

POWER AND THE POPULAR:
POPULAR CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS IN
TWO SHANTY TOWNS OF AREQUIPA, PERU

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ABSTRACT

POWER AND THE POPULAR: POPULAR CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS IN TWO SHANTY TOWNS OF AREQUIPA, PERU

MARGARET L. BULLEN

This thesis set out to explore the impact of modern urban society and the mass media on the cultural identities of rural migrants to the city of Arequipa, Peru. It examines how identities are constructed by the dominant sector of Arequipan society and powerful institutions like the broadcast media, who seek to exert control over the migrants. It explores how notions of the popular are constructed through discourses of race, class, ethnicity and culture, grounded in historically established dominant-subordinate relations and operating stereotypes informed by a series of discursive dichotomies.

It finds that whilst divisions are drawn between the powerful and the powerless in discourse, migrants are not without power. They contest the stereotypes constructed by those in whom power is institutionally invested and negotiate their own identities. Resisting categorization which ascribes to them a position of subordination and deprivation, they engage with the categories of the dominant, challenging the unjust social order and the discourses which maintain it. Participating in grass-roots activity, they fight for access to basic living requirements and produce their own popular broadcasts in opposition to the mainstream media. At the same time, migrants enjoy pop music and soap opera, but they receive the products of mass commercial culture within their own social environment and in the context of their own personal experience and interpret them in their own terms.

The thesis concludes that although some do have greater access to economic resources and political leverage, they do not necessarily have the power to influence others, for their attempt to do so generates resistance. Meanings are continually challenged, categories contested and new identities constructed.

Figure 1



Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4





Figure 5



CHAPTER ONEINTRODUCTION1. Introduction

The last fifty years have seen dramatic changes in all aspects of Peruvian life. One of the most striking socio-economic developments has been the radical reversal of the country's demographic distribution from the countryside to the city. In 1940, 65 per cent of Peru's population was concentrated in rural areas but, over the following forty years, mass migration displaced almost half the rural population to the urban centres so that by 1984 only 35 per cent remained in the countryside. Given the massive scale of the rural exodus, the cities were unable to house the incoming migrants who settled in *pueblos jóvenes*¹ or shanty towns on the urban periphery. It is with these *pobladores*² or settlers that this thesis is concerned.

¹ The term *pueblo joven*, literally 'young town', was introduced by Velasco (1968-75) to convey the recent formation of the settlements, the youth of their population and the residents' desire to improve the community and to replace a stream of often disparaging names: *barriada*, *barriada popular*, *barriada clandestina* or *barrio marginal* (little, popular, clandestine, marginal neighbourhood); *urbanización social* (social housing development); *cinturón de miseria* (belt of misery), *aberración social* (social aberration) or *cáncer social* (social cancer). See Collier 1975:137,144; Van Garderen 1989:27-8.

² *Poblador/ra* first referred to the migrants who invaded and settled the barren wastelands on the edge of the cities, but in its contemporary usage may indicate any shanty town resident. I will use the terms *poblador* and *pueblo joven* interchangeably with 'settler' and 'shanty town' respectively.

This thesis examines cultural aspects of socio-economic change amongst migrants principally from the southern region of the Andes in Peru's second city, Arequipa (fig.1). It investigates the way popular identities are constructed in the interaction between first and second-generation migrants and Arequipan society and its institutions, looking particularly at the concept of the 'popular' emerging in grass-roots organizations and the broadcast media.

My initial intention was to discover whether the interaction between migrants and Arequipans had resulted in a definable migrant identity which manifest itself in cultural innovation in urban popular culture such as theatre, poetry or music. I proposed to investigate the emergence of a new identity through an analysis of the various influences bearing upon the migrants in their encounter with Arequipans, the State and local authorities and the mass media. However, it soon became apparent that the relationship between socio-economic and cultural change was not as straightforward as it first appeared.

One problem was the notion of culture itself. To conceptualize what is happening in urban society in Peru in terms of a dualistic interaction between two 'cultures' is not only a simplification of a complex situation but glosses over the difficulties of the concept of 'culture'. The idea of an 'Andean culture' coming into contact with an 'Arequipan culture' and producing a new 'migrant culture' begs the

question of whether such cultures can be said to exist or be seen to be emerging. Who or what are they referring to? To a people, their way of life, their art forms? These questions may appear basic but they arose repeatedly in Arequipa, where I found multiple notions of 'culture' challenging my own culturally specific concept. The problem is that 'culture' is a discursive category which is differently used by particular social actors, including scholars, in their classification of specific people and situations. As Wagner (1975) argues, the fieldworker 'invents' the culture of the people being studied and must identify the categories people use rather than imposing upon them preconceived analytical categories. Hence in Arequipa, the multiple definitions of terms like 'Andean' or 'Arequipan', 'popular' or 'culture' were further complicated by my own difficulties in finding a language with which to discuss these concepts.

In the field, I could observe and participate in what people did and record what they said, but in analysing the data thus gathered, I had to discover the relationship between their actions (behaviour or speech) and the meanings they gave to them. I had to investigate how they constructed these meanings through their interaction with the social system and their interpretation of their experience. Thus, whilst I had set out to assess the influences to which migrants were subject, my research made it clear that although migrants in Arequipa were susceptible to prejudice and discrimination and

did have to contend with social injustices, they did not passively receive the categories of the dominant, but challenged the notions on which those categories were constructed.

On the premise that people are actively involved in constructing meanings and therefore in constituting their own identities, and in an attempt to distance myself from approaches which assessed ethnic change on the basis of whether one language or cultural practice was being substituted by another, I proposed to investigate how identities were continually renegotiated in different social contexts, at both a subjective and institutional level. The migrants' experience in the urban environment is thus examined in terms of the continual reinterpretation of social interaction with other persons or situations, looking especially at their discourse (understood as the language used to conceptualize that interaction).

Taking ethnicity to depend upon the differences members of one group perceive between themselves and another and group membership to depend upon where one situates oneself or is situated through the definitions of others, I looked at the way Arequipans and migrants spoke about themselves and each other and the categories and labels they used in relation to historically shaped stereotypes. I also looked at ways in which social actors contest categorization in the contemporary context, both through their speech and political action.

Again, the terms 'migrant' and 'Arequipan' are problematic since they too are discursive categories and do not refer to empirical groups or oppositional sets of people (it is possible for someone to be both Arequipan and migrant). The notion of 'group', like that of 'tribe', 'culture' or 'nation', is complicated because it does not refer to an objective reality but is constructed in interaction. To use Benedict Anderson's phrase (1983), these are all 'imagined communities' of which people perceive themselves or others to be a part.

People do conceptualize society as composed of discrete groups but these are cultural categories or models used to explain a social process and are not necessarily borne out in concrete situations. Any individual is not the member of just one but of several or many different groups and will have several or many interpersonal relationships both within and across the group (Holy and Stuchlik 1983:113). I therefore had to discover what groups people in Arequipa conceive themselves or others to be part of and how that affects their interaction and their sense of identity.

In order to examine the relationship between the subjective identities of migrants and their representation as an 'ethnic group' or a 'popular class' by dominant sectors of society, I moved from an analysis of their relationship with Arequipans in general to their interaction with powerful institutions like the State, represented by the local

authorities whom they pressure for basic services. I examined the way in which, although discriminated against and disadvantaged in many aspects of their lives, migrants have their own strategies for survival, their own ways of negotiating with the state, authorities and other economically or politically powerful sectors of society and their own interpretations of their encounters and experiences. Although the authorities, charities and church groups intrude upon the migrant society and try to impose certain ways of being or doing upon them, I explored the ways in which migrants develop strategies to negotiate with these bodies by organizing themselves at the grass roots and constructing socio-political identities for themselves.

My intention in this thesis has also been to link the micro level of social interaction to wider, less visible power structures operating in the context of modern, urban society in Peru and embedded in institutions such as the broadcast media, which I found to be the most far-reaching and most readily identified transmitter of 'popular culture' in Arequipa. I evaluated the varying definitions of 'popular culture' in the media and their contribution to the construction of a 'popular' migrant identity. Neither 'popular' nor 'mass culture' were found to be homogeneous or static categories in Arequipa but depended on different conceptualizations of those operating these terms in contrast to each other or in opposition to other concepts such as 'high

culture'. I particularly looked at how those who control radio and television reproduce stereotypes of Peruvian society and how they address or represent the migrant sector.

Whilst media images and messages might correspond to racist and classist stereotypes, I looked at how these are received and contested in the shanty towns as people make their own interpretations of what they hear or see. Radio also provided a field in which the migrants were not only consumers but also producers and I researched popular communication projects in the city, looking at how the *pobladores* produce images of themselves through community broadcasting and the way this contributes to their notions of a popular identity. Rather than treat the migrants as the passive recipients of a 'dominant culture' which is imposed upon them and which they are powerless to resist, I acknowledge them as social actors in their own right who may buy radios and televisions, archetypal symbols of imperialistic cultures, but make their own meanings out of what they see and hear.

Throughout the thesis I tackle the problem of the relationship between analytic and descriptive language as used by social actors and scholars. There is necessarily a difference between scholarly and popular discourses but they are interlinked and inform each other (Cameron & Frazer 1987:28). Theories are popularized and their vocabularies enter everyday language. People in the shanty towns, middle class Arequipans and media producers all use analytical terms

to describe themselves and their social environment. It is this problem I address in identifying the categories used by my informants, without assuming that their use of those categories coincides with my own.

I will now proceed with an overview of the historical background to rural-urban migration and socio-economic change in Peru from 1940 to the present.³

2. Rural-Urban Migration in Peru

2.1. Motives for Migration

The acceleration of rural-urban migration in the 1940s was stimulated on the one hand by a population increase, lack of land and increasing poverty in the sierra and on the other by the concentration of industry and modernized agriculture on the coast.⁴ Major economic and political changes taking place at that time facilitated the emergence of the popular urban sector and the *pueblos jóvenes*.⁵

³ I am grateful to Lewis Taylor for the provision of two articles (1990, 1991) which have informed this section. Details of political parties are from Rojas (1988); additional sources in text.

⁴ There is an extensive literature on internal migration in Peru: Matos Mar 1961, 1968, 1983, 1984; Dobyns & Vásquez 1963; Martínez 1968, 1969, 1983, 1986; Bradfield 1973; Dietz 1976.

⁵ On the urban expansion of Lima, amongst others see: Matos Mar 1966; Welsh 1970; Deler 1974.

The need for agrarian reform

Rural-urban migration to the city of Arequipa follows an inter-Andean trend from the rural villages and small towns of the southern sierra to the city of Arequipa. The principle forces of expulsion from the sierra are economic, based on the poverty arising from a shortage of arable land and the absence of other economic outlets (Matos Mar 1961). The land problem in Peru is grounded in the unequal distribution of property and the failure of successive governments to implement agrarian reform (Bourque & Palmer 1975; Harding 1975).

Up till the late 1960s, 85 per cent of Peru's land was owned by a minority of *gamonales* (landlords) who, together with the urban upper classes, formed a powerful oligarchy which held sway in both the political and economic realm and manipulated both civilian and military governments of the period. Despite mounting pressure from intellectuals and peasant movements first formed in the 1920s,⁶ they prevented agrarian reform from entering political or public debate until the late 1950s (Matos Mar 1984:28-30).

The deterioration of conditions in the sierra led to the increasing mobilization of peasants, reaching a peak in the

⁶ In the 1920s, José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, founders of the Peruvian Communist Party (PCP) and the Popular Revolutionary American Alliance (APRA) respectively, argued the need for land reform and called for the education and emancipation of the Indian. See Mariátegui (1979).

early sixties.⁷ Two hundred estate takeovers in 1964 precipitated the first agrarian reform law under Fernando Belaúnde Terry (1963-68), but its scope was limited by exclusion clauses which protected the owners of the largest and most lucrative estates and the majority of peasants remained without land. Instead, Belaúnde pursued an Amazon development scheme to colonize new lands and build a highway along the *ceja de selva*.⁸

By the mid sixties, political mobilization in the cities, where rural-urban migration was adding to social tension, reinforced the peasant movements and land invasions in the countryside. General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-75) finally responded to pressure to implement agrarian reform and in 1969 passed an extensive reform law as part of an overall strategy to create a more democratic society by cutting the power of the landlords and the oligarchy (Bourque & Palmer 1975:179; Dobyns & Doughty 1976:251). A far-reaching expropriation programme was carried out and within five years most large estates from the sugar plantations to the sierra had been

⁷ Between 1962 and 1963, land invasions in the valleys of La Convención and Lares in the department of Cusco were met with repressive action but also prompted the military government of Pérez Godoy to redistribute land in the areas of insurgency.

⁸ *Ceja de selva*, literally 'the jungle's eyebrow' refers to the area on the east side of the Andean foothills where most of the population of the Peruvian Amazon is settled and where coffee, tea, palm oil, exotic fruits and coca are produced. Belaúnde's grandiose projects were badly planned and harmful to the existent population and already over-exploited land.

taken over and more than eight million hectares handed to direct producers either in cooperatives or on an individual basis.⁹

However, the land problem was still not completely solved. Redistribution had only favoured the top quarter of the population and four thousand *campesino* (peasant) communities¹⁰ remained without sufficient land, irrigation, credit facilities and technical assistance.¹¹ In the 1960s, Andean agriculture was stagnant through lack of government investment to increase productivity. Although the growing urban centres expanded the food market, *campesinos* were penalized by price controls in favour of the urban consumer and exposed to free market competition and cheap imports of wheat and meat. By the 1970s, the sierra was only producing 11 per cent of national consumption as the decline in cash crops meant that more coastal land was turned over to food production. The economic crises of the subsequent years left the sierra in a state of decay and the highland rural population remained the poorest in the country so that,

⁹ The reform decreed the expropriation of all properties over 150 hectares on the coast and between thirty five and sixty five hectares (according to the region) in the sierra.

¹⁰ The term *comunidad campesina* was introduced by Velasco as a class category to replace the ethnically defined *comunidad indígena* (indigenous community).

¹¹ Lowenthal (1975:15) states that those who benefited most were those strong enough to make their demands heard such as the permanent, well-organized workers on the sugar plantations, whilst the lot of seasonal workers and the landless peasants of the sierra was unimproved.

despite economic recession in the cities, the tide of rural-urban migration continued unchecked.

Demographic growth

The shortage of land was exacerbated by the expansion of the rural population after 1940, as the mortality rate fell with improved health care and vaccination campaigns. The available land was insufficient to support the growing population which placed increasing pressure on the *minifundios* (small plots of land) which had to be divided into ever decreasing parcels (Pike 1967:311). Members of large rural families were often forced to seek a living outside the sierra, as migrants in Arequipa recollect. Piedad speaks of having to leave her home in Cailloma, one of Arequipa's highland provinces¹² (fig.2) so that younger brothers and sisters could be provided for:

Somos hartos hermanos, no se puede vivir, mejor retirarse un poco.

(There's an awful lot of us in the family, you can't live like that, it's better to move away a bit.)

Vicentina from the village of Yanque, also in the province of Cailloma, relates how her husband used to go to the city alone in order to supplement their income in the sierra and then decided to take the whole family to settle in Arequipa:

¹² Place of origin will be given with reference to the province first and the department second; mention of a particular district, village or town will be specified.

Estaba trabajando mi esposo acá, tiempo atrás, venía solito, hartos hijos (teníamos), no alcanzaba. Consígate lote le han dicho, después casucha empezaba a hacer para vivir... Vamos a Arequipa, me dijo, aburriéndome con borregos me vine.

(My husband was working here, a long time ago, he used to come all on his own, we had a lot of children, there wasn't enough to go round. Get yourself a plot of land, they told him, and then he started to make a little shack to live in... Let's go to Arequipa, he said to me, getting bored with the sheep, I came.)

The networks of reciprocity around which the economy is organized in the Andes meant that where families were numerous and parents could not support all the children, they would entrust their upbringing to relatives or godparents, often already living in the city (Alberti & Maya 1974). This is the experience of Juana, a young woman from Chumbivilcas, Cusco, who is still bewildered that her mother should not have wanted to bring her up and sent her to live with an aunt in Arequipa:

No sé por qué mi papá me trajo...siempre me criaba con mis tías, mi mamá no quería vivir conmigo... Nunca he vivido con mis padres, quería vivir al lado de mi mamá.

(I don't know why my father brought me...I was always brought up by my aunts, my mother didn't want to live with me... I've never lived with my parents, I wanted to live at my mother's side.)

In Andean society, a widow or an orphan is seen as the epitome of poverty and the death of a parent, abandonment of the family by one of the heads of household or remarriage leave children to fend for themselves or in the hands of sometimes unwilling relatives, godparents or step-parents (Degregori, Blondet & Lynch 1986:68). Magdalena from Lampa, Puno, was the penultimate of ten children whose mother died

when she was three, leaving her in the care of an elder brother and his wife. However, her sister-in-law overworked her and when it came to her sister's notice, she took five year old Magdalena to work in a house in Arequipa:

Tenía una cuñada que me tenía levantada a las tres o cuatro, para traer leña, para cocinar, así, mi hermana se enteró, ni mi mamá la tenía trabajando así, dijo, entonces me trajo.

(I had a sister-in-law who had me up at three or four, to fetch wood, to cook and so on, but my sister found out, not even our mother had her working like that she said, so she brought me [here].)

The geography and climate of the Andean region, where only 4.5 per cent of land is suitable for cultivation, posed further problems to production and all members of the family were expected to contribute to the struggle to wrest a living from the hostile environment. María Carmen recalls the toil and labour of her childhood in the sierra of Puno and her desire to escape the drudgery:

Hacemos turnos con mis hermanos, unas semanas en pastear vacas, otra semana ovejas, otra en la casa ayudando... Mucho trabajo en la chacra, tenemos que levantarnos temprano, cocinar almuerzo, tenemos que irnos rápido a llevar el ganado...tarde regresamos, mucho trabajo, para salir de eso (me he venido).

(My brothers and sisters and I used to take it in turns, some weeks pasturing the cows, another week with the sheep, another helping in the house... It's hard work in the fields, we have to get up early, cook the lunch, we have to go out quickly to take the cattle...we come back late, it's a lot of work, I came to get away from that.)

Lack of employment and education prospects

As industrial development was concentrated on the coast, the sierra offered few other occupational activities outside farming apart from craftwork or commerce. Changes in commercial circuits affected people's economic activity as in the case of Leonora, from Melgar, Puno, whose family used to take cheese, wheat and meat to Cusco and bring back fruit and coca. She relates how laws were introduced to control the trade in coca which restricted their source of income and, with neither land nor livestock, they had no other means of subsistence in the sierra and were obliged to migrate:

Ya no dejaban pasar la coca, controlada ya, ya no teníamos trabajo, pagábamos multa...no hay casi vida en la sierra, no teníamos ganado, nada, nada.

(They wouldn't let the coca through anymore, by then it was controlled, so then we had no work, we had to pay a fine...there's hardly any living [to be made] in the sierra, we didn't have any livestock, nothing at all.)

The sierra could offer neither educational nor employment prospects and education ranks high on the list of motives for migration. Migrants complain of a lack of opportunity to study in the sierra, either because they have to work from very young, because they are orphans whose relatives or guardians refused to finance their education or because the schools are scarce and poorly staffed. Women are frequently denied the chance to study since it is deemed superfluous to the work they are required to do at home: 'a las mujeres casi no nos han puesto en el colegio, a los hombres no más' ('they hardly put us women in school, only the men'). Leonora's mother died

when she was twelve and her aunt prevented her from educating herself:

Triste era, para eso no sé leer, quién me iba a sostener, tenía que trabajar para mis hermanos... Mi tía no quería, para qué necesitan eso, nos decía. Del queso que vendimos compramos cuadernitos, lapizeros, a escondidas, pero mi tía los encontró, quemó la bolsa. Una semanita hemos ido, discutía con la señorita, decía la tía es una vieja mala, mejor no vienen.

(It was sad, that's why I don't know how to write, who was going to support me, I had to work for my brothers and sisters... My aunt was against it, what do you need that for, she said to us. From the cheese we sold we bought exercise books, pens, in secret, but my aunt found them and burnt the bag. We went for just one week, but she argued with the teacher who said, your aunt is a wicked old woman, you'd better not come.)

Education may be inaccessible to those who live a long walk from the school and have no means of transport. Jacinta, from one of Arequipa's rural areas, La Joya, relates that this was the reason her parents sent her to study in the city:

Allá había colegio pero muy lejos, no había movilidad, había carro pero se malograba. Mi papá decía van a sufrir, mejor vayan a Arequipa.

(There was a school out there, but a long way off, there was no transport, there was a bus but it kept breaking down. My father said, you're going to suffer, you'd better go to Arequipa.)

The notion that education is better in Arequipa is part of the myth of the superiority of the city which prevails amongst Andean people. Migrants, like Rocío, from a highland village of Cailloma, complain that schooling in the sierra is of poor quality and teaching standards are low since the teachers are sent out from the city, frequently fail to adjust

to the area, dislike the countryside and spend long weekends back in Arequipa.¹³

Allá tienen profesores, pero enseñaban dos días a la semana no más, viajaban de Arequipa el martes, miércoles y jueves no más enseñaban, viernes vuelto vinieron a Arequipa... Entonces los padres se veían obligados a traer los niños acá para estudiar.

(Back there they've got teachers, but they only teach two days a week, they'd travel from Arequipa on Tuesday, they'd only teach Wednesday and Thursday, Friday they came back again to Arequipa... So then parents found themselves obliged to bring the children here to study.)

University education is only available in the towns and departmental capitals, so if people want their children to pursue higher education they either have to lodge them in the city or move the whole family to the town, as Valeriano Abancay, Apurímac, relates:

La educación en mi tierra en caso de superación no hay, solamente tenemos así que cumplir secundaria y salir a una ciudad y no tenemos casa donde poder hospedarse para poder superarse.

(Education in my village, as far as advancement is concerned, it doesn't exist, we just have to finish secondary school and go to a town, and we don't have a house to stay in so that we can progress.)

As well as education, migrants find health services to be superior in the city, and the lower altitude is favourable to those with certain medical conditions. The 'bright lights' phenomenon, the attraction of the activity and bustle of the city is low on the list of motives, but some, like Esmeralda

¹³ This criticism is unfair since it is an institutional problem rather than one of poor standards, teachers being forced to go and work in the sierra before they can obtain a post in the town.

admit that they wanted to wear city clothes and discover city ways:

Vine porque...no me gustaba ropa de bayeta, me gustaba otra idea, siempre soñaba con ponerme ropa de paño, siempre soñaba con venir a vivir en la ciudad.

(I came because...I didn't like homespun woollen cloth, I liked a different style, I always dreamt of wearing clothes made of fabric, I always dreamt of coming to live in the city.)

In the last decade, an additional motive for migration from the sierra has been the terrorist activity of *Sendero Luminoso* (the Shining Path)¹⁴, who launched a 'People's War' in May 1980 to bring down the Peruvian state and establish a social order like that in China in the fifties and sixties. Valeriano relates how he was forced to leave his property in Abancay on account of *Sendero*:

Ha sido un sitio así un poco problemático en caso de los terroristas ¿no? que bastante nos ha fastidiado aquellos dos años atrás... Yo tenía propiedad, una pequeña hacienda de los tiempos de mis padres...a mi me estaban fastidiando por tener una pertenencia grande.

(It's been a bit of a problematic place in the case of the terrorists, you know, who troubled us quite a lot those last couple of years... I had a property, a little hacienda from the time of my parents...they were hassling me for owning something big.)

Whether the stated aim is to escape the terrorists or poverty, the recurrent theme running through the migrants' accounts is that of *superación* (progress): the desire to overcome their lot and improve their standard of living.

¹⁴ Frequently referred to as *Sendero*, the group's full title is *Por el Sendero Luminoso de Mariátegui*, meaning 'In the Shining Path of Mariátegui', Mariátegui being hailed as the founder of Peruvian socialism.

2.2. Urbanization and Industrialization

Whilst the rural society of the sierra was entering crisis due to the stagnation of highland agriculture, overdue agrarian reform and overpopulation, the urban centres and plantations of the coast expanded rapidly through the 1950s and 1960s. Peru's traditional export orientation, dependence on foreign capital and markets, and the concentration of the export oligarchy in Lima all contributed to the preferential development of the capital and the northern coast relative to the interior and prompted mass rural-urban migration.¹⁵

In the 1950s, although Peru's petroleum production and wool trade slumped, cotton, sugar and minerals continued to be in high demand until the sixties, when foreign investment in mining declined after a tax increase in 1964 and exports of sugar and cotton fell as rising internal demand required plantations to be switched to food crops. The vast cotton and sugar *latifundios* (large estates) were located on the coast, where rice, beans and other food staples were also grown and unlike Andean agriculture, they were expanded by investment in large-scale irrigation, modern technology and mechanization.

Highlanders had long followed a pattern of seasonal migration to the coast to supplement their paltry living, but by 1940 the flourishing coastal estates had to recruit labour from the sierra, encouraging the rural-urban drift. On the

¹⁵ My main source of details of economic developments is Thorp & Bertram (1978).

south coast of Arequipa, Flor de María relates how they used to go from Puno to work on the rice and bean fields of Camaná:

En ese entonces venía mucha gente de Puno en julio, agosto, para la cosecha de frejoles o arroz. Venían familias enteras...pusieron sus esteras alrededor de la cancha de fútbol... Después de la cosecha se íban de nuevo a sus pueblos.

(At that time a lot of people came from Puno in July and August, for the bean and rice harvest. Whole families came...they set up their shacks of matting round the football ground... After the harvest they went back to their villages again.)

The emphasis on exports has bound the Peruvian economy to foreign markets, preventing it from developing autonomously to the benefit of local producers (Pike 1967:290). The depression in the 1930s and subsequent slump in foreign manufacturing industry during World War II provided an incentive for the Peruvian manufacturing industry and saw the incursion of local entrepreneurs in mining, rubber and fishing. However, these periods of independent domestic development were shortlived and the economy rapidly reverted to foreign control. Foreign firms continued to dominate both mineral production and the southern agro-industry and returned to the fore in the period of international industrial expansion and reconstruction after World War II and the Korean War. From 1948 to 1956, the military government of general Manuel A. Odría initiated a new era of 'laissez-faire export-led growth', consolidating the position of the export oligarchy and creating the freest system of trade exchange in Latin America (Thorp & Bertram 1978:205).

The promotion of free trade with the US was detrimental to the internal market and economic recession, unemployment and social unrest were the heritage of Odría's emphasis on exports, requiring the development of import-substituting industry to stimulate internal economic growth. The manufacturing sector expanded and diversified in the late fifties and, though still dominated by the elite and foreign firms, an industrial expansion law in 1959 aided the emergence of new industrial entrepreneurs from the urban middle classes. Nevertheless, production was capital intensive and concentrated in Lima, providing employment for only a small proportion of the working population.

The sector of most outstanding growth, and which attracted most Andean migrants, was the fishing industry which responded to a world demand for fishmeal-based fertilizers and animal feed. The fishing boom peaked in the mid-sixties, making Peru the world's largest fishing nation in terms of volume, accounting for half the world trade (Dobyns & Doughty 1976:225-6). Thereafter it grew at a decreasing rate until it fell into decline in 1971, due partly to overfishing as a result of government failure to impose controls, and partly to natural disaster.¹⁶

The industry had important socio-economic repercussions, both in breaking the monopoly of the export oligarchy through

¹⁶ Fish and seabird mortality resulted when the freak warm water current, *El Niño*, entered the cold Humboldt stream where anchovy thrive.

the incursion of local middle-class entrepreneurs and in accelerating internal migration. Rural migrants, finding that the slump in cotton and sugar exports had reduced the demand for their seasonal labour, headed for the fishing ports like Chimbote, which rapidly grew from a small fishing village to the largest fishing port in the world.

The slump in exports strengthened demands to develop an independent domestic economy which, together with pressure for agrarian and industrial reform, prompted Velasco's coup in October 1968, installing the Revolutionary Government of the Armed Forces. Velasco introduced a series of reforms to reduce foreign domination and internal inequality by widening ownership and control (Cotler 1975; Lowenthal 1975:4). The State adopted a more interventionist role in the economy, administering agro-industrial enterprises and investing in infrastructure. Industrial reform encouraged local investment and enabled the emergence of new entrepreneurial groups through the nationalization of foreign and private businesses, thus marginalizing many of the old elite families. In the factories, labour-management relations were revolutionized with profit-sharing incentives and the incorporation of workers on the directing boards. Education reform promoted bilingual education, Quechua was awarded official status and provision was made for the diffusion of indigenous cultural expressions by the media (Drysdale & Myers 1975).

However, after an initial period of growth, Peru was back in the throes of economic crisis in the 1970s, owing to the lack of internal resources for the government's ambitious projects for industry, mining and irrigation, the withdrawal of private investment from businesses hostile to the reforms and the 1973 world oil crisis causing export prices to plummet. The efforts to increase Peru's economic autonomy only involved it more closely with the world economy as exports had to be increased to pay off imported industrial machinery and the foreign debt which doubled between 1972 and 1975. Popular discontent manifest itself in Lima and Velasco was toppled by general Francisco Morales Bermúdez in August 1975 (Reid 1985:63).

In the midst of a world recession, the country crippled by falling commodity prices and excessive foreign borrowing, Morales reversed Velasco's reforms and economic policy with a set of stabilization programmes designed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Production fell as state investment and subsidies were slashed, wages dropped and inflation rose. Unemployment increased and the informal sector swelled with people making their living as *ambulantes* (street vendors), taxi drivers, shoe shiners, car washers and beggars. Violent protests and strikes from labour and shanty town organizations demanded a return to democracy, granted with the election of Belaúnde in 1980.

2.3. Social Policies and the Urban Popular Sectors

The socio-economic changes occurring in Peru from the 1940s effected changes in the highly unequal political structure. After decades of dictatorships, the end of World War II contributed towards a pro-democratic atmosphere in Peru. The old oligarchic system was challenged on the one hand by the rural sectors where peasant mobilization was stimulated by new political parties, rising levels of education and the anti-oligarchic movements in which APRA participated, and on the other hand by the urban popular sectors, expanded by rural-urban migration (Bourricaud 1970).

In view of the increasing politicization of the popular sectors, members of the oligarchy and political parties sought to co-opt the urban popular sectors by extending support to the *pueblos jóvenes*. Collier (1975:134; 1976:4) argues that the support of the Peruvian State and elite encouraged internal migration and large-scale settlement formation in Lima.

Odría was the first to show a major interest in the migrant settlements.¹⁷ He aimed to win over the urban poor with paternalistic social welfare programmes, charity and gifts designed to undermine political demand-making by organized groups and unions backed by APRA. He worked on a

¹⁷ Prior to Odría, on 24 December 1945, it is believed Pedro Beltrán, to become Prado's minister of the treasury and defender of the rich and managerial classes, sponsored the invasion of Ciudad de Dios, one of the largest invasions in Peru's history.

patron-client model, extending services and protection to the squatters in exchange for their political support in mass demonstrations and elections and settlements were named after people or events associated with the regime. The government would tolerate the invasion of certain lands but land titles were rarely granted in order to keep the people dependent on the president-patron, in what Stepan (1978:164) describes as a situation of 'institutionalized illegality'.

Opposition political parties began to recognize the political leverage to be obtained from the urban poor and, as discontent with Odría's regime grew, others began to intervene in the encouragement of squatter settlements. Following Odría, Manuel Prado Ugarteche (1956-62) promised a programme of *techo y tierra* ('roof and land') to provide housing and land for the needy, but emphasized self-help under the motto of *casa propia* ('a house of your own'), as did Belaúnde after him, encouraging self-help efforts in the provinces under the banner *el pueblo lo hizo* ('the people did it'). Belaúnde believed state expenditure on low-cost urban housing would only attract more migrants to the cities and favoured rural development projects, aimed at reducing reliance on the central state and shifting blame for Peru's centralism from Lima's oligarchy to provincial apathy. Belaúnde introduced grandiose projects for city planning, road building and housing schemes for the middle classes but none for the urban poor.

It was the military who made the most active response to the demands of the popular rural and urban sectors in order to allay unrest and divert their revolutionary potential. Between the governments of Prado and Belaúnde, the military regime of general Ricardo Pérez Godoy (1962-3) emphasized the self-help potential of the squatter settlements but at the same time increased state support. He passed the first 'Law of the *Barriadas*' and founded urban planning and housing institutes.¹⁸

The military's growing concern with the potential threat of violence in the shanty towns was evidenced by Velasco's immediate concern to improve the conditions of the urban poor (Díetz 1980). Velasco formed the Organismo Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblos Jóvenes (ONDEPJOV: 'National Organism for the Development of the *Pueblos Jóvenes*') in consultation with Lima's Bishop Bambarén who worked in the squatter settlements encouraging self-help action rather than a reliance on sporadic, paternalistic government programmes and believed the *barriadas* were positive responses by poor migrants to the crisis of rapid urbanization (Collier 1975:144-5; Van Garderen 1989:27-8). ONDEPJOV aimed to encourage and coordinate the local initiative and enterprise of the *pueblos jóvenes* as part of a government plan for a

¹⁸ These were the Instituto Nacional de Planificación and the Junta Nacional de la Vivienda. He also founded the Banco de la Vivienda to extend low-interest credit for the purchase of inexpensive housing and building materials.

comprehensive, national organization that could link every settlement to the State and involve the people in their own socio-economic development. As opposed to Odría's paternalistic relationship with the popular sectors, Velasco sought to reduce radicalization and attacks on private property and the socio-economic order by incorporating squatters into new legal arrangements in which benefits such as land titles were to be derived from membership in state institutions (Stepan 1978:164).

For two years there were no new invasions until the massive Pamplona invasion of May 1971.¹⁹ This indicated that the regime's receptive policy to squatters had only increased the rate of rural-urban migration without supplying solutions to the dire economic conditions and unemployment. There were numerous demonstrations of popular discontent throughout 1971 and in June of that year the Sistema de Apoyo a la Movilización Social (SINAMOS: National System to Support Social Mobilization) was created to increase government control of the popular sectors.

SINAMOS was intended to transfer decision-making from central government to the local level, linking the state and the people, channelling popular demands and weakening other forms of expression. ONDEPJOV was absorbed into SINAMOS, which

¹⁹ The invasion covered a wide area of both public and private land and involved thousands of settlers who were evicted by the police after a violent struggle and moved to the government appointed site of Villa El Salvador. Its history is documented by Blondet (1991).

was to continue the former's work of encouraging self-help in the *pueblos jóvenes*. However, many accused SINAMOS of crushing rather than fomenting local initiative, partly because of military involvement in its activities and administration. This tightening of control by the government was met with increasing hostility and SINAMOS was disbanded by Morales in 1978.

2.4. The Contemporary Situation: 1980-90

Belaúnde continued Morales' reversal of Velasco's efforts to promote state-supported, import-substituting industry and restored traditional raw material exports. After initial moderate growth, foreign investment diminished in 1982 as the world economy plunged Peru back into recession by 1983: production was at a standstill and agriculture, afflicted by natural disaster, was stagnant; inflation rose exorbitantly,²⁰ wages dropped and the foreign debt increased dramatically. The *El Niño* current brought flooding to the northern coast, destroying the cotton crop and causing landslides in the Andes, while the south was hit by severe drought, continuing the steady flow of rural-urban migration despite the crisis in the cities.

By April 1985, the economic crisis and public hostility virtually paralysed the government and elections were called.

²⁰ Inflation rose from 61% in 1980 to 125% in 1983 and to 163% in 1985.

These were carried by APRA, led by Alan García Pérez, who had witnessed the failure of the IMF stabilization packages since 1976 and instead implemented a reactivation strategy: he restricted payment of the foreign debt to 10 per cent of export earnings, raised prices of basic commodities and wages and then froze them for 100 days to reduce inflation, provided subsidies to boost production, cut interest rates to encourage investment and froze the exchange rate to lower inflation and provide stability for exporters.

For two years his economic strategy seemed to be effective: GNP and real wages rose, unemployment and inflation were down and the currency stabilized. However, the success was short-lived and by 1987 there was a lack of investment in industry as a result of falling tax revenues given the increasing informalization of the economy, a growing public sector deficit and the reluctance of the major industrial and financial concerns to invest in the context of instability generated by guerrilla insurgency, price freezes, García's populist rhetoric and the weakness of the right. García interpreted this as an investment strike by the oligarchy and on 28 July 1987 nationalized the banks.

This proved a disastrous move, provoking an outcry from the right and over the next year there was a total collapse in investment and a high rate of capital flight. In December 1987, the currency was devalued by 50 per cent to foment exports and currency reserves, production fell and inflation

rose to 660 per cent in 1988 and 3,399 per cent in 1989. In an attempt to control inflation, in September 1988, García delivered the first of a series of *paquetazos*, as his stabilization packages came to be called, and this was met with strikes and street protests. The *paquetazos* continued to fall throughout 1989 as the crisis continued and public unrest, political and criminal violence escalated.

Under the military regime the revolutionary left had grown rapidly and peasant, trade union and shanty town organizations had become increasingly radical. Through the eighties, the influence of the left manifest itself in peasant land invasions and general strikes in urban areas. When APRA came to power in 1986, García attempted to by-pass existing neighbourhood organizations by introducing various government programmes into the *pueblos jóvenes*. He launched Programas de Ingreso Temporal (PAIT: 'Programmes of Temporary Income'), public works schemes designed to provide a temporary minimum wage to *pobladores*, especially those expressing APRA sympathies who were then used to disrupt rival meetings at election time.

In the countryside he met with leaders of villages and peasant communities to discuss problems and promised technological aid and credit. He also endeavoured to establish good communication with the people by television appearances, visits to markets and shanties, and speeches made from the

balcony of the presidential palace (which came to be known ironically as *balconazos* in a play on *paquetazo*).

However, people were wary of the government initiatives in the *pueblos jóvenes*, alert to the fickleness of politicians who sought out their votes with offers of aid but rapidly abandoned them. People felt stunned by the succession of *paquetazos*, disenchanted with the corruption at the core of their society and disillusioned with García. In Arequipa, a sense of betrayal is expressed by migrants, Angel and Wilfredo:

Dos años perfecto, ahora está contra la gente pobre... Entró con buenas intenciones, no ha sabido cumplir, ha decepcionado... Nos está engañando...nos ha mandado a la quiebra, nos ha llevado a la crisis... nos está matando de hambre.

(For two years he was perfect, now he's against the poor people... He came in with good intentions, he hasn't known how to carry them through, he's disappointed... He's cheating us...he's sent us to ruin, he's brought us to crisis...he's starving us.)

The *pobladores* feel that the State has always neglected the most needy and failed to support peasants and the urban popular sectors, forcing them to act on their own initiative, as another migrant, Miriam, comments:

Bueno, el Estado nada apoya, claro, anteriormente en aquellos años nos ha apoyado el Estado... El pueblo es el que tiene que hacer un sacrificio para hacer cualquier obra, asfalto, colegios, cuotas por acá, por allá, todo tiene que salir del bolsillo del poblador.

(Well, the State doesn't give any support, of course, previously, in other years the State supported us... The people are the ones who have to make a sacrifice to get any job done, tarmac, schools, quotas here, there and everywhere, it all has to come out of the settler's pocket.)

In the municipal elections of November 1989, APRA's popularity reached an all-time low and the right returned to the fore, represented by the coalition of the Frente Democrático (FREDEMO: 'Democratic Front') led by Mario Vargas Llosa who seemed assured of victory in the general elections of April 1990. In the event, the elections took a surprise turn with the meteoric rise of Cambio-90 ('Change-90') and Alberto Fujimori, elected president in the second round. Fujimori was an independent at a time when the Indian and *mestizo* majority of the Peruvian public were disillusioned with the established parties of the 'white' upper and middle classes and fearful of Vargas Llosa's neo-liberal programme which promised an economic 'shock' policy. As it is, Fujimori has had to implement a similarly drastic set of measures to combat the crisis he inherited.

I have shown in this section how a number of socio-economic and political factors have led to the stagnation of agriculture in the sierra and the industrialization of coastal and urban areas, stimulating mass rural-urban migration in the last fifty years. I have indicated how first the reactionary oligarchy and then the revolutionary government of Velasco contributed to this process with their social policies in the shanty towns, provoking or facilitating the emergence of the urban popular sectors.

In order to inform my understanding of the relationship between socio-economic and cultural change, I looked at a

range of disciplines within the social sciences which would enable me to draw together and compare various themes: social anthropology, sociolinguistics, cultural studies and communication studies. I will now give an overview of the discourses derived from these schools of thought which have been used to explain the effects of urbanization on rural migrants and the socio-cultural interchange taking place.

3. Theoretical Background

3.1. The Mass Society Debate

One of the most influential discourses which has dominated both analytic and popular discussion of cultural change in modern urban society is that of mass society theory which postulates breakdown in the cultural, political and social spheres. It dates back to eighteenth century Europe, when members of the urban elite began to fear that the mass production and dissemination of commercial culture would debase traditional cultural values, be they of the rural 'folk tradition' or of urban 'high culture'. In the political arena, wider emancipation and the incorporation of the masses within the formal processes of government posed a threat to elite rule. In the social field, the erosion of the primary group through the dissolution of kinship ties and traditional rural forms of social relationships was to result in the loss of 'the community', giving rise to a volatile and ill-organized

mass of rootless and alienated individuals, vulnerable to mobilization by powerful groups.²¹

The most influential voices in the mass society debate were those of the Frankfurt School, founded in the 1920s and dominated by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse, who formulated a 'pessimistic' theory of socio-political disintegration.²² Whilst the elites felt threatened by the incursion of the masses onto territories they had hitherto monopolized, the Frankfurt School perceived dangers for the individuals subject to the depersonalizing power of remote and interdependent social institutions and subordinate to a meaningless routine of work and leisure. They speculated that individuality would be suppressed as the human being was engulfed by the apparatus of production and bureaucratic administration which would inculcate a 'one-dimensional' pattern of thought and behaviour (Marcuse 1964). Separated from the traditional controls and sanctions of religion and community, the masses were believed to be helpless, unorganized and without political direction and therefore susceptible to manipulation by the ruling classes.²³

²¹ On mass society theory see: Bramson 1961; Bell 1962; Kornhauser 1972; Giner 1976; McQuail 1987.

²² See Jay (1973) for a comprehensive history of the Frankfurt School. Also the respective works of Adorno & Horkheimer (1972) and Marcuse (1964).

²³ This argument was put forward by C. Wright Mills (1951, 1956) who demonstrated that the internal fragmentation of the mass of 'white collar' workers called forth a power elite to direct and control them.

The mass media were believed to be at the service of a remote but powerful elite and at the same time, the upper classes saw the media to be the disseminators of degrading 'mass culture', commercially produced for the urban market and posing a threat to 'high culture' (Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982; Hall 1982). In both cases, the individual was seen as weak and defenceless, subject to an all-powerful social structure and its institutions.

3.2. Urbanization: Disintegration or Integration?

Social Breakdown

The notion of the destructive impact of urbanization on rural society was developed by sociologists and anthropologists.²⁴

In the USA, Louis Wirth put forward a theory of 'urbanism as a way of life' which predicted:

the substitution of secondary for primary contacts, the weakening of bonds of kinship, the declining social significance of the family, the disappearance of the neighbourhood and the undermining of the traditional basis of social solidarity. (1938:21)

In anthropology, Robert Redfield (1941, 1947) developed the folk-urban continuum which predicted the increasing disorganization, secularization and individualization of society as it proceeded from the primitive rural community to the modern city. It was assumed a priori that urbanization would cause not only the breakdown of 'community' but also the

²⁴ For a bibliography of urban anthropology see Gutkind (1973).

erosion of cultural differences. Ethnicity, conceived to coincide with small and relatively isolated groups, was forecast to diminish as people moved to conglomerations of more complex socio-political systems in which economic class factors would sweep away the customs and creeds on which ethnicity was believed to depend.²⁵ This vision was translated into the metaphor of urban society as a 'melting pot' in which peoples of diverse backgrounds would renounce their distinctive cultural characteristics and seeking membership of the urban society, would merge into a homogeneous group sharing a single national culture (Epstein 1978:3).

The transition was not expected to be easy and problems were predicted both for the migrants and the society into which they were moving.²⁶ In Latin America, socio-economic problems arose from the disparity between the rate of industrialization and that of urbanization (Hauser 1963:201-7) but these were projected onto problems of a personal nature. Most notably, Oscar Lewis's theory of the 'culture of poverty' ascribed certain personality traits to the urban poor.²⁷ He

²⁵ See Hechter 1974:151-78; Bell 1975:143; Glazer & Moynihan 1975:7; Isaacs 1975:32; Rex 1986:69.

²⁶ Conflict was believed to arise from the migrants' difficult mental, social and economic adjustment to the urban milieu, the stability of which was to be further disrupted by the persistence of rural customs and the 'backwardness' of the peasant mentality (Handlin 1959; Matos Mar 1968).

²⁷ See Lewis 1959, 1961, 1966; also Patch 1967. This thesis has received widespread criticism, for example see Mangin 1965; Burke Leacock 1971; Leeds 1971.

argued that those living in wretched and overcrowded conditions, not integrated into the wider institutions of society and unbound by communal or associational ties beyond the basic family unit, demonstrated a propensity to extreme and erratic behaviour, oscillating between violence and apathy. Abject poverty was assumed to lead to degeneracy and crime and disillusionment was believed to foment resentment which would be channelled into political radicalism (Nelson 1969).

In Peru as elsewhere, the slums and squatter settlements were imagined to be breeding grounds for crime, delinquency, prostitution, family breakdown, mental illness, alcoholism and drug abuse. The middle classes envisaged the migrants to be apathetic and withdrawn, taking refuge from an alien environment in the 'Indian' habits of chewing coca and consuming large quantities of *chicha* (a fermented maize drink) (Mangin 1967:65-98).

Maintenance of Community

Contesting the simplistic notions of social breakdown, ethnographers began to describe the continuity of family and community cohesion in the city.²⁸ Squatter settlements were presented as transplants of rural communities in an urban

²⁸ Many (ironically including Lewis) demonstrated the persistence of the extended family networks of peasant societies through comparisons of the community of origin and that established in the city. See Lewis 1965, 1973; Beals 1967; King 1967; Butterworth 1970; Mangin 1970a-d.

setting, the strength of informal institutions was displayed and the role of various migrant associations in aiding adaptation to the urban environment was emphasized.²⁹ The evidence that people were still bound by personal ties and dependency networks countered the thesis that urban society was composed of isolated and therefore vulnerable individuals. Contrary to the homogenization expected to occur as traditional cultural traits were renounced in urban society, empiricists found that ethnic differences persisted: as Glazer and Moynihan (1970:xcviii) observe, 'the point about the melting pot...is that it did not happen'.

The persistence of ethnic differences in spite of cultural change, pointed to the operation of factors other than cultural traits in the constitution of ethnic identities. In the discussion of culture and ethnicity in the social science literature, ethnic group has commonly been equated with culture and culture reduced to identifiable cultural traits.³⁰ In nineteenth century comparative anthropology, culture was understood to refer to a whole and distinctive way

²⁹ Examples of works demonstrating the cohesion of communities in the US are: Whyte's study of an Italian community in Cornerville (1943), Gans' study of the Boston slums (1962). Studies of migrant associations include: Mangin 1959, 1973; Little 1965; Abu-Lughod 1967; Meillassoux 1968; Doughty 1970.

³⁰ On the history of the concept of 'culture' see Wagner (1975:21-3), Williams (1981:10-13).

of life.³¹ The early ethnographers sought to document the entire range of activities of primitive peoples organized into tribal groups. The tribe thus came to be defined in terms of common primordial links, genealogy and somatic characteristics (skin colour, hair texture, phenotype) and inherited cultural values (language, social organization, customs, beliefs) and a relationship was established between race, culture and language (Boas 1940; Park 1950).

Fried (1975) debunked the myth of the 'pristine tribe' thus defined, demonstrating the variability of each of these characteristics and the impossibility of using any of them to reach a universally applicable definition of tribe. Nevertheless, these broad defining features, established at birth were transferred to early definitions of the ethnic group.³²

The evidence that ethnic identities persisted even where cultural traits or languages disappeared in modern urban society brought into question the process by which a collective ethnic identity is generated in interaction with other groups in contemporary social, economic and political circumstances (Glazer & Moynihan 1975:3-4). From the premise that cultural traits were results rather than defining

³¹ Jenkins (1986) gives a historical review of socio-anthropological models of ethnicity.

³² Glazer & Moynihan (1975:1-21) give a historical survey of the usage of the term 'ethnicity'. On the relationship between ethnicity and tribe see: Van den Berghe 1974a:5; Jackson 1974:50-64.

characteristics of ethnicity, which rather depended on a sense of belonging attaching individuals to a collective, Barth (1969) proposed the notion of 'ethnic boundaries' to denote an imaginary line dividing one group from another and depending not on 'cultural' differences but on the way members see themselves as distinct from other groupings and are perceived by those others to be so.³³

However, the usage of the term 'boundary' is problematic and has been criticized for reifying ethnic group identity (Cohen 1978:386-7; Jenkins 1986:175). Since boundary is a topographical metaphor, it recalls notions of territory, evoking something physical and tangible which can literally be erected, knocked down and rebuilt. It is more apt to consider the constitution of ethnic identity in the interaction between different social actors rather than across or within 'boundaries'.

If ethnicity depends on interaction then it can be assumed to shift with the changing contexts in which the interaction takes place (Mitchell 1966). The emphasis is not then on the forms of ethnic groups and relations but on the 'processes involved in generating and maintaining ethnic groups' (Barth 1969:10). Not only the immediate context of the interaction but also the wider context of the whole socio-

³³ Narrol (1964) had signalled the ascription of group membership as one of the defining features of what he described as the 'cultunit' and this is developed by Barth (1969:10-13). See also Glazer & Moynihan 1975:15; Horowitz 1975:113; Parsons 1975:53; Giddens 1989:243.

economic and political system in which it is inserted and its history must be taken into account in order to understand the power relations involved in the way people ascribe identities to themselves and others (Cole and Wolf 1974; Parsons 1975:60).

In the seventies and eighties, more attention was given to people's motives in making a particular identification.³⁴ It is not merely a case of recognizing that people ascribe identity to themselves but that they deem it worth making what Wallman (1986) refers to as an 'identity investment'. These investments may match economic or political interests where there is a tangible struggle for power in the furtherance of collective interests, but they may not have any visible purpose or expression and rather be propelled by an affective tie (Epstein 1978:93). In either case, power relations are central to the generation of ethnic identities, for any form of ascription relies on the power of one group to pin labels to another.

3.3. Historical Perspective of Cultural Interaction in Peru **Acculturation**

The discourses of cultural interaction in Peru are grounded in the history of conquest and colonization, in which context acculturation is understood to be the substitution of the

³⁴ See for example: Siskind 1973; Cohen 1974; Glazer & Moynihan 1975; Stocks 1978; Fock 1981; Whitten 1981.

indigenous culture by the Spanish (Simmons 1952). The destructive impact of the conquest and subsequent process of conversion and colonization modified indigenous cultures but there is a history of resistance preventing any simple substitution of the autochthonous by the European.

However, the confrontation of the Spaniards with the indigenous peoples of Peru did lead to a conceptual dichotomization of society in the opposition between Hispanic dominators and dominated natives. Pre-Columbian Peru was inhabited by a diversity of ethnic groups but, as has been noted for other societies (Kolig 1977; Davison 1987), where there is a sudden encounter with a whole new society, there is a tendency for the variety of ethnic units to be considered as an ethnic aggregate in which the identity of one is generalized as the identity of all. Hence, for the invading Spaniards, the diversity of indigenous peoples was dwarfed by the overwhelming differences between themselves and the native inhabitants. The Andean peoples were subsumed into a category of 'the indigenous' and labelled 'Quechua', it being the most dominant linguistic group although neither universal nor uniform.³⁵ The central issue of this dualist concept, which

³⁵ There were three main pre-conquest languages: Quechua, Proto Jaqui/Aru and Puquina: see Mason 1963; Klein & Stark 1985. On the adoption of Quechua as the lingua franca by the Spaniards see Cerrón Palomino 1982:107-8; Hardman 1985:628. There are many Amazonian languages, but Quechua and Aymara (a Jaqui language) have the largest speaking communities in contemporary Peru: see Albó 1974; Miracle 1983; Escobar 1972; Harvey 1987. Furthermore, there are two varieties of Quechua spoken in different regions of Peru: see Torero 1972; Parker

still prevails as a discursive category, is that of the unequal power relations established through conquest and colony and maintained in contemporary Peru. Accordingly, the term 'internal colonization' has been proposed as a more exact representation of Peruvian society (Matos Mar 1968:169, 1983:19-72, 1984:25-40; Cotler 1983; Mannheim 1985).

Integration

Rather than the replacement of the indigenous by the Spanish there occurred a synthesis, both in terms of racial miscegenation (the vast majority of Peru's population today being *mestizo*) and cultural mixing. However, whilst as a cultural concept, *mestizaje* suggests an uncomplicated syncretization, it is by no means uniform across Peruvian society where social meaning is attached to cultural categories. People are still classified on the basis of the indigenous/Hispanic dichotomy although, as Fuenzalida (1969) shows for Peru and Friedlander for Mexico (1975), after four centuries of the mixing of the Hispanic and the native, many cultural traits classified as indigenous are in fact of Spanish origin.

The recognition of the persistence of ethnic difference in twentieth century Peru led intellectuals in the 1960s and 1970s to coin the term 'cultural pluralism' to describe Peruvian society (Matos Mar 1983). Furnivall (1939) defined a

1972.

plural society as one in which different ethnic groups are incorporated under the umbrella of the State and converge in the marketplace, but in which diversity is continued in religious, cultural and domestic areas of life. However, pluralism is a problematic concept which evokes the harmonious co-existence of different groups and ignores the unequal power relations which separate them.³⁶

Pluralism was developed by North American social scientists in the fifties and sixties to counter the theories of social disintegration and ethnic group eradication. They argued for the possibility of cultural integration into a pluralist society in which a broad-based consensus of cultural norms was assumed to prevail throughout society and which would absorb the divergent cultures flowing into it. Pluralists visualized society to be a complex of competing groups and interests, none of which is predominant all of the time and in which members of minority groups maintain their independent cultural traditions (Gurevitch et al.1982:1; McQuail 1987:86). Pluralism was embraced as the model for worldwide modern society and was influential in US intervention in some developing countries, made in the name of progression towards the pluralistic dream (Hall 1982:60-1).

³⁶ Van den Berghe (1974a:3) points to the precariousness of pluralism since different ethnic groups are held together tenuously by 'a mixture of political coercion and economic exploitation'.

The problem with the notion of the consensus was that it did not simply involve the incorporation of subcultures, but the levelling of cultural differences through the reduction of the minority, and often disadvantaged, groups to the standard set by the dominant sector of society (Hall 1982:62-5; McQuail 1987:92). In Peru, pluralism was combined with the nationalistic aspirations of the *criollo* elite, whose desire for a national identity again implied not a co-existence of cultures, but the assimilation of diverse and disadvantaged groups to the way of life, being and speaking of the economically powerful sector of Peruvian society who model themselves on the USA and Europe and expect the indigenous peoples to emulate them.³⁷

Since pluralism was heralded as the model of modern society, cultural and ethnic diversity pose an obstacle to the forging of a national identity and therefore to the progress of the country.³⁸ In the nineteenth century, the upper classes hoped that the Indians would die out and disappear; in the twentieth century, integration was hailed as a viable

³⁷ Henley (1982:157) defines assimilation as 'a situation in which the members of an indigenous group lose all sense of a common ethnic identity and become immersed in national society as an indistinguishable part of it'.

³⁸ Cotler (1983:167) describes the disarticulation of a socially and regionally divided society, which Matos Mar (1983:68) portrays as a 'social archipelago'. Stutzman (1981:47) on Ecuador and Stein (1985:211-33) on Peru indicate the belief that cultural divisions prevent progress.

alternative to eradicate all trace of indigenous Peru.³⁹ Nevertheless, the discourse of pluralism sometimes reveals itself to be a veneer for the continued belief in the necessary annihilation of the 'Indians'.⁴⁰

Moreover, pluralists believed urbanization to be a positive force in that, by separating the individual from the closed community of the primary group, the possibility of participation in a wider universe is created (Park 1950b, 1952). For Peru, Mangin (1970a) found that although kinship groupings persist in the city, there was more possibility of non-kinship groupings (regional clubs, tenant associations), agreeing with Matos Mar (1968) on the benefits of urbanization in creating a sense of belonging to a national society. Matos Mar (1983:69) believes urbanization can reduce the gulf between the diverse sectors of society through modernization and the standardization of culture.

³⁹ Following the Peruvian defeat in the War of the Pacific (1879-83) it was proposed that had it not been for the exploitation and neglect of the Indians, they could have been incorporated into the war effort and the Chileans defeated, and therefore if duly integrated they could also contribute to the peacetime development of the country (Pike 1967:159).

⁴⁰ One of the radio producers whom I interviewed (see Chapter 4) was of this opinion: 'gente andina, son gente inculta...hay que matar a toda esa gente y empezar de nuevo...este país hay que quemar, es la única forma' ('the Andean people, they're uncultured people...we ought to kill all those people and start over again...we ought to burn this country, it's the only way').

Marginalization

The discourse of marginality was developed to define the 'deviants' who would not conform to the consensus or had not yet been integrated. The term was coined by American sociologists in the 1950s to describe a person crossing a social divide of class or ethnicity and the marginal is thus seen as being in transition between two sectors of society. The onus of integration is either placed on the marginal or on the dominant sector which excludes them from full participation through discrimination and economic disadvantage and consigns them to the margins of society.

For Peru,⁴¹ it is argued that the Andean migrants are not 'on the margin of society, but marginated by the dominant sector' (Cotler 1983:168). The problem lies not in a lack of integration but in the mode of integration, for the Andean population are incorporated in a system of unequal, dependent relations which deny those people access to opportunities and resources (Stein 1985:230).

Marginality has been applied both to people and places. In Peru, the shanty towns are marginal because they are located on the periphery of the city, built on wastelands often invaded illegally and deemed unfit for conventional housing developments, the housing is sub-standard and they lack the basic services. The residents are marginal firstly,

⁴¹ On the concept of marginality in Peru see: Mangin 1970a; Myers 1973; Perlman 1976; Adams 1979; Lloyd 1980; Quijano 1977; Lobo 1982.

because they are migrants and therefore outsiders, conceived to be an ethnic group apart from those of the residential areas and secondly, because they are supposed to be criminals and deviants. Finally, they are on the margins of the economy, both in that they are poor, under-employed and underpaid and in that they form the 'informal economy'.

The informal sector is described by Quijano (1974) and Matos Mar (1984) as the sector marginal to or overflowing from the established economic system, where the unequal and capital-intensive nature of the industrial process prevents the admission of the popular sector, particularly shanty-town dwellers, to a decent standard of living. However, it has been argued that its informality does not make it marginal since, while not completely incorporated into the state-controlled system, it both serves and evades the official formal economy.⁴²

Transculturation

In view of these arguments, studies have sought out empirical evidence of whether rural migrants attempt to assimilate to city life or whether they cling to their 'old ways' (Doughty

⁴² Whilst Gianella (1970) evaluates marginality in Lima according to the level of participation in the economy and in organizations, Mangin (1967:78) argues that migrants participate extensively in the life of the city and do not form a social enclave within it. Lloyd (1980) argues that the self-help housing of the shanties compares favourably with that built by private and public companies. Chávez (1987:19-30) shows how the informal sector is related to the dominant capitalist sector in Arequipa.

1970:33). The pursuit of education, employment and a higher standard of living, the adoption of the Spanish language, 'modern' dress, pop music and television are all assumed to indicate the desire to integrate and to spell the eventual abandonment of indigenous cultural forms. Conversely, the survival of indigenous languages, religious or cultural practice in the city have been supposed to prove the existence of a 'Quechua' or 'Andean sub-culture' (Myers 1973; Adams 1979; Cotler 1983:197-8). The regional associations and the diffusion of Andean music in the city have been presented as vehicles through which native cultures are maintained in the city and through which identities are reaffirmed (Doughty 1970, 1972; Escobar 1983). On the other hand, it is argued that the attempts to revive Andean music or dancing are confined to intellectuals, whilst the migrants themselves exhibit no desire to create a counter-culture but seek to immerse themselves in 'westernized culture' (Lloyd 1980). Others maintain that migrants adopt the outer aspects of urban life in material matters but retain a deeper, symbolic level of beliefs, values and traditions (Adams 1979).

These studies argue that acculturation is not inevitable but that transculturation is possible where cultural encounters take the form of mutual interaction and the indigenous groups can affect the dominant sectors as much as being influenced by them. Thus, the presence of 'Andean sub-cultures' in the urban environment are interpreted as evidence

of the 'ruralization of the city'. However, the problem with these arguments is that they assess cultural death or survival on the basis of cultural traits, assuming ethnicity to coincide with cultural practice in a simple fashion and overlooking the process whereby people exploit the ambiguities of their position and do not necessarily see themselves forced to choose between maintenance or change.

Migrants do come to the city to gain access to certain aspects of modern life which are not available to them in the rural areas and that might involve acquiring the language and skills of the society which monopolizes access to those resources. However, that does not mean ethnic identity is jeopardized or reinforced, because ethnicity is constantly changing and being re-created and re-negotiated. It depends more on how people identify themselves and are identified by others than on what cultural traits they exhibit, more on how they use language to negotiate their identity than on the language they use. What is important are the meanings people attach to particular cultural practices and the reasons why they choose to preserve or abandon them and how they interpret their experiences and encounters in the city.⁴³

⁴³ For example, Isbell (1978:180) applies structuralist methodology to analyse how migrants from Chuschi order the chaotic events of migration and illegal invasion and how they utilize that experience to restructure their shared identity. She shows how the common founding of the shanty town and recounting of the invasion story becomes a modern urban origin myth and the subsequent building of the club house a physical self-constructed icon of migrant unity.

4. Methodology

The data presented in this thesis was collected during an eighteen month stay in Arequipa from July 1988 to December 1989. Set in the south western Andes, Arequipa is the capital of its department and Peru's second city, with a population estimated at 689,000 in 1989.⁴⁴ (see fig.1)

One of the reasons for choosing this city as a site in which to observe rural migrants in an urban context was Arequipa's regionalistic reputation, which suggested to me that migrants would have to contend with antagonistic attitudes in their interaction with Arequipans and that this would bear upon the construction of identities in the city. A second reason was that whilst there is an extensive literature on rural-urban migration to Lima, relatively little work has been done in provincial towns.⁴⁵ Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, my choice of Arequipa was influenced by my familiarity with the city gained on a previous study trip in 1987. During that time, I stayed with a couple, Dora, from Lima, and Roberto, a native Arequipan, who lived in a residential area of Cayma (see fig. 3) and the warmth of their reception and network of friends and acquaintances assured me

⁴⁴ Some sources now place Trujillo as the second city in terms of population. The figure given here for Arequipa is from the Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas (INE), cited by Cornejo (1989:5-6).

⁴⁵ The work on Lima includes: Matos Mar 1961, 1966; Doughty 1970; Myers 1973; Lloyd 1980; Lobo 1982; Altamirano 1984; Degregori, Blondet & Lynch 1986; Golte & Adams 1987; Blondet 1991.

of their assistance in establishing contacts in a shanty town suitable for field work.

Dora and Roberto welcomed me into their home on my return to Arequipa in 1988 and I spent the first two months living with them. This enabled me to meet members of the Arequipan middle classes and observe their attitudes towards migrants. These were manifest in general conversations about the Andean peoples, as well as in their specific interaction with migrants, especially in the paternalistic relationships between employers and domestic servants. In the course of the eighteen months, two different maids were employed in the house. First, a young woman from Sicuani, Cusco with her little girl and periodically her husband who eventually took her back to his home in Puno. She was replaced by a woman from Callalli in Arequipa's highlands, with her twin daughters and husband, a lorry driver who was often away from home. I give these details as I frequently visited the family after I had gone to live in the shanties and I thus had extensive opportunity to observe their interaction with these highlanders.

Dora and Roberto introduced me to Ruth, the head of the department of nursing at the Universidad Católica de Santa María (UCSM: 'Catholic University of Saint Mary') who took me to various *pueblos jóvenes* where the nursing students are sent to the medical posts as part of their public health training. After visiting different sectors of the city with the nurses,

I chose to work in Río Seco, district of Cerro Colorado in the north west of Arequipa (see figs.3 & 4).

I chose Río Seco because it presented an interesting example of a *pueblo joven* in a developing part of the city and which yet conserved something of a rural character. It borders the rapidly urbanizing area of the *cono norte* ('northern cone') and is adjacent to the industrial park and a site for a wholesale market which was being planned in 1989. At the same time, it is bordered on the west by maize and potato fields and many of its inhabitants are *trabajadores eventuales agrícolas* ('casual agricultural labourers'), hiring out their labour on a daily basis at the pick-up point of Zamácola (fig.3). Moreover, although established some twenty years, Río Seco has electricity but no domestic water supply and this suggested the possibility of observing what the neighbourhood organizations were doing about it.

Again a reason for my choice was the willingness of Rosemary, the staff nurse, to receive me at the health post and allow me to observe the work of the students. I was thus able to spend an initial period familiarizing myself with Río Seco by accompanying the students on their rounds, getting to know the women who attended a mother and toddlers' club at the health post and meeting key members of the community. The nurses also assisted me in finding lodging and I went to live for nine months with Doris, an Aymara-speaking migrant from Puno and her six year old grandson.

I carried out my research through participant observation, involving myself in domestic and communal life by 'hanging out' in the market and other meeting places of the *pueblo joven*, attending neighbourhood assemblies, various women's groups and self-help organizations and visiting the schools and churches. As these meetings (with the exception of the neighbourhood assemblies) were mainly attended by women, it is they who dominate this thesis. By participating in these various gatherings, I was able to establish friendships with many *pobladoras* who invited me into their homes and related their case histories to me. This assisted me in my first task of investigating their motives in migrating to Arequipa and their experiences in the city.

The second part of my research concentrated on the role of the broadcast media in the *pueblos jóvenes*. In Río Seco I watched television and listened to the radio with *pobladores*, observed their viewing or listening habits and tastes, noted their comments and prompted conversation on specific points on which I wished more information. In addition, I backed up my observations with surveys and questionnaires in the *pueblos jóvenes* and interviewed the owners, presenters and managerial staff of Arequipa's radio and television stations. I was assisted in this by Río Seco's *teniente gobernador* (literally 'lieutenant governor', an honorary government representative) Víctor, and his brother Hernán, who provided many contacts in the media.

I was also invited to collaborate with members of a popular communications centre, Ama Kella, (literally 'Don't be Lazy') in the administration of a survey in the *pueblo joven* of Porvenir, in the upper part of the district of Miraflores, in the east of Arequipa (figs.3 & 5) I was introduced to this shanty town by Birgit, a German nun working in the parish of *Cristo Obrero* ('Christ the Worker') where the priest, Eloy, also directs the communications centre. The willingness of Eloy and other members of Ama Kella to allow me to participate in the centre gave me the opportunity to observe a popular communications venture at close hand and join them in their involvement with the neighbourhood and self-help organizations. Two Ama Kella workers, Yolanda and Hugo, second-generation migrants from Puno and Cusco respectively, took me to live with them and I was thus able to gain insight into life in a different *pueblo joven* and of the particular experiences of the Arequipan-born children of migrants.

In the remainder of the thesis I have changed the names of all *pobladores* in order to preserve their anonymity, but I have kept the names of those I interviewed in the mainstream media since they are already public figures.

The data gathered during this period of research will be presented as follows. The first two chapters examine competing discourses of race, class and ethnicity. Chapter Two explores the interaction of migrants with Arequipans and looks at how the historical development of the south has contributed to

Arequipa's strong regional identity and to the racism expressed towards migrants. Chapter Three takes up the migrants' encounter with the institutions of the dominant sector of society and the establishment of an identity base for themselves through building the shanty town and participating in grass roots organizations. It discusses the possibilities for the consolidation of a popular political identity in the shanties.

The second half of the thesis presents an analysis of radio and television production in Arequipa and Chapter Four examines the different conceptualizations of 'popular culture' defined in commercial, public service and community radio. Chapter Five assesses the migrant response to radio and television programmes, looking at the links between music and identity and at the interpretation of soap opera in the local context. Finally, the conclusions question the possibility of migrants constituting their own autonomous identities and discusses the relationship between discourse, power and identity.

CHAPTER TWO

AREQUIPA AND ITS SHANTY TOWNS

1. Introduction to Arequipa

1.1. Stereotype of the Arequipan

When God was creating the world, he set aside all the best for Arequipa: the most magnificent volcano in the world, the best climate, the bluest sky, the purest air, the most beautiful countryside. The rest of the world complained saying: Why does Arequipa get the best of everything? And God replied: Just wait and see the shitty people I'm going to put there!¹

The 'eternal blue sky' of Arequipa, the volcano of El Misti and the *sillar*, the white petrified lava from which much of the city is built, are as renowned as the Arequipans' pride in *la blanca ciudad* ('the white city').² The reputed arrogance of the Arequipans provokes animosity in other Peruvians and is a source of a vast repertoire of jokes, of which the following is just one more example:

¹ This joke was told to me by both *arequipeños* and *cusqueños*, with variations on 'la mierda de gente' according to the degree of distaste. I give the jokes in English only as I heard different versions from different sources and was unable to record them at the time of telling.

² The Misti and its *sillar* are symbolic of Arequipa and *mistianos* is used as an epithet for Arequipans and the city (Zegarra 1973:266). Idiosyncracies of the Arequipan character are attributed to the physical environment: the Misti is held responsible for the reputed irritability of the Arequipans, said to be induced by the combination of the hot desert climate and the coolness of the snowcaps. People would comment 'se le ha entrado la nevada' ('the snow's got into their head'). Peralta (1977:64) citing Melgar, one of Arequipa's most famous poets, states that the Arequipans owe their sense of independence to the desert and their spirituality to the lofty Misti.

An Arequipan dies and goes to heaven, he knocks on the door and St. Peter opens. The man announces: I'm an Arequipan, I've died and here I am. St. Peter says to him: no Arequipans here, go to hell and see if the devil will take you. Off he goes and knocks on the door of hell, out comes the devil and the man repeats his greeting. The devil tells him to wait a minute. He goes in and comes out again with a bundle of wood and gives it to the Arequipan saying: Go and burn yourself outside!

Whilst others make fun of them, the Arequipans exult in the conviction of their own superiority and of the unsurpassable beauty of their city, told in histories, songs and poems.³ This quotation from Peralta (1977:58) is typical of the eulogies written in praise of Arequipa:

Hyperbole apart, Arequipa is, without doubt, one of the most beautiful cities of Peru. Translucent, luminous, of eternally blue skies, clean, of purifying, crystalline atmosphere. (my translation)

Pride in the city and the aggressive assertion of their independence makes its people unpopular amongst those from Lima and from Cusco, its rival city in the south. As a *cusqueño* told me: 'Arequipa es otro país, se creen una república aparte' ('Arequipa's another country, they think they're a separate republic'). Proclaiming itself the 'Independent Republic of Arequipa', Peru's second city has always resented the centralism of Lima and, with its own tourist passport and monetary unit, its regionalism is legendary.⁴ In the regionalization process initiated in the

³ See for example: Echevarría 1952; Cornejo 1958; Travada y Córdova 1958; Peralta 1977.

⁴ The passport is a tourist gimmick but the coin, called the *characato de oro* ('golden characato') was once in circulation. It takes its name from the rural village of

last days of Alan García's APRA government, Arequipa remained a region on its own, much to the delight of the Arequipans, one of whom expressed amusement that although many *puneños* live in Arequipa, neither Puno nor Tacna wanted to join with them: '¡los tacneños no nos pasan ni con azúcar!' ('the tacneños can't even stomach us with sugar!').

Although the Arequipans may be 'orgullosos como el Misti' ('as proud as the Misti') and their love for their city leads to extremes of patriotism (one *limeño* compared them to the Israelites for strength of loyalty to the homeland), it is acknowledged that they have cause to be proud of the city which they look after diligently, as the *cusqueño* concedes:

Son regionalistas, eso está bien, su ciudad es la más limpia, bien ordenada, bonita, por eso la quieren bastante, son orgullosos, trabajadores, quieren sacarla adelante.

(They're regionalists, that's alright, their city is the cleanest, it's neat and tidy, pretty, that's why they love it a lot, they're proud, hard working, they want to see it progress.)

The Arequipans boast of being industrious, ambitious and successful throughout the world: they say that wherever you go across the globe you will always find an Arequipan. An anecdote relates that the Arequipans were first to the south pole and planted a red flag in the snow, the sign of the *picanterías*, the typical Arequipan restaurants (Peralta 1977:59). They are not ashamed to admit their pride in

Characato on the outskirts of the city (fig.3).

themselves and their city but believe it to be justified, as an Arequipan, Enrique proclaims:

Donde ha ido el arequipeño ha caído bien...el arequipeño es un tipo inteligente, bien puesto en todas partes... Sí, es orgulloso, y ¡macho para todo!

(Wherever the Arequipan has gone, he's landed on his feet...the Arequipan is an intelligent sort, always holding high positions... Yes, he's proud, and macho in all things!)

The city of Arequipa was established in the colony and its Spanish heritage is manifest not only in its architecture but in the predominance of *blancos*, the white descendants of European settlers who form Arequipa's elite. Comparisons have been drawn between the colonial buildings and Arequipa's 'Spanish stock', between the 'glistening whiteness of its streets and walls' and the 'refined character' of its people (Peralta 1977:58). They attribute their excellence to their 'Spanishness' and people pointed out to me that Arequipans numbered amongst the most eminent politicians, lawyers, poets and even saints.

The high regard Arequipans have of themselves, their arrogance and chauvinism, are manifest in their disdain of the Andean peoples who in the last century have migrated en masse from the Andean regions to seek work and settle in the city. This was immediately obvious in the horrified reactions of middle-class *arequipeños* to my proposition to go and work amongst migrants in a *pueblo joven*.

They imagined the outskirts of their 'white city' to be places of squalor, strewn with rubbish, swarming with flies

and rank with disease, from which I would return sick, flea-ridden and as dark as the people who lived there, so encrusted would my skin be with the dirt: 'The grime will add twenty kilos to your weight! We'll have to hose you down outside the house or you'll block the drains with the dirt coming off in the shower!'. If not black, I would be white with the dust, whipped up by the winds which blow across the barren wastelands around the shanties and I would need pebbles in my pocket to stop me being blown away. I would be lucky to come back alive: the shanty town was depicted to me as a den of thieves, a hide-out for terrorists and criminals, a place of debauchery and promiscuity. I was certain to be robbed, raped and finally murdered: 'Two or three *cholos*⁵ will get hold of you and goodbye to you! Yes, and (the baby) will come out coffee-coloured!'.

Needless to say, these fears were mostly unfounded (though my room was broken into by stray sheep rustlers!) and they were not shared by those who worked in the shanty towns or came into close contact with the people. The hostility shown towards the shanty town residents is based on a mistrust of 'the unknown', an expression of the Arequipans' sense of difference between themselves and 'the other', translated into fear and deprecation. It is this sense of difference which people manipulate to construct identities on the basis of

⁵ *Cholo* here refers pejoratively to someone of Andean origins living in the city but has a variety of usages which I shall discuss below.

stereotypes. The construction of stereotypes is complex but operates categories based on a partial knowledge of 'the other' and manipulates dichotomized social variables (Epstein 1978:12; Lakoff 1987). The factors contributing to the stereotypes other Peruvians have of Arequipans and Arequipans of Andean migrants are not arbitrary but have arisen from socio-economic and political factors in Arequipa's development and are renewed or transformed in the contemporary context.

2. Racial, Social and Moral Stereotypes

2.1. The Notion of Race in the History of Arequipa

The racial categories people in Arequipa use to classify themselves and others are rooted in Peruvian history and central to the construction of an 'Arequipan' or an 'Andean' ethnic identity. The Arequipan racial stereotype is constructed on the basis of an image of the 'true Arequipan': a descendent of the first settlers, distinguishable in physical features and socio-cultural practice and associated with particular localities.

The citizens of the white city vaunt both the whiteness of the *sillar* and the fairness of their skin, both 'untainted' before the mass migrations from the interior, and Alfonso, from Azángaro, Puno believes the epithet to refer more to ethnic composition than to the architecture:

Esta ciudad era blanca, era de los blancos, y también por el sillar que se ha quedado blanco, pero más por los blancos que había.

(This city was white, it belonged to the whites, and it's because of the *sillar* as well that it has turned out white, but more because of the whites who were here.)

The ethnic composition of Arequipa was predominantly 'white' up till the twentieth century, the city being founded by the Spaniards on 15 August 1540 and often described as a 'western' or 'Spanish' city. The valley of Arequipa was originally populated by different ethnic groups from the high Andean zone who settled on the coast or the banks of the Chili river (Galdós 1987). These peoples were later conquered by the Incas, who extended their political and economic control over the disperse agricultural population but did not establish an urban base as in Cusco or Cajamarca.

There are different legends as to how Arequipa got its name, but the Arequipans prefer those based on the myth, derived from the account by Garcilaso de la Vega, that the Incas were the first to found Arequipa.⁶ It tells that the Inca Mayta Capac (in other versions Ccapac Yupanqui), leading his army to conquer the region, was petitioned by his captains to be allowed to settle in the valley of Arequipa and replied 'Ari, quepay', meaning 'Alright, you can stay'.⁷ The evidence that other groups had previously settled the region lends weight to another account, related to me by my Quechua

⁶ The 'Inca' Garcilaso de la Vega was one of Peru's first *mestizos*, born of a Spanish conquistador and an Inca princess and author of *Los comentarios reales de los Incas*.

⁷ Variations of the foundation story are to be found in: Bermejo 1954:5,11-12; Galdós 1987:11-24; Cornejo 1958:11-2.

teacher, Mario, which holds that the Incas referred to the original peoples of Arequipa as those living on the other side of El Misti, and named it 'are qhepa' or 'behind the volcano'.

That Arequipa has been populated by a succession of migrating peoples is used as an argument by migrants, like Alfonso, to ridicule the Arequipan's preoccupation with a pure 'Arequipan race', the present-day Arequipan being a hybrid of the arrival of the first settlers from the Andes who interbred with the Spanish:

Arequipa no existía antes, toda la gente que hay aquí es gente que ha venido de otros lugares, alguna gente venía de España, se quedó aquí, otra gente venía de Puno, Cusco, se quedaron aquí, eso es Arequipa, no, antes no existía gente aquí según la historia.

(Arequipa didn't exist before, all the people who are here came from other places, some people came from Spain, they stayed here, others came from Puno, Cusco, they stayed too, that's Arequipa, you see, according to history there was no one here before.)

The Arequipans do recognize their ambivalent ancestry but manipulate this *mestizaje* to fit specific notions of themselves. As well as harping back to their 'Inca' heritage they trace their ancestry to the Spaniards who rapidly populated the city and surrounding area, dividing lands between themselves and the Catholic Church which, as was typical of the conquest, was prominent in the establishment of the city.⁸ Churches, convents and monasteries proliferated,

⁸ The division of lands followed the *encomienda* system which apportioned lands and Indians to reward the conquistadors and better exert political control over the country. See Ballón 1986:3-4; Galdós 1987:157-93.

contributing to another aspect of Arequipa's reputation as a devoutly catholic and highly conservative city (Ballón 1986:28; Málaga 1986).

Although just ninety Spaniards initially settled in Arequipa, many Spanish nobles chose to take up residence there on account of the climate, fertile soil and the commercial prospects afforded by its proximity to the coast and, unlike other cities of the viceroyalty, they soon outnumbered the indigenous population.⁹ The Spaniards dedicated themselves to commerce and Arequipa became a strategic economic and political point for the whole viceroyalty, linking the towns of Cusco, Lima and Alto Perú (presently north Bolivia). Whilst agriculture was maintained at subsistence level, the native peoples, displaced from their lands and traditional occupations of farming and crafts, were forced to work in the mines or in construction, tanning and textiles.

Whether Spanish or Indian ancestry is seen as positive or negative is negotiable. There is a contradiction between the Peruvian pride in the Inca heritage and the scorn for the twentieth century Indian, resolved by the explanation that the contemporary Indian is not the same intelligent Indian of Inca times because 'los españoles los embrutecieron' ('the

⁹ Málaga (1981:28) cites a sixteenth century source from the census of the Viceroy Gil de Taboada y Lemos, recording 22,207 whites, 4,908 *mestizos*, 5,099 Indians, 2,487 free blacks and 1,225 black slaves. Flores-Galindo (1977:25) gives the population of Arequipa in 1795 as composed of 62% Spaniards, 13% *mestizos*, 14% Indians and 11% blacks and mulattoes.

Spaniards turned them into brutes'). There is also an ambiguous relationship with the Spanish heritage, dealt with by attributing to the Andean people negative aspects of Spanishness particularly pride, stubbornness and envy. These are taken up by migrants, like Ricardo from Sicuani, Cusco, who comments on the problems within the shanty town community:

Es esa sangre que nos ha dejado acá en Perú, española, orgullosa, envidiosa...dicen que es la sangre de los españoles que hace que la gente no quiere aceptar.

It's this blood which they left us here in Peru, Spanish, arrogant, jealous...they say it's the blood of the Spaniards which makes people objectionable, unwilling to accept things.

According to contemporary Arequipans, the present *mestizo* of Arequipa is a product of the flower of Inca and Spanish blood.¹⁰ The idea of *raza* ('race') in the sense of 'purity of blood', implying noble descent, is still very strong in Peru.¹¹ The last remaining strongholds of the 'legitimate' Arequipans are to be found on the rural outskirts of the city and are held to be the descendants of the first Spanish settlers and 'Incas', inheriting stature, fair skin and green eyes from the Spaniards and a disposition for hard work from the Incas. In this account by Rodolfo, from the valley of Aplao, Castilla, Arequipa, history is manipulated and time

¹⁰ Pitt-Rivers (1973:19) observes that the descent of the modern *mestizo* is validated by reference to an ideal past rather than by an unsatisfactory link to the modern Indian.

¹¹ Pitt-Rivers (1973:4-6) remarks that, before the discovery of genes, the concept of race was linked to 'the rather mystical notion of "the blood"', there being no other explanation for the transmission process.

scales confused in order to allow for the Incas to pass through Arequipa when the 'creoles' were already settled there:

Los fundadores eran gente criolla, de acá del pueblo, de Cayma, cuando todavía el Inca pasó por aquí, sangre de Inca mezclada con española, gente de trabajo, los arequipeños son bien chambeadores... Verdadera gente arequipeña ya no hay aquí, altos, colorados, ojos verdes como yo... Todavía en Yarabamba, Socabaya, esos sitios, hay esa gente alta, corpulenta...se han retirado, han regresado a la tierra.

(The founders were creoles, from here from the town from Cayma, from back when the Inca passed through here, Inca blood mixed with Spanish, hard-working people, the Arequipans are very hard-working. There aren't any true Arequipan people left anymore, tall, light skinned, green eyes like mine... In Yarabamba, Socabaya, in those places there are those tall, well-built people...they've withdrawn, gone back to the land.)

These 'true' Arequipans are further distinguished by their cultural practice, especially the playing and singing of the yaraví, a love-song signalled as representative of Arequipan music (Carpio 1976). Its preservation is hailed as an indication of the survival of old Arequipa, as Mauricio, from Matarani, on Arequipa's coast observes:

La gente verdadera arequipeña se ha perdido, la gente se ha casado con puneños, cusqueños...los netos, netos arequipeños, bueno, por Socabaya, Characato, por allí cantan yaravís.

(The true Arequipan people have disappeared, people have married others from Puno, Cusco...the real, true Arequipans, well, in Socabaya, Characato, over there they sing yaravís.)

The yaraví functions in opposition to the Andean wayno¹²

¹² The wayno is the most well-known form of numerous styles of Andean music and there are many regional varieties, but it is taken as 'typical' Andean music, referred to as

to differentiate the migrants from the 'authentic' Arequipans, as Mauricio continues: 'tienen sus costumbres diferentes, allá sus danzas folklóricas, de aquí los yaravíes' ('they've got their own different customs, out there their folkloric dances, here the *yaravis*').

A differentiation is made between the middle-class urban Arequipans and these farmers of hispanic ancestry who remain in Arequipa's rural areas like Socabaya and Characato (fig.3), the latter lending its name as a generic term to the farmers of Arequipa's *pueblos tradicionales* ('traditional villages') and used by outsiders to refer to all Arequipans, mostly in the derogatory sense of 'provincials' or 'country bumpkins'. The farmers are also known as *loncos* and although they are held to be the 'purest', most Spanish strand of Arequipans, they are placed on a lower social level, characterized as rather coarse, vulgar of speech and poorly dressed despite their wealth. This is explained by Mercedes, a migrant from Chucuito, Puno, living in Río Seco and neighbour to land farmed by *loncos*:

Lonco es el legítimo arequipeño, chacarero, es descendiente de los españoles, blanco pero no es culto, (es) tosco... Los arequipeños siempre meten el ajo... así hablan los characatos, los loncos... Son de la clase baja de los arequipeños, puede ser que son ricos, tienen treinta vacas y harta chacra, pero socialmente son de un nivel bajo.

(The *lonco* is the legitimate Arequipan, farmer, they are descendants of the Spaniards, white but not cultured, they're vulgar... Arequipans are always swearing...that's

música folklórica (folkloric music) (CEPES 1986).

the way the *characatos*, the *loncos* speak... They're of the lower class of the Arequipans, they might be rich, have thirty cows and a lot of land, but socially they're of a low level.)

The situation of the *lonco* in contemporary Arequipa shows the necessity to consider class and ethnicity together in accounting for social differentiation. The low status of the *loncos*, despite their wealth and their ethnic origins, demonstrates the inadequacy of Marxist theories of class which are based on economic factors and relate one's life chances to the position one occupies in relation to the market and the preference of Weber's theory of 'status' which acknowledges other, non-market conditions in accounting for prestige.¹³

Just as the *loncos* may be both rich and the 'purest' strain of the Arequipan race but still be of low prestige because they do not fulfil other social conditions (they are uneducated, uncultured, uncouth etc.), so educated 'Indians' fail to achieve social recognition of their professional achievements and continue to occupy a low status. Neither qualifications nor marriage with a 'white' guarantee acceptance amongst high status groups. This is exemplified by the cautionary tale I was told of 'an ugly little Indian with wiry hair' who qualified as a doctor and married a 'white' woman who was ashamed of her husband in her own social circles and received the disapproval of her friends. Moreover, much to

¹³ On the Marxist and Weberian concepts of class see: Giddens 1971:36, 163-7, 1989:209-13; Terray 1975:86, 91; Gordon 1978; Parkin 1979:625; Bloch 1983; Rex 1986; Solomos 1986.

the disgrace of the mother all five children took after their father: 'they all turned out ugly after their father, not one white amongst them'.

The offspring of such unions is held up as evidence of the debilitation of the 'white' blood. Arequipans fear that by interbreeding with 'brutish Indians' in the present (as opposed to the 'civilized' Incas of the past) the Arequipan stock will be whittled away. They worry that the migrants are 'polluting' their race, although highlanders are not likely to interbreed with 'white' Arequipans and rather it is the migrants who are forced to bear the children of Arequipans in the common cases of rape of servant girls by employers and their sons.¹⁴ Nevertheless, there are overtones of eugenics in the discourse of Arequipans, like Cecilia, who talk of the need to 'purify the race', believing Indian blood to be degrading to the 'Peruvian race' whilst for *mestizos* to breed with *gringos* is considered an improvement:

En cuanto a raza estamos retrocediendo...hay un cataclismo de raza como de economía ahora. Antes los indígenas estaban aparte de los blancos, ahora los indios están volcando la ciudad.

¹⁴ Flor de María, a domestic servant from Cusco related several cases of schoolfriends, who were also maids, having children by their employers or their sons: 'En el colegio había una chica, más bien coquetita era...no sé como hubiera sido, pero tuvo dos mellizitas, por el hijo parece, mucha confianza daba la señora a sus hijos...también había otra, ella más bien calladita, sencillita...tuvo una mujercita.' ('At school there was a girl, she was a bit of a flirt,...well I don't know how it came about, but she had twin girls, by the son it would seem, the lady trusted her sons too much...there was another one as well, she on the other hand was quiet, simple...she had a little girl.')

(As far as race is concerned we're going backwards... there's a cataclysm in race as much as in the economy at the moment. Before, the indigenous peoples were separate from the whites, now the Indians are overturning the city.)¹⁵

The paranoia over the disappearance of the Arequipan 'race' is echoed in the council offices, where I spoke to a woman who expressed dismay at the rapid rate of internal migration and estimated that in 1988, 60 per cent of Arequipa's population were migrants. An article in the local newspaper, *El Correo*, raised alarm at figures showing Arequipa's growth rate (at 3.3 per cent per annum for the department and 4 per cent for the capital) to be above the national average of 2.6 per cent:

¿Arequipeños en Arequipa? parece un juego de palabras pero la verdad es que hoy es difícil encontrar aquí gente que haya realmente nacido en la Blanca Ciudad. La mitad de la población actual proviene de la migración.

(Arequipans in Arequipa? It seems a play on words, but the truth is that today it is difficult to find here people who have really been born in the White City. Half of its current population are immigrants.)

The article seems to overlook the fact that a large proportion of migrants' children are Arequipan-born, but the stress on 'who have really been born in the White City' suggests that the journalist excludes non-white second-generation migrants from the category of 'Arequipan'. In the

¹⁵ Peralta (1977:61-2) in similarly hysterical terms talks of migrants laying a 'racial siege' to the city and predicts that either the Indian race will exterminate the whites and *mestizos* or the mingling of the bloods will produce a degradation of the Arequipan physique, producing people of shorter stature.

press, as throughout Arequipan society, social distinctions are made in racial terms.

2.2. Racial and Social Stratification in Arequipa

In Peru, divisions are made between *indio*, *mestizo* or *cholo* and *blanco* or *criollo*. *Indio* ('Indian') was the term given to the indigenous population of the Americas on the basis of Columbus's mistaken belief that he had reached India. There have been various unsuccessful attempts at abolishing the term, the last being Velasco's introduction of *campesino* ('peasant') which sought to redefine the 'Indians' as a class rather than an ethnic group but did not eradicate the pejorative use of *indio*, still very much in evidence. *Blanco* ('white') originally referred to the Spanish conquistadors and colonizers but is now applied to anyone of a relatively pale complexion.¹⁶ *Mestizo* was used to denote the progeny of Indian and Spanish interbreeding, but depending on a number of other social variables, can be synonymous with either *criollo* or *cholo*.

In the social science literature these categories have been redefined in socio-cultural rather than biological terms, given that, in so far as being of mixed blood, the vast majority of Peru's population today is to a greater or lesser

¹⁶ When referring to foreigners, the term *gringo* is used and this may be applied to Peruvians, indicating a trace of European or North American ancestry.

extent *mestizo*.¹⁷ The issue of whether class or ethnicity should be used to classify people in Peru is also widely documented.¹⁸ Rather than attempting to fit people in Arequipa into one or other of these categories, which would assume that they correspond to empirical groups of people, I propose to demonstrate how people use these terms to place themselves or others in a particular category, maximizing the ambiguities inherent in each.¹⁹

People use racial markers to construct social categories in daily discourse. They make distinctions on the basis of three different races in Peru: the whites or *criollos*, the *mestizos* and the Indians, as in Mercedes' definition:

La raza criolla...la mestiza o chola, cruzada con los indios, los españoles su sangre han dejado, y la raza india, del campo, los legítimos.

(The *criollo* race...the *mestizo* or *cholo*, crossed with the Indians, the Spaniards left their blood, and the Indian race, from the countryside, the legitimate ones.)

¹⁷ This is well established in the literature: Tschopik 1948; Bourricaud 1975; Fuenzalida et al. 1970; Pitt-Rivers 1973; Van den Berghe 1974b; Van den Berghe & Primov 1977; Albó 1979; Stutzman 1981; Cotler 1983; Stein 1985; Harvey 1987.

¹⁸ On the general relationship between race, class and ethnicity in Latin America see Mörner 1970. In studies of Andean society, amongst those who have preferred class over ethnic categories are Métraux (1959) and Orlove (1974) whilst Van den Berghe (1974) and Van den Berghe & Primov (1977) have favoured cultural criteria.

¹⁹ It has been shown that the attempt to draw up a cultural continuum such as that of Van den Berghe and Primov (1977) is a fruitless endeavour given the number of variables which need to be taken into account and the inconsistency of their correlation. See Gross (1979); Harvey (1987:23-53).

The claim to legitimacy is important in the opposition it sets up between the indigenous peoples and the invading Spaniards and lends a positive angle to the notion of being native, possessing a legitimate claim to the Peruvian nationality which was illegitimately usurped by the conquistadors.

In the literature, *cholo* was a term taken out of its context and used by social scientists in the same way as 'marginal' to indicate someone moving between two categories but fitting into neither.²⁰ This use of *cholo* suggests that there are two definable groups which someone may move between and moreover seeks to classify the migrants who, as a majority in Arequipa, cannot be dismissed with a label like *cholo* which suggests their marginality and which they themselves contest.

In Arequipa, *cholo* is used interchangeably with *mestizo*, and may be used both amongst Arequipans and migrants as a term of affection or abuse. As far as the migrants are concerned, the Arequipans are just as much *cholos* as they and point to the lyrics of a *yaraví* as proof: 'soy cholo arequipeño' ('I'm an Arequipan *cholo*'). However, they qualify the denomination of Arequipans as *cholos* with 'pero bien criollos' ('but very creole *cholos*') implying a greater proportion of Spanish blood. In fact, the Arequipans have historically defined

²⁰ Quijano (1980) first propounded the concept of *cholo* and *cholificación* in 1960. Amongst those who have discussed it see: Bourricaud 1970; Matos Mar 1968; Mangin 1973; Lloyd 1980; Harvey 1987.

themselves as *cholos* to denote their Spanish and Inca descent and establish a hierarchy of *mestizajes* in which they represent the optimum example as against the '*cholos comunes y corrientes*' ('the common or garden *cholos*') of the '*raza vernácula*' ('vernacular race') (Peralta 1977:59-60).

However, migrants argue that *cholo* refers to all Peruvians since all are of mixed blood and they cite history books which mention '*los peruanos cholos*' ('the Peruvian *cholos*'). Violeta, the daughter of *cusqueños*, comments:

Todos los peruanos somos cholos, la gente lo dice como insulto pero están equivocados, no es insulto, también se lo puede decir de cariño pero es igual, como mestizo, todos somos cholos.

(All of us Peruvians are *cholos*, people say it as an insult but they're mistaken, it's not an insult, you can say it affectionately as well but it's all the same, like *mestizo*, we're all *cholos*.)

The reference to a Peruvian identity appeals to a higher level of inclusivity, but whilst it is recognized that, in theory, all Peruvians can be *cholos*, it is evident that racial differences are not objective, biological differences but socio-cultural categories, influenced by history and selected by those who use them as indicators of superiority and inferiority. Migrants are aware that *cholo* is addressed to them disparagingly as a synonym of *indio*, signalling inferiority. María Carmen, from San Román, Puno, accepts the term *serrano* in its geographical sense of 'someone from the sierra', but adamantly refuses *cholo*:

Cholos no sé qué quiere decir, más bajo dirán, a nosotros nos pueden decir serranos porque somos de la sierra, pero cholos no, si todos somos cholos.

(I don't know what *cholo* means, inferior I suppose, they can call us highlanders because we're from the highlands, but not *cholos* because we're all *cholos*.)

The ambiguities of labels like *cholo* are negotiated by both Arequipans and migrants, as are colour categories. Whilst Arequipans differentiate themselves from *serranos* on the grounds of their 'white' skin and operate racial categories based on the degree of miscegenation,²¹ the Andean peoples refuse to be classed in an indiscriminate dark-skinned colour category. *Cusqueños*, like Fátima, rank themselves in the same pale-skinned category as the Arequipans, in opposition to the *puneños*: 'los arequipeños son blancos, cusqueños también, de Puno son trigueños' ('the Arequipans are white, and those from Cusco as well, people from Puno are olive-skinned'). Violeta argues against the tendency to class Andean peoples as 'Indians' on socio-cultural grounds, even though they may be of pale complexion and asserts her *cusqueño* descent and the lighter colouring of some *cusqueños* in order to reject the labels of *indio* or *cholo*:

En el Cusco encuentras gringos, ojos verdes, pero son quechuistas, carosos... En Ica, Lima, por el norte son morenos. Mi hermana es blanca, simpática, mi cuñado de Lima y él nos dice cholos, indiecitos, pero yo le digo, tú te vas a la sierra, al Cusco y te asombras, hay gringos, indios blancos, blancos, así le digo.

²¹ One Arequipan operated a colour classification using an analogy based on coffee and milk, by which *blanco* would be very milky coffee, *mestizo* equal parts coffee and milk and *indio* coffee with a dash of milk.

(In Cusco you find *gringos*, with green eyes, but they're Quechua speakers, fair-skinned... In Ica, Lima, in the north they're dark. My sister is white, pretty, and my brother-in-law is from Lima and he calls us *cholos*, little Indians, but I say to him, you go to the sierra, to Cusco and you'll be amazed, there are *gringos*, white, white Indians, that's what I say to him.)

Despite Violeta's refusal of labels based on skin colour, her description of her sister as 'white' and by virtue of that whiteness, pretty, points to acceptance of the dominant aesthetic which holds white skin, fair hair and blue eyes to be beautiful, those being the characteristics which make up the stereotype of the powerful sector of society and of the even more powerful states which rule them from beyond. Conversely, typically Indian physical features (dark skin colour, slanted eyes, prominent cheekbones, short stature) are branded ugly, both by Arequipans: 'the Indian is ugly, ugly, ugly' (Cecilia) and by those of Andean origins who deplore their own dark skin as being 'as black as coal'.

The correlation between the racial and the social stereotype is apparent: it is the power which the whites wield which makes them attractive and the poor Indians 'ugly'. However, the distinction is not purely economic: as I have illustrated above, the rich Indian is still 'ugly'. Nor is the power absolute: it is part of a struggle in which Arequipans try to defend their monopoly of power and prestige through discrimination against migrants who wish to gain access to resources and contest their prejudicial categorization.

Dichotomies are constantly constructed and deconstructed: dark/light, rich/poor, Indian/Arequipan.

2.3. Moral Stereotype

Personal traits are assumed of people of a particular physical appearance and these, like their physical features, are attributed to biological inheritance and used to place people in positions of inferiority relative to oneself. Moral stereotypes, relating to personality and behaviour, are also drawn in terms of a dichotomy, in this case between civilization versus animality. The Arequipan is depicted as fully human: civilized, intelligent, hard-working, ambitious, progressive and sociable. The Indian is the antithesis: savage, brutish, lazy, stubborn, backward and unsociable.

References to animality frequently arise in conversation and the Andean people are often compared to the llamas and other animals of their region, such as the *killincha*, an animal similar to the armadillo. They are called *llamacas* and *huanacos* (a member of the llama family): 'a los serranos dicen huanacos porque son feitos' ('they call the highlanders *huanacos* because they're ugly'). The snail is used by Cecilia as 'el símbolo del atraso y de la vergüenza' ('a symbol of backwardness and disgrace'):

El indio es como el caracol: deja su baba por dondequiera que vaya.

(The Indian is like the snail, they leave their dribble wherever they go.)

The Andean people are also accused of multiplying like rats and mice and their sexuality is envisaged in animal terms. The concept of people 'breeding like rabbits' attaches to the common image of the shanty towns as places seething with unbridled lust and promiscuity. The threat which the multiplication of the Andean people poses to the Arequipans is translated into accusations of ignorance and stupidity hurled at migrants who are blamed for causing conditions of overcrowding in the city. Many Arequipans believe the Indian women should be sterilized, overlooking the fact that there is a lack of sexual education at all levels. A spate of television publicity for contraceptive pills in 1988 showed well-off, middle-class Peruvians whose situation was far removed from that of most migrant women, few of whom would be unable to afford the pill.

The sexual stereotype is linked to a myth of the violence of *amor serrano* ('highland love') which maintains that the more a man beats a woman, the more he loves her. It is here related in a joke by Gónzalo, an Arequipan:

Un día un hombre se encuentra con dos indios en la calle. El esposo está pegando fuerte a su mujer. El hombre trata de intervenir, diciendo, bruto ¿cómo puedes tratar así a una pobre mujer indefensa? Enojada con él, la mujer le dice, no le digas de parar ¡déjalo, esto es signo de que me quiere!

(One day a man meets two Indians in the street. The husband is beating his wife hard. The man tries to intervene, saying, animal, how can you treat a poor defenceless woman like that? Angry with him, the woman says, don't you tell him to stop, leave him be, this is a sign that he loves me!)

In the joke, the man is obviously a non-Indian, representative of a civilized order, defender of justice, fully human in his effort to save the woman from her 'brutish' husband. Her refusal of assistance signifies a rejection of civilization, a desire to remain at the level of animals, an inclination for savage behaviour. The Arequipans speak of 'civilizing' the migrants to their way of being, but propose equally dehumanizing methods such as forcing them to do a compulsory period of domestic service on coming to the city, in order to teach them how to 'live properly'. The refusal to adapt is seen as a sign of their brutishness: they believe the Indians are naturally ignorant and will remain so because they are too proud to change.

The Arequipans not only rail against the blackening of their 'white' race but also the dirtying of their pristine streets. They accuse migrants of bringing their filth into the town centre, fouling up the clean white streets of Arequipa. In August 1988, the accusations of dirtiness and intolerance of *ambulantes* ('street vendors') erupted into a scandalous attempt at evacuating the market of San Camilo and the surrounding streets. The mayor, Luis Cáceres, ironically also a migrant from Puno, but described by *El Correo* (5/9/88) as 'a devotee of the beauty of Arequipa', launched a campaign to clean up the city which degenerated into a verbal and physically violent attack on the stall-holders. The heart of the problem seemed to be less one of hygiene than of Arequipan

aesthetics: according to the paper, the sellers were held to be 'contrary to the embellishment of the city', an opinion endorsed by this Arequipan, Claudia:

Los arequipeños odian a los indios porque están malogrando la ciudad, la raza. Tienen vergüenza de que los turistas lo vean así.

(The Arequipans hate the Indians because they're mucking up the city, the race. They're ashamed that the tourists should see it like that.)

The furore increased as the stallholders refused to go, their livelihood being more important than whether or not they were decorative. Violeta, whose mother works in the market, expresses outrage at the insult the campaign constituted:

(El alcalde) insulta a las madres de familia que venden, por la radio les insulta, dice que son unas borrachas, cochinas, que hay ratas en San Camilo, que han encontrado 200 ratas, para todos dice que es sucio y les bota, dice ¡con bomberos hemos sacado 3.000 ratas en carretillas!

(The mayor insults mothers who work on the market, on the radio he insults them, he says they're a load of drunkards, filthy pigs, that there are rats in San Camilo, that they've found 200 rats, he tells everyone that it's dirty and he throws them out, he says with the firemen we've taken out 3,000 rats in wheel barrows.)

The Arequipans believe the migrants not only to be animal and dirty but also lazy in contrast to the 'hard-working, tax-paying' Arequipans of the capital or to the coastal people who buckle under on the plantations and fight to get on. Rodolfo compares his determination to build his own house and workshop with the lack of ambition of his neighbours, to which he imputes the lack of progress of Río Seco:

Si todos los habitantes fuéramos mestizos, no de la serranía, sería otra cosa. El mestizo trata de superar, el indígena es flojo, le gusta todo gratis, por eso se

queda así no más... La gente de la sierra es gente negativa...no hay espíritu de adelanto, de superación...es ignorancia, falta de educación, flojera más que todo. Como el pajarito en la sierra que en la noche dice frío, frío, mañana hago mi casa, y en la mañana amanece con sol, se calienta y rico se descansa hasta la noche cuando vuelva a cantar frío, frío.

(If all of the inhabitants here were *mestizos* and not from the highlands, it would be a different matter. The *mestizo* tries to progress, the indigenous people are lazy, they like everything for free, that's why they stay the way they are. The people from the sierra are negative people...there's no spirit of advancement, of progress... it's ignorance, a lack of education, but above all idleness. Like the little bird in the mountains which at night sings, cold, cold, tomorrow I'll build my house, and in the morning the sun comes up, it gets warm and happily rests till nightfall when it takes up its song again, cold, cold.)

Arequipans believe the Andean people expect to be able to reap the benefits of the city, as effortlessly as they pasture the sheep in the sierra, as Flora remarks:

Qué hacen en la sierra? se sientan a mirar crecer la hierba, los niños están sentaditos hora trás hora mirando las ovejas ¿Y qué hacen cuando vienen a la ciudad? tienden un pañuelo con unas cuantas naranjas y se sientan a mirarlas hasta que las venden. Vienen a la ciudad y esperan obtener el dinero de balde.

(What do they do in the sierra? they sit and watch the grass grow, the children sit there hour after hour watching the sheep. And what do they do when they come to the city? they spread out a handkerchief with a few oranges and sit and watch them till they sell them. They come to the city and expect to get money for nothing.)

However, the migrants know that just as they need the work Arequipa can offer them, so Arequipa needs their labour.

Alfonso defends the hard work they do:

No saben también que ellos vienen a colaborar, a ayudarles con su trabajo, así en la casa, porque necesitan sus empleadas; están explotados, entonces no reconocen ellos, pero realmente les están dando una mano, están dando una ayuda, no saben reconocer también.

(They don't realize that they come to collaborate, to help them with their work, like in the home, because they need their servants; they're exploited, so the Arequipans don't acknowledge them, but really they're giving them a hand, helping them out, they don't appreciate that.)

It is the *ambulantes* who most aggravate the Arequipans, alarmed by any sign of migrants organizing themselves and demanding rights. They find it perfectly acceptable for people to work for them as servants, where the employer controls both the economic and the personal freedom of the employee but the conditions of poor pay and subordination mean many prefer to work for themselves, with the status of an independent worker. This evidently constitutes a threat to the paternalistic system of employment, as Alfonso continues:

Hablan con odio ¿no? ¿por qué tienen que venirse por aquí? están malogrando la ciudad, ensuciando... Y es que mayormente nos ubicamos en los pueblos jóvenes y reclamamos muchas cosas ¿no? y eso no le gusta a mucha gente... Bueno, les digo yo, que el Perú es de todos y podemos caminar donde nos de la gana.

(They speak with hate, you know, why do they have to come here? they're ruining the city, mucking it up... And it's because most of us are to be found in the shanty towns and we demand a lot of things and a lot of people don't like that... Well, I say to them that Peru belongs to everybody and we can go wherever we please.)

Organization spreads the fear of political subversion: fresh migrants to the city are considered fodder for the terrorists who are said to take advantage of their naivety, offering board and lodging and education in return for sundry services such as planting bombs. Mistrust of migrants is increased by tales of maids posing as Adventists and found not to have religious tracts but terrorist propaganda and weapons

in their rooms. This prompts employers to tighten their control on people they consider to be not only subversive but also unsociable, uncommunicative and taciturn:

El poblador es muy calladito, tiene frustraciones milenarias, es sospechoso de lo que viene de fuera.
(Claudia)

(The settler is very quiet, they've got age-old frustrations, they're suspicious of whatever comes from outside.)

The Arequipans' discourses are contradictory: Claudia's assertion of the migrants' historical distrust of anything alien conflicts with the assumption of their vulnerability to political manipulation.

The characteristics ascribed to migrants by Arequipans are completely negative and steeped in centuries-old racial prejudice. Migrants are viewed according to a stereotype of the ugly, ignorant, brutish and lazy Indian, who is moreover violent, a drunkard and a delinquent. Arequipans on the other hand, are the antithesis: beautifully white, intelligent, refined and hard-working with a high sense of religion and morals. 'Whiteness' is both a racial and a social marker which Arequipans operate in defining themselves and their city, and a preserve which Arequipa's oligarchy has always felt it necessary to defend, along with their material wealth, against the ravages of indigenous immigrants. What the Arequipans want is for the migrants to conform to their standard, to stop being different and therefore 'difficult' and become like them

in behaviour without equalling them in access to economic and political power and status.

2.4. Locality and Ethnicity

Another dualistic categorization which Arequipans and migrants manipulate in identifying themselves, this time in relation to their place of birth or their dwelling place, is the coast/sierra dichotomy.

Arequipans think of themselves as coastal people even though, whilst the department of Arequipa comprises both coast and sierra, the city is situated at 2,335m above sea level and at the foot of three volcanic peaks (El Misti, Chachani and Picchu Picchu). It therefore qualifies as sierra. However, the Arequipans refuse to think of themselves as *serranos* ('highlanders'), inhabitants of the Andean sierra, which denomination identifies people in terms of locality but also denotes inferiority. They prefer to think of themselves as *costeños* ('coastal people'), who are equated with *criollos* ('creoles'), the descendants of the Spanish conquistadors.²² Urged to define Arequipa as either coast or sierra, one Arequipan humorously declared it was *cuesta* (slope), poised on the slopes of the Andean foothills rising from the coast and

²² On *criollos*, see Simmons (1955).

so conceding its altitude without including it in the higher ground of what he considered to be the 'sierra proper'.²³

The coastal *limeños* deem the Arequipans to be *serranos* and migrants from the highland departments contest the Arequipan tendency to label others as *serrano* whilst rejecting the term for themselves. Magdalena points to their hypocrisy:

Los arequipeños insultan a los que de otros sitios vienen, Arequipa también es sierra, es primero departamento de la sierra, creen que son norteños, no quieren ser serranos...se creen de Lima, insultan a los que vienen de Puno, no saben que Arequipa es primero serrano.

(The Arequipans insult those who come from other places, Arequipa's sierra too, it's first and foremost a department of the sierra, they think they're northerners, they don't want to be highlanders...they think they're from Lima, they insult those who come from Puno, they don't realize that Arequipa is first of all highlands.)

Mercedes remarks that the snowcaps of the volcanoes proves Arequipa to be more worthy of the name sierra than some other parts of the Andes:

¿Qué serranos? Yo he vivido en la sierra, pero nunca he vivido al pie de los nevados como acá.

(What highlanders? I've lived in the sierra, but I've never lived at the foot of snowcapped mountains like here.)

²³ A possible explanation for Arequipa's coastal delusions is to be found in Carpio (1976:61-5). He relates that Arequipa was to be Cusco's coastal outlet during the colony, transferred from Camaná where the Indians were unable to adapt and were susceptible to malaria. However, Cusco was not a mining centre but a supplier on an economic circuit serving mines from present-day Bolivia to the north of Peru and therefore did not require a port. Consequently Arequipa never became a colonial coastal outlet but had to develop its own commercial activity.

It is well established that identity tied to locality operates at different levels of interaction (e.g. of village, town, region, country) and therefore varies according to which level of reference is being operated (Horowitz 1975:118; Davison 1987:15). The term Arequipan, like any ethnic label, is ambiguous and comes to mean different things depending on who is using it.

As I have been using it so far, it refers specifically to the urban Arequipan for, at the level of the city of Arequipa, Arequipan means having been born in the departmental capital and is set up in opposition to *serrano*. Those from the highland provinces of the department of Arequipa are excluded from the Arequipan category and included in the category of *serrano*. They are disqualified by urban Arequipans because they are viewed in terms of a more localized and distinctly highland identity, as being from the province of Cailloma, or the village of Yanque for example.²⁴ However, the migrants from the department of Arequipa, whilst identifying with their respective communities of origin, also assume the identity of Arequipan, particularly where broader identities are brought into play in their encounter with those from other departments, whether in the shanties of Arequipa or beyond, in Lima for example.

²⁴ The problem does not arise to the same degree with migrants from Arequipa's coast who would still be placed in a different category from those of the urban Arequipan category but not denied the label of 'Arequipan'.

Arequipan-born descendants of migrants similarly experience the ambiguities of their Arequipan identity. On the one hand, they vaunt their birth status over their migrant neighbours. They value having been born not just in Arequipa but in the General Hospital, as if having been born within the institution of Arequipa's hospital endorses the legitimacy of their Arequipan identity, as Magdalena remarks of her sister-in-law:

Mi cuñada es más mala, dice cholo, indio, ella es arequipeña pero su esposo es puneño, es que los que tienen su partida diciendo 'nacido en el Hospital General' se creen mejor.

(My sister-in-law is awful, she says *cholo*, Indian, she's an Arequipan but her husband is from Puno, it's just that those who've got a birth certificate saying 'born in the General Hospital' think they're superior.)

Other second-generation migrants appropriate the notions of the Arequipan stereotype for themselves, expressing pride in being Arequipan and delighting in the antagonism it arouses. Miguel, the son of *cusqueños*, told me that when he travelled to Lima he was proud to tell people he was Arequipan and enjoyed the idea of Arequipa as a separate republic, relating a joke about a world conference where each speaker gives their name and country and the Arequipan delegate declares only 'Arequipa'.

However, although place of birth entitles someone to a particular identity and second and third-generation migrants are Arequipans on paper, their certificate is not in itself sufficient to attain recognition by those who consider

themselves legitimate holders of that identity. Those descended from Arequipan families stress the exclusivity of the Arequipan identity, view all migrants and their descendants as *serranos* and will not admit them as fellow Arequipans. It is not enough to have been born in Arequipa, one needs to be able to claim Arequipan ancestry for at least several generations and to meet other social requirements.

In addition to place of birth, one's ancestry is signalled by one's surname, taken as a social marker of coastal or highland status and as an indicator of racial identity since it marks people out as of *criollo* or indigenous descent (Pitt-Rivers 1973:3-31). Second-generation migrants are denied Arequipan status on the basis of their Andean surnames, as Cecilia exclaims: 'whoever heard of an Arequipan called Quispe, Condori or Mamani?'. In Peru, Spanish names are of high prestige and Andean names low, and migrants recognize this as an impediment to their social advancement in the city, as Eduardo, the Arequipan-born son of migrants from Cusco, explains:

Por tener apellidos indios, medio caiditos, Quispe, Condori, Mamani, acá en el Perú...ya estás castigado por vida ya a no ser algo.

(Just or having Indian surnames, a bit lowly, Quispe, Condori, Mamani, here in Peru...you're already condemned for life to be a nobody.)

A *puñena* I met on the bus going up to the shanties one day, proudly told me her baby's surname was 'Vega', like the famed Garcilaso de la Vega. Names are negotiable and for some

there is the possibility of acquiring a higher status name through marriage. However, not everyone can change their surname, but they can and do manipulate the ambiguities of other identifiers, like *serrano*, which are laden with social meaning and can be negotiated according to the context of the interaction in which they are used.

3. Socio-Economic Development and Expansion of Arequipa

3.1. Economic and Political History

Arequipa's socio-economic development has established it as the commercial and industrial centre of the south, attracting rural migrants from the Andes and beyond. However, this development has involved it in a struggle for an autonomous regional economy, generating political movements demanding decentralization from the Lima-based state.

In the nineteenth century, Arequipa participated in numerous revolutions and civil wars, earning it the denomination of *pueblo caudillo* or 'political strongman'²⁵ of Peru and in the twentieth century it has been the instigator of rebellions against dictatorial governments, as Rodolfo boasts:

Por algo se llamaba León del Sur, para guerras, revoluciones, Arequipa se levantaba y el resto temblaba, bien guerrero... León por lo bravo que eran, guerreros, valientes.

²⁵ *Caudillo* refers especially to a military leader with a large political following and has been applied to Arequipa as leader of various revolutionary movements in Peru (Wibel 1975).

Not for nothing was Arequipa called the Lion of the South, for wars, revolutions, Arequipa rose up and everyone trembled, great warriors... Lion because they were so fierce, fighters, brave.

Arequipa's regionalism was founded on the commercial circuit established around agriculture and mining during the colony. Given the lack of an adequate port and difficulty of overland access across the desert, rather than developing links with Lima and the north coast of Peru, Arequipa traded with the main towns of the southern sierra, present-day Bolivia and northern Argentina (Flores Galindo 1977:13,26). The population and production of the south were organized around the mines of Potosí up till the beginning of the nineteenth century when agriculture stagnated and mining and commercial activity were disrupted by independence movements.²⁶

Although the lower sectors of the population participated in the struggle for emancipation, the dominant classes remained loyal to Spain. Arequipa's colonial heritage, the predominance of 'whites' and the influence of the Church contributed to this royalism and earned the city the epithets 'Muy Noble y Leal' ('Very Noble and Loyal'), 'Arequipa la Fidelísima' ('Arequipa the Most Faithful') (Málaga 1981:117; Wibel 1975:9, 269-302) and a reputation as Catholic, reactionary and conservative (Víctor Andrés Belaúnde cited by Flores Galindo 1977:113).

²⁶ On Arequipa in the colony see Sánchez (1987).

In the first decade of the Republic, Arequipa experienced economic prostration but was revived by the development of the wool export trade. The wool trade continued the region's autonomy with regard to the national economy but, since it was dependent on British capital and centralized in Arequipa, it prevented the generation of an internal market and the reinvestment of capital in the sierra. The wool trade was dominated by the Arequipan oligarchy and foreign capitalists who strengthened their position at the expense of the peasant producers.²⁷ Arequipa's hegemony in the region was consolidated by the expansion of haciendas in the sierra and its control of the export industry through the oligarchic administration both of the English-owned export houses and of the flow of capital through the Bank of Arequipa (opened in 1870). Arequipa also benefited from improved communications with the interior through the building of the Mollendo-Arequipa railway in 1876.

As the wool trade began to fall into decline with competition from synthetic materials after the First World War, the region moved away from commerce with the exterior to the development of an internal market. In the 1920s, there was some expansion in the manufacturing industry as materials previously exported in their raw state began to be processed for regional and national use. In the 1940s, some local

²⁷ On the social structure of Arequipa during this period see Ponce (1980) and Villegas (1985).

entrepreneurs emerged with the foundation of a plant for flour-based products, the Sociedad Industrial del Sur (Sid Sur) and a brewery, the Compañía Cervecera del Sur (Caravedo 1978:40). The major area of growth, albeit under foreign capital, was dairy-based agro-industry with the foundation in 1939 of the Leche Gloria evaporated milk processing plant, owned by Carnation Milk, part of the North American General Milk Incorporation (Gallard & Vallier 1988:152-6).

The expansion of dairy farming led to modifications in Arequipan agriculture as lands were given over for pasture or the cultivation of forage, but did not affect the distribution of land in the immediate environs of Arequipa, which remained mainly in the hands of *minifundistas* ('small-holders'). In the first years of the Republic, apart from large estates owned by the aristocratic Goyeneche family and the Church, land ownership in the province of Arequipa was characterized by small and medium property holding, whilst haciendas predominated in the surrounding valleys or in the highland departments of Puno and Cusco.²⁸

However, the shift from wool exports to agro-industry and the expansion of Arequipan commercial capital enabled Arequipan merchants to acquire haciendas in Puno and Cusco, taking over communal lands, destroying local markets and

²⁸ Flores Galindo (1977:15-16) points to the land holding system in the province of Arequipa as one of the factors contributing to the characterization of Arequipan society as democratic and bourgeois.

leading to a greater monopolization of land holding. The agrarian oligarchy dominated but did not modernize production in the region so that once sheep farming went into decline and their livelihood on the land was threatened by the oligarchy, peasants from the southern sierra were attracted to the industrializing city of Arequipa in the thirties and forties. However, industry did not expand sufficiently to absorb the labour force, resulting in high levels of unemployment and under-employment (Manrique 1976).

Faltering industrial growth in the 1930s and 1940s and the excessive influx of rural migrants prompted the emergent industrial and manufacturing bourgeoisie to renew their pressure on the central government for economic and administrative autonomy for the southern region. Their demands were channelled by new political parties²⁹ and the Arequipan bourgeoisie emerged as a political force which was to have considerable influence on the governments of that period, precipitating a coup by general Sanchez Cerro in 1933 (Castillo 1990). In 1936, Arequipa's Partido Liberal Independiente ('Independent Liberal Party') was influential in the election of Jorge Prado and made several regional demands and in 1945 the Arequipan bourgeoisie backed José Luis Bustamante y Rivero, an *arequipeño* with personal sympathies for the region.

²⁹ The Liga Autonomista was formed in 1930 and the Frente Democrática Nacional in the 1940s. See Adriánzen (1990) on political thought in the period 1930-68.

However, the growth initiated by these governments favourable to Arequipa, came to a standstill in the late 1940s and 1950s, when the industrial development of the south was crippled by Odría's price controls, competition from products from Lima and abroad, and increasing monopolization of regional industries (drinks, textiles, leather) as Odría renewed the emphasis on an export economy concentrated in Lima and Callao. The situation was exacerbated by severe droughts in Puno and Cusco which reduced the buying power of those departments on which Arequipa's market relied and increased rural-urban migration to the city, where the deteriorating industrial situation was unable to accommodate them.

The crisis provoked by Odría's policies in the south reinforced the bourgeoisie's demands for economic and political decentralization, industrialization and agrarian reform and to increase hostility to the military regime. In 1950, the Arequipan bourgeoisie formed the Liga Democrática ('Democratic League') and organized a series of mass meetings and marches, placing Arequipa at the centre of anti-Odría antagonism.

The situation reached a climax in June 1950 when the military violently repressed what began as a student strike and evolved into a mass protest. In the wake of this uprising, trade unions and political organizations were harshly repressed and the southern region fell prey to monopolizing interests. Discontent grew and in 1955 the bourgeoisie united

with the working classes, peasantry and migrant sector under the Movimiento Democrático Cristiano (MDC: 'Christian Democratic Movement') (Roncagliolo 1990:288-98) and entered a new phase of political struggle, culminating in a mass meeting on 21 December in which the police intervened, provoking a general uprising which was violently repressed but which proved influential in forcing Odría to agree to elections in 1956.

In the last thirty years, Arequipa has experienced growth and then decline as a result of widespread economic crisis. In the sixties, there were moves to recuperate the regional dynamic and develop local industry aided by Velasco's emphasis on import-substituting industry. However, this consisted of the assembly of imported intermediary products, only exacerbating the dependence on foreign technology. Nevertheless, with state support, the Junta de Rehabilitación y Desarrollo de Arequipa ('Rehabilitation and Development Corps of Arequipa') was formed in 1963 and founded the Industrial Park of Río Seco. The expanding industry attracted migrants, but although by the beginning of the seventies there were 1,350 jobs in the industrial park, these were mainly for technical and skilled workers and few openings were available to the non-skilled migrant workers whose agricultural background and lack of training confined them to under-employment in the informal sector. In the late seventies, industry ran into crisis, many firms shut down and 500 jobs

were lost in Arequipa. Furthermore, whilst Arequipa did benefit from state aid for major industrial, mining and agricultural projects, like the Majes irrigation scheme and the Cerro Verde mining project, their completion at this time increased the number of redundancies.

In the first year of the Aprista government, attempts were made to boost regional development with state investment and the facilitation of credit to the most depressed areas of the country (Ayacucho, Puno, Cusco, Apurímac). However, the failure of García's neo-liberal policies during the eighties terminated such schemes and paralysed industry in the more developed regions. As waged employment decreased in the official sector, more workers were forced into the informal economy, in which half the working population were engaged in 1985 and most of those migrants.

3.2. Internal Migration to Arequipa

Over the centuries Arequipa has expanded with the successive settlement of peoples migrating from the interior and the coast and given its prominence in the region at the centre of first commercial and then industrial development, it has remained a pole of attraction for peoples from the poorer, less developed areas of the south (Martínez 1969, 1983). In the last thirty years the population growth rate of the department of Arequipa has been one of the highest in the country and the population of the province of Arequipa

(concentrated in the capital) has almost tripled, from 222,237 in 1961 to an estimated 688,681 in 1989.³⁰ However, unofficial estimates calculate the actual population to be approaching one million, given the rapid expansion of the *pueblos jóvenes*. This demographic growth has been due to accelerated internal migration up to 1975, after which the rate of migration decreased owing to the deterioration of living and working conditions in the city. Nevertheless, in 1978 migrants still made up almost half of Arequipa's population (Chávez 1987:50) and current estimates reckon they constitute 60 per cent.

The vast majority of migrants to Arequipa come from the department of Puno, but also from other regions of the southern sierra, particularly Cusco and the department of Arequipa itself, and to a lesser degree from the coast and *selva*.³¹ In the two shanty towns where I worked, migrants from the highland provinces of Arequipa predominated in Río Seco (48 per cent), whilst in Porvenir there was a higher proportion of *puneños* (57 per cent).³² In both *pueblos*

³⁰ Figures from the 1961 and 1981 census, Instituto Nacional de Estadística. On demography of Arequipa and the southern region I have referred to: CNP 1984; CEPIA 1985a, 1985b; Colque 1985; Guerra et al. 1980; Guerra 1983, 1986.

³¹ In 1961, 41% of the migrant population were from Puno, 21% from the department of Arequipa and 15% from Cusco. In 1971, the *puñenos* were still the biggest group, making up 37% of migrants, but decreased proportionally in relation to the number of migrants coming from the interior of Arequipa which rose to 28% (Chávez 1987:52).

³² This is partly due to the fact that the road from Arequipa's sierra enters the city from the north west, where Río Seco is situated, and the road from Puno enters on the

jóvenes, 14 per cent of migrants come from the department of Cusco and the remainder from a variety of other departments, from the coast (Moquegua, Tacna), *sierra* (Ayacucho, Ancash, Apurímac) and *selva* (La Libertad) (see fig.1). The high incidence of migrants from Arequipa and Puno warrants a few words about these departments.

Within the department of Arequipa, 70 per cent of the departmental population are concentrated in the province of Arequipa (against 50 per cent in 1950). The concentration of industrial growth in the city of Arequipa and agricultural expansion in the valleys and coastal areas³³ means that migrants from the department come mostly from the highland districts of the provinces of Cailloma, Caravelí, Castilla, Condesuyos and La Unión, which are oriented towards cattle farming and backward in comparison to the rest of the department, being far from the urban markets of the capital³⁴ (see fig.2).

eastern side where Porvenir is located.

³³ Cotton, sugar cane and food crops are cultivated in Camaná and Islay; the Majes irrigation scheme has benefited the low-lying valleys of the province of Castilla.

³⁴ On the distribution of wealth in the department see Pacheco (1986), Gallard & Vallier (1988). 93% of the department's industries (agro-industry, food processing, fishing, mining and manufacturing), three-quarters of total production and slightly less of the workforce are concentrated in the province of Arequipa. Most of the departments' arable land is located in the coastal valleys and the province of Arequipa, where over 40% of the department's cattle and alfalfa are produced for the dairy industry as well as a large proportion of vegetable crops.

Migration from Puno is prompted by a number of factors typical of the situation of the sierra in terms of overpopulation and lack of land. Puno has experienced excessive population growth (from 686,260 in 1961 to 809,136 in 1970) in proportion to the available arable land. Population growth has divided lands into ever-dwindling *minifundios*.³⁵ In addition to the monopolization of land by *gamonales* and the lack of technological improvement discussed in Chapter One, Puno is subject to natural disaster, victim to drought and flooding as well as frost and hail, during which times the famine-afflicted population are forced to migrate.

Puno is divided by the Andes into two distinct zones: the *altiplano* or high plain, a flat expanse of land at high altitude (from 3,800m to over 4,000m above sea level) and the *montaña* or sub-tropical region on the eastern slopes of the Andes. Most migrants come to Arequipa from the *altiplano* (provinces of Azángaro, Chucuito, Huancané, Lampa Melgar, Puno, San Román, Yunguyo). *Puneños* from these areas have followed seasonal patterns of migration to the coastal valleys, and more recently the migratory trend has been facilitated by the construction of both the Tacna-Arequipa road and the Puno-Arequipa railway. Few migrate from the regions of the *ceja de selva* (Carabaya, Sandia), tending to travel eastward to the Amazon in search of work. (see fig.2)

³⁵ These are parcels of approximately 1.5 hectares per family whilst a minimum of 1 hectare is required per person).

3.3. Urban Expansion of Arequipa

Two factors contributed to the first period of growth of metropolitan Arequipa (Leyton & Gil 1987, 1988). First, the overpopulation of the town centre in the early fifties forced native *arequipeños* to form new urbanizations on the outskirts, organizing themselves to demand land rights and founding the Comité Unico de Urbanizaciones Populares ('United Committee of Popular Organizations') which adopted an anti-Odría stance. Secondly, the earthquakes which shook the city in 1958 and 1960 destroyed parts of the town centre and required the relocation of the population in peripheral areas.

A second stage of urban expansion was marked by the accentuation of poverty in the sierra and the process of industrialization initiated by the Rehabilitation and Development Corps in Arequipa, attracting increasing numbers of Andean migrants in the late 1950s and giving rise to the uncontrolled urbanization of the barren wastelands around the city. These settlements later developed their own organization, the Asociación de Urbanizaciones Populares de Arequipa (AUPA: 'Association of Popular Urbanizations of Arequipa'), a grass-roots organization which championed the cause of the popular sectors and channelled their demands for housing and their protests against Odría.³⁶

³⁶ AUPA was founded with just a handful of *pueblos jóvenes* and now has 200 affiliates. It has been targeted by successive repressive governments, sometimes outlawed but continuing to operate underground and resisting competition first from Velasco's SINAMOS which installed itself in AUPA's offices and

Internal migration continued to rise throughout the second period, 1971 to 1980, but by this time the *pueblos jóvenes* in the north (districts of Cercado Arequipa and Miraflores) and south (districts of Socabaya and Paucarpata) of the city were reaching saturation point and migrants moved into the expanding areas in the north-west (Cayma and Cerro Colorado) and east (Mariano Melgar) of the city. (see fig.3) In the seventies, Velasco's policies for the popular sectors involved the state housing body (Junta Nacional de la Vivienda) with AUPA and the foundation of SINAMOS increased government intervention in the *pueblos jóvenes*, reducing their independence but facilitating their legalization.

After the disbanding of SINAMOS and the return to civilian government, AUPA was unable to deal with the demands of the rapidly developing *pueblos jóvenes* and *pobladores* began to negotiate directly with the authorities without the mediation of AUPA. Their demands became more localized, and the collective socio-political vision was thereby reduced as they concentrated on individual requirements for water and sanitation, education, health and transport (Leyton & Gil 1987). As I will show in Chapter Three, once these demands are met, even the organizations within *pueblo jóvenes* have a tendency to break down although the economic crisis of recent

subsequently from parallel organizations instituted by García's APRA government (Zegarra 1979).

years has brought forth new forms of grass-roots organizations.

In the 1980s, the area of highest growth was the north-eastern zone of Arequipa, known as the *cono norte*, which had the greatest possibilities of expansion given the existence of vast expanses of wastelands along the Arequipa-Yura road. Although many migrants have moved into the area, there is a greater percentage of *arequipeños* than in other parts, many of whom are speculators, already having homes in other districts of the city and forming powerful groups who traffic in land and housing rights.

In Chapter Three I will go on to discuss the shanty towns of Río Seco and Porvenir and the process by which the migrants become settlers in new communities, finding new ways in which to organize and contest the prejudices to which they are at first subject in the city and the discrimination which they and their children continue to experience.

CHAPTER THREE**EMERGENCE OF A POPULAR IDENTITY IN THE SHANTY TOWNS**1. Introduction to Río Seco and Porvenir

Río Seco is situated in the district of Cerro Colorado in the north-west of Arequipa (fig.3 & 4). Lying between irrigated agricultural land and the arid foothills of Mount Chachani, Río Seco gets its name from a little stream which used to run down from the mountains in the rainy season (January-March) but dried up during the rest of the year.¹ Porvenir is the furthest point of urban expansion rising into the foothills of El Misti, at the tip of an extensive development leading from the city centre up to the *pueblos jóvenes* of the upper parte of Miraflores, which in the last twenty years have branched out from Alto Misti, an older and more established urbanization (fig.3 & 5).

The adult population of both shanties is composed largely of migrants from the southern Andean region.² Río Seco has a population of 2,150, half the size of Porvenir with 4,300.³ The shanty towns are divided into *lotes* ('plots of land') and

¹ The source of this anecdote was Río Seco's first president, Rafael.

² Whilst the heads of households are mostly first generation migrants, 80% of children are born in Arequipa.

³ All statistics for Río Seco in this section are from a document drawn up by the Facultad de Enfermería (1988). For Porvenir, the figures are from reports by Ama Kella and a survey carried out by myself and members of Ama Kella in 1989.

blocks of land lots are politically divided into *comités* ('committees'), of which Río Seco has eight and Porvenir thirteen.

Although bordered by the Arequipa-Yura main road, Río Seco itself has no paved roads and only one irregular *micro* ('mini-bus') runs into the shanty town so people have to use the state-owned Enatru bus which serves the *cono norte* or take *micros* from the Zámacola junction. Whilst most of Porvenir's roads are dust tracks, there is one paved road which extends from the city centre up to the area of most recent settlement and buses and *colectivos* (shared taxis) pass along there.

As is typical of Peru's *pueblos jóvenes*, the houses are gradually built by the *pobladores* themselves, adding another room or storey as and when they can afford it. Some manage to raise a two-storey house, but most are at an intermediate stage with rooms of *material noble*, that is, bricks or cement blocks, and others of *material rústico*, such as stone or *sillar*, the cheapest and most readily available material, quarried near Río Seco.⁴ It is common for a plot to contain separate rooms at different stages of construction, at least one of which is usually suitably roofed and floored for habitation. If no other rooms are finished, whole families of

⁴ On types of self-help housing in Peru see Riofrío & Driant (1987). It is interesting to note that the more refined materials are designated 'noble' as against 'rustic', indicating notions of civilization.

often seven or eight children will share that room. Most plots house more than one family so overcrowding can be acute.

Both *pueblos jóvenes* have electricity, although the most recent settlements, like Committee Eight, which lies in the gully at the far end of Río Seco, are not yet connected to the electricity supply and in Porvenir, there are problems with new neighbouring *pueblos jóvenes* wiring up to their cables and stealing their electricity. Neither of them have a domestic water supply and sewage system, although the pipes are laid and they are waiting to be connected. People have *pozos* ('wells'), cemented water tanks which they fill with water purchased periodically from the tanker which visits the *pueblos jóvenes*. In Porvenir, there is also a public well and a standpipe, and in Río Seco the vast majority of people fetch water from the irrigation channel bordering the farmlands which, unlike the drinking water sold by SEDAPAR, the water board, is free but carries a health risk. Most families have some sort of latrine which may just be a hole in the ground. Refuse is collected once a week, but the gulleys and wastelands are also used as rubbish tips.

Both shanties have schools which offer nursery, primary and secondary education although those who can afford it prefer to send their children to schools in the town centre where they believe the standards and discipline to be superior. Porvenir has a permanent health post and a dental surgery but Río Seco relies on the student nurses and outside

term time the people have to seek medical attention in Zamácola. The shanties have a telephone and telegraph post, but no postal service and no police post, the only authority being symbolically invested in the *teniente gobernador*. There are both catholic and protestant churches and the parish of Christ the Worker in Porvenir also houses the health post and the church building is used as a village hall (something Río Seco lacks). Porvenir also has a popular library, widely used by school children who cannot afford to purchase the reference books they require and the popular communication centre, Ama Kella. Both have football pitches and some sort of children's play area.

The *pueblos jóvenes* are supplied with several small shops and have a market. Río Seco's market stalls are set up in the main square since the plot allocated for the market is currently occupied by a bus owner who refuses to remove his vehicles. Porvenir also has a *mercado del pueblo* ('people's market'), a store set up under the APRA government to sell basic foodstuffs to the poor at fixed prices, but which fell foul to internal corruption, was unable to function during the food shortages occasioned during the economic crisis and remained closed for long periods. *Ambulantes* also come from outside to ply their wares and several *pobladores* set up impromptu stalls to sell fruit or home-brewed *chicha*, or run a business from their homes (as mechanics, carpenters, cobblers, hairdressers, photographers).

I have given detailed descriptions of the shanty towns not merely to set the scene, but in order to illustrate at what stage of development they find themselves. I will proceed to the histories of these shanties, charting the progression of the migrants from their first arrival in the city to the foundation of the *pueblos jóvenes*. I will look at how their grass-roots organization is crucial to their achievements and central to the construction of new identities in opposition to the 'powerful' with whom they come into contact: the Arequipans, local authorities, the Church and charities.

2. From Migrant to Settler

2.1. First Arrival in Arequipa

Although the migrant's arrival in the city is facilitated by an extended family network, the majority being able to contact relatives or neighbours who provide lodging and assistance in seeking employment at the outset,⁵ many nevertheless experience loneliness and isolation in the city, separated from their home communities and in an alien environment where the Arequipans make them aware they do not belong and are not welcome. This is especially the case of women, like Esmeralda, who migrate alone and go straight into domestic service, the

⁵ Two thirds of migrants make the move with parents or partners and have relatives or neighbours to contact in the city. Calculations in this chapter are based on my own data unless otherwise specified.

most common form of employment for newly arrived female migrants:

Al venir, triste andaba, no conocía a nadie, lamentaba mi mamá, sufraba (sic) de mi familia, los dos primeros meses lloraba.

(On arrival, I went along all sad, I didn't know anyone, I wept for my mother, I missed my family, I spent the first two months crying.)

Whilst some have previous experience of living outside their home town or village, having followed patterns of seasonal migration to the coast or *selva* or having worked in the mines and valleys of the department of Arequipa, the majority of migrants come directly to Arequipa from their places of origin and express both bewilderment at the unfamiliarity of the city and enjoyment of the novelty. They are impressed by the buildings and the grand houses (Flor de María said she's didn't know where you went in: 'no sabía por donde entrar'), by the bright lights in the shops, the bustle and the traffic. Olga said she loved being amongst people after the silence and solitude of the sierra and would spend all day riding on the tram cars, but others, like Jacinta, were afraid to go out:

Era bien vergonzosa, me escondía, no quería ir a jugar a la calle, en la casa no más quería estar, es que vivía en la chacra. (Jacinta)

(I was shy, I would hide, I didn't want to go out to play, I had to stay in the house, it's that I used to live in the country.)

Communicating in Spanish presents one of the major obstacles for monolingual Quechua or Aymara speakers in

migrating to the predominantly Spanish-speaking city and subjects them to prejudice and discrimination. Almost a third of the migrants I interviewed had been monolingual in Quechua or Aymara on arrival in Arequipa (of which a quarter were Quechua speakers).⁶ The incidence of Quechua or Aymara monolingualism is especially high amongst women who had had fewer opportunities to learn Spanish in their home communities, whereas obligatory military service had forced the men out into a Spanish-speaking environment:

Quechua no más sabía al venir, sufraba (sic) de eso, no sabía nada...a la fuerza tenía que aprender, siempre acá puro castellano hablan. Mis hermanos sabían, en el cuartel habían aprendido, ellos también sabían leer, yo no, nunca he ido al colegio. (Enriqueta)

(I only knew Quechua when I came, I suffered from that, I didn't know anything...I was forced to learn, they only speak Spanish all the time here. My brothers knew, they'd learnt in the army, they knew how to read as well, I didn't, I've never been to school.)

However, learning Spanish is facilitated for many women and girls by their immediate entry into domestic service where they are forced to learn commands, as Esmeralda recalls: 'eso de traer, tomar sabía, tenía que aprender así en casa' ('words like fetch, take, I knew, I had to learn that in the house'). She laughs remembering the mistakes she used to make: 'siempre me recuerdo que me decían, trae calcetín y ¡yo traía escoba!' ('I always remember that they told me to fetch a sock and I'd

⁶ Over half the migrants were bilingual and a small percentage trilingual in an autochthonous language(s) plus Spanish. A minority were monolingual Spanish speakers arriving from the coast or the environs of Arequipa.

take the broom!'). Others, like Ester, remember being ridiculed for speaking Quechua and are aware that lack of Spanish is equated with general ignorance and an inability to perform in the city:

Dicen serranito, cholito, porque no saben nada, ni castellano, no saben trabajar...cuando recién vienen de la sierra les miran, les tratan de serranos...como no saben bien hablar el castellano.

(They say little highlander, little *cholo*, because they don't know Spanish, they don't know how to work...when they have just arrived from the sierra, they look at them, they call them highlanders... because they don't know how to speak Spanish well.)

The disapproval they receive makes many Quechua speakers feel ashamed of their native tongue and in the city, where they have come to progress, migrants may deny all knowledge of the language:

Mucha gente tiene miedo, vergüenza ¿no? porque esos nos han hecho creer que el Quechua es de las cosas pasadas, de la época que ya no servía...nos quieren asustar, que nuestro idioma ya no sirve, en realidad no es así pues. (Alfonso)

(Many people are afraid, ashamed, you know, because that lot have made them believe Quechua is a thing of the past, of an age which was no good anymore...they want to frighten us, that our language is no good, when in reality that's not how it is.)

Both Quechua and Quechuized Spanish receive criticism from urban Arequipans, bar migrants from certain jobs and social circles, and disqualify them from recognition as full citizens of Arequipa. The Arequipans deride the protest marches in which migrants claim their rights as true '*arquepiños*', ridiculing the Andean pronunciation of *arequipeño* (the 'i' and 'e' being interchangeable in Quechua).

Migrants acknowledge that their low levels of education place them at a disadvantage in Arequipa. The majority have not progressed beyond primary school,⁷ prevented by the rural life of the sierra from acquiring the professional status needed to compete with Arequipans:

De allá pocos son profesionales, por el cultivo dejan de educarse, en la sierra no habían educadores, el estudio era un lujo. (Ceferina)

(There are few professionals from back there, because of the crops they have to leave off their education, in the sierra there were no teachers, studying was a luxury.)

Through lack of education many migrants are excluded from the better paid jobs which are only available to those with a higher education. The majority of *pobladores* are self-employed and form part of the informal sector.⁸ The overall

⁷ Approximately 40% in both Río Seco and Porvenir have some primary education, roughly half of those completing primary school. The figures are similar for secondary school but few go on to higher education. Men tend to have higher levels of education than women and migrants from the department of Arequipa than those from the remote highland provinces of Puno and Cusco. Second-generation migrants tend to progress further than their parents. In Porvenir no illiteracy was found amongst the second-generation; only 2% did not go beyond primary school, as against 42% of their parents; 17% completed secondary school against 7% of their parents and 10% went on to higher education against 2%. The dramatic improvement between first and second-generation migrants indicates important social change and at least a partial realization of goals.

⁸ A report by Ama Kella's planning party for 1987, registered 60% of Porvenir's population of working age as underemployed (in part-time work or self-employed without any security and earning less than the minimum wage), 30% in full-time employment (earning more than the minimum wage) and 10% unemployed. Those who are self-employed either run their own small business or work as *ambulantes* engaged in some form of commerce. A high percentage of women declare their occupation as 'housewife', although many are also engaged in money-making

feature of migrants' working histories was one of resourcefulness and adaptability, usually working through a succession of temporary jobs or entering the informal sector, often with the expressed aim of finally establishing their own small business, trade or workshop.⁹

One of their main concerns in the city, after finding a job, is to study in order to improve their employment prospects. Many employers allow their domestic servants to go to school but others, like Ricardo, have to work during the day and attend evening classes at night:

Soltero todavía estudiaba, por las tardes, por las noches, la cosa es terminar, siempre trabajando y estudiando, no tenía quien apoyarme.

(When I was still single, I studied in the evening, at night, the thing was to finish, working at the same time, I didn't have anyone to support me.)

However, they are often prevented by force of circumstances from realizing their aspirations to educate

activities in the informal sector, commerce or domestic work. Approximately 10% are *obreros*, full-time manual workers in one of Arequipa's factories such as the brewery or Yura's cement factory. Many more are employed on a temporary basis, having to hire out their labour in the construction industry or as agricultural labourers.

⁹ Given that a high proportion of migrants came to Arequipa young, a third of them had not had a paid job before leaving their places of origin although those from the rural areas would have grown up working on the land. Apart from agricultural work, migrants had been previously engaged in commerce, construction, mining and domestic service. I found no correlation between work done before migration and the occupation in which *pobladores* were engaged in Arequipa, although some, like the agricultural workers in Río Seco, continued to do the same kind of work to which they were accustomed.

themselves in the city. Some are able to complete primary school and progress to secondary, but others are obliged by employers or family to give up their schooling. Several women told me how they intended to complete secondary school and study a skill such as dress-making or nursing but found themselves without the financial resources to continue, or else they met a partner, got pregnant and were unable to finish their studies. Even where migrants did complete some form of higher education, few were able to exercise their training, finding themselves at a disadvantage against Arequipans from the university, as Edilberto testifies:

No hay trabajo para nosotros acá, hay demasiado profesionales de la universidad, nos dejan chicos, nos pisotean.

(There's no work for us here, there are too many professionals from the university, they make us look small, they trample us underfoot.)

Fluent Spanish and a good education do not guarantee social advancement for migrants or their children who continue to face discrimination as they look for jobs or seek promotion. Elmer relates a bitter experience of having secured a good post in an army office on completing his military service, but because of his Andean origins, he was gradually downgraded until he was finally forced to resign:

Se hace una discriminación, por el hecho de que uno es serrano o cholo, como uno viene de allá, entonces te dicen bueno, primer requisito ser arequipeño, te presentas y eres arequipeño, pero tus padres son del interior, entonces allí tienes un problema, te perjudica.

(They discriminate against you, for the fact that you're a highlander or *cholo*, because you come from out there,

so then they say to you, alright, first requirement, to be Arequipan, you present yourself and you're Arequipan, but your parents are from the interior, so then you've got a problem, it goes against you.)

At the same time as endeavouring to make a living and pursue their education, migrants have to look for a place to live, especially where they have begun to form their own families and have outgrown the parental home. Given the saturation of the available living space in the city centre, migrants strike further out and begin to inhabit the wastelands surrounding Arequipa. The collective purpose of securing a piece of land on which to build, draws strangers together, word goes round through family, friends and neighbours that an invasion is being planned, that lots are to be had, and thus are sown the seeds of solidarity, friendship and intimacy, as César recalls:

La voz pues ¿no? y así la agrupación se junta y esos otros más, más y así va creciendo, de un momento a otro nos conocemos.

(By word of mouth, isn't it, that's how the group gets together and then more come along and more and it keeps growing, from one moment to the next we got to know each other.)

Whilst migrants rely on the support of extended family networks in the city, initially they are dispersed throughout a generally hostile environment. The coming together to form the shanty town forges relationships amongst strangers from different backgrounds who come to be *vecinos* ('neighbours') in a new dwelling place. The invasion and subsequent building of the shanty town marks the transition from migrant to *poblador*

('settler') for it is in settling the land, populating the desert and building a *pueblo joven* ('a new town') that there emerges a sense of collective achievement, of solidarity, of belonging to a community (Degregori, Blondet & Lynch 1986; Blondet 1991).

2.2. Invasion and Foundation

As migrants move in to take and settle lands, they encounter other opposing groups in confrontation with which new identities are constructed. The encounter is envisualized in terms of a series of dichotomies: the landed versus the homeless, the authorities versus those challenging their authority, the institutionalized versus the grass roots. The divisions are based on the imbalance of economic and political power. The union of migrants of disparate backgrounds is founded on a common interest, to secure a place to live in the city, and sealed in an unspoken pact to wage war on their common enemies: the *gamonales* ('landowners'), the local authorities, the State.

Both Río Seco and Porvenir are built on wastelands originally owned by the State.¹⁰ In 1921, Arequipan landowners

¹⁰ The histories of the *pueblos jóvenes* were related to me by founder members: in Río Seco especially by Rafael and in Porvenir by Ramón and César, all pioneers still on the directing body. Río Seco's history has also been recorded by the Facultad de Enfermería (1988) and Porvenir's is included in a pamphlet produced for the 'Primera Convención P.J. Porvenir Miraflores' on its twenty fifth anniversary in 1987.

sought permission from the government to irrigate the arid lands of Río Seco and an irrigation channel was laid in 1927. The first farmers settled there in 1928, to be joined later by wealthy families from Puno who had come to settle in Arequipa. This group of *gamonales* petitioned the mayor of Cayma for portions of land and according to Río Seco's first president, Rafael, Bustamante y Rivero gave authorization for the lands to be divided into dwelling plots in 1945.¹¹ Over the next decade, migrants mainly from the surrounding provinces of Arequipa arrived in Río Seco and laid claim to the lands staked out by the *gamonales*.

The migrants believed their need for land outweighed that of the *gamonales* whom they accused of speculation. The migrants' urgent need for a place to live is set against the greed of the rich who already had more than they required. In this instance, the confrontation takes place between the landed and the homeless, the rich and the poor, between superfluity and want. It is this imbalance which legitimates the migrants' invasion, as Cándida, one of the founder members relates:

Los millonarios estaban abarcando todo, toda esta manzana, por ejemplo, era de un solo dueño, tenían en la chacra sus casas pero acá hacían sus canchones. ¿Para qué? para acaparar, para negociar, para vender.

(The millionaires were taking over everything, all this block for example, it belonged to one landlord, they had their houses in the fields but they marked out huge areas

¹¹ One of the first *puneños* to come to Río Seco recalls having made their application for land around 1956-58.

of land here. What for? to hog it all, to do business, to sell.)

In the face of opposition from the *gamonales*, the migrants sought official recognition for their right to appropriate the unused lands. Needing someone to tackle the excessive bureaucracy of the legal channels, they sought out a leader in Rafael, whose family had moved from Arequipa's coast to farm there. He relates how, having declared the *pueblo joven* officially founded, he led an invasion to consolidate their position:

Para fundar Río Seco...para tomar fuerza, hicimos invasión, amaneció como un circo...Toditos entraron... pusieron carpitas con esteras y su banderita. Después unos han venido particularmente, han invadido lotes abandonados, nosotros les apoyamos.

(In order to found Río Seco...in order to get up strength, we staged an invasion, at dawn it looked like a circus... Absolutely everyone went in...they put up little tents with matting and their little flag. Later some came on their own account, they invaded abandoned plots and we supported them.)

There is some confusion in people's memory over whether an invasion took place in either Río Seco or Porvenir, perhaps because there is a tendency, demonstrated here by Rodolfo, to deny any invasion because it is illegal and it is important to the settlers to have their legality recognized:

No, no había invasión, si eso es prohibido, penado, todos los terrenos eran del estado.

(No, there was no invasion, if that's prohibited, it's a punishable offence, all these lands belonged to the State.)

The accounts of founder members confirm that they did carry out an invasion in defiance of the *gamonales* who tried

to oust the invaders forcibly, taking trucks to carry away the *sillar* with which the people had demarcated their own boundaries and built a first room for themselves. Migrants describe the physical and verbal violence to which they were subjected. Cándida depicts the struggle between poor, unarmed invaders and rich and powerful owners:

Entonces la gente pobre se junta, me hace inscribir... hemos invadido. De allí una lucha, los dueños venían a botarnos...hemos tenido que meter lío, bastante hemos sufrido, indios coqueros nos decían... Hemos invadido en la noche, con todas mis cosas, mis hijos, animales. Con toldito no más, con palitos y toldera de costal, un mes, dos meses hemos estado así casi, poco a poco hemos construido... He peleado a trompada, han venido a botarnos, no han podido.

(So the poor people get together, they get me to enrol...we invaded. From there it was a struggle, the landowners came to throw us out...we had to kick up a fuss, we suffered a lot, coca-chewing Indians they said to us... We invaded at night, with all my things, my children and animals. With nothing more than a little tent, made of sticks and an awning made out of a sack, we were like that for a month, almost two months we were like that, then bit by bit we built... I've fought tooth and nail, they came to throw us out, but they couldn't.)

Solidarity was the key to their success: the fight for the right to land caused the people to rally round to defend each other and particularly to defend their leader, for whom there was a collective sense of protection, admiration and affection. Their perseverance in resisting the landowners prepared them to challenge institutionalized authorities on a wider scale, here embodied in the police force:

El dueño de estos lotes vivía en Zámocola, vino con su familia, los que tenían carro, carro nos han metido, había que ir a llamar a los vecinos para defendernos. A Don Rafael cuanto le han paleado, bien valiente ha sido, ha sufrido bastante... Le llevaron preso, todos fuimos

con el ómnibus a la comisaría ¿qué van a hacer con tanta gente? tenía que soltarle no más... Por eso nosotros le queremos bastante el pueblo, por el tenemos todo. (Cándida)

(The owner of these plots lived in Zamácola, he came with his family, those who had vehicles drove in with vehicles, we had to go and call the neighbours to defend ourselves. How badly they beat Don Rafael, he was so brave, he suffered a lot... They arrested him, we all went to the police station on the bus, what are they going to do with so many people? they just had to let him go... That's why the people love him a lot, it's thanks to him we've got all this.)

Having stood their ground and undertaken the official formalities, on 14 July 1967, the Urbanización de Interés Social de Río Seco ('Urbanization of Social Interest Río Seco') was founded and incorporated into the district of Cerro Colorado (founded 1955) and on 14 July 1969, at the time when Velasco decreed that all shanty towns be registered, it was recorded in the General Register of *Pueblos Jóvenes*.

The lands on which Porvenir now lies were likewise state-owned wastelands, used as a rubbish tip by the inhabitants of the settlements below. The adjoining lands were totally unsuitable for cultivation and, unlike Río Seco, the development of the *pueblo joven* was not the result of speculation by *gamonales*, but an extension of the planned urbanization of the Upper Miraflores area to cater for the second wave of Andean migrants arriving in the sixties. On 2 January 1960, a group of migrants from the department of Puno

invaded a barren hill at the top of Alto Misti.¹² However, since plans had already been made for the urbanization of that area, the invaders were denounced by inhabitants of what is now Unión Edificadores Misti who were in the process of legalizing their own settlement. The Civil Guard moved in, the leaders were arrested and everyone was evicted.

Undeterred, the invaders reassembled and in March 1964, struck further up the mountain side onto tracts of unused land, renaming their settlement Porvenir, which means 'Future'. After further confrontations with the authorities, approval of the plan of the *pueblo joven* was granted during the Belaúnde government (1963-68). People continued to arrive in droves and the first settlement had to be expanded further up the Misti's flanks in two subsequent invasions, the last one between 1976 and 1977. After the initial invasions, the land was divided into plots and distributed by lottery, but titles were not granted till several years later, after the lengthy legal procedures had been completed.¹³ Vicente explains:

Ya estaban lotizando, había lotes vacantes...cuota inicial damos, entonces dicen este lote es para ti, así... Antes había que tramitarse, había este SINAMOS, a este tenía que hacer tramite todos, para el título de la propiedad, todo eso.

¹² On 31 December 1962 this settlement was named 'El Morro Sin Vivienda Propia [The Hill Without Its Own Housing] María Delgado de Odría' (later renamed the Pueblo Joven Peñon Alfonso Ugarte).

¹³ For details of the legalities see Serrano (1987:227-40).

They were already dividing up lots, there were some empty lots...we pay an initial quota, then they say this lot is for you, and so on... Before that you have to go through the legal procedure, there was this SINAMOS, everyone had to present their papers to them, to get the property title and all that.

The foundation is only the first step: the building then has to begin, making the barren lands suitable for human habitation. The founders, conscious of being pioneers in the wastelands, describe the inhospitable terrain they first encountered: uneven, rocky land, arid and bare, where only mountain grasses and thorns grew and where lions were said to roam wild. They were dangerous, unsheltered and uninviting places, used only as rubbish tips, and still thought of as such by the Arequipans, unfit for a human dwelling place, as Ramón and César recall:

Todo eso era pampa, una pampa inhóspita, pura piedra y tierra, no había nada, llena de quebradas, todo un desastre...eso era torrentera, todo basural, todo descampado, era un desierto.

(This was all pampa, an inhospitable pampa, all stone and earth, there was nothing here, it was full of ravines, a complete disaster...that was a gulley, a rubbish tip, all exposed, it was a desert.)

The settlers share a sense of achievement in taming the wild and civilizing this hostile environment and recall the 'lucha ardua' ('arduous battle') in which they engaged, working together 'frente a frente, mano a mano' ('face to face, hand to hand') with 'sticks and shovels, picks and wheelbarrows and sledgehammers' to open watercourses, level the rough ground and lay roads, proud of their enthusiasm and energy:

La gente salía contenta a trabajar ¿por qué? por sus lotes, por todo lo que recibían. (César)

(People went out glad to work and why? because of their lots, because of everything they were receiving.)

The communal effort invested in the shanty town increases the value the *pobladores* place in their achievement and reinforces their sense of ownership and attachment:

Si fuera que cada uno había puesto su plata y de allí han hecho la electrificación, no tendrían que acordarse. Allí está la cosa, que es suyo, que con su esfuerzo lo han hecho, es como una casa que uno hace con su propio esfuerzo ¿no? se le va teniendo cariño ¿no? ésta es mía. Lo que es suyo, lo que ha conseguido con mucho esfuerzo, ésto creo que está haciendo que queramos a nuestro pueblo. (Alfonso)

(If each one had put their money in and they'd had the electricity installed out of that, there would be nothing to remember. That's it you see, that it's theirs, that they did it by the sweat of their brow, it's like a house you build with your own effort, isn't it? you become fond of it, don't you? this is mine. What's yours, what you've struggled to get, that's what I think makes us love our town.)

The next stage was to procure electricity for which they had to carry posts from rural districts further afield. During the seventies, electricity was installed, roads levelled and a village hall built, followed by the first part of the school in 1965. The building continued with schools, churches and village halls, the completion of each celebrated with due ceremony, not only to mark their achievements and spur them on to new ones, but also to invite official recognition to sanction the legitimacy of their new development:

Inauguramos la electrificación con la presencia de muchas autoridades, el Señor prefecto departamental, alcaldes del distrito, provinciales, fue un acto muy notable. (César)

(We inaugurated the installation of electricity in the presence of many authorities, the departmental prefect, the provincial and district mayors, it was a very distinguished occasion.)

The struggle to obtain a domestic water and sewerage system, undertaken in the eighties, still continues today. In both Río Seco and Porvenir, all the plumbing has now been laid, though by the end of 1989 they were still waiting to be connected. It is in working together to find solutions for these problems that the group organization continues to be reinforced and a popular identity negotiated.

2.3 A Place of our Own and a Cradle for our Children

Claiming the place as their own culminates in the naming of the *pueblo joven*, a way of putting their own stamp on it. This is especially the case of Porvenir, emotively christened by the first president, Romeo, whose words have gone down in local history. César says he will never forget those words and recited them for me:

Se llamaría este pueblo El Porvenir de Miraflores, donde será nuestra cuna, nuestro sitio de nuestros hijos y su propio nombre lo dice, Porvenir, algún día tendremos un porvenir.

(This town will be called Porvenir of Miraflores, where our cradle will be, our place for our children, and its own name says it, Future, for some day we will have a future.)

The future lies in the migrants' children, possession of the land will be sealed when children are born and cradled upon it. As seen above, locality, and especially birth in a particular locality, is a fundamental of identity. Alfonso,

who works in Ama Kella, maintains that the past, the place people came from, diminishes in importance as a new place is claimed for new generations:

Ya la gente no dice tanto yo soy de Puno o de otro lugar, sino somos de Porvenir y tenemos un porvenir. Hay un dicho que difundimos también: Construimos juntos nuestro porvenir. Eso ha pegado bastante bien y muchos lo han tomado en serio y tenemos que construir solos y juntos nuestro porvenir, en el pueblo joven Porvenir, nuestro porvenir.

(Now people don't so much say I'm from Puno or from another place, but rather we're from Future and we've got a future. There's a saying we put about as well: Together we build our future. That's stuck pretty well and many have taken it seriously and we've got to build our future alone and together, in the *pueblo joven* Future, our future.)

The emphasis on 'alone and together' highlights the fundamental need for solidarity amongst the settlers as they unite to achieve a common end. They are alone against the authorities and know they can rely on no state assistance, but their strength is in their togetherness. In the face of State neglect, there is a pride in having built the *pueblo joven* themselves, without any outside aid or assistance.

The lack of a future is one of the motives stated for leaving the sierra and becomes one for not going back. Having made a life for themselves in the city, having struggled to settle an uninviting land and make it their home, most migrants confess themselves reluctant to return definitively to the sierra. In Arequipa they have responsibilities to their homes and families and are committed to providing for their children's future in terms of education and employment. For

most migrants apart from an annual, or less frequent trip to visit family, participate in the harvest or celebrate the village's annual festival, there is no going back.

Whilst these visits enable migrants to renew links with their places of origin, those who migrated when very young, orphaned or whose entire family have moved away, say they have no reason to return and feel estranged from their home towns and villages. They may have nothing there and be known to no one, the language seems unfamiliar and their place of birth alien. Paloma from Canchis, Cusco, comments:

Casi no viajo, casi cinco años, ya no me integro a mi tierra, ya no nos conocemos como antes, nos sentimos extraños, allí se necesitan otras palabras, como de otro mundo.

(I hardly ever go, it must be about five years now, I don't fit in to my homeland anymore, we don't know each other as before, we feel like strangers, you need other words there, it's like another world.)

Others would like to go back because they still have family or lands in the sierra or because they miss the place and feel an affection for it. They nostalgically recollect the purity and plenty of their youth, contrasting it with the filth, food shortages and struggle to survive in the *pueblos jóvenes*. Although migrants mention times of drought and famine in the Andes, Charo's memories of her home in Cailloma, Arequipa, evoke a pre-monetary age of abundance in the sierra, where the water ran pure and people were honest, unlike the corrupt and criminal city dwellers:

Había carne...leche, papas, de todo, allá pura carne, mucho comen, acá medido...de la comida no se preocupa, la

vida es más difícil acá porque todo es plata, allá tienes todo a la mano, la carne tienes...cuando quieres se lo mata no más, se hace pan o por lo menos tostado, toma sopa por el desayuno...acá todos los días sacas plata, allá la plata entra.

(There was meat...milk, potatoes, everything, out there it's all meat, they eat a lot, here it's all measured out...you don't worry about food there, here life's harder because everything is money, there you've got everything to hand, you've got meat... whenever you want it you just kill [an animal], you make bread or at least toasted maize, you have soup for breakfast...here every day you have to get money out, there the money comes in.)

However, such bounty would have only come to the richer farmers or only on feast days. For most, everyday life in the sierra was one of poverty and hardship which is why even the seemingly unenviable conditions in a shanty town can be preferable to the migrants. Despite the hardships of life in the shanties, bowed under by the economic crisis, most believe the situation could be no better in the highlands where work is back-breaking and there are no facilities, no electricity and apparently no chance of progress, as Emilio, an inhabitant of Porvenir, remarks:

Yo pienso que la crisis acá es bastante, pero no creo que en mi tierra pueda pasar la vida mejor que aquí.

(I think the crisis here is bad, but I don't think in my homeland I could spend my life any better than I do here.)

The *pueblo joven*, the 'young village' or the 'new town', is a new home for the migrants, the place they have built with blood, sweat and tears and with which they now identify, no longer as migrants but as *pobladores*, settlers.

2.4. Linguistic and Cultural Practice in Shanty Society

The histories of the shanty towns show how a medley of migrants from a variety of backgrounds outside the city unite in opposition to urban Arequipans, wealthy highlanders and the authorities. As the shanty town is established, the differences between them in terms of place of origin are reduced as a new sense of belonging to a new dwelling place is created. As the shanty expands, the migrants gain security in the strength of their numbers and it is the Arequipans who begin to feel threatened by the massive influx of migrants and their level of organization.

Creating the *pueblo joven* defines a space exclusively for migrants within, and yet apart from, the city of Arequipa. Within the confines of the shanty, the migrants are in control and as confrontation with Arequipans becomes less frequent, the Arequipan/non-Arequipan dichotomy becomes less prominent in the construction of identity. In Río Seco, Donatilda, a *puneña*, dismisses the Arequipan presence and includes those migrants' from the outlying provinces of Arequipa in the *serrano* identity she attaches to the *pueblo joven*:

¿Acaso hay arequipeños acá? ¡no hay nada de arequipeños! puro serrano no más. Arequipeños del centro nosotros no conocemos nada.

(There aren't any Arequipans here, are there? there aren't any Arequipans! only highlanders. We don't know anything about Arequipans from the centre.)

The inclusive identity of being fellow *pobladores* breaks down the differences in backgrounds of the migrants from Puno,

Cusco, the department of Arequipa and elsewhere, as they assume the identity of their new dwelling place. Eduardo comments:

Los pobladores ya se olvidan de que tú eres de Puno, tú eres de Cusco, tú eres de Arequipa, yo soy de Lima, ¿no? todos los pobladores son de un mismo pueblo.

(The settlers soon forget that you're from Puno, you're from Cusco, you're from Arequipa, you're from Lima, you know, all the settlers belong to the same place.)

The establishment of the shanty towns as a domain where the migrants are in control and where a greater concentration of Quechua speakers is to be found also marks out a territory in which Quechua may be spoken freely. This is particularly the case in Porvenir where the work of the parish and the popular communication centre promotes a positive image of Quechua and neighbours greet each other freely and chat in their native tongue 'without fear, without shame' (Alfonso). Fátima (whose Andean Spanish I have transcribed literally) believes that though Quechua is little spoken in the town centre, it is thriving in the *pueblos jóvenes*:

Dentro de ciudad Arequipa, casi sí está desapareciendo quechua, ya no hablan, pero por los cantos, por ejemplo, en los pueblos jóvenes lejanos y como quien dice aquí, marginados...sí hay quechua.

(Within the centre of Arequipa, Quechua is almost disappearing, they hardly speak it now, but on the outskirts, for example in the far-flung and as they say here, marginalized, shanty towns, yes there's Quechua.)

There is a tendency to assume that indigenous languages are dying out in the cities, but this attitude fails to address the conscious decision of bilinguals in manipulating

their knowledge of Quechua/Aymara and Spanish in different situations.¹⁴ Although the majority of Quechua language learning is confined to academies and universities, some of the young Quechua speakers from the shanties regard that as positive for the diffusion of Quechua, breaking ground traditionally dominated by the Spanish-speaking middle classes. Despite the lack of actual Quechua learning in the shanty towns, Alfonso believes that its very maintenance in the city indicates that having survived five centuries of conquest and oppression, urbanization is not sufficient in itself to eliminate the language:

Son ya 500 años que no ha muerto...hay años que realmente está perseguido horriblemente ¿no? que uno tenía que hablar español, uno tenía que vestir como ellos, bailar como ellos, todo eso ¿no? pero ahora no hay esas prohibiciones.

(It's now 500 years that it hasn't died...and there have been years in which it was really persecuted horribly, you know, you had to speak Spanish, to dress like them, to dance like them, all that, you know, but there aren't those prohibitions anymore.)

If Quechua speakers do feel ashamed of their native language in the city centre, within the shanty town it is the monolingual Spanish speakers who are in the minority and it is the turn of the Arequipans to feel excluded. Gloria, born in the lower part of Miraflores relates her experience on first arriving in Porvenir:

¹⁴ The progression towards Spanish monolingualism in the cities is posited by: Parker 1972; Mangin 1973; Myers 1973; Van den Berghe & Primov 1977; Albó 1979; Cerrón Palomino 1982. Although referring to rural areas, Mannheim (1985) and Harvey (1987) contest the assumption that bilingualism is transitory.

Durante dos años no conocía a nadie porque iba a una tienda, me hablaban quechua, iba a otra, igualito, no se les entendía nada, tenía que ir hasta el centro para traerme, yo no tenía amigas, solo: vecina, buenos días.

(For two years I didn't know anyone because I'd go to a shop, they spoke to me in Quechua, I'd go to another, just the same, I didn't understand anything, I had to go right to the centre to fetch [myself things] I didn't have any friends, only: neighbour, good day.)

Faced by isolation in a group dominated by Quechua-speakers, Gloria, possessor of the language of the dominators, tried to impose that language on the majority, only accepting invitations from Quechua speakers on the condition they spoke Spanish, uneasy at not being able to understand what was being said:

Siempre me he alejado...porque estaban hablando castellano, entonces de repente meten el quechua, yo no sé ni jota, digo dentro de mí, se estarán burlando de mí o me mirarán mal ¿no? y entonces a veces me hallo un poco incómoda, entonces me privo de ir a muchas reuniones.

(I've always distanced myself...because they'd be speaking Spanish, then suddenly they'd slip in Quechua, I don't know a word of it, I say to myself, perhaps they're laughing at me or thinking badly of me, you know, and then sometimes I find myself a bit uncomfortable, so then I deprive myself of going to a lot of meetings.)

Migrants complain that the Arequipans refuse to share either their economic or educational resources with them ('it's selfishness, instead of lending support, they think they're superior, they don't want others to equal them') but it can work both ways: Gloria complains that the Quechua speakers were too selfish to teach her their language.

Language is a power tool in the negotiation of identities: it can be used to include and exclude, to build up

solidarities or create divisions. On their own territory, Quechua speakers can reverse the dominant-subordinate roles and assert their power by excluding Spanish monolinguals. In Río Seco, Quechua is not deliberately promoted, though sermons are preached in Quechua in the Pentecostal church, but a common bonding is evident amongst the Quechua-speaking market stall-holders, who often share a joke together in Quechua, creating an in-group solidarity, confirmed by manifestations of intimacy and affection.

Thus although a wider level of inclusiveness can be established across the *pueblo joven*, regional differences do not disappear. In terms of language, further distinctions are made between Quechua and Aymara speakers or between the regional varieties of Quechua, dividing the *cusqueños* from the *puñenos*.¹⁵ Two *cusqueñas*, Violeta and Fátima, claim their Quechua to be superior to that of the *puneños*, theirs being the 'legitimate' one derived from the Incas:

Es que en Cusco hablamos el quechua legítimo de los Incas. Todos los cusqueños hablan netamente quechua y es palabra de los Incas.

(In Cusco we speak the legitimate Quechua of the Incas. All the *cusqueños* speak pure Quechua and it's the word of the Incas.)

The language issue fuels an age-old rivalry between *cusqueños* and *puneños*, at least at the level of discourse in which *cusqueñas* emerge as notorious for stealing other women's

¹⁵ See Painter (1985) on the relationship between language and identity amongst Spanish and Aymara bilinguals in southern Peru.

men and are branded *quita-maridos* ('husband-stealer') whilst *puneños* are reputed to be hostile, aggressive and wicked.

Regional differences are also apparent in the observance of local feast days or traditions and there is a vast repertoire of cultural practice, customs and beliefs in both Río Seco and Porvenir, differentiating Andean migrants from urban Arequipans, *cusqueños* from *puneños* (etc.) and at the same time uniting people in the celebration of common festivals. Most people have family ties with people from their own town or village, as often several from the same family or community migrate together. These ties come to the fore at the celebration of a particular community's festival.

In Río Seco, for example, the immigrant population from Yanque, Cailloma, Arequipa, meet with other *yanqueños* in the city for the feast of the Virgin of the Immaculate Conception, patroness of their village.¹⁶ The festival is celebrated with a mass and procession of the Virgin on a float decorated in the style typical to Yanque, with fruits, flowers, shiny trays and clattering coins and knives. The women wear the traditional embroidered costume and linked in rows or circles, they dance to the regional music, the *wititi* which is played by a brass band.

A festival which is commemorated by both Arequipans and Andean migrants is that of All Saints and All Souls (1-2

¹⁶ A full study of beliefs and practice in Yanque is to be found in Valderrama & Escalante (1988).

November). Whilst the Arequipans visit the central cemetery, those from the sierra make a pilgrimage to the paupers' graveyards up in the arid hills beyond the shanty towns. The Arequipans take flowers and candles, but for the first three years after the death of a relative, the Andean families lay out special food on the grave and invite their friends and relations to pray and then eat and drink with them. In the third year, they play the dead person's favourite song so that the soul can depart cheerfully and sometimes accompany it with their dancing (some Arequipans also hire a band, but they play a traditional Arequipan *yaraví* whilst the migrant musicians play *waynos*).

The occasion draws on Andean beliefs, distinguishing them further from the more orthodox Catholic Arequipans:¹⁷ they believe that the dead return in the form of flies to eat the food left out for them and that the food will be found without taste or smell after the souls have passed by.¹⁸ On these two days of the year, the cultural distinction between Arequipans and migrants of Andean origin is striking and the Andean ritual receives extensive coverage in the local newspapers.

Religious festivals and rites of passage are observed with fervour by young and old alike, adhering to traditional

¹⁷ On 'popular religion' in Peru see Gonzalez & Van Ronzalen (1983); Marzal (1988).

¹⁸ Around that time of the year, people related many stories of ghosts and apparitions, especially of *condenados* (damned souls) condemned to wander the earth without rest and sometimes appearing to people in fully human form.

patterns and customs but adding new elements (the older migrants complain that the celebrations are never as good as when they were back in their villages). The important factor for the recreation of identities is not only that languages, customs and traditions are upheld, but that in doing so social relations are reaffirmed and reconstructed. All Saints and All Souls is a time of great social importance when whole families and communities reunite to pay their respects to the dead in a traditional manner. Second-generation migrants might not share their parents' and grandparents' beliefs, but whilst they distance themselves on one level, their very participation renews their identification with their past, transformed in the present urban context.

2.5. Second-Generation Migrants

The Andean heritage of language and traditions places second and subsequent generations of migrants in an ambiguous position in the city. Born of Quechua-speaking parents but brought up in an environment which despises Quechua and the whole Andean way of life, a contradiction arises between the Andean and the urban inheritance. Humberto, of *cusqueño* parentage, believes this manifests itself universally in conflict between parents and children:

¿Quién no ha peleado con sus padres o ha sentido vergüenza de sus padres que vienen de la sierra? que tire la primera piedra. Todos... Necesariamente hay un conflicto creado entre la cultura de sus mismos padres con toda la cultura occidental ya de la ciudad.

(Who has never fought with their parents or hasn't felt ashamed of their parents who come from the sierra? let them throw the first stone. All of us... There is necessarily a conflict between the culture of your own parents and the western culture of the city.)

Language is one of the main causes of embarrassment for both children and parents, the young becoming spokespeople for the old and diminishing the power of their parents' words:

Cuando nuestros padres tratan de decir algo en público, nosotros acompañando a nuestros padres decimos: papá, no hables por favor, mejor hablo yo. ¿Cuál es el resultado? Nuestros padres nos dicen en todo: hijito, escíbeme esto, o tú habla, tú dí esto, pero le quitamos en todo caso toda la cuestión de la palabra de los padres.
(Humberto)

(When our parents try to say something in public, we, accompanying our parents, say: father, please don't speak, it's better if I speak. What is the result? Our parents always say to us: son, write this for me, or you speak, you say this, but in any case we take away the whole weight of our parents' words.)

The parents' authority is thus undermined by the negative sanctioning of both society and their own children, sensitive to social pressure. Consequently, parents tend not to teach their children Quechua, because they feel it will be detrimental to their progress at school and to their chances in the 'professional' world from which their own language and lack of education has excluded them, as Miriam comments: 'I feel Quechua won't help you get on, like it limits you, it's no advantage'. The parents' lack of education is emphasized by the professional status of school teachers which legitimizes their mode of speaking and thinking and leads children to respect their authority over that of their parents:

Los padres dicen que es así en la casa ¿no? va a la escuela y se encuentra en constante conflicto ¿no? ¿a quién creer? ¿a sus padres o al profesor? y de repente, si uno no es fuerte, da razón al profesor porque el profesor es profesional, los padres no, todos hemos pasado por eso. (Humberto)

(The parents say that that's the way it is at home, don't they? [the child] goes to school and finds themself in constant conflict as to who to believe, don't they? their parents or the teacher? and all of a sudden if you're not strong, you think the teacher's right because the teacher's a professional and your parents aren't...we've all been through that.)

Children who go to school in the town centre and come into contact with children from wealthier homes, feel ashamed of their own parents' background. Maruja, whose parents are from Puno, recalls how she used to be embarrassed by their poverty and ignorance at parents' meetings:

Me parece que me sentía muy mal, por ejemplo, en la escuela, por tener padres que no tenían educación, que no sabían leer ni escribir...creo que soñaba con casas grandes, bonitas... En la secundaria ya sentía más vergüenza...y a la vez que sentía muy por debajo de las otras, muy desapercibida.

(I seem to think I felt really bad, for example, at school, for having parents with no education, who didn't know how to read and write...I think I used to dream of big, beautiful houses... In secondary school I felt even more ashamed...and at the same time I felt way below the others, very small.)

Nevertheless, however hard young people attempt to dissociate themselves from the language and lifestyle of their parents, they continue to be rejected by mainstream society on account of their background. Cultural integration is impossible because even by conforming to the norm of the dominant sector, the dominant ostracize them on other grounds. The hopelessness of their endeavour creates frustration and

tension between their 'roots' and the urban way of life which simultaneously attracts and repels them. Ernesto, Arequipan-born son of *cusqueños*, believes this gives rise to an 'identity crisis' amongst young *pobladores*:

Yo veo que nuestra generación está en una especie de corazón dividido, mantiene un sentimiento por lo suyo, pero relegado y encima de eso está un poco el sentimiento de la cultura impuesta, que puede más, que aliena más.

(I think our generation has a kind of divided heart, it still has some feeling for its roots, but it's submerged and on top of that is a bit of feeling for the imposed culture, which is stronger and which alienates more.)

For young people, Quechua is part of an inheritance they may wish to relinquish in order to assume, with Spanish, a new way of life in which that past is a burden to them. Ernesto fears that, by denying their ancestry and with it their cultural heritage, the 'Andean' identity will be irremediably lost:

Un pueblo que pierde sus costumbres, que pierde su idioma, que pierde sus tradiciones, termina por perder irremediabilmente su identidad y eso es lo que está pasando con nosotros.

(A people which loses its customs, which loses its language, which loses its traditions, ends up losing its identity irremediably and that's what's happening to us.)

This of course assumes that identity is attached to language, customs and traditions and does not allow for either cultural innovation or the constant recreation of identities.

The members of Porvenir's popular communication centre, Ama Kella (mostly second-generation migrants themselves) aim to restore interest in and appreciation for the Quechua language and Andean music and dance, but not as mere

appendages of a particular identity, rather as contributors to a struggle for better living conditions which involves a revaluation of themselves and their right to the living they are denied. In restoring pride in their native language and customs, they restore confidence in themselves. Settlers, like Fátima, who become involved in the communication centre, demonstrate this enthusiasm for Quechua:

Este idioma quechua, es lo mejor del castellano (sic) y nosotros peruanos debemos sentirnos orgullosos de nuestro idioma... Entonces debe seguir naciendo, en cada persona en su corazón debe nacer este amor, este cariño del Perú y esta canción, esta cultura del peruano, de los Incas principalmente.

(This Quechua language is better than Spanish and we Peruvians should feel proud of our language... So then it should go on being born, in the heart of each person this love should spring, this affection for Peru and this song, this culture of the Peruvian and principally of the Incas.)

In the shanties, festivals are still celebrated in traditional style and new anniversaries, for the foundation of the shanty or of a school, are occasions to don traditional costume and dance the traditional Andean dances. *Pobladores* show that they do not have to make a choice between maintaining or abandoning their inheritance. Indeed, where progress cannot be achieved by the assimilation of the modern, the revival of the old can be directed to the realization of their aspirations, not through winning acceptance by the dominant sector but by demanding it as their right. The revaluation of Quechua and traditional song and dance can counter the pressure to conform to the mainstream and succumb

to the subordinate position in which that maintains them, but it does not mean that people will not also speak Spanish and listen to rock music as much, and more, than *waynos*. All these things are resources upon which the *pobladores* can draw in the struggle to get on in the city. They have to respond to the demands of mainstream society, but their response does not have to be a renouncement of their past: it involves the manipulation of the ambiguities of their situation in the present.

3. Emergence of a Popular Class Identity

3.1. Concept of Class amongst *Pobladores*

In order to improve their standard of living in the city, *pobladores* organize themselves and coordinate with other grass roots movements, gaining an awareness of themselves as part of *el pueblo* ('the people'). As such they see themselves as members of the 'popular' or 'working' classes, as manifest in the politicized action they took in defence of the *pasaje obrero* ('workers' half fare') which the bus companies decided to abolish in 1985. The people of Porvenir, forming a popular front with neighbouring *pueblos jóvenes* set up road blocks and overpowered three buses, which were held in the parish compound until their demands were met. This incident remains very much in people's memories and Humberto gave this account:

Hicimos bajar al chófer y todos subimos cantando: el pueblo no será vencido. Allí sí, el pueblo estaba unido y había defensa de los dirigentes, vino la policía a llevarlos, todo el pueblo les defendía, todos acá somos

dirigentes decían, y cuando a la policía les parecía ver a un dirigente la gente lo rodeó y le hizo escapar. Allí no había política, nada, todo el pueblo unido, luchando juntos. (Humberto)

(We made the driver get down and we all got on singing: the people will not be vanquished. At that time the people were certainly united and protected the leaders, the police came to take them and all the people defended them, we're all leaders here they said, and when the police thought they'd spotted a leader the people surrounded him and got him away. There was no politics in that at all, all the people united, fighting together.)

Although Humberto stresses the action was apolitical, their commitment to the 'workers' in defence of the half fare suggests a socio-political working class identity as part of the popular identity emerging from the shanty's history of struggle. In Peru, it is difficult to decide who 'the workers' are, but if they are defined strictly in relation to the forces of production as the permanent, full-time industrial workforce, then they represent a minority amongst 'the people' and something of an elite.¹⁹ As noted above, a high proportion of the industrial workforce are 'independent' workers, who do not enjoy the stability of full-time contracts with a fixed wage and social security benefits. Whilst the vast majority of *pobladores* would be 'independents' (whether in industry, agriculture or the informal economy) at times of confrontation, they unite with the 'workers' and identify themselves as part of 'the popular classes' or 'the people'.

¹⁹ See Galín, Carrión & Castillo (1986) for a full discussion of the working classes in Peru and the problems with defining the different terms used. Also Román de Silgado (1981).

Pobladores do not define themselves simply in relation to the market, as the Marxist notion of 'class' tends to do, but identify themselves according to other factors which include social and political relations of domination (Galín et al. 1986:38). The significance of 'class' here is that it is a discursive category, operating a dichotomy which reduces the complexities inherent in the term and used by the *pobladores* to place themselves amongst 'the people' in opposition to the 'power bloc'.

If the *pobladores* identify themselves collectively as 'the people', this generalization is also taken up by the urban Arequipans who tend to imagine all migrants living in a *pueblo joven* and all inhabitants of a *pueblo joven* being poor. However there are poor people living in slum areas of the city centre and relatively wealthy migrants living in the shanties. If the social stratification is recast within the microcosm of the *pueblo joven*, internal divisions of a class kind are apparent.

Migrants exclude the upper classes from their conceptualization of the shanty's social stratification which is then divided between the middle and the lower classes. In the case of *pueblos jóvenes*, like Río Seco, which border agricultural land, the top of the social strata is occupied by the farmers (*loncos*) on a par with the former landowners (or their descendants) from the sierra, who have amassed both wealth and professional status in Arequipa. A dichotomy is

drawn between these and the majority of *pobladores* who rank below them as the 'lower classes' in terms of social status and economic wealth.

Pobladores situate themselves and others in terms of this dichotomy. Fátima counts herself a member of the 'lower class', using the terms 'lower', 'poor' and 'working class' in opposition to the middle classes. She finds class differences override difference of background:

Dentro del pueblo vienen de distintos sitios pero son clases, clase media, clase baja, clase pobre. Si es media, se ayudan entre sí, clase pobre, trabajador, siempre es diferenciado.

(Within the village people come from different places but there are classes, middle class, lower class, the poor class. If someone's middle class, they only help each other, the poor, working class is always discriminated against.)

Those who place themselves at the lower end of the scale identify themselves by their sense of communality. They view the middle classes in the *pueblo joven* as introspective, looking after their own. The middle classes are not just those who have money or come from families of some standing, they are also those from the coastal provinces or from departmental capitals, i.e. they are not from the rural zones of the sierra. However, as Esmeralda's comment illustrates, it is enough to be from the coast to qualify for a higher status than the Andean migrants, but if one is from Puno, albeit from the town of Puno, one needs money in order to achieve that status:

Hay otros que son detallosos, se creen de buena familia, al resto nos dice que somos indios, eso... Son los de Tacna, de Camaná, del mismo Puno cuando tienen plata.

(There are some who are very particular, they think they come from good families, they tell the rest of us we're Indians... They're the ones from Tacna, Camaná, from Puno itself when they've got money.)

Mercedes is one such migrant from Puno, the daughter of a Lima-born father and mother from 'one of the most distinguished families of Moguegua', wealthy landowners before the land reform took away a large proportion of their estate. She believes that her origins place her above living in a *pueblo joven* and unashamedly confesses herself to be a racist and a snob. She considers herself middle class and situates herself in an intermediate position in the rich/poor dichotomy. She does not think of herself as a migrant and places migrants in a separate category, as if they were in a class of their own:

Yo soy de la clase media, ni me junto con los ricos, porque no tengo sus recursos económicos, ni me junto con los pobres y a los migrantes soy indiferente.

(I'm middle class, I neither associate with the rich, because I haven't got their financial resources, nor do I associate with the poor and I'm indifferent to the migrants.)

Brought up on a hacienda in the altiplano of Puno to expect deference from the *campesinos* who are 'humble... always show respect...know their place, how to treat people', Mercedes is outraged when those of rural origins refuse to adhere to a place of subordination in the city. She categorizes these migrants as *cholos*:

Cuando vienen a Arequipa, se creen otra cosa, no son ni indios ni mestizos, no son nada, pero creen que porque han venido a Arequipa ya son de otra clase.

(When they come to Arequipa those people think they're something else, they're neither Indians nor *mestizos*, they're nothing, but they think just because they've come to Arequipa they're something else.)

Those who are relegated to a low status criticize those who share a similar background to themselves, but who have come into some money, climbed the social ladder and put on airs and graces which belittle and betray their fellows. Second-generation migrants, Miguel and Patricia, find that where people are born into wealth they are more willing to help the poor and cite the charity brought by Arequipans who distribute toys and food to the shanty towns at Christmas:

Hay unos que se creen más que los demás, son los que recién han tenido, son de allá también y tratan mal a su propia gente, pero viendo sus orígenes, son del mismo... Los indios que vienen a refinar, ellos son los que tratan mal...después no quieren ver a sus hermanos de raza, les tratan de indios calatos, cholos.

(There are some who think they're better than the rest, they're the ones who've just come into money, they're from the sierra as well and they treat their own people badly, but if you look at their origins, they're just the same... The Indians who come to refine themselves, they're the ones who treat you badly...they don't want to see the brothers and sisters of their own race, they call them skint Indians, *cholos*.)

Money is seen as a corruptive influence for the solidarity and collective identity of the *pobladores*, an identity which Miguel bases on shared race (*hermanos de raza*) and which disintegrates when economic differences bring about a change in social station. However, these differences also pre-exist migration, and it is not a case of a shift from

rural ethnicity to urban class, but both class and ethnicity are to be taken together, for both categories are used in discourse and operated in the construction of identities. There is not one migrant identity but many: an inclusive category like 'the people' can be embraced at times of collective struggle or it can be broken down when the divisions are drawn differently.

3.2. Socio-Political Organization in the Shanties

Socio-political organization is central to the construction of identities in the *pueblo joven*, forming groups with a common interest, be it for land titles, water or a new classroom. Identities are thus constructed at the level of the collectivity, which also brings into play new individual identities since the organization requires the delegation of tasks and conferment of leadership.

Although at the outset, the invading forces are recruited informally by word of mouth, there is a core of people in charge of the operation and a central figure who assumes the leadership. Once the *pueblo joven* is founded, the organization is consolidated and democratized through the election of a central governing body, commonly known as a *junta directiva* ('directing body') with representatives from each neighbourhood committee. The first leaders were called presidents but Velasco's democratization process extended not only to the renaming of the *barriadas* as *pueblos jóvenes* but

also to the new designations for the leaders of the neighbourhood organizations as *secretarios generales* ('general secretaries') as César recalls:

En el año 1978 entonces ya no había presidentes en ningún pueblo joven, tampoco no eran pueblos jóvenes, desde Juan Velasco Alvarado se cambió todo el nombre.

By the year 1978 there were no more presidents in any *pueblo joven*, nor were they even *pueblos jóvenes*, under Juan Velasco Alvarado the whole name was changed.

This form of democratically elected, autonomous local government is characteristic of the *pueblos jóvenes* and extends to each institution in the shanty, whether the schools' Parents Association, the Association of Market Stall Holders or the parish council.²⁰ In a country where most of the *pobladores* would normally be blocked from assuming positions of responsibility, it acknowledges the people's authority in making the decisions for the management of their own affairs, as Julio explains:

La organización del pueblo es la expresión del pueblo, es elegida por el pueblo, por los titulares de lote.²¹

(The organization of the people is the expression of the people, it's elected by the people, by the title holders of the lots.)

The main aim of the directorate is to promote the progress of the shanty town by mediating between the *pobladores* and the authorities for the procurement of basic

²⁰ A full list of popular organizations in Porvenir is given by López (1987).

²¹ The right to vote in the *pueblo joven* is given only to the *socios* ('title holders') who qualify as members of the *pueblo joven* with full rights.

services. In Porvenir, the organization is further specialized into *frentes de defensa* ('pressure groups') which take up particular causes, such as water, sanitation or transport, and lobby the authorities for the provision or improvement of services. The Committee for Water and Sanitation was formed in 1982 in reaction to the alleged apathy and degeneration of the appointed leaders and has increased pressure on the water board.

Whilst the neighbourhood organizations negotiate the demands of their particular *pueblo joven*, the collective need for electricity and water in the *pueblos jóvenes* (less than fifty disposing of a domestic water supply and sanitation) is coordinated by the Association of Popular Urbanizations of Arequipa (AUPA). AUPA reinforces the sense of solidarity based on shared needs and problems, as Gregorio, AUPA's Secretary of Education and Culture and delegate for Porvenir, explains:

Más que nada, AUPA ahora es una organización para hacer algunas gestiones...para los servicios... Nos une a todos los pobladores de pueblos jóvenes... Creo que la gente estamos acostumbrados a vivir en organización, no podemos ir camino cada uno y tenemos un montón de problemas comunes.

(More than anything, AUPA is now an organization for going through the procedure to get services... It unites all the settlers of the shanty towns... I think we're used to living in organization, we can't just each go our own way, we've got a load of problems in common.)

The dichotomy drawn between people and authorities is brought into evidence when AUPA summons its members to a demonstration, as on 1 December 1989, when they marched in protest at the incompetence of the bureaucrats in the various

service sectors,²² although Verónica's suggestion that they only go under pain of being fined places the strength of solidarity under question:

Somos unidos porque decimos vamos a un mitin y vamos todos porque sino nos pone multa...hay personas de todas partes, gente colaborativa son gente humilde.

(We are united because we say we're going to go to a demonstration and we all go because if not we get a fine...there are people from all over the place, poor people are always willing to collaborate.)

Whilst Porvenir is an active member of AUPA, Río Seco, having availed itself of AUPA's support in the early days of its invasion and foundation, has since distanced itself. The reasons for any *pueblo joven* withdrawing from AUPA are various: it might be that they have received the services for which they first approached AUPA, but in Río Seco the disalignment is more on political grounds. Beyond procuring services, AUPA does admit to a broader political aim as Gregorio declared at a meeting in Arequipa:

Nuestra propuesta es la justicia en el Perú, un nuevo sistema social. Los dirigentes nos vamos formando para asumir el gobierno, no siempre vamos a estar abajo, reclamones no más.

(Our aim is to achieve justice in Peru, a new social system. We leaders are preparing ourselves to assume government, we're not always going to be the underdog, just making demands.)

It is this kind of 'revolutionary' statement which causes people to brand AUPA a communist organization, but then in

²² SEDAPAR, the water board, SEAL, the electricity board, CORDEA, the local government corporation, and the Banco de Materiales, a bank which provides loans for building materials.

Arequipa anybody or any organization which defends the people is swiftly labelled 'red', as Julio, an Aprista, demonstrates:

A nivel de Arequipa hay AUPA, comunista, los que no queremos tener que ver con el comunismo no nos integramos.

(At the local level of Arequipa there's AUPA, which is communist, those of us who don't want anything to do with communism don't get involved.)

Both Río Seco and Porvenir try to remain non-party political as a whole, although individual *pobladores* will have their own particular sympathies as Jesús, Río Seco's general secretary, stresses:

Río Seco siempre ha sido independiente, es hecho por el esfuerzo de cada urbanizador...por eso las autoridades no entran porque no es politizado. Sí, han venido a hacer sus campañas, cada uno es libre, si uno quiere ir tras de ellos, bueno.

(Río Seco has always been independent, it's been built by the effort of each settler...that's why the authorities don't come in here because it's not politicized. Yes, they've come here campaigning, everyone's a free agent, if someone wants to follow them, fair enough.)

In their initial stages, popular organizations exist to provide a need, but as soon as they come into contact with party politics their identity is subject to change. Río Seco, while resisting manipulation by political parties, rejecting AUPA and refusing politically-defined leaders, fails to generate a cohesive and popular political identity. Río Seco's government representative holds some sway in the village and he believes politics should be left to the 'professionals' with minimum involvement of 'the people'. He sees grass-roots politics as tribal, backward and primitive and dominated by a

charismatic leader who in Río Seco has been embodied in the former general secretary, Federico Rojas, to whom he refers as a *cacique*, a local chief. Despite the fact that Rojas was demoted from office for fraud, when all else seemed to fail in the procurement of water, the people clamoured for him, hailing him as their hero and saviour. The fact is, Federico Rojas is an Aprista carrying considerable influence in the Town Hall and Rafael here admits that their tardiness in bringing water to Río Seco is not due to incompetence but to their lack of political contacts:

Ya tendríamos agua, pero hay que ser francos, no somos Apristas, yo al menos no tengo bandera.

(We'd have water by now, but to be quite honest, we're not Apristas, I, for one, don't fly their flag.)

In Porvenir, party politics are avoided on a local level, but the leaders do seem to have more defined political tendencies. There, the *teniente gobernador* works against, rather than with, the directorate.²³ There is thus a clear dichotomy between institutionalized, official party politics, as represented by the governor, and non-party popular politics, the aim of which is to meet concrete needs by uniting the people for that end. Alfonso believes this popular

²³ He is in possession of the loudspeakers bestowed by PROSERBA (Proyecto de Servicios Básicos de Arequipa) to be used by the health post for the benefit of the community. He uses them to criticize the leaders, even setting himself up in competition to the programmes broadcast by Ama Kella which consistently support the neighbourhood organizations.

political consciousness to be nurtured and encouraged in Porvenir:

Bueno, conciencia política sí lo tiene, así partidaria creo que no, pero hay una identidad de clase...se sienten pobladores de pueblo joven y entre todos tienen que hacer todo...los sufrimientos nos une a veces y nos está uniendo mucho más.

(Well, it does have a political consciousness, but I don't think it's party political, but there is a class identity...they feel themselves settlers of the shanty town and they have to do everything amongst themselves...sometimes suffering unites us and it's uniting us more and more all the time.)

'Class' reappears here as a discursive category, constructed not in terms of party politics, but linked to general socio-economic factors, notably poverty, taken as a distinguishing characteristic of 'the people'.

3.3. Women's Participation in Popular Organizations

Whilst some neighbourhood organizations have been subject to decline in the last years of economic crisis, García's *paquetazos* and Fujimori's shock stabilization measures have necessitated emergency measures and seen the incursion of a multitude of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), aid agencies and church groups in the shanty towns (Rodríguez, Riofrío and Welsh 1973; Riofrío & Rodríguez 1980; Barrig 1989). These have in turn prompted the proliferation of women's organizations and mothers' clubs, predominantly in the form of *comedores populares* ('popular kitchens') and provided the dynamic for the forging of a new socio-political identity

amongst *pobladoras*.²⁴ Assuming politically responsible roles in which they learn leadership, they are equipped to take up their position alongside the men who have traditionally dominated the popular political field (Villavicencio 1989).

There is a network of eight *comedores* in the Upper Miraflores district, the first of which was founded in Alto Misti in 1979, Porvenir followed in 1981 and with the exacerbation of the economic crisis in 1988, the number rose from five to a total of eight. In Río Seco there is a dwindling *comedor*, the 'Club de Madres Zoila Victoria de la Torre' (named after the wife of APRA's founder and initiated by Apristas), the Mother's Group of the Health Post and a Mother and Infant's Club run by the Adventist aid organization, OFASA.²⁵

The *comedores* have arisen precisely because of the economic crisis which has not only accentuated the already pressing needs for basic services, but meant that the most fundamental need, for food, has taken precedence over the call for improved living conditions in general, and for water, sanitation and electricity in particular. Other neighbourhood organizations are falling into decline because where people

²⁴ Blondet (1991) provides an illuminating history of women's organizations in Villa El Salvador, many points of which accord with my own findings in Arequipa.

²⁵ OFASA stands for Obra Filantrópica de Asistencia Social Adventista (Philanthropic Programme of Adventist Social Aid) and receives food supplies from the USA.

are living from hand to mouth their priority is how to fill the cooking pot each day.²⁶

La gente está pensando en como van a llenar la olla mañana..son trabajadores todos, si hoy no chambeo, mañana no como, y con la situación cada vez peor, no se puede dejar de chambear. (Alfonso)

(People are wondering how they're going to fill the pot tomorrow...they're all workers, if I don't work today, I don't eat tomorrow, and as the situation gets worse all the time, you can't stop working.)

Food has thus come to be the most pressing need: it has ceased to be a basic right and come to constitute a service (Blondet 1991:15). When economic crisis set in during the last years of Morales' government, the State began to distance itself from the popular sectors and other agencies moved in. The government has repeatedly tried to intervene in the self-help organizations with various programmes of aid, which ultimately only serve their own interests. The latest example has been the *Vaso de Leche* ('Glass of Milk') designed to combat malnutrition in the popular urban sectors and involve local government with existing self-help organizations.²⁷ It provided the initiative to set up *comedores* through which to distribute a daily ration of milk to children under six years old and pregnant or nursing mothers.

²⁶ Montes (1989) finds the same for Lima.

²⁷ The scheme was first introduced in Lima in 1982 by the Izquierda Unida (United Left) council and taken up by the incoming APRA government in 1985. It was promoted, *Eva Perón* style, as the special concern of the President's wife, Pilar Noris. See Haak 1987; Blondet 1991:153-8.

In Río Seco, at least, the scheme failed to materialize into a long-term project. Delegates from the local APRA government came to Río Seco with the proposal for the founding of a club, offering the stove and saucepans with which to prepare the milk which was to be supplied by the local council. For the first two years, the Apristas continued to supply milk powder and other foodstuffs, as well as providing advice on how to develop the *comedores* to prepare and sell meals to the community in order to finance the free breakfasts for the children and giving training on other income-generating activities (for example, some *pueblos* received sewing machines in order to set up workshops). However, APRA then withdrew its aid, expecting the *comedores* to be autonomous by that time.

In fact Río Seco never emerged from dependence because of poor implementation and political machination.²⁸ People become tired of the political manoeuvring behind these schemes, which come and go around election times without having any enduring effect (Blondet 1991:61,131). Amanda, the supervisor of a *comedor* in Upper Miraflores voices this criticism of politicians who present themselves as heroes and saviours:

Los mismos programas de leche que son obligaciones del Estado...solamente benefician al partido que está de turno ¿no? hace su campaña política como si estuviera haciendo un gran favor a quien va a dar, cuando realmente

²⁸ See Lizarzaburu (1989:20) for a distinction between aid (*asistencialismo*) and development (*desarrollismo*) in this context, the criteria for the latter being to discourage dependence through capacitating people to be self-sufficient.

esto es obligación del Estado...ellos hacen una campaña y forman un club de madres por aquí, un vaso de leche por acá y les dan los víveres sin ningún tipo de control...y no saben a los finales a quien beneficia eso ¿no? o sea, no llega nunca a la realidad del pueblo ¿no? sino solamente son cosas del momento nada más...y cuando se les acaba eso, entonces hay que desaparecer también todo lo que formaron y nadie se ha beneficiado.

(The very milk schemes which are the State's obligation...only benefit the party which is in power, don't they? they carry out their campaign as if they were doing a big favour to those they're going to help, when really that's the State's duty...they campaign and form a mothers' group here, a milk scheme there and they give them the foodstuffs without any kind of control...and they don't know in the end who it's going to benefit, do they? that is, they never get to the reality of the people...they're just things of the moment, that's all...and when that stuff runs out, then everything they set up has to disappear too and no one has benefited in the end.)

Although APRA never placed any condition of party allegiance on the club members, the women were invited to attend Aprista meetings. However, they deny any party political affiliation at the level of the club, and are unaware of each other's sympathies. Amalia, the president of Río Seco's *comedor* believes the essence of popular politics to be to work and to provide for themselves. In her comment that the women are more political at home, i.e. that there is a struggle in domestic politics over who should lay down the law in the home, there is an implication that the women's organizations, like the *comedor* are not political because there is no power struggle, they are democratic and practical:

Nos ha invitado a dos o tres mítines y hemos ido, pero unas ni son políticas ¡más políticas son en su hogar! Bien ha dicho la señora Pilar Noris que no le interesaba de qué política eran las madres, que el club sea

independiente, muy común... No les interesa a la gente pobre la política, tienen la política en su trabajo.

(They invited us to two or three meetings and we went, but some aren't even political, they're more political in their own homes! Señora Pilar Noris said quite clearly that she wasn't interested in what the mothers' political sympathies were, the club should be independent, open to all... Poor people aren't interested in politics, their politics is in their work.)

The women's organizations in Río Seco thus have no party political attachment but switch loyalties according to whoever might offer them goods. Dependency is the spoke in Río Seco's wheel: Laura, a social worker, believes need necessarily takes precedence over social and political awareness, leading women to grasp whatever has been on offer, embroiling themselves in political, charitable and religious organizations, all of which offer aid in the form of food supplies:

Hay mujeres que están en OFASA, están en CARITAS,²⁹ no sé en que otra institución, pero más que todo arrastradas por la necesidad, por el hambre. Les van a dar víveres, allí están, les van a dar eso, allí están, pero su papel político, su papel de desarrollo de la sociedad, de la comunidad, es muy limitado todavía.

(There are some women who are in OFASA, in CARITAS and I don't know in what other institution, but above all drawn along through necessity, hunger. They're going to give them foodstuffs, there they are, they're going to give something else, there they are, but their political role, their role in the development of the society and the community is still very limited.)

As soon as APRA withdrew its support, everyone switched over to OFASA, (leaving the *comedor* with a membership reduced from 140 at its peak to a straggling group of twenty or thirty women) to which Amalia applied when the governmental aid ran

²⁹ CARITAS is an international Catholic aid organization.

out. Pilar, also involved in the work of the *comedores*, believes OFASA merely creates another circle of dependency and relates that the same happened in Porvenir when all the women left a women's group in the parish to join OFASA, which incidentally no longer operates in that shanty:

Vino OFASA ofreciéndoles víveres a las señoras y todas se nos fueron allá. Está mal, eso de OFASA, acostumbra a las señoras a recibir no más, a estar allí adormecidos, a no reclamar.

(OFASA came along offering the women foodstuffs and they all left us to go to them. It's wrong, OFASA, it accustoms the women to just receive, to be there half-asleep and not to make demands.)

OFASA establishes vertical relationships with the *pobladoras*: it claims not to award charity but to reward effort with prizes of food (Blondet 1991:108). OFASA agreed to send foodstuffs to Río Seco on the foundation of a mother and infants group to which it distributes monthly food rations, in return for which the women must attend two afternoons a week to learn handicrafts and home skills and receive health education. Irma and Manuela admit that their main motivation in attending first the *comedor* and then OFASA has been to receive the food:

Por interés estábamos, porque estaban repartiendo víveres... Recibo alimentos, sino no vendríamos, buscamos la vida.

(We were there for what we could get out of it, because they were handing out food... I receive foodstuffs, otherwise we wouldn't come, we have to make a living.)

The development of independent income-generation is rarely encouraged as a viable alternative to aid. The articles

which the women are taught to make in the club are intended for their own use, but there is little incentive to make articles for sale or to set up a collective. Thus instead of encouraging women to contribute to the family income by their incorporation into the labour market, they are restricted to aid and remain financially dependent on men, as Piedad, a single parent and former president of OFASA, comments:

Sería bueno tener máquinas, en tallercitos, uno se dedica a tejer y uno va y vende. Así una persona se sepa defender y no está dependiendo del esposo.

(It would be good to have machines, in little workshops, you could devote yourself to knitting and go and sell it. That way a person knows how to survive and doesn't have to depend on the husband.)

The irony is that rather than make saleable items, they make useless articles and sell the food they receive, which is actually forbidden by OFASA. They complain that the milk powder often leaves the US old and stale and then is held in Callao for another two years so that it is moth-eaten by the time it ever reaches them, and gives the children diarrhoea.

There is a dislocation between the choice of items taught and the needs and reality of the women. Although the materials used are often household items, such as empty rice sacks, there is little emphasis on making goods explicitly to sell.³⁰

³⁰ The promoter did teach them to make *empanadas de queso* (cheese pasties) with the flour they received and told them she made them and sold them to the police station. However, she pointed out that she, of course, could not go and sell them herself but had a middle party to do it for her, whereas they could easily go out and sell them on the streets (implying that selling was degrading to her but not to them).

Women are taught to make superfluous, frivolous items such as shoulder bags (Clorinda protested she never used a shoulder bag and would make clothes for her children instead) and decorative bags for the bread or for market, carefully embroidered with flowers and one's initials. The assistant even had them making wall-hangers for their bathrooms when in Río Seco few scarcely have a toilet, let alone a bathroom.

There is some more useful instruction in making simple pieces of furniture for the home: stools and tables, wardrobes and partitioning screens, which would be appropriate in more prosperous times but shows a failure to grasp the immediate reality: the pressing need to feed one's family, either by receiving food or ideally by generating one's own income. The women are willing to work, and many do, but jobs are hard to come by and they are restricted by their children:

Sería mejor trabajar, pero no hay...no se puede trabajar con wawa. (Irma) A veces no hay trabajo... saliendo a trabajar se gana más pero con los bebés no se puede siempre. (Manuela)

(It would be better to work, but there isn't any...you can't work with a baby. Sometimes there just isn't any work...you earn more going out to work but with they children you can't always do that.)

In Porvenir, the *comedores* have shunned any political intervention and have never been troubled by it, already having strong links with the parish and CARITAS. The parish's commitment to social action and consciousness-raising has meant that despite the input of foreign priests and nuns,

there has been a consistent effort to promote self-help (Blondet 1991:111-121).

The initiative for the *comedores* grew out of the *Frente Feminina* ('Women's Front') where the nuns taught literacy as well as home and family matters, health and handicrafts. However, the education provided was aimed at consciousness-raising: making the women aware of the situation in which they lived and encouraging them to act to change it. This is a factor in the ongoing success of the organizations in Porvenir, where Ama Kella's social workers have now taken over the consciousness-raising role in the *comedores*:

Lo nuestro es más que todo formación, un poco a nivel ideológico...la gente que acude a los comedores es la que más sufre las consecuencias de la realidad, el sistema del país, y también es gente que ignora quizás de las perspectivas ...de las salidas, de la solución que se puede dar. (Laura)

(Our job is above all to train, a bit on the ideological level...the people who come to the kitchens are those who suffer most from the effects of our social reality, the country's system, and they are also the people who are perhaps unaware of the possibilities, the ways out, the solutions that there might be.)

Several of the members already had experience of community works sponsored by OFASA and PAIT³¹ and when the first nun left, they had the idea of carrying on by forming a *comedor*. However, they continued to enjoy the support of the parish and this is another factor in the success of Porvenir's

³¹ OFASA and PAIT both organize working parties in Porvenir, in which case the workers receive foodstuffs or a basic wage in return for participating in projects for the improvement of the community, such as levelling streets or building a classroom.

organizations, for it is never totally withdrawn even when responsibility has been largely handed over to the *pobladoras*.

Although the parish subsidizes the *comedores* far less than before and all members have to pay a quota and raise money themselves to cover any extra expenses, they do rely on the nuns for securing supplies from CARITAS, as well as additional aid from institutions abroad. Assured of this continuing support, and yet gradually weaned from dependence on the nuns, the women are developing an autonomy for themselves. Although they are unable to give much materially, they give of their time in participating in the meetings and taking their share of the chores and in so doing, they come to value their own contributions and feel a pride in their effort:

La dependencia o sea, el paternalismo, ahora creo que va mejorando, al menos la gente ya se va siendo consciente, porque años yo recuerdo...la cuota que se pagaba era poquísimo, nada ¿no? y mayormente lo que se hacía era dar los alimentos gratuitos... Las madres están aprendiendo a tomar decisiones, a dejar el paternalismo, la dependencia, a no estar a la espera de los sacerdotes o religiosas, si no puede estar uno de ellos, las madres mismas pueden tomar la decisión...ya se ha dejado un poco la dependencia, ya vamos madurando, creo, poco a poco. (Amanda)

(I think the situation of dependence, that is to say paternalism, is improving, at least people are becoming conscious of it, because I remember years back...the quota you had to pay was tiny, almost nothing, you know, and mostly they just gave out the food for free... The mothers are learning to take decisions for themselves, to leave behind paternalism, dependence, and not be waiting for the priests and nuns, if one of them couldn't be there, the mothers could make the decision themselves... we've stopped being so dependent, I think bit by bit we're maturing now.)

Autonomy is partly achieved by self-government, and as at the level of *pueblo* politics, the *comedores* are led by a democratically elected governing body, consisting of a president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer. In Upper Miraflores, each *comedor* has an *asesora* ('supervisor') over it, but unlike the promoters of OFASA who come in from outside, all the supervisors are local women whose role is not to dictate to the members, but to coordinate between leaders and mothers and lend advice and support when needed. The large numbers involved in Upper Miraflores are dealt with by subdividing the organization, which also involves more women in the decision-making:

La respuesta ha sido la formación de juntas directivas individuales, la unión se ha ido logrando poco a poco... Estamos buscando que sea una familia grande, donde el problema de uno es de todos, dar la palabra de aliento, hacer ver que juntas podemos seguir adelante. (Amanda)

(The response has been the formation of individual directing bodies, union has been achieved gradually... We want it to be one big family, where the problem of one is the problem of all, we want to give words of encouragement, show that together we can go forward.)

Again it is in uniting with a common purpose that the women begin to emerge from individualism to a recognition of shared problems and needs. It is a place where a disparate group of women get to know each other, develop friendships and a sense of family. In the clubs and *comedores* friendships are formed and in the recognition of common needs, mutual support is readily proffered in times of crisis, for example, when there is a death and a collection is made to help with the

funeral costs.³² In OFASA it gives the women time out from their household chores to socialize, relax and learn skills for which they would not otherwise have time:

Uno se alegra trabajando en conjunto, como en la chacra, es una distracción, una manera de distraernos, de pasar el tiempo al menos, de conversar. (Manuela)

(It makes you happy to work in a team, like in the fields, it's a distraction, a way of enjoying ourselves, at least to pass the time, have a chat.)

From the firm basis of friendship and solidarity, the women acquire confidence in speaking out and progressively assume responsibilities. In Porvenir, the *pueblo joven* provided an environment in which female Quechua speakers, fresh from the sierra, who would have had even less opportunity than their male counterparts to learn Spanish through school or work, were able to gain confidence in the church and clubs where the nuns encouraged them to speak out and corrected their speech so that many, like Gloria, were later able to assume positions of leadership:

Casi gente arequipeña éramos cuatro personas, y los demás eran así indígenas, que no podían conversar bien, entonces como la madre nos asesoraba y nosotros también hablábamos un poquito mejor, entonces ya también se contagiaban un poquito ellas, ya iban aprendiendo y toditas que hemos estado en la frente, toditas hemos sido directiva, porque han aprendido muy bien y muy bien se aprende, muy bien se desempeñan, muy bien se defienden... Ya nos perdíamos el miedo, porque siempre la mayoría de los hombres no más son los que hablan más claro.

³² Support also extends beyond the immediate group as when OFASA organized the large-scale mobilization of its members to aid in the clearing up operation when torrential rains in January 1989 caused the river to burst its banks and flooded the homes of the Barrio Obrero, leaving its inhabitants destitute.

(There were only about four of us Arequipans and the rest were indigenous, who couldn't speak very well, but then as the nun supervised us and we were also speaking a bit better, so then it rubbed off on them too, they were learning quickly and all of us who were in the group, all of us have been leaders, because they learnt very well and they still learn well, they get along really well and defend themselves really well... So then we lost our fear, because it used to be mostly just men who spoke most clearly.)

In Río Seco, Esmeralda relates how participation in the *comedor* enabled her to overcome her initial timidity and fear of voicing her opinion, so that now she is an active member of all three mothers' clubs as well as of the church and the market association:

Sirve para orientarnos, es una comunidad por decir, una comunidad de Club de Madres, allí aprendí a reclamar, a pedir, me nombraron ¿cómo iba a salir?...antes tímida era ¿qué iba a hablar? roja me ponía, miedo me daba hablar... Nunca me gustaba hacer nada, por tímida, callada era, no hablaba.

(It helps to guide us, you could say it's a community, a mothers' club community. That's where I learnt to make demands, to ask for things, they nominated me, how was I going to stand?...I used to be really shy, I'd go bright red, what was I going to say? I used to go red, I was afraid to speak... I never used to like to do anything, I was so shy, quiet I was, I didn't speak.)

As they gained experience of speaking out amongst their own sex, they were equipped to speak out amongst men. Coupled with their experience of holding responsibility within the *comedor* or club, this prepared them to venture onto the hitherto male-dominated domain of the neighbourhood organization. However, the woman's place has traditionally been considered to be in the home and men still resent their partners spending a lot of time out and about, instead of

being in the house working. Consequently, some deem membership of a club like OFASA to be for idlers and feel it reflects badly on their capacity as providers, as María Rosa and Juana say of their husbands:

Dicen que es una ociosidad, que me haces quedar mal en la casa, como que no te doy de comer... No quiere que salga, quiere que esté en la casa no más.

(They say it's laziness, that you make me look bad in the home, as if I didn't feed you... He doesn't want me to go out, he just wants me to stay in the house.)

Nevertheless, most women say their husbands appreciate the contribution they make to feeding the family and, having proved themselves on the homefront, they are ready to fight for recognition on the socio-political field. Gloria for example, started off as treasurer in the *Frente Feminina*, then became treasurer on the parochial council, took up a post in the nursery school and finally became secretary for her committee. She resisted her husband's protests that she was never at home:

Mi esposo nunca me dejaba salir y no sé, me dí por no hacerle caso y comencé a salir, me dice, tú no más sales, en la calle no más paras.

(My husband never let me go out and I don't know, I took it into my head to ignore him and I started to go out, he says to me, you do nothing but go out, you spend your life in the street.)

However, by the time she became representative of her committee, he supported her and stood by her whilst neighbours criticized and gossiped, inventing tales that she was having an affair with the leader. Thus, by standing their ground, facing gossip and reprobation, the women have asserted

themselves on the political field and opened the way for others to follow suit, as Gloria and Amanda's experience show. Amanda used to stand in for her husband when he was general secretary and fought for a sports pitch which had been promised by the district mayor. She believes her determination set an example for others to follow:

Los hombres mayormente de los pueblos jóvenes son unos machistas y no quieren que las mujeres se metan en las asambleas, ni por aquí, ni por acá, sino ellos...de repente yo pienso que mi actitud ha servido para despertar a muchas mujeres, hacer respetar y hacer ver que no todos somos hombres y también nosotras podemos hacer. He visto que después las mujeres que más antes se han reprimido, un poco han dejado salir ¿no? de ellas mismas.

(The majority of men in the *pueblos jóvenes* are male chauvinists and don't want women to get involved in the assemblies, neither in here, nor in there, no one but them...I think my attitude might have helped a lot of women to realize, to get some respect and show that we're not all men and that we can do things too. I noticed that afterwards, women who had been withdrawn before came out of themselves a bit.)

Women are also striking out onto the political arena beyond the *pueblo joven*, attending the demonstrations in place of their husbands who cannot afford to leave work, and although that might make their motivation questionable, it does not detract from the fact that they do go, and they do participate, and cannot therefore be impervious to what is going on:

Si hay una marcha de pueblos jóvenes o protesta, es la mujer que está ¿no? pero lo que yo todavía no me explico...si está la mujer porque se toma conciencia de que es responsable o debe estar allí, o será porque tiene tiempo y el esposo está trabajando y la mujer está en la casa, ella va a la marcha ¿no? (Laura)

(If there's a march or protest from the *pueblos jóvenes*, it's the woman who is there, although what I still can't explain...is whether the woman is there because she is conscious that she has a responsibility to be, or it's because she's got time and her husband is at work and she's at home so she goes on the march.)

In Río Seco, however, the women's organizations are in danger of being absorbed by the male-dominated neighbourhood organization, precisely because they have been unable to develop sufficient autonomy to handle their problems and have approached the leaders to settle discrepancies over eligibility to aid, as the general secretary told me:

Justo estoy con miras de administrar eso, sin ningún interés, para apoyarles, si ellos pidiesen un ayuda de trabajo por ejemplo, iremos a trabajar. (Jesús)

(I'm looking into administering that, not to get anything out of it, but to support them, if they asked for help in the way of labour for example, we would go and work.)

Jesús's willingness to offer support indicates the possibility of integration of the women's groups into the wider neighbourhood organization, a positive step given that the work of women outside the other neighbourhood movements has defined their activities as specific to women, thus reinforcing the traditional gender divisions of labour, restricting them to the domestic sphere and still excluding them from the 'hard politics' dominated by men (Blondet 1991:97). However, his intention to act as administrator forebodes the exchange of one form of dependence for another.

3.4. Autonomy or Dependence?

This chapter has shown how the foundation and building of the *pueblo joven* unites people and a collective identity is constructed, but divisions are not erased and re-emerge in different contexts of interaction. Identities are constantly reconstructed and that process involves a renegotiation of power.

I have indicated that the success of Porvenir's *comedor* and the collapse of that in Río Seco have been due on the one hand, to the continuing support and supervision of the parish in Porvenir, securing its financial solvency and at the same time cultivating autonomy through training and consciousness-raising, and on the other hand, to Río Seco's failure to free itself from dependence on external organizations with whom it enters into vertical relationships in which agencies, like OFASA, lay down certain rules and regulations with which the members must comply.

In all the popular organizations, unity has been based on need, and once the individual's needs are met, they all too often withdraw from collaborating in the common cause. However, the needy continue to unite and, in Río Seco, Committee Seven is held up as an example of solidarity, since it is one of the most recent and least developed sector of the *pueblo*:

Comité Siete es más unida porque más pobre, más se sufre, más unido, los que tienen dicen ¿qué me importa a mí? si no hay transporte, voy en taxi. En las faenas, de Comité Uno van unos veinte y capaz cinco trabajan, va Comité

Siete, va más gente y saben trabajar, saben sufrir...la gente pobre tiene que unirse. (Patricia)

(Committee Seven is more united because it's poorer, the more you suffer, the more you unite, those who've got money say, what is it to me? if there's no transport I'll take a taxi. In the communal works, about twenty go from Committee One and perhaps five work, Committee Seven goes and more people turn out and they know how to work, they know what it is to suffer...poor people have to unite.)

In some cases, like that of María Carmen, people are only living temporarily in Río Seco, waiting to secure a plot in the rapidly developing Cono Norte and, unlike the founders who were united in the prospect of building a permanent home, are therefore unconcerned for its future:

No me gusta Río Seco, tiene más de treinta años, no tiene nada...Río Seco no avanza, puras señoras pobres, viudas, pura chacra, las directivas son dejadas...a veces digo ¿qué me importa Río Seco? ¿acaso voy a vivir acá?

(I don't like Río Seco, it's over thirty years old and it's got nothing...Río Seco doesn't progress, it's full of poor women, widows, there's nothing but fields, the leaders are negligent...sometimes I say what does Río Seco matter to me? it's not as if I'm going to live here!)

Other factors which have already been signalled as markers of social differentiation (background, education etc.) also contribute to divisions which erode solidarity and disrupt unity. In Río Seco people frequently complained that they were divided, that there was no harmony between them, and some, like Ricardo and Soledad, in fact attribute the lack of unity to the diversity of backgrounds, giving rise to different ways of thinking:

No son unidos, sería porque son de diferentes sitios, tienen otros pensamientos, aportan (otras) ideas...cada cual tira a su lado...por eso estamos fracasados, no es

como otros sitios, no estamos de un solo sitio, de una sola familia, muy distinto el genio que tiene la gente.

(They're not united, maybe because they come from different places, they've got different ways of thinking, they bring along different ideas...each one pulls in their own direction...that's why we're a failure, it's not like in other places where they're all from the same place, from the same family, people's temperament is very different.)

Even in the seemingly harmonious *comedores* of Porvenir, the same rifts are apparent to Amanda:

Tenemos que enfrentar la convivencia entre mujeres, entre madres. Es difícil porque vienen de diferentes departamentos, tienen diferentes ideas, diferentes costumbres, unas jóvenes, otras mayores...son tantas y tienen diferentes caracteres y diferentes modos de pensar y diferentes modos de ser...entonces llegar a congeniar es un poco difícil.

(We have to face the coexistence between women, between mothers. It's difficult because they come from different departments, they've got different ideas, different customs, some are young, others older...there are so many of them and they've got different characters and different ways of thinking and different ways of being...so managing to get along together is a bit difficult.)

However, more than regional differences the lack of solidarity is attributed to human failure, to selfishness and envy, regarded almost as national characteristics:

Los peruanos somos egoistas, debe ser entre hermanos, si fuéramos hermanos debemos compartir... No es tanto la diferencia de que yo soy de aquí o yo soy de allá, sino es, de repente, la falta de unión, la unión de opiniones y la unión de fuerzas que debe haber. (Ricardo)

(We Peruvians are selfish, we should be like brothers and sisters, if we were brothers and sisters we ought to share... It's not so much the difference that you're from here and I'm from there, but rather perhaps the lack of union, the union of opinions and the union of strengths that there ought to be.)

It is this divisiveness which exasperates the leaders of both the neighbourhood organizations and the women's clubs. It is noteworthy that a high proportion of leaders come from the coastal regions of Arequipa or from urban areas, and wield some economic power and prestige which equips them for a position of leadership, but at the same time distances them from the people they are leading. The general secretary of Río Seco, himself from one of the more developed provinces of Arequipa, exhibits racism in his belief that back-biting and unruliness is an innate characteristic of 'the indigenous people', unbridled by a satisfactory education:

Así es la gente de pueblo joven, somos muy mezclados...así es la gente indígena, mentirosa, mala...en la asamblea yo digo sí, todos dicen sí, digo no, dicen no, pero después, afuera hablan de mí ¿por qué he tomado tal o cual decisión? no, esa gente hay que darles la sogá y jala y jala, no hay que darles la sogá así no más...yo no tengo tanta educación, no, pero no es como ellos, incultos. (Jesús)

(That's what the people in a *pueblo joven* are like, we're a mixed bunch...that's what the indigenous people are like, liars, wicked...in an assembly I'll say yes and they all say yes, I say no and they say no, but afterwards, outside they talk behind my back, why did I take this or that decision? you have to tie a rope around these people and pull, pull, you can't let them have the rope just like that...I haven't got such a lot of education, but I'm not like them, uncultured.)

Background and education are established as two important factors in determining the form of leadership one adopts.³³ The last two presidents of OFASA in Río Seco, Piedad and

³³ Blondet (1991:103-4) discusses the role of background and particularly education in the difference in style of leadership.

Charo, were also from districts of Arequipa and in discussing the difficulties of leadership, they also reveal a disregard for the 'ignorant' women from outside the department of Arequipa:

En las asambleas discuten, no se entienden pues...no hay legítimos arequipeños aquí...en el club de madres perro del hortelero que no come ni deja comer, por falta de educación... Para ser presidente hay que ser fuerte y saberles comprender, son como bebés las señoras, hay que saberles tratar...saber captar a las señoras, como les vas a impresionar.

(They argue in the meetings, they don't get along well...there are no legitimate Arequipans here...in the mothers' club it's a case of the gardener's dog which doesn't eat and doesn't let you eat either, it's because of a lack of education...To be president you have to be strong and know how to understand them, the women are like babies, you have to know how to handle them...how to attract the women's attention, how you're going to impress them.)

Although the presidents of the various directing bodies are local people, the workers representing the outside agencies, whether a political party, OFASA or the nursing department of the university, are themselves 'outsiders' and often ignore the reality of life in the shanty town. I have already indicated the chasm dividing OFASA from its members, and a similar abyss gapes between the student nurses, sent out on placement by the Catholic university and their potential patients. They have been running a Mothers' Club since 1979, with the aim of supplying health education to the women, though sometimes the Ministry of Health sends food for distribution, at which time attendance rises sharply.

The main problem the student nurses face is one of communication, because there is a failure to adjust either their manner of speech or their way of thinking to that of the *pobladores*. This is partly due to the emphasis placed on professionalism, conveyed both in their manner and in their dress: like the city clothes worn by the OFASA promoters, the nurses' uniform and regulation shoes and stockings are quite impractical for the dusty, stony streets of Río Seco. However, the fact that most of them come from the residential areas of the city means that they fail to grasp the reality in which people live in the shanties, using middle-class references in their teaching. Even the most glaring fact that no one in Río Seco has a supply of running water, was overlooked by one novice in giving a talk on basic hygiene in which she advised washing one's hands under a tap and another showed a picture of a fitted kitchen with sink when delivering a talk on making room partitions.

Not only the content of what they say, but also the manner in which they say it belies their ignorance and their condescension towards women who are invariably their seniors. Educational games played in the club are often too academic, involving reading out loud, embarrassing many women who are illiterate or under-confident about their reading ability. They are treated like schoolchildren, reprimanded for lack of concentration, rebuked for not learning the lessons:

¡Señoras! ¿están escuchando? no vienen aquí a pasar la hora, sino para aprender. El objetivo de este club de

madres es cambiar hábitos alimenticios, hábitos higiénicos y aquí estamos hablando de cultura ¿sí o no? y queremos cambiar porque queremos mejorar, porque queremos criar mejor a nuestros hijos y queremos que nuestros hijos sean mejores que nosotros ¿sí o no?

(Ladies! Are you listening? You don't come here to pass the time of day, but to learn. The aim of this mother's club is to change eating habits, hygiene habits and here we're talking about culture, yes or no? and we want to change because we want to improve, because we want to bring our children up better and we want our children to be better than ourselves, yes or no?)

The aim is honourable but, couched in the language of the dominator, of the one who knows better and has come to impart knowledge to the ignorant and inferior, it will never bridge the gap which divides the nurses, aid workers and politicians from the people. Communication is the key to success of the popular organizations in Porvenir, for although the nuns and priests are foreigners, they live and work alongside the people and have a far less distorted image of *pueblo joven* reality. The work of Ama Kella is vital and whilst its members are of the people, the training they have received places them one step away from their public, yet they nevertheless identify with them and are acutely aware that to understand someone else you must put yourself in their shoes, as Humberto comments:

Para entender a un borracho hay que emborracharse. No le sirve para nada que le digas deja de tomar, es un vicio, peor va a tomar. Hay que ver las cosas desde su nivel.

(To understand a drunkard, you've got to get drunk. It's no use at all to tell them, stop drinking, it's a vice, they'll only drink all the more. You've got to see things from their level.)

Humberto goes on to give the illustration from a filmstrip of a man shipwrecked on a desert island: doctors find him, examine him and give him medication; soldiers salute him as a hero and give him a medal, which he uses as a fish hook; explorers examine him as a rare specimen; a priest baptizes him; but they all go on their way. Finally, another shipwrecked man finds him, speaks to him, and is the only one to really communicate with him. All the others had been too absorbed with their own interests to see things from the man's perspective. This story is vital for the understanding of how people approach and react to others according to how they preconceive them to be. This theme will be taken up in my analysis of how broadcasters conceive of their audience in terms of stereotypes and address them accordingly, which is the subject of Chapter Four.

CHAPTER FOURRADIO AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION IN AREQUIPA1. Introduction to Mass Communications Theory

If modern urban society was believed to cause the breakdown of 'community' and the loss of ethnic identities, mass commercial culture, subject to the capitalist market and diffused by the mass media, was believed to destroy both traditional rural and urban high culture.

In Arequipa, I interviewed over thirty people working in commercial and public service radio and television and a similar number working in community radio. In the conversations I held with these owners, producers and presenters, there emerged various strands of the discourse of mass communications theory: a belief in the power of the media to influence, an adherence to the dominant ideology thesis and a sense of the economic determinism of media production. Before proceeding to an analysis of how media people in Arequipa use these discourses to explain the medium in which they are working, I will give a brief overview of how these issues have arisen in mass communications theory.¹

In the interwar period, the Frankfurt School attacked the political manipulation of the masses by right-wing elites, whom they accused of using the mass media to brainwash and

¹ For an overview of mass communications theory see: Golding 1974; McQuail 1987; Carey 1989.

mass culture to stupefy.² Mass culture was held to standardize cultural products, depersonalize the public and annul their critical appreciation of 'genuine art' (Adorno & Horkheimer 1979). The media were held to be party to this process and assigned an omnipotent and direct influence, capable of brainwashing the audience (Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982:11-12; McQuail 1987:29).

Power was believed to be invested in the social structure, in which the media were situated in a system of interdependent institutions, controlled by a powerful minority and producing messages in the interests of the ruling elite. Power relations were held to be vertical and one-dimensional and media influence was assumed to be direct and destructive. The media were described metaphorically as a 'hypodermic syringe', injecting repressive ideologies into the consciousness of a defenceless public, and their messages were penetrating 'word bullets' (Morley 1980:1; Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982:12; Hall 1982: 61).

Central to this argument is the Marxist dominant ideology thesis which argues that modern capitalist society maintains and reproduces itself through the control of not only material but also 'mental' production.³ It holds ideology to be the

² The media were held responsible for brainwashing people in World War I and contributing to the rise of fascism in Europe by the transmission of propaganda.

³ The thesis is formulated in Marx and Engels' *German Ideology*, discussed by Abercrombie, Hill & Turner (1980). See also Lodziak 1976:70-84; Frazer 1986.

representation of appearance as reality: the ruling classes produce 'false beliefs' which permeate working-class consciousness and incorporate the masses into the hierarchical class structure, presented as a natural order. The media are involved in this process by reinforcing the dominant norms and values of the capitalist social order, which in turn legitimize the interests of the classes owning and controlling the media. The dominant ideology thesis also informs the theory of culture imperialism which involves the domination not just of one class by another but of one nation by another through the imposition of foreign ideas and cultural values.⁴

In the thirties and forties, American behavioural scientists challenged the pessimistic and speculative hypotheses of the Frankfurt School. Influenced by theories of pluralism and empirical evidence that the primary group had not disintegrated in modern urban society, they postulated that media effects were not direct but mediated by other social processes. In the pluralist model of society, power was believed to be diffused across society and no power base was recognized for which the media could be said to reflect one dominant ideology or which could be shaping the norms of the 'core value system', an all-inclusive consensus which was supposed to have arisen spontaneously. On finding no

⁴ This thesis has been influential in the analysis of the media in Latin America, especially in the work of Armand Mattelart (1979, 1980). See also Wells 1972; Tunstall 1977; Atwood & Mc Anany 1986.

conclusive evidence for the power of the media to affect people's behaviour, its influence was declared negligible and the 'end of ideology' was proclaimed (Bell 1962).

However, in the late sixties and seventies, the objectivity and impotence attributed to the media in the previous decades was challenged by Marxist critical theory. This argued that the consensus on which pluralism depended did not arise spontaneously but was part of a particular order imposed by the ruling classes. Pluralists had maintained that the media reinforced rather than changed beliefs, attributing them a positive role in reflecting the multi-faceted reality of society, but ultimately confirming the values and norms of the consensus.⁵ The critics argued that the media do not reflect reality but represent a specific interpretation of the world, reproducing the dominant social norm as if it were inevitable, universal and natural. The media were not then mirrors on reality but 'signifying agents' distorting the 'real world'.

Since the Marxist critics located power in the institutions supporting the political order and controlling economic wealth, they sought to establish how and by whom power was wielded through the structures and practices of media institutions (Curran et al. 1982:16, 25-6). The political economy theory was developed, reducing the role of

⁵ On the reinforcement theory see: Curran et al. 1982:21; Lodziak 1976:85; Hall 1982:61.

the media industry to the production of cultural commodities and services for the power blocs by the selling of information or audiences to advertisers. Commercial media production was shown to be determined by economic interests and contents to be dictated both by the need to satisfy the demands of advertisers for 'audience-maximizing products' and by pressure to conform to the prevailing consensus (Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982:18).

The remainder of this chapter examines the economic factors influencing what is produced in Arequipa, the links between those controlling commercial media and the politically and economically dominant groups within Peruvian society and beyond, and the analysis Arequipan producers give of the national media as subject to an economically determined, imperialistic ideology imported from abroad. It then looks at how they conceive of their mission to the public, how they imagine the *pobladores* as a 'popular' public and how they evaluate 'popular culture'. Finally, it considers an example of popular communication produced by *pobladores* themselves.

2. The History of Broadcasting in Arequipa

2.1. The Development of Commercial Radio

The broadcast media in Peru are predominantly commercial concerns, privately owned and controlled by the dominant economic sectors and although based on the free-market model inherited from the United States, they are informed by the

public service values of British broadcasting which defines itself as a medium of entertainment, information and education.⁶

Radio came to Peru in 1925 and to Arequipa in 1930, during the eleven year dictatorship of Augusto Leguía (1919-30), years characterized by urbanization, industrialization and the expansion of foreign capital investment.⁷ It was in this economic climate that Peruvian radio developed on the US commercial model, financed by advertising and sponsorship and with profit-making ends. Lima's first radio was Radio OAX, ostensibly owned by a group of local capitalists but in fact the property of the Marconi electronic company which supplied the transmitters.⁸ OAX held a monopoly for ten years but as Lima's population expanded rapidly, business consortiums set up new stations and by 1940 there were nine radios operating in Lima, increasing to thirty by 1954 and to 159 in 1966. In the sixties, the vast majority of radios were still Lima-based

⁶ The imposition of North American rather than British broadcasting models in Latin America corresponds to displacement of European capital by US investment in Latin America from the late nineteenth century (Lewis & Booth 1989:35, 165).

⁷ On the history of the media in Peru: Gargurevich 1977, 1987; Pretell 1982; Ballón 1987a. My account is also informed by those I interviewed in the Arequipan media.

⁸ The British Marconi electronic company also owned the telegraphic equipment of the Peruvian postal service and received the radio when the Peruvian Broadcasting Company went bankrupt just two years later. The State intervened and changed OAX to Radio Nacional in the thirties, developing two agricultural stations from it.

but by that time each department had at least one radio and there were significantly more in the commercial capitals like Arequipa (Ballón 1987a:18).

Arequipa was the second city in the country to boast its own radio station, Radio Landa,⁹ followed by Radio Arequipa, both founded by electrical engineers who began as amateur radio enthusiasts and together they monopolized Arequipan broadcasting for almost thirty years. Only Radio Continental provided any significant competition as from 1940, but not till the 1960s did other small entrepreneurs enter the market. Arequipa's radio industry developed gradually over the following twenty years with eight stations being added during the course of the sixties and seventies. The 1980s saw an unprecedented proliferation of new radio stations, doubling in one decade the twelve radios it had taken fifty years to establish. In 1989, Arequipa had a total of twenty four AM and FM stations, commandeering five short and sixteen medium wavelengths and eleven VHF bands.¹⁰

⁹ Landa is named after its founder who had studied in the States and returned to pioneer the first radio in the south of Peru in November 1930. He initially named it Radio Sur, but later gave it his own name.

¹⁰ FM stands for Frequency Modulation and refers to the way sound is imposed on the carrier signal. Frequency measures the number of waves per second and is used to label waves of high frequencies, hence VHF is Very High Frequency. AM is Amplitude Modulation and refers to the size of the waves, being used to measure long, medium and short waves (Lewis & Booth 1989:14-16).

The multiplication of radios can be attributed to three factors: technological innovation, urban expansion and free-market media policy. The invention of the transistor, easier to build and cheaper to buy than the original wireless set, gave both broadcasters and receivers greater access to radio. In addition, the availability of FM stereo wavelengths placed more wavebands at the disposition of broadcasters with superior sound quality and less interference. Secondly, increased production to some extent corresponded to increased demand with the rapid expansion of Arequipa's population in the last thirty years. However, in the late eighties, radio producers affirmed that the market was saturated and that there were insufficient audiences to warrant the advertisers' investment.¹¹ Thirdly, the excessive number of radios can be attributed to the free-market policy on which the Peruvian economy in general, and commercial radio in particular, depends. This is sustained by Peru's oligarchy whose close relationship with the State has secured a high level of autonomy for the media with minimum control.

Although legislation was minimal in the first thirty years of broadcasting in Peru, during the dictatorships of Leguía and then Odría (1948-56) the media did pass through

¹¹ One producer pointed out that Arequipa has twice as many radios per capita as the capital. According to Ballón (1987a:29), Lima has approximately one radio to every 100,000 people. Arequipa has one to roughly every 28,000 taking the population at the official estimate of approaching 700,000 in 1989, or one radio to 40,000 if the highest estimate of one million is used.

periods of censorship and repression. It was not until the intervention of Velasco (1968-75) that a government tried to diminish the dominance of the private sector and increase state control of the media.¹² Velasco's media reform was contained in the General Telecommunications Law (1971) and affected ownership, content and publicity.

The government expropriated 51 per cent of television shares and 25 per cent of the major radio companies.¹³ The law restricted to seven the number of radio stations any one person could own and allowed only one licence per person per Department. It was laid down that at least 60 per cent of programmes should be of national production and restrictions were placed on programmes of violent or discriminatory content. Lastly, a series of regulations were imposed on advertising and foreign language broadcasting, in an attempt to eliminate 'alienating' publicity and programming.

Velasco's reforms were designed to exploit the media as a vehicle for the promotion of both national identity and national stability. However, many broadcasters flouted the rules, protesting against the military government and couching their call for a return to free enterprise in terms of the

¹² On Velasco's media reforms see: Alisky 1981:66-87; Fox & Schmucler 1982:102; Ballón 1987a:23-6; Gargurevich 1987:211-304; Ortega & Romero 1977:27-56.

¹³ Alisky (1981:77) states that many private radios did not sufficiently interest the State because they had no news programme and Ballón (1987a:24) reckons the percentage actually expropriated at nearer 15 per cent.

defence of the freedom of the press.¹⁴ When Peru returned to democracy under Belaúnde in 1980, the media reverted to the hands of the private owners who were amply compensated for the expropriations in the form of money and equipment. The APRA government (1986-90) continued the devolution of the media to the private sector and although the Telecommunications Law is still in force, García allowed the owners to resume self-regulation according to the 'laissez-faire' policy of the liberal economy.¹⁵

2.2. The Advent of Television

Television reached Peru in January 1958, twenty years after the first US broadcasts in April 1939. As with radio, State control of the medium was minimal. Although it initially monopolized the two channels, Canal 5 and Canal 7, the State soon faced competition from the commercial sector as the groups controlling radio expanded into the world of television. Canal 7,¹⁶ broadcasting just three times a week, was unable to compete with the private companies which had

¹⁴ A study in Lima in 1978 revealed that the law had failed to sway radio's bias from entertainment to education and 21 per cent of music was found to be in English, some radios like Panamericana playing up to 70 per cent foreign music (Ballón 1987a:25).

¹⁵ It is worthy of note that García counted amongst his principle advisors one of Peru's media tycoons, a member of the Delgado Parker family (see below).

¹⁶ Canal 7 was controlled by the Ministry of Education under an agreement with UNESCO to provide an educational television channel.

formed their own body, the Junta Permanente Nacional de Telecomunicaciones, and were able to manipulate the government to secure tax benefits, a reduction in the licence fee and protection from the incursion of outsiders (Gargurevich 1987:185).

In Arequipa, the two most important media groups are the Compañía Peruana de Radiodifusión (COPERAD) and Panamericana Televisión (PANTEL). COPERAD was founded in 1942 by the influential businessmen, Nicanor González and Jesús Antonio Umbert.¹⁷ The company already owned Radio América in Lima and Radio Continental in Arequipa and was linked to the Asociación Nacional de Radio Difusores del Perú (ANRAD). It was the first company to develop a commercial television in Peru, founding Televisión Continental (Canal 4) in Lima in 1958 and placing a transmitter (Canal 6) in Arequipa in 1969.¹⁸

PANTEL was founded in July 1958 but did not broadcast until October 1959. As well as Canal 13 in Lima, it now operates Canal 2 in Arequipa and has bases in Chiclayo, Trujillo and Piura and 200 boosters throughout the country. It was an offshoot of the Delgado-Lindley media group, which already owned Radio Panamericana and Radio Programas del Perú

¹⁷ Umbert married into the Bentín family of industrial millionaires who, amongst other business concerns, owned Peru's major breweries.

¹⁸ The assistant manager of Canal 4, Elisabeth Nuñez de Noboa, gave the date of foundation as 1963, but Pretell (1987:22-5) cites 1969.

(RPP) as well as other provincial stations.¹⁹ Its principal partners were Genaro Delgado and Isaac Lindley, later joined by Manuel Ulloa, owner of the *Expreso* newspaper and Minister of Hacienda in 1968.²⁰ PANTEL's organization and enterprising spirit soon placed it at the top of the television rankings where it has maintained its prestige, avoiding Velasco's expropriations by splitting into various sections immediately after the coup.

The history of Canal 8, Arequipa's third channel, differs from that of Canal 4 and Canal 6, emerging in June 1986 as the business venture of a group outside the old Lima-based networks of media control.²¹ César Portillo, administrator of Canal 8 and one of its founders, relates how the group perceived an opening for a new station in a market hitherto dominated by channels which had grown old and complacent. Canal 8 was intended to be a station of local character to represent Arequipa, to break the excessive dependence on Lima

¹⁹ RPP is Peru's most prestigious national station, renowned for its extensive national news coverage and Panamericana is the pop music station of highest acclaim.

²⁰ As well as holding extensive links with the industrial and financial bourgeoisie, Lindley's brother, Nicolás, was a member of Godoy's military junta ruling in 1963. It was not fortuitous that when the junta turned the State's Canal 5 over to the private sector, PANTEL rapidly applied and was granted the licence. Furthermore, PANTEL converted the superior studios of Canal 13, designated an educational channel, into Canal 5 (Gargurevich 1987:185-6).

²¹ Julio Melgar, Percy Tapía and Enrique Mendoza were the most important founder members.

and to counter those stations (Panamericana in particular) which supported the APRA government (Pretell 1987:78).

Que fuera un órgano de opinión de fuerza...que la gente tenga dos cosas para pensar, oficialmente se conocía un lado y nosotros dábamos el otro.

(That it should be a strong organ of opinion... that people should have two things to weigh up, one side would be known officially and we'd give the other side.)

However, as the ensuing analysis will reveal, even what Portillo calls 'the modest pretensions of a domestic station' rapidly fell prey to the economic and political pressures on production.

3. The Commercial Character of Arequipan Broadcasting

3.1. Economic and Political Constraints on Broadcasting

The realization of radio's broadcasting potential developed its role from its original purpose as a medium of confidential interpersonal communication for use by the State and military to one of universal entertainment and of wide publicity, rapidly seized upon by the commercial sector.²²

In Arequipa, apart from the Lima-based radio giants, such as Continental and Panamericana, radio is dominated by middle-class entrepreneurs for whom the radio is a branch of their established business concerns in property and commerce and may provide another source of income. However, capital gain is not

²² Radio technology was an extension of the wireless telegraph and telephone, designed for long distance communication and in Peru was first used by the navy in 1916 (Crisell 1986:19; Lewis & Booth 1989:13).

assured and some stations scarcely break even: few commercial radios in Arequipa are self-sufficient and most are backed by a small, inherited family business. Financial reward is not the only type of profit sought from the radio: it may boost other business but may also provide a source of political leverage, social prestige or simply a source of pleasure. In order to maximize its profits, commercial radio must cater for the widest audience possible to supply advertisers with the greatest number of potential consumers. It is far more cost-effective for a radio to play music than to produce programmes with a high speech content²³ so most commercial radios are restricted to programmes of entertainment value. These are usually music-based programmes, playing hit records interspersed with chat from presenters and guests and sometimes phone-ins from the audience (Lewis and Booth 1989:5). Such programmes including entertainment, sports or sensationalist news bulletins are those which attract the biggest audiences and consequently the advertisers. Raúl Díaz, advertising salesman for Radio Mundial, comments:

Crónicas rojas, policiales, asaltos, crímenes... La radio se mueve en base a la economía, no hay apoyo publicitario para programas educativos, culturales, música selecta.

(Sensational stories, police reports, assaults, crimes... The radio revolves around the economy, there isn't any sponsoring for educational or cultural programmes, specialist music.)

²³ For example, news and analysis, discussions and debates, programmes of health education, domestic affairs or general knowledge, radio plays or literary topics.

Advertisers are unwilling to sponsor 'serious' programmes which draw relatively small audiences or programmes playing folkloric music, assumed to be for the lower-class, Andean migrants who lack the buying power advertisers are looking to net. For many radio producers, to play pop music for the upper-middle class youth is a much more lucrative proposition and most of the new FMs, like Radio Concierto (founded 1987), aim at this audience who are in the high-earner, high-consumer bracket and attract publicity from more profitable businesses, such as Arequipa's fashionable boutiques, bars and restaurants. The AM radios on the other hand, are wary of specialization for fear of alienating sections of their public and try to cater for as wide a cross-section as possible.

From the outset, Peruvian television has been dominated by the same commercial interests as radio. Peru received television as a ready-made product: broadcasting equipment, television sets and programmes were all imported and links were established with US broadcasting groups and the business empires behind them.

PANTEL not only had important links in government, business, finance and industry at a national level but also became an associate of the transnational Columbia Broadcasting Company (CBS).²⁴ Contact was made through the media magnate,

²⁴ CBS is partly owned by mining and aviation companies and partly by Chase Manhattan Bank which also owns 8% of the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), the third biggest group supplying programmes to Latin America.

Goar Mestre, who joined PANTEL following his expulsion from Cuba in 1960.²⁵ PANTEL now has outlets in Argentina, Mexico, Panama and Puerto Rico and, in collaboration with CBS and Goar Mestre Asociados, markets both CBS and its own productions.²⁶ In order to compete with PANTEL and CBS, COPERAD sought to associate itself with the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).²⁷ The RCA launched Canal 4 in Peru and linked it to its subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), which in turn lent both technical aid and television programmes, precipitating the substitution of local live production with North American series, films and soap opera.²⁸

The strong links between the media and the business community are reinforced by the advertising industry which influences the economics and politics of Peruvian broadcasting. The principal manufacturers of products advertised on both television and radio belong to Peru's

²⁵ In the pre-Castro period, Goar Mestre Asociados controlled Cuban television, nine radio stations and other business concerns. After the revolution, Mestre transferred his interests to hotelerie in Spain and Miami, from where he rebuilt his media empire in league with CBS.

²⁶ One of the most famous productions to date has been *Simplemente María*, which was also adapted for Spain (Campo 1975).

²⁷ The RCA is the fifteenth biggest US corporation with extensive business, publishing and manufacturing interests, producing radio and electronic equipment, rockets and satellite sweepers under contract with the US Defence Secretary and NASA.

²⁸ Pretell (1987:23-4) believes the influence of the NBC signalled the channel's demise from the mid-sixties.

industrial oligarchy who hold positions of management and control in business, politics and the press. They define the political orientation of commercial broadcasting as anti-communist and anti-unionist, defending the freedoms of enterprise and press upon which the oligarchy depends.

Since private broadcasting depends on the income from publicity sales, commercial radio must not only play widely-liked, non-specialist music but must avoid controversial issues and radical comment which might alienate both audience and advertisers and mar its entertainment value. Some use the radio for their own political ends, campaigning on behalf of a particular politician,²⁹ but refrain from challenging the status quo and offending the commercial sector whom they need to placate. For that reason, many producers, who would swear to be defenders of free speech, control what their presenters say and forbid their concessionaires from expressing any political opinions on their shows.

The telecommunications law might not impose any restrictions on the radio's freedom of speech, but the law of free enterprise means forfeiting other freedoms. Producers, like Hermógenes Delgado of Radio Melodía, Arequipa's top-ranking radio,³⁰ believe that as long as they are not taking

²⁹ In Arequipa, Villafuerte, the owner of Radio Mundial, waged a successful radio campaign leading to the election of his brother as *diputado* (MP) in the APRA government.

³⁰ One of the reasons for Melodía's large audiences is that the station can be received clearly across Arequipa, having one of the most powerful transmitters in the city,

sides with any particular party or religion, they are being neutral:

Melodía es una radio comercial, independiente, no somos de ningún partido, ninguna religión...del diablo seremos!

(Melodía is a commercial, independent radio, we belong to no party, to no religion..we must belong to the devil!)

However, the very classification of Melodía as a commercial and independent radio creates a political identity for itself, since its commercial character depends upon the liberal economic policies which defend private property and its independence lies in the system of free enterprise.

Political bias is a bone of contention amongst television producers and in 1989 when I researched the Arequipan media and APRA were in power, there was a particular rivalry between the pro-government Panamericana and Canal 8, itself critical of García's populism. Some of Canal 8's partners belong to the right-wing Acción Popular, although they refuse the label *canal de oposición* ('opposition channel'). Initially the partners disputed the role politics should play in the new channel, torn between their aim to present a critical view of social reality and the need to avoid alienating either advertisers or audiences:

Porque si se identifica con una línea ideológica, automáticamente este canal pierde el sector con el cual no está identificado. Entonces hay una disputa ¿somos políticos pero no hacemos política en el canal? ¿para qué? ¿para mantener un rating eventual, para recibir la

(three kilowatt for AM and five for FM), all other stations only having one kilowatt capacity (with the exception of San Martín with three and Continental with ten).

atención de la gente? O una cuestión de principios, hacemos política en el canal, quizás podemos influir dentro de la gente, pero va a tener un mayor costo económicamente. (C. Portillo)

(Because if it identifies itself with an ideological line, this channel automatically loses the sector with which it is not identified. So then there's a dispute: are we political but we don't do politics on the station? why not? to maintain a possible rating, to attract people's attention? Or as a question of principle, we do politics on the channel, maybe we can have some influence amongst the people, but economically the cost is going to be greater.)

At present, political comment is reserved for the news programme, *El Noticiero del 8*, followed by a satirical slot, *La Pedrada de Andrés*,³¹ which criticizes the government, the authorities and certain sectors of society, including the media themselves. Portillo comments that these few minutes of criticism are some small compensation for the hours of unprovocative viewing they transmit:

Trata de sembrar polémica en la mente de la gente...nos estamos autocriticando, nos estamos golpeando a nosotros mismos...es como un paliativo.

(It tries to sow controversy in people's minds, we're criticizing ourselves, we're beating ourselves...it's like a palliative.)

Political comment is minimal and muted, but not because propaganda goes against the grain of journalistic neutrality but because it is not economically viable.

³¹*Pedrada* is literally a blow by a stone, but is used figuratively to mean a cutting or snide remark.

3.2. Culture Imperialism and National Identity

I have indicated that the lack of a national identity is constantly lamented in Peru and it frequently enters the discourse of media producers. They cherish the dream of attaining a national identity, at the heart of which there is supposed to be something quintessentially Peruvian with the potential to create a unified nation.

However, once again, the media find their ideals curtailed by economic considerations: producers deplore the incursion of foreign music or television programmes and yet have to admit they are profitable. They blatantly flout the ruling to broadcast at least 40 per cent of material of national production. Fernando Herrera of Panamericana Televisión claims they are the only channel to comply with the law (80 per cent of Continental's broadcasts are of foreign production):

Nosotros somos la única empresa que cumple con la ley... La política de la empresa desde treinta años ha sido darle importancia al producto nacional.

We are the only firm which obeys the law... The firm's policy for thirty years has been to emphasize national production.

Not only national but also local television production is minimal, the programme schedule of both Panamericana and Continental being dictated from their Lima headquarters. Local production is limited to news, discussion and game shows. Even Canal 8, which set out with a vision to boost local production and expose the 'real' Arequipa, is not yet in

conditions to do so and, apart from its successful news programme, finds itself equally dependent upon foreign material.³²

The logic of commercial radio is to target consumers by supplying 'what the people want', but the radio producers mostly believe demand to be created by the music industry rather than the consumers, since radios depend upon the music the record companies send them which is largely foreign music, pop and rock in English and *salsa*³³ produced in the US. The Peruvian music industry is stagnant: record labels have not only had to contend with the current economic crisis, but have also been unable to compete with foreign production and the escalation of bootleg cassettes sold on the streets. The radios depend on the records they receive, as Victor Choquehuanca of Radio Concordia comments:

El primer tropiezo es la falta de material...que música tocamos es la que nos llegue, de allí comienza la influencia. Que los disqueros nos manden música peruana sería fabuloso, pero los disqueros quieren lo que es fácil y seguro.

(The first obstacle is the lack of material...what music we play depends on what we receive, there begins the influence. If the record houses were to send Peruvian music it would be fabulous, but the record houses want what's easy and safe.)

³² Panamericana in Arequipa includes local news in the evening bulletin and has a weekly discussion programme, *Mesa Redonda* ('Round Table') on topics of local interest. Continental produces *Sandy Match*, a type of 'It's a Knockout', sponsored by *Sandy* fizzy drinks, and a game show *Rueda de la Fortuna* ('Wheel of Fortune').

³³ *Salsa* is derived from popular and folkloric Afro-Cuban music, enhanced by jazz (Gerard & Sheller 1989).

Foreign musics may be the most in demand but they also signify the least financial risk, they are the most up to date and the most readily available form. Many radio producers, faced with the same choices from a stagnant Peruvian music industry or the new products of a dynamic foreign output, say they are obliged to play music from abroad. They see themselves constrained by the local demand which they believe to be shaped by international economic forces conditioning people into wanting what they are given, even if it is music in a foreign language they do not understand. Jorge Rodríguez of Radio 33 remarks:

Siempre tiene que ver con el negocio, la gente no lo entiende, pero le gusta, es producto del condicionamiento, de la actividad económica.

(It's always got to do with business, people might not understand it, but they like it, it's a product of conditioning, of economic activity.)

Both radio and television producers then face the dilemma of reconciling economic viability with an uneasiness about foreign production. Producers attribute a considerable and pernicious influence to foreign music and television programmes, like the US game show, *Sábado Gigante* ('Saturday Big') which gives away huge money prizes and which Elisabeth Núñez (Canal 6) criticizes for encouraging people to leave Peru in search of a higher standard of living. Producers talk of 'alienation', arising from the disparity between the immediate Peruvian reality and the sounds and images of abroad which encourage people to acquire other tastes, fashions and

customs and adopt 'alien' ways of thinking and behaving. Foreign television production, based on cultural models different from those of Peru, is thus held to distort the national Peruvian identity:

La influencia es notable, porque sus moldes culturales son totalmente diferentes a los nuestros...los países receptores tienen que aceptar de alguna forma la cultura que nos transmite la televisión, modos, estilos, costumbres, que no son nuestros y que a través de la tele serán popularizados... La comunicación masiva en general influye con mucha fuerza sobre nuestro ser cultural propio. (F. Herrera, Canal 2)

(The influence is striking, because its cultural models are totally different from our own...the recipient countries have to accept in some form the culture which the television transmits to us, the fashions, styles, customs, which are not ours and which will be popularized by the television... Mass communications in general exert a very strong influence on our own cultural being.)

Producers, like Herrera, believe that the media could make a positive contribution to the creation of a national identity by levelling cultural differences and promoting a unified 'Peruvian culture' to counter the 'cultural invasion' from abroad:

La gran influencia de los países desarrollados es casi inevitable, lo que nosotros tenemos que hacer es rescatar nuestros propios valores para contraponer a esta influencia cultural ajena.

(The wide influence of developed countries is almost inevitable, what we have to do is salvage our own values to set against this alien cultural influence.)

However, Portillo (Canal 8) believes that their restricted resources limit them to the reproduction of foreign models which reinforce stereotypes by which patterns of

domination underlying class and cultural difference are maintained:

El mismo hecho de representar un tipo de vida que...la mayoría de veces no es propio, está rompiendo dentro de...los patrones de vida familiar, social y comunitaria. Se sigue viendo el asunto de que la persona que tiene tal vestido, tal carro o un tipo tal de vida, es la persona nacida para dominar y la que no la tiene es la que siempre va a tener que seguir... En este sentido yo creo que no nivela, sino, al contrario, impone, muy sutilmente, patrones de vida.

(The very fact that it represents a life style which... most of the time is not ours, is destructive to...the models of family, social and community life. We carry on seeing the case that the person who has a certain outfit, a certain car or a certain lifestyle, is the one born to dominate and the one which doesn't have them, is the one who'll always have to follow... In that sense, I don't think it does level, but rather on the contrary, it very subtly imposes patterns of living.)

Although both radio and television producers agree that media products from outside Latin America are potentially damaging to the Peruvian national identity, they claim to be forced to accept them given the dearth of national production and lack of a viable alternative:

En Perú, por la falta de recursos económicos, nuestra cultura es la expresión de nuestra economía. (C. Portillo, Canal 8)

(In Peru, because of the lack of economic resources, our culture is an expression of our economy.)

Portillo sees culture as economically determined and interprets the situation in terms of culture imperialism, believing that rich, capitalist countries reinforce their domination of developing countries like Peru, through the export of media products which inculcate an acceptance of the capitalist system:

Hay pocas fuentes de producción televisiva...el imperialismo tiene redes muy finas para llegar...no tenemos otra alternativa que acudir a esta fuente.

(There are very few sources of television production...imperialism has very fine networks through which to arrive...we have no other alternative but to resort to that source.)

As Peru lacks the resources to produce its own programmes, producers accept North American production even though it does not represent Peruvian interests. Portillo also believes the quantity of foreign production implicitly confirms the widely-held belief in the superiority of the foreign over the Peruvian, by surreptitiously working on people's consciousness:

La influencia es por debajo: lo americano es bueno, es lo mejor. Si ocurre una situación militar, por ejemplo en Nicaragua, caramba, qué pena, están matando gente, pero van a intervenir los EEUU, ay qué bueno... La Coca-Cola es buena, los japoneses extraordinarios, lo peruano no, es malo, no funciona, no camina... Las ideas se siembran allí, la televisión no toca la puerta para pedir permiso.

(The influence is underhand: the American is good, it's the best. If there occurs a military situation, for example in Nicaragua, hell, what a shame, but the USA are going to intervene, ah, that's good... Coca-Cola is good, the Japanese are extraordinary, but not the Peruvian, it's bad, it doesn't work, it doesn't get along... That's where the seeds are sown, the television doesn't knock on the door and ask to come in.)

This quotation explicitly demonstrates the belief in the immense influence of the media and the impotence of the people: its influence is subversive but direct, it might be uninvited but people are powerless to resist because it penetrates their consciousness. It has the power to shape people's opinions, to mould them into different cultural

beings and to reinforce both class domination and imperialism.

4. The Concept of Culture in the Arequipan Media

4.1. Popular Culture and Mass Culture

The media's evaluation of 'culture' is central to their concept of their mission to the *pueblos jóvenes* and informs their definition of 'the popular'. I do not wish to pre-empt their categories but will here discuss the usage of the terms 'the people', 'the masses' and 'popular culture' as used by the media people I spoke to.

'Popular culture' is defined and evaluated in relation to the category of 'high' or 'learned culture' from which it is excluded.³⁴ A dichotomy is drawn between the cultural practices of the dominant sectors of society, and those they deem 'the other', or in this case, 'the popular'. Accordingly, Peter Mason (1990:38-9) defines popular culture as 'the product of a constant drawing and redrawing of the boundary between popular and learned culture'. High culture is an elitist construct, manifesting itself in cultural products such as art forms, music or intellectual works, held to be the culmination of a process of refinement of the human mind, according to the standards set up and approved by the dominant sectors of society.

³⁴ For discussions of this topic see: Gans 1974; Bourdieu 1986; MacCabe 1986; Rowe & Schelling 1991.

In Arequipa, 'high culture' corresponds to the stereotype of the 'white', urban, middle-class and educated Arequipan and 'popular culture' to that of the dark-skinned Andean migrant of low socio-economic calibre. 'Popular culture' is defined in tangential relation to high culture and in the urban context of Arequipa includes both 'mass culture' and 'folk culture'. Mass culture is generally used to refer to the media-oriented product of the new technology of modern industrial society, such as television, radio, film and comics. 'Folk culture' refers to the rural Andean peasant tradition and is defined in opposition both to mass culture and to elitist high culture. It has been capitalized by the State in an attempt to create a national identity, extolling its symbolic value as representative of the 'authentic Peru', but it is not merely the survival of the past, for it is part of the contemporary life of migrants in the city who renew and transform their cultural heritage, often in opposition to the power structures which would have them 'integrate'.³⁵

Popular culture can then be defined from above, by the dominant classes and the economic and political systems which support them and into which they wish to absorb the more spontaneous elements of people's culture; or it can be defined from below, as a positive force which embraces primary knowledge of one's world and society enabling production,

³⁵ These issues are discussed by Rowe & Schelling (1991) in their recent analysis of a broad spectrum of popular culture across Latin America.

recreation and language use directly linked to daily life (Peirano 1982:99).

4.2. Public Service: 'Professional' and 'Cultural' Radio

The public service model of radio sets itself up as 'cultural' radio and although it is little developed in Arequipa, some of its characteristics spill into commercial radio which is, after all, an industry of public interest. It adopts the rhetoric of public service radio and is informed by its concepts of 'culture', 'education' and 'popular', leading it to define itself as a medium of information, education and culture.

Commercial radio defends its freedom from control and thereby defines itself in opposition to public service broadcasting which receives funding but has to submit to the sponsor's mandate. The public service model, on the other hand, is characterized by a non-profit making policy, designed to free radio both from commercial pressures and political interference. It professes high standards and has a paternalistic aim to encourage the listener to appreciate things a body of 'professionals' deem to be worthwhile, irrespective of the wishes or demands of the public who are conceived as capable of growth and change, rather than as mere targets for sponsors (Crisell 1986:24).

'Professionalism' is defined by standards of staff and production and is an aspect of public service radio which is

assumed by the commercial sector. In Arequipa, the radios are minimally staffed: frequently the owner is also the managing-director, administrator, producer and presenter or works with just a secretary, the rest of the radio hours being rented out to concessionaires. Where a radio is unable to generate sufficient income to cover its running costs and employ a permanent staff, it has no option but to bring in licensees, thereby forfeiting some of its control over the quality and content of what is produced.

Here, 'professional' is used in opposition to 'amateur', dividing any permanent, trained staff from the licensees who tend to regard the radio as a hobby or as a means of generating extra cash and lack formal media training, acquiring their knowledge empirically, just as the owner-directors before them.³⁶ Most radio producers agree that the lack of training is detrimental both to the overall image of the radio and the quality of production:

En Arequipa, noventa por ciento de los que trabajan en los medios de comunicación han adquirido su formación en una forma práctica, de su experiencia. Aquí toman personal gratuita, quieren hacerlo como un hobby, para ser algo...el nivel profesional, cultural es muy bajo. (C.Arías, Radio Mundial)

(In Arequipa, ninety per cent of those who work in the media have acquired their training on the job, from their experience. Here they take on people for free, they want to do it as a hobby...the professional and cultural level is very low.)

³⁶ Many owner-directors began as disc jockeys who later set up their own stations, like H. Delgado, who started out as a radio and theatre enthusiast, writing plays and jingles for Radio Landa, and went on to found Melodía.

The concept of 'professionalism' is linked to institutionalized education and to notions of 'culture'. To class a radio as 'professional' indicates the high calibre of its staff, but also implies high standards of output and a slick production which will attract more customers for the big advertisers. 'Professionalism' also implies higher profits for a radio and, just as businesses sponsor charities, radios also render service to the community in order to create a good public image (Lewis & Booth 1989:6-7).

Radio Continental is an example of a 'professional' radio, combining its commercial concerns with a public service ethic. Continental came to Arequipa in 1940, a new link in the González-Umbert chain of radios already existing in Lima, Ica and Tacna. In common with Radio Panamericana and Radio Programas, it employs a permanent qualified staff, has no licensees and aims at a middle-class, educated audience, imagined to live in the residential areas of Arequipa and in the cities of Peru and the world beyond. Continental's administrator, Rene Rodríguez, claims to exercise a strict quality control, refusing any music which he deems too 'vulgar', like *chicha* (see below) or commercialized folklore and instead plays a standard type of light, contemporary music. Furthermore, it has both the standards of production and audience to attract publicity from major companies such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi, banks, building societies and the

national airlines, and has built up a prestigious reputation for itself:

Por el tiempo que tiene, es una radio muy conocida, hablar de radio en Arequipa o en el extranjero, dicen 'Continental'. (R. Rodríguez)

(Because of the years it's been going, it's a very well known radio, talking about radio in Arequipa or abroad, people say 'Continental'.)

Apart from those commercial radios which in some way draw on the characteristics of public service radio, there are arguably four Arequipan radios which in some way fulfil the requisites of public service broadcasting: Universidad, Municipal, Educación and to some extent, San Martín, all of which follow the concept of radio as a national institution rather than a commercial enterprise. Basic to public service is the freedom from the economic strictures of advertising and each of these radios is accordingly funded by a body with an interest in promoting national values, education and the arts. Public service programming tends to include music, drama, discussion and a variety of educational topics aimed at specific sectors (children, women, farmers).

Radio Universidad broadcasting from the Universidad Nacional de San Agustín (UNSA: 'National University of Saint Augustine') is one of Arequipa's older radios, founded in 1937, but shut down during periods of military dictatorships. It is funded by donations from firms and run by student volunteers. Educación and Municipal are both fairly recent, opening in September 1988 and October 1987 respectively.

Educación is state-owned and funded, having its base in the Ministry of Education and is run exclusively by teachers. Municipal belongs to the local council of the district of Cerro Colorado and is funded by the Town Hall but has a view to becoming self-supporting through selling advertising. Finally, Radio San Martín is owned by the Dominican Order, resident at the church and monastery of Santo Domingo and although commercial in economic terms, it has a public service mission in its religious capacity of evangelizer and educator.

Public service radio aims 'to defend national territories, industries and identities' against the ravages of commercial interests (Lewis & Booth 1989:10) and the four Arequipan radios do so in promoting a Peruvian national identity and emphasizing a Peruvian cultural heritage by playing Andean folkloric music. They claim to be both 'cultural' and 'educational': educating people to recognize and appreciate *lo nuestro* ('what is ours'), comprising both indigenous Andean *waynos* and the *música criolla* of the coast. Furthermore, they hope to inculcate a taste for less 'popular' musics like classical music or jazz, as well as educating in the sense of imparting information, with programmes touching upon diverse topics, from history to health.

Media professionalism is based on high standards, journalistic objectivity and political neutrality. It has been attacked by adherents of the dominant ideology thesis as another aspect of the mechanism of concealment of motives and

manipulation by the intellectual elite, through selecting items to be broadcast not on 'professional' grounds but so as to maintain a particular social order which confers 'professional' status through its institutions. They believe the notion of 'professional', like 'culture', disguises the process of class domination by concealing class issues as 'cultural' issues, as in Rodríguez's exclusion of 'vulgar' music on grounds of quality control or the elimination of political radicalism in order to preserve neutrality (Kumar 1979; Bourdieu 1986).

4.3. Popular Music on the Radio

Music, the preferred medium of the radio, is central to concepts of culture operated in Arequipa. As well as the class-based division between high and low culture, types of music fall into two broad categories, defined in terms of a dichotomy between the old, traditional and established and the new and innovative. However, neither category is homogeneous but the aggregate of more than one public, more than one 'people'. Again I will explore how these entities are constructed in discourse.

The music of the middle classes falls between the 'old' musics characterized by *música criolla*, Mexican *boleros*, Argentinean tangos, romantic *baladas* and classical music, and the 'modern', dominated by foreign pop and rock, and Latin tropical music, especially *salsa*. The music of the lower

classes of Andean origin can similarly be bracketed under the old and the modern, being *música folklórica* and *chicha* respectively.

In both cases, the old is considered to be the higher form of culture, not only because it is validated by age, but also because innovation is seen as degeneration and the corruption of the 'authentic'. The authentic is classed as that which is native to Peru and 'folkloric music' (referring to all music from the Andes, but particularly the *wayno*) is the most ancient form and held to be the most representative of pre-Columbian Peru. However, the antiquity and indigenous quality which give folkloric music worth are simultaneously the source of condemnation as being outmoded and peculiar to the despised Andean peasantry.

Tradition can be positive in its 'authenticity' or negative because it represents the old-fashioned: such is the case of *música criolla*, particular to the coast and heavily influenced by Spanish and European trends. Its negative connotations do not relate to any racist overtones, but rather to the fact that it was popular in the nineteenth century and thus belongs to a past era (Llórens 1983). *Música criollo* is given little space on the majority of radios, usually no more than the statutory burst along with the midday rendition of the national anthem. However, Radio Arequipa devotes a quarter

of its playing time to *música criolla*, pandering to the self-ascribed *criollo* character of the Arequipan people.³⁷

Producers are reluctant to play folkloric music, not only on account of Arequipan prejudice ('el público arequipeño nada quiere saber de las provincias, del wayno': 'the Arequipan public doesn't want to know anything about the provinces or the *wayno*', V. Choquehuanca) but also because they are not as economically viable as pop and *salsa*. Furthermore, Delgado maintains that migrants no longer want to listen to *waynos* in the city, because they are ashamed of their Andean heritage and want to assimilate to urban cultural forms. His opinion is echoed by Ariás of Mundial:

Es un complejo de inferioridad, una idiosincracia, que el émulo es en el hombre de la ciudad, tratan de imitar, se va despersonalizando, perdiendo a sí mismo...alienación. Ya no quieren huaynos, quieren música de la ciudad, rock, salsa.

(It's as inferiority complex, an idiosyncrasy, that the person to emulate is the man of the city, they try and imitate, they are being depersonalized, losing themselves...it's alienation. They no longer want *waynos*, they want city music, rock, *salsa*.)

'Popular culture' then comes to embrace pop and *salsa* as well as folkloric music, and operates social variables other than class. Pop music, for example, culls a mass following largely from the youth and the high ratings for Radio Panamericana, broadcasting pop and rock, show that these musics are preferred by young people regardless of social

³⁷ Unless otherwise stated, all percentages given here have been calculated from my survey of radios in Arequipa in March 1989.

class.³⁸ Although categories are constructed in terms of a class-based evaluation, it is erroneous to assume that any particular type of music will correspond exactly to a determined social sector: *salsa*, pop and *waynos* may all be enjoyed by both middle-class urban Arequipans and low-class rural migrants.

Playing *salsa* and rock can qualify a radio as 'popular' because it is playing what is enjoyed by a wide cross-section of society, but those which play a substantial proportion of *waynos* and *chichas* also style themselves 'popular' because their public are 'of the people', envisaged to be 'the poor' and composed of adult, lower-class people of Andean origin. The proportion of Andean music played overall is relatively small and confined in the main to the early hours of the morning which, despite some allegations of marginalization, is in fact the prime listening time for the *pobladores* who rise early to leave for work in the fields or in the informal sector (Llórens & Tamayo 1987:45-62).³⁹

³⁸ A market research survey carried out by the Peruvian Company of Market Research (CPIM) amongst AM and FM radios in Arequipa ranks them in order of popularity according to class (although it does not specify how that category is arrived at) and finds the same FM radios (Panamericana, Melodía and Concordia) occupy the first three places for both lower and middle to upper class categories, indicating that class is not a relevant factor here.

³⁹ El Tiempo, Mundial and San Martín play half of all folkloric music broadcast on commercial Arequipan radio, devoting to it 47, 35 and 29% of playing time respectively.

The programmes on which folkloric music is played were originally intended for the agricultural sector of the provinces and served to send messages to and from isolated areas of the sierra, but with the mass migration of Andean peasants to the cities, the rural has introduced itself into the urban environment and folkloric music is now an established, if minor, feature on most AM radios. The folkloric programmes continue to serve a practical purpose, for instance in the location of missing persons where a migrant in the city has lost contact with family or friends, as well as facilitating the diffusion of Andean music in the city.

The 'alienating' types of music discussed above are defined in opposition to the 'authentic' music forms. *Chicha* is a case in point of what is deemed unauthentic and therefore 'not culture' and few radios actually play it. Radio Surperuano monopolizes the market, playing nothing but *chicha* whilst Radio Landa plays 40 per cent.

Chicha also known as *música tropical andina* or *cumbia andina* is a blend of the Columbian *cumbia*,⁴⁰ the Andean *wayno* and rock, emerging from the rural-urban migration of recent years and the interaction between cultural forms of rural-Andean and coastal-urban origins, the latter influenced by

⁴⁰ *Cumbia* derives from the Afro-Columbian rural tradition and evolved into an urban popular form, fashionable in Lima and Peru's coastal cities in the sixties. In Peru, it tends to be confused with *salsa* and labelled with it as 'tropical' or 'Latin' music.

modern musical currents from North America and Europe.⁴¹ It appeared in Lima in the early sixties and is widely played, sung and danced in the *pueblos jóvenes* and especially amongst second-generation migrants.

Chicha is an overtly mixed music style which Mauricio Quintanilla of Radio Surperuano describes as a hybrid:

Es producto de las migraciones en los últimos años, antes no existía esa música, es una mezcla de wayno y salsa, de costa y sierra, dando la cumbia andina, es un híbrido.

(It's a product of the migrations in recent years, this music didn't exist before, it's a mixture of wayno and salsa, of coast and sierra, giving the Andean cumbia, it's a hybrid.)

Since *chicha* is a mixture of two pre-existing, 'authentic' elements and a recent invention, it is excluded from the category of 'culture' and defined in negative terms. Max Landa defines *chicha* principally in terms of what it is not:

La chicha no es música autóctona, sino una mezcla de música folclórica y música tropical...es música folclórica con un ritmo juvenil...no es cultura, no representa la cultura del Perú, es una mezcla, una invención, hecho desde muy poco tiempo.

(*Chicha* is not autochthonous music, but rather a mixture of folkloric and tropical music...it's folkloric music with a youthful rhythm..it's not culture, it doesn't represent the culture of Peru, it's a mixture, an invention, made up only a little while ago.)

Landa's refusal to allow *chicha* as culture is based on the assumption, alluded to above, that high culture is enduring and immutable and conversely, popular culture is

⁴¹ On *chicha* see: CEPES 1986; Turino 1986; Romero 1988.

perishable and fluctuating. The autochthonous or 'folkloric' music of the Andes is held to be the most authentic representation of Peruvian culture, however erroneous the belief in the existence of one unified, untainted cultural source. *Chicha* is therefore negatively sanctioned as a degradation of the original stock, the mixing of two pure strains to form a 'mongrel' music.

The attitude to *chicha* echoes the discourse on *cholos* in reference to rural migrants to Arequipa. As noted above, *cholo* is used synonymously with *serrano* or *indio* in Arequipa, in opposition to *criollo* or *costeño* and generally signifies inferiority. It may refer specifically to an Andean migrant moving between two worlds and not fitting into either and *chicha* music is similarly described as the product of the rural in the urban context and a reflection of the identity crisis Andean migrants are believed to undergo in the city:

En la ciudad la gente andina empieza a cambiar su identidad, asume otros patrones, sólo escuchan waynos dentro de su casa, en la casa no se sienten andina, tampoco son costeños, de eso la chicha. (M. Quintanilla, Radio Surperuano)

(In the city, the Andean people begin to change their identity, they assume other models, they only listen to waynos inside the house, at home they don't feel Andean, nor are they coastal people, that's how *chicha* arises.)

The proximity of Andean migrants in the city means that the 'urban Indian', frequently denoted *cholo*, is the main source of Arequipan unease and *chicha* has superseded Andean music as the most despised form of popular culture. The *wayno*, although associated with peasant and lower class life,

acquires status as 'folkloric' music, representative of the folk tradition of Peru. Folklore is 'popular' in the sense that it comes from the people. The telecommunications law defines *música folklórica* as 'that which springs directly from the traditions and customs of the people and which in particular is the collective creation arising in non-urban zones of the country' (Llórens 1987:45-55, my translation). The rural context is conceived to be the seat of folklore, and the essentially urban *chicha*, inserted into modern society, incorporating foreign music styles and making use of commercial cultural production, is instrumental in creating the 'authentic' by opposition. Both the urban environment and mass cultural production are considered to be destructive of the 'authentic' and the same criticism is made of the standardized version of Andean music, mass produced in the city:⁴²

Es folklor comercial, distorsionado, sin ninguna profundidad de mensaje; lo auténtico transmite la cultura de lo ancestral. (R. Rodríguez)

(It's commercial folklore, distorted, with no depth of message; the authentic should transmit ancestral culture.)

A distinction is then made between high culture which has a relatively small, specialized market, controlled and

⁴² A standard form of the *wayno*, based on the *mestizo* variety which incorporates Spanish instruments and aspects of urban-western aesthetics (musical and vocal style, modification of the high pitch of Andean singing etc.) was commercialized in Lima in the 1950s and 1960s (Turino 1986:136).

protected by its institutionalization and 'popular media culture' which is mass produced for a mass market (McQuail 1987:37). The commercialization of music of any kind is believed to impair its quality, for it implies a standardization which eliminates the rich variety of local production and removes it from the context of participation in a shared way of life, to be consumed by people from outside. However, reactionary attitudes which defend the purity of the indigenous and resist innovation and change overlook the fact that what is conceived to be Peruvian folklore is still part of the life of 'the people' and is continually being recreated in the urban context.

Many of the negative associations of *chicha* derive from the fact that it classified as the music of the lower classes of Arequipan society, the Andean immigrants, the *pobladores* of the shanty towns:

La *chicha* se está tocando por el mismo sentido que hay bastante gente de nivel bajo...está dirigida a la clase baja, la mayor parte del público es de condiciones bajas, los que han venido de migración, a ellos les gusta ese tipo de música. La gente peruana de bajo nivel no responde mucho a cosas de tipo cultural, más están preocupados en ver la forma de subsistir, no tienen tiempo de (escuchar) un programa cultural, no ponen atención. (R. Rodríguez, Radio Continental; my underlining)

(*Chicha* is being played for the very reason that there are a lot of low people...it's directed towards the lower class, the majority of the public are of low conditions, those who've migrated, they like that type of music. The Peruvian people of a low level don't respond much to cultural things, they're more concerned with how to subsist, they don't have much time to listen to a cultural programme, they don't pay attention.)

The association between the lower classes and 'low' forms of culture reveals a class-based evaluation, inextricably linked to socio-economic conditions. Rodríguez (Continental) judges that those who are preoccupied with keeping body and soul together have neither the time nor the inclination for the refinement of the spirit or, as Arías (Mundial) says, 'piensan con el estómago' ('they think with their stomachs'). The impoverished way of life of the shanty towns, where people remain at subsistence level, conjures up the stereotype of the 'uncivilized' migrant, which is anathema to the aristocratic concept of culture.⁴³

The *pobladores* are held to be primitive, remaining at the level of animals or savages whilst they remain uneducated: 'la gente es semi-salvaje' ('people are half savages', J. Cisneros, Municipal); 'eran todos analfabetos, como animalitos' ('they were all illiterate, like little animals', H. Delgado, Melodía). Education is held to be fundamental to the process of refinement necessary for the appreciation of high culture and the low culture of the *pobladores*, represented by the superficiality and accessibility of *chicha*, is attributed to low levels of education. David Rivera, the owner of Radio Hispana, which professes to promote Hispanic high culture, says:

⁴³ The concept of a 'cultured' person came from the drawing rooms of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe, where people enjoyed a high standard of living and had time and money for education and artistic pursuits.

Son gente inculta, tienen poca educación, no les interesa cosas de cultura, más les gusta chicha, cumbia.

(They're uncultured people, they're not interested in culture, they prefer *chicha*, *cumbia*.)

The failure of the education system is held responsible for people's inability to appreciate 'culture', but there is also implicit the idea that the Andean people are innately and irremediably ignorant:

Están acostumbrados a escuchar cosas de pura diversión, hay que acostumbrar a esa gente, escuchan cosas que no llevan mayor educación...no hay cultura aquí, mucho analfabetismo, no hay un plan coherente del gobierno. (M. Landa)

(They're accustomed to listen to things of pure entertainment, you have to teach those people, they listen to things of no educational value...there's no culture here, there's a lot of illiteracy, the government have no coherent plan.)

Consequently, the broadcasters feel the need to educate, 'civilize' and control the migrant population. Control is an issue with *chicha* which is publicly played at *chicha* dances, held in the shanty towns at weekends but condemned and frequently banned on account of the excessive drinking and fights which often break out on such occasions.⁴⁴ The radio producers recognize that not only poor education but also wretched economic levels attract people towards a form of music which expresses their frustration and rejection of a

⁴⁴ The proposal to hold a *chicha* dance in the cloisters of the church of *La Compañía* caused a public outcry from the Catholic Arequipans and an article in *El Correo* (22/11/89) suggested that healthy pursuits such as team games or a mini-marathon would be suitable alternatives to occupy a restless youth.

system which fails to cater for them, as Ariás (Mundial) comments: 'tienen ganas de desechar la educación, infringir la ley' ('they want to throw off education, flout the law').

Chicha songs are love songs but some lyrics relate the social hardships which *pobladores* face, such as under-employment and lack of basic living requirements. The drunkenness and violence are interpreted by the middle classes as a result of the 'baseness' and lack of culture and education of what J. Escobedo (whose radio, *Cultura*, is itself based in the shanty town of Alto Libertad) calls 'un clase social de gente baja, no culturizada' ('a social class of low, uncultured people'). Others, like Landa, recognize *chicha* is a valid expression of the experience of the lower sectors of Peruvian society, but will not accept it as a legitimate representation of Peruvian culture:

Los temas de miseria, de los problemas que tiene la gente...es una forma de expresión que este tipo de gente tiene, esta forma de hablar, de expresarse, es darles su propia forma de vivir, trata de problemas que surge...pero no pertenece a la cultura peruana, es un injerto. (M. Landa: my underlining)

(The themes of misery, of the problems people have...it's a form of expression which this people have, this way of talking, of expressing themselves, it gives them their own way of living, it deals with problems which may arise...but it doesn't belong to Peruvian culture, it's been grafted on.)

As far as middle-class Arequipans are concerned, the *chicheros* have no culture, *chicha* is not culture, and must be dealt with either by repression or by isolating *chicha* from its social context. Escobedo favours the second option,

believing that to outlaw the *chicha* dances would only push them underground and exacerbate the problem. He proposes that giving *chicha* a higher profile on the radio would familiarize it, assuming that it is the music that gives rise to violence rather than other social factors:

Hay que darle otro sentido, que no les lleva a chavetear, pelear: debe haber más espacio (para *chicha*) en las radios...con una persona orientada para orientarles, que debe ser para que ellos se divierten, no para que se pelean.

(We've got to give it another meaning, which won't lead them to knifing and fighting: there ought to be more space for *chicha* on the radios...with a person equipped to guide them, to tell them that it should be for them to enjoy themselves, not for them to fight.)

However, most radios refuse to play *chicha* at all and believe, with Ariás, that to take up Escobedo's suggestion would be reneging on 'the popular mission' of a radio, conceived to be to change habits and to educate in order to preserve and protect the status quo to which popular culture poses a threat. It is questionable whether their reticence in playing *chicha* does not rather stem from the expectation of low economic returns, but Surperuano and Landa have cashed in on its success and captured that corner of the market because, as Max Landa explains, 'radio as a business has to be on the lookout and see what type of listeners there are, you have to keep in step with these changes, modify your programming, and Andean tropical music is very profitable'.

Thus, 'popular' can be that which is mass produced, enjoyed by the masses but held to be destructive to them (e.g.

foreign music and television programmes) or that which is produced by the people and considered a threat to the dominant order (e.g. *chicha*).

4.4. Popular Television and Telenovelas

Popular television can best be typified by the Latin American soap opera or *telenovelas*,⁴⁵ which obtain the highest television ratings, but like *chicha* are excluded from the category of 'culture'.

Producers explain that the commercial character of their medium forces them to succumb to public demand and provide *novelas* in order to please as many people as possible, although they betray their higher ideals of bringing 'culture' and education to the people:

A veces hay que hacer lo no nos gusta...buscar una programación para todos los gustos...si fuéramos un organismo de beneficencia ¡qué extraordinario! nosotros estaríamos poniendo programas culturales todo el día, pero nosotros tenemos una televisión cultural aquí en el país y es la televisión con menos porcentaje de espectadores... Entonces, si uno ha puesto una estación, se supone que ha hecho una inversión para obtener resultados económicos. Uno hace un ranking de sintonía... ¿qué pasa? ¿qué está en primer lugar, en Lima, en Puno, en Iquitos, en Arequipa? las novelas. (C. Portillo, Canal 8)

(Sometimes we have to do things we don't like...seek out a schedule to please all tastes...if we were a charitable

⁴⁵ I will use the Spanish *telenovela* (*novela* in shorthand) as it refers to a televised novel and does not correspond exactly to the US or British soap opera, since although both are serialised and continued over lengthy periods of time, the *telenovela* does lead to a definite ending, whilst a soap opera may be carried on indefinitely without ever reaching a conclusion.

organization, how amazing it would be, we'd be showing cultural programmes all day, but we've got one cultural television here in the country and it's the television with the least percentage of viewers... So then, if someone has set up a station, it's to be supposed they've made an investment to get economic results. You do your audience research... What happens? What's in first place in Lima, in Iquitos, in Arequipa? The novelas.)

'Cultural' programmes are classified as those with some informative or educational content, news and nature programmes, or drama of the 'high cultural' category. However, these are far outweighed by programmes of 'entertainment', principally children's programmes and cartoons, *telenovelas*, foreign films and series like 'The Incredible Hulk' or 'Wonder Woman'. Cultural programmes feature so little because public demand for them is low. A member of staff at Televisión Continental (who wished this remark to remain anonymous) stated that whether it were programmes promoting Alcoholics Anonymous or anti-drug groups or BBC Shakespeare, zero ratings were recorded for their attempts to raise the cultural level of the audience:

No lo aprecia la gente...más a la gente le gusta la violencia... es que la gente peruana es inculta, no quiere cultura, sólo quiere violencia... Si yo tengo un programa de violencia, el empresario me va a vender su publicidad.

(The people don't appreciate it...people prefer violence...it's because Peruvian people are uncultured, they don't want culture, they only want violence... If I'm showing a violent programme, the businesses are going to sell me their publicity.)

Public demand for *novelas* and action-packed police programmes like 'Miami Vice' and 'McGyver' (shown on Canal 8) means that advertisers will only sponsor this type of

programme. Culture is constructed in opposition to such 'immoral' *novelas*, 'violent' police series or programmes of 'pure entertainment', such as comedies, game and chat shows, which are similarly held to be degrading rather than elevating. Culture is linked with education and information as opposed to entertainment which is television's primary activity, as Núñez admits when setting out Continental's objectives:

Hacer llegar entretenimiento, cultura e información a la gente, hacer llegar entretenimiento es la base.

(To get entertainment, culture and information to the people, to get entertainment to them is the fundamental thing.)

Entertainment keeps television in business, but the whole concept of pleasure and escape is negatively sanctioned by the television producers who have other aspirations for their medium. They believe the popularity of the *telenovelas* to be a result of the crisis and Portillo believes that since society offers no alternative, people seize upon television as 'an escape valve, through which they try to run away from reality' ('es una válvula de escape...por allí tratan...de huir de la realidad'). He finds that the *novelas* do relate to real-life situations and although the details are exaggerated, they allow people to dream of solutions and success, of ways out of their misery, even if the happy ending is only an illusion:

Tratan de luchas basadas en la vida real, claro aumentado con dramatismo, escenas diferentes, finales bonitos, de sueños pues... Es una forma de escape porque la gente de

las novelas tiene éxitos, fines maravillosos, es una puerta de salida.

(They're about struggles based on real life, dressed up with melodrama of course, with different scenes, happy endings, of dreams, you know... It's a means of escape, because people in the *novelas* have success, wonderful endings, it's a way out.)

Financial impecunity is again linked to 'cultural poverty', implying not only that the crisis affects Peru's television production, but also that the crippling circumstances in which people live prevent them appreciating 'high culture':

Es parte de la crisis en que estamos viviendo, la pobreza económica tiene que ver mucho con la pobreza del nivel cultural del país. (E. Nuñez, Canal 6)

(It's part of the crisis we're living in, the economic poverty has a lot to do with the level of cultural poverty in the country.)

There is some disagreement as to how far the *novelas* are a bad influence on Peruvian society. Portillo is critical of the false ideals and expectations he believes *novelas* can foment, manipulating people's emotions and presenting the 'happy ever after' illusion of marriage:

No me gusta...el hecho de que tiene encadenada a la gente tras una trama trágica, cómica, que...les tiene mantenida a la explotación de sus sentimientos, su sensibilidad, no hay ningún resultado, siempre es lo mismo, al final se casaron y vivieron feliz, como si el matrimonio fuera el estado supremo de la sociedad, y allí se acaba todos los problemas.

(I don't like...the fact that they've got people tied to a tragic, comic plot, which...holds them in the exploitation of their feelings, their sensibility, there's no outcome, it's always the same, at the end they got married and lived happily ever after, as if marriage were the supreme state of society, and there end all the problems.)

At the same time as endorsing the hallowed institution of marriage, Portillo believes *telenovelas* encourage promiscuity and immorality. He claims there is a direct link between the *novelas* and the high incidence of divorce, rape and sex-related crime in the country, but he holds that some people are more susceptible to influence than others: 'hay conciencias susceptibles de asimilar los contenidos' ('there are some consciences which are more susceptible to assimilating the contents'). Here he seems to concede that people do have some control over their minds and emotions, which places some limits on the power of the media to penetrate people's consciousness, but he still denies them a wholly conscious role, their susceptibility assumed to be a 'natural' condition.

Herrera (Canal 2) considers police series and other violent programmes to be far more damaging than the more 'family-minded' *novelas*, although he does perceive their 'foreign models' to be an 'alien influence to our cultural being' ('son moldes extraños...resultan una influencia ajena a nuestro ser cultural').

Whilst North American soap opera and serials are held to be alienating, the Arequipan producers are more optimistic about Brazilian *telenovelas*. Brazil is generally esteemed to be the best Latin American producer of *novelas* and is commended for the revolutionary role it assigns to the people, as Portillo comments: 'la clase media y popular y pobre se

convierte en el heroe' ('the middle and popular classes are converted into heroes'). He says they boycott the US: 'han dado un boicot al asunto...no se dejan llevar por la imposición de patrones...pero tratan de rescatar y imponer lo suyo' ('they refuse to be taken over by the imposition of foreign models...and they try to salvage and impose their own').

According to the owners and producers of Arequipa's media, Peru however, is dependent on low quality foreign programmes and being economically impoverished must remain culturally so. The products of mass media culture are given no value but an illusory escape and still no credit is given to the part played by the audience in their reception and interpretation of the media.

4.5. Radio and Television for the People

The 'popular' is conceptualized in many forms: commercial radios consider themselves to be 'popular' where they have a mass following, where they conceive themselves to be rendering a service to the community, or again, where they believe themselves to be speaking on behalf of the people.

Radio Melodía is the most popular of Arequipan radios in all three senses. It has the biggest audience, caters for a cross-section of the lower and middle sectors with a programme of varied light music and an informal style, and cultivates a good relationship with the public, to whom it makes itself

available for broadcasting their announcements and appeals. Its owner-manager, Delgado, attributes its popularity to its identification with 'the masses', claiming it to be in touch with the tastes of the people:

Nosotros somos compenetrados con la masa, con la mayoría, tratamos de pensar como ellos.

(We enter into the spirit of the masses, of the majority, we try to think like them.)

As well as discerning the needs and wants of 'the people' (whether defined as 'the majority' or 'the poor'), radios also define themselves as 'popular' where they envisage themselves to be rendering a service to the community. Here the philanthropic aim of public service is a front for an essentially profit-making enterprise, designed to create a good public image. Landa's definition of the media as organs of assistance and not profit-making businesses indicates the idealism underlying his vision of the media's mission:

No se les va a cobrar a una persona que no tiene que comer, la misión de todo medio de comunicación es ayudar, no puede ser un medio de lucro, ya no será un medio de comunicación. (M. Landa)

(You're not going to charge someone who's got nothing to eat, the mission of every medium of communication is to help, it can't be a means of making profit, then it would no longer be a medium of communication.)

The radios consider themselves to be rendering a service to the public in sending messages to the provinces, coordinating between the people and the authorities,⁴⁶

⁴⁶ For example, following the flood disaster in Arequipa in January and February 1989, the city's water supply was cut off for a fortnight, and the radios, in this instance, *Nevada*,

allowing the poor to make their announcements free of charge, appealing for work or medicines, supporting health campaigns and charity fund-raising activities and running special promotions at Christmas and on other special occasions to take gifts to the poor. They also transmit question and answer programmes on medical and legal issues.⁴⁷

Both radio and television imagine their mission to the people to be to supply information, education and culture.⁴⁸ Panamericana Televisión, which devotes most time to news, assumes the task of informing the public as a social duty and aligns itself with the poor and needy, mitigating its commercial character by its philanthropic concern:

Las noticias destacan todos los problemas de la gente más necesitada y por otro lado, a través de las campañas publicitarias, la necesidad de un ayuda, solidaridad social, que todos debemos ¿no? Es comercial pero damos también mucha importancia a la parte social. (F. Herrera)

(The news highlights all the problems of the most needy people and, on the other hand, through publicity campaigns, the need for aid, for social solidarity, which

would mediate between SEDAPAR and the people, to inform the public when the water-tankers would be at particular points. They also supported activities organized to raise money for the disaster victims.

⁴⁷ Nevada runs health programmes in which a doctor is available to answer the queries of those who write or phone in and El Tiempo broadcasts programmes from the Ministry of Health, the Civil Guard and anti-drug organizations.

⁴⁸ Continental did not have a news programme in 1989, although one was in the pipe-line. Panamericana devotes 30% of its programming to news and is the only station to have a morning news bulletin, *Buenos Días Perú* ('Good Morning Peru') from 6 to 10 a.m. It also has a night-time news programme *24 Horas* ('24 Hours') which competes with *El Noticiero del 8* ('Channel 8 News') from 10 to 11.30 p.m.

we owe, don't we? It's commercial, but we also give a lot of emphasis to the social side.)

At Radio Mundial, on the other hand, they take the view that the radio is primarily a vehicle of entertainment and believe in paternalistic and protective selectivity in sifting out news reports of events which would disturb people's enjoyment. They hold that broadcasting violence will only breed it, making a correlation between media influence and aggressive behaviour, assuming the violent inclinations of the 'popular' public and furthermore, believing in their right to control the extent of other people's knowledge:

Pensamos que hablar de violencia contribuye al descontrol de la violencia, nunca sacamos noticias de violencia, pensamos que la gente escucha la radio para entretenerse, no para angustiarse. (R. Díaz, Radio Mundial)

(We think that talking about violence contributes to violence getting out of control, we never broadcast violent news items, we believe people listen to the radio to entertain themselves not to upset themselves.)

However, most producers tend to believe it more important to educate than to entertain their lower-class public. This attitude is typical of the wealthy's disapproval of the poor enjoying themselves, believing their time would be better spent educating themselves. Education is seen as a means to integrate those who do not conform to the standard set by the dominant sector. Music is one area where the media 'professionals' would like to control people's listening in order to elevate their appreciation to a standard set by the dominant:

A la gente andina hay que enseñarle, a la gente inmigrada no darle siempre lo mismo, no sería el rol de un medio de comunicación. Hay que dar una música con más amplitud, no todos los días vernacular. Si han venido a la ciudad es para aprender, sin que pierdan tampoco lo suyo. (R. Rodríguez, Radio Continental)

(You have to teach the Andean people, the immigrant people, not always give them the same thing, that wouldn't be the role of a medium of communication. You have to give them a broader choice of music, not the vernacular every day. If they've come to the city, it's to learn, without losing what's theirs either.)

The television producers also believe that education is the key to reduce cultural differences, to create the model plural society with a united national identity and they assign television a central role in that process:

El rol de la tele es educar esa gente...enseñar es una forma de integrarlos. Somos conscientes que tenemos un deber y una obligación para con el país y los programas están orientados a elevar el nivel cultural de la gente en general. (F. Herrera)

(The role of the telly is to educate people...teaching is a way of integrating them. We're conscious that we've got a duty and an obligation to the country and the programmes are aimed to elevate people's general cultural level.)

As well as providing information and education, one of the criteria put forward for 'popular' radio is that it should defend 'the people', allowing them to make their voice heard. Delgado of Melodía claims that it is the people of the *pueblos jóvenes* who occupy most airspace on the radio and extols the freedom of speech recuperated with Peru's return to democracy after the dictatorship of Morales Bermúdez:

Es esa gente que ocupa más espacio, reclaman, anuncian sus huelgas, utilizan bastante la radio, hay participación plena... Durante el gobierno de Bermúdez la libertad estaba muy reducida, hemos hecho uso de la

libertad expresiva, es lo único hermoso que tenemos en el Perú. En este radio tienen libre expresión.

(It's those people who take up most space, they make their demands, announce their strikes, they use the radio a lot, there's full participation... During the government of Bermudez, freedom was very limited, we've made use of the freedom of expression, it's the only beautiful thing we've got in Peru.)

However, commercial radio generally allows only limited participation, in the form of requests, announcements and opinions expressed by letter or given in spontaneous street interviews, phone-ins, debates and competitions. The speech of lower-class people is still restricted as producers are reluctant to give them access to the microphone: the friar in charge of San Martín feared people might cause havoc in the studio and wreck the equipment and Rodríguez (Continental) suspected they would speak out inappropriately or subversively:

Hacen mucho daño a las instituciones por su escaso nivel intelectual, hablan por hablar, dicen que se dice que...hay que tener mucho cuidado, un radio no es para decir las cosas así.

(They do a lot of damage to institutions because of their scant intellectual level...they say that it is said that...you have to be very careful, a radio isn't for saying just any old thing.)

Migrants are often believed to be subversive elements in Arequipan society, fodder for the terrorist groups operating in the city. The control of people's speech bears witness to the justified fear of terrorists who have on several occasions forced their entry into radio stations in order to broadcast their messages. Radio Concordia has been invaded three times

by MRTA terrorists,⁴⁹ Ama Kella is under constant threat from Sendero Luminoso and all radios tend to be suspicious of those wishing to participate in their broadcasts. This situation is indicative of the struggle people wage to impose their own definition of 'the popular' in the face of the media's attempts to control their expression, whether verbal or musical, by condemnation and exclusion.

Commercial radio then speaks on behalf of the people, in their place, rather than letting them speak for themselves. Mundial and El Tiempo for example, propose to be the voice of the people, not only speaking for them, but in place of them. They see the role of the radio as *fiscal* ('public prosecutor') with the authority to denounce the injustices inflicted on the lower classes, condemning and criticizing the authorities, campaigning against the rise in school fees or exorbitant and incorrect water rates:

Las puertas están abiertas, que vengan, que hagan tiras con el micrófono a los que han abusado de ellos. (Ernesto Suyco, Radio El Tiempo)

(The doors are open so they can come, so that with the microphone they can tear to pieces those who have abused them.)

Even then, Juan Pablo Gómez, *San Martín*, denies that either of these radios qualify as a popular radio, because they deny the full participation of the people. He makes the same distinction for San Martín:

⁴⁹ These are the Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru (Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement), the most active terrorist group in Arequipa.

No es un radio popular, es un radio cultural, comercial, no hay participación directa de la gente, es popular cuando la gente puede participar, contar su experiencia.

(It's not a popular radio, it's a cultural, commercial radio, there's no direct participation of the people, it's popular when the people can participate, relate their experience.)

The majority of commercial radios thus find themselves caught between their would-be 'popular' image, aiming to render a public service to 'the people', and the political implications of doing so when that service involves defending the rights of those people or allowing them to speak against the dominant sectors whom the radios must also placate.

Nevertheless, radio is far more accessible to the general public than television, and better able to represent them and their reality. The costs of community television make it unthinkable in Peru, and the interaction between television producers and the people is minimal. Televisión Continental does have some involvement with the *pueblos jóvenes* through its cooperation in *Sandy Match* which takes the television to the people, albeit as part of a publicity stunt. The Río Seco team won the competition in 1989 and the *pueblo joven* was awarded a children's playground.⁵⁰ The transmission of the inauguration of the park was accompanied by a documentary

⁵⁰ The playground was mounted, complete with turfs, to create an *area verde* (green area), an obsession with Arequipa's mayor to provide even the far-flung sectors of the city with parks or at least patches of green. Ironically, the lack of water in Río Seco made the task of watering the grass unmanageable and the turfs soon shrivelled, though the swings and slides remain.

about the district of Cerro Colorado. Núñez explains their intentions in emotive terms, revealing an idealistic aim to unite people across political frontiers and a romantic, paternalistic attitude towards those who are generally excluded by the media:

Hemos tratado de unir los distritos con Sandy Match, hemos juntado Apristas con Comunistas. Para hacer el programa de Cerro Colorado hemos reunido a todos y con ellos hemos trabajado, tratando de hacer algo para nuestro Arequipa, a pesar de nuestra adversidad, de la crisis...es una gota ¿Acaso teniendo los recursos no crees que no haría más? ¿Has visto las manos de los que trabajan en las canteras de sillar? ¿Y quién se preocupa de ellos? olvidados están.

(With *Sandy Match* we have tried to unite the districts, we've got *apristas* together with communists. To do the Cerro Colorado programme we united them all and worked with them, trying to do something for our Arequipa, in spite of our adversity, and the crisis..it's a drop [in the ocean]. Don't you think that with the resources I'd do more? Have you seen the hands of those working in the *sillar* quarries? And who worries about them? They're forgotten.)

Television does not differentiate publics in the same way as radio but aims at a mass audience. Its public are 'the people' in the widest sense of the word. The migrant sector are thus included within the target audience but not specifically represented. Herrera (Canal 2) explains that a mass medium must avoid specialization in order to reach the majority and ideally 'un público intermedio, de las tres principales capas sociales' ('an intermediate public, of the three main social strata'). Núñez (Canal 6) attributes under-representation to the media's lack of means:

Este sector no está bien representado, son marginados, da pena, es el medio en que vivimos. Si tenía plata, iría a

los pueblos jóvenes a averiguar como viven, que quieren, pero no hay recursos, quedan postergados.

(This sector is not well represented, they are marginalized, it's a shame, it's the environment in which we live. If I had money, I'd go to the *pueblos jóvenes* to find out how they live, what they want, but there aren't the resources and they are left behind.)

There are resources to represent some sectors but not others and of course those who are represented are those with economic power. The exclusion of the migrant sector is justified by the same argument used for omitting to play *waynos* or to broadcast in Quechua: migrants do not need a special space on television because television is part of the urban culture to which they want to adapt (Herrera, Canal 2). Portillo (Canal 8) believes the migrant to be in transition between two cultures and therefore prepared to receive whatever the television supplies, uncritically assuming that if it is on the television and in the city, it must be acceptable:

Es una persona abierta a todo, de allí que en cuanto a televisión no son exigentes, al contrario son abiertos y muchas veces aceptan con los ojos cerrados lo que les brinda la tele porque supone que esto está bien dentro de la ciudad y hay que asimilarlo.

(They are people open to everything, for that reason, as far as television goes, they're not demanding and many times they accept whatever the television offers them with their eyes closed because they suppose that that's right for the city and has to be assimilated.)

To conceive of people receiving so visual a medium as television 'with their eyes closed', again implies the operation of ideological influences bypassing the senses.

'The people' are consistently perceived as a passive audience,

whom the media aim to educate and inform in the hope of changing and improving them. However, the media producers and presenters believe themselves subject to culture imperialism which constrains them to supply not education but the kind of entertainment which they consider 'popular' and degrading, but persist in the conviction of the goodness of the consensus and the desirability of 'integrating' people into the established social order.

5. Community Radio: Ama Kella

As far as the commercial producers in Arequipa are concerned, the 'powerful' are the rich foreign countries on which they are dependent and the 'poor and powerless' are the Peruvian people in general. However, *comunicación popular* ('popular communications'), the discourse of which enters their explanations of their social aims, defines itself in opposition to the mainstream commercial and public service media, which it denounces as a purveyor of dominant ideology.⁵¹ 'Popular' or 'community' radio differentiates itself from commercial radio in that it is non-profit making, and from public service radio in rejecting its paternalistic and prescriptive character.

⁵¹ On popular communications in Peru see: Ballón 1987b; Montoya 1987; Orós 1987; Rodríguez 1987; Rowe & Schelling 1991:113-22. For Ecuador: O'Connor 1990. For Canada: Lewis 1984.

A fundamental difference between community radio and the other models is that it purports to treat its listeners as subjects and participants whereas commercial radio treats people as objects to be captured for advertisers or, in keeping with public service radio, as inept individuals to be improved and informed as they see fit (Lewis & Booth 1989:8). Community radio encourages people to speak for themselves, whereas commercial and public service radio speak to the people as consumers, in order to persuade them to purchase an article, or as pupils, imparting information to them designed to inculcate a certain attitude or opinion. Where public service radio involves defending people's rights, it adopts a paternalistic attitude towards them, assuming that they are not sufficiently empowered to speak for themselves and require an educated person, with the authority bestowed by the media and the social system behind it, to speak for them and make their voice heard. Community radio reacts against the idea that the people require a spokesperson and emphasizes participation.

In Arequipa, I worked with Ama Kella, the most successful popular communications centre in Arequipa, based in Porvenir and broadcasting programmes for the shanty towns. It has grown out of the popularization of the Catholic Church in Peru, influenced by the emphasis of Liberation Theology on the

involvement of the Church with the poor in their struggle against underdevelopment, injustice and human rights abuse.⁵²

Ama Kella grew out of a Comunidad Eclesial de Base (CEB) or grass-roots church community, a unit developed in Brazil in the 1960s as a means of involving lay-people and foreign missionaries in the peripheral parishes of the shanty towns. The CEB aimed at the improvement of the community through consciousness-raising education, as developed by the Brazilian educationalist, Paulo Freire (1970, 1973). Raised awareness of one's situation was intended to lead to mobilization and action for change. On this basis, Ama Kella's community work is aimed at a critique of mainstream media and society with a view to social transformation.

In the parish of Porvenir the CEB took the form of a youth group pioneered by foreign priests and nuns.⁵³ This combined socio-cultural activities, such as drama, folkloric dances and debates, with consciousness-raising educational projects, such as literacy campaigns and the production of a

⁵² The Peruvian Catholic Church underwent radical changes in the 1960s and 1970s, following the Council of Vatican II (1962-65) and the Latin American Episcopal Conference in Medellín (1968), both of which were informed by Liberation Theology (Gutiérrez 1973; Berryman 1987; Klaiber 1988, 1989).

⁵³ The parish of was founded by priests from a Swiss Order, first in Alto Misti, with a church being added in Porvenir in 1974. The present incumbent and director of Ama Kella is a Spanish priest, Eloy Arribas, and there is also a team of three nuns from the Germany, Holland and the US. There was a rise in the number of foreign missionaries in Peru responding to a call by Pope John XXIII's for priests and nuns to go out to Latin America and their collaboration facilitated the establishment of the church groups in the *pueblos jóvenes*.

local news bulletin, named *Ama Kella*, which supplied information of interest to the *pobladores* and was distributed once a month after mass. In 1978, the journalistic production of *Ama Kella* was extended to the broadcasting of an evangelistic radio programme on Radio San Martín called *Caminos a la Libertad* ('Paths to Freedom') as well as programmes transmitted over loudspeakers from the market or main square of the shanty.⁵⁴ Finally, in 1981, the work of communication and consciousness-raising was consolidated with the centralization of the diverse projects in a centre, named the Centro de Comunicación *Ama Kella*.

The work of the centre is broadly divided between radio production and support of the popular organizations. In terms of broadcast radio, *Ama Kella* continues to produce *Caminos a la Libertad*, but its most important radio production is a daily news programme for the shanty towns, *El Poblador* ('The Settler') and a review programme in Quechua, *Caminando Juntos* ('Walking Together') both of which go are broadcast on Radio Onda Sideral.

Caminando Juntos is the only serious, non-music programme to be broadcast in Quechua on Arequipan radio. First, it has the pragmatic aim of being comprehensive to the Quechua-

⁵⁴ Both types of programme still exist today: the original loudspeaker broadcast, *Palabra del Pueblo* ('Word of the People'), broadcast on Sunday morning from Alto Misti, has been augmented with the addition of a Saturday programme, *Horizontes* ('Horizons') and a Sunday programme in Porvenir, *Jatari Llacta* ('Rise Up People').

speaking inhabitants of the shanties. Secondly, it hopes to promote the official status of Quechua by giving it media coverage and expanding its domain of usage from the private to the public sphere. Thirdly, it is part of Ama Kella's plan 'para revalorar lo nuestro' ('to revalue what's ours'), to restore people's confidence in themselves, their language, traditions and cultural heritage and to integrate them as a positive force of which to be proud and from which to derive strength in the struggle for better living conditions.

Caminos a la Libertad continues the original religious emphasis of the work of Ama Kella in the parish, informed by the development of Liberation Theology, which has been assumed as the 'symbolic banner' of the grass-roots church movement.⁵⁵ Initially, the programme's appropriation of the discourse of the liberationists was met with severe opposition by the hierarchy of Arequipa's conservative Catholic church who objected to the revolutionary overtones with which words like 'popular' and 'the people' became invested. Eduardo, one of the presenters recalls:

Hubo problemas...que las palabras eran muy fuertes, los programas, la música, que ¿cómo va a ser programa pastoral si dicen palabras muy fuertes como 'liberación', 'popular', 'pueblo'?

(There were problems...that the words were very strong, the programmes, the music, that how can it be a pastoral

⁵⁵ Klaiber (1989:2-3) distinguishes between liberation theology as an intellectual current and the grass roots church movement which has sprung up in the wake of Vatican II and Medellín, as two separate currents which converge and feed from each other.

programme if they say such strong words as 'freedom', 'popular', 'people'?)

Ama Kella has since moved away from the parish, both spatially, since the centre came to be housed in its own separate building, and in its way of thinking, the shift being symbolized in the omission of 'Cristo' from the name of the news programme which started out as *Cristo Poblador* and which was renamed *El Poblador* in 1987. This represents a widening of perspective, moving out from the purely evangelistic emphasis to embrace the 'totalizing' idea of the progressive church which holds that Christianity addresses the whole of life and should not be compartmentalized. *El Poblador* aimed to appeal to all *pobladores* and focused on concrete issues of housing and transport, as Humberto, one of its presenters relates:

Dijimos que para muchos no les cae muy simpático que usemos Cristo, nos van a calificar simplemente de padrecitos, de monjitas, un programa de religiosos para ellos no más, pero el programa va dirigido a todo el pueblo, total, si hablamos de los problemas que pasamos, también estamos hablando de Cristo ¿no?

(We said that it wouldn't go down very well with a lot of people that we should use Christ, they're going to classify us as little priests or little nuns, a programme by the religious orders just for them, but the programme's directed at all the people, in the end, if we're talking about the problems we're going through, we're talking about Christ too, aren't we?)

The popularization of the Church led it onto the domain of popular politics, and this remains a bone of contention between the progressive and reactionary Catholics. However, a commitment to the poor necessarily involves the Church in their struggle for justice. The logic behind Ama Kella is the

defence of human rights against the intrusion of the State and capital (Lewis & Booth 1989:10). In practical terms this is translated into the support of the popular organizations, placing the media at the disposition of those fighting for basic services. A section of Ama Kella's work is devoted to the support of the *comedores* through the intervention of a team of pastoral agents who organize meetings and activities designed not only to secure that school children are well-nourished, but also to raise consciousness amongst parents, reinforce solidarity and integrate the *comedores* in the overall organization of the shanty.

Thus, Ama Kella primarily fulfils a communicative role, but it understands its task of 'informing' the people as one of denouncing injustice and exploitation. Similarly, its role of 'educating' is not carried out in the public service sense of those 'who know' teaching those 'who don't know', but rather it hopes to make people think for themselves, making them aware of certain social realities, and uncovering corruption and abuse. Education is conceived as 'consciousness-raising' and rather than the emphasis being on assimilating a certain body of fact and attaining certain qualifications by which mainstream society recognizes an 'educated' or 'cultured' person, the goal is a 'critical

consciousness', the capacity to reason for oneself and work out one's own conclusions.⁵⁶

Furthermore, mainstream radio expects the listener to receive its messages passively and absorb the information unquestioningly. It supports the capitalist structure of society and maintains the status quo. Community radio, like Ama Kella requires quite the opposite from its listeners, whom it calls to action, intending that a heightened awareness of their predicament will incite them to take corrective steps through involvement in the popular organizations.

Ama Kella is distinguished from its commercial counterparts in that it is funded by grants from foreign aid organizations and therefore does not have to bow to the demands of advertisers in order to survive. However, in order to secure that funding, it must comply with the demands of its financiers, which usually amounts to the compilation of a yearly report, giving evidence of a 'social gain' just as advertisers want assurance of capital gain. Thus, although community radio does not aim to amass capital, it does aim to influence the community and bring about some form of social change.

⁵⁶ These definitions of consciousness-raising education and communication are derived from pamphlets in Ama Kella's library, reports of their own activities and a seminar I attended with them organized by the *Coordinadora Nacional de Radio* (CNR: 'National Radio Coordinator') in November 1989. They draw very much on Freire.

Ama Kella emphasizes the participation of the people, and criticizes the failure of commercial radio to allow people to represent themselves. In *Porvenir*, participation is particularly facilitated by the programmes transmitted over the loudspeakers which are open to the members of the *pueblo joven* and its popular organizations to make an announcement or voice an opinion, as Efraín, one of the *Jatari Llacta* team explains:

Vemos la participación masiva del pueblo, de los pobladores, que dan a conocer sus ideas, no hay oposición de nadie, o sea, les damos el micro y los mismos dan lo que sienten ante los problemas que se presentan, no como en otras emisoras que no les conviene ¡paf! les cortan, pero acá no, nos convenga o no nos convenga pero tenemos que dar el micro.

(We see the mass participation of the people, of the *pobladores*, who let their ideas be known, there's no opposition from anyone, that's to say, we give them the mike and they themselves say what they feel about the problems that arise, not like other stations which if it doesn't suit them, wham! they cut them off, but not here, whether we like it or not we have to give them the mike.)

However, although one of the fundamental tenets of Ama Kella's popular communication is to take the microphone from the powerful and give it to the powerless, there are always those whose education or status in the shanty better equip them to speak than others. This was manifest at Ama Kella's anniversary mass where the priest offered up the microphone to prove this point, yet the only ones who came forward to speak were those who held a position of responsibility or were already accustomed to speak in public.

Furthermore, whilst all those who work in the centre are inhabitants of the *pueblos jóvenes* and mostly of migrant extract, their own education, whether within the education system or through the training and experience afforded by the centre, distances them from the people who are their public. In the process of consciousness-raising by which *pobladores* are equipped to promulgate their own heightened awareness among their fellows, there arises a division within 'the people', between those who have been educated and those they are yet to educate.

Even Ama Kella, producer of what it conceives to be 'genuine' popular radio, sets out with its own notions of what constitutes 'the popular' and who 'the people' are. Thus, although it presents an alternative definition of 'the popular', it still pre-emptes the self-definition of those it is addressing. All three models of radio have some measure of power to produce and in doing so to define 'the popular' but power is tested in the ability to make those meanings stick. In Chapter Five, I shall explore the reception of the broadcast media by the *pueblo joven* public and analyse how they interact with the media in terms of their specific social experience.

CHAPTER FIVE**AUDIENCE RESPONSE IN THE PUEBLOS JOVENES****1. Introduction to Audience Studies**

The preceding chapter showed how producers of both commercial and community radio demonstrate a belief in the power of the media to influence its audience. This chapter turns to the audiences in the shanty towns and examines how people use and interpret the media, rather than how it uses, or manipulates them. I will begin with an overview of different approaches which have been taken to audience studies.

As I have indicated, from the turn of the century up to the late thirties, the media were credited with considerable power to shape opinion and belief, change habits and mould behaviour. In the forties and fifties, American behavioural scientists challenged the hypothetical notions of the all-powerful and destructive influence of the mass media put forward by European theorists. They used psychological experiment to assess short-term effects of television viewing on isolated aspects of individual behaviour, such as the provocation of violent or criminal behaviour or a change in political persuasion in electoral campaigns (McQuail 1979).

Effects were first related to social and psychological characteristics of the subject and then to the wider social environment. The analytical emphasis was shifted from the source to the recipients, conceived as an active rather than

passive audience. It was recognized that rather than a homogeneous mass, society was made up of multiple publics of different ages, educational levels, occupations and tastes. It was found that media effects operated within a pre-existing structure of social relationships and in a particular socio-cultural context, and that these played a more significant role in shaping attitudes, opinions and behaviour. By the end of the 1950s, media influence was declared negligible.¹

Another stage in the study of media effects was the functionalist analysis of the individual's motives in approaching the media, their conscious selection of media products and interpretation of media messages.² This approach aimed to identify the needs which the public sought to satisfy through the media. The theory of 'selective perception' postulated that people's use, understanding and memory of media was selective, each individual bringing their own mode of attention to the media according to prior dispositions related to a number of social variables. 'Uses and gratifications' theory linked media use to social and psychological circumstances which prompted people to satisfy needs and derive gratifications from the media, such as

¹ On this stage of media studies see: Lodziak 1976:6-20; Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982:15; Hall 1982:56-7; Cantor & Cantor 1986:214; McQuail 1987:234.

² On the functionalist approach see: Morley 1980; Fiske 1987:62; Carey 1989:52.

gaining information or entertainment, filling in time or establishing social contact.³

Various shortcomings of these studies have been signalled. First, they took power completely out of the hands of the media and gave full control to the audience, assuming that not even the most forceful media content could influence an individual who has no use for it. Secondly, they revealed the motives which propel people to the media, but made no link between motivation (for example, to seek 'escape') and how the chosen medium provides that escape through a process of interpretation and symbolic meaning. Finally, they failed to link interpersonal communication with the institutional power of structural relations of class and politics (Morley 1980:7; Carey 1989:52).

In the late fifties and sixties, a third phase of audience studies was initiated as the media's power to influence was again brought into question. However, a shift in emphasis looked for more long-term effects and took into account the whole socio-cultural context of the audience. In the seventies, 'structuralist media theory' was developed to examine the media's systems and processes of signification and representation, engaging in textual analysis to discover how discourse produces meanings within texts, how the audience read texts within their own social context and how the

³ For a formulation of 'uses and gratifications' theory see: Blumler, Gurevitch & Katz 1974; McQuail 1987:234.

meanings produced affect people in their thinking or behaviour (Lodziak 1976:99-124; Curran, Gurevitch & Woollacott 1982:24).

On the premise that the same system of values was not shared by all members of society and that therefore meanings could not be taken for granted, the 'theory of aberrant decoding' was formulated. This held that since the social situation and corresponding codes and conventions of the decoder (audience) differ from those of the encoder (producer), the interpretation of media messages will be aberrant.⁴ Stuart Hall (1973, 1982:128-39) developed the 'preferred reading theory', arguing that the social situation of the audience member affected their 'openness' to the 'dominant ideology' encoded in the media messages. However, there was still a tendency to assume that there was only one 'real' meaning, as intended by the producers, rather than multiple possible meanings and understandings generated by different sectors of the audience (Morley 1980:8; Fiske 1987:63-5).

Cultural media theory, developed by Hall and colleagues at the Centre of Cultural Studies in Birmingham in the seventies and eighties, set itself up in opposition to all forms of economic or ideological determinism and, though heavily influenced by the structuralist premise that 'thought does not reflect reality but works upon it and appropriates

⁴ This theory was postulated by Umberto Eco (1972); see Corner & Hawthorn (1980).

it', it also criticized the tendency of structuralism to concentrate on texts as the sole producers of meaning. It argued that these positions were insufficient to explain how influence works, how far people's beliefs can be manipulated and how social actors interpret and negotiate meaning in different ways (Hall 1977:315-348).

In the last decade then, there has been a shift from the textual and ideological construction of the subject to socially and historically situated people and ethnography has been established as a valid way for studying the media and its audience (Morley 1980; Lull 1990).

I will now discuss the part the broadcast media plays in daily life in the *pueblos jóvenes*, the uses people have for it and the explanations they give of their choices.

2. Media Use in Río Seco and Porvenir

2.1. The Audience

My data on listening and viewing in the *pueblos jóvenes* of Arequipa is primarily qualitative, based on participant observation in the daily listening and viewing of the *pobaldores* and backed up by surveys carried out in Río Seco and Porvenir, the latter in conjunction with Ama Kella.⁵ The audiences include a cross-section of shanty society, focusing on the family. I have not sought to quantify them but rather

⁵ Unless otherwise indicated, the figures given in this chapter are calculated from the results of my own questionnaires.

to investigate how the people of the shanties respond to the media and interpret its messages.

In terms of ownership or access to a radio or television set, the audience of the *pueblos jóvenes* comprises a high percentage of the population, though of course the number of those listening at any one time is liable to fluctuation. An average of 98 per cent of homes in Río Seco and Porvenir own at least one radio set, and an average of 92 per cent of households own a television set.⁶ The high percentage of radio and television ownership shows the wide diffusion of the media amongst migrants and points to the accumulation of consumer goods and access to the mass media as two factors of social change which are accelerated by rural-urban migration.⁷

A substantial amount of time is devoted to the media in the *pueblos jóvenes*, where leisure activities are bound by economic constraints to pastimes requiring minimum expense and, given the lack of transport, minimum displacement from the home. However, it must be observed that the amount of time spent listening to the radio or watching television may indicate the extent of exposure to the media per se, but

⁶ 13% of the population own more than one radio and 36% have had their radios over twenty years, for many one of their first acquisitions in establishing their household in Arequipa. 4% own more than one television, these are usually black and white, although 6% do have colour television.

⁷ It must be noted that people in rural areas also have access to the media, especially radio, and even in Andean villages where there is no electricity, some families run a television from a car battery.

reveals nothing about influence.⁸ Furthermore, in the *pueblos jóvenes*, there is no definite sense of 'leisure' or 'spare time'. For a high proportion of *pobladores* working in the informal sector, there are no clearly defined limits of where the working day begins and ends since they have no fixed schedule and have to work long hours. Some claim to have no spare time at all and the little they do have is spent at home, doing jobs around the house and watching television. If they go out it is usually to see friends or to play sports, rarely to the cinema or a show.

The broadcast media are thus of central importance to the recreation of the *pobladores* for, although people may not be able to go out or get together with other people in public places, the media reaches the majority of them within their homes. The significance of receiving the media within the domestic space has been noted, for both the home environment and the wider social context affect the way people approach, use and interpret the media (Neuman & Sola Pool 1986:71-86; Fiske 1987:74).

2.2. Radio and Television in Daily Life

Pobladores expect to be both entertained and informed by the media and these are the two principle reasons specified for having a radio or television. Spiralling inflation makes the

⁸ On the error of basing media influence on extent of exposure see: Golding 1974:11; Snow 1983:147; Cantor & Cantor 1986:216.

acquisition of consumer durables increasingly difficult, so that people treasure their radio and television sets as prime sources of cheap information and entertainment. They represent an investment for them which they would be reluctant to relinquish in order to raise money.⁹ Guillermo, a *poblador* of Río Seco, comments:

Vendería alguna otra cosa que no tiene mayor apuro, la tele y la radio entretienen y ayudan a informar.

(I would sell something else which wasn't so necessary, the telly and the radio help to inform you.)

In the climate of economic crisis, radio and television provide a cheaper and more readily available source of information than the printed press. Newspapers are not distributed to the *pueblos jóvenes* and are only occasionally sold by a Sunday vendor. More importantly, they are regarded as prohibitively expensive, non-essential luxury items which people only buy sporadically, once a week or once a month, as Paloma, also from Río Seco remarks:

Cuando era barato, antes del paquetazo comprábamos, ahora cuesta medio sueldo.

(When it was cheap, before the *paquetazo* we'd buy [a paper], now it costs half your wage.)

⁹ People said they would not sell their radio or television in a crisis, unless it was an absolute necessity and a last resort. They would rather borrow the money, go out to work or sell another item considered to be less imperative (typewriter, liquidizer, sewing machine, clothes or even cattle).

The majority inform themselves through broadcast news, and José, from Porvenir, comments on the absolute necessity of having a radio or television as a source of information:

Pienso de que un padre de familia, o la familia en general, debe de informarse, por eso son las emisoras, como también las televisivas. En ese caso es una necesidad, ahorita una televisión o una radio es una necesidad, un caso de urgencia, porque ahorita no podemos comprar un periódico... Nada nos cuesta encender un televisor, ni un radio, entonces escuchamos las noticias. Es por ello realmente que es parte primordial en la familia.

(I think that a father of a family, or the family in general, ought to inform themselves, that's what the radio stations are for, and the television stations as well. In that case, it's a necessity, now a television or a radio is a necessity, a case of urgency, because now we can't buy a paper... It doesn't cost us anything to switch the television set on, or a radio, so then we listen to the news. That's why it really is a fundamental part of the family.)

The information gained from the media helps form opinions and provides common ground on which to engage in conversation with others, contributing to social interaction.¹⁰ Juliana, a market stall-holder in Río Seco, finds the news gives her topics on which to converse with her customers:

Como no he estudiado mucho, me gusta escuchar para aprender... La gente habla por gusto, a mi me gusta escuchar la radio para enterarme, para tener que conversar con mis clientes del mercado.

(As I didn't study much, I like to listen in order to learn... People talk for the sake of it, I like to listen to the radio to inform myself, to have something to talk about with my customers on the market.)

¹⁰ For types of gratifications amongst British media users see: McQuail, Blumler & Brown 1972; McQuail 1987:229.

Radio and television fulfil separate functions which fit in with the rhythm of daily life. In the shanties, radio provides a framework to regulate the pattern of daily activity, supplies information, marks time and provides accompaniment.¹¹ Radio is the chosen medium first thing in the morning (partly because only one of Arequipa's television stations broadcasts in the morning) and peak listening time is between 4 and 8 a.m., the time of greatest activity in the *pueblos jóvenes*, when people listen to the radio as they are getting ready for work or school. Radio introduces the day, offering news of national and local interest, of transport or teachers' strikes, price rises and other such measures which may affect the day's activity. It also supplies frequent time checks. *Pobladores*, like Violeta, admit that they put the radio on to hear the news or to get the time, but pay it little attention, as they are coming and going, doing other things:

En la mañana amanezco con la radio, pero no lo tomamos en cuenta... Escucho un rato, después tengo que salir a poner desayuno.

(In the morning I wake up with the radio, but we don't take any notice of it... I listen for a little while, then I have to go out and put the breakfast on.)

Radio also fulfils a companionship function, providing background noise and filling the void created either by

¹¹ On the functions of radio in general see: Mendelsohn 1964:242; Blumler, Katz & Gurevitch 1974:20; Crisell 1986:201-17; McQuail 1987:229. Specifically in Lima's shanties: Lloréns & Tamayo 1987:63-92.

routine and boring tasks or by the absence of other company. After the early morning rush, the rhythm changes and people who work at home listen to the radio to accompany their activity throughout the morning. Listening slackens off by lunchtime and in the afternoon radio faces competition from television, the preferred medium for relaxation.

Since radio's peak time is in the morning when its informing function is paramount, the news programmes are fundamental to attracting an audience. *Melodía* is the radio most widely listened to in Arequipa and its news programme, *Melodía en la Noticia* ('Melody in the News') is the favourite in Río Seco and Porvenir. People express a preference for *Melodía en la Noticia* on account of its speed of delivery and frequent time checks, both vital at this busy time of the day: 'habla rápido, noticias cada rato da, da la hora rápido' (Violeta: 'they talk quickly, they give the news at every moment, they give the time quickly').

Melodía prides itself on the speed with which it broadcasts news to its listeners, disposing of a team of mobile units which scour the city for newsworthy incidents. It is this immediacy from which popular radio news draws its authority (Crisell 1986:96) and which distinguishes it from the more serious and stylized delivery of Radio Programas' *Rotativa del Aire*, which also has a significant audience in the shanties and is applauded for the best news coverage on the national and international level.

The personalities of news presenters are important as people tend to trust the authority of certain established figures who function as a 'significant other' or reference point. They set forth and sanction values and norms and provide a source of interpretation and legitimation on a variety of topics (Snow 1983:115-19,149). The main presenter of *Melodía en la Noticia* is Arequipa's most well-known disc jockey, Jorge Velázquez. He envisages his role as to champion the cause of the people and *pobladores* cite him as their favourite presenter and look to him as a figurehead with the authority and expertise to make their concerns heard.

The other major personality of Arequipan radio is the veteran Guido Díaz, affectionately known as *El Tío Guido* ('Uncle Guido'), who hosts Radio Arequipa's news programme *El Extra*, broadcast from 5 to 7.30 a.m. and ranking second after *Melodía en la Noticia*. Guido Díaz delivers news items as if relating anecdotes and interjects his own personal comments, issuing warnings and recommendations to the public, whom he addresses paternalistically.¹² He holds sway over popular opinion, as manifest during the dispute over the market (discussed above), when people said that if Guido Díaz told the street sellers to leave San Camilo, they would go. The presenter conforms to Radio Arequipa's image of familiarity and solidity, in keeping with its status as one of the founder

¹² On news as a continuation of the story-telling tradition see: Darnton 1975:175-94; Fiske & Hartley 1978:85-6.

radios of Arequipa and pillars of traditional Arequipan society.

Like radio, patterns of television viewing fit in with the rhythm of the day's activities but follow a reverse trend from radio, attracting the main audiences in the afternoon and evening. This is partly because the television stations generally begin broadcasting later in the day (Panamericana commences at 6 a.m., but Continental starts at 11.30 a.m. and Canal 8 not till 3.30 p.m.), but more significantly because it suits the domestic routine. *Pobladores* prefer to sit down and relax in front of the television in the lull after lunch or at night when work is done.

Whilst it is frequently assumed that television is more absorbing and therefore more influential than radio, studies have shown that other activities combine with television viewing which, like radio, takes its place in domestic life.¹³ Thus, although the majority of informants specified that they watched television at night, it is not to be assumed that all other activity ceases. In the *pueblos jóvenes*, the television was frequently on in the midst of the general domestic bustle and conversation, while children did their homework, meals were prepared and eaten and people carried on conversations. Neighbours would visit and stay to watch a programme which served as a focal point to facilitate conversation and social

¹³ On how routines of viewing form part of the domestic routines by which home life is organized see: Fiske 1987:72; Hobson 1982.

interaction. Like radio, television is also used to create background noise and relieve the boredom of routine tasks.¹⁴ Watching television may also accompany work at home, as in the case of Ursula who makes her living by making clothes on a knitting machine and watches soap operas as she works. Television is not then the attention-consuming, all-dominating medium it is often portrayed to be, but is subject to other demands on the viewer's time and attention.

3. Radio and Identities

3.1. Choice of Music

Although several radios offer another news bulletin at midday, by then radio's role as companion takes precedence over that of informing and music becomes the crucial factor in people's choice of station. Melodía maintains a steady audience throughout the day, offering varied, easy-listening music but by the afternoon faces competition from other radios such as Radio Hispana, attracting listeners to its afternoon programmes of 'easy-listening' music, particularly the 'golden oldies' of *Aquellos Años*, ('Those Years') played between 6 and 8 p.m. Hispana's owner-manager, David Rivera, describes his radio as a 'cultural' radio for the middle classes and would be bemused by the attention of those he dismisses as the dross of Peruvian society and incapable of appreciating 'culture'.

¹⁴ On television viewing as an intensely social activity see: McQuail et al. 1972; Hobson 1982; Tulloch & Moran 1986.

Different musics are selected for different times of the day, to accompany particular activities or create certain moods. People choose music to cheer them up and distract them from their worries or, as Norma suggests, to romanticise:

La música es una distracción, hace olvidar las penas que uno tiene. Me encanta todo tipo de música, estoy enamorada, eternamente enamorada de la música... Soy muy romántica.

(Music is a distraction, it makes you forget the troubles you've got. I love all kinds of music, I'm in love, eternally in love with music... I'm very romantic.)

Música romántica (romantic music) is one of the favourite types of music amongst *pobladores* and represented by *boleros*, *baladas* and 'oldies'. It is also included in the general category of *música variada* (varied music), along with *salsa* and pop. *Música variada* was also cited as people's preferred music, evading the producers' attempts to categorize music tastes according to either social class or age group. Folkloric music and *chicha*, believed by radio producers to represent the music of the *pueblos jóvenes*, in fact account for less than a quarter of listening.

Nevertheless, migrants express an affection for *waynos*: they evoke their place of origin and make them nostalgic or cheer them up with the happy memories they trigger. Milagros demonstrates the importance of memory:

Nos gusta porque es bonito, recordar es vivir... Para mi es una alegría cuando escucho, me recuerda mi tierra, porque he abierto los ojos allá, cuando escucho esa música me pongo un poco más alegre.

(We like [the music] because it's pretty, to remember is to live... For me it's a joy to listen to it, it reminds

me of my homeland, because I opened my eyes there, when I listen to that music I feel a bit more cheerful.)

Remembering one's past is seen as essential for constructing one's life in the present and music prompts that remembrance. For some, like Juliana, a programme playing music specifically from their region is the highlight of the week and not to be missed:

Escuchamos música de la sierra, música folklórica, los domingos de mi pueblo lo tocan...no lo pierdo nunca... para recordar.

(We listen to music from the sierra, folkloric music, on Sundays they play music from my village...I never miss it...to remember.)

Programmes playing Andean music and addressed to migrants can create an 'imagined community' of listeners, reviving the sense of belonging to their home community and of being part of a community of migrants from that district or province. Migrants, Emilio and José, believe a music form like the wayno not only reaffirms their Andean identity under siege from urban cultural products but also their Peruvian identity threatened by the 'invasion' from abroad. They extol the wayno as the oldest and therefore most legitimate representation of the 'authentic' Peru and which is diffused abroad as such:

Bueno, es de sentirse peruano, porque siempre, en cualquier sitio, hasta en países extranjeros, es el waynito el que más se escucha, los demás ya son extranjerizados. (Emilio)

(Well, it's a way of feeling Peruvian, because always, in any place, even in foreign countries, it's the wayno which you hear the most, the others are already influenced by the foreign.)

El wayno es la máxima expresión de lo nuestro, frente a la invasión de lo ajeno. (José)

(The wayno is the supreme expression of our roots, in the face of the invasion of the alien.)

Playing waynos on the radio is a way of validating them in the urban context where they tend to be despised by the Arequipans and rejected by the younger generations in favour of the *salsa*, rock and pop of the city. Fátima acclaims the wayno as the music of the 'Peruvian race' ('de nuestro Perú, de nuestra casta, nuestra raza') and therefore its rejection is interpreted as a desire to be part of a different 'race'. Emilio's comment shows that the Andean people consider themselves fully human, manifest by their distinctive cultural identity and deem those who mimic the forms of other peoples to be 'monkeys':

Se está perdiendo porque mucha gente no le gusta, de la serranía dice o los paisanos dicen, de eso se avergüenza la juventud y todos son como monos que quieren ser de otra serie ¿no? (Emilio)

(It's dying out because a lot of people don't like it, it's from the highlands, they say, or of the peasants, the young people are embarrassed by that and they're all like monkeys who want to be of another species, aren't they?)

The embarrassment of the young people, provoked by prejudice and used by producers to justify the absence of broadcasts in Quechua, is sustained by Domingo in referring to the shame people feel towards their Andean heritage, not because they feel they must eschew their past in order to assimilate to city ways, but because they are made to feel out of place, strangers in their own land:

Es como un dicho muy antiguo que dice 'Qosqo me nace, Arequipa me cría y Lima me enseña la politiquería.' ¿Qué quiere decir esto? Bueno, yo lo interpreto de que uno va haciéndose más a la sociedad, el antiguo campesino ya no piccha su coquita, se sienta una persona importada, como decir hemos venido de otra país, y frente a cualquier pregunta yo creo que negaría ¿Wayno? no, no me gusta, dice. ¿Sabe hablar quechua? peor, dice ¿qué es eso? es una cobardía.

(It's like a very old saying which says 'Cusco bears me, Arequipa raises me and Lima teaches me politicking.' What does that mean? Well, I interpret it that you adapt yourself more to the city, the old peasant no longer chews his coca, he feels like an imported person, as if to say we've come from a different country, and faced with any question I think he'd answer negatively. Wayno? no, I don't like that, he says. Do you speak Quechua? worse still. What's that? he says, it's a cowardice.)

Migrants point to the media as one of the many social pressures which prompt both first and second generations to reject Andean music. Parents are critical of the *música loca* ('mad music') which refers to rock and pop and which they believe to be a corruptive influence on young people.¹⁵ They trace the root of evil to advertising and the associations made between types of music and 'immoral' behaviour or in the well-worn phrase, between sex, drugs and rock and roll:

Para mí, [el rock] viene de la droga, mediante el licor, en la televisión, por ejemplo, pasa la cerveza ¿qué tiene que ver la cerveza con unas mujeres, digamos, desnudas? que el otro, que rock-and-roll. Todas las radios, rock es lo que hablan, y eso es puro licor, pura droga. (José)

(As I see it, [rock] comes from drugs, through liquor, on the television, for example, beer comes on, what's beer got to do with some women who, let's say, are naked? and the other? and rock and roll? On all the radios, rock is what they're talking and that's pure liquor, pure drugs.)

¹⁵ On the relationship between age and music tastes see Robinson & Fink 1986:226-42.

Chicha is also seen by older migrants, like Milagros, to be the music of the youth: 'chichas casi no me gustan, esos son para los niños' ('I don't really like *chichas*, they're for the children') and similarly related to social problems. They are aware that music can provide a viable expression of protest for the young people:¹⁶

[La música] es una manifestación de cada ser humano, el hacerse sentir, expresarse. La música *chicha* manifiesta, desde casi todo su contenido, rebeldía, protesta. (Domingo)

([Music] is a manifestation of every human being, to make oneself feel, to express oneself. *Chicha* manifests, in almost all its content, rebellion, protest.)

However, the *pobladores* believe not only the media but also corrupt local authorities are responsible for promoting *chicha* by accepting bribes from the organizers of *chicha* dances:

Los bailes *chicha* es un poquito terrible, porque parece que no tenemos autonomía, por ejemplo, el actual alcalde, Valderrama: dales *chicha*, dales *chicha*, dales *chicha*, la cuestión. Pero ¿qué pasa? acá en un baile hasta balas, cuchilladas, eso no puede ser. (César)

(The *chicha* dances are a bit terrible, because it seems we have no autonomy, for example, the current mayor, Valderrama: give them *chicha*, give them *chicha*, give them *chicha*, that's all that matters. But what happens? Here in a dance there are even bullets, stabbings, that can't be allowed.)

Music does not then correspond to identity in any simple way. Although categories of music, like 'folkloric' or 'pop' music, are linked to stereotypes of a particular social or age

¹⁶ On the ideological and expressive role of music in counter cultures see: Yinger 1977:833-53; Lamy & Levin 1986:338-48.

group, those placed within that group evade categorization and construct their own meanings from music forms. Even a type of music like *chicha*, which seems to be the spontaneous expression of 'the people' and more specifically of second-generation shanty town residents, is manipulated by outside forces and its status as a 'popular' form takes on a diversity of meanings.

3.2. Response to 'Popular' and Community Radio

I found that in the *pueblos jóvenes* more people listened to commercial radio than to the public service radios, which producers might interpret as proof that the people who most need education are those who least want it. However, people expressed a desire for information, indicating that the knowledge mainstream media wish to impart is not the knowledge they need or desire or is not presented in a form they find accessible and enjoyable.

In Río Seco there was some interest expressed in Radio Municipal on account of its local appeal and the good reception afforded by its close proximity in the town hall of Cerro Colorado. Radio San Martín was popular for playing *waynos* but few tuned in to Educación or Universidad, the latter aiming at a highly educated audience, with classical and specialized musics and educational programmes.

The long-established popularity of Melodía's news programme and competition from the commercial sector means

that Ama Kella's two programmes for the *pueblos jóvenes*, *Caminando Juntos* and *El Poblador*, attract few listeners. As might be expected, more people listened to these programmes in Porvenir than in Río Seco. In addition, the inhabitants of Porvenir cannot help but hear the weekend loudspeaker broadcasts. Residents expressed a liking for these programmes because they directly address them and their problems; they found them informative and stressed the importance of news commentaries and the opportunity offered for the intervention of leaders and fellow *pobladores*. Sports, music and drama were considered of secondary importance, so that in this case information rather than entertainment was seen to be imperative. José comments of *Jatari Llacta*:

Para mí las noticias son lo primordial, nos traen las noticias de lo que sucede en el país, noticias del pueblo, como vivir en pueblo joven, toda la necesidad que pasamos... Es necesario para saber todo lo que sucede, todo lo que está subiendo.

(To my mind, the news is the most important, they bring us news of what's going on in the country, how to live in a shanty town, all the need we're going through... It's necessary to know everything that's happening, everything that's going up.)

The *pobladores* thought it important to have a programme to deal with the problems of the *pueblos jóvenes* in general and of Porvenir in particular. They said the programme helped to keep them informed of socio-political problems within their own organizations (where leaders were frequently accused of corruption or complacency) and in the fight to procure basic services:

Nos pone al día en cuanto a los avances...contribuye al desarrollo del pueblo, ayuda a resolver los problemas.
(Enriqueta)

(It keeps us up to date on the progress made...it contributes to the development of the *pueblo*, it helps to resolve the problems.)

Ama Kella also informs the *pobladores* of events in other parts of the city which might not be covered by mainstream news. People also appreciated the comprehensible explanations of political and economic issues, given by members of the *pueblo joven* community in 'the language of the *poblador*'. Furthermore, the *pobladores* upheld Ama Kella's aim to restore value to their roots ('revalorar lo nuestro'), promote their folklore ('incentivar nuestro folklor') and propagate Peruvian music ('propagar la música peruana').

Both the producers and the public of the programme expressed a concern that young people should not be alienated, but rather targeted with themes to interest them in order to counter the tendency towards less productive pastimes like 'billiards and table football...which do a lot of harm to the youth ('los billares, los juegos de fulbito...hacen mucho daño a la niñez'). *Pobladores* want a more 'cultural' or 'educational' programme both for themselves and their children, which would inform them of scientific discoveries, the arts and Andean culture, health matters, sexual education and moral and religious issues. Whilst programmes like *Jatari Llacta* are valued for their informational and educational content, they also provide a point of

identification for the *pobladores*. There is a sense that they are 'their' programmes, transmitted from within the community, from the parish, which most approve as a well-known and central location, and broadcast by fellow *pobladores*, several of whom are known by name to the public:

Alabo bastante la labor del grupo Jatari Llacta...con ellos me puedo identificar porque soy de este barrio, y pienso que cuando hay una institución de esta categoría, de este índole, que está en el seno del barrio, debe de ayudarse, debe de apoyarse, debe de incentivarse más bien. (Pedro)

(I praise the work of the *Jatari Llacta* group highly, I can identify with them because they're from this neighbourhood and I think that when there's an institution of this category, of this kind, which is in the bosom of the neighbourhood, that it should be helped, it should be supported, or rather it should be motivated.)

Nevertheless, another *poblador* Iván, stresses the need for team members to be aware of and sensitive to the suffering of the people by maintaining close contact with them. He upbraids the young people of Ama Kella for ignoring the plight of some of the hardest hit sectors of the shanty, even though all those involved are from Porvenir or other *pueblos jóvenes*. This suggests that some *pobladores* do feel distanced from the broadcasters for, as I indicated above, the very involvement in Ama Kella separates members from their public:

Un vecino sabe que en el pueblo hay gente que ni siquiera tiene para la olla, allí hay que ver, si es posible ir casa por casa, la juventud, ver las madres de familia, las madres abandonadas, los enfermos, Vd. sabe, como sufren.

(A neighbour knows that in shanty there are people who don't even have enough to fill the pot, you've got to look into that, if possible go house by house, [see] the

youth, the mothers of families, the abandoned mothers, the sick, you know, how they suffer.)

No one in Río Seco was found to listen to the Quechua programme *Caminando Juntos*, though members of the production team carried out surveys across Arequipa and were satisfied of their audience. The audience tends to be those who not only have a knowledge of Quechua, but who have a liking for it and a desire to see it maintained, as Ceferina, from Porvenir comments:

A veces en la mañana escucho, pero a veces no también, madrugo, voy abajo. Está bonito, siempre en la mañana todas las radios hablan quechua... Siempre me gusta hablar quechua, más hablo quechua que castellano.

(Sometimes I listen in the morning, but sometimes I don't, I have to get up at dawn, I go down [into town]. It's nice, all the radios always speak Quechua in the morning... I always like to speak Quechua, I speak more Quechua than Spanish.)

The notion that all the radios broadcast in Quechua in the early hours is contradicted by others who are under the impression that none of them do or at least because their favourite news programme is in Spanish, forgo listening in Quechua. Others see no sense in listening to Quechua when they already dominate the language and rather need to gain fluency in Spanish:

No escucho en quechua, yo sé quechua ¿para qué voy a escuchar? (Esmeralda)

(I don't listen in Quechua, I know Quechua, what am I going to listen for?)

However, there are those who like to listen to the short snippets of news given in Quechua during a folkloric music

programme on radios like *El Tiempo*. There is a sense that the use of Quechua not only facilitates their understanding, but also reinforces their sense of community because only Quechua speakers can understand:

Hablan quechua, noticia da, nos avisa que está pasando, nosotros comprendemos pues. (María)

(They speak Quechua, they give the news, they let us know what's going on, we can understand it, you see.)

Both commercial and community radio are used by the people of Río Seco and Porvenir to make their appeals and announcements. Río Seco publicized a march of protest against the water board on *Melodía* and another time a film show organized to raise money to mend the *comedor's* stove was announced on *Municipal*. In Porvenir, the people have more direct access to the media, being able to present their requests to *Ama Kella* to be broadcast on *El Poblador* or to participate directly in one of the loudspeaker broadcasts. *Jatari Llacta*, for example, encourages the participation of the people to make their announcements, complaints or requests and provides a forum for issues to be discussed.

On a typical Sunday when I observed the broadcast, the following people came: a *poblador* protesting at the local council's failure to provide rubbish collection; one of the local leaders bringing a report of the matters raised at the general meeting that week (the proposal to build a technical college in Porvenir and the threat to land allocated for it by speculators planning an invasion; the problem of neighbouring

pueblos jóvenes stealing Porvenir's electricity by wiring into their cables; the abuses of the transport services, particularly the *colectivos* charging exorbitant prices); leaders answering questions about those issues; a woman from the *comedor* announcing that they were now receiving subscriptions for lunches; a number of leaders and others criticizing the *teniente gobernador* for using loudspeakers, meant for the health post, to attack the local leaders and for failing to control market prices and the size of bread; finally, one man from Porvenir's sports club, announcing the volley ball championship and another from the school Parents' Association giving notice of the Sunday *faena* (communal labour).

In Porvenir the media are used by the people and become a central part in communal life, facilitating the organization of grass-roots politics as well as social activities and involving the people in the process of constructing a 'popular identity'. As Felipe, one of the *Jatari Llacta* team, says:

La comunicación popular es un eje importante para promover, sostenerte en tu identidad.

(Popular communication is an essential tool to promote and sustain you in your identity.)

Ama Kella's emphasis is on encouraging people to do things for themselves instead of relying on or submitting to others. Two members who live in the northern zone of Arequipa are of the opinion that Río Seco has failed to generate a strong popular identity because the church and aid groups

working there have lulled people into the complacency of receiving, of letting others do things for them. As a consequence, the people expect that their leaders will do the same for them and believe that once they have placed their vote and paid their quota, they can sit back and let the leader get on with it, as Eduardo, inhabitant of Victor A. Belaúnde, comments:

Dicen pues, bueno ¿por qué lo voy a hacer yo? qué haga él ¿no? se los eligen como directivos, bueno, si el fue elegido como presidente, qué se encargue él, yo ya di mi voto por él, yo vivo mi vida, cuando me piden cuota doy lo mío, pero más allá, que se encargue.

(They say, well, why am I going to do it? why not let him do it? they elect them as leaders, well, if he was elected as president, let him do it, I already gave him my vote, I live my life, when they ask for a contribution I give my part, but beyond that, let him do it.)

A community radio can encourage action on the part of the people, but it is not merely a question of motivation: as in the case of the *comedores*, it is also one of finance and depends on the ability of the leaders to procure funding from foreign agencies. In 1989, money was granted by an Irish aid organization, Trocaire, to reactivate a loudspeaker programme in the parish of Zámocola, adjacent to Río Seco. It remains to be seen whether, as Eduardo hopes, this will contribute to local organization, action and the construction of a positive popular identity:

Un medio de comunicación es algo que va a ayudar un poco más a hacer despertar un poco más.

(A means of communication is something which is going to help a little more in waking people up a little more.)

4. Soap Opera in the Shanties

4.1. Male and Female Viewing

Telenovelas account for one third of television viewing in the Río Seco and Porvenir, another third being devoted to children's programmes and the rest divided between news programmes, comedy shows and foreign series. Given the prominence of the *novelas* in family viewing in general and in the homes of those I lived amongst in the shanties in particular, my discussion of audience response to television is based on people's reaction to and interpretation of this genre.

Although the vast majority of *telenovelas* broadcast on Arequipan television are imported from Venezuela, Mexico and Brazil, the producers' fears of alienation as a result of exposure to foreign media products are countered by the way people in the *pueblos jóvenes* receive them in the context of their own social environment and interpret them in the light of their own life experiences. Liebes & Katz (1988:118) have noted that the familiarity of the themes¹⁷ and the continuity of the serial form enable viewers of different cultural

¹⁷ Weibel (1977:56) lists the most frequent themes of soap opera: the evil woman; the great sacrifice; the winning back of an estranged lover/spouse; marrying for money/respectability; the unwed mother; deceptions about paternity; choice between career and housewife; the alcoholic.

backgrounds to bring their own interpretations to a foreign soap opera.¹⁸

These characteristics are also found to invite both individual intimacy and communal involvement (Newcomb 1974:253). The *novela* becomes part of the individual's domestic experience and daily life but also involves them with the community of viewers as it is incorporated into the social life and discourse of the *pueblo joven* via gossip.

The evaluation and interpretation of *telenovelas* in Río Seco and Porvenir take place in a struggle over the meanings attached to them by men and women. This struggle is waged in the sphere of family politics: it forms part of the patterns of power and resistance both between men and women, and parents and children. It is manifest both in the attempts of different family members to impose their viewing preferences and in mutual criticism of those preferences.¹⁹

In Río Seco and Porvenir, the women show a preference for *telenovelas* whilst men prefer news, sport and action films. Men regard *novelas* as dull, boring and stupefying compared to fast-moving sport or film: 'cansan, atontan, el partido es más interesante' ('they tire you, stupefy you, the match is more interesting'). They think *novelas* are a waste of time, an amusement for 'las señoras que no tienen nada que hacer'

¹⁸ In addition to Katz & Liebes 1984; Liebes & Katz 1988:113-25, see Hobson 1982:106; Ang 1985:28; Fiske 1987:66.

¹⁹ Morley (1986) and Fiske (1987:75) demonstrate this for Britain.

('women with nothing better to do'). They also deem them to be a corruptive influence for both women and children, putting bad ideas into their heads:

Enseñan malas cosas, mucha corrupción, para los niños que deben estudiar, les tortura la mente. (Ricardo)

(They teach bad things, a lot of corruption, for children who've got to study, they torture the mind.)

Es un vicio, después los jóvenes actúan como en las telenovelas que están mirando diariamente. (Edilberto)

(It's a vice, then the young people act like in the telenovelas that they're watching every day.)

Whilst men denounce watching television as a pastime only for idle women, they legitimize their own viewing by claiming it to be hard-earned relaxation, a form of escape from the strains and stresses of the working day:²⁰

Es para relajarse después de la tensión que uno tiene en su trabajo, para distraerse, olvidarse de los malos ratos que uno pasa en el trabajo, de cierta forma escaparse, porque la realidad es vivir en tensión, vivir preocupado, venir a ver la tele es escaparse de eso. (Bernado)

(It's to relax after the tension you have at work, to distract you, to forget the bad moments you go through at work, in a way to escape, because the reality is to live tensed up, to live worried, coming to watch the telly is a way to escape from that.)

The home and the television provide a haven to which the working man returns after battling with the 'real world', but for the woman, the home remains a place of work rather than recreation, regardless of whether or not she also works outside the home. Many women rise to work at the crack of

²⁰ On the role of media in leisure and gender differences in attitudes to leisure time see: Curran & Tunstall 1973; Smith, Parker & Smith 1973; Morley 1986; Fiske 1987:218.

dawn, like Blanca, who says she has no time to watch television: each morning she fetches meat from the abattoir to sell on the market in Río Seco and if she is not in bed early, she finds herself doing household chores in the evening: 'siempre hay que hacer' ('there's always something to be done'). The presence of partner or children places demands upon women and impinges upon their potential free time:

No tengo tiempo, un ratito no más veo, después mi hijo se despierta, tengo que cambiarle o tengo que jugar con mi hijita. (Fernanda)

(I don't have time, I just watch for a moment, then my little boy wakes up and I have to change him or I have to play with my little girl.)

Television viewing must fit in with the multiple demands on their time and attention and does not occupy a defined recreation zone. Mercedes dismisses the importance of *novelas* on these grounds, qualifying them as mundane, momentary and passing; once an episode is over daily life resumes unchanged:

Es una parte de mi vida diaria, de lo diario, entre los labores de la casa miro un rato televisión... Pero pasa la novela ¿y allí qué?

(It's part of my daily life, of the everyday, inbetween the household chores I watch television a little while... But the *novela* ends and then what?)

Women feel guilty at 'sitting and doing nothing' when watching television and only feel free to indulge this pleasure either when their duties to men and children are dispatched or when the men are out at work.

Yo casi no tengo tiempo, estoy lavando, trabajando. En la noche no más miro, cuando venga mi esposo miramos una película. (Remedios)

(I hardly have time, I'm washing, working. I only watch at night, when my husband comes in we watch a film.)

On the other hand, the men's absence permits of some relaxation and many *pobladoras* watch a *novela* while resting after lunch. Given that many men disapprove of *novelas* per se and that women's viewing is frequently subordinate to that of men, their absence enables women to satisfy their own viewing preferences. Watching *novelas* while the men are out becomes a minor act of defiance:²¹

No veo casi novelas, a mi esposo no le gusta, cuando no viene miro un ratito. (Asunción)

(I scarcely watch *novelas*, my husband doesn't like them, when he doesn't come I watch for a minute.)

Others stand up to the men's disapproval, although there is still an underlying unease about the man's potential to impose his right to view where he is the wage earner and has bought the television:

¡Sonseras! dice, pero no me prohíbe, no pues ¿qué? ¿yo voy a estar sujeto a lo que él quiere mirar? yo también voy a mirar, no puede ser ¡en ese caso qué se lleve su televisión! (Soledad)

(Rubbish! he says, but he doesn't forbid me, not likely, what? am I going to be subject to what he wants to watch? no way, in that case let him take his television!

4.2. Melodrama and the Moral Order

Although men perceive *telenovelas* to be immoral, they are characterized by melodrama which tends to endorse the 'rightness' of the world order (Cawelti 1976:45-6). For that

²¹ Fiske (1987:75) calls this the 'claiming of a piece of feminine cultural territory within the masculine hegemony'.

reason, both Marxist and feminist critics have condemned soap opera for upholding socio-economic and sexual domination (Ang 1985:119). Buckman (1984:46) states that in the *novela*, melodrama becomes the modern version of a folk myth which presents traditional themes in a moralistic plot in which good always triumphs over evil.

Some women find that the subjugation of female characters in the *novelas* reflects the position of many women in Latin America. Mercedes feels that, instead of endorsing their subjection, the *novelas* should challenge it:

La mujer latina siempre es subyugada por el hombre, lava, cocina, cría niños, siempre el hombre quiere estar encima de la mujer, deben dar otro mensaje las novelas.

(The Latin American woman is always subjugated by the man, she washes, cooks, brings up children, the man always wants to be over the woman, the *novelas* should give a different message.)

However, the portrayal of women does not always support patriarchal domination and in the *novelas* there are forceful female characters who subvert male authority:

Hay algunas que desempeñan un papel bravo, que les manda a los esposos, que les maltratan, que les tienen así. (Soledad)

(There are some who have a strong part, who boss their husbands about, who treat them badly, who've got them in the palm of their hand.)

Modleski (1984:94) places such characters in the category of the 'villainess' who both attracts and repels through using her sexuality to manipulate men rather than allowing herself to be made vulnerable by it. The heroine of a Brazilian *novela*, *Doña Bella*, simultaneously aroused admiration and

criticism from women who expressed delight in the salacious story but, in the same breath, condemned its 'bad example':

Me gusta porque ella es muy fuerte... Se trata de una niña que fue abandonada, le han matado a su abuelo que le criaba, le han robado, de allí se ha vuelto ramera, por la vida pues, por lo que le han hecho y ella ha aprendido de la vida, es mujer de la vida, toda clase de hombres van allí y es vengativa, hace matar a la gente...no sirve mirar cosas así, es mal ejemplo. (Hilda)

(I like it because she's very strong... It's about a little girl who was abandoned, they killed her grandfather who brought her up, they robbed him, from there she became a prostitute, because of life, because of what they did to her and she's learnt from life, all kinds of men go there and she wants revenge, she has people killed...it's not good to watch things like that, it sets a bad example.)

Es una mujer que domina a cientos de hombres por el sexo, está con dos hombres a la vez, es una novela que no debe poner. (Mercedes)

(She's a woman who dominates hundreds of men through sex, she's with two men at the same time, it's a novela they shouldn't show.)

It is these characters who pose a threat to the men, fearing that they will put ideas into their partners' heads, 'leading them astray' by giving them models of infidelity or disobedience, as Hilda comments:

Los esposos generalmente no dejan mirar a sus esposas, porque cuando hacen cosas malas dicen Vds. están aprendiendo, están volviendo mañosas, no deben mirar.

(Husbands generally don't let their wives watch because when they do bad things they say, you're learning, you're becoming crafty, you shouldn't watch.)

Hilda adds that it is illiterate or poorly educated men who forbid their partners to watch *novelas*, indicating that the assumption of the media's influence stems from ignorance. It is always 'others' who are held to be susceptible to

influence, if not women or the 'uneducated', then children. Both male and female preoccupation with the immorality of the *novelas* is centred on their children, adults believing themselves to be immune to any such influence:

No me gusta que las chicas vean las novelas, porque ellas están en formación... Son inmorales, influyen en los jóvenes, pero cuando uno ya es formado, está en su hogar, ya no le seduce estas cosas. (Soledad)

(I don't like the girls to watch *novelas*, because they're still growing... They're immoral, they influence young people, but when you're grown up, when you're in your [own] home, those things don't seduce you anymore.)

Soledad admits that she had 'girlish dreams' ('mis sueños de muchacha') but was never influenced by the television ('nunca me ha influenciado la tele'). Like Esmeralda, she found the dreams vanished with the immediate and pressing reality of home and family:

Antes pues, cuando no tenía problemas, cuando era soltera...allí sí miraba... Ahora no, ahora que soy vieja ¿qué me sirve a mí? (Esmeralda)

(Before I used to, when I had no problems, when I was single...then I watched alright... Not now, now that I'm old, what good can they do me?)

The sexual liberality of the *novelas* is an area in which *pobladores* fear foreign influence on young people, who have a different social formation from those of the producer countries and who live in a social environment not yet prepared for such sexual freedom:

El estilo de vida...es un poco liberal para nosotros de un país subdesarrollado, conservador, no es tan liberal como otros países...estamos atrasados, unos cien años, no podemos alcanzar... La mente de los jóvenes no está preparado para recibir lo de los países desarrollados. (Bernardo)

(The lifestyle...is a bit liberal for us in an underdeveloped, conservative country...we're way behind, about a hundred years, we can't catch up... The minds of the young people are not prepared to receive the ways of the developed countries.)

Some also express concern that the *novelas* combined with cramped living conditions in the *pueblos jóvenes* will encourage promiscuity, as Mercedes comments on a neighbour whose seven children share one room with their parents and with the television. She says that to counter the liberal sexual attitudes portrayed in the *novelas* the television ought to provide more sexual education and advice on birth control, pointing out that even though the pill is advertised between scenes, the viewers in the shanties cannot afford to purchase it or else cannot read the instructions on the bottle.

Discussion of the immoral behaviour of the *novelas* often leads to comment on some scandal within the community, of extra-marital sex, young single mothers or illegitimate children. The accounts women gave of their own life experience showed that these were not just problems of the younger generation nor products of a North American liberal influence. It is not that *novelas* induce this behaviour but rather that these are social problems, which have to do with the family and personal relationships. As Liebes & Katz (1988:117) claim, the very appeal of soap opera lies in it being 'a drama of kinship' in which everyone, whatever their social or ethnic background, is a 'connoisseur'.

People make moral judgements about the characters of the *novelas*, who violate a moral code which, although repeatedly ignored by Peruvians is still believed to prevail in their society and is used as a standard against which to judge behaviour. The central theme of the *novelas* is 'true love' which all else conspires to thwart, but which always triumphs in the end.²² This corresponds to a social ideal applauded by the women in commenting on why they liked the Venezuelan *novela*, *Encadenados*:

Los actores principales luchan por su amor... Desde muchachos se llegan a enamorar y no hay nadie quien les separa. (Asunción)

(The main characters fight for their love... They have grown to love each other from childhood and there is no one who can separate them.)

People continue to entertain this ideal whilst recognizing that it is rarely borne out in real life experience:

El amor es idealizado, tiene algo, depende de las circunstancias, no es como la vida real, crea ilusiones para las chicas. (Hilda)

(The love is idealized, it's got something, it depends on the circumstances, but it's not like real life, it creates illusions for the girls.)

Hilda coyly comments on the way love affairs rapidly develop into sexual relationships in the *novelas*, violating the codes of courtship, well aware that they are not always

²² This claim is maintained for soap opera by Buckman (1984:66) but refuted by Berman (1978:68) who argues that the theme of love is in fact subordinate to issues of money and career.

observed in Peruvian society either, and yet believing that they ought to be:

El amor es muy exagerado, rápidito pasan cosas y ya...no debe ser eso, no es cierto, no hay noviazgo, nada y a veces pasan cosas.

(The love is very exaggerated, very quickly things happen and that's it...it shouldn't be like that, it's not true, there's no engagement and sometimes things happen.)

Committing errors and even crimes in the name of love are simultaneously condemned by the moral code and pardoned by idealism: 'qué ciegos somos a veces por el amor' ('how blind love makes us sometimes', Mercedes). Men tend to take a less sympathetic attitude than women, as manifest in the different reactions of Soledad and Bernardo to *Niña Bonita*, in which a woman unwittingly has a holiday romance with her sister's husband. Soledad enters into her dilemma when she finds that 'the love of her life' is her brother-in-law, excusing her on account of ignorance and the ideal of 'true love' which leaves her no way out:

El amor de su vida es esposo de su hermana ¿y cómo retroceder? quería escapar pero ya no podía.

(The love of her life is her sister's husband and how can she go back? she wanted to get out but she no longer could.)

However, Bernardo dismisses it as deceitful and dishonest:

No está dentro de lo correcto...es inmoral...que la hermana está con el esposo de la otra hermana, esto para mí es deshonesto, no me gusta.

(It's not within the bounds of the proper...it's immoral...that the sister is with the husband of the other sister, to me that's dishonest, I don't like it.)

Whatever happens, viewers are assured the moral order will be restored at the end of the *novela*. Another Venezuelan *novela*, *Amazonas*, typically ended with the 'baddies' receiving their just deserts and the 'goodies' marrying to live happily ever after. This ending was drawn into a discussion on crime in the shanty and *pobladores* commented that you could be sure the truth would always out and evil be punished.

The women are amused at the men's facility for criticizing them for watching 'immoral' *telenovelas*, without recognizing any contradiction in their appreciation of the action, excitement and often violence of war films and police series, westerns and sport:

La novela es una pérdida de tiempo dice, malas costumbres y ¡él se muere por el deporte! (Asunción)

(The *novela* is a waste of time, he says, bad habits, and he's dying for his sport!)

Some women enjoy watching these programmes with their partners but most deplore the violence. Esmeralda says she prefers 'algo sentimental, de guerra, cuando se matan, no me gusta' ('something sentimental, [if it's] about wars, when they kill each other I don't like it'). Women also indicate action and excitement as reasons for watching a *novela* like *Encadenados*, but these qualities are embedded in the melodrama of romantic struggle and the character of the impulsive and fiery heroine, rather than in a fast-moving, action-packed plot. Men, on the other hand, dismiss the women's preferred viewing as dull and boring and despise the *novelas* as stories

for the simple-minded. This allegation has been refuted by critics who argue that it is a complex genre, requiring a cultural competence to read the intricacies of its plots and sub-plots and to interpret the emotional rather than the physical level of action (Liebes & Katz 1988:114).

Both men and women find a positive, informative side to their preferred programmes and find ways of defining them as 'cultural' in order to justify their viewing. Women perceive the *novelas* as an education on life, setting up role models to emulate or avoid and giving practical guidance on how to react in certain situations:

Uno aprende cosas de la vida...da idea cual es mejor, como debe actuar...es cultural, hace ver la ambición en la vida real. (María Elena)

(You learn things about life...it gives you an idea what's best, how you should act, it's cultural, it shows the ambition in real life.)

Muestra buenas cosas, como un muchacho que quiere superar...contiene reflexiones para la vida práctica. (Magalí).

(It shows good things, like a boy who wants to get on...it contains practical reflections for life.)

Men also find a practical purpose for their viewing. They refuse to acknowledge any negative implications in their enjoyment of televised violence and claim the programmes they watch are realistic and informative. Some believe programmes like 'Miami Vice', 'McGyver' and 'Hawai 5-0' to be a source of insight into other societies, giving indications on how a man should react in certain situations:

Hay unas partes que nos enseñan otras culturas, como salvar a las personas, si un día uno se encontraba en tal situación, ya sabría como reaccionar, esos sí nos enseñan algo. (Edilberto)

(There are some parts which teach us about other cultures, how to save people, if one day you found yourself in such a situation, you'd already know how to react, those definitely teach us something.)

Various discourses, of morality, culture and education, are manipulated by the *pobladores* in condemning or justifying their respective viewing.

4.3. The Pleasure of the Form

Although education is used as a justification for watching television, the main motive for doing so is entertainment. Both men and women admit that diversion as a means of distracting oneself from cares and worries is one of the principal gratifications they seek from the media. It is evident that men and women derive those gratifications from different types of programme and it would seem that the difference in narrative style of the *novela* and television drama of male preference seems to be significant in the gendered choices made.²³

Viewers of *novelas* are held through the manipulation of the serial form, each episode building up emotion and suspense

²³ Fiske (1987:215-220) compares 'masculine' and 'feminine' drama, typified by 'The A-team' and soap opera respectively. He relates these to male and female sexuality in that soap opera is more concerned with process and 'masculine' drama with climax. However, the limitations of my data and the cross-cultural problems of applying this analysis to Peruvian sexuality, prevents a comparison here.

to end in a 'cliff- hanger', as María Elena comments of *Encadenados*:

Es más bonito, más acción, más rápido, violento... bastante emoción...la actriz es bien rebelde...se queda en suspenso, es interesante.

(It's nicer, there's more action, it's faster, violent, with a lot of emotion...the actress is really rebellious...it keeps you in suspense, it's intriguing.)

Even though the plot and characters of one *novela* very much resemble that of another, the *pobladoras* enjoy seeing the same familiar themes acted out in different ways and engage in the pleasure of solving the puzzle and predicting the denouement. The women derive satisfaction from following the thread of the *novela* in and out of the entangled mesh of plot and sub-plot, in which complications proliferate, so that as soon as one problem is resolved another arises:

Me gusta seguir la historia de cada *novela*... Hay momentos tristes, otros un poquito alentadores, de todo tiene. (Magalí)

(I like to follow the story of each *novela*... There are sad moments, others a little bit lively, there's a bit of everything.)

They enjoy the deliberately lengthy unravelling of the plot and once involved in the *novela*, the women find viewing compelling and are eager for the next episode, rushing home to see it and sometimes frustrated by their addiction:

No quiero perderlo, cuando voy al centro estoy mirando la hora... Cuando miro la *novela*, pierdo tiempo, cuando miro me desespero, tiene que ser la hora exacta, cuando no (miro), no me preocupo. (Esmeralda)

(I don't want to miss it, when I go to the centre I'm watching the time... When I watch a *novela*, I waste time.

when I watch I despair, it has to be the exact time, when I don't watch, I don't worry.)

The serial form, as much as the content, invites involvement with the *novela*, both through the manipulation of anticipation and the familiarity established with the characters who the viewer meets each day. The narrative form of the *novela* also suits the female mode of viewing which, as noted above, tends to be subject to interruptions as opposed to the concentrated attention men are able to give to the television. In the *pueblos jóvenes*, women often carry on their work whilst watching a *novela*, tuning in to alleviate the tedious or repetitive nature of their tasks. The rhythm of the *novela* is cyclical, breaking up scenes and returning to them in a repetitive pattern which is suited to the 'distracted viewer' who has to divide her attention between the television, her partner, children or the task in hand (Modleski 1984:98-100).

4.4. The Imposition of Foreign Cultural Models

Although producers speculate on the negative influence of foreign films imposing alien cultural models on the Peruvian people, there is little evidence amongst the *pueblo joven* audience that *telenovelas* induce dissatisfaction or altered behaviour.

On the material level, *novelas* broadcast in Peru generally deal with the private lives of rich and beautiful people living in sumptuous settings and there is some evidence

that these contribute to the maintenance of an aesthetic which pervades all levels of society. The images on Peruvian television conform to a 'white' North American or European model, both in advertising and in the person of Peruvian stars such as Gisela, of the *Aló Gisela* chat show, or the female news reader of *24 Horas*, both of whom have fair skin, blond hair and blue eyes. Whether on televised beauty contests or in the Arequipa Day parade, the beauty queens tend to follow this model, and it would be unthinkable for a woman of stereotypically Andean features (black hair, dark skin and eyes) to be elected. Andean appearance and dress is either parodied (as in the case of Arequipan dancers donning false plaits and *mini-polleras*²⁴) or represented in the folkloric context as something traditional and quaint. The representation of Andean or Amazon people on the television conforms to this stereotype. They appear in short slots of Andean song and dance, in comedy programmes like *Risas y Salsas* ('Laughter and Spice') where the 'Indian' is portrayed as stupid and ignorant or sly and wily, or in adverts. An advert for the Agrarian Bank portrays Andean people happily at work in the fields and dancing in a *fiesta*, and another for washing powder presents washing clothes in a jungle river as idyllic, reflecting both sexist and racist attitudes.

²⁴ *Polleras* are the long, full skirts traditionally worn in the Andes, usually in several layers.

The media repeat and endorse the stereotypes which are prevalent in society at large and may be influential in the area of fashions. *Pobladores* comment on the clothes and hairstyles of *novela* stars and although they do not have the means to imitate them, they do show an inclination for 'city dress' over the heavy and bulky skirts of the sierra. Several women, like Flor de María, say they migrated to get away from Andean clothes:

En la sierra no me gustaba llevar las polleras, siempre me ha gustado estar así, con una falda ligera, más estrecha. Mi mamá me decía ponte más ropa, pero no quería, con dos polleras no más me andaba.

(In the sierra I didn't like wearing the *polleras*, I always liked to be like this, with a light weight, narrower skirt. My mother always told me, put more clothes on, but I didn't want to, I went about with just two *polleras* on.)

There is a tendency for older migrant women to wear *polleras* and the hats particular to their place of origin, and to keep their hair long, and for the younger ones to wear shorter, straighter skirts or trousers and cloth caps, and to have their hair cut short or permed, but there is no fixed correlation between age and dress and no definite boundary between the different styles. The diffusion of North American commercial media products is evident in the proliferation of their logo: 'Madonna' T-shirts, 'John Player' tracksuits and 'Saturday Night Fever' bags.

I have shown that the media are not only accused of imposing foreign styles on the Peruvians but also of contributing to the maintenance of a 'false consciousness'

amongst the *pobladores* through raising their expectations of living standards and persuading them that such a lifestyle is available to them. The women admit that at some point in their lives they have dreamt of the riches arrayed in the *novelas*, but claim their lives have not been perceptibly influenced by them and they have come to accept their lot, which is what the dominant ideology theorists would say is exactly what the dominant want:

Por curiosa miro, los lujos, las joyas... Cuando era joven decía sí, voy a tener lo que tienen, pero ahora, lo que dé el señor, lo que alcance, primero la comida ¿pa' qué más ambición? (Esmeralda)

(I watch out of curiosity, the luxuries, the jewels... When I was young I used to say, yes, I'm going to have what they've got, but now, whatever God gives, whatever's enough, food first, what's the point of more ambition?)

Maruja, who works in Ama Kella, criticizes media, religious and other social institutions for detracting from issues requiring communal action by lulling the people into resignation and complacency and creating an illusion of a 'happy ever after'. Since *novelas* focus on individuals' emotional selves instead of depicting them as socio-political beings, it is argued that this prevents people becoming aware of their own reality and acting to change it (Modleski 1984:27; Berman 1987:7-9).

However, there are those, like Soledad, who deny that watching the *novelas* provokes envy or complacency and maintain that it serves as an inducement to work harder and make the most of one's lot:

Uno debe salir adelante, si a ti te falta algo, por ejemplo ¿no? te falta plata o algo, pero vas viendo en la novela todo todo tiene, todas las facilidades, y a uno le falta ¿por qué uno no puede trabajar y hacer y salir adelante? y no estar allí diciendo yo fallé, ya no puedo tener... Yo digo más, hacer más...salir adelante de lo que uno está.

(You should get on, if you lack something, for example, you know, you lack money or something, but in the *novela* you're seeing that they've got absolutely everything, all the comforts, and you're short, why can't you work and pull yourself up? and not be there saying, I failed, I can no longer have that... I say more, do more...pull yourself up from where you are.)

Salir adelante ('to progress', 'to get on') is very much the expressed ambition of the *pobladores* for whom the driving force behind their migration and the lives they have built for themselves in the *pueblo joven* is to progress and improve their situation as far as they are able. It does not mean that they aspire to the standard of living of the *novelas* nor that the impossibility of their attaining such a way of life induces a 'false consciousness'. On the contrary, people are aware that the *novelas* end all too happily and that solutions are not so easy in real life. The harshness of life, whether wresting a living from the land in the Andes, subject to the threat of terrorism or struggling for subsistence in a *pueblo joven* permits of few illusions:

En las novelas todo se soluciona, pero en la actualidad que se vive, no es así, en la vida real los problemas son más graves...es difícil, por los años, pero en las novelas, al instante no más, que ya salió de la cárcel, que ya le mató, ya le salvó, ya viene su ayuda, mientras en la vida real no es así, te matan y se acabó ¿no has visto? ese periodista que lo mataron en Ayacucho. (Hilda)

(In the *novelas* everything works out, but in the present reality we're living in, it's not like that, in real life

the problems are more serious...it's hard because of the years, but in the *novelas*, all in a flash, they already got out of jail, they already killed him, they already saved him, help's already on its way, while in real life it's not like that, they kill you and that's it, didn't you see that journalist they killed in Ayacucho?)

Moreover, those who work to 'raise consciousness' amongst *pobladores* through community broadcasts like those of Ama Kella, face the challenge of making their programmes as attractive to the audience as *telenovelas* and police serials. The problem of presenting something polemical in an entertaining form was brought home in the screening of two films about liberation theology and the Sandinista's literacy campaign in Nicaragua in order to raise money to mend the cooker of Río Seco's *comedor*. There was an impressive turnout of people who sat through the two films patiently but erupted in protest when they ended and there was still no sign of the film they had really come to see, an Indian 'weepee', *Madre India* ('Mother India'). It transpired that the women of the *comedor* had put about the name of this well-known film as a ploy to sell tickets. The high attendance showed that they had gauged their neighbours' tastes well and highlighted the problem posed for the consciousness-raisers.

However, a preference for a sentimental film or *telenovela* does not mean that people are bludgeoned into apolitical apathy and that being entertained on one occasion does not preclude being politically active on another. The same people who watch *novelas* are also involved in the *comedores* and community organizations.

4.6. The Representation of Reality

Women evaluate *novelas* in terms of whether or not they are true to life. However, the perception of realism is made at what Ang (1985:41-6) calls the 'connotative level' of associative meanings which viewers abstract from the context of the *novela*. At the literal, 'denotative' level, the conditions in which the characters of the *novela* live may be far removed from the circumstances of the *pobladores*, but Ang claims the concrete settings to be 'symbolic representations of more general living experiences: rows, intrigues, problems.' The external form of the *novela* becomes secondary to its 'emotional realism'.

Following this argument, despite the plush settings, so far-removed from the shanty dwellings, the *pobladores* are still able to describe the stories as being 'true to life', as Gabriela comments:

Es como la vida real...es idéntico a la vida real... todo lo que pasa en la realidad, son verídicas.

(It's like real life...it's identical to real life... everything which happens in reality, they're true to life.)

The huge gap between the socio-economic reality of the pueblo joven and that represented by the *novelas*, together with the recognized boundary between fiction and reality, keeps the viewers from comparing their possibilities too closely with the *novelas*. Women are aware that they are watching a fantasy and that enhances their pleasure (although one young woman, dubious as to the veracity of a *novela*, asked

her husband whether it were true or false and received the assurance that it was 'mentiras no más' ('nothing but lies'):

Hay bastante emoción, hay partes como en la realidad, pero eso es solamente ciencia-ficción, fantasía, es emocionante para los ojos, para distraerse. (Magalí)

(There's plenty of emotion, there are parts like in reality, but that's just science-fiction, fantasy, it's exciting for your eyes, to distract you.)

That Magalí's enjoyment is distinctly visual diminishes the weight of theories of ideologies penetrating people's consciousnesses or of the assertion of the television producer that people accepted television 'with their eyes closed'. The sense of spectacle is paramount and Ang (1987:47) suggests that viewers do not derive enjoyment from the realism of the external surroundings, but from the stylization of their presentation. The pleasure is enhanced by the interest in the lives of the actors outside the *novelas* and the awareness that the finery was part of the set, not the actor's personal property. However, Soledad does see this as ploy to beguile the poor, but only in the sense of capturing their attention as an audience and as consumers, encouraging them to buy the advertised products:

Mucha vanidad, muy superficial, para mí son muy vanidosas... Tú sabes que de las novelas pueden ser los escenarios propios, pueden ser alquilados, pueden ser prestados, no son de su propiedad... Es para aparentar a un pobre, atraer a la gente y ganar más plata... Yo soy tranquila con lo que tengo, con lo que soy, tranquila.

(It's a lot of vanity, very superficial, as far as I'm concerned they're very vain... You know that on the *novelas* the sets could be theirs, could be hired, could be borrowed, they're not their property... It's to deceive a poor person, to attract people and make them

spend more money... I'm content with what I've got, with what I am, contented.)

Nor are the *pobladores* taken in by the tales of 'rags to riches'. One of the most frequently repeated story-lines is that of the rich boy who falls in love with a poor girl, and after a series of problems arising from the difference in their social class and status, they discover that the girl is really the daughter of a millionaire, separated from her parents at birth for various reasons and therefore an acceptable match after all (e.g. *Rosa Salvaje*, *Simplemente María*, *Primavera*). *Pobladores*, however, doubt the possibility of social climbing through marriage, believing the way to advance is to work:

Creo que es mentira, no veo en la realidad que un rico se enamora de una pobre, quizá habrá pero yo nunca he visto nada de eso. (Remedios)

(I think that's a lie, I don't see in reality that a rich man falls in love with a poor girl, perhaps it happens but I've never seen anything like that.)

Even where it is accepted that this does happen, it is seen as a violation of the social order and doomed to fail. Commenting on the tragic consequences of such a situation in *Primavera*, Mercedes said a rich man falling for a poor girl only brings problems ('así vienen los problemas').

Furthermore, even the 'poor' in the *novelas* are comfortable middle-class families. Poverty at the level of a *pueblo joven* is never presented:

En las novelas en general se ve personas acomodadas, riquezas, casas lujosas, pero esas novelas no están identificados con la pobreza, siempre si hay una familia

que se dicen que son pobres, tienen la casa acomodada, por lo menos con cocina bien puesta, muebles. (Mercedes)

(In the *novelas* in general, you see wealthy people, riches, luxurious houses, but those *novelas* do not identify with poverty, if there's a family who say they're poor, they've got the house nicely done, at least with a fitted kitchen, with furniture.)

The awareness that the actors are not themselves poor or uneducated reduces the credibility in their 'poverty':

Rosa Salvaje es una muchacha salvaje, inculta, pero en la vida real es una mujer culta la Verónica Castro. (Mercedes)

(Rosa Salvaje is a wild girl, uncultured, but in real life Verónica Castro is a cultured woman.)

However, it is not the external material environment in which the *novela* takes place nor even the verisimilitude of the plot, but rather an internal emotional realism with which the viewers identify (Ang 1982:49). Even where millionaires are involved the women relate to their financial problems where the men squander their money and the women are left struggling to survive, because such is the case of many *pobladoras*, like Hilda, whose husband spent money set aside for a new roof on crates of beer. She identifies with the plight of those in the *novelas*:

Les hace sufrir, así en pobreza, a las señoras. Por ejemplo, él es millonario y gasta, malgasta su dinero con personas ajenas, y con su familia no gasta nada, (ella) sufre, trabaja, lucha para salir con sus hijos.

(They make the women suffer, like that in poverty. For example, he's a millionaire and he spends and squanders his money with strangers and with his family he spends nothing, she suffers, she works, she struggles to get on with her children.)

Women in Río Seco showed little interest for *novelas* which gave social issues precedence over sentimental ones, as was evident with the Venezuelan production, *El Sol Sale para Todos*, the beginning of which focused on a worker who was made redundant and the repercussions of unemployment for himself and the family. *Pobladoras* found it boring and watched comedy programmes on other stations, until, a few weeks on, the plot had developed sufficient romantic intrigue to engage their interest.²⁵ If the context of the *novelas* is far-removed from the reality of the *pueblo joven* in which the viewers live, the appeal of the subject matter to something fundamentally human which transcends cultural difference, opens it to different interpretations by people of different cultural backgrounds (Liebes & Katz 1988:118).

It is the emotional aspect of the *novelas* which the women find real and empathy is the key to their appreciation of these imported programmes. Viewers relate to the suffering of the characters and the tales arouse in them feelings of compassion and anger. For Soledad, this expression of emotion is part of the pleasure:

Hay algunas que me dan compasión, con los niñitos...y a veces lloro...a veces también me da cólera, me da una reacción que si yo estuviera dentro de la televisión...cuando viene la discusión, a veces da ganas de agarrar a los dos y darles.

²⁵ Press (1989:229-51) maintains that working-class women do not want to see the drudge of working-class life on the television, but desire more idealized images, less related to their 'real life' situations and more in keeping with their fantasies and dreams.

(There are some which make me feel compassion, with the little children...and sometimes I cry...sometimes they make me angry too, they make me react as if I was inside the television...when they start arguing sometimes I want to get hold of the two of them.)

At the heart of their compassion is the recognition of their own experiences and for some, like Esmeralda, the similarity is unbearable: 'más me hace sufrir, más me hace recordar, siempre estoy sufrienda' ('it makes me suffer, it makes me remember more, I've always suffered'). The women identify with unwanted orphans, children whose parents stand in their way, star-crossed lovers:

Es como...algo que pasa en la vida...sufren mucho, como yo sufraba (sic), por el sentimiento me gusta...es bonito, parece la vida real, lo que uno sufre. (Socorro)

(It's like something which happens in real life...they suffer a lot, like I suffered, for the emotion I like it...it's nice, it seems like real life, how one suffers.)

Like the themes of love and marriage, themes of suffering and sorrow are universal and therefore accessible to people of vastly different socio-cultural backgrounds, who relate to them via their own personal and culturally specific experiences.

4.7. Telenovelas and Gossip

It has been noted that television gives people something to talk about (McQuail, Blumler & Brown 1972) and it is evident that discussing the *novelas* leads people to discuss issues in their own lives (Katz & Liebes 1984). Both the themes and the form of *novela* lend themselves to the incorporation of these

programmes into everyday conversation in the *pueblo joven*. The familiarity of the themes, combined with the serial style and emphasis on dialogue rather than action, are conducive to conversation.

Watching *novelas* frequently triggers personal reflections on life and women tend to relate television episodes to personal experience or to occurrences in the community. They would refer to their lives as a *novela* and describe life for the poor as a 'novelesque' chain of woes. Aurora found striking similarities between the character of Margarita in *El Sol Sale para Todos* and her own experience. She identified with Margarita, a battered wife, who returns to studying against her husband's will, recalling her own experiences at the hands of a man who had deceived her, married her without telling her he already had two children from a previous marriage, mistreated her, and later left her in order to marry another woman bigamously:

La novela imita a la vida, mi vida es una novela, si uno se pone a escribir mi vida desde que conocí al padre de Carmencita, es una novela... Me he identificado con Margarita, sentía cólera, porque ella no sabía reaccionar, me hizo recordar cuando mi esposo me pegaba, así me sucedió a mí, pero cuando reaccioné, reaccioné muy violentamente... Así pues mi vida con ese hombre ha sido todo una novela.

(The *novela* imitates life, my life is a *novela*, if someone set down to right my life from the time I met the father of Carmencita, it's a novel... I identified myself with Margarita, I felt angry, because she didn't know how to react, she made me remember when my husband used to hit me, that's what happened to me, but when I reacted, I reacted very violently... So then my life with that man has been a whole *novela*.)

The parallels are infinite: women whose ambitions to study were thwarted by husband and children, drunkards beating their wives, children being rejected and adopted by others. The life of the *novelas* is linked time and again to the real life experiences of the viewers: for as Liebes and Katz (1988:118) point out, the themes are primordial and can be reduced to a set of stereotypical plots and characters which can be found throughout the world and throughout the ages.

Amazonas presented characters which reminded Mercedes of people in her life. Federico, the old *pícaro*, in love with a woman half his age, was compared to the father of her first child, thirty three years to her eighteen years, with whom she had run away only to be abandoned later. Then one afternoon at the OFASA meeting she met her half-sister never recognized by her father, and she compared him to Emilio in *Amazonas*, whose legitimate daughter falls in love with his illegitimate son, ignorant of being half-brother and sister.

Not only individual experience but also bizarre events in the community at large were connected with *novelas*. A young woman from Río Seco was found dead in a hotel, her baby in the street and her lover gone missing, and there was some speculation as to whether it was suicide or murder. The scandal was discussed one night between two *novelas*, *Amazonas* and *Primavera*. Nohemy commented that you might think *novelas* were far removed from reality when suddenly you found the

things they depicted happening on your doorstep, but as sure as in the *novela*, the criminal would be caught and punished.

Talking about the *novelas* is thus incorporated into daily conversations in the *pueblo joven*. In a small community like Río Seco, gossip is a central part of communal life, and people would complain of this with the comment: 'pueblo chico, infierno grande' ('small place, big hell'). Gossip carries negative connotations of triviality and femininity (Brown 1990), and may have adverse effects where malicious lies and rumours are spread, causing divisions within a club like OFASA, of which Hilda complains:

Se sienten en un círculo y allí el chisme va de una a otra, ya da miedo lo que dicen, ni se puede hacer una broma.

(They sit in a circle and from there the gossip goes from one to another, it frightens me what they say, you can't even make a joke.)

However, gossip can also serve to weld the community together, a form of social cement which binds viewers to each other as they talk about what happened in a *novela* or speculate on what will happen in the next episode (Geraghty 1981; Hobson 1982; Tulloch & Moran 1986).

In the *pueblos jóvenes*, women comment on the previous night's episode of a particular *novela*, whether they are in a group in the market or visiting a neighbour. Gossip about the *novelas* forms an integral part of the daily discourse, but that does not mean the *novelas* replace other topics of conversation but rather, since life and the *novelas* have so

many elements in common, they complement the discussion of other matters and thereby extend the range of gossip.

They also invite the viewer to pass comment and make a moral judgement which may be connected to the expression of opinion with regard to some other matter. As Buckman (1984:196) observes, the fact that gossip is centred on personal rather than political problems does not preclude the discussion of 'real' issues, and women still give importance to current affairs as Nohemy stresses:

Novelas son distracciones no más, pura fantasía, lo más importante es el noticiero, lo que ocurre en el Perú, en el mundo.

(The *novelas* are mere distractions, pure fantasy, the most important thing is the news, what's happening in Peru, in the world.)

Finally, gossip amongst women in the *pueblo joven* often draws on dreams and premonitions, religious beliefs and superstitions, ritual and faith healing. These too are linked in to the *novelas* where witches and wizards appear, for example in *El Maleficio*. Ursula, who was regarded as a *curandera* or faith healer in Río Seco, likened her own powers of premonition to those of the central characters of this *novela*, an evil man who had made a pact with the devil and a woman who was a spiritualist and able to predict disaster. Ursula, who knits at a machine for her living, gave testimony to her own powers in claiming that when a pregnant woman gives her wool to make baby clothes and she fails to do so, the baby will not be born alive:

Lo que esta boca dice se hace verdad... Si por alguna razón me da flojera y no lo hago, la bebé no llega a nacer o se nace muerto, o se aborta, pero no vive, y eso porque no he hecho la prenda.

(What this mouth says comes true... If for some reason I feel lazy and I don't do it, the baby won't get to be born or is stillborn, or it miscarries, but it doesn't live, and that because I haven't made its garment.)

On another occasion, when discussing adultery in a *novela*, Ursula told of an aunt of hers who had left her husband and walked across the square to live with a man who had similarly left his wife, and now that she was old and infirm, death would not come to her since because of her transgression she was condemned, and as a *condenada* would not be allowed to rest peacefully even after death.

Thus, *telenovelas* produced abroad and in completely different socio-cultural environments from that of an Arequipan shanty town, are incorporated into local discourse and 'read' within the context of the local community which brings its own experience, socio-economic reality and cultural values to make a meaningful interpretation of the programme. The evidence that *novelas* are not read in the way television producers would expect them to be challenges the theses of dominant ideology and culture imperialism together with modernist notions of mass communications, the disintegration of society and atomization of the individual and points to the way in which urbanized and institutionalized society facilitates oral as much as mass communication (Fiske 1987:77-9). The audience is active and not subordinate to an all-

powerful media, for the power to influence is undermined by the audience's own interpretation of the media.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

Power and the Popular

The broad aim of this thesis was to analyse cultural aspects of the socio-economic changes that have affected migrants in the city of Arequipa during the course of the last fifty years. My intention was to examine whether a migrant identity could be seen to have emerged amongst first and second-generation migrants in the *pueblos jóvenes* and whether this new identity was manifest in new forms of urban popular culture. I proposed to discover how notions of 'the popular' were constructed by Arequipan society and its powerful institutions and to assess how far these were able to influence *pobladores*. In addition, I intended to investigate how *pobladores* contested these notions and constructed their own 'popular' identity by developing alternative strategies in grass-roots organizations and popular communications projects.

Notions of influence and resistance brought into question the whole concept of power. Although it is apparent that those living in the *pueblos jóvenes* do not have the same access to economic wealth or political leverage as the middle classes of Arequipan society or the authorities and institutions with whom the *pobladores* interact, they are not without power. Power, as it manifests itself in the interaction between *pobladores* and dominant sectors of society, and as I

understand it here, is not a 'thing' which can be possessed in greater or lesser quantities, but a force which is diffused throughout a web of social interaction and struggled over.

This is Foucault's concept of power (Foucault 1980:109-33; Sheridan 1980, Cameron et al. 1992). Foucault challenged the concept of power as monolithic, stemming from a single source and located in the control of factories or guns. He argued that society does not divide neatly into the powerful and the powerless: the lower sectors of society are not to be seen as helpless victims for they are actively engaged in a power struggle. Power always meets with, and depends upon, resistance.

Power does not operate simply across a class divide, but across many different social divisions (of race, gender, age, linguistic group etc.). Individuals have complex identities constructed in relation to these variables which give them different power potentials in different contexts (Cameron et al. 1992). Throughout the thesis, I have examined the power struggles which take place in different contexts of interaction between migrants and Arequipans, between *pobladores* and local authorities, church groups and charities, and between shanty town audiences and the media. I have demonstrated how the power struggle is waged through socio-political action or community broadcasting to claim basic services and a better standard of living, and how it is always carried on through a negotiation of meanings.

Meanings are constructed in relation to dichotomies, such as powerful/powerless, and using discursive categories to classify people in terms of stereotypes or to explain situations with the concepts of certain discourses. However, I have illustrated that these meanings are not fixed but negotiable and are constantly constructed and reconstructed in different contexts of interaction.

Discourses of Race, Class and Ethnicity

The first broad context of interaction, which I dealt with in Chapter Two, was that between migrants and Arequipans. Understanding ethnicity to be a two-way process whereby members of a group (defined by themselves or others) see themselves as distinct from other groupings (similarly defined) and are perceived by those others to be so (Barth 1969:13; Glazer & Moynihan 1975:53; Wallman 1979:3; Giddens 1989:243), I explored how migrants and Arequipans defined themselves and each other and how those definitions were constructed.

Whilst I found the situation to be more complex than I had anticipated, there being not one but many definitions of 'Arequipan' and 'migrant', I also had to recognize that, like the concept of culture, these were discursive categories which did not relate to empirical sets of people but which were used (as they were by me) to reduce the complexity of social relations in Arequipa. As Wagner (1975:35-8) argues, the

fieldworker invents the 'culture' of the people being studied and at the same time, those people make sense of their own experience through a series of imagined facts, rules and traditions. My task was then to explore how those cultural categories were constructed in Arequipa.

Since categories are continually constructed and reconstructed, the identities to which they refer are also multiple and contextual. They shift according to the terms of the interaction: for example, when a distinction is made between migrants and Arequipans, migrants are classified together as a homogeneous group of outsiders; when classifications are made within the migrant sector, its heterogeneity becomes apparent, as people come from a diversity of backgrounds with different educational and occupational levels and different social statuses. Depending on the circumstances, people are separated into different categories and similarity or difference is emphasized according to the identification being made.

The categories used are based on a partial knowledge of 'the other', which knowledge is used to form a stereotype of a particular group according to which its members are judged (Epstein 1978:12). The factors contributing to the stereotype other Peruvians have of Arequipans, and Arequipans of migrants, are not arbitrary but have arisen from social, economic and political factors in the historical development of Arequipa. However, it is not only important to consider the

micro, regional level in understanding the historical dimension of intergroup relations but also to situate the local within the economic, political and ideological developments on a macro, national scale (Cole & Wolf: 1974; Parsons 1975:60; Wallman 1986:230). It is necessary to comprehend how the development of Arequipa made it a pole of attraction for migrants from the southern sierra, but it is equally important to understand how the historical developments determine the system of dominant-subordinate relationships in Peruvian society between peoples possessed of differential access to economic and political power.

The unequal power relations established during the Spanish conquest and colonization of Peru continue to influence the way Arequipans shape a regional identity for themselves in opposition to which they identify those from other regions. People appeal to history to explain the present social conditions but manipulate it according to their notions of themselves and others: Arequipans see themselves as the recipients of the great Inca heritage of Peru and of all that was progressive and beneficial about the Spaniards. The Andean people on the other hand, are conversely seen to be the descendants of ignorant Indians, brutalized by the conquest and inheritors of the stubborn pride, jealousy and other negative aspects ascribed to the Spanish character.

Historical discourses are thus appropriated in forming stereotypes based on a series of discursive dichotomies. These

follow a dualist model of Peruvian society, separating people into 'indigenous' and 'Hispanicized' categories, the first characterized by highland Indians, believed to be traditionalist and backward, and the second composed of coastal creoles supposed to form the dynamic, modernizing sector in which Arequipans situate themselves. Dualism is just one discourse that people employ in representing their social reality. It does not mean that they are unaware of the plurality of peoples in Peru and do not also define themselves in different ways according to the frame of reference (whether it be local or national, at the level of Arequipa or the shanty town) but that they have a notion about themselves which leads them to situate themselves on either side of the indigenous/Hispanic divide.

Similarly, a discourse of race also informs the stereotype of the Andean Indian which tends to be applied indiscriminately to all *pobaldores*, irrespective of their actual origins. Given the diversity of their backgrounds and the high frequency of miscegenation, the migrants in no way form a racially homogeneous group but people still classify them in terms of perceived racial differences. Physical characteristics are isolated as group identifiers and phenotype becomes one more element used to distinguish 'them' from 'us' in the construction of ethnic identities (Wallman 1986:229). Social meaning is attached to physical variations which are 'singled out by members of a community or society as

ethnically significant' (Giddens 1989:246). As soon as traits, held to be innate and immutable, are used to define and differentiate between groups, they signal socio-cultural characteristics on the basis of which one group assumes superiority over another (Leggon 1979:4).

To the Arequipans, the physical features which are characteristic of the Andean Indian conjure up a series of behavioural and cultural traits which are negatively sanctioned by Arequipan society. This reinforces the Arequipans' sense of superiority, derived from the historically established dominant-subordinate relations between themselves and the Andean peoples; they justify these in racial terms, suggesting that the migrants are innately savage, brutish, stubborn and lazy and therefore will never progress and should never be entrusted with the economic and political power the Arequipans wield. A moral stereotype is then formed on the basis of the racial stereotype, founded on the physical differences which the Arequipans perceive between themselves and the migrants and which perceptions are used as signs of expected behaviour.

The sense of difference between Arequipans and migrants, at times taking the form of fear of 'the other', evolves into racism where inherited characteristics of personality or behaviour are falsely ascribed to individuals of a particular physical appearance (Giddens 1989:246). The moral stereotype of the Indian is constructed in terms of animality, and the

non-human condition ascribed to the Indian is believed to be 'in the blood' and therefore continually perpetuated and potentially destructive to the 'white', civilized and progressive Arequipan race. Whilst scientists and scholars have argued that there is no biological explanation for ethnic differentiation, ordinary discourse continues to use folk models of race which would formerly have been found in theoretical discourse (Jenkins 1986:176; Wallman 1986:229; Yinger 1986:21; Banton 1988:9). Folk racial categorizations predominate in Arequipa; Arequipans and migrants are conscious of belonging to a particular categorization and place each other accordingly.

There is a convergence between popular and scholarly discourse in the expression of racial prejudice which frequently occurs in daily conversations. Arequipans repeat the assumptions of delinquency and political radicalism amongst shanty town dwellers to be found in early theories of mass society, social breakdown and the culture of poverty. The aristocratic defence of elite values against mass culture in nineteenth century Europe can be translated to twentieth century Peru, where Arequipans fear for the debasement of their 'civilized' city by the influx of migrants. Although for scholars racial typology may have been dismissed as a viable analytical concept (Wallman 1986:229; Banton 1988:7), as a social construct it represents another discursive category which people use not only to identify themselves and others,

but also to discriminate against others. As such, it is implicated in the power struggle, framed in the economic and political structures which maintain the dominant-subordinate relations of society (Leggon 1979:6; Solomos 1986:107).

In Arequipa, the migrant is then subject to racial prejudice and discrimination which manifests itself in abuse and the denial of access to particular sectors of the labour market or social strata. However, although the Arequipans may impose categories on the migrants, the migrants may also resist categorization, as they do in refusing the label *cholo*, which they believe to apply to Arequipans as well as themselves. Whilst migrants are forced to engage with the categories of the powerful sectors of society in their interaction with the social system, Arequipans do not always have the power to impose categories and migrants show that they have other notions according to which they identify themselves differently.

Nevertheless, such labels are not empty but 'power-loaded': 'whites' are beautiful because they wield economic and political power. However, such correlations are never single nor simple, but depend on different social criteria: the 'white' *lonco* may be the 'authentic' Arequipan and may be rich, but is vulgar and relegated to a low social status. This illustrates that it is impossible to make a clear-cut definition between the powerful and the powerless.

As well as the historical, racial and moral realms of discourse, social class is another discursive category operated in the construction of identities in Arequipa and discussed in Chapter Three. Again the category is constructed in relation to a dichotomy drawn between 'the people' and 'the power bloc'. People have notions about the place they and others occupy in the social class system and construct a hierarchy accordingly but their position in the hierarchical social system does have important economic repercussions. Race, class and ethnicity are co-existing principles which are interlinked in the network of social relations, where the racial and ethnic identities ascribed to certain people bar them from equal opportunities in the workplace and relegate them to certain social class positions (Solomos 1986).

It has been postulated that in modern urban society class relations would displace divisions based on ethnic origins, language or religion and although that has patently not been the case, there has been a tendency to see ethnicity diminishing as more universalistic status systems, such as class, take over with the development of large-scale social structures (Hechter 1974:1151-78; Van den Berghe 1974:10; Isaacs 1975:32; Glazer & Moynihan 1975:7; Van den Berghe & Primov 1977:132; Rex 1986:69). However, in Chapter Three, I have shown that class categories are not constructed simply in economic terms but draw on social and ethnic factors.

People in Arequipa tend to define class according to a rich/poor dichotomy, assessing their respective position in relationship to the means of production, the ownership of wealth and the control of resources and occupation, as in the Marxist concept of class. Giddens (1989:202) gives a very general definition of class as 'a large-scale grouping of people who share common economic resources which strongly influence the types of lifestyle they are able to lead' and in this sense the migrants are ascribed a lower class identity, defined as *las clases populares* ('the popular classes'), characterized by their lack of education or skills, poorly paid occupations and residence in a shanty town.

As sharers of a common lifestyle, in the sense that they are residents of shanty towns, the *pobladores* define themselves as 'the popular sectors' or 'the people' in particular circumstances. A popular socio-political identity emerges where migrants unite in grass-roots political action with a common interest, for example, to procure land, water or electricity. This identity is founded on the building of the shanty town: at this point, migrants from different backgrounds join with the common goal of securing a piece of land on which to build a home in the city. They organize in order to execute the invasion and subsequent confrontation with the authorities and that organization continues through the following stages of settling the land. Organization welds together a new community with a new identity which emerges

from a sense of belonging to a new locality: it is that of *pobladores*, or settlers, of a *pueblo joven*, a 'new town'.

As the migrants assume the identity of *pobladores* and grow in strength in terms of numbers and organization, they are no longer only 'outsiders' in Arequipa but 'insiders' within their own community. The strength of community enables them to contest the derogative categorization of themselves by Arequipans, not only in their discourse but also in their political action. The neighbourhood organizations, based on shared social needs, enable them to develop strategies to overcome the obstacles posed by the unequal distribution of resources and reinforced by racism, and to contest the categories by which they are defined.

In this sense, the migrants construct a class identity for themselves, not as a 'class-in-itself', defined by their shared relation to the means of production and categorized in economic terms of income stratification, but as a 'class-for-itself', defined as a group conscious of itself and as such capable of collective action and decision-making (Terry 1975:91; Gordon 1978:211; Rex 1980:80). Class is here defined in a Weberian sense, taking into account socio-political as well as economic factors. As Terry (1975:92) shows, people are bound by both a social and ethnic identity, based on cultural attributes and behaviour, ideas, values and life situations which provide the basis for collective action.

Since class is a discursive concept, it is no more stable a category than ethnicity, but constantly redefined according to context. In opposition to the Arequipans or in interaction with the authorities, the migrants might merge to present a united front in the pursuit of a specific cause, but once the goal is won, social divisions reappear. Within the shanty town, the *pobladores* conceptualize a social hierarchy which not only stratifies people according to economic wealth, but also ascribes political power or social status on the basis of other cultural categories, such as place of origin or linguistic ability (see Terray 1975:91; Milton 1978:123; Parkin 1978; Rex 1986:69).

As a collectivity, *pobladores* interact with representatives of powerful institutions. As they organize to procure basic services or to pressure the authorities to that end, they assume new individual and collective identities in confrontation with those in whom power is institutionally invested. The formation of new communities, with new organizations which enable them to negotiate with those in positions of power, demonstrates that migrants in Arequipa are not the mass of rootless and alienated people conceptualized by mass society theories, prone to disorganization, secularization and individualization and subject to manipulation, mobilization and violence by ruling elite.

It is evident that access to economic and political power is not evenly distributed in Peru: the dominant sectors

monopolize resources and through institutions wield power over other groupings within society. However, that power is not absolute and is challenged by resistance from the grass roots. Giddens (1989:52) defines power as the ability to make one's own interests count even where others resist. The refusal of migrants to settle for inadequate living conditions and their resistance to be labelled, to be ascribed inferiority and expected to submit to an unjust social order, shows that the power bases are not immutable nor are they absolute and cannot enforce specific types of thought or behaviour on the rest of the population.

Another discourse which informs Arequipans' notions of the shanty town residents is that of migrants being of a revolutionary and explosive potential, susceptible to brainwashing by communist ideologies. The evidence is nevertheless of a low level of political affiliation. Although migrants are susceptible to some forms of manipulation by political, religious or charitable bodies which encourage dependence, there is resistance to attempts by parties to infiltrate local organizations and an emphasis on meeting the needs of the people. As the economic crisis worsens, there is growing disinterest in party politics but acute poverty has heralded in new charitable, religious and development agencies and increased the popular struggle to meet basic needs.

Although the representatives of these agencies intrude upon the shanty town society and try to impose certain ways of

being or doing upon them, migrants develop their own strategies to negotiate with these bodies by organizing themselves in other ways. Despite decreasing levels of participation in some areas of the community organizations, new forms of political activity and political actors emerge. There are more opportunities for women to take an active part in contributing both to the domestic and communal sphere as organizations for subsistence, such as *comedores populares*, proliferate. Their involvement in literacy groups, mothers' clubs and *comedores* has given them a new confidence in themselves and their ability to contribute to the collective struggle for subsistence. Furthermore, their participation in activities of a social nature has encouraged their politicization. The holding of responsibilities within these groups equips women to enter the realm of political discourse and decision-making at the neighbourhood level previously monopolized by men.

However, an independent popular identity is only possible where the people are able to break their dependence on outside agencies, overcome their differences through establishing a common consensus and generate an autonomous organization. In Porvenir, autonomy is being cultivated but is still dependent on the support and supervision of the parish, which secures financial solvency whilst encouraging independence through consciousness-raising and the delegation of responsibilities. The unity on which a popular political identity relies is

nevertheless precarious and differences of social status, background and education are still apparent and can be divisive.

There are also divisions between the people and the promoters of external agencies whose preconceptions of the *pueblo joven* and the *pobladores* obscure their vision of the social reality and block their ability to communicate effectively with them. Moreover, the leaders of the *comedores* or the neighbourhood organizations may distance themselves from the *pobladores* and express a disregard for those of Andean origin. Different discourses are appropriated to represent people and situations and the very divisions are indicative of the resistance of categorization and the continual struggle to renegotiate meanings and create new definitions.

Competitive class relations do not invariably lead to the eradication of ethnically based differences but may result in the accentuation of those differences (Leggon 1979:3). Being a *poblador* does not substitute being a *puneño* or a *cusqueño*: regional differences do not disappear in the *pueblos jóvenes* and group identities are also constructed in relation to language groups or regional traditions. Different levels of inclusivity are operated from the national to the local and according to the context of the interaction, group identities are constructed, deconstructed and reformed.

The establishment of the shanty town community affords a space in which migrants may feel greater freedom to speak Quechua or observe certain cultural traditions without the negative sanctioning of the Arequipans. Whilst migrants may need to speak Spanish and acquire certain skills in order to gain access to economic resources, their entry into modern urban society, the accumulation of consumer goods or the exposure to the mass media, does not necessarily entail reneging on one's past. Indeed, the very fight to procure the basic necessities of urban life strengthens ethnic group identities by combining a material interest with an affective tie (Bell 1975:169; Glazer & Moynihan 1975:8; Yinger 1986:26). Aspects of modern life may be incorporated without the loss of a distinctive identity and traditional features. Migrants are not faced with a choice of maintenance or change but exploit their knowledge of different skills, for example their knowledge of Spanish and Quechua, according to the context of interaction. Ethnic identities are thus transformed or reformed through the preservation of the old or the adoption of the new in order to engage effectively with the social environment.

One of the models adopted by the dominant sectors as an ideal for their society is that of pluralism, the discourse of which permits the co-existence of different sub-cultures. However, in practice, pluralism involves the integration of those groups to the standard set by the dominant. Middle-class

Arequipans demand that migrants, who they believe to deviate from the established norm, should conform to their likeness. From their viewpoint, integration involves conformity to a social order in which their own positions of class, status and authority operate as the accepted standard which they wish to preserve.

The empirical evidence of the cultural variety of Peruvian society does not support the theory of the assimilation of migrants into the urban society and the subsequent loss of their distinctive identity in the city but demonstrates the resistance to assimilation on the terms laid down by the powerful. No such levelling occurs in Arequipa because the dominant sector, whilst advocating integration for the formation of a national identity, at the same time prevents it through their prejudice and discrimination. This presents particular problems for second-generation migrants in balancing the ambiguity of their position as children of Andean parents, born in the city and desiring to achieve professional status and progress in the city, but subject to discrimination on account of their ancestry.

The migrants also desire the creation of a national identity but essentially one in which they will be incorporated in their own right and in which their equal status is recognized. Rather than persuading 'deviants' to conform, the open rejection of migrants and their children gives rise to new forms of cultural expression which

accentuate difference and *chicha* music is a case in point. Despite the pressures to conform, group members may assess themselves and their cultural forms positively and indigenous languages (mainly Quechua), Andean dance and music are encouraged in some shanties, not to be preserved as relics but in order to place aspects of a shared history at the service of the contemporary popular struggle and to reinforce a common identity in opposition to Arequipans and their authorities. Thus, the attempts of the dominant to suppress cultural differences results in their proliferation through resistance.

Whilst migrants interact with Arequipan society on the basis of unequal power relations and are therefore obliged to engage with the discursive categories of the powerful which are operated to discriminate against them, they do not have to assume the identities ascribed to them. Where power is the power to make labels stick, the migrants' refusal of certain categories and their alternative interpretations of their experience enables them to constitute their own identities.

The Media and its Power to Define the Popular

In trying to assess the external influences bearing upon migrants in Arequipa, I looked at the broadcast media as one of the powerful institutions with which migrants interact and which might be expected to compel migrants to assume certain ideas and attitudes about the world. In Chapter Four, I showed that radio and television broadcasters appropriated the

discourse of mass society and mass communications theories and assumed the direct, destructive and all-powerful influence of the media on a passive and defenceless public.

Mass communications theory has oscillated between construing the media either as omnipotent or as of negligible influence. Power of both an economic and political nature is undoubtedly invested in the mass media, but its power to influence people, and in this case, the shanty town dwellers, is highly questionable. Whilst the media produce particular images of society which repeat prejudices found at the interpersonal level and exclude or relegate migrants and their cultural forms to a subordinate position, there is no evidence of their power to impose 'dominant ideologies' on the shanty town dwellers.

In the main, the broadcast media in Arequipa are commercial, privately owned and based on the North American free-market model and as such they are inserted within the powerful sector of society and reflect values prevalent in mainstream society. In this sense, the evidence seems to corroborate the political economy theory which holds that the media maintain class divisions by reinforcing dominant social norms and values. In commercial broadcasting, production is determined by economic considerations and especially influenced by the external economic forces of the international market. Producers believe themselves to be at the mercy of the music industry and susceptible to the

machinations of culture imperialism, a channel through which the ideologies of dominant nations like the US can enter and control less powerful states.

The need to attract advertisers binds the media to the business community which has influence over the politics and economics of Peruvian broadcasting. Manufacturers of the products advertised belong to the oligarchy which dominates Peruvian industry and are also to be found in various positions of management and control. The need to placate advertisers places constraints on the political identity of the commercial broadcast media and defines it as non-polemic, protector of the status quo and the defender of free enterprise.

The producers, who profess themselves victims of wider economic and political forces, are at the same time perpetrators of the prejudices towards migrants which are found in society at large. Migrants and their cultural forms are minimally represented, either excluded or relegated to a subordinate position. The producers' notion of 'popular culture' reflects the hierarchical evaluation of culture corresponding to the unequal social structure, as manifest in their attitudes to both *chicha* and *telenovelas*. Where one group dominates another on the economic field, the power it wields leads it to assume its cultural values are superior to those of another group and categories are constructed accordingly (Bourdieu 1986). Popular culture is judged in

opposition to the orthodox or 'high culture' as conceived by the dominant sectors of Arequipan society. For the producers, popular culture includes aspects of mass culture, understood to be the media-oriented production of the new technology of modern industrial society, and also aspects of the folk culture of rural Andean society.

Forced to transmit programmes which they themselves despise as 'low culture', because related to those they consider of 'low class', the producers criticize foreign media production and programmes of pure entertainment as a threat to aristocratic 'high culture'. However, they do not accept the criticism for themselves, but argue that they are subject to foreign media and market forces which oblige them to transmit potentially alienating programmes and prevent them from realizing their goals to create a national identity and educate, change and control the migrant population.

In radio, music is central to setting up and operating concepts of popular and high culture in Arequipa, based on categories of the old, traditional and established and the new and innovative. Certain types of music are ascribed to the 'popular sectors' of society and it is assumed that the musics preferred by shanty town residents are *waynos* and *chicha*, overlooking the fact that music tastes cross categories of background, age and class and that, for example, second-generation migrants enjoy *salsa* or rock and pop (which musics

are also 'popular' in that they are liked by many and are fashionable).

'Popular' is a category with multiple meanings. Commercial radios believe themselves to be popular when they have a mass following, render a service to the community or speak on behalf of the people. Both commercial and public service radio speak in the place of the people, considering themselves to be invested with an authority which the public do not possess. Commercial radio adopts the rhetoric of public service radio which defines its aims to provide information, education and entertainment and to inculcate tastes for 'higher culture' in its audience. These radios are also paternalistic in prescribing what a group of 'professionals' deem to be worthwhile listening. To supply information is equated with education and both commercial and public service producers reveal a desire not only to educate but also to control the people.

The possibility for migrants to define the popular is afforded by alternative or community radio, such as popular communications projects like Ama Kella. These present their own portrayal of migrants and their concerns and construct their own definition of the popular. Popular radio still assumes the power of the media to influence and sets itself up in opposition to profit-making commercial radio and paternalistic public service radio, believed to be vehicles of dominant ideologies. It treats its listeners as subjects

rather than objects and encourages the participation of the people, granting them the right to speak for themselves and challenging the need for a spokesperson. Furthermore, the far-reaching aim of Ama Kella is social transformation and it puts itself at the service of the popular organizations, placing the media at the disposition of those fighting to improve living conditions in the shanties. Rather than preserving the status quo, Ama Kella seeks to subvert it by prompting its public to question it and take action to change it.

Both mainstream and alternative radio produce their own definitions of the 'popular', demonstrating the complexity of this concept. Its variability indicates the continual renegotiation of meanings, a challenge to the institutionalized 'norm' and a questioning of the discourses of the powerful. Again, popular communications are an example of how power generates resistance: the mainstream media bring alternative broadcasting into being, multiplying the discourses of 'the popular' and increasing the power struggle.

However, even though Ama Kella aims to take the microphone from the powerful and give it to the powerless, there are always some who are better equipped to speak out than others. The preparation of those participating removes even these popular broadcasters from their public and the expression of 'the people' is postponed. Chapter Five looked at how 'the people', the audiences of Río Seco and Porvenir, respond to the media images and messages they receive.

Although the images and messages of mainstream media may correspond to racist and classist stereotypes, these are contested in the shanties as people make their own meanings from what they hear or see. Contrary to early theories of an all-powerful media, able to brainwash a susceptible public in the interests of the ruling elite, the evidence from Río Seco or Porvenir is that the media's power to influence migrants in their behaviour or thinking is modified by the individual's social environment and personal experience which compose the context in which the media is received and interpreted (Morley 1980, 1986). The migrants do not 'blindly' accept what is broadcast on the media as a faithful representation of reality, nor are they lulled into a false sense of security pre-empting a change in the status quo. Migrants are social actors who are not the passive recipients of a dominant culture imposed from 'above' and which they are powerless to resist.

The mass audience was believed to be homogeneous, in which individuality was lost and the criteria of taste and quality were reduced to the lowest common denominator. However, there is no evidence that the media are able to break down solidarities and encourage complacency through their allegedly individualistic and impersonal nature. The audience in Arequipa and within the shanties is composed of different publics who watch or listen in family or friendship groups and

they incorporate this activity into their own cultural experience.

Migrants may buy radios and televisions, the archetypal symbols of imperialistic culture, but whilst the media is thus diffused extensively throughout the shanties, exposure to the media does not render someone susceptible to influence. The public of the shanty towns uses radio and television for information and entertainment, to regulate the pattern of their daily routine and provide accompaniment or relaxation. The media are thus inserted in the domestic space and subordinate to the demands of the public. The media is only one of many different social influences with which migrants come into contact in the urban environment and their social situation bears upon their interpretation and reception of media messages received.

Up to a point, the producers' conceptualization of 'the popular' fits the listening and viewing tastes of the *pobladores*, as exemplified by the success of Radio Melodía and the popularity of *telenovelas*. However, some of their assumptions are simplistic and treat the public as a homogeneous whole, whereas in fact the audience is divided into many publics, their tastes cannot be compartmentalized and are subject to change. Furthermore, *pobladores* do look to disc jockeys as a source of interpretation and as figureheads with the power to make their voice heard. More people listen to commercial radio and watch television than listen to a

programme on public service or community radio. Nevertheless, in Porvenir, there is support for Ama Kella and the loudspeaker broadcasts and people appreciate a medium which directly addresses them and their problems and uses a language which is accessible to them.

Whilst television has been assumed to be more absorbing and therefore more influential than radio, it is similarly subject to other demands on the viewer's time and attention and subordinate to the domestic realm. Women's viewing of *telenovelas* demonstrates that rather than be alienated by foreign media production, they interpret the *novelas* in the light of their own social environment and personal experience. The 'emotional realism' of the subject matter appeals to something fundamentally human which transcends cultural differences and enables the women to empathize and relate to the *novelas* on an emotional level (Ang 1985).

Although the settings of the *telenovelas* are far removed from the social reality in which *pobladoras* live, this does not necessarily provoke envy, dissatisfaction or apathy and there is certainly no clear correlation between the media and such feelings which are rooted in the concrete circumstances in which people live. Emotional engagement in a *novela* does not preclude action on the political field: the same women who enjoy watching *novelas* are also involved in the *comedores* and neighbourhood organizations and their conversation relating to the *novelas* does not take place in the context of fantasy, but

rather in relation to events in their own lives or in the community.

However, pleasure does have to be considered as a factor in people's listening and viewing: pop music may be more appealing than an 'educational' programme, a 'weepie' film than a consciousness-raising documentary. That the majority do not listen to Ama Kella or to Radio Educación does not mean that they are apathetic, because people do express a desire to be informed, but suggests that the type of knowledge offered or the form in which it is presented is not attractive to them.

Telenovelas produced abroad and in completely different socio-economic environments are incorporated into the local discourse and 'read' within the context of the local community, allowing people to bring their own experience and their socio-economic reality and cultural values to make their own interpretation of the programme. This is facilitated through the familiarity and primordially of the themes and the continuity of the serial form which invite both individual intimacy and communal involvement (Newcomb 1974; Katz & Liebes 1983). The *novela* becomes part of people's domestic experience and daily life, but also involves them with the community of viewers as discussion of the *novela* leads to discussion of their own lives or events within the shanty. The life of the *novela* is thus incorporated into the gossip of the community.

Gossip, like women's viewing, meets with the disapproval of male members of the community (Brown 1990). Both are seen as subversive and criticized as being immoral, removed from reality, pernicious and unedifying. A struggle is waged over the value attributed to male and female choices of viewing in terms of the discourses of education and culture: both *novelas* and *Miami Vice* are argued to be an 'education on life'. The power of the media to influence is assumed, but it is always someone else who is susceptible to that influence: the poor, the uneducated, women, children.

Once more, the allegedly powerful media do not impose one meaning but prompt the negotiation of meanings and the proliferation of discourse. Mass culture does not eradicate the sense of community nor one's critical evaluation of a cultural product: rather it provokes conversation (McQuail, Blumler & Brown 1972), it is incorporated into and perpetuates the community and fosters the continuation of 'popular' forms, like oral culture, amidst the technologies of the city.

Theories of mass society and mass communications have shifted from an emphasis on the influence of external forces on the individual to the individuals themselves as social actors with the ability to make their own decisions, interpretations and definitions. Cultural media theory falls between notions of the all-powerful media and the all-powerful audience and provides the most adequate explanation of migrants' experience of the media in Peru.

Opposed to economic reductionism, it argues that the social order is both economically and ideologically constructed, i.e. that social actors are objectively constrained by the way things are, but that they interpret their observations and experiences subjectively according to pre-existent theories and concepts. They do not constitute a passive audience, but neither are they entirely free to make their own meanings since their freedom is constrained by the economic and political sectors which control media production and dominate the forum of free speech. In Gramsci's notion of hegemony, power is the power to set the agenda, to tell people what to think about and the power of the public is thus limited by the choices provided by the multinational media networks. Those in control of capital resources are also those in control of the channels of communication and the media not the public decide who may make their opinions heard and felt, who may represent others, set the agenda and establish the terms of conversation while others are represented only on the periphery and in stereotypical images and discourses defined by those representing them (Hall 1986).

People's option to engage in the social process of meaning construction is thus restricted by the social structure, but at the same time that structure is not autonomous and its power is constrained by the possibility of independent interpretation by the individual. In Peru, the media reproduces society's hierarchical power structure but

its power to influence is modified by the relationship between interpersonal communication and institutionalized power bases through which meanings are negotiated.

Power is then the power to define, to impose meanings, whether in terms of the media, in the political field or in everyday conversation (Frazer 1986; Morley 1980:7-8). However, whilst people use discursive categories to construct identities, in Arequipa, people are constantly creating new meanings and new identities for themselves. The evidence of multiple definitions of the 'popular' and the active involvement of shanty town dwellers in popular politics and communications, enabling them to produce their own, alternative definitions, demonstrates their resistance to influence and their participation in a struggle for power. Power is not absolute: it is embedded in a concrete social system with which migrants interact, they are subject to its injustices and must engage with its categories, but they are not powerless and constantly challenge, redefine and reconstruct their social reality.

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