

Behavioural Variation in Terrorist Kidnapping

**Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the
University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy**

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September 1998

Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to develop an empirically based understanding of the potential range of behaviour observed in terrorist kidnapping. Much terrorism research has focused on group motivation and socio-political characteristics of groups and areas. Little research has considered the way in which terrorists *behave* in the commission of their crimes. The current work develops a psychologically meaningful understanding of the process of terrorist kidnap. This research is based on analysis of 206 incidents of terrorist kidnap, the information used being taken from publicly available sources. A multi-dimensional scaling approach was taken to examine the interrelation between *all* behaviours without constraining the patterns or 'types' being considered.

The analysis was carried out at a group rather than individual level to test the hypothesis that the group is the appropriate level for such analysis (Crenshaw 1990). While much work has shown that individual offenders show consistency in their activity, the current work has shown support for meaningful and systematic variation in the activities of groups. Analysis of *all* behaviour observed in kidnapping resulted in a three-dimensional model showing the importance of interaction at different levels of operational control. Dimensions relating to 'behavioural expression' and 'direction of influence' parallel the 'affiliation' and 'control' dimensions of current interpersonal interaction models, albeit with a skew towards aggression. A third dimension, 'goal focus', showed that interactions can vary at strategic through to tactical levels of orientation. This mirrors current understanding of the structure of incident

management, and may represent an additional requirement for successful interaction at a group-level.

A number of key features of kidnap, such as the nature of the hostages, resources used, demands-made, hostage-control methods and negotiation strategies are examined in more detail to consider the ways in which behaviour can vary. Analyses tend to show 'common' patterns and less frequent ways that may be useful in distinguishing specific groups. Analysis focusing on patterns of negotiation found no simple or clear 'types', rather emphasising the importance of context-based interaction suggested in the overall analysis.

Acknowledgements

My deepest gratitude goes to Katie and Rebekah for waiting patiently while I completed this work, and for their support in the long hours when things did not appear to be going well.

Special thanks to Margaret for making the time to help during a particularly tempestuous few years.

Also thanks to all my friends from Surrey and Liverpool Universities, without whose support I would have given up long ago.

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Chapter 1 - Introduction to the thesis

1.1 - Approaches and definitions

It is the aim of the current work to develop an empirically based understanding of terrorist kidnap. The work will address both the nature and range of approaches which may be taken by groups carrying out this type of act. Drawing upon psychological, criminological and terrorist literature the current work seeks to develop an integrated understanding of the behaviour likely to be exhibited during a terrorist kidnapping, and the processes underlying such activity.

By its very nature, terrorism is difficult to combat; those involved plan secretly and act for maximum impact and gain. As a global term, terrorism covers a wide range of possible tactics and strategies. As a direct consequence, definitions of terrorism are also many and varied. The majority of researchers (e.g. Corsi 1981), define terrorism as a form of political act. However, Gibbs (1989) argues that the term "political terrorism" suggests the possibility of a non-political alternative.

Miller (1988) identifies *traditional* and *behaviourist* approaches to the study of terrorism as representing two qualitatively different methods of addressing the problem. Traditional approaches tend to isolate small numbers of events or single cases so as to maximise the number of variables considered. The behaviourist approach, on the other hand, is characterised by the analysis of large numbers of cases with the aim of isolating the relationships between relatively fewer variables.

In addition to these differences, the emphasis of the approaches also varies. Traditional approaches mainly address the question of who the terrorists are, concentrating on background details of groups (who is involved, their ideologies, their leaders and so on) and why they carry out the activities that they engage in. The behavioural emphasis, in contrast, aims to build models and theories that explain the actions carried out in a systematic and scientific manner.

Within the traditional approach, Miller (1988) identifies *historical* and *normative-judicial* perspectives, each having different underlying emphases. Historical studies account for the development of terrorist activity in terms of a group's moral and ideological beliefs, geographical influence over time and their reactions to the authorities' activities. Miller (1988) considers that many of the descriptive and more popular writings blend reality, fiction and mystery to produce sensational stories (Miller 1988). Normative-judicial (legal) studies emphasise the place of terrorism with respect to the law. This perspective looks at the legal mechanisms in place to control, prevent and punish terrorist activists. Having established these processes, their efficacy in combating international terrorism is evaluated.

The behaviourist literature comprises work in three areas: *psychological* studies, *socio-economic* studies and *public policy* studies. These are all characterised by attempts to identify common themes amongst terrorists and groups, such that universal explanatory variables can be identified. Psychological studies are typically characterised by attempts to identify mentally disordered terrorist personalities or profiles (Miller 1988). The underlying assumption is that terrorists have some aspect (or aspects) of their

psychological make up in common and that this (or these) can be identified. Emphasis is put on the development of terrorists, following a gradual progression from alienation, through protest, to full scale terrorism. This work typically focuses at the level of the individual, dealing with issues such as aggression, prejudice, learning (indoctrination) and personality disorders.

Socio-economic studies consider the question of terrorism at a societal level, focusing on the roots of conflict in a country or region and the specific nature of these conflicts. Many factors are included in analysis, such as economic, historical, cultural, demographic and technological aspects of the region in question. Miller (1988) states that, at least at the time of his review, much of the socio-economic work was speculative in nature. It is hypothesised in the current work that socio-political and cultural factors account for some variation in the nature of terrorist events. These factors will interact with individual and group processes and serve to put the observed actions into a meaningful context.

Public policy studies have a different emphasis to psychological and socio-economic work. Where the previous approaches examine the causes of terrorism, public policy work focuses on solutions. Consideration is given to the dilemmas facing governments threatened by terrorism and the way in which they attempt to deal with them. The central issue in public policy work is the establishment of effective policy to stop terrorist success, the aim being the deterrence of future events.

Traditional approaches reveal fine detail in the actions and motives of specific terrorist groups, whereas behavioural perspectives give a more global overview of patterns within the commission of terrorist acts. What appears to be lacking at the current time is an empirical and theoretical account linking these levels of concern. This would enable the highly focused work to be understood within a broader framework of understanding, making the broader patterns and trends more meaningful.

Complicating matters further, Stohl (1998) observes that "as the environment and political climate around them change, so do terrorist behaviour patterns" (Stohl 1988, p167). It is therefore important for any understanding of terrorism to be able to account for both *consistent patterns* within behaviour and *development* over time. Any categorisation of terrorism in terms of fixed behavioural modes or tactics is likely to afford little new information and become redundant within a relatively short space of time.

Terrorism is generally considered to have both political and criminal aspects; acting to outrage and intimidate a target audience. Stohl (1988) states that political terrorism is composed of three parts; the use or threat of violence, the emotional reaction to this and the social effects as a result. He claims that while all of these components are significant, it is the emotional qualities of events (i.e. the impact they have) which is most important.

Despite differences in the precise definition of terrorism, it is widely accepted as being a form of political activity in which force is used to influence others. It is reasoned that the

use of coercion, particularly when broadcast through the international media, will influence a far wider audience than could otherwise be reached. The focus of terrorist activists is on the audience rather than the victims (Stohl 1988). While the victims may be few in number, it is essential that the audience is as wide as possible, maximising the impact of an event.

It is common for definitions of terrorism to be followed by criteria setting the specific conditions under which they hold. Stohl (1988), for instance, states three conditions which need to be met for an act to be labelled terrorist: 1) violence must be exercised through stealth rather than open combat, 2) at least some of the targets must be political and 3) groups must act clandestinely and sporadically.

It may be seen from these criteria that many acts of guerrilla insurgency or continuous violent rebellion could be classed as terrorist on the basis of the first two criteria. These acts are excluded from being terrorist solely by their frequency of occurrence. For acts to be terrorist they must not occur too frequently. This limitation can be seen to serve an ad hoc conceptual purpose, but does not have any practical utility.

Current trends appear to be putting increasing emphasis upon the role of terrorism as a significant form of international conflict. For example, Latter (1991) states that in recent times terrorists seem increasingly willing to perform more lethal attacks. He cites the mid-air destruction of a PanAm airliner, resulting in the Lockerbie incident as an example, though the Oklahoma City bombing and numerous others could also be cited as evidence in support of his argument. Latter (1991) also claims that terrorists have

become increasingly more sophisticated over time. This is not only in their ability to use complex weapons systems but also in exploitation of the media and public opinion to gain influence on the target decision-making groups.

Terrorism has also been referred to as a form of drama, Stohl (1988) alluding to it as theatre for which the whole world is a stage. Those involved, the terrorists, authorities and sometimes hostages, may be considered to fulfil specific roles within standardised and recognised plots (Stohl, 1988). The effect of stable roles, and socially shared scripts, suggests a psychological basis for consistency of behaviour. It is this consistency which is hypothesised to underlie stable patterns within terrorist kidnap activities.

1.2 - Hostage taking

Hostage taking is considered to be one of the more extreme forms that terrorism may take. It involves greater personal risk and greater logistical and material input from terrorists than less personal acts such as bombing or assassination. However, the payoff for terrorists is that the hostages form a unique leverage, putting authorities into a situation where they must balance human life against political loss (Reich 1990).

Like terrorism generally, hostage taking also tends to be discussed as if it were a relatively homogenous type of crime. Discussion tends to focus on the similarities between hijack, siege and kidnap rather than the factors differentiating them. The fact that all involve the taking and holding of hostages often appears to be more significant than the tactical variations represented by the different acts. Little work appears to address these tactics in any detail.

Hostage taking events, more than any other terrorist act, result in dialogue between the authorities and terrorists. The taking of hostages results in an imperative for democratic governments to appear to care for their citizens. Hostage taking events need to be understood as complex and multidimensional in nature. It is of little value to consider the actions of just the hostage takers or authorities as if they were operating in a vacuum. The actions of each party will affect, and be affected by, the actions of the other, further setting the context within which following actions (physical or verbal) occur.

Research carried out at the Universities of Surrey and Liverpool (Wilson, Canter and Smith 1995) systematically addressed the nature of hostage taking events. This work has shown not only important similarities but also significant differences between these behavioural strategies. The implication of these findings suggests that it may be incorrect to treat all hostage taking as the manifestation of the same underlying processes. Analysis of the activities of various different terrorist groups, from the sixties through to the nineties, suggests that any given group will commonly use only a small selection of the entire range of tactics potentially at their disposal.

1.3 - Kidnapping

The current work focuses specifically on the processes observed to occur during terrorist kidnap. Kidnap differs significantly from hijack and siege in that the location of hostages is not known, at least at the outset of an event. This fact reduces the initial risk to the terrorists; having taken hostages they are then under less immediate threat of counter-action by authorities than in other forms of hostage taking (hijack or siege).

Kidnapping, like hostage taking and wider terrorism, is also generally discussed as if it were a homogeneous act. Focus on the core, defining, aspects of hostage holding tends to distract from the range of variation possible in the commission of these events. It is clear from accounts of kidnapping that many different approaches may be taken and techniques used. Far from being a homogeneous form of crime, kidnapping is clearly composed of various tactics and styles. No research has been identified which discusses this variation. For this reason the primary purpose of the current work is to empirically establish the nature and range of behaviour during terrorist kidnap.

1.4 - Drawing on investigative psychology

Almost all of the activities considered as terrorist (e.g. assassination, kidnap, barricade-siege or bank-robbery) are also executed as non-terrorist criminal acts. The label *terrorism* is proposed to relate to the underlying motive rather than any special characteristics of the activity itself. As a result, drawing on literature relating to criminal activity, particularly with respect to the types of crime occurring in terrorism, may also be productive in building up a comprehensive understanding of the processes underlying these events.

While much criminological work is focused upon the causes of crime, less is made of the direct implications of this for the investigation of crime. Walters, reviewing a number of criminological theories, stated that while these theories have stimulated a fairly large amount of research and debate they have not been as useful from an empirical/predictive perspective (Walters 1990). Investigative psychology is a relatively

new research discipline which has evolved through the application of psychological theory and methods to police work, particularly the investigative process.

A large proportion of criminological research focuses on individual offenders. Environmental approaches discuss the impact social and physical environments may have on an individual's interactions. Social approaches focus on how the socialisation process shapes individual offenders. Similarly, much of the work on profiling links the characteristics of crimes to likely types of offender, while work involving geographical modelling draws upon the environmental understanding of individuals. Little work appears to have addressed the behaviour of groups of offenders. What research there has been, however, appears to support the hypothesis that normal group processes can play a part in explaining criminal behaviour at a group level.

In most criminal investigation it is useful to be able to relate behavioural information about a crime to background characteristics of likely offenders. In the course of an investigation it is necessary to identify an unknown offender from available evidence. Offence behaviour has been shown to relate to stable attributes of the person carrying it out (Canter 1988). The requirements of an investigation following terrorist activity are slightly different, however.

Following terrorist acts the identity of those involved is often suspected, if not known. This is particularly the case for hostage taking, in which it is common for prolonged negotiation to be entered into. An area in which behavioural information may still prove

to be of use is that of decision support for the teams responding to an event; particularly negotiators attempting to understand or even shape an event in progress.

For negotiation to occur, interaction between the offenders and the authorities must arise. The ultimate aim of negotiations from the authorities' perspective is to minimise the impact of an event. The identification of optimal response strategies would be of benefit to those making decisions during the course of an event. What constitutes an optimal strategy would, however, be expected to vary according to the nature of the offenders involved. In identifying various approaches to hostage taking, the work carried out by Wilson, Canter & Smith (1995) has indicated the potential for the application of behavioural information in this way.

1.5 - Consistency and development

A fundamental assumption underlying a great deal of psychological study is the notion of behavioural consistency. Consistency relies upon the premise that the actions exhibited are characteristic of an offender, not of the situation in which they are observed. Within limit, it is assumed that an individual will act in a similar way regardless of the precise context they are in (Wilson 1995).

The consistency of an offender is composed of two aspects; firstly, the range of variation within an offender's behaviour and secondly, the range of behavioural variation across a number of offenders (Wilson 1995). For both offender profiling and offence linking to be viable it is important that the variation within the actions of an individual is smaller than that between individuals.

The notion that between-person behavioural variation is greater than within-person difference in the general population underlies a number of practices such as vocational guidance, personnel selection or clinical diagnostic testing. It is presumed that certain actions and responses a person makes are related in a causal manner to certain of their characteristics, or groups of characteristics, and that these remain stable over both time and a range of situations.

In the detection of serious serial crime the notion of consistency underlies the ability to link offences. However, linking is not so important in terrorist events where the perpetrators typically declare their affiliation. Consistency is important, however, as the basis of identifying meaningful patterns within the commission of terrorist activity. For any typology or model of terrorist activity to be useful the terrorist groups who are being described must be consistent in the way in which they act.

The aim of the current research is to establish an empirical basis for understanding the variation in terrorist kidnapping. It is clear from accounts of kidnappings carried out by various groups, across different geographical regions, that there are different ways possible for executing such crimes. For this observation to be in anyway useful, however, it is necessary to establish the nature of variation. It is expected that different groups will systematically vary from each other, group processes acting to ensure within-group consistency in the commissioning of these acts. The nature and range of such differences being determined only by the stable characteristics (and inter-dynamics) of the terrorist groups themselves.

Behavioural consistency has frequently been observed throughout the crimes carried out by individual offenders. Similar consistency has also been observed to a degree in the activities of terrorist groups (Wilson, Canter & Smith, 1995). However, just as individuals' behaviour changes gradually over time, so the actions of a group would be expected to vary. While general patterns of behavioural consistency are expected to be indicated, so too is variation reflecting situational and developmental change. A range of factors may act to produce variation in the nature of events carried out by the same group.

Having established 'core' patterns of behaviour in which a group is likely to be consistent, it is also valuable to be able to identify ways in which they may have developed or varied their approach from event to event. Current research on rape investigation has indicated that development is often 'directional' rather than random (Jack, Heritage, Canter and Wilson 1994) and if the nature of a group's development can be established a greater understanding of later development may also be afforded.

1.6 - Aims and assumptions in the current work

A fundamental aspect of the current work is the focus on *actions*. Actions are viewed as behaviours oriented towards the achievement of goals (Canter 1984). They are intentional and adaptive, not simply determined (caused) by influences within a setting. A person's activity in a place is constrained only by perceptions and understanding of the possibilities afforded. The identification of various possibilities is mediated through social interaction, direct experience and expectations of the situation.

Given that actions during terrorist kidnapping, as in any other activity, will be grounded in experience, understanding and social influence, it is proposed that common psychological processes can be drawn on in understanding these events. Further, the strong ideological, ethnic, political or religious belief motivating participation in terrorist involvement must be understood as having a significant influence on the expression of this activity. By focusing specifically on the way in which events are carried out it may be possible to identify key indicators of factors such as negotiation style or incident outcome.

A basic assumption in the current research is that the word *terrorist* is best used as a modifier rather than a descriptor. Bank robbery, kidnap, hijack and murder can all be carried out for both terrorist or non-terrorist purposes. Terrorism does not represent a specific type of behaviour in its own right, the term simply refers to politically motivated activities intended to influence others through fear. Understanding terrorism in this way reduces ambiguity and omission in definitions drawn. The particular form that coercion might take will vary depending upon the aims, intentions and expectations of the people carrying it out.

For the current work kidnapping was chosen as the focus, though any form of terrorist activity could have been used. A wide range of kidnappings are drawn on in the current work, including a number of incidents in which it is uncertain whether they were acts of “terrorism” or not. If these are found to be substantively different from clearly terrorist kidnappings then some basis for differentiation will be empirically derived.

As terrorism has been addressed from so many angles there is a great deal of work which can be drawn upon. This range of work has resulted in the establishment of a number of databases of terrorist events. Most research has addressed terrorism in terms of 'factual' details, such as numbers involved, locations, and demands. What tends to be lacking, however, is consideration of the way in which these events are carried out; that is, the range of behavioural styles which may be observed.

ITERATE III (Mickolus 1991) is an example of a 'factual' database. It includes information such as event date, event location, the name of the group(s) involved, the number of people involved, the type of event, the demands made and the outcomes for all parties involved. There is no information, however, on the way in which the hostages were taken, how they were treated or how the authorities were notified. This is the type of information which is considered in the current work.

Regard of non-behavioural information enables an understanding of general patterns of terrorist activity in terms of who does what, and with what result. It does, however, miss a central and potentially crucial sphere of information - the *how* of such events. Issues such as the types of hostage taking strategies (in this case kidnapping) available, or the range of action possible in an incident, cannot be addressed without consideration of the way in which such activities are carried out. A better understanding of the patterns and interactions of activities during kidnapping is required.

The focus on 'factual' information has arisen from the way in which the problem is typically understood. The understanding of events tends to be addressed through the linking of initial problem states with consequent end states, via a set of logical cause-effect rules. Various models taking this approach, having varying degrees of complexity, will be discussed in Chapter Four.

The logic focused approach to terrorism implies the assumption that the processes between initial problems and desired end states are relatively homogenous. That is, certain conditions are expected to determine later ones in a stable and systematic manner. No consideration is given to tactical variation in group performance; terrorists are viewed as following clear decision paths rather than expressing personal and group behavioural preferences.

Consideration of the behavioural variation and flexibility observed during kidnappings should enable clearer understanding of events to be developed. It might be suggested that groups differ not only in what they demand, but also how they do it. In considering alternative patterns of action which result in the achievement of the same, or similar, goals it may be possible to build up a more psychologically meaningful understanding of terrorist kidnap.

Much of the analytical research on terrorism has focused solely on details of the crimes committed. Although more sociological and anthropological studies do consider the socio-political context of terrorist activity, little account has been taken of the role of these processes in more empirically based work. From a social-psychological

perspective it would be expected that these factors have a significant impact on the way in which terrorists conduct themselves with both hostages and authorities.

For research to account for these issues it must address both behavioural and contextual information. Given the range of factors which may be involved in any single event, multi-dimensional analytic techniques are required for their examination. Context, action and reaction will all interact in complex manners which cannot be adequately addressed using unidimensional techniques.

The current research will enable a bridging of the gap between the psychological and public policy work identified in Miller's (1988) review of the terrorism literature. Rather than focus on the background details of terrorists and the relation of these to consequent actions, or on the relationship of a group's actions to the authorities reactions, the current work will attempt to address all of these issues, and their interrelations, during the course of an event. Of primary interest are *patterns* of interaction between the parties concerned, and any general types of approach which may emerge from these.

Discussing terrorism within the wider context of political violence, Crenshaw (1992) highlighted a number of areas in which further work is necessary. The current research addresses a number of these areas: Firstly, in dismissing the view that terrorism is pathological, the role of psychological factors and their relation to strategic rationales of terrorism should not be ignored. Taking purposive, goal directed, behaviour as a fundamental, and focusing on behaviour within the context from which it arises, the

research addresses the range of behaviour observed within psychologically meaningful patterns of variation.

Secondly, there should be greater awareness of the heterogeneity of terrorist behaviour. Effort should be focused on developing explanations for differing categories of violence rather than global theories which treat all violence as a unitary concept. Crenshaw (1992) states that analyses combining disparate activities can only serve to confuse results. As a result it may not be productive to speak of terrorism as a homogenous category of action but as a heterogeneous field of activities with a unifying theme.

The third issue is that the interactions of all concerned parties, and not just the strategies of one side or the other, should be analysed. Crenshaw (1992) notes that there is a process of mutual reinforcement and escalation that is common to all political violence around the world. One of the aims of the current research is to understand how all parties interact and what the resulting effects of these interactions are likely to be on ultimate outcomes.

1.7 - Summary

The aim of this chapter has been to outline the nature of the current research on terrorist kidnap. Fundamental assumptions and perspectives to be used in the current research have been discussed briefly, and the goal of the work - developing an empirically driven understanding of the nature and variation of terrorist kidnap - has been defined. Various possible types of approach have been discussed, and a need for clearer understanding of the behavioural processes occurring in terrorist kidnapping

has been identified. A precedent for this type of information has been set in the multidimensional study of various other types of crime. The present thesis draws on the principles of behavioural consistency and variation in understanding the nature and range of behavioural approaches observed in the commission of terrorist kidnap.

The work has two broad strands; the first addressing the *nature* of terrorist kidnap and the second *variation* in execution. Consideration of the nature of kidnap will illustrate the general patterns of behaviour which make up the activity. Addressing the range of variation will afford an understanding of systematic differences in the patterns of behaviour observed. The overarching aim of this research is to advance the knowledge of terrorist kidnap through the development of an empirical and integrated understanding of both the range of styles or behaviour, and the psychological processes underlying them.

Various psychological factors such as roles, scripts and group norming processes can be suggested as the basis for consistent behaviour at both an individual and group level. Consistency is crucial to understandable and predictable behaviour, and this will be addressed through the consideration of stable patterns shown in commission of an event. Hostage taking is often talked of as an homologous activity, though work by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) has shown that there is considerable variation between types such as kidnap, hijack and siege. The current work aims to take this a stage further, suggesting that kidnap itself is a heterogeneous activity, capable of being committed in various different ways. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this is so, and the current work will address this question empirically.

While much work has addressed the commission of crime by individual offenders, less has looked at offending in groups. Work on ram raid crews (Wilson 1995; Donald and Wilson 1999) and on football hooligan groups (Johnson 1999) has indicated that the structure and processes underlying criminal groups can be considered in much the same way as that of legitimate work groups. The current work aims to take these findings as a basis and test the assumptions of group level behavioural consistency in the context of terrorist kidnap.

Much of the work on terrorism has been based on 'factual' information; observed features of events. While this has provided much understanding of the structure of such events, little work has focused on the actions carried out, the *how* of event commission. The current work aims to address precisely this issue. It is hoped that by adding information on the way in which the factual features arise that a richer and more meaningful understanding of terrorism kidnap than is currently available can be developed.

As the patterns of interaction within an event are of key interest, it is important to make as few assumptions as possible about the order of, and relation between, the actions. For this reason it is proposed to use non-linear multidimensional scaling analytic techniques. Further, terrorist kidnapping is not considered to be carried out in isolation, completely at the control of the terrorist group. Interaction with other parties will mutually influence and reinforce the behaviours arising from the process of

negotiation. As a result, the actions of others will be included when considering the aspects of kidnap events in which negotiation and interaction are fundamental.

Chapters two, three and four will outline the literature drawn on in supporting the argument that terrorist kidnap is carried out by groups that can be considered both rational and consistent. Chapter five details the methodology and development of the database while chapters six to eleven detail the findings of various analyses on the behavioural execution of these events. Chapter twelve pulls these findings together and discusses their implications.

Chapter 2 - Rational behaviour: The nature of terrorist kidnap

2.1 - Introduction

The previous chapter outlined the tendency in much of the literature to use the terms terrorism and kidnap in a rather general fashion. It is now necessary to establish exactly what is meant by these terms. Different theoretical perspectives make different assumptions about the nature of terrorists. Some see terrorists as rational actors while others see them as being irrational or even dysfunctional. These differing views hold significant implications for the understanding of terrorist behaviour and the types of models which describe it.

Certain terrorist actions, such as the deliberate self-harm of suicide bombers, or the selection of hostages unrelated to the expressed political goals, appear at face value to defy rational explanation. These actions appear to have no personal (or group) utility, and consideration of the consequences for the offender(s) suggests that the actions are irrational. The existence of abnormality or psychopathology have been suggested to account for behaviour in these cases (Taylor 1993). The suggestion that some terrorist activity cannot be understood through “normal” rational processes has lead a number of researchers to the conclusion that terrorists are somehow other than normal, and that special theories are required to understand their behaviour.

The basis of rationality is more fundamental than consistency of behaviour (which is discussed in more detail in the following chapter). The use of consistency and variation in understanding psychologically meaningful differences in peoples’ behaviour is based upon the assumption that there is a rational purpose underlying that

behaviour. Psychodynamic approaches to terrorism, however, generally view involvement as stemming from irrational, or psychologically dysfunctional, behaviour.

The labelling of an action as irrational is unhelpful as it implicitly precludes complete understanding. Actions are normally understood, and predicted, on the basis of logical patterns of association between cause (precursors) and effect (outcomes). Likely outcomes can be predicted once precursory factors have been identified. Irrational behaviour is that for which the purpose does not appear to be intelligible. Irrationality is defined by a lack of logic, which means that the cause-effect links used for accurate prediction no longer hold. This does not necessarily mean that irrational behaviour cannot be predicted, but that predictions will be less accurate than is the case when clear cause-effect links can be established.

In contrast to the psychodynamic approaches, social and political science studies tend to be founded on the principles of goal directed social activity. These views suggest that terrorism is both rational and understandable using normal behavioural rules. Viewing terrorist kidnap as a purposive activity with criminal intention, many aspects of psychological research can be drawn upon in understanding terrorism, from individual through to cultural and societal levels of consideration.

At the individual level, factors such as beliefs, values and attitudes, motivation and intentionality may be related to involvement in terrorism. At a group level, aspects such as socialisation, group development, group maintenance and intergroup interaction may

have relevance in understanding the processes leading to intergroup conflict and aggressive action. At a wider level, aspects of psychology relating to societal and cultural influences can also have implications for the understanding of terrorism. These various levels of consideration are not separable, being mutually interdependent. They are distinct only in conceptual terms.

It is assumed in most liberal and democratic societies that all parties have an equal chance of being heard at some point in the decision making process. This is not necessarily the case, however. Many individuals and groups feel excluded from the traditional processes or are unsuccessfully represented in policy decisions. In such circumstances non-traditional methods may be viewed as becoming the only available option in order to promote strongly held views.

Individuals differ in their political views, being shaped by differing experiences within society. Through socialisation and personal experience people develop a view of the relative legitimacy of existing political institutions (Sprinzak 1990). Such institutions are regarded as being legitimate or illegitimate depending upon the respect held for the authority of those in power and the procedures and systems of government in operation. Groups typically regard the legitimacy of a political system according to the similarities and differences between the values of that system and their own values (Hogg and Abrams 1988).

The nature of political grievances and the characteristics of the groups developing to fight for them might be expected to influence the type of terrorist action observed.

Research carried out by Wilson, Canter & Smith (1995) showed that terrorist groups carrying out hijack, kidnap and siege do indeed differ systematically in the way they conduct themselves. One of the most striking differences being the variation between “amateur” and “professional” groups. “Amateur” hijackers, for instance, were generally found not to be particularly interested in the passengers, suggesting that they are perhaps incidental to the action. In contrast, “professional” hijackers were more likely to have actively targeted passengers seen as representative of the problem leading to the terrorist act.

The identification of systematic variation in terrorist behaviour suggests that different terrorist groups will need to be treated in different ways. Terrorists employing more “professional” approaches may not be more difficult to negotiate with than “amateur” ones, but they are likely to be more strongly committed to their goals. If negotiations run smoothly and gains are perceived to have been made then “professionally” acting terrorists may not represent any more of a threat to their hostages than “amateur” ones. Understanding events as goal directed interactions within meaningful contexts suggests far wider scope for response than simplistic explanations based upon criminal drive and personality.

This chapter will outline these conflicting views on terrorism, and discuss their implications for the understanding of terrorist activity. The following sections will focus on various views of terrorism in more detail. It is important to establish the nature of terrorist kidnap behaviour before going on to consider the implications of behavioural consistency and variation - issues which are discussed in more detail in

Chapter Three. While the discussion of behavioural rationality and consistency overlaps to an extent, it is valuable to consider them separately.

2.2 - Terrorism as irrational behaviour

There is a relatively large literature in which a psychiatric or clinical perspective is taken in the explanation of terrorist behaviour. The focus of this type of work typically relates to the psychological make-up of individuals involved in terrorism. There appear to be two general types of assumption implicit in the large majority of this work. The first is that terrorists are characterised by a particular psychological type. That is, their psychological composition is distinctly different from that of other people. The second is that this psychology is in some way disordered. While psychopathology is typically not invoked as a cause, emphasis is placed upon particular types or combinations of personality disorder.

For example, Post (1990) considers terrorists to have a particular way of thinking. He sees terrorists as being maladjusted individuals using terrorism as a cover for their need to engage in violence. This view implicitly treats terrorism as a psychology of the extraordinary. Post (1986; 1987) states that there are two basic types of terrorist; *ideological* terrorists wanting to change the political system of their country and *separatist* terrorists who desire autonomy for their country. Having established this distinction, however, he argues for the general uniformity of terrorists, making no reference to behavioural differences between the two groups. The distinction is made solely in the apparent motivation (Post 1986).

The motivation underlying terrorist activity is linked to parental relations. Ideological terrorists (*anarchic-ideologues*) are described as striving to change the world created and maintained by their parents. Terrorist involvement is viewed as rebellion against the views of their parents. They are driven to retaliate against the perceived injustices of their parents' generation. In contrast, separatist terrorists (*nationalist-separatists*) side with their parents and carry on the mission they are seen as engaged in. Their actions are seen as acts of loyalty to the desires and views of their parents (Post 1986).

The key functional difference between these two groups is the fact that the anarchic-ideologues are proposed to have made a complete break with society, resulting in an underground existence. Nationalist-separatists, in contrast, are seen as enjoying popular support and may even be celebrated for their heroism. However, despite this difference, in both cases the act of joining the terrorist group is seen as an attempt to consolidate identity and to belong (Post 1986). No reference is made to the effects such different motives are likely to have on the resulting behaviour.

Post (1996) remarks on the apparent uniformity of terrorist behaviour, despite the range and diversity of terrorist groups and causes. Groups are considered to draw their membership from marginal, isolated, and inadequate individuals from troubled families (Post 1986). While this may be true for a number of terrorists (Post (1986) drew his observations from interviews with a sample of captive terrorists) it seems an over-generalisation to infer that all terrorists will fit this interpretation.

Post (1986; 1987; 1990) hypothesises the existence of a special logic which characterises terrorists' thinking patterns. He does not consider terrorists' use of violence to be wilful or intentional. In contrast, he sees terrorists as being driven to act by deep, unconscious, forces. He states that terrorists have a "special psycho-logic" which serves to rationalise acts they are psychologically compelled to commit (Post 1990).

It seems unlikely, however, that carefully planned and smoothly executed operations are carried out by what might otherwise be considered a self-focused and disorganised group. While studies have found that many terrorists come from deprived and disturbed backgrounds (e.g. Taylor & Ryan, 1988), work described by Ferracuti (1990) has indicated that the family backgrounds of terrorists do not differ significantly from other politically active, but non-terrorist, peers.

Terrorist activity usually appears to be characterised by co-ordinated action aimed at the achievement of specific goals. However, impulsive, self-possessed and violent individuals could not all be expected to have common personal agendas for the expression of their violence merely by coincidence. Such an explanation ignores the causal role that socio-political contexts play in shaping the form (or direction) of the violence expressed. If the requirement is simply for expression of violence, the invocation of a political agenda seems unnecessary and difficult to explain.

Post (1987) fails to account for the tight-knit and focused action apparent in the majority of terrorist groups. If terrorist groups operated like delinquent gangs, simply enhancing a proclivity to antisocial activity (Thornberry et al, 1993) a wider range of disparate and

generally antisocial actions would be expected, rather than carefully planned and directed campaigns of action. Involvement in a group is difficult to reconcile with Post's understanding of terrorists. The origin of terrorist groups is also difficult to conceptualise given this perspective on group members. At least some of the group must be rational, goal oriented and socially skilled in order to develop organisational hierarchy and structure, and to exert leadership. From an organisational and social psychological standpoint it becomes apparent that only small and relatively informal groups can survive with no formal or informal leadership (Tajfel & Fraser, 1978).

It has been suggested that focusing upon problems individual terrorist group members may have is limiting except in the narrow context of clinical rehabilitation (Stohl 1988). It is not known whether terrorists suffer from some common mental disorder, or any mental disorders at all (Stohl, 1988). However, unless these individual problems can be equated to systematic behavioural differences in the commission of an event it is unclear what use this information can be put to in the course of a terrorist negotiation or investigation.

Further evidence suggesting the need for caution in stereotyping terrorists is the fact that data accumulated to date does not appear to indicate any single clear terrorist profile. Strentz (1988), for example, states that the profile developed of a 1960's left wing group would be radically different to groups operating today. This has two implications; first, that it is of limited value to talk of generic terrorist profiles and second, that there is change and development, both between and within groups, over time. Any useful theory of terrorism must be able to account for these factors.

Rothman and Lichter (1980) addressed the broader issue of involvement in political activism and radical activism of all types. They state that much of the social psychological literature prior to their study portrayed "New Left radicals" as having "positive personality traits". Left-wing radicals were typically portrayed as being morally advanced and free of bourgeois concerns. They were considered to be psychologically healthier than their peers (Rothman and Lichter 1980). However, they felt that many of the studies they were reporting were methodologically flawed.

Rothman and Lichter (1980) failed to find support for the psychological "liberation" or "transcendence" claimed in the previous work. Instead they suggested that a heightened power drive, self-absorption, and lack of concern for others are all necessary for a sustained commitment to radical social change. These conclusions were drawn from administration of a number of projective tests, a test of perceived family relations and a number of other behavioural and attitudinal tests, such as the New Left Ideology scale (Rothman and Lichter 1980).

In describing their results, however, they focus solely on individual personality measures as indicators of tendency towards radicalism. For example, looking at male students, they conclude that a radical personality appears to resemble an inversion of the traditional authoritarian personality (Rothman and Lichter 1980). Reasons for involvement in radical groups included reacting against fathers they saw as flawed and intellectualisation or "ideologisation" of their environment. Parallels can clearly be seen with Post's (1986; 1990) discussion of anarchic-ideologues.

Turco (1987) also discusses the psychodynamics and personality types of terrorists. His view of terrorism is immediately apparent in his reference to it as a theatre of the absurd. He refers to terrorism as "drama trauma", with the media playing a critical role in reinforcing the activity. According to Turco (1987), terrorism could not exist without the media coverage. He sees terrorism as a high-tech way of involving many innocent people in a "massive psychodrama" (Turco 1987).

Turco (1987) outlines four types of terrorist profiles:

- 1) the *inadequate personality* with excessive and exaggerated demands;
- 2) the *antisocial personality* with a criminal outlook and direct rational expectations;
- 3) the *paranoid* with bizarre demands, frequent religious overtones and underlying homosexual conflicts; and,
- 4) the *hypomaniac or depressive* - a "suicide to be" (Turco 1987).

A group profile is also suggested, being composed of a leader (a paranoid), activists (antisocial personalities) and idealists (most nearly normal and playing an insignificant role). The individual classifications can be seen to mirror Post's concept of the terrorist as psychologically dysfunctional. Although Turco extends his discussion to group structure, he makes no comment on potential variations, and the implications that different member type compositions may have on subsequent performance.

A number of other authors, such as Brunet and Casoni (1991) and Johnson and Feldman (1992), have also presented similar ideas about the mental state of terrorists. What all these approaches have in common is the development of theories explaining why these people do things "normal" people would not. An underlying premise is that these people are different. Further, they are individually different; the difference is not proposed to be

as a result of group processes but as a consequence of systematic variation in the individual's psychological composition. Even when socialisation is talked of as playing a role, it is not the interaction and social processes which are seen as being of importance, but the peculiar manner in which the person internalises what is happening to them.

This last fact indicates an even more fundamental assumption about the role a person plays in their interaction with the environment. The psychoanalytic and psychodynamic perspectives treat individuals as passive recipients of others' influence. They are active to the extent that they can interpret what happens in various ways, but they are still viewed as acting in a deterministic manner. This may be contrasted with the view of terrorists as active agents, interacting freely with their environment. This perspective is the basis for much of the non-clinical psychological perspectives of terrorist involvement outlined in the following sections.

Psychiatric and clinical perspectives on the problem of terrorism are limited in the amount of useful information they may provide in an investigative context. The focus on psychological problems may be useful in attempting to rehabilitate captured terrorists, but lacks wider application. Many of the assertions about individual involvement are untestable and general. Further, links between individual dysfunction and group membership generally lack supporting evidence.

Kellen (1990), discussing the particular context of ideological terrorism in West Germany, does not see terrorists as being dysfunctional, stating that they show strong

ties to reality. They operate extremely efficiently in their own terms and have been able to get away with their crimes rather easily, despite the efforts of the biggest and most effective anti-terrorist machinery ever created (Kellen 1990).

2.3 - Terrorism as rational activity

In contrast to the view of terrorists as irrational or not “normal”, the rational choice approach focuses upon the mundanity, or normality, of criminal involvement. This approach focuses upon the commission of events rather than the psychological precursors to involvement. Offenders are considered to seek benefit for themselves through their criminal behaviour. They make decisions and exhibit rationality, bounded by the limits of time, ability and information (Cornish and Clarke 1986). Some degree of rational decision making would even be expected in crimes where pathological motivations, or commission on impulse, could be hypothesised. Rationality is discernible not in the motives of the offender, but in the execution of the offence (Cornish and Clarke 1986).

The rational choice approach sees different crimes as having different operational requirements (Cornish and Clarke 1986). For example, discussion of burglary as an absolute type of crime will not suffice; residential and commercial burglary will have different parameters and constraints. Further, different types of residential burglary will vary - burglaries in middle-class areas, working-class estates, wealthy “enclaves” and other areas might be expected to provide different risks and benefits. This will follow not only for commercial burglary, but will also be true of other types of crime,

from serious crimes such as rape and murder through to volume crimes like shoplifting and vehicle crime (Cornish and Clarke 1995, 1986).

Sociological theories of deviance developed in the 1960's recognised explanations of crime as purposive, rational and often mundane. Deterministic and pathological explanations of criminal activity were rejected in recognition of the importance of control and the distribution of social and economic power in society (Clarke and Cornish 1985). Much research into offender's involvement in crime showed that it was not exceptional. Legal and illegal activities were often not considered incompatible, and may even be thought complementary.

Strictly deterministic approaches also fail to account for the observation that many offenders appear to develop, as they would in any activity, becoming more skilled through practice (Clarke and Cornish 1985). Research also showed that in addition to involvement in crime, rational choices (based upon perceived risks) also informed the decisions to desist involvement in illegal activity (Clarke and Cornish 1985).

Interviews with criminals, and observations of crime patterns, indicated that far from being random, crimes of all types had clear logic to them. Burglaries varied according to the proximity to, and apparent wealth of areas, and opportunities for undisturbed access to properties therein. Vandalism was most likely to occur to public property, or abandoned buildings where chances of being caught were minimal. Similarly, mugging victims were chosen as those least likely to resist, while still offering a reasonable payoff (Clarke and Cornish 1985).

Economic models provide a very clear and open method of structuring rational decisions. Economic gain and quantified risks enable calculation of rational choices such that the actions of offenders, and optimal choices, can be readily predicted. While offering a powerful methodology, however, economic models have significant weaknesses. The quantification of all information requires a high level of abstraction, and sometimes considerable assumption (Clarke and Cornish 1985). The systematic consideration of multiple factors afforded by economic models needed to be drawn upon in some way to account for individual differences in cognitive processing, preference and emotional response (Clarke and Cornish 1985).

In its strictest sense the rational choice model requires actors to have complete and accurate information on the costs and benefits likely to accrue from an activity. This information is processed logically in order that an optimal decision is made, the optimal decision choice being that with the highest rank from the set of possible options. However, these criteria are unlikely to be met in real situations (Trasler 1993).

Economic models of rational choice were found to be too limited, unable to adequately explain the full range of criminal behaviour. Rewards of crime can only be considered in material (quantifiable) terms, ignoring costs and benefits which cannot be converted to cash terms. The range of behaviours seen in the commission of crime cannot be considered in numerical terms, thus crimes tend to be considered as homogenous. The formal mathematical modelling of crime requires information

which is either not available, or which is subject to unrealistic assumptions about what is being represented.

Criminal decision making is typically subject to a degree of uncertainty. While an offender might be able to identify the options open to him and identify what outcomes these are likely to have, the likelihoods cannot be assessed numerically. At best arbitrary relative evaluations are possible, in that one outcome may be more, equally or less likely than another to occur (Trasler 1993).

“The economist’s image of the self-maximising decision maker, carefully calculating his or her advantage, did not fit the opportunistic, ill-considered, and even reckless nature of such crime” (Clarke & Felson 1993, p5). Most people make use of subjective rather than objective probabilities in the making of decisions, but even so the subjective expected utility model has received little support in criminological study (Trasler 1993). Criminals are not seen as necessarily maximising their decision choices, but attempt to meet their needs with the minimum of effort. To the extent that satisfactory outcomes are good enough, they are termed “satisficing” (Clarke & Felson 1993). Accounting for this, the rational choice approach to criminal activity can be seen to relate closely to the “naturalistic” approach to decision making espoused by Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood and Zsombok (1993).

A wide range of work by Klein and others (Klein et al 1993, Flin 1996) has shown that people make less than perfect, or optimal, decisions in many situations, from home buying and gambling to fire incident command and tactical military command.

This work has led to a profusion of theoretical models addressing different aspects of the decision process, or different *types* of decision. For example, Klein's "recognition primed decision-making" model focuses upon initial scene recognition and planning strategies (Klein et al 1993). Beach focuses upon the integration of information and its comprehension within "frames" limiting the range of interpretation possible (Beach 1990).

As a result of the methodological weaknesses associated with strict economic models, a relatively informal rational decision approach was developed by Clarke and Cornish (1986) to account for behaviour in criminal activity. Criminals have been shown not to process complete information in decision making, but to focus upon varying aspects of a situation throughout the decision making process. Event understanding is simplified rather than processed in its full complexity, with a few possibilities being picked out rather than fully analysed (Trasler 1993). Again this corresponds to Klein's discussion of experience based, "recognition primed", decision making, in which situational understanding is used to develop decision options which are considered serially rather than processed and compared in parallel (Klein et al 1993).

This type of rationality may be considered limited, or bounded. In the true economic sense such decision making may not be seen as rational. However, they cannot be considered to be *irrational* as there is typically a logic to the decision choices made, based upon a decision maker's personal attitudes and values, their understanding of the situation, and their current goals. Klein and Beach both refer to this limited

universe of information and influence as the decision *frame* (Beach 1990, Klein et al 1993).

Different crimes have different situational contexts and different informational requirements (Clarke & Felson 1993). Decision making in crime can be considered to divide into “involvement” decisions and “event” decisions. Involvement decisions refer to the processes by which offenders come to engage, continue or desist in a particular crime. They are influenced by various factors over a relatively long period of time. Event decisions, by contrast, are shorter term, making use of more limited information relating largely to circumstances and situational factors (Clarke & Felson 1993).

Most criminological theories attempt to account for crime through explanations of motivational concepts such as rule-breaking or delinquency. These accounts thus focus on reasons for crime and pay little heed to variations in the forms of crime committed. The rational choice perspective sees the nature of the crime as being highly significant: Different forms of crime have different informational requirements and require varying decision making processes (Clarke & Felson 1993).

The background social, environmental and motivational experiences and characteristics of offenders - the focus of traditional criminology - are theorised as influencing the values, attitude and judgements of an individual, rather than playing a direct role in criminal activity. The actual outcome of decision making will be effected not only by these characteristics, but also by situational factors (such as a

need for money) which demand action (Cornish and Clarke 1986). It is central to the idea of offenders as “reasoning” that their actions are non-pathological and unexceptional.

Research has shown that violent crime, such as rape and murder, does involve considerable planning. For example, the use of weapons and force has been suggested as a rational choice in establishing rapid control over uncertain situations during armed robberies (Cornish and Clarke 1986). Research on robbery has indicated that exact planning based on perfect information is not required for criminal acts to be carried out successfully. “Pattern planning” is sufficient for many offences which involve surprise, intimidation and seizing the initiative to carryout. That is, operating within a rational framework, general plans or schemas may be developed, with details being decided on the spot as required (Cornish and Clarke 1986). This type of planning is exactly mirrored in Klein et al’s (1993) concept of “naturalistic” decision making in emergency response. Prior experience, and an understanding of the nature of events, allows rapid decision making based upon situational data as it becomes available. This parallel is supported in Cornish and Clarke’s statement that “the more experienced offender behaves in much the same way as any expert decision maker” (Cornish and Clarke 1986, p14).

Once a crime has been engaged in, the offender derives knowledge about the implications and consequences of various actions and options. This information is influential in subsequent decisions (Cornish and Clarke 1985). However, the degree of specificity of this experience will mean that the information will only be relevant to a

small set of crimes. Burglary was used as an example of this previously; commercial and residential burglaries offering different risks and benefits, with different types of properties or targets offering further unique opportunities and difficulties (Cornish and Clarke 1985).

The decision to commit a crime is based upon an evaluation of how goals might be met. This decision will be based upon previous experience and factors such as values and attitudes. Contextual factors related to ethnic, social and familial situations will all play a role in influencing decisions. Cornish and Clarke (1985) view these factors as playing a less directly criminogenic role than many theorists suggest. They see these factors as providing the opportunity for certain courses of action to occur. Final decisions are also influenced by various situational factors and immediate goals or desires.

Cornish and Clarke (1985) hypothesise the key importance of chance events, such as peer pressure, the sudden need for money or an easy opportunity, in actually stimulating an individual to commit a burglary. However, all of these processes can also be seen to be pertinent to the involvement in terrorism. Ethnic and social factors, in combination with perceptions of alienation and lack of faith in normal political channels, are suggested to precede decisions to engage in radical activity or terrorism (e.g. Kellen 1990, Ferracuti 1990, Sprinzak 1990).

Involvement in an activity enables the development of experience, allowing incidents to be executed increasingly professionally. Further, increasing involvement in crime

leads to other lifestyle changes as offenders re-evaluate their values and attitudes. The people with which an individual associates also changes with increasing commitment to a different type of activity - reinforcing the changing attitudes and presenting more opportunities and contacts than were available before. This process of increasing socialisation, while being postulated by Cornish and Clarke (1985) for burglary, is almost identical to that suggested by researchers such as Sprinzak (1990) for involvement in terrorism. This provides support for the argument that terrorist involvement, like that for other crimes, is relatively mundane and does *not* require special theories of involvement or behaviour.

The identification of specific types of offence and offender may enable more clearly targeted responses to be developed (Cornish and Clarke 1985). "To the extent that their special characteristics, in particular the motives and reasons underlying their conduct, can be identified and described, it may be possible to suggest more carefully tailored forms of intervention" (Cornish and Clarke 1985, p175). While general responses to ill-defined groups of offenders may be unlikely to achieve their objectives, greater specificity of intervention based upon evidence driven decision (or policy) making is likely to be more successful (Cornish and Clarke 1985).

Although the decision making of individuals is important in understanding criminal activity (including terrorist kidnapping), wider contextual factors *influence* these decisions. Two sets of factors can be hypothesised: The *social psychological* and the *socio-cultural*. The social psychological perspective explains behaviour in terms of interpersonal and inter-group interaction. Socio-cultural perspectives are wider in their

range, encompassing political, cultural and sociological factors in their understanding of the issues.

2.4 - Social psychological perspectives on criminal involvement

Walters (1990) suggests that criminality becomes a lifestyle based upon a belief system and style of thinking which supports, justifies and rationalises criminal activity. Athens (1992) expands upon this notion suggesting how any person can become a dangerous and violent criminal through various stages of socialisation. Athens (1992) stresses the importance of social experience being integrated into all subsequent understanding and thinking. Such experiences occur over a period of time, later experiences building upon previous ones. In this way the learning of criminality can be seen to occur through a developmental process.

The concept of criminal lifestyle, while drawing upon many of the same theoretical processes (both psychological and social) in explanation of behaviour does not appear to contribute significantly to an understanding of terrorism. Much criminological discussion can not be clearly related to terrorist activity (Clinard & Quinney 1986). Discussion of the development of criminal career does not adequately account for politically motivated activity, tending to focus on largely asocial and self-gratificatory behaviour.

Criminals are thought to learn crime in much the same way that any skilled activity is learned, primarily through association and imitation (Walters 1990). Not only are the basic physical skills learned, but also the associated attitudes and rationalisations which

lead to involvement in antisocial activity. Differential association is the theory that individuals become involved in criminal activity as the frequency, duration and intensity of non-legal influences outweigh law-abiding examples. Support for this idea is suggested by the finding that individuals with delinquent friends are more likely to engage in miscreant behaviour than those with less delinquent peers (Walters 1990). This has also been shown to be the case in football hooligan gangs (Johnson 1999) and ram-raid gangs (Wilson 1995).

This process of progressive involvement is also suggested to underlie the strength of involvement in radical political and terrorist activity. Greater contact with those involved results in greater commitment. Sprinzak (1990) suggests that people undergo a long socialisation process before they become active terrorists. Groups of people initially holding relatively innocuous views, though linked by a common belief in an alternative to current social or political systems, become gradually and progressively more extreme through otherwise normal group socialisation processes.

Having studied delinquent gangs from a social network perspective Baron & Tindall (1993) found that the structure of a group plays a key part in shaping attitudes. Individuals who are central in a group, having a large number of contacts with large parts of the group network, are more likely to hold certain key attitudes. These attitudes are also generally stronger, being more commonly reinforced, than those held by members who are less fully integrated into the group. This is supported in Johnson's (1999) work of football hooligan gangs.

In contrast to the view of many researchers taking a psychiatric perspective, Kellen considers there to be essential differences among types of terrorist (Kellen 1990). The predominant difference relates to nationality. It is observed that terrorists in different countries have their own distinct characteristics. Not only will cultural influences shape variations in national character, but differing social and political structures will lead to variations in the immediate environment. These factors will all have an impact through their interaction, resulting in variation in the nature of terrorist groups. Attempts to identify a common or generic terrorist profile are unlikely to succeed (Kellen 1990).

In discussing the unique conditions which resulted in the occurrence of West German terrorism, Kellen (1990) states that "anyone who wants to gain some understanding of these [West German] terrorists should listen carefully to what the terrorists themselves say about their actions and motivations..." (Kellen 1990, p47). However, it may be hypothesised that if the cultural, social and political characteristics of terrorists truly result in differing "types" of terrorist, this variation will be manifest in their behaviour as well as their statements. That is, behavioural differentiation should be observed for terrorist groups in different geo-political regions of the world.

There is strong evidence to suggest that special psychological problems, or unique mental conditions, are not required to explain extreme behaviour. There are many cases in which otherwise ordinary people carry out violent acts, perhaps the most famous being illustrated in Milgram's (1974) series of studies. Further support has come from work addressing the behaviour of Nazi leaders during the Second World War. Zillmer, Ritzler and Harrower (1995), conclude that after extensive re-studying of projective tests

carried out on captured Nazi leaders, no significant distinctions were found separating them systematically from the wider population from which they arose. Following reinterpretation of Rorschach tests completed by Julius Streichter, for instance, Zillmer et al (1995) concluded that he was little more than emotionally insecure, a result not distinguishing him from large numbers of non-Nazis.

While it may be argued that in-depth clinical interviews could have greater predictive validity than a number of projective tests, the implications and outcomes of the approaches are rather similar. In both cases the focus is upon specific characteristics of the individuals involved. Intriguingly, while clinical studies appear to indicate specific clusters of psychological factors, the non-clinical research above suggest that there is little to distinguish violent people from non-violent in terms of distinct psychological patterns.

In discussion of how terrorists differ from non-terrorist users of violence, Kellen (1990) points to the underlying political motivation as being the most influential factor. While this may appear rather obvious, it is the peculiar combination of political interest with both intellectualism and a propensity for extreme physical violence which is seen as being salient in the occurrence of terrorism in West Germany (Kellen 1990). Additionally, although considered “intellectual”, the West German terrorist activists tended to be unsuccessful academically. It has been suggested that they are typically from middle class homes and have suffered repressive childhoods. It is this latter factor which is considered to be a particular precursor to anti-social activity (Taylor and Ryan, 1988).

These propositions about the social background and lack of success appear to agree with Post's (1986; 1987; 1990) conceptualisation of terrorists. The important difference, however, is that whilst Post views them as fractured identities using the group to regain wholeness, Kellen (1990) views them as angry isolates led by intellectualism and idealism. However, Kellen (1990) himself makes the point that even if we could understand the terrorists' mind, the practical use of this information is limited. He suggests that even if the motives of terrorists were understood, it would not make governments (or any party involved) any more conducive to giving in to their demands (Kellen 1990). What may be useful, however, is a greater understanding of the possible ways in which terrorist groups interact with the authorities concerned, and what the outcomes of such encounters are likely to be.

In support of the general views held by Kellen, Ferracuti (1990) also states that no evidence of psychopathology or consistent psychological disorder has been found in psychiatric studies carried out on Italian terrorists. He states that terrorists may best be viewed as fanatics, being totally committed to ideology and focused upon a single goal. Ferracuti (1990) proposes that being in a group, and particularly being isolates from society at large, reinforces the ideology and strengthens the motivation.

Ferracuti (1990) views terrorists as having extreme political and ideological beliefs. However, rather than viewing these beliefs as being categorically different from other people's, he sees them as falling at one extreme of a continuum. Terrorists represent one pole, radical activists being relatively less extreme, those active in politics being central

and those having no involvement or interest in political issues at the opposite pole. Under this perspective, one of problems associated with leaving a terrorist group arises with the difficulty of changing or rejecting such an extreme value system (Ferracuti 1990).

In a similar vein, Sprinzak (1990), refers to a process of radicalisation with reference to the development of the Weathermen (an extreme left-wing group in America during the 1970's). Based upon acts, practices, symbolic behaviour and rhetoric, the radicalisation process turns some young educated people into tough reactionaries prepared to use violence and force (Sprinzak 1990). Sprinzak (1990) makes two points which are fundamental to his argument. Firstly, terrorism is about *something*, it is not random. Secondly, it is *not* the product of mental derangement.

Sprinzak (1990) sees terrorism, and especially left-wing terrorism, as a special case of ideological opposition with authorities. Its roots are typically non-violent, leading to progressively more violent expression following a period of psychological shift in which the values of established society, or the regime in place, are increasingly depreciated and subsequently rejected. He states that those involved are typically not isolates or individuals with personality problems, but groups of normal people sharing common beliefs. These people believe in the need for an alternative social or political system and clash with the authorities in less extreme ways long before the hardening of collective world views and radicalisation occurs (Sprinzak 1990). In these situations it is commonly the middle class, and relatively well educated, who form the terrorist collectivity.

It is often assumed that fanaticism is one of a cluster of terrorist attributes, and that this state is in some way related to the use of violence (Taylor and Ryan 1988). Fanaticism refers to the holding of extremely strong beliefs. The beliefs that characterise the fanatic become so central to his life that other things are devalued or ignored (Taylor and Ryan 1988). The issue of concern becomes of overriding importance, playing a defining role for the individuals concerned. All other concerns are viewed with respect to this central issue, and become secondary to it.

However, Taylor and Ryan (1988) point out that fanaticism is not exclusive to terrorism. People may feel and behave fanatically with respect to a wide range of interests. This fact further supports the argument that terrorism does not represent a special class of behaviour, but can be understood through normal psychological mechanisms. The term “fanatic” is typically used in a pejorative manner, implying an unhealthy focus upon the object of interest. This ties in with the tendency in therapeutic approaches to define terrorists in a manner implying inferiority. The term thus becomes functional in a rhetorical and superficially descriptive way rather than in an explanatory manner (Taylor and Ryan 1988).

An important issue in the discussion of terrorist groups is the observation that beliefs and ideas are rigidly held. These strongly held beliefs and ideals are hypothesised to result in clear views of the world (which need not have internal consistency) through which everything is interpreted and which determines the fanatic's actions. An unwillingness to compromise and disdain for alternative perspectives are also

characteristic of the fanatic. Taylor and Ryan (1988) focus upon the use of the concept in explaining suicidal terrorist missions, however, fanaticism might also be expected to have an impact upon negotiation, making terrorist compromise or yielding less likely.

In addition to these arguments of progressive “acclimatisation” to terrorist values, Bandura (1990) argues against the need for special theories of violent personality. He observes that people can apparently disengage from normal moral reasoning, stating that disengagement is a process which occurs all the time, not just in extreme conditions. People often reinterpret their actions, or ignore the potential consequences, as many day to day actions which further self-interests can have detrimental effects for others (Bandura 1990).

It is hypothesised that involvement in terrorism is accomplished by cognitively restructuring the moral value of killing, so that the killing can be done free from self-censuring restraints (Bandura 1990). Rationalisation of violence occurs after non-violent methods have been interpreted as being ineffective. Violence is made defensible by interpreting it as a tool in the struggle against an oppressor, protecting cherished rights. A number of examples can be seen in discussion of Islamic terror; suicide bombing is reconstrued as dying in combat, innocent hostages are reinterpreted as agents of Imperialism and unconventional warfare techniques are justified as required for opposition to the superior power of the oppressor (Kramer 1990).

The notion of disengagement of responsibility may be particularly useful when considering hostage taking. It is proposed that disengagement is the process enabling

dehumanisation of hostages to occur. Bandura (1990) suggests that greater aggression may be used against dehumanised individuals - they can be seen as less than human and their suffering irrelevant. In contrast, most abductors find it difficult to harm their hostages after they have come to know them personally (Kramer 1990). Humanisation makes others' emotional responses more personally salient (Bandura 1990). Dehumanisation allows easier self-exoneration of blame for otherwise anti-social activity.

Bandura (1990) emphasises the importance that social processes play in the development of terrorism: Disinhibitory training is usually conducted within a communal milieu of intense interpersonal influences in isolation from mainstream life (Bandura 1990). In addition to shaping beliefs, this type of training may also play a strong motivational role in its own right. In addition to building the belief in the moral right to use force, such training instils a sense of eliteness and reward for social solidarity.

Sprinzak (1990) states that it is more useful to understand the development of terrorist groups than the individual terrorist's personal psychology:

“It appears that, as radicalisation deepens, the collective group identity takes over much of the individual identity of the members; and, at the terrorist stage, the group identity reaches its peak. The individual terrorists may not lose their former identity, but their actual behaviour can best be explained by the psychology of the larger group” (Sprinzak 1990, p79).

Sprinzak (1990) suggests that analysis of behaviour at a group level can prove useful without reliance on clinical interviews. Consideration of the terrorists' actions can yield useful information, especially about their attitudes to society at large, and the authorities in particular. While recognising that it is the exception rather than the rule for radicalisation to go as far as terrorism, Sprinzak's (1990) work illustrates the fact that much useful information can be gained by considering this type of behaviour as an extreme form of "normal" behaviour rather than as a substantively different type.

Taking a similar argument, Gurr (1990), states that terrorists' beliefs represent a distorted form of the beliefs and aspirations of larger society. He claims that analysis of the ideologies and traits of violent activists, and of the socio-dynamics of terrorist groups, is incomplete unless we also consider their place within the views of the larger public (Gurr 1990). There are larger groups, from which the terrorists themselves are drawn, which support the principle ideas but reject the violent tactics employed. An example of this can be seen in Ireland where some groups of (non-terrorist) Irish Catholics are sympathetic to the IRA (Irish Republican Army) while, similarly, some Protestants are sympathetic to the UDA (Ulster Defence Association). One may hold beliefs about one's nation without seeing violence as a valid response to the situation.

2.5 - Socio-cultural perspectives

The processes discussed already show that terrorism has its own internal logic, as do the terrorists themselves. Although this logic may be removed from that of the average citizen, being somewhat extreme, it arises from the same psychological processes that affect everyone. However, terrorism also has an external logic. Rather than arising from

a vacuum, violence being committed from violence sake, terrorism derives meaning through its situation in the wider context of the society within which it occurs.

Dutter (1987) considers terrorism to result from ethno-political processes, defining ethno-political activity as a class of intergroup interaction. He suggests that in order to fully understand the individuals and groups involved in terrorist activity one must consider the general background conditions which gave rise to them. To understand the problem of terrorism it is necessary to consider the society and wider culture into which they are born.

Dutter (1987) focuses his research upon the involvement of ethnic groups in what he terms "ethno-political activity", especially organised violence and terrorism. He sees the establishment of groups as involving anthropological, economic, psychological and sociological factors. These wide ranging factors result in the development of collective identity systems. These systems are composed of oral and cultural values and beliefs, common perceptions and interpretations, as well as a set of well-defined rituals which, among other things, reinforce and perpetuate themselves (Dutter 1987).

Contact with other groups is hypothesised to automatically provoke an us-them distinction. Identification with one group involves comparison with other groups, the difference from other groups being an integral part of the identity of a group. Dutter (1987) considers that antagonistic contact and disputes with out-groups not only reinforce the strength of we-they notions, but may also lead to the perceived need for collective action to defend the collective identity and the socio-economic status-quo.

Political agendas develop, leading to various types of political activity (Dutter 1987). It can be argued that the same processes underlie all inter-group activity, not just ethno-political issues (Tajfel 1981, 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988).

The importance of group and cultural processes is illustrated in Kramer's discussion of Hezbollah suicide bombers (Kramer 1990). The classification of such acts as resulting from brainwashing or clinical problems denies an understanding of the significance of these events in their context. Discussing the events in a contextual vacuum makes it impossible to know what such actions really mean to those performing them. Kramer (1990) considers that suicide bombings can be interpreted as serving the interests of Islam, and that often they are carried out with full awareness of their purpose and consequence. Western psychologists, and other commentators, mislabel such actions as being "irrational" as they do not understand the specific religious and cultural processes from which the actions arise as extreme, but otherwise understandable, purposive acts.

Similarly, Crawford (1993) discusses the role of socio-political and personal factors in discussion of the Basque separatist movement in Spain. Crawford refers to the Basques as being a strongly nationalistic people, having a very *tight* culture (Crawford, 1993). This means that the culture is highly cohesive and group oriented, focusing in this case on extended family social groups. Severely restricted individual autonomy results in a predisposition to direct unresolved psychological conflict and tension through projection onto outsiders. The prevailing attitudes within the Basque population contribute to a climate necessary for the breeding and sustenance of ethnic and political violence

(Crawford, 1993). In this case terrorism can be seen to arise logically from the perceived need to protect the society's values.

Within every society there are a wide range of beliefs and attitudes held. Within the entire span of such views there will always be a percentage who are prepared to use violence (Crawford 1993). Psychology is important in understanding terrorist activity because while historic precedents and societal processes create the basic conditions for political violence, it is perpetrated by individuals. Particular world views developed through experience are critical in shaping observed behaviour. This is supported by the fact that the strongest support for ETA comes from small town and rural areas where traditional Basque ways survive. Less support is seen in bigger and more cosmopolitan settlements where these practices are breaking down (Crawford 1993).

The importance of the socio-political context also means that the time period at which terrorist groups are considered is important. Despite the short term appearance of stability, societies' views and political balances are constantly shifting and altering (Smith & Morgan, 1994). As a consequence activist groups, and the types of action carried out, will change over time. From this it may be suggested that it is futile to consider terrorism, and particularly the motives of terrorists, without consideration of the prevailing social and political climate from which they arise.

This view is supported by Strentz (1988) who indicates significant changes in the characteristics of terrorist groups between the 1960s, '70s and '80s. He observes a shift in activism from the radical left across to right-wing extremists, particularly within the

United States. This trend can be seen to be continuing into the 90's, with increasing concern over the expansion of ultra-conservative militia movements across the United States (Anti-Defamation League 1995).

A fundamental basis of Crenshaw's (1990) work is that terrorism is an expression of political strategy. Crenshaw conceptualises terrorism as operating within the framework of a *collective rationality*, and that logical processes are followed which can be discovered and explained (Crenshaw 1990). An organisation may be considered to possess preferences and values that are emergent from, and influential upon, the social processes influencing individual members. This is supported by research on individual and collective decision-making (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; Tajfel 1981, 1984; Reicher, 1996), discussed in chapter 3.

There are a variety of options available to groups trying to reach their political goals. In some cases the decision making results in selection of terrorism as the strategy of choice. Crenshaw (1990) states that normal decision making processes are likely to be used in the planning and execution of terrorist acts. She asserts that this process is characterised by the making of intentional choices, with a conscious anticipation of the likely outcomes. Decisions are seen as being made collectively, on the basis of both observation and experience.

Crenshaw (1990) states that as terrorism is generally carried out by groups, an approach focused upon individuals will not be able to consider various important processes. It is necessary to identify the correct unit of analysis when considering terrorist activity, this

unit being the operational group in the majority of cases. Crenshaw (1990) takes a strategic perspective, seeing individuals as understanding the need to participate in collective activity. They choose involvement in a group as a result of judgements of the efficacy afforded by membership of it. People are considered to be aware of what can be achieved individually and collectively (Crenshaw 1990). As a result they select to behave according to collective rather than individual goals and purposes.

This view is similar to that of Triandis (1994). While Crenshaw (1990) suggests that an individual may select to behave according to either individual or group requirements, Triandis (1994) suggests a more complex relationship between individual and collective modes of activity, based upon cultural factors. Instead of choosing to act with the group rather than according to individual desires, Triandis (1994) suggests that in some situations people naturally think in a more collective than individual manner. In strongly collectivist cultures it is more common to think of the group before the self, whereas in strongly individualist cultures the reverse is the case. Given a more collectivist culture, group rationality could be followed with little or no reference to personal concerns (Triandis, 1994).

Crenshaw (1994) believes that terrorism has developed as a viable strategy in bringing about political change opposed by established governments. Further, she suggests that in some cases terrorism may be a reasonable and calculated response to circumstances. Acts of terrorism typically follow the failure of other approaches (Crenshaw 1990). Experience of oppositional politics provides radicals with information about the potential consequences of their choices. Terrorism is likely to arise as an informed

choice among available alternatives, some tried unsuccessfully. Terrorists also learn from the experiences of others, usually communicated to them via the news media. (Crenshaw, 1990).

The power imbalance between a radical group and an incumbent authority is significant in the decision making process. Given the perspective of a relatively weak group, terrorism, and particularly hostage taking, can be described as a process of systematic and coercive bargaining (Crenshaw 1990). Terrorism is conceptualised as a strategy to induce loss of morale and fear in the authorities. It is hypothesised to do this through tension caused by sustained unpredictable action and through the long term draining of resources. It may be hoped that such action will inspire further resistance or induce greater support through example. An example of this strategy succeeding in practice may be seen in the proliferation of radical groups in the Middle East.

Crenshaw (1990) also discusses the role of hostage taking as a specific form of tactic within the full range of terrorist acts. The taking of hostages for use in bargaining situations is hypothesised to reduce the power differential between the terrorist group and the authorities. A government's resources and strength are smaller advantage during such events. Hostage taking is seen as an attempt to directly manipulate a government's political decision making (Crenshaw, 1990).

However, Crenshaw (1990) is also careful to highlight a number of limitations associated with taking a strategic analysis. Firstly, it must be assumed that the terrorists genuinely want what they demand. Secondly, it is assumed that the terrorists want

government compliance rather than resistance. Thirdly, deception cannot be accounted for (Crenshaw, 1990). Crenshaw suggests that an alternative to strategic analysis in the case of hostage taking is bargaining theory. This explains the actions and counteractions of a group in terms of minimisation of own costs to while trying to maximise those of the opposing group. This returns the argument to the concepts of the rational choice approach discussed in section 2.3, indicating the fundamental interdependence of individual, social and cultural processes in determining the expressions and forms of terrorist activity.

Crenshaw states that prediction of future terrorism can only be based upon theories that explain past patterns (Crenshaw, 1990). This is a fundamental premise of the current work. The focus of the current research is to address the actions which can be observed during kidnapping with as much flexibility as possible. It is seen as essential to maintain the richness and complexity of the transactions which occur, within contexts "framing" these actions. By focusing upon the patterns of action and reaction as they are observed to occur, it is hoped to derive an empirically based understanding of the processes occurring during a kidnapping.

2.6 - Summary

The research outlined in this section suggest that terrorist activity can be considered to arise from normal behavioural processes. Individual members of a terrorist group need not be considered different from non-terrorist members of society in terms of psychological function. Normal social processes - particularly group dynamics - can be drawn on in understanding involvement in terrorist activity. Terrorism can be

understood as planned, goal directed and based upon shared beliefs (albeit of a particularly extreme form). These beliefs, and the actions arising from them, represent a drastic form of normal oppositional political activity, not an entirely different (and dysfunctional) form of behaviour.

Psychiatric and clinical perspectives on terrorism attempt to explain the phenomenon through individual psychological problems. These approaches generally suggest that particular types of cognitive dysfunction result in some vulnerable individuals being drawn to engage in terrorist activity. Social isolation and an innate propensity for violence lead these people to be grateful for social acceptance, making them particularly susceptible to manipulation.

These perspectives tend to suffer from contradictions, however. It might be observed that the types of psychological problem being suggested as a basis for entry to terrorist groups would make such groups particularly unstable. Involvement in terrorist activity is much more easily understood as an extreme form of radical adversarial politics. Frustration and disagreement within a context of inter-group conflict can readily be understood as the basis for a process of behavioural escalation from normal political activity, through radical political involvement, to extremist violence. Terrorism represents the most extreme end of the scale, or continuum.

Evidence from a wide range of sources indicate that both involvement in terrorism, and the execution of particular incidents, are likely to result from rational decision making processes. Individual, social and cultural factors all interact to shape the

behaviour observed, but these actions seen can be readily understood as following logical processes. Special theories accounting for, or explaining terrorism in terms of, irrational or dysfunctional behaviour are not required for an understanding of terrorist activity.

A number of hypotheses can be concluded from this discussion. First, if behaviour is rational then systematic patterns are expected to be found in analysis of it. Rational action should be characterised by clear and meaningful sequences and patterns of activity which can be readily interpreted in meaningful ways. Irrational behaviour, by contrast, is defined as that which does not make logical sense, or which is difficult to understand. As such, it might be expected to be manifest in disjointed and unsystematic groupings of actions.

Second, Crenshaw (1990) suggests that as terrorist events are carried out by groups, then the group, rather than the individuals comprising it, is the correct level of analysis. It was hypothesised that analysis of the actions carried out by all members of the group would also show systematic and meaningful patterns. The social psychology of groups can be drawn on to make a theoretical case for this, but empirical analysis is required to test it.

Third, different groups of terrorist kidnappers are hypothesised to differ in the way they operate. Post (1986, 1987, 1990) suggests that terrorists are basically similar, hypothesising a common psychological dysfunction, leading to typical and characteristic modes of expressing themselves. Differences in motive are not thought

to be reflected in behavioural expression. In contrast, Kellen (1990) holds that terrorist activities will differ according to the nationality, culture, and politics from which they operate. If Post's view is supported in analysis, little variation will be expected in the range of actions observed. If Kellen's view is more accurate then a wider range of possible patterns of action and interaction will be observed.

Chapter 3 - Consistent behaviour: Variation in terrorist kidnap

The previous chapter showed that terrorist behaviour generally, and that of terrorist kidnappers specifically, can be understood as rational. Rationality is a prerequisite for the comprehension, and prediction, of others' behaviour, serving as a basis for consistency. The extent and value of behavioural consistency is a central issue in many areas of psychology. This chapter will explore consistency at individual and group-levels, and the implications of that for terrorist behaviour.

3.1 - Behaviour and consistency

An important psychological question is whether behaviour at one particular moment in time can be indicative of later behaviour, or other stable characteristics of a person. The concept of personality is based upon the premise that people typically think and behave in a consistent manner over time. Consistency is the basis of everyday predictions about peoples' behaviour. Information on a people's conduct and appearance are interpreted through experience and stereotype, to predict how they will act and react. The persistence and generality of traits are commonly accepted as a basis for predicting future behaviour (Goffman 1959).

There has been much work carried out to establish the traits that underlie personality, traits that are both stable over time and across situations. Cattell's 16 Personality Factors, Eysenck's dimensions of neuroticism, introversion-extroversion and psychoticism and the Big Five personality factors are all well know examples of attempts to empirically explain the basis of the consistency in individual's behaviour (Feshbach, Weiner, and Bohart 1996).

Eysenck (1964) discussed whether behaviour could be predictable or not, considering two opposing perspectives in answering this question; specificity and generality. The notion of 'specificity' suggests that actions are individually learned and do not combine to form recognisable traits. Under this perspective it would be hard to predict actions unless one knows what a person has learned. Generality, in contrast, suggests that different activities are bound together in broad categories which give rise to identifiable traits and types.

The concept of specificity is based upon the premise that all behaviour is learned, via instrumental or classical conditioning and that stimulus generalisation accounts for what appear to be general traits emerging. Learning is considered specific, and the development of personality is seen as the individual training of specific associations, not as the generalised improvement of larger mental units or faculties (Eysenck 1964).

The concept of generality opposes this view. It assumes that there is an underlying basis for behaviour, common-sense psychology inferring the presence of stable traits. Without such inference the consistency of personal behaviour could not be explained. Traits are not always active, but even when latent they have low thresholds of arousal and are readily called into use.

Eysenck (1964) argued that both perspectives are correct in what they assert and wrong in what they deny. He suggests that the middle ground be taken where aspects of both views are integrated. There is generalisability, but specificity can also be seen. Thus,

predictions of behaviour can be made, but they will always suffer some error. For example, the general approach taken to committing a crime may be predicted for a known offender, but more difficulty would be encountered in predicting the exact actions likely to be observed. While the concept of traits does appear to have some utility, trait categorisation appears to oversimplify complex human action resulting in incorrect prediction in a number of situations (Feshbach et al 1996).

In addition to purely psychological reasons for limitations in behavioural prediction, situational factors may serve to reduce individual behavioural consistency (but also limit possible variability). Features of a situation may not afford the opportunity to carry out an offence in precisely the manner intended. Further, situational characteristics will serve to constrain the total number of ways in which a task can be achieved. For example, there are only a limited number of ways of housebreaking, reducing the variation between burglars' actions (Canter 1993).

Mischel (1968, 1971) felt that studying people's attributes was interesting but ultimately limited, the evidence for traits generally being weak and not valid in predicting behaviour in specific situations. While traits suggest general tendencies to act, they do not indicate under what circumstances a person will show more or less of a particular trait (Feshbach et al 1996). Mischel (1968) considered behaviour contingent on situations. While attempts have also been made to classify situations in various ways, focus on *either* traits *or* situations is not likely to be productive (Feshbach et al 1996).

While behaviour patterns may appear to be stable, they are not usually highly generalisable across situations (Mischel 1968). Behavioural outcomes tend to appear stable when the situational characteristics are similar. Regular patterns are observed in peoples' actions as they remain exposed to the same culture and situational contingencies related to home, school, work, leisure and social situations for long periods of time (Mischel 1968). Societal rules and sanctions are generally constant, thus enhancing the observed temporal consistencies in social behaviour.

In addition to accounting for the interaction between the situation and stable individual characteristics, the meaning of that situation - its interpretation by an individual - is crucial in predicting behaviour accurately. It is not the physical characteristics but the cues offered by a situation that trigger individual expectancies about what actions will be effective. Situations affording similar cues will be treated as functionally alike (Phares 1991). The intentions and goals of an individual in a situation are also likely to influence its interpretation and thus the exact nature of the actions observed (Klein et al 1993).

While any analysis of individual behavioural consistency is likely to be complicated by the range of factors that need to be considered, it is possible to compare the actions of offenders empirically. What is of importance is whether the probabilities associated with a series of actions in a crime are more typical of one offender when compared against the probabilities associated with the actions of another offender. Studies looking at behaviour during rape support the notion of behavioural consistency (Canter 1988; Canter and Heritage 1990; Jack, Heritage, Canter and Wilson 1994).

In one study (Canter 1993), accounts of behaviour occurring in each of three rapes carried out by seventeen convicted rapists (fifty-one events in total) were considered by experienced detectives. All three rapes were correctly linked for 65% of the offenders, only seven rapes being wrongly attributed. The study thus supports the hypothesis that between-offender differences in behaviour are generally greater than variation in the execution of different offenses by any single offender.

Behavioural consistency is expected to be observed with respect to two main criteria. Firstly, any offender committing a crime will, by default, show patterns of behaviour which are characteristic, if not definitive, of that offense. Secondly, in addition to these defining behaviours, an offender will show patterns of action which are more characteristic of himself than of other offenders.

Canter (1993) states that evidence accumulated to date appears to mitigate against personality playing a direct role in determining the crimes an offender becomes involved in. However, he acknowledges that as personality represents the relatively stable traits used to describe people, it is unlikely that this is not expressed to some extent in the commission of crime. The intelligence, extroversion, risk taking and other stable characteristics of an individual, would be expected to influence the way in which they offend (Canter 1993). Unlike a trait adjective checklist, an individual's identity plays a critical role in shaping a person's understanding of what they can do, and what they should do. Self-identity is closely interrelated to social relations and group membership, and the importance of this will be discussed in the following section.

In investigative psychology the concept of consistency is central to the understanding of individual criminals' behaviour. What is of central concern to the current work, however, is whether this notion can be extended to cover the activity of groups. Work by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) indicates that terrorist kidnap is generally carried out by operational groups. Before investing time and effort in systematic consideration of the activities of such groups it is necessary to establish whether or not their behaviour can be considered to be consistent. If such behaviour is not consistent then prediction based on it will be extremely difficult.

Two alternative hypotheses may be postulated. The first is that consistency is not shown at a group level. Individual behaviour is subject to idiosyncrasies, making perfect prediction impossible. The behaviour of several people together might be expected to multiply the possible divergence from expected performance. The contrasting hypothesis is that group behaviour will be consistent, especially when considering well-established groups. This hypothesis is supported by a range of social psychological research suggesting that groups develop shared meaning and understanding (Katzenbach and Smith 1993; Kellet 1993; Morgan, Salas and Glickman 1993; West 1994).

Groups exert pressure on their members to conform to the norms established within them (Morgan et al 1993). Groups all hold norms, either implicitly or explicitly. Norms are the shared expectations of group members towards behaviour, thoughts, feelings and attitudes. There is a great deal of pressure within groups to conform to these norms, rewards and punishments are proffered to maintain them (Morgan et al 1993). A group,

and the individual's membership in it, can act to define, modify and maintain each individual's attitudes and values.

3.2 - Group processes in regularising behaviour

Work by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) has indicated that the majority of terrorist hostage-takings (hijack, siege and kidnap) are carried out by relatively small groups of offenders. Further, the actions of these individuals are typically well co-ordinated. As work on terrorist rationality (discussed in Chapter Two) appears to suggest that normal psychological processes can explain terrorist behaviour, so social psychological research on group performance should be useful in understanding these influences on operational terrorist groups.

The precise number of people is not critical in discussion of small groups, what is of importance is the principle of sustained interaction (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978; Saks and Krupat 1988; West 1994; Baron and Byrne 1997). Baron and Byrne (1997) suggest that a group is two or more people interacting, having shared goals, a stable relationship, interdependence and who perceive themselves as members of that group.

Self-perception of membership is crucial to the existence of a group (Tajfel 1981; Brown 1984; Van Knippenberg 1984; Baron and Byrne 1997). Members constantly act and react with one another, their behaviour becomes mutually influential and interdependent. Through this, they will develop perceptions of the group as an entity in its own right, and themselves as members of it (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; Tajfel 1981; Brown 1984). Even if the group was initially formed in response to some external

factors or demands, it will develop its own shared goals. The initial purpose will be interpreted and reinterpreted according to the group's own terms and it is likely that self-generated goals will be added. Norms internal to the group will be expected to develop over time (Tajfel and Fraser 1978).

A group is more than the aggregate of the individuals composing it. Groups are a psychologically important level of consideration in their own right, they are all-pervasive and represent a conceptual mediation between the individual and society (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; Tajfel 1981, Robinson 1996). Tajfel and Fraser suggest a number of characteristic types: family, friendship, work and laboratory groups. Given that terrorist groups are considered to have both political goal orientation (Ferracuti 1990; Crenshaw 1990) and serve affiliative needs (Post 1986; 1987; 1990), it might be expected that they would serve the function of both friendship and work groups.

The main goal of a friendship group is the maintenance of the group per se, and the well-being of its members. These groups tend not to have clearly defined role structures. In contrast, the goals of a work group are instrumental (task oriented). Once goals have been achieved the group is likely to create further goals in order to rationalise its continued existence. It is likely to have a clear role structure, often hierarchical (Tajfel and Fraser 1978). Work groups are likely to have an explicit, formal, structure. Friendship groups may also have a recognisable structure, but it is likely to be much less formal.

Cohesion is an important factor effecting group stability. It may be defined as the number and strength of mutual positive attitudes held by the members of a group (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; West 1994). Groups exert an influence on their members such that adherence to the values and norms of the group are encouraged, while lack of agreement is discouraged. Pressure to conform is often increased by increasing group cohesiveness.

Janis and Mann's (1977) concept of 'groupthink' represents an extreme form of conforming. They studied public accounts of the decisions made by major policy-making groups that had created 'fiascos' or disasters (such as President Kennedy's invasion of Cuba, at the Bay of Pigs). A set of recurring features was identified in the decision making of the groups considered. The term 'groupthink' was coined, referring to situations when all members of a group are deeply involved in decision making or planning, and their desire for unanimity affects their ability to consider the available information objectively. Eight symptoms are thought to characterise this behaviour, including - the illusion of invulnerability, the unquestioned belief in a group's moral correctness, stereotyped views of out-group members, direct pressure on members to conform, and a shared illusion of unanimity (Janis and Mann 1977). It typically results in strong commitment to ideas and goals that do not appear to be reasonable to external parties. Groupthink may be hypothesised as an important process in the creation and maintenance of particularly extreme views within a group.

The primary antecedent conditions for the occurrence of groupthink are a highly cohesive group, strong leadership preference for an option and the isolation of the group from outside influence (Janis and Mann 1977; Moorhead, Ference and Neck 1991).

These conditions may be easily satisfied in terrorist groups. The affiliative, belief and goal orientations should serve to make such a group highly cohesive. The nature of a group and its aims will necessarily serve to reduce contact with outside parties. Further, strong leadership preference may also be expected to occur, especially in groups with a strict hierarchy, charismatic leadership or paramilitary structure.

Janis and Mann (1977) suggest that as group cohesion increases, so individual psychological dependence on the group increases. If groups are insulated such that they have little contact with outside opinion then members will increasingly rely on the judgments of the group in decision making (Janis and Mann 1977). Alongside Bandura's (1990) concept of moral disengagement (discussed in the Chapter Two) it is easy to understand how it might be possible for group members can engage in actions which do not appear moral by normal societal standards.

The holding of stereotypic views of out-group members and rivals may serve to further distance people from the consequences of their actions, enabling rationalisations which do not appear reasonable to non-group members (Moorhead et al 1991). Strong pressure is exerted upon group members to conform, any signs of argument or dissent will be labelled as disloyalty and pressure will be applied to acquiesce to the majority view. Further, *self-censorship* occurs; individuals seek to minimise their own doubts and seek consensus within the group in addition to the group level processes encouraging this (Moorhead et al 1991).

The creation of an illusion of unanimity will mean that any individual having doubts about the group's policy will tend to feel that they are alone. This, in conjunction with the previous influences might be expected to exert a powerful normative influence. Finally, and further increasing consistency with group views, is the existence of *mind-guards*. These are self-appointed individuals who actively protect the group from views which may contradict those being held (Moorhead et al 1991). All of these processes might readily be drawn upon in understanding terrorist activism.

3.3 - Intergroup processes in behavioural consistency

In addition to the process of norm development, and the possibility of extreme views developing through groupthink, there are other factors that can influence group behaviour. The relationship between groups can also influence the nature of the groups themselves:

“We live in a social environment which is in constant flux. Much of what happens to us is related to the activities of groups to which we do or do not belong: and the changing relations between these groups require constant readjustments of our understanding of what happens and constant causal attributions about the why and the how of the changing conditions of our life”
(Tajfel and Fraser 1978, p424).

Individuals are labelled both by others and by themselves according to their group membership. This labelling refers not only to the nature of group itself but also carries information as to the variety of social situations in which membership of that group

serves a function. Individuals define themselves according to the groups that are salient to them, and this identity can be enhanced by favourable comparison of these groups with others (Tajfel 1981, Brown, 1984; Turner 1984; Robinson 1996; Lee and Ward 1998). Negative perceptions of out-groups reinforce favourable in-group comparisons.

Social Identity Theory (Tajfel 1981, 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996) allows an explanation of inter- and intra-group processes in terms of individual psychological processes. Self-identity is proposed to occur as a direct result of categorisation of the self with respect to others. In addition to comparison, fundamental to social identity theory is the intrinsic motivation to derive positive self-evaluation from comparison with in and out-group members (Brown 1984; Van Knippenberg 1984; Robinson 1996). A number of distinct types of social change are hypothesised, based upon the beliefs of individuals and groups regarding the nature of group interrelations. The derivation of roles and rules within a group results in the creation of a group culture which is propagated through individual identification with the group (Tajfel 1981, 1984).

Social identities are considered extremely important, as they define for a person who they are and what they stand for. This can be evidenced by the fact that people are prepared to die for the good of collectives such as religions, ethnic groups and nations (Reicher 1996). The social identity theory may be particularly useful as a basis for understanding the psychological processes underlying terrorist group formation and maintenance. In drawing on individual through to societal processes, it may serve as a framework from which to integrate many of the disparate perspectives from which

terrorism has so far been addressed. The emphasis of the relationship between *groups* may be particularly pertinent in the case of terrorism, with between-group relations being critical to many understandings of the political processes underlying this type of activity.

By far the majority of social psychological research deals with interpersonal interactions rather than truly group-level interactions. Behaviour in groups is typically seen to be resultant from the combination of interactions between the individual members of any group. However, 'group behaviour' and 'individual behaviour' are substantively different (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel 1984; Brown 1984; Turner 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996). A central tenet of the social identity theory is that membership of a group is largely a psychological state that is distinct from that of being a unique individual. It confers a group identity, i.e. a shared/collective representation of who one is and how one should behave (Hogg and Abrams 1988). This view is supported with respect to terrorist involvement by Sprinzak (1990) - see page 48, Chapter Two.

The model of social identity theory rests on a number of assumptions (Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996):

1. Society is a heterogeneous collection of social categories standing in both power and status relations to one another.
2. People derive their identity to a great degree from the categories of which they are members.

3. As a result of 2, the group is considered to be in the individual. The psychological processes responsible for this also determine the form that the group behaviour takes.
4. Individuals belong to many social categories and thus have many potential identities to draw upon.
5. Every individual is uniquely placed in the social structure due to their differing experiences and thus differing repertoires of categories.
6. People associate with each other to a lesser or greater degree according to the correspondence, or overlap, of categories of which they are members, or with which they identify.

There are two fundamental psychological processes proposed to underlie the social identification with particular groups and categories: *categorisation* and *comparison*. The processes of categorisation and social comparison operate together to generate group behaviour (Tajfel 1981; Brown 1984; Turner 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996).

Categorisation is the tendency of humans to organise the otherwise disparate world into discrete categories. This makes a complex environment easier to understand and thus deal with. All information is categorised, whether physical or social in nature. Assignment of an element to a category leads to accentuation. Items in one category are typically seen as being more similar to each other than to items in another category. This occurs regardless of the intra-category variation and the inter-category similarities. This is true with respect to both physical and social stimuli. Categorisation thus produces

stereotypical perceptions by accentuating the differences between items in different categories and the similarities of items in the same categories.

However, categorisation generates accentuation only on those factors/constructs thought to be pertinent to the categorisation. These factors are those which are subjectively believed to distinguish between categories. The origin of these beliefs are to be found in the relevant historical, political, economic and cultural context in which that person lives (Reicher 1996). Accentuation is more pronounced when the categorisation is important, salient or of immediate relevance. People who place greater importance on a particular categorisation tend to stereotype more extremely than others. This may be construed as the process resulting ultimately in the exhibition of prejudice (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; Hogg and Abrams 1988).

Social categorisation is rarely objective, tending to be carried out with reference to the self. People tend to classify in terms of similarities and differences to self-concepts. Others are classified as members of the same category (in-group) or of different categories (out-group). As objects, experiences and people are categorised, so too is the self. Self-categorisation results in accentuation of similarities between the self and other in-group members and differences between the self and out-group members.

Self-categorisation leads to self-definition in terms of the individual's representation of the important characteristics of the group - the group prototype. Stereotyping is considered to occur on all dimensions relevant to the in-group categorisation, such as attitudes, beliefs, values, affective reactions, emotions, behavioural norms and even

speech styles. Self-categorisation can be considered as the process transforming individuals into groups (Tajfel 1981, 1984; Robinson 1996).

The world view generated through consensus within one's own group further enhances in-grouping and out-grouping by emphasising the differences and similarities between the groups. Different consensus's can be held as defining the parameters of different groups. There will be a tendency to positively evaluate all stereotypic properties of the in-group. In making inter-group social comparisons there is a tendency to maximise the intergroup distinctiveness, distinguishing between groups on as many dimensions as possible.

As intergroup social comparisons are overwhelmingly evaluative it is important to accentuate differences on dimensions which are significant to, or reflect favourably on, the in-group. By differentiating groups on evaluative criteria, the in-group acquires a positive distinctiveness and thus a relatively positive social identity in comparison with out-groups. As the self is defined in terms of group membership (in-group) this results in relatively positive self-evaluation, resulting in a sense of well-being, enhanced self-worth and self-esteem (Tajfel 1981; Brown 1984; Van Knippenberg 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988).

Linking in-grouping to wider group processes, group-based, as distinct from interpersonal, interaction has been shown by Hogg and Hains (1998) to play a significant role in groupthink. Janis stated that cohesiveness is a primary antecedent of "groupthink". Hogg and Hains (1998) found that groups characterised by interpersonal

cohesion (friendship) rather than a shared-group identity were characterised by less deference to the leader, less desire to reach consensus, less need for quick decisions and greater requests for information. Groups in which identification with the group itself was important were found to have significantly impoverished decision-making. They showed the classic characteristics of “groupthink”, such as desire for consensus, endorsement of the majority view and a tendency to defer to the leader. It is clear, therefore, that the nature of a group will influence the way in which it is likely to operate. This may have important implications for understanding the range of variation in group performance or behaviour.

3.4 - Social identity and social structure

Societies are comprised of large scale groups such as ethnicity, sex, occupation, class etc., which vary in power and status to one another. Social reality is that social systems contain collections of individuals who differ in a variety of ways (Tajfel 1981). The dominant group(s) control the material power to spread its (their) own view of the nature of society; the groups comprising it and the interrelations between them. It imposes the dominant value system and ideology which is such that it benefits the most and promotes its own legitimacy and the status quo (Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996).

Individuals are born into this structure and by virtue of their relative place in the system fall into some categories rather than others (sex, race, class, physical ability, mental ability, etc.). They develop particular social identities through internalisation of perceptions of their own category membership, and this will result in relatively positive

or negative self-perceptions. Subordinate groups will have relatively negative evaluations of social identity and thus lower self-esteem than those in superordinate groups. This has unsatisfactory implications for self-concept, resulting in motivation to alleviate the situation. When a group finds itself negatively defined against another group a tension is produced which provides a dynamic for change (Reicher 1996). There are various strategies available for change, depending upon individuals' belief about the nature of society (Mugny 1982; Turner 1984; Triandis 1995; Robinson 1996).

Verkuyten and Kwa (1996) state that ethnic groups' cultural traits (such as language and lifestyle) can change and develop over time as a result of contact with others, but that their identity remains the same. This means that ethnic groups can be assimilated into a majority culture and still retain a strong sense of their own ethnicity. However, many minority groups (particularly those living in the West) are relatively disadvantaged (in socio-economic and educational terms), often receiving prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination (Verkuyten and Kwa 1996). Their reactions depend largely upon the perceived permeability of group boundaries and the perceived legitimacy of the intergroup context (Verkuyten and Kwa 1996; Reicher 1996).

Two views of societal process can be postulated: *social mobility* and *social change*. When an individual's identity feels threatened through negative comparison, social change does not automatically follow (Reicher 1996). *Social mobility* refers to the belief that groups have permeable boundaries. An individual can move into a new group, redefining his or her self-image in terms of the new group identity, disassociating from the previous group. This is hypothesised to leave the balance of social groups unchanged

as members can move between them freely. This belief relates to *individual* freedom, seeing it as relatively simple to redefine one's social identity in order to improve one's situation (Tajfel 1981, Robinson 1996).

However, if individual mobility is not (perceived as) possible, tension for change may be produced. Collective action is based upon the meeting of three criteria (Reicher 1996):

- Perception of group boundary impermeability – action on the part of the whole collective is required for change.
- Moral desirability of change – the group's position as subordinate must be perceived to be illegitimate for action to arise.
- Practicality – group members must be able to envisage a future in which they are not subordinated, and which makes action for change a realistic option.

Social change is based upon the above criteria. This view suggests that a person cannot leave the group they find themselves in unless the status quo can be altered - one cannot leave a subordinate group to join a dominant one, the social order itself must be changed to improve the group's status (Tajfel 1981; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Reicher 1996). There are two sub-strategies of social change, social *creativity* and social *competition*.

Social Creativity does not alter the status quo yet enables the subordinate group to consider themselves more positively. There are three types of social creativity: 1) using different dimensions of intergroup comparison such that they can consider themselves in a more positive manner, 2) evaluative redefinition of traditionally negative

characteristics and 3) using different comparison groups such that comparisons are more favourable.

The dominant group's reaction will vary depending upon the nature of the attempted change: comparisons with other subordinate groups will invite little or no response. If different dimensions for comparison are chosen, or existing dimensions are redefined, then some change can be tolerated up to a point. Beyond this the dominant group must re-assert its control by either repudiating the subordinate groups attempts or simply shifting to further dimensions of comparison. This is relatively simple for the dominant group as it has greater control of materials and of the media (Hogg and Abrams 1988).

Social competition only occurs when the subordinate group can see no other options. If a viable alternative social order can be conceived then the legitimacy of the status quo can be called into question. A radical alternative ideology is developed, projecting the subordinate group into direct contention with the dominant group. Interaction with the other parties involved is crucial in competitive group action (Reicher 1996). Resolution of differences may be realised legitimately through oppositional politics, or result in violence. Social change (and specifically competition) might be hypothesised as the mechanism underlying terrorist activity.

This relationship between the terrorists and the authorities, being based on competition, may be expected to influence the nature of the interactions between these parties, particularly in hostage taking, where negotiations are entered into. Although the specific nature of a group will be determined by the social, historical and political contexts

within which it develops, the nature of adversarial dialogue will serve to constrain the range of interaction observed to relatively hostile modes. In any given event, different groups, having varying goals and aims, might be expected to behave in different ways, depending upon their motives. The range of potential variation will be constrained, however, by the intrinsically hostile nature of the interaction.

Cultural, physical and personality differences are not necessary for the emergence of inter-group conflict. Competition for a goal that only one of two or more groups can achieve is sufficient to cause intergroup discrimination (Turner 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996). The social categorisation of individuals into discontinuous groups is enough to stimulate inter-group competition (Turner 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988). Experiment has shown that the random assignment of individuals to groups results in favourable in-group and unfavourable out-group perceptions developing (Warr 1987). The accentuation of differences is biased in favour of the in-group because individuals derive social identity from their perceptions of the social category they find or place themselves in. It is the involvement of self-definition that results in the need to maximise positive self-evaluation and this can be achieved by favourable in-group comparisons.

Individuals have a vested interest in being associated with categories which are positive as these allow positive self-identity to be constructed, resulting in positive self-esteem. The social identity approach argues that it is the striving for self-esteem which leads to ethnocentrism at an inter-group level. Social categorisation and social comparison create

an accentuation of intra-group similarities and inter-group differences amongst members, thus exaggerating inter-group differences.

Members of in-groups who feel their self-identity is threatened accentuate the positive aspects of their group identity and increase the homogeneity of the in-group image. This process may be seen to relate cultural factors to an individual level of consideration, and may play a role in the onset of “groupthink” in the decision making of groups which feel attacked by others. As outlined in section 3.2, groupthink can occur when highly cohesive groups, with high degrees of concurrence, acting under stress, make sub-optimal decisions. Poor decision making may result in the situation between in- and out-groups worsening.

This situation may be exacerbated in certain (collectivist) groups as they put greater emphasis on group-decision making (Ali, Taqi and Krishnan 1997). It is important for collectivist groups to preserve harmony and group identity. Particular decision styles are developed to facilitate this - particularly consultative styles (or pseudo-consultative where a leader tries to gain consensus for his own perspective). Not only does this need for consensus play a significant role in Janis and Mann’s (1977) conceptualisation of “groupthink”, it also has implications for negotiations with out-groups. The effects of group type on conflict resolution are discussed in more detail in the next section.

3.5 - Socio-cultural factors in behavioural variation

LeVine (1973) sees culture as being composed of the distinctive forms of adaptation and the distinctive ways in which human populations organise their lives. Patterns of culture

are seen as acquired behavioural characteristics, which can vary widely from one population to another. The cultural environment is as significant as the physical environment in shaping the experience and understanding of those living within it. Cultures represent the established and organised body of rules (norms) regarding how members of a population communicate with each other, think about themselves and others, and behave with respect to other people and the environment. Such rules are not universally obeyed, but they are known and recognised. They act to place limits upon the range of communication, belief, values and social behaviour that may be observed within the population (LeVine 1973).

Socio-cultural environments are complex and variable. The norms that develop play a role in pressurising individuals to standardise their social behaviour. An individual's socio-cultural environment is made up of situations, roles and institutions that represent normative pressures for correct performance and which also offer a range of opportunity for personal expression and satisfaction (LeVine 1973). LeVine postulates three possible links between culture and deviance. First, deviance may arise as an exaggeration of norms (for example, the high suicide rate in Japan is attributed to the cultural significance of taking one's own life). Second, deviance may represent opposition to norms, and third, deviance may arise through the breakdown of norms.

Most perspectives on terrorism appear to advocate the second relationship, the opposition to norms, as the most common framework for understanding terrorist activity. Exaggeration or breakdown of norms cannot account for the wide range of cultures and societies in which terrorist activity occurs. The fact that terrorism tends to

take an adversarial framework, with particular emphasis on political issues, suggests that opposition to norms is a principal characteristic of the activity.

If sub-groups within a culture, or small groups representing a different culture, feel threatened by pervading norms they may try to bring about change. This process corresponds to inter-group processes discussed previously. This process also suggests a mechanism by which variation in terrorist approaches can be understood; the issues and world views in different places will vary and this will effect the modes of operation adopted.

Socio-cultural systems are proposed to act as controlling environments, offering incumbent members rewards, punishments and opportunities (LeVine 1973). Rewards and punishments are the system's methods of self-regulation, using these to encourage adherence to norms. However, different socio-cultural systems will have different values and norms, thus affording different opportunities and demands. Individual experience in different cultures will vary systematically and result in contrasting psychological and behavioural composition of group members. It is possible for members of one culture to misunderstand the actions of another's through misinterpretation of their meaning.

For example, in discussion of terrorist fanaticism and extremism, Taylor and Ryan (1988) refer to the role of suicide as martyrdom in Islam. They point out that from a typical Western perspective suicide bombings, such as that on April 18th 1983 at the U.S. embassy in Beirut, appear to be meaningless, or acts of insanity. Such acts have no meaning beyond the immediate goal to the members of most Western cultures.

However, from an Islamic perspective such an act has religious meaning. The suicide bomber is carrying out an action in the name of Islam, and as such is committing martyrdom rather than suicide. While the taking of one's own life is not condoned by Islam, death serving the Islamic faith is seen as honourable and brings merit in the afterlife (Taylor and Ryan 1988).

Psychologists who have discussed suicide bombings in terms of brainwashing or clinical problems have been criticised by Kramer (1990) for lack of consideration or understanding of the significance of the events in the context within which they occur. He states that such events are considered to serve the interests of Islam and that they are carried out with full awareness of their purposes and consequences (Kramer 1990). While these examples refer to relatively extreme and rare events, they serve to illustrate the difficulty of trying to understand behaviour without reference to the context within which it occurs. It will be clear how such misunderstandings may influence negotiation if the parties involved all view the situation from radically different positions. This is increasingly likely to present a problem in episodes of international terrorism.

Cultural experience and learning may have implications for the development of violent protest action and terrorism. If the experience of (minority) group members is such that normal political channels are not considered viable, or even relevant, then these methods may not be seriously entertained, even at the planning stage of some form of protest action. Experience results in the interpretation of situations in particular ways, information being used to support ideas rather than disprove them. New information is not used to correct assumptions, but is selected and reinterpreted in order to facilitate the

confirmation of the original ideas (Tajfel 1981, 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996).

There are clear differences in the thinking of prejudiced and less prejudiced individuals (Hogg and Abrams 1988). Greater prejudice is characterised by increasingly simple criteria being used in the classification of others, resulting in increasing numbers of people being mis-categorised. This process may be hypothesised to underlie the perceptions of fanatics that those outside their groups are necessarily opposed to them.

A basic factor holding group members together is a set of shared expectations about each other and the world that they share. This can be reinforced by the self-expectations of the individuals who grow up with the constraints and commitments of a particular culture and come to internalise some version of it. This sense of obligation can be referred to as an *ethic* and is based upon mutual expectations and self-expectations. This can cause problems if a group rejects the beliefs and values of the dominant culture from which it arises (Tajfel 1981, 1984; Hogg and Abrams 1988; Robinson 1996).

The work discussed so far has outlined how individual and group process can interact to create cultures and sub-cultures differing in content and interest. However, they do not account for variations in the *strength* of cultural systems. The work of Triandis (1994, 1995) directly addresses this issue, making a distinction between predominantly *collectivist* and *individualist cultures*. Triandis' (1994, 1995) work may be thought of as an extension to that already discussed. The social identity approach views group behaviour from the perspective of individual psychological processes. Triandis, in

contrast, draws on philosophical, historical, anthropological and sociological theory in development of his understanding of individualism and collectivism at a societal level (Triandis 1994, 1995).

Social identity theory does not explicitly state how the strength of group and inter-group processes might vary, for example it does not account for variation in such aspects as cohesion and membership turnover of a group. Triandis' (1994) work does address these issues, individual groups are proposed to be characterised by a particular balance of individualist and collectivist modes of action. This balance will in turn influence the overall nature of the group in terms of factors such as strength of adherence to norms and feelings of commitment.

The collectivist mode is defined as a social pattern consisting of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of one or more collectives (such as family, clan, work group etc.). Members of collectivist groups are primarily motivated by the norms and duties imposed upon them by the collective(s) of which they belong. They will place group goals before personal goals and emphasise their connections with a group. The exact nature of the collectivist behaviour depends upon the nature of the in-group (Triandis 1995). Individualism, by contrast, may be defined as a social pattern that consists of loosely linked individuals viewing themselves as independent of collectives. They are primarily motivated by their own preferences, needs and the contracts they have established with others. Personal goals are typically put before those of others (Triandis 1995).

Individualist groups are proposed to be generally looser and more complex, whilst collectivist ones are proposed to be more simple and tight-knit. It is recognised that no single culture will be purely one type or the other, but will be composed of varying amounts of each type. However, a culture will be typified by one style over the other, that is, one type will generally be more common. Members of an individualist group are proposed to put attitudes before norms, while those of collectivists put norms first. The tightness of collectivist groups results in greater stereotyping of out-groups and greater likelihood of scapegoating when things are not going well. Collectivist cultures have stronger in-group and out-group boundaries than Individualist cultures. This may result in greater animosity arising between groups.

The social identity of allocentric (collectivist) individuals is more core, or salient, than that of idiocentric (individualist) individuals (Lee and Ward 1998). In-group relations are more important to allocentric individuals, with the result that ethnocentrism and competition with out-groups is also greater. Within either generally collectivist or individualist cultures, it is the allocentric or idiocentric perspectives of the individual members that are most predictive of in- and out-group attitudes (Lee and Ward 1998).

A relatively individualistic group will be characterised by weaker in/out-group differentiation and greater flexibility of position than a more collectivist-oriented group. Strong collectivist groups will be characterised by relative homogeneity of beliefs regarding norms and expectations. Sanctions will be exercised more stringently to ensure that group norms and beliefs are adhered to. Such groups are considered *tighter*

by Triandis (1995), a term having clear parallels with the term *cohesion* used with reference to small group processes.

The relative balance of individualism and collectivism within a group will be strongly dependent upon not only the functional purpose of the group but also the wider culture from which the group members are drawn. For instance, Triandis suggests that a group of Americans will be characterised by a greater degree of individualism than a group of Japanese. This occurs as a direct consequence of the nature of the two cultures - the traditional Japanese culture is focused upon inter-dependence whereas the American culture is more focused upon individual freedom (Triandis 1995).

The orientation of a group can have an impact upon the resolution of any conflicts that arise. A number of studies have found that collectivist individuals focus more on avoidance, compromise and obliging in the course of conflict resolution. Such individuals are more oriented towards preserving relationships (Triandis 1995; Ali, Taqi and Krishnan 1997). However, when faced with obvious hostility, and particularly from out-group members, collectivists are likely to respond aggressively and may well resort to violence (Triandis 1995).

During a conflict between groups, individualists are proposed to disregard the history and context of a conflict and focus specifically upon weighing up solutions to maximise payoffs. Communication is predominantly focused upon content rather than context. The end-result of conflict is the arrival at some form of contract, whether or not the opponent benefits from this is not of importance to an individualist group. Collectivists,

however, are proposed to take a wider perspective on conflicts than individualists; addressing history, general principles and pride in addition to more specific problems, consequently there may be issues that become non-negotiable. Communication tends to focus more on the context than the content of the problem itself. Negotiations with collectivist groups are proposed to take longer than those involving only individualistic groups. In such events greater trust and mutual understanding need to be developed before the content of a conflict can be discussed (Triandis 1995; Ali, Taqi and Krishnan 1997).

These patterns of conflict resolution might be expected to have direct consequences for negotiation in terrorist situations. Different styles of negotiation will be appropriate depending upon the nature of the groups involved. The protracted hostage holding in Lebanon (particularly during the 1980's) may be understood in these terms. The Western nations were trying to swap hostages for some direct form of concession, while the Lebanese would have been negotiating from the perspective of a completely different set of ground rules. It is possible that such conceptual differences directly contributed to the length of captivity for some of the hostages held. The Western nations involved (the U.S., the UK, France and Germany) becoming impatient with the Lebanese and other Arab groups, who for their part expected much more protracted, formal and ritualistic forms of negotiation to occur before the hostages could be freed.

The notion of individualism and collectivism proposed by Triandis (1994, 1995) may be useful for generating a picture of modes of group interaction at a general level, but it would appear more difficult to make specific predictions from this understanding. Many

of Triandis's examples, such as the difference between Americans and Japanese discussed previously, only work by taking general stereotypes of the cultures. Rather like personality traits discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the concepts of collectivism and individualism are general in nature. While these broad distinctions appear true at a general level, no systematic basis is suggested for predicting when a person will behave more or less like an individualist or collectivist in varying situations. For a more explicit understanding of behavioural variation the psychological processes postulated by Tajfel (1981, 1984) are required.

The view of collectivism and individualism taken by Triandis (1994, 1995) may be useful in making general predictions of the way in which particular types of group may act towards each other. Further, it may be of use in making predictions about the types of problems arising from the meeting of general cultural 'types'. However, in order to understand about the dynamics between two (or more) specific groups in conflict, more detail is required about their political, historical and cultural relations to each other.

It may thus be seen that a wide range of processes are involved in understanding the complex interactions represented by international terrorist actions and the subsequent negotiation. It is important to note that individual, group and cultural processes are not proposed to have separate and clearly identifiable effects upon behaviour. These processes are inextricably linked. Individuals interpret the world through their experience from the perspective of the groups of which they are members, and the groups themselves interact with each other through the individuals of which they are composed.

It may be suggested from consideration of this literature that it is not enough to consider terrorist events simply from the perspective of the actions carried out regardless of the situational and motivational context within which they occur. This is particularly the case given that one of the defining features of terrorist activity is its political basis. Given very different political and socio-political situations in different regions of the world, the motivations, goals and styles of terrorists in each may be expected to systematically differ.

3.6 - Summary

Chapter two sought to illustrate that broadly similar processes can be seen to underlie involvement in most terrorist activity. These processes imply rational and meaningful behaviour rather than dysfunction, with the important implication that normal psychological factors can be invoked in understanding this type of activity. The current chapter has shown that behavioural stability will be expected to a degree, but that social, cultural and physical environmental features will serve to promote systematic, yet constrained, variation.

This chapter suggests that many social factors will influence the range of behaviour observed in terrorist kidnap. Two contrasting processes are proposed to shape the ultimate nature of interactions in such events:

1. The unique development, aims and political agenda of any given group will lead to a range of distinct groups developing. The actions of such groups would be expected to differ as a consequence of their different make-up.

2. Social competition, or adversarial politics, is proposed to be a common process underlying terrorist kidnappings. The effect of this process is to constrain the observed modes of interaction seen in negotiation to those involving hostility and brinkmanship.

The interaction of these two groups of processes is suggested to lead to a limited range of behavioural variation within an overall framework of hostile dialogue. Rather than a discrete type being observed for each terrorist kidnap group, a behavioural continuum is proposed where motivational differences in expressed behaviour are moderated by the nature of the relations between the groups.

Although the mechanisms underlying violent political conflict involve rational decision making and common psychological processes, the precise nature of the problems will vary. For this reason, the current research does not only aim to identify the nature of terrorist kidnap, but also to establish the patterns and types of variation observed. While the previous chapters have taken a particularly theoretical position, the following chapter will discuss various empirical approaches to understanding the nature and variation of terrorism, and where possible, kidnapping specifically.

Chapter 4 - Methods of understanding:

Taxonomies, economic models and empirically driven analysis

Chapters two and three have outlined the importance of rational and consistent behaviour from a theoretical standpoint. This chapter aims to illustrate a range of practical and empirical work in support of the arguments made previously. While the work to be outlined in this chapter is undoubtedly comprehensive, gaps will become evident which the current research aims to fill.

This chapter will start by outlining a number of taxonomies which aim to explain observed variations in terrorist activity, and where possible, approaches to hostage taking or even kidnapping. The benefits and limitations of these will be discussed, before turning to game-theoretic and economic modelling approaches. Finally, more empirically driven approaches will be considered.

Valuable information is provided by all of these approaches, however, there are gaps where further work may provide useful consolidation of the wide ranging data generated. It is the purpose of the current thesis to provide such an integration of concepts to provide an empirically driven understanding of the nature and range of behaviour observed in the case of transnational terrorist kidnap.

4.1 - Modelling behavioural stability: Taxonomies

Various typologies exist in the criminological literature to account for observed variations in criminal behaviour. Each of these, however, have different implications for the understanding of such behaviour. Typologies based upon legal definitions of crime, for example, tend to view people as falling into homogenous categories depending upon the crime they are convicted of having committed (Clinard & Quinney 1986). Under this class of typology all terrorists, and kidnappers, would be viewed implicitly as acting in a similar manner.

Reacting against the implicit homogenisation of criminals in legalistic classifications, individualistic typologies focus upon offender individual differences. Categories and differentiations tend to focus upon personality traits and syndromes such as aggression, immaturity or lack of conformity (Clinard & Quinney 1986). Under this class of typology all terrorists, or kidnappers, would be expected to have the same type of psychological characteristics.

Attempting to encompass environmental and social influences, a third class of typologies see crime as a social phenomenon, putting it into a wider context. A drawback with many of these typologies seems to be that in attempting to account for disparate and complex activities, types are often not clearly delineated, and overlaps occur between categories. Further, some of the types relate to an individualistic rather than social frame of reference, contrary to the purpose of the typology (Clinard & Quinney 1986). In these typologies it is often possible to classify any given terrorist (or kidnapper) in various ways depending upon the criteria being used to distinguish them.

Clinard and Quinney (1986) developed a further method of classification, seeing crime as multidimensional and systemic in nature. They identify a range of broad crime categories, distinguished on various dimensions, such as group support, legal definition and criminal career. While this approach represents an increase in the depth and range of factors used in construction of the categories, it is still let down by the lack of exclusivity in the types resulting. An example can be seen in the classification of murder as *violent personal crime*, while assassination is considered *political criminal behaviour*. Although the motivation may be different, the behaviours executed may be very similar. Gang and crime syndicate killings represent another case in which the context of an event rather than the behaviours themselves differ.

Both terrorism generally, and kidnap specifically, can be classified as representative of various types according to emphasis, activity and motive. For example, aspects of *violent personal crime*, *political crime* and *organised crime* can all be recognised in terrorism. Considering the case of kidnap in more detail, Clinard and Quinney (1986) class it as a violent personal crime, often involving the use of physical force. However, the fact that terrorists sometimes kidnap hostages suggests that other categories may also be appropriate. When used as a terrorist activity, kidnap also becomes a political criminal behaviour. This dual classification arises from of lack of clarity in the relationship between motive and action in the classification scheme. It is implicit in the typology that motive and consequent activity are linked in a relatively direct manner.

Following contemporary trends in terrorist activity it may also be possible to classify some activity as *organised criminal behaviour*. As political climates around the globe have continually shifted from the 1960's through to the 1990's, so too has the face of terrorism. Terrorism in the 1960's and 1970's was principally characterised by radical left-wing political movements. Changes in the world political structure has meant that terrorism has tended to become less ideologically driven throughout the 80's and 90's. In some cases now, terrorism has more in common with the increasingly sophisticated international drug syndicates and crime organisations than the ideological radicals of the 1960s.

The links between criminal and terrorist networks are facilitated by the increased involvement of terrorist groups in criminal activities as a source of income. This has implications for the nature of terrorism, as links with non-political crime organisations are likely to change the character of terrorist organisations (Kelly & Rieber 1995). Increasingly, differences between the two types of group are proposed to relate to little more than motivation, organised crime groups and terrorist organisations often adopt each others tactics, personnel and styles of operation. These changes illustrate how development occurs over a protracted period, making both consistency and development significant in consideration of behaviour over any length of time.

It might be expected that the behavioural strategies and tactics of various terrorists would differ with their motives, the nature of their beliefs and their specific social, economic and environmental contexts. Unfortunately no account of such variation is put forward in any typological approach to crime or terrorism. While Clinard and Quinney

(1986) consider commitment to a cause as being central to all political crime, it might be argued that it is often the *only* factor distinguishing many acts (such as terrorist bank robbery or kidnapping) from the same acts carried out by people without a political motive. The acts are value free, it is the underlying motivation which is political or not.

Various taxonomies purport to explain the consistent variations observed in terrorist behaviour. A great deal of work has been carried out in developing taxonomic models of terrorist activism. While many perspectives have been taken, a factor unifying all of the different approaches is that many of the themes resulting are consistent. This suggests that there is consistency in terrorist activity, and that this may be used to identify systematic differences between groups.

A large number of typological classification schemes have been developed in the study of terrorism. This appears to be a relatively common method of presenting information hypothesised to be significant in a research domain. Typologies have the advantage of representing conceptual themes within a set of data in a concise manner. Similarities and differences on a range of specified criteria are readily discernible.

Corsi (1981) outlines a classification scheme in which terrorism varies along two dimensions: a) terrorist intention and b) target location. *Terrorist intention* refers to whether the terrorists intend to capture people or property for use in a hostage situation, or whether they mean to cause harm (injury or damage) without capture. *Target location* refers to whether the location of the target is known or unknown by the authorities.

Interaction of these dimensions enables terrorist attacks to be classed as being one of four types:

	Location known	Location unknown
People/ property captured	Type 1	Type 2
Attack/ damage caused	Type 3	Type 4

This classification scheme focuses on the type of activity terrorists might carry out. Corsi (1981) states that the physical characteristics of a terrorist event will have a direct impact on the resultant interaction and communications. In specifying the various physical permutations possible, the associated behavioural dynamics can be examined. Event types 1 and 2 are characterised by hostage taking whereas types 3 and 4 are typified by various forms of assassination and destruction.

Corsi (1981) hypothesises a continuum of interactional success, starting with type 1 in which there is a high probability of receiving some concessions, and running through to type 4 in which there is a low probability. The probability is expected to be a function of a number of factors: These include the nature of the demands made, the specificity of the threats and the nature of the negotiations. The four event types are compared with a variety of characteristics, such as danger to target, danger to terrorists, authority response and the nature of the negotiations. Corsi's (1981) types, and the related characteristics, are supported by empirical data from the ITERATE database (Mickolus 1982).

While being common sensical, the characteristics relating to each type are relatively general and imply homogeneity of behaviour within any given type of event. No account is made of variations in event strategy or tactics within any of the types. Thus

kidnapping, for instance, is presumed to follow the same pattern regardless of where it is conducted, for what reason and by whom. This generality is partly a consequence of the fact that typologies focus upon comparison rather than comprehension. Classification schemes identify systematic differences and variations between types. Inter-class variations being emphasised over intra-class variations.

This conceptualisation of terrorist activity also makes no account of wider influences, such as the culture within which an action arises. The terrorism types are implicitly presumed to be generic and used rationally depending upon the nature of the point being made. No account is made of terrorist group preference for particular forms of action, or the effect of different group motivations and norms.

In taking a game-theoretic view of terrorism, Corsi (1981) focuses on a process of competition, each side trying to out-do the other. Outcomes are viewed from a perspective of brinkmanship. Other potential processes, such as co-operative loss-minimisation, or focus on operational success regardless of the consequences for other parties involved (i.e. task focus rather than outcome focus), are not considered. While making theoretical outcomes easier to account for in cost-benefit terms, it may artificially limit the range of understanding afforded by the model derived.

In an alternative conceptualisation, McLean (1986) outlines four groups of hostage taker based upon differences in the types of approach taken. She distinguishes 1) the mentally disturbed, 2) the trapped criminal, 3) the prisoner in revolt and 4) political terrorists. In discussing each, she outlines the associated symptoms, motives and characteristic events

involving these groups. This typology can be seen to be focused upon the terrorists themselves and is more detailed than Corsi's.

There are conceptual problems with this classification, however. McLean (1986) notes that individual offenders may have characteristics in common with more than one type of hostage taker. For example, within the *mentally disturbed* category, paranoid schizophrenics, manic depressives, inadequate personalities and psychopaths are conceptually differentiated. However, given these distinctions McLean (1986) then states that it is difficult to locate mentally disturbed perpetrators neatly into one group rather than another. The categories are not mutually exclusive, and this weakens the potential utility of the scheme.

One striking characteristic of this typology is that the categories imply a varying amount of personal responsibility or blame. Mentally disturbed hostage takers have the least personal responsibility, being conceptualised as having reduced control over their actions. Terrorists fall at the opposite end of the scale, being seen as fully rational and coldly calculating. Trapped criminals and prisoners in revolt fall in-between having increasing levels of responsibility based upon post hoc evaluation of the level of rational choice exerted in the taking of hostages. As a consequence, the classification scheme may be considered to imply moral blame in addition to affording an understanding of the differences in behaviour and the underlying causes.

Michalowski, Koperczak and Connelly (1988) developed a three type classification on which the motivation of terrorists can be distinguished: 1) *psychological*: a terrorist who

is very unpredictable, self-centred, sacrificial, and who may resort to extreme violence; 2) *criminal*: a terrorist who is task oriented and rational, and who will generally concede to negotiation if there is no other way out; 3) *political*: a terrorist who is well-trained, disciplined, and militant, and who, in the case of an ideological zealot, may become extremely violent. It is proposed that these three types of terrorist can be distinguished by the demands which they make. Following from this, it is hypothesised to be possible to select the appropriate negotiation tactics to employ to “neutralise” the offender(s) (Michalowski et al 1988).

While this typology appears to divide terrorists according to the nature of their motives, it can be seen to be subjective and largely atheoretical. A terrorist, or group, may be allocated to one category or another based largely upon the interpretation of the observer. It may be hypothesised, for example, that the boundary between criminal and political terrorism will be particularly difficult to ascertain with any degree of objectivity. In the absence of objective criteria such distinction depends as much upon legal definition than upon behavioural variation.

The examples discussed so far serve to illustrate the range and nature of typologies developed concerning terrorism, though there are many further classification schemes. The primary purpose of creating such schemes is to enable researchers to make general statements about classes of phenomena (Stohl 1988). The use of typologies implies a scientific and systematic approach to the understanding of terrorist activity. Typologies are used to differentiate between acts of terrorism, and from this to advance an understanding of causality (Stohl 1988). Consequently, it is important to establish the

hypothesised relationships between categories and the attributes on which they are based as clearly as possible.

Stohl (1988) observes that there have been a great number of independent attempts at the derivation of a typology covering terrorism. Each has tended to use slightly different criteria in the definition and classification of terrorist activity. It is argued that this has resulted in a research tradition in which previous work has not been sufficiently drawn upon. It is often the particular interests, understanding and biases of the researchers in question which define the factors utilised in the derivation of a classification system (Stohl 1988).

A common problem with these typologies is that they often lack analytic utility. Stohl (1988) cites four principle issues limiting the applicability of these classifications. First, there tend to be few, if any, testable propositions put forward. Second, the wide range of interests and focuses result in few schemes being comparable. Third, the predictive power of each of the variables composing the types are rarely specified. Finally, the manner in which the individual components are considered to interrelate is rarely specified. To the extent that typologies are only interesting in their ability to predict or explain the phenomena under consideration, few appear to be engaging (Stohl 1988). Further, some schemes appear to have poor theoretical development or a lack of functional focus.

Stohl (1988) identifies four generic types of classification scheme based on 1) groups, 2) motivations, 3) nature of activities and 4) aetiology. In reviewing the wide range of

typologies relating to terrorism, Stohl aims to identify key issues and possible approaches to be used in further development of classificatory schemes in order to maximise their applicability and utility.

Group based typologies tend to be the least structured of those identified (Stohl 1988). They refer typically to broad classes of group. Stohl (1988) criticises such schemes on the basis that they are often not comprehensive and often lack theoretical justification for the classifications derived. Three serious problems with this class of typology are distinguished; firstly, some classification criteria appear to be subjective, secondly, value laden categories are often used and thirdly, a lack of clear statement or operationalisation of terms may be apparent.

The relative subjectivity of certain criteria means that the classification of a group may be largely down to the interpretation of individual researchers. As objective measures are not available, a group may be classified differently by differing raters. Categories such as *extreme left*, *ultra left anarchist*, *radical left* are clearly open to interpretation as to what precisely is meant, and who can be considered to be representative.

This problem may be further compounded by the use of value laden categories. It is clear that labels such as *ultra left anarchist* carry an implicit negative value for the majority of people, especially within Western, industrialised, societies. Terms such as 'extreme', 'ultra', 'radical' or 'anarchist' all carry negative connotations. Even terms such as 'left' and 'right' may carry pejorative meaning, though to a lesser extent, and dependent upon the perspective of the interpreter.

The third problem, the lack of operationalisation, is clearly interrelated with the previous issues. The meaning of terms such as 'orthodox', 'radical' or 'ideological', when used as category titles or modifiers, are often not explicitly operationalised (Stohl 1988). Their meaning is taken for granted within the framework of understanding of the researcher suggesting them. The lack of clearly stated meaning can easily result in ambiguity. Stohl (1988) states that these shortcomings can reduce the validity and reliability of such typologies. With ambiguous or ill-defined terms, it is easy for different observers to classify a single group to differing categories.

Stohl (1988) has also criticised the fact that many group typologies provide information which is not empirically substantiated. He cites the example of distinguishing *left-wing* and *right-wing* terrorism. Left wing terrorists are often assumed to desire the support of the people whereas those on the right are presumed to be fighting on behalf of those holding power. As a consequence, right wing terrorism is proposed to be more indiscriminate and more excessive. However, Stohl (1988) says that much of the available evidence does not substantiate this view. He feels it is precisely in this manner that such typologies act to perpetuate erroneous myths regarding terrorism, rather than afford clearer understanding.

The use of certain distinctions has also been questioned by Stohl (1988). He discusses the case of classification according to *Nationalist* verses *Separatist* orientation (e.g. Post, 1990). Within the Nationalist class fall groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and Basque Nation and Freedom

(ETA). However, analysis based upon Mickolus' ITERATE 2 data (Mickolus 1982) indicates that these groups do not have a great deal in common and that the actions of each are dissimilar to those of the others. It is the simple descriptive nature and the absence of any functional relation between categories, and groups falling into them, which limit the applicability of many such typologies.

According to Stohl (1988), motivational classification schemes are more uniform in appearance and are more analytically based. These typologies are focused on the different goals and causes of terrorist activity. Typically these classification systems distinguish between state sponsored and anti-state terrorism. Within anti-state terrorism further distinctions are often made based upon whether a group desires total change (revolution) or only specific social or political adjustments (sub-revolutionary change).

While such distinctions are interesting, however, they still do not provide a great deal of operationally useful information. Although based upon underlying cause, such classifications do not tend to indicate how behavioural variation may accord to differences in goals. The focus tends to refer specifically to broad motivational causes, to the exclusion of other sources of inter-group variation. It is thus possible for groups within a single category to differ significantly in terms of goals and operational characteristics. For example Stohl (1988) indicates that even in the relatively homogeneous environment of republican Catholics in Northern Ireland, there is considerable variation in the typical activities of the IRA, Provisional IRA (PIRA) and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) terrorists.

The third group of typologies Stohl discusses refer to the nature of groups. These classification schemes are more concerned with the nature of the terrorism than they are with the terrorists themselves. Within this type of classification a range of factors may be considered, covering the targets of, and tactics utilised by, a terrorist group. Given the potential diversity of factors considered in any one scheme, these types of classification are difficult to compare with one another. This fact may be considered a severe limitation, making it very difficult to identify the criteria affording the most meaningful variation between groups (Stohl 1988).

The lack of well operationalised terms and the potential for ambiguity, discussed earlier, also causes problems for this type of classification system. In many cases it is not clear whether basic concepts, such as level of terrorism, targeting or tactics utilised, refer to the same patterns of terrorist behaviour in different typologies (Stohl 1988). Further, as discussed with respect to motivational schemes, there can be no certainty that any single terrorist group is indicated by variations in the targets and tactics used. The classifications still lack theoretical development. "These categorisations fail to provide a framework for hypothesis formation on probable links between the various types of terrorism and the plethora of known terrorist groups" (Stohl 1988, p167).

The final class of typology which Stohl discusses relate to group aetiology. These typologies address the origins of a terrorist group. While these schemes are characterised by greater theoretical development than the previous types they still lack analytic utility. These classification schemes focus on the groups themselves and tend to detail the environmental, historical, social and political contexts from which they derive.

However, whilst being more theoretically based than the previous types of classification, they still suffer from problems associated with the other types of group typology. Primarily, the categories used are broad and conceptualised as being all encompassing. The scope of some categories can subsume important differences between groups being classed together. Important sources of variation may not even be considered with focus being on historical group development. Details such as continuing motivations and operational tactics are not accounted for.

A sound typology would be expected to have some functional utility. To date no single scheme has a great deal of application outside of the narrow perspective from which it was derived (Stohl 1988). A wide range of valuable data are represented by these classification schemes but this information requires greater integration and stronger theoretical, empirical and analytic development.

What appears to be clear from the discussion on typologies is that integration of information derived from the various approaches is necessary. Historical and situational information needs to be combined with details of group motivation and tactics through a unifying theoretical framework. The development of a systematic theoretical structure would enable a better understanding of the complex dynamics underlying violent acts of political coercion. Specification of clearly defined terms and development of testable hypotheses would enable empirical testing of the models thus developed. A theoretically driven and empirically testable understanding of terrorist activity will act to ensure the utility of information thus generated.

4.2 - Empirical modelling of behaviour

In contrast to the qualitative derivation of taxonomies and classification schemes, some work on the patterns of behaviour has taken a data driven, empirical, approach. This work falls into two broad themes; rational/economic modelling and data analytical methods. These approaches will be discussed in the following sections.

4.2.a - Rational/economic approaches to terrorism

A number of studies have used formal modelling procedures in an attempt to specify the process of a terrorist event with greater systematic rigour. A number of techniques have been used, such as economic modelling, causal modelling, game theoretic modelling and expert system modelling. Despite the fairly wide range of methods used, they all have in common the application of some degree of formal logic or mathematical notation.

Selten (1988) proposed a simple model of kidnapping, using a game theoretic perspective. He defines a *game* as a mathematical model of a situation, where several actors with different goals are engaged in strategic interaction. Game theory explores the nature and the consequences of rational behaviour in such games. As discussed in Chapter Two, section 3, one of the fundamental assumptions of most rationalistic perspectives is that an optimal solution is being sought. For example, biological game theory assumes that animals are genetically pre-programmed by natural selection to behave optimally in standard social interaction (Selten 1988). It is taken as a given

within this perspective that behaviour, and decision making in particular, is aimed at the optimisation of outcomes.

However, situations arise where people appear to act in a less than optimal manner. That is, their actual behaviour can be observed to diverge from the predicted optimal behaviour. Selten accounts for this with the argument that people do not necessarily act in accordance with their rational analysis of a situation. People are assumed to plan logically even if they do not appear to act in accordance with such plans (Selten 1988).

In constructing his simple game model of kidnapping, Selten starts with a basic premise; a potential kidnapper can choose whether to go ahead with his plan or not. Initially, the game is represented as a dichotomous choice, ending if the plan is not executed and progressing if it is. The model is progressively developed through the addition of further arguments to account for increasing diversity in the range of options and choices available.

The second step in the development of Selten's model of kidnapping is the addition of demands. A logical argument is added stating that the hostage will be freed or killed depending upon the relationship of the demands to the concessions received. The hostage will be freed if the demands are met in full and killed if not met at all. In any other case the probability of hostages being freed is indicated by the linear relationship between what was demanded and what was actually conceded.

Thus far, however, the model does not account for authority attempts to find the kidnapers. To account for this a probability based argument representing the likelihood of the kidnapers being located is added. This requires an extended range of outcomes, covering not only hostage death or kidnapper success, but also the capture of the kidnapers. In this manner an increasingly complex mathematical expression of the parameters of a kidnap can be rapidly developed. The outcome of the equation will give a measure of the success of an event. This can be calculated from the perspective of either the terrorists or the authorities.

To further increase the "realism" of the models, the "players" are considered to have expected utility values pertaining to various outcomes. These values are expressions of preference for particular occurrences and outcomes during the course of an event. These are incorporated into the equation in the form of weighting factors. Complex mathematical models are relatively easy to create and modify using this process. Increasing sensitivity can be developed through the addition of weighting factors and expressions representing further possible eventualities.

However, there are a number of implicit assumptions made by the model which may serve to undermine its general applicability. Firstly, non-rational, emotional pressures are perceived as potentially upsetting the model (Selten 1988). Thus, a factor playing an intimate part in shaping normal human experience is rejected on the grounds that it is problematic to the modelling process. Secondly, Selten (1988) views his model as an extensive game with perfect information. Unfortunately, however, perfect information is very rarely available during kidnapping events. These factors suggest that game

theoretic models may be of most use in long-term strategic planning, and of limited application as a platform for short-term tactical or operational decision support.

Another criticism of Selton's (1988) game-theoretic modelling is the use of the terms "rational" and "irrational". "Rational" appears to be used to cover actions the model can account for, whereas "irrational" is used as a blanket term for aspects which fall outside the model's capacity to represent. This produces an inverted argument in which the model appears to dictate what should occur, rather than representing the full complexity of what actually does occur. The model plays a *normative* role, suggesting what actions are valid during a kidnapping. This is potentially misleading, however, as model accuracy will depend upon the knowledge of the model builder and denies the influence of factors such as human emotion (e.g. potential behavioural variations when angered, fatigued etc.) or subterfuge (in which observed behaviour does not necessarily mean what it appears to).

The models derived in this fashion also tend to be superficially descriptive and atheoretical. Parameters are added and weighted until the model appears to yield adequate outcomes from the information input. No account is made (nor can it be) of the processes underlying the observed decision making, planning and action execution. The rich and meaningful variability of individual and group psychological processes is subsumed by probabilistic weights. While playing an essential role in influencing the outcome of an equation they do not contribute to an understanding of the processes they represent.

Further, Hosking and Morley (1991), discussing formal negotiation from an organisational psychological perspective, state that negotiations are more than simply a series of bid and counter-bid. As such, they do not consider economic models to be useful for practical purposes. Such models view communication simply in terms of alternate strategic “moves”, rather than a meaningful dialogue (Hosking and Morely (1991). They do not represent a process in which shared understanding is developed and shaped such that the solutions derived are understood and make sense to all involved.

In a slightly different manner to Selten (1988), Lapan and Sandler (1988) have proposed an "economic analysis in a simple game-theory framework" to explain the likely bargaining positions taken during a hostage taking. A simple model is constructed by identifying clear decision nodes. Starting from a government's deterrence expenditure, a series of dichotomous options are proposed based upon the involvement of two parties; the terrorists and the authorities. The hostages are treated as silent, or irrelevant, participants (Lapan and Sandler, 1988) playing no part in an event. This will constitute a problem for the efficacy of the model in situations where the hostages try to escape, or in which the Stockholm Syndrome occurs. While the Stockholm Syndrome is typically considered to be rare, Turco (1987) suggests that it may occur in approximately half of all hostage-takings. Ignoring the influence hostages may play could therefore constitute a severe limitation to the model.

The model predicts the actions of each party by accounting for their expected payoffs at each decision node. The model is built up in the same way as Selten's game-theoretic model. By adding increasing numbers of parameters and factors the sensitivity of the

model can be improved. It is possible to rapidly develop a complex representation of the processes occurring during a kidnapping. The principle value of this approach is that through careful and thorough understanding of the processes occurring it may be possible to derive an extremely sensitive mathematical model of a hypothetical kidnapping. As a consequence the model's ability to predict outcomes should be reasonably powerful. However, this approach is limited by many of the same factors as were identified with respect to Selten's game-theoretic model.

Firstly, predictions can only be made from this model if all the relevant information is available for inclusion in the equation. If information is not available then aspects of the model cannot be calculated, and certain outcome possibilities therefore will not be calculated. A second problem is the quantification of information. The components of the model relate to observations of available resources, demands and actions. Some of these are more easy to convert into numerical terms than others. It is difficult to conceive how a willingness for martyrdom or the benefit of media coverage could be converted into a numerical form with any reliability. Ad hoc values could certainly be derived, but these would necessarily be subjective measures.

A common theme to this type of approach is the specification of a problem's parameters in logico-mathematical terms. From a strictly rational perspective this is a powerful method. However, from a psychological perspective it presents a number of problems. If a single and direct prediction of some objectively measurable observation is required then mathematical modelling can be a very useful tool, given adequate data. Increasing the complexity of input variables, the functions of their interrelations and the weightings

of influence can all enable prediction based upon such models to be improved over simpler versions. Such formulations may provide extremely elegant, and effective, analogous models of events given access to enough information. What they singularly fail to do, however, is enable an understanding of *how* and *why* various decision paths are more likely to be observed than others. That is, they fail to afford an *explanation* of the behavioural variation which they represent.

This lack of theoretical substance arises as a consequence of the nature of economic and mathematical modelling. Such modelling typically starts with the simplest possible conceptualisation of a problem domain and increasingly adds sub-components to account for the failure of the original model to match observed events. What is important to note is that these complications are typically based upon logical manipulations of variable influence in order that their solution matches observed outcomes. What these models cannot achieve is an account of what is actually occurring in a psychologically meaningful manner.

Overgaard (1994) used a similar theoretical approach to that of Lapan and Sandler (1988), but based his model on non-co-operative game theory. A fundamental difference in the underlying assumptions arises from his focus on hostage negotiation as a game with *asymmetric information*; terrorists and authorities are not considered to have equal information about the other. Overgaard (1994) focuses on government uncertainty; the terrorists are presumed to know the authorities' ability to retaliate but the authorities are less well informed of the terrorists' capabilities and commitment. This, along with the

nature of the resources considered, has considerable consequence for the outcomes generated by the model.

Both Overgaard (1994) and Lapan and Sandler (1988) focus upon the effects of resource utilisation. However, a significant difference between their models is in the nature of the resources considered. Whereas Lapan and Sandler (1988) consider resources in financial terms, Overgaard (1994) considers only manpower. At the most basic level, Overgaard considers it to be logical that governments never yield to low resource (manpower) groups, but always do to high resource groups. Terrorist groups are considered not to communicate with each other and to deliberately act in such a manner that they are not mistaken for one another. As a result, larger groups are expected to act in a way that smaller groups cannot easily imitate to ensure their own long-term success.

Overgaard (1994) suggests that increasing the manpower available to terrorists directly affects the authorities' optimum response. With increasing manpower the authorities are more likely to grant concessions. As a result it is beneficial for a terrorist group to signal a large base of manpower in any attack made. Overgaard's (1994) model balances various government options with the strength of terrorists solely in terms of manpower.

Overgaard's (1994) model highlights aspects of events that others, such as Lapan and Sandler's (1988), do not. As a result, despite taking a very similar methodological approach, the conclusions drawn may differ, as different features of events are being considered. What this difference serves to indicate is that models based upon the effects of single characteristics cannot adequately explain the full complexity of events. Both

Overgaard's (1994) and Lapan and Sandler's (1988) arguments are compelling and logical, and correct in their own terms. What is required is a model which can account for all actions and resources without imposing artificial limitations upon the frame within which they are considered.

Mathematical models assume that taking a number of inputs, the values of which are either known or estimated upon the basis of probability, an output can always be generated. The value produced will enable the optimal outcome, and by definition the optimal intervening factors, to be calculated. This approach can clearly be seen to have application at a strategic level, where there is time to consider the impact of various different possibilities. It fails, however, to account for real world situational factors and psychological modes of operation which are more salient at an operational level (Klein 1993).

Crenshaw (1990) indicates a further problem, which she refers to as the *free rider* problem. The free-rider problem hinges upon the calculated distribution and consequent reduction of the benefits of a successful action. It can only be concluded from a strict cost-benefit perspective that no logical person would engage in acts of terrorism, particularly hostage taking. The personal costs are high and any potential benefits would be widely spread amongst others. Not only are they dispersed, they are spread amongst people who put in no effort and took no risks themselves. Such reduction in personal benefit might be expected to reduce the expected utility of action to a nearly negligible level.

Mickalowski, Koperczak and Connelly (1988) take a slightly different approach in the development of an expert system designed to aid negotiation. They state that rational modelling typically results in the development of *static* game-theoretic models. A basic result of the structure of these models is that the iterative exchange of information which is typical in negotiation is reduced to a one phase process (Mickalowski et al 1988). Mickalowski et al's work was carried out in an attempt to account for both situational ambiguity and the dynamic nature of hostage taking events.

Negotiation is viewed as a process of strategic interaction; each party attempting to influence the other, and in turn being influenced. This dynamic view of the process requires a flexible approach to its modelling (Mickalowski et al 1988). Mickalowski et al (1988) point out that while many economic models have attempted to capture the dynamic quality of events they have typically been limited to the specification of a fixed set of negotiation parameters, ultimately becoming static again. The progress of time is included as a factor solely by considering events as progressing in a series of stages.

Mickalowski et al (1988) state that development of better negotiation support tools requires explanation of the nature of behavioural changes and their implications. They discuss the development of a pilot negotiation support system called NEGOPLAN (Mickalowski et al 1988). This is a rule based relational system using expert system technology, enabling the modelling of interactions between parties, and the ability to alter the problem representation as events change over time. It is limited at present, though, and as yet it does not fulfil all the requirements of a flexible support tool (Mickalowski et al 1988).

One immediate similarity between this approach and mathematical approaches is the assumption that problems can be modelled in terms of discrete, time-dependent, and hierarchical factors (Mickalowski et al 1988). The identification of discrete event units means that commonly linked behaviours, or typical cause-effect relationships, are pre-specified as likely to occur or not. The modelling of time-dependency and hierarchical structure, while being more flexible than the static economic conceptualisations, still assumes that patterns of interaction follow one of a set of pre-conceptualised, linear, routes through a series of possible decision nodes (rules) to predict the expected outcome.

Ambiguity of facts in the model is dealt with by the introduction of an "any" value. A fact has this value when its truth or falsity is not known. In such a case the rule or fact is not considered to play a significant role in establishing subsequent outcomes, or goals. As with economic models, increasing numbers of rules can be added to the model to account for increasing degrees of complexity, increasing the model's accuracy of representation for actual events.

The flexibility of such an approach is clear, the formal specification of cause and effect during negotiation can be structured through the creation of rules and meta-rules. The rules and meta-rules specify the relations between *facts* (observable aspects of events). However, Mickalowski et al (1988) indicate that this approach is limited by a dependence upon the knowledge the system holds (i.e. the sophistication of the rules available). The effectiveness of the system is dependent upon the comprehensiveness of

the knowledge-base, which is unlikely to cover all possible negotiation situations (Mickalowski et al 1988).

Another potential limitation is that the understanding represented by the model is derived from expert knowledge rather than systematic empirical observation. Consequently the model will be subject to any biases occurring within the understanding of the experts being drawn upon. While the principle of using expert knowledge appears to make common sense, there are no systematic criteria for the assessment of the information and relational rules derived. This means that there is no objective measure of the reliability or utility of the knowledge being modelled.

While expert systems operate via a series of logical/conditional rules, experts often do not structure their knowledge like this. In reality it is difficult to separate *what* an expert knows from *how* that knowledge is used (Klein 1993). As individuals progress from novice to expert they come to know things in a different manner. Novices use *declarative knowledge*, which consists of rules to apply and important cues in the form of easily communicable facts. However, with increasing expertise these become automated in the form of *procedural knowledge*. Procedural knowledge operates largely unconsciously; environmental cue and pattern recognition directly resulting in predispositions to act. This has the consequence that experts are often not able to clearly state how or why they act in a particular manner. In psychological terms, expert systems are often relatively novice systems (Klein 1993).

However, despite these limitations, the potential of these logical approaches to the problem of understanding terrorism is great. Regardless of any short-comings they may have, they do have the advantage of immediate applicability. Anyone able to find the requisite information can use one of these models to aid decision making. Another strength of these approaches, where others have been seen to fall short, is in the clear specification of the factors involved, and the interrelation of these. The hypothetical structure of the decision domain is open to scrutiny and adjustments can readily be made if they are deemed necessary.

4.2.b - Data analytic approaches

There appear to be relatively few published empirical studies of terrorist activity. A notable exception can be seen in the work presented by Friedland and Merari (1992). They make the comment that the results of many published studies lack generalisability, being either case studies or empirical analyses of few specific factors. They further note that detailed consideration of factors influencing the unfolding and outcomes of hostage taking events has yet to be presented.

Friedland and Merari (1992) set out to provide a *descriptive profile* of political hostage taking, developed through consideration of the cases contained in their database. They report a wide range of information, such as the percentage of events involving the take over of civilian, foreign, governmental/political or military locations, or the nature of the hostages, whether they were ordinary citizens (sic), diplomats, VIPs and/or members of the security services (Friedland and Merari, 1992). Unfortunately they do not elaborate

on this basic information, doing no more than considering simple frequencies and percentages.

Following this, they outline a number of analyses carried out in identification of the possible *determinants* and *antecedents* of the outcomes of hostage taking events. However, in attempting to establish clear links between precursory factors and outcomes they introduce a number of problems. The range of outcomes used is very limited, collapsing the full variation simply to violent and non-violent closure. Non-violent outcomes are those in which the terrorists surrender to the authorities. Violent outcomes, however, encompass both the storming of the terrorists and the terrorists killing their hostages. This may represent a limit to the use of the results; even if variables can be associated with a violent outcome, it is still not possible to differentiate which party initiated the violence.

Problems may also arise from the way in which the terms negotiation and mediation are used. Negotiation is defined as the dialogue between the terrorists and authorities while mediation is described as the participation of a third party. However, while stating that mediators are "significant indicators of the parties' willingness to pursue a negotiated solution" (Friedland and Merari 1992, p144) they do not suggest any basis for this observation, and indeed make no reference to the circumstances surrounding the involvement of third parties. By considering these complex interactive processes as single factual entities, a great deal of potentially useful behavioural information may be lost.

In addition, the analytical method used is felt to introduce potential weaknesses. Friedland and Merari (1992) found that roughly 60% of the events included in the analysis ended non-violently, the remaining 40% being closed violently. A dichotomous variable termed *outcome* was created with corresponding value frequencies. A number of other variables were cross-tabulated with the new outcome variable, forming a series of 2x2 tables. In looking at the distribution of the resultant cell frequencies, any variable was assumed to be influencing the violent or non-violent outcome if its joint distribution with the outcome variable is markedly different from the 6:4 proportional split.

A serious methodological issue arises from their treatment of the joint distribution calculations. Friedland and Merari (1992) do not use any statistical procedures beyond crosstabulation and frequency counts. They provide no criteria for discerning what constitutes a marked deviation from the expected proportional split, and consequently the identification of variables considered to be influential is potentially arbitrary. The lack of statistical measures means that no level of probability, or confidence, can be associated with the conclusions drawn by the researchers.

A further limitation concerns attempts to predict outcome from single behavioural variables. Given the complex system of inter-group processes theorised as underlying terrorist activity, no single action on the part of the terrorists, the hostages or the authorities would be expected to effect an event independently from all of the other processes occurring at the same time. For example, Friedland and Merari (1992) report that ordnance (explosives available) was found to effect outcome. The greater the ordnance the greater the likelihood of a violent ending to an event.

The reason hypothesised for this relationship was that the authorities would value a pre-emptive strike more greatly when the terrorist destructive capability was greater. However, reaction simply due to knowledge of the presence or absence of explosives seems unlikely. It would be expected that factors such as threats made, hostages injured, terrorist intractability, unreasonable demands and event duration will all play a role in the final decision to end an event by force or otherwise.

No single variable would be expected to have predictive value when considered in isolation from all of the other variables effecting an event. The current research is aimed at developing multidimensional models of hostage taking interactions in order to predict outcome from patterns of interrelated behaviours observable during an incident. It is hypothesised that by addressing the observed patterns of behaviours, responses and the contexts within which they occur in as holistic a manner as possible a greater understanding of terrorist events may result.

4.3 - Taking a multi-dimensional approach to criminal behaviour

In contrast to the longer established areas of criminological or forensic psychology, the purpose of investigative psychology is not to understand or attempt to rehabilitate offenders, but to aid in the process of their identification and capture. In police investigations a great deal may be known about the activities of an individual; what is required is an understanding of that person's nature - their age and occupation, the area in which they live, their lifestyle and anything else that may distinguish them (Canter, 1988).

Canter (1993) hypothesised that the relationships between offender behaviour and actions could be modelled through various forms of canonical correlation; that is, correlations reflecting general psychological laws or principles describing the link between individual characteristics and the resultant action strategies observed. These canonical models would be based about the form:

$$w_1A_1 \dots w_nA_n = x_1C_1 \dots x_nC_n$$

Where 'A' refers to observed actions, 'C' refers to offender characteristics and 'w' and 'x' to corresponding weighting factors. Causality is not implied in such modelling. Such relationships are based upon the fundamental premise of consistency, as previously discussed. For stable relationships to be observed between offender characteristics and actions there must be consistent psychological processes underlying them.

Through empirical analysis of large numbers of actions, carried out by many criminals, in a variety of different offence categories, it has been possible to develop theories elaborating the link between an offender's actions and his characteristics. Both multiple criterion and multiple predictor variables are included in any analysis. If there is no consistency in an offender's activity then no relationship would be found between these groups of variables. Further, it would also be extremely difficult for a case ever to be solved using knowledge of behavioural information.

Work has illustrated the possibility of establishing clear links between action and characteristic variables for a number of different crimes such as rape, burglary, homicide, workplace crime, child abuse and arson. However, in all of these disparate offence types no simple relationships are found between any single A (action) and single C (characteristic) (Canter, 1993). This is particularly important when considering the methodological approach taken by Friedland and Merari (1992). Any study characterised by attempts to make simple or direct variable-variable links are likely to be characterised by lack of success.

In addition to problems with single-variable links, the relationship between groups of action and characteristic variables may lead to difficulties. Minor changes in one set of variables, such as the addition of an extra item, may alter the pattern of relations with the other set (Canter, 1993). The practical implication of this is that the omission of a single piece of behavioural information may result in quite different conclusions being drawn about the nature of the offender.

Given the resultant difficulty in establishing satisfactory weighting factors for actions and characteristics included in such canonical equations, other approaches need to be sought. One option is to use methods which put greater emphasis on the development of meaningful explanation of the relationships rather than pure mathematical accuracy (Canter, 1993). Such an approach should serve to focus the use of informational resources and reduce the time taken in the development of theoretical understanding of the processes being observed.

4.3.a - Consistent behaviour and identification of offence style

A number of studies looking at behavioural variation have shown patterns in the style or manner in which a crime is carried out. For example, in considering the behaviour of burglars, Wilson (1995) distinguishes *professional* and *amateur* offenders. The same distinction was shown in the work of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) in analysis of kidnap behaviour, as discussed previously. In a study of rape, analysis showed that in addition to the actions that distinguish sexual assaults, there were systematic and meaningful differences amongst sub-sets of less frequent actions. Four broad themes were identified, relating to; 1) aggressive, 2) sexual, 3) criminal and 4) pseudo-intimate modes of orientation towards the victim of the offence (Canter, 1993).

Similarly, behavioural patterns evident in analysis of homicide showed themes pertaining to 1) sexual activity, 2) theft, 3) social significance and 4) domestic violence (Canter 1993). Studies have also shown behavioural themes in a variety of other offences, such as arson, insurance fraud and hostage taking. The underlying purpose of these studies has been to demonstrate that there are both observable consistencies within, and identifiable differences between, the actions of offenders. Canter (1993) does not consider it likely that rigid typologies of behaviour will be supported empirically. Rather, he suggests that trends in observed actions will be characteristic of both the offence itself and the wider experience and lifestyles of the individuals committing it.

Further to the previous discussion in section 4.1, Wilson (1995) notes that in many criminological typologies it is possible for offenders to fall into more than one category.

She suggests that one way of dealing with this problem is to consider behavioural themes rather than types of offence. Themes differ from types in that they are descriptive rather than categorical and proscriptive. Typologies imply rigid demarcation between one category and the next, whereas themes do not. Themes may, therefore, be more flexible than categories, and consequently better suited to discussion of the multidimensional nature of complex and interactive behavioural systems (Wilson 1995).

If a general crime theme, such as violence or sexual crime is considered, rather than a specific crime type, patterns of specialisation can be identified. Using broader groupings of offence types, rather than specific crime classifications, results in the identification of themes of specialisation (Canter 1993). Various studies have indicated that further offences can be predicted from a knowledge of previous offences. The immediately previous offence gives a reasonably strong indication of what the next offence type is likely to be, within broad types of offence.

4.3.b - Behavioural consistency and offending in groups

The majority of research into criminal activity conducted from an investigative perspective has focused upon the commission of crimes carried out by individuals. While it is possible for crimes such as murder, rape and burglary to be committed by more than one offender, the typical focus of study is on individual offender characteristics. Little work has addressed co-offending, though examination of the behavioural patterns of offenders working in groups may further enhance our understanding of criminal behaviour (Wilson, 1995).

Common sense might suggest that the commission of offences by groups, or teams, of offenders would be characterised by a greater degree of behavioural variation than would be the case with a single offender. However, various social psychological processes suggest a basis for group level consistency in behaviour. Behavioural consistency is still theoretically expected in crimes carried out by groups of offenders, as discussed previously in section 3.2. As for individuals, the range of behavioural variation for a single group is expected to be smaller than the range of variation observed across a number of groups.

Wilson (1995) claims that many currently available typologies are not of relevance for investigative psychological purposes. Like Stohl (1988), Wilson considers many classification schemes to have little application outside their original frame of reference (often criminological or rehabilitative). Wilson illustrates this point by considering the term *burglary*. In legal terms this refers to a specific class of offence. However, in practical terms Wilson (1995) argues that it can cover a wide range of actions such as:

- 1) Entering a kitchen through an open door and stealing a wallet from the kitchen table.
- 2) Breaking into an occupied house at night, conducting a thorough search and stealing jewellery and cash.
- 3) Breaking into a jewellers shop, having disabled the alarm, opening a safe and stealing hundreds of pounds worth of jewellery.

A similar issue arises in discussion of *hostage taking*. While the strategies of hijack, siege and kidnap are tactically quite different, they are often discussed as a single offence type as they all involve the holding of hostages. Research carried out by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) has shown that despite this important common link, the three offence types are quite distinct and that groups committing one type of offence are normally not likely to carry out other types. Looking at the commission of hostage takings by terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s, only the PFLP was found to carry out operations using all three strategies, and it was rare for any single group to use more than one type (Wilson, Canter and Smith 1995).

Wilson (1995) notes that in the majority of the literature there is little consensus regarding how criminal groups are defined. In some studies groups are considered to be highly structured and organised gangs, others see them as composed of loosely linked individuals, others still take a social network perspective on co-offending. No studies appear to consider the potential effects that variation in group structure might have on offence behaviour.

There appear to be relatively few studies addressing group offending in adults, the majority of work focusing upon juvenile gangs (Wilson 1995). It is often considered that group, or co-offending, is more characteristic of juveniles than it is of adults. However, such conclusions tend to be based upon studies which, although taking a longitudinal approach, do not follow juveniles into adulthood (Wilson 1995).

Various studies have noted that the majority of juvenile co-offenders do not form solid groups with stable memberships or clearly established roles and relationships. It has been found that the majority of juvenile delinquent behaviour is carried out by small clusters of individuals which form within a larger group of affiliations. Wilson (1995) and Donald and Wilson (1999) states that the evidence available suggests that adult co-offending does not arise from larger *gang* style group processes.

Adult co-offenders are most likely to recruit through normal social contacts made in day to day life (Wilson 1995). While some offenders will continually offend with the same accomplices, by far the majority of offences are carried out with whoever they can find for a particular job. However, a study by Johnson (1999) showed that football hooligan groups do have a hierarchical structure. Johnson (1999) showed that there was a central core of offenders who had a large number of contacts with other members of a group. More peripheral members were shown to have fewer contacts. There existed a hierarchical structure with a central *hardcore* holding the greatest influence, moving downwards in a series of steps to the most peripheral members having the least influence.

As was discussed in chapter three, formal groups are established upon the basis of achieving some purpose or goal. In legitimate work organisations this is directly related to the purpose of the organisation of which the group is a component. Wilson (1995) suggests that criminal groups need be treated no differently in theoretical terms. A criminal group's purpose is to make money through the offences it carries out.

Consequently, the structural and process considerations should be no different to those of other, more legitimate, groups.

In discussing the cohesiveness of criminal groups, Wilson (1995) suggests that the constant external threat of arrest by the police serves to focus the members of a criminal group, enhancing their sense of purpose and cohesiveness. This influence, and a hierarchical network structure similar to that of football hooliganism, may be hypothesised to underlie the processes shaping terrorist groups. Members of operational terrorist groups are conceptualised as forming a central hardcore who are separated from society as a result of their need for secrecy. However, there may be an extended group who support the hardcore group's aims, even if they are not committed to their means.

The separation of central members from the diluting or contradictory views of wider reference groups may enhance the members' perceptions of unity and cohesion. They still have contact with the outside world through various levels of peripheral members, from staunch followers and supporters through to less dedicated sympathisers. It may be hypothesised that being isolated and highly cohesive leads to increasingly extreme views through self-reinforcement, characteristic of the groupthink phenomena.

Wilson (1995) and Donald and Wilson (1999) carried out a study to look at the offence of 'group commercial burglary', or ram raiding, in detail. Wilson was particularly interested in how the organisational psychological concepts of 'groups' and 'teams' could be drawn on and applied to criminal activity. Groups are thought to form so as to carry out tasks that individuals cannot perform alone. Wilson (1995) and

Donald and Wilson (1999) suggest that ram raiding 'crews', or teams, show all the criteria necessary to be considered formal work groups: they have a clear purpose and structure, members having clearly defined roles and associated tasks.

Ram raiding may be considered a complex offence, having a number of different stages: planning and preparation, target selection, stealing a vehicle, smashing entry, stealing a quantity of goods in a short time, standing guard, driving a get-away vehicle, disposal and realisation of goods. It is not physically possible for one person to do all these things, so the offence is, by necessity, committed by a group. For well planned groups the roles do not appear to be interchangeable, members consistently fulfil particular roles (Wilson, 1995).

Wilson (1995) and Donald and Wilson (1999) addressed the application of the formal psychological concept of 'group' to ram raiding. Taking a sample of ram raiders, evidence of consistent roles in the activities of group members was sought. The previous convictions of these ram raiders were related to the roles they were found to fulfil, to address the issue of role specialisation. Information was requested from police forces that had investigated ram raiding offences. Details were provided of the individuals subsequently convicted, including their criminal histories and details from the prosecution files. These data were supplemented by interviews with the original investigating officers, and corroboration sought through further interviews with a number of the offenders themselves. A total of 70 individuals were included in the sample, making up 12 'crews', or 'teams', of three to 12 members each.

All of the offenders were male, between the ages of 16 and 52, with an average age of 23. Ram raiding, then, is not an offence committed by juveniles. The average age of first conviction was 15, with a range from 10 to 20 years. This suggests that offenders who do go on to become ram raiders commence offending as juveniles, but not especially early (though they may have received cautions before their first conviction). The majority of the previous convictions related to 'dishonesty' crimes such as taking a vehicle without consent ('twerking'), theft, handling stolen goods, burglary and theft from a motor vehicle. A small percentage of the ram raiders had been convicted of other 'violent' offences; including GBH, ABH, possession of an offensive weapon, assault on police and public order offences. None of the sample had convictions for serious offences such as murder, rape, arson or forgery.

Multiple Scalogram Analysis (discussed fully in chapter 8) was used to look at the consistency of the offenders in terms of their previous convictions (Wilson 1995; Donald and Wilson 1999). Having established the interrelations of the previous convictions - six distinct types were identified based on groups of corresponding convictions - the individual's roles were considered. 'Driver', 'leader', 'apprentice' and 'heavy' roles were identified within the immediate ram raid crew through the interviews with the police and offenders. In addition, peripheral roles of 'handler (fence)' and 'extra' were also identified (Wilson 1995; Donald and Wilson 1999).

Wilson (1995) found empirical support for the specialisation of roles she hypothesised. Offenders were found to keep to a particular type of role throughout their offending. Further, the nature of these roles was found to be associated with an offender's previous

convictions, adding further support to the notion that criminal specialisation relates to behavioural theme rather than specific crime. For example, '*leaders*' were most highly associated with previous convictions for dishonesty and '*heavies*' were most highly associated with violent offences.

In addition to this work, preliminary studies looking at different types of hostage taking have shown support for consistency in the offence behaviour carried out by groups. In a study carried out by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995), transnational terrorist incidents involving kidnap, barricade-siege and hijack were addressed. Coherent structure was found to the behaviour of the groups in all three hostage taking types. Although analysed as independent samples, the patterns identified were found to be conceptually similar, suggesting the reliability and robustness of the findings.

As discussed previously in chapter two, hijackings appeared to vary in the most simple manner; behaviours falling onto a theoretical continuum from the most *professional* to the most *amateur*. Groups with a predominantly professional approach were characterised by organised behaviour and clearly political motive. More amateur groups appeared to be less organised and were apparently motivated more by personal objectives.

The patterns of behaviour evident in barricade-siege were hypothesised to form three themes. These were labelled *reactionary*, *professional* and *bandit*. However, professional groups and reactionary groups may be considered to represent qualitatively different forms of organised groups, the main difference appearing to result from the

socio-political context within which events occur. In contrast, bandits represent the less organised and more inwardly focused groups.

The results of analysis of kidnappings indicate a broadly similar pattern, though with much less emphasis upon amateur or disorganised modes of operation. Two principle dimensions were proposed to underlie the variation in behaviour, those of *forcefulness* and *flexibility*. These dimensions may be hypothesised to interact, resulting in a conceptual continuum very similar to that of the other hostage taking types. More forceful and uncompromising behaviour would be expected to be characteristic of externally (ideologically or politically) focused and well planned groups. Predominantly less forceful and more flexible behaviour would be expected to characterise more internally (self) focused groups. In this case increased flexibility is proposed to represent less commitment to a predetermined plan of action.

These results suggest empirical support for group-level consistency in the commission of hostage taking. If the mode of operation is considered rather than the occurrence of specific actions, greater consistency appears to be evident. Typologies based upon behaviour are not proposed to be as reliable as themes, as they tend to be focused upon specific behaviours rather than broader conceptual approaches. Additionally, with some behavioural classification schemes it has been found that offenders may be assigned to more than one category. This suggests that the schemes do not reflect some of the important characteristics differentiating the groups they purport to order.

4.4 - Summary

Whereas chapters two and three sought to outline a basis for understanding the nature and consistency of terrorism (and where possible hostage taking or kidnap) from a theoretical perspective, this chapter has sought to present more empirical support. A range of approaches have been discussed, covering typologies, mathematical modelling and analytic approaches.

Typologies provide a clear method of understanding the range and variation of behaviours and groups, but do have potential weaknesses. They tend to focus on comparison rather than comprehension, and as such often suffer two potential limitations. Firstly, as the conceptual distinction of a category focuses upon between-category differences the member-items tend to be implicitly assumed homogenous. Secondly, the more complex typologies become, attempting to account for greater numbers of variables or dimensions, the more difficult it becomes for categories to be truly exclusive. Canter (1993) also states that rigid typologies are unlikely to be supported empirically. For these reasons, the current work will not attempt to differentiate 'types' of kidnap behaviour but will look to identify descriptive 'themes' emergent from the patterns of behavioural interrelations.

Mathematical modelling provides a potentially powerful method of specifying the range and nature of behaviour, accounting for the transaction between terrorist and hostage. However, these models are hampered by the need for high levels of information and subjectivity in the development of calculations. The interactions can only be considered between two parties in these models, with the consequent

assumption that the hostages are dormant throughout an event. In many cases this assumption may be true, but not always. The models also tend to rely upon assumptions about the relationship between the terrorists and the authorities - but different assumptions may lead to different outcomes using the same data.

While providing good outcome prediction if sufficient information is available, these models have no psychological utility in understanding how or why various actions occur, or what the impact of 'sub-optimal' decisions may be. The methodology adopted in the current research will enable actions and interactions to be studied without making any a priori assumptions about their rational logic or their probability of occurrence. This will offer a more flexible and empirical approach, one that is less likely to introduce researcher bias in event modelling or interpretation.

Focus on single variables has been shown to yield limited results. A multidimensional approach is likely to offer a clearer view of the systematic variation in the complex behaviour observed in terrorist kidnap. Single predictor variables considered out of context are considered unlikely to have strong relations to individual outcome variables. By considering the mutual influence of many variables simultaneously, multidimensional scaling procedures are proposed to represent a powerful methodology for understanding the complex and systematic patterns of behavioural interaction and influence observed in terrorist kidnap.

Multidimensional scaling techniques have been shown useful in understanding the behavioural variation in offences committed by individuals. While research evidence

strongly suggests that this methodology should also apply in the case of criminal activities carried out by groups or teams, little empirical work has yet addressed this issue. In taking a data-driven multidimensional approach to the analysis of terrorist kidnap, the current work will further test the hypothesis that groups operate as recognisable entities. If behavioural consistency is observable at a group level then distinct and meaningful patterns will be evident in analysis of the actions carried out by the members. If this is not the case then meaningful patterns would not be expected to be found. The next chapters will outline the development of the database and the analyses carried out.

Chapter 5 - Developing the database of terrorist kidnapping events

The last four chapters have served to outline the context of the current work. Chapters two and three discussed the nature and consistency of criminal and terrorist activity, providing a theoretical basis for the interpretation of observed behavioural variation in terrorist kidnap. Chapter Four outlined various analytical approaches to modelling this type of activity, suggesting that the best method to approach terrorist kidnap is through multivariate analysis, enabling the complexity of the data to be examined without simplification. This chapter will present the definitions of terrorism and kidnap used in the current research before outlining the data-sources drawn on and the development of the database used for the analyses discussed in subsequent chapters.

5.1 – Summarising the hypotheses of the research

Before continuing, the aims and hypotheses developed in each of the previous chapters will be summarised, so that the data used can be understood within the research context. The overarching aim of the current work is to develop an empirically driven understanding of the nature and variation of terrorist kidnap. The work has two broad strands; first, addressing the *nature* of terrorist kidnap and second, considering the *variation* in execution. Analysis of the nature of kidnap is expected to illustrate the general behavioural patterns making up the activity. Addressing the range of variation will afford an understanding of systematic differences in these patterns.

Consistency is crucial to understandable and predictable behaviour, and this will be addressed through the consideration of stable patterns shown in commission of an event. It is

hypothesised that normal (social) psychological processes underlie terrorist activity, no special theories need be developed to understand the behaviour observed. If this behaviour is rational, then systematic and meaningful patterns should be observed. If it is irrational, however, meaningful patterns should be more difficult to identify. Moreover, patterns should be evident at a group level of analysis. As groups differ in motive and composition, a range of approaches are expected to be identifiable in analysis.

As the patterns of interaction within an event are of key interest, it is important to make as few assumptions as possible about the order of, and relation between, the actions. For this reason it is proposed that non-linear multidimensional scaling analytic techniques should be used. This methodology should enable actions and interactions to be studied without making any a priori assumptions about their rational logic or their probability of occurrence. This will offer a flexible and empirically driven approach.

Hostage taking (like many crimes) is often discussed as homologous activity, though work by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) has shown that there is considerable variation between types such as kidnap, hijack and siege. The current research aims to take this a stage further, suggesting that kidnap itself is a heterogeneous activity, capable of being committed in various different ways. Post (1986, 1987, 1990) suggests that terrorists share a common psychological dysfunction, leading to typical and characteristic modes of expressing themselves. In contrast, Kellen (1990) holds that terrorist activities differ according to the nationality, culture, and politics. If Post's view is supported, little variation will be expected

in the range of actions observed. If Kellen's view is more accurate then a wider range of possible patterns of action and interaction might be observed.

Crenshaw (1990) suggests that as terrorist events are carried out by groups, then the group, rather than the individuals comprising it, is the correct level of analysis. If this is the case, then analysis of the actions carried out by all members of the group together should also show systematic and meaningful patterns. Analysis has shown systematic patterns in the behavioural variation of individual offenders, but little empirical work has yet addressed this issue for crimes committed by groups. If behavioural consistency is observable at a group level then distinct and meaningful patterns will be evident in analysis of the actions carried out by all the members. If this is not the case then meaningful patterns would not be expected to be found.

The following chapters outline the analyses to address these issues. This chapter discusses the derivation of the data used. Chapter six gives an overview of the general picture of kidnap emerging from the events included in the database. Chapters seven through to 11 discuss various analyses addressing the hypotheses and issues raised above before pulling the results together in the concluding chapter, chapter 12.

5.2 – Definitions and data sources

Further discussion of terrorist kidnap requires the term to be clearly defined. The legal definitions of terrorism, hostage taking and kidnapping in the UK are quite clear:

“‘Terrorism’ means the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear” – Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989, s20(1) (Saunders 1990, Ivamy 1993).

A hostage is:

1. “person taken by a belligerent and held as security”
2. “person seized in the UK or elsewhere in order to compel a state, international governmental organisation or person to do or abstain from doing any act”.

One who threatens to kill, injure or continue to detain the hostage commits an offence under the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 s1(1) (Curzon 1998).

Kidnapping is the “common law offence of stealing and carrying away, or secreting, of a person of any age, by force or fraud” (Curzon 1998).

For the current purposes these definitions are ideal. By keeping such a general definition, prior account of any differences between insurgent and state terrorism need not be made. If there are clear behavioural differences associated with these forms of terrorism then this will be shown empirically through analysis of the data. Kidnap is taken in the current work to refer to any event in which the hostage, or hostages, are taken and held in an *initially unknown and undisclosed* location.

Previous identification of behavioural consistency at both an individual and group level of action suggests a sound basis for expecting the activities of terrorist kidnappers to vary in a clear and systematic manner. Further, previous analytical work suggests that certain methods of approach may be particularly beneficial in understanding the meaning of systematic differences in behaviour. The complexity of terrorist kidnapping situations is such that individual actions are likely to be meaningless or misleading outside the context from which they occurred.

Take, for example, the fact that some kidnappers hit their hostages. From a simple viewpoint this indicates their willingness to use force. Nothing is known, however, of the circumstances and pre-cursors of this fact. If hostages were struck spontaneously then the explanation holds true. If, in contrast, a hostage tried to assault a kidnapper and escape then an entirely different interpretation of events (and actions) is appropriate. It is important that any method of addressing terrorist kidnapping can account for this complexity - multidimensional scaling techniques meet such a requirement.

This chapter will outline the development of the database of terrorist kidnapping events used in the current study. The work is structured such that preliminary analysis addresses the nature of terrorist kidnap, while further analyses address particular variations in more detail. Given the nature of the analytical techniques proposed, the data needs to be quantitative. The raw data itself will be drawn from qualitative accounts of terrorist kidnappings, and it will subsequently be coded in a numerical format suitable for use with multidimensional scaling techniques.

The data being used in the current thesis is compiled solely from publicly available material. The works of Mickolus (1980, 1993) and Mickolus, Sandler and Murdock (1989) were found to be a very useful and important source of information, covering all types terrorist incident up to late 1991. All of the *events* used in the current research were identified from these sources, and had already been classified as 'terrorist' by the authors. Kidnaps were identified as those hostage-taking events where the holding location was initially unknown. The majority of the data came from these sources - the information comprised of textual accounts of events, compiled by the authors from press reports in various different media and international wire services. In addition to the Mickolus chronologies, searches were carried out on a number of quality British broadsheet newspapers to supplement the information. These included The Times, the Guardian, The Independent and The Daily Telegraph.

Having established data sources, the next step was to establish how the data should be structured and quantified. Content analysis is a powerful tool enabling data to be structured in a simple, meaningful and systematic manner. Content analysis affords a methodical approach to the identification of the nature and range of issues to be considered in a research domain. In the current research, content analysis was used in the classification of key information from both the literature discussed in the previous chapters and accounts of terrorist kidnapping from the sources described above.

Many authors have stressed that content analysis is not simply a matter of counting things, but that all classification should be seen as a process of theory development and hypothesis testing (Krippendorff 1980). The purpose of the research will effect the development of classification

schemes by putting more emphasis upon certain aspects rather than others. In derivation of a systematic data collection tool for hostage taking events the current research emphasises the meaning of behaviour observed in such terrorist incidents. The coding framework outlined later in this chapter has been developed with respect to a particular psychological interpretation of hostage taking incidents. In this respect, the influence of more sociological and political distinctions have be disregarded for the purposes of the current work.

The work under discussion in this thesis represents the natural progression of research looking at the behavioural aspects of hostage taking. Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) conducted work looking at all forms of hostage taking, but discussion is focused specifically on kidnapping in the current work. Wilson et al's (1995) previous research has indicated that while many aspects of hostage taking are common to all of the sub-types (hijack, siege and kidnap) there are also, however, significant differences between them.

While the term *terrorism* has been difficult to define to the satisfaction of all parties interested in the phenomenon, *kidnapping* is relatively unequivocal in its definition. It may be defined as the taking of one or more hostages, holding them in an undisclosed location, for the purpose of putting a third party into a difficult negotiation position. It is predominantly the *unknown location* which distinguishes kidnapping from other forms of hostage taking.

The taking of hostages is considered to be important because it forces governments (or other third parties) to choose between the responsibility for the welfare of life and the duty to uphold principles (Friedland and Merari 1992). Further, it is easier to address psychological issues in

hostage taking for two principle reasons. First, there is direct contact between those involved in the event, meaning that patterns of action and response are quicker and easier to account for. Second, the lower visibility of non-hostage taking terrorists makes it difficult to gain any impression of their behavioural style(s) of operation.

Given the difficulties of defining terrorism with any precision it is recognised that it may be difficult to classify some hostage takings as terrorist acts with any degree of certainty. Precisely selected samples of events may vary depending upon exactly which definition of terrorism is being used. However, if terrorist events are substantially and meaningfully different in behavioural terms from non-terrorist events this would be expected to be indicated in analysis. If differences are indeed indicated, it would also enable the identification of the key aspects in which they vary, allowing a more empirical definition of terrorism to be generated.

Three broad areas of consideration were identified as central in the examination of any hostage taking event. These are (i) the temporal frame within which activity occurs, (ii) terrorist related factors and (iii) authority related factors. In practice these three areas are very tightly interrelated, but they can be distinguished conceptually. The following sections outline each of these three areas with reference to the current research requirements.

5.3 - Temporal frame

In the same manner that Wilson (1995) was able to consider the event structure seen to occur within ram-raid offences, so hostage taking can be seen to have a number of clear temporal stages. The relative duration of each of these stages may vary from event to event and between

event types, but the stages always follow in the same logical sequence. Miller (1988) identifies five stages in a terrorist attack;

- 1) conceptualisation and planning
- 2) attack
- 3) the event in progress
- 4) the event termination
- 5) the aftermath

These broadly cover every hypothetical stage of a hostage taking event, but in terms of understanding the behaviours *observable* in an event not all of these stages are meaningful. The first stage, *conceptualisation and planning*, refers to the prior planning that the terrorists carry out before an event. However, while this would be an interesting area to study, it is very difficult to gain an accurate impression of the nature and extent of a hostage takers pre-event planning. By its very nature the planning is clandestine. If the details of planning were to become apparent before an event was executed there would be a much greater possibility of preventing it.

Further, details which do become available suffer from being minimal and post-hoc interpretations. As a result of these problems, this stage is discounted for use in the current analysis. This type of information, should it become available, would be of great value in the extension of the framework being developed as it would allow useful insights into such psychological areas as practical goal setting, decision making and role specification with respect to tactical and strategic sophistication on the part of the hostage takers.

The second stage, the *attack* or *initiation phase*, of an event is when the terrorists first make their presence known. In terms of action and behaviour this is the first phase in which

information relating to the hostage taking is available. It is conceptually distinct from the remainder of the event. In all types of hostage taking, be it kidnap, hijack or barricade-siege, there are a number of strategies which can be employed in the initiation of an event. These are quite distinct from, and impose no logical limitations on, the possible range of actions characterising the remainder of the event.

However, given that the event initiation imposes no specific limitations on the following stages of an event, it is not necessarily the case that there is no link between the strategies employed during each by the terrorists. It makes intuitive sense to hypothesise that a group carrying out a violent initiation are more likely to use violence in the following stages of an event than a more restrained group. It must be stressed, however, that this need not be the case in reality. For example, in a number of kidnaps with violent initiations, resulting in the death of body guards and bystanders, the hostages were then treated courteously during the holding phase. By structuring the conceptual frame with these phases separate it is possible to test the nature of this behavioural relationship empirically.

The third stage, the event in progress or *hostage holding* stage, is commonly recognised as being characteristic of an event. In all types of hostage taking it is the physical holding of the hostage(s) in either a known or unknown location which is synonymous with the event, and distinguishes the different types of hostage taking. This also tends to be the longest stage in duration and the stage in which the widest range of options and greatest variation in possible actions is exhibited. It differs distinctly from the initiation as it concerns events which occur once the terrorists have succeeded in securing their targets.

In addition to the wide differences in actions exhibited by the terrorists themselves, the analysis of such events is further complicated by the influence of both the hostages and outside parties (typically, but not exclusively, the authorities). The hostages themselves have limited room for involvement in the course of an event, though it is not great given the scope of the actions of the other parties involved. The major influence of other parties is through involvement in, or refusal of, negotiations.

There are a wide range of possible negotiation strategies open to the authorities (and other parties), ranging from refusal to alter a stated position through to complete capitulation. Similarly the terrorists have a wide range of potential responses from giving themselves up through to increasing their demands. While there is much informed opinion and experience in both the military and the police as to the best strategy in negotiating, it is still not clear what the relative merits and implications of the various strategies may be in behavioural terms. While it is not possible to address this issue in detail with the present data, the structure of the current database should allow this interaction to be studied if more complete information were to become available. It is hypothesised that the current research will be able to indicate the potential for the use of behavioural data in such situations.

Stages 4 and 5, the event *termination* and *aftermath*, while being distinguished by Miller (1988), cannot be separated in behavioural terms. The manner of the event closure has direct bearing on the immediate aftermath and cannot be meaningfully divided. Focusing on terrorist behaviour, the aftermath refers to the immediate outcomes for the parties involved, not to the

long term effects on policy or legislation as a result of the event. The range of possibilities for closure is as wide as the range of initiation or hostage holding strategies. What is of importance is the relation of the actions carried out at all previous stages of the event to the eventual closure.

Michalowski et al (1988) have proposed a slightly different, though similar temporal structure, composed of four phases:

- 1) Introductory Phase
- 2) Demands Phase
- 3) Impasse/Suicide Phase
- 4) Surrender Phase

The *introductory* phase refers to the beginning of an event and may last up to the first 12 hours (Mickalowski et al, 1988). In this stage the initial terrorist demands and early intelligence regarding the terrorists enables the identification of the terrorist's profile (Mickalowski at al 1988). Having established a profile the introductory phase is regarded as having ended. The second phase is termed the *demands* phase. In this phase the possible issues are explored. Negotiators attempt to ascertain which of the demands are important and may try to suggest alternative issues for dialogue if the original ones are found impossible or unacceptable to meet.

The third phase, that of *impasse/suicide*, is characterised by the exploration of previously unexplored issues. This stage corresponds with the holding phase of Miller's (1988) conceptualised framework. The risk of negotiation failure is seen to increase with time during this phase, as does the potential for the development of the Stockholm Syndrome (Mickalowski at al 1988). The fourth and final stage is termed the *surrender* phase. In this phase successful

negotiation may result in the minimisation of terrorist gain and the parallel minimisation of authority losses, if not actual gain (i.e. terrorist defeat). In the case of protracted deadlock an assault upon the terrorists may be conducted.

While Michalowski et al (1988) acknowledge that this description of the negotiation process is oversimplified, it does appear to create artificial boundaries within the general flow of events, and the stages appear to have misleading titles. Miller's (1988) conceptualisation appears to correspond more closely to the structure of events suggested in early content analysis of the data utilised in the current thesis. For example, Miller's initiation phase corresponds to the location of, attack upon and taking of hostages. Michalowski et al's introductory stage, alternatively, covers this, the making of initial demands and the authorities' establishment of negotiation tactics based upon the development of terrorist profiles. Thus Michalowski et al's initial phase covers a greater time period and a range of authority response actions.

Michalowski et al's (1988) second phase, the demands phase, is misleadingly named as demands have already been made. This phase actually relates to the early stages of negotiation. Similarly the third stage, impasse/suicide, while suggesting a breakdown in dialogue, refers to continuing or subsequent negotiations through out the course of an event. Miller's (1988) view, in contrast, is that the issuing of demands, the authorities responses and the subsequent negotiation patterns form a single coherent phase. The making of demands is not conceptualised as being objectively separate, but as the first move in the opening of a dialogue which continues more or less smoothly until the closure of an event.

Michalowski et al's (1988) final, surrender, phase also appears to be a misnomer, covering far more than surrender alone. Miller's (1988) stage labels of closure and outcome are more encompassing, given that both schemes are referring to the same aspects of an event. For these reasons, a collapsed version of Miller's conceptualisation was used in the current work. However, Mickalowski et al's conceptualisation is interesting in that it emphasises the possibility of breakdowns in communication and stand-offs in which negotiation cannot be considered to be proceeding but which does not signal the closure of the event.

5.4 - Terrorist factors

A number of conceptual aspects have been identified as having potential utility in understanding the execution of hostage taking events. These aspects relate to themes or aspects of observed behaviour and can be broken down into two broad areas: First those pertaining to the terrorists and second, those relating to the authorities (or other third parties) which become involved. These sets of factors have been derived both from content analysis of kidnapping case accounts and consideration of literature discussed previously. The aspects relating to terrorist controlled actions cover: (a) resources, (b) level of planning, (c) motives, (d) rationality and (e) control.

5.4.a - Resources

The resources available to, and utilised by, a terrorist group may be very important in the consideration of their intent and potential. The material resources which may be drawn upon are wide ranging and include weapons, vehicles, safe houses and other equipment. It is also possible, however, to consider less tangible features such as information, skills, experience, and available manpower as resources.

Well established terrorist groups would be expected to have ready access to a relatively wide range of resources. They will have large pools of available manpower, well accounted organisational funds, a number of safe houses and organisational buildings as well as having access to sophisticated military and civil technology. In addition, they will have within their ranks a great deal of experience, a wide range of skills and access to a relatively large information network. Such a group is also likely to be backed and supported by a relatively large number of non-participative sympathisers from whom varying degrees of aid will be available. Amateur, or new, groups of terrorists would be expected to be relatively under-resourced. They are less likely to have organisational funds and will have less access to weapons and information. This is likely to have further effects on the level of planning possible and the degree of sophistication displayed during an event by such people.

Overgaard (1994) has suggested that the style and scale of a terrorist event is directly related to the amount of manpower resources available to a group. This is hypothesised to be of importance in itself, the initiation of an event being critical in conveying an initial impression to the authorities of group intent and ability. In the case of kidnapping, this means that the manner in which hostages are taken may be as important as the identity of the hostages themselves. Overgaard's hypothesis suggests that events carried out by large groups are more likely to be successful (more likely to receive concessions), and thus groups will always try to look as if they have more members.

5.4.b - Level of planning

The apparent degree of event planning is hypothesised to be indicative of important psychological information in the commission of a hostage taking, and kidnap in particular.

Planning relates to all aspects of an event such as the provision and use of materials, the selection of a location and/or target, use of information, allocation of manpower, the demands to be made and the provision of contingency plans should events not turn out as expected. As a consequence, these features of an event may be used to indicate the psychological sophistication of those carrying out such an event.

In a similar manner to the proposed significance of attack and resources use, the level and sophistication of planning is hypothesised to reflect the nature of the terrorists involved. Well planned events are proposed as more likely to be carried out by longer and/or better established organisations, less well planned ones being carried out by less experienced groups and 'one-off' terrorists.

Planning is likely to be most salient in pre-event stages of an incident. As discussed previously, this is the stage in which little or no observable data on behaviour is available. However, while specific details of planning are not likely to be available, an idea of the planning and sophistication of a group can often be inferred from the event details. An event which runs smoothly and appears to be well orchestrated may be considered to have had more thorough planning than an event which appears to be disorganised and spontaneous.

5.4.c - Motives

As with planning, it is very hard to ascertain the precise nature of the motives. Terrorists may have many and complex reasons and rationale for carrying out an hostage taking event. However, it may be possible to gain a degree of information from the actions carried out during an event. For example, it is hypothesised that the nature of the demands made would give an indication of the motives of a group. It might be proposed that a group demanding only money is more likely to be personally motivated than a group demanding the release of comrades from prison and social reforms. These latter are more likely to be motivated by political or ideological values and beliefs.

The exact role of demands in determining motives is open to debate and there are opposing views as to their place as indicators of intent during an event. Much work from an economic bargaining and rationalistic decision making perspective implicitly interpret demands at face value and as an integral part of the negotiation process. However, others, such as Mickolus (1987), warn that the demands may not be indicative of the strategic aims of a group. If the nature of demands made can be shown to be related to other aspects of a terrorist group's activity then the utility of demands during the course of an event, at least for informational purposes, may be established. At the very minimum it seems unreasonable to suggest that demands made are irrelevant to the purposes of the group.

Similarly, the nature of the target may give an indication of the motives. The selection of a company director or banker may imply extortion rather than political gain, whereas the taking of a government official or a foreign national may imply more politically directed emphasis on

the attack. Another potential indicator is the use of the media. Groups making direct use of the media, either as a communication channel or to get a manifesto or statement published are likely to be more politically motivated than a group who pay no special interest in their message being transmitted to others. The involvement of the media is not proposed to be indicative in and of itself, any hostage taking is likely to invoke media coverage as a direct consequence of its newsworthiness. What is of importance is any action on the terrorists part to manipulate their media coverage for their own ends.

5.4.d - Rationality

Once again, like planning and motivation, rationality is an inferred property, being implied from event details. Rationality refers to the realism or logic of the terrorists. While game theoretic and economic modelling approaches are based upon the assumption of rationality, it is possible to observe behaviour which does not appear to be strictly logical given the circumstances. If this was not the case then discussion of hostage takers and negotiation (e.g. McLean 1986, Poland 1988) would not need to consider categories of mental disorder, though they do so.

Pure rational decision making is classified as that resulting in the selection of an objectively optimal solution. Rational behaviour may thus be interpreted as that aimed at reaching such an ideal state. However, acts that do not appear to be perfectly rational may still have an internal logic, given an actor's framework of understanding. The easier to interpret an offender's framework of understanding is, the more rational it will be perceived to be. For example, actions that are difficult to understand will typically be considered irrational. Terrorism is typically defined in rational terms (having clearly understood political aims), and actions

suggesting a lack of rationality are often not classed as acts of terrorism but as isolated criminal acts. An example of this can be seen in the hijack of a plane to its intended destination (from JFK to Dulles airports in the US). The only demand was for travel, and was considered the act of a mentally disturbed person rather than an act of terrorism.

It is possible, however, for terrorists to display relatively more or less rationality while still remaining within a range of behaviour deemed normal. A group of terrorists holding a government official and demanding the release of two prisoners and the publication of a manifesto is clearly being more rational in their demands than a similar group demanding the release of all political prisoners, \$60 million and food and clothing to all the homeless in a district. Thus rationality need not refer only to actions per se, but may also be emergent from their significance in the overall process of an event.

It is possible that rationality might be suggested by single actions carried out during an event. For example, the total changing of demands, or unprovoked increase in the scale of the demands, may be interpreted as indicating irrationality. Similarly, a determination not to talk with certain negotiators or the setting of unattainable deadlines may be seen as suggesting non-rationality. However, this aspect of terrorist behaviour, as with the previous aspects, may be hypothesised to be more apparent as an emergent property of a range of activity over time.

5.4.e - Control

Control is one of the most immediately accessible aspects of terrorist behaviour, and possibly one of the most important given the assumption of purposive action. It can be hypothesised to

relate to three central areas; personal control, internal event control and external control. *Personal control* can be identified directly through reports of the terrorist's behaviour. Their apparent composure in action and their reactions to the behaviour of others are good indicators of personal control.

Greater personal control may be expressed in terms of confidence, unhurriedness and violence only in response to others actions. Lesser personal control is more likely to be characterised by nervousness, hurried actions or spontaneous violence (rather than reactive violence). It would be expected that the members of more professional, better planned, more experienced and more committed groups will exhibit more self/ personal control. Despite their apparent determination this may result in them being easier to deal with than a nervous and uncertain group, as it may be hypothesised that their actions would be more consistent and more easily predictable.

Internal control refers to the terrorists' handling of the hostage taking and hostage holding. It is clearly interrelated with personal control but may be conceptualised as distinct. Internal control covers aspects such as the manner in which the hostages are treated, initially in the hostage taking but also throughout their captivity. A range of hostage-control strategies may be observed, from the killing of selected hostages to instil fear in the remainder through to genial, almost 'house guest'-like treatment.

External control refers to the way in which the terrorists relate to the authorities and other external parties. It is principally exhibited in the setting of deadlines, the nature of threats made and their actions during negotiations. There is also a wide scope of potential control in this area;

ranging from groups who are relatively passive (allowing the negotiating party to set the pace) through to more assertive groups (who attempt to control the proceedings themselves). This variation should be apparent in the style of interactions between the parties.

Although control may be considered with respect to these three different areas, it would be expected to be relatively homogenous in its expression throughout an event. Through the principle of consistency, a group showing high levels of personal control would also be expected to show relatively high levels of internal and external event control. Further, a highly self-controlled group would be expected to remain so throughout, except in the case of critical circumstances. Any such mitigating circumstances or influences would then become extremely important themselves in the context of the current research.

5.5 - Authority factors

The actions of the authorities, and other concerned parties such as the hostages' family or company and international aid agencies, have less immediate impact on an event than those of the terrorists themselves. In most situations it is the actions of the hostage takers which directly shape the event, outside parties having a more reactive role. Usually the hostage takers attempt to reduce the role of external parties to a minimum; granting concessions or the demands, and little more.

The reduction of authority response to the terrorist manipulation is brought to its most extreme form in kidnapping where the location of the hostages is hidden to provide maximum advantage to the terrorists. The authorities are largely restricted to damage limitation, though it is

suggested that differing strategies may be more or less appropriate depending upon the nature of the terrorists. The key factor for the authorities in reducing this advantage is to find the location of the hostage(s), thus increasing the range of possible options open for action.

It is clear that the actions of the external parties, particularly the authorities, can be of great significance, however. External parties can choose whether to enter negotiations at all. If they choose not to enter a dialogue, the control of the event is put back into the hands of the terrorists. If negotiations are entered into it may be possible to move the situation to one in which the potential impact of the terrorists is minimised, or event neutralised peacefully.

If the location of the hostages and hostage takers is known, authorities can opt to end an event forcefully. Although the location of the kidnappers is unknown at the outset of an event, it may be identified if security searches are successful. Storming the hostage takers stronghold is typically only used as a last resort - it can result in injuries and deaths for all parties involved; terrorist, hostage and storming force alike. The nature and range of responses available to authorities will be related to their official policy towards terrorist action.

5.6 - Background/context factors

In addition to the aspects discussed so far, a number of background items are included to give some background information on the context within which an event occurs. These items cover such features as the number of terrorists and hostages involved, the roles or jobs of the hostages, the country and specific location of an event and the overall duration of the event. They thus enable consideration of both logistical complexity of an event and the socio-political climate

within which it occurs. As discussed previously, information regarding the background context within which action occurs is considered to be highly important. While not providing a direct influence (although the physical environment may be considered to do so), the socio-cultural and political climates will underlie the motivations and understanding of people involved. As such, details of these aspects create the context within which available action is understood and chosen (Klein 1993).

At the most fundamental level, the physical environment will constrain and afford various different types of action. However, the social and cultural environment will also play an important role in shaping events. While not being physically manifest they still exert a powerful influence upon the way in which the world is perceived, and form the underlying fabric of intergroup variation and conflict.

While these factors are not directly psychological in themselves, they may still have an important impact on an event, or provide the basis for systematic differences between terrorist activity in different geo-political regions of the world. In the current research there are a range of such items encoded. Although these influences are wide ranging and diverse they are combined to form a single section of the coding frame in the current research.

5.7 - The overall framework

Combining the background details, terrorist controlled factors and authority related factors within the temporal structure discussed above, a general framework covering behaviour during a kidnapping can be derived. This framework forms a conceptualised outline of what types of


action may be expected to occur at various stages of an event, and by whom. Actions found within each temporal phase are not proposed to occur strictly in the sequence listed. Analysis can be used to indicate which actions are most commonly related, but strict sequences of association need not be hypothesised.

This flexibility in data handling confers an advantage over economic and rational designs in which only linear paths, or chains, of action can be modelled. It may be hypothesised that any given action, such as providing photographic evidence of the hostage, may occur at various times and in response to a variety of circumstances. Static models typically do not allow for flexibility in the time at which actions occur being composed of decision nodes at which terrorists and authorities alternate in responding to each other. The only way for an action to be modelled as able to occur at a wide range of times is by including it as an option at multiple nodes. However, if this is done for all the possible actions at each node the model would rapidly become unusable.

From the conceptual framework derived, a checklist can be developed. This checklist enables details of kidnap events to be encoded numerically, according to which actions or conditions were present in each case. The contextual and background details are considered first. The remainder of the coding frame is composed of the temporal stages. These stages are not flexible and must, by their definition, occur in sequence. Within each stage, aspects of the terrorist and authority controlled behaviour are considered as they become relevant. Thus, for example, only the terrorist (and to a certain degree the hostage) activity is considered in the initiation phase, while the holding phase contains terrorist and authority negotiation and communication issues.

The final stage, closure, contains details of the ways in which the event could end and immediate repercussions (in terms of death or concessions granted).

The following outline illustrates the general considerations of each section of the checklist based upon the temporal structure and the terrorist and authority factors discussed above (see Appendix A for the full checklist with definitions of item meaning).



5.8 - Details of the database

The study was carried out on a dataset of 206 cases, derived principally from accounts reported in Mickolus (1980, 1993) and Mickolus et al (1989), as reported at the beginning of this chapter. These cases contained details of events ranging from September 1969 through to August 1991. The final structure of the dataset was derived through an iterative process. Early versions of the coding framework were tested on a small sub-sample of cases on several occasions, each time minor modifications being required as problems were identified, or further details became apparent from the accounts of the events. This process was repeated five times in total before the version shown in Appendix A was finally derived.

Once the final format for the checklist had been derived, all of the events were encoded, yielding a dataset of 206 cases with 136 variables. Each variable relates to a single event aspect, such as hostage nationality, whether the terrorists had guns, whether guns were fired, and so on. For each of the 206 cases, a profile was derived through indicating the presence or absence of each item. If an item was true (the action was observed), a code of '1' was allocated. If an item was untrue (the action was not observed), a code of '0' was allocated. In the event of uncertainty or missing data the '0' code was used. In no case was information recorded as present if it was not explicitly stated.

This rigorous, but potentially data impoverishing, approach was taken to ensure that the information encoded was as objective as possible. One of the most significant alterations carried out in development of the coding frame was the dropping, or alteration, of items which necessitated subjective interpretation of events. For example, items relating to terrorist

motivation were dropped as they could only be inferred by the rater from other behaviour observed, predominantly the demands made.

Before any analysis could be carried out on the dataset constructed, it was necessary to check the reliability of the data coding. The reliability of the checklist refers to its consistency and stability in use. All of the data used in the current research has been coded independently by two coders. This is for two reasons; firstly to assess the inter-rater reliability and secondly to allow identification of any aspects of the checklist which present problems for interpretation. It is essential that the checklists be reliable so that data generated represents variations in the hostage taking events themselves, not the idiosyncrasies of individual analysts.

The data were initially coded by myself and second coded by an independent rater. Use of the coding framework was explained before the rater coded the data (Appendix A shows the definitions of the variables). Any general queries arising were answered unless they pertained to the interpretation of an item. Any uncertainty or ambiguity in meaning was left to the second coder to determine as required. The Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR) of the checklist coding is calculated out by comparing the data generated by each of the coders. Every discrepancy in the codes given by the raters is marked. By dividing the number of discrepancies by the total number of data items coded a figure indicating the percentage error can be calculated:

$$\frac{\text{No. of Errors}}{\text{No. of Cells}} \times 100 = \% \text{ Error}$$

The converse of this figure is the percentage of correspondence, a measure of reliability:

$$100 - \% \text{ Error} = \% \text{ IRR}$$

The kidnap coding frame had an IRR of 93.5%. This means that 93.5 % of the information encoded by the raters corresponded. Whilst discrepancies were found to occur in just six and a half percent of the cases, these typically reflected a simple error on the part of one rater or the other and were easily rectified. This result suggests a high degree of reliability and is probably reflective of the fact that the coding frame has been developed to the extent that little ambiguity remains in the interpretation of any item's meaning.

All discrepancies in coding were amended after independent consideration of the original event details and subsequent mutual agreement as to the correct meaning between the two coders. Having established the reliability of the data, a range of analyses were carried out. Before carrying out any multivariate analysis, the observed frequencies were considered. These are outlined in the following chapter. Following account of the basic characteristics of the kidnappings included in the dataset, a range of multidimensional scaling procedures were used to explore the nature and variation of behaviour during terrorist kidnap in more detail. These analyses are discussed in Chapters Seven through to Eleven.

Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) was used to examine the interrelations between the behaviours carried out in the course of a kidnapping. This procedure groups the behaviours into regions in a multidimensional space such that the items with the greatest co-occurrence fall closest together. This analysis was expected to enable the identification of differing types or styles of

kidnapping. Leading on from this, Multiple Scalogram Analysis (MSA) was used to explore inter-group variation in more detail. MSA operates by comparing the 'profile' created by a number of variables across cases. The relationship between the cases based upon this profile is plotted in two dimensional space. A number of areas for between-group analysis are outlined, as well as the implications of patterns of inter-group variation. These analytical methods are discussed in more detail in the relevant chapters.

Chapter 6 - Overviewing terrorist kidnap

This section will outline the basic descriptive statistics of the 206 cases included in the database. As discussed in the previous chapter, these cases were identified principally from accounts reported by Mickolus (1980, 1993) and Mickolus et al (1989). The following discussion will serve to illustrate both features of the kidnappings themselves and the nature of the data being used in the current work. The focus is on the actions observed, and the methods used in carrying them out. Although non-behavioural details are also considered, less emphasis is placed on these for the current purpose of understanding event behaviour.

The frequency of kidnapping has varied over the time span being considered, Figure 1 illustrates the number of events occurring in each year included in the database. The annual frequency of events can be seen to vary, with an average of 9 events per year and a range from a minimum of 2 to a maximum of 19. The lack of a simple pattern in the annual frequencies suggests that kidnappings occur in response to particular issues rather than within a general temporal cycle (as has been suggested by Im, Cauley and Sandler 1987).

The work of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) did show a series of five-year peaks when looking at trends in all hostage-takings, but there appears to be no such regular pattern in the case of kidnap alone. While the pattern looks superficially regular, there is little similarity to the profile of the 1970's and the 1980's. Data from a wider time span is required to address the issue of long-term patterns of occurrence, but psychologically

meaningful interpretations of the trend are likely to relate to the underlying causes of the activities leading to peaks.




Figure 1 - Number of terrorist kidnappings per year

6.1 - Background features of kidnap

In 97.1% of the cases a single group was involved, however, in the other 2.9% (6 cases) two terrorist groups co-operated in the kidnapping. Kidnappings were carried out by clearly identified terrorist groups in 85.4% of the cases. The remaining 14.6% of cases were carried out by groups who did not name themselves, or by known guerrilla factions. An example of a group which did not name itself can be seen in the 22 February, 1977, kidnapping by Kurdish rebels in Iraq who abducted foreign workers and demanded that the Iraqis stop massacring Kurds. Another example can be seen in Burma on 18 October, 1983, when Karen guerrillas took two French hostages, demanding the cessation of French aid to the Burmese government.




Figure 2 - Location of terrorist kidnap

The distribution of events around the globe can be seen in Figure 2. South America and the Middle East can immediately be seen to have had the most frequent kidnappings over the previous two decades. This may be a reflection of the political instability of these regions - 25.2% of the events occurred in each of South America and the Middle East, thus combined both regions account for a little over half of the kidnappings in the database. This can be contrasted with 12.6% in Europe, 11.7% in both Africa and Mexico/ Central America and 9.7% in the East and Far East. Only 3.4% of the events occurred in the United States, while terrorist kidnapping in Australasia is virtually negligible.

The number of terrorists involved was not reported in 46.1% of the cases. Where this figure was known, however, the majority of events were carried out by groups of five people or less (32.5% of the cases). For a complete breakdown of group size see Figure 3. In 11.7% of the events nine or more terrorists were involved, and it is hypothesised that this large number of terrorists corresponds to a qualitatively different mode of hostage taking than occurs with smaller terrorist attack groups. Where it is possible to be certain, three to five terrorists appear to make up the most frequent attack force for a kidnapping.




Figure 3 - Number of terrorists in attack

It was most common to take a single hostage, this being the case in 60.7% of the incidents. Two hostages were taken in a further 15.5% of cases (see Figure 4 below). In a small proportion of further cases more than two hostages were taken, however, the taking of nine or more hostages represent a relatively large proportion (8.7%) of these. As suggested with reference to the kidnappers themselves, it is possible that events in which such large numbers of hostages are taken represent a qualitatively different type

of kidnapping to incidents involving fewer hostages, though further analysis would be required to test this hypothesis.




Figure 4 - Number of hostages taken

Looking at the hostage details a little more closely, 77.7% of hostages were found to be foreign to the country in which they were taken. While hostages were specifically targeted in the majority of cases, they were reported to have been selected randomly in 18.4% of the events in the database. Figure 5, below, shows the distribution of hostage nationalities. By far the majority taken were either European (44.2%) or North American (35.0%). Far Eastern and South American hostages were each taken in just under 10% of cases, South American, African and Middle Eastern hostages each being taken in just over 5% of cases. Australasian hostages were taken the least frequently, in only 1.5% of cases.




Figure 5 - Nationalities of the hostages taken

Considering the occupational role of the hostages, the majority (43.7%) were senior ranking industrialists or highly technically qualified (such as consultant engineers on international construction projects). Diplomatic or government (including military) related hostages made up 33.5% of the sample. A further 14.6% of hostages were aid workers or missionaries. Relatively few hostages were tourists (2.4%) or had academic roles (5.8%). The relative frequencies can be seen more clearly in Figure 6.

It would appear from these figures alone that the hostages taken may well be targeted for their value to the developed Western world. With significant proportions being European or North American, having government, military and business occupations, it is clearly suggested that the kidnappers want hostages which will provide the greatest possible leverage in negotiation and the greatest media coverage in the world press.




Figure 6 - Hostage occupations and roles

6.2 - Event initiation

Turning now to the way in which the kidnappings are started - the hostage taking itself - there are various ways that the event may be initiated. Ten point two percent of the kidnaps were reported to have started with a large scale assault or attack. It is expected that these events correspond with those involving large numbers of terrorists and hostages. For example, in Angola in February 1984 UNITA carried out a large scale attack on a government-run diamond mine. Following the assault, seventy-five foreign workers were abducted and forced to walk eight hundred kilometres before being released. In another case, 60 members of the Somalian National Movement raided a Medecins Sans Frontiers run refugee camp, taking ten French doctors and nurses.

Hostages were known to have been approached openly in 64.1% of the cases and with use of deception in a further 11.2%. The way in which the hostages are approached is

partly a function of the location from which they are taken (see below). Open approaches tend to involve travelling hostages, as potential targets are particularly vulnerable while on the move. For example, in June 1975 Colonel Morgan of the US Army was kidnapped in Lebanon when he was dragged from his taxi at a road block. In an event ten years later, in June 1985, Thomas Sutherland was kidnapped when his car was intercepted by several other cars, the occupants of which shot out his tyres to stop his escape.

Some highly elaborate plans have also been carried out in order to get at hostages, however. For example, in January 1987, in Lebanon, a number of American academics were kidnapped by gunmen posing as members of Lebanon's Internal Security Force. They drove onto the Beirut University College campus in a police van asking to advise the subsequent hostages on security. When they later returned they forced their hostages into the van and drove away. In July 1975, in Argentina, Charles Lockwood was kidnapped by members of the ERP dressed as railway workers when they stopped his car at a railway crossing.

Figure 7 illustrates the distribution of locations from which the hostages were taken: In 23.3% of events the hostages were taken from their residences (e.g. in Venezuela during February 1976, William Niehous was kidnapped while watching television at home), in 20.9% from their workplace (e.g. in August 1970 Dr. Fly was kidnapped from his office in Uruguay by men posing as police officers) and 38.3% while travelling. Only 5.8% were taken from leisure locations (such as restaurants, theatres or sports centres - as for example when in March 1970 Lieutenant Colonel Donald Crowley was taken from a polo field in the Dominican Republic) and only 2.9% were taken while walking

outdoors. It is interesting to note that while 50.0% of the known locations were buildings, the hostages were taken while indoors in only 19.4% of incidents. This, in combination with the large proportion of hostages taken while travelling, suggests that hostages are most commonly taken when they are at their most vulnerable.




Figure 7 - Location target taken from

The range of resources used in taking hostages is also interesting to consider. By and large terrorists appear to use the minimum of equipment. Figure 8, below, shows the resources identified in the events encoded. Guns were reported as available in 64.1% of events, making them by far the most common resource. Use of other possible weapons was relatively scarce; explosives and blades were used in only 0.5% and 1.5% of cases respectively. Miscellaneous equipment, such as ropes or tape to bind the hostages, was used in only 5.3% of the cases. An example of an incident in which unusual equipment did appear to be used is the January 1989 kidnapping of the former Belgian Prime Minister Paul Vanden Boeynants, where a syringe cap was found suggesting that he had been drugged upon capture.




Figure 8 - Resources used in taking hostages

Vehicles were reported to have been used in 42.2% of the events. Cars and light vehicles made up the majority at 38.8%, though lorries were used in 0.5% (1 case) and special vehicles such as ambulances or boats were used in 2.9% of events. For example, in Spain ETA gunmen dressed as hospital attendants kidnapped Javier de Ybarra from his home in May 1977, driving him away in an ambulance. Vehicles were used actively to block hostage escape in 11.7% of the kidnappings in the database. The hostages own vehicle was taken during 5.3% of the kidnappings.

Clear information on the methods used to establish control was not available in many of the events, predominantly as a result of the lack of reporting in the data sources used. However, where methods could be identified, verbal commands or threats alone comprised 5.3% of the cases, warning shots were fired in 4.4%, hostages were pushed or hit to enforce compliance in 31.1% and weapons were used to fire at potential hostages,

or their security, in 13.1% of the events. Hostages were injured in only 2.9% of the events, but non-hostages were injured or killed in 14.6% of cases.

6.3 - Hostage holding and negotiation

The hostage holding phase is what most people consider definitive of any type of hostage taking. This is the single longest stage of an event (after planning), especially as accepted negotiator practice is to protract dialogue for as long as possible (Poland 1988).

Kidnappings may be carried out for a range of motives, as Figure 9 illustrates. While hostages are typically taken for their use in a specific event, other motives do arise.




Figure 9 - Types of kidnap motive

In 9.7% of events in the database hostages appeared to have been taken specifically in order to interrogate or gain information from them. A further 13.6% appeared to have been carried out for the intrinsic publicity and no demands were ever issued. Ten point two percent of kidnaps were carried out to add pressure to on-going situations while the

majority, 76.7% of the events, were “normal” in that demands were issued and negotiations entered.

The range of demands that may be made appears to be very diverse. Figure 10 shows the most common types of demand. Money was the most frequent, being asked for in 36.9% of the cases. The release of specifically named prisoners was the next most common, being demanded in 28.6% of cases. Specifically named groups of prisoners were demanded in a further 7.3% and a general release of unspecified prisoners was demanded in 3.9%. Publication, or broadcast, of messages was demanded in 16.0% of events. Political and/or social change, and the distribution of supplies to poor areas, were each demanded in 4.4% of the cases.




Figure 10 - Demands made in terrorist kidnapping

A range of other demands, each having very low frequency, were also found to occur but were grouped together as a single group for the purposes of the current research. These included such issues as immunity from retaliation (VPR in Brazil, 11 March

1970), an end to French economic assistance (Karen guerrillas in Burma, 18 October 1983) and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories (Organisation for the Oppressed in Lebanon, 17 February 1988). None of these demands were made frequently enough to be categorised in their own right.

Having made demands, the event is truly under way and all parties are committed in one way or another. From the terrorists' perspective it is important that they retain control of events. There are two ways in which this is achieved, *internally* and *externally*. Internal control refers principally to the regulation of the hostages. Unfortunately there is very little good behavioural information available on this, especially in kidnap where the location is not known. Internal control methods could only be identified in 33.9% of the cases - a little over a third. In many cases this is because the information is simply not reported, though in some cases the hostages are bound not to discuss their captivity as a part of the release negotiation.

Where these details have been reported, however, a number of possible strategies can be identified: Hostages were reported as being treated well in 13.1% of events, treated strictly as prisoners in 8.7% and mistreated in a further 12.1% of the events. An example of good treatment can be seen in July 1986, in the Philippines, when Catholic nuns were kidnapped by the Moro National Liberation Front. After the event Sister Casimiro reported that they had been fed so well she had gained weight during her captivity.

Mistreatment was further composed of two methods: *Deprivation* occurred in 5.8% of the cases, and involved starving hostages or keeping them in the dark (for example, when Teide Herrema was kidnapped by the IRA in Ireland (October 1975) he was blindfolded and had cotton wool pushed in his ears). *Abuse* occurred in 6.3% of the cases in the database, and covered situations in which the kidnappers verbally and/or physically abused their hostages (in Lebanon during 1984 William Buckley was repeatedly and systematically interrogated and tortured until he died of heart failure). It might be expected that the majority of cases where internal control is unreported would be characterised by treatment as prisoners (that is, contact is minimised but humane), but this cannot be assumed.

External control methods were better reported, however, often occurring as part of the negotiation process. This refers to a range of behaviours aimed at pressurising or otherwise influencing outside parties. A number of these identified in the content analysis of the kidnapping cases are shown in Figure 11. These are actions which do not necessarily contribute in any direct way to the negotiation process, but which serve to increase the pressure on the other parties involved.

The hostages were accused of being spies in 10.7% of the events. Evidence that the hostages were really being held, and that they were still alive, was provided in 22.8% of events. Direct requests for the authorities to stop searching for the hostage holders location were only made in 3.9% of the events. A “peoples’ trial” was held in 8.7% of cases, in which the hostage is subjected to pseudo-justice as seen through the values and rhetoric of the terrorist group - for example, in the 1989 kidnapping of the former




Figure 11 - Methods of external influence

Belgian Premier Paul Vanden Boeynants the Revolutionary Socialist Brigade claimed to be trying him in a “People’s Court” as a “corrupt demagogue”. In the 1974 kidnapping of four Tenneco Oil Company workers in Ethiopia, ELF terrorists reported that they would try the hostages for the exploitation of the natural resources of Eritrea (though they were subsequently “acquitted” on the grounds that they were not aware of being manipulated by their government).

The setting of deadlines was found to be relatively uncommon in kidnapping, no deadlines being set (or reported set) in 79.6% of the cases. Of the 20.4% in which deadlines were clearly announced, however, they were allowed to pass without comment in 11.7% and extensions granted in 2.9% of events. Threats were actually carried out in only 3.9% of the cases. In the remaining 1.9% of cases where deadlines

were known to have been set, it was not reported what happened when they were reached.

In addition to the setting of deadlines, in some cases terrorists also altered their demands. The changing of demands was, however, quite uncommon, being reported in only 19.0% of the cases. In 6.8% of events the demands were increased (i.e. the amount of money, number of prisoners, etc. demanded was increased). In a further 7.8% demands were changed substantively (i.e. when something was requested initially, it was later altered completely to something else). For example, in July 1970, in Uruguay, the Tupamaro kidnapers of Aloysio Gomide initially demanded the release of prisoners but later changed their demands to money, completely dropping any reference to the prisoners. In the remaining 4.4% of cases the quantity of concessions demanded were reduced.

A wide range of parties may become involved in negotiation with the kidnapers, but the proportions of events in which each type of party was positively identified as being engaged were found to be surprisingly low. These proportions can be seen in Figure 12. The parties are not mutually exclusive, more than one may be involved in any negotiation, thus the figures illustrated total more than one hundred percent.

The authorities of the country in which the event occurred were reported as directly involved in negotiations in 25.2% of events, the hostages' government in 24.8%, the hostages' company in 14.1% and the hostages' family in 10.2% of the events. In 18.4% independent agencies such as the International Red Cross were involved. Further, in

9.7% of the events other terrorist groups became involved in negotiations (this was primarily in the Middle East in which there are many different groups and factions involved). Intermediaries were reported as being used between the terrorists and other organisations/ parties in 23.8% of the kidnappings.




Figure 12 - Parties reported as involved in negotiations

Although one or more of the parties were involved in some form of negotiation in each incident, the proportions of events in which the authorities (both from the country the event occurred in and hostages' home country) were identified as entering dialogue with the terrorists appear to be surprisingly low. One explanation of this finding may be the development of anti-terrorist no-negotiation policies, but more detailed information than is currently available would be required to test this hypothesis.

The number of parties explicitly and publicly refusing to enter negotiations during a kidnapping were relatively few. The majority of publicly announced non-negotiation

statements were made by the government of the country in which the event occurred (representing 12.1% of events, compared with only 5.3% for the hostage's government). This may well also reflect increasing use of no-negotiation policies - it is possible that overt statements are made as countries adopt the policy. Again, more information than is currently available is required to test this hypothesis. Demands were rejected without cutting off the possibility of negotiations in 8.7% of the events and alternative concessions were suggested in a further 5.3%. This can be seen in the 1984 kidnapping of Stanley and Mary Allen; the Sri Lankan government refused to accede to the demands of \$2 million in gold, but offered not to prosecute the terrorists provided the hostages were released unharmed.

Hostages were reported to have been harmed by the terrorists as a direct consequence of the authorities actions, or lack thereof, in 8.3% of the cases. For example, in March 1985 Alec Collett was killed by his Revolutionary Organisation of Socialist Muslims captors in reprisal for the US bombing of Libya. The release of hostages throughout negotiations is uncommon in kidnap, though this may well reflect the small number of hostages taken compared to other forms of hostage taking. Hostages were released during the course of an event for no clear reason in 7.3% of events. Release occurred as a direct consequence of the negotiation process in 4.4% of the incidents. Hostages were released compassionately (that is, through illness or plea) in only 1.5% of events. An example of this latter reason can be seen when Kurdish rebels released their Algerian and French hostages, whose health had been deteriorating. Hostages were not released during kidnappings for any other reason.

Some amount of concessions were known to have been made in a little under 40% of events. All demands were met in 17.5% of events while reduced, or alternative, demands were conceded in 18.9% of them. The proportions of different parties reported as having granted concessions can be seen in Figure 13. As the principle parties involved in negotiation were the governments of the effected countries (those in which the event occurred and from which the hostages came), they were the most likely to make concessions. The authorities of the country the event occurred in granted concessions in 9.2% of cases, the hostages' government granted a settlement in a further 10.2% of the incidents in the sample.




Figure 13 - Parties granting concessions

The hostages' company met some or all of the demands in 8.7% of the events, while their families did so in 5.3%. In these cases the authorities did not make any concessions, even if they were involved in negotiations. Independent agencies met demands in 4.9% of cases and in one case (0.5% of the sample) another terrorist organisation did so.

6.4 - Event closure

The kidnap closure stage marks the end of an event and is largely shaped by the progress of the previous stages. Figure 14 shows the distribution of the various event closure methods. In 50% of the events the terrorists were satisfied with the progress of the event and released their hostages. These events represent those in which demands were met (in full or part), and those in which tangible demands were not required. In a further 14.6% of events the terrorists effectively backed down and released their hostages with no gain to themselves. This was seen in March 1991 when Sindh bandits in Pakistan released their two Japanese hostages for no gain when authorities detained around 600 people including close relatives of the bandits. Similarly, in January 1985, the Sudanese People's Liberation Army released its last four hostages, one year after kidnapping them, dropping their demands, which had never been met.

Hostage escape is infrequent, and ended the event in only 1 case (0.5% of the sample). In February 1985 Jeremy Levin escaped his captors in Lebanon and walked for two hours before finding a Syrian army post to give himself up to. Even in this case it was rumoured that he had been allowed to escape. Terrorists are only slightly more likely to surrender, this occurring in 1% of the events (two incidents). In one case surrender was spontaneous (a lone activist whose political motives were questioned) and in the other the terrorists gave in when their location was detected (Irish criminals, also suspected of not really being politically motivated). This suggests that surrender may be indicative of lack of political commitment, but it does not occur frequently enough to properly resolve this hypothesis.




Figure 14 - Kidnap closure methods

Hostage death brings an event to premature closure in 10.2% of events. This may be thought of as representing a grave failure of the negotiation process, typically appearing to occur after protracted periods of deadlock or inaction on the part of the authorities. The kidnappers' location was found by police or security services in 17.0% of the events. Following discovery, 13.1% of events were closed through "storming" (77.1% of those where the location was identified). This suggests that a significant alteration in event dynamics, and shift of power over event-control, occurs when the location is known to the authorities. While an event is ended rapidly with this tactic, great care must be taken, as deaths are not uncommon. Terrorist death through storming occurs in 6.3% of all events (48.1% of those involving storming), hostage death in 2.9% (22.1% of stormed) and fatalities are suffered by the storming force in 1.5% of all cases (11.5% of stormed). A case in example occurred in 1985 when the Equadorian authorities located the hiding place of the M-19 kidnappers of Nahim Isaias Barquet. In a commando assault of the house four terrorists and the hostage were killed.

Terrorists are caught during an event closure in only 14.6% of cases. Given that terrorist fatalities represent a relatively low proportion of event closures, this suggests that terrorists do manage to escape immediately following a kidnapping (successful in their stated aims or not) in the majority of cases. A proportion of these terrorist kidnapers will be captured subsequent to the incident as a result of successful investigation, but this information was not available for consideration in the current research.

6.5 - Summary

This chapter has served to outline the general characteristics and patterns of terrorist kidnap from the late 1960's through to the early 1990's. While investigative methods are constantly improving, and world politics constantly change, the general pattern of outcomes is not expected to be entirely different today. Should an event occur it does appear most likely that the terrorists will get away uncaptured, whether successful in their stated aims or not, though they may be later apprehended through ongoing investigation.

The basic figures shown in this chapter raise a number of interesting questions. For instance, do terrorists who appear clearly in control at the outset remain so throughout? Does internal event control relate in any way to external control? These issues, amongst others, will be examined in the following chapters addressing the characteristics and variation of behaviour exhibited during terrorist kidnapping. The data presented in this chapter appear to suggest that different groups do operate

differently from each other. The information relating to initiation (capture) methods, internal and external event control, negotiation and event closure all suggest that variations do occur in the commission of kidnap. This supports the notion of kidnap as a heterogeneous event. Further, it clearly supports the hypothesis arising from Kellen's (1990) view of terrorist activity, that terrorist groups would systematically differ in how they operate.

The data presented do not suggest dysfunctional or mentally disordered behaviour. While it is difficult to interpret the decision-making processes of the kidnapers, and the current analysis does not allow one to look at how the actions are interrelated, there are no single actions that would suggest irrational behaviour. The types of action observed can all be understood, and make sense, within the context from which they are located. This supports the hypothesis that terrorist kidnap is carried out by 'normally' functioning people, and special theories to understand their behaviour are not required. However, the limitations of the current analysis – the range and nature of the questions left unanswered - support the suggestion that multi-dimensional approaches are required to fully explore the nature of terrorist kidnap behaviour.

While the basis premise of rationality does appear to be supported, consistency cannot be addressed with the current level of analysis. The next chapter will address the nature and range of behaviour in more detail. The patterns of interrelation between the actions will be examined, and the implications of these discussed. The chapters following that will look at specific features of terrorist kidnap, drawing out the nature of observed behavioural variation in more detail.

Chapter 7 - Patterns of behaviour; Smallest Space Analysis of kidnap

The previous chapter sought to overview the characteristics of kidnap through basic descriptive statistics. These figures give an impression of the issues and problems being considered, but it leaves as many questions unanswered as it resolves. For example, the proportions of groups treating their hostages in various ways during incident initiation are known, but how do these relate to further actions? Are these early actions systematically related to later hostage treatment, or behaviour during negotiations? Questions about the *interrelation* of the items need to be addressed to answer these types of question.

This chapter shows the results of analysis addressing the relationships between behaviours carried out by terrorists during the course of a kidnapping. This will enable the identification of the co-occurrence of aspects of behaviour. A multivariate approach is required, as discussed previously with reference to the empirical work of Friedland and Merari (1992), in Chapter 4. Problems involving complex behaviour cannot be solved taking a bivariate approach (Kerlinger 1973). Given the exploratory nature of the current work, an analytic method allowing the identification of the dimensions, or factors, underlying the observed activity is required. Factor analysis and cluster analysis could both be used for this purpose, but the nature of the current data means that these are not suitable. The current data is dichotomous (see discussion in Chapter 5) and does not fulfil the criteria required of parametric statistical tests, being neither cardinal in nature nor normally distributed.

Smallest Space Analysis (SSA1) was identified as an analytic method which could be used with nominal data (and dichotomous data specifically) if particular co-occurrence coefficients are

used instead of Pearson Product-Moment correlations. This is discussed more fully in the next section. SSA1 enables the interrelations of multiple variables to be examined simultaneously through a spatial representation of these associations. SSA1 is a non-metric multi-dimensional analytical procedure which graphically represents the patterns of association within a set of variables. Before considering the analyses themselves, the operation of SSA1 will be outlined.

7.1 - The Smallest Space Analysis procedure

Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) procedures are increasing being used in research as they apply powerful mathematical techniques to the understanding of the data generated (Brown 1985). Brown (1985) describes MDS techniques as a family of procedures enabling the representation of information as a set of points in space. The spatial properties of the points, the locations and distances between them, are based upon the empirical interrelations within the information being drawn upon.

Smallest Space Analysis (SSA-1) is one such MDS analytic technique. It generates a geometric representation of the variables or items being analysed. It plots variables as points within an n-dimensional Euclidean space (Brown 1985; Wilson 1995). The spatial relation of each point to every other one is a property of the empirical relationships between the information they represent. The distances between points are a representation of the strength of the association between the items, or variables. A number of different correlation coefficients can be used depending upon the nature of the data. If the information being used satisfies the criteria for interval or ratio level data then the coefficient applied is Pearson's Product Moment Correlation. However, if the data does not satisfy these criteria (if it is nominal or categorical) then

Guttman's Mu can be used. Both Guttman's Mu and Jaccard's Coefficient of Co-occurrence may be used with dichotomous data, depending upon the nature of the data.

In the current research, the coding frame (see Appendix A) is made up of details and actions which are coded dichotomously according to their presence or absence. Information is indicated as being either definitely present (1) or not present/ unknown/ ambiguous (0). Due to the nature of the data (publicly available accounts) it is not possible to tell whether any action/ aspect is truly absent, or merely unreported. It is thus not possible to distinguish between aspects which definitely do not occur and about which details are not known. As a result, a co-efficient which only considers joint positive co-occurrence, not joint negative co-occurrence, is required for SSA to be carried out on this data. Jaccard's Coefficient of Co-occurrence affords just such evaluation of the relationships between variables. This coefficient looks at the instances of co-occurrence between two variables. It does not account for any circumstance of non-occurrence, including co-non-occurrence. This is important in the current analyses, as it is only the coding of an aspect's occurrence which is definitely meaningful.

Using raw data, SSA1 starts by calculating correlations (in the current research co-occurrence coefficients) between every pair of variables in the analysis. This produces a matrix of association coefficients. These coefficients are then rank ordered. Distances are calculated based upon the inverse of the rank scores, such that the largest (strongest) association corresponds to the shortest distance, the smallest correlation corresponds to the greatest distance, with the remainder of the ranks and distances falling between. SSA next attempts to plot the points based upon these distances.

SSA attempts to provide a solution giving a good geometric representation of the interrelations using the minimum number of dimensions possible (Brown 1985). The program attempts to maximise the accuracy of the representation by comparing the rank order of the correlation coefficients to the rank order of the distances. Iterative adjustments are made to the geometric pattern of items in order to minimise any discrepancies between the two sets of ranked figures (Canter and Heritage 1990).

The closer the rank orders of the correlations and the distances, for a solution in a given number of dimensions, the better the *fit* between the empirical data and the spatial representation of it. In statistical terms this degree of fit is called *stress*; lower stress indicates better fit. Canter and Heritage (1990) report that iterations continue until the minimal stress possible has been achieved for the dimensionality of the solution specified. For SSA1 the measure of fit is known as the coefficient of alienation.

The lower the coefficient of alienation is the better, but there is no definitive cut-off point for acceptability. Guttman (1965) suggests a value 0.15 and Donald and Canter (1990) suggest one of 0.2. Canter and Heritage (1990) state that the acceptability of the coefficient of alienation will be influenced by the number of variables used in the analysis, the degree of error in the data and the theoretical strength of the interpretation framework proposed. The exact level of the coefficient of alienation is not as important as the identification of meaningful regions within the plot; a marginal coefficient may still be acceptable if identification of an interpretable solution is possible (Donald and Canter 1990).

Having derived a solution with a suitable co-efficient of alienation (solutions around the 0.2 level are tentatively accepted), identification of a meaningful empirical structure is necessary. Regional hypotheses are concerned with the division of the SSA space into identifiable areas that correspond to the elements of facets (Brown 1985). A facet is a conceptual categorisation underlying a group of observations. The elements of a facet represent the values which logically and completely describe all of the variations within any facet (Brown 1985). Discussing the partitioning of the conceptual space, Lingoes (1985) states that items related in some manner must form a single continuous subspace, having a single boundary unbroken by other conceptual regions. Further, in creating these partitions, it is crucial that there are theoretically compelling reasons for them (Lingoes 1985).

There are various theoretical (and geometric) structures which may be observed in SSA analysis, depending upon the number and role played by the facets identified (for more detailed discussion see Brown 1995). Facets may be understood as conceptual dimensions, though no assumptions of linearity or orthogonality are made. One of the key criticisms of the use of SSA has been that the partitioning of the plots is unscientific (Brown 1985). However, any partitions proposed are openly disclosed and available for the postulation of alternative interpretations and theoretical development. As long as partitions are based upon a meaningful theoretical basis, and are open to scrutiny, then there should be no question of their scientific validity.

In addition to the empirical confirmation of hypothesised facets and elements of a research domain, SSA is also a powerful tool for *exploratory analysis*. When previous literature does not

afford a detailed theoretical structure to be developed a priori, SSA can be used to identify facets and elements underlying observed analytical structures. The understanding of a research domain can be enriched from the generation of conceptual facets, or dimensions. These, and account of their interaction, can afford an understanding of the nature and structure of variations observed in that domain.

SSA is used in an exploratory mode in the current work. Review of the literature has enabled a general identification of the boundary of the research domain (terrorist kidnapping). Further, a number of psychological processes have been hypothesised to underlie systematic patterns of behavioural variation, and the maintenance of such behaviour themes. However, little work is available to suggest how behaviour exhibited during the commission of terrorist kidnap varies stylistically and strategically. The purpose of the work outlined in the present chapter is to develop just such an understanding of these patterns.

7.2 - Using SSA to examine patterns of behavioural variation in terrorist kidnap

It is proposed that while certain aspects of kidnapping will be influenced by the wider social and political culture within which a group operates, some methods and modes of operation will be group specific. Precise operational and tactical details will be more influenced by the nature of the group itself, though these will also be influenced to a certain extent by cultural factors. The focus of this chapter is to overview analysis establishing the nature and range of variation in the approach to terrorist kidnap taken by different groups. Most literature tends to talk of kidnap in generic terms, there is no evidence that possible variation in kidnap execution has been addressed empirically.

Considering only terrorist actions, ignoring the influence of wider context for the current purposes, it is hypothesised that various different tactical styles will become evident. The experience of trained negotiators (e.g. McLean 1986; Strentz 1988) suggest that different types of offender are associated with different behavioural styles and response requirements. The work of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) indicates support for this, identifying behavioural variation on two dimensions during kidnapping - use of force and flexibility.

The analysis being conducted was expected to yield a particular type of theoretical structure: A core group of common actions, relatively basic or definitive of kidnap, is expected to fall at the centre of the analytical space. Surrounding this core will lie a number of conceptually distinct regions relating to qualitatively different methods, or types, of kidnap. At the most basic, regions relating to a professional-amateur distinction are expected, though it is possible that more distinctions may be made. Wilson et al (1995) reported the identification of three regions (reactionary, professional and bandit) in analysis of barricade-siege type hostage takings, while the two dimensions identified in analysis of kidnap gave four modes of behavioural orientation (professional, over-zealous, amateur and uncompromising). Similar distinctions are expected to be identified in the current analysis.

Items were selected for inclusion on the basis that they reflect actions under the terrorists' control, these actions being most subject to their particular style of decision making. The analysis did not include any background details, such as resources used, contextual information, or details of authority responses. The initial SSA carried out consisted of 25 items spanning the

initiation and holding phases of all events. Items with relatively low frequency of occurrence are hypothesised to be indicative of specialised tactics and situational responses. As such, they are proposed to relate to specific differences in groups' modus operandi. If this is the case then these actions will be expected to emphasise meaningful differences in operational style between groups.

The Jaccard co-efficients of co-occurrence for the items used were generally low, ranging from 0.0 (no co-occurrence) to 0.28 (co-occurrence in 28% of cases). The highest rate of co-occurrence occurred between the items *shoot at* and *non-hostage injured/killed*, with a coefficient of 0.73, indicating 73% co-occurrence. While these co-occurrence coefficients appear to be surprisingly low, however, two reasons may be suggested to account for this. First, the items themselves have relatively low frequency of occurrence, thus reducing the likelihood of co-occurrence by chance. Second, and more importantly, few of the actions have any logical dependence on each other. They are proposed to occur as part of complex, and event sensitive, goal directed action plans rather than through simple stereotyped kidnap tactics. The fact that few high co-occurrence rates occur immediately suggests that variations in actions arise from event specific planning rather than standardised event types.

If there were obvious "standard" forms that kidnap could follow then clear groups of items would be expected to have high inter-correlations, resulting in clusters of strongly inter-related actions. This is not the case, however, suggesting that many actions do not have significant interdependence with other actions. This means that stereotypical *types* of kidnap are not likely

to be identified. This does not preclude the identification of meaningful patterns within the observed behavioural variation, however.

Before looking at the patterns observed, however, the method used to ensure the reliability of the empirical model developed should be discussed. It is possible that any structure shown in the analysis could be an artefact of the items selected. Even if meaningful patterns were identified in the items, how is it possible to be certain that these patterns are reliable indicators of behavioural variation?

Reliability of the empirical structure identified was addressed by carrying out a corroborative analysis using many of the same and a number of alternative (and in some cases mutually exclusive) items and considering the effects these had. For instance, in the main analysis (discussed in the next section), *deception approach* was included, this being replaced by *large scale assault* in the alternative (replication) model. These items are mutually exclusive as they cannot, by definition, both occur within a single event. The items used in each of the analyses, and the plots of the SSA using the alternative items, can be seen in Appendix C. If the patterns of interaction identified in the main analysis occurred as an artefact of the items selected then they would not be expected to be found in the alternative analysis.

The criteria for establishing reliability are firstly, that the items interrelate to each other in the same manner, such that the same regions can be identified even with different items being considered. Secondly, while the position of the items with respect to each other need not be identical, it is crucial that the points form the same contiguous regions. For the empirical model

developed to be considered reliable the conceptual regions identified in each analysis must be composed of *the same* groups of items, having the same overall relationships to each other.

In the replication analysis (see appendix C) the precise positions of the items did alter, but the overall regions identified through their interrelations did not. As a result, identical conceptual regions could be identified in the plots of both SSA analyses. The alternative items were found to fall into the regions they were expected to: For example, “deception approach” fell into the *adaptive-persuasive* region of the original analysis, while its alternate action, “large scale assault” fell into the *aggressive-coercive* region of the corroborative analysis, as will be discussed in detail in the following section. The concordance of the two analyses suggests that the conceptualised structure is robust. The fact that the same empirical structure can be identified using alternative items suggests that the model reflects real variations in event commission rather than merely chance, or artefacts of the items selected.

7.3 - A structural model of kidnap tactics

A meaningful structural model was indeed identified through analysis, having a three dimensional solution. The co-efficient of alienation for this solution is 0.18. As guidelines suggest a figure of 0.2 or less as desirable (Donald and Canter, 1990), this solution suggests an acceptable fit between the statistical calculations and the resultant graphical plot of the interrelationships. This proposition is supported empirically through the clear and meaningful facets distinguished in each of the three dimensions of the solution. Figures 15a and 15b show the items and their distribution in vectors 2x1 and 3x1 of a three dimensional solution (the plot of vectors 3x2 shows the same facet structure as that in the 3x1 plot (Figure 15b)).




Figure 15a - SSA of kidnap behavioural variation - vectors 2x1

Four facets have been conceptualised to account for the systematic pattern of variation observed within the behaviours, three *axial* and one *modulating*. The modulating facet is represented by the series of concentric rings marked on Figures 15a & b. The regions correspond to the frequency of occurrence of each item - the most frequent falling centrally, the least frequent to the periphery of the plot. This modulating facet represents a simple order corresponding with

distance from the centre of the plot and is observed in the plots of vectors 2x1 (Figure 15a) and 3x1 (Figure 15b).

The axial facets operate in each plane of the plots. These facets are conceptualised as being continuous, but are partitioned into dichotomous regions here for ease of discussion. They are represented by the horizontal and vertical partition lines on Figures 15a & b. The interaction of the three axial facets produces a simple conceptual form termed a *triplex* (see Figure 19).




Figure 15b - kidnap behavioural variation - vectors 3x1

7.3.a - Variations in action frequency

The modulating facet, as stated, was found to relate to item frequency. The most central items having the highest frequency (occurring in more than 20% of cases). With distance from the centre of the space, item frequency falls and items are proposed to become increasingly indicative of specific types or modes of action. The frequency gradient appeared to be continuous and thus the partitions illustrated (<10%, 10-20% and >20%) were selected arbitrarily. The central region contains the most common behaviours, while the more peripheral actions occur in fewer cases.

The higher frequency items falling to the centre of the plot may be thought of as “core” actions to kidnapping, while the less frequent actions may be more indicative of particular approaches, or types of approach. The two most common actions, coercing targets in their acquisition and providing evidence that they are being held, represent basic actions that may be required before negotiation can commence. The taking of hostages and proving to outside parties that they are being held can be seen as the basis from which an event can develop. It establishes the position from which the terrorists are proposing to negotiate from.

As the actions' frequency of occurrence falls they become increasing peripheral on the plot, and more indicative of different modes of behavioural style or orientation. These differing styles are important in distinguishing the axial facets. The axial facets are partitioned dichotomously in the above plots to clearly illustrate the differences between the poles of the scales being hypothesised. These facets are, however, conceptualised as being continua, representing a range of behaviours which would be expected to show a normal distribution. Behaviours at either

extreme of the scale having relatively low frequency of occurrence, while more 'central' actions have greater likelihood of being observed.

As the three axial facets are proposed to operate orthogonally to each other, the combined three dimensional distribution of frequencies will appear to be spherical. The highest frequency items forming a core at the centre of all three dimensions, with increasingly low frequency items radiating outwards. The nature of the axial facets is very interesting, and suggests the concept of kidnap as a process of an interaction, even though only the terrorists actions are considered.

7.3.b - Expression

The first axial facet relates to the kidnapers mode of orientation towards other groups. Two principal regions are proposed; *aggressive-coercive* and *persuasive-adaptive* (see figure 16). Aggressive-Coercive behaviour is characterised by the use of physical force. Direct coercion and physical violence are likely to be observed by groups whose actions fall predominantly into this region. In opposition to this is hypothesised to be Persuasive-Adaptive behaviour. This may appear threatening, but tends to be vocal rather than physical. Further, activity tends to be flexible and responsive to the nature of the situation.

The aggressive region is characterised by various actions involving either direct or implicit violence. Direct aggression includes actions such as shooting at potential hostages during the event initiation, physical abuse of the hostages in captivity and the injury or killing of hostages as a direct consequence of the actions of other parties. Less direct actions which still involve aggressive acts include the blocking of a targets escape with the terrorists vehicles during direct

approaches, pushing or hitting hostages and the firing of warning shots during the hostage capture. Implicit aggression can be seen during negotiation via such actions as increasing the demands and the setting of very short deadlines.




Figure 16 - Behavioural expression

The actions falling into the adaptive region are characterised by a lack of immediately aggressive implications. Many of these actions involve attempts at persuasion rather than overt aggression, or involve adaptation to circumstances as they arise. For example, the provision of evidence that the hostages are being held may be construed as persuading the negotiating parties to treat the terrorists seriously. Demanding the cessation of searches for the kidnappers' location is adaptive to situational activity on the part of the authorities. The provision of medical aid is adaptive to situations in which hostages have been injured (or become ill).

Similarly, hostage release, for whatever reason, may be designed to indicate that the terrorists are reasonable people to negotiate with. The taking of the hostages' vehicle may represent adaptation to opportunities afforded by the incident. During the course of negotiations, accusations that the hostages were spying may be hypothesised to reflect commitment to political agendas, while allowing deadlines to pass may signify flexibility in the course of discussion with the outside parties.

The location of the 'mistreat-deprive' item was initially questioned, falling in the right-hand side of the plot, well into the 'adaptive-persuasive' region. Defined as mistreatment, the item was expected to fall into the aggressive-coercive region. However, on reviewing the actions that the item represents, they are characterised by a lack of force or aggression. Although some types of deprivation could be construed as harmful to the hostages (e.g. limiting food), various sensory-reducing actions (e.g. blindfolding or darkening rooms) may represent adaptive behaviour, possibly even serving to protect the hostages. Such actions may be designed to protect the kidnappers' identities and the location at which the hostages are being held. The adaptive function of kidnapper protection is clear, but reduction of potentially antagonistic kidnapper-hostage contact may well also serve a hostage protection function. This discussion serves to emphasise the importance of taking a multivariate approach, enabling the interpretation of actions within the context they arise rather than assuming single specific meanings in all cases.

7.3.c - Direction of influence

The second facet relates to the direction in which actions are focused. Two modes are proposed, *external* and *internal* (see figure 17). External behaviour is focused upon influence of third parties, attempting to maintain control over the course or overall process of an event. In contrast, internal actions direct focus on internal control of the operation and of the hostages. These actions may be considered to be expressive of the power exercised by the terrorists.




Figure 17 - Direction of influence

The release of hostages during an event is considered to have an external orientation, as it is aimed at delivering a message to outside parties about how reasonable the terrorists are prepared

to be. Demands for the cessation of searches is external as it aims to influence the actions of external parties engaged in the event. Treating the hostages well is considered to ultimately have an external orientation (and strategic, as will be discussed) as it increases the likelihood that the hostages will support, or at least not condemn, the terrorists subsequently. The holding of a “people’s trial” is also considered to have an external focus as it is hypothesised to be a theatrical activity, aimed at indicating the political intent and issues being *contended by the* terrorists.

Shooting at potential targets, and others involved, during the event initiation is proposed to be an extreme form of external influence designed to bring people rapidly under the control of the terrorists where they were not previously influenced by them. The increasing of demands is also proposed to be externally focused, as it aims to influence the parties engaged in negotiation.

More of the actions are hypothesised to be internal than external. This is partly as a consequence of the nature of kidnapping. The incident relies to a large degree on the terrorists’ location remaining undisclosed, so a great deal of event management is required for a kidnap to be successful from the terrorists’ perspective. The changing of location during an event can be seen as a case in point, ensuring that the authorities cannot alter the power balance in the negotiations being engaged in.

While the holding of a “people’s trial” is considered to have an external focus, having a theatrical influence over the perceptions of external parties, the accusation of spying is considered to be an internal action. Although the statement may be thought of as showing

political intention rather than attempting to influence others, it is hypothesised to serve a rhetorical purpose - reaffirming to the terrorists themselves the righteousness of their actions. The mistreatment of hostages - through abuse or deprivation - typically serves only the terrorists and may reflect attitudes towards the hostages (see previous discussion in section 7.3.b). Similarly, taking hostages' vehicles also serves the terrorists rather than anyone else.

A number of actions, such as the setting of short deadlines or the harming of hostages as a reprisal for other parties actions were initially considered to be externally focused actions falling into the wrong region. However, these actions can also be hypothesised to serve a purpose for the terrorists themselves as well as to external parties. In addition to acting as communication signals to others, these actions may also serve more immediate self-motivating purposes for the terrorists. The setting of short deadlines may serve to enhance the terrorists' perception that they are setting the pace of the negotiations. Harming the hostages may serve a similar self-affirmation purpose for the terrorists, emphasising that they hold control over the hostages' welfare. Once again, the meaning of single actions will be dependent upon the wider behavioural context within which they arise.

7.3.d - Goal Focus

The third axial facet relates to the goal focus of an action. Goal orientations may be focused at *strategic* or *tactical* levels (see figure 18). Strategic actions refer to those associated with longer term processes and goals. No immediate result or benefit may be apparent, but the action may have an effect over a longer time period. Tactical actions, by contrast, may seem to be more situationally expedient. They are direct in impact and oriented toward the achievement of short-

term goals. The first two facets, *mode of expression* and *direction of influence*, support the empirical structure shown in the work of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995). The facet of *goal focus* was not evident in Wilson et al's (1995) work, the current model therefore represents both corroboration and a theoretical advance of their empirical structure.




Figure 18 - Behavioural orientation

This facet appears to overlap conceptually with the “direction of influence” facet, but it does make an important theoretical distinction which is worth considering in terms of hostage situation and negotiation management. While the “direction of influence” relates to the party an action is most likely to be targeted at, either external parties or the internal control of an event

(in both instrumental and emotional/morale terms), the “goal focus” facet is proposed to indicate how actions relate to the overall purpose of the terrorists. Some actions, both internally and externally focused, have greater or longer term implications than others and it is this distinction that the goal focus facet is proposed to be highlighting.

Strategic actions are hypothesised to include both internal and external control actions. The taking of the hostage’s vehicle (internal control) may be considered strategic as it represents an additional resource which may have long term application, or at least use beyond the immediate kidnapping being carried out. Hostage release and good treatment (external control) may be hypothesised to play a strategic role in long term image management, suggesting that the terrorist group is reasonable and wishes to appear to be fair. Further, the increasing of demands (external) and setting of short deadlines (internal) may indicate that the terrorists are committed and professional, serving a strategic rather than specifically tactical role. Although many of these actions are based upon communication, the distinction in this case is not the specific influence on internal-control or external parties but on the creation of an impression or image which is more enduring than the duration of the immediate incident.

The majority of the tactical actions, by their definition, coincide with the internal control actions. The internal control actions, being under the terrorists’ direct influence, are aimed at the smooth running of the event, and tactical actions are defined as those indicating the short term purpose of the terrorists in executing an incident. It is more likely for an externally influencing action to have a tactical role than it is for an internally focused action to have a strategic role, and this serves to confuse the distinction between the two facets. It is expected, however, that if

fuller data were available analysis could be carried out with a wider range of behaviours, enabling these two facets to be more clearly distinguished.

7.4 - The interaction of the facets

Figure 19 shows the hypothetical interaction of these conceptual dimensions; forming a conceptual structure termed a triplex. The facets are hypothesised to operate as orthogonal dimensions. They are seen as being linear and independent of one another. The first facet, *behavioural expression*, is similar to that of *force* in Wilson et al's (1995) study. The 'Aggression-Coercion' element relating to 'Forceful' and the 'Persuasion-Adaptation' to the 'Non-forceful' elements of their theoretical model.

The conceptual distinction being made in the current study, however, is more complex than that made in Wilson et al's work - linking kidnapping behaviour to models of interpersonal interaction. In Wilson et al's (1995) study the facet of 'force' was considered to relate directly, and solely, to the use of violence. Actions were considered to form a continuum from actual and physical force, through threatened violence, to non-violent actions. Rather than simply implying the use of force, or not, this facet is now understood in more complex terms of the expression of affiliation (or lack) between the parties negotiating. Thus, Aggression-Coercion refers to actions of overt and forceful display of hostility, whereas Persuasion-Adaptation refers to more flexible and "friendly" expression.

While good rapport may be established during the course of negotiations, given the nature of kidnapping it is unlikely that really friendly behaviour will be observed. This skew in the

affiliation dimension towards hostility is proposed to be a genuine reflection of event processes rather than an artefact of the data coding. However, this conceptualisation does strongly imply that kidnapping is fundamentally about interaction. This dimension is conceptually similar to the affiliation scale of current models of interpersonal interaction (Auerbach et al 1994).

The second facet to be considered is termed *direction of influence*. This facet is also proposed to be an axial facet, and may be considered to relate to the *rigid-flexible* facet of Wilson et al's (1995) analysis. In their analysis rigid actions were proposed to be those indicating a single mindedness about achieving goals. They were considered to generally relate to the internal processes of an event. These were contrasted with flexible actions, indicating greater willingness to adapt to matters as they arise. They were seen to relate more to efforts to influence external parties. Wilson et al's (1995) flexible element can be seen to overlap in meaning with the Persuasive/Adaptive element of the *expression* facet discussed above. The structure derived from the current analysis represents both an enrichment and clarification of these facets.

In the current analysis the *direction of influence* facet is conceptualised as being constituted of *external* and *internal* elements. Externally oriented actions are proposed to be those which seek to influence outside parties in some way through engaging in interaction. Such parties may include the target and others during the hostage taking itself (e.g. bodyguards, drivers, friends or passers-by) as well as the authorities during the course of the hostage holding phase of the event. These actions represent attempts to exert control over the wider course of the event, or influence the direction in which the event appears to be going.




Figure 19 - Interaction of the axial facets

In contrast, the internally oriented actions are conceived as relating to control of the internal processes of a kidnapping; predominantly the logistics of taking the hostages, the control of the hostages once they have been abducted and self-legitimising actions on the part of the terrorists (such as rationalising the abduction as being due to the espionage activities of the target). To the extent that these actions relate to event control they are relatively less interactive and appear to represent the deliberate indication of will, or exercise of dominance. This facet may be hypothesised to relate to the *control* dimension of models of interpersonal interaction (Auerbach et al, 1995).

While the *expression* facet is conceived of as referring to the manner in which interactions are conducted (hostile versus reasonable) the *direction of influence* facet is proposed to indicate the way in which control, or power, is exercised in an event. Dominant behaviour may be characterised by a relative lack of external interaction, and where communications do occur they are demanding. Less dominant behaviour may be characterised by a willingness to engage external parties, to negotiate a solution rather than demand one.

Actual submission on the part of the terrorists is proposed to be very uncommon in kidnapping. Kidnap implies coercive bargaining and a professional terrorist group engaging in such an act is unlikely to be actively submissive. Although no event closure details were included in the present analysis, submission may be implied by ending an event, releasing the hostage(s) with no gain. Terrorist surrender to the authorities was observed to occur in only 1% of the events. As the expression facet may be considered to represent a skewed interpersonal affiliation dimension, so the direction of influence facet may be thought of as a skewed interpersonal control dimension.

A third axial facet has also been identified, operating orthogonally to the first two, composing a third dimension to the model being outlined. Like the previous facets, this is also partitioned dichotomously on the SSA plot, but is hypothesised to represent a continuum of behaviour between poles. This facet has been labelled the *goal focus* facet and refers to the operational emphasis of the actions.

The *goal focus* facet is proposed to be composed of *strategic* and *tactical* elements, though once again these broad classifications are really hypothesised to represent the opposite poles of a continuous variation. The *strategic* element covers items with wider and longer duration impact on the process of an event. Such actions are termed strategic as they relate to broad control and image management issues. *Tactical* actions, in contrast, are more immediate in impact. This element includes actions with immediate impact, aimed at the achievement of short term goals and more immediate event control management. This distinction will be clear from an incident management perspective; strategic, tactical and operational decision making representing different levels of systematic control over a situation.

In the course of serious incidents, organisations such as the emergency services, the armed forces and industrial emergency response systems, initiate a complex hierarchical control system. At the top of this system is a strategic management level with control of, and responsibility for, global incident management. At this level strategic decisions are made regarding event management techniques and wider policy implications of actions taken. Below this lies operational command, concerned with the implementation of specific plans. At this level decision making is oriented toward the selection and implementation plans of action to tackle specific issues. Tactical command forms the last, basic, level. This is the level at which actions are carried out to deal with problems, in executing plans (see Flin 1996 or Klein 1993, for fuller details).

A terrorist group, in attempting to maintain control over the process of a kidnap, may be thought of as having (or attempting to keep) responsibility for the management of a potentially very

complex event. While the negotiating authority will be large and have many levels of hierarchical control, the terrorist group (and particularly those organised into independent operational cells) must carry out all of these control functions itself. A group must not only ensure that plans are carried out (tactical mode), but in adapting to other parties influence throughout interactions, it must ensure that general goals and aims are still being accounted for (strategic mode). As a terrorist group must carry out all of these functions, so it would be expected to see actions reflecting different levels of operational focus during an event.

The relationship of this facet to the others, acting orthogonally, is as would be expected given that the first two are hypothesised to represent a model of interaction. While strategic and tactical levels of focus represent different types of behavioural orientation, the overall goals and aims will be achieved through the same processes, or styles, of interaction. A group characterised by dominant yet flexible behaviour would be expected to behave that way whether acting on long or short term goals.

7.5 - Summarising the patterns of behaviour in terrorist kidnap

The analysis outlined in this chapter indicates that systematic patterns can be seen in the behaviour of terrorist groups carrying out kidnappings. Behavioural variation can be seen in three underlying dimensions; 'expression', 'direction of influence' and 'goal focus'. The first two dimensions relate to interpersonal interaction. The 'expression' dimension relates to variation in the friendliness or hostility shown in the nature of interactions, while the 'direction of influence' relates to issues of control. The 'direction of influence' is skewed in favour of dominance, suggesting flexibility in some cases, though no kidnappers appeared to act submissively. The 'goal focus' facet is proposed to be a feature of group level activity, being suggestive of event management issues not necessary for individuals acting alone. Evidence for the reliability of this empirical model has been shown, the conceptual structure being found to be robust through replication of the analysis using some altered items. This indicates that the conceptual dimensions being discussed did not arise simply as an artefact of the variables used in the initial analysis.

This model supports anecdotal and experience-based understanding that different kidnappers act in varying, but characteristic, ways - with some differences, however. The model is interesting in what it shows about terrorist kidnap. The range of kidnapping behaviour shown is smaller than others have suggested. Post (1987) suggests that many terrorists are not psychologically mature or stable, while McLean (1986) suggests that hostage takers vary from the mentally unstable to the politically aware professional. The current analysis suggests that terrorist kidnappings are generally carried out by quite capable, and rational, groups. Although there is variation in the range of actions used to attain goals, none suggest a lack of ability or

coherence to their actions. Analyses of hijack and barricade-siege carried out by Wilson et al (1995) indicate regions of behaviour suggestive of disorganisation or lack of preparation, but no such region is found in the actions of kidnappers.

In addition to the focus on rational, planned operations, no simple *types* of kidnapper have been identified. Many typologies identify specific types of terrorist - for example McLean (1986) talks of mentally unstable, trapped criminal, prisoner in revolt and political terrorists as discrete types of hostage taker. However, despite including a number of events that may not have been carried out by terrorists, the current analysis did not identify them as being in any way distinct in behavioural terms. If different types of hostage taker behaved differently then empirical distinctions would have been identified. While greater consideration of non-terrorist kidnaps may show differences in behaviour as a result of specific circumstances, the current work shows no evidence for distinct types of terrorist kidnapper.

What the current analysis does show is that kidnaps are complex events influenced by patterns of interpersonal interaction. The model developed shows terrorist kidnapping to be managed at various levels, with actions operating at strategic and tactical levels. A strong psychological understanding appears to have been established in the identification of dimensions analogous to the 'wheel models' of interpersonal interaction (Auerbach et al 1994), despite the fact that group rather than individual actions are being considered. These factors combined suggest that no special theories are required to account for behaviour in terrorist kidnap.

While it is possible to consider kidnap in numerical terms through the quantitative values of demands, offers, counter-demands, and so on, using an economic bargaining framework, it is almost impossible to account for qualitative behavioural variation with this method. The current research suggests that the process of kidnap and negotiation is influenced by far wider issues than mere economic profit, that a more psychologically meaningful and contextually grounded understanding of such events is required, and attainable.

Discussing formal negotiation in an occupational context, Hosking and Morley (1991) conclude that economic models are not useful for practical purposes during the course of such negotiations. They suggest that viewing communication as a series of strategic moves, rather than as exchanges of meaningful information, strips the interactions of their most significant qualities. The same may be hypothesised as being true of terrorist kidnap. While kidnap can be modelled economically, doing so ignores the meaningful, and context based, content of the inter-group interactions being engaged in.

Behavioural variation will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters. Chapter Eight examines the nature of the hostage targeting in detail, considering not only the types of location and approach used but also the nature of the hostages targeted - their role and nationality. Chapter Nine looks at variations in the use of resources in kidnapping. Control of the hostages in the initiation, and the relationship of this to subsequent hostage treatment is considered in Chapter Ten. Finally, Chapter Eleven looks at patterns of variation in the nature of the demands made, and the types of negotiation observed.

Chapter 8 - Variation in kidnapping: Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis

The work discussed in Chapter Seven has enabled the development of an understanding of the processes underlying terrorist behaviour in kidnap. It indicates that kidnapping can be thought of as a form of group-level interpersonal interaction, albeit with a skew towards more dominant and hostile modes. Although psychological models of interpersonal interaction are typically oriented toward dyadic interactions, the current analysis has identified a similar structure with respect to inter-group interaction. This analysis therefore supports the argument that terrorist kidnapping can be understood with normal psychological processes, no special mechanisms are required to explain this type of activity.

Further, this understanding supports the literature on terrorism which suggests that terrorists are not qualitatively different from other people. The identification of otherwise normal patterns of interaction seem to indicate that terrorists are best considered as having extreme beliefs, which have developed, and are maintained, through ordinary group processes. The work discussed in Chapter Seven supports the theory that normal group processes occur during terrorist kidnapping by indicating the importance of interpersonal interaction as a fundamental basis for stable behavioural variations in kidnapping behaviour.

The analyses discussed in this and the following three chapters address variations within a number of specific factors in more detail. A number of aspects of terrorist kidnapping activity have been identified from previous literature, content analysis of events and the analysis discussed in the previous chapter. These, covering hostage targeting and taking, the resources used, hostage treatment, the demands made and the negotiations following, are considered to be

significant features of events. Establishing the patterns of behavioural variation within these particular aspects of kidnapping may have an important role to play in understanding the overall kidnap process. While the previous analyses indicated that there *are* meaningful variations in the commission of kidnap, the next set of analyses aim to address these variations more closely.

8.1 - Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis

Having identified several conceptual features upon which terrorist kidnappings may vary, the variables considered best representative were selected from the coding frame. These variables were then included in analysis to study the range of styles observed in kidnap commission. The analytical procedure used to do this is called Multiple Scalogram Analysis (MSA). While SSA1 looks at the associations between the variables in a data matrix, MSA compares *profiles* of variables between cases. A small number of variables, typically between five and ten, are selected and the profiles created by the scores coded on each case are compared. The more similar two profiles are, the more similar the cases are in terms of the behaviours exhibited and the closer together they are plotted in geometric space.

Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis is used to examine the similarities and differences between cases across a set of variables (Wilson, 1995). In the current analyses, the cases are made up of kidnap events and the variables are composed of actions, or details, observed during an event. The output created by MSA is similar to that of SSA, in that a geometric space is generated. However, the points in MSA represent the cases (events) included in the analysis rather than the variables. The variables selected for use in an MSA are used to create a *profile* for each case (in this analysis a kidnap event). The profile of any single case is composed of the

relevant values, or classifications, of each variable included. Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis represents these in the solution space such that the closer two profiles correspond to each other, the closer they are plotted within the space.

As a simple example, consider the following hypothetical data matrix, composed of four cases, each with three variables representing different observed actions. The variables are coded either 1 (the action is present) or 2 (the action is absent):

Case 1	1 1 1
Case 2	1 1 2
Case 3	2 2 1
Case 4	2 2 2

It can be seen that cases one and two are more similar to each other than they are to cases three and four. Likewise, cases three and four are more similar to each other than they are to cases one and two. As a result, points representing cases one and two will be placed closer together in a geometric space than either of them will be to points three and four, which will likewise be located closer to each other than to points one and two (see Figure 20)




Figure 20 - Hypothetical Points in MSA Space

"MSA represents ... [all observed profiles] as points in the geometric space such that for every category comprising the ... [profile] there will be a clear partition of the space into distinct regions" (Brown 1985). That is, "MSA plots each ... [event] as a point in geometric space. It attempts to find a configuration of points so that the plot can be divided into clear regions which distinguish the ... [cases] on the basis of each of the ... [items]. In effect ... the more qualities two ... [cases] have in common, the closer together they are in the plot" (Wilson 1995).

Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis produces two types of plot, the overall plot and "item" plots. The overall plot, illustrated in the example above (see Figure 20), indicates the overall relationships between the cases included in the analysis. However, while the interrelations of the cases are illustrated, it is not possible to ascertain from this plot *how* the cases are associated. The way in which the cases are similar and different from one another cannot be distinguished from this plot. In addition to the overall plot, MSA also produces *item plots*. An item plot is generated for each variable in the profile. These plots indicate the regions corresponding to the categories (values) of each variable. By comparing the item plots with the overall plot it is possible to see how the points on the general plot (cases) are composed of different values on each of the variables used in the analysis. The item plots indicate why the points are similar and different to one another (Wilson 1995).

Partition lines demarcating the regions of each variable can be drawn on the overall plot to give a graphical representation of both case variation and the conceptual basis for the observed patterns. From the interrelation of these regions it is possible to draw conclusions as to the

relationships between the variables themselves. “Combinations of overlapping ... [variables] can be used to interpret the overall meaning of the similarities and differences between the ... [cases]” (Wilson 1995). Returning to the previous example, the item plots generated by the analysis can be partitioned into regions defining the cases where each behaviour (variable) did or did not occur. The contributions of each of the variables differentiating the cases can thus be clearly presented. The combination of the items can be simply and clearly illustrated by overlapping the regions, as illustrated in Figure 21.




Figure 21 - Item partitioning of hypothetical MSA

8.2 - Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis in the current research

A constraint of MSA is that it can only consider 100 cases in any single analysis. As the study database consists of 206 cases, it was split into two subsets. Each case in the database was alternately allocated to one subset or the other, producing one sub-file composed of *even* numbered cases (case 2, 4, etc.) and one with *odd* numbered cases. As the sub-files therefore contained 103 cases, three cases were deleted from each. In the even sub-file these cases were those dated 12/4/74, 7/3/84 and 11/6/92. In the odd sub-file the deleted cases were dated 18/4/74, 23/2/84 and 29/5/92. The cases to be deleted from each file were selected arbitrarily,

but such that the deletions covered the full range of dates, and that the events removed from each set corresponded in terms of their year of occurrence.

This method of splitting was used deliberately to avoid any potential confounding effects of global change in the socio-political, and religious, climate. The database includes events ranging from the late 1960's, through the 1970's and 1980's to the early 1990's. Over this time period the world's political climate has constantly shifted and altered. The database was not simply halved at the mid-point, as events carried out in the earlier and later periods would be expected to differ systematically. Although this might constitute an interesting way in which to consider change over time, that was not the purpose of the current analysis. Whilst the effects of such socio-political changes over time are interesting in their own right, the focus of the current analysis is on establishing the nature of general processes and actions.

The alternate case method of splitting the data has the benefit that empirical structures derived through analysis can be tested for reliability. As each of the sub-sets are proposed to be equally representative of the full dataset, the reliability of an empirical structure can be tested by comparing the results of analysis on each sub-set. The same criteria of item inter-relation and region replication discussed in Chapter 7 (section 7.2) are used in the MSA analyses. The items need not fall into identical positions on the spatial plots, but they must fall into the same clearly partitionable regions. If the reliability of a structure cannot be shown then its validity is questionable.

The following sections, and the next three chapters, detail the results of analysis on a range of conceptual aspects. These were identified as having potential significance in understanding the nature and variation of events in more detail. The aspects being dealt with represent the key features of a kidnapping, clearer understanding of the patterns of variation within each of these factors may enable a clearer picture of this complex interaction to emerge.

The conceptual aspects identified relate to the components of the coding frame and are considered systematically, from the beginning through to the end of an event. The first analyses, discussed in this chapter, address the taking of the hostages themselves; considering where and how hostages may be taken and who hostages are likely to be. Chapter Nine addresses what resources are used by the terrorists. The assertion of control over the hostages is considered in Chapter Ten while Chapter Eleven considers the nature of the demands made and the patterns of negotiation arising.

8.3 - Place: Kidnap location and approach type

Planning a successful hostage taking in order to kidnap a target will require, as a minimum, details of the target's location and a method for capture. It is expected that considerable thought will go into this aspect of event planning. The nature of the hostage(s) and their typical routine will be expected to influence the locations at which they can be taken. However this still gives terrorists a relatively large margin to identify what they consider to be a best place, and the method best suited to taking the hostage(s). As a consequence of this potential for variation, it is possible that knowledge of kidnap location and method may indicate something particular about the group(s) carrying out a hostage taking. However, before the relationship between this and

other event details can be explored it is necessary to identify what types of location and approach are used, and if there are any systematic links between these.

The locations from which hostage(s) may be taken were identified in the initial content analysis of the events. These were "*residence*", "*workplace*", "*leisure location*" or while "*travelling*". Residence refers to the normal home of the hostage. Workplace refers to the normal workplace of the hostage, and may be a building such as an office or embassy, an industrial complex or may be an outdoor location such as a construction site. Leisure location refers to a range of possible locations, such as restaurants and sports facilities (these were combined due to the low frequency of any single specific location). Travelling indicates that the hostage(s) were taken while they were moving between locations. This was typically by car, though in a few rare cases while on foot.

The manner in which the kidnap was executed was considered in the broadest possible terms. Three general strategies were identified through content analysis; *deception approach*, *direct approach* or *assault/attack*. The term "deception approach" refers to events in which the terrorists use some form of deceit or disguise in order to reach their target without arousing undue suspicion. For example, on 31st July, 1975, Charles Lockwood was kidnapped at a railway crossing outside Buenos Aires, Argentina, by a group of kidnappers dressed as railway workers. Other such approaches, as discussed in Chapter Five, have included the use of "props" such as ambulances and disguises such as paramedics' clothes or police uniforms.

The “direct approach” is the most common form of approach found, in which the kidnappers openly approach and take their target as swiftly as possible, with little or no attempt at stealth. An example of this type of approach may be illustrated by the May 16th, 1989, kidnapping of a number of West German humanitarian aid workers in Lebanon. A number of vehicles were used to block the car they were in, where-upon they were dragged out and forced into the boot of one of the kidnappers’ vehicles. Given the frequency of this approach (occurring in at least 64.1% of the events considered) this may be thought of as the most frequent method of hostage approach.

The final type of approach to be considered was the “assault”. This refers to kidnapping following a large scale attack on the targets’ location. An example of such an approach is the October 22nd, 1986, kidnapping of three engineers and a soldier in the Philippines. A force of fifty guerrillas conducted a raid on the road construction site at which the victims were employed, disarming the security guards and abducting the hostages.

It can be hypothesised that deception and assault represent opposite ends of a continuum of hostage approach methods. Deception approaches require the most information and subtlety to execute. Direct approaches require less detailed planning and information but still require some degree of finesse to execute successfully. Attack or assault methods require much less sophistication, simply involving enough manpower and weapons to carry out the attack.

Multidimensional Scalogram Analyses were run on both the even and odd subsets of the data in order to address the observed patterns of kidnap location and the nature of the approach used by the terrorist groups. It was hypothesised that large scale attacks or assaults would only be made

on relatively large locations such as office buildings, sports/leisure complexes and industrial or construction sites. As a result most assaults would be expected to occur at hostages' *workplace* or *leisure location*. Assaults on smaller locations such as *residences* would not be expected as this would represent a considerable over-use of resources. Assault on *travelling* hostages would also not be expected for over-resource reasons, and the additional difficulty of timing likely to be involved in co-ordinating large numbers of people and a moving target.

No rationale was readily identified to link deception and direct approaches to particular places, they might be expected to be made at any type of location. The only real criteria affecting the location of deception or direct attacks might be the routine of the hostages' themselves. The use of a deception approach might be expected to be influenced more by the security surrounding individual targets than the nature of their location. While this is an interesting hypothesis it cannot be explored in the current analysis. The results of the analysis can be seen in Figure 22.

Each point represents one or more kidnapping events, the number indicating how many.




Figure 22 - MSA of kidnap location and approach

The following discussion is based upon the “even” dataset MSA. The “odd” dataset MSA showed the same pattern of location-approach interrelations across the cases (and can be seen in Appendix D). The correspondence between the results of analysis on the two data sub-sets constitutes evidence in support of the reliability of the conceptual model being discussed. The individual item partitions are illustrated in Figure 23, showing how the cases are distinguished by the actions occurring. In each plot the points marked with a ‘1’ are characterised by that action (or characteristic) while ‘2’ indicates an absence.

Item Plots for MSA of Place: Location and Approach




Figure 23 - Partitioning of location and approach items

Of the one hundred cases included in the analysis, three were removed as representing anomalous cases. These cases involved the simultaneous taking of multiple targets from different locations. One case is characterised by hostages being taken from both residence and workplaces, while two by hostages being taken both while travelling and at leisure locations. The analysis described thus contains 97 of the 100 items. In all three incidents the hostages were taken by direct approach, the removal of these cases simply clarifies the analytical structure and in no way alters the conclusions being drawn from it. A simplified schematic of the empirical structure can be seen in Figure 24, and is described below. This structure is also supported by the “replication” MSA using the alternative data set (Appendix D).

Schematic Model of Place; Location and Approach




Figure 24 - Schematic diagram of target location and approach

The schematic diagram was derived through careful consideration of the overlaps shown in the item plots, i.e. the interrelations of the variables. Firstly it can be seen that the points representing the different locations never overlapped, though this is unsurprising given that they

are mutually exclusive - if a hostage is taken in one location he or she cannot be taken from another as well. Following this basic distinction, shaded regions (representing deception and assault approaches), were indicated on the locations affected by these methods of approach. The result is the diagram shown in Figure 24. As the analysis only included deception and assault approaches, the remainder of incidents include both direct and unknown approaches. Although this represents a potential weakness in the analysis, by far the majority of the unknown approaches are expected to be direct approaches. Deception and assault approaches are both relatively uncommon, and are thus considered to be more likely to be reported when they do occur. While it is an assumption that cases with no comment on the approach style were therefore most likely to be direct, it is considered to be a fair supposition for the purpose of the current analysis.

It was apparent that in all the events in the current database, spanning some twenty-five years, targets taken from a leisure location were never subject to deception or assault approaches. This was not as hypothesised, some assault approaches being expected. However, this is an uncommon location for targets to be taken from (occurring in only 6 of the 97 cases), it is possible that other strategies might be observed if more events occurred at this type of location.

This finding may, however, represent a systematic difference between leisure and the other location types. Unless it is a location used very regularly by the target, leisure locations may be difficult to make detailed plans for, making deception approaches less common. Further, the nature of such locations makes it likely that there will be greater numbers of people present, reducing the terrorists control of the situation and increasing the potential risks associated with

kidnapping. Although this may not deter assault attacks in itself, the type of people present are not normally likely to represent particularly good hostage types (further analysis on the nature of the hostages, discussed in the next section (section 8.4), supports this hypothesis).

Hostages taken from their workplace may be taken using any of the three approaches, though deception is the least probable strategy. Large scale assault approaches are conducted almost exclusively at work locations, typically targeting engineering or industrial settings. In two cases of assault, however, the location is unspecified. Hostages appear to be taken from their workplace through assault and smaller scale direct (and unknown) approaches with almost equal frequency. Hostages taken either from their residence or while travelling (the single most frequent location) are generally taken through a direct (or unknown) approach. In a small proportion of cases they may be taken through a deceptive strategy, but in no case were these locations the target of a large scale assault.

The frequency of the various approach types suggest that a common mode of operation is clear, with less common methods offering the potential of distinguishing groups in a meaningful manner. By far the most conventional method appears to be the use of a direct approach. It may be hypothesised that this represents the simplest and most cost-effective (in terms of risk and time) method of taking a hostage. However, in a considerably smaller proportion of cases, the two alternative and distinct methods of hostage taking may be observed.

Hostages may be taken through direct assault of their workplace, these events are normally carried out by large numbers of terrorists and represent the "large scale" events. These appear to

represent a distinct type of hostage taking, in which hostages are taken with a large display of power and aggression. In contrast to assault, deception approaches may be carried out on nearly any location. Contrary to hypothesis, this style of approach appeared to be equally likely when taking hostages who were travelling, at their residence or workplace.

The fact that deception approaches occur at nearly any location suggests that this approach offers information about the terrorists themselves. The fact that they are prepared (or even able) to plan and resource such intricate operations may distinguish them from other groups in terms of professionalism. Groups using deception approaches would be expected to correspond to groups with increased use of information observed in the resource model (see Chapter Nine), as a considerable amount of effort is required to plan an event to the required level of detail. Not only must the hostage's location at the time of kidnapping be ascertained with greater certainty, but the terrorists must account for their own presence at that location and get suitable clothing and equipment to make the cover fit. For this reason, the observation of deception approaches may be indicative of particularly professional and well organised groups.

The hypothesis that approach types may be ordered from deception, through direct, to assault approaches is tentatively supported in this analysis. This relationship between the approach types is observed in the area relating to workplace locations. However, given the low frequency of assault occurrence it is not possible to tell whether this pattern would hold for other locations. There is no reason to suspect that it would not, however. Whatever the conceptual relationships between these approaches, it is clear that they represent distinct types, and that the deception

and assault approaches are likely to offer particular insights into the character of the groups using them.

8.4 - Hostage targeting strategy

The previous analysis indicated the type of locations from which hostages were likely to be taken, and the typical strategies used in execution of such an act. The current analyses consider *who* the hostages are likely to be. Certain types of people (particularly the rich and politically powerful) might be expected to present the most common targets. The current analysis explores this aspect of target selection in more detail, considering who the hostages of transnational terrorist kidnappings are most likely to be.

Considering terrorist activity to be subject to relatively limited variation, Kelly and Reiber (1995) consider that terrorists world-wide have tended to stay within fairly narrow operational frameworks, relying on proven tactics. One of the examples they cite is the kidnapping of “elitists” - principally industrial but also governmental. Although they are generalising, this does suggest that hostages are largely representative of groups holding political or economic power. Intuitively this seems common sense, but there appears to be no empirical evidence to support or disprove this hypothesis.

Two alternative hypotheses may be suggested for the nature of the hostages taken, though they are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Firstly, hostages may be targeted for their specific meaning to the terrorists. Alternatively, they may be taken for their value to the party they are trying to influence. If hostages are taken for their symbolic meaning to the terrorists then they

might be expected to be a diverse group - different types of hostage being taken depending upon the precise nature of the terrorists grievances or issues. The range of hostage types would be as great as the number of terrorist groups taking them. However, if the hostages are generally targeted for their value to the party the terrorists are trying to coerce then a less diverse hostage profile of "high value" individuals might be expected. The higher the value of the hostage to the third party involved the greater the coercive influence on negotiations might be expected to be.

Two MSAs have been carried out in attempting to understand the nature of hostages in more detail. The first looks at hostage *role* or *occupation*, while the second considers the hostages' *nationality*. Typical types of hostage role, or occupation, were identified from content analysis.

Six general categories were established;

- 1 - diplomatic, government, services (military/security)
- 2 - business, professional, legal, technical
- 3 - academic
- 4 - aid, relief, missionaries
- 5 - tourist
- 6 - family or associates

Diplomats, government officials and service personnel are conceptualised as being representative of a particular government or ruling establishment. Business and professional occupations are proposed to link individuals to corporate or economic power groups. Academics may be seen as representative of certain views or perspectives, some becoming associated with political parties or influence groups. Along with relief workers and tourists, academics may also constitute easy (or "soft") targets. Family and associates are hypothesised to be linked by association to government or corporate power groups, and may also represent soft targets enabling emotional pressure to be applied to otherwise "hard" (difficult to reach) targets.




Figure 25 - MSA of hostage role

Item Plots for MSA of Hostage Role




Figure 26 - Item partitions for the hostage role MSA

The simplified schematic model shown in Figure 27 indicates some interesting aspects of hostage occupation. The patterns of association and frequency of occurrence suggest a two tier classification of target occupation: Governmental and business occupations may be considered to represent *principal* (high frequency) targets whereas the others represent a smaller proportion of *lesser* (low frequency) targets. The governmental and business regions of the plot are shown in bold to highlight the distinction between the high and low frequency hostage types.

Schematic Model of Hostage Role




Figure 27 - Schematic model of the hostage roles

Sixty nine of the 100 cases involved the taking of governmental (30), business (35) or both (4) types of hostages. In contrast, relief workers were only taken in 12 cases, family/associates in 5 cases and tourists in 4 cases. Hostages of high value to governing or large corporate bodies were therefore taken in more than two thirds of the cases, less influential hostages being taken in less

than one third of incidents. As the schematic diagram illustrates, the number of cases in which both “principal” *and* “lesser” hostages are taken were very few. Where this does happen the “lesser” hostages are typically taken in addition to the “principal” hostages at the time of the hostage taking, but do not appear to be specifically targeted themselves.

It may be hypothesised from these results that both hostage occupation hypotheses are supported. It appears to be most common for principal, high value targets, to be taken, supporting the proposal that hostages have value to the negotiating party or parties. However, the range of less politically or economically influential hostages also targeted specifically suggests that in some cases the targets are significant to the terrorists in their own right. Thus the role of the hostage may yield useful information as to the nature and intent of the terrorists. Relief and aid workers in particular are never taken in combination with any other type of hostage. The fact that they are marked exclusively suggests that they may have particular significance to their kidnappers. As a consequence, the taking of this type of hostage would be expected to indicate something about the nature of the kidnappers themselves.

Further, even if the hostages are classed as high value targets, it may still be possible to discern a specific rationale underlying the hostage choice. Although general hostage value may appear to have greater significance in these cases, variation in the nature of that value is observable. Governmental hostages may be hypothesised to have relatively significant political value. In contrast, business hostages principal value may be thought of as being economic. This distinction may not be clear cut, as in cases where respected businessmen hold political office, but the general principal that hostages have meaning is still supported.

8.4.b - Hostage nationality

Figure 28 shows the MSA plot of nationality, using the categories described earlier. This analysis used the “even” dataset, though the results of analysis using the “odd” dataset show the same empirical structure. As before, ‘1’ indicates the presence of a feature and ‘2’ indicates its absence. The points in the plot represent unique profiles of nationality types (and combinations), the numbers indicate how many incidents are represented. Figure 29 shows the individual item partitions for hostages from each of the geo-political regions identified. As with role, two alternative hypotheses could be suggested: First, that hostages are selected for very specific symbolic meaning, giving a diverse range of hostage nationalities, depending upon the nature of the motives underlying the terrorist group’s actions. Secondly, hostages may be taken purely for their value to the negotiating authorities. As such a smaller range of “high value” (in this case assumed to generally be U.S. and European) hostages would be expected to be targeted.




Figure 28 - MSA of hostage nationality

Three cases were dropped from the analysis; two cases involved hostages of multiple nationalities and the third contained no data for the hostage nationality. Removal of these cases enables the clarification of the conceptual structure, and in no way alters the conclusions drawn from it. As with hostage role, a two tier classification can be hypothesised (see schematic diagram illustrated in figure 30).

Plots for MSA of Hostage Nationality




Figure 29- Item plots for the MSA of hostage nationality

U.S. and European hostages were taken exclusively in almost two-thirds of the incidents (64 of 97 cases - U.S. in 28, European in 34 and both in 2 events). These nationalities may be hypothesised to be significant in their value as representatives of Western democracies. They were taken in combination with hostages of other nationalities in a further 15 events. Therefore,

kidnaps include U.S. and European hostages in 79 of 97 (81.4%) incidents. Hostages from the remainder of the geo-political regions are exclusively targeted in only 19 incidents (19.6% of the events).




Figure 30 - Schematic model of the hostage nationalities

It can be clearly seen that regardless of where the hostages were taken, certain nationalities are more vulnerable, predominantly North Americans and Europeans. There are two possible, and potentially interrelated, reasons for this. Firstly, people of these nationalities may be seen as part of the problem that the terrorists are fighting. Secondly, these hostages may be favoured for their political and/or financial weight. The same arguments about targeting (meaning and value) apply to hostage nationality equally as to hostage role, with neither hostage targeting hypothesis

being excluded by the analysis. First world nationalities, principally the U.S. and Europe, may be proposed to represent high value hostages, both economically and politically. Specifically targeted hostages with other nationalities, however, may be expected to have particular significance in the context of the terrorist group's activity.

8.4.c - Hostage nationality and occupation interaction

Having established that individuals of certain nationalities and occupations are more susceptible to kidnapping, these constructs might be hypothesised to interrelate. It might be expected that the high frequency occupations and the high frequency nationalities would correspond with each other. Table 1 shows the overlap between hostage nationality and occupation using the incidents from both the “even” and “odd” MSAs (as a small number of cases were excluded from each MSA the current analysis includes 194 cases rather than all 200).

The hypothesised relationship can be observed to hold; the “high value” classes in both occupation and nationality relate to each other. The governmental and business people most susceptible to kidnapping are from the United States or Europe. These categories appear to be the most vulnerable to hostage taking.

	US	Europe	Middle East	Central & South Am.	East/Far East	Africa	Combined
Government	18	16	4	8	4	2	4
Business	16	28	-	9	4	-	9
Academic	4	3	-	-	-	-	1
Relief	10	10	-	1	1	-	7
Tourist	-	1	-	-	1	-	2
Family	2	3	-	5	-	-	-
Combined	2	7	3	3	2	-	4

Table 1 - Table showing hostage Role and Nationality combinations (n=194)

Following U.S. and European government and business targets, two groups appear to have an intermediate level of threat. European and U.S. relief workers and Central/South American government and business people also appear to be particularly vulnerable to kidnapping. These groups both fit into the higher “value” hostage category on one of the two criteria (role or nationality), and support the hypothesis that hostages are most frequently taken for their intrinsic bargaining value.

Governmental/diplomatic and business hostages from the US or Europe account for 78 of the 194 cases, or 40.2% of the events. However, if the relief workers are also considered then 98 of the 194 events involved exclusively US or European hostages, 50.5% of the incidents. If the Central and South American government and business targets are also included then 115 of the 194 incidents (59.3%) of the cases can be conjectured to involve *only* the highest possible value targets the terrorists can select. Forty-four incidents involve a mixture of hostage types which include “high value” hostages along with “lower value” targets. This means that 159 of the 194 incidents involve “high value” and other targets - 82.0% of all the events.

Other types of hostage nationality and occupation are also observed, though these each have relatively lower frequencies of occurrence. The general distribution of low frequency nationality/occupation types suggests that these hostages may be targeted for some particular reason rather than general bargaining potential. These hostages might be hypothesised to be more significant in themselves to the terrorists’ underlying motives or causes than general “high value” targets.

The targeting of hostages with the greatest political or financial bargaining power may be the most common, and common sense, approach. This may be indicative of professional groups, attempting to put the greatest pressure on those parties engaging in negotiation with them. However, the taking of other nationality-occupation types may indicate more about the terrorists themselves. Depending upon the nature of the hostage type it may suggest lack of planning (taking easy or random targets) or very clear focus on motivations (such as targeting nationals of a particular country, or particular types of person regardless of nationality). While this can only really be ascertained within the context of the event as a whole, it may provide useful additional information on the nature of the terrorists, particularly with respect to motive and commitment.

Having established the general patterns of hostage approach and selection, the next step is to consider their targeting and taking in more detail. The next chapter (Chapter Nine) will address the nature of the resources the terrorists bring to the initiation of an event. The nature of the resources used in terms of equipment, manpower and information, may distinguish between distinct types of approach if systematic differences can be established.

Chapter 9 - Variation in resources used in an incident

This chapter will address the way in which terrorist kidnappers draw upon various resources in the commission of an event. Knowledge of the resources used in an event may suggest useful information about other characteristics of that group carrying it out. At a most simplistic, for instance, increasingly organised and professional terrorists may be associated with increasing amounts of resources as their financial and material base develops. A contrasting hypothesis, however, is that qualitatively rather than quantitatively different combinations of resources may indicate types of terrorist group. The following analyses address the patterns of resource use observed in the terrorist kidnappings in the current database.

It is suggested from the results of the previous analyses that information about details of the nature and location of the hostage taking and the hostages themselves may be useful in distinguishing terrorist groups. However, it may also be possible to gain useful information from the types of resources which are drawn upon in carrying out a kidnapping. The nature of resources used by a group might indicate the level of planning involved in an event, this being the case especially where groups carry-out a deception approach to their target. However, the resources used may also be indicative simply of what assets are available to a group. It would be expected that groups using relatively large amounts of resources in the execution of an intricate kidnap plan would be better established and more professional than groups using a bare minimum of resources. The nature of the terrorists' resources will typically become apparent during the opening stages of an event.

While it is not possible to conclude that the equipment and people observed represent all of the resources available to a group, they may be hypothesised to broadly indicate the nature and scope of resources readily accessible. A group with access to greater quantities, or better types of, resources would be expected to make use of these. As a result, the nature and scale of resources observed during an event are hypothesised to provide a clear measure of what is available to the terrorists.

Various types of resource may be hypothesised as being of relevance to terrorists planning a kidnapping. Principal amongst these are manpower, information, weapons and vehicles. A cumulative use of resources is hypothesised to occur. As stated, relatively unskilled or inexperienced groups would be expected to use the fewest resources, possibly little more than the bare minimum required (e.g. weapons and possibly vehicles). Increasingly well established and well organised groups would be expected to use greater amounts, and a wider range, of resources as they become better able to procure and use them. However, certain types of resource, such as detailed information, may only be used if more basic resources are already available.

Manpower refers to the number of people involved in a kidnapping. It may be hypothesised that longer established and better supported groups would have greater potential manpower to draw upon in the execution of an event. Within certain limits, increasing manpower offers increasing likelihood of safety and success for the terrorists. While one or two people could possibly carry-out a successful kidnapping, increasing the number (up to a point) should make the job quicker, and safer, for all. The availability of more people affords greater control over potentially problematic hostages.

Chapter Five indicates that most kidnappings involve three to five terrorists, but that only 11.7% involved nine or more.

While having manpower is an essential basis for carrying out a kidnapping, *information* is also required. The precise amount and nature of the information available to terrorists cannot be easily ascertained. However, the general nature of the information made use of is open to interpretation from the manner in which the event is carried out. Principally, the way in which hostages are taken is proposed to be strongly indicative of the way in which pre-event intelligence is used.

It may be hypothesised that the minimum information required for the kidnapping of a specific target will cover the daily routine of that person, so that preparations can be made to abduct them at all. In some cases, however, evidence of considerably more information gathering is observable through the sophistication of the abduction strategy. Well orchestrated and smoothly executed kidnaps are likely to have been well researched and planned before being carried out. Further, a deceptive approach requires considerable planning in order for it to work, especially if security measures have to be breached in order to get close to the target.

Other types of resource are more easily observable in the course of an event. The availability of *weapons* is normally clear, as is their nature (whether knives, small arms, rifles etc.). In addition to this, the use of *vehicles*, and the type used, is normally observable during the initiation of an event. The use of certain types of equipment and vehicle may also be indicative of more carefully planned events, tying in with details of

the terrorist use of information (For example, in one case an ambulance and medical staff uniforms were used to approach the target without provoking suspicion).

While Chapter Five outlined the basic frequencies of these variables, the aim of the current analysis is to address their interaction in use. Variables reflecting the resources discussed above were included in the MSA. The analysis aims to identify the patterns of interrelation observed in the resources used. Most of these resource types can be addressed directly using data encoded in the coding frame, though accounting for the use of information provides more difficulty.

Variable 12 (see Appendix A), the number of terrorists involved, was used to consider manpower. The values of this variable were split into four categories - unknown numbers, 1-4 members, 5-8 members and 9 or more. Variable 41, relating to the use of guns, was used to account for weapons in the analysis (content analysis showed these frequently to be handguns rather than larger firearms, but no distinction is made in the coding). Explosives and knives were reported in only four cases in the entire database (1.9%) and were excluded from the current analysis.

Variables 45, 46 and 47 related to the terrorists' use of vehicles. Variable 45 to the use of cars, variable 46 to lorries and variable 47 to special vehicles such as ambulances or boats. As variables 46 and 47 account for only 3.4% of events, they were not considered separately and the three types of vehicle were combined to form a single "vehicle" variable.

Terrorists' use of information was more difficult to ascertain with any degree of accuracy. However, a basic measure of information was proposed to be characterised by the targeting of hostages. The random taking of non-targeted hostages requires little or no specific information. Variable 30, opportunist target selection, and variable 31, random hostage selection, were used to indicate low levels of information. For comparison, variable 34 (deception approach) was used to indicate the highest levels of planning, and therefore information gathering and use.

For the majority of the analyses discussed the entire database was used and split into two files, as described previously. However, for the purposes of the current analysis a slightly different procedure was carried out. Cases were selected for inclusion in this analysis on the basis that they involved the taking of only one or two hostages. This selection was carried out in order to avoid any bias in resource allocation resulting from the taking of larger groups of hostages. While resource use is expected to vary between groups, taking increasing numbers of hostages would be expected to necessitate more resources as a simple function of the task itself. In order to establish a baseline measure of resource variation, cases involving greater numbers of hostages were excluded from consideration at this point.

One hundred and fifty seven cases were identified in which only one or two hostages were taken. For the purposes of MSA these were split into two files, one containing seventy eight cases, the other seventy nine. The structural models generated through the MSAs carried out did concur, a similar pattern of interrelation being identified in both (the replication MSA using the "odd" dataset can be seen in Appendix D). The result of

analysis on the “even” dataset can be seen in figure 31. The points represent unique combinations of the resources included in the analysis, the numbers indicating the number of incidents each combination was observed in.

The MSA appears to indicate that each of these resource types or combination is relatively independent of the others. The individual item partitions can be seen in Figure 32. It is clear that the use of information is progressive. Events in which deception approaches were planned fall on the left side of the plot, while those in which hostages were not specifically targeted (taken randomly or through opportunity) fall on the right. As incidents in which large numbers of hostages are taken have all been excluded from this analysis, random hostage taking represents little planning as far as the hostage taking is concerned. Between these extremes fall the events in which information on the hostages is sufficient to specifically target them, but not to use deception.




Figure 31 - MSA of resources




Figure 32 - Resource variable partitions

Figure 33 illustrates a schematic diagram of the interrelations between the resources. Considering the resources one by one, the use of vehicles appears to be independent of information, the plot partitioning in the vertical rather than horizontal dimension in this analysis. This means that the terrorists may or may not use vehicles regardless of the level of information they appear to have. The use of weapons also partitions independently of both information and vehicle use. The distribution of events in which guns were used indicates that for each combination of information or vehicle use, guns may also have been used or not. This suggests that the weapons (gun) facet partitions orthogonally to both of the previous facets.




Figure 33 - Schematic diagram of resource use

Manpower also appears to operate independently of the other facets. Most combinations of information, vehicle and gun use can be seen at each category of manpower. The pattern of results of this MSA does not support the hypothesis that resources are used cumulatively. Table 2 indicates the number of incidents showing each type of resource combination (using all 157 cases, from both the “even” and “odd” datasets). Figures in bold indicate the most frequent resource combinations.

man-power	vehicles used						no vehicles					
	deception		simple target		random		deception		simple target		random	
	guns	none	guns	none	guns	none	guns	none	guns	none	guns	none
1-4	2	3	19	4	0	0	0	1	11	6	2	0
5-8	4	0	14	1	0	0	1	0	5	4	1	0
9+	2	0	4	1	0	0	1	2	1	0	1	1
N/K	2	0	12	3	1	0	1	2	17	25	2	0

Table 2 - Number of incidents resource combinations shown in

The most frequent combinations of resources include:

- guns, vehicles and information sufficient to target specific hostages at all levels of manpower;
- guns and sufficient information to target at low and unknown levels of manpower (no vehicles); and
- sufficient information to target hostages (no vehicles or guns) with unknown manpower.

It can therefore be seen that the most frequent combinations cover a range of resource levels, from minimal to greater amounts. In addition to these specific combinations, most alternative resource combinations can be seen to occur in a few cases. Considering the distribution of resources generally, the most frequent types include moderate levels of information, weapons, vehicles and where known, under 9 terrorists.

It might be concluded from this analysis that the resources used indicate the level of assets available to the terrorists concerned. The MSA analysis indicates that almost every possible combination of resources is observed in at least one event, and frequently more. This counters the suggestion that resources are cumulative, that some resources are dependent upon other types being available first. The analysis strongly suggests that the types of resources considered (manpower, guns, vehicles and information) are used independently of each other. That is, each resource is used as it is available or required, rather than them being dependent upon each other.

It cannot be ascertained from the current data whether the resources used accurately reflect either the kidnappers choice or their circumstances. That is, in an incident in which few resources are used it is not possible to know whether that is all that is

available to the kidnapers, or all they chose to use. Incidents in which the non-availability of a resource is indicated also include those cases in which it was not known whether they were available or not. If there is any error it serves to reduce the apparent level of available resources; terrorists may be better equipped than they appear. More information would be required to examine this, and the reasons behind the selection of specific resources, in greater detail.

Chapter 10 - Variation in hostage treatment

Chapters Eight and Nine illustrated the patterns observed in two fundamental aspects of kidnappings; the characteristics of the hostages and the resources used in an event. This chapter will discuss further MSA analysis looking at patterns of variation in the actions of terrorist groups once the hostages have been targeted and taken. The first analysis looks at the actions and approaches taken in capturing the hostages. The capture, and subdual, of hostages is evidently critical to the success of a kidnapping and various methods of control are apparent from the discussion of the action frequencies in Chapter Six. The current chapter will examine the patterns of controlling actions observed, and link this to later hostage treatment.

10.1 - Initiation control

One of the most significant tasks that the terrorists must achieve in the course of kidnapping is establishing control over the potential hostages. If control cannot be established quite rapidly the kidnapping is likely to fail. While guns are a fundamental tool for the coercion and rapid subdual of the victims (other weapon types were found to occur in only 1.9% of the incidents), simply having them is not necessarily guaranteed to ensure success. The previous analysis, looking at the use of resources, suggested that some groups carryout kidnappings without the use of guns. Similarly, content analysis of the events indicated cases in which armed terrorists did not succeed in capturing their targets (though these events are not included in the current database). The current analyses address the ways in which groups manage hostage control in the course of an event.

Taking the perspective that activity is the result of context dependent, feedback guided, decision making (Klein 1993), control may be identified as an important aspect of event consideration. Such actions may be considered particularly significant as they represent the terrorist's attempts to reach a state where the impact of other parties are minimised or eradicated. In this case it is the terrorists' actions in asserting control over their hostages which is of interest.

Four methods that terrorists may use in attempting to assert control over their potential hostages were identified from content analysis of the cases. These ranged in severity of force from minimal through to potentially fatal and, in order of increasing force are:

1. verbal commands/threats
2. firing warning shots
3. physical violence
4. shooting at

Verbal commands and threats refer to situations in which the hostages were simply instructed what to do, with no further action necessary. The *firing of warning shots* referred to cases in which weapons were fired in order to establish the hostage takers intent, or to intimidate the potential hostages, but it was clear that no immediate harm was intended to anyone present. Although the threat of violence is implicit, no physical harm is actually caused.

Physical contact refers to a range of actions in which the hostage takers physically interact with their hostages. These actions cover hitting, pushing or tying the hostages. Unlike the previous actions, relying upon the threat of violence, these actions represent direct physical coercion. The final control technique involves *firing weapons at the*

potential hostages. This is considered to be an extreme act; given the potential for fatality this action is viewed as excessive and may be indicative of desperation or loss of control.

It could be hypothesised that these actions form a cumulative scale, representing a progression from little to fatal force. It may be expected that warning shots would only be fired if verbal commands had not been complied with. Pushing and hitting would only occur after warning shots were ignored (where guns were used) and shooting at targets would only be expected to occur if physical contact was resisted. Each type of control method represents an escalation of force over the previous one. Alternatively, different terrorist groups may favour different control techniques. If this is the case then one might expect little or no overlap between the control strategies.

In addition to these actions, the way in which they are used was also considered. The item "*violence only in response to other's actions*" was also included in the analysis. This item allows discrimination between actions carried out spontaneously on the part of the terrorists, and actions carried out in response to the situational demands, i.e. provoked responses. This action makes the distinction between gaining control and maintaining it.

As in the previous analyses, MSAs were carried out on both "even" and "odd" subsets of the data. Almost identical conceptual structures were identified in each MSA analysis, suggesting the reliability and robustness of the structural model derived. Figure 34 illustrates the results of the MSA on the even dataset (that from the odd data can be

seen in Appendix D). Figure 35 shows the individual item plots for the analysis. The schematic diagram in Figure 36 shows the relationship of the controlling actions more clearly.




Figure 34 - MSA of Initiation control




Figure 35 - Item plots of initiation control MSA




Figure 36 - Schematic diagram of initiation control MSA

It is clear from the item plots and the schematic diagram that a wide range of control techniques are observed. Unfortunately there was a high proportion of missing data for this aspect of kidnapping. This is a problem associated with the nature of the data and will be discussed in more detail in the final chapter of this thesis. Of the 100 cases included in the analysis, no details were available in 54. Thus the model being described represents only 46% of the cases. Conclusions drawn must therefore be treated with caution, but the general pattern of results is supported by the replication MSA on the other half of the data.

Three distinct levels of force can be hypothesised from this distribution - low, medium and high. Verbal control is conceptualised as low force, warning shots and physical

contact as moderate force and shooting at represents high use of force. No evidence for cumulative use of the control techniques was observed, the techniques seem largely to be independent of one another. However, there are two instances where more than one control type may be used: in four incidents warning shots were fired and hostages were hit and in two cases hostages were both hit and fired at. It is suggested that these represent cases where one technique failed and the next most forceful was used to gain control.

It is clear that spontaneous physical contact - pushing and hitting the hostages - is the most frequent form of control used in initiation. This is possibly not surprising given the high frequency of kidnapping involving an open approach on targets in moving vehicles. Having stopped the vehicle some resistance from the occupants is likely, increasing the need to manhandle the potential target. Add to this the need to be quick, and the stress and excitement of the operation, and it is clear that physical aggression is quite likely as an immediate response to the situation.

Verbal commands and firing at targets appear to fall at opposite ends of a scale of hostage taking aggression. Falling between these, physical contact and firing warning shots appear to represent a mid-range level of coercion - in some cases both tactics are used during an incident. Physical violence and warning shots appear to represent the "typical" requirement for control (based upon increased frequency of occurrence). Relatively few groups use more or less force in hostage control.

Interestingly, very few groups were reported to have acted in response to their targets, and only in cases when physical contact or high force was used. This was found in only 4 incidents of the 46 (8.7%) in which data was available. Verbal warnings and warning shots (alone) were never given in response to actions from the targets. As suggested before, any lack of co-operation on the hostages part must be subdued very quickly and greater expression of force is the only way of achieving this safely (for the terrorists). It might be suggested that “acting in response” is more likely to be influenced by situational characteristics than the spontaneous mode of operation. Where the terrorist’s spontaneously executed tactics are found inadequate, only then is more force required in response.

The fact that three distinct levels of controlling tactic have been identified suggest that knowledge of this might prove useful in distinguishing groups. The mid-level, physical violence and warning shots, could be hypothesised to represent the most “professional” approaches, using controlled force as necessary. The use simply of verbal commands may suggest an amateur approach, lacking the experience or commitment to take the extra step into direct coercion, or lacking weapons to back up threats. Shooting at targets, in contrast, may suggest more violently inclined terrorists, or a lack of control or discipline. Shooting at hostages may reflect a terrorist’s perception that the event is starting to get out of hand, the firing being in desperation to contain the situation as rapidly as possible.

10.2 - Relating initiation control to subsequent hostage treatment

Having established the relationship between the different modes of initiation control, it might be asked how these types relate to subsequent hostage control throughout the course of an event. On the basis of pure consistency it might be hypothesised that the way in which the hostages are first treated will reflect the way in which they are handled later on during their captivity. Thus, terrorists who use little aggression in hostage taking might be expected to show little force in the control of their hostages throughout the hostage holding phase. In reverse, terrorists willing to use force in the hostage taking might be prepared to use more aggression in control of the hostages during later confinement.

A number of actions were identified in the coding frame as specifically concerning the control of hostages during the hostage holding phase of a kidnapping. In some events the hostages were *treated well*. In such cases hostages are treated with as much hospitality and courtesy as is possible given the nature of the situation. Books, games and writing materials may be provided in order that the hostage is kept occupied, or otherwise entertained, throughout the enforced captivity.

In many cases hostages were *treated strictly as prisoners*. In this case contact between the hostages and their captors is minimised. Hostages are typically confined, though may be allowed to exercise. Food is commonly provided at regular intervals but no further contact is engaged in. A psychological distance may be kept between the hostages and their captors so that personal bonds do not develop. This may be necessary

for the kidnappers if hostages are to be later injured or killed in the course of the incident.

Two categories of hostage mistreatment were identified through content analysis of the incidents used in the current work. *Deprivation* and *abuse* are hypothesised as representing qualitatively different ways in which hostages may be maltreated. *Deprivation* concerns the removal of stimuli from hostages and may be thought of as psychological mistreatment. In incidents where hostages suffer deprivation it is common to keep them blindfolded, or in darkened rooms. Additionally, hostages may not be spoken to, or ordered not to talk (while this may be adaptive rather than abusive in nature, as discussed in chapter 7, it is still considered mistreatment for the current purposes). *Abuse* represents physical mistreatment. In such cases hostages may be beaten or interrogated and tortured.

Multidimensional Scalogram Analysis could not be carried out on the hostage control actions alone for two reasons. Firstly, the actions were conceptualised as being mutually exclusive. If hostages are treated in one way they cannot be treated in any other, thus there will be no relationship between patterns of hostage control. This first limitation is linked to the second, the lack of detail available in the incident accounts. While the hostage *taking* was frequently described in reasonable detail, hostage treatment *throughout* an event was infrequently reported. Lack of reporting not only meant that significantly fewer incidents could be coded for this type of information, it also meant that the conceptual distinctions being derived from content analysis were cruder and broader.

Multidimensional Scalogram Analyses including all of the initiation and event control actions together, using both data sub-sets, were found to be unpartitionable. There appeared to be no systematic pattern to the interaction of the initiation and control actions during the kidnapping events. However, given the potential significance of establishing a link between these types of behaviour, the initiation control types identified in the previous analysis (see Figure 36) were crosstabulated with the event control actions to examine the patterns of interrelation in more detail. The results can be seen in Table 3, below.

Initiation Control Method	Holding Phase Control				
	Well	Prisoner	Deprivation	Abuse	Unknown
Spontaneous Control Methods					
Verbal	1	0	2	0	7
Warning shots	0	1	0	0	2
Warning shots and push/hit	0	2	1	0	2
Push/hit	9	8	7	1	26
Push/hit and shoot at	0	1	0	0	2
Shoot at	2	0	0	1	12
Actions in response					
Warning shots and push/hit	0	0	0	0	1
Push/hit	0	0	0	1	0
Push/hit and shoot at	0	1	0	1	1
Shoot at	1	0	0	0	2

Table 3 - Crosstabulating Initiation and Holding Phase Hostage Control Methods

The figures in this table are composed of all incidents in which the initiation control styles could be identified. This covers 46 incidents from the “even” and 47 from the “odd” datasets. It is clear from the table that many of these cases did not also include information on hostage controlling actions in the holding phase of an event. Hostage control information was available for both stages in only 40 of the 200 incidents (20%).

Although tentative conclusions may be drawn from the patterns of association in the table, the results must be treated with great caution.

Given the caveat of caution, it appears from the table that the hostage control techniques used at the different stages do not systematically link with each other. As suggested by the MSA analysis, there appears to be no clear and stable relationship between the hostage control actions at each stage. The hypothesis that hostage control methods will be consistent throughout an event, solely at the discretion and selection of the terrorists, does not appear to hold. This could reflect the fact that treatment of the hostages might vary as a response to hostage actions or the involvement of other parties during the holding phase.

It was expected, for example, that terrorists using little force (verbal commands only) in the initiation would also treat the hostages well, or at worst only as prisoners. However, in one case where only verbal commands were given during the hostage taking, the target was then subjected to deprivation once being held. Targets who were pushed or hit to ensure compliance in event initiation could later be subjected to any of the holding phase control techniques. Almost in reverse of the expected relationship, in two cases where hostages were directly shot at during the initiation (an act considered to represent the extreme use of force) they were treated well throughout their captivity. This occurred regardless of whether the shots were fired spontaneously or in response to hostages' actions.

There was also no apparent difference between events in which a single hostage control method was used and those in which two were observed (e.g. warning shots being fired, then hostages also being pushed or hit). The range of holding phase control methods were just as great whatever the circumstances of the event initiation. The results of the MSA and the distribution of the incidents in the table above suggest that incident and subsequent hostage control are independent, and may be influenced by *different factors* depending upon the stage the event is at.

Although these results do not immediately support the hypothesis of consistency, the lack of simple and stable links may be a consequence of interaction. The SSA analysis outlined in Chapter Seven indicated the central importance of interaction in kidnap, and this may account for the variation in behaviour across the timespan of a kidnapping. While much analysis has indicated the importance of behavioural consistency in many crimes, these tend to be committed by individuals operating alone, with the emphasis of the crime on the activity itself rather than on negotiations with a third party.

Burglars can operate with a consistent style as they rapidly learn what works for them in the theft of goods. Even crimes such as stranger rape and murder are characterised by a high level of consistency. In each case the focus of the criminal is on the action rather than the outcome. Terrorist kidnapping, in contrast, involves more people at all stages and is fundamentally about interaction - coercive negotiation being the basis of the crime. It might be hypothesised that the terrorists' activities at the outset of an event indicate more about them than later actions, as they are still operating according to their own plans. Subsequent actions will be increasingly influenced by the requirements of

the event (if, for example, negotiations are going well or not, if their location is found or not) and other people (the interaction of the terrorists themselves, the negotiation styles and strategies of the parties engaged with and the nature of the hostages).

Thus for instance, the use of force in initiation, followed by good treatment of the hostages later, may to a large part reflect the characteristics of the situation rather than the terrorists themselves. Initial force may have been used to ensure rapid hostage compliance, but once captured the actions of the hostage(s) may make the terrorists more amenable to positive interaction. In the reverse situation, hostages who acquiesce easily but who object to their captivity may be treated more harshly in the holding phase. No simple relationships appear to hold and general predictions are not possible without knowing more details of a case. Professional terrorist kidnap is less likely to be a crime against a specific person than many other violent crimes. As such, the use of force is not significant in itself, but should be considered with respect to the circumstances surrounding it.

Chapter 11 - Variation in the demands made and negotiations resulting

Having established the range of initiation approaches, and the complexity of the relationship between these and subsequent hostage controlling actions, the current chapter addresses the terrorists' demands and interaction with the parties being influenced. This chapter will look at the patterns of variation in the nature of the demands made, and the patterns observed in the subsequent negotiations. The making of demands represents the first stage of the negotiation process as it establishes contact and a baseline from which the negotiations can be further developed. Two alternative hypotheses might be made about the nature of the negotiations. It is possible that a small set of "standard" negotiation patterns might be observable if there are distinct interaction types observed. In contrast, it might be that no stable patterns are observable as interaction is influenced by many situational variables.

11.1 - Demands made

The exact significance of demands within the process of hostage negotiation has been a source of some controversy within academic discussion. There is some disagreement within the literature as to the functional role played by demands during the course of an event. Some commentators have suggested that the demands made reflect something of the goals and style of a group (e.g. Sandler and Scott 1987). In contrast, others have concluded that the demands in themselves are not important. Rather, the publicity gained both through media coverage and explicit communiqués is what has critical importance (e.g. Rubin and Friedland 1986).

This question was addressed by Wilson et al (1995) in analysis of aerial hijacking, in which support was shown for view that demands were meaningful in the context of an event. The range of demands made in the course of 100 terrorist hijacks appeared to have a clear empirical structure in analysis. This suggests that demands do relate to meaningful differences in terrorist group behaviour rather than simply being random. Had demands been arbitrary or meaningless then no clear pattern would be expected to emerge from analysis. If the demands are not significant of themselves, being made simply for media attention, then a random distribution would be expected across events, yielding no clear empirical structure. That a meaningful structure is apparent supports the contention that the nature of the demands made is important in the course of an event.

While a clear structure has been shown in the analysis of hijacking (Wilson et al, 1995) the current analysis is aimed at addressing this issue with respect to kidnapping. The arguments outlined above also apply to this analysis: It is hypothesised that the demands made in the course of a kidnap will offer a meaningful indication of the purpose of the terrorists in that event. Support for this hypothesis will be indicated if a clear empirical structure is derived through analysis.

A wide range of demands were used in this analysis. Terrorist request for the release of named individuals and named groups of prisoners were combined after early analysis indicated that there was little distinction between them, the important thing being that the prisoners were specifically identified. In contrast to this, general prisoner release was

also requested in some cases. In this case reference was made only to general categories of prisoner rather than specific people.

Demands for money, publicity, political change and the distribution of supplies were also included. A number of demands, such as for information from the authorities, travel or recognition for the group, were excluded from the analysis. Although they cover a wide range of issues, they have particularly low frequency of occurrence (four incidents in all 206 considered in this work - less than 2%). Although they may have significant meaning for the kidnappers making them, their low occurrence means that they will not have any measurable relationship with the other types of demand made. While they might be interesting in their own right, they cannot add to an understanding of wider patterns of demand making.

The use of demands by terrorist groups in the course of a kidnapping are, again, examined using MSA. As in previous analysis, both “even” and “odd” datasets were used to corroborate empirical structures being derived. Once again the structures yielded in each dataset did correspond. The work discussed in this chapter is from the “even” data, the results of the “odd” data analysis can be seen in Appendix D. Figure 37 shows the overall MSA, the points represent unique profiles of demand combinations, the numbers indicate the quantity of incidents in which these demands were made. Figure 38 shows the partitions of the individual demands.




Figure 37 - MSA of kidnapers' demands




Figure 38 - Item plots of the kidnapper demands MSA

Some interesting features of the interaction between the demands can be seen immediately in the item plots (Figure 38). Firstly, support for the hypothesis that the

demands made are meaningful is supported as there appears to be a clear structure to the interaction of the demands. This does not imply that the implicit publicity caused by an event is not important to terrorist groups committing kidnappings, simply that the demands are not made randomly, as has been suggested by some researchers (e.g. Rubin and Friedland 1986).

Figure 39 shows a conceptualised schematic diagram showing the interdependence of the demands. This is a complex figure and represents a four-dimensional model. The first dimension (x axis) covers forms of prisoner release, and is conceptualised as relating to strategic-tactical purpose. The second dimension (y axis) represents the internal-external orientation. The third dimension (y axis) represents the focus on publicity and the fourth dimension (represented by the oblique division of regions) represents the demand for money.

Looking at the structure of the interrelations between the demands made, it is clear that general prisoner release and named prisoner release never co-occur. That is, they are never both asked for in the course of a single incident. The same relationship can be seen between the demand for political (or social) change and the distribution of supplies to particular people or areas. The demand for money frequently overlaps with both types of prisoner release and political and social change, but never the distribution of supplies. The demand for publicity overlaps almost all of the other combinations of demand. The numbers in Figure 39 indicate the frequency of occurrence of the various demand combinations. It can be seen that while the majority of the combinations are observed,

not every possible one appears to occur. The overlap of demands with specific prisoner release in particular was quite infrequent.




Figure 39 - Schematic diagram of the of demands made

No information is available about the demands made in 33 cases. A small number of these will represent incidents in which no demands were made, though this generally arises through lack of information in the original details drawn upon in database development. Money and specific prisoner release were the most common single demands. Money alone was demanded in 23 incidents and specific prisoner release

alone was demanded in 19 cases. These two demands alone therefore account for 42% of the incidents in the analysis, and combined with the unknown demands cover 75% of them. While prisoner release (both types), socio-political change and distribution of supplies appear to have a stable interrelationship, demands for money and publicity appear to be independent of them.

In the conceptual understanding of hijack demands developed by Wilson et al (1995) the empirical structure derived was proposed to result from the interaction of two underlying dimensions; *strategic-global purpose* and *internal-external orientation*. This underlying conceptual structure can also be identified in the current analysis of kidnap. Strategic-global purpose refers to the general aim or intention of the demand. "Strategic" demands are defined as those focused on specific or concrete gains. "Global" demands, in contrast, are wider ranging and more general in nature. Internal-external orientation refers to the direction of influence, or impact, of the demands. "Internally" oriented demands are aimed at profiting the terrorists themselves, whereas "externally" oriented ones are aimed at benefiting, or effecting, external parties.

It is suggested for the current purposes, however, that the label "strategic-global" be altered to more readily fit with the wider literature on incident command (see Klein et al 1994; Flin 1996). It is proposed that the dimension be renamed *tactical-strategic*, though its meaning will remain identical. The new "tactical" aspect relates to that which was previously defined as being "strategic", while the new meaning of "strategic" replaces that which was previously termed "global". This alteration is proposed as tactics refer to actions and plans aimed at reaching specific and/or short term goals and

objectives, whereas strategy relates to longer term objectives and wider goals. These definitions appear to better fit the distinction being made in the current analysis.

Looking first at the tactical/strategic dimension, demanding the release of specific prisoners may be considered to be tactically oriented. Specific prisoners are selected on definite criteria, their release forming a distinct and short term goal. In contrast, the release of general prisoners has less immediate, but wider ranging, implications. While the terrorists themselves receive less direct gains from the granting of such demands, they may appear to have scored over the authorities. Further, and of less immediate consequence, is the fact that such released prisoners may also commit further acts of terrorism. This threat is often circumvented by governments exiling any prisoners who are released. General prisoner release is considered to represent a strategic demand as benefits are more likely to accrue in the long term.

Considering the internal/external dimension, the demand for political and social change can be hypothesised as having an internal orientation. The demand is aimed at benefiting the terrorists themselves. The changes demanded are likely to reflect the group's values and desires, and as such the terrorists themselves are likely to benefit the most from any such alterations to the social or political structure. Such changes are most likely to be aimed at increasing the dominance of the group concerned, or at least reducing the weakness imposed by their relative minority.

The demand for the distribution of supplies, in contrast, can be seen to fall at the opposite end of the conceptual scale, representing an external orientation. In this case an

identified third party, typically a working class area or a particular ethnic minority, benefits from the provision of such supplies as food, clothing and medicines. The conceptualisation of external focus is strengthened by the fact that the demand for supply distribution never coincides with demands for money. That is, the terrorists do not try to gain for themselves at the same time as demanding benefits for others.

In the hijacking demand model of Wilson et al (1995) the demand for money was found to be independent of the other demands, potentially occurring with any of the other combinations. A similar pattern can be seen in the current kidnap model, but in this case money appears to be only partially independent. While occurring in combination with demands for specific or general prisoner release, socio-political change and publicity, it never appears to overlap with demands for the distribution of supplies. Money might be hypothesised as most likely to profit the terrorists themselves, and as such it can be thought of as having a relatively “internal” role. The fact that money does not co-occur with the most externally focused demand reinforces the conceptual distinction of internally and externally focused demands in terrorist kidnap.

Although demands for the distribution of supplies and the release of general prisoners are suggested to overlap in the conceptual model, no occurrences of this combination appear to occur in any of the kidnaps in the current database. It is not clear why this is, but it might be hypothesised to reflect a relatively “tactical” (short term) use of the supply distribution demand - for popularity- rather than reflecting a genuine long term (strategic) interest in the recipients. This possible explanation cannot be examined in any more detail with the data currently available.

The demand for publicity in kidnap plays a different role to that identified by Wilson et al (1995) in the hijack demand model. In the hijack model explicit demands for publicity were identified as externally oriented acts, on the basis that terrorists were trying to use the publicity to further influence outside parties. In the kidnapping model publicity demands appear to play a different role, operating independently of all the other demands. The demand for publicity is observed with nearly every other type of demand. With media attention almost guaranteed in terrorist hostage takings, it is hypothesised that demands for publicity in kidnap serve to remind people during ongoing incidents, and to increase the pressure on the negotiating parties.

This is an interesting finding, and is difficult to explain. Sieges and hijacks automatically gain significant media exposure by their readily identifiable location. In these situations demands for publicity may represent the strategic manipulation of the information presented by the media. In kidnap it may be that demands for publicity play a more pragmatic role. As the location of hostages are unknown in kidnap it is easier for authorities to suppress details of kidnaps from being released, or to deny that a kidnapping has occurred. Use of the media may represent self-publicity in these cases. Further, without constant reminders, a long running incident might lose coverage compared with other events arising on the world news stage.

In such cases the demand for publicity may reflect the terrorists' desire to gain wider exposure for their actions. While other demands may indicate something about the true motives and desires of a group, the demand for publicity may simply represent

situationally expedient behaviour. The demand for publicity may reflect a response to the current situation rather than a more psychologically significant insight into the purposes and characteristics of the terrorists.

It may also be hypothesised that systematic differences in the nature of the demands made will be associated with variation in other behaviour. Less professional groups might be expected to make relatively more internally (self) oriented and tactical (short term gain) demands. In contrast, highly established and organised groups might be expected to make both internally and externally oriented demands, but to emphasise strategic rather than tactical gains. These groups might also be expected to fall into two sub-groups: The most professional making realistic demands while more aggressive and unreasonable ones making greater demands (or multiple combinations), which are likely to be difficult to meet.

The “tactical-strategic” and “internal-external” dimensions in the current analysis can be hypothesised to parallel the *direction of influence* and *goal focus* dimensions of the SSA outlined in Chapter Seven. The identification of similar conceptual dimensions in both of these analyses not only supports the validity of the theoretical structures identified, but also suggests that the demands made may relate to systematic differences in the behaviour of the groups making them. The results of this analysis indicate that the demands made are not irrelevant, as has been suggested by Rubin and Friedland (1986). Rather, the demands can be seen to vary systematically and can be hypothesised to relate to stable patterns of variation in wider behaviour.

11.2 - Kidnap demands and the granting of concessions

The previous analysis ascertained the range of demands made during kidnap, and hypothesised a meaning underlying these demands. It is proposed that the nature of the demands made may indicate information about the likely other actions of the terrorists. It might also be hypothesised that the nature of the terrorists will directly influence the negotiation process. Groups making certain types of demand, or demand combination, might be expected to be more likely to receive concessions from the parties they are engaged in dialogue with. Groups making solely self-focused demands may be rejected as unlikely to be serious or committed to their threatened course of action. Groups making multiple and complex demands, by contrast, might be unlikely to receive concessions as the authorities may feel that they cannot be seen to be giving in to them.

Four actions were identified as relevant to the nature of concession granting; rejecting the demands made, offering alternative concessions, meeting the demands in full or granting reduced demands. *Demand rejection* refers the situation in which the demands are immediately turned down by the authorities as unlikely to be met. In some incidents authorities suggest *alternative concessions* in place of the ones initially made by the terrorists. If demands are met they may either be granted *in full*, as initially requested by the terrorists, or *reduced*. Reduced demands are considered likely to represent concessions made through negotiation.

From the assumption that the demands made relate to the aims of the terrorists, and that this would influence negotiation, it was hypothesised that different types of demand would be associated with different concession types. Outright rejection might be

expected to occur when complex multiple combinations of demands, and particularly strategic rather than tactical demands, were made. Demands would only be expected to be met (in full or partially) in cases where single, or combinations of two, internal or external demands were made. Alternative demands might be expected to be offered in cases where politically difficult demands (e.g. political change or prisoner release) were made.

It is recognised that the specific quantities of various demands made might also influence whether they were met or not. For instance, demands for moderate quantities of money might be more likely to be met than demands for small or large sums. Unfortunately this type of information cannot be accounted for in the current data. Further problems would also be anticipated in pursuing this issue; the definition of small, moderate and large quantities of various different demands, and the comparability of such judgments on qualitative different demand types would be open to interpretation. For these reasons the analysis is focused specifically on the impact of general types and combinations, not on quantities of demands made.

Once again, MSA including both demands and concessions proved to be unpartitionable. The interaction of the demands was complex (as seen in Figure 39), and inclusion of the concession items meant that no clear patterns could be discerned at all. As the demands themselves interrelate systematically, this result suggests that the simple relationship hypothesised between demands and concessions does not hold. The various demand combinations were crosstabulated with the concession types to examine the patterns of interrelation in more detail, the results can be seen in Table 4.

Nature of Demands	Concession				
	Demands Rejected	Alternative offered	Demands met (full)	Reduced demands	Unknown
Specific prisoner release	7	4	8	10	17
General prisoner release	-	-	-	-	3
Money	1	1	13	8	20
Political change	-	-	-	-	2
Distribution of supplies	-	-	-	1	1
Publicity	-	-	4	3	2
Specific prisoner & money	3	1	1	5	4
General prisoner & money	1	-	-	-	1
Publicity & money	2	-	1	2	-
Political change & money	-	-	-	1	2
Specific prisoners & publicity	1	1	4	-	1
Distrib. Supplies & publicity	-	1	1	1	1
Spec. pris. & political change	-	-	-	-	1
General prisoner & pol. change	-	-	-	-	1
Spec. pris., publicity & money	2	2	2	-	2
Spec pris., pub. & distrib.	-	-	-	1	1
Distrib., money & publicity	-	-	1	-	-
Spec. pris., pub., mon. & pol. ch.	-	-	-	1	2

Table 4 - Demands made and concessions granted through negotiation

Table 4 is composed of figures from both the “even” and “odd” datasets. Although these include 200 cases, no information on demands is available in 45 of these. The table thus accounts for 155 incidents. However, both demand and concession details are only available in 95 of the incidents, 47.5% of the cases drawn on. Caution must therefore be exercised in extrapolating from these results. The relatively high amount of information available for specific prisoner release and monetary demands reflects the higher frequency with which these are made. As was concluded from the MSA analysis, no systematic relationship can be observed between the demands and the concessions granted, either in the hypothesised manner or in any other.

The only demand showing the hypothesised relationship with concessions was the single demand for money, such demands being more likely to be met in part or full.

No other demand showed a consistent link. It is tentatively concluded from these figures that the granting of concessions is not solely dependent upon the nature of the demands. Although there is much information missing, that which is available clearly suggests that there is more to the process of negotiation than the demands themselves. This is disappointing given the hypothesis that the demands reflect something more about the terrorists than their immediate aims. However, this lack of simple relation between terrorist characteristics and event outcomes does emphasise the importance of the interaction between the terrorists and authorities. These results suggest that the nature of the interactions (negotiations) may significantly effect event outcomes, regardless of the terrorist's characteristics.

It is suggested that information on the nature of the terrorists will provide valuable insights into their likely mode of operation throughout an event. However, to really understand the entire process of a kidnap similar data on the stance of the parties entering negotiations, and the negotiation tactics being employed, are required. Much of this type of data is not available in the current research.

11.3 - Negotiation

The critical importance of negotiation (interaction) has been indicated by the SSA analysis in the Chapter Seven and is further supported by results of the analyses outlined in this and the previous chapter (Chapter Ten). It was hypothesised from account of the literature that a number of discrete negotiation strategies would be observable. Many writings suggest that negotiations need to be carried out differently depending upon the nature of the hostage takers (e.g. McLean 1986). In the current work, broad terrorist

approach types (amateur, professional, unyielding, etc.) were expected to interact with general authority response types (sympathetic, determined non-concessionary, etc.) to produce a relatively limited number of general negotiation strategies.

MSA analyses were carried out on many different combinations of actions and items from the hostage holding/negotiation phase of the events. The types of items included in these analyses covered the setting of deadlines, changing of demands, the release of hostages, details of which parties entered and refused negotiations and gambits such as rejecting demands or offering alternative concessions. Despite exploration of a wide range of these items, in no case was a reliable empirical structure derived. In all of the analyses discussed previously the outcome of analysis on the “even” and “odd” datasets yielded very similar conceptual structures, but this was not the case when considering negotiation activities.

The negotiation phase of kidnappings is very important, and the results of these analysis are worth further discussion, despite not supporting the hypothesised patterns of association. The lack of identification of clear empirical structures or systematic patterns in the analyses on negotiation suggests that the dialogue developed in any incident is complex and situation specific. The patterns of interaction developing throughout negotiation lead *not* to the identification of a few common negotiation types, but to a complex proliferation of events. No simple and predictable interrelations between negotiation actions are observed.

One problem associated with these analyses was that the negotiation actions are often given meaning by the context within which they arise. For instance, the fact that the terrorists alter their demands may mean different things depending upon why they changed them. They may have changed them at their own whim, through successful negotiation or as a consequence of being dissatisfied with the progress being made in the general bargaining process. This means that many of the actions do not indicate anything specific about the parties involved, rather the value of an action is emergent from the dialogue being engaged in.

This problem is further evidence of the complexity of kidnap negotiation. It suggests that understanding the process requires analysis not only of the immediate negotiation actions, but also the circumstances surrounding them. The actions of each party are shaped not only by the immediate interpersonal dialogue ensuing in an incident, but also by their history, their shared understanding of this, and their current aims and goals.

This complexity does not preclude analysis of negotiations, but very good information on the nature of the interactions is required for this to be approached properly. Data about the nature of the terrorists, which analysis suggests is discernible from the outset of an event, is expected to be useful in understanding how they will react throughout negotiation. However, to predict likely outcomes with any accuracy it is not enough to know this alone. It is also necessary to know more about the nature of the other party (or parties) engaged in negotiation, and the dialogue itself.

If the parties are hostile to one another, for example, then the nature of the interaction is likely to be antagonistic and dialogue might be expected to be based upon brinksmanship - each trying to win over the other, winning for one side involving losing for the other. However, if the groups involved share an understanding of each others' perspectives, and are prepared to allow more give-and-take, then a very different style of negotiation would be expected. Unfortunately the level of information required to address this hypothesis is not available in the current data.

11.4 - Summary

This chapter started by considering the nature of the demands and attempted to find regular patterns in the negotiations held. The demands made were found to differ systematically. It has been suggested that the nature of the demands themselves is meaningless, the sole purpose of hostage taking being to gain media attention. Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) suggested that this was not the case in hijack, where a two-dimensional conceptual model explained the range of variation in the types and combinations of the demands made. The significance of this being that the demands were shown to be important in their own right. This conceptual structure is supported in the current work on kidnap, though the demands made differ slightly.

While the significance of the demands as an indication of the terrorists intentions has been established, the relationship of these demands to subsequent outcomes is more complex. The demands made represent the start of a complex negotiation process where many influences may play an active role. A simple relationship was hypothesised to link the demands made to the subsequent negotiation outcomes but no empirical support was

found for it. Instead the data suggested that the link between initial demands and final outcomes is considerably more complex.

Further analysis attempting to address the negotiation process itself was unsuccessful in establishing any simple patterns or styles of negotiation in terrorist kidnap incidents. Based on a classification of hostage takers by McLean (1986) it was hypothesised that a number of simple terrorist types (flexible, professional, forceful) would interact with simple negotiatory party types (sympathetic, non-concessionary) to produce a small number of discrete and simple negotiation types. This was emphatically not the case, as various combinations of negotiation actions failed to indicate any stable patterns of interrelation. It has been concluded from this that the negotiation process is very complex and sensitive to contextual and situational variations.

These results do not preclude the possibility of outcome prediction from details of negotiation activity, but greater information is required than was available in the current work. Not only would fuller information on the terrorists' actions during an incident prove valuable, but information on the negotiating party's (or parties') actions, and contextual information about the circumstances surrounding the event, would be required to build an accurate predictive model of terrorist kidnap.

Chapter 12 - Discussion: Behavioural variation in terrorist kidnapping

A great deal of research addressing terrorism has been completed in a wide range of disciplines. A far smaller amount has focused specifically on hostage taking, and very little appears to be available on kidnapping itself - with a few notable exceptions. While a wealth of experience has been developed by operational police and security personnel (MacWillson 1992), there seems to be very little empirical research to support it. Rather than adding to discussion of terrorist psychological "profiling", the principle aim of the current work has been to develop an empirically based understanding of the nature and range of behaviour characterising terrorist kidnapping. Much of the literature on terrorism focuses upon comparisons between groups, emphasising between-group differences. The current research, however, shows little support for the existence of many distinct behavioural types, instead emphasising core approaches to kidnap and a number of less frequent alternatives, with interaction between parties as the critical mediator of outcomes.

12.1 - Overview of study aims

Two fundamental hypotheses were proposed to underlie the current work, based on previous terrorism and psychological literature. First, terrorist kidnap was expected to be characterised by rational and pre-planned actions. Consequently, meaningful patterns would be expected to be observed in analysis. Second, the observed behaviour was expected to show consistency, manifest in distinct 'types' of event relating to particular groups. This observed variation should be attributable to 'normal' psychological theory, no special theories should be required to understand behaviour seen in terrorist kidnappings.

A wide theoretical base was identified as having relevance to the current research. Terrorism has been considered from a range of perspectives, and a multi-disciplinary literature has developed. This literature provides a basis from which to understand the nature and context of the phenomena under study. No single definition of terrorism has been agreed upon by all those addressing the issue. However, of critical salience is the role of violence, or the threat of violence, in the pursuit of a political aim. The political issues at stake are of key importance in understanding terrorist kidnap as a coercive bargaining processes, occurring through inter-group interaction.

Crenshaw (1992) highlighted a number of areas in which further work is required, the current work approaching three of them. Firstly, it is crucial to the approach taken in this work that no "special" theories need be postulated to account for this type of activity. Terrorist kidnapping is proposed to be as purposeful and goal directed as any "normal" activity. No special mental states, peculiar personality types, or forms of psychological dysfunction need be postulated in order to account for, and understand, the patterns evident in behaviour. Rational and economic models of hostage taking have proven useful in event modelling and it is hoped that developing a more psychologically meaningful understanding will enable further clarification of the processes that occur.

The analyses outlined in the previous chapters serve to support these hypotheses. Normal psychological processes, from individual perception through to group social and cultural processes, can be readily drawn upon in understanding the observed behavioural variations. Of particular significance is the theoretical parallel identified between contemporary theories of

interpersonal interaction and the structure of terrorist behaviour in the course of an incident. This will be discussed more fully in section 12.3.

Much of the literature on terrorism, hostage taking, and even kidnap, tends to imply that this is a relatively homogenous activity. The second of Crenshaw's (1992) recommendations addressed is that research should focus on the variation within specific crimes rather than generating theories in which all crime is treated in a unitary manner. This relates to the behavioural consistency and variation shown by groups. It appears to be implicitly assumed, but rarely discussed in much of the literature, that kidnapping (or any other terrorist activity) is homogenous in its expression. Evidence from non-terrorist crimes such as murder, rape or burglary (Canter 1988; Canter and Alison 1997; Jack, Heritage, Canter and Wilson 1994) show that there is systematic variation in the methods used to commit these crimes. Work on terrorist hostage taking carried out by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) shows further support for diversity of behavioural expression in terrorist events as well.

It is common to reduce the apparent diversity of actions within a type of crime by discussing them in terms of a few standard patterns. The work of Selten (1988), for example, carefully attempts to model the process of kidnap as a relatively small number of serial options. Further, these options are proposed to follow from one another in a common series of paths. While this method provides a powerful way to understand kidnapping, its application may be weakened by its inability to readily represent the apparent diverse variability in the actions observed across a large number of kidnap events. The current work has failed to identify any stable types of kidnapping, suggesting that kidnap is a highly heterogeneous activity. While certain core

characteristics are always observed, i.e. those defining the activity, there appears to be ample scope for variation in the actual commission of an event.

Rational and economic models of terrorism and kidnap tend to focus upon sets of decision paths or nodes, suggesting limited and rigid ways in which an event can evolve. The current research attempts to steer away from making assumptions about the nature of events by drawing on analytic techniques that maintain the complex patterns of association in the data rather than simply testing the accuracy of a number of hypothetical patterns. The current work takes a multi-dimensional approach looking at the patterns of interrelation between all observed actions.

The third of Crenshaw's (1992) areas of focus suggested that the involvement of all parties should be considered in understanding crime, not just the strategies of one side or the other. The relationship of the kidnap model outlined in Chapter Seven with the model of interpersonal interaction (Auerbach et al 1994) suggests that kidnap may profitably be understood as a form of coercive interaction in which terrorists use their hostages in an attempt to force authorities (or other third parties) to grant them certain concessions. Although there are many similarities between terrorist kidnapping incidents, suggesting that it is an activity with a common general script, the interaction between the parties involved creates a highly complex dynamic that can be resolved in many different ways. Simple, direct, links between precursor actions and likely outcomes are extremely difficult to make.

Much of the psychological literature addressing terrorism has tended to focus upon individual terrorists. Attempts to understand terrorism have tended to take the form of clinically based assessments of what is "wrong" with such people, and how they may be "cured". While this work may have therapeutic value in rehabilitation terms, it does not provide an understanding of the process of terrorist events. In focusing upon precursors and causes, the meaning of variations in action and expression appear to have been over looked. Sociological and political science perspectives appear to be more focused on observed variation in methods and approaches taken by criminals or terrorist groups. However, they appear to be more interested in developing conceptual typologies of these differences rather than empirical exploration of the variations.

Clinard and Quinney (1986), for example, attempted to derive a typological system that pulled together a wide range of criminological taxonomies. However, in stressing differences between crimes rather than all relationships, including similarities, they ignore the subtle differences in some crimes. For example, kidnap is considered to be a "violent personal crime", but "political crime" and "organised crime", which may also be applicable to terrorist activity, are so defined as to be mutually exclusive categories. Thus, *terrorist* kidnap cannot be readily accounted for using this methodological framework.

Stohl (1988) makes a similar point in his review of a large number of terrorist typologies. He classes them into four types, all of which are focused upon distinguishing groups in different ways. Many typologies suffer from ill-defined and subjective class labels and overlapping types (Stohl 1988). With these problems it is difficult to see how they can be used with any

confidence in an applied setting. The aim of the current work, by contrast, has been to examine the observed diversity in event commission. Rather than assuming different types are observable, statistical methods have been used which draw out the associations between actions without making assumptions about the independence or linearity of dimensions identified. As a result the issues discussed in the current work represent *themes* which may identify the role of certain actions, rather than types which distinguish them from one another. Themes are characterised as 'regions' within a behavioural continuum rather than types which imply demarcation.

There is a great deal of literature within psychology that addresses individual behaviour in groups, behaviour between groups and the influence of culture and climates of belief on subsequent action. Research has been carried out in both social and organisational psychology looking at these issues. However, this type of information does not appear to have been applied to terrorism in any explicit manner, and literature search yielded no work addressing variation in terrorist offence commission in these terms. The work outlined in Chapter Three illustrates how important these processes might be in understanding the context embedded, conflict based interaction between two or more groups. The work of Tajfel (Tajfel and Fraser 1978; Turner and Brown 1982) Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Triandis (1994a; 1994b) particularly illustrate how individual interpersonal processes might also apply at an inter-group level. These conceptual frameworks appear to offer a strong theoretical basis for making predictions about terrorist hostage taking behaviour, including the complexity of the interactions identified in the current analysis.

Analysis of crimes such as stranger rape (Jack et al 1994) and arson (Canter and Fritzon 1998) have shown systematic differences in the actions of different offenders. However, these crimes are often committed by individuals. One purpose of the current work was to extend the form of behavioural modelling used to understand these individual crimes to one carried out by groups. Work by Wilson (1995) and Donald and Wilson (1999) on ram-raid crews and Johnson (1999) on football hooligans suggested that group behaviour could be understood using the same methodology. However, they tended to focus on the nature of the groups rather than the commission of the crimes they were engaged in. The current work supports the contention that this methodology may be productive in understanding the nature of crime committed by groups.

It is clear from the analyses in the current research that the principle of group behavioural analysis has significant promise. Clear, consistent, and above all meaningful patterns were identified in the actions carried out during kidnapping, suggesting ways in which kidnappings can vary. However, the nature of the data means that the specific findings must be treated with caution. Better, or at least fuller, data is required to further examine the findings outlined in the current thesis.

12.2 - Summarising the findings of the current research

Chapter Six outlined the descriptive characteristics of the 206 incidents included in the database. These were all successfully initiated kidnappings carried out by groups claiming to have some kind of religious, social or political agenda. A small number of incidents in which planned kidnaps failed in the initiation stage, hostages not being successfully captured, were not included in the current database. These may represent an interesting sub-set of data for further

comparative analysis, to see if there are systematic factors resulting in successful or unsuccessful events. This may be important in exploration of the finding that only 'rational' behaviour was observed in terrorist kidnap. Wilson et al (1995) found evidence for irrational and even foolish activity in siege and hijack. Such was not the case in analysis of terrorist kidnap.

The descriptive statistics provide a "baseline" profile of terrorist kidnapping which can be used as a point of reference in subsequent multivariate analysis. These figures provide an insight into the basic characteristics of terrorist kidnap. The pattern of events over the twenty-five year timespan suggest that kidnappings do not simply occur cyclically. This supports the findings of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) who tested Im, Cauley and Sandler's (1987) hypothesis of cyclical variation in terrorism. In Wilson et al's (1995) research all hostage taking types combined were found to display five year peaks in frequency of occurrence. Such cyclical activity was not shown, however, for individual types of hostage taking, or for the activity of individual terrorist groups. This suggested that any observed cyclical variation was a statistical artefact rather than a psychologically meaningful feature of terrorism (Wilson et al 1995). It was hypothesised from the current data that kidnap is carried out by terrorist groups responding to particular issues of salience to them. While copycat events might be carried out by other groups as a result of an incident, this does not lead to regular cyclical variation. The copycat hypothesis cannot be addressed with the current data, but might represent another interesting avenue for further study.

The event characteristics suggest that kidnapping is most common in particular geo-political regions (South America and the Middle East). It is most likely to be carried out by relatively small groups, but some events do employ large numbers of activists. Single hostages are most frequently taken, tending to be from wealthy First World nations and in powerful roles such as government officials or senior business executives. The most frequent time of capture was while travelling, guns and vehicles being the most common resources used by the terrorists to do this.

Simple demand making appeared to be the most common reason for kidnapping, specific prisoner release and money being the most frequent demands made. A range of activities were observed which served to indicate to outside parties the terrorists intentions or commitment. The hostages' and the local authorities were the most likely parties to become engaged in negotiations. Where granted, concessions could be made by a variety of parties. Whether concessions were finally granted or not, terrorists concluded events without capture in the majority of incidents. Terrorists may be subsequently captured as a result of police investigation, but this could not be addressed with the current data. These figures serve to draw an impression of a complex activity in which considerable care and skill is shown in execution and handling by the terrorists.

This might be interpreted as supporting Cornish and Clarke's (1986) notion of criminal activity as resulting from rational decision making. This will be discussed further in section 12.3. However, while Cornish and Clarke's work addresses offender development, it is not possible to look at terrorist group development in the current research. Although 206 events were included in the database, no more than ten of these relate to any single group - frequently fewer.

Further, while a single organisation (e.g. ETA) may have carried out more than one kidnapping, there is no way of knowing whether the same individuals were involved in each. Groups made up of different individuals are not expected to behave identically, and no systematic development would expect to be observed. This would be a very interesting area to explore in future research.

Having established a basic understanding of the characteristics of kidnappings, a number of non-linear multidimensional scaling analyses were carried out to address the interrelations of the actions observed. Friedland and Merari (1992) contribute one of the few empirical studies of political hostage taking, but their approach was considered to be methodologically limited as they only compared pairs of variables. No single action would be expected to significantly effect another independently of all the other processes occurring simultaneously. As a result, a multidimensional approach was concluded be the most appropriate for understanding the apparent complexity of terrorist kidnap.

All the analyses carried out and illustrated in the previous chapters suggest that there are systematic differences in the way in which terrorist groups behave. Analysis of behaviour in the first stages of kidnaps appear to distinguish clear differences in the way in which these events are executed. There was also considerable emphasis on the importance of interpersonal, or inter-group, interaction. The range of behavioural approaches which could be taken appear to be overshadowed in significance to the overall incident by the process of interaction which develops between the parties involved.

The importance of the interaction was initially shown in Chapter Seven, where analysis of terrorist actions yielded an empirical structure very similar to models of interpersonal interaction from general psychological research (Auerbach, Kiesler, Strentz, Schmidt, and Serio 1994). The main difference in the case of kidnap negotiation being a skew towards more hostile and dominant behaviour. The analysis of the demands made also appears to reinforce the importance of the negotiation process in shaping events. The two main dimensions of the conceptual model of demands-made appear to correspond to dimensions identified in the overall analysis of terrorist behavioural patterns, which, as stated, showed a structure very like models of interpersonal interaction. The models of interaction will also be discussed more fully in section 12.3. While some ‘types’ of kidnapping were expected to be shown, there was little empirical evidence of any. The behaviours observed formed a continuum, on which groups could be located by the general ‘theme’ evident in their actions.

The importance of interaction aside, however, analysis suggests that although there are some aspects of terrorist kidnap which are relatively standardised, some features may be particularly profitable in discerning variation between incidents. As indicated in the descriptive analysis, there appears to be a “common” type of kidnap which involves the open taking of hostages while they are most vulnerable (typically while travelling). The hostages taken are typically as high value as possible (such as senior military or government officials or leading industrialists). These actions might be considered to represent the most “professional” kidnappings.

In addition to this “type” of event, various other less common approaches have been observed, and other types of hostage may be taken. It might be hypothesised that highly intricate plans

indicate a particularly intellectual group while violent assault on a location resulting in the taking of hostages would indicate a very different type. Not only might these groups be expected to have different motivating aims and goals, but their different modes of operation might also be related to future behaviour. It might indicate, for instance, how they would react to authority intervention. This could be represented by the occurrence of very different negotiation processes.

The procurement and use of resources showed a similar pattern to the acquisition of hostages. Just as some hostage types appear to be more common than others, so some resource combinations are observed more frequently. Guns and basic information are generally used regardless of the amount of manpower available, and vehicles are often observed too. Various combinations including more or less of these resource types are observed, but typically as many resources as possible seem to be used. Resources do not appear to be linked in any cumulative way, the presence or absence of each not apparently effecting the others. It cannot be ascertained from the current data whether the terrorists' use of resources is by free choice, or is restricted to those readily available. The situation is likely to be different for different groups and this is an area where future research may be particularly valuable.

In various analyses addressing features of behavioural variation in kidnapping, stable empirical structures were identified. These suggest that there are stable patterns in what terrorists do in their initial control of hostages while capturing them, and in the types of demands they make. However, when relating these actions to subsequent acts and outcomes, the simple relationships

initially hypothesised were found not to hold. In both cases there was no predictable overlap between what the terrorists did at the earlier stage and what they did later.

Behaviour carried out in the initial control of the hostages was hypothesised to indicate the nature of the terrorists' attitudes or orientation to their hostages. Increased violence in the taking of hostages being expected to indicate greater hostility toward them throughout the event. However, when compared to subsequent hostage control throughout the incident this relationship was not found to occur. It is suggested that while the terrorists actions indicate their general orientation towards their hostages, the actions of the hostages themselves also influence how they are treated. This fact again emphasises the importance of the *interaction* rather than the actions simply of one party or the other.

Similarly, the demands made were found to vary systematically. They were considered to indicate not only the apparent aims of the group, but also something of the character of a group - whether it was inward or outward-focused and whether it was operating for immediate gain or with a longer-term strategic view. The relationship between the demand types and the subsequent granting of concessions was examined. It was hypothesised that certain types of demand would indicate particular types of terrorist, and that certain event outcomes would typically be associated with them. This hypothesis was not supported, suggesting that there is more to the negotiation process than the nature of the terrorists alone.

This conclusion was further examined through consideration of the negotiation process itself. It was hypothesised that different terrorist groups would interact with the various external groups

in relatively straightforward ways, resulting in a few distinct negotiation patterns. Once again, support was not found. The data appeared to indicate that the negotiations were far more complex, with terrorist, authority (and other) groups interacting in complex ways, and being influenced by the context from within which they were operating. This would appear to support the contentions of researchers such as Dutter (1987), Taylor and Ryan (1988), Kellen (1990), Feracuti (1990) and Sprinzak (1990) who all argue for the importance of the conditions and context from which the terrorists arise.

This section has served to summarise the nature and implications of the analyses discussed in the previous chapters. They consistently emphasise a 'core' or 'typical' behavioural approach with possible variations evident. The critical importance of interaction in shaping the outcomes emerges throughout the analyses. An inter-group interaction model of terrorist kidnap is emergent in which few or no distinct 'types' of event are observed, but in which the process of negotiation is the defining feature. The following sections elaborate on some of the key findings, drawing in more detail on the literature discussed in the introductory chapters.

12.3 – Implications of the research

While the previous section outlined the basic findings of the research, this section will discuss these results, and their meaning, in more detail. The relation of the current findings to the literature covered in the introductory chapters will be addressed, and the implications drawn out. It is the intention of this section to indicate how the current work, interpreted with respect to the previous literature, can inform the understanding of terrorist kidnap.

12.3.a - Rational behaviour in kidnap

Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) found that hijackers behaviour could be seen to vary on a theoretical continuum from professional, through amateur, to unprofessional. Professional activity was characterised by organised and carefully planned actions with a clearly objective purpose. Lack of professionalism was characterised by relative irrationality and more spontaneous, ill considered actions.

However, this broad width of behavioural variation was not found in the case of kidnapping. The worst kidnapers would only be classified as amateur or inexperienced. They may carry out actions which appear to be misguided, or which do not maintain control over an event. However, none of the kidnappings in the sample analysed appeared so disorganised that their mental health would be questioned. No events appeared to be carried out without fairly careful planning, and no hoaxes occurred. In contrast, some of the least organised hijackers had hairdryers for guns or pans with wires poking out for bombs (Wilson et al 1995). It may be that some less stable, or rational, people did attempt to commit terrorist kidnaps but were not successful in taking hostages. Only successful kidnappings were included in the current research and these types of event would therefore have been excluded. This only serves to reinforce, however, the serious nature of kidnapping when it is successfully executed.

Some of the psychological literature considers terrorists to have particular psychological problems resulting in the need to carry out violent actions, though the current analysis does not support this. Although the current findings cannot prove or disprove the suggestions of Post (1986; 1987; 1990), Rothman and Lichter (1980), Turco (1987), Brunet and Casoni (1991) or

Johnson and Feldman (1992) that terrorists have some type of inadequate or violent personality, there is no suggestion that such explanations of involvement in terrorist activity are warranted. These psychodynamically based explanations of involvement are based upon the understanding of terrorists as passive recipients of others' influence, acting in a deterministic manner. In Chapter Two these approaches were contrasted with others in which the terrorists are seen as active agents, freely interacting with their physical and social environment.

The rational choice approach of Cornish and Clarke (1986) is considered more likely to provide a theoretical framework for understanding terrorist decision-making. In developing their theory, deterministic and pathological explanations of criminal activity were rejected in recognition of the importance of control and the distribution of social and economic power in society (Clarke and Cornish 1985). This can be seen to have direct relevance to the explanation of terrorist activity, itself commonly defined as relating to the balance of power between minority groups and the dominant majority.

Cornish and Clarke (1986) and Trasler (1993) outline a rational choice model of criminal involvement which is based upon economic models, but which is relatively informal. It does not assume mathematical calculation of options in the identification of the optimal choice. Instead it integrates psychological understanding and proposes a model of bounded rationality in which incomplete information is used to make assessments of options which are considered serially rather than in parallel. Satisfactory rather than optimal outcomes are acceptable. While decisions resulting may not be the best according to strictly rational theory,

they cannot be considered irrational as the resulting actions and plans are considered, goal directed and internally consistent in their logic.

This model is proposed to apply to terrorist activity just as much as to any other criminal activity. Further work by Klein et al (1993) and Flin (1996) have shown that the same principles of 'informal' reasoning can be applied to emergency situation management and many more mundane day to day activities. The current analysis strongly suggests that kidnapping, in all of its manifestations, represents planned and responsive action. In the worst cases the terrorists are violent, in the least threatening they appear to be inexperienced. In no case, however, is disorganisation or psychological dysfunction in any way apparent. Looking at the model of terrorist behaviour derived in Chapter Seven, a continuum can be hypothesised to run diagonally from the aggressive/external/strategic pole at one end to the adaptive/internal/tactical pole at the other. This can be considered to represent an approximate scale from fanatical extremist (at the aggressive and inflexible end), through professional (characterised by the most common and high frequency actions) through to the least experienced groups (being most flexible self- and short-term focused).

The situational context is very important in influencing observed activities (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Clarke and Felsen 1993). This is considered to be of importance in terrorist involvement, as ethnic and social factors, in combination with perceptions of alienation and lack of faith in normal political channels, are suggested to precede decisions to engage in radical activity or terrorism (Ferracuti 1990; Kellen 1990; Kramer 1990; Sprinzak 1990; Crawford 1993). The process of goal focused radicalisation described in political and sociological perspectives on

terrorism can be seen to have an explanation based on psychological and social psychological theory.

Chapter Three outlines the work of Tajfel (1981, 1984), Hogg and Abrams (1988) and Triandis (1994; 1995) who discuss the role of the individual in society, and the propagation of society through the individual. These theoretical ideas have been tested successfully in a number of areas, such as in the views of Chinese youths in Holland (Verkuyten and Kwa 1996). Further, recent work by Hogg and Hains (1998) has shown a connection between inter-group interaction and “groupthink”. “Groupthink” is a phenomenon identified by Janis (Janis and Mann 1977) resulting in poor decision making in highly cohesive, or what Triandis (1995) might call “tight”, groups. It might be hypothesised that “groupthink” may occur in terrorist groups’ decisions to become involved in terrorist kidnap (especially fanatical and intractable groups), an action in which the risks to the terrorists are considerable in relation to the likely outcomes. This issue cannot be addressed using the current data, however its significance lies in the fact that it does not require the assumption of irrational behaviour to explain activities that most people find difficulty in understanding.

The SSA analysis described in Chapter Seven clearly showed that terrorist behaviour in kidnapping has a similar structure to models of interpersonal interaction (Auerbach et al 1994). This in itself suggests that the behaviour is rational. Although the actions tend to be skewed towards dominance and hostility rather than submission and friendliness, a finding not unexpected in this context, if the actions carried out were not rational then such a clear structure would not have been found.

Considering the performance of activities throughout a kidnap, rather than the motives for becoming involved, no rationale for postulating irrational behaviour is suggested. From this analysis it is concluded that terrorist kidnappers' actions are by and large clearly comprehensible and rational given the context in which they occur. This conclusion was also drawn from earlier work on hostage taking by Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995). Looking at siege, hijack and kidnap, behaviour was modelled using the same methods as described in the current work. Hijack and siege were found to show groups of behaviours suggesting amateurism, but there was little to suggest psychological dysfunction. The current research supports their findings and represents a conceptual elaboration of the model of kidnap hypothesised in Wilson et al's (1995) work.

The range of behaviour seen in kidnap might serve to distinguish it from other forms of hostage taking; notably hijack and siege. Not only are the obvious location characteristics of these hostage taking types different, but the range of performance types appears to be narrower in kidnap. The behaviour of groups engaging in kidnap seems generally more professional, or at least less unprofessional, than that in hijack and siege. Wilson et al (1995) found that hijack could be committed by "fanatical", "professional" and "unprofessional" groups. Similarly, sieges were found to be carried out by professionals, "bandits" (aggressive groups) and "reactionaries" (the least committed and practical).

Kidnap may necessitate greater professionalism for a number of reasons. It might be suggested that kidnap is less about the publicity and more about the actual demands than the other types of

hostage taking, a view supported by the analysis of demand variation. This might mean that it is more serious and committed groups who engage in kidnapping as opposed to the other hostage taking types. The unknown location of the hostages in kidnap leads to the possible hypothesis that it is more about coercive influence and less about displays of aggression than the other types of hostage taking.

These results suggest that kidnap, of all hostage taking types, must be treated with extreme seriousness. As stated, the SSA model, and further analysis of kidnap details using MSA, all point to the central importance of *interaction* in understanding the negotiation phase, the longest stage of a kidnap. The fact that no irrational behaviour was evident in analysis suggests that negotiation is an important tool in the resolution of such events. This will be examined in more detail in the next section.

12.3.b – Terrorist hostage taking and interpersonal interaction

Auerbach, Kiesler, Strentz, Schmidt and Serio (1994) carried out an empirical study designed to address the processes arising in hostage taking which lead to the Stockholm Syndrome. The Stockholm Syndrome is defined as the development of positive feelings on the part of the hostages for their captors (Auerbach et al 1994). In their paper Auerbach et al outline a theoretical model of the interaction process between the terrorists and the hostages which may result in observation of the Stockholm Syndrome.

A basic aim of their research was to examine the development of the Stockholm Syndrome within the context of contemporary interpersonal theory (Auerbach et al 1994). The conceptual

structure of interpersonal behaviour is widely considered to form a circle around the two central dimensions of control (dominance-submission) and affiliation (friendliness-hostility) (Auerbach et al 1994). In the derivation of test measures this circle is typically divided into eight segments and items falling in each are considered to form sub-scales representing interpersonal types. In the study, the interpersonal activity of the hostages and hostage takers was measured in a simulated captivity scenario. Both self-report measures and independent ratings of hostage adjustment and emotional reaction were used during the course of the exercise.

Auerbach et al (1994) consider 'complementarity' in interpersonal style to be critical to the occurrence of the Stockholm Syndrome. Interpersonal theory proposes that complementary interaction is based upon reciprocity in control and correspondence in affiliation. Friendly or hostile behaviour should provoke the same type of response (correspondence) while dominant behaviour should be met with submissive, and vice versa (reciprocity). The Stockholm Syndrome is thus resultant upon behavioural transaction. If hostage takers are perceived as being friendly and the hostages' responses are friendly, while the hostage taker remains in an unthreatened dominant position, then the conditions of complementarity are met. The better the complementarity the better the hostages' adjustment and the more likely the Stockholm Syndrome is to arise (Auerbach et al 1994).

The hostage taking was run using volunteers from American domestic airlines. The hostage takers were played by FBI agents. Participants were carefully briefed on the nature of the study but the hostage taking itself was carried out as realistically as possible in order to make the experience as stressful as possible within ethical constraints (Auerbach et al 1994). In addition

to self-completion questionnaires, following both the initial "capture" and following "rescue", two clinical psychologists monitored the subjects and rated their behaviour, looking specifically at dysfunctional behaviour.

The study confirmed Auerbach et al's (1994) hypothesised relationship between modes of interaction and the establishment of the Stockholm Syndrome. Canonical correlation on both affiliation and control aspects of behaviour showed that deviations from complementarity resulted in poorer hostage adjustment. This result is significant as reciprocity of control is indicated as being just as important as complementarity of friendliness, though traditional discussion of the Stockholm Syndrome considers only the friendliness aspect.

This work is hypothesised to be of value outside the immediate sphere of hostage-terrorist interaction. During negotiations the nature of the interaction process and the roles of the terrorists and authorities involved are likely to have important implications for the consequential outcomes. If hostage-terrorist interaction is influential in the Stockholm Syndrome then terrorist-authority interactions should clearly be influential in the negotiation process. It may be hypothesised that eventual outcomes are heavily influenced by the level of complementarity in the negotiation transactions.

Support for the importance of terrorist-authority interaction can also be seen in Wilson and Smith's (1998) work on the place of scripts in hostage taking. All parties concerned; terrorists, hostages and authorities (or other third parties), will understand their role in the course of an event. To the extent that everyone keeps to their expected part of the overall script, an event is

likely to run relatively smoothly. Problems are likely to arise, however, if participants do not conform to the roles expected of them (Wilson and Smith 1998). This explanation can also be applied to Auerbach et al's work, in that complementarity can be hypothesised to occur when the terrorists and hostages play the roles expected of them in the event script.

Considering the SSA structure discussed in Chapter Seven, the two-dimensional structure created by the interaction of the first two facets, *behavioural expression* (aggression-adaptation) and *direction of control* (internal-external) can be seen to correspond with the structure of interpersonal interaction outlined by Auerbach et al (1994). *Behavioural expression* may be hypothesised to parallel the affiliation (friendliness-hostility) dimension while the *direction of control* facet relates to the control (dominance-submission) dimension. The *Aggressive-coercive* end of the *behavioural expression* facet can be hypothesised to correspond to the hostile end of the affiliation dimension in interpersonal theory. Similarly, the *adaptive-persuasive* pole might relate to the friendliness end of the affiliation scale.

The terrorist *behavioural expression* facet will be expected to be skewed towards the hostile end of the affiliation dimension as a result of the coercive nature of kidnapping. In a similar manner, the *external control* end of the *direction of control* facet in the current work might be considered to relate to the dominance end of the interpersonal interaction control dimension. The external actions are all focused upon influencing others, making them comply with the terrorists' wishes. In contrast, the *internal* end of the *direction of control* facet might correspond to a mid-point on the control dimension. These actions were focused upon the terrorists' internal event control and do not clearly relate to interaction with the authorities. No terrorist behaviour was observed to

be submissive, this would represent dysfunctional behaviour for this type of activity. Thus, like the *behavioural expression* facet, the *direction of control* facet may be thought of as a skewed analogy of the interpersonal control dimension. The skew towards dominance being required given the nature of kidnapping.

It is possible that the modulation facet (the concentric rings representing bands of action frequency) apparent in the SSA analysis is indicative of a normal distribution within behaviour across the two facets. Auerbach et al (1994) state that when many peoples' interpersonal style is plotted on the two axes of control and affiliation there is a central tendency observed. Relatively few people fall at the extremes of either axis, and a normal distribution is observed across them. If the kidnap behaviour model developed in Chapter Seven is truly reflective of the interpersonal interaction model then this normative pattern would also be expected to be observed across the kidnappings in the database.

Although a wide range of possible interpersonal styles are possible between the terrorists and their hostages, the relationship between the terrorists and authorities is likely to be more constrained. Whereas the terrorist-hostage relations can span the full range from hostile, through disinterested, to friendly, the terrorist-authority relationship is more formal and is most likely to be based upon conflict. The nature of the power balance and stakes of the operation mean that it is less likely that friendly behaviour will occur, shifting the whole emphasis of the scale to the ambivalent or hostile aspect. This may account for the terrorist model emphasising the range from forceful to not-forceful; interpersonal reactions only varying in the range of negative to neutral, and never becoming positive.

12.3.c - Modes of interaction; levels of operation and group control

The identification of the *goal focus* facet, which has not apparently been identified in any analysis of crimes committed by individual offenders, may result from the current focus on a complex group activity requiring careful situational management. This facet is suggested to be distinguishing systematic variation within group-level situation management which does not appear to occur at an individual level. The first two facets (*behavioural expression* and *direction of control*) have been hypothesised to correspond to the dimensions proposed to underlie interpersonal interaction. However, this two dimensional model is concerned solely with an individual's style of interaction, the *task orientation* of those interactions is not considered.

When considering the behaviour of a group of closely co-ordinating people involved in a complex task it is hypothesised that various qualitatively distinct levels of consideration may become evident as a consequence of group dynamics. Situation management of complex tasks will require strategic, operational and tactical levels of control (Klein et al 1993; Flin 1996). A group's actions are not purely focused upon immediate goal completion, a proportion of group activity must relate to executive control of the group itself, or longer term event management goals. These are not conceptualised as long term goals in a truly strategic planning sense. Rather, they reflect behaviour on the part of the group which indicate the ability to continue an event over a longer period than may be possible for an individual operating alone. It is these actions that appear strategic rather than tactical in nature.

This distinction may also arise as a consequence of the particular characteristics of kidnapping (and other hostage taking it would be hypothesised). Most behaviour, including a large number of criminal activities are focused upon the immediate action. For example, the focus of a house breaking is on entry, theft and unobstructed exit. It might be hypothesised that little concern is usually given to the impact of the current event on later actions or future events. In terrorist kidnap, however, long term political goals are being sought in addition to the immediate gains from the kidnap itself. The potential impact of current actions on the later event, or even future events, must be considered if the event is to be successfully managed. Kidnapping tends to get wide media attention, and thus image management might also be considered to be important to professional terrorist kidnapers.

The identification of this facet may represent a conceptual extension to the interpersonal interaction model, enhancing its explanatory power to analysis of complex inter-group behaviour. Although this appears to be the case in the current analysis, it would require considerable research to test this hypothesis on a wider range of intergroup interactions. The potential significance of this facet on the general terrorist behaviour model is supported by the identification of a similar facet in analysis of the demands made; it was suggested in Chapter Eleven (section 1) that one of the dimensions on which the demands vary indicates a tactical versus strategic orientation.

12.3.d – Identification of patterns in terrorist kidnap behaviour

The analyses in Chapters Seven (hostage action SSA), Ten (initiation and event control MSA) and Eleven (demands MSA) indicate that interaction is a critical influence on the process of a

kidnapping. That said, however, no systematic patterns could be identified in a number of MSAs addressing the negotiation process. Chapter Eleven (section 2) outlined the attempts to model the negotiation process. It was initially hypothesised that a small number of distinct negotiation strategies would be apparent. Various negotiation actions were identified in the coding frame and these were considered in various combinations using MSA. No reliable patterns could be identified in any of these analysis, suggesting that simple discrete *types* of negotiation do not arise.

It would appear that instead of simple negotiation types, a dialogue (based on a shared situational understanding) develops through the course of each incident. This will be shaped by the characteristic style of each of the parties involved, and the situational and cultural context within the event occurs. Simple and direct links between behavioural precursors and event outcomes are not expected to be observed due to the complexity of the influences effecting the negotiation process. The task of outcome prediction will also be extremely complex, and dependent upon the constantly developing narrative during the course of an event.

Cultural differences may be particularly influential in the negotiation process. The linguistic and comprehension gulf between the parties from different regions of the world may be considered to be a significant barrier to successful negotiation. For example, discussing Islamic terrorism, Taylor and Ryan (1988) conclude that hostage taking has been a common political tool in the Middle East for a long time. Failure to recognise this, and the socio-religious context in which it occurs, has lead to significant problems as the various attempts to negotiate with holders of Lebanese hostages over the period 1980 to 1987 have shown. Approaching hostage takers in the

Middle East with the preconceptions appropriate to such situations in the West can lead to difficulties (Taylor and Ryan 1988; Triandis 1994a and b).

The MSA analyses in Chapters Eight to Eleven show some interesting findings about the patterns of behaviour in terrorist kidnap. Kidnap is a crime in which certain aspects of behaviour appear to be quite proscribed or scripted, but in which expression of a group's individual variation is still possible at certain points. Certain characteristics of events appear to be quite common, such as the targeting of high value hostages and using of certain resources - predominantly guns, vehicles and basic information. Other actions, such as the way in which control over the hostages is established for example, are almost entirely at the control of the terrorists and thus provide much greater indication of behavioural variation.

Despite certain regularities, however, kidnapping does appear to be a complex activity. Terrorists have the greatest freedom to act as they desire in the initial taking of the target. At this stage they are able to act according to their own plans. Consequently, it is during the event initiation in which the greatest amount of behavioural variation is observed. However, behavioural homogenisation might be hypothesised to occur through exposure to accounts of successful incidents reported in the press. If an approach has been shown to be successful then it may not only be used again by the same group but it may well be used by other groups in a copycat fashion. This issue has not been addressed in the current research but represents an area which may be worth addressing in further work.

The negotiation itself presents difficulties for outcome prediction, taking part of the event control out of the hands of the terrorists. However hard they attempt to maintain control they are subject to the influence of the negotiating parties. The dialogue ensuing is a two-way process, where the actions of each side are to some extent dependent upon previous actions of the other. As a result a close synchronisation of the behaviour patterns of each side can follow, the actions of each side being reflected in the responses of the other (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978).

The mutual influence throughout the course of negotiation results in difficulties for prediction of outcomes from knowledge of terrorist behaviour alone. The univariate approach taken by Friedland and Merari (1992) was considered inadequate to deal with the complex interplay between multiple factors in a hostage taking incident. To overcome this, an approach based upon the identification of multidimensional styles in terrorist behaviour was used in the current work. This has also proven unsuccessful in identifying consistent patterns, or types, of negotiation and outcome in the current analysis. This lack of stable patterns suggests that there are no common negotiation types, and that the interactions are extremely adaptable and open to change. The analyses in the current work, and that of Auerbach et al (1994), suggest that negotiations are effected not only by the character of the terrorists and the parties with which they engage, but also on the compatibility of these approaches. Further research using fuller information on the negotiation process is required to test this hypothesis.

Prediction from this type of data is not impossible, however. Research on criminal behaviour has shown that it is possible to predict an offender's criminal history from features of his/her behaviour in a target offence (Wilson et al 1995). Further, the work of Wilson et al (1995) has

shown some limited support for prediction of outcomes based upon knowledge of the actions of hijackers and kidnappers. However, the tentative nature of the analyses do little more than suggest that prediction is possible and more detailed research in this area was suggested as a useful area of further study (Wilson et al 1995).

12.3.e - Decision support using behavioural information in kidnap

The lack of simple and direct outcome prediction does not mean that the behavioural information identified in the current work has no use. Decision support is seen as a primary application of behavioural data, and was one of the bases for the development of the current work. Crime detection and investigation may be considered to be a process of decision making. It is no longer based on mere hunch or experience, but should be thought of as a series of actions that are selected from the options available. Therefore the psychology of investigative decision making can contribute to the understanding and improvement of what happens in an enquiry (Godwin, 1996).

"Classical" research into decision making has been based upon the derivation of rational and analytic models. These have tended to focus upon one specific aspect of the decision making process; the option choice (Klein et al 1993). These models typically portray numerically the various costs and benefits of the options available to decision makers such that a single score, representing the efficacy of an option, is derived. The decision maker thus selects the option with the highest overall value, a figure representing the decision with the highest benefits and lowest costs.

This perspective on decision making assumes that a quantitatively optimal decision is being sought, that complete or virtually complete information regarding options and outcomes is available and that there is no limit on the time required to weigh and balance options. An increasing number of people have noted the limitations of classical analytic and rational models of decision making and considerable research effort is being put into studying alternative approaches (Cornish and Clarke 1986; Klein et al 1993). In widening the perspective of decision making, a number of alternative methods have been put forward, notably for dealing with novel, dynamic and high pressure situations.

The current work, modelling terrorist kidnap, has been derived directly from research addressing the development of decision support systems and other potential applications of behavioural databases. Decision making has been recognised as a critical component within tasks such as diagnosis, negotiation, situation assessment and event command and control. In many cases, the context within which these tasks are performed precludes the use of formal models, no matter how well trained the actors are (Klein et al 1993). Further, decision tasks are not simply a matter of making a single choice at one point in time, they involve a series of actions or decisions, each of which effects the external environment (or the decision maker's understanding of it) in ways that influence subsequent decisions (Klein et al 1993).

In discussion of the Recognition Primed Decision (RPD) model of decision making, Klein (1993) considers the use of prior experience in making decisions in real situations. He hypothesises that in novel situations people draw upon knowledge of similar episodes encountered in the past. He states that given the complexity of real situations, no prior event

will ever be identical to the problem currently being encountered. However, the experience of military and emergency response professionals generally enables them to merge the individual cases and use judgements of familiarity that would not be present with the retrieval of an individual analogue case (Klein 1993).

Support for this view has been shown by Hosking and Morley (1991) in discussion of formal negotiation. They write that effective social action requires a suitable knowledge base, typically in the form of an organised system of evaluative beliefs. Expertise in an area is seen largely as involving the ability to quickly recognise a situation as the same, or similar, to one previously encountered. This recognition then prompts rapid evaluation of threats and opportunities which others less experienced may not be aware of: The skilled performer is a skilled perceiver (Hosking and Morley 1991).

As has been stated, it was initially hypothesised that the analytic approach taken in the current work might enable the identification of prototypical kidnap, and possibly negotiation, styles. This information could then be used to identify clear strategies and their likely conditions for success. Following analysis of the data this does not appear to be the case and no consistent patterns of interaction could be identified in examination of the negotiation process. It was concluded from this that negotiations are a complex form of interaction, influenced by many factors.

Hosking and Morley (1991) consider negotiation to be a skilled performance in which considerable expertise is required in order to deal effectively with pressured and complex

situations. They consider that the hope of finding one best strategy to follow, regardless of context, is doomed to failure (Hosking and Morley 1991). This conclusion would certainly appear to be supported by the results of the analyses carried out in the current work. For this reason, effective negotiation in terrorist kidnap might be hypothesised to require the development of a common understanding of the social and political situation between all of the parties involved. Differing groups and differing issues will require flexibility on the part of negotiators in tackling the problems they represent.

The general terrorist kidnap model outlined in Chapter Seven indicated the key importance of interaction, taking a similar form to that of a number of models in interpersonal interaction. The work of Auerbach et al (1994) showed that a general model of interpersonal interaction could explain behavioural variation, and the occurrence of the Stockholm Syndrome, in a simulated hostage taking. From this, and the importance of interaction in kidnap it was hypothesised that the rules of interpersonal interaction found to lead to good relations between the terrorists and their hostages could well hold in negotiations between the terrorists and the authorities. Further research using much better accounts of the negotiation process would be required to properly test this, however.

Despite the problems identified, behavioural data may still be of support to negotiators in the beginning "pattern recognition" or "situation recognition" stages of an event. It may be hypothesised that problems arising through lack of experience could be readily addressed, and greater familiarisation with the knowledge area quickly facilitated. In discussing the application of his RPD model, Klein (1993) argues that "training is needed in recognising situations, in

communicating situation assessment, and in acquiring the experience to conduct mental simulations of options" (Klein et al 1993, p146).

Expert systems have been used in attempts to address the issue of decision support (Michalowski 1988, see Chapter Four). However, like formal models of decision making, these suffer from a number of problems. Firstly, expert systems can be no better than the "expert knowledge" captured within them. Second, this knowledge is stored as a set of facts or logical/conditional rules. The use of formal logic structures makes conceptualisation of the *problem* domain susceptible to the same criticisms as economic/mathematical modelling. The model becomes simplified and sometimes reduced to subjective quantification of factors which are difficult to assign numerical values.

Systems of operational rules and factual information have questionable application when the psychology of expert decision making is considered. As people progress from novice to expert they come to know things in a different manner, they go from having declarative to procedural knowledge. It is not what they know which is different, but the way in which the information is integrated with their understanding of the world. Novices typically use declarative knowledge. This is factual knowledge; it covers knowledge of rules to apply and things to look out for in terms of readily vocalisable facts. This is the form of knowledge being compiled in the building of expert systems. Expert systems thus model novice knowledge structures. In the progression to expert status this knowledge becomes "automated" and is termed procedural knowledge. Procedural knowledge represents the same information in a different manner. Pattern recognition results in relatively automatic categorisation of a situation. Such interpretation

results in the invocation of relatively automatic actions and reactions: It is difficult to separate what an expert knows from how he or she uses that knowledge (Klein et al, 1993).

Given this conceptualisation of expert knowledge, the current work is not aimed at the derivation of a system of rules for action but an understanding of the typical patterns of action and reaction evidenced during kidnap. It is not the aim of the system to guide decision-makers along predetermined "optimum" decision paths, but to be able to assist more rapid and clearer situation assessment. It is hypothesised that such a system may aid in the reduction of ambiguity and as a prompt for key indicators in assessing situations. It has already been shown in other areas that improved situation assessment can lead to improved decision performance (Klein et al, 1993).

The current work clearly indicates that behavioural information has the potential to yield useful material. Such information could be of direct use to decision makers and negotiators, alongside the information already available to them, in aiding the most effective decisions to be made as rapidly as possible. If behavioural information can be used to inform negotiators about likely significance of particular types and combinations of action, and the nature of the dialogue ensuing, then different negotiation tactics may be identified and developed systematically according to incident specific criteria.

It must be stressed that the current research only indicates the feasibility of such an approach rather than providing any concrete results. As stated, the nature of the data has meant that many questions are unanswerable at this stage. However, the fact that such clear conceptual models

have been derived from the data suggests much promise for the detailed and systematic analysis of all the behavioural data available from such incidents.

Little attention has previously been paid to the nature and role of the *actions* exhibited by those involved in terrorist kidnapping, though the work of Wilson, Canter and Smith (1995) represent a notable exception to this. As discussed previously, they developed models to explain the range of behaviour evident in siege, hijack and kidnap. The current work represents a conceptual enhancement of the kidnap aspect of that work. It also suggests that consideration of behavioural data may allow decision-makers access to a great deal of information currently not available to them in any systematically structured way. Many of the themes emerging may already be understood by experienced negotiators, but they do not appear to have been explicitly operationalised. Knowledge about behaviour is typically derived from first hand experience and anecdote, but there is little evidence of formal or theoretical explanations having been developed.

It is the clear structure and systematisation of the behaviour found to occur in such events which makes the current research potentially so powerful. It does not focus upon the relations between single indicators, and does not attempt to isolate key individual measures. By looking at behavioural themes a much broader, and potentially more useful, conception emerges. No action should be considered outside of the context within which it occurs. For example, terrorists who fire weapons in response to perceived threats and those who fire spontaneously are both using firearms, but they are not using them in the same way psychologically. The more detailed the information which negotiators have, the better equipped they will be to handle

differing situations as they arise. There is clearly much scope for work in developing the models outlined in this study.

12.4 - Limitations of the Data and Analysis

The current work clearly indicates that the understanding of behaviour in the course of terrorist kidnap represents a profitable area for further research. The validity of modelling behavioural information and the feasibility of applying these models in a number of ways have been established. However, the most notable problem associated with the current research is the nature of the available data. Given this limitation it would be necessary to carry out further analysis using more complete information before it would be possible to make concrete conclusion based upon the analyses outlined in this thesis.

While the work on construct development is proving to be productive it must be recognised that there are significant limitations imposed upon the current work by the nature of the data. Some of the behaviours being considered are of relatively low frequency and this makes it difficult to draw concrete conclusions from analysis including them. The low frequency of such actions may be attributable to two main causes.

The first relates to the probability of occurrence of any given action during a hostage taking. With the incredible diversity of behaviours which could occur it is likely that many actions occur with a relatively low frequency when a representative sample of hostage taking events is taken. However many events and actions are considered, it remains a fact that some potentially significant behaviours occur with a relatively low frequency.

The second reason relates to characteristics of the data itself. Due to the nature of the data available the amount of information is often limited. Coming from publicly available data sources, mainly media reports of events, there are two factors limiting the information of use in understanding the psychological aspects of hostage taking. Firstly, the media have a different purpose in the reporting of events and often do not record the type of behavioural details of interest in this work. Secondly, the media do not have direct access to details of importance for the current study such as terrorist pre-event planning, hostage conditions, hostage treatment and the negotiation process. What information is available is often limited and second hand.

Given this, it is extremely encouraging to be finding consistent and meaningful structures in the behavioural modelling of these events. Despite the limitations, it is hypothesised that it should still be possible to learn a great deal from the information that is available. The research to date has indicated clear patterns and consistencies within the behavioural structure of hostage taking events despite the relative poverty of the information available. The fact that stable and meaningful results are emerging using this data indicates the potential of research in this area. This work could be especially useful if fuller information was available, though at present this is not possible.

Aside from the sources of data, further problems arise from the nature of the current coding frame. While care was taken in the identification of the contents of the framework, in deriving a generic structure certain event information may be lost. Within each hypothetical phase of kidnap as little structure was imposed as possible. The aim was to account for the presence of

actions which occurred rather than suggest an ideal sequence. As a consequence the current analysis cannot account for event sequences in anything but the most general terms. Given the current analytical purpose this does not pose a problem but it does limit the further work which can be done using the same database.

Gurr (1988) states that there is no alternative to using accounts of terrorist events published in the media. There is no other open source of information held on terrorist activities which can be drawn upon. Governments do not compile or make publicly available information regarding such activity, if for no other reason than security. While this is entirely understandable, it does hinder the understanding of such events and the processes surrounding them. In particular, it makes information on the processes of terrorism very difficult to study with any accuracy. For this reason the analyses described in Chapters Eight to Eleven, looking at specific features of kidnapping behaviour, focused upon the stages of events in which reasonable detail is generally available.

12.5 – Contributions of the current research

The fundamental aims of the current research were to establish an empirically based understanding of the nature and range of terrorist kidnap. Underlying this were the assumptions of rationality and consistency. The current work supports the notion that terrorist kidnapping is characterised by rational and planned activity, no support is shown for irrational behaviour in the kidnappings comprising the database used. Further, the identification of meaningful patterns within behaviour serves as the basis for understanding patterns of consistency in event commission.

This research has both practical and academic implications. At a fundamental level it has indicated the potential usefulness of behavioural information in understanding terrorist kidnap. Practically, it serves to provide empirical support for the detailed experiential knowledge developed about the progress of kidnap events by operational security personnel. No unexpected insight into the nature of terrorist kidnap has been developed, but the understanding of the negotiation process afforded by the analyses serve to support current practice in kidnap response.

The fundamental importance of the negotiation process in shaping the nature of the dialogue arising during the course of an event supports the current practice that emphasises calm and deliberate interaction in a controlled environment. The establishment of trust, respect and understanding between negotiators and kidnappers is clearly critical if the interactions are not to result in stand-off and failure. The correspondence of the kidnap structural model to 'wheel' models of interpersonal interaction clearly illustrates an empirical and scientific basis for the approach that has developed over time through operational experience.

Academically this work makes contributions to a number of areas of interest in the understanding of criminal behaviour. The work extends the previously successful research into individual offences (e.g. Canter 1988; Canter and Heritage 1990; Jack et al 1994; Canter and Alison 1997) to that of groups. Previous work on football hooligan gangs (Johnson 1999) and ram-raid gangs (1995) has suggested that group activities can be modelled in a similar manner

to individual crimes. They focused, however, on the characteristics of the people involved rather than the range of behavioural themes which may be observed in event commission.

A number of different offences committed by individuals, such as rape, homicide and arson, have been shown to have various possible approaches, or methods of execution. The current work has shown that the same is true of a crime committed by *groups* of offenders. Further, while the nature of 'task' specific variation has been illustrated for terrorist kidnap, a further dimension relating to group management has been identified. That is, certain types of behaviour can be seen to have a function not only in the context of the crime itself, but also in controlling the co-ordinated execution of the event by a group's members. The ready identification of systematic and meaningful patterns within the behaviour of terrorist kidnappers supports Crenshaw's (1990) contention that the group is the correct level of analysis for terrorist acts committed by organised groups of offenders.

The research has shown that terrorist kidnap is an extremely serious form of hostage taking. It is likely to be committed by rational and well-motivated groups who see themselves in conflict with another group over political, religious or social issues. The purpose of the kidnapping is to engage in coercive bargaining with this other group, with the ultimate aim of achieving the political/religious/social changes felt necessary. The fact that a model representing interaction has been developed is important, especially in view of the skew towards hostile and dominant modes of behaviour on the part of the terrorists. This suggests that parties negotiating with the terrorists must be particularly careful in their modes of interaction if negotiations are going to be managed to completion smoothly and without violence.

The analysis of particular aspects of terrorist kidnap (chapters 8 to 11) has shown systematic differences in the way in which events may be carried out. Some types of activity appear to be more common than others, but it is clear that different approaches may be taken in kidnapping hostages. This represents a significant clarification of current discussion of terrorist activity. While general discussion of kidnap tends to suggest that it is a homologous event with no recognised diversity of expression, typologies and economic models suggest a few distinct 'types' of event. The reality appears to be much more complicated and situation dependent. A further problem with the 'types' identified in economic and typological models is that no clear distinctions are made between these in behavioural or operational terms.

The current research does *not* show support for qualitatively distinct 'types' of kidnapping that may be approached using discrete and specific tactics. Further, the work does *not* support the implicit view that all kidnappings are the same. The work *does* serve to illustrate how behaviour in the commission of terrorist kidnap can vary systematically and continuously to give a range of general 'themes' of approach. These themes vary from violent and externally-oriented behaviour, through to adaptive and inwardly-focused behaviour. Depending upon the balance of such behaviours observed, the general approach of the terrorists can be understood in more detail. Rather than serving to force groups into stereotypical and artificial categories, this understanding serves to point out how such groups might be approached for maximum effect in the course of negotiations. This understanding suggests that what is important in terrorist kidnap is not having a range of tactics available for different kidnapping scenarios, but that a fully developed understanding of *event management* is required.

The critical importance of proactive event management, rather than simple reaction based upon group classification, cannot be stressed enough. Certain behaviours are suggested a being of particular use to negotiators in determining the nature of the people they are dealing with. While the most common behaviours are professional and task focused, some types of action potentially indicate information about the kidnappers themselves. For instance, the demands made were shown to be meaningful, their nature indicating something about the motives of a group rather than being arbitrary. The suggestion that demands are not relevant and that kidnap (and other forms of hostage taking) is only about publicity in the most general sense is not supported in the current analysis.

The current work is particularly significant in that it does not attempt to provide static 'rules' about how events can be reacted to. Further, it does not serve to provide a set of proscriptive decision nodes setting out how an event 'should' develop. What it does contribute is a dynamic and psychologically-based understanding of the nature and range of behavioural variation observed, framing this within a context and process of goal directed interaction. This has immediate implications for *how* terrorist kidnappers are responded to, but does not presume to indicate *what* the content of discussion or the nature of any interventions should be.

12.5.a – Directions for future work

The results of the analyses carried out in this research suggest that there is considerable scope for further work. This not only includes exploring the current analyses with fuller data, but also looking at slightly different aspects of behaviour not covered in the present work. It might be

useful to develop a greater understanding of the patterns of interaction between terrorist groups and those responding to them. If consistent patterns of interaction could be found to be based upon stable attributes of those involved then an understanding of these variations should enable more accurate prediction of the dynamics of an event, and likely consequent outcomes. The complexity of hostage taking events has precluded the identification of any clear patterns within negotiations in the current work. By drawing on a wider range of contextual factors it may be possible to increase the understanding of the processes underlying observed behaviour. In this way more accurate prediction should be possible from consideration of terrorist behaviour and interactions with negotiators.

If better information was available on the specific details of the negotiation process then a number of interesting hypotheses could be tested. It has been shown that a model of interpersonal interaction developed in general psychological experiment can be applied to the development of the Stockholm Syndrome (Auerbach et al 1994). Following from the identification of the central importance of interaction in kidnap, it is suggested that the same model might be used to better understand the dynamics of hostage-authority interaction during negotiations.

Analysis of the development of terrorism over time might also prove to be valuable. Strentz (1988) suggested that the nature of terrorists and terrorism had changed over the sixties, seventies and eighties. Such developmental changes were deliberately not considered in the current work, the focus being on identifying the general patterns of interrelation between the actions observed in all events. However, the data could equally be used to look at the way in

which kidnap has altered over the last twenty-five years. This might also then suggest trends indicating the way in which such activity is might develop in the future.

If the dates of significant security and policy changes could be identified then these might also be included in any analysis of temporal development. It might be that an apparently random change in terrorist kidnap behaviour actually results from the impact of anti-terrorist law or policy, or the introduction of particular forms of security. An example of this may be seen in hijack, where the introduction of better airport security screening reduced the incidence of this type of hostage taking (Kurz 1987).

Overall, the current work has provided tentative evidence for the dynamic complexity of terrorist kidnap. The shift of focus from sets of 'decision nodes' and 'types' of event to patterns of goal-directed and variable behaviour has both expanded knowledge of the processes underlying terrorist kidnap, and opened a new set of questions and problems. Exactly what the contributions of all the parties - terrorists, hostages, authorities and mediating organisations – might be, framed within the precise political, social and economic contexts motivating the activity, will require much better data to address fully. This research should serve as the foundation for more, and varied, examination of the complex behaviour observed in organised and group-based crime.

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Appendices

Appendix A - Terrorist Kidnap Coding Framework

All of the incidents used in the work discussed were coded according to the coding frame below. Each item was developed to be as unambiguous as possible, but the explanations ensure that the meaning is interpreted correctly.

Background and Context Related Items

1) Date of event occurrence

Location of the Event

- 2) US/ Canada
- 3) Mexico/ Central America
- 4) South America
- 5) Europe
- 6) Africa
- 7) Middle East
- 8) East/ Far East/ Asia
- 9) Australasia

In which geographical region did the kidnapping occur?

Numbers Involved

10) Named Group

Was the group committing the kidnapping a named group (e.g. ETA etc.)?

11) Single Group

Two groups co-operating

Was the incident carried out by a single terrorist group, or by two groups in co-operation? (content analysis has shown that co-operation between three or more groups never occurred in this sample of events).

12) Unknown number

1 terrorist

2 terrorists

3 terrorists

4 terrorists

5 terrorists

6 terrorists

7 terrorists

8 terrorists

9 or More terrorists

How many terrorists were there in the group that took the hostage(s)?(i.e. the group involved in the event initiation)

13) Escapes in initiation

- 1 hostage
- 2 hostages
- 3 hostages
- 4 hostages
- 5 hostages
- 6 hostages
- 7 hostages
- 8 hostages
- 9 or More hostages

How many hostages were captured in the initiation stage of the incident?

Region of Hostage Origin

- 14) US/ Canada
- 15) Mexico/Central America
- 16) South America
- 17) Europe
- 18) Africa
- 19) Middle East
- 20) East/ Far East/ Asia
- 21) Australasia

From which region did the hostages originate? This refers to the nationality of the hostages, but considers regions rather than specific countries.

Details of the Hostages

22) Foreign to country of event

Were the hostages in their own, or another, country when they were captured?

- 23) diplomatic/government/services
- 24) business/professional/legal/technical
- 25) academic
- 26) aid/relief/ missionary
- 27) tourist
- 28) family - target by association

In which type of work were the hostages employed?

General details of event

29) >1 group claimed event

Did more than one terrorist organisation claim that they had carried out the kidnapping?

30) opportunist - target absent

If the target was found to be absent from the location at which they were expected to be taken, were alternative hostages taken instead?

31) random hostage selection

Were no hostages targeted specifically, individuals being taken from a location as opportunity presented itself?

Event Initiation

Nature and Place

32) large scale assault/ attack

Did the hostage taking involve an attack on the hostages' location by a large number of terrorists?

33) direct approach

Were the hostages taken by direct approach from a terrorist attack group?

34) deception approach

Did the terrorists get close to their hostages through deceit or cunning?

35) hostage's residence

36) hostage's workplace

37) a leisure location

If the hostages were taken in, or at, a building, which type was it?

38) target taken inside

If the hostages were at a built location at the time of capture, were they inside or out?

39) travelling in vehicle

40) travelling on foot

If the hostages were travelling at the time of capture were they on foot or in a vehicle?

Resources Utilised

41) guns

42) explosives

43) blades

What type of weapons did the terrorists have at the outset of an event?

44) Miscellaneous equipment (e.g. ropes)

Did the terrorists use any unusual or improvised equipment in the hostage taking?

45) car/ van/ pickup

46) lorry

47) specialised (e.g. ambulance/ boat)

What type of vehicle, if any, did the terrorists use in the hostage capture?

Establishing Control

48) verbal commands/ threats

Were the hostages controlled simply by telling them what to do?

49) warning shots

Did the terrorists fire warning shots to control their potential hostages?

50) push/ hit/ tie

Did the terrorists use physical contact in order to control their targets?

51) shoot at

Did the terrorists actually fire on their potential targets?

52) violence only in response

Was aggression only used by the terrorists in direct response to the actions of the hostages (e.g. vigorous attempts to evade capture)?

53) non-target (e.g. passers-by) injured/ killed

54) target injured

Was anyone injured or killed by the terrorists during the hostage taking?

54) vehicles used to block

Were the terrorists' vehicle(s) used to block the hostages' escape?

55) targets own vehicle taken

Following the taking of a target, was their vehicle taken by the terrorists?

Hostage Holding/ Negotiation Phase

Apparent motives

57) interrogation

Were the hostages captured specifically in order to question them?

58) intrinsic publicity (no demands issued)

Did the event appear to be staged simply to gain media coverage for a group?

59) strengthen ongoing situation

Was the event carried out by a group already holding hostages to increase the pressure on the authorities?

60) swap others hostages

Were the hostages captured exchanged for another group's hostages?

61) demand making and negotiation

Did the terrorists appear to take the hostages simply in order to make coercive demands on a third party?

Nature of the Demands

62) named prisoner release

Was the release of specific individual prisoners demanded?

63) named group release

Was the release of a specific group of prisoners demanded?

64) general release

Was the demand for prisoner release not accompanied by any specific details?

65) money

Was money asked for?

66) publicity/ broadcast

Was a specific demand made for the transmission of a message or manifesto?

67) political/ social change

Did the terrorists demand some form of constitutional or societal change from the authorities?

68) distribution of supplies

Did the terrorists demand the provision of resources to specific sectors of society?

69) information from the authorities

Did the terrorists want the authorities to provide them with specific information?

70) recognition of group

Did the terrorists want a government to officially recognise them as a group to be dealt with?

71) travel

Did the terrorists want some form of transport to be provided?

72) other demands

Were any demands other than those outlined above made?

Host control/ treatment

73) accuse of spying

Was the hostage openly accused of spying during the course of negotiations?

74) evidence that held

Was evidence provided to substantiate claims that a hostage was being held, or that the hostage was still alive?

75) cease search demanded

Did the terrorists tell the authorities to stop looking for their location?

76) "peoples' trial" held

Were the hostages subjected to a "people's trial" by a kangaroo court of terrorists?

77) moved between locations

Were hostages held at more than one location throughout the duration of their captivity?

78) treated well

Were the hostages treated with respect and/or allowed privileges during their captivity?

79) treated strictly as prisoner

Were the hostages treated neutrally, but with respect, maintaining a distance between the hostages and their captors?

80) mistreatment- deprivation

Were hostages harmed mentally or physically by the absence of food or stimulation?

81) mistreatment- abuse

Were the hostages harmed physically or mentally through violence/torture?

82) medical aid provided

Was medical aid provided by the terrorists in cases where the hostages were clearly hurt or unwell?

Use of deadlines

83) deadline - hours

84) deadline - days

85) deadline - longer

If deadlines were set during negotiations, how long were they for?

86) deadline pass- no action

Were deadlines allowed to pass without carrying out the threatened actions?

87) deadline pass- extension

Were deadlines pushed forward when the originally specified time had been reached?

88) threats carried out at DL

Did the terrorists carry out their threats at the passing of the deadlines?

Acts during negotiation

89) demands increased

Were the amounts of any demands increased numerically throughout negotiations?

90) demands changed

Was the qualitative nature of the demands altered during an event, i.e. were original demands replaced by different ones?

91) demands decreased

Were the amounts of any demands decreased numerically throughout negotiations?

92) harm "as result"

Were hostages harmed in anyway as a direct consequence of the actions of the negotiating parties - but not seriously enough to end or jeopardise an incident?

Release during event

93) no stated reason

Were hostages released for no specific reason?

94) compassionate grounds

Were hostages released for sensitivity reasons (e.g. old age, children, wounded)?

94) nationality

Were hostages of specific nationalities (or lack of certain nationalities) allowed to leave?

96) directly through negotiation

Were hostages allowed to leave as a direct result of concessions in the negotiation process?

Negotiation entered by

97) local authorities

98) hostage authorities

99) hostage company

100) hostage family

101) independent agents

102) other terrorist group

Which parties did engage in negotiations with the terrorists?

Negotiation refused by

103) local authorities

104) hostage authorities

105) hostage company

106) hostage family

107) independent agents

108) other terrorist group

Which parties openly refused to negotiate with the terrorists?

Concessions made by

- 109) local authorities
- 110) hostage authorities
- 111) hostage company
- 112) hostage family
- 113) independent agents
- 114) other terrorist group

If concessions were granted to the terrorists, which party (or parties) granted them?

Concession Details

- 115) demands rejected

Were the kidnappers' demands rejected? This does not refer to the entire negotiation process - were specific demands rejected during the course of bargaining?

- 116) alternative concessions offered

If demands were rejected, were alternative concessions offered in their place?

- 117) demands met in full

If demands were met, were they met in their entirety?

- 118) reduced demands conceded

If demands were met, was the amount reduced through negotiation?

Event Closure

Mode of Event Closure

- 119) terrorists satisfied and end

Did the terrorists release their hostages having received some or all of their demands, or because they appeared to consider that their point had been made?

- 120) terrorist back down, end

Did the terrorists appear to release their hostages under the threat of being captured, or losing control of the event?

- 121) hostage death ends

Did the death of the hostage(s) in captivity end the incident?

- 122) hostage escape ends

Did hostage escape end the kidnapping?

- 123) location found

Did the authorities find the whereabouts of the kidnappers location?

- 124) terrorists surrender

Did the terrorists end the event by surrendering to the authorities?

- 125) terrorists stormed

Having located the kidnappers, did the authorities attempt to end the event by forcefully entering their position?

Deaths in storming

126) terrorist death

127) hostage death

128) authority death

If the terrorist location was stormed, were members of any of the groups involved killed?

Duration of Event

129) up to one day

130) up to one week

131) up to a month

132) up to a year

133) longer

How long did the incident last from initiation to hostage release (or forceful event closure)?

Miscellaneous

134) Intermediaries

Were intermediaries between the parties involved demanded and/or used throughout the process of negotiation?

135) terrorists caught

Did terrorist capture occur in the course of the event? This excludes subsequent capture following post-incident investigation.

136) hostage passed to another

Did the terrorists pass their hostage(s) to another group during the course of an event?

Appendix B - Variable Frequencies for 206 Transnational Terrorist Kidnappings

The following frequencies and percentages represent the reported occurrence of each item in the 206 cases of terrorist kidnap encoded in the data collection stages of the research. Note: Item 1 (not listed) is the date of event occurrence.

Background and Context Related Items

Location of the Event	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
2) US/ Canada	7	3.4
3) Mexico/ Central America	24	11.7
4) South America	52	25.2
5) Europe	26	12.6
6) Africa	24	11.7
7) Middle East	52	25.2
8) East/ Far East/ Asia	20	9.7
9) Australasia	1	0.5

Numbers Involved	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
10) Named Group	176	85.4
11) Single Group	200	97.1
Two groups co-operating	6	2.9
12) Unknown number	95	46.1
1 terrorist	5	2.4
2 terrorists	7	3.4
3 terrorists	18	8.7
4 terrorists	23	11.2
5 terrorists	14	6.8
6 terrorists	9	4.4
7 terrorists	5	2.4
8 terrorists	6	2.9
9 or More terrorists	24	11.7
13) Escapes in initiation	1	0.5
1 hostage	125	60.7
2 hostages	32	15.5
3 hostages	10	4.9
4 hostages	12	5.8
5 hostages	3	1.5
6 hostages	2	1.0
7 hostages	1	0.5
8 hostages	2	1.0
9 or More hostages	18	8.7

Region of Hostage Origin	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
14) US/ Canada	72	35.0
15) Mexico/Central America	13	6.3
16) South America	19	9.2
17) Europe	91	44.2
18) Africa	13	6.3
19) Middle East	12	5.8
20) East/ Far East/ Asia	20	9.7
21) Australasia	3	1.5

Details of the Hostages	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases¹
22) Foreign to country of event	160	77.7
23) diplomatic/gov./services	69	33.5
24) business/profes./legal/tech.	90	43.7
25) academic	12	5.8
26) aid/relief/ missionary	30	14.6
27) tourist	5	2.4
28) family - target by associat.	16	7.8

General details of event	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
29) >1 group claimed event	27	13.1
30) opportunist - target absent	4	1.9
31) random hostage selection	38	18.4

¹ Please note, for some aspects the percentages may not add up to one hundred as the items are not mutually exclusive. An incident could be characterised by more than one type of resource, and more than one of a type of activity could be shown under a particular heading.

Event Initiation

Nature and Place	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
32) large scale assault/ attack	21	10.2
33) direct approach	132	64.1
34) deception approach	23	11.2
35) hostage's residence	48	23.3
36) hostage's workplace	43	20.9
37) a leisure location	12	5.8
38) target taken inside	40	19.4
39) travelling in vehicle	79	38.3
40) travelling on foot	6	2.9

Resources Utilised	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
41) guns	132	64.1
42) explosives	1	0.5
43) blades	3	1.5
44) Misc. equip. (e.g. ropes)	11	5.3
45) car/ van/ pickup	80	38.8
46) lorry	1	0.5
47) specialised (ambul./ boat)	6	2.9

Establishing Control	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
48) verbal commands/ threats	11	5.3
49) warning shots	9	4.4
50) push/ hit/ tie	64	31.1
51) shoot <i>at</i>	27	13.1
52) violence only in response	10	4.9
53) non-targ. injured/ killed	30	14.6
54) target injured	6	2.9
54) vehicles used to block	24	11.7
55) targets own vehicle taken	11	5.3

Hostage Holding/ Negotiation Phase

Apparent motives	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
57) interrogation	20	9.7
58) intrinsic pub. (no dem.s)	28	13.6
59) strengthen ongoing situ	21	10.2
60) swap others hostages	1	0.5
61) demand making and nego.	158	76.7

Nature of the Demands	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
62) named prisoner release	59	28.6
63) named group release	15	7.3
64) general release	8	3.9
65) money	76	36.9
66) pub./ broadcast	33	16.0
67) political/ soc. change	9	4.4
68) distrib. supplies	9	4.4
69) info from authorities	4	1.9
70) recognition of group	4	1.9
71) travel	3	1.5
72) other demands	53	25.7

Host control/ treatment	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
73) accuse of spying	22	10.7
74) evidence that held	47	22.8
75) cease search demanded	8	3.9
76) "peoples' trial" held	18	8.7
77) moved between locations	20	9.7
78) treated well	27	13.1
79) treated strictly as prisoner	18	8.7
80) mistreatment- deprivation	12	5.8
81) mistreatment- abuse	13	6.3
82) medical aid provided	8	3.9

Use of deadlines	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
83) deadline - hours	11	5.3
84) deadline - days	22	10.7
85) deadline - longer	9	4.4
86) deadline pass- no action	24	11.7
87) deadline pass- extension	6	2.9
88) threats carried out at DL	8	3.9

Acts during negotiation	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
89) demands increased	14	6.8
90) demands changed	16	7.8
91) demands decreased	9	4.4
92) harm "as result"	17	8.3

Release during event	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
93) no stated reason	15	7.3
94) compassionate grounds	3	1.5
94) nationality	0	0
96) directly through negotiat.	9	4.4

Negotiation entered by	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
97) local authorities	52	25.2
98) hostage authorities	51	24.8
99) hostage company	29	14.1
100) hostage family	21	10.2
101) independent agents	38	18.4
102) other terrorist group	20	9.7

Negotiation refused by	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
103) local authorities	25	12.1
104) hostage authorities	11	5.3
105) hostage company	1	0.5
106) hostage family	0	0
107) independent agents	0	0
108) other terrorist group	0	0

Concessions made by	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
109) local authorities	19	9.2
110) hostage authorities	21	10.2
111) hostage company	18	8.7
112) hostage family	11	5.3
113) independent agents	10	4.9
114) other terrorist group	1	0.5

Concession Details	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
115) demands rejected	18	8.7
116) alternative conc. offered	11	5.3
117) demands met in full	36	17.5
118) reduced demands con.	39	18.9

Event Closure

Mode of Event Closure	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
119) terrorists satisfied and end	103	50.0
120) terrorist back down, end	30	14.6
121) hostage death ends	21	10.2
122) hostage escape ends	1	0.5
123) location found	35	17.0
124) terrorists surrender	2	1.0
125) terrorists stormed	27	13.1

Deaths in storming	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
126) terrorist death	13	6.3
127) hostage death	6	2.9
128) authority death	3	1.5

Duration of Event	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
129) up to one day	12	5.8
130) up to one week	47	22.8
131) up to a month	45	21.8
132) up to a year	72	35.0
133) longer	25	12.1

Miscellaneous	Freq. of Occurrence	% of Cases
134) Intermediaries	49	23.8
135) terrorists caught	30	14.6
136) hostage passed to another	6	2.9

Appendix C - Corroboration of the SSA on kidnap behavioural variation

Items used in the Analyses (those marked in bold and italics were changed):

Primary SSA of Behavioural Variation


deception approach
verbal commands/threats
warning shots
push/hit/tie
shoot at
violence only in response
non-target injured or killed
target injured
vehicles used to block
target's own vehicle taken
accused of spying
evidence that held
cease search demanded
people's trial held
moved between locations
treated well
mistreat - deprive
mistreat - abuse
medical aid provided
deadline - hours
deadline pass - extension
demands increased
harm as a result of others actions
release - no stated reason
release though negotiation

Corroborative SSA


large scale assault
vernal commands/threats
warning shots
push/hit/tie
shoot at
violence only in response
non-target injured or killed
target injured
vehicles used to block
target's own vehicle taken
accused of spying
evidence that held
cease search demanded
people's trial held
moved between locations
treated well
mistreat - deprive
mistreat - abuse
medical aid provided
deadline - days
threats carried out at deadline
demands decreased
harm as a result of others actions
release - no stated reason
release though negotiation
interrogation (additional item)

The SSA to test the reliability of the empirical structure derived from the original analysis used 26 items. The size of the co-occurrence coefficients was similar to that found in the first analysis, generally ranging from 0.00 to 0.28. Although these represent relatively low levels of co-occurrence it must be remembered that the behaviours considered tended to have low frequencies of occurrence themselves, and represent complex goal directed action plans.

The following plots show the items and their patterns on interrelation. The coefficient of alienation for the three dimensional solution was 0.16, representing an acceptable level of fit between the Jaccard's co-occurrence coefficients and the final spatial representation.



Corroborative SSA of kidnap behavioural variation - vectors 2x1



Corroborative SSA of kidnap behavioural variation - vectors 3x1

The diagrams on the following page are the schematic diagrams for the corroborative SSA analysis. Although the facets on the first plot have changed axes, the relations between the items, and the dimensions themselves, remain the same as they were in the original analysis. This strongly supports the reliability of the empirical model developed.

External Influence
Focus of effect on others,
appearance orientation,
control of outside events

Internal Influence
Internal control of event,
influence on course of
event, expressive of
power.

**Aggressive -
coercive**
forceful
escalation
coercive

**Adaptive -
persuasive**
flexible
verbal
conciliatory or
concessionary

Strategic
Relate to longer term
processes, image
management and long
term aims.

Tactical
Relate to immediate
requirements, the
attainment of specific
and short term goals.

Appendix D - Replication MSAs


The MSA analyses discussed in chapter 8 were all replicated to ensure that the conceptual structures being discussed were reliable. A limitation of the MSA procedure is that it can only accept 100 data cases. The database constructed for the current research was composed of 206 incidents of transnational terrorist kidnap. It was decided to split the dataset into two sub-sets of 100 cases each. Alternate cases were allocated to an “even” and an “odd” dataset, three cases in each sub-set being randomly selected for deletion. The data was divided this way to ensure that changes over time did not influence the structures yielded.

In all cases the theoretical structures identified in the two datasets were found to be nearly identical. Despite variation in precise geometric orientation, the spatial interrelations of the profiles were very similar. The following illustrations show the MSA plots and item partitions for each of the analyses outlined in chapter 8. The analyses shown in this appendix used the “odd” dataset, and afford a split-half reliability test of the conceptual structures being theorised. In each analysis, the schematic diagrams were developed from consideration of both MSAs in conjunction.


Where the MSAs did not corroborate the structures could not be considered reliable. When this occurred the analysis was excluded from consideration in the current work. All of the analyses discussed in chapter 8 show stable and reliable empirical structures.

1. Place; Location and Approach


Replication MSA of Place; Location and Approach




Item Plots for Replication MSA of Place: Location and Approach




2.a. Hostage Role




Item Plots for Replication MSA of Hostage Role




2.b. Hostage Nationality




Item Plots for Replication MSA of Hostage Nationality




3. Resources




Item Plots for Replication MSA of Resources used by Terrorists in Kidnapping



4. Initiation Control




Item Plots for Replication MSA of Initiation Control



5. Demands Made

Replication MSA of Kidnap Demands



Item Plots for Replication MSA of Kidnapper Demands

