.4         | 0.4  | B        |      |
| Chad         | 5.4                       | 0.8     | B       | 11.5         | 0.2  | B        |      |
| Dahomey      | -                         | -       | C       | 5.5          | 0.1  | B        |      |
| Gambia       | -                         | -       | C       | 3.5          | *    | B        |      |
| Ghana        | -                         | -       | B       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Guinea       | -                         | -       | B       | 27.1         | 0.5  | B        |      |
| Ivory Coast  | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Liberia      | -                         | -       | A       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Mali         | 0.7                       | 0.1     | B       | 36.2         | 0.7  | B        |      |
| Mauritania   | 4.7                       | 0.7     | B       | 181.8        | 3.5  | B        |      |
| Niger        | 2.8                       | 0.4     | B       | 19.0         | 0.4  | B        |      |
| Nigeria      | -                         | -       | B       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Senegal      | 0.5                       | 0.1     | B       | 48.2         | 0.9  | B        |      |
| Sierra Leone | -                         | -       | B       | 0.3          | *    | B        |      |
| Togo         | 1.0                       | 0.1     | B       | 6.3          | 0.1  | B        |      |
| Upper Volta  | -                         | -       | B       | 4.9          | 0.1  | B        |      |
| Burundi      | 1.0                       | 0.1     | B       | 2.1          | *    | B        |      |
| Ethiopia     | -                         | -       | B       | 2.5          | *    | B        |      |
| Kenya        | -                         | -       | B       | 8.4          | 0.2  | B        |      |
| Rwanda       | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Somalia      | 4.0                       | 0.6     | B       | 148.6        | 2.8  | B        |      |
| Sudan        | 3.3                       | 0.5     | B       | 441.4        | 8.4  | B        |      |
| Tanzania     | -                         | -       | B       | 0.2          | *    | B        |      |
| Uganda       | -                         | -       | B       | 35.5         | 0.7  | B        |      |
| Botswana     | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| C.A.R.       | -                         | -       | C       | 0.2          | *    | B        |      |
| Congo        | -                         | -       | B       | 4.2          | 0.1  | B        |      |
| Eq. Guinea   | 5.0                       | 0.7     | B       | 13.0         | 0.3  | B        |      |
| Gabon        | -                         | -       | C       | 1.5          | *    | B        |      |
| Madagascar   | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Malawi       | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | C        |      |
| Lesotho      | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Swaziland    | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Zaire        | -                         | -       | C       | -            | -    | B        |      |
| Zambia       | 0.3                       | *       | B       | 0.8          | *    | B        |      |
| Mozambique   | -                         | -       | -       | 1.1          | *    | B        |      |
|              | <hr/>                     |         |         | <hr/>        |      |          |      |
|              | \$695.3m                  |         |         | \$5261.5m    |      |          |      |
| Cluster B    | (27)                      | \$695.3 | 100%    | Cluster B    | (40) | \$5261.5 | 100% |
| Cluster C    | (12)                      | -       | -       | Cluster C    | (1)  | -        | -    |
| Cluster A    | (1)                       | -       | -       |              |      |          |      |

\* Less than 0.1%

The relationship between Arab economic assistance and the pattern of African voting at the United Nations is far from straightforward. In the years from African independence up to 1973, the relatively minor program appears to have had some bearing upon the voting behaviour of African states. During this period, not one dollar of the total of \$695.3m was distributed to states who failed to consistently support Egypt in the General Assembly debates. From 1974 to 1976, however, the nature of Arab-African aid relations becomes more confused.

African support for the Arab cause rose to overwhelming proportions and, to a certain extent, this undermines the test of a relationship between voting and the vastly increased aid program. As has already been noted, many states consistently endorsed the Arab position from 1974 without being in receipt of assistance. In this respect, it is difficult to view the pattern of African voting, in the second time period, in terms of the aid program.

Nevertheless, further insight into the nature of a relationship between assistance and voting behaviour can be provided by analysing changes in the pattern of African behaviour at the United Nations and the distribution of economic aid between the two time periods.

All of the states which were in receipt of Arab economic aid up to 1973 continued to support Egypt in the General Assembly from 1974 (see Table 14). In this respect, it could be argued that economic assistance in the first time period forged an African caucus of positive and consistent voting support in the Middle East debates. It is also apparent that the Arab donors were more willing to extend assistance to African states who

were unwavering in their support, rather than states who had only been prepared to endorse the Arab position in the United Nations from 1974:

| <u>Count</u><br><u>(Row %)</u>                            | <u>Cluster C-C</u><br><u>(Uncommitted)</u> | <u>Cluster A-B</u><br><u>(Anti-Pro)</u> | <u>Cluster C-B</u><br><u>(Uncommitted-Pro)</u> | <u>Cluster B-B</u><br><u>(Pro)</u> |    |
|---|--|---|--|------------------------------------|----|
| African States<br><u>not</u> in receipt<br>of aid 1974-76 | 1<br>(8.3)                                 | 1<br>(8.3)                              | 6<br>(50.0)                                    | 4<br>(33.3)                        | 12 |
| African States<br>receiving aid<br>from 1974-76           | 0<br>(0)                                   | 0<br>(0)                                | 5<br>(17.9)                                    | 23<br>(82.1)                       | 28 |
|   | 1<br>(2.5)                                 | 1<br>(2.5)                              | 11<br>(27.5)                                   | 27<br>(67.5)                       | 40 |

Cluster A = 60% Anti  
Cluster B = 60% Pro  
Cluster C = Uncommitted

Chi Square = 10.78724 with 3 degrees of freedom  
Significance = 0.0129

Of twenty-seven African countries which voted with the Arabs throughout the years from independence up to 1976, twenty-three received economic aid in the second time period. This should be contrasted with African states who only supported the Arab cause from 1974, over 54% of whom did not at the same time garner Arab assistance. The value of chi squared is significant at a level beyond 0.0129, providing evidence of a strong relationship between aid from 1974 and changes in the pattern of voting behaviour. In this respect, despite the huge increase in the size of the assistance program following the October War of 1973, aid relations with the African continent retained an element of caution; finance primarily being provided to recipients who were consistent in their support. However, if

such support was assured over time, the Arab donors were more willing to increase their investment. Of the twenty-seven African states who supported the Arab cause in both time periods, sixteen negotiated an increase in their share of the Arab program. Only four African states who supported Egypt throughout the years up to 1976 failed to receive any economic assistance. In this respect, African disquiet over the lack of Arab finance in the years following the Yom Kippur War of 1973 was most pertinent for many of those African states who only endorsed the Arab position in the second time period.

#### ARAB AID AND DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION

In the period up to October 1973, nine African states severed diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv, of whom five were in receipt of Arab assistance. Following the Yom Kippur War, twenty African states terminated bilateral relations with Israel, of whom thirteen garnered concessional finance from the Arabs. It is difficult to separate the impact of both the October War of 1973 and of Arab oil money in critically damaging Afro-Israeli relations. Naturally, statements of solidarity with Egypt were replete with condemnation of the attack on 'African soil', but it must be remembered that the Israelis had faced similar charges in 1967, when only Guinea severed relations. The possibility that these African states were mindful of the Arab oil money is a very real one. The two factors are of course intertwined, since the October War led to the Arabs' use of oil as a major political weapon. Nevertheless, with the Arabs emerging as potential large scale donors to the continent, the black

African states approached a sense of unanimity in their opposition to Israel, which they had failed to do on all previous occasions. Within the space of two months, only Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland maintained diplomatic contacts with Israel. However, the extent to which African states have, in any substantial sense, been 'rewarded' for their diplomatic initiatives against Tel Aviv is limited. Susan Gitelson, in her analysis of Israeli-African relations in 1974, commented:

"For the long run, the African leaders may have erred. They have lost their manoeuvrability, which was possible only when they were comparatively 'non aligned' on the Middle-East question. They were probably more valuable to the Arabs when there was a possibility that they might break relations than there could be after they had actually done so. After all, what else of importance did they have to offer the Arabs? That the Arabs would not risk their own vital interests for the Africans was evident by their initial unwillingness to reduce the oil prices to the poorer developing countries from those demanded by their ostensible targets, the industrialised states ... the Africans would have been wiser to keep their options open by merely threatening to break relations with Israel rather than actually doing so". (32).

Of the twenty African states who severed diplomatic relations with Israel in October and November of 1973, seven were not in receipt of any Arab aid up to 1976 and the remaining fourteen garnered barely 2% of the total program.

#### CONCLUSION

The character of African relations with the major protagonists of the Middle East conflict has been radically transformed in the years from African independence up to 1976. During the late 1950s and the 1960s, Israel's aid to the continent, albeit insubstantial, was favourably received and was largely

instrumental in fostering a positive image of the Jewish State. Without a similar program of economic assistance, Egypt and the Arab states were noticeably unsuccessful in developing African support, or even interest, in their cause. Despite the outbreak of war between Israel and the African state of Egypt in 1967, relations between black Africa and Tel Aviv did not show signs of deterioration until the 1970s. By this time, states who took a positive line against Israel began to increase their chances of accruing Arab concessional finance, although the program as a whole was cautious in its application. Analysis of aid and voting in the United Nations up to 1973 reveals a significant relationship between the pattern of African behaviour in the General Assembly and the distribution of Arab assistance.

The outbreak of fresh hostilities in the Middle East in October 1973 seems to have signalled the end of cordial relations between Israel and Africa. The timing of the Yom Kippur War in relation to the severing of bilateral relations by the vast number of African states, and the overwhelming degree of African support for Egypt at the United Nations, indicates that this invasion of 'African soil' was a major catalyst for Afro-Arab solidarity. The pattern of African support for Egypt following the October War far outweighed the development of the aid program to the continent. Nevertheless, the significance of the war can only be judged in conjunction with the African realisation that the Arab states now had the wherewithal to provide large scale assistance. Black Africa had not, with the sole exception of Guinea severed diplomatic relations with Israel when 'African soil' was similarly threatened in 1967. However, despite the huge increase in the size of the aid program from 1974,

the Arabs have maintained their cautious approach. They have pursued a policy of positive aid relations with African states whose support against Israel has been sustained. Not surprisingly, this has favoured those African countries whose religious and ethnic contacts with the Arab donors have cemented their opposition to Tel Aviv. It has most obviously ignored the claims of the predominantly Christian, economically disadvantaged states in Central and Southern Africa. It has also failed to fulfil the expectations of many African states who have only opposed Israel since October 1973. The fact that the prospect of Arab finance had possibly been instrumental in bringing together an anti-Israeli stance amongst these African states, can be seen in their disillusionment and even bitterness, by 1976, when it appeared that the Arabs would not, after all, provide substantial aid to all areas of the continent.

REFERENCES

1. For further details see A Rivlin, Israel and the Afro-Asian World, Foreign Affairs 37, No. 3. April 1959. Nkrumah's stature as an African leader undoubtedly attracted attention to Israeli-Ghanaian aid relations and, to a certain extent, served as a model for other African states.
2. Quoted in the Guardian, 19th January, 1977
3. For a discussion of the difficulties experienced by the non-oil developing countries as a direct result of the higher fuel costs, see, Development Co-operation: Efforts and Policies of the Members of the Development Assistance Committee, Annual Reviews 1974 and 1975, Paris.
4. Tripoli Radio Home Service, 11th February, 1976
5. S A Gitelson, 'Why Do Small States Break Diplomatic Relations with Outside Powers', International Studies Quarterly, 18, 1974, p. 455
6. Many commentators have noted the efforts of the O.A.U. to minimise dissension within their own ranks and establish a continental perspective. See, for example, C Legum eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, Rex Collings, London, A3.
7. As a testing ground for black African views on the Middle East conflict, the U.N. voting record will prove to be the most valuable. This is primarily due to the desire within the O.A.U. to provide an image of continental solidarity and a consequent reluctance to publicise differences amongst its members. In addition, the U.N. is a political forum where both the Israelis and the Arab states can compete on an equal footing to gain support for their respective positions. As far as the O.A.U. is concerned, some of the Arab states have the advantage of being members whilst Israel is prohibited from O.A.U.
8. By 1976 the Arabs established a number of institutions to co-ordinate Afro-Arab economic co-operation.
  - a) The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
  - b) Speical Arab Fund for Africa
  - c) Arab African Bank
  - d) Islamic Development Bank
  - e) Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development
  - f) Arab Technical Assistance Fund for Africa
9. The 'grace period' indicates the initial years of the agreement during which repayments are not requested. For further details of the terms and conditions of

Arab economic aid see, Development Assistance Committee, Annual Review 1974, Paris, p. 101-117; E K Hawkins, The Principles of Development Aid, Penguin, 1970.

10. Tom Mboya, Freedom and After, Boston, Little, Brown, 1963, pp. 173-174
11. For a study of Israel's assistance to Africa see M E Krenin, Israel and Africa, A Study in Technical Co-Operation, New York 1964. However, it would be erroneous to paint too much of an unblemished image of Israeli-Afro relations during this period. Not all of her programs were unmitigated successes. One notable failure was the Mwanza land settlement project in Tanzania which did little to enhance Israel's image in President Nyerere's eyes. For a full discussion of this failure, see Abel Jacob, "Foreign Aid in Agriculture: Introducing Israel's Land Settlement to Tanzania", African Affairs, 71, No. 283, April 1972, pp. 186-194.

As of 1970, Israel was engaged in the following aid projects in Africa:

|                 |   |
|-----------------|---|
| <u>Botswana</u> | Eradication of T.B. (5 years prog.)<br>Survey of eye disease.   |
| <u>Cameroon</u> | Young Pioneer agricultral settlement at Obala and Garoua<br>Advice on Urban Youth Clubs<br>Management of 2 agriculture training and village centres (5th year)<br>Vegetable growing at Fonban<br>Preparation of youth-training teachers at teachers college |
| <u>C.A.R.</u>   | Advice on 6 co-op villages<br>National youth movement   |
| <u>Congo</u>    | Poultry Farm scheme (3rd year)  |
| <u>Dahomey</u>  | Pioneering youth training<br>Advice to government on broadcasting and State Lottery<br>Experimental citrus farm   |
| <u>Ethiopia</u> | 12 projects   |
| <u>Gabon</u>    | Civic, and rural training centre<br>Civic physical education and handicrafts  |
| <u>Gambia</u>   | Advice in agriculture<br>Course on agricultural extension studies.  |
| <u>Ghana</u>    | Cattle raising at Tadzewu<br>Advice on medical school<br>Advice to Bureau of Standards  |
| <u>Kenya</u>    | Lecturer at Nairobi University  |

|                     |   |
|---------------------|---|
| <u>Lesotho</u>      | Soil conservation programmes<br>Advice to government on youth organisations   |
| <u>Liberia</u>      | Training farm at Harrisburg Urban youth clubs<br>Urban Youth Club<br>Eye Clinic   |
| <u>Malagasy</u>     | Citrus programme<br>Agricultural Training centre<br>Advice on women's organisations   |
| <u>Malawi</u>       | Youth Training and school for youth trainers<br>Direction of eye clinic   |
| <u>Mauritius</u>    | Agricultural instruction to Young Farmers<br>Organisations<br><br>Advice on bacteriology in Central Lab.<br>Lecturer at Mauritius College   |
| <u>Niger</u>        | Youth movement<br>Training farm at Dalol Boso   |
| <u>Rwanda</u>       | Ophthalmic service<br>School of Nursing<br>Youth Training Programme<br>Dental Clinic  |
| <u>Senegal</u>      | Bee raising programme<br>Youth programme  |
| <u>Sierra Leone</u> | Advice on electrical engineering<br>Survey of experimental farm at University of<br>Agriculture, Najila                                     |
| <u>Swaziland</u>    | Youth training (3rd year)<br>and course for youth instructors   |
| <u>Chad</u>         | Management of youth farm at Cardoul (5th year)<br>Model farm and Young Pioneer farm<br>Afforestation programme<br>Government printing press |
| <u>Togo</u>         | 5 projects  |
| <u>Uganda</u>       | Citrus planting<br>Lecturer at Makerere University<br>Consultant at Ministry of Health  |
| <u>Upper Volta</u>  | Paediatrics Department at Hospital<br>State Lottery<br>Polyvalent Farm  |
| <u>Zaire</u>        | Poultry Farm  |
| <u>Zambia</u>       | Development schemes (4th year)  |

Sources: M Curtis and S A Gitelson (eds), Israel in the Third World,

Transaction Books, New Jersey, 1976

12. A Rivlin and J Fomerand, in M Curtis and S A Gitelson, *ibid.*, p. 340. The Arabs had some success in pushing through a resolution critical of Israel in January 1961 at a Conference attended by Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Egypt and the Provisional Government of Algeria. However, it is generally recognised by political commentators that the resolution condemning Israel 'as an instrument in the service of imperialism' was a classic example of log-rolling in which all the participants succeeded in having the Conference endorse their primary concerns.
13. For details on the fate of Israel's programs in Chad, see *New York Times*, January 12th, 1973, for Zaire and Ethiopia, see Legum, eds, Africa Contemporary Records 1974; Rex Collings, London, A4-5. In order to develop Israel's unfavourable image in the eyes of African states, the Arabs fully exploited Tel Aviv's friendly relations with South Africa.
14. It should be noted that the majority of United Nations debates on the Middle East crisis were held in the late 1960s and early 1970s when Libya was beginning to demonstrate a willingness to reward Israel's enemies.
15. This, of course, excludes African members of the Arab League who did not recognise the state of Israel.
16. See, for example, Doudou Thiam, The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects, Greenwood, 1977
17. C Legum, eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1972-73, A 23. African awareness of the potential of Arab aid in the early 1970s, is also emphasised in other studies, for example, S A Gitelson, *op.cit.*; J C Millar, African-Israeli Relations: Impact on Continental Unity, Middle East Journal, 1974, pp. 393-408.
18. Uganda did not receive Arab economic aid until 1974.
19. Vincent B Thompson, Africa and Unity: The Evolution of Pan Africanism, Humanities Press, New York, 1969, p. 290. For further discussions of O.A.U., see also, E Mbwyinga, Pan Africanism or Neo Colonialism: The Bankruptcy of the O.A.U., Lawrence Hill, 1981; C Legum, Pan Africanism, Praeger, New York, 1965.
20. For a more complete record of this resolution, see C Legum eds., Africa Contemporary Record, 1970-71, Documents Section, C 10
21. Africa Contemporary Record, 1972-73, C23.
22. J C Millar, *op.cit.*, p. 399

23. For a more detailed discussion of Arab involvement in the politics of the Red Sea, and Ethiopian anxiety, see C Legum, 'The Politics of the Red Sea', New Middle East, December 1972.
24. See B Rivlin and J Fomerand, op.cit.
25. Radio Kaunda, 11th February 1974
26. New York Times, 12th November, 1974
27. For further details of the General Assembly debates, see United Nations Yearbook, 1974.  
  
For a consideration of the ramifications of Israel's move into Egypt and the legal implications, see, D E George, Israeli Occupation: International Law and Political Realities, Exposition, 1979; K Carr, Israelis and Palestinians: After the October War, International Documentation Series, UO66, 1974
28. Jeune Afrique, Paris, 14th March, 1975
29. O.A.U. Council of Ministers, Resolutions, November 19-21, 1973
30. C Legum, eds, Africa Contemporary Record, 1973-74, A7
31. African states included in this list are:  
  
Botswana, Burundi, C.A.R., Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Upper Volta.  
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977
32. S A Gitelson (1974), op.cit., p. 476

CHAPTER NINE

ECONOMIC AID TO AFRICA:

SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The development of large scale programs of economic assistance to African can primarily be traced to the decline of colonialism. In 1957, Ghana became the first African colony to gain independence and, within the following decade, over thirty African states followed this lead and discarded their formal dependent status. Prior to 1957, several countries had been the occasional recipients of donations of aid, but it was the emergence of a host of newly independent states which provided the impetus for the major flow of foreign economic assistance from the developed world. Andrew Westwood, in his consideration of the role of aid in the framework of international relations noted that the granting of independent status acted as a catalyst for substantial assistance from at least one, major source, the United States.

"With the independence of Ghana in 1957, the first of the wave to come, the United States thought it necessary to offer aid for economic development. It was providing aid to Liberia, Ethiopia, across North Africa, and elsewhere in the world. To fail to offer aid to Ghana could be taken as a mark of American disinterest or antagonism. The same essential reasons were brought to bear when the next country became independent, and the next, until by 1963 the United States had begun in 27 new African nations and saw no easy way to stop. There was a broad official position within the Department of State that this was not to happen - that the independence of a new country was not itself a sufficient reason for aid. But case by case, officials responsible for policy towards Africa felt that this could not be applied to their particular, present problem". (1)

However, this somewhat superficial explanation fails to emphasise the increasing importance of an independent African continent whose member states provided an essential voting caucus in the United Nations. The major donors have had different motives for providing aid to the continent. For example, Britain and France were primarily guided by the desire to maintain close relations

with their former dependencies; the Arab states have been looking for support against Israel in the Middle East conflict; Communist China has endeavoured to establish herself as a prominent figure in international relations; whilst the United States and the Soviet Union have extended their largely world-wide competition for influence onto the African continent. However, it has been possible to isolate these individual aims and ambitions partly within the context of the General Assembly debates and the analysis so far has provided an insight into the extent to which each major donor has been able to utilise economic aid to develop his own area of political support in Africa<sup>(2)</sup>. However, this assessment does not take into consideration the extent to which each program can be significantly associated with the general pattern of voting behaviour. Whilst each donor may primarily have been concerned with the ramifications of the African vote upon resolutions which they had openly expressed their support, it may be erroneous to assume that the interaction of aid and influence did not extend throughout the proceedings of the United Nations. It is the intention of this chapter to provide a comparative examination of the impact of economic assistance upon African voting behaviour as a whole. Consideration will be given to the focal points of total aid to the continent and the relative importance of each major program. At the same time, reference will be made to the overall pattern of African voting in the United Nations and the extent to which this can be associated with the flow of economic assistance. In this respect the comparative analysis will provide an insight into the general political significance of each aid program.

THE PROGRAMS

With the sole exception of aid from the oil rich Arab states, each program has been analysed in two similar time periods. For the United Kingdom, France, the United States, the Soviet Union and Communist China, this division has focussed upon the distribution of economic assistance from African independence up to 1969; and the years from 1970 to 1976. In the study of Arab assistance, reference was made to the distribution of economic aid both before and after the Middle East War of 1973. For the purposes of comparison, this framework will be maintained, although references to the Arab program will be limited in the light of this contrast.

In the period following the onrush of independence, the six major donors to the continent committed at least \$11766.6m<sup>(3)</sup>. In what was the first decade of independence for the majority of African states, this approximately represents over \$1176.0m flowing to the continent per annum. During the second time period, a total of \$14451.9m was distributed in official development aid to Africa; the equivalent of over \$2281.0m per annum. The terms and conditions of aid from each of these donors tended to vary from year to year and from one recipient to another. However, in general, it would appear that Moscow, Peking and the Arab states offered assistance at relatively low rates of interest. For example, a substantial proportion of aid from Communist China was in the form of grants, or loans at only 2½% rate of interest. Concessionary finance from the West fluctuated at between 4% and 6% interest, but it is noticeable that the loans were generally extended for relatively long periods of time - the American program occasionally negotiated aid agreements for a forty years repayment period.

TABLE 1

## AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RECEIPTS: THE FIRST PERIOD

|               | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> | <u>TOTAL</u><br>% |
|---------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| Algeria       | -              | 74.2          | 9.2                  | 13.1                | 3.1          | 0.4          | 100               |
| Egypt         | 0.3            | 0.5           | 37.5                 | 35.4                | 3.3          | 23.0         | 100               |
| Libya         | 20.3           | 2.2           | 77.5                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Morocco       | 0.1            | 28.8          | 66.3                 | 4.8                 | -            | -            | 100               |
| Tunisia       | 0.1            | 21.0          | 73.5                 | 4.5                 | -            | 0.9          | 100               |
| Cameroon      | 7.6            | 67.3          | 19.5                 | 5.6                 | -            | -            | 100               |
| Chad          | -              | 84.7          | 8.7                  | -                   | -            | 6.6          | 100               |
| Dahomey       | -              | 84.2          | 15.8                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Gambia        | 92.5           | -             | 7.5                  | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Ghana         | 10.5           | 1.8           | 53.9                 | 23.3                | 10.5         | -            | 100               |
| Guinea        | -              | -             | 26.9                 | 51.6                | 21.5         | -            | 100               |
| Ivory Coast   | 0.1            | 82.3          | 17.6                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Liberia       | 0.5            | -             | 99.5                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Mali          | 0.1            | 29.5          | 11.3                 | 36.9                | 21.8         | 0.4          | 100               |
| Mauritania    | 0.2            | 75.6          | 0.2                  | 6.2                 | 8.2          | 9.6          | 100               |
| Niger         | 0.1            | 82.5          | 14.7                 | -                   | -            | 2.7          | 100               |
| Nigeria       | 42.8           | -             | 57.2                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Senegal       | 0.2            | 83.7          | 12.8                 | 3.1                 | -            | 0.2          | 100               |
| Sierra Leone  | 41.3           | -             | 34.9                 | 23.8                | -            | -            | 100               |
| Togo          | -              | 60.6          | 36.6                 | -                   | -            | 2.8          | 100               |
| Upper Volta   | -              | 84.7          | 15.3                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Burundi       | -              | 34.9          | 53.5                 | -                   | -            | 11.6         | 100               |
| Ethiopia      | 1.0            | -             | 63.4                 | 35.6                | -            | -            | 100               |
| Kenya         | 68.8           | -             | 12.9                 | 13.3                | 5.0          | -            | 100               |
| Rwanda        | -              | 19.8          | 80.2                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Somalia       | 8.9            | -             | 36.4                 | 38.8                | 13.5         | 2.4          | 100               |
| Sudan         | 11.4           | -             | 55.0                 | 31.9                | -            | 1.7          | 100               |
| Tanzania      | 51.4           | -             | 22.7                 | 6.6                 | 19.3         | -            | 100               |
| Uganda        | 65.8           | -             | 16.4                 | 9.2                 | 8.6          | -            | 100               |
| Botswana      | 89.9           | -             | 10.1                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| C.A.R         | 7.0            | 83.8          | 4.0                  | -                   | 5.2          | -            | 100               |
| Congo         | 0.1            | 63.1          | 3.7                  | 9.1                 | 24.0         | -            | 100               |
| Eq. Guinea    | -              | -             | -                    | -                   | -            | 100.0        | 100               |
| Gabon         | -              | 87.2          | 12.8                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Lesotho       | 91.1           | -             | 8.9                  | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Madagascar    | 0.1            | 95.0          | 4.9                  | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Malawi        | 90.3           | -             | 9.7                  | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Swaziland     | 100.0          | -             | -                    | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Zaire         | 0.7            | 4.2           | 95.1                 | -                   | -            | -            | 100               |
| Zambia        | 74.7           | -             | 9.0                  | 3.2                 | 12.9         | 0.2          | 100               |
| <b>TOTALS</b> | <b>11.0%</b>   | <b>25.0%</b>  | <b>37.0%</b>         | <b>17.1%</b>        | <b>4.0%</b>  | <b>5.9%</b>  | <b>100</b>        |

AID TO AFRICA: FIRST PERIOD

Table 1 reveals the relative contribution of each donor to individual African receipts. One of the most striking features of this analysis is the fact that the vast majority of states could accrue financial aid from more than one source. Of the forty recipients of assistance during this period, only Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea were entirely dependant upon one donor. More specifically, it should be emphasised that African countries could usually rely upon concessional finance from at least two Western donors. Aid from Britain, France and the United States dominated the total flow of assistance to the continent and only Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Somalia and Guinea could not look to London, Paris or Washington as the major provider.

During this period, the six major donors of assistance committed over \$11766.6m to forty independent African recipients (See Appendix II). The North American program was by far the most comprehensive, providing \$4354.0m., or 37%, of total aid to thirty-eight states. In contrast, the Soviet Union allocated \$2011.0m to nineteen recipients, which was the equivalent of 17.1% of the overall flow of concessional finance. In a similar fashion, there was a considerable difference in British and French commitments to the continent. Although both donors favoured positive contacts with their former dependencies, Paris distributed \$2941.9m, or 25% of total assistance to Africa, whilst London's injection of \$1294.9m represented only 11% of the flow of aid. Communist China and the Arab states were relatively small scale

donors during this period, providing \$470.4m and \$695.3m respectively.

#### AID AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS

Analysis of the economic characteristics of all those recipients who accrued in excess of \$300.0m in aid during this period reveals that the major flow of assistance was not simply determined by the desire to alleviate economic weakness.

TABLE 2

#### MAJOR BENEFICIARIES AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid (\$m)</u> | <u>GNP (\$m)</u> | <u>Pop. (m)</u> | <u>GNP per Capita</u> |
|-------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 1776.9           | 3175             | 12.6            | 252                   |
| Egypt       | 2832.9           | 4816             | 30.1            | 160                   |
| Morocco     | 909.4            | 2623             | 14.1            | 186                   |
| Tunisia     | 748.5            | 90               | 0.4             | 225                   |
| Ghana       | 399.0            | 2296             | 8.0             | 287                   |
| Guinea      | 325.4            | 288              | 3.6             | 80                    |
| Nigeria     | 377.0            | 3992             | 49.9            | 80                    |
| Kenya       | 360.4            | 1205             | 9.8             | 123                   |
| Tanzania    | 305.0            | 136              | 1.7             | 80                    |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks 1958-69; UN Yearbook of National Accounts, 1971; IMF World Bank Atlas, 1965-72

There is little evidence to assume that the donors favoured these beneficiaries because of their low economic status. None of the programs can be significantly associated with a relatively low recipient GNP per capita during this period and in general terms, assistance flowed to the well-populated, economically stronger states on the African continent. Pearson Correlation Coefficients of total aid, GNP and population reveal a very significant bias in the distribution of assistance towards recipients with a high GNP (0.4536) and a large population (0.2855). On the whole, there is no reason to believe that the distributive pattern of assistance was dictated by criteria of recipient economic

need, in terms of a relatively low GNP per capita. On the contrary, there is an insignificant correlation between total aid and a high recipient GNP per capita (0.0877). It could therefore be argued that the recipients' case for substantial assistance based upon economic weakness may not have been relevant to the reality of overall aid distribution during this period.

The geographical focus of concessional finance to Africa during these years reveals that certain areas of the continent figured more prominently than others in the donors' aid priorities.

TABLE 3

REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS

|               | <u>North<br/>Total</u> | <u>West<br/>Total</u> | <u>East<br/>Total</u> | <u>Central &amp; Southern<br/>Total</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|--------------|
| Britain       | \$ 57.4m               | \$278.2m              | \$560.3m              | \$399.0m                                | \$1294.9m    |
| France        | \$1756.2m              | \$818.7m              | \$ 5.0m               | \$361.1m                                | \$2941.0m    |
| United States | \$2562.4m              | \$937.7m              | \$511.2m              | \$342.7m                                | \$4354.0m    |
| Soviet Union  | \$1312.0m              | \$367.0m              | \$316.0m              | \$ 16.0m                                | \$2011.0m    |
| China         | \$ 149.7m              | \$151.5m              | \$114.9m              | \$ 54.3m                                | \$ 470.4m    |
| Arabs         | \$ 666.6m              | \$ 15.1m              | \$ 8.3m               | \$ 5.3m                                 | \$ 695.3m    |
| TOTALS        | \$6504.3m<br>(55.3%)   | \$2568.2m<br>(21.8%)  | \$1515.7m<br>(12.9%)  | \$1178.4m<br>(10.0%)                    | \$11766.6m   |

In accumulating over 55% of total aid to Africa it is apparent that the five recipient states of North Africa were able to negotiate economic aid much more successfully than other areas of the continent. To a large extent, the dominance of this region in the overall allocation of finance reflects the importance of these Mediterranean states to the political ambitions of many of the major powers. Both France and the Arab donors were anxious to maintain close associations with the North African states because of cultural and ethnic affiliations, together with their proximity to Paris and the Middle East respectively. Economic aid from the United

States and the Soviet Union favoured North African recipients who were perceived to be of strategic and political influence in international and continental affairs. At the same time, Communist China was not unaware of the importance of developing aid relations with this area, although in general there is little evidence of a very strong regional emphasis to Peking's program.

Elsewhere on the continent, Britain and France focussed upon their former dependencies, whilst the Arabs favoured those Sub Saharan African states with religious and ethnic ties. Washington endeavoured to provide assistance, albeit in some cases limited, to countries as they became independent. Moscow and Peking tended to be relatively circumspect in their aid relations, primarily confining substantial sums of finance to states of political importance who displayed an element of independence from the developed powers of the Western World. On the whole, the states of West Africa were in receipt of \$2568.2m. or over 21% of total assistance, whilst East African countries garnered \$1519.7m, the equivalent of almost 13% of overall concessional finance. The eleven recipients of Central and Southern Africa were not fundamental to the donor's priorities at this time and were only able to negotiate aid to the value of \$1178.4m, or 10% of the total flow of finance.

To a certain extent, this regional imbalance in the distribution of aid, together with the nature of the large French program, explains the relatively substantial flow of finance to the former French dependencies on the continent. During this period, Francophone Africa was in receipt of \$4936.2m, whilst their Anglophone counterparts garnered only \$2411.8m<sup>(4)</sup>. However, it should be noted that \$4418.6m was disseminated to the

eleven African states who either had no history of French or British colonisation, or, like Guinea, who had displayed an early determination to discard the authority of London or Paris. It is apparent that many large scale beneficiaries on the continent for example Egypt, Ethiopia, Liberia and Libya, could justifiably claim a certain 'independent tradition'. This distinguished them from the majority of Africa which only secured independence in the late 1950s and 1960s. Donors wishing to develop political influence within such states may have found it necessary to commit considerable sums of finance in order to override this 'tradition'.

Given the overall dominance of aid from Western based donors, it could be argued that recipients wishing to maximise the flow of assistance would be advised to ensure positive aid relations with London, Paris and Washington. This would especially seem to be the case for fifteen African states whose receipts of Western-based aid were unchallenged by finance from either the Soviet Union, Communist China or the Arabs. This was most apparent in Central and Southern Africa where only the Central African Republic, the Congo and Zambia were able to negotiate agreements with donors from both the West and East during this period. However, in areas of the continent where the Soviet Union, China or Arabs, may be interested in developing influence, recipient attitudes towards each donor may not be so constrained.

TABLE 4: MATRIX OF VOTING SCORE CORRELATIONS: FIRST PERIOD

|                |               | Voting With |         |               |          |         |         | Voting Against |         |               |          |         |         |
|----------------|---------------|-------------|---------|---------------|----------|---------|---------|----------------|---------|---------------|----------|---------|---------|
|                |               | Britain     | France  | United States | U.S.S.R. | China   | Arabs   | Britain        | France  | United States | U.S.S.R. | China   | Arabs   |
| Voting With    | Britain       | 1.000       | 0.7806  | 0.9780        | -0.9096  | -0.9481 | -0.8198 | -0.8774        | -0.4393 | -0.8941       | 0.8545   | 0.9344  | 0.7526  |
|                | France        | 0.7806      | 1.0000  | 0.6746        | -0.6306  | -0.6231 | -0.6149 | -0.6583        | -0.6747 | -0.5861       | 0.5492   | 0.6287  | 0.4765  |
|                | United States | 0.9780      | 0.6746  | 1.000         | -0.9221  | -0.9471 | -0.8105 | -0.8775        | -0.3711 | -0.9356       | 0.8664   | 0.9203  | 0.7350  |
|                | U.S.S.R.      | -0.9096     | -0.6306 | -0.9221       | 1.0000   | 0.9056  | 0.9210  | 0.7003         | 0.1824  | 0.7832        | -0.9629  | -0.9107 | -0.8323 |
|                | China         | -0.9481     | -0.6231 | -0.9471       | 0.9056   | 1.0000  | 0.7651  | 0.8041         | 0.2710  | 0.8399        | -0.8729  | -0.9760 | -0.7168 |
|                | Arabs         | -0.8198     | -0.6149 | -0.8105       | 0.9210   | 0.7651  | 1.0000  | 0.6054         | 0.1523  | 0.6646        | -0.8881  | -0.8008 | -0.8687 |
| Voting Against | Britain       | -0.8774     | -0.6583 | -0.8775       | 0.7003   | 0.8041  | 0.6054  | 1.0000         | 0.6867  | 0.9595        | -0.5769  | -0.7400 | -0.4535 |
|                | France        | -0.4393     | -0.6747 | -0.3711       | 0.1824   | 0.2710  | 0.1523  | 0.6867         | 1.0000  | 0.5463        | -0.0012  | -0.2104 | 0.0370  |
|                | United States | -0.8941     | -0.5861 | -0.9356       | 0.7832   | 0.8399  | 0.6646  | 0.9595         | 0.5463  | 1.0000        | -0.6730  | -0.7839 | 0.9036  |
|                | U.S.S.R.      | 0.8545      | 0.5492  | 0.8664        | -0.9629  | -0.8729 | -0.8881 | -0.5769        | -0.0012 | -0.6730       | 1.0000   | 0.9036  | 0.8677  |
|                | China         | 0.9344      | 0.6287  | 0.9203        | -0.9107  | -0.9760 | -0.8008 | -0.7400        | -0.2104 | -0.7839       | 0.9036   | 1.0000  | 0.7680  |
|                | Arabs         | 0.7256      | 0.4765  | 0.7350        | -0.8323  | -0.7168 | -0.8687 | -0.4535        | 0.0370  | -0.5460       | 0.8677   | 0.7680  | 1.0000  |

AFRICAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE FIRST TIME PERIOD

The matrix provides evidence that a large number of African states were relatively consistent in their attitudes towards the donors of the developed West and also in their reaction to resolutions drafted with the support of Moscow, Peking and Egypt. Positive correlations can be significantly made to a pattern of African support for Britain, France and the United States, together with opposition to the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs. Similarly, it is possible to discern an ideological African response in favour of Moscow, Peking and Egypt, together with opposition to London, Washington and, less significantly, Paris.

Crosstabulations of the pattern of African voting during these years not only reflect this ideological response to the United Nations debates, but also isolate more specifically the areas of political influence for each donor. For example, it is noticeable that only six African states reacted differently to resolutions sponsored by the United States and those endorsed by Britain:

VOTING WITH UNITED STATES

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)  | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)   | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)   |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|--|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | Algeria<br>Mali  | -  | -  | 2  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | Guinea, Congo,<br>Mauritania,<br>Burundi,<br>Tanzania,<br>Zambia | Egypt, Libya,<br>Ghana, Morocco,<br>Tunisia, Nigeria,<br>Ethiopia, Kenya,<br>Somalia, Sudan,<br>Uganda | -  | 17 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | -  | -  | Cameroon, Chad,<br>Dahomey, I. Coast,<br>Liberia, Niger,<br>Senegal, Sierra<br>Leone, Togo,<br>Upper Volta,<br>Rwanda, Botswana,<br>C.A.R., Eq.<br>Guinea, Gabon,<br>Lesotho,<br>Madagascar,<br>Malawi,<br>Swaziland, Zaire,<br>Gambia | 21 |
|                            | 8<br>(20.0%)   | 11<br>(27.5%)  | 21<br>(52.5%)  | 40 |

VOTING WITH BRITAIN

Chi Square = 46.47057 with 4 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Twenty-one states consistently voted with both major powers during this period, including the majority of Francophone West Africa and all Central and Southern states with the exceptions of Zambia, and the Congo. Rwanda was the only North or East African country to consistently vote with both London and Washington. In this respect, it would appear that the major sources of political support for Britain and the United States were those areas of the continent which were of relatively minor political and strategic importance at this time. With the sole exception of Equatorial Guinea, all of these states were primarily dependent upon Western sources for aid finance and twelve of these countries were not in receipt of any assistance from Moscow, Peking or the Arabs (See Table 1). However, it is apparent that support for London and Washington was not necessarily symptomatic of the central position of these two powers in aid relations. In particular, whilst the United States provided concessional finance to all but two of the states who consistently voted with her, she was only the major donor to Liberia, Rwanda and Zaire, none of whom were formerly British or French dependencies. In other words, Washington preferred to leave the major responsibility for providing assistance to these African 'supporters' to her NATO allies, the ex-metropolitan authorities of Britain and France.

#### THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION

The United States was the major donor of aid to twelve African states - Burundi, Ethiopia, Liberia, Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt, Ghana, Zaire, Libya and Rwanda. In one respect, Washington's focus upon these countries was not altogether

unsuccessful since only Burundi consistently opposed the North American donor in the United Nations. However, the extent to which her status as the primary source of assistance was influential in establishing support in comparison with the Soviet Union was limited.

#### VOTING WITH SOVIET UNION

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)   | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)   | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)  |    |
|----------------------------|---|--|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | -   | -  | Algeria, Guinea, Mali,<br>Mauritania, Burundi,<br>Congo, Tanzania,<br>Zambia              | 8  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | -   | Ethiopia   | Egypt, Libya, Morocco,<br>Tunisia, Nigeria,<br>Kenya, Somalia,<br>Sudan, Uganda,<br>Ghana | 11 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | Gambia, Liberia,<br>Rwanda,<br>Botswana;<br>Lesotho, Malawi,<br>Swaziland | Cameroon,<br>Chad, Dahomey,<br>Sierra Leone,<br>Togo, Upper<br>Volta, CAR,<br>Gabon,<br>Madagascar,<br>Zaire, I. Coast,<br>Niger | Equatorial Guinea,<br>Senegal   | 21 |
|                            | 7<br>(17.5%)  | 13<br>(32.5%)  | 20<br>(50.0%)   |    |

Chi Square = 29.27472 with 4 degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Only three African states treated these two major powers with equanimity in the General Assembly. Equatorial Guinea and Senegal voted with both Washington and Moscow, whilst Ethiopia remained uncommitted. Seven countries supported the United States and opposed the Soviet Union, all of whom, with the exception of Swaziland, were in receipt of American, but not Soviet, finance.

It is noticeable that, of the twelve states whose aid was primarily derived from Washington, eight adopted a more favourable

voting position towards Moscow whilst only Liberia and Rwanda consistently supported the North American donor and opposed the Soviet Union in the United Nations.

On the whole, it is apparent that the focus of American aid was not guided by the desire to simply reward African states who voted with Washington, or even with Paris or London. Moreover, this assessment seems to be applicable to the pattern of aid from all three Western donors.

WESTERN AID AND AFRICAN VOTING: THE FIRST PERIOD

TABLE 5

AID AND VOTING SUPPORT CORRELATIONS

| African support for: | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>British Aid</u>   | -0.2128        | 0.0530        | -0.2646              | 0.1330              | 0.3171       | -0.0163      |
| <u>French Aid</u>    | -0.2283        | -0.1516       | -0.2380              | 0.2216              | 0.1911       | 0.2067       |
| <u>American Aid</u>  | -0.3358        | -0.4361       | -0.2368              | 0.3295              | 0.2963       | 0.3359       |

The American program did not disproportionately favour recipients who supported Britain and France; and actually flowed to African countries who voted with Moscow, Peking and Egypt. To a large extent, this extends the earlier insight into aid from the United States where Washington tended to focus upon certain states irrespective of their negative voting response during this period. The British and French programs are less significantly associated with the pattern of African voting at this time, although there is some evidence that London's assistance flowed to those who supported Peking's application to join the United Nations and avoided states who voted in agreement with the United States.

As has been noted, African support for the Western

powers was most prevalent in those areas of the continent which were unchallenged by assistance from the Soviet Union, Communist China or the Arab states. During this period, nineteen countries consistently agreed with Britain, France and the United States. Twelve of these states did not register their support for any other major power and can be classed as politically orientated towards the West. Cameroon, Niger, Senegal, Chad, Togo, Upper Volta and Equatorial Guinea also concurred with at least one other donor.

#### AID AND VOTING ALIGNMENT WITH THE WEST

TABLE 6

| <u>African States who voted with Britain, France, US and at least one Eastern power</u> | <u>Aid from Western donors (\$m)</u> | <u>% of Total</u> | <u>Aid from Soviet Union, China, Arabs (\$m)</u> | <u>% of Total</u> | <u>Total \$m</u> |
|---|--------------------------------------|-------------------|--|-------------------|------------------|
| Cameroon  | 134.4                                | 94.4              | 8.0  | 5.6               | 142.4            |
| Chad  | 76.2                                 | 93.4              | 5.4  | 6.6               | 81.6             |
| Eq. Guinea  | -                                    | -                 | 5.0  | 100               | 5.0              |
| Niger   | 99.9                                 | 97.3              | 2.8  | 2.7               | 102.7            |
| Senegal   | 216.7                                | 96.7              | 7.5  | 3.3               | 224.2            |
| Togo  | 35.3                                 | 97.2              | 1.0  | 2.8               | 36.3             |
| Upper Volta   | <u>77.2</u>                          | 100               | -  | -                 | <u>77.2</u>      |
|   | \$639.7m                             | 95.6%             | \$29.7m  | 4.4%              | \$669.4m         |

#### African states who voted with Britain, France and US only

|             |              |         |        |        |              |
|-------------|--------------|---------|--------|--------|--------------|
| Dahomey     | 63.9         | 100     | -      | -      | 63.9         |
| Ivory Coast | 180.0        | 100     | -      | -      | 180.0        |
| Liberia     | 214.7        | 100     | -      | -      | 214.7        |
| Rwanda      | 10.1         | 100     | -      | -      | 10.1         |
| Botswana    | 59.3         | 100     | -      | -      | 59.3         |
| CAR         | 74.4         | 94.8    | 4.1    | 5.2    | 78.5         |
| Gabon       | 56.2         | 100     | -      | -      | 56.2         |
| Lesotho     | 45.0         | 100     | -      | -      | 45.0         |
| Madagascar  | 173.4        | 100     | -      | -      | 173.4        |
| Malawi      | 158.0        | 100     | -      | -      | 158.0        |
| Swaziland   | 16.2         | 100     | -      | -      | 16.2         |
| Zaire       | <u>292.2</u> | 100     | -      | -      | <u>292.2</u> |
|             | \$1343.4m    | (99.7%) | \$4.1m | (0.3%) | \$1347.5m    |

In total, African states who consistently voted with all three Western donors were in receipt of aid to a value of \$2016.9m. This represents less than 18% of the overall flow of assistance to the continent. It is noticeable that the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Arabs largely ignored those African countries who displayed an ideological commitment to the Western powers alone. With the exception of \$4.1m to the Central African Republic, only pro-Western states who also displayed some willingness to vote with Moscow, Peking or Egypt could hope to negotiate with these donors. Moreover, these African states were also overwhelmingly dependant upon Western finance as the major source of assistance.

To a certain extent, it is difficult to discern whether 'Eastern' donors were unconcerned with developing positive aid relations with these states, or were unwilling to sponsor African leaders who seemed predisposed towards the West. Nevertheless, the absence of Eastern competition to aid from Britain, France and the United States undoubtedly reinforced the ideological pattern of voting evident in the behaviour of these states in the United Nations. It is interesting to note that 80% of African states who did not receive assistance from the Soviet Union, Communist China or the Arabs consistently voted with all three Western powers in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that these African countries did not all disproportionately benefit from the flow of economic aid during this period. They were unable to accrue substantial concessional finance from donors other than Britain, France and the United States who, in the absence of competition, could effectively ensure the dominance of Western aid with a relatively limited input.

EASTERN AID AND AFRICAN VOTING: THE FIRST PERIODTHE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA

To a large extent, aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China seems to have developed along a relatively common operational framework. Certainly, crosstabulation of the distribution of assistance from Moscow and Peking reveals that, despite the contrast in size, the direction of the two programs was very similar. Thus of thirteen recipients of Chinese finance during this period, twelve were also in receipt of aid from the Soviet Union. George T Yu, in his study of Sino-Soviet relations with Africa, noted that economic aid to the continent from Moscow and Peking was a reflection of Sino-Soviet rivalry:

"With the emergence of open Sino-Soviet discord in the early 1960s, China's African policy began to be more and more directed against the Soviet Union ... Indeed, Africa soon assumed major importance as an arena of Sino-Soviet competition". (5)

However, crosstabulation of the pattern of voting towards these two powers provides little evidence that either Soviet or Chinese assistance was instrumental in securing a more favourable African attitude.

VOTING WITH COMMUNIST CHINA

|                                 | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)  | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)          | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)   |    |
|---------------------------------|--|-------------------------------------|--|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)         | Gambia, Liberia,<br>Rwanda, Botswana,<br>Lesotho, Malawi,<br>Swaziland   | -                                   | -  | 7  |
| Cluster C<br>(Un-<br>committed) | Cameroon, Chad,<br>Dahomey, Ivory<br>Coast, Niger,<br>Togo, Upper<br>Volta, CAR,<br>Gabon,<br>Madagascar,<br>Zaire | Ethiopia, Sierra<br>Leone           | -  | 13 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)          | Equatorial<br>Guinea   | Libya, Tunisia,<br>Nigeria, Senegal | Morocco, Ghana, Guinea,<br>Mali, Mauritania,<br>Burundi, Kenya, Somalia,<br>Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda,<br>Congo, Zambia, Algeria,<br>Egypt | 20 |
|                                 | 19<br>(47.5)   | 6<br>(15.0)                         | 15<br>(37.5)   | 40 |

Chi Square = 31.82186 with four degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Twenty-four African states voted in a similar fashion in the debates concerning Moscow and Peking and not one country voted for Communist China whilst not according the same degree of support for the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify twelve African states who may have been reacting to the nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict by voting in a relatively unfavourable manner towards Peking. Eleven countries consistently voted against Communist China whilst remaining uncommitted towards Moscow. In addition, Equatorial Guinea voted with the Soviet Union during this period and opposed Peking. However, it is difficult to discern an influential role for economic aid in the development of this contrasting African

VOTING WITH SOVIET UNION

behaviour. Certainly, it must be pointed out that, of the twelve African states who adopted a more negative attitude towards Peking rather than Moscow, ten were not in receipt of either Soviet or Chinese financial assistance. The Central African Republic received aid from Peking only and Cameroon was the sole African state amongst these countries where receipts of Soviet finance coincided with a relatively unfavourable attitude towards Peking.

In this respect, it is evident that the majority of African states did not react to the Sino-Soviet conflict by merely voting with the provider of the largest amount of aid, namely the Soviet Union. On the contrary, it could be argued that certain countries attempted to play off one donor against the other - of fifteen states who consistently supported both Peking and Moscow, twelve were in receipt of both Chinese and Soviet finance. From one African perspective, therefore, the element of competition in Soviet and Chinese assistance to the continent merely increased the flow of non Western aid and did not diminish a pattern of support for the East.

#### THE ARAB STATES

Aid from the Arab states during this period was limited and tended to be confined to their Islamic brothers on the continent. Whilst it is not possible to establish a very significant relationship between this finance and the overall African performance in the General Assembly, the program can be more easily associated with the pattern of support for the East rather than the West. This is evident not only in the correlation matrix (Table 4) but is also reflected in the crosstabulations

of African voting behaviour towards the Arabs, the United States and the Soviet Union:

VOTING WITH THE UNITED STATES

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)   | Cluster B<br>(Uncommitted)   | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)   |    |
|----------------------------|---|--|--|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | -   | -  | Liberia  | 1  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | -   | -  | Dahomey, Gambia,<br>Ivory Coast, Rwanda,<br>Botswana, CAR, Gabon,<br>Lesotho,<br>Madagascar, Malawi,<br>Swaziland, Zaire | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | Algeria,<br>Guinea, Mali,<br>Mauritania,<br>Burundi,<br>Tanzania,<br>Zambia,<br>Congo | Egypt, Libya,<br>Morocco, Tunisia,<br>Ghana, Nigeria,<br>Ethiopia, Kenya,<br>Somalia, Sudan,<br>Uganda | Cameroon, Chad,<br>Niger, Senegal, Sierra<br>Leone, Togo,<br>Upper Volta,<br>Equatorial Guinea                           | 27 |
|                            | 8<br>(20.0)   | 11<br>(27.5)   | 21<br>(52.5)   |    |

VOTING WITH EGYPT

Chi Square = 17.42504 with four degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0016

Nine African countries were completely juxtaposed in their voting behaviour towards the United States and Egypt (i.e., voted either with Washington and against Egypt or vice versa), and only eight states voted in the same fashion towards both powers. In other words, barely 20% of the independent African members of the United Nations were consistent in their reaction towards both Washington and the Arabs. In addition, thirteen states supported the United States whilst failing to endorse Egypt's position in the debates of the General Assembly. It is noticeable that none of these countries were in receipt of Arab aid finance. The absence of assistance to states who adopted a more

favourable attitude towards Washington would conform with Egypt's hostility towards American support for Tel Aviv in the Middle-East conflict. Certainly, it is generally recognised that the Arabs have relied more upon the support of Moscow rather than the United States in their struggle against Israel. In this respect, it is not altogether surprising that crosstabulation of African voting behaviour towards Egypt and the Soviet Union reveals a considerable level of consistency:

VOTING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)  | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)   | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)  |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | Liberia  | -  | -   | 1  |
| Cluster B<br>(Uncommitted) | Gambia, Rwanda,<br>Botswana,<br>Lesotho,<br>Malawi,<br>Swaziland | Dahomey, Ivory<br>Coast, C.A.R.,<br>Gabon,<br>Madagascar, Zaire              | -   | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | -  | Cameroon, Chad,<br>Niger, Sierra<br>Leone, Togo,<br>Upper Volta,<br>Ethiopia | Algeria, Egypt,<br>Libya, Tunisia,<br>Ghana, Guinea,<br>Mali, Mauritania,<br>Nigeria, Senegal,<br>Burundi, Kenya,<br>Somalia, Sudan,<br>Tanzania, Uganda,<br>Congo, Eq. Guinea,<br>Zambia, Morocco. | 27 |
|                            | 7<br>(17.5)  | 13<br>(32.5)   | 20<br>(50.0)  | 40 |

Chi Square = 27.30158 with four degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Twenty-seven states treated Moscow and the Arabs with equanimity in the United Nations. Twenty countries consistently supported both these powers, all of whom, with the exceptions of Libya and Nigeria,

were in receipt of aid from at least one of these donors and ten negotiated assistance from both the Soviet Union and the Arabs. By far the largest aid 'burden' was accepted by Moscow who provided the major share of concessional finance to sixteen of these supporters.

Africa's relatively consistent approach towards these two international actors was reflected in the fact that not one state voted against either Moscow or Egypt and with the other. Moreover, the perceived association between the non-Western donors is not without justification if analysis is made of the pattern of African voting and aid from the Arabs, Communist China and the Soviet Union.

TABLE 7

EASTERN AID AND VOTING SUPPORT CORRELATIONS

| African support for | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> |
|---------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>Soviet Aid</u>   | -0.3903        | -0.4372       | -0.3429              | 0.3431              | 0.3333       | 0.3080       |
| <u>Chinese Aid</u>  | -0.6765        | -0.5343       | -0.6556              | 0.5811              | 0.6300       | 0.4684       |
| <u>Arab Aid</u>     | -0.2228        | -0.2919       | -0.1855              | 0.1985              | 0.1649       | 0.2040       |

There is evidence to believe that both the Soviet and Chinese programs contributed to an ideological African voting response in favour of the Eastern powers. Aid from Moscow and Peking favoured those African states who voted with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs, and was directed away from those who supported Britain, France and the United States. Arab assistance cannot be so significantly associated with this pattern although there are indications that Middle Eastern finance did not focus upon those states who voted with London, Paris and Washington.

AID AND VOTING ALIGNMENT WITH THE EAST

Fifteen African states consistently voted with Moscow, Peking and Egypt in the United Nations, of which nine were unwilling to also support any of the Western donors. Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and the Congo preferred to temper their support for the three Eastern powers by also voting with Britain, France or the United States:

TABLE 8

AID AND SUPPORT FOR MOSCOW, PEKING AND EGYPT

| African States who voted with Soviet Union, China & Arabs and at least one Western power | Aid from Eastern donors (\$m) | % of Total | Aid from Western donors (\$m) | % of Total | Total (\$m)      |
|--|-------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|------------|------------------|
| Kenya  | 66.0                          | 18.3       | 294.4                         | 81.7       | 360.4            |
| Somalia  | 93.0                          | 54.7       | 77.1                          | 45.3       | 170.1            |
| Tanzania   | 78.9                          | 25.9       | 226.1                         | 74.1       | 305.0            |
| Uganda   | 31.0                          | 17.8       | 143.4                         | 82.2       | 174.4            |
| Congo  | 36.4                          | 33.2       | 73.4                          | 66.8       | 109.8            |
| Zambia   | 30.1                          | 16.3       | 154.7                         | 83.7       | 184.8            |
|  | <u>\$335.4m</u>               | (25.7)     | <u>\$969.1m</u>               | (74.3)     | <u>\$1304.5m</u> |

African States who voted only with Soviet Union, China, and Arabs

|            |                  |        |                  |        |                  |
|------------|------------------|--------|------------------|--------|------------------|
| Algeria    | 294.7            | 16.6   | 1482.2           | 83.4   | 1776.9           |
| Egypt      | 1748.7           | 61.7   | 1084.2           | 38.3   | 2832.9           |
| Morocco    | 44.0             | 4.8    | 865.4            | 95.2   | 909.4            |
| Ghana      | 135.0            | 33.8   | 264.0            | 66.2   | 399.0            |
| Guinea     | 238.0            | 73.1   | 87.4             | 26.9   | 325.4            |
| Mali       | 96.2             | 59.1   | 66.6             | 40.9   | 162.8            |
| Mauritania | 11.7             | 24.0   | 37.0             | 76.0   | 48.7             |
| Burundi    | 1.0              | 11.6   | 7.6              | 88.4   | 8.6              |
| Sudan      | 67.3             | 33.6   | 133.1            | 66.4   | 200.4            |
|            | <u>\$2636.6m</u> | (39.6) | <u>\$4027.5m</u> | (60.4) | <u>\$6664.1m</u> |

Every African state who consistently supported the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs received economic aid from both non-Western and Western based donors. Moreover, these fifteen

recipients dominated the flow of assistance to the continent, being in receipt \$7968.6m; the equivalent of over 67% of total aid. However, only \$2972.0m, or 37.3% of concessional finance to these states was distributed from the East. In other words, the majority of African states who consistently endorsed a non-Western voting perspective in the United Nations were able to negotiate the large proportion of their aid from Western states. However, it would be erroneous to assume from this that London, Paris or Washington either based their programs on an enlightened sense of altruism or rewarded African states for lending their support to other major political powers. Rather, it would appear that these states were able to maintain aid contacts with the West despite their voting alignment and because of their importance to the donors' political aims and ambitions. The importance of the latter was reflected in the regional, historical or religious imbalances inherent in many of the programs, which provided a set of constraints upon a simple quantifiable relationship between aid and the pattern of African voting. In this context, it is noticeable that, whilst the general voting response of both Egypt and the Sudan placed them in the same voting clusters, the strategic and politically important North African state was in receipt of a total of \$2832.9m from all six major donors. By contrast, Sudan garnered only \$200.4m and was completely ignored by the French and Chinese programs.

Moscow, Peking and the Arabs never adequately competed with the flow of Western aid during this period. This is even evident in the distribution of assistance to African states who adopted an exclusively pro-Eastern voting posture. The nine countries who consistently voted with all of these donors, and who failed to concur with Britain, France or the United States, were

in receipt of a total of \$6664.1m, of which only \$2636.6m, or 40% was provided from non-Western sources. To a large extent, this was symptomatic of the West's desire to maintain positive aid contacts with certain areas of the continent irrespective of negative, recipient voting behaviour.

Economic assistance to states who consistently voted with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs, but who also concurred with at least one donor from the developed Western world, amounted to \$1304.5m. This finance was also primarily provided by Britain, France or the United States who committed \$969.1m or over 74% of total assistance to these recipients.

On the whole, it is apparent that Soviet, Chinese and Arab finance operated within a relatively cohesive framework and was much more closely allied to the pattern of African voting in the United Nations. A total of \$3176.7m was distributed to the continent from these donors during this period, of which less than 7% was allocated to recipients who did not vote with Moscow, Peking and Egypt. Moreover, there were only four instances when an African state was able to accrue finance from either the Soviet Union, China or the Arabs whilst failing to vote in agreement with any of these powers<sup>(6)</sup>. As a result, it could be argued that African states who developed a voting position in favour of the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs, improved the likelihood of Eastern-based finance and, at the same time, did not necessarily forfeit the opportunity for substantial aid from the West. In this respect, it should be noted that, of nine recipients who were able to acquire total aid in excess of \$300.0m, seven consistently voted with all the 'Eastern' donors.

AID AND UNCOMMITTED VOTING

During this period, six African states failed to register their consistent support with either of the two sets of donors. In other words, these leaders did not appear to draw an ideological distinction, as exhibited in their voting behaviour, with Britain, France and the United States or in support of the Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt:

TABLE 9

| Name         | Aid from Western donors (\$m) | % of Total | Aid from Eastern donors (\$m) | % of Total | Total (\$m)      |
|--------------|-------------------------------|------------|-------------------------------|------------|------------------|
| Libya        | 236.6                         | 100        | -                             | -          | 236.6            |
| Tunisia      | 707.6                         | 94.5       | 40.9                          | 5.5        | 748.5            |
| Gambia       | 14.7                          | 100        | -                             | -          | 14.7             |
| Nigeria      | 377.0                         | 100        | -                             | -          | 377.0            |
| Sierra Leone | 89.6                          | 76.2       | 28.0                          | 23.8       | 117.6            |
| Ethiopia     | 184.7                         | 64.6       | 102.0                         | 35.6       | 286.7            |
|              | <u>\$1610.2m</u>              | (90.4)     | <u>\$170.9m</u>               | ( 9.6)     | <u>\$1781.1m</u> |

These states who were in one sense, ideologically uncommitted, were able to garner \$1781.1, which was the equivalent of over 15% of total aid to the continent. However, with the possible exception of Ethiopia, such receipts are not consistent with an ability to 'play off' one set of donors against the other. The Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs would not allocate any assistance to Libya, Gambia and Nigeria and provided less than 15% of the total finance to Tunisia, Sierra Leone and Ethiopia. Nevertheless, these relatively uncommitted leaders were able to negotiate considerable sums of aid from the West, from whom over 90% of the assistance was acquired. In this respect, a failure to ideologically conform with either 'set' of donors did not seem to inhibit the distribution of Western-based assistance, but did coincide with a limited flow, or even absence, of aid from other sources.

SUMMARY: THE FIRST PERIOD

In total, Britain, France and the United States, provided 73% of the overall flow of economic assistance to the continent during this period and, if African concurrence with these three donors can be regarded as symptomatic of ideological commitment towards the West, it would appear that this finance has some influence in areas where it was unchallenged by aid from other sources. This was especially noticeable in Francophone West Africa and certain states in Central and Southern Africa, where the former metropolitan authorities tended to dominate aid relations. However, on the whole, there is little evidence to assume that the individual French, British or American programs can generally be associated with the pattern of voting in the United Nations. Moreover, it would seem that these donors operated and distributed concessional finance in relative isolation. London and Paris primarily concentrated on their former dependencies whilst Washington only overlooked Swaziland and Equatorial Guinea in her vast network of African aid contacts. A considerable proportion of aid from the developed West appears to have been allocated to a number of African states despite a lack of voting support in the General Assembly. Certainly, for recipients who were the focus of attention from many aid donors, a substantial measure of Western-based finance seemed to be assured during this period, irrespective of their behaviour in the United Nations. In this respect, even within the context of the British and French imbalance towards their former colonies, Western assistance seems to have operated on the basis of political and strategic observations. By these, the donors' perception of the importance of individual

recipients may influence the direction of the program. Such 'political and strategic observations' did not, during these years, incorporate the relative economic weakness of the recipient, nor necessarily involve a large degree of African voting agreement.

However, economic aid from the other major powers can be significantly associated with African behaviour in the United Nations. This was especially the case with assistance from Moscow, whose program was the most comprehensive amongst the Eastern donors, and Peking. There is no evidence to believe that either of these two donors successfully utilised economic aid to gather African support in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Rather, Soviet and Chinese finance may have served to unite certain African states in an ideological pattern of voting which was favourable to all three non-Western powers. Certainly, the Arab states should be more closely linked to the framework of aid and support for the East than with any of the other donors.

To a large extent, it would seem that those states who were able to maximise their aid receipts on the African continent displayed a voting commitment towards the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs. Of nine African states who accrued in excess of \$300.0m during these years, seven consistently voted with Peking, Moscow and Egypt. Moreover, with the exception of a mere \$4.1m distributed to the Central African Republic, no African state was able to gain from these donors whilst consistently opposing their positions in the United Nations.

On the whole, the ability to acquire assistance from the West does not seem to have been contingent upon consistent support for Britain, France or the United States or lack of agreement with the Soviet Union, Communist China or the Arabs.

Nevertheless, the majority of African states who did not establish aid contacts with Eastern donors appear to have registered their voting commitment towards the West. However, substantial receipts of concessional finance from Moscow, Peking and the Arabs do seem to have coincided with a degree of support for at least the donor and more probably with all these Eastern powers.

TABLE 10

## AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL RECEIPTS: SECOND TIME PERIOD

|              | Britain | France | United States | Soviet Union | China | Arabs | Total % |
|--------------|---------|--------|---------------|--------------|-------|-------|---------|
| Algeria      | 0.3     | 49.2   | -             | 41.9         | 3.5   | 5.1   | 100     |
| Egypt        | 0.3     | 1.0    | 7.5           | 11.1         | 0.6   | 79.5  | 100     |
| Libya        | -       | 100.0  | -             | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| Morocco      | 0.1     | 44.9   | 26.0          | 5.6          | 4.1   | 19.3  | 100     |
| Tunisia      | 0.3     | 38.7   | 23.6          | 7.6          | 15.3  | 14.5  | 100     |
| Cameroon     | 1.4     | 61.4   | 8.8           | -            | 22.3  | 6.1   | 100     |
| Chad         | -       | 65.6   | 7.6           | 0.8          | 21.1  | 4.9   | 100     |
| Dahomey      | 0.4     | 47.0   | 9.8           | 3.8          | 34.8  | 4.2   | 100     |
| Gambia       | 36.3    | -      | 12.5          | -            | 42.5  | 8.7   | 100     |
| Ghana        | 30.2    | 2.5    | 64.4          | 2.9          | -     | -     | 100     |
| Guinea       | -       | 0.3    | 24.9          | 28.9         | 24.1  | 21.8  | 100     |
| Ivory Coast  | 1.7     | 93.8   | 4.5           | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| Liberia      | 1.6     | -      | 85.1          | -            | 13.3  | -     | 100     |
| Mali         | 2.4     | 43.8   | 17.6          | 11.3         | 11.3  | 13.6  | 100     |
| Mauritania   | *       | 10.8   | 7.1           | 0.7          | 20.4  | 61.0  | 100     |
| Niger        | 1.0     | 55.8   | 18.3          | 0.7          | 17.8  | 6.4   | 100     |
| Nigeria      | 30.9    | -      | 64.5          | 3.2          | 1.4   | -     | 100     |
| Senegal      | 0.4     | 65.0   | 8.5           | 0.5          | 12.9  | 12.7  | 100     |
| Sierra Leone | 11.1    | -      | 37.4          | -            | 51.0  | 0.5   | 100     |
| Togo         | 0.9     | 44.6   | 9.6           | -            | 39.4  | 5.5   | 100     |
| Upper Volta  | 0.2     | 60.7   | 15.0          | 0.4          | 21.7  | 2.0   | 100     |
| Burundi      | -       | 49.8   | 6.0           | -            | 40.0  | 4.2   | 100     |
| Ethiopia     | 9.4     | 0.3    | 56.5          | 1.5          | 31.4  | 0.9   | 100     |
| Kenya        | 70.5    | -      | 25.6          | -            | -     | 3.9   | 100     |
| Rwanda       | 0.2     | 52.1   | 14.8          | -            | 32.9  | -     | 100     |
| Somalia      | 0.8     | -      | 6.4           | 23.5         | 29.6  | 39.7  | 100     |
| Sudan        | 4.8     | -      | 2.8           | -            | 14.5  | 77.9  | 100     |
| Tanzania     | 6.3     | -      | 25.0          | -            | 68.7  | *     | 100     |
| Uganda       | 34.8    | -      | 20.3          | -            | -     | 44.9  | 100     |
| Botswana     | 64.9    | -      | 35.1          | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| C.A.R.       | 0.2     | 96.0   | 1.8           | 1.8          | -     | 0.2   | 100     |
| Congo        | 0.2     | 72.6   | -             | 2.8          | 22.1  | 2.3   | 100     |
| Eq. Guinea   | -       | -      | -             | 7.1          | -     | 92.9  | 100     |
| Gabon        | 0.3     | 98.6   | -             | -            | -     | 1.1   | 100     |
| Lesotho      | 63.1    | -      | 36.9          | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| Madagascar   | 0.5     | 67.9   | 3.0           | -            | 28.6  | -     | 100     |
| Malawi       | 84.4    | -      | 15.6          | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| Swaziland    | 76.6    | -      | 23.4          | -            | -     | -     | 100     |
| Zaire        | 0.6     | 32.7   | 24.1          | -            | 42.6  | -     | 100     |
| Zambia       | 24.6    | -      | 1.8           | -            | 73.4  | 0.2   | 100     |
| TOTALS       | 5.4     | 30.0   | 13.1          | 9.1          | 13.0  | 36.4  | 100     |

(\* Less than 0.1%)

AID TO AFRICA - SECOND TIME PERIOD

In the 1970s, every African state, with the sole exception of Libya, was able to negotiate economic assistance from more than one donor. To a large extent, aid to Libya became superfluous as the 1970s progressed and Colonel Al-Quaddafi began to exploit the natural deposits of oil in this North African state. Elsewhere, it would seem that African leaders attempted to maximise their sources of foreign assistance.

During this period, a total of \$14451.9m was distributed to forty independent African countries<sup>(7)</sup>, of which \$5260.4m, or over 36%, was committed by the oil-enriched Arab donors. With Communist China also providing a larger proportion of overall aid to the continent, Soviet, Chinese and Arab finance accounted for over 58% of Africa's aid. Nevertheless, these Eastern programs remained relatively narrow in their focus. Six countries were not in receipt of finance from any of these donors and only twelve states could look to Peking, Moscow or the Arabs as the major donor. Thus, despite the dominant share of Eastern aid in the second time period, at least 70% of the recipients remained dependent upon Britain, France or the United States. France, encouraged by President D'Estaing's strategy towards a New International Economic Order, distributed \$3316.5m to Africa, which represents over 30% of total assistance. By comparison, Washington and London were more limited in their aid relations with the continent, committing \$1899.0m, and \$785.6m respectively; but it is apparent that these two donors preferred

to allocate relatively minor sums of assistance to a larger number of recipients on the continent. (See Appendix IV). In this respect, the vast majority of African leaders could rely upon a degree of aid, albeit in some cases limited, from at least one of the Western powers.

Nonetheless, it is noticeable that those recipients who were able to negotiate in excess of \$300.0m during this period were all in receipt of assistance from at least two, and usually three, Eastern donors. Thus, it could be argued that the major recipients on the continent displayed an ability to develop positive aid contacts with donors other than Britain, France or the United States.

#### AID AND ECONOMIC INDICATORS IN THE SECOND TIME PERIOD

Analysis of the economic characteristics of the major beneficiaries of aid to the continent provides an indication of the extent to which the flow of aid was determined by criteria of recipient need:

MAJOR RECIPIENTS AND ECONOMIC INDICATORSTABLE 11

| <u>Name</u> | <u>Aid</u><br><u>(\$m)</u> | <u>GNP</u><br><u>(\$m)</u> | <u>Population (m)</u> | <u>GNP per capita</u> |
|-------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| Algeria     | 1150.9                     | 8220                       | 14.7                  | 559                   |
| Egypt       | 4952.5                     | 9180                       | 35.6                  | 258                   |
| Morocco     | 779.7                      | 5250                       | 15.9                  | 330                   |
| Tunisia     | 634.7                      | 2760                       | 5.3                   | 521                   |
| Cameroon    | 318.3                      | 1440                       | 6.9                   | 209                   |
| Senegal     | 378.9                      | 1290                       | 4.7                   | 274                   |
| Somalia     | 374.7                      | 260                        | 3.0                   | 87                    |
| Sudan       | 566.5                      | 3010                       | 14.9                  | 202                   |
| Zambia      | 395.2                      | 2330                       | 4.6                   | 507                   |
| Tanzania    | 444.0                      | 1810                       | 14.0                  | 129                   |

Sources: UN Statistical Yearbooks, 1970-77; UN Demographic Yearbooks, 1970-77; Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1969-75, O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977

At a time when inflation, drought and the huge increases in the price of oil were threatening Africa's economic position, it would be erroneous to claim that assistance to the continent completely ignored the less developed areas. Somalia and Tanzania, who acquired in excess of \$300.0m were in relatively weak economic positions; whilst the eighteen African states categorised by the O.E.C.D. to be amongst the least developed countries of the world were in receipt of \$3580.8m, the equivalent of 25% of total assistance<sup>(8)</sup>. However, in general terms there are few indications that the donors, either individually or collectively, took the criteria of economic need into strong consideration in the distribution of their concessional finance. Pearson Correlation coefficients of total aid and GNP per capita do not reveal evidence of a significant relationship (-0.0126). On the whole, it would appear that the pattern of aid neither disproportionately favoured the relatively strong economic systems on the continent nor significantly focussed upon the relatively weak African states during this period.

Analysis of the geographical distribution of aid finance during this period reveals that North African states were able to maintain their dominance of total receipts:

TABLE 12

REGIONAL ALLOCATIONS - SECOND PERIOD

|               | <u>North<br/>Total</u> | <u>West<br/>Total</u> | <u>East<br/>Total</u> | <u>Central &amp; Southern<br/>Total</u> | TOTAL            |
|---------------|------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|------------------|
| Britain       | \$ 22.9m               | \$ 153.6m             | \$264.7m              | \$344.4m                                | \$ 785.6m        |
| France        | \$1217.6m              | \$1421.1m             | \$ 57.3m              | \$620.5m                                | \$3316.5m        |
| United States | \$ 725.0m              | \$ 624.0m             | \$386.0m              | \$164.0m                                | \$1899.0m        |
| Soviet Union  | \$1123.0m              | \$ 91.0m              | \$ 92.0m              | \$ 8.0m                                 | \$1314.0m        |
| China         | \$ 197.0m              | \$ 546.4m             | \$622.0m              | \$511.0m                                | \$1876.4m        |
| Arabs         | <u>\$4238.3m</u>       | <u>\$ 363.7m</u>      | <u>\$638.7m</u>       | <u>\$ 19.7m</u>                         | <u>\$5260.4m</u> |
| TOTALS        | \$7523.8m<br>(52.1%)   | \$3199.8m<br>(22.1%)  | \$2060.7m<br>(14.3%)  | \$1667.6m<br>(11.5%)                    | \$14451.9m       |

The ability of the Mediterranean states to accrue the major share of aid to the continent was primarily a function of the bias by the donors of the Middle East towards their Arab neighbours. In addition, it is noticeable that the United States and the Soviet Union continued to focus upon many of the strategic and politically important states North of the Sahara. The French program during this period concentrated upon the former dependencies in West Africa, a region which also received substantial American and Chinese aid and accrued over 22% of total aid to the continent. British assistance favoured her ex-colonies in Central and Southern Africa and these areas, together with the Eastern region, benefitted from Peking's growing commitment to the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway link during the 1970s. On the whole, Central and Southern recipients garnered over 11% of total aid whilst East Africa was in receipt of over 14% of the total flow of concessional finance.

African states with a former French colonial connection

acquired \$5657.7m. This far exceeded aid to Britain's former dependencies (\$2485.3m) and was largely symptomatic of the greater French commitment to the continent. However, beyond London and Paris, it is difficult to discern whether such historical considerations held any significance for donors in the 1970s. Certainly, the vast program of economic assistance from the oil rich Arab states was determined more by religious and ethnic affiliations than colonial heritage. To a large extent, it would seem that the criteria governing the overall distribution of aid to Africa extended beyond ex-colonial contacts; especially when it is apparent that recipients not formerly dependent upon Britain or France were able to accrue \$6308.9m during these years.

TABLE 13: MATRIX OF VOTING SCORE CORRELATIONS

|                | Voting With   |         |               |          |         |         | Voting Against |         |               |          |         |         |         |
|----------------|---------------|---------|---------------|----------|---------|---------|----------------|---------|---------------|----------|---------|---------|---------|
|                | Britain       | France  | United States | U.S.S.R. | China   | Arabs   | Britain        | France  | United States | U.S.S.R. | China   | Arabs   |         |
| Voting With    | Britain       | 1.0000  | 0.9615        | 0.9745   | -0.8207 | -0.8808 | -0.4531        | -0.9591 | -0.9434       | -0.9478  | 0.7441  | 0.8411  | 0.3863  |
|                | France        | 0.9615  | 1.0000        | 0.9203   | -0.7310 | -0.8807 | -0.3208        | -0.9276 | -0.9520       | -0.9063  | 0.6665  | 0.8379  | 0.2970  |
|                | United States | 0.9745  | 0.9203        | 1.0000   | -0.8658 | -0.8934 | -0.4976        | -0.9585 | -0.9387       | -0.9731  | 0.7723  | 0.8554  | 0.3918  |
|                | U.S.S.R.      | -0.8207 | -0.7310       | -0.8658  | 1.0000  | 0.8599  | 0.7948         | 0.7906  | 0.7557        | 0.7971   | -0.9331 | -0.8750 | -0.5683 |
|                | China         | -0.8808 | -0.8807       | -0.8934  | 0.8599  | 1.0000  | 0.5547         | 0.8790  | 0.8955        | 0.8689   | -0.7810 | -0.9635 | -0.3952 |
|                | Arabs         | -0.4531 | -0.3208       | -0.4976  | 0.7948  | 0.5547  | 1.0000         | 0.4302  | 0.3965        | 0.4271   | -0.7713 | -0.5731 | -0.6962 |
| Voting Against | Britain       | -0.9591 | -0.9276       | -0.9585  | 0.7906  | 0.8790  | 0.4302         | 1.0000  | 0.9792        | 0.9881   | -0.6482 | -0.7955 | -0.3190 |
|                | France        | -0.9434 | -0.9520       | -0.9387  | 0.7557  | 0.8955  | 0.3965         | 0.9792  | 1.0000        | 0.9678   | -0.6217 | -0.8183 | -0.2928 |
|                | United States | -0.9478 | -0.9063       | -0.9731  | 0.7971  | 0.8689  | 0.4271         | 0.9881  | 0.9678        | 1.0000   | -0.6536 | -0.7924 | -0.3097 |
|                | U.S.S.R.      | 0.7441  | 0.6665        | 0.7723   | -0.9331 | -0.7810 | -0.7713        | -0.6482 | -0.6217       | -0.6536  | 1.0000  | 0.8235  | 0.6771  |
|                | China         | 0.8411  | 0.8379        | 0.8554   | -0.8750 | -0.9635 | -0.5731        | -0.7955 | -0.8183       | -0.7924  | 0.8235  | 1.0000  | 0.4099  |
|                | Arabs         | 0.3863  | 0.2970        | 0.3918   | -0.5683 | -0.3952 | -0.6962        | -0.3190 | -0.2928       | -0.3097  | 0.6771  | 0.4099  | 1.0000  |

AFRICAN VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN UNITED NATIONS IN SECOND TIME PERIOD

Analysis of the voting matrix for this period reveals a strong ideological pattern to African behaviour in the United Nations. There is a significant relationship between African voting agreement with the Western powers, Britain, France plus the United States, and opposition to resolutions endorsed by the Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt. In addition, a positive association is evident between support for Moscow, Peking and the Arabs, together with those who registered their opposition to debates sponsored by London, Paris or Washington.

Individually, the major powers experienced various degrees of support and opposition in the General Assembly. However, to a certain extent, the absence of opposition to Egypt, the Soviet Union, or France at this time undermines the significance of some voting comparisons. Nevertheless, it is possible to discern a relationship in African attitudes towards certain donors.

Crosstabulation of African reactions towards resolutions drafted with the support of Britain and the debates of interest to Washington, reveals that over 75% of the independent African members of the United Nations were in agreement with each other.

VOTING WITH UNITED STATES

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)                                | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)                            | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)   |    |
|----------------------------|--|---|--|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | Libya, Guinea,<br>Somalia, Zambia,<br>Tanzania.        | -   | -  | 5  |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | Algeria, Egypt,<br>Mali, Mauritania,<br>Sudan, Congon, | Nigeria, Sierra<br>Leone, Senegal,<br>Burundi, Uganda | -  | 12 |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | -  | Cameroon,<br>Ethiopia                                 | Zaire, Morocco,<br>Tunisia, Chad,<br>Dahomey, Gambia<br>Ghana, Ivory<br>Coast, Liberia,<br>Niger, Togo,<br>Upper Volta,<br>Kenya,<br>Rwanda,<br>Botswana, C.A.R.,<br>Gabon,<br>Lesotho,<br>Madagascar,<br>Malawi,<br>Swaziland | 23 |
|                            | 12<br>(30.0%)  | 7<br>(17.5%)  | 21<br>(52.5%)  | 40 |

VOTING WITH BRITAIN

Chi Square = 39.69806 with four degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0000

Twenty-one states consistently voted with these two major powers during the 1970s, all of whom, with the exceptions of Chad and Gabon, received economic assistance from both London and Washington. However, as in the period up to 1969, the United States was not prepared to distribute the major proportion of aid finance to these 'supporters'. The primary aid burden to these states was provided by the ex-colonial authorities Britain and France, who dominated the distribution of concessional finance to six and twelve of these countries respectively. It is noticeable that the United States was the major, overall donor to only three countries on the continent, specifically Ghana, Liberia and Ethiopia. In this respect, it would appear that Washington was less willing to be heavily committed to aid relations in Africa during the 1970s. Whilst such a development may have reduced the proportion of American aid finance flowing to areas of negative recipient attitudes, it was also not without possible ramifications if African voting behaviour towards the United States is viewed in comparison with support for the other donors. It should be noted that not one state adopted a more favourable attitude towards Washington than Paris or London, whilst seven countries supported France and two voted with London but not with the United States.

#### UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

Analysis of voting behaviour towards the United States and the Soviet Union reveals that over 47% of African states adopted a much more positive attitude towards Moscow.

VOTING WITH THE SOVIET UNION

VOTING WITH UNITED STATES

|                            | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)                | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)  |    |
|----------------------------|---|---|----|
| Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)    | -   | Algeria, Egypt, Libya,<br>Guinea, Mali,<br>Mauritania, Somalia,<br>Sudan, Tanzania, Congo,<br>Eq. Guinea, Zambia  | 12 |
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | -   | Cameroon, Nigeria,<br>Senegal, Sierre Leone,<br>Burundi, Ethiopia,<br>Uganda  | 7  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | Liberia, Lesotho,<br>Malawi,<br>Swaziland | Morocco, Tunisia, Chad,<br>Dahomey, Gambia, Ghana,<br>Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo,<br>Upper Volta, Kenya,<br>Rwanda, Botswana, C.A.R.,<br>Gabon, Madagascar, Zaire | 21 |
|                            | 4<br>(10.0)                               | 36<br>(90.0)  | 40 |

Chi Square = 4.02116 with two degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.1339

Only four African states remained uncommitted towards Moscow during this period, all of whom voted with their North American donor of aid. However, twelve countries consistently supported the Soviet Union whilst opposing resolutions endorsed by the United States. It is interesting to note that barely 41% of these states, excluding the strategic and politically important states of Egypt, Algeria and Somalia, could look to Washington as the major provider of assistance from these two powers. Libya was not in receipt of either Soviet or American finance and six countries benefitted more from Moscow. In this respect, the relatively circumspect nature of the United States program from 1970 helped to develop the role of the Soviet Union as an important aid donor on the African continent and coincided with a

50% increase (from eight to twelve) in the number of states who adopted a distinctly pro-Soviet perspective whilst voting against Washington.

WESTERN AID AND AFRICAN VOTING - SECOND PERIOD

TABLE 14

AID AND VOTING SUPPORT CORRELATIONS

| African Support for: | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> |
|----------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>British Aid</u>   | 0.0507         | -0.0572       | 0.0917               | -0.2158             | -0.0493      | -0.3325      |
| <u>French Aid</u>    | 0.0615         | 0.1049        | 0.0688               | 0.1523              | -0.0411      | 0.1616       |
| <u>American Aid</u>  | -0.0264        | -0.0603       | -0.0737              | 0.2158              | 0.1625       | 0.1248       |

With the exception of the British program, which avoided those countries who supported the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict, there is little evidence to assume that aid from any of the Western donors can be significantly associated with the pattern of African voting. Certainly, there are no indications that the flow of Western aid disproportionately favoured African support for London, Paris or Washington. Nevertheless, fifteen states can be identified who adopted a voting position consistently in agreement with these three powers (see Appendix V). Malawi voted exclusively with the West in the 1970s whilst a further fourteen countries tempered their pro-Western behaviour with a tendency to concur also with at least one (but not all) other donors.

TABLE 15

AID AND VOTING WITH THE WEST

| African states who voted consistently with Britain, France and the United States | Aid from France, Britain and the United States (\$m) | % of TOTAL    | Aid from Soviet Union, China, and Arabs (\$m) | % of TOTAL    | TOTAL          |
|--|--|---------------|---|---------------|----------------|
| Tunisia  | 397.7  | 62.6          | 237.0   | 37.4          | 634.7          |
| Chad   | 173.5  | 73.2          | 63.5  | 26.8          | 237.0          |
| Dahomey  | 75.5   | 57.2          | 56.5  | 42.8          | 132.0          |
| Gambia   | 19.5   | 48.8          | 20.5  | 51.2          | 40.0           |
| Ivory Coast  | 264.1  | 100           | -   | -             | 264.1          |
| Liberia  | 65.2   | 86.7          | 10.0  | 13.3          | 75.2           |
| Niger  | 222.1  | 75.1          | 73.6  | 24.9          | 295.7          |
| Upper Volta  | 182.1  | 75.9          | 57.9  | 24.1          | 240.0          |
| Kenya  | 210.1  | 96.1          | 8.4   | 3.9           | 218.5          |
| C.A.R.   | 108.8  | 98.0          | 2.2   | 2.0           | 111.0          |
| Gabon  | 137.5  | 98.9          | 1.5   | 1.1           | 139.0          |
| Lesotho  | 59.7   | 100           | -   | -             | 59.7           |
| Swaziland  | 34.2   | 100           | -   | -             | 34.2           |
| Zaire  | 154.8  | 57.4          | 115.0   | 42.6          | 269.8          |
| Malawi   | 147.1  | 100           | -   | -             | 147.1          |
|  | <u>\$2251.9m</u>                                     | <u>(77.7)</u> | <u>\$646.1m</u>                               | <u>(22.3)</u> | <u>2898.0m</u> |

Whilst eleven of these states were able to garner aid from both Western and Eastern donors, it is noticeable that only Gambia was not dependent upon assistance from Britain, France and the United States, for the major source of finance. Moreover, the Ivory Coast, Lesotho and Swaziland were completely ignored by the Soviet, Chinese and Arab programs despite voting in agreement with at least one of these donors. Malawi voted exclusively with the Western powers from whom the South African state garnered all its assistance. In total, African countries who voted with London, Paris and Washington in the 1970s, received \$2898.0m., of which less than 23% was provided from alternative sources. In this respect, Eastern finance to these states was relatively limited, and, with the sole exception of Tunisia, none of these recipients were able to accrue in excess of \$300.0m

during this period.

EASTERN AID AND AFRICAN VOTING: SECOND PERIOD

THE SOVIET UNION AND COMMUNIST CHINA

To a large extent, Peking's aid commitment to the continent was more comprehensive than Moscow's program of assistance. Communist China distributed \$1876.4m to twenty-eight African states during this period, including substantial sums of concessional finance for the Tanzanian-Zambian Railway Project, an undertaking which had previously been rejected by Western donors as unfeasible. During the same years, the Soviet program totalled \$1314.0m and encompassed nineteen recipients. However, there is little evidence to assume that Peking's larger allocation served to fuel the Sino-Soviet conflict by obtaining a greater level of African support in the United Nations.

VOTING WITH PEKING

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)   | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)     | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)  |    |
|----------------------------|---|--------------------------------|---|----|
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | Liberia, Lesotho,<br>Malawi, Swaziland                                      | -                              | -   | 4  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | Chad, Dahomey,<br>Gambia, Ivory<br>Coast, Niger,<br>C.A.R., Gabon,<br>Zaire | Tunisia, Upper<br>Volta, Kenya | Algeria, Egypt,<br>Libya, Morocco,<br>Cameroon, Ghana,<br>Guinea, Mali,<br>Mauritania, Nigeria,<br>Senegal, Sierra<br>Leone, Togo, 36<br>Burundi, Ethiopia,<br>Rwanda, Somalia,<br>Sudan, Tanzania,<br>Uganda, Botswana,<br>Congo, Eq. Guinea,<br>Madagascar,<br>Zambia |    |
| Count<br>(Row %)           | 12<br>(30.0)  | 3<br>(7.5)                     | 25<br>(62.5)  | 40 |

VOTING WITH MOSCOW

Chi Square = 10.37037 with two degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.0056

Eight states adopted a distinctly more favourable attitude towards the Soviet Union by consistently voting with Moscow whilst opposing resolutions endorsed by Peking. However, it is not possible to discern an instrumental role for economic aid in this disparity since, with the sole exception of the Central African Republic, not one of these countries benefitted more from Soviet, rather than Chinese finance. In a similar fashion, despite being more dependent upon Communist China for aid in the 1970s, Upper Volta and Tunisia voted with Moscow but failed to accord the same level of support to Peking. On the whole, it should be noted that the overwhelming level of voting agreement with the Soviet Union during this period was not matched by assistance from the East European power. By contrast, following Peking's successful admission into the

United Nations in the early 1970s, African support has been relatively constrained despite a comprehensive program of aid. In this respect, it is not possible to discern an obvious relationship between economic aid and support in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Moreover, there is little evidence to assume that a majority of African states were successfully able to capitalise on the tension between these two powers by playing off one against the other - of twenty-five states who voted with Moscow and Peking, only eleven secured assistance from both donors.

#### THE ARAB STATES

The developing level of support for Moscow during this period was paralleled only by African agreement with the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict. Ninety per cent of the African members of the United Nations supported both Moscow and Egypt and only Malawi failed to support either of these two powers. In contrast, only twenty states could agree with both Egypt and Washington during this period.

VOTING WITH UNITED STATES

|                            | Cluster A<br>(60% Anti)  | Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted)   | Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)  |    |
|----------------------------|--|--|---|----|
| Cluster C<br>(Uncommitted) | -  | -  | Malawi  | 1  |
| Cluster B<br>(60% Pro)     | Algeria, Egypt,<br>Libya, Guinea,<br>Mali, Mauritania,<br>Somalia, Sudan,<br>Tanzania, Congo,<br>Eq. Guinea,<br>Zambia | Nigeria, Senegal,<br>Sierra Leone,<br>Burundi, Ethiopia,<br>Uganda, Cameroon | Morocco, Tunisia,<br>Chad, Dahomey,<br>Gambia, Ghana,<br>Ivory Coast,<br>Liberia, Niger,<br>Togo, Upper Volta,<br>Kenya, Rwanda,<br>Botswana, C.A.R.,<br>Gabon, Lesotho,<br>Madagascar,<br>Swaziland, Zaire | 39 |
| Count<br>(Row %)           | 12<br>(30.0)   | 7<br>(17.5)  | 21<br>(52.5)  | 40 |

VOTING WITH EGYPT

Chi Square = 0.92796 with two degrees of Freedom  
Significance = 0.6288

Despite the fact that Arab-African assistance was substantially larger than aid from the United States, it is interesting to note that the twenty states who consistently voted with Washington as well as Egypt during this period were more dependent upon the North American donor for concessional finance. This would seem to suggest that the Arab states were relatively unconcerned in providing substantial aid to these African countries despite their voting support. However, in areas where the United States did not match Arab finance, there was less likelihood of African agreement with Washington. Thus, of twelve states who voted with Egypt and against Washington, only four received more assistance from the North American donor.

EASTERN AID AND VOTING SUPPORT CORRELATIONS: SECOND TIME PERIODTABLE 16

| Voting Support for: | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> |
|---------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>Soviet Aid</u>   | -0.3054        | -0.3244       | -0.3117              | 0.2689              | 0.2649       | 0.1088       |
| <u>Chinese Aid</u>  | -0.3790        | -0.3148       | -0.3805              | 0.3570              | 0.2955       | 0.2470       |
| <u>Arab Aid</u>     | -0.1839        | -0.1950       | -0.2262              | 0.1989              | 0.1992       | 0.0801       |

Table 16 reveals that the Arab program cannot be significantly associated with the pattern of African voting at the United Nations. To a certain extent, this may be symptomatic of earlier observations that the Arab program failed to live up to the expectations of the non Moslem states. However, there are indications that aid from Peking and Moscow may be associated with aspects of African voting behaviour; in particular, African attitudes towards the Western powers. Thus, both the Chinese and Soviet programs significantly avoided those who voted with London, Paris or Washington.

Aid and Voting Alignment with the East

During this period, nineteen states consistently voted in agreement with Moscow, Peking and Egypt whilst not concurring with all three major powers of the developed Western world.

TABLE 17

AID AND SUPPORT FOR MOSCOW, PEKING AND EGYPT

| African States<br>who voted with<br>Soviet Union,<br>China and Arabs<br>only | Aid from Soviet<br>Union, China<br>and Arabs<br>(\$m) | % of<br>TOTAL | Aid from Britain<br>France and<br>United States<br>(\$m) | % of<br>TOTAL | TOTAL<br>(\$m) |
|--|---|---------------|--|---------------|----------------|
| Algeria  | 581.5   | 50.5          | 569.4  | 49.5          | 1150.9         |
| Egypt  | 4513.4  | 91.2          | 439.1  | 8.8           | 4952.5         |
| Libya  | -   | -             | 6.0  | 100           | 6.0            |
| Guinea   | 93.1  | 74.8          | 31.4   | 25.2          | 124.5          |
| Mali   | 96.2  | 36.2          | 170.0  | 63.8          | 266.2          |
| Mauritania   | 244.6   | 82.1          | 53.4   | 17.9          | 298.0          |
| Somalia  | 347.6   | 92.8          | 27.1   | 7.2           | 374.7          |
| Sudan  | 523.4   | 92.4          | 43.1   | 7.6           | 566.5          |
| Tanzania   | 305.2   | 68.7          | 138.8  | 31.3          | 444.0          |
| Congo  | 49.2  | 27.2          | 132.1  | 72.8          | 181.3          |
| Eq. Guinea   | 14.0  | 100           | -  | -             | 14.0           |
| Zambia   | 290.8   | 73.6          | 104.4  | 26.4          | 395.2          |
| TOTALS   | \$7059.0m   | (80.5%)       | \$1714.8m  | (19.5%)       | \$8773.8m      |

African states  
who voted with  
Soviet Union, China,  
Egypt and at least  
one Western power

|              |          |         |          |         |           |
|--------------|----------|---------|----------|---------|-----------|
| Cameroon     | 90.4     | 28.4    | 227.9    | 71.6    | 318.3     |
| Nigeria      | 10.0     | 4.6     | 208.7    | 95.4    | 218.7     |
| Senegal      | 99.2     | 26.1    | 279.7    | 73.9    | 378.9     |
| Sierra Leone | 30.3     | 51.5    | 28.5     | 48.5    | 58.8      |
| Burundi      | 22.1     | 44.2    | 27.9     | 55.8    | 50.0      |
| Ethiopia     | 90.5     | 33.8    | 43.5     | 66.2    | 267.3     |
| Uganda       | 35.5     | 44.9    | 176.8    | 55.1    | 79.0      |
| TOTALS       | \$378.0m | (27.6%) | \$993.0m | (72.4%) | \$1371.0m |

Twelve states voted with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs who were not prepared to endorse the other major donors in the General Assembly debates. With the sole exception of relations with Libya, whose substantial oil reserves largely negated the need for aid at this time, the three Eastern donors committed relatively large sums of assistance to these African countries. These recipients garnered a total of \$8773.8m, of which less than 20% was provided by the West. Moreover, it would

seem that exclusive voting support for Moscow, Peking and Egypt did not necessarily inhibit the total flow of aid finance. Whilst individual receipts varied considerably, it should be noted that six of these recipients garnered in excess of \$300.0m.

Seven African states also displayed a tendency to vote with at least one of the Western powers. However, it is apparent that the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs did not allocate large scale funds to such recipients. A total of \$1371.0m was distributed to these countries who were not exclusively committed in their voting support to the 'East', of which over 72% was provided by London, Paris or Washington. Only Sierra Leone did not primarily benefit from Western sources and only Cameroon and Senegal were able to accrue over \$300.0m in total aid receipts.

#### AID AND UNCOMMITTED VOTING

During the first time period, six African countries failed to vote in a consistent ideological fashion either with London, Paris and Washington, or with Moscow, Peking and Egypt. For the majority of these states, an uncommitted voting position coincided with a dependence upon Western sources of aid. Assistance from the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs amounted to less than 10% of total finance to these recipients whilst three states did not receive any economic aid from the East. In the second time period, it is interesting to note that six states also registered their lack of ideological commitment, but did so by voting with all the major donors.

TABLE 18: Uncommitted States and Aid Receipts

| Name       | Aid from Britain,<br>France and<br>United States<br>(\$m) | % of<br>TOTAL | Aid from Soviet<br>Union, China<br>and Arabs<br>(\$m) | % of<br>TOTAL | TOTAL<br>(\$m) |
|------------|---|---------------|---|---------------|----------------|
| Morocco    | 553.3   | 71.0          | 226.4   | 29.0          | 779.7          |
| Ghana      | 134.2   | 97.1          | 4.0   | 2.9           | 138.2          |
| Togo       | 62.9  | 55.1          | 51.3  | 44.9          | 114.2          |
| Rwanda     | 40.7  | 67.1          | 20.0  | 32.9          | 60.7           |
| Botswana   | 85.4  | 100           | -   | -             | 85.4           |
| Madagascar | <u>164.9</u>  | 71.4          | <u>66.0</u>   | 28.6          | <u>230.9</u>   |
|            | \$1041.4m   | (73.9%)       | \$367.7m  | (26.1%)       | \$1409.1m      |

This attempt to maximise cordial relations had some success in that only Botswana failed to accrue finance from both Western and Eastern sources. However, it is difficult to determine the extent to which these recipients were successfully able to 'play off' one set of donors against the other. Certainly, Botswana and Ghana had little aid contact with the Eastern powers. In addition, it should be noted that these six states acquired less than 10% of total aid to the continent during this period, which compares unfavourably with over 15% of total assistance distributed to the uncommitted states in earlier years. Moreover, only Morocco was able to garner in excess of \$300.0m. Nevertheless, if certain African leaders were determined not to be ideologically committed to either the West or the East, an attempt to maximise cordial relations probably maintained more aid contacts in the second period than would have a largely uncommitted voting position. This is especially the case in the light of Washington's increasing unwillingness to provide substantial sums of assistance to the continent irrespective of African voting behaviour.

SUMMARY - SECOND TIME PERIOD

Analysis of voting performances of the major African beneficiaries of aid during this period seems to suggest that states wishing to maximise their receipts of economic assistance would be advised to consistently vote with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs. Ten African countries were able to negotiate in excess of \$300.0m, of whom nine registered their agreement with all three of these powers. Moreover, it is apparent that the group of African states which was able to accrue by far the largest proportion of concessional finance comprised those recipients whose voting concurrence with Moscow, Peking and Egypt was matched by a lack of support for London, Paris and Washington. To a large extent, this was the only group of states where Western based assistance tended to be eclipsed by finance from other sources. In this respect, it would appear that Washington's reticence in the 1970s to provide substantial amounts of aid to recipients, irrespective of unfavourable voting attitudes, was compensated by the increasing dominance of Eastern finance in the overall flow of assistance to Africa.

However, exclusive support for Moscow, Peking and Egypt was not an automatic guarantee of large scale aid. Equatorial Guinea who fulfilled these 'requirements' was in receipt of only \$14.0m during these years, whilst the North African state of Morocco who voted in agreement with all the major powers, garnered \$779.7m. Nevertheless, concurrence with the Soviet Union, China and Egypt did tend to be a prerequisite for a substantial commitment from Eastern sources.

There is little evidence to assume that Western donors disproportionately favoured states who voted with London, Paris or Washington. This is especially the case for the United States, who tended to allow the former metropolitan authorities of Britain and France provide the major share of aid to African 'supporters'. On the whole, it is apparent that the West in general and Washington in particular, could not match the overwhelming level of African support for Moscow and Egypt in the General Assembly. Moreover, the inability of the Sino-Soviet conflict to be reflected in recipient attitudes in the United Nations, merely served to emphasise the significant association between aid from these two donors and an ideological pattern of African voting.

#### CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the extent to which aid from all the major donors can be associated with a general pattern of African voting. For the majority of African states it is not erroneous to interpret voting behaviour in the United Nations in terms of a 'pattern'. Certainly, it is noticeable in both time periods that many delegates from this continent reacted in a manner consistent with international ideological conflicts. Positive correlations can be established between the level of African support for resolutions endorsed by Britain, France and the United States. A similar degree of African agreement exists on resolutions drafted with the support of the Soviet Union, Communist China and Egypt.

Whilst it would appear that the distribution of aid from

London, Paris and Washington cannot be easily associated with this ideological framework, there are indications that a large proportion of Eastern based finance was linked to African voting behaviour in the General Assembly. In the light of the different time periods involved in the study of Arab assistance, comparisons with the Middle East donors must only be tentatively made. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to believe that aid from the Soviet Union and Communist China can be correlated with African opposition to the developed powers of the Western World. The relatively limited and apparently circumspect programs from these two donors revealed elements of a common operational framework. This may have been a function of Sino-Soviet rivalry but such assistance can be most closely associated with a pattern of African support for Moscow, Peking and Egypt in the first time period, and with African voting opposition to London, Paris and Washington in both periods<sup>(9)</sup>.

During the years up to 1969, Britain, France and the United States dominated the flow of assistance to the continent, providing 75% of the total. Moreover, although from 1970 onwards, the proportion of concessional finance from these powers declined, the majority of African states remained primarily dependent upon the West as the major provider of assistance. In areas where this assistance was unchallenged by aid from the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs, recipients tended to vote exclusively with all the Western donors. However, elsewhere on the continent, where African states were able to accrue finance from both the Western and Eastern sources, support was rarely confined to, and often avoided, resolutions endorsed by London, Paris and Washington. This does not necessarily signify that Britain, France

and the United States were unconcerned about the debates in the United Nations; rather that the interaction of aid and influence in the General Assembly cannot be categorised as a simple quantitative function in which positive recipient behaviour is a reflection of the size of the program. Certainly, economic assistance from these donors was not often instrumental in determining a positive image in this international forum. In the first time period, it is apparent that considerable sums of concessional finance were provided to certain African states irrespective of their voting behaviour. This is particularly evident in the distribution of aid from the United States. During the 1970s, the American program was not so clearly disassociated from the pattern of support, but, in general terms, Western based finance can still not be matched with the ideological pattern of African voting. On the whole, the group of African states which accrued the major share of total assistance in all the years up to 1976 consistently voted with Moscow, Peking and Egypt. Countries which concurred with London, Paris or Washington, or remained ideologically uncommitted, rarely negotiated substantial sums from Eastern as well as Western sources.

## FINDINGS

This research has examined the hypothesis that economic aid to Africa is commensurate with the development of political influence. To a large extent, the assumptions of this research have been justified in that, in all the years from African independence up to 1976, there is little evidence to assume that the major donors of aid were solely motivated by the desire to alleviate economic weakness on the continent. The flow of assistance did not necessarily ignore the less developed areas, especially in the second time period, but it would appear that the distributive pattern of concessional finance was dictated by considerations other than the recipients' economic needs. However, the extent to which the donors were able to secure political returns on the African continent tended to vary. In the previous six chapters, consideration was given to the extent to which the major powers were able to gain African support in areas of foreign policy concern specific to each donor. In the final chapter, the distribution of aid was analysed in terms of its association with a broader framework of African voting behaviour. At this point, it would be useful to briefly emphasise some of the more important findings of this study.

Both Britain and France have focussed their economic assistance primarily upon their former dependencies on the continent. However, neither donor exhibited an ability to utilise aid to establish political influence over African delegates in the United Nations, although the majority of states who voted with London in the 1970s were able to garner increased shares of

a rather limited program. Under de Gaulle, aid was employed as an instrument to safeguard French investment, but, following the President's departure from politics, French resources, together with British interests, became vulnerable to nationalisation by recipient states.

Washington's assistance seemed to be guided largely by the desire to maintain aid relations with certain states irrespective either of voting behaviour in the General Assembly, or of the incidence of African expropriation. Moreover, although the program from 1970 displayed elements of careful scrutiny and control, the extent to which this concessional finance can be linked to a sphere of political influence on the continent is tenuous. In contrast, there is evidence to believe that Soviet aid up to 1969 can be associated with the pattern of African voting. At the same time, it is apparent that Moscow tended to favour African states who were prepared to nationalise Western based investment. However, in the 1970s, the Soviet program was no longer able to match the increased incidence of nationalisation. In addition, the level of African support in the United Nations increased dramatically, but to a level at which it is difficult to ascertain a relationship between aid and voting behaviour.

All of these donors displayed a willingness to provide substantial assistance to recipients who extended facilities to their respective military personnel, but, it should be noted that by the 1970s, there was general African antipathy towards a foreign military presence which even large scale aid programs could rarely counteract.

Economic aid from Communist China seems both to have

helped Peking break out of international diplomatic isolation and can be associated with African support for her claim to be the only true representative of the Chinese people in the United Nations. Nevertheless, it would appear that, in the 1970s, a number of states were able to acquire a share of a relatively large Chinese program whilst not endorsing her position in the General Assembly.

African awareness of the increasing potential of the oil-producing Arab states as large scale aid donors seems to have been crucial in determining changing African attitudes towards the Middle East conflict, although by the mid 1970s, there were indications that receipts of Arab finance did not match the expectations of the non-Moslem African states.

For all these donors, the initial purpose of economic aid was to establish or maintain, a presence on the continent in the period following decolonisation, from which political influence could hopefully be developed. In areas where assistance from the capitalist West remained unchallenged by concessional finance from rival state systems, there is evidence to believe that Britain, France and the United States could secure some measure of political return. Moreover, if the Soviet Union, Communist China or the Arabs were unconcerned, or unwilling, to provide assistance to these African states, it would seem that the 'price' for Western influence was relatively low and aid input was generally limited.

However, in areas of political, strategic or economic importance, Western assistance seems to have been employed less successfully as an instrument of political influence and, more pertinently, as the forfeit major donors need to pay in order

to try to counter a rival's interest. This would especially seem to be the case for the developed powers, like Britain and France, with a relatively unpopular history of colonisation on the continent, or, like the United States, which is readily associated with the former metropolitan authorities. For these donors, attempts to develop influence in areas of Africa which are also the focus of Soviet, Chinese or Arab finance, have increasingly failed. In contrast, the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arabs have been less prepared to concentrate upon states where African attitudes may not be favourable. This is especially noticeable in the first time period when recipients became aware of these donors as supplementary sources to Western finance. As a result, certain African states, who have at times been the subject of aid competition, have tended to vote with Moscow, Peking and Egypt and have acquired substantial sums of Western finance despite largely negative or uncommitted attitudes towards London, Paris and Washington. More recently, due to an absence of opposition to Moscow and Egypt, it has become difficult to ascertain the extent to which economic aid can be significantly associated with the pattern of African voting in the United Nations. Nevertheless, it is still noticeable that the major recipients of aid tend to be those who vote only with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the Arab states.

On the whole, it would appear that a number of Western donors may have realised how limited their influence can be and have either reduced their commitment to the continent, or emphasised their focus upon areas where positive relations may be established. It should be noted that opposition to the

notion of a foreign military presence has reached the stage where few African states are willing to extend facilities to outside powers. In addition, inflation and energy prices have drastically threatened the less developed economies with the result that many African leaders are prepared to experiment with nationalisation policies irrespective of a possible erosion in donor-recipient relations. In such an environment, it is possible that only a few donors will feel motivated, or equipped, to further inject substantial aid into the African continent.

REFERENCES

1. A F Westwood, Foreign Aid in a Foreign Policy Framework, The Brookings Institution, Washington, 1966, pp. 95-6
2. De Gaulle's antipathy towards the proceedings of the United Nations presents some reservations in assimilating French aims and ambitions into the General Assembly debates. Nevertheless, it would be erroneous to assume that African states did not identify their relationship with the Western European state in terms of agreement with or opposition to, resolutions endorsed by Paris. See, A Mazrui, Africa's International Relations, Heinemann, 1977.
3. It should be noted that this does not include \$1167.2m in aid distributed from France to Africa. In the years up to 1963, the data on French aid to her colonies was not disaggregated by territory and has therefore been excluded from calculations for Table 1.
4. The distinction between Francophone and Anglophone Africa is mainly a colonial, rather than linguistic, division. The major aberration from this categorisation is that Guinea is not included within the 'Francophone' states due to the acrimonious nature of the break with Paris in 1958. As a result of voting 'No' to de Gaulle's idea of a French Community, France immediately severed diplomatic contacts with the West African state. The nature of this break continued to disrupt relations into the 1960s and 1970s and, as a result, it would seem more representative of France's post colonial operations on the continent if Guinea is excluded.
5. G T Yu, Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Africa, in D E Albright, eds., African and International Communism, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1980, p. 169
6. The most notable recipient of Eastern aid who voted against the donor was the Central African Republic who negotiated an aid agreement with Peking for \$4.1m., but generally opposed her application for entry into the United Nations. Nevertheless, this should be compared with the fact that recipients of assistance from Britain, France and the United States consistently failed to concur with the donor on forty-four occasions during the first time period.
7. For the purposes of this comparative study, Mozambique, which only attained independence in 1975, has been omitted
8. African states categorised by the O.E.C.D. as being amongst the twenty-nine least developed countries are, Botswana, Burundi, C.A.R., Chad, Dahomey, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and

Upper Volta. Geographical Distribution of  
Financial Flows to Developing Countries (1969-75),  
O.E.C.D., Paris, 1977

9. The pattern of Eastern aid and voting support correlations reveal that the Soviet and Chinese programs significantly avoided those who voted with the Western powers. In addition, there is evidence to believe that these Eastern donors favoured those states who voted against London, Paris and Washington in both periods

| Voting opposition to: | <u>FIRST TIME PERIOD</u> |               |                      | <u>SECOND TIME PERIOD</u> |               |                      |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|
|                       | <u>Britain</u>           | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Britain</u>            | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> |
| <u>Soviet Aid</u>     | 0.3212                   | 0.3139        | 0.2812               | 0.3217                    | 0.3215        | 0.3383               |
| <u>Chinese Aid</u>    | 0.6665                   | 0.4625        | 0.6507               | 0.3698                    | 0.3423        | 0.3605               |

APPENDICES

APPENDIX IAFRICAN STATES - DATE OF INDEPENDENCE

| <u>Country</u>              | <u>Date of Independence</u> | <u>Date of Entry into U.N.</u> |
|-----------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Algeria                     | 3 July 1962                 | 8 October 1962                 |
| Botswana                    | 30 September 1966           | 17 October 1966                |
| Burundi                     | 1 July 1962                 | 18 September 1962              |
| Cameroon                    | 1 January 1960              | 20 September 1960              |
| Central African<br>Republic | 14 August 1960              | 20 September 1960              |
| Chad                        | 11 August 1960              | 20 September 1960              |
| Congo                       | 15 August 1960              | 20 September 1960              |
| Dahomey                     | 1 August 1960               | 20 September 1960              |
| Egypt                       | 26 July 1922                | Original Member (1945)         |
| Equatorial<br>Guinea        | 12 October 1968             | 12 November 1968               |
| Ethiopia                    | 1040 B.C.                   | Original Member (1945)         |
| Gabon                       | 17 August 1960              | 20 September 1960              |
| Gambia                      | 18 February 1965            | 21 September 1965              |
| Ghana                       | 6 March 1957                | 8 March 1957                   |
| Guinea                      | 28 September 1958           | 12 December 1958               |
| Ivory Coast                 | 7 August 1960               | 20 September 1960              |
| Kenya                       | 12 December 1963            | 16 December 1963               |
| Lesotho                     | 4 October 1966              | 17 October 1966                |
| Liberia                     | 26 July 1847                | Original Member (1945)         |
| Libya                       | 24 December 1951            | 14 December 1955               |
| Madagascar                  | 26 June 1960                | 20 September 1960              |
| Malawi                      | 6 July 1964                 | 1 December 1964                |
| Mali                        | 22 September 1960           | 28 September 1960              |
| Mauritania                  | 28 November 1960            | 27 October 1961                |
| Morocco                     | 2 March 1956                | 12 November 1956               |
| Mozambique                  | 25 June 1975                | 16 September 1975              |
| Niger                       | 3 August 1960               | 20 September 1960              |
| Nigeria                     | 1 October 1960              | 7 October 1960                 |
| Rwanda                      | 1 July 1962                 | 18 September 1962              |
| Senegal                     | 11 September 1960           | 28 September 1960              |
| Sierra Leone                | 27 April 1961               | 27 September 1961              |
| Somalia                     | 1 July 1960                 | 20 September 1960              |
| Sudan                       | 1 January 1956              | 12 November 1956               |
| Swaziland                   | 6 September 1968            | 24 September 1968              |
| Tanzania                    | 9 December 1961             | 14 December 1961               |
| Togo                        | 17 April 1960               | 20 September 1960              |
| Tunisia                     | 20 March 1956               | 12 November 1956               |
| Uganda                      | 9 October 1962              | 25 October 1962                |
| Upper Volta                 | 5 August 1960               | 20 September 1960              |
| Zaire                       | 30 June 1960                | 20 September 1960              |
| Zambia                      | 24 October 1964             | 1 December 1964                |

APPENDIX IIAID TO AFRICA IN THE FIRST TIME PERIOD (\$m)

|              | <u>Britain</u> | <u>France</u> | <u>United States</u> | <u>Soviet Union</u> | <u>China</u> | <u>Arabs</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|--------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
| Algeria      | -              | 1318.8        | 163.4                | 232.0               | 55.0         | 7.7          | 1776.9       |
| Egypt        | 8.9            | 13.1          | 1062.2               | 1002.0              | 94.7         | 652.0        | 2832.9       |
| Libya        | 48.0           | 5.2           | 183.4                | -                   | -            | -            | 236.6        |
| Morocco      | 0.3            | 261.8         | 603.3                | 44.0                | -            | -            | 909.4        |
| Tunisia      | 0.2            | 157.3         | 550.1                | 34.0                | -            | 6.9          | 748.5        |
| Cameroon     | 10.9           | 95.8          | 27.7                 | 8.0                 | -            | -            | 142.4        |
| Chad         | -              | 69.1          | 7.1                  | -                   | -            | 5.4          | 81.6         |
| Dahomey      | -              | 53.8          | 10.1                 | -                   | -            | -            | 63.9         |
| Gambia       | 13.6           | -             | 1.1                  | -                   | -            | -            | 14.7         |
| Ghana        | 41.7           | 7.2           | 215.1                | 93.0                | 42.0         | -            | 399.0        |
| Guinea       | -              | -             | 87.4                 | 168.0               | 70.0         | -            | 325.4        |
| Ivory Coast  | 0.2            | 148.2         | 31.6                 | -                   | -            | -            | 180.0        |
| Liberia      | 1.0            | -             | 213.7                | -                   | -            | -            | 214.7        |
| Mali         | 0.2            | 48.0          | 18.4                 | 60.0                | 35.5         | 0.7          | 162.8        |
| Mauritania   | 0.1            | 36.8          | 0.1                  | 3.0                 | 4.0          | 4.7          | 48.7         |
| Niger        | 0.1            | 84.7          | 15.1                 | -                   | -            | 2.8          | 102.7        |
| Nigeria      | 161.5          | -             | 215.5                | -                   | -            | -            | 377.0        |
| Senegal      | 0.3            | 187.7         | 28.7                 | 7.0                 | -            | 0.5          | 224.2        |
| Sierra Leone | 48.6           | -             | 41.0                 | 28.0                | -            | -            | 117.6        |
| Togo         | -              | 22.0          | 13.3                 | -                   | -            | 1.0          | 36.3         |
| Upper Volta  | -              | 65.4          | 11.8                 | -                   | -            | -            | 77.2         |
| Burundi      | -              | 3.0           | 4.6                  | -                   | -            | 1.0          | 8.6          |
| Ethiopia     | 2.8            | -             | 181.9                | 102.0               | -            | -            | 286.7        |
| Kenya        | 247.8          | -             | 46.6                 | 48.0                | 18.0         | -            | 360.4        |
| Rwanda       | -              | 2.0           | 8.1                  | -                   | -            | -            | 10.1         |
| Somalia      | 15.2           | -             | 61.9                 | 66.0                | 23.0         | 4.0          | 170.1        |
| Sudan        | 22.8           | -             | 110.3                | 64.0                | -            | 3.3          | 200.4        |
| Tanzania     | 156.9          | -             | 69.2                 | 20.0                | 58.9         | -            | 305.0        |
| Uganda       | 114.8          | -             | 28.6                 | 16.0                | 15.0         | -            | 174.4        |
| Botswana     | 53.3           | -             | 6.0                  | -                   | -            | -            | 59.3         |
| C.A.R.       | 5.5            | 65.8          | 3.1                  | -                   | 4.1          | -            | 78.5         |
| Congo        | 0.1            | 69.3          | 4.0                  | 10.0                | 26.4         | -            | 109.8        |
| Eq. Guinea   | -              | -             | -                    | -                   | -            | 5.0          | 5.0          |
| Gabon        | -              | 49.0          | 7.2                  | -                   | -            | -            | 56.2         |
| Lesotho      | 41.0           | -             | 4.0                  | -                   | -            | -            | 45.0         |
| Madagascar   | 0.2            | 164.7         | 8.5                  | -                   | -            | -            | 173.4        |
| Malawi       | 142.6          | -             | 15.4                 | -                   | -            | -            | 158.0        |
| Swaziland    | 16.2           | -             | -                    | -                   | -            | -            | 16.2         |
| Zaire        | 2.1            | 12.3          | 277.8                | -                   | -            | -            | 292.2        |
| Zambia       | 138.0          | -             | 16.7                 | 6.0                 | 23.8         | 0.3          | 184.8        |

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TOTAL                    \$1294.9m    \$2941.0m    \$4354.0m    \$2011.0m    \$470.4m    \$695.3m    \$11766.6m  
                                   (11.0%)    (25.0%)    (37.0%)    (17.1%)    (4.0%)    (5.9%)

APPENDIX IIIAFRICAN VOTING CLUSTERS - FIRST TIME PERIOD

| Resolutions<br>sponsored by: | Britain | France | U.S.A. | Soviet<br>Union | China | Arabs |
|------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|-----------------|-------|-------|
| Algeria                      | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Egypt                        | C       | C      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Libya                        | C       | C      | C      | B               | C     | B     |
| Morocco                      | C       | C      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Tunisia                      | C       | C      | C      | B               | C     | B     |
| Cameroon                     | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Chad                         | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Dahomey                      | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Gambia                       | B       | C      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| Ghana                        | C       | C      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Guinea                       | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Ivory Coast                  | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Liberia                      | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | A     |
| Mali                         | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Mauritania                   | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Niger                        | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Nigeria                      | C       | C      | C      | B               | C     | B     |
| Senegal                      | B       | B      | B      | B               | C     | B     |
| Sierra Leone                 | B       | C      | B      | C               | C     | B     |
| Togo                         | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Upper Volta                  | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Burundi                      | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Ethiopia                     | C       | B      | C      | C               | C     | B     |
| Kenya                        | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Rwanda                       | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| Somalia                      | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Sudan                        | C       | C      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Tanzania                     | C       | B      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Uganda                       | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Botswana                     | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| C.A.R.                       | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Congo                        | C       | B      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Eq. Guinea                   | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Gabon                        | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Lesotho                      | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| Madagascar                   | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Malawi                       | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| Swaziland                    | B       | B      | B      | A               | A     | C     |
| Zaire                        | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Zambia                       | C       | B      | A      | B               | B     | B     |

Cluster A - (60% Anti)

Cluster B - (60% Pro)

Cluster C - (Uncommitted)

## APPENDIX IV

## AID TO AFRICA IN THE SECOND TIME PERIOD

|              | Britain         | France            | United States     | Soviet Union     | China             | Arabs             | Total (\$m) |
|--------------|-----------------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------|
| Algeria      | 3.3             | 566.1             | -                 | 483.0            | 40.0              | 58.5              | 1150.9      |
| Egypt        | 17.4            | 49.7              | 372.0             | 548.0            | 28.0              | 3937.4            | 4952.5      |
| Libya        | -               | 6.0               | -                 | -                | -                 | -                 | 6.0         |
| Morocco      | 0.3             | 350.0             | 203.0             | 44.0             | 32.0              | 150.4             | 779.7       |
| Tunisia      | 1.9             | 245.8             | 150.0             | 48.0             | 97.0              | 92.0              | 634.7       |
| Cameroon     | 4.6             | 195.3             | 28.0              | -                | 71.0              | 19.4              | 318.3       |
| Chad         | -               | 155.5             | 18.0              | 2.0              | 50.0              | 11.5              | 237.0       |
| Dahomey      | 0.5             | 62.0              | 13.0              | 5.0              | 46.0              | 5.5               | 132.0       |
| Gambia       | 14.5            | -                 | 5.0               | -                | 17.0              | 3.5               | 40.0        |
| Ghana        | 41.7            | 3.5               | 89.0              | 4.0              | -                 | -                 | 138.2       |
| Guinea       | -               | 0.4               | 31.0              | 36.0             | 30.0              | 27.1              | 124.5       |
| Ivory Coast  | 4.4             | 247.7             | 12.0              | -                | -                 | -                 | 264.1       |
| Liberia      | 1.2             | -                 | 64.0              | -                | 10.0              | -                 | 75.2        |
| Mali         | 6.5             | 116.5             | 47.0              | 30.0             | 30.0              | 36.2              | 266.2       |
| Mauritania   | 0.1             | 32.3              | 21.0              | 2.0              | 60.8              | 181.8             | 298.0       |
| Niger        | 3.1             | 165.0             | 54.0              | 2.0              | 52.6              | 19.0              | 295.7       |
| Nigeria      | 67.7            | -                 | 141.0             | 7.0              | 3.0               | -                 | 218.7       |
| Senegal      | 1.4             | 246.3             | 32.0              | 2.0              | 49.0              | 48.2              | 378.9       |
| Sierra Leone | 6.5             | -                 | 22.0              | -                | 30.0              | 0.3               | 58.8        |
| Togo         | 1.0             | 50.9              | 11.0              | -                | 45.0              | 6.3               | 114.2       |
| Upper Volta  | 0.4             | 145.7             | 36.0              | 1.0              | 52.0              | 4.9               | 240.0       |
| Burundi      | -               | 24.9              | 3.0               | -                | 20.0              | 2.1               | 50.0        |
| Ethiopia     | 25.0            | 0.8               | 151.0             | 4.0              | 84.0              | 2.5               | 267.3       |
| Kenya        | 154.1           | -                 | 56.0              | -                | -                 | 8.4               | 218.5       |
| Rwanda       | 0.1             | 31.6              | 9.0               | -                | 20.0              | -                 | 60.7        |
| Somalia      | 3.1             | -                 | 24.0              | 88.0             | 111.0             | 148.6             | 374.7       |
| Sudan        | 27.1            | -                 | 16.0              | -                | 82.0              | 441.4             | 566.5       |
| Tanzania     | 27.8            | -                 | 111.0             | -                | 305.0             | 0.2               | 444.0       |
| Uganda       | 27.5            | -                 | 16.0              | -                | -                 | 35.5              | 79.0        |
| Botswana     | 55.4            | -                 | 30.0              | -                | -                 | -                 | 85.4        |
| C.A.R.       | 0.2             | 106.6             | 2.0               | 2.0              | -                 | 0.2               | 111.0       |
| Congo        | 0.4             | 131.7             | -                 | 5.0              | 40.0              | 4.2               | 181.3       |
| Eq. Guinea   | -               | -                 | -                 | 1.0              | -                 | 13.0              | 14.0        |
| Gabon        | 0.4             | 137.1             | -                 | -                | -                 | 1.5               | 139.0       |
| Lesotho      | 37.7            | -                 | 22.0              | -                | -                 | -                 | 59.7        |
| Madagascar   | 1.1             | 156.8             | 7.0               | -                | 66.0              | -                 | 230.9       |
| Malawi       | 124.1           | -                 | 23.0              | -                | -                 | -                 | 147.1       |
| Swaziland    | 26.2            | -                 | 8.0               | -                | -                 | -                 | 34.2        |
| Zaire        | 1.5             | 88.3              | 65.0              | -                | 115.0             | -                 | 269.8       |
| Zambia       | 97.4            | -                 | 7.0               | -                | 290.0             | 0.8               | 395.2       |
| TOTAL        | 785.6<br>(5.4%) | 3316.5<br>(30.0%) | 1899.0<br>(13.1%) | 1314.0<br>(9.1%) | 1876.4<br>(13.0%) | 5260.4<br>(36.4%) | 14451.9     |

APPENDIX VAID AND VOTING - SECOND TIME PERIOD

| Resolutions<br>sponsored by: | Britain | France | U.S.A. | Soviet<br>Union | China | Arabs |
|------------------------------|---------|--------|--------|-----------------|-------|-------|
| Algeria                      | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Egypt                        | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Libya                        | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Morocco                      | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| Tunisia                      | B       | B      | B      | B               | C     | B     |
| Cameroon                     | B       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Chad                         | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Dahomey                      | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Gambia                       | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Ghana                        | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| Guinea                       | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Ivory Coast                  | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Liberia                      | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Mali                         | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Mauritania                   | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Niger                        | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Nigeria                      | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Senegal                      | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Sierra Leone                 | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Togo                         | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| Upper Volta                  | B       | B      | B      | B               | C     | B     |
| Burundi                      | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Ethiopia                     | B       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Kenya                        | B       | B      | B      | B               | C     | B     |
| Rwanda                       | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| Somalia                      | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Sudan                        | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Tanzania                     | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Uganda                       | C       | B      | C      | B               | B     | B     |
| Botswana                     | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| C.A.R.                       | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Congo                        | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Eq. Guinea                   | C       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |
| Gabon                        | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Lesotho                      | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Madagascar                   | B       | B      | B      | B               | B     | B     |
| Malawi                       | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | C     |
| Swaziland                    | B       | B      | B      | C               | A     | B     |
| Zaire                        | B       | B      | B      | B               | A     | B     |
| Zambia                       | A       | C      | A      | B               | B     | B     |

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