

**THE DETERMINANTS OF CHILEAN
FOREIGN POLICY: 1970-90**

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of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy**

by

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ABBREVIATIONS

ALADI	<i>Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración</i>
API	<i>Acción Popular Independiente</i>
BID	<i>Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo</i>
CECLA	<i>Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latinoamericana</i>
CEPAL	<i>Comisión Económica Para América Latina</i>
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIDH	<i>Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos</i>
CIPEC	<i>Comité Intergubernamental de Países Exportadores de Cobre</i>
COMECON	Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
CORFO	<i>Corporación de Fomento (estatal chilena)</i>
CPPS	<i>Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur</i>
DINA	<i>Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia</i>
EC	European Communities
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LAFTA	Latin American Free Trade Association
MAPU	<i>Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria</i>
MIR	<i>Movimiento Independiente Revolucionario</i>
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NICs	Newly Industrialised Countries
NIEO	New International Economic Order
OAS	Organisation of the American States
ODEPLAN	<i>Oficina de Planificación Nacional</i>
PRC	People's Republic of China
SELA	<i>Sistema Económica de América Latina</i>
SEREX	<i>Secretaría Ejecutiva de Relaciones Exteriores</i>
TIAR	<i>Tratado Interamericano para Asistencia Reciprocidad</i>
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UP	<i>Unidad Popular</i>

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PREFACE

This study represents an attempt to survey the foreign policy of Chile during the two consecutive regimes of Allende and Pinochet, tracing the country's relations with external players in respect to major issues. The study is presented within a purpose-built framework for the study of the foreign policy behaviour of Latin American States with a special attention to policy orientation. It is, therefore, a departure from the usual descriptive study or analytical study under an existing framework such as the *systems* theory, in terms of methodology.

The study of foreign affairs has been dominated by the great powers since the Napoleonic era, in the same way as they controlled relations among nation states. That bias has greatly affected the way in which foreign policy and international relations have been discussed. Under the dominance of the neo-realist *systems* theory in modern days, the foreign policy of a small country is still regarded as a response to external environment. Consequently, a large portion of publications has followed the notion that Latin American behaviour toward other nations tends to be a reaction to outside stimuli lacking autonomous initiatives.¹ As a result of this belief, literature addressing 'foreign policy' has not in fact been devoted to the analysis of the foreign policies of Latin American states, but more to the factual matters of their external relations. For some Latin American academics *política exterior* does not necessarily mean the foreign policy of a nation state while the misuse of the term has frequently been seen in US academic circles where 'Latin American foreign policy' or 'international relations' refer to 'US policy toward Latin America.' Furthermore, overstressing the external environment also leads to the extreme view that their foreign policies are basically identical. Thus, researches concerning the external behaviour of the region have been carried out with unequal attention; that is to say,

¹ The examination of two contemporary works the Latin American international politics of the 1990s verifies that the *systems* approach is still a popular method in studying Latin American foreign policies. See Calvert, Peter, The International Politics of Latin America, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1994; Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, Westview, Boulder, Third Edition, 1995.

the issues of smaller countries, other than Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, have simply been ignored.

A major reason for this phenomenon is to be found in the lack of an applicable theoretical framework, which has generated two fundamental problems in current literature: a paucity of foreign policy study and a prevailing tendency towards descriptive studies. It has been five decades since the intellectual subordination of Latin America was first attacked by CEPAL under the leadership of Raúl Prebisch.² During this period, an impressive theoretical advance in the social science of Latin America has been seen including the rise and fall of the *dependency* theory. Nevertheless, this kind of theoretical - or at least methodological - progression does not seem to have happened in the field of international politics, with rare exceptions. The status of foreign policy study in Latin America as an independent academic field has been seriously challenged.

Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold: *first*, to build a viable framework for studying Latin American foreign policy; *second*, to (re-)assess the policy orientations of the foreign policy of Chile between 1970-90. Broadly speaking, two related questions are addressed throughout this research: *What* was the foreign policy? and *Why* was it made?

In order to achieve this purpose, the thesis is divided into two parts. The first part consisting of Chapter I, II and III basically deals with theoretical perspectives. Chapter I is concerned with an analytical and synthetical background incorporating theoretical dimensions such as the identification of the determinant variables of a state's foreign policy and the categorisation of foreign policy under three *Issue Areas*. The determinant variables are then explored in detail in Chapter II: Internal Variables, and Chapter III: External Variables. After introducing the general pattern of influence that stimulates linkage between a determinant variable and the formulation of foreign policy, the implications to Latin America and Chile are discussed. The focus of this

² See Tomassini, Luciano, "Los Estudios Internacionales en América Latina: Experiencias y Desafíos", Los Estudios Internacionales en América Latina: Realizaciones y Desafíos, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1980, pp.104-5.

research is, of course, the foreign policy of a Latin American state in a particular period. However, it is argued that the questions posed cannot be satisfactorily answered without examining the characteristics and possible functions of determinant variables. A complex regeneration the framework is necessary given the two general notions which have been widely accepted, but have in fact undermined the development of foreign policy theory: *first*, foreign policy is a subject too broad and specific to be generalised, *second*, a country's foreign policy is designed and implemented by the complex functioning of determinant variables. Therefore, the study is intended to offer a viable way of studying foreign policy within the analytical and explanatory framework although still based on the above concepts.

Using the framework built in the first part, Chapter IV and Chapter V - the second part of this study - describe the foreign policy of the socialist regime (1970-73) and the military regime (1973-90), respectively, according to three *Issue Areas: Status-Diplomatic Area, Military-Strategic Area and Economic-Developmental Area*. Primary attention is paid to the examination of foreign policy origins and the determinants of major issues.³ In the last Chapter, in conclusion, the role of each determinant variable is reviewed and their particular functions in each *Issue Area* of the Chilean foreign policy of a given period are further discussed. Finally, it is suggested that the next stage of this study, the cross-country comparative study, be undertaken by a more directive method based on the framework used in this research.

One might question the need for yet another study of modern Chilean history which has already been a popular theme amongst social scientists and historians thanks to the dramatic political and economic changes since 1970. For this reason, in fact, Chilean history between 1970 and 1990 provides one of the best examples for the application of this study's framework to a single country. Within two decades, a relatively short period, Chile experienced two political regimes showing a sharp contrast in every perspective, with rich varieties in terms of ideology, domestic

³ In order to help to explain the nature of foreign policy, particular variables with importance are underlined within the text.

politics, a regime's external outlook, elite and economic policies.⁴ Historically, furthermore, Chileans have seen themselves playing a significant role not only in inter-American affairs but also on the stage of international politics by small country standards, although Chile has often been unwilling or unable to assert its presence and its national interests, in many instances limiting the aim of its foreign policy to 'security' and 'survival.'

Another answer for the question of 'why Chile?' is to be found in the relative richness of the literature on Chilean foreign policy and international relations, which was basically been produced by Chilean and North American scholars, although the latter group has been primarily concerned with the evolution of US-Chilean relations *vis-à-vis* the changes of US foreign policy. However, what makes the Chilean literature special is not the quantity but the quality of the works. Although the field is dominated by a small academic circle and researches tend to be grounded more in history than in political science, there are fortunately some impressive efforts with extensive survey of data and information such as that of Joaquin Fermandois, Chile y el Mundo: 1970-73. Data access being particularly difficult in this area, these previous studies with rich factual information have been of great use in addressing contemporary Chilean foreign policy.

This work is based on nine months field research in Santiago, Chile and a two month stay in Texas, USA. The material used in this study includes primary and secondary sources. Not only works directly addressing Chilean and Latin American international politics, but also some on other individual countries' foreign policies, were a very valuable source of information. Therefore, my primary debt in the writing of this thesis is to scholars who have produced inspiring academic works on international politics and, particularly, Chilean foreign policy.

I wish to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Professor Benny Pollack, for his suggestions and criticisms based on his professional, academic and personal experience as an active participant in and observer of Chilean foreign policy.

⁴ Nevertheless, this research is not primarily designed to perform a comparative study between the two regimes, although some comparison is attempted in the conclusion chapter.

Throughout the period of this study, his expert guidance, perceptive comments and enthusiasm for the thesis topic have been a constant source of inspiration.

I would like to thank my Chilean colleagues, who assisted my field research with great enthusiasm, particularly Professor Roberto Duran in the Catholic University of Chile and Mr Fernando Labra in the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Relations. Many more officials in the Chilean Foreign Ministry talked to me on a variety of subjects, on condition that they would remain anonymous. Their comments and advice were particularly useful in helping me to understand the nature of Chilean foreign policy at the initial stage of my field work. Although most of what they said was useful in confirming historical ‘facts’ already presented in a number of studies on Chilean foreign policy, I was deeply impressed by their valuable comments on my work and their harsh self-criticism of Chilean foreign policy.

I would also like to thank the staff and librarians at the Diplomatic Academy of the Chilean Foreign Ministry; the Institute of International Studies of the University of Chile; the Institute of Political Science of the Catholic University of Chile; and the *Facultad Latinoamericana Ciencia Sociales* (FLACSO), who allowed me access to their precious collections on this subject.

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I. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS: AN INTRODUCTION

It is quite possible that we shall never have a theory of foreign policy. Even if the epistemological difficulties about generalising in social science are surmounted, foreign policy may still be too particular a phenomenon to generate theories of its own.

- Christopher Hill

1.1. The Study of Latin American Foreign Policy

Penetrated by multinational companies, foreign capital and the hegemonic power of the United States, no single country in Latin America has been able to become a major player in the international political and economic system. During the past decades, therefore, it is not strange to see that a preferred academic subject in the area of Latin American social science has been development studies, not international relations or foreign policy analysis. On the substantive level, as a result of this, a major feature of Latin American international politics studies has been a constant preoccupation with development, and with national and regional autonomy problems, since their effort has been highly concentrated on economic and financial issues. Partly because of this, comprehensive and interdisciplinary studies of the foreign policy of Latin American states have been scarce and largely formalistic providing very little guidance for researchers interested in this subject, leading to the argument as to whether or not there exists a discipline of international relations in Latin America. Simpson and Wrobel evaluated the current state of the discipline as follows:

... in Hispanic America there is not a discipline of International Relations in the traditional European or North American sense; that is, an academic community doing 'normal science', demonstrating a consensus on basic postulates and methodology. If we can divide the development of a discipline into three stages - the establishment of a research agenda specific to the field, the production of case studies and flowing from this, a stage of theory building - then one can say that Hispanic America is still in the process of transition from the first to the second.¹

¹ Simpson, Mark and Wrobel, Paulo, "The Study of International Relations in Hispanic America", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 16:2, 1987, p.312. Tomassini pointed out three problems

Another, but more decisive, reason for the underdevelopment of Latin American foreign policy study is the international dominance of *systems approach* based on neo-realism, from which research questions have largely concerned interactions between a state and the system. As one critic pointed out, “[e]ither the system determines the principal moves which states make, ... or states can profoundly influence the system.”² It may not be completely unreasonable to argue that the popularity of *systems approach*, in fact, seriously undermined the development of foreign policy theories when the approach, firstly, regards the foreign policy of a country as a response to the external environment, thus ignoring the domestic nature of the ‘units’ because while they are able to influence the system, they are powerless to change it,³ secondly, concerns ‘relations’ or ‘interactions’ rather than ‘policy,’ and thirdly, frequently treats the region as a whole.

Firstly then in Latin America, overemphasis on the external environment has produced the notion that the region is extremely sensitive and vulnerable to its external setting and that its behaviour toward other nations tends to be a reaction to outside stimuli, with Latin American countries lacking autonomous initiatives. In this respect, Atkins noted as follows:

An apparent reason for the lack of analysis of Latin American foreign policy formulation has been the erroneous assumption or impression that those processes are overwhelmingly dominated by foreign influences, especially from the United States (Davis and Wilson, 1975:448). ... More importantly, this assertion of foreign dominance ignores the political complexity and relative foreign policy autonomy of the major regional states, as well as the isolated international environment of some of the smaller ones.⁴

of current literature addressing Latin American international politics: absolute lack of research; little attention to the issue of foreign policy and methodological weakness. See Tomassini, Luciano, La Política Internacional en un Mundo Postmoderno, GEL, BS AS, 1991, pp.300-1.

² Linklater, Andrew, “Neo-realism in Theory and Practice”, in Booth, Ken and Smith, Steve, International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995, p.253.

³ For further discussions about the neo-realist *systems approach*, see Waltz, K. Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1979. For an introduction of classic *systems approach*, see McClelland, Charles A. (eds.), “On the Fourth Wave: Past and Future in the Study of International Systems”, in Rosenau, James N., Davis, Vincent, and East, Maurice A. (eds.), The Analysis of International Politics, Free Press, New York, 1972, pp.15-40.

⁴ Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, The Free Press, New York, 1977, p.42.

Nevertheless, the underdevelopment and the lack of research should not imply that Latin America has pursued no foreign policy, even if they have only developed a number of activities which have constituted “a mimetic reflex of the behaviour of the classical great powers.”⁵

In fact, secondly, a large proportion of the work addressing ‘foreign policy’ has not been devoted to the analysis of the foreign policies of individual states. As one author claimed that “Latin American foreign policies in the 1950s and 1960s were overwhelmingly influenced by the foreign policy goals and actions of the United States,”⁶ it is not unexpected to discover that the majority of researches - many of them in English - broadly surveying the subject, have traditionally been diplomatic histories focusing primarily on the US-Latin American relations, or institutional and legal treatments of Pan Americanism and the Organisation of American States. Thus, for some Latin American academics, ‘*política exterior*’ does not necessarily mean the foreign policy of a nation state. Furthermore, in spite of the evolving complexity of Latin American participation in the international system, the position of the United States has been so predominant that the misuse of the term has been frequently seen in US academic circles in which ‘Latin American foreign policy’ has usually referred to ‘US foreign policy toward Latin America’ rather than foreign policies of Latin American nations - individually or collectively - toward other entities.⁷

Thirdly, overstressing the external variables may also lead to the extreme view that Latin American foreign policies are basically identical. For instance, works in English have tended to emphasise the problem of US policy in these hemispheric relations, frequently treating the area as a unit.⁸ Although the idea of division

⁵ Drekonja-Kornat, Gerhard, “The Rise of Latin America’s Foreign Policy: between Hegemony and Autonomy”, Latin American Research Review, 21:2, 1986, p.238.

⁶ Lincoln, Jennie K., “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions”, in Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, Westview, Boulder, 1981, p.8.

⁷ See Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie, “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Latin American Governments as Actors in the International System”, in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, Westview, Boulder, 1984, p.14.

⁸ See Davis, Harold Eugene, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies”, in Davis, Harold Eugene and Wilson Larman (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis, Baton Rouge and London, 1975, p.3. These US scholars have tended to study the international and domestic policies of

between the Latin American nations was developed upon the political, economic, social and geographic differences of the nations,⁹ the efforts to search for a similar pattern of foreign policy was based on their actual external behaviour, thus regarding the region as a unit. Among the similarities of their external behaviour, Kelly identified the stagnant and isolationist character of the foreign policies of the major Latin American countries:

[g]overnments of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Chile are not committed to a fundamental restructuring of the international system (though they may well extend symbolic support for such efforts) but rather to increasing their share of the rewards within the present international system. These nations have a vested interest in maintaining the present system.¹⁰

Others tend to emphasise identical policy objectives of the countries. Not surprisingly, there is an agreement amongst Latin American internationalists about the objectives of their foreign policy: namely 'national security' and 'economic survival.'¹¹ There is no doubt that these passive objectives were established under the circumstances of historical rivalries inside the region and the economic vulnerability by which external behaviour of Latin America has long been limited.

Meanwhile, Davis emphasised the similarities of their foreign policies by pointing out the common historical linkage:

... the foreign policies of the Latin American nations are a product of all the conflicts and rivalries of the European nations in the centuries-long fight with each other for the possession of America. The foreign policies also reflect the conflicts and rivalries involved in the national struggles for independence and

Latin America in those times when the region has been of particular concern to US governmental and economic interests.

⁹ More specifically, various types of data can be used for the purpose of the classification, e.g. population, area, life expectancies, literacy, GNP, energy consumption, military expenditure, ... etc.

¹⁰ Kelly in Biles, Robert, "Perspectives That Make a Difference", p.3, in Biles, Robert (ed.), Inter-American Relations: The Latin American Perspective, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1988.

¹¹ The Latin American foreign policy objectives have been described in various ways. For instance, Pope Atkins utilised words like "sovereignty," "independence" and "prestige" pointing out that the primary objectives of Latin America have been: *first*, "to maintain their sovereignty and independence from all outside powers" ; *second*, "to strengthen their sovereignty and independence from all outside powers" and *third*, "to achieve national prestige, or at least the respect of other nations." See Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.47.

the many different experiences of the international relations of the new nations since achieving nationhood. Since most of these countries got their independence in the same era of modern history - the American and French Revolutionary - Napoleonic-Metternich era, they have had many comparable if not identical experiences in their histories as nations. Hence their policy aims and the principles they follow in their international relations also show many similarities.¹²

However, this should not mean that all or most have pursued similar or cognate policies in the global international arena or within the region, although it cannot be denied the existence of many very similar perspectives on foreign policies of Latin American countries as seen above. One major aspect which cannot be overlooked is the diversity of the Latin American states in terms of their physical and geographical capacity, level of economic and political development, patterns and level of sophistication of decision makers, and international experience after independence, which can all produce different foreign policy outputs. In this respect, various authors contributed to set up a model of international hierarchy in the Latin American core according to their own specifications. Generally speaking, there is agreement in regarding Brazil, Argentina and Mexico as the *main powers* of the region; and Chile, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru as the *middle powers*, even if one could argue about specific placements in each criteria.

Moreover, although objectives and historical heritage are very similar, their effects on policies and approaches are not always manifested in the same pattern. Even though the Latin American regional states tend to use the same means chosen by most small states in the world,¹³ it is difficult to tell whether such important aspects as the

¹² Davis, Harold Eugene, Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History. An Introduction, p.2.

¹³ Atkins presented five general tactics of small states' foreign policy: (1) *playing an active role in international organizations*; (2) *promoting international law and supporting such principles and procedures as non-intervention and peaceful settlement of disputes*; (3) *appealing to humanitarian sentiments and moral principles*; (4) *exploiting the rivalries of greater powers while remaining as noncommittal as possible themselves*; (5) *bargaining with their markets and natural resources*. See Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.48. On the other hand, McGraw summarised the five "agreed-upon" characteristics of small state foreign policy behaviour as: *a low level of participation in world affairs*; *a narrow foreign policy scope*; *an economic focus in foreign policy execution*; *an emphasis on internationalism, involving participation and regional organizations* and finally, *a moral emphasis in foreign policy, with a high level of support for international legal norms*. McGraw also concluded that "the foreign policies of National governments [in New Zealand] have tended to conform to the precepts of the small state model more than have the foreign policies of

process of foreign policy making or domestic determinants are identical without attempting a detailed assessment of each case.

However, the underdevelopment standard of Latin American foreign policy study, stemmed from the prevalence of the *systems approach*, has changed since the 1970s. Lincoln said that “while the literature concerning foreign policies of the 1950s and 1960s analyses Latin American foreign policies in the context of *dependence* upon the United States, the literature since 1970 focuses upon the emergence of Latin American foreign policy in the context of regional and global *interdependence*.”¹⁴ Drekonja-Kornat defined the 1960s and 1970s as the period of a “learning process vis-à-vis foreign policy” that has produced the new Latin American foreign policy¹⁵ and a growth in status for the region within the international system. The new Latin American foreign policy is a notable phenomenon considering the widely accepted premise of dependency doctrine, which classifies Latin America as incapable of acting on its own. ‘Underdeveloped’ in the international system since World War II, Latin America found it necessary to pursue its own interests to seek change rather than the perpetuation of the status quo.¹⁶

This outlook required Latin Americans to develop a foreign policy school of their own. Inside Latin America, various individuals and academic institutions have contributed to developing and analysing the foreign policy outlook. As far as research organisations are concerned, two prominent academic institutions can be pointed out within the region: *El Colegio de México* and *Instituto de Estudios Internacionales* of *La Universidad de Chile*. Each institution publishes a journal, *Foro Internacional* and

Labour governments, ...” See McGraw, David J., “New Zealand’s Foreign Policy under National and Labour Governments: Variations in the ‘Small State’ Theme?”, *Pacific Affairs*, 67:1, 1994, pp.7-8 and p.25.

¹⁴ According to her, the term interdependence implies “the equal dependence of two or more parties upon each other.” See Lincoln, Jennie K., “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions”, p.14.

¹⁵ See Section 1.3. for the discussion of the new Latin American foreign policy.

¹⁶ See Drekonja-Kornat, Gerhard, “The Rise of Latin America’s Foreign Policy: between Hegemony and Autonomy,” p.239.

Estudios Internacionales, respectively, which presents its own version of foreign policy development.¹⁷

What has been seen in the 1980s and the 1990s is the notable growth of publications on Latin American international relations and foreign policies especially inside the region. The creation of *Programa de Estudios Conjuntos sobre las Relaciones Internacionales de América Latina* (RIAL), funded by UNDP and CEPAL, has been in boosting the mass publication of the discipline. Although the increase in quantity does not necessarily promise better quality, it is certain that various issues have been handled with complexity. Scholars involved began to address theoretical and methodological sensitivity and comparative perspectives, although at a limited level.¹⁸ There is also a growing consensus among internationalists of the region that international studies are an autonomous academic field which must be characterised by an interdisciplinary point of view.¹⁹

To complicate matters, however, the case studies that have been produced are barely satisfactory. Research questions have been formulated with more of a grounding in history or development studies than in political science, and thus devote more efforts to tracing the historical development of external experiences rather than searching for

¹⁷ For detailed survey about the education and research of international relations in Chile, see Sepúlveda, Alberto, "Problemas para el Desarrollo de los Estudios sobre Relaciones Internacionales en Chile", pp.143-172; Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Desarrollo y Crisis de los Estudios de Relaciones Internacionales en Chile", pp.173-191 both in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), Los Estudios Internacionales en América Latina: Realizaciones y Desafíos, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1980. Also see Van Klaveren, Alberto, "El Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales en Chile. Logros, Problemas y Desafíos", in Perina, Rubén (ed.) El Estudio de las Relaciones Internacionales en América Latina, GEL, BS AS, 1985, pp.99-130.

¹⁸ Three articles are particularly interesting in this movement: Ferris, Elizabeth, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, pp.269-284; Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives", in Muñoz, H and Tulchin, J. (eds.) in Latin American Nations in World Politics, Westview, Boulder, 1984, pp.1-21; and Muñoz, Heraldo, "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations", World Affairs, 150:2, 1989, pp.129-146.

¹⁹ The analysis of Latin American foreign relations has been traditionally conducted from an unidisciplinary perspective: economists have dealt with international trade and investment, world monetary affairs, and, more recently, with subjects related to the changing International Economic Order or external debt; jurists, in turn, have concentrated on international law and the institutions of the international system; and political scientists have emphasised contemporary political relations among nation-states.

(ir)regular patterns in the external behaviour of a country.²⁰ These works tend to be descriptive, rather than explanatory, with unsystematic methodology, unable to distinguish between a theory of international relations and a theory of foreign policy, concentrating on major factual events and resulting in simplistic interpretations while ignoring policy orientations.²¹ A typical single country research concerning Latin American foreign policy is normally formatted as the following sequence:

First, Explanation of international political theories, *e.g. idealism, realism, behaviourism, structuralism, ... etc.*

Second, History of international relations of a country

Third, Decision making mechanism or Players, *e.g. President, Foreign Secretary, Bureaucracy, Military... etc.*

Fourth, Description of relations between the country and the outside world, *e.g. neighbouring countries, the US, Europe, Asia, Africa ... etc.*

Several reasons can be suggested for the prevalence of descriptive researches. Firstly, the relatively short history of Latin American experience in international relations can be pointed out. In the case of the European states or the United States, their foreign policy and international relations have a long enough history to provide scholars with a wide spectrum of state behaviour, whereas Latin American states only started to take part in international politics after World War II. Hence, to a certain degree, this lack of historical experience resulted in a low degree of sophistication and systematisation of the literature.

Secondly, determinant variables for analysis, especially domestic variables, have been fairly limited. For instance, it is hard to find any significant participation of the general public or interest groups in the foreign policy making process. Even if certain interest groups play active roles in foreign policy decision making, such as coffee growers in Colombia, their influence is limited to a certain issue. Governments are

²⁰ See Ferris, Elizabeth, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", p.269.

²¹ The work of Joaquin Fernandois (*Chile y El Mundo: 1970-73: La Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el Sistema Internacional*, Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, 1985) is one of the major contributions to the study of Latin American foreign policy with originality backed by an extensive material survey and the depth and scope of issues covered. However, the work is still too descriptive, historical and subjective, rarely touching on policy orientations.

still able to manipulate and almost monopolise the flow of information in Latin America. The lack of domestic integration and economic and political dependency on the international system have also weakened the importance of the domestic determinants of foreign policy.

Thirdly, the majority of researchers have not seemed to be much interested in theory building with the exception of a small academic circle. In other words, social science research oriented by well structured propositions and well versed on methodological instruments, although not necessarily on the specific area of quantitative techniques, is not very widespread in the region. Hence, theory building has never been a central goal of many Latin American internationalists.

In a similar dimension, lastly, Drekonja-Kornat argued that the prevalence of descriptive works accords with Latin American educational tradition, emphasising that “[t]he use in Latin American universities of Spanish translations of classics in international relations, particularly the works of Hans Morgenthau and Raymond Aron [of realism or power politics], proved inappropriate.”²² In fact, Latin America has shown notable (relative) stability in this century, with the exception of several cases,²³ when many other parts of the world were in turmoil. Not only were the countries in the region not directly involved in the two World Wars, but also Latin America was only partially involved in the inter-state Cold War.²⁴ If one may argue that the core of international politics is the struggle for power among sovereign states, Latin America does not seem to provide the best example to be analysed within such a framework. Moreover, some even tend to question the existence of a genuine foreign policy in Latin American states, which justifies the lack of development of the discipline. For instance:

²² Drekonja-Kornat, Gerhard, “The Rise of Latin America’s Foreign Policy: between Hegemony and Autonomy”, p.239. In addition, it should not be overlooked that the fundamental problem of the discipline of international politics in general is that it lacks an organising device: in other words, a quasi-theory model, a conceptual framework, or a framework for analysis.

²³ The cases of serious military confrontations are *the Salvador-Honduras ‘football war’*, *the War of Chaco between Paraguay and Bolivia*, *the Leticia border dispute between Peru and Colombia*, *the Falkland/Malvinas War between Britain and Argentina*, and *the US invasion of Grenada and Panama*.

²⁴ Colombia was the only country in Latin America that sent troops to the Korean War in line with the UN resolution and US pressure. It is worth remembering that the Korean War in 1950 was the first large scale East-West confrontation which could have caused the Third World War.

All Latin American and Caribbean nations have foreign relations; most do not, however, have true foreign policies. Foreign policy implies purposive behavior, not simply the ability of a state to react to external events. The minimum objective of any state is to ensure its continued survival and advance the nation's well-being. However, most states have neither the organizational capacity nor the range of alternatives necessary to make foreign policy decisions and implement them.²⁵

However, if one defines the foreign policy solely as "purposive behavior" excluding an important dimension of 'the reaction to external events,' it is questionable how many states in the world can implement 'the foreign policy.' Rather it is more sensible to trace the unique patterns of their behaviour to identify Latin America's own version of foreign policy.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that good descriptive researches based on history form an important step for the development of the discipline. With well-surveyed descriptive products, the difficulty of Latin American foreign policy analysis caused by lack of reliable materials²⁶ can be more or less overcome, and, more importantly, those who are particularly concerned with the analytical observation can save a considerable amount of effort in tracing historical facts. In other words, they can be a most valuable source for the task of implementing systematic case studies.

In summary, critics have so far identified two major perspectives: researches which are too historical and descriptive, and the absence of comparative studies and theory.

²⁵ Hazleton, William, 'The Foreign Policies of Venezuela and Colombia: Collaboration, Competition and Conflict' in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, Westview, Boulder, 1984, pp.152.

²⁶ In studying contemporary Latin American foreign policy, the obstacles are not only caused by having no access to classified documents but also by the unreliability of documents open to the public. In this research, for instance, I have consulted the series of *La Memoria de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* for the Chilean foreign policy analysis. However, it is one of the most confusing and disappointing documents in terms of continuity, editing standard, and the selection of information. Particularly, it fails to show complete statistics of formal diplomatic relations, merely presenting some of the major changes in Chile's diplomatic relations. Therefore it is understandable for even a leading internationalist like Edy Kaufman to consult The Statesman's Yearbook to trace the network of Latin American diplomatic representatives. See Kaufman, Edy, "Latin America", in Clapham, Christopher (ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States, Saxon House, Surrey, 1977, p.143. Generally speaking, it is the problem of students of foreign policy and international relations who suffer from "an irremediable liability in foreign affairs - [they] cannot know what goes on behind closed doors, ... and unable to study classified papers, reports, and documents." (Lovell, John P., Foreign Policy in Perspective: Strategy, Adaptation, Decision Making, Holt, Rinehart and Wilson, New York, 1970, p.3.)

However, many of them have failed to express the necessity of an intermediate process, explanatory and systematic analysis of cases with a more explicit methodology, in order to fill the gap between these two perspectives.²⁷ In this respect, and in view of the points raised above, any student of Latin American international politics of the 1990s must, at the very least, devote their effort to a explanatory and systematic case analysis of foreign policy which can be utilised for comparative study and, possibly, for new theory building by the next generation of scholars.

1.2. Framework for Foreign Policy Analysis

1.2.1. What is Foreign Policy?

Foreign Policy and International Relations

There have been many attempts to define these terms but little agreement upon which are the most accurate or where the exact distinctions are between them. Hosti defines 'foreign policy' as "the actions of a state toward external environment and the conditions - usually domestic - under which those actions are formulated."²⁸ According to this definition, it is possible to define two characteristics of foreign policy: first, the actions of a state toward an external entity, and second, the fact that these foreign policy actions are uni-directional. On the other hand, 'international relations' is defined as "all forms of interaction between the members of separate societies, whether government-sponsored or not."²⁹ Therefore, primary distinction between 'foreign policy' and 'international relations' can be made in terms of: first, actors, and second, presence of interactions. This means that the object of 'foreign policy' study is primarily objectives and determinant variables affecting their choice,

²⁷ Van Klaveren is one of the few academics who has emphasised a necessity for "the presence of a comparative awareness in individual studies." See Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies", p.16.

²⁸ Holsti, K.J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, Fourth Edition, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1976, p.19.

²⁹ *ibid.*, p.19.

while 'international relations' are more concerned with the interactive function between players. Although the study of 'foreign policy' may lie within the study of 'international relations' in that the 'foreign policy' of a state can be identified in a state's 'international relations,' it should be differentiated because the former does not concern the reactions of the external environment unless they influence a state's foreign policy.³⁰ Thus, the interactive feature is less emphasised in the study of foreign policy. Consequently, whereas 'foreign policy' means actions, 'international relations' is a situation created by actions and responses between international actors.

Foreign policy is a state behaviour

The study of foreign policies can be made difficult by confusion concerning which actions are to be considered foreign policy. Although people do not agree on exactly what should be included in the category of foreign policy, it is certain that "they are concerned with the policies that states declare, with the decisions taken within governmental circles, with the actions actually taken by governments and their official representatives."³¹ While foreign policy is generally regarded as action taken by governments as noted before, it is quite another matter whether the target of foreign policy is limited to governments. Even if some suggested limiting the analysis to the governmental level because "governmental policies toward foreign investors and toward transnational actors (particularly multinational corporations and subregional political groupings) make precise specification of the concept difficult,"³² it is more rational to see governmental action towards private investors and transnational actors as a kind of foreign policy. It is, furthermore, more sensible to include these private sectors as one of the components of foreign policy considering the significant implication of the role of foreign investors and MNCs.³³

³⁰ If the reactions of the external environment do influence one's foreign policy, they become external determinants.

³¹ Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey, World Politics, the Menu for Choice, W.H. Freeman and Company, New York, 1981, p.188.

³² Lincoln, Jennie K., "Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions", p.4.

³³ Otherwise we might have to run the risk of excluding the nationalisation of the copper industry of the Allende government from this analysis.

Foreign policy is continuous

Even if some issues may last for a specific time only, a certain pattern of foreign policy or international relations of a country does not end at a particular date or with the end of a government. Russett and Starr, in this respect, argued that, “[t]he process of making and implementing decisions to get others outside one’s boundaries to behave in a manner useful to oneself is never-ending as long as there are states of some sort.”³⁴ In Latin America however, policies have been changed too frequently for specific purposes to insist on the continuity of patterns of behaviour. Repeated and often unconstitutional changes of regime as well as economic policy have contributed this. However, some continuous policies with certain patterns can be found, such as the *Argentine-Brazilian rivalries*, and *Bolivia against Chile and Peru for access to the Pacific Ocean*. Although the number of cases of this pattern might be much smaller than those in the developed world, they have always been situated in the centre of policy priorities.

Foreign policy is ‘past politics’

Assuming that one major purpose of studying social science is ‘prediction,’ one interesting criticism is that the status of foreign policy as a social science should be challenged when international politics cannot provide any firm basis for predicting the future. Other social sciences seem much better at doing this. Economists, after all, are always making predictions - about balance of payments problems, levels of inflation, growth potential, etc. Political scientists can use psychology and other tools to predict election outcomes, public reactions, future developments in political parties and organisations; while sociologists can often make telling predictions regarding social problems after having worked with minorities, prisoners, drug addicts and criminals. International Relations specialists, on the other hand, always seem “much more coy about their particular discipline.”³⁵ It has rarely seen any kind of prediction concerning, for instance, the 1973 oil crisis or the Falkland/Malvinas War, all of

³⁴ Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey, *World Politics, the Menu for Choice*, p.188.

³⁵ See Sked, Alan, “The Study of International Relations: A Historian’s View”, in Dyer, Hugh and Mangasarian, Leon (eds.), *The Study of International Relations - the State of the Art*, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989, p.92.

which surprised many experts and decision makers. So, why has international politics has failed to predict the future, when other social sciences, to say nothing of the certainty of natural sciences, are able to? This is probably because most devices used in foreign policy and international relations studies are limited to explanation or generalisation of historical affairs, and are neither current or futuristic. Even these attempts have only been successful when specialists have built up generalisations based on correct historical examples and data.³⁶

1.2.2. Three Approaches

This section directly concerns the design of the framework for the case study of Chilean foreign policy under the assumption that ‘theory has relevance to anyone interested in systematic analysis of foreign policy.’ In this respect, it is necessary to briefly review three main approaches for foreign policy study: *the classic approach*, *the scientific approach*, and *the hybrid approach*.

The classic approach, in other words, the ‘conceptual models’ perspective, examines foreign relations using historical or geographical basis in descriptive form.³⁷ Most of the studies on contemporary Latin America have been implemented by this classic-descriptive method as already pointed out. This group normally suffers from being too descriptive and from hardly making any real effort to incorporate the ultimate aim of social science research, theory building. Furthermore, it fails to provide the logical steps taken to determine which patterns of behaviour - or factors - tend to be dominant in which circumstances.

The scientific approach, undertaken almost exclusively by North American political scientists, was directly influenced by behaviourism assuming that social science is concerned with generalisations about classes or types of phenomena, which can be

³⁶ For an interesting study with extensive numbers of cases about the unpredictability of foreign affairs, see Johnson, Richard A., The Administration of United States Foreign Policy, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1971, pp.4-7.

³⁷ See Hill, Christopher, “A Theoretical Introduction”, in Wallace, William, and Paterson, William (eds.), Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1979, p.8.

achieved by setting variables, quantifying data and comparison. The problem of this type of scientific research is that it usually involves built-in assumptions and values derived from the US experience in the bipolarised world system and which are usually not appropriate to apply to the cases of smaller nations.³⁸

The line dividing a historian's classic approach to foreign policy from scientific research is more or less clear enough to distinguish the different concerns of the two approaches. While the supporters of the scientific approach seek to explain actions of nations in relation to global configurations of power or to discern behavioural uniformities in the interactions of nation-states, historians focus on unique national behaviour and on the region's specific attributes and traditions. As Sasson pointed out, "[scientific] [f]oreign policy studies have been left to historians specialising in diplomatic history."³⁹

On the other hand, *the hybrid approach*, adopted in this study, provides an alternative middle road although it is "less clearly articulated as a separate approach"⁴⁰ than the above mentioned dominant methods. This method attempts to provide a link between the assumption and attitude of the scientific approach and the historical and conceptual understanding of the classic approach. Since the theoretical activity in the field of foreign policy study has not yet reached a level of general theory, this approach aims to gauge the extent to which determinant variables have influence. In other words, how particular factors/variables in foreign policy implementation operate is the fundamental question of this type of analysis. This is a balanced approach with appropriate historical consideration as well as carefully selected variables, since the study of international politics is generally concerned with process and patterns of

³⁸ It may be interesting to introduce the work of Voorhoeve concerning Dutch foreign policy. Although he utilised an issue-oriented descriptive method, he tried to measure the importance of each political issue, such as domestic affairs, foreign affairs, national security and European co-operation. Voorhoeve analysed and quantified the speech and the declarations of Dutch decision makers. Issues in the first quarter of the speech and/or declarations were multiplied by 1.25, in the second and third by 1.00, and in the last by 0.75. His attempt at modelling a non-US country is meaningful, but the choice of particular weight is debatable as he himself admitted. See, Voorhoeve, Joris J. C., Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979, pp.64-5.

³⁹ Sasson, Donald, "The Making of Italian Foreign Policy", in Wallace, William, and Paterson, William, Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe, p.83.

⁴⁰ Hill, Christopher, "A Theoretical Introduction", p.9.

behaviour found in many historical contexts. At the same time, it suggests “a uniform approach for analysing foreign policy, so that case studies may be easily compared, and it is explicitly concerned with concepts, generalisations, and causes.”⁴¹ The statement of Krippendorff, from a historian’s point of view, is quite significant in this sense:

What is largely absent in Latin American International Relations theory is the realisation that such theory has to be historical: not in the sense of, again, hypothesis testing based on historical data, but in the sense of a historical understanding and conceptualisation of the international system and of the emergence of the United States as a hegemonic power, as *the* hegemonic power today. ... But a theory based upon history, working with historical categories (not historical data), interpreting the structures of the present in the light of the past requires also a creative incorporation and learning from the thinking about politics on the part of the great political philosophers of the past as our contemporaries.⁴²

Therefore, the *hybrid approach* basically aims to undertake conceptual understanding of foreign policy with great emphasis on generalisations and theoretical contribution.⁴³ In this respect, this research under the *hybrid approach* basically follows the notion of the *scientific approach* that ‘social science is concerned with generalisations about classes or types of phenomena, so as to develop a theory,’ but emphasise the historical understanding of foreign policy. Ultimately it is attempted to correspond to what Atkins pointed out:

..., a number of valuable studies of sound scholarship have dealt with the international relations of Latin America, but a need exists for a topically complete, factually current, introductory level general survey using political science concepts.⁴⁴


⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.10.

⁴² Krippendorff, Ekkehart, “The Dominance of American Approaches in International Relations”, in Dyer, Hugh and Mangasarian, Leon (eds.), The Study of International Relations - the State of the Art, p.38.

⁴³ In order to make a theoretical contribution to the subject, one must not only find patterns or uniformities of foreign policy, but “one must specify the distinct values that foreign policy can entail or can assume over time.” That is to say, one must also suggest how foreign policy can vary within different environments. See Coleman, Kenneth, “On Comparing Foreign Policies: Comments on Van Klaveren”, in Muñoz, H., and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.23.

⁴⁴ Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.xiii.

In the light of the above discussion, therefore, it can be suggested that five stages are essential for theory building and development in the study of foreign policy.



This research directly concerns the first and second stages considered to be essential processes, in order to meet the extensive demands for the comprehensive case study which could provide the more macroscopic and expansive background for a comparative study, and, at the same time, to build a systematic and practical mechanism for the next stage of comparative study. In this respect, although some comparisons between the two Chilean regimes are attempted in this research, they will only be dealt with in a descriptive form. This is because comparative study tends to be - or should be - more concerned with particular foreign policy under more directive framework rather than with foreign policy in general. In the following sections, a preliminary research model based on *the hybrid approach* will be built and a further examination of research agendas - the *what* and *why* of foreign policy - will be implemented.

1.2.3. Research Agendas

What kind of perspectives should be considered is another vital question when studying foreign policies. Most studies and reviews of the theories tend to suggest

⁴⁵ A definition of theory which suits this study's purpose is suggested by Singer. According to him, theory can be defined as "a fairly large (but unspecified) amount of descriptive, correlational, and explanatory knowledge which has been assembled into a logical and coherent whole." (Singer, J. David, "Theorists and Empirists: The Two-Culture Problem in International Politics", in Rosenau, James N., Davis, Vincent, and East, Maurice A. (eds.), *The Analysis of International Politics*, Free Press, New York, 1972, pp.80-95.)

various agendas for studying the issue, which normally include *determinant variables, decision-making structures and processes, contents of individual foreign policies, consequences of foreign policies* and *foreign policy objectives and means*.⁴⁶

Among these, three main questions regarding foreign policy: *what, why* and *how*, seem to be the most compact way of classifying research agendas, as Mujal-Leon suggested. According to him, the *what* of foreign policy concerns “the definition and measurement of the foreign policy output,”⁴⁷ which has been a largely neglected field in the Latin American context:

Does the general label “foreign policy” mean general objectives, specific behavior (acts or decisions), or objectives and behavior combined? ... Textbooks that are supposed to single out major problems and to synthesize their solutions are also neglectful. Even an overview of foreign policy analysis published recently still defines the object of the field as the “hows and whys of state behavior.” The “what” remains undefined, and is consequently easily overlooked in the analysis.⁴⁸

In contrast to the absence of the *what*, the majority of existing literature has incorporated the second agenda of the *why*, which directly concerns determinants of foreign policy. On the other hand, while the *how* question of the decision making

⁴⁶ The list of the sets of agendas is endless. In the Latin American context, Mares suggested *geopolitics, economic structure, institutional frameworks for policy-making, and national cultures* as “the most promising areas to explore” (Mares, David, “Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: The Burden of the Past, the Hope for the Future”, Latin American Research Review, 29:1, 1994, p.237.) Wilhelmy suggested *actors, agendas and processes*. (See Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile”, in Russell, Roberto (ed.), Política Exterior y Toma de Decisiones en América Latina, GEL, BS AS, 1990, p.136.) Meanwhile, Ferris and Lincoln listed *external and internal determinants, decision-making structures and processes, substantive contents of individual foreign policies* and finally *subsequent consequences of foreign policy behavior*. (See Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie, “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Latin American Governments as Actors in the International System”, pp.14-5.) In a slightly different dimension, Atkins divided a country’s foreign policy process into two stages: *inputs initiated with objectives* and *outputs managed by means*. (See Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.47) On the other hand, Moon suggested that “any comprehensive understanding of foreign policy must eventually consider all four dimensions of behaviour: *affective relations, position taking on global issues, problem-oriented behavior, and economic policy*.” (Moon, Bruce, “Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”, in Hermann, Kegley and Rosenau (eds.), New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1987, p.47.)

⁴⁷ Mujal-Leon, E, “Perspectives on Soviet-Latin American Relations”, Washington Quarterly, 9:4, 1986, p.167.

⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.468.

process has been extensively addressed in case studies of developed countries, it should be carefully treated because firstly, it may cause confusion with the elite variable of the *why* question and secondly, it is best suited for the application of behaviourism which forms the base of empirical or social 'scientific' study. Hence, one of the major concerns of this study, the creation of an analysing device for studying the foreign policy of Chile, will be limited to the questions of both *what* and *why* by making use of some of the existing foreign policy determinant variables and, at the same time, further developing the idea of *Issue Areas* which were initially suggested by Rosenau and then renovated by Ferris in the Latin American perspective.

In order to analyse the processes and the determinants of foreign policy, this research includes historical descriptions of specific policy decisions and actions taken by the Chilean government. Foreign policy orientations are then explained in terms of governmental actions in response to one or more determinant variables.

1.2.4. The What of Foreign Policy: Issue Areas

The first challenge in constructing a framework is to integrate specific cases and policies into the theoretical context by establishing exactly what phenomena need to be explained. The most convenient way of doing this will be systematic grouping of cases under similar topics. In the survey of current Latin American foreign relations studies, Muñoz suggested three main topics which can be considered in the analysis: firstly, "the desire to maximize national and regional autonomy," secondly, "the need to advance towards development," and lastly, "the decisive importance of the United States for all the countries of the region."⁴⁹ However, his grouping points more at the broad meaning of research agenda than at the *what* of foreign policy, especially when he mentions the importance of the US, which can be a major factor in Latin American international politics but cannot be treated on the same level as 'national security' or 'autonomy' in framework design.

⁴⁹ Muñoz, Heraldo, "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations", p.130.

One methodological attempt which has been paid a certain degree of attention is *Issue Areas* which was originally introduced by Rosenau to explain policy making processes, *i.e.* the *How* question.⁵⁰ According to Faurby, who examined the foreign policy making of Scandinavian countries, this concept is useful to a great extent for the generalisation of foreign policies:

Issue-areas are defined as clusters of issues having some similarity. Whereas issues can be short lived, issue-areas are of a more permanent character. The idea of dividing foreign policies into different issue-areas rests on the notion that there is no single general process of foreign policy making, but different processes depending upon the issue-area.⁵¹

A reformation of Rosenau's concept in the Latin American context was undertaken by Elizabeth Ferris, who re-organised *Issue Areas* for the study of the *what* of foreign policy. Ferris basically divides issues into three sub-issues: *Military-Strategic*, *Economic-Developmental*, and *Status-Diplomatic Area*.

- *Military-Strategic Area* covers security issues, such as territorial disputes, traditional rivalries, security (military) alliances, military aid and logistical issues.
- *Economic-Developmental Area* deals with trade policy, financial issues including policies to obtain investments, loans, aid and external financing, and regional integration.
- *Status-Diplomatic Area* concentrates on routine diplomatic relations, participation in regional and international organisations, and bilateral and multilateral agreements on cultural, tourism, education, and health issues.⁵²

⁵⁰ See Rosenau, James, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, The Free Press, New York, 1971.

⁵¹ Faurby, Ib, "Foreign Policy Making in Scandinavia", in Wallace, William, and Paterson, William (eds.), *Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe*, p.125.

⁵² See Ferris, Elizabeth, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", Table 15.1.

Ferris also attempted to classify between the regional and global level “for more systematic cross-national comparisons.”⁵³ However, although it may be useful at a later stage of comparative research, this dimension will be excluded from this study for two main reasons. First, it would make the analysis more complicated in relation to determinant variables by producing two levels of generalisations, which may lead the research into another variation of a descriptive one with nothing but a simple list of issues and levels. Second, the assumption, with the definite distinction between regional and global levels, that a country implements different foreign policy in the same *area*, is somewhat contradictory to the basic notion of *Issue Areas*. When an issue deals with a particular phenomenon, it may have same character regardless of being ‘regional’ or ‘global.’ For instance, Ferris included “policies to obtain new foreign markets, investments, and loans...” in the *Global level of Economic-Developmental Area*. However, ‘obtaining new markets and investments’ is also an important aspect of regional policy.

Table 1.1. *Issue Areas and Contents*

<i>Issue Areas</i>	Contents
<i>Military-Strategic</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - territorial issues and traditional rivalries - military aid and arms flow - ideological alliances - security (military) alliances
<i>Economic-Developmental</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - commercial relations (including policies to obtain markets) - financial issues (including policies to obtain investments, loans, aid and debt refinancing) - nationalisation of inland foreign assets - regional integration - economic and technological co-operation
<i>Status-Diplomatic</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - diplomatic relations - bilateral and multilateral agreements on cultural, tourism, education, and health issues - participation in regional and international organisations - Third World movement - human rights issues (including granting political asylum)

Source: Compiled and amended by the author based on Ferris’ Model in Ferris, Elizabeth, “Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy”, p.273.

⁵³ See *ibid.*, p.273, Table 15.1.

In this sense, this study will be based on a simplified *Issue Areas* survey model by eliminating the regional and global distinction in order to address the *what* question, as briefly illustrated in **Table 1.1**. Finally, it is important to remember that the *Issue Areas* survey tends to deal with the elements of both ‘foreign policy’ and ‘international relations.’ It is assumed in this study that ‘foreign policy’ can be identified within ‘international relations’ where a state is involved. Therefore, the interactive issues and cases of ‘international relations’ will be utilised in order to identify Chilean foreign policy and its orientations.

Military-Strategic Area

The *Military-Strategic Area* fundamentally concerns aspects of the national security of a state’s foreign policy. Without doubt, protecting national sovereignty from outside threat or aggression is a major goal of foreign policy. As the extra-continental threat to Latin America declined in the twentieth century and their foreign policies were designed in co-operation with the anti-Communism campaign of the US, the region subsequently became dependent on US power in regional security matters with the birth of the inter-American security system.

At the same time, inter-state conflicts within the region are still regarded as serious threats to national sovereignty and are a major policy issue in this *Area*. Without attempting here to review the complete history of Latin American inter-state relations, it is however possible to claim that unsettled national boundaries gave rise to a continuous flow of relations which have existed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and which, by and large, remain a key element of the foreign policies of the Latin American countries to this day. These sets of relations include: the boundary disputes between Argentina and Chile, the conflicts between Chile, Bolivia and Peru, and those between Ecuador, Peru and Colombia. Furthermore, how the sentiments of traditional rivalries can affect their foreign policy behaviour is also an important issue in Latin America, as is the case of the traditional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil.

Even if extra-continental players have had several important territorial and strategic interests in Latin America, no state outside the hemisphere has viewed Latin America in terms of primary national security considerations, and *vice versa*. Nor have they made significant efforts to export their national ideologies to the region. Even the Soviet Union has placed less emphasis on ideological or military concerns than on other matters.⁵⁴ Therefore, the issues of *Military-Strategic Area* tend to be highly regional - but essentially including the US - in their nature. An important extra-hemispheric issue will be that of arms procurement, as many cases, particularly in the 1970s, revealed independent efforts of Latin America to diversify the sources of military equipment, especially to the European suppliers. Whatever the causes were, US sanctions or their own desire to minimise their dependence on the US, the issue of arms cannot be overlooked.

Economic-Developmental Area

Issues in the *Economic-Developmental Area*, which have traditionally deserved serious attention in the economic history of Latin America, had been fundamentally characterised by structural 'economic monoculturalism' until the 19th century:

... national income depends heavily on the export of a few, perhaps only one or two, agricultural or mineral items, causing national economies to be strongly affected by the vagaries of world markets. Stagnation is averted as long as full export market demands exist, but economies tend to deteriorate when export products must compete in markets characterized by declining prices.⁵⁵

More recently, although the 'monoculturalism' was more or less overcome in many parts of the region, the foreign trade of every state has been still crucial to their economic survival. Not only because government revenues largely rely on foreign trade and financial aid, but also because exports are required to generate the foreign currency necessary to pay for essential imports and to service foreign debt. This unique situation has produced a common dilemma in Latin America: national development and autonomy *vis-à-vis* dependency. In order to solve this dilemma,

⁵⁴ Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, pp.54-55.

⁵⁵ *ibid.*, p.33.

“the tactics of playing off great powers and participating in international organizations and other multilateral associations are conspicuous in foreign economic policy.”⁵⁶ Therefore, the multilateral foreign economic policy and bargaining with the US have been major concerns of Latin American decision makers. At the same time, the *Economic-Developmental Area* of Latin American foreign policies includes not only traditional concerns with foreign trade and investment, but also newer concerns with regard to international economic institutions, expropriation of foreign enterprises, regional integration, foreign economic aid and developmentalism in general.

The inter-relationship between the policies of this *Area* and determinant variables - for example, structural constraints posed by a nation's economic dependence on the outside world, or the development strategy - can be an exciting area of enquiry. Even if the above economic variables are major determinant factors of the *Economic-Developmental Area*, other variables tend to play an equally important role. Lincoln suggested that processes of economic integration and developmental nationalism have to be analysed partly as the result of internal determinants such as “national attributes, regime orientation, domestic social forces, and specific national experiences,”⁵⁷ and not solely of external determinants. In other words, the importance of national security in the *Economic-Developmental Area* in Latin American foreign policy is that it has been equated with national development.⁵⁸ More specifically, many Latin American military governments which emerged in the 1960s, perceived national development - especially economic development - “to be in the interest of the military itself to be able to purchase the necessary military hardware to maintain a secure position in the regional balance of power.”⁵⁹ Therefore, the complex nature of the weak economic status of Latin America obligates researchers to undertake a more careful examination of determinant variables of this area.

⁵⁶ *ibid.*, p.157.

⁵⁷ Lincoln, Jennie K., “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions”, p.10.

⁵⁸ This perspective was particularly notable in Peru and Brazil.

⁵⁹ *ibid.*, p.14. Also see Ferris, Elizabeth, “Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy”, p.272.

Status-Diplomatic Area

The last *Issue Area* concerns the routine interactions between the states which are not included in the previous two areas. As seen in **Table 1.1.**, the *Status-Diplomatic Area* covers Latin American foreign policy action in the evolution of diplomatic relations, bilateral and multilateral agreements, Third World movements and Human Rights issues. Although this area incorporates a wider range of issues than the others, a further delineation within the group may not be practically advantageous. For instance, the (neo-)functionalism approach of many governments has complicated the analysis in terms of the ultimate purpose of their behaviour in this *Area*, e.g. cultural and educational exchanges are primarily used in Latin America as ways of improving relations with other countries and only secondarily as attempts to improve the education of culture at home.

1.2.5. The Why of Foreign Policy: Determinant Variables

A further theoretical problem in foreign policy analysis is the selection of determinant variables. As Faurby pointed out, “the empirical literature is full of examples of overdetermined explanations of foreign policy behaviour.”⁶⁰ There are a wide variety of ways in which to explain the foreign policies of states but no commonly agreed form. A classic set of variables for foreign policy analysis was presented by James Rosenau in the mid-1960s. All possible independent variables or influences on foreign policy, he claimed, could be included into five categories: first, “idiosyncratic(having to do with the characteristics of individual decision makers)”;

second, “the role (of decision makers)”;

third, “governmental”;

fourth, “societal and

fifth, systemic influences - all the stimuli and influences from the outside.”⁶¹

⁶⁰ Faurby, Ib, “Foreign Policy Making in Scandinavia”, in Wallace, William, and Paterson, William (eds.), Foreign Policy Making in Western Europe, Saxon House, Farnborough, 1979, p.106.

⁶¹ Rosenau, James in Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey, World Politics, the Menu for Choice, pp.192-3. The sets of variables are endless. For variables from the psychological point of view, see Davis, Harold Eugene, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies”, p.11. Also, Davis, Harold Eugene, Fiman, John and Peck, Ta emphasised rational choices among concrete alternatives. See Davis, Harold Eugene., Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History. An Introduction, p.1; Concerning determinants of foreign economy policy, see Moon, Bruce, “Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy”, p.44; Richardson tested four

Table 1.2. Two Bodies of Leading Latin American Foreign Policy Literature

	<i>Dependency Approach</i>	<i>Authoritarian and Corporatist Approach</i>
<i>Determinant Factors</i>	Economic Underdevelopment, External Factors	Latin American Political Culture
<i>Strength</i>	Being unique Latin American (and the Third World in general)	Making useful distinction between Latin America and the rest of the world
<i>Weakness</i>	To explain Latin America's economic underdevelopment, not for foreign policy behaviours	Less useful for differentiating between Latin American governments

Source: Compiled by the author based on the article Ferris, Elizabeth, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", pp.269-70.

In the Latin American sphere, the most widely studied variables have been 'economic dependency' and 'political culture' (or domestic politics), each forming a basis of two common approaches: *Dependency* and the *Authoritarian/Corporatist approach*, respectively.⁶² Although both of the approaches offer insights into Latin American foreign policy behaviour, as **Table 1.2.** shows, neither of them are sufficient to stand by themselves to form a basis for a comprehensive framework for studying foreign policy,⁶³ in that the former tends to ignore the domestic nature of foreign policy and the latter does not differentiate countries of the region.

hypothesis linking dependency with four subtypes of compliant behaviour. See Richardson in Mujal-Leon, E, "Perspectives on Soviet-Latin American Relations", p.474.

⁶² Many academics also suggested other sets of variables for Latin American foreign policies apart from those included in the text. For more, see Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie, "Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Latin American Governments as Actors in the International System", in Lincoln, p.14-5; Yale Ferguson categorised the theoretical approaches to analysing Interamerican relations according to three levels [of variables]: *individual level, state level and international system level*. See Ferguson, Yale, "Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Interamerican Relations", *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 19:1, 1977, pp.3-34. On the other hand, prominent Latin American theorist Tomassini, Luciano, suggested: *la visión o interpretación que tenga un país del context externo; la cultura cívica, el sistema político o sistema político; carácter nacional o global and marco institucional en que se elabora la política*. See Tomassini, Luciano, *Teoría y Práctica de la Política Internacional*, Universidad de Católica, Santiago, 1989, pp.148-152.

⁶³ Ferris, Elizabeth, "Toward a Theory for the Comparative Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policy", p.270.

This research will make use of two existing methods. First, a widely-accepted classification that distinguishes between internal and external variables and second, a modified set of variables based on the following comprehensive list of McGowan and Shapiro:

1. *Individual* variables - characteristics of foreign policy makers
2. *Elite* variables - aggregate characteristics of the country's foreign policy elite
3. *Establishment* variables - organizational features of a nation's foreign policy and national security departments
4. *Political* variables - political process and domestic environment within a country
5. *Governmental* variables - structural attributes of the political system and nation as a whole
6. *Economic* variables - economic structure and processes of a country regarding its foreign policies.
7. *Societal* variables - social structure, population, population growth rate, social stratification patterns
8. *Cultural* variables - cultural systems of national societies, degree of cultural pluralism, patterns of national identity, ideology, race, religion
9. *Linkage* variables - historical traces of the actor's past foreign policy behavior
10. *Others' policies* variables - actions of other international actors directed at the society or societies under analysis
11. *Systemic* variables - sociopolitical and physical environment of the actor, such as geographical position, number of neighbors, and characteristics of the international system at a given point in time
12. *Decision-making* variables - decision making process of foreign policy⁶⁴

The distinction between the internal and external variables is necessary to provide certain potency to, or at least to preserve, the less explored internal variables, since it has been frequently and excessively assumed that the foreign policy of Latin America is mainly a reflection of and reaction to events located abroad. This aspect is not completely ignored among Latin American internationalists. Van Klaveren suggested three regime-oriented (internal) variables, according to, "the form of political organization," "development strategy" and "historical tradition of international

⁶⁴ By order of 'Rapid change', 'Slow change', 'No change' in McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1973, pp.42-51.

relations.”⁶⁵ Wilhelmy, another leading Chilean scholar in this field, presented a rather confusing set of variables in the comparative study between Chile, Argentina and Brazil while he still maintained the separation of the internal and external variables.⁶⁶ Although not all of the sets of variables suggested are analytically viable, or theoretically compatible with the current trend of foreign policy study, it is fortunate to have, at least, an extensive list of variables to choose from. **Table 1.3.** shows the foreign policy determinant variables selected for this study. While internal variables with a temporary nature are regime oriented, those with a persistent nature tend to be influenced by tradition. With respect to the external variables, geopolitics and dependency are more likely structural rather than situational while others’ policies can have all four characters, particularly situational. Before the *Issue Areas* of the Chilean foreign policy are assessed, an pre-examination of some internal variables of the two Chilean regimes, as well as deeper theoretical implications, will be attempted in the **Chapter II**, in order to provide more concrete basis for the *Issue Area* survey. The pre-identifiable variables will include: first, those with a persistent nature, *i.e.* historical linkage; ideology, and the elite;⁶⁷ second, that with a temporary nature but not situational: the development model. The specific role of domestic politics will be addressed in the *Issue Areas* chapters since its general implications to foreign policy tends to be more abstract, thus situational, than other variables.

⁶⁵ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies,” pp.11-12.

⁶⁶ Wilhelmy set *Diplomatic Tradition, Territorial Situation, Demographic Development, Social Development, Economic Development, Interest Group, Political Party System, Government and Bureaucracy* as internal variables, against *International Political System, Bilateral Relations with the United States, the European countries, the Socialist Countries, the Third World countries, Latin America, and the relations between themselves (Chile, Argentina, Brazil)* as external variables. He noted that the comparative study between three countries could be implemented within “... aspects or factors of the functioning of internal and external variables.” It should be pointed out that his choice of external variables is irrational by including concrete bilateral relations in the external variables. Furthermore, when he argues in the conclusion that “the most favourable factor in the foreign policy of Chile is the relations with the neighbouring countries...,” the word ‘factor’ seems to be misused. (See Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Políticas Exteriores Comparadas: Chile, Argentina, Brasil”, in Cursos y Seminarios del Instituto de Ciencia Política : Política y Relaciones Internacionales, 1988, p.82.) It is possible to compare between, say, the relations between Chile and the US, and that between Argentina and the US in a descriptive basis as he did. However, the specific relations can not be determinant variables on the same level as the *international political system* or the *diplomatic tradition*, but they are objects - the components of the *Issue Areas* in our terms, of foreign policy studies. See, pp.72-83.

⁶⁷ The role of the military in each regime will be illustrated in the analysis of *Issue Areas*.

Table 1.3. Setting of Determinant Variables

	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Character</i>
Internal Variables	Historical Linkage	Persistent
	Ideology	Persistent; Temporary
	Domestic Politics	Temporary / Situational
	Development Model	Temporary
	Elite	Persistent; Temporary
External Variables	Geopolitics	Persistent / Structural
	Dependency	Persistent / Structural
	Others' Policies	Persistent; Temporary / Structural; Situational

Note: Characters of variables are determined under the following assumptions:

Persistent: a variable which is likely to be influenced by the traditional behaviour of a country

Temporary: a variable which depends on a regime's idiosyncrasy

Structural: a pre-determined external factor *vis-à-vis* the international environment

Situational: a factor with a highly situational character

This research has not attempted to include the whole set of variables suggested by McGowan and Shapiro. Neither has it tried to incorporate as many variables as possible. If it had, it would have been an extremely complicated process consisting of a web of variables and links with *Issue Areas*, possibly only manageable by a pure quantitative/scientific method. Rather, it has been attempted to make it as compact as possible to minimise overlaps between the variables. Nevertheless, the intention has not been to completely eliminate them, but to reveal the complexity of foreign policy determinants in a Latin American state by showing certain necessary overlaps. That is because this research should begin with the notion that the selected variables are by no means mutually exclusive: instead, that they tend to complement each other, possibly guiding and exposing new dimensions. This is surveyed in the **Chapter IV and V** concerning *Issue Areas* of Chilean foreign policy. An attempt will be made to determine the 'relative potencies' of these independent variables, although at a descriptive level, so as to detect the patterns of linkage between the determinant variables and *Issue Areas*.

In this Chapter, the theoretical framework for the case study of Chilean foreign policy based on the determinant variables and *Issue Areas*, was created. Further theoretical

investigations, particularly those concerning variables, will also be of interest in the forthcoming two Chapters as well as the actual case study. Before a further theoretical dimension to the study is presented, a historical background of this study, from the angle of Latin American foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the US in the 1970s and 1980s, will be surveyed in the following section.

1.3. The US-Latin American Relations and New Latin American Foreign Policy

Latin America has been characterised in many ways in terms of the aspects, especially in political structure, social stratification and culture, which differentiate Latin America from Afro-Asian countries. The adherence to the principles of a pluralistic Western democracy, even when military dictatorships prevailed, remained very strong and such regimes attempted to provide some type of legitimisation by promising elections or maintaining some sort of parliamentary facade with restricted opposition parties. More recently, it is important to remember that Latin America was the first Third World region in which a democratic system was consolidated in the majority of the countries, if one uses a broad definition of the notion of democracy. The social structure presents such features as the existence of a large middle class in the more developed Latin American countries. The European ingredient in the cultural dimension has left strong traces in fields such as theatre, literature and art. The trade unions and student movements have been powerful pressure groups in the political scene.⁶⁸

Meanwhile, economic perspectives have been assessed in a more diversified fashion. The popular theme of the region's economic vulnerability and underdevelopment *vis-à-vis* the outside environment has been discussed with a great deal of interest. On the other hand, publications written before the economic crisis of the early 1980s often, but cautiously, mentioned the relative economic superiority of Latin America to other parts of the Third World. In turn, this argument has had to be seriously challenged and replaced with the reverse angle in order to explain Latin American economic failure in contrast to the success of the Asian NICs.

⁶⁸ Kaufman, Edy, "Latin America", pp.134-5.

As far as the international politics of the region is concerned, the issues are more complicated due to the complex nature of the field. That is to say, the international politics of Latin America has produced many more features, sometimes differentiated from other parts of the Third World and sometimes identifiable with them. The region has suffered, unbalanced with the political and cultural status, from a serious weak international status like everywhere else in the Third World. For instance, many non-Latin American countries do not regard most of the countries in the region as important to them and do not have interests that depend on the responsiveness of countries in the region. However, one important difference from other regions can be seen in terms of Latin American foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the US.

In his “paradox” thesis, Sánchez pointed out the general Latin American attitude to the US in which, “United States is no more welcome by the governments, members of the society look for the assistance of the North Americans” on one hand, and in which, “the connection with the United States is too much an important agenda for the governments, whereas the people express their hostility against the penetration of the United States.”⁶⁹ This is often described as a ‘love-hate relationship’ and there is a strong heritage of anti-Americanism among intellectuals, reformists and revolutionaries in particular, in Latin America, while, for many others, feelings about the United States are a mixture of “respect for its economic success and internal political system” and “rejection of aspects of its culture and its interference in Latin American internal affairs.”⁷⁰

Even if the connection with the European states has its significance in historical and cultural perspectives, the North-South connection is a decisive aspect in Latin American foreign relations drawing the nations of the region toward each other and particularly toward the United States. This also contains a special significance as the basis of the regionalism behind the various movements for hemispheric unity of some kind. The north-south ties are geographic in origin, but they are also historical,

⁶⁹ Sánchez, Walter, “Política Exterior de América Latina: Agenda de Investigación,” in Sánchez, Walter (ed.) Las Relaciones entre los Países de América Latina, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1980, pp.214-5.

⁷⁰ Biles, Robert, “Perspectives That Make a Difference”, pp.5-6.

economic and political. In some respects they are also ethnic and sociological. Originating in the nineteenth century, these ties have grown to become a major aspect of the economic life of twentieth century Latin America as the United States has come to be the prime source of new capital and a major market for the exports, to say nothing of its political and strategic significance.⁷¹

During World War II and for roughly two decades after, the international behaviour of most Latin American countries became more dominated by their interactions with the United States.⁷² During the presidency of Kennedy and the first part of the administration of Johnson, Latin America was placed as a major consideration of US policy under the Alliance for Progress concept. In the 1970s, however, there were changes and the US-Latin American relations entered a new era with a more independent policy with regard to the northern neighbour, namely new Latin American foreign policy. Therefore, as an important background of forthcoming Chapters, it is necessary to assess the external environments of the period from the viewpoint of US- Latin American Relations.

Although the ultimate purpose of the new Latin American foreign policy, achieving independent status, was pursued through various channels, the most efficient and visible way was the expansion of international contacts. The Latin American countries have done this on a substantial scale since the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly by increasing economic links with the European countries and Japan.

⁷¹ From the US point of view, on the other hand, their interest in Latin America has been expressed in a set of semi-permanent long range goals, in terms of the perceived realities of national security. This set of goals has remained remarkably constant since the beginning of US-Latin American relations in the early nineteenth century, which one author outlined in the following three points:

First, preventing and excluding nonhemispheric influence and control, and assuring the independence and self-determination of Latin America with regard to the other external states.

Second, assuring its own leadership in the western hemisphere and domination of the Caribbean area, as a corollary to the first goal.

Third, maintaining political stability in Latin America, which it has considered necessary to its own security and well-being as well as Latin America's economic and social stability, since the interest of the United States as a major, industrial-metropolitan, status-quo state have been considered by US leaders to be best served in a secure, peaceful, and stable world. (Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.89.)

Hence, US policy to Latin America has been based on certain necessary conditions, the assured stability and security of the region, which should be accomplished before the United States would be able to pursue more proximate goals, such as commercial interests and the democratisation of Latin America.

⁷² Exceptions are, of course, Argentina, to a lesser extent Chile during the war, and Cuba after Castro.

They have also obtained large portions of arms imports from Western Europe and a few other suppliers instead of exclusively relying on the United States. Along with the intensification of existing diplomatic relationships, at the same time, many new links - most notably with Communist countries - have been established. This broadening has gone sufficiently far in a few Latin American countries, so for them the United States is an important, but no longer a dominant or pre-eminent, actor as the following examples of the evolution of US-Latin American relations in the 1970s show:

- The rejection of the US proposal, by OAS foreign ministers, to establish an OAS mission to negotiate a transition in Nicaragua and the idea of sending a multilateral 'peace keeping force' to restore order in that country. Instead, they favoured a proposal of the Andean Group that facilitated the victory of the Sandinistas over the Somoza regime.
- The failure of the US to rally significant regional support for its 1980 effort to boycott the Olympic Games in Moscow.
- The creation of SELA in 1975, which excluded the United States but included Cuba.

The expansion of international contacts has made a substantial contribution to the achievement of independent status for some innovative players such as Peru. For others it has at least contributed "psychologically, enhancing the feeling of independence."⁷³ In view of the situation outlined above, therefore, it is possible to characterise the new Latin American foreign policy in three tiers, as suggested by Drekonja-Kornat:

[Firstly] the policy must be oriented toward the Third World; [secondly] it must work toward a New International Economic Order; and [lastly] because of Latin America's singular geographic position, it must develop a specific attitude toward the United States. In other words, because Latin America and the Caribbean in particular are highly sensitive security zones for the United

⁷³ Cochrane, James, "Characteristics of Contemporary Latin American International Relations", *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 20:4, 1978, p.458.

States, Latin America does not have complete freedom in its foreign policy despite its formal sovereignty.⁷⁴

Then what made the new Latin American policy in the 1970s possible? Three reasons can be suggested here: *Neglectful Policy of the US; Change of the World System; Intensification of Nationalistic Ideology.*

Firstly, after the significant events in the US-Latin American relations in the 1960s, (such as: the humiliating failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961; a massive military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the lack of a Communist threat to the hemisphere) US congressional disillusionment with foreign aid to the Southern Hemisphere resulted in the large decline of available US economic and military assistance funds. Furthermore, President Nixon indicated an abandonment of 'developmentalism': while he referred to the Alliance for Progress as a 'great concept,' he expressed disillusionment with the results of its programmes.⁷⁵ Therefore, the rather neglectful US policy to the southern neighbour made them pursue more independent foreign policy in the 1970s.

Secondly, the evolution of a multipolar system which ended the dominance of the US - Soviet rivalry increased the significance of the Third World in the international configuration.⁷⁶ The global oil crisis of the early 1970s was another factor which relatively enhanced the Latin American position as a main possessor of natural resources. Thereafter, the period of unchallenged US hegemony in the southern hemisphere seemed to have ended, and the objective will of Latin American nations to forge their own policies increased.

Lastly, the nationalistic leaders - both civilian politicians and authoritarian military dictators - who emerged from the political and social movements in Latin America during the late 1960s and early 1970s, began to reject the hegemonic presumption of the United States in the region, by imposing autonomous development goals which

⁷⁴ Drekonja-Kornat, Gerhard, "The Rise of Latin America's Foreign Policy: between Hegemony and Autonomy", p.240-241.

⁷⁵ See Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.103

⁷⁶ For more reasons and cases, see Muñoz, Heraldo, "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations", p.136.

certainly resulted in increasingly independent foreign policies.⁷⁷ They intensified nationalistic ideologies by introducing tighter restrictions and controls on foreign capital and investment with the backing of dependency ideologists. Therefore, the foreign policy axis of Latin American nations has moved to anti-Dependency from anti-Communism of the pre-1970 era. In point of fact, strong commitment to such objectives as security, survival, development and independent status has contributed to the growth of nationalistic sentiments of the decision makers, whose policy objectives and aims to counter the US hegemony were pursued, in the light of the changing international environment. Therefore, Latin American foreign policy strategies shifted to increase interaction on both regional and global levels in the areas of diplomatic contacts, cultural exchanges, arms procurement, economic assistance, private investment and trade relations.

By the early 1980s, this dramatic process undoubtedly accelerated Latin America's foreign policy efforts to achieve political and economic autonomy. Their international linkages with governmental and non-governmental entities were notably increased. Vigorous Latin American leaders argued for greater international respect for the region. This demand reached a climax when their active participation in the special sessions of the UN General Assembly in the mid-1970's resulted in the adoption of the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). With the active role of Venezuela and Mexico, the Third World countries seemed to strengthen their position regarding the Declaration, over and above the opposition of the US, although they were not able to strengthen Group 77's bargaining powers with the North.

However, after the 'Human Rights' period of the Carter administration, the United States sought to reimpose hegemony over the hemisphere again with the arrival of the Republican Reagan administration to power in early 1981. The relative recuperation of the US economy, the fall in oil prices and other raw materials, the failure of the North-South dialogue, and the external debt crisis of Latin American countries have

⁷⁷ See Roett, Riordan, "The Foreign Policy of Latin America", in Macridis, Roy (ed.) Foreign Policy in World Policy, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1985, pp.399-400. For Peruvian and Brazilian examples, see pp.400-403.

produced an intensive debate on whether or not the United States has managed to rebuild its past hegemony.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the Latin American hopes that Western Europe might provide an alternative to the US in terms of source and market have proven to be erroneous. Not only has the EC policy sharply restricted Latin American exports to Europe, but European financing of the hemisphere's foreign debt has not been on concessional terms.⁷⁹

In Latin America, in general, the 1980s was an era of a sweeping democratic renewal. All across the region, military dictatorships fell and were replaced by elected, civilian governments. By the end of the decade, only a few non-democratic leaders remained in power, like General Pinochet in Chile. As the dramatic change of domestic politics suddenly eliminated the nationalistic (and chauvinistic) sentiments of the previous decade in Latin America, it is debatable whether the Reagan administration contributed to the democratisation of the region. In Central America, the Reagan administration's forceful anti-Communist policies did prevent the rise of further leftist governments but had only limited effects with respect to democracy, although it has been often pointed out that one noticeable fact in the 1980s was the 'Centralamericanized' Latin American policy of the US.⁸⁰ In South America, Reagan's early policy of renewing relations with the military governments of the region went against the democratic trend that was sweeping through the area in those years. However, the second Reagan administration attempted to influence factors against the remaining right-wing dictators in Latin America to carry out electoral transitions, with greatly varying results.⁸¹ The crucial question of the Latin American policy of the second Reagan administration was the balance and/or conflict between rhetoric and reality in the use of promoting the democracy theme. Carother may partially provide the answer, by suggesting that "even though promoting democracy

⁷⁸ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations," pp.135-136.

⁷⁹ Intermittently, individual European states, such as Spain under Felipe González, have attempted to identify with Latin America but the results have been primarily casual and diplomatic. See Roett, Riordan, "The Foreign Policy of Latin America", p.399.

⁸⁰ Muñoz, Heraldo, "The Dominant Themes in the Study of Latin America's Foreign Relations," p.136. For details of Reagan Administration's Latin American policy. See also Carothers, Thomas, "The Reagan Years: The 1980s", in Lowenthal, Abraham F. (ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991, p.114.

⁸¹ Therefore, the US favoured successful holding of the 1988 plebiscite in Chile.

did become a substantive element of various policies in later years, the conception of democracy to which the Reagan administration subscribed remained extremely limited.”⁸² The best example of the limited conception of democracy may be found in the Nicaraguan policy of the US when promoting democracy was adopted as a rhetoric cover for the militaristic policy aimed at ousting the Sandinista government.

It has been identified two contrasting stages of the US-Latin American relations in the contemporary history, which can be characterised as ‘the new Latin American foreign policy’ and ‘re-imposed US hegemony into the region.’ It is interesting to see that each stage respectively corresponds the periods of two Chilean regimes of this study’s concern, the Allende regime (1970-73) and the Pinochet regime (1973-90).

⁸² Carothers, Thomas, “The Reagan Years: The 1980s”, p.115.

II. INTERNAL VARIABLES

Most of the decisions that confront the president today represent choices not between good and bad but between bad and worse alternatives.

- Richard Johnson

It has been argued that internal variables that affect the foreign policy behaviour of Latin American countries have received less attention than external factors. It is understandable that, considering the vulnerable status of Latin America in international politics, foreign policy decisions tend to be highly influenced by external settings rather than domestic determinants. Moreover, given the lack of information available to observers concerning the attitudes and the decision making mechanism of individual Latin American states, external variables focusing on the East-West conflict, external economic reliance or the predominant role of the US have naturally attracted more attention. It is equally important to point out that, as argued in the previous chapter, the “relative underestimation of the importance of domestic factors” in foreign policy studies followed by “the scarcity of detailed case studies”⁸³ has directed more scholastic interest to external determinants. However, the omission - or underestimation - should not mean that external factors are solely important and decisive in foreign policy decision making. Hazleton is one of few academics who correctly pointed out the vital importance of the internal variables:

... unless the internal resources and predisposition to act are present in Latin American states, major changes in the international system will likely have little or no bearing on their passive or ineffectual foreign policy orientations.⁸⁴

There is no doubt that the most convenient unit of foreign policy analysis is ‘political regime,’ not only because each regime tends to have a coherent policy in a given period but also a dramatic shift of foreign policy is expected when one regime is

⁸³ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives,” p.10.

⁸⁴ Hazleton, William, “The Foreign Policies of Venezuela and Colombia: Collaboration, Competition and Conflict”, in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, p.155.

replaced by another. As occurred in Argentina during the transition from the military regime to the democratic one of Raúl Alfonsín concerning the issue of support for the campaign against Nicaragua and the FMLN in El Salvador,⁸⁵ a change in foreign policy does often result in the exactly opposite way from the previous regime's. Therefore, the regime oriented approach, in other words, the influence of the type of regime upon external behaviour, has been a particularly interesting research agenda, although it has been widely regarded as an inferior factor compared to external variables in foreign policy making.⁸⁶ The Chilean experience also seems to provide a good example of the vital importance of the inter-relation between the regime type and foreign policy: the long tradition of a democratic system *versus* the authoritarian military regime followed by the violent coup in 1973. In the various attempts of comparative study, examining foreign policy behaviour *via-à-vis* regime type, *i.e.* the structural attributes of the political systems, has been one of the most commonly adopted methods.

In this introductory section, before discussing the set of internal variables, an examination will be made of the viability of using 'political regime' as an independent internal variable and the probability of a direct relationship between foreign policy and the type of political regime, in order to assess a prevailing hypothesis in foreign policy analysis: *the type of government a nation has is reflected in its foreign policy*,⁸⁷ for instance, the more open and democratic a regime, the more constructive, peaceful and friendly its international behaviour.

In the case of Chile, it is widely accepted that during a long period before the 1973 coup the democratic nature of political tradition not only influenced foreign policy outcomes but also became in itself a national capability. Even if some questioned the real value of Chilean democracy,⁸⁸ the fact that prior to 1973 Chile had been

⁸⁵ Cases are drawn from Ferguson, Yale, "Analyzing Latin American Foreign Policies", Latin American Research Review, 22:3, 1987, p.144.

⁸⁶ In Latin America, as might be expected, the primary distinction of regime type can be made between democratic and authoritarian regimes.

⁸⁷ McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, p.93.

⁸⁸ Puryear pointed out the weakness of the Chilean Presidential system with limited "accountability and legislative backing." According to him, Chile could not have enjoyed the classic meaning of democracy - rule of the majority - in her recent history:

categorised as one of the few countries with stable and relatively participatory politics in a region⁸⁹ surrounded by violent and chaotic dictatorial regimes, secured a relatively superior status in her international behaviour. Although it was not an international presence based on smart diplomatic skills or “objective power assets,”⁹⁰ the violent change of the regime in 1973 and the emergence of an unprecedentedly repressive regime not only dramatically altered the style and content of Chilean foreign policy but also removed an important asset: the prestigious international status. Thus, the Chilean experience represents a case supportive of the above mentioned McGowan and Shapiro’s hypothesis in which the international isolation of the military regime contrasts sharply with the relatively prestigious external status of previous democratic governments.

However, it is desirable to be cautious about this direct link in studying Latin American cases, especially as there has been a certain continuity of internal variables despite regime change. As the Argentine experience has shown, each regime has emphasised different aspects of the same major elements, so the role of regime type has often tended to be weakened. In this respect, Tulchin noted as follows,

..., I will content myself with pointing out that Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, three bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, exhibit markedly different patterns of international behavior and that each has altered its international behavior in the course of the period during which it has been a B-A state. ... it does not follow that we can predict the behavior of a nation simply because we know that its political regime is a B-A state. We need to know more about it.⁹¹

... when no candidate achieved a simple majority of the votes in a presidential election, the Constitution required Congress to choose from among presidential candidates, rather than ordering a run-off election that could provide the winner with a popular mandate. In this way of the last five presidents elected through 1970, only Eduardo Frei won a simple majority of the popular vote; the rest were chosen by Congress, after receiving the largest minority of votes in presidential elections. (Puryear, Jeffrey M., Thinking Politics: Intellectuals and Democracy: 1973-1988, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1994, p.26.)

⁸⁹ To a lesser extent, Costa Rica and Uruguay until the 1960s shared the same category with Chile.

⁹⁰ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives,” p.11.

⁹¹ Tulchin, Joseph, “Authoritarian Regimes and Foreign Policy”, in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.188. He also added that “the answer suggested by a careful study of the Argentine case is that it is a contingent variable and should never be taken in dichotomous terms.” (p.197.) For a similar argument concerning the Brazilian case, see Hirst, Monica, “Democratic Transition and Foreign Policy: The Experience of Brazil”, in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, pp.216-229.

As was pointed out before, furthermore, the existence of similar patterns in their external behaviour, especially in terms of ‘policy objectives,’ is one major factor which undermines the direct link between the regime type and foreign policy. In Latin America, the objectives of ‘national security’ and ‘economic survival’ have been pursued in particular, regardless of the regime type: conservative, liberal, dictatorial or democratic.

Therefore, it is not a rational idea to maintain the single-minded observation in terms of a co-relationship between regime type and foreign policy: *i.e.* that a democratic regime results in international co-operation, or an authoritarian military regime in conflict and isolation. It is not worth the risk of setting regime type as a determinant variable since the generalisation based on this normally produces bewildering results mixed with incomparable assumptions and exceptions. Only the comparative research of numerous cases, followed by proper comprehensive study with more appropriate and less expansive research agendas, can reveal the precise relations between a regime type and foreign policy. Yet this link tends to be tentative, since several cases of Latin American foreign policies have already disproved the direct correlation as seen in some success stories of Peruvian and Brazilian military authoritarian governments. On the other hand, democratic regimes such as those in Mexico and Venezuela have not always shown successful results.

Nevertheless, there cannot be any objection to saying that political regime is regarded as the most convenient unit in analysing a country’s domestic or foreign policy. In particular, internal variables which are to be examined are mainly ‘regime oriented variables’ since most of them are largely affected by the type of political regime.⁹² In the forthcoming sections, a set of variables, historical linkage, ideology, domestic politics, development model and elite, will be examined with special attention given to each variable’s character, proposed role and implication in this case study of Chilean foreign policy.

⁹² With the exception of *Linkage* variable which focuses on the structural characteristics and traditional orientations of foreign policy behaviour, all internal variables such as *Ideology*, *Economic Policy*, *Domestic Politics*, and *Elite* are closely linked to regime type. They, therefore, have ‘temporary’ character as can see in **Table 1.3. Setting of Determinant Variables**.

2.1. The Historical Linkage

The historical linkage variable concerns the historical traces and patterns of a country's past foreign policy behaviour including the most recent predecessors' on the assumption that traditions of past foreign economic and political involvement are likely to influence current and future behaviour, such as:

- *Colonial ties strongly affect trade and other transactions between nations.*
- *The pattern of the traditional foreign policy of a country may affect current decision making.*
- *Previous governmental collaboration is positively associated with transactions at a later period.*⁹³

In terms of the historical background of Latin American foreign relations, Davis suggested the 'two axes of relations' as one noticeable perspective of the linkage variable. The first axis is horizontal, in a general east-west direction, in which all the nations of America have certain cultural, political, and economic ties to their European countries of origin. Thus, "the Spanish American nations are linked to Spain, while Haiti and other former French territories have ties to France, Brazil to Portugal, Surinam to the Netherlands, and Trinidad, Jamaica, the other islands of the British West Indies, Guyana and Belize to Great Britain."⁹⁴ The existence of this axis means that Spain's present concern in her ex-colonies in Latin America, and *vice versa*, can possibly be explained in the light of the heritage of the past.

The second axis is, of course, vertical linkage with the US. A good example can be found in the sad story of relations between Mexico and the United States which has contributed to the formation of the Mexican attitude of fear, distrust and resentment of its northern neighbour. It cannot be denied that this historical background has been, to a certain degree, reflected in their sympathetic policy to Castro's Cuba and Allende's Chile as well as the general Mexican policy which has shown a notably

⁹³ See McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, pp.138-9.

⁹⁴ Davis, Harold Eugene., Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction, p.4.

autonomous feature. However, the role of the historical linkage variable is not limited to a matter of counterparts; it primarily covers ideological perspectives of traditional behaviour such as foreign policy *vis-à-vis* international law or defence of the *status quo*.

Furthermore, not only the preservation of tradition but also its breakdown should be paid special attention, particularly in the theoretical aspect in which the importance of other variables is more stressed.⁹⁵ Although the fact that a tradition can be discarded in the face of other determinants' predominance diminishes the importance of the historical linkage variable, tracing implications of historical continuities and disparities in foreign policy is an indispensable process of studying the nature of foreign policy. Moreover, the variable also gains a dialectical importance when the 'diminishing' does not mean the 'termination' of a tradition, but 'adapting' into a new environment and 're-creating' a new tradition which can be linked to future generations' foreign policies, as Chile has experienced.

Until the nineteenth century, traditional Chilean foreign policy promoted "territorial expansion, regional internationalism and extra-continental internationalism"⁹⁶ by aiming to restructure the international system so as to create a favourable environment to assist her own economic development. After the victory of the Pacific War, however, foreign policy during the first half of the twentieth century replaced "the territorial expansionism" with "conservative defense of the status quo in the Interamerican system."⁹⁷ At the same time, Chile began to be incorporated into the international economy "from the beginning of its life as a state," which was initiated by commercial and financial ties with Britain.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Brazilian foreign policy, known to be pursued with the strongest tradition and continuity in Latin America, also experienced the breakdown of historical linkage when the military government ousted Goulart in 1964. See Morandé, José, "Regímenes políticos y política exterior en América Latina: Un comentario", *Opciones*, 12, 1987, p.41.

⁹⁶ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", in Davis, Harold, E. and Wilson, Larman (eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis*, 1975, pp.310-2.

⁹⁷ Wilhelmy, Manfred, *Chilean Foreign Policy: The Frei Government, 1964-1970*, Ph.D. Thesis, Princeton University, Princeton, 1976, pp.345-6.

⁹⁸ See Fernandois, Joaquin, "Chile and the Great Powers", in Morris, Michael (ed.), *Great Power Relations in Argentina, Chile and Antarctica*, Macmillan, London, 1990, pp.77-8. According to him: Britain's prudent and efficient policy has been rewarded with significant influence over Chile up to the present, without the problems inherent in the more complex presence of the United States. (p.78)

During the period of post-World War II democracy, the conduct of Chilean foreign policy contained “an element of pragmatic appraisal of the relevant international power realities”⁹⁹ with special emphasis on international law, the realistic understanding of the world power structure, and the professionalisation of diplomacy.

More recently, this tradition of Chilean foreign policy was more or less preserved until the Alessandri government (1958-1964) whose principal initiatives included reduction of military expenditure, state orientated economic policy and a foreign policy of ‘isolation.’ Although Alessandri government did not particularly support Latin American integration or try to solve territorial disputes with Argentina and Bolivia, the diplomatic and commercial contacts were still confined to the nations of the Atlantic community and Latin America.¹⁰⁰

The priority of the Frei government’s (1964-1970) foreign policy was a change of international conditions inspired by “ideological conceptions in which domestic reform, independence from the great powers, and the need for improved conditions of international political and economic relations were greatly emphasized.”¹⁰¹ Therefore the effort included: emphasis on Andean subregional integration aiming for an increase of domestic production capability; expanded formal and informal diplomatic contacts, notably with the Soviet Union and the East European countries, and increased military relations with the Pentagon. Furthermore, Chile entered into a trade agreement with China in 1966 to sell electrolytic copper and also became the second most important supplier of iron ore to Japan by 1968.¹⁰² Although mutually inter-dependent and effective traditional relations with the US - capital and technology *vis-à-vis* copper and nitrates - were not decisively harmed, the innovative foreign policy initiatives of the Frei government caused some strains in relations with the US when Chile committed itself to the principles of non-intervention and self-

⁹⁹ Fortín, Carlos, “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”, in Hellman, R. and Rosenbaum, H. J. (eds.), Latin America: The Search for a New International Role, p.219.

¹⁰⁰ In a sense, the lack of international vision of the Alessandri government was somewhat affected by the conservative nature of the regime.

¹⁰¹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, Chilean Foreign Policy: The Frei Government, 1964-1970, p.345.

¹⁰² See Cope, Orville G., “Chile”, p.325.

determination by criticising a series of Latin American policies of the US such as the military intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the Alliance for Progress Programme.

A more comprehensive effort to identify the perspectives of traditional Chilean foreign policy was undertaken by Sánchez who suggested four elements: *tendencia americanista*; *nacionalismo político que no es un nacionalismo xenofóbico*; *tendencia al legalismo*; and *la búsqueda de un Sistema Internacional*. According to him, each element is based on a different tradition:

Hay algunos señores de la Política Exterior Chilena, y se me ocurren los Padres fundadores como O'Higgins en el americanismo; Portales en el nacionalismo; Bello en el legalismo; y Balmaceda en la idea de cierto nacionalismo independentista, preocupado de los imperialismos, y alarmado de las tremendas asimetrías que se producen en el juego internacional del Poder.¹⁰³

In view of the brief ideas outlined above, it is possible to identify three traditional elements of Chilean foreign policy conducted for the purpose of *the conservative defense of the status quo: Americanism, Nationalism and Legalism*.

Americanism has produced a tendency for regional co-operation and multilateralism. Generally speaking, regionalism can be expressed in two ways, having either a national or an international aspect. While the former concerns the individual policy of nations “expressed in treaties or other agreements defining common objectives and establishing rules or principles of conduct in their relations with each other,” the international aspect emphasises “the [collective] policies adopted and pursued by regional international bodies.”¹⁰⁴ Inter-relationships with the Latin American countries form an important part of Chilean external behaviour in that the international relations of Chile have been traditionally viewed as basically those with her neighbours and with the United States. However, what makes Chilean

¹⁰³ Sánchez González, Walter, “Chile en sus Relaciones con los Países Vecinos y los Países Andinos en los Años: 1970-1973”, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, 1970-1973, IERIC, 1987, pp.216-7.

¹⁰⁴ Davis, Harold Eugene, Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction, p.10.

Americanism unique is its devotion to the multilateral (international) aspect which can be dated to the forming of the Organisation of American States in 1889. Since then, Chileans have been among the leaders in the creation of such influential regional organisations as CEPAL. Before the adoption of monetarism during the Pinochet regime, Chile had also been an active participant in the Andean Pact.

Nationalism expanded its function to economic developmentalism and resource nationalism. Nationalism is regarded as an important factor in Latin American foreign policy formulation. However, the implication of nationalism is complicated by the lack of a precise and widely accepted definition of the ideology, and by the global phenomenon that the beliefs, attitudes, and emotions that inform nationalistic sentiments vary widely, even within a state. At its simplest, nationalism can be defined as “the belief that humanity is divided up into nations and that all nations have the right to self-government and to determine their own destiny.”¹⁰⁵ Therefore, nationalism tends to seek national self-sufficiency, fear or hate foreigners, and frequently exclude the thought that his nation may be incorrect in any international dispute. However, it is still hard to arrive at an exact definition since, in most historical cases, nationalism is an emotional force which cannot exactly be defined even in a given country or given time. For instance, in the hands of the Jacobins during the post-revolutionary period in France, nationalism was a revolutionary idea which they sought to export to neighbouring peoples. Meanwhile, the mutual fear between the Arab states and Israel is in a sense emotional nationalism each fearing the other’s nationalism. According to Biles, Latin American nationalism has another emotional nature with the strong background of corporative culture:

In the Western tradition, nationalism has been a tool of nation-building, because it means that the citizen gives loyalty to the nation over other allegiances, such as those of personal friendship and ethnicity. In Latin America, however, nationalism often may not mean mutual support of the nation but rather a xenophobic antiforeign sentiment. Citizens of a given Latin American nation at times may not unite to help one another, because they feel more loyalty to subnational groupings than to the nation as a whole. But they often do unite in the face of foreign intervention in their national affairs.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ Adams, Ian, *Political Ideology Today*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1993, p.82.

¹⁰⁶ Biles, Robert, “Perspectives That Make a Difference”, p.5.

On the other hand, Almeyda suggested that Latin American nationalism should serve for: (i) resource nationalism and objecting ‘international division of labour’; (ii) integration and democratisation of society; (iii) resistance to dependency and economic imperialism; (iv) regional economic integration; and (v) basis for socio-economic development.¹⁰⁷ However, while the importance of nationalism in Latin American foreign policy cannot be denied, the concept of nationalism is so vague that building a direct analytical link between nationalism and foreign policy other than in a descriptive form is a hard task. Therefore, it is possible to incorporate some of its varieties and emotional features into other domestic determinants, as Almeyda’s elements imply. For instance, a variation of nationalism such as public pressure may be analysed within the frame of the domestic politics variable. On the other hand, nationalism such as the Allende government’s Resource Nationalism can be a foreign policy ideology of a regime as examined in a later Chapter.

Legalism prevents hostile propaganda and unnecessary warfare or military conflict, and dedicates itself to the settlement of international disputes by arbitration. Based on imperatives of power politics, legalism has been particularly important in a world where violence is commonplace. International law has been seen as the only alternative to force, by which national interests can at least be defended although not enhanced. Davis sees Latin American emphasis on international law in general as a products of “the era in which the nations achieved independence, a response to the need of new nations born of revolution to justify their sovereign existence in a generally hostile world; the nations’ Iberian heritage, which included a tradition of international law based upon the Christian theory of natural law as the law of God.”¹⁰⁸ An example of the legalistic tradition of Chilean foreign policy can be found in the following interesting statistics:

¹⁰⁷ See Almeyda, Clodomiro, Pensando a Chile, Terranova, Santiago, 1986, pp.32-3. Based on this definition, he accused the proclaimed ‘nationalism’ of the Pinochet regime as “el falso nacionalismo del fascismo chileno.”

¹⁰⁸ For further discussion, see Davis, Harold, E., Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction, p.18.

Between November 1946 and September 1982, the position of minister of foreign relations has been filled thirty-two times by twenty-six individuals (some have served in the position more than once). More than 75 percent have been lawyers, with or without an active professional practice. This would indicate that juridical preparation - traditionally in close relationship with political activity - confers advantages for designation to the post. Without a doubt, this factor is related to the tendency, mentioned by diverse observers, toward a juridical or legalist style in Chilean foreign policy.¹⁰⁹

2.2. The Ideology

The role of ideology has been particularly decisive in the international relations of this century. It cannot be denied that the main feature of the global system was the polarisation between the East and the West; and the conflicts between the two blocs were originally based on ideology. Therefore, the ideological perspective has been very useful in understanding sensitive bilateral relations like those between the United States and Cuba, or Israel and the Arabs. According to the *New Encyclopædia Britannica*, ideology is defined as “a form of social or political philosophy in which practical elements upon which action can be based are as prominent as theoretical ones; it is a system of ideas that aspires both to explain the world and to change it.”¹¹⁰ From a historian’s point of view, Blachman and Hellman, defined ideology as follows.

Ideology is taken to be a set of ideas publicly articulated for the express purpose of explaining the past and present historical conditions - how we got to where we are - and for establishing what are legitimate political goals and what are the appropriate political means - where we should be going and how we should/could get there.¹¹¹

The well known sociological definition by Apter is also suitable for inclusion here. According to him, ideology is:

¹⁰⁹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, p.53-4. According to him, only five ministers were MPs or Senators before and/or after serving in the ministry.

¹¹⁰ *The New Encyclopædia Britannica*, 15th Edition, Chicago, 1985, Vol. 20, p.828.

¹¹¹ Blachman, Morris and Hellman, Ronald (eds.), *Terms of Conflict: Ideology in Latin American Politics*, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1977, p.x.

a generic term applied to general ideas potent in specific situations of conduct. ... it is the link between action and fundamental belief. In societal development, ideologies perform two major functions: (a) they provide solidarity by binding members of a society together, (b) they rationalize individuals' understanding of the world and thus sustain individuals in enacting roles that fulfill their individual personalities.¹¹²

Probably ideology can best be understood being distinguished from 'pragmatism' which is defined as "the approach that treats particular issues and problems purely on their merits and does not attempt to apply doctrinal, preconceived remedies."¹¹³ Therefore, pragmatic policy is usually understood as a way of dealing with problems or issues in a practical way rather than by using theory or abstract principles. In the study of foreign policy, it can be presumed that pragmatism is based on national interest whether it is compatible or incompatible with foreign policy ideology, whereas a pragmatic foreign policy can be implemented on an ideological basis.¹¹⁴

While there have been many attempts to identify the role of ideology in foreign policy,¹¹⁵ many people have equally questioned the limitations of ideology and its precise relationship with the external behaviour of a nation. Among them, Ferguson showed some limitations in using ideology as a determinant variable in foreign policy analysis:

Promising though an emphasis on ideology may be in analyzing foreign policy, it, too, has some serious limitations. First, there is the hard task of identifying relevant values and distinguishing these from less basic goals and policies. Second, even if we are able to identify values, their precise relationship to policy goals and means - and hence their significance - is far from clear. ... Another reason why it is difficult to be precise about the relationship between ideology and policy goals and means is that policy makers obviously have much more to consider than simple ideological

¹¹² Apter, David, "Introduction: Ideology and Discontent," in Apter, David (ed.), Ideology and Discontent, Free Press, New York, 1964, pp.17-21.

¹¹³ The New Encyclopædia Britannica, p.831.

¹¹⁴ Chinese foreign policy can be classified in this category.

¹¹⁵ For instance, Beymer noted: "Ideology accounts for a large component of socialisation. Ideological phrases and interpretations are imperative in order to create continuity in foreign policy and are manifold in order to take in different interests." Beymer, Klaus Von, The Soviet Union in World Politics, Gower, England, 1987, p.13.

rectitude. They have been concerned, as well, about how successful their policies will be in the “real world.”¹¹⁶

The second limitation can be overcome by understanding foreign policy ideology as something interpreted from policy objectives by decision makers and reflected in real policy. It is difficult to believe that policy makers are expected to set their ideologies as policy goals or means. Policy goals and means are normally set according to real situations and prediction on a pragmatic basis. They can either influence or be influenced by ideology.¹¹⁷ Certainly the success of foreign policy lies not in the promotion of an ideology but on the achievement of policy goals which can be realised by effective co-ordination of diverse values and interests, hence it is generally a higher value than ideology.¹¹⁸ For instance, the Latin American states have always managed to find a certain type of practical linkage - mainly cultural and economic - with politically incompatible partners, while maintaining their own political identity. Especially from the early 1970s, overcoming both ideological and geographical barriers, this tendency was notably boosted by the trans-nationalised world economy and the desire for development.¹¹⁹ Sánchez described this tendency as “innovative pragmatism”:

El aspecto innovador está claramente señalado por el papel de “puente de cristal” que puede jugar América Latina en la cooperación horizontal y en la articulación de intereses del Tercer Mundo y en el diálogo Norte-Sur por un “Nuevo Orden.” Lo importante es no caer en el aislacionismo cuando el transnacionalismo es lo que caracteriza las relaciones internacionales del presente y futuro.¹²⁰

Furthermore, in the case of a country with active and long-standing national aims, such as the ‘great power’ of Brazil, the role of ideology may remain fairly limited.

¹¹⁶ Ferguson, Yale, “Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Interamerican Relations”, pp. 9-10.

¹¹⁷ Their relation is bi-directional. In order to avoid a complicated investigation process which might be caused by an attempt at searching for ‘their precise relationship to policy goals and policies,’ what is emphasised here is ‘real politics,’ where ideology is manifested, rather than “policy goals and means.”

¹¹⁸ A prime example will be the Allende regime’s ‘maximum international independence.’

¹¹⁹ See **Section 1.3**, for the new Latin American foreign policy.

¹²⁰ Sánchez, Walter, “Política Exterior de América Latina: Agenda de Investigación”, in Sánchez, Walter (ed.) Las Relaciones entre los Países de América Latina, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1980, p.217.

Nevertheless, in certain regimes with a strong ideological basis such as socialism or anti-communism regardless of tradition, it is necessary and inevitable to pay more attention to ideology in explaining their conduct, as in the case of Chile. Ferguson was correct in pointing out that decision makers have a lot to consider, but the careful investigation of each case can reveal the role of ideology and its relationships with goals and means in foreign policy. Hence the answer to the third limitation is the primary assumption of this study: the foreign policy of a country is determined by multiple factors. The relationship between ideology and goals and means (or real policies) may be either 'close' or 'remote,' or 'uni-' or 'bi-directional' depending on the nature of foreign policy ideology and other determinants' roles. In fact, the real challenge seems to be the first limitation, the identification of ideology. This can be done by analysing basic foreign policy principles and later exploring the cases of an ideological factor in actual foreign policy implementation. Hence, two stages of the process are suggested here: *Conceptual Identification* and *Empirical Identification*.

1. Conceptual Identification

- *The basic foreign policy principles of a regime*

In this study, the election programme will be included in the case of the *Unidad Popular* (UP) government and the *Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile* of the military regime.

- *Decision makers' speeches, discourses and announcements*

Although the language of politics - if adequately interpreted - always has certain relations with real policy, it is not always implemented as presented. Therefore, analysis of discourses and speeches of top decision makers is another valuable source for the conceptual identification of ideology.

2. Empirical Identification

- *Identifying the ideological factor in real policies*

As Schwabe pointed out that "[t]he conceptual equipment of the language system associated with politics which is used to designate the subject matter of political

activity do not produce any wordly events or deeds,”¹²¹ it is necessary to further develop the stage of *Empirical Identification* in order to identify the real functioning of ideological factors and to explore the gap between the two stages. The gap between hypothetical result of conceptual identification and actual policies might be unavoidable in that “many ideological tenets are so general that they do not provide much guidance for concrete policies.”¹²² Pragmatism or *Realpolitik* is often suggested as the most convenient tool to explain the gap because it is closely linked to policy goals and principles, although the absence of a conventional mechanism for a reasonable explanation should be admitted.

However, one cannot rely purely on pragmatism, since pragmatism itself reflects varying specific values and influences. Therefore, a wide gap does not automatically imply that foreign policy is ‘pragmatic’ since foreign policy ideology, as in conceptual identification, can already have a pragmatic basis. Equally, a narrow gap does not necessarily suggest that foreign policy is ‘ideological.’ However, one thing is certain: *with a narrow gap* the crucial role of ideology in foreign policy can be argued; while *with a wide gap*, the less important role of ideology and more potency of other variables.

The precise role of ideology - *Empirical Identification* - will be examined in the Chapters concerning *Issue Areas* of foreign policy. In the following sections, meanwhile, the conceptual identification of the foreign policy ideology of two contemporary Chilean regimes will be attempted.

2.2.1. Conceptual Identification: The Socialist Regime

As seen in **Table 2.1.**, the fundamental foreign policy ideology of the UP government can be identified especially in the first section of the election programme¹²³

¹²¹ Schwere, Robert, Quantification in the History of Political Thought : Toward a Qualitative Approach, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1981, p.147.

¹²² Ferguson, Yale, “Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Interamerican Relations”, p.10.

¹²³ The election programme of Popular Unity was approved by the Communist, Socialist, Radical and Social Democratic Parties, as well as by the *Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitaria* (MAPU) and *Acción Popular Independiente* (API) on 17 December, 1969.

concerning 'objectives' which made it clear that the foreign policy objective would be to maximise the political and economic autonomy of Chile. Two distinctive foreign policy ideologies can be identified for the achievement of the objective: Ideological Pluralism and Anti-Imperialism.

Table 2.1. The Election Programme of the *Unidad Popular*

<i>Area</i>	For	Against
<i>More National Independence</i>	- Creation of New Latin American Organisation - Protection of National Resources	- OEA - All the unequal treaties with the US
<i>International Solidarity</i>	- Supporting Vietnam, Cuba, Middle East	- Imperialism and Colonialism
<i>Good Neighbour Policy - Latin American Policy</i>	- Latin American Integration	- Dependency on and exploitation of Imperialists - Territorial dispute - Bureaucratisation and stagnation in diplomacy

Source: Compiled by the author based on the UP Election Programme in "Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular", in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.359.

2.2.1.1. Ideological Pluralism

The first ideological initiative set down in the foreign policies of the Popular Unity Administration was the breaking down of ideological frontiers. This pragmatic design was the expression of a democratic society that aspired to maintain cordial relations with other countries of different ideologies:

Existirán relaciones con todos países del mundo, independientemente de su posición ideológica y política, sobre la base del respeto a la autodeterminación y a los intereses del pueblo de Chile.¹²⁴

¹²⁴ "Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular", in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.359.

Clearly, the introduction of Ideological Pluralism was based on the UP decision makers' perception that the possibility of Chile's political and economic isolation within both the Latin American and the global context was high. At the global level, the proclaimed core of Ideological Pluralism was obviously to open and cultivate relations with all the nations of the world, not only following in the steps of the previous government of Frei whose main interests were commercial relations, but also developing the idea with a political viewpoint. However, this principle of global activism was vague and vast enough in its meaning to provoke academic debates among students of Chilean foreign policy. Right wing writers such as Mac-Hale argued that:

the final objective of the international policies of the Popular Unity was to locate Chile directly in the political and economic orbit of the Socialist bloc in very similar terms to what Cuba did before. The greatest symbol of this intention was when, for the first time in the history of Chile, a Chief of State, Mr. Allende, committed the irritating act of recognizing in a foreign power, the Soviet Union, a "big brother" of the Republic.¹²⁵

To prove the argument, he stressed "the first loyalty of a Marxist to ideology, which recognizes in the USSR its supreme interpreter" as a fundamental characteristic of socialists. Given no tradition of criticism of either Marxist foreign policy theory or practice in the Soviet Union until the 1970s, it is understandable that debates about alternative policies or theories had rarely been found.¹²⁶ However, the Ideological Pluralism of the UP had incorporated a unique feature which the decision makers repeatedly emphasised with words like 'peaceful' or 'pluralistic.' For instance, in his speech in CEPAL, Allende stressed the pluralistic nature of his government:

Nosotros preferimos no hablar de Revolución sino hacerla. Una revolución hacia el socialismo en democracia, pluralismo y libertad. Hoy tenemos en Chile pluralismo, legalidad y libertades públicas gracias al esfuerzo y sacrificios de muchas generaciones. El camino que seguiremos hacia el

¹²⁵ Mac-Hale, Tomás, "The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity", in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), Chile: the Balanced View, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1975, p.77.

¹²⁶ See Light, Margot, The Soviet Theory of International Relations, Wheatsheaf Books, Brighton, 1988, p.2.

socialismo quiere profundizar estas conquistas para que operen realmente al servicio de las grandes mayorías.¹²⁷

In the regional dimension, the traditional regional policy promoting the unity of Latin American countries was to be continued within the same framework of Ideological Pluralism:

En el plano latinoamericano el Gobierno Popular propugnará una política internacional de afirmación a la personalidad latinoamericana en el concierto mundial.

La integración latinoamericana deberá ser levantada sobre la base de economías que se hayan liberado de las formas imperialistas de dependencia y explotación. No obstante se mantendrá una activa política de acuerdos bilaterales en aquellas materias que sean de interés para el desarrollo chileno.

El Gobierno Popular actuará para resolver los problemas fronterizos pendientes en base a negociaciones que prevengan las intrigas del imperialismo y los reaccionarios tendiendo presente el interés chileno y el de los pueblos de los países limítrofes.¹²⁸

2.2.1.2. Anti-Imperialism

In the broad context of the Third World, Anti-Imperialism has been adopted as “a major principle for resistance against the classic imperialistic power struggles between the Western Powers.”¹²⁹ However, the Anti-Imperialism of the UP, like many modern Third World regimes, was basically a natural corollary to their perception of the objectives of US power and hegemony, though it was not directly specified in the election programme:

La defensa decidida de la autodeterminación de los pueblos será impulsada por el nuevo Gobierno como condición básica de la convivencia internacional. En consecuencia, su política será vigilante y activa para defender el principio de

¹²⁷ “Intervención del Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, en la Sesión Inaugural del Decimocuarto Período de Sesiones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) de las Naciones Unidas”, Santiago, 27 April, 1971, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.) La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, 1970-1973, p.367.

¹²⁸ “Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular”, pp.360-1.

¹²⁹ It is especially strong in Arab nations. See Dawisha, A.I., Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy, Macmillan, London, 1976, p.125.

no intervención y para rechazar todo intento de discriminación, presión, invasión o bloqueo intentado por los países imperialistas.¹³⁰

Anti-Imperialism, in other words, the international vision of the socialistic ideology of the UP, was frequently manifested throughout their period in power revealing the strategic objectives of their foreign policy. The four socialistic characteristics of the UP international discourses were found by Meneses:

- First, The logic that dependency will lead to underdevelopment
- Second, Peaceful transition to socialism
- Third, No criticism of a socialist regime
- Fourth, Anti-imperialist rhetoric¹³¹

The copper nationalisation issue, backed by the logic that “dependency will lead to underdevelopment,” was one of the most frequently declared agendas along with their concern about bipolarised world politics. Support for the anti-imperialistic struggles of the peoples of Vietnam, Cuba and the Middle East was also expressed both in the election programme and in discourses. Although the Non-alignment Movement was not directly mentioned in the election programme, UP discourses constantly revealed its strong interest and support for the movement as an effective mechanism for the promotion of Anti-Imperialism by supporting those countries. For instance:

La política internacional chilena debe mantener una posición de condena a la agresión norteamericana en Vietnam y de reconocimiento y solidaridad activa a la lucha heroica del pueblo vietnamita.

De mismo modo se solidarizará en forma efectiva con la Revolución Cubana,

...

La lucha antiimperialista de los pueblos del Medio Oriente contará con la solidaridad del Gobierno Popular, ...¹³²

¹³⁰ “Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular”, p.359.

¹³¹ Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oxford, Oxford, 1987, p.365.

¹³² “Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular”, p.360.

However, the following two manifestations of strong anti-US sentiment were by far the most controversial factors in the UP election programme: *accusation of the OAS*; and *denunciation of previous treaties with the US*:

La posición de defensa activa de la independencia de Chile implica denunciar la actual OEA, como un instrumento y agencia del imperialismo norteamericano y luchar contra toda forma de panamericanismo implícito en esa organización. ...

Se considera indispensable revisar, denunciar y desahuciar, según los casos, los tratados o convenios que signifiquen compromisos que limiten nuestra soberanía y concretamente los tratados de asistencia recíproca, los pactos de ayuda mutua y otros pactos, que Chile ha suscrito con los EE.UU.¹³³

The above issues will be further examined in *Status-Diplomatic Area* and *Military-Strategic Area*, respectively, in **Chapter IV**. Nevertheless, the direct accusation against US imperialism is difficult to find in other governmental announcements. According to Almeyda, “both the official statements of the UP, and the government newspapers were always very careful not to cause difficulties with the United States by using radical language.”¹³⁴ It was not until December 1972, when President Allende spoke at the General Assembly of the United Nations, that Chile formally denounced the economic blockade which had been imposed on the country. Even on that occasion, Allende did not make a direct attack on the US government. Therefore, the discourses of decision makers started to show moderate and rather rhetoric Anti-Imperialism not in any way equal to the strong manifestation of the ideology in the election programme.

2.2.2. Conceptual Identification: The Military Regime

After Allende was overthrown Chile returned to the Western camp, but without a clear foreign policy framework or ideology. However, in numerous discourses and the

¹³³ *ibid.*, pp.359-360.

¹³⁴ Almeyda, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, in Sideri, S (ed.), Chile: 1970-1973: Economic Development and Its International Setting - Self Criticism of the Unidad Popular Government’s Policies, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1979, p.117. Also see Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile”, in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.) Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.164.

Declaration of Principles of the Chilean Government in 1974, the military regime expressed two main ideologies which would guide the implementation of foreign policy: Anti-Communism, National Security Doctrine and Economic Developmentalism.

2.2.2.1. Anti-Communism and National Security Doctrine

The military government formally declared its anti-communistic nature in the *Declaration of 1974*:

Chile must reject the alternative of the Marxist inspired society, because of its totalitarian characteristics and its devaluation of the human being which are diametrically opposed to our Christian and Hispanic traditions. Furthermore, experience shows that Marxism does not create well-being, and its socialist and statist nature renders it incapable of achieving the economic development we require.¹³⁵

Furthermore, the military regime proclaimed that the war against “international communism” was inevitable:

... having witnessed with its own eyes the fallacy and failure of the so-called “Chilean road to socialism,” our country has decided to fight openly international communism and the Marxist ideology it upholds. In doing so it has inflicted on communism the greatest defeat it has suffered in the past thirty years.¹³⁶

A strategic doctrine adopted as an ideological goal was that of ‘national security,’ the most popular doctrine of Latin American military regimes, at the time.¹³⁷ The

¹³⁵ Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile, Republic of Chile, 1984, p.25.

¹³⁶ *ibid.*, p.26.

¹³⁷ In 1971 only one country - Brazil - had adopted the doctrine of national security. By 1976, Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay could be added to the list and similar tendencies had emerged in Ecuador and Peru. The ideological shift of the South American military was best described by the Brazilian General Breno Borges Fortes at a meeting of the Latin American chiefs of Staff in Montevideo in 1973: “As regards the security of America ... There has been no fundamental change ... Our enemy is international communism, which in some cases has only changed its strategy for action without actually renouncing its final aim: the take-over of power ...” General Borges Fortes’ statement was made in the context of a changing situation in Latin America. See Rada, Juan, “The National Security State in Latin America”, in Britain and Latin America: An Annual Review of British-Latin American Relations, Latin American Bureau, London, 1978, p.58.

national security doctrine can be defined as “a belief in the concept of the nation as an ‘essence’, ‘tradition’, or ‘spirit’ that has been ruined by political demagoguery and menaced by antinational aggression, in the acceptance of social inequalities as the national order, in the idea of government as authoritarian, and the definition of Marxism as the principal enemy of society.”¹³⁸ According to Garcés, the notion of ‘National Security’ of the Pinochet regime was different from that of the Allende regime, in that the former targeted “internal enemy” while the latter meant (traditional meaning of) national defence against “external enemy.”¹³⁹ Therefore, emphasis on the internal order can easily be found in numerous speeches of decision makers. For instance, Jaime De Valle, one of the hard line Foreign Ministers of the regime, proclaimed that internal order was preferred to the international image of Chile:

La realidad chilena ... es deformada sistemáticamente, y no podemos dejar de tomar ciertas actitudes o adoptar medidas que sean necesarias para salvar esa imagen exterior. Ello sería un error, y el día que una nación, Chile por ejemplo, comience a actuar y legislar en función de una mejor percepción internacional, quiere decir que habría destruido totalmente su alma nacional.¹⁴⁰

Another example is that, followed by the brutal repression of national demonstrations and strikes at the end of October 1984, the military government aggressively declared that it would not accept any kind of protest from outside over domestic issues:

El gobierno de Chile rechaza terminantemente que su situación política y económica pueda ser utilizada por otras naciones, que viven circunstancias mucho más difíciles, para atender sus problemas de orden interno, con alardes verbalistas destinados a satisfacer a los partidarios marxistas de su propio espectro político.¹⁴¹

The rigid goal of national security and internal order was also described in the Declaration by the government admitting that they were an ‘authoritarian regime’:

¹³⁸ Angel, Alan, “Chile since 1958”, in Bethell, Leslie (ed.), *Chile since Independence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p.179.

¹³⁹ See Garcés, Joan, *Allende y la Experiencia Chilena*, BAT, Santiago, 3rd Edition, 1991, pp.67-69.

¹⁴⁰ Jaime del Valle in Muñoz, Heraldo, “La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa”, in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.), *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1984, p.340.

¹⁴¹ *ibid.*, p.341.

3. *An authoritarian, impersonal and just government.*

Guided by the inspiration of Portales, the Government of Chile will energetically apply the principle of authority and drastically punish any outburst of disorder or anarchy. It will exercise power impersonally and avoid every type of petty sectarian interest.¹⁴²

According to Munizaga's analysis, lastly, the "strong", "independent" and "nationalistic" character of the regime was frequently emphasised in Pinochet's discourses whereas the previous UP government was condemned as being "marxist-leninist", "totalitarian", "corrupted", "immoral" and "foreign." (Table 2.2.)

Table 2.2. The Semiological Analysis of Pinochet's Public Discourses

	<i>Military Government (1973-1990)</i>	<i>Socialist Government (1970-1973)</i>
ES:	auténticamente nacionalista	marxista-leninista
	para los chilenos	para los marxistas, sectario
	militar	político
	independiente	dependiente (del comunismo internacional)
	impersonal	ególatra
	fuerte	tirano, totalitario
	justo	corrupto, nefasto
	consciente de sus deberes	abandona sus deberes, fracaso
TIENE:	sentido y objetivos nacionales	ideas foráneas
	sentido de autoridad	ideas asesinas
	decisión	propósitos inmorales
	espíritu de servicio público	

Source: Munizaga, Giselle, *El Discurso Público de Pinochet: Un Análisis Semiológico*, CESOC/CENECA, Santiago, 1988, p.37.

2.2.2.2. Economic Developmentalism

Every developing country has its own version of developmentalism. However the Chilean version of the ideology of economic development, *i.e.* neo-liberalism, not only radically transformed the domestic economy, but was also strong enough to be an important element of foreign policy in itself:

¹⁴² *Declaración de Principios del Gobierno de Chile*, p.33.

After reorganizing its economy, destroyed to its very roots by the Marxist regime, Chile has to advance rapidly and decisively for without this, it will be impossible to satisfy the hopes for security of our countrymen, especially the poor. This demands a clear understanding that the only realistic way to reach these objectives lies in a large increase of mining, agricultural, and industrial production, which requires national and foreign investments. ... With regard to foreign investments, the present Government reaffirms, "It is not a true nationalism to reject foreign investment, but to subject it to conditions which ensure, primarily, that it is beneficial to Chile."¹⁴³

While the previous regime's concern about the issue of national development was based on political economy emphasising equal distribution, independence, resource nationalism, state economy and regional integration, the military regime's approach was pure economic liberalism strongly backed by absolute power with a firm emphasis on quantitative economic growth by way of encouraging foreign investment, and promoting an open and free market economy.

Major foreign policy ideologies for each regime have so far been identified: the Ideological Pluralism and Anti-Imperialism of the socialist regime; and the Anti-Communism, National Security Doctrine and Economic Developmentalism of the military regime. However, whereas the Socialist regime was equipped with clear foreign policy ideologies, the military regime's policy was mere expansion of the domestic ideology and lacking independent international vision.

2.3. The Domestic Politics

The endeavour to examine linkages between domestic and foreign policies has significantly developed the field of international relations, dealing primarily with the US and Western European political systems and, secondly, with the old Soviet and Eastern European cases. One of the rare attempts focused on Latin America was that on Mexican foreign policy by Shapira.¹⁴⁴ In terms of issues covered, while some have been devoted to the domestic needs of a government to demonstrate the visible

¹⁴³ *ibid.*, p.39. (with Speech by General Pinochet on 10 November, 1973.)

¹⁴⁴ See Shapira, Yoram, Mexican Foreign Policy under Echeverría, Sage policy paper, New York, 1978.

success of their foreign policy, others have tried to find patterns of interactive functions between domestic and foreign policy especially emphasising external influence on domestic politics. Likewise, as “the relationship between foreign and domestic policy flows in both directions,”¹⁴⁵ words like ‘interactive,’ ‘interactions’ and ‘interrelations’ have been widely adopted in studies of foreign policy and international relations. However, these terms have not exactly meant ‘to and from’; the unilateral application of the concept has been more common. It often tends to be forgotten that two levels of analysis are possible in terms of the relations between domestic politics and foreign policy: first, the impact of external factors on domestic political events; second, domestic politics as a determinant factor of foreign policy.

As is often the case in every country, external factors are generally understood to be a decisive element in Latin American domestic affairs. Issues such as human rights or foreign economic aid, primarily influenced by the international outlook or the external view of a regime, have played an extremely significant role in the domestic politics of the region. The guidance and economic help of the European Christian Democratic parties, particularly in West Germany and Italy, to ‘homologue movements’ in Chile and Venezuela are good examples. Similarly, without the international accusations and pressures against the Chilean military government’s notorious human rights abuse and the external aid to opposition parties, the re-democratisation of Chile would have been far more difficult. In contrast to the Chilean case, the Cuban case represented a uniquely advantageous situation to Castro, created by external environment. Coleman and Quirós-Varela argued:

Among the numerous advantages enjoyed by Castro ... were (1) the extent to which the electoral process was discredited in prerevolutionary Cuba (MacGaffey and Barnett, 1962:125-165), and (2) the presence of a rich neighbor with an opportunity for the revolutionary regime to divest itself of a higher percentage of its political opponents than is normally the case.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ Bowers, Stephen, “East German National Consciousness: Domestic and Foreign Policy Considerations”, *East European Quarterly*, 13:2, 1979-80, p.177.

¹⁴⁶ Coleman, Kenneth M. and Quiros-Varela, Luis, “Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies,” in Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie (eds.), *Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions*, p.53. For further discussions of foreign influence on Latin America politics, Edy Kaufman wrote an excellent article. See Kaufman, Edy, “Latin America”.

Therefore, the impact of external factors on purely domestic political events can be an interesting research agenda in the broad meaning of international relations studies since powerful external factors may significantly influence a small country's decisions. After examining Peruvian foreign policy, Russett and Starr called this phenomenon "a merge of foreign and domestic policy", which "may happen in any country but is especially widespread in relatively small, poor countries that are extensively penetrated from abroad."¹⁴⁷

However, since the aim of this study is to search for determinant factors of foreign policy, concentration should centre on the other aspect. In other words, as long as the impact of state A's foreign policy is limited to the domestic issues of state B but not affecting the foreign policy of B, it cannot be the objective of the study of B's foreign policy. The external view of regime B should only be considered when it actually affects the foreign policy of B.¹⁴⁸

It is assumed that domestic politics can play two different roles in influencing foreign policy: a situational role; and an objective role depending on the presence of domestic political purpose.

2.3.1. Situational Role of Domestic Politics

The primary assumption of the situational role of domestic politics, *i.e.* the natural implication of the domestic political situation into foreign policy, is that "[t]he politically unstable states are less united on international issues and less able to deal with their own national development; preoccupied with domestic problems, they tend to consider foreign policy of relatively less importance."¹⁴⁹ This, in other words, means that the potential burden of negative effect following on the implementation of foreign policy can be eased by previously stabilising domestic politics. Considering that there is no general theory of relations between regime type - democratic or

¹⁴⁷ Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey, World Politics, the Menu for Choice, p.9.

¹⁴⁸ A typical pattern of this indirect influence is: *Action of A to B targeting B's domestic policy influencing Reaction of B's policy targeting A.*

¹⁴⁹ Atkins, Pope, Latin America in the International Political System, p.31.

authoritarian - and political stability, it is difficult to see that democracy brings more stabilised politics, and thus the possibility of functioning more positively in external behaviour, than authoritarian or totalitarian politics. However, the relationship between political stability and foreign policy has been positive at least in the case of Latin America. That is to say, the Latin American states with the most effective foreign policies have been those that have developed political stability, gaining a certain amount of respect and attention from other states. The following three cases can be suggested as examples of the situational role of domestic politics in Latin America:

Mexico's political turmoil beginning in 1910 for all practical purposes retired her from international politics for two decades. But by regaining stability since the 1930s Mexico has become an important power in inter-American and world affairs, despite her geographic disadvantage in proximity to the United States.

Brazil's stability since the mid-1960s, as in an earlier era, has been fundamental to her current drive for world power. Brazil's main rival, Argentina, although loath to admit it, has effectively dropped out of the Latin American leadership race, primarily because of problems directly related to severe political instability beginning about 1955.

Uruguay developed influence in inter-American relations for many years based on the element of prestige stemming from its stable democratic development. It suffered a great loss in prestige, however, when its political stability and democratic government deteriorated with its economic life in the decade after 1966.¹⁵⁰

An interesting aspect of the (possible) situational role is the impact of external views on the domestic politics of a regime which is manifested in its foreign policy behaviour. Numerous authoritarian regimes have experienced fundamental obstacles stemming from a domestic political situation, and ending in external political isolation. However, although domestic politics provide a fundamental origin, an external action of a state is more likely to be directly motivated from an outside environment, *i.e.* others' policies. It is an important aspect to consider in terms of the role of an external factor, not only for those who view the implementation of foreign

¹⁵⁰ Cases are drawn from *ibid.*, p.31-2.

policy as a more adaptive and responsive function *vis-à-vis* outside environments, than the domestic condition.

The situational role of domestic politics has been particularly important in traditional Chilean foreign policy because of the positive relations between political stability and foreign policy which were briefly shown in the earlier part of this Chapter. Despite vulnerable economic status, a small population, and geographic isolation, Chile's expanding role in regional, inter-American and sometimes extra-continental affairs was supported by stable internal politics. That is to say, along with the strategic nature of mineral deposits, the most important factor allowing Chile to become influential in international affairs was "the degree to which internal political institutions and processes allowed her foreign policy elite to view rationally the realities of the international system and link the nation's international objectives to capabilities in order to achieve an effective response."¹⁵¹ Therefore, an interesting perspective in this study will be in verifying a hypothesis of the *positive relations between political stability and domestic consensus, and successful implementation of foreign policy* in two strongly contrasted cases: domestic instability under democracy during the socialist regime; and (forced) domestic stability under dictatorship during the military regime.

2.3.2. Objective Role of Domestic Politics

The external behaviour of a nation is also influenced by its efforts to satisfy domestic needs and wants. In other words, the use of foreign policy for domestic political purposes such as national integration or domestic mobilisation is quite effective in gathering or maintaining support for the legitimacy of a regime. Political advantage has been sought, and often gained, by both government and opposition leaders by raising such issues as territorial disputes with neighbouring states, intervention by external powers, imperialism by foreign entrepreneurs and so on. According to Good who observed the performance of leaders of developing states in the international sphere, they often turn to an international arena to validate their capacity to act:

¹⁵¹ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.323.

Leader X appears before the United Nations. His speech is later featured at home as the occasion when X set the world aright, advising his fellow statesman of the course that must be pursued to avoid ruin and achieve justice. For a leader of a new state, all the world - the UN, regional conferences, or state visits - is a stage on which to play a heroic role, partly for its impact on an audience back home.¹⁵²

Dependence on external factors to provide domestic unity has been an important perspective revealing the integrated character of Latin American domestic and foreign policy, where foreign policy has been an important mode for furthering domestic political goals, especially by opportunistic politicians who lack popular support and legitimacy or who wish to divert attention from domestic political crises by focusing on nationalist foreign policy causes. Mexico during Echeverría regime is a good example of this integration of domestic and foreign policy. Other examples may include the series of nationalisations of US companies in Mexico, Argentina, Peru, Chile, Bolivia and Venezuela.

2.4. The Development Model

The economic element of a state influences foreign policy making in a number of ways. In particular, an economy vulnerable to external forces can severely limit the decision-makers' freedom of manoeuvrability. Deep economic crisis may provoke unexpected reactions, such as "external debt moratoria or the replacement of democratic regimes with nationalist governments."¹⁵³ However, while power politics analysis or a more global dimension of frameworks frequently include capability factors such as the weak economic status and structure of a country, it is instructive to concentrate on an examination of the role of development strategy. This is primarily because a country's foreign economic policy tends to originate in its development

¹⁵² Good, R.C., "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in L.W. Martin (ed.), Neutralism and Nonalignment, Praeger, New York, p.9.

¹⁵³ Roett, Riordan, "The Foreign Policy of Latin America", in Macridis, Roy (ed.), Foreign Policy in World Policy, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1985, p.408.

strategy which may well explain major shifts in foreign policy orientation between succeeding regimes in a single country as well as variations between countries.

If there are any inter-relations between economic development and foreign policy in contemporary Latin American history, the following argument appropriately describes the closeness of the two factors:

..., it is our belief that the study of the determinants of foreign policy-making in rich countries involve the analysis of many issues which are not really relevant to the foreign policy-making process in Latin America. For Latin America, where political leaders are judged by their ability to articulate goals for national economic transformations as well as for their ability to produce such changes, foreign policy-making is unavoidably very much a function of the requirements of development statecraft.¹⁵⁴

Hence, the fact of being small nations with fragile economies in a world dominated by large powers has prompted many Latin American foreign policy makers to seek to decrease their own vulnerability by putting particular emphasis on the factors that affect self-determination, such as development, inter-dependence and inter-American co-operation. Although it is true that some portion of foreign policy activity would have been oriented to the pursuit of non-developmental goals, for example, ideology, security, defence of national boundaries, ... etc., economic development has been especially emphasised "as a means of manipulating international variables in a way favorable to development goals."¹⁵⁵ The Latin American goals of national development have prompted foreign policy in various directions: for instance, expanding new markets for the export of raw materials; securing external economic and technical assistance, and increasing contacts even with ideologically incompatible partners.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ Coleman, Kenneth M. and Quiros-Varela, Luis, "Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies", p.40.

¹⁵⁵ Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives", p.12.

¹⁵⁶ Enhanced relations between Latin America and communist states in the 1960s and 1970s are well explained in terms of the economic needs - of both sides - despite their ideological differences.

Table 2.3. Latin American Development Models

	<i>Conventional</i>	<i>Reformist</i>	<i>Revolutionary</i>
<i>Basic Goals and primary value</i>	Elaboration of the existing modern sector	Reduction of inequities between the modern and traditional sectors	National autonomy and the achievement of social equality
<i>Foreign policy goals and formation</i>	1. Close ties with the developed capitalist powers 2. Alignment with the United States in a relationship of dependent development	1. Presenting the regime differentially to diverse international actors 2. Increasing national autonomy in economic decision-making over strategic questions	1. Breakaway from economic dependence on the hegemonic capitalist power 2. Greater control over foreign investors 3. Societal closure to prevent the subversion of the regime by externally antagonistic groups
<i>Bureaucrats</i>	Technocrats	Technocrats in preference to foreign experts	Any type of bureaucrat but should be 'Socialist and Expert'
<i>Ideology</i>	Neoliberalism : Economic growth = Development *	Cepalism : Economic growth \neq Development	Socialism : Economic growth \neq Development
<i>Examples</i>	Chile (1973-)	Chile (1970-1973) Peru (1968)	Cuba (1959-)

Source: Compiled by the author from Coleman, Kenneth M. and Quiros-Varela, Luis, "Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies," in Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: Global and Regional Dimensions, 1981, pp.48-55.

Note:

* While economic growth is generally defined as "expansion of GNP per capita," Coleman and Quirós-Varela argued that economic development should be defined by the application of at least the following three criteria rather than by mere expansion of GNP:

- (1) greater equity in the generally inequitable income distribution
- (2) national economic and social integration
- (3) increasing the proportion of economic decisions about national economic conditions which are made by economic actors whose primary affective commitment is to the nation-state. (p.41)

In contrast to the widespread academic interest in this issue, however, there have been few attempts to identify the pattern of links between a regime's development model and its foreign policy behaviour. One of the most dedicated efforts in theoretical development was undertaken by Coleman and Quirós-Varela whose model suggested three types of development strategy: *Conventional*, *Reformist* and *Revolutionary*.

This study will utilise their framework as presented in **Table 2.3.**, focusing the impact of development strategies foreign policy. The development strategies of the two regimes will be briefly introduced and categorised in the following sections.

2.4.1. Economic Policy of the Socialist Government

The initial domestic economic policy of the socialist regime was similar to that of populism, as implemented by Perón in 1946 and Castro in 1959: raising wages and freezing prices. The goal was a radical change in the structure of society to give greater income and power to the working class but “not a complete takeover of production or an authoritarian Marxist state.”¹⁵⁷ Therefore, the Allende government’s development strategy was more close to the *Reformist model* rather than the *Revolutionary model*.

Following the policy of reduced interest rates, increased wages and strict price controls, there was an immediate boom in consumption and short term redistribution of income. Even the GDP went up by 8.6 per cent in 1971 basically due to the sharp rise in wages and purchasing power. The government liquidated the *latifundios* which comprised about three million hectares of land, and nationalised commercial banking. They succeeded “in controlling more than 80 per cent of credit for social ends; and about fifteen banks have been taken into the social sector.”¹⁵⁸

However, the principle worked only during the first stage and then rising wages and increasing problems with material inputs pushed marginal costs above controlled prices, and output stopped rising.¹⁵⁹ Simultaneously, since the government strongly intervened in the national economy in the areas of production, distribution and finance, central government expenditure rose sharply, more than 66 per cent in nominal terms in 1971 over the previous year, from 21 to 27 per cent of GDP, and government current revenue declined from 20 to 18.5 per cent of GDP. Therefore the

¹⁵⁷ See Sheahan, John, Patterns of Development in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1987, p.212

¹⁵⁸ Martner, Gonzalo, “The Economic Aspects of Allende’s Government: Problems and Prospects”, in Medhurst, Kenneth (ed.), Allende’s Chile, Hart-Davis, London, 1972, p.140.

¹⁵⁹ See Sheahan, John, Patterns of Development in Latin America, pp.212-21.

fiscal deficit rose to 8 per cent of GDP compared with 4 per cent in the preceding year. The money supply more than doubled, and the huge expansion of credit went mostly to the public sector.¹⁶⁰

Internationally, the role of common economic factors such as the foreign exchange rate has been limited in Chile as external revenue has largely depended on the export of copper and its international price. When the Frei government inherited a deficit in the balance of payments in 1964, Chile soon generated a surplus mainly because of the increased demand for copper by the US and the high price on the world market. The situation of the Allende government was an opposite example: during the first two years of the Allende government, the foreign reserve were reduced by US \$400 million because of decreased copper production and export, the low world market price, and a sharp rise in food imports.¹⁶¹

Although the economic crisis was initially created from domestic policy, the impact - psychological impact - from the outside world should not be ignored. In September 1970, even before the inauguration of Allende, Chilean Finance Minister Andrés Zaldívar reported that “financial reactions in the week following the election had provoked a credit and banking crisis.” He also said that the inflow of capital from abroad had stopped, and he warned that unemployment would spread.¹⁶²

On the whole, as a result of increased imports and government expenditure, decreased export earning, and the negative international image of the regime, the objective of minimising the impact of external constraints not only failed but also pushed Chilean decision makers to make further arrangements to secure and reschedule external loans and aids, which became the UP government’s major activity in foreign economic policy.

¹⁶⁰ See Angel, Alan, “Chile since 1958”, in Bethell, Leslie (ed.), Chile since Independence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, pp.161-2.

¹⁶¹ See Cope, Orville G., “Chile”, p.314. The decline in copper production was mainly a result of a serious transitional stage in the nationalisation process.

¹⁶² See “Chile: A Chronology”, in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-american Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives, US Government Printing Office, 1975, p.373. To cover runs on the banks, the Central Bank had to supply \$48 million, three times the average for a full month, during the first two weeks of September. Except for food, sales of all goods had fallen by 30 to 80 percent. At the same time, inflation threatened. See pp.373-4.

2.4.2. Economic Policy of the Military Government

While the principle of Chilean politics before 1973 had been strong state intervention in the domestic and international economy, the military government adopted the *Conventional Model* of development strategy which emphasised the role of private enterprise and liberalism in commercial exchange, and the considerably decreased role of governmental authority in both domestic and international economy in technical terms. The policy was implemented by a group of economists known as the ‘Chicago Boys’ making Chile a laboratory for the testing of Milton Friedman’s doctrines.¹⁶³ The new government’s policy was to turn from state control to decentralised, open and free economy through an orthodox monetarist approach by:

- normalising and liberalising exchange rates, tariffs and prices.
- expanding the infrastructure, notably in power supplies.
- emphasising Chile’s continuing needs for external finance by the appearance, in July 1974, of Decree-Law 600, which established very favourable conditions for external investment.¹⁶⁴
- reducing public spending and government expenditure. For example, in 1973 the Chilean government had 650,000 employees. By 1989 the Chilean people had only 157,871 central government employees to support and to obey.¹⁶⁵

The short term output showed mixed results. Industrial and mining production returned to higher levels, and foreign investment began to return to the country, encouraged by the new policies towards the private sector and also by the Government’s agreements with enterprises nationalised without compensation by the

¹⁶³ For a detailed survey about ‘Chicago boys’ and technocratisation of Chilean politics, see Silva, Patricio, “Technocrats and Politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks”, *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 23:2, pp.385-410; and Silva, Patricio, “Intellectuals, Technocrats and Social Change in Chile: Past, Present and Future Perspectives”, in Angell, Alan and Pollack, Benny (eds.), *The Legacy of Dictatorship: Political, Economic and Social Change in Pinochet’s Chile*, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, 1993, pp.198-224.

¹⁶⁴ See Blakemore, Harold, “Chile: Current realities and historical perspectives”, in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco, *Chile: the Balanced View*, p.19.

¹⁶⁵ See Codevilla, Angelo, “Is Pinochet the Model?,” *Foreign Affairs*, 72:5, 1993, p.129.

previous regime. At the same time, general agreement on the rescheduling of Chile's foreign debt was reached with the Paris Club in April, for repayments due in 1973 and 1974, and several favourable bilateral agreements followed. Further loans from international agencies were also secured. On the other hand, domestic economy continued to suffer. GDP fell by 16.6 percent in 1975. Real wages had fallen by 1975 to 47.9 per cent of the 1970 level and unemployment stood at 20 per cent. Manufacturing was devastated by foreign imports.¹⁶⁶

Although a recovery based largely on the increased export of primary products began in 1977, and an economic boom lasted until 1980 with an average annual growth rate of 8 per cent, the functional distortion of foreign capital, mostly in the form of loans to Chilean banks, was a potentially dangerous factor creating a 'bubble.' Hoping to attract heavy foreign investment, the government deliberately kept interest rates high. Chilean banks borrowed abroad for 12 per cent and loaned at 35 to 40 per cent. The companies did not invest in production but used the loans to invest in real estate or buy up privatised companies. Consequently, during the period of 'crisis' between 1980 and 1985 the 'bubble' began to burst. Bankruptcies multiplied, production declined sharply, unemployment rose to more than 30 per cent which was six times higher than the level of 1972, and real wages declined by 20 per cent. Furthermore, GNP per capita became lower than that of 1972 and production dropped by 14 per cent in 1982 and 4 per cent in 1983. The earthquake in 1985 further damaged the Chilean economy. The government was forced to step in to take over large banks to avoid further economic collapse. A recovery began in 1986 and turned into another boom that continues to the present day.¹⁶⁷

In terms of the overall economic performance of the neo-liberal policy, two areas of success can be pointed out: a lowered rate of inflation, and an increase in nontraditional exports. Even though it took four years to get the inflation rate below 100 per cent, the rate was finally brought down to a reasonable level - under 30 per cent - throughout the 1980s. Meanwhile, in terms of dollar value, exports other than copper and iron tripled between 1974 and 1980. According to Sheahan,

¹⁶⁶ See Keen, Benjamin, *A History of Latin America*, Houghton Mifflin, p.337

¹⁶⁷ See *ibid.*, p.338-9.

By 1975 the cost of a dollar in real terms, adjusted for inflation, was 80 percent higher than in 1970. That depreciation in real terms was central to the striking success with new exports, but it added its own strong impact to the rate of inflation....¹⁶⁸

However, in spite of the remarkable success of some macro-economic indicators, the implementation of the neo-liberal policy deeply influenced Chilean society. First, unequal distribution was exacerbated. Between 1978 and 1988 the wealthiest 20 per cent of the population increased their share of the national income from 51 to 60 per cent. The next 60 per cent, including the middle class, suffered their share falling from 44 to 35 per cent. And the poorest 20 per cent continued to receive 4 per cent.¹⁶⁹ Second, the Pinochet regime's debt equity swap efforts finally resulted in the growth of foreign control of the economy, while free market policy virtually destroyed the basis of the domestic manufacturing sector. Third, in domestic politics, the creation of a favourable environment to attract external investment was regarded as a policy priority. Consequently, neo-liberal policy under the military authoritarian regime was inevitably accompanied by harsh domestic political repression which resulted in the elimination of strong syndicate movements and organised political opposition.

In the case of the military government, above all, the adoption of an orthodox, extreme monetarist and outward-oriented economic model initially placed a new requirement on its foreign policy: the search for foreign capital and investments. In addition, the issue of debt scheduling became the dominant major foreign policy activity during the early 1980s.

In summary, **Table 2.4.** shows a brief comparison of the development models and the (proposed) effects on foreign policy between the two regimes examined in this section.

¹⁶⁸ Sheahan, John, *Patterns of Development in Latin America*, p.224.

¹⁶⁹ Keen, Benjamin, *A History of Latin America*, p.338.

Table 2.4. Development Models and (expected) Effects on Foreign Policy: Chile 1970-1990

	<i>Socialist Regime</i>	<i>Military Regime</i>
Development Model - <i>Economic Policy</i>	Reformist - <i>Socialist</i>	Conventional - <i>Neo-liberal</i>
Expected Impacts on Foreign Policy	- Copper Marketing - Emphasis on regional integration - Discouragement of foreign investment - External financing but diversification of supplies: approach to various financial sources, <i>e.g.</i> USSR and European states	- Copper Marketing - Emphasis on foreign capital and investment - Debt rescheduling

2.5. The Elite

As previously noted, foreign policy is directed within limits set by numerous internal and external variables. However the effect of these factors in setting limits for the formulation of policy is not automatic, since the complicated decision-making process of policy formulation in contemporary nation states involves rational choices, among concrete alternatives, made by foreign policy elites. The principal task of foreign policy makers is therefore “to adjust the changing internal values and interests of a nation to the changing conditions prevailing in the international system in order to achieve specific objectives.”¹⁷⁰ In other words, foreign policy elites function as intermediate apparatus linking inputs and outputs of foreign policy.

While the term ‘political elite,’ at its most basic, can be defined as groups of people who either directly or indirectly influence the exercise of political power, many theorists try to limit the definition by arguing that in every political elite there exists an identifiable smaller ruling elite whose preferences strongly prevail on key

¹⁷⁰ Cope, Orville G., “Chile”, p.310.

issues.¹⁷¹ This group tends to have a greater share of power, being more highly organised and better motivated than any other groups. Therefore, the basic assumption of elite theory or decision-making theory is that it is reasonable to argue that all types of policy are prone to influence by dominant minorities, particularly in developing countries. This is the case with foreign policy which largely remains the domain of power elites and of particular groups. That is, the unique nature of foreign policy more effectively excludes the majority of the people from policy formation than any other areas of national decision making. Even in socialist countries pursuing ‘people’s policy’ no exception could be found. Furthermore, given the relatively high concentration of power and governmental centralisation in Latin America, foreign policy invariably tends to be the special concern of “an elite within an elite.”¹⁷² In order to assess the role of decision making bodies, it is necessary first to examine some problematic perspectives.

Firstly, *the limited role of foreign policy elites must be considered*. Within the widely appreciated academic agreement that structural and other situational variables are more significant in influencing decision making, defining the exact role of foreign policy elites would never be possible. Russett and Starr exemplified the absolute limit of the elite variable, thus: “[t]he wartime decision to drop the atomic bomb seems, ... to be one that would have been reached by almost any American leader who was president at that time - however much anyone might now regret the decision.”¹⁷³ In this respect, it is possible to question the validity of the argument on the decisive role of the Latin American foreign policy elite, in that historical perception of the national interests, *i.e.* ‘security’ and ‘survival,’ has remained extremely stagnant in the face of changes in personnel at the top.¹⁷⁴ However, it is also possible to argue that, in a region with highly centralised personal politics, the personal traits of prominent leaders and their effects on foreign policy have had a certain potency, at least more than in any other part of the world. Since political power has been held by extremely

¹⁷¹ see Dahl, Robert A. “A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model”, American Political Science Review, 52:2, June 1958, pp.463-75.

¹⁷² Calvert, Peter, The International Politics of Latin America, p.36. For further discussion of the nature of ruling elites, see pp.36-8.

¹⁷³ Russett, Bruce and Starr, Harvey, World Politics, the Menu for Choice, p.6.

¹⁷⁴ Exceptional cases can be found, of course, when profound changes take place and a new power elite enters the scene as happened in Cuba in 1959 and Chile in 1973.

small groups, large majorities of the non-elite class have had no choice but to leave the conduct of foreign relations to a very small number of individuals and groups with appropriate knowledge and power. Hence, the stagnant foreign policies can also be identified with the quality of the small elite groups: as one author pointed out, these stagnant policies have been the product of unimaginative policy makers with isolationist sentiments:

[T]he foreign policy of these Latin American countries (1) is, or tries to be, a continuation of domestic policy; (2) sponsors policies which are a function of the interests of internal elites; (3) serves more as a way of preserving the social order and the interests of its ruling elites than of the state or the national well-being in the abstract.¹⁷⁵

However, as the recent change in the region - the multi-polarisation of the socio-economic structure and political democratisation - resulted in the emergence of more democratic and rational decision making elites and the increased participation of the non-traditional sector, especially economic technocrats, in the making of foreign policy, the argument does not seem to be persuasive or universal any more, particularly in the case of countries such as Brazil with highly professionalised foreign policy bureaucrats.

Nevertheless, it would be equally naive to argue that the rise of new types of actors will constrain the decisive role which conservative traditional elites have played in the making and conduct of foreign policy. The traditional foreign policy elites, particularly the President and Foreign Minister, are themselves still an important factor in Latin American foreign policy making. Unfortunately, this area, like most other aspects of Latin American foreign policy studies, has not been sufficiently addressed because of the dominance of structural and situational forces both at the external and domestic levels, which have attracted more attention and have been considered to have more explanatory potential.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁵ Astiz, Carlos Alberto, "The Latin American countries in the International System", in Astiz, Carlos Alberto (ed.), *Latin American International Politics*, University of Notre Dame Press, 1969, p.5.

¹⁷⁶ See Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives", p.15.

Secondly, *which governmental organisations are regarded as actors of foreign policy implementation?* While “the closed nature”¹⁷⁷ of the foreign policy decision-making process makes it difficult to identify the role of the specific institutions relevant to the analysis, there is no academic agreement upon the question with the exception of one principle: the pluralised nature of the decision making mechanism in designing modern foreign policy. The multiplicity of participants in foreign policy tends to produce a complicated decision making system which results in a significant amount of inconsistencies and disparities in its procedure. For instance, thanks to the increase of inter-state relations in the modern age, not only the foreign office but also all other governmental organisations have overseas operations. They are all *de facto* actors of foreign policy. It is generally assumed that governmental actors are more numerous in developed countries where non-administrative organisations such as Parliaments and political parties also tend to have a variable role in the foreign policy decision-making process. Nevertheless, it is improper to view the foreign policy making in Latin America as a simple and restricted process in which only two or three institutions participate. In other words, the participation of highly institutionalised bureaucracies and the existence of complex networks of decision making groups are not the case only in developed countries. The increasing complexity of Latin American governments and societies has forced analysts to consider a wider range of actors beyond the circle of executive powers. However, bureaucratic institutions other than the Foreign Ministry are still hard to take seriously into account as main objectives in this analysis, since neither their foreign operations, nor their policy aims or purposes, are ‘foreign’ in essence, especially during the given period of this study: the 1970s and 1980s. The role of these groups in foreign policy implementation will only be regarded when it becomes excessive enough to take over that of the Foreign Ministry. In other words, while all the relevant institutions participating in the process of foreign policy will be considered on principle, special emphasis should be placed on executive powers and the Foreign Ministry in this study.

¹⁷⁷ Tulchin attached considerable significance to the “closed” nature of decision-making. In his study on Argentina, the “dilemma” of the military governments and the cause of their foreign-policy failures was “not a lack of professionalism among the diplomatic corps nor a lack of information... [but rather a] lack of channels for that information to reach the decision makers in the cabinet and the junta.” Tulchin, Joseph, “Authoritarian Regimes and Foreign Policy”, in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), *Latin American Nations in World Politics*, p.191.

Thirdly, *is the military included in the category of bureaucracy?* Their significant role in Latin American history and organisational character allow a decision either way, inclusively or exclusively as Ferguson noted:

On the one hand, the military can behave like other bureaucracies, and its identity may be blurred by military “occupation” of bureaucratic roles outside of the presidency or ruling junta. On the other hand, the military obviously is not like other bureaucracies in that it has a special capacity to wield force to impose its policy positions and to protect its institutional interests.¹⁷⁸

In this research, the military is classified as an independent organisation separable from other formal agencies, given the special function of Latin American military, even though it has bureaucratic characteristics.

The final dilemma is *the matter of categorisation of each elite group*. Among many efforts at classification undertaken by academics, Wilhelmy attempted a fairly analytical categorisation of participants in bureaucratic politics by using two axes of factors: *Policy Areas* and *Actors*. However, complex division of *Policy Areas* into internal, national and external elites may not be the case in Latin America where a high degree of overlap has prevailed. (Table 2.5.)

Table 2.5. Categorisation of Foreign Policy Elites by Wilhelmy

<i>Actors</i>	<i>Policy Areas</i>		
	<i>Internal</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>External</i>
<i>Political</i>	Ministers, other political leaders	President, principal political leaders	Foreign Relations Ministers, some ambassadors
<i>Bureaucratic</i>	Administrative Service heads	High officials of economic sector, military chiefs (civilian regime)	Ambassadors, functionaries of Foreign Relations Ministry

Source: Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, p.52.

¹⁷⁸ Ferguson, Yale, “Analyzing Latin American Foreign Policies”, p.152.

In this analysis, the foreign policy elite consists of three sub-categories: the political (individual) elites; the bureaucratic (organisational) elites; and the military, clearly distinguished by executive powers, other decision-making apparatus and the military institution. (Table 2.6.)

Table 2.6. Classification of the Foreign Policy Elites

<i>Political</i>	<i>Bureaucratic</i>	<i>Military</i>
President and advisors	Foreign Ministry Bureaucracy	High Military Officers
Foreign Minister	Economic Bureaucracy	(ex-) Military Officers within the Bureaucracy
Other Ministers	Other Bureaucracies	

The examination of the political elites concentrates on the perceptions of top decision makers and staffs, mainly of Presidents and surrounding power elites, Foreign Ministers and other relevant Ministers, and attempting to explain the relationship between their profiles and the policies they adopt. While political 'perception' is undoubtedly regarded as one of the key elements of decision-making, other aspects of individuals such as their personalities and social backgrounds may be useful explanatory factors.

The bureaucratic elites do not only include foreign office officials, but also other influential technocrats. The growing importance of economic matters has forced governmental institutions to establish their own international staffs of technocrats, usually young, liberal, nationalist economists, well trained in developmental and international economics, and this has caused some degree of conflict with traditional foreign policy bureaucrats.

On the other hand, the absence of an objective distinction between the political elites and the bureaucratic elites is a problematic feature in characterising these two groups, as countries have maintained elites of a political nature inside bureaucracy. Chile has been no exception as Fernandois states:

. ... , siempre se daba una clara distinción entre el personal diplomático - que en los años que tratamos era de alrededor de 400 funcionarios -, el personal administrativo - que permanecía en Santiago - por una parte, y los cargos más políticos; el ministro mismo, que sólo excepcionalmente fue un funcionario de carrera, algunas embajadas y algunos funcionarios diplomáticos como agregados culturales y políticos, de confianza ya sea del Canciller, del Presidente o del partido o coalición de partidos en el poder, por otro lado.¹⁷⁹

The latter group, *los cargos más políticos*, can be incorporated into the political elites according to this classification. Among them, however, those within the system of the Foreign Ministry such as *algunas embajadas y algunos funcionarios diplomáticos* will be regarded as bureaucratic elites for analytical reasons and the difficulty in objective distinction between *algunas* and the others.

2.5.1. Political Elites

2.5.1.1. The President

As a result of the enormous power given to the presidency and the legislative weakness in the policy formulation of Latin American countries, foreign policy making tends to be largely in the hands of a small executive power, the president in particular. Whether the executive power is derived from a constitution which normally provides prime responsibility and authority in the conduct of external affairs, from political culture which has absolute confidence in presidential power, or from political violence, the personality, political orientation and perception of a president may determine the degree of his involvement in foreign policy and his desire to use it as a major tool of government.

However, not all Latin American presidents have shown great concern about the issues of foreign policy: “Innovators such as President Echeverría in Mexico, Allende in Chile and Perón in Argentina have tended to be more concerned with foreign affairs, whereas more conservative rulers in the same countries at other times were inclined to be more isolationist and detached from the international community.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Ferandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.61.

¹⁸⁰ Kaufman, Edy, “Latin America”, pp.152-3.

Several attempts have been made to identify the precise role of the presidents of Latin American states. While Shapira showed how Echeverría's personality and his concern with domestic policy were reflected in foreign policy, Wilhelmy provided a framework to examine presidential participation in foreign policy decision making by distinguishing "between the superior executive role of the president of the republic and the style or form of behavior of each of the individuals who has occupied that position."¹⁸¹ In general, people have considered two main factors: *personality*; and *the decision maker's perception of the world*.

A major difficulty in dealing with *personality* is the task of constructing a meaningful personal "profile" of the individual in question. Wilhelmy showed that traditional Chilean foreign policy has been greatly affected by the various personal styles of its Presidents. In other words, the roles of top decision makers have been dependent on their personal styles:

Por ejemplo, el presidente Jorge Alessandri tenía una definición de su propio rol en política exterior que tendía a encuadrar su participación dentro de límites más bien estrechos, y el proyecto político oficial era básicamente conservador. No obstante, en la segunda mitad de período presidencial, el proyecto oficial asumió algunos rasgos reformistas como consecuencia de la incorporación del Partido Radical al gobierno, un cambio que explica cierto incremento en la visibilidad internacional de la figura de Alessandri. Bajo la presidencia de Eduardo Frei prevaleció tanto una concesión más ambiciosa del rol presidencial en el ámbito externo, como un proyecto político de vasto alcance reformista. Estas características enmarcan un papel conductor de Frei en la política exterior del período.¹⁸²

Since Max Weber's initial formulation of the idea of *charisma*, there have been intensive debates concerning the possible links between personality and policy output although over-simplification and a paternalistic point of view have been prevalent. People have been much concerned about some decision makers' unique personalities,

¹⁸¹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile", in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.47. Also see Shapira, Yoram, Mexican Foreign Policy under Echeverría.

¹⁸² Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.141.

such as those of John F. Kennedy and Fidel Castro, with respect to their actions and special impacts on the international scene.

Another decisive factor is a top decision maker's style and perception of the world which can substantially and directly influence a country's international behaviour. As Hill noted: "[t]he 'psychological environment' encapsulates the notion that decision makers perceive the world is at least as important for explaining their actions as is the world's actual condition,"¹⁸³ those perceptions are a more central factor in analysing the role of president than personalities. Hence, this study will pay primary attention to the style and ideological vision of top decision makers. It is assumed that each president can be classified into one of the categories of *Revolutionary*, *Innovative* or *Conservative*.

On the other hand, *the decision maker's perception of the world*, or one's international vision, tends to take into account the external environment, while fundamentally reflecting one's political vision. Academics have also studied this aspect under the structural dimension: "how the process of adapting to the requirements set by the external environment affects the states' internal structure, and how the results of this adaptation process, in their turn, have consequences for the external structure."¹⁸⁴ However, it is very difficult to apply this structural context of interactions between internal and external entities in Latin America, since the structural adaptation of the region *vis-à-vis* the rapidly changing external environment has never been active, and if it existed, has hardly affected its foreign policy. Rather, a common pattern has been the direct response of a country, based on top decision maker's perceptions, to internal or external entities in the face of the changing external environment or structure, before the change of the domestic structure. Therefore, their international vision, which may include a crisis perception or optimistic interpretation of the changing outside environment, has been a crucial factor in determining foreign policy.

¹⁸³ Hill, Christopher, "Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries", p.8.

¹⁸⁴ Lieshout, Robert H., Between Anarchy and Hierarchy: A Theory of Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, Edward Elgar, Aldershot, 1995, p.177.

*Salvador Allende*¹⁸⁵

Salvador Allende was a typical example of a Chilean middle class intellectual, educated in a democratic school and a liberal, progressive university, which were products of social and political conflict in the 19th century, and of ideological varieties in this century. In 1933, the Chilean Socialist Party was born and Allende was one of the founders. He also took part in the formation of the *Frente Popular* in 1936 and was appointed as Minister of Health under President Pedro Aguirre Cerda (radical). In 1943, Allende became Secretary General of the Socialist Party and was a Member of Parliament for thirty years. He had been widely involved in Chilean politics, not only being a member of the Socialist Party but also having a good relationship with all kinds of popular organisations, *i.e.* syndicate, cultural, professional and international.¹⁸⁶

Allende's own vision of the Chilean road to peaceful revolution and the building of socialism was based on participation by leftist parties in electoral politics and the restructuring of society and the economy through constitutional means, rejecting any violent means. Hence, his version of socialism has been considered as a more restricted one than those in the Soviet Union, China or Cuba. For instance, at the *Congreso de la Organización de Solidaridad Latinoamericana* (OLAS), hosted by Castro's Cuba in 1967, the radical position of Cuba viewing guerrilla movements as the only way to take power in Latin America was challenged by the Chilean delegation, headed by Salvador Allende himself. He clearly assumed the democratic position that power can be achieved by the people through peaceful electoral methods. This position was warmly supported by Che Guevara, one of the most influential figures in the development of guerrilla theory: "A Allende, quien está tratando de obtener el mismo resultado por otros medios."¹⁸⁷ His long held position continued to be a cornerstone of the government's foreign policy in later years. It was an important ideological break with the Leninist model that had long dominated the experience of

¹⁸⁵ Although it is not directly related to our topic, it is worth mentioning the bibliographic novel on Allende's life, Alegría, Fernando, *Allende: Mi Vecino el Presidente*, Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1989.

¹⁸⁶ Almeyda, Clodomiro, in Witker, Alejandro (ed.), *Salvador Allende: Una Vida para la Democracia y el Socialismo*, p.13.

Marxist governments since the Bolshevik revolution. Allende's rejection of armed insurrection, violent class struggle, and the dictatorship of the proletariat would have been the cause of some ideological concern to the Cultural Revolutionaries in power in Beijing whose main target was the peaceful coexistence line of Soviet revisionists.¹⁸⁸

In view of the points raised above, therefore, it is possible to argue that Allende's socialistic vision was creative, pragmatic and above all democratic. However, his vision was not theoretically well enough refined to avoid the criticism of being 'idealistic.' According to Boye:

Allende interpretó en cierta manera un sueño de conciliar la democracia con el socialismo, sueño fundado en la decepción producida en ellos por los socialismos reales y en la valoración que adquirió la idea democrática después del trauma nazista y fascista que azotó a Europa.¹⁸⁹

However, although Allende's socialistic philosophy was based on classic Marxism, it was the actual international situation and domestic realities by which his activities were motivated and by which he could always secure influence and power. He always regarded politics as a question of power, not of justice or correctness. Herein is the reason why he emphasised pluralism and why he kept his distance from ideologists.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁷ Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", *Foro Internacional*, 66, 1976, p.250.

¹⁸⁸ See Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A Case Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 18:2-3, 1985. p.131. Also see **Chapter IV** and **V** for further discussion about the relations with China.

¹⁸⁹ Boye, Otto, "Allende: Socialismo y Democracia", in Witker, Alejandro (ed.), *Salvador Allende: Una Vida para la Democracia y el Socialismo*, Archivo Salvador Allende, Universidad de Guadalajara, Guadalajara, 1988, p.124.

¹⁹⁰ However, this is not to suggest that he was a pure pragmatist. According to Almeyda:

Tampoco fue un puramente pragmático, y aunque siempre quiso y logró intervenir en la coyuntura, nunca lo hizo perdiendo de vista el objetivo final, sino adecuando su propuesta política a la realidad concreta, pensando siempre - intuitivamente y con razón -, que el proceso político se da en el terreno de las fuerzas y no en el de las ideas, lo que no significa menospreciar a estas últimas, sino valorarlas en cuanto esclarecen y no en cuanto confunden, en cuanto movilizan y no en cuanto sumen en la perplejidad, en el desconcierto y en el inmovilismo. (Almeyda, Clodomiro, "Los Legados de Salvador Allende", in Witker, Alejandro (ed.), *Salvador Allende: Una Vida para la Democracia y el Socialismo*, p.15.)

Allende's international vision was more concrete and realistic, whereas his version of socialism can be described as an idealistic one. He was seen as a leader with a clear international vision unlike his predecessors. This was not because he had been associated for a long time with various international figures, especially with social democrats, before taking up the presidency, but because his socialistic vision of international politics was unique, even dissimilar to that of the leaders of Cuba, Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia, in that he had a moderate and pragmatic, but determined, perception of Chile's place in the world.¹⁹¹ Nathaniel Davis, the US Ambassador to Chile at the time, exemplified the excellence of Allende's perceptive ability on international issues:

What about the US "invisible blockade," which Salvador Allende denounced in his celebrated speech to the UN General Assembly in December 1972? The Chilean president's eloquence and his perception of the secret US strategy contained in NSDM 93 was such that one might almost think he had read the document.¹⁹²

Although Cochrane suggested that "most Latin American decision makers have moderate, even modest, and very pragmatic perceptions of their countries' place in the world, objectives, capability, and what is possible,"¹⁹³ Allende was an exception to the generalisation. He was a leader with *Innovative* international vision, based on both socialist idealism and realistic interpretation of international politics.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹¹ Hence, the Chilean road was seen as an alternative way for the Third World countries and particularly welcomed by social democratic governments in Europe.

¹⁹² Davis, Nathaniel, "In the Years of Salvador Allende", p.120.

¹⁹³ Cochrane, James, "Characteristics of Contemporary Latin American International Relations", Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, 20:4, 1978, pp.463-4.

¹⁹⁴ Allende's international vision is well revealed in the two most famous public discourses at the UN General Assembly in December 1972 and at the third meeting of UNCTAD in April 1972. See Allende, Salvador, "Exposición del Presidente de la República de Chile, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens, en el XXVII Período de Sesiones de la Asamblea General de las Naciones Unidas" New York, 4 December, 1972, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, 1970-1973, pp.25-46; Allende, Salvador, "Discurso pronunciado por el Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, en la Ceremonia Inaugural de la Tercera Conferencia de las Naciones Unidas sobre Comercio y Desarrollo", Santiago, 13 April, 1972, in *ibid.*, pp. 87-104.

Augusto Pinochet

The authoritarian and anti-communistic nature of Pinochet's military government, as seen in the ideology section, was in a sense a reflection of the top decision maker's style and perception. It is not difficult to discover his personal nature through his announcements, books and interview articles. For instance, Pinochet did not deny his *Conservative* authoritarian character in an interview with Margarita Serrano:

Margarita Serrano: *¿quién es más cierto en usted, el sencillo o el autoritario?*

Pinochet: Por construcción soy sencillo. Mi manera de vivir, de ser, de actuar, es la de un hombre sencillo que se transforma cuando tiene que cumplir una misión. No voy a hablar riéndome porque me creerían tonto.

Margarita Serrano: *Debido a los cargos que ejerce y a su condición de militar, ¿podría no ser autoritario?*

Pinochet: ¿Por qué voy a ser autoritario si no es del caso? Cuando uno tiene que enfrentar alguna cosa que requiere autoridad, tiene que hacerlo con autoridad. Si usted va a pedir algo no lo puede hacer con modestia porque va a sentirse incómodo.¹⁹⁵

Furthermore, it can easily be seen that his authoritarian nature was justified by blaming the inefficient nature of democracy in the war against Marxism:

Asimismo entendí que no es posible pensar en una lucha anticomunista eficaz cuando se está enmarcado en añejos esquemas democráticos. Siempre reapéte y admiré esta concepción política, la democracia, pero, no obstante sus bondades, si no media una debida adecuación, es absolutamente incapaz de enfrentar al comunismo.¹⁹⁶

On the other hand, the international vision of General Pinochet was known to originate from his geopolitical thinking. His central thesis was that "the geopolitics regards a nation state as a super-individual organism which is alive and constantly engaged in a battle for survival."¹⁹⁷ Following the general trend of the geopolitics

¹⁹⁵ Serrano Pérez, Margarita, Personas de Mundo: Entrevistas de Margarita Serrano, Zig-Zag, Santiago, 1990, p.227.

¹⁹⁶ Pinochet, Augusto, El Día Decisivo: 11 de Septiembre de 1973, Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1980, p.11.

¹⁹⁷ Pinochet, Augusto, Geopolítica, Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1974, p.21.

school, he emphasised the aspect of power politics, especially the struggle between neighbouring states, by defining land, divided into a certain number of spaces, as the stage for the struggle between nation states. In practice, this conception dominated his international vision and furthermore became the cornerstone of the regime's international behaviour particularly when Pinochet stressed the multi-dimensional aspect of geopolitics as "an area of political science which is based on the historical understanding of geography, history, sociology, economics, strategy and politics."¹⁹⁸

2.5.1.2. The Foreign Minister

While the president represents a state and therefore bears responsibility for the conduct of a country's foreign policy, a foreign minister, through his/her professional staff, is responsible for both the formulation and implementation of policy in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the president. Although a foreign minister is usually the voice of the president on all major questions, he/she usually makes routine policy decisions and is the spokesman through whom the president acts. The increased complexity and enlarged volume of international relations, especially in countries with a highly professionalised diplomatic corps, has also tended to give ministers more autonomy, so that more matters are now handled routinely, without reference to the president, than was previously the case.¹⁹⁹ However, the role of a foreign minister inevitably varies according to his surroundings and his own profile.

In Latin America, a foreign minister is normally a distinguished and notable public person. Some ministers have had personal influence in formulating basic policy while most have not.²⁰⁰ Chilean tradition has also corresponded with the general pattern of the region with the exception of a few ministers such as Gabriel Valdés and Clodomiro Almeyda. According to Wilhelmy's survey, the frequent nomination of non (career) diplomats to the post and the rapid turnover of ministers which averaged

¹⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p.44. See also Section 3.1. for the further discussion of geopolitics.

¹⁹⁹ See Davis, Harold Eugene, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies", p.12.

²⁰⁰ The list of such ministers would include, among others, such notable figures as the Baron de Rio Branco of Brazil, Luis Drago of Argentina, and Baltasar Brum of Uruguay. See *ibid.*, p.12.

thirteen months in the period 1946-1982, indicate that “the position of minister of foreign relations tends to ‘socialize’ the person who serves in international activities and offers career alternatives regarding national contingent politics.”²⁰¹

Moreover, the rising importance of developmental issues has dramatically shifted the role of economic ministers leaving foreign ministers relatively less dominant in foreign policy design and implementation as these ministers have increasingly centralised control over the internal and external resources deployed in the total development process. According to Coleman and Quirós-Varela, “[t]he Ministries of Foreign Affairs have been the great losers in this game, displaced by the development agencies, by economic ministries, or by mining or hydrocarbon bureaus whose representatives have assumed the task of negotiation with foreign counterparts on crucial economic issues,....”²⁰² Thus, the position of foreign ministers has been seriously challenged, and seen as less ‘modern’ than the agencies with a developmental mission, especially since the 1970s.

1. The Socialist Regime

Only two ministers, Clodomiro Almeyda and Orlando Letelier - both of them socialists - served in the foreign relations post as seen in **Table 2.7.**, whereas more than ten cabinet crises shook the rest of the ministries. During the period in question, therefore, there was a certain degree of continuity in the management of Chilean foreign affairs.

Table 2.7. Foreign Ministers during the Allende Regime

<i>Name</i>	<i>Duration</i>
Clodomiro Almeyda Medina	Nov/1970 - Jun/1973
Orlando Letelier del Solar	Jun/1973 - Aug/1973
Clodomiro Almeyda Medina	Aug/1973 - Sep/1973

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources

²⁰¹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, p.54.

²⁰² Coleman, Kenneth M. and Quiros-Varela, Luis, “Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies”, pp.44-45.

a. Clodomiro Almeyda

Almeyda was certainly an exception to the above pattern of Latin American foreign ministers. His consolidated position initially benefited from the peaceful change of government from the Christian Democrats, since the process of both takeover and handover of the ministerial position between Valdés and Almeyda was exceptionally smooth and he received all kinds of support from the bureaucracy of his predecessor.²⁰³ However, what made him special as Foreign Minister was his strong personal profile. According to Fermandois:

Fue la individualidad descollante que tuvo en sus manos la diplomacia y la política internacional chilena. Su gran influencia dentro del Partido Socialista le aseguraba, además, un peso propio tanto dentro del gabinete como en la política nacional. Este hecho, y sus antecedentes personales, dan testimonio de que la Cancillería estaba en manos de una fuerte personalidad.²⁰⁴

Nathaniel Davis also evaluated him highly as a key moderator of UP policy:

Even so, Almeyda stood close to Allende, and his practical outlook served the government well. His good sense in day-to-day matters seemed to count for more than his theoretical urges. In a regime where there were all too many ideologues and postures, Almeyda was a force for balance and broad judgement. ... Chilean foreign policy in Allende's time was notably successful, at least in part because of Almeyda.²⁰⁵

It is interesting to note that neither Fermandois, a leading critic on the UP foreign policy, nor Davis, the US Ambassador at the time, was a strong advocate of the Allende government. Their judgements on Almeyda seem to be fairly reliable. Furthermore, although his ideological attitude, Marxism, was said to be less orthodox,²⁰⁶ he was well known as a nationalist, Latinamericanist and anti-

²⁰³ An important factor was the ideological orientation of Gabriel Valdés, the Foreign Minister of the Frei regime. He was known to be a left winger inside the Christian Democratic government.

²⁰⁴ Fermandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, p.56.

²⁰⁵ Davis, Nathaniel, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1985, p.36.

²⁰⁶ Meneses pointed out that this was "permeated by a strategically oriented sense of reality and opportunity." (Meneses, Emilio, *Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century*, p.365.) On the other hand, Fermandois emphasised the ideological influences from the Chinese model, Titoism, and from the Cuban Revolution on him.

... Sin embargo, aunque sin adherir a una ortodoxia rígida, o a un paradigma inamovible, Almeyda pronto se manifestaría como marxista tanto en su estilo como en su contenido.

imperialist. Therefore, Allende could confidently rely on Almeyda and granted him maximum power in the management of foreign policy, fulfilling the nationwide demand for 'vía institucional.' Although Chile was in a difficult situation on the stage of international politics, Almeyda efficiently utilised existing resources, both domestic and international.

b. Orlando Letelier

Although Orlando Letelier, who is known to the world more through his assassination by DINA than being a Foreign Minister, had a less distinguished personality and less authority than Almeyda, he was the most important figure in the process of the UP government's economic negotiations with the US as the Ambassador to Washington and Foreign Minister. It can even be said that relations with the White House and the US State Department were practically managed by him. However, his political significance was not comparable to that of Almeyda since he was more an economist than an ideological socialist or diplomat. In this regard, he was not comparable to Almeyda.

2. The Military Regime

Generally speaking, the role of the Foreign Ministers in the military regime corresponded to that of the general Latin American pattern in the light of the dominant presidential power in foreign policy making. Among eight ministers during the 18 years of the military government (**Table 2.8.**), two figures who represented opposite political visions, one being reformist-pragmatic and the other being conservative-ideological, will be introduced here.

Ciertamente como parte del socialismo, mostraría una admiración hacia el titoísmo, como alternativa a la URSS, pero en la década de 1960 trasladaría su admiración a China, no tanto como modelo fijo, sino porque creía que la "coexistencia pacífica", razonable para la URSS (cuyo carácter de "socialista" no le merece duda), en los países subdesarrollados llevaría al statu quo. Por cierto Cuba también se incorporaría a sus miradas que buscaban un paradigma. (Fernandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, p.56. For more details, see pp.55-59.)

a. *Hernán Cubillos*

Cubillos is known to be the only Foreign Minister under Pinochet with a pragmatic nature as the word ‘Neo-Pragmatism’ in Chilean foreign policy was frequently heard while he was in charge. One of the first activities of Cubillos was to set up a new *Comité Asesor del Ministro* which incorporated distinguished ex-diplomats and academics. According to Cubillos, the objective of the Committee was “to enhance the judicial power of the Ministry and to incorporate more internationalists for Chilean foreign policy.”²⁰⁷

Table 2.8. Foreign Ministers during the Pinochet Regime

Name	Duration
Vicealmirante Ismael Huerta	Sep/1973 - Jul/1974
Vicealmirante Patricio Carvajal	Jul/1974 - Apr/1978
Hernán Cubillos Sallato	Apr/1978 - Mar/1980
René Rojas Galdames	Mar/1980 - Feb/1983
Miguel Schweitzer Walters	Feb/1983 - Dec/1983
Jaime del Valle	Dec/1983 - Dec/1986
Ricardo García Rodríguez	Dec/1986 - Oct/1988
Hernán Felipe Errázuriz	Oct/1988 - Mar/1990

Source: Compiled by the author from various sources.

Furthermore, the significance of Cubillos can be found not only in the pragmatic pursuit of foreign policy but also in its impact on domestic policy: the polarisation of the ruling elites. Following the humiliating fiasco of the presidential visit to the Philippines, Cubillos was replaced with René Rojas. The removal of Cubillos from the post provoked a fierce polemic in the Chilean press. Even *El Mercurio* and *Qué Pasa*, both pro-government publications, criticised the decision to sack the Foreign Minister. This incident revealed the conflict between the *blandos* and the *duros* inside the government since Cubillos was a key figure in the *aperturista* group, *blandos* who favoured the eventual return to civilian rule. His sacking thus provoked fears of a fundamental return of isolation policies, which would favour the *duros*, who wanted

²⁰⁷ Hernán Cubillos in Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, Las Ediciones del Ornitornico, p.45.

²⁰⁸ *Latin American Weekly Report*, Latin American Newsletters, London, 4 April, 1980, p.2.

some form of institutionalisation of the present regime, while trying to build up a measure of popular support for it. The other group of *duros* which included the First Lady, Lucía Hiriart de Pinochet, claimed that the insult to the President by the Philippine government was the result of an elaborate plot hatched between the US State Department, the Foreign Minister and the *aperturistas*, apparently for the sole purpose of humiliating the President.²⁰⁸

b. Jaime del Valle

Jaime del Valle was a representative of the strongly ideological and hard-line Foreign Ministers during the period of the Pinochet regime. Particularly, he demanded that the loyalty of foreign office bureaucrats should be to the regime rather than the country:

... la lealtad debe ser total para con su gobierno, así como para con las autoridades que representa, además de ser también fundamental la que debe guardar para con sus colegas de labores.²⁰⁹

Several cases of discharge of career diplomats such as Maximiliano Jarpa; Monica Madariaga, Ambassador to the OAS; and Leonidas Irrarrázaval, also Ambassador to the OAS, in 1985 can be understood within the context of the hard-line policy of the president and the Foreign Minister not only against the outside world but also their own staff.²¹⁰ The last two cases worsened the unstable image of Chilean diplomacy in multilateral politics, especially when Chile faced a harsh challenge from the OAS over its human rights violation. In the conduct of foreign policy, he maintained a strong position against the international condemnation of the human rights abuses of the military government.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Jaime del Valle in Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", in Muñoz, Heraldo(ed.) *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, 1984, p.340.

²¹⁰ Maximiliano Jarpa stated that "Me expresó el Ministro (Del Valle) que en varias ocasiones diversas personas me habían escuchado emitir opiniones contrarias al gobierno. Pregunté por sus nombres. Dijo no poder decirlo." Jarpa in *El Mercurio*, 10 May, 1985, p.C2.

²¹¹ See Chapter V.

2.5.2. *Bureaucratic Elites*

This section concerns secondary decision making groups such as Foreign Ministry bureaucrats, exploring the lower level of the organisational features of a nation's foreign policy.²¹² Examination of the bureaucratic factor may offer useful insights into foreign policy, albeit at more restricted levels. Latin American countries have shown the general pattern of developing countries, in which the bureaucracy of foreign relations is considered as only one part, and not the critical one. The bureaucratic politics approach has basically responded to the particularities of the United States and Western European reality. However, it is assumed that the roles played by the members of the bureaucracy are related to their foreign policy actions and attitudes, although the perspective on the role of bureaucracy in Latin American foreign policy making has never been a popular subject under the centralised power structure.

The analysis of the role of the foreign policy bureaucratic elite can be realised within the frame of common elite theory or decision making theory, by studying issues such as: *the formal positions and missions of the actors within the decision making system; the personal profiles, professionalism and efficiency of bureaucracy; the relations between decision making groups including their organisational features; and the influence of political culture.*²¹³

2.5.2.1. Foreign Office Bureaucrats

In most Latin American countries, Foreign Ministry officials and diplomats have traditionally been recruited from a small upper class elite: hence, they tend to be sophisticated, cosmopolitan, well educated, and conservative. This tradition has continued despite important changes in social class structure in this century. Hence, nepotism and upper class attributes are closely related to the functional character of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats when recruitment for diplomatic and bureaucratic

²¹² It is also called *Establishment Variable*. See McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, pp.69-74.

²¹³ For further theoretical discussion of the above perspectives, see Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", pp.137-8.

positions depends upon political considerations. Unlike the US and European nations where foreign policies are highly bureaucratized and the role of bureaucrats is based on their professionalism, “politicization of the bureaucracy”²¹⁴ is the phenomenon in Chile and many of the Latin American countries. According to Wilhelmy,

... the specialization or professional preparation required for appointment within the bureaucracy of foreign relations traditionally has been limited, one consideration being that the functionary should be trained principally on the job, a conception that only in the last decades has undergone a change. Finally, the working of the bureaucracy constantly depends on political criteria: functionaries tend to fit their activities into a political framework in order to avoid dysfunctional risks to the progress of their careers, as well as to maintain or increase their power in the organization (the latter is not, in reality, a phenomenon distinctive of a politicized bureaucracy).²¹⁵

The fact that Latin American diplomatic elites have been recruited from the upper class, and have thus had a highly politicized character, has resulted in the instability of foreign ministries. This aspect includes important political figures in disgrace, confined to an “elegant exile in a diplomatic post.”²¹⁶ However, with the intensification of Latin American involvement in international politics since World War II, Latin American foreign ministries have been increasingly professionalized. In the case of Chile, the process of recruitment was partially formalized between the 1930s and 1950s.

The historical role of Chilean diplomatic elites basically reflected the traditional definition of the foreign policy of Chile: *conservative defence of the status quo*. However, during the last two decades these roles have been gradually transformed incorporating more modern-progressive factors as seen below.

Traditional factors

- *defence of national sovereignty*
- *territorial integration*
- *peace keeping*
- *conflict management*

²¹⁴ Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, p.46.

²¹⁵ *ibid.*, p.46.

²¹⁶ Kaufman, Edy, “Latin America”, p.153.

- *maintenance of normal diplomatic relations*
- *fulfilment of international contracts and treaties within the realm of international law*

Modern-progressive factors

- *modernisation of organisation*
- *external debt negotiation*
- *promotion of export including access to new markets*
- *acquisition of modern technology*
- *scientific and technological development*
- *intensifying economic co-operation at regional and global level*
- *promotion of cultural relations*²¹⁷

1. Socialist Regime

While the upper class attributes of foreign policy elites were not exceptional in Chile, their advanced education, cultural attitudes, and experiences and contacts both in national and international political life enabled Chile to have relatively well-qualified elites.²¹⁸ Hence, it has been often pointed out that, regardless of regime type - democratic or oligarchic - in Chilean history prior to the 1973 coup, one of the most important policy capabilities was those relatively well trained elites in the Foreign Ministry. This more or less explains why the Chilean *Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores* enjoyed a virtual monopoly of foreign affairs and a superior position to the rest of the national bureaucracies until it lost control of wide functional areas in 1973.²¹⁹ According to Cope,

Chile's career diplomats and political appointees serve to link the foreign policy objective of assisting internal economic development to the various components of the international system. Most of Chilean foreign policy elites have held realistic views of the international system as composed of other nations, formal international political and economic organizations and associations, and various blocs, or alliances of nations, in which negotiations must be conducted to achieve Chile's objective.²²⁰

²¹⁷ Elementos para la Gestión de los Servicios Exteriores, Documento de Trabajo No.6, Proyecto de Cooperación con los Servicios Exteriores de América Latina, PNUD/CEPAL, Santiago, 1989, p.27. For the organigram of the Chilean Foreign Ministry, see p.41.

²¹⁸ See Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.319.

²¹⁹ Interview with Chilean Diplomat Fernando Labra, Santiago, 5 October, 1992.

²²⁰ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.333. For more on the Chilean Foreign Ministry in this century, see Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", pp.145.

Another highly regarded factor of the Foreign Ministry was that, despite some differences in career structure, “careerists and politicians complement one another on a functional basis, and some careerists have obtained ambassadorial portfolios.”²²¹ In many cases, ambassadorships tended to be taken by political appointees rather than career diplomats since the classic notion that these posts were direct representatives of the president had a strong influence. Unlike the prediction based on the complex nature of the UP coalition that this tendency would be predominant, Allende did not change the balanced tradition and continued to name career officers to ambassadorial positions. While traditionally prestigious positions such as those in Argentina, the US and Europe were filled by more prestigious personnel, both careerists and politicians, rather symbolic appointments were made in the Socialist countries, except Cuba, since relations with the Socialist countries were maintained directly from Santiago.²²²

However, the inclinations of the Chilean Foreign Ministry officials have been conservative, supporting the *status quo*, with the exception of a small but significant left-wing group who maintained close relations with Allende for a long period until his election.²²³ Since the latter group’s revolutionary tendency could not be compatible with the UP’s foreign policy ideology and functional diplomacy, it was known that Almeyda barred any further movement. According to Fermandois,

... Con todo, había sectores de la Unidad Popular que hubieran visto con buenos ojos una actitud más agresiva, para demostrar una diplomacia “revolucionaria”, tal como lo prometía el Programa de Gobierno. Pero Almeyda corta de raíz cualquier devaneo revolucionario directo en el interior del Ministerio. Tenía conciencia de que el Gobierno quería y tenía que actuar rápidamente en el plano internacional, y que ello no era posible sin el concurso del funcionariado tradicional.²²⁴

²²¹ Cope, Orville G., “Chile”, p.321.

²²² Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.66. The inside story of Chile-Cuban diplomacy is well addressed in Edwards, Jorge, Persona non Grata, although it is not an academic writing.

²²³ Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.61.

²²⁴ *ibid.*, p.63.

Hence, the traditional figure of a generalist as an ideal diplomat²²⁵ was not changed in this period, although the recruitment of a 'special task force' for professional advice became popular during the Frei regime. Prestigious career diplomats, such as Enrique Bernstein as *Director de la Dirección de Relaciones Internacionales*, continued to advise Allende and Almeyda with wide influence in the design and implementation of foreign policy, securing its continuity. On the whole, the stability of the bureaucracy continued during the Allende regime in the following respects.

First, with the exception of high level posts, no significant change in the bureaucracy could be found. A rather propagandist statement of Almeyda described the bureaucratic continuity inside the Ministry:

President Allende had the full and constant support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and decision-making in foreign policy was free of partisan and other disruptive influences. As a result, the Government's foreign policy was conducted in a spirit of unity, consistency and decisiveness.²²⁶

Second, although Muñoz pointed out that "international policy of peoples rather than of Ministries of Foreign Affairs ... was never implemented,"²²⁷ the initiative of the Ministry and professional diplomacy were in no way superseded.

Third, even if some socialists, particularly the left wing of the UP, expressed their criticism of the government's management of foreign policy, there was a general consensus at least inside the Socialist Party on the successful management of foreign affairs by the President of the Republic and by the Ministry.

²²⁵ According to Wilhelmy, the traditional figure of Chilean diplomat is: "un diplomático concebido como un representante de la totalidad de los intereses nacionales más que de una especialidad o un segmento específico de los mismos." Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.145.

²²⁶ Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", in Sideri, S. (ed.), Chile: 1970-1973: Economic Development and Its International Setting - Self Criticism of the Unidad Popular Government's Policies, p.126. A number of ex-diplomats confirmed this statement through interviews,. However, Fermandois argued that the UP did experience some problem, although minor, in the naming of Ambassadors to the Socialist countries. See Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.53.

²²⁷ Muñoz, Herald, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.164. This tendency was changed with a deep impact by the completely different approach of the military government.

2. *Military Regime*

One of the most significant changes in the bureaucratic landscape under Pinochet's rule was the proliferation of actors outside the Foreign Ministry and the weakening of the Ministry itself in the decision making on foreign policy. Wilhelmy argued that the role of the Foreign Ministry was significantly weakened due to three reasons: a shift of international agendas (to more economic issues); an increased fusion between domestic and foreign affairs, and the breakdown of the democratic tradition.²²⁸ Consequently, not only did the participation of other existing Ministries, particularly those of the Economy and Interior, increased, but also newly created power groups surrounding the President such as the *Comité Asesor* considerably extended their share of participation in foreign policy making. Therefore, the gap between the political elites and the bureaucracy increased, and "problems of communication between the immediate presidential environment (leading sector) and the regular government (led sector) have occurred."²²⁹ The collapse of traditional elites and the decision making mechanism will be examined through the prism of the *interfered Foreign Ministry*.

The most radical change was undertaken during the first year of the military government. A large number of officials were removed from their posts. Leftist officials were the main target as well as those with a 'lack of political confidence.'²³⁰ The government resorted to transfers and new destinations, both civilian and military, in order to replace the functionaries removed from their positions, which "significantly modified the internal reality of the Foreign Ministry."²³¹ Hence, the Foreign Ministry came under the strong control of the military and pro-militarist civilians. The first two Ministers were military officers: Ismael Huerta and Patricio Carvajal, served between September 1973 and April 1978.²³² Even when civilian

²²⁸ *ibid.*, p.144.

²²⁹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile", p.57.

²³⁰ Estimation varies between 35 and 50 per cent.

²³¹ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile", p.55.

²³² The appointment of a 'civilian' Minister in 1978, Hernán Cubillos, might be also regarded within this category, since he had been a Marine Officer and his father a Commander in Chief of the Army. See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, Las Ediciones del Ornitorrinco, Santiago, 1986, p.31.

ministers were in charge they had to face strong intervention by *sub-secretarios* and *vice-ministerios* which have normally been military officers' posts. The presence of the military was also strong in ambassadorships and senior posts of the Ministry in comparison to the previous three regimes as **Table 2.9.** indicates. The lack of professional experience and the authoritarian attitude of these military officers was strongly criticised:

... la mayoría de los designados carece de experiencia diplomática o de preparación en asuntos internacionales, y la manutención de las prácticas de rotación en los cargos castrenses impide que los funcionarios militares en servicio - con alguna excepción - se compenetren del estilo de trabajo y acepten la "cultura corporativa" de la Cancillería.²³³

During the last years, as a symbolic gesture - but still a significant challenge to career diplomats - the military government often designated ex-Ministers to ambassadorships as well: for instance, Sergio Gaete, ex-Minister of Education, to Buenos Aires; Juan Carlos Délano, ex-Minister of Economy, to the United Kingdom, and Francisco Jabier Cuadra, ex-Minister of the Secretary General of the government, to the Vatican in 1987.²³⁴

Table 2.9. Appointment of Ambassadors during the Governments of Alessandri, Frei, Allende and Pinochet

	Total Ambassadors	Career Diplomats	%
J. Alessandri	47	23	48.9
E. Frei	52	21	40.3
S. Allende	60	37	61.6
A. Pinochet (up to 1986)*	64	23	35.9

Source: Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.), *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1986, p.429.

Note: * Excluding Consul General

The organisational transformation of the Foreign Ministry in the late 1970s brought about a significantly diminished role for the traditional section, making it more vulnerable to outside interference. For instance, several foreign representatives were

²³³ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.146.

²³⁴ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.), *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1987, p.298.

brought together: the representative to the *Asociación Latinoamericana de Integración* (ALADI) with the Chilean Embassy in Montevideo; the one to FAO with the Embassy in Rome; those to *Organización de Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo Industrial* and *Organización de Naciones Unidas para la Energía Atómica*, both with the Chilean Embassy in Vienna.²³⁵

Meanwhile, the *decreto supremo* No. 161 of 31 March 1978 was issued in order to institutionalise the military's open interference in the Foreign Ministry. First, it created *Vice-Ministro* which was always occupied by a military officer to supervise civilian Ministers and high officials. Second, the *decreto* established *el Consejo de Política Exterior*, *el Consejo de Política Antártica* and *la Dirección de Planificación*. Among them, *la Dirección de Planificación*, which has been a central body of the Ministry since then, became the most powerful co-ordinating body of military intervention in the Ministry. Many officers of the *Dirección* were directly recruited from military, which made it easy for the Ministry of Defence to participate openly in the making of foreign policy.²³⁶ Another threat to the professionalism of Chilean diplomacy was made in 1979 when the government issued DFL No. 33: firstly, "the Head of the State can name thirty attaches (mainly administrative and press) without normal qualifications for foreign service," secondly, "the Head of the State can appoint up to ten Consul Generals."²³⁷ This situation had to face unexpected criticism from inside and outside the Foreign Ministry. For instance, ex-Ambassador Barros criticised the excessive participation of the military in Chilean diplomacy:

La Cancillería chilena es la única donde el diplomático profesional más alto ocupa el cuarto lugar jerárquico. Hay un ministro que no es de carrera; un viceministro que es un general de Ejército, y un teniente coronel que es el subsecretario. En cuarto lugar viene un diplomático que no son de carrera, y verá que ahí hay un remezón que vale la pena revelar.²³⁸

This statement also reveals that there were certain tensions, if not antagonism, between traditional career bureaucrats and military officers inside the Ministry,

²³⁵ See *ibid.*, pp.298-9.

²³⁶ Interview with an anonymous ex-diplomat.

²³⁷ Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, pp.47-8.

²³⁸ Interview with *Cosas* No. 203, 12 July, 1984, p. 28.

however it did not affect the changing atmosphere.²³⁹ Although there were various efforts to co-ordinate the individual conduct of senior diplomats such as *Reunión de Coordinación de la Política Exterior Chilena*, in most cases the ultimate aim of these efforts was to control civilians averse to the military rule. For instance, in a meeting of the *Reunión*, General Pinochet accused some ambassadors of not completely identifying themselves with the governmental policy but acting more in their personal interests than those of the country.²⁴⁰

The influence of the military culture was obvious from trivial aspects²⁴¹ to main issues. Accordingly, Muñoz argued that the overall ideology of *pretoriano-ideológico* was dominant inside the Ministry regardless of individual officers' background:

El estilo civil pragmático no siempre es atributo de los civiles, ni el pretoriano-ideológico de los sectores uniformados. De hecho, bajo el gobierno castrense ciertos militares en la Cancillería se han caracterizado por su moderación y adaptación al estilo convencional del servicio exterior, en tanto que diversos funcionarios civiles - incluyendo a integrantes de la delegación chilena en Naciones Unidas e incluso embajadores - han practicado el estilo *pretoriano-ideológico*.²⁴²

Consequently, the traditional professionalism of the civil bureaucrats was seriously limited in the decision making processes of foreign policy which were substantially monopolised by military officers and pro-military civilians.²⁴³ The foreign policy, therefore, largely reflected the attitudes and perspectives of a few high-ranking military officers. Hence, it has been frequently argued that the Ministry of Foreign Relations had at that time little or no influence on foreign policy decisions.²⁴⁴

²³⁹ Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.), *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1984, p.342. In a personal interview, an officer in the Foreign Ministry mentioned that even the initial antagonism could not last long since the Ministry was completely under the control of the military.

²⁴⁰ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.), *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1986, p.430.

²⁴¹ One very controversial issue was the time control of foreign office bureaucrats, imposed from September 1973. See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.44.

²⁴² *ibid.*, pp.36-7.

²⁴³ It is an interesting fact that some other Latin American military regimes have deliberately tried to avoid the militarisation of foreign offices. For instance, Brazilian military governments tried to maintain the civilian character of the Foreign Ministry during the Castelo Branco regime. In the case of Peru, the majority of ambassadors were civilians during military regimes.

²⁴⁴ The US preference for military linkage also contributed to the discontinuation of the professionalism of bureaucracy and the legitimacy of the Foreign Ministry in the handling of external

Further causes can be identified in the Economic Developmentalism of foreign policy. As a result of the adoption of the neo-liberal policy, economic bureaucrats outside the Foreign Ministry became more participatory in the conduct of international economic policy than the economic specialists inside the Foreign Ministry, although the role of the Chilean Foreign Ministry gradually changed during the Pinochet regime, emphasising the themes of international economic co-operation rather than the traditional juridical-diplomatic aspects of the defence of the status quo. Consequently, the Foreign Ministry was incapable of competing with other economic departments in terms of either quality or quantity of human resources. Some tend to see this phenomenon as partly responsible for the fact that Foreign Ministers with the exception of Hernán Cubillos, no longer attempted to train their own economic specialists inside the Foreign Ministry.²⁴⁵

Increased interference from other Departments of the government, particularly from the *Ministerio de Interior*, made the Foreign Ministry more vulnerable. Not only issues such as public announcements, declarations, and nomination of positions, which the Foreign Ministry might not have entirely controlled, were targeted, but also issues clearly proper to the Foreign Ministry were sometimes handled by other departments of the government. In February 1984, for instance, the Interior Minister, Sergio Onofre Jarpa, said in a press conference that the Israeli government's request backed by the European nations to extradite Nazi criminal Walter Rauff was,

... típicamente una maniobra política en contra del Gobierno de Chile. ... Hay una campaña de prensa internacional que no sólo está teniendo vigencia y está siendo impulsada en países con gobiernos de extrema izquierda sino que también dentro de Estados Unidos.²⁴⁶

relations. During the period, the US increasingly turned, particularly in Chile and Argentina, to either high military officers or economists-technocrats excluding traditional elites in the Foreign Ministry. See Tulchin, Joseph, "Authoritarian Regimes and Foreign Policy", in Muñoz, H. and Tulchin, J. (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.191.

²⁴⁵ It was the *Decreto No 161* by which Hernán Cubillos tried to unify and enhance the role of international economic bureaucrats by creating *la Dirección General de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales* inside the Foreign Ministry. The *Dirección General* functioned as almost an independent agency in terms of human resources and budget. See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.145.

²⁴⁶ Jarpa in Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", pp.343-4.

2.5.2.2. Economic Bureaucracies

The ministries of economics have become important players, in the modern diplomacy, governing foreign economic policy in co-operation with, or in competition with, the economic branch of the ministry of foreign relations. Their principal roles are setting or recommending policies on the balance of trade, foreign debts, and foreign exchange. Coleman and Quirós-Varela suggested that economic bureaucracies have come to participate in the formulation of foreign policy for the following reasons:

- increasing reliance on the state as an agent of economic change,
- the tentativeness of the political process,
- the technical requirements of implementing development plans,
- differential modernization within governmental bureaucracies,
- the modernization of bureaucracies in response to external demand,
- the transnational convergence of views on development,
- the direct interests of external institutions in the specific facets of development.²⁴⁷

Meanwhile, more concrete factors in the Latin American perspective were suggested by Wilhelmy:

The growing importance of international economic relations within the whole of foreign policy of the last decades meant for the ministerial bureaucracy a challenge for which it was unprepared. The initiatives of Latin American integration, the fusion of foreign policy, multilateral economic relations, and “structural reformism” produced during the existence of the Alliance for Progress came about through partial changes.²⁴⁸

However, the power relations in the conduct of foreign economic policy between the bureaucracies of a traditional Foreign Ministry and the economic ministries are by no means clear and need to be determined by thoroughly examining cases. The National Bureaucrats, in Wilhelmy’s term, are also actors of special importance, since in contrast to functionaries in other areas, who must act through their respective ministers, the national bureaucracy has direct access to the centre of governmental

²⁴⁷ Coleman, Kenneth M. and Quiros-Varela, Luis, “Determinants of Latin American Foreign Policies: Bureaucratic Organizations and Development Strategies”, p.47.

²⁴⁸ See Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, p.56.

power. In the case of Chile, “the high officials of the *Corporación de Fomento* (CORFO) and of the principal public enterprises, the management personnel of the Central Bank, and the specialists in copper affairs” have made up some elements of the top layer of a growing technocracy.²⁴⁹

1. Socialist Regime

The UP government chose to remove the business of international economic affairs from the Foreign Ministry by establishing *Secretaría Ejecutiva de Relaciones Exteriores* (SEREX), an organisation in charge of foreign economic relations constituted on the basis of functionaries from the Central Bank. SEREX was often criticised as “a disguised parallel foreign service”²⁵⁰ or “mediocre Marxist officials who were welcomed with succulent remunerations in dollars in the new parallel service.”²⁵¹ However, the use of the potential power of SEREX was neither realised nor affected the role of the Foreign Ministry during the three years. Rather, SEREX was more significant as an object of strong debates over its legal status in the Congress.

2. Military Regime

A progressive bureaucratic transformation in the international economic policy area was undertaken in 1979 with the creation of the *Comité de Relaciones Económicas Internacionales*. The *Comité*, presided over by the Minister of Foreign Relations, incorporated the Ministers of Finance, Economy, Agriculture and Transport; the director of *Oficina de Planificación Nacional* (ODEPLAN), the *Viceministro* of the Foreign Minister, the president of *Banco Central*, the director of the *Relaciones Económicas Internacionales* in the Foreign Ministry; and finally the directors of major entrepreneurial organisations such as the *Confederación de la Producción y del Comercio*, the *Sociedad de Fomento Fabril*, and the *Sociedad Nacional de*

²⁴⁹ *ibid.*, p.53.

²⁵⁰ Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, p.366.

²⁵¹ Mac-Hale, Tomás, “The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity”, p.83.

Agricultura, the *Sociedad Nacional de Minería*. Also, the *ProChile* was in charge of the *Secretaría Ejecutiva* of the *Comité*.²⁵² On the other hand, the *Comité Coordinador del Comercio Exterior* played an important role in linking and coordinating the Foreign and Economic Ministries in the implementation of its original task of export promotion.²⁵³

The rise of economic bureaucrats in foreign policy making also had some positive results with the introduction of pragmatism followed by the challenges from the economic *aperturistas* of the late 1970s. For instance, the nomination of Jorge Cauas, ex-Minister of Finance to the post of Chilean Ambassador to Washington in 1977 can be understood in this context as a prime example of the increased role of economic bureaucracies in the making of foreign policy and, at the same time, as a step forward to pragmatism in diplomacy.²⁵⁴

2.5.3. *The Military*

It is undoubtedly a fact that modern military institutions tend to take part in the negotiation and administration of a certain foreign policy area: *i.e. Military-Strategic Area*, whether by direct or indirect participation. Latin American military institutions have had an inherent interest in foreign policy, mainly stemming from their role in national defence. More specifically, they have had immediate concerns based on their dependence on external states for arms and training.

For many years before Latin American democratisation, there had been a noticeable similarity between the structural position of the military and the national bureaucracy: military officials had the benefit of access to higher levels of government and tended to define problems in an increasingly less sectoral manner, instead emphasising their global dimensions, both internal²⁵⁵ and international. This signified a clear expansion

²⁵² See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.46.

²⁵³ Non-bureaucratic *Chicago Boys* also actively participated in the economic area of foreign policy making and implementation as the most influential players outside the government.

²⁵⁴ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.44.

²⁵⁵ Although Latin American armed forces have remained vastly inferior to those of the world's great powers despite the continuous modernisation processes, military capabilities in most of the countries

of military activity related to foreign policy.²⁵⁶ In the Latin American perspective, Portales suggested a rather complicated framework to analyse military participation in a country's foreign policy decision making, which consisted of 'four types of influence' and 'four channels to realise influence.'

1. Types of Influence

- *Influencia logística o de aprovisionamiento*
- *Influencia organizacional*
- *Influencia ideológica*
- *Influencia política*

2. Channels of Influence

- *Canales de aprovisionamiento*
- *Canales organizacionales*
- *Canales ideológicos*
- *Canales de influencia política*²⁵⁷

Table 2.10. The Role of Military in Foreign Policy

	<i>Strategic Role</i>	<i>Political Role</i>
<i>The military itself as a decision making body?</i>	Yes	No
<i>Influence of military values on foreign policy?</i>	High	High in Military Regime Low in Civilian Regime
<i>Participation in decision making?</i>	Direct and formal	Indirect and normally confidential

Based on the concept of Portales, a simpler but more realistic framework can be set up for the study of the role of the military: *Strategic Role* and *Political Role*. As **Table 2.10.** suggests, *the strategic role* of the military is an area almost exclusively military by its nature. The influence of the military tends to be fairly high in decision making in the areas of arms transfer - especially procurement, joint manoeuvre and its

have been significant enough to implement the role of counter-insurgency and domestic political arbitration.

²⁵⁶ See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile", p.53.

²⁵⁷ Portales, Carlos, "Las Relaciones Internacionales de las FF.AA. Chilenas: de la Guerra Fría a los Años 80", *Opciones*, 8, Jan-Apr, 1986, p.200.

relations with external counterparts: *influencia de logística o aprovisionamiento* and *organizacional*. Such an independent role of the military in foreign policy is usually significant regardless of regime type. Nevertheless, what was peculiar to the Latin American military institution in foreign policy decision making was their *political role*, as the historical participation of Latin American military force was focused on internal order rather than national or continental defence. The impact of the political role tends to vary: it could be limited in some cases, and notable or, even, decisive in others. The following are several aspects to be considered in the study of the *political role*.

First, the military can increase its influence on foreign policy making as a source of information. Information relevant to foreign policy making is gathered in many ways and through many sources. Modern governments rely heavily on intelligence organisations of one type or another. Most of the Latin American countries have imitated more advanced nations in international involvement by setting up such agencies, usually under the jurisdiction of the military establishment, even if a large portion of their efforts has been directed towards gathering domestic information within their respective countries.

Second, although basically categorised as a strategic role, their direct link with military institutions in other countries can play a political role, producing an unusual form of link. The prime example of this kind is the *operación cóndor*, a clandestine network of former or present South American secret military agencies, which was revealed in the early 1990s. Although the *operación cóndor* was initially formed for the purpose of counterinsurgency and an anti-Communist campaign during the authoritarian regimes, it is reportedly said to be still in operation in order to protect their own security in collaboration with each other against possible charges of human rights abuses in the past.

The third aspect concerns the import of military culture. If military personnel participate in policy making and operation with their conservative tendency to fear nearly every type of basic economic, social, and/or political change, it is easy to visualise the handicaps under which the foreign policy of Latin America is made and

implemented (*Canales ideológicos* and *Canales de influencia política*). Although the level of participation can be measured by numerous indicators of political influence, such as the number of military officers in the decision making body of foreign policy, it is very difficult to measure their qualitative participation.

When most other Latin American militaries tended to be bands of armed men loyal not to the nation or to central governments but to charismatic regional *caudillos* in their history, the Chilean military was the principal exception to this tendency. As clearly manifested in the Constitution of 1925, the armed forces in the political system of Chile were to be subordinated to civilian authority as well as politically free. Although the geo-physical nature of the Chilean territory has always assured the military a favoured position in relation to civilian power groups,²⁵⁸ the fact that there has been hardly any important decision making on national security or border issues has long restricted the role of the Chilean military in this century.

However, Portales observed that Chilean military forces have consistently but gradually increased their influence on foreign policy making since the World War II, when their organisation and operation became sophisticated and, more importantly, the Pan-American military system was initiated.²⁵⁹ However, the mission of Chilean armed forces under the civilian regimes was still limited by the traditional terms: defence of the territorial integrity and the national sovereignty, *i.e.* the strategic role. It was not until the last years of the Allende regime that the military took over real *political roles*, intensely expanding their traditional notion of “*Nuestra Patria, Anti-Communism* and *Tercermundismo*.”²⁶⁰ The professionalised Chilean military had always been one of the most prestigious governmental institutions influential enough to be “capable of lobbying effectively for its budgetary interests and defending itself

²⁵⁸ Many people have argued a relatively high military strength in Chile. According to North, the ratio of military personnel to total population in Chile was among the second highest in Latin America to Cuba. See North, Liisa, “The Military in Chilean Politics”, in Lowenthal, Abraham (ed.), Armies and Politics in Latin America, Holmes & Meier, New York, 1976, pp.165-196.

²⁵⁹ *ibid.*, pp.202-3.

²⁶⁰ Their Anti-Communism had been strongly influenced by US counterinsurgency training. For a detailed survey of international notions of the Chilean military, see Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, pp.86-7.

against any antagonistic civilian action,"²⁶¹ whatever restricted role it played during the eight successive civilian regimes before its rise to power in 1973.²⁶²

In summary, in this Chapter, characters and possible roles have been examined in both theoretical and practical perspectives. The implications of four pre-identifiable variables to the two regimes in question are presented in **Table 2.11**.

Table 2.11. Pre-identifiable Internal Variables of the Two Regimes

		<i>Socialist Regime (1970-73)</i>	<i>Military Regime (1973-90)</i>
<i>Historical Linkage of Chile</i>		Americanism, Legalism, Nationalism	
<i>Foreign Policy Ideologies (Conceptual Identification)</i>		Ideological Pluralism; Anti-Imperialism	Anti-Communism; National Security Doctrine; Economic Developmentalism
<i>Economic Development Model</i>		Reformist	Conventional
<i>Foreign Policy Elite</i>	<i>Political Elites</i>	Democratic, Socialist	Authoritarian, Conservative
	<i>Bureaucratic Elites</i>	Independent, Stable	Interfered, Unstable

²⁶¹ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", pp.322-3.

²⁶² In terms of the domestic politics of Chile, the relative calmness of the Chilean military for several decades before 1973 was not because they completely obeyed or were subordinated to civilian rule, but because the political regimes had established a series of legitimate mechanisms for resolving its conflicts. For further discussions of the military and politics in Chile from this viewpoint, see Antonio Garretón, Manuel, The Chilean Political Process, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1989, pp.117-131. General Prats' memoir and an excellent analysis of Prats' work by Arriagada are valuable sources to assess the background of the politicisation of the Chilean military see Prats, Carlos, Memorias: Testimonio de un Soldado, Pehuén, Santiago, 1985; and Arriagada, Genaro, Pinochet: The Politics of Power, Unwin Hyman, Boston, 1988, Chapters 9-14.

III. EXTERNAL VARIABLES

A society's external behavior is a result of yesterday's experiences and today's circumstances.

- James N. Rosenau

As discussed in **Chapter I**, the literature concerning Latin American foreign policy has paid a great deal of attention to the external context - the *international system* - as a determining factor of its policy behaviour. Although there is a growing tendency in foreign policy studies to point out the relevance of the inner workings of states, and it is hardly necessary to stress once again that the internal and external settings are not in competition in the making of foreign policy, analysis within the level of the whole transnational or international system has been predominant. Hence, the common assumption concerning the function of external variables in Latin American foreign policy has been that "Latin America is extremely sensitive to its external environment and that its behavior towards other nations tends to be a reaction to stimuli originating at this level."²⁶³ Therefore, by demonstrating the region's sensitivity and vulnerability to its outside environment, external variables can offer valuable insights into the formation of Latin American foreign policy. However, overstressing external variables may lead to the view that states' foreign policies are basically identical when:

[e]ach state under study is treated as a whole or "billiard ball", whose movement is determined by the activity of the other balls, for one does not inquire into internal characteristics.²⁶⁴

However, given the fact that even powerful states like the United States are partially dependent on the international systems outside their unilateral control, to say nothing of a country such as Israel whose survival depends largely on the politics of the

²⁶³ Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives", p.4.

²⁶⁴ McGowan, Patrick and Shapiro, Howard, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, pp.45-6.

Middle East,²⁶⁵ a more sensible analysis should pay special attention to the differences of each player in coping with the external environment rather than to similar reactions to the external environment. In other words, “[w]idely different functions that individual countries perform within the system and ... the diverging ways in which they react to the same external stimuli” cannot be neglected.²⁶⁶ In this study, the external variables affecting Latin American foreign policy will be discussed in three aspects: geopolitics; dependency and others’ policies.

Firstly, geopolitics can effectively explain an action motivated by the external physical environment of a country, and also the power relations in a region lacking serious ideological confrontation between neighbouring countries but with enough room for conflict; whereas the system approach, created under bipolarised world politics and crisis escalation, is not applicable to Latin American countries, unlike other Third World areas such as the Far East and the Middle East.

Secondly, dependency concerns the action of a country affected by external economic environments in the field of international relations. It views Latin America as an area extremely sensitive with regard to the external economic environment, *e.g.* the presence and domination of major economic powers, international financial organisations and MNCs. Thus, the foreign policy activities of nations are inclined to be stimulated or constrained by this condition.

Finally, all other reactions against international players’ behaviour directed towards a country such as hostile acts, threats and support are to be examined under the framework of others’ policies.

By their natures, the dependency perspective is particularly useful in explaining the behaviour of an *Economic-Developmental Area* whereas geopolitics can be used as an effective analysing tool for assessing a *Military-Strategic Area*. For example, while the externally reliant Latin American economy enables us to take a more detailed

²⁶⁵ In the global aspect, countries in similar but less dramatic circumstances are Belgium, Australia, Poland and Thailand.

²⁶⁶ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives”, p.5.

inside look at the nationalisation process of foreign companies, the power structure of the Southern Cone countries may explain why they need to import high-tech weapons.

3.1. Geopolitics

Primarily originating in Western Europe in the nineteenth century, the geopolitical approach defines states as “organisms that develop, live, decay, and die according to rather precise life cycles and that struggle constantly in a wild scramble for survival,”²⁶⁷ or as “entit[ies] in [their] own right, in constant search for an ideal *modus vivendi*”²⁶⁸ Its major area of concern is the socio-political and physical environment of the actor, such as geographical position, number of neighbours, and the characteristics of the international system at a given point in time. In terms of emphasising the external environments and capability factors of a state, geopolitics may be regarded as a branch of power politics analysis in which actions of other countries are often considered as the primary condition affecting foreign policy decisions. Hence, it assumes that the capability of state *A* to change the behaviour of state *B* is enhanced if it possesses both physical resources such as a modernised strong military, natural resources, or a large production scale, and non-physical assets like intellectual resources.

However, even if the power politics approach has been useful in examining states’ behaviour and relations with their counterparts of different capabilities, especially under bipolarised world politics, it fails to explain why states with very weak capabilities are often able to resist the demands of other players in a similar or stronger position, and sometimes achieve their own demands at the expense of the interests of major powers. It certainly overlooks the possibilities of the enhanced ability of a state if it possesses such factors as clear international perceptions, friendships, national prestige and an advantageous geographical setting, although admittedly these are not easy to measure.

²⁶⁷ *ibid.*, p.7. As a similar definition can be found in Child, Jack, “Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the 1980s”, in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, p.30.

²⁶⁸ Rada, Juan, “The National Security State in Latin America”, in Britain and Latin America: An Annual Review of British-Latin American Relations, Latin American Bureau, London, 1978, p.56.

From the geopolitical point of view, on the other hand, each state has objectives and aims which transcend those of the individuals who constitute it, whereas the power politics approach simply focuses on the inability of smaller nations to react effectively against hegemonic powers. Furthermore, setting aside the dogmatic view of geopoliticians that the external action of a state “is subject solely to its geopolitical characteristics and not inspired - according to this school - by ideology, class or any other interest,”²⁶⁹ the geopolitical perspective can be useful in explaining the foreign policy behaviour of a country not just as a mere “extreme version of power politics”²⁷⁰ but as another significant determinant of foreign policy with the unique consideration of geographic setting. In conjunction with other variables, in other words, geopolitics can effectively demonstrate power relations between neighbouring countries by offering “a way of thinking about the international relationship between geography and power politics.”²⁷¹

3.1.1. Perspectives of South American Geopolitics

Nevertheless, with the development of modern communications, weapons and other technology, geographic setting and position are not as important to foreign policy calculations in contemporary world politics as in previous eras. Hence, the geopolitical approach to matters of politics and the military became rare in academic research, especially after World War II. However, “the [academic] concept is alive and well in Latin America, especially in those Southern Cone countries where the most prolific thinking and writing on geopolitics has taken place.”²⁷² Strong influence from the German school of *Geopolitik* can be suggested as a prime factor when Latin American writers accept “the basic concept of the state as a living organism that responds to geographic, political, military, economic, demographic, and psychological

²⁶⁹ Rada, Juan, “The National Security State in Latin America”, p.56.

²⁷⁰ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives”, p.7.

²⁷¹ Mares, David, “Foreign Policy in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile: The Burden of the Past, the Hope for the Future”, p.228.

²⁷² Child, John, “Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America”, Latin American Research Review, 14:2, 1979, p.89. This article also includes an extensive review of the writings of various South American geopoliticians.

pressures in its struggle to survive in competition with other states.”²⁷³ However, a more important factor is that the foreign policies of South American countries have been constantly affected in a number of fundamental ways by their geopolitical settings.

The first point to consider is the geopolitical implication of South America as a whole with regard to the remote location of the South American continent from the world powers. This aspect of geographic remoteness has been viewed in two opposite ways: *that the independent position of the South American countries was secured*, on the one hand; and *that they were victimised in history*, on the other. Atkins is a representative of the first view:

The area has remained isolated from world politics in general and beyond the immediate Caribbean sphere of US influence. The location of Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay, and parts of Peru and Brazil in the southern cone places them at great distances from both Europe and the United States. The external states, while providing major markets for all South American exports, otherwise tend politically to ignore even the major states in the southern cone. ... Most of the time, distance has given to those states located farthest from the world's great powers a measure of freedom in the international political system, allowing them to maintain relatively independent positions in world affairs.²⁷⁴

The second view has been argued mostly by radical South American writers, who claim that they have been geopolitically victimised by other states in the past and that their internal development and international relations should be guided by the attempt to regain some of their past power.²⁷⁵ In the contemporary history involving outside world, the Falkland/Malvinas dispute between Argentina-Britain can be a good example of the argument when “[t]he eventual recovery of the islands is a constant theme in Argentine geopolitical thinking and patriotic rhetoric.”²⁷⁶

²⁷³ *ibid.*, p.89.

²⁷⁴ Atkins, Pope, *Latin America in the International Political System*, pp.26-7.

²⁷⁵ Guglielmelli and Pinochet are representatives of this view. See Guglielmelli, Juan E., *Geopolítica del Cono Sur*, El Cid Editor, BS AS, 1979; Pinochet, Augusto, *Geopolítica*, 1974.

²⁷⁶ Child, Jack, “Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the 1980s”, p.34.

Secondly, each country has also been affected by its unique geographical location within the continent. The following are some examples of regional disputes influenced by geographical peculiarities:

- *Bolivia's desire for an outlet to the Pacific* provides one of the principal axes of the conflict. "Geopolitics as the central determinant of Bolivian foreign policy captures the essence of the country's past, present, and future; for few countries has geopolitics been as important and constant as in the Bolivian struggle for political and economic sovereignty."²⁷⁷
- *The dispute between Argentina and Chile over the Beagle Channel* has directly affected conflicting claims to Antarctica and associated territorial waters.²⁷⁸
- *The dispute over Ecuador's Amazon claim in the northern Andean area* dates back to colonial days and still exists today. Even though Ecuador was defeated by Peru in the region's last major war in 1941, the matter has remained open because the border in the Cordillera del Condor area has not been clearly determined. Ecuador repudiated the Rio Protocol in 1960, and clashes took place in 1981 and 1995. Recovering the lost territories would satisfy a geopolitical ambition of Ecuador's to be an 'Amazonian power,' and would provide an access to the Atlantic Ocean via the major river systems.²⁷⁹
- *Exploitation of the hydroelectric potential of the River Plate basin by Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay:* The historical rivalry between Argentina and Brazil was effectively resolved in favour of Brazil, and Brazil was also successful in making Paraguay sign the Treaty of Itaipú, authorising a joint project. However, the Paraguayan government has been seeking a revision of the 1973 treaty to allow it to sell some or all of its electricity surplus to Argentina.²⁸⁰

²⁷⁷ Queiser Morales, Waltraud, "Bolivian Foreign Policy: The Struggle for Sovereignty", in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, 1984, p.171. See **Chapter V** for further discussion.

²⁷⁸ See also **Chapter V** for further discussion.

²⁷⁹ Keesing's Record of World Events, Longman, London, 1995, p.40356.

²⁸⁰ See Calvert, Peter, The International Politics of Latin America, pp.225-6.

Thirdly, in terms of regional hegemonic relations, not necessarily including the geographical factor, geopolitics is closest to a balance of power approach in its application to foreign policy behaviour. It views the Latin American situation as a typical scenario of regional competition: not only as an objective reality but also as a necessary and natural product of the coexistence of several states.²⁸¹ This aspect provides cases of regional power relations: for instance, Argentina and Brazil on the Atlantic coast; Chile and Peru on the Pacific side, and Mexico and Venezuela in Central America. Their desire for development and maximum independence, and to be respected by all the states in the hemisphere, have historically prompted them to increasingly implement expansionist regional policies.

Lastly, it is often emphasised that what made the unstable geopolitical competition more explicit in the second part of this century was the emergence of the authoritarian military regimes in the region whose strategy was based on the National Security Doctrine. The development of this particular geopolitical thought in a region has been viewed as “another expression of the militarism that has come to reign over the countries.”²⁸² Child offered a further explanation:

... in the Southern Cone a small group of military officers and their civilian counterparts picked up and preserved the original ideas of the European geopoliticians and used them as the basis for several Southern Cone “school” of geopolitical thinking, most notably in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (Child, 1979) These schools remained somewhat isolated and had relatively little influence outside of military circles in the 1950s and 1960s, in large part because United States strategic thinking and doctrine exerted an overwhelming weight in the hemisphere. ... In the late 1960s and 1970s this situation began to change as U.S. strategic influence declined in South America and as the larger states of the region came under military rule (Brazil in 1964, Chile in 1973, Argentina in 1976). The ensuing regimes were quite different from previous military governments in that they came to power in response to a perceived serious threat from the left. Furthermore, they were committed to creating a permanent defense against such threats and to a long-term economic development program. As a result, the government that emerged from this period placed a strong emphasis on authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism and security.²⁸³

²⁸¹ See Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives”, p.7.

²⁸² Caviedes, César, The Southern Cone: Realities of the Authoritarian State in South America, Rowman & Allanhelp, Totowa, 1984. p.2.

²⁸³ Child, Jack, “Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the 1980s”, pp.30-1.

In summary, the geopolitics of South America serves as a convenient explanatory factor behind both the regional foreign policies of the bigger states, whose policy objective is the search for regional power and influence, on the one hand; and those of smaller states - like Bolivia - whose economic and political systems are prone to penetration by their powerful neighbours, on the other hand. All these perspectives indicate that special attention should be paid to the role of geopolitics in South American foreign policy.

3.1.2. Chilean Geopolitics

At the end of the Pacific War, Chile became established as a hegemonic Pacific power in the Southern Cone after defeating Bolivia and Peru and extracting territorial concessions. However, this position did not last long with the growth and development of Argentina and the increased domination of the U.S. in sub-continental affairs. Furthermore, the opening of the Panama Canal replaced the Chilean controlled southern passage as the primary route between the two Oceans and made the Chilean isolation deeper. Therefore, Chile has been forced into a lesser international position in the 20th century than that enjoyed in the past.²⁸⁴

Nevertheless, the fact that Chile, even with a lesser international position, managed to maintain a reasonable independent foreign policy despite her relatively small population and geographic isolation surrounded by three often-hostile neighbours needs further explanation. In other words, unlike the general assumption of the *Realists* that a nation with a great national capacity tends to have more dominant status in international politics, widely respected status of Chile in history shows that her international involvement has not been determined by military, economic or other kinds of capacity. Certainly the answer to the question should include geopolitical consideration as well as Chile's continuing devotion to pragmatic national goals and political stability.

²⁸⁴ See Pittman, Howard, "Chilean Foreign Policy: The Pragmatic Pursuit of Geopolitical Goals", in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (ed.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, p.126.

First, the concept of geopolitics, particularly that of the German geopolitical school's Social Darwinism, was imported to the country earlier than to most other parts of Latin America, so that both the Chilean politicians and the military could develop their own versions of strategic tactics based on this concept. According to Fernandois:

La escuela geopolítica alemana, con sus implicaciones de “darwinismo social”, organismo y uso de su haber intelectual con función de ciencia política (por lo tanto, como ordenadora del Estado en el plano interno), comienza a influir al ejército chileno desde comienzo de siglo, a la sombra de lo que ha sido denominado la “prusianización” de dicho ejército. Ciertamente que esto en Chile no se transformó jamás en una ideología vitalista vulgar ni en un principio expansionista. Pero la geopolítica, que es una vertiente determinada (principalmente alemana) del desarrollo de la ciencia política, quedó hasta cierto punto petrificada en las Academias de Guerra de Chile. (como de muchos países de Latinoamérica).²⁸⁵

When its own power was insufficient to defend national interests, successive Chilean governments worked in concert with remote regional states and extracontinental states and organisations. For instance, while at war with Bolivia and Peru, Chile reached an accommodation called the ‘Oceanic Principle’ with Argentina: *Argentina in the Atlantic, Chile in the Pacific*. More recent example is that,

..., in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR), Chile insisted on provisions which would guard against aggression, not only by extrahemispheric powers, but also by one American nation against another - a hedge against both the power of the United States and the aggressive desires of some of its neighbors.²⁸⁶

The second point to consider is that there has been a certain relationship between the geographic location of Chile and physical safety. It is a fact that the marginal location of Chile not only as regards the centre of the world but also inside the South

²⁸⁵ Fernandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, p.88. With the impact of German immigration and the Prussian military mission in the late nineteenth century, the influence of the German geopolitical school is known to be stronger in Chile than in any other Latin American country.

²⁸⁶ Pittman, Howard, “Chilean Foreign Policy: The Pragmatic Pursuit of Geopolitical Goals”, pp.125-6.

American continent has often been suggested as a fundamentally weak element in terms of national capability as Meneses pointed out:

En este caso la mayor actividad y concentración de poder están ubicadas en las cuencas fluviales atlánticas y en menor escala en el macizo andino; Chile no tiene acceso a ninguna de las dos áreas. De este modo no aparece extraño que las tres actuales primeras potencias sudamericanas - Brasil, Argentina y Venezuela - ocupan dichas cuencas atlánticas.²⁸⁷

The limited geographical capability of having no access to the Atlantic,²⁸⁸ therefore, has inevitably caused logistical and strategic problems, which have prevented Chile from any large scale military operations in this century. Paradoxically, at the same time, her limited geographical capability has often been regarded as a favourable element for her own safety: a position in the Pacific Rim of the South American continent with over 4,000km of coastline; permanent security barriers - the Andes and the Atacama - against hostile neighbours, and an almost exclusive access to both the Antarctica and the Pacific Ocean. Therefore, the geopolitical environment of Chile, both the strategic and geographical perspectives has been an important external variable for determining her foreign policy.

3.2. Dependency

Many attempts have been made to determine the relationship of the economic perspective of external reliance with foreign policy behaviour, based on the common belief that an economically dependent country is forced to make foreign policy decisions favourable to its dominant partner. Accordingly, "one could expect a high degree of compliance between the dominant and the dependent countries in their foreign behavior, provided that this compliance is highly valued by the dominant

²⁸⁷ Meneses, Emilio, "Estructura Geopolítica de Chile", *Revista de Ciencia Política*, 1:2, 1981, pp.107-8. Meneses offered a wide range of perspectives of the geopolitical structure of Chile in this article.

²⁸⁸ However, this did not prevent Chile from demonstrating her willingness and ability to carry out military actions during the War of the Pacific. Actually, Chile was in the most favoured geographical position during the War, in which the major battle ground was Antofagasta: the Peruvians had to cross the Atacama and the Bolivians experienced a serious problem in transport due to the Andes.

country.”²⁸⁹ Among the various views on external economic reliance, James Caporaso distinguished dependency from *dependence*: whereas *dependence* means the external reliance of one nation, dependency is the process of insertion of the lesser developed countries into the global capitalist system.²⁹⁰ Similarly, *dependence* is the global phenomenon where “the operations of the contemporary world economy affect not only the developing countries but all the participants within it,”²⁹¹ while dependency can be understood as developing country’s excessive external economic reliance.

The initial approach to the dependency theory in the Latin American case focused on the balance-of-payments difficulties and the slow growth rates of most countries in the region caused by the deteriorating prices of primary export products on which the region was heavily dependent *via-à-vis* the rising prices of imported manufactured goods from the developed countries. Subsequently, this analysis was extended to include the impact on the late-developing periphery of other external perspectives, such as foreign direct investment, foreign financial reliance and the scientific-technological gap,²⁹² as Calvert suggested in a broader perspective of dependency: “dependency is not just a matter of trade, but a matter of investment,”²⁹³

It is well known that Latin American dependency theories had their roots, first, in the region’s nationalist tradition; second, in Marxist anti-capitalistic approaches to the international system. Biles explained the historical nature of Latin American anti-capitalism, as a background to the birth of the dependency theory:

Latin America’s long experience, often negative, with the international marketplace has produced a variety of explanations for Latin America’s continuing underdevelopment, many of which emphasize the world marketplace’s capitalist nature. ... Rather, three points stand out. First, most

²⁸⁹ Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives”, p.9.

²⁹⁰ See Caporaso, James A., “Introduction to the Special Issue of *International Organization* in Dependence and Dependency in the Global System,” *International Organization*, 32:1, 1978, pp.1-3.

²⁹¹ Hill, Christopher, “Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries”, p.9. Although some are undeniably more independent than others, very few are isolated from the effects of such international phenomena as fluctuating primary product prices.

²⁹² Van Klaveren, Alberto, “The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives”, p.4.

²⁹³ Calvert, Peter, *The International Politics of Latin America*, p.97.

Latin American nations have a much broader spectrum of opinion about the proper relation of the state and the economy than is found in the United States. Second, even strong supporters of capitalism in Latin America commonly accept a substantial governmental role. And third, international capitalism (including multinationals, the international marketplace, and foreign investment) carries with it an intellectual baggage of memories of past intervention and dependence.²⁹⁴

However, more immediate and direct implication should be found in the financial crisis and the continued underdevelopment of the region in the 1970s and early 1980s. Whatever the historical background of the theory, it was the recent economic crisis of Latin America stemming from distorted relations with the international system that made the dependency perspective particularly important. According to dependency theorists' general arguments, the economic crisis of the early 1980s took place in the following sequence:

1. *Two oil price rises in the 1970s*
2. *A Sharp drop in Latin American export revenues*
3. *Increased borrowing of readily available Petrodollars with low interest rates*
4. *World-wide recession in the early 1980s*
5. *Substantially higher rates of interest for far shorter periods of time*
6. *Crisis of foreign exchange in Latin America*

Nevertheless, in spite of the 'foreign' origin of the crisis and Latin America's high degree of economic reliance on the developed world, especially the United States, the dependency perspective has largely been treated with secondary importance in the study of their foreign policy. This is mainly because the theory has been developed as a broad and general framework of analysis to describe and explain Latin America's economic underdevelopment within the capitalist world system, not particularly to explain foreign policy behaviour. Even the broader perspective of 'external reliance' - *dependence* according to the above definition - tends to be excluded from the list of

²⁹⁴ Biles, Robert, "Perspectives That Make a Difference", p.7.

foreign policy determinants.²⁹⁵ By its nature, the dependency theory is more concerned with themes such as the distribution of wealth within the world focusing on imperialism, international division of labour, aid, colonialism, ... etc., rather than the economic inter-dependence between players. In Van Klaveren's terms, "dependencia theory usually focuses on the relationship between, on the one hand, a highly aggregate external unit, the global capitalist system, and on the other, a highly disaggregate and fluid dependent society, composed of distinct class arrangements, alliances between local and external groups, and so forth."²⁹⁶ Therefore, they inevitably place less emphasis on the behaviour of a nation state than other schools, e.g. 'Realists' or 'Idealists,' who claim the state should remain at the centre of the argument in the study of foreign policy.

Furthermore, another dilemma is the difficulty in defining 'independent policy,' since Latin American aspirations to play important world roles have been modest despite their desire for independence and respectability. Many people have argued that the general thrust of their foreign policies has been towards ensuring their physical survival and economic benefits rather than trying to enhance their world power. In this respect, Davis pointed out that the meaning of an independent (or a dependent) policy is far from clear in the Latin American scene:

The most common meaning (which is highly conceptualized) has concerned dependence upon the United States,... In this connection, an independent foreign policy has not meant complete independence - and certainly not isolation - as much as solidarity for the purpose of bargaining more effectively with the United States and the European Common Market group of nations. Sometimes the independent policy is expressed in terms of nonalignment. But as a position statement, this formulation involves a contradiction when nations seek to join with other Third World countries, yet reject the idea of forming

²⁹⁵ For instance, the studies of both Richardson and Ray questioned the clear relations between external reliance and foreign policy conduct. See Richardson, Neil, Foreign Policy and Economic Dependence, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1978, p.163; Ray, James Lee, "Dependence, Political Compliance, and Economic Performance: Latin America and Eastern Europe," in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Pat McGowan (eds.), The Political Economy of Foreign Policy Behavior, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Sage, Beverly Hills, 1981, p.123.

²⁹⁶ Van Klaveren, Alberto, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies: Theoretical Perspectives", pp.8-9.

anything like a bloc. Argentina under Juan Perón and, in a more striking fashion, Cuba under Fidel Castro, provide examples.²⁹⁷

However, even if the orthodox dependency theory does not consider foreign policy behaviour as a very significant indicator of dependency and the meaning of 'independent policy' is far from clear,²⁹⁸ the dependency perspective has still directed some scholarly attention towards the structural dimension of external behaviour. In other words, as the theory was born to provide a structural explanation for the economic underdevelopment of the Third World by objecting to existing development theories, its application to foreign policy analysis can be a sensible approach in a similar context, in that existing theories of foreign policy have been built more to accurately explain the behaviour of a few relatively large and developed global powers than of the broad universe of contemporary states. From the viewpoint of poor countries, therefore, it can be "a promising addition to more traditional approaches,"²⁹⁹ although its limitation, like that of all other determinant variables in the study of foreign policy, is inevitable. However, although the general proposition states that larger Latin American countries tend to implement a more articulated and independent type of foreign policy while the smaller ones confine their foreign policy goals to self-preservation and survival, the implication of dependency to foreign policy has not been explored within a mechanism viable enough to verify the proposition or common belief of 'high degree of compliance between the dominant and the dependent countries.'

For analytical purposes, in this respect, it is assumed that structural dependency may generate two different - opposite - directions of foreign policy according to policy objectives - or priorities - taken: subordinative policy; and resistive policy. (**Table 3.1.**) Subordinative policy is based on the classic dependency theorists' argument, as

²⁹⁷ Davis, Harold Eugene, "The Analysis of Latin American Foreign Policies", in Davis, Harold, E. and Wilson Larman (eds.), Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis, 1975, p.20.

²⁹⁸ Fagen suggested that "politics are not 'dependent' on each other in the same sense as economics." Mexico, with maximum economic dependency on the U.S. and simultaneously with remarkably independent foreign policy, is a good example. See Fagen, Richard, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a *Dependencia* Approach," Latin American Research Review, 12:2, 1977, p.17.

²⁹⁹ Chicote and Johnson, 1983, in Moon, Bruce, "Political Economy Approaches to the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy", p.35.

Hill noted, that “dependence will ... impose acquiescence in the interests and dogmas of capitalism (and/or state capitalism, if the USSR is included), via the mechanisms of trade, aid, and investment.” Meanwhile, Resistive policy can be imposed when dependency “breed[s] a determination to resist, to achieve solidarity with those similarly placed, and to create a world order based on different socio-economic values from those which currently hold sway.”³⁰⁰

Table 3.1. Dependency and Foreign Policy

	<i>Subordinative</i>	<i>Resistive</i>
<i>Development Strategy</i>	Conventional	Reformist or Revolutionary
<i>Policy Priority</i>	Autonomy < Growth	Autonomy > Growth
<i>Domestic Foreign Investment</i>	Liberal, less control	Selective, more control
<i>Expected Foreign Policy Output</i>	- Searching for more aid; - Increase of foreign capital import; - Emphasis on global dimension	- Minimising effects caused by pressures from major powers; - Diversification effort against Dependency; - Regional Co-operation
<i>Hypothetical Effect on the National Economy</i>	More dependency	Less dependency

As seen in **Table 3.1.**, subordinative policy attributes more importance to growth than autonomy under the development strategy of a liberal economic policy, whereas the resistive policy tends to give policy priority to overcoming a dependent position in the international system. Nevertheless, those two perspectives are not always mutually exclusive in foreign policy since a country may pursue a resistive policy on a particular issue, *e.g. diversification of creditors*, while maintaining a generally subordinative policy, *e.g. attracting more foreign investment*. In this respect, the

³⁰⁰ Hill, Christopher, “Theories of Foreign Policy Making for the Developing Countries”, p.8. Ferris also pointed out that the dependency theory in the study of Latin American international ‘relations’ is particularly useful for the explanation of the following two issues, *economic relations with the US*, and *their behaviour searching for more independence*. See Ferris, Elizabeth and Lincoln, Jennie, “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Latin American Governments as Actors in the International System”, pp.12-3.

Issue Areas analysis can provide an adequate mechanism for the application of this variable.

3.3. Others' Policies

Most governments do not launch diplomatic or military actions to change a regional or world order as Hitler sought to do. Rather, they are more likely to respond to a variety of other players' actions. This is a trend not only of small and vulnerable states but also of larger and powerful ones. For instance, enormous European and U.S. pressures on Japan to restrict exports and increase imports have been a response to Japan's inroads in their markets, balance-of-payments problems and Japan's technological leadership. Holsti suggested the typical pattern of response:

The *type* or response (conciliatory, threatening, and the like) will usually be similar to the stimulus; that is, most foreign-policy actions tend to be reciprocal. "Hawkish" behavior tends to beget a similar response, although in a relationship characterized by deep distrust, a conciliatory signal from one actor may be perceived as more a threat than an opportunity.³⁰¹

The analysis of the reaction of a country against others' policies is the last remaining component of external variables, which should be relied upon in tracing the cause of all other foreign policy behaviour outside the scope of geopolitics and the dependency perspective. The others' policies variable can be no more specific because actions and reactions are largely undertaken in situational circumstances. However, it is necessary to identify two ways in which this variable functions: one which only affects 'relations' between relevant countries; and the other which affects both the 'relations' and 'foreign policy' of the target country. Whereas these two aspects of the others' policies variable will be paid equal attention in the following two chapters concerning *Issue Areas*, the latter aspect, which may directly affect Chile's external behaviour, will only be considered in the conclusion of this study which aims to identify the orientation of Chilean foreign policy.

³⁰¹ Holsti, K.J., International Politics: A Framework for Analysis, p.348.

IV. ISSUE AREAS: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT, 1970-1973

El señor Nixon es presidente de los Estados Unidos y yo soy presidente de Chile. No tendré nada despectivo a decir sobre el señor Nixon mientras el señor Nixon respete al presidente de Chile. Pero si una vez más ellos hacen una farsa autodeterminación y la no intervención encontrarán una respuesta digna de un pueblo y su líder.

- Salvador Allende

4.1. The Status-Diplomatic Area

4.1.1. Chile in Latin America

One of the main objectives of the foreign policy of the UP government was to break down ideological frontiers on a regional level in order to secure the traditional presence of Chile in the American continent. Since regional isolation was highly probable considering the UP's ideological differences with the neighbouring countries, active regional diplomacy was intensified with the introduction of Ideological-Pluralism. Although some affinity was expected with the leftist military government in Peru, the right wing military governments of Argentina and Bolivia did not seem to be co-operative from the initial judgement of the UP. Hence, the real threat may have been the potential danger in case "the disputes in which Chile was involved with Bolivia and Argentina would flare up simultaneously, facing the Allende government with a serious international situation."³⁰² Furthermore, the Brazilian military regime, which was capable of stimulating Bolivian hostility towards Chile, was openly opposed to the UP government.

In this respect, Foreign Minister Clodomiro Almeyda stated that the policy maker's pragmatic interpretation of Ideological Pluralism was inevitable to avoid the would-be regional isolation of Chile.

³⁰² Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.106.

La alusión a la doctrina del “pluralismo ideológico” estuvo contenida en todas las declaraciones conjuntas suscritas por los personeros chilenos con sus contrapartes latinoamericanas. De ello dan fe los documentos conjuntos suscritos por Chile con Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, México y Venezuela. La circunstancia de que muchos de esos Estados estuvieran gobernados por administraciones de orientación conservadora, le dieron especial relevancia a estos acuerdos, los que, por otra parte, no constituyen sino otra versión del Principio de la No Intervención que, como se ha dicho, fue la norma invariable que Chile observó escrupulosamente en sus relaciones con las naciones hermanas del continente.³⁰³

Another implication of this ideology was the ‘Cuba thesis’ when the Chilean government argued that the political and economic embargo launched by the US controlled OAS could not be compatible with Ideological Pluralism. In the official visits to Latin American states, e.g. Argentina, Peru, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and Venezuela, Allende and his counterparts signed declarations that affirmed the right of Latin American nations to restore relations with Cuba, rejecting US led economic pressure and calling for the need to reinforce the joint action of Latin American states.³⁰⁴

This display of support-winning diplomacy turned out to be well timed and the relations with individual Latin American states began to follow a more conventional pattern. The diplomatic effort was also accompanied by a significant increase in economic and commercial relations.³⁰⁵ Not only did Chile share the notion of *pluralismo ideológico y político* with Caldera’s Venezuela, but also special and cordial relations with other ideologically-not-compatible right wing governments. Despite traditional antagonism and ideological difference, for example, Chile maintained considerably good relations with Argentina.³⁰⁶ The relations with their eastern neighbour became immediately consolidated with Allende’s visit to Salta in July in 1971 and Lanusse’s to Antofagasta. In Salta, a joint *communiqué* was issued,

³⁰³ Almeyda, Clodomiro, Reencuentro con mi Vida, Ornitorrinco, Santiago, 1987, p.225.

³⁰⁴ See Fortín, Carlos, “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”, p.222.

³⁰⁵ See the section for *Economic-Developmental Area*.

³⁰⁶ The escape of 10 Argentine leftist guerrillas to Chile did not harm relations even if it caused slight tension between Chile and Argentina. For details of this event, see Trucco, Manuel, “Foreign Armed Intervention in Chile”, in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), Chile: the Balanced View, p.99.

reaffirming the principle of Ideological Pluralism in Latin American international politics. In addition, the strong legalistic tradition of Chilean diplomacy was manifested in the *communiqué*: “[los países] se obligan a someter a la Corte Internacional de Justicia todas las controversias de cualquier naturaleza que por cualquier causa surgieren entre ellas ... (Art.1)”³⁰⁷

Despite the good relations with Argentina, Chile was concerned about a possible anti-UP right wing alliance of Argentina-Brazil (geopolitics). The growing *rapprochement* between Chile and Argentina was boosted by Argentinean policy: firstly, President Lanusse, although politically conservative, was also announcing the end of the “ideological frontiers” thesis, since the Argentine government wanted to show a pluralist image for their own internal electoral purposes³⁰⁹; secondly, Argentina also feared a radicalised Cuba-like Chile, spreading revolution across the Andes and supporting the local subversives; and thirdly, both countries were deeply alarmed by Brazilian economic development in the 1960s and its hegemonic ambition in Latin America. Specifically, Argentina was increasingly concerned with Brazilian influence - backed by the United States - in Latin America as a whole and in the *Rio de la Plata* basin in particular.

In 1971 when the left-wing regime of President Torres in Bolivia was overthrown by the right-wing military coup, the danger of regional isolation of Chile seemed to be greater. However, although Chile did not have diplomatic relations with Bolivia because of border disputes, the Allende government had been active in reopening discussions with the Bolivian government with a view to restoring a normal relationship. Nevertheless, as the territorial issues remained unsolved, the relations between Chile and Bolivia could not be developed further.

³⁰⁷ Sánchez, Walter, “Las Tendencias Sobresalientes de la Política Exterior Chilena”, in Sánchez, Walter and Pereira, Teresa (eds.), 150 Años de Política Exterior Chilena, pp.374-411.

³⁰⁸ Sánchez, Walter, “Chile en sus Relaciones con los Países Vecinos y los Países Andinos en los Años 1970-1973”, pp.219-220.

³⁰⁹ Fortín, Carlos, “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”, p.222. Also *see*, Mac-Hale, Tomás, “The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity”, p.81.

On the other hand, relations between Chile and Brazil remained normal at the diplomatic level, although commercial and financial links were intensified initially. Among the external relations of the UP, one of the most debated areas is of that with Brazil, where evaluations are varied between supporters and critics of its foreign policy: ranging from the ‘UP’s success in neutralising Brazilian attempt to isolate Chile’ to ‘two countries’ permanent hostility.’ Although the policy based on Ideological Pluralism was launched by the Chilean side, it is difficult to define the relations as amicable since they were more determined by the Brazilian view on the domestic political process of Chile, as seen in the following two statements:

El triunfo de la Unidad Popular, como era de preverse, fue recibido negativamente por el Brasil. En un comienzo, fue notoria la desfavorable disposición brasileña hacia el nuevo régimen chileno, y es presumible que en esa época el Brasil haya estado dispuesto a apoyar cualquier intento por aislar a Chile en el hemisferio. Sin embargo, el cuidado puesto por nuestro país en el manejo de sus relaciones con el Brasil y el éxito obtenido por la Cancillería para neutralizar las posibles actitudes en su contra por parte de los otros Estados latinoamericanos, hicieron desistirse al Gobierno brasileño de tales propósitos. La doctrina de “pluralismo ideológico” derrotó así en el ámbito latinoamericano la doctrina de las “fronteras ideológicas” que anteriormente sostuvo el propio Brasil.³¹⁰

As the internal policies of the Allende government became more radical, and as the conflict with the United States escalated in 1972, relations with Brazil deteriorated even further. The accusation has even been made that at least some private Brazilian business concerns helped finance opposition groups in Chile.³¹¹

On the other hand, the UP government was ardently and unconditionally supported by the Echeverría regime of Mexico which Chile could comfortably rely on. For instance, when the strike started at the oil refineries at Concón and Concepción in May 1973, in which an average of 10 million cubic metres of oil had been produced annually, Allende requested urgent aid from the Mexican government. Within four days, President Echeverría sent two oil ships filled with petrol to Chile. At the same time, Mexican oil experts came to Chile and normalised the production, which

³¹⁰ Almeyda, Clodomiro, Reencuentro con mi Vida, p.229.

³¹¹ Fortín, Carlos, “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”, p.223.

contributed to preventing a military coup planned to be staged during this national disorder caused by the strike.³¹² Apart from the well established traditional friendship between the two countries, Mexico's doctrine based on traditional foreign policy and Echeverría's decision to re-orient its foreign policy toward Latin America and the Third World, opened the way for close economic and political ties between Mexico and Chile.³¹³ Mexico never severed relations with Castro's Cuba and tended to disagree with the United States more consistently than any other Latin American state in the OAS debates. It was also the only Latin American country, apart from Cuba, that broke with the later Pinochet regime. The famous *Estrada Doctrine* stipulates that the government may decide to maintain or withdraw its diplomatic representatives whenever it deems it necessary, without accepting the principle of recognition of new regimes. However, it does assume friendly relations once they are established.³¹⁴

Chilean relations with Peru this century have not been defined in terms of the presence of real conflicts but in terms of the historic and psychological legacy of the Pacific War (1879-1883). Chilean support of Ecuador in her territorial conflict with Peru has also been a factor in the sensitive relations between the two countries. For instance, while various Chilean Presidents have visited Peru, no single Peruvian counterpart has accepted an invitation to Santiago.³¹⁵ Hence, Peru, similar to Bolivia, has always been a policy burden on successive Chilean decision makers. However, relations with the Populist military government of Peru were very cordial not only

³¹² See Martínez Corbala, Gonzalo, in Witker, Alejandro (ed.), Solidaridad Internacional con Chile, Archivo Salvador Allende, Instituto Politécnico Nacional, Guadalajara, 1989, p.78.

³¹³ Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.120.

³¹⁴ See Kaufman, Edy, "Latin America", p.150. Gonzalo Martínez Corbala, the Mexican Ambassador to Chile at that time, further explains the nature of the enthusiastic support of Mexico:

La sola existencia de relaciones diplomáticas con cualquier país obliga, en respecto a la Doctrina Estrada, a que éstas sean buenas; si a esto se agrega la solidaridad que México - especialmente - debe a los países de América Latina que luchan por encontrar sus propias vías de desarrollo y por ejercer el dominio que su soberanía les otorga sobre sus recursos naturales, creo que quedará muy clara la razón por la que el embajador de México - que tuvo el honor de haber sido yo, en este caso - no solamente se mantuvo completamente al margen de los comentarios que creaban los rumores destinados a aumentar la tensión social en Chile, sino que rechazó invariablemente las presiones que sobre la embajada de México se hacían, abierta o subrepticamente, para que cambiara su actitud de apoyo a las instituciones legítimamente establecidas de acuerdo con la propia Constitución chilena. (Martínez Corbala, Gonzalo, in Witker, Alejandro (ed.), Solidaridad Internacional con Chile, Archivo Salvador Allende, p.80)

³¹⁵ See Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.143.

because of their same ideological position of Anti-Imperialism and Socialism, but also because of the fact that the two countries were strong promoters of the Andean Pact and the reform of the existing inter-American system. (reformist model; resistive policy) As a member of *Comité Intergubernamental de Países Exportadores de Cobre* (CIPEC), Peru also supported the Chilean position against the US blockade.³¹⁶

4.1.2. The US

The US response to the election of Allende and the *vía chilena* was as cool as expected. President Nixon failed to send the protocolary congratulations to Allende on his election. After he cancelled a four-day trip to Valparaiso by the aircraft-carrier *Enterprise* which had been especially invited by President Allende, uneasy relations became obvious. The last minute cancellation in late February 1971, due to what the US called ‘operational difficulties,’ of a visit to Chile by the *Enterprise*, was interpreted as “a rebuff of friendly overtures of the Chilean Government.”³¹⁷ Furthermore, when Allende paid a non-official visit to the US, he only managed to meet George Bush, the US Ambassador to the UN, instead of Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of the State, as he had wished. Thus, the diplomatic relations between the US and the Chilean socialist regime continued with suspicion and uncertainty. Ratliff explains:

From the beginning, most US officials did not like the Allende government, and no Popular Unity officials liked the US government. Official statements by leaders of either country ranged from tentatively friendly to provocative.

³¹⁶ Although the ideological compatibility and the similar line of multilateral diplomacy have decisively affected solidarity of the two governments, it is interesting to see that the Peruvian government knew how to recognise the negative experience that Chile underwent in the construction of Socialism, and how to make use of it. According to Mac-Hale,

... Peru benefited directly from Chile’s economic chaos. The crisis from the production of Chilean copper, at the same time as the difficulties arisen in its commercialization as a consequence of the embargos in Europe, created a vacuum that Peruvian copper was preparing to fill, among other ways through the attraction of foreign capital. (Mac-Hale, Tomás, “The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity”, p.80.)

³¹⁷ Hagen, Virginia, M., “United States Relations with Chile under the Government of Salvador Allende (November 1970-September 1973): Background and Current Developments”, in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1975, p.400.

Unofficial US statements were often on the hostile side. Statements by the main parties which made up the Popular Unity coalition - not the government - were invariably hostile toward the United States, for decades before and then after Allende's inauguration.³¹⁸

It is not difficult to see why the UP, as the second Marxist government in the Western hemisphere, was an inevitable target of Washington's hostility. Allende's victory was perceived by the Americans as "a definite psychological defeat for the United States and a decisive psychological success for the Marxist ideology."³¹⁹ The root of the conflict with Washington in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* was based on the fear of the US with the potential threat to US capital in the Chilean economy, and the fear of a spillover of Communism.

However, the hostility of the US did not have any substantial effect on the UP's diplomatic stance regarding the US. This meant that the Chilean policy was not a simple reaction to US policy, but was particularly cautious and could be characterised as what has been called "principled pragmatism."³²⁰ Unlike Cuba, Chile wanted to retain open relations and contacts - direct and indirect - with the US, in order not to totally break the relationship. The UP government continued to allow full operation of official or unofficial US organisations, e.g. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), USIS (United States Information Service) and Peace Corps.³²¹ Almeyda once stated that,

[r]elations with the United States are important to Chile... We believe that, despite the existence of present or potential areas of conflict with the Government of the United States... We will be able to approach and solve such problems without damaging the friendship between two people - as those of Chile and the United States, which, by force of reality, are determined to maintain peaceful, cordial and mutually respectful relations.³²²

³¹⁸ Ratliff, William, "Chile", p.60.

³¹⁹ Miller, Nicola, Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989, p.130.

³²⁰ Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.164.

³²¹ According to UP sources, it is argued that there were over 500 CIA agents in Chile. See Tuffon, Michael, "Chile, Human Right and Canada", International Perspectives, Nov-Dec, 1986, p.259.

³²² Press interview of Clodomiro Almeyda in the New York Times, 22 November, 1970 in Hagen, Virginia M., "United States Relations with Chile Under the Government of Salvador Allende (November 1970 - September 1973): Background and Current Developments," p.399.

President Allende made a more promising statement:

We will never do anything against the United States or contribute to injuring its sovereignty. For example we will never provide a military base that might be used against the United States. Chile will never permit her territory to be used for a military base by any foreign power - by anybody.³²³

Even at the most critical moments of the relationship between the two countries when successive destabilisation attempts were made by a number of US MNCs and by the Nixon administration followed by the nationalisation of the copper industry, the government, as in the speech of Allende before the United Nations in 1972, seen in the *Conceptual Identification*, abstained from any aggressive or hostile reaction to the part played by the United States in Chile.³²⁴

However, one major exception to the general friendship-seeking policy of the UP in this *Area* is that concerning the OAS. We have already seen the conviction with which the OAS had to be denounced as a 'tool and agent of North American Imperialism,' with the accompanying suggestion that there was a need to 'create an organisation that would be truly representative of the Latin American nations.' Chile's position was one of frontal attack against the OAS based on US power throughout the period. The Chilean proposals regarding changes in the philosophy and structure of the OAS were officially announced at the meeting of the organisation's General Assembly held in San José, Costa Rica, in April 1971. These included:

- sanctions against Cuba to be suspended
- the Special Consultative Commission on Security to be dissolved
- the Rio Treaty, the Inter-American Defence Board and the Inter-American Defence College to be re-examined on the principles of 'ideological neutrality'

³²³ Press Interview of Salvador Allende in New York Times, 23 Mar 1971 in *ibid.*, p.399.

³²⁴ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.164.

- calling for more voting power for Latin America in the Inter-American Development Bank
- a co-ordination mechanism between OAS technical bodies, CECLA and CEPAL to be made³²⁵

Moreover, there is an evidence that Chile attempted to put into effect the proposals in its original meaning through the creation of a new Latin American organisation. In 1973, the UP government specifically suggested, with the backing of Peru and Argentina, that a new Latin American organisation be created in the inter-American system, with one having its headquarters in Latin America. This would allow for the co-ordination of common positions to be discussed and negotiated at a later date with the United States. In addition, at the Conference of the Special Committee on the Reorganisation of the Inter-American Systems in Lima in June 1973, Chile and Venezuela proposed a complete revision of operation of the *Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo* (BID) because they did not achieve the objectives for which they had been created. However, given the hemispheric context at that time, the Chilean proposals did not go far³²⁶ although the UP intended to pursue a transformation of the inter-American system following the proposal of the Anti-Imperialism factor of the election programme. In spite of sympathetic support from other Latin American governments, the three year time period was too short to make a fundamental change to the inter-American system.³²⁷

4.1.3. The European Connection

Although the initial efforts of consolidation of international links were basically directed toward the Latin American countries and the socialist world where the

³²⁵ See Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, p.369.

³²⁶ Later, the same ideas were embodied in part in SELA, founded in 1975, and have acquired even greater importance since the Malvinas war although the idea was never put into effect.

³²⁷ One may question the moderate strategy solely resorted to the diplomatic negotiations in this matter, as Muñoz pointed out, "Almeyda emphatically explained that Chile was not contemplating withdrawing from the OAS and that it was not asking that the United States be excluded from membership, only that the organization be revamped." (Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.163.)

immediate foreign policy reorientation was needed, attention was also paid in order not to upset the traditional relations with Western Europe. As Allende said in his speech to the General Assembly of the UN, the government was devoted to maintaining the traditionally cordial relations with the Western European countries.³²⁸ For instance, the UP never exposed ideological differences between Western European capitalism and Chilean socialism. The crucial factor why Western European countries were important for Chile was that many of them were still major clients of Chilean copper and financial creditors. Therefore, the policy of Allende was implemented primarily to secure these markets and financial sources, particularly with the three largest European consumers of Chilean copper - Britain, Italy, and West Germany, by giving assurances that the opening of new markets would not be at the expense of the traditional European customers.³²⁹ (development model)

Spain under Franco was a major country in Western Europe with a political system ideologically incompatible to Chile. However, Spanish foreign policy was at its most consistent and Franco's Spain showed remarkable continuity and maturity in Latin American policy, never succumbing to American pressure to isolate Allende's government, or to influence it.³³⁰ On the Chilean side, Oscar Agüero, a friend of Allende and a businessman well known in Spain, was named as the Ambassador to Madrid.³³¹ Chile's friendly stance to Franco's regime was another example of the efforts to promote Ideological Pluralism and to minimise isolation, and was of course a continuation of the traditional special relations with Spain. According to Almeyda:

Es importante destacar estos hechos porque revelan que la política exterior chilena logró minimizar - incluso en relación con países como España, regida por un gobierno tan antitético desde el punto de vista ideológico al de Chile -

³²⁸ He said, "La gran mayoría de los países de Europa Occidental, desde el extremo norte con los países escandinavos, hasta el extremo sur con España, han seguido cooperando con Chile y nos ha significado su comprensión." in La Gira de Chile, Santiago, 1973, p.66. quoted in Fernandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.382.

³²⁹ See Fortín, Carlos, "Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government", p.224.

³³⁰ See Pollack, Benny, Paradox of Spanish Foreign Policy: Spain's International Relations from Franco to Democracy, Frances Pinter, London, 1987, p.82-3. According to him, "Spanish Latin American policies have of course been influenced by what could be called the post-colonial syndrome." p.83.

³³¹ See Fernandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.387.

los roces doctrinarios, atenuando también con ello los efectos de las políticas de quienes promovían el aislamiento económico de Chile.³³²

On the other hand, unlike the historical friendship between Britain and Chile, the British Conservative government held a very similar position to that of the US. Judith Hart's view, "[w]here Washington led, London followed," is the most succinct description of the British position regarding the Allende Regime.

For the British Conservative Party, Chile had been the Latin American country whose navy Britain trained and most of whose naval ships we supplied; where our trading commercial and banking interests were with the very companies plotting subversion; where British Council money was largely concentrated on assisting a large private school for the upper class in Santiago; and where the British ambassador's cocktail party guests and friends were entirely 'the Mercurio crowd'. This is my own label for the bitterly anti-government business people and journalists who graced the ambassador's drawing room and his dinner table, all of them in perfect harmony with the right wing views of El Mercurio, which were faithfully reflected in the leader columns of the pre-Murdoch Times.³³³

The relations with France were maintained at a cordial level. Allende appointed his close friend, Pablo Neruda, as the Chilean Ambassador to France, which greatly contributed to building a channel of mutual understanding and dialogue between Santiago and Paris.

With the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany, the relations with West Germany became delicate since the Brandt regime still maintained the 'Hallstein Doctrine' which had long prohibited diplomatic relations with the Socialist Bloc. Although there was no ideological debate from the UP regarding formal relations with the whole of Germany, there was a "certain degree of mistrust against Chile" in West Germany.³³⁴ However, world-wide sympathy to the UP government and *rapprochement* between the West and the East prevented Bonn from making further

³³² Almeyda, Clodomiro, *Reencuentro con mi Vida*, p.230.

³³³ Hart, Judith, "A Special Relationship", in *The Thatcher Years: Britain and Latin America*, Latin American Bureau, London, 1988, p.12.

³³⁴ See Fermandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, p.386.

troubles with Chile. Therefore, Chile could successfully maintain diplomatic relations with both governments in Germany.

4.1.4. Approach to the Socialist Bloc

A major example of the Allende regime's reoriented foreign policy can be seen with regard to the socialist countries, especially to China and the USSR. In accordance with the proposition concerning international solidarity, that diplomatic relations should be maintained with all nations regardless of their ideological and political inclinations, the Allende government re-established diplomatic ties with Cuba and North Korea, and increased extracontinental contacts with Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, China and Third World countries such as Zambia and Zaire. The first trip of Clodomiro Almeyda outside Latin America was to the USSR and Eastern Europe in May-June 1971, and President Allende visited Moscow in December 1972.³³⁵ In Moscow, Allende was warmly received by Soviet leaders like Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny. For the first time in Chilean history, the socialist countries seemed to be important partners of Chilean diplomacy. Along with the promotion of Ideological Pluralism, the policy towards the Soviet Union was emphasised in terms of the perspective of socialist ideology. This was based on the framework of the ideological discussion of the Latin American left that the Soviet policy led to "the introductory steps of a socialist revolution, emphasizing in these countries the development of state capitalism, a position fully congruent with the policy observed at the level of interstate relations."³³⁶ However, the active policy initiative to the

³³⁵ See Theberge, James, "Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile", in The Soviet Analyst, 15 August, 1974, published in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, p.635.

³³⁶ Varas, Augusto, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone", in Muñoz, Heraldo and Tulchin, Joseph (eds.), Latin American Nations in World Politics, p.247. According to him:

These orientations allowed the USSR to renew diplomatic relations with almost all the countries with which it had maintained ties previously and to develop new ties. At the end of the 1970s the USSR could witness a noticeable diversification of its diplomatic relations in the region, and its commerce with the region increased to more than one billion dollars. ...These characteristics of Soviet policy toward Latin America, which apparently continued following the death of Breznev and the emergence of Andropov, allowed some countries of the area to define their foreign relations by contemplating this new actor in their international environment. (p.247.)

Socialist Bloc cannot be regarded as something completely new, since during the previous Frei government, the USSR, Hungary and Rumania had already been ranked 3rd, 5th and 7th, respectively, according to statistics of official diplomatic interactions.³³⁷ Therefore, it is possible to say that the intensification of interactions between the UP and the Socialist countries was somewhat in line with the previous regime's policy. At the same time, nevertheless, UP's approach was initiated by criticising and partly denouncing the previous regime's discriminative policy with regard to the Socialist countries, although they highly evaluated the Frei regime's decision to establish diplomatic relations with some socialist countries:

Among the negative aspects of the Christian Democratic foreign policy, the *Unidad Popular* noted its refusal to establish relations with Cuba, the People's Republic of China, and the German Democratic Republic; its hesitation to formally join the movement of nonaligned nations; and its compromises with North American imperialism, both in the Organization of American States and in its bilateral ties with the United States.³³⁸

However, relations with the USSR were not developed to a level beyond diplomatic lip service. The USSR intended to maintain no more than formal relations with the Allende regime. During this period, the Soviet delegation was significantly reduced in size and filled with politically less important officials. This was interpreted by Hamberg who said that:

la representación soviética no había sido “espectacular,” para evitar cualquier inferencia sobre la posibilidad de que los chilenos se estuvieran orientando a la órbita soviética.³³⁹

³³⁷ This is based on the number of bilateral agreements signed between Chile and these governments. See Sánchez González, Walter, “Chile en sus Relaciones con los Países Vecinos y los Países Andinos en los Años 1970-1973”, p.221.

³³⁸ Almeyda Medina, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, in Gil, Federico, Lagos, Ricardo and Landsberger, Henry (eds.), *Chile at the Turning Point*, p.79.

³³⁹ Hamberg, Roger, “Soviet Union and Latin America”, quoted in Turrent, Isabel, *La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73*, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico City, 1984, pp.61-2. However, the USSR had immediately, although temporarily, added twenty new staff in their Embassy in Santiago after the election of Allende on 4 September, 1970. See *Documentos Secretos de la ITT*, Empresa Editora Nacional Quimantu, Santiago, 1972, p.36.

Apparently the electoral success of the UP coalition in Chile not only reinforced the Soviet position and attitude toward Latin America but also coerced the USSR in having a great deal of interest in the Chilean compromise between peaceful coexistence and the building of socialism, since they had favoured the peaceful construction of socialism via elections as manifested in the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1956. Kaufman notes:

Por lo tanto, el triunfo de la UP en Chile servía a la Unión Soviética como prueba fehaciente de lo correcta de su interpretación de los procesos no sólo de América Latina sino del mundo occidental en general...³⁴⁰

Initially, therefore, the *vía chilena* or the peaceful transition to socialism, was very much seen as a potential model applicable to other Latin American countries where local communist parties set about trying to organise popular fronts, most notably in Argentina, Uruguay and Venezuela, and in European countries such as France and Italy.³⁴¹ As Miller argued, “in ideological terms, Allende’s Chile was a far more obvious target for Soviet support than Castro’s Cuba had been in 1960.”³⁴²

Accordingly, the role of the *vía chilena* could have been significant in developing relations with the USSR if the Soviets had truly regarded the Chilean model as a viable way of building a socialist society and had provided full support. The success of Allende would have promised a stronger position for the USSR in international politics. Hence, the key element was, that to the extent that the Chilean political process would adjust to Soviet expectations, Chile could aspire to the consolidation of its relations with the USSR. According to Varas, this case represents a classic

³⁴⁰ Kaufman, Edy, “La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena”, p.269.

³⁴¹ Although not an inter-governmental issue, the electoral victory of the UP had very positive effects on the local socialists, social democrats and communists parties particularly in the Southern European countries like Italy, France, Portugal and Spain. For them, the Chilean model was seen as a kind of future strategy for power, as François Mitterrand once emphasised, “la síntesis siempre buscada por los socialistas (...) por una parte, la reforma revolucionaria de las estructuras económicas y por la otra, el respeto a las libertades democráticas.” (*La Opinión*, 14 November, 1971.) For further discussion about the effect of the UP’s victory on European leftist parties and the inter-relationships with Eurocommunism, see Kaufman, Edy, “La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena”, p.264; Fermandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, pp.391-2.

³⁴² Miller, Nicola, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987*, p.127.

example of the critical influence of a major power's policy based on a small country's political process in mutual relations:

The Chilean political process, upon constituting itself in a "referential optimum" for the rest of the Latin American countries and the Third World, had to maintain the parameters on which this relationship was based, such as the internal political capacity to carry out the process without resorting to its financing by the USSR. In this way, the USSR would be willing to deepen its relations on the political and military level provided that the defection of the internal political process was maintained in the mainstream of the peaceful transition to socialism. As a consequence, the government of the Popular Unity was not in any position to define the preferred role that - from its own perspective - the USSR should play.³⁴³

However, there were more factors which influenced the rather indifferent Soviet policy to Chile. First, *the overall international system*. Allende's presidency coincided with the height of *détente* between the Super Powers despite the Vietnam War and the Middle East conflict. While this factor may initially have seemed advantageous to the Popular Unity, in fact it produced a negative effect on Chile. It is true that there were widespread anti-US sentiments in Latin America, with the background of Latinamericanised Soviet policy in the early 70s, which Soviet policy makers used in order to direct the countries of the region for the interest of Moscow.³⁴⁴ However, as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, the prestige to be gained among the world's left wing forces by supporting Allende, could not be compared with the potential economic and political benefits of peaceful coexistence with the United States. Moscow was also well aware of the burden of overplaying its hand in a country which Washington regarded as being within its traditional area of influence. In this regard, Turrent noted,

Esta tendencia de la diplomacia soviética empalmó con la moderación de la política externa de la UP, para darle un carácter especialmente distante al arranque de las relaciones entre la Unión Soviética y la Unidad Popular. Tanto Chile como la URSS parecieron coincidir en la necesidad de apaciguar a Washington.³⁴⁵

³⁴³ Varas, Augusto, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone", p.248.

³⁴⁴ See Turrent, Isabel, *La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73*, p.42.

³⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.59.

Therefore, the Soviet position on the structural and permanent struggle against capitalism did not advocate the 'export' of local revolutions in the area of special sensitivity to US interests.

Secondly, *Soviet pragmatism and lack of substantial interest*. In the light of the Soviet Union's experience in Cuba (and in other Third World countries) between the early 1960s and the fall of Khrushchev in 1964, Moscow undertook a reappraisal of its role in the developing world. This occurred at the same time as overall Soviet foreign policy was gradually being shifted to more pragmatic lines with an increased emphasis on the primary goal of attaining strategic parity with the United States. The meaning of the Chilean process was basically symbolic for the USSR lacking substantial interest except in one area, Chilean ports:

Sólo una variable ligada a la *Realpolitik*, y muy secundaria, dio importancia a Chile para la política global de Moscú: la posibilidad de utilizar puertos chilenos para abastecer a la marina soviética en plena expansión a principios de los sesenta.³⁴⁶

Soviet pragmatism was revealed further after the coup of 1973. Although voluminous Soviet propaganda condemned the military's takeover, it included comparatively little serious consideration of the ideological issues at stake.³⁴⁷ However, the overthrow of Allende was in fact an event of tremendous impact enough to force Moscow to redesign its Latin American policy. Varas continued,

It should be noted that the interruption of Soviet diplomatic and commercial relations with Chile immediately after the military coup and the condemnation of US intervention in Chile clearly departed from Soviet global policy toward the region. ... Allende's victory had shown how, without altering the relations with the United States in an area so sensitive to US interests, the Soviet Union could gain a regional position in line with its expectations and its reduced possibilities of proving financial and economic assistance. The US

³⁴⁶ Turrent, Isabel, *La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73*, p.16. From the power politics point of view, Turrent utilised the term "*Realpolitik*" in contrast to "ideology" or "doctrine" that assumes that,

el motor de las relaciones internacionales es la defensa del interés nacional de los actores en el ámbito mundial, que la interacción de los estados implica antes que nada la lucha por el poder. (p.15.)

³⁴⁷ See *Latin American Topics*, November, 1973.

intervention in Chile meant putting into doubt a policy with which the Soviet Union was involved.³⁴⁸

Thirdly, *Soviet antagonism to China*. Moscow was not satisfied with the Chilean approach to China, especially at the height of conflict with the country even though the Chilean Maoist group hardly had any critical influence on UP policy and there was no possibility of a Chile-China alliance against the USSR. Consequently, it may be correct to say that Moscow's definition of the relations with the UP government was, "*relaciones estrechas, pero normales*."³⁴⁹

On the Chilean side, the lack of agreement among the UP participants with regard to their position to the Soviet Union was a big obstacle. Various sections within the UP had maintained special connections with specific countries. For instance, the Chilean Communist party leaders had strong ideological and personal ties with the Soviet party leadership.³⁵⁰ Hence, they followed the Soviet line, while Radicals were more associated with the Third International³⁵¹; the MIRistas with Cuba; and the left of the Socialist party with China. However, UP foreign policy was designed almost exclusively by the Socialist party which maintained 'rather unsatisfactory' relations with the Communist party. The attitude of the Socialist party has often been described as anti-Communist which evidently meant that they did not support the Soviet line. Based on their survey of the attitudes of Socialist party leaders over Sino-Soviet disputes, Pollack and Rosenkranz argued:

The Sino-Soviet dispute provided some insight into the nature of the party's anti-communism. The strong pro-Moscow line of the PCCh [*Partido Comunista de Chile*] obviously caused some opposition by members of the PSCh [*Partido Socialista de Chile*]. Only 13 per cent of the interviewed PSCh

³⁴⁸ Varas, Augusto, "Soviet-Latin American Relations Under the US Regional Hegemony", in Varas, Augusto (ed.), *Soviet-Latin American Relations in the 1980s*, Westview, Boulder, 1987, pp.24-5.

³⁴⁹ Turrent, Isabel, *La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73*, p.58.

³⁵⁰ In general, the Soviet Union in Latin American eyes was much more important in ideological and political terms than in military or economic ones.

³⁵¹ According to Almeyda, "The Radical party did not share the anti-Communist viewpoint of most affiliates of the International, and it condemned the pro-imperialist attitudes of some members." (Almeyda Medina, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", in Gil, Federico, Lagos, Ricardo and Landsberger, Henry (eds.), *Chile at the Turning Point*, Institute for the Study of Human Issues, Philadelphia, 1979, p.78.)

leaders considered the Soviet Union as the 'correct' party in the dispute. Furthermore, the 45.7 per cent who did not want to commit themselves, and expressed no allegiance to any party in the dispute, can be viewed as presenting the 'diplomatic' answer aimed at avoiding criticisms of the 'brother' party.

The extent of the criticism of communism was emphasized by the position of the leaders on the question of international socialist solidarity. Some 65.2 per cent of the leaders showed categoric dissatisfaction with the aid given by Eastern European countries to the Popular Unity government. Both poor political support and the lack of financial help were considered as the main shortcomings in this relationship.³⁵²

Therefore, it is understandable when Aniceto Rodríguez, a former Secretary General of the Socialist party - known as a moderate social democrat - said, "nosotros, socialistas, no hemos jamás pertenecido a ninguna internacional, ni a la segunda ni a la tercera."³⁵³ Furthermore, President Allende, above all the most important personnel, once emphasised, "the experiences of Cuba, China and the USSR won't be repeated in Chile"³⁵⁴ Although on his return to Chile [from Cuba] in December 1972 Allende immediately faced charges by the opposition Christian Democrats that he was "leading Chile to a dependence on and a subordination to the Soviet Union,"³⁵⁵ it is very difficult to see that the Chilean foreign policy makers truly intended a serious ideological alliance with the USSR. (*elite*) If there had been any possibility of defining the relations (and policies followed) with the USSR from the UP point of view, it could not have been a full, consolidated or Cuban style strong commitment, but a limited one for more specific and pragmatic necessity. Consequently, the (modest) Chilean approach to the USSR - and Eastern Europe in general - cannot be fully explained by any single variable such as ideology or modest Soviet policy, although each one played a significant role in the making of foreign policy. Meanwhile, another major determinant of the Chilean policy was the dependency; resistive policy as follows.

³⁵² Pollack, Benny and Rosenkranz, Hernan, Revolutionary Social Democracy, Frances Pinter, London, 1986. p.160.

³⁵³ Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.269.

³⁵⁴ *ibid.*, p.269.

³⁵⁵ Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1982, p.396. They also demanded an investigation of all agreements concluded on the trip calling them a dangerous threat to the economic future of Chile.

The expected financial blockade of the US and depleted domestic liquidity inevitably forced Chile to find some other alternative financial sources from the early stage of the UP government, which naturally lead to increased extracontinental contacts. The socialist countries could not be exceptions since Popular Unity's early efforts in these countries were centred fundamentally on obtaining grants of long-term credit. The results of Almeyda's visit to the USSR in May 1971 went some way towards answering those requirements through an important policy shift. According to Turrent:

... el gobierno de Allende había decidido olvidar en parte su moderación inicial frente al campo socialista, y aprovechar las ventajas de una relación más estrecha. El Canciller chileno buscaba elevar el comercio entre los dos países y encauzarlo a través del establecimiento de una misión comercial soviética en Chile y una chilena en Moscú y de la firma de acuerdos para adquirir maquinaria y equipo. Otro objetivo del viaje era, por supuesto, elevar el monto de los créditos otorgados por la URSS a Chile, especialmente a corto plazo.³⁵⁶

With agreements for opening trade representatives in both countries and Soviet support for the chemical industry and fishing business, Almeyda returned with complete optimism. He declared that Chile would newly receive a total of US\$100 million from the Eastern Bloc.³⁵⁷ However, this was never realised. Soviet aid to Chile was more or less the same amount of that to Peru in 1971 when Chile received more from China - US\$95 million - than from the USSR - US\$39 million.³⁵⁸ Although substantial support was never offered to them, economic pragmatism, basically stemming from the external reliance of the Chilean economy, finally outlined the Chilean position to the USSR and Eastern European countries.

The policy to China was initiated in line with Ideological Pluralism on which both the establishment of diplomatic relations and Almeyda's visit to the country in April 1971 were based. In contrast to the USSR's indifferent attitude to Chile, the extent of the Chinese response was overwhelming in terms of the level of diplomatic interchange

³⁵⁶ Turrent, Isabel, La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73, pp.95-6.

³⁵⁷ See Kaufman, Eddy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.269.

³⁵⁸ See Turrent, Isabel, La Unión Soviética en América Latina: el Caso de la Unidad Popular Chilena 1970-73, p.102. For further arguments, see *Economic-Developmental Area*.

and the volume of trade and aid, in addition to the massive media coverage devoted to Chile. According to Joseph, “those relations had a dynamic of their own as Chile became a major Third World testing ground for the PRC’s renewed international initiatives following the ‘high tide’ of the Cultural Revolution.”³⁵⁹ However, unlike for the Russians, the model of the *via chilena* was not greatly attractive for Chinese policy makers since they had already resumed pragmatic positions in foreign policy, and their vision of building socialism was still based on orthodox Communism and Maoism. Hence, Chinese decision makers always emphasised ‘self-reliance’ and warned ‘not to depend too much on external aid,’ warning and trying to constraining Allende’s approach to the USSR. At the same time, China encouraged Allende “to crack down hard on counterrevolutionaries while slowing down in the pursuit of social and economic change.”³⁶⁰

Moreover, the fundamental limit of the relations between China and Chile, along with the ideological differences, can be found in the dramatic shift of the global power structure which resulted in the *rapprochement* between China and the US, and deepened antagonism between China and the USSR in the early 1970s. Therefore, “from Beijing’s point of view, Allende must have appeared to be moving in the opposite direction as Chile’s connections with Moscow became closer [although only symbolic] and its relations with Washington deteriorated.”³⁶¹

However, Chile under Allende did assume a role of some importance in Chinese foreign policy of the early 1970s, particularly of “the diminishing salience of ideology and the increasing importance of geopolitics in determining China’s international behavior.”³⁶² And President Allende’s long record of friendship with China, his ardent nationalism, and the progressive agenda of *tercermundismo* in particular of the UP deeply moved China.

Above all, because the level of Chilean expectation of China’s economic and political support was not as high as that of the Soviet’s, the UP was in a position to more or

³⁵⁹ Joseph, William, “China’s Relations with Chile under Allende: A Case Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition”, p.126.

³⁶⁰ *ibid.*, p.137.

³⁶¹ *ibid.*, p.149.

less define its policy. Hence, they took the series of Chinese warnings against the *vía chilena* and external reliance just as friendly advice, not altering or amending their policy line. While these kinds of relations were fully anticipated inside the Foreign Ministry, one thing they did not anticipate was the negative impact of deepening antagonism between the USSR and China. If not exactly ‘sacrificed’, Chile definitely did not ‘benefit’ from the restructuring of global power.³⁶³

Only days after assuming power, Allende’s Chile re-established diplomatic relations with Cuba. However, the Chilean approach to Cuba, and *vice versa*, had some complicated implications. First, it automatically meant *de facto* retirement of Chile from the OAS, which obliged member countries to cut ties with the Castro regime. Thus, the Chilean decision policy faithfully mirrored one of the initial principles of foreign policy by denouncing the OAS as an imperialistic apparatus.³⁶⁴ Second, and more importantly, the conventional relationships in diplomatic, economic and cultural areas were basically developed in a mutually beneficial way, as the phrase: ‘*solidaridad entre los hermanos*’ indicates. However, the UP had to face domestic and international criticism for providing Cuba with another base for Communist expansion. For instance, “diplomatic and official visas were indiscriminately used in order to remove Cuban agitators arriving in the country from ordinary police control.”³⁶⁵ Even the Chilean government experienced trouble in naming its first Ambassador to Cuba when the Congress rejected Gazmuri who was proposed by Allende.³⁶⁶ Although Chile finally established cordial relations with this socialist

³⁶² *ibid.*, p.149.

³⁶³ Interview with an anonymous Chilean ex-diplomat in Santiago on 3 September 1992.

³⁶⁴ See Allende, Salvador, “Declaración Oficial del Presidente Salvador Allende acerca del Restablecimiento de Relaciones Diplomáticas, Consulares, Culturales y Comerciales entre la República de Chile y la República de Cuba, Santiago, 12 November 1970”, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, pp.508-9.

³⁶⁵ Trucco, Manuel, “Foreign Armed Intervention in Chile”, in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), Chile: the Balanced View, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1975, p.94. Trucco continued:

..., between January 1971 and August 1973, 1,305 diplomatic visas and 1,255 official visas were issued in Havana to Cubans traveling to Chile. By adding to this, the 81 diplomatic visas and the 39 official visas issued in Santiago during the same period and under identical conditions, we reach a total of 1,386 diplomatic visas and 1,294 official visas granted in favor of Cuban citizens. (p.94.)

³⁶⁶ Edwards, Jorge, Persona non Grata: An Envoy in Castro’s Cuba, The Bodley Head, London, 1977, p.97.

country, negative impact on domestic politics implied that some ideological factors were present in them.

4.1.5. The Third World

In accordance with the emphasis of Chilean socialism on its posture of international nonalignment, Allende's government formally joined the Movement of Non-Aligned Nations in 1971 and actively participated in its various undertakings. As Fortín notes, "[i]n view of the elements contained in the program and of the general philosophy that oriented the foreign policy of the Allende government, it is not surprising that the policy included a sustained effort to incorporate Chile in the system of Third World nations."³⁶⁷ (Ideological Pluralism) In April 1972, Santiago hosted the Third Conference of UNCTAD with more than 3,000 delegations from 142 countries, which reflected a sign of the priority, given by the government, not only to the need for ties with the Third World and the establishment of a new international economic order but also to "economic nationalism and the defense of national resources."³⁶⁸ In this respect, Chile obtained the backing of the members of the CIPEC in suspending all trade with Kennecott Copper Corporation which was involved in a move to impose an embargo on the exportation of Chilean copper abroad.³⁶⁹ (Resource Nationalism)

Close relationships were also maintained with nationalistic Arabic governments. Chile established new diplomatic relations with Libya in May 1971. As described by Almeyda, Chile "apoyó la justa reivindicación de los pueblos árabes por recuperar las tierras ocupadas por Israel en la guerra de 1967 y los legítimos derechos del pueblo palestino a lograr su expresión nacional."³⁷⁰ In particular, the UP government enjoyed cordial relations with Algeria under President Houari Boumedienne. Allende visited

³⁶⁷ Fortín, Carlos, "Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government", p.226.

³⁶⁸ Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.162.

³⁶⁹ Concerning the extent to which copper exports could be more beneficial to each nation's economic development, the Frei government with Zaire, Zambia and Peru established the CIPEC. At that time three-fourths of the net copper exports in the world emanated from the CIPEC countries. (See Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.325.)

³⁷⁰ Almeyda, Clodomiro, Reencuentro con mi Vida, p.234.

the North African nation and secured strong support from Boumedienne who promised to provide petroleum to Chile without requiring immediate payment.³⁷¹ Allende government's *Tercermundismo* was known to be best described in his letters to the President Boumedienne. In the letter of 10 August 1993, he wrote,

... buscamos constituir en forma libre y soberana una sociedad más justa orientada por nuestras propias convicciones ideológicas y basada en nuestra particular realidad. Buscamos romper con la dependencia externa, integrarnos con nuestros hermanos de América Latina y del Tercer Mundo. Somos un pueblo que cree y practica los principios de la no intervención, la autodeterminación, el pluralismo ideológico y la solidaridad internacional. Pensamos por ello, que el Movimiento de los No Alineados es un cauce natural de expresión de nuestra política. ...³⁷²

These close relations with Arabic nations meant a certain shift of traditional Chilean policy to the Middle East, although the UP government became sensitive to human rights issues in the region. On the other hand, Allende's personal sympathy towards Israel and Zionism prevented Left-wing control in his government from pushing towards radical anti-Zionism in spite of its role within the Non-Alignment Movement. Thus, Chile did not support the political isolation of Israel, nor harm friendly relations with the country. Meanwhile, technical assistance from Israel continued.³⁷³ (elite)

The UP also proceeded to exchange Ambassadors and to establish Embassies with the African governments of Guyana, Zambia, Nigeria, Guinea, the Popular Republic of the Congo, Madagascar and Tanzania. (Ideological Pluralism) As a nationalist, Latinamericanist and anti-imperialist, Almeyda was extremely skilful in dealing with Third World nations and at finding a common ground, which helped to promote the

³⁷¹ Muñoz suggested that the Socialist Party's traditional interest in Algeria, even before its independence, facilitated the development of friendly relations between the two countries. See Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.162.

³⁷² "Carta Dirigida por el Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens al Presidente de la República Argelina Democrática y Popular, Houari Boumedienne, Santiago de Chile, 10 de agosto de 1973", in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, pp.501-2.

³⁷³ It is said that the respective roles of the Arabic and Jewish communities in Chile influenced Chilean foreign policy, not only to the Middle East but also in the UP's approach to the socialist countries. For instance, the Chilean government consolidated relations with the Jewish people in the USSR. See Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.268.

striking popularity of the UP government in international organisations and in world public opinion. (elite)

4.1.6. Conclusion

Internal Variables

At least on an official level, it is difficult to see the UP's policy in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* as 'revolutionary' especially when no radical breakdown of the traditional style was found and the UP tried to maintain the "traditional *reglas del juego*."³⁷⁴ Americanism played a very important role in the UP's general regional bilateral and multilateral diplomacy while Legalism was seen in relations with Argentina. Probably the least emphasised factor was Nationalism in this *Area*, which was overshadowed by Ideological Pluralism. It can also be pointed out that the continuity of foreign policy in line with the previous government of Frei was not ignorable despite large scale changes in domestic affairs. Among the many distinctive examples of the continuity of foreign policy during the UP period, it is worth emphasising that the Allende regime was still in the heyday of Chilean multilateral politics which was often described as the 'golden age' (1961-1973).³⁷⁵ Her representatives were awarded many directive posts in the United Nations and the OAS. This gave Chile a stronger voice in hemispheric matters particularly when dealing with the US.

Foreign policy was also implemented following the basic ideology of the UP, Ideological Pluralism on which almost all the cases of external behaviour of the UP in this *Area* were based. However, although a minority view, the unilateral application of Ideological Pluralism has sometimes been criticised. As was seen in the relations with Brazil, an unofficial level of hostility existed to a certain extent. In this respect, Mac-Hale argued as follows:

³⁷⁴ Fermandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73, p.67.

³⁷⁵ See Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, p.386.

From the very beginning it was evident that the Popular Unity administration conceived the breaking down of ideological barriers in a unilateral way, that is, it was a laudable principle to the extent in which other governments agreed to accept the presence of a Marxist regime in Chile, but at no time did the Popular Unity indicate its acceptance of other ideologies present in these other countries. In sum, they continued to attack with no respite the military government of Brazil and Argentina; all this criticism was not expressed through the Administration but through their press channels and political parties, which were inseparable from the government itself as it is common knowledge.³⁷⁶

However, regrettably his perception of “common knowledge” was misplaced, in that the only Chilean governmental press was *La Nación*, and no matter which other Chilean press channels and political parties criticised the military regimes of Argentina and Brazil, they cannot be regarded as representing institutions of governmental policy or ideology. Various interviews have revealed that the Allende administration did not try to manipulate the press. During the Allende regime, the Chilean press enjoyed overall maximum freedom.³⁷⁷ Furthermore, there can hardly be any objection to saying that what the Chilean government showed in their relations with the Argentine military government was a clear example of successful promotion of Ideological Pluralism and the acceptance of other’s philosophies. On the whole, the Latin American - and the Third World in general - strategy of the Allende government can be positively evaluated. Although relations with the US, the USSR and some other European States such as Britain did not reach a satisfactory level, Ideological Pluralism was an important driving force for Chilean diplomacy at that time, and can also be identified as an important means to achieving their policy objective of enhancing international participation in this *Area*.

Whereas Anti-Imperialism in its original meaning was important in defining relations with some left wing governments such as in Peru, Resource Nationalism - a variation of Anti-Imperialism - was particularly useful when the UP sought extra-continental alliance with various Third World countries. However, the UP abstained from

³⁷⁶ Mac-Hale, Tomás, “The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity”, p.78.

³⁷⁷ On the other hand, it was an organisational problem of the UP when it was not able to control the fragmented sections inside itself.

directly targeting US imperialism at an official diplomatic level, although the effort to reform the inter-American system was boosted by Anti-Imperialism. Pragmatism defined the policy towards the US and the European countries in order to secure economic necessities, and it can also explain the UP's position to the USSR, China and the Eastern European countries for expanding new markets and financial sources.

Despite the polarised domestic politics during this period, no major implications of this variable in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* could be found. However, it cannot be denied that Chilean 'relations' with the world were significantly influenced by the outlook of the UP government and the domestic political process, as was witnessed in those with Britain, the US and the USSR.

With regard to the elite variable, the complex nature of the structure of the UP coalition and the anti-Soviet sentiments of the majority of socialists who were in charge of the foreign policy, certainly blocked the regime's full commitment both to the Soviet Bloc and or to China. Similarly, the tremendous popularity of Allende and Almeyda in the Third World, especially in Non-Alignment groups, became an important asset to Chilean diplomacy and to the promotion of Ideological Pluralism.

External Variables

The USSR's moderate support³⁷⁸ of the UP, an apparent product of a paradoxical environment which Moscow faced in the early 1970s - *Allende's victory and via chilena vs. the peaceful mood created from the détente with the US* - has been widely criticised. The inability of the Soviets to define a clear position towards the UP government outlined the relations of the two countries and further limited the manoeuvrability of Chilean policy during the Allende regime. At the same time it contributed to more cordial Chilean-Chinese relation, even if it was not an 'ideological' alliance but a 'practical' relationship. However, the rather optimistic judgement of the Chilean government, that the USSR would support the Chilean process in her confrontation with the United States, was proven to be erroneous. The

³⁷⁸ It was 'disappointing support' from the UP's point of view.

lack of a precise analysis of the international system and the existence of a series of options to choose for the USSR made the situation difficult.³⁷⁹

By its interactive nature, the others' policies variable tends to determine the relations with players involved as well as to affect foreign policy. As seen in the above example, while the external relations of Chile - as a small nation - were largely affected by the determinant, foreign policy was not exactly a reaction to outside stimuli, particularly in the light of the strong presence of Ideological Pluralism. An important example is the position of the UP with regard to the US. Although both Chile and the US more or less responded to each other's hostility in terms of speeches and announcements, the difference was that Chile did not exactly react against the visible and invisible US hostility. Furthermore, although Chile's external behaviour was boosted by the friendly stances of governments of Argentina, Peru, Mexico, Spain and other Third World countries, they should be understood as a subsidiary factor for UP's foreign policy in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* primarily determined by the promotion of Ideological Pluralism.

On the other hand, both geopolitics and dependency played rather limited roles in this *Area* although the geopolitics of the Southern Cone influenced the Chilean position to Argentina and the UP's reformist development model and resistive policy pushed Chilean decision makers to increase contacts with extra-continental countries in order to diversify markets and sources from the US. The latter perspective will be further examined in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.

³⁷⁹ This aspect can be applied to the internal politics of the UP. According to Varas:

I agree that the political and military defeat of the Popular Unity was not a consequence of the lack of USSR support, of the role that the latter played in the internal ideological struggle, or of the function that it does not play in international terms, but I do insist that such defeat could have had other characteristics and the other resources could have been mobilized provided that the definition of the role of the USSR in the internal political process had been better adjusted to reality. (Varas, Augusto, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone", pp.250-1.)

4.2. The Military-Strategic Area

4.2.1 Arms Procurement and Security Issues

Without the presence of any precise territorial disputes, the UP government's policy in the *Military Strategic Area* was centralised arms procurement and military assistance issues with a limited number of counterparts involved, namely, the USSR and the US. As far as the issue of military co-operation with the Soviet Union was concerned, there were strong debates concerning the intention of the Chilean government: from "Allende turned down offers of Soviet military aid"³⁸⁰; to "Allende did not want Soviet equipment."³⁸¹; to "Allende maintained an early decision not to buy Soviet military equipment"³⁸² and to "Allende repeatedly pressed his commanders-in-chief to take advantage of the Soviet's offer."³⁸³

Apart from the fact that the USSR offered military equipment to the Allende government,³⁸⁴ the incomplete history and the inaccessibility to reliable document do not rule out the possibility of the above speculations. However, it was certain that General Prats, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, was in favour of accepting Soviet aid, arguing that:

En la tarde de ese día, sostengo una importante entrevista con el Ministro de Defensa [of the USSR], Mariscal Grechko, con quien analizamos las posibilidades de equipamiento soviético para el Ejército de Chile, definiéndose como de primera urgencia un apoyo sustancial de variados rubros de elementos logísticos de campaña, en condiciones financieras extraordinariamente favorables.³⁸⁵

³⁸⁰ Ratliff, William, "Chile", p.60.

³⁸¹ Mac-Hale, Tomás, "The Chilean Approach to International Relations under the Government of the Popular Unity", p.78.

³⁸² Theberge in Miller, Nicola, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987*, pp.136-147.

³⁸³ "La acción del ejército en la liberación de Chile", Santiago, circulated informally by senior Chilean Army officers, p.21, quoted in Davis, Nathaniel, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, p.131.

³⁸⁴ In October 1971, the Chilean government officially denied any negotiations or offers on Soviet arms. However, it is known that the USSR offered US\$300million worth of military equipment. (See Theberge, James, *Presencia Soviética en América Latina*, Gabriela Mistral, Santiago, p.115.)

³⁸⁵ Prats, Carlos, *Memorias: Testimonio de un Soldado*, p.389.

In May 1973, General Prats said publicly in Washington that he was not ruling out buying arms from the USSR, as Chile did not want to depend on her only “one line of supply.”³⁸⁶ Two weeks later, he signed a military co-operation agreement with the USSR. However, the comptroller General refused to register the agreement for technical and legal reasons. As far as the military was concerned, anti-Soviet officers could not agree with General Prats since they did not want to harm the good relations with the Pentagon, and practically it was not viable to change their defence system based on US and European equipment. In this respect, Davis described the whole scenario as, “political games between Allende, the comptroller general, Prats, and Prats’ anti-Soviet opponents in the Military.”³⁸⁷ Meanwhile, the coup was staged and the aid was never secured.

With regard to the military ties with the US, certain changes were expected as mentioned in the election programme which stated that it was “indispensable to revise, denounce, or reject all treaties or agreements that limited the nation’s sovereignty, specifically reciprocal-aid treaties, mutual-assistance pacts, and other pacts made by Chile with the United States.”³⁸⁸ In fact, the Allende government announced the need to introduce ‘modifications’ only into the *Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Recíproca* (TIAR).³⁸⁹ It was argued that the Treaty was incompatible with the principle of Ideological Pluralism because the sanctions applied against Cuba were based on it. However, the danger was that by disabling the existing security system - the Treaty of Rio, Chile was going to remain without a mechanism for collective security in cases of external aggression, except the totally ineffective United Nations’ peace keeping system. In such an eventuality, the

³⁸⁶ Ratliff, William, “Chile”, p.60.

³⁸⁷ Davis, Nathaniel, The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende, p.132.

³⁸⁸ Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile”, pp.159-160.

³⁸⁹ TIAR was signed at the *Conferencia Interamericana de Consolidación de la Paz* in Río de Janeiro in 1947. Its principal function was the collective defence of the American Hemisphere and the prevention of armed conflict within the region. See Varas, Augusto, “Las Relaciones Militares Internacionales de América Latina: Evolución y Perspectivas”, in Lagos Matus, Gustavo (ed.), Las Relaciones entre América Latina, Estados Unidos y Europa Occidental, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1979, pp.124-6.

government would have had no alternative other than to resort to military intervention of the Soviet Union, which was hard to imagine.³⁹⁰


Therefore, the Allende regime resumed a pragmatic position not to revise or scrap the Treaty, so as to avoid greater danger from the viewpoint of national security. Consequently, unlike the progressively deteriorating political and economic relations between the United States and Chile, military ties remained unchanged. Even though the Socialist party had criticised the Inter-American Defense Exercise (UNITAS) operations involving the armed forces of the two nations before the Unidad Popular came to power, these operations continued to be held during the Allende government without any ‘show of public protest.’³⁹¹

As seen in **Figure 4.1.**, while US economic assistance to Chile was dramatically curtailed during the first year of UP government, US military assistance did not change significantly. It even superseded the economic assistance of 1972 and 1973 showing a reasonable stability during the UP period. In other words, although Chile faced harsh US economic sanctions, her military force continued to receive a significant amount of US aid for arms purchase and modernisation of military as well as to initiate the diversification efforts by importing arms from Western Europe. During that time, for instance, a new US\$4 million C-130 four-engined transport aircraft and paratroopers’ equipment were purchased and Chile successfully leased a seagoing fleet tug, the *Arikara*, from the US Navy while maintaining the lease on the other eight US naval vessels. Meanwhile, Chile remained a member of the Inter-American Defence Board and maintained normal military relations with the United States military advisory group.³⁹² The overall military tie with the US was contrary to what other Latin American leftist governments had with the US, such as Peru under Juan Velasco Alvarado and Francisco Morales Bermúdez, and Argentina under Jorge Rafael Videla and his successors.

³⁹⁰ Interview with Chilean diplomat Fernando Labra in Santiago on 5 October, 1992.

³⁹¹ See Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile”, p.164.

³⁹² See “Chile: A Chronology”, p.377.

Figure 4.1. Announced Authorised US Assistance to Chile: 1970-74

Source: Statistical Abstract of Latin America, vol. 20, UCLA, Los Angeles, 1991.

Note: Prices are deflated in 1970 US dollars.

Thus, it can be pointed out that the Chilean behaviour in this *Area* provides a major example of the limits of the UP foreign policy: first, as they continued to receive military assistance from the US; and second, as the arms acquisitions and the training of officers in the United States implied an ideological acceptance of the fact that they were involved in the East-West confrontation. Therefore, UP foreign policy in this *Area* preserved the historical linkage as opposed to the projected foreign policy ideology of Anti-Imperialism. This evident contradiction can be understood by taking into account several major determinants: the objective role of domestic politics and the military's role vis-à-vis the US policy.

As a minority President being elected with a narrow margin, Allende required more political support from various sectors, particularly from the military, not only because it was a traditionally powerful and conservative institution, but also because their support was perceived vital for political stability and his government's survival. In order to secure the support of the armed forces, he increased their pay, improved living conditions and educational opportunities, expanded the military budget to buy new equipment from abroad, encouraged participation in operations of public

policy³⁹³ and accommodated high military officers on the question of links with the Pentagon.³⁹⁴ Therefore, it was difficult for the UP leaders to turn down the visible aid from the US as it helped to secure both domestic stability and military loyalty to the government. However, this logic could also imply that the internal weakness of the regime could not effectively control the military's connection with the Pentagon, as General Prats criticised, "I think that neither President Allende nor the UP politicians know how much and how profoundly our Armed Force is being influenced by North Americans."³⁹⁵

US governments have often encouraged the local military to prepare a coup in the case of problematic regimes, as happened in Cuba in 1962 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. This is called "*pentagonism*: namely, securing the allegiance of the national army in a Latin American country to the Pentagon rather than to the national government."³⁹⁶ Although there is no clear evidence that the US was directly involved in the 1973 coup, the continued assistance to the Chilean military should be understood within the same context as part of a destabilisation policy - such as Track I

³⁹³ In order to integrate the armed forces, the UP government integrated military officers into the planning and management of key sectors of the economy. For instance, Brigadier General Pedro Palacios was named as the director of the Chuquicamata Copper Company. Military representatives also took part in ODEPLAN. See North, Liisa, "The Military in Chilean Politics", in Lowenthal, Abraham (ed.), *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, pp.181-4.

³⁹⁴ The small increase in US military aid to Chile in 1972 and 1973 was requested by Allende as part of his effort to win military backing for his government. See Ratliff, William, "Chile", p.60.

³⁹⁵ General Prats quoted in Fernandois, Joaquín, *Chile y el Mundo 1970-73*, p.92. From the Chilean military's viewpoint, military links with the US, particularly the education of Chilean officers in the US, were not only ideologically important, but also economically viable. According to a senior officer of the Chilean military:

¿a dónde se envían alumnos [military officers]? Mandamos un oficial a un curso a Francia o a España, que nos cuesta, fuera de los pasajes, mil quinientos dólares mensuales y el paquete va a costar cuarenta mil dólares, o los mandamos a Estados Unidos que nos cuesta solamente el sueldo de tantos meses; y entonces mandamos cinco oficiales en vez de uno. (General Alejandro Medina Lios in an interview with Sergio Marras, in Marras, Sergio, *Palabra de Soldado*, Ornitorrinco, Santiago, 1989, p.67.)

³⁹⁶ The phenomenon was referred to by the ousted Dominican President Juan Bosch. See Kaufman, Edy, "Latin America", p.145. Also, for the (covert) operations of the US governments - the Treasury, the CIA, and the US Information Service - before and during the Allende government, see Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CEA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, pp.2-371; Opaso, Cristian (ed. and tr.) Informe del Senado de los Estados Unidos: Frei, Allende y la Mano de la CIA, Ornitorrinco, Santiago. (Translation of Covert Action in Chile (1963-1973): Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 18 December, 1975.) ; and Petras, James and Morley, Morris, The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1975.

and Track II - launched by Washington. Consequently, the paradox for the Allende government was that the stabilisation effort, the policy of allowing US assistance to the Chilean military, became one of the cornerstones of the coup in 1973.

At the same time, the perception of a crisis was so deeply ingrained in decision makers that, “the objective which the Chilean government pursued in its relations with the United States was to ensure that no pretext could be used to facilitate or legitimate either a strict economic blockade of Chile or other measures that could be harmful to the UP government.”³⁹⁷ This primarily implies that one main policy tactic was not anti-imperialism itself but conflict management which was aimed “to reduce the number of conflict situations to a minimum and to ensure that those could not be eliminated should not become more serious.”³⁹⁸ It is therefore possible to argue that, in the more global perspective, the main inspiration of the UP decision makers was not quite an anti-imperialism but “a policy of distance and equilibrium against two dominant Super Powers.”³⁹⁹ Through this strategy, the UP’s foreign policy objective became less revolutionary and more realistic, focusing on ‘the creation of a favourable international environment to secure the domestic programme of socio-economic change.’⁴⁰⁰ Here is a major reason why the UP’s anti-imperialistic policy was not exactly implemented as initially designed. Unfortunately, therefore, the UP government had no other alternative but to leave the US-Chilean military connection intact.

³⁹⁷ Almeyda, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, p.117.

³⁹⁸ *ibid.*, p.117.

³⁹⁹ Fernandois, Joaquín, “Elementos para un Análisis de la Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular 1970-1973”, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.142.

⁴⁰⁰ Almeyda confessed later that “solidarity with and support for other revolutionary forces in the world were limited by pursuit of the principal objective.” Almeyda Medina, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, p.81.

4.3. The Economic-Developmental Area

4.3.1. Regional Integration: *The Andean Pact*

After the failure of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA),⁴⁰¹ the Andean Pact was formed by five nations - Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador and Peru - in an effort to accelerate the economic development and the regional integration of the members. The Allende government's policy on the Andean Pact was very positive, even though earlier policy had tended to oppose the existing integration plans on the grounds that they would offer an expanded market to the corporations from developed countries. The political and cultural importance that the Allende government gave to subregional integration resulted in an official commitment favourable to integration plans. In December 1970, Chile strongly supported the approval of the Andean Common Market's Decision 24 which concerned the common Andean regulation for the treatment of foreign capital.

During the previous Frei government, Chile had also played a significant role in the articulation of a more self-assertive attitude in Latin America. A growing sense of identity within Latin America and differentiation from the United States was expressed, in order to try and control the penetration of foreign capital and to encourage regional integration. Whereas the Frei government's participation was instrumental in bringing about the Consensus of Viña del Mar and in redefining a new continental role for the Special Coordinating Commission for Latin America (CECLA), the UP's role was more active and substantial in the establishment of the Andean Pact, whose common policy for the treatment of foreign capital represented a first step towards controlling the activities of multinational corporations on the continent. Thus, the Allende government could benefit from the previous experience

⁴⁰¹ Several reasons have been suggested to explain the failure of LAFTA: lack of sincere participation of the three biggest countries, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, being reluctant to grant their markets to smaller countries; frequent changes in the governments of the member countries and in the economic development choices; shifting ideologies toward development through central or state planning rather than reliance on private sector; and traditional rivalries and hostilities between members. See Lincoln, Jennie K., "Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions", p.11.

which “lately had been largely convergent with its own basic approach, and which could also help to identify realistic goals for foreign policy.”⁴⁰² (historical linkage)

Just as their general emphasis on the unity of the Third World was closely linked to the question of the economic position of the underdeveloped countries in the international structure, the Chilean link to the Andean Pact was caused by strong concern over the international economic system and the North-South conflict. Almeyda stated in the General Assembly of the UN that:

La cabal realización de esta política exige y supone en el contexto internacional la plena vigencia de los principios de no intervención y de autodeterminación de los pueblos y el irrestricto respeto a los tratados y acuerdos internacionales libremente convenidos, con resguardo de la soberanía nacional.⁴⁰³ (resistive policy)

Hence, Chilean participation in the Pact began to gain more political significance particularly for image projection, subcontinental solidarity and self-determination. For instance, in March 1972 when Chile found difficulties in renegotiating her external debt, the government sought support from the Andean countries, putting the matter in the more convenient light of the North-South confrontation. Almeyda explained to the Andean Foreign Ministers that “Chile’s debt originated in the current international power structure”, and that “their countries were affected in the same way.”⁴⁰⁴

In this respect, the UP’s Anti-Imperialism was promoted by emphasising that the fight against imperialism should be carried out not only by the Chilean people but also by other Latin American people, and it became a significant feature of the Chilean strategy in the subregional integration movement of the Andean Pact. Therefore, the active participation in multilateral integration was accompanied by enhanced bilateral diplomatic interactions with the member countries, particularly with Perú, Ecuador

⁴⁰² Fortín, Carlos “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”, p.219.

⁴⁰³ Clodomiro Almeyda, Chile, Perú, Bolivia, Discurso de en la Asamblea General de la OEA, San José, Costa Rica, 14 April, 1971 p.133, quoted in Kaufman, Edy, “La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena”, p.253.

⁴⁰⁴ Almeyda, Clodomiro in Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, pp.369-370.

and Colombia. During the visits to these states in 1971, Allende was successful in securing their support for the Chilean strategy. In Colombia, both presidents blamed the US for its economic pressure on Chile; in Ecuador Allende agreed with President Velasco Ibarra about the right of Latin American nations to renew diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the Peruvian military government of progressive nationalist Velasco Alvarado saw its southern neighbour as a close colleague.⁴⁰⁵

Consequently, the UP's policy regarding the Andean Pact had more meaning in terms of promoting Ideological Pluralism and Anti-Imperialism than in actual economic benefits. According to Almeyda, "[r]eciprocal ties multiplied among the Andean Pact members, thus increasing their interdependence while they at the same time were being asked to accept the principle of ideological pluralism as the political basis for that Pact."⁴⁰⁶ Furthermore, President Allende frequently mentioned phrases such as "Ideological Pluralism of the Latin American States" or "Self-determination" in discourses and public declarations to emphasise regional integration as a matter of priority over other issues in Latin America.

However, because of the serious economic problems in the last months of the government of the UP, Chile's participation in Latin American economic integration became weakened after the government invoked the safeguard clauses included in the integration agreements and pulled out of the common system.⁴⁰⁷

4.3.2. The Copper Nationalisation Issue and the US

During the first year of the Allende government, Chile nationalised not only the mineral industries but also a number of foreign owned banking firms such as the Bank of America, the Bank of London and the First National City Bank of New York. On the one hand, the nationalisation of these banks was not taken seriously because the *Banco de Estado* had controlled approximately half the nation's banking for many

⁴⁰⁵ Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.254.

⁴⁰⁶ Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.119.

⁴⁰⁷ See Muñoz, Herald, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.161.

years.⁴⁰⁸ However, the nationalisation of the copper industry was another matter outlining relations between the US and Chile as being a result of one of the most determined foreign policy agenda of Allende whose government fully and uncompromisingly carried out its original programme.⁴⁰⁹

Allende charged that the Americans had mismanaged Chile's copper mines and had taken 'excess profits', claiming that "[w]e will pay if it is just, and we will not pay what is not just."⁴¹⁰ He cited a Soviet study and an investigation by the French Mining Society to prove his charges of mismanagement. The investigation concluded that Kennecott owed the Chilean government over US\$310 million, and Anaconda, US\$38 million.⁴¹¹ This came to be known as the Allende doctrine, the idea that compensation for nationalised properties could be reduced on the basis of an excess profit calculation. From the US point of view, not only for the companies involved but also for the government, the result was catastrophic since they were concerned much more with a possible spillover to other Third World countries than with this particular Chilean case. Therefore, the nationalisation gave rise to a legal and commercial confrontation between the Chilean government *versus* the US government and the companies involved. In this section, the issue of copper nationalisation will be examined by directly identifying determinant variables of the Chilean policy.

Firstly, the copper nationalisation policy was carried out under Anti-Imperialism - Resource Nationalism more specifically - as manifested in the election programme as follows:

⁴⁰⁸ See Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.329.

⁴⁰⁹ For the historical context of Chilean copper and its international implications, see Sutulov, Alexander, "Evolución de la Política Nacional del Cobre y sus Consecuencias en las Relaciones con Gran Bretaña y Estados Unidos de Norteamérica", in Sánchez, Walter and Pereira, Teresa (eds.), 150 Años de Política Exterior Chilena, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1977, pp.223-44.

⁴¹⁰ Salvador Allende in "Chile: A Chronology", p.377. For full text of the decree, see "Decreto N° 92, Firmado por el Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, Relativo a las Rentabilidades Excesivas de las Empresas de la Gran Minería del Cobre Afectadas por la Nacionalización", Santiago, 29 September, 1971, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, pp.409-14.

⁴¹¹ Landsberger, Henry, "Answers to Some Questions about the Military Coup in Chile", in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, p.523. Detailed calculation for 'compensation' can be found in Contraloría General de la República, "Fijación de la Indemnización a las Empresas Cupreras Nacionalizadas", 11 October, 1971, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, pp. 414-7.

Asimismo se rechazará todo tipo de imposiciones foráneas respecto a las materias primas latinoamericanas, como el cobre, y a las trabas impuestas al libre comercio que se han traducido durante largo tiempo en la imposibilidad de establecer relaciones comerciales colectivas con todos los países del mundo.⁴¹²

Secondly, the Chilean tradition of Legalism was strongly manifested in two perspectives: *Constitutional Amendment* and *Insisting on UN Resolution 1803*.

Constitutional Amendment

Copper was nationalised through a Constitutional amendment which was debated for seven months and adopted in July 1971 with the full support of the political parties in the Chilean National Congress. According to Carlos Fortín, one of the key decision makers in the copper issue, the Constitutional amendment was necessary, “first, to emphasize the great significance of the measure being adopted and second, to help solve certain legal and technical problems deriving from the copper agreements made by the Frei Government.”⁴¹³ Adding to the decision regarding the method of compensation, the Constitutional amendment also authorised the President to deduct from the amount of compensation, all or part of the ‘excess profits’ acquired by the US companies since 1955 when the New Deal legislation had begun taking effect. The significance of the legal dimension for the justification of nationalisation can be easily noted in major official speeches of the UP leaders. For instance:

La nacionalización será conquistada en conformidad con nuestro sistema legal, en uso de nuestra soberanía y de acuerdo con las resoluciones de las Naciones Unidas. ... Reclamamos el respeto a la autodeterminación y la plena vigencia de la no intervención. La dignidad de las naciones no se mide por el ingreso per cápita.⁴¹⁴

⁴¹² “Política Internacional del Gobierno Popular: Programa Básico de Gobierno de la Unidad Popular”, p.360.

⁴¹³ Fortín, Carlos, “Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions”, p.192. For the detailed history of US investment in Chilean copper mining before 1971, *also see* pp.184-192.

⁴¹⁴ Allende, Salvador, “Intervención del Presidente de la República de Chile, Salvador Allende Gossens, en la Sesión Inaugural del Decimocuarto Período de Sesiones de la Comisión Económica para América Latina (CEPAL) de las Naciones Unidas”, p.365. Similar cases were the speeches of: Allende in the UN General Assembly in December 1972 (p.25-45.); Almeyda in the UN General Assembly in October 1971 (p.369.) and in the meeting of Group 77 in Lima in October 1971 (p.402.)

Therefore, as copper nationalisation was implemented by Constitutional amendment with full support of the political parties, it was legally impossible to obtain reasonable compensation unless another Constitutional amendment was introduced. This meant that the Constitutional initiative functioned as a systematic obstacle for drawing any substantial agreement with the US.

UN Resolution 1803 and International Law

The international law on which the Chilean decision makers relied was the United Nations Resolution 1803 passed in 1962 which mentioned the right of the host state to freely make use of its resources for their interests. Especially, clause 1 and 4 of the resolution which state:

1. El derecho de los pueblos y de las naciones a la soberanía permanente sobre sus riquezas y recursos naturales debe ejercerse en interés del desarrollo nacional y la bienestar del pueblo del respectivo Estado.

4. ... En estos casos [Nationalisation] se pagará al dueño la indemnización correspondiente, con arreglo a las normas en vigor en el Estado que adopte estas medidas en ejercicio de su soberanía y en conformidad con el derecho internacional. En cualquier caso en que la cuestión de la indemnización dé origen a un litigio, debe agotarse la jurisdicción nacional del Estado que adopte esas medidas. No obstante, el litigio podrá dirimirse por arbitraje o arreglo judicial internacional.⁴¹⁵

The strengthened resource nationalism and the evolution of international law had been the most effective resorts for Third World governments against MNCs. Even the US Supreme Court decision in the Sabbatino case, which dealt with the nationalisation of the sugar industry in Cuba in 1963, recognised the validity of the Cuban nationalisation, despite the fact that no compensation had been paid, on the basis of the 'act of state' doctrine. According to this principle, "the courts of one country

and in the General Assembly of the OAS in April 1973; Ambassador Humberto Díaz Casanueva in the UN General Assembly. (p.387.)

⁴¹⁵ "Resolución 1803 (XVII). Soberanía Permanente sobre los Recursos Naturales", the UN General Assembly, December 1962, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.421. Needless to say, Chile was one of the most active promoters of the Resolution 1803.

cannot judge the validity of an action taken by any other sovereign power within the latter's own territory," which more or less supported the underlined phrase of resolution 1803.⁴¹⁶ Several Latin American doctrines also supported the Chilean position, such as the *Calvo*, *Drago* and *Carranza* Doctrines. Named after Carlos Calvo, a noted Argentine diplomat and jurist, *Calvo Doctrine* came to be incorporated in international agreements for foreign investment. He said that foreign capitalists should accept as final the jurisdiction of the laws of the host country and should not appeal to their own government for any special intervention. The *Drago Doctrine*, another principle of Argentina, went further by declaring that economic claims should never give rise to a legal right to intervene by force in another country.⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, the *Carranza Doctrine* [Mexican] restricted the right of foreign investors in Mexico.⁴¹⁸ At least, therefore, the right of a state to nationalise the property of aliens was no longer questioned seriously and the Chilean government's action seemed to be legitimate.

On the other hand, international courts and the general rules of international law have also recognised the obligation of the state to respect rights acquired by aliens. In this respect, the United States' objections to the Chilean decision were based on the principle of international law which states that, in case of nationalisation, a "just, prompt and effective" compensation should be paid.⁴¹⁹ A leading Chilean international law specialist, Orrego Vicuña argued that, "Resolution 1803 rests in part on this proposition [regarding the obligation of state to respect rights of aliens], as evidenced by the history of its drafting and the opinion of authoritative sources."⁴²⁰ Because this principle, however, can be neither absolute nor immutable, a state may undertake measures to affect the acquired rights of aliens so long as the measures are

⁴¹⁶ It is true that shortly after the Sabbatino decision was handed down, the US Congress passed the so-called Hickenlooper Amendment which, in practice, had the effect of revoking by legislation the doctrine that had been established by the Supreme court; but even then, the Hickenlooper Amendment only applied to companies in which US interests had a share of at least 50 per cent (Chilean case: 49 per cent). See Fortín, Carlos, "Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions", pp.119-200.

⁴¹⁷ See Davis, Harold Eugene., Fiman, John and Peck, Ta, Latin American Diplomatic History: An Introduction, p.12.

⁴¹⁸ See Kaufman, Edy, "Latin America", p.150.

⁴¹⁹ Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.112.

⁴²⁰ Orrego Vicuña, Francisco, "Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the Copper Industry by Chile", pp.256-7.

not inconsistent with the requirements of international law or with any existing treaty. With regard to copper nationalisation, no such treaty or agreement existed between Chile and the United States⁴²¹ and the claim by the US was only to be rejected, as Almeyda said, “[n]o existe ningún precedente que pueda ser invocado en favor de la tesis norteamericana.”⁴²² Therefore, as a mutually acceptable settlement through legal procedures became difficult, the issue became political rather than legal.⁴²³

Thirdly, the Chilean decision makers’ justification very much relied on domestic politics mainly stemming from opposition parties support, which provided enormous popular backing and a unanimous congressional decision. However, it cannot be denied that nationalisation was perceived by the UP leaders as a means to attract domestic support and unity as well as external support by emphasising their opposition to US imperialism and MNCs’ economic penetration. (the objective role of domestic politics)⁴²⁴

⁴²¹ The only treaty referred to between Chile and the US during the nationalisation process was the treaty for settlement of disputes of 1914 which stated that “differences or conflicts between the two countries that could not be resolved through direct negotiations should be investigated and reported on by an International Commission made up of two members nominated by each of the parties and a fifth member nominated by common agreement.” In 1972 Chile proposed the procedure established by the treaty but included that “the investigation should also cover the more general question of economic relations between Chile and the United States, and more specifically the attitude of the US Government in the international financial agencies.” Obviously it was opposed by the US for two reasons; “first, because the 1914 treaty could not, in this case, lead to a decision that would be binding on both parties since both governments would have to give their consent before the arbitration phase could begin and Chile was not, at that time, in a position to give such consent; second, because it felt that inclusion of questions other than the copper dispute would go beyond the terms of the treaty.” See Fortín, Carlos, “Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions”, p.213.

⁴²² “Intervención del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, Clodomiro Almeyda Medina, en el Tercer Periodo Ordinario de Sesiones de la Asamblea General de la Organización de Los Estados Americanos”, Washington D.C., 5 April, 1973, in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.457.

⁴²³ In order to solve the critical difference of opinion between the UP and the US upon the issue of copper nationalisation and compensation, the Chilean government turned to the only judicial instrument in existence; the Chile-United States Treaty of 1916, under which conflicts were to be submitted to an Arbitration Committee whose members were to be appointed by the affected parties. In case of disagreement between the two parties, the Arbitration Committee would issue an opinion on how that conflict should be resolved. The parties were under no obligation to accept that opinion. This matter was discussed four times by officials of the two countries but they never reached an agreement. This impasse continued until the military coup in 1973. See Almeyda, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, p.112.

⁴²⁴ For similar viewpoint, See Fermandois, Joaquín, “Elementos para un Análisis de la Política exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular 1970-1973”, p.146-7. and Lincoln, Jennie J., “Introduction to Latin American Foreign Policy: Global and Regional Dimensions”, p.13.

Fourthly, there was the widely accepted speculation that the copper nationalisation would provide the US government and the companies involved with an excuse for direct or indirect economic blockades which would have been difficult to initiate under normal circumstances. Hence, it was expected that the blockade might seriously affect Chile's economy given their deep economic dependency on the US as follows:

- 40 per cent of Chilean imports originated in the US
- 90 per cent of copper suppliers were in the US
- 60 per cent of crude oil came from US companies
- Short-term credit to Chile from private US banks and main suppliers reached US\$220 million
- World Bank and IDB loans were an average of US\$50 million a year during 1965-70
- 50 per cent of external debt was owed to the US government.⁴²⁵

So, what kind of economic background made the Chilean decision makers launch a resistive policy of nationalising the copper industry without compensation? To address this question, it is necessary to examine the direct economic benefit of nationalisation and the UP's economic development model.

Chile's internal economic development had been primarily dependent upon the exportation of copper as a means of earning foreign exchange. In other words, Chile's importance in the world market had been completely based on her capacity to produce copper, copper products, nitrate, iron ore and fishmeal. Therefore, since the limited capabilities and structural weaknesses of the Chilean economy played a decisive role in the development of domestic and foreign policy, it was necessary to gain control of the industry and maximise the revenue as a first step towards gaining an independent position. If Chile had paid the US companies according to Fortín's calculation a reasonable compensation would have been "a figure of about US\$70 million a year for ten years," which is an enormous amount of money that "would have considerably reduced the immediate economic benefits of nationalization: it amounted to about one third of the companies' average annual profits for the preceding four years, when the

⁴²⁵ Fortín, Carlos, "Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions," p.201.

copper price had been abnormally high.”⁴²⁶ Therefore, Chile would not have been economically better off even if she had nationalised her industries with reasonable compensation.

Apart from legal, technological and commercial reprisals available to the US companies,⁴²⁷ there were also financial reprisals. The decreased flow of US foreign capital and investment into Chile was anticipated by the UP decision makers, although this could not have been critical for them since the socialist government’s reformist economic policy was aimed at discouraging foreign investment. The UP government had other reasons not to be seriously concerned apart from their primary foreign policy objective: to reduce dependency on the US. It was believed that commercial and financial relations with other parts of the world, particularly with Europe, Japan and the Socialist Bloc, would be intensified, or at least not affected, since “the possible effects of nationalization on flows of credit and other sources of financing that were not linked with foreign ownership of companies in Chile was quite another matter.”⁴²⁸ The Chilean government also relied on the case that it was prepared to pay compensation for the *Sociedad Minera Andina*, a small joint venture between the US Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the Chilean government, which had not made excess profit.⁴²⁹

Fifth, Cope pointed out that the US State Department’s initial ‘soft line’ prediction over the compensation issue was another factor that affected the Chilean decision.

They were:

1. Economic or political retaliation would focus great attention on the United States in Chile as a cause of Chile’s deepening economic crises under Allende regime;
2. The Chilean treatment of Anaconda and Kennecott did not mean that all US private interests would be prevented from obtaining compensation for their nationalized properties;

⁴²⁶ *ibid.*, p.197.

⁴²⁷ Chilean assumptions on the importance of the conflict with the companies proved to be basically correct in that no insuperable difficulties in the production or sale of Chilean copper occurred as a result of direct reprisals taken by Anaconda and Kennecott.

⁴²⁸ Fortín, Carlos, “Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions,” p.201.

⁴²⁹ *ibid.*, p.196-7. Unfortunately, it did not impress the US government at all.

3. There was little the United States could do in the wake of increasing nationalization of foreign-owned properties in Chile and in other Latin American nations in which nationalism has a tendency to unite internal power contenders with political system.⁴³⁰

The initial 'soft line' of the US may well explain why Rogers, the US Secretary of State, did not indicate possible retaliatory measures to be taken against the UP government but merely declared that nationalisation without compensation was contrary to international law.

Lastly, it is necessary to take into account the decision makers' perception which is reflected in the decision to nationalise, in that most people who participated in the UP decision making process would have been denied the possibility of substantial benefit if they had reached an agreement with the US.⁴³¹ Almeyda argued that nothing would have changed in real terms pointing out that the 'massive problems' seen by the US policy-makers would not have disappeared; and the CIA would not have been called off, and nor would private and public American economic actions have been basically any different.⁴³² In turn, Fajnzylber, a key decision maker in Chilean foreign economic policy, presented a similar opinion, still denying any possibilities of the lift of the US invisible blockade. According to him, "the Chilean copper industry by a government that would act independently from the United States would threaten long-term US economic interests." He claimed that the US would allow any kind of copper nationalisation whether Chile paid or not.⁴³³ On the other hand, Fortín offered an explanation from a different viewpoint, noting that the total picture was optimistic for the decision makers:

⁴³⁰ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", pp.329-330.

⁴³¹ If the excess profits doctrine had been dropped and at least token payments been made, Chile would have been better off in the following aspects: first, certain lines of credit would have been eased; some of the tension would have drained from US-Chilean diplomatic exchanges; copper marketing in Europe and elsewhere would have been somewhat less difficult. Due to Kennecott's legal action in several European countries, sales of small amounts of copper (from *El Teniente* mine) were suspended in France and Sweden, and in other cases shipping routes had to be changed, which involved extra costs. However Kennecott did not achieve its tactical objective. See Fortín, Carlos, "Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions", p.206.

⁴³² See Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.113.

⁴³³ Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", in Sideri, S. (ed.), Chile: 1970-1973: Economic Development and Its International Setting - Self Criticism of the Unidad Popular Government's Policies, p.162.

To begin with, it was felt among Chilean decision-makers that a Cuban-type blockade was unlikely. As long as the UP Government's foreign policy did not provide excuses for taking extreme measures, the impression was that the political costs of a blockade of this kind for the US Government would be very high, given the political climate in Latin America and throughout the world. It was also expected that if an open conflict with the United States could be avoided, short-term credits from Western Europe and Japan would remain unaffected, while at the same time Chile could re-direct its imports from the United States to those countries.⁴³⁴

These conceptions of decision makers were primarily based on an overestimation of future copper production and export. The assumption was that copper prices would be at best rising, stable, or at least not falling so much so as not to be able to sustain the Chilean economy under the new reformist UP policy.⁴³⁵ In view of the above, Chilean policy makers' perception can be characterised by the following three points.

Firstly, any kind of effort to facilitate the US's anti-Chilean campaign would be meaningless, as long as the socialist government in Chile continued the 'legitimate' nationalisation process. This view gains support when one recalls that the US blockade had started even before the Chilean decision to nationalise the copper industry.

What President Nixon did not say was that the economic squeeze against Chile had already begun. It began, in fact, months before the Allende government had made its basic decisions on the terms of expropriation for the copper companies. A credit blockade had been mounted against Chile by early 1971. The participants were the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Ex-Im Bank.⁴³⁶

Secondly, since the doctrine of 'excess profit' was already publicised, Chilean decision makers perceived that the copper issue was no longer in their hands, regardless of the actual implementation of nationalisation. Furthermore, they were

⁴³⁴ Fortín, Carlos, "Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions", p.202.

⁴³⁵ However, exceptionally low copper price during 1971 and 72 proved that their expectations were misplaced.

⁴³⁶ Stern, Laurence, "Chile: The Lesson," in Washington Post, November 1973, published in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, p.535.

not certain that an offer of (even reasonable) compensation would have been sufficient to avoid the conflict and financial blockade. These crisis perceptions were probably not misplaced, as the following statement suggests:

Form the US hard liners' point of view, for focusing, justifying, and implementing the broad lines of US policy toward Chile, the copper question was the perfect issue. Therefore, it is reportedly said that the US hard-liners did not want to negotiate with Chile over token payments: "The Popular Unity government was damned if it did, and probably just as damned if it didn't."⁴³⁷

Finally, they were so optimistic about the economic performance of Chile and further financial assistance from the European countries and the Socialist Bloc that they perceived the risk of conflict with the copper companies as affordable.

Therefore, the only conclusion the Chilean decision makers could draw was for nationalisation without compensation, whether due to the extreme pessimism over the relations with the US, overestimation of Chilean capacity, or the misjudgement of overlooking US influence on the international lending agencies.

In summary, the numerous determinants functioned together in the issue of copper nationalisation. Resource Nationalism played an initial role along with other variables such as historical linkage (Legalism), domestic politics (situational and objective), the reformist developmental model, dependency: resistive policy, and the moderate US position during the initial stage. A particularly interesting factor was the perception of decision makers which was a mixture of extreme pessimism and optimism.

However, the ultimate US policy against the UP government was harsher and much more destructive than the expected response to the way in which the nationalisation of copper was carried out. While the Chilean decision makers failed in preventing the

⁴³⁷ Fagen, Richard, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches", in Hearing before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CEA, House of Representatives: United States and Chile during the Allende Years, 1970-1973, p.672.

US from utilising the copper nationalisation issue for the anti-Chilean campaign,⁴³⁸ the US government could somewhat successfully legitimise the blockade internationally, openly linking the question of compensation with the economic blockades: for instance, with the votes of the World Bank and the IDB, and with the refusal to renegotiate the Chilean debt. Although efforts from both sides to settle the issue were continued, the possibility of finding a workable solution was minimal. As the situation was moving to an impasse, the coup took place in September 1973.⁴³⁹

4.3.3. Foreign Economic Policy

With the nationalisation of the large mines, most of Chile's exports came under state control. At the same time, a similar process took place in the import sector as leading private enterprises were transferred over to the social area. Therefore, redesigning of foreign economic policy was inevitable according to the changing situations and the adoption of the reformist economic policy. The re-orientation of foreign economy policy was undertaken in two major policy areas: the centralisation of its formulation and operation; and the shift of the regional structure of foreign trade and external financing.

4.3.3.1. Organisational Reform

The organisational reform was undertaken for the purpose of centralising foreign economic policy through the creation of SEREX; the creation of the *Empresas de Comercio Exterior*; and centralising external financing in the Central Bank. SEREX was created to be responsible for formulating and carrying out the government's foreign trade policy. Because of legal and political difficulties, the government was

⁴³⁸ It has to be remembered that the fundamental concern of the Nixon administration was not this particular case but the interest of the US investors world-wide.

⁴³⁹ In the cases of the nationalisation cases with European governments involved, the Foreign Ministry always intervened before the Ministry of Economy to avoid conflict so as to reach an agreement mutually acceptable. See Fortín, Carlos, "Nationalization of Copper in Chile and its International Repercussions", p.211.

systematically prevented from setting up a Ministry of Foreign Trade.⁴⁴⁰ Thus, the new foreign trade functions had to be assigned to an organisation that could fit into the existing institutional framework: to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Relations by making use of officials and the infrastructure of the Central Bank. It was hoped that in this way:

coherency within the government's foreign policy could be guaranteed, so as to ensure that the new organization would be able to operate effectively and, at the same time, to give it a substantial amount of independence *vis-à-vis* both the Central Bank and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁴¹

Initially, the government felt the need to approach the task of managing foreign economic policy in a systematic manner by creating a specialised agency, given the traditional and conservative character of the above two institutions, particularly the former which was not particularly committed to the objectives of the UP government.⁴⁴² In addition, although the formation of the coalition had been a crucial factor in the electoral victory of 1970, the UP leader soon realised that it also had a negative effect on decision making and on the efficiency of government operation. As it became obvious that the external sector was becoming rigidly constrictive, the necessity for a separate institution was growing. However, as political conflict sharpened throughout the country, this unusual organisation had to face resistance from the institutions with which it maintained organisational links, and the actual operation of SEREX was not as significant as the controversy in the Congress over the legitimacy of this institution.

Meanwhile, *Empresas de Comercio Exterior* were set up for the purpose of opening the way for concrete foreign trade operations and centralising export orientations by transferring them to a small number of specialised agencies. Further benefits were expected from the organisational reform such as, strengthening Chile's bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the rest of the world; encouraging the process of commercial and

⁴⁴⁰ The government would have had to submit a bill to that effect to the National Congress but there was no chance that such legislation would have been passed.

⁴⁴¹ Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", p.150.

⁴⁴² *ibid.*, p.151.

financial programmes; facilitating the regional restructuring of external trade, ensuring that in each sector the technical personnel would cooperate closely with specialists in international commerce in solving the purely commercial problems.⁴⁴³ As a result, four enterprises became responsible for 90 per cent of the country's exports: CODELCO handled the export of the large mining companies; ENAMI dealt with the smaller ones; SOQUIMICH took care of nitrate exports; and CAP took charge of petroleum and iron exports.⁴⁴⁴

Previously, on the other hand, short term financing had been controlled by commercial banks and long term financing had usually been negotiated and used by the individual firms with the state serving as a guarantor. However, external financing - both short term and long term - became centralised in the Central Bank, in order to: re-direct productive activities; cope with the effects of the discontinuation of credits lines available formerly; reorganise the entire system of financing; ensure that the financing system would operate in accordance with national priorities; and meet the need of renegotiating the external debt, which required full information on and strict control of, external financing agreements and of the way in which external credits were used.⁴⁴⁵ Considering the sensitive situation for which approval by relevant government agencies - mainly the Central Bank - was always required, such attempts at external financing and debt renegotiation had an essentially political character that had more to do with foreign policy as many other Latin American countries.

4.3.3.2. Changes in the Regional Structure of Foreign Trade

In an attempt to come to grips with problems originating outside Chile, one of the objectives of the foreign trade policy was to alter the regional structure of Chile's


⁴⁴³ *ibid.*, p.152-3.

⁴⁴⁴ *ibid.*, p.152-3. More specialised agencies were created in other sectors: for instance, ECETEX for Textiles and leather; and ENARA for Automobile parts. In addition, All these agencies also maintained links with sectoral organisations: for instance, CORFO emphasised the need to obtain the quantity of supplies; SEREX stressed the need to keep within the maximum levels of available foreign exchange.

⁴⁴⁵ *ibid.*, p.153-6.

foreign trade. It was an inevitable reaction to the real problems arising *vis-à-vis* the United States. In terms of regional trade, while Western Europe and Japan together continued to be the largest commercial partners of Chile, the decreasing share of the US and Canada resulted in Latin America taking over second position, while they dropped to third place. (Figure 4.2.)

Figure 4.2. Chilean Trade Partners by Region



Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL, New York, Various Years.

Although the Socialist countries emerged as the new commercial partners of Chile thanks to the increase of trade with China, the amount of trade was still low compared to other regions.⁴⁴⁶ Generally speaking, the changes were not very drastic, in that the major individual trading partners were not significantly changed during the time of the UP government. (Table 4.1.)

The regional structure of Chilean exports was determined fundamentally by the copper market. The main consumers of Chilean copper were Germany, the UK and

⁴⁴⁶ This process of the contacts with the Socialist block except China and Cuba had already initiated during the Frei regime. See Sánchez González, Walter, "Chile en sus Relaciones con los Países Vecinos y los Países Andinos en los Años 1970-1973" in Vera Castillo, Jorge (ed.), La Política Exterior Chilena durante el Gobierno del Presidente Salvador Allende, p.219.

Japan, whose total copper imports took up half of the Chilean export of this mineral. During the UP period, the US share in Chilean exports dropped from 14 per cent in 1970 to 11 per cent in 1971, 8 per cent in 1972 and around 5 per cent during the first half of 1973.⁴⁴⁷ However, with the exception of the decreased US share, Chile's major markets were not changed during the three years.

Table 4.1. Total Chilean Trade between 1971-1973

<i>Order</i>	<i>Chilean Export to</i>	<i>Chilean Import from</i>
1	Japan (548.61)	US (673.91)
2	Germany (412.31)	Argentina (442.02)
3	UK (327.75)	Germany (296.6)
4	US (264.37)	UK (171.44)
5	Netherlands (227.07)	France (117.18)

Note: Cumulative Prices are in US\$ million

Table 4.2. Chilean Imports from the US: Percentage of US Portion in Total Imports

	1971	1972	1973	
<i>Consumer goods</i>	21.4%	10.8%	5%	sharp drop
<i>Intermediate goods</i>	33.5%	33.7%	33%	steady
<i>Capital goods</i>	27.1%	14.3%	6%	sharp drop

Source: Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", p.180-1.

Note:

Consumer goods - foodstuffs, medicines and pharmaceuticals, tools and instruments for the foodstuff industry

Intermediate goods - raw materials for agricultural and industrial origin, spare parts, fuels and lubricants, parts for assembly production

Capital goods - machinery and equipment, transport equipment

In terms of imports, similarly, there was a shift away from the United States towards Latin America and Western Europe, although the US continued to be by far the largest single supplier to the Chilean market. As seen in **Table 4.2.**, the US blockade was

⁴⁴⁷ See Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", pp.160-1.

concentrated on both consumer goods, mainly foodstuffs, and capital goods which were directly related to the copper industry. For instance, Chile suffered from a shortage of key items such as “certain types of chemical catalysts for the mining industry which were indispensable.”⁴⁴⁸

In the case of Latin American trade, the pursuit of the redesigned foreign economic policy was closely allied to the principle of Ideological Pluralism. Almeyda insisted that:

... la decidida política de Chile para sostener y mejorar sus relaciones con las naciones hermanas de América Latina, frustraron los intentos de aislarlo políticamente y le permitieron al país, a través de facilidades crediticias a corto plazo y del incremento del comercio con los países latinoamericanos, atenuar considerablemente los problemas existentes en la balanza de pagos y los efectos del bloque financiero estadounidense.⁴⁴⁹

However, ‘the increase of trade with the Latin American countries’ did not seem to contribute significantly to solve the balance of payments problem, given the fact that the imports to Chile from the Latin American governments increased almost in proportion to total imports, while Chilean exports hardly showed any increase, as seen in **Figure 4.3.**, **Figure 4.4.** and **Table 4.3.**

Figure 4.3.
Chilean Exports to Latin America





Figure 4.4.
Chilean Imports from Latin America



Note: Data includes the trade with Cuba.

Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years.

⁴⁴⁸ *ibid.*, p.160.

⁴⁴⁹ Almeyda, Clodomiro, Reencuentro con mi Vida, p.229.

Table 4.3. The Share of Latin America in Chilean World Trade

		1970	1971	1972	1973
Total Trade	<i>A</i>	2179	1942	1793	2329
Trade with Latin America	<i>B</i>	360	398	405	485
<i>B / A</i>	(%)	16.52	20.49	22.6	20.82

Note: Data includes the trade with Cuba

Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, various years.

The most marked increase was from Argentina which represented the second largest share of Chile's total imports and was only exceeded by the United States. (Table 4.1.) The Chilean imports was facilitated by Argentinean credits for financing purchases of machinery, automobiles, meat, leather and wool.⁴⁵⁰ Although other modest increases also took place in trade with Mexico, with whom diplomatic relations were also extremely cordial, and Brazil, they were not comparable to that with Argentina. There is no doubt that extensive development of the amicable relationship between the two regimes of Allende and Lanusse played a major role in this increase.

As mentioned before, US hostility forced the Chilean authorities to lay greater significance on maintaining relations with Western European countries. The Chilean approach to these countries was conducted with considerable importance: firstly, when it was thought that "economic relations with the West could become very significant in the event of a US-sponsored blockade;" and also when "these countries held an influential position in the international community and could block any possible attempt to isolate Chile internationally."⁴⁵¹

Nevertheless, the actual output was disappointing despite the gap created by the US blockade and the diversification effort dated from the previous Frei regime. In terms of trade, as seen in Figure 4.2., Chilean trade with Europe between 1971-73 never reached the level of 1970. Because of the lack of the assurance of security for investment and because of decision 24 of the Andean Pact, Chile could not attract major European investors into that vacuum, with the exception of Spain with whom

⁴⁵⁰ Short-term operations amounted to approximately US\$350 million. See Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government," p.118.

⁴⁵¹ *ibid.*, p.121.

import credits had considerably increased and very substantial agreements were signed for co-operation in the automobile industry. In other cases, only companies like Siemens (Germany) and Philips (Holland) showed any interest in investment and in the Chilean market. Hence, the speculation that the *via chilena*, which was ideologically comparable to leftist and socially democratic origins of many European governments, would enable intensive economic co-operation, was proven to be wrong. Therefore, the following argument of Almeyda can be only applicable to the *Status-Diplomatic Area* without substantial results in the *Economic-Development Area*:

Los propósitos amistosos hacia Europa Occidental parecían viables, ya que los lazos tradicionales de Chile con esos países y la circunstancia de que muchos de ellos estuvieran regidos por gobiernos de orientación izquierdista o socialdemócrata, los predisponía a tener una actitud favorable hacia el nuevo régimen chileno. El inobjetable acceso al poder por la vía democrática y electoral del Presidente Allende y los propósitos de la Unidad Popular de construir en Chile una sociedad socialista “en términos de democracia, pluralismo y libertad”, tornaban particularmente atractivo para la opinión pública europea el experimento político chileno.⁴⁵²

Although Chilean foreign policy was often defined by the decision makers as ‘defending interests of developing nations against Superpowers’ relatively emphasising the importance of Western Europe, President Allende and Foreign Ministers devoted their major attention to the US and Third World Countries. It is hard to prove that the UP gave priority to enhancing economic interactions with the European nations.⁴⁵³ Furthermore, even if they intended to do so, three years was not sufficient for the UP government to establish and consolidate economic ties with their European counterparts. However, it is important to point out that the European

⁴⁵² Almeyda, Clodomiro, *Reencuentro con mi Vida*, p.229.

⁴⁵³ According to Kaufman, the UP government did not make use of its component, the radical party in the European connection, which was a member of Socialist International. One of the scarce examples can be found in the nomination of a radical as Austrian Ambassador. See Kaufman, Edy, “La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena”, p.266.

members of the Paris Club⁴⁵⁴ showed a favourable attitude to the rescheduling of the Chilean debt.

On the other hand, the UP formally requested co-operation with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) of the East European Bloc, and an increasing amount of copper was sent to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Moscow agreed to purchase 130,000 tons of copper over a three-year period until 1975, even if this was never realised.⁴⁵⁵ Despite the fact that economic relations with socialist countries had reasonably increased, capital goods imported from those countries in 1973 still only accounted for a modest 15 per cent of such imports.⁴⁵⁶ This means that these countries never became substitute suppliers of the vital goods which the US had stopped providing. As briefly expressed before, however, it was the intensified economic tie with China which made the whole trade statistics with the socialist countries significant. This tie was formally initiated with the signing of the *acuerdo de intercambio y de cooperación técnica y financiera* in April 1971. Although Sino-Chilean trade was heavily concentrated on Chinese imports, the economic relationship between the two nations was known to be mutually beneficial. Chile was a major source of a vital strategic mineral (copper) for which Chinese production capabilities in the early 1970s were judged 'greatly deficient' and was an inroad into Latin America at a time when China was keenly interested in expanding economic ties with the Third World. Chile, meanwhile, gained access to the potentially vast Chinese market precisely when it was experiencing severe economic pressure from the United States.⁴⁵⁷

It is important to point out that, during this period, Sino-Chilean trade was substantially larger than that between Chile and the Soviet Union. In 1973, for example, total Soviet-Chilean trade turnover was approximately US\$38 million, whereas the Sino-Chilean trade reached over three times that amount. In 1972 and

⁴⁵⁴ This consists of *Belgium, Britain, Denmark, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.*

⁴⁵⁵ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", pp.324-5.

⁴⁵⁶ Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", pp.155-6.

⁴⁵⁷ Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A Case Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", pp.141-2.

1973, China bought Chilean copper to the value of US\$20 million and US\$90 million, respectively. In contrast, the Soviet Union purchased only US\$8.6 million in 1972 and US\$7.4 million in 1973. Meanwhile, Chile also received Chinese financial aid: a total of US\$65 million in economic aid in during the first two years of Allende's presidency, which was, "by Chinese standards, ... a significant and generous sum."⁴⁵⁸ These figures help to explain why Allende increasingly became so keen on cultivating a good relationship with Beijing, and *vice-versa*. While the Soviet Union might have been the source of more economic aid and political support, the Chinese market was seen by the UP decision makers as a much more valuable long-term source for the stimulation of the Chilean economy.⁴⁵⁹

4.3.3.3. The US Financial Squeeze and External Financing

In view of what was pointed out in the section on copper nationalisation, the dependency of the Chilean economy on the US can be summarised into three tiers: first, seventy-five per cent of Chile's self-generated foreign exchange came from the export of copper at the beginning of the UP government, which was by and large dominated by US based multinational corporations; second, the capital for debt service and investment was largely from US governmental and private sources or international institutions dominated by the United States; and third, more importantly, most of Chile's imports from the United States were capital goods, such as vital machinery and parts for the mining industry.

Therefore, for the US Republican government and the mining companies, the financial squeeze of cutting off capital goods, aid and credit to Chile and spreading the crisis perception to other creditors, was viewed as an effective way to humiliate the UP government given the vulnerable status of Chilean dependency on the US.⁴⁶⁰

⁴⁵⁸ *ibid.*, p.140.

⁴⁵⁹ For detailed survey on Sino-Chilean relations *see ibid.*, p.125-44; and Eduardo Matta, Javier, "Chile y la República Popular China: 1970-1990", *Estudios Internacionales*, 24:95, 1991.

⁴⁶⁰ The only macroeconomic indicator with a reasonable reliance to the US was 'Chilean export.' However, although the US share of Chilean export was modest 14 percent in 1970, the possibility of joint blockade of the Western European countries pressured by the US government could not be overlooked since 83 percent of the total Chilean export revenue was generated from these countries, namely the Paris Club.

This squeeze was carried out by various institutional means such as: US government action through public lending agencies; US government action through international lending agencies; US government action designed to obstruct renegotiation of the Chilean external debt; action by private US banks and action by the nationalised copper companies.⁴⁶¹ By all accounts, Washington's destabilising policy was damaging the economic programme and the Chilean economy. The Chilean Under-Secretary for the Economy announced in July 1972 that Chile had not received any credit from the US government or from international financial organisations where Washington had a vote. In his opinion, Chile was falling victim to an 'invisible blockade.'⁴⁶²

To this blockade, however, there was a fundamental limit in Chile's effective reaction, since it was hard to imagine that Chile would redirect her fiscal policy as insisted by the IMF. According to Landsberger:

The Chilean Left had never liked those orthodox fiscal policies insisted upon by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Left had always said it would refuse to play, ie., to be governed by these policies, and many specialists might sympathize.⁴⁶³ (development model)

Another possible reaction against the US 'economic aggression' could have been rejection of Chile's debt acquired by her predecessors, which was estimated at between US\$3,200 and 3,800 million. However, Allende claimed that Chile would deliver her international obligations by serving all its external debt. Rescheduling was more successful with the European countries, although the US denied them new loans.⁴⁶⁴ An interesting fact was that some negotiations were carried on with US private companies: for instance, CORFO and RCA concerning radio and television; a

⁴⁶¹ See Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", pp.114-5. In January 1972, President Nixon announced that the United States will "withhold its support from loans under consideration in multilateral development banks" when foreign countries expropriate American holdings without swift and adequate compensation." Nixon, Richard in Stern, Laurence, "Chile: The Lesson", p.535.

⁴⁶² See Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century, p.380.

⁴⁶³ Landsberger, Henry, "Answers to Some Questions about the Military Coup in Chile", p.523.

⁴⁶⁴ At the beginning of 1972, Chile succeeded in rescheduling the debts with the Paris Club. Despite US pressure, major European countries resumed a favourable position to Chile.

new contract with Armco Steel in the iron and steel industry and some private banks loans to Chile.⁴⁶⁵ Nevertheless, these were unable to change the whole situation caused by the US economic blockade.

Meanwhile, the UP was devoted to attracting more international support by emphasising the political character of the US while directing its effort to diversifying financial sources. As early as his first message to Congress, Allende referred to the need to maintain the apolitical character of multilateral financial organisations as if he was predicting the future:

The member countries of those institutions cannot be challenged as to their right to choose whatever form of government they wish. And the international institutions of finance cannot be permitted to be the instrument of powerful countries against the weak.⁴⁶⁶

This argument continued to be a cornerstone of Chile's foreign policy, particularly when the United States started to oppose any credits to Chile within the World Bank and the IDB after the nationalisation of copper. For instance, both the Governor of the Chilean Central Bank in the 1972 annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the World Bank and the Chilean Minister of Finance in the 1973 Assembly of Governors of IDB, strongly made the point that Chile was being discriminated against for political reasons, and that this was contrary to the charter and to the spirit of the institutions involved.⁴⁶⁷

Initially, however, the problem of short-term financing seemed not to be desperately serious either in terms of the volume of credits or of the policies of creditor countries involved, because the absence of credits from US sources had been compensated for by new sources of financing coming from Latin America, Europe and the socialist countries. Major Latin American financial sources were Mexico, Argentina and Brazil since they wished to develop new commercial links with Chile. Some

⁴⁶⁵ See Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.261. This situation was described by a Chilean official, "Nosotros estamos mejor con Wall Street que con Washington. El sector privado sabe que nosotros producimos cobre." *Le Monde Diplomatique* (quoted in p.261.)

⁴⁶⁶ Allende, Salvador in Fortín, Carlos "Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government", p.227.

⁴⁶⁷ *ibid.*, pp.227-8.

European banks were also interested in taking the place of US banks. Still, however, some of the credits were obtained by linking them with copper sales.⁴⁶⁸ Hence, if based on the statistics of the short term loans, one may possibly argue as follows:

Chile's indebtedness increased by almost \$2 billion during the three years that Allende's government was in power; and it received more economic help and promises of help than any previous Chilean government in an equivalent period. By September 1973, Chile had close to the highest per capita debt of any country in the world (exceeded only by Israel).⁴⁶⁹

Nevertheless, the short-term credits for basic commodities were not enough or sufficient to meet the exploding domestic demand originated from the domestic economic policy of the UP: raising wages and freezing process.

The situation regarding long-term credits for purchasing equipment was much less favourable. Credits had to be imported from countries where equipment with the right specifications could be obtained. Normally this meant that there would be only a limited number of potential suppliers. What in fact happened was that credits from socialist countries were obtained for purchasing machinery and equipment which did not consist of the right specifications for existing Chilean industry.⁴⁷⁰

The long-term credits obtained from other Latin American countries were used basically to purchase transport equipment, since this was a relatively developed sector in Argentina and Brazil. A large proportion of the other capital goods which the economy required had to be acquired in Western European countries and in Japan, as access to US suppliers was closed. Credits were made available by these countries but not in sufficient amounts. This applied particularly to Japan who took the hardest line *vis-à-vis* the UP government. Despite substantial Chilean exports of iron to Japan and the possibility of expanding Chilean capital goods imports from that country, the credit granted by Japan was only US\$10 million.⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁸ See Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", pp.153-6.

⁴⁶⁹ Davis, Nathaniel, "In the Years of Salvador Allende", p.121.

⁴⁷⁰ See Fajnzylber, Fernando, "The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government", p.155.

⁴⁷¹ See *ibid.*, pp.155-6.

The financing from the USSR was the most debated area since it was one of the most obvious alternative sources to replace the US. Although, on taking office, Allende had made it quite clear that he neither wanted nor expected Chile to become dependent upon Soviet aid to the extent that Cuba had done, it is true that he was hoping that the USSR would step in with substantial aid in the event of any sustained attempt to isolate Chile. At the early stage of Allende regime's diversification policy, the Socialist Bloc was seen as only one of the areas to which he made overtures.⁴⁷² However, establishing economic links with them became more and more important in terms of securing external financing and aid for survival. According to Theberge, the USSR authorised US\$260.5 million in credits (\$US98.5 million in short-term credit and US\$162.0 million in economic aid) to the Allende regime, most of which was never utilised.⁴⁷³ Even if the UP had been granted this credit as promised, it could not have been much helpful for Chilean economy which already had annual foreign debt of US\$400 million.⁴⁷⁴ Furthermore, the Soviets only came through with grants for future purchases of Russian goods at a time when Chile needed massive commodity assistance, *i.e.* food and hard currency credits.⁴⁷⁵ According to Almeyda, Chile received US\$50 million from the USSR in the first year of the UP government and US\$100 million in total from Eastern European nations. Almeyda estimates that credits for long-term projects which the socialist countries had granted, totalled approximately US\$500 million, of which US\$70 million was actually spent before the military coup.⁴⁷⁶ Hence, not only was the economic assistance Chile received from the socialist countries insufficient by far, but also that from the USSR was totally insignificant. The reason why substantial support never materialised could be found in the policy of the USSR in various dimensions.

Firstly, similar to the cool response of the USSR in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*, their role as expected by the Chilean decision makers, could not be fulfilled partly because

⁴⁷² Miller, Nicola, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987*, pp.136-147.

⁴⁷³ See Theberge, James "Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile", p.635. According to his calculation, total credit from the Socialist Bloc was US\$620.0 million (US\$156.5 million in short term bank credit and US\$463.5 million in project aid and supplier credits) in the 1971-73 period.

⁴⁷⁴ Kaufman, Edy, "La Política Exterior de la Unidad Popular Chilena", p.270.

⁴⁷⁵ Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A case study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", p.138.

⁴⁷⁶ See Almeyda, Clodomiro, "The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government", p.123.

of the internal political process of Chile. In other words, the failure to attract a contribution of significant importance from the USSR was due to the lack of internal consensus in Chilean politics. Cope added that, "Chilean nationalism and the configuration of party politics in Chile prohibited any policy that would permit penetration of Chile by yet another large foreign power."⁴⁷⁷ Consequently, the problem of the UP was that the internal political price that the government had to pay for this political and economic relationship was disproportionately high in relation to the economic assistance received. Furthermore, the question of Soviet economic assistance seemed to be linked with the Kremlin's doctrinal assessment which could be judged from both Chile's strategic value for the USSR angle and the UP government's revolutionary development. By all accounts, Latin America has never been a part of the USSR's strategic, military or economic zone. It provides the Soviet Union with no vital materials or important markets. Furthermore, the Kremlin has tended to recognise the primacy of US dominance in the continent with the exception of Cuba. It should be remembered that the enormous economic support of Cuba and Khrushchev's original commitment to Castro were based on the strategic value of Cuba to the Soviet Union along with the ideological obligations of proletarian internationalism for a new revolutionary state transformed from a severe right-wing dictatorship. When the Soviets recognised Cuba as a socialist state, Moscow was obliged to guarantee Cuba's survival. Chile, on the other hand, was understood differently. This meant that "when the internal political crisis deepened and the need for economic aid in hard currency for immediate purchases increased, the USSR saw that the role of the Chilean political process as a model was being called into question."⁴⁷⁸ Therefore, it is understandable that the USSR increased its distance from the Chilean process as the situation worsened.

Secondly, Fermeandois correctly noted the limit of Soviet resources for satisfactory assistance to the UP, pointing out the misjudgement of decision makers:

De hecho la ayuda soviética fue importante en relación a la ayuda internacional que otorga la URSS. Pero sus posibilidades eran limitadas. Los chilenos tenían ante sus ojos el ejemplo de Cuba, pero éste era inaplicable a Chile. ...

⁴⁷⁷ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", pp.324-5.

⁴⁷⁸ Varas, Augusto, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone", p.249.

Además a los soviéticos no les podía parecer bien un subsidio a un programa económico que consistió en parte esencial en un aumento drástico del consumo que sólo podía financiarse mediante ese subsidio externo, al menos hasta que los datos del cambio institucional estuvieran arrojados en Chile. Era sencillamente incomprensible para la mentalidad de los hombres del Kremlin, y fuertes razones no les faltaban.⁴⁷⁹

Between 1967 and 1972, some US\$4.14 billion in economic aid was granted by the Soviet Union to Cuba. When Allende came to power, the Soviet Union was subsidising the Cuban economy with roughly half a billion dollars a year.⁴⁸⁰ The USSR could manage to support the Cuban economy as the US did Israel. However, even a Super Power in the 1970s had limited resources and Cuba had already taught the Kremlin how expensive and dangerous the construction of socialism could be in Latin America. Similar support for Chile was simply out of the question even if the Soviets wished to provide. Rather, they were more interested in 'mutually beneficial' economic relations than in socialist brotherhood as Noguee and Sloan argued:

The orthodox Soviet position is that a higher level of industrialization and capital accumulation must be attained so that the countries of Latin America are able to stand on their own feet and - not incidentally - so that they will not make exorbitant demands on the Soviet Union. Soviet theorists do not believe that the Cuban model, or one-leap into socialism, can be repeated in Latin America. ... The Soviets made it clear that they would support Allende's "noncapitalist road of development" but not at the expense of their own working people.⁴⁸¹

It is known that the USSR made it clear to Allende that the responsibility for Chile's economy rested with the Chileans, as the Soviet journal *New Times* commented: "Money for reforms would have to come from the nationalization of the copper industry, banks and foreign companies"⁴⁸²

Thirdly, the structural similarity of the two economies was a very important factor. Miller has noted that "[t]he development of economic relations between the Soviet

⁴⁷⁹ Fermandois, Joaquín, "Elementos para un Análisis de la Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular 1970-1973", p.145.

⁴⁸⁰ Noguee, Joseph and Sloan, John, "Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union. a Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy", p.350.

⁴⁸¹ *ibid.*, pp.352-4.

⁴⁸² USSR and the Third World, Volume 1,1:38, 1971, quoted in *ibid.*, p.356.

Union and Chile is in any case hindered by the absence of a sound material base: the Soviet and Chilean economies are simply not very compatible.”⁴⁸³ It was true that not only was the USSR self-sufficient in Chile’s major export, copper, but it was also seeking new markets for the mineral in the West. In the early 1970s, furthermore, both countries were also significantly dependent on grain imports for their urban food supplies. Allende hoped that the Soviet Union would buy Chilean copper for re-export to other COMECON countries, particularly Rumania, which already imported substantial quantities of this mineral and which after entered into a supply agreement with the Pinochet government. However, not surprisingly, Soviet decision makers refused to undertake this since such a commitment would make neither political nor economic sense for them.

Lastly, as mentioned before in the *Status Diplomatic Area*, the Popular Unity government came to power at a very critical period of Soviet foreign policy and the overall international system. The Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the abortive manoeuvre in 1970 to establish a submarine base at Cienfuegos, reinforced the Kremlin attitude to act cautiously in Latin America, perceiving that the United States might be willing to accept a Communist state but not a hostile military base in the Caribbean.⁴⁸⁴ Therefore, “[a]s much as anything else, Allende and the Popular Unity government may have become a victim of detente,”⁴⁸⁵ as Cuba became a victim of the new international order in the 1990s.

Consequently, while Allende had understandably good reason to look to the Soviet Union for help, his Soviet comrades were not prepared to fully support the Chilean road to socialism. To a certain degree, it is possible to consider that Moscow was prepared to provide Chile with ‘substantial’ - from the Kremlin’s point of view - economic support, although it did not guarantee the survival of the UP in any decisive way, in that the Allende regime was the second largest beneficiary of Soviet aid in Latin America only exceeded by Fidel Castro’s Cuba (although by a considerable margin). However, the aid from the USSR was far from the massive amount Allende

⁴⁸³ Miller, Nicola, *Soviet Relations with Latin America, 1959-1987*, pp.129-33.

⁴⁸⁴ See Noguee, Joseph and Sloan, John, “Allende’s Chile and the Soviet Union: a Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy”, p.357.

⁴⁸⁵ *ibid.*, pp.362-3.

needed, although some evaluated that “it no doubt helped reduce Chile’s dependence on the United States.”⁴⁸⁶

Initially, to summarise this section, external constraint was not seen as a critical factor for the management of the Chilean economy since there was still an adequate amount of international reserves available and optimistic forecasts for copper prices. However, at the end of 1971 the Chilean government realised the necessity of introducing some neutralising policies against the increased external constraint. Meanwhile, the hidden problems caused by the re-structuring of trade partners were revealed, *i.e.* shortage of certain vital items and capital goods only available from the US.

Therefore, the outline of foreign economy policy was designed in order to meet the domestic demand created from the implementation of the reformist policy, and to minimise the impact of the US blockade (policy). At the same time, Latin America, Western Europe and the Socialist Bloc became the major target for the purpose of diversification of the Chilean economic link and/or dependency, although successful outcomes are hard to find for many reasons as presented above. (resistive policy)

Another factor for the unsatisfactory outcome of the Chilean foreign economic policy may be found in the elite variable. While the policy making body became more centralised than before, the bureaucrats working in this sector for the new government had very little experience in taking a more active role. As Fajnzylber noted, this is because traditionally “[in Chile] the state’s role in international and economic relations had been very discrete and passive, and most officials dealing in this area had been trained in that kind of work climate.”⁴⁸⁷

4.3.4. Conclusion

The examination of various issues in the *Economic-Developmental Area* revealed that economic variables, the development model and dependency were considerably

⁴⁸⁶ Theberge, James, “Kremlin’s Hand in Allende’s Chile”, p.635.

⁴⁸⁷ Fajnzylber, Fernando, “The External Sector and the Policies of the Unidad Popular Government”, p.156.

significant in the making of foreign economic policy. However, unlike the simple speculation, these variables had by no means sole importance in determining the foreign policy of the UP. The specific policy issues concerning the Andean Pact and the copper nationalisation were implemented by a complex set of variables.

The Allende government's policy on the Andean Pact is a major example of promotion of traditional Americanism while a strong Legalistic factor can be seen in the copper nationalisation process. On the other hand, the UP's foreign policy ideology was manifested in two different perspectives. Strong commitment on the regional integration issue was backed by the promotion of Ideological Pluralism in order to secure regional support and image projection. Resource Nationalism, which entirely dominated the copper issue, was perhaps the most distinctive element of Anti-Imperialism in UP foreign policy.

While the internal political consensus over copper nationalisation (domestic politics: situational) fundamentally removed probable domestic constraints, the issue was further utilised for gaining domestic support as argued by Lincoln and Fernandois. (domestic politics: objective) The simultaneous function of both dimension in the role of domestic politics in the copper issue provides a very good example of perfect linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy. This analysis has disclosed an interesting insight into UP decision makers' paradoxical perception: a 'mixture of extreme pessimism and optimism' which to the certain extent inspired the final decision along with other variables. (elite)

Meanwhile, foreign economy policy in trade and external financing was implemented in line with the reformist development model accompanied by the diversification effort which attempted to secure more economic links with Latin America, Western Europe and the Socialist Bloc. (dependency: resistive policy) Particularly during the last year, the UP's foreign economic policy was implemented in order to minimise the impact of the US blockade (policy) although the outcome was never satisfactory.

V. ISSUE AREAS: FOREIGN POLICY OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT, 1973-90

La Geopolítica ha dejado de ser sólo una ciencia agresiva entre los Estados para convertirse en una sana consejera del Conductor, a quien, científicamente, le señala los fines del Estado y cuál sería la forma como podría alcanzarlo en el futuro, para brindar con ello, paz, dicha y bienestar a su pueblo.

- Augusto Pinochet

5.1. The Status-Diplomatic Area

5.1.1. The Coup and the World

The military government achieved recognition from 28 foreign countries including the US, Britain, France, Argentina, Peru and Venezuela within three weeks of the coup on 11 September, 1973.⁴⁸⁸ Chile broke off diplomatic relations with Cuba immediately after the coup and shortly afterwards with North Korea although the latter subsequently claimed to have broken the links herself on 18 September. The government stated that both countries had been interfering in Chile's internal affairs, notably by secretly providing weapons and training to extreme leftist groups. (Anti-Communism)

However, reactions from other Communist countries were hesitant and far from unanimous. The USSR waited ten days before severing diplomatic relations on 21st September on the grounds that Soviet citizens and institutions in Chile had been subjected to "acts of arbitrariness and lawness."⁴⁸⁹ According to Theberge, Moscow cut off diplomatic relations with Santiago and withdrew their Ambassador and Embassy staff because of alleged persecution of Soviet officials by the military *Junta*,

⁴⁸⁸ Latin American Weekly Report, 28 September, 1973, p.312.

⁴⁸⁹ The Counsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Santiago, Igor Pashkov, was quoted by the Chilean Armed Forces network on 26 September, however, as telling journalists before his departure that relations had been "suspended" rather than "broken." (Tass, 21 September in Latin American Topics, November, 1973)

not because of the coup itself.⁴⁹⁰ Meanwhile, East Germany broke off her ties with Chile on 21 September, and was followed by Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and North Vietnam, Hungary and the 'Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam,' Yugoslavia, Mongolia and Poland. At the end of October, China, Albania and Romania still maintained relations.⁴⁹¹

Other international opinion appeared to be much concerned about the *Junta*. Although the British Conservative government recognised the new regime even before the US government did, the British Labour Party demanded to suspend aid and loans, and the events of September 1973 produced a strong reaction from the labour movement in Britain.⁴⁹² While Italy continued to withhold diplomatic recognition, the anti-*Junta* campaign in the Scandinavian countries persistently continued. In Venezuela the senate passed a motion condemning the *Junta* and Mexico withdrew its Ambassador shortly after the coup.⁴⁹³

The first contact between the *Junta* and United States officials occurred on 12 September, the day after the coup, when General Pinochet initiated a secret meeting with the head of the US Military Assistance Advisory Group. The US understood that the *Junta*'s fundamental desire was to restore the traditional ties of friendship with the United States as well as to obtain help with food and debt relief. Kissinger stated in his report:

Pinochet understands and is relaxed about the matter of recognition. He volunteered that obviously the US should not be the first to announce its intention to continue relations with the new Chilean Government. He also recognized the advisability of avoiding too much public identification with us for the moment.⁴⁹⁴

⁴⁹⁰ See Theberge, James "Kremlin's Hand in Allende's Chile", p.638.

⁴⁹¹ Latin American Topics, November, 1973. China and Romania did not sever diplomatic relations with the military government throughout the period.

⁴⁹² The first Trafalgar Square protest in London was followed by the creation of the Chile Solidarity Campaign, the first of the solidarity groups of the 1970s and 1980s concerned with Latin America. It emerged out of party conference statements and resolutions, a Labour promoted debate in the House of commons, and a deep and very real grass roots concern. It mobilised strong and committed trade union support. See Hart, Judith, "A Special Relationship", p.12.

⁴⁹³ Latin American Weekly Report, 3 May, 1974, p.132.

⁴⁹⁴ Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval, p.408.

Therefore, the initial US position was favourable to the military *Junta* but with some doubt and uncertainty. Kissinger continued:

The Nixon Administration was not so insensitive to the Chilean *Junta*'s clumsy and occasionally brutal practices as our critics alleged. But we considered that the change of government in Chile was on balance favorable - even from the point of view of human rights. We were therefore prepared to give the military leaders a chance; we made repeated private approaches to ease their methods.⁴⁹⁵

Immediately after the coup, various collaborators in the new regime, such as Enrique Krauss and Onofre Jarpa, travelled overseas in order to justify the military's action by vigorously launching an anti-Allende campaign, accusing the UP regime of corruption and inability as well as trying to assure the world that democratic order would be restored.⁴⁹⁶ At the same time, the government expanded and strengthened the structure of the *Dirección de Asuntos Culturales e Información Exterior* of the Foreign Ministry. The infamous *Libro Blanco del Cambio de Gobierno en Chile*, concentrating on inside stories of 'illicit' arms shipment from the Communist countries during the Allende regime, was spread all over the world.

Despite all these efforts, the limited success of the military government in overcoming the initial international isolation became evident when the government faced the first diplomatic agenda: political refugees protected by diplomatic representatives in Santiago. The protection extended by foreign Embassies to those seeking asylum led to serious conflicts between the *Junta* and the governments of Sweden, France, Colombia, Venezuela, Italy, Belgium, West Germany and Mexico.⁴⁹⁷ The Foreign Ministry warned European Embassies in December 1973 that the *Junta* would not allow their representatives to grant asylum to any more political refugees.⁴⁹⁸ For instance, the military *Junta* declared the Swedish Ambassador Harald Edelstam

⁴⁹⁵ *ibid.*, p.411.

⁴⁹⁶ This was called *Operación verdad*. See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.219.

⁴⁹⁷ See Arriagada, Genaro, Pinochet: The Politics of Power, p.14.

⁴⁹⁸ Latin American Weekly Report, 14 December, 1973, p.400. In May 1974, the Chilean foreign ministry announced that 145 people remained in foreign embassies: Mexico 54, Italy 17, West Germany 11, Sweden 10, Honduras 8, Holland 8, Finland 7, Argentina 5, Colombia 5, Venezuela 4, Norway 4, Switzerland 3, Austria 3, Panama 2, Belgium 2, Costa Rica 2. (*ibid.*, 31 May, 1974, p.168.)

persona non grata following a dispute conflict over a Uruguayan woman refugee abducted by security forces from a Santiago hospital when she was under the protection of the Swedish government.⁴⁹⁹ The government also announced that eight refugees in the Italian Embassy would not be given *Salvo Conducto* until relations were 'normalised' between the two countries.⁵⁰⁰ The government's hard line attitude brought strong reactions from the relevant countries - mainly European.

5.1.2. Regional Isolation

During the first years of the military regime, the Chilean *Junta* was unable to find any regional allies except for General Alfredo Stroessner, the Paraguayan dictator, and that was only at the high and unprecedented price of making him a Chilean general.⁵⁰¹ Moreover, Chile did not host any single head of a state during the first six years with the exception of Argentine President Jorge Videla in 1976. Although this was an important step for both isolated authoritarian governments, the genuine reason for accepting the invitation from the Argentine end was their desire to see Chile remain in the Andean Pact, and also to maintain more amicable relations with Latin American countries than Brazil. The Argentines also appear to have encouraged talk of reviving the free trade association with Chile.⁵⁰²

From the late 1970s onward, however, the military regime's relations with Argentina seriously deteriorated. Firstly, as the outbreak of visible conflicts and the war-like situation indicated, the Beagle Channel dispute fundamentally defined the relations between Argentina and Chile until the signing of the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad* in 1984.⁵⁰³ Secondly, although the two governments reached an agreement on the territorial issue, the difference in their domestic political systems caused another dimension of conflict throughout the 1980s. The Argentine democratic government of Raúl Alfonsín expressed their concern that the internal polarisation and political

⁴⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 7 December, 1973, p.392.

⁵⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 21 June, 1974, p.192.

⁵⁰¹ *ibid.*, 24 May, 1974, p.158.

⁵⁰² *ibid.*, 10 September, 1976, p.274.

⁵⁰³ See Section 5.2.2.1. for the Beagle Channel dispute.

instability of Chile might threaten the stability of the Southern Cone. The official reaction of the Chilean government was tough, emphasising the principle of non-intervention: respect for other countries' domestic affairs and the absolute self-determination of their people. For instance, the Chilean Foreign Minister indicated his government's uneasiness:

Creo que de los sucesos que están ocurriendo en Chile y de la acción terrorista debemos preocuparnos los chilenos; a ellos [the Argentines] les corresponde preocuparse de lo que sucede allá ... no tienen por qué velar por lo que sucede aquí en Chile. Nosotros sabemos perfectamente bien medir nuestros riesgos y enfrentarlos.⁵⁰⁴

A third issue which harmed the relations of the two countries occurred during the new Malvinas conflict when Britain imposed the 150 mile exclusive fishing zone around the island in 1986. In May 1986, Argentine Naval Intelligence announced that they had detected a Chilean spy network gathering information on submarine operations in the *Mar de Plata* area from December 1983.⁵⁰⁵

Lastly, the bad relations were also due to the well-timed 'containment policy' of the Argentine government which increased contacts with neighbouring countries. Argentina's approach to Brazil and Peru can be understood in this context especially when the Buenos Aires government signed a series of treaties with the former including one concerning nuclear power, and provided logistical technology to Peru. Moreover, the Videla regime intensified economic, military and cultural contacts with the USSR. It is reportedly said that he visited China for the purpose of eroding cordial relations between China and Chile.⁵⁰⁶ The regional isolation of the Pinochet government continued even after the democratisation of Argentina, especially when Argentina and Brazil signed an agreement in July 1986 to establish *Programa de Integración y Cooperación* with 12 protocols basically concerning commercial exchange and technological co-operation but also emphasising the consolidation of democracy in the Southern Cone.⁵⁰⁷ The *rapprochement* with Argentina in the

⁵⁰⁴ Del Valle, Jaime, in *El Mercurio*, 13 November, 1985, p.C3.

⁵⁰⁵ See *El Mercurio*, 13 May, 1986, p.C2.

⁵⁰⁶ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, pp.156-7.

⁵⁰⁷ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.434.

Status-Diplomatic Area started in 1986 in politically less sensitive areas such as tourism and academic exchange. However, because of the fundamental difference in the domestic politics of the two countries, the relationship could not be advanced beyond the framework of the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad*.

Relations with the Peruvian military government of General Velasco Alvarado remained extremely cool at least until 1981 although visits and meetings of senior officials of the two countries continued. In 1979, formal diplomatic relations were suspended and downgraded to the level of *Chargé d'Affaires* after the Peruvian government declared the Chilean Ambassador in Lima *persona non grata*. Only when the civilian government of Fernando Belaúnde, impressed by Chilean economic growth, made a gesture of peace in order to obtain technical support on the Chilean model, were diplomatic relations re-established.⁵⁰⁸ In 1981, peaceful *rapprochement* between Chile and Peru was initiated with the agreement to co-operate in CIPEC and with the series of talks in the *Comisión Mixta Chileno-Peruano* in 1982 and 1984. Furthermore, President Belaúnde's declaration that the OAS had no judicial authority on the issue of *salida al mar* between Chile and Bolivia was regarded as a sign of major political support for Chile, which satisfied the Chilean authority.⁵⁰⁹ In the background of the Peruvian approach to Chile, there was the territorial conflict over *la Cordillera del Cóndor* between Peru and Ecuador.

Although the democratic government under Alan García basically wanted good relations with Chile,⁵¹⁰ the domestic politics of Chile became an obstacle in mutual relations as was also the case with Alfonsín's Argentina. For instance, the Pinochet regime could not accept the Peruvian government's link with opposition leaders such as Gabriel Valdés or Ricardo Lagos. During the second half of the 1980s, it is hard to find any major policy agenda with the northern neighbour except arms limitation

⁵⁰⁸ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.152.

⁵⁰⁹ *ibid.*, p.153.

⁵¹⁰ García expressed his desire through Hugo Otero, special envoy to Chile, that his government should have "mejores relaciones con Chile." (See Declarations of Hugo Otero in *El Mercurio*, 13 July, 1985, C3.)

issues.⁵¹¹ At most, Chilean support for the building of the Peruvian Antarctic base in 1989 can be pointed out.

However, there were occasional exceptions in relations with neighbouring countries although they never showed a conventional or consistent pattern. For instance, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Bolivia and Pinochet's visit to the country in 1975 were regarded as a considerable triumph for the military government.⁵¹² On his return to Santiago, President Pinochet announced that Chile was interested in importing Bolivian wheat and cotton as well as oil, while he expected Bolivia to import Chilean manufactured goods such as consumer electronics. Although the decision to re-establish diplomatic relations and the strategy to attract Bolivia to the negotiating table by offering a solution for the *salida al mar* was widely publicised as a victory in Chilean diplomatic battle with Peru over Bolivia, it was soon revealed that the Chilean intention was to unite its domestic forces as well as to lessen its regional isolation, as will be addressed in section 5.2.

As Chile remained the only military authoritarian regime except Stroessner's Paraguay after the democratisation of South America in the 1980s, problems in domestic politics made the regional isolation of the military government deeper. Among the numerous examples of the isolation of Chile, it is worth pointing out that General Pinochet failed to attend any of the inauguration ceremonies of the newly elected civilian presidents of the South American countries.⁵¹³

5.1.3. The US

On the advent of the Carter Democratic government, the US initiated a human rights policy based on the imposition of measures consisting of the application of economic

⁵¹¹ See Section 5.2.1.3. for the arms limitation issues.

⁵¹² Diplomatic relations were broken off in April 1962 after Bolivia had protested vainly against a unilateral Chilean decision to divert the waters of the River *Lauca*.

⁵¹³ By contrast, Chilean opposition leaders such as Gabriel Valdés, Ricardo Lagos, Enrique Silva Cimma, Luis Bossay Leiva and Andrés Zaldívar were invited to the inauguration ceremony of President García. Foreign Minister Jaime Del Valle attended the ceremony officially representing the Chilean government. See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.133, 155.

and political sanctions: reducing or eliminating US aid to several Latin American governments; voting against loans from international financial institutions on explicit human rights grounds, and supporting action by the OAS and the UN condemning human rights violations.⁵¹⁴ Chile was obviously the first and most frequent object of these sanctions. The US Congress increasingly adopted severe restrictions on military aid and sales between 1974 and 1976.⁵¹⁵ Loans to Chile by the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank were opposed by Carter appointees, and a series of sanctions including exclusion from joint naval manoeuvres (UNITAS) and prohibition of Export-Import Bank credits was adopted after the murder of Letelier.⁵¹⁶

The Letelier case had long dominated relations between the US and Chile since Chile consistently refused to extradite three military officers accused of the assassination. The Chilean government rejected the extradition on the grounds that the testimony of Michael Townley would not be impartial, because of his previous plea-bargaining with the US Justice Department.⁵¹⁷ On the recall of the US Ambassador, the Chilean Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos publicly said that Washington was putting unacceptable pressure on the government and that it was now a question of whether their aim was “to see justice done or bring down a military regime they don’t like.”⁵¹⁸ As the issue remained unsolved, Carter applied various diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions on the Pinochet dictatorship for failing to conduct a serious investigation into the Letelier case.

However, the impact of Carter’s Human Rights policy was more obvious in Chilean domestic politics than in its foreign policy in which the military government did nothing but strongly reject international accusations. Although the overall effectiveness of the strategy of President Carter was eroded by an international

⁵¹⁴ The military government was upset by President Carter’s remarks at the opening of the OAS meeting in June 1978, when he pointed out Bolivia’s landlocked position as a cause of conflict in the sub-continent. (Latin American Weekly Report, 30 June, 1978, p.193.)

⁵¹⁵ See **Figure 4.1.** in **Chapter IV.**

⁵¹⁶ See Sigmund, Paul, “US-Latin American Relations from Carter to Reagan: Change or Continuity?”, in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, pp.73-74. For the detailed survey of the Letelier case, see Varas, Florencia and Orrego, Claudio, El Caso Letelier. Third Edition, Aconcagua, Santiago, 1990.

⁵¹⁷ Latin American Weekly Report, 18 May, 1979, p.148.

⁵¹⁸ *ibid.*, 30 June, 1978, p.193.

overabundance of petrodollars from private sources which severely weakened the effectiveness of economic pressures on Latin American military regimes,⁵¹⁹ it should be remembered, for instance, that less than two weeks after Carter's election, Pinochet freed over three hundred prisoners.⁵²⁰

The subsequent US government's approach was different. When Ronald Reagan took office in early 1981, he immediately lifted all sanctions against Chile. The violations of human rights and the military regime's refusal to allow a transition to democracy were initially disregarded. Instead, the Chilean military government was viewed as an ally in the global strategy of the containment of Communism. The background to this policy can be seen in the Reagan administration's definition of Latin American 'authoritarian' governments as "traditional societies without sufficient development to sustain democracy."⁵²¹ Hence the logic, that to push them on human rights would open the door to Marxist-Leninist totalitarian regimes, served as a firm base for Republican foreign policy: in other words, effective transition to democracy in Chile would be accomplished by way of supporting them with a shift of policy priority towards a more traditional balance-of-power diplomacy more focused to the communist threat. Thus, even if the encouragement of human rights was not completely abandoned as an objective of US policy, it was to receive a much lower priority. Instead, a policy of 'silent diplomacy,' rather than public denunciations and aid cut-offs, was promoted with regard to friendly authoritarian governments. Even

⁵¹⁹ Therefore, short term effects of the overabundance of petrodollars can be differentiated from *dependency* theorists arguments based on long term effects. See section 3.2. (p.121).

⁵²⁰ See Muñoz, Herald, "Chile: The Limits of 'Success'", in Lowenthal, Abraham F.(ed.), Exporting Democracy: The United States and Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1991, p.165. While some welcomed the policy as a successful effort to correct serious human rights abuse in the Third World as the above example shows, others tended to conclude that it merely generated counter-productive effects which destabilised societies and national economies. From the Latin American point of view, Orrego Vicuña pointed out the problem of the Carter's policy:

Human rights policy was to be less stringent when the country in question represented a political, economic or military strategic interest for the United States. Thus the basic subject entirely lost its humanitarian significance and was converted into a tool for the political advancement of the interests of a world power. ... there was a tendency in Latin America to see this policy as a problem of political confrontation between conflicting national interests rather than as an issue arising out of the need to safeguard vital moral values. (Orrego Vicuña, Francisco, "Domestic Policies and External Influence on the Human Rights Debate in Latin America", in Vincent, R.J. (ed.), Foreign Policy and Human Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986, p.109.)

⁵²¹ Sigmund, Paul, "US-Latin American Relations from Carter to Reagan: Change or Continuity?", p.57-8.

the Letelier case was downplayed by the Reagan government. The humanitarian concern regarding Chile, however, continued to be expressed in the US Congress, thus impeding a full *rapprochement* between Washington and Santiago. The 1976 arms embargo was not lifted and the Reagan administration agreed that it would be rescinded only after a presidential certification that human rights had improved in Chile.

However, systematic violations of human rights continued in Chile as the Pinochet government perceived the 'silent diplomacy' of the US as the green light for repression, which meant that they did not attempt to introduce even slight changes in the domestic politics. In such a context, the cordial relations between Reagan and Pinochet gave way to a period of increasing bilateral tensions. The deterioration of relations became evident when the US government granted certification to Argentina in December 1983, in gratitude for its democratic transition and the end of human rights abuses.⁵²² Furthermore, the massive national protests of 1983 in Chile followed by the collapse of the monetarist experiment activated the routine US security concern over violence and radicalisation in a country previously considered to be safe and stable. By 1984, 'silent diplomacy' was abandoned as the State Department openly criticised governmental repression of popular protests in Chile. The Reagan administration sought to restore humanitarian values like democracy and respect for human rights in the foreign policy agenda. However, the new policy adopted by the Reagan administration was rather different from that of Carter: in other words, the 'silent diplomacy' was replaced with an ambiguous attitude towards Chile. The new policy of Reagan was much more limited than Carter's and were still subordinated to the principal security goal of fighting Communism. It was the new US Ambassador, Harry Barnes, who initiated the shift of US attitude, cautiously making contacts with dissident and opposition groups and stating that the US would support a Chilean return to democracy. Once again his behaviour annoyed General Pinochet who said:

¿Desde cuándo algunos embajadores son componedores de nuestros problemas internos? Ello es inaceptable. por lo cual quiero señalar muy claro a los

⁵²² See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", p.354.

señores representantes de algunos países que su función no es de correctores, y menos pueden tomar bandera ante cualquier bando político interno ... tal situación no la aceptaremos.⁵²³

At the same time, the US continued to show some favourable gestures. For instance, the US was the only country which voted in favour of Chile on the resolution of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1985; and the absence of a vote for the loan of US\$11 million to Chile in a World Bank meeting was understood as silent support; visits and friendly declarations from senior officials in the US State Department were even regarded as approval of Pinochet's 1980 Constitution. In March 1986, however, tension between the US and Chile again arose when the US presented a resolution in Geneva criticising the Chilean human rights situation. The resolution, approved unanimously, provoked a strong objection from the Chilean authority. Moreover, the US included Chile in the list of 'dangerous' countries for tourists because of political instability. In May, President Reagan and the Secretary of State George Shultz classified the Chilean regime as 'dictatorship' and suggested the necessity of political transformation.⁵²⁴

At the beginning of 1987, US - Chilean relations were brought into conflict when a Chilean Army officer, Major Armando Fernández Larios, testified in a US court against Chilean senior officials including General Pinochet with regard to the assassination of Orlando Letelier.⁵²⁵ Accordingly, the US government requested the military government to extradite (retired) General Manuel Contreras and (retired) Colonel Pedro Espinoza to be prosecuted under the US judicial system. When the US petition was denied by the Chilean government in June on the grounds that the testimony of Armando Fernández had no legal effect under the Chilean judicial system, diplomatic conflict between the two countries was deepened.⁵²⁶ The immediate reaction of the US government was strong:

⁵²³ *Hoy*, No. 438, December, 1985, pp. 9-15.

⁵²⁴ See Muñoz, Herald, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", pp.438-9.

⁵²⁵ For details of the testimony, see Varas, Florencia and Orrego, Claudio, *El Caso*, Editorial Aconcagua, 1990, pp.169-171.

⁵²⁶ See Muñoz, Herald, "Chile y Estados Unidos en 1987: Tensiones en Vísperas de un Momento Decisivo", in Muñoz, Herald (ed.) *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1987. p.315-6. The Reagan administration also condemned the Chilean government for falsification of official passports in the Letelier case.

El gobierno chileno se ha rehusado constantemente a ocuparse de este claro ejemplo de terrorismo internacional, que creemos fue cometido por altos oficiales chilenos. Ésta es una interesante respuesta de un gobierno supuestamente preocupado de contrarrestar el terrorismo. El reciente rechazo de la Corte Militar de Santiago a la solicitud de la familia Letelier para reabrir el caso en Chile, confirma el pasado historial de no cooperación por parte del gobierno de Chile...

El pueblo de los Estados Unidos no puede entender por qué el gobierno de Chile se rehúsa inexorablemente a actuar para presentar ante la justicia a los culpables de estos crímenes sin sentido.⁵²⁷

The Chilean Foreign Minister, Ricardo García, objected to the US declaration claiming that the US government was confused and did not understand the rule that the Chilean judicial order had long admitted the difference between “the function of government” and “something applicable by the law.”⁵²⁸

Again in 1989, the responses of seven Chilean officials to written enquiries from the US court attracted much attention since the statement of ex-Ambassador Barros confirmed the participation of the Chilean intelligence agency in the Letelier case.⁵²⁹ When the US Department of State suggested to the Chilean Foreign Ministry that an international commission should be established to reach a solution of the case according to the bilateral treaty of 1904, the Chilean government refused the proposal condemning “illicit pressure.”⁵³⁰ The intention of the military government was obviously to conceal the issue by blocking any further proposal.

During Reagan’s second term, therefore, relations between the US and Chile were marred to a certain extent by the legacy of the Letelier case. The reason for the

⁵²⁷ Declaración del Departamento de Estado sobre el caso Letelier-Moffit, Servicio de Cultura y Prensa, Embajada de Estados Unidos, Santiago, 16 October, 1987, p.2, in Muñoz, Heraldo, “Chile y Estados Unidos en 1987: Tensiones en Vísperas de un Momento Decisivo”, p.316-7.

⁵²⁸ El Mercurio, 18 October, 1987, pp.A1 and C5.

⁵²⁹ They were: (retired) General Manuel Contreras, (retired) General Odlanier Mena, ex-Foreign Minister Miguel Alex Schweitzer, ex-Interior Minister Enrique Montero Marx, ex-Chilean Ambassadors in Washington Jorge Causas, Manuel Trucco and José Miguel Barros. See Muñoz, Heraldo and Asenjo, Daniel, “Chile: el Último Año del Régimen del General Pinochet”, in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.) Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas 1989-1990, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, Caracas, 1990, pp.289-290.

⁵³⁰ *ibid.*, p.290.

ambiguous attitude of the Reagan administration can be found in the foreign policy orientation of the Reagan presidency which began to favour a smooth transition to democracy in Chile without breaking the neo-Conservative market-oriented economic order. The intensive debate inside US decision making circles in the mid-1980s between the supporters of the anti-Communist security interest and those favouring the promotion of democracy and human rights could only contribute to the ambiguous attitude of the US.⁵³¹

Therefore, the relations between the US and Chile in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* were fundamentally defined by the degree of balance among the major US foreign policy agendas on political aspects such as anti-Communism, human rights and democratisation. In this environment, the foreign policy of Chile was nothing more than a reaction to what they had received from the US, and lacking in autonomous initiatives. The reaction of the Chilean government was typical, condemning the criticism as 'excessive interference in domestic affairs.' (others' policies) While the political aspects were never satisfactory for either player during the periods of either the US Democratic or the Republican government, it was the other two *Areas - Military-Strategic and Economic-Developmental* - which further defined the axis of the relations and Chilean policy.

5.1.4. The Military Regime and the European Countries

Delicate issues such as human rights, transition to democracy and Chilean exiles also dominated the military government's relations with the European countries. With the exception of Mrs Thatcher's Britain, the Pinochet government had to face a strong political challenge from the European states. Classic examples of the 'isolation thesis' can easily be seen in those areas.

⁵³¹ For detailed views, discussions and arguments on US policy *vis-à-vis* Chilean politics and human rights, see Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs, CFA, House of Representatives: Prospects for a Democratic Transition in Chile, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1985; and Hearing and Markup before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House of Representatives: UP Policy, Human Rights and the Prospects for Democracy in Chile, US Government Printing Office, Washington, 1988.

The uneasy relationship between the British Labour government and Chile reached its peak when the *Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia* (DINA) detained a British citizen, Dr Sheila Cassidy, at the end of 1975. Formal diplomatic relations were downgraded until the arrival of Thatcher in 1979. However, Mrs Thatcher's Latin American policies took Britain into a closer relationship with Pinochet's Chile in line with Reagan's US. From the beginning, the British Conservative government realised Chile's strategic value in the defence of national interest in the Southern Atlantic. Chile had its own territorial dispute with Argentina, and was a natural and, on occasion, very useful unofficial ally for Britain in the Falklands/Malvinas war although the Chilean military government officially held a neutralist position.⁵³² This point has been often described as "a significant coincidence of interest"⁵³³ as a major determinant for defining Anglo-Chilean relations. Hence, Chile could maintain better political relations with the Thatcher Administration than any other European states by virtue of its geopolitical advantage to Britain, and also the similarity of their political systems - of a right wing Conservative nature. However, facing a strong domestic challenge and political pressure from opposition parties and the public against the government's favourable stance towards Chile, the British government could not openly support the Pinochet regime. They continued to vote against Chile in a series of UN resolutions condemning the human rights situation in Chile. Moreover, numerous cases of human rights abuses and expulsion of British citizens were still critical diplomatic agendas to be solved between the two governments.⁵³⁴

In most other cases, Chile had been a frequent target of the European countries' anti-Chile campaign concerning its domestic politics. As François Mitterrand, who had persistently supported Chilean socialism and opposed Pinochet's dictatorship, was elected as the French President in 1981, the relations between France and Chile

⁵³² See Hart, Judith, "A Special Relationship", p.14.

⁵³³ Little, Walter, "Britain, Chile and Human Rights, 1973-1990", in Angell, Alan and Pollack, Benny (eds.), The Legacy of Dictatorship: Political, Economic and Social Change in Pinochet's Chile, Institute of Latin American Studies, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, 1993, p.149.

⁵³⁴ In 1983, the Secretary of the Human Rights Committee for Chile based in London was expelled on the grounds that he was politically active; Anthony Boadle, the UPI correspondent in Chile, was also deported in 1984 for the reason of having dispatched false news to the outside world. See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.109.

became uncomfortable. French concern for Chilean exiles and human rights abuse became a central issue in the relationship. The declaration of *persona non grata* to the French vice-Consul, Ivonne Le Grand, and the death of the French priest, André Jarlan, both in 1984, caused a further deterioration in the relations with France.⁵³⁵

On the other hand, the Italian Prime Minister, Bettino Craxi, said at the US Congress, “we have to find a moderate way, but not that moderate, to remove Pinochet.” On that occasion, the Chilean authorities strongly protested to the Italian *Chargé d’Affaires* in Santiago: “no state has a right to intervene in the domestic or international affairs of another, nor should propose ways to coerce another state.”⁵³⁶

The Swedish government’s financial support to Chilean non-governmental organisations (NGOs), which was condemned by the Chilean authority as “open and unacceptable interference in domestic affairs,” caused very uncomfortable relations between the two countries. Despite the fact that many NGOs had received similar economic aid from countries like West Germany and the US, the Chilean Foreign Minister Jaime del Valle averred that financial assistance from the Swedish government to progressive organisations was a “delicate issue.”⁵³⁷

Meanwhile, after the death of Franco and the subsequent *Franquista* government’s ‘silent support’⁵³⁸ for the military regime, the victory of the Socialist party and the arrival of Felipe González completely changed relations between Chile and Spain. Showing similarities to Mitterrand’s policy, the González administration began to voice its concern over the Chilean political situation. In 1983, the Spanish government, through Ambassador Miguel Solano, presented a formal protest against the detention of Chilean opposition leaders such as Gabriel Valdés. However it was only to be refused by the Chilean Foreign Minister as an “interference in internal politics.”⁵³⁹ In the background of the weakened relationship, ideological differences played a significant role.

⁵³⁵ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, pp.127-8.

⁵³⁶ Muñoz, Heraldo, “La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985”, p.436.

⁵³⁷ Muñoz, Heraldo, “La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa”, p.351.

⁵³⁸ The voting behaviour of the Spanish government, either abstaining or in favour of Chile, between 1975-77 can be understood as such.

⁵³⁹ *El Mercurio*, 13 July, 1983.

Uneasy relations with the Vatican were revealed when the military government banned the re-entry of *Vicario de la Solidaridad*, the Spanish priest Ignacio Gutiérrez, to Chile in November 1984. The protest of the Spanish Embassy was ignored by the Foreign Minister for the reason that Gutiérrez had violated the immigration law by having a meeting with exiled Marxist leaders in Rome. *El Comité Permanente del Episcopado* regretted the strange decision of the government: "Today, another Chilean Minister [Jaime del Valle] is visiting a Marxist country [China] in the name of the Chilean government in a very cordial fashion."⁵⁴⁰ The case of Gutiérrez was not the only example of the military government's conflict with the Catholic Church which continued despite the papal arbitration over the Beagle channel dispute. When four members of the MIR sought asylum at the *Nunciatura Apostólica* in Santiago, the government refused to issue *Salvo Conducto* claiming that these people had been connected to the assassination of the *Intendente de Santiago* in 1983. The Vatican sent a special envoy to Santiago, *Mons. Claudio Celli*, to negotiate. Finally, two of the refugees were sent to Ecuador and another two to Belgium. Moreover, later in 1984, when the Chilean government deported a US priest, Denis O'Mara, for the distribution of "a Christmas card with subversive contents," relations with the Catholic Church decisively deteriorated.⁵⁴¹

A final example is the *caso Walter Rauff* involving many governments: Israel, the US, Germany, Britain and the European Parliament. Under international pressure to extradite - and later deport - Walter Rauff, an ex-officer of the Nazi S.S., to Israel, Foreign Minister Jaime Del Valle said, "you can ask whatever you like, but you cannot force us to do something which we have no reason to do."⁵⁴²

⁵⁴⁰ *Carta a los Católicos de Chile*, Conferencia Episcopal de Chile, 16 November, 1984 in Muñoz, *Heraldo*, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", p.350.

⁵⁴¹ See Muñoz, *Heraldo*, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", pp.348-351.

⁵⁴² *La Tercera*, 15 May, 1984. The case was soon closed after Walter Rauff died in a hospital in Santiago.

5.1.5. *The Asian-Pacific*

The military government devoted its efforts to increasing diplomatic contacts with the Asian-Pacific region, whose political sensitivity over the issues of human rights and democratisation was much less than that of the rest of the world. Furthermore, what made the region more attractive for Chile was the emergence of the NICs with whom Chile could expect more economic links. Chile considerably extended diplomatic relations with Asian-Pacific countries by 50 per cent from 1973 to the late 1980s, maintaining relations with 29 out of a total of 36 countries and keeping 20 resident Ambassadors and 8 concurrent Ambassadors.⁵⁴³

During the 1970s, numerous diplomatic ties with the Pacific Islands were established: Papua New Guinea in 1976; Western Samoa in 1978; Tonga in 1979; Tuvalu in 1980, and Nauri and Kiribati in 1981. At the same time, several new Chilean Embassies were opened in South East Asia: the Philippines in 1975; Indonesia in 1977; Singapore in 1979, and Thailand in 1981. As **Table 5.1.** shows, Chilean diplomatic penetration into the major Asian-Pacific countries was the highest among the selected Latin American countries, with remarkable expansion of diplomatic networks from 4 delegations in 1971 to 9 in 1992. Chile had more diplomatic delegations in the region than any other Latin American country shown competing well with Argentina and Mexico.

Comparing the data of 1971 and 1992, it is clear that the exchange of delegations between the two regions intensified for twenty years, regardless of the geographic location - Pacific or non-Pacific - of the Latin American countries. In 1971, Asian-Pacific countries sent more unilateral delegations to Latin America than *vice-versa*: 6 cases of Asian *versus* 3 of Latin American. However, the situation was reversed in 1992: 3 *versus* 6. This phenomenon is understandable considering the dramatic shift of Asian-Pacific status in the world economy in contrast to the economic hardship of the Latin American countries. In other words, the Latin American countries began to

⁵⁴³ See García, Ricardo, "Política de Chile en el Pacífico", in Valdivieso, Sergio and Gálvez, Eduardo (eds.), Chile en la Cuenca del Pacífico: Experiencias y Perspectivas Comerciales en Asia y Oceanía, Editorial Andrés Bello, Santiago, 1989, p.4.

perceive the importance of the Asian-Pacific region. The expansion of Venezuela, not a traditional Pacific country, is especially noticeable. Although Chile was not the only nation which increased diplomatic delegations, it was obviously in the front line of Latin American ambition towards the Asian-Pacific. Chile also maintained commercial representatives - Pro-Chile - in South Korea, Japan, Singapore, Sidney and Hong Kong, and have sent commercial missions to the region every year from 1978.

Table 5.1. Diplomatic Exchange between Latin America and Asian-Pacific: 1971, 1992.

1971	<i>Pacific Latin American</i>					<i>Non-Pacific Latin American</i>		
	<i>Asian-Pacific</i>	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru	Argentina	Uruguay
Australia	#			#	#	#	*	
New Zealand								
China	*	#						
Indonesia	**			#		**	**	
Japan	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
South Korea	#	*		**		#	**	
Malaysia								
Philippines	**			#				
Singapore								
Thailand						#		

1992	<i>Pacific Latin American</i>					<i>Non-Pacific Latin American</i>		
	<i>Asian-Pacific</i>	Chile	Colombia	Ecuador	Mexico	Peru	Argentina	Uruguay
Australia	#	*		#	*	#	*	#
New Zealand	#			#	**			
China	#	#	#	#	#	#		#
Indonesia	#			#		#		#
Japan	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
South Korea	#	#	#	#	#	#	#	#
Malaysia						#		
Philippines	#	*		#	#	#		**
Singapore	*					*		
Thailand	#			**		#		

Source : Europa Yearbook, 1971 and 1992.

Note: 1. Embassies and High Commissions are shown in the table including *Chargé d'affaires*, but excluding Concurrent Embassies or Consulate General. Therefore, the table does not show actual diplomatic relations between the countries.

2. # : Reciprocal exchange.

* : Latin American delegation in Asian-Pacific country.

** : Asian-Pacific delegation in Latin American country.

At the institutional level, the *Departamento del Pacífico* was set up inside the Foreign Ministry in 1982 in order to deal with broad agendas within the Asian-Pacific region. Its main functions were: to collect important information on the area; to contribute to the formulation of Chilean policy on the Asian-Pacific, and to establish and coordinate contacts with non-governmental sectors such as companies and the academic world. A higher level of official institution was created in 1985: the *Comité Chileno de Cooperación en el Pacífico*, as an advisory body to the Foreign Minister. In order to strengthen its multilateral approach to the region, the Chilean government sought support from the member countries of the *Comisión Permanente del Pacífico Sur* (CPPS: Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru), but they did not achieve any obvious success.⁵⁴⁴

During the military regime, Chilean ambition towards the Asian-Pacific countries was strongly influenced by Chilean domestic politics and international isolation. The Pinochet administration, faced with international condemnation and criticism of its human rights policy, was desperate to find some less politically sensitive and more friendly supporters on the stage of international politics. Increased friendship with South Korea is a good example. When Foreign Minister Del Valle visited South Korea in 1985, he proclaimed, "South Korea is a fortress against Communism in the north of the Pacific, as we are here in the Southern Hemisphere."⁵⁴⁵ The ideological coincidence - anti-Communism - between Chile and many Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore enabled Chile to build up cordial relations, while these Asian authoritarian regimes were also keen to create amicable relationships. (ideology) The geopolitical perspectives cannot be ignored in the Chilean ambition towards the Asian-Pacific countries as Pinochet often emphasised: for instance, "the destiny of Chile depends on the sea", and "Chile will continue her opening to the Pacific Ocean."⁵⁴⁶

⁵⁴⁴ For the evolution of institutions in Chile, see Moreno Laval, Celso, "América Latina y la Cuenca del Pacífico, Una Visión Chilena", *Estudios Internacionales*, 24:95, 1991, p.380. For Chile and multilateral politics of the region, see Salazar Sparks, Juan, *Chile y la Comunidad del Pacífico*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1985, pp.94-101.

⁵⁴⁵ *El Mercurio*, 3 June, 1985.

⁵⁴⁶ Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.224.

Special attention should be paid to the relations between Chile and China since the case represents one of the few examples where the military government managed to maintain stable relations with a major world power, and at the same time with a nation ideologically incompatible. According to Joseph, the military government's ties with China since 1973 were "a fascinating case of accommodation on the basis of coinciding strategic concerns between regimes whose domestic policies would seem to be mutually anathema."⁵⁴⁷ Numerous visits by senior officials from Chile have shown how badly they wanted good relations with China: Foreign Minister Hernán Cubillos in 1978; Economic Minister Roberto Kelly in 1979; Foreign Minister Jaime Del Valle in 1984 and 1985, and General Matthei in 1987. The Chilean connection with China was basically established on a practical interest in the field of economic co-operation, which was in general an important determinant factor of Chilean policy towards the Asian-Pacific countries. A prime example can be seen in the formation of a joint venture, the 'Beijing-Santiago Copper Tube Co.,' in 1987. From the Chinese point of view, however, numerous factors contributed to the development and strengthening of relations with Chile: the desire to fill the gap which the USSR had left after the coup; the desire to preclude Taiwan from an active presence in Chile,⁵⁴⁸ and the desire to acquire Chilean support in its presence in Antarctica.⁵⁴⁹ Furthermore, China and Chile shared a common interest in "thwarting the imperialist designs of the Soviet Union and its alleged surrogates, Cuba and Vietnam."⁵⁵⁰ Therefore, such agreement on the international security issue even overrode whatever ideological distaste China and Chile may have had for each other's domestic politics. This international factor was equally important for Chile, as René Rojas, Chilean Foreign Minister, wrote a letter to his Chinese counterpart:

Chile admira la entereza demostrada por el pueblo chino y sus gobernantes en su valiente oposición a la intromisión extranjera en Kampuchea, su decidida actitud en Afganistán y su firme rechazo a la intervención de una potencia expansionista en América Central. No podemos menos que coincidir en

⁵⁴⁷ Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A case study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", p.126.

⁵⁴⁸ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", p.364.

⁵⁴⁹ The co-operation between China and Chile over the Chilean Antarctic base has been a central issue in the relations. See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", pp.439-40.

⁵⁵⁰ Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A case study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", p.148.

condenar el social-imperialismo que, a través de una política imperialista y hegemónica, viola sistemáticamente los principios del derecho, sin más respaldo que la fuerte brutal de sus armas.⁵⁵¹

While Allende's Chile was somewhat abandoned in the course of the antagonism between the USSR and China, the strong anti-Soviet sentiment of the *Junta* provided "a bond of mutual strategic interest between Beijing and Santiago that reached across both the ideological spectrum and the Pacific Ocean."⁵⁵² China's relations with the Marcos government in the Philippines and support for the South African backed faction (UNITA) in the Angolan civil war (1974-5) also illustrate that their links with the Chilean military regime were perfectly in line with their pragmatic international behaviour in the mid-1970s.⁵⁵³

5.1.6. Multilateral Politics

Facing the annual UN Resolution regarding the human rights abuse of the military regime, Chile promoted a more aggressive ideological foreign policy. (Table 5.2.) The following two cases in the most critical years are only the tip of iceberg.

Table 5.2. The UN Resolution on the Chilean Human Rights Situation: 1980-1985.

	For		Against		Abstention		Total
	votes	%	votes	%	votes	%	
1980	95	66.9	8	5.6	39	27.4	142
1981	81	57.4	20	14.2	40	28.4	141
1982	85	59.4	17	11.9	41	28.7	143
1983	89	61.8	17	11.8	38	26.3	144
1984	93	64.5	11	7.6	40	27.7	144
1985	88	60.2	11	7.5	47	32.1	146

Source: Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena Durante 1985", p.422.

⁵⁵¹ René Rojas in a letter to Huang Hua in *Memoria de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores*, Chile, 1982, p.33. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was one of the few issues on which the military government could openly and ardently justify its strong Anti-Communist ideology. Later, Foreign Minister Del Valle announced that the Chilean government observed "con indignación y dolor la contumacia soviética en Afganistán y Kampuchea, produciendo la desolación y la muerte en pueblos sedientos de libertad y de paz." See Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.429.

⁵⁵² Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A Case Study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", p.149.

⁵⁵³ See *ibid.*, p.149.

When the new Special Envoy to the UN, the ex-Foreign Minister of Costa Rica Fernando Volio, was named in 1985, the Chilean government expected him to produce a modest report about the human rights situation in Chile since he was known as a man with a favourable attitude to the military regime.⁵⁵⁴ However, the actual report of Volio which unexpectedly included multiple cases of human rights abuse provoked a strong reaction from the military government. The report was attacked as: “full of mistakes with unacceptable accusations against the Chilean government”; “with no consideration of the Chilean efforts on transition to democracy”; “influenced by terrorists”, and “incomplete and superficial in some parts.”⁵⁵⁵ Regardless of the Chilean reaction, the Commission adopted the resolution, by unanimous decision for the first time, which was an extremely embarrassing decision for the military government. Later, the UN General Assembly approved yet another resolution on the Chilean human rights situation. Notably the US voted against the resolution.

The military government was the frequent object of criticism by the OAS based *Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos* (CIDH). Their report of 1985, including the detailed cases of human rights abuse in Chile, caused tensions between Chile and the organisation. In July 1985, the Chilean Ambassador to the OAS refused to accept the report and returned the envelope unopened.⁵⁵⁶ An official objection was expressed in October when the report was presented in Washington:

⁵⁵⁴ Chilean expectation was made plain by Ambassador Pedro Daza in 1985: “El relator, por el contrario, está actuando dentro del campo de la competencia legítima, en este momento.” (Ambassador Pedro Daza in *La Tercera*, 27 December, 1985, p.5.)

⁵⁵⁵ Declarations of various Chilean officials can be found in *El Mercurio*, 2 February, 1986, p.A1., At that time Chile returned to the UN Human Rights Commission after eight years of absence in the expectation of a favourable report.

⁵⁵⁶ Some reasons announced by the Chilean government were:

- a) que “constituye un procedimiento especial, no contemplado en la Carta de la OEA ni en el reglamento especial.”
 - b) su “carácter retroactivo”, señalando que “todos los organismos internacionales ajustan sus trabajos a lapsos determinados, concretamente, al año calendario.”
 - c) que este informe implicaría “volver sobre asuntos acerca de los cuales ya se pronunció la propia CIDH y fueron objeto de resoluciones” de la Asamblea General de la OEA.
- (Informe sobre la Situación de los Derechos Humanos en Chile, OEA/SER., L/V/II 66, doc. 17, 27 September, 1985, p.4. in Muñoz, Heraldo, “La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985”, p.423.)

la publicación de un informe que ha sido totalmente objetado por graves vicios de orden procesal, sobre los cuales la CIDH no se ha pronunciado derechamente, constituye una nueva demostración de que a Chile se le pretende aplicar un procedimiento selectivo, discriminatorio y especial, lo cual es inaceptable.⁵⁵⁷

Almost without exception Chile reacted strongly against the repeated international pressure and the UN resolutions. The most commonly used expressions were: 'operation of international Communism backed by the Soviet'; 'illegitimate interference in internal affairs'; and 'political manoeuvre against the Chilean government.' (ideology, others' policies)

5.1.7. Conclusion

Chilean external relations during the Pinochet regime can be characterised by the 'international isolation' on which her foreign policy in this *Area* was established and carried out. Although the military government often emphasised the increase of accredited embassies in comparison with those before 1973,⁵⁵⁸ the simple increase of diplomatic representatives cannot be a sufficient reason to renounce the isolation thesis. Furthermore, it does not reflect the qualitative dilemmas of foreign policy Chile had to face during the military regime. However, on most occasions, the military government directly expressed its frustration at the international isolation of Chile rather than trying to hide it. For instance, the Foreign Minister Jaime Del Valle once stated, "Chile has 90 per cent of countries as enemies, not just remote friends but enemies."⁵⁵⁹ While the Chilean government hardly tried to improve their international image, they attempted to overcome this handicap via economic development.⁵⁶⁰ The

⁵⁵⁷ Declaration of the Foreign Minister in La Tercera, 5 October, 1985. Further conflicts with international organisations in 1985 and 1986 are discussed in Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", pp.424-425; and Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.432, respectively.

⁵⁵⁸ For instance, Chile had a total of 47 embassies in 1973. This increased to 81 in 1986. See Memoria de Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, vol. 1973 and vol. 1986.

⁵⁵⁹ Jaime del Valle in Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.437.

⁵⁶⁰ However, the collapse of the monetarist policy during 1981-1982 eroded this important dimension of Chile's international image.

role of determinant variables on the background of Chile's policy can be traced as follows.

Ideology: Anti-Communism

Chile not only promoted relations with anti-Communist countries such as South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, but also shared anti-Soviet sentiments with Saudi Arabia, Zaire, Indonesia and China.⁵⁶¹ The anti-Communist crusade was perceived as one of the major elements of Chilean international isolation. In other words, the isolation of Chile was interpreted by the government as an inevitable by-product of both the anti-Communist crusade and the operation of international Communism. Pinochet stated:

... percibo la existencia de ciertos sectores que no entienden o no quieren entender la realidad de Chile ... existe un grado importante de incomprensión hacia el gobierno de Chile, y en ello hay una responsabilidad directa de determinadas ideologías transnacionales, como la marxista, empeñada en tergiversar la realidad chilena y en presentar al gobierno como un sistema represivo y antidemocrático.⁵⁶²

The anti-Communist crusade was not only promoted at the inter-governmental level; Chile also built links with other right wing forces. In this context, Chile invited visits from several international figures in less politically sensitive sectors such as business, banking and religion. The visit of Bo-Hi Park in 1981, the second most important figure in Moon's Unification Church and the president of the *Confederación de Asociaciones Unificadas de la Sociedad Americana* (CAUSA), an ultra-right wing organisation, is a good example.⁵⁶³

⁵⁶¹ According to Varas, the anti-Communist crusade meant that the Chilean military *Junta* represented the USSR as exactly the opposite of how it wanted to appear or act. "One thing to remember is that Chile's experience was unlike the Argentine case, in which even the harshest repression was not justified in the same terms and in which the attitude of the USSR could keep to its permanent interests in bilateral trade relations." In the Chilean case such relations did not exist. (see Varas, Augusto, "The Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations of the Southern Cone", p.251.)

⁵⁶² Pinochet in Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", p.298.

⁵⁶³ See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.221.

Elite

General Pinochet's and other key governmental officials' provocative declarations, which were not always reactions or responses against outside criticisms, also played an undermining role in international relations. For instance, Pinochet declared, "a neighbouring country [Peru] is a so-called democracy without principle or character, and Chile will follow the same path if we do not accomplish the objectives we have set ourselves."⁵⁶⁴

Meanwhile, Pinochet's *private diplomacy* ignoring official channels was another influential factor in the foreign policy conduct of the military government. A prime example can be found in the course of Chilean diplomacy with Peru in the late 1970s. In 1979, Chilean - Peruvian relations became extremely cool with a series of strong Peruvian policies: first, seizure of three Chilean naval personnel in Talara, and the Air Force Attaché, General Vicente Rodríguez Busto in Lima, by the Peruvian government for spying; second, declaration of *Persona non grata* to the Chilean Ambassador in Lima, Francisco Bulnes Sanfuentes, and finally, the expulsion of the naval vessel 'Beagle' from Peru. In Santiago, the case provoked an open debate between military and civilian members of the government. Hernán Cubillos, the civilian Foreign Minister, publicly accused the military attaches in the Chilean Embassy in Lima. But President Augusto Pinochet overrode his minister and Ambassador Bulnes, and sent off General Herman Brady as his personal emissary to sort things out with the Peruvian war minister, General Oscar Molina. Although he had good personal contacts with several of Peru's top generals, Brady got a cool reception in Lima, and was unable to prevent the subsequent expulsion of Bulnes and the recall of the Peruvian Ambassador, (retired) General Guillermo Arbulú Galliani.⁵⁶⁵

Another case was the convention with the US in granting permission to NASA to use *Mataverí* airport in the *Isla de Pascua*; the *Junta* approved the convention to avoid

⁵⁶⁴ El Mercurio, 5 June, 1983.

⁵⁶⁵ Latin American Weekly Report, 26 January, 1979, p.26.

possible controversial debates in the Congress and in public.⁵⁶⁶ The group of Pinochet's personal envoys also included his daughter Lucía Pinochet Hiriart. She visited China, Japan, the US and Taiwan in 1982 as the president of the *Corporación de Estudios Nacionales* and *Fundación de la Cultura*. The official reason for tour was to increase cultural integration with these countries, but the political aspect could not be ignored, especially when she met senior officials like the Taiwanese Prime Minister.

The *private diplomacy* of Pinochet, accompanied by the militarisation of diplomacy, has often been criticised as anti-professionalism especially when the military government lacked skilful management of multilateral diplomacy. Furthermore, the powerful political role of the military, in addition to its traditional strategic role, was formally institutionalised in the Constitution of 1980 which included such phrases as: "the military forces exist for the defence of the fatherland, are essential for the national security, and guarantee the institutional order of the Republic."⁵⁶⁷ At the *Consejo de Seguridad Nacional*, over which the President presides, the Commanders-in-Chief of the three military branches and the *General Director* of *Carabineros* were to participate along with key Ministers. The *Consejo* was to play potentially unlimited role in national security by "presenting its opinion on any issue, action or matter which, in its judgement, could seriously imperil institutional bases or could endanger national security."⁵⁶⁸ Therefore, the increased political role of the military naturally became an accelerating factor in the further participation of the military in foreign policy, particularly in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.

Geopolitics

Geopolitics can effectively explain the regional isolation of Chile and her subsequent policy. A good example can be found in the late 1970s when the new Bolivian regime showed a more friendly approach to Peru and Argentina and more hostility to Chile,

⁵⁶⁶ See Muñoz, Herald, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", p.435.

⁵⁶⁷ Article 90, Constitución Política de la República de Chile, 1980.

⁵⁶⁸ Articles 95 and 96, *ibid.*

thus leading to the possibility of an anti-Chilean axis of Peru-Bolivia-Argentina.⁵⁶⁹ The strong geopolitical stance of the military government, viewing the inter-state conflict as a natural phenomenon, did not improve the regional image of Chile.

In the more global dimension, geopolitical consideration also became an important factor especially in relations with Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia. Although the evolution of the close relations with Australia and New Zealand was based on the economic interests of Oceanic private companies, the emphasis on the friendly relationship with Indonesia shows a genuine example of the geopolitical consideration of the military regime's foreign policy towards the Pacific, where it lacked any major economic interests.⁵⁷⁰ Another example can be found in their relations with South Africa. Unlike the limited and scarce Chilean interests with other African states, an ideological and geopolitical similarity South Africa resulted in an active correlation with that country.

Others' Policies

Examples of the role of others' policies in the foreign policy of Chile are countless, as the Chilean conduct in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* was largely a reaction to other players' policies. The most common pattern was Chilean response to others' concerns over the domestic political conditions of Chile. Almost all the international condemnations against the repressive military regime were accused of being an 'illicit international campaign of Soviet Marxism' or 'interference in domestic politics.'

Its singular regime type was a principal obstacle in the foreign 'relations' of Chile. Troubles arose not only with the Communist countries but also right wing democratic governments. Chilean conflict with democratised Latin American neighbours can be understood in this context. Diplomatic relations with Argentina more deteriorated in the mid-1980s, when Argentine officials showed concern about a possible link

⁵⁶⁹ Latin American Weekly Report, 26 January, 1979, p.26.

⁵⁷⁰ See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", p.311.

between left wing terrorist groups of the two countries.⁵⁷¹ Although in 1987 the re-nomination of Jorge Carlos Ribeiro as Brazilian Ambassador in Santiago, who developed good contacts with various sectors in Chile, was considered as a positive move by the Brazilian government, the remote relations with Brazil can be basically explained by the difference in regime type throughout the period.⁵⁷²

During the last years of the regime, especially after the defeat of the plebiscite in late 1988, the Pinochet regime tried to reassert itself in the international community. Many countries which had maintained low level or suspended relations with the Pinochet regime also showed sincere interest in re-establishing links with Chile. The Italian government immediately announced the designation of an Ambassador to Santiago after the plebiscite. Greece, Portugal and Finland followed the Italian example.⁵⁷³ Also relations with the Eastern European countries, long suspended after the coup, started to be reconstructed, initially by Chilean private entrepreneurs. In 1989, a delegation headed by the president of the *Cámara Nacional de Comercio de Chile*, Daniel Platovsky, visited Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. With Poland and Hungary, diplomatic relations in consulate level were established in 1990. Two factors contributing to the *rapprochement* with the Eastern block were the easing of ideological confrontation between East and West, and the defeat of Pinochet in the Plebiscite in 1988. Although the expanded international relations of Chile appeared to reflect a new pragmatism in Chilean foreign policy in 1989, the ideological factor still remained and also the negative image of the regime on human rights issues, which characterised the foreign policy agenda during the whole period of the Pinochet regime.⁵⁷⁴

⁵⁷¹ Argentine Foreign Minister, Dante Caputo, said that Chilean guerrillas were operating in Argentine territory and being supplied with military equipment from Argentina. On the other hand the Chilean Foreign Minister, Jaime del Valle declared in 1985 that the Argentines "les corresponde preocuparse de lo que sucede allá ... no tienen por qué velar por lo que sucede aquí en Chile." *La Tercera*, 31 December, 1985, p.5.

⁵⁷² See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", p.305.

⁵⁷³ See Muñoz, Heraldo and Asenjo, Daniel, "Chile: el Último Año del Régimen del General Pinochet", p.280.

⁵⁷⁴ In March 1989, The United Nations Human Right Commission approved a new resolution (condenatoria) regarding the human right issues and basic freedom. See *ibid.*, p.283-4 for more cases of human rights abuse of the last years of Pinochet regime.

On the whole, the foreign policy of the military government in the *Status-diplomatic Area* was primarily determined and characterised by highly ideological and personal factors: Anti-Communism; geopolitics, and Pinochet's personal diplomacy, while the domestic political situation and its international response dominated the external 'relations' of Chile.

5.2. The Military-Strategic Area

5.2.1. Arms Procurement and Security Issues

5.2.1.1. Arms Procurement

The traditional arms procurement policy of Chile faithfully mirrored the influences at work in the individual armed forces: the Army showed a distinct preference for weapons of German design; the Navy largely confined its purchasing of new construction to British yards, and the Air Force was initially equipped with British material but large quantities of US built aircraft were increasingly preferred. Quantities of US arms began to reach the Army and the Air Force from the 1950s, though strangely not the Navy. For more than two decades US war surplus material - of the Second World War - came to dominate the inventories of the Chilean armed forces, as was the case in Argentina and Brazil.

After the military coup in 1973, Chile's most important arms suppliers, the US and the UK, declared partial arms embargoes.⁵⁷⁵ The declarations were followed by actions, such as the British Labour government's refusal to deliver naval vessels and aircraft already paid for, shaking Chilean faith in the reliability of many of its

⁵⁷⁵ In 1975, President Ford wrote to the US Congress recommending the end of all military aid to Chile for the next financial year. The Chileans were furious. The Chilean Ambassador in Washington, Manuel Trucco, is reported to have told United States officials that Chile had not asked to be included in next year's military aid budget anyway. El Mercurio accused Ford and Kissinger of vote-catching, and suggested they should remember that the armed forces had stopped Chile becoming a second Cuba. See Latin American Weekly Report, 31 October, 1975, p.341.

traditional suppliers.⁵⁷⁶ However, the US and British actions did not prevent the Chilean armed forces from receiving weapons from other sources, even if the arms procurement was pursued on an *ad hoc* basis - materials being acquired from whatever sources available. In fact, between 1971 and 1985 - with the exception of the 1975-1980 period - Chilean arms imports not only increased, but also more diverse markets were explored as shown in **Table 5.3**. For instance, German small arms were adopted, together with quantities of Israeli and Spanish naval vessels, and French combat aircraft.⁵⁷⁷ (others' policies) However, difficulties in access to the US market inevitably resulted in an increasingly heterogeneous and unbalanced equipment inventory. During this period, the Navy and Air Force encountered particular difficulties in the acquisition of replacements and spares.⁵⁷⁸

Table 5.3. Share of Major Suppliers in Chilean Imports of Major Conventional Weapons: 1971-1985

Period	Supplier (%)					Yearly Total Imports*
	USA	France	UK	Germany	Others	
1966-70	39	-	43	-	18	140
1971-75	24	16	37	-	24	858
1976-80	25	30	13	6	26	762
1981-85	8	15	38	15	23	1,164

Source: Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-1985, SIPRI/Oxford University Press, 1987, p.341.

Note: * 1985 US\$ Million Constant Price.

By the early 1980s, the embargoes by the U.K., Switzerland and West Germany had lost much of their edge. The British Conservative government lifted the ban on arms

⁵⁷⁶ See English, Adrian, Regional Defense Profile No.1: Latin America, Jane's, London, 1988, p.96. The word 'partial' can be applied more suitably to the British position, when the Foreign Secretary Jim Callaghan announced the new arms shipment policy to Chile: vessels already acquired by Chile under existing contracts would be delivered but no new export licenses for the sale of armaments to Chile would be granted. According to Little, the policy of the British Labour Party reflected "a clear clash between the nation's material interest and the moral position adopted by the party." See Little, Walter, "Britain, Chile and Human Rights, 1973-1990", p.153.

⁵⁷⁷ See *ibid.*, p.95.

⁵⁷⁸ The Chileans urgently needed to replace their rundown, US-built F-5s, which they had had great difficulty in servicing since the imposition of the US arms embargo. See Cohen, Martin, "Latin Aerospace Strives for Self-Sufficiency", Defense and Foreign Affairs, March, 1988, pp.33-37.

sales to Chile, imposed for six years by the Labour government.⁵⁷⁹ Thus, the sudden increase of the shipment of British arms between 1981-85 can be explained with the arrival of the Thatcher Conservative government and their favourable stance towards Chile during and after the Malvinas conflict.⁵⁸⁰ (Table 5.3.) The only remaining obstacle, the case of 'Walter Rauff,' was removed with his sudden death in 1984, and Britain became the largest supplier of arms to the military government. Meanwhile, Israel and Spain continued to supply both weapons and technology.⁵⁸¹ Despite the deterioration in relations in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*, Chile established the *Empresa Nacional de Aeronáutica* (ENAER) with the help of Spain.

Although the French President Giscard d'Estaing criticised Chile's poor record on releasing political prisoners, there was no suggestion that France would actually take any measures to stop the flow of arms, or financial aid. Rather, thanks to the embargoes of the US and Britain, they became the largest supplier of arms to Chile between 1975-1980. (Table 5.3.) However, after the inauguration of Mitterrand, the French socialist government initiated an embargo on arms shipments to Chile⁵⁸² although it declared that France would respect all the political and commercial contracts including those concerning arms. However, this does not mean that France completely blocked her arms sales to Chile. It should be remembered that the French government authorised the sale of a training version of the Mirage III fighter to Chile in 1984. Nevertheless, as political relations cooled between the two governments, the amount of French arms sales to Chile became significantly reduced in the 1980s.⁵⁸³

On the other hand, the US tightened its policy with the issue of 'the Statement on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy' by President Carter in May 1977, which resulted

⁵⁷⁹ Latin American Weekly Report, 25 July, 1980, p.12. Their justification was not that Chile's human rights record was of no concern to the UK but that it had improved and so rendered the embargo unnecessary. However, obvious reason was to ease British fiscal difficulties and promote arms exports. See Little, Walter, "Britain, Chile and Human Rights, 1973-1990", p.156.

⁵⁸⁰ The first major arms transfer from Britain was the arrival of a destroyer and a tanker to the Chilean Navy in 1982. Latin American Weekly Report, 9 October, 1981.

⁵⁸¹ See Brzoska, Michael and Ohlson, Thomas, Arms Transfers to the Third World 1971-1985, pp.31-2.

⁵⁸² Hence, the French government refused the supply of 29 AMX-30 tanks on the grounds that these tanks could be used for the purpose of internal order and repression. See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.127.

⁵⁸³ See *ibid.*, p.126-7.

in a further drop of arms exports to Chile in the early 1980s. In November 1979, the Carter administration launched a series of sanctions against the Chilean government following the assassination of Letelier in Washington, which included: the substantial reduction of the US Embassy staff in Santiago; suspension of the supply of all military equipment; suspension of financial aid and the guarantee of the Export-Import Bank and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). At the beginning of 1980, the US government also decided not to invite the Chilean Navy to UNITAS.⁵⁸⁴

Although the regime more or less replaced US suppliers with other alternatives during the period of the Carter administration, the Chilean government seemed to be genuinely afraid of what measures might be taken against it - fear of the unknown, since they had not yet learned whether it would be possible to survive without US assistance. In this respect, an author pointed out the paradoxical aspect of the relationship with the US on the issue of arms acquisition: on the one hand Chile did not need the United States for advanced weaponry; on the other it still desired good relations desperately in order to resume arms acquisition and military contacts from the US.⁵⁸⁵ However, the paradox did not last long since the election of President Ronald Reagan once again dramatically changed the bilateral relations of the two countries. In addition to the partial lifting of the financial sanctions,⁵⁸⁶ the Chilean government began to receive military support from the US except arms sales.⁵⁸⁷ The Chilean Navy was again invited to UNITAS in 1981.

Various forms of military assistance were given, and gestures of friendship made by senior US officials. For instance, Admiral Wesley L. McDonald, the Commander-in-Chief of the US Atlantic Fleet declared, "on no occasion have the sanctions against Chile affected the relations between our two [Navy] forces. Our close relations have

⁵⁸⁴ Department of State Bulletin, January 1980, pp.65-66, in Varas, Augusto, Los Militares en el Poder, p.152.

⁵⁸⁵ See Falcoff, Mark, "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition and the United States", World Affairs, 149:4, Spring, 1987, p.189.

⁵⁸⁶ Furthermore, on 22 September, 1983, Chile and the OPIC signed an agreement to resume the participation of the US in the financing of new investments to Chile. See Varas, Augusto, Los Militares en el Poder, pp.152-3.

⁵⁸⁷ Veto from the US Congress, of course, prevented the Republican government from resuming US arms sales to Chile, until the late 1980s.

been continued.”⁵⁸⁸ And again, George Schultz declared, “the change may be slow, and the patience and mutual respect for different cultures and political traditions should guide our initiatives; nevertheless, the final objectives won’t be changed.”⁵⁸⁹ All these gestures were interpreted as the green light from the Reagan administration, unlike the ambiguous US position in the *Economic-Developmental Area* and the *Status-Diplomatic Area* in the mid-1980s, and effective contacts between the Chilean military and the Pentagon took place. In November 1983, for instance, three generals and four colonels of the Chilean Air Force were invited to visit by the US Air Forces. Also, in May 1984, several generals of the US Air Forces visited Chile to participate in *la Feria Internacional del Aire* (FIDA) and Admiral James D. Watkins, the Chief of US Naval Operations paid an official visit to Chile in the same year. In 1986, a very cordial level of contact between Chilean generals, such as general Luis Danús, and the US Ambassador Harry Barnes was established.

The Republican administration’s new stance on Chile in the 1980s can be somewhat explained by their understanding of the geopolitical importance of Chile to the US: firstly, the potential conflict in the Northern and Southern border areas of Chile was regarded by the US as a permanent threat to the security of the Southern hemisphere; secondly, the important mission of the Chilean military in the defence of the Southern Pacific can be pointed out, particularly since the US asked for Papal mediation during the Beagle Channel dispute, and thirdly, for practical reasons, the isolated international position of the Chilean military government was favoured by the US government in terms of arms supply in case of the Congressional agreement on arms sales to Chile.⁵⁹⁰ France, Spain, Israel and South Africa were countries that showed great interest in the Chilean market for the same reason.

⁵⁸⁸ *ibid.*, p.162.

⁵⁸⁹ *ibid.*, p.153.

⁵⁹⁰ The (illegal) inflow of US arms, mostly by private companies, to Chile continued despite of the imposition of the Kennedy Amendment. See Muñoz, Heraldo, “Chile y Estados Unidos en 1987: Tensiones en Vísperas de un Momento Decisivo”, in Muñoz, Heraldo (ed.) *Anuario de Políticas Exteriores Latinoamericanas*, GEL, BS AS, 1987, p.315.

During the last years of the military regime, as was seen in the exchange visits of senior military personnels between the two countries,⁵⁹¹ the consolidated relationship with the US in the *Military-Strategic Area* continued. In summary, although international isolation caused some difficulties in many respects, it would be wrong to say that the isolation of the military regime decisively undermined Chile's military connections with the world, judging from the military assistance Chile obtained: strong military ties with the US and arms procurement from rest of the world.

5.2.1.2. Arms Export

Along with the diversification efforts in arms procurement, the arms embargo caused another effect from the late 1970s: the development of a domestic arms industry in Chile. According to General Pinochet:

... Y nos encontramos que los Estados Unidos nos cerraron las puertas, y prácticamente, no teníamos dónde comprar armamento. Y, este país estaba totalmente desarmado. Entonces, se creó la necesidad de disponer algún organismo que nos fabricara el armamento.⁵⁹²

By the mid-1980s, the Chilean arms industry not only fulfilled domestic demand to a certain degree but was also able to export, which became an important foreign policy agenda. As a result of the strong co-operation of the Spanish government, *Empresa Nacional de Aeronautica* (ENAER) was founded in February 1984 as a subsidiary of the Chilean Air Force. Twenty one Spanish CASA-101 airplanes were assembled at the same company and forty T35 *Pillán* airplanes were manufactured and exported to Spain in 1984. The most internationally successful - and controversial - Chilean

⁵⁹¹ For instance, a member of the *Junta*, Admiral José Toribio Merino visited the US, and US General John Galvin, the Chief of NATO went to Chile. See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", p.325.

⁵⁹² General Pinochet, in the interview with Jane Corbin in Panorama: Making a Killing, BBC television program, 24 June, 1991. This does not mean that arms production effort in Chile originated in the Pinochet regime. The Chilean Armed Forces had developed a local arms industry long ago to avoid a complete dependence on foreign suppliers, although they achieved little. According to Portales and Varas, FAMA (Fabrica y Maestranza del Ejército) spent a yearly average of US\$2.75 million in 1963-64, and US\$9.13 million in 1971-73, whereas ASMAR (Astilleros y Maestranza de la Armada) was reorganised as a state enterprise in 1960, and spent a yearly average of US\$16.88 million in 1966-70 and US\$17.1 million in 1973. See Portales, Carlos and Varas, Augusto, "The Role of Military Expenditure in the Developing Process. Chile 1952-1973 and 1973-1980: Two Contrasting Cases", Iberoamericana: Nordic Journal of Latin American Studies, 12:1-2, 1983, p.29.

weapon was the cluster bomb called *racismo* produced by *Cardoen S.A.*, a government subsidised private company. The company sold five thousand units - worth US\$35 million - to Iraq. One interesting fact is that there were two different versions of *racismo*: one for NATO airplanes, the other for the Warsaw Pact's.⁵⁹³ However, because of its cruel, dangerous and indiscriminate capability which could destroy an area equivalent to the size of ten football pitches, the international pressure to prevent the production and export of the bomb, including those of other countries, was enormous and finally UN resolution of 37/79 for the prohibition of inhumanitarian weapons was passed in December 1982.⁵⁹⁴ However, despite international pressure and subsequent numerous UN resolutions upon arms limitation - 37/98 in 1982, 38/187 in 1983 and 38/188F in 1983, the Chilean government's hard line position did not change. *Cardoen* maintained sales office in various countries, such as in Argentina, Spain, the US, Iraq, Greece and Hong Kong. Chilean companies continued to sell weapons to Iraq, in contrast to Brazilian government, which stopped shipping arms to Iran.⁵⁹⁵ Meanwhile, the government did not sever good military-strategic relations with Israel. For instance, Admiral José Toribio Merino visited Israel in July 1987. Judging from the people he met in Tel Aviv including the Israeli Defence Minister he negotiated arms transfer issues with Israel government although his visit was classified as 'private.'⁵⁹⁶

As to not being an active participant in the multilateral politics on arms limitation, the military government's behaviour can be explained by the National Security Doctrine, the international arms embargoes against Chile (others' policies), and the need for export revenue after the economic collapse of the early 1980s.

⁵⁹³ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", p.363.

⁵⁹⁴ See Varas, Augusto, Los Militares en el Poder, p.121.

⁵⁹⁵ It is said that another Chilean company exported certain types of bombs to Iran. See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", pp.311-2; and Varas, Augusto, Los Militares en el Poder, p.121.

⁵⁹⁶ "Fuerzas Armadas y Defensa Nacional: Relación Cronológica Mensual, 1987", Limitación de Armamentos y Confianza Mutua en América Latina, pp.316-7.

5.2.1.3. Regional Disarmament Issue

With the initiative of Peru, the *Declaración de Ayacucho* was subscribed to in 1974 and reaffirmed in 1978 by numerous Latin American governments including Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. The primary objective of the *Declaración* was to promote and construct consolidated world peace and international co-operation through the effective limitation of arms and the reduction of military expenditure. In 1976, the Chilean government hosted the second working group meeting of experts. In this meeting the following weapons were included on a prohibition list: missiles with more than a 40km range; tanks with artillery bigger than 105mm, and all kinds of artillery with bigger than 155mm calibre.⁵⁹⁷

At the same time the Chilean military joined their Bolivian and Peruvian counterparts in subscribing to the *Acuerdo de Cooperación para el Afianzamiento de la Paz y la Amistad entre las Fuerzas Armadas de las Repúblicas de Bolivia, Chile y Perú* under the principle of the *Declaración de Ayacucho*. This accord sought to build a workable mechanism to ease tensions in the border areas of the three countries. Despite intensive meetings and studies, however, the results were not satisfactory enough to reach a concrete treaty.⁵⁹⁸

For the Chilean military government, strong objections to disarmament by private companies as well as military institutions were a major obstacle. Furthermore, the lack of Chilean participation and experience in other major multilateral disarmament agreements was also a drawback. By that time, Chile had not joined, for instance, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Chemical and Biological Arms Treaty, or the Modification of Environment Treaty.

⁵⁹⁷ See Mercado Jarrin, Edgardo, "Perspectivas de los Acuerdos de Limitación y Desarme en América Latina y el Caribe", *Estudios Internacionales*, 20:77, 1987, p.50.

⁵⁹⁸ Mercado Jarrin pointed out the three main reasons for the failure of the *Declaración de Ayacucho*: too academic; limited geographic scope and participation, and existing tensions among the countries involved. See *ibid.*, p.51. For a detailed survey on the *Declaración*, see San Martín, Alejandro, "Las Medidas de Confianza y los Procesos de Limitación del Gasto en Armamentos: Conceptos Generales y su aplicación en América Latina después de Ayacucho", in *Limitación de Armamentos y Confianza Mutua en América Latina*, pp.77-84.

Bilateral aspects of the military government's disarmament policy can be found in the Chilean reaction to the Peruvian government's proposal in the mid-1980s. In his inaugural speech in July 1985, President Alan García called for a limitation on arms imports to Latin America. He announced that Peru had already reduced defence expenditure by 10 per cent, eliminating a battle cruiser and importing only 12 Mirage 2000 fighters instead of 26.⁵⁹⁹ Chile was obviously the prime target of the Peruvian initiative and the García's effort seemed initially to be welcomed by General Pinochet. Based on the principles of *Tratado de Lima* in 1929, the foreign ministers of Chile and Peru had a series of meetings in Arica and Lima.⁶⁰⁰ However, despite the notable improvement of relations between Chile and Peru in the mid-1980s, the actual result was not particularly fruitful. After the Arica meeting with his Peruvian counterpart, the Chilean Foreign Minister Del Valle announced that disarmament could not be realised for the following reasons:

las armas que tiene Chile son para la Defensa nacional integral, contra cualquier otro país sea vecinal o de ultramar. Tenemos un compromiso a través del TIAR, por el cual debemos mantener armamento para una defensa continental y un tipo de armamento para la seguridad interior. No basta la voluntad de dos países para producir un efecto de desarme o de limitación de armamentos.⁶⁰¹

In October 1986, the head of the Chilean Navy Admiral Merino said: "If President García wants to reduce his country's weaponry, that is fine, but I need to increase my own and I will do so."⁶⁰² The Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal, the Minister of Defence, also said that "a bilateral treaty of disarmament can be suicide," suggesting the promotion of and complete ratification of the multilateral treaties: the *Tratado de Tlatelolco* and the *Declaración de Ayacucho*.⁶⁰³

⁵⁹⁹ See Varas, Augusto, *Los Militares en el Poder*, pp.133-4. Also see Ferrero Costa, Eduardo, "Peruvian Foreign Policy - Current trends, Constraints and Opportunities", *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, 29:2, 1987, p.63.

⁶⁰⁰ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", p.431, for details of the treaty.

⁶⁰¹ Del Valle in *El Mercurio*, 6 November, 1985.

⁶⁰² Admiral Merino in Ferrero Costa, Eduardo, "Peruvian Foreign Policy - Current trends, Constraints and Opportunities", p.64.

⁶⁰³ Patricio Carvajal in Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", p.431.

Both cases of disarmament movements in which Chile was involved proved that the Chilean military government made no real effort to reach a substantial result. The pessimism on bilateral disarmament of Del Valle and Carvajal even contained a contradictory logic considering the lack of Chilean participation in the major multilateral disarmament treaties. Finally, it can be noted that Chilean policy on the disarmament issue, which was affected by the National Security Doctrine, even lacked the usual diplomatic lip service.

5.2.2. Territorial Issues

5.2.2.1. Chile vs. Argentina: Beagle Channel Dispute

This dispute between Argentina and Chile concerned territorial and maritime boundaries in the region of the eastern Beagle Channel. By the Treaty of 1881, Argentina and Chile agreed to partition Patagonia and the island of *Tierra del Fuego*, which earlier in the century had been regarded as Chilean territory rather than Argentinean. The terms of the Treaty stated rather indefinitely that the boundary between the two countries would follow the highest peaks of the *cordillera* that divided the waters. This meant that “[e]ach of these countries sees the other as aggressive and expansionist, and even feels that it has given up too much territory in the past,”⁶⁰⁴ appending one more factor to the traditional antagonism. Although the three islands in the Beagle Channel, *Picton*, *Nueva* and *Lennox* are completely insignificant on their own, at the heart of the dispute was the ‘Oceanic Principle’ claimed by Argentina:

The “Oceanic Principle”, that is also called the Atlantic-Pacific Principle, establishes that Argentina has a right to the whole of the coasts, islands, and waters of the southern Atlantic, and Chile that same right to the coasts, islands, and waters of the southern Pacific.⁶⁰⁵

⁶⁰⁴ Child, Jack, “Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the 1980s”, p.33

⁶⁰⁵ Argentine Embassy, 1978:II in Gordon, Dennis, “Argentina’s Foreign Policies in the Post-Malvinas Era”, in Lincoln, Jennie and Ferris, Elizabeth (eds.), The Dynamics of Latin American Foreign Policies, p.91.

However, in order to improve her claim to jurisdiction in Antarctica, Chile wished to establish rights in the Atlantic, which conflicted with Argentina's own claims. The fact that Chilean control of the Beagle Channel and the creation of a 200-mile maritime zone would make Chile an Atlantic nation was unacceptable to Argentina as it was regarded as a serious threat to her national interests: for instance, Argentina's access to the Atlantic from its naval base at Ushuaia; communication with her Antarctic regions, and economic resources such as potential petroleum reserves and fishing rights. Furthermore, it was anticipated by the Argentines that "Chile as an Atlantic nation could cement bonds with Brazil, claim membership in any future South Atlantic collective security arrangement, and deny Argentina's passage to the Pacific in time of war."⁶⁰⁶

Hence, the Beagle Channel issue became the most immediate and explosive dispute in South America in the late 1970s; both sides prepared for war and competed furiously for allies. This explains the increasing warmth of Chile's relations with Ecuador. On the other hand, Argentina consolidated her relations with Peru. President Videla received a personal letter of support from President Francisco Morales Bermúdez, and the Argentine Foreign Minister Oscar Montes visited Lima.⁶⁰⁷

To make the matter more complicated, the arbitration award of 1977 brought about by the mediation of the British Crown, based on the arbitration agreement of 1902, was rejected in January 1978 by the Argentine government.⁶⁰⁸ In a note delivered to the Ambassador of Chile in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Foreign Minister stated:

⁶⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p.91. The full historical background of the dispute is well presented in "Argentina-Chile: Beagle Channel Arbitration", International Legal Materials, 17, 1978, pp.632-679; Muñoz Miranda, Osvaldo, "Una Visión Histórico-Jurídica de las Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas: Experiencias de una Política Territorial", in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), Chile y Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relación Constructiva, Pehuén, Santiago, 1989, pp.49-60. Also see, Echeverría D., C. Gloria, "La Controversia entre Chile y Argentina sobre la Región del Beagle: Origen, Desarrollo y Desenlace", in Sánchez, Walter and Pereira, Teresa (eds.), 150 Años de Política Exterior Chilena, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1977, pp.264-317. At that time, Brazil was doing its best to draw what strength it could from the situation, building on its traditional alliance with Chile. See Latin American Weekly Report, 17 February, 1978, p.49.

⁶⁰⁷ Hence, the deterioration of relations between Lima and Quito can be partly explained by deterioration of relations between Argentina and Chile.

⁶⁰⁸ The Court of Arbitration supported the Chilean thesis. For the details of the court decision, see "Argentina-Chile: Beagle Channel Arbitration", pp.637-40.

I wish to advise that, in accordance with the express instructions of my Government, the Government of the Argentine Republic, after thoroughly studying the arbitration award of Her Britannic Majesty on the Beagle Canal controversy, has decided to declare the award insuperably null and void, in accordance with international law.⁶⁰⁹

On the very next day, the Chilean Government repudiated the Argentine note of rejection:

My Government categorically rejects the unusual "Declaration of Invalidity" ... The rejection is based on elemental norms of international law, ... Nevertheless, it is my duty to advise you that ... the clear title to the indisputable sovereignty of my country over the territories and maritime zones of the southern region are based on indubitable property rights ... My Government would like to understand the wholesome intention which led your Government to propose "bilateral negotiations", but I must reiterate very emphatically that such negotiations can never deal ... with questions resolved by the decision of Her Britannic Majesty. You are well aware of the fact that the Chilean Government expressed its complete acceptance of the decision of May 2, 1977, and has fully carried out.⁶¹⁰

Meanwhile, in order to keep the negotiation channel open, the presidents of both countries signed an agreement at Puerto Montt in February 1978 establishing a mechanism for negotiations in three stages. At the same time, however, a series of hostile moves on both sides continued. Aircraft from both sides flew low over the disputed islands and mainland towns. Military reservists were called up. Two Argentine officers were arrested as spies near Santiago.

The Pope, then, indicated his willingness to mediate in the dispute after a request by the US government. Subsequently, another agreement was signed in Montevideo on 8 January, 1979, accepting the mediation of the Pope and committing themselves not to resort to the use of force in their mutual relations.⁶¹¹ Finally, on 29 November 1984, the two governments signed the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad* in Rome based on the Papal arbitration and intense diplomatic contacts, on the one hand; and effected by the

⁶⁰⁹ See "Argentina-Chile: Exchange of Diplomatic Notes Concerning the Beagle Channel Arbitration", *International Legal Materials*, 17, 1978, p.738. See pp.739-750 for the full text of the "Declaration of Nullity" by the Argentine government.

⁶¹⁰ *ibid.*, p.751.

⁶¹¹ "Argentina-Chile: Negotiation and Conclusion of Border Dispute Agreement (1978-1985)", *International Legal Materials*, 24:1, 1985, p.1.

democratisation of Argentina and the inauguration of Raúl Alfonsín, on the other. The *Tratado* not only included immediate agendas of boundary limits in the Straits of Magellan, navigation in the area and the maritime delimitation in the Austral zone, but also economic co-operation and physical integration.⁶¹²

Although there were some criticisms inside Chilean political and public circles, the *Tratado* was generally accepted as making important and necessary progress towards peace. The Chilean *Junta* approved and ratified the *Tratado* in May 1985 whereas it was approved in a referendum with more than 80 percent of 'yes' votes after intensive national debate on the other side of the Andes. Inspired by the success of the *Tratado*, the bilateral relations between Argentina and Chile notably improved in the areas of trade, communication and transport. However, political relations remained cool especially after Chile conceded the isle of *Diego Ramírez* to Britain in 1984 to be used as a military base. Argentine nationalists strongly protested against the Chilean government's decision.⁶¹³

By 1986 the conflict with Argentina had abated somewhat as the process of the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad* of 1984 advanced. The first meeting of *la Comisión Binacional Chileno-Argentina* took place in Buenos Aires and several agreements, including one concerning a border passage between the two countries, were signed in the same year.⁶¹⁴ However, the Argentine government continued to support Bolivian position over the issue of *salida al mar*.

While the diplomatic effort, by which Chile obtained Argentina's acceptance of arbitration in the Beagle Channel controversy, was highly successful, the Chilean government had to face a domestic challenge based on the 'isolation thesis' which

⁶¹² The main points of the *Tratado* were: 1) that the islands of *Picton, Lennox and Nueva* be confirmed as Chilean territory; and 2) that in Antarctic waters Chilean sovereignty should extend only to a 12-mile zone from the islands, while beyond this point Argentina should have jurisdiction up to 200 miles. See Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 3 July, 1981, p.30952. For the details of the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad*, see "Argentina-Chile: Negotiation and Conclusion of Border Dispute Agreement (1978-1985)", International Legal Materials, 24:1, 1985, pp.11-28. For the legal aspects of the dispute and the *Tratado*, see articles in Díaz Albónico, Rodrigo (ed.), El Tratado de Paz y Amistad entre Chile y Argentina, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1987.

⁶¹³ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", p.359.

⁶¹⁴ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.445.

regarded the *Tratado* as an unnecessary concession of Chilean territory caused by the international isolation of the military regime. However, the major opposition parties, Socialists, Christian Democrats and Radicals all supported the *Tratado*. Even if the Chilean Navy was not fully satisfied with the *Tratado*, its representative in the *Junta* voted for its approval.⁶¹⁵ The dispute on the question of the Beagle Channel was given a high policy priority during a significant period of the military regime reflecting the geopolitics of the Southern Cone. (geopolitics and others' policies) It was also a case which showed strong historical linkage with Chile's traditional foreign policy: Legalism.

Finally, the symbolic importance of the Beagle Channel issue was also closely linked to the fact that throughout the period of conflict both states were under the control of military governments, for which an international factor of this kind acted as a useful pretext for extending control over national life. When the International Court of Justice ruled that the islands were in fact Chilean in March 1977, Chile was very unpopular in the world community. Naturally, the military government showed excessive enthusiasm in the domestic use of the ruling. President Pinochet stated in public that "the award [of the International Court of Justice] was very welcome as Chile could now claim a 200 mile territorial sea stretching out from the mouth of the channel in a wedge formation into the Atlantic."⁶¹⁶ (domestic politics: objective)

5.2.2.2. Chile vs. Bolivia: Salida al Mar

The issue of *salida al mar* was reopened when General Pinochet, surprisingly, offered a corridor in the north of Arica at the meeting with General Hugo Banzer in Charaña, a border town between Bolivia and Chile, in 1975. However, in return for the corridor, Chile made three demands in Pinochet's proposal.

First, Chile must be compensated by an equivalent area of land;

⁶¹⁵ See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.161.

⁶¹⁶ Pinochet in The Times, 17 January, 1978, quoted in Calvert, Peter, "Boundary Disputes in Latin America", Conflict Studies, 146, 1983, p.11.

Second, Chile should determine which area of land it should receive, and proposed the mineral-rich Los Lipez region;

Third, the area of land concerned had to be equal not only to the area of land surrendered but also to that of the 200 mile wide strip of the sea to which possession of a coastal strip would give Bolivia rights.⁶¹⁷

Although Bolivia initially seemed to accept the proposal, the process of negotiation was interrupted by the La Paz government without a clear explanation. Although the Foreign Ministers of the two countries, Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal and Alberto Guzman agreed to nominate special representatives of the two governments to proceed with the negotiation, Bolivia never named its representatives.⁶¹⁸ It was soon admitted by the Bolivian government that the failure of those negotiations was due to the weakness of the Banzer government at that time, as he declared on 29 September, 1977:

Presencia reconocía que los acontecimientos relacionados con la negociación habían sido muy dinámicos, por lo que su gobierno entraría en una pausa, a fin de analizar la situación, y que sería el Parlamento el que decidiría si Bolivia aceptaba o rechazaba el canje territorial propuesto por Chile. ... su gobierno no tomará decisión sobre el asunto.⁶¹⁹

President Pinochet thereby sent a letter to his Bolivian counterpart urging the reopening of the negotiations:

Mi gobierno mantiene inalterable la voluntad política que dio origen a esas negociaciones y está dispuesto a impulsarlos de acuerdo con los deseos y son la intensidad que Vuestra Excelencia quiera darles. ... Considero que en la etapa actual de la negociación sería aconsejable hacer una evaluación de lo actuado, precisar acciones futuras. Los representantes especiales podrían realizar una útil labor al respecto.⁶²⁰

In 1978, the Bolivian government decided to break down diplomatic relations with Chile, condemning the lack of *voluntad sincera* of the Pinochet regime over the talks.

⁶¹⁷ *Prensa Latina Bulletin*, 674 (1976) quoted in *ibid.*, p.13.

⁶¹⁸ See Chubretovich, Carlos, Reseña de la Gestión Diplomática con Bolivia, Editorial La Noria, Santiago, 1987, p.52.

⁶¹⁹ Banzer in *ibid.*, p.52.

Simultaneously, Bolivia reinitiated an international operation to multilateralise the territorial demand. Her position was supported by US President Jimmy Carter in the 8th General Assembly of the OAS in June 1978, who echoed the Bolivian demand calling for action from the international community to help in settling the issue.⁶²¹ In the La Paz meeting of 1979, furthermore, the OAS passed a resolution by an almost unanimous decision of the member countries - except Chile - emphasising “the necessity of a fair solution which can provide Bolivia access to the Pacific for the permanent hemispheric interest.” They also specified what was to be included in the negotiation: in particular “no compensation by Bolivia.”⁶²² The military government had to face strong domestic challenges on this resolution. For instance, ex-Ambassadors condemned the government saying that the isolated position of Chile on this issue was only “a matter of the present regime and should not damage the national image of Chile.”⁶²³

However, things suddenly changed. Even though the vote in 1979 was against the Chilean position, another resolution in 1980 approved of the Chilean attitude becoming more positive and sincere than in previous years, and also recommended a new negotiation between the two countries. However, it is probable that the pro-Chilean position came about not because of the actual change of the Chilean attitude, but because of the extreme unpopularity of the Bolivian military regime of Luis García Méza who had ousted the democratic government of Lidia Gueler. In 1983, finally, the position of the OAS became more favourable to Chile. However, Bolivia and Chile only arrive at a mutually incompatible position in the preliminary talks between the Ambassadors of the two countries in Geneva in the next year. Although the Chilean Foreign Minister, Jaime del Valle, advised General Pinochet to suspend talks with Bolivia after the fruitless meeting with his Bolivian partner, Gustavo Fernández, the negotiation channel remained open until 1987.

⁶²⁰ Pinochet in *ibid.*, p.53.

⁶²¹ See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, pp.144-5.

⁶²² OAS Resolution quoted in Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.144.

⁶²³ El Mercurio, 23 November, 1979.

In April 1987, Bolivia proposed two alternatives - both of them without compensation - in a Montevideo meeting of the two Foreign Ministers, Jaime del Valle and Guillermo Bedregal: first, Chilean concession of land and a maritime corridor of 2,830km² space between *la Línea de la Concordia* and *Arica*; or second, Chilean concession of a triangular zone of *Caleta Camarones*, *Tocopilla* and *Mejillones*.⁶²⁴ Chilean reactions varied: while the Foreign Minister Del Valle did not express his opinion but merely said “there is no reason to discard optimism and hope,”⁶²⁵ Admiral José Toribio Merino, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Navy, expressed his objection against the negotiation:

la costa chilena es una línea continua que se inicia en la Línea de la Concordia y termina en el Polo Sur. Así que si alguien quiere que pensar que en esa línea continua, que es chilena, propia, se va a meter alguien, está equivocado.⁶²⁶

Facing strong public opinion⁶²⁷ as well as that of the military institutions, the Chilean government formally rejected Bolivia's proposal in June 1987:

... la Cancillería siente el deber de informar que no resulta admisible para Chile el fondo de la aludida propuesta boliviana en sus dos alternativas, esto es la concesión de territorio chileno soberano, sea a través de un corredor al norte de Arica o de un clave a lo largo de su litoral.⁶²⁸

The Chilean rejection forced Bolivia to resort to a multilateral solution again and Bolivia obtained reasonable support from the *Consejo Permanente* of the OAS and the UN General Assembly. However, the Bolivian strategy proved inadequate due to the bilateral - trilateral if Peru is included - nature of the issue, the strong objections of Chile both at governmental and public level, and the international unpopularity of Bolivia itself. As can be seen in a note distributed by the Foreign Minister to the representatives at the OAS meeting in 1985, the strategy of the military regime,

⁶²⁴ For maps and details, see Chubretovich, Carlos, Reseña de la Gestión Diplomática con Bolivia, “Chapter 10: Contenido de la Propuesta”, pp.89-98.

⁶²⁵ El Mercurio, 23 April, 1987.

⁶²⁶ Admiral José Toribio Merino, Commander in Chief, Chilean Navy, in El Mercurio 8 May, 1987.

⁶²⁷ Examples of public protests are well documented in Chubretovich, Carlos, Reseña de la Gestión Diplomática con Bolivia, pp.86-88; pp.120-124.

⁶²⁸ *ibid.*, p.126. The whole text of the declaration can be found on pp.126-7.

emphasising the bilateral character of the issue, reveals Chile's internationally isolated position particularly in multilateral politics.

Chile estima conveniente reiterar la absoluta incompetencia de todo organismo internacional para conocer la aspiración marítima boliviana, en cuanto ella afecta la integridad y soberanía territorial de Chile. Las pretensiones de Bolivia de acceder al mar a través de territorio chileno sólo pueden ser analizadas dentro de un ámbito bilateral.⁶²⁹

As has been suggested in the above discussion, the issue of *salida al mar* was determined by a number of variables.

Linkage: Legalism and Nationalism

As Wilhelmy suggested, Chile had two possible options in the issue of *salida al mar*: either, "internally acceptable territorial concessions in exchange for reasonable compensation," or, "maintaining the *status quo* without harming bilateral relations by making it clear that there would be no concession."⁶³⁰ The traditional Chilean position - obviously the second option - was based on the impossibility of revising *el Tratado de Paz, Amistad y Comercio* of 1904 which subsequent Chilean governments had regarded as a permanent solution to the issue.⁶³¹ This unerring position had led to simple ignorance of the Bolivian demand. When President Ibáñez, for instance, visited La Paz, people in the street shouted "port, port!" openly demanding a solution for Bolivian access to the sea. Illustrating his position, the president asked his Bolivian partner, Paz Estensoro, "Why do you want a port when you do not have the sea?"⁶³²

⁶²⁹ *EL Mercurio*, 3 March, 1985, p.C3.

⁶³⁰ Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", p.304.

⁶³¹ In this treaty, Bolivia confirmed the absolute dominance of Chile in this area as recognised in the *Pacto de Tregua* of 1884. See Chubretovich, Carlos, Reseña de la Gestión Diplomática con Bolivia, pp.44-5.

⁶³² Miguel Barros, José, "Presencia y Status Internacional de Chile durante las Tres Últimas Decadas", in Cursos y Seminario del Instituto de Ciencia Política : Política y Relaciones Internacionales, p.92. During the previous Chilean regime, however, Bolivia strengthened her position as the Allende government supported the Panamanian position based on Latin Americanism and Anti-Imperialism, when Panama was in a conflict with the US in revising the Panama Channel Treaty.

However, the military government initially seemed to adopt the first position. In other words, the negotiation attempt with Bolivia under the Pinochet regime was an exception to the traditional Chilean position that presumed that the territorial issue was permanently settled with the *Tratado* of 1904. In contrast to what was suggested, nevertheless, what was revealed throughout the negotiation period was that the government neither wanted to make a territorial concession nor to continue sincere negotiation. Although the fundamental Chilean position was based on the traditional Legalism and Nationalism, the inconsistent actions in the negotiation period were naive enough to damage not only the bilateral relations between Chile and Bolivia, but also the international image of Chile.

Domestic Politics: Objective

The overall crucial element in Chilean policy on this issue was domestic politics which were motivated by the concept of the defence of sovereignty backed by the public and, especially, the military. Consequently the real purpose of Pinochet's proposal in 1975 was to draw the nation together and to secure internal political support, by making an offer impossible to be accepted by Bolivia. It should be remembered that the *salida al mar* issue was one of the scarce examples of the military regime taking the initiative in its external behaviour.

Elite

It is also possible that the problem during the negotiation process was somewhat closely related to the change of Foreign Minister, from Jaime del Valle, a pro-Bolivian, to Ricardo García Rodríguez. When the appointment was announced in 1986, it was expected that Chile would soon finish negotiations with Bolivia. However, a more decisive factor in this issue was the presence of the strong objection of the Chilean military with deep geopolitical as well as historical roots.

Geopolitics

A major geopolitical factor in the background of Pinochet's proposal was concern about increased status of Bolivia. The Banzer administration had come to power in

1971 in a coup which had strong support from the Brazilians, and both Chile and Argentina were eager to offset Brazil's growing influence there. Brazil's promise to upgrade rail links into eastern Bolivia and develop the iron ore resources of that area threatened Chile's status as a major mineral producer and geographical advantage over Bolivia, thus the Pinochet regime had to reorientate her Latin American Policy towards Bolivia. For the moment, it gave Banzer increased bargaining power in regional politics while the temporary stability of his right-wing government offered time to negotiate.⁶³³

In the course of the negotiation, on the other hand, the presence of Peru made the issue more complicated, but more comfortable for Chile. Hence, one traditional strategy was to maintain the position that Chile could not satisfy Bolivian aspirations because it required Peru's approval in this matter. It was a highly skilful strategy, although the fundamental fact was that the Bolivian aspirations were unacceptable to the concept of Chilean sovereignty and territorial integrity: Peruvian consent was another matter. This position was also retained during the Pinochet Regime. Indeed, the Peruvian Foreign Ministry claimed the right of Peru in the north of Chile at the time of the Chilean offer to Bolivia. Peruvians had persistently argued that if Arica's status were ever to change, it should be returned to Peru, not to Bolivia - which had no historical claim to it. Their chief concern, understandably, was to resist the idea of handing *Arica* (once Peruvian, now Chilean) to Bolivia, although ever since 1929, when the *Arica-Tacna* border dispute was finally settled, Peru had shown no real hankering after this lost territory.⁶³⁴

Above all, Chilean geopoliticians, including General Pinochet, interpreted their nineteenth century expansion northward as an example of classical and justified *lebensraum* (the struggle for living space) and argue that the matter is closed.⁶³⁵ Hence, the sincerity of his proposal can be questioned, in that Pinochet's position to the issue was theoretically well prepared long before:

⁶³³ See Calvert, Peter, "Boundary Disputes in Latin America", p.13.

⁶³⁴ See Latin American Weekly Report, 3 January, 1975, pp.2-4.

⁶³⁵ See Child, Jack, "Inter-State Conflict in Latin America in the 1980s", p.44.

Por más que quiera pensarse en el derecho como elemento nivelador de categorías nacionales, siempre frente a la dura realidad el país de categorías nacionales, siempre frente a la dura realidad el país más fuerte militar o económica, diplomática o demográficamente, tendrá ventajas en los litigios fronteras. De ello hay varios ejemplos en Sudamérica.⁶³⁶

La falta de claridad en la delimitación de los Estados después de la independencia de América y, posteriormente, una gran omisión por parte de Chile, permitió a Bolivia alcanzar las costas del Pacífico en desmedro del litoral chileno. En 1879, la Guerra del Pacífico hizo posible a Chile recuperar la zona que le pertenecía. Bolivia, como país mediterráneo, ha recibido amplias facilidades por parte de los chilenos.⁶³⁷

Such geopolitical factors provide a convenient mechanism for the explanation of both the background of Chile's initial proposal and the reluctant negotiation process. The mixed factors in the Chilean geopolitical strategy can be pointed out. While it was necessary to cope with increased Bolivian status by calling them to the negotiating table, both the presence of Peru and the firm theoretical position of Chilean geopoliticians made the negotiation process complicated - or even impossible. The Chilean strategy can easily be detected from the three demands in Pinochet's proposal which would hardly be acceptable by any nation state.

Finally, even if it were assumed that Chile had sincerely tried to solve the issue of *salida del mar*, it was undermined by the domestic politics of Bolivia: for instance, Banzer was soon ousted and Bolivia's internal politics were in a state of extreme instability; and later, in the early 1980s, Luis García Meza's military regime replaced the democratic government of Lidia Gueler. The previous UP government had to face a similar situation when Bolivian domestic politics did not permit improved relations between the two countries, although Chile was willing to build friendly relations.⁶³⁸ Torres, who tried to seek solution sincerely from the other end, was toppled and the anti-Chilean military regime appeared. Consequently, while the Chilean proposal to Bolivia was based on other factors such as geopolitical consideration and domestic

⁶³⁶ Pinochet, Augusto, Geopolítica, p.165.

⁶³⁷ *ibid.*, p.97.

⁶³⁸ Allende government's policy to Bolivia has been often pointed out as an example of the limit of UP regime's Ideological Pluralism: being unilateral.

politics as described above, its negotiation process was also very much influenced by the confusion in Bolivian domestic politics.

5.2.3. Conclusion

Chilean policy in the *Military-Strategic Area* was determined by a number of variables. Considering the strategic nature of issues encountered in this *Area* such as disarmament or territorial disputes, the important role of variables with a highly political character is clear.

Arms acquisition and production efforts were largely reactions against external actors' behaviour, *i.e.* others' policies, whether it was the arms embargo against Chile or extensive marketing efforts by suppliers. As emphasised before, the arms procurement of Chile was implemented on an *ad hoc* basis from whatever sources were available. Hence, Chilean military had a rather unbalanced and inefficient inventory of arms, which became a key factor in the initiation of arms development and production efforts from the late 1970s. An ideological perspective was also manifested in the form of the National Security Doctrine in the arms production and disarmament issues as well as in the two territorial issues.

While Chilean policy dealing with both the Beagle Channel dispute and the *salida al mar* issue was based on geopolitics, the difference between the two territorial conflicts was that the former was basically a reaction against Argentine demands in contrast with the latter which was influenced by other factors. Whereas the objective role of domestic politics and Bolivia's growing international status (others' policies) was a major determinant of Pinochet's initial proposal, subsequent Chilean behaviour lacked sincerity and the fruitless result of the series of negotiations was effected by several variables: Bolivia's domestic problem as others' policies; the presence of Peru as geopolitics, and the application of traditional Chilean nationalism and legalism as historical linkage. The latter was manifested itself in two ways: 'respect of international law and arbitration' (the Beagle Channel dispute) and 'the impossibility of revising the Treaty of 1904' (the *salida al mar* issue).

While the effective management of issues like arms acquisition and two territorial disputes was constantly and fundamentally restricted by the isolated position of Chile rooted in the domestic political situation, it is necessary to point out the important role of the military institution in the overall decision making mechanism on security issues. (elite: strategic role of the military)

5.3. The Economic-Developmental Area

5.3.1. Regional Integration : The Andean Pact

The economic policies introduced by the military regime constituted a new and extreme application of free market principles: tighter control of the money supply and government spending; reduced protection; efforts to eliminate currency overvaluation and to promote exports; an initial sharp cut in real wages, and renewed encouragement to foreign investors.⁶³⁹ Among these principles, the Chilean government particularly maintained a strong line to the effect that it needed foreign investment to resolve its serious economic crisis, and must therefore set more attractive conditions than those provided under the Andean Group's Decision 24. This policy line was manifested in Decree 600. The other five countries of the Andean Group, for their part, insisted that the Chilean Decree 600 on foreign investment was wholly incompatible with Decision 24. The basic points of divergence were due to differing philosophies of development. While the Andean Group's approach was based on a determination to retain control over national development strategies and natural resources; limiting foreign investment according to the level of each country's economic capability and restricting the profits obtained by foreign investors, the Chilean approach aimed to attract maximum foreign investment by offering almost unconditional terms. The following are more specific contradictory features between the two:

- Decision 24 placed far stricter limits on the fields open to foreign investment, and provided for foreign firms to sell off their shareholding to

⁶³⁹ See Sheahan, John, Patterns of Development in Latin America, p.221.

domestic investors over a period of fifteen years, whereas Decree 600 had no such provision;

- Decision 24 restricted profit remissions to 14 per cent a year, while Decree 600 set no limit;
- The Andean regulations forbade member governments to guarantee foreign credits unless the government had a stake in the operation, but the Chilean rules did not;
- While under Decision 24 foreign firms could have access only to short-term domestic credit, local credit for foreign corporations was not restricted in Chile;
- The Andean rules on the import of foreign technology were very much stricter than the Chilean.⁶⁴⁰

After a series of debates with other member countries, Chile finally withdrew from the Andean Group in 1976, a departure which was decisively influenced by the neo-liberal economic development model. Under such a strategy, foreign policy was regarded as an important part of national economic development, with more emphasis on the commercial and financial issues with specific and immediate interest than on the previous regime's broader issues such as North-South conflicts.⁶⁴¹ (conventional development model) As the penetration of economic technocrats increased in the mechanism of foreign policy making, the Andean Pact was soon regarded as an obstacle to the effective implementation of new economic policy. Furthermore, the regional political isolation and the military elite's perception that the majority of the members were hostile to Chile became another factor in the withdrawal from the Pact.⁶⁴²

Via Decree 600 and debt-equity swaps, foreign direct investment reached 6 per cent of GDP, which was by far the largest share in Latin America.⁶⁴³ However, whereas the government was able to launch an aggressive outward-oriented economic policy,

⁶⁴⁰ Latin American Weekly Report, 1 November, 1974, p.343.

⁶⁴¹ See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.144.

⁶⁴² See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.20.


⁶⁴³ See Hojman, David, Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democracy in the 1990s, Macmillan, London, 1993, p.166.

participation of the Chilean government in multilateral politics, e.g. the Third World movement, became rare. Although re-entry to the Pact was discussed in the early 1980s, it was never realised.

5.3.2. Regional Structure of Trade

The active promotion of the outward-oriented policy resulted in an increase of foreign trade in two phases: up to the period of the economic collapse in the early 1980s; and then the mid-1980s onward as seen in **Figure 5.1**. Chile did not have a serious trade balance problem, except during the period of economic crisis. As the economy entered into recovery after the stagnation period, both exports and imports showed stable increase from 1985.

Figure 5.1. Total Value of Chilean Exports and Imports: 1973-1989



Source: *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean*, CEPAL, Various volumes.

Note: Prices are in FOB US\$ million.

However, major trade partners were not significantly changed as **Table 5.4.** and **Figure 5.2.** indicate, apart from the facts that the US became the single most important trade partner with a considerable margin, and Brazil became a major partner being the third largest copper importer from Chile after the US and Germany. Western Europe and Japan continued to be by far the largest bloc for Chilean commercial activities. While trade with socialist countries remained insignificant, it

can be seen that the increase of the share of *Others* from the mid-1980s gradually overtook that of Latin America, thanks to intensified trade with the East Asian countries. **Figure 5.2.** also suggests that the outcome of foreign trade was closely related to the general economic performance of Chile regardless of partner groups: the first boom (1979-1982); the collapse of the neo-liberal policy (1982-1985), and the second boom (1985 onwards).


Table 5.4. Major Chilean Trade Partners: 1974-1989

Order	Chilean Export to (FOB)	Chilean Import from (CIF)
1	US (11613.96)	US (13387.44)
2	Germany (7363.99)	Brazil (4932.82)
3	Japan (7201.15)	Japan (4929.51)
4	Brazil (4452.75)	Germany (3986.48)
5	UK (3627.42)	Argentina (3227.83)

Source: Calculated by the Author from data in Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL, Various volumes.

Note: Figures are cumulative value of export (or import) in US\$ Million between 1974-1989.

Figure 5.2. Chilean Trade Partners by Region: 1974-1989




Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL, various volumes.

Note: Figures are in US\$ million.


From 1976, Brazil became the largest market in Latin America for Chilean goods overtaking Argentina - traditionally the largest. (Figure 5.3.) Unlike the political area in which Brazil intentionally kept its distance from the Chilean military regime, economic relations between Brazil and Chile were reasonably close. The visit of President João B. Figueiredo with 200 businessmen in 1980 was the manifestation of Brazil's '*pragmatismo ecuménico*,' i.e. forced pragmatism under the economic crisis and massive external debt.⁶⁴⁴ Naturally, Brazilian interest was concentrated on the promotion of exports especially to a country governed by a neo-liberal economic policy, as can easily be seen in the sharp increase of Chilean imports - mainly manufactured goods and machinery - during the two boom periods. (Figure 5.3.) However, the agreements signed during the visit of Figueiredo were limited purely to the economic area such as bilateral commerce, tourism and energy.

Figure 5.3. Chilean Trade with Argentina and Brazil: 1974-1989

EXPORT (FOB)



IMPORT (CIF)



Source: *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean*, CEPAL, various volumes.


Note: Figures are in US\$ million.

The impact of the *Tratado de Paz y Amistad* of 1984 was seen in the area of bilateral trade with Argentina. In contrast to a rather unstable trend in the first ten years of the military regime, both export and import figures showed a steady increase from 1985. (Figure 5.3.) During the second half of the 1980s, mutual economic co-operation between Argentina and Chile also moved forward, but slowly, despite potential conflicts in other areas. In 1985, for instance, more than 500 businessmen from the

⁶⁴⁴ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, pp.297-8.

two countries gathered in Mendoza in order to discuss the ideas of regional integration and joint investment in private economic activities.⁶⁴⁵ The meetings of the *Comisión Binacional Chile-Argentina* served to formulate co-operation on specific topics while *la Cámara Chileno-Argentina de Comercio* developed as a dynamic mechanism for the contacts of entrepreneurs of major industries including the financial sector.⁶⁴⁶ However, because of several undermining factors such as the weak economic status of both countries and the complex nature of their relationship, the co-operation process did not advance until the end of the 1980s.⁶⁴⁷

Figure 5.4. Chilean Trade with Major Industrialised Countries: 1974-1989



Source: *Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean*, CEPAL, Various volumes.

Note: Figures are in US\$ million

It is interesting to see that Chile was able to maintain normal economic relations in the areas of trade and foreign investment with the US and the European countries as **Figure 5.4.** shows, in spite of problematic relations in the political area. Despite

⁶⁴⁵ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", p.429. Also see, Gutiérrez Olivos, Sergio, "Las Relaciones Chileno-Argentinas: Proyecciones de la Vecindad", in Díaz Albónico, Rodrigo (ed.), *El Tratado de Paz y Amistad entre Chile y Argentina*, Editorial Universitaria, Santiago, 1987, pp.136-7.


⁶⁴⁶ See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Chile: Problemas Externos y 'Proyección del Régimen'", pp.304-5.

⁶⁴⁷ For a detailed survey of Chilean-Argentine economic relations during the 1980s, see Feliu, Manuel, "La Integración Chileno-Argentina desde una Perspectiva Empresarial", in Orrego Vicuña, Francisco (ed.), *Chile y Argentina: Nuevos Enfoques para una Relación Constructiva*, Pehuén, Santiago, 1989, pp.74-84.

some troubles in diplomatic relations with West Germany, economic links were developed to a level desirable to Chile. As one of the most important economic partners for Chile, Germany provided a major market for Chilean exports. (Table 5.4.) Except in 1981, Chile recorded considerable surplus in her trade with Germany throughout the period. (Figure 5.5.)

In contrast to the *Status-Diplomatic Area*, commercial links with France and Spain continued to be developed showing a similar pattern of increase to those of other developed countries. Their capital and technology as well as manufactured goods were continuously imported to Chile. Especially, Spanish investments - mostly private ones - reached US\$220.4 million in 1984, which made Spain the second largest investor in Chile after the US.⁶⁴⁸

Figure 5.5. Chilean Trade with West Germany: 1973-1989



Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL, Various volumes.

The relationship with Italy was particularly complex. For the first 8 years of the military regime, the two governments maintained symbolic, marginal and sometimes hostile positions to each other. Economic interests were a major factor in the normalisation of relations in the early 1980s. With visits of Italian state and private missions to Chile, for instance, the Institute of External Trade (ICE) in 1980 and an

⁶⁴⁸ See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.280.

official delegation to the *Feria Internacional de Santiago* (FISA) in 1982, economic contacts were initiated making both countries reasonably satisfied. While Italian entrepreneurs appreciated the favourable conditions for external investments in Chile, Chile could enjoy trade surplus. In 1980, trade between the two countries reached nearly US\$400 million, a 400 per cent increase on the 1975 total. Of this figure, Chile exported US\$271.1 million while Italian exports to Chile totalled US\$125.8 million.⁶⁴⁹ Meanwhile, political relations remained cool showing a clear division between the two areas.

As already noted, unlike the uneasy relations between Chile and the above politically sensitive European states, those with Britain showed reasonable stability after the arrival of Margaret Thatcher. Chilean trade with Britain showed a similar pattern to that with Italy in terms of amounts exchanged. However, although political and economic co-operation between the two countries intensified,⁶⁵⁰ the trade figure did not show any considerable growth. Nevertheless, the visits to Chile of British government officials, trade missions, entrepreneurs and investors continued during the years of the Conservative government.

The division between the political and economic aspects of Chilean foreign relations was more obvious in the case of the US. Except during the period of economic hardship in the early 1980s, trade with the US increased by an impressive rate compared to that with other developed countries. Even after the Letelier Case, trade between the two countries expanded until 1980. (**Figure 5.4.**) The highly stable commercial relations with the US can be explained by the dualism of Carter's foreign policy.⁶⁵¹

As Japan is well-known as a country with strong economic pragmatism in her foreign policy, it is not unexpected to see a dominance of economic issues in its relations with Chile. In particular, Japan had a great deal of interest in the importation of Chilean

⁶⁴⁹ Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1980.

⁶⁵⁰ For instance, British Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) cover was restored in 1979, and major credit lines were opened and trade talks were initiated in 1980. (See Little, Walter, "Britain, Chile and Human Rights, 1973-1990", p.156.)

⁶⁵¹ For further discussion on Carter's dualism and Chile, see Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.202.

primary products as well as in the attractive Chilean market for Japanese goods. Japan became one of the most important trading partners and, at the same time, enabled Chile to generate more trade surplus than any other country in the 1980s. In terms of Japanese investment in Chile, the combination between Japanese technology and capital, and Chilean natural resources was the most favourable and desirable pattern. Extensive investment was directed to the development of forest, mining, and marine resources in Chile.


In addition to the active economic interaction with Japan, another important dimension of Chilean foreign trade was the rise of its share of trade with other Asian-Pacific countries. (Figure 5.2.) Ending the long-lasting trade protectionism, the introduction of neo-liberal economic policy provided a decisive incentive to find new trade partners. During this period, the miraculous economic development, boosted by an export drive policy, of the Asian-Pacific countries was also witnessed. Along with enhanced political, diplomatic and cultural exchanges, commercial and economic aspects gained more importance in the axis of Chilean policy to the region. Therefore, it is understandable that some positive evaluations of Chilean foreign policy are based on the increased economic interaction and the constant trade surplus with the region. (Figure 5.6.) Chilean export to the region increased by 514 per cent between 1973 and 1987, compared with a total export increase of 309 per cent during the same period. Total commercial exchange increased by four times from US\$929 million to US\$4,058 million, and the trade balance rose to a surplus of US\$633 million from the deficit of US\$165 million in 1973. The increase of commercial exchange was backed by repeated bilateral contacts: for instance, numerous commercial missions sent to Japan (1978), China (1980) and Singapore (1980); the creation of the *Comité Empresarial Chile-Japón* (1979) and *Chile-Singapore* (1980); the establishment of the *Comisión Mixta* with China (1977) and the *Comités de Cooperación Económica Chile-Corea* (1978).⁶⁵² In 1989, 47 per cent of the total Chilean exports was directed to the Pacific Rim region (US\$3,848 million). Among them, the share of the Asian-Pacific countries reached 54.1 per cent exceeding that of the US and Canada (39.5 per cent). When most of the Latin American countries' economic protectionism

⁶⁵² See García, Ricardo, "Política de Chile en el Pacífico", p.5.

prevented their participation within this region, the neo-liberal economic policy of the military government enabled Chile to become the Latin American country most integrated into the Pacific Rim region.⁶⁵³ (development model)

Chilean economic interest helps to explain the continuing Sino-Chilean friendship. Although Chile accounted for only a tiny fraction of the total of the greatly expanded global economic activity of China and was no longer a main trading partner among Latin American states, it was one of China's major sources of vital copper imports.⁶⁵⁴ Furthermore, there was constant trade surplus in Chilean trade with China, as seen in **Figure 5.6**. As explained in the above section, the Chinese relationship with the Chilean *Junta* is not the only case where Chinese foreign policy in practice has showed a pragmatic attitude beyond its self-proclaimed progressive stance on international issues.

Figure 5.6. Chilean Trade Balance with China, South Korea and Taiwan: 1982-1989



Source: Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL, various volumes.

However, the matter of mutual economic co-operation became controversial. For instance, after a Chilean trade mission visited China and signed a series of economic agreements in 1980, it was pointed out that these were unequal agreements favouring

⁶⁵³ Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1989.

⁶⁵⁴ See Joseph, William, "China's Relations with Chile under Allende: A case study of Chinese Foreign Policy in Transition", pp.148-9.

Chinese interests. In the agreements, China merely offered agricultural technology for rice cultivation, in exchange for copper processing and production technology as well as Chilean assistance in China's Antarctic investigation projects. The 'isolation thesis' can once again be applied to explain the case.⁶⁵⁵

The economic link between South Korea and Chile was as strong as the cordial diplomatic relationship and was further boosted by Korean economic growth and the Chilean neo-liberal economic policy. Frequent visits of government officials and trade missions were exchanged in the 1980s. In 1982, the *Comisión Mixta Chileno-Coreana* was established as a permanent body for economic co-operation between Chile and Korea. Although the trade pattern was similar to that with Japan - an exchange of primary products and consumer goods - overall bilateral relations were maintained at a much higher level thanks to the common ideological stance: Anti-Communism.

5.3.3. Financial Issues

Immediately after the coup, the *Junta* appealed to the IMF and the World Bank for assistance to rescue Chile from the 'the brink of bankruptcy,' promising to create conditions that would form an environment in which external assistance could prove effective. The Foreign Minister Admiral Ismael Huerta, furthermore, declared Chile's willingness to resume negotiations on compensation for American copper companies whose Chilean properties had been nationalised. In 1974, Chile reached agreements with Anaconda, Kennecott, ITT and others concerning compensation.⁶⁵⁶ The Pinochet regime's initial economic plan also coincided with that of the US Republican government during 1974-76 which fully backed the Chilean economy's revival through the Paris Club and international financing institutions.⁶⁵⁷ Economic assistance to Chile from US multilateral sources during the first three years of the military regime reached to "almost ten times the amount approved during Allende's

⁶⁵⁵ *El Mercurio*, 4 November, 1980, p.A3.

⁶⁵⁶ See Kissinger, Henry, *Years of Upheaval*, p.409.

⁶⁵⁷ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.19.

three years in office.”⁶⁵⁸ During this period, Chile received the World Bank loan of US\$66.5 million and the BID loan of US\$237.8 million.⁶⁵⁹ In 1976 when the UN passed its almost ritual resolution on human rights abuse in Chile, the United States along with West Germany and France abstained rather than voting against Chile as they had done in the previous year. This meant that, in contrast to what was done against the Allende regime, the position of the US government significantly changed. According to Kissinger,

We continued to walk our tightrope, trying to balance our conviction that developments within Chile were geopolitically in our national interest with our view that too ardent an embrace might embarrass us domestically with the Congressional majority, always suspicious of conservative governments. Publicly we maintained some distance from the military government; privately we responded to several of its requests. On October 1, I told my State Department staff: that so far as the new government of Chile is concerned, we should not support moves against them by seeming to dissociate ourselves from the Chileans and on the other hand should not be in a position of defending what they are doing in Santiago.⁶⁶⁰

However, after the murder of Orlando Letelier, US-Chilean relations entered a new stage. The US government announced a series of economic and diplomatic sanctions against Chile. The US package included a ban on future financing or guarantees for US projects in Chile by the Export-Import bank or the private investment corporation.⁶⁶¹ Nevertheless, the favourable stance of the US economic sector, particularly the private one, was very positive for Chile, as the division between the economic and political areas in the making of American foreign policy deepened. General Matthei stated:

Con las Fuerzas Armadas de Estados Unidos estamos muy bien. Con el Departamento de Estado probablemente estamos muy mal. Ahora, con los

⁶⁵⁸ Arriagada, Genaro, Pinochet: The Politics of Power, p.14. According to his calculation, Chile received US\$628 million in 1974-1976, compared with US\$67 million in 1971-1973.

⁶⁵⁹ See Muñoz, Heraldo and Portales, Carlos, “Las Relaciones entre Estados Unidos y Chile durante el Gobierno Militar: 1973-1986”, in Hirst, Monica (ed.), Continuidad y Cambio en las Relaciones América Latina - Estados Unidos, GEL, BS AS, p.113.

⁶⁶⁰ Kissinger, Henry, Years of Upheaval, p.409.

⁶⁶¹ See Latin American Weekly Report, 7 December, 1979, p.1.

círculos económicos estamos excelente ...; yo diría que hay buenas y malas relaciones con Estados Unidos, depende con quién sean.⁶⁶²

In the *Economic-Developmental Area*, as a matter of fact, Chile did not find herself internationally isolated. Although the official uneasy relations with the Carter Administration were continued, the fact that Chile managed to obtain finance from the US private sector supports Matthei's statement.

Chilean economic policy created a new economic environment more favourable and open to external investors: effective inflation control; a low import tariff, and a high interest rate - 7.9 per cent in 1977, 9.2 per cent in 1978, and 12.2 per cent in 1979. The neo-liberal policy was enormously supported by external investors until the collapse of the economy in 1981. Not only with the US, but also with other developed world and non-governmental financial institutions, the pattern was similar or better. For instance, while the Chilean debt from public sector increased by 9 per cent between 1978 and 1981, credits from private banks or financial institutions considerably increased - more than 300 per cent, during the same period. In 1981, Chile, with Uruguay and Jamaica, was rated as one of the few countries which did not lose credibility with the major international banks.⁶⁶³

In the background of the economic collapse of the early 1980s, there was the aggressive anti-inflationary policy of America's Federal Reserve Board as a system factor, producing very high real international interest rates, which caused a world recession and historically low commodity prices.⁶⁶⁴ Furthermore, from 1981 to 87, copper prices averaged US\$0.63 per pound (in 1980 price), about half the average price during the previous twenty years.⁶⁶⁵ Unfortunately for Chile, the deterioration in terms of its trade could not be improved with increased copper exports due to the

⁶⁶² General Fernando Matthei in an interview with *Cosas*, No. 52, 28 September, 1980, p. C3.

⁶⁶³ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.209.

⁶⁶⁴ See *Preliminary Overview of the Economy of Latin America and the Caribbean*, CEPAL, Santiago, 1991.

⁶⁶⁵ *Indicadores Económicos y Sociales: 1960-88*, Banco Central de Chile, Santiago, 1989, p.190.

global recession. As a result, from 1981 to 1989, debt service absorbed 23 per cent of export revenues.⁶⁶⁶

In terms of the internal policy factor, the 'crawling peg system' - frequent devaluations by small rates - were used between 1973-1979 and after 1983 as a strategy to maintain a realistic exchange rate. From 1979-1983, however, Chile maintained fixed nominal exchange rates which led to a balance of payments crisis.⁶⁶⁷ Attempts at rescheduling external debt and obtaining new loans became the major activity of the Chilean government in the *Economic-Developmental Area* throughout the 1980s.

The negative reactions of the international community against the repressive domestic politics and the lack of internal democratic order continued to be a major obstacle which the military government had to deal with during the debt crisis in the early 1980s. After the period of economic hardship, however, the official stance of the US government began to change with the end of the 'silent diplomacy.' This change was expressed in various ways: for instance, new credits of US\$500 million by the Export-Import Bank in 1983; US\$100 million by the World Bank and US\$200 million by BID. In 1985, when the military government had difficulty in rescheduling of external debt, the US Treasury guaranteed a loan of US\$250 million from the World Bank.⁶⁶⁸ The decision of a US private bank to grant Chile US\$1,950 million between 1985 and 1987 without guarantee of the World Bank, in order to support a macroeconomic programme, can be interpreted as a further manifestation of the positive US attitude. Subsequently, the approval of US\$195 million and US\$250 from the World Bank followed in 1985 and 1986, respectively.⁶⁶⁹

⁶⁶⁶ See Sohn, Ira, "Chile's Resource Sectors: Challenges and Opportunities in the 1990s", *Natural Resources Forum*, 17:3, 1993, p.201.

⁶⁶⁷ On the other hand, the Allende regime favoured the fixed rate system. One of the promises of the Allende presidential campaign was: *terminaremos con las escandalosas devaluaciones del escudo* (we'll stop the shameful devaluations of the *escudo*) See Hojman, David, *Chile: The political Economy of Development and Democracy in the 1990s*, p.172.

⁶⁶⁸ See Varas, Augusto, *Los Militares en el Poder*, p.154.

⁶⁶⁹ Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior Chilena durante 1985", pp.434-5.

Although the economic sanction was newly imposed in December 1987, the US did not block the process of debt rescheduling and the granting of credits by multilateral banks to Chile as the Reagan administration did not want further conflict with Chile. In 1987, Chile successfully obtained about US\$1,000 million for government planning from the IMF, the World Bank and private banks. Interestingly, the paradox of the debt issue that it was not only a problem for Chile but also for the lenders, generally the US financial sector, meaning that Chile had more manoeuvrability in dealing with the situation. According to Falcoff:

It [Chile] has discovered that financial markets are remarkably resistant to political pressures. And since it entered into a serious economic downturn in 1981, it has benefited indirectly but quite decisively from the fact that its huge foreign debt is but part of a larger problem for the US Treasury and the American banking system. It is thus difficult (though not impossible) for the US government to deal with Chilean financial problems on an exclusively political basis.⁶⁷⁰

In some cases, Chile was able to obtain the necessary loans, thanks to the help of Latin America and the Third World: the gentlemen's agreement to vote in support of one another at the international financial institutions regardless of ideological differences.⁶⁷¹ However, as a result of excessive foreign borrowing by Chilean banks, the government was forced to take over some of them and liquidate others. To restore confidence in the banking sector, the government guaranteed private debt and rescheduled principal payments. As a result, Chile was able to benefit from credit infusions from the IMF. By 1985, five of the banks taken over were returned to their former owners, with more rigorous supervision, an enhanced capital base and a requirement that banks repurchase their bad debt from the Central Bank before being permitted to resume dividend payments. A positive indicator in the Chilean financial situation of the late 1980s was that Chilean debt was selling at over 90 per cent of par value - the highest of all the major Latin American debtor countries.⁶⁷²

⁶⁷⁰ Falcoff, Mark, "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition and the United States", p.189.

⁶⁷¹ Thus, Chile continued to vote in favour of Nicaraguan loans at the Inter-American Development Bank (and vice-versa). See Falcoff, Mark, "Chile: Pinochet, the Opposition and the United States", p.194.

⁶⁷² See Sohn, Ira, "Chile's Resource Sectors: Challenges and Opportunities in the 1990s", p.201.

5.3.4. Conclusion

The Pinochet regime's foreign policy in the *Economic-Developmental Area* was primarily based on both Economic Developmentalism as an ideological force and the conventional development model as an instrumental one. The regime's strong commitment to outward-oriented economic growth backed by neo-liberalism meant that economic consideration became a major axis of foreign policy. Its first implication in foreign policy was the withdrawal from the Andean Pact in 1976.

As for trade policy, the government tried to stimulate Chilean exports in various ways particularly during the period of economic crisis: re-entry to the Andean Pact was considered although not realised; the government requested special action by GATT to eliminate the tariff against Chilean products imposed by the EC and others, and co-operation with the CIPEC countries was intensified.⁶⁷³ As the role of the private sector in foreign trade was expanded and the economy was recovering from the collapse, it became necessary to create a governing body to co-ordinate the commercial activities of both the public and private sector. For this purpose, the *Comité Coordinador del Proyecto Nacional de Exportaciones*, consisting of entrepreneurs, was created, and the *Consejo Consultivo de Negociaciones Económicas Internacionales* with the participation of the private sector and the Foreign Ministry was established in 1985. Furthermore, the government transformed the structure of the *Dirección de Exportadores Pro-Chile* by incorporating it within the Foreign Ministry in order to give more decision making power.⁶⁷⁴ However, this radical transformation of bureaucracy further limited the participation of the traditional elite in foreign economic policy inside the Foreign Ministry and boosted the phenomenon of the 'interfered Foreign Ministry.'

On the other hand, the Chilean economic project in external financing emphasised the direct link with international lending institutions from as early as 1973, immediately after the *coup*. This link played a major role in avoiding financial disaster at the end of the 1970s which might have been caused by the economic sanctions of the Carter

⁶⁷³ See Muñoz, Heraldo, "La Política Exterior de Chile: la Crisis Continúa", pp.368-9.

⁶⁷⁴ See Muñoz, Heraldo, Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno, p.214.

administration. In the mid-80s, Chile once again utilised this link, with the help of the Reagan administration and European governments at that time.

During the boom period of the late 1970s and after the recovery of the economy in the 1980s, the image of Chile was relatively positive in the international business circle, even when compared to the previous government. This was a result of the monetarist economic policy which had boosted the reinsertion of Chile into the international economic system (or the stage of the international division of labour). The growing importance of Chilean foreign economic activity meant that, to a certain extent, it overshadowed the military government's negative image and poor performance in other *Areas*, as Magnet expressed:

La completa apertura al exterior en importaciones, contratación de créditos y facilidades a las inversiones genera una ventaja diplomática: la de insertar a Chile en una red de intereses económicos norteamericanos, europeos (y también japoneses) tan fuertes como para hacer olvidar ciertos aspectos conflictivos de la política externa y cubrir el grave déficit de la seguridad exterior provocado por esa misma política.⁶⁷⁵

In other words, while most of the political and diplomatic efforts of the government to overcome international isolation met with no success, the improved economic image of Chile seemed to compensate for the frustration of the military regime. For instance, Chilean decision makers particularly tried to improve economic relations with some problematic European counterparts. During the boom period of the late 70s and the early 80s, the Chilean image was also promoted by the regular appearance of a series of special editions in international journals and newspapers dedicated to the Chilean economic performance, although most of them were financed by the Chilean government and companies.⁶⁷⁶

While the development strategy of Chile deeply affected 'the economic perspectives of foreign policy,' Chilean experience suggested that their 'foreign economic policy' and 'foreign economic relations' tended to be also influenced by external factors. In particular, one negative factor of importance was the variable US policy under the

⁶⁷⁵ Magnet, Alejandro, "La Visita de Sonoda", in *Hoy*, 12-18 September, 1979, p.63.

⁶⁷⁶ See Muñoz, Heraldo, *Las Relaciones Exteriores del Gobierno Militar Chileno*, p.221.

Reagan administration although this is not to suggest the US did not support the Chilean development model. According to Muñoz, this unsteady position of the US concerning the use of economic pressure on Chile was due to the existence of fragmented power groups inside the US government. They were:

1. Those who refused to use the voting power in the international financial institutions as a form of political pressure;
2. Those who wanted to use this power for democratisation of Chile by opposing grants;
3. Those who wanted to use voting power as political pressure, albeit with a strong desire to save the neo-liberal economic policy of the military government of Chile, which resulted in the absence of a vote in several cases.⁶⁷⁷

Eventually, what made the position of the US more ambiguous was that the majority of people inside the decision making circle were classified in the third group. For them, economic pressure was understood as the last resort although they still aimed at the democratisation of Chile,⁶⁷⁸ which has been often pointed out as a limitation on Reagan's policy. In other countries, however, the pattern was rather more simple as many favourable responses to Chilean open economy were seen. On the whole, the ambiguous but basically supportive position of the US and the more positive reaction from other parts of the world became major factors in the reintegration of Chilean economy with the world, especially from the mid-1980s.

In summary, the political isolation and the economic reintegration process meant that there was a division between the economic and political aspects of the foreign policy and international activities of Chile in terms of the function of determinants, as the decisiveness of the economic variables in this *Area* suggests: Economic Developmentalism; conventional development model and dependency: subordinative policy. Although international pressure against the problematic domestic politics continued until the end of the Pinochet regime, some macroeconomic indicators in the

⁶⁷⁷ Muñoz, Heraldo, "Chile: Autoritarismo y Política Exterior en 1986", p.439.

⁶⁷⁸ See *ibid.*, p.441.

second half of the 1980s have shown an impressive performance in the foreign economic activities. Chilean export in volume increased by 64 per cent between 1980 and 1989 by increasing terms of trade by 5 per cent during the same period. By 1989 the external debt burden was lower in Chile than anywhere else and the secondary market price of Chilean paper was 59 per cent of face value in November 1989, only exceeded by Colombia's 64 per cent. "The Chilean economy at the end of the 1980s looked consistently solid and healthy."⁶⁷⁹

⁶⁷⁹ Hojman, David, Chile: The Political Economy of Development and Democracy in the 1990s, pp.14-5.

VI. CONCLUSION

This research has so far assessed the foreign policy of the two contemporary Chilean regimes under a purpose-built framework utilising two major axes of the theory of foreign policy study: determinant variables and *Issue Areas*. In Chapters II and III, the theoretical aspects of study were discussed, including a preliminary examination of the implications of determinant variables on Chilean foreign policy. Successive Chapters were dedicated to the survey of the policies of the socialist regime and the military regime, respectively, with regard to *Issue Areas* and each issue's determinants. As stated before, the study was intended to offer a viable way of studying foreign policy under two specific notions: *first*, a country's foreign policy is a subject too broad and specific to be generalised, and *second*, it is designed and implemented by the complex functioning of determinant variables. **Table 6.1.** briefly shows the patterns which have emerged. The grey cells signify that that particular variable influenced foreign policy in that *Area*. According to this **Table**, several common features of the positive function of variables can be listed as follows:

- The role of historical linkage in the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- The role of ideology in the *Status-Diplomatic* and *Economic-Developmental Areas*.
- The objective role of domestic politics in the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- The importance of the political elite, particularly the President, in all three *Areas*.
- The role of the military in the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- The role of geopolitics in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.
- The influence of dependency in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.
- Foreign policy as a response to others' policies in the *Military-Strategic Area*.

On the other hand, negative co-relations between determinant variables and foreign policy *Issue Areas* can be also found:

- No *direct* implication of domestic politics in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.
- No role of development model in the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- No role by the bureaucratic elite and the military elite in the *Military-Strategic Area* and *Economic-Developmental*, respectively.
- No role of geopolitics in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.
- No implication of structural dependency in the *Military-Strategic Area*.

Table 6.1. Determinant Variables and Issue Areas of Chilean Foreign Policy: Socialist Regime and Military Regime.

	Socialist Regime			Military Regime		
	S-D	M-S	E-D	S-D	M-S	E-D
<i>Historical Linkage</i>	Americanism Legalism	Previous History	Legalism; Nationalism		Legalism; Nationalism	
<i>Ideology</i>	Ideological Pluralism		Ideological Pluralism; Anti- Imperialism	Anti- Communism	National Security Doctrine	Economic Developmentalism
<i>Domestic Politics</i>		Objective	Situational; Objective		Objective	
<i>Development Model</i>	Reformist		Reformist			Conventional
<i>Elite</i>						
<i>Political</i>						
<i>Bureaucratic</i>	Foreign Ministry					Economic Bureaucrats
<i>Military</i>		Strategic		Political	Strategic	
<i>Geopolitics</i>						
<i>Dependency</i>	Resistive		Resistive			Subordinative
<i>Others' Policies</i>						

Note: S-D: Status-Diplomatic Area

M-S: Military-Strategic Area

E-D: Economic-Developmental Area

What is more important, however, is the characteristic features of each regime's policy in terms of co-relations between determinant variables and the *Issue Areas*.

The Socialist Regime

- Foreign policy was generally pursued in line with tradition in all three *Areas*. (historical linkage)
- Ideology was not present in the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- Domestic politics was highly influential in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.
- The development model and the dependency: resistive policy variables were important in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.
- The role of the Foreign Ministry bureaucrats was seen in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. (the bureaucratic elite)
- The role of the military was limited to the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- The others' policies variable did not influence external behaviour in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.

The Military Regime

- The division of economic (the *Economic-Developmental*) and political (the *Status-Diplomatic* and the *Military-Strategic*) *Areas vis-à-vis* determinant variables.
- No historical linkage with the exception of the *Military-Strategic Area*.
- Overall importance of ideology.
- The *Economic-Developmental Area* was not influenced by domestic politics.
- The roles of the development model and the dependency: subordinative policy were limited to the *Economic-Developmental Area*.
- The functional role of the economic bureaucrats in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.
- Excessive participation of the military in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.
- The others' policies did not influence the *Economic-Developmental Area*.

However, the specific function of each variable is by no means homogeneous and it is difficult to generalise. In this concluding **Chapter**, therefore, the focus will be on characterising each variable by further reviewing and comparing their roles in the foreign policies of the two regimes with special attention paid to the afore mentioned features.

Historical Linkage

As any governmental change can break certain historical traditions of a country's foreign policy, there have been several cases of historical inconsistency in the Allende government's foreign policy. Firstly, the breakdown of certain *taboos* was seen in the (re)establishment of the diplomatic relations with Cuba, East Germany and China as well as in their active participation in the Non-Alignment movement. Secondly, the international aspect of Americanism was implemented in such a way as to deny the existence of the inter-American system - the OAS, while national aspects were still emphasised.⁶⁸⁰ That is to say, Pan-Americanism which had originally incorporated the US was discarded when imperialism was identified with the United States. The UP not only objected to the Organisation of American States as a tool of the United States government, but also intended to form a new kind of regional organisation.

Despite such examples of the breakdown, it is not difficult to find traditional values in the UP's foreign policy in all three *Areas*. Although Americanism manifested itself in different ways by denouncing Pan-Americanism, relations with the Latin American countries as well as the connection to the Andean Pact were dealt with as a matter of considerable importance and priority. Legalism and Nationalism were strongly present in the most significant foreign policy agenda of the period: copper nationalisation. Although Nationalism was probably the factor which was manifested the least among the traditional values, as a form of Resource Nationalism, it played a crucial background role in conjunction with Anti-Imperialism.

Furthermore, Allende's policy was designed and implemented in line with the previous regime's policy, to a certain degree. While the constant inflow of military assistance from the US demonstrated the passive preservation of the traditional, the issues in the *Economic-Developmental Area* offer stronger examples of historical linkage. Given the need for economic and technological resources for development, the policy priority of the Frei regime, which was based on the model of "induced development,"⁶⁸¹ opened the way for a flexible response to the international system

⁶⁸⁰ See Section 1.2.

⁶⁸¹ Cope, Orville G., "Chile", p.312.

composed of new forms of co-operation and conflict in the early 1970s. Consequently, while emphasising less US penetration and more diversification in the development process, the UP government initiated a foreign policy which utilised the general outline of the previous administration but with “a significant difference of intent,”⁶⁸² as we have seen in the increasing contacts between the nations in Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, Asia and the Socialist Bloc.

On the other hand, the foreign policy of the military government was initiated by objecting to all the aspects of the previous regime. Thanks to regional and global isolationism and the radical transformation of economic policy, the traditional meaning of Chilean foreign policy no longer existent at least in two *Areas: Status-Diplomatic* and *Economic-Developmental*. However, as we have seen in two territorial disputes, the Beagle Channel dispute and the *salida al mar* issue, Nationalism and Legalism still retained great importance. Consequently, the *Military-Strategic Area* was the only policy area in which Chile did not experience the breakdown of linkage.

Ideology

Many students of Chilean foreign policy have tried to outline the Allende regime’s policy using an ideological perspective: some have argued that it was ideological⁶⁸³ while others have emphasised the pragmatic dimension of the policy.⁶⁸⁴ However, as pointed out before, it is not easy to differentiate between something ideological and something pragmatic since being ideological can have pragmatic elements. The ideologies manifested in the election programme of the UP coalition and promoted in the real policy contained both ideological and pragmatic elements in themselves.

⁶⁸² *ibid.*, p.312. For the Frei regime’s development strategy, also see Veliz, Claudio, “The Chilean Experiment,” *Foreign Affairs*, 49:3, 1971, pp. 442-53.

⁶⁸³ See Meneses, Emilio, Coping with Decline: Chilean Foreign Policy during the Twentieth Century; and Fernandois, Joaquín, Chile y el Mundo 1970-73: La Política Exterior del Gobierno de la Unidad Popular y el Sistema Internacional; and Barros, Mario, Realismo e Idealismo en la Política Exterior de Chile, Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, 1984.

⁶⁸⁴ See Fortín, Carlos, “Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government”; and Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile.”

While most policies inspired by Ideological Pluralism were pragmatic, copper nationalisation was processed in rather an ideological way in which the promotion of Resource Nationalism as an expression of Anti-Imperialism was witnessed.

As suggested in **Chapter II**, the role of foreign policy ideology should be assessed in accordance with actual policy behaviour, since there is no point saying that there is no gap between the proposal and the actual policy implementation. In the case of UP foreign policy, although Ideological Pluralism was pursued almost completely in line with its original definition, some gap was found in the implementation of the Anti-Imperialistic policy, e.g. arms imports from the US.

Muñoz pointed out that the majority of proposals of the election programme were “perfectly consistent with the long-standing postulates of Chilean socialism in the area of international affairs and with the character of the SP,” suggesting that the UP programme was influenced by six international principles of the Chilean Socialist party,⁶⁸⁵ which was in charge of the international section of the UP programme.⁶⁸⁶ It is, therefore, necessary to trace Chilean socialists’ international vision. Being differentiated from the Chilean Communist Party, the Socialist party’s international policy exhibited two unique features: autonomy and anti-imperialism. Between 1955 and 1960, Yugoslav socialism was adopted as an ideal model to follow when its autonomous non-alignment policy was greatly popular. This pro-Yugoslav approach to both domestic and international issues prompted “an occasionally bitter open debate with the Communists.”⁶⁸⁷ In the 1960s, however, the influence of the Yugoslav experience in the international position of the Socialist party declined and

⁶⁸⁵ These are *Antiimperialism, Nationalist Perspective, Nonalignment, Opposition to the Politics of Blocs, Latin-Americanism and Third Worldism, and Protection of National Resource*. See Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile,” pp.154-55.

⁶⁸⁶ Here is the reason why the extensive debate between the Communists and the Socialists did not take place over the matter of UP’s foreign policy unlike the domestic policy area. For the debates between the Communists and Socialists over general and domestic issues, see Silva Solar, Julio, “The Program of the Unidad Popular”, in Gil, Federico, Lagos, Ricardo and Landsberger, Henry (eds.), Chile at the Turning Point, pp.192-194.

⁶⁸⁷ Pollack and Rosenkranz continued:

This was only moderated when, on the one hand, the Communists gradually began to accept the existence of Titoism as a fact of life and, on the other hand, the Socialists began to move further to the left in the political spectrum, a move mainly inspired by the new challenges arising from the Cuban experience. (Pollack, Benny and Rosenkranz, Hernan, Revolutionary Social Democracy, pp.37-38.)

was replaced by the transcendental impact of the Cuban Revolution. The Cuban case represented a process with which Chilean socialists could more identify themselves politically, culturally, geographically and economically than Yugoslavia's. With great passion, Chilean socialists began to support the Cuban government in its confrontational position with the US. Hence, the radicalised international policy of the Socialist party which was reflected in the election programme, can therefore be seen.⁶⁸⁸

Furthermore, the theoretical outlook of the Allende government, that the existence of underdevelopment in the world is linked to the process of expansion of world capitalism and international exploitation, perfectly complied with the dependency perspectives proposed by CEPAL in the 1950s and the 1960s. However, it is important to note the great difference between the contribution made by the Socialist party to the foreign-policy section of the election programme of the UP and what was actually accomplished by the socialists who took charge of the government's foreign policy.⁶⁸⁹ The pragmatic foreign policy was influenced by President Allende and his advisors' moderate socialism. When the Chilean transition to socialism inevitably needed maximum international permission, the decision makers perception, especially Allende's, was that there was not a sufficiently favourable international environment to run the risk. Therefore, what they sought was to transform Chilean foreign policy in such a way which was for suitable for the international system while carrying on the transformation of domestic politics and economy. The strong manifestation of Anti-Imperialism and Socialistic Idealism was soon to be replaced with moderated

⁶⁸⁸ During this period the Socialists condemned the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) as an instrument oriented to serve the interests of the United States and opposed the creation of the Andean Pact, which was seen largely as a scheme that would facilitate the expansion of transnational capitalism in the region. See Muñoz, Heraldo, "The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile", p.154.

⁶⁸⁹ In order to understand the existence of fractions inside the party, it is necessary to note the pluralistic character of the Socialist Party as Pollack and Rosenkranz expressed:

Although from its very inception the party declared itself Marxist, Marxism appeared more as a general ideological background than as an exclusive set of beliefs, and this is why it was so often relegated to the rear of fashionable isms like Peronism, Titoism or Nasserism. Latin American nationalism and Third World stands on a variety of issues have always been salient features of the party's ideology which, together with its multi-class base and its successful efforts to become an influential mass party, have brought it nearer to Latin America's populist parties, like Peronismo, Aprismo or the MNR, than to the classical Marxist-Leninist model of a party of committed revolutionaries. (Pollack, Benny and Rosenkranz, Hernan, Revolutionary Social Democracy, pp.212.)

Anti-Imperialism somewhat related to ‘Principled Pragmatism,’ which contradicted the Socialistic Idealism of the initial stage of the UP. Therefore, it was the presence of the Principled Pragmatism that made the gap between the *Conceptual* and *Empirical Identification* unavoidable.⁶⁹⁰ The reason for the lack of ideological elements in the *Military-Strategic Area* can be partly explained by this, although further reasons are to be found in the examination of other variables. The core of moderated Anti-Imperialism can be described as ‘an equilibrium between two World Powers’ when the UP had to adjust itself to reality during the period. The major tactic adopted was ‘*vía institucional*’ as seen in the use of the inter-American system as an instrument for confrontation with the US. (Table 6.2.) Thus, it is possible to argue that the UP’s foreign policy ideology was unique. Even if there was a model with a great deal of influence on domestic politics, Cuban socialism, it did not affect the foreign policy of Chile. Neither was there big impact from the Yugoslavian or Algerian model which stood as a kind of paradigm in the early 1970s.

Table 6.2. Foreign Policy Ideology of the Socialist Regime

<i>Conceptual Identification</i>	<i>Empirical Identification</i>
Ideological Pluralism	Ideological Pluralism
Anti-Imperialism	Moderated Anti-Imperialism
Socialistic Idealism	Principled Pragmatism (with the US)

Finally, while the UP’s version of Anti-Imperialism constituted a certain, if not major, motivation for the Allende regime’s foreign policy, it also served other domestic functions which were primarily designed to maintain internal political consensus and to strengthen the authority of the decision making elite. Furthermore, unlike the conflict in domestic politics among the various parties in the UP coalition, “there were no significant disagreement in discussions during the elaboration of foreign policy” in pursuing major issues.⁶⁹¹ Although the foreign policy ideology of the military regime

⁶⁹⁰ An explanation of this tendency to be found in special characteristics of the Chilean Socialist party is offered by Muñoz:

That is, whenever the party came to power, even if at that moment it happened to be near one of the two poles, its thinking on international matters tended to relocate itself at a point of equilibrium between populism and doctrinaire socialism and to be translated into a flexible state policy without sharp breaks in continuity. (Muñoz, Heraldo, “The International Policy of the Socialist Party and Foreign Relations of Chile”, p.165.)

⁶⁹¹ Almeyda Medina, Clodomiro, “The Foreign Policy of the Unidad Popular Government”, p.78.

was not as clearly manifested as that of the previous regime, it has been seen as the introduction and the promotion of three distinctive ideologies: Anti-Communism, National Security Doctrine, and Economic Developmentalism. In all three *Areas*, these ideologies played more or less separate and respective roles in each corresponding *Area*. (Table 6.1.) However, this is not to suggest that the foreign policy of the military government completely lacked pragmatic features. The prime example of the pragmatic element of the Pinochet regime's foreign policy can be seen between 1978 and 1980. Pinochet's highly ideological policy began to change when Hernán Cubillos, a civilian entrepreneur, became foreign minister in April 1978. The principal background to this was as follows:

- The UN Resolution in 1977 condemning the continuing violation of human rights in Chile.
- Deterioration of the relations with Argentina after the Argentine refusal to arbitrate in the Beagle channel dispute.
- Break of diplomatic relations with Bolivia in March 1978.
- Increased tension between the US and Chile after the 'Letelier case.'
- Increased pressure from *Económico-Aperturistas* against the hostility of the regime to the World.

However, pragmatism under Hernán Cubillos was different from the Chilean pragmatism of traditional foreign policy, in that it was not based on civilian democracy. Rather, economic aspects were emphasised, in the light of the rise of Economic Developmentalism. The case that most suitably confirms this argument is the Chilean approach to China, which was initiated even before the appointment of Cubillos. Unlike the policy applied to other socialist countries, the Pinochet government did not break diplomatic relations with China. Even in 1975, the Chilean vice Foreign Minister announced that his country was ending the anti-Communist 'crusade' that had guided its foreign policy and that Chile would adopt 'a more realistic and pragmatic attitude' in international relations while maintaining firm anti-Marxist policies in internal affairs. These relations were based on consideration of the potential economic benefit to be had by increasing trade with China and from China's hostility to the USSR. Hence, the small gap between the *Conceptual* and *Empirical Identification* in the promotion of Anti-Communism can be explained when the emergence of another ideology was witnessed: Economic Developmentalism.

Although the Anti-Communism entirely dominated major Chilean foreign activity during the early days of the regime, it was Economic Developmentalism which gained considerable importance after the adoption of the neo-liberal economic policy in 1975. Similar to the domestic scene of the coexistence of economic liberalism and political suppression, it is interesting to see the apparent division of economic and political aspects of the foreign policy, shown by the international isolation in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* and active inter-actions with the outside world in the *Economic-Developmental Area*. This can be partly understood by considering the respective roles of the foreign policy ideologies. That is to say, while Anti-Communism and the National Security Doctrine influenced policies in the *Status-Diplomatic* and the *Military-Strategic Areas*, respectively, Economic-Developmentalism strongly influenced Chilean behaviour in the *Economic-Developmental Area*.

One interesting finding is that, unlike the observations of many academics,⁶⁹² the application of the National Security Doctrine was not limited to domestic politics during the military regime, but it provided an important basis for the external behaviour of Chile. As the military became a major player in foreign policy and territorial disputes deepened, the notion of national defence played a crucial role in the issues of the *Military-Strategic Areas*. Above all, the role of the foreign policy ideologies under the Pinochet regime was very important given the small or non-existent gap between *Conceptual* and *Empirical Identification*.

On the whole, it should be admitted that, given the period of two regimes which marked the heyday of ideological confrontation both in domestic and international aspects, this study inevitably focused on the function of ideology in foreign policy. However, the end of the Cold War and the globalisation of world politics and the economy have seriously undermined the importance of ideology in the design and implementation of contemporary foreign policy. It may not be completely unreasonable to argue that, in some cases, ideology does not serve as an effective tool to address foreign policy in modern times. In this respect, an alternative can be

⁶⁹² See Section 2.2.2.1.

realised by utilising the concept of 'policy of principles,' rather than ideology itself. Likewise, those who attempt to propose positive evaluation of the UP foreign policy, tend to emphasise the notion of the policy of 'principles' as well as 'pragmatic' aspects.

Domestic Politics

The foreign policy of the Allende regime had to follow the priorities and demands of domestic politics. To a certain degree, in other words, it was aiming for the creation of favourable external conditions in order to make feasible development of the project of socialist transformation. This tendency was particularly distinctive in the *Military-Strategic Area* (arms imports) and the *Economic-Developmental Area* (copper nationalisation) where the role of domestic politics was more purposive than in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. (the objective role) However, despite the complication and instability of domestic politics, no clear cases of the objective role of domestic politics in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* were found.

As far as the situational role of domestic politics is concerned, the uninterrupted tradition of the long standing democracy provided a very important asset for the UP's external behaviour in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. The situational factors of domestic politics, both in democracy and socialism, were crucial in determining the international outlook of the socialist regime. These provided the basis of the function of the others' policies, in that, whereas the UP's democracy was highly regarded by many countries, their socialist politics had to face strong rejection by the US. Therefore, maintaining democracy and socialism became, at the same time, an asset and a burden for the UP's international 'relations.' Meanwhile, the general instability and the lack of consensus in domestic politics did not undermine the UP's foreign policy making in major issues, while some cases of the domestic consensus such as during the process of copper nationalisation, functioned positively. However, it cannot be denied that the conflict in domestic politics somewhat troubled the smooth management of foreign policy in minor issues. For instance, the opposition controlled

Congress frequently rejected the approval of ambassadorial appointments such as to Cuba, Peru, the US and Italy.

During the military regime, a classic example of the objective role of domestic politics can be found at the initial stage of the *salida al mar* issue in the *Military-Strategic Area* when Pinochet offered the proposal to Bolivia. At the same time, the fact that the *Economic-Development Area* was not influenced by domestic politics of the military regime again suggests the division of political and economic areas during that period.

However, as under the socialist regime, the foreign 'relations' of the military government were fundamentally constrained by the situational factors of domestic politics, which provided the most controversial agenda in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*, the issue of human rights. While the international concerns of Chilean domestic politics were mainly concentrated on the structural defect of being 'repressive' and 'authoritarian,' the Pinochet regime strongly counter-attacked these concerns as 'interference to internal affairs' or 'the operation of the international Communism,' emphasising the political stability of domestic politics. Considering that a large part of the military regime's foreign policy in this *Area* was a response to others' actions against the former's repressive domestic politics, the *indirect* situational role of domestic politics was no different from that of the UP. However, policy output was considerably different. For instance, while the socialist regime was defensive and implicitly against the hostile US policy, the military regime was offensive and explicitly against the international condemnation of human rights issues.

Another finding is that, the hypothesis of the situational role of domestic politics - a positive relation between political stability and domestic consensus, and successful foreign policy (Section 2.3.1.) - was not applicable in the cases of this study, in that domestic instability under democracy during the socialist regime did not undermine their foreign policy implementation, and (forced) stability under the dictatorship of General Pinochet did not result in successful management of foreign policy as the weakened diplomatic relations indicated. This may imply that political stability is

neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for successful management of foreign policy.

The study of the two regimes' foreign policies also suggests that the situational role of domestic politics tends to function in *indirect* ways: A's foreign policy tends to be determined by B's policy to A, which is based on B's judgement of A's domestic politics, such as their type of regime or political situation. Nevertheless, these perspectives should be considered within the range of the others' policies variable which is a more direct determinant.

The Development Model

The reformist policy of the UP resulted in active extra-continental contacts which were devoted to searching for alternative sources and markets. This effort was more or less reflected in the foreign activities in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. However, although the economic variables played crucial roles in the *Economic-Developmental Area*, they did not exclusively influence the policies in this *Area*, where specific cases like 'copper nationalisation' and 'the Andean Pact' were actually determined by rather a complex set of variables.

Meanwhile, the conventional model for economic development strongly and almost exclusively influenced the *Economic-Developmental Area* of the military regime's foreign policy and it was further supported by favourable responses from outside, which became a major factor for the reintegration of the Chilean economy into the world. A major difference from the socialist regime was that the strategy of economic development hardly influenced the other two *Areas*. This again suggests the division between economic and other perspectives of the foreign policy of the military regime.

The Elite

The Political and Bureaucratic Elite

The Chilean experience reveals that the style of each President brought in fundamentally different decision making mechanisms for the foreign policy of the two regimes. Allende was central to the process of defining Chile's international positions during his years in power, but his staff and bureaucracies could function with certain autonomy. Therefore, it can be suggested that Allende served as an arbitrator in the making of foreign policy.⁶⁹³ Even if the role of the President as an arbitrator might not have been fully compatible with the revolutionary nature of the UP, it was certain that the decision makers found *modus operandi*. For instance, although there was an attempt to remove the economic sector from the Foreign Ministry by establishing SEREX, it never had a great deal of significance. It was not until the end of the 1970s, when a series of progressive bureaucratic transformations were undertaken during the Pinochet regime, that the rise of economic bureaucrats in the policy making of the *Economic-Developmental Area* was witnessed. Consequently, the foreign policy of the UP was maintained with a certain historical linkage to the Chilean tradition which had been the product of political concert rather than an imposition of official lines.

On the other hand, Pinochet, an authoritarian leader, distinguished himself by the active direction of foreign policy. However, his style was far different from that of Frei or Allende whose foreign policy initiatives were also crucial. Firstly, the relationship among the foreign policy elites showed a completely different pattern. Traditionally, Chilean Foreign Ministers had been distinguished personnel, incorporating themselves into the decision making of major governmental affairs as well as managing and the taking initiatives on foreign policy. While the tradition had been more or less preserved during the Allende regime, things became radically

⁶⁹³ In internal politics, he had to act more as an arbitrator than an ideologist because of the structure of the UP coalition. According to Wilhelmly:

Allende was not in a commanding position in the context of the ideological elaboration of the Marxist left as a whole or of the Socialist party in particular. Rather he limited himself to support of ideological positions on the basis of the convergence of diverse tendencies within his party and to active development of linkages with the rest of the parties that assumed power in 1970. (Wilhelmly, Manfred, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile", p.50.)

different during the military regime when the President installed himself as sole manager of foreign policy, limiting the political power and manoeuvrability of Foreign Ministers.⁶⁹⁴ Even if the foreign policy of the military regime experienced some positive changes with the appointment of Hernán Cubillos, his role was by no means comparable to the traditional figures such as Gabriel Valdés and Clodomiro Almeyda. The position of the Foreign Ministry was critically challenged in terms of both political and functional areas. Pinochet's style also created some problematic relations between the presidency and the bureaucracy, as was addressed before. The only bureaucracy with certain significance was economic bureaucracy that played a role in the functional areas within the *Economic-Developmental Area*.

Secondly, not only did the President actively take charge of foreign affairs, such as relations with neighbouring countries and issues within the *Military-Strategic Area*, but also his role under the military regime embodied an extreme example of the personalisation of decision making through direct implantation of military values - hierarchy, discipline and respect for order in the political arena. This was quite a contrast compared to what had been done by other Latin American military leaders, e.g. the corporate rule of the Brazilian military after 1964, or the hostility towards personalism that developed in Argentina, Uruguay and Peru in the 1970s.⁶⁹⁵ The personalisation of foreign affairs was manifested in two ways: casualisation of decision making and staff diplomacy. While the examples of the former were largely seen during the early days of the regime,⁶⁹⁶ staff diplomacy became a routine of the foreign policy of the military government. Pinochet preferred to utilise direct personal staff and emissaries highly loyal to him instead of the Ministry of Foreign

⁶⁹⁴ Wilhelmy exemplified the first Foreign Minister of the military regime, Admiral Ismael Huerta, as the only personnel with some significance. However, his professional contribution to the design and conduct of foreign policy was not comparable to that of Gabriel Valdés or Clodomiro Almeyda. See Wilhelmy, Manfred, "Las Decisiones de Política Exterior en Chile", p.147.

⁶⁹⁵ Pinochet's considerable political skill was decisive in outmanoeuvring his potential opponents in the officer corps, such as General Gustavo Leigh, and in appointing loyal subordinates to all command posts in the armed forces. See Angell, Alan, "Chile since 1958", p.179.

⁶⁹⁶ For instance, a few hours after an announcement by the Foreign Minister, Vice Admiral Patricio Carvajal, promising full guarantees to a United Nations commission on a human rights delegation which had planned to investigate the situation in Chile, General Pinochet decided after all to deny access to the mission. (*Latin American Weekly Report*, p.223, 18 July, 1975.) Not only did the announcement of his ban a week before the commission delegates were due to arrive make trouble, but this case also revealed the weakness of the Ministerial post and the fundamental importance of the top decision makers in the military regime's foreign policy.

Relations or other official channels.⁶⁹⁷ His style was more decisive on occasions of importance such as normalisation with Bolivia and the human rights issue. As a result of this, Pinochet is widely regarded as an animator as impersonation was predominant in the making of foreign policy in all three *Areas*.

It is possible to draw two conclusions from the examination of the foreign policy elite. First, the role of the bureaucratic elite was, at most, confined to functional areas: *i.e.* the specific roles of Foreign Ministry bureaucrats of the UP in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* and the economic bureaucracy of the military regime in the *Economic-Developmental Area*. However, although a certain differentiation may be possible in their roles, it may be inappropriate to define exactly the role of bureaucrats in the regimes where bureaucracies were not bureaucratized. According to Wilhelmy:

In those areas it would be fitting to speak of a tendency toward the “bureaucratization of foreign policy,” in which the bureaucratic actors are of crucial importance on political results, whereas in Chile it would be more appropriate to think in terms of a “politicization of the bureaucracy,” without this having similar influence on the orientation of policies.⁶⁹⁸

However, although the ‘politicization of the bureaucracy’ may be an interesting research possibility for the socialist regime period with its democratic nature and the complex power structure of the UP coalition, there was very little room for the ‘politicization’ of the bureaucracy during the military regime. Rather, the ‘technocratisation’ of Chilean politics was more a phenomenon since the introduction of neo-liberalism. After democratisation and the handover of political power, as Silva noted, “[t]he struggle for political power between competing technocratic groups entrenched in their respective think tanks has become a new feature of Chilean politics.”⁶⁹⁹

Secondly and importantly, it can be argued that the differences in the presidential roles according to personality, perception and personal ideology, defined the pattern

⁶⁹⁷ For the personalisation process of Pinochet’s leadership in domestic politics, see Antonio Garretón, Manuel, *The Chilean Political Process*, pp.121-3.

⁶⁹⁸ Wilhelmy, Manfred, “Politics, Bureaucracy, and Foreign Policy in Chile”, p.46.

⁶⁹⁹ Silva, Patricio, ‘Technocrats and Politics in Chile: from the Chicago Boys to the CIEPLAN Monks’, p.410.

of decision making and the power relations not only between political and bureaucratic elites but also among political elites themselves. However, as Ferguson argued that “the primacy of the presidential role is difficult to distinguish from the impact of the individual and other levels of analysis,” it is difficult to exactly differentiate presidential, or other decision makers’, initiatives from other variables. For instance, individual decision maker’s perception inevitably reflects the foreign policy ideology of a regime: *e.g.* “Pinochet’s geopolitical worldview became far more than individual opinions.”⁷⁰⁰

Military

During the socialist regime, the participation of the military in foreign policy did not go beyond that of the traditional, being limited to the strategic role in the *Military Strategic Area*. The process of political, and rather clandestine, contact between the US and the military to accomplish the series of anti-UP campaigns and the coup, cannot be regarded as a foreign policy agenda.

On the other hand, the military institution of the Pinochet regime significantly enhanced its status in the making and implementation of foreign policy. Firstly, although the Chilean military had a certain political role before 1973, it was not comparable to the profound penetration into the government under the Pinochet regime. Not only did the Chilean military itself become the single most important organisation in the government but it also implanted many officials into main decision making posts inside the bureaucracy. The fact that the Foreign Ministry became a major target of that process, *i.e.* the militarisation of the Ministry, can be seen to have a positive correlations with countless problems which Chile had to cope with in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. Secondly, the issues examined in the *Military-Strategic Area* were influenced by the maximised strategic role of the Chilean military, in addition to the strong promotion of the National Security Doctrine in the face of enhanced tensions with the neighbouring countries and the US arms embargo. The Chilean military responded to these external environments in three ways: a diversification

⁷⁰⁰ Ferguson, Yale, “Analyzing Latin American Foreign Policies”, pp.149-150.

effort for arms imports; the development and export of military equipment, and the hostile objection to arms limitation initiatives.

Geopolitics

This study has revealed that geopolitics tends to play a very important role in relations not only with neighbours but also with more remote countries, particularly in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* and the *Military-Strategic Area*. Although it was only possible to trace limited geopolitical elements in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* of the UP foreign policy because of the strong promotion of regional diplomacy based on Ideological Pluralism and the absence of major territorial disputes in the *Military-Strategic Area*, geopolitics dominated in these two *Areas* of the Pinochet regime. This can be seen in the complicated power structure of the Southern Cone in the *salida al mar* issue. Geopolitics can offer a very useful mechanism to assess certain types of foreign activities of the military regime, in the issues not only among neighbouring countries, but also among more remote countries, particularly when its functioning is increasingly powerful, as the Chilean vision of the Pacific Rim suggests.

Dependency

It has already been argued that structural dependency can influence foreign policy in two directions, by generating either resistive or subordinative policy. The cases of this study have illustrated each example: the socialist regime adopted the resistive policy while the military regime's foreign policy can be described as subordinative vis-à-vis dependency. However, their ultimate impact on the national economy generated unexpected results in both cases. In other words, the hypothesis of **Table 3.1.**, that the resistive policy would lead to more autonomy and the subordinative policy would deepen the dependency is not applicable to the cases of this study.

The socialist regime ardently tried to reduce Chile's dependency upon the United States through its active foreign policy initiatives in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* and

in the *Economic-Developmental Area* in order to find alternative sources of supplies and credits and, therefore, to achieve more independence. However, when they could not procure enough alternative sources to replace the US, the consequences of the resistive policy were not what the UP decision makers had looked forward to. The results were increasing balance-of-payments problems, accelerating inflation and continuing reliance upon the technology of the US. Nevertheless, the UP's effort to overcome structural dependency has a great significance, as the persistent and coherent activities in the two *Areas* have shown, although the result was barely satisfactory being "as dependent upon outside aid as the Alessandri and Frei regimes."⁷⁰¹

On the other hand, the subordinative policy of the military regime did not influence its behaviour in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. Instead, the globalisation of the world economy and neo-liberal economic policy enabled Chile to further increase contacts on a larger scale with outside players in the *Economic-Developmental Area* even without the backing of the *Status-Diplomatic Area*. Although regional co-operation was emphasised less than in the previous regime, the bilateral trade with Argentina and Brazil considerably increased during the late 1980s. Meanwhile, external financing and investment were overemphasised so much that Chile had to cope with heavy external debts. Interestingly, although overall external economic reliance became far greater than before when economic growth became a top priority while the conception of autonomy was missing, it is doubtful whether dependency on the centre was any greater. In fact, with the exception of the period of the economic (and military) embargo of the Carter Administration, Chilean trade with the US consistently increased at a far greater rate than with any other country (**Figure 5.4.**), in addition to the massive capital inflow from the US. However, Chile not only achieved sizeable macro economic growth but she was also successful in diversifying her economic partners, choosing particularly Japan and the Asian NICs, which was an unexpected outcome from the dependency theorists' point of view. Chile's national

⁷⁰¹ Noguee, Joseph and Sloan, John, "Allende's Chile and the Soviet Union. a Policy Lesson for Latin American Nations Seeking Autonomy", p.349.

economy showed no sign of dependency, but instead greater external economic reliance.

Therefore, two cases can be seen to establish an argument against the *Hypothetical Effect on the National Economy* in **Table 3.1.**, one when the military regime's subordinative policy did not bring any greater dependency and two when the socialist regime's resistive policy did not reduce the dependency of the Chilean economy on the 'centre.'⁷⁰² One reason for this is to be found in the globalisation of the world economy in which every single player has continually increased their external reliance, and polarisation of their 'centres' since the 1980s. In the light of the above points, it can be argued dependency theory has lost much of its edge as a foreign policy theory as it has been severely challenged as a development theory and the idea of inter-state dependency has been replaced with the concept of the globalisation of the state economy. In fact, the notion of dependency may be more useful for the study of domestic perspectives: for instance, the distortion of domestic distribution as a side effect of the international perspectives of neo-liberal policy.

Others' Policies

It has been widely regarded that the others' policies variable tends to play a major role in the external behaviour of a small country. Chile was no exception to this rule in the given period except in the socialist regime's *Status-Diplomatic Area* and in the military regime's *Economic-Developmental Area* where foreign policies were strongly influenced by internal variables. The former by Ideological Pluralism, and the latter by Economic Developmentalism and the conventional development model.

A decisive difference between the socialist regime and the military regime in terms of the role of this variable in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* was that, while the former tried to adapt itself to the changing structure of world powers based on the crisis perception, the latter lacked this kind of effort. It is, therefore, possible to argue that the isolation of the Pinochet regime was largely self-imposed. However, a more

⁷⁰² See **Section 3.2.** for the definitions of 'dependency' and 'dependence.'

fundamental difference seems to be the existence of 'creativity' in policy making. The policy of the socialist regime incorporated creative (*sui generis*) elements, while a large proportion of the military regime's foreign policies were largely reactions to the external environment in the *Status-Diplomatic Area*.

The UP government was realistically aware that the level of potential external conflict was high owing basically to its general orientation in the internal arena. This risk of growing international isolation alerted decision makers to the idea that foreign policy had to be dealt with most carefully. Therefore, it was expected that both the domestic policies and the international outlook of the government would create difficulties with the external world, particularly with the United States.⁷⁰³ In the Latin American context, in addition, the situation was not particularly favourable, with right-wing, anti-Communist governments in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Bolivia after the coup of August 1971. In this respect, a basic principle of the UP foreign policy in the face of would-be external pressure had to be "to minimize international conflict in nonessential areas in order to be able to concentrate on facing the inevitable conflicts in essential areas."⁷⁰⁴ Therefore, the Allende regime was able to respond under this principle, particularly in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* where the others' policies variable did not affect foreign policy.

Meanwhile, the military regime's policy in the *Economic-Developmental Area* was fundamentally determined by its strong promotion of developmentalism and the conventional development model. Although Chile's economic 'relations' with the world were greatly influenced by the outside environment, external variables hardly altered her persistent implementation of foreign 'policy.' Therefore, it can be differentiated from the socialist regime's foreign economic policy which was influenced by and adjusted according to the external environment. Moreover, the military government did not experience any delicate or confrontational issues in the

⁷⁰³ On the other hand, Fortín noted that "the incipient process of détente inaugurated by Nixon's 'era of negotiation' address of 1969 opened up possibilities of increasing relations with the socialist world without aggravating likely difficulties with the United States." (Fortín, Carlos "Principled Pragmatism in the Face of External Pressure: The Foreign Policy of the Allende Government", p.220.) However, such possibilities proved to be misplaced.

⁷⁰⁴ *ibid.*, p.221.

Economic-Developmental Area, like copper nationalisation during the socialist regime, and the external environment was generally favourable to Chile's economic policy during the period.

Nevertheless, in the *Military-Strategic Area*, both regimes' policies were greatly influenced, boosted, undermined or constrained by the others' policies variable, which can be explained by such characteristics of the *Area* as the reciprocal nature of territorial disputes and arms procurement issues. This tendency restricted the domestic orientations of foreign policy, as the numerous cases addressed in the previous chapters have indicated.

Finally, as was explained in **Section 1.2.2.**, this research was aimed at corresponding to the first and second stages of theory building and development of the study of foreign policy: BUILDING A PRELIMINARY RESEARCH MODEL and COMPREHENSIVE AND SYSTEMATIC SINGLE COUNTRY ANALYSIS. It has revealed that the foreign policy of Chile during the given period (1970-90) was not just a reaction to external stimuli but was determined by the complex functioning of both internal and external variables. Special attention has been paid to the role of internal variables in order to readdress the common belief that 'the foreign policy of a small country is usually determined by the role of external variables.' The socialist regime's policy in the *Status-Diplomatic Area* had a strong internal orientations, and this was true, although to a lesser degree, in the case of the military regime. The policies of the other two *Areas* have shown mixed results because of the more individual and specific nature of policy issues. The two regimes' policies in the *Military-Strategic Area* in general showed a surprisingly similar pattern (**Table 6.1.**), although a differentiation can be made between arms procurement policy and territorial disputes. Common major determinants were: historical linkage, domestic politics, the political elites, the military and the others' policies. The absence of geopolitics during the Allende regime, which was an important determinant during the Pinochet regime, can be explained by the lack of territorial conflict. While the socialist regime's policy in the *Economic-Developmental Area* was determined by variables with both political and

economic character, that of the military regime was very much exclusively a function of economic variables. Again, the presence of a characteristic issue during the socialist regime, copper nationalisation, was a main reason for the different orientation of foreign economic policies between the two cases.

Therefore, it has to be once again stated that the collective study of the foreign policy of a state in itself is still a subject too broad and complex to be generalised even within the frame used in this study. Likewise, the results shown in **Table 6.1.** do not reveal any general pattern or value of the functions of each determinant variable *vis-à-vis* the *Issue Areas*. In this respect, a further delineation of issues will be necessary for comparative studies and generalisation stage, although the fact that issues within the same *Area* tend to show similar patterns suggests that the *Issue Area* approach provides a viable mechanism towards a systematic (comparative) study of foreign policy. For instance, it is desirable that issues in the *Military-Strategic Area*, territorial disputes, arms procurement policy and demilitarisation issues, be separately assessed and compared.

Therefore, the next stage of foreign policy research, the CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARATIVE STUDY, can be effectively implemented under a more directive method based on the framework utilised in this research. Qualitative comparisons between issues in the same policy *Areas* using a complete or a limited set of determinant variables, will help in the understanding of the nature of policy orientation of the particular *Area*. Particularly, the *Military-Strategic Area* seems to be a promising research subject for generalisation given the similar orientations of the two regimes' foreign policies in the *Area*. On the other hand, a cross-country comparison, or even a cross-regime comparison, with special reference to one or two variables, *e.g.* the role of the conventional development model, could reveal the precise functioning of the particular variable(s). There is, of course, no need to emphasise that more studies of individual cases based on analytical concepts must be a precondition for effective comparative studies.

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