THE LOGISTICS OF ANCIENT GREEK LAND WARFARE

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by David Harthen

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABL	Haspels, E., 1936: *Attic Black Figured Lekythoi*, Paris.
ABV	Beazley, J. D., 1956: *Attic Black-Figure Vase Painters*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Aineias	Aineias the Tactician *Poliorketika*. Translated: 'The Illinois Greek Club', 1928, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Aischin.	Aischines
Ktes. (Or. 3)	*Against Ktesiphon* (Oration 3). Translated: Adams, C. D., 1919, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Amm. Mar.	Ammianus Marcellinus. Translated: Hamilton, W., 1986, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd.
Ar.	Aristophanes
Ach.	*Acharnians*. Translated: Rogers, B. B., 1924, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Birds	*The Birds*. Translated: Rogers, B. B., 1924, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Peace	*Peace*. Translated: Rogers, B. B., 1924, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Wasps	*The Wasps*. Translated: Rogers, B. B., 1924, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Arist.	Aristotle
Pol.	*Politics*. Translated: Sinclair, A. T., 1962 (revised by Saunders, T. J., 1981), Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd. (Greek text: Ross, W. D. (ed.), 1967, Oxford Classical Texts, Clarendon Press).
Rhet.	*Rhetoric*. Translated: Freese, J. H., 1926, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
ARV^2	Beazley, J. D., 1963: *Attic Red-Figure Vase Painters*^{2}, Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Arr.	Arrian
Anab.	*Anabasis*. Translated: Robson, E. I., 1933 (2 vols.), Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Ath.	Athenaios
Deipnosoph.	*Deipnosophistai*. Translated: Gulick, C. B., 1927 (6 vols.), London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
BSA	*Annual of the British School at Athens*
CAH VI^2	Lewis, D. M., Boardman J., Hornblower, S., & Ostwald, M. (edd.), 1994: *The Cambridge Ancient History* VI: *The Fourth Century*^{2}, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
CR	*Classical Review*
Dem.	Demosthenes
Aphobos. I	*Against Aphobos.* I. Translated: Murray, A. T., 1936, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Aristok.	*Against Aristokrates.* Translated: Vince, J. H., 1935, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Crown.	*On the Crown.* Translated: Vince, C. A., & Vince, J. H., 1926, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Embassy.	*On the Embassy.* Translated: Vince, C. A., & Vince, J. H., 1926, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Ol. I	*First Olynthiac.* Translated: Vince, J. H., 1930, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Ol. II	*Second Olynthiac.* Translated: Vince, J. H., 1930, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Or. XI	*Oration* XI *(Answer To Philip's Letter).* Translated: Vince, J. H., 1930, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Phil. I	*First Philippic*. Translated: Vince, J. H., 1930, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Phil. II	*Second Philippic*. Translated: Vince, J. H., 1930, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Polykles.	*Against Polykles*. Translated: Murray, A. T., 1939, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Timotheos.	*Against Timotheos*. Translated: Murray, A. T., 1939, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Diod.	Diodoros of Sicily. Translated: Oldfather, C. H. (Books I-XV.19); Sherman, C. L. (Books XV.20-XVI.65); Welles, C. B. (Books XVI.66-XVII); Geer, R. M. (Books XVIII-XX); & Walton, F. R. (Books XXI-XXXX), 1933-67, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Frontin.	Frontinus
Strat.	*Stratagems*. Translated: Bennett, C. E., & McElwain, M. B., 1925, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Latin/English text).
Gomme *et al*	Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. & Dover, K. J., 1970: *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, vol. IV, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
Hdt.	Herodotos. Translated: Godley, A. D., 1930 (4 vols.), London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Hom.	Homer
Il.	*Iliad*. Translated: Murray, A. T., 1924 (2 vols.), London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Od.	*Odyssey*. Translated: Murray, A. T., 1931 (2 vols.), Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Isok.	Isokrates
Antid.	*Antidosis*. Translated: Norlin, G., 1929, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Areop.	*Areopagitikos*. Translated: Norlin, G., 1929, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Ep. 9	*Epistle* 9 [*Archidamos*]. Translated: van Hook, L., 1945, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Euag.	*Euagoras*. Translated: van Hook, L., 1945, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Paneg.	*Panegyrikos*. Translated: Norlin, G., 1928, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Phil.	*Philippos*. Translated: Norlin, G., 1928, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
JHS	*Journal of Hellenic Studies*
Lysias	Lysias
Matitheos.	*Oration 16: In Defence of Matitheos*. Translated: Lamb, W. R. M., 1957, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Nepos	Cornelius Nepos
Ages.	*Agesilaos*. Translated: Watson, J. S., 1902, London, George Bell & Sons.
Iph.	*Iphikrates*. Translated: Watson, J. S., 1902, London, George Bell & Sons.
Lys.	*Lysander*. Translated: Watson, J. S., 1902, London, George Bell & Sons.
Milt.	*Miltiades*. Translated: Watson, J. S., 1902, London, George Bell & Sons.
Timo.	*Timotheos*. Translated: Watson, J. S., 1902, London, George Bell & Sons.
Onas.	Onasander
Strat.	*Strategikos*. Translated: 'The Illinois Greek Club', 1928, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Paus.	Pausanias. Translated: Levi, P., 1979, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd. (Greek text: Rocha-Pereira, M.H. (ed.), 1973-81 (3 vols.), Leipzig, BSB B. G. Teubner Verlagsgesellshaft).
Pl.	Plato
Repub.	*Republic.* Translated: Waterfield, R., 1994, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Greek text: Adam, J. (ed.), 1920, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Symp.	*Symposion.* Translated: Lamb, W. R. M., 1953, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Plin.	Pliny the Elder
N. H.	*Natural History.* Translated: Rackham, H. (Books I-XIX); Jones, W. H. S. (Books XX-XXXII); Rackham, H. (Books XXXIII-XXXV); Eichholz, D. E. (Books XXXVI-XXXVII), 1938-62, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Latin/English text).
Plut.	Plutarch
Ages.	*Life of Agesilaos.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1917, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Alk.	*Life of Alkibiades.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1950, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Arat.	*Life of Aratos.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1943, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Arist.	*Life of Aristeides.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1914, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Dem.	*Life of Demosthenes.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1949, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Dion.	*Life of Dion.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1943, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Kim.	*Life of Kimôn.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1914, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Kleom.	*Life of Kleomenes.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1921, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Lyk.	*Life of Lykourgos.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1915, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Lys.	*Life of Lysander.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1950, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Mor.	*Moralia.* Translated: Babbit, F. C. (1A-409E); Helmbold, W. C. (439A-523B); De Lacey, P. H. & Einarson, B. (523C-612B); Clement P. A. & Hoffleit, H. B. (612C-697C); Minar, E. L. & Sandbach, F. H. & Helmbold, W. C. (697C-771E); Fowler, H. N. (771E-854D); Pearson, L. & Sandbach, F. H. (854E-919F); Cherniss, H. & Helmbold, W. C. (920A-999B); Cherniss, H. (999C-1086F); Einarson, B. & De Lacey, P. H. (1086C-1147), 1927-69, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Nik.	*Life of Nikias.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1916, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Pel.	*Life of Pelopidas.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1917, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Per.	*Life of Perikles.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1916, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Phok.	*Life of Phokion.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1919, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Them.	*Life of Themistokles.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1914, London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Tim.	*Life of Timoleon.* Translated: Perrin, B., 1943, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Polyain.	Polyainos
Strat.	*Stratêgika.* Translated: Krentz, P., 1994 (2 vols.) Chicago, Ares Publishers Inc. (parallel Greek/English text).
Polyb.	Polybios. Translated: Paton, W. R., 1922-27 (6 vols.), Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Ps-Arist.	Pseudo-Aristotle
Ath. Pol.	*Athenaion Politeia.* Translated: Rhodes, P. J., 1984, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd. (Greek text: Kenyon, F. G. (ed.), 1920, Oxford Classical Texts, Clarendon Press).
Oik.	*Oikonomikos.* Translated: Armstrong, G. C., 1935, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English & Latin/English text).
Strabo	Strabo of Amaseia
Geog.	*Geography.* Translated: Jones, H. E., 1917 (6 vols.), London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
REA	*Revue des Etudes Anciennes*
Thuc.	Thucydides. Translated: Smith, C. F., 1919-23 (4 vols.), Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Xen.	Xenophon
Ages.	*Agesilaos.* Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1946, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Anab.	*Anabasis.* Translated: Brownson, C. L., 1922, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Cyrop.	*Cyropaideia.* Translated: Miller, W., 1915 (2 vols.), London & New York, William Heinemann Ltd. & G. P. Putnam's Sons (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Hell.	*Hellenika.* Translated: Brownson, C. L., 1918-21 (2 vols.), Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).

Hipp.	*Hipparchikos*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1946, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Kynêg.	*Kynêgetikos*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1946, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Lak. Pol.	*Lakedaimoniôn Politeia*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1946, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Mem.	*Memorabilia*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1923, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Oikon.	*Oikonomikos*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1923, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
P. H.	*Peri Hippikês*. Translated: Marchant, E. C., 1946, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
Symp.	*Symposion*. Translated: Todd, O. J., 1923, Cambridge (Mass.) & London, Harvard University Press & William Heinemann Ltd. (Loeb Classical Library edition: parallel Greek/English text).
ZPE	*Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik*

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

"La racine du terme «logistique» est grecque" (Kroener, 1988:522).

This thesis on the logistics of ancient Greek land warfare focuses on the central questions concerning the supply, maintenance, and provisioning of Greek armies in the Classical period. It seems quite fitting, therefore, that Kroener's (*loc. cit.*) statement above; that the root of the term 'logistics' is Greek, refers to the fact that this word is Greek in origin. A Greek λογιστικός was one who was skilled in calculating, while a λογιστής was a calculator, and λογισμός a reckoning or computation.

That the subject of Greek military logistics is a sadly neglected topic has been widely and repeatedly recognised. In 1985, Lonis (1985:339), in his catalogue style summary of fifteen years of academic research on the various topics of Greek warfare carried out during the period 1968-1983, has only the briefest of paragraphs on the subject of Greek military logistics. Lonis (*loc. cit.*) observed in his section 'logistique', that: "Ce problème, pour important qu'il soit, n'a fait l'objet, récemment, d'aucune étude particulière pour l'époque classique". Lonis (*ibid.*) goes on to observe that logistics in the age of Alexander had received attention from Engels, in the form of Engels' work: *Alexander the Great and the logistics of the Macedonian army* (1978), and Lonis (*ibid.*) duly notes Pritchett's chapter on 'Provisioning' in the first volume of Pritchett's work: *The Greek State at War* (1971:30-52), though Lonis (*loc. cit.*) fails to note Anderson's chapter on 'Commissariat and Camps' in Anderson's work: *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (1970:43-66). Ducrey (1986:199) takes the view that: "technological developments account for the growing importance of logistics in modern times. Nevertheless, they also played an appreciable role in antiquity...And although war commanders are frequently confronted with problems of logistics, it was not until recently that their importance was generally recognised. Studies on the subject of logistics are rare indeed, particularly in the history of warfare in ancient Greece". Similarly, Lazenby (1994:3) points out of logistics that: "with rare exceptions, this is a neglected subject in the study of

Greek warfare". Luttwak (1993:4-5), in a brief essay on ancient military logistics, takes a similar view to that of Ducrey (*loc. cit.*) in alleging that the study of, and concern with, logistics is a relatively modern phenomenon. Luttwak (1993:5) even goes so far as to state that: "we may assert categorically that Thucydides and all his emulators of classical antiquity included lengthy speeches while excluding any sufficient account of how food, fodder, and weapons were procured because the contemporary reader wanted his history books to be written that way". By comparison, Burn (1984:352) with regard to Xerxes' invasion and Greek strategy remarks that the: "Greeks knew very well that logistics are basic to operations, though they did not (especially the later rhetorical historians) find the subject interesting".

In contrast, the statement by Keegan and Holmes (1985:221) that: "the logistic requirements of the armies of the ancient world were relatively simple" is, I believe, something of an over-simplification. Sage (1996:xiv) maintains of our source material that: "logistics are rarely touched upon and difficult to reconstruct". I aim to disprove Sage's allegation that our source material rarely touches upon logistics, and this thesis will demonstrate that the Greeks were fully aware of logistical concerns: they employed a number of methods and systems by which troops could obtain arms, armour, tools and obtaining adequate supplies of food and drink as well as being able to transport them to enable them to conduct military operations successfully. I aim to show that there is a considerable and substantial body of source material evidence to allow us to attempt to reconstruct the systems and methods employed by the ancient Greeks. In addition, I take as being correct Hamilton's (1983:120) statement that: "effective generalship in antiquity demanded attention to tactics and logistics as well as overall strategy" and aim to demonstrate that the commanders of ancient Greek armies, as well as ancient Greek authors, knew this very well.

Indeed, as if to illustrate this, Thucydides (1.11.1), discussing why the Trojan war had lasted ten years, comments that the reason was not a lack of manpower but rather a lack of money. Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains that it was due to a lack of supplies that the Greeks could only employ a force as large as the countryside

around Troy could support. Thucydides (1.11.2) goes on to state that the Greeks never brought their full force to bear as many of the troops were dispersed in the Chersonesos having resorted to farming in order to support themselves, or had taken to pillaging for the same reason. Thucydides (*ibid.*) offers us his opinion on how the Greeks could have shortened the war:

> "But if they had taken with them an abundant supply of food, and in a body, without resorting to foraging and agriculture, had carried on the war continuously, they would easily have prevailed in battle and taken the city...if they could have sat down and laid siege to Troy, they would have taken it in less time and with less trouble" (Thucydides, 1.11.2)[1].

Clearly, Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) takes the view that it was poor logistical planning on the part of the Greek forces before Troy that was responsible for the lengthy duration of the war. Furthermore, Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) offers us what he believes the solution for a speedy end to the war would have been, and this helps to show that Greek writers, and in Thucydides' case former generals, understood the importance of, and relationship between, good logistical management and planning and achieving success in military operations. Similarly, Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, 3.1.6) has Sokrates place a good understanding of logistical concerns at the very head of his list of attributes that a good general should possess. In another of his works Xenophon (*Cyropaideia*, 1.6.14-15) reiterates this same point, having the Elder Cyrus recount how the first lesson in generalship he learnt from his father was that tactics are useless if the troops do not receive sufficient provisions to keep them healthy.

I intend to divide the main body of this thesis into two distinct parts. The first part will examine the methods employed for the procurement of arms and armour by the soldiers of Greek armies. I aim to demonstrate that the notion that the

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[1] *περιουσίαν δὲ εἰ ἤλθον ἔχοντες τροφῆς καὶ ὄντες ἀθρόοι ἄνευ λῃστείας καὶ γεωργίας ξυνεχῶς τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον ῥᾳδίως ἂν μάχῃ κρατοῦντες εἷλον...πολιορκίᾳ δ' ἂν προσκαθεζόμενοι ἐν ἐλασσονί τε χρόνῳ καὶ ἀπονώτερον τὴν Τροίαν εἷλον.*

responsibility to procure arms and armour lay with the individual soldiers themselves, although a relatively standard practice, was by no means exclusive, and that other methods of procurement existed. I will show that there were indeed alternative systems employed for the procurement of arms and armour and that these systems were actually employed on occasions. The second part, which will be subdivided into chapters, will focus on the methods and systems employed by Greek armies to ensure they obtained food and drink in sufficient quantities and with sufficient regularity to enable them to undertake military campaigns, often at relatively long distances from their home *polis*. It will demonstrate that there were a number of methods that Greek armies could employ to ensure that they received adequate supplies of food and drink. I aim to provide verifiable evidence to illustrate examples of Greek armies taking provisions with them at the outset of a campaign. In addition I aim to show that there is a body of evidence to support the view that Greek armies on occasions employed foraging for provisions as a means of supply. Furthermore, I will exhibit evidence that the Greeks occasionally employed the method of purchasing provisions from established markets at towns along an army's line of march or from merchants travelling with an army. Furthermore, I aim to demonstrate that the employment of supply convoys dispatched from the home *polis* or that of an ally to rendezvous with an army in the field was a method of supply familiar to the Greeks. In addition, I will prove that the use of magazines and depots was a system of supply that was not alien to the ancient Greeks. I aim to show that Greek commanders could, and indeed did, employ any one, or combinations, of these systems to ensure that the troops under their command received adequate maintenance.

In order to address such an examination of these logistical methods and systems it will be necessary, given the practical confines of a research thesis, to set manageable parameters. Therefore, the reader should be aware that the battle of Chaironeia (338 BC) has been chosen as a convenient cut-off point. There are several reasons for choosing Philip of Makedon's victory of Chaironeia as the end-date for this thesis. Historically, the battle of Chaironeia can be seen as a watershed in Greek history as it saw the establishment of Makedonian hegemony

over the Greek *poleis*. Historiographically, to end in 338 BC would allow the project to avoid duplicating the work of Engels (1978) unnecessarily, while the military logistics of the armies of the Hellenistic *diadochoi* are worthy of study as a major research topic in their own right and will not be examined as part of this thesis.

I aim to focus whenever possible on passages of our source material that provide us with evidence as to how Greek commanders and Greek armies overcame the logistical problems facing them, and demonstrate how we may attempt to reconstruct the logistical systems employed by commanders and armies within the Greek world to ensure that they received adequate supplies of equipment, food, and drink. In addition, in cases in which we are informed that particular armies were suffering from *ἀπορία*, a lack of resources, I aim to examine how such situations came about, and what measures, if any, the commanders or armies concerned undertook to attempt to find solutions to the logistical problems facing them, and whether or not these proved to be successful.

I also aim to demonstrate that Luttwak's assertion is flawed that for the historians, politicians, and generals of antiquity: "logistics were as much a precondition of war and indeed of politics as they are now, but they were not an *aristocratic* concern except in the broadest sense. The army must be led, exhorted and commanded but the supplies merely follow (*l'intendance suive*), procured by grubby sutlers whom one does not have at one's dinner table (which they provision) and for whom one does not write one's books - for even if they read it is not their good opinion that one courts by writing" (1993:6). On the contrary, there is indeed evidence of 'aristocratic' writers and generals paying considerable attention to logistical concerns. It is worth noting exactly who Luttwak believes to be guilty of such 'aristocratic' views; Luttwak (1993:6) lists the following culprits: "Thucydides, Polybios, Tacitus, and Cassius Dio", along with their 'successors' from the Renaissance and beyond.

One name I find surprisingly absent from such a list of 'aristocratic' authors is that of Xenophon. Throughout his essay Luttwak (1993:3-7) fails to mention

Xenophon at all, yet Xenophon is undeniably 'aristocratic', having written shorter works on such aristocratic concerns as hunting (*Kynêgetikos*), on horsemanship (*Peri Hippikês*), and on commanding cavalry (*Hipparchikos*) - a particularly aristocratic branch of military service in ancient Greece - as well as a longer work on estate management (*Oikonomikos*), in addition to his more historical and philosophical writings. It is very surprising that Luttwak (*loc. cit.*) fails to take into account the evidence and testimony provided by Xenophon. His failure to even acknowledge the existence and importance of the Xenophontic corpus has, I believe, disturbing implications, especially given Xenophon's usefulness to scholars of Greek military history and military science in general. Indeed, a study on any aspect of Greek military history and military science which does not draw upon the works of Xenophon to provide evidence is deeply flawed for, as Wood (1964:38) states: "students and practitioners of military science, however, have always held Xenophon in high esteem. Ancient military writers refer to him with respect". Wood (1964:38-39) goes on to point out how Arrian also called himself Xenophon and came to be known as 'Xenophon the Younger' even going as far as to entitle his major work the *Anabasis of Alexander* in emulation of Xenophon's *Anabasis*. Furthermore, Wood (*ibid.*) maintains that even Machiavelli: "does not hesitate to acknowledge his debt to the Greek". Therefore, I believe that Xenophon's credentials as a *military* historian's historian are beyond question and as such Luttwak's (*loc. cit.*) failure to even mention Xenophon in his essay on logistics suggests perhaps poor scholarship rather than the possible suppression of evidence and testimony that, I believe, would otherwise help to demolish Luttwak's (*loc. cit.*) line of argument. Therefore, it will perhaps come as no surprise to the reader to be aware that this thesis will draw heavily on the works of Xenophon in particular as this author especially, as I aim to demonstrate, was particularly concerned with military matters.

The reader will become aware that this thesis makes extensive use of the testimony provided by Xenophon in his *Anabasis*. As it can be argued that the activities of the 'Ten Thousand' represent a wholly 'abnormal' military situation where the army came to have no 'home government' to support it, it is necessary

to offer some explanation as to why the evidence in Xenophon's *Anabasis* can be safely used. Although the *Anabasis* focuses on the activities of an 'unusual' army this is not say that the methods and systems employed by the 'Ten Thousand' to secure adequate supplies of provisions during their expedition were different from the practices of the Greek armies of 'mainstream' history. Rather, Xenophon's *Anabasis* contains examples of how the 'Ten Thousand' procured their provisions by methods that are paralleled by similar episodes from 'mainstream' Greek military history. For example, during the course of their march the 'Ten Thousand' encamped on the opposite bank of the Euphrates to the city of Charmande. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.5.10) records how the troops crossed the river (on rafts) in order to purchase their provisions. Similarly, the Athenian expeditionary force bound for Sicily in 415 BC, stopped en-route at Rhegion in order to purchase supplies (Thuc. 7.39.2). Here we have two very similar examples of military forces both obtaining provisions by purchase during their respective journeys to their intended objectives; both were, at that point, each operating at a considerable distance from the starting points of their respective expeditions. During their march following the battle of Kounaxa, the 'Ten Thousand' largely relied on foraging for supplies, the various episodes of which will be discussed in detail in the relevant portion of this thesis. It will suffice here to cite one of a number of examples of the activities of the 'Ten Thousand' that has echoes in 'mainstream' Greek history. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.30-31) gives a very detailed account of the 'Ten Thousand' gorging themselves while lodged in a number of well-stocked Armenian villages. Similarly, during the Spartan campaign against Kerkyra of 374 BC, the Spartan commander Mnasippos allowed the troops under his command to plunder and loot the well-stocked farms of the Kerkyrans with less discipline and more indiscriminately than the 'Ten Thousand' had done in Armenia, to the extent that Mnasippos' troops rejected all but the very finest foods and wines (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.5-6). Once again we can see that the 'Ten Thousand', in their search for provisions, employed a method of procurement which, as a detailed examination of other episodes from Greek history in the relevant section, will show, was a relatively common method throughout all theatres of military operations in the Greek world. Even though the experiences of the 'Ten Thousand' in Asia can be seen

as wholly exceptional, this is not to say they employed logistical methods or systems that would have been alien to *any* Greek army advancing through territory that it perceived as either 'friendly' or, alternatively, potentially hostile depending on the particular episodes that Xenophon describes. Furthermore, however unusual the situations that the 'Ten Thousand' experienced, there are two facts which cannot be overlooked: ethnically, the 'Ten Thousand' were Greeks and therefore the systems and methods employed by them to obtain provisions are valid for consideration and discussion within this thesis; secondly, this is all the more so as Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the *only* detailed account we possess of a Greek army on the march.

Indeed, despite possessing a relative wealth of source material, our substantial body of source material does however have large lacunae, as Sage (1996:xiv) correctly observes, while the treatment which the subject of logistics receives varies enormously, not merely between different authors but often within a single author's work. There may be any number of reasons for this. Firstly, an author may not have had access to the required information to allow him to produce a fully detailed account of the events and methods of procurement he is attempting to describe. Secondly, we must be aware that there may have been problems for an author attempting to obtain information. For example, when Thucydides (5.68.2) was attempting to ascertain the number of troops of the Lakedaimonians and their allies who were present at the battle of Mantineia in 418 BC, he confesses:

> "the number, either of the separate contingents or the total on either side, I could not possibly state accurately. For on account of the secrecy of their polity the number of the Lakedaimonians was unknown; and that claimed for the others, on account of men's tendency to boast with regard to their own numbers, was discredited" (Thucydides, 5.68.2)[2].

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[2] *ἀριθμον δὲ γράψαι, ἢ καθ' ἑκάστους ἑκατέρων ἢ ξύμπαντας, οὐκ ἂν ἐδυνάμην ἀκριβῶς· τὸ μὲν γὰρ Λακεδαιμονίων πλῆθος διὰ τῆς πολιτείας τὸ κρυπτὸν ἠγνοεῖτο, τῶν δ' αὖ διὰ τὸ*

There seems little doubt that there has never been a historian throughout the annals of history who has not empathised with Thucydides' statement at some time or other in their career. Thucydides was in no position to obtain accurate information about the size of the Lakedaimonian army, and this is hardly surprising given the very insular nature of the Spartan state (which Thucydides himself remarks upon in the passage above), coupled with the fact that his home *polis* of Athens was considered an enemy of Sparta at the time he was probably writing his work. This contrasts sharply with the information on the Spartan army given to us by Xenophon in his *Lakedaimoniôn Politeia* (11.1f). Xenophon, a friend of the Spartan king Agesilaos, would not have been faced with the same problems as Thucydides had been, and Xenophon would have been in a much better position to obtain information on Sparta, her army organisation, as well as her political, and social institutions than would Thucydides.

In contrast, when information was more readily available it was easier for an author to provide a more detailed account. A particularly important section of Thucydides' text as far as logistics are concerned is that regarding the Sphakteria-Pylos campaign. Thucydides (4.26.5-6) not only informs us that the Lakedaimonian state:

> "called for volunteers to convey to the island ground corn and wine and cheese and other food such as might be serviceable in a siege, fixing a high price and also promising freedom to any Helot who should get food in" (Thucydides, 4.26.5)[3].

Thucydides (4.26.6-9) goes on to inform us of the various ways by which these volunteers attempted to run the Athenian blockade of Sphakteria and get supplies through to the Spartan force on the island. In addition, Thucydides (*ibid.*) informs us of the methods employed by the Athenians in their attempts to cut the Spartan lines of supply. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing how many

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ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες ἐς τὰ οἰκεῖα πλήθη ἠπιστεῖτο.

[3] *προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἐσάγειν σῖτόν τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀληλεμένον καὶ οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἵ' ἂν ἐς πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι.*

medimnoi of grain etc. were successfully delivered to the Spartans on Sphakteria by the blockade runners and it would be unfair to expect Thucydides to be able to provide such figures. Furthermore, actually obtaining any reliable figures for the amount of foodstuffs that successfully made it through the Athenian blockade would have been an impossible task not only for Thucydides (unless Thucydides had the opportunity to interview the Spartan commander after the campaign) but undoubtedly for scholars of our own era. For example, even today customs and excise officials can only give *estimates* of the amount of contraband that is *successfully* smuggled across national borders.

In fairness to Thucydides, where figures are known, such as the quantities of provisions allowed through to the Spartans during the (earlier) truce, Thucydides (4.16.1) reports them, saying that the: "Athenians were to permit the Lakedaimonians on the mainland to send flour to the men on the island, a fixed amount and already-kneaded, for each soldier two [Attic] quarts of barley-meal (δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων) and a pint of wine (δύο κοτύλας οἴνου)[4] and a ration of meat, and for each servant half as much; and they were to send these things to the island under the supervision of the Athenians, and no boat was to sail thither secretly". Obviously, in this instance, with the Athenians both imposing and monitoring the amount of foodstuffs being transported to the island Thucydides is in a better position to obtain figures and duly records them within his narrative.

Therefore, despite our source material having large lacunae, I believe there is also a substantially large body of detailed evidence to at least attempt to reconstruct the ancient Greek approaches to military logistics. I aim to demonstrate that it is possible to build up a picture of the systems and methods employed by the ancient Greeks in their attempts to overcome the logistical problems facing their armies. Our picture may prove to be incomplete due to lack of detailed evidence for particular campaigns or particular practices, however, for even today obtaining precise and accurate information from war zones is usually difficult

[4] Forster Smith in a footnote to this passage (Loeb edition) says the *kotyle* was: "about half a pint", therefore two *kotyles* (δύο κοτύλας) would equate to about a pint.

and often impossible. Instead, we must often rely on eye-witnesses and trust that their testimony is reliable. Despite the modern use of 'spy satellites', stealth aircraft, and modern technology we can often only estimate the number of human casualties and the number of villages, towns, and even cities, destroyed in areas of conflict, therefore any lack of detail on the part of an ancient historian is all too understandable.

PART ONE: *HOPLA*, THE PROCUREMENT OF ARMS AND ARMOUR BY GREEK ARMIES

It is my purpose in this portion of the thesis to examine the systems by which Greek armies of the Classical period procured arms and armour. As the hoplite dominated Greek warfare in the Classical period it is my intention to focus mainly on this arm of military service, though I should add that the arms and armour (or lack of it as and when applicable) of other troop types: *peltastai*, *hippeis*, and *psiloi*, will also be considered.

I aim to show that the popular notion of the Greek citizen-soldier having to purchase his own equipment does not ring true either for all *poleis*, or for the whole of the Classical period. For example, Snodgrass (1967:58-59) remarks that to: "the hoplite, his equipment became a source of pride, not only as a status-symbol to show that he belonged to the class which could afford it; but as the principal medium through which he served his city". It is my view that such statements do not adequately explain the Greek systems of procuring arms and armour either as a generalising statement, nor are they applicable to the whole of the Classical period at Athens (which I believe Snodgrass was considering in his notion that only a particular socio-economic class could afford armour, for instance the Solonian *zeugitai*). Hanson (1989:57), discussing the discomfort soldiers had to endure when wearing the hoplite panoply, remarks that hoplites had to resist the: "natural urge to cast aside at a moment's notice expensive hoplite armour which usually was purchased by the individual and not supplied by the state". Further on, Hanson (1989:58) states that hoplites did not: "necessarily wear identical equipment - which is not surprising, considering that men brought along their own equipment and were never really provided with 'general issue'". Yet on his very next page Hanson (1989:59) contradicts himself stating that: "it was to Agesilaos' credit that on his return from Asia during the early fourth century he still wore his regular Spartan issue".

It could be argued, however, that Spartans were a special case in point. For example, Lazenby (1985:vii) remarks that: "although the peculiarities of the

Spartan way of life have been exaggerated, both in ancient and modern times, and it is a mistake to project these peculiarities too far back in time, taken as a whole Sparta remains unique". Indeed, Lazenby's (*loc. cit.*) assertion of the unique nature of Sparta could equally be applied to her army, which, in the literature of both ancient and modern times, is considered the most professional army in Greece until the Makedonians of Philip II[1]. Therefore, it is only fitting that I begin this work on the arms and armour supply systems of Classical Greece by first examining the Spartan, or Lakedaimonian, army.

[1] For ancient views on the 'professional' nature of the Spartan army see: Herodotos, 7.211.3, Thucydides, 2.39.1; 4.33.2, Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 26.4 (cf. Polyainos, 2.17 who repeats the episode in Plutarch) and Aristotle, *Politics* 1338b27f. For examples of modern assertions of Spartan 'professionalism' see: Lazenby (1985: passim), Connolly (1981:38), and Warry (1980:39).

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Finley (1968:149) states: "The production and distribution of weapons remain something of a puzzle. I think we can take it that the procurement of metals and the manufacture of arms were the responsibility (and also the privilege) of the *perioikoi.* But how did the individual Spartiate obtain his arms and armour? The traditional Greek conception of *hoi hopla parechomenoi*, of the hoplite as by definition the citizen (or metic) rich enough to equip himself, does not apply. All Spartiates were 'rich' enough, but none had the proper market mechanism. The choice lies between (*a*) individual procurement from *perioikoi* by payment in *naturalia* (or, conceivably, iron spits), and (*b*) procurement and distribution by the state. I know of no ancient text which gives the answer. Nor does archaeology help in the absence of systematic excavation of any perioikic community. One can argue either way from the shields, all of which were required to have a Lambda inscribed on them, but many (if not all) of which also had a personal blazon. My own preference is for the public supply system, because the other seems insufficiently reliable and because we do have textual evidence (Xen., *Lak. Pol.* 11.2; 13.11; cf. *Ages.* 1.26) that once the army had marched off, the state took responsibility for repair and replacement (as it must have done for the initial procurement even at home when helots were enrolled as hoplites, e.g. Thuc. 4.80.5)".

Finley's statements above suggesting a centralised state supply system for the distribution of arms and armour at Sparta appears to be correct. For example, although referring to an army led by a Spartan rather than *the* Spartan army itself, Xenophon, writing of Koroneia states of the army that Agesilaos brought back from Asia that:

> "...he [Agesilaos] so armed it that it looked like one solid mass of bronze and scarlet..." (Xenophon, *Agesilaos* 2.7)[1].

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[1] Xen. *Ages.* 2.7: *...ὥπλισέ τε οὕτως, ὡς ἅπαντα μὲν χαλκόν, ἅπαντα δὲ φοινικᾶ φαίνεσθαι.* I am not happy with Marchant's (Loeb) rendering of *φοινικᾶ* as "scarlet". I believe "crimson", or even "purple", would be a more appropriate translation, "scarlet" being *κόκκινος, κοκκοβαφής.* See Liddell & Scott (Abridged edition) page 765 (under: *φοῖνιξ, ἰκος, ὁ, ἡ...*)

What is notable about the Xenophon passage above is the relative 'uniformity' in appearance of Agesilaos' phalanx. Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 11.3) informs us of the 'crimson' (*φοινικίδα*)[2] cloaks of the Spartans and their bronze shields (*χαλκῆν ἀσπίδα*)[3] which Xenophon believed were instituted by Lykourgos. Whether or not one believes in the existence of Lykourgos as anything other than a semi-mythical figure is irrelevant here. It is clear from the passage above that Xenophon certainly considered that the preparations by the Lakedaimonian army for a campaign, as he describes them, were considered familiar and old enough to been ascribed to Lykourgos. Indeed, Sekunda (1986:6) makes a similar point, going as far as to say that: "it seems probable...that the Lakedaimonian army was one of the first Greek armies to have adopted uniform dress, and that this practice might date back to the Archaic period". Therefore, if this is the case then the Spartans seem to have had a well organised supply system in use at, perhaps, a relatively early date. If the 'crimson' colour of Spartan clothing represented a 'uniform' in a similar way to British scarlet tunics (circa late 17th Century AD onwards), then it appears to have been copied by other forces, i.e. Cyrus' Greek mercenaries:

> "and all the Greeks had helmets of bronze, crimson tunics, and greaves, and carried their shields uncovered" (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.16)[4].

Perhaps 'crimson' clothing and its use by military forces echoes the 'copying' of military styles by later (post-medieval) armies (for example, Napoleonic French lancers in 'Polish' outfits etc.). After all, since imitation is a form of flattery, the Spartans' reputation as professionals, coupled with the desire of troops, not only mercenary bands, to appear more professional, may have extended to their adoption of 'Spartan' dress, including the colour. However, how far can we extend the notion of 'uniformity of dress' to suggest a centralised state supply system at Sparta? After all, it could merely show that traders would provide 'any

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[2] "red" according to Marchant.

[3] "brass" according to Marchant.

[4] *εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς καὶ κνημῖδας καὶ τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαλυμμένας.*

colour you want so long as it's *crimson*', to corrupt the alleged saying of Henry Ford.

However, there are other factors relating to the 'uniformity' of Spartan arms and armour to be considered which might suggest a state controlled supply system. Plutarch, in a number of passages (*Moralia*, 191E; 217E; 241F; 553D, *Dion* 57-58), indicates that Spartan swords were short, even by Greek standards. Plutarch's statements (*loc. cit.*) would seem to suggest that the Spartans had uniformity in their, collective, choice of secondary offensive weapons (the long thrusting spear being their primary weapon). However, as Anderson (1993:27) points out: "it should be noted that the Spartan sword was not the sickle-shaped object called *xyele*, which formed part of the equipment of young Spartans, apparently in place of the strigil, used elsewhere in Greece to scrape off oil, sweat and dust after athletes had finished exercise". Therefore the seeming 'uniformity' of Spartan side-arms would suggest a supply system under central state control. Indeed, Cartledge (1987:44) suggests that there is the possibility that armament procurement at Sparta was: "centrally administrated...possibly by requisition from the *Perioikoi*".

Furthermore, there is also an apparent 'uniformity' among the headgear of Spartan soldiers, at least from the latter part of the fifth century onwards. Thucydides (4.34.3) refers to the *piloi* of the Spartans as being unable to provide protection against the arrows and javelins of their Athenian enemies at Sphakteria (in 425 B.C.). Anderson (1970:30-34) has suggested the possibility that the *piloi* worn by the Spartans at Sphakteria were nothing more than strong felt caps, although he concedes (1970:31) that he himself believes: "that Thucydides [4.34.3] means helmets of the *pilos* shape". Certainly, bronze examples of *piloi* do exist, though I am currently unaware of any bearing a dedicatory inscription that might prove they once belonged to Spartans[5].

[5] Should a bronze *pilos* bearing an inscription like that of the Spartan shield (B 262) excavated in the Athenian Agora (Thompson & Wycherley, 1972:92-93): Athênaioi apo Lakedaim[on]iôn ek [Pu]lo - "The Athenians (dedicated this) from the Lakedaimonians from Pylos" (which I have seen in the Agora Museum Athens) ever be found it would undoubtedly prove Anderson's

The *pilos* (helmet), being little more than a conical cap in shape, was easier to craft than the more elaborate styles of Greek helmets such as the 'Corinthian' or 'Chalkidian' types. The *pilos* would also allow its wearer a greater field of vision than the more elaborate styles as well as leaving the ears uncovered to permit the Spartan hoplite to hear verbally transmitted orders more clearly. These factors may well have influenced a Spartan decision to adopt this form of headgear. Certainly there is textual evidence to suggest that the Spartans employed shouted verbal communication in battle (Thuc. 4.34.3; 5.65.2. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.22, Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 13.9). Of these references, that of Thucydides (4.34.3) relates how the din raised by the Athenians disconcerted the Spartans, in that because of the noise the Spartans were unable to hear their *own* orders. Anderson (1970:31) readily believes that, at the time of Sphakteria: "the *pilos* was no doubt standard equipment in the Spartan army". Despite the advantages of allowing a greater field of vision and unimpeded hearing (noisy enemies not withstanding) that the *pilos* gave its wearer over other forms of helmets there was also a downside. The *pilos* left the face, ears, and neck exposed and may well go some way to explaining Polyainos' (1.17) statement that before: "a battle with the Messenians in which the Lakedaimonians had decided to conquer or die, they wrote their names on sticks tied to their left hand, so that each would be recognised by his relatives when the dead were recovered". Polyainos (*ibid.*) has 'filed' this stratagem under Tyrtaios' name though his source is, ultimately, probably Ephoros as preserved in Diodoros' narrative (fr. 8.27.2), and might, possibly, allude to Spartan practice in the *Fourth* century BC. *If* Spartan hoplites employed such 'dog-tags' in case the faces of their corpses would be unrecognisable then, surely, it would be more likely to have been during a period when their headgear provided less protection for the face than in a time which is probably prior to the adoption of the *pilos* as military headgear[6]. It would also

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interpretation of Thucydides' (4.34.4) reference to Spartan *piloi*. My own inclination is to follow Anderson and believe that Spartan *piloi* were bronze helmets of the *pilos* shape.

[6] A number of bronze figurines alleged to depict Spartan warriors have been found. For example: Provenance: Sanctuary of Zeus, Dodona, now in Ioannina Museum (inv. 4914), early fifth century (illustrated in: Ducrey, 1986:65 pl.46). Provenance: Sanctuary of Zeus, Dodona, now in Berlin, Antikenmuseum, Staaliche Museen Preussicher Kulturbesitz (inv. Misc. 7470), circa 500 B.C. (illustrated in Ducrey, 1986:275 pl.187. See also Levi, 1980:63). Unknown provenance, now in

suggest the universal, and uniform, employment of the *pilos* by Spartan hoplites which in turn might also suggest a state-controlled supply system for Spartan arms and armour.

Furthermore, there are examples of individual Spartans abroad equipping rowers, poorer allied citizens etc. with arms. These examples have been catalogued in the following table.

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS & ARMOUR BY SPARTAN OFFICERS				
Date	**Reference**	**Distributor**	**Recipients**	**Context**
Summer 427 BC	Thuc. 3.27.1-2	Salaithos	Mytilenaians	*hoplizei* distributed to poorer citizens
?424 BC	Diod. 12.68.5[7]	Brasidas	"the young men who possessed no arms" (Amphipolis)	*panoplias pollas* distibuted to: "the young men who possessed no arms" (Amphipolis)
Summer 414 BC	Thuc. 7.1.3[8]	Gylippos and Pythen (Corinthian)	Peloponnesian sailors and (?) marines	Himeraians not only persuaded to join the expedition but also furnish arms (*hopla*) for the crews of the ships.

the Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford, Conn. (gift of J. Pierpont Morgan) circa 500 B.C. (illustrated in Sekunda, 1986:3 and also as an artist's colour reconstruction [by Angus McBride] - Sekunda, 1986: front cover and plate A1; Levi, 1980:68 [colour photograph]; Lazenby, 1985:33 pl.3). These show (if the figurines actually show Spartans, only the last example is certain) that during the early fifth century the Spartans wore variants of the 'Corinthian' helmet.

[7] Cf. Thucydides, 4.109.1f, who makes no mention of Brasidas distributing arms during this campaign.

[8] Cf. Thucydides, 7.1.4, who tells us that Gylippos had: "about seven hundred" of his marines and sailors armed in this way. Cf. Diodoros, 13.7.7, who does not mention Gylippos arming his crews in this way.

DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS & ARMOUR BY SPARTAN OFFICERS				
Date	**Reference**	**Distributor**	**Recipients**	**Context**
Summer 412 BC	Thuc. 8.17.1	Chalkideus and Alkibiades (Athenian)	Peloponnesian sailors	The Lakedaimonian admiral Chalkideus and Alkibiades the Athenian allegedly armed (*hoplisantes*) the sailors from the Peloponnesian ships and stationed them on Chios. Chian sailors then took their places on the ships.
Summer 412 BC	Thuc. 8.23.4	Astyochos	citizens of Eresos (Lesbos)	The Lakedaimonian admiral Astyochos armed (*hoplisas*) the citizens of Eresos on Lesbos

Could such references indicate that these Spartan 'officers' were merely putting into operation a system of arms distribution that was familiar to them from the Spartan state system? It seems plausible to suggest that there is every likelihood such Spartans serving abroad were merely doing 'things' in the same way as they were used to doing such things back home in Sparta. That is to say the 'if it works do not tamper with it' approach.

In addition, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 11.1) states that: "if anyone wishes to discover in what respect Lykourgos' organisation of the army on active service was better than other systems, here is the information he seeks". Xenophon then goes on to relate how:

> "The Ephors issue a proclamation stating the age-limit for the levy, first for the cavalry and infantry, and then for the handicraftsmen. Thus the Lakedaimonians are well supplied in the field with all the things that are found useful in civil life. All the implements that an army may require in common are ordered to be assembled, some in carts, some on baggage animals; thus anything missing is not at all likely to be overlooked" (Xenophon, *Lak. Pol.* 11.2)[9].

However, what *were* these "implements that an army may require in common"? Another of Xenophon's works may provide us with the answer. Xenophon has the Elder Cyrus remark:

> "...we shall need the most necessary tools for repairs, since smiths and carpenters are not to be found at every turn, but there are few who cannot patch up a makeshift for the time. Then there should be a mattock and a shovel apiece for every wagon, and on every beast of burden a billhook and an axe, always useful to the owner and sometimes a boon for all" (Xenophon, *Cyropaideia* 6.2.33-34)[10].

Anderson (1970:165-191) has suggested that the military practices of the Elder Cyrus' Persians, as described in Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*, are best read as illustrating not so much the *Persian* military system but rather that of the Spartans. However, although Anderson is probably correct, these two passages (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 11.2 and Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.2.33-34) do not really tell us anything of a state supply system at Sparta for arms and armour. However, if Anderson (*loc. cit.*) is correct in seeing 'Spartan' practice in the *Cyropaideia* (6.2.33-34), coupled with the testimony of the *Lakedaimoniôn Politeia* (11.2) passage, this evidence shows that the Spartans had tools and equipment that was for use by all

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[9] *Πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν οἱ ἔφοροι προκηρύττουσι τὰ ἔτη, εἰς ἃ δεῖ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ ἱππεῦσι καὶ ὁπλίταις, ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τοῖς χειροτέχναις· ὥστε ὅσοισπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως χρῶνται ἄνθρωποι, πάντων τούτων καὶ ἐπὶ στρατιᾶς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι εὐποροῦσι· καὶ ὅσα δὲ ὀργάνων ἡ στρατιὰ κοινῇ δεηθείη ἄν, ἁπάντων τὰ μὲν ἁμάξῃ προστέτακται παρέχειν, τὰ δὲ ὑποζυγίῳ· οὕτω γὰρ ἥκιστ' ἂν τὸ ἐκλεῖπον διαλάθοι.*

[10] *ἔχειν δὲ δεῖ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαιότατα ὄργανα ἐπὶ ταῦτα πάντα· οὐ γὰρ πανταταχοῦ χειροτέχναι παραγίγνονται· τὸ δ' ἐφ' ἡμέραν ἀρκεσον ὀλίγοι τινὲς οἳ οὐχ ἱκανοὶ ποιῆσαι. ἔχειν δὲ χρὴ καὶ ἄμην καὶ σμινύην καθ' ἅμαξαν ἑκάστην, καὶ κατὰ τὸν νωτοφόρον δὲ ἀξίνην καὶ δρέπανον· ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ χρήσιμα καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ κοινοῦ πολλάκις ὠφέλιμα γίγνεται.*

in common. Therefore, might not the practice have extended to arms and armour?

However, there is still the question of who, ultimately, paid for such armour, the individual Spartans themselves, or the Spartan state? It is plausible that the cost of such armour could have been eventually paid for by the individual Spartans themselves. Plutarch (*Lykourgos*, 12.2) tells us that:

> "They met in companies of fifteen, a few more or less, and each one of the mess-mates contributed monthly a bushel of barley-meal, eight gallons of wine five pounds of cheese, two and a half pounds of figs, and in addition to this, a very small sum of money for such relishes as flesh and fish. Besides this, whenever any one made a sacrifice of first fruits, or brought home game from the hunt, he sent a portion to his mess" (Plutarch, *Lykourgos*, 12.2)[11].

Therefore, given that the Spartans contributed to their 'messes', or *syssitia*, might they not also have contributed in kind, say for example with agricultural produce, towards the cost of arms and armour? That is to say, might not Spartans have been *given* arms and armour by the state, the value of which was recuperated in the form of agricultural produce from Lakedaimonian *kleroi*? This produce could then, conceivably, have been redistributed to *peroikic* armourers in payment for their work.

Although purely a hypothetical suggestion, might not individual Spartans have borne the cost, in kind, of their own arms and armour? It really is anyone's guess. However, it is worth considering Sparta's decision to send a force to help the Chalkidians during the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides (4.80.5) remarks that:

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[11] *συνήρχοντο δὲ ἀνὰ πεντεκαίδεκα καὶ βραχεῖ τούτων ἐλάττους ἢ πλείους. ἔφερε δὲ ἕκαστος κατὰ μῆνα τῶν συσσίτων ἀλφίτων μέδιμνον, οἷου χόας ὀκτώ, τυροῦ πέντε μνᾶς, σύκων ἡμιμναῖα πέντε, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις εἰς ὀψωνίαν μικρόν τι κομιδῇ νομίσματος. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ θύσας τις ἀπαρχὴν καὶ θηρεύσας μέρος ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὸ συσσίτιον.*

> "So, on the present occasion, the Spartans gladly sent with Brasidas 700 Helots as hoplites, the rest of his forces being drawn from the Peloponnesos by the inducement of pay" (Thucydides, 4.80.5)[12].

Gomme (1956b:548) remarks of the *ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας* of this passage that it should be read: "'700 in number, to serve as hoplites'; i.e. they were provided with armour for the occasion". If Spartans provided and probably bore the cost of the arms and armour used to equip *Helots* (who surely would have been unable to afford such items even in kind), would they not have been more likely, and more willing, to have borne the cost of equipping their own citizens rather than slaves induced to serve by promises of freedom?[13]. There are reasons to doubt that they would. Firstly, having the necessary wealth to afford arms and armour, Spartan citizens may have bought their own armour as a matter of civic pride and to underline their very status as citizens. Secondly, by the time of Kinadon's conspiracy (397 BC) we hear from Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.3.7) of the many swords and machairai 'for sale' in the iron-market at Sparta[14]. Whatever system Sparta may have employed for arming its citizen troops it would seem that by the early fourth century BC at least, Spartan citizens were expected to purchase their own arms and armour at their own expense.

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[12] *καὶ τότε προθύμως τῷ Βρασίδᾳ αὐτῶν ξυνέπεμψαν ἑπτακοσίους ὁπλίτας, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ἐκ τῆς Πελοποννήσου μισθῷ πείσας ἐξήγαγεν.*

[13] Cf. Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 6.5.28, during the Theban led invasion of Lakonia in 370 BC, Helots are offered their freedom if they wished to take up arms and take their place in the ranks.

[14] I am indebted to Dr. Hans van Wees of University College London for bringing this passage to my attention.

THE ATHENIANS

The Athenian system seems to be completely in contrast with that of the Spartans. An inscription of late sixth century date from the Athenian acropolis (*IG* I^3.1)[1] of a decree regarding Athenian *kleruchs* on Salamis, states (lines 9-11) that each *kleruch* was to provide himself with his own *hopla*, or arms, to the value of 30 *drachmai* and that the arms would need to pass inspection by the archon[2]. There is also testimony to support the practice of private purchase of arms at Athens during the fifth century. Aristophanes (*Peace*, 1208-1264) has arms salesmen attempting to sell various items of armour to Trygaios without success. Although the 'door-to-door' nature of their sales 'pitch' can be doubted as fact, the actual inclusion of arms salesmen, each trying to sell their wares to Trygaios, would seem to indicate that individual Athenians, at least in 421 BC when the play was performed at the city Dionysia, were expected to procure their arms and armour on an individual basis from traders. We can safely ignore the prices of items quoted by the arms salesmen as being grossly exaggerated for comic effect[3].

Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.20) records that most Athenian citizens had their arms and armour seized by the 'Thirty', which probably explains why Thrasyboulos' followers took the trouble to collect the arms, armour and 'baggage' of their defeated opponents following an engagement (Xenophon *Hell.* 2.4.7). Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.19) goes on to relate how, following another engagement, Thrasyboulos' men took possession of the arms of two of the 'Thirty', one of the 'Ten', and about seventy others: "but they did not strip off the tunic of any citizen". As support for Thrasyboulos' faction grew, Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.25) relates that these were: "now numerous and included all sorts of people", and that they: "were engaged in making shields, some of wood, others of wicker-work, and in painting them [white]". Clearly, the disarmed citizens could not simply purchase more arms, even if they had had the economic resources to do so.

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[1] *IG* I^3.1; *SEG* xli (1992) 2; *GHI*^{2} no.14. See also *SEG* xxiii (1968) 1.

[2] Sage (1996:30) erroneously states that this inscription is an: "Athenian decree concerning Samos".

[3] 1,000 drachmai for a breastplate and 100 drachmai for a helmet.

We have already seen how, in Aristophanes (*Peace*, 1208-1264), armament manufacture at Athens appears to have been in the hands of private enterprise. This is further borne out when we consider the words of Lysias (*Against Eratosthenes* 19) that a metic family resident in Athens at the time of the 'Thirty' had 700 shields confiscated by the oligarchs. Presumably these items were what the 'family business' were producing. However, armament manufacture was not exclusively in the hands of resident foreigners at Athens. Demosthenes (*Against Aphobos* I, 27.9) relates how his father, also called Demosthenes, had a 'factory' of *machairopoioi*, makers of machairai[4]. Demosthenes (*ibid.*) tells us that this 'factory' employed: "32 or 33 slaves, most of them worth five or six minas each and none worth less than three minas". Demosthenes (*ibid.*) adds that the sword 'factory' gave his father: "a clear income of 30 minas each year". Just prior to this Demosthenes (*ibid.*) tells us how both his father's sword 'factory' and his other workshop, producing furniture items, were: "both doing a large business".

However, what of those who could not afford their own arms and armour? Thucydides (4.9.1) tells us that the Athenian general Demosthenes armed his naval crews with poor quality wicker shields of plaited willow for their involvement in the land operations at Pylos and Sphakteria in the summer of 425. Thucydides (*ibid.*) also states that a few arms were obtained from a privateer in the area and from some Messenians in a light boat. Presumably Demosthenes felt the need for more land-based troops considering he was facing the famed Spartans. Furthermore, Thucydides (4.32.1) tells us that the Athenians overran the Spartans in their first watch-posts on Sphakteria during a night attack and goes on to say:

> "Then as soon as day dawned the rest of the army began to disembark. These were the crews of somewhat more than seventy ships (with the single exception of the rowers of the lowest benches), equipped each in his own way, besides eight hundred archers and as

[4] The *machaira* was a singled edged sword especially suited to slashing and hacking.

> many targeteers [*peltastai*], and also the Messenians who had come to reinforce them, and all the others who were on duty about Pylos except the men left in the fort" (Thucydides, 4.32.2)[5].

Thucydides (4.32.4) goes on to say that the Athenian light-armed troops, presumably including the naval crews: "fought at long range with arrows, javelins, stones and slings"[6]. Given Thucydides' (4.9.1) earlier statement that Demosthenes' naval crews were, by and large, poorly armed and his statement (Thuc. 4.26.2) that the 'beach-head' of the Athenians was on a shingle beach, would suggest that some of the *lithoi* hurled at the Spartans were probably picked up on the beach and perhaps carried in the fold of the cloaks or 'wraps' of the crews[7].

The Athenian need for suitable and adequately armed manpower is also apparent from Thucydides' (8.25.1) statement that in 412:

> "At the end of the same summer there sailed from Athens to Samos one thousand Athenian and fifteen hundred Argive hoplites - for the five hundred of the Argives that were light-armed the Athenians had provided with heavy arms - together with one thousand from the allies" (Thucydides, 8.25.1)[8].

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[5] *ἅμα δὲ ἔῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινον, ἐκ μὲν νεῶν ἑβδομήκοντα καὶ ὀλίγῳ πλειόνων πάντες πλὴν θαλαμιῶν, ὡς ἕκαστοι ἐσκευασμένοι, τοξόται δὲ ὀκτακόσιοι καὶ πελτασταὶ οὐκ ἐλάσσους τούτων, Μεσσηνίων τε οἱ βεβοηθηκότες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ὅσοι περὶ Πύλον κατεῖχον πάντες πλὴν τῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ τείχους φυλάκων.*

[6] *τοξεύμασι καὶ ἀκοντίοις καὶ λίθοις καὶ σφενδόναις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἔχοντες ἀλκήν.*

[7] A number of Attic vase paintings show *psiloi* throwing stones: see Boardman (1989) figs. 231.1; 327; 392.1, 2, 3. These tend to depict either naked figures or figures wearing a *chiton*. The figures have either an animal skin or cloak draped over the left forearm (to act as a 'shield') while the right hand clutches a stone (which varies in size from the size of a cricket ball to that of a grapefruit) and is drawn back ready to throw. Dry stream beds, stony ground, or even a shingle beach would supply handy missiles for *psiloi* to pick up and use. The effects of concussion on hoplites hit by such missiles is discussed by Hanson (1989:213-214), though Hanson focuses mainly on spear-thrusts aimed at an enemy's head. Cf. Plutarch (*Pyrrhos* 34) who relates that Pyrrhos was knocked unconscious in Argos when a distressed mother watching the fighting in the street below picked up a roof tile which she hurled down at Pyrrhos and which: "struck him below the helmet and bruised the vertebrae at the base of his neck". For the use of thrown stones in sieges see: Aineias (*Poliorketika* 38.6), who suggests that the besieged lower men and baskets down outside the city walls to collect and 'recycle' such stones as missiles.

[8] *Ἐκ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηνῶν τοῦ αὐτοῦ θέρους τελευτῶντος χίλιοι ὁπλῖται Ἀθηναίων καὶ πεντακόσιοι καὶ χίλιοι Ἀργείων (τοὺς γὰρ πεντακοσίους τῶν Ἀργείων ψιλοὺς ὄντας ὥπλισαν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) καὶ χίλιοι τῶν ξυμμάχων...*

The Athenian need for suitable and adequately equipped manpower, hence Athens' arming of 500 Argive *psiloi* as hoplites, is all the more apparent when we consider that the previous year had seen the final destruction of the Athenian expeditionary force in Sicily. Indeed, as Thucydides (8.24.5) remarks, 412 saw Athens' allies in open revolt and he states that: "not even the Athenians themselves, after the Sicilian disaster, could any longer deny that their circumstances were beyond a doubt exceedingly bad".

There is an extant inscription dating from 403-402 from Athens regarding the public financial maintenance of Athenian orphans whose fathers had been killed whilst on 'active service'. This "Decree of Theozotides" (Harding no. 8)[9] outlines that these children were to receive an obol per day as financial support from the Athenian state. In comparison, Aischines (*Against Ktesiphon* 154) asks of his Athenian audience:

> "For what Greek, nurtured in freedom, would not mourn as he sat in the theatre and recalled this, if nothing more, that once on this day, when as now the tragedies were about to be performed, in a time when the city had better customs and followed better leaders, the herald would come forward and place before you the orphans whose fathers had died in battle, young men clad in the panoply of war; and he would utter that proclamation so honourable and so incentive to valour: 'These young men, whose fathers showed themselves brave men and died in war, have been supported by the state until they have come of age; and now, clad thus in full armour by their fellow citizens, they are sent out with the prayers of the city, to go each his own way; and they are invited to seats of honour in the theatre'" (Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 154)[10].

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[9] See also Stroud, R. S., 1971:280-301.

[10] *τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν ἀλγήσειεν ἄνθρωπος Ἕλλην καὶ παιδευθεὶς ἐλευθερίως, ἀναμνησθεὶς ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐκεῖνό γε, εἰ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ὅτι ταύτῃ ποτὲ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ μελλόντων ὥσπερ νυνὶ τῶν τραγῳδῶν γίγνεσθαι, ὅτ' εὐνομεῖτο μᾶλλον ἡ πόλις καὶ βελτίοσι προστάταις ἐχρῆτο, προελθὼν ὁ κῆρυξ καὶ παραστησάμενος τοὺς ὀρφανοὺς ὧν οἱ πατέρες ἦσαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τετελευτηκότες, νεανίσκους πανοπλίᾳ κεκοσμημένους, ἐκήρυττε τὸ κάλλιστον κή-ρυγμα καὶ προτρεπτικώτατον πρὸς ἀρετήν, ὅτι τούσδε τοὺς νεανίσκους, ὧν οἱ πατέρες ἐτελεύτησαν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ ἄνδρες.*

Aischines delivered this speech in 330 BC and his words indicate that the practice of equipping war orphans with a full panoply at public expense was well established by that date. Indeed, the practice of equipping Athenian orphans with their armour and weapons is alluded to by Aristophanes in his comedy *Birds* which was first performed at the Athenian Great, or City, Dionysia festival of 414 BC (*Birds* 1360)[11]. Interestingly enough, Aischines (*ibid.*) says that the orphans equipped with their armour at state expense would be presented to the citizen body (in the theatre) on the day that the tragedies were performed, that is to say at the Great, or City, Dionysia, the very festival that saw the premiere of Aristophanes' *Birds*. However, how much would the public purse expect to spend on each of these young men's armour and weapons? A possible indication is given in a fourth century inscription from Thasos (Pouilloux, 1954:371, *Inv.* 1032). This inscription, also honouring war orphans, states (lines 18-20) how, when they reached manhood, they were each given *knêmidas* (greaves), *thôrêka* (breastplate), *egcheiridion* (knife/dagger, or possibly a 'short sword'), *kranos* (helmet), *aspida* (shield), *doru* (spear), to the value of not less than three minas, or 300 drachmai. Jackson (1993:229) remarks that in order to be fit for the state to honour its war orphans these panoplies: "were presumably of good quality".

Whereas equipping the sons of Athenians who had fallen in battle with arms and armour at public expense may, in part at least, have been the product of Athenian social conscience, Athens took even further steps towards the state provision of arms and armour. The *Athenaion Politeia* (42.4), attributed to Aristotle, relates how Athenian *epheboi*, in their second year of 'national service', took part in: "an assembly in the theatre, at which the cadets display to the people the manoeuvres which they have learned and receive a shield and spear from the state. Then they patrol the frontiers of the country, and spend their time in the guard-posts". Sekunda (1986:57) remarks how these changes to the Athenian system: "are known as the Reforms of Lykourgos after the Athenian magistrate who

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ἀγαθοὶ γενόμενοι, μέχρι μὲν ἥβης ὁ δῆμος ἔτρεφε, νυνὶ δὲ καθοπλίσας τῇδε τῇ πανοπλίᾳ, ἀφίησιν ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ τρέπεσθαι ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν, καὶ καλεῖ εἰς προεδρίαν.

[11] I am indebted to Mr. Robin Seager for bringing this passage of Aristophanes to my attention.

implemented them". Sekunda (*ibid.*) believes the introduction of these measures occurred following the battle of Chaironeia (338 BC). Snodgrass (1967:59) states that despite being presented with his shield and spear by the state an Athenian *ephebe* still: "had to find the rest of his equipment at his own expense".

However, how much would it have cost for additional arms and armour? A hint is provided by Attic stelai: "recording the sale of items of personal property confiscated from Alkibiades and other condemned men, who were accused of mutilating the Herms and profaning the Eleusinian mysteries in 415-414 BC" (Pritchett, 1956:178). Pritchett (1956:307) tells us of weapons included in the sale which feature in stele II. Although the prices are for 'second-hand' items we are told that it cost two drachmai for a short spear (II.226: *doration*), and one drachma four obols for a spear without a spear-butt (II.225: *doru aneu sturakos*). Pritchett (1956:307) states that: "one other inscription is known...which contains prices for some weapons. This is from Koresia on the island of Keos and is dated at the beginning of the third century BC. The weapons mentioned were given as prizes of victory, so were presumably of good quality". Pritchett (1956:307) gives the prices in the form of a table which has been reproduced below.

VALUE OF WEAPONS IN *IG* XII, 5, 647

Weapon	*Price*	*Line No.*
Bow (*toxon*)	7 drachmai	28
Bow and quiver (*pharetra*)	15 drachmai	28
Spearhead (*lonche*)[12]	3.33[r] obols	31
Staffpole (*kontos*)	2 drachmai	31
Shield	20 drachmai	31

[12] Pritchett (1956:307 n.5), remarks that this item might possibly be a complete spear. Cf. Snodgrass (1967:127) who is of the opinion that this is a spear (rather than a spear-head), and suggests comparison with the earlier 'second-hand' spear without a spear-butt (the *doru aneu sturakos* mentioned above) at one drachma four obols. I myself believe that the *lonche* here, valued at only three and a third obols, *must* be a spear-head only, if not the cost and value of weapons must have fallen greatly in the intervening years and following the emergence of the *sarissa*.

Of weapons prices in general, Pritchett (*ibid.*) remarks that: "our evidence is scattered, but we may safely conclude that weapons were not cheap". Snodgrass (1967:127) also cites the value of these prizes pointing out that they were given to those successful in an archery competition. Snodgrass (*ibid.*) also states that among the list of prizes was a helmet valued at six drachmai, but fails to give any further details.

Unfortunately, no *reasonably believable* prices are known for the cost of either *thorakês* (breastplates or cuirasses) or *spolades* (corslets). As we can interpret the former of these to be metal (bronze) armour and the latter as either leather or linen armour it naturally follows that the latter, one would assume, would be the less expensive of the two. The alleged price of a thorax costing 1,000 drachmai in Aristophanes (*Peace* 1224) is, as has been pointed out earlier, obviously exaggerated for comic effect, as is the price of the helmet (Aristophanes *Peace* 1251) at 100 drachmai[13].

Kroll (1977:141) has written of: "nine lead tokens...found in 1971 in the [Athenian] Agora well with the large lot of 3rd century cavalry tablets...Coming from the same context as the tablets, the tokens should date with them to around the middle of the 3rd century BC Each token is stamped on both sides. On the obverse is shown a piece of armour - helmet, corslet, greave or shield...On the reverse is a letter - alpha, gamma, or delta"[14]. Kroll (1977:143) goes on to state that: "although the purpose of most ancient tokens is notoriously uncertain, there

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[13] Cf. the cost of a complete panoply in the Thasos inscription (lines 18-20 above) of 300 drachmai, and the six drachmai helmet given as a prize in Keos (see above and Snodgrass, 1967:127).

[14] Kroll (1977:141) informs us that one token has a depiction of Nike on the obverse side. He suggests (1977:143) that : "the Nike, too, ought to refer to some kind of military equipment. A military standard is one possibility, though more probably the Nike stands for an item like a spear or a sword that does not lend itself to depiction in the small field of the token". Although I find the suggestion that it may represent a standard plausible enough (Asklepiodotos [*Tech Tactic*, 2.9] ascribes one *semeiophoros* to each 256 man strong *syntagma*), I am not fully convinced by Kroll's suggestion that the Nike figure represents a spear or sword. I believe *either* of these items would have been easier to engrave on a die than that of a figure of: "Nike standing left, holding a (?) trophy in her right hand" (Kroll, 1977:143), especially if the die-maker chose to depict only a spear-head and *part* of the shaft, as intricate and detailed designs, for example the club of Herakles (see Kraay, 1969:65 and plate I), are quite often seen on Greek coins (cf. Kraay, 1969:65-75, plates I-VIII).

is good documentary evidence that some were distributed by the state to be exchanged for public pay or for allotments of grain. The iconography of the present tokens suggests for them an analogous function, namely that they were to be exchanged for the issue of state-owned armour". Kroll (*ibid.*) suggests that the letters on the reverse of some of the tokens represent 'sizes', that is to say, that the alpha, gamma, and delta correspond with, perhaps, 'small', 'medium', and 'large'. Kroll (*ibid.*) also points out that these letters *only* appear on those tokens depicting greaves, corslets, and helmets, notably three items of equipment that would need to be reasonably 'tailored' to fit men's differing physiques.

However, as Sekunda (1986:56) points out these: "lead tokens imply state ownership and issue of arms and equipment in the Hellenistic period; but how far did the practice stretch back into the Classical period?" Sekunda (*ibid.*) cites Demosthenes' oration *Against Stephanos* I (45.85) in which we hear of how the banker Pasion donated 1,000 shields to the Athenian state. Elsewhere, but not cited by Sekunda, Demosthenes (*On the Crown*, Or. 18.116) cites a decree which tells us that Chairedemos and Diotimos gratuitously bestowed eight hundred shields for the *neaniskoi*, or 'young men'/'youths', of Athens. By comparison, Plutarch (*Lives of the Ten Orators*, 852C) tells us that Lykourgos had stored a great quantity of arms and armour (*hopla polla*) on the Athenian acropolis. Kroll (1977:144) believes that: "we may assume that such equipment was kept on hand primarily for the arming of irregulars - thetes and slaves - at time of total mobilisation; for Athenians of the hoplite register were legally responsible for procuring their own military equipment". Sekunda (1986:58) concurs, remarking that: "as far as the Athenian state was concerned the main use of this armour was not to replace that owned by private citizens, but to expand the size of the hoplite force by providing arms for those too poor to afford them". My own view follows that of both Kroll and Sekunda in that complete state provision of arms and armour at Athens during the fourth century BC and later applied only to war orphans and to those too poor to purchase their own equipment.

Furthermore, there were elements of Athenian society, throughout the Classical period, that could not only afford their own arms and armour, but lavished

considerable expenditure on such items. Xenophon, writing in the third person of how he addressed an assembly of the Ten Thousand, tells us that:

> "...Xenophon arose, arrayed for war in his finest dress. For he thought that if the gods should grant victory, the finest raiment was suited to victory; and if it should be his fate to die, it was proper, he thought, that inasmuch as he had accounted his office worthy of the most beautiful attire, in this attire he should meet his death" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.2.7)[15].

Clearly, Xenophon possessed *more than one set of armour* if he chose to wear his finest to address the meeting. Presumably other individuals among the Ten Thousand also had additional armour, as Xenophon later tells us that when his idea to raise a cavalry force was approved at another meeting of the Ten Thousand, the following morning saw how:

> "...horses and horsemen to the number of fifty were examined and accepted, and jerkins[16] and cuirasses were provided for them; and Lykios, the son of Polystratos, an Athenian, was put in command of the troop" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 3.3.20)[17].

Unfortunately, Xenophon never tells us *who exactly* supplied the *spolades* and *thorakes* for the cavalry force. However, it seems plausible to suggest that it was *either* men of 'officer' rank or else relatively wealthy hoplites among the Ten

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[15] *...Ξενοφῶν ἀνίσταται ἐσταλμένος ἐπὶ πόλεμον ὡς ἐδύνατο κάλλιστα, νομίζων, εἴτε νίκην διδοῖεν οἱ θεοί, τὸν κάλλιστον κόσμον τῷ νικᾶν πρέπειν, εἴτε τελευτᾶν δέοι ὀρθῶς ἔχειν τῶν καλλίστων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιώσαντα ἐν τούτοις τῆς τελευτῆς τυγχάνειν.*

[16] 'jerkins', Brownson's [Loeb] translation for *spolades*. I prefer the term 'corslets' or even more preferable, simply transliterating as *spolades*, largely because it avoids confusion, and secondly, modern historians writing of the *Roman* army often use Latin terms for items of Roman armour, and I see no good reason why those of us involved with *Greek* military history should not follow suit by using Greek terms and terminology. Furthermore, terms such as hoplites and peltasts (more correctly *peltastai*) are already relatively familiar and increasingly used and understood by both students and laymen alike so the increased use of proper terms and terminology would be, even if only eventually, understood.

[17] *...ἵπποι δὲ καὶ ἱππεῖς ἐδοκιμάσθησαν τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ εἰς πεντήκοντα, καὶ σπολάδες καὶ θώρακες αὐτοῖς ἐπορίσθησαν, καὶ ἵππαρχος ἐπεστάθη Λύκιος ὁ Πολυστράτου Ἀθηναῖος.*

Thousand[18] who may have possessed 'spare' armour. Nor do we know if it was any of the Athenians among the Ten Thousand. Roy (1967:300-309) catalogues the known (named) Athenians with the Ten Thousand appearing in Xenophon's *Anabasis* narrative, adding of these that: "the Athenians were all officers" (Roy, 1967:307), though he does concede that of the sixty-six named individuals among the whole of the Ten Thousand some fifty-two were of officer rank adding (*ibid.*): "that the evidence for non-officers is poor".

There is, however, further evidence of the expense lavished by some Athenians on arms and armour at Athens. Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, 3.10.10) alleges that Pistias the breastplate-maker (*τὸν θωρακοποιὸν*) charged more for his work than other armourers because the 'fit' of his breastplates was better than those produced by others. Xenophon (*Mem.* 3.10.13) has Sokrates remark how the well-fitting breastplate is much less of a burden than an ill-fitting one and that the former is more advantageous to the wearer, to which Xenophon (*Memorabilia.* 3.10.14) has Pistias reply:

> "The advantage you speak of is the very one which I think makes my work worth a big price. Some, however, prefer to buy the ornamented and the gold-plated breastplates" (Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.14)[19].

To this Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, 3.10.15) has Sokrates remark: "Still, if the consequence is that they buy misfits, it seems to me they buy ornamented and gold-plated trash". This would suggest that *some* Athenians *did* buy elaborately decorated and gilded breastplates purely for their appearance giving little thought, it would seem, to the ensuing discomfort of an ill-fitting cuirass rather than purchase a more functional, though less ornate, but better fitting breastplate. For some individual Athenians their ostentation did not stop at breastplates. Plutarch (*Alkibiades* 16) tells us that Alkibiades had a gold shield made for himself.

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[18] Though of course 'relatively wealthy hoplites' among the Ten Thousand would be extremely rare if we believe Isokrates' (*Panegyrikos* 146; *Philippos* 89-92) statements regarding the alleged poverty of the Ten Thousand in general.

[19] *Εἴρηκας, ἔφη, αὐτό, δι' ὅπερ ἔγωγε τὰ ἐμὰ ἔργα πλείστου ἄξια νομίζω εἶναι· ἔνιοι μέντοι τοὺς ποικίλους καὶ τοὺς ἐπιχρύσους θώρακας μᾶλλον ὠνοῦνται.*

Elsewhere, Plutarch (*Nikias* 28) tells us that down to his own day: "a shield, said to belong to Nikias, can be seen in one of the temples of Syracuse. The outside shows a design of gold and purple, elaborately inlaid and interwoven". Similarly, Plutarch (*Demosthenes*, 20.2) tells us that at Chaironeia Demosthenes had the words *agathê tuchê* ('with good fortune') on his shield in gold. However, as Sekunda (1986:56) remarks: "we are not told whether the words were written on the inside of the shield, or on the rim, or alongside a blazon".

For most Athenians during the Classical period the private individual would appear to have purchased his own arms and equipment with the notable exceptions of war orphans, *epheboi* (post-Chaironeia at least) and those too poor to purchase arms. In addition to the passages already cited there are also the diverse motifs on the shields of figures on Attic vases which were probably copied from 'life'. Lamachos in Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (964-5, 1124, 1181) has a gorgon motif on his shield which was presumably familiar enough with the audience as belonging to Lamachos for Aristophanes to mock it. Sekunda's (1986:24) interpretation is surely correct in stating that the shields marked *ATHE* and carried by Athenian *ephebes* in a *hoplitodromos*, or armoured foot-race, on a small Attic *pelike*[20] of around 430 BC are shown thus as they: "would all be equal in weight: they were used in the armoured race to make sure no one was running with an artificially lightened shield". That is to say that such shields, at least in this period, are more likely to be state approved and accepted 'weights and measures' than to suggest they might indicate state supply of arms to Athenian *ephebes*. Athens did go some way (notably from the fourth century BC onward) towards state provision and the state subsidising of arms and armour for sections of the citizen body, but that by and large the majority of Athenian citizens were expected to provide their own arms and armour during the Classical period.

[20] Laon, Municipal Museum of Archaeology, 371029.

OTHER STATES

So far we have examined the possible methods by which the Spartans and Athenians may have procured arms and armour in the Classical period, and, during this discussion we have touched only briefly on the practices of other states. However, what of these other states? A hint may be provided by the fourth century writer Aineias who states that:

> "One ought also to take precautions in regard to the arms imported for sale and displayed in the market-place, likewise those in the small shops and the bazaars (since these, if gathered together, would make a considerable number), to prevent them from being ready at hand for anyone of those who desire to start a revolution" (Aineias, *Poliorketika* 30.1)[1].

This passage by Aineias illustrates both the importation into, and the open sale of arms from 'retail outlets' within, a Greek city. Presumably such an allusion would have been one familiar enough to many or most Greeks for Aineias to have used it as an example for suggesting that a city's leaders ensured the careful monitoring of arms for sale in any given city. Naturally, it would follow that this example, probably outlined by Aineias for its 'universal' familiarity and it being applicable to many and most, if not all, Greek *poleis* during the fourth century, suggests that the private purchase of arms and armour by individual citizens was the most common practice in the Greek world during the Classical period.

Although Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.3) tells us that Agesilaos was given: "everything he asked for and provisions for six months" by the Lakedaimonians to undertake his expedition in Asia, he does not inform us if Agesilaos asked for armour and weapons with which to equip the Asiatic Greeks. Later, however, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.17) describes how, when Agesilaos had made Ephesos his base:

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[1] *Προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ πράσει εἰσαγόμενα καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἐκτιθέμενα ὅπλα τά τε ἐπὶ τῶν καπηλείων καὶ παντοπωλείων, ὧν ἀθροισθέντων πλῆθός τι γένοιτ' ἄν, ὅπως μηδενὶ ἕτοιμα ᾖ τῶν βουλομένων νεωτερίζειν.*

> "In fact he made the entire city, where he was staying , a sight worth seeing; for the market was full of all sorts of horses and weapons offered for sale, and the copper-workers, carpenters, smiths, leather-cutters, and painters were all engaged in making martial weapons, so that one might have thought that the city was really a workshop of war" (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.17)[2].

Cornelius Nepos (*Agesilaus*, 3), writing of the same expedition, relates how Agesilaos, following his campaign in Phrygia: "led back his army to Ephesos for the winter, and erecting forges for arms there, made preparations for war with great industry". Nepos is probably following Xenophon at this point though both authors make it clear that Agesilaos was responsible for *arranging* the production of arms at Ephesos. However, although Agesilaos had *arranged* for the production of arms for his Asiatic Greek allies at Ephesos who, ultimately, paid for them? It seems probable that it was the Asiatic Greeks themselves and such a hypothesis is based on another of Xenophon's statements regarding Agesilaos' Asian expedition. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.15) states that when Agesilaos decided to raise a cavalry force drawn from the Asiatic Greek *poleis*:

> "Accordingly he [Agesilaos] assigned the richest men in all the cities in that region to the duty of raising horses; and by proclaiming that whoever supplied a horse and arms and a competent man would not have to serve himself, he caused these arrangements to be carried out with all the expedition that was to be expected when men were eagerly looking for substitutes to die in their stead" (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.15)[3].

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[2] *ἀξίαν δὲ καὶ ὅλην τὴν πόλιν ἐν ᾗ ἦν θέας ἐποίησεν· ἥ τε γὰρ ἀγορὰ ἦν μεστὴ παντοδαπῶν καὶ ἵππων καὶ ὅπλων ὠνίων, οἵ τε χαλκοτύποι καὶ οἱ τέκτονες καὶ οἱ χαλκεῖς καὶ οἱ σκυτοτόμοι καὶ οἱ ζωγράφοι πάντες πολεμικὰ ὅπλα κατεσκεύαζον, ὥστε τὴν πόλιν ὄντως οἴεσθαι πολέμου ἐργαστήριον εἶναι.* Cf. the almost identical passage in Xenophon, *Agesilaos* 1.26.

[3] *καὶ τοὺς μὲν πλουσιωτάτους ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἐκεῖ πόλεων ἱπποτροφεῖν κατέλεξε· προειπὼν δέ, ὅστις παρέχοιτο ἵππον καὶ ὅπλα καὶ ἄνδρα δόκιμον, ὅτι ἐξέσται αὐτῷ μὴ στρατεύεσθαι, ἐποίησιν οὕτω ταῦτα συντόμως πράττεσθαι ὥσπερ ἄν τις τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ ἀποθανούμενον προθύμως ζητοίη* Cf. Xen. *Agesilaos* 1.23-24.

Certainly Xenophon makes it clear exactly *who* was to provide the horses and arms and suitable manpower for Agesilaos' cavalry force: the richest (*πλουσιωτάτους*) men of the Asiatic Greek *poleis*. Presumably Agesilaos, by arranging for the manufacture and sale of arms at Ephesos, felt he provided the means by which his allies could equip themselves and, presumably, they did so at their own expense. Agesilaos appears to have provided an incentive for his allies to equip themselves as well as they could afford by his offering prizes for the best turned out and best drilled units (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.16; *Agesilaos* 1.25, cf. Nepos, *Agesilaus* 3). However, that the emphasis lay with his allied troops to provide their own arms is proved by Xenophon's (*Hell.* 3.4.17; *Agesilaos* 1.26) remark that the arms produced in Ephesos were "for sale" (*ὠνίων*).

Immediately prior to Agesilaos' expedition to Asia Minor Spartan leadership in Asia had been provided by Derkylidas (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.9f). Derkylidas' army had also contained troops drafted from the Asiatic Greek cities. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.17) records of the preparations prior to a battle in Ionia that:

> "Now all that part of the army which was from the Peloponnesos kept quiet and prepared for battle; but as for the men from Priene and Achilleion, from the islands and the Ionian cities, some of them left their arms in the standing grain (for the grain was tall in the plain of the Maiander) and ran way, while all those who did stand showed clearly that they would not stand very long" (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.17)[4].

Certainly troops would be more inclined to abandon expensive equipment if they themselves had not had to pay for it to begin with. However, we have no real evidence to suggest that, on this occasion, Derkylidas' Asiatic Greek allies had not originally paid for their equipment themselves. It could indeed be possible that Derkylidas' non-Peloponnesian troops were willing to abandon equipment that they *had* paid for themselves. Indeed, Hanson (1989:63) quite correctly

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[4] *ὅσον μὲν δὴ ἦν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου στράτευμα, ἡσυχίαν εἶχε καὶ παρεσκευάζετο ὡς μαχούμενον· ὅσοι δὲ ἦσαν ἀπὸ Πριήνης τε καὶ Ἀχιλλείου καὶ ἀπὸ νήσων καὶ τῶν Ἰωνικῶν πόλεων, οἱ μέν τινες καταλιπόντες ἐν τῷ σίτῳ τὰ ὅπλα ἀπεδίδρασκον· καὶ γὰρ ἦν βαθὺς ὁ σῖτος ἐν τῷ Μαιάνδρου πεδίῳ· ὅσοι δὲ καὶ ἔμενον, δῆλοι ἦσαν οὐ μενοῦντες.*

points out that: "throughout Greek literature we find constant references to the abandonment of hoplite arms on the field of battle". For example, Aristophanes (*Wasps*, 22) jokes at Kleonymos' expense about the latter's tendency to abandon his shield in battle. Similarly, following the failed Athenian night-assault on Epipolai, Thucydides (7.45.2) remarks how the Athenians left behind more arms than corpses on the heights. Obviously on this occasion some Athenian troops had abandoned their equipment in their flight. In a similar vein, Herodotos (5.91.1) alleged that the poet Alkaios once saved himself by abandoning his arms and fleeing from a battle. Perhaps the most well-known incident of the abandonment of military equipment is referred to in a fragment of a piece written by the Lyric poet Archilochos (fragment 5):

> "Some Thracian [now] is pleased with my shield, which unwillingly I left on a bush in perfect condition on our side [of the battlefield]; but I escaped death. To hell with that shield! I shall get another no worse" (Archilochos, fragment 5)[5].

Despite the expensive nature of arms and armour it would appear from the examples cited above that troops were, sometimes, prepared to abandon their equipment, regardless of the financial loss, in order to preserve their lives by attempting to flee from the field of battle unimpeded by heavy or awkward equipment. Therefore, the abandonment of arms in Ionia, as described by Xenophon (*loc. cit.*), could very well indicate that some of Derkylidas' allied troops were more concerned with the preservation of their own lives and, as seems only natural in the circumstances, less concerned with the loss of expensive equipment.

We have already seen how, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.20)[6], the 'Thirty' confiscated the arms of Athenian citizens. A strikingly similar occurrence,

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[5] *Ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ, ἔντος ἀμώμητον κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων·αὐτὸς δ' ἐξέφυγον θανάτου τέλος· ἀσπὶς ἐκείνη ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω.*

[6] See also Lysias, *Against Erastothenes* 19, and the confiscation of 700 shields from a Metic family in Athens by the 'Thirty'.

according to Diodoros (14.10.4), took place at Syracuse in 404 BC. Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) relates that:

> "Dionysios, sending the Syracusans out to harvest their crops, entered their homes and carried off the arms of them all..." (Diod. 14.10.4)[7].

Similarly, we also hear from Diodoros (14.15.1), that in 403 BC Dionysios (the Elder) also took: "their arms from the citizens" of Katanê. This would imply that the citizens of both Syracuse and Katanê had, prior to their seizure by Dionysios, possessed their own arms and armour[8]. Yet later, during Dionysios' preparations for the coming war with Carthage, Diodoros (14.44.2) states that:

> "From the Syracusans he [Dionysios] enrolled those who were fit for military service in companies [*eis taxeis*] and from the cities subject to him he summoned their able men" (Diod. 14.44.2)[9].

Diodoros fails to mention if and when these citizen troops were equipped with arms and armour even though, if they were not re-armed with the most rudimentary weapons, they would have been useful only as rowers in Dionysios' navy. In order to ascertain how Dionysios set about using the citizens of Syracuse (and, presumably, the citizens of his subject cities) in his campaigns we must turn to Polyainos (5.2.14) to provide an answer. Polyainos (5.2.14) states that:

> "After Dionysios confiscated the citizens arms, whenever he needed to fight the enemy he ordered them to advance 100 stades from the city, and then returned the arms. After the battle, before they returned

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[7] *Διονύσιος δὲ τοὺς Συρακοσίους ἐπὶ τὸν θερισμὸν ἀποστείλας ἐπῆλθε τὰς οἰκίας, καὶ τὰ μὲν ὅπλα πάντων ἀφείλετο...*

[8] Cf. Xen. *Hiero* 5.3, in which Xenophon appears to be acutely aware of how an autocratic ruler would employ such methods when he has the tyrant Hiero say to Simonides that: "even a despot must needs love his city, for without the city he can enjoy neither safety nor happiness. But despotism forces him to find fault even with his fatherland. For he has no pleasure in seeing that the citizens are stout-hearted and well-armed; rather he delights to make the foreigners more formidable than the citizens, and these he employs as a bodyguard".

[9] *τῶν οὖν Συρακοσίων κατέλεγε τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους εἰς τάχεις, καὶ παρὰ τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν ταττομένων πόλεων μετεπέμπετο τοὺς εὐθέτους.*

> to the city and opened the gates, he ordered them to put their arms aside again" (Polyainos, 5.2.14)[10].

Earlier in Syracuse's history the practice of citizens providing their own arms and armour is implied in a summary of a speech Thucydides (6.72.4) attributes to the Syracusan Hermokrates. Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) believed that it was Hermokrates who suggested the Syracusans should cut the number of generals holding command down from fifteen. Thucydides (*ibid.*) then reports that Hermokrates also suggested that: "during this winter [415-414 BC] they [the Syracusans] should get the hoplite-force ready, providing arms for those who had none, in order that the number might be as large as possible". This would suggest that the majority of citizens who were wealthy enough already had armour and weapons of their own and that Hermokrates is here suggesting that the Syracusan state provide equipment for those who were too poor to afford it. Furthermore, as McKechnie (1989:82) points out: "the implication is that even under democracy Syracuse could (given good management) issue arms to citizens to maximise hoplite strength in the field". In addition, as McKechnie (1989:95 n.21) indicates, during Dionysios the Elder's attempt to secure power in 406 BC, we hear how:

> "For instance Dionysios at once selected such citizens as were without property but bold in spirit, more than a thousand in number, provided them with costly arms, and buoyed them up with extravagant promises" (Diod. 13.96.1)[11].

Presumably Dionysios' recent appointment as *stratêgos autokrator* (Diod. 13.95.1) had ensured that, in his military capacity, he had access to any stockpiled arms within the possession of the Syracusan state.

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[10] *Διονύσιος τὰ ὅπλα τῶν πολιτῶν παρελόμενος, ἡνίκα πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κινδύνου καιρὸς ἦν, προάγειν αὐτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἑκατὸν στάδια κελεύσας, τότε ἀπεδίδου τὰ ὅπλα· μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην, πρὶν ἐπανελθεῖν εἰς τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰς πύλας ἀνοῖξαι, πάλιν αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευεν ἀποτίθεσθαι τὰς πανοπλίας.*

[11] *Εὐθὺ γὰρ τοὺς χρημάτων μὲν ἐνδεεῖς, τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ θρασεῖς ἐπιλέξας, ὑπὲρ τοὺς χιλίους, ὅπλοις τε πολυτελέσι καθώπλισε καὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις ἐπαγγελίαις ἐμετεώρισε.*

There are also other alleged incidents of the arming of those Syracusans without their own arms later in the history of that *polis*. Diodoros (16.6.5) alleges that when the disenchanted Dion was planning the overthrow of Dionysios II he reached Corinth and began recruiting mercenaries. In addition, Diodoros (*ibid.*) alleges, Dion also began to: "collect armour" (*πανοπλίας συνήθροιζε*), and: "gradually accumulated large supplies of armour and many mercenaries". In all, Diodoros (16.9.5) states that Dion collected 5,000 panoplies[12] and that, upon his arrival in Sicily:

> "Dion distributed the 5,000 panoplies to such of the Syracusans as were unarmed, and equipped the rest as well as he could with weapons that came to hand" (Diod. 16.10.3)[13].

Plutarch's (*Dion* 22f) version of events somewhat contradicts that of Diodoros (*loc. cit.*). Plutarch (*Dion* 22.5) alleges that Dion recruited less than 800 mercenaries and makes no mention of Dion collecting full panoplies. Later however, Plutarch (*Dion* 25.1), describing Dion's embarkation for Sicily, states that:

> "The soldiers of Dion filled two merchant-ships, and a third transport of small size, together with two thirty-oared galleys, accompanied these. Moreover, besides the arms which the soldiers had, Dion carried two thousand shields, missiles and spears in great numbers" (Plut. *Dion* 25.1)[14].

Clearly there is a great discrepancy between the accounts of Plutarch and Diodoros both as regards the type and the quantity of equipment that Dion took with him to Sicily. Plutarch's statement (*loc. cit.*) that Dion took 2,000 shields and an undisclosed number of spears and other missiles is in complete contrast

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[12] *πανοπλίας πεντακισχιλίας.*

[13] *Δίων δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀνόπλοις τῶν Συρακοσίων διέδωκε τὰς πεντακισχιλίας πανοπλίας, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν τοῖς παρατυχοῦσιν ὅπλοις συνεσκεύασεν.*

[14] *Τοὺς δὲ στρατιώτας τοὺς Δίωνος ἐξεδέξαντο στρογγύλαι δύο ναῦς, τρίτον δὲ πλοῖον οὐ μέγα καὶ δύο τριακόντοροι παρηκολούουν. ὅπλα δέ, χωρὶς ὧν εἶχον οἱ στρατιῶται, δισχιλίας μὲν ἐκόμιζεν ἀσπίδας, βέλη δὲ καὶ δόρατα πολλά.*

to, and falls far short of, Diodoros' assertions (*loc. cit.*) that Dion took with him, and later distributed, 5,000 complete panoplies. Plutarch (*Dion* 27.3) alleges that following Dion's arrival in Sicily:

> "No fewer than five thousand men had joined him on the march, and though they were wretchedly armed with such weapons as came to hand, their enthusiasm made up for their lack of equipment, so that when Dion gave the word they advanced on the run, exhorting one another with joyful shouts to win their liberty" (Plut. *Dion* 27.3)[15].

Therefore, we have two contrasting versions of the extent to which Dion is alleged to have equipped those Syracusans who had joined his cause. Earlier in his narrative Plutarch (*Dion* 19.5) asserts that Dionysios II had seized and sold the property of Dion, keeping the money from the sale himself. This immediately raises the question of how Dion had raised sufficient funds to acquire *either* 5,000 panoplies or 2,000 shields and "missiles and spears in great numbers". Certainly, Dion may have had some 'liquid assets' despite the seizure of his estate and he could, perhaps, count on some financial support from friends and allies at Corinth and his fellow exiles. It may be possible that such support took the form of support in kind, that is to say by his friends and allies donating equipment to his cause. Either way, however, I find Plutarch's version of the amount of equipment Dion had in his possession to distribute is the more plausible.

McKechnie (1989:94 n.12) suggests that the cost of a full Greek panoply might plausibly be reckoned as costing about 100 drachmai. If Diodoros' (16.10.3) figure of 5,000 panoplies is to be believed then the purchase cost, using McKechnie's suggested cost-price, would amount to some 500,000 drachmai or 5,000 minai or, put another way, 83 talents! In contrast, based on the cost of a shield valued at 20 drachmai (*IG* XII.5.647, line 31), the 2,000 shields Plutarch

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[15] *ἦσαν δὲ πεντακισχιλίων οὐκ ἐλάττους προσγεγονότες κατὰ τὴν ὁδόν· ὡπλισμένοι δὲ φαύλως ἐκ τοῦ προστυχόντος ἀνεπλήρουν τῇ προθυμίᾳ τὴν τῆς παρασκευῆς ἔνδειαν, ὥστε κινήσαντος τοῦ Δίωνος δρόμῳ χωρεῖν μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ βοῆς ἀλλήλους παρακαλοῦντας ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν.*

(*Dion* 27.3) states Dion took with him would be valued at some 40,000 drachmai or 400 minai or somewhat over six and a half talents. Admittedly the cost of a shield valued at 20 drachmai is from a third century context and is also for an item given as a prize and so, presumably, was of high quality. Nevertheless even allowing for, perhaps, a slightly lower price-value in the mid-fourth century the figure of just over six and a half talents for 2,000 shields is infinitely more plausible than believing Dion and his supporters could raise over eighty-three talents for 5,000 complete panoplies. Unfortunately, without a firm figure for the number of spears Dion is alleged to have taken with him it is impossible to calculate the overall cost, although Pritchett (1956:307) records the second-hand prices of two drachmai for a *doration* (short spear) and one drachmai four obols for a spear without a spear-butt (*doru aneu sturakos*) from the Attic stelai (II.225-226) recording the sale of goods confiscated from Alkibiades in 415-414. Plutarch's (*Dion*, 25.1) remarks about other missiles, similarly, shed no light on either what these may have been or their cost. Greek slingers used lead sling-bullets[16] cast in either bronze or terracotta moulds,[17] however we of no knowledge of prices for lead slingshot from our sources. The lead sling-bullets in the Paul Canellopoulos Collection weigh between 32 grams and 110 grams,[18] however even if the price of lead is known it would be a fruitless and pointless exercise to attempt to calculate the cost of Greek lead slingshot especially as we do not know, even approximately, how much 'ammunition' a Greek slinger would normally be expected to carry.

Diodoros (16.80.6) alleges that following the battle of Krimisos in 341 BC, Timoleon captured 1,000 breastplates and *over* 10,000 shields from his Carthaginian opponents. These, Diodoros (*ibid.*) maintains, were distributed

[16] For example, see Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.17; 3.4.17.

[17] For example, Empereur (1981:555) illustrates an example of one half of a bronze slingshot mould now in the Paul Canellopoulos Collection (Inv. 732), while I myself have seen a terracotta sling-bullet mould in the museum in Eretria, Euboia. The bronze example is rectangular in shape and has a central pouring channel from which 'branches' lead off, terminating in the distinctive Greek leaf-shaped bullets. The overall impression of the interior of the mould is very like that of a stylised tree with 'leaves'. The terracotta example I saw in Eretria was circular in shape with the leaf-shaped bullet moulds clustered around a central pouring channel giving it the impression of a stylised flower, the bullets looking like the petals of a flower.

[18] See Empereur (1981:555-561).

among Timoleon's "allies" once a tithe of these spoils had been dedicated in the temples of Syracuse and Corinth. Plutarch (*Timoleon*, 29.2) concurs with Diodoros on the number of breastplates captured and gives a 'precise' figure for the number of shields taken as being 10,000. Plutarch (*ibid.*) says that the breastplates in particular were: "of superior workmanship and beauty"[19]. However, Plutarch's account regarding the dedication of a tithe of the spoils differs from that of Diodoros. Plutarch states that:

> "Along with the report of his victory Timoleon sent to Corinth the most beautiful of the captured armour, wishing that his own native city should be envied of all men" (Plut. *Timoleon*, 29.2)[20].

Plutarch makes no mention of any tithe of captured arms for the temples of Syracuse *nor* does he tell us if Timoleon distributed the remainder among his allied troops. although he does inform us (*Timoleon* 28.1) that the Carthaginians Timoleon had taken the armour from had *iron* breastplates, bronze helmets and "great shields" (*σιδηροῖς θώραξι καὶ χαλκοῖς κράνεσιν ἀσπίδας...μεγάλας*). An iron cuirass (with gold decoration) was found in Royal Tomb II at Vergina and is believed to have belonged to Philip II of Makedon. The use of such items as iron breastplates (even without gold decoration) would have been a rare exception rather than a general practice among warriors of the fourth century. Indeed the 1,000 breastplates captured following the battle of Krimisos would probably have come from the Carthaginian citizen-troops. Plutarch (*Timoleon* 27.2f), describing the deployment of the Carthaginian army with its four-horse chariots and mercenaries from numerous ethnic backgrounds nevertheless makes a special point of remarking how Timoleon's army saw an enemy body of 10,000 'hoplites' with white shields (*μυρίοις ὁπλίταις λευκάσπισι*). Plutarch goes on to state that:

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[19] *ἐργασίᾳ καὶ κάλλει.*

[20] *Ἅμα δὲ τῇ φήμῃ τῆς νίκης ὁ Τιμολέων εἰς Κόρινθον ἔπεμψε τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν αἰχμαλώτων ὅπλων, βουλόμενος αὐτοῦ τὴν πατρίδα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ζηλωτὴν εἶναι.*

> "These the Corinthians conjectured to be Carthaginians, from the splendour of their armour and the slowness and good order of their march" (Plut. *Timoleon* 27.3)[21].

Connolly (1981:147) illustrates a: "frieze showing Carthaginian arms from a triumphal monument found in Tunisia. The cuirass is probably mail. The shield...is North African and probably was used by the Liby-Phoenician phalanx". Although Connolly omits to provide a suggested date for this relief sculpture the style of the cuirass closely resembles that of the Greek *spolas* type while the shield is of familiar 'hoplite' type with its characteristic bowl shape with off-set rim. The Tunisian relief of a cuirass *might* be meant to represent mail but the iron cuirass found at Vergina was of iron plate in the style of the *spolas* type. Certainly *if* either of the items featured on the Tunisian frieze were carried by Carthaginian citizens in their phalanx in the *fourth* century BC, then they would not look out of place in a *Greek* hoplite phalanx and could easily have been utilised for just such a role.

Further evidence that the armour captured by Timoleon could only have come from Carthaginian citizen-hoplites is that the type of military equipment carried by mercenaries in the service of Carthage (Greek, Etruscan, and Campanian mercenary hoplites excepted) would probably be unsuitable for use by the *hoplites* of a Greek army. Connolly (1981:148-151) and Warry (1980:122) both describe and illustrate the type of equipment carried by the 'typical' mercenaries and subject troops who served in Carthaginian armies: the Numidians and the Iberians[22]. Usually lightly armed and probably fulfilling a similar role to Greek *peltastai*, the Iberians in particular carried flat oval shields (presumably of hide-covered wood) similar to both Celtic types and the type of shields later carried by

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[21] *τούτους ἐτεκμαίροντο Καρχηδονίους εἶναι τῇ λαμπρότητι τῆς σκευῆς καὶ τῇ βραδυτῆτι καὶ τάξει τῆς πορείας.*

[22] Cf. Plutarch, *Timoleon*, 28.6 who states that: "they [the Carthaginians] used Libyans for the most part and Iberians and Numidians for their battles, and thus sustained their defeats at the cost of other nations".

Hellenistic *thureophoroi*[23], but not known to have been used by Classical Greek armies. Admittedly, such items of equipment could, conceivably, have been pressed into service by Greek *psiloi* and *peltastai* should the need have arisen, but we have no evidence to say that, on this occasion, they were. However, we do not have any firm testimony that says that such items were not used either and Greek troops could, and sometimes did, improvise when the occasion demanded or presented itself[24].

At this point it might prove useful to take another look at some of the source material that have already been cited in the chapters on the Spartan and Athenian systems of arms procurement. Taking a fresh view of these passages, but working to a different agenda, might provide a better way for us to attempt to piece together a clearer picture of the arms supply systems of other Greek *poleis*.

For example, Thucydides' (3.27.1-2) account of how the Spartan Salaithos distributed arms to the poorer citizens of Mytilene in order that the Mytilenaians might field a larger hoplite force. Salaithos' actions in arming the poorer sections of the populace naturally presupposes that he did not need to arm the *whole* citizen body, many or most of whom must have already possessed arms. In the absence of any other evidence, and bearing in mind Thucydides' (*loc. cit.*) statement that it was only the poorer citizens who received arms at this point, probably at state expense, it seems reasonable to assume that any citizens not included in this group would have had to have provided their own armour and weapons and also borne the cost of their own equipment themselves.

As for those 'poorer citizens' who were armed at Salaithos' instructions, the arms they received must *either* have been made specially for this purpose when the

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[23] *Thureophoroi*: literally 'door-carriers' on account of their relatively large, flat oval shields. This troop type appears to have evolved from the classical Greek *peltastai* and as a result of contact with the Celts / Galatians.

[24] Greek troops could be extremely resourceful on occasions. For example: Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.28 describes the Karduchians as having bows nearly three cubits long and arrows of more than two cubits in length. Xenophon (*ibid.*) relates how, if the Greeks got hold of any Karduchian arrows, they would fit thongs to them (to aid throwing them further) and use them as javelins! Cf. the suggestion of Aineias (*Poliorketika*, 38.6) that besieged forces 'recycle' stones to re-use them as missiles.

Mytilenaians agreed to Salaithos' instruction or have come from stock-piled arms already in the possession of the Mytilenaian state or in the 'warehouses' of arms manufacturers. If they were manufactured specially for the purpose, perhaps the biggest drawback would be the time it would take to craft extra armour and weapons (an occupation requiring great skill) in order to increase the number of hoplites that the Mytilenaians could field. The other alternative, that there *were* stock-piles of arms within Mytilene, seems an attractive possibility. Certainly, according to Thucydides (3.27.3), the newly armed elements of the population, once they had weapons in their hands, demanded that the *aristoi* bring out into the open, and distribute to all, any stock-piles of food there may have been in the city, although, Thucydides (3.27.1) tells us, the food supplies had already been exhausted. That the newly armed sections of the populace at least *believed* that there was still food left would suggest that stock-piling (for the duration of the siege at least) had been practised. Therefore, it may also be possible that arms too had been stock-piled, even if for no better reason than allowing the ruling faction to keep such arms in a secure place away from those elements (real or imagined) that they feared may, as indeed happened, offer to turn the city over to the besieging Athenians.

Furthermore, there may be a case for suggesting that the Mytilenaians had managed to arm their poorer citizens from an already existing stock-pile of arms. For example, if such a suggestion is correct then it would echo the proposals that Thucydides (6.72.4) attributes to Hermokrates of Syracuse, during the winter of 415-414 BC, that those Syracusan citizens without arms should be provided with them in order to increase the number of suitably armed troops that the *polis* could put into the field. There is also an indication, from Thucydides (7.1.3), that the Himeraians too had a stock-pile of arms, as they managed to equip some seven hundred of Gylippos' sailors and marines as hoplites in addition to being persuaded to join Gylippos with their own citizen forces. In addition, as the war-orphans of both Thasos (Pouilloux, 1954:371, *Inv.* 1032) and Athens (Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 154) received arms from their respective states during the fourth century at least indicates that a degree of state stock-piling of arms was relatively common. Presumably the workshops producing arms and armour in

the Greek world did so regardless of whether the *polis* in which they worked was at war at the time or not. Certainly, the metic family in Athens who had 700 shields seized by the 'Thirty Tyrants' (Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 19) obviously had this considerable number 'in stock' at the time of their seizure. Likewise two of our sources, Diodoros (17.8.5) and Plutarch (*Demosthenes*, 23), relate how the orator Demosthenes donated a free gift of weapons to the Thebans in 336 BC, presumably to enable them to fight against Alexander. In this instance, considering Demosthenes' (*Against Aphobos* I, Or. 27.9) own family's involvement in arms production, and his hostility towards the Makedonian Agaid dynasty, the temptation to connect the two and suggest that Demosthenes gladly supplied the Thebans with arms produced at his family's 'sword-factory' is very strong indeed. Finally, although Diodoros (17.8.5) may be incorrect to suggest that Demosthenes equipped *all* those of the Thebans who lacked *heavy armour*, Demosthenes may, at least, have provided all of those Thebans without *weapons* with *machairas*, which would, of course suggest that the 'family business' had plenty of swords 'in stock'.

MERCENARY TROOPS

The subject of mercenary troops in the Greek world has received considerable attention from scholars[1]. However, as recently as 1989, McKechnie (1989:80) stated that: "modern writers have not explored the question of who provided the armour which the soldiers wore". Since McKechnie made his statement other work on the subject of mercenaries and who supplied their equipment has appeared. For example, Whitehead's (1991:105-113) article, on the subject of who equipped mercenary troops in Classical Greece, is a direct response to McKechnie's original discussion (1989:80-85) and expresses Whitehead's (*loc. cit.*) disagreements with the points made, and the conclusions reached by McKechnie in the latter's book: *Outsiders in the Greek Cities in the Fourth Century BC*. McKechnie (1994:297-305) himself readdressed the topic in order, he maintains, to clarify his own case and to question Whitehead's arguments against it. Some of the arguments put forward in the debate between McKechnie and Whitehead will be discussed later in this section on mercenary troops[2]. At this point, however, it is sufficient merely to say that McKechnie (1989:85) believes that: "there is enough evidence to suggest that persons and states wanting to raise an army would often start by collecting arms and armour, and when they raised mercenaries they would often - perhaps even usually - equip them". In contrast, Whitehead (1991:113) would: "urge instead the opposite (and traditional) view: that to hire a mercenary in Classical Greece was, under normal circumstances, to hire a man who brought with him the tools of his trade".

The earliest Greek mercenaries of which we know are those mentioned by Herodotos (2.152.4f), who records the tale of Ionians (and Carians) serving

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[1] For example, Parke (1981), Griffith (1935), and Roy (1967:287-323) to cite just three.

[2] In stark contrast, Krasilnikoff's (1992:22-36) article: "Aegean mercenaries in the fourth to second centuries BC: A study in payment, plunder, and logistics of ancient Greek armies", fails to address the topic of who supplied the armour used by mercenaries. Krasilnikoff's failure to also show any knowledge of McKechnie's original argument could, conceivably, be due to a delay between the submission of his work and its eventual publication, and it is therefore necessary to give him the benefit of the doubt as to his failure to show any awareness of McKechnie's work. However, I find it puzzling that Krasilnikoff does not mention the subject of how mercenaries procured their armour especially given that the emphasis of his article is on mercenaries and logistical matters.

Psammetichus I of Egypt (circa 650 BC). In Herodotos' account Psammetichus received an oracle saying that he would obtain vengeance (for his having been exiled) thanks to 'bronze men' (*chalkeoi andres*) arriving from the sea. These, according to Herodotos, proved to be Ionian and Carian raiders whom Psammetichus employed as mercenaries to help his cause. Even if, as Parke (1981:4) remarks, Herodotos' story is: "rather naive" it does provide evidence that these *chalkeoi andres* arrived: "in full hoplite armour" (Parke, 1981:4). Admittedly they had been, allegedly, merely raiding the Nile delta but even if their arrival in Egypt was pure chance they certainly seem to have come fully equipped for action and would not have needed equipment from Psammetichus.

Griffith (1935:237), discussing the provenance and recruiting of mercenaries, states that in: "the fifth century the situation is clearer. It was then that the Arkadian hoplite began to come into his own". Indeed, as both Griffith (*ibid.*) and Parke (1981:14 n.1) point out by both citing Herodotos (8.26), "the first specifically Arkadian mercenaries seem to be those who, in 480 BC, after Thermopylai approached Xerxes" (Parke, 1981:14 n.1). In the passage to which both authors refer, Herodotos (8.26) tells us that some few (*oligoi tines*) Arkadian *automoloi*, deserters, came to Xerxes seeking employment. Unfortunately, Herodotos' main interest in these men is that they allow him to relate the story that when questioned by Xerxes they told him that the Greeks were attending the Olympic Games (thus allowing Herodotos to underline the differences between Greeks and non-Greeks: Greeks honour their gods regardless of the threat posed by Xerxes' invasion and the Olympic victors receive only garlands in reward, all of which, of course, is beyond the comprehension of non-Greeks, or '*barbaroi*', such as Xerxes). Instead of telling us more about these Arkadian deserters, Herodotos seems merely to include them in his narrative in order to help him draw ethnic distinctions between the Greeks and their Asiatic enemies. However, Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) clearly states that these Arkadians are "deserters" (*automoloi*) which naturally raises the question, deserters from whom? The common Greek cause? Or from the allied troops whom, Herodotos (7.220) says, Leonidas had dismissed on his last morning in the pass at Thermopylai?

It is reasonable to suppose that the Arkadian deserters asking Xerxes for employment (Herodotos, 8.26) could conceivably have been deserters from Leonidas' former confederates. Herodotos (7.202) informs us that there were some 2,120 Arkadian troops with Leonidas' force (500 each from Tegea and Mantineia, 120 from Arkadian Orchomenos, and 1,000 from the rest of Arkadia). Furthermore, Herodotos (7.228) later quotes the war memorial inscription at Thermopylai which alleged that 4,000 Peloponnesians had stood against Xerxes in the pass at Thermopylai. Burn (1984:378) points out the discrepancy between Herodotos' total of Peloponnesian troops at Thermopylai (given at 7.202) and the alleged 4,000 men of 'Pelop's land' of the inscription, but adds that Herodotos may have omitted 1,000 Lakonians who, according to later tradition (Isokrates, *Panêgyrikos* 4.90; *Archidamos* 6.99; Diodoros, 11.4.5) should have been included either in addition to, or including, the 300 Spartans present. Even with such complications over the total number of Peloponnesian troops under Leonidas' command it is clear that a little over fifty per cent of Leonidas' Peloponnesian troops were Arkadians. Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that the Arkadian *automoloi* who approached Xerxes had indeed deserted from Leonidas' Arkadian troops, a theory which Burn (1984:424) believes: "seems far from impossible". The point is that if we are correct in believing that the Arkadian *automoloi* Herodotos (8.26) mentions were formerly part of Leonidas' army and that they were seeking employment as mercenaries then there is probably a good possibility that they still had their own arms with them.

Similarly, the 1,300 Thracians whom Thucydides (7.27.1) describes as: *τῶν Θρᾳκῶν τῶν μαχαιροφόρων τοῦ Διακοῦ γένους* (the Thracian machaira-bearers of the Dioi tribe) who arrived at Athens too late in the summer of 413 BC to sail to Sicily with Demosthenes would, one would assume, have had their weapons with them. Thucydides (7.27.2) goes on to say that the Athenians decided that they were too expensive to employ: "since each received as pay a drachma a day" (Thuc. 7.27.2), and sent them home. However, these same Thracians are heard of a short while later (Thuc. 7.29.1f) engaged in a particularly savage attack on Mykalessos in Boiotia having been ferried there by the Athenian Dieitrephes, who, Thucydides (7.29.1) states, had been instructed to

make use of them while he conducted them home. Gomme *et al* (1970:405) point out that Thucydides (2.96.2) has, much earlier in his narrative, described the Dioi as the 'mountain Thracians' who inhabited the Rhodope range and as being: "*autonomoi* (i.e. not controlled by the Odrysian king) and *machairophoroi*" (Gomme *et al*, 1970:405). Thucydides (7.27.1) *could* have described the Thracians who arrived at Athens in the summer of 413 BC simply as being from the autonomous Dioi to make it sufficiently clear who they were. Instead, Thucydides applies the term *machairophoroi* to them which surely indicates that they were armed in such a way as to merit such a description. It is unlikely that Thucydides would apply the adjective *machairophoroi* to these troops simply as a 'poetic' epithet. Indeed, as Whitehead (1991:112) remarks: "to suppose that they had to turn up in Athens before being issued with their *machairai*, or for that matter the rest of their equipment which merited Thucydides' description of them as peltasts strains credulity; and their bloodthirsty progress after leaving Athens...is further corroboration that no such strain is called for".

It would be impossible to discuss the problem of who supplied the arms and armour used by mercenaries without examining what is undoubtedly the most famous body of Greek mercenaries, the 'Ten Thousand' who served the younger Cyrus. Indeed, as Parke (1981:24) points out: "for us the Ten Thousand have an added interest through Xenophon's *Anabasis*. They are the only mercenary army of whose adventures we have an account written by an eye-witness". Parke (*ibid.*) goes on to say that: "the Ten Thousand, if not the most typical, at least as the best known of Greek mercenary armies, claim full and detailed treatment". Parke (1981:23-42), quite correctly, acknowledges the importance of Xenophon's *Anabasis* for the study of Greek mercenaries and devotes a whole chapter to the 'Ten Thousand'. However, Parke (*loc. cit.*) does not discuss the question of who supplied the arms and armour used by the Cyreans.

Other authors have, however, discussed who was responsible for providing the 'Ten Thousand' with their arms and armour. Roy (1967:287-323) in his otherwise excellent article on the mercenaries of Cyrus puts forward his views on

arms supply in very concise fashion devoting only a single page (1967:310) to the subject of arms procurement by the 'Ten Thousand' concluding that on: "general grounds one may doubt whether Arkadia could supply 4,000 mercenaries and Achaia 2,000, all of these possessing their own equipment; and this consideration makes it probable that the employer supplied the mercenary with equipment". McKechnie's (1989:80-82) line of argument certainly endorses this view, though McKechnie (1989:80-85) perhaps generalises more than Roy does on the matter and tries to suggest that it was usual for the employers to supply the arms and armour used by mercenaries. Whitehead (1991:105-113) although largely disagreeing with McKechnie's line of argument does concede (1991:107) that on the subject of Cyrus' mercenaries McKechnie may indeed have a fair point to make.

However, what of the testimony of our important eye-witness, Xenophon? Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.2.2) tells us that Cyrus recruited some Milesian exiles who joined him with their own arms at Sardis[3]. However, as Roy (1967:310) observes of these Milesian exiles: "as volunteers they may have been exceptional" in providing their own arms for the expedition. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.3.16;18) also mentions Rhodians who had their own slings with them and suggested the generals pay for someone to plait more. However, slings, one would presume, would be easier to make than master, though we should not underestimate the number of men among the 'Ten Thousand' who may have had the necessary skill to use such a weapon. Although, as Snodgrass (1967:84) remarks: "by Classical times, the Rhodians had come to excel among the Greeks in the specialised use of the sling", that is not to say that other Greeks had no experience in the use of such a weapon. Indeed, one would imagine that if any man had previously worked as a shepherd or goatherd they may have been familiar enough with using a sling, if not expertly like the Rhodians, at least sufficiently well enough to have driven off wolves and the like using one.

[3] *καὶ λαβόντες τὰ ὅπλα παρῆσαν εἰς Σάρδεις*

Indeed, although not from a Greek context, the Biblical story of the young shepherd David, armed with a sling, springs to mind.

However, what of the main, predominantly hoplite, body of the 'Ten Thousand'? Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.2.14f) tells us that during a three day stay at Tyriaeion Cyrus held a military review in order, it seems, to impress the Cilician queen. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.2.16) goes on to say that at this review:

> "...the Greeks all had helmets of bronze, crimson tunics, and greaves, and carried their shields uncovered" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.2.16)[4].

Certainly, there is a remarkable degree of uniformity in the appearance of Cyrus' Greek mercenaries. This is all the more intriguing when we consider the different regional backgrounds of the various contingents[5].

Similarly, when Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.8.6-7) later describes the 600 strong cavalry bodyguard around Cyrus at Kounaxa, we hear how:

> "These troopers were armed with breastplates and thigh-pieces and, all of them except Cyrus, with helmets - Cyrus, however, went into battle with his head unprotected - and all their horses had frontlets and breast-pieces; and the men carried, besides their other weapons, Greek sabres" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.8.6-7)[6].

Once again we see a considerable degree of uniformity, this time among Cyrus' cavalry bodyguard. However, it is necessary to return to the appearance of the 'Ten Thousand' as given by Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.2.16) for further discussion. Although Cyrus' Greek mercenaries came from different parts of Greece (albeit

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[4] *εἶχον δὲ πάντες κράνη χαλκᾶ καὶ χιτῶνας φοινικοῦς καὶ κνημῖδας καὶ τὰς ἀσπίδας ἐκκεκαλυμμένας.*

[5] For the regional origins of the various contingents, or at least their commanders see: Xen. *Anab.* 1.1.6-1.2.3; 1.2.10.

[6] *ὡπλισμένοι θώραξι μὲν αὐτοὶ καὶ παραμηριδίοις καὶ κράνετι πάντες πλὴν Κύρου· Κῦρος δὲ ψιλὴν ἔχων τὴν κεφαλὴν εἰς τὴν μάχην καθίστατο. οἱ δ' ἵπποι πάντες εἶχον καὶ προμετωπίδια καὶ προστερνίδια· εἶχον δὲ καὶ μαχαίρας οἱ ἱππεῖς Ἑλληνικάς.*

that the majority were Peloponnesians) they all had crimson *chitons* and bronze armour.

Perhaps not too much can be read into how they all had bronze armour. Bronze was the usual metal for defensive body armour throughout the Greek world. Testimony to this are the countless items of bronze Greek armour in the museums of Greece, particularly at Olympia, as well as pieces in several other major museums outside Greece such as the British Museum London, and the Louvre in Paris. Furthermore, the 'Chigi Vase', actually a Corinthian *oinochoe* dating to the late seventh century BC and now in the Museo Nazionale di Villa Giulia (*inv.* 22679), has a polychrome frieze depicting two opposing armies advancing against each other[7]. The hoplites of both 'armies' wear bronze (orange-yellow) helmets of early 'Corinthian' type and bronze greaves. Those advancing from the left also wear bronze 'bell cuirass' breastplates and a sort of 'loin cloth' in crimson rather than the more familiar *chiton.* The torsos of the figures advancing from the right are obscured by their distinctive large round shields, though they would presumably be wearing the same sort of torso armour as their opponents. My point is that on the 'Chigi Vase' both, opposing, armies look very similar. Both wear bronze armour. Returning to Xenophon's (*Anab.* 1.2.16) description of the 'Ten Thousand' in the review at Tyriaeion, what is striking is that all the Greeks had crimson *chitons.* These items of clothing may have been issued to the Greeks by Cyrus. Also of note is that, in this passage, Xenophon makes no mention of either *thorakes* (breastplates) or *spolades* (cuirasses) being worn, and there might be a number of reasons for this.

Firstly, Cyrus may have gone so far as to arm his Greek troops with helmet, greaves and shield, along with crimson clothing and offensive arms, but not torso armour. After all Cyrus was gambling for the highest of stakes, the throne of the Persian empire, and the cost of providing arms for his Greek mercenaries may have seemed like a relatively small price to pay if they helped him to reap the

[7] Pedley (1992:124) provides a good quality colour photograph of one half of the battle scene on the 'Chigi Vase', while Connolly (1980:38-39) gives a good colour reproduction of the whole battle scene presented in a flat rectangle format across two pages.

ultimate reward and he became king of Persia. Secondly, Cyrus may have issued each of the Greeks with a complete panoply, including either *thorakes* or *spolades*, but they did not wear them at the review. Alternatively, Xenophon may simply have forgotten to mention that they were wearing *thorakes* or *spolades*.

The third of these possibilities, that Xenophon simply forgot to mention any torso armour is highly unlikely. Xenophon tends to take great care in the *Anabasis* to accurately describe the military equipment worn both by the Greeks *and* their opponents. For example, Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.8.6) describes Cyrus' cavalry bodyguard, he also gives a (less detailed admittedly) description of the enemy troops facing the Greeks at Kounaxa (*Anab.* 1.8.9-10), and there is his detailed description of the arms and armour of the Mossynoikoi (*Anab.* 5.4.12-13), all of which provide us with much valuable detail. What Xenophon *may* have forgotten to tell us is whether, because it was a review and not a battle, the Greeks may have decided, or been instructed, to dispense with torso armour for the sake of comfort during what was, after all, simply a parade. Indeed, Hanson (1989:60f) outlines at some length how: "there seems to have been a special reluctance on the part of the Greek infantryman to put on his body armour, strap on his shield and don his helmet until the last possible moment before battle. This expresses his sensible aversion to wearing arms and armour until their life-saving potential was more significant than their inherent discomfort". Hanson (1989:60-62) then proceeds to cite a commendable and comprehensive body of evidence to reinforce his line of argument.

Furthermore, Hanson comes to a reasonable conclusion. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.7.20) himself tells us that on the approach to Kounaxa: "the greater part of the army [of Cyrus] was proceeding in disorder and many of the soldiers' arms and accoutrements were being carried in wagons and on pack-animals". Indeed, it is only when a horseman came galloping in, his horse sweating, with news of Artaxerxes' army, that Cyrus himself, Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.8.3) maintains: "leaped down from his chariot, put on his breastplate, and then, mounting his horse, took his spears in his hands and passed the word to all the others to arm

themselves and get into their places, every man of them". As Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.8.4) then proceeds to tells us that Klearchos took up station on the extreme right of the Greek wing and the rest of the Greeks took their deployment from him, it certainly provides substance to Hanson's (1989:60-62) view that Greek troops only armed themselves fully at the last possible moment. Therefore, if Hanson's (*loc. cit.*) line of argument is correct, and there seems little reason to doubt it, we can fully appreciate the possibility that at the review at Tyriaeion the Greeks may have possessed either *thorakes* or *spolades* but did not wear them at the review simply for the sake of comfort and not through Xenophon forgetting to mention them.

We do hear later in Xenophon's narrative of torso armour. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.1.18) tells us of how Leonymos the Lakonian was killed when an arrow pierced his side after going through both his shield and cuirass[8]. In addition, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.3.20) tells us that when the '10,000' raised a force of fifty horsemen cuirasses and breastplates were provided for them[9]. Indeed, as Anderson (1970:27) points out, presumably: "not all these men had body armour when they served in the infantry". Why? It is possible that Xenophon's (*Anab.* 1.2.16) description of the equipment of the '10,000' at the review at Tyriaeion omits any mention of *spolades* or *thorakes* because they did not have any to begin with, though it is equally possible, as has been stated above, that for the purposes of the review the '10,000' simply did not wear their torso armour.

There is, however, the possibility that only the front rank, or file-leaders and rear rank, or file-closers (*ouragoi*) had torso armour. Some of the relief sculptures of the Nereid Monument from Xanthus, now in the British Museum, show hoplites. Some of these figures are shown wearing the *spolas*, a few *thorakes*, and a few wear no torso armour at all. Anderson (1970:24-28) discusses the evidence for a, possible, tendency towards lighter torso armour and even its complete abandonment as the Classical period progressed Anderson (1970:27-28) concludes that the: "evidence is slight and scattered, but it does suggest that the

[8] *τῆς ἀσπίδος καὶ τῆς σπολάδος.*
[9] *καὶ σπολάδες καὶ θώρακες αὐτοῖς ἐπορίσθησαν.*

hoplite was not the 'heavy infantryman' encased as completely as possible in plate of proof, but, though still trained to fight hand-to hand and in close order, depended chiefly on his shield for protection". Although it must be conceded that Anderson (1970:24-28) makes a reasonable point, indeed the funerary stele of the Boiotian hoplite Mnason (now in Thebes Museum) shows the deceased without torso armour but in battle pose and wearing a *exomis*, the argument that hoplites dispensed with torso armour, particularly the *spolas*, completely is not fully convincing. Connolly (1981:58) explains how he himself: "made a copy of one of these cuirasses [a *spolas*]. It was difficult to put on because of its stiffness, but once one had got used to it, it was quite comfortable and easy to move about in....The great advantages of the linen cuirass [*spolas*] were its cheapness and lightness. The example...made had no metal plates and weighed 3.6 kg; a [bronze] bell cuirass when lined would have weighed 6 kg".

However, if for a moment we assume that the '10,000' did not have either *spolades* or *thorakes* is this cause for concern? Of course this immediately makes us wonder where the fifty strong cavalry force (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.20) got *their* torso armour from, and, if Cyrus did equip the '10,000' but not as far as issuing *spolades* or *thorakes*, why Leonymos is described (Xen. *Anab.* 4.1.18) as wearing a *spolas*. In the former case, that of the cavalry unit, it may well be that the officers of the '10,000' donated spare *spolades* and *thorakes* from their own personal possessions. Certainly, Xenophon himself appears to have had additional pieces of equipment (Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.7) as he chose the finest items of armour he had in his possession to wear when he addressed the '10,000'. Whether or not Cyrus *did* equip the '10,000' one cannot help but feel that the Greek officers at least probably had their own equipment to begin with. One also wonders why the fifty cavalrymen equipped with *spolades* and *thorakes* (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.20) did not have armour prior to their being issued with it when they volunteered for the cavalry force. There are, perhaps, two possibilities. Either not all of Cyrus' Greek mercenary hoplites were issued with torso armour (as has been suggested above), or, and this is also a possibility, the volunteers for the cavalry may not have come from the ranks of the hoplites. The point is that they may have been drawn from the grooms and the baggage animal handlers with the

army, men accustomed to being around horses and with the ability to be able to ride without the need for training on how to sit a horse. Indeed, as Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.3.19) told the 'Ten Thousand' that he himself had a few horses (*τοὺς μέν τινας παρ' ἐμοί*) at his quarters we can safely assume that Xenophon, at least, would have had at least one groom, possibly more, with him. Perhaps it was men such as these, grooms, baggage animal handlers, and possibly other non-combatants with the army that volunteered to serve in the cavalry force in return for a suitable mount and the provision of adequate defensive armour.

But what of Leonymos? Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.1.18) clearly states that he was a *Lakonian* (*Λακωνικὸς*) rather than calling him a Lakedaimonian (*Λακεδαιμόνιος*) as he does of Cheirisophos (Xen. *Anab.* 3.2.37). Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.3.3) tells us that Cheirisophos arrived at Issos with 700 hoplites in response to a summons from Cyrus, for the Spartans to return his support for them (Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.1). Although we do not know the make-up of Cheirisophos' force we can safely assume that they would have been either *perioikoi* or *neodamodeis*, rather than full Spartiate citizens, and as the only contingent among the '10,000' to represent a specific polis in anything approaching an official capacity they would have been regarded as 'allied' troops rather than mercenaries and would probably have come already equipped.

Unfortunately, Leonymos the Lakonian, whether he himself was a *perioikos* or not, was not serving in Cheirisophos' contingent at the time of his death (if ever). Rather, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.1.19) makes it plain, when he informs us that he himself proceeded to reproach Cheirisophos over the loss of two good men (Leonymos and Basias the Arkadian) and for not allowing the army to halt, but instead compelling it to fight while fleeing the enemy. These two men had fallen while fighting in the rearguard, a position occupied, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.2.37) has told us earlier in his narrative, by the contingents commanded by Xenophon himself and Timasion the Dardanian, who had taken over the command of the contingents formerly commanded by Proxenos and Klearchos the (exiled) Spartan respectively (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.47). Furthermore, that Leonymos fell fighting with the rearguard is all the more apparent when Xenophon (*Anab.*

4.1.19) tells us that he upbraided Cheirisophos about their not being able to give Leonymos (or Basias) burial on the grounds that Cheirisophos had refused (uncharacteristically) to wait for the rearguard as they had attempted to retrieve the bodies.

Therefore, Leonymos had been a 'private' in either what were formerly Proxenos' and Klearchos' contingents, and if Leonymos had a *spolas* does this imply that his comrades also did? It is probable that they did. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.2.28) later reiterates his comments on the deadliness of the Carduchian archers saying that: "...their arrows would go straight through shields and breastplates" (*τὰ δὲ τοξεύματα ἐχώρει διὰ τῶν ἀσπίδων καὶ διὰ τῶν θωράκων*). Xenophon's (*loc. cit.*) clear use of plurals for both shields (*ἀσπίδων*) and breastplates (*θωράκων*), confirms that other men, among the hoplites of the Ten Thousand, suffered a similar fate to Leonymos despite having the protection of *both* shields *and* breastplates.

There remains another important passage in Xenophon's *Anabasis* (2.5.38) to discuss which conclusively proves that Cyrus had been responsible for equipping the 'Ten Thousand'. Xenophon (*Anab.* 2.5.38f) records how a delegation from Tissaphernes arrived to parley with the Greeks (following the seizure of five of the Greek generals) and that Ariaios, one of Cyrus' former confederates but now aligned to Tissaphernes, said to the Greeks:

> "For yourselves, the King demands your arms; for he says that they belong to him, since they belonged to Cyrus, his slave" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.5.38)[10].

This statement proves *who* had provided the 'Ten Thousand' with their arms and armour: Cyrus. McKechnie (1989:81), however, states that this: "brief passage raises a number of difficulties. It must be examined carefully. If taken at face value, it implies that Cyrus provided armour for all his Greek mercenaries".

[10] *ὑμᾶς δὲ βασιλεὺς τὰ ὅπλα ἀπαιτεῖ· αὑτου γὰρ εἶναί φησιν, ἐπείπερ Κύρου ἦσαν τοῦ ἐκείνου δούλου.*

McKechnie (1989:81-82) then proceeds, at some length, to assess the implications of this passage (Xen. *Anab.* 2.5.38). However, there is no good reason for McKechnie (*loc. cit.*) to dwell on Xenophon's attributing the use of the word *doulos*, slave, to Ariaios in describing Cyrus, and the implications of ownership this would or would not imply. Rather, Whitehead (1991:81) is surely correct in his criticism of McKechnie's (1981:81) statement regarding how *Anabasis* 2.5.38 should be read. Xenophon's (*Anab.* 2.5.38) statement should be taken at face value, and this is precisely how Xenophon intended it to be taken. Indeed, Whitehead (1991:107) concedes that he himself is: "unable to demonstrate that it should not be so taken". McKechnie (1989:81) remarks that no other statement in Xenophon's *Anabasis* directly confirms that made at 2.5.38. However, there is no good reason why it should, to do so would be merely needless repetition on Xenophon's part. Furthermore, when Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.1.28) later reminds the 'Ten Thousand' how when the King had demanded "our arms" they had refused, and much later, when we hear how some of the troops had sold their equipment (Xen. *Anab.* 7.2.3), have no bearing on who supplied the equipment originally. A gift, once bestowed, becomes the property of the recipient.

Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.8.26) closes the *Anabasis* by saying: "Thibron arrived and took over the army, and uniting it with the rest of his Greek forces, proceeded to wage war upon Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus". In *Hellenika* (3.1.4) Xenophon gives further details of Thibron's other Greek forces, stating that Thibron had an army made up of 1,000 *neodamodeis* and "4,000 of the other Peloponnesians" (*τῶν δὲ ἄλλων Πελοποννησίων εἰς τετρακισχιλίους*) and had asked for, and received, 300 Athenian cavalrymen. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.5) goes on to say that Thibron also gathered troops from the Greek cities in Asia. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.8) later tells us that the Lakedaimonians recalled Thibron and sent Derkylidas to take command of affairs in Asia. Therefore, as both Thibron and Derkylidas employed the remnants of the Cyreans it would appear that neither of these officers would have needed to equip their mercenaries as the Cyreans already possessed arms.

Furthermore, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.23) informs us that while Derkylidas was operating in Asia he instructed the spearmen (*doruphoroi*) of the Dardanian Meidias' bodyguard to take up station, with their arms, in the front ranks, or van, of his own army, as mercenaries[11]. Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) clearly mentions both that these men were armed with spears, calling them *doruphoroi*, and points out that Derkylidas instructed them to take their *hopla*, or arms, with them when he placed them in the vanguard of his own army. In addition, Xenophon's use of ὡς μισθοφορήσοντας indicates that they were to be treated as mercenaries and would, presumably, have been paid as such in return for their services.

Xenophon's (*Hell.* 3.2.14f) last report of Derkylidas' activities prior to the arrival in Asia of Agesilaos, places Derkylidas in the plain of the Maiander, probably using Ephesos as his base for operations (*Hell.* 3.2.11). Agesilaos made Ephesos the starting point for his own expedition (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4-5) and it seems reasonable to suppose that the armies of Agesilaos and Derkylidas became one. Indeed, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.6) next mentions Derkylidas as being one of the three commissioners that Agesilaos sent to parley with Tissaphernes. Xenophon's (*Hell.* 3.4.2) account of the force that Agesilaos brought from Greece, consisting of thirty Spartiatai, 2,000 *neodamodeis*, and a contingent of 6,000 of "the allies" (εἰς ἑξακισχιλίους δὲ τὸ σύνταγμα τῶν συμμάχων), makes no mention of any mercenaries as being included in the force that Agesilaos brought with him to Asia. Therefore, when we later hear of mercenaries serving in Agesilaos' Asian expedition we can presume that they were either the remnants of the Cyreans or mercenaries raised in Asia who may have been serving in Derkylidas' campaigns. Furthermore, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.20) tells us that Agesilaos assigned the Spartan Herippidas to the command of the Cyreans. Similarly, although Xenophon (*ibid.*) relates the names of the Spartans placed in command of the various detachments of Agesilaos' force, the *neodamodeis*, the cavalry, the troops from the allied cities, and the Cyreans, the latter are the only mercenaries to be mentioned by Xenophon.

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[11] ...τοὺς Μειδίου δορυφόρους θέσθαι τὰ ὅπλα ἐπὶ τῷ στόματι τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ στρατεύματος, ὡς μισθοφορήσοντας.

When Agesilaos was preparing to return to Greece from Asia, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.2.5) informs us that Agesilaos:

> "in order to lead with him the best men and as many as possible offered prizes to the cities, for the one which should send the best force, and to the captains (*tois lochagois*) of the mercenaries, for the one who should join the expedition with the best equipped company of hoplites, of bowmen, and of peltasts. He likewise announced to the commanders of cavalry that he would also give a prize of victory to the one who should furnish the best mounted and best equipped battalion" (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 4.2.5)[12].

Xenophon leaves us in no doubt that in this instance the mercenaries would have provided their own arms and armour, and presumably the *lochagoi* of the mercenary units would have seen to it that the equipment of their men was in good repair and fit to pass inspection. Furthermore, if Agesilaos' force of mercenaries consisted solely of the Cyreans, who had been campaigning in Asia for some six years, they already had armour and weapons and had been given *at least* one occasion (and perhaps more) to replace damaged or lost arms and armour when Agesilaos had set up the market selling arms at Ephesos (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.17; *Agesilaos* 1.26) during the winter of 396-395 BC. As Xenophon does not state that there were any exceptions among Agesilaos' troops who were expected to purchase their own arms and armour, in the light of Xenophon's statements in *Hellenika* 4.2.5, that any replacement equipment the former Cyreans needed had been purchased at their own expense. Returning to the prizes offered by Agesilaos, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.2.7), oddly enough states that:

> "as for the prizes, most of them were beautifully wrought arms, both for hoplites and for horsemen; there were also wreaths of gold, and the prizes all told cost not less than four talents. As a result,

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[12] *βουλόμενος ὡς βελτίστους καὶ πλείστους ἄγειν μεθ' ἑαυθοῦ, ἆθλα προύθηκε ταῖς πόλεσιν, ἥτις ἄριστον στράτευμα πέμποι, καὶ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοῖς λοχαγοῖς, ὅστις εὐοπλότατον λόχον ἔχων συστρατεύοιτο καὶ ὁπλιτῶν καὶ τοξοτῶν καὶ πελταστῶν. προεῖπε δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἱππάρχοις, ὅστις εὐιπποτάτην καὶ εὐοπλοτάτην τάξιν παρέχοιτο, ὡς καὶ τούτοις νικητήριον δώρων.*

> however, of the expending of this sum, arms worth a vast sum of money were provided for the army" (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 4.2.7)[13].

Whitehead (1991:112) cites Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.2.5) to support his argument that mercenaries provided their own arms and armour, adding (*ibid.*) merely (of Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.7) that: "somewhat paradoxically, the ἆθλα for the hoplites and the cavalry turn out to be ὅπλα". However, the two Xenophon passages (*Hell.* 4.2.5; 7), cited by Whitehead (1991:112), deserve further discussion.

It is worth looking again at the fourth century inscription from Thasos honouring war orphans (Pouilloux, 1954:371, *Inv.* 1032) which states that each young man was to receive a complete panoply of greaves, breastplate, short sword, helmet, shield and spear to the value of not less than three minai or 300 drachmai. Both Jackson (1993:229) and McKechnie (1989:94 n.12) concur in remarking that we can safely assume these panoplies to have been of fine quality. Although Pouilloux (1954:372) dates the Thasos inscription to the second half of the fourth century, whereas Agesilaos is offering his prizes (in Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.7) in the early fourth century and the two could be at least ninety years apart in time scale it is perhaps reasonable, nevertheless, to use the 300 drachmai figure of the Thasos inscription as an approximate guide for trying to deduce how many panoplies Agesilaos may have offered as prizes.

If, for the sake of a hypothetical example, we temporarily ignore Xenophon's statement that the ὅπλα offered as prizes were for both hoplites *and* cavalrymen and, similarly, we temporarily ignore the gold crowns mentioned, and instead suppose that Agesilaos provided precisely four talents worth of arms of a similar high quality to those issued to the war orphans of Thasos, but only for hoplites, then at 300 drachmai for each panoply Agesilaos could have provided a maximum of eighty hoplite panoplies. Of course when we take into account Xenophon's actual statement, that arms for *both* hoplites *and* cavalrymen, as well

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[13] ἦν δὲ τὰ ἆθλα τὰ μὲν πλεῖστα ὅπλα ἐκπεπονημένα εἰς κόσμον καὶ ὁπλιτικὰ καὶ ἱππικά· ἦσαν δὲ καὶ στέφανοι χρυσοῖ· τὰ δὲ πάντα ἆθλα οὐκ ἔλαττον ἐγένοντο ἢ ἀπὸ τεττάρων ταλάντων. τοσούτων μέντοι ἀναλωθέντων, παμπόλλων χρημάτων ὅπλα εἰς τὴν στρατιὰν κατεσκευάσθη.

as gold crowns, were offered as prizes then the number of hoplite panoplies would be considerably less than eighty. Furthermore, although the number in a Greek *lochos* could vary considerably[14], the usual number of men in a *lochos* would appear to have been about 100, as Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.21) records how the commanders of the '10,000' formed a tactical reserve of six *lochoi* of a hundred men in each and each commanded by a *lochagos*. Later, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.8.15) also mentions eighty *lochoi* each: "numbering close upon one hundred" men. Therefore, even if Agesilaos had provided eighty top quality hoplite panoplies as prizes there would not have been enough to equip a complete *lochos* of 100 men.

It seems reasonable to suggest that *either* the panoplies offered as prizes by Agesilaos were worth less than 300 drachmai each, if the entire unit of the most deserving hoplite *lochos* or cavalry squadron were *all* to receive fine quality armour *or* that only the officers of the units chosen received the prizes[15]. Either way, what Agesilaos did was to induce his mercenary units (and the citizen troops from the Asiatic Greek cities) to equip themselves as well as possible, *at*

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[14] For example: Thuc. 5.59.4; 5.72.3 asserts that in circa 418 BC the Argive army was commanded by five *strategoi* and comprised five *lochoi*, each *lochos* possibly being 1,000 strong as we hear of Argive units of this size elsewhere (e.g. Herodotos, 6.92, Thuc. 1.107.5). Similary, Thucydides, 5.67-68 says the Lakedaimonian army at Mantineia in 418 BC consisted of seven *lochoi* plus the 600 strong Skiritai. Sekunda (1986:22-23) suggests each of the five citizen *lochoi* consisted of 512 men and suggests that the two *lochoi* of *neodamodeis* may have each been 1,000 strong.

[15] For example, the six *lochoi* mentioned by Xenophon in *Anabasis* (3.4.21) were each commanded by a *lochagos*, who, in addition, each had a complement of other, more junior officers, under their command. These 'commanders of fifties' (*pentêkontêras*) and 'commanders of twenty-fives' (*enômotarchous*) are strikingly similar, identical even, to the Spartan system of officer ranks as given in another work of Xenophon's (*Lak. Pol.* 11.4) which states that each Spartan *mora* had one *polemarch*, four *lochagoi*, eight 'commanders of fifties' (*pentêkontêras okto*) and sixteen 'commanders of twenty-fives' (*enômotarchous hekkaideka*). This would mean that each of the six *lochoi* mentioned by Xenophon in *Anabasis* (3.4.21), if organised along Spartan lines, would have had a compliment of officers as follows: one *lochagos*, two *pentêkontêras*, and four *enômotarchous*. Therefore; 2 'squads' of 25 men = 1 'platoon' of 50 men, 2 'platoons' of 50 men in each = one 'company' or *lochos* of 100 men, though of course the actual figures, even as 'paper strengths', were probably not as straightforward as these: cf. Connolly (1981:40-44) who suggests that each Spartan *enomotia* consisted of three files of twelve men, thirty-six men in total. If Connolly is correct a Spartan *pentekostys* would, therefore, actually consist of 72 men. However, cf. Gomme *et al* (1970:112; 114) who suggest a number of *circa* 32 men in each *enomotia*, which therefore results in each Spartan *pentekostys* being either c.128 strong (based on Thuc. 5.68.3) or in a later period c.64 strong (based on Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 11.4).

their own expense, by offering the prizes of both arms and gold crowns as an incentive.

Turning our attention to Sicily, Garlan (1975:143) remarks that Dionysios the Elder: "was apparently one of the first to take the arms 'industry' directly in hand". Indeed, in what Davies (1993:193) describes as one of Diodoros' more vivid passages, Diodoros (14.41.3-42.2) relates how, in 399, Dionysios:

> "At once, therefore, he gathered skilled workmen, commandeering them from the cities under his control and attracting them by high wages from Italy and Greece as well as Carthaginian territory. For his purpose was to make weapons in great numbers and every kind of missile, and also quadriremes and quinqueremes, no ships of the latter size having yet been built at that time. After collecting many skilled workmen, he divided them into groups in accordance with their skills, and appointed over them the most conspicuous citizens, offering great bounties to any who created a supply of arms. As for the armour, he distributed among them models of each kind, because he had gathered his mercenaries from many nations; for he was eager to have very one of his soldiers armed with the weapons of his people, conceiving that by such armour his army would, for this very reason, cause great consternation, and that in battle all of his soldiers would fight to best effect in armour to which they were accustomed. And since the Syracusans enthusiastically supported the policy of Dionysios, it came to pass that rivalry rose high to manufacture the arms. For not only was every space, such as the porticoes and back rooms of the temples as well as the gymnasia and colonnades of the market place, crowded with workers, but the making of great quantities of arms went on, apart from such public places, in the most distinguished homes.
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> In fact the *katapelta* was invented at this time in Syracuse, since the ablest skilled workmen had been gathered from everywhere into one

> place. The high wages as well as the numerous prizes offered the workmen who were judged to be the best stimulated their zeal. And over and above these factors, Dionysios circulated daily among the workers, conversed with them in kindly fashion, and rewarded the most zealous with gifts and invited them to his table. Consequently the workmen brought unsurpassable devotion to the devising of many missiles and engines of war that were strange and capable of rendering great service" (Diodoros, 14.41.3-42.2)[16].

Of course Dionysios needed to meet the costs of such activity, and the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 2.2.20 [1349a15-1350a6]) relates the various ingenious, and often unscrupulous, ways Dionysios went about collecting funds. In the Aristotle passage (*loc. cit.*) we hear of Dionysios duping prisoners, and even his own troops, into parting with money and plunder in addition to his 'borrowing' from the temple of Demeter and outright theft from the temple of Leukothea in Etruria. Such financial measures appear to have worked reasonably well for the Elder Dionysios and, perhaps, allowed him to stockpile arms which were probably paid for by such money-making ruses. Indeed, Diodoros (15.13.2) informs us that Dionysios once sent 2,000 troops to his allies in Illyria along with: "500 suits of Greek armour"[17]; presumably the former were mercenaries whilst the latter could have come from an arsenal within Dionysios' fortress-

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[16] *εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς τεχνίτας ἤθροιζεν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτὸν ταττομένων πόλεων κατὰ πρόσταγμα, τοὺς δ' ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔτι δὲ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείας μεγάλοις μισθοῖς προτρεπόμενος. διενοεῖτο γὰρ ὅπλα μὲν παμπληθῆ καὶ βέλη παντοῖα κατασκευάσαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ναῦς τετρήρεις καὶ πεντήρεις, οὐδέπω κατ' ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους σκάφους πεντηρικοῦ νεναυπηγημένου. συναχθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τεχνιτῶν, διελὼν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἐργασίας κατέστησε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐπισημοτάτους, προθεὶς δωρεὰς μεγάλας τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὅπλα διέδωκε δὲ καὶ τῶν ὅπλων τὸν γένους ἑκάστου τύπον διὰ τὸ τοὺς μισθοφόρους ἐκ πολλῶν ἐθνῶν συνεστηκέναι· ἔσπευδε γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν στρατευομένων κοσμῆσαι τοῖς οἰκείοις ὅπλοις, καὶ διελά μβανε τὸ στρατόπεδον πολλὴν ἕξειν κατάπληξιν διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ κατὰ τὰς μάχας κάλλιστα χρήσεσθαι τῷ συνήθει καθοπλισμῷ πάντας τοὺς συναγωνιζομένους. συμπροθυμουμένων δὲ καὶ τῶν Συρακοσίων τῇ τοῦ Διονυσίου προαιρέσει, πολλὴν συνέβαινε γίνεσθαι τὴν φιλοτιμίαν περὶ τὴν τῶν ὅπλων κατασκευήν. οὐ μόνον γὰρ ἐν τοῖς προνάοις καὶ τοῖς ὀπισθοδόμοις τῶν ἱερῶν, ἔτι δὲ τοῖς γυμνασίοις καὶ ταῖς κατὰ ἀγορὰν στοαῖς, ἔγεμε πᾶς τόπος τῶν ἐργαζομένων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς τῶν δημοσίων τόπων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις οἰκίαις ὅπλα παμπληθῆ κατασκευάζετο.*

Καὶ γὰρ τὸ καταπελτικὸν εὑρέθη κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν καιρὸν ἐν Συρακούσαις, ὡς ἂν τῶν κρατίστων τεχνιτῶν πανταχόθεν εἰς ἕνα τόπον συνηγμένων. τὴν γὰρ προθυμίαν τό τε μέγεθος τῶν μισθῶν ἐξεκαλεῖτο καὶ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν προκειμένων ἄθλων τοῖς ἀρίστοις κριθεῖσι· χωρὶς δὲ τούτων περιπορευόμενος τοὺς ἐργαζομένους ὁ Διονύσιος καθ' ἡμέραν λόγοις τε φιλανθρώποις ἐχρῆτο καὶ τοὺς προθυμοτάτους ἐτίμα δωρεαῖς καὶ πρὸς τὰ συνδείπνια παρελάμβανε. διόπερ ἀνυπέρβλητον φιλοτιμίαν εἰσφέροντες οἱ τεχνῖται πολλὰ προσεπενοοῦντο βέλη καὶ μηχανήματα ξένα καὶ δυνάμενα παρέχεσθαι μεγάλας χρείας.

[17] *πανοπλίας Ἑλληνικὰς πεντακοσίας.*

palace on Ortygeia. Diodoros (14.43.2-3) alleges that the armourers working for Dionysios in 399 BC produced:

> "one hundred and forty thousand shields and a like number of daggers and helmets; and in addition corselets were made ready, of every design and wrought with the utmost art, more than fourteen thousand in number. These Dionysios expected to distribute to his cavalry and the commanders of infantry, as well as to the mercenaries who were to form his bodyguard" (Diod. 14.43.2-3)[18].

If Diodoros' figures are to believed the economic cost must have been staggering, and even if Diodoros is exaggerating somewhat the methods Dionysios is alleged to have employed in order to raise money, as related by Aristotle (*loc. cit.*), it certainly suggests that the need for financing armament production on a very large scale was one of Dionysios' possible motives for using such methods. Also worth noting is how Dionysios: "with typical prudence...provided the arms first and then raised the mercenaries, so that he might not be paying them wages before he was ready to use them in war" (Parke, 1981:69). Parke (*loc. cit.*) is of course referring to how Diodoros (14.43.2) first tells us of Dionysios' armour production and then (Diod. 14.43.4) the actual raising of his mercenaries.

However, is Dionysios' arming of his mercenaries the exception to the rule? That is to say, is the example of Dionysios' armament production and subsequent equipping of his mercenaries unique among *Greeks*? To answer this we must turn to the testimony of Isokrates. Whitehead (1991:113) states that: "what Isokrates has to say must be taken seriously. The relevant passages are well-known (chiefly, in chronological order: 4.168; Ep. 9.8-9; 8.24; 15.115;5.96 and 120-123; Ep. 2.19), and the image they conjure up is one of itinerant forces of mercenaries on the loose, especially in Asia Minor". Indeed, the picture painted

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[18] ἀσπίδων μὲν τεσσαρεσκαίδεκα μυριάδες, ἐγχειρδίων δὲ καὶ περικεφαλαιῶν ὁ παραπλήσιος ἀριθμός· ἡτοιμάσθησαν δὲ καὶ θώρακες, παντοῖοι μὲν ταῖς κατασκευαῖς, περιττῶς δὲ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην εἰργασμένοι, πλείους τῶν μυρίων τετρακισχιλίων. τούτους δὲ διενοεῖτο διαδιδόναι τοῖς ἱππεῦσι καὶ τῶν πεζῶν τοῖς ἐφ' ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις, ἔτι δὲ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοῖς σωματοφυλακεῖν μέλλουσιν.

by Isokrates with regard to mercenaries in the passages Whitehead (*loc. cit.*) cites is extremely bleak. For example, Isokrates (*Ep.* 9.9 [*Archidamos* 9]), referring to the problem of mercenary bands in general, states that:

> "These renegades, if we had any sense, we should not be permitting to come together into bands or, led by any chance leaders, to form armed contingents, composed of roving forces more numerous and powerful than are the troops of our own citizen forces" (Isokrates, *Epistle* 9.9 [*Archidamos* 9])[19].

Isokrates (*ibid.*) goes on to depict mercenary bands as being little more than armed bandits, threatening not only the Persian king but also wreaking (allegedly) havoc, murder, robbery, and destruction on Hellenic cities. Ten years later, in 346 BC, Isokrates urged Philip of Makedon:

> "to settle in permanent abodes those who now, for the lack of the daily necessities of life, are wandering from place to place and committing outrages upon whomsoever they encounter...If we do not stop these men from banding together, by providing sufficient livelihood for them, they will grow before we know it into so great a multitude as to be a terror no less to the Hellenes than to the barbarians...It is therefore the duty of a man who is high-minded, who is a lover of Hellas, who has a broader vision than the rest of the world, to employ these bands in a war against the barbarians" (Isokrates, *Philippos* 120-122)[20].

Certainly, the bands of mercenaries of whom Isokrates speaks always appear to be little better than armed renegades. Even allowing for paranoia on Isokrates'

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[19] *οὓς, εἰ νοῦν εἴχομεν, οὐκ ἂν περιεωρῶμεν ἀθροιζομές οὐδ' ὑπὸ τῶν τυχόντων στρατηγουμένους, οὐδὲ μείζους καὶ κρείττους συντάξεις στρατοπέδων γιγνομέναις ἐκ τῶν πλανωμένων ἢ τῶν πολιτευομένων.*

[20] *καὶ κατοικίσαι τοὺς νῦν πλανωμένους δι' ἔνδειαν τῶν καθ' ἡμέραν καὶ λυμαινομένους οἷς ἂν ἐντύχωσιν. οὓς εἰ μὴ παύσομεν ἀθροιζομένους βίον αὐτοῖς ἱκανὸν πορίσαντες, λήσουσιν ἡμᾶς τοσοῦτοι γενόμενοι τὸ πλῆθος, ὥστε μηδὲν ἧττον αὐτοὺς εἶναι φοβεροὺς τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἢ τοῖς βαρβάροις·...ἔστιν οὖν ἀδρὸς μέγα φρονοῦντος καὶ φιλέλληνος καὶ πορρωτέρω τῶν ἄλλων τῇ διανοίᾳ καθορῶντος, ἀποχρησάμενον τοῖς τοιούτοις πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους.*

part, the point is, however, that they do appear to be armed, and presumably had their own arms when they sought employment between their periods of brigandage.

If it was usual for mercenaries to provide their own armour and weapons there appears, however, to be another exceptional case, that of the mercenaries employed by Phokis in the Third Sacred War. Diodoros (16.32.4) states of the Phokian general Onomarchos that:

> "having been chosen general with supreme command, he began to collect a large number of mercenaries, and, filling the gaps in his ranks caused by the casualties and having increased his army by the large number of foreigners enrolled, he set about making great preparations of allies and of everything else that is serviceable for war" (Diodoros, 16.32.4)[21].

A short while later Diodoros (16.33.4) maintains that to aid these preparations:

> "Onomarchos, when he had been chosen general in supreme command, prepared a great supply of weapons from the bronze and iron, and having struck coinage from the silver and gold distributed it among the allied cities and chiefly gave it as bribes to the leaders of those cities" (Diodoros, 16.33.4)[22].

The metal for these preparations came, of course, from the dedications at the sanctuary at Delphi. Although Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) alleges that Onomarchos prepared his supply of weapons from the bronze and iron (dedications), other evidence suggests that some items of armour could have been used without having reached his troops via a furnace. Polybios (5.8.9-9.1) states that when

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[21] *αἱρεθεὶς δὲ στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ μισθοφόρων τε πλῆθος ἤθροιζε καὶ τὰς τῶν τετελευτηκότων τάξεις ἀναπληρώσας καὶ τῷ πλήθει τῶν ξενολογηθέντων αὐξήσας τὴν δύναμιν μεγάλας παρασκευὰς ἐποιεῖτο συμμάχων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων εἰς πόλεμον χρησίμων.*

[22] *ὁ δ' οὖν Ὀνόμαρχος στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ ᾑρημένος ἐκ μὲν τοῦ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου κατεσκεύασεν ὅπλων πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀργυρίου καὶ χρυσίου νόμισμα κόψας ταῖς τε συμμαχούσαις πόλεσι διεδίδου καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς προεστηκότας ἐδωροδόκει.*

Philip V of Makedon marched on Thermon in 218 BC, he and his troops allegedly found the stoas there full of some 15,000 panoplies of armour. Polybios (*ibid.*) goes on to say that Philip's troops exchanged some of the armour there for that of their own and destroyed the remainder. Might not have Onomarchos, similarly, pressed some of the dedications of armour at Delphi into service also? Perhaps. However, Jackson (1993:246) points out that following the spoils which Thucydides (4.134) attests the Tegeans and Mantineians both sent there in 423 BC: "thereafter very few offerings of spoils taken from [fellow] Greeks are reliably reported at Delphi" (Jackson, 1993:246). Furthermore, Plato (*Republic*, 469e-470a) seems to hint at a possible change in attitude among the Greeks, expressing distaste at the practice of stripping the bodies of fallen enemies, who are also Greeks, and dedicating such arms as trophies on the battlefield and in temple precincts. It might well be that the practice of dedicating captured armour in sanctuaries had begun to lose favour. A visitor to the museums at both Olympia and Delphi, is immediately struck by how the majority of the items of armour exhibited in both museums come from the Archaic and early-Classical periods, with far fewer pieces of later date. Indeed, as Jackson (1993:247) remarks the: "refusal of the three panhellenic sanctuaries to accept spoils of Greeks is then probably not a mere matter of silence in the archaeological record". Some items of armour may, however, have remained in place in Greek sanctuaries. Pausanias (9.16.3)[23] states that at the sanctuary of Law-giving Demeter in Boiotia he saw: "bronze shields dedicated here which they say came from the Spartan officers who died at Leuktra", that is to say still surviving some five hundred years after their dedication. However, whether or not Onomarchos pressed the dedications of armour from Delphi into service remains no more than a possibility.

Philip of Makedon's victory over Onomarchos at Crocus Field (Diod. 16.35.4-6), a somewhat inappropriately beautiful name for a particularly bloody battle, saw, Diodoros (16.35.6) alleges, the death of 6,000 Phokians and their mercenaries as well as Onomarchos himself, with a further 3,000 troops taken captive. Parke

[23] Paus. 9.16.3 according to Levi in the Penguin translation. However, Jackson (1993:244) cites this passage as Paus. 9.16.5.

(1981:137) takes *all* 6,000 of the dead and the 3,000 who were taken prisoner as having been mercenaries and suggests that the original number of mercenaries had been: "somewhat over 10,000 originally, or more than half the total force" (Parke, 1981:137), Diodoros (16.35.4) giving a total figure of about 20,000 infantry for each side in the battle. Pausanias (10.2.3) gives a brief and less impartial account of Onomarchos' defeat and death but fails to give any details of the number of troops involved, relating instead a rather fanciful tale saying that Onomarchos was murdered by his own troops because of his, alleged, cowardice and inexperience in generalship leading to their defeat. Pausanias' version is hardly credible when we consider that Diodoros (16.31.5; 32.3-4; 35.2-6) portrays Onomarchos as a competent, possibly even gifted, general who, Diodoros (16.35.2) maintains had twice defeated Philip in battle.

Given the heavy losses suffered by the Phokians at Crocus Field, it is hardly surprising that Diodoros (16.36.1) states that the brother, and successor as general, to Onomarchos, Phayllos: "began to gather a multitude of mercenaries, offering double the customary pay, and summoned help from his allies. He got ready also a large supply of arms (κατεσκεάζετο δὲ καὶ ὅπλων πλῆθος) and coined gold and silver money". Diodoros (16.37.1-2) later duplicates his statement (of 16.36.1) about Phayllos' preparations though omits on his second telling to make any mention of arms production. Diodoros (16.37.3) states that Phayllos' forces received a manpower boost in the form of 2,000 mercenaries who had been serving the two tyrants of Pherai and who, it seems, followed their paymasters and joined the Phokians. As Diodoros (16.35.1f) has earlier related Philip's campaign in Thessaly against the Pheraian tyrants we can presume that the 2,000 mercenaries in the service of Lykophron and Peitholaos (or Pytholaos according to Plutarch, *Pelopidas* 35.3) and who had followed their employers in joining the Phokians, were already equipped with armour and weapons. Exactly who had armed them it is impossible to say. Diodoros (16.37.5-6) puts Phayllos' losses in Boiotia as being: "a great number of men" near Orchomenos, over 500 dead and about 400 taken prisoner at the Kephisos river, and 50 dead and 130 captured a few days later near Koroneia. Diodoros' (16.38.1-7) narrative of the

continuing events of the Third Sacred War relates a catalogue of occasional Phokian success coupled with a number of defeats and continuing losses.

Those mercenaries who survived, Plutarch (*Timoleon* 30.4) tells us, had eventually: "wandered about Peloponnesos, where they were enlisted in his service by Timoleon, in the dearth of other soldiers". Four hundred of them were to die near Messana (Plut. *Timoleon* 30.3) at the hands of Mamerkos, Hiketas, and their Carthaginian allies, perhaps out of a force of 4,000 (Plut. *Timoleon* 25.3). Timoleon's defeated mercenaries would appear to have been still carrying the arms that Diodoros (16.33.4; 36.1) asserts had been manufactured out of the bronze and iron dedications at Delphi, if Plutarch's (*Timoleon* 31.1) citation of the epigram written by Mamerkos, when he dedicated their shields to the gods, is anything to go by:

> "These bucklers, purple-painted, decked with ivory, gold and amber,
> We captured with our simple little shields" (Plutarch, *Tim.* 31.1)[24].

Such ostentatiously decorated items would certainly appear to give credence to Diodoros' (*loc. cit.*) statements that Onomarchos and Phayllos had used the dedications at Delphi to manufacture arms. We can only guess if arms of such quality were designed to offset any feelings of conscience the mercenaries may have felt at the impious nature they had come to be produced. This would suggest, therefore, that the mercenaries who served Phokis during the Third Sacred War had been provided with their equipment by their employers but that such provision had, in effect, been due to unusual circumstances and, perhaps, served as a bribe to entice mercenaries to fight for employers who had been branded as temple-robbers. This would also suggest that when the remnants of this mercenary army had later taken employment with Timoleon they still possessed the arms given to them by the Phokians and, in their service under

[24] *Τάσδ' ὀστρειογραφεῖς καὶ χρυσελεφαντηλέκτρους, ἀσπίδας ἀσπιδίοις εἵλομεν εὐτελέσι.*

Timoleon, had a more traditional employment arrangement. That is to say, they were already equipped when their next employer, Timoleon, hired them.

Although Diodoros *can* be guilty of using stereotypical phrases, for example when in a number of passages (Diod. 13.96.1; 16.6.5; 9.5; 80.6) he alleges that individuals stockpiled arms and used them to equip their troops, usually the poor or mercenaries, and that in the case of Onomarchos and Phayllos he is actually telling the truth. Furthermore, his assertions in the cases of Onomarchos, and particularly Phayllos, are borne out by Plutarch's (*Timoleon* 31.1) recording of Mamerkos' dedication describing the ornate nature of their shields. Finally, we must regard the equipping of the Cyreans, Dionysios' mercenaries, and those employed by the Phokians during the Third Sacred War, as exceptional cases. Cyrus was, after all, not a Greek but a Persian prince; Dionysios an autocrat; and the Phokian commanders were able to hire and equip a large mercenary force solely because they had access to the treasures of the Delphic sanctuary. Therefore, it appears logical to concur with Whitehead (1991:113) and suggest, on the basis of the evidence we have examined and discussed, that in the Greek world it was usually the mercenary who provided his own equipment at his own expense and not his employer except in extraordinary or unusual circumstances.

PART TWO: *EPITÊDEIA*, THE NECESSARIES OF LIFE: THE PROCUREMENT OF FOOD AND DRINK BY GREEK ARMIES

> "For a general must be skilful in preparing what is necessary for war, able in securing provisions for his troops" (Xen. *Mem.* 3.1.6)[1].

Wilkins (1995:1) states that: "until recently, the production and consumption of food, that vital part of ancient life, was, apart from the occasional monograph, neglected by Classical scholars. Over the past twenty-five years, however, numerous books have appeared, particularly in Europe". However, the vast majority of these published works have their focus in the broadest sense, that being food in society in general, with little emphasis being placed, overtly, on the topic of food in a military context. There has been *some* work on the subject of provisioning armies, notably Anderson (1970:43-66) and Pritchett (1971:30-52), who each devote a chapter to this topic within the bodies of their respective works. In comparison, Griffith (1935:264-273) devotes nine pages to the subject of the pay and maintenance of mercenaries in the classical period, much of which centres on a discussion of the terms σῖτος (etc.) and μισθός. In contrast, more recent work, such as that of Hanson (1983; 1993) and Foxhall (1995), focuses more on the effects of warfare on agriculture than with concerning itself with the provisioning of troops, the notable exception being that of Lazenby (1994).

Sage (1996:55) states, quite correctly, that: "provisioning is central to the effective functioning of any army. Without adequate supplies, military forces become hard to control and disintegrate". Sage's statement is, of course, absolutely true and echoes a speech that Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.3.11) attributes to Klearchos when the Spartan addressed mutinous troops at Tarsus:

> "In my opinion, therefore, it is no time for us to be sleeping or unconcerned about ourselves; we should rather be considering what

[1] καὶ γὰρ παρασκευστικὸν τῶν εἰς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν στρατηγὸν εἶναι χρὴ καὶ ποριστικτὸν τῶν

> course we ought to follow under the present circumstances. And so long as we remain here we must consider, I think, how we can remain most safely; or, again, if we count it best to depart at once, how we are to depart most safely and how we shall secure provisions - for without provisions neither general nor private is of any use" (Xenophon, *Anab.* 1.3.11)[2].

Although Luttwak (1993:3-7) would probably disagree, it is not surprising for Xenophon to record such information[3]. Indeed, as Tuplin (1998:782) remarks of the Xenophontic corpus: "issues of leadership (by states as well as individuals) or military skill...engage his [Xenophon's] didactic muse". Pritchett (1971:30) too, singles out Xenophon in particular for attention, stating that: "the provisioning of the soldiers was an important element in Greek, as in all, warfare, for, as Xenophon frequently noted, without the assurance of adequate rations it was difficult to maintain discipline in the ranks (Xenophon *Anab.* 1.3.11; *Hell.* 7.5.19; *Cyrop.* 4.2.34, 6.2.19)". In addition to helping to maintain discipline adequate supplies of food and, just as importantly if not more so, drink, were, and are, essential for the physical well-being of troops and in maintaining their ability to fight when called upon to do so.

ἐπιτηδείων τοῖς στρατιώταις. Watson's translation, Everyman's Library edition. I have chosen to use Watson's translation over that of Marchant (Loeb Classical Library edition) as it follows the meaning of Xenophon's Greek text more accurately.

[2] *ἐμοὶ οὖν δοκεῖ οὐχ ὥρα εἶναι ἡμῖν καθεύδειν οὐδ' ἀμελεῖν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ βουλεύεσθαι ὅ τι χρὴ ποιεῖν ἐκ τούτων. καὶ ἕως γε μένομεν αὐτοῦ σκεπτέον μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα μένωμεν, εἴ τε ἤδη δοκεῖ ἀπιέναι, ὅπως ἀσφαλέστατα ἄπιμεν, καὶ ὅπως τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἕξομεν· ἄνευ γὰρ τούτων οὔτε στρατηγοῦ οὔτε ἰδιώτου ὄφελος οὐδέν.*

[3] However, as Luttwak (1993:3-7) fails to even acknowledge the very existence of the Xenophontic corpus the reader can draw his own conclusions as to the validity of Luttwak's arguments.

THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE WATER SUPPLIES

> "...how sweet water is to drink when one is thirsty" (Xenophon, *Cyropaideia* 1.2.11)[1].

Ober (1993:176-177), in the context of discussing summer campaigning in central Greece, remarks that: "adequate water must have been a real problem. Hiking in the dry summer heat of central Greece requires drinking great quantities of water to maintain one's health and strength. The hoplites, their attendants and the pack/draught animals all required drinking water; the daily water requirement for even a small army would be tremendous. In some areas, it would not be easy to procure the required amounts, and thirst would then torment man and beast alike".

It is impossible to overstress the fundamental importance of securing adequate supplies of drinking water by armies of any period, and Greek antiquity is no exception. Often the need for adequate supplies of water dictated where armies encamped, the particular topographical positions they occupied, and also went some considerable way toward dictating the halting places of armies on the march. Of the army that Xerxes assembled for the invasion of Greece, Herodotos (7.21.3) asks the rhetorical question: "for what nation did Xerxes not lead from Asia against Hellas? What water did not fail when being drunk up, except only the greatest rivers?". Later, Herodotos (7.108.2) names one of the rivers that allegedly failed to meet the requirements of Xerxes' army when he states that when Xerxes left Doriskos: "he first passed the Samothracian fortresses; of these, the city built farthest to the west is called Mesambria. Next to it is the Thasian city of Stryme; between them runs the river Lisos, which now could not furnish water enough for Xerxes' army, but was exhausted". Later still, when attempting to calculate the number in Xerxes' army, Herodotos (7.187.1) states that in

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[1] Xen. *Cyrop.* 1.2.11: *πῶς...ἡδὺ ὕδωρ πιεῖν διψῶντι.* Xenophon echoes this sentiment in another of his works (*Lak. Pol.* 15.6) when he remarks of the king's house at Sparta that a: "lake near the house supplies abundance of water; and how useful that is for many purposes none know so well as those who are without it"
(*Καὶ πρὸς τῇ οἰκίᾳ δὲ λίμνη ὕδατος ἀφθονίαν παρέχει· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς πολλὰ χρήσιμον, οἱ μὴ ἔχοντες αὐτὸ μᾶλλον γιγνώσκουσι*).

addition to the actual fighting force: "No one, however, can say what the exact number of concubines, and eunuchs was, nor can one determine the number of beasts of draft and burden, and the Indian dogs which accompanied the host; so many of them were there". Herodotos (*ibid.*) then reiterates his remark about the invasion force drinking from rivers saying that: "It is accordingly not surprising to me that some of the streams of water ran dry"[2]. Although Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) never states that Xerxes' force actually did drink the rivers dry he does add, immediately after his reiterating that the rivers ran dry, that: "I do, however, wonder how there were provisions sufficient for so many tens of thousands" (Herodotos 7.187.1). The matter of securing adequate water supplies is raised again by Herodotos (7.196.1) in narrating Xerxes' progress through Thessaly and Achaia Phthiotis: "Of the Thessalian rivers, the Onochonos was the only one which could not provide enough water for his army to drink. In Achaia, however, even the greatest river there, the Apidanos, gave out, remaining but a sorry trickle"[3].

Maurice (1930:210), in an article that has still yet to be superseded, remarks that when he visited the Dardanelles-Hellespont in the late summer of 1922 AD he observed: "in that district, during the dry season, the problem of water supply looms large, and...was at once struck on reading Herodotos by the fact that this had also been Xerxes' chief difficulty, in that portion of his march which took him from the Skamander, the modern Mendere, across the Hellespont to the Hebros, the modern Maritza". Maurice (1930:212-213) goes on to state that three passages of Herodotos (7.43; 58; 108): "make it evident that the dry season was well advanced, and the fact that he [Herodotos] lays stress upon the difficulties of water supply in connection with the part of the march from the Hellespont to Doriskos seems to indicate that he had heard that they were

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[2] Cf. Herodotos 7.43 on how the Skamander failed to supply Xerxes' force with sufficient water and Herodotos 7.58 where the supply from the river Melas, likewise, was insufficient. For modern discussions of Xerxes' problems in obtaining sufficient supplies of water see: Maurice (1930:212f); Burn (1984:328-329); Lazenby (1993:91; 116).

[3] Cf. Herodotos (4.91.2) who cites an inscription relating to Darius' campaign against the Skythians, he quotes it thus: "From the headwaters of the river Tearos flows the best and finest water of all; and to them came, leading an army against the Skythians, the best and finest man of all, Darius son of Hystaspes, king of Persia and all the continent". Darius and his army were encamped here for three days Herodotos (4.91.1) maintains.

exceptional and required special measures to deal with them". In addition, Maurice (1930:215) puts forward a most sensible, and surely correct, suggestion that Xerxes' army would have been in column of march for the journey to Greece and, therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose, as Maurice (*ibid.*) does, that each 'division' of Xerxes' army upon arriving at a river such as, for example, the Skamander (Herodotos 7.43); "halted on the river for two nights and the intervening day to fill up with water and then advanced to the bridges" (Maurice 1930:215). Furthermore, Maurice (*ibid.*) states, quite forcibly, how: "it is out of the question that the whole army should have been halted together before crossing in the country round Abydos, which could not have supplied it with water for one day". Maurice's (*loc. cit.*) line of argument is perfectly reasonable. To have had the whole of the army of Xerxes halt in one place would have placed impossible strains on the local water supply. It seems much more plausible that the troops of Xerxes' army were watered in relays and then each marched on thereby making way for the next 'division' of troops in the column. That rivers gave out despite such measures is perhaps not as remarkable as it would first appear; the number of troops involved in Xerxes' enterprise, Maurice (1930:228) suggests between 150,500-175,500 combatants[4], coupled with the likelihood that, from reaching the Skamander and for the rest of the march into Greece itself, the Persian army was marching during the dry season suggest that these factors could well have led to rivers running dry.

Herodotos (7.20) maintains that Xerxes undertook preparations for the invasion of Greece that lasted four full years. Later, Herodotos (7.25) informs us of the magazines that Xerxes had set up in Thrace. Similarly, a fragment by Theopompos (fr.125 M)[5], referring to Artaxerxes III's invasion of Egypt gives, what Burn (1984;319) calls a "vivid description" of similar magazines. Although neither the passage in Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) nor that in Theopompos make any

[4] Maurice (1930:228) calculates a figure of 150,500 troops for the march up to the Hellespont and also suggests figures of: 60,000 camp-followers and 75,000 animals. Maurice (*ibid.*) believes that there were some 175,500 combatants on the march from Doriskos to Thermopylai by modifying the number that Herodotos (7.185) says joined the expedition (300,000) during this stage of the march down to a more reasonable, and more acceptable, figure of 25,000.

[5] In Longinus, *On Style*, 43.2. Cf. also Athenaios 2.67.

mention to water being among such stores it is feasible, and surely plain common sense, to suggest that water supplies too were placed in such magazines. Herodotos (3.9-10) records two versions of how Cambyses obtained water supplies during his march on Egypt through the Arabian desert. Of these two versions Herodotos (*ibid.*) states that he considered the story that the Arabian king had cowhides and other skins stitched together to form a pipeline from the river Corys all the way into the desert and into three large constructed reservoirs, as being hard to believe. The other version, which Herodotos believes more likely, is that the Arabian king filled camel-skins with water and, loading them onto his living camels, conveyed them into the desert to await the arrival of Cambyses' invasion force. Herodotos (3.6.2) states that, following Cambyses' conquest of Egypt, the Persians had supplies of water collected in ceramic jars in Egypt and carried to Syria to form water supply depots. Herodotos (*loc. cit.*), it should be noted, mentions this in attempting to explain why, although Egypt imported wine in jars, the wine jars (once the original contents had been drunk and the vessels refilled with water) ended up in Syria, and also to illustrate how this was the system employed once Egypt had been conquered before going on to explain (Herodotos 3.9-10) how Cambyses overcame the problem of ensuring adequate water supplies for his march through the desert. Although Greece and Thrace were by no means deserts, the four full years of preparations for the invasion, including the establishment of magazines in Thrace, would probably have afforded ample time for Persian commissary officers stationed at such magazines to observe seasonal changes in the water supply of these areas. They may also, it seems reasonable to suggest, have possessed enough intelligence and initiative to have foreseen the potential problems of supplying a large force in the dry season in these areas and, as a result, taken appropriate measures to minimise or prevent the occurrence of such difficulties by stock piling water during the wetter months of the year[6]. However, this is only a hypothesis, and whether or not the Persian magazines set up for the invasion of Greece actually stockpiled supplies of water is open to debate.

[6] E.g. in building cisterns etc. cf. Herodotos 4.173.1.

Whether or not supplies of water were stored in the depots that Xerxes set up in his preparations for the invasion of Greece, supplies of water would also be needed on the march. Herodotos (1.188.2) states that:

> "this water of the Choraspes [river] is boiled, and very many four-wheeled wagons drawn by mules carry it in silver vessels, following the king wherever he goes at any time" (Herodotos, 1.188.2)[7].

Whether or not similar procedures were followed to ensure that Xerxes' troops had adequate supplies of water on the march is very much open to question. However, it seems reasonable to assume that troops of *any* army would, at the very least, attempt to carry water with them when on the march. The need for an adequate supply of drinking water, even for an individual on a journey, was recognised as early as the time of Homer (*Odyssey* 5.265) who, when Odysseus is preparing to leave Kalypso, sang of how Kalypso:

> "on the raft the goddess put a skin of dark wine, and another, a great one, of water, and provisions, too, in a wallet. Therein she put an abundance of dainties to satisfy his heart" (Hom. *Od.* 5.265-268)[8].

Similarly, Herodotos (2.32.5) relating a journey of exploration undertaken by the Nasamonians, remarks how these: "young men left their companions, being well supplied with water and provisions,...journeyed first through the inhabited country, and after passing this they came to the region of wild beasts". Xenophon (*Cyropaideia* 6.2.25-26) has the Elder Cyrus advocate that for a forthcoming march of at least twenty days through terrain allegedly devoid of supplies, his troops should carry enough food with them adding: "as for wine, each one ought to take along only enough to last until we accustom ourselves to drinking water; for the greater part of the march will be through a country where there is no wine, and for that all the wine we can carry will not suffice, even if we

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[7] *τούτου δέ τοῦ Χοάσπεω τοῦ ὕδατος ἀπεψημενου πολλαὶ κάρτα ἅμαξαι τετράκυκλοι ὑμιόνεαι κομιζουσαι ἐν ἀγγηίοισι ἀργυρέοισι ἕπονται, ὅκῃ ἂν ἐλαύνῃ ἑκάστοτε.*

[8] *ἐν δέ οἱ ἀσκὸν ἔθηκε θεὰ μέλανος οἴνοιο τὸν ἕτερον, ἕτερον δ' ὕδατος μέγαν, ἐν δὲ καὶ ᾖγα κωρύκῳ· ἐν δέ οἱ ὄψα τίθει μενοεικέα πολλά.*

take along a great quantity" (Xen. *Cyropaideia* 6.2.26). Presumably once these supplies of wine were exhausted and the troops had, as Xenophon has the Elder Cyrus maintain, accustomed themselves to becoming water drinkers, the containers in which their wine had been carried could be reused to carry water supplies on the march.

During the Plataiai campaign of 479, Herodotos (9.25.2) maintains that Pausanias took the decision to move the Greek encampment from Erythrai to the territory of Plataiai as the latter offered a better camping-site and, importantly, better water supplies than the position at Erythrai. Similarly, Herodotos (9.49) asserts, the Greek decision to subsequently abandon their position at the Asopos ridge and withdraw towards Kithairon was due to the efficient action of Mardonios' cavalry in denying the Greeks unhindered accessibility to adequate water supplies in the immediate vicinity. Herodotos (*ibid.*) goes on to inform us, somewhat belatedly as Burn (1984:525 n.34) rightly points out, that the new position was to be nearer the springs in the Greek rear that the army had been forced to rely on as a result of Persian cavalry activity around the water supplies of the Asopos position[9].

The need for the availability of adequate water supplies could even dictate the timing of campaigns. For example, Thucydides after relating that another outbreak of the plague occurred at Athens in the winter of 427-426 BC (3.87.1f) goes on (3.88.1) to state that:

> "The same winter the Athenians in Sicily and the Rhegians made an expedition with thirty ships against the islands of Aiolos, as they are called; for it was impossible to invade them in the summer time on account of the lack of water there" (Thucydides, 3.88.1)[10].

Of Thucydides' (*loc. cit.*) use of *δι' ἀνυδρίαν* Gomme (1956a:389) remarks: "this illustrates, briefly, but clearly, one of the chief purposes of the chronological

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[9] Cf. Plutarch, *Aristeides* 16.

[10] *Καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐν Σικελίᾳ Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Ῥηγῖνοι τοῦ αὐτοῦ χειμῶνος τριάκοντα ναυσὶ στρατεύουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς Αἰόλου νήσους καλουμένας· θέρους γὰρ δι' ἀνυδρίαν ἀδύνατα ἦν ἐπιστρατεύειν.*

system of summers and winters [employed by Thucydides]: it shows the military conditions". It is also extremely useful in indicating that the Athenians and their Rhegian allies had given thought to the problem of obtaining sufficient water in, what would have been, the dry season of summer and hence undertook their planned invasion in winter when water would, presumably, have been more plentiful.

The Athenian occupation and fortification of the sanctuary at Delion (Thuc. 4.90.1-3) in the winter of 424-423 BC, was followed, Thucydides (4.90.4) maintains, by the withdrawal of the main Athenian army except for the garrison. Gomme (1956b:559) points out that the Athenian purpose in occupying this site was that it should: "form a strong point, an ἐπιτείχισμα...from which harassing raids could be made into Boiotian territory, as later into Attika by the Peloponnesians from Dekeleia". Following the defeat of the main Athenian army as it marched homeward from Delion (Thuc. 4.96.6), those Athenians garrisoning the now fortified sanctuary at Delion were criticised, Thucydides (4.97.3) states, for not only having occupied a religious sanctuary but also for: "drawing for the common use the water which was untouched by themselves [the Boiotians] except for use in lustrations connected with the sacrifices". The Athenian response to this, Thucydides (4.98.5) maintains, was to say that: "The water...they had disturbed in their sore need, which they had not wantonly brought upon themselves; they had been forced to use the water while defending themselves against the Boiotians who had first invaded their land". However, this seems to be merely an excuse, given when the Athenians in question found themselves in the particularly embarrassing situation of having to justify their actions. It is possible that one of the very reasons that Delion was chosen by the Athenian commander Hippokrates to receive a garrison was actually because there was a supply of water at the sanctuary, and that subsequent Athenian protestations of innocence were merely attempts to deny that they had contravened accepted Greek military practice in occupying and fortifying a religious sanctuary.

That the need for adequate water supplies could dictate march rates is apparent from Thucydides' description of the Athenian retreat from Syracuse. Thucydides (7.78.4) states that on the first day of the retreat: "the Athenians advanced about forty stadia and bivouacked at a hill". Thucydides (*ibid.*) then proceeds by saying:

> "but on the next day they began the march early and after proceeding about twenty stadia descended into a level place, where they encamped; for they wished to get something to eat from the houses, the place being inhabited, and to get there a supply of water to take with them, since for many stadia ahead in the direction in which they were to go water was not plentiful" (Thucydides, 7.78.4)[11].

In contrast to the Thucydides passage cited above, where the Athenians cut their march short upon seeing (and reaching) signs of habitation, which would have, it seems reasonable to assume, contained stores of food and water supplies, march stages or *stathmoi*, could be made longer in the desire to reach adequate supplies of water. For example, during the Younger Cyrus' march through the 'Arabian' desert, Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.5.7) affirms how:

> "...Cyrus sometimes made these stages through the desert very long, whenever he wanted to reach water or fresh fodder" (Xenophon, *Anab.* 1.5.7)[12].

Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 5.4.40) remarks of the Elder Cyrus that: "from the first Cyrus kept Gadatas among those about him as he marched, to give him information in regards to roads and water, fodder and provisions, so that they might be able to camp where things were most abundant". Later, Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 8.1.44) alleges of the Elder Cyrus that: "whenever there was an

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[11] *τῇ δ' ὑστεραίᾳ πρῲ ἐπορεύοντο καὶ προῆλθον ὡς εἴσκοσι σταδίους, καὶ κατέβησαν ἐς χωρίον ἄπεδόν τι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο, βουλόμενοι ἔκ τε τῶν οἰκιῶν λαβεῖν τι ἐδώδιμον (ᾠκεῖτο γὰρ ὁ χῶρος) καὶ ὕδωρ μετὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν φέρεσθαι αὐτόθεν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ πρόσθεν ἐπὶ πολλὰ στάδια, ἢ ἔμελλον ἰέναι, οὐκ ἄφθονον ἦν.*

[12] *ἦν δὲ τούτων τῶν σταθμῶν οὓς πάνυ μακροὺς ἤλαυνεν, ὁπότε ἢ πρὸς ὕδωρ βούλοιτο διατελέται ἢ πρὸς χιλόν.*

expedition to make, he would lead the serving men to water, just as he did the beasts of burden".

Xenophon in particular seems to have paid especial attention to what to many may have considered to be the rather mundane and day to day tasks that he believed a commander ought to attend to. In advising the would be *hipparchos* he states:

> "In the garrisons he must show an interest in fodder, tents, water, firewood, and all other supplies: he must show that he thinks ahead and keeps his eyes open for the sake of his men" (Xenophon, *Hipparchikos* 6.3)[13].

No doubt attention to such details were in the forefront of his mind when he maintains, of the Elder Cyrus, that: "when the soldiers were all together, Cyrus bade his men take luncheon: and when they had lunched and he had discovered that the place where the scouts had their posts of observation was strong and well supplied with water, he at once proceeded to build a fort there" (Xen. *Cyrop.* 3.2.11). Detail of a different sort is apparent in Xenophon's account of Derkylidas' operations in Asia in 397 BC. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.18), no doubt an eye-witness to the events he describes at this point, says that upon receiving word that Tissaphernes wanted to discuss the possibility of peace: "Derkylidas, taking the best-looking of the troops he had, both cavalry and infantry, came forward to meet the messengers". After Derkylidas had made clear to the Persians his preparedness to fight he nevertheless agreed to a temporary truce, an exchange of pledges, and an exchange of hostages at which point, Xenophon states:

> "When this plan had been decided upon and carried out, the armies went away, the barbarians to Tralles in Karia, and the Greeks to Leukophrys, where there was a very holy shrine of Artemis and a lake

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[13] ἐν δὲ ταῖς φρουραῖς χρὴ καὶ χιλοῦ καὶ σκηνῶν καὶ ὑδάτων καὶ φρυγάνων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων φανερὸν εἶναι ἐπιμελούμενον καὶ προνοοῦντά τε καὶ ἀγρυπνοῦνα ἕνεκα τῶν ἀρχομένων .

> more than a stadion in length, with a sandy bottom and an unfailing supply of drinkable, warm water" (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.19)[14].

Xenophon (*Hellenika* 4.1.15-16) tells us that, in the winter of 395-394 BC, Agesilaos went into winter quarters at Daskyleion where Pharnabazos had his palace. No doubt Agesilaos' decision was partly motivated by the knowledge that it would make a good base in which to spend the winter months. Indeed, Xenophon (*ibid.*) remarks that both the palace and the surrounding villages were well stocked with abundant supplies and that a river containing many fish flowed beside the palace. This river may have provided Agesilaos' army with an adequate water supply during these winter months although Xenophon does not specifically say so. However, there are examples of bodies of troops (or even political factions making an armed bid for power) finding themselves in situations were they had insufficient supplies of water. For example, the occupation of the Athenian acropolis by Kylon and his supporters in the seventh century BC, is mentioned by several sources[15], though only Thucydides (1.126.9) states that:

> "Kylon and those who were besieged with him were in hard straits through lack of food and water" (Thucydides, 1.126.9)[16].

Thucydides (1.126.10) goes on to state that Kylon and his brother, presumably realising the hopelessness of their situation, escaped; their confederates, however, were not so fortunate and were killed (Thuc. 1.126.11; Herodotos 5.71; Plut. *Solon* 12). In 510 BC the Athenian tyrant Hippias found himself besieged on the acropolis[17]. Herodotos (5.6.3) maintains that, unlike Kylon and his supporters, Hippias had ample supplies of food and drink. Despite this, he was obliged to surrender when the children of the Peisistratidai were captured as they were being smuggled out of the country. The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (19.5)

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[14] *δόξαντα δὲ ταῦτα καὶ περανθέντα, τὰ μὲν στρατεύματα ἀπῆλθε, τὸ μὲν βαρβαρικὸν εἰς Τράλλεις τῆς Καρίας, τὸ δ' Ἑλληνικὸν εἰς Λεύκοφρυν, ἔνθα ἦν Ἀρτέμιδός τε ἱερὸν μάλα ἅγιον καὶ λίμνη πλέον ἢ σταδίου ὑπόψαμμος ἀέναος ποτίμου καὶ θερμοῦ ὕδατος.*

[15] Herodotos 5.71; Thucydides 1.126.3f; Plutarch *Solon* 12; Pausanias 1.28.1.

[16] *οἱ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ Κύλωνος πολιορκούμενοι φλαύρως εἶχον σίτου τε καὶ ὕδατος ἀπορίᾳ.*

[17] Herodotos 5.63; Thuc. 6.59.4; and the *Athenaion Politeia* (19), attributed to Aristotle.

attributed to Aristotle asserts that the Spartan king Kleomenes was largely responsible for having: "confined Hippias within what is called the Pelargic wall, and with support from the Athenians laid siege to him". The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (19.6) continues, relating how the children of the Peisistratidai were seized: "when they were being sent out to safety, after which the Peisistratidai came to terms to secure their children's safety and in five days evacuated their possessions and handed over the Acropolis to the Athenians"[18]. Had it not been for the capture of their children the Peisistratidai might have held out on the acropolis for some considerable time, and certainly appear to have been prepared for a siege (Herodotos 5.6.3).

In contrast, another occupation of the Athenian acropolis, by Kleomenes of Sparta and the Athenian Isagoras, lasted only two days. Both Herodotos (5.72) and the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (20.3) concur in stating that they were forced to surrender after a two day siege. In this instance the occupation appears to have been on the spur of the moment as, when their plans to dissolve the Athenian *Boulê* failed, and: "the common people gathered in force; the supporters of Kleomenes and Isagoras fled to the Acropolis; the people settled down and besieged them for two days, but on the third made a truce to release Kleomenes and all the men with him" (*Athenaion Politeia* 20.3). Burn (1984:180-181) writes in glowing terms of this affair that: "a blockade of two days' might hardly seem to rank among the great sieges of history. Yet it was not least among the achievements of the people of Athens. The remarkable fact is that they did this - they not merely rioted, but kept up an effective blockade of a fortress containing several hundred well-armed, trained and desperate men, for forty-eight hours, initially without organised leadership". Burn (1984:181) goes on to suggest that: "it is worth while to imagine the situation from the point of view of the besieged. No one had expected this development, and the citadel was presumably unsupplied with food or water". This incident, humiliating in the extreme to Kleomenes, was still remembered with pride by the Athenians of Aristophanes' (*Lysistrata* 271f) day and was to have similar echoes in the Athenian capture of Lakedaimonian troops on the island of Sphakteria.

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[18] Rhodes' translation, Penguin.

Thucydides (4.26.4), relating the campaign on and around Sphakteria during the summer of 425, states that the Lakedaimonian force were: "on a desert island and had only brackish water to drink". Thucydides (4.31.2) goes on to say that this water supply was near the central and level part of the island near to the main Spartan camp. Pritchett (1965:26-27) remarks that the: "most likely candidate for the water supply of 425 BC seems to be the natural cave called Grundy's Well...the total depth of the well is close to 100 feet,...estimate[d] from the echo of stones, [and] suggests that a considerable force may have obtained water here. That it became brackish with constant use is a normal hydrogeological phenomenon. The important consideration is that it is in the middle of the level ground, which must have been the Spartan camp".

During the military actions on Sphakteria, Thucydides (4.35.1) states, the main Lakedaimonian force, due to pressure from Athenian *peltastai* and *psiloi* were obliged to fall back to the: "fortification on the island", that is, to the northern end of the island, and, therefore, must have had to abandon their camp near the water supply. Finally, Thucydides (4.36.3) states, the: "Lakedaimonians were now assailed on both sides...Since, then, they were now assailed on both sides they no longer held out, but, fighting few against many and withal weak in body from lack of food, they began to give way"[19]. Thucydides (4.37.1-38.1) states that at this point Kleon and Demosthenes sent forward a herald to ask the remaining Lakedaimonian troops to surrender and that the latter agreed to do so. Therefore, according to Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) the surrender of the Lakedaimonian force was due, in part, to their lack of *food.* Diodoros (12.63.3) also follows this line saying that:

> "the Athenians wore down the bodily strength of the Spartans on Sphakteria through their lack of provisions and accepted their formal surrender" (Diod. 12.63.3)[20].

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[19] *ἀμφίβολοι ἤδη ὄντες οὐκέτι ἀντεῖχον, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ὀλίγοι μαχόμενοι καὶ ἀσθενείᾳ σωμάτων διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν ὑπεχώρουν.*

[20] *οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τῇ σπάνει τῶν ἀναγκαίων καταπονήσαντες τοὺς ἐν τῇ Σφακτηρίᾳ παρέλαβον αὐτοὺς καθ' ὁμολογίαν.*

However, it seems reasonable to suggest that dehydration, along with lack of food and the volleys of Athenian missile fire, also played its part in inducing the Lakedaimonian force to surrender. My reasons for proposing such a hypothesis are as follows: firstly, Thucydides (4.31.2) tells us that the Lakedaimonian main camp in the central part of the island was near their water supply. In abandoning this position and withdrawing towards the: "fortification" (Thuc. 4.35.1) at the northern end of the island the Spartans also abandoned the well. Thucydides (4.31.1) informs us that the Athenian landings on two sides of Sphakteria occurred: "a little before dawn"[21]. The 800 Athenian hoplites (Thuc. 4.31.1) embarked on the island quickly overran the thirty hoplites at the first Spartan outpost (Thuc. 4.31.2). The speed of the Athenian assault on the first outpost is apparent in that, Thucydides (4.32.1) states: "the Athenians...immediately destroyed the men in the first post, upon whom they charged at full speed, finding them still in their beds or endeavouring to snatch up their arms". At this point it must have been still dark as it is difficult to believe that Lakedaimonian troops would sleep beyond dawn when on active service and, Thucydides (4.32.2) clearly states: "then as soon as day dawned the rest of the army began to disembark" (*ἅμα δὲ ἕῳ γιγνομένῃ καὶ ὁ ἄλλος στρατὸς ἀπέβαινον*).

From Thucydides' (4.33.1f) narrative it would seem that from the arrival of the Athenian hoplites on the island, the capture of the first Spartan outpost, and the disembarkation of the rest of the Athenian force, mainly *peltastai*, archers, and sailors armed as *psiloi*, up to the commencement of the attacks on the main Lakedaimonian force, little time had elapsed. This would suggest, therefore, that the Lakedaimonians in the main camp had had to forgo breakfast and instead had armed themselves and been ordered to 'stand to' from dawn onwards. Indeed, Gomme (1956b:477) interprets Thucydides' statement: *διὰ τὴν σιτοδείαν* (4.36.3) as meaning: "i.e. they had had nothing to eat all day, and, more important, their main reserve of food (Thuc. 4.39.2) will have been in the central camp and they could expect no more". The lack of food mentioned by Thucydides (4.36.3) is

[21] *πρὸ δὲ τῆς ἕω ὀλίγον ἀπέβαινον τῆς νήσου ἑκατέρωθεν.*

not to be interpreted as meaning that the Lakedaimonians had run out of food on the island, but rather that, as Gomme (*loc. cit.*) implies, they had been forced to abandon their food supplies when they abandoned the main camp in the central part of the island. For Thucydides (4.39.2) states that:

> "...indeed some grain was found on the island at the time of the capture, as well as other articles of food; for the commander Epitadas was accustomed to give each man a scantier ration than his supplies would have allowed" (Thucydides, 4.39.2)[22].

Therefore, The Lakedaimonian force had 'stood to' since dawn, without breakfast, and, following the withdrawal from the main camp, had lost their food supplies and their access to their supply of drinking water. Furthermore, Thucydides (4.33.2) tells us that the Lakedaimonians were unable to drive off the Athenian missile-armed troops over the broken terrain on account of the Lakedaimonians wearing armour[23]. Hanson (1993:78n.1) cites the weight of reproduction hoplite equipment made by students at California State University, Fresno. These items include metal helmets, body armour, shields, spears, swords, and greaves, and, Hanson (*ibid.*) adds, that: "the total weight of the entire [hoplite's] ensemble is nearly 70 lbs (over 31 kgs)"[24]. Therefore, it is hardly surprising, when we consider the burden carried by hoplites, to hear that after a short time: "the Lakedaimonians were no longer able to dash out promptly at the point where they were attacked" (Thuc. 4.34.1). Unfortunately, Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) does not clearly state if the Lakedaimonian dashes were charges made by the

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[22] *καὶ ἦν σῖτός τις ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη· ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἐπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἑκάστῳ παρεῖχεν ἢν πρὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν.*

[23] *ἐν οἷς οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι οὐκ ἐδύναντο διώκειν ὅπλα ἔχοντες.*

[24] Delbrück (1975:86) gives a figure of a 72 lbs burden carried by Greek hoplites. Delbrück (1975:90n.10) does admit later however that although the figure of 72 lbs is: "arbitrary; the fact of being heavily burdened, however, can, in general, not be questioned". Keegan (1993:301), discussing the weight of equipment carried by soldiers *throughout* history remarks that: "experience, ...borne out by modern field trials, has established that the soldier's load cannot on average be made to exceed seventy pounds' weight. ...These figures have not varied over centuries". In support of his statement Keegan (1993:301-302) cites a recommendation of Vegetius (*Epitome of Military Science* 1.19) in which Vegetius proposed that young soldiers (recruits?) should be given frequent practice in carrying loads of up to 60 lbs and marching at a 'military pace' bearing this load. Keegan (1993:302) goes on to point out that on the first day of the Battle of the Somme (1st July 1916 AD) the British troops in the assault: "were burdened on average with sixty-six pounds".

whole of the phalanx or whether *ekdromoi* (literally 'runners-out') were used[25]. Whether the Lakedaimonian sallies were carried out by *ekdromoi* or, the whole of the phalanx, the latter of which we can perhaps consider unlikely, such efforts would prove futile and any brief respite from missile attacks they could provide would be offset by the exhausting effects they would have on the men that undertook them. In addition, Thucydides (4.34.2-3) also mentions the dust from: "the newly burned forest", allegedly so thick in the air that: "a man could not see what was in front of him".

Therefore, the combination of weight of armour, summer heat, futile sallies, and seemingly choking dust, and, most importantly, the abandonment of their water supply, probably led to the Lakedaimonian force becoming dehydrated. Dehydration was not, it should be added, the only reason the Lakedaimonian force surrendered, for the tactical hopelessness of their position and not having eaten all day no doubt played their considerable parts. However, it does appear to be credible to argue that dehydration was a major factor in undermining the Lakedaimonian force's will to continue the struggle on Sphakteria.

It is worth pointing out the situation regarding the water supplies of the Athenians, during their operations in the vicinity of Sphakteria and Pylos. Thucydides (4.26.2) maintains that:

> "The blockade, however, was harassing to the Athenians on account of the lack of food and water; for there was only one spring, high up on the acropolis of Pylos, and a small one at that, and the soldiers for the most part scraped away shingle upon the beach and drank water such as one might expect to find there" (Thucydides, 4.26.2)[26].

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[25] Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.8-11 where Xenophon himself used: "such of the hoplites and peltasts as were guarding the rear with him" to launch (unsuccessful) sallies towards cavalry, archers and slingers under the command of Mithradates. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.3.11f) himself admits that his actions earned him criticism from Cheirisophos and the: "eldest of the generals" and also (*Anab.* 3.3.12) admits that he completely deserved their criticism!

[26] *ἐπίπονος δ' ἦν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἡ φυλακὴ σίτου τε ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ὕδατος· οὐ γὰρ ἦν κρήνη ὅτι μὴ μία ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἀκροπόλει τῆς Πύλου καὶ αὕτη οὐ μεγάλη, ἀλλὰ διαμώμενοι τὸν κάχληκα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐπὶ τῇ θαλασσῃ ἔπινον οἷον εἰκὸς ὕδωρ.* Cf. Arrian, *Anabasis* 6.23.4; 26.5, for similar episodes involving the army of Alexander the Great during the march through Gadrosia.

Pritchett (1965:24), commenting on Thucydides' (4.26.2) statement that there was a spring on the acropolis at Pylos, stated that this "water supply has never been discovered" and adds (*ibid.*) that it is not unusual for springs located high up to have run dry since antiquity. In addition, Pritchett (1965:24-25) observes, of Thucydides' (4.26.2) remark that many of the Athenians were obliged to scrape away beach shingle in order to obtain water, that: "there are no pebbles or gravel on the bedrock and breccia which make up the southern part of Pylos. Where the sandbar rises to join the tip of the promontory, there is today a natural well. The water is said by the natives to be potable, and it is used for animals...Likely places where the Athenians might have scraped are the sandy areas which must have been outside the walled parts". In a later study of the area Pritchett (1994:145-177) has nothing further to add on the subject of the Athenian water supply during the military and naval operations of 425 BC, and indicates the still elusive nature, despite examination of the area and some archaeological excavation, of some of the features, both natural and man-made, that Thucydides refers to, adding that: "since we cannot identify the Messenian fortification constructed over a period of fifteen years, we can hardly identify any remains with Demosthenes' walls, only speculate from the clues given by Thucydides" (Pritchett, 1994:167). It would seem that the location of the spring mentioned by Thucydides (4.26.2) from which some of the Athenians managed to draw water, similarly, has still not been found or identified.

During the Athenian expedition against Syracuse, Thucydides (7.4.5) alleges that, during the summer of 414 BC, Nikias, as a consequence of the arrival of Gylippos, decided to concentrate more on the possibility of bringing an end to the struggle by naval rather than land warfare and accordingly: "built three forts, in which most of the stores were deposited; and the large boats and the ships of war were now moored there". Thucydides (7.4.6) continues by saying:

> "And it was especially in consequence of this that the condition of the crews then first began to decline. For their water supply was scanty and not near at hand" (Thucydides, 7.4.6)[27].

In addition, Thucydides (*ibid.*) states that the crews also suffered heavily, whenever they left camp to fetch firewood, at the hands of the Syracusan cavalry force, one third of which was stationed near the Olympieion. Thucydides (7.10.1) later recounts the letter that Nikias sent to the Athenians and had asked to be read out to them. In this letter, Thucydides (7.13.2) maintains, Nikias said:

> "...And our crews have been and are still being wasted, for the reason that our sailors, forced to go out to a distance for wood and forage and water, are constantly being killed by the cavalry" (Thucydides, 7.13.2)[28].

We have already seen how during the retreat from Syracuse the need for the Athenians to procure water (and food) supplies had dictated the halting of a day's march after travelling twenty stadia (Thuc. 7.78.4). This halt was, according to Thucydides (*ibid.*), because: "for many stadia ahead in the direction in which they were to go water was not plentiful". Earlier, Thucydides (7.77.6) has Nikias tell his troops that they must make haste on their journey by both day and night on account that they had only scanty supplies of even the necessaries of life (*τὰ γὰρ ἐπιτήδεια βραχέα ἔχομεν*). This need to make haste becomes evident in their having to march at night as well as during the day, and is largely responsible for the rearguard under Demosthenes becoming separated from the head of the column led by Nikias (Thuc. 7.80.3-4). Nikias effectively abandoned Demosthenes and his troops to their fate by his having: "marched his men more rapidly, thinking that in the circumstances safety lay, not in standing firm and fighting of their own choice, but in retreating as rapidly as possible, fighting only as they were forced to do so" (Thuc. 7.81.3). Nikias' troops were probably in no

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[27] *ὥστε καὶ τῶν πληρωμάτων οὐκ ἥκιστα τότε πρῶτον κάκωσις ἐγένετο· τῷ τε γὰρ ὕδατι σπανίῳ χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἐγγύθεν.*

[28] *τὰ δὲ πληρώματα διὰ τόδε ἐφθάρη τε ἡμῖν καὶ ἔτι νῦν φθείρεται, τῶν ναυτῶν μὲν διὰ φρυγανισμὸν καὶ ἁρπαγὴν καὶ ὑδρείαν μακρὰν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων ἀπολλυμένων.*

fit state to undertake a battle in any case and this becomes apparent later in Thucydides' (7.84.2) narrative when he relates how, on the eighth day of the retreat:

> "The Athenians pushed on to the river Assinaros, partly because they thought, hard pressed as they were on all sides by the attack of numerous horsemen and of the miscellaneous troops, that they would be somewhat better off if they crossed the river, and partly by reason of their weariness and desire for water" (Thucydides, 7.84.2)[29].

There is no doubt that the Athenians had been pushed beyond the limits of human endurance. Indeed, Thucydides (7.84.3) states that, upon reaching the river: "they rushed in, no longer preserving order, but everyone eager to be himself the first to cross". Thucydides (*ibid.*) relates how the attempted crossing was made against pressure from their Syracusan enemies, no doubt both from those pursuing the army and those stationed on the opposite bank. In one of the most moving and horrific passages in the whole history of warfare, Thucydides (7.84.4-5) describes what Ober (1994:193 n.14) rightly calls the "ghastly scene", the complete and final disintegration of the Athenian expeditionary force:

> "The Syracusans stood along the other bank of the river, which was steep, and hurled missiles down upon the Athenians, most of whom were drinking greedily and were all huddled in confusion in the hollow bed of the river. Moreover, the Peloponnesians went down to the water's edge and butchered them, especially those in the river. The water at once became foul, but was drunk all the same, although muddied and dyed with blood, and indeed was fought for by most of them" (Thucydides, 7.84.4-5)[30].

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[29] *καὶ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἠπείγοντο πρὸς τὸν Ἀσσίναρον ποταμόν, ἅμα μὲν βιαζόμενοι ὑπὸ τῆς πανταχόθεν προβολῆς ἱππέων τε πολλῶν καὶ τοῦ ἄλλου ὄχλου, οἰόμενοι ῥᾷόν τι σφίσιν ἔσεσθαι, ἢν διαβῶσι τὸν ποταμόν, ἅμα δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς ταλαιπωρίας καὶ τοῦ πιεῖν ἐπιθυμίᾳ.*

[30] *ἐς τὰ ἐπὶ θάτερά τε τοῦ ποταμοῦ παραστάντες οἱ Συρακόσιοι (ἦν δὲ κρημνώδες) ἔβαλλον ἄνωθεν τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, πίνοντάς τε τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀσμένους καὶ ἐν κοίλῳ ὄντι τῷ ποταμῷ ἐν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς ταρασσομένους. οἵ τε Πελοποννήσιοι ἐπικαταβάντες τοὺς ἐν τῷ ποταμῷ μάλιστα ἔσφαζον. καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ εὐθὺς διέφθαρτο, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπίνετο ὁμοῦ τῷ πηλῷ ᾑματωμένον καὶ περιμάχητον ἦν τοῖς πολλοῖς.*

Thucydides (7.85.1-2) goes on to say that the slaughter continued until Nikias managed to surrender himself to Gylippos and pleaded with him to put an end to the destruction of his men. The account of the Athenian retreat from Syracuse that Thucydides (7.75-7.85) relates illustrates several interesting points from a logistical perspective. Firstly, the Athenians halting their march on the second day of the retreat, despite an early start, after covering half the distance that they had the previous day (Thuc. 7.78.4), was for the express intention of obtaining supplies of food and water for the following leg of their journey. They did this knowing full well, Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains, that these resources would be in short supply during the next stages of their march. Furthermore, Thucydides (7.78.3) describes how the Syracusan cavalry, supported by light-armed infantry, had begun to harass the retreating Athenians on the first day of their march. That the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed troops had gone ahead of the Athenians in order to impede their march (Thuc. 7.78.5) could well have influenced the Athenian decision to halt their march, in that, by knowing that enemy troops lay ahead of them their attempts to forage for, or even stop for, the purpose of obtaining either food or water supplies would have been extremely difficult or even impossible. There had been inadequate supplies at the outset of the retreat (Thuc. 7.75.5) and this halt, on the second day of their retreat, must have been decided upon by the Athenians with the knowledge that it was absolutely necessary for them to do so. That the Syracusan attempts at harrying the Athenians were undertaken extremely skilfully is apparent from Thucydides' (7.78.6-7) narrative when he relates how the tactics employed by the Syracusans resulted in it being: "no longer possible to leave the main body" of the Athenian force for the purpose of foraging for food or water supplies. It is reasonable to assume that such tactics were also employed over the succeeding days of the Athenian retreat and that Gylippos and his Syracusan subordinates clearly understood the effects that such tactics would have on undermining not only Athenian morale but also their ability to offer resistance: a consideration which in turn, shows how Greek officers were fully appreciative of logistical considerations. Despite Thucydides' (7.80.1) statement that, by the night of the fifth day of their retreat, the Athenians were: "in a wretched plight, since by now

they were in want of all supplies and many had been wounded in many assaults with the enemy"[31], it was not to be their lack of *food* supplies that led to their eventual destruction, but rather, unbearable thirst that led to the final annihilation of the Athenian expeditionary force (Thuc. 7.84).

The Arkadian contingents of the former Cyreans, on at least one occasion, also found themselves in similar circumstances to those that the Athenians in Sicily had found themselves in during their retreat. Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.3.2f) relates how the Arkadians had proceeded to make attacks on villages in Asiatic Thrace from their embarkation point of Kalpe harbour, adding that the Arkadian generals prearranged to reassemble on a particular hill (*Anab.* 6.3.3). The Arkadian contingents, Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.3.6) maintains, came together, following their raids, at the prearranged assembly point with varying degrees of ease or difficulty. Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.3.6) states that the Thracians gathered their forces during that night and:

> "At daybreak they proceeded to form their lines all round the hill where the Greeks were encamping, their troops consisting of horsemen in large numbers and peltasts, while still more were continually streaming together; and they made attacks upon the hoplites without danger to themselves, inasmuch as the Greeks had neither bowman nor javelin-thrower nor horseman; so they would come running or riding up and throw their javelins, and when the Greeks charged upon them, they would easily get away; and different parties kept attacking at different points. Hence on the one side many were being wounded, on the other side not a man; the result was that the Greeks were not able to stir from the spot, and at last the Thracians were even cutting them off from their water supply" (Xen. *Anab.* 6.3.6-8)[32].

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[31] Cf. Thuc. 7.83.3, and Thucydides' reiteration that the Athenians were short of provisions.

[32] *καὶ ἅμα ἡμέρᾳ κύκλῳ περὶ τὸν λόφον ἔνθα οἱ Ἕλληνες ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐτάττοντο καὶ ἱππεῖς πολλοὶ καὶ πελτασταί, καὶ ἀεὶ πλέονες συνέρρεον· καὶ προσέβαλλον πρὸς τοὺς ὁπλίτας ἀσφαλῶς· οἱ μέν γὰρ Ἕλληνες οὔτε τοξότην εἶχον οὔτε ἀκοντιστὴν οὔτε ἱππέα· οἱ δὲ προσθέοντες καὶ προσελαύνοντες ἠκόντιζον· ὁπότε δὲ αὐτοῖς ἐπίοιεν, ῥᾳδίως ἀπέφευγον· ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλῃ ἐπετίθεντο. καὶ τῶν μὲν πολλοὶ ἐτιτρώσκοντο, τῶν δὲ οὐδείς· ὥστε κινηθῆναι οὐκ ἐδύναντο ἐκ τοῦ χωρίου, ἀλλὰ τελευτῶντες καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος εἶργον αὐτοὺς οἱ Θρᾷκες.*

Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.3.9) goes on to say that when this situation became serious the Greeks were obliged to open negotiations in the hope of securing a truce. Failing to obtain Thracian hostages to ensure that the Thracians kept their side of the truce the Arkadians were only saved, Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.3.10f) continues, thanks to the efforts of himself and his men in that they arrived in time to rescue them (Xen. *Anab.* 6.3.24). Similarly, during a Boiotian invasion of Thessaly in 368-367 BC, Diodoros (15.71.4) maintains that when the Boiotians:

> "found all their provisions of food and drink and all other supplies giving out the Boiotarchs decided to return home" (Diod. 15.71.4)[33]

We hear of Alexander of Pherai subsequently following the Boiotians with a large body of cavalry (Diodoros 15.71.5), and these troops had presumably been largely responsible for preventing the Boiotians from straying far from their camp to search for food and water. In an earlier invasion of Thessaly, undertaken by the Athenians with some Boiotian and Phokian allies with the intention of restoring Orestes to power in Thessaly (Thuc. 1.111.1), the expedition against the city of Pharsalos had much the same lack of success as that of the later Boiotian invasion of 368-367 BC. Of this earlier expedition, Thucydides (1.111.1) sarcastically remarks that the invaders:

> "made themselves masters of the land, so far as this was possible without going far from their camp - for the Thessalian cavalry hemmed them in - they failed to capture the city and indeed none of the other objects of their expedition was attained, so they went back home again unsuccessful, having Orestes with them" (Thucydides, 1.111.1)[34].

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[33] *τὰ δὲ σῖτα καὶ ποτὰ καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ἐπέλειπε τοῖς Βοιωτοῖς, ἔγνωσαν οἱ βοιωτάρχαι τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἐπάνοδον ποιεῖσθαι.*

[34] *καὶ τῆς μὲν γῆς ἐκράτουν ὅσα μὴ προϊόντες πολὺ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων (οἱ γὰρ ἱππῆς τῶν Θεσσαλῶν εἶργον), τὴν δὲ πόλιν οὐχ εἷλον οὐδ' ἄλλο προυχώρει αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ὧν ἕνεκα ἐστράτευσαν, ἀλλ' ἀπεχώρησαν πάλιν Ὀρέστην ἔχοντες ἄπρακτοι.*

Although Thucydides never mentions how these troops managed to extricate themselves from Thessaly, their decision to leave Thessaly was probably influenced by the effectiveness of the enemy cavalry patrols. These patrols appear to have ensured that the Athenians and their allies were unable to stray far from their camp. Furthermore, Thucydides gives us no details regarding the water and general supply situation within this camp and we can only assume that it was adequate for if it was not we might, perhaps, have expected some comment on a scarcity of water or other supplies.

The importance of adequate water supplies in siege warfare was also well understood by the Greeks. Thus we hear how, during the Athenian siege of Syracuse: "the Athenians destroyed their [the Syracusans'] pipes which ran underground into the city and supplied it with drinking water"[35]. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.7) relates how, during Thibron's attempt to capture 'Egyptian' Larisa, Thibron "sank a shaft and began to dig a tunnel therefrom, with the idea of cutting off their water supply. And when they [the defenders] made frequent sallies from within the wall and threw pieces of wood and stones into the shaft, he met this move by making a wooden shed and setting it over the shaft. The Larisians, however, sallied forth by night and destroyed the shed also, by fire". During the military operations of Thibron's successor Derkylidas, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.18) tells us, one of Derkylidas' subordinates, a Sikyonian *lochagos* named Athenadas, growing impatient with Derkylidas who was delaying due to his religious sacrifices continuing to produce unfavourable omens, thought:

> "that Derkylidas was acting foolishly in delaying, and that he was strong enough of himself to deprive the Kebrenians of their water supply, rushed forward with his own company [*taxis*] and tried to choke up their spring. And the people within the walls, sallying forth against him, inflicted many wounds upon him, killed two of his men,

[35] Herodotos (3.60.2) informs us that the city of Samos also had a pipeline supplying the city with water.

and drove back the rest with blows and missiles" (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 3.1.18)[36].

Despite the failure of Athenadas and his men this incident shows how even junior officers in Greek armies were capable enough to realise the importance of denying water supplies to the enemy. It is also worth noting that the spring supplying the Kebrenians with water lay outside their fortification walls and, as such, would have presented itself as a primary target to besiegers[37]. Such considerations appear to have also been of importance to Aineias the tactician who, writing in the fourth century BC, refers to his (now lost) book on *Military Preparations* (*Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος*) on four occasions in his *Poliorketika* (7.4; 8.5; 21.1; 40.8). From these allusions to *Military Preparations* within Aineias' *Poliorketika* (*loc. cit.*) we can observe that this work addressed logistical matters including water supplies. Aineias' allusions to this lost work are tantalising. For example, Aineias states: "how to conceal both food and drink, the products of the fields and how one must make standing waters undrinkable, and places fit for cavalry movements unfit for them, - the particular treatment of all these subjects is, for the present omitted, to avoid explaining them at this point, since they are too numerous. They have been fully treated in the book on

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[36] *νομίσας τὸν μὲν Δερκυλίδαν φλυαρεῖν διατρίβοντα, αὐτὸς δ' ἱκανὸς εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ ἀφελέσθαι τοὺς Κεβρηνίους, προσδραμὼν σὺν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ τάξει ἐπειρᾶτο τὴν κρήνην συγχοῦν. οἱ δὲ ἔνδοθεν ἐπεξελθόντες αὐτόν τε συνέτρωσαν καὶ δύο ἀπέκτειναν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους παίοντες καὶ βάλλοντες ἀπήλασαν.*

[37] A number of Greek vase paintings show the ambush of the Trojan prince Troilos and/or his sister Polyxena by Achilles at, or near, a fountain house outside the walls of Troy: a black figure neck amphora now in the British Museum, Inv. No. 97.7-21.2 (*ABV* 86, 8.), by the Painter of London B 76, shows Achilles crouching behind the fountain waiting to spring his ambush with Polyxena approaching with her water jug followed closely by her brother Troilos who is shown mounted with a second horse alongside . One of the friezes on the François Vase, a Volute Krater signed by Kleitias and Ergotimos, now in the Florence Museum, Inv. No. 4209 (*ABV* 76, I; *Para* 29), shows Achilles in pursuit of the mounted Troilos, whose horse (and, once again, another alongside it) straddles a dropped water jar, while Polyxena is shown running , as they flee from Achilles who has emerged from behind a fountain house. On a black figure *lekythos* by the Sappho Painter, now in the National Museum Athens, Inv. No. 552 (*ABL* 227, 37), Achilles crouches beside/behind a fountain as Polyxena approaches with her water jar. The name-vase of the Troilos Painter, a red figure *kalpis* now in the British Museum, Inv. No. 99.7-21.4 (*ARV*^{2} 245, I.), shows Polyxena running, whilst her brother is mounted on a horse, once again with a spare, fleeing from a pursuer (indicated by the fleeing figures looking behind them) and, as in the François Vase example, Troilos' horses are shown straddling Polyxena's dropped water jug. For illustrations of these examples see: Boardman, 1974, figs. 46.5; 55; 262 and Boardman, 1975, fig. 190. Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.9, for a spring outside a walled village.

Military Preparations" (*Poliorketika* 8.4-5)[38]. Similarly, remarks: "about wheatless rations and things of which there is a scarcity during a siege, and how waters are to be rendered drinkable, I have explained in the book on *Military Preparations*" (*Poliorketika* 40.8)[39].

The recommendations that Xenophon (*Cyropaideia* 6.2.26) attributes to the Elder Cyrus, viz. that his army take along only so much wine as to last until they accustomed themselves to drinking water, is at variance with Herodotos' (1.71.3) allegation that Kroisos, about to embark on a campaign against the Elder Cyrus, was told by a Lydian named Sardanis that the Persians "do not use wine, but drink only water". However, the Persians of Xenophon's time *did* drink wine (Xen. *Anab.* 1.9.25) and whether or not their forefathers did is of little consequence here. The Greeks themselves would, usually, drink wine rather than water when it was available. For example, the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria, during a truce with the Athenians, were each allowed two *kotylai* (about one pint, or half a litre) of wine along with other supplies (Thuc.4.16.1) during the period of the armistice. Also in a Spartan context, we hear from Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.4.8) of how, at the final briefing before the battle of Leuktra, Kleombrotos and his staff were drinking wine: "as they did, at the middle of the day", which infers that this was something they did on a regular basis. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.4.40) remarks how Theban cavalry misjudged the speed of the advance of Agesilaos' horsemen and hoplites and thus discharged their spears (δόρατα) too early and generally: "acted like men who had drunk a little at midday". Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.5) tells us that the Spartan Mnasippos had both Lakedaimonian troops and no fewer than 1,500 mercenaries with him on Kerkyra. These troops, Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.6) maintains, overran the countryside, laid waste to the beautifully cultivated farms, and: "destroyed magnificent dwellings and wine-cellars with which the farms were furnished; the result was, it was said, that his soldiers became so luxurious that they would not

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[38] *ἀφανίζειν τά τε βρωτὰ καὶ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ κατ' ἀγροὺς ἔγκαρπα καὶ τὰ ἄκκα κατὰ τὴν χώραν, καὶ τὰ στάσιμα ὕδατα ὡς ἄποτα δεῖ ποιεῖν, τά τε ἱππάσιμα τῆς χώρας ὡς δεῖ ἀνιππα ποιεῖν, περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων πάντων ὧδε μὲν νῦν παραλείπεται, ὡς δεῖ ἕκαστον τούτων γίγνεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ καὶ ταύτῃ, λίαν πολλὰ, δηλῶται· γέγραπται δὲ τελέως περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βίβλῳ.*

[39] *Περὶ δὲ τροφῆς ἀσίτου καὶ ὧν στάνις ἐν πολιορκίᾳ καὶ ὑδάτων ὡς δεῖ πότιμα ἐν τῇ Παρασκευαστικῇ βύβκῳ δεδήλωται.*

drink any wine unless it had a fine bouquet". The former Cyreans, too, would drink alcohol when it was available[40]. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.26) informs us of a 'barley-wine' (beer?), *οἶνος κρίθινος*, that he and his comrades tried in Armenia, and a somewhat harsh and sharp wine that the Greeks obtained from the Mossynoikoi (Xen. *Anab.* 5.4.29). This is not to say that Greeks would not drink water unless absolutely necessary, as we do hear of drinking water in a urban domestic context in another of Xenophon's (*Mem.* 3.13.3) works, albeit in this case, it is an individual complaining that the water in his house is unpleasantly warm to drink and yet too cold to wash in.

Even when alcohol was available, Greeks would tend to dilute it with water. The wine that Odysseus took with him into Polyphemos' cave was, apparently, so strong that he would usually dilute it to the ratio of one part wine to twenty parts water (Homer, *Odyssey* 9.196-211). Of the barley-wine, or beer, that Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.26) and his comrades drank in Armenia, Xenophon adds the following remarks:

> "It was an extremely strong drink unless one diluted it with water, and extremely good when one was used to it" (Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.27)[41].

It is safe to assume that Xenophon did probably sample enough of this particular beverage to indeed get used to it. Similarly, Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.4.29) remarks, of the provisions they found among the strongholds of the Mossynoikoi that they plundered, that:

> "The Greeks also found wine, which by reason of its harshness appeared to be sharp when taken unmixed, but when mixed with water was fragrant and delicious" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 5.4.29)[42].

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[40] In addition to the examples cited cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.3.14 of villages where the Ten Thousand found: "palm wine and a sour drink made from the same by boiling". In addition, Xenophon (*Anabasis* 2.3.15) tells of a sweet drink that, although pleasant, was apt to cause headaches.

[41] *καὶ πάνυ ἄκρατος ἦν, εἰ μή τις ὕδωρ ἐπιχέοι· καὶ πάνυ ἡδὺ συμμαθόντι τὸ πῶμα ἦν.*

[42] *οἶνος δὲ ηὑρίσκετο ὃς ἄκρατος μὲν ὀξὺς ἐφαίνετο εἶναι ὑπὸ τῆς αὐστηρότητος, κερασθεὶς δὲ εὐώδης τε καὶ ἡδύς.*

Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Oikonomikos* 17.9) has Sokrates express the opinion that: "the stronger the wine, the more water I add". The Greek attitude towards drinking neat alcoholic drinks was usually one of condemnation mixed with allegations that only 'barbarians' drank undiluted alcohol. Herodotos (6.84) records the tale that the Spartan king Kleomenes I acquired his habit of drinking wine undiluted with water from Skythian ambassadors and consequently went mad as a result adding that since that time the Spartans would use the expression 'Skythian fashion' when they wanted a stronger drink than usual. Even in Late Roman times another Greek, Ammianus Marcellinus (15.12), associated drunkenness with 'barbarians': in this later example it was alleged that the Gauls were fond of drinking and that many would wander about in a state of near permanent intoxication. Returning to Greek practice, if troops had supplies of wine or other alcoholic beverages with them, or even if they acquired them as a result of foraging, they would usually also require adequate water supplies in order to dilute such drinks. It is likely that the drinking of water when on campaign was more usual than drinking alcohol. However, there is the possibility that prior to a battle troops may have sought a little 'Dutch courage' to steady their nerve and fortify their courage and at such a point drunk such, if any, alcohol that they had with them[43]. Indeed, as if to underline the fact that both hunters and soldiers would usually drink water rather than carry supplies of wine with them, there is the statement of Xenophon (*Cyropaideia*, 1.2.8) that when 'Persian' (perhaps Spartan?) boys were receiving training in weapon skills, self-control, and self-restraint in drinking and eating they: "bring from home bread for their food, cress for their relish, and for drinking, if any one is thirsty, a cup to draw water from the river". Plutarch (*Lykourgos*, 9.4-5) mentions the very practical Spartan cup which, he maintains, became particularly fashionable and eagerly sought after even by non-Spartan soldiers. In describing such a cup Plutarch (*Lykourgos*, 9.5) states:

[43] See Jackson (1993:240), cf. Lazenby (1993b:90) for a contrasting view.

> "For its colour concealed the disagreeable appearance of the water which they were often compelled to drink, and its curving lips caught the muddy sediment and held it inside, so that only the purer parts reached the mouth of the drinker" (Plutarch, *Lykourgos*, 9.5) [44].

Water supplies would also be needed for the preparation and cooking of soldiers' provisions. Indeed, Xenophon (*Cyropaideia*, 6.2.28) states that:

> "whoever eats barley bread always eats meal that has been kneaded up with water, and whoever eats wheaten bread eats a loaf that was mixed with water; and everything boiled is prepared with water in liberal quantities" (Xenophon, *Cyropaideia*, 6.2.28)[45].

Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.4.29) observes that the among the food stores that the former Cyreans plundered from the Mossynoikoi they found: "large quantities of flat nuts, without any divisions. Out of these nuts, by boiling them and baking them into loaves, they made the bread which they [the Mossynoikoi] used most". The Elder Pliny (*Natural History*, 18.14.72) states that in order to produce barley meal (Greek *alphita*): "the Greeks soak some barley in water and then leave it for a night to dry, and next day dry it by the fire and then grind it in a mill". However, this soaking of barley was probably done in domestic contexts only as Thucydides (6.22) has Nikias recommend that the proposed Athenian expedition to Syracuse take along with it adequate supplies including roasted barley (*κριθάς*) which infers that for military operations barley grains that had already been soaked and roasted would have been used. Plutarch (*Lykourgos*, 12.7) remarks how even a unnamed king of Pontus had heard of the famous Spartan black broth (*μέλας ζωμός*), while Athenaios (4.141b) says that this dish included, and was made from, boiled pork. Whether or not it was also eaten on campaign by Spartan troops is difficult to say, though a meat ration was included in the

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[44] *τὰ γὰρ ἀναγκαίως πινόμενα τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ δυσωποῦντα τὴν ὄψιν ἀπεκρύπτετο τῇ χρόᾳ, καὶ τοῦ θολεροῦ προσκόπτοντος ἐντὸς καὶ προσισχομένου τοῖς ἄμβωσι, καθαρώτερον ἐπλησίαξε τῷ στόματι τὸ πινόμενον.*

[45] *καὶ γὰρ ὅστις ἀλφιτοσιτεῖ, ὕδατι μεμαγμένην ἀεὶ τὴν μᾶζαν ἐσθίει, καὶ ὅστις ἀρτοσιτεῖ, ὕδατι δεδευμένον τὸν ἄρτον, καὶ τὰ ἑφθὰ δὲ πάντα μεθ' ὕδατος τοῦ πλείστου ἐσκεύασται.*

provisions allowed through to the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria during the truce (Thuc. 4.16.1). However, some indication that it may have been possible for the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria to cook this dish seems to be provided by Aristophanes (*Wasps* 235-239) who has the leader of the chorus of old waspish men reminisce of how, years before while on active service in Byzantion, he and his comrades had stolen a wooden kneading-trough one night and chopped it up in order to build a fire on which they had boiled pimpernel (ἥψομεν τοῦ κορκόρου) for their meal. Later in the same play, Aristophanes (*Wasps* 737) has Bdelykleon offer his father 'gruel to sip' (χόνδρον λείωειν), the expression probably helping to indicate the man's advanced years, and later (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 811; 814) we see the old man, Philokleon, sat by the fire with a bowl of φακῆ, which was a dish of lentils or pulses; a 'pease-porridge' or pea or lentil soup[46]. Such foods as soup, broth, stew, and porridge would all require water for either soaking grains, lentils, or other pulses etc. or for the actual cooking process and, once again, this helps to underline the importance of ensuring adequate supplies of water were available.

Although the logistics of naval warfare, strictly speaking, lie outside the scope of the present work it is nevertheless worth noting that naval vessels would have needed to make regular landfall in order to perhaps replenish provisions and certainly to obtain fresh water supplies. Herodotos (7.193.2) suggests that Aphetai on the Magnesian gulf was where Jason had sent Herakles to fetch water, prior to sailing for Kolchis, and had abandoned him here. Herodotos (7.196.1) states that it was here, also, that the Persian fleet of Xerxes had their station for the operations at Artemision and, therefore, the place appears to have had an adequate water supply. Later, as the Greek fleet withdrew, Herodotos (8.22.1) alleges that: "Themistokles picked out the most seaworthy Athenian ships and went about to the places of drinking water, where he engraved on the rocks writing which the Ionians [in the Persian fleet] read on the next day when they

[46] Cf. Aristophanes, *Ekklesiazousai* 845: "The youngest girls are boiling pots of broth" (χύτρας ἕτνους ἕψουσιν αἱ νεώταται).

came to Artemision",[47] the written messages urging the Ionians to either desert the Persians or refuse to fight against fellow Greeks. These places where Themistokles left his messages would possibly have been the same ones that the Greek fleet had used for obtaining fresh water when they had been stationed at Artemision.

Of the armada the Athenians sent against Syracuse, Thucydides (6.42.1) informs us that at Kerkyra the Athenian generals divided their fleet into three divisions, each of the three commanders taking a division each: "in order that they might not, by sailing together, be at a loss for water and ports and provisions when they put into shore"[48]. Upon the force reaching Italy, however, Thucydides (6.44.1-2) maintains that: "when the whole armament reached the Iapygian promontory, or Tarentum [Taras], or wherever they severally found opportunity to make land, they sailed along the coast of Italy - some of the cities not receiving them with a market, nor into the town, although furnishing them with water and anchorage, and Tarentum and Lokri not even with these - until they came to Rhegion"[49].

In comparison, when Iphikrates was dispatched with an Athenian fleet to Kerkyra, Xenophon (*Hellenika* 6.2.28) maintains, he would make the landfalls of his fleet en-route a training exercise in efficiency, Xenophon (*ibid.*) remarking that it "was counted a great prize of victory to be the first to get water or anything else they needed, and the first to get their meal. On the other hand, those who reached the shore last incurred a great penalty in that they came off worse in all these points, and in the fact that they had to put to sea again at the same time as the rest when the signal was given; for the result was that those who came in first did everything at their leisure, while those who came in last had to hurry"[50].

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[47] *Ἀθηναίων δὲ νέας τὰς ἄριστα πλεούσας ἐπιλεξάμενος Θεμιστοκλέης ἐπορεύετο περὶ τὰ πότιμα ὕδατα, ἐντάμνων ἐν τοῖσι λίθοισι γράμματα, τὰ Ἴωνες ἐπελθόντες τῇ ὑστεραίῃ ἡμέρῃ ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσιον ἐπελέξαντο.*

[48] *ἵνα μήτε ἅμα πλέοντες ἀπορῶσιν ὕδατος καὶ λιμένων καὶ τῶν ἐπιτείων ἐν ταῖς καταγωαῖς, πρός τε τἆλλα εὐκοσμότεροι καὶ ῥᾴους ἄρχειν ὦσι.*

[49] *καὶ προσβαλοῦσα ἡ πᾶσα παρασκευὴ πρός τε ἄκραν Ἰαπυγίαν καὶ πρὸς Τάραντα καὶ ὡς ἕκαστοι ηὐπόρησαν, ταρεκομίζοντο τὴν Ἰταλίαν, τῶν μὲν πόλεων οὐ δεχομένων αὐτοὺς ἀγορᾷ οὐδὲ ἄστει, ὕδατι δὲ καὶ ὅρμῳ, Τάραντος δὲ καὶ Λοκρῶν οὐδὲ τούτοις, ἕως ἀφίκοντο ἐς Ῥήγιον.*

[50] *μέγα δὴ νικητήριον ἦν τὸ πρώτους καὶ ὕδωρ λαβεῖν καὶ εἴ του ἄλλου ἐδέοντο, καὶ πρώτους ἀριστῆσαι. τοῖς δ' ὑσατάτοις ἀφικομένοις μεγάλη ζημία ἦν τό τε ἐλαττοῦσθαι πᾶσι τούτοις καὶ ὅτι ἀνάγεσθαι ἅμα ἔδει ἐπεὶ σημήνειε· συνέβαινε γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρώτοις ἀφικομένοις καθ' ἡσυχίαν ἅπαντα ποιεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τελευταίοις διὰ σπουδῆς.*

To sum up, there is a considerable body of literary evidence to show that Greek commanders paid careful attention to the problem of ensuring that adequate supplies of water were available for their troops. Sometimes, however, such supplies were not available, or in short supply, and on such occasions, along with those examples of adequate water supplies being obtained, these are noted by Greek authors. It should be stressed, however, that it is not simply a case of water supplies only being mentioned by Greek authors on those occasions when armies ran into trouble, but on occasions we are also informed that commanders deliberately chose a particular spot to make their encampment because the site had adequate water supplies which in turn dictated the commander's decision.

'PACKED LUNCHES': SOLDIERS PROVIDING THEIR OWN RATIONS AT THE OUTSET OF CAMPAIGNS

Perhaps the most logical solution, if albeit in the relatively short-term, to the problem of feeding armies was for troops to take their own provisions with them at the outset of a campaign. Existing testimony ranges from forces carrying rations for a single day (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.18) to the proposal that Thucydides (6.34.4) attributes to the Syracusan Hermokrates, who suggested that the Syracusans send out their fleet with two months' *trophê*. Both these extremes, from one day to two months, coincidentally, relate to naval operations and therefore lie outside the scope of this work. The following table, cataloguing instances where a stated number of days' provisions are given is based on that of Pritchett (1971:32-33).

No. of days	Source	Context
1	Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.18	Spartan naval night raid on Peiraieus 388 BC.
2	Arrian *Anab.* 3.21.3	Forced march of Alexander in pursuit of Darius.
3	Thuc. 1.48.1	Corinthian navy for expedition to Kerkyra.
3	Xen. *Anab.* 6.2.4	Speech of Lykon.
3	Xen. *Cyrop.* 5.3.35	Cyrus against the Assyrians.
3	Aristophanes *Acharnians* 197	
3	Aristophanes *Wasps* 243	Contemporary Athenian practice[1].
3	Aristophanes *Peace* 312	
3	Souda 2, p.496 no.4034 (Adler)	From Aristophanes.
4	Polyainos 4.15.1	Antiochos before Damascus.
5	Thuc. 7.43.2	Athenian attack at Syracuse.
5	Polybios 16.36.3	Expedition of Philopoimen, 200 BC.

[1] Aristophanes' *Acharnians* was first performed in 425 BC, *Wasps* in 422 BC, and *Peace* in 421 BC.

No. of days	Source	Context
5	Polyainos 3.12.2	Athens: stratagem of Phokion.
5	Plutarch *Phokion* 24.3	Athens: stratagem of Phokion.
5	Plutarch *Kleomenes* 23.3	Spartan march on Megalopolis.
7	Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41	Argives in 367 BC.
10	Diodoros 19.37.3	Antiochos on a desert march, 317 BC.
20	Xen. *Cyrop.* 6.2.25	Elder Cyrus on a march to Sardis.
30	Frontinus *Stratagems* 4.1.6	The army of Philip of Makedon.
30	Diodoros 13.95.3	Dionysios for march to Leontini, 406 BC.
40	Demosthenes 18.157	Letter of Philip to Peloponnesian allies to come with provisions.
60	Thuc. 6.34.4	Proposal of Hermokrates of Syracuse in 415 BC to send out their fleet with two months' *trophê*.

Pritchett (1971:33) remarks that it: "is generally assumed that each soldier was required to furnish at his own expense the provisions with which he was to march out; and this inference seems to be confirmed by such passages as Lysias 16 *In Defence of Mantitheos* 14 where the ἐφόδια were paid by individuals". In support of this Pritchett (1971:34) cites Thucydides (6.31.5) as confirmation that the individual soldier provided his own ἐφόδια and believes that Aristophanes *Peace* (1181-1182), where Aristophanes has his chorus remark how the expedition is to leave the following day but one poor soul has bought no provisions because he did not know he had been called up for service (τῷ δὲ σιτί' οὐκ ἐώνητ'· οὐ γὰρ ᾔδειν ἐξιών), bears testimony to the same effect. Pritchett (*ibid.*) remarks how: "each time that Aristophanes mentions the three-day rations, it is a context which shows that the ration was a well-known and hated feature of campaigning, which would hardly have been the case if it had been furnished free".

In addition to the evidence cited above whereby provisions for a particular number of days were actually taken or were put forward as proposed amounts

there are references to supplies being taken with armies at the outset of campaigns that, although less specific in the number of days that they were supposed to last for nevertheless deserve attention. Burn (1984:241; 241 n.13) believed that the 'Miltiades decree', referred to by fourth century writers (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.10 [1411a]; and an allusion to it by Demosthenes, *On the Embassy* 303; cf. Nepos *Miltiades* 5), included the crucial words that the Athenians should be ready to: 'take food and march'[2] at a moment's notice in 490 BC.

Thucydides (2.10.1) states that the 'Peloponnesians' and their allies took supplies with them for the invasion of Attika in the summer of 431 BC. Gomme (1956a:12-13) suggested that the invaders' supplies may have been for, at the very most, forty days (cf. Thuc. 2.57.2), and adds: "though they would expect to get a good deal on the spot, from the enemy land and from the Boiotians (Thuc. 2.22.2, 3.1.2; cf. 3.26.4); on this occasion for about thirty days"[3]. Thucydides (2.23.2) later states that the invasion force withdrew from Attika when they had exhausted their supplies. The following summer, in 430 BC, Attika was invaded again (Thuc. 2.47.1f), and although Thucydides makes no mention of the invaders' supply provisions, he does say (Thuc. 2.57.2) that the invaders went home after nearly forty days. The summer of 428 BC once again saw a Peloponnesian invasion of Attika (Thuc. 3.1.1) and the invaders remained as long as their provisions lasted and then withdrew (Thuc. 3.1.2). Similarly, Thucydides (3.26.1-4) maintains that in the summer of 427 BC Attika was again invaded, this time the invasion being led by Kleomenes, and, as in previous years, the invaders withdrew once they had exhausted their supplies. These Spartan-led invaders appear to have brought at least *some* provisions with them, Thucydides'

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[2] Burn (1984:241 n.13) reading *episitisamenoi*, 'having provisioned themselves' in Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.10 [1141a].

[3] Gomme (1956a:79) remarks that the second invasion was the longest at forty days and, therefore, for the duration of this first invasion: "we may suppose a length of 30 to 35 days". Cf. Hanson (1998:133) who suggests that the first invasion may have lasted for: "perhaps as little as twenty-five days".

statements of their remaining in Attika until they had exhausted their supplies certainly indicating this. Furthermore, Plutarch (*Kleomenes* 27.1) remarks that

> "It is said also that Archidamos of old, towards the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, when the allies ordered their contributions for the war to be fixed, said: 'war has no fixed rations'" (Plutarch, *Kleomenes* 27.1)[4].

Therefore, although it is possible to say that the invading armies under Archidamos, Kleomenes, and Agis, took some provisions with them for the invasions of Attika it is impossible to say how many days these were expected to last. They may, indeed, have taken provisions for thirty to forty days, and even if they had envisaged staying longer, that is to say by supplementing their supplies by foraging in the countryside of Attika, this latter option seems to have been denied them by the effective patrols and sallies of the Athenian cavalry (Thuc. 2.22.2; 3.1.2). Certainly, Thucydides (4.2.1) maintains that the Peloponnesian invasion of Attika in the spring of 425 BC, led by Archidamos' son Agis, was the shortest, lasting for only fifteen days. Thucydides (*ibid.*) gives a number of reasons for this; firstly that the Lakedaimonians were somewhat perturbed by the Athenian occupation of Pylos. Secondly that the grain in Attika was still green due to it still being early in the season. Finally, Thucydides (*ibid.*) alleges that the violent spring storms in the region undermined the morale of the invaders.

However, during these invasions, the Peloponnesian forces appear to have been more intent on ravaging the countryside than in expecting to supplement their provisions by foraging. This, at least, seems to have been the case as the sort of language Thucydides uses implies devastation and destruction albeit in somewhat vague terminology. Indeed, Hanson (1998:133-134) states, of the first invasion, that "of the actual details of the devastations Thucydides tells us little, using only characteristically vague terminology for destruction, such as *diaphtherô* (destroy: 2.20.4), *kakourgô* (inflict harm: 2.22.2) and *dêoô* (ravage: 2.23.1, 3). The

[4] *λέγεται δὲ καὶ Ἀρχίδαμος ὁ παλαιὸς ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ Πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, κελευόντων εἰσφορὰς τάξαι τῶν συμμάχων αὐτόν, εἰπεῖν ὡς ὁ πόλεμος οὐ τεταγμένα σιτεῖται.*

frequent appearance of *temnô* (cut: 2.19.2; 2.20.1, 2, 4; 2.21.2, 3) within his description, however, suggests that much of the Spartan destruction was aimed at croplands". In narrating the second of Archidamos' invasions Thucydides frequently uses ἔτεμον to describe the activities of the invaders (Thuc. 2.55.1, 2; 2.57.2) within Attika. Thucydides' (3.1.1-2) account of the third of Archidamos' invasions is short and remarks only that the Athenian cavalry, whenever possible, made sallies to prevent the enemy's *psiloi* straying far from the watch-posts of their main force and "laying waste the districts near the city"[5]. Of Kleomenes' invasion of 427 BC, Thucydides (3.26.3-4) states: "this invasion proved more grievous to the Athenians than any except the second; for the enemy, who were momentarily expecting to hear from Lesbos of some achievement of their fleet, which they supposed had already got across, went on and on, ravaging most of the country". Finally, the invaders led by Agis are described by Thucydides (4.2.1) as having: "ravaged the land" (ἐδῄουν τὴν γῆν).

Therefore, these Spartan-led invasions of Attika between 431 and 425 BC appear to have attempted to cause as much destruction as possible, and any provisions that the ravagers may have collected would have been incidental to achieving their main objectives. Furthermore, the Lakedaimonians and their allies could have brought their provisions with them for the whole of the period that they were in Attika. Spartiates were expected to contribute produce from their *klêroi*, 'allotments', to their military messes each month. Figueira (1984:88) points out that, at first glance, there appears to be some discrepancy between the amounts of produce that Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 12.3) and Dikaiarchos (Fr. 72 [Wehrli], preserved in Athenaios 4.141c) each reckon were contributed monthly to such messes, the details of which he summarises in a table which is reproduced here:

	Plutarch, *Lykourgos* 12.3	Dikaiarchos Fr. 72 (Wehrli).
Grain	1 *medimnos* of *alphita*	1.5 Attic *medimnoi*
Wine	8 *choes*	11 or 12 *choes*

[5] τὰ ἐγγὺς τῆς πόλεως κακουργεῖν.

	Plutarch, *Lykourgos* 12.3	Dikaiarchos Fr. 72 (Wehrli).
Cheese	5 *minai*	"a certain weight"
Figs	2.5 *minai*	"a certain weight"
Opsônion	"a small amount of money"	10 Aiginetan *obols*

However, as Figueira (1988:89) goes on to point out, the figures can be reconciled, at least for grain and wine, when we consider that Dikaiarchos specifically gives Attic measures, whereas Plutarch appears to be giving Lakonian measures. Either way the amounts given are quite large when compared to Herodotos' (7.187.2) figure, when he attempts to calculate the provisions for the daily requirements of Xerxes' army for the invasion of Greece in 480, and begins by reckoning a *choinix* of wheat per day per man[6]. Figueira (1988:91) remarks of Herodotos' (*loc. cit.*) figure that: "this amounts to five-eighths of a *medimnos* in a month of thirty days". Therefore, it feasible to suggest that when the Spartan army was on campaign the provisions that it took with it would have come from the contributions made to the military messes by the individual Spartiates. Even if only a proportion of the amounts that each Spartiate was expected to contribute to his mess were taken it is conceivable that provisions for, perhaps, a month could have been carried with the army. Indeed, Anderson (1970:48) remarks that: "thirty days seems to have been considered a reasonable time for an army to live off its own supplies, if there was time for proper preparation". Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 11.2) maintains that the Spartan army regularly took wagons (ἁμάξας) and baggage animals (ὑποζυγία) with it when it embarked on a campaign. Furthermore, Thucydides (4.72.3) mentions Lakedaimonian wagons (ἁμάξας) with the Spartan army at the battle of Mantineia in 418 BC, and, describing the events of the winter of 416 BC, states that the Lakedaimonians:

[6] Cf. Thuc. 4.16.1 who tells us that during the period of the truce each of the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria were to be allowed two Attic *choinikes* of barley-meal each day (δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων) and each of the servants half as much (θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεα). Cf. Herodotos (6.57) for the allowance of the Spartan king at home. According to Thucydides (7.87.2) the Athenians who were taken prisoner in Sicily by the Syracusans were allowed only two *kotylai* of wheat per man each day (δύο κοτύλας σίτου).

> "...invaded the Argive territory, ravaged a small part of the land and carried off some corn in wagons which they had brought with them" (Thucydides, 6.7.1)[7].

In addition, if Anderson (1970:165-181) is correct in suggesting that we should see Lakedaimonian rather than Persian military practices in Xenophon's *Cyropaideia*, then it should come as no surprise to see, according to Xenophon (*Cyrop.* 2.4.18), that the army of the Elder Cyrus employed wagons to carry provisions with the army on the march. Furthermore there is Xenophon's (*Cyrop.* 6.2.25) reference to the twenty days' rations carried by the Elder Cyrus' army during its march to Sardis. It is worth comparing Thucydides' (4.2.1) statement that Agis' invasion of Attika in the spring of 425 BC lasted only fifteen days. It is possible that the Lakedaimonian army regularly carried provisions for some twenty days or so (allowing for the time it took to reach Attika and the return journey), especially if it took wagons and baggage animals along with it. Even during a winter campaign, that which Kleombrotos undertook in 379 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.14f), we hear of "great numbers of pack-asses" (*πολλοὺς...ὄνους*) being employed by the Spartan force (Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.17). Even if there was no baggage train it is still feasible that provisions for up to thirty to forty days could have been taken along (cf. Frontinus, *Stratagems* 4.1.6; Diodoros 13.95.3; Demosthenes 18.157) as was allegedly the practice of the Makedonian army under Philip:

> "When Philip first organised his army, he forbade the use of wagons to all. He allowed cavalrymen one servant apiece and the infantry one for every ten men. It was the servants' task to carry a flour mill and tent ropes. He ordered the troops, when going out on summer campaigns, to carry thirty days of flour rations for themselves" (Frontinus, *Stratagems* 4.1.6).

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[7] *...στρατεύσαντες ἐς τὴν Ἀργείαν τῆς τε γῆς ἔτεμον οὐ πολλὴν καὶ σῖτον ἀνεκομίσαντό τινα ζεύγη κομίσαντες.*

The possibility that the Spartans met and ate together in their respective *syssitia* when on campaign is plausible when we consider the number of members in these groups. Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 12.2) states that the Spartans gathered in groups of about fifteen for their public meals or *syssitia*. Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 5.5) maintains, with regard to these public meals, that Lykourgos had introduced: "mixed companies at Sparta, so that the experience of the elders might contribute largely to the education of the juniors". Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 5.2; 7.4; 9.4;13.7; 15.5) frequently refers to these gatherings as *syskênia*, that is to say military mess-tent gatherings. Michell (1952:282) states how there: "seems little doubt that originally" a *syskênos* or *syssition* "was a military mess in which the members met 'under arms' and that the fifteen members formed half a company in the Spartan army". By this we can take Michell (*loc. cit.*) to mean that each *enomotia* in the Spartan army was comprised of two *syskênia* or *syssitia*. This would make perfect sense, though Michell (1952:282) adds that, later: "this purely military character was lost, since men over military age belonged, and the *syssition* as a military unit was abandoned". Michell's (1952:283) assertion that "boys" were included in the 'mixed companies' to which Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 5.5) refers is not fully convincing. Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 5.5) refers to the 'younger' members merely as being τοὺς νεωτέρους as compared to the 'older' members or τῶν γεραιτέρων. There is no reason to suppose that the 'younger' members were not actually young men of military age rather than 'boys' as Michell (1952:283) refers to the 'younger' members. It seems plausible to suggest that the Spartan *syskênia* or *syssitia* were comprised of men who, with two or more *syskênia* or *syssitia* grouped together in *enomotiai*, were to serve together in the Spartan army. Indeed, Lazenby (1985:13) remarks of just such a system that: "there is something to be said for this view: the *syssitia* clearly had strong military overtones, and mobilisation would have been all the easier, and *espirit de corps* all the stronger, if members of the same *enomotia* were accustomed to eat together". Polyainos (2.3.11) gives credence to the idea that the Spartan mess system was also employed when the troops were on campaign[8].

[8] Cf. Polyainos (2.1.15) who maintains that Agesilaos sent men to collect the shields of the deserters from their: "beds and messes" (στιβάδας καὶ τὰ συσσίτια). If this is the same incident as described by Plutarch (*Agesilaos* 32) then these deserters appear to have been *perioikoi* and

Polyainos (*loc. cit.*) relates how after a hard fought engagement between the Spartans and their Theban adversary Epameinondas, in which both sides lost many men:

> "The Lakedaimonians, who camped by companies, regiments, platoons, and messes, learned the number of casualties and went to sleep discouraged" (Polyainos, 2.3.11)[9].

Lazenby (1985:13) maintains that: "whatever the size of the *syssitia* in Xenophon's time, it is very improbable that they continued to form the basis for the *enomotiai*, even if they had ever done so". However, whether or not the Spartan *syssitia* formed the basis of the *enomotiai* as Lazenby (*loc. cit.*) questions, the members of the Spartan *syssitia* do appear to have served together on campaigns, and this is confirmed by Xenophon's (*Hell.* 5.3.17) description of Agesilaos' siege of Phleious in 381-380 BC when he states that:

> "Whenever any Phleiasians came out of the city either from friendship or kinship with the exiles, he [Agesilaos] instructed the latter to form common messes [*ξυσσίτιά*] of their own with such of the new-comers as were ready to undertake the army training, and to supply money enough for provisions; he also urged them to provide arms for all these people and not to hesitate to borrow money for this purpose. The exiles accordingly carried out his injunctions, and showed as a result more than a thousand men in splendid condition of body, well disciplined, and extremely well armed; so that the Lakedaimonians finally said that they had need of such fellow-soldiers" (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 5.3.17)[10].

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neodamodeis, which suggests that these troops, too, formed themselves in military messes along regular Spartan lines.

[9] *Λακεδαιμόιοι μὲν δὴ κατὰ λόχους καὶ μόρας [καὶ] ἐνωμοτίας καὶ συσσίτια στρατοπεδεύοντες ἔμαθον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀπολωλότων καὶ οὕτως ἀθυμήσαντες ἐς ὕπνον ἐτράποντο.*

[10] *ὁπότε γὰρ ἐξίοιεν ἢ διὰ φιλίαν ἢ διὰ συγγένειαν τῶν φυγάδων, ἐδίδασκε ξυσσίτιά τε αὐτῶν κατασκευάζειν καὶ εἰς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἱκανὸν διδόναι, ὁπόσοι γυμνάζεσθαι ἐθέλοιεν· καὶ ὅπλα δὲ ἐκ πορίζειν ἅπασι τούτοις διεκελεύετο, καὶ μὴ ὀκνεῖν εἰς ταῦτα χρήματα δανείζεσθαι. οἱ δὲ ταῦτα ὑπηρετοῦντες ἀπέδειξαν πλείους χιλίων ἀνδρῶν ἄριστα μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχοντας, εὐτάκτους δὲ καὶ*

Clearly, those Phleiasians who left the city to join their friends or kinsmen who had been exiled and who were now with Agesilaos' force besieging the city, organised themselves along Spartan lines, including the establishment of common messes presumably in the Spartan manner. Furthermore, the importance of this passage in providing us with reliable evidence that the Spartans ate together in their respective *syssitia* while on active service cannot be overstated. Somewhat surprisingly, although Cartledge (1987:131;229) twice mentions this particular passage of Xenophon's *Hellenika*, on neither occasion does he comment on the apparent military function of the Spartan *syssitia.* Rather, Cartledge (1987:131) chooses to concentrate on how, in his view, the system of the Spartan *syssitia*: "contributed powerfully to the...anti-democratic character of Spartan society". Later Cartledge (1987:229) remarks on the *social* organisation of the Spartan *syssitia* but makes no comment whatsoever on any possible *military* function.

In contrast, Singor (1999:67-89) has put forward the argument that each *enomotia* in the Spartan army was made up of two or three *syssitia.* Singor (1999:71) maintains that: "the *syssitia* were smaller units than the *enomotiai* and to judge from Thucydides' [5.68.3] omission of them in his detailed description of the Spartan army one may conclude that the *syssitia* did not function as tactical units in battle, but as tent-companies in the camp, as indeed their synonym *συσκήνια* suggests". However, it is conceivable that the members of each of the *syssitia* ate, encamped, slept, and fought together as a sub-units of the *enomotiai.* It has already been noted that Plutarch (*Lykourgos* 12.2) gives a figure of: "about fifteen" as being the number of members within each of the *syssitia.* If, for example, we accept that this figure included the very young and the very old, not all of the age-classes were likely to have been called upon to serve at the same time except in very unusual or extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, it seems plausible to suggest that if the younger and older members remained at home, the mess could still actually comprise, for example, a group of twelve men which could have formed one file, twelve men deep, within the ranks of the phalanx, as indeed the Spartans did at Leuktra in 371 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.12). Furthermore,

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εὐοπλοτάτους· ὥστε τελευτῶντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔλεγον ὡς τοιούτων δέοιντο συστρατιωτῶν.

even if only eight members of each mess was called upon to serve, they could still form a file eight men deep as the Spartans are known to have done on several occasions, such as at Mantineia in 418 BC (Thuc. 5.68), at the Maiander River in 399 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.16), and on Kerkyra in 373 BC (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.21).

Singor (1999:72) suggests that: "although it is nowhere stated in our sources, the three *syssitia* forming one *enomotia* in my view represented the three Dorian *φυλαί* of Sparta", that is to say the tribes of the Hylleis, Dymanes, and Pamphyloi. Singor's suggestion is certainly a very attractive one as it would ensure that each of the three Dorian tribes would be spread out along the whole of the phalanx rather than grouped together as tribal units. This of course would mean that if casualties occurred at a particular point along the phalanx any subsequent losses would be spread across all of the three tribes and no one tribe would be decimated. Furthermore, Fornis and Casillas (1997:37f) have also suggested a military function to the Spartan *syssitia* and also propose that the *syssitia* formed part of a Spartan *enomotia.*

If then, we accept that each *enomotia* in the Spartan army was formed from three *syssitia*, perhaps as Singor (*loc. cit.*) suggests with each of the three representing one of the three Dorian tribes, and if we also accept that the Spartan *syssitia* therefore served a *military* as well as social function it would make perfect sense that the responsibility to provide provisions when the Spartan army was on campaign devolved upon the *syssitia* themselves. As the individual Spartiate's monthly contributions of food produce to his *syssition* was an unavoidable prerequisite of membership of a *syssition* it seems logical, and indeed plausible, that the members of each *syssition* would draw such provisions as were required from the stores of their individual *syssitia.*

Whether it was the case that individual Spartan soldiers carried their own provisions or whether *skeuophoroi* from among the helot population were employed is difficult to say. Sekunda (1998:32) states of the ancillary equipment of Spartan soldiers that: "the hoplite or his helot had to carry equipment for cooking and eating". Lazenby (1994:5) is of the opinion that helots accompanied

Spartan troops for the purpose of helping to carry some of their masters' equipment: "in particular the heavy shield". Lazenby (*ibid.*) bases his assessment on the testimony of Thucydides (4.8.9) who states that an, unspecified, number of helots crossed over to Sphakteria with the Spartan force. However, as Lazenby (1994:5) goes on to admit: "on the other hand, Spartan soldiers retreating from Boiotia along a precipitous coastal track were apparently carrying their own shields, because Xenophon [*Hell.* 5.4.17-18] says a violent wind tore some of them from their owners and swept them into the sea. As a result many abandoned the shields with their concave surfaces filled with stones to weigh them down, and went back to fetch them next day". The view that Spartan troops would have carried their own shields and that any helots who accompanied them as 'attendants' would have been employed as *skeuophoroi* (baggage-carriers) rather than as *hypaspistai* (shield-bearers) is an attractive one and seems likely. The reason for taking such a view is based on the testimony of the Xenophon passage cited above (*Hell.* 5.4.17-18). In addition, in another of his works (*Lak. Pol.* 12.2) when, in describing the Lakedaimonian system for military camps, Xenophon states that:

> "He [Lykourgos] caused sentries to be posted by day facing inwards, along the place where the arms were kept, for the object of these is to keep an eye not on the enemy but on their friends" (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 12.2)[11].

Shortly after this, in the same work, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 12.4) states that:

> The rule that patrols invariably carry their spears has the same purpose, undoubtedly, as the exclusion of slaves from the place of arms" (Xenophon, *Lak. Pol.* 12.4)[12].

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[11] *φυλακάς γε μὴν ἐποίησε μεθημερινὰς τὰς μὲν παρὰ τὰ ὅπλα εἴσω βλεπούσας· οὐ γὰρ πολεμίων ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ φίλων αὗται καθίστανται·*

[12] *τὸ δὲ ἔχοντας τὰ δόρατα ἀεὶ περιιέναι, εὖ καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ εἰδέναι ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκά ἐστιν οὕπερ καὶ τοὺς δούλους εἴργουσιν ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων.*

Furthermore, Plutarch (*Moralia* 220A) alleges that Spartans who lost their shields were disgraced, though the same punishment was not inflicted on those who lost helmets or breastplates, and, later, Plutarch (*Moralia* 241F) records how a Spartan mother, handing her son his shield, exhorted him by saying: "either this or upon this". In addition, Diodoros (12.62.5) maintains that, of the Spartans: "all...those who lose their shields are punished with death". Therefore, this would suggest that Spartan troops would have kept both their weapons and shields close to hand and not entrust them to helots. However, there is a problem in this in that Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.14) clearly states that those Lakedaimonians who were wounded in the engagement near Lechaion were carried back to Lechaion by: "the shield-bearers" (τοὺς ὑπασπιστὰς) adding (*ibid.*) that these (the evacuated wounded) were to become the only survivors. Unfortunately, Xenophon does not see fit to tell us how many Lakedaimonians actually survived the debacle at Lechaion. If he had done so we could perhaps estimate the number of shield-bearers there were with the Spartan *mora* that was ambushed. It is tempting to suggest that perhaps only Spartan *officers* had shield-bearers, and for a Spartan *mora* the full compliment of officers would amount to twenty-nine men holding some sort of rank within the command structure of the *mora* (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 11.4). Nevertheless however tempting it may appear there is no evidence to support the hypothesis that only Spartan officers had shield-bearers. Furthermore, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.17) does tell us that: "about two hundred and fifty" of the Lakedaimonians present at Lechaion died and remarks that "some few" men escaped with the Lakedaimonian horsemen. Connolly (1981:40) calculates that a Spartan *mora* in Xenophon's time consisted of 576 men, therefore there would have been about 226 survivors; even if only half this amount were among the wounded it would be perhaps stretching credibility a little too far to have expected only twenty-nine ὑπασπισταὶ to have been capable of evacuating so many casualties. However, that said, it is also worth noting that Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.2.21; *Hell.* 4.8.39) mentions ὑπασπισταὶ, shield-bearers, on only two other occasions in the entire corpus of his written work and in both cases it is in the context of the shield-bearers of senior officers. Of these other references to shield-bearers one (*Hell.* 4.8.39) is, indeed, in a Spartan context, that being the mention of how the Spartan commander Anaxibios had taken his

shield from his shield-bearer and died fighting against Iphikrates' troops in the Hellepontine region. Earlier in his narrative, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.32) has informed us of how Anaxibios, due largely to his friendship with the Spartan ephors, had originally managed to secure his appointment as the Spartan *harmost*, or governor, of Abydos. The only other reference to shield-bearers in the Xenophontic corpus is when Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.2.21), who at the time of the incident he describes held the rank of general, tells us that he himself was left in considerable danger when his own personal shield-bearer ran off with his shield when the Greeks' Karduchian enemies were rolling boulders down a slope at them.

Returning to what the specific purpose of helots accompanying Spartan troops on campaign actually was, the matter is further complicated by Herodotos' (9.29) allegation that seven 'light-armed' helots accompanied each of the 5,000 Spartan troops who took part in the Plataiai campaign of 479 BC. Lazenby (1985:100-101) states his belief that: "it is very unlikely that there really were 35,000 helots at Plataiai, despite what Herodotos says - apart from anything else there hardly seems room for them on the battlefield...and at most we should probably assume one batman to each hoplite". In a later work Lazenby (1993a:227-228) reiterates this line of argument and again expresses doubt that there actually were some 35,000 light-armed helots with the Spartan contingent at Plataiai adding (1993a:228) that: "it seems more likely that each Spartan was accompanied by just a single helot, as Herodotos [7.229.1] implies was the case at Thermopylai". Burn (1984:505), however, appears to accept Herodotos' statement merely remarking (*ibid.*) that: "with the Spartiates are said to have gone no less than 35,000 helots, 'every man armed for war', as light-armed troops, equipped probably with javelins". The situation regarding the alleged 35,000 light-armed helots is made even less clear in that during Herodotos' (9.30-80) subsequent narrative of the events of the Plataiai campaign helots, whether light-armed or not, are only mentioned again when, Herodotos (9.80-81) maintains, Pausanias instructed the helots to collect together all the booty that had been taken when the Greeks had secured the Persian camp at the end of the battle. However, at the very least *some* helots appear to have fought in the battle as Herodotos (9.85)

informs us that the 'Lakedaimonian' dead were interred in three tombs, one of which contained the youngest of the Spartans, another for the rest of the Spartans: "and in the third the helots" (ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ οἱ εἵλωτες).

Certainly helots did accompany Spartan troops on campaigns. For example an undisclosed number of helots accompanied their Spartan masters when a force of four hundred and twenty Lakedaimonian hoplites crossed over to the island of Sphakteria in the summer of 425 BC (Thuc. 4.8.9), though there is no mention of their use in combat in Thucydides' (4.8-15; 23; 26-39) narrative of the events of the Pylos-Sphakteria campaign, and it would appear that these helots at least were non-combatants. It seems clear from the fact that although Thucydides (4.9.1) maintains that the Athenian general Demosthenes equipped and made use of sailors from his ships as improvised light-armed troops, those helots who had accompanied the four hundred and twenty Lakedaimonian hoplites to Sphakteria, and others who had run the Athenian blockade of the island in order to bring in supplies (Thuc. 4.26.5f), do not appear to have been called upon to serve in a military capacity. Therefore, it is tempting to suggest that helots, unless described as being armed, accompanied Spartan forces as attendants and were, perhaps, responsible for carrying food and other supplies on behalf of their masters and also, perhaps, required for the preparation and cooking of provisions for Spartan troops.

Interestingly enough, we hear from Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.3) that during Agesilaos' operations near Peiraion in 390 BC, Agesilaos sent one Spartan *mora* along the heights and in the ensuing cold of that evening managed to win credit for himself by employing a timely expedient for those troops stationed on the heights:

> "For since no one among those who carried provisions for the regiment [*mora*] had brought fire, and it was cold...Agesilaos sent up not less than ten men carrying fire in earthen pots" (Xenophon, *Hellenika* 4.5.4)[13].

[13] τῶν γὰρ τῇ μόρᾳ φερόντων τὰ σιτία οὐδενὸς πῦρ εἰσενεγκόντος...πέμπει ὁ Ἀγησίλαος οὐκ ἔλαττον δέκα φέροντας πῦρ ἐν χύτραις.

It is unfortunate that Xenophon does not explain further as to whether or not those who were carrying the provisions for the *mora* were actually soldiers or helots, or indeed who those men were whom Agesilaos subsequently sent up to the heights with fire-pots. Whether they were actually Spartan soldiers or helots employed as attendants it is impossible to say, given Xenophon's rather vague terminology at this point in his narrative. Elsewhere, certainly, Xenophon's (*Lak. Pol.* 12.4) remark that slaves were excluded from the 'place of arms' within a Spartan military camp illustrates that slaves actually did accompany Spartan armies on campaign, though whether the men carrying the provisions for the *mora* stationed on the heights or those men who carried fire-pots up to the troops actually were slaves, that is say helots, or not it is simply not possible to say for certain. However, of the Xenophon passage cited above, Sekunda (1998:32) believes this "passage shows that on operations away from the main army, the [Spartan] hoplites would not be accompanied by a helot each, but only enough helots to carry their food", adding (*ibid.*) that: "It further implies that rations were issued to the troops by this date". The argument that rations were actually issued to Spartan troops is not convincing. Frontinus' (*Stratagems* 4.1.6) assertion that Philip of Makedon's infantry troops were allowed only one servant to every ten men and his statement that Philip instructed the troops themselves to carry thirty days provisions is worth noting again. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.4) simply does not tell us how many men there were who were actually responsible for carrying the provisions for the *mora.* Nor does he say anything whatsoever about where these provisions had been obtained from originally. The provisions for the *mora* may have been brought by the Spartan troops themselves from their contributions to their respective *syssitia* at home and, perhaps, carried on behalf of these troops by attendant helots. Furthermore, whether helots accompanied Spartan armies as light-armed troops or as carriers they, too, would require feeding although it is extremely doubtful that they would have received the same quantity of provisions as their Spartan masters. Thucydides (4.16.1) tells us that the helots with the Lakedaimonian force on Sphakteria received half the amount of provisions that the Spartan troops did during the period of the truce. The Lakedaimonians themselves were each to receive two Attic *choinikes* of barley-meal, two *kotylai*

of wine and a ration of meat each day[14] and as the 'servants' were to receive half as much as this (*θεράποντι δὲ τούτων ἡμίσεα*); this would amount to the helots each receiving one Attic *choinix* of barley-meal, and *perhaps* one *kotylê* of wine, though whether they received any meat ration may have been doubtful.

The Athenians too, also appear to have employed *skeuophoroi* (baggage-carriers) or *therapontes* (attendants), or *akolouthoi* (camp followers). In Aristophanes' *Acharnians* (1174f) the *θεράπων*, or 'attendant', of the Athenian general Lamachos, who returns to his master's household to instruct the household servants to prepare to treat their master's wounds, is presumably the same 'boy' (*παῖς*) to whom Aristophanes has had Lamachos giving orders to earlier in the play (*Acharnians* 1097f) prior to their embarkation to the front line. It is no doubt for comic effect that Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 1138f) has Lamachos carrying his own *gulios*, or 'knapsack', which contains Lamachos' meagre provisions while the attendant is instructed to carry the heavy shield which has had Lamachos' blankets (presumably *several* blankets as the 'expedition' sets off as it starts to snow) strapped to it. However, what Aristophanes merely joked about in 425 BC in his *Acharnians* (*loc. cit.*) was to have a real-life parallel in that, in the summer of 413 BC, as the Athenian expeditionary force was about to embark on an overland retreat from Syracuse, Thucydides (7.75.5) informs us that of some "four *myriads*" (40,000) many bore whatever they could:

> "while the hoplites and the horsemen, contrary to their wont, carried their own food, some for want of attendants, others through distrust of them; for there had been desertions all along and in greatest numbers immediately on their defeat. But even so they did not carry enough, for there was no longer food in the camp" (Thuc. 7.75.5)[15].

Of the Thucydides passage above, Gomme et al (1981:452) state that: "this is perhaps the clearest evidence we have of the extent to which a hoplite force in the

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[14] *δύο χοίνικας ἑκάστῳ Ἀττικὰς ἀλφίτων καὶ δύο κοτύλας οἴνου καὶ κρέας.*

[15] *καὶ οἱ ὁπλῖται καὶ οἱ ἱππῆς παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς αὐτοί γε καὶ τὰ σφέτερα αὐτῶν σιτία, οἱ μὲν ἀπορίᾳ ἀκολούθων, οἱ δὲ ἀπιστίᾳ· ἀπηυτομολή-κεσαν γὰρ πάλαι τε καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι παραχρῆμα. ἔφερον δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα ἱκανά· σῖτος γὰρ οὐκέτι ἦν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ.*

field used servants". Of attendants and servants, Ducrey (1986:202) takes the view that when: "an expeditionary force set out, the soldiers had to carry with them rations for periods ranging from three to thirty days. The Spartan fighting men took a helot along with them, the Athenians a manservant, usually a slave". Whether Greek troops had attendants or not, an individual's rations appear to have been carried in a *gulios*. This item of ancillary equipment clearly had military associations as is apparent from Aristophanes (*Acharnians* 1097; 1138, *Peace* 526), for it is in a *gulios* that Lamachos carries his meagre provisions (Aristophanes *Acharnians* 1097; 1138). Sekunda (1998:32) remarks of the first of these Aristophanes passages (*Acharnians* 1097) that: "an ancient commentator on this passage tells us that it was a wicker-work basket in which soldiers put their provisions on campaign". However, it is somewhat surprising that Sekunda chooses to refer to the scholia on Aristophanes when Aristophanes *himself* gives us confirmation, in another of his plays (*Peace* 526-528), that this item was indeed made of wicker. Aristophanes (*loc. cit.*), in response to Hermes' comment that Theoria's sweet perfume is not at all like the (unpleasant) smell of a *gulios*, has Trygaios reply by expressing revulsion at the thought of the *gulios* and referring to it by the term πλέκος (*Peace* 528), clearly confirming that this piece of equipment was made of wicker.

There is little in the way of evidence of the Athenian army using wagons or carts, though Herodotos' (9.25.1) statement that the Greeks loaded the corpse of Masistius onto a wagon (ἅμαξαν) to be paraded before the Greek ranks suggests that there were wagons with the Greek army at Plataiai. As Herodotos (9.22) tells us that Masistius was thrown by his wounded horse in front of the Athenians, who then killed him, it would be reasonable to assume that the wagon which Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) speaks of was part of the Athenian contingent at Plataiai. However, apart from this mention of a wagon there is a general lack of evidence in our primary source material concerning whether or not the Athenian army employed wagons and carts to the same extent as the Lakedaimonians. In the summer of 431 BC, Thucydides (2.6.4) tells us, the Athenians marched to the aid of Plataiai and brought in food, though how this was transported to Plataiai

Thucydides fails to tell us. Similarly, during the period of stasis at Athens in 404 BC, the forces under Thrasyboulos, Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.7) informs us, packed up all the arms and baggage they had captured and took this booty to their base at Phyle. Xenophon (*loc. cit.*), like Thucydides (2.6.4), fails to tell us whether or not wagons, carts, or pack-animals were used to transport this material.

Although it would be logical to assume that the Athenians, and other Greek armies, employed wagons, carts, and pack-animals on campaigns there is, nevertheless, surprising little solid evidence, with the notable exception of the Spartans, that they did actually do so. The Phleiasians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.18) asked the Athenian general Chares to escort a convoy (*παραπομπήν*) to Pellênê which conveyed their non-combatants out of the city and returned carrying provisions on 'beasts of burden' (*ὑποζύγια*). Although *ὑποζύγια* literally means 'beasts under the yoke' Xenophon (*ibid.*) maintains that as many supplies as possible were loaded directly onto the animals[16] which suggests that there were no wagons in this case. Polyainos (3.9.41) relates a stratagem employed by Iphikrates in Thrace, in which Iphikrates used his: "pack animals and many cattle" (*τὰ σκευοφόρα καὶ πολλὰ τετράποδα*) as bait to lure the enemy Thracians into a trap. That Iphikrates served in Thrace is confirmed by Cornelius Nepos (*Iphikrates* 2), as well as by the Pseudo-Aristotle in the *Oikonomikos* (2.2.26)[17]. Of another Athenian general, Timotheos, Polyainos (3.10.7) states that:

> "Wishing to march past Olynthian territory, but fearing the Olynthians' cavalry, Timotheos arranged his army into a rectangle. He put the baggage animals and the cavalry in the middle, drew the wagons crowded together and fastened to one another, and surrounded all these with the hoplites, so that a cavalry attack was impossible for the Olynthian horsemen" (Polyainos, 3.10.7)[18].

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[16] *ἐπισκευασάμενοι ὁπόσα ἐδύναντο ὑποζύγια*

[17] Cf. Frontinus, *Stratagems* 1.5.24

[18] *Τιμόθεος τὴν Ὀλυνθίαν βουλόμενος παρελθεῖν δεδοικὼς τὸ ἱππικὸν τῶν Ὀλυνθίων ἔταξε τὸ στρατόπεδον εἰς ἑτερόμηκες πλινθίον τὰ μὲν σκευοφόρα καὶ τὴν ἵππον εἰς τὸ μέσον λαβὼν, τὰς δὲ ἁμάξας πυκνὰς ἄγων καὶ συνηρτημένας, τοὺς δὲ ὁπλίτας τούτων ἔξωθεν περιβαλὼν, ὥστε τοῖς Ὀλυνθίοις ἱππεῦσιν ἀδύνατος ἦν ἡ ἱππασία.*

Several of our other sources make reference to Timotheos' military operations against the Olynthians of 364 BC. Nepos (*Timotheos* 1) relates how Timotheos subdued Olynthos, while the orators Isokrates (*Antidosis* 15.112-113) and Demosthenes (2.14 and 23.150) both refer to Timotheos' campaign against the Olynthians, as does the Pseudo-Aristotle in his *Oikonomikos* (2.2.23)[19]. None of these other sources, however, are concerned with Timotheos' baggage train and pack animals.

Nevertheless, it is certainly conceivable that Timotheos would indeed have employed just such a measure, as that described by Polyainos (*loc. cit.*) to protect the baggage train and non-combatants with his army when faced by an enemy force containing cavalry. For example, Thucydides (4.125.2) states that when the Spartan Brasidas believed that Perdikkas and his cavalry force of a little less than a thousand horsemen had deserted him and changed sides, he ordered his hoplites "into a square" (*ἐς τετράγωνον*) and placed his *psiloi*, or light-troops, and presumably any baggage-carriers he had, inside it. Similarly, at the first battle at Syracuse in 415 BC, Thucydides (6.67.1) tells us that the Athenians stationed half their total force in reserve to the rear of the battle-line. This half of the expeditionary force took up station in a hollow square formation inside which Thucydides (*ibid.*) tells us the Athenians placed their *σκευοφόρους*, no doubt to provide them with protection should the Syracusan cavalry force, which Thucydides (6.67.2) maintains was not less than twelve hundred strong, have found a way to attack them. During the Athenian retreat from Syracuse, Thucydides (7.78.2) states that the whole Athenian force formed a hollow square formation inside which they placed their non-combatants to protect them from harrying attacks from the Syracusan cavalry and light-armed infantry. Polyainos (2.1.17) maintains that Agesilaos, during his return from Asia, had pack animals with his army consisting of asses, mules, and old horses carrying baggage during his march through Makedonia[20]. According to Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.4.24) Agesilaos also had some camels with him that he had captured from the Persians,

[19] Cf. Diodoros, 15.81.6

[20] Cf. Polyainos, 4.4.3 which relates a similar incident involving Antipatros, in which Polyainos alludes once again to Agesilaos' pack animals.

and which he brought back to Greece with him. Agesilaos adopted the same sort of hollow square formation as those previously related as he traversed hostile Thessaly (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 4.3.3-9; *Agesilaos*, 2.2-5) and presumably the pack animals mentioned by Polyainos (*loc. cit.*) and the camels mentioned by Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) were placed inside the hollow square formation for their protection. Xenophon himself and the former Cyreans also adopted just such a formation, once again with the baggage train and non-combatants placed inside the protective square, at stages during Xenophon's narrative of their return from Kounaxa[21]. Indeed, the hollow square formation, enclosing the baggage train, appears to have been a relatively standard method of advancing through territory when faced with enemy cavalry forces as Onasander (*Stratêgikos*, 6.5-6) states:

> "A marching formation that is compact and rectangular - not very much longer than its width - is safe and easy to manage for every emergency...The general must place his medical equipment, pack animals, and all his baggage in the centre of his army, not outside" (Onasander, *Stratêgikos* 6.5-6)[22].

Returning to the possibility of finding evidence for the use of wagons, pack animals, and carts by Greek, and in particular Athenian armies, it is worth considering the advice that Xenophon (*Oikonomikos*, 8.4) has Ischomachos give his wife when he, Ischomachos, compares a disorganised household to an army in chaos:

> "an army in disorder is a confused mass, an easy prey to enemies, a disgusting sight to friends and utterly useless, - donkey, *hoplite*, carrier, light-armed, horseman, *wagon*[23], huddled together. For how

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[21] We hear of the Cyreans marching in a hollow square formation in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, 3.2.36; 3.3.6; 3.4.19; 3.4.22; 3.4.43 (mentioned twice); 7.8.16. Cf. Xenophon, *Cyrop.* 6.3.20; 8.3.16

[22] *Ἡ δὲ σφνεσταλμένη πορεία καὶ τετράγωνος ἡ μὴ πάνυ παραμήκης εἰς πάντα καιρὸν εὐμεταχείριστός ἐστι καὶ ἀσφαλής...Λανβανέτω δὲ τὴν θεραπείαν καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια καὶ τὴν ἀποσκευὴν ἅπασαν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ μὴ χωρίς.*

[23] I have amended Marchant's (Loeb) translation and replaced his '*chariot*' with '*wagon*' as the Greek text clearly has *ἅμαξα*: 'wagon', and there is no evidence to even suggest that the Greeks of the Classical period used chariots in warfare. In addition, I have substituted the term *hoplite* in place of Marchant's translation of *ὁπλίτης* as '*trooper*'.

> are they to march in such a plight, when they hamper one another, some walking while others run, some running while others halt, *wagon* colliding with horseman, donkey with *wagon*, carrier with *hoplite*?" (Xenophon, *Oikonomikos* 8.4)[24].

The Xenophon passage above may provide us with evidence that the Athenians, and other Greeks for that matter, did indeed take wagons and pack animals with them on campaign. Perhaps less reliable is Polyainos' (3.9.4) tale of how the Athenian general Iphikrates calmed his panic-stricken troops by offering a talent of silver in reward to anyone who gave him information as to who had let an 'ass' (*τὸν ὄνον*) get loose among their weapons the previous night. Polyainos' tale is far too similar to an episode recorded by Xenophon in his *Anabasis* (2.2.20) to be believed. In Xenophon's version, which, after a similar panic among the troops, the Spartan Klearchos has an army herald announce that:

> "The commanders give public notice that whoever informs on the man who let the ass loose among the arms shall receive a reward of a talent of silver" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.2.20)[25].

The tale recorded by Polyainos about Iphikrates is of questionable validity, the whole set of circumstances that Polyainos describes: the ass getting among the place of arms at night, the panic among the troops, and even the offer of the same sum as reward; a talent of silver, is far too close to Xenophon's tale to be considered as reliable evidence. Furthermore, Xenophon at least was an actual eye-witness to the episode he describes, and is recording an episode from his own personal life experience. In contrast, Polyainos was writing over five hundred years after the alleged event he describes, although in fairness to him he was basing his account on an earlier, but completely unspecified, source. There might well be some truth to Polyainos' tale, and perhaps Iphikrates did once either offer

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[24] *καὶ στρατιά γε,..., ἄτακος μὲν οὖσα ταραχωδέστατον καὶ τοῖς μὲν πολεμίοις εὐχειρωτότατον, τοῖς δὲ φίλοις ἀγλευκέστατον ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀχρηστότατον, ὄνος ὁμοῦ, ὁπλίτης, σκευοφόρος, ψιλός, ἱππεύς, ἅμαξα. πῶς γὰρ ἂν πορευθείησαν, ἐὰν ἔχοντες οὕτως ἐπικωλύσωσιν ἀλλήλους, ὁ μὲν βαδίζων τὸν τρέχοντα, ὁ δὲ τρέχων τὸν ἑστηκότα, ἡ δὲ ἅμαξα τὸν ἱππέα, ὁ δὲ ὄνος τὴν ἅμαξαν, ὁ δὲ σκευοφόρος τὸν ὁπλίτην.*

[25] *οἱ ἄρχοντες, ὃς ἂν τὸν ἀφέντα τὸν ὄνον εἰς τὰ ὅπλα μηνύσῃ, ὅτι λήψεται μισθὸν τάλαντον.*

a reward in the way Polyainos maintains or perhaps by Iphikrates' day the story had become a well known 'soldier's joke' commonly used to help diffuse tension among nervous troops. However, the fact that Xenophon was recording an episode he had witnessed first-hand makes his account the more credible.

Connolly (1981:47) states that: "the only detailed account that we have of an army on the march is Xenophon's retreat of the 10,000". Although Xenophon's *Anabasis* recounts the adventures of a large body of mercenaries it is perhaps worthwhile examining the practice of the Greek mercenaries employed by the Younger Cyrus for an indication of what the arrangements regarding transport may have been for a 'typical' Greek army. Following the battle of Kounaxa, Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.10.18) states that:

> "They [the Greeks] found most of their property pillaged, in particular whatever there was to eat and drink, and as for the wagons loaded with flour and wine which Cyrus had provided in order that, if ever serious need should overtake the army, he might have supplies to distribute among the Greeks (and there were four hundred of these wagons, it was said), these also the King and his men had now pillaged" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 1.10.18)[26].

The four hundred wagons laden with wheat-flour and wine that Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) mentions were undoubtedly not typical of a Greek army on the march. It is also a complete mystery why Cyrus had not seen fit to distribute these provisions during the march through the 'Arabian' desert (Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.1f) when the Greeks' grain supply gave out and the only supply available for purchase, from the Lydian merchants accompanying Cyrus' army, had been grossly inflated in price resulting in the Greeks having to subsist on a diet of meat (Xen. *Anab.* 1.5.6). The Greek mercenaries also had wagons and animals (*ἁμαξῶν...καὶ ὑποζύγιων*) of their own on which many of the soldiers had stowed

[26] *καταλαμβάνουσι δὲ τῶν τε ἄλλων χρημάτων τὰ πλεῖστα διηρπασμένα καὶ εἴ τι σιτίον ἢ ποτὸν ἦν, καὶ τὰς ἁμάξας μεστὰς ἀλεύρων καὶ οἴνου, ἃς παρεσκευάσατο Κῦρος, ἵνα εἴ ποτε σφόδρα τὸ στράτευμα λάβοι ἔνδεια, διαδιδοίη τοῖς Ἕλλησιν — ἦσαν δ' αὗται τετρακόσιαι, ὡς ἐλέγοντο, ἅμαξαι — καὶ ταύτας τότε οἱ σὺν βασιλεῖ διήρπασαν.*

their arms and accoutrements (Xen. *Anab.* 1.7.20). Xenophon (*Anab.* 2.7.20) tells us that, in the aftermath of Kounaxa, the Greeks awaited news from Ariaeus:

> "meanwhile the troops provided themselves with food as best they could, by slaughtering oxen and asses of the baggage train" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.7.20)[27].

Later, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.2.27) tells us that he proposed that the Ten Thousand burn their wagons and tents, which, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.3.1) maintains, met with the agreement of the army and was carried out. However, later still we hear of how Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.4.17) agreed that he himself would lead out a party in order to obtain provisions if the omens of his sacrifice were favourable. Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.4.22) states that:

> "Now they no longer had any sheep, but they bought a bullock that was yoked to a wagon and proceeded to sacrifice" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.4.22)[28].

The ever pious Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.4.23), on finding the omens unfavourable refused to lead the men out. Cheirisophos' replacement, Neon, however did, though his foraging party was attacked by Pharnabazos' horsemen with the loss of five hundred (*Anab.* 6.4.23-24) at which point, Xenophon (*Anab.* 6.4.25-26) states:

> "And Xenophon, inasmuch as the sacrifices had not proved favourable on that day, took a bullock that was yoked to a wagon, - for there were no other sacrificial animals, - offered it up, and set out to the rescue, as did all the rest who were under thirty years of age, to the last man" (Xenophon, *Anabasis* 6.4.25-26)[29].

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[27] *τὸ δὲ στράτευμα ἐπορίζετο σῖτον ὅπως ἐδύνατο ἐκ τῶν ὑποζυγίων κόπτοντες τοὺς βοῦς καὶ ὄνους·*

[28] Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.22: *καὶ πρόβατα μὲν οὐκέτι ἦν, βοῦν δὲ ὑπὸ ἁμάξης πριάμενοι ἐθύοντο·*

[29] *καὶ ὁ Ξενοφῶν, ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐγεγένητο τὰ ἱερὰ ταύτῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, λαβὼν βοῦν ὑπὸ ἁμάξης, οὐ γὰρ*

Clearly, these two passages (Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.22; 25-26) indicate that the Ten Thousand had acquired more wagons at some point to replace those they had burned earlier. Where they were obtained from Xenophon does not inform us, though presumably it was at some point following their descent from the mountains to the more level coastal regions inhabited by the Tibarenians (Xen. *Anab.* 5.5.2). The two Xenophon passages cited above are also interesting in that they provide us with evidence that prior to these two sacrifices the former Cyreans appear to have had sheep with them for the purposes of religious sacrifices. The ritual sacrifice of animal victims was a normal feature of Greek military practice. Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 13.2-5) informs us that whenever the Spartan army mobilised, the Spartan king would offer up an animal sacrifice in Sparta itself and would offer up another animal sacrifice on reaching the border of Lakonia. On the march an army would be accompanied by a flock of sacrificial goats and sheep (Paus. 9.13.4), and once an enemy was sighted another sacrifice would take place (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.20; 6.5.8, *Lak. Pol.* 13.8). In the case of the Spartans, victory in battle was celebrated with the modest, but heavily symbolic, sacrifice of a cockerel (Plut. *Agesilaos*, 33)[30].

In addition to its wagons, and unspecified *ὑποζύγια*, the army of the former Cyreans also utilised horses and mules as baggage animals (Xen. *Anabasis*, 3.3.19). Engels (1978:14-22) has made a detailed study of the carrying capacities of both men and animals on the march, and argues that the amount of calories required by both men and animals when marching through desert terrain would mean that an army could not march for more than four days without consuming the food or fodder that they were actually carrying. Although Engels (1978:22) concludes that after four days of marching through desert terrain baggage animals: "would only be so much meat on the hoof", that does not detract from the fact that if the testimony of Xenophon in his *Anabasis*, with regard to the use of wagons and *ὑποζύγια*, can be applied to a wider context then it seems

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ἦν ἄλλα ἱερεῖα, σφαγιασάμενος ἐβοήθει καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν ἅπαντες.

[30] Jameson, 1993:197-227, gives a full account of the Greek military practice of animal sacrifices.

reasonable to suggest that the use of such baggage trains probably echoes that of the normal practice among Greek armies on the march, and it is plausible to believe that wagons and ὑποζύγια appear to have been employed by Greek armies. Furthermore, the Greek world was not, by and large, made up of desert and animals could have been grazed on the route of an army's line of march, for example when encamped. Indeed, of Philip II of Makedon, Plutarch (*Moralia*, 178A) relates that:

> "When he [Philip] was about to pitch his camp in an excellent place, he learned that there was no grass for the pack-animals. 'What a life is ours' he said, 'if we must live to suit the convenience of the asses!'" (Plutarch, *Moralia* 178A)[31].

The Greek word χιλὸς is usually translated as meaning green fodder or grass. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.6.1) tells us that as Cyrus got nearer to the Royal Persian army, they found that such 'fodder' had been burnt, presumably to prevent Cyrus' baggage animals making use of it. Herodotos (4.140) describes the pursuit of retreating Persians by the Skythians who took a route through countryside where there was both water and pasture believing that the Persians would take a path through just such countryside and that they could therefore intercept them. Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) uses the word χιλός to describe such "pasture". In this particular campaign the Skythians adopted a 'scorched earth' policy, for which Herodotos (*ibid.*) criticises the Skythians, remarking that if they had not spent their time blocking wells and destroying fodder instead of trying to actually locate the Persians then, he believes, they would most likely have achieved their objective. Therefore, it is worth noting that providing an enemy did not resort to such destructive tactics as those related by both Xenophon and Herodotos then there is, perhaps, every likelihood that the animals of an army's baggage train were allowed to graze on the line of march, something that would also be necessary if an army was accompanied by a flock of animals to be used as sacrificial victims in religious observances.

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[31] *Μέλλων δὲ καταστρατοπεδεύειν ἐν χωρίῳ καλῷ καὶ πυθόμενος ὅτι χόρτος οὐκ ἔστι τοῖς ὑποζυγίοις, " ὁ βίος ἡμῶν ἐστιν, εἰ καὶ πρὸς τὸν τῶν ὄνων καιρὸν ὀφείλομεν ζῆν ".*

However, what of non-combatant humans travelling with an army? These too, would need to be fed, and unlike the animals they could not survive on grass. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 4.1.12-14) tells us that, while marching through the territory of the Karduchians, the commanders of the former Cyreans held a meeting at which it was decided to discard as much baggage, including human 'baggage', as possible, keeping only the most powerful of the baggage animals and leaving the rest behind. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 4.1.13) states that the former Cyreans took this decision as the great number of captives, concubines, and baggage animals were greatly slowing the army down. All of the captives were set free, and the women and boys abandoned. In addition, Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us that, the captives were freed and the concubines abandoned largely because: "with so many people to feed it was necessary to procure and carry twice the amount of provisions" which obviously, it would seem, they were not prepared or willing to do.

FORAGING FOR PROVISIONS IN THE THEATRE OF MILITARY OPERATIONS

We have a considerable body of evidence to show that another method by which Greek armies could attempt to ensure adequate supplies was by means of foraging for provisions in the theatre of military operations in which they were operating. Indeed, as Pritchett (1971:40) states: "there are many isolated examples where our sources indicate that Greek armies supplied themselves by foraging". Of the practice of foraging, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.1.17) has the Spartan commander Teleutias claim that procuring provisions by seizing them from the enemy was the "most honourable" (*κάλλιστον*) of methods. However, it should be borne in mind that at that particular time Teleutias was attempting to rouse the men in his fleet and boost their low morale prior to their carrying out a daring raid on the Peiraieus itself in order to obtain provisions. Spartans were encouraged from an early age to develop their skills at foraging for supplies. Indeed, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 2.6) tells us Lykourgos decreed that Spartan boys be allowed to steal, adding:

> "It was not on account of a difficulty in providing for them that he [Lykourgos] encouraged them to get their food by their own cunning. No one, I suppose, can fail to see that. Obviously a man who intends to take to thieving must spend sleepless nights and play the deceiver and lie in ambush by day, and moreover, if he means to make a capture, he must have spies ready. There can be no doubt then, that all this education was planned by him in order to make the boys more resourceful in getting supplies, and better fighting men" (Xenophon, *Lak. Pol.* 2.7)[1].

Certainly, Xenophon himself was well aware of the Spartan practice of encouraging boys to steal in order that they might develop their skills as foragers.

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[1] *καὶ ὡς μὲν οὐκ ἀπορῶν ὅ τι δοίη ἐφῆκεν αὐτοῖς γε μηχανᾶσθαι τὴν τροφήν, οὐδένα οἶμαι τοῦτο ἀγνοεῖν· δῆλον δ' ὅτι τὸν μέλλοντα κλωπεύειν καὶ νυκτὸς ἀγρυπνεῖν δεῖ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἀπατᾶν καὶ ἐνεδρεύειν, καὶ κατασκόπους δὲ ἑτοιμάζειν τὸν μέλλοντά τι λήψεσθαι. ταῦτα οὖν δὴ πάντα δῆλον ὅτι μηχανικτέρους τῶν ἐπιτηδείων βουλόμενος τοὺς παῖδας ποιεῖν καὶ πολεμικωτέρους οὕτως ἐπαίδευσεν.* Cf. Plutarch, Lykourgos, 17.2-3

Xenophon in his *Anabasis* (4.6.14-15), records an exchange of banter between himself and the Spartan Cheirisophos about 'stealing' a strategic topographical position from the enemy, in which Xenophon himself said:

> "as I hear [Cheirisophos] you Lakedaimonians, at least those among you who belong to the peers, practice stealing even from childhood, and count it not disgraceful but honourable [*καλὸν*] to steal anything that the law does not prevent you from taking. And in order that you may steal with all possible skill and may try not to be caught at it, it is the law of your land that, if you are caught stealing, you are flogged" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.6.14-15)[2].

The flogging of unsuccessful thieves at Sparta was not for the actual act of attempting to steal, Plutarch (*Lykourgos*, 17.3) tells us, but rather for being such poor thieves as to get caught. There was also a mythological precedent for Spartan skills as 'foragers', in that a limestone metope from the Sikyonian treasury at Delphi, dating to about 560 BC, depicts the mythological Spartan 'Dioskouroi'; Kastor and Polydeukes. This sculpted relief shows them carrying their spears over their shoulders, and bringing back cattle from a successful raid[3]. The mythological cattle raid of Kastor and Polydeukes was to be mirrored in the Classical period when, in 398 BC, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.26) tells us, the Spartan king Agis, with the backing of the Lakedaimonian army and their allies, went to the sanctuary at Olympia and:

> "After his sacrifices he [Agis] marched upon the city of Elis, laying the land waste with axe and fire as he went, and vast numbers of cattle and vast numbers of slaves were captured in the country" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 3.2.26)[4].

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[2] *ὑμᾶς γὰρ ἔγωγε...ἀκούω τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὅσοι ἐστὲ τῶν ὁμοίων εὐθὺς καὶ ἐκ παίδων κλέπτειν μελετᾶν, καὶ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι ἀλλὰ καλὸν κλέπτειν ὅσα μὴ κωλύει νόμος. ὅπως δὲ ὡς κράτιστα κλέπτε καὶ πειρᾶσθε λανθάνειν, νόμινον παρ' ὑμῖν ἐστιν, ἐὰν ληφθῆτε κλέπτοντες, μαστιγοῦσθαι.*

[3] Illustrated in Boardman, 1978, fig. 208.2, and in Pedley, 1992:155

[4] *θύσας δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ ἐπορεύετο, κόπτων καὶ κάων τὴν χώραν, καὶ ὑπέρπολλα δὲ κτήνη,*

Xenophon (*ibid.*) maintains that at this: "many more of the Arkadians and Achaians" joined the expedition of their own accord with the result that the invasion became a ἐπισιτισμὸς, or "harvest", for the states of the entire Peloponnesos.

Under normal circumstances armies usually, but not exclusively, carried out foraging expeditions in enemy territory. There were notable exceptions to this practice, and both recorded examples would appear, it seems, to involve mercenary troops. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.5) relates how the former Cyreans, arriving in the territory of the Greek city of Kotyora and in need of provisions:

> "got them partly from Paphlagonia and partly from the estates of the Kotyorites; for the latter would not provide them with a market, nor would they receive their sick within the walls of the city" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.5.6)[5].

Kotyora, a colony of Sinope, appealed to its mother city, who in turn sent ambassadors to the Ten Thousand to discuss this violation of the territory of her colony. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.13) states that he himself spoke on behalf of his men, attempting to justify their actions by saying:

> "wherever we come, whether it be to a barbarian or to a Greek land, and have no market at which to buy, we take provisions, not out of wantonness, but from necessity" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.5.16)[6].

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.19) goes on to blame the Kotyorites themselves, arguing that by shutting their gates to the Ten Thousand they had not behaved to them as friends. There can be little doubt that the city of Kotyora closed its gates to the Ten Thousand probably out of fear rather than hostility, though their

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ὑπέρπολλα δὲ ἀνδράποδα ἠλίσκετο ἐκ τῆς χώρας.

[5]*τὰ δ' ἐπιτήδει' ἐλάμβανον τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς Παφλαγονίας, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν χωρίων τῶν Κοτυωριτῶν· οὐ γὰρ παρεῖχον ἀγοράν, οὐδε εἰς τὸ τεῖχος τοὺς ἀσθενοῦντας ἐδέχοντο.*

[6]*ὅποι δ' ἂν ἐλθόντες ἀγορὰν μὴ ἔχωμεν, ἄν τε εἰς βάρβαρον γῆν ἄν τε εἰς Ἑλληνίδα, οὐχ ὕβρει ἀλλὰ ἀνάγκῃ λαμβάνομεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια.*

refusal to provide a market from which the troops could legitimately purchase provisions no doubt aggravated the situation. Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.6) tells us that the remnants of the Ten Thousand enlisted in Spartan service and served with the forces under Thibron, the Spartan commander in Asia. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.1.8) goes on to inform us that Thibron was recalled to Sparta to stand trial and was exiled, because, Xenophon (*ibid.*) states: "the allies accused him of allowing his soldiers to plunder [ἁρπάζειν] their friends". Given the previous example of the former Cyreans taking provisions from the estates of the Kotyorites, it seems probable that, in this later instance, they were among the culprits.

Herodotos (7.49) has the Persian Artabanus express his misgivings concerning the planned invasion of Greece by underlining the problems of logistical supply to Xerxes. Herodotos (7.50.1-4) has Xerxes respond confidently to Artabanus in reported speech which Xerxes concludes by saying:

> "we will return home the conquerors of all Europe, having nowhere suffered famine or other harm; for firstly, we carry ample provision with us on our march, and secondly we shall have the food of those whose land and nation we invade; and those against whom we march are no wandering tribes, but tillers of the soil" (Herodotos, 7.50.4)[7].

At first glance it may seem odd that the Persian king should appear to be suggesting that the invasion force will, in part, draw its provisions, like foragers, from the people it aims to conquer, especially when we consider that the sheer scale of the Persian empire required a much greater level of organisation and bureaucracy than the relatively small patchwork collection of Greek *poleis.* However, if we view the statements that Herodotos (*loc. cit.*) attributes to Xerxes more closely we can, perhaps, find some middle ground. It is feasible to suggest that if Xerxes conquered any state, Greek or otherwise, it would be considered

[7] *καὶ καταστρεψάμενοι πᾶσαν τὴν Εὐρώπην νοστήσομεν ὀπίσω οὔτε λιμῷ ἐντυχόντες οὐδαμόθι οὔτε ἄλλο ἄχαρι οὐδὲν παθόντες. τοῦτο μέν γὰρ αὐτοὶ πολλὴν φοβὴν φερόμενοι πορευόμεθα, τοῦτο δέ, τῶν ἄν κου ἐπιβέωμεν γῆν καὶ ἔθνος, τούτων τὸν σῖτον ἐξομεν· ἐπ' ἀροτῆρας δὲ καὶ οὐ νομάδας στρατευόμεθα ἄνδρας.*

'Royal property' and as such may have been considered as a potential royal depot from which the king and his army could expect to receive hospitality. If this, then, was indeed the case, then strictly speaking we are not dealing here with 'foraging' in the true sense of the term.

Perhaps the most effective means of obtaining supplies by foraging was to seize a village, town, or city where supplies would probably be stored in much greater quantities in a collected settlement rather than would be the case if an army had to roam the countryside picking up whatever supplies its foraging parties could find in dispersed individual rural farmsteads. The acquisition of provisions and other supplies from settlements could range from an army simply descending on an unprotected or poorly defended settlement to the full-scale assault on major settlements, the express motivating factor of such an assault being the desire for provisions and other supplies. Obtaining 'other' supplies, as well as food and drink, were sometimes just as important as obtaining provisions. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 3.4.16-17) in relating a period of long-range missile exchanges between the pursuing Persian archers of Tissaphernes, who Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us: "also had large bows" (*μεγάλα δὲ καὶ τόξα τὰ Περσικά ἐστιν*), and the Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers of the Ten Thousand, remarks that the Cretan archers "consequently" (*ὥστε*) made use of Persian arrows fired at them which implies that they had bows of similar size to those of the Persians. In addition, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.18) adds that: "in the [local] villages, the Greeks found gut in abundance and lead for the use of their slingers". As well as supplying gut and lead for the slingers, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.18) tells us that on the following day the Greeks:

> "...collected supplies, for there was an abundance of corn in the villages" (Xenophon, Anab. 3.4.18)[8].

Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us that they did not move on until the next day, which means they spent a whole day procuring provisions from these villages, which in

[8] Xen. *Anab.* 3.4.18: *...ἐπεσιτίσαντο· ἦν γὰρ πολὺς σῖτος ἐν ταῖς κώμαις.*

turn perhaps gives us a indication about how well stocked these villages actually were. A little later on the march, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.30) tells us that after sustaining "many casualties" to the extent that eight surgeons were appointed to deal with the wounded, the Ten Thousand reached more villages, and that:

> "in these villages they remained for three days, not only for the sake of the wounded, but likewise because they had provisions in abundance - flour, wine and great stores of barley that had been collected for horses, all these supplies having been gathered together by the acting satrap of the district" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.4.31)[9].

This particular passage is interesting for a number of reasons. Xenophon's (*Anab.* 3.4.19-29) narrative immediately preceding this is a catalogue of almost incessant skirmishing with the Persians pursuing the Greek mercenaries. The three days spent in these particular villages would have given the Greeks what would appear to have been a clearly much needed period of rest and recuperation during which time their wounded could receive medical attention. Secondly, the Ten Thousand could simply help themselves to the stores of these villages and there seems little reason to doubt that both the soldiers and their accompanying baggage animals could have eaten their fill of such supplies, and, when their journey continued, carried away with them as much in the way of provisions as they could. Although Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.4.32) does not specifically say that when they resumed their march on the fourth day they did actually take supplies with them from these villages it seems reasonable to suppose that they would have done.

Later, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.1) informs us that after having seen off the enemy troops under Tissaphernes and Ariaeus, Cyrus' former confederate who had made his peace with Artaxerxes, the Greek army under:

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[9] *Ἐνταῦθα ἔμειναν ἡμέρας τρεῖς καὶ τῶν τετρωμένων ἕνεκα καὶ ἅμα ἐπιτήδεια πολλὰ εἶχον, ἄλευρα, οἶνον, κριθὰς ἵπποις συμβεβλημένας πολλάς. ταῦτα δὲ συνενηνεγμένα ἦν τῷ σατραπεύοντι τῆς χώρας.*

> "Cheirisophos descended into the plain and proceeded to encamp in a village stored with abundant supplies. There were likewise many other villages richly stored with supplies in this plain on the banks of the Tigris" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.5.1)[10].

However, from what Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.2) tells us next, it appears that the seeming withdrawal of Tissaphernes and Ariaeus was little more than a feint, for late on that same day they returned and troops from among the Ten Thousand, who were scattered about in the plain in search of plunder and booty (*ἐσκεδασμένων ἐν τῷ πεδίῳ καθ' ἁρπαγήν*) almost fell victim to this surprise attack from their Persian enemies. Indeed, Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us that some of these men were cut to pieces by Tissaphernes' troops and that the Persians subsequently followed up this attack by attempting to burn the villages from which the Greeks were hoping to get provisions. We will return to this particular episode later in this section when the more extreme methods that an army could employ to deny supplies to an enemy will be discussed. Suffice to say at this point that Cheirisophos, Xenophon (Anab.3.5.4) states, led out his troops and managed to rescue the plunderers. At this point in his narrative it is interesting to note that Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) uses terminology such as *ἁρπαγή* which is perhaps to be more associated with 'booty' and 'plunder' rather than of obtaining provisions. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.1) does describe the village that Cheirisophos encamped in as being: *μεστῇ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν*, 'full of many good [things]', and says of the rest: *ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι κῶμαι πολλαὶ πλήρεις πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν*, 'and also many other villages full of many good [things]', though he does not provide us with any clearer indication of precisely what these 'many good things' may have been. Indeed, his choice of language at this point in his narrative is somewhat different from that he uses a short while later to describe how:

> "while the rest of the army[11] went after provisions, the generals held another meeting..." (Xen. *Anab.* 3.5.14)[12].

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[10] *οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ Χειρίσοφον καταβάντες ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο ἐν κώμῃ μεστῇ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν. ἦσαν δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι κῶμαι πολλαὶ πλήρεις πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ πεδίῳ παρα τὸν Τίγρητα ποταμόν.*

[11] Or perhaps more correctly: "while some of the soldiers...", as I believe *οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι στρατιῶται* actually reads, 'army' would be more likely if *ὁ...στρατός* were used.

In this passage Xenophon uses terminology which is more familiar with regard to the procuring of *τὰ ἐπιτήδεια*, 'the necessaries of life', that is to say food and drink. Indeed, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.1.8-9) uses similar terminology when he narrates the passage of the Ten Thousand into the territory of the Karduchians, where they saw some of the local villages, and:

> "then it was that the Karduchians abandoned their houses and fled to the mountains with their wives and children. As for provisions, there was an abundance for the Greeks to take, and the houses were also supplied with bronze vessels in great numbers; the Greeks, however, did not carry off any of these, and did not pursue the people themselves, refraining from harshness on the chance that the Karduchians might perhaps be willing to let them pass through their country in friendship, seeing that they also were enemies of the King; but they did take whatever they chanced upon in the way of provisions, for that was necessary" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.1.8-9)[13].

In the passage cited above, Xenophon (*loc. cit.*), in the choice of the language he uses is careful to draw a distinction between how the Ten Thousand took what was necessary, that is to say food and drink, while not harming either the local population or their other possessions. Xenophon also points out how the Ten Thousand refrained from taking the bronze vessels they found in the homes of the Karduchians. Had the Ten Thousand taken them, they would have constituted 'booty' or 'plunder', rather than the procuring of provisions, and an act that would have been perceived as hostile. Therefore, they decided not to take the bronze vessels and the Karduchians' other possessions in the hope that such an act would persuade the Karduchians to allow them to cross their territory unmolested. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.3.2) tells us that it took seven days of continual

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[12] *ἐνταῦθα οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι στρατιῶται ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἦσαν· οἱ δὲ στρατηγοὶ πάλιν συνῆλθον...*

[13] *ἔνθα δὴ οἱ μὲν Καρδοῦχοι ἐκλιπόντες τὰς οἰκίας ἔχοντες καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ παῖδας ἔφευγον ἐπὶ τὰ ὄρη. τὰ δὲ ἐπιτήδεια πολλὰ ἦν λαμβάνειν, ἦσαν δὲ καὶ χαλκώμασι παμπόλλοις κατεσκευασμέναι αἱ οἰκίαι, ὧν οὐδὲν ἔφερον οἱ Ἕλληνες, οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐδίωκον, ὑποφειδόμενοι, εἴ πως ἐθελήσειαν οἱ Καρδοῦχοι διιέναι αὐτοὺς ὡς διὰ φιλίας τῆς χώρας, ἐπείπερ βασιλεῖ πολέμιοι ἦσαν· τὰ μέντοι ἐπιτήδεια ὅτῳ τις ἐπιτυγχάνοι ἐλάμβανεν· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν.*

fighting for the Ten Thousand to cross the territory of the Karduchians, during which we twice hear of the Ten Thousand taking up quarters in the well-stocked houses of the Karduchians, once in fine houses with such abundant stocks of wine that it was stored in cisterns (Xen. *Anab.* 4.2.22), and once more when the Greeks, with a considerable degree of relief, were almost at the Armenian border (Xen. *Anab.* 4.3.2).

Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.1) tells us that once the Ten Thousand had crossed the river into Western Armenia they formed up in battle order and marched: "over entirely level country and gently sloping hills, not less than five *parasangs*; for there were no villages near the river because of the wars between the Armenians and Karduchians". From what Xenophon has to say immediately after this it is clear that villages were precisely what they were looking for, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.2) continues by stating that:

> "The village which they finally reached was a large one and had a palace for the satrap, while most of the houses were surmounted with turrets; and provisions were plentiful" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.4.2)[14].

Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.4) goes on to inform us that as the Ten Thousand advanced into the region they were met by Tiribazus, the *ὕπαρχος* to the satrap of the region, who was escorted by a body of cavalry. Xenophon (Anab. 4.4.6) states that Tiribazus concluded a treaty with the Greeks in which he promised not to harm them if in return they did not burn any of the houses from which, Tiribazus added, they were free to: "take all the provisions they needed"[15]. Given the gruelling circumstances, and the hard-fought nature of their march through Karduchian territory, it is hardly surprising that the Greeks agreed to such terms (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.6); after all they were to be allowed to help themselves to necessary provisions in comparative safety provided they did not indulge in wanton destruction. Although Tiribazus' conclusion of a treaty with the Ten

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[14] *εἰς δὲ ἦν ἀφίκοντο κώμην μεγάλη τε ἦν καὶ βασίλειον εἶχε τῷ σατράπῃ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς πλείσταις οἰκίαις τύρσεις ἐπῆσαν· ἐπιτήδεια δ' ἦν δαψιλῆ.*

[15] *λαμβάνειν τε τἀπιτήδεια ὅσων δέοιντο.*

Thousand may appear to be an act of blatant collaboration with men who were enemies of the Great King, Tiribazus' main concern was probably to get the Ten Thousand, shadowed but nevertheless left unmolested, to take what provisions they needed and that once they had done so the Ten Thousand would then move on and out of his superior's province with the minimum amount of damage and hardship having to be endured by the region. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.7) tells us that another: "three stages, fifteen parasangs, through level country"[16] brought the Ten Thousand to a palace surrounded by: "many villages...full of provisions". Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.8) describes how a heavy snowfall that night led the Greek commanders to decide upon quartering the various *taxeis* of troops, along with their respective commanders in the villages in the vicinity, on the grounds that there was no sign of an enemy and with the amount of snow there must have seemed little likelihood of any enemy approaching them. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.9) recounts with fond memory how in these villages:

> "they had all possible good things in the way of supplies - animals for sacrifice, grain, old wines with a fine bouquet, dried grapes, and beans of all sorts" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.4.9)[17].

Following reports of fires seen in the night, the generals took the decision to reassemble the troops in one body in case of attack, but a night spent in the open and further heavy snowfall resulted in another change of decision and the troops were allowed to return to the houses in the villages they had left (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.10-14). Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.14) tells us that the majority of troops were delighted to return: "to their houses and provisions", though some who had burnt their quarters just before they had left had to return to the same. Receiving word that Tiribazus was gathering an army with which to block off a mountain pass through which the only road ran and there attack the Greeks, the commanders of the Ten Thousand decided to proceed again with their march with all speed, which they did despite atrocious weather conditions (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.17-4.5.22).

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[16] *σταθμοὺς τρεῖς διὰ πεδίου παρασάγγας πεντακαίδεκα.*

[17] *εἶχον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ὅσα ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, ἱερεῖα, σῖτον, οἴνους παλαιοὺς εὐώδεις, ἀσταφίδας, ὄσπρια παντοδαπά.*

Eventually, Cheirisophos, at the head of the column, managed to reach a village with the vanguard of the army and they quartered themselves there, though Xenophon tells us most of the army spent another night out in the open, and in the snow, without food or fire and that as a result: "some of the soldiers perished" (Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.11). When the rest of the army reached Cheirisophos and his troops it was decided that, probably due to the dreadful weather conditions, it was safe enough to disperse the troops and quarter them in the neighbouring villages (Xen. *Anab.* 4.5.22). Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.22f) relates that during the time spent in these villages there was no lack of good food and drink, the diversity and manner of which Xenophon describes in some detail, and they remained quartered in the villages for seven days before continuing their march (Xen. *Anab.* 4.6.1). There can be little doubt that the appalling weather conditions, along with the ample and readily available supply of food and drink in the villages, were the two main reasons for the Ten Thousand's week long stay in these villages.

Despite their week long sojourn in these well stocked Armenian villages, once their march resumed and they were on the third *stathmos*, or stage of it, the Ten Thousand were once again looking for other villages. Xenophon (*Ana*b. 4.6.2) tells us that they had taken a village chief with them to act as their guide through the snow. What happened next, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.6.3) maintains, resulted in the: "only cause of difference between Cheirisophos and Xenophon during the course of the march". This was that Cheirisophos grew angry with the guide for not leading them to villages, while the guide claimed there were none in the area, Cheirisophos struck the man, who in turn slipped away during the night and left them without a guide. Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) does not tell us if Cheirisophos wanted to find other villages in order to billet the men in them so that they would be out of the snow or if they were in need of further provisions, concentrating instead on expressing how Cheirisophos, in Xenophon's view, had been heavy-handed in his ill treatment of the guide and in not having guarded him well enough to prevent his desertion.

However, it is tempting to suggest that the decision to continue their march despite the amount of snow on the ground may have been prompted by the stocks of provisions in the Armenian villages running low. Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.29) states of the village in which his contingent had been billeted that they: "went to bed amid an abundance of everything". Similarly, during their stay in the Armenian villages, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.30-31) tells us that whenever he, in company of the chief of the village he was billeted in, visited the troops quartered in any of the other villages, that:

> "everywhere he found them faring sumptuously and in fine spirits; there was no place from which the men would let them go until they had served them a luncheon, and no place where they did not serve on the same table lamb, kid, pork, veal, and poultry, together with many loaves of bread, some of wheat and some of barley" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.5.30-31)[18].

In addition, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.33) tells us that when he and the village chief reached Cheirisophos they found: "his troops also feasting in their quarters". The eating habits of the Greeks when lodged in the Armenian villages, therefore, appear to have bordered on gluttony. Such overindulgence by soldiers in a time of plenty need not be as remarkable nor as unusual as it may first appear. Plato (*Symposion*, 219E-220A) has Alkibiades relate how, when he and his friend Sokrates were on active service together and whenever they were compelled to go without food Sokrates showed incredible levels of endurance during such times of hardship. Plato (*ibid.*) then has Alkibiades add, however, whenever they found themselves in a position where supplies were in abundance, no one enjoyed them more than his friend Sokrates. This story of Sokrates' eating habits contrasts sharply with Xenophon's (*Mem.* 1.3.5) claim that Sokrates ate just sufficient food so that his desire for *sitos* was his *opson*. Davidson (1995:205) states that: "Greek victuals were regularly divided into three parts: *sitos* (the

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[18] *πανταχοῦ εὐωχουμένους καὶ εὐθυμουμένους, καὶ οὐδαμόθεν ἀφίεσαν πρὶν παραθεῖναι αὐτοῖς ἄριστον· οὐκ ἦν δ' ὅπου οὐ παρετίθεσαν ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τράπεζαν κρέα ἄρνεια, ἐρίφεια, χοίρεια, μόσχεια, ὀρνίθεια, σὺν πολλοῖς ἄρτοις τοῖς μὲν πυρίνοις τοῖς δὲ κριθίνοις.*

staple, usually bread), *opson* (whatever one eats with the staple) and *poton* (drink). For example, of the food served at the banquet described by Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.31) the loaves of wheat and barley bread would have been the *sitos*, while the sumptuous array of meats would have been the *opson*. It is also worth noting that Xenophon (*ibid.*) makes a point of saying how this incredible variety of meat dishes were all served on the *same* table, which would suggest that under normal circumstances Greeks would expect perhaps only one meat dish, or maybe two at most, to have been served. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suppose that after the hardships that the Greek mercenaries had been through, to find such an abundance of provisions perhaps led to the men gorging themselves, and they may, or may not, have made serious inroads into the available stored supply of provisions that the Armenians had and, although it can at best perhaps only be suggested tentatively, they may have been compelled to continue with their march, despite the inclement weather, due to the necessity of finding further supplies of provisions.

That said, however, the Ten Thousand appear to have taken some provisions with them when they left the Armenian villages, as we hear a short while later that Cheirisophos and Kleanor both agreed that they should make an attempt to dislodge an enemy from a pass immediately after the troops had had their 'breakfast' on that particular day (Xen. *Anab.* 4.6.8-9). Furthermore, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.6.17) tells us that he himself volunteered to lead the party to outflank the enemy in the pass, and goes on to state (Xen. *Anab.* 4.6.22) that: "after they had had dinner and night had come on"[19], Xenophon's party set off and reached the higher ground overlooking the enemy position. Clearly, the Ten Thousand still had provisions with them and as Xenophon, who has been so meticulous in his recording of where the troops had obtained provisions from, has not raised the issue again in his narrative since they had left the 'well-stocked' Armenian villages, that would suggest, unless Xenophon has forgotten to mention their

[19] ἐδείπνησαν καὶ νὺξ ἐγένετο.

obtaining further supplies, that the provisions the men were eating at this point had been brought from the Armenian villages.

Once the Greeks had successfully forced the pass against their Chalybian, Taochian, and Phasian enemies, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.6.27) tells us that the Ten Thousand: "descended into the plain on the farther side, and reached villages full of many good things". However, immediately after this Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.1) states that following a march of five *stathmoi*, thirty *parasangs*, through the land of the Taochians, they once again found that:

> "their provisions were running low, for the Taochians dwelt in strongholds, and in these strongholds they kept all their provisions stored away" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.7.1)[20].

It is interesting to note that Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.1) uses the expression *χωρία ἰσχυρὰ*, 'strongholds' in connection with the 'dwellings' of the Taochians. During his narrative of the Ten Thousand's march through Armenia, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.1f) refers to the 'villages', *κώμαι*; settlements without defensive walls. In contrast the strongholds of the Taochians, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.2) tells us: "contained no town nor houses, but only a place where men and women and a great number of cattle were gathered". It seems therefore, that they were little more than walled enclosures or perhaps an area surrounded with a palisade that could be defended against an aggressor. Certainly, in Xenophon's account of the Ten Thousand coming up against one of these strongholds the defenders held their own against attacks from the first two *taxeis* of Cheirisophos' vanguard (Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.2). Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.3) states that when he himself arrived at the scene that Cheirisophos said to him: "You have come in the nick of time, for the place must be captured; for the army has no provisions unless we capture this place". Here we see a change in circumstances for the Ten Thousand: whereas earlier they had descended upon unwalled, and largely unprotected, villages and had helped themselves to provisions, in attacking one of these

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[20] *τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπέλειπε· χωρία γὰρ ᾤκουν ἰσχυρὰ οἱ Τάοχοι, ἐν οἷς καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἅπαντα εἶχον ἀνακεκομισμένοι.*

strongholds their circumstances must have deteriorated to the point where they had to run the risk of attacking a fortified position in order to obtain crucial and necessary supplies. After a particularly hard struggle the Greeks eventually took the stronghold, though many of its defenders leapt to their deaths to avoid capture (Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.13). Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.14) tells us that although they did not take many human captives they managed to secure: "cattle and asses in large numbers and sheep".

During the next stage of their journey, through the land of the Chalybians, of whom Xenophon speaks highly (Xen. *Anab.* 4.7.15-18), the Ten Thousand found out of the Chalybians that:

> "these people would stay within their towns, and when the Greeks had passed by, they would follow them, always ready to fight. Their dwellings were in strongholds, and therein they had stored away all their provisions; hence the Greeks could get nothing from this country, but they subsisted on the cattle they had taken from the Taochians" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.7.17)[21].

From this passage it is clear that whereas the former Cyreans had undertaken the assault on the stronghold of the Taochians through necessity, being desperate to obtain provisions, they clearly thought twice before deciding not to make any attempt to take the strongholds of the Chalybians. In the former case, that of the Taochians, they had felt compelled to make an assault due to their need for supplies, however, when faced with the prospect of attacking the Chalybians in their strongholds the Ten thousand could at least choose not to undertake an assault and instead subsist on the cattle they had taken following their previous assault and capture of the Taochian stronghold. Therefore, it comes as little surprise, when Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.18) tells us that, when the Ten Thousand marched the territory of the Skythinians (*Σκυθινῶν*) and arrived at some villages,

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[21] *οὗτοι ἐνέμενον ἐν τοῖς πολίσμασιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ παρέλθοιεν οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἵποντο ἀεὶ μαχούμενοι. ὥκ ουν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ὀχυροῖς, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐν τούτοις ἀνακεκομισμένοι ἦσαν· ὥστε μηδὲ λαμβάνειν αὐτόθεν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἀλλὰ διετράφησαν τοῖς κτήνεσιν ἃ ἐκ τῶν Ταόχων ἔλαβον.*

they remained there: "for three days and collected provisions". Certainly their stocks of provisions must have been running extremely low for them to have slaughtered baggage animals for food during their passage through the country of the Taochians, and here, in the land of the 'Skythinians' they appear to have had the opportunity to collect supplies of provisions without, it seems, having to fight the local population in order to possess them.

For a while, upon reaching Europe again, there was the possibility of the Ten Thousand being employed by the Spartans. The Spartan *nauarchos* in the area, Anaxibios, who had ferried the Ten Thousand from Asia to Byzantion, instructed the Ten Thousand thus:

> "Get your provisions from the Thracian villages; there is an abundance there of barley and wheat and other supplies; when you have got them, proceed to the Chersonesos, and there Kyniskos will take you into his pay" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.1.13)[22].

Xenophon does not give us any indication of whether the Ten Thousand were expected to pay for such provisions or whether they were simply allowed to help themselves from these Thracian villages. However, the latter of the two of these possibilities was the more likely, as shortly before this Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.1.7) has remarked how the soldiers had no money with which to purchase provisions on their journey homeward. Indeed, Xenophon (*Anab.*7.3.5) reiterates, in a speech to the assembled troops, how they do not have any money with which to purchase provisions, and adds that as they are not permitted to take anything without paying for it where they are, they ought:

> "to set forth to the villages from which we are permitted to take, since the inhabitants are weaker than ourselves, and there, possessed of provisions and hearing what the service is that one wants for us, we

[22] *Τὰ μὲν ἐπιτήδεια...λαμβάνετε ἐκ τῶν Θρᾳκίων κωμῶν· εἰσὶ δὲ αὐτόθι πολλαὶ κριθαὶ καὶ πυροὶ καὶ τἆλλα ἐπιτήδεια· λαβόντες δὲ πορεύεσθε εἰς Χερρόνησον, ἐκεῖ δὲ Κυνίσκος ὑμῖν μισθοδοτήσει.*

should choose whatever course may seem best for us" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.3.5)[23].

This passage is illuminating in that it provides evidence that the Ten Thousand were, indeed, allowed to simply help themselves to provisions from the local Thracian villages. Met by the Thracian Seuthes while en-route to procure provisions, Xenophon informed Seuthes of the intention of the army to procure provisions and decide whether to take employment with the Spartans or Seuthes, and Xenophon asked him where they might best obtain supplies, hinting that such an action would prove favourable to Seuthes' desire to hire them (Xen. *Anab.* 7.3.8). Seuthes, no doubt to gain favour with the Ten Thousand, offered to lead them to: "a large number of villages close together and containing all sorts of provisions". Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.3.10) tells us that they reached the villages in question that afternoon, at which point Seuthes told him that if the Ten Thousand took employment with him they would receive the customary pay, adding: "food and drink you will obtain, just as today, by taking it from the country".

Later, Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.7.1-2) tells us that the Ten Thousand took supplies from Thracian villages belonging to Medosades, a subordinate of Seuthes. Medosades complained to Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.7.3) about these actions, though Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.7.4f) defended the men's actions. Seuthes' subordinate Herakleides had allegedly withheld money earned from the sale of booty captured by the Ten Thousand (Xen. *Anab.* 7.6.41) from the Greek troops, and Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.7.8) also accused Medosades of failing to reward the help the Greeks for that had they given Seuthes in regaining his kingdom. Therefore, in this instance it would seem that the former Cyreans believed, or at least claimed, that they were merely obtaining supplies of provisions in lieu of any payments or rewards they would expect to receive but had not. From the Xenophon passages cited above there certainly appears to have been considerable bad feeling and bitterness between the Ten Thousand and their former Thracian employers, and as such

[23] ἐπανελθόντας εἰς τὰς κώμας ὅθεν οἱ ἵπποι ἐῶσι λαμβάνειν, ἐκεῖ ἔχοντας τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούντας ὅ τι τις ἡμῶν δεῖται, αἱρεῖσθαι ὅ τι ἂν ἡμῖν δοκῇ κράτιστον εἶναι.

they may well have felt perfectly justified in taking what they wanted in lieu of their expected rewards not being forthcoming.

At the beginning of this section it was pointed out how, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.1.17), the Spartan *nauarchos*, Teleutias, believed that taking supplies from the enemy was the most honourable method by which to acquire supplies and provisions. Indeed, as Anderson (1970:54-55) duly notes of this practice: "in wartime, to supply oneself fully from the enemy brought honour in the eyes of the world as well as provisions". Such a philosophy appears to have been adhered to by the Spartans, especially as Xenophon gives us a number of examples of just such practices by Spartan commanders within the body of his work *Hellenika.* In 405 BC, Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.1.18) tells us that during naval operations against the Athenians in the Hellespont, the Spartan commander Lysander attacked and captured the well stocked city of Lampsakos, an ally of Athens:

> "whereupon the soldiers plundered it. It was a wealthy city, full of wine and grain and all other kinds of supplies" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 2.1.19)[24].

Lampsakos was to provide Lysander's fleet with a much more suitable base than that of Aigospotamoi where the Athenians subsequently took up station. Being a city, well stocked with provisions and other supplies, it would have made the matter of provisioning Lysander's fleet much easier and more efficient than where the Athenians had taken up station, as the latter had to fetch their provisions from Sestos, which Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.1.25) informs us, was some fifteen *stadia* from the station of the Athenian ships at Aigospotamoi.

Although Xenophon does not specifically say so, it is feasible to suggest that Lysander actively chose to capture Lampsakos to use as a base due to the

[24] *καὶ διήρπασαν οἱ στρατιῶται οὖσαν πλουσίαν καὶ οἴνου καὶ σίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων πλήρη.*

availability of supplies within the city. In support of such a suggestion there is evidence of another Spartan commander, Derkylidas, who, it appears was motivated into attacking an enemy city due to the amount of provisions it contained. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.11) states that Derkylidas' attention turned to Atarneus when: "he [Derkylidas] learned that they had a large stock of grain in the city, he invested and besieged them; and in eight months he brought them to terms".

Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.1.15-16) [25] informs us that Agesilaos, during his campaign in Asia Minor went into winter quarters at Daskyleion, where the palace of the Persian satrap Pharnabazos was situated:

> "and round about it were many large villages, stored with provisions in abundance, and splendid wild animals, some of them in enclosed parks, others in open spaces. There was also a river, full of all kinds of fish, flowing by the palace. And besides, there was winged game in abundance for those who knew how to take it. There he spent the winter, procuring provisions for his army partly on the spot, and partly by means of foraging expeditions" (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.15-16)[26].

Here too, it is tempting to believe that Agesilaos' decision to go into winter quarters at Daskyleion was perhaps motivated by a knowledge that it would provide adequate supplies for his army during the winter months of 395-394 BC. Agesilaos' actions differ somewhat from those of Derkylidas who had campaigned in the region in 399 BC. Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.2.1) tells us that Derkylidas, due to concerns over Pharnabazos' superiority in cavalry, concluded a truce with the Persian and that with this:

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[25] Cf. Plutarch, *Agesilaos*, 11.1, who states that Agesilaos: "stationed his troops in the province governed by Pharnabazos: here the food was plentiful and he was able to secure great quantities of treasure".

[26] *καὶ κῶμαι περὶ αὐτὰ πολλαὶ καὶ μεγάλαι καὶ ἄφθονα ἔχουσαι τὰ ἐπιτή-δεια, καὶ θῆραι αἱ μὲν καὶ ἐν περιειργμένοις παραδείσοις, αἱ δὲ καὶ ἀναπεπταμένοις τόποις, πάγκαλαι. παρέρρει δὲ καὶ ποταμὸς παντοδπῶν ἰχθύων πλήρης. ἦν δὲ καὶ τὰ πτηνὰ ἄφθονα τοῖς ὀρνιθεῦσαι δυναμένοις. ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ διεχείμαζε, καὶ αὐτόθεν καὶ σὺν προνομαῖς τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ λαμβάνων.*

> "Derkylidas went to Bithynian Thrace and there passed the winter, by no means to the displeasure of Pharnabazus, for the Bithynians were often at war with him. And during most of the time Derkylidas was plundering Bithynia in safety and had provisions in abundance" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 3.2.2)[27].

The truce that Derkylidas had concluded with Pharnabazos was to their mutual advantage. The Greek cities were safe from potential attack by Pharnabazos, whereas Pharnabazos' territory of Phrygia was spared the attentions of Derkylidas' troops who were content, it seems, to plunder the Bithynian Thracians. Agesilaos (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.15f), however, concluded no truce with Pharnabazos, and what followed (Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.17-19), which we will return to later, although it was by no means Agesilaos' fault clearly illustrates what Tuplin (1993:58) describes as: "the undisciplined and over-confident behaviour of his troops...[and]...casts something of a shadow over his generalship".

Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.3.21) states that following the battle of Koroneia, Agesilaos went to offer sacrifice at Delphi, and Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.3.22) continues by saying that the Spartan *polemarch* Gylis led the army that Agesilaos had brought back with him from Asia on an invasion of Eastern Lokris. The army contained among its number the remnants of the Ten Thousand[28], and while in Eastern Lokris, the army carried out similar plundering and foraging raids on villages in the area, much as the former Cyreans had done during the return leg of their march from Kounaxa. Pritchett (1971:40) somewhat erroneously attributes this Spartan carrying off of provisions in Lokris to Agesilaos himself, though Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.3.22) clearly states that it was the Spartan *polemarch* Gylis who was in command, albeit temporarily, at this particular point.

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[27] *ἐλθὼν ὁ Δερκυλίδας εἰς τὴν Βιθυνίδα Θρᾴκην ἐκεῖ διεχείμαζεν, οὐδὲ τοῦ Φαρναβάζου πάνυ τι ἀχθομένου· πολλάκις γὰρ οἱ Βιθυνοὶ αὐτῷ ἐπολέμουν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ὁ Δερκυλίδας ἀσφαλῶς φέρων καὶ ἄγων τὴν Βιθυνίδα καὶ ἄφθονα ἔχων τὰ ἐπιτήδεια διετέλει.*

[28] For the recruitment of the former Cyreans by the Spartan Thibron see: Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.6; Derkylidas replaces Thibron as army commander: Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.8; Agesilaos arrives in Ephesos with *his* army: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.5; Derkylidas serving under Agesilaos in Asia: Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.6, which suggests the forces of Agesilaos and Derkylidas, including the remnants of the former Cyreans, were merged.

In 390 BC, during the Corinthian War, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.1) tells us, Agesilaos received intelligence that many of the Corinthians had taken refuge, along with all their cattle, in Peiraion. Xenophon (*ibid.*) makes it clear that this fact, coupled with the knowledge that: "many were being maintained from this supply" prompted Agesilaos to lead an invasion into Corinthian territory. On the fourth day of his invasion, Agesilaos marched on Peiraion and then made a feint as if to march on the city of Corinth itself, and once he had duped the Corinthians and their Athenian allies into believing this to be the case, he promptly turned his army around and marched back toward Peiraion (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.3). Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.5) goes on to state that when the Corinthians realised that Agesilaos had occupied the heights overlooking Peiraion and had captured the fortress of Oinoe, the stronghold protecting Peiraion, they fled, complete with: "the greater part of their cattle", to the Heraion sanctuary at the extreme western end of the peninsula. With the capture of Peiraion, Xenophon (Hell. 4.5.5) informs us: "all the soldiers on that day possessed themselves of provisions in abundance from the farms", while the Corinthians taking refuge in the Heraion gave themselves up, along with, Xenophon (*ibid.*) adds: "their property", and threw themselves on Agesilaos' mercy. In another of his works, the *Agesilaos*, Xenophon (*Agesilaos* 2.18-19) gives another, though less detailed, account of this same expedition. In the version in his *Agesilaos*, Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) once again mentions the Corinthians' cattle being kept in Peiraion for safe keeping, and also remarks how Peiraion, now undefended following his stratagem, fell into Agesilaos' hands along with everything inside it.

According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.5.14), in 362 BC, Epameinondas not wishing to face a combined force of Lakedaimonians and Arkadians, marched back: "as rapidly as he could" from Lakonia to Tegea. The Theban general allowed his hoplites to rest there:

> "but sent his horsemen on to Mantineia, begging them to endure the additional effort and explaining to them that probably all the cattle of

> the Mantineians were outside the city and likewise all the people, particularly as it was harvest time" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.5.14)[29].

Certainly, Epameinondas made the deliberate decision to ask his cavalry to make an extraordinary effort to ride to Mantineia in the hope that their arrival might have the element of surprise, and that their sudden appearance might catch the Mantineians off guard, and result in the Theban and Thessalian cavalry catching both the Mantineian citizens and their livestock out in the open countryside. Epameinondas' vision proved correct and, Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.5.15) goes on to inform us, the Mantineians were, indeed, fearful for the safety of those citizens and livestock of theirs that were outside the city walls when the Theban and Thessalian cavalry appeared riding towards the city.

Diodoros (17.29.2) maintains that Memnon, the Greek mercenary general employed by the Persian king Darius, pursued a campaign of capturing the cities on the Greek islands of Chios and Lesbos. Diodoros (*ibid.*) states that on Lesbos Memnon easily took Antissa, Methymna, Pyrrha and Eressos, and says of Mitylenê that it was:

> "large and possessed of rich stores of supplies as well as plenty of fighting men, he [Memnon] nevertheless captured it with difficulty by assault after a siege of many days and with the loss of many of his soldiers" (Diodoros, 17.29.2)[30].

Although the supplies within Mitylenê, would doubtless have been of use to Memnon in his campaigns, they do not appear to have been his motivation for taking the city by assault. Memnon had systematically captured the other cities on the island of Lesbos, proceeding, if Diodoros lists them in the actual order they fell to Memnon, in an anticlockwise circuit of the island. Furthermore, if the

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[29] *τοὺς δ' ἱππέας ἔπεμψεν εἰς τὴν Μαντίνειαν, δεηθεὶς αὐτῶν προσκαρτερῆσαι, καὶ διδάσκων ὡς πάντα μὲν εἰκὸς ἔξω εἶναι τὰ τῶν Μαντινέων βοσκήματα, πάντας δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἄλλως τε καὶ σίτου συγκομιδῆς οὔσης.*

[30] *μεγάλην οὖσαν καὶ παρασκευαῖς μεγάλαις καὶ πλήθει τῶν ἀμυνομένων ἀνδρῶν κεχορηγημένην πολλὰς ἡμέρας πολιορκήσας καὶ πολλοὺς τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἀποβαλὼν μόγις εἷλε κατὰ κράτος.*

acquisition of supplies had been Memnon's primary concern we might have expected him to have attacked Mitylenê first when he arrived on the island.

Although it is not strictly foraging in the true sense of the term, and was perhaps more due to good fortune, tactical skill, or even sheer opportunism, the capturing of supplies intended for the military forces of the enemy would carry the added bonus of helping to feed one's own side while at the same time helping to deprive an enemy of valuable sustenance. For example, Herodotos (9.39.1) tells us that eight days into the manoeuvring of the two armies during the Plataiai campaign of 480 BC, Mardonios sent his cavalry out after nightfall bound for the pass over Kithairon known to the Athenians as 'the Oak's Heads' and to the Boiotians as 'Three Heads'. Herodotos (9.39.2) continues by relating how this:

> "dispatch of horsemen was no fruitless one; for they caught five hundred beasts of burden [*ὑποζύγιά...πεντακόσια*] issuing into the low country, bringing provision from the Peloponnesos for the army, and men that came with the waggons; having taken which quarry the Persians slew without mercy, sparing neither man nor beast. When they had their fill of slaughter, they set what remained in their midst and drove them to Mardonios and his camp" (Herodotos, 9.39.2)[31].

The Persian interception and plunder of the Greek convoy may illustrate one of two things. That is to say, either the Persians understood the detrimental effect their action would cause on Greek morale, not to mention the loss of valuable supplies of food. Alternatively, the supply convoy may have been attacked as it was a 'soft' target. My own view is that Mardonios' cavalry had been sent out with the specific instructions to attack just such targets, not because they provided 'easy pickings', but rather that Mardonios understood very well that such an attack would have a detrimental effect on the main army of the Greeks

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[31] *πεμφθέντες δὲ οἱ ἱππόται οὐ μάτην ἀπίκοντο· ἐσβάλλοντα γὰρ ἐς τὸ πεδίον λαμβάνουσι ὑποζύγιά τε πεντακόσια, σιτία ἄγοντα ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον, καὶ ἀνθρώπους οἳ εἵποντο τοῖσι ζεύγεσι. ἑλόντες δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἄγρην οἱ Πέρσαι ἀφειδέως ἐφόνευον, οὐ φειδόμενοι οὔτε ὑποζυγίου οὐδενὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπου. ὡς δὲ ἄδην εἶχον κτείνοντες, τὰ λοιπὰ αὐτῶν ἤλαυνον περιβαλόμενοι παρά τε Μαρδόνιον καὶ ἐς τὸ στρατόπεδον.*

for a number of reasons. Firstly, it would serve to undermine Greek morale. Secondly, by cutting off their line of supply, he could try to goad them into battle. Thirdly, while the Greeks continued to decline to fight him such tactics could result, if any other convoys could be intercepted, in also affecting the physical ability of the Greeks to fight.

The occurrence of Persians attacking wagons laden with supplies intended for Greek troops was to be repeated in albeit somewhat different circumstances in a later campaign. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.10.18) informs us that following the battle of Kounaxa, when the Greeks returned to their camp they found that Artaxerxes' troops had completely pillaged it: "in particular whatever there was to eat and drink". In addition, Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us that four hundred wagons loaded with wheat flour and wine (*ἀλεύρων καὶ οἴνου*) belonging to Cyrus and allegedly intended for distribution among the Greeks should the need have arisen, had also been plundered by Artaxerxes' troops. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.10.19) goes on to lament, in language that is both moving and sorrowful, how, that night: "most of the Greeks had no dinner; and they had had no breakfast either".

Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.2.22-23) records an incident that occurred in 366 BC during the struggle between the Phleiasians, along with Chares the Athenian, on the one side and the Pellêneans and Sikyonians on the other. Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) tells us that during an advance upon the fortress at Thyamia, the Phleiasians were in front with Chares and his troops following not far behind. Shortly before sunset the Phleiasian troops began to run forward, as did Chares' men:

> "they found the enemy at the fortress, some bathing, some cooking, some kneading, and some making their beds. Now so soon as the enemy saw the vehemence of the onset they straightway fled in terror, leaving all their provisions behind for these brave men. The latter accordingly made their dinner off these provisions and more which came from home, and after pouring libations in honour of their good

> fortune, singing a paian, and posting guards, they went to sleep" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.2.22-23)[32].

With the provisions they had captured from the Pellênêans and Sikyonians, along with the food they brought from home, there can be little doubt that the Phleiasians and their Athenian allies dined extremely well on that particular night. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.2.23) goes on to relate how, once news of this achievement reached Corinth, the Corinthians were so impressed that they: "ordered all their teams and pack-animals, loaded them with corn, and conveyed them to Phleious". These convoys were to continue for as long as the Phleiasians were completing the construction of the fortress they had captured.

The practice of foraging for provisions and other supplies was not without its potential pitfalls and hazards. Perhaps the biggest, and certainly the most dangerous, potential problem that could face foraging parties is the possibility that they might run into enemy patrols. For example, in Sicily in 480 BC, Diodoros (11.21.1) tells us that the Greek city of Himera, on the north of the island, was besieged by a large Carthaginian army. Diodoros (11.21.2) goes on to inform us that the Syracusan leader Gelôn immediately marched to its aid and reaching the area, pitched his camp which he, allegedly, surrounded with a ditch and stockade and then:

> "dispatched his entire body of cavalry against such forces of the enemy as were ranging over the countryside in search of booty. And the cavalry, unexpectedly appearing to men who were scattered without military order over the countryside, took prisoner as many as each man could drive before him" (Diodoros, 11.21.2)[33].

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[32] *κατελάμβανον δὲ τοὺς ἐν τῷ τείχει πολεμίους τοὺς μὲν λουομένους, τοὺς δ' ὀψοποιουμένους, τοὺς δὲ φυρῶντας, τοὺς δὲ στιβάδας ποιουμένους. ὡς δ' εἶδον τὴν σφοδρότητα τῆς ἐφόδου, εὐθὺς ἐκπλαγέντες ἔφυγον, καταλιπόντες τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσι πάντα τἀπιτήδεια. κἀκεῖνοι μὲν ταῦτα δειπνήσαντες καὶ οἴκοθεν ἄλλα ἐλθόντα, ὡς ἐπ' εὐτυχίᾳ σπείσαντες καὶ παιανίσαντες καὶ φυλακὰς καταστησάμενοι, κατέδαρθον.*

[33] *τοὺς δ' ἱππεῖς ἅπαντας ἐξαπέστειλεν ἐπὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν χώραν πλανωμένους τῶν πολεμίων καὶ περὶ τὰς ὠφελείας διατρίβοντας. οὗτοι δὲ παραδόξως ἐπιφανέντες διεσπαρμένοις ἀτάκτως κατὰ τὴν χώραν, τοσούτους ἀνῆγον αἰχμαλώτους ὅσους ἕκαστος ἄγειν ἠδύνατο.*

Cavalry in particular could play an extremely important role against troops dispersed in foraging activities and could prove to be very dangerous. Indeed, as Anderson (1970:57-58) states: "the vulnerability of small foraging parties to cavalry attack made them a precarious source of supply". When faced with a cavalry force, an army that relied on foraging for its supplies might find, as Spence (1993:128) states: "constant attacks on their foragers could therefore cause considerable hardship and reduce the military effectiveness of the force. Foragers were especially vulnerable to cavalry attack because they operated as individuals or in small groups and were often encumbered by tools or booty". Indeed, Xenophon (*Hipparchikos*, 7.9) was well aware of the vulnerability of enemy foragers or stragglers dispersed from the main body, in that he advises the would-be cavalry commander to be alert to careless enemy blunders, remarking of potential enemy troops that:

> "either they scatter deliberately in search of provisions, or they are so careless of order of march that they lag too far behind. So he [the *hipparchos*] must not let such blunders go unpunished, or the whole country will be occupied" (Xenophon, *Hipparchikos*, 7.9-10)[34].

Thucydides (7.4.6) informs us that the sailors of the Athenian expeditionary force at Syracuse suffered heavily at the hands of enemy cavalry due to sailors having to leave their camp in order to forage for water and firewood as the site of the Athenian camp at Plemmyrion had supplies of neither. Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains that the Syracusans had stationed a third of their cavalry at the nearby Olympieion specifically to prevent the Athenians at Plemmyrion either foraging or laying waste the countryside. Thucydides (7.11.4) narrates how this situation was reported in a letter that Nikias sent to the Athenian *ekklesia* in which he stated:

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[34] ἢ γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐπιμελείᾳ σκεδάννυνται ἢ πορευομένων ἀταξίᾳ οἱ μὲν προέρχονται, οἱ δ' ὑπολείπονται πλέον τοῦ καιροῦ. τὰ οὖν τοιαῦτα ἁμαρτήματα οὐ χρὴ παριέναι ἀκόλαστα· εἰ δὲ μή, ὅλη ἡ χώρα στρατόπεδον ἔσται.

> "it has turned out that we, who are supposed to be besieging others, are rather ourselves under siege, at least by land; for we cannot even go far into the country because of their cavalry" (Thuc. 7.11.4)[35].

The Syracusan cavalry were to cause further problems for the Athenian force in Sicily. During their retreat, Thucydides (7.78.7) states that the Athenians were short of provisions and had hoped to forage for supplies in the countryside they passed through. Unfortunately for the Athenians, the activities of the Syracusan cavalry meant that the Athenians returned to the same camp as that which they had started out from that morning. However:

> "they no longer had provisions as before, for by reason of the enemy's cavalry it was no longer possible to leave the main body" (Thucydides, 7.78.7)[36].

Short of provisions and unable to forage for supplies due to the unwanted attentions of enemy cavalry, the Athenian force was eventually worn down through casualties suffered, but mainly through lack of food and water and was finally forced to capitulate at the Assinaros river (Thuc. 7.85.1).

Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.4.21), in narrating Agesilaos' military operations in the neighbourhood of Sardis, states of Agesilaos' march that:

> "for three days he proceeded through a country bare of enemies, and had provisions for the army in abundance, but on the fourth day the cavalry of the enemy came up" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 3.4.21)[37].

Xenophon, (*Hell.* 3.4.22) goes on to state that the Persian cavalry: "getting sight of the camp-followers [ἀκολούθους] on the side of the Greeks, scattered for

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[35] *ξυμβέβηκέ τε πολιορκεῖν δοκοῦντας ἡμᾶς ἄλλους αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον, ὅσα γε κατὰ γῆν, τοῦτο πάσχειν· οὐδὲ τῆς γὰρ χώρας ἐπὶ πολὺ διὰ τοὺς ἱππέας ἐξερχόμεθα.*

[36] *καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ὁμοίως εἶχον· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀποχωρεῖν οἷόν τ' ἦν ὑπὸ τῶν ἱππέων.*

[37] *καὶ τρεῖς μὲν ἡμέρας δι' ἐρημίας πολεμίων πορευόμενος πολλὰ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια τῇ στρατιᾷ εἶχε, τῇ δὲ τετάρτῃ ἧκον οἱ τῶν πολεμίων ἱππεῖς.*

plunder, killed a large number of them". The situation, Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us, was only saved by Agesilaos ordering his own cavalry forward to face off the Persians, and additionally in ordering forward both his hoplites and his peltasts in support of his cavalry (Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.23)[38]. However, this whole episode begs the question why Agesilaos did not have his cavalry force operating in front of the foragers, acting as both a screen for his dispersed *akolouthoi* (camp-followers) and as scouts on the lookout for enemy forces? It would appear from Xenophon's account of this episode that Agesilaos was guilty of proceeding without due caution in what was, after all, enemy territory. It is also even more puzzling when we consider that, in another of his works, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 12.2) maintains that whenever the Spartan army were encamped the enemy was: "watched by the cavalry from positions that command the widest outlook". Although the army under Agesilaos was not actually encamped, nor was it the Lakedaimonian army, it does seem odd that Agesilaos did not post those cavalry he had with him in front of his foragers. One would imagine that it would have been mere common sense for a cavalry screen to have been sent out to keep watch on any potential enemy movements while the *akolouthoi*, camp-followers, were dispersed for the purposes of foraging for supplies. In addition, Xenophon's (*Hell.* 3.4.23) statement that the Persian infantry had not yet come up, gives credence to the idea that the Persian cavalry were operating as an advance guard to the main body of the Persian forces. Agesilaos' failure to do likewise was, it seems, saved only by the timely intervention of his infantry forces in support of the cavalry force he sent forward to engage their unsupported Persian opponents.

Agesilaos was to prove careless on another occasion during his campaigns in Asia Minor. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.1.15-17) informs us that while Agesilaos was in winter quarters at Daskyleion he procured supplies of provisions on the spot and by foraging expeditions. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.1.17-19) continues by stating that:

> "on one occasion, while the soldiers (στρατιωτῶν) were getting their provisions in disdainful and careless fashion, because they had not

[38] This episode is also recorded in Xenophon's *Agesilaos* (1.29-31).

> previously met with any mishap, Pharnabazos came upon them, scattered as they were over the plain, with two scythe-bearing chariots and about four hundred horsemen. Now when the Greeks saw him advancing upon them, they ran together to the number of about seven hundred; Pharnabazos, however, did not delay, but putting his chariots in front, and posting himself and the horsemen behind them, he gave orders to charge upon the Greeks. And when the chariots dashed into the close-gathered crowd and scattered it, the horsemen speedily struck down about a hundred men, while the rest fled for refuge to Agesilaos; for he chanced to be near at hand with the hoplites" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 4.1.17-19)[39].

On this occasion it was not the army's *akolouthoi*, the camp-followers or attendants, that were dispersed for the purpose of foraging for provisions, but rather the soldiers, *stratiôtai*, themselves. Once again it is a complete mystery why Agesilaos' cavalry do not appear to have been posted so as to guard against the sudden appearance of enemy forces. Xenophon's use of such terms as 'disdainful' (*καταφρονητικῶς*) and 'careless' (*ἀφυλάκως*) to describe the manner in which Agesilaos' troops were going about the task of foraging for their provisions is particularly telling, implying that because they had not met with any mishap in the time they had been in the vicinity of Daskyleion they had become extremely overconfident and had allowed themselves to be caught off-guard. There can be little excuse for such carelessness, for after all the *akolouthoi* of this very same army had been subjected to a sudden attack by Persian cavalry earlier in the campaign, while the former were dispersed in foraging activities, and the Greeks should have been more wary of the potential for such a possibility to arise again and taken suitable precautions to prevent it.

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[39] *καταφρονητικῶς δὲ ποτε καὶ ἀφυλάκτως διὰ τὸ μηδὲν πρότερον ἐσφάλθαι λαμβανόντων τῶν στρατιωτῶν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ἐπέτυχεν αὐτοῖς ὁ Φαρνάβαζος κατὰ τὸ πεδίον ἐσπαρμένοις, ἅρματα μὲν ἔχων δύο δρεπαντηφόρα, ἱππέας δὲ ὡς τετρακοσίους. οἱ δ' Ἕλληνες ὡς εἶδον αὐτὸν προσελαύνοντα, συνέδραμον ὡς εἰς ἑπτακοσίους· ὁ δ' οὐκ ἐμέλλησεν, ἀλλὰ προστησάμενος τὰ ἅρματα, αὐτὸς δὲ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐκέλευσεν. ὡς δὲ τὰ ἅρματα ἐμβαλόντα διεσκέδασε τὸ ἀθρόον, ταχὺ οἱ ἱππεῖς κατέβαλον ὡς εἰς ἑκατὸν ἀνθρώπους, οἱ δ' ἄλλοι κατέφυγον πρὸς Ἀγησίλαον· ἐγγὺς γὰρ ἔτυχε σὺν τοῖς ὁπλίταις ὤν.*

It has already been noted that, in 362 BC, Epameinondas sent his cavalry force ahead of his main army into Mantineian territory in the hope of catching the citizens of the city and their livestock out in the open, especially as it was harvest time (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.14). However, there is every likelihood that the Theban and Thessalian cavalry did not expect to meet with any opposition, so it must have come as an unforeseen surprise to them to be met by an enemy force of Athenian cavalry, who, despite only having arrived at Mantineia that morning, rode out to confront them (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.15). It is possible that Epameinondas had hoped that his cavalry force would round up any citizens or livestock caught outside the city of Mantineia, much in the way that the Persian cavalry during the Plataiai campaign had driven all that they had not slaughtered of the Greek supply train that had come from the Peloponnesos to their own lines (Herodotos, 9.39.2). Indeed, it was not only the mere appearance of the Athenian cavalry but also their brave conduct in the fighting that followed that did indeed prove: "the means of saving for the Mantineians everything that was outside the wall" (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.17)[40].

The presence of cavalry forces in considerable numbers could prove extremely effective in deterring enemy forces from straying from the relative safety of the main body of an army in order to forage for supplies. This efficient use of cavalry is seen in particular in the Thessalian defence of their territory on at least two occasions. In 457-456 BC the Athenians, along with some Boiotian and Phokian allies, invaded Thessaly with the intention of restoring Orestes to power in Pharsalos. As has been previously mentioned (on page 96), Thucydides (1.111.1) remarks rather dryly of the campaign that the Athenians were unable to venture far from their camp due to the patrols by Thessalian cavalry. The expedition ended without the Athenians managing to achieve any of their objectives.

Similarly, a Theban-led Boiotian invasion force in Thessaly, in 368 BC, found themselves facing constant attacks from the Thessalian cavalry of Alexander of

[40] *καὶ μαχόμενοι αἴτιοι μὲν ἐγένοντο τὰ ἔξω πάντα σωθῆναι τοῖς Μαντινεῦσιν.*

Pherai (Diod. 15.71.1-6). It was not only the Thessalian missile attacks that took their toll on the Boiotians, Diodoros (15.71.6) maintains that: "they [the Boiotians] were reduced to utter helplessness, as was natural when they were running short of provisions". Although neither Thucydides (*loc. cit.*), in the case of the Athenian-led invasion, nor Diodoros (*loc. cit.*), in that of the Boiotian invasion, specifically state that either of the invading armies were relying on being able to forage for provisions, it is tempting to believe that they were actually hoping to, though the Thessalian cavalry prevented them from doing so. Certainly, Anderson (1970:58) is of the opinion that both invasions failed: "because the Thessalian cavalry did not allow the invading infantry to scatter and forage".

There were, however, ways and means by which an army could offset or even negate patrols by the enemy against its foragers. Xenophon (*Anab.* 7.6.27) recalling how the Ten Thousand's employment by Seuthes had provided them with much needed 'allies' in the form of Seuthes' peltasts and cavalry, addressed the former Cyreans reminding them of how:

> "when you had joined forces with these troops, you not only found food in greater abundance in the villages, for the Thracians were compelled to flee in greater haste, but you also got a larger share of cattle and captives. In fact we never saw the face of an enemy again after the cavalry had joined us, whereas up to that time the enemy had been following boldly at our heels with horsemen and peltasts and had prevented us from scattering in any direction and thus securing a greater abundance of provisions" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.6.28-29)[41].

In situations where such cavalry support was lacking the main danger was to foragers who were scattered and dispersed. Certainly, Xenophon appears to have been well aware of such a danger; the Ten Thousand, short of money with which

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[41] *κοινωνήσαντες καὶ σῖτον ἀφθονώτερον ἐν ταῖς κώμαις ηὑρίσκετε διὰτὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι τοὺς Θρᾷκας κατὰ σπουδὴν μᾶλλον φεύγειν, καὶ προβάτων καὶ ἀνδροπόδων μᾶλλον μετέσχετε. καὶ πολέμιον οὐκέτι οὐδένα ἑωρῶμεν ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἱππικὸν ἡμῖν προσεγένετο· τέ ως δὲ θαρραλέως ἡμῖν ἐφείποντο οἱ πολέμιοι καὶ ἱππικῷ καὶ πελταστικῷ κωλύοντες μηδαμῇ κατ'*

to purchase their provisions from the market provided by the Trapezuntians[42], had no alternative but to forage for supplies in enemy territory. Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.1.6-7), realised the potential danger and addressing the troops he told them that:

> "the territory is hostile, and hence there is a danger that many of you will perish if you set out after provisions carelessly and unguardedly. Rather, it seems to me that you ought to get your provisions in foraging parties and not roam about at random, in order that you may be kept safe, and that we [generals] ought to have charge of this matter" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.1.6-7)[43].

Later, in his *Anabasis*, Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.6.32f) has to reiterate this message of the merits of staying together in a body following threats from individuals that whosoever desired to leave army at the earliest opportunity should be allowed to do so. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.32), however, warned them and advised them that by:

> "standing together and in force, as you are now, I think you will be held in honour and will have provisions, for in strength lies the opportunity to wrest away the possessions of the weaker; but let yourselves get separated and your force broken up into small parts, and you would neither be able to obtain food to live on nor would you come off unharmed" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.32)[44].

Certainly, Xenophon's (*Anab.* 5.2.1) idea of a foraging party was that it should be large. He tells us that, with guides from the local *polis* of Trapezus: "Xenophon...led forth half the army to the country of the Drilae, leaving the

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ὀλίγους ἀποσκεδαννυμένους τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀφθονώτερα ἡμᾶς πορίζεσθαι.

[42] See Xen. *Anab.* 4.8.23 for the Trapezuntians providing the Ten Thousand with a market (along with gifts of hospitality). Cf. Xen. *Anab.* 5.1.6, in which Xenophon claims that the market provided by the Trapezuntians was not adequate for their needs, nor did most of the troops have any money with which to purchase those goods that were offered for sale.

[43] *ἡ δὲ χώρα πολεμία· κίνδυνος οὖν πολλοὺς ἀπόλλυσθαι, ἢν ἀμελῶς τε καὶ ἀφυλάκτως πορεύησθε ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. ἀλλά μοι δοκεῖ σὺν προνομαῖς λαμβάνειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ἄλλως δὲ μὴ πλανᾶσθαι, ὡς σῴζησθε, ἡμᾶς δὲ τούτων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.*

[44] *ὁμοῦ μὲν ὄντες πολλοὶ ὥσπερ νυνὶ δοκεῖτε ἄν μοι καὶ ἔντιμοι εἶναι καὶ ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια· ἐν γὰρ τῷ κρατεῖν ἐστι καὶ τὸ λαμβάνειν τὰ τῶν ἡττόνων· διασπασθέντες δ' ἂν καὶ κατὰ μικρὰ γενομένης τῆς δυνάμεως οὔτ' ἂν τροφὴν δύναισθε λαμβάνειν οὔτε χαίροντες ἂν ἀπαλλάξαιτε.*

other half to guard the camp"[45]. The purpose of his mission was to obtain supplies, and as he states that he took half the army with him, his force probably numbered some 4,000 hoplites and 900 light-armed troops in the form of peltasts and archers[46]. Certainly, there were advantages to employing such a large force in a search for supplies. Firstly, such a large body of troops advancing as one entity would discourage all but the most determined of opponents from attacking such a column. In addition, the inhabitants of relatively smaller settlements, upon seeing them approach, might have been sufficiently intimidated by a force of this size to abandon their settlement and seek safety, thereby allowing the Greeks to plunder almost at will. Later in his narrative Xenophon (*Anab.*6.4.23) tells us that Neon, who had taken over in Cheirisophos' place, led: "about two thousand men" out on a foraging expedition to obtain supplies. Although a reasonably large force they dispersed to forage for provisions and were caught scattered and in the open by Pharnabazus' cavalry who slew about five hundred of their number (Xen. *Anab.*6.4.24). However, even if a large foraging party was employed and was not subjected to a direct attack by the enemy this method of attempting to obtain supplies was by no means foolproof, nor was it guaranteed to succeed, and the more extreme measures employed by 'defenders' to deny supplies to a foraging enemy will be discussed later in this chapter.

Although less physically dangerous than being caught dispersed and in the open by the enemy, another potential hazard facing armies expecting to find food and other supplies by foraging was, nevertheless, no less serious nor less life-threatening. That is to say the dangers posed to an army that was relying on, or expecting to forage for, supplies in an area that did not have the resources or wherewithal to sustain both the local population and the attentions of an army seeking supplies. According to Xenophon (*Agesilaos*, 1.20) the Spartan king Agesilaos was acutely aware of such potential hazards:

> "Recognising that a country plundered and depopulated could not long support an army, whereas an inhabited and cultivated land would yield inexhaustible supplies, he took pains not only to crush his enemies by force, but also to win them over by gentleness" (Xenophon, *Agesilaos*, 1.20)[47].

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[45] *Ξενοφῶν...ἐξάγει εἰς Δρίλας τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ στρατεύματος, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ κατέλιπε φυλάττειν τὸ στρατόπεδον.*

[46] Shortly before the mission Xenophon records above, the 'Ten Thousand' had made their descent from the mountains into Kolchian territory, Xenophon records that at that time the army consisted of eighty *lochoi* of hoplites, and that each (hoplite) *lochos* numbered about 100 men to which can be added approximately 1,800 peltasts and archers (*Anab.* 4.8.15).

[47] *Γιγνώσκων δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν πορθουμένη καὶ ἐρημουμένη χώρα οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο πολὺν χρόνον στράτευμα φέρειν, ἡ δ' οἰκουμένη μὲν σπειρομένη δὲ ἀέναον ἂν τὴν τροφὴν παρέχοι, ἐπεμέλετο οὐ μόνον τοῦ βίᾳ χειροῦσθαι τοὺς ἐναντίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ πρᾳότητι προσάγεσθαι.*

Certainly this passage makes it clear that Agesilaos understood that areas could only be plundered on a finite level and he would therefore try to win them over. This passage is also interesting in that it provides yet more evidence to show that Greek generals in the Classical period were fully aware of, and understood the need for good logistical planning to ensure the success of their operations. Xenophon himself certainly did. Wood (1964:53) maintains that Xenophon was the first Greek writer: "to stress the crucial logistical role of supplying an army". That said, even Xenophon himself found himself in a situation where:

> "The time came when it was no longer possible to obtain provisions and return to the camp on the same day" (Xen. *Anab.* 5.2.1)[48].

It is fair to assume from this passage that the supplies of provisions in the local area had been exhausted by the continued presence of the former Cyreans and they were having to range further afield in order to obtain adequate supplies. The reason for their staying in the same place despite their lack of provisions in the area was due to the fact that they were waiting for Cheirisophos to return with ships to convey them home (Xen. *Anab.* 5.1.5). The subsequent delay caused by Cheirisophos' mission as the former Cyreans waited for the ships to arrive had obviously led to the on-going foraging activities of the former Cyreans exhausting the local area, which in turn, required their venturing further in order to get supplies.

During the Theban-led invasion of Lakonia in the winter of 370 BC, Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.50) tells us that, as more and more of their allies left for home with their plunder:

> "...the Thebans and the rest were desirous of departing from the country, partly for the very reason that they saw their army growing

[48] *Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐκέτι ἦν λανβάνειν ὥστε ἀπαυθημερίζειν ἐπὶ τὸ στρατόπεδον.*

> daily smaller, and partly because provisions were scantier, the supply having been in part used up or stolen away, in part wasted or burned up; besides, it was winter, so that by this time all alike wanted to withdraw" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 6.5.50)[49].

The Theban advance had seen the plundering and burning of Sellasia, as well as the houses of the Eurotas valley to the east of the river, and unwalled towns on the road to Helos and Gytheion (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.27; 32). Such actions as these, along with the fact that the invasion was undertaken in the winter, clearly placed a strain on the Thebans' ability to obtain supplies in Lakonia. Furthermore, the Spartan institution of the *syssitia* to which the Spartiates contributed produce from their *kleroi* (Plutarch, *Lykourgos*, 12.3) may have meant that such produce as there was, perhaps, was stored at Sparta itself, which withstood the invasion as the invaders: "did not even make the attempt to cross over the bridge against Sparta" (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.27).

Diodoros (16.13.3) maintains that during his campaign against Dion and the Syracusan citizen body, Dionysios II had:

> "plenty of everything but grain and being in control of the sea, he began to pillage the countryside and, finding it difficult to provide subsistence from his foraging parties, he dispatched merchantmen and money to purchase grain. But the Syracusans, who had many ships of war and kept putting in an appearance at opportune places, made off with many of the supplies that were being brought in by the traders" (Diodoros, 16.13.3)[50].

This passage is particularly interesting in that although Dionysios the Younger could be considered unfortunate to have had his merchant vessels frequently

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[49] *οἱ δὲ Θηβαῖοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τὰ μὲν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀπιέναι ἐβούλοντο ἐκ τῆς χώρας, ὅτι ἐώρων ἐλάττονα τὴν στρατιὰν καθ' ἡμέραν γιγνομένην, τὰ δέ, ὅτι σπανιώτερα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἦν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀνήλωτο, τὰ δὲ διήρπαστο, τὰ δὲ ἐξεκέχυτο, τὰ δὲ κατεκέκαυτο· πρὸς δ' ἔτι καὶ χειμὼν ἦν ὥστ' ἤδη πάντες ἀπιέναι ἐβούλοντο.*

[50] *πάντων δ' εὐπορῶν πλὴν σίτου καὶ θαλαττοκρατῶν ἐλῄστευε τὴν χώραν καὶ τὰς τροφὰς ἐκ τῶν προνοῶν κακῶς ποριζόμενος ἐξαπέστειλε ναῦς φορτίδας καὶ χρήματα πρὸς τὸν τοῦ σίτου καταγορασμόν. οἱ δὲ Συρακόσιοι ναῦς μακρὰς πολλὰς ἔχοντες καὶ κατὰ τοὺς εὐκαίρους τόπους ἐπιφαινόμενοι πολλὴν τῆς ὑπὸ*

intercepted and taken by his Syracusan opponents, he was also very fortunate in that he had the economic resources to have dispatched the merchant vessels in the first place. If Dionysios had been in the position of having to rely completely on his foraging parties for supplies his army could have been brought to very dire straits, as, from what Diodoros states, the local area of operations simply could not provide him with enough provisions merely through the use of foraging parties.

It could be that an area had already been stripped by an army marching through it, who, if they returned from their destination by the same route would find the area completely devoid of supplies and unable to support their troops. Such was the situation facing Cyrus' Greek mercenaries following the battle of Kounaxa. As the Greek generals and Cyrus' former friend and confederate, Ariaeus, deliberated what to do, Ariaeus said:

> "If we should return by the way we came, we should perish utterly from starvation, for we have no provisions whatever. For even on our way hither we were not able to get anything from the country for the last seventeen stages; and where there was anything, we consumed it entirely on our march through. Now, accordingly, we intend to take a route that is longer, to be sure, but one where we shall not lack provisions" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 2.2.11)[51].

Clearly Xenophon has Ariaeus both understand, and point out, the need for Cyrus' Greek mercenaries and the troops under Ariaeus to return by a different route, as the way they had come would have been devoid of all supplies.

Alternatively, an area may have been deliberately stripped of supplies to deny them to the approaching hostile army. This could range from the local population either hiding provisions and other supplies from the enemy or invader,

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τῶν ἐμπόρων κομιζομένης ἀγορᾶς παρῃροῦντο.

[51] *Ἦν μὲν ἤλθομεν ἀπιόντες παντελῶς ἂν ὑπὸ λιμοῦ ἀπολοίμεθα· ὑπάρχει γὰρ νῦν ἡμῖν οὐδὲν τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. ἑπτακαίδεκα γὰρ σταθμῶν τῶν ἐγγυτάτω οὐδὲ δεῦρο ἰόντες ἐκ τῆς χώρας οὐδὲν εἴχομεν λαμβάνειν· ἔνθα δέ τι ἦν, ἡμεῖς διαπορευόμενοι κατεδαπανήσαμεν. νῦν δ' ἐπινοοῦμεν πορεύεσθαι μακροτέραν μέν, τῶν δ' ἐπιτηδείων οὐκ ἀπορήσομεν.*

or alternatively the moving of such things as cattle, flocks, and other livestock, to what they considered to be a safe area or even fortified defence beyond the reach of the invader. For example, we have already seen how, during the Corinthian War, many of the Corinthians had taken refuge, along with all their cattle, in Peiraion, which was protected by the fortress of Oinoe (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1; cf. Xen. *Agesilaos*, 2.18). As Oinoe lay on the north-eastern part of the mountainous peninsula of Peiraion, the Corinthians must have felt that they had taken adequate precautions to protect their property against any potential invasion by their Lakedaimonian enemies. However, as we have seen this was not in fact to be the outcome (Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.5-6; cf. Xen. *Agesilaos*, 2.19).

It has already been mentioned earlier in this section how Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.7.1; 4.7.17) records that both the Taochians and the Chalybians stored their supplies away in strongholds, in an attempt to prevent them being seized by enemies. After the hard fought struggle to break into the stronghold of the Taochians, it is hardly surprising that the Ten Thousand, when faced with the strongholds of the Chalybians, chose to subsist on the meat of the cattle they had fought so hard to possess from the Taochians rather than attempt to storm the Chalybian strongholds.

In its most extreme form the ultimate act that could be employed to deny supplies to a foraging army was for the 'defenders' to indulge in a 'scorched earth' policy and thus leave the area devastated and barren, from which an invader would be unable to draw sufficient supplies to support themselves. Just such a policy, employed by the Persians, is described by Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.6.1) who states that Cyrus' army:

> "...kept seeing tracks of horses and horses' dung. To all appearances it was the trail of about two thousand horses, and the horsemen as they proceeded were burning up fodder [χιλὸν] and everything else that was of any use" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.6.1)[52].

[52] *...ἐφαίνετο ἴχνια ἵππων καὶ κόπρος. εἰκάζετο δ' εἶναι ὁ στίβος ὡς δισχιλίων ἵππων. οὗτοι προϊόντες ἔκαιον καὶ χιλὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο χρήσιμον ἦν.*

It has already been noted above (Xen. *Anab.* 2.2.11) how Ariaeus pointed out to the Greek generals that, following Kounaxa, they could not return by the same route as they had come due to the scarcity of supplies along that route. There seems little doubt that part of the reason that supplies along that particular route were either scarce or even non-existent was due to the deliberate destruction carried out by the horsemen of the Persian king's army at this stage of the Cyreans march 'up country'.

Earlier in this section it was mentioned how troops of the Ten Thousand, dispersed and foraging for booty and plunder in several well-stocked villages in the plain on the banks of the Tigris had almost fallen victim to a surprise attack by Tissaphernes and Ariaeus. It is worth looking more closely at this particular incident in relation to how an army might endeavour to deny supplies to the enemy by attempting to destroy such means of supply. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.3) tells us that Tissaphernes' men:

> "attempted to burn the villages; and some of the Greeks got exceedingly despondent, out of apprehension that they would not have a place from which to get provisions in case the enemy should succeed in this attempt" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.5.3)[53].

At this point, Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.5-6) gave an impassioned speech in which he claimed that by carrying out such an action the Persians were admitting that the territory no longer belonged to the Persian king but rather to the Greeks, and urged that they sally forth to protect 'their' property. Xenophon (*Anab.* 3.5.6) records that the Spartan commander Cheirisophos disagreed with such an action and added, in true laconic style: "let us set about burning ourselves, and then they will stop the sooner".

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[53] καίειν ἐπεχείρησαν τὰς κώμας. καὶ τῶν Ἑλλήνων μάλα ἠθύμησάν τινες, ἐννοούμενοι μὴ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, εἰ καίοιεν, οὐκ ἔχοιεν ὁπόθεν λαμβάνοιεν.

Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.2.3) later records of the Drilae too, how, when faced with half the total force of the former Cyreans:

> "the Drilae set fire to such of their strongholds as seemed easy to capture, and fell back, and the Greeks could secure nothing except an occasional pig or ox or other animal that had escaped the fire" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.2.3)[54].

There can be little doubt that faced with such shortages in the amount of available supplies, the assault Xenophon led on a 'city' of the Drilae immediately after this was motivated from the pressing need to secure provisions. From the account that Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.2.4-27) gives us of the attempted storming of this city it is clear that it was an extremely hard-fought, and somewhat desperate, engagement in which the Greeks by no means had things all their own way. In effect, the entire city was burnt to the ground with the exception of the citadel. The Greeks however, Xenophon (*Anab.* 5.2.28) informs us, returned to their camp the next day: "with their provisions".

The wanton destruction of enemy property, be it crops, stores of food, farmsteads, or villages and towns, by invading armies could sometimes backfire and have serious repercussions for the destroyers if a campaign dragged on longer than expected, or if the invader was unable to move on, especially if the army in question had problems with supply. Although we have touched on the following episode earlier in this section (on page 142) it is worth examining again as it helps to illustrate the potential drawbacks of troops engaging in wanton destruction of property or supplies. During their march through Western Armenia, the former Cyreans had been dispersed and billeted in several of the local villages, as at that time there seemed to be no enemy forces in the area and the amount of snow on the ground made them feel that it was unlikely that any enemy should reach them (Xen. *Anab.* 4.4.8). Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.9-10) then describes how some of the men saw the gleam of a: "great many fires"

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[54] *ὁποῖα τῶν χωρίων τοῖς Δρίλαις ἁλώσιμα εἶναι ἐδόκει ἐμπιμπράντες ἀπῆσαν· καὶ οὐδὲν ἦν λαμβάνειν εἰ μὴ ὗς ἢ βοῦς ἢ ἄλλο τι κτῆνος τὸ πῦρ διαπεφευγός.*

(*πολλὰ πυρὰ*) at night, and due to such reports the generals took the decision to collect the army together again in case of attack. Waking up in the open, covered in snow, Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.4.14) states:

> "After this it was deemed necessary to distribute the troops again to quarters in the houses of the several villages. Then followed plenty of joyful shouting as the men went back to their houses and provisions, and all those who just before had wantonly burned the houses they were leaving, paid the penalty by getting poor quarters" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.4.14)[55].

It is easy to imagine, given the extremely inclement weather conditions at this point in Xenophon's narrative, that the Greek perpetrators of these acts of arson *had plenty of time, during what must have been extremely cold nights, to* contemplate and rue their earlier destructive actions.

Similarly, as the Theban-led invasion of Lakonia in the winter of 370 BC dragged *on the Thebans found themselves facing shortages in supplies.* Apart from that carried off as plunder by their allies, or that which had already been consumed or wasted, part had been: "burned up" (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.50). There seems every likelihood, with the onset of winter, that the Thebans, as their supplies grew low, were perhaps regretting some of their actions earlier in the invasion such as the burning of Sellasia, the burning and plundering of the houses along the Eurotas valley (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.27), as well as the unwalled towns they had burnt down while on the road to Helos and Gytheion (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.32). It is worth noting that the invasion of Lakonia led by Epameinondas and Pelopidas took place in winter, not a time one would imagine, to have been the best for the invasion of the land of a still formidable foe, especially as Plutarch (*Pelopidas*, 24) tells us that military office at Thebes ran from winter to winter to echo the Boiotian calendar whose new years started at about the same time as our own today. Plutarch (*ibid.*) also informs us that the plan to invade Lakonia had been put

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[55]*Μετὰ ταῦτα ἐδόκει πάλιν διασκηνητέον εἶναι εἰς τὰς κώμας εἰς στέγας. ἔνθα δὴ οἱ στρατιῶται σὺν πολλῇ κραυγῇ καὶ ἡδονῇ ἦσαν ἐπὶ τὰς στέγας καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια· ὅσοι δὲ ὅτε τὸ πρότερον*

forward by Epameinondas with Pelopidas providing support, while the other *Boiotarchs* were in favour of returning home as their offices were almost at an end, even before the Thebans entered Lakonia. Whilst the lack of supplies and it being winter no doubt played there part in the Theban withdrawal from Lakonia, what of the possibility that the *Boiotarchs* took the decision to return home to relinquish their offices? Although this could have been the case it is also, perhaps, just as likely that the decision to leave Lakonia was motivated by the Theban inability to take Sparta itself, Sparta being, at this point, cowed but unconquered.

On occasion, even in areas where supplies of agricultural produce were in short supply, Greek troops could prove extremely resourceful in finding ways to procure provisions. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.5.1-3) describing the march of Cyrus' army through the 'Arabian desert' recounts how the mounted troops attempted to hunt the wild asses, gazelles, and ostriches. Xenophon (*Anab.* 1.5.2) notes that the meat of the wild asses resembled that of venison, but more tender and adds (*Anab.* 1.5.3) with something of a note of dead-pan humour that no-one managed to catch an ostrich. Xenophon (*ibid.*) does tell us that the bustards they found in this region were relatively easy to catch if one was quick and skilful enough, remarking: "for they fly only a short distance, like partridges, and soon tire; and their flesh was delicious". One imagines that Xenophon, himself the author of a treatise on hunting (*Kynogetikos*) was certainly skilled enough to catch such birds and appears to have enjoyed eating them. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.1.16) relates of Agesilaos' troops when in winter quarters at Daskyleion, that in the area there was: "winged game in abundance for those who knew how to take it". Once again, as Xenophon himself was serving under Agesilaos at this point it would be fair to imagine that Xenophon was, indeed, just such one of those who could put his skills as a hunter into practice.

Finally, whereas Xenophon (*Anab.* 4.5.30-31) provides us with an account of the Ten Thousand gorging themselves on every kind of food and drink that they could lay their hands on in the Armenian villages where they were lodged for a

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ἀπῆσαν τὰς οἰκίας ἐνέπρησαν ὑπὸ ἀτασθαλίας, δίκην ἐδίδοσαν κακῶς σκηνοῦντες.

week, we also hear of a different extreme, that is to say extremely selective 'connoisseur' tastes, incidentally, it would seem, among another body of mercenaries, and also recorded by Xenophon, though in another of his works, the *Hellenika*. According to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.5-6) the Spartan commander Mnasippos took no fewer than one and a half thousand mercenaries with his expeditionary force against Kerkyra in 374 BC, which Mnasippos allowed to lay waste the particularly beautifully cultivated land, including the wine-cellars of the local farms:

> "the result was, it was said, that his soldiers became so luxurious that they would not drink any wine unless it had a fine bouquet. Furthermore, very many slaves and cattle were captured on the farms" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 6.2.6)[56].

Certainly, in rather stark contrast to the experiences of the Ten Thousand who had been through particularly severe hardships prior to reaching the abundance of supplies they found stored in the Armenian villages, Mnasippos' mercenaries appear to have found provisions, and especially fine wines, in such great abundance that they could afford to be extremely selective in their choice of what they were actually prepared to drink. However, it should be added that there is no guarantee that it was only Mnasippos' mercenary troops that were so selective in their tastes. Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.2.6) refers to these actions as having being carried out by *τοὺς στρατιώτας*, 'the soldiers'. He does not, at any point, it should be noted, refer to those troops with such connoisseur tastes either by the term *μισθοφόροι* nor by the term *ξένοι*; if he had used either term it would prove conclusively that it was the mercenaries with Mnasippos' force that had such selective tastes.

As we have seen, there is a considerable body of evidence illustrating examples of Greek armies attempting to secure necessary provisions by foraging for supplies. Many of these examples are contained within the pages of Xenophon's

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[56] *ὥστ' ἔφασαν τοὺς στρατιώτας εἰς τοῦτο τρυφῆς ἐλθεῖν ὥστ' οὐκ ἐθέλειν πίνειν, εἰ μὴ ἀνθοσμίας εἴη. καὶ ἀνδράποδα δὲ καὶ βοσκήματα πάμπολλα ἡλίσκετο ἐλ τῶν ἀγρῶν.*

Anabasis, which is hardly surprising when we consider that this one work is, in effect, our sole detailed account of a Greek army on the march. During their journey following Kounaxa the former Cyreans especially, as we have seen, relied heavily on the need to forage for their provisions. Of the return stage of the journey of the former Cyreans, Griffith (1935:266) states that they: "were marching through a hostile country, taking what they could get without paying for it". Dalby (1992:24 n.54) believes that Griffith's remarks oversimplified the manner and methods by which the Ten Thousand acquired their provisions. However, the alternative methods employed by the Ten Thousand, and other Greek armies for that matter, to obtain provisions, for example by purchase, will be addressed in the relevant sections of this thesis.

'SOLDIERS' MARKETS': TROOPS PURCHASING THEIR PROVISIONS

Another method by which Greek troops could procure adequate provisions was to purchase them from traders, either in markets at cities along an army's route of march, or from sutlers travelling with an army. Herodotos (1.94) tells us that the Lydians were the first people to mint coinage and use it as a means of economic exchange, this being at some time between 625-600 BC. However, exchange procedures pre-date coinage by millennia and even before the Greeks adopted coinage as a means of the notion of trade was something already familiar to the Greeks, though the adoption of coinage no doubt made such procedures easier. Homer (*Iliad*, 7.467f) narrates how Eunêos, the son of Jason, was sending Lemnian wine to the 'Achaian' forces at Troy for which the troops exchanged bronze, iron, hides, slaves, and cattle.

Herodotos (7.176.5) states of the Greek force at Thermopylai under the command of Leonidas of Sparta that it expected to obtain supplies from the town of Alpenoi which lay a short distance from the Greek camp. However, Herodotos does not give us any further details about how such provisioning was to be undertaken. We do not know, therefore, whether the Greek troops purchased these provisions or whether the people of Alpenoi were expected to contribute them 'voluntarily' to the Greek 'common cause'. Similarly, Thucydides (6.94.3) informs us that the Athenians obtained provisions from Katanê after their arrival in Sicily. However, Thucydides does not specifically say whether these supplies were actually purchased or not.

Even prior to the embarkation of the Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily Thucydides (6.22.1) records Nikias' speech to the Athenian *ekklesia* regarding the need for such an expedition to take merchant vessels with them to Sicily. Thucydides (*ibid.*) has Nikias state of this required merchant fleet that:

> "we must also take with us in merchantmen the grain in our stores *here, wheat and parched barley*, together with bakers requisitioned for

> pay from the mills in proportion to their size, in order that, if perchance we be detained by stress of weather, the army may have supplies" (Thucydides, 6.22.1)[1].

However, once again, Thucydides is not forthcoming as to whether or not the troops and sailors of the Athenian expeditionary force would be expected to buy their provisions from such merchantmen. It seems reasonable to suppose that they would, indeed, have been expected to purchase such supplies rather than to receive them for free. We can perhaps find a clue in the seemingly familiar mobilisation order of the Athenians that troops called up for service were expected to assemble bringing "three days rations" (*σῖτος τριῶν ἡμερῶν*)[2]. While Griffith (1935:264 n.1) is under the erroneous impression that such supplies were issued by the state, in contrast Pritchett (1971:34) is correct when he argues that such provisions were purchased at the individual soldier's expense. As mentioned earlier (on page 107), Pritchett's argument is borne out by a passage in Aristophanes' *Peace* (1181-1182) in which the chorus relate how an expedition is to leave the following day but one unfortunate soldier had not bought his "three days' rations" as he did not know that he had been called up for military service (*τῷ δὲ σιτί' οὐκ ἐώνητ'· οὐ γάρ ᾔδειν ἐξιών*). Certainly, this shows that Athenian troops were expected to purchase their provisions for short duration expeditions and it is tempting, therefore, to suggest that the practice of individual soldiers being expected to purchase their provisions applied also to the Athenian expedition to Sicily. Furthermore, that troops and sailors alike were expected to purchase their provisions appears to be supported by the statement of Thucydides (6.31.3) when he tells us that the initial Athenian force for the Sicilian expedition comprised sixty warships and forty transports and that the sailors were to be paid a drachma a day. A little later in his narrative, Thucydides (6.31.5) in estimating the amount of money taken on the expedition; including pay from the state (*τοῦ ἐκ δημοσίου μισθοῦ*), individual travelling expenses, and the value of goods for sale, concluded that the sum must have amounted to "many talents".

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[1] *τὸν δὲ καὶ αὐτόθεν σῖτον ἐκ ὁλκάσι, πυροὺς καὶ πεφρυγμένας κριθάς, ἄγειν καὶ σιτοποιοὺς ἐκ τῶν μυλώνων πρὸς μέρος ἠναγκασμένους ἐμμίσθους, ἵνα, ἤν που ὑπὸ ἁπλοίας ἀπολαμβανώμεθα, ἔχῃ ἡ στρατιὰ ἐπιτήδεια.*

[2] See Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 197; *Wasps*, 243; *Peace*, 311.

This passage is particularly interesting in that it provides evidence that Athenian military and naval personnel received maintenance pay. Even if they were expected to purchase their provisions they nevertheless received money from the state with which to obtain supplies[3]. Thucydides (6.32.2) informs us that the Athenian force made its way to Kerkyra where it was to rendezvous with allied contingents. Upon reaching Kerkyra and following the arrival of allied contingents, Thucydides (6.43.1) states that the expedition left Kerkyra for Sicily with one hundred and thirty-four triremes, a hundred and two *pentakonters*, or fifty-oared galleys, five thousand one hundred hoplites, a further two hundred and fifty mercenaries, along with four hundred and eighty archers, eight hundred and twenty slingers, and one horse transport vessel carrying thirty cavalry. Certainly, the logistical problem of supplying such a relatively large force had been first pointed out by Nikias in his speech to the *ekklesia* (Thuc. 6.22.1f) and no doubt as an attempt to avoid supply problems it comes as no real surprise that we hear from Thucydides (6.44.1) how: "thirty food-bearing transports" also accompanied the expedition. Thucydides (*ibid.*) also informs us that many other vessels also accompanied the force voluntarily in the hope of trade (ἐμπορίας).

Despite having thirty food transports accompanying their force the Athenians, Thucydides (6.44.2) informs us, made several attempts to procure provisions from the Greek cities of southern Italy, though with extremely little success. Indeed, Thucydides (*ibid.*) states that some of the cities refused to provide them with a market or allow them to enter the town although they provided fresh water and anchorage to the Athenian fleet, though Taras and Lokri would not even allow them fresh water and anchorage. Thucydides (6.44.3) goes on to state that when the Athenians reached Rhegion, its citizens would not allow the Athenians within the city walls but did provide a market for them in the precinct of Artemis where the Athenians had established their camp.

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[3] For references to state provided ration money in the Fourth Century BC see Demosthenes, *First Philippic* 4.28; *Against Timotheos* 49.15; and *Against Polykles* 50.53, in which Demosthenes speaks of Athenian rowers being deprived of their ration money.

Thucydides (7.39.2) informs us that during naval skirmishes in the Great Harbour at Syracuse, Ariston persuaded the Syracusan commanders to send word into the city and request that all the food merchants move down to the shore as quickly as possible bringing with them whatever food supplies they had for sale. Ariston's reasoning behind this move was so that the Syracusan naval crews could land and take their ἄριστον, the morning or midday meal, close to their ships and thereby be ready to launch a second attack on the Athenian ships on the same day after a reasonably short interval. Thucydides (6.40.1) continues by telling us that this plan met with the agreement of the Syracusan commanders and the shore-side market was prepared[4]. Thucydides (6.40.3f) goes on to state that as a direct result of this expedient Syracusan tactic most of the Athenian sailors had to re-embark despite not having eaten and thereby fought the second engagement at a considerable disadvantage.

Later in the Athenian Sicilian campaign, as the Athenians prepared to retreat overland from Syracuse, Thucydides (7.77.6) has Nikias issue a statement to the army that word had been sent to the Sikels to rendezvous with them bringing food supplies. Unfortunately, Thucydides makes no mention of whether the Athenians were going to have to purchase these provisions or if they were expecting to merely receive aid from an ally. It seems likely, given that the Athenians had seemingly been purchasing at least some of their provisions during the expedition that, had they actually reached the rendezvous point, they would have expected to pay for their rations, although this cannot be said for certain, especially when we consider that earlier in the campaign Thucydides (6.88.4) has informed us that many of the Sikels had sided with the Athenians and had brought supplies of grain and in some cases money also to the Athenians. Similarly, we have no real confirmation that, according to Plutarch (*Nikias* 18), when the Athenians were stationed at Plemmyrion and had been receiving supplies carried in on grain-ships "from every quarter", whether the Athenians were actually required to purchase such provisions or whether they were being

[4] Cf. Diodoros, 13.10.1f and Plutarch, *Nikias* 20, who both record the naval skirmishes in the Great harbour but neither makes any mention of Ariston's clever plan. See too: Polyainos, 5.13.2, who records Ariston's stratagem.

sent in lieu of actual physical military support on the part of Athens' Sicilian Greek allies[5]. Certainly, Thucydides (7.4.4) informs us that Plemmyrion was initially chosen as a base because it allowed supplies to be brought in by sea, and following Athenian naval reverses in the Great Harbour, Thucydides (7.24.3) records Athenian fears that their supply-lines by sea had been cut. The Athenians also appear to have been receiving supplies by land. Thucydides (6.99.4) refers to supply convoys coming to the Athenian camp overland from Thapsos, as well as having a regular supply line with Katanê (Thuc. 7.60.2). It could be that Sicilian Greek cities who were either wary of Syracuse's strength or jealous of her power, contributed supplies of grain to the Athenians in the hope that their rival Syracuse would be defeated. However, this cannot be conclusively proved to be the case and we have no way of knowing whether such supplies were paid for by the Athenians or not.

During the summer of 411 BC, Athenian troops on the island of Samos, Thucydides (8.76.4) states, were having to compel cities under Athenian control to provide monetary contributions with which the Athenians could purchase provisions. In addition, Thucydides (8.76.6) informs us, the troops were having to buy provisions with whatever currency they had with them as Athens herself was unable to send them any money. Gomme *et al* (1981:269-270) remark that within the eighth book of Thucydides' history nothing has been said about the financing of the war from Athens since Thucydides, 8.15.1, and that as a result by the winter of 411-410 BC: "commanders in the field were forced to spend time collecting money". Indeed, in 410 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 1.1.12) informs us, the Athenian commanders Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, operating in the northern Aegean, had both spent time engaged in collecting money for their sailors.

However, in the summer of 411 BC, it was not only the Athenians who were having problems in not receiving their due pay. Thucydides (8.83.1-85.3) relates

[5] Cf. Thucydides, 6.88.4, who states that most of the Sikels sided with the Athenians and sent grain and in some cases money to the Athenians. It is notable that no actual troops are mentioned, which would perhaps give credence to the possibility that the allies contributed supplies in lieu of actual military service.

how the Peloponnesian fleet, stationed at Miletos, were in dispute both with Astyochos the Lakedaimonian admiral and the Persian satrap Tissaphernes over the issue of arrears of pay, which of course would have meant they were unable to purchase provisions unless they, like the Athenians at Samos, used their own reserves. This on-going dispute, Thucydides (8.84.2) maintains, got so agitated that at one point Astyochos raised his *βακτηρίον*, the Spartan staff of office, as if to strike the Syracusan commander Dorieus for supporting his men's grievances.

The same summer, during naval operations in Euripos channel, Thucydides (8.95.4) alleges, the Eretrians deliberately arranged that there were no provisions for sale to the Athenians in the market-place and that as a result, therefore, the Athenians had to resort to buying provisions from individual homesteads on the outskirts of the town. Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains that the Eretrians were in league with the Peloponnesians, even, allegedly, signalling the Peloponnesian fleet, stationed across the narrow straits at Oropos, when to put to sea, and had taken the step of making sure that there were no provisions for sale in the *agora* so as to put the Athenians at a disadvantage in the time it took them to man their vessels when the Peloponnesian fleet put to sea against them.

Thucydides (8.101.1) states that when the Spartan admiral Mindaros was at Chios he took on board his ships two days' provisions and: "three Chian *tessaracostai* for each man" from the Chians. In this instance the sailors are not having to buy their provisions out of their pay but rather appear to be receiving provisions as if it were part of their pay. Thucydides' use of the term *tessaracostai*, or 'fortieths', has been discussed by Gomme *et al* (1981:346-347) with regard to whether the 'fortieth' refers to a coin of some sort or a measure, suggesting that if the term actually refers to a measure of something in addition to the two days provisions: "we might expect Thucydides to tell us what this something was". Gomme *et al* (*loc. cit.*) after discussing the various theories concludes simply that: "the 'fortieths' must remain for the time being a mystery. We thus have no materials for guessing how many days' pay this represents, or estimating the total taken from the Chians". If, indeed, these *tessaracostai* were coins of some kind then the money issued to Mindaros' sailors is in the form of *μισθός*.

So far the majority of the examples cited of troops purchasing their provisions have related to purchasing from established settlements. However, there is also an example of merchants and traders travelling with an army, albeit not exactly a 'Greek' one. For example, Xenophon (*Anabasis*,1.2.18) relates how, following a parade by the Younger Cyrus' Greek mercenaries, the Greeks advanced their arms and charged as if going into battle at a run towards the tents of the main camp and:

> "As for the barbarians, they were terribly frightened; the Cilician queen took to flight in her carriage, and the people in the market left their wares behind and took to their heels; while the Greeks with a roar of laughter came up to their camp" (Xen. *Anab.* 1.2.18)[6].

This passage clearly shows that the Younger Cyrus had provided a market from which his troops could purchase their provisions while on the march. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.3.1) states that upon suspecting the true purpose for which they had been hired the Ten Thousand mutinied at Tarsos. As the Greeks debated what their best course of action was, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.3.14) tells us that one man in particular suggested that they should choose new generals and purchase provisions for their journey home. Xenophon comments rather scornfully on this man's suggestions, pointing out to his reader that the market was among the barbarian army. We hear of the market accompanying Cyrus' army once more when Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.5.6), pointing out once again that it was with the barbarian part of the army, relates how the Lydian hucksters who ran the market were grossly overcharging for grain during the portion of the march through the 'Arabian' desert. Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us that the Lydians were demanding a price of:

> "four *sigli* for a *kapithê* of wheat flour or barley meal. The siglus is worth seven and one half Attic obols, and the *kapithê* had the

[6] *τῶν δὲ βαρβάρων φόβος πολύς, καὶ ἥ τε Κίλισσα ἔφυγεν ἐπὶ τῆς ἁρμαμάξης καὶ οἱ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καταλιπόντες τὰ ὤνια ἔφυγον. οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες σὺν γέλωτι ἐπὶ τὰς σκηνὰς ἦλθον.*

capacity of two Attic choinikes. The soldiers therefore managed to subsist by eating meat" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.5.6)[7].

Roy (1967:311) describes the prices being demanded by the Lydians as: "extortionate", adding (*ibid.*): "Naturally the Greeks did not buy at such a price". Despite the attempted profiteering by the Lydian merchants we nevertheless have a picture of a commander in chief, or from the Cyreans' viewpoint, an employer of mercenaries, who has provided a market from which his troops could, in theory, obtain provisions. Dalby (1992:24) points out, however, that: "Xenophon's description of the travelling market suggests that it was something unusual in his experience". It is true that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.3.14; 1.5.6) twice makes the point of telling us that the market was actually attached to the non-Greek part of Cyrus' army, but however unusual the practice may have seemed to Greek eyes there is actually testimony in the form of Thucydides' (6.44.1) statement that many merchant vessels accompanied the Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily voluntarily for the purpose of trading with the military and naval personnel. So, however unusual the practice may have been among the Greeks it certainly was not completely alien to them, although perhaps we cannot put too much emphasis on Diodoros' (11.80.3) allegation that a large ἀγορά was sent from Attika to the Athenian army during the campaign that culminated with the battle of Tanagra in Boiotia; the incident is not mentioned by Thucydides (*1.107.5-108.2*) in his account. Dalby (*loc. cit.*) points out that the Ten Thousand did not have a market travelling with them during their retreat: "as an Asiatic army might have done". There is certainly credibility to Dalby's point of view, as information on markets travelling with Greek expeditionary forces is extremely rare, Thucydides' (6.44.1) statement about merchant vessels accompanying the Athenian expeditionary force to Sicily on a voluntary basis being the one possible exception. It would certainly appear though that Asiatic armies were accompanied by merchants on a relatively regular basis. Xenophon (*Cyropaideia*, 6.2.38) maintains that the Elder Cyrus ordered his troops to carry fifteen days' provisions with them and that, in addition, no trader accompanying

[7] *τὴν καπίθην ἀλεύρων ἢ ἀλφίτων τεττάρων σίγλων. ὁ δὲ σίγλος δύναται ἕπτ' ὀβολοὺς καὶ ἡμιωβέλιον Ἀττικούς· ἡ δὲ καπίθη δύο χοίνικας Ἀττικὰς ἐχώρει. κρέα οὖν ἐσθίοντες οἱ*

the army was to sell provisions to his troops until the fifteen day limit had expired under penalty of having his goods confiscated. It seems reasonable to suppose that Xenophon, who, after all, had personal experience of witnessing first-hand the practice of merchants travelling with an Asiatic army, that of the Younger Cyrus, believed that the practice of travelling merchants accompanying an Asiatic army, in this case that of the Elder Cyrus, was something familiar enough to be recorded as standard Persian practice.

Following Xenophon's (*Anabasis*, 1.5.6) statement that the Greeks subsisted on a diet of meat, rather than pay the exorbitant prices demanded by the Lydian merchants accompanying Cyrus' army, we next hear of them purchasing provisions only after the army reached the river bank of the Euphrates opposite the: "large and prosperous" city of Charmande. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.5.10) informs us that:

> "here the soldiers made purchases of provisions, crossing the river on rafts in the following way: they took skins which they had for tent covers, filled them with hay, and then brought the edges together and sewed them up, so that the water could not touch the hay; on these they would cross and get provisions - wine made from the date of the palm tree and bread made of millet, for this grain was very abundant in the country" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.5.10)[8].

Clearly, once the Lydian merchants' stranglehold monopoly had been broken the Greeks returned to purchasing their provisions once more. This passage is also the last we hear of the Ten Thousand purchasing their provisions prior to the battle of Kounaxa.

The next time Xenophon mentions the Greek troops purchasing provisions is when Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 2.3.26) states that as part of the truce with the Great

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στρατιῶται διεγίγνοντο.

[8] ἐκ ταύτης οἱ στρατιῶται ἠγόραζον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, σχεδίαις διαβαίνοντες ὧδε. διφθέρας ἃς εἶχον στεγάσματα ἐπίμπλασαν χόρτου κούφου, εἶτα συνῆγον καὶ συνέσπων ὡς μὴ ἅπτεσθαι τῆς κάρφης τὸ ὕδωρ· ἐπὶ τούτων διέβαινον καὶ ἐλάμβανον τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, οἴνόν τε ἐκ τῆς βαλάνου

King's forces, the Persians promised to lead the Greeks homeward and supply them with a market from which they could purchase their provisions. The same agreement contained the clause that if there was no market available the Greeks would be directed to places from which they could take provisions. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 2.3.27) also states that as part of the agreement, that the Greeks on their part had to swear to abide by this agreement and promise that they would only take provisions from places if the Persians failed to provide them with a market.

As mistrust between the two sides grew, and suggestions were made that the Greeks should attempt to slip away from the Persian force shadowing them, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 2.4.5) maintains that Klearchos voiced his concern that if the Greeks did decide to attempt to go their own way such an act would be considered by the Persians as a violation of the truce, and, Klearchos adds that, in addition to such a course of action being considered as a violation of the terms of the truce, they would also no longer have a market from which to buy provisions. Certainly, this passage underlines the fact that the Greeks have no merchants accompanying them from whom they could buy provisions and were relying on the Persians to provide them with either markets from which they could purchase provisions or have places pointed out to them from which they had permission to take provisions.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 2.5.30) states that in this continuing atmosphere of growing distrust, the Persian satrap Tissaphernes arranged a meeting with the Greek generals ostensibly to improve relations between the two sides. Xenophon (*ibid.*) maintains that Klearchos, despite misgivings among some of the soldiers, secured an agreement whereby five of the generals and twenty of the *lochagoi* would meet with Tissaphernes. In addition to this party, Xenophon (*ibid.*) adds:

> "and about two hundred of the soldiers also followed along, with the intention of going to market" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 2.5.30)[9].

πεποιημένον τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ φοίνικος καὶ σῖτον μελίνης· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ πλεῖστον.

[9] συνηκολούθησαν δὲ ὡς εἰς ἀγορὰν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων στρατιωτῶν ὡς διακόσιοι.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 2.5.31-32) alleges that at a prearranged signal the five generals were seized while the twenty *lochagoi* waiting outside Tissaphernes' doors were cut down. In the aftermath of this treachery, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 3.1.19-20) states that he himself addressed the officers of his friend Proxenos' contingent saying:

> "For my part, so long as the truce lasted I never ceased commiserating ourselves and congratulating the King and his followers; for I saw plainly what a great amount of fine land they possessed, what an abundance of provisions, what quantities of servants, cattle, gold, and apparel; but whenever I took thought of the situation of our own soldiers, I saw that we had no share in these good things, except we bought them, I knew there were but few of us who still had money wherewith to buy, and I knew that our oaths restrained us from getting provisions in any other way than by purchase" (Xen. *Anab.* 3.1.19-20)[10].

Although Xenophon's words were intended, in part at least, to boost the morale of these Greek officers, there appears to be certainly some truth to what he says about the lack of money among the Ten Thousand. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.2.11-12) records only one instance of the Ten Thousand receiving any pay from Cyrus, that being when the army reached Tarsos in Cilicia where they received four months' *μισθός*, of which: "more than three months'" was actually back-pay. There are only two other occasions on which Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.3.21; 1.4.13) refers to the matter of Cyrus and the troops' pay. The first (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.3.21) is when Cyrus, in an attempt to retain the services of the Greeks, promises to raise their rate of pay from one *daric* a month per man to one and a half *darics* a month, although we never hear of any further payments

[10] *Ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ἔστε μὲν αἱ σπονδαὶ ἦσαν οὔποτε ἐπαυόμην ἡμᾶς μὲν οἰκτίρων, βασιλέα δὲ καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ μακαρίζων, διαθεώμενος αὐτῶν ὅσην μὲν χώραν καὶ οἵαν ἔχοιεν, ὡς δὲ ἄφθονα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ὅσους δὲ θεράποντας, ὅσα δὲ κτήνη, χρυσὸν δέ, ἐσθῆτα δέ· τὰ δ' αὖ τῶν στρατιωτῶν ὁπότε ἐνθυμοίμην, ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡμῖν μετείη, εἰ μὴ πριαίμεθα, ὅτου δ' ὠνησόμεθα ἤδειν ἔτι ὀλίγους ἔχοντας, ἄλλως δέ πως πορίζεσθαι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἢ ὠνουμένους ὅρκους ἤδη κατέχοντας ἡμᾶς.*

actually being made to the Ten Thousand by Cyrus. Indeed, it is possible that the Greeks received no further payments from Cyrus, especially when we consider how it was only due to the Cilician queen giving a large sum of money to Cyrus, when the army was at Tarsos, that he appears to have been able to give them four months' pay, and three months' worth of that was in arrears (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.2.12). Griffith (1935:265) is of the opinion that the payment made to the Ten Thousand at Tarsos was: "the only actual payment Cyrus ever made to the Ten Thousand". The other occasion that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.4.12) mentions that the troops raised the subject of money again is when the Greeks reached the city of Thapsacus on the Euphrates, on being told of Cyrus' true intentions, they refused to go any further unless they were given money. In this case, however, it was not pay they were demanding but rather a special "donation" comparable to that which the troops who had, on a previous occasion, escorted Cyrus to his father had received. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.4.13) then states that Cyrus promised to give each man five *minai* in silver when they reached Babylon and full pay for their march back to Ionia again. As Cyrus never actually reached Babylon, falling in battle at Kounaxa en-route, there is little doubt that the Greeks never received these promised payments.

If we accept, therefore, that the Ten Thousand received only one payment from Cyrus then it is easy to imagine that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 3.1.19-20) was being honest when he refers to the terms of the truce and points out how this had restrained the Greeks from getting provisions by any other means other than by purchase. It is also significant that Xenophon (*ibid.*) notes the general lack of money among the troops of the Ten Thousand with which to buy supplies. This lack of money among the Greek troops is a topic that Xenophon returns to on a number of occasions in his *Anabasis* narrative. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 3.2.21) refers back to when the troops had been purchasing provisions during the period of the truce and also their lack of money remarking how they had been getting: "small measures for large prices"[11]. Xenophon makes three further mentions of the Ten Thousand's lack of money in his *Anabasis* narrative: at 5.1.6, with regard

[11] Cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.5.6: the Lydian hucksters overcharging during their earlier march through the desert.

to how even if there was a market available from which they could purchase provisions there were few of the troops who actually had any money with which to buy. Later, at *Anabasis*, 7.3.5 and 7.6.24, Xenophon twice more refers to the general lack of money among the troops of the Ten Thousand.

Later however, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 4.8.22-23) states that the Ten Thousand spent thirty days in Kolchian villages near Trapezus and that the Trapezuntians provided a market for them[12]. This, of course raises the question of how the Ten Thousand had the wherewithal to actually obtain their provisions by purchase given Xenophon's (*loc. cit.*) repeated statements regarding the lack of money among the army. Perhaps the Ten Thousand had raised funds from the sale of booty taken from the territories of the peoples their march had passed through, although Xenophon does not specifically say that was how they had managed to find the money to purchase their provisions in the market provided for them by the Trapezuntians. Xenophon (*ibid.*) does tell that the Ten Thousand used the Kolchian villages as a base from which they plundered Kolchis and it may be possible that, perhaps, booty taken from these villages provided the Ten Thousand with the wherewithal to purchase their provisions from the market at Trapezus although Xenophon does not, it should be pointed out, specifically say this was actually the case. Xenophon (*ibid.*) also states that in addition to proving the troops with a market, the Trapezuntians also bestowed gifts of oxen, barley-meal, and wine upon them as a sign of their hospitality.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.1.1f) informs us that the Ten Thousand assembled in order to deliberate the remainder of their homeward journey. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.1.6) then states that he himself rose and addressed the army. In his speech to the troops Xenophon maintains that he pointed out to them how:

> "In the first place, we must obtain provisions from hostile territory, for we neither have an adequate market, nor have we, with some few exceptions the means wherewith to buy" (Xen. *Anab.* 5.1.6)[13].

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[12] Cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.5.14

[13] *πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια δεῖ πορίζεσθαι ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγορὰ ἔστιν ἱκανὴ οὔτε*

As well as pointing out to the troops their need to forage in hostile territory for provisions as they had no adequate market, it is also worth noting how Xenophon, once again, reiterates, how few of them have the means with which to buy provisions anyway even if they found an adequate market. This also deepens the mystery as to how the Ten Thousand had managed to purchase their provisions when they had been provided with a market, a short time earlier, by the Trapezuntians.

It would seem that the Ten Thousand were actually getting most of their provisions from hostile villages in the vicinity of Trapezus by foraging, as Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.1) states that it was no longer possible to obtain provisions and return to their camp on the same day. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.2f) tells us that as a result of this, he took half the army, and escorted by some Trapezuntian guides, led them to the territory of the Drilae in the highlands, although they found little in the way of provisions. It is only some time later that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.7) informs us that he received word by messenger of a tribal 'metropolis' stronghold in the area: "full of all kinds of stores" although the messenger believed the place to be too strong for them to attack. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.8f) nevertheless resolved to attack it, and after forcing their way in the peltasts and other light troops emerged having snatched whatever plunder they could. Later in the attack, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.18) states that he gave permission for anyone who wanted to, to enter the place and to seize whatever they could. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.2.28) tells us that on the day after the attack on the Drilae stronghold the Greeks made their way back to their camp. Therefore, when we hear from Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.3.1) a short while after this that the Ten Thousand could no longer get provisions, it is probably due to local supplies having been exhausted rather than the troops having completely run out of money. This seems all the more feasible in that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.3.2) states that the army marched for three days until they reached the territory of the Greek coastal city of Kerasos where the army remained for ten days. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.3.4) also tells us that it was while they were in the

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ὅτου ὠνησόμεθα εὐπορία εἰ μὴ ὀλίγοις τισίν·

territory of Kerasos that they: "divided the money received from the sale of the booty". Certainly, the troops would once again have money with which to purchase provisions subject, of course to their finding an adequate market. It is only somewhat later in his narrative that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.7.13), while making a speech to the army, refers back to and informs us of how, while the army was in the territory of the Kerasos, the troops had purchased cattle and other goods from the friendly barbarian inhabitants of mountain strongholds. Xenophon (*ibid.*) adds how some of the troops: "went to the nearest of these strongholds and did some buying and came back again". However, not content with purchasing from these friendly locals, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.7.14f) reminds the troops about the attempt by one of the army's *lochagoi*, one Klearetos, to seize one of these strongholds, which, because of the friendliness of the local inhabitants was unguarded. Once again we see that whenever the Ten Thousand felt that they could get away with obtaining provisions without having to purchase them they would. Even when faced with a friendly local non-Greek population, troops of the Ten Thousand appear to have preferred to simply take what they wanted without paying for it, which perhaps gives some credence to Isokrates' (*Panegyrikos*, 146; *Philip*, 90-93) statements in which he presents the Ten Thousand as a largely being made up of a collection of undesirables.

The next time Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.6) mentions the subject of a market it is in the context of the Kotyrites' refusal to supply a market for the Ten Thousand or even to receive their sick and wounded within the city walls. Xenophon (*ibid.*) states that the troops therefore obtained their provisions by plundering Paphlagonia and the estates of the Kotyrites. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.7) states that these actions by the Ten Thousand resulted in a delegation of ambassadors from Sinope, the mother city of the colony of Kotyora, arriving at the Greek camp. In the discussions that followed between the ambassadors and Xenophon, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.14) refers back to the market that had been provided by the Trapezuntians and from which they got their provisions by purchase. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.16) adds that, wherever they went, if there was no market provided and whether or not the land was Greek or barbarian they were forced to take what they needed by foraging. If they had been provided with a

market by the Kotyrites the troops might have possibly still had money with which to buy supplies from their share of the booty sold earlier (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.3.4) and it seems rather surprising that a Greek city would refuse to provide market for them, even if they had stipulated that it be set up outside the city walls. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.17) attempted to justify the actions of his men by saying that the Ten Thousand had taken provisions from the Karduchians, Taochians, and the Chaldaeans because: "they would not provide a market". However, this is clearly a case of Xenophon being extremely economical with the truth as there is no guarantee that the Ten Thousand would have even contemplated purchasing provisions from these peoples even if they had not been hostile; after all Xenophon has already mentioned on several occasions[14] how short of money the troops were. Furthermore, what of the Ten Thousand's conduct in the Armenian villages? These had not been openly hostile, and instead had chosen to take the 'line of least resistance', and yet the Ten Thousand simply helped themselves to provisions and there is no mention of their offering to pay for any of it[15]. However, that said, as Armenia was part of the Persian empire perhaps the Ten Thousand could be justified in regarding the area as 'enemy territory' and therefore a legitimate target for plundering activities.

Later, while still in the vicinity of the Euxine, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.19) states that:

> "Timasion the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian said to some Herakleiot and Sinopean merchants who were there, that if they did not provide pay for the troops so that they would have provisions for the voyage, there would be a danger of that great force remaining in Pontos" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.19)[16].

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[14] See: Xenophon *Anabasis*, 3.1.19-21; 5.1.6; 7.3.5; 7.6.24

[15] See: Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 4.4.4f; 4.5.22f.

[16] *Τιμασίων...ὁ Δαρδανεὺς καὶ Θώραξ ὁ Βοιώτιος πρὸς ἐμπόρους τινὰς παρόντας τῶν Ἡρακλεωτῶν καὶ Σινωπέων λέγουσιν ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἐκπορισοῦσι τῇ στρατιᾷ μισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας, ὅτι κινδυνεύσει μεῖναι τοσαύτη δύναμις ἐν τῷ Πόντῳ.*

Griffith (1935:266) states of the expression: *τῇ στρατιᾷ μισθὸν ὥστε ἔχειν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐκπλέοντας*, that this: "phrase looks awkward at first, with *μισθὸς* appearing to mean 'money for rations'; but the context shows quite clearly that it is not used here in the technical (military) sense, and what it really means in the circumstances is a 'bribe'". Griffith (*ibid.*) also states that there is no clear evidence that the cities of Herakleia and Sinope actually paid in fact. Here then, it would appear that two of the officers of the Ten Thousand, Timasion a *stratêgos*, and Thorax, perhaps a *lochagos*[17], were merely attempting to obtain money for the troops by extortion threats.

Shortly after the suggestion to the Herakleiot and Sinopean merchants that they give them money to leave, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.20) has Timasion address the army, saying that as the Ten Thousand had no means with which to obtain provisions, they should merely take whatever they wished in the countryside about the Euxine, which, of course, would mean that the territories of both Herakleia and Sinope could possibly be subjected to the plundering activities of the Ten Thousand. This statement of Timasion to the troops appears to have had the desired effect, in that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.21) then states that the Herakleiot and Sinopean merchants took this message back to their cities, with the same tale being circulated by Eurymachos the Dardanian and Thorax the Boiotian both at the instigation of Timasion, with the result that:

> "they sent to Timasion and urged him to take charge, for a fee, the matter of getting the army to sail away" (Xen. *Anab.* 5.6.21)[18].

Although Xenophon does not disclose the actual sum that Timasion was to receive from the Herakleiots and Sinopeans, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.23) does say that Timasion offered to take the army to the Troad and to pay them each: "a

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[17] Timasion was the replacement as *stratêgos* for Klearchos, see Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.1.47, while Thorax's probable rank as a *lochagos* is suggested by Roy (1967:300 and n.62), who points out that Thorax was unlikely to have been in a position to dispute Xenophon's leadership of Proxenos' former contingent unless Thorax was actually a *lochagos* within that contingent (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.25).

[18] *πέμπουσι πρὸς τὸν Τιμασίωνα καὶ κελεύουσι προστατεῦσαι λαβόντα χρή-ματα ὅπως ἐκπλεύσῃ ἡ στρατιά.*

Kyzikêne per month". During the same assembly, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.26) adds that Thorax the Boiotian, at odds with Xenophon over the leadership of the army, was the next to address the army, and like Timasion, promised them regular pay. Xenophon (*ibid.*) maintains that Thorax said these things:

> "with full knowledge of what the Herakleiots and the Sinopeans were promising Timasion for getting the army to sail away. Xenophon meanwhile was silent" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.26)[19].

When Xenophon himself addressed the army, he (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.31) maintains that he, himself, informed the army that he thought the plan to receive money from the Herakleiots and the Sinopeans and ships to transport them away, to be good one. However, after this particular assembly, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.6.35-36) alleges that although the Herakleiots did indeed, supply them with ships nevertheless:

> "in the matter of the money they had promised Timasion and Thorax they turned out to be deceivers. Consequently, the men who had promised the pay were panic-stricken, and stood in fear of the army" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 5.6.35-36)[20].

Following this incident, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.1.1) states that while the army was delaying at Kotyora: "some of the men lived by purchasing from the market and others by pillaging from Paphlagonia". This market could well have been provided following the agreement reached between the ambassadors from the Kotyorites' mother city of Sinope and the Ten Thousand that Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.5.24f) refers to earlier in his narrative. Xenophon (*ibid.*) also states that the Sinopeans agreed that if the Ten Thousand marched to Sinope the city would receive them with gifts of hospitality, a statement which indeed, they

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[19] *εἰδὼς ἃ Τιμασίωνι οἱ Ἡρακλεῶται καὶ οἱ Σινωπεῖς ὑπισχνοῦντο ὥστε ἐκπλεῖν. ὁ δὲ Ξενοφῶν ἐν τούτῳ ἐσίγα.*

[20] *τὰ δὲ χρήματα ἃ ὑπέσχοντο Τιμασίωνι καὶ Θώρακι ἐψευσμένοι ἦσαν. ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐκπεπληγμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἐδεδίεσαν τὴν στρατιὰν οἱ τὴν μισθοφορὰν ὑπεσχημένοι.*

honoured when the ten Thousand reached Harmênê in Sinopean territory. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.1.15) states that this gift consisted of:

> "three thousand *medimnoi* of barley-meal and fifteen hundred jars of wine" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 6.1.15)[21].

As these supplies were gifts of hospitality (ξένια) from the city of Sinope the Ten Thousand would not have needed to pay for them. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.1.3) informs us that when the Ten Thousand reached Herakleia, this city also sent them gifts of hospitality, which were even more generous than those that the Sinopeans had given them, consisting of three thousand *medimnoi* of barley-meal, two thousand jars of wine, twenty cattle, and a hundred sheep. Herodotos (7.187.1), when attempting to calculate the daily provisions required by Xerxes' troops, calculates on a rate of allowing a *choinix* of wheat per day per man, while Thucydides (4.16.1) states that during the period of the truce the Spartan troops on Sphakteria were allowed two Attic *choinikes* of barley-meal per man each day. Therefore, as there were forty-eight *choinikes* to one *medimnos*, the three thousand *medimnoi* of barley-meal would have fed an army of approximately ten thousand for a little more than a full week if we allow each soldier a ration of two *choinikes* each. However, as Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.2.16) informs that the number in the army had fallen to a total of eight thousand three hundred and forty, the provisions provided by the Sinopeans and the Herakleiots would, in both cases, theoretically have lasted the troops for more than a week if they each received two *choinikes* a day per man.

Therefore, it is extremely surprising that immediately after receiving these gifts of hospitality from the Herakleiots, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.2.4) records how Lykon the Achaian addressed an assembly of the whole army saying:

> "I am astonished, soldiers, that the generals do not endeavour to supply us with money to buy provisions; for our gifts of hospitality will not make three days' rations for the army; and there is no

> place...from which we can procure provisions before beginning our journey" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 6.2.4)[22].

Even allowing for non-combatants with the army it is hard to believe that three thousand *medimnoi* of barley-meal would only last the army three days. It would mean, if what Lykon is reported to have said were true, that the army would have had the same number of camp-followers accompanying it as there were serving troops. There certainly were non-combatants with the army, as Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 5.8.6) had earlier had to justify why he had struck a mule-driver who was travelling with the army, although Xenophon does not provide us with any information as to how many non-combatants there actually were with the army. Returning to Xenophon's (*loc. cit.*) report of the speech of Lykon, he states that Lykon, in addition to his statement, also proposed that they demand money from the Herakleiots. Xenophon and Cheirisophos were both opposed to this plan but Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.2.7-8) tells us that the army appointed three ambassadors, one of them being Lykon, who went to the Herakleiots to demand money and, Xenophon (*ibid.*) alleges, Lykon also issued threats against the Herakleiots. Faced with such demands the Herakleiots, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.2.8) maintains, gathered in their property from the countryside and moved the market inside the city walls, and closed the city gates. No doubt it was from this market that Lykon, and those who supported him, had expected to buy provisions if they had received money either from the generals or from the Herakleiots themselves.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.2.16) informs us that the Herakleia incident resulted in the army splitting into three, the Arkadians and Achaians, Xenophon's contingent, and the troops of Cheirisophos. Later Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.4.1) states that the three contingents came together again at Kalpê Harbour. While in this area, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.4.16) informs us, the army's provisions gave out and there was no market to hand from which to obtain more and it was necessary to forage for supplies, although Xenophon, in traditional pious form,

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[21] *ἀλφίτων μεδίμνους τρισχιλίους, οἴνου δὲ κεράμια χίλια καὶ πεντακόσια.*

[22] *Θαυμάζω μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες, τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅτι οὐ πειρῶνται ἡμῖν ἐκπορίζειν σιτηρέσιον· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ξένια οὐ μὴ γένηται τῇ στρατιᾷ τριῶν ἡμερῶν σιτία· ὁπόθεν δ' ἐπισιτισάμενοι πορευσόμεθα οὐκ ἔστιν.*

would not lead the men out until he could ensure favourable omens from his sacrifices. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.4.22) states that there were no longer any sacrificial sheep with the army and that they therefore had to buy a bullock that was yoked to one of the wagons of their baggage train to use as a sacrificial victim. Presumably at least someone had some money and it may well have been Xenophon himself.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 6.6.38) states that when the army reached Chrysopolis in Kalchedonia, the army spent a week selling the booty they had taken from the Bithynians, which consisted of slaves and sheep: "in abundance". Their main reason for plundering the Bithynians had been to acquire booty, Xenophon (*ibid.*) tells us, in order that the army would have: "a little something in hand" upon reaching friendly territory.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.1.7) states that upon reaching Byzantion, Anaxibios the Spartan *nauarchos*, ordered the Ten Thousand out of the city, saying that he intended to count them and send them home. Xenophon (*ibid.*) maintains that the Ten Thousand grew angry at this as they had no money with which to purchase provisions for the next stage of their journey. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.1.13) states that he himself approached Anaxibios with queries about the army's lack of provisions and was informed by him that they were to take them from the Thracian villages, and to proceed to the Chersonesos to enlist for pay with the Spartan Kyniskos, although as events were to turn out, however, the army did not take up employment with Kyniskos.

Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.2.6) informs us that Aristarchos, succeeding Kleander as the Spartan *harmost* of Byzantion, was instructed to sell into slavery any of the Ten Thousand still remaining at Byzantion. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.2.6) states that as soon as he arrived in Byzantion, Aristarchos did indeed sell some four hundred of the troops into slavery. Following the army's arrival at Perinthos (*Anabasis*, 7.2.11) and a meeting with the Thracian Seuthes (*Anabasis*, 7.2.17f) Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.3.3) states that he addressed the army following another meeting, this time with Aristarchos who had told him that if they were to make

war on the Thracians, Aristarchos in return would no longer sell them into slavery, would no longer turn a blind eye to them not being sold provisions, and that they would also receive proper pay from him. However, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.3.5) suggested to the troops that:

> "seeing that here we neither have money with which to buy nor are we permitted to take anything without money, that we ought to set forth to the villages from which we are permitted to take, since their inhabitants are weaker than ourselves, and that there, possessed of provisions and hearing what the service is that one wants us for, we should choose whatever course may seem best to us" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.3.5)[23].

The last time we hear of the Ten Thousand buying their provisions from a market is when Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.6.24), addressing the troops, himself reminds the Ten Thousand:

> "Did you not go to Perinthos, and did not Aristarchos the Lakedaimonian forbid your entering and shut the gates against you? So you encamped outside the walls, in midwinter, and you got your provisions by purchase at a market, though scanty were the supplies you saw offered for sale and scanty the means you had with which to buy" (Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 7.6.24)[24].

Certainly, as we have seen, the general lack of money among the Ten Thousand, was something of a recurring issue, and clearly a major problem with regard to the Ten Thousand's relative inability to obtain provisions by purchase. Although the passage above does not specifically say there was any overcharging it is also interesting in that it shows that there was little on offer which might suggest that

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[23] *ἐπεὶ ἐνθάδε οὔτε ἀργύριον ἔχομεν ὥστε ἀγοράζειν οὔτε ἄνευ ἀργυρίου ἐῶσι λαμβάνειν, ἐπανελθόντας εἰς τὰς κώμας ὅθεν οἱ ἥττους ἐῶσι λαμβάνειν, ἐκεῖ ἔχοντας τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἀκούοντας ὅ τι τις ἡμῶν δεῖται, αἱρεῖσθαι ὅ τι ἂν ἡμῖν δοκῇ κράτιστον εἶναι.*

[24] *οὐκ εἰς μὲν Πέρινθον προσῆτε, Ἀρίσταρχος δ' ὑμᾶς ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος οὐκ εἴα εἰσιέναι ἀποκλείσας τὰς πύλας ; ὑπαίθριοι δ' ἔξω ἐστρατοπεδεύετε, μέσος δὲ χειμὼν ἦν, ἀγορᾷ δὲ ἐχρῆσθε σπάνια μὲν ὁρῶντες τὰ ὤνια, σπάνια δ' ἔχοντες ὅτων ὠνήσεσθε.*

it was not only Lydian merchants who could charge extortionate prices[25]. In addition, the scarcity of supply may have led the merchants to charge whatever prices they wished, given the high demand among the troops for provisions. Perhaps the best way to prevent profiteering at the expense of soldiers would have been for the officers of the Ten Thousand to buy in bulk on behalf of the men under their command in much the same way as the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 1350b [2.2.22-23]) maintains Timotheos did on Samos, a point which will be discussed later in this chapter.

During the naval operations in the Hellespont in 405 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.1.25) relates how the Athenians were having to go to Sestos, a distance of fifteen stadia, in order to obtain provisions. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.1.27) then informs us that these supplies were obtained by purchase. In contrast, Diodoros (13.105.1-106.1), in rather melodramatic fashion, claims of the Athenians that: "famine gripped the army". Plutarch (*Lysander* 10; *Alkibiades* 36), probably basing his accounts on that of Xenophon, also records how the Athenians were having to fetch their provisions from Sestos at a distance, although he does not make any mention of them actually having to purchasing them[26]. By comparison, Cornelius Nepos (*Lysander* 1.) records how the Athenians were straggling about in the fields prior to Lysander's sudden appearance at Aigospotamoi in an ill-disciplined manner, although he does not state that they were actually going to and from Sestos in order to obtain provisions. However, although some of these and other accounts fail to mention that the Athenians were fetching their provisions from Sestos, we can be confident that the account given by Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) is actually the most accurate.

Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.4.11), in describing Agesilaos' Asian campaign states that Agesilaos sent word to the cities of Karia that lay on his supposed line of march to have markets for his troops ready for when he reached them. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.4.12) goes on to record that this was actually a ruse on Agesilaos'

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[25] See Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.5.6

[26] Cf. Polyainos, 1.45.2, who does not mention anything about the fact that the Athenians were obtaining provisions, nor does Pausanias, 9.32.6, who instead concentrates on condemning Lysander's alleged 'war-crimes'.

part to deceive the Persian satrap Tissaphernes, as the Spartan king actually marched on Phrygia instead[27].

Similarly, and once more involving Agesilaos, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.48) states that, in the spring of 377 BC, Agesilaos sent word to Thespiai that a market be made ready for his arrival. Once again it was to prove to be merely a ruse, for the Thebans guarded the pass leading from Thespiai into their own territory, while Agesilaos marched along the road leading towards Erythrai instead and after completing a single day's march to cover a distance that should have taken two days for an army, which suggests a 'forced' march, Agesilaos made his way unopposed into Theban territory passing through the Theban stockade at Skolos and ravaged the land right up to the walls of Thebes (Xenophon, (*Hellenika*, 5.4.49)[28].

That Agesilaos could get away with using, by and large, the same stratagem twice and twice fool his enemies into believing he intended to march in a different direction than that which he actually did is not so very surprising. Both Tissaphernes and the Thebans would possibly have heard about the markets in each case being prepared for the arrival of Agesilaos' troops. It would probably have not seemed inconceivable to both Agesilaos' opponents that an experienced general commanding an army would, by sheer necessity, make arrangements for providing his troops with provisions. In addition, the actual ploy of arranging for markets to be ready suggests that troops purchasing their provisions from such markets was a relatively common practice.

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[27] Cf. Xenophon, *Agesilaos*, 1.14, which contains an almost identical passage to that within the *Hellenika*. See also: Plutarch, *Agesilaos* 9, who mentions Agesilaos' ruse but fails to mention that he sent word for markets to be ready for his troops. In contrast, Cornelius Nepos, *Agesilaos* 3, merely states that Tissaphernes himself expected that Karia would be the most likely target for attack by Agesilaos. Polyainos, 2.1.9, records Agesilaos' ruse but he maintains that Agesilaos turned from Karia into Lydia rather than Phrygia.

[28] Xenophon also gives a much briefer account of this campaign in his *Agesilaos* (2.22), though he omits to record Agesilaos' ruse of sending the message to Thespiai. Cf. Polyainos, 2.1.11, who mentions that Agesilaos sent word for provisions to be gathered at Thespiai; while Diodoros, 15.34.1-2, who gives a very pro-Theban account of the campaign, fails to mention Agesilaos' stratagem. Cf. Frontinus, 1.4.3.

Furthermore, that the practice of troops purchasing *their provisions from a* market was a relatively common one is seemingly confirmed when Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 6.5.12) maintains that when Agesilaos, in the winter of 370-369 BC, occupied the city of Eutaia[29], on the Arkadian border, he did the city no harm, allowing its residents to remain there:

> "and his troops got everything they needed by purchase; and if anything had been taken as booty at the time he entered the city, he searched it out and gave it back" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 6.5.12)[30].

Somewhat surprisingly this alleged act of magnanimity on the part of the Spartan king is omitted by Xenophon in his *Agesilaos*. This is perhaps all the more surprising when we consider Tuplin's (1993:142) statement concerning: "the laudatory account of the king's role in the defence of Sparta" as given in Xenophon's *Agesilaos* (2.23).

In describing the courage of the Phleiasians while under a state of near-siege Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.17), full of admiration, states:

> "that they maintained their fidelity to their friends is clearly manifest; for when they were shut off from the products of their land, they lived partly by what they could get from the enemy's territory, and partly by buying from Corinth; they went to the market through the midst of many dangers, with difficulty provided the price of supplies, with difficulty brought through the enemy's lines the people who fetched these supplies and were hard put to it to find men who would guarantee the safety of the beasts of burden which were to convey them" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.2.17)[31].

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[29] Or Eugaia, according to Tuplin (1993:141; 141n.57).

[30] *καὶ ὠνούμενοι ἐλάμβανον ὅσων δέοιντο· εἰ δέ τι καὶ ἡρπάσθη, ὅτε εἰσῄει εἰς τὴν πόλιν, ἐξευρὼν ἀπέδωκε.*

[31] *Ὡς γε μὴν καὶ διὰ καρτερίας τὴν πίστιν τοῖς φίλοις διέσωζον περιφανές· οἳ ἐπεὶ εἴργοντο τῶν ἐκ τῆς γῆς καρπῶν, ἔζων τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς πολεμίας λαμβάνοντες, τὰ δὲ ἐκ Κορίνθου*

In this instance we have an example of a *polis* organising a supply convoy and obtaining provisions from elsewhere by purchase. Although, at first glance, it could be argued whether or not this example actually applies to the provisioning of troops the matter is clarified when Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.18) goes on to record how the Phleiasians arranged with the Athenian general Chares for an escort for the supply train. Xenophon (*ibid.*) also states the Phleiasians begged Chares to escort their non-combatants (ἀχρεῖοι) out of the city and to the safety of Pellênê. Therefore, those who remained behind in Phleious would have all been serving troops and as such the provisions that Chares and the Phleiasians bought at Pellênê would have been solely for the consumption of the city garrison.

Earlier in this chapter, we touched on an example by which a commander prevented merchants profiteering at the expense of the troops under his command, that being when the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 1350b [2.2.23]) relates how when Timotheos was at Samos he banned the sale of milled corn in measures of less than one and a half bushels and measures of less than eight and a half gallons of wine or oil. Timotheos then instructed his officers to buy in bulk and at wholesale prices and to issue such supplies to the troops under their command[32]. This passage is particularly interesting as Timotheos' directive would have prevented profiteering among the merchants who were selling the supplies to his army. In addition, it would also, perhaps, have allowed Timotheos' officers to dictate the prices they were willing to pay for such supplies[33].

Similarly, The *Athenaion Politeia* (42.3) of the Pseudo-Aristotle describes how when the Athenian *epheboi* were under instruction by their 'disciplinary officers' each of the 'disciplinary officers' received an allowance of one drachma per day for himself as well as his receiving of the allowance for each of his tribal cadets at a rate of four *obols* for each cadet. In turn, each of the 'disciplinary officers'

ὠνούμενοι, διὰ πολλῶν κινδύνων ἐπὶ τὴν ἀγορὰν ἰόντες, χαλεπῶς μὲν τιμὴν πορίζοντες, χαλεπῶς δὲ τοὺς κομίζοντες διαπορεύοντες, γλίσχρως δ' ἐγγυητὰς καθιστάντες τῶν ἀξόντων ὑποζυγίων.

[32] Cf. Polyainos, 3.10.10, who also records this.

[33] Cf. Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 1.5.6; 3.2.21, in both passages Xenophon relates how the Ten Thousand were subjected to profiteering merchants.

was responsible for buying the provisions in common for himself and the cadets of his own tribe who are in his charge.

As we have seen there is a sizeable body of evidence from our source material which shows that the practice of troops purchasing their provisions from markets while on campaign was relatively common. In those cases in which troops received maintenance payments this was usually provided by their own *polis*. However, there were some exceptions to this. In addition to the examples cited earlier in this chapter, there is the statement by the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 1350a [2.2.23]) that when Timotheos was conducting his Olynthian campaign he found himself short of silver with which to pay his troops. Timotheos' remedy to this was to issue copper coinage to his troops telling them that the local merchants would accept this as legal tender. Similarly, a lack of money is evident once again during Timotheos' campaign on Kerkyra according to the Pseudo-Aristotle (*ibid.*), although allegedly Timotheos had plenty of provisions to distribute to the troops in lieu of payment. Some credence is given to this by Xenophon's (*Hellenika* 5.4.63-66) account of the campaign especially when Xenophon (*Hellenika* 5.4.66) states that Timotheos: "kept sending for money from Athens".

Another exception is provided by one of the clauses of the treaty concluded between Athens, Elis, Argos, and Mantineia, in the summer of 420 BC. Thucydides (5.47.6) states that the treaty contained the following clause:

> "for the relieving force the state which sends for them shall furnish provisions for thirty days after their arrival in the state that sent for succour; and in like manner on their return; but if they wish to use the army for a longer period, the city which sends for it shall furnish provisions for hoplites or light-armed troops or bowmen, three Aiginetan *obols* per day, and for a cavalryman one Aiginetan drachma" (Thucydides, 5.47.6)[34].

[34] *Τοῖς δὲ βοηθοῦσιν ἡ πόλις ἡ πέμπουσα παρεχέτω μέχρι μὲν τριάκοντα ἡμερῶν σῖτον ἐπὴν ἔλθωσιν ἐς τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐπαγγείλασαν βοηθεῖν, καὶ ἀπιοῦσι κατὰ ταὐτά· ἢν δὲ πλέονα*

Clearly, in this instance, the financial burden for providing either provisions or money for maintenance fell upon the *polis* which had sent for military aid rather than on the home *polis* from which the troops had been summoned. The inclusion of such a clause in the terms of the alliance allowed an allied state to furnish military support to an ally but without the additional financial burden of having to provide provisions or maintenance pay for such forces.

The desire to alleviate the financial burden on the mother *polis* during wartime is also apparent in the fourth century BC, when, during Artabazus' rebellion against the Great King, Diodoros (16.22.1) states that:

> "Chares, now that he had succeeded to the command of the whole fleet and was eager to relieve the Athenians of its expense, undertook a hazardous operation. Now Artabazus had revolted from the Persian King and with only a few soldiers was on the point of joining combat with the satraps who had more than seventy thousand. Chares with all his forces took part with Artabazus in a battle and defeated the King's army. And Artabazus, out of gratitude for his kindness made him a present of a large sum of money with which he was able to furnish his entire army with supplies" (Diodoros, 16.22.1)[35].

However, Chares' actions, Diodoros (16.22.2) goes on to say, led to ambassadors arriving from the Persian King with threats of war in support of Athens' enemies[36]. This incident, however, does make one wonder what Chares was hoping to achieve by his actions when at that time his energies would have been far better spent fighting Athens' enemies in the ongoing 'Social War', rather than becoming embroiled in another conflict. Certainly, the payment he received from

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βούλωνται χρόνον τῇ στρατιᾷ χρῆσθαι, ἡ πόλις ἡ μεταπεμψαμένη διδότω σῖτον, τῷ μὲν ὁπλίτῃ κ αὶ ψιλῷ καὶ τοξότῃ τρεῖς ὀβολοὺς Αἰγιναίους τῆς ἡμέρας ἑκάστης, τῷ δ' ἱππεῖ δραχμὴν Αἰγιναίαν.

[35] *Χάρης δὲ παραλαβὼν παντὸς τοῦ στόλου τὴν ἡγεμονίαν καὶ σπεύδων τῆς δαπάνης ἀπαλλάξαι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπεχείρησε πράξει παραβόλῳ· Ἀρταβάζου γὰρ ἀποστάντος ἀπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ μέλλοντος ὀλίγοις στρατιώταις πρὸς τοὺς σατράπας διαγωνίζεσθαι μυριάδας ἑπτὰ στρατιωτῶν ἔχοντας, συμμαχήσαντος αὐτῷ Χάρητος πάσῃ τῇ δυνάμει καὶ νικήσαντος τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως δύναμιν, ὁ μὲν Ἀρτάβαζος ἀποδιδοὺς τῆς εὐεργεσίας χάριτας ἐδωρήσατο πλῆθος χρημάτων, ἐξ ὧν δυνατὸν ἦν πᾶσαν τὴν δύναμιν ὀψωνιάζεσθαι.*

Artabazus would have helped to ease the financial burden on his *polis*. However, at what price politically? The risk of war with Persia was a price that Athens was unwilling to pay.

[36] Cf. Diod. 16.34.1; Isok. *Areop.* 8, 10, 81; Plut. *Arat.* 16.3.

SUPPLY CONVOYS, SUPPLY LINES, AND DEPOTS

In addition to the methods discussed in the preceding chapters that could be employed by armies to ensure adequate supplies of food and drink there are two other methods that could be employed to ensure that an army received adequate supplies. An army could employ the use of supply convoys, dispatched along lines of supply perhaps having prearranged to meet the army at some point on the march. Alternatively, an army could set up depots or magazines in which supplies were stockpiled to be distributed as and when an army reached them. Herodotos (7.20) states that the preparations for Xerxes' invasion of Greece took four years to complete. During that time, Herodotos (7.25.1) maintains that the Persians depots established magazines along Xerxes' proposed line of march through Thrace. Earlier in his narrative, Herodotos (3.6.2) relates how, following the conquest of Egypt by the Persian king Cambyses, the Persians had drinking water collected in ceramic jars in Egypt and carried into Syria to establish water supply depots.

The Persian use of supply convoys and depots is also attested to by Xenophon in his *Cyropaideia* (2.4.18), in which Xenophon has Cyaxares send wagons loaded with provisions to meet the Elder Cyrus on his march. Perhaps less reliable is Diodoros' (17.81.1) claim that when the army of the Elder Cyrus was marching against a people called the Arimaspians, the Persian army was reduced to such dire straits through their lack of provisions that the troops, allegedly, were resorting to cannibalism: at which point, Diodoros (ibid.) maintains, the Arimaspians appeared: "bringing thirty thousand wagons laden with provisions", and as a result the Elder Cyrus renamed them 'the Benefactors' and exempted from taxation. The story seems a little far fetched to be believed. Perhaps also as unreliable is Xenophon's (*Cyropaideia*, 5.2.4) story that the fortress of the Babylonian Gobryas, who defected to the Elder Cyrus, was stockpiled with enough provisions to last a whole generation. In another of his works Xenophon (*Oikonomikos*, 4.6) alludes to the Persian practice of the maintenance of troops in citadel garrisons within the Persian empire. By comparison, the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 1353a [2.2.38]) refers to the system of Persian magazines

stationed along the royal highways, and maintains that these were expected to be replenished, by law, by the regional satraps. So much then for Persian practice, what of that of the Greeks themselves?

It could be argued that the ships carrying Lemnian wine that Homer (*Iliad*, 7.467f) states Eunêos sent to the 'Achaian' forces at Troy is a relatively early indication that the idea of supply convoys was one which was familiar to the Greeks. Although the Greek forces before Troy had to barter bronze, iron, hides, slaves, and cattle, in order to obtain the wine, it nevertheless suggests a line of supply between Lemnos and the forces besieging Troy.

Herodotos (7.158) maintains that Gelôn of Syracuse offered to supply the entire Hellenic League's army with provisions for the duration of the conflict with Xerxes on the condition that he were made overall commander in chief. Herodotos (7.159) states that upon hearing that Gelôn was willing to help only if he were made commander in chief the Spartan delegate, Syagros, exploded violently uttering oaths that Agamemnon himself would lament loudly if the Spartans were to give up the leadership of the Greeks in favour of Gelôn and his Syracusans. Herodotos (7.161) goes on to record that the Athenian envoy pointed out to Gelôn that while the Athenians were willing, if asked, to surrender command of the Greek navy to the Spartans they would not do so for anyone else. As a result, Herodotos (7.162) maintains, Gelôn withdrew his offer of help and suggested the envoys leave for home.

During the Plataiai campaign of 479 BC, Herodotos (9.39) informs us of a supply convoy dispatched from the Peloponnesos to the Hellenic League forces stationed along the Asopos ridge in the vicinity of Plataiai. However, as the convoy came through the 'Oak's Heads' or 'Three Heads' pass, and made its descent onto more level ground, it was attacked by a patrolling Persian cavalry force with the result that of the five hundred beasts of burden (ὑποζύγιά), wagons, and wagon drivers of the convoy, the Persians slew whatever they could and drove the remainder to the Persian lines. This passage is of particular importance as it provides us with valuable historical evidence that someone, somewhere, had

taken an important military and logistical decision to send out this convoy to the Greek forces. It clearly shows that the ancient Greeks were well aware of the importance of good logistical support for troops in the field. That it failed to reach its destination is largely due to the efficiency of the Persian cavalry patrols. The cavalry patrol itself was in the vicinity of the pass over Kithairon, on the intelligence of a Theban, Timagenides, who would no doubt have been well aware of the approaches into his native Boiotia (Herodotos, 9.38).

Who had taken the decision to dispatch the convoy in the first place is unknown. However, it would seem likely that as the Spartans were the acknowledged leaders of the military and naval forces of the Hellenic League (Herodotos, 7.159), it could well have been a Lakedaimonian decision to send the convoy to the Greek forces. Herodotos (9.50) also records that the Greek commanders deliberated their next action as their food supplies ran out and in the light of the fact that the men sent to the Peloponnesos to fetch provisions had been cut down by Persian cavalry patrols. If this passage refers to the same convoy as that caught as it passed through, and emerged from, the 'Oak's Heads' or 'Three Heads' pass, then it may well have been on the return leg of their mission having been sent from the army's position on the Asopos ridge to the Peloponnesos by the commanders in the field themselves. Burn (1984:521f) is of the opinion that the Greeks were receiving food convoys, rather than a single convoy, and given the duration of the campaign it is conceivable that there was more than just one convoy, although we are no further in determining who had organised such convoys. Though the main point to be made is that the Greeks were using a line of supply and at least one, or more, supply convoys to keep the army in provisions during the campaign.

Perhaps less reliable is Diodoros' (11.80.3) allegation that a large Athenian *ἀγορά* sent from Attika to the Athenian army in Boiotia, during the Tanagra campaign, was intercepted during a night raid by Thessalian cavalry who had defected to the Spartans. The incident is not recorded in Thucydides' (1.107.5-108.2) account of the campaign, although Thucydides (1.107.7) does mention that the Thessalian cavalry, who were meant to be allies of the Athenians

deserted them for the Spartans. In the summer of 431 BC, Thucydides (2.6.4) informs us that the Athenians sent a relieving force to their ally Plataiai, which brought food supplies with it, although Thucydides fails to explain how these provisions were transported to Plataiai.

In describing the ability of the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria to hold out despite the Athenian blockade during the operations around Sphakteria and Pylos, Thucydides (4.26.5) relates that:

> "the Lakedaimonians had called on volunteers to convey to the island ground corn and wine and cheese and any other food such as might be serviceable in a siege, fixing a high price and also promising freedom to any Helot who should get food in" (Thucydides, 4.26.5)[1].

Thucydides (4.26.6f) goes on to state that many, especially among the Helots, took the risk to run the Athenian blockade in boats approaching the island from the seaward side and attempted to get supplies through to the Lakedaimonian troops on Sphakteria. Gomme (1956b:467) raises the question of what happened to the volunteers if their boats were badly damaged following their somewhat reckless approaches to the island in their attempts to elude Athenian naval and hoplite patrols, and asks the somewhat rhetorical question "did the sailors...stay behind on the island helping to consume the food they had brought?" Presumably, if any boats were indeed too badly damaged to use again, or if they were seized by Athenian patrols there is every likelihood that they did. In addition to the volunteers in their boats, Thucydides (4.26.8-9) states that:

> "At the harbour, too, there were divers who swam to the island under water, towing after them by a cord skins filled with poppy-seed mixed with honey and bruised linseed; at first they were not discovered, but afterwards watches were set for them. And so both

[1] *οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι προειπόντες ἐς τὴν νῆσον ἐσάγειν σῖτόν τε τὸν βουλόμενον ἀλῃλεμένον καὶ οἶνον καὶ τυρὸν καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο βρῶμα, οἷ ἂν ἐς πολιορκίαν ξυμφέρῃ, τάξαντες ἀργυρίου πολλοῦ καὶ τῶν Εἱλώτων τῷ ἐσαγαγόντι ἐλευθερίαν ὑπισχνούμενοι.*

> sides kept resorting to every device, the one to get food in, the other to catch them doing it" (Thucydides, 4.26.8-9)[2].

Certainly, the volunteers appear to have made every effort to run the Athenian blockade in their attempts to get provisions through to the troops on the island. The initial Lakedaimonian call for volunteers, and their setting of a fixed high price as an inducement to get volunteers to come forward shows that the Lakedaimonians were well aware of the necessity of keeping the troops on Sphakteria supplied with adequate provisions. The Athenian efforts to prevent such volunteers getting through the blockade and onto the island, likewise, illustrate that the Athenians, too, understood the importance of attempting to cut the Lakedaimonian lines of supply, and thereby force the troops on the island to surrender.

Thucydides (4.27.1) remarks that the Athenians were greatly distressed at the prospect that these Peloponnesian blockade runners were actually getting through to the troops on Sphakteria. Furthermore, they were also fearful that winter would overtake them while the troops on the island were still holding out. In addition, Thucydides (*ibid.*) states that the Athenians had problems with supply convoys of their own, in that:

> "they saw that conveyance of supplies round the Peloponnesos would be impossible - Pylos being a desolate place at best, to which they were unable even in summer to send round adequate supplies - and that, since there were no harbours in the neighbourhood, the blockade would be a failure" (Thucydides, 4.27.1)[3].

Plutarch (*Nikias*, 7.1), similarly, records the Athenians' distress pointing out that transporting supplies round the Peloponnesos was a lengthy and expensive

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[2] *ἐσένεον δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λιμένα κολυμβηταὶ ὕφυδροι, καλῳδίῳ ἐν ἀσκοῖς ἐφέλκοντες μήκωνα μεμελιτωμένην καὶ λίνου σπέρα κεκομμένον· ὧν τὸ πρῶτον λανθανόντων φυλακαὶ ὕστερον ἐγένοντο. παντί τε πρόπῳ ἑκάτεροι ἐτεχνῶντο, οἱ μὲν ἐσπέμπειν τὰ σιτία, οἱ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν σφᾶς.*

[3] *ὁρῶντες τῶν τε ἐπιτηδείων τὴν περὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον κομιδὴν ἀδύνατον ἐσομένην, ἅμα ἐν χωρίῳ ἐρήμῳ καὶ οὐδ' ἐν θέρει οἷοί τε ὄντες ἱκανὰ περιπέμπειν, τόν τε ἔφορμον χωρίων ἁλιμένων ὄντων οὐκ ἐσόμενον.*

process in summer and risky or quite impossible in winter. In somewhat stark contrast, Diodoros' (12.61.1-63.3) account of the Pylos-Sphakteria campaign makes no mention whatsoever of the Athenian supply problem, but rather alleges (12.63.1) that the Athenian blockade was so effective that the Lakedaimonian troops were in danger of starving to death. This is somewhat at odds with Thucydides (4.39.2), who states that even after the eventual surrender of the Lakedaimonian troops:

> "some grain was found on the island at the time of the capture, as well as other articles of food; for the commander Epitadas was accustomed to give each man a scantier ration than his supplies would have allowed" (Thucydides, 4.39.2)[4].

This passage is particularly interesting in that it shows that Epitadas had been carefully shepherding his resources, no doubt fully aware of the uncertain nature by which his troops were being supplied. Epitadas was probably acutely aware that there was no guarantee that the attempts by those Peloponnesians to run the Athenian blockade would actually get through to the troops on the island. That some did is confirmed by this passage, just prior to which Thucydides (*ibid.*) has once again referred to how the Peloponnesian blockade runners at Sphakteria had indeed managed to get supplies through to the troops on the island. The achievements of those who successfully attempted to run the Athenian blockade can only be described as considerable. Thucydides (4.39.1-2) tells us that the siege lasted in total seventy-two days of which the troops on the island had been allowed provisions for the twenty days that the truce lasted. Therefore, those who had successfully got past the Athenian blockade and brought in supplies had managed to provide the Lakedaimonian troops with adequate provisions, depending on what supplies, if any, the troops had initially taken over to the island with them, for perhaps a total of fifty-two days.

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[4] σῖτός τις ἐν τῇ νήσῳ καὶ ἄλλα βρώματα ἐγκατελήφθη· ὁ γὰρ ἄρχων Ἐπιτάδας ἐνδεεστέρως ἑκάστῳ παρεῖχεν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ἐξουσίαν.

Thucydides (6.47.1) states that while the Athenian expeditionary force was at Rhegion, Nikias was of the opinion that they sail with their full armament to Segesta and ask them for *χρήματα*, money, or *τροφή*, provisions or a means of maintenance for sixty ships, in return for Athenian help against Selinous. Thucydides (6.48-49) records how the other two commanders, Alkibiades and Lamachos, had differing views. Alkibiades wanted to make allies of the Sikels in the hope they would furnish the Athenians with grain and troops, and urged the others that they should try to persuade Sicilian Messêne to ally itself with them. Lamachos, in contrast, maintained that they should head straight for Syracuse in the hope of catching the Syracusans unprepared, and by making themselves masters of the countryside have adequate supplies for the army. As events were to transpire, Thucydides (6.50.1f) states, Lamachos was persuaded to support Alkibiades' plan, although his mission was to prove unsuccessful. It is particularly interesting to note of this episode that although each of the three Athenian commanders had differing views as to the course of action they should take, all three made a point of raising the issue of how best to obtain supplies for the expeditionary force.

Thucydides (6.88.1) states that, while the Athenians were stationed at Sicilian Naxos, they were negotiating with the Sikels. Thucydides (6.88.4) goes on to state that of the Sikel settlements of the Sicilian interior:

> "with few exceptions straightway sided with the Athenians, bringing down grain for the army and in some cases money also" (Thucydides, 6.88.4)[5].

Thucydides (6.74.2) tells us that the Athenians went into their winter quarters, in 415-414 BC, at Sicilian Naxos, and at that time sent a trireme back to Athens with a request for money and cavalry, so that these may be on hand for the expeditionary force at the start of the following spring. Later, Thucydides (6.93.4) states that this vessel reached Athens at the end of the winter and that the

[5] *εὐθύς, πλὴν ὀλίγοι, μετὰ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἦσαν, καὶ σῖτόν τε κατεκόμιζον τῷ στρατεύματι καὶ εἰσὶν οἳ καὶ χρήματα.*

Athenians voted in favour of sending extra supplies of money, as well as cavalry, to the Athenian force in Sicily.

Plutarch (*Nikias*, 16) alleges that while the Athenians were in their winter quarters at Naxos, Nikias spent immense sums of money in maintaining his army. Presumably, the cost of maintaining the army during the winter was, perhaps, provided by the one hundred and twenty talents that Nikias and Lamachos had received from the sale of slaves following their capture of the Sikanian town of Hykkara, along with a further thirty talents given to them by the inhabitants of Segesta (Thuc. 6.62.3-5).

During the summer of 414 BC, Thucydides (6.99.4) states that supply convoys for the Athenians were arriving at the Athenian camp before Syracuse having come overland from Thapsos, as their ships had not yet sailed around from Thapsos into the Great Harbour. By comparison, Plutarch (*Nikias*, 18) maintains that despite the death of Lamachos[6], and being left in sole command, Nikias was still relatively hopeful of the outcome of the campaign[7] as he was receiving supplies by grain-ships coming: "from every quarter". It is tempting to suggest that, at this point, such grain-ships as those of which Plutarch (*loc. cit.*) speaks were arriving at Thapsos, and that their cargoes were then being transported overland to the Athenian camp, as it is only later in Thucydides' (7.4.4) narrative that we hear of Nikias' resolve to occupy and fortify the headland of Plemmyrion. Furthermore, Plutarch (*loc. cit.*) records these grain-ships arriving prior to the arrival of the Lakedaimonian Gylippos (Plut. *Nikias*, 19), whereas, according to Thucydides (*loc. cit.*), Nikias only took the decision to occupy Plemmyrion *after* Gylippos' arrival at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.2.1f). This would appear to give credence to the idea that the grain-ships bringing supplies to Nikias were, indeed, arriving at Thapsos, and then supply convoys were proceeding with the supplies brought by these ships overland to the Athenian camp. Nikias' reasoning behind his choice of Plemmyrion was that:

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[6] On Lamachos' death, cf. Thucydides, 6.101.6.

[7] Cf. Thucydides, 6.103.3, who alleges that the Syracusans felt they could not win the war.

> "it seemed to him [Nikias] that the bringing in of supplies would be an easier matter" (Thucydides, 7.4.4)[8].

Therefore, clearly one of the reasons for the choice of the base at Plemmyrion was for the purpose of allowing supply convoys to reach the Athenians more easily. Unfortunately for the Athenians, as Thucydides (7.4.6) points out the water supply at the site of Plemmyrion: "was scanty and not near at hand", while firewood for cooking fires had to be fetched from the nearby countryside and troops who attempted to do so were subjected to Syracusan cavalry attacks.

Thucydides (7.13.1) states that Nikias, in his letter to the Athenian *ekklesia*, pointed out of his forces that:

> "if we relax our vigilance ever so little, we shall not have our supplies, which are even now with difficulty brought past their city and into our camp" (Thucydides, 7.13.1)[9].

Thucydides (7.14.3) has Nikias' letter continue by expressing concern that the enemy might turn their attention to Athens' allies in Italy, who were providing them with food supplies. Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains that Nikias was fearful that those allies the Athenians did have in Italy might be swayed to defect to the enemy as a result of seeing the plight that the Athenians found themselves in. The Athenian response to this was to resolve to send a further armament to Sicily (Thuc. 7.16.1). Eurymedon, with ten ships and one hundred and twenty talents of silver, was dispatched to Sicily immediately, at the time of the winter solstice (Thuc. 7.16.2), while the other nominated commander made preparations by assembling ships, troops, and money, to set sail to reinforce the expeditionary force at the beginning of the spring (Thuc. 7.17.1).

Thucydides (7.22.1-24.2) records how Gylippos launched a successful combined attack, by land and sea, on the three Athenian forts at Plemmyrion. Following

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[8] *ῥᾴων αὐτῷ ἐφαίνετο ἡ ἐσκομιδὴ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἔσεσθαι.*

[9] *εἰ γὰρ ἀφαιρήσομέν τι καὶ βραχύ τῆς τηρήσεως, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια οὐχ ἕξομεν, παρὰ τὴν ἐκείνων*

the capture of the forts, the Syracusans demolished one and garrisoned the other two, having captured stores, food supplies and merchants within the forts (Thuc. 7.24.2). The capture of these forts certainly led to Athenian fears regarding the possibility that their supply route by sea at Syracuse had been cut, as any vessels attempting to reach them would have sail past the two forts which were now in Syracusan hands (Thuc. 7.24.3) [10].

Thucydides (7.43.2) states that for his assault on Epipolai, the Athenian general Demosthenes: "ordered provisions for five days", but Thucydides fails to record where these provisions came from. These provisions might have been from those being brought overland from Thapsos (Thuc. 6.99.4) or, alternatively perhaps from Katanê, as Thucydides (7.60.2) later provides us with evidence that the Athenians had been getting supply convoys from Katanê. Thucydides (*loc. cit.*) mentions the Athenians' supply line with Katanê in the context that word had already been sent to Katanê to stop sending supplies to the Athenians, as they had intended breaking out of the harbour and sailing for home, although this had been prevented by Syracusan naval victories in the fighting in the Great Harbour.

As the Athenians prepared to retreat overland from Syracuse, Thucydides (7.77.6) has Nikias speak of the arrangements they had made to rendezvous with the Sikels who were supposed to meet up with the Athenians bringing supplies with them. As we have heard that many of the Sikels had previously sent both provisions and money to the Athenians (Thuc. 6.88.4) it could be argued that, had the Athenians actually reached the rendezvous point, they would not have been expected to have to purchase such provisions, although this cannot be said for certain. The main point to be made is that Nikias had given the matter of how to adequately provision his troops careful thought and had at least made arrangements to rendezvous with a supply convoy on the march. That the Athenians failed to reach the rendezvous point is, by and large, inconsequential.

πόλιν χαλεπῶς καὶ νῦν ἐσκομιζόμενοι.

[10] Cf. Plutarch, *Nikias* 20, who echoes Thucydides' statement that the Athenians felt the loss of the forts at Plemmyrion meant their supply lines by sea had been cut.

In recording the events of the stasis at Athens in 404 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.2) informs us that Thrasyboulos and seventy companions, all opposed to the oligarchic regime, set out from Thebes and occupied Phylê, which Xenophon (*ibid.*) describes as being a: "strong fortress". Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.3) goes on to state that at this, The Thirty along with the Three Thousand and the Athenian cavalry arm, marched out of the city and planned to invest the fortress in an attempt to shut off the avenues of supply to the men in Phylê. Unfortunately for the oligarchs a very heavy snowstorm during the night and continuing on the following day led them to abandon the plan and they marched back to Athens. That The Thirty had attempted to cut Thrasyboulos' lines of supply suggests that supplies were reaching him in the fortress. Indeed, an Athenian inscription honouring those who had liberated the city from The Thirty, and recorded by Harding (1985:8), contains two lines (lines 4 and 5) mentioning those who had donated money or supplies to the men in Phylê. Lines ten to twenty of the same inscription (Harding, 1985:9) record the names of those being honoured. Rather notably these include a muleteer, a mule-tender, a oil-seller, a nut-seller, a bread-seller, and a cloth-fuller, as well a number of farmers and artisans. That several of those being honoured were from a background of supplying foodstuffs is particularly interesting as it suggests that some of the people being honoured had transported provisions to Thrasyboulos' forces at Phylê during the period of stasis.

Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.18-19) states that the anti-oligarchic faction was victorious in a battle with the oligarchs and occupied Peiraieus. During this occupation Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.26) goes on to record that men from Aixone, going to their farms in order to fetch provisions to take back to Peiraieus, were intercepted by Athenian cavalry forces and put to the sword. Although the men of Aixone can hardly be described as a supply convoy in the strictest sense, the fact that they were attempting to make a return journey to and from their farms in order to obtain provisions demonstrates that they considered such a journey as a potential line of supply.

Shortly after this event, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.28) states that the Lakedaimonians, Lysander and his brother Libys, in support of The Thirty attempted to blockade the men in Peiraieus by land and sea. Clearly, they were attempting to sever all lines of supply into Peiraieus. While Lysander assembled a large force of Peloponnesian hoplites at Eleusis in order to blockade Peiraieus by land, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.4.29) states that Libys, as admiral:

> "kept guard on the sea, to prevent supplies coming in by water to the besieged; so that the men in Peiraieus were soon in difficulties again" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 2.4.29)[11].

The employment of a blockade to prevent a force receiving adequate provisions seems to have been a relatively standard Lakedaimonian tactic. Thucydides (2.75.1) states that when the Lakedaimonians and their allies invested Plataiai in the summer of 429 BC, they surrounded the city with a wooden stockade. Later, according to Thucydides (2.78.1), this was replaced by a much more substantial structure consisting of a double wall of mud-brick with ditches both inside and outside the circuit. The aim of such a wall would clearly have been to completely cut off Plataiai from any possible assistance. Thucydides (7.28.1) maintains that the continual occupation of Dekeleia by the Spartans caused considerable hardship to the Athenians. In addition, it also caused a further disadvantage to the Athenians in that provisions which were being brought in to Athens from Euboia, now had to travel around Cape Sounion by sea, a method which Thucydides (*ibid.*) maintains, was more expensive. Even so, as Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 1.1.35) points out, the Spartan king Agis was well aware that Athens would not fall unless she were also blockaded by sea as well as by land. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.2.9-10) states that Lysander sailed to the straits of Salamis and took up a blockading station at the entrance to Peiraieus, and, as a result, the Athenians: "knew not what to do". Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.2.21-22) states that the resulting famine within the city, as a direct result of the Spartan

[11] *κατὰ θάλαττα ἐφύλαττεν ὅπως μηδὲν εἰσπλέοι αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιτηδείων· ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἦσαν οἱ ἐν Πειραιεῖ.*

blockade, induced the Athenians to surrender[12]. Earlier in the war, in 406 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 1.6.19) states, the Athenian admiral Konôn had also found himself blockaded at Methymna on Lesbos, by the Spartan admiral Kallikratidas, and unable to procure provisions from any source. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 1.6.20-22) goes on to state that Konôn sent two triremes in opposite directions, one towards the Hellespont, the other out to the open sea. The ship sent towards the Hellespont managed to evade capture and eventually took word of the blockade to Athens. In 371 BC, during Kleombrotos' invasion of Boiotia, the potential threat of investment by the Lakedaimonians, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 6.4.6) maintains, caused the leaders of the Thebans to be fearful of being blockaded and thereby cut off from provisions, with the possibility that the city itself might turn against its leaders.

Indeed, there had been previous experience at Thebes of shortages of provisions due to Spartan military activity. Following two successive Spartan invasions of Theban territory, in 379 and 378 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.56) states that:

> "the Thebans were now greatly pinched for want of corn, because they had got no crops from their land for two years; they therefore sent men and two triremes to Pagasai after corn, giving them ten talents. But while they were buying up the corn, Alketas, the Lakedaimonian who was keeping guard in Oreios, manned three triremes, taking care that the fact should not be reported. And when the corn was on its way from Pagasai, Alketas captured both corn and triremes, and made prisoners of the men, who were not fewer than three hundred. These men he then shut up in the Acropolis, where he himself had his quarters" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 5.4.56)[13].

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[12] Cf. Plutarch, *Lysander* 14, who, no doubt following Xenophon's account, records how the famine at Athens as a direct result of the Spartan blockade brought about the surrender of the city.

[13] *Μάλα δὲ πιεζόμενοι οἱ Θηβαῖοι στάνει σίτου διὰ τὸ δυοῖν ἐτοῖν μὴ εἰληφέναι καρπὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς, πέμπουσιν ἐπὶ δυοῖν τριήροιν ἄνδρας εἰς Παγασὰς ἐπὶ σῖτον δέκα τάλαντα δόντες. Ἀλκέτας δὲ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος φυλάττων, Ὠρεόν, ἐν ᾧ ἐκεῖνοι τὸν σῖτον συνεωνοῦντο, ἐπληρώσατο τρεῖς τριήρεις, ἐπιμεληθεὶς ὅπως μὴ ἐξαγγελθείη. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπήγετο ὁ σῖτος, λαμβάνει ὁ Ἀλκέτας τόν τε σῖτον καὶ τὰς τριήρεις, καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ἐζώγρησεν οὐκ ἐλάττους ὄντας ἢ τριακοσίους. τούτους δὲ εἶρξεν ἐν τῇ ἀκροπόλει, οὗπερ αὐτὸς ἐσκήνου.*

Clearly, Alketas was fully aware of the importance of this grain shipment to the Thebans and his interception of it was a clever stroke[14]. Unfortunately, for both Alketas and the Spartans, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.57) points out, the Theban prisoners on the acropolis of Oreios seized control of the acropolis while Alketas was occupying himself with a handsome young boy in the town. The result was, Xenophon (*ibid.*) states, that the city, too, rose in rebellion against the Spartans and that after this episode the Thebans found it easier to bring in provisions of corn.

The Spartans in particular, and indeed their allies also, seem to have been acutely aware of the detrimental effects on an enemy that the interception of supply convoys could achieve. In the year following the episode at Oreios, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.60) maintains that at an assembly of the allies of the Lakedaimonians held at Sparta, several of the allies made speeches pointing out that they had more ships than their Athenian enemy and that they could starve Athens into submission, or even use the same ships to transport an army to invade Theban territory. As a result of these discussions, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.61) goes on to say, Pollis was appointed admiral and sixty triremes were manned and placed under his command. Xenophon (*ibid.*) states that the reasoning of the allies proved to be correct, since the Lakedaimonian fleet being stationed in the neighbourhood of Aigina, Keos and Andros, meant that the Athenian grain ships would not sail any further along the coast than Gerastos, situated at the southern extremity of the island of Euboia. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.4.61-62) goes on to record that the Athenians: "realising the necessity that was upon them" manned their warships, and under the command of Chabrias fought a successful naval engagement after which: "the corn was brought in for the Athenians"[15]. The episode is particularly interesting in that it, once again, demonstrates that the ancient Greeks were fully aware of the harmful effects that cutting an enemy's lines of supply could induce. It is perhaps noteworthy that

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[14] Cf. Frontinus, 4.7.19. See also Tuplin (1993:129-130; 130 n.12) who points out that Polyainos, 2.5.7, has another story involving Alketas, ships, and Oreios.

[15] Diodoros, 15.34.3, also records how Pollis intended intercepting the Athenian grain convoy. Unlike Xenophon's account, Diodoros does not record a naval battle, but rather merely that the Athenians responded by providing the grain convoy with a naval escort.

Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) describes the actions of the Athenians as being undertaken due to "necessity" or compulsion (*ἀνάγκη*). This shows that they were fully aware of the gravity of the situation they found themselves in and took the necessary steps to remedy the situation and restore their lines of supply.

In the summer of 369 BC, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.1.15) states that a force of Lakedaimonians and Pellênêans holding Oneion were attacked by the Thebans and their allies and dislodged from their position. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.1.17) is particularly scathing of the actions of the Spartan commander, an unnamed *polemarch*, pointing out that such as managed to survive the assault took refuge on the nearest hill, adding:

> "although the polemarch of the Lakedaimonians might have got as many hoplites and as many peltasts as he pleased from the forces of the allies and might have held his position - for supplies might have been brought in safety from Kenchreai - he did not do this" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.1.17)[16].

This unnamed, and very senior, Spartan officer concluded what: "Xenophon represents as an unnecessarily craven truce, permitting the Thebans to enter the Peloponnesos" (Tuplin, 1993:144). This particular Xenophon passage is of further interest in that not only does Xenophon criticise a serving senior Spartan officer for his tactical failings, but in addition Xenophon draws attention to logistical matters, this being the relative ease with which the Spartan *polemarch* could have allegedly kept his force adequately supplied[17].

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[16] *ἐξὸν τῷ Λακεδαιμονίων πολεμάρχῳ λαβόντι ὁπόσους μὲν ἐβούλετο τῶν συμμάχων ὁπλίτας, ὁπόσους δὲ πελταστάς, κατέχειν τὸ χωρίον, καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἐξῆν ἀσφαλῶς ἐκ Κεγχρειῶν κ ομίζεσθαι, οὐκ ἐποίησε ταῦτα.*

[17] As a former general of some considerable skill himself, Xenophon was more than adequately qualified to comment with some appreciable authority on military matters be they of a tactical, strategic, or logistical nature. Cf. Xenophon's (*Hellenika*, 6.5.51-52) criticisms of the Athenian general Iphikrates, which also involves the holding of Oneion against the Thebans in 370 BC. On logistical matters see Xenophon's (*Hellenika*, 6.2.5-23) account of Mnasippos' logistical mismanagement of the Kerkyran campaign of 374 BC.

Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.1-23) gives a long and praiseworthy account of the small *polis* of Phleious' fidelity in their alliance with Sparta. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.1) states that, in 366 BC:

> "the Argives had fortified Mount Trikaranon, above the Heraion, as a base of attack upon Phleious, while the Sikyonians were fortifying Thyamia on its borders, the Phleiasians were extremely hard pressed and suffered from lack of provisions; nevertheless they remained steadfast in their alliance" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.2.1)[18].

Certainly, the Phleiasians were all too well aware of the danger of being blockaded. During this time, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.17) states that the Phleiasians, while they were: "shut off from the products of their land" got their provisions partly by living off what they could take from their enemies, and partly by buying from the market in Corinth. Xenophon (*ibid.*) points out that this was despite the many dangers and difficulties this entailed as well as having difficulty providing the money to meet the price of the supplies they purchased. At first glance it could be argued that this was not strictly a military supply convoy system. However the military nature of these convoys is clarified a short time later when Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.18) records how the Phleiasians requested that the Athenian general Chares escort a convoy, accompanied by the non-combatants among the Phleiasians, to Pellênê. Once this had been successfully achieved, the Phleiasians, having loaded their purchases upon *ὑποζύγια* headed back to Phleious. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.19) continues by pointing out that the Phleiasians were well aware that their supply convoy could well run into an ambush, which indeed it almost did, had not the Phleiasian troops, followed by Chares, gone ahead of the convoy to clear the road of enemies. Tuplin (1993:167) observes of this episode that Xenophon's treatment of the Athenian general Chares: "manages not to be particularly flattering, with Chares taking no initiative and sometimes literally puffing along behind the eager Phleiasians". The episode is also interesting for a number of other reasons than

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[18] *τῶν τε Ἀργείων ἐπιτετειχικότων τῷ Φλειοῦντι τὸ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἡραίου Τρικάρανον, καὶ τῶν Σικυωνίων ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁρίοις αὐτῶν τειχιζόντων τὴν Θυαμίαν, μάλα ἐπιέζοντο οἱ Φλειάσιοι καὶ*

Xenophon's attitude towards Chares. Firstly, it shows that the Phleiasians were acutely aware of the absolute necessity of making an attempt to get through to Pellênê. Secondly, they were willing to take such a risk, albeit because of sheer necessity, in order to obtain supplies from Pellênê. Furthermore, it appears that they knew full well that there was a risk of the supply convoy being ambushed as it made the return leg of its journey and took suitable precautions to prevent any interception of the convoy by enemy forces. Shortly after this episode, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.20-23) states that the Phleiasians, accompanied by Chares and his troops, attacked the Sikyonian builders engaged upon constructing the fortification at Thyamia, as the Sikyonians had plenty of builders at the site but few hoplites. Following the success of this mission, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.23) states that:

> "the Corinthians, after news had reached them in the night in regard to Thyamia, in a most friendly way, ordered out by proclamation all their teams and pack-animals, loaded them with corn, and conveyed them to Phleious; and so long as the fortifications were building, convoys continued to be sent out every day" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 7.2.23)[19].

It is perhaps worth noting that although Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.1-23) has embarked on the task of recording the deeds of the Phleiasians as an example of a trusting and loyal ally of Sparta, nevertheless, as Tuplin (1993:146) points out: "it is Corinth that takes the lead here", and not Sparta. It is actually the Corinthians who decree to send the daily supply convoys of grain to the Phleiasians and not the Spartans. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.2.2) states that, in 386 BC, the Mantineians supplied the Argives with grain even though the latter were at war with Sparta. There is one other alleged shipment of supplies from one ally to another. Diodoros (14.79.4) states that while Agesilaos was campaigning in Asia, the Lakedaimonians concluded an alliance with Nephereus

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ἐσπάνιζον τῶν ἐπιτηδείων· ὅμως δὲ διεκαρτέρουν ἐν τῇ συμμαχίᾳ.

[19] *οἱ...Κορίνθιοι, ἀφικομένου τῆς νυκτὸς ἀγγέλου περὶ τῆς Θυαμίας, μάλα φιλικῶς κηρύξαντες τὰ ζεύγη καὶ τὰ ὑποζύγια πάντα καὶ σίτου γεμίσαντες εἰς τὸν Φλειοῦντα παρήγαγον· καὶ ἕωσπερ ἐτειχίζετο τὸ τεῖχος, ἑκάστης ἡμέρας παραπομπαὶ ἐγίγνοντο.*

the king of Egypt who, according to Diodoros (*ibid.*) sent a gift of enough equipment for one hundred triremes along with five hundred thousand medimnoi of grain. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.4.3) informs us that when Agesilaos embarked for his Asian campaign he took with him: "provisions for six months" (ἑξαμήνου σῖτον) but makes no mention, either in his *Hellenika* (3.4.5f) or in his *Agesilaos* (1.7f), of Agesilaos' campaign in Asia that the Spartan king ever received supplies from Egypt and, as an eyewitness to, and a participant in, the events of Agesilaos' campaign in Asia, we might at least have expected him to do so.

The Greeks of the western Mediterranean also understood the need for a good understanding of military logistics. Diodoros (13.88.1) maintains that the Syracusan general Daphnaios had planned to lay siege to a Carthaginian camp before the city of Akragas, in 406 BC, but in finding it heavily fortified instead posted his cavalry troops on the roads and thereby captured such enemy troops as were out foraging for supplies. Daphnaios' actions, Diodoros (*ibid.*) alleges, brought the Carthaginians into serious straits in that by cutting off the means by which provisions could be transported into the camp it led to severe shortages of supplies within the Carthaginian camp. Diodoros (13.88.2) goes on to say that the situation within the Carthaginian camp was allegedly so bad that Himilcar's Campanian mercenaries marched on his tent in a body and threatened to defect to the Greeks. Diodoros (*ibid.*) states that at the same time, the Syracusans were sending a great amount of grain (πλῆθος σίτου) by sea to Akragas and alleges that the Carthaginian commander Himilcar received word of the shipment from: "some source" and planned to intercept it with triremes he summoned from the Carthaginian bases at Panormus and Motyê. Following the success of the Carthaginian triremes in their raid on the Greek supply convoy, Diodoros (13.88.5) maintains, the whole situation was reversed with the Carthaginians now having plenty of supplies, while the citizens of Akragas were deeply concerned at the interception of the convoy. Diodoros (13.88.6) infers that such shipments of grain had been an on-going concern during the siege and that the interception of one of these convoys led to grave concerns about the lack of supplies within the city.

There is something deeply unsatisfactory about Diodoros' whole account of this siege. Firstly, although he does inform us (13.85.1) that the Carthaginians established two camps before Akragas, he merely says that the main camp was near to the city. Secondly, Daphnaios' forces arrived and overran one of the camps and posted troops to cut Himilcar's lines of supply by land (Diodoros, 13.87.1-88.1), so how did Himilcar manage to send word to the Carthaginian bases at Panormus and Motyê? Diodoros is not forthcoming on this point. If Himilcar's main camp had been close to the sea and he had managed to send a dispatch boat or similar we could at least have expected Diodoros to mention it. Furthermore, if Himilcar could get word to the Carthaginian bases at Panormus and Motyê requesting triremes, could he not have also asked for supplies to be sent to him? As to his receiving intelligence of the Greek grain shipment, it seems likely, given Diodoros' (13.88.6) inference that such supply convoys were being sent throughout the siege, that Himilcar knew full well that another supply convoy would arrive sooner or later and he therefore planned to intercept it and attempt to cut the line of supply between Syracuse and Akragas.

During further conflict between the Syracusans and the Carthaginians, Diodoros (14.55.5) states that following the arrival of Himilcon and his capture of both Eryx and Motyê, the Syracusan tyrant Dionysios, stationed as he was at Aigesta (or Segesta), thought it more prudent to avoid battle and pursue the war in another area on the grounds that:

> "he was widely separated from his allied cities and because the transport of his food supplies was reduced" (Diodoros, 14.55.5)[20].

It is hardly surprising that Dionysios took such a decision, for his forces were approximately one hundred and sixty miles away from Syracuse as the crow flies. Certainly, with supply lines stretching so far to the rear there was a very real danger that Himilcon could have attempted to cut Dionysios' lines of supply and

[20] ἅμα μὲν μακρὰν τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων ἀπεωσμένος, ἅμα δὲ τῆς σιτοπομπίας ἐπιλειπούσης.

bring him to battle at a considerable disadvantage. Dionysios' decision not to force a battle at this stage can only be condoned and helps to underline his skill as a general. Indeed, as Keegan (1993:304-305) points out: "few commanders in ancient or pre-modern times, except those of Roman armies operating at the extremities of the imperial road network or those keeping close to a water-borne supply train, could campaign outside their home territories with a freedom unconstrained by logistic consideration", and Dionysios of Syracuse was no exception. Diodoros (14.55.6-7) states that following unsuccessful negotiations with the Sikani which were intended to bring the tribes into alliance with Dionysios, the Syracusan autocrat made his way back to Syracuse, laying waste the land in his wake.

Diodoros (14.63.3) states that when Himilcon laid siege to Syracuse, he built three forts, one at Plemmyrion, one at the middle of the harbour, and a third by the temple of Zeus. Diodoros (*ibid.*) maintains that Himilcon had these stocked with grain, wine and other provisions, believing that to besiege Syracuse would be a lengthy task. In addition Himilcon is alleged to have sent merchant ships to Sardinia and Libya to: "secure grain and every kind of food", while on the Syracusan side, Dionysios' brother-in-law Polyxenos arrived from the Peloponnesos and Italy with thirty warships from Syracuse's allies along with a Lakedaimonian admiral, Pharakidas. At this juncture, Diodoros (14.64.1) states that Dionysios and Leptinês set out with warships to escort a supply of provisions[21]. Unfortunately, Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) fails to provide us with any further details of this mission, merely saying that while Dionysios was away the Syracusans on their own initiative intercepted a Carthaginian merchant vessel that was laden with food and destined for the besieging forces. As Syracuse was under siege at that time it seems logical to suppose that Dionysios and Leptinês were sailing out with warships to a prearranged rendezvous point to meet up with merchant vessels in order to provide them with a naval escort into Syracuse.

[21] *μετὰ μακρῶν νεῶν ἐξέπλεον ἀγορὰν βουλόμενοι παρακομίσαι.*

Following the failure of the siege at Syracuse, largely as a result of the plague, Diodoros (14.77.1-6) gives a brief account of a revolt from Carthage that took place in Libya. Diodoros (14.77.6) maintains that the revolt failed largely due to the disorganisation among the rebels, a lack of suitable commanders, and a lack of supplies. In stark contrast, Diodoros (*ibid.*) states that the Carthaginians: "brought supplies by sea from Sardinia" and also bought off some of the rebels.

Some four years later, as another Carthaginian force made its way through the Sicilian interior, Diodoros (14.95.7) maintains that Dionysios allied himself with Agyris of Agyrion, who readily provided Dionysios' army with all of its food supplies. Diodoros (14. 96.1) goes on to allege that the Carthaginian commander Magon was continually in want of supplies, in that the troops of Agyris were constantly laying ambushes and cutting off the Carthaginian lines of supply. Dionysios was of the opinion that the Syracusans and their allies should bide their time rather than force a pitched battle, believing that hunger among the Carthaginian forces would achieve victory for the Greeks without their having to fight. Unfortunately for Dionysios, Diodoros (14.96.3-4) states, his plan met with the disapproval of the Syracusans, who deserted him and, consequently forced him to conclude a peace agreement with Magon.

During his war against Persia, Euagoras of Kyprian Salamis, Diodoros (15.3.1) alleges, indulged in acts of piracy to intercept Persian supply ships bringing provisions to Persian troops stationed on Kypros and thereby attempted to sever the Persian lines of supply. Diodoros (*ibid.*) maintains that Euagoras was so successful in this that there were such severe shortages of supplies among the Persian forces that the mercenary troops employed by the Persians rebelled and murdered their officers. Diodoros (15.3.2-3) states that the Persians only managed to put down the rebellion after transporting a large amount of grain to the island from Cilicia. Diodoros (15.3.3) goes on to state that Euagoras received a shipment of grain, along with money and other supplies, from his ally king Acoris of Egypt. In somewhat stark contrast, Xenophon mentions Euagoras on only three occasions (*Hellenika*, 2.1.29; 4.8.24; 5.1.10), and of these only the latter two of the three references relate to Euagoras' war with Persia. Xenophon

(*Hellenika*, 4.8.24) tells us that the Athenian admiral Philokrates, with ten triremes, was sailing to aid Euagoras when he was intercepted by the Spartan Teleutias who captured all ten of his ships. The only other occasion on which Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 5.1.10) refers to Euagoras' struggle against Persia is in remarking that the Athenian admiral Chabrias set out on a voyage to aid Euagoras with eight hundred peltasts and ten triremes along with other ships and hoplites obtained from Athens[22].

Diodoros (16.13.3) maintains that during a period of stasis at Syracuse, between the forces of Dion and the tyrant Dionysios the Younger, the latter found he had plenty of everything but grain and that although he had mastery of the sea his raids to obtain provisions by foraging proved to be inadequate. Diodoros (*ibid.*) alleges that as a result Dionysios the Younger dispatched merchantmen and money in order to obtain grain, but that the Syracusan forces who were siding with Dion manned their warships and intercepted many of the merchant vessels that were bound for the tyrant. Plutarch's (*Dion* 28-37) account of the overthrow of Dionysios the Younger makes no mention of the tyrant attempting to obtain provisions in the way that Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) describes. It is plausible that Diodoros is correct and Dionysios' enemies had deliberately waited to intercept the merchant ships on the return leg of their mission when they would be fully loaded, thus slower and easier to intercept. Perhaps Plutarch, working to a different agenda to Diodoros, chose instead to focus on the involvement of Dion (his subject matter) in the overthrow of the tyrant and this might be the reason he failed to include any account of Dionysios' attempts to obtain supplies from abroad. Plutarch (*Dion* 35) does mention the attempt of Philistos to bring naval aid to the tyrant in the form of a fleet of warships which sailed for Syracuse from Iapygia, and records that this attempt was to prove unsuccessful, he makes no mention of Dionysios' further attempts to break the siege or of the tyrant's continued efforts to obtain provisions from outside Syracuse. This is not to say that Diodoros' (*loc. cit.*) account is correct. On the one hand Diodoros alleges that Dionysios the Younger had mastery of the sea, and yet he could not exploit

[22] Isokrates, *Euagoras* 57f, has little to add to our knowledge, being little more than laudatory encomium.

this alleged supremacy and bring in supplies. This seems highly implausible. Surely if Dionysios the Younger did have mastery of the sea he would have had little trouble shipping in supplies from abroad. In addition, later in his narrative Diodoros (16.16.3) records that at the naval battle in which Philistos was defeated there were about sixty triremes on the two opposing sides; this suggests *parity* of forces rather than the supremacy of one side over the other which would cast doubt on Diodoros' (16.13.3) assertion that Dionysios the Younger had control of the sea. Furthermore, Plutarch's (*loc. cit.*) account makes it plain that the Syracusan *dêmos* felt that the balance of power lay in their own fleet and not in the hands of Dion's mercenary troops, which would suggest that Dionysios the Younger was effectively cut off by both land and sea from any aid.

Later in the siege, Diodoros (16.17.2) maintains that the tyrant managed to slip out of Syracuse by ship and reached Italy; from the safety of which he dispatched Nypsios, along with merchant vessels laden with supplies for the tyrant's troops garrisoning the Syracusan acropolis (Diod. 16.18.1). Nypsios succeeded in reaching the beleaguered garrison with these much needed supplies in time to persuade Dionysios' mercenary force not to surrender (Diod. 16.18.3). There was a final twist to the episode however, in that, Diodoros (16.18.4) states, in response to this the Syracusans quickly manned their triremes, attacked and defeated Nypsios' men as they were in the act of unloading the supply ships.

Diodoros (16.76.3) states that during the siege of Perinthos, in 341-340 BC, Philip of Makedon became aware that the city was receiving supplies from Byzantion. Diodoros (*ibid.*) maintains that Philip's response to this was to divide his forces in two and invest both cities simultaneously, thus preventing the one from aiding the other. Although Demosthenes (*Answer to Philip's letter*, 11.3f) refers to Philip's attacks on both Perinthos and Byzantion, he does not add anything to our knowledge as to whether the Byzantines were sending supplies to their neighbour Perinthos. Perinthos was receiving aid in the form of mercenaries financed by the Persians (Demosthenes, 11.5), while Philip of Makedon himself complained that the Athenians were openly inciting the Byzantines against him (Demosthenes, 12.16). Elsewhere, Demosthenes (*On the*

Crown, 18.80) states that it was he himself who was responsible for dispatching Athenian naval forces in support of Byzantion, although the Athenian grain ships that Philip intercepted (Demosthenes, 18.73) were no doubt actually bound for Athens itself rather than either Byzantion or Perinthos. What is clear is that the two states, Byzantion and Perinthos, were indeed allied to each other and it seems likely that the one would have come to the aid of the other in the way that Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) maintains.

Diodoros (17.8.3-4) maintains that when the Thebans rebelled against the Makedonian garrison holding the Kadmeia, the Thebans surrounded the acropolis with trenches and stockades so that neither reinforcements nor supplies could get through to the besieged Makedonian troops. Arrian (*Anabasis*, 1.7-8) concurs with Diodoros' account and, similarly, remarks on how help could not get through to the besieged troops[23]. Diodoros (17.8.5) alleges that the Thebans themselves received a free gift of arms from the Athenian statesman Demosthenes, which presumably had been transported in some way to Thebes, and therefore constitutes a supply convoy. While it is questionable that Demosthenes allegedly provided complete sets of arms to the Thebans, as Diodoros (*loc. cit.*) maintains, we do know of Demosthenes' involvement in the business of arms production in that Demosthenes (*Against Aphobos* I, 27.9) himself mentions his father's sword making 'factory' and Demosthenes' gift may well have been to supply those among the Thebans who were unarmed with *swords*.

On the subject of the employment of depots and magazines by the Greeks, Anderson (1970:53) states that: "it was unusual to establish a fixed magazine and base of supplies...Nothing like the elaborate chain of bases that supported the Persian invasion of Greece in 480 BC could ever have been organised by any Greek state". While what Anderson (*loc. cit.*) says is, by and large, true there

[23] Cf. Justin, 11,3,6-7; Plutarch, *Alexander* 11-12.

were exceptions, and the notion of depots and magazines was certainly not completely alien to the Greeks, however unusual.

Thucydides (6.97.5) states that when the Athenians, in the early stages of their Sicilian expedition, occupied the heights of Epipolai they marched down on Syracuse but as the Syracusans refused to offer battle to the Athenians the latter:

> "withdrew and built a fort at Labdalon, on the verge of the bluffs of Epipolai looking towards Megara, that it might serve as a magazine for their baggage and stores whenever they advanced either to fight or to work at the wall" (Thucydides, 6.97.5)[24].

Clearly Thucydides' use of the term *ἀποθήκη* to describe the primary function of the fort at Labdalon shows that it was indeed intended to serve as a magazine, or storehouse, for supplies. The wall construction of which Thucydides speaks was the wall being constructed by the Athenians to encircle Syracuse[25].

Later in the Athenians' Sicilian campaign, Thucydides (7.4.5) states that Nikias built three forts at Plemmyrion in which he placed most of his stores. Following the capture of the forts at Plemmyrion by the Syracusans, Thucydides (7.24.2-3) reiterates that the Athenians had been using them as 'warehouses' stating that:

> "in the capture of the forts many men were killed or made prisoners, and much property in all was taken; for as the Athenians used the forts as a warehouse, there were in them many wares belonging to merchants as well as food, and also much property belonging to the trierarchs - in fact the sails and other tackle of forty triremes were taken there, as well as three triremes that had been drawn up on shore" (Thucydides, 7.24.2-3)[26].

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[24] *ἐπαναχωρήσαντες φρούριον ἐπὶ τῷ Λαβδάλῳ ᾠκοδόμησαν ἐπ' ἄκροις τοῖς κρημνοῖς τῶν Ἐπιπολῶν ὁρῶν πρὸς τὰ Μέγαρα, ὅπως εἴη αὐτοῖς, ὁπότε προΐοιεν ἢ μαχούμενοι ἢ τειχιοῦντες, τοῖς τε σκεύεσι καὶ τοῖς χρήμασιν ἀποθήκη.*

[25] Cf. Plutarch, *Nikias* 17, who mentions the Athenians building an encircling wall, but omits any mention of the fort built at Labdalon.

[26] *ἄνθωποι δ' ἐν τῶν τειχῶν τῇ ἁλώσει ἀπέθανον καὶ ἐζωγρήθησαν πολλοί, καὶ χρήματα πολλὰ*

It is worth noting that in addition to the equipment that had been stored within the forts the Athenians also lost money belonging to the trierarchs as well as having a number of merchants, probably along with their wares, captured also. These merchants were probably the same merchants that Thucydides (6.44.1) has mentioned earlier in his narrative who had accompanied the expedition voluntarily in the hope of trade. The captured merchants may also have included merchants and their wares from other Italian and Sicilian Greek cities, although Thucydides does not specifically say so.

Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.2.11) states that when Derkylidas received word that the city of Atarneus was held by Chian exiles who were using the stronghold as a base from which to pillage Ionia, the Lakedaimonian Derkylidas:

> "when he heard further that they had a large stock of grain in the city, he invested and besieged them; and in eight months he brought them to terms, appointed Drakôn of Pellênê to have charge of the city, and after storing in the place supplies in abundance, so that he might have it as a halting-place whenever he came there, departed to Ephesos, which is distant from Sardis, a three days' journey" (Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 3.2.11)[27].

This passage is of particular interest in that it shows a Lakedaimonian commander in the field acting upon his own initiative and making a conscious decision to establish a depot, furnished with an abundance of supplies, to be used as a magazine for his troops whenever he was in the area. Although it is indeed rare for Greek commanders to establish such magazines this particular passage shows that the notion was by no means completely alien to them. Isokrates (*Panegyrikos*, 4.144) also notes the incident, although he makes no mention of

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τὰ ξύμπαντα ἑάλω· ὥστε γὰρ ταμιείῳ χρωμένων τῶν Ἀθηναίων τοῖς τείχεσι πολλὰ μὲν ἐμπόρων χρήματα καὶ σῖτος ἐνῆν, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῶν τριηράρχων, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἱστία τεσσαράκοντα τριήρων καὶ τἆλλα σκεύη ἐγκατελήφθη καὶ τριήρεις ἀνειλκυσμέναι τρεῖς.

[27] *πυθόμενος δὲ ὅτι πολὺς σῖτος ἐνῆν αὐτοῖς, περιστρατοπεδευσάμενος ἐπολιόρκει· καὶ ἐν ὀκτὼ μησὶ παραστησάμενος αὐτούς, καταστήσας ἐν αὐτῷ Δράκοντα Πελληνέα ἐπιμελητήν, καὶ κατασκευάσας ἐν τῷ χωρίῳ ἔκπλεω πάντα τὰ ἐπιτήδεια, ἵνα εἴη αὐτῷ καταγωγή, ὁπότε ἀφικνοῖτο, ἀπῆλθεν εἰς Ἔφεσον, ἣ ἀπέχει ἀπὸ Σάρδεων τριῶν ἡμερῶν ὁδόν.*

Derkylidas establishing a magazine at Atarneus, and states that Drakôn actually took possession (*καταλαβὼν*) of Atarneus. In addition, as Tuplin (1993:50 n.23) observes of this Isokrates passage, Isokrates: "speaks of *ἐπαρχία* in Aiolis, and suggests a more active role for Drakôn than [Xenophon] *Hellenika*, 3.2.11". Isokrates (*loc. cit.*) alleges that Drakôn, using Atarneus as a base, took three thousand peltasts and devastated the plains of neighbouring Mysia. One further point to make on the topic of Derkylidas' (or Drakôn's) capture of Atarneus is that one wonders how much of the original stockpile of grain that had attracted the initial attention of Derkylidas in the first place actually remained following a siege of eight months duration, although it would be futile to speculate.

Later in the fourth century BC, in early 351 BC, Demosthenes (*First Philippic*, 4.32), addressing the Athenians, reminded them that:

> "You have the advantage of winter bases for your troops in Lemnos, Thasos, Skiathos, and the neighbouring islands, where are to be found harbours, provisions, and everything that an army needs" (Demosthenes, *First Philippic*, 4.32)[28].

Demosthenes (*ibid.*) was attempting to persuade the Athenians to equip and maintain a standing army fearing that Philip of Makedon would be likely to launch an attack in winter, when the Athenians would be unprepared for such action. Of the winter bases that Demosthenes speaks it is clear that they are stocked with provisions, although whether or not they could be classed as depots is questionable. That the bases contain supplies of food as well as providing harbour facilities, and that they are used on a seasonal basis would seem to suggest that they do fulfil the criteria to be classed as a system of magazines across the Aegean which the Athenians could draw upon in the months of winter.

To sum up therefore, there is a sizeable body of evidence to show that Greek commanders and Greek states were familiar with the use of supply convoys as a

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[28] *ὑπάρχει δ' ὑμῖν χειμαδίῳ μὲν χρῆσθαι τῇ δυνάμει Λήμνῳ καὶ Θάσῳ καὶ Σκιάθῳ καὶ ταῖς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ νήσοις, ἐν αἷς καὶ λιμένες καὶ σῖτος καὶ ἃ χρὴ στρατεύματι πάνθ' ὑπάρχει.*

means of ensuring that troops received adequate supplies of both provisions and equipment. The employment of supply convoys by Greek forces shows that they did indeed pay attention to overcoming the logistical problem of supplying forces serving, on occasions, at some distance away from their home *polis*. Furthermore, I believe Anderson (1970:53) to be incorrect when he states that the ancient Greek general: "did not have to keep his lines of communication open". As we have seen, Thucydides (7.24.3) clearly states that the loss of the three Athenian forts at Plemmyrion led to the very real fears among the Athenians that they had indeed had their line of supply by sea severed and that they clearly understood the magnitude of the situation they then found themselves in. In addition, the employment of tactics specifically designed to sever an army's or *polis*' lines of supply appears to have been all too familiar among Greek commanders and was employed on a number of occasions with the full knowledge of the detrimental effects on both physical strength and morale that disrupting or breaking an enemy's line of supply could achieve.

Although there is considerably less evidence for the Greek use of depots and magazines that is not to say that such a system was completely alien to them. Indeed, although we have few examples of the Greek use of depots and magazines the fact that there are at least some few examples helps to illustrate that the Greeks were indeed aware of the possibility of employing just such a method to ensure that troops received adequate supplies when necessary.

CONCLUSION

This thesis has focused on the public and private systems that supplied a Greek army with: (a) arms, armour and tools, (b) food and drink in sufficient quantity and with sufficient regularity and reliability to ensure that it could operate effectively, including its means of transport, over relatively great distances. While several works deal with *specific items* of Greek military logistics, few have set out to explain or analyse the *whole process*. Lazenby (*War in History* 1 [1994]: 3) points out of logistics that: "with rare exceptions, this is a neglected subject in the study of Greek warfare". The only substantial published work that deals with *the whole process* of military logistics in a Greek context is D.W. Engels' (1978) *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army* but this concentrates specifically on Makedonian operations in the territory of the Persian Empire. Pritchett's massive *Greek State at War* (in five volumes, 1971-1991), by contrast, contains little concerning logistics. My aim has been to investigate the approaches adopted by the various Greek *poleis* and federal groups by re-examining available literary, epigraphic, archaeological and topographical evidence and analysing the problems Greek states faced when planning and executing a military campaign. The analysis has brought out the constraints, both economic and geographical, which affected armament, provisioning and deployment of large bodies of soldiers. The topic is important both as an aspect of military history and for its engagement with non-military questions: for military logistics involve socio-economic processes that apply in other contexts of Greek life, and as this project examines the redirection of resources to support 'eccentric' behaviour, it contributes to our understanding of the ordinary processes of Greek society.

I believe I have demonstrated that ancient Greek writers and commanders were fully aware of the imperative necessity for commanders to exercise good logistical management. Throughout this thesis I have taken a viewpoint and line of argument that is at variance with the arguments put forward by Luttwak (1993:3-7) who is of the opinion that Classical writers excluded any sufficient accounts of how food, fodder and weapons were procured. However, as Luttwak

(*loc. cit.*) fails to make any reference whatsoever to the Xenophontic corpus I believe his arguments to be flawed. Furthermore, I believe I have demonstrated that there is a considerable body of evidence relating to logistical concerns within our ancient source material, and that this evidence does not merely focus on those occasions when armies were suffering from ἀπορία, that is to say when an army was faced with a lack of resources. Rather, there is a quite substantial treatment of logistical issues within our source material that helps to outline how armies, on many occasions, successfully overcame the problems of logistical supply. The level of detail assigned to logistical issues within our source material varies enormously however. For example when Thucydides (7.60.2) informs that the Athenians had been receiving apparently regular supply convoys from Katanê, it is recorded as something of an afterthought, and he gives us no further details about the size or composition of such convoys, nor any information with regard to how often such convoys arrived within the Athenian camp. In contrast, Thucydides' (4.3.1-39.3) narrative of the events of the Sphakteria-Pylos campaign goes into considerable detail with regard to the logistical problems facing the two sets of protagonists, and how the two sides attempted to overcome such problems. It can perhaps be argued that, in the case of the Sphakteria-Pylos campaign, Thucydides was better placed to interview survivors, including the Lakedaimonian troops who had been captured on the island, and therefore was able to paint a much more detailed and complete picture of the campaign than he would have, perhaps, been able to with regard to the Athenians' Sicilian expedition.

Furthermore, Luttwak's (*loc. cit.*) failure to even acknowledge the existence of the Xenophontic corpus gives a completely distorted view of ancient historiography and the topics that ancient authors chose to address. This thesis does indeed rely heavily on evidence contained within the testimony of Xenophon's works. Perhaps because of the author's personal experiences as a military commander Xenophon was particularly attuned to military matters and his works in particular, are invaluable, not merely to a study of logistics but to our understanding of Greek military history and Greek warfare in general. Time and again Xenophon raises the subject of logistics within his works, sometimes

when we would least expect it. For example, it is noteworthy that when Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, 3.1.6) has Sokrates outline the attributes of a good general the first topic that is raised is that a general must be skilled in regard to logistical concerns. That Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) has Sokrates point out the need for good logistical skills at the head of his list for the attributes a good general must possess, clearly shows the importance of this subject in relation to success as a general. Similarly, Xenophon has the Elder Cyrus reiterate just such a point in another of his works, the *Cyropaideia* (1.6.14), pointing out how allegedly Cyrus' father had instructed him in generalship and that, of this lesson, the first thing the Elder Cyrus had learnt was that tactics were useless if a general could not procure sufficient provisions and keep his army healthy. Indeed, as Wood (1964:49) observes, Xenophon clearly understood: "that the vital role of a general is the creation and maintenance of an army that will be able to execute his commands". No general could expect an army to execute his commands if the commander in question did not provide his troops with the means to obtain adequate supplies of provisions.

Furthermore, I contend that if Xenophon knew of the importance of good logistical management then so too did other Greek commanders and writers. Unfortunately, we have lost the *Παρασκευαστικὴ βίβλος*, the *Book of Military Preparations*, of Aineias written in the fourth century BC. Aineias himself alludes to this work on four occasions in his *Poliorketika* (7.4; 8.5; 21.1; 40.8). Although we have no way of knowing what the work contained, it seems logical to assume that as it was concerned with military preparations the subject of military logistics would seem likely to have been among the topics it addressed. In addition, as Hanson (1999:162-163) points out: "almost all the late Fourth- and early Third-century [BC] followers of Xenophon and Aineias - and others who probably wrote similarly practical military handbooks - are mere names, their work lost. Worse yet, the subsequent enormous industry of Hellenistic military scholarship (nearly thirty names of such authors and titles are known to us) has likewise been obliterated". It has not been my intention, however, to indulge in speculation and base my arguments on any silences within our source material but rather to examine the evidence that we do possess.

The careful reader will, no doubt, be aware that this thesis has drawn heavily on one of Xenophon's works in particular, that being the *Anabasis*, for evidence of logistical matters. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, as Dalby (1992:17) observes, Xenophon: "knew how crucially food and comfort can effect men's morale", and thereby their ability to function as an effective military force. Secondly, within the narrative of Xenophon's *Anabasis*, as Dalby (1992:23) notes of the Ten Thousand: "their economic life is equally instructive. Their continuing most urgent need, more insistent even than the need to find a way home, was for a regular supply of food". Time after time, within the pages of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon addresses this issue on an almost continual basis. Thirdly, a heavy reliance on Xenophon's *Anabasis* to provide evidence of Greek handling of logistical issues is also due to the fact, as Connolly (1981:47) points out, that: "the only detailed account that we have of an army on the march is Xenophon's retreat of the Ten Thousand". Nevertheless, despite a seemingly heavy reliance on Xenophon's *Anabasis* for evidence of how Greek armies addressed logistical concerns I believe I have sought, and found, parallel evidence in other source material to underline and endorse my examination of the methods by which Greek armies procured adequate supplies of provisions, or not, as the individual cases may be. This has been necessary in that, as Dalby (1992:17) quite rightly states: "a study on the basis of a single source risks being coloured or invalidated by its prejudices and errors". I have therefore assembled similar evidence from as many sources as possible to demonstrate that Greek commanders could, and indeed did, employ any one method or combination of several possible methods to overcome logistical problems.

With regard to the procurement of arms and armour by Greek troops, while in the majority of cases the individual soldier was expected to equip himself at his own expense, there were some exceptions to this. I have demonstrated that a notable exception to this is Sparta's arming of seven hundred helots to serve with Brasidas in Thrace (Thuc. 4.80.5). Another exception are the war-orphans of

Athens and Thasos both of whom received arms and armour at state expense[1]. The author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (42.4) maintains that all Athenian *epheboi* each received a spear and shield from the state at the conclusion of their two year training period. Dr. Hans van Wees (via letter) has suggested that over time, with each successive generation of *epheboi* receiving a spear and shield from the state, the Athenian army would eventually have been completely equipped at state expense[2]. The arming of naval crews by a commander, for example as Thucydides (4.9.1) alleges the Athenian general Demosthenes did at Sphakteria-Pylos, is perhaps not usual, nor too is the Athenians' arming of five hundred Argive *psiloi* as hoplites in 412 BC (Thuc. 8.25.1). In the latter case, this example probably helps to illustrate the shortage of suitable manpower available to Athens at that time, rather than an established policy of arming one's allies. With regard to mercenary troops I have favoured accepting Whitehead's (1991:105-113) arguments over those of McKechnie (1989:80-85, 1994:297-305), the latter believing that the *employer* of mercenaries provided arms and armour for the troops. As Whitehead (*loc. cit.*), and quite rightly so I believe, points out that the evidence contained within our source material suggests that mercenary troops usually came equipped with the tools of their trade.

I believe I have demonstrated that Greek armies employed a number of possible methods in order to procure adequate supplies when on campaign. These being; taking provisions with an army at the outset of a campaign, foraging for provisions in (usually) the territory of an enemy, the purchase of provisions from established markets, or in the case of the Ten Thousand (or other Greek mercenaries in Persian service) from traders travelling with the army, the employment of supply convoys dispatched to rendezvous with an army in the field, or the establishment of magazines from which troops could obtain provisions on the line of march. I have demonstrated that Greek armies

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[1] For the arming of Athenian war-orphans at state expense see: Aischines, *Against Ktesiphon* 154. Cf. Aristophanes, *Birds* 1360. For the war-orphans of Thasos see: Pouilloux (1954:371, *Inv.* 1032, lines 18-20).

[2] Dr. van Wees' comments via private written correspondence. Dr. van Wees points out in his letter that by the Fourth century BC Greek hoplites had largely abandoned body armour and that therefore the state gift of a spear and shield would constitute complete state provision of military equipment.

employed each of these methods, or combinations of them, at one time or another.

Of the various systems by which Greek armies could procure adequate provisions Anderson (1970:58) states: "the surest supplies of a Greek army were those it brought with it". The amount of provisions taken with an army could determine the duration of the campaign if other methods of procurement were not employed. Indeed, it is noteworthy that Thucydides (2.23.2; 3.1.2; 3.2.4), on three occasions, states that three of the Spartan invasions of Attika each lasted as long as the invaders' provisions lasted and that the invaders withdrew when they had exhausted their supplies. Provisions could be transported by employing ὑποζύγια, wagons, carts, pack-animals, or even human *skeuophoroi.* Engels (1978:19-22) calculated that after four days' march through desert territory any baggage animals would have consumed the whole of the load that they could have possibly carried. Nevertheless despite such a relatively inefficient system the fact remains that the Greeks did, indeed, employ such baggage trains.

Foraging for provisions, fuel, and fodder was arguably the least reliable method of procurement. The practice could also be potentially hazardous to troops employing this method. Dispersed foraging parties could well find themselves under attack, such as the Athenian sailors that Thucydides (7.4.6) states suffered heavily at the hands of Syracusan cavalry whenever the former attempted to obtain water and fuel from the Syracusan countryside. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.4.22) informs us that foragers from Agesilaos' force in Asia came under attack from Persian cavalry forces[3]. There are other examples of foragers coming under attack from hostile forces which have been discussed in full in the relevant chapter of this thesis. However, it was not just enemy forces attacking foragers that could prove hazardous to an invading force, for Thucydides on a number of occasions[4] describing the activities of the Lakedaimonian led invasions of Attika uses terminology, although somewhat vague, to describe the

[3] See also Xenophon, *Hellenika*, 4.1.17-19, for another example of Agesilaos' foragers once again proving to be careless and coming under attack, though in this example it was not the army's *akolouthoi* but rather the soldiers themselves

[4] I.e. 2.20.4; 2.22.2; 2.31.1, 3.

wanton destruction of Athenian crops, land, and property. Therefore, it is hardly surprising to hear from Thucydides (2.23.2; 3.1.2; 3.2.4) that the invaders withdrew when they had exhausted their supplies. They had probably destroyed whatever was available and could not count on foraging for supplies within Attika to ensure they had adequate provisions and so called an end to these three campaigns as a result. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 6.5.27; 32) informs us that during the Theban-led invasion of Lakonia in 370 BC, the invaders employed a policy of burning whatever they could, with the result that, with winter approaching their supplies ran out, and of course as they had embarked on a policy of destruction, they would have been unlikely to be able to find supplies in Lakonia, which in turn resulted in an end to the campaign.

Purchasing provisions from an established market was another method that could be employed by Greek armies to ensure that troops received adequate provisions. As we have seen there were potential problems with such a method. Firstly, troops needed to have the necessary economic resources in the form of money with which to actually obtain provisions by purchase, and yet on occasions we hear of troops lacking such resources. For example, Thucydides (8.76.4) informs us that Athenian troops on the island of Samos were having to compel cities under Athenian control to provide monetary contributions with which the Athenians could obtain provisions by purchase. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 1.1.12) states that, in 410 BC, the Athenian commanders Theramenes and Thrasyboulos, operating in the northern Aegean, had both had to spend time engaged in collecting money for their sailors. In comparison, Xenophon remarks on the general lack of money among the Ten Thousand to purchase provisions with on five separate occasions within his *Anabasis* narrative[5]. If pay was not forthcoming troops could suffer if they were expected to purchase their provisions but lacked the wherewithal to actually do so. Thucydides (8.76.6) informs us that the Athenians on Samos were, indeed, having to purchase their provisions from whatever money they had of their own to hand. Presumably any

[5] These being: Xenophon, *Anabasis*, 3.1.19-20; 3.2.21; 5.1.6; 7.3.5 and 7.6.24

sailor or soldier who had little or no money would probably have gone hungry, or would have had to rely on the charity of friends or comrades.

Another potential problem with an army relying on obtaining supplies by purchase was the possible unscrupulousness of the merchants from whom the troops expected to purchase their provisions. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.5.6) records the exorbitant prices being charged by the Lydian merchants during Cyrus' march through the 'Arabian' desert. In addition, when addressing the troops of the Ten Thousand, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 3.2.21) reminded them of how, during the period of truce with the Persians, they had been receiving small measures yet paying high prices for the purchases. Elsewhere, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 7.2.17) states that the Phleiasians had purchased provisions from Corinth, although they had difficulty in meeting the required price. Unfortunately, Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) fails to record whether or not this difficulty was due to Corinthian merchants asking artificially high prices or whether it was merely due to a lack of economic resources on the part of the Phleiasians. A method that could be employed to prevent merchants profiteering at the expense of troops was for an army commander to instruct his officers to buy provisions in bulk on behalf of the troops under their individual command as Timotheos is alleged to have done on Samos (Pseudo-Aristotle, *Oikonomikos*, 1350b [2.2.22-23]).

The final potential flaw with employing purchase of provisions as a means of supply was the possibility that local markets might have an insufficient amount of supplies to meet an army's requirements. Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 7.6.24) himself reminded the Ten Thousand of how, when they had been at Perinthos, there had only been scanty supplies of provisions actually offered for sale. Furthermore, there was also the possibility that a city may simply have refused to provide a market for an army. Indeed, this was allegedly the case, according to Thucydides (6.44.2), when the Athenians attempted to obtain provisions by purchase from the Greek cities of southern Italy while en-route to Sicily they found: "some of the cities not receiving them with a market". Similarly, Thucydides (8.95.4) alleges that the Eretrians deliberately arranged that there

were no provisions for sale to the Athenians in the market-place during the naval operations in the Euripos channel during the summer of 411 BC, and that in consequence the Athenians had to obtain their supplies by buying food from private homesteads on the very edge of the town.

Anderson (1970:53) states that it was usually the case that supply columns accompanied an army rather than follow after it. However, I believe Anderson (*ibid.*) to be incorrect in his statement that the supply convoys dispatched to the Greek forces at Plataiai in 479 BC and the alleged convoy sent to the Athenians at Tanagra[6]: "were exceptions to this rule". My main reason for disagreeing with Anderson (*loc. cit.*) is that there are several other examples of supply convoys being sent to rendezvous with military forces in the field, and not just the two convoys that Anderson cites. Indeed, Pritchett (1971:41f) actually believes the practice of sending supply convoys out to an army in the field was one that was familiar enough to Greek armies to class this practice as a valid method of supply as employed by Greek armies, which as I have argued, was indeed a system employed by Greek armies on several occasions. For example, Thucydides (6.99.4) informs us that the Athenians before Syracuse were receiving supply convoys coming overland from Thapsos, as well as from Katanê (Thuc. 7.60.2). In addition, Thucydides (7.4.4) states that the choice of Plemmyrion as a base for the Athenian force was to allow easier access for sea-borne supplies to reach the Athenian camp. Furthermore, Thucydides (6.88.4) maintains that many of the Sikels, when the Athenians had been based at Thapsos, had sent grain and money to the Athenians. Therefore, in one campaign alone we have supplies being received by the Athenians from four supply routes.

In addition, I have demonstrated that Greek commanders were fully aware of the importance of keeping their lines of supply open, while enemy commanders were also aware of the detrimental effect that cutting an opponents' lines of supply could have. For example, Thucydides (7.24.3) informs us of how the Athenians feared that their supply lines by sea had been cut following the loss of the three

[6] As related by Herodotos, 9.39.2, in the case of the supply convoy sent to the Greek army at Plataiai, and Diodoros 11.80.3 for the, alleged, Athenian convoy at Tanagra.

forts at Plemmyrion[7]. Similarly, Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.2.2) informs us that Lysander, following his victory at Aigospotamoi, embarked on a deliberate and calculating policy of allowing safe passage back home to Athens to any Athenians he captured in the full knowledge that the more people gathered within Athens and the Peiraieus, the sooner they would run out of provisions. Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 2.2.8-10) goes on to say that while Agis was based at Dekeleia, Pausanias led a Lakedaimonian and allied force into Attika, while after making his way across the Aegean, Lysander sailed into the straits of Salamis and blockaded the Peiraios. Clearly, here we have a concerted blockade of a city undertaken in the sure knowledge that such a blockade completely severed any lines of supply into the city and which would bring Athens to her knees and force her final capitulation. Although perhaps not the most sophisticated of methods, Greek commanders were obviously aware that the severing of an enemy's lines of supply by blockade could be incredibly effective in ensuring a successful outcome to a military operation. Furthermore, Thucydides' (4.39.2) statement that the Lakedaimonian commander on Sphakteria, Epitadas, had been giving his men less provisions than his resources would have allowed provides a couple of points of interest. Firstly, this passage shows that Epitadas, or perhaps one of his subordinates, was directly responsible for the issue and distribution of any provisions that reached the Lakedaimonians blockaded on the island. In addition, that Epitadas chose to give his men scantier rations than his resources would have allowed shows that he was aware of the uncertain nature of the methods by which he was receiving provisions from the mainland, and, as a result, he carefully shepherded the resources he did have probably knowing full well that it was not certain if any more blockade runners would actually succeed in reaching him with supplies. Both these points help to underline that Greek commanders in the field very often understood the crucial importance of good logistical management, and that failure to successfully manage the resources available to them, however limited, could result in military defeat.

[7] Cf. Plutarch, *Nikias* 20, who echoes Thucydides' statement regarding the real fear among the Athenians that their supply line by sea had been severed.

Evidence for the establishment of magazines by Greek forces is, however, much more scanty. Indeed, there are only four examples known from our source material. The first of these is Thucydides' (6.97.5) statement that the Athenian fort at Labdalon was built primarily to serve as a ἀποθήκη, a magazine or storehouse. The second example of the establishment of a magazine is, once again, related by Thucydides (7.4.5) who states that Nikias built three forts at Plemmyrion in which he placed most of his stores[8]. In addition, we hear from Xenophon (*Hellenika*, 3.2.11) of the magazine which the Lakedaimonian Derkylidas organised in Atarneus following his capture of the city, in which he placed an: "abundance of provisions". Finally, the fourth and final reference to Greek magazines or supply-depots are the winter-bases of the Athenians, to which Demosthenes (*First Philippic*, 4.32) refers, in the Aegean on Lemnos, Thasos, Skiathos: "and the neighbouring islands, where are to be found harbours, provisions, and everything else that an army needs". Certainly, although there are only a few examples of the Greek use of magazines, the actual fact that there are *some*, however few, examples demonstrates that the notion was not completely alien to the Greeks, even if Greek magazines were somewhat rare in actuality, and certainly not on the same scale as those of the Persians.

Throughout this thesis I have endeavoured, whenever possible, to focus on those passages in our source material that address the issue of ancient Greek military logistics in a detailed and positive manner, rather than concentrating on the more negative passages in which we are told little other than a particular army found itself suffering from ἀπορία, which invariably tell us little or nothing of either how an army came to be in such a situation or how they attempted to alleviate their logistical problems. Therefore, I have focused on those passages in which an author relates how armies or commanders, when faced with logistical concerns set about successfully overcoming them, or at the very least attempting to do so. For example, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.5.6) not only informs us of the Greeks' grain supply giving out and of the overcharging by the Lydian merchants during the Cyreans' march through the 'Arabian' desert, he also (*ibid.*) informs

[8] Cf. Thucydides, 7.24.1, in which Thucydides reiterates that the forts at Plemmyrion were effectively warehouses containing most of Nikias' stores along with naval equipment and money.

us that the Greek troops among Cyrus' army subsisted on a diet of meat rather than pay the inflated prices being demanded by the Lydian merchants. In addition, just prior to this, Xenophon (*Anabasis*, 1.5.1-3) has recounted the various types and great number of wild animals that the troops hunted during their march through the desert including wild asses, ostriches, bustards, and gazelles, adding (*Anabasis*, 1.5.3) rather whimsically that: "no ostrich was captured by anyone" on account of this particular animal's speed. Xenophon (*ibid.*) even goes as far as to inform us that the flesh of the bustards was like that of the partridge and that: "their flesh was delicious". Here we have an author who provides us with the solution to how the Greek troops overcame the attempted profiteering by the Lydian merchants; they simply went hunting for food in a place where game was seemingly plentiful, hence they managed to exist on a diet of meat. Not only has Xenophon (*loc. cit.*) informed us of the Greeks running out of grain, as well as the overcharging by the merchants, he has also shown us how the Greek troops overcame the problem of obtaining food. Of course this is just one example, and the reader is referred to the main text of the thesis for a more thorough and detailed discussion of such issues.

Dalby (1992:23-24) is of the opinion that a Greek general's obligation to his men with regard to logistical concerns was somewhat abstract and consisted merely of providing a means, of one form or another, by which troops could obtain their provisions. Ducrey (1986:206-207) takes a slightly different view suggesting that two possibilities were open to the commanders of armies: "either they themselves could provide food supplies for their infantrymen and their train, or they could leave it up to the men". However, the existence of a degree of logistical infrastructure among Greek armies is suggested by a number of passages in our source material. It has already been mentioned that Thucydides' (4.39.2) statement with regard to Epitadas' careful management of the provisions at his disposal shows that either Epitadas, or one of his subordinates, was directly responsible for the issue and distribution of provisions to his troops, and that a conscious command decision had been made that the troops were to be issued with less than full rations. Furthermore, Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 13.1) informs us of the three commissary officers attached to the Spartan king's 'general staff'

whenever the Spartan army was on campaign. Their primary duty was to take entire charge of the commissariat, thereby allowing the king and the *polemarchs* to concentrate on more strategic and tactical concerns. This suggests that, usually, a commander's duty with regard to providing the means by which the troops under their command could obtain supplies was perhaps not as abstract as Dalby (*loc. cit.*) would have us believe, and the Spartan use of commissary officers suggests that in other armies such duties were part of the commander's remit. Indeed, as Xenophon (*Memorabilia*, 3.1.6) has Sokrates place good logistical management at the head of the list of attributes that a good general must possess, it suggests that good management of logistical concerns were indeed part of a general's obligation to his troops. Returning to there being a degree of logistical infrastructure among Greek armies, there is also a suggestion of this in the Pseudo-Aristotle (*Oikonomikos*, 1350b [2.2.23]) in that Timotheos is alleged to have instructed his officers to purchase provisions in bulk on behalf of the men under their individual command. Similarly the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* (42.3) attributed to Aristotle, informs us of the 'disciplinary officers' of the Athenian cadets of their own tribe purchasing provisions for both themselves and the tribal cadets in their charge which suggests a reasonably organised system for the procurement of provisions.

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