ALEXANDER III: A POGROM-MAKER? CAPABILITY AND CULPABILITY IN RUSSIAN SOCIETY, 1881-1894.

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Alexander III: a pogrom-maker? Culpability and Capability in Russian Society, 1881-1894. By Natasha Lea Mian

Abstract

This thesis intends to show that pogroms in the reign of Alexander III were neither encouraged nor instigated by the government. While other historians have demonstrated why the government could not have been involved in a pogrom policy, a thesis to which the author adds new primary source materials, it is possible to go one step further with new information emerging on alternative origins and reasons for the pogroms. It is argued that there was independent anti-Jewish action among the peasantry that clearly shows their capability for self-motivation and organisation.

Chapters 1 and 2 review the literature on the Russian peasantry, the nature of the autocracy, the tensions within Russian society and the role of the Jewish population within the Russian Empire until the 1880s. These are the areas on which the crux of the thesis rests. Chapter 3 re-examines the period 1881-1894 in more detail in an effort to understand more clearly Jewish and Russian social perceptions of the pogroms, and how this has led to misconceptions among historians. Chapter 4 looks more closely at the government policy on the Jewish Question, using new data that allows research to take into account the real feelings and concerns that were expressed at the highest levels of government. Chapter 5 considers the same unofficial and frank source of documentation but at lower levels, i.e. police and local officials. From these police reports, comes the factual evidence of the existence of peasant leadership, organisation and movements against authority, and more specifically against Jews.

Chapter 6 concludes that by 1881, the autocracy did not control or understand Russian or Jewish society, and it was during the next thirteen years that this became evident. The re-evaluation of available data only serves to show that the pogroms were a clear illustration of this fact.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AIU	*Alliance Israelite Universelle*
APS	*The American Philosophical Society*
CASS	*Canadian-American Slavic Studies*
CSP	*Canadian Slavonic Papers*
EEQ	*East European Quarterly*
EHQ	*European History Quarterly*
HEI	*History of European Ideas*
I & M	*Immigrants & Minorities*
IRSH	*International Review of Social History*
JEH	*Journal of Economic History*
JIH	*Journal of International History*
JMH	*Journal of Modern History*
JSH	*Journal of Social History*
JSS	*Jewish Social Studies*
NP	*Nationalities Papers*
RH-HR	*Russian History-Histoire Russe*
RR	*Russian Review*
SEER	*Slavonic and East European Review*
SJA	*Soviet Jewish Affairs*
SR	*Slavic Review*
SS	*Soviet Studies*
SSH	*Social Studies in History*

Archive Abbreviations

TsGADA	Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Drevnikh Aktov
TsGIA	Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Istoricheskii Arkhiv
TsGAOR	Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Oktiabr'skoi Revoliutsii
f.	fond (source)
op.	opis (inventory)
k.	karton (box)
ch.	chast (part)
d.	delo (file)
l./ll.	list/listi (page/pages)
ob.	obratnoi (overleaf)

Note

Old Style Calendar is in use throughout thesis. Old Style was 12 days behind the Western calendar in the nineteenth century, and 13 days up to 1917.

If the source of power lies neither in the physical nor the moral qualities of the individual who possesses it, it is obvious that it must be looked for elsewhere - in the relation to the masses of the man who wields the power.

Leo Tolstoy, 'War and Peace'.

Figure 1.1

Western Russia and the Boundary of the Pale[1]

[1] Reproduced from I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origin of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), p. 31.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

Alexander III inherited an empire plagued by conflict. The dual economic systems of industrialisation and agricultural feudalism created 'instability'[2] of the work force and ultimately of the economy itself. In demographic terms, Russian population growth trends followed the model of modern economic growth associated with a country on the verge of industrialisation.[3] Cyclical depressions of Russian industrial output and maintenance of rail construction corresponded with those of external economies, so although hindered by its agricultural "ball and chain", Russia by 1881 was 'already closely interrelated with the world economy'.[4] At the same time, the strain of preserving the pre-reform agricultural system, which involved the majority of Russian subjects, began to show in the slow growth rate of agricultural productivity.[5] The discrepancy between the two systems, and the gap between the ideal and reality, went unrecognised in Russian society.

The peasant was the most misunderstood of all. The strength of peasant conservatism and backwardness was not appreciated, and certainly the early revolutionaries mistakenly believed that the dual nature of the economy would directly allow peasants to become proletarians and socialists. Moreover, it has been pointed out that there was 'no necessary connection between Marx's vision of socio-economic crisis' - every individual

[2] George V. Rimlinger, 'The Management of Labour Protest in Tsarist Russia: 1880-1905', *IRSH*, 5 (1960), p. 228.
[3] Paul R. Gregory, 'Economic Growth and Structural Change in Tsarist Russia: A Case of Modern Economic Growth?', *SS*, 23 (1972) p. 419.
[4] Alexander Gerschenkron, 'The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia since 1885', *JEH*, Supplement 7 (1947), p. 145-47.
[5] ibid.

motivated by their own material interests - 'and the world of harmony and brotherhood which was supposed to succeed the revolution.'[6]

In the 1870s, when the peasantry came under society's scrutiny, all kinds of explanations were offered, such as that the peasant was too insular, too victimised and exploited, too ignorant, even too rational and too moral. Such images provided further handicaps to successful modernisation and development, and did not get to grips with the real reasons for their discontent and increasing brutality. Society had to cope with the emergence of a new class - the bureaucracy, which in essence betrayed the very basis of what the autocratic regime was based on - the patriarchal relationship. Lukashevich suggests that the undeveloped spirituality of the reformers and liberals of this time was more than counterbalanced by the strength of the reactionary or 'black' influence of monasticism, and that this dualism 'played a fatal part in the disintegration of the moral forces of pre-Revolutionary Russian society'.[7]

Indeed the weakness of Russian culture and the church as forces of enlightenment only encouraged reactionary influence. The resulting tension, borne of frustration, was often expressed in violence. Economic pressure has been shown by Sutton to have caused a rise in ethnic and religious violence, because of migration to the cities, increasing urbanisation and the breakdown of family values.[8] From the bureaucracy to the peasantry, the aggravation of social tensions within their own class resulted in 'the polarisation of existing conflict between generations and sexes, fostering a climate of excessive fear, and the weakening of the reliance and trust in the effectiveness of Tsarist authority'.[9]

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[6] Geoffrey Hosking, *A History of the Soviet Union*, (London: Fontana, 1990), p. 24.
[7] Stephen L. Lukashevich, *Ivan Aksakov, 1823-1886: A Study in Russian Thought and Politics* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 64.
[8] Richard Cummer Sutton, 'Crime and Social Change in Russia after the Great Reforms: Laws, Courts and Criminals, 1874-1894' (PhD thesis, US: Indiana University, 1984).
[9] Sutton, p. 140.

Violence was mainly a rural problem until the end of the 1890s, but levels of violence increased four times between 1874 and 1894. Ninety per cent of the offenders, until the mid 1880s, were Russian Orthodox.[10] This was related to the fact that peasant brutality existed alongside and as part of peasant culture, a fact that was not accepted by society. It was certainly not accepted by an autocratic government to whom violence was an illegal act that breached the security of the nation. An acceptance would also have meant an admission on behalf of the government that they neither understood nor controlled the huge peasant force in its society. Yet it would appear logical that in the face of new problems and tensions, the peasantry would have turned to their traditional outlet to release their increased frustration. Sutton sees this recourse to violence on behalf of the peasantry as a 'tragic symptom of the modernisation process.'[11] The increase of violence is one main symptom of the discrepancy between government ideals for its society and what was happening in reality.

The contradictions that were established in Russian society before 1881 were many and powerful, and at the same time accepted as the Russian way of life. These contradictions involved industrialisation and agrarianism, autocratic monarchism and the enlightened alternative ideas of the intelligentsia, urban modernisation and traditional ruralism - all bringing with them new classes and opinions, and new levels of tension and prejudice. The minorities of the Empire were caught up in these dichotomies.

There was no room for ethnic autonomy in such a society. Rogger has pointed out that the minorities were located in strategically sensitive border areas of the Empire.[12] As Russia was so concerned with national security, these minorities were often perceived as a major threat to that security, and policy towards them reflected this. In the reign of

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[10] Sutton, p. 126. Sutton found that the biggest increases in major crime rose occurred between 1879-81, and 1884-7.

[11] Sutton, p. 229.

[12] Hans Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917* (London: Longman, 1983), p. 183.

Alexander II, foreign policy not only saw the expansion of Russian-conquered land in Asia, but unprecedented Russian involvement in a war for the sake of Pan-Slavism. When the Turks massacred Bulgarians in 1876, the Russian public was outraged and Russia's government reluctantly involved Russia in the conflict. Pan-Slavism, hitherto a passive philosophy, became an active form of Nationalism. For the minorities, there could be no immediate assimilation with such strong public sentiment based on these traditions of Russian culture and society.

Over a hundred different peoples made up the 'Nationalities Question'.[13] The treatment they received from the government varied enormously depending on the Tsar in power. Uniformity and assimilation were the overall aims, but this was interpreted very differently by individual leaders. National schools and churches were regarded as the strongholds of national feeling, and thus they were the object of official attack. It was ironic that by the 1860s, many minorities had been influenced by the nationalism of Europe themselves, thus exacerbating the tensions they caused within the Russian Empire. From the Poles, the Finns and the Baltic states people to the Armenians and Georgians, russification was attempted to varying degrees. Regarding Muslim minorities, it was felt that they had sought Tsarist protection from the Islamic powers of Turkey and Persia, but it was not for the Empire to absorb them for that was 'impossible'.[14]

According to Bunge, Russia should preserve the meaning of the state, which would provide for the protection and the education of foreigners and promote their ties with other parts of the empire.[15] Why then could the government not decide in which camp

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[13] Violet Conolly, ' The Nationalities Question', *Russian Thought and Society 1800-1917* ed. by Roger Bartlett (Keele: Keele University Press, 1984), p. 152.
[14] N. Kh. Bunge, 'The Years 1881-1894 in Russia: A Memorandum Found in the Papers of N. Kh. Bunge', trans. and commentary by George E. Snow, *TAPS*, 71, (Philadelphia 1981), p. 44.
[15] Bunge, pp. 18-45.

the Jews lay? To absorb or not to absorb - this was the debate raging in the 1880s. Why were pogroms and Jewish nationalism considered to be so different from the peasant unrest and the general nineteenth century trend for nationalism that were both in existence before 1881?

The answers to this lie in the complexities of the way in which Russian society viewed its Jews socially, economically and legally. Jews, as a large group of people, were outsiders that were incorporated into the Russian Empire almost incidentally, when Polish lands were annexed in 1795. Therefore, Russian society was not prepared for them, and so distrusted what they did not understand. This reaction was evident from the suspicious peasant to the fearful government minister, and is illustrated by the use of the term 'exploitation' that became virtually synonymous with the Jewish character.

Secondly, Jewish nationalism was only really formed in an organised fashion after the community had suffered terrible physical and mental attacks. It was not their own cultural or political or religious initiative that caused Jewish patriotism, as it was with other minority groups. The Jews had become passive people, using and craving anonymity as a means of survival through the centuries of wandering.

This makes the question of the origins of such violent pogroms even more pressing. There has been no singular answer provided to date. The underestimation of the power of the peasantry, the overestimation of the government's, a lack of appreciation of the various complexities of everyday life in a modern but autocratic regime, and a failure to examine the Jewish Question in this context are the main concerns of this thesis. The social divide and consequent isolation, the absence of communication between social levels, the lack of control, the chaos and fear that ruled government action - all these are aspects that must be taken into account when considering the causes of atrocities such as the pogroms of 1881-2, and the anti-Jewish legislation that followed until 1894. New

materials studied in chapters 4 and 5 respectively deal with the real feelings of confusion and concern at the highest and lowest levels of government.

Field leads the way in pointing out independent peasant action. However, little is known about their ability to think and organise movements independently. As Kingston-Mann has made clear in her search for archival sources on the subject of peasant culture, it is a subject that is neither easily identifiable nor categorised. Virtually nothing is known of independent religious movements and beliefs other than those associated with the Russian Orthodox Church or pagan superstition and ritual, which Sutton, Frank, Ramer and others have been exploring.

The argument that pogroms were government policy was taken up by eminent historians such as Dubnov, Baron and Greenberg. Their accounts were largely based on eye-witness reports of events, and government publications in papers such as the anti-Semitic *Grazhdanin* (Citizen) under the editorship of Prince Meshcherskii, a favourite of Alexander III. Conclusions from this, from the horrors of the pogroms themselves and the lack of available documentation at the time, meant that the belief in government involvement was sustained for many years. The problem that faced present day historians was dealing with an issue that was a hundred years old, and that would always be viewed through more recent atrocities of the twentieth century, implying that well-developed, systematic racist policies were applicable to the nineteenth century. On the other hand, there was also the problem of over-simplification, where the complexities and problems of everyday life on all levels were ignored. The Jewish Question was a problem for the government at the same time that civil unrest, famine, and power struggles around the throne were taking place.

However, it has become acceptable to treat the thesis that pogroms were not government initiated or encouraged at this time with more regard, thanks largely to the

work of Klier, Aronson, Rogger, Wynn and Hamberg. They have each taken their own angle on this issue: Klier has examined the Russian and Jewish press extensively; Aronson has examined the nature of the inherent anti-Semitism of a variety of government officials, and socio-economic geographic factors; Rogger has concentrated on the reasons and motives, and benefits behind such official action; Wynn has examined the impact of industrialisation and its significant role in the pogroms; and Hamberg has looked closely at the role of the gentry, in particular the 'Holy Retinue'.[16] Although there is general agreement that the pogroms were an 'urban phenomenon', Russian social tensions on an everyday level, in particular amongst the peasantry that were not yet 'proletarianised', have not been emphasised. This thesis intends to show that the peasantry were capable of a lot more than that for which they have previously been credited. This is partly due to the reasons outlined above, but also because of the inaccessibility to archives in Russia, the Soviet belief in the peoples' revolutionary aims, and even the Tsarist belief that their 'children' were naive and needed guidance in order simply to live.

In the last few years, it has become possible to access documents in a number of archives that were previously closed to foreign researchers. At the time of writing, materials on the Pahlen Commission were surfacing in St. Petersburg, and it is to be expected that greater information will be gleaned from them than is discussed here. Documents in the Police Department files, State Department files and personal files from the Tsarist period, including that of Alexander III allowed for a more rounded and balanced picture of real concerns and events in society, seen as they happened and from different points of view. It was felt by the author that documents of unofficial, private

[16] The 'Holy Retinue' was an organisation formed by some nobles after the assassination of Alexander II in order to protect the life of the new Tsar and counteract terrorist and revolutionary activity. Its activities ceased after only a year in 1882.

correspondence between central government ministers would reveal a frankness of feeling about the Jewish Question, government policy, and more widely the nature of autocratic power at work, lacking in official state documents. Similarly, police reports labelled secret were more likely to reveal police concerns after the incidents rather than government circulars that preceded trouble, although both are used in conjunction.

The aim of this work is to provide two angles on pogroms and anti-Jewish activity in the reign of Alexander III: one on the peasantry and one on the central government. It was decided therefore, that the limitations of this thesis would prohibit any major and detailed discussion on the diversity of intellectual Jewish thought, the philosophies of the various movements, and description of the main personalities. The bent of the thesis is to examine the case for and against the accused aggressor, i.e. the government, and any alternative origins: not to study the victims of the violence other than to gauge their position in Russian society. The independent study of the Jewish community is an important one that has been taken up by many others, and is beyond the realm of the present work. This was also felt to be the case regarding Russian revolutionary sects and activity, the Russian press and church, other than their significance as general forces in Russian society, and how the government viewed them.

The line of research taken indeed leads to a clearer picture of a society out of control, that no one man or woman could hope to guide, let alone dominate. It is hoped that the specific and wider consequences of this fact are evident in the context of this thesis.

Chapter Two

RUSSIAN SOCIETY

AN AUTOCRATIC REGIME

That autocracy and centralisation of power have gone hand in hand throughout history, is generally accepted by historians. Autocracy is defined in this thesis as the singular power emanating from the apex, imposed downwards on all levels, of a social structure. In the case of the Russian Empire however, the idea of absolute autocratic government - regardless of efficiency and effectiveness at governing - was a popular one with the masses from the 1300s and the rise of Muscovite Russia. There are historical and geographical reasons for this.

Previous to this date, the princes of the Norse Rurik dynasty and the Grand Princes of Kiev had ruled their principalities independently, with no centralised power at the helm. When the Mongols had ruled the region, they appointed a Grand Prince to rule directly for them. The net result of this influence was a move away from an equal dynastic rule. It was felt to be necessary to cut one's losses and for each prince to make a bid for central control - to rid the area of 'feudal usurpers'.[1] By the time of Ivan IV (the Terrible), autocracy was clearly established. Moscow emerged as the dominant force, in part due to its centralised position in the Russian heartland and along crucial river trade routes. The Mongols were defeated and the Byzantine Empire collapsed, leaving the way clear for Muscovite domination. Ivan appointed himself 'Tsar' in 1547, and this title became almost synonymous with his absolute autocratic rule.

As Russia conquered more and more land to the East, overtaking the boundaries of the old Kievan Rus, and internal migration increased, security became a vital component

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[1] Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime* (London: Penguin (Peregrine), 1979), p. 58.

of government policy. There were no natural frontiers preventing Russian domination of Lithuania, Kazan, Astrakhan, Latvia and among other places taken elsewhere, Finland and the Kingdom of Congress Poland. The latter was annexed at the end of the eighteenth century under Catherine II, and from then on, Russia had a significantly increased Jewish population - the debates of the 'Jewish Question' began to emerge. With this absorption and unification however, came the struggle with many other indigenous peoples.

Faced with invaders on all fronts, the Empire acquired what Hosking has called a self-consciousness bound up with a 'demotic quality'[2] as a nation, a fact that divided the development of Russia from Western Europe. By the nineteenth century, it was clear that with its vast and flat frontiers, the autocratic Russian Empire needed a means by which to endear its millions of inhabitants to the same way of thinking, with the same goals and priorities - uniformity came to mean everything.

As a social concept however, the existence of the idea of state and society was not acknowledged by Russians until relatively late - only in the eighteenth century did the word society (*obschestvo*) come into common usage. The Russian Orthodox church had been the most effective means of promoting these ideas, and patriotism was the lowest common denominator uniting all elements of the social hierarchy. Indeed, since the collapse of the Byzantine Empire, Moscow had become one of the most important religious centres of the region. Thus in religious, military, economic and political terms Russia's development as a nation was as great as its social development remained primitive.

From Muscovite times until the Emancipation Act of 1861, the divide between classes was fixed, without possibility of movement. What made this social rigidity so taut was

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[2] Hosking, p. 17.

the issue of land-ownership, but in terms of rights, both sides were at the complete mercy of the autocrat. Although the gentry and members of the service estates[3] had privileges - the most substantial being the monopoly of land and serfs - all subjects had a duty to produce evidence of loyalty and service to the Tsar, by way of their occupation, be it manual labour, farming, army or government service. In theory at least, this state of affairs effectively rendered all classes powerless before the will of one individual.

Primitive social development can also be explained in part by the centralisation - de-centralisation struggle, a major theme in Russian history. As long as power was not delegated to local bodies, and the various social classes were tightly bonded in position relative to the Tsar, de-centralisation could not be effective. But the problems caused by the concentration of power at the top meant that centralisation was difficult to enforce in the vast areas of the empire, from one remote corner to another. Indeed by 1600, Muscovy was the same size as Europe, and the difficulties of governing such an area, absolutely or otherwise, became evident. Thus the need for increased national security and bonding of the people that lived within its borders, grew ever pressing.

Yet from Ivan IV to Stalin, there has been one form or another of autocratic power, and certainly until the early twentieth century, it was sustained primarily by the popular belief in paternalism. It was the paternal or patrimonial system, coupled with society's self-awareness as a separate entity as distinct from its leaders, that indicates when autocracy became an anachronism. The creation of an official government police department in 1811 under Alexander I, the new secret police and censorship measures of 1826 under Nicholas I, to the Emancipation Act of 1861 under Alexander II, were all steps in that direction. The climax of the crisis for autocracy was that radical thought was transcribed into revolutionary action. This culminated in the terrorist act of the

[3] Peter I (the Great) created a bureaucratic Table of Ranks, along Western lines, to serve the autocracy in 1722.

assassination of Alexander II in 1881, and the resulting policies of the new Tsar Alexander III whose reign was characterised by temporary measures - a sure sign of the loosening of autocratic control.

The problems that followed during the period of the 'Great Reforms', were exacerbated by new external forces of industrialisation and modernisation in every aspect of life, and for the first time this involved the life of every individual living within the realms of the Empire.

What did 'government' mean before 1881? Under such monarchs as Peter I and Catherine II, the centralisation of power in one person had reached its height. Autocracy reigned supreme, yet still no ruler was able to fully enact their will, because of the physical dimensions of the empire and the social isolation of classes from one another. Pipes takes this view even further: for each ruler regardless of political persuasion, there came 'the realisation [...] that they simply lacked the capacity to lead their empires where they wanted and that the best they could hope for was to keep it from sinking into chaos'.[4] It cannot be known for certain if the rulers in question were as aware of this as Pipes asserts, but autocracy could in no way, shape or form absolutely rule these people and their lands. Thus it became introverted, and based its power on keeping society out of the realms of political influence, therefore not allowing room for any real social change.

This point seems to have eluded many historians who have looked at the reasons and origins of pogroms in the Russian Empire, especially from 1881, and concluded that the government had the motive and the means for such an initiative. As the extent of governmental control of society decreased as the nineteenth century wore on, this would

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[4] Pipes, p. 115.

have been at the very least an act that was totally out of character with its long-term concerns.

Reform policy worked as long as the ruler was strong and confident enough to cope with fundamental change. Alexander II gave more power to the *zemstvo* institutions,[5] so that local gentry who wished to contribute their opinions could do so, only to have the privilege attacked by the next Tsar. In the case of Alexander III, an autocrat came to rule who believed in all the old symbols of autocracy, which included the revival of traditional noble power. His choice of governmental ministers reflected this belief, and his clinging to these ideals revealed much about his lack of understanding of the current day class dynamics.

In the nineteenth century, a new force came to bear on the side of autocracy - Nationalism. In Europe, nationalist waves swept country after country resulting in prejudicial action against minorities. In Russia, however, a sense of Nationalism was already part of the patriotic Russian character. However, it took on a more sinister aspect with the deterioration of communal life that was brought about by industrialisation, leading to unrest. For the government, violence was a legitimate method of dealing with the revolutionaries, but extermination of its subjects 'en masse' does not appear to have been part of the nationalist aim. This was a major reason why the government never chose to employ a systematic policy of eliminating minorities from the Empire. The priority was to assimilate, conform, centralise, and to preserve the equilibrium. Indeed it was not logical to breach the boundaries of the status quo. The paternal instinct inherent in the Russian autocracy prevented this. Often contradictory actions of policy can be explained by the desire to preserve the balance, even as in

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[5] Local government bodies

Alexander III's reign, if the use of autocratic power violated current law in order to maintain it.

Certainly by 1881, the question to be asked is whether Russian industrialisation created problems for Russian society, or whether the real problems stemmed from the government's handling of it. Rimlinger suggests that one side effect of industrialisation in an autocratic regime is the rise of labour protest, which became apparent in factory life everywhere from the 1870s.[6] Sutton has shown that crime patterns changed to directly reflect changes in the post-reform era of economic, political and cultural development in the late nineteenth century.[7] It is clear that sudden surges of crime emerging in this period reflect the differences between the ideas of peasantry and state,[8] as well as highlighting administrative corruption, religious tensions among minorities, and the regional variations of crime between the cities and the countryside.

Most research done on the period after 1861 concludes that the Russian autocracy was clearly no longer the absolute power of an earlier time, regardless of whether it was liberal or reactionary inclined. 1861 saw individuals being given the opportunity to enlighten themselves through education, but it also turned autocracy on its head by giving potential rebels the means to rebel, thus providing the autocracy with the means for its own destruction. The twenty years between the Emancipation Act and the reign of Alexander III saw the stirrings of the transformation that Russian society was to undergo. They would ultimately lead to the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.

[6] Rimlinger, p. 226.
[7] Sutton, 'Crime and Social Change'.
[8] Stephen P. Frank, 'Cultural Conflict and Criminality in Rural Russia, 1861-1900' (PhD thesis, US: Brown University, 1987).

Historians have had much to say on the subject of autocracy: on the definition and limits of its power, and the boundaries drawn between state and society, the leadership and the led. It has been said that there are three types of restraint on leadership[9] - the first is direct, meaning set rules and laws; the second is indirect, which includes the church and economic interests; and the third is natural, which involves the traditions of that society, its character, and what is socially acceptable to it. The autocratic Tsarist regime only effectively subverted the first kind, came into conflict with the second and never challenged the third.

From this the essence of autocracy in Russia is summed up by Brzezinski: it was a regime motivated by a curious mix of autocratic paternalism and a strong belief in the immaturity of the people. It resorted to violence but never complete extermination of its enemies. This was not the logical conclusion, because of the conscious and unconscious assumptions inherent in the paternalistic attitude. The 'paternalistic sense of authority recognises the transcendent system of values which inherently limits its otherwise institutionally wide scope of action'.[10] All shared the desire to defend the broad outlines of the status quo.

Although the policies of reform or reaction each had their supporters, there was always the commitment to the status quo, which necessarily involved a limitation on power and a system of values inherent in the status quo. The problem with the post-emancipation period is that while autocratic power was traditional, society was changing. The autocratic authorities could not wipe out elements like the revolutionaries, who were

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[9] Z. K. Brzezinski, 'The Patterns of Autocracy', in *The Transformation of Russian Society* ed. by C. E. Black (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1970), p. 110.
[10] Brzezinski, p. 102.

part of that change, without shattering the status quo. This resulted in much of the political history of the last few decades of the nineteenth century being the history of political plots, conspiracies, and assassinations of countless important officials, including the murder of two emperors - in 1881 and in 1917.

Autocratic power is an ancient form of power, and very basic compared to the more complex systems of constitutional or democratic power. The power of the ruler as autocrat was recognised by fundamental law and confirmed by tradition. The ruler used this power to choose and dismiss his ministers. They would often have an informal head, usually the minister that enjoyed the Tsar's confidence. Because this 'head' did not have the control of appointing ministers, there was no incentive for ministers to co-ordinate their activities or policies - everything was imposed upon them by the Tsar. Important decisions could be made when the Tsar locked himself away with his closest advisors - a practice that continued into the twentieth century, and did not encourage harmony and good relations between individual ministers, discouraging them from joining forces and even encouraging them to perpetuate clashing policies, to see who would gain the favour of the Tsar. This often led to matters of importance being decided by the direct intervention of the Tsar, circumventing written legislation. Judicial independence was often sacrificed to meet political needs. Governmental pressure on judges was not unknown in Russia, supported by administrative powers which could impose up to a five year sentence. These illegal deviations from the written judicial law only served to emphasise the 'absence of a strong legal tradition'[11] in Russia, which should have been there to act as a restraint on the leadership.

However, specific research on the latter half of the nineteenth century has shown the issue to be more complex than this. Lincoln emphasises the aspect of power-shifts within

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[11] Brzezinski, p. 100.

relationships when the autocracy faced a social crisis at the end of the 1870s, believing it to be the direct result of the failure of old and new powers to move together towards modernisation.[12] This was in part due to the government failure to recognise on a broader level, social development in the same direction. Therefore, any invasion of the Tsar's power was deemed illegal, regardless of the fact that industrialisation was by nature an intrusive, and unrestrained, force at all levels of society. By not being aware and making preparations for this, an industrialised economy emerged that ran counter to the aims of autocracy, even though it was superficially controlled by the bureaucratic branches of autocratic government. This dual economic system was a major feature of imperial autocratic rule from the middle of the nineteenth century.

Alexander I acknowledged that his power as Tsar was unlimited.[13] Against this was stated just as firmly the principle of legality, or conformity to the law. This in effect placed the Tsar under obligation to limit himself, through his court system. However, the courts did not impose any limitations, so already an illegality in the fundamental system of autocratic rule was occurring. This was a trend that was to continue and gather pace throughout the nineteenth century. The law became dependent on the good will of the Tsar. Compounding this was the bypassing of the State Council. Set up by Alexander I to distinguish between various types of law, it was consistently and illegally bypassed. Alexander III was particularly guilty in this respect. His reign appears to be one where breaches of the law were almost the norm, but as the complexities of autocracy coupled with modernising forces becomes clear, it is difficult to say where and when those boundaries were first crossed, and whether indeed the basis of legality had not altogether shifted. Would the same actions have appeared illegal to, or even have

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[12] W. Bruce Lincoln, *The Great Reforms: Autocracy, Bureaucracy, and the Politics of Change in Imperial Russia*, (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press 1990), pp. 176-77.
[13] Hugh Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire, 1801-1917* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1967, repr. 1990), p. 75. Alexander had written that 'an autocratic ruler [...] must feel that unlimited power has been granted to him', the laws are 'defined by himself' but 'he must be the first person to honour and obey it'.

troubled, the governments of earlier autocrats? If so, then clearly the basis of autocracy - absolute autocracy - had changed.

The fact that an increasing number of secret departments were set up by the later Tsars indicates that this was indeed the case. It was felt necessary to have separate bodies working on the Tsar's 'side' in order to combat potential opposition from his government ministers and members of the cabinet. Alexander I had the Committee of Ministers usurp many of the functions of the Senate Council, because the latter stood for the law and the former for the Tsar. It was significant that the Senate Council was not abolished by the Tsar. Its toleration was a recognition of its importance in government and for society. The Tsar needed to boost supporters of his opinion, and thus the rule of absolute autocracy was over in Russia.

By the time of the 'Great Reforms' of Alexander II, the autocracy had made the control of society in the old sense almost impossible. On what basis could an autocratic government act legally? Without a recognition of this dilemma, inconsistencies of policy, short-term answers to the growing social unrest and even harsher police measures for national security, characterised government response.

Hamberg maintains that autocratic power is never absolute, and moments of weakness provide the evidence.[14] One such moment was the assassination of Alexander II in 1881. The power of the state was gradually being eroded in favour of the power of society, and Zaionchkovsky has clearly demonstrated how this weakness manifested itself in the personalities and actions of the ministers in power between 1878-1881.[15] He concludes that the fatal error of the autocracy in that period was not to sweep away all the elements of serfdom in 1861, because of the need to placate the gentry. It was

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[14] Gary. M. Hamberg, 'Introduction' in Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, *The Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 1878-82* (Florida: Rutgers University Press 1979), p. vii.
[15] Zaionchkovsky, *The Russian Autocracy in Crisis, 1878-82*, (Florida: Rutgers University Press 1979).

therefore a major achievement in itself that the autocracy survived at all. Pipes believes that it survived to become stronger in the sense that it took on a modern form of dictatorship with the beginning of the police state.[16] However, it cannot be denied that the autocracy did not survive in its pre-nineteenth century form, i.e. in a more absolute form. This is clear from the government's relationship with society, and particularly with the peasantry.

Because the peasants' position in society changed after 1861, the gentry's situation had to be re-examined. What held them together once serfdom had been abolished? As has been indicated above, it was clearly not land. Hamberg believes that it was the fight for their economic survival.[17] They fought huge forces - the Emancipation Act itself, a new market economy and industrialisation - but they were not ready to accept defeat until the 1900s. The chief result of this battle was the further de-centralisation of power away from the traditional forces at the top of the social structure, because it made less and less sense for the nobility to retain power over forces they could not control.

Neither was the Russian Orthodox church an independent or progressive force in Russian society, because of the traditional reliance on state authority. This meant that the moral and ethical sides to the question of serfdom, of massacres or any other injustice carried out in the name of the Tsar was side-stepped from a religious point of view. The church was not a political force, and secular power was greater in Russia than in Europe from a much earlier date. Russian autocracy was considerably strengthened by this. Indeed, the church played a significant role in promoting the power of the Tsar by reinforcing popular monarchism. It was the indubitable link between Tsar and God for millions of people that helped sustain autocracy for as long as it did. The relationship

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[16] Pipes, p. 313.

[17] Gary M. Hamberg, *Politics of the Russian Nobility, 1881-1905* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press 1984).

was crucial to both the state and to the masses. For the state, this belief allowed them to feel safe in the knowledge that even in difficult times, the people would be loyal to the Tsar.

The association of the Tsar with God was deep-rooted in the peasant psyche and the church helped maintain this belief throughout the empire. For the people, the direct link of the Tsar to God gave them significance in a society that otherwise dominated and controlled them. They were the children of the 'Little Father', there was a strong and direct, paternal relationship between them that all others in society were not privy to.

Their unquestioned loyalty encouraged passivity. The fact that life was hard and often cruel was seen as part of the test that God had sent for the people to endure. The church reinforced this belief, and the state relied on it. It encouraged a whole different form of thinking and understanding to arise, and for a different set of definitions, rules of law and acceptable behaviour to exist. Peasant religious belief was influenced by superstition with elements of their pagan past and of medieval magical ideas, joined to the ritual of the Russian church. Yet still peasant unrest and resistance to authority occurred. Along with the loyalty to the Tsar went the belief that his advisors and officials, from those around him to those whose land the peasants tilled, were trouble-makers and not to be trusted. The Tsar was supposedly unaware of this. Field's studies show conclusively the power of the paternal relationship in all its manifestations. This belief also underlines the increasing differences in nineteenth century Russian society, even though the bond had existed since the twelfth century:

> [...] political life not only concentrates itself in the persons of the rulers; it is actually rooted in them. A citizenry as such does not exist at all [...] The people is the object of the ruling authority, not an independent bearer of some national mission.[18]

[18] Julius Kaerst, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1926) II, pp. 335-6.

The patrimonial system was a major reason for the prevention of Russian social development.

Lincoln believes that because of the uncertainty regarding the legality of government action, one must question whether it is possible to speak of clear cut terms such as the 'Great Reforms' of Alexander II and the subsequent 'Counter-reforms' of Alexander III.[19] Were the former so liberal and did 1881 really mark the onset of reaction and the violation of law? For Lincoln, the changing nature of autocracy can be seen from the times of Peter the Great, who was not threatened by the West, and was able to learn from it. By the time of Nicholas I, it is the very usage of western models that threatens the Russian autocracy. It was by then an anachronism, and reform could only take the form of action from within; and not action that could change the whole societal structure. The latter was further prevented by such factors as the passive resistance of petty officials; the isolation of classes, and of administrative officials, from the people. Lack of funds and resources to improve communication was aggravated by Tsarist inclination for secret surveillance and committees to gather information. To have cut through the red tape to make the fundamental changes that were needed would itself have been a major violation of the procedures of the bureaucracy.[20] This led to a permanent backlog of bureaucratic paperwork. In contrast, Peter the Great had changed policies as circumstances and needs had occurred.

As people left the land and became wage earners in the city factories, new communities appeared that the government could not contend with. Not only was the government unprepared for this, but they would not face up to the fact that people had now become the centre stage, and unless they were included in political decisions in a public forum, it would be the autocracy that would suffer most from the consequences.

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[19] Lincoln, pp. xi-xvii.
[20] Lincoln, p. 93.

Some in government in the 1850s began to realise that no one person could solve these problems, but although they recognised the need for reform, they did not understand either the depth or the implications of it. If anything, the limited *glasnost*, allowed by Alexander II, only brought into sharp focus, and heightened the tension of, peoples' expectations by showing them how limited their choices were in an autocratic system. At this time, radicals became revolutionaries, going outside what Lincoln calls the established framework of '*glasnost-proizvol-zakonnost*',[21] to find their freedom. At one time, all three elements were part of the absolute autocracy, but by 1861, *proizvol* was becoming increasingly alienated from the other two. *Zakonnost* and *glasnost* were the first two steps towards a different path for the revolutionaries. By the time of Alexander III, the government was trying everything to combat the growing complexities of modern everyday life - another reason why they did not simply abolish or eliminate all opposition, including the *zemstvo*.

The success of terrorist activity was equated with government failure. The new reign began with a climax in this situation, 'a crisis of confidence, a loss of faith in the government's capacity to control events, in the statesman's craft of mastering reality'.[22] Indeed, the terrorist's most important act was something that the government of Alexander III had to live with - he had to accept their existence in Russian society.

While the revolutionaries dreamed of a Russia without an autocrat, and the autocracy believed the only way forward was virtually to stand still, people between the two political extremes became restless. Expecting change, enlightened to some degree by Alexander II and desperate after the control of Nicholas I, frustration set in and paths towards progress began to diverge. Social thinking got way ahead of itself having been

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[21] *Zakonnost* meaning legality, *glasnost* meaning openness, *proizvol* meaning tyranny or arbitrary rule. Lincoln, p. 40.

[22] Gary M. Hamberg, 'Russian Noble Politics and the Terrorist Movement, 1878-82', *CAS* 17, No. 2 (1983), p. 180.

held back for so long, even though actual social development was slow. Secret committees and meetings continued. The government view was classic: 'to institute reforms so that no one would notice or feel them',[23] i.e. to initiate reform from within the autocracy, but not to change it.

This returns to the question of whether people really understood - from the Tsar to the peasant- what was meant by citizen and society. All reforms were still made subject to central government. *Proizvol* was condemned by society, but autocracy was essentially ruling by the *proizvol* concept. If not recognised by society, it was certainly not recognised in law. This meant that understandings, perceptions, assumptions for the future were left unclear. Nothing therefore, could be guaranteed - especially social stability.

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[23] Lincoln, p. 61.

It can be said that the suffering of the peasants after 1861, was as much to do with the emergence of the bureaucracy as a new social class, as with peasant emancipation from serfdom. Certainly, the rise of the bureaucracy contributed to the decline of the gentry as a social class, as the former took over many functions of the latter, including direct control of the peasantry. As peasant life became more geared towards a system of separate judicial and economic institutions; a 'segregation' from the local gentry administration was created.[24] In January 1864, Alexander II established the *zemstvos* with the intention of modernising local authority, by giving it more power to deal with the urgent needs of rural Russia. This was achieved by the inclusion of elected members from peasant communes.

The *zemstvo* epitomised the belief of these liberals, i.e. the delegation of autocratic power to the servants of the state, as opposed to the conservative element who clung to the autocratic form of bureaucrat - a servant to the state imposing the autocrat's direct will. The *zemstvo* was authorised to deal with the fundamental areas of education and health among others, and indeed they served in themselves as outlets for public opinion, from liberalism to radicalism, which as Fischer[25] points out was contrary to the government's wishes. However, the *zemstvos* brought the gentry into conflict with the central government at the highest levels. Count M. T. Loris-Melikov, Minister for Internal Affairs in Alexander II's government, blamed the bureaucracy for weakening the prestige of the monarchy by such conflicts of interest, which came to be a problem in all aspects of policy between central government ministers and their ministries. For him, the

[24] Francis W. Wcislo, 'Bureaucratic Reform in Tsarist Russia' (PhD thesis, US: Columbia University, 1984), p. 6.
[25] George Fischer, *Russian Liberalism* (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1969).

danger of western-oriented political models, including representative assemblies, was dangerous. It was a potential source of political authority at a time when the Russian peasantry was still caught up in the patriarchal relationship between the Tsar and the people. Every effort to enhance the power of the *zemstvos* was fought tooth and nail by the bureaucracy. They were eventually victorious in their struggle because, primarily, of the assassination of the Tsar. The new Tsar proved to be of reactionary tendency. With the triumph of the bureaucracy, Russian society was again prevented from partaking in political life.

THE GENTRY - THE DECLINING CLASS

The feudal power of the gentry (*dvorianstvo*) in Russia did not decline until the reforms of the 1860s, which was late compared with the rest of Europe. Yet what made the decline of this class different to similar movements in Europe was the change in the nature of the elite, and this itself was symbolic of the social and economic tensions at work. Politically, where once the gentry and the government had been on the same side, *zemstvo* debates made it clear from the 1860s that a schism in the traditional base of support for the autocracy had emerged. Although the emancipation had been more than favourable to the gentry, still a considerable amount of gentry wealth had been mortgaged to the state before 1861. Compensation awarded by the reform to landowners went to pay off debts, leaving very little for the development of the gentry economy. However, it was more a question of being able to function independently of the state - could the gentry survive the transition to become a class that would have

political influence? Since they were neither educated in business procedures nor versed in strict accounting practices, the new responsibilities of such a precarious position proved too much. Many landowners lost their estates in the modernising process of the years that followed, with relatively few managing to survive the new capitalist economy. On the whole, the gentry could not make the adjustment from old to new systems because so much had depended on feudalism.[26] The competition introduced by Capitalism and the freedom of the masses undermined their power base.

The gentry reacted to this in various ways. The Russian Liberalism of the 1860s was made up of those nobles whose differences were 'neither passionate nor clear cut'.[27] In general, they feared large-scale social reforms and did not believe in revolution, but they admired western models of government without knowing how best to transplant such concepts into Russian society. The undefined ideology of the Liberals at this time indicates that the gentry was only flirting with new ideas, at a time of decline and discontent among them. To the left of the mainstream Liberals were an off-shoot group called the Constitutionalists. Their rival ideology involved demands for the quicker pace of reform as well as the subjection of the monarch to the law, but their ideas led to the abolition of the monarchy rather than mere modification.

Much more significant was the philosophy of the gentry and the intelligentsia before 1881 known as Slavophilism - the 'first ideology of Russian nationalism',[28] and created by men who had connections with land. This was an ideology to the right of the Liberals, which rejected the idea of a constitution and parliament, maintaining the power of local self-government combined with the central power of the autocracy. Originally

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[26] Pipes states that by 1905, the gentry had lost a third of the land that they had kept by the Emancipation Act. Richard Pipes, *Russia Under the Old Regime*, (London: Penguin (Peregrine), 1979), pp. 141-171.
[27] Pipes, p. 250.
[28] Pipes, p. 266.

the Slavophiles were romantic thinkers who expressed a 'fundamental vision of integration, peace, and harmony among men'.[29] The reforms of Peter the Great had corrupted the true Russian traditions by allowing the infiltration of the Western 'disease'. At its height in the 1850s, the Slavophiles centred on, as they believed, the one distinguishing feature that differentiated it from other countries and national philosophies - the Russian Orthodox Church. All differences between them could be traced to the belief that only Orthodoxy was true to Christian ideals. Yet although the Slavophiles decried the traditions of the West, its philosophies were ultimately based on thinkers such as Hegel, believing that the Russian peasant was not 'alienated' as the European peasant was. The Russian tradition involved communal faith and lifestyle, not one based on concepts of law and individuality.

The Slavophile is therefore 'un-Russian' in concept, a demonstration of the infiltration of western ideas. The autocracy was being confronted with an increasing number of complex forms of opposition. Yet opponents such as the Slavophiles could have been allies had not the adherence, especially after 1881, to the idea of absolute monarchy made the separation of state from society even wider.

The gentry also made up the small number of radical, revolutionary element of pre-1881 Russian society. The majority of them were educated, and their ideas were based on the theoretical notion of social revolution. These revolutionaries were often estranged from the rest of their society. It was precisely the privilege of their noble birth that entitled them to an education enlightening them to the unfairness of the system of which they were a part. The frustration that this knowledge brought resulted in the works of Chernyshevsky, Herzen, Bakunin and in Turgenev's Bazarov, whose character embodied the frustration of educated and enlightened Russian youth who became the

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[29] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984) p. 362.

ultimate nihilist. By its very name, it is possible to see that Nihilism was a social ailment that offered no solution.

Only in the 1870s did an active programme become apparent. *Narodnaia Volia* (The People's Will) was established, and the revolutionaries began to take action. The 'going to the people' movement, although in practice a failure, was in theory felt to be the only way in which to motivate change in a society dominated by peasants. This populist approach prevailed upon radical thinking until the end of the century in various forms of splinter groups and movements. The busiest period of revolutionary action came between 1879-81, when *Narodnaia Volia* encouraged strikes and protests. They felt that a passive society that allowed a ban on the freedom of thought would be of no help to the revolution. However as Venturi has pointed out, the members of *Narodnaia Volia* were not united on this issue, as some felt that the encouragement of immediate strike action would not give 'theoretical depth' to terrorism.[30] It was feared that the real aims of the revolutionaries would become lost by too much action too soon. Although these fears were realised with the strong conservative reaction of the next reign, the terrorism of *Narodnaia Volia* continued, bringing the revolutionary face to face with the Tsar and culminating in the assassination of Alexander II in March 1881. Russian society was changed forever.

[30] Franco Venturi, *Roots of Revolution* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1960), p. 671-2.

The uncertainty surrounding the basis of the legality of the autocratic government affects what the historian accepts as a 'legal' government response to society, from revolutionary and peasant activity to journalistic opinion. Moreover, government response is an important way for the contemporary student of Russian history to understand how the autocracy felt it could retain control of society, regardless of whether or not it did. The onset of the bureaucratic 'police state' in the nineteenth century reveals that the autocracy gave away much power to its servants, i.e. government and police officials, bit by bit. As this was not a systematic or deliberate move on the part of the autocrat, riots and other forms of social protest were often met with inadequate means and measures.

Enforcement of the autocratic will was in the hands of Russia's police. However, the police state did not amount to much in practice. Klier records that the regular number of police was 47,866 in control of a total population of 127,000,000.[31] This figure is appropriate until 1900. In the 1870s with the rise of revolutionary terrorism, Alexander II called a special conference to deal with the restructuring and reorganising of the police, so that the need to call out the military for support in riot incidents and street violence would no longer exist. Despite increased police experience of dealing with the small numbers of revolutionary groups at work, it became apparent that the police lacked the efficiency and ability to disperse a crowd. Their lack of control in the face of peasant trouble becomes extremely important after 1881.

In the area of censorship and the Russian press, the police under Nicholas I in 1826 were given extra powers under a separate department - the Third Section - to deal with

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[31] John D. Klier, 'Orientation IV', chapter from unpublished book on Alexander III and the Jews of Russia, p.10.

what was considered dangerous opposition. Prior to the late eighteenth century, Russia's absolute rulers had forbidden private printing. Catherine II, although not above seizing materials that she disagreed with, had believed that one would only 'debase the human mind' by 'restraint' and 'oppression' by censorship ,[32] and used the press as a means with which to enlighten and educate her society. Alexander I kept a tight reign over censorship. He acted in the true spirit of an eighteenth century enlightened despot, by using those who would oppose government policy, for example academics, as writers and censors. Periodicals flourished, and there was an increase in the broadcasting of western ideas. The church was not in agreement with the Tsar on the liberal censorship policy, and when the conservative Nicholas ascended the throne, he found in the country's religious leaders a powerful ally. This marked the beginning of nineteenth century association of the Russian Orthodox Church with nationalism and the autocracy - an association that lasted until the twentieth century.

Nicholas I became personally involved in press matters, and his oppression was noted by the European press, which became very critical of Russia. Nicholas reacted to this by instituting police agents around Europe. The police became the national censors while the newly created Third Section was given private censorship powers. Indeed, Zaionchkovsky has shown that substantial funds were given to the Third Section in order to bribe writers to write favourably about Russia.[33] This appears to be a deliberate measure, and yet one that proved to be of less importance as a security measure than searching for would-be Tsarist assassins. What it reveals is that the government was trying to take control of the social and political situation but was not fully aware of what the situation was or what its priorities should have been.

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[32] Charles A. Ruud, *Fighting Words: Imperial Censorship and the Russian Press, 1804-1906* (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 19.
[33] Leonard Schapiro, 'Russian Censorship, Then & Now', *Encounter* 60 (1983), p.85.

Ruud has stated that Catherine II's regulations on the press were used as a model, and that it was pointed out by an official of the Third Section that unlike in Catherine's reign, society in 1828 was divided into the contented and the discontented. This assessment included the peasants. The tensions were brought on by the disaffection of war, of individual ministers and dreams of constitutionalism. With the emergence of the Slavophiles in the 1840s, came a growth of a more sophisticated opposition to the government. People such as the literary critic Belinski attacked the authorities for their lack of social and cultural progress, especially on the issue of serfdom.[34] The demand for social, personal rights coupled with the European revolutions of 1848, saw the immediate tightening of censorship.

Fear of revolutionary activity at home and fear of infiltration of western ideas into Russian society combined to encourage censorship. In general, there were two results: increased censorship raised social tensions to a new pitch, and writers were afraid to fall foul of the Tsar. They became unable to voice their opinions, and the effect on public opinion was to be profound. But as an absolute monarch, Nicholas was indifferent to this. He believed that not even the press had the right to protest against his policies. By the definition of autocracy, no-one was his equal. However, the second result was that the government was fearful; a fact that was made evident by the severity of the censorship imposed across the spectrum of Russian writers and foreign publications. According to Schapiro, 'the whole story of nineteenth century censorship shows in the clearest relief the limits of a police state, and the difference of such a polity from a totalitarian society.'[35] In Alexander III's society, censorship was a major part of the paternalistic approach towards the subjects of the autocrat.

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[34] Riasanovsky, p. 381.
[35] Schapiro, p. 87.

In the nineteenth century, the responses of both society and government were to be evident in the years between 1881 and 1894. After twenty six years and despite the reign of Alexander II, the autocratic will returned to the status quo, government concerns were based on the same fears, but the tensions in society had developed beyond the capability of government awareness and understanding. The best illustration of this can be seen in the peasant arena.

Social bipolarity in Russia is best illustrated by the differences in cultural perceptions. Pipes has said that peasant understanding appeared to deal only with specific customs and traditions of heritage.[36] This itself would differ from village to village, so that it is extremely difficult for the historian to talk of a general peasant culture. Certainly terms such as 'revolution', 'society', and 'war' revealed a comprehension problem, as the local government courts often discovered, when trying peasants for crimes that they could not conceive of as crimes. This included the crime of resistance and unrest.

Indeed, it would appear that the more the bureaucracy interfered in peasant life using modern terms, the more confused and isolated the peasantry became from the rest of society. Autocracy and paternalism ruled so completely that political awareness of the peasantry appeared to have developed very slowly outside village boundaries, and there was great distrust of any outsider. This distrust is reflected in the many proverbs that remained in peasant folklore until the end of the nineteenth century. Peasant proverbs of the 1860s reflect fear of change, suspicion of the authorities and of anything different - 'Politics is a rotten egg' (*Politika - tukhloe iaitso*); 'Be friendly with the bear, but hang on to your axe (*S medvedem druzhis', a za topor derzhis'*); Pray to God and don't anger the devil' (*Bogu molis', a chorta ne gnevi*).[37] Pipes points out that it was only in the late nineteenth century that the peasant became acquainted with the Bible, and was able to quote passages from it.[38] This is significant in light of the data in Chapter Five, and it is relevant to peasant social development and growth at a time when so much was

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[36] Pipes, p. 158.
[37] John S. Reshatar, 'Russian Ethnic Values', *The Transformation of Russian Society: Aspects of Social Change since 1861* ed. by C. E. Black (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1970), pp. 559-560.
[38] Pipes, p. 161.

forcing the break-up of their traditions, their families and their stability. It also gave them a new outlook on society, that was less fatalistic and resigned than hitherto.

The harshness of peasant life is reflected in peasant philosophy, as it was in the philosophy of the generations of people before them. Central to the peasantry's (*narod*) belief was the notion of strength that one gained from sorrow and from suffering, symbolising the life of Christ and his disciples. The peasants' indifference to hardship and resignation to it, also made them indifferent to violence which became a normal part of their society, totally acceptable alongside religious belief.[39] Along with many others, this religious idea was anathema to the government, who interpreted it as the inherent naiveté of the masses. However, rioting and violence were viewed by the government simply as an 'absence of legal consciousness'.[40]

Similarly, the concept of property and land was enshrined in two different systems of belief - that of the State, which decreed that all property questions were to be decided by reference to the law, and that of the peasants, whose only law was based on what was perceived as natural ownership of the land. The different definitions of property crime reflected this. To the peasants, taking from another's property if that person had plenty, i.e. trees for fuel, was not considered to be a crime. The forests were not made by the landowner, so therefore they could take from it. Such practices gave rise to the notion among educated society of an absence of legal consciousness or sense of ethics among educated society, but in fact the peasants had a very strong code of behaviour. They did not steal from just anywhere, but only from those they thought could afford it. To the State this was a major crime. Property was the hallmark of the ruling classes and a fundamental tenet of society that could not be abused, and the punishments they meted

[39] Cathy A. Frierson, 'From 'Narod' to 'Kulak': Peasant Images in Russia, 1870-1885', (PhD thesis, US: Harvard University 1985), p. 282.
[40] Seton-Watson , p. 516.

out in their own courts caused considerable resentment. For peasants, 'real' crimes were those that affected their livelihoods, not unlike the peasantries in Western Europe. One of the most serious crimes, therefore, was that of theft - of a property essential to survival - especially horse theft, followed by murder and incest. To the State, horse theft was a petty crime.

The often brutal punishments meted out by peasants to their own were against the State law. In particular, the punishment of *samosud* was illegal but this did not prevent the peasants from carrying it out. It was reserved for horse thieves, arsonists and witches, and involved lynching and mob violence. Such a punishment served to reinforce the power of the peasant authorities and to strengthen the division between the majority and the better off minority. Popular justice left the punishment of women to their husbands which often meant death, and children could be publicly flogged if they committed a crime against the property of the village. However, when a fine was imposed by the State - considered by the State to be a light penalty - the peasants thought it a most cruel and damaging punishment, because loss of money meant a lack of food.

The so-called absence of legal consciousness in the countryside was actually a misinterpretation of the internal workings of peasant society. There was custom, not law. There was no process of deliberation, or belief in debate. Rapid decision-making was finalised with vodka, but these agreements were enduring and popular in a society that could not afford to move indecisively in times of modernisation. For the peasant, the law was laid out in the ritual, and not in discussion. Lewin and Yaney have written about a 'peasant customary law' in Russia, so strong was the tradition governing peasant mentality on matters of ownership and rights to land.[41] Lewin states that the *pravo*

[41] George L. Yaney, 'Some Suggestions Regarding the Study of Russian Peasant Society Prior to Collectivisation', *RR*, 44 (1985).

truda (right of labour), gave the person who worked the land the right to the land, i.e. the noble did not have the right to own the land; and the *pravo na trud* (right to labour) which was a more complex statement of peasant needs.[42] From these basic rights followed the family's right to exist, the family being the basis of village survival. An attack on this led to an undermining of peasant village life. From the government's point of view however, the peasantry had to be brought under the control of the general law so that the state of anarchy that the government believed to exist, would disappear. Yet by instituting a separate law, known as *krest'ianskoe pravo* (peasant rights), for the peasants only, the government simply encouraged peasant social isolation adding even further to their grievances.

Indeed, crucial to the issue is the fact that not all peasants were serfs just as all peasants were not farmers or tillers. This made it hard to govern judicially the peasants as a single entity, but it also highlights the diversity of peasant economics. The government therefore divided the peasants into those who were owned by the state and those who were owned directly by a landlord.[43] The latter group was known as the serfs because of their complete dependence on the landlord who could sell or keep them as he wished. The state peasants were usually defined by area and while not technically serfs, they were at the mercy of the autocrat. Apart from other small groups of 'free' peasants, who were of non-Russian origin and who paid contributions to the Russian state, 33 categories of state peasant alone were listed in 1838.

Geographically, peasants met different problems which would have contributed to the diversity of grievances. Those in the non-blacksoil area, the central industrial region including Moscow and St Petersburg suffered more from insufficient grain

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[42] Moshe Lewin, 'Customary Law and Russian Rural Society in the Post-Reform Era', *RR*, 44 (1985), p. 6.
[43] Roger Bartlett, 'The Russian Peasantry on the Eve of the French Revolution', *HEI*, 12 (1990), p. 398.

production[44] and a plethora of modern industrial problems. In the blacksoil belt including Karkov, Poltava and Chernigov, the left-bank Ukraine and the Mid-Volga, where the land was exclusively rural and arable, but the weather was bad, and the soil suffered from depletion, there was always the potential problems of debt and famine. Those on the Western periphery, the Baltic Sea and the Danube in the South were made up mainly of Baltic peasants, many of whom had been freed by Alexander I. Those in the Southern Steppes including Kherson, Taurida and Ekaterinoslav had plenty of rich soil and were close to the southern warm ports, but there were problems of shortage of labour, of peasant migration and of 'rootlessness'. Peasant gatherings at the rail and river lines were common by the 1880s, and at Kherson there was one occasion when 9,000 workers gathered at one time.[45] Mixter's research into the gatherings of workers at work-hiring markets in the Steppe area from 1853 has shown that they were indeed places where the mobilising of collective action took place. He concludes that peasants were capable of utilising the social space of the hiring market 'for the articulation of conflicting values which in other cases often remained below the surface when peasants and outsiders interacted with one another'.[46] Clearly there is no simple answer to why there was peasant unrest, but there is an entanglement of factors, including demography, environment, the intrusion of the patriarchal state and modern industrial forces, and the heritage of the peasants' own lives and traditions.

Given the question about the origins of pogroms in 1881 in this context, it must be asked why a plan would have been needed to start riots. A backward, rural peasant without answers as to why he had such a hard life, what the benefits of the emancipation

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[44] Hamberg, *Politics of the Russian Nobility, 1881-1905*, p. 31.
[45] Hamberg, p.35.
[46] Timothy Mixter, 'The Hiring market as Workers' Turf: Migrant Agricultural Laborers and the Mobilization of Collective Action in the Steppe Grainbelt of European Russia, 1853-1913' in *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia, 1800-1921* (US: Princeton University Press, 1991) ed. by Esther Kingston-Mann, p. 334.

settlement were, or why he had to go looking for work to survive, would not have needed much encouragement to enjoy himself, to let himself be 'free', as defined below. To vent his anger and express his grievance against authority would have also been an expression of this freedom. Therefore, to plunder, to loot from his employers, i.e. taverns, factories and private property, and to get drunk would perhaps not seem unfair from his perspective, and from ours it appears to be doubly plausible.

Field equates the peoples' traditional belief in the Tsar, termed by the Soviets 'naive monarchism', with the blind acceptance of the legitimacy of the autocracy. Inextricably tied up with this was the peasant concept of freedom.[47] The Tsar brought them freedom in delivering them from the evil squires, authorities, tax collectors and so on. Ideas of freedom were increasingly based on resistance, a "thoroughly destructive concept, an act of revenge on the forces that forever frustrated them".[48] To express their freedom from this, they were "to enjoy license, to revel, carouse, set things on fire", and they did. The belief's origins were rooted in earlier experiences when Tsars were rulers who came directly from the people, and who led uprisings against oppression. In this sense, the peasantry or *narod* based their freedom on a backward-looking model. Venturi says that there was the *volia narodnaia,* freedom of the people, and *volia kazennaya,* freedom of the state.[49] The former meant freedom from the landowner so that the peasant would have rights to the land he worked and he could be 'free' to belong to the Tsar directly, but the latter could not allow this because it would have meant the sanctioning of anarchy, i.e. the overthrowing of the nobility from their estates. Yet by encouraging the continuation of these naive beliefs for their own reasons, the authorities were endorsing the backwardness of the peasantry.

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[47] Daniel Field, *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar* (US: Unwin & Allen, 1989), p. 1.
[48] Pipes, p.156.
[49] Venturi, p. 211.

Thus it can be said that the Emancipation Act was less important as a piece of progressive legislation than as an indication of the new socio-economic forces at work in Russian society. The peasant lost more than he gained, and with the breakdown of the traditional peasant commune (*mir* or *obshchina*), resulting in both the loss of land and the loss of the security of communal and financial support. Redemption payments to the government for the land were so high that they became unrealistic and were eventually abolished in 1905. Hence there was considerable incentive for moonlighting activities and unrest. What the state did not appear to understand was that if the Tsar did not 'reward' the peasantry for their patience and loyalty, or honour the relationship between them, he would not have been truly accepted by them as the Tsar. It was the institution of Tsar they were loyal to, and they had their own set of expectations and ideas of legality that went unrecognised by the authorities. Nicholas II was to be made fully aware of this.

In the early years after 1861, it was possible for industrialisation and agricultural feudalism to co-exist, even though they were theoretically, and ultimately, incompatible. The static nature of peasant demands meant that many aspects of their lifestyle could be preserved. One of these aspects was the routine of seasonal migration.[50] There came a unique time when peasants, not being needed by their commune and no longer being serfs, would migrate to the cities to be manual, unskilled workers in industry, and then return to their homes when the communes needed them. In this way peasants eventually became proletarians as their traditional patterns broke down, and increasing numbers of peasants stayed in the cities to take up work in industry. From 1861 - 1881, the effects of this transformation provide vital clues to the historian for determining the origins of the violence which broke out in the years that followed. Glickman has suggested that in

[50] Men and women would travel often significant distances from their own villages in order to find work at other regional harvesting times.

the change from peasant to proletarian, the years from 1880 show that 'the legacy of serfdom weighed heavily upon them'.[51] Indeed, they were only twenty years from serfdom.

The embryonic form of proletarian adapted well initially to the patriarchal system of employer-employee relationships emerging in the new industries, because it was an element that was part of the agricultural lifestyle the peasant had left behind. It also neatly replaced the role of employer for the role of government. The employer was in charge of his workers' lives, not just their working hours. This was a factor which was to have a considerable effect on the development of the codes and laws of industrialisation when the relationship progressed from its early transient form to become a major problem after 1894. A misunderstanding that arose before the 1880s was the revolutionaries' assumption that the 'proto-proletarians', as they have been called,[52] were thinking as socialists, believing in the forward-looking philosophies of Marxism and Populism, and preparing for the fight for their communistic future. In fact, the rebellions of the time suggest that the proto-proletarian was angry about the trappings of his freedom, his 'land-hunger', and wanted to return to the old days of relative plenty, without so much as a thought for Socialism.

Peasant conservatism is a major reason for the unrest of this period in the rural communes where people were affected most by the new laws. It was the communes which 'began to function as veritable pressure cookers of discontent'.[53] The peasant way of dealing with the system was indicative of their attitude towards the whole of society. The people were extremely pro-Tsarist in their loyalties, and remained so until the bloody disillusionment of 1905. Here again the revolutionaries made a serious

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[51] Susan M. Vorderer, 'Urbanisation and Industrialisation in Late Imperial Russia' (PhD Thesis, US: Boston College, 1990), p. 533.
[52] A term used by many historians as Robert J. Brym notes in *The Jewish Intelligentsia and Russian Marxism* (London: MacMillan Press, 1978), p. 22.
[53] Brym, p. 19.

mistake; they did not appreciate the strength of the peoples' love for the Tsar until after the reign of Alexander III. They misunderstood the causes of peasant action.

It was precisely because of popular patriarchal monarchism that there was resistance to the authorities. Field states that the peasants were not as stupid as the authorities supposed them to be.[54] Their frequent pleas of delusion and foolishness were to ensure lighter punishments in court. This is significant in light of the fact that the peasants blamed a ukase ordering them to attack the Jews during the pogrom wave of 1881-2, a ukase of which there is no objective evidence. The peasant plea of ignorance and fear of authority appears to provide a far more plausible explanation of events than that offered by those historians who insist that such a ukase was issued, without any record to support their belief.

The real problem facing historians of the Russian peasantry is how little research has been done, or indeed can be done, on what really motivated peasants at the time. Contemporary attempts to question them were faced with suspicion or stupidity or ignorance, either feigned or genuine, and proved fruitless. There is no documentation available to show that the peasants did understand what was meant by society at large, or that they did believe literally in the rule of the autocracy. Field maintains however that they were neither naive nor passive. He uses the Chigrin affair in 1876 as an example of this.[55] Peasants would not accept the government's imposition of land settlement and forms of land tenure, so they organised themselves into a secret society which was pledged to secure freedom through armed resistance to nobles and police, as well as to a new system of land tenure. It was discovered the following year that this society had over a thousand members, and it was based on the grievances of the peasantry developed over several years.

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[54] Field, p. 210.
[55] Field, pp. 113-202.

In general there were a number of forms of peasant unrest and resistance that took place in the nineteenth century. For the most part this social protest was passive and ongoing. Included in it were collective petitions, the most legal and general form of peasant protest. Then there was collective litigation, and disobedience through passive resistance, which would usually follow the other measures if they had been unsuccessful. It involved going against the orders of the estate administration, refusing to work, and refusal to elect 'rubber-stamp' officers of the commune. To avoid military conscription, debts or taxes, persecution by a landlord, police or other officials, people often resorted to flight. Though it was illegal because of the communal structure and dependence on each member to pull their weight, it required the minimum organisation and was therefore regarded as an easier option.

If these 'softer' measures failed, more drastic action could be taken. Illegal organised assemblies could be held where major decisions were taken from the boycotting of alcohol to the destruction of taverns and armed resistance to the police. As Kahan[56] importantly notes however, most of these measures were spearheaded by leaders appointed by the peasants themselves. These leaders were often more educated, intelligent, and travelled than most, but they were not agitators in the revolutionary sense. This was a fact that was unknown to the authorities because they could not envisage the existence of such independent people (i.e. from revolutionary influence) and therefore did not investigate the possibility of leadership among the peasantry beyond the realm of their own fears. The social grouping of the peasantry was evidently complex beyond social awareness. In addition to this, other class groups such as the lower clergy and the military had incomes and cultures not unlike the peasantry. Bartlett quotes a report in 1827 on peasant attitudes. Among the serf class, was found 'far more thinking

[56] Arcadius Kahan, *Russian Economic History* (US: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 157-8.

minds than one might suppose at first sight'. Even more revealing is that 'among the peasantry are to be met [religious] itinerants [*stranniki*] who talk with them about their condition.'[57] The significance of this phenomenon is examined below (Chapter Five).

Then there were the more active forms of resistance. Violation of property rights was seen as 'recovering property' that belonged to them - especially after the Emancipation. Such action increased greatly after 1861 ranging from stealing livestock, grain, and wood to using arson to burn down agricultural land and forests. Assault and murder were usually the last resort of the desperate peasant, often with the help of domestic servants when the victim of the attack was a landlord.

Bartlett notes however, that it was not unusual for peasant unrest to occur at the start of a new reign. By 1881, such unrest had both traditional and modern roots. Traditionally, it was a time for the peasants to voice their grievances about unfulfilled expectations of reforms, as well to display the strength of the people which used to produce pretenders to the throne. Alexander III was the first Tsar to ascend the throne since the 1861 reform, and he did so amidst fear and violence. From the peasant wars of early modern Russian history, including the Pugachov rebellion,[58] to the outbreak of the pogrom wave in 1881, any eruption of violence and unrest gave vent to the fury arising from a multitude of complex peasant grievances. Yet at the same time it must be remembered that it was not the autocracy that the peasants were fighting. They were not trying to change the system of rule as communist history has written. Bartlett calls the unrest a reaction to a change in circumstances. The peasants clearly had their own way of expressing themselves, regardless of the extent of their social development within the Russian social framework.

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[57] Report of Count Benkendorff to Tsar Nicholas I in Roger Bartlett, 'The Russian Peasantry on the Eve of the French Revolution', *HEI* 12 (1990), p. 413.

[58] 1773-75. Led by the Cossack Pugachov, his numerous followers expressed a variety of peasant grievances from working conditions in the Urals to landlord-serf squabbles. Pugachev himself was protesting about arrears in his service pay.

The form of the expression appears to have differed from region to region. Pipes points out the difference between the work cycle of peasants in the central region to those in the South-west.[59] In the central region, the peasants did not work from November to February when most of the holidays took place. From April to September however, the peasants were kept constantly busy. It is interesting that in the South-west this was not the case, and it was in these months - April to September, and in this region - that the pogrom wave of 1881 was at its strongest.

Despite peasant dissatisfaction with redemption payments and with having less land than before the Emancipation, Hamberg states that the peasants remained passive up to and including the reign of Alexander III.[60] But the fact that there was a peasant revival of active resistance after 1895, beggars the question of peasant capability for independent thought of action during the 1880s. Clearly the peasantry knew how to resist authority by collective action, and how to deal decisively with problems. It would therefore appear not to be too much of a leap into the dark to suggest that peasant capability for thought and action was well established by the reign of Alexander III.

This is not to suggest that the peasantry were thinking along revolutionary lines. The failure of the 'going to the people' movement in the 1870s shows this was not the case. Perhaps the real reasons can never be established because they were a mix of deep-rooted social problems stemming from before the Emancipation, and aggravated by the Emancipation; and new problems of increasing physical and social isolation from the rest of society.

Certain aspects of peasant life were common throughout the empire. Vodka was a major part of peasant culture and lifestyle, but it also helped to record the break-up of that life. Christian's research has shown that there were two distinct kinds of drinking

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[59] Pipes, p. 142.
[60] Hamberg, pp. 201-3.

habit.[61] The traditional habit was associated with the community, with seasonal harvest, and religious festive occasions. It was a collective activity to celebrate, but the celebration was always at a definite time. Families drank together, and the peasants overindulged as a way of escape and for recreation. In traditional farming work culture, drink was taken at certain times and to excess. At these times, religious celebrations would become a tour of the local village with icons held aloft. All would partake, including the priest. Indeed, most village priests were hardly more educated or abstemious than their parishioners. The financial arrangements for buying the vodka were pre-arranged in a number of contracts, when those buying would have been quite sober, although the deal was confirmed with vodka. No wedding, funeral or birth could have been celebrated otherwise. As a ceremonial procedure, drink was a cohesive force in peasant life, and there was no division of age or sex. It epitomised the close-knit community life in which mutual support and the social regulation of behaviour co-existed.

With the introduction of factory life and industrialisation contributing to migration, a more modern drinking habit began to replace the old one. Urbanisation and the rise of the cash economy brought the tavern and the lone drinker together. This increasingly meant an all male drinking culture, and at any time. It was an anti-social pursuit as far as the family was concerned, although it did much to bring workers together. The original reasons for drinking were no longer there - not to celebrate, not to mark a seasonal event, but just for the individual to drink. The money spent was usually money not budgeted for that purpose, and so financially the new habit was potentially ruinous. The main importance of the modern drinking habit however, was that unhappy workers

[61] David Christian, *Living Water: Vodka and Russian Society on the Eve of Emancipation* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).

drinking together needed little incitement to violence. The tavern provided the means for such incitement to take place.

Apart from the new drinking culture, families broke up because of the new working regime. Peasant agricultural and farming work was based on the family working together on land that belonged to them under the rules of the commune. Once one individual began to earn more, an inequality in the earning ability gave rise to resentment and friction. Many younger members of the family left the village for town life to start their own family units that were smaller and without communal support. Coupled with peasant indebtedness after the land settlement, internal migration began to increase. The government became concerned with the question of how to control the social movement of the masses and the issuing of internal passports became a major issue.[62]

There are a number of striking parallels between the liquor protests in 1859 and the pogroms of 1881. According to the police, the disturbances were incited by outsiders. There were rumours among the peasantry that the Tsar was to sanction the riots by sending emissaries that would proclaim that the time for peasant freedom had come. The peasants would know it was a genuine call because the emissaries would carry seals from the Tsar himself.[63] In the case of Tambov province riots, the rioters were known to be a group that included peasants, townspeople and soldiers on leave. The rumour that started the trouble involved vodka. It was on sale for too high a price, and taverns were being sacked as a result. When fighting started, shops and stalls in the market square where everyone was gathered were immediately looted. Not long after, attacks were made not only on tavern keepers but on their families as well.

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[62] Jeffrey Burds, 'The Social Control of Peasant Labour in Russia: The Response of Village Communities to Labour Migration in the Central Industrial Region, 1861-1905', in *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia*, pp. 70-77.
[63] Christian, pp. 322-3.

Many other places suffered similar fates once the original riot and its cause - the high price of vodka - became known. All these elements featured in the pogroms of Alexander III's reign. What is suggested here is that once peasant grievances found an outlet and their anger was put into motion, there was nothing that could stop the flow of violence and brutality that ensued. Certainly no authority could have claimed to control it.

In addition to the above, other factors causing change have been examined. In village life, there were sharp divisions in the living space between men and women, and clear definitions of the work carried out by each sex. It has been made apparent that 'the advent of capitalism led to a deterioration in the appreciation of the work done by women', especially as the government tax (head tax) forced more and more people to live under one roof, causing more tension and friction between families and among the community as a whole.[64] Enhancing the role of violence in peasant life was the belief in magic and mystical religion. Drawn from sources of fatalism and paganism, an illustration of this combination can be seen in the peasant concept of the devil. Trachtenberg wrote that the peasants saw the devil as one to be outsmarted, or whose help could be enlisted, rather than one who was to be feared. The devil would appear in all kinds of human and recognisable forms, including hysterical women, drunk conversations, the evil eye and yawning. Feast days were said to have magical associations, with goblins, elves and spirits appearing in various guises. It was common for mourners to stroll through the graveyards, eat on the grave and wait for the soul, all in order to appease the dead.[65] These activities and beliefs had very little to do with the Russian Orthodox Church.

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[64] Frank, 'Cultural Conflict and Criminality in Rural Russia, 1861-1900', p.187.
[65] Joshua Trachtenberg, *The Devil and the Jews: The Medieval Conception of the Jew & Its Relation to Modern Anti-Semitism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943).

More recent research by Frank[66] has revealed the extent to which witches as medicinal healers played a role, i.e. a practical element, in peasant life. The peasant conception of illness and disease was inextricably tied to the idea of supernatural forces at work.[67] Thus if a village was struck down with a plague, it was considered that somehow the witch or sorcerer had been offended and the village was paying the price. Ramer cites cases where those suspected of witchcraft were brutally punished. It is clear that any member of the community who was perceived as different, or who acted in a way unacceptable to the peasant cultural norm, would pay a heavy penalty.

Kingston Mann[68] states that for historians the peasant question has always been a choice between regarding the peasantry as objects, i.e. victims, or subjects, i.e. shapers of change. This was the state of research on the issue until the 1980s when it became possible to examine archival material that provided evidence to show that they were a complex mixture of both. In addition to the Soviet revolutionary and the traditional paternalistic approaches of the gentry, there is now another idea that is gaining ground . The universalist approach views the peasant as being as human as the next person, and therefore capable of the same things. The Populist approach also remains valid for many, i.e. that great emphasis is put on the strength and development of peasant folklore and tradition. Both these last mentioned approaches to the peasant question will be shown to be important in gaining further insight into the growing activity and capability of the Russian peasantry in the late nineteenth century.

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[66] Frank's research has shown that punishment of 'magical' people carried out by peasants continued into the 1890s, in Stephen P. Frank, 'Popular Justice, Community and Culture among the Russian Peasantry, 1870-1900', *RR* 46 (1987), pp. 26[illegible]-2.
[67] Samuel C. Ramer, 'Traditional Healers and Peasant Culture in Russia, 1861-1917', in *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia*, p. 213.
[68] Esther Kingston-Mann, 'Breaking the Silence: An Introduction', *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia*, p. 3.

The use of the word *evrei* ((Jew) in Russian only became more widespread than the more derogatory term of *zhid* (yid) in Russia after the annexation of Polish lands by Catherine II. The change in government phraseology can be perceived as the government's first serious attempt to make the Jews an ordinary religious minority, without special treatment. But did the change occur within Russian society? Klier says it changed nothing for the peasantry, and Jewish stereotypes remained the same in Russian literature.[69] The Russian press is a useful source in the analysis of the depth to which any change occurred in more educated Russian society. Indeed, there was a battle between newspapers over whether or not the use of the term *zhid* was insulting.[70]

Certainly Klier states that the hostility of the authorities filtered down to the press in the late 1860s. If this is so, surely the confusion of the authorities in the 1880s was also reflected in the press. This is a difficult question to answer in detail since strict censorship along Nicholaevan lines were in force. Jews were described in state-favoured newspapers such as *Grahzdanin* as anti-social, with no interest in, or loyalty to, Russia, and they were exploitative. Yet the question of Jewish assimilation, emancipation and emigration did continue to be discussed in government circles.

The tightening of censorship would appear to imply that, as many have believed, the government did not want its supposed anti-Semitic policy being discussed in the open. It could be more forcibly argued that it was in fact a means of containing the unrest and disorder. Authorities feared that the printed word would be directly translated into violence on the street. This explanation would imply that law and order came first, and indeed were the only factors of a 'policy' that the government remained consistently

[69] John D. Klier, 'Zhid: Biography of a Russian Epithet', *SEER*, 60 (1982).
[70] The battle referred to was that between *Den'*, *Novoe Vremia* and others between 1869-70.

adhered to throughout the reign. Klier has shown that state circulars, although imbued with anti-Semitism, were more concerned with security.[71]

In the early 1860s, the Crimean war, the Emancipation Act, and the Polish Rebellion,[72] all had repercussions on the Jewish Question in Russian society. Questions were raised about the horrors of the Cantonist system (described below), Jewish economic life and its role in Russia, and the government's treatment of minorities in general. These issues added to the complexities of the Jewish Question for a new generation, and the subject began to be taken more seriously in the press.[73] Moreover, educated Jews began to enter the debate in the Russian press, advocating for the most part assimilation of the Jews with Russians. Some agreed with the view that measures should be taken to interfere with certain aspects of Jewish life, such as adherence to Jewish law.

To be heard at all in Russia, the Jewish voice had to base its opinion on a fundamentally racist angle of the situation. Although there were varying responses to the Jewish Question, all of them were based on this accepted concept. Even those who conceded that the Russian Christian world had to take some responsibility for depriving the Jews of civil rights, and that the Russian social environment had helped to produce some anti-social Jewish traits, considered that those Russians should 'cleanse' the Jews and help them curb their natural 'negative' racial characteristics. Klier has called this mild Judeophilia. It did not outlive the 1860s, and perhaps it was mild in relative terms, because the situation of the Jews was never any better than this. However, because

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[71] John D. Klier, '1855-1894 Censorship of the Press in Russian and the Jewish Question', *JSS*, 48 (1986), pp. 264-5.

[72] An uprising of Polish Nationalists in 1863 in which some Jews had taken part as Polish subjects against the Russian imperial yoke.

[73] Klier examines the press extensively on this subject in '1855-1894: Censorship of the Press in Russia and the Jewish Question' *JSS*, 48 (1986) pp. 257-268; and 'The Jewish *Den'* and the Literary Mice 1869-1871', *RH*, 10 (1983).

'philo' implies a bias in favour of an idea, it is more accurate to describe the phenomenon as passive anti-Semitism, and it was inherent in Russian culture.

It was this inherent passive anti-Semitism that led to inconsistent policies over the years, and policies based on racial assumption. Peter I, a great reformer, and Elizabeth had professed no love for the Jews. Catherine II took an indifferent view of the question, but she was greatly influenced by French humanism. Thus her reaction was not a traditionally Russian one. The provisions of the Statute of 1804 were primarily educational. The *kahal*, the Jewish communal leadership body, was made subordinate to local Russian institutions. The trend of the liberal days of Alexander I was to 'transform' Jews into good citizens, and for Christians to recognise the potential in Jews. By restricting their harmful activities and encouraging useful ones, Jew and Gentile could be brought together. This included gradual settlement of Jews throughout the empire, but this assimilation clearly had as its goal the superiority of Gentile over Jewish culture. Nicholas I was noted for his severe treatment of all religious and political sects that sought to be different, and his absolute rule was totally incompatible with allowing freedoms of this kind. His abolition of the *kahal* was a statement along these lines, and more specifically, that he intended to force assimilation on the Jews by removing fundamental aspects of their culture. They would have to obey the law of the land like everyone else, which included the loss of any special privileges. It was hoped that this would help break down their exploitation of the peasantry through the tavern and alcohol trade.

The move made it clear that the government did not understand how the Jewish community survived. By placing restrictions on one of the few trades that was open to them, economic disaster was almost inevitable. The government also failed to understand that the economic role of the Jew was part of the exploitative autocratic

system - they were in many cases as vital to the gentry and landowners as vodka revenues were to the government. Congress Poland was an example. The de-centralisation of power over the Jews allowed them to work for feudal estates. This gave the gentry the tax revenue claims from Jews formerly given to the monarchy.[74] There then arose a situation where the Jews were extremely useful to the gentry and damaging to the peasantry, accounting for the number of peasant uprisings that were aimed jointly at noble landlords and Jewish tavern-owners.[75]

The lack of comprehension regarding the social set-up of either community was reflected by the fact that the 1804 Statute was mild in comparison to what had been originally proposed. The error was repeated with the May Laws of 1882, which were a modified form of Ignat'ev's first proposals. The government structure allowed for debate and opposition. On issues such as the Jewish Question, it adopted a middle-of-the-road approach that was consistent with the haphazard and discriminatory policies that began to appear in the late 1880s-90s. It was a case of ignorance breeding doubt, and doubt breeding fear and reaction - a situation that was easily reached under Tsars such as Nicholas I and Alexander III; both ruthless, indifferent but limited men. Nicholas I's notorious 'Cantonist' system[76] was a terrible blow to the Jewish community who could see in it nothing but systematic government persecution of their people. By enforcing apparently necessary reforms, it would not have occurred to them that the Tsar believed that his actions were for their long-term benefit. The result was the traumatic breakdown of Jewish communal relations, trust and solidarity.

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[74] Hillel Levine, 'Between Polish Autarky and Russian Autocracy: The Jews, The *Propinacja*, and the Rhetoric of Reform', *IRSH*, 27 (1982).
[75] ibid.
[76] Begun under Peter I to form battalions of children from unwanted situations, Nicholas reformed it so that Jewish male children from as young as 7 would be taken by force for a compulsory service of 25 years: in effect, this was persecution through forced conversion.

The crisis among the nobility after 1861 was another factor that affected Russian attitudes to the Jewish community. Antipathy to industrialisation caused insecurity about their future role in the social structure, and loss of land caused much anger and fear which came to be directed at foreign competition, and in particular, at the Jewish population. Jews were therefore resented by the very people that they helped sustain, especially so after the Emancipation settlements. In the industrial setting, where unrest often erupted among the vast groups of people that were living together, workers were usually migrants from across all regions of the empire. They had come searching for work. The Jewish population of such places was a separate force, usually because they performed a different function. In the mining town of Iuzovka, Jews were administrators, book-keepers and tavern-owners, and they formed between 15% and 20% of the population.[77] There was little or no integration of the Jewish community with the factory or mine workers. They were given responsible positions because the authorities and industrialists knew that there would be no integration or joining of forces. The Jew was seen as the outsider, not to be trusted.

In large primitive social groups, the isolation of the Jews was therefore a normal and acceptable situation. Yet Bunge had said that 'the state requires protection from being dominated by a race which unfailingly strives to subordinate the interests of every country to the interests of Jewdom.'[78] How could educated, enlightened men such as Bunge, a central government minister, subscribe to such an opinion? As Aronson has discovered from his research, there were many levels of discrimination.[79] He states that minority legislation ranges from extermination to ethnic autonomy. Extermination was a policy used by Ivan the Terrible, involving the physical destruction of the Jews.

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[77] Theodore H. Friedgut, *Iuzovka and Revolution: Life and Work in Russia's Donbass, 1869-1924* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 199. Iuzovka was a town in the Donbass named after the English industrialist John Hughes.
[78] Bunge, p. 31.
[79] I. Michael Aronson, 'Nationalism and Jewish Emancipation in Russia: The 1880s', *NP*, 5 (1977).

Expulsion was used when the attitude of the day favoured ridding the country of the 'contaminating' race. Discrimination itself can be divided into that stream of thought which had assimilation as its ultimate goal, and that which was aimed at the opposite. The latter entailed enforced segregation, legal, political, social and economic disabilities and lack of civil rights. Those who followed this line of thought decreed that a minority is a burden on society, but it is also a danger. Under no circumstances, they believed, should these people assimilate with the native population because they would dominate, corrupt and exploit them. All the Tsars of the nineteenth century, except for Alexander II, followed this line of thought.

Discrimination with the aim of promoting assimilation still punishes the minority for being different, but offers incentives of various rights to force them to assimilate and therefore to become accepted in society. This has been called an 'attraction' policy.[80] Discrimination becomes minimal with either partial or complete 'acceptance'. Partial acceptance is a more passive and long-term policy with the ultimate expectation of assimilation. It allows the minority to develop naturally, while seeing it as different. Complete acceptance lets the minority live without expectation of eventual change, allowing equal rights, and freedom to practise traditions without official encouragement or discouragement. At the extreme end of the scale is ethnic autonomy. This involves official encouragement of the differences of the minority while treating its members as equal, allowing self-government, educational institutions and national rights. Although both extremes are based on different attitudes towards equality, freedom and tolerance, they share the view that the minority is inevitably different from everyone else, a supposition rooted in racist ideas. When this idea combines with nationalism, it is

[80] Aronson, p. 171.

difficult to say for sure which way the pendulum will swing, as negative and positive discrimination both reinforce the message given out by such separatism.

In Russia, positive discrimination was never the issue. Indeed, the question for successive governments concerned the extent to which negative discrimination should be employed. In retrospect, it is necessary to ask to what degree did Russian society as a whole have complete freedom and civil rights. Aronson suggests that the Jews were useful as a tool to compensate for the 'inequality within the Russian nationality'.[81] Yet during the reign of Alexander II, tentative steps were made towards Jewish emancipation, involving some economic and social freedoms. The government of Alexander III quickly put paid to this.

Jews were a special case when it came to their legal status, set apart from every other social group in the empire. Yet Alexander III was at pains to make it clear that Jews were no different to any of his other subjects. Already a contradiction was established between the law and the aims of the policy. It is important to remember that this contradiction did characterise other aspects of government policy, although the legal aspects of the Jewish Question were prominent. When put into a context where Russian society at large suffered at the hands of this trend in government policy-making, i.e. social and economic discrimination, it becomes more difficult to interpret the policy as aimed specifically against the Jews.

[81] Aronson, p. 174.

What was happening within the Jewish community throughout this time? How did the Jews view the Russian government and Russian society, and what actions from within the community signalled the fundamental changes that took place in these relationships, especially in the light of the pogroms?

For centuries Jews had lived along the borders of Russia, Poland and Slovenia[82] in an existence that had changed very little in that time. Jewish life was based on the laws of the Talmud.[83] Secular life was an unknown concept, for the Talmud set out rules for life that were inseparable from the religion. The language they spoke was either that of the Talmud or the Germanic-Hebraic mixture known as Yiddish. The differences between them and the general population were heightened by the fact that the Jews did not enjoy full civil or legal status. It would appear that surrounding them, neither community nor government was anxious for assimilation. East European Jews furthermore were very different to their western counterparts: 'a Jew of Vienna might pass unrecognised [...] but a Jew of Galicia [...] could be identified at sight by a complete stranger.'[84] The Jews of Western Europe had developed culturally and politically along with the people native to the countries in which they lived, but the Jews of the Pale lived an artificially stable and backward existence which they were happy to continue if it meant being able to practise their religion freely. Only when instability came to be a general feature of Russian life did this existence become untenable.

The Pale area was a gradual creation of Jews fleeing persecution from the Crusades, expulsions and accusations of ritual murder. In Poland at that time, the Jews were part

[82] James William Parkes, *The Emergence of the Jewish Problem* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. xix.
[83] Written code of the fundamentals of Jewish civil and canon law.
[84] Parkes, p. xviii-xix.

of an urban estate, and a middle class between landowners and peasants. Gradually, Jews from all parts of Europe and the Middle East swelled the numbers in the Pale. However, when the Russians annexed the Kingdom of Poland, they would not allow the Jews to move from the Pale area into Russia, and so the area became more densely populated and living conditions deteriorated. The Jews had become 'Russian' without any change to themselves or their social infrastructure, and at the same time the Russian imperial government had introduced as part of its foreign expansionist policy major repressive anti-Jewish legislation. Economically, the change was disastrous for the community. At the time of annexation, between 750,000 and 800,000 Jews lived in this region. Their livelihood was bound up with the feudal system that existed there. Capitalism itself had severely shaken up the Jewish community, but one of the results was a development of an industrial community within an industrial Polish society.

Jews who had become wealthy from the alcohol tax farming became involved in finance on an international scale. They were centrally involved in the creation of the successful railway ventures begun in the nineteenth century. This minority group were allowed to live outside the Pale by their guild status under Russian law,[85] so that the financial and cultural differences with their Polish-Russian co-religionists eventually became difficult to bridge. The wealthier Jews were allowed to enter the medical and legal professions, while poor Jews were increasingly barred from these areas, and ultimately from adapting to life in Russian society. Some from among them became merchants in export, alcohol, estates, military supplies, and raw materials such as sugar, and especially internal trade and credit. Although the community was trying its hardest to adapt to the new situation, the most serious consequence from the Jewish

[85] The government bestowed the title of Guild Merchant on this minority, which conferred both social and trading privileges upon them.

community's point of view was that 'the redirection of capital flow was partly responsible for the demise of the Jewish community.'[86]

Brym is correct in his assessment that there was a pattern of withdrawal of the Jewish community from the traditional system which helped to weaken the community. The movement into Russian society on a financial level meant that business ties were made with Gentiles and not other Jews, as in the past thus undermining the community's self-sufficiency. The new educational opportunities afforded the Jews, led to the introduction into the community of various non-Jewish philosophies, such as Populism, and most importantly the great internal struggle between the *Haskalah*[87] and the Jewish traditionalists. But where Brym fails to convince is his conclusion that once the Jews had outlived their economic usefulness: 'it was but a short downhill road to the infamous pogroms of 1881.'[88] There was no doubt by the 1880s that the old 'Royal Alliance', between the leaders of the country and the leaders of the Jewish community, was dead, but there is no evidence to support the statement that 'government emissaries' were then sent to all local police to warn against interfering with 'public will' regarding the pogroms. Brym cites Dubnov on this issue, who derived the information from contemporary Russian journals and newspapers. It will be seen below that documentation highlighting the problems of everyday Russian life had more to do with the reasons for Russian unrest, than with anti-Jewish feeling.

Existing research gives the historian invaluable insights into the tensions and developments going on in the Jewish community before 1881.[89] It could be said that the essential spirit of the Jew was anti-Russian. The resulting Jewish 'state within a

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[86] Brym, p. 26.
[87] *Haskalah* was a movement for Jewish enlightenment encouraged by the Russian government, for its belief in making the Jewish community less introverted.
[88] Brym, p. 30.
[89] Eli Lederhendler, 'From Autonomy to Auto-Emancipation: Historical Continuity, Political Development and the Pre-Conditions for the Emergence of National Jewish Politics in Nineteenth Century Russia' (PhD Thesis, US: The Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1987).

state' situation was built on the traditional pattern of Jewish politics. Crucial to this structure was the issue of power. Although the structure of the community was religious, the power was secular because it was based on economics. Jews had long since learned that in order not to be expelled from a country, an alliance with the central authorities of that country, based on the economic talents of the community, was essential. Many political ends were achieved with such an alliance, for example in Spain, where the Jews' special badge of identification was abolished under Ferdinand III. However, where this alliance broke down, or indeed was not possible at all, was in countries where the regime was unstable, or where there was a history of repression. Russia was such a country. In short, the Jews did not have control of the situation, and everything depended on the individual ruler's inclinations and whims.

Such dependency on irrationality led to an extremely dangerous situation for the community. Lederhendler has called the power of the community 'derivative power', where the power is only a fraction of a greater power, i.e. that of the 'host' country. When the host country enjoys economic, foreign and social polices which contribute to the general prosperity of the country, the traditional alliance works well and the Jewish community thrives within its own structure; but when the host country is troubled by civil unrest, the resulting uncertainties and changes in policies are reflected in the breakdown of communication between the host country and the Jewish communal leaders. This situation led to the development of Quietism, a stratagem of Jewish political thought that said passivity was best to ensure survival as a cohesive minority. Quietism was a policy that was calculated to maintain co-operation with the established authorities on the basis of utility.

Quietism produced two results: first, it was acceptable to the government because on one level, it advocated Jewish subordination to Gentile rule where both politically and

theologically the Jews understood that the head of the country was their ruler. Having accepted the host leader, the Jews were given a certain amount of autonomy. The rabbinical leaders in the *kahal* - the Jewish communal self governing body - were sanctioned to control the Jewish community's spiritual life as well as to collect the communal taxes for the State. From the rabbinical point of view, this state of affairs was acceptable since it allowed them to wait for the Messiah. The rabbis preached Quietism, advocating passive contemplation of God in order to reach religious perfection; and Messianism, the belief that it was God's will that one should suffer and endure hardship because the reward would be evident when the Messiah came. These doctrines helped people to endure the harsh social, physical and political realities of their lives. At such times, when the country itself was going through economic transformation, with more economic pressure and restrictive and discriminative legislation applied to the Jewish community, Jews turned to alternative and often illegal ways of making money such as smuggling. These activities led to an increase in economic pressure against the Jews, helping to whip up anti-Jewish feeling and charges of disloyalty, and raised the issue of dual allegiance.

The dual allegiance that grew up in the middle ages worked well until such times as the national culture and the fundamental basis of society felt threatened. On the whole, the protection of the Jews was guaranteed by the state in return for Jewish financial support to the Crown, and the Jews came to rely on the promises of government during such times as the Crusades and the Inquisition, which were not always honoured. The 'Royal Alliance',[90] or vertical alliance, was based on how much the State needed Jewish money, and the willingness of the Jews to believe in Messianism. In short, the predatory

[90] The "Royal Alliance" was not a formal relationship between Russian Tsars and the Jewish community. Russia inherited the alliance when it had already past its peak in terms of success, when they annexed Polish lands in 1795. Also known as the 'vertical alliance'.

nature of the ruling power, and the more faith-based nature of the Jews made for a very unequal relationship. Moreover, the self-containment of the Jewish community depended to a large extent on this relationship, and well before the 1880s it was breaking up. 'Informing' was as serious a crime among the Jews as it was among the Russian peasants, and just as common. When differences among the Jewish community arose, one of the parties could go to the church to have the views of their opponents pronounced as heresy. This appeal over the heads of the Jewish courts to the non-Jewish authorities revealed the limits of power of the Jewish community. Sometimes a Jewish mediator called a *shtadlan*, would be called in. The *shtadlan* came to be of central importance to the relationship between community and national leader.

These *shtadlanim* were individuals who often interceded or lobbied privately first at a local and then at a national level between the Jewish community and various officials. Although there are no records of them until the seventeenth century because their dealings were confidential, there were many instances of them at work in Russia and Poland in the period under review. At the same time as offering up prayers and holding discussions, they were often called upon to proffer money on behalf of members of the Jewish community, thus playing both a religious and a practical role. The *shtadlan* was part of a well organised system whose activities included intelligence-gathering, bribery and involvement in the debates on privileges - all in order to protect the Jewish community. They were also instrumental in displacing the last vestiges of the Royal Alliance in favour of less centralised communal authority, and later less traditionally religious authority, on the Jewish side.

In 1866, the community was assaulted by a Jewish man called Jacob Brafman. Charged to look at the problem of Jewish separateness as part of the Vilna Commission,

he 'revealed' that the OPE[91] and the *kahal* were really secret organisations of Jewish brotherhood with ominous plans in mind for Russian society. The fact that Brafman's accusations were taken so seriously, indicates the level of anxiety about Jews in Russia, even in the liberal 1860s. His emphasis on special treatment of the Jews had caused this. No other minority had a central organisation, and however weak and divided the *kahal* was, it still represented a significant development beyond other representations of minorities in an autocratic regime. Furthermore, it was known that in the West, Jews had similar organisations - for example the Board of Deputies of British Jews - and so the *kahal* took on a sinister aspect within educated circles. Such documents as the detailed report against the *Alliance Israelite Universelle*[92] (hereafter known as the *AIU*) clearly show that educated opinion tolerated such views.

In the 1860s, two things happened that added to the heat of the Hassidic and the Maskilic debate.[93] The OPE was founded, and the newspaper *Ha Maggid* was set up - both Maskilic operations. It was perceived that the state went along with the *Haskalah* movement, since it allowed these organisations to exist. Both became vehicles for Maskilic expression, and for the new Maskilic *shtadlanim* such as Baron Gintsberg to become well known both inside and outside the community. However, the OPE was meant to be for educational enlightenment only, not a political forum for Jewish grievances. The St Petersburg Maskilic Jews were anxious that the OPE should stick to its original function, but the communal perception that it was replacing the *kahal* was very difficult to shake off. It is ironic that because the government withdrew its state

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[91] OPE, known in English as the 'Society for the Advancement of Enlightenment among the Jews in Russia', was established in St. Petersburg in 1863 primarily to familiarise Jews with both Russian culture and secular learning. Initially it dealt with some Jewish grievances.

[92] The *AIU* was an organisation that was set up in the West to help Jews around the world fleeing persecution.
See start of Chapter Four for the document in question. Moscow, TsGADA archive, fond 1385, op. 1, del. 1202.

[93] The *Maskilim* were believers in the Haskalah movement, while the *Hassidim* were the opposing Jewish traditionalists.

patronage from Jewish communal organisations, the gap created was filled by new forms of Jewish political activity. Many Jews looked to the OPE for the central guidance that the community lacked, a move not anticipated by the government nor desired by the OPE. Just as importantly, the Maskilic press writing in Russian was a vehicle for the defence of the Jewish community: 'the purpose of a journal in the language of the country should be to pave for the Jews a high road into the hearts of their countrymen [...]'.[94] Hassidic reaction took up the crux of the matter, that by defending the people, one 'presumes to challenge' and criticise the 'lords and inhabitants of the country'. The Hassidic answer always referred to the Torah: 'The Lord will battle for you - you hold your peace.'[95] The Hassidim did not believe in enlightenment or modernisation, because they believed this would have meant violating the word of God. But the Hassidic response was always apologetic, describing the Jewish people as 'small and unfortunate', daring to 'show pride' to the masters of the country.[96]

The leaders of the Jewish community were individuals who acted from either a sense of collective responsibility or personal ambition, or both. In reality, there was no higher Jewish authority to whom they were accountable, and Jewish interests were confined, as always, to short-term goals.[97] Rabbis (traditional *shtadlanim*) working from the Pale and the leaders in St Petersburg (modern *shtadlanim*) had different priorities and their actions as communal heads reflected this. In the first half of the nineteenth century, the traditional leaders were still the dominant force in the relationship with the Russian government, but particularly in the reign of Alexander II, the 'independent' modern leaders were increasingly referred to by the government. By this time, certain Jewish families had established themselves in Russian society; families such as the Gintsbergs

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[94] Lederhendler, p. 381.
[95] ibid.
[96] Lederhendler, p. 387.
[97] Lederhendler, p. 437.

who started as holders of the alcohol licence for the Crimea, and the banker Joseph Halperin of Berdichev. These men understood business and economics in the western, more capitalist sense. Ironically, the more they assimilated into Russian society, the less good they were able to do for the Jewish community because they did not promote tolerance and understanding of the ordinary Jew in the Pale. By 1881 most of them could not identify with them either. All these factors led to a greater plurality of political figures representing fringe groups within the Jewish community, with no central authority representing the majority. In times of trouble, this political plurality and diversity was a considerable weakness. When famine struck the Pale in 1868-9, there was no collective sense of responsibility or unity. The lack of Jewish public support given to the farm colonies, supported by the government, did nothing to create a positive image of the Jews in Russian eyes. Indeed, it helped to breed the feeling that the Jews were shy of manual labour and shirked it at all costs in favour of more illicit kinds of livelihood.

The self-image of the Jews is crucial to an understanding of the Jewish belief in apologetics and passivity until the 1880s. Even within the community, there was a sense of not deserving equal rights, and not aspiring to be the same as the Russians either because of the beliefs held by the Messianics - that physical oppression was necessary to be a good Jew - or because of the borderline activities that many Jews got involved in. It was said by a Jew, that 'even when troubles surround it (the Jewish community), each Jew is a thorn in the side of his fellow Jew'.[98] These attitudes offer at least a partial explanation as to why there was no active resistance by the Jews to the discriminatory legislation imposed by one Tsar after another on the community. In the 1840s and

[98] Lederhendler, p. 3.

1850s, there was only passive resistance against particular legislation, and that was usually followed by an inward return to religious fervour.

Passive resistance gave fuel to the *Maskilim*, an important force in the 1870s expressing the social discontent of the Jewish people of the Pale. By this time, the state-rabbinical relationship had much less significance than the internal struggles of the community, and the art of persuasion came to decide everything. Maskilic poets such as Judah Leib Gordon publicised their views throughout the Jewish community. Through newspapers and plays, the *Maskilim* criticised both their Jewish rivals and Russian intellectual counterparts. In papers such as *Ha Maggid, Ha Melitz, Ha Karmel* , *Den'* and *Rasznet* , they were able to preach against Hassidism and air their own ideas. According to Abramovitch's play "The Nag" (1873), by the 1870s the Jew saw the Russian official as corrupt and petty, who did not want the young Maskil to break out of the traditional Jewish mould. The state is depicted as sadistic and anti-Jewish, while Russian Liberals are depicted as weak and ineffective. The Jews are clearly being used for the State's own purposes. The Jewish authorities did not escape criticism either. In a play of two years earlier, the *kahal* was taken to task for its exploitation of the poor, highlighting the inner political paralysis in Jewish society.

According to one Jew, Mordechai Cohen,[99] Jews were so concerned with their own squabbles, it led them to unreasonable expectations from the outside world as rescuers, emancipators or even arbitrators. Cohen said that during the Russian-Turkish Balkan war of 1877-8, many Jews had given their lives fighting in the armies of Imperial Russia. Thus it was hoped that when the Rabbinical Commission was called by the Minister of Internal Affairs in 1879, the sacrifice made would have been rewarded with civil emancipation. When it did not happen, bitterness and puzzlement prevailed. If the Jews

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[99] Lederhendler, p. 430.

had been reading what the Russian press had been printing about them all year, they could not have expected anything from the government in the first place. Therefore Cohen said, the Jews themselves must take some blame for what happened, i.e. the pogroms, through their self-centredness, corruption, factionalism and lack of direction as a community.

Clearly then, external relations and internal structural control were inseparable, since the communal leaders could not supervise the community without concern for external political ramifications. The external factor ultimately had the controlling force over the fate of the Jewish community, even though the Jewish economic role was a significant one in Russian society. As moneylenders and travelling salesmen peddling goods in rural areas, and then as the new capitalist middlemen between landlord and peasant, Jews filled a gap in Russian society, which came to rely upon them performing these roles. Indeed, the change in the perception of the Jewish role in Russian society provides an exemplary illustration of the derivative power syndrome. The new image formed a natural link with old ideas of the Jew, and at the same time a natural link was formed with the autocratic crisis of modernisation, industrialisation and the ensuing economic strain.

What the Russian establishment failed to perceive was that the economic transformation that the Jews were forced to make in order to survive in Russian society, was detrimental to their own community. This forced a further breakdown of its structure, as modern industry was thrust upon the traditional community as much as it was upon the Russian masses.[100] Jews had traditionally shown their loyalty to the crown through their pockets. When other demands were made which could not be met financially, as in the case of military conscription, it was a catastrophe for communal life because the communal authorities were forced to carry out State orders against their

[100] Brym, pp. 24-26.

own people. It brought to the fore the issue of civil rights, causing half the community to become even more introverted, and the other half to demand social change.

By 1881, the Jewish community was clearly divided. It had no central direction, no strong individual leadership, and it was not ready for the wave of violence that was about to descend. The old relationship between community and government had demonstrably failed and the efforts of both old and new *shtadlanim* to revive it were proving fruitless. The community therefore, faced with the fact that they could no longer rely on the government for protection, was completely paralysed by the pogroms. The Russian-Jewish community was about to undergo its most dramatic divide and change. By the end of the seventies however, there were several important elements in place that set the scene for the changes. It took the whole of the next reign to consolidate them, culminating in the formation of the Jewish Union, the Bund, in 1895. The *Maskilim* had come from the edges of Jewish society to become the first political leaders of the community to be actively involved in Russian politics. There were new outlets not only for the leaders' opinions, but for the community itself. Just as Russians were coming to terms with the idea of the voice of the people in society, so were the Jews.

The parallels that can be drawn between the two societies, one living within the borders of the other, are important ones. They centre on the breakdown in the relationship between officialdom and the Jewish community, incorporating the derivative power idea, and the 'echo effect' of Russian society on Jewish life. A political parallel can be drawn regarding the struggle between old and new forces which erupted from passive opposition into full blown radical activity, especially after 1881. The change in what was acceptably legitimate in both societies creates a legal parallel - again a feature that takes on greater meaning after 1881. The social parallel can be seen in the disintegration of the traditional structure of both societies after the annexation of Poland

and the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. Inextricably tied to these, and perhaps the most direct parallel, is the economic one. Capitalism and industrialisation threw both societies into chaos, for both had to undergo dramatic change in order to survive, a process neither easily nor quickly accomplished.

It is not difficult to see why relations between Jews and Russians deteriorated and why blame for the pogroms was laid solely at the door of the government given the Jew's image of the Russian, the Russian's image of the Jew, and perhaps more surprisingly the Jew's image of the Jew. In every camp there was division, suspicion and hostility.

QUESTIONS OF ASSIMILATION, EMANCIPATION AND EMIGRATION

The reign of Alexander III is important for defining for the Jewish community and for Russian society the paths that the Jewish Question could take. If assimilation could not take place for whatever reasons, the answer for many was Zionism, the emergence of Jewish Nationalism. If the emancipation of the Jews was not possible, the answer for many was emigration. These views were consolidated on both sides by the end of the century. It was reported that one Russian official said: 'A fusion with us [Russians] is impossible [...] The only solution of the problems of the Russian Jew is his departure from Russia'.[101] There appeared to be two options facing the Jews then, as Russia came into the 1880s - assimilation or emigration.

The issue of Jewish emancipation was fought long and hard in government circles and in the pages of the Russian press, but by the early eighties, the Jewish community had more or less given up hope.[102] To Russian society, the question was still an open one because it was not so long after the emancipation of the serfs, and it seemed to many to be a logical step to emancipate the Jews from their physical and political isolation. Aronson[103] states that the question has been under-emphasised because it has been taken for granted that the government hated the Jews, and would not have wasted time in discussing such an issue. Before this debate, the question was always one of assimilation. Were Jews to be forcibly assimilated via conversion and would assimilation solve the problem of the Jewish Question? Some natural assimilation had already taken place via for instance, the *Haskalah* movement, and the financial role that Jews played in

[101] Michael Davitt, *Within the Pale* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1903; repr. New York: Arno Press, 1975), pp. 65-66.
[102] Eli Lederhendler notes in his thesis that in 1879, a belief still existed within the Jewish community that government attitudes towards the Jews would take a turn for the better.
[103] I. Michael Aronson, 'The Attitudes of Russian Officials in the 1880s Toward Jewish Assimilation and Emigration', *SR*, 34 (1975), pp. 1-2.

Russian society. It becomes clear that there were many degrees of assimilation, and that not everybody was talking about the same thing.

In order for assimilation to work in its fullest sense, i.e. in Aronson's definitive meaning of acceptance as equals and without force, it had to be desired by both sides to an equal degree, as it was in England and in France.[104] Both sides had to participate in the long process of first emancipation and then acculturation. Mutual desire implied that both sides respected the other, even admired the skills that the other had to offer. In this way, both societies could retain features of their own heritage whilst being essentially one people. This was certainly not the case with the Jews in Russian society, and consequently, full assimilation was not achieved because it was never attempted. The fear of Jewish contamination and domination of Christian society persisted. In the rising nationalist temperature of the nineteenth century, these fears were for many a very real prospect. Russian acceptance of fringe group Jews, such as the *Haskalah*, was on Russian terms, the *Maskilim* being willing to give up many aspects of their Jewishness. This was not the same as Russians accepting Jews per se. For the majority of Jews, there was not much about local Russian life, either culturally or economically, to make assimilation into Russian society desirable.

Jewish radicals of the 1870s became involved in Russian radicalism, and the movement of "going to the people" meant for them going to the Russian people, not their own - an assimilation of a kind, since they identified with Russians. In short, many Jews did not see themselves as an assimilating force, but one that should be abolished or dispensed with by forcing the traditional community to accept Russian life without retaining any Jewishness. In reality it is difficult to talk of assimilation of the masses of Russian Jews when even within the Pale, Jews and non-Jews did not mix. When both

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[104] Parkes, p. xxii.

groups came together in a collective sense, it was almost always in connection with traditional socio-economic factors. Individual Jews might have assimilated for other reasons, but 'assimilation in Bodiboy or in Vilna was a function of occupational isolation from other Jews'.[105]

The emancipation of the serfs had only made life for the Jewish community worse. The main effect was economic - the release of millions of cheap workers into all branches of Russian life immediately affected the employment of Jews as middlemen, since the rigid class structure between landlord and peasant had officially been abolished. In the post emancipation economy, there was a huge fear that Jewish capitalists would take over land in the countryside. According to the findings of Prince Dondukov-Korsakov[106] in 1872, Jews dominated the trade in timber, railway, alcohol, grain and sugar export in South-western Russia and through the *kahal*, the Jewish plan to take economic control of the world was already under way. But although the Prince believed this, and was against granting the Jews equal rights, he could not agree that perpetuating the Pale of Settlement was the answer. The only solution for him was the dispersal of the Jews throughout the empire to end their 'physical concentration and tribal solidarity'. Although the Prince's ideas were dismissed, it is interesting to see that not everyone in Russian society saw the assimilation issue as an inseparable element of the pro-emancipation argument, and that it was indeed used as a solution by anti-Semitic educated men, the kind that made up the government.

Neither assimilation nor emigration were movements that gained mass support or proportions overnight. Europe had made a stand for the full emancipation and rights of people of all faiths at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Russia had not subscribed to this,

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[105] Brym, p. 40.

[106] Memorandum submitted to Alexander II entitled 'Memorandum Concerning the Most Important Questions in the Administration of the South-West Region'. Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Russia* (Oxford: MacMillan, 1986), p. 127.

and the effect was to drive Russian Liberalism whose high ideals had proved inadequate in 1848, to include national unity, power and prosperity in its programme and the inclusion of all who could contribute towards these goals. The development of Jewish nationalism and Zionism was thus a gradual response to other nationalisms.

By 1881, the call for emigration implied that assimilation was neither possible nor desired, and that they were opposed ideals. The call for emigration caused huge division within the Jewish community, exacerbating the splits that already existed. The St Petersburg Jews were against emigration. They felt that by wishing to emigrate, the Jews were only giving more ammunition to the anti-Semites in Russian society who had always claimed that the Jews suffered from dual loyalty. They further argued that if the young, fit and educated Jews emigrated, those left behind would be even more vulnerable because they would be less able to defend themselves both physically and verbally, and less useful to the Russians. Supporting mass emigration would therefore undermine the more important goal of Jewish emancipation. Emancipation and assimilation were the keys to the resolution of the Jewish problem and this was of course the essence of the philosophy of the *Haskalah* movement.

The traditional rabbinate back in the Pale were also against emigration, but on biblical grounds. They feared that if the closed community was broken up, all the traditional rituals and customs would be lost among expatriates in a new and strange world. Indeed, the loosening of the bonds of traditional Jewish autonomy was a major factor in the gradual surge of emigration. Pogroms had occurred before 1881, but they had not resulted in mass emigration. Small-scale movement had continued consistently until the reign of Alexander III, when it took on a new momentum. Between 1880 and 1914, nearly two million Jews left Russia for the new world.

The unique significance of the pogrom wave was that it produced a new dimension in the internal divisions of the Jewish community. It laid bare not only the differences, but also the breakdown of the government-community relationship for all of Russian society to see, exposing the precariousness of Jewish legal and social status and giving fresh impetus to emigration from Russia after 1881. It is from here that confusion besets the factors contributing to the pogroms and subsequent anti-Jewish activity. What had changed within the Russian-Jewish relationship specifically to make mass emigration a realistic and desirable goal?

Chapter Three

ALEXANDER III'S RUSSIA

THE CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT

In 1881 a man came to the Russian throne who had not intended to rule. It can be argued that his personal limitations were equal to his public preparation for the role, a fact which ultimately and increasingly manifested itself in the thirteen years that followed. In addition to the issue of legality within the autocracy, Russian society was beginning to question its role as an entity separate from the government; and the bureaucracy was becoming increasingly separate from the autocratic helm. The nature of government policy reflects the constant struggles in both relationships.

Taranovski believes that by 1894 the bureaucratic 'battles' had reached a position of stalemate.[1] Although Alexander had triumphed over the State Council with the Land Captains law in 1889,[2] much of the *zemstvo* and local government reforms of the early 1890s had been achieved only through compromise with the bureaucracy. With regard to judicial reform, the government had positively failed to overturn the 1864 statutes. While the bureaucracy was there to serve the Tsar, there had been increasing opposition to the following of unquestioning pursuit of Tsarist policy since the 1860s. Now members of the government such as Ignat'ev wrote that the bureaucracy above all was imbued with the revolutionary spirit - providing an opposition to the autocracy. In such a situation, how could the government possibly hope to stop the spread of revolutionary anarchistic 'rot'? Ignat'ev proposed purges at the highest levels of government, but

[1] T. Taranovski, 'Alexander III and his Bureaucracy', *CSP*, 26, (1984), p. 207.
[2] The Land Captains Law was intended to give the central government more control of the peasantry, by installing Land Captains with considerable powers across the Empire. See Chapter Three, 'The Counter-Reforms'.

Alexander III did not act on this advice. Taranovski argues that this was because the autocrat recognised his need for the bureaucracy in order to rule the country. In effect, this meant that the autocrat could no longer rule the nation solely on the basis of his own power - truly, an official acknowledgement that the days of absolute Tsarist power were over. At the same time, he was limited by his own laws as to how to proceed. He could only change the system from within, without doing serious damage to his own position as an autocrat.

Alexander III was born the second of five sons in 1845. He was not brought up to be emperor, and therefore received only the necessary basic education. His school reports showed that he was not the brightest of students, but that he was diligent. As Alexander III, he was said to be an excellent husband, devoted to the running and care of his house, a serious but simple man who was attached to the people and the church. However, contemporary accounts give us a more complex picture of the man:

> His characteristic reserve arises partly from an inborn and invincible shyness, partly from a want of self-confidence [...] The Emperor is almost impervious to the counsel and opinions of other people - not because he always has his own private opinion in which he puts implicit trust, but because he holds it as a duty to be and to appear incapable of being influenced, and because he fears the appearance of dependence still more than the dependence itself [...] If he were stronger than he is, he would be more yielding, and if he had greater reliance in his own powers and a stronger will, the appearance of yielding would not trouble him [...] He arrives at a decision with a certain vehemence because all decisions are troublesome to him. Alexander III's repugnance to the Western European system is closely bound up with this inner instability of his nature [...] He prefers to transact business with his Ministers and generals rather by writing than by word of mouth, as he wishes to avoid the discussion of subjects with which he is unacquainted. As a matter of duty he receives hundreds of his subjects from all parts of his enormous Empire; but he never allows them to discuss minute points, because he fears explanations which may lead to difficulties. He avoids as far as possible direct and lengthy transactions with foreign diplomatists, because he has no confidence in his power of estimating them at their proper value.[3]

[3] Herman Von Samson-Himmelstjerna, *Russia under Alexander III*, (London: Unwin, 1893), pp. 13-15.

This extract serves to show three things: first, that the Tsar was intelligent enough to recognise his own shortcomings which secondly, put more restraints on him than on an autocratic ruler of strength and self-confidence. The system was built around him for his exclusive use and will, and although he accepted it, he was not comfortable with it. He had to impose extra informal methods of government in order to conceal his doubts. Thirdly, all this has relevance to the Jewish Question, since it explains why the Tsar would not welcome deputations from the community. The Jewish issue was more complex than most, and the meeting with the deputation he did see in 1881, was brief.

> In Russia there is no ministry and no Ministerial council: there are only individual Ministers, who as chiefs of departments are directly subordinate to the Emperor, and transact affairs directly with him [...] the so-called committee of Ministers [...] is an administrative court of appeal whose strictly limited power is of a formal nature, and excludes essentially political decisions.[4]

This statement was supported by Bunge, Minister of Finance under Alexander III . In his memoirs, Bunge raises the question of ministers' dependence on the Tsar, and the resulting ineffectiveness of the state council. In his recommendations, Bunge suggested that the council's function be allowed to include 'co-ordination and discussion of draft laws' among the administrative bodies. This would give the council a much wider perspective of Russian law, and would avoid the narrow specialisation of individual ministries. Bunge continued that it was essential that 'in a monarchy [...] ministries not consider themselves as units that are separate from one another'.[5] In effect what he was proposing was a profound change in the structure of the autocratic centralised system. Bunge was part of the 'liberal' party which made an unsuccessful bid for the new emperor's favour in 1881, so it is not surprising that his ideas went unheeded.

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[4] Von Samson-Himmelstjerna , p.37.
[5] Bunge, p. 14.

Count I. D. Delianov, Minister of Education under Alexander III, had 'thrown in his lot with the men of the future and with nationalism: he is a man who really stands with both feet on the ground of the past'.[6] Indeed, he was certainly an example of a Liberal turned Conservative, following the trends of first Alexander II and then his son. Such men were to become increasingly common in central government towards the end of the nineteenth century. Under Alexander III, Delianov implemented educational counter-reforms and the russification policy by bringing all schools in the Baltic region under his direct control. However, this trespassed on the territory of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. As fast as Tolstoi, the Minister of Internal Affairs, worked for the peasantry and their educational rights, Delianov was undermining him with his denial of 'equal access' to education rule.

Tolstoi, according to Witte, was 'an exceptional man, a man of strong will and 'politically, on the extreme right'. Witte said that he 'did not agree with him on many matters', believing that 'many of the reforms he introduced, both as Minister of Education and as Minister of Internal Affairs, are to a considerable degree responsible for the disorders Russia has experienced in the past few years.'[7] However, this was not a direct reference to any involvement in pogroms. '[...] it can be said on Count Tolstoi's behalf that under his administration the government did not go to the extremes that it does nowadays in its treatment of Jews, Poles and other non-Russian subjects.'[8]

Count D. A. Tolstoi was said to have 'carried his servility and obsequiousness to those extreme limits which pleased the Tsar'.[9] Another member of government, Chicherin, said that Tolstoi had 'been created in order to serve as the instrument of

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[6] Von Samson-Himmelstjerna, p. 41.
[7] Count Witte, *The Memoirs of Count Witte* (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1990), p.143.
[8] Witte, p. 145.
[9] Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, *The Russian Autocracy Under Alexander III* (US: Academic International Press, 1976), p. 29.

reaction'.[10] Tolstoi had been dismissed by Alexander II and when he reappeared in 1882 as Minister of Internal Affairs, it was felt that reaction had triumphed and marked the future direction of Alexander III's policies. Tolstoi blamed the previous government for the rioting that occurred in the 1880s, as the inevitable result of the great reforms and the emancipation. The wave of pogroms came to an end after his appointment, and he made it clear that he would not tolerate any mob violence against the Jews. Rather than putting an end to the government policy of pogroms in 1882 as has been suggested,[11] Tolstoi put the government policy of suppressing disorders and violence more effectively into practice, since this was the only definite belief with which the man can be identified.

N. P. Ignat'ev, Minister of Internal Affairs until 1882, was also a reactionary and an opportunist, but was considered dangerous by his fellow Ministers because he was unreliable and unpredictable. Although he had borne the main responsibility for the peasant reforms in 1881,[12] Ignat'ev made no secret of his desire to repress the Jewish population of Russia. His comments on this subject were often alarming as well as inconsistent, leading many outsiders to believe that it was the Russian government's aim to confuse the issue. Indeed, other Ministers called Ignat'ev a master of intrigue and a liar.[13] Certainly it was not clear whether he was stating government policy or airing his own prejudices when early in 1882, he told a Jewish newspaper editor from Ekaterinoslav, Dr. Orshanskii, that the Western frontier was open to Jews and their emigration was in no way hindered.[14]

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[10] ibid.
[11] Louis Greenberg, *The Jews in Russia*, 2 vols (New Haven, NY: Yale University Press, 1951), I, p. 26.
[12] Peasant Reforms, including the reduction of redemption payments, were prepared before Ignat'ev's appointment but were carried through by him on taking up his post as Minister of Internal Affairs.
[13] Salo W. Baron, *The Russian Jew under Tsars and Soviets* (London: MacMillan, 1976), p. 46.
[14] Alexander Orbach, 'The Pogroms of 1881-2: The Response from St. Petersburg', *The Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies* (1984), p. 18.

Elsewhere he had said that 'the Government would be but too glad to get rid of them'.[15] If this were true, then it was a conspicuous and dramatic change in government policy as officially, emigration from Russia did not exist. It took until 1892 before the government allowed legal Jewish emigration. In any case, Ignat'ev had made statements that suggested he was both for and against Jewish emigration, and so his reliability as a representative of government policy is weak.[16] It was his Slavophilic beliefs however, that led to Ignat'ev's downfall. He proposed a consultative assembly (*zemskii sobor*) as part of government, which was in direct opposition to the idea of autocratic government. Ignat'ev was dismissed in May 1882.

N. Kh. Bunge criticised the anti-Jewish legislative proposals that Ignat'ev had put forward, and which became the "Temporary Laws" of 1882. Bunge was against the measures on economic grounds however, because he felt such laws would stifle industrial growth and foreign investment. Moreover, the Jews would feel forced to emigrate, a move that would deeply affect Russian society. As Minister of Finance, Bunge put his concerns for the economy first, and this included the Jewish contribution.

In other respects, Bunge was anti-Semitic in his outlook, but such views only reflected common assumptions among Russian administrators in general, as Aronson has shown.[17] He believed that Jews had 'pernicious influence', and their bible - the Talmud - was an evil that should be contained within the Pale of Settlement. However, he also advocated that once Jews were completely 'de-Judaified', they should be allowed to enter Russian life. This reflected the nationalist feeling that Russian culture was under threat from a greater force. However, it did not necessarily lead to the idea of the total destruction or eradication of Jews per se. In the long run, he was worried about

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[15] Sir Edward Thornton to Earl Granville, 25 Jan. 1882, 'Russia, 1881-1905', in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs and Papers from the Foreign Office* ed. by Domenic Lievan, 2 (1982), 21-23 (p. 22).
[16] John D. Klier, Chapter 22 'Prejudice into Policy', unpublished book, p. 1.
[17] I. Michael Aronson, 'The Attitudes of Russian Officials in the 1880s toward Jewish Assimilation and Emigration', *SR* 34 (1975).

Russians, not about Jews. According to Bunge, all legislation has led either to the triumph or to the distress of the Jews, and neither benefited the indigenous population.'[18]

I. N. Durnovo took over as Minister of Internal Affairs when Tolstoi died in 1889. According to Witte, 'he did what the Emperor told him to do and tried to get along with everybody',[19] relying on his subordinates. The Ministers appeared to concur that Durnovo was a very agreeable man, but this made him a mediocrity.[20] In terms of policy, he continued what Tolstoi had been doing, and did not initiate any ideas of his own. He was willing to carry out whatever action the Tsar wished, a factor which is important in an examination of the direction of government policy at the time; the change in the attitude towards the Jewish Question, and the importance of the newly amalgamated police system under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

K. P. Pobedonostsev, as the Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod and the most influential Minister in Alexander III's government, is perhaps the most closely associated with the idea of a pogrom policy. Indeed, published contemporary accounts clearly led to this historic assumption. Pobedonostsev was called a 'cold fanatic'[21] in reference to his church policy of national conformity. Of the Jewish population it was said that Alexander III thought they 'were much [...] ragged and irregular, and to the sawing-off process the new Tsar and his Ministers now strenuously addressed themselves. Or rather, he sent for his village carpenter in the person of M. Pobedonostseff [...]'.[22]

However it has been shown that Pobedonostsev was a more complex man than most of his ministerial colleagues. He was the man who was blamed for the destruction of liberal influence at the beginning of the reign, and was noted for his lack of originality,

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[18] Bunge, p. 31.
[19] Witte, p.145.
[20] Zaionchkovsky, pp. 84-5.
[21] Von Samson-Himmelstjerna, p. 52.
[22] Alexander Lowe, *Alexander III of Russia* (London, 1895), p. 204.

and for being 'totally uncreative' [23] His enormous influence over Alexander III stemmed from the supervision that he had had over the young Tsarevich, who had grown to trust him and his ideas. Through the Holy Synod press, Pobedonostsev published huge quantities of literature on the Russian Orthodox Church, in order to inspire and strengthen popular respect for the autocracy. Yet these materials were based on philosophies that already existed, and on the convictions that he already possessed.

Much of Pobedonostsev's political thought was established by 1870, and although he had been a pan-Slavist, he was a firm reactionary from that date onwards. He did not advocate reform in any area. It can be said that his ideas, including his anti-Semitism, were a response to the society that he lived in. He also believed in the contemporary social structure that supported the gentry's right to financial control of the nation through the ownership of land and the almost sacred right of private property. The link between control and land was clearly a central one, for the threat of Jewish financial exploitation led many to believe that Jews would take over the land if the Pale of Settlement was abolished.

Pobedonostsev believed that the Pale should exist, and that it was right to have limitations, restrictions and quotas on the Jews, partly because he was opposed to Jewish religious separatism, and did not want the Russian *narod* to be exposed to this. As Ober-Procurator, he actively promoted the ideas of Russian Orthodoxy all over the world.[24] Pobedonostsev also saw the Jewish threat as economic, which he linked to the western influence on Russians. He believed that Russia needed an economic transformation to deal with the challenge of the advanced West, i.e. to maintain an army and the autocracy, and also to be able to 'restrict the influence of Jewish usurers'[25] and

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[23] Witte, p. 150.
[24] Robert Byrnes, *Pobedonostsev - His Life and Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana Press, 1968), pp. 210-11. Byrnes lists the places as being Galicia, Carpathian Ruthenia, Balkans, Holy Land, Abyssinia, Japan, US and Africa.
[25] Byrnes, p. 331.

assure opportunities and aid for small businesses. In every area, he was trying to contain the 'evils' of Judaism, but in none of his letters and writings, was there ever any suggestion that these restrictions should lead to anything more sinister or drastic. Indeed, he spent much of his time ensuring that measures taken to restrict and isolate the Jews, such as the Moscow Expulsion of 1891, were effective: 'M. Pobedonostsev would be as averse to the killing of Jews as General Ignatieff', but [...] 'they sought the accomplishment of a tyrannical purpose by means which led to such suffering, injustice and bloodshed as will ever be associated with their records and names'.[26]

Above all, Pobedonostsev was 'contemptuous of the idea that an individual had sacred rights, and that all should participate in government; the rights of the state and society should always prevail over those of the individual'. Constitutional government amounted to nothing less than the 'tyranny of the masses' and was 'the weapon of the unrighteous'.[27] With this in mind, the rights of the Jewish population were evidently not at the top of Pobedonostsev's agenda. It was precisely the call for 'rights' from radicals and revolutionaries that the government was trying to stamp out:

> Democracy is one of the falsest political principles. It is regrettable that since the French Revolution the *idea* has gained currency that every kind of authority comes from the *people* and has as its basis the popular will [...] Out of this grew the theory of parliamentarianism which the misguided masses of the so-called intelligentsia until now have accepted. [28]

This idea had unfortunately 'turned some Russian heads' and some 'stubborn narrow fanatics'.

Pobedonostsev, Tolstoi, Katkov and Prince Meshcherskii formed an elite circle around the emperor, although as a group they were not friends. The latter had opposed

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[26] Davitt, p. 42-3.
[27] Byrnes, p. 350-53.
[28] Zaionchkovsky, p. 25. Note Zaionchkovsky's italics.

zemstvo education reform in the previous reign, and now attempted to influence Alexander III, a childhood friend, via letters and personal diaries. Meshcherskii is significant in that he was successful in his chosen route of influence. He managed to avoid censorship of his paper *Grazhdanin*, and he represented the argument for the interests of the gentry - both of which were important matters of the day.[29] For most of the reign, Meshcherskii was the recipient of many payments from the Tsar, which were ostensibly for his paper. In effect however, he was a royal favourite with all the power that that entailed. Apart from influencing a number of dismissals and appointments, he reported items in his paper that were not meant for publication.

One such example was the publication of Imperial Council minutes of a meeting concerning the Land Captain draft.[30] Brought before the Main Committee on Press Affairs to be officially warned, Meshcherskii continued his activities and drafted his own conservative views on the necessity to abolish Justices of the Peace under the new system. This proposal had been opposed by most ministers across the political spectrum, as too extreme. He then submitted it to the Tsar. Neither the minority conservative nor the majority liberal views were accepted: The Tsar astounded everyone by accepting a proposal that no longer existed in the draft legislation. Meshcherskii had written that the powers of the Land Captain would be paralysed if the Justices of the Peace were retained. Although the ministers had agreed that the concentration of administrative and judicial powers in the one official was unacceptable, Meshcherskii did not think so and told the Tsar that Tolstoi would be happy if, 'even without his knowledge, the Tsar was to reinstate his original project by fiat'.[31]

[29] W. E. Mosse, 'Imperial Favourite: V. P. Meshcherskii and the *Grazhdanin*', *SEER*, 59 (1981), 529-47.
[30] Mosse, p. 539.
[31] Lincoln, p. 181.

Witte for one wrote that Meshcherskii's role in the new law had not been inconsiderable. Katkov, the powerful newspaper editor, also printed editorials that were based on knowledge that he had been privy to via his direct relationship with the Tsar. Indeed, much has been made of Katkov's role in preparing the ground for pro-French and anti-German relations with Russia at this time. Katkov enjoyed this direct link with the Tsar, but whenever he used his influence beyond the patience of Alexander, Pobedonostsev would step in to defend him.

These occurrences in government policy-making appear farcical when it is remembered that Russian policy was devised mainly by these men, but they are important since they serve to show that the Tsar was violating his own laws of censorship and of government secrecy. In the case of the Land Captains Law, confusion and lack of communication represented more than a display of government intrigue. The law was one of the most important pieces of legislation of the reign, and the most reactionary version of it was thus implemented. It appeared then, that the Tsar was sanctioning a violation with another violation.

Like Pobedonostsev, Katkov was an uncompromising opponent of socialist ideas. He hated nihilism and separatism, enough to make him join the forces for discriminatory legislation against the Jews. Yet he also respected the values of the West and was a great admirer of Peter the Great. Essentially, Katkov reflected the paradox inherent in the views of many of the central Ministers. They recognised the need to modernise Russia while wanting to maintain certain truly Russian principles.

Count S. Iu. Witte provides another example. He did not become Minister of Finance until the later years of the reign (1892), but he followed the fundamental financial policy laid down by Bunge and his successor, Vyshnegradskii. Although his greatest hour as a statesman came after 1894, Witte managed to pursue modern economic ideas which

sprang from his acceptance of western industrialisation and its effect on Russian industry. His political views however, were not always consistent with one another. There is uncertainty about his real feelings. He was a political opportunist, while holding opposing views. He believed fervently in the autocratic principle of leadership, but he also believed in reconstructing Russia along capitalist lines in order to strengthen the state. However the state in question was ruled by the financial interests of the gentry, a fundamental tenet of the regime. But Witte, like Pobedonostsev and others, believed that this tenet was valid. Not unsurprisingly, this led to inconsistencies in his views. Witte was thought to be a sycophant in the higher circles of government, so he has remained an ambivalent figure. Yet his actions as Minister of Finance belied the fact that he felt backwardness to be both the result and the cause of backwardness. This view led him to be more sympathetic to the Jewish Question, and also to be in direct philosophical confrontation with the Ministry of Internal Affairs after 1894.

The Tsar's awareness of his own limitations, both personal and public, was evident not just in the so-called counter-reforms and Alexander III's "U-turn" on the Great Reforms. Taranovski has pointed out that although the liberals were seriously undermined by the power struggles that ensued from March 1881, Alexander III was not solely dominated by the conservatives. In 1885, Pobedonostsev failed to revive the Council of Ministers (*Soviet Ministrov*), and the Tsar deliberately kept his personal involvement in Ministerial alliances to a minimum.[32]

If the 'divide and rule' policy had been Alexander III's main preoccupation, then inconsistent and apparent contradictions in policy would be much more easily explained. He would have recognised the need for modern minds trained in law, finance and industry, reflected in his choice of finance Ministers and the decision to retain the

[32] Taranovski, p. 217.

reformed judicial system. However at the same time, it was his right as an autocrat to choose those people that he felt comfortable with to confide in and allow to influence him, for example Prince Meshcherskii and Katkov. Government meetings reflect that ministers and officials would be aware of both these conflicting needs of the Tsar. While they were afraid of dismissal, it was also not easy for them to resign their posts - it was simply not part of the autocratic style of government. By 1881, it is clear that although opposing each other in fundamental terms, the autocracy and the bureaucracy were bound up together, each needing the other to survive.

Alexander III's reign has been considered a relatively quiet period for the peasantry. Hamberg calls it the time of the 'collapse' of the peasant movement.[33] It was a time of crisis for the nobility and the government, and indeed it was a time when government action was a response to what was believed to be occurring in society, i.e. the build-up of peasant anarchy, the rise of the revolutionary in many forms, and the emergence of self-styled leaders from among the people. For many, these problems were a direct result of the Emancipation Act and the subsequent agrarian problem. There was a recognition therefore at the top levels of Russian society that the lower levels had power that needed to be taken into account. The famine of 1891-2 only promoted this feeling.

Hamberg notes that the peasant movement was revived after 1895, when the labour and industrial workers began to organise.[34] This indicates that the capability of peasants as peasants and not as proletarians was there for independent thought and action throughout the reign of Alexander III. Local and central government officials were aware of this, but as with the revolutionary threat, they had no specific evidence either to assess or to enable them to differentiate between the different forces, or indeed to determine the extent of the problem.

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[33] Gary M. Hamberg, *Politics of the Russian Nobility*, p. 194.
[34] Hamberg, p. 203.

Clearly the meaning of autocracy as defined by the Tsar was different to that of his predecessor, and this is an issue that Lincoln takes up in his re-examination of the so-called 'counter-reforms'. If the basis of what the ruling power controlled was different to that in the previous reign, can the term counter-reform be applied at all to the measures imposed by Alexander III's government? In short, is it accurate to talk of a conservative reaction to the previously liberal policies? Lincoln believes that the events of the 1880s show that the government was concerned to shape and follow through the Great Reforms within a more conservative framework; hardly a 'U-turn', then. In this reign, the conservative voice was stronger, but government policy was not passed without opposition. This opposition was not rejected out of hand, and often influenced policy enough to create inconsistencies and contradictions.

Perhaps it is Pobedonostsev who has created the most controversy in his role as the Tsar's right-hand man and Ober-Procurator of the Holy Synod. Pobedonostsev stood directly opposed to those who believed in the free market economy, where individual enterprise and ability played a large part. Such emphasis on the individual could not have a place in Russian thinking which held that left to their own devices, the Russian people could only come to grief.[35] He believed that God had put each of them in their place, and no good could come from trying to encourage individuals to aspire to any other way of life.

Thus, Pobedonostsev epitomised the Russian religious and paternal view of the people, and the old power of autocracy. What Pobedonostsev saw as the 'malady' of the people, others such as Reuturn[36] saw as talent and opportunity. In this sense, Russian culture was not ready for Jewish enterprise, which was so often labelled 'exploitation'. If initiative and modern business practice in Russian society as a whole could be seen as

[35] Lincoln, pp. 177-78.
[36] Minister of Finance in the 1860s under Alexander II.

symptoms of a disease, the policy towards the Jewish population could hardly have been without reference to such 'disease'-ridden practices as existed in Russian-Jewish society. Pobedonostsev was not alone in his thinking. Both Katkov and Meshcherskii shared his views,[37] and therefore it was not surprising that their papers should have echoed them.

Meshcherskii's influence on the Tsar increased after 1887 when Tolstoi was ill and Katkov had died.[38] According to Whelan's research, it was Meshcherskii's belief that the bureaucracy was the greatest danger facing autocracy. All the reforms of the last reign had been inherently un-Russian, because they had been based on liberal 'foreign' ideas, divorced from the spirit of autocracy. Would Alexander III have viewed his actions as counter-reforms or purely as attempts to guide Russia back to a Russian way of thinking, that included social conformity and excluded individual and minority differences? Yet the Jewish Question was different because the Jews were an unknown quantity in Russia, and the Jewish population suffered from being stereotyped according to prejudice which was as much European in its origin as Russian.[39] It can be said that it was the fear of the unknown - both in terms of Russia's future and the Jewish Question - that sustained government policies and thinking throughout the reign.

Whelan certainly suggests that the bureaucracy did play a large part in giving rise to some of the tensions in Russian society. The inertia that surrounded government policy had hindered the Great Reforms, but now there was a new element. The reform of the judiciary had led many in the bureaucracy to place the law as an independent force above all else in society, bringing it into conflict at times with loyalty to the Tsar. By 1881, not only was there a problem with the basis of government legality, but a struggle within the judicial system between new and traditional concepts of the law's priority in the running

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[37] Lincoln, p.179.
[38] Heide W. Whelan, *Alexander III & the State Council: Bureaucracy & Counter-reform in Late Imperial Russia*

of society. Alexander III's actions only made the issue more complex: 'this Tsar valued the appearance of strength even more than the actuality'.[40] Whelan suggests that the Tsar's personal desire to keep his limited abilities in government concealed actually resulted in his contravening established legal procedure, illustrated by the influence of people such as Meshcherskii and Tolstoi with regard to appointments.[41]

It is evident that throughout his reign, Alexander III did use all the measures at his disposal to achieve the result that he wanted. These included bypassing State Council, issuing ukases, issuing temporary measures through his Committee of Ministers, confirming the minority reports of the Council, or re-writing majority recommendations himself and confirming them. Yet nothing he did was unprecedented, so was he breaking the law? The temporary measures are particularly important for this thesis, since most of the legislation against the Jews were of this nature. Rather than seeing these measures as examples of official rabid anti-Semitism, they epitomise two points. First, it was not Alexander III that deliberately violated or initiated change, but that the social concept and basis of legality had changed; secondly, and perhaps in part due to this, the government was not in control of society.

If a measure such as the Land Captains law of 1889 is examined, some of the complexities begin to emerge. It was considered to be legislation that looked back, 'full of nostalgia for pre-reform Russia'.[42] The Land Captains made the Ministry of Justice accountable to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It issued a direct confrontation to reformers, and caused much upset within the balance of government ministerial power. The intrusiveness of the land captain in the village assembly, the imposition of legal rights

[40] Whelan, p.114.
[41] Whelan, p.123. Whelan states that Meshcherskii obtained the appointments of Vyshnegradskii as Minister of Finance (1886), and governors Anastasiev and Tatischev (1892). Tolstoi obtained Bobrinskii's appointment in 1882.
[42] Whelan, p. 174.

and the lack of awareness of economic conditions for the peasants, did not help to endear the land captain to the peasant.

Clearly, the law was intended to impose central control and monitor peasant activity and unrest. It was perceived by many at the time as a blatant attempt to confirm the existence of the supreme autocratic will. However, it was also a statement that further government interference was deemed necessary. Wcislo believes that this policy of answering public strength with autocratic strength was an unequivocal statement of autocracy, implying that the government was in control of the situation. Yet the 1880s as a whole, culminating with the Land Captains in 1889, was a decade of government response to public activity. The Land Captains Law shows that the Tsar had in reality autocratic control of neither his government nor his people. Indeed, it can be said that the Khakanov Commission of 1881, appointed to examine the problems of rural organisation, ultimately ended in the Land Captains Law - an extremely intrusive and conservative measure - and that the long period in between the two disclosed a feeling that there was no other alternative to suppressing rural lawlessness.

This element of government desperation was also reflected in the abandonment of consistent policy on the Jewish Question after the Pahlen Commission of 1883-8.[43] Indeed, Gessen asserts that the closure of the Pahlen Commission was due not to the influence of any one man, but due to irreconcilable differences among its members, torn apart by the two contradictory tendencies.[44] Regarding *zemstvo* policy, it was the fear of chaos that prevented an increase in self-government measures as much as the stubborn belief in autocratic power. The point is that it would have been all too easy for the government to hide behind the mask of absolute authority, so that it did not have to

[43] The Pahlen Commission is discussed in detail below. See Chapter Four, 'Official Government Activity'.

[44] Iulii Gessen, 'Glava dvenadtsataia', *Istoriia Evreiskii v Rossia*, (St. Petersburg, 1906; repr. Leningrad, 1925-7), p. 216.

explain itself or its actions to society, while privately feeling at a loss as to how to control disruptive forces. The expression of these concerns would hardly have been publicised or stated in official circulars and documents, and it is on this basis that the data in chapter four below has concentrated.

The Tsar was evidently not a man of creativity, or he would not have been close to Pobedonostsev. He had no record of initiating either great reform or counter-reform, and it is perhaps this that makes the charge of the government's instigation of a pogrom policy at this time so doubtful:

> [...] decisions made at the apex often did not penetrate into the countryside simply because the administration had no representatives to take them there, so that the paralysis of any ability to do good was perhaps balanced by a corresponding inability to effect harm.[45]

[45] Whelan, p. 188.

RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT POLICY

The Counter-Reforms

It is possible to say then that the government felt 'forced' into a situation where most of their decisions and actions were part of a thirteen year response to their own fears, as well as to social development and activity. The nature of this response was the so called 'counter-reforms'. They illustrate how the anachronism of the autocratic regime of Alexander III prevented the progress of Russian society into the twentieth century. 'The official estimate of Russian conditions and needs became increasingly unreal',[46] and the gap between the ideal and the reality only widened. This is most obvious in the russification policy of Alexander III. Designed to incorporate and unify the Russian Empire, such a policy, co-existing with the current trend of Nationalism, only succeeded in creating divisions within a multi-cultural and multi-national state.

The counter-reforms were intended first and foremost to strengthen the hierarchy on which the autocracy was based, supported by the new element of direct and active government interference. The new and the old elements of government policy did not necessarily work in tandem. Alexander III's desire to make Russia an industrial power was as strong as his desire to keep democratic and representative institutions weak and powerless, as they had been in feudal Europe. The tensions produced by these demands were matched by the contradictions within the policies when implemented.

That an active gentry was important to the government was evidenced by the creation of the Gentry Land Bank in 1885, the Land Captains in 1889, and the *zemstvo* reforms in 1890 and 1892. The *zemstvo* reform was designed to support the new system of Land

[46] Riasanovsky, p. 391.

Captains by reducing peasant representation. The Land Captain replaced the Justice of the Peace in most cases. The major difference between them was that the Justice of the Peace was an independent and elected member of the *zemstvo*, and the Land Captain was a centrally appointed and unelected member of the local landed gentry. He also had much greater judicial powers. The Land Captain (*Zemskii Nachalnik*) was allowed direct bureaucratic control over the peasants, control of the appointment of local officials in the villages, the decisions of peasant meetings and arrests and fines. His role contravened the 1864 legislation by combining administration with justice. The Land Captain was ultimately only accountable to the Minister of the Interior, and in this way Russia became divided into Land Captaincies.[47]

The *zemstvos* were convinced that such a direct intrusion of the Land Captain into village life would only help to undermine the moral influence of the gentry in peasant life because the squire would become an enemy, not a friend.[48] As Frank has shown, the peasants were made to feel this intrusion by the constant reminder that their customs and the law were very often in conflict with one another, and it was up to the Land Captain to bridge the gap, often with harsh results. In effect, the noble Land Captain prevented the social progress of the ordinary people from peasants to modern industrial workers, by keeping them within the parent-child relationship.

As well as increasing the direct powers of the nobility over the people, the government restricted the rights of the peasants by giving more favourable rates of loans to the nobles through their Land Bank than to the peasants through the Peasant Land Bank, created by the government in 1883. According to Bunge, the Bank's aims were:

> first, to counter in a practical manner the conviction of the peasants that they have the right to allotments, and to convince them that every expansion of their land ownership could only be the result of free transactions with the

[47] Riasanovsky, p. 393.
[48] Maxime A. Kovalevsky, *Modern Customs & Ancient Laws of Russia* (London: David Nutt, 1891).

> landowners concerning the purchasing of land; second, to promote the spreading of private agricultural property among the peasants.[49]

The order of priorities here is very interesting given the autocracy's understanding of contemporary economics.

On the other hand, new factory legislation was taking into account rapid changes in industrialisation. This meant breaking away from the traditional paternalistic relationship which the government had encouraged the factory owners to foster with their workers. That the workers were unhappy with factory life is evident from the unrest and strikes that took place over what Vorderer calls 'bread and butter' issues[50] - conditions, money, cheating by factory administrators on shift times, poor materials and machinery.

Why did the factory inspectors not deal with this? Mainly because the workers feared reprisals and distrusted them as much as the factory owners did. For the workers, the factory inspector was a symbol of authority, no different to the factory owner. The factory owner saw the inspector as nothing less than unwanted Tsarist interference.[51] The workers preferred to express their dissatisfaction through strikes, different to those of 1905 because they were not the expression of some deeper unrest, and they were not backed by strong trade unions. They were simply the result of unfair treatment. Nor were they taken lightly, since the workers knew that they were risking their livelihoods by striking. The workers were upset by the new laws designed to protect them because they prevented women and children working at night, thus depriving families of much-needed extra income.

Friedgut's research into Iuzovka[52] shows that in the 1890s, strikes and unrest were the culmination of grievances arising out of bad living conditions, the confinements of

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[49] Bunge, p. 60.
[50] Vorderer, p. 158.
[51] Frederick C. Giffin, 'The Formative Years of the Russian Factory Inspectorate 1882-1885', *SR* , 25 (1966).
[52] Friedgut, p. 72.

industrial life and resulting ill-health. Although the settlement was not as permanently rooted as those in later years, Friedgut noted the 'remarkable stability' of Iuzovka by 1884. As much as one third of all workers had stayed for ten years or more. This made it socially possible for the working class proletarian in factory life to have become an established prototype by the end of the eighties.

It has been shown that at the settlement, Jews made up 15-20% of the total population.[53] The lack of assimilation with the wider Russian community at Iuzovka was a situation that resembled that of Jewish communities in the past. The Jews maintained a 'vertical alliance' style relationship with the leaders of the community, in this case the industrialists. The relationship did not encourage trust to develop between the workers and the Jews. When cholera riots broke out in 1892, they were first expressed by smashing up 'yid shops' *(neskol'kikh zhidovskikh larok')*[54] and 'Jew doctors',[55] because Russians died while apparently the foreigners and the Jews did not. Although this has significance regarding the question of pogrom origins and the inherent anti-Semitism of the Russian workers, the main point is that Russian society and Jewish society lived side by side although not as one, and still riots targeted against the Jews had broken out. Had government agents initiated them? The question is further complicated by the distinction historians have made between riots, strike violence and pogroms. At this time and with the examples cited, it is difficult to say how one could be distinguished from the other.

In other areas of economic and fiscal policy, Alexander III allowed Russia to take a much more progressive line due to three successive Ministers of Finance, Bunge (1881-87), I. A. Vyshnegradskii (1887-92) and Witte (1892-1903). All ministers followed the same policy of promoting railway building, and heavy industry through various means.

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[53] Friedgut, pp. 193-258.

[54] Friedgut, p. 202

[55] Steven Charters Wynn, 'Workers, Strikes and Pogroms: The Donbass-Dnepr Bend in Late Imperial Russia, 1870-1905', (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 113.

The increase in railway building provided industries with their materials and became an industry in itself, changing the lives of traditional rural communities forever. Bunge brought in a system of tariff protection, which raised the price of import duties in an effort to support Russian industry. It was his reluctance to increase the burden of taxation on the peasants that led him to resign. He had cut redemption payments, abolished the salt and poll taxes, and he did not think that raising taxation would solve Russia's long-term agrarian or industrial problems.

His successor Vyshnegradskii was not so reluctant. The period 1885-89 saw a rapid and sustained growth in industrial output, consolidated by Vyshnegradskii's high tariff policy in 1891. He aimed to implement the Gold standard, stabilising the ruble by giving it an international value. Vyshnegradskii believed that it could be achieved if the agricultural population sold more of their crops, thus increasing exports. Unfortunately, the short-term solution backfired as famine and disease plagued Russia in the early 1890s. Witte continued Vyshnegradskii's policy of high taxation and high tariffs on imports, but he also planned for the long-term and managed to finally implement the Gold Standard (1897). His main achievement of the reign was to build up metallurgy and machinery production levels, and attract millions of rubles of foreign investment in Russian industry. It was by using such modern strategies that he pulled Russia up to industrial production levels comparative with Europe.

Whether it was Tsarist indifference or ignorance that allowed such sweeping advances to take place, the government undermined what they were trying to achieve, with other policies. At a time when the industrial needs of the country called for re-education, the Minister of Education Delianov prevented not only freedom of education, but greatly restricted the numbers of those who could be educated. In August 1884, the University Statute of 1863 was overturned bringing both students and professors directly under

government control. All appointments were made by the Minister following the recommendations of the educational inspectors who were given greatly increased powers. This policy was clearly motivated by a response to the revolutionaries as much as anything else, but it only served to whip up student resentment, resulting in public disorder and rioting at several universities throughout the reign. University and *gymnasium* school fees were increased in 1887 and this, together with the restriction on the numbers of children who were taken into the schools, typifies Delianov's belief that there was no point educating children of low birth to expect more from life than was realistic. Schools he felt should not include 'children of coachmen, servants, cooks, washerwomen, small shopkeepers and persons of a similar type'.[56]

If the aim had been to discourage revolutionary ideas, the policy was a dismal failure. It resulted in increased revolutionary activity. The government kept secret funds for bribing foreign writers to portray Russia in a good light. At home, if a newspaper was warned more than three times by the censor, it was often banned altogether from publication. However, Ruud has pointed out that censorship at this time was not as efficient or as thorough as has been believed,[57] a point that is borne out by Pobedonostsev's comments on the Kharkov press.[58] However, as independent journals were put out of business one by one, the Russian press was left with very little respectability internationally or with the intelligentsia at home. The closure of the liberal and independent *Golos* in 1883 is a good example.[59] Papers such as *Grazhdanin* and *Novoe Vremia* succeeded in surviving because they expressed the government view. In this respect, the 'Temporary Regulations' of 1881, came to characterise the whole reign.

Afraid of a hostile press, of revolutionaries and of public disorder, government

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[56] Seton-Watson, p. 476.
[57] Schapiro, p. 85.
[58] See Chapter Four, 'Ministerial Concerns - A Re-Examination'.
[59] Paul A. Russo, '*Golos*' and the Censorship, 1879-1883', *SEER*, 61, (1983). Russo states that the paper was also known as '*The Times* of Russia' because of the authority with which it spoke.

officials throughout the Empire were given the right of search, arrest, imprisonment and exile via the temporary emergency powers, which were never removed and remained open to interpretation for any official to use in any way he chose.

Minorities and the Russification Policy

The counter-reforms examined so far display a new distinct element of direct central government interference. The concepts behind the Land Captain, the Factory Inspectorate, the education and censorship policies bear this out. Lowe, writing about Alexander III's minorities legislation in 1895, said the policy was:

> like the man who, having suddenly inherited a large library, and desiring to establish uniformity in the appearance of his bookshelves, sent for the village carpenter to saw off the ends of all such volumes as marred the general symmetry of the rows.[60]

Indeed, by the end of the reign the russification policy was in force against the Finns to the Mohamedans and the Tatars.[61]

The policy was not applied equally to all minorities or groups. Certainly there was a generally negative reaction to any non-Russian. But within the policy, there were distinct differences in the degrees of russification enforced. Rogger puts this down to a demographic fear, because in effect the Great Russians were almost a minority in their own empire, as the census of 1897 showed.[62]

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[60] Lowe, p. 202.

[61] The Times of London, 'Russian Intolerance', *Latest Intelligence*, 13th June, 1891, p. 9.

[62] Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution*, p. 182. With language as the test of ethnicity, non-Russians made up the majority of people in the Empire at 55.7%. Examining the Slavic element, the figures were more 'comforting' because the Russians, the Poles, the Ukrainians and the Byelorussians accounted for approx. 75%. Here there were religious differences and problems of assertion of independence. The remaining quarter were of varying degrees different to the Russians - the Finns, the Baltic peoples, the Asians and Muslims, and the Jews.

Both the Nationalities Question and the religious policy were based on a new code of understanding of legitimacy. In addition to old ideas of religious loyalty, a new secular loyalty was demanded for Alexander III. Such a policy united in one fell swoop the Slavophiles, the military with their obsession for national security, and the Russian orthodox. The unique aspect of the policy was that it appeared to be almost entirely unnecessary. Most of the minorities had not blatantly revolted or shied away from Russian rule, so why did such a policy exist? The answer lies in Rogger's 'demographic fear', a fear shared by the government of Alexander III. It was not enough that these people were under the rule of the Russian Empire, they had to wish to be assimilated with the Great Russians. Such a goal did not allow for ethnic, religious, political or cultural differences of any kind. It was an all-embracing policy of total russification.

The policy was the government's response to its own fears. Indeed Bunge in his memoirs, stated that the russification policy meant 'the predominance of the Russian state system, with the Russian nationality and language holding sway' (*i.e.*, the liberation of Russians from foreign dominance), and that '*respect for the roots* professed by the Russian people and its sovereign should have primacy.'[63] A fear of being swamped by other peoples and other cultures was central to the thinking behind the active russification policy; the greater the fear, the harsher the implementation of the policy. For example, Finland did not suffer russification until the 1890s. The Russian government had become concerned that Sweden would attack Russia through Finland. Thus it was felt necessary to bind Finland ever closer to the empire. The first change came in the form of the Postal Manifesto, unifying the postal system between Russia and Finland. The Finns were mortified because their Parliament, the Diet, had not been consulted first; the law was simply imposed on them, and was perceived to be a distinct

[63] Bunge, p. 24. Note Bunge's italics.

threat to their autonomy. This was followed by similar reviews of both the legal system and the military, with the prospect of amalgamation. Despite the heavy-handedness with which these actions were taken, the policy was in reality relatively limited. The fact that the Finns had their own land, made no territorial claims to any other, and that they posed no cultural threat to Russia's own cultural heritage protected them from earlier or more extensive russification.

The Baltic Germans were treated in a similar way. Russia had let the German barons keep their Lutheran faith, churches, school and language, as well as control over the lower classes of their regions Lifland, Kurland and Estland.[64] Furthermore, the German nobles were allowed to climb the table of ranks in the military, judiciary and civil services. But when Russian nationalist sentiment, in addition to the protests of the peasantry, became important in the 1880s, and Prussia loomed as a force to be reckoned with, the questions of German loyalty and peasants paying homage to German culture and domination were not ignored. Along with the more general russification measures, such as the compulsory use of the Russian language and legal system, efforts at conversion began, and Lutheran clergy who refused to convert were either exiled or jailed. In 1885-6, schools and universities, the local administration and the police underwent similar reform.

Poland and Lithuania were different however. The Catholicism of these countries represented a link with the West which particularly in Poland, was cherished, and which led to the infiltration of many western ideas such as liberalism and democracy. Poland also begrudged the Russian Empire the land that it had lost to it through annexation, and the rebellions and revolts in Poland before 1881. But Poland's integration into the Russian Empire had led to great economic, industrial and political progress. Indeed it

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[64] Lifland was part of Liflandia Guberniia, Kourland was part of Kourlandskiia Guberniia, and Estland was part of Estlandia Guberniia after the Russians took over control of the Kingdom of Poland.

saw the greatest development in these fields of the whole Empire. Until the 1830s, Poland had a constitution, a parliament, and a special army. Because of the Polish Revolt of 1863, the university of Warsaw had been 'russianised' (1869), and typical russification measures were carried out before 1881.

After this date, russification was intensified. In 1885, all subjects taught had to be in Russian, except for the study of the Polish language and the Catholic faith. Bunge saw this as a mistake. By identifying Catholicism with the Polish language, he thought the Russian government was only serving to encourage a separate Polish culture. Bunge notes that Tolstoi and others in the government were categorically against allowing the conducting of Catholic services in the Russian tongue, regarded as a sin against Russian Orthodoxy. But it was Poland's ties with the West that caused the Russians most concern. Particularly in the 1880s, Polish politics became closely associated with international events and western politics. It was also said at the time that Poles did not fear russification because 'they possessed a higher culture and greater intelligence than Russians.'[65] This, in addition to the strategically sensitive and precarious Russian land ownership of annexed lands, helps to explain the severity of the implementation of russification measures in Poland.

Because minorities were felt to be a threat to things Russian, it is possible to speak of a blanket russification policy being enforced by Alexander III and his government. Perhaps its heavy-handedness can be attributed to a lack of a developed governmental diplomacy. The government even managed to alienate its Armenian friends in the South by making peace with the Ottoman Empire and harassing Armenian schools and churches in the early years of the reign.[66]

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[65] Seton-Watson, p. 491.
[66] Seton-Watson, p. 501.

However, the russification policy was clearly motivated by foreign policy concerns and the Russian obsession for secure borders. Largely a domestic problem, religious policy could be enforced without any restraint or consideration for other factors. Nothing tempered the fervent desire for uniformity, and the russification policy took on a much more sinister aspect. A group of people who suffered considerably at the hand of the government were the Stundists. They were a small group of people, who held a different religious belief to the Russian Orthodox. They possessed no land of their own, and neither were they numerous. Yet they were banned from entering artisan Guilds, or buying land. Their children were taken from them and brought up in Russian Orthodox homes; and they suffered confiscation of property and expulsion under the power granted to the Governor-generals in the 'Temporary Laws'.

It could hardly be said that they posed a serious cultural threat to Russian Orthodox Christians. In the treatment of the Stundists, it is possible to see the work and drive of one particular minister, Pobedonostsev. It became his personal mission as Ober-Procurator to deal severely with all sects that had broken away from the Russian Orthodox Church. The Stundists derived their beliefs from the doctrines of the German Baptists in the southern Ukraine, and they were well known for their high standards of morality, their pacifism and their belief in the sharing of property. This last in particular smacked too much of revolutionary Socialism for the autocratic government. They were hounded throughout the reign, and by 1894 the Stundists were prevented from holding prayer meetings by a central ministerial circular, in which they were called an 'especially dangerous sect'.[67]

Lowe stated that both Jews and non-Orthodox Christians were the most loathed subjects of the reign. But although the religious differences of both groups set them

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[67] Seton-Watson, p. 473.

apart from the Russian Orthodox, Lowe has pointed out that this was less of a reason for their persecution than 'Intellectual jealousy and fear of supersession'. The Tsar 'loathed [...] all those of his subjects who lived and worshipped without [...] the Orthodox Church'. To force them all back into the Russian Orthodox Church was his 'consuming passion'.[68] Religious persecution in the form of forced conversions and exile to Siberia was most definitely a part of the policy pursued by the government of Alexander III. Both Stundists and Jews suffered this fate. However, the fate of the Jews had the overwhelming passive approval of Russian society.

Yet the Jews, who were perceived to have a clearly negative influence and to be a cultural threat, were strangely not russified in the ways described for other minorities. They themselves were increasingly alienated more than ever by government law. It is this puzzling ambivalence which has led to many questions about the Jewish special case as expressed and interpreted differently by Russian society, government and historians ever since. Well before 1894, the international press were reporting stories of the persecution of the Jews in Russia, so that even Archbishop Davidson in England commented on the 'terrible narratives' and the 'glowing colours' of press reports.[69] After the mass of pogrom reports in 1881, followed by ten years of various discriminatory legislation against minorities of the empire including Jews, details of anti-Jewish riots became linked directly to government actions in the eyes of outsiders. Contemporary accounts and those written afterwards in Russia led to the views of such historians as Dubnov and Greenberg.[70] Their views, while in some ways natural and logical, lacked hard evidence that government actions amounted to a formal pogrom policy.

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[68] Lowe, pp. 218-19.
[69] London, Lambeth Palace, Archbishop Davidson Archive, 29f, 116. Letter from Bishop of Rochester to Rev. B. J. Solomons, 5th October, 1891.
[70] John D. Klier, 'S. M. Dubnov and the Kiev Pogrom, 1881', unpublished article.

Certainly, the differences between the treatment of other minorities of the empire and the Jews were marked, to the disadvantage of the Jews, as was their relationship with the new government of Alexander III. In addition to the importance of the religious symbolism of the 'more ancient race and faith'[71] with its apparent overtones of devilry and witchcraft, Judaism was felt to pose both an economic and intellectual threat to Russian society. There was also the important question of land. The Jews were by all accounts at this time without a homeland; they were a 'ghost nation',[72] a spectre of a race wandering across the world. This 'landlessness' was not understood by a nation that was motivated by love of the land and all the nationalistic glories that stemmed from it. A central tenet of the Russian psychological and philosophical make-up, it dominated Russia's foreign policy, its bargaining power, its political and economic importance in the world, and its conquests. Furthermore, the Jews appeared quite happy to settle in other countries, to trade and live with the locals and yet remain a distinct cultural and religious group, never completely assimilating through their own choice.

Because this was not understood it was feared, leading to the unique geographical status of the Jews penned up in an area of South-western Russia. A survey of anti-Jewish legislation confirms this fact. Among other legislation, the following regulations display both diversity and contradiction. Apart from the 'Temporary Laws' in 1882 discussed below (Chapter Four), other legislation of that year involved the removal of Jewish artisan workshop owners to the Pale, the restriction of Jewish surgeons in the army to five percent, the prohibition of Jews in the navy, and the restriction of Jews selling alcohol. 1883 saw the removal of residential privileges of Jews attending

[71] Lowe, p. 205.
[72] Leo Pinsker's *Auto-Emanzipaton*, 1882. See Chapter Three, 'The Jewish Community and the Reaction to the Pogroms'.

university lectures outside the Pale, and the prohibition of Jews in the police. In 1884, the privileges of Jewish Guild members to live outside the Pale were restricted, and Jews were not allowed to be foremen in the Pale courts.

In 1885, restrictions that were applied to previous laws such as rights to residence outside the Pale, were further enforced. The prohibition included the children of midwives where the husband did not have his own right of residence. Jewish quotas at the Stock exchanges could not exceed a third of the total number of members. 1886 saw more dramatic increases in Guild and military restrictions, and the education reform fixed the Jewish quota in schools and universities at ten percent in the Pale, five percent elsewhere, and three percent in St. Petersburg and Moscow. In 1887, it was decided that Jewish graduates were not considered to be privileged members of the Guild and therefore lost their right to residence outside the Pale. In addition, it was decided that the areas of Rostov and Tagenrog were no longer part of the Pale, which forced thousands of Jews to uproot their families and go 'back' to the Pale. Furthermore, the boundary zone residential restrictions were increased.

In 1888, Jewish physicians were forbidden from army work, and no Jews were allowed to reside in Finland. Jewish artisans were not allowed to possess new real estate, and were banned from theatre schools. They were barred from the legal profession in 1889, along with further restrictions on stockbroking and educational quotas, and the leasing and purchasing of land. In 1890, the boundary zone with China was closed to Jews and they were banned from standing in *zemstvo* elections. It was also decided that Jewish privileges did not apply to Siberia, which caused more expulsions.

1891 saw the greatest expulsion order of the reign, in Moscow. Furthermore, Jewish artisans were forbidden from employing Jewish servants in Kiev. In 1892, the mining

industry in Turkestan was closed to Jews, and the government debate on what constituted a townlet led to a stream of expulsions across the empire, for where a townlet was pronounced to exist, Jews had no right of residence. The year closed with the exclusion of all Jews in local self-government and within the Pale, the quota could not exceed ten percent. The last privilege of all - the Nicholaevan soldiers of the Cantonist system, who had lived non-Jewish lives for twenty-five years or more - was removed from Moscow. Finally in 1893, Yalta, a health resort in the Pale, was pronounced not to be within the Pale's borders. Russian was forbidden to be taught in Hebrew schools and the right of residence restrictions continued.[73]

This catalogue of discriminatory legislation shows three things: The restrictions on numbers of Jews working and living outside the Pale was clearly a response to the fear that Jewish influence on Russian society, whether perceived as revolutionary or other, could not be tolerated. These restrictions led to a dramatic rise in the number of people living in the Pale. Considering that the government kept making the Pale area smaller, living conditions could only deteriorate for both the Jew and the non-Jew Pale-dweller. Secondly, the prohibition on Jewish children learning Russian is plain evidence that the Jewish population were treated differently to the other minorities of the empire who were forced to learn it. Thirdly, the 1893 residential rights restrictions actually contravened the order of Tolstoi in 1882 that Jews settled outside the Pale before April 3rd 1880 should be left undisturbed. There could be no better example of the change in government direction. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Durnovo, had lost sight of any Jewish policy that Tolstoi had had in mind, and had yielded to the call of reactionary influence.

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[73] Full details of the anti-Jewish legislation passed in the reign of Alexander III can be seen in Lucien Wolf, *The Legal Sufferings of the Jews in Russia* (London: Fisher Unwin, 1912), pp. 83-93.

The laws reflect above all the widespread fear of Jewish assimilation, either because of old superstitions or of new ideas of economic domination. It was at the root of an abnormal situation where the Jews were the only minority of the empire not allowed to make links in the normal way with the larger community around them. They were not given equal rights as citizens for the same reasons, giving rise to another unique aspect of their situation: hatred of the Jews was to be found among other minorities. Indeed, Cala had found in her research that 'Whole social groups discovered their national allegiance as an offshoot of the feeling of separateness from the Jews.'[74] This was particularly evident in Polish Russia where the majority of Jews were living. Polish nationalists believed as did some Russians, that Jewish monopoly of commerce and industry was part of the 'judification' of Poland.[75] The Russian government did nothing to eradicate the hostility between the Jews and the Poles, because as much as they did not want the Jews to become Russians, neither did they wish them to become Poles.[76]

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[74] Alina Cala, 'The Question of the Assimilation of the Jews in the Polish Kingdom, 1864-1917', *Polin: A Journal of Polish Jewish Studies*, 1 (1986), p. 149.
[75] Stephen D. Corrsin, '*Warsaw before the First World War: Poles and Jews in the Third City of the Russian Empire, 1880-1914* (Boulder, NY: Columbia University Press, 1989), p. 64-5.
[76] Michael Jerry Ochs, 'St. Petersburg and the Jews of Russian Poland, 1862-1905' (PhD Thesis, US: Harvard University, 1986), p. 179.

FEAR OF VIOLENCE

Given the lack of understanding of the social tensions within its own society, and leaving aside the complex issues of the Jewish Question, it is difficult to imagine how the ministers began to comprehend the violence which greeted it from the first day of the new reign. The Times of 15th March, 1881 stated that Alexander III 'begins his reign in something like a panic'.[77] The fear that followed the assassination came to dominate the whole reign of Alexander III. To a large extent, the new direction of policy can be traced to this single event, where uncertainty and fear of the new Tsar would have communicated itself to his closest advisors and ultimately, the whole government structure.

From the first, Alexander III suffered from the activities of the Nihilists and the anarchists. The numerous actions and threats against high powered officials, and the attempts on Alexander III's life produced a general nervousness and a deterioration in the health of the Tsar himself, though he was determined not to give in. The police regularly uncovered potential assassination plots, and largely as a result, flourished into an independent ministry in this period. Alexander III had been witness to his father's mangled corpse, and treated those responsible with the utmost severity. The Nihilists, the 'Will of the People' *(Narodnaia Volia)* and the various splinter groups such as 'Popular Rights' spoke out about the deep discontent among the people, demanding different reforms.[78] Their activities were certainly more calculated and more forceful than in the previous decade. Before the Tsar's coronation, the Prefect of Police was sent

[77] The Times, 'The Assassination of the Emperor of Russia', *Russia*, telegraph correspondent, 15th March, 1881, p. 5.
[78] Lowe, p. 237, p. 240.

a basket of eggs, several of which were filled with dynamite, with a note that said 'We have plenty more for the Tsar's coronation'.[79]

Although the coronation itself passed off without trouble, it was actions such as these that caused the incredible fear and general paranoia of the reign, giving new meaning to the conventional historical term 'reign of terror'. The people were terrorising the men in power, and not the other way round. The Nihilists not only had highly placed members of society among their number, but they were beginning to consolidate forces. As people around him suffered at the hands of the revolutionaries, the Tsar increasingly isolated himself at his home at Gatchina, where the security and surveillance measures were extreme.[80]

Social unrest was the main concern of a particular group of nobles following the assassination of Alexander II. The 'Holy Retinue' (*Sviashchennaia druzhina*) were pledged to protect the new Tsar from revolutionary terrorism. It has been claimed that this group was responsible for the pogroms, but Hamberg for one has shown that nobles such as Shuvalov, Durnovo, and Prince San Donato were members of this secret organisation.[81] None of these men gave evidence either in private or public of being anti-Semitic beyond what was 'normal' for Russian society. Indeed San Donato had written a favourable report on the emancipation of the Jews,[82] Durnovo's reports as Minister of the Interior under Alexander III show nothing but concern about the public disorder, and Shuvalov's documents in particular show how opposed to anti-Jewish measures he was.[83] Furthermore, the Jewish railway magnate Poliakov was a member of the group. It is true that as a group they did not trust non-Russians, but research has shown that the

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[79] Lowe, p. 244.
[80] Lowe, p. 253.
[81] Hamberg, 'Russian Noble Politics and the Terrorist Movement', p.189. Hamberg cites Dubnov's findings among others.
[82] Prince Demidoff San-Donato, *The Jewish Question in Russia*, 1884.
[83] See Chapters Four and Five for documentary evidence.

preservation of the state was their only goal. They believed that they had reason to believe its survival was in jeopardy.

On the anniversary of his father's death in March 1887, Alexander III escaped a daring assassination attempt when six men had attended a church service with bombs that had been made to look like books. Soon after, the Tsar received a communication from the Executive Committee of the Nihilists that an order had gone out for him to be put to death, and that fifty people had been given the task of carrying this out. The effect that this had was to force an increase in stringent measures of security, in the importance of the police and in oppressive measures. In 1890, however, protest against the government's policy came from another area. A lady called Madame Tshebrikova decided she could remain silent no longer and, knowing that she would be arrested, appealed to the Tsar in a letter on the disastrous effects that secret justice, censorship and persecution had on Russian society:

> What is the use of all this oppression and persecution? Is it for the sake of the peaceful development of Russia? Or is it for the sake of autocracy - that is, really for the advantage of the officials? Your Majesty's self is proved powerless to struggle against abuses [...] You are inevitably powerless, because all the Imperial measures are founded upon the same slavery and enforced silence of society.[84]

On the Nihilists' aims and actions she tried to show that:

> If a general revolution, which could overturn the throne, is as yet remote, still district mutinies, such as the Pugachoff riots, are more than possible. The people will grow familiar with blood. Honest citizens await with horror the miseries which this system of all-powerful administration must, sooner or later, inevitably bring, and they are silent; but their children and grandchildren will not be silent.[85]

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[84] The Times, ' Madame Tshebrikova and the Tsar', Paris correspondent, 24th March, 1890, p. 7.
[85] ibid.

That this was prophetic of the revolutions of the early twentieth century, there can be no doubt. Yet it was a comment made in the midst of 'panic', when the flaw in the legal basis of the regime was starting to be recognised by society; and when pogroms, civil unrest and revolutionary terrorism had clearly affected both society and policy-making for at least a decade.

Pogroms

The clearest evidence that exists for the unrest in Russian society in the reign of Alexander III is the wave of pogroms that began in April 1881.

Much has already been said in reference to the pogroms. However, a clearer definition of the word 'pogrom' is needed for the present thesis. The Russian verb *pogromikhivat'* means to rumble intermittently, or to thunder in the distance, while a *pogromshchik* translates as a pogrom-maker and as a general thug. Indeed, a member of the family of the Russian-Jewish railway tycoons, the Poliakovs, recalled that pogroms were seen as a massacre of any kind in Russia, referring to the German pogrom of 1916,[86] and the Russian language dictionary *Russkii-Angliisksii Slovar'* translates 'pogrom' as 'massacre' without any Jewish connotation.[87]

However in the West, the word 'pogrom' is almost synonymous with anti-Jewish outrages. Riasanovsky says pogroms are 'violent popular outbreaks against the Jews',[88] and Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary describes a pogrom as 'an organised massacre orig. (late 19th cent.) esp. of Jews'.[89] Aleksandrov's dictionary of 1910 translates pogroms as 'devastation, desolation and destruction'.[90] Perhaps the most revealing description of the word comes from Pavlenkov's Encyclopaedic Dictionary of 1913 which lists a Jewish pogrom (*pogromov Evreiskii*) as being separate from the pogroms of students, Germans and supporters of the liberation movement. The difference between the riots and pogroms of 1905-6 was that the 'pogroms were initiated

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[86] Alexander Poliakoff (London: unpublished interview with the author, 1992).
[87] *Russko-Angliiskii Slovar'*, ed. by O. S. Akhmanova, and others, 16th rev. edn. (Moscow: Russkii Iazyk, 1992).
[88] Riasanovsky, p. 395.
[89] *Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary*, ed. by E. M. Kirkpatrick, and others, new ed. (Suffolk: The Chaucer Press, 1983).
[90] *Aleksandrov's Complete Russian-English Dictionary*, ed. by A. Aleksandrov, 4th rev. edn. (St. Petersburg, 1910).

by sections of the population of low cultural development'.[91] Clearly then, there is a difference in the way that the word pogrom is understood and perceived; a difference exaggerated by time, contributing to a lack of understanding of the origins of pogroms in the period 1881-1894.

The first Russian 'modern' pogrom,[92] took place in Odessa in 1871, and was based on the trading and economic rivalries of the large Greek and Jewish communities in the city. Odessa, as a port, housed many ethnic groups whose differences encouraged tensions, which spilled over into aggressive attacks on Jewish property. Fighting broke out at Easter 1871, a festival which was considered to be the traditional season for fighting between Christians and Jews,[93] but Russians joining the fray after a few days were reported to have done so because of the bitterness felt by exploited Christians at the hands of the manipulative Jews, who in addition 'offended our Christ, (they) grow rich and (they) suck our blood'.[94] Religious differences and fights had been a feature of earlier riots in 1821 and 1859, but the Ministry of Internal Affairs was concerned that there was some political motive involved in the fighting. Several groups of agitators had been arrested in the crowds of rioters, claiming that an Imperial ukase had sanctioned riots against the Jews.

Klier has shown that in reports of the aftermath to the Governor-general of the district, the cause of the pogrom was laid at the door of the victims, i.e. that they deserved the 'punishment' because of their economic domination and exploitation of the local population. This is what Klier has called the retributive theme in pogrom violence, that 'became one of the most persistent myths of the pogrom'.[95]

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[91] *Entsiklopedicheskii Slovar'*, ed. by F. P. Pavlenkov, 5th edn.(St. Petersburg, 1913).
[92] John D. Klier, 'The Pogrom Paradigm in Russian History', in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, ed. by Klier and Lambroza (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
[93] Klier, p. 33.
[94] Klier, p. 21.
[95] Klier, p. 17.

This theme became more important in 1871 because of the increased attention given to it by the Russian press. As physical communication and travel between towns and cities became easier, the press was a much more influential source of information for both government and people than in 1821 and 1859. The idea that the Russian people were no longer going to stand by and be exploited by foreigners, was promoted by the press.[96] Influenced by the voice of Brafman, it became part of the regime's philosophy on the subject from 1871.[97] At a time when patriotic religious and nationalist sentiments were coming to the fore, the idea that violence was a reaction to exploitation was much more acceptable than the contrary traditional peasant violence and greed. The government, having reformed society so that the concepts of personal freedom and equality could move forward, was not likely to take kindly to the news that the peasants still had the same mentality despite such grand central changes.

In Odessa, the Governor-general, Kotsebu, protected his own staff by stating that there was no way of knowing that the Easter Holy Week processions would become a pogrom, and that the numbers of police at his disposal could not have dealt with the crowds any more efficiently. But Katkov did blame Kotsebu and the police in his paper *Moskovskie vedomosti.*[98] Traditional violence between ethnic groups was blamed, but the Jews specifically were not, because at this time they were seen by some to be just another ethnic group. But the traditional anti-Semitic view of Russian society was expressed in many other journals, such as *Golos* and *Kievlanin,*[99] where it was taken for granted that one looked for answers to the Jewish Question based on the precept that Jews exploited the local population. Emphasis was placed on the purity and righteousness of the anger of the Russian people. There were many different points of

[96] Klier, pp. 26-30.
[97] Klier, p. 20.
[98] Klier, pp. 26-27.
[99] Klier, pp. 28-30.

view on the Jewish Question expressed in the wake of the 1871 pogrom. A great deal of reassessment of the position of the Jew in Russian society took place in the next ten years, which was by no means resolved by 1881.

The Western use of the word 'pogrom' mainly began in 1881 with the many specific outbreaks against the Jews that took place intensively over a whole year, and which were the first to be reported extensively in the international press. The main differences between the pogrom of 1871 and those a decade later were the location, and the extent of the damage incurred. The 1871 pogrom was the spontaneous result of ethnic and economic competition. This meant that by 1881, there existed a social framework into which a pogrom mentality and causes, as well as consequent governmental and social responses, neatly fitted, even though the unrest of post-1881 was more complex.

The spectre of socialism and revolutionary activity played a great part in the years after 1881; heightening social tensions and directing the attitudes and policies of the government. Bunge recalled in his memoirs that 'it is impossible to eradicate socialism, just as it is impossible to eradicate microbes.'[100] Referring to the pogroms of 1881-2, *Grazhdanin* wrote 'When microbes have to be destroyed, we do not pause to inquire how microbes like the process'.[101] The use of the microbe imagery sums up precisely how the Jews, the revolutionaries and all undesirable non-conformist groups were viewed by some sections of Russian society, right up to the revolution of 1917.

Perhaps partly due to this, many historians today adhere to the argument of S. M. Dubnov, a contemporary Russian-Jewish journalist and historian. He believed that the pogroms from the start of Alexander III's reign were part of a definite government policy to keep the general population from turning to more important issues and perhaps from identifying the real causes of their misfortunes. In short the Russian government

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[100] Bunge, p. 72.

[101] The Times, 'The Rev. Dr. Adler on the Persecution of the Jews in Russia', 7th October, 1890, p. 7.

used the Jews as a scapegoat for all that was wrong with society. The government secretly initiated a policy of pogroms the theory goes, in order to satisfy the mob and to throw society off the revolutionary trail. From the Tsar and his central ministers, right down to the lowest official at local police levels, violent attacks on the Jews were not only known about and encouraged, but were enforced. Defenders of this state that no official would have committed such a policy to paper, in case documents fell into the wrong hands. And so the argument about whether or not pogroms were government policy has raged for a century.

On April 29th 1881, the 'Times' reported:

> In consequence of the precautionary measures taken by Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakofff, provisional Governor-general of Odessa, and M. Lovkovitch, town commandant, the premeditated attack, here of the Christians upon the Jewish inhabitants has not taken place yet, and it is therefore hoped that all danger of a collision is avoided.[102]

This was the first mention in the English press of anti-Jewish excesses taking place in Russia, but from that time onwards the newspaper is littered with reports of attacks, incidents and full-scale pogroms. The first major pogrom took place in Elizavetgrad on April 15, 1881. Klier and Lambroza[103] have pointed out that there were three surprising elements to this pogrom - it did not take place in Odessa, it was just after Easter week and it was not an isolated event. Pogroms occurred throughout 1881 and into 1882, and despite government legislation designed to prevent further trouble, i.e. by separation of Jew from Christian, they continued through to 1884. By then pogrom activity was more sporadic and isolated, and most historians consider 1882 to be the end of the first wave of pogroms, the second beginning in 1903. Klier and Lambroza identify the last 1884

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[102] The Times, 'Telegram from Odessa', *Russia*, 26th April, 1881, p. 5.
[103] Klier and Lambroza, 'The Pogroms of 1881', in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*, p. 40.

pogrom as the end of the general period of pogroms.[104] It is possible however, to talk of the pogrom 'wave' coming full circle, since there was a pogrom on August 22nd 1887 in Ekaterinoslav, the starting place of the 1881 pogroms. Indeed, anti-Jewish incidents and attacks continued throughout the reign, and certain patterns emerge that show inextricable links with the problems of Russian society.

On May 4-11 1881, various outbreaks against Jews and others occurred. This took the form of pogrom activity, popular outbreaks, agrarian riots and nihilist activity, indicating nothing less than general discontent. Pogroms on May 26 and June 1 were followed by agrarian riots on June 10 and student riots on December 4 within the same geographic areas.[105] Similar situations were reported in the summer of 1884, and the summer of 1885, suggesting seasonal discontent. In addition to this, traditional fighting led to four Easter pogroms between April 10 and 21, 1882. According to the Times, the pogroms occurred as follows:[106]

Date	Place
April 27-29	Elizavetgrad
May 7	Smela
May 8	Kiev
May 10	Konotop, Vasil'kov
May 13	Alexandrovsk, banks of Dneiper. Jewish agricultural colonies, established for more than forty years. Gaigula, Orekhov, Mariupol.

[104] Klier and Lambroza, p. 41.
[105] The Times omitted some important pogrom areas such as Aleksandriia, Anan'ev and Tirospol towns in Kherson guberniia, and across a vast group of towns in Kiev guberniia. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that correspondents for the Times would have only been able to report back on pogroms in places that were easily accessible to the foreigner. The most detailed listing of pogroms in 1881 to date can be found in I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1990), pp. 50-56.
[106] The Times, 'Persecution of the Jews in Russia', 11th January, 1882, p. 4. The list was compiled from information given in the Times article. Note that the dates in the Times list are according to the New Style calendar.

May 17	Rural areas of Rasdory and Balka near Dneiper
May 15	Odessa (originally planned for May 13)
May 21, 24	Berdichev, Smenka, Podolia
June 8	Saratov
early July	Kiev and neighbouring banks of Dneiper again.
Sunday 12 July	Pereiaslav
July 21	Borispol
August 2	Nezhin
August 8	Lubny
August 18	Borzna
August 28	Itchnia
September	Noted as relatively quiet because of harvest needs
October 3rd	Balverzyski, government of Suwalki (Yom Kippur)[107]
November 15	Tsarvoni, near Zhitomir
November 18	Kiev
November 27	Odessa
December 25	Warsaw

Most pogrom activity, as Figure 4.2 shows (Chapter Four), was concentrated in the guberniias of Kherson, Ekaterinoslav, and the border areas of Kiev, Chernigov and Poltava. However in the published contemporary accounts, the emphasis was placed more on the horrific nature of the outrages committed, and less on detecting patterns of behaviour, or of geographic connections and their implications. Thus the Times noted

[107] Jewish Day of Atonement

that 160 villages during the last nine months of 1881 suffered pogroms, and in 45 villages alone, there were 23 murders, 17 deaths, 1 violation and 225 rapes reported.[108]

In 1883, there were two notable pogroms - one in Tagenrog in March and one, very violent pogrom in Ekaterinoslav in August. By now outsiders were beginning to believe that the authorities had a hand in the outbreaks. But even this major pogrom can be seen as an expression of something other than hatred of Jews. The majority of the rioters were migrant workers from the Donbass-Dnepr bend who came to the area in their thousands looking for work in the factories and the mines, travelling along the new railway lines that many of them were involved in building. The prolonged violence was as much due to the conditions that these people found themselves in, as it was a signal that the rioters were unafraid of lawlessness and rule-breaking. Here, pogrom activity was one method among many of industrial workers' protests, strikes and attacks on their employers.[109] Meanwhile isolated anti-Jewish incidents continued, notably one in Riga, a few days before a public holiday. Placards were frequently displayed bearing 'Jew-baiting' slogans and indications of anti-Jewish activity to follow. This pre-meditative aspect of the pogroms plays an essential role in the pogrom policy argument, yet the role of peasant culture is usually under emphasised, especially the aspect of holiday rituals discussed above.

At the same time and into 1884, agrarian riots and arrests of socialist demonstrators took place in February (Odessa), August (Poltava), and October (Kiev). Pogroms occurred in July (Minsk) and August (Kiev) 1886, and in August 1887 (Khotin and Ekaterinoslav). After two years of isolated incidents, sudden anti-Semitic rioting erupted in Lithuania, followed by other incidents in the empire such as that at Byalistock, Poland, in August.

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[108] The Times, 11th January, 1882, p. 4.
[109] Wynn, *Workers, Strikes and Pogroms*, pp. 108-113.

By 1891, a plethora of laws had been passed against uprisings and non-conformist activity of any kind, and in the same year famine and disease became a major national problem. Pogrom activity began to increase again in July and October (Chernigov), and November (Balta), and while the famine areas did not overlap the Pale of Settlement at all,[110] it is necessary to look at the underlying changes in Russian society which would make the unrest in one situation fuse with another. For instance, the significant increase at this time in the building of the railway system and the extent to which it was used for communication from one village to another, has been extensively examined by Aronson.[111] He has shown in detail that the rail was vital in relaying news, and even the concept of pogroms, from one place to another. It can be said that the general destabilisation of peasant culture and lifestyle would have only been exacerbated by the famine, even in the Pale. So, regardless of how disastrous the famine was for the peasant in the long-term financially, the additional grievance could only have acted as fuel to the fire.

As 1894 loomed, the lot of the peasant, the non-conformist and the Jew appeared to deteriorate, the latter represented by the 1894 Easter pogrom in Ekaterinoslav. Thus Alexander III's reign can be called the reign of the pogrom cycle, creating a new perspective of the 'first wave' concept. In the wider context however, increasing protest and social disorder was evidently not being dealt with effectively or satisfactorily by the government.

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[110] Richard G Robbins, *Famine in Russia 1891-1892*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), p. 43. Robbins shows that the famine areas stretched as far South-west as Orel, Kursk and Voronezh guberniias, the former two bordering the troubled Pale guberniias of Chernigov and Poltava.
[111] I. Michael Aronson, 'Geographical and Socio-Economic Factors in the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia', *RR* , 39 (1980).

The Russian reaction to pogroms

When the pogroms started, the authorities publicly blamed the revolutionaries for provoking the masses to attack the Jews. The government feared that the unleashing of civil unrest would lead to revolutionary attacks on society in general. This fear naturally followed on from the assassination of Alexander II. But the nihilists responded by saying that they had no reason or desire to attack Jews, many of whom were among their ranks. It is acknowledged that some members of *Narodnaia Volia* caused confusion over what was revolutionary policy. Romanenko, a revolutionary, issued a statement supposedly representing *Narodnaia Volia.* He took what Haberer calls the 'place of honour' in the representation of the anti-Semitic revolutionary, clearly regurgitating accusations of Jewish exploitation.[112] Generally though, the revolutionaries echoed the feelings of many in Russian society by believing that the pogrom was the autocracy's revenge for the assassination. Because one of the assassins was a Jewess, a rumour quickly spread that the Jews had killed Alexander II. It is clear then, that right from the beginning of the reign there was political and social, central and local, confusion.

The traditional arguments of historians such as Dubnov, Greenberg and Baron do not take such factors into account, yet they are clearly evident as the British Foreign Office affairs papers, unofficial ministerial letters, minutes and notes, and secret police reports show. Dubnov was the most outspoken historian and commentator on the pogroms as part of government policy in the late nineteenth century. It is his material evidence therefore that elicits the most important examination. Dubnov states that the police

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[112] Details of the proclamation are given in Harberer's essay 'Cosmopolitanism, anti-Semitism, and Populism', (Klier & Lambroza), p.101-108. Issued in August 1881 and addressed to the Ukrainian people, the statement ended: 'You have begun to rebel against the Jews. You have done well. Soon the revolt will be taken across all of Russia against the Tsar, the [...] gentry and the Jews.' The reaction to this from other revolutionaries was one of confusion and disassociation. The failure of leading revolutionaries such as Lavrov and Plekhanov to roundly and publicly condemn the statement led many Jewish revolutionaries to turn to the idea of the Bund, a Jewish Nationalist party.

constitution created in August 1881, and which gave the police emergency powers when needed, was a 'symbol of legalised lawlessness',[113] allowing for the pogroms to happen according to unofficial government wishes. Under the heading 'The initiation of the pogrom policy', Dubnov wrote that the assassination of Alexander II was soon being avenged by 'invisible hands from above' pushing the people into anti-Jewish agitation through the press and 'mysterious emissaries from St Petersburg' in all major cities of South Russia. He further states that 'secret negotiations' were entered into with the police concerning possible riots against the Jews, and that the 'Sacred Retinue', an organisation created by some nobles to defend the life of the new Tsar, were not entirely free from suspicion of contributing to the well-organised mob actions that followed. Despite all these suspicions and statements, Dubnov admits that he is unable to corroborate any of the accusations as true, due to a lack of hard evidence.

On the eve of the first pogrom, rumours were rife among some of the Greek population that the Jews were about to be beaten. Nothing happened initially because the troops had been called in. The minute they were withdrawn, the pre-arranged signal was given when:

> The organisers of the riots sent a drunken Russian into a saloon kept by a Jew, where he began to make himself obnoxious. When the saloon-keeper pushed the trouble maker out into the street, the crowd, which was waiting outside, began to shout: The zhyds are beating our people,' and threw themselves upon some Jews who happened to pass by.[114]

From this first incident, further destruction of markets and houses followed, and according to Dubnov, quoting from official investigation records, the police and military were 'helpless' and 'without definite instructions'.[115] For two days the violence

[113] Dubnov, p. 247.
[114] Dubnov, p. 249.
[115] Dubnov, p. 250.

continued and only the rain and wind stopped the pogrom on the second evening. Much has been made of the fact that many of the rioters believed that they were acting in accordance with the orders of an Imperial Ukase to attack the Jews, a widespread rumour which emerged during the pogrom trials. This ukase never surfaced, but Dubnov believed that such rumours had a definite association with the orders of the local and central authorities, as did the 'barefoot brigade' and the 'Secret League'.

Dubnov wrote that the Warsaw pogrom on Christmas day 1881 had taken place because since pogroms had died out in Russia proper, government attention was directed elsewhere to show that the pogrom phenomenon was not a purely Russian one. 'The organisers of the pogrom who received their orders from above managed to adapt themselves to local conditions and the unexpected came to pass'.[116] On the pretext of a fire, pandemonium broke out in the Church of the Holy Cross in the town centre. Although there was no fire, rumours were started that two Jewish pickpockets had been caught in the crowd, then whistles were heard and the pogrom started. Only on the third day did the authorities 'remember' to stop the pogrom, having refused a request from some Polish people to create a civil guard to end the unrest. Similarly in Balta in the spring of 1882, the Jewish population was not allowed to create a self-defence unit in anticipation of the pogrom that took place on the second day of Easter. Dubnov quotes horrific accounts of violence, death, rape and homelessness,[117] and again the authorities appeared slow to react.

Almost ten years later on September 29 1891, another pogrom broke out in Starodub, led by a Russian fanatic called Gladkov and which resembled the Odessa pogrom of 1871 in that economic rivalry was purportedly the main cause. However even Dubnov admitted that the government was not happy at the reappearance of the pogrom

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[116] Dubnov, p. 280.
[117] Dubnov, p. 299.

phenomenon. He put it down to a policy of 'legislative pogroms'[118] that followed the much publicised 'first wave' of pogroms, rather than to the more likely reason that legislation designed to prevent more disorder simply failed. Moreover, nothing was made of the fanatic Gladkov, or of the fact that people like him were more indicative of peasant ability than was realised.

Klier has raised two important issues regarding Dubnov's findings. First that Dubnov's sources were often questionable, being second-hand reports, uncorroborated vocal accounts and Russian press articles. Furthermore, the accounts that he gives in his works are mostly without source references. Secondly, when Dubnov began to write the history of the Jews up to 1917, he started to do so after 1903 when the questions of pogrom activity and government involvement were much less clear cut and more open to doubt. It became harder to distinguish in retrospect between a definite policy and more human factors. For example, regarding the Kiev pogrom in 1881, Klier quotes Dubnov as stating that 'the pogrom was carefully prepared by a secret organisation which spread the rumour that the new Tsar had given orders to exterminate the Jews' under the Governor-general Drenteln, a notorious anti-Semite.[119]

Although Dubnov took his information from a Kiev contemporary N. I. Petrov, Petrov's original account gives more credit to Drenteln for trying to prevent trouble.[120] He had taken pre-Easter measures before, and had become personally involved to this end when, the troubles began. Drenteln did lay the blame for the pogrom at the door of the Jews for their exploitation of the local population, but it is not implausible to suggest that this could have been the action of a man nervous about his career prospects. He would have had to have provided an explanation to his superiors, a government obsessed

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[118] Dubnov, p. 312.
[119] John D. Klier, 'S. M. Dubnov and the Kiev Pogrom of 1881', unpublished article, p. 6.
[120] Klier, pp. 7-8.

with the fear of national anarchy. Other archives have thrown up documents that deal with the concern of the central powers regarding Drenteln, and the endless telegrams requesting news from, and with orders to, him and his office signed by Pleve, the Minister in charge of the Police Department. These documents, and others relating to the prevention of pogrom activity in the Krasnyi-Admoni archives seriously undermine Dubnov's argument.[121]

According to Baron, the assassination of Alexander II was 'used as an excuse for anti-Jewish legislation', and the 'Sacred Retinue' of nobles (*Sviaschennaia Druzhina*) was used for 'the defence of the existing order engaged in large-scale anti-Jewish propaganda. It stirred up sufficient resentment among the peasants to lead to bloody outbreaks in many communities, particularly in southern Russia.'[122] Again he blames Drenteln for whipping up hatred of the Jews and suspects the local police and military of being slow to react.

Greenberg lifts some of the blame from the attackers when he states that the mob that destroyed Jewish lives and property were frequently under the impression that they were executing the order of the Tsar: permission was therefore given by the authorities, who did not disapprove of mob attacks on Jewish properties. For Greenberg, this was the reason for the rioters' surprise at being arrested, for the courts' light sentencing and for their refusal to uphold civil claims for damages. The Senate would have agreed with the latter decision because granting money to pogrom victims might set a dangerous precedent, making an additional annual expense for the treasury. Greenberg further stated that the government had a good reason for rejecting this precedent because 'in spite of outraged protests of the civilised world, the ruling clique of Russia had no

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[121] Klier, p. 9.
[122] Baron, p. 44.

intention of relinquishing the pogrom as a weapon to fight the revolution'.[123] But these years before the revolution are not only important as a prelude; they demonstrate that any suggestion of a revolution was still very much an extremist and unacceptable point of view to Russian society, who saw more likely a culprit in the autocratic regime. Subsequent court cases illustrated a much more realistic contemporary concern - the whole subject of special treatment.

Greenberg cites the 'procedure' for pogroms such as the ones that took place in Kiev and Balta in 1881. Pogroms would be preceded by rumours of approaching disorders. The Jews would ask the authorities for protection but were dismissed as panic-mongers. On the appointed day, a band of hooligans - known as the 'barefoot brigade' - would arrive from out of town at the railway station, and read out a list of Jewish names and shops to be plundered and wrecked. The peasants, while not joining in at first, would eventually be incited to participate by 'secret agitators'. Some pogroms would be worse than others depending upon whether or not the Governor-general of a particular area was willing to participate. Where the Governor-general did not participate and allowed Jewish resistance, pogroms were quelled at the start.[124] But does any of this prove that the central authorities were instigating the pogroms as policy? Greenberg expresses doubt about the question, but concludes that the evidence is positive because Dubnov stated that secret emissaries travelled from St Petersburg to southern Russia, and the 'Sacred Retinue' were involved - both of which were never proved.

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[123] Greenberg, p. 52.

[124] Greenberg flatly believed that a pogrom could be nipped in the bud if there was a will to do so (p. 50). Yet there were exceptions to this, i.e. Kiev and Elizavetgrad. In these places, where the pogrom wave began, the authorities were taken very much by surprise. There were no rumours to forewarn them. Harberer, Aronson and Klier concur on this point (Klier and Lambroza), which also rests on the fact that pogroms were essentially an urban phenomenon. This convinced the authorities that they were under attack from revolutionaries at work in the industrial centres, and thus the chance for a unified and quick response was lost.

Greenberg states that when Count Tolstoi took over as Minister of the Internal Affairs from Ignat'ev in May 1882, the pogrom pattern immediately changed.[125] Tolstoi issued a circular, in favour of ending the disorders and giving the provincial authorities a choice of establishing law and order or losing their jobs. Greenberg points out that the pogroms became sporadic and were easily suppressed by the police, and that this implies a crucial link between the Minister of Internal Affairs in power and the degree of pogrom activity. Greenberg concluded that on Tolstoi's signal the pogrom policy came to end, and legislation against the Jews began. It is also a link that relies on the traditional belief in authoritative control of social activity. As the tensions in Russian autocratic society demonstrate, it is a link that is rather more to do with the necessity of re-establishing order after a period of terrifying anarchy for the authorities, than an indication of their control. If Greenberg was right in making the connection between Tolstoi's elevation to Minister of Internal Affairs and a change in the pogrom pattern, it was an unprecedented situation because never before had the people at the top been able so fully to control the masses at the bottom.

Just as Greenberg believed that the government organised the pogroms, he believed that the local Christian population played no part at all in organising them. It will be shown why this assumption is incorrect, and how the religiosity of some peasants became a factor in anti-Jewish activity in the 1880s - 1890s.

Gessen believes that the speed of the 1881-2 pogroms and the size of the territory covered speaks in favour of their spontaneity.[126] However, the spontaneity theory emphasises that only Jewish houses were attacked.[127] Gessen proposed that the reason for this may have been embedded in the Russian collective presumption that Jews were a

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[125] ibid.
[126] Gessen, p. 230-234.
[127] This may indeed have been a reason for such violent attacks on Jewish property, although pogroms often ended in drunken and indiscriminate fighting and looting.

form of outlaw whom the authorities would not bother to protect against the will of the Russian people. Gessen also believed in the theory of the travelling band of agitators, capturing the crowds with talk of a ukase that ordered riots, mainly because of the controversial *Narodnaia Volia* statement. Certainly he did not see the government at work behind the pogrom scenes, because there was no evidence to support the charge.

The classic historical works on this subject in the secondary literature by Dubnov, Baron and Greenberg narrate events entirely from secondary sources. However, if the government's apparent involvement in a pogrom policy is to be accurately assessed, it becomes necessary to look at the situation from the central authorities' point of view, through their correspondence with each other, their everyday concerns and worries, and the very nature of the regime itself. Recent research has begun to address the problem in this way and has effectively solved some of the issues raised previously. One of these issues is the pogrom as an urban phenomenon, 'the result of Russia's accelerating modernisation and industrialisation process'[128] of which the authorities did not appreciate the full impact. Thus the pogroms caught both local and central authorities by surprise. They were inclined to adhere to the idea that the pogroms were the result of peasant misery at the hands of Jewish exploitation, and that it was a peasant phenomenon, starting in the rural areas.[129] Pogroms did occur in the countryside but by far the majority took place in industrial centres, where discontented protoproletarians had the chance to meet and discuss their grievances, and even the rural unrest occurred in places that were affected by urbanisation and growth.

The possibilities of either revolutionary and 'Sacred Retinue' involvement have been eliminated. Although it took a while for the fact to register, the government knew that

[128] I. Michael Aronson, 'The Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia'(Klier and Lambroza, 1992), p. 46.
[129] The development of this belief - through vodka, taverns and Jewish capitalism - is discussed above ('The Jewish Question', Chapter Two).

revolutionaries could not be to blame because the encouragement of pogrom activity by some of their number did not begin until after the pogroms had started. As mentioned above, the 'Sacred Retinue' has been shown to be a group of nobles, including some Jewish communal leaders, who were devoted to defending the Tsar's life in response to the assassination of his father. They were ineffective and often got in the way of the police. Leading members of the government (such as Pobedonostsev) who have been accused of initiating pogrom policy, did not agree with their activities, and they were disbanded not much more than a year after they were formed.[130]

At the time of their existence, there was much controversy over the extent and nature of the pogroms. Both the Russian and the western press had conflicting stories to tell, but the confusion and chaos of the situation are reflected in British Foreign office papers. In a communication of May 28, 1881, Consul-General Stanley wrote from Odessa to Earl Granville in the House of Commons that the rioting there had not been as serious as at Elizavetgrad and Kiev, and that windows were broken of 'Jews and Christians indiscriminately'.[131] The actions of Governor-general Prince Dondoukoff-Korsakoff were praised for curtailing the would-be pogrom, but the report stated that in this particular case, there were at least 10,000 police and troops available. Concern was expressed over the arrests of innocent people, 'as is always the case on any disturbance occurring in Russia, the Russian police being probably the most ignorant and the least-discriminating in Europe'. Mr Stanley goes on to say that:

> I do not think the mass of the nation has any hatred against them (Jews). They live together in the villages on perfectly friendly terms, and on the rare occasions when they have been attacked, the motive has been not hatred, but plunder.[132]

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[130] Witte, pp. 68-71.
[131] 'British Documents on Foreign Affairs and Papers from the Foreign Office', *Russia, 1881-1905* ed. by Domenic Lievan (US: Maryland, 1982), MS 7/4672/9, p. 4.
[132] ibid.

A confidential letter dated 14th June, 1881 from Vice-Consul Law in St Petersburg to Consul Michell[133] stated that during the Odessa pogrom 'the authorities were prevented from seizing the active rioters by the passive resistance of an immense crowd of spectators.'[134] The Cossack troops were then told it was necessary to treat everyone in the crowd as rioters, and as a result the crowds did begin to disperse.

While not detracting from the extent to which the Jewish population had suffered, attention was called by the document to the 'general spirit of violence and discontent displayed by the mob, and to their proclivities for robbing independently of any special question as regarded the Jews;' and it was noted that 'before the riots were stopped, the houses of several Russians were broken into', and also that 'numbers of people belonging to the generally respectable orders of society had joined heartily in the pillage, although abstaining from violent house-breaking'. This clearly portrays an atmosphere of general chaos and loss of order. Moreover, light sentences were given to the arrested rioters in the pogrom trials which inspired criticism, but there were many recorded instances of justice being administered on the spot in the form of severe floggings. The local police and court system would have been aware that by the laws of peasant culture, corporal punishment was a serious penalty.

In a memorandum dated 19th July, 1881 by Vice-Consul Wagstaff, traditional peasant hatred of the Jew is stated as the cause of the violence, and that 'Immediately after the late disturbance, haymaking commenced. This gave employment to a large number of idle hands and the Jews for the moment are partly forgotten',[135] and it was noted that the trouble only began because vodka was involved.

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[133] No mention is made of Michell's status, but all reports from Russia were destined for the British Foreign Office.

[134] 'British Documents', MS 7/4672/11(i), p. 7.

[135] 'British Documents', MS 13/4672/16(i), p. 13.

With regard to the Warsaw pogrom on Christmas day, Colonel Maude, a British representative in Poland, wrote the following to Lord Granville on 30th December, 1881:

> Five thousand troops patrolled and bivouacked in the streets [...] from Sunday night until the present time. Had they received, from the first, stringent orders to suppress disturbance [...] whatever their sympathies, they would have obeyed, and order would have at once been restored. But General Albedynski, the Governor-general of Poland, who is a man of most human disposition, and who is especially known for his warm Polish sympathies, hesitated for some time to issue such orders to the troops, as I believe, purely from a desire to avoid shedding Polish blood, and it was not until Tuesday morning that the military acted with vigour in the suppression of the riots.[136]

The traditional picture of the troops acting tardily in accordance with official orders does not appear to take instances such as this into account. Of course, the authorities could not control the personal attitudes of their troops and in some places passive anti-Semitic influences would have been the deciding factor in the Governor-general's decisions. In the same document an instance of officers telling 'with glee how their men had helped in the plunder of the dram-shops, and their superiors did not reprove them for their admissions' is reported. Such actions would not have helped allay the ukase rumour. It is the general passive anti-Semitism which presents the greatest difficulty to the researcher who rejects the pogroms-as-Russian-government-policy theory, but which is also the dominant factor in traditional popular culture, as portrayed here.

Finally, some observations have emerged from research which are relevant to the society which produced the 1881 pogroms. In the course of Alexander III's reign, there were protests against the inhumanity and brutality of the pogroms. Early on, the press published some scathing remarks on the government's inactivity in respect to the disorders, and lone voices such as Madame Tshebrikova were heard. In 1890, there was

[136] 'British Documents', MS 16/4672/20, pp. 16-17.

a literary protest, headed by Leo Tolstoi and some of Russia's leading writers and artists. A member of the clergy took his life in hands by condemning what he described as the government's policy of 'anti-Semitism, which is anti-Christian and inhuman' from his pulpit in Odessa.[137] Such reports and their subsequent suppression by the authorities, did much to convince both contemporary Russian society and later historians that the government was doing its best to cover the tracks of a pogrom policy.

Far from the consolidation of action that is usually associated with the concept of government policy, the authorities sustained the pretence of autocratic control by such actions as censorship. They did not want to admit their inability to prevail over the pogroms. The confusion over government action was echoed by social reaction. Writing in 1898, Russian lawyer, historian and journalist, K. D. Kavelin, wrote that the pogroms of 1881 had sadly not evoked unanimous indignation from Russian society. The time had been characterised by a split in public opinion.[138]

This would appear to correspond with what is known about the views expressed by the Russian press. They were as much caught unawares by the violence as the rest of society and the government.[139] Before the first pogrom, papers such as the anti-Semitic *Kievlanin* mocked the idea of any pogrom in Odessa, stating that the Jews there exaggerated the rumours themselves.[140] When trouble did come, the diversity of opinion in the press matched that of the government officials and police, all expressing surprise. The most favoured explanation in the press was that of Jewish exploitation, as discussed vociferously by *Kievlanin* and *Novoe Vremia*.[141] The anti-Semitic *Rus* laid the blame for the pogroms at the Jewish community's door, and thus opened up another debate on the

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[137] The Times, 'Father Remiroff in Odessa', *Russia*, Vienna correspondent, 27th November, 1890, p. 5.
[138] K. D. Kavelin, '*Nashi inorodtsy i inovertsy*' (1881), *Pravda*, (St. Petersburg, 1907), pp. 3-14.
[139] Klier's research makes this evident in John D. Klier, 'The Russian Press and the Anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1881', *CASS*, 17 (1983), p. 202.
[140] Klier, p.204
[141] Klier, p. 208.

kahal and the influence and activity of the *AIU*. Other papers such as *Strana* concentrated on the disorders themselves, fearing what they would mean for society in general,[142] while Katkov's *Moskovskie vedomosti* sought out possible ringleaders, concluding that 'dark forces' were at work.[143] There was nothing that was new in what the press had to say, including the biased basis from which they operated. Some, such as *Golos* and *Novosti*, did point to the need to emancipate Jews physically and legally but even these papers entertained the idea of Jewish exploitation.[144]

Greenberg has emphasised the extent of hostile Russian opinion towards the Jews over the pogroms, but seen against the background of severe censorship and punishment for opposing the government, it could hardly be expected that the Russian press could or would go against the wishes of its autocratic ruler. Indeed, why should they bother to oppose the government on such an issue as the Jewish Question when more important matters such as peasant misery, the changing economy and industrialisation, and the response to the Great Reforms remained in flux? It is clear that Russian social anti-Semitism did not allow the Jewish Question to be placed high on the list of priorities for 'telling it how it was'.

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[142] Klier, p. 209.
[143] Klier, p.210
[144] Klier, p.213.

THE JEWISH COMMUNITY AND THE REACTION TO POGROMS

The effects of the pogroms of 1881-2 were deeply felt at every level of Jewish society. The community as a whole did not respond in unison, reflecting the differences between rich and poor, St Petersburg and Pale, traditionalist and radical, religious and secular. For example, The Times reported on August 23, 1884 the establishment of a National Jewish Christ-Believing (New Testament) Congregation, gathering force and followers in Bessarabia. The leader, Rabinowitz, said that once Jews accepted Christ as the true Messiah, Jewish persecution would cease. The Times' correspondent believed that it was not a movement born from a genuine desire for baptism or to join the Catholic Church, but 'most definitely a result of the tragic victimisation of the previous years'.[145] However the existence of passionate, religious sects in the area concerned was not unusual, and the fact that this movement existed in Bessarabia appears not to be mere coincidence.[146]

By 1891, the financial split in the Russian Jewish community was evident. In May of that year, the Times reported that rich Jews, bankers and upper classes were untouched by the new laws, and 'do not appear to do what they can for their unfortunate co-religionists'.[147] The prominent St Petersburg Jews and *shtadlanim* Poliakov family, who were descended from Hassidic rabbis, were not affected at all by the discrimination affecting other Jews in the reign of Alexander III. The Minister of the Interior Ignat'ev, was a personal friend, the family did not go to synagogue, weddings took place at home, and they possessed the title of "Secret Councillor".[148] They were an example of well-entrenched Jews within Russian society, with more in common with the Russian land-

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[145] The Times, 'A Jewish Religious Movement in Bessarabia', letter by J. H. Titcomb, British Coadjutor for the English Church in Northern and Central Europe, 23rd August, 1884, p. 6.
[146] See Chapter Five, 'Police, Peasants and Pogroms'; and Chapter Six, 'Suitable Conditions'.
[147] The Times, 'The Jews in Russia', St. Petersburg correspondent, 5th May, 1891, p. 5.
[148] Alexander Poliakoff (London: unpublished interview with the author, 1992).

owning class than with the ordinary Jewish petty trader. At the forefront of the Jewish response were the *shtadlanim* on the one hand, and the Jewish revolutionaries on the other. The main outcome was that Jewish politics gave up its single most important and traditional principle - that of apologetics, the 'raison d'etre' of the *shtadlanim.*

In the aftermath of the pogroms, it was decided that a Jewish delegation should be sent to the Tsar, an idea that 'appealed greatly'[149] to the Jewish notables in St Petersburg. They assumed that the Tsar would have the power to stop the pogroms from spreading. This assumption was clearly linked to another - that the pogroms were part of a government policy against the Jews. Both the *shtadlanim* and the community as a whole no longer understood the situation, as an appeal from South Russia in 1882 shows. In a letter to the Tsar from the Jewish population of the southern provinces, the language is diplomatic but definite it its approach: 'The events of the last period have produced 'new proof' of 'the terrible regicide' (of Alexander II):

> The same bloody hands have extended destruction over the region, and with this aim have selected the weapon of racial and civic differences, arousing the passion of the dark, irrational mob against faithful Jewish subjects, who do not enjoy civic rights.[150]

It continues: 'the devastation [...] could reach not only Jews if measures are not taken quickly by the government'. The letter clearly states that revolutionary hands are at work, and that Christian property and business will be next. Attacks on four million people it pointed out, was enough to damage Russian society in itself. In these few sentences, the appeal went to the heart of the government's concerns - the economy, the possible harm to Christians, and the real evil of the revolutionary. It showed that the

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[149] Moshe Mishkinsky, '"Black Repartition" and the Pogroms in Russia in 1881', in Klier and Lambroza, p. 67.

[150] Moscow, TsGADA, f. 1288 (Shuvalov), op. 1, d. 3359, 'Appeal from the Jewish population in the southern provinces of Russia to Alexander III on preventing pogroms. Additional note of governor with measures on how to stop the pogroms'.

Jews of the Pale understood to some extent the government's concern with public disorder, violence and most importantly, revolutionary anarchy. They appeared to perceive this more acutely than did their leaders in St Petersburg. Yet at the same time they believed that 'a single word from the monarch in condemnation of robbery and violence would do much to bring the peasant masses to their senses'.[151]

Certainly, direct decrees from the mouth of the government would have encouraged the pogrom epidemic to end sooner, as it did in late 1882, but the community did not understand the extent to which the authorities were not in control of the pogroms. It was not a case of simple revolutionary activity or government revenge for the Tsar's assassination. There is also a naiveté in the answer that the Jewish community sought, and it showed how disassociated and unassimilated the lives of the two communities were. Friedgut's research of Iuzovka has made this evident. There was as much a lack of understanding of the Russian government-society relationship by the Jews, as there was a lack of Russian understanding of the Jewish community. The following examples of simplistic explanations help to illustrate this from the Russian perspective.

A writer called Vermel wrote that the Moscow Expulsion order was a direct result of the political reaction of the 1880s, encapsulated in the formula 'Orthodoxy, Autocracy, Nationality'. As the Jews could not find a place for themselves under this banner, they responded with their own triad: 'Nationalism, Zionism, Socialism'. It was because of this that relations between the Jewish community and the government were so tense.[152] The Judeophobic *Novoe Vremia* claimed that the negative racial traits of the Jews prevented the government from dismantling the restrictions that prevented assimilation.[153] Did the Jewish community think that either of these theories reflected

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[151] ibid.
[152] S. S. Vermel', '*Moskovsoe izgnanie, 1891-2': Vrechatlenaiia, vospominaniia*, (Moscow, 1924).
[153] '*Chto nam delats Evreiami*', *Novoe Vremia* (1st May, 1881) in John D. Klier, 'The Russian Press and the anti-Jewish Pogroms of 1881', *CASS*, 17 (1983), p. 218.

government thinking? Certainly the delegation that met the Tsar thought the government were to some degree capable of arresting the violence, if not culpable for its initiation.

The Jewish delegation saw the Tsar on May 11th, 1881. They hoped to obtain a direct statement from the Tsar to the effect that the pogroms were not ordered by him in retaliation for the assassination of his father. The Tsar told them that he believed the revolutionary role to be a major factor for the unrest, but that the Jews had done much to bring the pogroms on themselves. The Tsar talked of Jewish exploitation. The banker Zak agreed that Jewish economic activities were a problem but implied that the restrictions placed on the Jews by the physical boundaries of the Pale helped to create the abuse.[154] The interview was ended without any real communication. It came as a great shock to the Jewish community, who had always relied on the direct intervention of the ruler to prevent trouble. The total failure of the *shtadlanim*, however, implied much more than this immediate result.

Some time before the delegation was sent, a meeting had taken place among representatives of the major Russian Jewish communities in St Petersburg, to discuss pogroms and emigration. No solution was unanimously accepted. Only one course of action was agreed upon: to make a declaration to the Tsar, his ministers and Russian public opinion categorically denying any existence of the *kahal* in Russia, either secretly or openly. This statement as Stanislawski has said, was basically telling Russian society that 'Jewish society was devoid of any internal organisational coherence'.[155] Whether or not this was true, it was a pathetic attempt at Apologetic politics. The *Maskilim* did not want to admit that more drastic measures were needed, and thus make options such as emigration viable. They turned away from what was happening to the Jews in the early

[154] Orbach, p. 13.
[155] Michael Stanislawski, 'The Transformation of Traditional Authority in Russian Jewry: The First Stage', in *Legacy of Jewish Migration* ed. by J. Frankel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 23.

1880s because they felt it was necessary to first make sure that the pogroms were not the work of the government. They felt compelled therefore, to sustain Jewish efforts towards emancipation.

More meetings were held by Baron Gintsberg, head of the St Petersburg Jewish community, who had been forced into hosting such events.[156] The agenda was always apologetic in its tone, concentrating on how the Jews could help themselves out of their own troubles, for example diversification of activities among Jewish merchants, and an increase in Jewish military conscription. But there was no major decision made, no massive fund raising effort for the pogrom-hit villages. After a further attempt at communication with the Tsar, one of his ministers told the delegation that they must stop trying to get to the top through their personal contacts.[157] They must go through the bureaucratic channels that existed for that purpose for all other minorities and subjects of the empire. There could not have been a more blatant signal to the Jewish community that the "Royal Alliance" was over.[158]

Emigration was the factor that spurred on the *shtadlanim* to call another meeting of national Jewish representatives. While this meeting was taking place - March 29-30, 1882 - pogroms were actually taking place, and the agenda was consequently dominated by the emigration issue.[159] This time it was given more serious attention, but after much heated argument, it was decided not to establish an emigration policy. Gintsberg and Poliakov set up funds for relief work. Right up until the start of the 1890s, the leaders of the Jewish community did not want to face the fact that the relationship between them and the government had changed for ever. They continued to look backwards, and to

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[156] Orbach, p. 12.
[157] Orbach, p. 17.
[158] As mentioned above, the Royal Alliance was never an alliance between Russian and Jewish leaders, but the tradition of the relationship between Polish and Jewish leaders was perceived to continue by some in the Jewish community after 1795.
[159] Orbach, p. 22.

act accordingly. This was their mistake, for their short-sightedness could not possibly have achieved rights for the community. To make such a demand would have gone against the old, familiar politics; they did not recognise the power shift in Russian social relationships or the resulting shift in the social definition of law. The *shtadlanim* were therefore only successful in this period in doing what they were always able to do - persuade individuals against anti-Jewish legislation, or at least to have such moves reviewed, and sometimes curbed. They viewed the emigrationists, the Jewish revolutionaries and nationalists as movements created in the heat of the moment, which would be short-lived. But it was precisely these people who took over where the *shtadlanim* failed, and they changed the face of Jewish politics forever. In the reign of Alexander III, however, the two forces shared a unique but an uneasy leadership role.

The main difference between the two was that modern Jewish thought was non-apologetic. Jewish Nationalism and Jewish Socialism called for pride in the community, for human rights for Jews as for everyone else, for not having to defend themselves against accusations, or apologise for any particular Jewish trend, as did the Maskilic press.[160] They were open about their politics, believing that nothing could be gained by discreet or diplomatic delegations to the government. Many Jewish revolutionaries were first part of the Russian revolutionary movement. They were imbued with ideas of Russian radicalism and Nihilism, movements that would not consider dealing with a Tsarist government on anything less than their own terms.

But to revolutionaries such as Gurevich, Axelrod and Deich, it was clear that the Jewish revolutionary was a political liability. The Russian revolutionaries had refused to print Axelrod's work on denouncing the pogroms because they were unsure of the popularity of such a move among the masses. Where the Russian revolutionary

[160] The exception to this was *Den'*, which made an attempt at the end of the 1860s to redress the situation. John D. Klier, 'The Jewish *Den'* and the Literary Mice 1869-1871', *RH*, 10 (1983).

movement was uncompromising and isolated on so many issues, it became confused when dealing with the Jewish question. Jews began to criticise the Russian government openly for the first time and on their own terms.

Vital has called Zionism merely the 'normalisation' of the Jews.[161] Thus from an abnormal situation of being spread over several countries without a diplomatic or military history of their own, and certainly no polity, Zionism gave the Jews the same social structure as other nations. It grew from different sources however. First, it was a minority view of a minority group; secondly, it only became a force in the community because the community was pushed to the brink of desperation. Thus, self-recognition and awareness came about almost reluctantly, and as a result of persistent anti-Semitism. It also grew out of a vacuum to recreate what was once lost. For these reasons, Zionism in part defines anti-Semitism.

Putting aside the debate over modern Zionism, the early Zionists saw their goal as obtaining a land of freedom for all badly treated Jews. Although, the confirmation of the existence of Zionism as a concrete force did not come until the first international Zionist congress in 1897, many of its modern tenets had been in existence since 1881. The congress however, did indicate the official end of apologetics, with the provision, without excuse, of a national answer to the Jewish Question. Jewish nationalism was different to other nationalisms therefore, because it was based neither on purity nor superiority of race. Rather, Jewish nationalism was based on the bitter experience of being treated as inferior.

As if to respond to the emergence of Zionism, the first anti-Semitic International conference was held in 1882-3. The resolutions adopted proved to be very similar to the beliefs widely held about the *AIU*, but the worst or 'supreme achievement of the anti-

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[161] David Vital, *The Origins of Zionism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). Note author's quotation marks.

Semitic campaign' was the policy of expulsion.[162] In practice however, French and Russian hatred of Germany prevented a successful union of international anti-Semitic movements, and the international press proved uninterested at this early stage.

Zionism provided an answer for many Jews in the period of Alexander III, when religious passivity was no longer effective or acceptable. It could be said that it was religious resignation and non-Jewish attitudes towards the Jew that created the Zionist. It was not the invention of any single person, but the result of years of unchecked persecution in Eastern Europe causing general distress.

The most famous expression of what was happening was seen in Leo Pinsker's '*Auto-Emanzipation*' or 'self emancipation' (1882). With this document, Pinsker emphasised that all other action to solve the Jewish Question had failed. Pinsker put into words the first modern political form of Zionism in Russia. The work was not apologetic but scientific and this was the essence of its importance, as a future theory for the twentieth century. Pinsker wrote his work after being an eye-witness to the pogroms and consequently believed that the world of Russian and Polish intellectuals was irrelevant for the Jewish community. Anti-Semitism was not the fault of the Jew. It was a disease that afflicted both individuals and nations that could not accept the idea of a landless, wandering people who sustained a national consciousness but no land. Therefore there was only one solution, and in order to attain land, Jews must not continue to rely solely on the progress of civilisation, but must act on their own initiative - and on their own inner forces, their own historic will, their self help or self emancipation.

The emigration issue continued to cause problems for the community, however. While some were deciding whether or not there should be an emigration policy among the Jews, others had already progressed to the question of to where they should

[162] C. C. Aronsfeld, 'The First Anti-Semitic International', *I & M*, 4 (1985), pp. 68-69.

emigrate. The Zionists believed that Jews should colonise the land that was once theirs, i.e. Palestine. When the modern *shtadlanim* of St Petersburg decided to act, they did so with the help of foreign Jewish money and organisation, not associated with the idea of Palestinian resettlement i.e. Baron Hirsch of England and his proposed JCA. The St. Petersburg Jews only agreed to this in the first place because it was approved by the Russian government, and that was not until 1892.

Outside Russia, western Jews kept basic records of immigrants, but nothing comprehensive was compiled. Knowing the problems that their Russian co-religionists encountered, they felt the situation to be hopeless, and this was confirmed by the numbers of immigrants. A publication entitled 'Darkest Russia' was produced by the Russo-Jewish Committee of the Board of Deputies of British Jews between 1891-2, to try to bring about general public awareness of the persecution of Jews in Russia. Pictures of etape chains that were used to deport Jews from Moscow in 1891 and a page of a Russian-Jewish passport with all its restrictions were reproduced as illustrations.[163] The Board also tried to monitor the attitude of the Russian government. A letter from the President of the Board of Guardians in Britain for the relief of the immigrant poor to the Lord Mayor of London revealed that :

> Most of them, when they arrive here, have formed definite plans as to their destination, and by far the greater number state that in going to America they are going to join relatives who have preceded them thither. It appears certain also, from the statements I have myself taken down, that the Russian Government is much more facile than heretofore in the grant of passports to Jewish emigrants, and that those who have hitherto arrived are but the vanguard of a much larger number who are prepared to follow [...] It is obvious from all these facts that a movement is in progress which may assume vast proportions, and of which this country may not improbably become the centre [...][164]

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[163] Moscow, TsGADA, f. 1385, op. 1, d. 1200, *Darkest Russia*, No. 9, 18th March, p. 7, and No. 11, 20th May, 1892, p. 1, carried these pictures respectively.

[164] Lionel L. Cohen writing on 24th February, 1882. England, Southampton University Parkes Library, MS 173, 1/1/1.

A decade later, the prophecy had become true and it was felt necessary by English Jewry to issue a statement to all fleeing Russian Jews:

> [...] The English Jews have done their utmost for their foreign Co-Religionists, but at present and for the next two years it would be absolute madness for any Russian Jew to try and settle in London. Thousands already here can find no work and are destitute, and many more are daily returning to Russia from London in a far worse condition that when they arrived, and the same is reported from all the large towns of England. The English Jews [...] are becoming powerless to assist them.[165]

In contrast, the number of Jews wishing to go to Palestine was very small. The land of Palestine was harsh, uncivilised, and mainly desert. However, when the alternatives put forward were either to remain where they were or suffer minority status elsewhere, Palestine remained a feasible option. It would allow the continuity of custom and ritual to remain intact, as it could not in America. Lilienblum was another writer of the 1860s who had been profoundly affected by the pogroms and who now turned to emigration to Palestine as the only option.[166] His conversion reflected the transformation of many in the community. In his diary, he wrote:

> In 1877 I thought, "My life is meaningless; for I cannot live like a human being if I lack high culture and formal education." At the end of 1881 I was inspired by a sublime ideal and I became a different man full of a sense of purpose and spiritual satisfaction even without secular schooling.[167]

Lilienblum went on to conclude that the pogroms were not a temporary aberration of history, but just another example of the hatred called anti-Semitism that had permeated history. For this reason, assimilation would never be successful because assimilated Jews would always be seen as Jews. The only place where the Jewish people could be both a religious and a national community, he proclaimed, was the land of Israel. He believed

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[165] Communication sent to the foreign Jewish press, 13th October, 1893. Parkes Library MS 173, 1/11/2.
[166] Stephen M. Berk, *Year of Crisis, Year of Hope* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1985), p. 107.
[167] Berk, p. 108.

that the Jews should be a living people, not a people assimilated into any other society, Lilienblum argued against *Maskilim* such as Gordon, who later advocated emigration to America, in the pages of *Raszvet* and other journals in late 1882. A variety of views emerged between the positions taken up by Lilienblum and Gordon, including those of people still unsure about abandoning their beliefs. Pinsker helped to put people into various camps.

Only a few hundred ended up emigrating to Palestine between 1881-2, and a total of a few thousand during the whole decade.[168] Many relief and emigration agencies, such as the *AIU*, would not endorse such movements on the grounds that money would be wasted on trying to settle people where it was not suitable. The Ottoman Empire which controlled Palestine was not keen on Jewish emigration to the area because of fears of where it could lead, i.e. to a Jewish state. Those who went to Palestine wrote letters back of horrific hardship and hostility. Many of these were *Biluim*,[169] young Russian Jewish university students who had returned to their community after the pogroms, and who were the founders of the *yishuv* and *kibbutz*, socialist communal establishments in Israel. An organisation called *Hibbat Zion* (Lovers of Zion) was set up in the Russian Jewish communities to promote the idea of emigration to the Holy Land. In 1890, as part of a series of government moves, *Hibbat Zion* was given legal and official recognition as the Society for the Support of Jewish Farmers and Artisans in Syria and Palestine, or as it was more often called, the Odessa Committee. Still, support from wealthy Jews, including those abroad, was not forthcoming for this venture until much later on.[170]

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[168] Berk, p. 120.
[169] Berk, p.122. *Bilu* was an abbreviation in Hebrew of 'House of Jacob, come ye and let us go' (*Beit Yaakov Lekhu ve-nelkah*).
[170] Orbach, p. 147.

In *Russkii Evrei*, America was promoted as the preferred destination for emigrants. Unlike Palestine, it stated, America was a rich country, which possessed everything one needed to set up home. There would be no government coercion to assimilate or convert. Many advocates of America mistakenly assumed that the Jews would be allowed a state to themselves, as opposed to the colonies that were created, within American borders. Once the misunderstanding was recognised, the 'American' camp lost quite a number to the 'Palestinian' camp.

Meanwhile, the Russian intelligentsia did not escape criticism by the Jewish community. The hypocrisy and silence of Russian society came under attack, most notably by the editor Adolph Landau,[171] who rejected the idea that there was a Russian 'society'. No civilised society, he said, would have let the atrocities occur and continue as it did. Having examined the nature and essence of Russian society, it is possible to see that there is more to this argument than even Landau might have suspected.

It was evident that the government was not interested in the destination of the emigrants, just in the fact that they were leaving. The official authorisation of the establishment of the JCA was the result of long negotiation with, and assurances from, its founder, Baron Hirsch, on how prospective emigrants would be gathered, selected and removed.[172] At first, the Baron intended to make a gift of 50 million francs in order to establish agricultural schools in Russia to educate Jews, but when it became clear that this gift was to be in the control of Baron Hirsch, and the first million francs did not lead to any progress, Hirsch became convinced that emigration was indeed the only answer. Apart from setting up a relief fund in America for Jewish victims of Romanian and

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[171] Berk, p. 131.
[172] Baron Hirsch was an international philanthropist who gave money to many such causes in Europe and Palestine.

Russian persecution, he began inspecting prospective land in Argentina for cultivation and agricultural colonies.

At first he considered buying a whole province in Argentina in which to establish an autonomous Jewish state. Argentina's population was small, around three million, and the potential for growth in all areas was good. However, obtaining the Russian government's permission for Jewish emigration was difficult, as officially emigration of any kind from Russia was illegal. However at a meeting, which included the *shtadlanim* Gintsberg and Poliakov acting as mediators, the government did agree to the setting up of the JCA (1892). Norman has suggested that one reason for such liberality on the part of the Russian government would have been the totally unrealistic emigration figures that were put forward by the English representative for Hirsch, Arnold White, MP,[173] who said that three million Jews would leave in twenty-five years via the organisation. In fact the majority of emigrants continued to go to North America, and Hirsch's scheme attracted meagre numbers in comparison.

Although the government took its time to agree to wholesale emigration, and the Jewish community both inside and outside of Russia were not convinced by the merits of the scheme, there were members of the educated Russian elite who thought that Baron Hirsch was a hero who had come to rescue them from the Jewish disease. At an economic dinner that was convened on the 12th February, 1892, consisting of Jewish and Russian notables,[174] it was noted that reference was made to 'the inability to assimilate Jews because they are not aspiring to the same goals' as the Russian people, i.e. Autocracy, Nationalism and the Russian Orthodox Church. One Russian, Kapustin, said

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[173] Theodore Norman, *An Outstretched Arm: A History of the JCA* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), p. 21. Mr White expressed anti-Semitic views that were in line with Russian government contemporary thought. His empathy with them helped to establish good personal relations with the influential ministers, and this was a major reason why Baron Hirsch used him in setting up negotiations for the JCA.

[174] Moscow, TsGAOR, f. 1385 (F. P. Osten-Sakhen), Op. 1, d. 1201, 'Minutes of an Economic Dinner'.

'What prevents the union of Jews with Russians? The point is that we all know that our Semites are not drawn to the same sun as we are. Unity is only possible if there is a general sun'. The author then noted that Kapustin 'expressed complete sympathy with the plan of the Baron'. Zak defended the Jews once again by refuting all accusations about the existence of the *kahal*, the despising of manual work by the Jews, and stated that 'Jews do not have any special solar system, they are drawn to the same sun as Russians'.[175]

One General Annenkov stated that the proposed banishment of Jewish tradesmen from Moscow was not an innovation, but a re-enactment of an old law, which Zak objected to. But the reference to the plan of Hirsch dominated the dinner. General Annenkov expressed his thanks and respect to Baron Hirsch for offering to remove the Jewish Question from Russia. Zak stated firmly that the Jews could not take the Hirsch plan seriously, for:

> How shall we seek a new fatherland? Are we really aliens? Our youth wants to be assimilated. We are not aliens - we carry out all our state obligations. We must seek another answer to this other than emigration. In my opinion, the Jews do not exist any longer. There aren't any. I myself today am ready to become a Russian.[176]

What follows will examine how this meeting revealed much about ministerial feelings on the Jewish Question. However, these particularly strong words reflected just one Jewish man's views on the subject of his community. By 1892, his views would have been in the minority - a dramatic change from a decade earlier, when both types of *shtadlanim* still dominated much Jewish thinking. This chapter has attempted to show that the Jewish community was as much in control of the relationship between it and the government, as the government was in control of Russian society. During the reign of

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[175] d. 1201, 'Minutes', ll. 106ob-7.
[176] d. 1201, l. 105.

Alexander III, government control was considerably weakened, and the derivative power of the Jewish community was thus also weakened. It appears that neither side was aware of the situation until the pogroms of 1881 occurred, and then each blamed the other. Notwithstanding this, it is the government response and actions that have led to the idea of a pogrom policy.

Chapter Four

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE POGROMS

OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY

Whether or not the government took the fear of revolutionary action more seriously than general peasant action at this time has already been discussed. However, it is clear that the government was afraid of the threat of peasant action. Although migration was proposed as a means of scattering the land hungry peasants across the empire, including Siberia,[1] the reactionary government struggled to accept the potential loss of rural labour for gentry land.[2] Because the state still believed in the pre-Emancipation concept of the patriarchal relationship and tying the peasant to the land, nothing was decided upon in law until 1886.

In 1885, Tolstoi was still calling for the mass floggings of peasants, harking back to the days of serfdom. Since there had been laws to prohibit such actions since that time, Tolstoi was asking for a contravention of the law.[3] Indeed, from Tolstoi to the Governor-generals, illegalities such as these, through vague interpretations of the law, were committed throughout the reign. Tolstoi, with his reputation for keeping law and order, was able to indulge in such practices because of the nature of the autocracy. His personal power could be curbed only by the emperor, and when Alexander III allowed his decisions to stand, he was sanctioning violations of the law. Tolstoi was notoriously

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[1] Nikolaus Poppe, 'The Economic and Cultural Development of Siberia', *Russia Enters the Twentieth Century*, George Katkov, ed., and others (London: Methuen, 1973), p. 141.
[2] Harry T. Willets, 'The Agrarian Problem', p. 124. There had been laws passed allowing the migration of peasants to Siberia at the beginning of the reign, but Willets states that the government tried to stem the flow of migration until 1889 when it quickly changed its mind, suggesting a greater government fear of unrest.
[3] Peter A. Zaionchkovsky, *The Russian Autocracy Under Alexander III*, ed. and trans. by David R. Jones, 2nd ed. (NY: Academic International Press, 1976), p. 96.

harsh to the peasants. In 1888, he wished to evict twenty families from their homes in Vladimir province, because they had not paid their taxes or redemption payments. This was legal, but Tolstoi's further suggestion of exiling them to Eastern Siberia was not. However, the Committee of Ministers allowed the punishment, even though a year earlier they had turned down a similar case as 'an unprecedented breach of the law'.[4] Later in 1889, Tolstoi proposed that in cases where armed groups stole from forests, entire villages should be stripped of their wealth if the evidence of the crime was found there. The Minister of Justice Manasein pointed out that this would be a direct violation of the law by punishing the innocent as well as the guilty, but decided in the end that it would be possible to implement such a measure by administrative means, i.e. the emergency powers given to the administrative authorities, decreed on August 14 1881.

The Governor-generals' abuse of these powers holds much more interest for the student of anti-Jewish legislation at this time. Although flogging could be used in unusual circumstances, many Governor-generals made this the most common method of dealing with peasants. The growth of administrative abuse of the law went unchecked and were sometimes repeated so often they became, in effect, legalised. The general feeling that the reforms of the 1860s were an aberration, led to the view that they could be overridden in the 1880s. The Governor-general of Moscow, Dolgorukov, believed that the judicial courts who dealt with illegal visits to the city by exiled people, were not severe enough in their judgements. Consequently, he petitioned for the right to deal with the offenders himself by 'administrative order'.[5] Even though his request was turned down as not sufficient to justify the use of extraordinary measures, his successor Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich, expelled the Jews from Moscow a few years later in 1891.

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[4] Zaionchkovsky, p. 102.
[5] ibid.

Why was he allowed to get away with this? There are two reasons. First, it is clear that the reason all the Governor-generals who abused the system so blatantly, did so because they knew that they would not be punished. Alexander III was not in the habit of restraining his officials. Indeed, the emperor seemed intent on believing that all stories of abuse and traumas in his empire were nothing more than lies and exaggerated tales, including the terrible famine of 1891. Giers was 'terrified about the attitude taken by the Emperor and the imperial family toward the disaster. His Majesty does not want to believe that there is any famine', and considers that:

> much of the relief work is really being used to demoralise the people. Some take it upon themselves to set out for the provinces to help out in this business and he (the Emperor) suspects that they are doing this only because the press is squandering praise upon them.[6]

Secondly, it is crucial to understand that once the regime accepted a different basis of legality from which to progress, future laws could only keep bypassing the laws being violated so that temporary measures, after temporary measures, would be enacted, and further violations could occur. As a result of course, no one minister or official could set the record straight, and most would not have wanted to attempt to do so. The broad and undefined language of the temporary regulations led to many problems of their own. For example, Ignat'ev's Temporary Laws of May 1882 against the Jews could be enforced with as much or as little severity as the individual Governor-general chose, so that some areas of the Pale were worse off than others, and since the regulations stood till 1917, the degree of severity imposed in each area could and did change. A Governor-general would receive no more than a reprimand for such offences because it was felt that his

[6] Zaionchkovsky, p. 104.

illegal actions 'resulted from his incorrect understanding of the limits of the authority granted to a provincial executive', in his official capacity.[7]

The violations continued and certain individual Governor-generals abused their powers to the extreme. The Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, owned land in Chernigov province, and wished to sell the forest wood from one of his lots. The Governor-general there, Anastasiev, wanted to do him a favour, and so:

> To help him Anastasiev pushed through a resolution through the Forest Preservation Committee permitting Durnovo to cut his trees on the grounds that they were infected with silk worms. Then Anastasiev called in the leading men of the lumber industry and proposed that they buy the wood for 90,000 rubles. They all refused to pay this sum, but Anastasiev succeeded in obtaining 75,000. Anastasiev wasted little thought about where he might obtain the remaining 15,000 rubles. Without hesitating, he summoned the city rabbi, explained the situation, and sternly ordered that he collect within a week the remainder of the stipulated sum from the Jews. The rabbi was horrified and begged that the poor Jews be shown mercy. But he was sent off with the threat 'that were the instructions not carried out, the Jews would be sorry [...]' And within a week the 15,000 rubles were collected.[8]

Such incidents reveal the heights to which the illegalities committed within the legal framework had reached. At the same time, such persecution of the Jews would appear to be nothing less than a government policy, but in fact what it emphasises is the role played by individuals abusing and corrupting the government system from within. Who could stop the Anastasievs, and on what basis? The Tsar was not to be relied upon, and in some cases Alexander III encouraged abuse by taking the Governor-general's side.[9] This only had the effect of undermining the Committee of Ministers who had called the Governor-general to account in the first place.

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[7] Zaionchkovksy, p. 101.
[8] Zaionchkovsky, p. 98.
[9] Zaionchkovsky, p. 98-101. Zaionchkovsky also cites examples where the Tsar did not protect the Governor-generals, especially in the early years of the reign. For example, the Tokarev case in which illegal seizure of peasant land by the Governor-general in Minsk province ended with the State Council's decision, supported by the Tsar, to dismiss Tokarev.

It is clear then that both peasant and Jew got a 'raw deal' as far as government treatment was concerned, but unlike the peasant, the Jew had to contend with the prevalent social idea that the 'equality of man' did not necessarily include him. Were the Temporary Laws, or May Laws as they became known, really legislative pogroms, or were they a piece of oppressive legislation, in line with other anti-Jewish legislation, on the Jewish community that stemmed from the passively anti-Semitic view of the Jew? Ignat'ev's 'Temporary Laws' were originally inspired by the report of Prince Kutaisov, who had toured the pogrom areas speaking to non-Jews involved in the riots. They had cited Jewish economic domination of the local population as the main reason for the violence, and Ignat'ev had reported Kutaisov's findings to the Tsar on 21st August, 1881. The Tsar had immediately commissioned the Pale guberniias to make reports on the Jews in their regions (25th August, 1881).[10] Ignat'ev took charge of this affair, and his Laws were based on the gubernatoriial findings. Klier notes that ten guberniias made reference to Brafman in their discussion of Jewish economic exploitation, although the Odessa committee doubted the reliability of his word. Almost all reported Jewish alienation from Christian society, and the majority recommended the abolition of the special Jewish communal tax because it promoted separatism. Other more anti-Semitic commissions believed that education for Jews was unnecessary because it was believed to be impossible to reform them.[11]

Indeed, the Laws were designed ostensibly to prevent pogroms, but they did nothing of the kind, and two further measures were imposed in an effort to make government wishes understood by the people. First, the government published an announcement against the violence, especially against persons and property of Jews who were protected

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[10] Berk, p. 59.
[11] Klier, Chapter 22, 'Prejudice into Policy', unpublished book, p. 30.

under the law with all other subjects of the Tsar. Secondly, officials were reminded of their duty to forestall pogroms at the very beginning or face removal from office.[12]

It is clear that the authorities were not willing to tolerate disorder no matter how 'justified', and the Laws were designed to prevent further trouble by aiming to restrict the areas where Jews and Russians might meet. This meant prohibiting Jewish residence outside of towns and villages. But the measures displayed their inherent anti-Semitism by blaming the victims of pogroms for the violence - what Klier has called the 'retributive theme'. Yet regardless of who was blamed, the Laws did nothing less than create a new Pale within the old one. Ignat'ev had in fact not created new laws, but had made old ones even more restrictive. The Pale areas now open to Jewish residence became oppressively small, especially as more Jews were forced to live in them every year. Restrictions on Jewish residence in the countryside, 'suspension' of Jewish rights to own and lease property, and to carry out trade on Sundays and Christian holidays comprised the main points of the legislation that lasted until 1917.[13] Typically, the Laws were not put into effect straight away as a result of widespread condemnation from the West. So they were suspended, only to be implemented at a later date. They were also vague in their wording as to how Jews should be expelled from a village, although the method had been spelled out in the draft form. Thus the Laws were open to interpretation and abuse. The May Laws epitomise the concerns, the inherent anti-Semitism, the illegalities, but not least the uncertainties and ineffectiveness of Alexander III's government on this issue.

The approved version of the May Laws was actually a much toned down version of what Ignat'ev had originally drafted in 1881.[14] The basis of the Laws had been a report

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[12] Klier, pp. 10-11.
[13] 'British Documents', MS 15/4672/17(i), p. 15. Copy of Ignat'ev's circular on the approved law, 6th September, 1881.
[14] This had included the forced resettlement of all Jews from rural areas to the towns, and a complete ban on Jews in the alcohol trade.

imbued with passive anti-Semitism, working on the premise of the supposed naturally harmful aspects of the Jewish character. The Pahlen Commission that was set up the following year charged with reviewing the Laws, along with all other Jewish legislation up to that date, also reflected the Russian belief in the Jewish danger but reached significantly different conclusions. Officially called the "Supreme Commission for the Review of the Laws in Force in the Empire Affecting the Jews", it became better known as the Pahlen Commission because of its chairman, Count Pahlen. Was it a show to appease critics, or was it a serious attempt to understand the Jewish community? This time, the information gathered included statistical evidence and the Commission examined the results of restrictions previously imposed. For five years it studied old and new reports from each guberniia in the Pale, on the numbers of the Jewish population compared to the general population, the relations between them with a view to possible assimilation, their economic and social status, and the potential results of restrictions and quotas on Jews in Russian life.

The majority concluded in 1888 that gradual Jewish emancipation and removal of all discriminatory legislation was the necessary solution to the Jewish Question. Expressed in the majority opinion was the basis of both the anti and pro emancipationist belief, i.e. that Jews suffered from negative racial traits. This common denominator indicates the extent to which inherent anti-Semitism was prevalent, regardless of the extent and type of education or political belief that the commission members might have possessed. While the anti-emancipationists believed that the racial aspect meant that assimilation was impossible, the pro-emancipationists believed that by scattering the Jewish population across the empire, the Jewish 'passion' for money and property would become weaker, and the inclination to take up manual work would become stronger. The linking factor between the two is reflected in the gubernatorial findings, where general

fears were depicted in the presentation of data gathered from the fifteen guberniias of the South-west.

The first table below (Table 4.1) shows the numbers of the general and Jewish populations in each guberniia, and the percentage of Jews in the general population, as presented in a gubernatorial report.[15] On average the Jewish population makes up approximately 10.1% of the overall population for the fifteen guberniias. The report then divides the Jewish population into five distinct groups, as represented on the square diagram (Figure 4.1) and an alternative representation of this grouping in tabular form (Table 4.2). Group one is comprised of the guberniias of Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Taurida and Chernigov in which the Jewish population numbers between 2.7% and 3.4%, making up not more than a fortieth of the general population. Group two was comprised of Bessarabia and Vitebsk guberniias where the Jewish population made up 9.1% to 9.7%, and about an eleventh of the general population. Group three was made up of Volynia, Grodno, Kiev, Minsk, Mogilev, Podolia and Kherson guberniias where the Jewish population numbered between 12.2% and 13.4%, about an eighth of the general population. Vilna was alone in group four, where the Jewish population was 15.2%, and a seventh of the general population. The final and fifth group was comprised solely of Kovno guberniia, with a Jewish population of 19.3%, approximately a fifth of the general population.

The square diagram illustrated these groups and percentages in the form of a rising line. The report justified this by claiming that although in each group the numbers of Jews were fairly similar, the difference between one group and the next was a significant increase ('*visota eto bistro izmenyayetsya*'). This is a misrepresentation of the data,

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[15] Moscow, Lenin Library, T 90/645, '*Dannyia dlia cherty evreiskoi osedlosti po guberniiam*", in *Statisticheskie dannye chislennosti evre'ev zanimaiutsikhaia remyeslami i nekotorymi drugimi proizvoditel'nymi zaniatiami, v cherte postoiannoi evereiskoi osedlosti (krome privislianskovo kraia)*, (St. Petersburg, 1888).

since there is no correlation between the groups other than a numerical one. As Aronson has shown,[16] there was no uniformity to the Pale in geographical terms, nor was there a correlation between the numbers of Jews in relation to the general population, and the frequency of pogroms that had occurred. The Jewish population of the Pale was scattered over a great distance. As the map of the Pale shows (Figure 4.2), the only correlation that can be made is between those areas of the Pale that suffered most pogrom activity, i.e. guberniias 15, 12, 6, 7, 13 and 14 - areas that come in the report's smallest and third smallest groups of the Jewish population - and those that were industrial areas, and areas known for their religious evangelicalism. Moreover, the final table (Table 4.3) shows that in terms of absolute numbers of Jews, the smallest Jewish populations suffered the worst pogrom attacks - in the South. In these guberniias of the Pale, there was a history of 'freebooter traditions' among the people, and a defiance of authority and a spirit of independence that coupled well with the 'vivid and active tradition of hatred and persecution of Jews'.[17] Around the Donbass-Dnepr bend area, there was a particularly heightened atmosphere.[18] A combination of problems and tensions brought together in the one place by landless peasants, semi-proletarian workers, diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, met within the Pale. So why does the report present the data in this way?

It would appear that the only reason was to present information that provided a basis from which they could work. This involved portraying a familiar view of the Jewish population - which also happened to be a semi-alarmist one - by indicating a rising trend in its population, and a concentration of Jewish numbers, where there was neither.

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[16] I. Michael Aronson, *Troubled Waters: The Origins of the 1881 Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Russia* (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1990), p. 217.
[17] ibid.
[18] Wynn, *Workers, Strikes and Pogroms*, p. 255.

Table 4.1
Figures of the General and Jewish populations.[19]

Name of gubemiia	General population	Jewish population	Percentage of Jews	No. of gubemiia
Bessarabia	1,495,248	136,053	9.1%	1
Vilna	1,267,375	192,988	15.2%	2
Vitebsk	1,192,600	115,116	9.7%	3
Volynia	2,234,140	290,962	13.0%	4
Grodno	1,214,516	155,149	12.7%	5
Ekaterinoslav	1,619,554	52,500	3.2%	6
Kiev	1,445,490	194,471	13.4%	7
Kovno	1,305,960	252,492	19.3%	8
Minsk	1,750,539	215,013	12.2%	9
Mogilev	1,250,309	155,732	12.5%	10
Podolia	2,471,667	304,955	12.3%	11
Poltava	1,842,481	49,208	2.7%	12
Taurida	1,028,810	34,940	3.4%	13
Kherson	1,616,715	197,338	12.2%	14
Chemigov	1,980,724	57,339	2.9%	15
TOTAL	23,716,128	2,404,256	10.1%	

Table 4.2
Gubemiias ordered according to percentages of the Jewish population as in Figure 4.1

Name of gubemiia	General population	Jewish population	Percentage of Jews	**No. of gubemiia**
Poltava	1,842,481	49,208	2.7%	**12**
Chemigov	1,980,724	57,339	2.9%	**15**
Ekaterinoslav	1,619,554	52,500	3.2%	**6**
Taurida	1,028,810	34,940	3.4%	**13**
Bessarabia	1,495,248	136,053	9.1%	**1**
Vitebsk	1,192,600	115,116	9.7%	**3**
Kherson	1,616,715	197,338	12.2%	**14**
Minsk	1,750,539	215,013	12.2%	**9**
Podolia	2,471,667	304,955	12.3%	**11**
Mogilev	1,250,309	155,732	12.5%	**10**
Grodno	1,214,516	155,149	12.7%	**5**
Volynia	2,234,140	290,962	13.0%	**4**
Kiev	1,445,490	194,471	13.4%	**7**
Vilna	1,267,375	192,988	15.2%	**2**
Kovno	1,305,960	252,492	19.3%	**8**
TOTAL	23,716,128	2,404,256	10.1%	

[19] Reproduced from *Statisticheskie dannye o chislennosti evre'ev*, St. Petersburg 1888, p. 2.

Figure 4.1
Graph illustrating General and Jewish populations.[20]



The box *ABCD* represents the total population of the fifteen guberniias. The line *a* to *k* represents the Jewish population in the fifteen guberniias. The numbers along the line *A* to *D* refer to the guberniias ordered top to bottom in table 1. The line *m* to *n* is the mean percentage of the Jewish population in all the guberniias.

[20] Reproduced from *Statisticheskie*, St. Petersburg 1888. p. 3.

Table 4.3
Guberniias ordered according to absolute numbers of Jews.

Name of guberniia	General population	Jewish population	Percentage of Jews	**No. of guberniia**
Taurida	1,028,810	34,940	3.4%	**13**
Poltava	1,842,481	49,208	2.7%	**12**
Ekaterinoslav	1,619,554	52,500	3.2%	**6**
Chernigov	1,980,724	57,339	2.9%	**15**
Vitebsk	1,192,600	115,116	9.7%	**3**
Bessarabia	1,495,248	136,053	9.1%	**1**
Grodno	1,214,516	155,149	12.7%	**5**
Mogilev	1,250,309	155,732	12.5%	**10**
Vilna	1,267,375	192,988	15.2%	**2**
Kiev	1,445,490	194,471	13.4%	**7**
Kherson	1,616,715	197,338	12.2%	**14**
Minsk	1,750,539	215,013	12.2%	**9**
Kovno	1,305,960	252,492	19.3%	**8**
Volynia	2,234,140	290,962	13.0%	**4**
Podolia	2,471,667	304,955	12.3%	**11**
TOTAL	23,716,128	2,404,256	10.1%	

Without an understanding of the special characteristics of the Southern regions, the members of the Commission would not have been aware that there was any other correlation of the given information to make.

Yet the Pahlen Commission, appointed by the Tsar and his ministers, did favour change. How had this come about? In the context of shifting power relationships, it would not be wrong to say that the Pahlen Commission was an example of a separate modern bureaucratic entity from the autocracy, no longer a mere servant of the state. The Committee by its very nature was looking for change. For Alexander III, however, appointing the Commission was his answer to the Jewish Question, and he was apparently not ready to deal with its solution. It was a classic example of the battle

between the Tsar's divine beliefs and the committee's 'existing reality and the daily recurring problems of governing'.[21]

Figure 4.2
Map of the Pale of Settlement showing the Guberniias numbered as in Table 4.1

The broad and liberal measures of the majority were proposed in three ways. First that in order to establish healthy and normal relations between both societies, the Jews must have the same civil rights as the Russians. Only as equals could normal relations

[21] I. Michael Aronson, 'Russian Bureaucratic Attitudes towards Jews, 1881-94' (PhD Thesis, US: Northwestern University, 1973) p. 325.

exist. Secondly, they must be allowed to live anywhere in the empire in order to facilitate their assimilation, which would thirdly, be greatly helped by educating Jewish children in a Russian system. It is clear that all the measures proposed were based on the premise of passive anti-Semitism. In the first case, this would prevent Jewish inclination for financial exploitation; in the second it would end Jewish separateness and exclusiveness, and dissipate the evils of Judaism; and in the third, it would imbibe the youth with a sense of morality of which Jews were naturally 'devoid' because of the Talmudic teachings. From these conclusions, it is fair to suppose that the Commission was interested in seeing how effectively the May Laws had been in preventing further trouble since 1882. Finding them to be a hindrance rather than a help, the Commission's work took a different line.

For the first time, the Jews were viewed from a more humanistic point of view. It was understood that in order to survive, they had little choice but to engage in law-breaking activities, especially when that law was changing all the time. Moreover, it was noted that Jews had nowhere else to go, unlike all other minority subjects of the empire. Leskov's 'Notes'[22] on the subject of the Jews in Russia dealt with the age-old accusations against the Jews from this point of view. Although illustrating the complexities and opposing tendencies that Gessen spoke of, the Commission suggested help for the Jews and not protection for Russian society from the Jews - a fundamental change in outlook. For the first time, the huge problem of administration regarding the Jews in Russia was tackled and for the first time also, a Jewish contribution to the findings was included and heeded.[23] Even though the measures were not adopted, it is an important piece of work because it demonstrates that as late as 1888, there were

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[22] Nikolai S. Leskov, *The Jews in Russia: Some Notes on the Jewish Question*, trans. by Harold Klassel-Schefski (St. Petersburg, 1884, repr. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).

[23] *Shtadlanim* in St Petersburg such as Gintsburg, Poliakov, Zak and others were invited to sit with the Commission, which they did in 1887. Jewish leaders had sat on the commissions previous to the 1882 May Laws, but their contribution had been of insignificant value to Ignat'ev.

differences of opinion on the Jewish Question in government circles, and that there was a desire for, followed by real effort towards, practical change.

The minority opinion however, was approved by the Tsar, the Commission was dissolved and the Assistant Minister of the Interior, V. K. Pleve, proposed measures that were more in line with Ignat'ev's first proposals back in 1881. It was indeed a strange thing to allow a commission to work on a problem for so long and then to dismiss it and ignore its findings. Was it merely the leap into the unknown by granting Jewish emancipation that so frightened Alexander III and his advisors? Perhaps the victory of the anti-emancipationists was indeed a victory less concerned with an anti-Semitic policy, than with the continuing trend for caution and response to social activity. Certainly, it would appear that the complexities of individual characters and the daily problems of running the country played a more substantial role than has been previously suggested.

Historians such as Dubnov wrote that the Moscow expulsion of the Jews in 1891 was part of the government policy of pogroms,[24] and there is evidence contained in a decade of anti-Jewish discriminatory legislation, as shown above, to support this argument. However as has been examined here, the importance of the role of individual Governor-generals accounts for a great deal. When the Grand Duke Sergius went to Moscow as Governor-general, he ordered the 'clearing out' of Jews from the area,[25] because the Tsar had remarked how he did not want to see any on his visit. That such a conversation could lead to mass expulsion and the resulting misery and poverty seems almost bizarre until it is remembered what an autocratic regime could mean, with a Tsar at the helm of the nation who could turn his back on his subjects in time of famine and cholera.

Nevertheless it is unlikely that the Moscow expulsion was an act of a systematic anti-Jewish government policy. As much as Durnovo, Minister of Interior, was a sycophant

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[24] Dubnov, pp. 400-413.

[25] Davitt, p. 47.

and an anti-Semite, he sent out two circulars to all governors, the first recommending them to 'dissuade the Jews from emigrating, and to discover and punish the persons who are guilty of endeavouring to seduce them'; and the second forbidding the expulsion 'from the districts in question, but that no newly arrived Jews should be allowed to take up their residence in them'.[26] There appears to be no logic in a policy which calls for the expulsion of the Jews on the one hand and the discouraging of emigration on the other.

The Moscow expulsion more likely represents a break with previous government activity. The May Laws and the Pahlen Commission, however structured and biased, were definite attempts at a 'Jewish Question' policy by the government. The Moscow expulsion signified the turnover of men who surrounded the Tsar and their lack of individual direction. It was the single most anti-Semitic government action of the reign. It was also one of the tragedies of the reign for both the Jewish community and Russian society. Bunge recorded the occasion, where 'they (the Jews) were not even given time to get out of town', spending nights out in the freezing weather at Easter.[27] For Russian society, the tragedy lay in the new era of unprecedented chaos which was to ensue. Because of the attacks against Jews following the expulsion, the government finally had to recognise that the problem was largely to do with its own failure to exercise power and authority, and it was at this point that the proposals of Baron de Hirsch for the setting up of the JCA began to be seriously considered.

The Moscow expulsion is also a turning point in the reign. It marked the peak of dubious legal action, indicating both loss of control and an abandonment of a true policy. The situation of the Jews grew steadily from this time. Beginning with the closure of the

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[26] 'British Documents', MS 57/4776/57, 'Letter from Sir Edward Thornton to Earl Granville', St. Petersburg, 18th July, 1882, pp. 64-65.
[27] Bunge, p. 28.

Pahlen Commission in 1888, a period of government 'stale mate' on the Jewish Question ensued, which was confirmed by the establishment of the JCA in 1892. However, the real manifestation of the abandonment of policy was not seen in its extreme form until the wholesale expulsion in 1891. The Pahlen Commission's findings were rejected, and there was no other 'untried and untested' option left to the government, so they continued with the Temporary Laws out of desperation. Wolf noted that the Senate began compelling Jews to live in the Pale of Settlement in 1887, indicating that the Laws were then being implemented in force.[28] 1883-5 had been relatively legislation-free after the Laws' initial implementation, but in 1886 with Delianov's heavy-handed educational reforms, the Jewish Question once again came under scrutiny. Educational, geographical, professional and legal restrictions followed in the remaining years of the reign.

All was not quiet in other areas. Legislation restricting migration of the peasants became official in 1889, and in 1893 the peasants were prohibited to sell their land without the consent of the commune. This was perhaps the climax of 'illegal' legislation of the reign that was not associated with the Jewish Question, attacking one of the fundamental principles of Russian society - the right to private property. Bunge called the limitations 'one of the greatest restraints in general and civil law'.[29] Its importance is made clear by reference to the relative power of those surrounding the Tsar. Tolstoi, having succeeded in establishing completely reactionary policies, died in 1889, leaving no capable person behind to pursue the policies with confidence and personal conviction. Durnovo became responsible for the Ministry of Interior, the man who was 'a careerist [...] a bureaucratic functionary [...] who tries to satisfy his superior [...] but is completely

[28] Wolf, p. 88.
[29] Zaionchkovsky, p.116.

unable to give him any reasonable advice'.[30] Even Pobedonostsev was not as influential any more. Alexander III marked the change himself when he said that although Pobedonostsev had been of great help in troubled times after the death of his father, 'one must move forward [...] I have long stopped paying attention to his advice'.[31] The question then, is whose advice was the emperor taking?

The increase in the late eighties of general civil and political unrest was a reflection of the instability of the regime, which in turn responded with more repressive legislation. The Jews, the revolutionaries, the radicals, the peasants were all part of this. When seen against this background, the treatment of the Jews by the government appears less extreme. It also becomes more apparent that there was no pogrom policy.

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[30] I. Michael Aronson, 'The Prospects for the Emancipation of Russian Jewry during the 1880s', *SEER*, 55 (1977), p. 365.
[31] Witte, p. 151.

MINISTERIAL CONCERNS - A RE-EXAMINATION

That anti-Semitism existed in the highest government circles of educated 'reasonable' men should not come as a surprise. It played a crucial part in government thinking and decision-making. For example, a study of the *AIU* found in the papers of a familiar figure connected with such influential ministers[32] contains substantial evidence of traditional anti-Semitism.

To begin with, the symbol of the *AIU* is described as one depicting dominance over the world.[33] This dominance, the study claims, is the aim of the international 'conspiracy', and the *AIU* is a disguise for influencing international law in favour of Jews.[34] The sittings, meetings and locations of the *AIU* are said to be shrouded in secrecy because of its clandestine dealings.[35] The issue of dual loyalty is raised as the *AIU* is depicted as an international brotherhood of Jews, i.e. plotting against non-Jews everywhere.[36] Therefore, the study claimed, Jews cannot possibly 'join' with the people among whom they live, and thus this proves that a Jew cannot be loyal to his country.[37] The study calls it disgraceful that Jews demand civil rights from that country.[38] The Jewish aim is to climb up and over, and to beat down all others.[39] They are therefore a threat to the Russians, orthodoxy,[40] and thus to Christianity.

The supplement to the document sums up the reasons why the Russian government of Alexander III should not give its Jewish population equal rights with all other Russian subjects: basically Jews were denounced as untrustworthy. 'The *AIU* hides behind

[32] Moscow, TsGADA, f. 1385, op. 1, d. 1202 'Study of the *AIU*' (18th November, 1881).
[33] d. 1202, l. 1, point 2.
[34] d. 1202, ll. 1, 3, points 3, 8.
[35] d. 1202, l. 7, point 14.
[36] d. 1202, l. 1, point 4.
[37] d. 1202, l. 3, point 7.
[38] d. 1202, l. 1, point 5.
[39] d. 1202, ll. 2, 3, points 6, 7.
[40] d. 1202, l. 6, point 12.

advocating the principle of combating those who repulse Jews because they are Jews.'[41] This was a disguise for an intention to destroy all other races. Whether locally, nationally or internationally, the supplement proclaims that it was the Jew's job to wage war among other people and on nations. In Russia's case, this took the form of the revolutionaries. For this reason, "It is necessary that Russia should abstain from considering Jews as Jews" - similar to *Grazhdanin*'s view of Jews not as people, but as 'microbes'.[42] This was the anti-Semitic legacy handed down over centuries, but it did not lead to a pogrom policy. It undoubtedly led in Russia to wariness, suspicion, and distrust. This document illustrates such anti-Semitic sentiments, but nowhere does it advocate a pogrom policy.

The reports of the guberniias that were compiled on the orders of the government commissions between 1883-8 reflect this suspicion and wariness. What dominates the reports, is an expression of puzzlement as they tried to understand what, where and how much they had to deal with when disorders broke out. Certainly there is no suggestion of orders to instigate attacks on the Jewish population. The concerns which emerge appear to be more concerned with keeping the peace between the various groups of the general population and the Jews, and monitoring the relations between them.

From the minutes of the economic dinner described above, that was attended by the Committee of Ministers,[43] it can be seen that the argument was not whether to eliminate or not, but whether to emancipate or not. There were difference of opinion. Certain rights as well as limitations were suggested, the Pale of Settlement was blamed for the 'miserliness' of the Jews, and some decided that the Jewish Question was 'the squaring of a circle', because the government was 'disabled'. Therefore discussions could lead

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[41] d. 1202, l. 6, point 10. Note document's underline.
[42] This was a term used also in the Russian Judeophobic press in the 1880s.
[43] Notes were taken by prominent historian and noble Baron F. R. Osten-Sakhen.

nowhere.[44] It is revealing that the ministers were prepared to allow the questioning of the government's role in the matter. Then Zak brought up the issue of exploitation and the wisdom of government thinking:

> What is it to do with the Russian state? It is a user on a national scale, so to speak, and the user never asks where his goods come from, when they are cheap and of good quality. It is desired that Jews are kept under the old conditions at any cost. **The Russian Empire has so far only been a conglomeration of heterogeneous elements. It is clear therefore, that any one of these dominant parts could easily act purely on its own interest.** [45]

In pointing out that it was not in the state's interests to harass the Jews or evict them, Zak strengthens the argument that the government did not control the pogroms, and that any powerful force in Russia could have initiated such violence if it wished to do so. This is substantial evidence that government authorities were hearing these views in an effort to prevent further trouble.

Another issue was discussed at the economic dinner, giving rise to the expression of many personal fears. Emigration was discussed at length, and the anti-emigrationist stand was led by Zak, who also stood for Jewish emancipation. The pro-emigrationist stand was led by the anti-Semitic anti-emancipation lobby. The meeting of one type of Russian official view with a specific minority view from the Jewish community clearly illustrates the complexities of the Jewish Question. Zak's apologetic line, itself representing the end of an era when such views were becoming less and less popular in the Jewish community, and the Russian view imbued with traditional anti-Semitism, could not combine to produce any form of progressive result or mutual understanding of the situation that Russian society was facing. Annenkov's argument summed up for many Russian officials the essence of the Jewish Question, and provided a reason why

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[44] TsGADA, f. 1385, op. 1, d. 1201 'Minutes', l. 103 (12th February, 1892).
[45] d. 1201, l. 104ob. Note author's bold.

Baron Hirsch's emigration plans should be seriously entertained. Annenkov praised talented 'Hebrews', and indeed spoke of their bravery during the Oriental war. But, he continued, Jews were natural exploiters, and there was an excessive concentration of them in the Pale. Zak in reply pointed out the advantages which would have been gained from assimilation:

> I would like to thank Mikhail Nikolaevich for his justified assessment of the good features of the Jewish nation, and to add to it that if the Jews were allowed to assimilate, all their bad features would have disappeared.[46]

With regard to Jewish trade, he observed:

> A Jewish population [in Russia proper] [...] might be useful. All the trade in Novorossiskii region was created by the Jews (together with the Greeks). The trade in provinces around the Visla river also exists thanks to the Jews. But Jews do indeed damage the business of other nationalities. They wreck the deals of those Russian corn traders who want to wait for the right moment to suppress their competitors. However, the Jews cannot wait and give you the best price.[47]

In fact what Zak was saying was that the Jews were not in a position to do all the exploiting. Russian merchants and businessmen were in the best position to make demands, and wait for the 'right moment'. Jews actually gave up profit because they could not afford to wait. This line of argument preceded his remarks on just who exactly was using whom, when it came to business. Zak attacked the government as a whole. The autocracy itself was exploiting the unnatural situation of the Jews for its own benefit, although it might not have been fully aware of this, just as it was not fully aware of modern business practices in general. What was called exploitation in Russia was

[46] d. 1201, l. 104.
[47] d. 1201, l. 104.

called capitalism in the West. Zak summed up: 'Exploitation is a dangerous term. Anybody from a monarch to a village teacher could be accused of exploitation'.[48]

Zak's arguments on emigration have already been noted. It appears that no-one took his side on this issue except Lamanskii[49]. He argued that while the Jews 'possessed a special gift' to get around the admittedly unjust laws against them, it would still be better to give them equality rather than take up Baron Hirsch's plan. On this point he was in full agreement with Zak - if the strongest and most capable of the Jews left Russia, 'economic losses' would result.

The more anti-Semitic speakers were not convinced that anything short of emigration would solve the problem because of the Jewish adherence to the *kahal.* Despite Zak's denial of its existence, they believed it to be in full operation along the lines of the *AIU.* General Annenkov, Kapustin (Administrator of the St Petersburg region), Lodski (Professor of the Institute of Forestry and Veshniakov (Deputy Minister of State Property) could not come to terms with the idea that assimilation was possible let alone desirable. According to Kapustin, emigration should be made to include all elements of the Jewish population because 'the strength of the future colonies should manifest itself in combining both weak and strong elements'.[50]

It is important to note that Veshniakov expressed the view that the government would hardly suppress enthusiasm in respect to the scheme, but added that any Jews who did not emigrate would enjoy greater freedom. He believed that there should be no obstacle in the way of Jewish emigration from Russia, especially since the emigration would hardly become large-scale. It is not known what Veshniakov was referring to by 'greater freedom', but in recognising that Russia was not about to lose its entire Jewish

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[48] d. 1201, l. 107.
[49] Although there is no mention of Lamanskii's status in the documents, it can be assumed that at this economic dinner of senior bureaucrats, it is the same Lamanskii who was Chairman of the State Bank.
[50] d. 1201, l. 106ob.

population - as the more fanatic anti-Semitic dreamers wished - the government itself was taking a more moderate line, and preparing itself for a continued presence of Jews in the Russian Empire. However, as much as Zak tried to point out that 'the Jewish Question in its Russian version is a product of the ignorance of high society',[51] and defend the actions of, and answer the charges levelled at, the Jewish community, the anti-Semitic rhetoric clearly underlined the proceedings of the discussion. Yet at no time did even the most extreme voice call for violent action.

Other government officials held moderate views and saw different solutions to the Jewish Question. In a direct letter to the Tsar, State Councillor Avilianov clearly stated his ideas: '1. Instruction from the highest level [...] would clearly express condemnation and strictly forbid violence against the Jews and their property.'[52] Avilianov proposed four other measures:

> 2. Circular instruction to newspapers not to speak about the Jewish Question at the present time [...] 3. To leave Jews in places where they are living at present and to stop the examination of residence rights [...] 4. To encourage agricultural work and give permission for Jews to acquire land for cultivation everywhere [...] 5. To permit Jews without hindrance to settle anywhere in the Empire, in particular as craftsmen[53]

Avilianov was proposing no less than Jewish emancipation and as he was part of the government structure, his opinion is an indication of the differences within it. As far as he was concerned, order would only be regained by these measures, and 'exceptional measures undertaken' by Governor-generals elsewhere 'to prevent the collision between Jewish and Christian populations'.[54] Avilianov also suggested that the only way to solve the Jewish Question was to assimilate and emancipate the Jews, noting that the

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[51] d. 1201, l. 103ob.
[52] TsGADA, f. 1288, op. 1, d. 3359 'Appeal', ll. 4-4ob (1881).
[53] ibid.
[54] Moscow, TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D (1881), d. 333 'Smolensk police report', ll. 12ob-13.

government's legislation so far had only 'artificially and by force divided and separated the Jews from the basic Russian population.'[55]

According to Avilianov, the evil of Judaism lay in the *melameds*, the traditional teachers of the community. To him, it was vital that the traditional system of education be broken up by the withdrawal of government support. This involved the issuing of government certificates on payment from the community. 'Their [the *melameds*] existence is preserved artificially by the containment of the Jews within the Pale of Settlement'. To help the Jews, he argued, the government must 'turn them away from' this life and lead them into Russian schools and trades. The special communal tax should be removed as well, he suggested, since it only served to impoverish the poor still further and to highlight the difference between Jew and Russian - a major concern at this time. The fusion of Jew with Russian was desirable, he concluded, because then the Jews would see the superiority of Russian Orthodoxy, but most importantly because Jewish and Russian poverty were inextricably bound together. The poverty of the Jewish 'poorer classes' that were 'literally gasping for lack of air in their closed Pale of Settlement', was 'inevitably reflected in the Russian population too'. Avilianov, then, saw the Jewish Question as linked to Russia's other problems, and not as the cause of them.

Perhaps the most important evidence against the pogrom policy theory is contained in a private letter that was sent from Pobedonostsev to the Tsar:

> With regard to the disorders in the southern provinces, I have received instructions that priests in churches should explain to the people how pointless such movements are. Regulations on this subject were drawn up long ago and put into effect. But it would be strange to assume that everything depends on sermons alone. No sooner had I received this paper from the Ministry of Internal Affairs than I was brought an issue of the Kharkov newspaper *Iuzhni krai*, in which I read the most disgraceful proclamation inciting the people against their masters, landowners and Jews;

[55] d. 3359, l. 5 (1881)

> and at the bottom it said: "passed by the censor. Kharkov, 8 May". What bitter irony.
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> The priests can give their sermons, but the government with the censor's stamp of approval is publishing disgraceful appeals. It is essential that everyone should act in the same spirit.[56]

This letter, dated June 1881, reveals the extent to which the government and the church were not in control of the riots and pogroms, and their lack of control over the press. Pobedonostsev was clearly angry that the government was taking measures to prevent riots on the one hand, and the press - a government organ - was promoting them on the other. The letter shows how disorganised the autocratic machinery was, how disassociated from local authority and press it could be, and how Pobedonostsev recognised all of this. His language is strong, and there can be no doubt about his feelings on the subject. The appeals for pogroms are 'disgraceful' (*vozmutitel'nuiu proklamatsiiu*). The last sentence quoted shows that there was obviously an effort being made to suppress disorders at this time, however ineffective the effort might have been. Furthermore, in another letter to the Tsar, Pobedonostsev firmly blames the rioting on the backwardness of the *narod*.[57]

Other letters between members of the leading circles and the authorities support Pobedonostsev's assessment of government ineffectiveness on this issue. Count P. A. Shuvalov, a liberal member of the gentry and friend of Bobrinskii and others, asked in his diary, who was to blame for the social unrest. He condemned the government for not suppressing the troubles, and by doing nothing, achieving anarchy - the state of affairs most feared.

> If the fault is calculated up to 100%, then 25 is propaganda, but 75 is the lack of administrative skills, and the mistakes and inconsistency of the local and central government. The government is doing nothing and has done

[56] TsGAOR, f. 677, d. 960 'Letters to Alexander III', part 2 (June 1881).
[57] d. 960, part 3 (June 1881).

> nothing to prove to the people that it is impossible to get away with open robbery and destruction of cities and small towns. It is as if somebody agreed to consider these shameful vestiges of social disorder as less important, and as temporary excesses that do not have any political significance and do not threaten social calmness [...] We are up to our necks in anarchy. It is not German or French anarchy, but true Slavonic anarchy, the anarchy of rulers and of peasant throngs among the rotten bog of the *obschina*. It is the anarchy which is praised by the newspapers in all variety of forms and expressions.[58]

What Shuvalov stresses here is the government's inability to cope, its inefficiency at all levels, and its inactivity. For many historians, the fact that the pogroms went on for so long unchecked is the evidence that pogroms were part of a government policy. For Shuvalov however, the fact that pogroms were being committed at the time he was writing in Poltava and Chernigov guberniias only three months after the major eruptions in Elizavetgrad, Odessa, Kiev and Smela, is the 'best evidence of the lack of government capability' (*Luchshie dokazatel'stva nedostatka sposobnosti pravitel'stva*). Russian anarchy could only be stopped by government action, and if this meant that it was necessary to accept representative bodies of the people, i.e. the argument for *zemstvos*, then so be it. Thus, the real fear was not the spectre of the Jewish ghost, but the very plausible fear of individuals among the peasant masses causing unrest and uprisings against the Russian social system. So far it has been difficult to prove that such fears were grounded in reality, and perhaps Shuvalov's personal worries were not based on fact, but the little data that is known to exist on peasant activity, shows that such independent action, whatever the motivation, was more than possible.

According to Shuvalov, the authorities were divided as to the causes. Most pressing was the challenge to the principle of property, which had been upset by the government. 'In St Petersburg, [...] I hear diametrically opposed opinions on established important questions starting with the question of state property [...] which the government has

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[58] TsGADA, f. 1288, op. 1, d. 3356 'Who is to blame?', ll. 1-1ob. (22nd July, 1881).

rocked to the foundations and continues to proceed to shake up the question [...]' .[59] Shuvalov does not seem to doubt the direct link between pogroms and peasant unrest, as evidenced by the general increase of violence against property from the 1870s.[60] Industrial and property violence, caused by the undermining of the peasants' rights and wealth, was seen by Shuvalov as the only way in which the peasantry and other elements could voice their opinions, and it was being allowed to go unchecked. That, for Shuvalov, was the crime of the government.

F. P. Osten-Sakhen was a historian of the day who collected foreign articles on Russia, her problems and especially the Jewish Question. He was in regular contact with Pobedonostsev,[61] and his views are therefore important in reflecting the feelings that were being 'floated' at senior levels. Just after the Tsar's accession in March 1881, Osten-Sakhen wrote to Pobedonostsev with optimism for the new reign. He wrote in patriotic style, saying that he was glad that the Tsar wrote everything in Russian and not in French. He looked forward to the honeymoon period of the new reign. In August of the same year, with the pogrom wave in full swing, he wrote a more pessimistic letter. He was disappointed with the latest changes and switch in policies. He used the example of Russia's actions in Spain as an illustration of his feelings regarding these changes: 'A very capable government is useless in cases where basic needs are so evident that the whole world can see; and so considerable are they that over many years we would not be able to satisfy these needs.'[62]

Whether Osten-Sakhen was also referring to the pogroms cannot be known for sure, but given his sympathies, it is an abrupt change of attitude about Russia's actions and her

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[59] d. 3356, l. 2ob.
[60] Sutton, 'Crime and Social Change in Russia after the Great Reforms'. Sutton's tables (Chapter One) present the evidence.
[61] Moscow, Lenin Library, Manuscripts Dept., f. 230, k. 4390 'Pobedonostsev letters', d. 23, (26th April, 1881).
[62] d. 23 (8th May, 1881).

Tsar by one of the confidantes of the most powerful ministers of the reign. Osten-Sakhen did feel strongly about the Jewish Question, as his diary records. Having witnessed the meetings of the Committee of Ministers that took place on April 5 and May 12 1892, he wrote in great length on the discussion on the report of 22 March concerning the emigration of Russian Jews to America by the Minister of Internal Affairs:

> The Committee started with the discussion of the general question: how desirable would be the satisfaction of the petition by Baron Hirsch from the point of view of the Russian government [...] The Committee shared the viewpoint of the Minister of Internal Affairs that any measures aimed at the decrease of the Jewish population in Russia [...] deserve special attention and sympathy [...][63]

Osten-Sakhen was horrified by the immediate and overwhelming motion in favour of the Hirsch plans for the JCA. He expressed fear that if the options proposed were to be the starting point of the meeting, then other suggestions could only become more extreme. He was also disgusted: 'Listening to those wise men one might think, indeed, that the Jews are insensitive pawns, and Russia is a dead chessboard!'[64] It is also striking that Witte, who is mainly recognised for his moderating influence on anti-Jewish policy because of his economic priorities, was the one to suggest that if a certain number of Jews were not moved annually from Russia by the JCA, then the nature of the JCA activities should come under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs:

> This stupid [...] Witte's suggestion met objections even from the State Secretary Durnovo: "The Ministry of Internal Affairs consider that it would be extremely difficult to force the Colonisation Association to move a certain amount of Jews out of Russia [...] because of the lack of the data required to make this number definite".[65]

[63] TsGADA, f. 1385, d. 1201 'Minutes', l. 115 (5th April, 12th May, 1892).
[64] d. 1201, l. 115ob.
[65] d. 1201, l. 116.

Osten-Sakhen wrote that Witte was caught up in the ardour of the meeting, and appeared not to pay his remark much attention. Witte's odd behaviour emphasises the fact that other concerns were also at stake. His pandering to the anti-Semitic tendencies of the reactionaries illustrates the difficulty for the historian in assessing and defining the influences in government, and the necessity to accept apparently trivial characteristics and daily matters as an important contributory factor to overall policy. Certainly the meeting had an alarmist atmosphere, which corresponds to the data that was presented in the 1888 gubernatorial reports.[66] Chikhachev, the head of the Maritime Ministry, said that it was impossible not to sympathise with every measure aimed at the decrease of the Jewish population in Russia. Baron Hirsch's plan was:

> [...] one of those lucky coincidences which should be used by all means for the successful solving of the question [...] because five million Jews who inhabit Russia now will become twenty million by the middle of the next century if the annual growth rate is 2% [...] financial support should even be offered to the Association for each Jew resettled.[67]

Osten-Sakhen noted that Chikhachev proposed to raise the money through the Jewish communal tax, so that in effect, they would be paying, in part, for their own emigration. But there was opposition. The Chairman of the Department of the State Economy, Abaza, spoke up for the tax money to be spent on more pressing needs in the Jewish community. But his protest was limited. Osten-Sakhen noted:

> He could have said a lot about ugliness and the damaging character of the whole enterprise. Alas, so hard is the yoke which censors reasonable opinion now, thanks to our autocrat, that even Abaza is forced to remain silent.[68]

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[66] Lenin Library, *Statisticheskie dannye o chislennosti evre'ev*. See Figure 4.1. Bunge echoed many government estimates of the Jewish population when he stated in his personal documents that there were 6-8 million Jews in the Russian Empire (Bunge, p. 31). In fact, the real figure according to the 1897 census did not approach 4 million.
[67] *Statisticheskie*, l. 116ob.
[68] *Statisticheskie*, ll. 116ob-117.

The 'saturnalia' continued[69] with the discussion clearly based on the vices of the Jews. Since they were to be allowed to emigrate despite military draft, the 'privilege' could not be published in law because it 'would look very dangerous', and provoke a whole series of abuses and protests. Osten-Sakhen paints an almost farcical picture because at this point, the 'lawyers distinguished themselves' in order to ensure that minor offences committed by Jews did not become an obstacle to emigration. The observation is made that just because they wanted to increase the number of emigrants, the Russian government were prepared to permit and encourage the Jewish population to commit crimes by their lax attitude. Because one desire was greater than another, the law was setting up a situation that was illegal, contradictory, and allowing for the very things that the government did not want - violence, protest and the granting of special privileges. The fears of the government of Alexander III, as expressed in these minutes, reflect their inability to understand and deal with the Jewish Question.

Osten-Sakhen was dismayed by the general agreement to allow Jewish emigration and the lack of moral responsibility, disassociating himself from those present. From the historian's point of view, it is evident that anti-Semitism and a general backwardness of thought marked the meeting. There is no talk of emancipation, but there is no mention of extermination either. The dominant feature of the discussion as with others cited, is how the government is to take control of the Jewish Question in Russian society in all areas.

One of the government's biggest fears was appearing to give the Jews special treatment. This fear was touched upon by government support of the *melameds* in Avilianov's letter, and was a major reason for the length of time it took for the Russian government to agree to the setting up of the JCA. The term 'special favours' was

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[69] Osten-Sakhen's description for the meeting that took place.

interpreted differently by both sides. The Governor-general of Lifland managed to use the government's fear of 'giving' special favours to strengthen his own arguments. Trouble in Iurevskii University, which was outside the Pale of Settlement, was, he said, taking place only because Jews had been allowed to go there, and had formed a clan of Jewish solidarity. This, he argued, had only occurred because of the 'special government favour' granted them.[70] On the other hand, many felt that by not granting Jews emancipation and rights, the government was singling out the Jewish population for special discriminatory treatment that only served as a bad example to the rest of Russian society.

However, if the government was determined to view the Jews as a problem, a Jewish Question, alongside that of the revolutionary question, it would be difficult for it to justify liberal measures rather than repressive ones. When it came to extraordinary measures such as emigration, the government faced a new situation. If the aim was to eliminate Jews by whatever means as quickly as possible from the empire, then surely the implementation of swift emigration procedures should have followed. Even though emigration from Russia was illegal, other illegalities and violations of the law had occurred.

The answer lies in the fact that the government was more concerned with its idea of the conformity of all its subjects, not the elimination by whatever means of those it did not want. Indeed, when the agreement for the establishment of the JCA was finally achieved, the arrangements were staggering in their intricacy and detail. Every branch of the bureaucracy was to be involved - from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who had the right to cancel the whole affair at any time, to the local police who had to ensure the legality of certificates and the committees who issued them. It was stated that the

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[70] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D (1894), ch. 7, d. 104 'Police report from Lifland guberniia', l. 20ob. (10th October, 1894).

committees' duties 'do not give the Jews special rights and advantages to choose the place of settlement'.[71] For those leaving, penalties were to be paid if certificates were found faulty in any way. Military service was not to be evaded, and the rules for eligibility were strict. The most striking statement of all is that:

> The local police, being informed by the local committees or the officers in charge, of when the numerous crowds of Jews leaving are going to move, must undertake corresponding measures to preserve the order and security in those places, through which the crowds in question would make their way.[72]

The order stated that protection must be given to the Jews when they were to leave; and not just from their home towns but all along the entire route. The order was signed by the Minister of Internal Affairs himself, Durnovo. Why would a government intent on ridding the country of its Jews behave in this way?

The mention of 'special rights' and the security measures called for make it clear that the fear of the emigration of Jews leading to the unrest of the masses was very real for the government - especially the Ministry of Internal Affairs, whose job it was to ensure social stability. For the same reason, the Ministry issued instructions to ensure that every Jew with a name from the Old Testament, i.e. a Jewish name, should only have that name registered. This way the Ministry felt it would be easier to access information on the numbers of Jews in each area. Up to that point, doubt had arisen about regulations regarding numbers, because of the numbers of Jews with Christian names. The problem was that one Jew might end up with several names, creating a bureaucratic and security nightmare, so the law insisted that only the name registered at birth could be the name used when reported. The order meant that Jews were often referred to by their diminutives in Yiddish in a derogatory and humiliating fashion, implying that the order

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[71] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D (1913), d. 159 'Circular from the Minister of Internal Affairs to all guberniias', ll. 13-15 (12th June, 1892).
[72] d. 159, l. 18, point 19.

was more in the nature of a cruel joke by the authorities, and another way of making life more difficult for the Jews,[73] than a serious regulation designed to keep a check on the Jewish population for security reasons.

In 1888, the Pahlen Commission had come to a close without its majority recommendations being accepted. There was no other solution put forward and the government was wary of disorder. It adopted measures such as these, not because they would increase the hardship of life in Russia for the Jews, as indeed it did, but because it did not know what else to do. Tact and sensitivity were not the hallmarks of Alexander III's reactionary policies. It has been seen that the government was heavy-handed in all its dealings with the minorities of the empire, even turning previously loyal allies into enemies. For the Ministry of Internal Affairs, it was a means by which it could keep a wary eye on the numbers of Jews in a village or town, in order to weigh up the chances of trouble.[74]

The documents above demonstrate conclusively that the need for national and internal security was the driving force behind Alexander III's government policy. Even the restrictions on foreign Jews, which caused other governments to become more involved with the Jewish Question, were related to this need. Foreign Jews visiting Russia on business were subject to the same discrimination as Jews of the Pale. Western governments claimed this to be illegal as it violated the laws of international treaties whereby their citizens were treated as guests in the Russian empire. The Russian government insisted that while foreign Jews were under their jurisdiction, they would be treated the same as all other Jews, regardless of their nationality. In trying to explain this action to the Austrian embassy, the Foreign Affairs office stated that limiting visits of

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[73] Greenberg, p. 40.
[74] Moscow, TsGIA, f. 16, op. 78, d. 94 'Circular from the Minister of Internal Affairs to the Head of Moscow Police and the Ober-Procurator' (13th October, 1890).

foreign Jews to certain areas for certain lengths of time, was a 'simple measure of police protection', i.e. a measure of security, and could only be sanctioned by the Minister of Internal Affairs himself.[75] Seen in context with these other expressions of concern, it would appear to be a sincere explanation.

This evidence illustrates more clearly than has previously been advanced, how much the everyday concerns of the government dominated their overall, albeit short-term, goals. From the first year, temporary regulations of one kind or another formulated the response of the government to its fears, and set the tone for legislative action in an apparently arbitrary and illogical framework. The reign of Alexander III began with personal trauma for the new Tsar. In an autocratic system, the effects of this could hardly not have been transmitted to his ministers. It is against this background that we turn to the pogroms at their source and to those directly involved.

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[75] TsGADA, f. 1385, op.1, d. 1203 'Note from the Minister of Foreign Affairs regarding correspondance with the Austrian Embassy', l. 2ob. (26th October, 1882).

Chapter Five

POLICE, PEASANTS AND POGROMS

SETTING THE SCENE

To some extent, the 'police state' was initiated by the growth of industrialisation, which demanded tougher laws to cope with the troubled modernisation process. The factory legislation begun under Alexander III went some way towards acknowledging these problems with the creation of the police factory inspector. However, a rift was caused between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which directed this police activity, and the Ministry of Finance, which preferred the patriarchal relationship in the new industries to go undisturbed by the constant presence of the police. Disputes such as these were to plague industry, and characterised the role of the police, hindering the efficiency and effectiveness of both. In the long term, it had damaging effects on the economy and society.[1]

The tension between the industrialists and the police increased with that of strikes from the early 1890s onwards. According to a survey carried out by police in 1889, the strike instigators were more often than not outsiders, and not people who lived locally.[2] This was the case in the majority of the pogrom actions as well. It is almost certain that the government would not have been encouraging or 'running' the strike activity. When strikes became violent, the police, the army and mounted Cossacks were employed in full-scale military operations. This was the typical Tsarist method of dealing with disorder. The workers, having been let down by legislation and 'help' such as factory inspectors, turned to rioting. The last thing they needed was an attempt to control them

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[1] Giffin, p. 649.
[2] Rimlinger, p. 235.

with force by the authorities, which not only failed to solve the problems but often aggravated them.

These events occurred after the Ministry of Internal Affairs absorbed the Ministry of Police at the end of 1880. The following year the Statute on Measures for the Protection of State Security and Public Tranquillity set out exactly how the newly created Department of Police would function in the reign of Alexander III and beyond. Like other temporary laws passed at this time, the measures became subject to vague interpretations which left the power of the police open to abuses.[3] The measures were declared in ten provinces at first, but were lifted in five in 1889. Most of these were in the Pale, the South-west of Russia, e.g. Kiev, Chernigov, Volynia, Poltava, Kherson and Bessarabia. Once the measures were declared, the Governor-general of that area was given greater powers. One Governor-general in Odessa violated both the previous law and the temporary law by using his extended powers to shift the cost of the area's medical expenses from himself to the municipal council. As with the Anastasiev case, the Minister of Internal Affairs considered this a breach of law. The Tsar himself allowed the Governor-general's act to pass. The Statute was thus given greater power through the support of the autocracy: one illegality was strengthened by another.

In addition to the five sections of the new Department of Police,[4] the Tsar and Tolstoi gave the Secret Police, (*Okhrana*), wider powers for the defence of public order and security. They were independent of the regular police system. These were the secret police agents responsible for controlling factory and strike situations, and for preventing demonstrations and violence. Meanwhile local police forces suffered greatly from manpower shortages, poor pay, and a lack of discipline and training. It was reported

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[3] Zaionchkovsky, *The Russian Autocracy under Alexander III*, Moscow 1970, p. 86.
[4] ibid., pp. 89-90. Section One was for administration, Two was for censorship, Three was for political prisoners, Four was for crimes against the state, and Five was for justice and political crime administration.

from Poltava in 1881, that 76 policemen served a population of 76,000.[5] In addition to these problems, the people joining the police force were little better educated than the population they aimed to control. As a result, knowledge of the law was either non-existent or confused with common practice. The same situation applied to the lower ranks of the army. It is important to note this in light of the reports of some police officers joining in the pogroms and riots.[6] The central powers could have had very little hope of controlling these people from St Petersburg.

The Pahlen Commission (1883-8) reported that current police resources were not sufficient to prevent every Jew from crossing the borders and to restrict their economic exploitative activities, as each one would need constant surveillance. The Pahlen Commission therefore recommended less repressive measures in order to ease the problems of the Jews so that they would not need such supervision. However, repressive measures were the watchwords of the reign, and Pleve now proposed measures along the lines of Ignat'ev's proposals from back in 1882. These included creating separate Jewish 'ghetto' areas, even more restrictions on Jewish activities and a narrowing of the 'privileges' they enjoyed concerning the right to be members of the trade guilds.

By 1888-9, ideas about the Jewish Question had apparently come full circle, and no-one appeared to know which way to turn. Although no major innovation occurred in 1888 to repress the Jews still further, nothing was done to alleviate their problems either. The Tsar's 'indifference led to a failure to substitute a coherent policy for the old one that was breaking down, or being dismantled at the grass roots. Alexander III's reign might best be characterised as a period without a Jewish policy [...].'[7] The indifference

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[5] I. M. Aronson, 'The anti-Jewish pogroms in Russia in 1881', in *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Russian History*, ed. by Klier and Lambroza, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 53-54.

[6] 'British Documents', MS 16/4672/20, p. 18. Letter from F. C. Maude in Warsaw to Earl Granville, 30th December, 1881. This letter gives specific details of such events in the Warsaw pogrom, 25th December, 1881.

[7] Klier, unpublished book on reign of Alexander III and the Jewish Question, ch. 25, p. 31.

of the Tsar left his ministers puzzled and without any plan of action. This communicated itself in no uncertain terms down through all branches of the police and their Governor-generals. Indeed, Shuvalov said in his memoirs: '[...] There is not a single official in [...] Russia, from district police-officer and Justice of the Peace to Governor-general, who would know for sure what the government wants or does not want.'[8]

Pleve, as head of the Department of Police from 1881, was one of the initiators of the Statute regarding police emergency powers. Pleve was known for his energy and devotion to his work, but like many of his colleagues, he wavered in his opinions. He was a man who followed the Tsar's views loyally, and between himself and Durnovo in the latter years of the reign, government policy looked backward in an effort to maintain order. That is not to say that Pleve did not have his own ideas. He made it clear that the only way to deal with the undercurrent of protest that existed was to try to keep it at bay.[9]

It is possible to see how far Pleve took this view, particularly during the pogrom wave of 1881-2. From the telegrams that passed back and forth between him and his Governor-generals, it is clear that Pleve wanted to avoid violence and unrest at any cost. Action was even taken over the rumours of riots that ultimately came to nothing. Pleve would request to know the details of troops employed, the extent of police knowledge of trouble, the exact nature of what was predicted and the details of what happened - almost as soon as these things took place.[10] This concern and urgency was communicated to the local governors, who admitted that although at times 'the police are powerless',[11] they were still making efforts to find out who was leading the riots: 'This would be useful information to have to take preventive measures against popular

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[8] TsGADA, f. 1288, op. 1, d. 3356, l. 1ob (July, 1881).
[9] Kiev, TsGIA, f. 274, op. 1, d. 238 'Pleve police reports', ll. 1-161.
[10] d. 238, ll. 3, 8, 120.
[11] d. 238, l. 12.

unrest against the Jews [...]'[12] In similar fashion, it was reported that General Gourko ordered the military to go immediately to the assistance of the police wherever they were needed, in the event of any anti-Jewish disturbance. They were to do this 'without waiting [...] for orders from their superior officers, or the Governor of the district, or other civil authority [...]'.[13]

Although the nature and the timing of anti-Jewish legislation in the annexed Kingdom of Poland were often different to that in the Pale, the directives from St. Petersburg to the Governor-general of Warsaw, Albedyinski, were strikingly similar. They clearly stated the necessity of taking preventative and watchful measures regarding pogroms.[14] The fact that these actions were often ineffective and gave rise to the question of where the police and the authorities' loyalties lay, is less important than the fact that these orders were given.

Perhaps one of the most controversial Governor-generals is A. R. Drenteln. He openly believed that the Jews were being rightly punished for their exploitation of the people. Reports of his inaction and inertia supported suspicions, particularly in the West, of his involvement in the instigation of pogroms:

> The Governor-general, Drenteln, with his staff and a considerable military force arrived on the spot early in the afternoon; but beyond expostulation no effort was made to protect the Jews and their property. An Aide-de-camp of the Governor, who showed a disposition to interfere actively, was most roughly handled by the mob; but this did not arouse the authorities to action.[15]

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[12] d. 238, l. 250.
[13] 'British Documents', MS 45/4776/41, p. 57. Letter from G. E. Stanley in Odessa to Earl Granville, 2nd May, 1882.
[14] Michael Ochs, 'Tsarist Officialdom and Anti-Jewish Pogroms in Poland' (Klier and Lambroza), p. 167.
[15] 'British Documents', MS 10/4672/11(i), p. 7. Letter from Vice-Consul Law in St. Petersburg to Consul Michell, 14th June, 1881.

Witte, on the other hand, wrote that Drenteln was a well thought-of man in Kiev, who was known to be 'strict with his troops and harsh towards non-Russians'. Both Poles and Jews suffered at his hands, but 'now they acknowledge that his period was one of the best they have experienced because he was very fair'.[16] Witte recalls attacks on Jews in Kiev that he witnessed, which were broken up by mounted Cossacks beating the drunken mob. Both accounts were probably true, but the dilemma that a man like Drenteln would have faced needs to be emphasised. On the one hand, he did not like Jews at all, and on the other, he had a job to do. It can be surmised that the following comment from Shuvalov, who was regarded as an effective chief of police in his earlier career, provides the most accurate picture of the dilemma, especially by the time it was said (1887):

> [...] It was not so much what I said and did as the absolute stupidity or incapacity of my successors - Potapoff, Mezentseff, and then Drenteln, who said himself, that he did not know what to do and would willingly have declined the post.[17]

Drenteln is the classic example of a local official who had to overcome his inherent anti-Semitism in order to do his job properly. Sometimes he succeeded and sometimes he did not; after all, his extensive powers could be abused quite easily. His difficulty with this is illustrated above. His reluctance to protect the Jews, and his reluctance to attack his own people whom he felt had just cause to be angry with their victims, prevented Drenteln from carrying out his task swiftly. It does not follow of course, that his attitudes were shared by all Governor-generals and police. The question is often asked why police were so tardy and passive when dealing with pogroms, and why it took them till late 1881 to do anything at all.

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[16] Witte, p. 73.

[17] J. F. Baddeley, *Russia in the Eighties*, (London: University of London Press, 1921), p. 303.

There are two questions here. The second can be answered by turning to the central government's surprise at the violent turn of events, to the priorities given by central government in the first few months of the new reign to sorting out its own power struggles, and to political under-development for dealing with such situations. The first question relates to the second, in that it was police backwardness as a force in Russia, their lack of control, their inefficiency in determining how to find the culprits, and their ineffectiveness in knowing how to prevent violence, that led to this charge. To claim that local authorities were involved in pogroms because they had a definite policy for maintaining law and order in their regions, is to misunderstand what was meant by the term 'police' in Russia at this time.

Apart from the low numbers of police and their other resources problems, there is no evidence to suggest that they received any training for dealing with crowd violence, and consequently they were next to useless in these situations. From the many reports of pogroms, the police were never on the scene in time to nip the initial incident in the bud, and so prevent crowds forming. By the time they arrived, rioting was usually under way and they had to call in the army. The period between when the police and then the army arrived was given over to free plundering and destruction by the mob.[18] On the occasions when the police anticipated riots, they were usually able to prevent them from developing. Regardless of whether or not their measures had actually stopped trouble from occurring, the police were not always happy that they had made such efforts, and often blamed the Jews for wasting their time with their fears.

Perhaps it is also valid to ask why the police action taken across the region was not a united one. Again, the vague interpretations of laws must be emphasised. The orders

[18] John D. Klier, 'Orientation IV', unpublished materials on the government, the press, the police and the pogroms of 1881, p. 150.

given by Ignat'ev to the police in doing whatever was 'necessary',[19] illustrates this. Much of the decision-making as to whether to protect the Jews or not, was left to the individual discretion of the Governor-general and at the grass roots level, to his men. In addition, violence and unrest were much worse in some places than others, and therefore more drastic measures were taken. In areas such as this, the vagueness of the measures led at best to the worst kind of inefficiency and stupidity: '[...] Such as the summoning of 500 peasants from adjoining villages for the alleged purpose of assisting in suppressing the riot. These peasants, as might have been expected, instead of protecting the Jews, joined the despoilers.'[20]

Sometimes, protection was asked for in advance, as happened in Balta. One victim stated:

> I applied [...] for soldiers to protect my house and property, and accordingly a party of twelve soldiers were posted at my gate. A band of rioters soon approached the house, but on perceiving the soldiers, halted about two fathoms from the gate, and having broken down a wooden railing, entered the house and sacked it, similarly as in other houses. The soldiers, on being asked why they had allowed the rioters to enter, replied that they 'had been ordered not to let them pass through the gate'.[21]

The Police-master told the Jews that the 'police are of no use; I am afraid that they themselves will create disturbances'. There is no doubt that in this instance police orders were given, but the sympathy of some soldiers and police were with the rioters. It is certain that apart from being an inefficient, weak and ignorant force, the police were often afraid to act against the violent mob, and some individuals even joined in the pogroms. Not being united as a force however, indicates a prevalence of Drenteln's dilemma rather than a policy of pogroms. As long as the pogroms and riots were

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[19] Aronson, p. 54.
[20] 'British Documents', MS 44/4776/38(i), p. 55-56. Extract from *Golos*, 21st April, 1882.
[21] ibid.

eventually quelled and social stability was re-established at the end of the day, the main priorities were being met. This was a hard enough job in itself, but this was the end to which the majority of police were prepared to work towards.

Many of the actions and events of the period can be re-evaluated from the perspective of the local police. For example, there are many police reports that reflect a concern for order. It is expressed very clearly in one such report from Ekaterinoslav. The known involvement of factory workers in the riots meant that the police saw industrial workers as a major influence in the group that 'made up the highly dangerous element for society's tranquillity and security.'[22] This report was deemed important enough to be sent from the Ministry of Justice to the Ministry of Internal Affairs for further action, a mark that such reports were taken seriously by the higher authorities.

The report also expresses police anxiety over various problems associated with security and the Jewish Question. Right from 1882, the police were worried about Jews illegally emigrating and crossing the borders because of pogrom activity. The question of illegal passports was a particular problem, and the police were anxious to establish where the illegal emigration cards were coming from, how Jews were managing to cross the border undetected - though known to be at night - and most importantly the identity and financial backers of the agents who arranged such deals.[23] However, more concern was expressed in this matter over the possible implication of the revolutionary party than the illegal emigration of the Jews. The police were concerned about any illegal emigration, but especially if it was aided by the revolutionaries. It was suggested that all frontier points be policed, and more help in the form of legislation be given by the central authorities.

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[22] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 79, d. 185 ch. 2 'Ekaterinoslav police report on anti-Jewish disorders' (1883).
[23] TsGADA, f. 1288, op. 1, d. 3295 'Additional measures for guarding frontiers against illegal emigration', ll. 1-2ob. The report was by the Head of the St. Petersburg Department of Public Order to the Head of Alexander III's suite (2nd September, 1882).

During the ten years before the setting up of the JCA, the police fought a losing battle with illegal Jewish emigration, especially to the US (*emigratsia snova evre'ev v Ameriku*[24]) and consequently there are many documents testifying to their concern. Internal migration among Jews became a main part of police business. Jews living outside the Pale of Settlement needed police certification as well as the right passports, evidence of legal residency, and certificates of trade.[25] Police reports regarding these concerns were labelled 'completely secret' (*Sovershenno sekretno*). Although this would not have excluded most high-level officials, it was certainly not meant for public consumption or publication.

It has been seen that central government wariness and suspicion of the Jews at government level resulted in such legislation as the 'names' law, requiring Jews to use only Old Testament names. The same tone was evident in some police reports. In the Moscow region for example, the police were involved in the big question of Jewish residential rights and the issue of Jewish desertion from families. Police reports contain detailed individual cases of Jewish residence and passport investigations. This involved scrutinising every case, and anything that struck them as unusual was investigated.[26] The solution offered in one report was drastic but effective: individual or family expulsions. This was long before the Moscow expulsion of 1891, which could therefore be said to be not a wholly unprecedented act in terms of police ideas for keeping the peace.

Actual disturbances are described by the police in the following telegrams, from the Police Chief in Odessa to the Director of the Police Department (Tolstoi):

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[24] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 76a, d. 29, 'Reports on Jewish emigration'.
[25] Moscow, TsGIA, op. 78, d. 176, Letter from Head of Moscow Administration to the Minister of Internal Affairs.
[26] Moscow, TsGIA, op. 78, d. 2T, 10 'Expulsion of Jews from Moscow'; d. 176, 39 'Questions about the rights of and the names of Jews in Moscow'; d. 38 'Jewish desertion' report by the Minister of Internal Affairs; op. 79, d. 10(T1) 'Applications and entreaties of Jews to live in Moscow'.

> The violent drunken mob threw stones at the windows of the taverns and shops and at the policemen [...]
>
> [...] the disarray manifested itself in throwing stones at the gendarmes, cossacks and policemen, who were trying to protect several Jews from the attacks of the crowd [...]
>
> [...] let's hope that order will be secured by joint measures of the police and military forces' readiness.[27]

These telegrams reveal that the police were convinced that the mob saw the tavern-owners, most of whom were Jewish, and the police, as being the common enemy. The fact that the police were employed to protect the Jews would have certainly encouraged this idea. The police statement regarding their protection of the Jews, and later expressing the hope that disorder will be contained, illustrates beyond any reasonable doubt the priorities of the local police in Odessa.

The urgency of these priorities is also clearly documented. In addition to another anti-Jewish incident in Pskov province, the following was reported to the Minister of Internal Affairs:

> On 12th May [1881] at 10am, a policeman took notice of a crowd gathered on the market square - not such a large crowd, about 15 people or so. One of them, **Morozov**, a petty bourgeois, after discussing with the others the Tsar's manifesto, which had been read in the church on the 9th May, explained that it had ordered people 'to beat and oppress the Jews'. Morozov was **immediately** detained by the policeman and, accompanied with the report on his action, faced the court for sentencing.
>
> In addition to what has been said above, I have the honour to say that a) it was I who asked the judge to solve two cases, jumping the queue, in order to make an impression on those, who might imitate these deeds; and b) that both cases appear to be unique and **do not point towards preparations of any persecution of the Jews in general**, who, by the way, do not irritate the natives in Pskov and are mentioned as brawling and having feuds more among themselves, than with Christians.[28]

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[27] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1886, d. 301 'Telegrams from Odessa Police Department', 15th April, 17th April, 1886, ll. 1-3ob.

[28] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1881, d. 527 'Pskov Police Report', ll. 1-2 (13th May, 1881). Note author's bold.

The report reveals a knowledge of the relations between Christian and Jew, and interestingly, of feelings among the Jewish community as well. The local police in this area had clearly researched the problems, and had taken the initiative themselves. Most importantly, they were concerned about the possibility of further trouble and not about how to make it themselves. The police took every rumour seriously, and acted accordingly to display to the populace what would happen to trouble-makers. They also blamed the Jews for spreading alarm, but rather than merely bemoaning Jewish 'cowardice', the police chief took action:

> [He] summoned the Jewish rabbi here and scolded him in connection with the gossips about the impending massacre, spread mainly by the Jews themselves, because these gossips might artificially provoke the masses of people to act inimically.[29]

That the rumours could have a disastrous effect on public order was obviously not a welcome prospect to the police chief. All the preventative measures taken would have been negated. This upsets the idea that the police deliberately ignored Jewish pleas for help because of their involvement in the pogroms.[30] Indeed, preventative police action continued. After instructing the rabbi to tell the Jews in synagogue about the untrustworthiness of the rumours and the danger of the gossip, the Governor-general reported that he personally was keeping an eye on the local pubs and taverns to make sure they did not break the regulations regarding the sale of drink at Russian religious festival times. He instructed all metropolitan and local police to keep strict control over any would-be disorders, while he himself came to an oral agreement with the head of the military in his area, who would provide support when needed.

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[29] d. 527, ll. 5-5ob.

[30] Dubnov includes in this argument a 'rare instance' of the local police in Berdichev turning a blind eye to Jewish self defence, p. 257.

What is so revealing here is that the agreement was oral, nothing was written down. Having seen how disorganised the police were as a whole, and how arbitrary action taken could be - depending only on the individual Governor-general - it is not surprising that such an agreement should be arranged only by word of mouth. It helps to explain why there is so little documentation to prove one way or the other the question of official incitement. The oral agreement was very important. Troops were moved in at night so that crowds of people would not be around to witness it, and a request was made by the Governor-general that the troops strengthen the ordinary groups of soldiers, and not act as independent special groups. It was desired that the people would not think that anything unusual was going on, and so somehow inadvertently trigger riots. Unfortunately, the ordinary troops requested were men of the lowest army ranks, who as mentioned above, were a factor in the composition of the pogromshchiks.

An examination of a detailed report from Kovno district, which had the highest population of Jews in the empire, describes every action of the police when confronted with a possible pogrom. A local police official (*pristav*) reported to the police officer in charge of the Rossienskii region, who reported to the State Police Department:

> [...] Half an hour prior to writing this report, a peasant went to the Ivanovich shop and asked for a quarter of a pound of good quality tobacco. He said: 'Give me the best quality tobacco please, because we are already sick and tired of the Jews and we are not going to tolerate them any more'. Who this peasant was I failed to establish, but his talk was overheard by the people in the shop at that time [...] [31]

Quite what the association was between buying the best tobacco and being sick of the Jews was not commented on or explained,[32] but there is no doubt that the police officer took incidents such as this very seriously. Rumours of impending pogroms were rife,

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[31] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1882, d. 95 'Rossienskii Police Department Report', l. 2ob. (28th January, 1882).

[32] There was always the general belief in the Jewish exploitation of the peasants.

and fighting talk as well as talk of planned attacks were clearly not ignored, no matter how numerous or seemingly trivial. The police did their best to find out the source of any rumour so that they could determine the extent of the trouble and try to anticipate what action they would have to take. They duly reported everything back to the Minister of Internal Affairs:

> I have to add to my report today that I checked out the rumours spreading among the Jewish population concerning the attack by the Christians. So I went to the Mateush Veinberg tavern and had a conversation with the retired lieutenant Zbignev Napoleonovich Przhevlotskii. He told me that Christians were going to attack Jews tomorrow for certain [...] There is serious reason to fear for turmoil, and that is why I believe it is my duty to let your High Nobility know. I will be waiting for my orders.[33]

The Rossienskii chief then reported:

> After receiving the pristav's report and because of his serious fear for the security of the inhabitants of Kel'my small town, the local officer in charge informed the commander of the Draguny Novorossiskii regiment, who immediately ordered a squadron of this regiment, fourteen people, and an officer of the third squad of the nineteenth Reserve battalion to Kel'my small town. They went to Kel'my together with the main police officer on the carriage today about six o'clock in the morning. The report by the pristav [...] had not been received by that time, it only arrived at 7.30 in the morning [...] As I wanted to know where the rumours came from, I tried my best, but did not achieve the required result. I only found that the rumours emerged from the Christian throng, that visited the bazaar in Krozhi last Monday. As I wanted to know what kind of rumours are being spread in Kel'my I went today to the small town [...] and found that the same rumours were being spread among the Jewish population, and they were based on the same information, but nobody wanted to point me to the person responsible for the rumour, saying that 'everybody says that' [there will be trouble] [...] Rumours like these forced me to stay all day in Kel'my where I summoned all the *uriadniki* of my district, and also the *sotskie* and *desiatskie* [different ranks of police officers], with the help of whom **I will try not to let the turmoil start.**[34]

From this lengthy description, several facts emerge. The police clearly suffered from a lack of good communication facilities, with reports not being able to keep up with

[33] d. 95, ll. 2-2ob.

[34] d. 95, ll. 2ob-3. Note author's bold.

events. In addition there were many levels of police bureaucracy to which each report had to be circulated. Such hindrances reveal the extent of the general confusion and chaos that existed in these tense situations. The details of the incidents noted are meticulous, and it is clear that the police tried to ascertain the facts from both the Jewish and the Christian populations. Troops were mobilised immediately on the strength of the rumour without waiting for trouble to begin, as was characteristic of pogrom reports in 1881-2. It is evident from the report that police efforts to find the source of the rumours led to a significant depth of inquiry, involving considerable police time and resources.

The report concludes in frustrated tones that the rumours were groundless, and that inherent Jewish cowardice must have started the panic. Such a statement in the context of these police efforts can point only at the very most to the kind of passive anti-Semitism that was rife in Russian society. For the police, it seemed necessary to cast blame for their wasted efforts. The rumours had unwittingly played on the prioritised concern of the authorities, and it was only natural that the police would feel a little annoyed. But there can be no doubt that the police were prepared to defend the Jewish population, along with the local population, from violence and civil unrest.

It is made clear in these reports that the Governor-general and the police were fearful of the violent disorders. Their actions and their feelings express this, and there is a sense of urgency and secrecy about dealing with the masses. It appears that they were aware of their lack of control, as their efforts to find out the source of the rumour testifies. It must be remembered that neither peasantry nor Jews trusted outsiders, especially the authorities. As has been mentioned above, the peasantry often played dumb as a form of resistance to the interference of state authority. The police felt that all they could do in the circumstances was to act immediately on whatever they found out. A telegram from Kostroma in Kharkov province, dated July 1881, reveals how the police responded to

news of riots: 'After the reception of this telegram, I immediately ordered one battalion and two squadrons to go Nezhin'.[35]

Outide the Pale, and as far away as Estland, the governor wrote to the Minister of Internal Affairs that due to notices posted everywhere that appealed to 'Estonians to beat the Jews and drive them away from Revel', military patrols had been increased as a precaution. The search for the guilty parties who compiled the appeal was underway but as yet they were unknown. It is clear that the same rumours were everywhere, and everywhere the same problems were faced by the police. Unfortunately, their actions in stamping out the pogroms did not meet with overall success.

The police were at the bottom of the bureaucratic ladder, and were often frustrated by the lack of their forces, overwhelmed by the strength of peasant forces, and exasperated by Jewish alarm. In realistic terms, they had a job to do, and they were trying to do it. The police reports examined here are examples of how orders from above were implemented where it really mattered, at the grass roots level of Russian society; and of pogrom activity. Whether they personally believed in repressing or emancipating the Jews was irrelevant, since all that mattered was maintaining order and placating their superiors. The police spent most of their time struggling to keep abreast of the chaos that pogroms and unrest wrought. Both their actions and the tone of their reports make it highly unlikely that the police were following orders to incite pogroms. There is, simply, no logical sense to it.

The question remains then, of who were the instigators of the pogroms. Since the government had only vague ideas about revolutionary capabilities, it was more than likely that if there were to be any answers provided, these would also be furnished by police

[35] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1881, d. 790 'Telegram from Khar'kov Police Department', l. 5 (2nd July, 1881).

reports of the time. Their mammoth task of maintaining order would have made the police aware of much more than the pogroms alone.

Further evidence of general violence is in fact provided by contemporary Russian police documents.[36] Rostov on Don was part of the industrialised region that made up the Donbass area, and it was here that violence erupted most often. A document written in 1884 by a police chief in Ekaterinberg shows how the police place a recent pogrom in the context of the peasantry's other problems, and underlines how fighting was a part of the peasant concept of freedom, i.e. resistance to interference and control:

> The nature of disarray on the streets on the 10th May was not the initiative of pernicious (in the political sense of the word) persons [...] It was only natural that the crowd consisted in Rostov on Don of mostly such people who have nothing to lose; who worked for five months a year and then spent all their wages in the countless pubs of Rostov; they did not like the police, who they treated as the representative of the authorities and landowners [...][37]

The report states that after an initial drink-related incident:

> The mob seemed to be inclined to calm down in the very beginning, but then more drunken people, mainly from the lowest army ranks of the military reserve, and the workmen who are extremely wild in Rostov, separated and began their own riot in different parts of the city where there was no police.[38]

Such reports might lead to the conclusion that the revolutionaries had initiated the pogrom, and in such a place as Rostov, this is not implausible. However, when examining other reports it is possible to discern another explanation, which would incorporate the features of this pogrom, but which would present a significantly different picture of pogrom origins. It has already been seen that the source of pogrom rumours

[36] TsGAOR, f. 102 provides a wealth of reports on such activity.
[37] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1884, d. 88 ch. 4 'Ekaterinoslav police report', ll. 22, 23 (15th January, 1884).
[38] d. 88 ch. 4, l. 22ob.

traced by the police led to a 'Christian throng' in the market place in Kovno.[39] The following document, written by the head of the Bessarabian guberniia police department, describes a certain Zalupi, who was in the business of preaching to the masses about the necessity of emasculating the Jews, quoting passages of the Bible to support his argument:

> The passenger called himself Ivan Zalupi, wine merchant from Oliopol town. The main aim of his travels, Zalupi said, was to promote the propaganda of the destruction of the Jews by means of their emasculation, as referred to in the Bible, Book V, Chapter 28. Zalupi said for sure that there were a lot of his disciples in different parts of Kherson province - even in Ekaterinsoslav, and especially in Odessa. Those disciples actively propagated among the common people and military ranks of the lowest grade as well.[40]

It is possible to see a link with the previous document. The trouble-makers in both cases are people of the lowest class, and the lowest military rank. The witness's statement is even more revealing:

> [...] I made a stop a Razdel'naia station. Dressed in disguise, I spent all my time walking around the third class hall. There I noticed a person who was talking shyly with the other passengers. I noticed this, and tried, in time, to make contact with him. He looked at me for quite a long time and then opened his heart. He confessed that he was travelling in order to propagate Moses' doctrine among the people, i.e. his words from the Bible, book 5, chapter 28[41] [...] He invited me to propagate the same idea, especially among the Russian common people and soldiers. He told me then that Elizavetgradskii region and others in Kherson province were ready for action, and most of the lowest army ranks (especially in Odessa) are instructed to attack (wearing masks) the Jewish houses at night and emasculate the male Jews.[42]

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[39] d. 95, l. 3.
[40] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1883, d. 921 'Bessarabian Police Reports', ll. 1-8 (24th, 27th October, 3rd, 9th November, 1883). See Appendix for copy of full correspondence.
[41] The tract being preached was a misquotation, as follows: Moses 5. 30 'You will marry your wife and the other man will sleep with her; you will build your house but will not live in it'; 32 'Yours sons and your daughters will be taken by the other nation; your eyes will melt, your hands will be powerless'; 33 'The fruits of the earth and your labour will be appropriated by the strangers; and you will be oppressed and tortured all the time'; 41 'Your sons and daughters will be born, but you will not have them, because they will become captives'; 63 'As the Lord was exulted having done a favour for you and having increased your population, so the Lord would be exulted ruining you and destroying you; the country which you are going to conquer will throw you up [...]'.
[42] d. 921, ll. 3-4.

Although the main wave of pogrom activity had occurred in 1881-2, what is disclosed here is the extent to which the ordinary peasant could organise himself, and initiate such a movement. It required time, effort, careful thought and study, and the ability to read, which in the 1880s would have been a remarkable feat - certainly the rest of Russian society would have thought so. To the government, rioting was a regular feature of the peasant way of life, but they could not credit the peasantry with initiating and planning the rioting across the country. Perhaps this would explain why no documents could be found on this subject dated 1881-2. Such a movement was far away from the control or reaches of central and even local authority, and indeed it would appear that Zalupi's movement was discovered by accident, rather than as a result of systematic search and interrogation by the police.

The police themselves show nothing but worry and concern, indicating that they knew nothing about the goings-on of Zalupi and certainly were not encouraging him. It was noted by one police report that 'Zalupi's ideas of destruction of the Jews by means of their emasculation is very popular among the local peasants'.[43] On the margin of the report is noted: 'The Deputy Minister gave orders to include the content of this correspondence to the weekly report'. The report would have gone to the Minister of Internal Affairs if not the Tsar himself. This is a clear indication that from the highest to the lowest authorities, knowledge or involvement in pogrom activity, incitement to racial hatred or anti-Semitism, was not a policy. Their fears and concerns were tied up with the first priority of maintaining peace and social stability and order. It is known that in his thirteen year reign, Alexander III blatantly avoided war situations, believing strongly in the benefits of peace. Why then should he have wanted to have instigated a policy of

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[43] d. 921, l. 5.

pogroms at home, which could have led to attacks on landowners and the whole system, as the revolutionaries desired and succeeded in making the authorities think was a real possibility?

It was noted clearly in the police reports that continued to survey the Zalupi problem, that the peasants were grumbling: 'We'll attack the Jews soon; God himself wants them to be baptised; Moses himself had told them through the Bible that they must disappear'.[44] It has been emphasised that the peasants believed in a secret ukase that the Tsar had issued ordering the destruction of the Jews, thus implying that some part of local officialdom at least was instructed by their superiors to relay the ukase contents to the people. However, since God and the Tsar were inextricably linked for the masses, it is possible that the Zalupi propaganda was, with time, by word of mouth, and with a history of such ukase rumours among the masses, taken for a secret ukase by some peasants. Moreover, it distinguishes the significance of the part played by independent religious personalities from that of either revolutionary or industrial influences.

Indeed, it is necessary to re-examine old ideas and assumptions with these new factors in mind. In a letter to the State Police Department from the Kiev police, peasant grievances are discussed. After a complaint against Count Bobrinskii and the demand for land; second, and another calling for the removal of all Germans from the area, the third demands the removal of the Jews. The Jewish issue however, is less of a grievance than a description of plans for the local church holiday. The report talks of rumours regarding the Jewish massacre and arson in the town, and 'Workmen and foremen discuss confidently their indispensable duty to beat the Jews'.[45] Although nothing ultimately happened, a pogrom was evidently set up in advance and beatings were discussed openly. The question remains not about pre-laid plans, but about pre-laid plans by whom? The

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[44] d. 921, l. 7.
[45] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1881, d. 524 'Kiev Police Report', ll. 43-45 (17th August, 1881).

Jews were a separate issue from the main grievances, but a separation that was made by the peasants, bringing forth a different response from the authorities. In another report from Chernigov Police Department, two Cossacks called Kononenko and Kemstako were discovered telling people in Nezhin that there would be another Jewish pogrom there around Christmas.[46] In both cases (Kiev and Chernigov), the people involved are the kind of people connected to Zalupi's ideas, i.e. soldiers, cossacks, the common people of the Ukraine, and the police followed up in detail these events in order to prevent any possible disorder.

In conclusion then, it can be said that instead of assuming that the government secretly ordered the pogroms, it would appear far more plausible to believe that the peasants themselves had started a movement to deal with the Jews, but which also incorporated both their other grievances and their pastime pleasures. As has been shown, the peasantry was a violent, backward people but they were not without a sense of self-awareness and freedom, their own brand of morality and ideas that greatly differed from those of the government, and an ability to act on their own initiative.

Even if not indicative of a major movement, a regional incident or phenomenon such as this is evidence of peasant capability. The revolutionaries, most of whom were atheists, would not have associated themselves with any religious sect; the church would not have encouraged a sect whose views were based on misinterpreted extracts from the Bible in such a dangerous way, and from the nature of the margin remarks on the Zalupi documents, they prove that higher ranking officials became aware of the sect's existence only after the statements were taken. The authorities' involvement is confined to the area of finding the information so important that they felt it should be included in the weekly report to the central authorities. Certainly, more credence needs to be given to,

[46] TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 3D 1881, d. 790 'Telegrams from Chernigov Police Department', l. 3-5 (23rd and 29th December, 1881).

and research needs to be continued on, this theme. Until the present day, it has been believed that the peasantry could not have initiated pogrom activity on their own, other than in an industrial or revolutionary atmosphere. This thesis has tried to show that all the right ingredients were there for independent peasant action.

Chapter Six

CONCLUSIONS

SUITABLE CONDITIONS

In order to understand the reasons for pogroms on the one hand and anti-Jewish legislation on the other, it is essential to place them both in the context of other political and social actions.

In addition to the sources discussed in Chapters Two and Three, there are many area-related sources that also support the two main arguments of this thesis. Russian industry began in earnest from 1881, but there was a slump recorded around 1886, as Vorderer's research into the Russian textile industry has illustrated.[1] She found that such falls could be attributed to internal problems as well as to fluctuations in the world markets. They certainly contributed to strike action, unemployment and discontent amongst the workers. Share's research shows that between 1889 and 1894 the government arrested many of the revolutionary leaders of the Central Workers' Circle.[2] But strike activity did not subside. Neither did expressions of sympathy for striking workers throughout Moscow, Tula, Riga, Kostroma, and Nizhni Novgorod in 1891 and after.[3] The government responded with large scale arrests, which only served to fuel the aims of the revolutionaries. Revolutionary protest in the form of strikes, while not always connected with the Jewish Question, often led to pogroms that were reported by the police and the press.

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[1] Susan M. Vorderer, 'Urbanisation and Industrialisation in Late Imperial Russia' (PhD Thesis, US: Boston College, 1990).
[2] Michael B. Share, 'The Central Workers' Circle of St. Petersburg, 1889-1894: A Case Study of the "Workers' Intelligentsia"' (PhD Thesis, US: University of Wisconsin, 1984), p. 3.
[3] Wynn, *Workers, Strikes and Pogroms*, pp. 100-105.

Many police reports, as quoted in Chapters Four and Five, reflect their concern about the trouble created by revolutionaries and others, and demonstrate the priority given to stopping them swiftly and decisively. They do not describe deliberate attempts by the police or revolutionaries to instigate trouble directly against the Jews. The unrest took place in the context of rapid industrialisation, the associated problems of old and new social forces, and revolutionary and other disruptive activity - all of which epitomise in particular the Southern regions of the Pale - and all of which had an impact on the situation of the Jews.

The rule of the Ministry of Internal Affairs can be divided into two distinct phases in this period. While chaos reigned for many months in 1881 after the assassination of Alexander II, famine and riots, a period of relative order was established under Tolstoi until his death in 1889. The break in the wave of pogroms in the early 1880s, has led some historians to believe that the government was involved in instigating them. After 1889, the government was plunged into a series of domestic problems which Durnovo, as the new Minister for Internal Affairs, had to preside over. With the terrible winter conditions of 1890-91 and the famine that followed in 1891-92, Durnovo was forced into co-operating with the local *zemstvos* to raise immediate relief which normal bureaucratic channels could not have produced so quickly. 1890 was at the same time, a turning point in the composition in the revolutionary groups.[4] For the first time, it appeared that uneducated urban workers outnumbered the middle and upper class members of the revolutionary movement, a signal of how desperate some members of the lower classes had become.

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[4] Thomas Earl Porter, 'The Development of Political Pluralism in Late Imperial Russia: Local Self-Government and the Movement for a National Zemstvo Union' (PhD Thesis, US: Washington State University, 1990).

Indeed, the famine illustrates to what extent social tensions were working against each other. Until Robbins' study of the government's relationship with the public over the famine, it was assumed that the authorities were indifferent because the action taken was limited. Alexander III might have personally neglected the issue, yet Robbins shows that the lack of government action was mainly due to the central ministries' inability to approach the problem with a confident clear cut policy. The government had not buttressed the Emancipation Act with support for the newly liberated serfs. It had not recognised the need for it, in the same way that it did not see that Jewish emancipation would help solve the problems inherent in the Jewish Question.

Squabbling at senior levels of government was rife, with ministers taking the opportunity to discredit each other, in this case Durnovo and his efforts, for no other motive than personal animosity. Robbins records a meeting of the top ministers in which a conflict between Abaza, the Chairman of the Council's Department of the National Economy, and Durnovo was pursued. While there was evident delight taken at the opportunity to embarrass the government on its new policies, no solutions were put forward. Durnovo, while working with the *zemstvos* and allowing them direct and independent powers, could not control the situation of *zemstvo* power once the famine crisis was over:

> The close advisors of Alexander III [...] were convinced that to expand the role played by institutions of local self-government would ultimately be dangerous to the autocracy and the state. Ironically, the events of 1891-2, far from shaking the views of these men, had the effect of reinforcing them. For the conservative entourage which surrounded the throne, the activity of the *zemstvos* during the famine, and the participation of suspicious figures like Tolstoi and Korolenko in relief operations seemed unhealthy signs. Through the efforts of the public to aid the needy, the revolutionary virus could enter the countryside.[5]

[5] Robbins, *Famine in Russia, 1891-2*, p. 181.

The government appeared unaware that it needed society to co-operate with it in order to retain society's loyalty in the new world that was emerging, as a result of industrialisation, emancipation and peaceful foreign relations. It was not enough to grant freedom in law and then to act against it with every stroke of its autocratic decision - making process. When seen against this background, it becomes clear that the paranoia felt by the government in 1881 showed itself throughout the reign. The weakness and insecurity of inconsistent policies highlights the fact that in terms of an acceptance policy as defined by Aronson, Alexander III did 'return' to policies of discrimination, and the pogroms are therefore a social phenomenon, an extreme example of the response cycle, herein described at work.

The government also re-worked the definition of the law. How was society supposed to respond to this? If the people believed in a ukase ordering the pogroms, who could have said that the rioting was illegal? More specifically, where was the evidence of authoritative social control? The Jews had no recourse to law to protect them. It was this factor and the resulting Jewish communal paralysis, that caused emigration to gradually but steadily increase.

Ministerial power struggles centred around other problems of the interior, such as revolutionary terrorism. The government of Alexander III only succeeded in creating further undercurrents of instability and disquiet which erupted in the early nineties. The government became involved in a vicious circle of social unrest and reactive laws which created further protest. The result was a breakdown of communication and understanding between the government and society. The government did not appear to have the capability to deal with, or understand the enormity and implications of social change, from labour law to the Minorities Question.

It is with regard to the Jews that a switch in the government's policy can be detected. The Jewish Question was different not because it was pogrom-based, but because anti-Jewish legislation was the result of individual and diverse factors, and by 1888 the government no longer knew what to do in order to prevent pogroms and anti-Jewish riots - they simply ceased to have any policy on the matter. The inability to structure a Jewish policy should not be surprising. Arranging and initiating the Emancipation laws was shunned by many Tsars before finally being implemented in 1861 - even now there are doubts as to its degree of success. The assimilation of the Jews, a people that they did not know or understand, was even more difficult a task to envisage. Forced methods of assimilation, i.e. conversion, show the ineffectiveness of government attempts to pursue action, as Pobedonostsev discovered. This abandonment is therefore signalled to us as much by government action as by the effect government insecurity and indecision had on the Jewish and Russian peasant communities, and by the central and local authorities' increasing failure to maintain stability.

Between 1881 and 1894, peasant life was being forced to change to accommodate the modern forces of industrialisation. Within each village, specific and varied traditions reacted to the intrusion from the outside in different ways. Frierson and others have made it clear that the family break-up and the move towards individualism and away from collectivism were the main indicators of this change. At the same time however, the tie between land and peasant was still a fundamental relationship in Russian society in the 1880s, and this was highlighted by the economic and agricultural stress of the famine of 1891-2.

Burds has found that by the 1890s, statistics indicate that an average of 14% of the total rural population - more than one third of all male adult peasants - were involved in work that took them away from the village.[6] Migration itself was thus both a symbol and promoter of change. But was it a symbol of grave and increasing peasant poverty and destitution; part of the more unfortunate results of the Emancipation Act, redemption payments, inadequate subsequent legislation, famine and disease? Wheatcroft has examined these factors and concludes that the growth in peasant unrest as a whole was more a consequence of the decline in government authority, as well as of regional problems, than of any increase in overall peasant poverty.[7]

It is not the intention of this thesis to detract from the serious factors creating peasant destitution; but merely to point out that peasant customs were changing in reaction to the government. The brutality and violent traditions of former times were being transplanted into the contemporary situation to act as outlets for peasant frustration and

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[6] Jeffrey Burds, 'The Social Control of Peasant Labor in Russia: The Response to Labor Migration in the Central Industrial Region, 1861-1905' in *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia*, p. 55.

[7] Stephen Wheatcroft, 'Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late Imperial Russia', in *Peasant Economy*, p. 171.

anger, and occasionally to confront new concepts that were either directly or indirectly introduced into peasant life. *Samosud* is a prime example of this. Considered a form of torture by educated Russian society, it has been said that *samosud* remained popular until the twentieth century because it was a form of moral justice and 'law' devised by the peasants for the peasants, as separate from the rest of society. It was a means by which respect for authority other than the government and nobility was maintained, i.e. the authority of the commune, and the importance of it in the closely bound lives of its villagers.[8] Frank has found that *samosud* was used for the more traditional forms of punishment well into the 1890s, but that it was not 'lawless violence'.[9] The purpose of this severe form of punishment was to suppress any kind of criminal activity that was deemed harmful or socially disruptive to the community. *Samosud* was therefore a protective measure against the outside world.

The rise in religious dissent among the peasants in the 1890s is another example of the decline of government authority. Camfield's research into the Pavlovtsy of Kharkov Province from 1886 reveals that the leader, a self-styled independent noble called Khilkov, was preaching evangelical pacifism.[10] Indeed, the areas of Kherson, Ekaterinoslav and Odessa were centres for Russian evangelical opinion in the 1860s, and there were known links between them and Tolstoi's Christian followers. Kiev was also the scene of religious fervour where a former Baptist called Malevannyi, proclaimed himself the Messiah. The popular enthusiasm for his preaching led to his arrest in 1892. Although it was from 1900 onwards that new leaders preached more radical lessons, the movements that existed in the Kherson region from the 1860s are significant in themselves. These consisted of religious groups unaffiliated with the Russian Orthodox

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[8] Stephen P. Frank, 'Popular Justice, Community and Culture among the Russian Peasantry, 1870-1900', *RR*, 46 (1987), pp. 239-65.

[9] Frank, p. 263.

[10] G. P. Camfield, 'The Pavlovtsy of Kharkov Province, 1886-1905: Harmless Sectarians or Dangerous Rebels?', *SEER*, 68, (1990), pp. 692-717.

Church; and anarchistic elements not associated with the revolutionaries. It was in precisely this area also that the pogroms began in 1881. Independent religious movements and beliefs clearly existed, and found a ready audience among the desperate peasantry.

CONCLUSIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

The background outlined above illustrates the multiple social complexities of the reign of Alexander III. Supported by the numerous police reports and ministerial expressions of concern discussed in this thesis, the pogroms must be seen to be, at the very least, of complex origins. The role of Alexander III as instigator becomes less credible as more research is undertaken on the capabilities of the peasantry. Indeed, from the present research several important conclusions have emerged.

Russia in the 1880s provides a clear example of nineteenth century passive anti-Semitism. Whereas active anti-Semitism sets out in policy form a belief in the inferiority of the Jews, passive anti-Semitism takes no such form. In Russian educated society in the 1880s, passively anti-Semitic ideas were the norm. Being pro-Semitic was thus advocating bias, in other words special treatment, which was indeed a major concern for the government of Alexander III. The socially accepted levels of anti-Semitism, echoed the acceptable levels of violence, inequality and brutality in Russian society, a society that fixed all its Russian members into tightly bonded unequal classes. It was quite a different form of anti-Jewish thought to that which inspired for example, the active anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany. This is a necessary and important distinction in historical terms.

The society which embraced this brand of passive anti-Semitism was unable to come to terms with the huge modern industrialising forces it encountered. The changing class system, the various kinds of unrest, and the inability of the government to control what was happening, resulted in social chaos. In the reign of Alexander III, old policies still appeared plausible, and new hatreds were emerging but were not yet fully acceptable. Truly, it was a transitional period. The Jewish community found that, although not

assimilated, they could not and did not escape the effects of this. The old methods of negotiation and discussion with the authorities were no longer relevant to the new situation of the 1880s, and the community failed to perceive that the government was not in control of society. The pogroms were a violent example of how little the autocratic government's power affected Russian society at the grass roots level, a phenomenon which demands further research, especially with respect to the peasantry and their activities. Beginning with events which were momentous for both Russian and Jewish societies - the assassination of Alexander II and the pogroms of 1881 - the reign of Alexander III is a turning point in both Russian and Jewish History, and thus is of greater significance than has previously been accepted.

Ultimately, the collision of an autocratic regime with non-autocratic socio-economic and political forces produced a situation that was neither comfortable nor easily understood in the Russian Empire of the 1880s. Whatever the inherent inclinations of the Tsar, he was still the ruler of a vast multi-national state, and regardless of his personal feelings, his entire heritage and upbringing would have instilled in him one aspect of his position above all else: the necessity to maintain social law and order. The strength of his reputation at home and abroad as Tsar over all Russia would have depended on his ability to achieve this goal. It has been established that Alexander III was a man who was concerned with his public image. He was also a man who believed in fulfilling his role as ruler of all his subjects, regardless of any legal and social inequality. Although puzzling in a contemporary world, this belief and the reality were not incompatible at the time. Such subtleties of belief cannot be emphasised enough. Perhaps the controversy, and the paucity and apparent contradictions, of available evidence, which inspired the question posed in the title of this thesis, was best explained by Count Witte:

> [...] It should be said that although the Emperor loved his Russian subjects more than he did his non-Russian ones, he understood that he was sovereign of all his subjects[...].[11]

Thus the role of human cognisance and interpretation, often a substitute for real communication between government and society, must be taken into account. This factor extended across the social spectrum, from the Tsar to the peasant in the South-west. As the argument continues over the apparent increase of peasant poverty in the 1890s, it must be said that whether or not this was true matters little if peasants themselves perceived their position to be worsening, and acted according to their instinct.[12] For instinct is what the origins of the pogroms were all about, and the loss of social control could not have been more clearly revealed than by the frequent eruptions of popular violence borne from a society in which independent religious, as well as revolutionary, factions and sects were gaining ground. The capability and culpability of these diverse, often little-known but very real elements constitutes a distinguishing trademark of Russian society in the reign of Alexander III.

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[11] Witte, p.147.
[12] Aronson, *Troubled Waters*, p. 24.

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'Persecution of the Jews in Russia', 11th January, 1882

'Father Remiroff in Odessa', 27th November, 1890

'A Jewish Religious Movement in Bessarabia', 23rd August, 1884

'The Jews in Russia', 5th May, 1891

APPENDIX

Police reports and correspondence regarding Zalupi and his activities in Bessarabia

TsGAOR, f. 102, op. 1, d. 921, ll. 1-8

27342

31 ОКТЯБРЯ 1883

НАЧАЛЬНИКЪ
БЕССАРАБСКАГО
ГУБЕРНСКАГО
ЖАНДАРМСКАГО
УПРАВЛЕНІЯ.

Октября 27 дня 1883 г.

№ 1078

г. Кишиневъ.

Совершенно секретно.

Во время пребыванія моего въ г. Бендерахъ, лишонный по суду нѣкоторыхъ правъ, Харлампій Ивановъ Сидиринъ Новгородскій, братъ мѣстнаго городскаго Пристава, заявилъ мнѣ, что на ст. Раздѣльной, въ ожиданіи поѣзда, онъ обратилъ вниманіе на одного подозрительнаго пассажира, и старался съ нимъ сблизиться. Онъ назвалъ себя Ивановъ Загути, и высказалъ, что торгуетъ пятіями въ г. Ольвіополѣ, а разъѣзжаетъ проповѣдывать объ уничтоженіи евреевъ, на основаніи 28 главы, 5 книги Библіи, посредствомъ оскопленія мужескаго ихъ пола, увѣряя, что имѣетъ во многихъ мѣстахъ Херсонской Губерніи, даже Екатеринослав

Въ Департаментъ Полиціи.

въ, особенно въ Одессѣ, согласныхъ дѣйствовать съ нимъ, какъ въ средѣ народа, такъ и между нижними чинами войскъ; приглашалъ Новгородскаго принять также въ этомъ дѣлѣ участіе, научивъ его условнымъ выраженіямъ для извѣщенія объ успѣхахъ пропаганды и готовности партіи дѣйствовать.

Докладывая объ этомъ, имѣю честь присовокупить, что я совѣтовалъ заявителю проѣхать въ Ольвіополь, собрать о Залупи болѣе подробныя свѣдѣнія и постараться ближе сойтиться съ нимъ, узнать всѣхъ его соучастниковъ, гдѣ они проживаютъ, и если возможно будетъ, то и съ ними лично познакомиться, и изучивъ такимъ образомъ всю организацію, обо всемъ подробно сообщить

миъ. На это Андринъ-Новгородскій согласился и долженъ былъ начать съ Загули переписку и затѣмъ, отправиться къ нему въ Ольвіополь.

Приложеніе: Копія заявленія Андринъ-Новгородскаго.

Полковникъ [illegible]

Копія

Господину Начальнику Бессарабскаго Губернскаго Жандармскаго Управленія

Харлампія Иванова Сидримъ-Новгородскаго

Заявленіе.

Состоя въ качествѣ частнаго сыщика, 16 сего Октября проѣзжая по ж. дорогѣ, остановился на станціи Раздѣльной и будучи переодѣтымъ, вращался все время въ залѣ III класса, гдѣ замѣтилъ одну личность разговаривающую съ прочими пассажирами какъ бы стѣсняясь прочихъ слушателей. Замѣтивъ это, я постарался въ свою очередь познакомиться съ этою личностью, который между прочимъ долго испытывая мою личность а затѣмъ началъ откровенничать, а именно: сознался что онъ ѣздитъ съ цѣлью пропо-

вѣдывать въ народѣ слова Мои-
сѣя, гдѣ въ 5 части главѣ 28-й
той библіи говорится: „прій-
„детъ время, что будетъ спать
„съ женами но не будетъ имѣть
„дѣтей и что дѣти отъ вашихъ
„женъ будутъ православными."
Приглашалъ меня проповѣды-
вать тоже самое въ особенности
между русскимъ народомъ и
войсками. Высказавъ притомъ,
что въ Херсонской Губерніи,
Елизаветградскій и другіе
уѣзды почти всѣ подготовлены
и большая часть нижнихъ чи-
новъ къ началу приведенія
въ исполненіе своихъ проповѣ-
даній а въ особенности въ г.
Одессѣ - нападать ночью въ
маскахъ на еврейскіе дома и
скопить мужскій полъ. Лич-
ность о которой я заявляю
Вашему Высокоблагородію,
если не обманула меня, по-
казалъ себя жителемъ г. Оль-
віополя, Херсонской Губерніи

по имени Иванъ Загути, тор-
гующій питьями, куда просилъ
и сообщать ему письмомъ въ
случаѣ надобности. Причемъ объ-
явилъ, что въ самомъ недале-
комъ будущемъ они начнутъ
(недалѣе какъ чрезъ мѣсяцъ, пол-
тора) свои дѣйствія.

Заявляя объ этомъ для свѣ-
дѣнія Вашему Высокоблагоро-
дію, докладываю что я во всякое
время готовъ къ услугамъ для
защиты спокойствія и бла-
гамъ нашей Россіи.

Харлампій Ивановъ Сидиринъ
Новгородскій.

Живу въ г. Бендерахъ
въ домѣ Штабсъ-Ка-
питана Тарасенки.
24 Октября 1883 г.

3/ № 6540



15 Ноября 83 г. 5

15 НОЯБ 83

28528 Совершенно секретно.

НАЧАЛЬНИКЪ
БЕССАРАБСКАГО
ГУБЕРНСКАГО
ЖАНДАРМСКАГО
УПРАВЛЕНІЯ.

Ноября 9 дня 1883 г.

№ 1143

г. Кишиневъ.

III/13

Вице-Д. Тов. Мин.

Въ дополненіе къ донесенію моему отъ 27 Октября за № 1088, имѣю честь при семъ представить второе заявленіе Харлампія Сидоровича Новгородскаго, о томъ, что онъ ѣздилъ по желѣзной дорогѣ въ м-ко Балту, и далѣе къ Елизаветграду и удостовѣрился, что крестьянинъ Иванъ Загута, проживаетъ въ с. Лысая Гора, Елисаветградскаго уѣзда, верстахъ въ 10-ти отъ с. Ольвіополя, и ведетъ тамъ пилочную торговлю; что пропаганда Загута, уничтожить евреевъ чрезъ оскопленіе ихъ, распространена въ той мѣстности между крестьянами, — и доложить, что на просьбу заявителя, о снабженіи его открытыми предписа-

Господинъ Товарищъ Министра [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

16 Ноября 1883 [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 16 Нояб. 83.

Полковникъ [illegible]

Въ Департаментъ Полиціи.

921/83 г.

[illegible]

ніями Полиціи, объ оказаніи ему содѣйствія, мною объявлено ему, что такая мѣра была бы неудобна, тѣмъ болѣе, что онъ проситъ сохранить его имя въ тайнѣ.

Подлинныя заявленія Сидиримъ-Новгородскаго, я вмѣстѣ съ симъ представляю къ Г. Временному Одесскому Генералъ-Губернатору; и объ изложенномъ сообщилъ для свѣдѣнія Начальникамъ Жандармскихъ Управленій Херсонскаго Губернскаго и г. Одессы, не обнаруживая заявителя.

Приложенія: копіи заявленія Сидиримъ-Новгородскаго и выписка изъ 5ᵒ главы Библіи.

Полковникъ [подпись]

Кн. № 1143-ій

6

Копія

Его Высокоблагородію
Господину Начальнику Бессараб-
скаго Губернскаго Жандармскаго
Управленія

Бендерскаго жителя Харлам-
пія Иванова Сидиринъ-Новго-
родскаго

Заявленіе.

Въ дополненіе къ заявленію
моему, отъ 24 минувшаго Октя-
бря сего года, имѣю честь доложить
Вашему Высокоблагородію, что
для удостовѣренія о самолично-
сти вызвавшаго во мнѣ сомнѣ-
ніе своими проповѣданіями, я
1 сего Ноября ѣздилъ въ м. Голь-
ту, Ананьевскаго Уѣзда, гдѣ дѣй-
ствительно удостовѣрился, что
не въ Гольтѣ, и не въ Ольвіополѣ,
а въ с. Лысой Горѣ, Елисаветград-
скаго Уѣзда, въ 10 верстахъ отъ
Ольвіополя, живетъ Иванъ За-
гупа и что онъ дѣйствительно
тамъ занимается разною лж-

лочною торговлею, лица у которыхъ я спрашивалъ про Загупу, подозрительно весьма, сперва спросили меня, откуда я? чѣмъ я занимаюсь? какъ моя фамилія, кого я въ Бендерахъ знаю и только послѣ такихъ распросовъ сообщили мнѣ, гдѣ живетъ Иванъ Загупа. При подобныхъ распросахъ, я назвалъ себя по фамиліи Ивановымъ и по профессіи торговцемъ; при этомъ находился и старшій жандармскій унтеръ-офицеръ станціи Сагта, Иванъ Акимовъ Стреликовъ, которому между прочимъ, я по пріѣздѣ на станцію Сагту, сообщилъ цѣль моего пріѣзда, зная его, Стреликова лѣтъ пять тому назадъ, за человѣка весьма достойнаго своему назначенію.

На слѣдующій день, со станціи Сагты я поѣхалъ по направленію къ Елисаветграду; доѣхавъ до скрещенія, т. е до послѣдней станціи подъ Елисаветградомъ,

вернулся обратно въ тотъже день
и все время съ кѣмъ только изъ крест-
янъ, не заводилъ разговоръ о евреяхъ,
слышалъ тѣже отзывы, что отъ
Загуры, только безъ всякихъ откро-
венностей, а лишь: „будьи имъ маму
„курдуваты, самъ Богъ приказуе асче-
„бы они кристылыся; самъ Мойсъй
„въ Библіи имъ раньше говоривъ,
„что оны повынни сгезнуты."

Добавляя свое заявленіе, я святымъ
долгомъ считаю, если позволяетъ мнѣ
законъ, доложить Вашему Высокобла-
городію, что для предупрежденія подоб-
ныхъ дурныхъ замысловъ, невѣжего
народа, и вмѣстѣ съ тѣмъ, всеобща-
го смятенія, Вашему Высокобла-
городію необходимо принять зависящ-
щія мѣры, снестись куда слѣдуетъ.
Прошу при этомъ, при докладѣ, неос-
тавить упомянуть, что заявленія
эти доложены Вашему Высокобла-
городію, заштатнымъ канцеляр-
скимъ, лишеннымъ по суду правъ,
Харлампіемъ Ивановичемъ Сидиркинымъ
Новгородскимъ. — 9 Ноября 1883 г.
г. Кишиневъ.



Причемъ имѣю честь присовоку-
пить, что дальнѣйшія свѣдѣнія
по этому дѣлу, я предлагаю свои
услуги докладывать Вашему Вы-
сокоблагородію; а также, прошу
ходатайства предъ Начальникомъ
Херсонской Губерніи и города
Одессы, о снабженіи меня необ-
ходимыми документами, о данъ
мнѣ полицейскими властями
содѣйствія; а также, волостны-
ми старшинами. — при этомъ
прошу неупоминать моего
имени при производствѣ рас-
слѣдованія, въ виду того, чтобы
не повредило мнѣ это, при
дальнѣйшихъ по сему дѣлу
добыванія свѣдѣній

Харламній

5 книга Моисея
Глава 34 Стр. 177.

Ст.30. Съ женою обручишься, и другой будетъ спать съ нею; домъ построишь и небудешь жить въ немъ.
" 32. Сыновья твои и дочери твои отданы другому народу и глаза твои будутъ смотрѣть и истаевать о нихъ весь день; и небудетъ силъ въ рукахъ твоихъ.
" 33. Плоды земли твоей и всѣ труды твои будетъ ѣсть народъ, котораго ты незналъ; и ты будешь только притесняемъ и мучимъ во всѣ дни.
" 41. Сыновъ и дочерей родишь, но ихъ небудетъ у тебя, потому что пойдутъ въ плѣнъ.
" 63. И такъ радовался Господь, дѣлая Вамъ добро и умножая Васъ, такъ радоваться будетъ Господь, погубляя Васъ и истребляя Васъ; и извержены будете изъ земли, въ которую ты идешь, чтобы овладѣть ею.