

PELOPONNESIAN POLITICS: 371-361 B.C.

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Abstract

The Peloponnese was arguably the key political area of mainland Greece. From at least the mid-sixth century it had been at the centre of Greek politics, due to Sparta's uniting much of the region into the Peloponnesian League. But there was never a genuine unity. Each state always had its own agenda, and it was Sparta's military reputation that enforced this artificial peace. Therefore the region as a whole has come in for much scholarly attention. The focus has mostly been on the fifth century when the twin powers, Athens and Sparta, tried to maintain their reputations as leaders of the Greek world. Nevertheless, the Battle of Leuctra in 371 saw Sparta fall from her undisputed position as hegemon of Greece. Scholarship has generally viewed Leuctra as the end of an era. Sparta would never be the same power again, Thebes was a fleeting replacement, and the next event would be the coming of Macedon. This may well be true in the overall scheme of things, but the decade immediately following Leuctra has a story to tell of its own. Within the Peloponnese lay seven key areas, generally disunited internally, and all seeking to benefit from Sparta's demise. The period 371-361 saw a decline as the region became a battleground both for them and for external powers. Formerly Boeotia, the home of Thebes, had been the "dancing floor of Ares". Now the Peloponnese took its place and Boeotians did their fighting there, rather than at home. Nationalism and political affiliation were the two clarion calls which shaped the era. Alliances between powers were made and broken. Some powers then re-aligned. No single Peloponnesian state was capable of assuming Sparta's former mantle. Arguably, neither was Thebes. Sparta herself strove fruitlessly to re-claim her helots and thus her hegemony, but was viewed as a hated ogre which must never be able to lead Greece again. The states of the Corinthia fought to keep their heads above water as armies trampled through their domains, attacking them en route. Argos still held sway over the Argolid but also wanted control of the Corinthia. Messenia was finally freed from Spartan domination but had to look to other powers to prevent Sparta from re-enslaving her. The Eleans were desperate to re-claim their *perioeci*, freed by Sparta in c. 400. Achaean wanted neutrality but was never going to be allowed to have it. Arcadia wanted unity and, if achieved, saw herself as the next hegemon of the Peloponnese – if Thebes would leave her alone. The external powers of Athens and Thebes became involved to different degrees. Athens was not strong enough to try directly for hegemony over the Peloponnese or Greece, but was going to make sure the hated Thebans made no headway in this direction. Thebes saw herself as the hegemon elect of Greece, but was disliked by many and struggled to keep the Peloponnese under her control by a series of invasions. All was thus in turmoil. We shall be looking at six regions of the Peloponnese individually and chronologically. The backbone of the whole thesis will in fact be the chronology. Events taking place in one area brought a reaction from elsewhere. But has modern scholarship always interpreted the fragmentary evidence correctly? On many an occasion it has not. This re-appraisal is necessary to redress the balance. No outsider defeated the Peloponnesians – they defeated themselves. The decade did not end well for them, but at the beginning the future had never looked brighter. The period 371-361 tells how they managed to succumb to their own weaknesses.

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INTRODUCTION

A New Beginning?

The year 371 B.C. is a salient point in the history of ancient Greece. Whilst we have a tendency, based on convention, to divide antiquity into periods which fit neatly into our scheme of things, some Greeks of the time would have perhaps viewed this particular year as a watershed, one that could admirably serve as the basis for a new beginning in its own right. For all intents and purposes it possibly welcomed the dawning of a new age. That they were to be proved sadly mistaken in such beliefs does not serve to condemn them or to lessen the impact of the event that had shaped their thinking.

In the summer of 371, on the plains of Leuctra in Boeotia, the seemingly impossible had happened. For the first time in living memory the full Spartan field army had been defeated.¹ It would be a mistake to suppose that the victory of the Thebans and their allies was welcomed throughout Greece (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.18-20) but for many Greeks it was a momentous occasion. They had, it seemed, witnessed the end of Spartan hegemony in Greece. Yet little could most of those celebrating the news have realised just how momentous the event was to be for reasons other than those they expected. Few could have guessed, no matter how much they may have wished it, that Sparta would never recover her leadership of not only the Peloponnese, but also of Greece itself. Unfortunately, with it came a sting in the tail. “Greek freedom”, that lauded and abused concept,² was in reality as unobtainable as ever. Sparta’s fall was not going to herald a new beginning. Even the most far-sighted of Greeks could not have imagined that within forty years Persia’s age-old empire and meddling in Greek politics to the point of dictating matters, would be terminated once and for all; and, indeed, that this would be accomplished not by Greeks, Scythians or any other of the more likely candidates, but in the main by Macedonians, a people who many Greeks tended to view as nothing more than a weak, semi-barbarian buffer on their northern frontier. Could they have envisioned a future where Aetolians and Achaeans were to

¹ On the battle of Leuctra see Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.4 ff.; Diod. 16.55-56; Plut. *Pel.* 23; cf. J.F. Lazenby (1985), 151-62; Pritchett (1965), 56-7; Tuplin (1987a), 72-107; Munn (1997), 81-86. On events immediately leading to Leuctra see Mosley (1962), 41-46.

² On the origins of this rallying cry see Seager and Tuplin (1980).

the forefront of the power struggle within mainland Greece; where an Egyptian dynasty, at least of sorts, could attempt to play a similar game in Greece to that which Persia had once practised; and where interference in Greek affairs could be expected from such diverse quarters as Syria, or even Italy, a land whose culture owed much to Greece and contained many of her colonies?

Surely, we may say, Leuctra cannot be cited as the cause of all the aforementioned taking place? Directly, it cannot; but it did act as an important catalyst for much that was to follow. The whole political system of the Greek states rested on networks of alliances. Those smaller states that could not wield great power had, since at least the Archaic period, looked to the larger ones, such as Athens, Sparta and Thebes, for protection from encroachment. What we have come to know as the “Peloponnesian League”, the “Delian League” or the “Boeotian Confederation” had for long been some of the key factors in Greek stability, or even instability, depending on one’s vision of the Greeks’ political problems.³ Whilst the Spartans had held sway in the Peloponnese and beyond since at least the mid-sixth century (Hdt. 1.68), from the end of the Persian wars and her taking over Sparta’s mantle as the leader of the “Hellenic League” Athens had steadily increased her standing in the Greek world, so much so that 431 had seen Sparta and her allies declare war on her in the hope of “freeing” those Greek states, mostly island and seaboard states of the Aegean, that, according to them, she had enslaved (Thuc. 1.118-146). Many Boeotian cities were keen to join Sparta, none more so than Thebes, in this quest to overturn Athenian fortunes and end her naval hegemony of the Aegean. But Athens’ great wealth was a vital component in extending this conflict into a twenty-seven year battle of endurance, one that was to change many attitudes to war in the future. Before the combat was even finished that future began to look decidedly shaky. Sparta’s crack hoplite troops, seemingly invincible in an even or uneven contest, had hardly been tested on the battlefield during the war; the same applied to most other states’ land forces for that matter. The “killing zone” being made almost redundant. What had emerged was a new approach to warfare. Not only had the potency of naval power become plain, so had the resort to drastic measures to provide victory. Clearer still were the ideological and

³ On the Peloponnesian League see Larsen (1932), 136-50; (1933) 257-76; (1934) 1-19; Kagan, (1969), 9-30; de Ste. Croix (1972), 101-24. On the Delian League see Meiggs (1972). On the Boeotian Confederation see Buck (1979 and 1994).

territorial differences between the states which composed Sparta's fragile alliance - more importantly there also arose differences in their future ambitions.

Athens had not been attacked because of her political ideals by the mainly, but not entirely, pro-oligarchic Spartan alliance. As Thucydides famously noted (1.18) it was the growth of her power that made many Greek states feel threatened, especially as some of them had their own spheres of influence to protect and would continue to do just this very thing in the future. In 404 only one power block remained in Greece, everybody seemingly being an ally of Sparta. Yet for the Spartans their problems were only just beginning. Pushed, to a great extent, into war by her allies in 431, Sparta had sold her fellow Greeks of Asia Minor to the Great King in order to, ironically, win the contest and free Greeks from the clutches of Athens.⁴ The immediate problems resulting from her victory were twofold. Firstly, irrespective of her wishes, some of Sparta's leading allies looked to further their own ambitions in their own particular spheres of interest. Secondly, she herself now had the problem of administering an empire that had not originally been viewed as a prize but as a target for destruction, and which she knew little what to do with.⁵ She could not relinquish it without causing a power vacuum and thus unleashing another conflict upon Greece; she could not allow another contender to seize her position; but neither could she please her allies by acting as policeman of the Greek world and thereby curbing their ambitions in the process. Thus she simply chose to continue in her role of hegemon, an easy way round the problem and no doubt a reward she felt was deserved, and steadily alienated the members of her alliance and also Greek goodwill towards herself. The Corinthian War saw some of her former allies line up against her and fight a desultory conflict which eventually saw Sparta once more call on the Great King for assistance. The King's Peace of 387/6 was a humiliating bargain for all Greeks, but none more so than the Spartans. Greek disunity had paved the way for an external power to intervene in their affairs - it would not be the last time such an event was to occur.

⁴ On Spartan negotiations with Persia see Thuc. 2.7.1, 67.1; 4.50; 8.18, 37, 58; Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.2-3 with Lewis (1977), 124-25; cf. Ryder (1965), 1-4; Hamilton (1979), 31-35; Tuplin (1987), 17-30. On Athenian dealings with Persia see Thuc. 4.50.3; 8.56; also cf. 8.28.2 and 54.3 with Andocides 3.29; as Cawkwell (1997), 15-16 notes, Thucydides' reporting of Athenian relations with Persia is poor, and one suspects he did not have, or give, the full story.

⁵ The two leading recalcitrant allies were Corinth and Thebes, the first of which had gained little of what she wanted from the war and needed to maintain some form of leadership over her many colonies; see Graham (1983), esp. 118-19 and Salmon (1984), 279. Thebes was concerned with her hegemony of Boeotia, a long-term goal of hers; cf. Buck (1979), esp. 155 ff.

For Sparta the bell had all but tolled. Her ways were not those of many other Greek states. Corruption, conservatism and self-discipline can be strange enough bedfellows, but a decreasing citizen population (*oliganthropia*) in addition is a recipe for disaster.⁶ The art of war was changing but the Spartans, perhaps understandably, refused or did not know how to change (what was, in reality, now no longer) a winning team. The signs had been flagging themselves for some time, at Delium in 424, at Lechaeum in 390, at Tegyra in 375.⁷ Sparta's moves to retain leadership of the Greek world became ever and ever more desperate as time went on, and her taking of the Theban Cadmea in peacetime (382) coupled with Sphodrias' failed bid for the Peiraeus (378) meant that alliance between Thebes and Athens, those formerly inveterate enemies, became once more a viable proposition.⁸ Soon even Persia would turn her back on Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33).

With hindsight it is all too easy to say that the outcome of Leuctra should have been a foregone conclusion. But Sparta's hoplites had proved dependable against all odds previously,⁹ and their reputation was often enough to scare most adversaries prior to actual combat taking place. This time it was not to be. Sparta's day had come and gone, and the fifty-deep Theban left careered the Spartan right off the field of battle.¹⁰ The result astounded Greece and seemingly left future hegemony in the lap of Thebes, if she could make something of it. At this stage one defeat, perhaps inevitable if a city-state was involved in as many conflicts as Sparta, did not necessarily mean the end of the Spartans. Neither was it the end of them; but what their future held was an uphill struggle to try and re-capture past glories. The here and now presented an imbalance in the Greek power structure which made even the like of Athens shudder - Spartan hegemony had been bad enough, the thought of a rampant Thebes ruling the roost was too much for many Athenians to contemplate. As for the Peloponnese, what had always been a power base was now a power vacuum, and it remained to see whose

⁶ See Arist. 1270a 29-b 6; cf. de Ste. Croix (1972), 331-32; Cartledge (1979), 307-18.

⁷ Thebans twenty-five shields deep against the Athenians at Delium: Thuc. 4.89 ff.; Spartan *mora* defeated by, mostly, Iphicrates' peltasts at Lechaeum: Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.11 ff.; Pelopidas' defeat of Spartans at Tegyra (perhaps unsurprisingly, omitted from *Hellenica*): Diod. 15.37; *FGrHist* 124 Callisthenes F11 and 18; Plut. *Pel.* 16-17. We should not be misled by Thuc. 4.55 or Xen. *Hell.* 3.15 (cf. 4.3.3-9).

⁸ But before or after the founding of the 2nd Athenian Confederacy? Cf. Cawkwell (1973), 47-60.

⁹ Especially at 1st Mantinea in 418, Thuc. 5.63 ff.

¹⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.6 ff.; but cf. Diod. 15. 51-56 and Plut. *Pel.* 20-23; also see Anderson (1970), 192-220.

leadership would be strong enough to return it to its former state and successfully utilize its resources for their own ends.

The Significance of the Thesis

Thus do we take up the story as told over the following decade, but our main area of interest concentrates on one particular region of Greece rather than on one *polis*, Greece as an entity in itself, or on the whole of the Greek world. The Peloponnese was a crucial part of ancient Greek history, and we can only guess how different that history would have been, as with Britain and the divide from continental Europe that is the English Channel, if that narrow strip of land known as the Isthmus of Corinth had never existed. The very shape and position of the Peloponnese marks it off from the rest of Greece by virtue of its unified geographical character. In truth, in antiquity this was almost the only thing about the Peloponnese that could be associated with unity. As a home to several ethnically different peoples, from at least the time of the Dorian invasions the region was frequently torn asunder by internal rivalries. Any unity that arose was generally forced and transient, the “Peloponnesian League” being an exception to the latter but not, for much of its history, the former. Yet this loose amalgamation of states was enough to maintain some form of independence, albeit under Spartan hegemony, and stability, however infirm, for at least two centuries: external forces might threaten, but never triumph. In 371 this situation was about to change, and it will be our task to trace those changes that occurred in 370 and thereafter down to just after Xenophon finished his reporting of events. After 361 matters continued in much the same vein until Philip of Macedon arrived on the scene. So the termination of Xenophon’s reporting should not be viewed as the end of an era. But despite his shortcomings, after his departure we lack evidence on events in mainland Greece.

It can hardly be claimed that we are treading in an area previously untouched. Originally the idea was to trace events in the Peloponnese down to Rome’s ultimate triumph over the Greeks in 146 B.C. But after spending much time researching the Achaean and Aetolian leagues, the Spartan attempts at hegemony under Agis IV and Cleomenes III, and the arrival of the Romans in Greece, a suspicion became a “fact”. It occurred that the decade 371-361 had plenty of questions still to be answered. The

more the decade was studied, the clearer this became. Finally nearly two and a quarter centuries was lost from the original target to allow a concentration on just ten years of Greek history. But these ten years were very eventful.

My idea was to approach matters from the viewpoint of each main individual region involved. I have complained in the past that ancient Greece was about more than just Athens. Therefore I have tried to ensure that the Peloponnese was about more than just Sparta. If achieving nothing else, I have certainly succeeded in this respect, as Laconia is the only key area of the Peloponnese that will not feature in our survey. Space was a major factor in this decision, but also the last twenty years or so have seen such an upsurge in Spartan studies that it seemed quite pointless to focus on her more than was necessary. This seemed very strange to me personally, as it was because of a fascination with Sparta that I was originally attracted to ancient history. Nevertheless, since Paul Cartledge's *Sparta and Lakonia* was published in 1979 Spartan studies have become immensely popular, and so to avoid repetition, Sparta will not feature except through the eyes of other states. Neither can Athens and Thebes be allotted the space normally given them. Naturally, they are not Peloponnesian, but also I felt this allowed a freer concentration on the Peloponnesian regions that normally get relegated to virtual non-speaking parts. So, like Sparta, they come into the narrative only when the narrative requires it. They are certainly not left out of the picture, their profiles and actions prevented them from being ignored.

Although let us say here and now that there will probably never be a definitive answer to the questions that can be asked about the 360s, I have tried to look at matters from a different angle by this process of singling out each state for individual treatment. With Achaia this was difficult because of the lack of evidence available, and no region has an over-abundance of evidence collected on it. Much of this kind of study is down to interpretation – I have interpreted some events far differently than others on several occasions. The blueprint for the study of Peloponnesian politics in the 360s was, for me, James Roy's article from 1971. So I find it worrying that I have disagreed with much of its findings. But this was genuine, and in taking the approach that I have adopted it is quite easy to view affairs from a somewhat different perspective. I have given the Eleans a greater say and influence than would most writers; I have perhaps treated the Argives with less respect than other commentators. It is how I genuinely interpret events.

Although great arbiters of fate, battles have not been dissected. I have concentrated purely on vital political events, believing that ultimately they shape much else anyway. Each state is put under the microscope in turn, the question being not, did it want anything, but what was it really after. There are few innocent parties. I hope to have looked at matters fairly, and to have eradicated my pro-Spartan bias.

The Outline of the thesis

The Peloponnese is approached in a clockwise direction, each chapter covering one of six areas, and finally finishing at the centre in mountainous Arcadia. As a region the Peloponnese is notoriously mountainous, with few exceptions, and this has shaped much of its history, the plains it possesses being much sought after.¹¹ We shall start at the Corinthia, where Corinth was arguably the only Peloponnesian city not unduly affected by the mountains and reliant on the sea for its livelihood. Basically, for the sake of equity, all of our areas will be approached in the same way. That is, we shall take a mainly chronological view of events, singling out for scrutiny those which happened prior to the period 371-361, if they have a direct bearing on that decade. At all times I have tried to include an outline, however fleetingly, of the historical path that led to 371.

After the Corinthia, we travel south to the Argolid, an area that formerly, thanks to the city of Argos, had a high profile in the Peloponnese but had been in semi-decline since the beginning of the fifth century. Sidestepping Laconia, we then journey to the newly created state of Messenia, its very creation being fundamental to the Peloponnesians' understanding of Sparta's overthrow. Next it is the turn of Elis to come under our microscope. This being, as I believe, a region that was more influential in the events of 371-361 than has often been recognised. Achaëa is indeed neglected by our source material, but I felt it should be included because of the role it played after 366 as much as anything else. Finally we come to Arcadia. There can be no doubt that

¹¹ This has been a crucial factor, and can be seen in numerous works on the Peloponnese from those of, for example, Leake (1830) to Baladié (1980). Strabo in the 1st century B.C. knew enough about its geography to allow him to describe the Peloponnese as being similar to the leaf of a plane tree in shape (8.2.1), and Aristotle's *Meteorologica* (1.14) even describes the fluctuating agricultural fortunes of Argos and Mycenae. Certainly the Alpheus plain in Elis, the Megalopolis plain in Arcadia, the Pamisus plain in Messenia, and the central Argolid plain were all vital to their respective surrounding areas. But in recent years climactic change has had its effects; cf. Vita-Finzi (1969); Bintliff (1977).

the Arcadians played a very significant role in events of the period, and there is little that can be written that does not include mention of the Arcadian League. I only hope that I have treated every region with justice.

Chapter 1 The Corinthia: Loyalty and Isolation

For the cities of the Corinthia, the year 365 could be considered to be every bit as important as that of 371. Certainly Corinth, for one, drops out of the narratives of both Diodorus and Xenophon at this point, Diodorus not referring to her again until after (2nd) Mantinea, a fact which in itself implies a change in her circumstances.¹ If 371 created turmoil and uncertainty within the Peloponnese, then 365 went some way towards resolving the situation. Unfortunately for Sparta, it was to leave her isolated, the states of the Corinthia deciding to terminate their own isolation at her expense by reaching an accommodation with Thebes. After centuries of guiding the peninsula's policies, the Peloponnesian League, under Spartan domination, was finally a dead letter, and the way was left open for a new entente, or, at least, *détente*.

By the time of the break-up of the League the states of the Corinthia were practically the only allies Sparta had left to her. Considering the increased pressure the Spartans had applied to Peloponnesian League members in the fifteen years or so prior to Leuctra, perhaps the greatest surprise is that they had generally remained so steadfastly loyal to her following the battle. As so often in Greek inter-state relations the truth was rather more complex, and any thoughts we may have of these cities remaining altruistically united behind Sparta can be dismissed. However serious the internal weaknesses that plagued Sparta prior to Leuctra, she had still had it in her power, even if only by relying on her reputation, to offer protection to those in need of it; after Leuctra she could no longer do so with the same conviction. The ruling cliques in each city came to know this only too well, and thus surveyed their positions accordingly and with a view to maintaining them.

We have no way of knowing if all the states of the Corinthia were represented at Leuctra, but the presence of Phliasian cavalry (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.9) may indicate that they were. Neither would all of its inhabitants have been pleased at Sparta's defeat,² because what was to emerge from the ashes was not entirely certain at this stage. Xenophon reported that aid was sanguinely sent to Sparta by, amongst other Peloponnesian states, Corinth, Sicyon, and Phlius, the first two even supplying ships as

¹ Cf. Munn (1997), 90.

² Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15; cf. Salmon (1984), 375. Hamilton (1997), 55, seems to imply an immediate defection by 'many' of her allies. Both the time and number factors are debatable.

well as troops (*Hell.* 6.4.18). Salmon makes the point that this was sent 'more out of habit than anything else',³ which is a relevant observation. But there can be little doubt that besides the practice of centuries, the oligarchs were still in control of these cities and, the shock of Leuctra not having made its mark yet, both they and any democratic sympathizers were simply unsure what would occur next.

What did actually occur next is hard for us to untangle, but it would seem that Athens called a peace conference soon after Leuctra and before the end of 371.⁴ This was in reality a third renewal of the King's Peace of 387/6, and even though our sources provide few details of which Greek states sent delegates, we should believe that no single state of the Corinthia could afford to be left outside of its resolutions. Whether or not Sparta attended, and if she did not that made it all the more imperative that the states of the Corinthia did so, could not disguise one clear fact that had become plain in the few months elapsing since Leuctra: Spartan influence and power had become seriously weakened.

With this in mind, we must now turn to the infamous passage that is Diodorus 15.40. Beloch suggested many years ago that this section concerning revolutions in Peloponnesian cities belonged to the period after Leuctra, rather than that before it but immediately following the Peace of 375/4.⁵ Roy has made a case for Diodorus' dating being correct,⁶ but doubts remain. Isocrates' supporting evidence (6.64-69) for the existence of revolutions fails to throw any light on when they took place. If we think of Sparta's position in 375/4, she had lost her cutting edge somewhat it is true, but mainly due to naval defeats such as Naxos and Alyzia rather than to any similar setbacks on land which would threaten her hold on the Peloponnese.⁷ After the way Sparta had interpreted the King's Peace of just over a decade earlier, can we really imagine that

³ Salmon (1984), 375.

⁴ *Xen. Hell.* 6.5.1-3 (Diodorus fails to mention this). Cf. Ryder (1965), 71-74; Buckler (1980a), 68-69; Cartledge (1987), 382-83.

⁵ *Griechische Geschichte* (1st edition; III.1) 174, notes 2 and 4 in the second edition. Momigliano (1994), 108, to be warned, has alluded to his 'reputation for bold and ill-founded conjecture' that grew especially after the first edition of *G.G.*

⁶ Roy (1973), 135-39; cf. Fuks (1972, 35-7 and n. 66; 1974, 64f., 71f. and n. 24) Roos (1949) has also defended Diodorus on the matter of his confusing his source material in relation to the Peace of 375/4, though the resort to blaming a pro-Theban source for the uncertainty is perhaps an all too-familiar scenario in circumstances such as these, and ignores the obvious trap of there being various sources available who knew the details of what took place. Diodorus' general slackness in dealing with source material further weakens any defence of him, though suspicion alone is not enough to convict him of outright negligence in this case.

⁷ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 291-92.

she would allow democrats or those of any other political persuasion to bend the concept of autonomy their own way? Nor is it likely that before 371 opponents within the Peloponnese would dare challenge her rule independently of each other, and of any kind of planned and concerted effort there is no evidence. The overwhelming factor against a dating of 375/4 comes at 15.40.1, where Diodorus addresses his readership in the past tense when referring to Spartan *arche*: '[t]hus falling into internal strife they had recourse to exilings and confiscations of property, particularly against those who during the Spartan hegemony had been leaders of their native cities'. Although scholarship is much divided on the issue, we should view the later half of 371 as providing the correct climate for uprisings of such a nature.⁸

According to 15.40.3-5, Corinth, Sicyon, and Phlius were the cities of the Corinthia involved in the revolts.⁹ At Corinth the effort was made by returning exiles from Argos, but Diodorus fails to provide us with as much detail as we would like. Buckler understandably speaks of the post-Leuctran period of turbulence as seeing 'the democratic elements generally coming to the fore',¹⁰ but the Corinthian rising may not be that simple. As Salmon notes,¹¹ we would expect returning exiles to be those involved in the union with Argos of some fifteen years earlier (cf. *Hell.* 5.1.34). More

⁸ Some of those supporting 375/4 are Lauffer (1959), 318 n.5; Dušanic (1970a), 286; Seager (1994), 176; Stylianos (1998), 330-32. Against: Hammond (1967²), 495 and n.2; Cawkwell (1976), 77, n.53; Buckler (1980a), 70, 291-92, n.1; Salmon (1984), 374 and n.15; Cartledge (1979), 296 and (1987), 266, 383. Griffin (1982), 67, thinks the matter is equivocal and leaves the question open to a large degree, but tentatively settles on 375. Lauffer, above, has questioned the date of 371 (but, despite basic agreement, see the criticisms of Stylianos (1998, 330)), and notes the doublet in Diodorus as being that of 15.38 and 15.50 due to similarities of language. This places the dating of the uprisings to 371 on awkward ground (ie. 15.40 and 15.57 do not contain such similarities). I would say, taking the stance of Buckler (1980a), 291-92, into consideration, that all of these passages are confused and unreliable with regard to dating, and that only historical probability can be used to arrive at an answer. Whatever any peace may have stated, Sparta would not allow it to stand in her way in the Peloponnese, and all potential revolutionaries understood this better than we ever could.

⁹ Diodorus here also refers to the involvement of Phigalia and Megara. Phigalia is an Arcadian city and as such will be dealt with in the appropriate place. Megara is something of an anomaly. For Thucydides (cf. 2.9) it was outside of the Peloponnese, which seems to be a reasonable assumption. Whatever one's opinion, and I accept Thucydides' verdict, she had been a Spartan ally for much of her history and her geographical position by the Isthmus explains Spartan interest in her, but the plain fact is that our source material seriously neglects to include her in the events of the 360s. I agree with Legon (1981), 276, that despite Diodorus' (15.68.1-2) testimony that Chabrias recruited troops from Megara to aid Sparta in 369, they were in fact mercenaries and she was neutral throughout the period (cf. esp. Isoc. 5.53; 8.117-118). She may have favoured Boeotia, but was incapable of offering any resistance to her anyway. The failed revolution of Diodorus 15.40.4 was an attempt to overthrow her democratic government, possibly but not certainly by oligarchs; cf. Legon (1981), 277-78. It is also worth considering the suggestion of Legon (1981), 265-66, that Megara took a neutral stance in 395, and thereby gave Corinth the impetus to do the same in 366.

¹⁰ Buckler (1980a), 70.

to the point we would expect them to be democrats, and it is here that Salmon has his doubts if this was in fact the actuality. A passing reference by Xenophon (*Hell.*7.3.2) to Pasimelus acting as an intermediary in negotiations between Euphron and the Spartans for the handing over of Sicyon's port to Sparta somewhat inadvertently reveals that Corinth was in the control of an oligarchic faction (cf. Diod. 16.65.6-8). This same Pasimelus, it would appear, had, as an oligarch of some standing, betrayed Corinth's Long Walls to Sparta in 392 (*Hell.*4.4.4-14).¹² The Corinthian exiles' attempt ended in their defeat and suicide but the affair highlights the political difficulties of the Peloponnese at this point, and of Corinth over an even longer period of time.¹³ Following the King's Peace many anti-Spartan Corinthians were in exile at both Argos (Diod. 15.40.3) and Athens (Dem. 20.51-57), and it may be that neither group were entirely democratic. Thus the picture of a unified Corinth, one that only strayed from the Spartan straight and narrow briefly, as though a temporary aberration, is misconceived. Corinth's famed leaning towards oligarchy did not, by any means, reflect the feelings of all Corinthians within and without the city, but only of those oligarchs who could rely on what was now decidedly shaky Spartan support.

The report of Diodorus on the Sicyonian revolution is brief indeed: 'Likewise among the Sicyonians as well a number who tried to effect a revolution but failed were killed' (15.40.4). As noted by Meloni,¹⁴ the agitators were almost certainly democrats, as Sicyon later sent forces with Archidamus against Thebes (Xen. *Hell.*7.4.18) and

¹¹ Salmon (1984), 383-84; cf. Cartledge (1987), 256-57.

¹² It is true, if we consider the like of Euphron, that there is no guarantee of an oligarch remaining such for life; neither can it be proved that the Pasimelus of *Hell.* 7.3.2 is the same as that of 4.4.4-14, despite the thoughts of Cawkwell (1979), 208-09; or that the latter figure is not a relation of the former, who seems to be a young man in 392 (though the obvious link of grandson appears impossible). But without further evidence the assumption that they are one and the same seems safe. My doubts would revolve around a different assumption, that of Pasimelus having to be part of a controlling élite within the city. If trusted for his former services by the Spartans, a fact obviously known to Euphron, they may well have approved of his acting as go-between in discussions in any event. Why I accept Salmon's suggestion is due to a belief that any democratic government in Corinth would probably have long memories and view Pasimelus as a figure that could not be trusted, and who probably deserved exile at the very least. Stylianos (1998), 334, although aware of Salmon, makes no reference to the intercession of Pasimelus.

¹³ Salmon (1984), 354-62, focusing on the events of the 390s, demonstrates the problems of drawing what may appear to be obvious conclusions on the topic. A corrupt passage from Diodorus (14.86.1) has often been thought to imply that following the massacre of oligarchs at Corinth in 392 a democracy was immediately introduced. *Hell. Oxy.* (7.3) speaks of those 'wanting to change the state of affairs', and, as Salmon says, this does not necessarily mean that they were democrats. The possibility being that it was pro-Spartan oligarchs who were attacked by oligarchs in favour of continuing the war against Sparta; cf. Gehrke (1985), 83, n. 9; Thompson (1986), 155-71.

¹⁴ Meloni (1951), 11-16.

aided Sparta's defence in 370/69 (Xen. *Hell.*7.2.2). Further, when Xenophon first introduces Euphron in 368 he relates how up to this point Sicyon had been 'governed in accordance with the traditional laws' (*Hell.*7.1.44), this being prior to him turning the city into a democracy (of sorts). Coupled with Sparta's reorganising the government of Sicyon 'on more oligarchical lines' (Thuc. 5.81.2) in 417, we should have no doubts that we are here talking about an attempted democratic *coup* against an oligarchically ruled city.

Finally, Diodorus (15.40.5) tells of the last city of the Corinthia to be challenged by revolutions, and here we get a little more information on events. At Phlius, as at Corinth, he talks of 'many' being involved, and, if his information is correct, judging by what occurred next he cannot be exaggerating very much.¹⁵ *Hellenica* 7.2.1- 7.2.23 is something of a rarity, as it is devoted exclusively to the Phliasians and their exploits. The problem is that Xenophon gives few clues as to his reckoning of time. Thus there can be difficulties with 7.2.5-9 in particular, as this passage could easily be confused with Diodorus 15.40.5. In fact the details make it plain that we are dealing with two separate incidents.¹⁶ What is certain here is that we are viewing a democratic exiles' attempt on Phlius that was well organised and supported. That the exiles could seize a stronghold in Phlissia, afford mercenaries, kill over three hundred from within the city, and then, in defeat, lose six hundred men through execution and still have six hundred others escape to Argos tells its own story.¹⁷

The striking fact about the Corinthia - though glaring exceptions do exist - is the unity that remained within the region up until the end of the 370s, and even then most of its *poleis* still maintained a uniform front in the face of external pressure. Unlike, for example, Arcadia, the cities did not take to fighting each other, though we

¹⁵ We should not be surprised, considering his past record, that Xenophon says nothing of the revolutions, but we may ask ourselves just *why* he fails us here. The obvious reason, excuse might be a better description, is that their failure meant no change took place in any city's political circumstances. But we could also argue that as some were directed against Spartan overlordship he did not care to refer to them at all, and this, I believe is nearer the truth of the matter.

¹⁶ Legon (1967), 335 n.75, has tried to make a case for them being the same, and whilst this would add weight for a post-Leuctra date for Diodorus' Peloponnesian revolutions, the two accounts actually have very little in common when examined closely. This of course does not effect our arguments in support of Peloponnesian revolutions being after 371.

¹⁷ The escape to Argos strengthens the case for the revolution being democratic, but by itself does not prove such if we consider that the Argives had also harboured Corinthian exiles who were possibly

might add that, Corinth included, none of them were remarkably strong and so any attempts at dominance by one of them would inevitably end in failure.¹⁸ The 360s continued the trend in many respects, but minus Spartan aid, or perhaps pressure is more apt, a combination of democratic tendencies both internally and externally saw oligarchic rule teetering on the verge of collapse.

Referring to Corinth's oligarchy in its earlier days, Salmon notes the 'remarkable intelligence, moderation, tolerance, and sensitivity' with which it managed its affairs.¹⁹ That was a different era, one where Argos threatened but Sparta was a saviour. The Peloponnesian War's losses to Corinth were large, and it dawned that Sparta cared little for Corinthian well-being. Corinth was only important to Sparta for its geographical position as the entry and exit point of the Peloponnese. The Corinthian War heralded a change of thinking at Corinth, and this was reinforced by the union with Argos. Always ready to criticize Spartan policy when necessary, the Corinthians had habitually stuck their necks out, but the idea of them going over to the Argives was unthinkable and a blow to Sparta of massive dimensions. The dissolution of the arrangement in 387/6, whether known in advance of the peace talks or not,²⁰ was predictable, and the return of her exiles, many to positions of power in the city, saw Corinth fall back in line with Spartan outlook. In Salmon's words, 'Corinth behaved in accordance with the implication of her history, that she was no longer fitted to occupy even a small part of the Greek stage.' We can imagine the thoughts of many Corinthians who had supported the union, but any thoughts of a forcible rejection of Spartan desires were out of the question and would have to lie dormant - until, that is, the shock of Leuctra presented them their opportunity.

Similarly, the treatment meted out to Phlius by Sparta in the 380s can only have caused lingering resentment on the part of some Phliasians.²¹ When Agesilaus was allowed to settle matters there his seemingly generous arrangements as reported by Xenophon (cf. *Hell.* 5.3.25), whereby fifty restored exiles and fifty from within the city

not democratic in outlook. For Argos, almost any movement that was anti-Spartan was a good movement.

¹⁸ The Corinthian War is an obvious exception, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.16. But passages such as Thuc. 1.105 are nearer the norm for the area, or even Thuc. 1.114, which sees the Corinthians, Sicyonians and Epidaurians go to the assistance of the Megarians. Clearly, Argive aggression promoted unity in the area.

¹⁹ Salmon (1984), 406.

²⁰ Cf. Salmon (1984), 369-70.

²¹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.8-10, 5.3.10-17, 21-25; Diod.15.19.3.

were to decide upon the future constitution, were in reality a sham.²² Although Xenophon does tell us that this commission also decided which citizens should be executed, he does not actually spell out the drawback for the Phliasians who were very possibly in the majority. That is, the fifty from inside the city were just as oligarchic and pro-Spartan in outlook as the returned exiles.²³ The arrangement was helped by the installation of a garrison, which stayed for at least six months and paved the way for the oligarchy to last until after the battle of Leuctra.

At Sicyon loyalty to Sparta continued after the events of 417, even to the extent that the Sicyonians fought with the Spartans against the Corinthians in the war of 395 to 387/6 and their city became the main base of operations for the Spartan alliance.²⁴ Only Sparta's defeat in 371 and the limitations it placed on her room for manoeuvre had a bearing on this adherence.

We have greater difficulties in tracing the history of the states of the Acte as they are almost non-existent in our source material, but there seems no reason to doubt a continued adherence to Sparta. They were placed in the same unit, the seventh, as Sicyon and Phlius in the Spartan reorganisation of the Peloponnesian League forces in 377/6 (Diod. 15.31.2; Corinth made up the sixth with Megara) and could be expected to follow Sparta's lead more so than Corinth, Sicyon, or Phlius. This was partly because of their inherent weakness as small states which relied on a major power for protection, and partly due to geographical position. Whereas the more westerly states of the Corinthia had their importance for communications,²⁵ the Acte was out on a limb and always had the shadow of Argos hanging over it.²⁶ Sparta naturally preferred to have these states with her than against her, but was less likely to be overly concerned about their situation. As long as Sparta had the strength they viewed her as guarantor of freedom from Argive encroachment and, in contrast with many other of her allies, did not want to see her weakened. As far as we can tell, they remained, under great duress, loyal to Sparta throughout the period 371-61.

²² See Smith (1953/4), 279-80; Rice (1974), 171-75.

²³ Cartledge (1987), 372-73. As Cartledge notes, Agesilaus was reinstating his friends into power, and the resemblance to the settlement of Athens in 404, 'ancestral constitution' notwithstanding, is in fundamental terms quite plain. On Athens, cf. Lys. 12.43; 12.71; Arist. *Ath.* 34.3; 35.1-2; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2, 11; Diod. 14.3-4; Plut. *Lys.* 15.

²⁴ Griffin (1982), 66-67.

²⁵ Tomlinson (1972), 140.

²⁶ Cf. the interesting clash between Epidaurus and Argos at Thuc. 5.53 ff. It was this kind of Argive threat that saw Epidaurus, Hermione, Haleis, and Troezen keeping close ties with each other.

To return to events following Leuctra, for Sparta the Corinthia was a key area, and despite the challenge that was the Corinthian War, the region had continually proved to be a staunch ally. The question now, in wake of the revolts, was would it remain so. The following five years saw, with few exceptions, an amazing amount of loyalty to Sparta. This in spite of tremendous pressure from all directions. A sense of loyalty alone was not what kept the area almost solidly pro-Spartan. As ever, fear played a factor, and it came down to a choice 'between a Sparta no longer capable of serious interference and a Boeotia whose ultimate intentions may have been unknown but were strongly suspect'.²⁷ The Greek states' love of autonomy was, ironically, crucial to the Corinthia's pro-Spartan stance, as Salmon intimates, but there was more to it than meets the eye. The democratic revolutions at Phlius and Sicyon had failed, as had the anti-Spartan oligarchic revolution at Corinth. The pro-Spartan factions in each city had proved their efficacy. To those oligarchs in control, Argives, Arcadians, and Boeotians proclaiming the wonders of democracy were a definite threat to their continued ascendancy. Allow them leeway and their own positions would be destroyed. But, as we know from events, democrats existed, and often in a formidable majority, in every *polis*. The danger was obvious, and we can imagine that support for the external forces of democracy was strong and at times proved very detrimental to oligarchic rule. At Sicyon, our exception to the rule of pro-Spartan solidarity, democracy, at least officially, took a firm hold and the danger of a "domino" effect must have sent a shudder throughout oligarchic circles within the region when its rise occurred. Before that event could take place, existing circumstances had to change. Sparta was down but not out, to lose a battle was not to lose the war, and only a direct assault on her capacity to support her prodigies within the cities of the Peloponnese could break her hold on the peninsula. It had to be seen that Sparta was no longer the arbiter of Peloponnesian fortunes - as long as the Spartan myth existed, so did her power, a fact understood only too well by many both within the Peloponnese but also beyond it.

The formation of the Arcadian League, its alliance with Argos and Elis (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3 ff.; Diod. 15.62), and, in turn, their alliance with Thebes (*SV* 273 = Diod. 15.62.3), saw the 370/69 invasion of Laconia. It did not prevent the states of the

²⁷ Salmon (1984), 375.

Corinthia sending aid to Sparta (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.2). But if Leuctra, followed by this blow, did not convince some Peloponnesians that Sparta was impotent, then Epaminondas' second invasion of 369 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15 ff.; Diod. 15.68 ff.) went a long way towards doing so.²⁸ Faith in Spartan prowess was perhaps all but shattered, but throughout the whole episode the cities of the Corinthia were still ruled by oligarchs who had no choice but to maintain their ties with Laconia or risk, at best, demotion to the status of mere citizen. It was with such fears in mind that the alliance of Sparta and Athens in 369 was secured in part by the aid of speeches given by delegates from the cities of the Corinthia at Athens. Procles of Phlius is the prominent voice among Sparta's allies (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.38-48; 7.1.1-11), and if we compare *Hellenica* 5.3.13-14 it may be that here was a character who was genuinely an admirer of Sparta and tied to her by friendship with Agesilaus. Considering the future, Sparta's allies from the Corinthia must have seen Argos looming large in matters. With the backing of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance behind her she would be doing her utmost to re-gain her ancient hold over the area.²⁹ We can therefore assume that many of those inhabitants disaffected by Spartan policy would be inclined to worry about Argive ambitions in the region. This at least would yield a certain amount of additional solidarity, albeit inadvertently, to an oligarchic cause that was possibly in danger of being ousted.

Epaminondas' first invasion, which, unlike the second, created little in the way of a direct threat to the Corinthia, saw the Spartan alliance's attempts to hold the Isthmus reduced to a shambles.³⁰ Around 1,000 of Sparta's mercenaries left Corinth to aid Orchomenus, thus leaving the Isthmus unprotected. The successful descent into Laconia and the re-founding of Messenia was followed by the invaders' return north to the Isthmus, and here Xenophon's wrath fell upon Iphicrates for his failure to prevent Epaminondas from leaving the Peloponnese (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.51-52). We should consider the prospect that while some of Xenophon's criticisms are salutary from the military viewpoint, it may be that Iphicrates thought it better to allow a victorious and

²⁸ I follow the chronology of Meloni (1951), supported by both Roy (1971a), 577, n. 49, and Buckler (1980a), 242-44, on this matter.

²⁹ See Tomlinson (1972), 142; cf. Roy (1971a), 572; Griffin (1982), 64.

³⁰ On the first invasion, see: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11-14; Diod. 15.62.1-2.

thus confident army travelling *away* from the Peloponnese to get out, rather to bottle it up and cause more suffering within.³¹

Later in 369, the Thebans invaded the Peloponnese a second time on the invitation of the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15-22; Diod. 15.68; cf. 15.72.1). Xenophon, in lax fashion, reports that once the Thebans had joined with their Peloponnesian allies Sicyon, Pellene, Epidaurus, and Corinth were attacked,³² but does not tell us that Sicyon surrendered. It is beyond doubt that it did, as did Pellene in Achaia.³³ What made Sicyon surrender is open to question. If we consider the failed revolution reported by Diodorus (15.40.4) then things may become a little clearer. This occurred less than two years earlier, and it could be much less than even that, thus the dust was only just settling on the event and for us questions remain unanswered. Diodorus says that those making the attempt were killed, suggesting, unlike the comparable efforts at Corinth and Phlius (cf. Diod. 15.40.3, 5), that they were few in number, that an outright massacre took place,³⁴ or that he has simply misinformed us. We certainly have no evidence to suggest that huge numbers were involved in the incident or exiled because of it; a large number of killings would very possibly have attracted the attention of our sources (Diodorus (15.40.5) is very informative on

³¹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.37: Cliteles' speech at Athens, which depicts the Theban ravaging of the area committed by an army travelling at leisure - if forced to stay the damage could have been worse.

³² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18-19; cf. Diod. 15.69.1 and Tuplin (1993), 152 n.18. Diodorus says that Troezen was also a target, and it is perhaps on this basis that Buckler (1980), 101, surmises that Hermione and Haleis were attacked. Geographically, this means that the forces of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance covered virtually the whole stretch of the Acte peninsula. Although neatly proving the thoroughness of the campaign, I doubt that the invaders pushed themselves this far. To take Epidaurus was a worthwhile venture, but if it had fallen it is almost a foregone conclusion that both Hermione and Haleis (and perhaps Troezen too, if indeed it was a target) would have surrendered without further ado - to try and hold out would have been a futile gesture. The reality was that the alliance had greater things on its mind than wasting time on relatively insignificant communities such as these. There was a chance that whilst its army was distracted in this area Sparta and her allies were perhaps making some effective counter plans. The example of the trial of Epaminondas (after the first invasion, for illegal retention of the office of Boeotarch; cf. Buckler (1980a), 138-42) notwithstanding as a warning to others holding the office (though the trial may have been due to a personal grudge by Meneclidas - Epaminondas was acquitted), in respect of the time factor, and the possible desertions delay encouraged if no booty was to be gained (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.50 on the first invasion), the risk was simply not worth the effort.

³³ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.8, 3.2. Diodorus 15.69.1 informs us that Phlius surrendered also, but it did not, and I accept the explanation of Buckler (1980a), 296, n.40, that Phlius is here confused with Pellene; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.5-9. On Sicyon also see Paus. 6.3.2-3. On the surrender of her harbour: Polyæn. 5.16.3; Aen. Tact. 29.12; Front. *Strat.* 3.2.10; Paus. 8.27.2; cf. Roy (1971a), 574-75; Salmon (1984), 377, nn. 29 and 30. On the fall of the town of Phoibia (or Boughia) in Sicyonia: Paus. 9.15.4; s.v. Steph. Byz.; cf. Griffin (1982), 27-28.

³⁴ Not impossible, see Diod. 15.57.3-58.4 on some 1,200 deaths in the *stasis* at Argos in 370; cf. Tomlinson (1972), 139-40.

casualties at Phlius); and whilst Diodorus is always open to accusations of misrepresentation, we cannot seriously doubt that deaths occurred in such an action. Bearing in mind later events during Euphron's regime (discussed below), we can surmise that initially Sicyonians were perhaps hesitant over any breach with Sparta, a state they were closely connected with through their city's status as a former Headquarters of the Peloponnesian League, and that her democrats willing to take matters into their own hands were far fewer than her democratic sympathizers worried by oligarchic solidarity and reaction.³⁵ During Euphron's running of the city there was without doubt a large pool of democrats ready to take to arms in defence of their beliefs. Not all of this support can have appeared overnight. The chances are that besides any new followers impressed by Euphron's system of government, there was already a fairly large groundswell of democratic sympathy within Sicyon's walls. This had existed for many years, and was enough to see Sparta venture there in 417 to ensure it grew no larger (Thuc. 5.81.2). However dead it may have appeared to many over the passing years, it was actually lying dormant, and this was due only to Sparta's high profile. Any doubts as to its existence were rudely shattered by the uprising following Leuctra. If the Spartans could still maintain their influence in the vicinity all might be saved for the oligarchic cause, but a great deal depended on this factor.

The capitulation of Sicyon in summer of 369 was a blow to the whole region, and not just Sparta, even though it is never emphasized in our source material. Regional solidarity was now shown to be a hollow sham. With contiguous Pellene also falling, Corinth, Phlius, and the states of the Acte must have considered their own days to be numbered. Buckler thinks that the Sicyonians were '[a]bandoned by the Athenians and Spartans',³⁶ and no doubt, for the most part, many of them felt badly let down (many of course, democrats to a man, felt quite elated). In view of *Hellenica* 7.1.15 and 17, it would seem that the forces of Sicyon were present around Corinth when Oneum was turned by a Theban dawn attack, and that they managed to retreat to

³⁵ If any collusion took place between the conspirators in Corinth, Phlius, and Sicyon we have no evidence of it, nor should we expect any in the case of Corinth if her exiles were oligarchic. It should hardly come as a surprise if it did in the other cases, but also a degree of spontaneity is equally feasible in the circumstances. What we need to remember is the situation arising if these endeavours were not timed to coincide (and here Diodorus' order of treatment (ie. Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius) does not necessarily denote chronological sequence). For example, if the Phliasian democrats' failure was known in advance to the Sicyonian democrats we can imagine that there was a minimum of participation from within the city's democratic community.

³⁶ Buckler (1980a), 98.

their own city in order to defend it. The account of Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.18) is very poor, and renders little of value; that of Diodorus (15.69.1) is only marginally better. If Pausanias 6.3.2-3, concerning the Elean Stomius, can be taken as evidence it may point to the Sicyonians putting up a defence against the invaders, perhaps, as we might expect, even a gallant one. But after another successful crossing of the Isthmus by the Thebans it must have seemed to the Sicyonian oligarchs that the days of reliance upon Spartan protection were now over. Roy refers to a class struggle within both Sicyon and Pellene,³⁷ and if we are correct in placing Diodorus 15.40 in 371/0 (which Roy doubts), then the ruling clique in Sicyon had more reason to worry than ever. The possibility of betrayal from within was now very real and the chances of the oligarchs escaping with their lives, let alone positions, must have seemed slim. From their situation they had never before let Sparta down, but now the reverse had occurred. They knew also that Epaminondas had no personal axe to grind regarding themselves. There was nothing to lose, and perhaps something to gain, by negotiating with him. The Arcadians and Argives would certainly press for the installing of a democratic government on the grounds of an assurance of future loyalty alone. But if he could be convinced that what had served Sparta well could serve the invaders equally well, especially in light of the debt the oligarchs would owe him, then an agreement might be reached. If he was forced to take the city by assault the survivors would only bear great resentment towards their assailants anyway, which served no purpose. Whatever the arguments and promises presented, the Sicyonian oligarchy remained in place.

Despite the success of Dionysius' mercenaries around Sicyon after the Thebans had retired (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.22), the Sicyonians held firm to their arrangement with Epaminondas.³⁸ Ultimately, the democratic threat from without coupled with that from within, and, crucially, the absence of Sparta's forces from the scene, had sealed the fate of Sicyon's oligarchs. But what a fate. Although having little choice but to surrender, could any one of them have predicted that their regime would remain in power?

³⁷ Roy (1971a), 574-75.

³⁸ As did Pellene (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.2-3, 11; cf. 7.2.18 and Salmon (1984), 377, nn.29 and 31) whose troops, for whatever reason, had been closely associated with the Spartans in defending Oneum (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.15-17). Griffin (1982), 68, referring to *Hell.* 7.1.22, has it that 'Dionysios of Syracuse, acting as an ally of Sparta, invaded Sikyonia, won a battle, and captured the fortress of Derai.' If this is meant to imply that Dionysius was present in person she is surely wrong. As for his forces' success, the Sicyonians were not naïve enough to view it other than the transient moment that it was. They were not going to maintain a long-term presence in the vicinity any more than Sparta was - Sicyon's democrats and oligarchs alike realized the true situation that existed, and acted accordingly.

Indeed, could the Arcadians or Argives? Perhaps even worse and eventually more telling, could Sicyon's democrats? The new boss being in effect the same as the old boss did nothing for Sicyonian democrats, except to make them more distrusting and militant than ever. Whether one considers it sensible in the immediate circumstances or not, Epaminondas' move was to have serious repercussions in the not too distant future. Indirectly and in the long-term, the truth is that it confirmed a split in the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, began the demise of the Arcadian League, and gave Sparta a lifeline that he had previously removed. Epaminondas, he who 'may have had a finer vision of international politics than Pericles',³⁹ whose 'spark of genius' was to be a huge loss to Thebes,⁴⁰ had made one of the most fateful decisions of fourth century Greek history.

Such pressure had a different outcome at near-by Phlius, where on their way to meet with the Thebans, the Arcadians, and possibly both the Argives and Eleans (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.2.5, 8), joined Phliasian exiles in an attack on Phlius which was bloodily repulsed. Why should Sicyon desert Sparta when almost simultaneously Phlius, in much the same position, put up such a glorious struggle to stay loyal to her? Previous history has a lot to do with Phlius' stand. Legon's suggestion that Phliasians,⁴¹ even if democrats, would not acquiesce in the installation of a democratic government if outsiders, and particularly the Argives, were responsible for the change, has considerable merit. Phlius, like Corinth,⁴² was geographically closer to Argos than Sicyon and more likely to feel threatened by her. Roy points out that a decade earlier Phlius had doggedly defended her democracy in the face of Spartan aggression, yet in 369 the citizen body fought against such a re-introduction.⁴³ Similarly, Corinth had from 392-387/6 shared a union with Argos but was now resisting her intentions. What can be very easily and correctly viewed as a class struggle is always in danger of being smashed once nationalism comes to the fore,⁴⁴ and where Argos was involved both

³⁹ Hammond (1967²), 510.

⁴⁰ Munn (1997), 94.

⁴¹ Legon (1967), 335-37.

⁴² Which with Chabrias' aid had just fought off an attack by the Thebans returning home through the Isthmus; cf. *Hell.* 7.1.18-19; Diod. 15.68-69. Xenophon fails to mention Chabrias and the Athenians.

⁴³ Roy (1971a), 574.

⁴⁴ The imminence of World War II saw many British socialists, and especially communists, threatening a refusal to fight against fellow workers from Germany - once war was a reality and invasion a distinct possibility the overwhelming majority took up arms in defence of their country.

cities viewed a democracy of her making as little more than an Argive takeover of their autonomy.

It is no easy task to try and analyze Phliasian politics of the period.⁴⁵ That Phlius was internally divided is surely beyond doubt, but this in itself presents the main problems of analysis. The whole of *Hellenica* 7.2.1-7.2.23 is exceptional in several ways. Xenophon's interruption of his main narrative to feature a digression focusing upon what one may term a minor supporting player is unusual, as Xenophon himself implies (*Hell.* 7.2.1). But his almost total ignoring of the time factor,⁴⁶ and his general approach, leaves the impression that he is paying homage to a city whose outlook he respects because it followed a policy 'to which he himself subscribed'.⁴⁷ In his discussion of Phliasian politics, Cartledge rightly alludes to the role played by Agesilaus' friend Procles, who was willing to recognise the re-emergence of the traditional dual hegemony of Athens and Sparta after Leuctra. Therefore Xenophon would naturally see in loyal Phlius a fine vehicle for pro-Spartan, that is oligarchic, propaganda, and whilst he could not re-write history in total, he could emphasize those facets which appealed to him.⁴⁸ Cartledge goes on to say that Phlius' brave resistance to Argive and Arcadian attack in the first half of the 360s was made by 'only those with full citizen rights who satisfied the probably moderate (hoplite census?) property qualification for membership of the *politeuma*'.⁴⁹ This was very probably the case, there being enough enthusiastic defenders of the city to suggest that any property qualification was temperate. But bearing in mind both Xenophon's doctrines and his penchant for leaving, very often, his own thoughts or involvement unreported or, at least, understated,⁵⁰ I would put forward an addendum to Cartledge's argument.

⁴⁵ See esp. Legon (1967) and Thompson (1970). Although, worthy as his discussion is, the move away from a split between democrats and oligarchs as suggested by Thompson fails to convince.

⁴⁶ Cf. Cartledge (1987), 266, who correctly identifies the overall period covered as being 370-66.

⁴⁷ Cartledge, (1987), 266.

⁴⁸ A close reading of *Hellenica* 5.3.10-5.3.25 also reveals, I would argue, some Xenophonic reservations regarding Agesilaus' harsh treatment of the Phliasians; see 5.3.17 on the topic of many Spartans disliking Agesilaus' alienation of a city of some 5,000 men; cf. *Ages.* 2.21. See also Tuplin (1993), 90-93, and esp. on this aspect 92-93.

⁴⁹ Cartledge (1987), 266.

⁵⁰ For example, his absence from many events which we know he was present at, such as the battle of Coronea (4.3.10-21), in the *Hellenica*; more so, consider the clash of Athenian and Boeotian cavalry at Mantinea (7.5.15-18) in which his son Gryllus died (Diog. Laert. 2.54; cf. Paus. 8.11.6), yet is not referred to at all. Xenophon, like Thucydides, but not as adroitly, can often guide his audience into thinking the way he wants them to think. In Xenophon's case, not by stating matters, but by revealing only what seems necessary to him.

Those Phliasians meeting the requirements of the (possible) hoplite qualification might have rallied to the cause in numbers, but let us consider a main focus of Xenophon's from Leuctra down to the mid-360s. Throughout this period the *Hellenica* consistently refers to the exploits of the Phliasian cavalry.⁵¹ Now this may be simply a straightforward reporting of what occurred, but, whatever, there would seem to be no refuting their involvement in affairs. This, I believe, points to a force of some fairly significant numbers for a cavalry unit (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.4 says there were just sixty of them), or certainly towards a force that was very efficient and also very pro-Spartan. Their influence off the battlefield was probably akin to that on it. Aristocratic and conservative, we should see them as the city's leading lights to whom many of their fellow citizens almost by nature deferred. They were indeed the *kaloï kagathoi* within Phlius (again, the affinities with Xenophon's outlook, and even his writings, are all too plain), and their recent performances in battle proved the point. They were the mainstay of the Phliasian oligarchy that wanted to maintain its position in the face of pressure from democrats inside Phlius and Argives and Arcadians outside.⁵² It is virtually certain that no small number of them, or their relations and followers, were the exiles reinstated by Sparta in 379, and thus their loyalty to her was ensured. As 379 demonstrated, there was opposition to them, but not enough as compared with other cities. Agesilaus' commission (*Xen. Hell.* 5.3.25) and its drawing up of a constitution that was moderate with the franchise had made sure of that. Xenophon does not explain all, but indeed, it is no wonder to us that he admired and lavished praises upon such men.

The cities of the Corinthia had much to contend with during a short period of time. The determination of Argos can be seen quite plainly in the number of attacks she launched against them without the aid of her allies,⁵³ who were preoccupied with their own priorities. The states seem to have been undeterred, and the Argives faltered badly at Epidaurus when, fortified by Athenian aid, the Corinthians hit back and only the

⁵¹ See: 6.4.9; 6.5.13-14; 7.2.9, 10, 12, 14, 20-23.

⁵² It is here where the differences with Sicyon become clearer. She, too, had her 'best men' but they had not constantly had to deal with the Argive threat on the same footing as Phlius; they had not had to come to the fore as often to show leadership abilities; they, like the remote Achaeans, did not live so close to Argos. As 417 proved (*Thuc.* 5.81.2), their oligarchy was not as entrenched, was probably much more artificial, and was, from day one, lacking support from its own people. the Phliasians, generally, were far more unified, and far more determined to maintain their form of government

⁵³ *Xen. Hell.* 7.2.2-4: Phlius (369); 7.1.25: Epidaurus (369); *Plut. Tim.* 4.1: Corinth (uncertain); cf. Roy (1971a), 572, n.20.

intervention of the Arcadians got them out of difficulties (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.25). Phlius became a chief target for assault because of her previous status as a base for Spartan pressure on Argos, as Tomlinson believes,⁵⁴ but also possibly due to old rivalries, contiguity, and democrats within.

The Sicyonians, naturally, were free from such attacks, but their real problems were only just about to commence. In the spring of 368,⁵⁵ around the time of the aborted mission of Philiscus to Delphi,⁵⁶ there arose to the forefront of Sicyonian politics one Euphron.⁵⁷ For us, his rise and fall throws light on events otherwise lost and reveals something of the political in-fighting of the period. Xenophon and Diodorus are scathing of him,⁵⁸ but many in Sicyon, as *Hellenica* 7.3.12 reluctantly admits, thought much of him. If anything he was an opportunist who possessed nerve and determination more so than most of his ilk.⁵⁹ Discussing Epaminondas, Cawkwell has observed that he had 'perceived that there were sufficient numbers of men like Euphron of Sicyon who would relax their zeal for Sparta when Sparta lost her power to support them',⁶⁰ and we can surmise that Euphron was indeed not alone in this respect. To paint Euphron as an unspeakable villain on the basis of Xenophon's account is all too easy.⁶¹ Originally a pro-Spartan oligarch, like Timolaus at Corinth over thirty years earlier, he changed sides,⁶² only, if anything, with less honourable reasons for so doing.

⁵⁴ Tomlinson (1972), 142.

⁵⁵ Again, I follow the chronology of Meloni (1951), as opposed to, for example, that of Gehrke (1985), esp. 370-72 (also dealing with Xenophon's Phliasian excursus). Meloni basically stays with Diodorus, who is preferable to Xenophon on this matter. Gehrke stays closely with Xenophon's chronology, which presents problems for Euphron's period of prominence. I find it very difficult to believe that Euphron came to power so late as early in 366, and Gehrke drastically telescopes events, leaving the whole of Euphron's reign far too short to be believable. The chronology of Wiseman (1969), 177-99, likewise fails us, mainly during the second half of the 360s but also because of his emphasis on a Theban judicial procedure we know little about; see the valid criticisms of Roy (1971a), 593, n.119a; cf. Cawkwell (1972), App. II, 276-78.

⁵⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; Diod. 15.70.2; cf. Ryder (1965), 79, 134-35.

⁵⁷ On his career see: Meloni (1951), 10-33; Dusanic (1970a), 296, 298-99; Roy (1971a), 577, 579-81; Buckler (1980a), 100-01, 243-44; Griffin (1982), 70-75; Thompson (1983), 150-52.

⁵⁸ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44-3.12; Diod. 15.70.3; cf. Griffin (1982), 70.

⁵⁹ Despite the excellence of Meloni on the topic of Euphron, I cannot accept his verdict on this matter (cf. (1951), 23). I find it impossible to believe that Euphron was naïve enough to think he could steer a course that would see Sicyon maintain her independence from external powers: the only way Sicyon could retain any limited form of independence was to throw in her lot with a power greater than herself, hence Euphron's plight.

⁶⁰ Cawkwell (1972a), 269.

⁶¹ Though neither should we stray too far in the opposite direction, as does de Ste. Croix (1981), 70.

⁶² See Cartledge (1987), 254.

Approaching the Arcadians and Argives, Euphron said that the current oligarchic government could not be trusted to remain loyal (this, we should remember, was the one Epaminondas had approved) and might return to the Spartan fold if the chance presented itself (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.44).⁶³ A consideration of Sparta's situation may not convince that such a move would be immediately forthcoming, but Euphron, as he knew, was negotiating with willing listeners. Already, in 369, the previous year, pressure had been placed on the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance when Lycomedes of Mantinea espoused a nationalist cause for Arcadia.⁶⁴ The Arcadians, along with the Argives, were only a short distance away from Sicyon, and, vital to Euphron's planning, were seen as supporters of democracy. Although the Arcadian split with Elis over Triphylia and Lasion had its roots in the claims and counter-claims of 369, as yet there were no outright breach in their alliance.⁶⁵ Thebes, on the other hand, had no doubt alienated many Arcadians and Argives by allowing an oligarchy to exist on their doorsteps. For some anti-Spartan Peloponnesians, and especially some of the Arcadians, the Thebans had done their job and were not wanted back at all - but the danger of a Spartan renaissance meant that continued relations were a necessity. At least, Thebes was on the other side of the Isthmus, and was thus handily placed if needed, but far enough away if not. With such feeling existing, Euphron was dealt a winning hand.

With his backers the Arcadians and Argives present, and, though we are not informed of such, probably in some numbers, Euphron announced to the Sicyonians that there would be free elections for all.⁶⁶ We have to consider just how legitimate

⁶³ Cf. Roy (1994²), 192. Gehrke (1985), 148, thinks a tyranny was Euphron's aim and that a main problem for him was that his following did not qualify for hoplite status; cf. 147: '[d]azu stützte er sich auf den Demos in seiner Heimatstadt (also in erster Linie die Kleinbauern, Tagelöhner, Handwerker und Fischer) der in Sikyon noch nie eine ernstzunehmende Kraft mit eigener politischer Initiative gewesen war.'

⁶⁴ *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.22-25; Diod. 15.59.1, where he is wrongly referred to as a Tegean; cf. 15.62.1-2, where he now, correctly, becomes a Mantinean. On the ill-feeling within the alliance see esp. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.26, 32; and cf. Roy (1971a), 578, and Buckler (1980a), 109, both of whom confirm that by 368 there was disillusion within its ranks.

⁶⁵ Roy (1971a), 575, and forthcoming (1), 153-156.

⁶⁶ We should not believe, as do Roy (1971a), 574-75, and Buckler (1980a), 100-01, that a Theban garrison had been present since the previous year when the accommodation with Epaminondas was reached. As Griffin (1982), 72-73, makes clear, it is first mentioned during the attack against Phlius after Euphron's rise to power (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.11) and made no showing when Dionysius' mercenaries attacked (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.22). Whilst it made little impression when Sicyon had internal problems, one would expect it to intervene when Spartan allies made threatening moves. Hammond (1967²), 504, interprets matters differently, and for him the 'situation was accepted by Boeotia as a *fait accompli*, but the Boeotian League placed an officer and a garrison in Sicyon', which is nearer the mark.

such an action was. A decree dating from the Arcadian-Elean War of c.365/4-362, though admittedly later than 368 and somewhat fragmentary, indicates that the alliance offered definite safeguards against external forces interfering with the constitution of a member state.⁶⁷ Dealing with the admittance of Pisatis into alliance with Arcadia, Sicyon, and Messenia, it is similar to the agreement of 370 between Arcadia, Argos, and Elis, and as such places the action at Sicyon under a shadow. Buckler is certain in his belief that a democratic constitution was put in place and that 'Euphron's actions violated Sicyon's autonomy.'⁶⁸ We cannot ascertain that this was what happened, and Roy notes that Euphron had the majority of Sicyonians behind him, and that the existing constitution could have still been used if a change of government were secured.⁶⁹ We may suspect that Euphron and his associates did violate Sicyon's autonomy, but that, firstly, any opposition was in a minority, and that, secondly, his friends from Arcadia and Argos did not really care about this aspect of matters. What the Thebans thought was immaterial, they, not being a party to the agreement in the first place, could hardly complain of events that, at least officially, were none of their concern.

Euphron's election as one of five generals is proof of his legitimacy in the eyes of the Sicyonians (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.45). The Arcadians and Argives were mere insurance against any oligarchic reaction. The message being that if there was one, they would return. Roy is correct in his observation that Euphron next 'set up what he represented as a democratic government in Sicyon'.⁷⁰ How soon he adopted tactics of which a Sicilian tyrant would have been proud is uncertain. But as he had to rid himself of oligarchic opposition, which was a possible physical threat, as well as an embarrassment if it claimed to be the legitimate government, it was almost certainly sooner rather than later, and probably immediately, so as to prevent any concerted plan

Further, I would suggest that as confident as Euphron was about receiving Arcadian and Argive support for his scheme, his case would have sounded quite hollow if a Theban garrison were already present. How, also, could Thebes have been anything but outraged if their own allies suddenly descended on the city unannounced and, at best, seemed to be tacitly implying the garrison was not up to its task or, worse, were perhaps planning to make the city their own? There is even a chance that the garrison would have offered resistance to such an unofficial move. Finally, we should note that there is no evidence for any Theban garrison being present at Pellene, which, as we have discussed, surrendered to Epaminondas at the same time as Sicyon.

⁶⁷ *SEG* 22. 339, originally edited by Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7.211-17; cf. Roy (1971a), 594-95.

⁶⁸ Buckler (1980a), 100.

⁶⁹ Roy (1971a), 577.

⁷⁰ Roy (1994²), 192.

being formed against him. It may be that his crude methods caused the Thebans to place a garrison in Sicyon, but we should doubt this. Buckler notes that as the legitimate government was that of the oligarchs the whole alliance should by right have defended it from interference from the beginning. But the reality, he continues, was that the Thebans were more concerned about keeping Sicyon free of Spartan influence than they were about how the city was governed.⁷¹ Essentially, this is true, but as we will discover, there was more to the introduction of a garrison than just concern with possible Spartan recovery in the area.

The garrison, then, arrived shortly after Euphron's *coup*.⁷² The Thebans probably gave good reasons for wanting to put it in place: it was protecting the new and popular democratic government from oligarchic or Spartan machinations; ensuring free elections could be undertaken; even supporting the work of the Arcadians and Argives who had vacated the city.⁷³ If they needed to offer explanations to anyone, it was the Arcadians and Argives.⁷⁴ In this respect, there was little that the latter could do or say in the way of opposition. Thebes, as an equal member of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, had as much right to intervene as the Arcadians and Argives had. As, in truth, the (unofficial) leading member of the alliance through the maxim of, in Thucydidean terms, 'might is right', she could risk pushing matters to the brink

⁷¹ Buckler (1980a), 100-01.

⁷² There should be no objections as to how it arrived there. Besides the obvious route across the Isthmus, which may have been used with ease in the current circumstances, there was also the sea crossing from Creusis to the port of Sicyon, which lay less than five kilometres due north of the city.

⁷³ Not to be forgotten at this juncture is a passage in Pausanias (9.15.4), which may throw some small light on another reason why Thebes wanted to garrison Sicyon. Pausanias tells us that the town of Phoibia (or Boupbia, see above) in Sicyon's territory had become a centre for Boeotian exiles, and that Epaminondas captured it and, seemingly, dispersed them. We may choose to believe this report, if only because the still today obscure Phoibia (see Levi (1979a), 339, n. 73) seems an unlikely location to invent false tales such as this one about. There is no hint as to when the fall of Phoibia took place, but we may surmise that it was during the second invasion of the Peloponnese, or, failing this, after the Theban garrison was installed in Sicyon. Either way, the Thebans had good reason for ensuring that Phoibia was cleared, or remained clear, of dissident Boeotians fomenting trouble in the Peloponnese.

⁷⁴ As can be seen, I do not follow what can only be termed the popular view of happenings at Sicyon. This, I feel, takes an *a priori* view of matters which fails to appreciate more recent events. That view is, very broadly speaking, as follows: if the Boeotians were in formal alliance with the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans, then all, being anti-Spartan, were only concerned with keeping Sparta weak. They were thus united, and Lycomedes' speech of 369 had changed nothing in their inter-relationships with each other. In the case of Thebes, therefore, her garrison *must* have worked in tandem with the Arcadians (and Argives) in Sicyon. It is insulting to the Thebans' political acumen to even think that they, and particularly Epaminondas, who had made the arrangements at Sicyon, were not worried about Arcadian-Argive intervention in the city, and, further, had no interest in it themselves. To consider that all parties involved actually cared about the Sicyonians' welfare is, quite frankly, bordering on the ingenuous.

without too much fear of reprisal. The Arcadians, at this point, were in no position to lose her support, and neither could they dare consider the outcome of direct confrontation. But even the Thebans could not, without causing more problems, merely march into Sicyon without being formally accepted. Legitimation was vital to avoiding a severance with the Arcadians, because despite her military superiority, Thebes needed to ensure that they, and all Peloponnesians, did not find need to return to the Spartan fold. It was very unlikely, perhaps, but not impossible, as there was always a Sparta willing to exploit any situation developing within the Peloponnese; and in a desperate situation the tattered but not totally torn Spartan myth easily appeared as the best route for salvation. The Thebans, as Griffin notes,⁷⁵ approached Euphron and exchanged assurances with him. What these pledges were, exactly, we do not know. But that such took place is clarified at *Hellenica* 7.3.8, when one of Euphron's assassins refers to them. Griffin rightly thinks that they probably allowed for the emplacement of a garrison at Sicyon. There would not appear to be a more appropriate time for such an agreement to be reached than early in Euphron's tenure of power, and as we have established that there was no garrison in Sicyon prior to his rise, this was the moment it took place. That the garrison apparently stood by idly as he conducted, if our sources are not exaggerating matters, a reign of terror could be due to this agreement being one of non-interference on the part of the Thebans (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.46, 3.8-12; *Diod.* 15.70.3). Again, as with Thebes only being bothered about a Spartan resurgence (above), other considerations also ensured its passiveness.

Firstly, let us examine Euphron's methods at Sicyon. He ruled first and foremost by virtue of his mercenaries, who were well rewarded and under the command of his son. To help in paying them he purged the rich, exiling many and confiscating their property, and even resorted to bribery and raiding temple treasures (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.45-46; 7.3.1,8). Diodorus (15.70.3) claims forty leading Sicyonians were exiled. Both the former oligarchs who were pro-Spartan and those who had been in government with him, and who might be termed, perhaps loosely, pro-Theban, were attacked.⁷⁶ It is even said that some slaves became enfranchised.⁷⁷ How long this went

⁷⁵ Griffin (1982), 72.

⁷⁶ Not all in government with him, as Xenophon implies, were actually killed; on one Cleander, see below.

⁷⁷ Was Euphron, as Meloni (1951), 20-21, implies, part of the change from an extreme to a moderate oligarchy? I am less convinced about slaves becoming citizens, but cf. Whitehead (1980), and about

on for is unclear, as Xenophon's narrative is interrupted by his eulogy to the Phliasians (*Hell.* 7.2.1-7.3.1), which neatly contrasts their loyalty to Sparta with the fickleness of the Sicyonians,⁷⁸ but serves only to confuse the reader. At most, his period of rule must fall just short of two years.⁷⁹ Why he fell from grace is one of the great puzzles of fourth century Greek history, but fall he did.

In 366 Aeneas of Stymphalus entered Sicyon at the head of an Arcadian League army with the intention of removing Euphron from power (on the event and its aftermath, see *Xen. Hell.* 7.3.1-12). Many commentators have quite simply followed Xenophon's somewhat skeletal narrative on this episode, and, I believe, taken for granted certain things which he does not in fact say. The key passage on the reason for him being jettisoned is at *Hellenica* 7.3.1., and, to say the least, it is sketchy. The majority of modern opinion on the situation is perhaps best summed up by Roy.⁸⁰ This assumes that the Arcadians were concerned about Euphron's harsh methods of ruling, which were in contravention of the terms of the Peloponnesian alliance, and thus that 'Euphron's unconstitutional government was a breach of the alliance.'⁸¹ Whether translated as 'unendurable' or 'intolerable', Xenophon merely says Aeneas removed Euphron because he was dissatisfied with the situation appertaining at Sicyon.⁸² It is not expressly stated that Aeneas pitied the Sicyonians' plight, disliked Euphron's unbenign dictatorship, or disapproved of his methods of ruling. If this was the truth, and considering our belief that his abuses began as soon as he assumed power, we are perhaps entitled to ask why it took so long for Arcadia to intervene. Aeneas was determined to rid Sicyon of Euphron, and was opposed to its state of affairs, but not for these reasons.

Neither, considering our conclusions on Euphron's military aid, can we accept the view of Meloni that his half-hearted attitude in this area enraged both the

some of the conclusions reached regarding serfdom in Sicyon; cf. Cartledge (1980) and Whitehead (1981).

⁷⁸ See the interesting observation of Dušanic (1970a), 341, n. 24.

⁷⁹ Roy (1971a), 579.

⁸⁰ Roy (1971a), 580-81.

⁸¹ Roy (1971a), 580.

⁸² We cannot stretch matters too far, but I would also question just how much Xenophon really knew about Aeneas' motivation for his action. Was he in fact surmising what lay behind the thinking of Aeneas whilst actually knowing little more than the bare bones of the story?

Arcadians and Thebans so much that they removed him.⁸³ Harder to believe is the theory of Dušanic, which argues for economic failure being responsible for Euphron's downfall.⁸⁴ What really concerned Aeneas was the Theban influence within Sicyon, and, on a wider scale, its implications for the future of the Peloponnese.

On the surface of matters, Sicyon was not of crucial importance to Peloponnesian fortunes. But what it had become strategically was a potentially serious flashpoint. When Euphron first approached the Arcadians and Argives with his offer, he knew that he was making them one they virtually could not refuse. It made Euphron and almost the whole of the Sicyonian *demos* beholding to them, further assuring them that Sparta would be shut out from interference within the vicinity. As the Thebans were still of importance to Arcadian and Argive fortunes, they had to be sounded out over acceptance of this new development. Their price was, on the grounds discussed above, to garrison Sicyon.⁸⁵ She was a 'fetter' of the Peloponnese, and ensured the Thebans another foothold there.⁸⁶

Let us not think that this was solely related to Sparta's possible threat - it was barely related at all. As already discussed, the Thebans were well aware of the Arcadians' new-found independent streak. They also knew that whatever else the

⁸³ Meloni (1951), 10-33. The fall of Thyamia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.20-23) cannot be specifically blamed on Euphron, despite Griffin (1982), 73-74, for, as she admits, the fortification of it only began 'at about the time of Euphron's *coup*'. In other words, it may have been one of the key reasons that the Arcadians were willing to listen to Euphron's plans for a new and more loyal regime in Sicyon in the first place.

⁸⁴ Dusanic (1970a), 299, with notes 75, 76, and 77. He makes much of Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.46 (and, to a lesser degree, 7.3.1 and Diod. 15.70.3) in support of his case - though his failure to include *Hell.* 7.3.8 seems surprising, it being more persuasive evidence than that which he cites. Whilst Arcadia admittedly needed money, the stress on Sicyonian coinage being found there in liberal quantities proves nothing of decisive worth. That coin exchange took place throughout Greece is common knowledge, and he surely cannot believe that the Arcadians were reliant on Sicyon's limited resources or that they were creaming off its wealth to any great degree. To, theoretically, democratic Arcadia the loss of some rich Sicyonians' wealth would mean nothing. The Arcadians had more pressing concerns over what had happened in Sicyon, and economic matters were not responsible for Aeneas' action.

⁸⁵ Cf. Griffin (1982), 72-73, on the Thebans acting in a similar way with Achaean democracies; not being able to totally trust a former pro-Spartan such as Euphron; and insisting that a Theban commander lead the Sicyonian citizen forces on campaign. All of which, I feel, is indirect supporting evidence for my case. If the Arcadians and Argives had claimed to have entered Sicyon on the grounds of justice, as Roy implies, not only was this a front, but now it also made it difficult for them to refuse an ally such as Thebes, even though not part of the original Peloponnesian axis of 370, any access to it if she claimed to be aiding the common cause against Sparta. The claims of Buckler (1980a), 192, that Theban garrisons were protective and not imperialistic can safely be dismissed.

⁸⁶ We must not forget that Messene also had 'a considerable garrison' (Diod. 15.67.1), which was possibly of Theban composition. This places Theban actions in a more sinister light and reinforces our fetter theory.

Arcadians lacked, it was neither manpower or ambition.⁸⁷ Sicyon could not, however loose the reins may appear, be allowed to become an Arcadian satellite. If they did not demand to garrison her, how long before the Arcadians would find an excuse to do so? The risk of an Arcadian hegemony of the Peloponnese was not totally negligible, Sparta having a lesser advantage in respect of size, internal shackles, and manpower at the beginning of the sixth century. If the Arcadians remained united and accomplished this, then Boeotia was facing major problems.

For the Arcadians, it was imperative that Thebes be kept out of the Peloponnese as much as was possible. Could they really be facing a position where they had changed one master for a different one? What Thebes wanted was uncertain, but if allowed to take liberties like Epaminondas had done at Sicyon, the danger of oligarchies remaining or arising which tacitly owed allegiance to Sparta or favoured her support was ominous; worse was the prospect of them being in the control of Thebes. Could it be that Thebes, for her own interests, wanted to see a divided and weakened Peloponnese?

What had arisen was a classic case of both sides being frightened and unaware of what the other had planned, and a stand-off resulted. It is only when bearing all of this in mind that we can understand why Aeneas' entry into Sicyon was not met with any hostility. To the Sicyonian *demos* he represented a friendly power who had released it from the clutches of oligarchy. To the Theban garrison he was an ally that was possibly not to be trusted but whose forces out-numbered theirs, and especially if the population supported him.⁸⁸ Once ensconced safely inside, Aeneas' next action probably alienated both *demos* and garrison alike: he reinstated oligarchy.

This, admittedly, goes against all that the Arcadians had seemingly stood for, but the Arcadia of 366 was no longer the same Arcadia of 370/69. In any event, it was *Realpolitik*, and not doctrine, that mattered in such circumstances. Here, let us turn to

⁸⁷ Cf. Dušanic (1970a), 299, a defence of their outlook which I totally reject.

⁸⁸ The garrison may not of course have actually been composed of Thebans, though its commander at least was Theban, but it is likely, as Thebes did not, unlike many other states of the period, employ mercenaries on a wide-scale; cf. Parke (1933), 90. Generally, garrisons were not large, though perhaps more so on average than in the fifth century; cf. Sage (1996), 109. In both Thucydides and Xenophon 300 and 500 seem to be popular figures, but much depends on which part of the world is under consideration; cf. Tuplin (1987b). At Sicyon, especially considering Theban commitments elsewhere (manpower was possibly being used for naval training; cf. Buckler (1980a), 163-64), we should not perhaps expect much more than 300 men, and certainly no more than 500. Aeneas would have taken far more.

the views of Thompson,⁸⁹ which concentrate mainly on a split within the Arcadian League rather than on an Arcadian-Boeotian one, but whose views are nevertheless relevant for any consideration of the Sicyonian affair.

Thompson's general line of thought is as follows. *Hellenica* 7.3.4 merely reflects a situation that is possible no matter the constitution involved, and Aeneas reinstated an oligarchy at Sicyon, one which included re-called exiles, 'for he summoned only the most powerful and did nothing to reassure the common people'.⁹⁰ In this instance, Roy believes that the Arcadians' intervention demonstrates their dislike of tyranny, 'even if their [the tyrants] policies were in the popular interest'.⁹¹ Now while Roy might claim with some justice that Euphron's government was in contravention of the terms of the Peloponnesian alliance, and that therefore Aeneas was obliged to take action and re-call the exiles, we should not commit ourselves to accepting this as the reason for Arcadian interference. The 'popular interest' was none other than that of Aeneas and his acolytes. If Epaminondas had trodden on toes with his original agreement at Sicyon some three years earlier, then the Arcadian-Argive backing of Euphron had counteracted it to some degree. But a matter of perhaps weeks earlier, Epaminondas had struck the same deal once again at neighbouring Achaëa.⁹² Whatever the current position in Achaëa, it had become plain to some Arcadians that Thebes was now more of a threat than Sparta. Arcadia was still officially a pro-democratic state, but despite the majority of Sicyonians being behind Euphron's government, the clear fact was that he was too close to Thebes.

Thompson goes on to say that at *Hellenica* 7.3.1 Xenophon was in no doubt about what he wanted to put across to his audience: those re-called to the city were oligarchs.⁹³ This is why Xenophon refers to mercenaries being paid from funds secured from pro-Spartans (*Hell.* 7.1.46); why he later wanted them banished by the Thebans (*Hell.* 7.3.4); and why it was former exiles who murdered him (*Hell.* 7.3.5; cf. 7.3.8).

⁸⁹ Thompson (1983), 150-52.

⁹⁰ Thompson (1983), 151. Compare the action of Agesilaus at near-by Phlius in 379 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.25), who set up his commission on a very similar basis. His selection of a portion of oligarchs from within the city and a portion from without was perhaps the exemplar for Aeneas.

⁹¹ Roy (1971a), 581.

⁹² No matter which chronology is followed, there is no possible way to truly come to a conclusion which event came first, the Achaean agreement of Epaminondas (and its subsequent overthrow before Achaëa became once again firmly pro-Spartan) or the deposition of Euphron.

Let us turn towards the finale of Xenophon's narrative, which concerns Euphron's reaction to his deposition. Fleeing to Sicyon's port, presumably with his mercenaries, he used Pasimelus of Corinth to act as intermediary in negotiations for the handing of it over to Sparta, to whom he claimed he had been a firm ally all along.⁹⁴ Lacking enough force to capture Sicyon, he went to Athens and obtained mercenaries, the fighting within the city between democrats and oligarchs being ended, no doubt, when the former aided him in achieving his goal. But the Theban garrison was holding the Acropolis and clashed with Euphron, who then went to Thebes to try and get the aristocrats removed by bribery. Here he was assassinated by Sicyonian exiles (Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.4-5). A twist that has caused so many problems (there are many others), comes at *Hellenica* 7.4.1, where we learn that the port of Sicyon was re-taken by the Sicyonians and Arcadians.⁹⁵

On this topic, Thompson asks '[w]ho, then, were the *πολιτεια* who recaptured the harbour from the Spartans?' His answer, contrary to most opinion, is that they were the Sicyonian oligarchs acting in concert with the Arcadians who had restored them to power.⁹⁶ Modern readings of the situation have generally assumed such a

⁹³ Roy (1971a), 581, thinks that the Arcadians could not tell the oligarchic and democratic (former associates of Euphron) exiles apart, thus they had to re-call them all. This is hard to believe when they were surrounded by Sicyonians who could definitely tell them apart.

⁹⁴ Griffin (1982), 74, says that it 'seems likely' that Sparta turned Euphron down, but gives no reason for her position. This is to misjudge Sparta's situation. The Spartans were only too keen to re-claim a city that had been important as a base, and the possession of its harbour was a starting point to both the re-taking of Sicyon and an announcement that they had not deserted the Corinthia. My main problem with Xenophon's account is not that the Spartans accepted Euphron's offer, but how they managed to get to or be in the vicinity in the first place.

⁹⁵ The harbour town seems to have been taken in Euphron's absence at Thebes.

⁹⁶ Thompson (1983), 152. I, very tentatively, and considering Xenophon's use of *demos*, *kratistoi*, and *beltistoi* in this section, suggest that it is feasible for Xenophon to be referring to those with the power of the vote here. He consistently uses the above terminology, but at *Hellenica* 7.4.1 switches to what we would see as a description of 'citizens' (cf. *LSJ*⁹, 1434). Could it be that Aeneas and the oligarchs had already organised, though it was short-lived, a very limited form of franchise? Hence Xenophon's use of the term and further support for it being the oligarchs who joined with the Arcadians in an attack on the harbour. If we consider the similar connotations of its use during the Euphron episode in book 7 (1.44 (ancient laws); 3.6 (members of the Theban *boule*); 3.8 (slaves enfranchised); 3.12 (citizens under a democracy)), I would suggest that in every case, no matter the mode of government in existence at the time, it refers to those with the power of the vote. Although the meaning may appear obvious and merely be referring to the mass of the people, contrast the usage of *demos* at 1.44, 45, and 3.4 (twice). Here the first two instances refer to the masses under the rule of an oligarchy; the second two to them during a state of *stasis*: in neither case do the *demos* in question actually have the power to vote at the time of which Xenophon is speaking (cf. Lintott (1982), 93, on Thucydides' technique: '[*d*]emos may mean specifically the common people, especially those with little part in decision-making').

scenario impossible, simply because the Arcadians were, above all else, almost fanatical in their support of democracies. We should not be so sure that this was the case.

Recently, Roy has defended the popular position over the issue, but admits that Thompson's arguments 'cannot so immediately be refuted'.⁹⁷ After a résumé of events according to Xenophon, Roy makes the points that the Arcadians would have disliked Euphron's tyrannical rule, perhaps also his military failure, and were concerned over breaches of the alliance's constitution, all in themselves being motives for intervention. He adds that the backing of the *demos* for Euphron left Aeneas no choice but to summon the *kratistoi*. All of these factors have been dealt with above, but as for Aeneas' summoning of the *kratistoi*, surely the very act of overriding the wishes of the majority in favour of calling in the few is in itself an oligarchic move?⁹⁸ Dealing with Thompson's belief in two Arcadian factions divided over the question of democracy and oligarchy, Roy notes *Hellenica* 7.1.44 and its emphasis on the pro-Spartan tendencies of Sicyon's *kratistoi*, which would seemingly prevent any Arcadian from backing them or see them wanting Arcadian support in re-taking Sicyon's harbour. This makes sense, but what we are speaking of in Sicyon is not to be solved by such rules as loyalty or doctrine. Power and the retention of it were the only maxims that governed thinking on all sides. For the Sicyonian oligarchs the only criteria that mattered was that they retain power, who put them back in such a position was not the issue at stake. Even genuine pro-Spartans among them knew that the chances of Sparta ever resuming her old role in the area were slight. As always, to the victor went the spoils, and in this case to the Arcadians went Sicyon's oligarchs.

Neither is the joint attack on the harbour hard to explain. Whether demanded or suggested by the Arcadians, or volunteered by the *kratistoi*, oligarchic participation was vital to reassuring them that Sicyon's oligarchs were genuinely supporting the move. That it was against the Spartans was all the more convincing of their loyalty.

⁹⁷ Roy (2000a), 323. He here re-states that Arcadia was consistent in its support for democrats, but adds 'except perhaps in overthrowing Euphron of Sicyon'.

⁹⁸ I would also draw attention to the absence of any Argive presence in this operation as compared with their direct involvement with the setting up of Euphron's regime. As members of the Peloponnesian alliance who were on bad terms with Arcadia, the non-involvement of the Eleans from the very beginning is easily explained. But why should Argos have taken part in initial affairs but not in their corollary? The answer, I would submit, is that Aeneas anticipated that the generally keen pro-democratic Argives would have been horrified at such a pro-oligarchic move, and, if not actually resisting, would have refused to take part in it. He thus had to leave them in the dark about matters.

For all we know, the initiative may have come from the oligarchs, they perhaps seeing the chance to re-gain the port whilst the Arcadians were still with them in person. Again, with the question of the Arcadians being wary of the *kratistoi*, we are mistaken if we think that they did not fully realize the position. If invited to form a government by Aeneas, were they going to refuse? As long as backing was given to the *kratistoi*, then the Arcadians knew they could rely on them. The arrangement suited both parties.⁹⁹

Roy goes on to tackle the question of the *stasis* that followed Euphron's removal, putting forward the suggestion that its outbreak points to the *demos* still being in a powerful position. Much here depends on interpretation of *Hellenica* 7.3.4. Xenophon says that clashes were taking place within Sicyon, certainly, but he does not say who had the upper hand, and here two factors arise. Firstly, democrats may have been fighting, but that does not mean that they were powerful or organised enough to be at an advantage. Nor, even if, as we should expect, they were superior in numbers, does it mean they were a serious threat to better organised or disciplined opposition. Secondly, despite the possibility of armed backing from the democrats, the very fact that Euphron had to approach Athens for mercenaries before he could seize Sicyon tells us that they were not as strong as Roy believes. The next item discussed is that of Aeneas using the *kratistoi* as a temporary measure in the removal of Euphron. The premise being that they were useful for getting government underway again, but once such was established they would have no permanent form of control. Roy supposes that it was feasible for this to be Aeneas' plan. Xenophon says nothing of this, though we could not really expect him to know. But other problems remain. Aeneas would probably not have been able to oversee matters himself, which presents a minor setback, but in reality could he dare launch this kind of subterfuge? We can suppose he would not have informed the *kratistoi* of his scheme, for if he did their participation was questionable. As much as they craved power, they were not about to pave the way for others to achieve it and then step down. Indeed, the very proposition was a dangerous precedent to set. Once in government, would they meekly step aside when

On the role of the Argives compared with that of the Arcadians in the initial *coup*, cf. esp the thoughts of Dušanic (1970a), 296 and n.48.

⁹⁹ I here also put forward the proposition that, if the Sicyonians here were democrats, then there is every chance that the Arcadians involved in the attack on the harbour were not those of Aeneas' army

told to? What would Thebes make of it? In implementing such an *ad hoc* measure Aeneas was taking a great risk, one that could make the situation worse than it was already. As things stood, much of the oligarchic vitriol was directed at Euphron. To promote this new move would see it aimed exclusively at Arcadia, with the added danger that Thebes, though let us not remove Sparta from the equation, would possibly stand to be the beneficiary. Roy finally argues that the ‘citizens’ who attacked the harbour were ‘the Sicyonians as a whole rather than any particular faction’. Consider Thompson’s words of explanation on this matter:¹⁰⁰

If, however, Aeneas left Sicyon a democracy, it should mean that the *demos* first supported Euphron, then freed the port from his new allies, but in the end made common cause with him once again. Certainly it is understandable that the *demos* hated Sparta so much that it might go against Euphron’s wishes, but it is hard to understand its subsequent return to his side.

Whatever one’s thoughts on Arcadian democratic outlook, the inconsistency involved with alternate explanations of the Sicyonian *demos*’ behaviour is no answer to our problem. Let us return to the Theban garrison and its behaviour. Roy has noted how surprising it is that it did not intervene in the internal affairs of Sicyon and also that its commander must have acquiesced in the deposing of Euphron.¹⁰¹ For Griffin, the garrison was removed before Aeneas’ entry into Sicyon and only later returned, and it also clearly supported the oligarchs.¹⁰² Differences do exist between the two interpretations, but both accept a basic spirit of co-operation between the Thebans and Arcadians. This assumption has to be questioned. Meloni believes the garrison present throughout the whole episode.¹⁰³ There is no reason to doubt that this was the case.

In spite of any surmising to the contrary, *Hellenica* 7.1.44-46 does not allude to any initial Theban involvement in Euphron’s democratic takeover of Sicyon, or to the placing of a garrison. Only at *Hellenica* 7.2.11-15 do we first meet with it during

but another force sent out later to counteract the damage Aeneas had done. This later force may have been sent by the League *archontes*, possibly after a vote in the assembly. See Chapter 6.

¹⁰⁰ Thompson (1983), 152.

¹⁰¹ Roy (1971a), 580 and n.64.

¹⁰² Griffin (1982), 72-73, 74-75. We may wonder why, if the Thebans was so pro-oligarchic, Euphron thought he had a chance of bribing them to remove the Sicyonian oligarchs.

¹⁰³ Meloni (1951), 27, though his attitude on the matter is never categorically stated.

an attack on Phlius at Which Euphron commanded only his own mercenaries.¹⁰⁴ The Theban commander led his own garrison troops and also the citizen soldiery of both Sicyon and Pellene. Now we might argue that both cities had made democratic decisions and voluntarily joined the expedition, but even this, if true, points to a preponderance of Theban influence at Both Sicyon and Pellene, no matter their political persuasion of the moment. With the democrats in control at either, then they would have probably been quite willing to follow the Theban lead, and at Sicyon this was all the more certain because of Euphron's agreement with Thebes. Finally, *Hellenica* 7.3.4 and 9 recounts the fighting that took place in Sicyon. Xenophon is here at his worst, and from a combination of 7.3.4 and 7.3.9 we have to surmise that it took place between, on the one side, Euphron, his Athenian-supplied mercenaries, and the democrats of Sicyon, and, on the other, the Theban garrison in the city.¹⁰⁵

Once ordered inside, the Theban garrison was not going to be withdrawn, even if Thebes began to think that Euphron was trustworthy. Throughout matters it remained, almost at times as if imprisoned within the city. As an ally, Its commander was in no position to question even Aeneas' entry, unless risking the alliance with Arcadia in a battle, out-numbered, he could not win. Neither, if he had acted, was there any guarantee that the wrath of the Thebans would not descend on him when, and if, he returned home. By maintaining a dignified silence he also maintained the Theban position. Matters only changed when the democrats clashed with the reinstated oligarchs, apparently before Euphron's trip to Athens, and possibly instigated by Euphron himself. It is here that we must part with Griffin's view of a pro-oligarchic Theban garrison. Xenophon never states this at any point of his narrative. It was happy enough to work with Euphron's democrats in external sorties, and stay aloof from internal intervention in Sicyonian politics. For what it is worth, which is not very much,

¹⁰⁴ Cf. Diod. 15. 75.3 for Argive involvement, and dated to 367/6 by Diodorus, but without reference to a Theban presence.

¹⁰⁵ I suspect that Euphron's mercenaries may still have been with him - if he could still pay them - but they have already dropped out of the picture at *Hell.* 7.2.11-15 on the Phlius expedition, never to re-appear, and it is thus impossible to say. If he no longer had the funds to pay his mercenaries and they had deserted him, then this is admittedly an argument in favour of those who believe that this is why he was removed. Against this, I would argue that besides us not having any such evidence, there are two other key factors, in the shape of his having ample funds to attempt bribery at Thebes, and having enough backing to be able to take Sicyon's port (unless he literally walked in and received automatic support from the locals). As he gained control of Sicyon, except for the Acropolis, backed by the democrats, the implication is that they were willing to resort to arms in resistance of the oligarchic takeover, but also, in desperation, to remove the Theban garrison.

we might add that Thebes herself was a democracy and therefore the garrison members for the most part had no difficulty with this arrangement. Crucially, let us here say, once and for all, that throughout the whole sorry episode of Euphron's rise and fall there is no actual record whatsoever of any joint Arcadian-Theban action. Never were the two sides at any time in cahoots with each other, and never were they anything but rivals for supremacy within Sicyon.

But why did the Theban garrison clash with Euphron and his democrats? From the garrison commander's viewpoint, there was ultimately no choice. Euphron, thanks to the meddling of Aeneas, had thrown in his lot with the Spartan-Athenian alliance. No longer was there a somewhat low-key rivalry involving two allies, a third force, neither low-key or allied, had entered on to the scene. Previously, Sicyon was in danger of falling under Arcadian influence, and Aeneas' arrival had made this even more imminent. But at least, as an ally, diplomacy and mutual need could play its part in maintaining a Theban presence against the increased Arcadian activity. Never had the Arcadians even suggested that the garrison be removed. But once Aeneas had deposed Euphron and driven him into the arms of Sparta the situation became drastic. Euphron, betrayed, had nothing to lose. Sicyon could be his once more, a mere garrison stood in his way. Therefore, with the mercenaries, he rallied the democrats to attack it and the Thebans, knowing too well what was coming, occupied the Acropolis and finally had no alternative but to resist him. Sicyon was not about to fall into pro-Spartan hands.

One may see a stumbling block in the shape of the democrats helping Euphron to aid 'hated Sparta', as Thompson described their feelings for her (above). His assessment is correct, but now they viewed the situation as providing aid for Euphron and a return to democracy.¹⁰⁶ Euphron was aware from the beginning that he needed the protection of a major power to hold his position, but now he was striking out alone. If successful, he may have turned to Sparta once more,¹⁰⁷ the attack on the

¹⁰⁶ In the words of Tuplin (1993), 122, he was an 'unambiguous tyrant', which is a fair description of his position. He was, like all 'popular' tyrants, careful as to his treatment of the *demos*, despite having the support of mercenaries. The introduction of elections kept the population behind him, though it seems very likely that, to some degree, his candidates were the ones elected, but he obviously knew how far he could push matters and possibly gave the populace benefits that Xenophon, perhaps purposely, does not inform us about.

¹⁰⁷ Griffin (1982), 70, believes he may have been telling them the Spartans the truth about his actions, though not his motives, at *Hellenica* 7.3.2-3, which may well be correct. This did not prevent him from, in effect, betraying them again by approaching the Thebans after Aeneas' intervention.

garrison losing him support at Thebes. But his failure meant he had to go begging to Thebes and blame the installation of an oligarchy for events (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.4). To the Sicyonian democrats he would have emphasized that the liberating force of mercenaries was obtained at *democratic* Athens, and proclaim his aim of reinstalling a democracy at Sicyon. The handing of the port to the Spartans could be explained as a move necessary under extenuating circumstances, one that brought Sicyon closer to Athens and thus closer to the harbour being retrieved via Sparta's alliance with her. Whatever, it is beyond question that the democrats continued to support him.

Ultimately, the Sicyonian oligarchs had their revenge on Euphron at Thebes, this being doubly so, as the Thebans acquitted them of his murder. He was buried with full honours in the *agora* at Sicyon (Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.12). Our sources are nowhere more inadequate than at this point. They simply fail to tell us what the political situation was in Sicyon after Euphron's death. In fact, it was under the control of the democrats.¹⁰⁸ What we can envision upon his demise is something of a stalemate, the democratic majority still having the city within its power but not the Acropolis. Thebes had benefited, thanks to its garrison's tenacity. The garrison was not about to go, and the fight with the *demos* was put to one side.¹⁰⁹ Relations with Arcadia were at an all time low, but another precarious foothold in the Peloponnese had been maintained. For the Sicyonians, despite the loss of Euphron, the majority got the government they wanted, Sparta had been kept at bay, and the oligarchic influence had been nullified. The garrison actually offered protection from a Spartan revival. Therefore, matters virtually reverted to what they were after Euphron's initial *coup* had first drawn the Thebans into the city.¹¹⁰ The democrats continued both in power and in alliance with Thebes.¹¹¹ As for the Arcadians, their influence in Sicyon, once so substantial in 368, was now all

¹⁰⁸ I believe that Xenophon thought he told us such by reporting on the fact of Euphron's final resting place and the honours he received. Note also *IvO* 36 (=Hill and Hicks (1901²), 115), which refers to honours awarded to two Sicyonians in c. 364 by Pisa. One of the recipients is Cleander, undoubtedly the same one Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.45) mentions as a member of Euphron's elected government. Obviously, he is still at Sicyon, and, one would assume, still in a position of some importance. There can be no doubting, as we have seen, the popularity of Euphron with the mass of the Sicyonians. For Cleander to survive and retain prominence, a democratic regime must almost certainly have continued to flourish at Sicyon.

¹⁰⁹ If one took place - Euphron may have used only his mercenaries to attack the Thebans.

¹¹⁰ Cf. Griffin (1982), 75, with references. I have little doubt that she is correct in saying that Euphron's son Adeas became leader of the Sicyonian democrats, and that in his turn his son, Euphron II, did so after him.

¹¹¹ Cf. Diod. 15.85.2 (2nd battle of Mantinea); 16.39.2 (defence of Megalopolis): both of which attest a continuation of the Sicyon-Thebes arrangement.

but destroyed, and their credentials as champions of democracy seriously undermined (not that this upset *all* Arcadians). In future, certainly in the northeast Peloponnese and at Thebes (and also Achaëa), their intentions would be viewed with a wary eye.

During 368 and 367 both Boeotia and Elis had desisted from action within the Peloponnese. But Arcadia had steadily increased her gains,¹¹² and Argos was more determined than ever on expansion in the northeast Peloponnese.¹¹³ For Thebes, the dual task of operations was proving too much, and by 367 something had to give. In the words of Buckler, 'The Thebans could intervene on a large scale in Thessaly only by pressing their resources in manpower to their limits, or else by postponing their operations in the Peloponnesus.'¹¹⁴ Pelopidas' journey to see the Great King and obtain the same kind of support which had saved Sparta on more than one occasion was a Theban success. Gaining acceptance of the terms handed down seemed a formality, but the congress called by Thebes after Pelopidas' return achieved nothing, mainly due to the Arcadians' actions.¹¹⁵ Not to be put off by a convention's rejection, the Thebans approached the Greek cities on an individual basis, and Corinth was chosen as the first to be tested.

Possibly the Thebans had calculated, understandably, that after all the ravaging Corinth's *chora* had undergone over many years, she would be only too keen to accept any terms available. Sparta, after all, could no longer come to her rescue, and she, like the rest of the Corinthia, was isolated. Amazingly, the Corinthians unceremoniously refused the offer. We have to applaud the decision, as it was undoubtedly brave. But whilst gaining little, the Corinthians perhaps realized that Thebes had made herself unpopular, and a view of the wider Greek picture revealed that whilst the Corinthia was isolated, it was likely that in her attitude towards Thebes she was not. If so, the gamble paid off. The other states followed her lead and the Theban proposals for, in effect, their own hegemony were rejected. Thebes abandoned her attempt in total (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.40).¹¹⁶

¹¹² Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25-26; 7.1.28; 7.2.2; 7.4.12; Paus. 8.27.4; Theopompus fr. 60 (Jacoby).

¹¹³ See above; cf. Roy (1971a), 572.

¹¹⁴ Buckler (1980a), 129.

¹¹⁵ On the whole episode, see Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33-39; Diod. 15.76.3; cf. Ryder (1957), 199-205) and (1965), 80-81, 136; Cawkwell (1961), 80-86.

¹¹⁶ A 'diplomatic fiasco', as Tuplin (1993), 153, terms it; cf. Salmon (1984), 377-78. I would think it possible that some Corinthians considered the chances of Thebes daring to resort to armed force against Corinth negligible, her current unpopularity making a backlash possible, especially perhaps

Whilst Thebes and Arcadia struggled to make headway over each other within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, the Corinthia could only await events with some trepidation. Elis' problems with Arcadia added a new dimension to events, but more worryingly, the Theban interest in Achaëa was a further threat to the region if it was to be viewed as a corridor for Theban-Elean communications.¹¹⁷

We have no need to doubt that Epaminondas' third Peloponnesian invasion was intended to test Arcadian loyalty as much as it was to open a corridor to Elis or bring Achaëa into line,¹¹⁸ not that this was much comfort to the Corinthia.¹¹⁹ Entering as easily as on previous occasions, Epaminondas had little problem in subduing Achaëa, and his willingness to leave her oligarchs in power eventually backfired on both Thebes and Arcadia (see above). But at that moment, as far as the Corinthia was concerned, beyond Phlius there was nothing of even a neutral disposition left - isolation was never more plain. Worse was to follow in the shape of the overturning of Epaminondas' decision, for it then became obvious that despite what had occurred at Sicyon, Thebes was now quite prepared to overthrow oligarchies.

With fortunes never having seemed bleaker for the Corinthia, there then took place one of the most startling events of the 360s. The feud between Athens and Thebes over Oropus went back many years, both cities claiming her as their own.¹²⁰ Thebes decided to make it her own in 366.¹²¹ This in itself was not shocking, that Athens expected help from her allies who were themselves in far worse predicaments than she, and when she did not receive it accepted Arcadia's offer of alliance most certainly was. The alliance which Lycomedes of Mantinea offered was eagerly grasped by an Athens in need of what she considered reliable allies.¹²² The agreement may have

from the direction of Arcadia. Thebes dare not risk helping along the impossible - a reforming of the old Peloponnesian League against her.

¹¹⁷ Buckler (1980a), 186.

¹¹⁸ Buckler (1980a), 185-86; Westlake (1975), 26. Attractive as the theory is for our purposes, Dušanic (1970a), 297, is mistaken to consider the possibility that the Arcadians did not take part in the operation; see *Hell.* 7.1.42: 'the allies' surely includes all concerned.

¹¹⁹ Cary (1927), 6. 95, is wrong to see the Theban taking of Naupactus and Calydon (cf. Diod. 15.75.2; Daimachus *FGH* 65 F1) on the northern shore of the Corinthian Gulf as a deliberate attempt to hit Corinth's maritime interests, as unnerving as it may have been for some Corinthians; see Buckler (1980a), 190. Any Theban maritime concerns would centre on the Aegean, and Thebes would surely not have given both ports to the Aetolians despite the understanding existing between the two states (on which see Diod. 15.57.1; cf. Tod 137 = Harding 54).

¹²⁰ For an informative discussion of the history of this conflict, see Buck (1994), App. I, 123-26.

¹²¹ It fell around June of the Julian calendar, but the archon year cannot be ascertained; cf. Buckler (1980a), 150-51.

¹²² Kallet (1983), 251.

offended many pro-Spartans, but it was to be Corinth that felt the backlash of her co-allies' failure to aid Athens over the Oropus affair. As so often, Athenian self-interest was to have a great bearing on the course of Greek history.

Corinthians armed with a knowledge of their city's recent relations with Athens had some reasons for demonstrating an ambivalent attitude towards the current situation existing between the two states.¹²³ Highly supportive of Spartan efforts at alliance with Athens in 369 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.37), Corinth had relied on the protection of Athenian garrisons for much of the 360s.¹²⁴ But once the Arcadian alliance of Athens had been formalised there followed a sinister development. Speaking in the Athenian assembly, Demotion put forward the idea of securing Corinth for Athens. This speech soon reverberated throughout the Corinthia and saw Corinth eject all Athenian garrisons and rebuff Chares' fleet on its somewhat "timely" arrival at Cenchreae (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4-6).

Corinth's renowned stability, even allowing for the union with Argos, was now about to undergo a serious crisis. Shaken by the projected Athenian *coup* and needing replacement garrisons, the Corinthians turned to recruiting mercenary foot and horse in some numbers (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6; Plut. *Tim.* 4.4). The implications of such a move are all too obvious, and Corinth possessed a figure aware of the possibilities. Very likely the example of Euphron's rise, though not his demise, inspired that of Timophanes at Corinth.¹²⁵ Of an aristocratic background, and thus an obvious candidate to be part of the Corinthian oligarchy, his leadership of the mercenaries gave him the impetus to assume the position of tyrant in Corinth. He was not slow to execute many of the city's leading oligarchs, and in typical tyrannic style, he appealed to the masses and armed some of the poor. His reign being brief does not say as much as the fact that he could become tyrant at all. Corinth's weakness had manifested itself in outright dissatisfaction with her oligarchic government and its reliance on a Spartan alliance that was now worthless. It took further outrages before his own brother Timoleon

¹²³ Although not to be pushed too far, as the city had been under Olynthian control for some years, I would suggest that Potidaea's return to Athens in 367 (cf. Buckler (1980a), 169, 256-57; Heskell (1996), 48-49; Schwenk (1997), 26) was a timely reminder for Corinthians of Athenian past ambitions re-surfacing - Potidaea was originally a Corinthian colony.

¹²⁴ Sealey (1956), 193-94.

¹²⁵ On Timophanes, see: Plut. *Tim.* 4.4-8; *Mor.* 808A; Arist. *Pol.* 1306a 21-24; Isoc. 5.51; Nepos *Tim.* 1.2-6; Diod. 16.65.3 (wrongly dated to 346/5); cf. Westlake (1952), 59-61; Salmon (1984), 233, 236, 384-85, 402. His opportunity probably came around the winter of 366/65, his tyranny lasting a matter of mere months.

finally assassinated him. How many Corinthians actually wanted to be rid of him is another matter. The oligarchs, helped perhaps by their experience of governing, lost no time in re-asserting control and, a shrewd move to keep the populace diverted no doubt, taking the fight to Argos. We may consider that Timoleon's removal to Sicily was also done in the interests of the ruling élite.

For her oligarchic leaders, Corinthian fortunes, they could argue, had been changed for the worse not by Sparta but in the long-term by the democratic governments of Argos, Thebes and Athens (and perhaps also Arcadia, for her tacit encouragement of Argive operations).¹²⁶ Our meagre sources on this matter imply that any such defence carried little weight within the city. The *demos* itself was now restless and dissatisfied, and hence in part the oligarchic recruitment of mercenaries (cf. esp. Arist. *Pol.* 1306a 21-24). Salmon suggests that for many Corinthians continued loyalty to Sparta seemed implausible, an argument we may accept with few qualms. Clearly, democratic revolution and a wish to break with Sparta need not be divorced from each other, and we can presume Corinth's oligarchs were also aware of the danger this link presented. Corinth's connections with Sparta would have to be severed. Further, Salmon notes the presence of Corinthian exiles in Athens (cf. Dem. 20. 51-57), their former influence within Corinth, and how many Corinthians might see some benefits from a rapprochement with Athens rather than a belligerent Boeotia.¹²⁷ This certainly has merit but there are drawbacks involved.

Argos, Athens, and Boeotia were all democracies to different degrees and, as we have seen, Argos was possibly also harbouring Corinthian oligarchs (Diod. 15.40.3). Now whatever the political outlook of Corinth's exiles, they, whether oligarchs or democrats, had one vital factor in common: they were all anti-Spartan.¹²⁸ Salmon has already identified this as now being a crucial problem within Corinth itself. By no means were all Corinthians anti-Argive, and many would have memories of a union dissolved a little over a decade previously; neither would all Corinthians have

¹²⁶ Lintott (1982), 226-27, makes much of Plutarch's *Timoleon* (esp. 3.1-5.2) in arguing for a democratic regime at Corinth. I have suspicions that Plutarch may be anachronistic here, but Lintott also thinks that Corinth's constitution was in any case 'dominated by the pro-Spartan aristocrats'.

¹²⁷ Salmon (1984), 379.

¹²⁸ Not for one moment am I suggesting an alliance between the two. But we should envisage a situation where both democrats and oligarchs forgot about their disagreements with each other and were more concerned with ridding Corinth of her pro-Spartan oligarchs, which if achieved of course gave them the chance to once more turn the city round to their own particular ways of thinking.

found the arrangement distasteful. The Argives had attacked the cities of the Corinthia independently, and of all of them, Corinth was the most sought-after and impregnable. There was little chance of taking Corinth itself; and the Acrocorinth was nigh an impossibility, a bastion that could withstand the attempts of the most numerous and disciplined of forces with ease.¹²⁹ What the raids into Corinthian territory point toward is not an Argive belief in their own ability to take either obstacle but rather the possibility that some Corinthians would be willing to betray them. But Argos, although a safer bedfellow than Athens for some Corinthians, had other factors militating against her: the ties with Arcadia and Thebes now appeared fractious, and her military strength negligible. Despite some support and the fact that she had not recently betrayed Athens, Argos was not to be the answer.

Contrary to Salmon's position, we have to believe that any resurgence of good relations or alliance with Athens presented Corinth with little advantage. Geographically, Athens was some distance from the city and its ports, and would have to rely heavily on her navy to send Corinth any aid - if Lechaeum and Cenchreae could be held against an enemy. But a state that had been an ally and then tried to take Corinth could simply not be trusted. To side with Athens would do nothing to stop what had brought the Corinthians to this crux in the first place - the continual ravaging of their *chora*. Lastly, how could Corinth escape Sparta and her plans when Athens was in alliance with her? We must on these grounds reject Salmon's theory of a rapprochement between Corinth and Athens. Corinth's next move was, as Salmon says, an oligarchic effort to get the city out of difficulties. Although it may be added that this was not due to the danger of an Athenian affinity within, and was probably designed to save their own positions as much as to save Corinth.

The 'dark affair' that had been the attempted Peace of 366/5,¹³⁰ was, in large part, aborted due to Corinthian influence. Now Corinth, and particularly her oligarchic leadership, wanted peace as never before, an irony probably not lost on her democrats, who would have possibly accepted it in the first place. We shall here follow the account of Xenophon on matters (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6-11). It makes perfect sense that at

¹²⁹ Anyone who has scaled the heights of Acrocorinth from top to bottom by avoiding its paths, as I did in September of 1999, will realize the futility of an all-out assault on it. Perhaps Antigonus Gonatas' simple resort to knocking on the door and demanding entry was as effective as any method; Plut. *Arat.* 17; Polyæn. 4.6.1; cf. Tarn (1913), 372-73; Walbank (1933), 42-43.

¹³⁰ Cawkwell (1972), 273.

this moment Corinth would make peace overtures to Thebes and then seek the approval of Sparta. The 'coolness' of Athens towards Sparta, sensed by the Corinthians in the swearing of the Arcadian pact, should not be over-estimated, as it is to a degree by Buckler.¹³¹ She was certainly in no position to reject Sparta, but the Corinthians were.¹³² Corinth had suffered long enough and had shown amazing loyalty. Sparta was indebted to her now, and no longer the reverse.¹³³ By Approaching Thebes before Sparta, the Corinthians had cleverly demonstrated their determination to secede from the Peloponnesian League, but had also placed the onus of responsibility for the next step upon the Spartans. The eyes of the Peloponnesians were upon them now. To refuse the Corinthians the chance for peace placed Sparta in the position of being totally self-centred and uncaring of her allies, who then might well follow the same route as Corinth; to give the Corinthians the chance for peace was to open the floodgates for the allies to do the same: either way, Sparta could not win this one.

Spartan permission for her allies to settle peace with Thebes was the death knell of the Peloponnesian League.¹³⁴ It hardly rates a mention in the pages of history, especially as Xenophon tries to play down the isolation it brought to Sparta. Corinth's stand may, as Salmon suggests,¹³⁵ have brought long-term benefits for smaller states. She is to be admired for her refusal to enter into alliance with Thebes, an arrangement that would have seen her merely exchanging loyalties and being dragged into future conflicts. Neither is it to be forgotten that she paved the way for the other cities of the Corinthia to make their peace with Thebes, though our evidence only fleetingly refers

¹³¹ Buckler (1980a), 199.

¹³² Athens could not afford to desert Sparta at this juncture. In the shape of Arcadia, she had finally gained a Peloponnesian ally, apart from Sparta, that was having as many problems with Thebes as she was herself. There was no greater rivalry in the Peloponnesians in 366/5 than that between Arcadia and Sparta, but to lose either was to face being deprived of a possible winning formula. Athens trod a thin line very successfully.

¹³³ I would here draw attention to Isocrates 6.91, which is perhaps only a reflection of its author's outlook, but records the Peloponnesian situation well in the fictional words of the young Archidamus III of Sparta: 'No one, for example, would reproach Epidaurians, or Corinthians, or Phliasians if they thought of nothing else than to escape destruction and save their own lives.' The truth on Spartan feelings is noted by Cartledge (1987), 257, and not by Xenophon. That is, the Spartans saw Corinth's actions as a revolt because their allies must have been prepared to recognise Messenian independence. They took it with good grace because they had to; cf. Roy (1971a), 582. Salmon (1984), 379-80 and n. 47, suggests the loss of Naupactus was a factor in the equation.

¹³⁴ Despite the belief of De Sanctis (1934), 149-50, we must reject the evidence of Diodorus (15.76.3) that a *koine eirene* was formulated at this juncture. What resulted was a set of separate alliances between Thebes on the one hand and Sparta's former allies on the other; cf. Hampl (1938), 62-64.

¹³⁵ Salmon (1984), 380-81.

to two of them.¹³⁶ For all intents and purposes, fighting in the northeast Peloponnese now stopped.

The Corinthia here virtually drops out of our source material for nigh on three years. By the time of the (2nd) Battle of Mantinea in 362 she had been removed (or gladly retired) from the forefront of Peloponnesian politics. Only two of its states are recorded as being present, Sicyon fighting on the side of the Thebans (Diod. 15.85.2), as we should expect from our discussion of Euphron, and Phlius once more behind Sparta. She was the only state of the Corinthia to take part in the treaty of alliance with Athens, Arcadia, Achaea, and Elis after the battle.¹³⁷ Others may have been there, but it would not be many. Nevertheless, they may all have been a party to the 362/1 reply to the satraps.¹³⁸ The realignment of the Peloponnese that had taken place would have been unimaginable a decade earlier. But (2nd) Mantinea speaks volumes of how the Corinthia, once so crucial, was now sidelined. If one searches for evidence of a complete turnaround in the region's political outlook, then it soon becomes plain that one is searching in vain. The Peloponnesian democrats of 362 must have wondered what the point of their efforts had been. True, many pro-Spartan elements had been swept aside, but only Sicyon had actually changed its basic mode of government. The rest had, in some shape or form, remained oligarchic. Even at Sicyon it had taken the presence of an autocrat supported by an external force, whether primed to maintaining a non-committal attitude or otherwise, and remaining long after its guarantor had departed, to allow a "democratic" government to exist. A pro-Spartan may well have alluded to the halcyon days of the Peloponnesian League and poignantly asked: what

¹³⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.10: Phlius; Isoc. 6.91: Phlius and Epidaurus. Cf. Diod. 15.76.3; Ryder (1957), 199-205, and (1965), 83, 137-39; Cawkwell (1961), 80-86.

¹³⁷ *IG II²* 112 = Tod 144 = *SV* 2. 290. Cf. Ryder (1965), 88. Despite the protests of Salmon (1984), 381, n.55, I hesitatingly accept the arguments of Roy (1971a), 587, n. 95, that Phlius was not a democracy in 362/1. As Roy says, line 30 relies upon considerable restoration to arrive at 'politeia' (for Arcadia, Achaea, and Elis) and 'demos' (Phlius) for the terms which describe the constitutions in the text (I am not as convinced that 'politeia' did not generally refer to an oligarchy when used in such contexts, as I make clear in the case of Euphron above). Salmon thinks that Phlius 'probably...regained a democratic constitution after 365', but we have neither evidence or reason to believe this to be the case. It is clear, despite Diod. 15.40.5, that the oligarchs in Phlius were very much in control of matters. If Salmon is considering that, after all they had been through, by entering into a peace treaty in 365 they would give up all they had struggled to retain, he is surely mistaken. Thebes was not pushing to change state constitutions, and would not risk all she had fought Sparta for being thrown away by such an insistence. Roy's point that Phlius' Peloponnesian allies at Mantinea were 'the natural allies of an anti-democratic group' is worth consideration (Athens was not Peloponnesian and was there mainly because of the Theban threat, and not because of political belief).

¹³⁸ *IG IV* 556 = Tod 145 = *SV* 2. 292.

price freedom? The verdict of Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.5.26-27), that there was more uncertainty in the Peloponnese after the battle than before it, is his personal view of Sparta's decline, and only partly correct. Xenophon knew one thing: no clear hegemon had emerged. The Corinthia's geographical position meant that in such a situation, and without Spartan protection, she would not remain on the sidelines for long.

Chapter 2 The Argolid: The 'Sickman' of the Peloponnese?

Cicero said that he had never heard of an Argive orator,¹ which in a sense says much of the problem facing us in our present context and of the general light in which our source material has viewed Argos (though not necessarily providing a clue about Argive attributes, or lack of them). As Roy has noted of the years following 371/70: 'Xenophon gives relatively little attention to Argive affairs of the period.'²

Whereas the cities of the Corinthia had been loosely unified in adversity to some degree for at least two centuries, the Argolid's "unity" was an enforced one. In both cases the city of Argos was responsible. Argos' history was juxtaposed with her imperialistic ambitions within the Peloponnese, and particularly the northeast Peloponnese. Few major Peloponnesian treaties in the fifth century do not have an Argive contribution to them, even if only indirectly.³ That she had been out-thought as much as out-fought by Sparta is well recorded.⁴ The isolation this entailed lasted throughout all of the fifth century, with only spasmodic attempts at a renaissance of former glories intermittently making their presence felt in the information available to us. In fact Argos had never abandoned either her claim to lead the Dorians of the Peloponnese or her designs on doing so. But Sparta's grip on the Greek world actually increased rather than decreased, and the Argives could only remain ever more ruefully on the periphery of Peloponnesian politics, awaiting the opportunity to restate their credentials at the expense of the Spartans.⁵

Neither should we deny them credit for their efforts in this direction, fully equipped, as they were, with the knowledge that there was more than one way to skin a cat. It would seem that for some three to four centuries Argos had utilized religious belief as a means to gain advantage, and into the fourth century she was still trying to

¹ Quoted by Grote (1888, IX), 418, without reference, and the original of which I, despite some effort, have been unable to trace.

² Roy (1971a), 572.

³ See Mosley (1971), 322 for a comprehensive list.

⁴ Argos had not managed to conduct a policy with a duality of purpose towards the inhabitants of the Peloponnese with the same acumen as had Sparta. Cf. Hdt. 1.67-69 (Orestes); 5.72 (Cleomenes I); with Cartledge (1979), 139 f.; Forrest (1980²), 74 f.; Adshead (1986), 30 f.; but esp. Dickens (1912), 22.

⁵ By whom, as Cartledge (1987), 364 says, they thought they 'had been unjustly robbed' of Peloponnesian hegemony.

do such.⁶ But a problem by which Argos, unlike what we may term her counterpart in the Corinthia, the city of Corinth, was plagued came from within, and undoubtedly played into Sparta's hands as much as any of her aggressive tendencies towards her neighbours. *Stasis* was part and parcel of Argive history. From the destruction of Asine,⁷ the days of Pheidon's rule (Chapter One), the emergence of an assertive aristocracy,⁸ through to the possible rise of a tyranny under Perilaos (Paus. 2.23.7), Argos had been at the centre of the political upheavals within the Argolid - but most of these events imply that internally all was not well within the city itself. What arose after the catastrophe that was Sepeia (c.494) is not entirely certain,⁹ but we should have no doubts that, despite any possible early recovery of manpower and political power, or whether those classed as Argives were now all Dorian or not, the future of Argos had been radically changed. The closer ties that arose with Athens after the Persian Wars were not down to mere chance, and it is here, through a mist of fragmentary information, that Argive democracy was born.¹⁰ Though not as radical as that of Athens was shortly about to become,¹¹ it was enough to once and for all draw a firm line between the oligarchically oriented aristocrats and the democratically inclined mass of the citizens. We can see it in the fiasco prior to the (1st) Battle of Mantinea and in the events immediately following it.¹² It had an impetus in the union with Corinth in that such a move saw Argos become not only what we might call the senior partner in

⁶ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.1-2. The details of the religious policy are mainly beyond the scope of our interests. On the various aspects, such as the promotion of Hera and Apollo and the clashes with Asine and Cleonae, see: Farnell (1896-1907, IV), 215 ff.; Head (1911²), 437; Tomlinson (1972), 200-20; Miller (1982), 100-08; 1990, *passim*, but esp. 22-23, 42-43, 61-62, 71, 119, 169; Wells (1987-88), 349-52; 1990, 157-61; Piérart (1990), 319-33; Polignac (1995), esp. 41-55.

⁷ Around 710 (Strabo 8.6.10-11; cf. Paus. 4.14.3; Tomlinson (1972), 41-43; Polignac (1995), 50 and 130, but probably not at the same time as Tiryns and Nauplia (and possibly Midea, the MS is poor).

⁸ Paus. 2.19.2; cf. Hägg (1981) on burials as early as the mid-eighth century.

⁹ On this see the excellent articles by Seymour (1922) and Willetts (1959), which share some common ground, particularly in their rejection of Busolt's (1895, II), 564, n. 2, late date for the Argives' expulsion of their new masters. Cf. Gehrke (1985), 361-63.

¹⁰ Much may well be due to Themistocles; see Forrest (1960), 221-41; cf. Jones (1987), 112 ff.

¹¹ Tomlinson (1972), 192-93; on the Argive democracy overall, see 192-99.

¹² That is: the deal struck between Agis and the Argives Thrasyllus and Alciphron (the latter a Spartan *proxenos*, no less) that precluded any clash of arms (Thuc. 5.59-60); the lax efforts by the Argive generals to prevent the Spartans escaping (Thuc. 5.65); and, most telling of all, the complicity of pro-Spartan Argives in reaching an agreement that saw Argos revert, albeit briefly, to oligarchy (Thuc. 5.81-83; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 1304a 25-27; Diod. 12.80; Plut. *Alcib.* 15; Tomlinson (1972), 122-25. Is there any connection between the 1,000 Argives at Mantinea of Thuc. 5.67 and the pro-Spartan 1,000 of 5.81? The whole episode, I believe, had a huge bearing on the attitude of many Argive democrats in the future (cf. Thuc. 5.84.1 for Athens' removal of oligarchs from Argos in 416/5). Never again could they, their children, or their children's children ever have anything but distrust and utter contempt for the city's aristocrats - they were the enemy within.

the arrangement, but also a strengthened democracy when faced by the Argive aristocratic opposition. It is thus no wonder that the Spartans were quick to dismantle the agreement following the King's Peace of 387/6 (Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34-36).

The news of Sparta's defeat at Leuctra, we can guarantee, was no more warmly greeted throughout the whole of Greece than it was at Argos (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.19-20 on Athens' reception of it). Neither, as is also the case with the cities of the Corinthia, do we have to entertain any nagging doubts as to whether Argos sent representatives to the conference at Athens.¹³ Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.1-3), besides Athens herself, mentions only Elis of the major powers as being in attendance, and this due to her refusal to take the oath. But in this instance especially, Argos would want to be present. No longer was there a Sparta, represented or not, ruling the roost and allowing Argos nothing. For once the Argives actually had a chance to gain. From what we know of what took place this did not happen, the terms accepted being different from those laid down previously, and only Athens herself gained anything by the recognition of her alliance.¹⁴

What occurred next at Argos is one of the most infamous events of the fourth century, and is often, due in great part to Xenophon's silence on the matter, met with a degree of suspicion. As pointed out by Swoboda,¹⁵ only Diodorus' account (15.57.3-58.4) of the *skytalismos* is consistent. Other references to what appears to be the *skytalismos* do exist. Some of these are mere passing mentions of the event with little to add to what we can extract from Diodorus (or Ephorus), and may well have been based partly on his reporting, but none can be totally written off (see below).¹⁶

¹³ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 93. I use the term 'Argos' rather than 'Argolid' here because, as uninformed as we are about the region's political organisation at this juncture, it would seem that cities as far away as Cleonae, on the Corinthian side of the watershed that divided the Corinthia from the Argolid, had long accepted Argive domination (cf. Plut. *Tim.* 4.1). It is also quite plain that whatever else Sparta did, she felt the threat of Argos and her mini-empire was necessary to ensuring her own continued hegemony amongst her Peloponnesian allies, and was quite prepared to tolerate an Argos that was isolated within her own boundaries (cf. Davies (1997), 128). In truth, the history of the Argolid for much of the fourth century is, in our sources, the history of Argos. On the towns of the Argolid see Tomlinson (1972), 15-47.

¹⁴ She was possibly also granted the right to the recovery of Amphipolis; cf. Aesch. 2.32; Cawkwell (1979), 335 and n.

¹⁵ Swoboda (1918), 94-95.

¹⁶ I include in this category Dion. Hal. *Ant.* 7.66.5 (who says nothing of worth); Ael. Arist. *Panath.* 273d, 311d; Plut. *Mor.* 814b; and Helladius *ap.* Phot. cod. 279 (Bekker, *Anecd.* 534); the latter accounts both give the body count as being 1,500 compared with Diodorus' 1,200. Absent are what many would consider two important references to the event, that is Aen. Tact. 11.7-10 and Isoc. *Philip* 51-52. I have never believed that these refer to the *skytalismos*, and was gratified to see that David (1986), supported by Whitehead (1990), 130-31, also refused to accept this belief, though many

Diodorus tells of a major outbreak of *stasis* at Argos in 370/69. In essence, the city's demagogues whipped up a storm of resentment against those with wealth, the retaliation being in the form of a plan to overthrow the Argive democracy. Discovered in their machinations, some of those under suspicion were tortured, and others committed suicide to avoid such, but one victim denounced thirty others. These were promptly dispatched by the democracy and their property confiscated. Others were also suspected, and the demagogues were only too pleased to condemn them, despite obvious signs that their accusers were falsely implicating many wealthy citizens. This inspired further accusations, until all of those arrested were condemned to death by 'the mob', who in turn, not satisfied with 1,200 deaths (or more) to their credit, then sensed the demagogues' nerves were failing and, feeling deserted and betrayed, also put them to death. Putting that down to divine justice, Diodorus then terminates the episode by saying that at last the people regained their senses.

There are several questions arising from the episode, not least of which being just when exactly it occurred. Scholarly opinion is much divided on the matter, as Diodorus simply places it under the year 370/69, and Xenophon is less specific but a provider of vital clues if we examine his account of events carefully. Going against what Diodorus says, Dušanic puts the *stasis* in the summer of 371, '[a]ccording to the order of events in Diodorus' narrative, somewhat earlier than the formation of the Arkadikon (59,1)'.¹⁷ This idea has to be rejected. At 15.59.1 Diodorus says that Lycomedes tried to influence the Arcadians into forming a league '[a]bout the same time' as the *skytalismos*.¹⁸ Diodorus' ordering of events can possibly give a pointer to the truth of the matter but is not guaranteed to, and we may suspect that his wary

others have done so. See: Hunter and Handford (1927), 137-38; Tomlinson (1972), 193; Mitsos (1983), 243-49, whose linking of a very fragmentary Argive inscription to Aen. Tact. 11.7-10 is tenuous to say the least; Gehrke (1985), 31-33; and Jones (1987), 116. Unfortunately, David's arguments for a date between 387/6 and 371 do not stand up to scrutiny, and I was beginning to believe that the 350s may have been a possibility until reading Stylianou (1998), 414, who, I am convinced, is absolutely correct to view the 'second attack' of Aen. Tact. 11.7 on the democracy as that of Thuc. 5.83.1f., the first attack being that of Thuc. 5.81.2 (cf. Aen. Tact. 17.2-4; Diod. 12.80.2-3). As for Isocrates' *Philip* 51-52, there may be a fleeting mention of the *skytalismos* at 52, but, composed in 346 as it was, it is for the most part a general summary of the 350s, with some references to earlier history, rather than a studied appraisal of the *stasis* of 370.

¹⁷ Dušanic (1970a), 287, n. 40. Grote (1888, IX) 417, seems to agree. But definitively, see Roy (1974), 505-07.

¹⁸ Roy (1971), 370, also uses almost the same words, saying it was 'going on at the same time'. We have no reason to doubt that this was the case. Hammond (1967²), 496, and Tomlinson (1972), 139, accept such, though Lintott (1982), 225: 'c.370', and Cartledge (1987), 383: 'in the years following 371', are more equivocal.

approach here stresses his own uncertainty as to which occurred first. If we bring in Xenophon (*Hell.*6.5.3-5) as a mediator, then we have to conclude that the foundation of the Arcadian League was in 370, as implied by both accounts. Swoboda is closer to the truth when he says that the *skytalismos* took place sometime after Leuctra but before the July of 370.¹⁹

There can be no answer that is beyond doubt here, but let us try to make some sense of what information we have at our disposal. The *staseis* of Diodorus 15.40 must have taken place soon after Leuctra,²⁰ but not immediately so. We know that Sparta's allies sent help to her following the battle (*Hell.*6.4.18) and that the attempts at revolution recorded at 15.40 failed miserably. Whilst Diodorus may have confused his source material concerning the year, he was probably correct to link the events of 15.40 (cf. 15.40.1) to the outcome of a peace conference – he merely mixed-up the details. That of 15.38 is actually the same one recorded at *Hell.* 6.5.1-3 as being held at Athens. Therefore, in the second half of 371 and after Leuctra we have Sparta's allies aiding her; the Peace of Athens; and revolutions in the Peloponnese. This sequence of events could not have happened overnight. The allied contingents were prepared to help Sparta straight after the battle, but revolt within the various cities involved, racked with uncertainty as they were, would have taken some time to spread or even for its undercurrents to come out into the open. Before this could manifest itself, Athens had not lost too much time in seizing the moment and, perhaps with a view to winning over Sparta's wavering allies,²¹ calling the conference. To plan it, send out invitations, stage it, and then dispatch officials to administer the oath would consume much time, perhaps at least a month, if not two.²² Add to this the actual revolts of Diodorus 15.40 finally commencing, and we can safely calculate that already we are in the year 370.

To put what followed into perspective we have to consider the position of Argos. The oligarchic *coup* of 417/16 had never been forgotten by democrat or

¹⁹ Swoboda (1918), 95, and stressing Diodorus' misplacing of the archon year.

²⁰ Fought in midsummer 371 (5 Hecatombaeon (June-July of the Attic calendar): Plut. *Ages.* 28).

²¹ Ryder (1965), 71; Hammond (1967²), 499; cf. Stylianou's (1998), 336, comments on the Chabrias monument and *IG II*² 46 for possible evidence of slightly earlier Athenian interference in the affairs of Sparta and her allies.

²² Although only circumstantial evidence, we must also take into consideration that what little we know of the conference itself implies that there was no kind of disruption because of attempted revolutions interfering with the process before or during its duration.

oligarch alike. An uneasy truce had been secured between the two sides as both awaited a seachange in Peloponnesian politics that would suit them. Leuctra gave the democrats the opportunity they had sought. A century earlier the “sons of the slain” from Sepeia had acted in vengeance to claim their inherited right to rule Argos. Around one hundred years later the sons of the betrayed from (2nd) Mantinea sought to utilize their inherited democratic right as rulers of Argos to inflict vengeance on those they already, in-effect, ruled. But a problem existed. Even Sparta’s defeat could not bring about an immediate assault on the oligarchs because if her allies were still willing to answer her calls to arms then any attack on them could bring about serious repercussions. It might even suit Sparta to resurrect an oligarchy in Argos to aid her now faltering cause in the Peloponnese, something she had usually hesitated to do in the past.²³ Therefore the Argive democrats had to carefully gauge the political climate before striking, and the allied support of Sparta after Leuctra coupled with the total failure of the Peloponnesian revolutions made procrastination a necessity. The proposition that Argive influence might have played its part in Arcadia’s revolt is thus a strong possibility, even if any support had to be clandestine.²⁴

Now as Roy has said,²⁵ presumably the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans formed alliances with each other before they appealed to Athens, and were rejected, and then turned to Thebes, and were accepted (Diod. 15.62.3; Dem. 16.12,19). This all took place before the winter invasion of the Peloponnese of 370/69. Therefore we have to take account of the time factor involved. Even if one were to argue that the alliances

²³ The intervention in 417/16 was in unusual circumstances. Prior to (1st) Mantinea Argos had actually succeeded in luring some of Sparta’s allies away from her, and Sparta had no compunction in acting to prevent the Argive democrats from behaving in such a way ever again, even if they were effectively isolated after the battle. I am convinced that the isolation of Argos at this juncture virtually disarmed her, making her a secondary target. The Spartans had long lived without her as an ally prior to this, and did not really want her as anything other than a possible threat to her own allies, particularly in the northeast Peloponnese. Their primary target was now Mantinea (Elis would also be dealt with in due course), which, it should be understood, was *not* allied to her any longer (neither Thucydides or Xenophon ever claim other than that a treaty existed; cf. Thuc. 5.81.1; Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.2), had been the centre of an anti-Spartan mini-empire within Arcadia (with Argive help, cf. Thuc. 5.33), and could cause further problems in the future. Argive democrats had links with her and thus *had* to be countered by the installation of a pro-Spartan oligarchic government within Argos. It was soon overthrown, but the whole episode had seen, in the words of Amit (1973), 162, ‘the last manifestation of the existence of the ‘Sonderbund’ (the Argive League)’. For the years 421-16 see Thuc. 5.13ff.; on the Argive-Mantinean relationship see Amit (1973), 121ff. *passim*; on the Argos-Mantinea alliance of 421 see Nielsen (1996a), 79-84.

²⁴ The Mantineans had only recently aided the Argives, much to Spartan chagrin: cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.1-7; Rice (1974), 166; Seager (1974), 156-57.

were very informal at such an early stage, and this, going on what we know, does not seem to be the implication, it is still quite obvious that much time had been consumed. Other factors also arise, and here Arcadia is a crucial element. There can be no doubt that the Arcadians had set about revolting and then forming a league some time before the attack on Laconia occurred in 370 (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.3-11),²⁶ which also provoked, after attempted negotiation, the expedition of Agesilaus against Arcadia (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.4-5).²⁷ We could here be talking of some time elapsing between the first stirrings in Arcadia and the actual entrance into the Peloponnese of the Thebans. All of the above evidence being taken into account, we may well be going back as far as September or October, 370. Of all the areas of the Peloponnese, Arcadia was of the utmost importance to the Argives. If the Arcadians were to secede from the Spartan alliance, then Argos' democrats had virtual *carte blanche* to act as they liked within the city – but for the latter position to come about an Arcadian secession had to take place first. Only then could the Argive oligarchs be seriously in danger of receiving no succour from the direction of a geographically isolated Sparta. To consider the prospect of Argive democrats quietly encouraging Arcadian revolution is in keeping with the situation;²⁸ to believe that they would commence the *skytalismos* before Arcadia made a move is quite the reverse: the Argive demagogues may have been thirsting for blood, but they were not suicidally so.

The same chain of events that followed Leuctra also saw Arcadia hold back from any swift action. By late 370 her oligarchs were no longer in control (or some of them were actually a part of the revolution). Once open insurrection had occurred, the Argive democrats' accusations against the oligarchs would have been set in motion almost immediately. Within weeks, and very possibly days, the *skytalismos* would have

²⁵ Roy (1994²), 190; cf. Roebuck (1941), 40-41. On the Peloponnesian-Boeotian alliance see Diod. 15.62.3 (=SV 273).

²⁶ Vollgraff's misinterpretation of an inscription should not be used as evidence for Argive influence on the formation of the Arcadian League; Vollgraff *Mnemosyne* 42, (1914), 330 ff.; cf. Plassart, *BCH* 39 (1915), 122 ff. See the interesting claim of Dušanic (1970a), 290 and n. 63, that Argives and Arcadians involved in the Peace of Athens also had an influence.

²⁷ Although limited as evidence, I would draw attention to Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.8, 6.5.12 and 6.5.19 here. The first notes that the Tegeans had 'long before' sent to Mantinea for help, the second that Agesilaus occupied Eutaea for an unspecified amount of time, and the third implies that there had been protracted negotiations between Elis and Thebes, all of which are worthy of consideration as factors which may have extended the time span involved. We cannot, though, make too much of Agesilaus' ravaging of the land at *Hell.* 6.5.15, it being the wrong time of the year for destroying the harvest (cf. *Hell.* 6.5.20 for confirmation).

²⁸ Cf. Stylianou (1998), 414-15.

followed, and soon thereafter alliance with Arcadia and Elis. Both of these states were far from being without political tensions, but their defiance of Sparta's wishes had a great deal of internal support and matters were settled quickly. If we contrast *Hellenica* 6.5.22, where it is noted how the Arcadians were still in full array, with 6.5.16, the impact of events at Argos becomes plain. At 6.5.16 the Argives are not in full force, and this and the early to mid-winter time-scale tells us of just how recent and how bloody the *skytalismos* had been. During those few short months following it, the democrats either realized that they had killed so many that a full citizen levy as raised previously was no longer possible, or that they dare not leave Argos with their total forces in case of a reaction whilst they were away.²⁹ The truth probably lies somewhere between the two, as the dating of the event itself, we should conclude, lies somewhere between late summer and mid- autumn, 370.

What are the actual details of the *skytalismos*? Argos had been awash with outsiders of different political persuasions since at least 387/6 (Diod. 15.40.3; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.34), the only common denominator often being an almost pathological hatred of Sparta. The city was the headquarters and virtual clearing house for anti-Spartan Peloponnesians, most of them naturally being of democratic outlook.³⁰ This situation was not ideal and gave rise to an increased militancy that was fuelled by the Argive demagogues' intense dislike of a pro-Spartan oligarchic minority within their own citizen body, the very existence of which was both an embarrassment and a danger to themselves. Deprived by Spartan hegemony of a means for ridding Argos of this

²⁹ The recovery after Sepeia seems to have been accomplished by perhaps the 470s, but the eight years following the *skytalismos* hardly provided time for a repeat of this nature. During the 360s Argos did not live up to her past military reputation, and we should here note that her poor performances must have stemmed in very large part from the losses and distrust this event engendered internally (cf. Hammond (1967²), 496: 'Argos weakened herself by an internal revolution'). Whilst it could be argued that one was a full field army (including other contingents from the Argolid?) and one a detachment, I would nevertheless point to the differences between the forces Argos mustered for Nemea in 394 (7,000; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.17) and at Olympia in 365 (2,000; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.29). We should also note, with both reference to the reduction in Argive forces and oligarchic links with Sparta, the mixed force of five hundred Argives and Boeotians present with Sparta's army at Orchomenus (Diod. 15.62.1-2) at around the same time as the *skytalismos* was underway, and which may well reflect the situation in Argos at this time. Indeed, just how recent was their rendezvous with the Spartans?

³⁰ Cf. Swoboda (1918), 100-01, citing K.H. Lachmann *Gesch. Griechenlands von dem Ende des peloponnesischen Krieges bis zu dem Regierungsantritte Alexanders d. Gr.* (Leipzig, 1854, I, 337, 2; a work I have not been able to obtain), though Lachmann thinks it was a haven for democrats only. This, as we have seen with our examination of the Corinthia, is too simple a solution and fails to come to grips with the heterogeneous nature of Peloponnesian politics of both this and earlier eras, power and not party ideology or political allegiance being the spur behind much of what occurred.

scourge for so long, once that threat had vanished revenge took the form of the most brutal kind of catharsis the fourth century had witnessed.

Modern commentators have described it in a variety of ways,³¹ but what becomes plain is the lack of fundamental agreement between many of their interpretations, and a tendency towards skirting over any in-depth analysis of the episode. One vital component frequently overlooked is noted by Arnheim in his remark that the victims ‘were not only rich but also noble’.³² That is, what took place was a real class war in every sense of the word, with all the ingredients that entailed. It is this aspect combined with what we have discussed which made the affair so vicious. Excluding the class element, the proscriptions of the “second” Triumvirate at Rome had a forerunner in the *skytalismos*, and we would be naïve to think that the very demagogues who stirred up the populace did not make any personal gain from the slaughter. But of course these demagogues themselves, as Tomlinson has noted,³³ were possibly of the wealthier class and may have met their deaths because of their backgrounds once they shied away from further killings.³⁴ At this point, let us ask ourselves if there was a little more to the immediate causes of the *stasis* than first meets the eye.

To take, as we must, Diodorus 15.57.3-58.4 as our starting point, his explanation of the outbreak of the *stasis* is really no explanation at all. At 57.3 he tells of how this “club-law” was the greatest strife Greece had ever seen. It is at 58.1 that he informs us that the Argives had a democratic type of government and that ‘certain demagogues instigated the population against the outstanding citizens of property and reputation’. The unanswered question is why, and the presumption that we have oligarchs and democrats in the same vicinity and thus we have *stasis*, is not convincing. We already know the overall answer from our above discussion of Argos’ history, but there may be more as to the question of why it should have broken out at precisely this

³¹ ‘A democratic mob bludgeoned 1,200 opponents to death’: Hammond (1967²), 496; ‘the bloody trial of the Argive rich’: Dušanic (1970a), 287; ‘a dramatic political upheaval’: Tomlinson (1972), 139; ‘a pogrom of the wealthy in democratic Argos’: Lintott (1982), 224; ‘an extreme democratic movement’: Roy (1994²), 189.

³² Arnheim (1977), 70.

³³ Tomlinson (1972), 140.

³⁴ Was there ever any genuinely poor democratic leaders in ancient Greece? One is struck by the dearth of them, and it appears that some aristocratic Greeks used democracy as a means to an end in exactly the same way that their Roman counterparts used the tribuneship; cf. Connor (1971), esp. 110ff. On the *skytalismos*’ socio-economic motivation see Fuks (1974), esp. 71-72 and n.24.

moment in time. Arcadia's revolt was definitely the event that gave the all-clear for the go-ahead, but was it enough in itself to instill a confidence of success within Argos' democrats?

Examining the supporting evidence for the *skytalismos*, Dušanic has arrived at an interesting conclusion that is worthy of our consideration.³⁵ Both Plutarch (*Mor.* 814b) and Helladius (*ap. Phot. cod. 279 (Bekker, Anecd. 534)*) record that on hearing of the shocking news from Argos the Athenians ordered an immediate purification of their assembly. Further, Aelian Aristides (*Panath. 273d; cf. 311d*) reports that they then made efforts to stop the Argive butchery. Why should they feel the need to behave in this manner concerning a slaughter that did not involve them? Dušanic has few doubts that Athens was influential in bringing about the strife, and neither should we, even if Diodorus knew nothing of the truth. We have briefly made mention of Athenian designs on Sparta's allies both before and after Leuctra. Athens often, and for similar reasons of self-interest, attempted to play the Great King's role in his relations with Greece in her own relationship with the Peloponnese – but she had not the gold, standing, or even theoretical military might to carry it off. What she therefore did was to skulk in the background rather than the foreground, and scheme rather than threaten. Throughout the duration of the 360s she wielded a limited, but not always negligible influence on Peloponnesian affairs that we only occasionally get glimpses of in the sources. Her gifts were her remote geographical position away from the Peloponnese and her knowledge of how and when to play the “great game”. As both we and Demosthenes (18.235; cf. 1.4, 8.11) have noted, the Athenian democracy had its weaknesses, but Athens' politicians were often very shrewd. In the 390s Thrasybulus urged caution when dealing with Sparta, only to turn towards advocating war against her when the time was right.³⁶ Following the King's Peace of 387/6 Athens had calculatedly harboured Corinthian exiles (*Dem. 20. 51-57*). According to Diodorus, both she (15.45.1) and Argos (15.40.3,5), if not actually working in conjunction with each other, had encouraged anti-Spartan Peloponnesian revolutionaries. But her peace conference following Leuctra had paid limited dividends in attracting Sparta's allies directly into her sphere *en masse*, which was the only way she could openly accept any such alignment. Now, faced by her old adversaries, an

³⁵ Dušanic (1970a), 287, n.41.

ever-burgeoning Thebes and a declining but still threatening Sparta, she had to seek protection. To openly come out in favour of one and against the other at an early stage was not only against her inclinations, it could also have been fatal in the long-term. Sometime in mid-370, but after the *skytalismos*, she was approached by the new Peloponnesian alliance of Arcadia, Argos, and Elis, which sought to ally with her (Diod. 15.62.3).³⁷ She, unsurprisingly, refused and later acted with Sparta and finally became allied to her instead (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.33-7.1.15; cf. [Dem] 59.27), but only after the situation had changed and Thebes had the full weight of the Peloponnesian alliance on her side (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.22; Diod. 15.62.3).³⁸

To take up the offer of alliance with the Peloponnesians would have been risky, and the worse possible scenario could have resulted from the emergence of a new power block: alliance between a threatened Thebes and Sparta. But when we survey the allies' proposition, we might well wonder why it was made at all. Athens was no land power of outstanding merit, and even if she could have made her way through the Isthmus or landed forces in the Peloponnese via her navy, defeat was very possibly staring her in the face if Sparta, Thebes, and their allies opposed her in full force. What Athens had proved was her intent to support Peloponnesian democrats, and it was perhaps due to her stalwart backing of Argos' demagogues, and the democratic cause in general, that the alliance was persuaded to try and reach an understanding with her.³⁹ If they themselves could not lure away Sparta's remaining allies, Athens' appeal to democratic revolutionaries remained strong, and she had the backing of a maritime league to help establish her point. The *skytalismos*, we should believe, had the support of an Athens desperately in need of mainland allies but not prepared, because of her lack of them, to risk an open fight in trying to win them. Her only way to do so was to promote democratic revolution within the Peloponnese, and, as in the Peloponnesian War, whatever drawbacks a full-scale battle might present to her, she could still land troops inside a friendly city (such as Argos, cf. Thuc. 5.84.1). We may surmise that

³⁶ Cf. Seager (1967), 99-100.

³⁷ Diodorus places this under 369/8, which is a little too late; cf. Roy (1971a), 594.

³⁸ Buckler (1980a), 72, is wrong to think the Athenian refusal of the Peloponnesian offer was in 'large part' based upon Elis' rejection of the Peace of Athens the previous year. Peeved the Athenians may well have been, but Greek inter-state politics had always relied upon one city quickly forgiving (if not exactly forgetting) another's recent slight. The only barrier to an alliance being forged was if there was nothing to be gained by such – which was the very reason why Athens refused the Peloponnesian advances.

³⁹ Note that in the case of Elis being a democracy, all is not quite straightforward (see Chapter 4).

when the news of the horrors of the *skytalismos* became known to the Athenians, it was indeed the thought that they were responsible in part that saw the need for them to expiate their guilt by purification, and to also try and bring about an internal Argive reconciliation. We might also surmise that this occurred only *after* the latest news arrived informing them of the ruthless execution of the demagogues at Argos, and their links with the city were in danger of being totally severed as it sank into a state of *anomie*. A salvage operation was thus put in motion to try and secure a nexus with what would emerge, probably a democratic form of government, or even to ensure that what emerged was democratic, favourable, and beholden to the Athenian democracy. Athens, we should accept, even if direct evidence is lacking, had been involved in events at Argos. It was possibly clandestine backing, rather than material, but the evidence we do have perhaps points to a motion of moral support, at least, for current Argive democratic agitation being passed in an assembly which did not expect a massacre to result from its meddling.⁴⁰ That regret weighed heavier than guilt should not be a proposition easily dismissed. The guilt stemmed from the news that retribution had reached such extreme levels. But it was tempered by the regret that the *coup* was intended to be low-key, a projected satellite had been lost, and collusion in the event could now propel Athens into the centre of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian political arena, a conflict into which she did not want to be openly drawn. If we appear to be a little hard on the Athenians, let us remember that a population that could bear the responsibility and wear the legacy of actions undertaken at places such as Scione (see esp. Thuc. 5.32.1) or Melos (Thuc. 5.85-113; cf. Dion. Hal. *On Thuc.* 37-41) should be neither horrified at the events of the *skytalismos* or underestimated as to its capabilities.

We must now examine Diodorus' evidence to try and come to some understanding of what really occurred at Argos during the *skytalismos*. Polarization upon the topic is best summed-up in the differing approaches of Beloch and Swoboda.⁴¹ For Beloch, the mob was driven to insane anger by the demagogues and

⁴⁰ As Roy (1971a), 570, and (1973), 138, n.19, noted, Argos was not allied to Sparta. Thus we can imagine that the Athenians would feel rather easier about passing motions of support for her democrats, though even this had to be done with more than a modicum of tact regarding the wording of any such decree.

⁴¹ Beloch (*GG* 3.1), 174-75; Swoboda (1918), 94-101.

turned on those with possessions and clubbed them to death in their hundreds.⁴² Swoboda believes we are not dealing with unorganized strife but a process of law, yet he also thinks the trials were in truth what he terms “Justizmord” (judicial murder) because of their slanging, mob-like mentality, which he compares to Arginusae’s aftermath (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.1-35).⁴³ To arrive at the truth about this and much else, a close scrutinization of Diodorus’ account is required.

At 15.58.2 we are told that the oligarchic (we might also use the term aristocratic, as he refers to them as ‘citizens of property and reputation’) victims of the demagogues’ accusations banded together and decided to overthrow the democracy. Who decided that this was the case? It would appear that Diodorus, but in all likelihood his source (or his source’s informant), has presented the evidence of a pro-democratic Argive here. Perhaps it is even the testimony of one who genuinely believed that there had been a conspiracy by the oligarchs because at the time he was told, along with every other citizen, that this was indeed the situation. Quite simply, what follows does not add up. Some of those believed to be involved were tortured and then took their own lives, only one of them being saved by his revealing of the names of thirty of the leading citizens, as co-conspirators we may presume, who were promptly despatched without ‘a thorough investigation’ and their property confiscated. We have seen, from 15.58.1, the deliberate attempts to create trouble for the oligarchs, and this in a city that was *already* a democracy and thus in no need of the introduction of a democratic government to appease the demagogues and their followers. Those ‘thought to be implicated’: who thought they were implicated? Seemingly there was no charge to answer and no proof to be presented until after the suspects had been tortured. In other words, accusations and rumour-mongering from demagogues ensured the arrest of the victims in the first place, and during a torture session that saw no admittances of guilt from the majority of them, there being nothing to admit to, one

⁴² ‘Der von den Demagogen zu wahnsinniger Wut aufgestachelte Pöbel stürzte sich auf die Besitzenden, die zu Hunderten mit Knütteln erschlagen wurden’ (174-75).

⁴³ I find the comments of Grote (1888, IX), 418, quite untenable: ‘[w]e know the facts too imperfectly to be able to infer anything than the brutal working of angry political passion amidst a population like that of Argos or Korkyra, where there was not (as at Athens) either a taste for speech, or the habit of being guided by speech, and of hearing both sides of every question fully discussed.’ Athenian behaviour during the Arginusae trial and also the period 404-2 hardly recommends their approach to speech, and Argos did at least employ ostracism (Arist. *Pol.* 1302b 18). We do not know enough about Argos (and other Greek states) to make this kind of conjecture, and civil strife is not necessarily a sign of ignorance.

of their number, under extreme duress, decided to avoid further pain by naming thirty “fellow conspirators” in exchange for immunity. He would have named a hundred if necessary. The demagogues had exactly what they required: how else do we explain what we can only describe as the mass suicide of an unknown number of victims while they were quite obviously still in custody? Where did they get the means? How was it nobody noticed and prevented these attempts on their own lives? They were, of course, disposed of immediately an informer had been found, and before they had a chance to escape and vehemently deny any conspiracy or continue with the time-consuming denials which made the charges against them look ever the more flimsier the longer they were held in captivity. The reality was that once arrested, they could never be allowed to walk away with their lives.

The lack of a full investigation, as acknowledged by Diodorus, relates directly to the executions of the oligarchs named by our anonymous informer, and we also have a problem if we try to include the torture of those who committed suicide under the label of a proper inquiry. It is not without relevance that those executed had their property confiscated. Naturally in such circumstances, a snowball effect took hold, and apparently anyone with property was placed under suspicion. We are now informed that the demagogues backed false accusations, which points to their own charges being such in the first place. But the fact that the victims, were ‘many and wealthy’ (58.3) leads one to suspect that the kind of sycophancy not unknown in democratic Athens, and taken to unprecedented lengths in Imperial Rome, was being employed to whip up the support of the mob.⁴⁴ So, is Swoboda correct to see some form of procedures being utilized?⁴⁵ Diodorus never at any juncture presents a picture of the populace running amok and slaughtering anyone looking remotely wealthy. But it is difficult to imagine 1,200 separate trials. As Grote has said of the *skytalismos*, ‘the name seems more to indicate an impetuous popular insurrection than deliberate executions.’⁴⁶ The simple explanation, and one far from being impossible, is that Diodorus has not really

⁴⁴ An informant at Athens could gain much financially from such charges, particularly under prosecutions for *phasis* and *apographe*; cf. McDowell (1978), 62-66. I again point to the Athenian connection, not just on the grounds of an influence on Argive democracy, but also in the context of distant involvement in the *skytalismos*.

⁴⁵ See especially his interesting comparison with Indian society and belief that only despotic regimes employ such types of execution as clubbing: Swoboda (1918), 100, n. 1.

⁴⁶ Grote (1888, IX) 418.

communicated the facts properly. But one is loathe to accuse him of such in this specific case, especially if we consider the matter from a wider perspective.

All too often in such matters we employ a hindsight available to us that could not be seen by those involved in affairs at the time. Uncertainty ruled Argive democratic action. It was why Athens was looked to as insurance; and why Arcadia had to revolt before the *skytalismos* could commence. But here we must once again give close consideration to the time factor. Diodorus' '[a]bout the same time' (15.59.1) as an explanation of when both the *skytalismos* and the Arcadian revolt were taking place perhaps points to his own brand of uncertainty as to which actually commenced first. It nevertheless also tells us just how close in time they were to each other. We have spoken above of the *skytalismos* probably occurring within days of the first stirrings in Arcadia. What those initial Arcadian moves proved to the Argive democrats was that most Arcadians would not be helping Sparta's cause within the near future, and that internal agitation against their wealthy Spartan sympathizers could begin. What both events proved to Athenians sympathetic to the Argive democrats was that support for them and their rantings could be placed on a more official level. What was not proved was: that the Arcadians would be triumphant; that they would be totally united; and that Sparta would be too helpless to intervene. The *skytalismos*' duration is unknown. From its first rumblings to its final subsidence, we are possibly talking of a month at most, even six weeks seems unlikely. Only towards the end of this period, at best, can we even begin to speak of an Arcadian League. Orchomenus, Heraea, and, though technically Elean, Lepreum all remained loyal to Sparta at first (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11).⁴⁷ Crucially, as we have seen, Sparta was prepared to attack Arcadia, and it was not impossible that some northeastern Peloponnesian states would assist her. The Athenian conference and its guarantee of autonomy meant nothing in this situation (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6, 36, 37). If the Spartans were successful, outright *stasis* in Argos was exactly the excuse they needed to intervene, ostensibly to prevent further slaughter. There was no saying that they would not take action anyway, but whilst things were being done under the cloak of judicial procedure, transparent as it was to all concerned, it made interference harder to justify. Thus the

⁴⁷ Not all was sealed within Arcadia. We have a tendency to think of Mantinea as being extremely democratic in outlook at this stage, but the attitude of some of her leading figures is perhaps not as

Argive demagogues *had* to be seen to be doing things correctly, but for more than this reason alone. Athens would not, indeed, could not, as we now know by her reaction to the *skytalismos*' outrages, condone and support a massacre that reflected badly upon herself. Even closer to home lay another reason for trials to be introduced. The mass of Argives, living under a democracy, would naturally expect to be party to any decision taken. By allowing them such a role the demagogues widened the circle of involvement in the dishonourable deed, and thereby, they hoped, diluted their own part in proceedings. The verdicts were to be those reached by the whole populace, and not by a cabal within the Argive democracy.

The brake applied to such a slaughter, once it was fully underway, was not bound to be effective. At 15.58.3-4 Diodorus explains the episode's finale. A 'turn of fortune' possibly rebounding on them is his explanation of why the demagogues desisted from further accusations. This implies that they were, up to this point, still taking the lead in matters and then suddenly, almost as if gaining a conscience, ceased all prosecutions. The reason, in truth, is what we have just discussed. Knowing that what was happening was losing Argos all sympathy in Athens, goading Sparta into possible action (Agesilaus may have been very close to the Argolid with his army around this time), and alienating neutrals, the demagogues now wanted an end to the executions. Diodorus' 'turn of fortune' that worried them was not the body count, but the cold fact that they themselves, despite mass involvement of all citizens, would probably still be held responsible if the Spartans got control of the situation. They, more than any other Argives, would have wanted alliance with Arcadia – if the Arcadians were to remain united and successful. What resulted from their refusals to continue the killing was their own deaths.

Swoboda's "judicial murder" is a very apt phrase indeed. Throughout the whole process judicial procedures were adhered to, but not perhaps even as Swoboda imagines. He cited the Arginusae trial as an example of the disorganized proceedings, linking the mass participation of Argive citizens to *eisangelia* at Athens. This is correct, but what we should also believe, and here the specific arguments of Socrates at the Arginusae trial are very fitting (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.8-15; cf. Plato, *Gorgidas* 473e; *Apology* 32b), is that many victims were condemned in large groups, together *en*

clear as we may think, and the Argives could not afford to be over-optimistic concerning Arcadian

masse, though now all were charged with trying to overthrow the government. The “reign of terror” that afflicted the French Revolution was no more frightening or brutal than the *skytalismos*, and the parallels are plain. The endless trail of wealthy and aristocratic accused, arrested singly or in family groups, led in bands before a “kangaroo court” which had found them guilty before even casting eyes upon them. The secret of the *skytalismos*’ success was the factor we might identify as that of the “unknown”. That is, nobody up until the last moment knew who the next victims would be. If a possible candidate, to stay was to brave it out and hope for mercy, to be caught trying to flee the city was a virtual admission of guilt and an accelerated date with the club.⁴⁸ It may be a supreme irony that once the first thirty had been dispatched without proper investigation, thereafter shams of trials followed, but the only victims to die without even this cold comfort were probably the demagogues themselves (cf. Diod. 15.58.4). The Athenians perhaps did effect a reconciliation that helped in seeing the people ‘restored to their senses’ (Diod. 15.58.4). If so, they, like the Argives, gained nothing from the whole affair. But in the long-term Argos, as she would soon begin to discover, had lost far more by it than had Athens.

Argos played her part in Peloponnesian politics during the following decade – but not in a capacity equivalent to her former status. Even though our sources refer little to her, what we find is a city rocked to its foundations by the *skytalismos* and reduced to taking her lead from others.⁴⁹ Not that Argos did not have her own agenda. But as all the other states she was allied with also had their own agendas, the chances for success were limited from the very beginning. The reality was that both the Peloponnesian alliance and the Peloponnesian-Boeotian alliance were built upon the simplistic foundation of unity equals strength, and not upon any solid, shared beliefs and aims beyond those of the destruction of Spartan power and an accumulation of some of it for themselves. Even the much-proclaimed adherence to democracy began to look ever more hollow as time passed.

allegiance. On Lepreum, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25 and Neilsen (1996a), 76.

⁴⁸ Note that, unless Diodorus and others took no account of deaths on the democratic side, there is no intimation that this *stasis* was like that reported in other Greek cities of the period. That is, the death toll was purely one-sided and we find no hint of armed retaliation from the oligarchs, suggesting quite clearly the formal introduction of trials.

⁴⁹ Tomlinson (1972), 142, finds Argos’ role after Leuctra ‘strangely subdued’, but this underestimates the impact of the *skytalismos*.

Argos' agenda rested upon her past glories, and she fully revived a claim on that most natural of routes for her to take, dominance over the northeast Peloponnese.⁵⁰ But what the newly invested democratic regime at Argos lacked was experience. Her leading citizens killed by her own hand, some would say deservedly, the fledgling Argive democracy arising from the ashes of the old one was too carried away by Spartan decline; and Athens could have little faith in a band of murderers who sided with the hated and now dangerous Thebans, democratic outlook or not. The Argives were quick to realize one thing. Without entirely throwing in their lot with democratic, anti-Spartan states of like mind as themselves, they were nothing. In their eagerness to become attached to the rising stars of the likes of Thebes and Arcadia, they did not see the real truth of the matter. These states had their own aims, and Argos could only prove useful as long as she remained pliant to their wishes. From the very outset she misjudged the situation. The planned Argive renaissance was doomed before it began for one simple and often overlooked reason. Never could Thebes, or for that matter any others among her new-found allies, seriously support an Argive claim that would give her control of the Acrocorinth, the Isthmus, and, in-effect, the Peloponnese. Sparta had spent years cultivating relationships with Corinth and contiguous states (at Argive expense) in part to ensure that only her friends could dominate access to this crucial stretch of land. By seeking to change the arrangement to her own advantage, Argos had fallen at the first hurdle.

Keen to be part of an invasion that would finally and irrevocably see the end of Spartan supremacy, the Argives, no less than the Eleans, some northern states, and even the Arcadians, merely rode on the Theban bandwagon that made its way into Laconia in the winter of 370 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.23-52; Diod. 15.62.4-67.1). They probably wanted Sparta destroyed, but it was not to be, and such was their attitude and that of the other Peloponnesians towards the invasion, the Theban ardour for further action was soon quelled.⁵¹ But what did please the Argives was the re-founding of Messene,⁵² in which they, as fellow Dorians, played a major role.⁵³ This was to be

⁵⁰ Roy (1971a), esp. 572.

⁵¹ Cf. Seager (1974), 57. As the Peloponnesians had persuaded the Thebans to invade in the first place, as they also did the following year according to Diodorus (15.68.1), their disappearing with booty may have been the result of the disappointment of not being able to take Sparta.

⁵² Diod. 15.66.1; Paus. 4.26.7, 27.7; 10.10.5; Plut. *Pelop.* 24.5; *Ages.* 34.1; Isoc. *Arch.* 28; and also commemorated at Delphi in the ten Argive statues of their ancestors (Paus. 10.10.5); cf. Cartledge (1987), 35.

one of the shackles, alongside those of Mantinea, Tegea, and Megalopolis, which could be used to keep Sparta subdued.⁵⁴

Already, in the spring of 369,⁵⁵ some ominous signs for the future of the alliance made themselves clear. The Arcadians attacked Pellana, but the Argives moved against Phlius (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.4; Diod. 15.67.2). As much as a demonstration of confidence, this is the first clue as to what individual states really wanted from the pact they had endorsed, and it is possible that Argos felt justified in arguing for an attack on Phlius, as a tentative step to isolating Corinth, as it had the more strategic value. Any such individual preferences were cast aside for the entry of the Thebans into the Peloponnese in the summer (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.13ff.), but the allied concentration on the northeast perhaps bore out the Argive viewpoint, and also made them more doubtful about the Arcadians' real aims beyond the confines of what was deemed necessary by the alliance (or perhaps Thebes). That was only the tip of the iceberg. If this concentration on the northeast was now made to appease Argos, as Roy believes,⁵⁶ that appeasement was short-lived. The fall of Pellene and Sicyon saw Epaminondas allow them to maintain their oligarchic governments.⁵⁷ This blow to all of the allies hit none of them harder than Argos.

However one views the Argives in the context of perpetrators of the *skytalismos*, there was no other state in the alliance that was as ardent in support of democracy. She could be no other way. All had been staked on it internally, and it had been utilized as a clarion call to northeast Peloponnesian dissidents externally. The Argive democrats were not so much radical as fanatical. Only in this very year they, along with the Arcadians and Eleans, had been instrumental in helping Phliasian democratic exiles in a failed attempt to take control of the city (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.5-9). Democracy might have been used to gain advantage in pursuing their personal goals in the northeast but, unlike Thebes or Arcadia, the Argives were not prepared to champion it externally only when it suited, and then jettison it when it did not.

⁵³ Buckler (1980a), 87; Munn (1997), 88.

⁵⁴ Megalopolis touched the whole Peloponnese, but will be discussed in relation to Sparta and Arcadia. The similar role as a shackle allocated to Argos by Cartledge (1987), 347 is somewhat overstated.

⁵⁵ Roy (1971a), 574-75; cf. Dušanic (1970a), 294-95.

⁵⁶ Roy (1971a), 574. We may doubt that Argos received that much consideration, and on anyone's evaluation, the northeast was a valid target anyway.

⁵⁷ We have already discussed much of the details of the northeastern theatre (see previous section).

Athenian democracy had held its own, above all, because Athens had the power to make it work and claim an empire. Argos had no such attribute. During this period little Phlius refused to succumb to allied pressure (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.5-9; cf. 7.2.4), and it may have struck Argos' allies that the gallant resistance came from a people united in its determination that the Argives in particular would not win out.⁵⁸ Thus the operation's lack of success did nothing to aid Argos' cause in the eyes of the alliance.

From the allied angle, the Argives were becoming a liability. They lacked manpower, possibly to the extent of not being able to fill their quota of troops, but were seemingly bent on claiming the Corinthia as their own. For Thebes in particular, but also Arcadia, the position was embarrassing. Just as Sparta had faced the same difficulty after the Peloponnesian War in keeping her promise of freedom for the Greeks, now they in their turn, promising freedom from Sparta, were faced with the proposition of forcing an Argive form of control on the northeast which the majority in the region did not want – even many of democratic persuasion. At least Sparta could claim that states in the Corinthia were staying with her by choice. Epaminondas' answer was to leave the cities under their preferred (or perhaps accepted is a more apt term) mode of government, that of their traditional constitution. In large part, this contentious decision was also due to tradition, that of the Corinthia's hatred for Argos. Epaminondas must have known he was facing trouble, but he could do little else, no matter his personal beliefs, thanks to the Argive presence. Therefore, the first cracks in the alliance began to appear at this point. For Argos, there had been disappointment almost from the first, but now it was affecting all members. To make matters somewhat worse, Sparta was now in alliance with democratic Athens (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.1-15; *Diod.* 15.68.1) and if anything had slightly raised her profile, whilst Thebes appeared to be sympathizing with oligarchy.

The Boeotians having vacated the Peloponnese to mixed feeling, the autumn of 369 saw Argos receive a further blow. The Argives had the choice of laying low or keeping the pressure on their chosen stomping ground in the northeast. They chose the latter, and also an easy target. Epidaurus had limited manpower and was a safe distance away from the epicentre of northeastern action – it was a fatal mistake.⁵⁹ A

⁵⁸ Legon (1967), esp. 335-37.

⁵⁹ I place an addendum here as to the reasons why Epidaurus was attacked at this time, though it is a very tentative one and serves to complement the evidence for Argos' ultimate aim of northeastern

close examination of Xenophon's report (*Hell.* 7.1.25) reveals an action serious enough to suspect many Argive casualties. They were blockaded in the area by Chabrias' mercenaries, Athenian and Corinthian citizen troops, and, one supposes, the Epidaurians themselves. How long it took for the Arcadians to come and rescue them, perhaps days, we can only guess: but let us have no doubt that this was a very costly clash for Argos, and was something of a turning point in her fortunes. Spartan *oliganthrôpia* is well-recorded, but we should not doubt that the Argives, for different reasons, were now having manpower problems themselves.

To further inflame the situation, the Arcadians then took Asine and, following Lycomedes' lead, began to look increasingly towards their own aims rather than those of the allies, whose suspicions were now seriously aroused (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.23-26). More irksome to the Argives was their total inability to strike out on their own. Their history informed them that the very people whom they and Sparta had battled with each other to control for so long were now dictating the situation in the Peloponnese. The last thing Argos could afford was to slip back into the kind of isolation which had destroyed its fifth century ambitions. Viable alternatives revolved around two evils. The first was to move closer to Arcadia, the second towards Thebes. Neither prospect was inviting. Arcadia was closer spiritually and geographically; Thebes still possessed the military power. Either choice would see her as only a bit player. She could only

domination, and not to replace it. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.5.1-2) has recorded the rivalry that existed between Argos and Sparta over the staging of the Isthmia in 390; cf. Tuplin (1993), 70. Plainly, the hosting of games was important for the prestige value involved. Miller (1990), 22-23, 39-44, 55, 61-62, 71; cf. 1982, 100-08, has reported on the absence of the Games from Nemea, based on the excavations of two wells and the absence of relevant coins and pottery from the site, from the late fifth century down to c.330. Whether he is correct to see in the manoeuvring of Thuc. 5.58-60 (419/8) and 6.95 (415/4) the passing of the Games from Cleonae to Argos via the destruction of the sanctuary is another matter (whatever the religious (or irreligious) views of Thucydides, I cannot imagine him failing to record the defiling of such a sanctuary). But it would seem to be the case that Argos held them during this period (they were undoubtedly staged; cf. Paus. 6.2.9, 3.7, 12.8, 4.1-3). The sanctuary at Epidaurus underwent a massive building programme in the fourth century, with the Stadium, Athletes' Quarters, Temple of Artemis, Tholos, Priests' Residence, Temple of Aphrodite, Propylon, Epidotion, Anakeion, and Katagogion all being a part of the upgrading during the period; cf. Spathari (1995). Perhaps of particular relevance is the Temple of Asclepius erected in, or by, c. 370; cf. Burford (1969), XX; Tomlinson (1983), 27. We are possibly witnessing an attempt by the Epidaurians to project themselves into the larger circuit of Greek games and festivals here (cf. *IG IV*² 1, 94; *IG IV*² 1, 95, and *SEG* 26. 189 in relation to the (large) list of *thearodokoi* appointed by the Epidaurians of the sanctuary of Asclepius and dated to c. 365-360). Argos already had her problems, but the expansion of Epidaurus, a site very near to where she would be holding the Nemean Games (the Stadium at Argos remains unexcavated; cf. Miller (1990), 20), was perhaps too close to home. With the building of the Temple of Asclepius, a major attraction, and termination of Spartan protection over the Epidaurians coinciding with each other, the opportunity to correct matters at Epidaurus was probably too tempting for the Argives to miss.

hope that the Peloponnesian-Boeotian alliance held together, even if only in name, allowing her to bide her time and gain from any advantages the allies made. But time was in fact pressing, and Arcadia was at loggerheads with Elis, Thebes, and even herself.

In 368 the choice was made for her. Thebes had what she wanted for the time being and could turn her attentions away from the Peloponnese (Elis would certainly not contemplate operations alongside the Arcadians⁶⁰), but Argos could not afford such luxury and still saw in Arcadia a hope of gain, her military strength and (shaky) adhesion to democracy deciding the issue. The arrival at Delphi of Philiscus in the spring of 368 with plans for a Greek peace which included the recognition of Sparta's claims to Messenia is recorded as not suiting the Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; cf. Diod. 15.70.2).⁶¹ But it would not have suited the Arcadians or Argives either. What is indicated here is twofold. The Arcadians were experiencing their own internal problems; and the Argives were exhausted: both would also have heard in advance of the despatching of reinforcements to Sparta by Dionysius of Syracuse, the first batch of which had already caused problems for the alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28; cf. 7.1.22). Therefore when the opportunity arose to promote Argive influence in the Corinthia at Sicyon, it was quickly seized upon (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44-45).⁶² What amounted to a small victory was followed by a crashing defeat. Bolstered by Dionysius' mercenaries, the Spartans made inroads into southwestern Arcadia. They were met by the joint forces of Arcadia and Argos. The Argives apparently ran away as fast as the Arcadians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28-32; Diod. 15.72.3; Plut. *Ages.* 33.3-5; *Mor.* 218f). The humiliation was matched only by the further losses of precious manpower. Argive attacks on Phlius

⁶⁰ Who themselves were making massive territorial gains; cf. Roy (1971a), 576.

⁶¹ Diodorus' allusion that Thebes was excluded due to her maintenance of the Boeotian Federation is an absolute fallacy, and surely confuses the event with the situation of the 370s.

⁶² The Arcadians needed, as did the Argives, to provide proof that this was a legitimate move on behalf of all the members of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, hence the joint effort. But if Euphron had not invited the Argives (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44) would the Arcadians have let them, or any other members, know of the invitation? It is worth noting that Diodorus believed the Argives to be alone, no doubt wrongly (15.70.3). Euphron was in fact a tyrant, and not exactly an avid democrat. This places the Argives in an awkward light in relation to their devotion to democracy. We must not be deceived here. What Euphron set-up was not ideal as far as they were concerned. But, as Xenophon makes clear (*Hell.* 7.1.44-46), he was not only turning against Sparta (which in Argive parlance made him worthy of attention anyway), but also made it plain, in their presence, that the constitution would be one of equality for all and that open elections would be held. This clearly fitted the bill as far as democratic government was concerned, and theoretically allowed Euphron to be voted from any kind of office granted him. We cannot actually say that they even lacked good faith in him initially. Above all, he was at this stage quite plainly carrying out the will of the people as *primus inter pares*.

(Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.10) with the Arcadians in 368 were merely a reflection of their failures in the south driving them to salvage pride in the north – these, too, achieved nothing.⁶³

The northern theatre, and not the Arcadian-Laconian border, was now the main focus of contention. With a Theban garrison not only sitting tight in Sicyon but actually utilizing neighbouring Peloponnesian allies for attacks upon Phlius (the message was intentional), the Arcadian-Argive alignment had cause to be worried. This was their area, and Thebes was attempting to take Phlius despite the fact that they had so recently tried and failed. In this atmosphere, we should not be surprised at Argos' next desperate but futile gesture.

Sparta's similar desperation led to an approach to the Great King which precipitated a Greek rush to try and win his favour (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33-37). The Arcadians were keen to win over the King and present their credentials for the rights to Triphylia; the Eleans were just as keenly in opposition to them (and expected the support of Thebes); Athens, like Sparta and Thebes, needed her pretensions to Greek leadership confirmed, and her claims to Amphipolis recognised by Persia; Argos had nothing to say that would be listened to, and sent no envoys. Many scholars would reject this latter notion. A reading of *Hellenica* 7.1.33 is at the crux of the matter. Who or what is the 'Argaeus' mentioned by Xenophon as being in attendance? Roy is absolutely correct to see it being the former and not the latter.⁶⁴ To explain Argaeus as being merely a reference to an 'Argive', a representative from Argos whose name has fallen from the manuscript is really not good enough, nor, as we shall see, does it need much explanation to fit the matter into the historical context. Roy argues that what we are in fact reading is an allusion to Argaeus of Elis, the democrat referred to at

⁶³ I disagree with Roy (1971a), 578, and discount Diodorus' (15.75.3) evidence in favour of that of Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.2.11-15), who makes no mention of an Argive presence during the attack on Phlius in 367. Whilst we may think it natural that Argos would be keen to continue with further attacks on Phlius, the situation had changed. The attack of *Hell.* 7.2.10 is a definite sign of the differences between Argos and Arcadia on the one hand, and Thebes on the other – either side, if successful, would have viewed Phlius as being in their sphere, and not in that of the whole alliance. It is obvious from the evidence we have just discussed that the Argives were running with their more natural allies the Arcadians at this juncture, and a consideration of certain factors supports this view. Firstly, the Thebans had proved wanting in their devotion to democracy in the Peloponnese, which worked against Argos more than any other of the allies because of her firm support of it in the Corinthia. Secondly, we now know that the Thebans would be back in the Peloponnese, but there was no guarantee of this being the case on their retirement from it in 369. Crucially, with Arcadia, Argos, Elis, Messenia, Pellene, and Sicyon allied to them, what was the point of a return? From the Argive and Arcadian angle, she had offered them nothing in the way of support after the "Tearless Battle" and seemingly basked in their downfall (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.32).

⁶⁴ Roy (1971a), 578, n. 55; cf. Buckler (1980a), 152.

Hellenica 7.4.15. I would add in support of this that, firstly, Xenophon places his name directly following that of the other Elean present, Archidamus; secondly, that Elis is not the only state with dual representation, as the Athenians also contributed two envoys; and thirdly, once the embassies had returned home to report on the meeting, Xenophon makes no mention of any such discussions taking place at Argos (cf. *Hell.* 7.1.38).⁶⁵

The Argives were still very much alive to the prospect of being the dominant state in the northeastern Peloponnese, but they realized that Thebes, for one, was not about to back their claims. The Arcadians had their own concerns, but possibly knew in advance exactly why Argos would not be attending, even though invited to by the Thebans. For the Argives, in their situation an acceptance would amount to a tacit admittance of fealty to a Thebes which saw their alliance as a one-sided relationship, virtually that of overlord to vassal. The humiliation of attending a conference in this role, in front of a king to whom Argos proudly claimed ties of kinship (*Hdt.* 7.151), and after they had for so long asserted the right to Peloponnesian hegemony as a major power, was too much of an insult. The Great King, as they knew, was not going to support a declining Greek state. Rather than sit in silence, the Argives decided not to attend at all. The refusal was a premeditated slice of recalcitrance deliberately aimed at Theban pretensions of grandeur. It was probably better that Argos was absent. Pelopidas' swipes at other Greek states (and claims of long-standing allegiance to Persia that made those of Argos pale into insignificance) included an overt reference to the inferiority of both Argos and Arcadia once they no longer had the Theban crutch to lean on (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.34-37).⁶⁶ The alliance was now hanging by a thread.

Even the Argives must have rejoiced at the Greeks' rebuff of the Theban proposals (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.39-40; cf. *Diod.* 15.76.3). But Epaminondas was not to be balked so easily. A test for his Peloponnesian allies the third Theban invasion may

⁶⁵ Only, it is true, the report of Archidamus of the Elean envoys is referred to at 7.1.38, but he was clearly the main representative from Elis and a figure set to re-emerge later in *Hellenica*. Ryder (1957), 199, clearly believes that the Argives did send envoys to the King, though it is notable that Warner (1979), 364, has no qualms about translating Argaeus as a person, rather than an 'Argive'. Of interest on the topic of Argaeus is a work by Dušanic (1989), 84, which in part traces the history behind his name and links it back to the Argos, Athens, Elis, and Mantinea alliance of 420.

⁶⁶ I see this scathing attack by Pelopidas as further proof of non-Argive participation in the attacks on Phlius (*Hellenica* 7.2.11-15; cf. *Diod.* 15.73.5). Though not impossible, I doubt that Pelopidas would have tried to alienate an ally that had, almost literally, just fought alongside Thebes in the Corinthia, and would thus also have effectively come over to the Thebans and deserted the Arcadians.

have been,⁶⁷ but he knew that they had to join him whilst Sparta still presented even a remote threat, and the “Tearless Battle” had worked well in his favour. The goal is spelt out by Roy when he says that Epaminondas, ‘attempted to combine the promotion of Boeotia’s interests with a check on Arcadian power’.⁶⁸ Thus the alliance would be salvaged and Thebes left once more in unofficial control of matters. But his plans for Achaean adherence to Thebes, and thus further consolidation in the northern Peloponnese, were decidedly dangerous as they rested on acceptance of continued oligarchic rule. If some Arcadians might acquiesce, others, and certainly the Argives, would not.⁶⁹

This betrayal must have made been doubly hard on Argos. Her general, Peisias, had made Theban entrance into the Peloponnese possible by his turning of Oneum (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41). It was Arcadian (and perhaps Achaean) resistance that had the decision overturned. But the inevitable backlash which saw Achaean oligarchs become firmly pro-Spartan also placed Argive claims to the Corinthia ever more in jeopardy, the Achaeans being in a position to support or pressurize their near-neighbours.

If the Argives were disgusted by Theban actions, the next move by the Arcadians must have totally stunned them. The removal from power of Euphron (Xen. *Hell.* 7.3.1-7.4.1) came like a bolt from the blue: the Argives had been truly stabbed in the back. Instrumental in elevating him there in the first place, they had undoubtedly not even been consulted about his deposition. Worse was the news that he had been replaced by an oligarchy which the majority of Sicyonians clearly did not want. Argos had become a victim of Arcadia’s internal struggles and the need to preclude the spread of Theban influence in the northern Peloponnese.⁷⁰ It was no consolation, and for Argos once more isolation beckoned.

Reduced in numbers as they were, and despite their wretched condition, most of the few surviving aristocratic and oligarchic Argives must have afforded themselves

⁶⁷ Buckler (1980a), 185-86.

⁶⁸ Roy (1971a), 579.

⁶⁹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.43: the oath of the Achaean oligarchs to follow the Thebans wherever they led not only smacked of Spartan usage, though perhaps fairly standard (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20), but excluded all the other allies.

⁷⁰ One vital point also needs addressing here in relation to our discussion on Argive devotion to democracy (which should not be doubted). Another reason why they were not invited to help oversee Euphron’s ousting was their inherent disapproval of the action, and the possibility that they would have refused to take part in the setting up of an oligarchy in Sicyon. Only the promise of the installation of a democracy would have appeased them. Aeneas was not going there for that reason.

a wry smile at Argos' current situation. Her democrats, filled with a loathing for the city's rich, had ruthlessly confirmed their status, but had now led Argos to the brink of disaster through a link-up with democratically-inclined states that, in reality, cared nothing for them, and perhaps even little for democracy itself. It was fortunate for the democrats that the Argive oligarchs were so few on the ground. Being amongst the most bitterest inhabitants of the whole Peloponnese, they would dearly have loved to have taken advantage of the democrats' plight. Possibly there were some rumblings at Argos around this time that we know nothing about (see below), as any government is only as safe as its last great deed or gesture to the people. In 370/69 the future of the democrats seemed assured. Had they not finally trodden on Laconian soil, upped Argos' standing within the Peloponnese, and made steps into the long-sought after Corinthia? The achievements were, of course, both transient and illusory. They were attained on the backs of others, and any problems for the alliance, such as a division within its ranks, would leave Argos absolutely stranded. In all the regions she had allied with, democracy was either a recent acquisition or built on unstable foundations. Too late, the Argive democrats began to realize the hollowness of their successes.

Matters went from bad to worse. Argive-Athenian relations had been good for around a century up until Athens' entente with Sparta of 370/69. That entente was under threat once Sparta and her allies failed to respond to the Theban occupation of Oropus in 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1-2; Diod. 15.76.1; cf. schol. Aeschin. 3.85). If ever Argos needed evidence that she was surplus to requirements it came with Lycomedes' immediate approach to Athens for alliance. Duly obtained (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2-3, 6 = *SV* 284),⁷¹ Athens then tried to secure Corinth for herself (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.4-6; Plut. *Tim.* 4.1). This bewildering turn of events, though not so from the Arcadian and Athenian viewpoint, left Argos utterly alone, her alliances, still officially in tact, now being worthless.

What followed has often been seriously misinterpreted, and Xenophon's description of Argos (together with Arcadia) as being one of the Peloponnese's two most powerful states (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.2) has not helped matters.⁷² It is true that Argos

⁷¹ Although Nepos *Epam.* 6 and Plut. *Mor.* 193 c-d, 810f complicate matters here; see Roy (1971a), 596, n.145.

⁷² To put things in perspective, not only is he speaking of the situation post-Leuctra but before the *skytalismos*, his real aim is to praise the Phliasians for their bravery, and thus he has to elevate the power of those they faced.

still wanted domination over the northeast Peloponnese in 365, and perhaps well after this date. But wanting such and having the wherewithal to do it are two clearly different things. The Argives could only achieve this with allies in support of them, and this they obviously did not have. What has prevented an objective view of the situation is our perception of Argos' past history, which leads us to think of a powerful state in contention for hegemony of the Peloponnese. Add to this the evidence from 371 down to 365 as presented by our sources, and the myth continues. But a close reading of that evidence reveals an entirely different picture.

The Argives attacked Laconia (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.16ff.; Diod. 15.62.4ff.), the northeast Peloponnese (7.1.18ff.; Diod. 15.68.5ff.), and Achaëa (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41ff.). They also made Phlius a target for consistent attack (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.4, 5-9, 10), attempted to overwhelm Epidaurus (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.25), took part in the "Tearless Battle" (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28-32), and, though no violence was involved, helped Euphron become head of the Sicyonian democracy (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.44-46; Diod. 15.70.3). Now these actions and their number look impressive at first glance. But closer inspection shows that all of them were undertaken with allied support (and not all were victories), except for two,⁷³ those of *Hellenica* 7.2.4 and 7.1.25. The first was against the Phliasians, the second against the Epidaurians, Corinthians, and the Athenians and their mercenaries: both were resounding defeats.⁷⁴ This is not the record of a powerful city-state, and it is time we recognised that Argos was a *polis* seriously short of confidence and manpower.

If, as Roy claims, the Phliasians were still being attacked by Argos in 366, we can consider that these efforts soon ceased,⁷⁵ and, as we shall see, with good reason. Much of the misrepresentation of the Argive situation which is present in modern

⁷³ Unless we count the action in the first Laconian invasion as recorded by Diodorus (15.64.2), but this was a confrontation that saw the full Argive contingent overrunning a mere Spartan detachment. We might also do well to remind ourselves that other actions took place that we have no idea about during the period; cf. Roy (1971a), 578.

⁷⁴ In fact, if our sources are correct, the Argives had not won a full-scale battle on their own since Hysiae in c.669 (Paus. 2.24.7). Oenoe (Paus. 10.10.3), if indeed it happened, was not full-scale, and was fought with Athenian aid; Jeffery (1965), 41-57; cf. Meiggs (1972), 469-72.

⁷⁵ Roy (1994²), 194. It is not easy to follow Xenophon on his Phliasian excursus, but I cannot discover where exactly the evidence for Argive attacks on Phlius in 366 occur in the *Hellenica*. Surely, 7.2.1 refers to 368; 7.2.2-3 to 371; 7.2.4 to 369; 7.2.5-9 to later 369; 7.2.10 to 368; 7.2.11-15 to 367; and 7.2.16-23 does not appear to include the Argives: if it does, then 17-19 sees them, once again, soundly beaten. I can only surmise that 7.4.11 (cf. 7.2.1) and its reference to recent attacks on the Thyamiatricaranum area is the answer (but how recent?). Neither can I find any reference to such attacks in Roy's 1971 article (cf. esp. 578 on 7.2.11-15, which he also dates to 367).

appraisals revolves around *Hellenica* 7.4.6-10. This section tells of how Corinth, apparently on its knees due to persistent Argive attack, according to recent interpretations, approached Thebes for peace. The Corinthians managed to get their allies included, remain neutral from the Spartan-Theban conflict, and thus ended, effectively, the Peloponnesian League as a going concern.⁷⁶ These events, from the time of the approach to Thebes and what followed thereafter, are beyond dispute. It is those events preceding the approach that have been badly misinterpreted.

Plutarch's *Timoleon* (4.1) informs us that the Corinthians clashed with Argos (which was aided by Cleonae) around this very juncture. Xenophon's *Hellenica* (7.4.6) tells of how the Corinthians, traditionally weak in land warfare, but now with their new mercenary cavalry and infantry alongside them, took the fight to their immediate neighbours. Obviously, these two pieces of evidence tie up with each other, and these neighbours have to be Argos and Cleonae. We know even without the say so of Xenophon that Corinth was quite mediocre when fighting on land. She was certainly buoyed by the addition of mercenaries to her forces, and this was the reason that she dared face Argos in the field. But to actually strike out into Argive territory is a move we should not expect of her – unless Argos was particularly vulnerable at this point. We now know this to be the case, yet the reasons for the Corinthian approach to Thebes are put down to consistent Argive pressure. Why, then, did Corinth not merely contact the Argives? This is usually explained away as being due to Thebes' position as unofficial leading state within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, and of course, as we have seen, she herself had also joined in the attacks on Corinth. If any state of the Corinthia was feeling pressure from Thebes, it was Phlius. But on our reckoning the last time Thebes attacked her was in 367 (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.2.11-15), and even this was via her garrison at Sicyon, and not in full force across the Isthmus. Argos tightened the screw by fortifying Tricaranum, the Sicyonians by acting similarly at Thyamia (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.1), but the latter had fallen to the Phliasians and Chares (*Xen. Hell.* 7.2.17-23).⁷⁷ Throughout the whole of our evidence there is no argument to support constant pressure on Corinth from the direction of Argos, only failed attempts at such and Corinthian reprisals

⁷⁶ I leave aside the woeful reporting of Diodorus (15.76.3) on the Peace of 365.

⁷⁷ It is also worth considering *Hellenica* 7.2.23: the Corinthians could send convoys into Phlius every day. This is hardly supportive of any argument for Argive pressure on Corinth.

Corinth wanted peace, without doubt. But approaching Argos was a waste of time. What the Corinthians knew well enough, and which we so often deny, was that the Argives were weakened militarily and politically. If Thebes wished to devastate the Corinthia, she could not be stopped – Argos could neither do such or use her influence to prevent (or encourage) others to do so. The very reason why Corinth wished to come to terms is spelt out for us by Xenophon immediately following Athens' attempts to take her but before the attacks on Argive territory: 'now also the Athenians were added to the number of states unfriendly to them.' (*Hell.* 7.4.6). Athens, as ever had swung matters in the Peloponnese, not Argos, who merely bore the brunt of sorties made against herself. The Corinthians had to consider that the Arcadian-Athenian alliance had possibly changed the balance of Peloponnesian politics. There existed the possibility that Athens might forget about her Spartan alliance and lean more towards Arcadia. This in turn meant the isolation of the Corinthia, especially if somewhere along the line an unthinkable rapprochement between Athens and Boeotia occurred, thanks to the Arcadian connection. To round matters off, if any state was now feeling a dislike for Corinth and might use its influence against her, it was Athens. Thus the Corinthians approached Thebes, a city with both influence and capability, for peace and not an Argos who was now nothing more than the chastened, hamstrung elephant of Peloponnesian politics.⁷⁸

The Corinthian attacks on Argos served a triple purpose. They were a long-awaited revenge on the old enemy; they tested the measure of Argos' allies when the city was in need of aid; and they allowed Corinth to approach Thebes from a position which was, if not one of strength, then at least one which was respectable. Argos, belittled, could do nothing but accept the Peace once Thebes had agreed to it. But what we have to realize is that whilst the Argives were disgusted with their allies' attitude, they were also aware of the futility of continuing their claims to the Corinthia without them. Argos was in truth not so wary of the Peace of 365 as is often supposed, and was possibly relieved that attacks from Corinth's mercenaries had to stop once it came into force. She had overstepped herself and was now on the

⁷⁸ I take into account here the evidence of Isocrates' *Archidamus* 6.91. Written around the same time as these events, but obviously with a slant towards its author's viewpoint, it states that nobody could blame the Epidaurians, Corinthians, and Phliasians for saving themselves. But let us note that it does not say who from, and is also considering several years of fighting and devastation in the northeast

receiving end of matters. Indeed, Dušaníc is quite probably close to the truth when he says that the retention of Tricaranum by Argos after the Peace was signed and her refusal of arbitration (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.11) was actually an example of the Argives' temporary abandonment of Thebes.⁷⁹ It certainly allowed her to show that she was still marking out her territory in the northeast. But considering our discussions, we might conclude that this was not Argos demonstrating how independent and decisive she could be, but rather a last feeble gesture of recalcitrance by a state worn down and now accepting the inevitable after her allies had so readily deserted her. She knew that such a showing would not even raise a flicker of disapproval from a Thebes that no longer cared about Argos or her problems.

This set of circumstances would have been enough to sideline Argos from Peloponnesian politics for some while, if a lifeline had not appeared from an unlikely direction.⁸⁰ The Arcadian-Elean connection had always had a tenuous ring about it, and the continued support for Triphylian incorporation into Arcadia by the Arcadians themselves placed pressure on the alliance as a whole. In addition to this the Arcadian League's internal problems were only serving to increase the stress factor.⁸¹ Open warfare had perhaps seemed a possibility for some time, but one thing was sure: if it occurred, Sparta would be involved in some shape or form. If we can describe Arcadian-Elean connections as being tenuous, then those between Elis and Sparta were far more flimsy. Such considerations mattered little to interested parties in any era of Peloponnesian politics, but even less so in the chaos of the 360s. Elis needed help, and Sparta, equally in need of allies, would be only too glad to offer it. It took no genius to

Peloponnese. We should not believe for one moment that Argos was at the centre of Isocrates' message.

⁷⁹ Dušaníc (1970a), 301, n. 91.

⁸⁰ Was she officially, so to speak, sidelined around this period? I here refer, with the utmost caution, to Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7. 211-17 = *SEG* 22. 339 = *SV* 285a). This decree has been dated to 365/4-363/2 (cf. Roy (1971a), 594-95, and records the alliance between Arcadia (the decree was found at Olympia but is Arcadian), Sicyon, and Messenia with Pisatis. Fragmented, there is clearly room on it for the restoration of the name of the Argives (cf. 11.b.7-8 and 8-9 = *SEG* 11.16-17 and 17-18), and this has generally been accepted as the missing term. But could it be possible that the betrayed Argives were annoyed enough to have withdrawn from the alliance entirely at this point (ie. c.365), only to rejoin almost immediately (see below)? I only suggest the possibility, and not the probability. Our preconceived ideas of what *should* have happened too often lead us to join the dots on matters such as this one, and Argos would have been risking total isolation. Nevertheless, in light of what we have just discussed in relation to the retention of Tricaranum, I believe the proposition to be worthy of consideration. Dušaníc (1970a), 300, and n. 110, sees Argos as being allied with Arcadia here, but makes no comment on her absence from the treaty).

⁸¹ Note the reference to Arcadian exiles at Elis by Diodorus (15.77.1). On the situation in general, see Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-32; Diod. 15.77.1-4, 78.1-3.

forecast this outcome, and once Elis had made initial moves (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.20) Sparta duly reciprocated by invading Cromnus. If anything could act as a re-unifying force within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance, then the re-appearance of Sparta on the scene was that very thing.

But Elis was already lost to this particular rejuvenation; and Achaea would only fight against it (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4. 16-17). We are not privy to what happened during the run-up to the attacks on Cromnus (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.20, 4.27), but it is notable that prior to it there were at least three expeditions against the Eleans by the Arcadians. The Argives are not referred to as being present on any of them (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-26), and it is only when the fighting around Cromnus is featured in *Hellenica* for the second time that we discover an Argive presence in the city.⁸² An oversight by Xenophon? We should not think so in this particular instance. Lycomedes' boastings of 369 were already looking like empty rhetoric following the "Tearless Battle" of 368 (in which the Argives were present). The, *prima facie*, simple task of subduing the Eleans gave the Arcadians the opportunity to make Lycomedes' claims for them come good, specifically by acting alone in what was, after all, their fight. But when the actions in Elis are reviewed, we find that whilst the Arcadians had acquitted themselves well enough at times, overall they had not subdued the city of Elis or cowed the Eleans. Nor, unlike the Arcadians, were the Eleans bereft of external support. Both the Achaeans and Pelleneans were now prepared to help Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.16-18), which meant that the almost inevitable aid from Sparta was closer to materializing. Once that had happened and the Arcadians had fended off the first Spartan attack on Cromnus by merely making a truce, the awful truth dawned on them: they needed allies.

Argos had for some months been almost forgotten, up until this point. But she could be relied upon in certain situations. The Elis affair was of no direct concern to her, but its implications were. The basis of a second Peloponnesian League under Spartan tutelage was beginning to gell. An attack on southwest Arcadia was nothing more than a warning that the Argolid might not be long in facing a similar plight. Not only did the Arcadians need assistance, aid to them would break Argive isolation. All these factors combined to bring Argos into the fray. Most of all, though evidence is

missing, we should consider that the embarrassed Arcadians had to ask her for help under the terms of the alliance they had so conveniently overlooked.

The Arcadian League's involvement at Olympia precipitated an open split within its ranks (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28-40; Diod. 15.78.1-3), and this was the last thing that the Argives wanted. Argos had to decide who was the biggest threat to herself. She could not really side with Sparta anyway, but the oligarchic tendency's influence at Mantinea virtually decided the issue for her, though no doubt a minority of Argives would have accepted alliance with this faction. Thebes, almost from the first, had proved unreliable in its external experiments with politics, but was neither oligarchic or Sparta; she also had the best military set-up. Therefore the debates as to what actions Argos should take would hardly have rent the city asunder. At (2nd) Mantinea the Argives lined up alongside the Thebans and their northern and Peloponnesian allies (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.1-25; Diod. 15.82.3-87.6).⁸³ The victory gave Argos little of value, but it did allow the city to keep its freedom and constitution – in her situation she could not have expected more. If the inscription (now lost) which features a warning from 'the Greeks' to the Persian Satraps is correctly dated to 362/1, then it would appear that our one certain identification of any of the anonymous Greek states included in its precepts is that of Argos – it was found there.⁸⁴ Thus she did indeed, as we might expect, participate in the Common Peace following (2nd) Mantinea (Diod. 15.89.1-2; Plut. *Ages.* 35.2-4; Polyb. 4.33.8).

The story of Argos in the 360s is almost a microcosm of the whole of her fifth and fourth century history down to 371. Commencing with serious internal problems, she tried to overcome them partly by relying on her past reputation, partly by looking to Arcadia, and mainly through a determination to dominate the states around her in the northeast Peloponnese. Before long she was sidelined and isolated, a state with only a past and little promise for the future, her slim chances of success depending entirely upon others. The Spartans had always played their part in any Argive downfall,

⁸² Both at Cromnus and later at Olympia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.30) the Argives were once again found to be wanting in battle.

⁸³ Tomlinson (1972), 143, says they 'achieved nothing memorable', but Diodorus (15.85.5-6) seems to imply that they acquitted themselves adequately when facing the Athenians. That Epaminondas placed them on his non-attacking right flank, obviously as a holding force, tells us he did not rate them highly.

⁸⁴ *IG* IV 556 = Tod 145 = *SV* 2. 292 = Harding 57. The dating is not certain, though a majority of scholars accept 362/1, and dates as far apart as 371 and 334 have been put forward. For discussion see Ryder (1965), 140-44.

but even a weakened Sparta in the 360s could still hold the winning hand in the northeast Peloponnese, simply because Argos had already proved her intentions towards the area over many years. But in many respects Sparta was not the key reason for Argive failure, despite the victory at Sepeia acting as a catalyst for much of their subsequent chaotic predicament. From the time of the internal uncertainty following Sepeia, through the strife that occurred in 417-16, to the massacre that was the *skytalismos*, Argos was her own worst enemy. It seems almost no exaggeration to say that the Argives killed more of their own citizens than any enemy ever did, the *skytalismos*' excesses being the prelude to the final scenes in the story of a city destined to destroy itself by *stasis*. In Joycian terms, Argos was the old sow that ate its young.

Chapter 3 Messenia: The “New” Deal?

Cawkwell has aptly summed-up Xenophon’s treatment of post-Leuctra Messenia in the *Hellenica* thus: ‘there is nothing to indicate that Messene has ceased to be a mere geographical expression’.¹ Not only has Xenophon misled us on this matter to some degree, with regard to Sparta’s loss of her Messenian holdings, so has much modern scholarship. Xenophon can only be partially blamed for this state of affairs. What comes across in many discussions on the events of c. 371-61, despite the *Hellenica* providing some scanty evidence to the contrary, is an altogether too-simplistic portrait. It is that of a sudden and complete collapse of Spartan power, juxtaposed with an equally swift upsurge in Messenian freedom and unity. Neither picture is absolutely correct.²

It is true that some time after the news of Leuctra became common knowledge,³ the Messenian helots had revolted in total. But Sparta’s *perioeci* in Messenia remained ‘uniformly loyal’.⁴ What is more, as far as we can tell, *perioecic* settlements were not so much numerous as strategically located.⁵ The Messenian struggle for independence had not ended, it had only just commenced.

The Messenians would, of course, reach their goal,⁶ but it was not attained immediately or without external support. In relation to this external support, the myth of contiguous states concerned for the enslaved conditions of fellow-Greeks persists. We should not be susceptible to such gloss. The freedom of Messenia was intrinsically bound to the need for Sparta to be kept at heel. Recalcitrant ex-members of the Peloponnesian League such as Arcadia and Elis wanted freedom to expand;

¹ Cawkwell (1972), 256; cf. Tuplin (1993), 146.

² From Aristotle (*Pol.* 1270a 29: ‘the city [Sparta] could not withstand a single blow’) to Larsen (1968, 186: ‘Moreover, Epaminondas and the Thebans are to be credited with the refounding of Messene and the liberating of all Messenia from Sparta’) this scenario has been wrongly perpetuated.

³ But *before* the invasion of Laconia in 370/69, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.2; *Ages.* 2.24; Cartledge (1979), 299.

⁴ Cartledge (1987), 385. This does not square with Cartledge’s earlier opinion (1979), 299, that the *perioeci* of Aethaea and Thouria also revolted with the Messenians as they had done in c. 465 (Thuc. 1.101). I prefer Cartledge’s later view (see below). On Spartan settlement of Thouria in the late eighth century B.C. see Malkin (1994), 86-89.

⁵ This century Messenia has been the subject of archaeological surveys by various expeditions (Valmin (1938) McDonald and Rapp (1972); Davis (1998)), and such work is on-going (Alcock *et al.*, forthcoming; and in preparation), but much of it has been related to the Bronze Age. For a brief overview of the history of archaeological survey in Messenia see Davis *et al.* (1997), 393-96. Regarding settlements in Messenia, in the Copenhagen Polis Centre Catalogue some five *poleis* are firmly attested as being *perioecic* (nos. 18-21 and 34, ie. Aithaia, Asine, Aulon, Thouria, and Kardamyle), but numbers 35 and 36 (Kyparissia and Mothone) are not in real doubt, though confirmation of their classical period status is not, so far, obtainable; cf. Shipley (1997), 194-95.

Argos was no different; and Thebes was after something greater than mere limited growth alone. All knew that Sparta's hegemony was truly terminated once her control of Messenia was lost, hence their avid support of a free Messenian state. In the *Archidamus* of Isocrates, whether rhetorical exercise or not,⁷ it is made quite plain that Spartan claims on Messenia had never before been challenged.⁸ But glimpses of other states' attitude to the injustice of Sparta's pre-371 position can be gleaned from our source material, though they only appear during times of acute crisis.⁹ Once the Spartan ghost had been exorcised at Leuctra "freedom for the Messenians", we can imagine, became almost as large (and the cynical might claim that at heart as false) a rallying cry as "freedom for the Greeks" would become after 314 B.C.¹⁰

'The most cruel blow',¹¹ for Sparta, one that 'reversed 350 years of history',¹² was Epaminondas' restoration of Messenia as a state in 370/69. Prior to this the Messenians had been nothing more than the workers to Sparta's drones, and bearing this in mind we can see something of the problems confronting the construction of a fully functioning Messenian state. Space prevents us from attempting an in-depth

⁶ The link between an increase in rural settlement and political innovation in Messenia is clear; see now Davis *et al* (1997), 391-494.

⁷ There is no certainty as to when either pamphlet was written, but the *Messenica* of Alcidas of Elaea opposes the Isocratean view and defends the right of the Messenians to freedom. The rivalry between the two men (revealed in Alcidas' *On the Writers of Written Speeches*) is enough to make us suspect that one was written in answer to the other and without scruple regarding content. For the Dorian invasions' effect on source material see: Rubensohn (1975), 105-31; Hooker (1979), 353-60.

⁸ 6.24, 29; Roebuck (1941), 44; Seager (1974), 61-62; cf. Cawkwell (1961), 82.

⁹ That is, when certain states were trying for a similar position of overlordship of contiguous neighbours, and, naturally, were faced with serious Spartan disapproval. For example, Plut. *Ages.* 28, Nepos *Epam.* 6.4 (both involving Thebes), and Paus. 3.8.3 (Elis), but Messenia is not directly named. We may thus find Hornblower's (1991²), 199, claim that it is astonishing that for so many years nobody viewed Sparta's overlordship of Messenia as an autonomy violation, as quite astonishing in itself. To take just one example, it is quite plain that the links existing between Athens and Messenia, whilst obviously based around Athenian self-aggrandizement to a large extent, were in part built upon the knowledge that the Messenians' plight was, to say the least, unconventional by Greek standards (and thus worth exploiting for propaganda purposes). If lying somewhat dormant in our source material, there can be no doubt that many Greeks were aware and disapproved of the situation existing in Messenia prior to 371. Quite simply, they were unable to do anything about it. But we may also assume that many cared little about what had now become a familiar and solid institution, until the shackling of Sparta became a viable prospect, rather than an impossible one, following Leuctra. For a copious list of references to Athenian-Messenian connections in Thucydides alone see Figueira (1999), 237, n. 17; cf. also the obscure reference to an Athenian founder, Colaenus, of Colonides in Pausanias (4.34.8).

¹⁰ Cf. Diod. 19.61.1-3 with Walbank (1992³), 51, 92-93, 98, 136-39, 141, 233.

¹¹ Oliva (1971), 195.

¹² Hamilton (1997), 56. This estimate accords with what we might term the conventional dating for the Spartan conquest of Messenia, but doubts remain as to its veracity (cf. Dinarchus 1.73: 400 years; Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 62: 500 years). The dating of the early Messenian wars is an infamous problem, with many differing opinions as to when they took place (see Schwartz (1899), 428-68; Kiechle (1959), 109-23; Huxley (1962), 89-92; Pearson (1962), *passim*). See now Shaw (1999), 273-

discussion of the Messenians' position and outlook before the invasion of 370/69,¹³ and we must concentrate mainly on the events that immediately arose as a result of Leuctra. What we are confronted with is a chicken or egg situation.

We cannot divorce the Messenian uprising from other similar Peloponnesian occurrences. Did the Messenian revolt act as a catalyst for action in Arcadia and thus the subsequent unrest that swept much of the Peloponnese? We should think not. Like the Argives, the Messenians' position had not changed in itself because of Sparta's defeat. What needed undermining was the Spartan power-base,¹⁴ and whilst in many respects it was dependent upon Messenia to a large degree, Messenia was also a captive source of power. The other main prop on which Sparta relied was a free source - the willingness of her allies to follow her. If this was to fail, then so would Spartan hegemony. Arcadia, on Sparta's doorstep and, if united, with great manpower resources, *had* to desert the Spartans first and set the example for the Messenians and others to follow. Therefore, we can place the Messenian revolt perhaps in the autumn or even winter of 370. The revolt raises some interesting questions.

The Messenians, if unified, were clearly not organised, but the knowledge that they had made their intentions plain was the deciding factor which drew Epaminondas into the Peloponnese. Technically, the conference at Athens in late 371 gave the Greek states *carte blanche* to free Messenia under the autonomy clause which had been sworn to by the Athenians and their allies (Dem. 16.9 f.). Therefore, from the Theban viewpoint, even if they did not attend, matters were taking a turn for the better. They were no doubt elated, if not surprised, to discover that Athens had rejected the Peloponnesian appeal for aid (Diod. 15.62.3; Dem. 16.12) made in late

309, who brings into question the whole reliability of our evidence, and particularly that of a chronology based on Olympiad lists.

¹³ The modern literature concerning their situation as helots is plentiful, but I would note the following: Cartledge (1975), 59-84; (1979), 160-77, (1987), 170-77, (1991), 379-81; Talbert (1989), 22-40; Whitby (1994), 87-126; Hodkinson (1997), 83-102. Opinion is very much divided on the matter, and that of Cartledge has been very influential. But his belief that the helot threat pervaded almost every facet of Spartan life has recently been challenged, in different ways, by the remainder of the aforementioned, and what has emerged is a picture of a, generally, non-threatening and prized asset. Perhaps surprisingly, no ancient source distinguishes between Messenian and Laconian helot. We should have no doubts that the more ethnically aware and nationalistically inclined Messenians were a far greater worry to Sparta than ever the more localised Laconians were; cf. esp. Roobaert (1977), 141-55. On Messenian helots see Cartledge (1979), index. For aspects of fifth century Messenian history see Reece (1962); Cartledge (1979), 102-30 and (1987), *passim*; Shipley (1992), 211-26; Stylianou (1998), 443.

¹⁴ Cf. Cawkwell (1972), 266.

370.¹⁵ Thebes was not as hesitant when faced with the same decision. The intriguing question is: did the Thebans ever expect to launch an offensive on the southern Peloponnese when they made this alliance?

Buckler believes that although some Thebans were keen to invade Laconia from the outset, the Boeotian hierarchy at most only ever envisioned a defensive campaign in Arcadia as a consequence of the alignment.¹⁶ The evidence of Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.22-25) tends to support him, but Cartledge points to the huge numbers of troops Epaminondas brought with him and concludes that the invasion was perhaps preconceived.¹⁷ Whilst any force entering the Peloponnese would have to be large if a confrontation with Sparta was imminent, to believe that Epaminondas and the Boeotian authorities had never considered the possibility of an invasion of Laconia is to seriously underrate the ambitions of both parties.¹⁸ The very fact that they knew of a Messenian revolt, even if a fairly confined one, was enough to lure a full-scale expedition into Laconia; the bonus was the incentive of a refounded Messenia which would owe a great debt to its benefactor.¹⁹ In this respect Cawkwell is quite correct to note the importance of the references in Plutarch to the words of Epaminondas in his clash with Agesilaus at the conference prior to Leuctra in 371.²⁰ Epaminondas was

¹⁵ According to Figueira (1999), 228 and 232-35, due to the existing ties between Athens and Messenia, the Messenian helots may well have been holding out hopes of assistance from the Athenians during the aftermath of Leuctra. Obviously they were not the only Peloponnesians to have such hopes. The irony for the Athenians lay in the fact that for years they had awaited such a breakthrough as this, but when it finally arrived were in no position to take advantage of it, and had no real option but to support a beleaguered Sparta instead.

¹⁶ Buckler (1980a), 72-74.

¹⁷ Cartledge (1987), 232, this suggestion did not appear in his earlier appraisal (cf. (1979), 296-97); Plutarch (*Ages.* 31) refers to 40,000 Thebans, Diodorus (15.62) to a combined total of 70,000 invaders.

¹⁸ Roebuck (1941), 33, believes that Epaminondas had very possibly considered refounding Messene before the invasion of 370/69 had begun. On the strength of *συνεδρεύσαντες* in Diodorus (15.62.5) Stylianou (1998), 425-26, argues that the Boeotians were only persuaded into a Laconian invasion after entering the Peloponnese. We may suspect that Diodorus was following Xenophon in part here anyway, but the arguments revolving around the expiry of the Boeotarchs' year of office are not totally convincing. As Buckler (1980a), 75-76, points out, the Boeotian constitution was not formulated with a prorogation of office in mind. Whether the Boeotians took into account that the expedition into the Peloponnese would be in danger of affecting the Boeotarchs' term of office or not, we can be sure that such considerations would not perturb Epaminondas – the thought of being remembered by posterity as the man who finally subdued Sparta was enough to spur him on. One thing was certain. The ambitions of the Thebans demanded that they, no matter the time of year, had to help the Peloponnesians immediately. To postpone was to appear a hollow sham and risk their new allies returning to the Spartan alliance.

¹⁹ Theban internal politics involved Epaminondas in rivalry with one Meneclidas, but much is uncertain on this matter and we should not assume from our inadequate evidence that whatever action was conceived by Epaminondas was automatically opposed by Meneclidas. At any given time both men had to take account of current political feeling within Boeotia on any situation that arose. Cf. Buckler (1980a), 72-73; 138-50; 183-84; 191-92 (who at times perhaps makes too much of the available information).

²⁰ Plut. *Ages.* 27.4.28; cf. Paus. 9.13.2; Cawkwell (1972), 264.

'by implication' letting it be known that if it was at all possible Thebes would assert the independence of Messenia in the future. His efficacy as a statesman can perhaps be open to question,²¹ but here Epaminondas was cunning in the extreme. Before the eyes of the assembled representatives of the Greek states he was not only confronting Agesilaus, and thus the power of Sparta, as an equal, he was also fishing for new allies in his quest to see Sparta itself humbled. Many of those present did not forget a man who sought the same goal as themselves and seemed determined, brave, and honourable enough to attain it. Therefore Sparta's allies, and others, knew in advance of Leuctra, and even before the Theban entry into the Peloponnese, exactly what Epaminondas had in mind with regard to Laconia and Messenia. It is thus no source of amazement that on the field of Leuctra some of Sparta's allies 'were not even displeased at what had taken place' (Xen. *Hell.*6.4.15). If indeed Xenophon had good information on what took place once the Peloponnesian Alliance had met with the Thebans in Arcadia (Xen. *Hell.*6.5.22-25), and was not merely besmirching the Theban character, his analysis of matters may be quite different from that of our own. Epaminondas had to be certain that his new-found allies were every bit as genuine as they claimed to be, especially as many of them knew at first hand, as long-standing members of the Spartan alliance, just what the Spartans were capable of in the field. He was in effect testing their resolve and ensuring that it would not be the Thebans and their northern allies alone that took on the Spartan army. True enough, the approach of some *perioeci* willing to betray Sparta no doubt had an impetus on the decision to invade, but that decision had in reality already been made – the Thebans had obviously been prepared to face them alongside the Spartans in the first place. For Thebes it was pointless, even if winning another victory over Sparta's army, to triumph alone. It would not change the situation in Greece, and it would not see the demise of Spartan power: only a combined effort that isolated Sparta and destroyed her on home territory could truly succeed in humbling her once and for all. It is the very reason that Epaminondas attacked Laconia immediately and before the Peloponnesians could melt away, rather than forthwith embark upon the freeing of Messenia and obtain even more indigenous forces in the process. More to the point, Thebes, without appearing overly-keen to do so, had virtually taken Sparta's former place on the Greek stage, the one *coup* she could not dare openly attempt. Hence her

²¹ Cf. Hammond (1967²), 510-11.

tacit methods, which proclaimed publicly her sympathy for those shackled by the Spartan despots. It only remained for her to win over, through battle or otherwise, the remaining allies of Sparta in the northeast Peloponnese to fully complete her goal.

During the fourth century Sparta remained safe as long as she could act as guarantor of the series of common peaces which were agreed from 387/6 onwards and allowed her to effectively keep Messenia enslaved – Leuctra placed this lucrative position in grave jeopardy.²² Although still in existence, following Leuctra the Peloponnesian League, that organ of Spartan hegemony that was almost as important to Sparta as the Spartan army itself, was seriously impaired as a main support to Sparta's all but now collapsed domination of the Greek world. To recapture her former position she needed to revive the League along the old lines, but without a cowed Messenia to hand this was impossible; and without the League she alone could not secure Messenia: the immense size of the task would not prevent her from trying to achieve a goal that was, with hindsight, probably always beyond her means.²³

The combined weight of the Thebans and their allies and the Peloponnesian alliance was too much for Sparta and her now reduced circle of allies to overcome. Sparta itself was not defiled, but Laconia suffered devastation at the hands of the invading force, which then retraced its steps northward and turned west into enslaved Messenia.²⁴

We cannot over-estimate the loss of Messenia to Spartan fortunes.²⁵ The importance of her helots to Sparta is seen as far back as the Tegean treaty,²⁶ and their input into the state was crucial.²⁷ This was common knowledge, and the Spartans had taken precautions to preclude their own allies from taking advantage of any weaknesses which would thereby allow them to detach her from Laconia. This was done with very good reason. Messenia, or the "midland", provided the Spartiates with a bounteous lifestyle, and the central area of the region yielded much in the way of

²² Cartledge (1987), 200.

²³ Even into the period of Roman rule she continued her border disputes with Messenia (cf. Tacitus *Ann.* 4.43 and Malkin (1994), 35) over what was, to her, justly "spear won" territory; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.9 with Tuplin (1993), 140; Cartledge and Spawforth (1989), 138-41.

²⁴ On the (Derveni) route see Roebuck (1941), 31; cf. Loring (1895), 36-47; Pritchett (1982), IV, 1-28; (1985a), V, 69-76; (1985b), 77-91.

²⁵ Cf. Toynbee (1969), III, 258 f.; Oliva (1971), 194-97; Cawkwell (1972), 266; Roy (1994²), 191. Above all, for an in-depth economic appraisal see Roebuck (1945).

²⁶ *SV* 112. For our immediate purposes, but our immediate purposes alone, it makes little difference if the recent downdating of the treaty from the mid-sixth century to the first half of the fifth century by both Cawkwell (1993), 364-76, and Braun (1994), 40-45, is correct; cf. Cartledge (1987), 11.

²⁷ On the status of the helots see Cartledge (1987), 170-73.

produce.²⁸ Beloch suggested a population of 80,000 for Messenia in c. 400 B.C.,²⁹ which is possibly a conservative estimate, and we can surely say that Sparta had at least 15,000 male helots working her Messenian estates.

No doubt Epaminondas had long realised that to keep Messenia free the region needed a focal point, a centre for political, military, and even religious resistance to the inevitable Spartan backlash. Messenian history and geography dictated that such a centre had to sit astride Mount Ithome. The city of Messene was erected on its western slopes, with walls which encompassed the summit and provided a clear view of the plain below on its western, northern, and eastern sides.³⁰ The refounding of Messene was beyond all argument the work of Epaminondas.³¹ The belief that it was an *ad hoc* decision is belied by the careful planning that lay behind the project. We are always subjected to the idea that Sparta was the sole consideration that guided the thinking on how Messene should be constructed and organised. But Epaminondas possessed enough political acumen to know that what at that moment was a unified effort against Spartan overlordship could change in an instant. The history of the Greek city-states clarified this, and he had to ponder on what replaced Sparta once her allies had deserted her. There could only be one answer – it had to be Thebes (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33).

The southern Peloponnesian theatre was some distance away from Thebes, and with the rise of Jason in contiguous Thessaly, Pherae now presented a threat to allies such as Phocis and Locris and also to Theban control of Boeotia itself. His death, in summer, 370,³² diminished Pheraeon power, as internal squabbles inevitably took a toll on Pherae's ability to harness concerted action, but with the perhaps even

²⁸ Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 34.1; Plato *Alc.* I 122d; Polyb. 5.37; Euripides *ap* Strabo 8.5.6. The *kleroi* of the Spartiates were situated within the vicinity of the upper, lower, and Soulima plains, whilst those of their *perioeci* lay around the coastal areas (cf. *IG V* 1 1421). Cereals and livestock were common to both, but the cultivable land in actual use was small and much was left undeveloped; Roebuck (1945), 151-55; cf. Beloch (1886), 114. On the topography of Messenia see Roebuck (1941), 1-26; Christien (1998), 436-45.

²⁹ Beloch (1886), 147ff. Cf. Roebuck (1945), 164, whose figures of 40,000 for Messene (or "Ithome", cf. Scylax, *Periplus* 45; Diod. 19.54.4) and 90,000 for Messenia as a whole may be correct but rely too much on *ephebe* lists of the mid-third and late-second centuries B.C. for their calculations (cf. *IG V* 1 1398 and *IG V* 1 1384 and 1385).

³⁰ To the south the ridge of Psoriari still contains the ruins of a lookout tower; see Roebuck (1941), 4 and n. 7; 39-40; and (1945), 156.

³¹ Cf. Paus. 9.15.6; Beloch (*G.G.* III². 1), 177-78; Cartledge (1987), 385; Roy (1994²), 191. Pausanias (4.1.3; cf. Strabo 8.4.1) refused to accept an original Messene and archaeology has supported him. References for the refounding: Diod. 15.66-67; Paus. 4.19.3, 20.4, 26.3-27; Plut. *Ages.* 34.1-2; *Pel.* 24.9; *Mor.* 540d-e; 817; Strabo 8.4.8; Isoc. 5.49; 6.27; Dinarch. 1.73; Lyc. *Leoc.* 62; Nepos *Epam.* 8.5; Aelian *VH* 13.42; Dio Chrys. 15.28.

³² The month of Boukatios (August/September); Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.29-32 with Beloch (*G.G.* III². 2.), 83.

more unpredictable and tyrannical Alexander at the helm the northern Greeks in particular had cause for concern.³³ That Athens had interests in the area, especially with her long-time claim to Amphipolis, was no form of relief. In fact whilst it may divide the resources of an increasingly over-burdened Athens, any Athenian entry onto the scene could only complicate matters. It was all well and good to draw Athens away from the Peloponnese, but there could be no question of joint action, and if she switched her main focus to the north, then Thebes would have to reciprocate and also split her own forces.³⁴ Without this almost certain scenario materialising the Peloponnese still presented a serious problem. What was to happen when the Peloponnesians were left to their own devices complete with a power vacuum in their midst? The states within the Peloponnese showed little long-term goodwill towards each other. Here Sparta knew she had an advantage. From her angle it was only a matter of time before old rivalries split any internal alliance asunder and one state, or more, turned to her, as always the doyen and arbiter of Peloponnesian politics, for aid against superior rivals. Future problems arising over who held Triphylia, which city would lead the Arcadian League, and what would Argos expect from the alliance were not difficult to predict. All of the parties involved could not be satisfied, and where Sparta could bide her time and await developments, Thebes would not be afforded that luxury. To allow events to overtake them would see the Thebans, never the most loved of peoples among their fellow Greeks, perhaps relegated to a position they had occupied in the mid-fifth century. Paradoxically, what if the Peloponnesian Alliance held? The Isthmus of Corinth, that narrow lifeline that maintained Peloponnesian participation in mainstream Greek politics, could become a barrier of massive proportions if adequately protected. Arcadia was the only real contender for leadership, and who was to say that she would not place herself in Sparta's erstwhile position and thus directly threaten Thebes? Experience taught that a neighbouring state could not be physically occupied *en masse* by an invading force, and to attempt

³³ For Jason and the general situation in Thessaly see Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.2-19, 4.20-37, 5.1; cf. Westlake (1935), 115ff.; Gehrke (1985), 189-94; Davies (1993²), 235 ff.; Tuplin (1993), 117-21. Whilst Alexander has been painted as a brute of immense proportions, and the *Hellenica* of Callisthenes has been influential in this respect (cf. *FGH* 124), the analysis of Xenophon can perhaps be considered as reliable evidence in support of this portrait. He, if anyone, could be relied upon to praise a figure who clashed with Theban ambitions.

³⁴ On Athenian intervention at Amphipolis see now Heskell (1996), 19-49. For Theban involvement with Jason and Thessaly see Buckler (1980a), 110-29. As noted by Westlake (1935), 126, Jason's death had implications for the Peloponnesians, as Thebes 'could never have undertaken an invasion of the Peloponnese with a formidable power in the rear'.

such would possibly meet with serious resistance. Viewing the future thus, Epaminondas saw that Thebes had gained a lead and that it could not be frittered away, the fall from the very top of the Greek pile being a long one. When he entered the Peloponnese in the winter of 370 his strategy was already formulated. It aimed at no less than Theban domination of the Greek mainland, and within its confines Messenia, like others, had her own special niche. This was no mere punitive or defensive expedition.

The unity between the Thebans and their allies on the one hand and the Peloponnesian Alliance on the other would only later show itself as the façade it actually was in reality; as, indeed would the unity demonstrated among the Peloponnesians themselves. Messenia witnessed the honeymoon period that saw all concerned working in concert, and we can be sure that Epaminondas did all within his power to maintain this effort.³⁵ The new foundation even had an Argive *oikistes* (Paus. 4.26.7-8), a sign of the equitable nature of the arrangements. But Buckler has well summed-up the attitude of Thebes towards Messene:

This new state, at least in its infancy, would not be strong enough to dispense with Theban protection, so there was no fear of its launching a policy independent of Theban wishes.³⁶

It was, in fact, to be little more than a satellite which promoted Theban influence within the Peloponnese.³⁷ Therefore the first aim was to create a city capable of withstanding attack. Garland has noted how Messene was part of a general trend within the Peloponnese in the 360s (along with Megalopolis, Mantinea, and Gortys) that saw improved and strengthened defences.³⁸ Some nine kilometres in circumference, Messene's walls, were only part of an interlocking system which also included strategically placed watch towers and forts, the whole set-up providing a sweeping

³⁵ Roebuck (1941), 31, is perhaps right to think that Messene was founded in the spring of 369, but as Diodorus (15.67.1) speaks of the whole expedition lasting eighty five days and Plutarch (*Ages.* 32.8) of it lasting three months, we might adjust this slightly to early spring.

³⁶ Buckler (1980a), 86. Worth noting on the topic of founders in Messenia is the evidence of Pausanias (4.34.5) and Ptolemy (3.14.42), though how much faith we can place in the latter is especially open to question. Pausanias, as Habicht (1985), esp. 36ff, has proved, is usually quite reliable, and tells of one Epimelides of Coronea as being the *oikistes* of Corone, a site traditionally founded in 369. Ptolemy speaks of a Haliartus also being founded. The obvious point here are the connections with Boeotia and Epaminondas' strategy of clandestine Theban infiltration of Messenia.

³⁷ Dušanic (1970a), 300-01 and n. 92; Seager (1974), 59.

³⁸ Garland (1994²), 692. Messene's towers seem to have also set the trend for a general increase in the height of Greek defences.

view of the countryside round about.³⁹ Despite these impressive precautions, it will be noted that the Spartans never got anywhere near Messene, and nor were they ever likely to do so. Even before the founding of Megalopolis a Spartan army, now somewhat limited in numbers due to *perioecic* and helot defections after Leuctra, and also debilitated by the effects of *oliganthropia*, would have to successfully negotiate a crossing of southwest Arcadia in the face of strong opposition. If narrow passes over the Taygetus were available as shortcuts, such a force as the full Spartan field army would almost certainly not be able to get its wagons through them.⁴⁰ If they travelled without the wagons they were no longer a full or threatening force. Add to this the problem of, whichever route was attempted, having to leave a substantial holding detachment in Laconia, and they were a depleted outfit before they had set out. If they reached Messene in tact they had no option, torsion catapults being alien as yet, but to attempt circumvallation, as at Plataea (Thuc. 2.71-78; 3.52-68), or try an all-out assault. Quite simply, in neither case had they the manpower to triumph against such lengthy and strong defences, especially as the besieged could certainly rely on external aid to create a rear offensive that would see the hunters become the hunted.⁴¹ It would be wrong for us to credit Epaminondas with the foresight capable of seeing that Spartan efforts would be futile, or that the Spartans themselves would realise that this was the case. But we may suspect that he envisaged a situation where it was not the Spartans that attacked Messene. The city was indeed a strong bastion, and had to be, but it is also the reason that he aimed to keep it reliant upon Thebes. Messene was the first Theban outpost within the Peloponnese, and it would become such assisted by a mixture of subterfuge and fear. In the latter respect, Sparta had her uses alive and well, and only partially stripped of her former strength, rather than as a smoking ruin.

Let us turn to the former case involving subterfuge. It was plain that the new capital needed defenders in some numbers to give it adequate protection. Xenophon, of course, says nothing of the refoundation of Messenia until he describes the events of 368 (*Hell.* 7.1.27), but Diodorus (15.67.1) informs us that the Thebans left a ‘considerable garrison for Messene’ before returning home. On the surface this

³⁹ Roebuck (1941), 39-40; and (1945), 156. See also Marsden (1969), 126-63; Winter (1971), 113-14, 164-65; Lawrence (1979), 382-85; J.-P. Adams (1982), 171-75.

⁴⁰ Let us not doubt that the Spartans on campaign always needed and took wagons with them; cf. Thuc. 5.72; Xen. *Lac. Pol.* 11.2.

⁴¹ We might add that even if they had achieved their aim at Messene, there was no possibility of re-enslaving a population that had finally attained its freedom – the Messenians would have fought to the

appears a wise move, but there was more to this than mere Theban common sense or altruism. At 15.66.1 Diodorus has already reported that upon the invaders' withdrawal to Arcadia from Laconia Epaminondas had personally advised his allies to refound Messenia. This, we can surmise, was planned in advance with the express motive of obtaining a Theban foothold in the Peloponnese. Knowing that his Peloponnesian allies would comply with the wishes of their benefactor out of gratitude and because of apprehension of what Sparta would do in his absence, Epaminondas easily gained allied approbation for the planting of a substantial garrison in their midst. This force was designed to maintain a watch on them every bit as much as it was on the Spartans. His timing was impeccable, allowing them to look back and see what a resilient, determined, and aggravated Sparta had been left behind.⁴² One might argue that the garrison was composed of a multi-national allied force. Diodorus speaks of the Thebans alone, and with good reason. Epaminondas was not so naïve as to leave a garrison that was prone to disagreement over who to take orders from, could not be trusted, or which could have sections of it re-called at any moment. The detachment remaining in Messene was undoubtedly Theban, or at least Boeotian, and owed allegiance to its home state. All had gone according to plan, it now only needed the other "ox's horn" (Polyb. 7.12.3) of the Peloponnese, the Acrocorinth, to fall under Theban sway.

Both the small numbers and inexperience of any proposed Messenian defence force were of significant help to this strategy. No Messenian troop figures exist for this period, and the few available to us are projections over a century and a half into the future.⁴³ Citing 2,500 infantry and 250 cavalry, and 2,000 infantry and 200 cavalry respectively, when taken in comparison with what smaller city-states, such as Mantinea or Tegea, could field years earlier, these numbers seem quite moderate for an area as large as (most of) Messenia. Roebuck considers them 'not incompatible' with his (maximum) estimate of 112,500 for the total population of all Messenia, but we should note, as Roebuck does not, that the first figure was identical to that which the Achaean League Strategos also arranged for Sparta to send at this point (c. 220

death to avoid this ignominy. But we should not forget that the Messenians would have problems themselves in manning such lengthy defences.

⁴² Even taking into account that the Boeotarchy was up for re-newal and that he was not selected for office the following year, it will be noted that Epaminondas neither stayed or returned to help the Messenians re-conquer all of Messenia – he had Messene in his pocket, and that was all he required.

⁴³ Polyb. 4.15.6; 5.20.1 with Roebuck (1945), 163; cf. (1941), 69, n. 12. The figures probably exclude Pylos.

B.C.); and that the second figure, as noted by Roebuck, was that of an élite force. Therefore neither figure actually reveals what the Messenians were capable of providing in an emergency, and we might well conclude that it was a greater number of troops than this evidence provides. Our point is that even if a more organised Messenia could have produced twice this amount in the late-third century, it could probably, at a conservative estimate, only supply around 1,000 or so in 370/69.⁴⁴ Considering that Epaminondas' re-call of exiles and settlement of newcomers (cf. Diod. 15.66.1; Paus. 4.26.5-27.7) would take some while to be fully realised,⁴⁵ the paramount need was for an external garrison to be put in place, a situation he understood and exploited.⁴⁶

There also existed the need for a working constitution. Surprisingly, the source material covering this initial period never actually informs us what type of constitution Messene had. Certainly the Hellenistic period seems to point to it being under an oligarchy,⁴⁷ but, *prima facie*, it is hard to imagine a generally, if not entirely, democratic group of allies imposing an oligarchy, with all the memories of Spartan domination it evoked, upon the newly-freed Messenians. Nevertheless, in favour of the oligarchic argument we might adduce that a basically rural, and thus perhaps conservative people, without experience of governing,⁴⁸ might turn to established local pillars of the community to see them through a time of possible crisis. It might also be said that, as with Philip II and his later flirtation with Messenia,⁴⁹ Epaminondas would have preferred to deal with the limited numbers an oligarchy presented. But in both cases there remain obstacles. The Messenians, after years of taking orders, would probably have wanted a say in the running of their new state and to be on a political par with their saviours. For their part, these providers of liberty would have expected, even demanded, that the Messenians adopt a democratic

⁴⁴ Let us also remember that, at least in the first few months, there would be the problem of an acute shortage of armour and weapons (cf. the remarks of Cinadon at Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.7), and, unless the Spartans had trusted some of the Messenian helots to act as *neodamodeis* (on the latter see Oliva (1971), 166-70), a distinct lack of training in the military arts.

⁴⁵ Noting also the point made by Dipersia (1974), 59, n. 15, that Dionysius I would probably have prevented any mass exodus to Messenia from his part of the world. Besides Sicily, the Messenians had also been dispersed to Italy and Africa (Cartledge (1987), 353, 385), and as Roebuck (1941), 34, says, the number that did return from overseas was probably exaggerated later.

⁴⁶ It would be interesting to know the composition of the Greeks he introduced as settlers. Certainly some of his troops remained to make up the numbers (Diod. 15.66.1; Lycurgus *Leoc.* 62). One suspects that many northerners allied to Thebes followed later, and, more to the point, that no small number of these newcomers were of Boeotian and Theban extraction.

⁴⁷ Cf. Ernst Meyer, *RE* supp. xv (1978), 155 f.

⁴⁸ Pearson (1962), 402.

constitution, if only to prevent any links developing with the Spartan oligarchs. As for Epaminondas, there were limits to his powers, one being the need for re-election, and he was not a dictator or anything close to being such. He had tremendous influence, but his basic affiliation with democracy, in spite of what the exigencies of foreign policy may have pressed upon him, we should not doubt.

Based on the Messenians' ethnic affinities, Roebuck has suggested that Messenia formed a federal league of its own.⁵⁰ This assumption has to be doubted.⁵¹ First and foremost, much of Roebuck's case lacks evidence. Secondly, the fact that both Arcadia and Boeotia, states at the forefront of the refounding, were federal leagues should not be pressed too hard. Their own histories taught them that claimed ethnicity was no guarantee of harmony,⁵² and in truth it is quite easy to argue the opposite. Clearly, the one thing that all involved understood was that this new state must not be allowed to fall into immediate disarray because of internal rivalries. It was to avoid this that, in part, a new capital was constructed in the first place.⁵³ A system that precipitated rivalry was suicidal. The evidence for a Messenian *koine* does not really exist,⁵⁴ and we have to assume that Messene's first form of constitution was democratic.⁵⁵ Whether those settlements surrounding Messene followed her lead in

⁴⁹ Cf. Roebuck (1948), 84-92; Bosworth (1988), 187-88.

⁵⁰ See Roebuck (1941), 115; for what follows see 110-16.

⁵¹ Even Larsen, who on occasion appears to stretch the evidence in his endeavours to prove the existence of certain confederacies (cf. (1968), 97-103, on the Euboean Confederacy), makes no attempt to demonstrate that a Messenian Confederation ever existed.

⁵² Obviously in the case of the Arcadians, their own problems with the forming of an official league were just around the corner (on a possible fifth century Arcadian League see Chapter 6), but they had experienced internal rivalry throughout their history. Neither should we forget that similar rivalries had plagued Boeotia, and that the near future would show that they were not terminated (cf. Diod. 15.79.3-6; Plut. *Pel.* 25.15; Paus. 9.15.3 on the attempted *coup* of the Orchomenian cavalry).

⁵³ The similarities with the Mantinean-Tegean situation in the Arcadian League are quite apparent.

⁵⁴ That *demiorgoi* are accounted for (*IG V 1 1425*) means little. As Roebuck himself acknowledges, (1941), 115, they also existed at municipal as well as federal level; cf. Rhodes (1993²), 71-72, 182-84 (on Athens). Although Roebuck, with little to go on, argues for a Messenian federal league, in the face of more concrete evidence (Polyb. 4.4.2, 31.2) he denies the influence of Sparta on the existence of an ephorate in Messenia in c. 220; see (1941), 115, n. 30.

⁵⁵ See *SEG* 22. 339 (= Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7 = *SV* 285a = *IvO* 36 = *Syll.*² 98 = Hill and Hicks 115; cf. *SEG* 29. 405; *SEG* 32. 411): the alliance with Pisatis of Arcadia, Sicyon, and Messene (and Argos?) would seem to point to a democratic alignment. Arist. *Rhet.* III. xvii. 14-15 alludes to Callistratus of Athens addressing the Messenian ἐκκλησία, which suggests a democratic constitution. It could be argued that this is no guarantee of a democracy if we take into consideration that the franchise could have been a limited one. But we may wonder, after the Messenians' long-term enslavement, how it could be decided who held enough property or wealth to qualify for membership of this assembly. To point to the example of what many consider to be the arch oligarchy, that of Sparta, it is amazing how the verdicts delivered on it in antiquity differ so much. Plato (*Laws* IV, 712 D-E) was uncertain if it was a democracy or a tyranny; Aristotle (*Pol.* 1294b 15 ff.) thought it contained elements of oligarchy but was a blend of both this and democracy; Isocrates (*Areopag.* 61 (152)) considered it a democracy; and Cicero (*de Rep.* II. 23) defined it as mixed. Our evidence from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has been

matters, as with Sparta and her *perioeci*, is not clear. Roebuck believes that from its inception Messenia was very centralised,⁵⁶ and, even though we should dismiss the idea of a federal state, he may well be correct in this view (Athens and Attica perhaps acting as a loose model?). Whatever form the constitution took, we can speculate with some certainty that Messenia became allied to her benefactors. The Messenians would have wanted an alliance as a guarantee for the future, and the Boeotians and Peloponnesians, with one eye looking across the Taygetus, would have been equally keen to consolidate their achievements. Roy considers it a 'safe assumption' that because of Epaminondas' influence, Messenia would have become allied to Boeotia.⁵⁷ On the basis of their own alliances with each other, we can also assume with some assurance that the Peloponnesians allied with Messenia (in the case of Arcadia, her forthcoming involvement in Messenia virtually ensures alliance).

There was also the question of religious policy,⁵⁸ and in close relation to it what today we would see as a virtual war of propaganda. Cartledge sees 370/69 as being the moment when the clash between Sparta and Messenia 'transferred the war from the physical to the verbal plane'.⁵⁹ There remain many problems with pre-370 Messenian history, and much of this is due to the Messenians inventing their own historical narrative in their search for an identity. In the words of Figueira 'local historiography proclaimed that a submerged Messenian polity had always opposed the Spartans.'⁶⁰ Crucial to the whole process was the figure of Aristomenes, the hero whose cult was at the centre of this Messenian revolution.⁶¹ Pausanias could report (4.31.11) on seeing historic murals of the ancient kings of Messenia at Messene, no doubt intended as support for the tradition that had recently been worked up. As Malkin has said of the Spartan-Messenian situation, '[t]he proximity of the two countries served as a constant reminder of Messenia's past subjugation.'⁶² It was this very uncomfortable position that the Messenians had to overcome, and hence their

queried, but I would take it to be more than circumstantial if we take into account the situation existing in Messenia in the 360s.

⁵⁶ Roebuck (1941), 116.

⁵⁷ Roy (1971a), 595.

⁵⁸ See Christien (1998), 454-59

⁵⁹ Cartledge (1979), 114.

⁶⁰ Figueira (1999), 218.

⁶¹ Cf. *IG V 1 1469* and *SEG 23*: a bull sacrifice to Aristomenes during the reign of Augustus. See also Kiechle (1959), 72ff. and 86ff.; Pearson (1962), 397-426. Excavation at Messene has uncovered an intricate complex dedicated to cult worship and built around a temple of Asclepius (see *Ἐργον* reports from 1988).

⁶² Malkin (1994), 35.

fabrication of history. Years of living as the underclass to the Spartan ruling élite meant that, as ever in such a situation, the rulers' influence filtered down to their subjects. We find clear indications of this in Messenian religious cult.⁶³ The Carneia, in worship of Apollo, seems to have been continued, and at Messene itself so did the homage paid to the Dioscuri (these were featured amongst many gods generally accepted within the Greek pantheon). But the Messenians claimed that Zeus and Asclepius were born in Messenia, and whilst this helps explain the worship of Zeus Ithomatas and the temple of Asclepius that were both part of the new city's culture,⁶⁴ more to the point was the cult of Zeus Soter (cf. Paus. 4.31.6-32.6). This Zeus, the saviour, was the direct beneficiary of the founding of Messene. Designed, no doubt, as a genuine celebration of Messenian freedom, the cult also represented Messenia's new cultural identity as sanctioned by Zeus. Messenia was now a state separate from that of Sparta, and thus was signified the end of Spartan domination and a new beginning.⁶⁵

This invention had to rebound on the Messenians. Firstly, It seems plain that a reaction set in at Sparta. Schwartz speculates that Tyrtaeus never existed, and that his "works" were released by the Spartans in 370/69 to help them enlist the aid of Athens to their cause.⁶⁶ More tellingly, personal statues of Spartan military and athletic victors were absent from Sparta prior to 368, until one of Euryleon was erected.⁶⁷ If we investigate him, what we discover is a Spartan general from the first Messenian War (Paus. 4.7.8, 8.11; cf. 3.17.6). For the Spartans to break any tradition was a major event, and from this action, one recalling Messenian enslavement to Sparta, the Messenians would have known just how determined Sparta was to retrieve her lost territory. Not that this would have been a worry for Epaminondas, who could see Messenia becoming ever more tightly bound to Thebes.⁶⁸ Here is the place for us to

⁶³ On which see Roebuck (1941), 34-36.

⁶⁴ Zeus Ithomatos: cf. *IG V* 1 1468, 4-6; *IG V* 2 419.23. There was also a cult of Artemis Laphria, which was seemingly connected with those Messenians who returned from Naupactus. On the re-settlement of the Asinians and Nauplians in Messenia see Cartledge (1979), 126, 140.

⁶⁵ Roebuck (1941), 114, believes that the five tribal divisions based on a Heraclid pattern at Thouria stemmed from its incorporation into the Messenian state in 338, which in turn was inherited from Messene's founding in 370/69 (*IG V* 1 1433; cf. *IG V* 1 1425; *IG V* 1 1386), the original idea being to build a tradition for the new state.

⁶⁶ Schwartz (1899), esp. 466.

⁶⁷ Hodkinson (1998), 62.

⁶⁸ Despite the work of Beister (1973), 65-84, esp. 77-81, we should note the evidence of Pausanias (4.32.5; 9.13.6; cf. *IG VII* 2462 = Tod 130 = Harding 46) which claims that Epaminondas and Xenocrates had the shield of the Messenian hero Aristomenes paraded before the armies at Leuctra. If

refer to the Cabiri cult. In the midst of a propaganda war that owed much to the celebration of Messenian indigenous religion, this cult with very alien origins perhaps made its first appearance. When it is discovered that, after making its way westwards from the near east, only two other places in mainland Greece have yielded evidence of this cult, and that both are in Boeotia, at Anthedon and no less than Thebes,⁶⁹ then the evidence for the Thebans making deliberate inroads into the heart of the Messenian consciousness becomes stronger.⁷⁰

By spring of 369 the basic work of establishing Messene had been completed, and Epaminondas and his allies left the Peloponnese, to slight harassment by the Athenians (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.51-52), but in their rear remained the Messene garrison. He may have felt apprehensive for the future when considering his Peloponnesian allies' early disappearing act (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.50), but at least there was the consolation that such a force would hardly be a match for his own should the worst happen. What he had not accomplished was the complete subjugation of Messenia. Sparta's *perioeci*, many of them as keen to keep the helots down as any Spartan, still clung to huge chunks of Messenian soil, and particularly around the coastal areas, which they were not prepared to give up.⁷¹

Epaminondas was not away for long. If the information of Xenophon alone is followed, it would appear that almost without warning or reason the autumn of 369 saw him once more re-unite with his Peloponnesian allies in another invasion of the Peloponnese. It is actually the information supplied by Diodorus (15.67.1-4) that opens our eyes to what was really behind this move. Sparta had formally allied with Athens; the Arcadians had attacked (Laconian) Pellana; and the Thebans were beginning to get involved with the machinations of Alexander of Pherae (cf. Plut. *Pelop.* 26). Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.1-7.1.15) tells us in some detail of how the Athens-Sparta alliance was cemented, but not of the attack on Pellana or of Thebes' northern

correct, we can surmise that this act was committed with more than just the effects on morale in mind. Epaminondas was purposely demonstrating Thebes' new-found devotion to the Messenian cause.

⁶⁹ Cf. Schachter (1986), 66-110. A subsidiary of other cults, the Cabiri at Thebes were linked to agriculture (and bore resemblance to the Dioscuri), which aptly reflected Messenia's status as an agricultural state (on this see Roebuck (1945), esp. 151-52).

⁷⁰ Even before the Sacred War they were not above utilizing religion for their own ends: cf. Hicks and Hill 116 on the Thebans using their influence in c. 363 to banish an anti-Theban from the Delphic Amphictyony.

⁷¹ These included Asine, Cyparissia, Coryphasium (Pylos), Mothone, and the island of Prote; Cartledge (1979), 299. What has recently come to light through excavation has been the lack of land exploitation in Laconia in the years following 370/69, which clarifies to some extent that there was no mass exodus

involvement. When Xenophon reports on Lycomedes' nationalistic stirring of the Arcadians (*Hell.* 7.1.22-25), he ignores or forgets that it was Lycomedes who led the attack on Pellana. We know that Lycomedes' behaviour as related by Xenophon first awakened the Thebans to Arcadian ambitions, but, whilst not being outside the terms of their alliance, the independent attack on Pellana will have raised more than a few eyebrows throughout the Peloponnese and Boeotia. Xenophon does tell us, however, of an Arcadian attack on Laconian Asine (*Hell.* 7.1.25). Situated, approximately, to the west of Sellasia and not far from Arcadia, Pellana would appear an obvious target for a raid. But Laconian Asine is south-east of Gythium and Las, far south of Sparta itself, and thus seen as being too ambitious a goal for the Arcadians to even consider attacking.⁷² Buckler is correct in his belief that Lycomedes first hit at Pellana and then made his way westwards in a thrust at Messenian Asine, the episode being a demonstration of how the Arcadians could now easily penetrate Laconia's defences.⁷³

The Messenians at this point must have had mixed feelings. The attack on Asine, a major success as far as Arcadia was concerned, had not actually seen Asine fall and the Arcadians themselves did not have to live with the consequences. Every Messenian would have liked to see the end of Sparta and her outposts in Messenia, but this was a raid that guaranteed some form of Spartan reprisal – and the chances were that they, weak as they were in comparison to Arcadia, would be on the receiving end of it. It was now official that they could expect no aid from the direction of Athens, and once acquainted with the news of Theban preoccupation with Thessaly, matters began to look serious indeed. What does emerge from Xenophon's narrative (*Hell.* 7.1.20-21) is that it was only a short matter of time after the forces of Epaminondas had traversed the Corinthia that Dionysius' mercenaries arrived to help the Spartans. It is quite plain that this aid was sent for in advance of the second Peloponnesian invasion, and we may speculate that far from being a response to it, the aid was instrumental in bringing it about. It must not be forgotten that Sicily had its

from Messenia of Sparta's *perioeci* in the wake of the invasion (personal conversation with Professor Chris Mee on 31.5.2000; and see also Catling, forthcoming).

⁷² Cartledge (1979), 300 and Tuplin (1993), 151, n.15 both think the Asine referred to by Xenophon is that in Messenia still held by Spartan *perioeci*. This makes sense, but Xenophon, unless a later insertion by another hand, explicitly refers to 'the Laconian land' as being where Asine was situated. He knew the region well enough not to make a mistake and seems to be emphasizing that it was indeed the Asine south of Sparta that was attacked. Nevertheless, we cannot really accept that the Arcadians were so bold, or even reckless, to try and mount an unassisted attack so far into Sparta's heartland.

⁷³ Buckler (1980a), 92; on Pellana then being the first line of Laconia's northern defences, see Cartledge (1979), 297. For the tomb of Olbiadas (*IG V 1 1591*) being connected to the raid on Pellana see Cartledge (1979), 300.

Messenian settlers. A Spartan request for aid could not be kept secret, and word would soon reach the Messenians of the Peloponnese from their fellow countrymen in Messana or similar. The plea might have been made months earlier, but we can imagine that Dionysius would have no wish to keep his allies waiting. What we may believe is that the mercenaries were sent in reply to a recent request, and that request was precipitated by the Arcadian raid against Pellana. Diplomatic exchanges between Messenia and Thebes, unrecorded in the sources, would have been taking place concerning the reinforcements for Sparta, and we might claim that the Messenians were as guilty for the second Peloponnesian invasion as any state could be: except that at the root of it were Arcadia's incursions into Pellana and Asine.⁷⁴

Events had overtaken the Thebans to some degree. The Athens-Sparta alliance demanded immediate pressure to be brought upon it; Sparta's remaining Peloponnesian allies needed detaching from her; and, now, Thebes needed to show her concern for Messenia and make further inroads into the Peloponnese. But what were the Arcadians seeking? They were fast becoming the flies in the ointment and needed to be brought in line; of most concern was the danger of them displacing Thebes in the Messenians' defence strategy. All of these factors combined to bring Epaminondas into the Peloponnese in late 369 - by the end of the year Argos, Arcadia, Elis, Messenia, Pellene, and Sicyon were all allied to Thebes.⁷⁵

The Messenians are conspicuous by their absence during what was, after all, a north Peloponnesian campaign. Nevertheless, and considering the participation of the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans, the limitations placed on them by a lack of adequately trained and armed troops were the main reasons for their non-involvement. What little sufficient manpower they possessed would have to be in readiness for a possible Spartan movement against Messenia, especially as the Arcadian forces were mostly absent, and an invasion from the direction of Laconia would serve to remove the pressure from Sparta's northern allies. Ironically, like the Messenians, the Spartans also had problems connected with manpower, but commitment to their northern allies necessitated a march northwards to help defend the Isthmus.

⁷⁴ Stylianou (1998), 448, in trying to argue that the second invasion belongs to 368, pours scorn on the idea of the Boeotians returning home from the first invasion only to return to the Peloponnese almost immediately. But that is to miss the whole point of the situation. Nobody, surely, would claim that the Boeotians *wanted* matters arranged this way. It was immediate events and the gravity of them that forced Epaminondas to act with such haste.

⁷⁵ Roy (1971a), 575-76. As Buckler (1980a), 93, notes, in late 369 the Thebans also wanted to be invited into the Peloponnese, rather than be seen as outsiders intervening without invitation.

When Lycomedes' actions began to threaten the very existence of the Peloponnesian Alliance (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.22-26; Diod.15.67.2), the Messenians had to consider what choices lay before them. It boiled down to who could protect them better, Arcadia or Thebes. The Thebans had shown them every courtesy, being chiefly responsible for the re-birth of Messenia as a state, and also possessed the most powerful military forces in Greece. On the other hand, the Arcadians were becoming more of a force in their own right and were closer at hand for when the inevitable Spartan strike should come. For the time being they could only hope the Alliance held and that Sparta's manpower shortage continued unabated. The latter hope was shortly about to be dashed.

We should not perhaps place too much emphasis on the very timely arrival of the second reinforcements from Dionysius while many Greek embassies assembled at Delphi (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28).⁷⁶ Persia was facing internal problems, and, as a prelude to the infamous Satraps' Revolt,⁷⁷ Ariobarzanes had dispatched Philiscus to end the Greeks' internal problems in the hope of securing mercenaries for the forthcoming struggle. Both the Spartans and Thebans probably realised before they attended that there could be no satisfactory outcome to the main topic. The status of Messenia had become Thebes' first priority. Her input towards the re-founding was such that she could not back down without seriously losing face, and if this should happen her unofficial capacity as leader of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance would be under threat, a development many Arcadians would relish. For Sparta it was the *cause célèbre*, one that she would champion with a fanatical zeal.⁷⁸ Not only would backing down be tantamount to officially declaring she was finished in her traditional role as leader of the Greeks, it would also lose her the rich Messenian lands forever.

The dismal performance of the Spartans at the Isthmus and their reluctance to face the enemy in the field must have lifted Messenian spirits.⁷⁹ Sparta had certainly proved recalcitrant at the bargaining table, but this the Messenians expected and could

⁷⁶ Probably in the spring of 367. Diodorus does not report on the arrival of the reinforcements, and his account of the Delphi conference (15.70.2) is totally confused with regard to what was the sticking point. The argument was about Messene's status, the Boeotian Confederation's existence under Theban tutelage was no longer a pressing issue; see Seager (1974), 58, n. 115; Stylianou (1998), 463; cf. Buckler (1980a), 297, n. 47.

⁷⁷ Diod. 15.90 ff.; cf. Hornblower (1982), 170 ff.; Weiskopf (1989).

⁷⁸ In the words of Ryder (1965), 79, the conference was 'the first indication of the Spartans' new attitude to Common Peace treaties, that they would accept nothing which would leave the Messenians independent'; cf. Jehne (1994), 81.

⁷⁹ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 102.

abide. Their stalwart ally, Thebes, had spearheaded the stiff resistance to Spartan demands at Delphi, and, total recognition aside, they could have expected nothing more. Surely, now it was only a matter of time before even the Spartans were forced to admit them to statehood. The first half of 368 held nothing but promise. Unfortunately, the Spartan net reached to Persia as well as Sicily.

On good terms with Antalcidas, and determined to end the Greek troubles for his own ends, Ariobarzanes had instructed Philiscus to loan the Spartans some 2,000 of his hired mercenaries upon the failure of the Delphi talks;⁸⁰ coupled with the arrival of the second contingent of mercenaries from Dionysius, Sparta was now catapulted back into the forefront of the Peloponnesian frame. The seriousness of the situation can be measured by the fact that Messenia mobilised her forces for the very first time when the Spartans invaded southwest Arcadia and devastated Caryae and Parrhasia.⁸¹ What followed was the overwhelming defeat of the Arcadians and Argives at the “Tearless Battle”.⁸² There was one question the now wavering Messenians wanted to know the answer to: besides the garrison in their midst, where were the Thebans?

For the answer, Buckler points to Theban dissatisfaction with Epaminondas’ policies (he was not re-elected Boeotarch in 368), these seemingly helping the Peloponnesians become stronger and serving themselves little.⁸³ But this is to account for only the symptom and not the cause. More so than even their involvement in Thessaly, the Arcadian nationalist streak had driven the Thebans away from the Peloponnese. The risk was the loss of Messenian goodwill, and possibly Messenia itself. Theban (and Elean) joy at Arcadia’s defeat by Sparta (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.32) was

⁸⁰ Antalcidas was very probably a major player within the Spartan delegation; Buckler (1980a), 103. Ariobarzanes was later allied to Sparta, his funds, along with those of Tachôs and Mausolus, helping Sparta to enlist mercenaries in the quest to re-gain Messenia; cf. Cartledge (1987), 325, 389.

⁸¹ Messenia mobilised just twice before 362, and only when southwest Arcadia (and thus Messenia) was in danger; cf. Roy (1971a), 584, and (1994²), 192.

⁸² *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.29-32; Diod. 15.72.3. Neither Xenophon or, especially, Diodorus provide satisfactory explanations of the topography involved (cf. Loring (1895), 64-66). Following Xenophon’s account, I have often wondered if the Messenians, astride the road to Sparta and preventing Cissidas and his mercenaries marching south (and thus mustered in some force?), actually failed to come to the aid of the Arcadians and Argives. Although sometimes wrongly perceived as being a Spartan victory over the combined forces of all three states (eg. Cartledge (1987), 387; *contra* Dušanic (1970a), 296, n. 55), Xenophon’s description makes it obvious that the Messenians never encountered the Spartans. For confirmation see *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.35: Pelopidas’ jibes at the Arcadians and Argives for the defeat never alludes to the Messenians taking part; he may not have wanted to upset them, but on these grounds if they did fight he would have had to avoid reference to the battle altogether. The mercenaries from Dionysius certainly joined the Spartans for the action (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.31-32), so why were their Messenian “shadows” not also involved in the battle?

⁸³ Buckler (1980a), 104-05, who fully acknowledges the Arcadian attitude and its consequences (105-06).

the outcome of a calculated gamble. As much as any Theban ally, Messenia had to be taught that the Arcadians and their boasts could not be relied upon. They had intervened independently in Messenia with the attack on Asine, a move that had to be seen as a failure,⁸⁴ alienated the Eleans (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.26), and espoused an Arcadian cause that threatened the stability of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance and thus the whole of Greece.⁸⁵ The Thebans had made their point, but also lost ground in the Peloponnese which needed to be recovered.

By summer, 367 the contest had once more become a race as to who could gain the Great King's ear. Sparta placed much upon this tried and trusted formula, but she was in for a shock this time around. Their recent record being nothing to commend them, the Spartans fell victim to the erudite arguments of Pelopidas (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.34-35; *Plut. Pel.* 30.2-4; cf. *Diod.* 15.8.3).⁸⁶ Athens and Arcadia were also to be disappointed, but for Sparta the autonomy principle that she had tried to wield against Thebes in 371 was turned back on her – Messenia was recognised as a self-governing state in its own right. Artaxerxes had deserted his former champion in favour of the younger, hungrier, and now potentially more dependable pretender. It is often taken for granted that Messenia sent delegates to the conference but our sources failed to name check their presence.⁸⁷ We must cast doubt upon this belief. It is feasible that Messenia was not represented in person for a very good reason. There is the possibility that she was not organised properly as a state.⁸⁸ That is, at least along the lines which would not cause embarrassment at the conference table. The Thebans may well have persuaded the Messenians to let them speak on their behalf, and no doubt would have wanted it that way to increase their own standing, not only in the eyes of the Persians but also before those of their own allies, their opponents, and the somewhat equivocal Arcadians. Such a move would also have drawn, or at least have been intended to draw, Messenia further into the Theban sphere of influence at the expense of Arcadia. Bearing in mind the retort of the Spartans at the preliminary

⁸⁴ If Cartledge (1979), 300, is correct, the failed attempt on Asine pressed the worried Messenians to build Colonides and Corone as buffers against reprisals; he also thinks the "Tearless Battle" served to make the Messenians push for the building of Megalopolis (cf. also (1987), 386). In fact the building of Megalopolis was already underway, see Chapter 6.

⁸⁵ Neither should it be forgotten that in the spring of 368 the Arcadians became involved with Euphron at Sicyon.

⁸⁶ This time there was no Antalcidas present to aid Spartan efforts; see Buckler (1977a), 139-45. On the conference as a whole, see the excellent treatment of Buckler (1980a), 151-58.

⁸⁷ Buckler (1980a), 152. The same applies to Argos.

negotiations of 362, that the Messenians had no city (Plut. *Ages.* 35.3), we can begin to understand what the Thebans could see as a potential pitfall. The Spartans' future words, as Roebuck has said,⁸⁹ were spoken with the aim of making clear their claim on Messenia and emphasizing that she was not free from their control. But the simple fact was that the Messenians in 367, and after, did not control Messenia. Sparta still controlled vast tracts of the Messenian landscape. Any Messenian delegates attending the meeting would have been expected to speak and put their case. What and who did they represent? A shrewd and experienced Spartan delegate could have taken advantage of a somewhat naïve and inexperienced (and possibly deferential?) Messenian representative. Did he speak for the thousands of Spartan *perioeci* born and raised in Messenia? Had they been consulted? Were they willing to be subject to Messenian rule? What if they were not? If this new Messenia was "spear won", who had won it? It is manifest from Xenophon's account of the talks that Pelopidas held all the cards, but this was not apparent beforehand. As Cawkwell has pointed out, even at the Delphi meeting Persia still accepted the Spartans being in control of Messenia, but in 367 Artaxerxes did nothing less than betray them.⁹⁰ The Thebans had physically kept away from the Peloponnese, here was their chance to make amends to the Messenians (and the Eleans and the absent Argives), put the old enemies, Athens and Sparta, in their place, but to also relegate the Arcadians to a position of mere peers within the Peloponnesian Alliance. They were not going to risk all this because of a possible conference clash between Messenia and Sparta, one which would highlight Sparta's strong position in Messenia and simultaneously resurrect her credentials as leading contender for the Great King's favours. If the Spartans asked Pelopidas the same questions, he could fend them off, with allied backing, far easier by claiming to represent and defend Messenian interests than could a Messenian who had his status, credibility, and political standing questioned.⁹¹

The insult handed out to many of the Greeks gathered at the conference was compounded by the next Theban move. Their efforts on home soil to gain acceptance

⁸⁸ As late as the period 363-2 her funds towards the re-building of the temple at Delphi, even if her first contribution (*ἐπαρχή*), were a paltry seventy drachmas; cf. Tod 140 = Harding 60.

⁸⁹ Roebuck (1941), 46, and n. 86.

⁹⁰ Cawkwell (1961), 83.

⁹¹ Although not by any means a certainty, let us consider the proposition that Arcadian-Messenian relations were also strained following the "Tearless Battle", thus pushing the Messenians further toward the Theban camp. Neither should we forget, even at this early stage as far as our evidence goes, that the Arcadian League was soon going to split, and the cracks may have already been apparent to many Messenians worried about the effects of such a division on their own futures.

for the terms handed down at Susa met with Corinthian defiance and, later, outright rejection. The Greek states followed her lead.⁹² A third Theban invasion of the Peloponnese, whilst *prima facie* pulling the allies back together, only served to alienate the Achaeans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41-43).⁹³ Further Theban arrogance towards the Arcadians, combined with their seizure of Oropus from under Athenian noses, drove Arcadia and Athens into alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1-4).

Throughout these whole proceedings the Messenians must have looked on, helplessly, in dismay. Every twist and turn held new horrors for them. The Arcadian-Theban breakdown, the Arcadian-Elean débâcle, the Arcadian-Athenian entente: all threatened a total collapse of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance. If this occurred, who would protect them from Spartan incursions? Always, it appeared, Arcadia's foreign policy was at the heart of the problems. Ironically, it was her internal turmoils which would finally bring about the collapse Messenians dreaded. But respite came when Epaminondas, having already terminated the Spartan hold on Messenia, accomplished his goal of destroying the Peloponnesian League in 366/5 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.6-11).⁹⁴ The Peace of 366/5 itself seemed guaranteed to end five long years of Messenian efforts to establish statehood.⁹⁵ The Spartans, after nearly two hundred years of leadership, had finally been detached from their allies once and for all.⁹⁶ This same period also saw what we might now view as the greatest breakthrough Messenians had experienced since 370/69. It came not, as one might expect, from the direction of Thebes but much closer to home. The Arcadians, as much for their own ends as for those of the Messenians, took decisive action in Messenia. Seeking to improve their standing within the Peloponnese, and thus underline the ambivalent attitude of Thebes, they captured the *perioecic* strongholds of Cyparissia and Coryphasium, which, along with the island of Prote, they handed to the Messenians

⁹² Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39-40; Diod. 15.76.3; cf. Buckler (1980a), 200-01.

⁹³ See Buckler (1980a), 185-93, with references. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.42) speaks of 'all the allies' being present. Technically, this would include the Messenians, but without further corroborative evidence and bearing in mind the dangers of a northern venture, we have to conclude that they did not take part in the expedition.

⁹⁴ Roy (1994²), 200. It was tainted by the news that Sparta would never give up its claim on Messenia; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.9. Tacitly or otherwise, Sparta's northeastern allies had now recognised Messenia; see Cawkwell (1972), 269; Buckler (1980a), 201; Cartledge (1987), 257; cf. Roebuck (1941), 45.

⁹⁵ We do not know whether Messenia sent envoys to Thebes or not. Considering there was the distinct possibility that the Corinthians and others may formally recognise Messenia's existence at the talks, it seems quite likely that they did; cf. Roy (1971a), 597-98.

⁹⁶ Xen. 7.4.6-9; Isoc. 6.11-13, 27, 58, 91, 96. Cf. Diod. 15.90.2: Messenia's admittance to the Peace saw the Spartans enraged with Artaxerxes. As he was not involved in the Peace of 362/1, Diodorus has

(Diod. 15.77.4; Scylax, *Periplus* 45). Sparta now perhaps only held onto Asine and Mothone on the Acritas peninsula, although it is possible that the Mani district in the north of Messenia was still hers.⁹⁷ This apparently magnanimous gesture should be placed in its correct context. The Arcadians were simply safeguarding themselves from any further Spartan movements against southwest Arcadia.⁹⁸ On the defensive at home and, seemingly, unable to hit back at Sparta, by reducing her holdings in Messenia they diverted her attention. Crucially, it was impressed upon her that the ultimate aim behind her forays into Arcadia – the recapture of Messenia – was no longer a goal worth pursuing. Once such a strategy had been successfully undertaken, the Arcadians could not, after supporting autonomy, keep what had been won without risk of being accused of introducing another version of Spartan imperialism. Neither, as Epaminondas perceived, could they or any other state of the Alliance, except Thebes, justify garrisoning the territory of a fellow member: the newly liberated cities had to be given to Messenia.

In the summer of 365 the uneasy Arcadian-Elean relationship finally broke down. It took no seer to forecast what the Eleans' first move would be. Sparta was only too keen to re-new her relationship with a state that bordered on and effectively hemmed in Messenia, yet also had a good understanding with the Achaeans. The war soon turning against Sparta's allies, the Eleans lost no time in drawing the Spartans into the conflict in earnest.⁹⁹

At Cromnus the Messenians stood and fought alongside their Arcadian, Argive, and Theban allies against the Spartan assault on southwest Arcadia.¹⁰⁰ They

to be referring to that of 366/5; see De Sanctis (1934), 152. On whether this Peace was a "Common Peace" or not, see Ryder (1957), 199 ff. and (1965), 137 ff.; cf. Cawkwell (1961), 80 ff.

⁹⁷ Roebuck (1941), 38 and n. 62, cf. 29 and n. 9; Cartledge (1987), 389-90; Stylianou (1998), 492. Dušanic (1970a), 300-01 and n. 92 is correct to emphasize the absence of the Thebans at this point, but wrong (302 and n. 101) to assume an oligarchic and secessionist Messenian régime could have existed prior to Arcadian intervention. There is no evidence for this, and to attempt such independence would have seen this minute enclave totally devoid of allies, including Sparta, and all hope.

⁹⁸ Months earlier Sparta had re-taken Sellasia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12) and possibly Pellana (cf. Cartledge (1979), 301).

⁹⁹ On the conflict see Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-18; Diod. 15.77.1-4; Polyb. 4.75.1; cf. Beloch (*G.G.* III² 2.) 242; Buckler (1980a), 201-05.

¹⁰⁰ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.19-25, 27; Justin 6.6.6-10; Plut. *Mor.* 535 A-B, cf. 192A; Callisthenes fr. 13 (Jacoby). See also Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7 (*SEG* = 22. 339) with Roy (1971a), 584, 594 ff.; cf. *SV* 285 = *SEG* 29. 405. Although always taken for granted, there is no need to assume that the Thebans were now so involved as to dispatch forces to the Peloponnese from Boeotia. The Thebans referred to at *Hell.* 7.4.27, if actually present at all and not just receiving an allies' share of the booty, would have been members of the Messene garrison who had marched north with the Messenian forces. That the Messenians now fought the Spartans was an achievement in itself and a major step towards laying the Spartan ghost; cf. Paus. 5.26.1 and ML 74 on the story behind the Nike of Paeonius at Olympia.

could take heart from the fact that some form of united front had revealed itself during this crisis, but with the states involved all having their own interests, the future was not bright. The eventual defeat of the Spartans at Cromnus saw them eschew invasion of southwest Arcadia for the following three years. What took centre stage at this juncture was the Elean-Arcadian War's effect on the power struggle within the Arcadian League. As this internecine inner contest developed it soon became clear that the members of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance would have to choose which side they would take. For the overwhelming majority of Messenians the choice was not difficult. If victorious, the Mantinean faction,¹⁰¹ oligarchic and pro-Spartan, would allow Messenia to revert to Spartan control as the price to be paid for alliance and their own elevation to leadership of the Arcadian League. In the south of Arcadia, it was to be noticed that a line of Arcadian cities along Sparta's route north were standing by Thebes.¹⁰² From west to east these were Megalopolis, Asea, Pallantium, and Tegea (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.5). Thebes had kept herself free from Peloponnesian intervention in recent years, but Messenians owed her much, had maintained good relations with her, knew she was democratic, and admired her military superiority. First and foremost, she had made the freedom of Messenia the cornerstone of her foreign policy. In short, for Messenians, there could only be one choice.

How many troops the Messenians fielded at (2nd) Mantinea is unknown, but they occupied a position in the centre of the allied line (Diod. 15.85.2) and probably saw little, if any action. Their part in the victory proved as sobering for them as it was for the Thebans once they learned of the news of Epaminondas' death. The architect of Messenian freedom, Epaminondas bequeathed to Messenia a garrison, but no guarantee that Sparta would refrain from attacks upon either. The Peace that followed the battle only left matters unresolved, and the Messenians looking once more towards their allies for protection.¹⁰³ Sparta categorically refused to recognise a clause that left all signatories in possession of the territories they then held, thus leaving Messenia's independence, as far as she was concerned, open to question.¹⁰⁴ The

¹⁰¹ Not, at this stage, as Roebuck (1941), 45, continually insists, a Megalopolitan faction.

¹⁰² Buckler (1980a), 206-07.

¹⁰³ On the Peace see Diod. 15.76.3, 89.1, 90 ff.; Polyb. 4.33.8 f.; Plut. *Ages.* 35.3. Cf. *IG* IV 556 = Hill and Hicks 120 = Tod 145 = *SV* 2. 292 = Harding 57. See also De Sanctis (1934), 145-55; Momigliano (1934), 482-514; Hampl (1938), 26-34; Ryder (1965), 140-44; Jehne (1994), 96-115.

¹⁰⁴ Ryder (1965), 84-85. Cf. *IG* II² 112 = Hicks and Hill 119 = Tod 144 = *SV* 2. 20 = Harding 56. Ryder (1965), 88; Roy (1971a), 587. It may be, as Buckler (1980a), 313 and n. 24, suggests, that the evidence for embassies by Callistratus (Aristotle, *Rhet.* III, xvii, 13-14, and Theopompus the Comic, fr. 30, Kock I, 740) belongs to this period when Athens was trying to forge alliances.

Greeks may have avoided the involvement of Persia in a common peace for the first time, but they had still not sorted out their differences and reached a genuine consensus of opinion. Sparta's former allies who had helped in no small way to keep her helots subjugated were now, as such, in the camp that wanted them kept free.¹⁰⁵ The Spartans felt betrayed on all fronts, not least of which by the great King, whose friendship, even in such circumstances, was refused, so much did the loss of Messenia mean to them.¹⁰⁶ Theban hegemony, or more correctly, as Buckler termed it,¹⁰⁷ 'ascendency', was short-lived. But Epaminondas knew the value of a garrison, and in this respect his death did not prevent Theban influence lingering in the Peloponnese for some time to come.¹⁰⁸ Despite proclamations to the contrary, Messenia's new deal was intended, in essence, to be little different than her old one as far as the Thebans were concerned. Her inhabitants, now notably of mixed extraction, would be free, but to owe allegiance to Thebes. The relationship could even be termed symbiotic. Messenia needed Theban might to ward off Sparta's threat; Thebes needed Messenia as the perfect foil that allowed her to justify having access to the far south of the Peloponnese: either way, as intended from the very beginning, Thebes could be the only winner.

¹⁰⁵ Common Peace: Cartledge (1979), 301; allies and helots: Cartledge (1987), 347.

¹⁰⁶ Artaxerxes' letter to Agesilaus: Xen. *Ages.* 8.3 ff.; Plut. *Ages.* 23.10; *Mor.* 213 D; cf. Cartledge (1987), 201.

¹⁰⁷ Preface (1980).

¹⁰⁸ The Thebans only left the Peloponnese during the Sacred War (Paus. 4.28.1); Theban garrisons: Messene: Diod. 15.67.1; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.27; Justin 6.6.6-10; Sicyon: Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.11-15, 17-23; 3.4, 9; Tegea: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.36-37. It will be noted that all of these cities (Tegea as part of Arcadia) were also the signatories of the Piasatis decree (Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7 = 22. 339): Epaminondas, in reality, had successfully introduced the proto-type "fethers of Greece" into the Peloponnese.

Chapter 4 Elis: the 'Quietman' of the Peloponnese?

The description of the region of Elis left to us by Polybius (4.73.6-74.8) has over the years become something of an accepted portrait. Here is an area from antiquity that we view as a backwater, its inhabitants having few ambitions beyond a bounteous new harvest and peaceful co-existence with their neighbours. If we study Peloponnesian politics of the 360s a little closer this picture is shattered. In this period the Eleans had as much in common with such an idyllic existence as did the Arcadians with pastoralism and the poetry it inspired. Nevertheless, both myths persist in the modern conscience. The words of Roy penetratingly reveal the truth: 'La discorde politique évidente à Élis, et parfois ailleurs, suggère l'image d'une société plus complexe et moins heureuse que celle d'un peuple content d'une vie faite de simplicité campagnarde.'¹

Let us not be too harsh on Polybius, and particularly on three counts. Firstly, he was writing some two centuries later, in a world where the *pax romana* was, if not actually guaranteed, at least becoming feasible to some degree. Secondly, time had seemingly proved that his presentation of the Elean temperament was not such an unreasonable one, even if the circumstances of their recent docility were partially forced upon them by greater powers. Thirdly, and crucially, he did note that the Arcadian attacks on Lasion and Pisa shaped the Eleans' future outlook and mode of life (Polyb. 4.74.1-2).

The 360s provide us with a supreme irony where Elis is concerned. Whilst the Spartans had no greater distrust, and perhaps dislike, of any other erstwhile Peloponnesian League member, the reason for their wariness bore a striking resemblance to their own situation. The Spartans' first concern was to maintain control of their *perioeci* and helots. Elis had no helots, but she did claim authority over neighbours we might term *perioeci*.² She also, like the Spartans, undoubtedly believed

¹ Roy (1999a), 163-64.

² On which see Cartledge (1979), 178-85; Shipley (1992), 211-26; Roy (1999a), 156-58. Above all see Roy (1997a), who has noted, 283, that the term should not necessarily be viewed as being identical with the usage as applied to Sparta's *perioeci*. Andrewes (1990), 174, says that 'the word *perioikos* does not of itself indicate the character of the regime imposed.' On Elean expectations of their *perioeci* see Nielsen (1996b), 76; Roy (1997a), 292. Nielsen (1996b), 74, argues that Elis' *perioecic* system was based upon the Spartan one. He also provides a useful, broad definition of what *perioeci* were: they were 'inhabitants of (minor) *poleis* situated close to major *poleis*, who claim to have a right to rule these minor *poleis*, a right sanctified by a long tradition of such rule'. My only doubt here concerns the term 'long tradition'. How long is a 'long tradition'? If we are speaking of the general

she was fully within her rights to rule these ‘dwellers around’ and made it her first priority to do so. This belief led her to break with Sparta soon after Leuctra and seek support from, amongst others, Arcadia. It would also, within just a few short years, lead her to attack the Arcadians in co-operation with the Spartans.³

Prior to Leuctra the list of Elean misdemeanours against Spartan policy – possibly felonies is a better word, and certainly so as far as the Spartans were concerned – was already impressive;⁴ and all the more so, if we take Polybius at his word. Possibly Sparta’s first Peloponnesian ally,⁵ Elis had managed to alienate the Spartans to some degree a century before Leuctra when in c.471 she seems to have erected a democracy in place of her oligarchy⁶ – the latter being Sparta’s favoured mode of government for her allies within the Peloponnesian League.⁷ Indeed, the snippets of pre-500 B.C. Elean history that have been preserved for us, mainly by the later writers Strabo (bk. 8) and Pausanias (bks. 5 and 6), point to a people who *were* inclined to take risks and expand their rule over others.⁸ Venturing out of Koile Elis in the northwestern Peloponnese before the end of the archaic period, the Eleans moved

situation, where the existence of *perioeci* is recognised as a virtual institution by the Greeks, even if many states did not utilize it, then the premise is understandable. If we are speaking of a localised situation, then it would appear that not always does a powerful neighbour need a ‘long tradition’ behind her to sanctify her domination of a neighbouring *polis*. Nielsen says that ‘Elis acquired her *perioikoi* during the fifth century’: surely, this is not a ‘long tradition’?

³ In the words of Larsen (1968), 190, ‘the two old enemies were brought together by common hostility to the Arcadians and by a similar desire to subdue their former subjects.’

⁴ Or, as Cartledge’s has said (1987), 249: ‘the record of Elis as an ally of Sparta was chequered, to say the least’.

⁵ Perhaps as early as 572 B.C.: Cartledge (1979), 127, 137-39; and (1987) 248; cf. Nielsen (1996b), 87; Roy (1997a), 290. If we are looking for another irony, the Spartans helped them to suppress their neighbours after the Eleans had aided Sparta in subduing the Messenians; Strabo 8.3.30; cf. 8.3.33 (on Pisatis and Triphylia). On Elean history see Hammond (1967²), 169-70; Lewis (1992²), 103 ff.; Roy (1994²), 187 ff.

⁶ Diod. 11.54.1; Strabo 8.3.2, 15; Hdt. 9.77.3; Paus. 10.9.5; Arist. *Pol.* 5.6, 1306a 12-19; cf. Hammond (1967²), 262; Roy (1999), 158.

⁷ Elis’ democracy might even have been in place as early as c.500, see O’Neil (1981), 340.

⁸ Around 500 B.C. Elis concluded a treaty of *symmachia* with Heraea (*Syll.*³ 9 = *GHI* 5 = *SV* 27; cf. Tausend (1992), 178). See Siewert (1987/8) on unpublished late sixth century inscriptions referring to ‘the Eleans and the *symmachia*’ with *SV* 193; and esp. Siewert (1994), 257-64, which clarifies the existence of such. Inscriptions from Olympia dating down to c. 450 refer to unknown communities such as the *Anaitoi* and *Metapioi* (*IvO* 10) and the *Chaladrioi* (*IvO* 11), and point to Elean expansion into some of these territories (cf. Roy (1997a), 296). But the recent work of Roy and Schofield (1999), 155-65, which involved a reappraisal of *IvO* 9 (= *Nomina* I, no. 52; on the tablet’s history: Cook (1987), 60-61) via three-dimensional computer enhancement, has made it ‘very probable’ (164) that the *Ewaioi* are indeed the people recorded on the inscription (Dubois (1985), 45-48, considered them to be citizens of Eua in the Thyreatis; cf. Theopompus (*FGr Hist* 115 fr. 60)). The case for Elean expansion at the expense of smaller communities is thus further reinforced, and we should no longer accept the views of Tausend (1992), that the treaty was between equals, or Hansen and Fischer-Hansen (1994), that it was between Elis and Heraea.

mainly southwards but also eastwards, and before 500 B.C. had control of areas such as Acrorea and Pisatis, and perhaps also Scillus, Macistus,⁹ and what Herodotus (4.148) describes as the Minyan communities.¹⁰ Thus the ancient geographical Elis as we picture it had already begun to take shape before the fifth century. The Eleans' rule over Pisatis also gave them domination of Olympia (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.31), an attractive benefit in itself.¹¹ Therefore, signs of an individualistic, not to say imperialistic streak, already existed in the Elean psyche before their adhesion to Sparta's alliance. Like the Spartans, the Eleans now also ruled over a region whose heterogeneous population had, understandably, little love for its masters.¹²

To fully comprehend the Elean position in the period 371-61, and why Isocrates (8.100) could accuse the Spartans of stealing part of the Eleans' territory, we must first consider two important factors that have a tremendous bearing on what took place in that decade and why. The first concerns the history of Elis' dealings with her neighbours; the second, the perplexing question of the Elean constitution: on occasion the two, inevitably, converge.¹³

If we accept, tentatively, 471 for the installation of the Elean democracy,¹⁴ then shortly afterwards it appears that in cahoots with the Arcadians and Argives, the Eleans may have attempted an overthrow of Spartan hegemony within the Peloponnese (cf. Hdt.9.35). Much is conjecture but if Themistocles did try to undermine Spartan influence over the Peloponnesians, then we can safely assume that he did so by attacking oligarchy as a system of government and, whether already firmly democratic

⁹ Paus. 5.6.4, 6.22.4 with Roy (1997a), 314, n. 32).

¹⁰ See Roy (1997a), 282-83; cf. Neilsen (1995), 83-102.

¹¹ Cf. Roy (1999a), 158-59. For fifth century coin issues bearing the legend *ΟΛΥΜΠΙΚΟΝ*, see Seltman (1955), 96-97; Kraay (1976), 103-05. On the question of early Pisatan tenure of the Games, see Shaw (1999), 284. On the possibility of an early amphictyony governing Olympia see Siewert (1991), 257-64, who follows the view first taken by Kahrstedt (1928), 161-67.

¹² See Roy (2000b), 133-37, for the view that Elis was a state only in concept, this being due to the "northern" Eleans, as such, conquering neighbours who did not view themselves as "Elean" at all. Thus the long process of statehood was only in its final stages in the second half of the fifth century. Nielsen (1997), 141, believes that 'the Eleian *perioikoi* had the formal status of *symmachoi*', which may well be true but is beyond the scope of our investigations.

¹³ Unfortunately, in neither of our tasks are we helped by the dearth of published inscriptions from Elis; see the comments of Siewert (1991b), 105-07.

¹⁴ Cf. Hammond (1967²), 262. Roy (1997a), 285-89 (see also Roy (1999a), 158-59) has proved that the Elean state existed before the synoecism of 471, and probably differentiated between *poleis* of the Elean state proper and those of its *perioeci*. Gehrke (1985), 365-67, considers that changes were made to the Elean constitution at the time of the 471 synoecism. We should dismiss, with Siewert (1994), 30, any notions that Elis was a federal organisation.

or not, that the Eleans were a receptive audience.¹⁵ It was because of these problems with their allies that the Spartans were forced to accept a democracy within the framework of the Peloponnesian League (Mantineia was the other anomaly,¹⁶ on which see Ch. 6). Spartan preoccupation with League affairs would in fact also work in Elis' favour later in the fifth century, and we can surmise that their attitude towards the Eleans was tempered only by the notion that their democracy did not seem, at least initially, to be hostile to Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesians. But some matters Sparta could not turn her back on indefinitely.

No hegemon of an arrangement like that of the Peloponnesian League could afford to allow states inside the alliance to construct their own mini-empires. If we think Sparta an ogre towards democracy, let us at least consider the prospect that in the 420s the two democracies within her alliance were also the very two states which tried to expand their influence over contiguous territories. From 421-18 the survival of the Peloponnesian League was on a knife edge, and in no small thanks to the Eleans.¹⁷

When some members of the Peloponnesian League decided that an alliance which did not include Sparta was the requirement, the Eleans were in the forefront of the movement.¹⁸ For Elis the crux of the matter was the contiguous city of Lepreum.¹⁹ The Eleans were not outraged by the Peace of Nicias so much as disgusted with Sparta's defence of the Lepreates' wish to be free from their annual payment of one talent to Olympian Zeus. We know that the tithe was owed due to Elean aid to Lepreum against some Arcadians;²⁰ that the Eleans allowed the Lepreates to cultivate the half of their land that had been promised to Elis in exchange for the aid, on condition of the payment to Zeus at Olympia being received annually; and that the

¹⁵ On the episode see Andrewes (1952); Forrest (1960); Reece (1962); Hammond (1967²), 262. We should also make reference, whether linked in any way with disaffection or otherwise, to the Eleans being late for the Battle of Plataea in 479 (Hdt. 9.77); cf. Lazenby (1993), 208, 246, 253, who is not convinced of any connection; *contra* Andrewes (1952) 2-3; Forrest (1960), 229; Tuplin (1977), 10.

¹⁶ Cf. de Ste. Croix (1972), 98, n. 25. Interestingly enough, the Mantineans were also late for Plataea (Hdt. 9.77).

¹⁷ For the whole story in detail, including Mantinean involvement, see Thuc. 5.13-83; on Elis' involvement see specifically Thuc. 5.31.1-5; 5.34.1-2; 5.49.1-50.4; 5.62.1-2.

¹⁸ See Cartledge (1987), 53. As in 370, there was 'a continuous zone of allied states hostile to Sparta across the northern and central parts of the Peloponnese': Tomlinson (1972), 119.

¹⁹ For an appraisal of the affair, see Roy (1998).

²⁰ Although we do not know who these 'Arcadians' were, they were not part of an Arcadian League 'proper' at this stage; cf. Neilsen (1996a); Roy (2000b), 155, n. 59. On whether an early Arcadian League ever existed see Wallace (1954), 32-55; Williams (1965); Roy (1972d), 334-41.

event occurred at least ten years earlier (Thuc. 5.31).²¹ We can also surmise that Elis was guilty of an attempt to enlarge her local dependent allies, and that Sparta was never going to approve of such a move.²² She thus placed a garrison in Lepreum. That the whole allied campaign eventually collapsed in ruins at (1st) Mantinea in 418 was not helped by the Elean withdrawal once the Argives, Athenians, and Mantineans decided to attack Tegea and not, as the Eleans wanted, Lepreum (Thuc. 5.62).²³ This decision to withdraw says much of Elean single-mindedness and determination when the question of their rule over neighbours was at stake. Neither was Lepreum the Eleans' only interest in this respect.

Recent work has thrown some light on the long-standing problem of what the Eleans' relationship was with those *poleis* we, due to ancient geographical, historical, and political considerations, of necessity label "Elean".²⁴ That is not to say that we have solved this problem, and Lepreum is as typical a case in point as any other of the areas within the region, many of which present us with similar puzzles. In Lepreum's case much of the question revolves around the situation of Triphylia. The 'concept', to use Nielsen's term,²⁵ of Triphylia involves the issues, of what it was, where it was and when it came into existence.²⁶ The latter proposition arises with Elis' next clash with Spartan supremacy. In 402 the Spartans demanded that Elis set free her *perioeci*.²⁷ For

²¹ Lepreum had certainly fought independently of Elis at Plataea (Hdt. 9.28; ML 27 (= *Syll.*³ 31.34)), and during the fifth century was not part of a large political unit (cf. Thuc. 5.31.2; Nielsen (1997), 136-37).

²² Fitting in comfortably on this occasion with her adherence to the autonomy principle, on which see Ryder (1965), 12-14; Tuplin (1993), 54.

²³ Elis could field some 3,000 hoplites at this point (Thuc. 5.58.1); cf. Stylianou (1998), 282.

²⁴ For much of what follows the articles by Nielsen (1997) and Roy (1997a; 1999a; 2000b) form the basis, and I here refer the reader to them. The communities in question, some of whose locations are now lost to us and some of which can rate only a passing mention, include: Amphidolia, Epeum, Epitalium, Heraclea, Lasion, Lepreum, Letrinoi, Macistus, Margana, Noudium, Phaisana, Pheraia, Phrixa, Psophis, Pyrgus, Scillus, and Thraustus. Four further possibilities, Bolax, Hypana, Typanea, and Stylangium are not actually attested in the classical period, cf. Roy (1999a), 156-58; Pritchett (1989), 46-58; and some, such as Alipheira, Heraea, and Phigalia, we should, I believe, despite some modern doubts, class as being Arcadian. The sanctuaries of Olympia, in Pisatis, and Samicon, administered by Macistus, if somewhat slightly anomalous, are also part of the equation.

²⁵ Nielsen (1997), 129.

²⁶ Certainly by 394: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30; 4.2.16; cf. 6.5.2; 7.1.26; *SEG* 35. 389; *SEG* 40. 392; Nielsen (1997), 144-50. *SEG* 40. 392 proves Triphylia was organised as a state with institutions, but little else.

²⁷ On the whole episode see Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-31; Diod. 14.17.4-12, 34.1-2; Paus. 3.8.3-5, 5.4.8, 20.4; cf. Cartledge (1987), 248-53; Tuplin (1993), 54-56. Xenophon's dating on the matter cannot be trusted, despite some scholars still following him. For the correct chronology see Tuplin (1993), 201-05; cf. Sordi (1984), 145-48; Lewis (1994²), 41-42. See also Faulkner (1996) and Roy (1997b) on the possibility of Sparta having designs on the ports of Cyllene and Phea; Gehrke (1985), 198-99 on Spartan control of the surrounding area during the Peloponnesian War.

the Spartans Elean actions since 421 made this demand essential.²⁸ Aristophanes' *Birds* (149-50) informs us that by 414, the year of its performance, Lepreum was back in Elean hands.²⁹ It would thus appear that Elean stubbornness in 418 was not put aside once they had deserted their allies prior to (1st) Mantinea. They had in fact acted to recover it within the next four years – and we can certainly say it was done without Spartan approbation. Now the victors of the Peloponnesian War, and in total control of the Greek world (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 6.6), the Spartans were not about to let the Eleans flaunt their authority. They had awaited their opportunity, and once their demands of 402 were flatly rejected by Elis (as the Spartans probably knew they would be)³⁰ they threw themselves and the weight of their allies into the region. After two years of enemy invasions and an attempted internal oligarchic *coup*,³¹ the Eleans were ready to accede to Spartan wishes.³² It is here that both the *perioecic* and constitutional factors come into play, and we shall deal with that of the *perioeci* first.

There is no mention of Triphylia before circa 400 in our source material, and it would seem that it was either at this juncture or in the very late fifth century that it

²⁸ See esp. Thuc. 5.31-32; 49-50, 76.3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.21-22; Plut. *Mor.* 835f; Diod. 14.17.5 (cf. Loomis (1992)). As in 421, the Eleans looked to other states for help, and we may well surmise from Xenophon's narrative that the Boeotians and Corinthians, who remained absent from the eventual invasion of Elis, were almost certainly approached (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24-25).

²⁹ Nielsen (1997), 141; Roy (1997a), 283.

³⁰ Diodorus (14.17.6) uses the term 'pretext'; cf. Roy (1997b), 3.

³¹ Led by the incredibly rich and pro-Spartan Xenias (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.27; Polyæn. 6.36; 6.40.3; cf. Roy (2000b), 135.

³² On the terms see Roy (1997a), 299-304. In brief, the various demands, not all spelt out at the beginning of the War, were that Elis: free her *perioeci* (the crux of matters and the one Spartan demand that all our sources are agreed upon: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23; Diod. 14.17.5; Paus. 3.8.3); pay her contributions to the cost of the Peloponnesian War (Diod. 14.17.5); surrender her triremes to Sparta (Diod. 14.34.1; Paus. 3.8.5); destroy her city walls (Paus. 3.8.5; this despite the fact that *Hell.* 3.2.27 denies that any existed at this point). There is something distinctly odd about Xenophon's reporting at *Hell.* 3.2.21-22. The incidents concerning Elis' alliance with Athens, Argos, and Mantinea, and the beating of Lichas are some twenty years old by c. 400 (cf. Thuc. 5.47 and 49). That the Spartans had not forgotten them, as we have seen, is obvious. But surely the refusal to let Agis sacrifice at Olympia, it not being acceptable in a war against fellow Greeks, is from the same period? I mention this because at the beginning of 3.2.21 Xenophon speaks of the Spartans having trouble with Elis at the same time as the campaigns of Dercylidas. Allowing for Xenophon's chronology being seriously inaccurate (in truth he is speaking of events of c. 397, when Agis had been dead some three years), we are still faced with Sparta having very recent problems with Elis, possibly since the end of the Peloponnesian War. Plutarch tells us that Thrasydaeus, a leading Elean democrat whom we shall be meeting again, gave two talents to Athenian democratic exiles in 404/3 (on Thrasydaeus and his rival Xenias cf. Tuplin (1993), 54 and n. 33); and that the Eleans, Argives, Megarians, and Thebans all played their part in aiding fugitives (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 835 F; *Lys.* 27; Just. 6.9.4 f.; Dem. 15.22; Din. 1.25): has Xenophon, yet again, failed to tell us of vital evidence? As Cawkwell (1979), 337, has said: 'Xenophon writes for those who know', and is infuriating because of this trait.

came into being.³³ It has long been the opinion of many scholars that most of the other communities south of the River Alpheus but north of the River Neda belonged to what we can only describe as being an artificial construction.³⁴ Further, that this new venture was a voluntary set-up,³⁵ the *poleis* involved accepting that Lepreum was to be the central community of the whole project.³⁶ Sparta's previous championing of Lepreum's independence may lead us to think that it would be entirely fitting that Lepreum become the centre of a new region that looked towards safety in numbers from any future Elean incursions. Nevertheless, all is not so straightforward, and even the convenient north-south Alpheus divide is far from being beyond dispute.³⁷

What must be avoided is the tendency to erect a neat, stable package that fits our preconceptions of what a Triphylian state should or would have been like.³⁸ As noted by Roy,³⁹ there is a lack of information on both Elis' relations with her *perioeci* from c. 400 down to the 360s, and for Triphylia being Elean from c. 400 down to the third century. Xenophon, to whom we should be eternally grateful for supplying us with some evidence, is unfortunately spasmodic and haphazard in the extreme when it comes to reporting matters. Diodorus is spasmodic and haphazard, but even more so. Apart from passing references in other works, they are basically all that we have in the way of concentrated literary testimony, and it is to Xenophon we must turn to for our

³³ Nielsen (1997), 144.

³⁴ Cf. Bölte (1948), 186; Siewert (1987-88), 10; Tuplin (1993), 184; Roy (2000b), 140.

³⁵ Cf. Roy (2000b), 140: '...states south of the R. Alpheios which had not previously had a single common identity, had created for themselves ca. 400 a new Triphylian identity...'

³⁶ See Bölte (1939), 200; Roy (1971a), 575. Nielsen (1997), 137, actually says that due to the lack of evidence on these communities, that which we have for Lepreum 'can be generalised to cover the other "Triphylian cities"', a method of approach that I find fraught with risks and which virtually accepts *a priori* that Lepreum was the leading city of the area. It should not be forgotten, especially considering the Greek *poleis*' general fixation with remaining independent (if at all possible), that those communities involved in the formation of Triphylia may not have wanted one city to be placed in a position of power over them. If they were in no position to refuse, it hardly augured well for the future if from its inception they were coerced into membership of such an organisation. These *poleis* did not, we must remember, constitute an *ethnos*. They were composed of Minyans, almost certainly of remaining Cauconians and Paroreatans, and perhaps even Arcadians: Hdt. 4.148 with Nielsen (1997), 129-37; cf. esp. 134-35.

³⁷ For doubts over the existence of a Triphylian sub-dialect, see Striano (1991), 139-43.

³⁸ Despite the excellent work of those scholars involved with the investigations of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre*, I believe that on one or two occasions there has been a proclivity to package matters a little too neatly. The one certainty about ancient Greece is its heterogeneous nature: there are no rules governing the behaviour of *poleis*, either individually or collectively, and matters cannot be tidily compartmentalised. To state the obvious example, the difference between Athenian and Spartan outlook, on many fronts, is often immense. These are easily our best documented *poleis*, and to construct principles which guided the behaviour of those which we know next to nothing about is treading very close to creating an entirely false picture.

³⁹ Roy (1997a), 284-85.

outline of events. In doing so we would do well to bear in mind Tuplin's verdict on the evidence Xenophon presents: 'the truth may still be that we should not be looking for logical consistency at all.'⁴⁰ To discard Xenophon is to dispose of what might be a valuable insight into events of the period, to follow him to the letter is possibly to enter into a dangerous distortion of the truth. But, given the absence of other worthwhile evidence and the tendency to correct him wherever possible, we must choose to take Xenophon at his word for the most part or risk becoming historical revisionists. Whilst we have to postulate our own scenarios to a degree, until anything superior to the *Hellenica* appears, we must follow its guidelines. We cannot improve on it, and to attempt such may see us, for all we know, actually rejecting factual reporting. Xenophon's evidence may not always fit with our ideas of what happened, but historical truth often does not. What is more, despite the trend towards the opposite, on this occasion there are good reasons for accepting the greater part of Xenophon's evidence. Considering Cawkwell's belief that he wrote 'for those who know', the corollary of this statement is that Xenophon was taking it for granted that his readership understood fully of what he spoke, and to present matters otherwise was to be viewed as a blatant liar, and therefore a worthless reporter of events. Any reputation he had as a reliable witness would have been destroyed. As our own corollary, let us consider some further thoughts from Cawkwell on Xenophon's reporting. Writing of the *Anabasis*,⁴¹ he notes that Xenophon may well have written his account of it in answer to others that were in existence, and which perhaps underrated Xenophon's part in events.⁴² Here Xenophon is perhaps defending what is open to interpretation by those who were a part of the expedition. What he could not do was change factual evidence,⁴³ which is the point we must make in reference to the writing of the *Hellenica*. His audience knew or could easily check just what the situation was or had been in Elis over the years, and especially what the situation was or had been regarding the position of those *poleis* the Eleans viewed as theirs by right.

⁴⁰ Tuplin (1993), 184.

⁴¹ Cawkwell (1972), 17-18.

⁴² Those being by Themistogenes of Syracuse (probably no more than a pseudonym for Xenophon himself, cf. *Anab.* 3.1.2; Cawkwell (1972), 17), Ctesias of Cnidus (cf. *Anab.* 1.8.26f.) and, in particular, Sophraenetos of Stymphalus (cf. *Anab.* 1.1.11; 1.2.3; 2.5.37; 4.4.11; 6.5.13; and esp. 8.8.1).

⁴³ For example, he could express his opinion on Cyrus' leadership and organisational abilities, but not deny the fact that Cyrus was the undoubted leader and organiser of the whole venture – this was a fact that all present knew only too well.

Therefore when Xenophon writes passages that seemingly reflect a lack of knowledge of events or a slack methodology on his part we must beware.⁴⁴ He may actually be reflecting changes that have taken place of which he, in his own indomitable and lax style sadly typical of the man, is well aware and expects his readership to be equally familiar: he would not bother to inform those unaware of events of what had taken place in the meantime. Bearing that in mind, we have no alternative but to take his evidence seriously, even if some shortcomings are manifest (for example, *Hell.* 6.5.2).⁴⁵

From the Elean war to 369 there exist five key passages that render clues as to the route events took: the majority are highly perplexing in their relationship to each other.⁴⁶ At *Hellenica* 3.2.25 Xenophon informs us that as soon as the Spartans entered upon the second invasion of Elis (the first (*Hell.* 3.2.24) being aborted due to an earthquake) by way of Aulon the Lepreates immediately revolted from the Eleans; next the Macistians, and then the Epitalians followed suit; finally the Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians did the same when Agis was leading his forces across the river (Alpheus).

Our second passage (*Hell.* 3.2.29-31) reports the end of this first year of campaigning, Agis re-crossing the Alpheus and leaving a garrison in Epitalium, south of the river, under the command of one Lysippus and supported by Elean exiles (who had failed in their attempted *coup*).⁴⁷ Their ravaging, it would appear, then led to the Elean democratic leader Thrasydaeus sending to Sparta to offer the destruction of the fortifications of Phea and Cyllene (not one of the original demands); independence to the Triphylian cities of Phrixa, Epitalium, Letrinoi, Amphidolia, and Margana; also the

⁴⁴ Nor should we discount the possibility that he had his own diary of events of the period to hand, though this has usually been discussed in relation to the writing of the *Anabasis* (against: Cawkwell (1972), 21-23, 161 n. 8, 270, n. 3; for: Barnett (1963), 1). I would not consider it an impossibility that he did have such, and his allusiveness on the topics we are now about to discuss, Xenophon being Xenophon, does not necessarily cancel this out. However, if accepted, this would convert his characteristic show of laxity into one of uncharacteristic exactness.

⁴⁵ Diodorus cannot be trusted to the same degree. At 15.77.1 he speaks of Lasion being Triphylian. Even if this were a part of Xenophon's evidence, we would have to question its validity. It is quite plain that during the first half of the fourth-century down to the mid-second century B.C. Lasion was never a part of Triphylia (*Xen. Hell.* 4.2.16; cf. 7.4.12-13; Polyb. 4.77.8).

⁴⁶ For an excellent appraisal of this evidence see Tuplin (1993), 183-85.

⁴⁷ Cf. Lintott (1982), 222; Gehrke (1985), 53-54. Xenias fomented the *coup* (cf. Paus. 5.4.8; 7.10.2) and as a Spartan *proxenos* and friend of Agis (Paus. 3.8.4) he was probably encouraged by Sparta; cf. Roy (1997b), 2.

Acrorians and Lasion (the latter claimed by the Arcadians)⁴⁸. The only stumbling block was Epeum (between Heraea and Macistus), which the Eleans said they had bought from those who had held it, but the Spartans considered the sale forced, and made the Eleans grant it freedom. The Eleans being allowed to retain control of the Olympic Games (not originally a sticking point),⁴⁹ terms were thus agreed and the war terminated.

Thirdly, at the battle of the Nemea in 394 (*Hell.* 4.2.16) we discover a very straightforward description of the allies who fought alongside the Spartans. Present were hoplite contingents provided by the Eleans, Triphylians, Acrorians, and Lasionians; in addition there were over 400 slingers of the Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians.

The fourth of our passages (*Hell.* 6.5.2) reports on the conference of 371 at Athens. Here the Eleans refused to swear the oath because it would have meant them recognising the independence of the Marganians, Scilluntians, and Triphylians.

Finally, at *Hellenica* 7.1.26 Xenophon tells us of the Elean request that the Arcadians return the cities freed by Sparta (in c. 400), and how the Arcadians paid no heed to their pleas but on the contrary treated with great respect the Triphylians and others who had revolted from the Eleans because they considered themselves to be Arcadian.

It will be noted that these passages for the most part have little in common with each other in the way of consistency and only serve to confuse rather than clarify. This is emphasized if we are looking to find continuity and a truly united and workable Triphylian state. It becomes less so if we take the evidence at face value and for what it is: the story of an artificial unification which may not have had the sanction of all its members and thus struggled to survive from its inception. What, then, do we conclude about Triphylia from these various passages?

Let us begin with *Hellenica* 3.2.25. It would appear that Lepreum was not only eager but perhaps ready to go over to Sparta's cause.⁵⁰ We may also perhaps believe that at this stage she and Macistus were not a part of Triphylia, because if we also

⁴⁸ On Lasion see Nielsen (1996b), 75-77.

⁴⁹ That they did so is borne out by Diod. 15.23.1, 36.1, 50.1, 71.1.

⁵⁰ As perhaps were the other five communities mentioned here by Xenophon. The Epitalians were probably quite open to the idea of entertaining a Spartan garrison at this point, and the Epeians

consider *Hell.* 3.2.30, but without Grote's insertion of *καί* into the text,⁵¹ it then seems that the Phrixans, Epitalians, Letrinians, Amphidolians, and Marganians were in fact Triphylian.⁵² But this cannot be so, not if we insist on the River Alpheus as the dividing line between northern non-Triphylia and southern "Triphylia proper". This recognition would leave Letrinoi, Amphidolia, and Margana in a very anomalous situation.⁵³ Acrorea, like Lasion, was not, of course, Triphylian. Neither, at this juncture, was Epeum.⁵⁴ Her status was debated (*Hell.* 3.2.30-31), but there is no hint that she was considered to be Triphylian. Let us here ask ourselves a very important question: where is the ancient evidence for Triphylia being exclusively and at all times south of the Alpheus?⁵⁵ Macistus, which is south of the Alpheus, is the only firmly attested Triphylian *polis*.⁵⁶ But Polybius (4.77.8-10), names Samicum, Lepreum, Hypana, Typanea, Pyrgus, Epeum, Bolax, Stylangium, and Phrixa as the cities that comprised Triphylia – there is no mention of Macistus.⁵⁷ Naturally, he is speaking of

gratified that Sparta was willing to insist on her freedom. The details of the campaigns are muddled. For discussion and references see Tuplin (1993), 201-05.

⁵¹ Grote (1888, 2), 394-95. Although in some respects it does make sense to go along with Grote (cf. Tuplin (1993), 184; Nielsen (1997), 138-39, 144, 150), I have serious difficulties coming to terms with this addition. That a part of the text is missing is very possible, but to simply insert a word that fits with what we suspect might have been the situation, I find unacceptable. The very fact that there exists much conflict between our five passages – with or without an additional 'and' – might actually be telling us that for once Xenophon is being meticulous with his reporting, rather than the reverse. Roy (1997a), 302, has pointed out that freeing Phrixa and Epitalium from Triphylia does not help – both were undoubtedly Triphylian. Although Roy is undoubtedly correct, the evidence he cites (Hdt. 4.148; Polyb. 4.77.9; 4.80.13) should be treated with the utmost care. It is not from the period in question and thus makes no allowance for changing circumstances within the state of Triphylia itself. In this instance I agree with Roy because of our findings, not because of the evidence of either Herodotus or Polybius. In both cases I believe what they have to say is anachronistic, the one not even being aware of the existence of Triphylia, the other speaking of the geographical concept as he knew it in his own day.

⁵² Note that here we cannot make any claims on Xenophon having forgotten the "Triphylian" city of Macistus. It is referred to in this passage, along with Heraea, but not in the context of it actually being Triphylian.

⁵³ Stephanus of Byzantium (89.19) states that Amphidolia was Triphylian, but his evidence is usually doubted. Basically a grammarian, he was probably contemporaneous with Justinian and was therefore writing nearly a millenium after the foundation of Triphylia. He does refer to sources he used, including Hecataeus, Herodian, Polybius, and Strabo, but he is the lone voice on Amphidolia's Triphylian status (he does not seem to have followed either Polybius or Strabo where Amphidolia is concerned).

⁵⁴ Hdt. 4.149 and Polyb. 4.77 may lead us to think otherwise, but see below.

⁵⁵ The comment of Nielsen (1997), 138, that 'Triphylia is *usually* [my italics] thought of as the area south of the Alpheios' typifies our lack of definite knowledge on this topic.

⁵⁶ *SEG* 35. 389 (but only roughly datable to the period 400-369, cf. Nielsen (1997), 150-51 and esp. 148). See also Hdt. 4. 148 (but written before Triphylia officially existed and concentrating on the cities' Minyan origins).

⁵⁷ At 4.80.13, where Polybius provides a similar list, it is also absent. But so are Hypana and Typanea, whilst Epitalium has been added. The list provided by Roy (2000b), 138-40, and featuring Heraea,

his own day, when Triphylia had been incorporated into Arcadia as its most southwesterly region. But Pyrgus has been connected to Letrinoi,⁵⁸ and is north of the Alpheus, although we are uncertain of its whereabouts. Despite scholarly reliance on Herodotus, Pausanias, Polybius, and Strabo for clarification of which cities were or were not Triphylian, let us not forget that none of this quartet were writing at the time in question; it is difficult to decipher whether they are merely describing a basic geographical concept; their reports can conflict with each other; and, as we have seen, even their own evidence is not always consistent.⁵⁹ Our conclusion has to be that the Triphylian state developed along evolutionary lines rather than revolutionary ones. It was something of a piecemeal process, not all of those communities later viewed as Triphylian being originally involved in the formation, and some who were originally involved later being considered non-Triphylian.⁶⁰ The only type of revolution occurring was the mass rebellion against Elean rule when the Spartans arrived on the scene in c. 402, but this did not necessarily see the inauguration of a unified Triphylian state with membership for every local community. These conclusions fly in the face of what is often accepted by modern scholarship, and as such we need to examine other related factors.

Nielsen has put forward the proposition that the concept of Triphylia existed during the late fifth-century, and, following Grote's emendation, that the likes of Epitalium, Phrixa, and Scillus were possibly not a part of it in c. 400 but became so later.⁶¹ This is similar to our belief, except that we have not rejected the manuscript of the *Hellenica* as it stands, and thus see, opposingly, these cities as in fact being Triphylian. We might also question the idea of a Triphylian state being in existence before c. 400. Xenophon may have been particular about the details of what occurred at the end of the Elean War, but we cannot exclude the possibility that he wrote of the Triphylian cities and others of the area anachronistically, as they would be organised in

Phrixa, Epeum, Lasion, Aliphera, Psophis, and Triphylia, proves that shifting alliances were endemic within the region as a whole. Pherecydes (*FGH* 3 fr. 161) said Phrixa was Arcadian. Eusebius dates him to 456 B.C. (Olympiad 81.1). If Eusebius, writing some 600 years later, is correct Phrixa may have originally been Arcadian (could Heraean pressure have alienated her?). On Eusebius, cf. Wallace-Hadrill (1960); Thomas (1989), 163 ff., 181.

⁵⁸ Tuplin (1993), 184. Margana, we can safely say, was also north of the Alpheus: cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.14; Strabo 8.3.24.

⁵⁹ What, for instance, does Strabo (8.3.24) mean when he talks of 'Epitalium, a small place in Macistia'?

⁶⁰ Nielsen (1997), 150, reaches a similar conclusion, though we differ markedly in other respects.

the 390s. All we know is that Triphylia became a state – when it embraced statehood, no extant work of the period tells us. But the terms agreed with Elis in c. 400 gave the Spartans the chance to act, and our evidence fails to provide a setting more fitting than this one for them, or any other body, to erect a Triphylian state.⁶² It should be remembered that when Triphylia was perhaps being organised Xenophon was overseas with the 10,000 and, later, Agesilaus (c. 401-394/3). Therefore, at this crucial stage of events he was absent, and only able to learn of them second-hand and, for the most part, at a later date. This taken into consideration, he has acquitted himself quite ably. No doubt some of his information would have come from those Scilluntians he knew well,⁶³ but, sadly for us, he was not really interested in the formation of the Triphylian state, or any other state for that matter. Whereas the Elean climb down was a personal joy not to be forgotten,⁶⁴ the forming of a somewhat minor unit did not fit neatly into his ‘memoirs’.⁶⁵ This is especially so if the founding of Triphylia was a case of Spartan intervention where it was not wanted. The belief in Triphylia as a Spartan foundation has been espoused by Siewert.⁶⁶ Although dismissed by Nielsen,⁶⁷ we should not be so hasty. It is true that the cities themselves could have united of their own volition. But there are drawbacks to this scenario. Any *polis* or amalgamation of *poleis* around the Greek mainland and Aegean Sea had to ensure, unless particularly brave or reckless, that any action undertaken had the approval of Sparta. The Corinthians and Boeotians, estranged as they were from Sparta, still trod warily down to 395 – recalcitrance, yes, but open war with her never - when a wealth of support in Greece and money from Persia enabled them to form a coalition against her (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1-5; *Hell. Oxy.* 7.2-3; Diod. 14.82.1-4). Sparta therefore distinctly had the upper hand, and her views on

⁶¹ Nielsen (1997), 138-39.

⁶² Cf. Siewert (1987/88), 8.

⁶³ I would suggest that the Spartans, and especially Agesilaus, wasted no time in settling him on his beloved estate at Scillus (cf. Xen. *Anab.* 5.3), and that by 393, at the latest, he was living there. Cartledge (1987), 252, is doubtless correct to speculate that Xenophon’s estate was ‘a clearing-house of information’, with Agesilaus being the main beneficiary. The Spartans were grateful for his services, but Xenophon at this time was also at his most loyal to them, and would have had his uses to the city that had given an exile a home. As Cartledge says: ‘the Eleian democracy liked this cuckoo in their nest as little as Xenophon liked that regime’, which may explain why he is sometimes economical in his reporting of events in Elis.

⁶⁴ When he wrote the *Hellenica* is unknown, but it was certainly after 371 and the Elean removal of him from Scillus (if we accept Diogenes Laertius (2.53) before Pausanias (5.6.6), which on this occasion, due to the possible bias of Pausanias’ informants, I most certainly do).

⁶⁵ Cf. Cawkwell (1979), 198.

⁶⁶ Siewert (1987/88), 8-12.

⁶⁷ Nielsen (1997), 151-53.

such amalgamations and synoecisms of any description were well known. It would take a very valiant enterprise indeed to even dare present its thoughts on the matter to Sparta, just the merest suspicion of independent leanings being enough to create a serious threat of action. The idea of a self-organised Triphylia should thus be rejected.⁶⁸ If matters were, on the other hand, to their advantage, the situation was viewed quite differently by the Spartans.

From a Spartan vantage point, the Eleans never seemed to learn. The events of 421-18 had taught them nothing. That conflict had been brought about in large part by Elean refusal to accept that Sparta would not tolerate what we might term a league within a league: Elis would not be allowed to rule over others, and most certainly cities which were part of the Peloponnesian League. Despite this, in c. 400 the Spartans could see a case for fighting fire with fire. The communities around the Alpheus and Neda rivers were at this moment no serious threat to Sparta, and what is more, they obviously had a dislike for the Eleans. Here was an opportunity to stifle Elean ambitions in the area and simultaneously win more friends into the bargain: the cities of the region would be unified into a single entity.

What the Spartans envisioned was nothing more than a buffer-zone to keep Elis within her more natural boundaries far north of the Alpheus.⁶⁹ The further north this zone went, the better for all those opposed to Elean encroachment. The more northeasterly areas, such as Acrorea and Lasion, were perhaps a little too distant both geographically and ethnically to become a part of the new foundation.⁷⁰ The Pisatans, no matter their long-time rivalry with Elis over the management of Olympia, had never

⁶⁸ Nielsen (1997), 152, suggests that 'the creation of an ethnic identity presupposes the active involvement of the people whose identity is being created.' I would argue that the creation of Yugoslavia did no such thing, and that with regard to its formation, history, and demise it has a tale to tell that is possibly not unlike that of Triphylia.

⁶⁹ Considering *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.30, did Sparta originally envisage Heraea as part of the buffer-zone but, possibly, she was too "Arcadian"? Heraea may well have held Epeum before c. 400, and she was perhaps also a part (or even all?) of the Arcadians who claimed Lasion: cf. *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.30-31. Both Dušanic (1970a), 299, and Nielsen (1996b), 75, believe Lasion must have been ethnically Arcadian. She became a state in c.400: cf. *Xen. Hell.* 4.2.16; *SEG* 29. 405 A (with *SEG* 32. 411); Roy (1997a), 289, 315, n. 56).

⁷⁰ *Xen. Hell.* 3.2.30 informs us that by c. 400, at least, the Arcadians were laying claim to Lasion. For the Spartans this was no disaster. Whilst the Arcadians were still keen to have Lasion, but were extremely unlikely to do anything positive to get it, the Eleans would be less inclined to try and retake her. There even exists the possibility that Sparta used the Arcadian claim on Lasion (others may well have existed) to her own advantage, its threat being cultivated so as to bring home to the communities around the Alpheus the realisation that unification was a preliminary step to survival. We have to be careful here. Bearing in mind that later many cities in the region actually took up the case of being Arcadian, it would mean that Sparta's strategy badly backfired.

been turned into Elean *perioeci*, and were unlikely to become such in the near future.⁷¹ Neither were the Spartans concerned with a people whose usefulness to themselves was limited.⁷² More to the point, Sparta did not want to give birth to a cohesive and large force that might prove to be a long-term threat, either directly or, more likely, indirectly, to her own standing within the Peloponnese.⁷³ To view the Alpheus as a natural boundary, as does Nielsen,⁷⁴ is understandable, until one considers the political situation of the time. To create a new state, whether one accepts that Sparta was to the fore of the foundation or not, and leave isolated on the wrong side of the Alpheus the very cities who were the nearest to the heart of the problem would be a major blunder. These were the communities most open to Elean influence and pressure. If they were to feel abandoned and outside of any anti-Elean front, then who was to say that eventually they would not, of necessity, succumb to some sort of understanding with Elis. If that happened, those south of the Alpheus might well be witnessing the beginning of a “domino” effect on the region. Siewert thinks that Sparta was looking to an increase in the number of hoplites the region could supply to Peloponnesian League expeditions,⁷⁵ we should be thinking in more immediate terms. The Spartans simply did not have the manpower or inclination to garrison the area on a large scale. A local, loyal, and organised force would be required for defence. Elis’ internal political situation (see above, and to be discussed below) also demanded that Sparta leave in power an Elean democratic government, which in turn demanded that a permanent presence should be developed to counteract its influence. Sparta may never originally have envisaged the somewhat extended Triphylia that modern scholarship has concocted.

The Spartans may have decided initially to include in the buffer zone only those cities which lay closest to the Alpheus and would bear the brunt of any Elean efforts at seizure. Eventually others joined, either due to a Spartan wish to widen the safety net through further unification or through Spartan approbation of a request from them, or

⁷¹ Roy (1997a), 283, 310 n. 12.

⁷² Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.31, where we are told that the Spartans considered the rival claimants to the Elean guardianship of Olympia to be rustic and unfit to administer the site. This is obviously the Pisatans, and says much about Spartan disdain for them and why they would not include them in any new set-up.

⁷³ Sparta had learnt her lesson with Thebes, whom she, I believe, was responsible in 457 for placing within the position of power that she now held over the Boeotian Confederation: cf. Diod. 11.81.1-4.

⁷⁴ Nielsen (1997), 139.

⁷⁵ Siewert (1987/88), 10.

those cities already comprising Triphylia, to expand what had proved to be a solid defensive system.⁷⁶ Alternatively, we may surmise that Lepreum, so often seen as a key force behind the unification, was originally a leading element in rejecting membership of a new Triphylian state. Geographically, in comparison with other cities of the area she was somewhat removed from the immediate buffer zone, though not from the Elean danger. The former was marginally re-assuring, but the idea of joining an organisation which Nielsen thinks ‘strongly resembled a federation’ was not.⁷⁷ Without doubt Lepreum’s history, such as we have it, demonstrates an independent stance. We know this certainly went back as far as the Battle of Plataea, and can be seen again during the 420s (see above). What she did not want was to be subsumed into a body which might see her lose her own identity and her power to make her own decisions.⁷⁸ A “special relationship” with Sparta might have been her gain from the events of the 420s. If so, this may have helped her case. She would not have been alone in resisting any Spartan pressure to become Triphylian, especially if other local communities felt they stood to lose out to more powerful neighbours in matters such as voting procedures. The attractions of joining a new state which limited a city’s autonomy were minimal: was this not similar to being a part of Elis? Of the five communities named at *Hellenica* 3.2.25 and 3.2.29-31, which we believe became Triphylian following the treaty of c. 400, those to the north of the Alpheus and west of Acrorea, that is Amphidolia, Letrinoi, and Margana, virtually encompass all of the territory to the south of the city of Elis and its enlarged *chora*. The exception is Pisatis, which we have already discussed. The cities to the south of the Alpheus, Epitalium and Phrixa, are so close to the river that they both virtually sit upon it. This, especially for the

⁷⁶ We can imagine that in terms of defence, Triphylia appeared to be a success almost immediately. This goes some way to elucidating why others would want to become a part of it. If an Elean invasion did occur, a united Triphylian force would have stood up to it far better than would an assortment of uncoordinated neighbours. There may also be factors we do not know about. Those communities which initially comprised Triphylia might have gained in prestige and, in a small way, power. For example, were they taken more seriously in Peloponnesian League meetings (they surely were members, cf. Nielsen (1997), 151-52)? Even if we cannot see economic gains being made, the presence of a state that was now becoming an accepted and respected part of the Greek world would provide a salutary message to those contiguous to her.

⁷⁷ Nielsen (1997), 149.

⁷⁸ *SEG* 35. 389, which concerns a grant of citizenship by Macistus, sees Nielsen (1997), 149, comment that ‘we must conclude that the *poleis* of Triphylia were not *autonomoi* in every respect since the right to control admission to one’s own body of citizens was one aspect of *autonomia*.’ This drawback would also serve to alienate those cities situated further north than Lepreum.

Spartans, was the crucial area that had to become a buffer zone.⁷⁹ They may, for all we know, have perhaps preferred that zone to be wider, but if so, did not want to risk losing the goodwill of cities such as Lepreum, Macistus, and Epeum (and Scillus?), all situated south of the Alpheus but not on it, who wished to remain aloof from becoming Triphylian at this point;⁸⁰ and they could certainly not coerce them, thus appearing to be nothing more than Eleans in disguise.

If we next consider the evidence for the battle at the Nemea in 394 B.C. (*Hell.* 4.2.16), the picture is drawn much more clearly. Triphylia is named as sending a contingent of hoplites, as are Elis, Acrorea, and Lasion. Margana, Letrinoi, and Amphidolia provide slingers. Xenophon may quite plainly be rounding up matters in the most simplistic form, some communities being absent altogether from his list. Nevertheless, if his evidence is accepted at face value, we clearly must not view Triphylia as a concrete, unchanging entity. Although we may well believe that during the 390s, soon after its birth, and for an unknown amount of time, Triphylia was at its greatest geographical and political extent. Siewert has argued that the division between those areas that provided hoplites and those which provided slingers mirrors a split between those states which were unified and those which were not.⁸¹ The truth is far more straightforward. Here Xenophon's division is purely military and nothing more. First he lists those communities providing hoplites, and then those providing slingers. His Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians could easily be part of the Triphylian state, and are separated from the rest simply because they did not supply hoplites.⁸² It does not prove that they were not still Triphylians, or that they supplied slingers only. Many would view this passage as being the definitive picture of the region's political

⁷⁹ The idea of a buffer zone is not specific to the modern psyche. In discussing the policy of Julius Caesar Shotter (1991), 49, has noted that he 'had sought the protection of Rome and Italy by the establishment of a 'buffer' of provinces and pro-Roman territory'.

⁸⁰ The claim that some of the cities of the region were originally Arcadian foundations may have been a factor in curbing their enthusiasm for becoming Triphylians. Macistus is a case in point. What would seem to be its eponymous hero, Makisteus, appears as one of the sons of Lycaon in the Arcadian myth of origin list (Pseudo-Apollodorus 3.8, on which see Roy (1968)), as does one Caucon, which also imputes an Arcadian identity on the Cauconians, who were one of the ethnic peoples linked to the area by Herodotus (4.148). Cf. Nielsen (1997), 134-35.

⁸¹ Siewert (1987/88), 9-11.

⁸² We could, taking up the reins of Siewert's belief, argue that the failure of these three communities to supply hoplites led to their withdrawal, or dismissal, from the Triphylian state. But in reality we cannot seriously believe that the three, individually or collectively, lacked a force of hoplites (cf. Nielsen (1997), 152). If they had not, we can imagine that the Eleans would have overrun them many years before the end of the fifth-century. However, looking towards our next passage for discussion, (*Hell.* 6.5.2) it would explain why they fell so quickly in 371.

lay-out. It is the one which unites all cities south of the Alpheus under Triphylia, and thus satisfies our need for a neat, explicable, and understandable conclusion.⁸³ Unfortunately, on the evidence which we have, Triphylia defies rational explanation. If the picture is correct, as it may well be so for this particular period, it did not last. The 390s immediately followed Sparta's successful invasion and peace settlement, and if a united Triphylia as modern historians often envision it ever did exist, then this was the most likely time for it to be at the height of its powers. For us, the key element that arises from this passage is the possibility that Triphylia experienced no boundary changes from *Hell.* 3.2.25-31: if the Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians were Triphylians in c. 400, they were also Triphylians in 394.

At the conference at Athens in 371 (*Hell.* 6.5.2) Margana (north of the Alpheus) and Scillus (south of the Alpheus) are not part of Triphylia, all three being named separately of each other. Of all our passages, this is the most baffling. Where is, as noted by Tuplin,⁸⁴ the logic in Xenophon's description? Scillus was south, not north, of the Alpheus (and also Triphylian if one chooses to believe Pausanias (5.6.4; 6.22.4: by 371 it surely was⁸⁵). Bölte believed, and was to later find an adherent in the shape of Siewert,⁸⁶ that this passage pointed to the collapse of Triphylia immediately following Leuctra, the Eleans re-conquering part of it; and also that when the conference at Athens was underway Scillus alone had been re-taken by the Eleans, hence it being specifically referred to here.⁸⁷ Although Bölte is on the right lines here, his belief concerning Scillus' position will simply not suffice. On these foundations we

⁸³ There is, I feel, a problem here. The way Xenophon has communicated his information possibly points to the Eleans being part of a unit that includes also the Triphylians, Acrorians, and Lasionians (if not also the Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians). This, considering the recent history of those communities, would seem to be precipitating trouble, even if it made sense regarding the deployment of the army. If we also consider the c. 377/6 division of the Peloponnesian League forces into units as reported by Diodorus (15.31.2), then it would appear that the Spartans still kept roughly to geographical divisions. The tenth-part division that Diodorus records names only the Elean forces in the fourth unit, and nowhere is reference made to the others within the region as reported by Xenophon at *Hell.* 4.2.16. Despite the temptation to assume otherwise, our lack of information cannot allow us to think that Triphylia had broken down at this stage. We must therefore presume that the Spartans did indeed override considerations of historical rivalry, and that the communities named at *Hell.* 4.2.16 are included under the term 'Eleans' here, for to consider that they were allowed to stand aloof from membership of the Peloponnesian League (or that they wanted to) would be a big mistake on our part.

⁸⁴ Tuplin (1993), 184.

⁸⁵ Cf. *IvO* 16: c. 450-25 attempt at defection from Elis by Scillus.

⁸⁶ Bölte *RE* VII A. 199; Siewert (1987/88), 12.

could suppose that the Eleans had wasted no time in overrunning Margana, Scillus, and Triphylia. That the Eleans took their chance and were the only state to openly act immediately after Leuctra, and risk war with a tottering Sparta, should not be doubted - though Bölte has virtually reversed the roles of free and captive areas. There exists a passage in the *Hellenica* which, although circumstantial, we should believe supports our theory that Elis mounted an immediate attack following news of the Spartan defeat at Leuctra. At 6.4.18 Xenophon informs us of those allies which sent aid to Sparta for the projected revenge attack against the Thebans. The Tegeans, Mantineans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, Achaeans and 'other states' sent their forces. One might argue that the states of the Acte are among the latter, or perhaps those Arcadian states not referred to by name here, or perhaps both. Certainly we should not be surprised to see such states omitted, especially where Xenophon is the reporter.⁸⁸ Neither should we explicitly expect the Triphylians and other cities from the northeast Peloponnese to be mentioned. But what is blatantly conspicuous by its absence is any mention of the Eleans being present - in a Xenophontic list of this nature, with all of Sparta's main Peloponnesian allies accounted for, such is unthinkable. Coupled with the absence of the other cities of the region, we have to conclude that simultaneously with this call-up the Eleans were already on their way south to attack those very communities, and that some had perhaps already fallen. Acting alone and not the strongest militarily, the Eleans were in no position to blitzkrieg their way through all of the territories they claimed were theirs by right. What is far more likely was the fall of the communities on the northern bank of the Alpheus to Elean arms. Roy has doubted that Margana could hold out alone on this side of the river,⁸⁹ but we do not know the circumstances involved. A lack of siege engines at this period is certain, and meant that a quick victory was a remote hope;⁹⁰ and for all we know the conference was early

⁸⁷ I did accept Bölte's solution with some enthusiasm initially, but Tuplin (1993), 184, (also followed by Nielsen (1997), 152) has convinced me that the resulting 'mixture of possession and claims' the passage then becomes makes little sense.

⁸⁸ Cf. *Hell.* 6.4.8-15, on the Battle of Leuctra, or *Hell.* 7.5.18-27 on the Battle of (2nd) Mantinea: both leave much to be desired when it comes to accounting for allied contingents involved on either side.

⁸⁹ Roy (1997b), 311, n. 20.

⁹⁰ Siege-towers had already been used by both the Carthaginians (Diod. 13.54.7) and Dionysius I (Diod. 14.49 ff.), and were known in mainland Greece by c. 375, as were catapults (Aen. Tact. 32.8). We should doubt that the Eleans were employing either at this date, and even the somewhat elaborate measures utilized by the Spartans at Plataea in 429-27 (Thuc. 2.75 ff.) would appear highly unusual for the period, and also, with reference to our discussions, very time-consuming.

enough to preclude the successful termination of operations against Margana.⁹¹ There is no easy way round the problem, and the solution can only be that which Tuplin himself suggests, and which is worth quoting in full.

The best option is to note that Scillus did become practically separated from Triphylia in the 360s (since it was finally reacquired by Elis, whereas the remainder of Triphylia was not) and to suppose that this distinction influenced Xenophon's formulation in 6.5.2 even though strictly speaking it still lay in the future. (His personal interest in the place may have encouraged the phenomenon.)

Xenophon has to be speaking anachronistically at this juncture. It would be fruitless to argue that he would not do so, as it is the kind of slip he could easily make, and one we believe he had already committed when reporting on the Elean War of c. 402-c. 400. The communities of the area which he does not list are by implication those which the Eleans had re-subjugated.⁹²

Did the Triphylian state collapse because of the result of Leuctra? Again, there is no easy solution. It is possible that by 244, and definitely by 219, Triphylia had been subjugated by Elis prior to its final incorporation into the Elean state in 146, but *Hell.* 6.5.2 is the last reference to Triphylia as a state in its own right.⁹³ We know that Scillus, at least, fell to the Eleans sometime shortly after Leuctra (cf. Diog. Laert. 2.53; Paus. 5.6.6), and probably, to follow Bölte, more communities besides.⁹⁴ In this event the evidence of Xenophon at *Hellenica* 3.2.25-31, 4.2.16, 6.5.2, and 7.1.26 becomes much more fathomable, as does that of Polybius in his fourth book. Xenophon writes of events from the past armed with the knowledge of what occurred later, and habitually speaks of Triphylia and its neighbours as they were later or around the time of his writing about them, neither explaining or taking stock of the changes that had happened along the way. Polybius also writes of the situation as he knew it in his own day, perhaps looking at matters from a geographical perspective, and in this case of a Triphylia that was now wholly south of the Alpheus. Amphidolia, Letrinoi, and Margana

⁹¹ Cf. Tuplin (1993), 184.

⁹² On the problems presented by *Hell.* 6.5.2, besides Tuplin see also Nielsen (1997), 138-39, 148, 150-51, 152; Roy (1997a), 284-85, and esp. 285 and n. 20.

⁹³ Nielsen (1997), 152; Roy (2000b), 145.

were thus not a part of Triphylia when Xenophon wrote of them, whereas originally they were. Nielsen, taking into account the influence of the newly-founded Arcadian League, has put forward three basic alternatives as to what happened to Lepreum and Triphylia.⁹⁵ The first is that Lepreum became the main city and representative of Triphylia within the League;⁹⁶ the second that it left the Triphylian state; the third that Triphylia simply ceased to exist as a state. We shall discuss them in ascending order of credibility.

The idea of Lepreum representing the rest of Triphylia in the League relies far too much on the example of the Boeotian Confederation, a trait that has perhaps blighted the study in general of leagues and federations from this period of ancient Greek history.⁹⁷ We cannot assume that the Boeotian Confederation was a paradigm par excellence for all such other similar foundations.⁹⁸ Thebes occupied a unique position within its unique confines, and in truth she was hardly confined by its constitution at all.⁹⁹ We cannot grant to Lepreum the same prestige, power, and influence within Triphylia that Thebes had within the Boeotian Confederation; nor can we allow her the freedom to act independently of the Triphylian state, yet still be either a leading member of it or the actual leader herself: Lepreum was not Thebes, and Triphylia was not Boeotia. Thebes had worked for many years to accomplish her situation, especially against the equally ambitious Orchomenus, and also the recalcitrant Thespia.¹⁰⁰ To put matters in perspective, Lepreum was not even a large fish in a small pond, but, as far as Greek inter-state politics were concerned, a small fish in a small pond. She may, as Nielsen intimates, have been the leading city of the

⁹⁴ At least Margana and Acrorea: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.14; Diod. 15.77.4; cf. Bölte, *RE* VII A. 199-200; Ryder (1965), 73.

⁹⁵ For what follows see Nielsen (1997), 153-55.

⁹⁶ As championed by Bölte (*RE* 13 A. 200).

⁹⁷ This tendency has perhaps affected the work of both Larsen (1968) and Salmon (1978).

⁹⁸ For example, see Dušanic (1970a), 285-86, and Roy (1994²), 190, for denials of Boeotian influence on the constitution of the Arcadian League. More specifically, Seager (1994²), 177-78, makes the often overlooked point that we do not actually know how the Boeotian Confederation was organised in the 370s.

⁹⁹ Cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 11.2-4; Buck (1979 and 1994); Buckler (1980a).

¹⁰⁰ One might, despite the protection provided to her by her long and close association with Athens, also add Plataea (on Thespia's demise: cf. Tuplin (1986), 321-41). As I have already stated above, initially Thebes herself had assumed the leadership of the Boeotian Confederation under Spartan aegis.

region, but we do not even know this with any certainty.¹⁰¹ To suppose that a newly inaugurated state's members would automatically hand leadership over to a city no more powerful than themselves, and which was perhaps even considered to be a rival, is to make a grave error. If there were cities within the Triphylian state that were willing to do such, neither can we presume that they were those close to the River Alpheus: a state which came into being, on any reckoning, as basically a defensive alliance in answer to the Elean menace would not have many members that approved of a leader which resided at the furthest point from the frontline. Nielsen draws comparisons between Xenophon's confusion of Thebes and Boeotia in his reporting to demonstrate that the Arcadian League could similarly treat Lepreum as the equivalent of Triphylia.¹⁰² This brings into play the infamous "Phylarchus Decree", an inscription that has to date caused much controversy,¹⁰³ and which we shall discuss in our deliberations on Arcadia. We cannot, nevertheless, ignore it here.

There is no way of dating this inscription, our sole physical survivor of an Arcadian League decree, with any certainty. Roy, going against his original belief, now says that he is 'much less confident' about the dating of it than he was once was.¹⁰⁴ Let us, for the sake of clarity, accept that it belongs in the 360s.¹⁰⁵ As we know, most opinion stresses that this is unequivocal proof that Lepreum did indeed represent Triphylia in meetings of the Arcadian League. This conclusion is very convenient, and removes the sticky problem of the need to explain just why there is no reference to other Triphylian delegates being present at this (or any other) Arcadian League meeting. Are we to accept that an Arcadian League which was, at least originally, viewed as a democracy would sanction or demand such an arrangement?¹⁰⁶ Can we believe that the rest of the Triphylian communities would agree to it? Do we really think that those Triphylians who claimed to be Arcadian and those Arcadians who had

¹⁰¹ I personally believe that it is possible that she was, but if so it was in large part due only to her special relationship with Sparta, which gave her a certain amount of prestige within the region, and her inherent independent stance.

¹⁰² Nielsen (1997), 153: Tod 101 (= *IG* II² 14 = Harding 14) = Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.7-16. I here point to *IG* VII 2462 (= Tod 130 = Harding 46), which commemorates a Theban victory at Leuctra: Xenophon at *Hell.* 6.4.9, reporting on this victory, refers to 'the Boeotian army'.

¹⁰³ *IG* V 2² 1 (= Tod 132 = Harding 51).

¹⁰⁴ Roy (2000a), 312, n. 17; cf. Roy (1971a), 571. Despite this, in another recent discussion of Lepreum and Triphylia Roy would appear to place the decree in the 360s, or at least does not implicate otherwise (cf. Roy (2000b), 145 and n. 60).

¹⁰⁵ I place much emphasis on *IG* V 2² 1 being one of the earliest decrees the Arcadian League issued.

laid claim to Triphylia as an ethnic Arcadian entity, would reach an agreement which stipulated that the overwhelming majority of Triphylians would not be represented in assemblies which could shape their whole future? These questions are of course rhetorical. There can be no possibility of any of them being answered in anything but the negative.¹⁰⁷ Neither does the likelihood that Triphylia was not a completely autonomous state necessarily mean that it was subordinated to Lepreum.¹⁰⁸ Nielsen also refers to the fact that the Arcadian representative at Susa in 367 was a Lepreate.¹⁰⁹ All this proves is that the Lepreates were a part of the Arcadian League, and that Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.26) was correct to say that the Triphylians and ‘others’ who had joined the League were treated with great respect by the Arcadians. As possibly the very first city to join, Lepreum may have been accorded this honour in repayment for her efforts, especially if the Triphylian cities, whatever their relationship with the Lepreates, had followed her example and soon thereafter joined the League themselves. There is also the more obvious reason that as an Olympian, Isthmian, and Nemean champion, the Arcadians hoped that Antiochus’ fame may have helped produce the decision that they wanted from the Great King (it did not). Nielsen then offers the evidence of Pseudo-Scylax (*periplous* 44).¹¹⁰ Whilst this was a fourth-century work, we do not know exactly what part of that century it is from. The implication that the Lepreates ruled much of the coastline, as Nielsen himself admits, ‘should only be treated as a further support for the centrality of Lepreum which seems to appear from the fact that the Confederacy drew its Triphylian officials from the city’. We do not believe that this was the situation anyway, and what the *periplous* has to offer is not in the least compelling. The Lepreates did perhaps have a large influence on those living around the coast, but of the main centres only Samicum and Epitalium could be said to be anywhere near it, and it has to be appreciated that Pseudo-Scylax’s

¹⁰⁶ Roy (2000a), 313, n. 19, makes the pertinent observation that if Lepreum represented Triphylia in the Arcadian League her allocation of just two *damiorgoi* is surprising.

¹⁰⁷ Nielsen (1997), 152-53, employs the Mainalians as an example of a tribal state organised along similar lines to Triphylia and who are referred to in *IG V 2² 1*, and thus were members of the League on such a basis. This is beyond dispute, but considering he goes into some detail about the Mainalians’ and Parrhasians’ membership (158-60), it is striking that he does not refer to the total absence of Parrhasian representatives when discussing *IG V 2² 1*. Similarly, in his earlier discussion of the Mainalians and *IG V 2² 1*, Nielsen (1996b), 96-97, refers to the tribe being represented as a unit, rather than by Pallantium, which surely begs comparison with the situation of Triphylia *vis-à-vis* Lepreum and must question the idea that the latter represented the former in League meetings.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Nielsen (1997), 154.

¹⁰⁹ *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.33, 38; Paus. 6.3.9; Nielsen (1997), 153. Cf. Seager (1974), 59.

work is little more than a product of its time, a manual for sailors which may not be entirely reliable as historical evidence for the political arrangements existing in the western Peloponnese.¹¹¹

Nielsen's second alternative, and one that seems feasible on first perusal, is simply that Lepreum was never a part of the Triphylian state in the fourth century.¹¹² She was thus part of Polybius' geographical concept of the area later, but was always a *polis* in her own right and acted as such.¹¹³ Whilst the latter statement makes sound sense, Nielsen's idea is destroyed if we re-consider *Hellenica* 4.2.16 for a moment. When Xenophon returned to Greece with Agesilaus in 394 the first news he would have heard, and in detail, was about the battle at Nemea. He was now well connected enough to Agesilaus to hear first-hand personal accounts from those Spartans and their allies who had fought in it. We will re-call that the Eleans, Triphylians, Acrorians, Lasionians, Marganians, Letrinians, and Amphidolians were among those fighting for Sparta. If Lepreum was independent, she would have been expected to turn up for this encounter, and especially as she was probably on good terms with Sparta. Xenophon, in spite of having excellent information at his disposal, makes no mention of her. Although we can be critical of him, he would not have left the Lepreates out of his list of western Peloponnesian allies here, not when he has obviously gone to some lengths to acquire a correct knowledge of the contingents involved. If they were separate from Triphylia he would have included them. Perhaps they had reason to remain at home? Tacked on to the end of the same passage is the information that the Phliasians failed to appear because they were in a sacred period of truce. If Xenophon remembered this, he would also have remembered and informed us of the reasons for Lepreum's non-appearance. Lepreum was certainly a part of the Triphylian state.

¹¹⁰ Nielsen (1997), 153.

¹¹¹ I dismiss Nielsen's footnote (1997), 153, n. 155, concerning a possible cult of Zeus Lycaeus at Lepreum. Even if it could be proved that one existed and that it was from the same period as those at Megalopolis and Tegea, we cannot say, as Nielsen does, that it points to Lepreum being the main centre of Triphylia. Jost herself (1985), 269, is uncertain about emending the text of Pausanias (5.5.5) to read 'Lycaeus' instead of 'Leucaeus'. Regarding Samicum and its cult of Poseidon Samius, Nielsen (1997), 147, makes the point that cultural identity is usually marked by a cult shrine, and Strabo (8.3.13) informs us that all Triphylians shared an affinity for this particular cult. We should have no doubt that it was of singular importance to the region. Considering that the distance between, on the one hand Lepreum, and on the other Macistus, from Samicum is almost identical, it might be argued that if Lepreum was the leading city of Triphylia, then the sanctuary, in the care of Macistus (Roy (1997a), 289), might have been transferred to the safekeeping of the Lepreates. There is no evidence that this ever occurred or that Lepreum housed any cult that promoted Triphylian unity.

¹¹² Initially, this was my feeling as well, but we shall see that there is a problem with this stance.

Much more believable is Nielsen's third alternative, that the Triphylian state disintegrated following Leuctra due to Lepreum's independent stance. Let us attempt our own reconstruction of the course of events. The crucial passage here is *Hellenica* 6.5.11, which speaks volumes of Lepreum's attitude. In late 370 Agesilaus was taking the news of Mantinea's re-synoecism and Tegea's subsequent democratic revolution very badly, and led what was left of Sparta's allies into an attack on Mantinea. Among those allies, amazingly at this juncture, were the Lepreates.¹¹⁴ Why, after Sparta's power had reached an all-time low, should Lepreum stay with her? It was nothing to do with any special relationship or sense of loyalty, *realpolitik* was what counted now, and the Lepreates had arrived at a valid conclusion. Sparta had been defeated, but we must stress once again that she was not necessarily in an irreversible decline as far as many Peloponnesians were concerned. Who was to say that once her army was back in the field again, attacking the Arcadians, that it would not retain its old tenacity,¹¹⁵ or that many oligarchic Arcadians would not betray their own cities to it? One thing the Lepreates did know was the speed at which those communities north of the Alpheus had fallen to the Eleans the previous year. What was the point of being a member of a state that was primarily erected as a defensive measure but could not defend itself? Triphylia, as perhaps the Lepreates had known from day one, was never going to be a match for Elis or any other of the larger, more established Greek states. It was only a matter of time before the inevitable happened. An alternative contingency needed to be sought. None appeared any brighter than to remain with Sparta. Surely, to join the Arcadians would have seemed a better alternative? There were drawbacks to such a scenario. If we consider the evidence of Thucydides (5.31, 49-50), then, no matter what may have been just around the corner in 370, the Lepreates will have had grave doubts about throwing in their lot with the Arcadian cities, some of whom they had fought against, and who had actually forced them to turn towards, of all people, the Eleans for help. For the Lepreates, whatever was going on in Arcadia was, at this stage, almost as worrying for them as the prospect of what was happening in Elis. Besides, what were the chances of Mantinea and Tegea, of Orchomenus and Cleitor,

¹¹³ Cf. esp. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11, to be discussed below.

¹¹⁴ The reasons for the continued adherence to Sparta of Heraea and Orchomenus are considered during our discussions on Arcadia.

¹¹⁵ In the hour of defeat at Leuctra some Spartans were already keen to take the fight to the Thebans again (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.14).

to name only the obvious Arcadian rivalries, combining peacefully in a spirit of co-operation with each other? No, any whispers of Arcadian unity were unlikely to become anything other than just that. The deciding factor was the knowledge that a victorious Sparta would in all likelihood cancel its protection of Lepreum from Elean encroachment. Whilst we can imagine that the decision to stay with Sparta was not a unanimous one, to most Lepreates it seemed to be the best one. It was probably only when the Lepreates answered Sparta's call and their army met with the rest of Sparta's allies in 370 that the awful truth dawned: only the Heraeans and Orchomenians had turned their backs on their fellow Arcadians.¹¹⁶ It was from this moment that the Lepreates began to have a dramatic change of heart. The operations with Agesilaus were not a stunning success, and the disbanding of the allied army soon saw Lepreum left isolated, as both Heraea and Orchomenus capitulated to Arcadian pressure.

It was at this point, in late 370, that the Lepreates took a momentous decision: they would abandon Sparta and join the Arcadians.¹¹⁷ Now virtually surrounded by potential enemies, the danger was that Lepreum would alienate all of them. She could not placate all sides, and the next move had to be one of damage limitation. One factor clearly emerged. Like the state of Triphylia, Lepreum's whole existence was based on her ability to ward off the Elean threat. Whereas the rest of the Triphylians, fearful of the Eleans' immediate plans, had ignored the Spartan call-up, they had answered it, and had automatically made themselves a target for future incursions into their territory from the east as well as the north. Placed in this situation, the question was how to kill two birds with one stone, and there appeared to be only one answer. Back in 418 (Thuc. 5.62) the Eleans had abandoned their allies because they would not attack Lepreum, and there was no saying that they would not try to persuade their

¹¹⁶ Cf. Roy (1971a), 571.

¹¹⁷ Dušanic (1970a), 317, n. 6, suggests that the Arcadians synoecized Triphylia, which I do not follow at all. Nielsen (1996b), 97, makes the feasible assumption that Lepreum, Heraea, and Orchomenus were forced into the Arcadian League. But in Lepreum's case, she had already seen Heraea and Orchomenus surrender before making her decision to do the same. Although Xenophon tells us little directly, at *Hell.* 6.5.13-15 he does inform us of the Arcadians' attack on Orchomenus; and at *Hell.* 6.5.22 of the similar ravaging of Heraea's territory. Whether subsequent League action against both was required to bring them into alliance we cannot say. But I assume that the lack of a similar report on Arcadian action against Lepreum is tacit circumstantial evidence for no such attack having been undertaken, the Lepreates having immediately made overtures to the Arcadians once their intentions towards these two cities became plain. That both were perhaps seen by the League's membership as being ethnically and geographically Arcadian, more so at any rate than were the Lepreates at this juncture, did not enter into matters: the danger for Lepreum was that she had

present allies to make a similar attempt on the city. The Eleans had to be forestalled. How could they mount an attack on a city they were allied to? If the Lepreates were to ally with the Arcadians such an attack would be out of the question. The Lepreates would, effectively, be allied to Elis. Arcadia simply offered the best protection available.¹¹⁸ What the Arcadians had to offer was hardly onerous. Lepreum could continue to exist in her normal manner, outside interference being virtually non-existent. Whether the Lepreates tried to convince her fellow Triphylians of the advantages of joining the Arcadian League, we do not know. Considering her later position (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33, 38), we may assume that she perhaps, at some point, did make some efforts in this direction. Whatever happened, the Lepreates lost little time in detaching themselves from Triphylia. They perhaps attended the conference at Athens that shortly followed,¹¹⁹ but as an independent state.¹²⁰ The Triphylian presence there was possibly the last official embassy the state ever despatched, as from that point onwards she was to disintegrate as a political entity in her own right.

The Eleans had themselves hardly been docile. Their attacks on their southern neighbours had ground to a halt at the Alpheus, perhaps in part hindered by their inability to quickly take Margana. But they lost no time in securing help from other quarters. The Peloponnesian Alliance is often viewed as being nothing more than the Arcadians and their allies, as if, because we do not have more direct information, the whole enterprise must have been put together by the Arcadians alone. It is the same situation with the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance. The big two, so to speak, of Arcadia and Thebes are often seen as the prime movers behind the forging of links between the Boeotians and Peloponnesians.¹²¹ A close scrutiny of the *Hellenica* will tell us otherwise. At *Hellenica* 6.5.5 we discover that the Eleans had sent three talents to help re-build Mantinea's walls after the decision to re-synoecise the city. This proves that Elis was involved with events within the Peloponnese from a very early stage, though her efforts to aid Mantinea and thus ensure the formation of an anti-

unequivocally supported a Spartan invasion of Arcadia. She, ironically, was to remain Arcadian (Dem. 16.16 with Schol.).

¹¹⁸ Cf. Nielsen (1997), 154. As Larsen (1968), 189, says 'the Arcadians offered membership in the Confederacy, while Elis offered only subjection.'

¹¹⁹ Cf. Ryder (1965), 71.

¹²⁰ As Nielsen (1997), 155, notes, the geographical concept of Triphylia continued down to at least the 350s (cf. Dem. 16.16), but we have no evidence for it being anything other than that.

¹²¹ See, for example, Cawkwell (1972), 265; Seager (1974), 54.

Spartan front should hardly come as a surprise to us.¹²² More tellingly, at *Hellenica* 6.5.19 we discover that once the Peloponnesians were gathered in Arcadia to confront Agesilaus it is none other than the Eleans who inform the Mantineans that the Thebans would soon join them because they had loaned them 10 talents, at their own request, to aid the expense of bringing their army south.¹²³ This says much of Elean involvement in the formation of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance. For neither the Arcadians (or the Argives) to know what was happening at this stage points to the Eleans having taken the lead in inviting the Boeotians into the Peloponnese in the first place.¹²⁴ The Eleans were set on retrieving their lost dominions,¹²⁵ and they were the first to invite outside forces into the Peloponnese to ensure that they got them. This obsession was to change Peloponnesian and Greek history for all time, and we might say that the Eleans have a lot to answer for.¹²⁶ They had stood alone at Athens in rejecting the proffered peace in 371 (*Xen. Hell.* 6.5.2).¹²⁷ But they realised that if alone at the conference, they were not alone in rejecting its terms as such, because the Thebans

¹²² Cf. Buckler (1980a), 70.

¹²³ Cf. *Plut. Mor.* 193 B-C; Cawkwell (1972), 267.

¹²⁴ Diodorus (15.62.3; cf. *Xen. Ages.* 2.23-24; *Dem.* 16. 12, 20) speaks of the Arcadians associating Argives and Eleans with themselves and then sending to Athens for alliance. We should not necessarily assume that Diodorus' wording means that the Arcadians took the lead in forming the Peloponnesian Alliance, but even if this were the case, I would argue as follows. Once the Athenians rejected the allies' offer, the delegates returned home (we should not think that they took it upon themselves to approach Athens, or that their instructions covered a contingency plan to immediately travel on to Thebes in the face of Athenian rejection), it was then that the Eleans grabbed the nettle and made overtures to the Thebans. They may have informed the Arcadians and Argives of their intentions, which would allow all three states to send representatives to Thebes simultaneously, or even have made the first approach themselves, but certainly only the Eleans knew exactly what was happening. This suggests, at least, close further contact with the Thebans on their part. I fail to understand the interpretation of Cartledge (1979), 296, which leaves the Arcadians out of the equation altogether. Xenophon (*Ages.* 2.23) leaves out the Argives, but I feel that the inclusion of the Eleans provides a hint, considering the way in which Arcadia and Thebes are usually placed in the forefront of matters, that they had been very instrumental in events. The Eleans would not have approached the Athenians alone after refusing to swear the oath at their conference of 371, though Buckler (1980a), 72, goes too far in suggesting it was for this very reason that Athens rejected the allies' offer. Athens, like any other Greek state, would have looked to her own interests and forgotten past events if it appeared advantageous to the city – as the Eleans knew, alliance with a lone Elis would not have been such. Despite my reservations on this matter, the appraisal of Buckler (1980a), 71-72 and 292, n. 4, on the formation of the Alliance is worthy of attention, and esp. for the problems presented by the Alliance's lack of an official leader and a council, and the part played by the wealth of the Eleans.

¹²⁵ Cf. Roy (1971a), 572.

¹²⁶ On the other hand, the verdict of Sealey (1976), 423, on the Eleans ('they would not acknowledge the independence of three small towns on their borders') is brusque and too dismissive of what for them had become a *cause célèbre*.

¹²⁷ *Xen. Hell.* 6.5.2; cf. Cartledge (1979), 295-96.

(and Jason of Pherae) had not even bothered to attend at all:¹²⁸ it soon became obvious to the Eleans in which direction their future lay. They, more than any other Peloponnesians, were responsible for the invasion of Laconia and the subsequent rekindling of war in the Peloponnese.¹²⁹

The final passage, *Hell.* 7.1.26, from c. 369, clarifies that at this time the Triphylians were in revolt from Elean rule, and that not only they but also ‘others’ as well.¹³⁰ These would include the Lasionians,¹³¹ who were on the eastern border and close to Arcadia.¹³² The city of Lasion was near to Acrorea, and, despite Diodorus 14.77.1, it should be considered beyond dispute that neither were a part of Triphylia. But neither must we forget that Lepreum was also among ‘the others’. *Hellenica* 7.1.26 implies that Triphylia was now a well-understood concept by its simple reference to these ‘others’ that were the communities which comprised the rest of the region, but Xenophon never at any time actually tells us which communities were officially Triphylian.¹³³

In brief, our conclusion is along the following lines. The birth of a Triphylian state was a Spartan initiative activated in c. 400 and following the peace settlement with Elis. It was instituted as a purely defensive measure, the idea being that a buffer-zone straddling the Alpheus would intimidate the Eleans from trying to physically reclaim those communities on both banks of the river which she thought were hers by right. It would also serve first and foremost, as would the Emperor Hadrian’s later introduction of a wall into Britain, as a psychological and palpable reminder that a

¹²⁸ Cf. Ryder (1965), 131; Buckler (1980a), 68-69; Jehne (1994), 74-79; Stylianou (1998), 408. The Spartans did attend, cf. Sordi (1951), 34-64; *contra* Hammond (1967²), 495; Hornblower (1991²), 224; Schwenk (1997), 25.

¹²⁹ For the record, regarding the Eleans’ efforts at enticing Thebes, Cartledge (1987), esp. 253, cf. 309, perhaps comes closest to suggesting a scenario similar to that of myself, or at least that appears to be the implication; but see also Ryder (1965), 73. Most opinion simply imagines that all three Peloponnesian states approached Athens and then Thebes jointly; cf. Dušanic (1970a), 285.

¹³⁰ Vital evidence is supplied here by the Arcadian monument at Delphi (*FD* III. 1. 3-11; *CEG* II 824.7; cf. Polyb. 4.77.8), which depicted Apeidas, Elatus, Azan, and Arasus, as sons of the eponymous hero Arcas. But also represented as such was the eponym Triphylus, complete with an epigram. From c. 369, the monument is more than just a commemoration of victory over Sparta (it directly faced the Spartan “Navarchs” Monument); cf. Cartledge (1987), 34-35. It is a clear statement of Arcadian ambition and also a claim over their contiguous neighbours who were “Arcadian”.

¹³¹ Tuplin (1993), 183-84; Roy (1997a), 284-85.

¹³² See Roy (2000b), 143-44.

¹³³ The term ‘Triphylians’ here should not be taken as inferring that the state of Triphylia was still enjoying a healthy existence. As we know, Lepreum had already left. The general feeling within the region was now definitely pro-Arcadian, so much so that many cities had already, as our passage makes manifest, joined the Arcadian League (cf. Nielsen (1997), 150, n. 130).

barrier existed as a demarcation line between territory that was rightfully Elean and that which was not. The local communities that were to join the new state were either small in number originally, that is those placed within a few miles on either side of the river, or comprised all of the territory threatened by Elean claims that was directly south of Elis itself. If, as we suspect, the first solution applied, then during the 390s other cities of the area joined, either from a further Spartan initiative, or one of their own presented by them on an individual or collective basis. By the mid-390s Triphylia was possibly at its greatest extent, but thereafter it disintegrated. Our evidence all but disappears until the Battle of Leuctra changed Greek fortunes and brought Elis into open conflict with Sparta and her protégés around the Alpheus. Amphidolia, Margana, and Letrinoi became lost to Triphylia along the way. The proposition that Elis re-took them arises, and especially on the strength of *Hellenica* 6.5.2. We should believe the reality was that Sparta's power remained undiminished in these interim years, and Elis would not have dared to try such a move. The gap between these three states, both ethnically and culturally, and those south of the river was probably far wider than the Alpheus itself. But that particular physical divide asked too much of all concerned. Sparta's buffer simply died a natural death on the north side of the Alpheus, as it became detached in every sense from its counterparts in the south.¹³⁴

The Elean deputation approached the bargaining table at Athens in 371 with, as they knew, little to bargain with, at least in the eyes of those gathered there.¹³⁵ For their part, The Eleans, saw the conference as the only way they could continue to keep alive their ambitions for the territories they believed were rightfully theirs to administer – even if having grave misgivings about attendance, they could not afford to be absent. If they could prove, in effect, that possession was nine parts of the law, then the overwhelming majority of the communities north of the Alpheus would remain in their hands. But not only was this unlikely in a meeting which revolved around the question of autonomy, if anything the greater problem was in maintaining a claim on those they

¹³⁴ I would suggest that Amphidolia, Margana, and Letrinoi became detached before the signing of the King's Peace in 387/6, and when Sparta was in some slight degree of turmoil. Sparta would have no conscience about forcing these "Triphylians" back into statehood after the King's Peace, but not only did she realize it was blatantly contrary to the spirit of what she had signed, she was also too preoccupied with the dioecism of Mantinea to bother about such small fry.

¹³⁵ On the conference, see Ryder (1965), 131-33.

did not possess.¹³⁶ The Athenians' resolution was the new feature of what was a basic oath to uphold the Common Peace as sent down by the Great King.¹³⁷ The hopes of making an agreement on the basis of all participants to hold what territory they then controlled were nil. Staring across the table at them would be representatives of the Triphylians.¹³⁸ They would not, could not, under any circumstances renounce their claims to these, their *perioeci*.¹³⁹

What has to be made clear here, because of the internal upheavals in Elis that we shall soon be encountering, is that the Elean delegation was sent by a democratic government. This has been disputed, but for no good reason. The doubts about the matter arose with Swoboda,¹⁴⁰ and his belief has given rise to other variations of it.¹⁴¹ It is plain to see how the problem arose: once again it is fundamentally a case of doubting what Xenophon wrote or, in this instance, doubting him for what he did not write. One might plausibly argue that Xenophon's reporting on occasion has almost asked us to doubt him. That is as may be, but he is quite definite concerning the peace terms that were agreed at the end of the Elean War (see above).¹⁴² They did not include any mention of Sparta changing Elis' mode of government. But because of the Spartans' aversion to democracies, it has been difficult for some scholars to come to terms with this situation.¹⁴³ Thus has arisen the idea that they did install a democratic government but that Xenophon neglected, for whatever reason, to inform us of this

¹³⁶ Ryder (1965), 73, notes that if the Elean-*perioecic* question was discussed in full then 'for the first time that is known the application of the general terms of a Common Peace treaty to a particular problem was decided before the conclusion of the treaty.'

¹³⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.2-3. This appears a highly suspicious move on the part of the Athenians, and Xenophon tells us nothing of what exactly the resolution contained. Cawkwell (1979), 335 and n., has considered it a recognition of the Athenian right to Amphipolis (cf. Aesch. 2.32; Sordi (1951), 34-64). If this is so, the refusal to recognise their right to rule what were actually contiguous territories, rather than a distant city colonised by force, would hardly have improved the Eleans' mood (Amphipolis was originally a Thracian establishment, Ennea Hodoi (the "nine ways": Hdt. 7.114), colonised as recently as 437-36; cf. Pritchett (1965), 30)). Seager (1994²), 171, correctly defines Amphipolis and the Chersonese as Athens' 'fatal obsessions'.

¹³⁸ Nielsen (1997), 152.

¹³⁹ On the Elean refusal to sign the Peace: cf. Seager (1994²), 185-86.

¹⁴⁰ Swoboda (1903), *Elis* (no. 1), *RE* V 2428 f., cf. 2403.

¹⁴¹ Cf. Beloch (*GG* III² 1), n.1, 201: an oligarchic government installed in 400 which remained in power until at least the late 360s. Roy (1971a), 572-73: both democrats and oligarchs competed for leadership in 370 (which is much closer to the truth).

¹⁴² Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30-31; cf. Diod. 14.17.4-12, 34.1-2; Paus. 3.8.3-5; 5.4.8.

¹⁴³ Nevertheless, it is naïve of Lintott (1982), 230, to suggest that 'the Spartans did not necessarily want to overthrow an established constitution', as, given the right circumstances, they would not have thought twice about doing such.

change. Our sources on Elean government are scanty, to say the least.¹⁴⁴ We have tentatively accepted 471 as the date for the rise of democracy in Elis (above), but its fall should be placed in c. 365/4. Dušaníc, supporting the theory of a Spartan-installed oligarchy in c. 400, has consistently asserted that Phormion, probably, but not definitely, the famous pupil of Plato's,¹⁴⁵ was responsible for a new Elean democratic constitution installed in 371 and lasting until c. 365.¹⁴⁶ Whilst there is a possibility that Phormion was involved with constitutional changes at Elis, we cannot allow the arguments of Dušaníc too much weight. Over a quarter of a century ago Roy pointed out that the word order in which Plutarch (*Adv. Col.* 32 C) enumerates his three lawgivers (that is, Phormion follows Aristonymous) cannot be taken to be chronological.¹⁴⁷ Dušaníc has placed far too much faith in this word order, and on such a flimsy main foundation as this, what are a well-argued series of papers have to be treated with extreme caution.¹⁴⁸ If we consider Diodorus (14.17.4-12; 34.1-2) we are

¹⁴⁴ See Arist. *Pol.* 1306a, 10 ff.; cf. Thuc. 5. 47; *DGE*, 409.6; and the discussions of Whibley (1896), 155-60 and Arnheim (1977), 62-64. Considering such institutions as Aristotle's ninety elders and the *demiorgoi* referred to by Thucydides (whom Tomlinson (1972), 195, compares with the Athenian *boule*), I agree with Roy (1971), 572-73, who has suggested that the Elean constitution was a loose framework which could be used by both democrats and oligarchs without resort to major change.

¹⁴⁵ Arnheim (1977), 63.

¹⁴⁶ Dušaníc (1970a, 291, n. 7 (English summary); and 1970b (English summary, 61-64) ; 1979; 1991) with Plut. *Adv. Col.* 32 C (= *Mor.* 1126 C); *Praec. ger. Reip.* 10. 805 D. The supposed links between the Elean democracy and Plato's Academy are enumerated by copious references to Plato's works in Dušaníc (1970b), 63-64, none of which I find are overly convincing and could be connected to various strands of political thought of the day. For similar links between Epaminondas' outlook and the influence of the Peripatetics, see Shrimpton (1971), 316-17, who finds little direct evidence for such.

¹⁴⁷ Roy (1974), 505-07. I would also add some further doubts to those espoused by Roy. Dušaníc (1970b, Eng. Sum., 61-64) compares Phormion with Ephialtes, believing that the 'radicalism of the latter did not remain unknown to the writer (cf. Plut., *Per.* 7)'. We have to ask ourselves if the radicalism of Ephialtes was actually truly radical at all, and also, no matter when the reform of Phormion was undertaken, if it was radically democratic or oligarchic: all is not clear (cf. Beloch *GG* III 1, 541, n.1). It is also stated that Arist. *Pol.* 5.6, 1306a is an earlier and different reform. Whilst in basic agreement with Dušaníc on this, we do not know what period Aristotle is referring to here.

¹⁴⁸ I have the greatest respect for Dušaníc's scholarship, but here consider that he pushes the evidence a little too far. His arguments for Athenian involvement in matters make sense *prima facie*, as we have seen with their meddling in Argive politics, yet to believe in this instance that Plato and Timotheus, with Isocrates also fully involved, were part of a grand strategy, is to defy belief. Isocrates may have taught Timotheus, but if the *Plataicus*, as recent as 373, is a genuine attack on Thebes' pretensions to grandeur at the expense of Athens and Sparta, we may ponder on whether he would have become involved in a piece of legislation that could only be detrimental in the long-term to the old "dual hegemony". Further, however one perceives their personal relationship, Plato's *Phaedrus*, 279a, is nothing more than a thinly disguised attack on Isocrates, enough to prod Isocrates into defending his techniques in the *Antidosis*. The pair were not the best of friends and viewed each other's methods warily (cf. Eucken (1983)). Dušaníc stands virtually alone in dating the formation of the Arcadian League to as early as 371 (see 1970a, 290) and I have wondered if this is due to a misplaced belief in Phormion's reforms being in this same year, in which case he *has* to put the formation of the League earlier. Dušaníc could be correct in his assumptions – but we cannot re-write

no nearer a conclusion, but the differences between his evidence and that of Xenophon saw Sordi conclude that they complement each other. That is, what Xenophon does not tell us, Diodorus does, probably by his use of the *Oxyrhynchus* historian.¹⁴⁹ Diodorus also says nothing about a change of government in Elis. Although we should have no doubts that both Elean democrats and oligarchs were of one (imperialistic) mind when it came to claims to rule their neighbours, the very fact that the Eleans were so keen to help form an alliance that was to be composed of democratic states must surely point to a democratic regime being in control at Elis in 371/70, even if it was shortly about to face serious opposition from opportunistic Elean oligarchs. At the end of the Elean War the Spartans, having seen both the attempted oligarchic *coup* defeated and the strength of feeling within Elis (which probably also saw some oligarchs defect to the democrats because of the invasion), had no choice but to leave a democratic regime in power or face further problems in the future. As Gehrke noted in defending his view of consistent democratic government in Elis from 471-365/4, the sources simply do not tell us otherwise, and, despite the dangers of arguments from silence, as such there exists no direct evidence to sway us towards the contrary opinion.¹⁵⁰

The intervening period between the conference and the invasion of Laconia had quite obviously seen no slackening on the part of the Eleans. They played their role in the invasion, perhaps also seeing in it a revenge for the 're-stocking of the whole Peloponnese' (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26) which the Spartan invasion of thirty years previously had unleashed on Elis.¹⁵¹ What is worth noting, as proof of the where the Eleans' real agenda lay, is the close relationship, even under the conditions of an invasion, which they maintained with the Thebans. On the third or fourth day the Spartan cavalry and some younger hoplites ambushed their opponents at the sanctuary of Poseidon (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.30-31). What is striking about the invaders movements is the division between the northern Greeks with Epaminondas and the Peloponnesian contingent. It is as if they are completely separate armies for much of the time (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.30). But the Eleans did not remain, as we would think, with the Peloponnesians but with the northern Greeks instead during this attack. We may surmise that this was the

the history of the period to accommodate what is, at best, tenuous evidence, and which places the cart before the horse.

¹⁴⁹ Sordi (1984), 155.

¹⁵⁰ Gehrke (1985), 82.

situation for much of the duration of the action in Laconia.¹⁵² The Eleans knew which contingent commanded the greater power and influence, and how useful these factors would be as an aid to their own future ambitions within the western Peloponnese. The feast at the expense of the Spartans having subsided, the Eleans slunk off home (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.5). Their work was only just beginning and much was still to be done.

By the mid-Summer of 369 the Peloponnesian Alliance had once more prevailed upon Thebes the importance of a second invasion of the Peloponnese,¹⁵³ and we can safely say that Elis was to the forefront of the petitioning. The targets were Sparta's allies in the northeast Peloponnese,¹⁵⁴ though the invasion was only partially successful in that Sicyon and Pellene alone were overcome (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18; Diod. 15.69.1). For us it is the aftermath of the invasion that is of interest. Whilst it signalled further actions in their own spheres of interest for Arcadia and Argos, the Eleans appear to have remained quiet, an oddly lethargic stance for a state that had so much to gain from Sparta's sidelining. Roy has suggested that at this time Elis had recovered Margana and Scillus, thus she could relax her efforts, especially as Triphylia had gone over to the Arcadians.¹⁵⁵ This is no doubt basically correct, although Roy is considering Lepreum as part of Triphylia. In fact Lepreum had separately spearheaded the move towards Arcadia that others from the same region had followed, and had

¹⁵¹ On the route they took (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.25; Diod. 15.62.5, 64.1; Paus. 2.38.7; Dio Chrys. 15.28) see Buckler (1980a), 78; *contra* Loring (1895), 63.

¹⁵² Naturally, we must link this to the leading role the Eleans had played during the negotiations to bring Thebes into the conflict (above). Their actions would be noted by the Arcadians and Argives.

¹⁵³ Roy (1971a), 573-75; Buckler (1980a), 92. The account of Diodorus (15.68.1-69.4) virtually ignores any allied aid to the Boeotians, preferring to concentrate on the exploits of Epaminondas and, in opposition, the daring of Chabrias. In fact such is the standard of his reporting that one could be forgiven for believing that Boeotia's Peloponnesian allies did not take part in matters. Athens' help to what was left of Sparta's alliance was valuable though, and in this respect Xenophon's scant appraisal (*Hell.* 7.1.18-22) of events rather fails to do justice to his place of birth.

¹⁵⁴ It is interesting to note that during their journey to meet the Thebans, the Arcadians and Eleans were asked to help Phliasian democratic exiles overthrow the oligarchic government of Phlius, to which request they agreed (Xen. *Hell.* 7. 2.5-9; cf. Legon (1967), esp. 335-37). But the story related by Xenophon only actually portrays the Arcadians and Argives taking part (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.8), a fact often ignored by modern scholars (cf. Buckler (1980a), 98; Roy (1994²), 192). A long shot perhaps, but did the Elean contingent's leadership still contain oligarchically-inclined aristocrats who, somewhat alienated already by the turn events had took since 371, balked at this particular task, perhaps having past relations with those ruling in Phlius? It did not, of course prevent them from attacking chosen targets of oligarchic persuasion within days of the Phlius incident. But this was under Theban leadership and as a part of the pre-set goal of the Elean government and in conjunction with the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance. Basically, they could do little about the situation. But as an assault on Phlius was, technically, prior to the Alliance convening in full and was not on the official agenda, we may wonder if some members of the Elean force made excuses and declined to attack the city.

¹⁵⁵ Roy (1971a), 575.

done so some time earlier. The crucial passage is *Hellenica* 7.1.26, which deserves closer appraisal. Xenophon informs us that after Lycomedes had promoted Arcadian autochthony, independence, and superiority (*Hell.* 7.1. 22-25), both the Thebans and Eleans were offended. For the Eleans, the crux of the matter was the return of their erstwhile *perioeci*, who had joined the Arcadian League.¹⁵⁶ It is generally considered that Xenophon is speaking in the present tense here. But what he says that is actually in the present tense is that the Eleans now demanded back these *perioeci*. He does not say that now, in 369, those *perioeci* had only just discovered their “Arcadianism” – this matter had been brought to the fore already. What had changed Elean opinion was the aforementioned attitude of the Arcadians, which had been boosted by the decision of these *perioeci* to join them. Only now, due to Lycomedes’ pro-Arcadian outbursts, had relations taken such a downturn that the Eleans were willing to speak out. Previously, for the sake of an alliance which from both the Arcadian and Elean viewpoints was only a marriage of convenience, the Eleans had remained silent. They realised that once Lycomedes had won over Arcadia to his way of thinking there was little chance of a friendly return of their *perioeci*, and that the sooner they spoke up, the better. They had nothing to lose that they had not already lost, and possibly something to gain. What is more, they knew that the Thebans were as offended as themselves by Lycomedes’ sabre rattling, and might, hopefully, give them the backing which could perhaps shift the hardline Arcadian attitude.

Lycomedes had of course in reality sounded the death knell of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance; but what he triggered simultaneously in Elis was the initial spark which would lead to the fall of its democratic government. For over a century the Eleans had lived under the rule of democracy. At times, such as c. 400, its continued existence had been severely put to the test. But the overall support of the Elean *demos* had ensured its survival, even in the face of tremendous Spartan pressure. We can only note that it took an ally to inadvertently achieve what Spartan arms had failed to do; and that the overthrow of what appeared to be a very safely ensconced mode of government was attained not from without but from within.

¹⁵⁶ By c. 369: Roy (1971a), 575. Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30: the Arcadians claimed Lasion in c. 400. If the Lasionians were ever wary of such claims originally, they certainly were not so now. The general area around the city could be traversed quite easily from Arcadia, which, as Roy (2000a), 133, has noted ‘explains the strategic importance of Lasion’. What is more, south of the Alpheus at Makistus the

Arcadian nationalism's rise appeared as a gift from the gods to Elis' oligarchs. Consigned to the Elean scrap heap for some thirty years, thanks to Spartan belligerence towards Elis and then, worse, failure to back-up that belligerence with a change of government within the city, they grasped at Lycomedes' lifeline with alacrity. Dubious from the outset about democratic Thebes' intentions, wary of a united Arcadia, and forced to follow a line handed down by a majority of their fellow citizens, the future had seemed bleak indeed. This feeling had only been exacerbated by the fall of Sicyon and Pellene. Certainly, Arcadia's self-assertiveness was a worry for such near-neighbours, especially if continued in tandem with Elis' democrats. But that was the very sticking point that presented a golden opportunity. The Alliance's delicate balance could only be maintained by an adherence to principles shared equally by all. The cornerstone of those principles was a united Peloponnesian front built on stability and understanding between neighbours. If one member of the Peloponnesian Alliance was to break the chain that straddled the Peloponnese and kept Sparta isolated from her allies in the northeast, then the whole framework would crumble. Lycomedes had just begun that very process, and all it needed to steer it to its natural conclusion was a concerted effort. The Elean democrats had been automatically placed in an almost untenable position. Had they not championed alliance with the fledgling leviathan that lay next door? At least Thebes, the established leviathan, was external to the Peloponnese. She was unlikely to force herself on any state within the region while Sparta stood in the wings awaiting the call to arms which would see her unite the Peloponnesians behind her leadership. The Elean oligarchs lost no time in agitating for the removal of an incompetent government. We should not imagine that they were all purely concerned with what was best for the majority within the state; nor should we presume to think they were all solidly pro-Spartan. Many would be aristocrats with an inborn sense of their own superiority and god-given right to rule;¹⁵⁷ the best way, indeed the only way, to achieve this end was to throw in their lot with the one force that could pave the way to such: Sparta, in her turn, was soon to be given the lifeline that she had sought for some two years.

temple sculptures, dated to the early fourth-century, have been interpreted as demonstrating Arcadian sympathies; see Roy (1997a), 290, 316, n. 65.

¹⁵⁷ Some leading democrats would also be of this ilk. We have only to consider the likes of Cimon or Pericles at Athens to realise that the best way to power is via the *demos*' hearts.

To go back to Roy's point (above) concerning Elean inaction in c. 369/8, whilst Elis was indeed hamstrung to a great degree by her Arcadian ally's stance over her lost *perioeci*, it was not the sole reason for her lethargy. The one thing that Eleans wanted more than anything else was the return of those *perioeci*. But within Elis was taking place a shift in political balance. Her democrats were embarrassed but also virtually silenced by Arcadia's recalcitrance; her oligarchs were buoyant and revitalised. Roy believes that from c. 370 democrats and oligarchs were battling for power in Elis, and thus there was less of a commitment to democracy than in Arcadia and Argos.¹⁵⁸ This was not quite the case. In 370, following on the heels of Leuctra, Elean oligarchs were quieter than at any time since c. 400. For the Eleans to join in an alliance with Arcadia, Argos, and Boeotia, this had to be the position. Only a government with a total understanding and control of the current situation could have led Elis into such an alignment. As with the present day, so with the past: people in general will be swayed by whatever the seems appropriate to themselves at a given moment. In 370 Sparta's star was no longer in the ascendancy. Perhaps, granted, never quite as committed to democracy as some states, the very reason for this was due to the situation Lycomedes had erected. Prior to 369 we should not doubt that commitment. Elis was won over by, and wanted to be a part of, the *zeitgeist* that prevailed in 369. If not even alive at the time in some cases, Eleans knew only too well of Spartan actions in c. 400. The attack on Elis had been alienating, to subsequently deprive her of her *perioeci* was the final insult. Even hardened Elean oligarchs would not have forgiven Sparta for this move – especially if, as we cannot actually prove, they had personal economic interests reliant upon the continued adherence of the *perioeci*.¹⁵⁹

Buckler has chastised the Thebans for their failure to settle matters between the Eleans and Arcadians (and also, like Roy, blamed the dispute with Arcadia for Elean

¹⁵⁸ Roy (1971a), 572-73.

¹⁵⁹ See Roy (1997a), 292. As we have seen above, Lepreum (Thuc. 5.31) paid annually one talent to Zeus at Olympia. Roy (1998; cf. Weiler (1991), 87-93) himself has, I believe, proved the huge influence Elis had over Olympia, even to the extent of issuing judicial decisions that favoured herself (in this case, more fuel to the fire, against Sparta). I would suspect that this influence also ran to covert financial gains for those in leading positions, and hence it was more than just mere prestige that saw the Eleans desperate to maintain a hold over the sanctuary from at least the sixth century onwards. We have also seen how the Eleans paid thirty talents for the possession of Epeum (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.30-31): are we to suppose they did not expect a return of some (immense?) kind for this huge outlay?

docility in 368).¹⁶⁰ But what could the Thebans really do? The problem for Epaminondas first and foremost, and many Peloponnesians would have supported him on this matter, was to hold together the now fragile alliance he had done so much to cement. To step into the affairs of individual Peloponnesian states was to become a prototype Sparta. The Peloponnesian Alliance had fought to throw off, once and for all, any form of rule that was external to their own modes of government. Intervention would have seen Epaminondas, and not Lycomedes, receive the blame for the dismemberment of the Alliance once the Arcadians had turned to Sparta - as they most surely would. Within the Peloponnesian League it was plain who the leadership belonged to - the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance had seen Thebes carefully try and avoid such overt hegemony, and with good reason.¹⁶¹ She may have been *primus inter pares* in truth, and in Orwellian terms of equality, some, indeed are more equal than others, but she could not openly be seen to be such. To arbitrate was one thing, but what when arbitration had failed and the matter had become a running sore that there was no longer any disguising? Sleeping dogs had, in this case, to be left to lie.

Plutarch (*Mor.* 219A) provides a valuable piece of information concerning king Archidamus of Sparta, but it in fact tells us more about the Eleans than it does about the Spartan situation. The Eleans, we can imagine, had dutifully attended the conference held by Philiscus at Delphi in 368.¹⁶² If they hoped for a development over the question of their *perioeci*, they were to be disappointed. Neither were Sparta's grievances met, automatically pushing to the fore a common bond between the two. But what the Spartans did obtain from the conference was mercenary assistance. Coupled with the arrival of similar aid from Syracuse (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.28), they embarked upon a trek which saw the fall of Caryae, the devastation of Parrhasia, and resulted in the victory over the Arcadians and Argives known as the "Tearless Battle" (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.28-32; *Diod.* 15.72.3-4).¹⁶³ Xenophon recalls the joy of this event at not only Sparta but also at Thebes and Elis. This is in keeping with Xenophon's report at *Hellenica* 7.1.26, where Lycomedes' manoeuvres had served to estrange both the Thebans and Eleans

¹⁶⁰ Buckler (1980a), 105, 222.

¹⁶¹ The situation within the Boeotian Confederation was another matter. Here Thebes' hegemony was not disguised, and was more in keeping with Sparta's position within the Peloponnesian League, simply because she was not dealing with whole regions that, theoretically, viewed themselves on equal terms as herself.

¹⁶² *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.26; *Diod.* 15.70.2; cf. Buckler (1980a), 102-04; Cartledge (1987), 386-87.

¹⁶³ The Messenians were present in the vicinity but were sidelined (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.29; see Ch. 3).

from the Arcadians. From 370 onwards we have witnessed concerted action by the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance – up until this point. Without doubt, as we have discussed above, Thebes and Elis were now standing aside, if only temporarily, from their alliance with the Arcadians. What Plutarch tells us is that Archidamus, the Eurypontid and son of Agesilaus, sent a message to the Eleans informing them that they should not appear for the battle. It is patently ridiculous to warn an enemy that they should not attack you. If Elis was so weak or suspect, why do we not hear of a similar ploy during the invasions of 370/69 or 369? What Archidamus knew, and which our sources, including Plutarch, do not tell us, was that this message had more to it than meets the eye. The Eurypontids had links with leading oligarchs in cities throughout Greece.¹⁶⁴ Archidamus was well aware of the Elean situation, and whether the warning was delivered in secret or otherwise we cannot say with certainty. What we can surmise is that it was meant particularly for the ears of Elis’ oligarchs, some of whom, doubtless, had ties with Archidamus or his family. In 370-69, and prior to Lycomedes’ machinations, such a communication would have been pointless. Now the government of Elis had become something of a “hung Parliament”. The democrats no longer held total sway as they had done in previous years, and the oligarchs could now make inroads into the minds of the *demos*.¹⁶⁵ The disappointment of the Delphi conference gave, for the first time in years, the oligarchs the upper hand in Elis. Archidamus’ action sealed matters. The Eleans would not be appearing in Arcadia. Whatever the impact of the message upon the Eleans, whether the oligarchs utilized it to convince them of the justice and merit of inaction or not, Archidamus knew it would have its benefits. Perhaps, as Buckler says,¹⁶⁶ the Eleans ‘needed no such admonition’ to prevent them appearing. Certainly, Archidamus’ message could not be totally concealed, as he realised, but if unheeded it had still served its purpose: what were

¹⁶⁴ Proving Thucydides (1.19) correct in his assessment of Sparta’s power base. Where the Eurypontids are concerned (naturally, I am not suggesting the power base was exclusively the work of the Eurypontids), note the reports in *Hellenica* on some of their actions (cf. Tuplin (1977), 5-10). At 5.2.3 we discover their relationship with some of the Mantineans; at 5.3.13 occurs a similar scenario at Phlius; and we have already referred to 3.2.27 and Xenias of Elis. Even the strange actions of Agis II when facing the Argives in 419/18 (Thuc. 5.59-60, 63) may point to a close relationship with the two Argives who were involved.

¹⁶⁵ As will be gathered, I here believe Roy (see above) to be absolutely correct in asserting that the Elean constitution allowed for both democrats and oligarchs to assume power within its confines; cf. esp. *Xen. Hell.* 7.4.15. “Moderate” could be applied to either a democracy or an oligarchy under such a system, and though we lack concrete information on the Elean assembly, let us not doubt the need to appeal to it.

Elis' allies to think of such a gesture? The seeds of doubt had been well and truly sewn in the minds of the Alliance – including the Thebans.

What further clarifies our suspicions of upheavals within the Elean government was the democratic *coup* (at least officially) of Euphron of Sicyon in spring, 368 (on which, see Ch. 1). One may look at the close proximity of Arcadia and Argos to Sicyon as being the reason for their invitation to proceedings; one may argue that Thebes' position within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance demanded her involvement at some point: one cannot make a good case for Euphron leaving the Eleans out of the equation. Elis was officially as much a part of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance as any of the aforementioned states. Quite simply, Euphron did not see the point of inviting a state torn asunder by oligarchic diehards into a Sicyon trying to set up a democratic government. The very people he was trying to oust were mainly pro-Spartans, and how could an Elis with its fair share of such be fully relied upon? The Arcadians or Argives would certainly not recommend or invite Elean participation. Worse from the Elean viewpoint, neither would the Thebans.

For the Thebans, it was worthwhile to keep Elis within the Alliance,¹⁶⁷ but by now they were beginning to have their doubts as to where Elean allegiance lay. As with Arcadia, Thebes could not interfere in Elis, a state politically divided, without risking a division in the Alliance itself. If she did intervene, the Elean oligarchs would, in essence, get what they wanted, an excuse to turn to Sparta. Therefore, the following year saw the Thebans react strongly to a Spartan approach to the great King. A strong front was necessary to ward off Sparta's efforts to win Persian support, and the Eleans were needed to play a role in the enterprise.¹⁶⁸ When the Thebans thus summoned their allies (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33), expectations were high, both in Elis and Arcadia, that firmly placed on the agenda would be the question of the destiny of the *perioeci*. It is very possible that to gain allied adherence the Thebans even hinted at such, especially where the Eleans were concerned. In Elis democratic hopes soared, and even her oligarchs could not demur, despite the fact that a successful conclusion would cost them dearly. The democrats enthusiastically secured the sending of a delegation to represent Elis at Susa.

¹⁶⁶ Buckler (1980a), 107.

¹⁶⁷ As Buckler (1980a), 106, says: 'it strengthened the anti-Spartan front and denied the Spartans a Peloponnesian ally.'

Much about this conference has been misunderstood. It is beyond doubt that Athens and Sparta lost out considerably to what was now the new élite, Thebes as represented by Pelopidas.¹⁶⁹ What has been wrongly accepted by virtually all modern scholars since Grote,¹⁷⁰ is the premise that Elis had her *perioeci* returned to her. Let us note now, once and for all, that neither Xenophon or any other source, including Plutarch, says anything of the kind. Xenophon is our most detailed source. To paraphrase to some degree, he tells us that the Eleans sent Archidamus and Argaeus (see Ch. 2 on the latter) to represent them at the conference, whilst the Arcadians sent Antiochus (a Lepreate, emphasizing the importance placed on their claim to the *perioeci* by the Arcadians). Pelopidas presented his case for Theban supremacy in Greece and loyalty to Persia at some length, berating the Arcadians and Argives in the process. Asked by Artaxerxes what he wanted enacted, Pelopidas replied that Messenian independence, the laying up of Athens' fleet, and the full compliance of the Greeks in ensuring these measures was his requirement. Artaxerxes had such duly inscribed, and replied to the outburst of the disgusted Leon, one of the Athenian representatives, that if the Athenians could come up with a better solution, then they should let him know what it was.¹⁷¹ At no time in this, the report of the main arguments presented at Susa, is there any mention of Elis' erstwhile *perioecic* lands. What scholarship has taken as evidence for the reinstatement of the *perioeci* into Elean hands has been the triumphant return of Archidamus to Elis as presented by Xenophon. Whilst the Athenians actually executed Leon's colleague, the conciliatory Timagoras, and Antiochus, after refusing gifts from the King, besmirched Persian wealth and luxurious living, Archidamus was full of praise for Artaxerxes. This was because 'he had treated the Eleans with more distinction than the Arcadians' (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.38).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁸ Cf. Seager (1974), 59.

¹⁶⁹ The main references are: Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.33-38; Plut. *Pel.* 30.1-12; 31.3. See also Paus. 6.1.3, 3.9, 17.5; Plut. *Artax.* 22.8-9; Aelian *VH* 1.21; Dem. 19.191; Nepos *Pel.* 4.3.

¹⁷⁰ Grote (1888, X) 39; cf. Dušanic (1970a), 297. See also Roy (1971a), 578, and (1994²), 196; Buckler (1980a), 156; Cartledge (1987), 387-88 (to name but a few).

¹⁷¹ This should not be forgotten. If the Athenians had been given leave to approach the Great King with an addendum at a later date (cf. Stylianou (1998), 486-87), then the Eleans would probably believe that a similar kind of opening was also available to them. If so, Pelopidas no doubt encouraged that belief and gave hope that the Thebans would be giving them support.

¹⁷² The translation of Warner in the Penguin edition of *Hellenica*. Alternatively, I offer the Loeb translation of Brownson: Archidamus 'praised the doings of the King, because he had honoured Elis above the Arcadians.' Either way, this refers to the situation as seen through Elean and, via Antiochus' report, Arcadian eyes. The Elean-Arcadian contest had never really materialised as envisioned. What had occurred at the Persian court was the elevation of Elis to the detriment of

This, it hardly needs saying, does not refer whatsoever to any handing back of her *perioeci* to Elis. It would have been far easier for Xenophon or Plutarch to simply say the obvious, 'The Eleans got back their *perioeci*', rather than present us with riddles. The fact that neither they or any other source says such is decisive.

Lacking concrete evidence, it is an easy solution to a vexing question to surmise that the Eleans were simply given back the *perioeci*. Archidamus apparently returned home ecstatic - he could not appear otherwise. In reality, this was not the return of the conquering hero, but more akin to the return of Neville Chamberlain from Munich. At least Chamberlain believed he had been given assurances that would be acted upon. Archidamus strongly suspected that he had been used and duped. As a part of an Elean democratic party teetering on the edge of the abyss, he could not publicly declare the truth of the matter lest democratic credibility become utterly destroyed. Pelopidas, no doubt with the connivance of Epaminondas, had, in similar mode to Cicero treating with the young Octavian, lauded and praised Archidamus prior to removing and forgetting him. Unfortunately for Archidamus, unlike our Roman example, in this case that is exactly what had happened. Let us make no mistake, it is absolutely inconceivable that the Thebans would risk the collapse of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance by taking away from the Arcadians those areas which had voluntarily and eagerly gone over to them. They most certainly wanted to admonish them, to openly give them, and also to some extent the absent Argives, a slap on the wrist. To go further was to prompt a virtual return to the pre-371 position. The Arcadian League was already perhaps showing signs of division (see following chapter). At times the Theban leadership must have dearly wanted to split the Arcadian League down the middle. They could not seriously afford to even contemplate such a move. The Eleans, like the Argives, were crucial to the united Peloponnesian front. But the Arcadians were indispensable to its continued existence. They were the real power within the Peloponnesian Alliance, but as such had to be kept within bounds. Neither can we put to one side, as has been done repeatedly, the feelings of those *perioeci* who hated the Eleans with a passion and were now happily Arcadians, and thus in turn supportive of Theban policy within the Peloponnese. How would they, probably in tandem with the Arcadian League, react to such a *fait accompli*? As a

Arcadia. But it was the overall substance and atmosphere of the occasion, not a specific matter, such

further poser for the Thebans, had the *perioeci* not previously had good relations with Sparta?

What, then, did occur at Susa? We do not know the exact nature of what took place. We can, though, surmise the following scenario. Both Archidamus and Argaeus were courted by Pelopidas to the full. They were fussed, and, most important of all, introduced to Artaxerxes as especially esteemed representatives of a state whose importance placed her to the forefront of Greek inter-state politics; a state vital to Theban hopes for a peaceful settlement of future affairs in Greece. The pair were fully taken in. They gleefully accepted the King's good wishes and accompanying gifts. Antiochus, on the other hand, refused the King's gifts, and notable are his words on his return to Greece. He said that he did not accept the presents because the Arcadian League had been belittled, or less regarded, than the Eleans. Xenophon does not actually say that the Great King was responsible for any insults (if he was, we can accept that it was only coincidental, Persian protocol did not run, most certainly, to insulting guests; and any such perceived insults were, we can imagine, basically due to the influence of Pelopidas, who perhaps virtually ignored Antiochus). As for the question of the *perioeci*, it was never actually raised. This was why Antiochus was so enraged. As he implied, the Arcadian League had been insulted – but it was an insult of Pelopidas' against the fighting qualities of the League (and the Argives), not any remark emanating from the mouth of Artaxerxes. The Arcadians had been belittled, it was true. But it was a calculated and pre-planned strategy by Pelopidas, designed to bring them into line, that was the cause of Antiochus' disgust. Pelopidas had shrewdly killed a whole handful of Greek birds with one stone. The Elean representatives left Susa overawed, impressed with Persian pomp, and minus any real promises from Pelopidas. Antiochus had fared no better. The matter had been left in abeyance. Pelopidas knew that to prolong the agony over the *perioeci* was the only way to keep the Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliance in being. To attempt a solution was to estrange a section of it, and Thebes could not afford to do that.

Once back in Elis, Archidamus concentrated on recounting the better aspects of his visit to Susa and presented a brave face. It was enough to maintain the upper hand of the democrats but little more. As Abraham Lincoln said, you cannot fool all of the

as the *perioecic* question, that had pleased Archidamus and outraged Antiochus.

people all of the time. The Elean democrats were beginning to seriously lose face. Archidamus could only relate, probably euphemistically, that Pelopidas had deferred the question of the *perioeci* until a later date. The fact was, despite Theban declarations of friendship and hints at future satisfaction, that they still lay in Arcadian hands. In Arcadia feelings were mixed. She still had *de facto* possession of the *perioeci*, and had wanted this made official, but stood to lose them if the question was subsequently raised again. When the Thebans set about the implementation of the Susa conference's resolutions in Greece, the Arcadians (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39-40) were instrumental in their being rejected. Besides the other implications of the acceptance of the Susa terms, the Arcadians did not want to give Thebes, as the new hegemon of Greece, as she would then become, *carte blanche* to decide on which state would get the *perioeci*.¹⁷³ The Arcadians felt that they already knew which way that particular verdict would go.¹⁷⁴

Determined to bring the allies to heel after the failure of the Susa terms, Epaminondas sought their aid when he invaded Achaia in the spring of 366. As he rightly suspected, none of them were in a position to refuse the call to arms.¹⁷⁵ The fact that this was the first time Thebes had called for a Peloponnesian expedition ably demonstrates the worrying situation she now found herself in. The Eleans, no doubt still under democratic influence, complied with his request, but perhaps with less élan

¹⁷³ We are never informed of the Elean response to the terms, if indeed, considering the immediate rejection of them by other Greek states, there was one. No doubt they sent representatives to the meeting at Thebes. But despite what seems to be a unanimous rejection of them at the meeting (as implied by Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39-40), it is difficult to believe that Elean delegates would have dared upset the Thebans at this particular time (which still applies, but even more so, if one accepts the view that Elis got back her *perioeci* at Susa), or during Theban attempts to implement them via the subsequent sending of ambassadors to the individual Greek cities.

¹⁷⁴ Stylianou (1998), 486-87, has noted that Diodorus (15.77.1-20; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-13; Polyb. 4.74.1), in reporting the 365 attack of the Eleans on Lasion (see below), refers to them using the Arcadian exiles in Lasion as a 'pretext' for the action, something not reported by Xenophon. Stylianou is chiefly concerned with proving that Diodorus is superior to Xenophon on the matter, and especially with reference to the Peace of 366/5 being a Common Peace handed down by Persia, rather than the limited peace it actually was in reality (cf. Ryder (1958), 199-205 and (1965), 83, 137-39; Buckler (1980a), 251-55; *contra* Cawkwell (1961), 80-86). What is interesting here are the implications for the Susa conference of 367. Diodorus, I would argue, is only perhaps expressing his opinion (or following that of Ephorus). But if we consider that this was the situation, and that the Eleans were looking to claim back what they believed was rightfully theirs, why, as Stylianou says, did they need a pretext? When the terms of the Susa conference were rejected by the Greeks, where did it leave the Eleans? If we accept that they were indeed awarded back their *perioeci*, then in spite of any rejection by the majority of Greeks they could still claim right on their side, and especially so with both Persia and Thebes clearly supporting them. If, as we have argued, they did not win Persian or Theban support then, more than ever, they needed a pretext to invade Lasion.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 185-93, esp. 188.

than on previous occasions. The outcome from an attack on such an easy target appeared inevitable. Achaean oligarchic leaders lost no time in coming to terms with the invader. This was not a shock under the circumstances. The Elean oligarchs, many no doubt present but with mixed feelings, and believing that Elis should have stayed neutral, saw their Achaean counterparts' surrender as a setback akin to that of the fall of Sicyon and Pellene. For them, total isolation beckoned. Soon Euphron's reign at Sicyon was overturned by the Arcadians, which further worried Elean oligarchs. It was not the fact that Euphron was any kind of an ally which caused the worry, but the inescapable conclusion that the Arcadians were now acting as a major force in their own right, and one which clearly saw itself as the leading light in Peloponnesian politics. If there was an advantageous side to the move, it was the increasing strain it placed on Elis' democrats at home. Embarrassingly shut out of the Sicyon equation from start to finish, Elean democrats had as much cause for anxiety as did the oligarchs. What seemed an all but lost oligarchic cause was given a tremendous boost when Achaean oligarchs, enraged by the overturning of Epaminondas' arrangements which had allowed them to retain power, decided upon concerted action. By the end of the summer of 366 they had overthrown Thebes' harmosts and democratic governments throughout Achaean, and we may surmise that Elis' oligarchs gave, at the very least, moral support to their fight.¹⁷⁶

If succour was to appear, the least likely quarter it could be expected from was Thebes. But whilst Achaean oligarchs were in the process of re-taking control of their cities, in the mid-summer of 366 Thebes made a move that in the long-term was to prove a major blunder. Oropus had long been a bone of contention with Athens, and Thebes, taking advantage of the situation that presented itself and resenting Athenian aid to Sparta, occupied the city. The repercussions were to prove disastrous. Athenian efforts to both recover Oropus and, crucially, rally support from their Peloponnesian allies came to nought. Watching events with great interest was Lycomedes. The offer of alliance he then made to Athens was gratefully accepted (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.2-3).

It is quite obvious that throughout the duration of the affairs over Oropus and Arcadia's allying with Athens, Elean oligarchic agitation would have reached fever pitch. The aftermath saw questions flying thick and fast. How had Elis' government

¹⁷⁶ The Achaean episode: *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.41-43; *Diod.* 15.75.1-2; cf. Roy (1971a), 577.

ever allowed alliance with an Arcadia that seemed bent on Peloponnesian domination? What was to be the scenario now that, in theory, Arcadia could call upon Athens if attacked? Did the Atheno-Arcadian alliance thus mean that whatever Arcadia did in the future Elean hands were virtually tied? Where, well over a year on from the Susa conference, was the Theban support for the return of Elis' *perioeci*? The news that Athens, Arcadia's new ally, was now also trying to make inroads into the Peloponnese with her attempt on Corinth was the final straw. In autumn, 366, Elis' democratic party was finally ousted from the political spectrum once and for all.

As Xenophon points out (*Hell.* 7.4.15), before the attack on Lasion there had been political dissension in Elis. This we should date to the autumn of 366. In other words, the democratic party probably did not accept with good grace the takeover of the oligarchs. Most likely the popular support for the democrats had waned to such a degree that Elis' oligarchs found it relatively easy to occupy the positions of power that were part and parcel of the Elean constitution. The democrats may have resorted to *stasis*, but it seems they simply waited for their chance to present itself in the future. Once power was assumed the Elean oligarchs lost no time in reverting Elis' allegiances, and simultaneously turning Peloponnesian politics on their head.

Sparta, the natural friend of all things oligarchic, became, once more an ally. Achaëa, which had probably had very close contacts with Elis' oligarchs since mid-366, if not before, was also drawn into alliance. None of these states, we should believe, attended the peace negotiations of 366/5. For Elis there was good reason. Her non-participation kept her free of entangling alliances and thus allowed her to attack Lasion, which she had allowed Arcadian oligarchic exiles she had been harbouring to occupy in advance. A two-pronged offensive in effect, the Spartans had already moved north to take Sellasia.¹⁷⁷

Denied for so long the right to their *perioeci*, the Eleans' patience had finally deserted them. They would take them back by force. Ironically, the first state to actually deny them access to the *perioeci*, Sparta, was now her major ally. There was no objections to her right to them from that quarter any longer. Both states were fighting to re-claim subjects they believed were rightfully theirs to rule. The Eleans

¹⁷⁷ Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12; Diod. 15.77.1-2. Although Roy (1971a), 583, n. 75, rightly points out Diodorus' confusion over Lasion and Triphylia, I give Diodorus the benefit of the doubt over the Arcadian exiles' existence.

could not move without Spartan support, not with the obvious backlash that would follow from Arcadia and, now, Athens. To make matters worse, Thebes was unlikely to show much sympathy either. If, as was well understood, the Thebans' prime aim was to isolate Sparta, Elean actions were guaranteed to turn Thebes into an enemy. The question was, how much of an enemy? From the Theban perspective, Arcadia was the greater worry than Elis. But whilst Thebes and Arcadia needed each other, and, despite some close calls, had never actually broken faith with each other officially, Elis had committed the cardinal sin and gone over to Sparta. The Eleans therefore probably suspected the worse, but were now prepared to face it head on.

The Eleans suffered badly in the Arcadian reprisals,¹⁷⁸ seeing virtually all of Acrorea, the area around Olympia, and Margana slip from their grasp and into Arcadian hands.¹⁷⁹ Not before the onslaught had reached the agora of Elis itself did the Eleans manage to reverse matters. Heartened, and arranging for Arcadian help, the Elean democrats decided upon action. But their seizure of the Acropolis was thwarted by the oligarchs, who perhaps behaved leniently when only exiling some four hundred democrats because they did not want to illicit feelings of sympathy for them.¹⁸⁰ Once these exiles had seized Pylus, and sympathizers from Elis had joined them, they were emboldened to encourage the Arcadians in another attempt on Elis. But the firm friendship the Elean oligarchs had cultivated with the Achaeans saw the move beaten off. In our period, there was to be no further backlashes from Elean democrats. The Arcadians, and to a lesser extent the Thebans, had successfully made the world, or at

¹⁷⁸ Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.13; cf. 16, 31) refers here to the Elean 'three hundred' and 'four hundred'. We know little about either unit, but both Xenophon (*Lac. Pol.* 2.12) and Plato (*Symp.* 182b) hint at homosexual practices being accepted in the Elean army as they were in the Boeotian, the references basically drawing comparisons with the Theban Sacred Band. The link is made most explicit by Xenophon in the *Symposium* (8.34), and it would appear that the three hundred at least were of this composition. The leader of the three hundred at Elis was Stratolas (*Hell.* 7.4.31), who appears at *Hellenica* 7.4.15 as a leading oligarch. Pritchett (1974 II), 223, refers to them merely as a 'special guard'. Ogden (1996), 115, considers both the three and four hundred to be units of homosexuals, but adds little more. I suspect that the three hundred were politically motivated, but as Elean politics had only just allowed for an oligarchic takeover we may wonder just how long they had existed. It is possible that like the Elean constitution they were a permanent fixture to be utilised by whoever was in power at any given moment. The four hundred quickly disappear from Xenophon's account.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-14; Diod. 15.77.1-4 (who adds Cyparissia and Coryphasium). At this point Elis' loss of territory is reflected in her loss of *phylai*, which were reduced from twelve to eight (cf. Paus. 5.9.5-6). They had been increased from ten to twelve in 368 (reflecting, as we have argued above, her re-capture of territory following Leuctra) but were increased to ten again only in 348. On this and the *hellanodikai* see Jones (1987), 142-45, nn. at 152-53; Roy (1971a), 586, and (1997a), 297-98; Stylianou (1998), 492.

least the Elean part of it, safe for oligarchy. Their stance it was, more than any other factor, which saw Elis' democracy mistrusted by its own citizens. But, as we shall see, not by any means were all Arcadians democratically inclined anyway. Not to be deflected from their aims, the Arcadians tried yet again to successfully invade Elis, and the battle which followed saw the Eleans defeated and their cavalry commander commit suicide.¹⁸¹ Nevertheless, the Arcadians could still not make the kind of headway they required to take Elis.

Plainly, the Eleans, with considerable losses of manpower, could not survive much more of this kind of pressure. With this in mind, they approached the Spartans to provide a diversion. The Spartan invasion of Arcadia saw Cromnus fall, but whereas the Arcadians took the pressure off Elis by immediately sending their troops to try and re-take it, when the Spartans tried ravaging Arcadia to draw off the Arcadians surrounding Cromnus, they simply refused to budge (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.20-27). Arcadian nerve held, and the ruse had failed. Sparta's help to Elis, which a weakened Elis could not reciprocate, saw Sparta sidelined from action until 362. The Arcadian gamble had paid off; that of the Eleans had not. The ally which their oligarchs placed so much emphasis on had, in trying to help her, made itself, and seemingly Elis, impotent. True, the Spartan diversion had allowed the Eleans to put paid to the threat from Pylus and its surrounds,¹⁸² but at a devastating long-term cost. Almost before it had begun, Elean strategy now lay in ruins.

What happened next was against all odds, and demonstrates what a people driven by anger, outrage, and determination are capable of achieving. Like the Athenians in the latter years of the Peloponnesian War, in adversity the Eleans showed their true mettle. Unrated for their fighting prowess by other Greeks (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.30), the news that the Pisatans and Arcadians were celebrating the 104th

¹⁸⁰ Among them was Argaeus (*Xen, Hell.* 7.4.16), which, if we ever doubted it, points to the Elean mission to Susa in 367 being sponsored by the democratic party.

¹⁸¹ *Xen. Hell.* 7.4.19. Lost also was the Spartan Socleides, prompting Xenophon to inform us that by now the Eleans and Spartans were allies. We may presume that they had been allied for some time before this. The Spartan attack on Sellasia being immediately followed by that of the Eleans on Lasion we can believe was more than just a coincidence. The Eleans may have been keen to take back their *perioeci*, but they must have had more than just Spartan assurances to attempt such, especially after their experiences with the Thebans.

¹⁸² This time, to finally end resistance, the Elean democrats were shown no mercy (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.26).

Olympics,¹⁸³ without a by or leave from them, stirred the Eleans into the kind of action they had rarely even contemplated. In tandem with the Achaeans, they stormed Olympia in the summer of 364, driving before them Arcadians, Argives, and Athenians (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.29; *Diod.* 15.77.3).¹⁸⁴ Having withdrawn before nightfall, the following day saw them faced by a mass of barricades, and an impossible task. They retreated, but their actions had perhaps served them well. The Arcadians, if they had but realised, had almost certainly had the Eleans demoralized and beaten. The only thing that could have possibly stirred them to such heroic deeds was the removal of the Games from their care. Indirectly, the Elean attack on Olympia was to eventually play its part in forcing the Arcadians to try and bring the war to an amicable conclusion.

Although Elean efforts at Olympia no doubt made the Arcadians somewhat dubious about further attempts on Elis, it was the split within the Arcadian League itself which nullified the threat. The Eleans could be contented with the thought that if the Arcadians had not had designs on Olympia, then the rift would not have come into the open and finally destroyed Arcadian unity. We can understand Xenophon's report that the Eleans were as enthusiastic about Arcadian peace overtures as were the Arcadians themselves (*Hell.* 7.4.35). Whether any of the Eleans gathered at Tegea to swear to the peace got involved in the troubles which ensued is unknown (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.36), but it is most probable that under the circumstances they made a fast exit. Epaminondas, without naming her directly, took the Mantinean faction of the Arcadian League to task for making a separate peace with Elis, and in effect made this act responsible for his subsequent fourth invasion of the Peloponnese as much as the events at Tegea (*Xen. Hell.* 7.4.39-40). We may wonder how the Achaeans and Spartans felt about Elean actions. As with the Peace of 366/5, perhaps the Spartans were realistic enough to admit that in their current position they could not really help or thus complain.

This did not prevent both the Spartans and the Achaeans from taking their place in the battle line alongside the Eleans at (2nd) Mantinea, but there was by then

¹⁸³ See Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7.211-17 = *SEG* 22. 339; *SV* 285a proving Elis' withdrawal from the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance; cf. *SEG* 29. 405; *SEG* 32. 411; *IvO* 36.

¹⁸⁴ As Roy (1994²), 203 says, 'Athens must have regarded Elis as the aggressor, as it sent help to Arcadia under the mutual defence pact of 366.' The four hundred Athenian cavalry are not mentioned in the action itself.

more at stake than just misplaced pride.¹⁸⁵ After all, according to Xenophon, the Eleans were among those states which had ‘the interests of the Peloponnese at heart’. It was not, of course, the real truth of matters. Elean interests were, from beginning to end, concerned with the interests of Elis. She was going to have back her *perioeci*, whatever her ruling regime, whatever the cost. In this respect she perhaps deserves our condemnation. If so, it can only be in company with condemnation of other narrow-minded, self-interested Greek states. There did, nevertheless, exist one major difference between Elis and Sparta over their respective *perioeci*. Sparta, used to consistent rule over her *perioeci* before 370 and with a glorious past, refused to take part in the alliance formed by the defeated states of Athens, (part of) Arcadia, Achaea, and Phlius after the battle of Mantinea. Elis, used to being parted from her *perioeci* and consistently weak militarily, gladly joined the alliance.¹⁸⁶ The Eleans were thus a part of the Greek Common Peace arising after the battle, the corollary of which was a terse, joint refusal to become involved with Persian problems in 362/1.¹⁸⁷ Elis was therefore prepared to remain parted from some of her *perioeci* indefinitely.¹⁸⁸ Her experiences, compared with those of Sparta and her insistence on living in what Aristophanes might term “cloudcuckooland”, at least kept her in touch with the harsh political realities which now faced the Greek world. It appears that she had enough sense at least to refrain from coming to the aid of the rebellious Megalopolitans, who claimed her help under the terms of the Common Peace, just a year after the battle of Mantinea (Diod. 15.94.1-3). After the previous ten years, the Eleans had, more than most, very good reasons for wanting a quieter life.

¹⁸⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5. 18-27; Diod. 15.85.1-87.6; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 194C, 761D; Polyæn. 2.32; Paus. 8.11.5-10; Aelian *VH* 12.3; Polyb. 12.25 ff. According to Diodorus (15.85.7-8) the Elean cavalry acquitted themselves very ably.

¹⁸⁶ *IG* II² 112 = Tod 144; *SV* 2. 290; cf. Ryder (1965), 88; Roy (1971a), 587.

¹⁸⁷ *IG* IV 556 = Tod 145; *SV* 2. 292; cf. Diod. 15.76.3, 89.1, 90.1-4; Polyb. 4.33.8; Plut. *Ages.* 35.3-4; Ryder (1965), 140-44.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. Dem. 16.16 (c. 353): the Eleans should have the right to recover a part of Triphylia.

Chapter 5 Achaea: the Real Backwater of the Peloponnese?

We have previously bewailed our lack of evidence on various areas of the Peloponnese. When Achaea comes into view there is a plentiful amount of wailing to be done. Do we blame Xenophon, or perhaps Diodorus? The truth is that there was apparently little to tell, and especially for the period 371-361. Ancient Achaea generally kept to a policy of neutrality whenever possible,¹ though this was no easy task, and it is in large part due to this that we have such a dearth of material on the area.² An Athenian or Spartan of the fifth or fourth centuries would have been flabberghasted to discover that in the not so distant future Achaea would be a key player in Greek power politics.

Achaea was somewhat removed from the mainstream of Peloponnesian life, even more so than Elis. She was surrounded by mountain ranges to the south and faced the Corinthian Gulf in the north, which both protected and isolated her. Neighbours such as the Arcadians had difficulty in making and keeping contact with her.³ It may seem surprising that both Polybius (2.41; cf. 4.1.5) and Strabo (8.384) imply that she discovered democracy very early, Polybius even suggesting that she was determined to retain it after she had rejected her monarchy.⁴ We might be sceptical about this claim.⁵ What does seem certain is that the Achaeans were unified from the earliest historical times, far more so, due to their geographical situation, than were the Arcadians. Composed of twelve main cities,⁶ Achaea's constitution remains a mystery. Any attempts to define it fail due to anachronisms – the evidence is basically from after our period. Larsen has discussed the Achaean League's constitution and history before the signing of the King's Peace.⁷ In truth, little is known of this early period. When we speak of an Achaean League we automatically assume that we are speaking of the third century B.C., if not later.⁸ This is because

¹ Even during the Persian invasions: Hammond (1967²), 237.

² For the history of Achaea in general, I here refer the reader once and for all to the articles by Larsen (1953) and Anderson (1954). On Achaean colonization: Hammond (1967²), 118; cf. 130. Only Aegira and Aegion have been excavated to any great degree; cf. Morgan (2000), 205.

³ On the topography see Anderson (1954), 73-76.

⁴ Pausanias (7.24.2) relates that League meetings took place at Aegion in the sanctuary of Zeus. Anderson (1954), 80, thinks this a democratic assembly, but I have doubts about this interpretation.

⁵ Cf. Larsen (1953), 797. Larsen (1968), 89, also doubts that the constitution was 'democratic by the standards of fifth century Greece'.

⁶ Hdt. 1.145; Polyb. 2.41; Strabo 8.7.1; Paus. 7.1 ff.: their lists are not identical. Larsen (1968), 82, notes that Herodotus is speaking of districts here, and that Achaea thus lacked urban centres. Morgan (2000), 210, notes the differences in Achaea's local settlement patterns.

⁷ Larsen (1968), 80-89; cf. Buckler (1980a), 187.

⁸ It was revived in 281/80 after an early third century demise: Larsen (1968), 215-16.

before its rise to major power status under Aratus of Sicyon and his successors,⁹ the League was a something of a bit player in mainstream Greek politics, and it could be argued that during this period she made her biggest impact, albeit briefly, in the 360s. What we can say of the early League is mainly derived from an inscription discovered at Aegium, and although it is not complete it seems to date from the period before 281/80.¹⁰ A treaty with Coronea, but which Coronea is uncertain, it reveals that the League had both a *boule* and *damiorgoi*, but little else. The later League's secretary and *strategoi* are not mentioned, and whether the early League had such is open to conjecture.

Prior to this we have fleeting glances of the Achaeans in Greek history.¹¹ But considering the future, perhaps the first meaningful contact with outsiders centred around the recovery of Tisamenus' bones from Achaea by the Spartans (Paus. 7.1.3), giving her early links, no doubt unwanted, with her later mentors. Like other Peloponnesians, between 480 and 460 Achaea probably turned to resentment of Sparta and opposed her hegemony, but if so, long-term, it was a futile effort.¹² Thucydides provides some useful information on Achaea, and particularly, as we would expect, during the period of the Peloponnesian War.¹³ But in the mid-fifth century Achaea seems to have come under Athenian influence.¹⁴ The Thirty Years' Peace saw Athens surrender Achaea (Thuc. 1.115.1), and thereafter the Achaeans embarked upon a policy of strict neutrality – it was not to last.

The Achaean anomaly is Pellene, the *polis* of the region which lay furthest east, and was thus most open to outside pressure and influence. Larsen has said that 'the Pellenians sometimes go their own way', but if anything, this is an understatement.¹⁵ He argues that Pellene's position near Sicyon left it exposed and

⁹ On the later Achaean League see Larsen (1968), 215-40. Her later success, as noted by Larsen (1968), 80-81, was aided by her acceptance of non-ethnic Achaeans into membership.

¹⁰ *SEG* 14. 375; cf. Larsen (1968), 86.

¹¹ We are told that they arbitrated after the fall of the Pythagoreans in Italy (Polyb. 2.39.4; Strabo 8.7.1; Iamblichus, *Vit. Pyth.* 263), Polybius adding that Caulonia, Croton, and Sybaris were influenced by the Achaean constitution.

¹² Davies (1993²), 41; cf. 154.

¹³ Thuc. 1.115.1; 2.83.3; 84.3; 4.21.3; 5.82.1; 7.34.1, 8 with Larsen (1953), 797-98.

¹⁴ Both Larsen (1953), 798-802, and Anderson (1954), 81-83, find common ground on the possibility of an Achaean-Athenian alliance, but differ over why it came about. Cf. de Ste. Croix (1972), 196-200. The main references are: Thuc. 1.103.3; 108.5; 111.2-3; 2.83.3; 84.4; 86.2; 3.102.2; cf. Diod. 11.84.7; 85; 12.60.3; Plut. *Per.* 19.

¹⁵ Larsen (1953), 797, n. 4.

that by 429 it was a member of the Peloponnesian League.¹⁶ Whilst Patrae made an agreement with Alcibiades in 419 (Thuc. 7.6.4; cf. Plut. *Alc.* 15.3), Pellene stayed within the Spartan alliance.¹⁷ Finally in 417 and following on from the spectacular Spartan victory at (1st) Mantinea, Achaea became a member of the Peloponnesian League as a unit, the Spartan expedition that arrived there probably putting oligarchic governments in place.¹⁸ As with Pellene, the rest of Achaea was to give Sparta loyal service. From 417 to 371 the Achaeans indeed followed the Spartans wherever they led,¹⁹ supplying troops at Nemea in 394 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18-20), where the Pelleneans were the only Spartan allies to stand firm and fall fighting, and to make up the fifth division of the Peloponnesian League reorganisation of 377/6 (Diod.15.31.2).²⁰ In 389 the Spartans even sent an expedition to Acarnania on Achaea's behalf, though it was after she threatened to leave their alliance (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1-14).²¹

Achaea did not lack manpower, though the large numbers of Achaeans that took up mercenary service could suggest that she lacked something in the way of basic resources. Many Achaeans can be detected making a living as mercenaries, and the comparisons with contiguous Arcadia become quite apparent. Names such as Lycon, Phryniscus, Dracon, and Alcimenes are recorded in our sources, all being Achaean mercenaries.²² Achaean and Arcadian mercenaries totalled nearly half of the Greek forces on the march of the Ten Thousand, and Roy estimates the number of Achaeans to have been around 2,000.²³

¹⁶ Larsen (1953), 802-03, and relying on Thuc. 2.83-92. Anderson (1954), 84, envisions a similar sequence of events, but thinks the Thirty Years' Peace allowed Sicyon to intervene and establish an oligarchic government in Pellene. If so, it proved more enduring in its loyalty to Sparta than did that of Sicyon. Notably the seventh and sixth centuries saw much conflict between the pair (*FGH* 105, 2; cf. *Pap. Oxy.* 10. 1241, 3.2 ff.; Aelian *VH* 6.1).

¹⁷ She supplied ships in 413/12 (Thuc. 7.3.2; 106.3) and 373 (Xen. *Hell.* 6.2.3)

¹⁸ Thuc. 5.8.21; cf. 1.19; Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.42-43; Diod. 15.72.5; Arist. *Pol.* 1307b 20. Cf. Hornblower (1991²), 46. Larsen (1953), 797, and Anderson (1954), 85, consider that all Achaean cities were represented in a constitutionally governed League.

¹⁹ Even to the point of allowing Agis to invade Elis through their territory in the invasion of c. 402 (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23). We could say that they had little choice, except for the fact that they subsequently took part in the pillaging of Elis (Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.26).

²⁰ On the latter see Cartledge (1987), 272; Seager (1994²), 168; Stylianou (1998), 281-85.

²¹ Cf. Kelly (1978), 133-41; Cartledge (1979), 286;

²² Parke (1933), 37, 39, 44, and 117 respectively. It is notable how the Pellenian Dracon is singled out, the others being merely 'Achaeans'. See also Griffith (1935), 237-38; Hornblower (1991²), 162.

²³ Roy (1967), 308-09. Roy (1972b), 133, n. 3, notes that seven Achaeans are singled out in the *Anabasis*, and, again, one of them (Philoxenus) is referred to as a Pellenian whilst the rest are 'Achaeans'. It is notable how we lack names of leading Achaeans. Cartledge (1979), 272, puts Achaean (and Arcadian) participation down to over-population.

How much of an effect the earthquake of 373 had on the region is difficult to decide, but it must have had some reverberations.²⁴ Even Delphi across the Corinthian Gulf, seems to have suffered from the same disaster.²⁵ Coming only three years before the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance's invasion of Laconia, it is possible that the Achaeans could not afford to get involved in a struggle of such a nature.

There are many oddities and spurious pieces of evidence that we have left to us from antiquity.²⁶ Although perhaps not in the same category as the infamous Peace of Callias, the supposed Achaean arbitration between Sparta and Thebes after the Battle of Leuctra has caused scholars many problems. Cary has made a spirited defence of Achaea's right to arbitrate.²⁷ The evidence comes from Polybius (2.39.9) and Strabo (8.7.1), who, it should be noted, were writing some time after the event.²⁸ Cary rightly points out that the silence of Xenophon and Diodorus means little; that an Achaean falsifier would get small joy from an event that turned into a fiasco; that Thebes was not popular after Leuctra; that the Spartans saw in arbitration a means by which to salvage some pride in the face of defeat; that the Achaeans were seen as fair-minded; and that Achaea, at first keen to aid Sparta after Leuctra, did not give her help during the 370/69 invasion and for some time following it. All are valid points. But some have to be placed in their correct perspective. A state that had been such a loyal adherent of Sparta as had Achaea would surely be suspect as an independent arbiter. Despite Cary's contrary opinion, we should doubt that a victorious Thebes had much that she wanted to have arbitrated. Leuctra did not see an overnight change of loyalties, many of Sparta's allies not realizing the implications of it immediately. But they were on Sparta's doorstep. The Thebans, somewhat distant from the Peloponnese, knew the enormity of their victory, their vast resources of manpower, and how many Spartiates had been killed at Leuctra. They also knew how badly the

²⁴ See Marinatos (1960), 186 ff. The list of cities cited in Polybius (2.41.7) features Keryneia and Leontion, but from our other sources Aegae, Rhypes, Helice, and Olenos are absent. Diodorus (15.48.3) says Helice and Bura were destroyed (cf. Strabo 1.3.18).

²⁵ Cf. Davies (1998), 1, n. 2. See also Diodorus (15.49.1-6), who states that the earthquake was Poseidon's revenge for Achaean sacrilege (cf. Hdt. 1.145; Strabo 8.7.2, 4; Paus. 7.24.3-7).

²⁶ I include among them the evidence that Dušanic (1991), esp. 85, has used to try and create links between Achaea and the Academy via the membership of Chaeron

²⁷ Cary (1925), 165-66. Grote (1888, 8), 189, forcefully refuted the legitimacy of the evidence, and the cogency of his argument is difficult to ignore. More recently Buckler (1978), 139, has also placed the arbitration under doubt, though Ryder (1965), 70, thinks it possible, and Dušanic (1970a), 282, n. 6, accepts Cary's belief.

²⁸ The opinion of Larsen (1953), 805, n. 37, has some merit: '[t]he story is not impossible, but the account of Polybius is tendentious and exaggerates both the pettiness of the power and the reputation

Spartan cavalry had performed, how easily the Spartan infantry had been outmanoeuvred, and, crucially, how some of Sparta's allies were visibly pleased at results (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.13-15). Thebes was not looking for an arbitration that, whatever the outcome, would make her victory a hollow one, would possibly give the Spartans heart, and would give Sparta's perhaps wavering and certainly disgruntled allies every reason to think that they still needed her.

Leuctra, nevertheless, was a catastrophe for Sparta. Members of her alliance slowly began to drift down the road that would culminate in the events of late 370. At first, before the shock waves had hit home, Sparta still received aid from her allies (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.18). But Achaëa, one of the most loyal, was no different than many others when it came to protecting her interests.²⁹ She probably sent delegates to the Peace of Athens in 371,³⁰ but there was no aid sent to Sparta in the invasion of 370/69. Details are lacking, but she appears to have deserted Sparta without too much delay, and certainly before the invaders landed in Laconia.³¹ Two points are notable here. Firstly, Achaëa may have left Sparta to her fate, but she did not join her enemies. It could be argued that she was never asked, but that in itself says something about her stance. Those who did attack Sparta had something to gain. Elis wanted back her *perioeci*; Arcadia wanted independence and a power base; Argos wanted control of the northeast Peloponnese; and Thebes wanted Greek hegemony. Achaëa had never seemingly wanted anything except to be left in peace.³² Further, unlike Corinth, Phlius, Sicyon, or the cities of the Acte, Achaëa was unlikely to be a particular target for any state. Although not inaccessible, her geographical situation helped her to a large degree in this respect. But also Achaëa's self-imposed isolation meant that she was not a threat to others. She did not even keep strong ties with the still pro-Spartan states of the Corinthia. The Achaeans could be left alone. They had no reason to invade the territory of any other state, and no other state had reason to invade hers. Secondly, Pellene actually sent aid to Sparta in 370/69 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.2-4). Larsen has said that this does not so much speak of Achaean disloyalty, rather of

for virtue of the Achaeans.' As someone who believes that Polybius' bias towards the Achaean League, and thus Achaëa, is underestimated, I am in sympathy with Larsen's comments.

²⁹ On Achaean loyalty to Sparta after Leuctra see Sealey (1976), 420; cf. Seager (1994²), 184.

³⁰ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 187.

³¹ Ryder (1965), 200, n. 2, doubts that Achaëa ever became formally allied to Sparta after the Theban invasion.

³² On the north shore of the Corinthian Gulf lay perhaps her only goals (see below).

Pellene's close relationship with Sparta, which is a correct assessment.³³ The Pelleneans' mission must have seemed a hopeless task, and all credit must be given to them for even attempting it.

When in 369 Epaminondas led the second expedition into the Peloponnese we see no reference to Achaean involvement.³⁴ But once more the Pelleneans were at the forefront of events, the Spartans having enough faith to share the burden of defending the difficult route through Oneum with them.³⁵ The force failed quite miserably in its task, but obviously the Spartans placed much trust in the Pelleneans (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15-16). Unfortunately, Pellene was to feel the burden of failure more than most of the Peloponnesian states which fought alongside Sparta.³⁶ Although not directly stated by Xenophon, She and Sicyon fell, or came to terms, with the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18).³⁷ In Pellene's case, we know this from *Hellenica* 7.2.11-15, where, in 367, the Pellenians joined the Argives, the Boeotian garrison from Sicyon, and the Sicyonians themselves in an attack on Phlius. Pellenian forces no doubt had mixed reactions, to say the least, about attacking a still active Spartan ally. For the rest of Achaea, the policy of neutrality had proved its worth once again.

Achaea, scarcely referred to at all in our sources up to this point, now drops out of the Peloponnesian equation until Epaminondas' third invasion of the Peloponnese in 366 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.41-43).³⁸ There seems no reason for us to think that the Achaeans had been doing anything other than keeping a low profile during this time, or that the Pellenians had been doing anything other than reluctantly following the lead of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance. Although later to be in close contact with the Eleans, at this stage Achaea had no need to establish ties with either them or, as she was also to do later, the Spartans. In fact it was only this third invasion that precipitated those future ties. The Achaeans had watched events pass

³³ Larsen (1953), 805.

³⁴ I have grave doubts concerning the belief of Cartledge (1987), 310, that the Achaeans remained loyal to Sparta. Surely, it was because they stayed neutral that they were not attacked?

³⁵ Cf. Tuplin (1993), 152.

³⁶ The invasion was only a partial success, and Westlake (1975), 28, n. 15, has drawn attention to the fact that Pelopidas was simultaneously in Thessaly with a part of the Boeotian Confederation's army.

³⁷ Cf. Roy (1971a), 576, and (1994²), 191-92; Cartledge (1987), 386. It would seem certain that Pellene had an oligarchic government and, going on what we know of Epaminondas' strategy, was allowed to keep it after coming to terms. On Sicyon, also see Chapter 1.

³⁸ It is the first time in *Hellenica* (7.1.41) that Epaminondas is mentioned, probably due to his hatred for Thebes. See Westlake (1975), 23, n. 3, who points out that neither did Isocrates or Demosthenes ever refer to him by name.

them by. Those that were seen as crucial by many Peloponnesians, such as the Susa conference and its aftermath, seemed distant, even superfluous, to Achaeans who merely wanted to remain in splendid isolation. The invasions of the Peloponnese would always hold some trepidation for them, but as they had escaped two without injury, despite their oligarchic leanings, it appeared that their remoteness was their salvation. This illusion was about to be shattered.

Whether we blame, as many scholars have done, the Arcadian (and possibly Achaean) democrats for their collusion in overturning Epaminondas' arrangements,³⁹ the Thebans themselves for acting on their complaints,⁴⁰ or whether we blame Epaminondas for invading in the first place,⁴¹ is open to question. Events had a snowball effect, and it could be said that the Arcadian attitude as typified by the behaviour of Lycomedes (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23-24) was ultimately responsible for Epaminondas seeking to bring the Arcadians into line. Whatever one's opinion, this third invasion was aimed exclusively at Achaea, and was attempted not because the Achaeans were a problem, but because the Arcadians were becoming one.⁴² Epaminondas and the Thebans viewed Arcadia's independent stance with some disdain. Although never official, Thebes was the leading power of the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance,⁴³ and Arcadia's blatant disregard of Theban wishes had to be addressed. A call to arms by Thebes would test the Arcadians' resolve and bring them into line. If they failed to answer, then the writing was on the wall.⁴⁴ Achaea was a scapegoat and an easy target. A hopeless task facing them, Achaea's oligarchs approached Epaminondas soon after his arrival in their territory and came to terms with him.⁴⁵ Few could have guessed that such a simple agreement would have such

³⁹ Cartledge (1987), 388, thinks Epaminondas' arrangements were 'wise'.

⁴⁰ As does Cawkwell (1972), 268-69, whilst doubting the involvement of the Achaean democrats. Dušanic (1970a), 297, believes they were involved, which also applies to Buckler (1980a), 190-91, who stresses that Epaminondas' arch-rival Meneclidas probably combined with Lycomedes to overturn the arrangements. Beloch (*GG*² III. 2.), 238 ff., argues that the deed was done by the incoming Boeotarchs of 367/6.

⁴¹ Buckler (1980a), 187, believes that theoretically Epaminondas had every right to invade Achaea because it had never formally concluded a peace with Thebes: *contra* Beloch (*GG*² III. 1.), 187. If this had any bearing, we might wonder why he did not invade earlier.

⁴² Cf. Roy (1971a), 579

⁴³ Buckler (1980a), 221-22, has made the point that this was never officially the case, and was perhaps a major reason for the failure of both the Alliance and the Theban hegemony.

⁴⁴ Cf. Westlake (1975), 24; Buckler (1980a), 187-88.

⁴⁵ Cf. Larsen (1953), 806. Westlake (1975), 27, makes the interesting suggestion that the Achaean oligarchs might have been deceiving Epaminondas over their loyalty from the first. I doubt that to be the case. We have no reports of disloyalty prior to the Thebans changing Epaminondas' arrangements, and up until this point the Achaean oligarchs may have been unhappy but not enough to actually rebel. Buckler (1980a), 188-89, is nearer the mark when he suggests that the federal officials who approached

serious repercussions. It was extremely naïve of Epaminondas to have the Achaeans swear allegiance to Thebes without reference to her allies within the Alliance. This placed Thebes in the position of overlord and imperialist, her allies, particularly the Arcadians, in the position of subordinates, and the Achaeans in the position of being allied to Thebes but owing nothing to her Peloponnesian neighbours. Worse, if Diodorus (15.75.2) is relating events chronologically, it is possible that Epaminondas made terms *first* and then went on to liberate Dyme (cf. Ephorus *FGH* 70 F84), Naupactus, and Calydon,⁴⁶ perhaps without reference to the Achaean leadership.⁴⁷ For all we know the opponents of Epaminondas' arrangements may have included Achaean democrats and also some of the Argives and Eleans.⁴⁸ Some Arcadians were definitely such, and a delegation went to Thebes to complain, specifically playing on the dangers of the past relationship between Achaea and Sparta being reactivated in the near future.⁴⁹ Whether down to personal rivalries within Thebes or because of a genuine worry that the Alliance was on the brink of extinction, the Thebans overturned Epaminondas' Achaean agreement and sent harmosts and, it seems, garrisons to the region.⁵⁰ What followed was to totally re-shape the history of the 360s.

Whoever we lay the blame on, the invasion had turned out to be a blunder of immense proportions.⁵¹ If there were Achaean democrats involved in the mission to

Epaminondas were fully aware that the Sicyonians and Pellenians had dealt with him and still retained their constitutions. Thus they would have no reason to suspect that Epaminondas' decision would not merely be rubber stamped by the Boeotian Confederation. There is also the distinct possibility that Achaea's oligarchs thought it better to deal now with a power that was some distance away from them but could, as a direct ally, offer some protection, rather than later with close neighbours, and in particular the Arcadians, many of whom would have no sympathy for an oligarchy that was almost on their doorstep.

⁴⁶ Cf. Tuplin (1993), 74-75.

⁴⁷ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 188. The importance of these cities is open to question. Roy (1971a), 579, believes they were of 'strategic value', which seems reasonable, whilst Buckler (1980a), 189-90, has correctly denied that they were anything to do with future Theban naval policy in the Aegean. Naupactus and Calydon, across the Corinthian Gulf, were, naturally, claimed by the Aetolians. The Achaeans had thus garrisoned Calydon in 390 (Xen. *Hell.* 4.6.1). The three cities were freed eventually, and Buckler (1980a), 190, believes they were quickly re-taken. The Aetolians only re-took Naupactus and Calydon in 338 (cf. McQueen (1995), 336). Stylianou (1998), 480-81, considers the pair garrisoned because of the Aetolian threat, but Dyme because of its close proximity to Elis or because of a possible democratic revolt supported by the Arcadians.

⁴⁸ Cf. Westlake (1975), 27; Roy (1994²), 197-98.

⁴⁹ Achaean loyalty to Sparta had been very consistent in the past, and the speech of the Thebans (Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8-15, esp. 12) at Athens in 395 was calculated to gain Athenian support. Thus the point about Achaean dissatisfaction with Spartan leadership should not be taken too seriously.

⁵⁰ Harmosts: Seager (1974), 61. Garrisons: see Buckler (1980a), 192-93, although his belief that these were merely sent as protection has to be treated carefully. The Thebans, as we know, were prone to planting garrisons in the Peloponnese as "protection".

⁵¹ Cf. Tuplin (1993), 154.

Thebes, and we should not necessarily think otherwise, then did the Achaean League still now exist as such? Epaminondas had promised that there would be no exiles made of any Achaeans, and so the oligarchs remained, still in charge of affairs. The Theban harmosts drove them and their mode of government out of the Achaean cities. This was done with the aid of Achaean democrats, the government of Achaea inevitably becoming a democracy. The region thus pre-empted the split in the Arcadian League, becoming effectively two separate camps. Unlike the situation in many states, Achaea seems to have had, if not a majority, then a very sizable minority of oligarchs. A reaction was inevitable and quick in coming.⁵²

Determined to win back control of their cities, the Achaean oligarchs regrouped and took each one in turn. This would be during the late spring to late summer of 366. Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.43) informs us that the Achaeans now went over to Sparta and were once more keen to fight on her behalf; and also that the Arcadians therefore found themselves pressed hard from both north and south. We might see some justice in this outcome. No doubt the Achaeans were encouraged in their endeavours by the news that Aeneas of Stymphalus had removed what was, at least in theory, a democratic government from contiguous Sicyon in a retaliatory move against Epaminondas' arrangements in Achaea. With the Arcadian League quite obviously in some disarray, the Elean democracy experiencing similar problems, and both states at loggerheads with each other over the *perioecic* question, there appeared to be light at the end of the Achaean oligarchic tunnel. If both the Thebans and Argives were disenchanted with Arcadia, then so much the better. At this point it is probable that contact, at least, was being established between Achaean and Elean oligarchs. The knowledge that Sparta stood in the background hardly dampened the Achaeans' ardour.⁵³

The Oropus affair and the subsequent Arcadian-Athenian alliance of 366 placed a damper on matters to some extent, only relieved by the death of Lycomedes. The Achaeans were however back in control of their own territory, the question was could they hold on to it. By now, although it is difficult to pinpoint a date, the Pellenians had thrown off their forced alliance and were back in the pro-Spartan camp (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.2.17-23; cf. 7.4.17). They may have been aided by the Achacan oligarchs, who themselves were taking great risks. The Peace of 366/65 would not

⁵² Cf. Gehrke (1985), 14-15.

⁵³ Cf. Roy (1971a), 585.

have been attended by the Achaeans. The states which did attend (with the exception of Elis – if she attended) now had nothing to do with Achaea's problems, as neither did the conference itself.⁵⁴ The Achaeans would have shown little reaction to Sparta's loss of her northeast Peloponnesian allies. They had served no purpose for the Achaeans, and their departure might even allow Sparta to fully concentrate her resources on the northwest Peloponnese.

In 365 the Spartan move on Sellasia (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12) and that of the Eleans on Lasion (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.12-13) left the Achaeans sidelined. They, after all, had no reason to mobilize. But matters went very badly for the Eleans thereafter, the Arcadians getting into the *agora* of Elis and taking much of her outlying territory (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.13-14). The Achaeans deserve all credit for becoming involved in the defence of Elis shortly afterwards, and included among their number the Pellenians. But after throwing back an Arcadian invasion, the retreating forces discovered that the Pellenian town of Olorus was thus unguarded and wasted no time in seizing it (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.16-18).⁵⁵ What becomes clear from Xenophon's account is that Pellene had only a small number of oligarchs, and that she also possessed an active and perhaps numerous democratic faction. This may help to explain why Pellene fell to the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance back in 369. *Stasis* followed, the Pellenians attacking both the Arcadians in Olorus and their own democrats throughout the area. Eventually they re-took Olorus, but nothing more is spoken about the situation throughout the length of the *Hellenica*.

The Elean attack on Olympia in 364 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28-32) would probably never have gone ahead if the Achaeans had not given the Eleans their full support.⁵⁶ Neither state was seen as a threat to the bigger powers within Greece, and it is a tribute to their prowess and courage that they won an overwhelming victory against Arcadian and Argive forces on day one, and were only prevented from following this up the next day by the barricades their scared opponents had erected. The Arcadian League split which followed (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33-40; cf. Diod. 15.78.1-3) set the scene for a final showdown. At *Hellenica* 7.5.1-2 we discover the Achaeans, as we would expect, joining the mainly oligarchic alliance alongside Elis and Sparta. Although

⁵⁴ Cf. Cawkwell (1961), 86.

⁵⁵ Cf. Dušanic (1970a), 302; Roy (1971a), 583.

⁵⁶ Cf. Stylianou (1998), 493.

there is a hint by Xenophon that the Achaeans were at (2nd) Mantinea (Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.18), it is Diodorus who establishes their presence in the battle line (15.85.2).

The Achaeans, after their experiences, were keen to stay with an alliance, even though defeated, which guaranteed all members' constitutions.⁵⁷ They was a signatory to the alliance made after (2nd) Mantinea which only Sparta rejected,⁵⁸ and probably to the reply which refused aid to the Persian satraps.⁵⁹ As a small state initially uninterested in the political wranglings within the Peloponnese, Achaea had ended a decade of threats and invasions with her pride intact. She had helped her neighbours at risk of great cost to herself, and had perhaps earned the respect of these and her opponents. Although more than most she had avoided constant warfare, what she could claim was to have actually played a vital role in settling issues. Her stand against an imposed government in 366 in many respects changed the subsequent history of the Peloponnese. But perhaps her democrats would not see things in quite the same light. In many respects their struggle was now an impossible task.

⁵⁷ Mosley (1971), 326.

⁵⁸ *IG* II² 112 = Tod 144 = *SV* 2. 290; cf. Ryder (1965), 88; Roy (1971a), 593-94. See also the comments of Roy (1971a), 587, on the term *politeia*.

⁵⁹ *IG* IV 556 = Tod 145 = *SV* 2. 292; cf. Ryder (1965), 140-44.

Chapter 6 Arcadia: Oligarchy: the Enemy Within?

By 362/1 the Arcadian League lay in two separate divisions. Although they had a bearing on matters, it was not so much external as internal forces which had caused what appeared to be an abrupt termination to this experiment in pan-Arcadian, democratic politics. On the field of (2nd) Mantinea that part of the League which was oligarchically inclined, along with similar-minded allies, tasted defeat at the hands of its democratic counterpart, which was aided and abetted by states of similar outlook to herself from both the Peloponnese and central Greece.¹ One may take the view that in 370 it would have been impossible to forecast such a termination to Arcadian unity after such short a period. In fact the truth is that it was entirely predictable, and the surprise element is that the League remained relatively in tact as long as it did.

The terms of the treaty to which states of the oligarchic faction swore after the battle explain exactly what reasons had led them to fight in the first place. As Mosley has said of the treaty, it 'not only guaranteed assistance in repelling attacks on territory but also in maintaining the current political regime in each state'.² Athens, the only democratic signatory, had long worried about Theban ambitions. Achaea and Phlius had strong oligarchic leanings and were traditionally of pro-Spartan outlook, and thus automatically concerned over Thebes' power.³ Both the Arcadian faction and Elis now also had a similar outlook towards Thebes, but paradoxically had only a short time previously seen in her their route to salvation. In both of their cases the Theban threat to the freedom of the Peloponnese (that is, as matters are seen by Xenophon: cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.5.1-2) had only recently seemed no threat at all, but this was when both also had democratic governments in control of their domestic affairs. Herein lies the answer to the question of what caused the problems of the 360s.

Whilst state nationalism would have the greatest appeal to many Peloponnesians, just how the state was run could overtake such considerations, with power, as ever, being the deciding issue. For the lower-classes especially it was in their prime interest to ensure they did not fall victims to politically, and thus ultimately economically, oppressive regimes. Xenophon said that with regard to territory and power The battle of (2nd) Mantinea solved nothing (*Xen. Hell.* 7.5.27).

¹ The ancient sources for the campaign of (2nd) Mantinea are: *Xen. Hell.* 7.5.6-17; *Diod.* 15.82.5-84.2; *Plut. Ages.* 34.3-5; *Mor.* 346 B-E; *Polyaen.* 2.3.10; *Polyb.* 9.8.2-13; *Justin* 6.7. Cf. Westlake (1975), 29-40; Buckler (1980a), 208-19; Cartledge (1987), 235-36.

² *JG* 2² 112 = *Tod* 144 = *SV* 290; Mosley (1971), 326.

³ Sparta herself naturally refused to swear to any treaty that in-effect guaranteed the future of Messenia.

Neither did it do such economically, and this problem would continue to blight Peloponnesian politics well into the future.⁴

Arcadia had a reputation for being a poor region throughout the length and breadth of ancient Greece, and we may be sceptical about recent attempts to adjust this picture.⁵ We might, for example, doubt that mercenary service in Arcadia was anything less than a necessity, and Roy's reasoning that Arcadians adopted 'a highly distinctive social pattern as a response to the limited economic resources of their homeland' surely supports this view.⁶ The population of Arcadia was not negligible by Greek standards of the time,⁷ and this factor would have had a bearing on the existing economic situation within the area. Economic divisions therefore led to *stasis* between rich and poor, and these were never so clearly demonstrated as during the period 371-361.⁸

A common ethnicity was recognised amongst the Arcadians themselves, but this bond had never been strong enough to unite them politically.⁹ Indeed, what little

⁴ See Cartledge and Spawforth (1989), esp. 38-58, on the Peloponnesian economic plight and the attempts of Agis IV and Cleomenes III to solve it to Sparta's benefit.

⁵ Both Dušanic (1970a), 299, n. 81, and, with reference to Mantinea in particular, Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 265-66, 278, 288, subscribe to the traditional view. Recently Nielsen and Roy (2001), and Roy (1999b, 2001, and forthcoming) have presented impressive evidence refuting the idea that Arcadia was poor. Nevertheless, as Roy (2001), 264, himself has noted 'the economic potential of Arkadia was limited by the natural environment.' This, I believe was Arcadia's problem. Thus whilst it may have possessed natural resources quite comparable with other areas of Greece, though notably not metal (cf. Roy (forthcoming)) and may have had a trusted road network, possibly developed in part by Sparta (Pikoulas (1999), 248-319), both were limited in their effectiveness due to Arcadia's isolated geographical situation (see Thuc. 1.120.2; cf. Roy (forthcoming), and (2000b), 133-35). On the relationship between Arcadia's economy and her settlement pattern and defence system see now Jost (1999b), 192-247. I firmly believe that the report of Polybius (2.62.12), though many years after our period, that just 300 talents were acquired in 223 for the sale of Mantinea and its moveable property is decisive here. Similar is the story much earlier, Herodotus (8.26.1) informing us that some Arcadians even offered their services to Xerxes in 480 because they lacked life's necessities.

⁶ Roy (1999b), 349. On the predominance of Arcadians among the "ten thousand" see Roy (1967), esp. 303-09, 319, and (1972b), 129-36. On Arcadian mercenaries in general see Parke (1933), 11, 14 ff., 19, 23 ff., 37, 85, 93; Griffith (1935), 237-38. As far back as Gelon's tyranny we can trace well-travelled Arcadian mercenaries: cf. Pindar *Olymp.* 6 (Agesias of Stymphalus); Paus. 5.27.1 (Phormis of Maenalus); *Olympia*, vol. 5 Inscr. 266 (Praxiteles of Mantinea). Xenophon's remark that the Greeks who went on the *Anabasis* were not poverty-stricken (Xen. *Anab.* 6.4.8) has been successfully challenged by Cawkwell (1972), 43-44. For an excellent appraisal of why Greeks turned to mercenary service see Cartledge (1987), 316-17.

⁷ Cf. Roy (1999b), 340-42.

⁸ The Arcadians were prodigious temple builders, but these efforts, especially in the Archaic period, should not lead us to believe in great wealth residing within the individual communities of Arcadia. Many such constructions could have been joint projects sponsored by combinations of states, and perhaps also reflected regional differences, the southern Arcadians appearing to be more consistent in this respect than their northern neighbours; see Voyatzis (1999), 130-168.

⁹ Cf. Hansen (1999), 80-88; Morgan (1999), 321-82; Nielsen (1999), 16-79; and Roy (1999b), 7-8, and (2000b), 135-37: all of whom trace threads of an Arcadian identity pre-dating the Classical period, in Morgan's case actually dating back as far as the Iron Age. Psophis, for example, may have had an Arcadian identity in the sixth century; cf. Hecataeus *FGrH* (no. 1) fr. 6; Roy (forthcoming).

evidence we have of Arcadian history often serves as proof of her disunity. That Sparta adopted a divide and rule strategy towards Arcadia is understandable, and it particularly came into play where Mantinea and Tegea were concerned.¹⁰ These two cities, the most powerful in Arcadia, and therefore also the most influential, were always an obvious threat to continued Spartan hegemony over the Arcadians. During the mid-sixth century Tegea, whether duped by the “Orestes policy” or otherwise, may have become Sparta’s first Peloponnesian ally.¹¹ By the early fifth century probably all Arcadian cities had also become Spartan allies. Certainly Herodotus (9.77) tells of the Mantineans’ late arrival for the battle of Plataea, and she was also an anomaly, alongside Elis, within the Peloponnesian League for her democratic stance (see Ch. 4).¹² Nevertheless, she did not side with her fellow Arcadians during their flirtation with Argos, which took place in the two decades following the battle;¹³ and she also gave aid to Sparta during the revolt of her helots which followed the earthquake of the 460s.¹⁴ During the early fifth century Arcadia issued its own coinage, and our evidence may suggest that Tegea was at the centre of matters.¹⁵ What becomes plain is that Mantinea was staunchly pro-Spartan after Plataea, whereas Tegea, seemingly loyal to Sparta before it, was quite the opposite.

We may thus find it surprising that Larsen can say of the Tegeans that they ‘appear to have been faithful allies and later, much of the time, the most trusted

¹⁰ Cf. Andrewes (1952), 1-5; Brunt (1965), 255-80; Larsen (1968), 181; Cartledge (1987), 257. On Mantinean and Tegean history to 370, see Cartledge (1987), 257-62.

¹¹ Hdt. 1.67-68; cf. Paus. 7.1.3; see Forrest (1980²), 74; Adshear (1986), 30; Cartledge (1979), 139. Note also the treaty with Tegea: Plut. *Mor.* 292B; *Quaest. Graec.* 5; Arist. fr. 592 Rose; *SV* 112; cf. Michell (1952), 28 ff., and Cartledge (1979), 138-39. Oliva (1971), 136, thinks the Tegean treaty was made because of Sparta’s failure against her; Kagan (1969), 10-11, and Michell (1952), 28-30, believe Tegea was defeated. Polyaeus (2.10.3) tells us that Tegean aristocrats betrayed their city to Sparta.

¹² The Mantineans were late whilst the Tegeans, especially, and Orchomenians performed well: cf. Hdt. 7.202, 9.77; Paus. 5.23; Tod 19. The city became a democracy during the fifth century, we are not certain as to when but certainly by 418 (see Nielsen (1996b), 90); cf. Thuc. 5.29.1; Hdt. 9.77.1-2; Strabo 8.3.2; Arist. *Pol.* 6.4, 1318b 25-27.

¹³ Herodotus (9.35) tells of five Spartan victories being forecast, all of which came about. Plataea (479) and Tanagra (457) book-ended victories, on dates unknown to us, against the Tegeans and Argives (at Tegea), the Arcadians, except the Mantineans (at Dipaea), and the Messenians (near Ithome). Cf. Wallace (1954), 32-35. On the possible involvement of Themistocles in events: see Andrewes (1952), 1-5; Forrest (1960), 221-41; cf. O’Neil (1981), 335-46.

¹⁴ Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3. On the earthquake: Thuc. 1.101 ff.; Diod. 11.63 ff.; Plut. *Cim.* 16.6 f.; Polyaeus. 1.41.3. Sources for the earthquake are in Hill (1951); on dating see Reece (1962).

¹⁵ On the ‘Arkadikon’ coinage: cf. Williams (1965) and Kraay (1976). Roy (1972d) believes some form of league existed; *contra* Nielsen (1996a), 39-62, who thinks the coinage either Tegean but unrelated to any league, or simply an attempt to advertise the pan-Arcadian games; see also the doubts of Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 260, n. 67. The machinations of King Cleomenes, I suspect, did constitute the essence of some form of early league, however basic and tentative it might have been.

members of the Peloponnesian League'.¹⁶ In fact he is quite correct.¹⁷ Whatever took place in Arcadia, whatever the involvement, if any, of Sparta, Tegea on our available evidence did become a Spartan loyalist. The influence of Mantinea on this state of affairs would not have been negligible. Particularly enlightening is Thucydides' outlining of Mantinea's attempts to construct a mini-empire within Arcadia during the Peloponnesian War; how far back its origins went, we are uncertain.¹⁸ The Spartans successfully destroyed Mantinean ambitions, but the thirty years' agreement reached with the Mantineans in 418/17 did not see them fully integrated into the Peloponnesian League on the basis that Sparta would have preferred.¹⁹ As we have seen with Elis, the Spartans would not entirely forget how the democracies within her alliance had let her down at a crucial moment in her fortunes.

Prior to these hostilities the Mantineans and Tegeans, with their own Arcadian allies on either side, had come to blows at Laodocium in 423.²⁰ Whilst Sparta may have been clandestinely supportive of Tegean efforts, and even pleased to see Arcadian in-fighting, she would not be over-joyed at either side having allies within Arcadia – her divide and rule policy did not allow for individual cities constructing alliances that could threaten her own hegemony. But it is highly probable that several Arcadian cities were already ambitious in this direction, and if not so at this moment, would be in the near future.²¹ Further, Arcadia also possessed several tribal conglomerations in the shape of the Azanians, Cynurians, Maenaliens, and

¹⁶ Larsen (1968), 182.

¹⁷ The statement of Dušanic (1970a), 290, that Tegea was 'often an enemy of the Lacedaemonians' is unwarranted.

¹⁸ Thuc. 4.134.1-2; 5.28.3-29.2; 5.33.1-3; 5.47 (=SV 193); 5.67.2; 5.81.1. At 5.61-62 the Orchomenians are overcome by the combined forces of Mantinea, Argos, Athens, and Elis (all of which, notably, were democratic *poleis*); and at 5.67.1 the Tegeans, Heraeans, and Maenaliens are with the Spartans. Obviously many Arcadians were worried about one of their own number gaining control of the region, the period 421-18 already seeing the Parrhasians and some Maenaliens under Mantinean domination; cf. Nielsen (1996a), 132-43, and (1996b), 80-81. See Cartledge (1979), 253; cf. Mitsos (1983), 243-49.

¹⁹ Thuc. 5.81.1; cf. Cartledge (1987), 242-43, 258; Nielsen (1996b), 91-92.

²⁰ Thuc. 4.134; on these events see Larsen (1968), 181-83. On the political situations in Mantinea and Tegea during the Archaic period see Gehrke (1985), 101-03.

²¹ We are not certain about dating on this matter. The evidence is discussed by Nielsen (1996b), who believes that not only Mantinea and Tegea, but also Cleitor and Orchomenus were heads of epichoric leagues. For the epigraphic evidence on the latter see Rhodes (1995). Our main evidence for Tegea is basically that of Thucydides 4.134 (above). Mantinea can be linked to Nestane and Helisson by 370 (cf. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 246-48; Nielsen (1996b), 66-70; SEG 37. 340), as well as the Parrhasians and (some) Maenaliens previously (see above). On Cleitor see Nielsen (1996b), 86-87. On Orchomenus see Nielsen (1996b), 84-86; Dušanic (1978), 338-40 (Euaimon); Roy (1972a), 78-80 (the expansion of Orchomenus into Methydrium, Teuthis, and Thisoa brought about war with Cleitor; cf. Paus. 8.27.4; *IPark* no. 14). For the evidence of internal Arcadian clashes see Roy (1972d), 339-40.

Parrhasians. All could perhaps be a threat to Arcadian unity, but were also open to encroachment, as we have seen, from more organised and powerful neighbours.²²

Neither did Arcadia's rather unique geographical situation help her in some respects. She was in the unusual position of bordering on every Peloponnesian region, which, we might suppose, would help her communicate with her neighbours. But other factors complicated matters. Situated in the central, rugged highland of the Peloponnese, the Arcadians were the descendants of one of the peninsula's indigenous peoples; even their dialect (Arcado-Cyprian) was unique. In many ways their geographical setting shaped their history. The mountains of Arcadia, Erymanthos (2224m.), Chelmos (2355m.), and Cyllene (2376m.), were difficult of access, serving to guarantee their inhabitants' remoteness from the mainstream of Peloponnesian life, and even from each other. Central to the whole was the fertile plain we know as Tripolis, worth fighting for and thus a stumbling block to a unified Arcadia.²³ The Arcadians thus saw not only Greeks but also their fellow Arcadians as being, to use the term very loosely, the "other". Crucially, Sparta needed a route north for her army's movements, and the plain of Tripolis lay across that very outlet.²⁴

Within Arcadia, then, lay some solid obstacles to unification. There were differences between *poleis* and between tribes; between richer and poorer elements; between the regions themselves. All were ideal targets for exploitation by external forces. Until the uncertainty following Leuctra, only Sparta had really been in a position to take advantage of the situation. Once Leuctra was a fact, that situation was about to be changed irrevocably. The victory in the Peloponnesian War seemed to have given Sparta unhindered control of the Greek world, let alone control of Arcadia, and she had no qualms about settling old issues. Unlike the case with Elis, she could do little about Mantinea immediately because of the thirty years' treaty. On its expiry in c. 385/4, she wasted no time in amending matters.²⁵ Fear of objections from other Arcadians was not an issue, and certainly not from the loyal, Mantinea-hating

²² Azania, in the far north of Arcadia, is a strange concept, and drops out of our source material very early (cf. Nielsen and Roy (1998)). On the other tribes see Nielsen (1996b); Roy (1972e, which has been somewhat revised in Roy, 1996).

²³ It is worth noting that landlocked Arcadia could only gain access to the sea by adding Lepreum and Triphylia to its domains. The sceptical may see more to the Arcadians' acquisition of this area than just a concern with justice for their brother "Arcadians" within it.

²⁴ Cf. Roy (1994²), 194.

²⁵ Cawkwell (1979), 257 and note, believes that on the strength of Thuc. 5.81.1 the treaty between Mantinea and Sparta had already expired before the King's Peace was made.

Tegeans.²⁶ As she had done with Elis, Sparta had compiled a list of grievances against Mantinea,²⁷ and the eventual outcome would be the city's dioecism into four or five small villages. This was an additional variation to Sparta's familiar divide and rule policy.²⁸

What happened at Mantinea in c. 385/4 had a bearing on what was to occur there in 370. From Sparta's viewpoint the Mantineans had much to answer for. Her complaints were based on Mantinea's previous conduct over several years. If the events of 423-418/17 were not already enough, the Spartans also considered the Mantineans guilty of sending corn to the Argives in time of war; using periods of sacred truce to avoid service in the Peloponnesian League's expeditions; acquitting themselves badly when they did serve; and showing delight at any Spartan setbacks (*Xen. Hell.* 5.2.2).²⁹ The proclamation that Mantinea's walls be dismantled, the

²⁶ Polyaeus (2.25) states that some of Sparta's allies aided the Mantineans. The supposed Theban aid to Mantinea is fictional: cf. Buckler (1980b), 179-85.

²⁷ Cf. Seager (1974), 39-40, who notes that Spartan actions saw no reference to the King's Peace of 387/6, and Diodorus (15.5.1) accuses the Spartans of violating its precepts. Stylianos (1998), 173, is probably correct in suggesting that Sparta used the autonomy clause encapsulated within the King's Peace against Mantinea, whilst the Mantineans themselves were moving closer towards Argos (see *IG II²* 33 (cf. *Dem.* 20.59) on Spartan involvement with Thasos). He also thinks (1998), 414, it possible that those expelled in c. 385/4 were later involved in Argos' *skytalismos*. Dušanic (1970a), 286, n. 31, considering links between Arcadia, Argos, and Athens, thinks that *IG II²* 33, if dated to c. 382, proves Athens a haven for those Mantineans who were expelled (cf. Cartledge (1987), 260-61). Though one may wonder why these pro-Argives did not go to Argos.

²⁸ The sources differ. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.7) thinks four villages. Diodorus 15.5.4, Strabo 8.3.2, and Ephorus *FGH* 70 F79 all believe it was five, as does Moggi (1976), 152. See also Diod. 15.12.1-2; Paus. 9.13.1; Plut. *Pel.* 4; Isoc. 8.100; Polyb. 4.27.6; Suda s.v. *Agis*. Pausanias (8.8.9) may solve the riddle if we accept that one group remained in the city whilst the other four moved back to their villages: cf. Stylianos (1998), 175. Interestingly, Diodorus (15.5.1-5) tells of an appeal to Athens by the Mantineans. For discussions of the event see: Whibley (1896), 180; Amit (1973), 173-74; Lintott (1982), 231; Cartledge (1987), 226, 258-61; Tuplin (1993), 87-90; Seager (1994²), 156-57; Stylianos (1998), 173-76, 188-91.

²⁹ It should also be noted that Mantineans had served, alongside Argives, with Athens during the Sicilian expedition of 415-13 (*Thuc.* 6.29, 43, 61, 67). In relation to half-hearted Mantinean service, the Spartans had been ridiculing the Mantineans' efforts for some five years (*Xen. Hell.* 4.4.17); and the delight at Spartan failure can be seen when Agesilaus singled out Mantinea as the city to be avoided when returning home after the disaster at Lechaem (*Xen. Hell.* 4.5.18). We may imagine that the Mantineans were also a part of those allies who were present and pleased at Sparta's humbling at Leuctra (*Xen. Hell.* 6.4.15). The strong support sent by Mantinea to Sparta immediately following the defeat (*Xen. Hell.* 6.4.18) does not contradict this view. What it does reflect is the differences within the citizen body at Mantinea. 'Being then governed by an aristocracy' is how Xenophon explains the extent of this support. In other words, those in control were backed in their positions by Sparta. Possibly a majority of Mantineans, those of lesser wealth and standing within the community but forming the largest part of the Mantinean army, were very much opposed to a Spartan hegemony which kept them from power within their own city. Following Leuctra even some of Mantinea's aristocrats, already perhaps disenchanted with Spartan actions in c. 385/4 and possibly small in numbers, were probably ready to defect to the democratic cause. Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.7) tells of the aristocrats being pleased at the dioecism. This would probably speak for the greater part of them, but not for every single aristocrat. Later, in the aftermath of Leuctra, some would have gathered which way the wind was blowing and decided that ancient ties were not as compelling as the prospect of newfound power without Spartan interference: democracy perhaps suddenly had an appeal.

pretext being that the Spartans thought the Mantineans capable of betraying them to their enemies,³⁰ was rejected outright. Only after Agesipolis' wall around the city had failed to humble the Mantineans and he resorted to flooding it by damming up the nearby river, which did change their minds, was the demand for dioecism issued (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.4-5). The Mantineans complied, but when we discover that some sixty Mantinean democrats and pro-Argives feared for their lives, we see the real reason behind Sparta's mission. An ally which was democratic in outlook had been reluctantly tolerated, but the fear of a democratic ally which, besides her other crimes, had links with Argos was too much to bear. The report that the members of the aristocratic party could not keep their hands off their democratic counterparts seals the matter (*Xen. Hell.* 5.2.6), and collusion with Spartan officials prior to Agesipolis' arrival is certainly not out of the question. The Spartans, despite the statement of Diodorus (15.12.2) to the contrary, now effectively placed an oligarchy in power at Mantinea (*Xen. Hell.* 5.2.7).³¹

Roy has noted that when the Mantineans reverted to democratic government in 370 the change took place within the existing Mantinean constitution.³² There is no reason to doubt that the same constitution was in force in c. 385/4, and that the same process occurred but with the change being in favour of the oligarchs.³³ The sixty ejected Mantinean democrats are enigmatic. Cartledge has pointed out that there appears to be two parties involved, one pro-Argive, the other merely pro-democracy, but that both were firmly democratic in tendency. He also thinks that Agesilaus' refusal of command was designed to place the the young Agesipolis in an embarrassing situation.³⁴ The split in the democratic camp had no doubt hindered the democratic cause in Mantinea, one strand wanting to couple their efforts with those of Argos, the other, perhaps wary of the example set at Corinth during the 390s, when her democrats virtually delivered the city into Argive hands,³⁵ remaining firmly nationalist in stance. For us, the reluctance of Agesilaus to lead the campaign is of

³⁰ Following on the King's Peace, one may wonder just who these "enemies" were at this juncture.

³¹ Diodorus (15.5.1-4) may be correct in stating that Sparta wanted oligarchic governments in all Greek cities, as tried in Boeotia earlier.

³² Roy (1971a), 570, and (1994²), 206.

³³ See the views of Lintott (1982), 231, who envisions the oligarchy retaining the electoral college for the choosing of magistrates and limiting the assembly's decision-making abilities, especially as the dioecism would have decreased the numbers attending.

³⁴ Cartledge (1987), 259-60; *contra* Stylianou (1998), 189-91.

³⁵ See Griffiths (1950), 235-56; Tomlinson (1972), 130-39; Tuplin (1982), Salmon (1984), 354-62; Whitby (1984), 295-308; Thompson (1986), 155-71.

some importance because of the reason for his refusal. It was because, he said, of the aid given to his father by the Mantineans against the Messenians (that is, during the revolt of the 460s: cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3). The doubts of Cartledge are groundless, Agesilaus being genuine in his convictions.³⁶ This is proved by the very fact that when the Mantinean revolt of 370 was underway, it was Agesilaus who went to treat with the Mantineans due to his long-standing family ties with them (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.4). There is therefore no need to read something deeper into his refusal in 385/4.³⁷ So Sparta seemed to have got her way, and the leading Mantineans, once the division into villages had been undertaken, were also now seemingly in control of a happier citizen body which gladly answered Sparta's call-up, according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 5.2.7). Sparta, as she would also learn in the case of Elis, had actually lost more than she had gained by her actions, and the backlash would not be long in coming.

If Leuctra brought a smile to some Mantinean faces, then the conference following it at Athens served to make that smile wider.³⁸ How many of Sparta's allies attended is unknown, but they all appear to have been invited.³⁹ The implication from *Hellenica* 6.5.1-3 is that many did attend. The implication from *Hellenica* 6.5.4 ff. is that the Mantineans were certainly present, because it took them little time to spearhead the movement towards a free, democratic Mantinea and a united Arcadia

³⁶ Rice (1974) takes a very similar view to Cartledge, but his article owes rather too much to the idea of a three-way split in Spartan politics as postulated by Hamilton (1970; 1979; 1997; cf. the criticisms of Lazenby (1985), 201, n. 1). There is no evidence for such a division, and for Rice to refer to the 'Lysandrians' when Lysander himself had been dead for nearly a decade is to press matters too far. Smith (1953-54), 284, is quite correct to refer to 'the two groups centred around the two kings', for which there is evidence. I would draw attention to the salutary remark of Seager (1994²), 157, n. 161, who describes the supposed Agesilaus-Agesipolis rivalry as being 'grossly exaggerated'.

³⁷ The intervention of his father Pausanias, who lived much of his life in Tegea (cf. Tod 120), on behalf of the Mantinean democrats (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.6) is open to differing interpretations, but proves, again, the strong ties existing between leading Spartans and Mantineans, and, surely, the presence of aristocrats among the Mantinean democratic parties.

³⁸ Lazenby (1985), 167, has correctly remarked that it was not losses that cost Sparta support but 'the fact of her defeat in a set-piece battle'.

³⁹ The part being played by Athens should not be underestimated, the Peace was in essence anti-Spartan: cf. Sordi (1951), 56-63; Dušanic (1970a), 287. A major Athenian figure in treaties of the period was Callistratus. Kallet (1983), 251, has noted that 'he played a major role in the peace with Sparta in 371, and in 370/69 he proposed the Athenian expedition under Iphikrates into the Peloponnese to aid Sparta against Thebes.' But he was not a convinced pro-Spartan. Rather, he was a figure who saw that an Athens-Sparta rapprochement was in the Athenian interest at this juncture – Athens still saw her own conference as a way of attracting Sparta's allies towards herself, even if her aim was thwarted. In 366 the Oropus affair virtually put paid to Callistratus' career (on the problematic question of Athenian entitlement to Oropus: see Buckler (1977b), 333-34). The anti-Spartan backlash which took place in Athens saw his pro-Spartan policies, and thus himself, firmly disgraced. On Callistratus' part in the Peace of 371 at Sparta see Mosley (1962), 41-46; Ryder (1963), 237-41. On his ascendancy and eclipse see Sealey (1956), 189-90, 193-203; Cawkwell (1961), 83-84, and (1963), 94, n. 87; Seager (1974), 52-53, and (1994²), 180; Dušanic (1979), 134-35.

on the back of the conference's stipulations.⁴⁰ We have already noted the significance and dating of Arcadia's uprising (see Ch. 2). If other Peloponnesians needed to wait on Arcadia's movements, then within Arcadia the Arcadians themselves required one city of their number to openly challenge Sparta. Mantinea was to be that city.⁴¹ But for Arcadia to truly unite it needed both Mantinea and Tegea to come together – if just either one stood aloof, then so would much, if not all, of Arcadia. For the first time in memory, Peloponnesian league activities apart, the Mantineans and Tegeans had actually worked together. The possibilities seemed endless.

Once news of the Mantineans' decision to re-synocize as a *polis* reached Sparta, the response was rapid but measured.⁴² Agesilaus' old family ties with some of the Mantineans were enough to ensure that it was he who went north to explain to them the error of their ways. He had no intention of refusing this mission. What is often ignored is the question of whom he actually met. Regarding individual identification, there is no definite answer. Political affiliation is a different matter. It is usually assumed that he dealt with leading, dyed-in-the-wool democrats, a *prytany* who refused to let him address the citizen body.⁴³ There exist other alternatives. Firstly, let us consider the detective work of Tuplin.⁴⁴ Concentrating on Cyniscus of Mantinea, Tuplin has made a very convincing case for the existence of strong ties between his family and that of the Eurypontids.⁴⁵ If we consider this as a working hypothesis, then the possible proposition is that already in c. 385/84 some Mantineans of leading aristocratic families had become involved with the democratic movement.

⁴⁰ Cf. Nielsen (1996b), 94. Dušanic (1970a), 284-85, offers evidence in support of Mantinea being at the centre of the League's founding. Although I agree with him on this matter, I do not think his supplementary evidence at all convincing. That Lycomedes and Hopoleas of Mantinea were cited first in the Megalopolitan oecist list (Paus. 8.27.2) is meaningless. Neither can we rely on Diodorus (15.59.1) when he informs us that Lycomedes urged the League's formation, as his account is misleading on many matters at this point (see Roy (1974), 506-07), and he even suggests that Lycomedes was a Tegean. As for the bones of Arcas being moved to Mantinea being proof of Mantinean centrality, I agree with Levi (1971), 392, n. 67, that this probably belongs with the Mantinean machinations in Arcadia in the 420s.

⁴¹ On the following events at Mantinea and Tegea: cf. Roy (1971a), 570-71; Seager (1974), 55-56; Lintott (1982), 231-33.

⁴² Cf. Moggi (1976), 251-56, no. 40; Buckler (1980a), 70-71.

⁴³ Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7: the 'demagogues' had caused the aristocrats many problems.

⁴⁴ Tuplin (1977), 5-10.

⁴⁵ It is even possible, as Tuplin (1977), 9-10, suggests, that whilst these connections were along oligarchic lines, paradoxically, there was a nexus existing which saw the Agiads linked to democratic elements in Mantinea. If correct, and the city had already reverted to democracy, we may wonder why Agesipolis did not go to Mantinea. I would suggest that the Spartans knew who the leaders of this Mantinean revolution were, that some were formerly leading oligarchs, and that is why Agesilaus went in his co-king's stead. On relations between Spartans and the Greek world see Cartledge (1987), 243-

Hence Agesilaus' reluctance to proceed against them in person and what we may interpret as a similar reluctance on the part of Agesipolis because of family ties with democrats in Mantinea (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.3). It would also explain the attitude of many Mantineans towards Sparta and why the Spartans were keener than ever to take stern action against Mantinea. Of our alternatives in 370, the officials confronting Agesilaus could have been either democrats or aristocrats, or both, whom Agesilaus did not know, but this we should consider unlikely. Secondly, there may well have been leading aristocrats present whom Agesilaus knew well and who had become part of the democratic cause. This we should consider to be a very possible alternative. Their refusal to let him speak to the Mantinean people can be well understood. Embarrassment at their betrayal of a long-established trust would ensure they wanted rid of him as quickly as possible. But his known influence over them placed them under suspicion of colluding with him now. They could not let him address the Mantinean citizen body directly, to do so was to risk some falling prey to his rhetoric. There was also the consideration that those aristocrats of oligarchic and thus pro-Spartan persuasion might still perhaps make much of his arguments and create problems for what was, after all, only a fledgling regime. These anonymous pro-Spartan aristocrats, still ensconced within Mantinea, were the "enemy within" who would re-appear in the future and play a major role in terminating the Arcadian League. Neither should we assume that those aristocrats who in 370 sensed change approaching, and fully realized that to survive in their leading positions they had to swim with the tide, had no part in the League's downfall. Today's democrat was to be only tomorrow's re-born oligarch.

Rebuffed, and with Mantinea's re-building of her walls now a fact, Agesilaus retired to Sparta. Worse was yet to come. Besides the Eleans providing money, other Arcadians were giving the Mantineans physical aid in the re-building. This demonstrates that the idea of a united Arcadia was in the planning stages, if not already established (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.5). If further evidence is needed, we only have to look south towards Tegea.

When Tegea was formed as a *polis*, from some nine local communities, we cannot say, though it was before the late fifth century.⁴⁶ Undoubtedly oligarchic, and

45; Herman (1987), 167-75; Mitchell (1997), 51-65; cf. Morgan (1990), 99-103 (Olympia), and 168-71 (Delphi).

⁴⁶ Cf. Pretzler (1999), 98-128.

notable for its provision of asylum for leading Spartan exiles,⁴⁷ it nevertheless must have shocked the Spartans to discover that this most loyal of allies had joined the move towards a unified Arcadia (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6-10).⁴⁸ This is because as far as the Spartans were concerned Stasippus and his fellow oligarchs were in control of affairs and their loyalty to her cause was assured (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.6; cf. Diod. 15.59.1-4, which is confused).⁴⁹ But what took place at Tegea was a revolt against Spartan overlordship. Having their ideas for a united Arcadia rejected by the oligarchically controlled council of magistrates,⁵⁰ but knowing that a majority of citizens agreed with them, Callibius and Proxenus, the leading democrats, resorted to violent methods to achieve their aims. At first the oligarchs, though inferior in numbers, were victorious and Proxenus was killed. As Larsen points out,⁵¹ there must have already been an understanding with the Mantineans (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.8), as before long reinforcements arrived from Mantinea and the oligarchic cause was all but finished. Admitted by the Tegean democrats, the Mantineans helped to track down the fleeing oligarchs to the temple of Artemis. Here they were lured out by treachery, taken back to Tegea, and sentenced to death, Stasippus among them.⁵² Diodorus (15.59.2) agrees with Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.9) to some extent on this matter by reporting that Pallantium was the oligarchs' goal. But Diodorus also adds that 1,400 oligarchs were involved, and that some went to Sparta. The figure is very large, but Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.10) says that some 800 fled to Sparta as exiles. We could thus surmise that a slight majority headed for Sparta, a minority to Pallantium.⁵³ But as Stylianou notes,⁵⁴ according to Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.9) it took only one wagon to take Stasippus and his

⁴⁷ The most recent being Pausanias II (see above and Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22-25; 5.2.6).

⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the cult of Athena Alea outside Tegea may well have had a form of unifying influence on Arcadians for many years, finds there dating back to the Mycenaean period: cf. Jost (1985), 142-65.

⁴⁹ Cf. Cawkwell (1972), 266;

⁵⁰ Larsen (1968), 183, n. 4, thinks that the *thearoi* were a board of five magistrates. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 285, believe that the magistrates had great powers of discretion in the calling of assemblies. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1318b 9-27) implies a rotation system of electors at Mantinea – but we may surmise that the aristocrats had a huge influence over the electors. The whole passage points to a conservative outlook on behalf of Greek farmers, that Mantinea is specifically singled-out in this area must lead us to believe that Mantinea's farmers were more conservative than most. This in turn implies that a pro-oligarchic stance was much to the fore within Mantinea.

⁵¹ Larsen (1968), 183, n. 3.

⁵² We can imagine the glee with which the Mantineans performed their task. We may also wonder if it struck many of those Tegeans present that they were helping the Mantineans undertake what many of them had waited many years to do, and if it also occurred that as far as inter-state rivalry was concerned, they had now given the Mantineans a distinct advantage. Some Tegeans would no doubt have resented and remembered this Mantinean incursion.

⁵³ Cf. Gehrke (1985), 154-55.

⁵⁴ Stylianou (1998), 418.

party back to Tegea. Possibly the democrats concentrated solely upon the figure of Stasippus, and therefore the few with him were also caught. Whatever the number of those who made it to safety, that safety was to be found at Sparta. Those who fled to Pallantium were handed over and slaughtered (Diod. 15.59.2-3). What can be ascertained is that not just many but virtually all Tegean oligarchs were swept out of the city.⁵⁵ However awry the figures our sources provide, there is no need to doubt that Tegea had contained large numbers of oligarchs, and it is obvious why the city had been ruled by an oligarchic government for so long. Now, with no opposition within Tegea to oppose democratic sway, the path to unity and success seemed assured. But there was one drawback. Tegea had also lost large numbers of her hoplites. In the future the remaining Tegeans would have to ensure they had reliable allies, and, in the long-term, it would be Thebes, not Arcadia, that gained from this shortcoming. Ironically, the real prime mover behind a united Arcadian League, Mantinea, would suffer greatly because of her own peaceful revolution, and in no small manner because of the violence of the Tegean one. Within Mantinea, her own oligarchs were still very much at large. Perhaps the supreme irony was that, at a stroke, one city with an age-old oligarchy had become staunchly democratic, whilst her democratic neighbour, though unbeknown to her at the time, had just laid the foundations for the future emergence of an oligarchic regime to take control of its destiny.

We must now face some of the most taxing questions related to the foundation of the Arcadian League, questions which have a huge bearing not only on the shaping of the League itself but on the shaping of the whole period 371-361. We must consider: when the events we have spoken of actually took place; when Megalopolis was founded; and what form of constitution governed the workings of the Arcadian League.

Dušanic has been the most recent and consistent champion of a pre-370 date for the founding of the Arcadian League.⁵⁶ He accepts the evidence of Pausanias that Megalopolis was founded in the year of Leuctra, and believes it is corroborated by Stephanus of Byzantium. Further, he notes that the name Proxenus appears three times in our sources, but that he was dead by spring or summer of 370. Finally, Dušanic suggests that the Tegean *stasis* was an anti-federalist rebellion which took

⁵⁵ Cf. Roy (1971a), 570.

⁵⁶ Dušanic (1970a), 281-85; cf. Beloch (*GG*² III 1), 175; Larsen (1968), 183.

place after the League was founded.⁵⁷ Thus he concludes that the League's founding date was at some point during the second half of 371. We have previously presented arguments against this dating, but let us add some here. The case of Megalopolis will be tackled below, but that of there being three references to Proxenus is undoubtedly the most compelling argument. It is indeed quite a coincidence for there to be three such Arcadian figures or even two operating at around the same time.⁵⁸ What we may consider to be the main Proxenus, he of *Hellenica* 6.5.7, was killed, as we have seen, in what is on our reckoning (see Ch. 2) summer 370. The second was an oecist of Megalopolis. The third an ambassador who accepted money towards the building of Megalopolis from Magnesia-on-the-Maeander. Roy has pointed out:⁵⁹ that Proxenus was not an uncommon name in Arcadia, and cites *IG V 2* as evidence;⁶⁰ that Xenophon refused to give details of the founding of Megalopolis; that the list of Pausanias is very rudimentary, even omitting comment on Lycomedes; and that the men could have been related. It is not so much that Roy's doubts are more attractive than Dušanic's beliefs, more a case of a lack of conclusive evidence. The remainder of our overall evidence surely points to the League being founded in 370.⁶¹ To suggest, as Dušanic does, that Xenophon drops us in the middle of a rebellion against the Arcadian League without explanation as to its existence is to credit even Xenophon with too little acumen. He may have disliked the Arcadian League, but as he is already admitting its existence by reporting on it, then it is hardly likely that he would deny that it was already in being. This is especially the case when we consider that he would have been only too pleased to report on dissension within its ranks. The text of Xenophon (cf. *Hell.* 6.5.6-10) simply does not fit, in either word or spirit, with what is being posited by Dušanic. His arguments concerning Plato's involvement in Elean fortunes, we have concluded (see Ch. 4), relied too much on remote possibilities, even though feasible to some extent.⁶² We must say, once again, that we

⁵⁷ Paus. 8.27.8; Steph. Byz. s.v. Megalopolis. Proxenus: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.7; Paus. 8.27.2; *SIG*³ 559, II 26 ff. Tegean *stasis*: Diod. 15.59.1-2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.6-10.

⁵⁸ Hornblower (1990), 72, and Stylianou (1998), 471-72, believe it was no coincidence and that we are speaking of one person.

⁵⁹ Roy (1974), 506.

⁶⁰ This one was in fact a Cleitorian. Neither should we forget that Xenophon's friend from the *Anabasis*, a Boeotian, was also called Proxenus.

⁶¹ Even Diodorus places it under the year 370/69.

⁶² I have criticized Dušanic previously for reliance on word order concerning the involvement of Plato's pupil Aristonymus in founding the Elean constitution. Besides the Megalopolitan oecist list (above), he also resorts to this technique at (1970a), 294, n. 35 (*Xen Hell.* 7.1.18) and (1970a), 296, n.

cannot re-write history on the strength of such. The *stasis* in Tegea took place in late 370.⁶³

Dušanic does not accept that Epaminondas was responsible for the foundation of the Arcadian League.⁶⁴ Whilst we may disagree with his reasoning that the League was already founded in 371, he is perhaps correct to say that the first Arcadian contact with Boeotia was in the December of 370, and thus before Boeotia became directly involved with Arcadian affairs and have any influence upon the League's founding.⁶⁵ More troublesome is the question of Megalopolis' foundation date.

This problem has occupied scholars for many years, and still no satisfactory answer has been arrived at – nor will there perhaps ever be one, our evidence is simply too confusing. Xenophon is once again infuriating. He *had* to know when the event occurred, but his petty biases prevented him from informing his readership of such.⁶⁶ Nor does the *Hellenica* even offer us a clue, such was Xenophon's determination to cover Megalopolis' tracks. What we do have is the evidence of Pausanias (8.27.8), the Parian Marble (Tod 205 = *FGH* 239 F 73), and Diodorus (15.74.2). Pausanias dates matters to 371/0, the Parian Marble to 370/69 or 369/8, and Diodorus to 368/7. Deciding which is the most reliable is an impossible task.

Of attempts to uncover the truth, the recent offering of Hornblower, if not solving the puzzle, provides most food for thought.⁶⁷ He relies much on Pausanias and

48 (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.44). We really cannot, especially in the case of Xenophon, rely on this method as any kind of solution to our problems.

⁶³ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 70-71; Cartledge (1987), 242-43; Roy (1994²), 189-90;

⁶⁴ He does, however, give rather too much credit to Lycomedes (cf. Dušanic (1970a), 291), who no doubt had a large input, but not to the extent that the League was necessarily 'much indebted' to him above all others. He relies on Diodorus 15.59.1 in reaching this conclusion, but neglects to mention that this passage also informs us that Lycomedes was a Tegean. He was of course a Mantinean, which hardly adds to Diodorus' credibility on the matter, even if later correcting himself (cf. 15.62.2). Diodorus introduces Lycomedes to us slightly earlier than does Xenophon (Diod. 15.59.1: 370/69; *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.23: 369), but this and the credit that he gives Lycomedes for the founding of the League should not be allowed to cloud our judgement.

⁶⁵ Dušanic (1970a), 285, n. 24. Roy (1971a), 572, also categorically denies the involvement of Boeotian statesmen in the foundation. Pausanias (8.8.10; 9.14.4) was possibly too influenced by the information he received from biased parties in proclaiming that Epaminondas re-built Mantinea. Flower (1994), 101, believes Epaminondas founded both the Arcadian League and Megalopolis, whilst Salmon (1978), 104-06, thinks there is a link between the Boeotian Confederation's division into districts and a similar Arcadian division reflected by the *damiorgoi* of the Phylarchus decree.

⁶⁶ Only at *Hellenica* 7.5.5 does he even refer, in passing, to the Megalopolitans.

⁶⁷ Hornblower (1990), 71-77. I, like Roy (1971a), 577-78, had long accepted Diodorus' date of 368 as being fairly decisive on the matter, but Hornblower's thoughts have made me re-think my position, as they apparently have Roy (cf. (2000a), 314, and n. 22). Other worthwhile discussions on the topic are as follows. Dušanic (1969), 263-80, with English summary at 281 ff., and (1970a), 317-31, who suggests a similar scenario, as we shall see, to that of Hornblower. Moggi (1976), 293-325, no. 45, which concentrates on ancient source material and is more detailed than the discussion of Hornblower. Buckler (1980a), 107-09, which is brief but worthwhile. Much older but still valuable are those of

our already discussed presence of more than one Proxenus in the source material.⁶⁸ Hornblower thinks it 'desperate' to even consider the possibility of there being more than one Proxenus around.⁶⁹ This is plainly not the case. One can think of such coincidences throughout history, and as Roy has noted, if two of the men are one and the same, then the pair may have been related.⁷⁰ Hornblower also believes that Diodorus used the so-called chronographic source, rather than Ephorus,⁷¹ and became seriously confused over it, that confusion leading him to mistake the battle of Leuctra for the Tearless battle. This is all very well, but totally beyond clarification. Nevertheless, Hornblower's criticisms, if not always convincing, are valid. Let us consider some possibilities based on the situation of the time.

Firstly, let us once and for all dismiss the idea of Epaminondas being responsible for the foundation of Megalopolis. He was undoubtedly involved with that of Messene in no small way (see Ch. 3),⁷² but Megalopolis is a different matter.⁷³ Braunert and Petersen rightly point out that the famous epigram accorded Epaminondas (Paus. 9.15.6; cf. 8.27.2) distinguishes between the Theban role in the foundation of Messene and that of Megalopolis,⁷⁴ Pammenes and his hoplites being merely sent to protect Megalopolis.⁷⁵ When Epaminondas entered the Peloponnese for his first invasion in the winter of 370, the Arcadian League was already in existence. Although Diodorus (15.72.3-4) implies that the defeat at the Tearless battle made the Arcadians realize, for the first time, that a fortress was needed to be built to prevent the Spartans from making incursions into their territory, we cannot accept his statement. To not have realized this before 368 would make the Arcadians very naïve indeed.⁷⁶ Possibly Diodorus surmised that the Arcadians were of this mind in 368 and

Niese (1899) and Beloch (*GG III*² 1), 186, the former being the first to seriously challenge the evidence of Pausanias.

⁶⁸ Pausanias' evidence is, as Tuplin (1993), 151, n. 13, says, 'problematic'. On Pausanias' Megalopolis see Jost (1973), 241-67; cf. (1974) 179-86.

⁶⁹ Hornblower (1990), 76.

⁷⁰ Roy (1974), 506.

⁷¹ Hornblower (1990), 73; *contra* Stylianos (1998), 471-72.

⁷² Larsen (1968), 186; cf. Cartledge (1987), 385.

⁷³ I fail to see how Levi (1979b), 438, n. 193, can justify the grand strategy of city foundations in the Peloponnese which he attributes to Epaminondas.

⁷⁴ *Contra* Dušanic (1970a), 320.

⁷⁵ Braunert and Petersen (1972), 65-67. I would add that epigrams often exaggerate the truth anyway.

⁷⁶ Among those supporting Diodorus' date are Larsen (1968), 497, and Roy (1974), 505-06. Cartledge (1987), 63, 262, 386-87, believes that it was begun in 370 and finished in 368. Stylianos (1998), 471, thinks that the decision was taken in 371/0 but that the work was not undertaken until after the Tearless Battle.

attached it to his report.⁷⁷ Regarding Arcadian motives, and despite Dušaníc's belief to the contrary,⁷⁸ the main reason for the construction of Megalopolis was to avoid conflict between Mantinea and Tegea which would split the League down the middle. Although its uses as a bastion against Spartan invasion were obvious, Megalopolis was not an impregnable fortress, and it could be by-passed.⁷⁹ Hornblower has convincingly argued that the city could be skirted around and that it did not dramatically alter tactical thinking.⁸⁰ There is nothing in *Hellenica* that contradicts this view. What is perhaps more likely are the very similar ideas advanced by both Dušaníc and Hornblower.⁸¹ It makes perfect sense to postulate that, so to speak, Megalopolis was not built in a day, and both Dušaníc and Hornblower believe this to be the case, the one firmly believing in a foundation date of 371, the other in the rather more loosely formulated 371/0 with the first work taking place in the summer of 369 and after the second invasion of the Peloponnese.⁸² This takes us back to the founding of the Arcadian League again. Megalopolis, we should accept, could only be founded after the League was in existence. The League was not in existence, as we have seen, before the events in Mantinea and Tegea of late 370. From the first the Arcadians realized that to even attempt to build a city close to the Laconian border a shift in the balance of power was needed. We have to realize, as did they, that before such a grandiose scheme could be put into action Sparta *had* to be defeated in battle. Alternatively, the scenario was to be constantly assailed by Spartan forces whilst the building process was underway. The first inklings of such a building project may have been in the air in late 370, but only after the first Peloponnesian invasion, of 370/69, could matters be put into operation. From the Arcadian perspective, one of the key reasons for, firstly, the Peloponnesian Alliance and, secondly, the Bocotian-Peloponnesian Alliance coming into being was to allow for the construction of Megalopolis. The Eleans may have taken a major lead in formulating both alliances, but for the Arcadians to take part at all a prerequisite was that membership would allow them the opportunity to end Spartan domination and thereby found Megalopolis. There was perhaps no guarantee of a Peloponnesian invasion originally, but the possibility of one increased dramatically once membership had been

⁷⁷ Cf. Hornblower (1990), 74.

⁷⁸ Dušaníc (1970a), 317, n. 5. *Contra* Larsen (1968), 185-86.

⁷⁹ On the physical features: Winter (1971), index.

⁸⁰ Hornblower (1990), 75-76; cf. Dušaníc (1970a), 331.

⁸¹ Dušaníc (1969), 263-67; cf. (1970), 293-94; Hornblower (1990), 76.

established. Far from Epaminondas being responsible, the Arcadians wanted themselves, and no one else, to be the sole founders of the city; they, and they alone, were autochthonous Arcadians; they, and they alone, wanted the plaudits for erecting it. More to the point, external claims of influence or even power-sharing were to be precluded from the very beginning: Arcadia was going to be independent and a power in its own right. After the first invasion the way was paved for the commencement of the foundation in earnest: it could not proceed without it taking place. Pammenes was sent by Thebes to offer protection (Paus. 8.27.2; Polyæn. 5.16.3).⁸³ Megalopolis was mooted in late 370, and became a factual building project after the successful Laconian invasion of 370/69. If we try and pinpoint a date, then the spring of 369 is perhaps as close as we can get to one.⁸⁴ Of our sources, the Parian Marble is nearest to being correct as to Megalopolis' founding date, though the building process continued beyond 368 and its date of termination cannot be clarified.

The resistance to both the founding of the Arcadian League and the Megalopolis project came not only from Sparta. Internally, Arcadia was in some turmoil in 370/69. The loyalties of Lepreum, outside of Arcadia, have been discussed (see Ch. 4), but she was not the only city to have initial doubts about leaving the Spartan alliance. Both Orchomenus and Heraea put up a brave resistance to joining the League (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11, 13-15, 17, 22; Diod. 15.62.1-2). Like her namesake in Boeotia previously, Arcadian Orchomenus had resisted the call to ethnicity and determined upon staying within the Spartan fold because of the threat of other forces within her own region. In her case, she had been the cause of problems within Arcadia and was perhaps ambitious at the expense of her neighbours,⁸⁵ but she was also particularly hostile towards Mantinea (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.11). Heraea also had longstanding ties with Sparta,⁸⁶ and she also held out until she was overcome, and,

⁸² Cf. Dušanic (1970a), 320.

⁸³ The Arcadians probably begrudged having to ask Thebes for aid, but we shall see, below, that there was a compelling reason for them to do so. After the deterioration of Arcado-Theban relations in 369 we should doubt that Thebes would have been as keen to send Pammenes to protect the project.

⁸⁴ As we shall see later, this fits in with the actions of Lycomedes during the period.

⁸⁵ See Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.36-37, where she had battled against Cleitor, with Roy (1972a), and Dušanic (1970a), 291 and nn. 2 and 3; cf. Larsen (1968), 184; Nielsen (1996c), 84-86. Thuc. 5. 61-62; Xen. *Hell.* 4.5.18 and 5.1.29 prove her close ties with Sparta.

⁸⁶ See Thuc. 5.67.1; Xen. *Hell.* 3.3.1; cf. Nielsen (1996c), 89. Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 260, n. 66, think that Heraea's synoecism was completed by Sparta in the 370s (cf. Strabo 8.3.2). On synoecism not necessarily being an instrument of democracies alone, see Roy (1972d), 338, n. 20, and (1972e), 50, n. 45.

like Orchomenus, was forced into the League.⁸⁷ At *Hellenica* 6.5.17 Xenophon tells us that all of the Arcadians had now joined together (cf. *Xen. Ages.* 2.24), but the same passage implies that this excluded the Orchomenians, who sent mercenaries to the Spartans. Thus we cannot say with certainty when either Orchomenus or Heraea fell. But we can imagine that it was very much a case of sooner rather than later, and that their democrats were immediately installed in power by the League. The *koinon* itself thus had nearly every Arcadian community as a member almost immediately following the events at Mantinea and Tegea.

For many of those communities included in the synoecism that was to establish Megalopolis, the prospect was an unpleasant one.⁸⁸ The main sources of information are Pausanias (8.27.3) and Diodorus (15.72.4), the first naming the forty communities to be placed within it, the second suggesting that the figure was twenty.⁸⁹ This brought forth objections from a number of them, and in 369, after the first invasion of the Peloponnese,⁹⁰ some were forced into joining the project and others

⁸⁷ This seems to be the only solution; cf. Nielsen (1996b), 97. Both cities are also listed on the Phylarchus decree: see *IG V 2 1*. Earlier, Heraea had probably fought Cleitor (see *SEG XI 1045*; cf. Williams (1965), 9-10, 12) and she appears to have been held by Phigalian oligarchs ('Phialia' in the MS of Diodorus) for a period. Much depends on interpretation of the infamous Diodorus 15.40, which we have dated, along with Beloch (*GG²*, 3 1 174, notes 2 and 4), to late 371 (see Ch. 1). These oligarchs attacked Phigalia from Heraea and retreated to Sparta. We have to suspect that, in the wake of the democratic revolts in late 371, this, like the episode at Megara, was an oligarchic attempt to retrieve a former situation of power. Phigalia is absent from the Phylarchus decree but, as Roy (1971a), 571, says, her League membership can be assumed on the general evidence. Diod. 15.59.3 and *Xen. Hell.* 6.5.9, concerning Pallantium, have some grounds for agreement, yet *Xen. Hell.* 7.5.5 implies that Pallantium was something of a diehard democratic state, at least by 362. I follow Xenophon's more detailed account, and consider the Tegean oligarchs to have fled in the direction of Pallantium because they had little choice, but that the city itself was democratic (*contra* Dušanic (1970a), 292). If she was on the Phylarchus decree she would have remained invisible under the Mainalian tribal set-up, as would Eutaea. Both have implied membership (*Xen. Hell.* 6.5.12; cf. Nielsen (1996b), 95). Aliphera, surprisingly but perhaps due to her geographical position, may have remained aloof from the League throughout our period (cf. Paus. 8.27.7), and due to the same passage in Pausanias Dušanic (1970a), 292, 294, suggests that Pallantium was against federation. Stymphalus was certainly a member by spring 369: Eratosth. ap. Strabo 3.389.

⁸⁸ See Dušanic (1970a), 317-331, who devotes much space to the whole question of Megalopolis and the problems its synoecism presents. See also Roy (1968), 287-89, and (1983), 267-69; Lloyd, Owens, and Roy (1988), 179-80.

⁸⁹ Dušanic (1970a), 290, 294, 318-20, posits what he describes as a 'first dogma' and a 'second dogma' for the founding of Megalopolis. The idea entails the League issuing two official decrees concerning the city. The first envisioning a smaller number of communities to be enrolled into Megalopolis, the second a larger figure. Although possible, we have no real evidence for this theory, and it must be dismissed.

⁹⁰ The Arcadians needed at least a token presence on the site. I believe that there was more than just that on the site by summer of 369 and prior to Epaminondas' second invasion. We have said that Pammenes provided protection, but was it imperative for Megalopolis' survival? Pammenes and his 1,000 élite hoplites would be at Megalopolis by the early summer of 369 and, I believe, probably retired with Epaminondas' forces at the end of that same summer (cf. *Xen. Hell.* 7.1.22: Dionysius' forces go home after the Boeotians, which means that the former probably stayed until the latest date at which they could still guarantee themselves good sailing weather). Within a matter of months, if not

even left mainland Greece altogether (Paus. 8.27.5-6).⁹¹ Lycomedes, the most influential politician in Arcadia and an oecist of Megalopolis, no doubt had much involvement in the decision. Pausanias (8.27.3-4) lists the five communities which provided two oecists each for the foundation. They were Mantinea, Tegea, Cleitor, Maenalia, and Parrhasia. As communities from Maenalia and Parrhasia were included in the project, and Megalopolis was situated in Maenalia, their presence is understandable.⁹² So is that of both Mantinea and Tegea, due to their importance and influence. Cleitor is the anomaly to some degree. But she was important in her own right and, as a city from the north, helped to keep up the appearance of a truly pan-Arcadian organisation.⁹³ These five communities would not be the only ones involved but reflected the basic requirement for oecists.

The evidence of Diogenes Laertius (3.23) and Aelian (*VH* 2.42) attributes to both the Arcadians and Thebans the idea of inviting Plato to be *nomothetes* of the new foundation. He refused, saying that the Arcadians did not want true equality. This, if true, may lead us to ponder on just how democratic the League itself was.⁹⁴ Unfortunately, it is difficult to decide how reliable the reports are. If correct, the case for the Boeotian Confederation's influence on the League's constitution is totally destroyed. Dušanic considers that the passages from Diogenes Laertius and Aelian, taken in conjunction with one from Aristotle, point to a Megalopolitan constitution being discussed by Arcadian immigrants and members of Plato's Academy just after the events of 385.⁹⁵ The passage from Aristotle's *Politics* is, to say the least, vague, and only makes a passing comment on Arcadia. If we also take into account that such

less, Lycomedes was issuing statements proclaiming Arcadian superiority (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23). Are we to believe that a reticent Arcadia could, almost within the blink of an eye, suddenly become a confident and independent state? The official reason for Pammenes' presence shielded a hidden agenda. The pro-Megalopolis Arcadians knew they would experience difficulties with some of the communities projected to comprise Megalopolis. The presence of Pammenes reflected the strength of the alliance which now faced recalcitrants and, as an external force without local ties, was designed to prevent any attempt at outright rebellion by a majority, rather than a minority, of these communities.

⁹¹ The versions of Pausanias and Diodorus cannot be reconciled with each other. I simply feel that one of them has got his figures wrong, especially as they are neatly rounded, the forty of Pausanias being exactly halved by Diodorus. It is pointless to enter into the kind of discussion that Dušanic does on the matter: we do not know the truth behind events and probably never will. It may be that we should follow Pausanias here, as he could have actually seen an inscription detailing the communities involved.

⁹² Dušanic (1970a), 297, thinks that along with Eutrasia, these were the first districts to become a part of Megalopolis, Cynuria, most of Maenalia, and southeast Orchomenia with Tripolis not becoming a part of the city prior to 361. For this analysis of the situation see Dušanic (1970a), 330-31.

⁹³ The oecists included both Lycomedes and one of the Proxenus' we have already discussed. On Eucampides see Dem. 18.295, and on Hieronymus see Dem. 18.295, 19.11; Theopomp. fr. 230 J.

⁹⁴ Roy (2000a), 311, believes that the Arcadians had a different understanding of *isonomia* than Plato.

⁹⁵ Arist. *Pol.* II 1261a 24 ff.; Dušanic (1970a), 317; cf. 343-45; see esp. Dušanic (1979), 319-47.

discussions as those envisaged by Dušanic must presuppose a knowledge of Sparta's downfall, an event which seemed very unlikely right up to the morning of Leuctra, and for some elements even beyond it, then it can be seen that this theory can be safely discounted.

The constitution of the League is partly shrouded in mystery.⁹⁶ We can believe that the Arcadians lost no time in making its framing their number one priority, even the Megalopolis project taking second place to it.⁹⁷ Whilst we have no idea where League decisions were made or how often, and despite the role of Mantinea in matters, we may perhaps look towards Tegea. The League's early days would see the Arcadians bereft of a capital.⁹⁸ This was to continue to be the case for some years to come.⁹⁹ It is at this early juncture that the League's future downfall was virtually sealed. There is little doubt that Lycomedes was the Arcadian League *strategos* for the first two years of its existence (370/69: Diod. 15.62.2; 369/68: Diod. 15.67.2), and probably beyond.¹⁰⁰ This was a singular and important position,¹⁰¹ the incumbent having control of the League's army, and was obviously open to re-election. As often

⁹⁶ The following all have useful discussions on it. Beloch (*GG*² III 1 175); Larsen (1968), 186-89, 193-95; cf. 194-95; Dušanic (1970a), 338-43; Buckler (1980a), 71. Thompson (1983), 156-58; Gehrke (1985), 154-58; Trampedach (1994), 27-35; Nielsen (1996c), 95-96; Beck (1997), 67-83; Stylianos (1998), 416-17; Roy (2000a), 310-16.

⁹⁷ Plut. *Mor.* 1126C (= *Adv. Colotem* 32) informs us that Aristonymus organised or re-organised the Arcadian League constitution, which as Roy (2000a), 311-12, says, makes it hard to understand why the Arcadians and Plato parted company over the founding of Megalopolis. I have serious doubts concerning this evidence, despite the efforts of Dušanic (1979) to persuade us otherwise. Composing a new constitution would take time, a commodity that the Arcadians did not have, and at best we must consider a later re-organisation of a hurried Arcadian manifesto the most likely scenario. If Plato had later doubts about the Arcadian attitude to equality, it may have stemmed from problems arising over his pupil's framing of the Arcadian constitution. Bearing this in mind, the question of just how democratic the League constitution actually was should not be forgotten throughout what follows.

⁹⁸ Roy (2000a), 314, doubts Megalopolis was ever founded as the capital of the League. I disagree, and believe its very existence was down to the fact that the Arcadians realized that Mantinean-Tegean rivalry could only have a chance of dissipating and the League surviving if a neutral capital was founded, neither of them being willing for the other, or any existing Arcadian city, to be the League's centre. The example of Cypsela (cf. Thuc. 5.33) stood before the Arcadians as a reminder of what a suitably placed fortress could achieve (cf. Larsen (1968), 185; Dušanic (1970a), 317), but the priority was to maintain some kind of harmony between Mantinea and Tegea.

⁹⁹ Larsen (1968), 186-87, believes that meetings could be called at short notice, which is feasible, but whilst making allowance for them being held in other cities, he also says that they took place in the Thersilion at Megalopolis. How long it took for the Thersilion to become operational we have no idea, but we can safely say that it would not be in the first or second year of the League's existence. As noted by Roy (2000a), 315, the report of Pausanias (8.32.1; cf. Harpocration s.v. *Myrioi*; Aristotle, frg. 483 Rose³) that names the Thersilion as the meeting place could rely on information that originates from the 350s. He also adds that it was probably not built early, and perhaps could not hold 10,000 people.

¹⁰⁰ Dušanic (1970), 342, n. 34, would have him as such in 371/70, which is plainly incorrect, but also in 366/65 on the strength of *Hellenica* 7.4.2. The passage does not actually state that he was such, but it would seem to strongly imply that he was still *strategos*.

¹⁰¹ Cf. Larsen (1968), 188; Dušanic (1970a), 341.

with such posts, it could be transformed into one of great power by a determined and charismatic holder. Lycomedes may have been a charismatic hero to many Arcadians (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23), but it is too much to expect total devotion. The Tegeans, we should believe, would not freely endorse the leadership of a Mantinean. Lycomedes was indeed charismatic, but to allow a Mantinean of such talents a major say in League strategy was, for a Tegean, too dangerous a move. The Tegeans had to be given a sweetener for them to accept the situation, and, as with the framing of the constitution of the United States, compromises had to be made. It is no coincidence that, concerning the 360s, the one recorded League meeting that we have and the one League inscription left to us are both from Tegea.¹⁰² The city was chosen as the temporary seat of League meetings.¹⁰³ We might say that the League got off to an undemocratic start via an arrangement that left its two leading cities with a disproportionate share of what was on offer, but the majority of Arcadians had few other options open to them. For the Mantineans, they had the satisfaction of seeing the League army under the control of a Mantinean of some merit. For the Tegeans, they had the satisfaction of knowing that League meetings would be undertaken in their city, complete with all the advantages this provided. Due to the fact that the Arcadians wanted to ensure the best possible direction for their organisation from the very beginning, there were to be no obstacles placed in the way of the best man continuing to provide the best leadership. Therefore Lycomedes, seemingly assured of the support of a majority of Arcadians, and also with great influence over the assembly, could continue in his post indefinitely. This the Tegeans realized. But having meetings held at Tegea also ensured that they themselves, distance being a crucial factor,¹⁰⁴ would very likely supply the majority of the federal assembly and thus be able to carry motions in their favour.¹⁰⁵ With apparently no termination date set for the arrangement, it perhaps depending on how soon Megalopolis could be developed,¹⁰⁶ we can see already why the League had set itself on a course of ultimate self-destruction.

¹⁰² Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.36-38; *IG V² 1* (= Tod 132); cf. Roy (2000a), 315.

¹⁰³ Stylianou (1998), 417, views Tegea as the permanent capital.

¹⁰⁴ Roy (2000a), 314.

¹⁰⁵ If the assembly did not choose the *strategos*, then we can see why the Mantineans felt quite safe with the compromise. If it did, then the Tegeans had even more reason to feel safe.

¹⁰⁶ Dušanic (1970a), 318-19, believes that Megalopolis did not exist in 368 and nor had work on it progressed much by the time of the Elean-Arcadian wars of 365/64.

The assembly itself would, at least theoretically, be exclusively at the centre of all decisions taken.¹⁰⁷ What we have to remember is that, firstly, the initial League meeting, almost certainly held towards the end of 370, was crucial in shaping future decisions that would be made; and, secondly, that first meeting had to work with some speed. The question of just who would sit in this assembly had to be addressed immediately. It is possible that those making the decision were the fighting men of Arcadia. They were the obvious candidates to sit in the assembly, having possession of the means to defend the homeland. Dual citizenship was probably the basis for membership,¹⁰⁸ but there was no time to delve into how many citizens in Arcadia as a whole theoretically qualified as members of the assembly; and it might be suggested that neither was there much interest in finding out. Thus the assembly was perhaps less democratic in origins and composition than we might expect. The *Myrioi*, or ‘Ten Thousand’, represented an ideal, round number, and not the actual size of the body.¹⁰⁹ There were more than ten thousand hoplites in Arcadia all told (cf. Diod. 15.31.2),¹¹⁰ and they were the truest expression of Arcadian strength. Dušaníc has argued that it is probable that a hoplite census was in operation because the name itself reflects an oligarchic orientation; and that the “Periander decree”,¹¹¹ describing the Arcadian constitution as a *politeia*, also leans towards an oligarchic constitution. Neither point is beyond argument, but we should accept Dušaníc’s basic assumption. A property qualification was the criteria that selected who were to compose the *Myrioi*,¹¹² and membership was therefore limited to Arcadia’s hoplite population.¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ It could overrule archons, and despatch embassies (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34); carried initiative on foreign policy (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.2); acted as a court (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.33); and probably held the power of *euthynai* over magistrates (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.34): see Nielsen (1996c), 95.

¹⁰⁸ As is so often assumed: cf. Dušaníc (1970a), 338.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Trampedach (1994), 27-33; Nielsen (1996c), 95. Roy (2000a), 314, thinks the name was designed to enhance the standing of the assembly, as the name *Megale Polis* was used to enhance the standing of that city.

¹¹⁰ Dušaníc (1970a), 340, n. 22; Roy (2000a), 314. Beloch (*GG*² III 1), 279 f., estimated a number in excess of 12,000. I would suggest that following the announcement of the forming of the *eparitoi* (below) the hoplite population of Arcadia increased by several thousand, native Arcadians, mainly mercenaries, returning home from afar to seek payment at home as a member.

¹¹¹ *JG* II² 112 = Tod 144 = *SV* 2.290. But as Roy (1971a), 587, n. 95, has noted, the decree is not easy to decipher. Regarding the Arcadian League at this point, it should be remembered that it was only one part of a divided organisation and, for all we know, could have already devised a new and more oligarchic constitution for itself.

¹¹² Cf. Hammond (1967²), 500, who considers that a property qualification limited democratic rights.

¹¹³ Nielsen (1996c), 95, believes it was open to all Arcadians who were citizens of an Arcadian *polis*.

What we know of the League's *boule* and *damiorgoi* comes not from literary sources but from the Phylarchus decree, and they have caused much discussion.¹¹⁴ Whilst the inscription's origins in the fourth century are not disputed, the exact date of those origins is controversial. It is certainly post-369, and probably, considering the time spent on building Megalopolis, even later than that, as is indicated by the presence of Megalopolitan *damiorgoi*.¹¹⁵ Of the fifty *damiorgoi* listed from some ten cities, Those of Megalopolis (10), Maenalia (3), and Lepreum (2) are disproportionately represented in comparison with the other communities. That is Tegea (listed first, feasibly, as the home of the decree), Mantinea, Cynuria, Orchomenus, Cleitor, Heraea, and Thelphusa, all have five *damiorgoi*. Dušanic believes the Megalopolitan figure reflects the power of Megalopolis, and as she was of little stature in the 360s, then the decree must be from after those years.¹¹⁶ But Roy has rightly said that this was a part of the propaganda attached to the promoting of Megalopolis.¹¹⁷ Taking into consideration Maenalia and Lepreum, why is there no equality in the numbers of *damiorgoi* on the list? Why is most of northern Arcadia absent? Why, also, are so many Arcadian states not represented at all?¹¹⁸

We can only try and surmise an answer. As both Mantinea and Tegea are on the list it cannot be later than 362. Cary, later supported by Larsen, maintained that the decree was from 369-67.¹¹⁹ This is close, but we must consider that Megalopolis was probably still being erected in this period, and if more than a building site, was not ready to become a functioning *polis*. By 366/65 there is more likelihood that Megalopolis, even if not actually the finished item, was at least a feasible concern. It

¹¹⁴ *IG V² 1* = Tod 132 = Harding 51; see also Larsen (1968), 180-95; Wiseman (1969), 177-99; Dušanic (1970), 336-37; Roy (1971), 571, and (2000a), 312-13. The stele, recovered in 1868, is now built into the Church of the Metamorphosis and thus lost.

¹¹⁵ Cf. Roy (2000a), 312, who also notes the presence of Heraea and Orchomenus, both of whom originally refused to join the League. *IG V² 278* (two groups of five officials) has been associated with the Mantinean *phylai* system (cf. *IG V² 271*) by Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981), 287, n. 160. These tribes (Epalia, Enyalia, Hoplodomia, Posoidaia, and Wanakisia) are perhaps to be dated, along with the inscription, to the later fourth century.

¹¹⁶ Dusanic (1978a), 350, n. 14; cf. (1970a), 337.

¹¹⁷ Roy (2000a), 313. It may also have had a large number of citizens. Dušanic (1970a), 336-37, takes up the ideas of Beloch (*GG² III 2*), 173 ff., and proposes a date of post-338. Much of his argument relies on line 27 of the decree, which lists Atrestidas of Megalopolis, and who Dušanic equates with the Atrestidas of Demosthenes 19.305, a friend of Philip of Macedon. This is similar to the case with Proxenus of Tegea, above. But this time the coincidence is even less compelling. There could easily be a grandfather and grandson relationship involved here, and, noting the case with our Proxenus of Cleitor (line 59), the chances of coincidences arising from a list of fifty names is high indeed.

¹¹⁸ To quote Roy (2000a), 313, they are: 'Phigalia, Psophis, Cynaetha, Caphyae, Lusi, Stymphalus, Alea, Torthyneum'. To say, as does Tod (132), that no northern states are present is incorrect. Cleitor is very much present.

¹¹⁹ Cary (1922), 188 ff.; Larsen (1968), 187.

was of course in this period that Arcadia allied herself with Athens, the very city Phylarchus was from.¹²⁰ Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the decree could be from before this date, all the circumstances point to such an arrangement being made when Arcadia and Athens had cemented relations between themselves.¹²¹

Maenalia and Lepreum remain a problem, but there is possibly an answer. Even as late as 366 Maenalia could still be feeling the effects of being included in Megalopolis. It will be noticed that the list of communities to comprise Megalopolis as supplied by Pausanias (8.27.3-5) sees Maenalia yielding more of its citizens than any of the others listed. This is why Maenalia is only allowed three *damiorgoi* on the Phylarchus decree (Parrhasia, also a large part of Megalopolis' founding, is not on the decree). Lepreum, we have proved, did not represent Triphylia in the League. As a lone and not very large *polis*, she could only be allowed two *damiorgoi*.

As Roy's list determines, it is not just northern communities that are missing from the decree. De Sanctis used the example of the Boeotian Confederation (cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 16) to propose an Arcadian system whereby three small cities combined to share and alternate, every three years, the holding of the positions of *damiorgoi*, and found support for the theory from Tod.¹²² We have demonstrated that the Boeotian Confederation had no direct influence on the Arcadian League's constitution, but this idea, which could have been copied without direct Boeotian influence, is perhaps close to the truth. Larsen has argued in support of proportional representation within the League structure.¹²³ We have to consider the Phylarchus decree to be reflecting this in some way. Although unlikely, there could even be a hidden agreement that took account of the distance to be travelled by those having to come from the far north, and hence their partial absence. Ten is indeed a round figure, and it is unlikely that this just happened to be the total number of members of the Arcadian League when the decree was published. Here the suggestion of Keen deserves consideration.¹²⁴ He thinks it possible that a permanent seat existed for larger cities

¹²⁰ Cf. Roy (2000a), 312

¹²¹ The interesting similarity is the fragment from a symbola agreement between Athens and Stymphalus. Often dated to c. 368-364 (*SV* 279; cf. *SEG* 36. 147), it could be further proof of the new relationship forged by Arcadia and Athens in 366, especially if it is considered that Stymphalus was besieged by Iphicrates in 370/69: Eratosth. ap Strabo 8.389. If dated correctly, the fragment also begs the question of how much independence the individual cities within the Arcadian League were allowed. Coupled with Aeneas' later ventures (below) and *JG* IV 616, our brief evidence on Stymphalus has often made me wonder if the city was more important to the League than has been imagined.

¹²² De Sanctis (1927), 485 ff.; Tod 132.

¹²³ Larsen (1968), 187, who also suggests that votes were taken by a head count, rather than by cities.

¹²⁴ A suggestion reported by Nielsen (1996c), 96.

and a rotational position for smaller ones. If we follow this line, it would explain, for example, the absence of Parrhasia *vis-à-vis* Maenalia. In essence, the system would function similarly to that of the United Nations, and employ a permanent executive membership for a minority of important members, although we should not think this implied the use of a veto. The Phylarchus decree may never provide us with a definitive answer to its mysteries, but we should believe that it is from the period 366/65, and that it mirrors the Arcadian League's use of proportional representation in its meetings.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.33-40) informs us of the existence of League magistrates (*archontes*), and the question of what duties they and the *boule* and *damiorgoi* performed is a puzzle. The 'strong executive department' envisioned by Larsen would appear, from the available evidence, to be a fact.¹²⁵ Beloch equated the *damiorgoi* with the *boule*,¹²⁶ but this belief is perhaps not the intention which the Phylarchus decree meant to impart. Neither can the possibility that Xenophon's *archontes* were to be identified with the *damiorgoi* of the decree be easily dismissed. In other words, we could be talking of one body under three different guises. Nevertheless, perhaps the best solution is to assume that the *damiorgoi* were separate from the *boule*,¹²⁷ and fitted with their ancient designation, going back as far as Homer but not always utilized so later, as public workers.¹²⁸ Therefore the *boule*, we should believe, was composed of Xenophon's *archontes*, and its members, given the right conditions, could have great influence on the assembly, and, more importantly, the army. This was the body which played a key role in the events of 362.

It could be argued that the *eparittoi* carried the greatest weight of all the Arcadian League's institutions.¹²⁹ This standing army, the obvious answer to Sparta's military professionalism, was the backbone of League strength and, it can be

¹²⁵ Larsen (1968), 188, 189, and taking into account the circumstances of the League split of 362.

¹²⁶ Beloch (*GG²* III 1), 175.

¹²⁷ Both Larsen (1968), 187, and Buckler (1980a), 71, rightly equate the *damiorgoi* with *prytaneis*.

¹²⁸ The later Achaean League's *damiorgoi* were to the forefront of foreign affairs, assisted the *strategos*, (cf. Larsen (1968), 221-22), and consisted of a board of ten (Livy 32.22.2). This would fit in with their duties on the Phylarchus decree to an extent, but *SEG* 14. 375 also implies the existence of an Achaean League *boule*. The *damiorgoi* of the Phylarchus decree thus reflect something of the League's workings, but we should not believe that they played a major role in the events of 362. They perhaps took care of League business, such as aiding the *strategos*, witnessing decisions (as in the Phylarchus decree), or helping the council set agendas, but they were not responsible for decision-making in any capacity.

¹²⁹ On which see Larsen (1968), 188-89; Trampedach (1994), 34-35; Beck (1997), 81-83. On the question of what élite forces influenced the Arcadians to form the *eparittoi* see Roy (2000a), 316; cf. Pritchett (1974, II), 221-25.

surmised, was instituted almost immediately the *koinon* came into existence. It is Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.33-34, 36; 7.5.3; cf. Heyschius s.v. *eparittoi*) who refers to them as *eparittoi*. According to Diodorus (15.62.2) they were termed *epilektoi*, and were composed of some 5,000 men.¹³⁰ Thompson, considering the confusion in our sources over the attack on Orchomenus (Diod. 15.62.1-2; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.10-15), has attributed this to one of Diodorus' doublets, and is correct to do such.¹³¹ Although no doubt many ex-mercenaries were a part of the *eparittoi*,¹³² we should suppose that Larsen's loose use of the term 'mercenaries' is meant to convey that these troops were by birth native Arcadians.¹³³ They were permanent, paid by the League's member states, and had huge political influence.¹³⁴ This latter power, we can suppose, was at first wielded on behalf of democracy, but this was to change as, eventually, the League's political stance became blurred. The *eparittoi* were not rich fanatics, but, as we would expect, the poorer elements of Arcadian society.

It has often been argued that the Arcadian League's institutions were fundamentally democratic.¹³⁵ But all is not straightforward. Like the constitutions of Elis and Mantinea, the latter here being particularly worthy of note, there was room for manoeuvre within its confines. A series of checks and balances existed to a degree, but there was also quite obviously scope for a power struggle to take place, especially between assembly and council, or between general and council for control of the assembly, and thus the army.¹³⁶ Was this then not democratic? The beliefs of Larsen and Stylianou should be taken into account here.¹³⁷ Both acknowledge the basic democratic principle underpinning the League constitution, but have reservations as to how democratic it was in practice. Larsen says that, no matter the constitution, constant warfare must have put matters in the hands of the middle and

¹³⁰ This figure has been much debated ever since Parke (1933), 93, n. 1, seriously questioned its veracity. I personally believe that Diodorus was correct, the later problem of payment stemming from the large numbers of the *eparittoi*, whose numbers had to be so because of the constant Spartan threat. On the *eparittoi* and the *epilektoi* see Stylianou (1998), 424.

¹³¹ Thompson (1983), 155. His arguments viewing the *eparittoi* as a force of latecomers paid from Olympic funds is convincingly destroyed by Roy (2000a), 317-18; cf. Thompson (1983), 156-58. No more compelling is his argument for two separate bodies; nor that which views the *epilektoi* as being peltasts: Thompson (1983), 154-56.; *contra* Stylianou (1998), 424, who thinks that only Diodorus used the term *epilektoi*, given that it was even employed by Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F215).

¹³² *Contra* Pritchett (1974, II), 223.

¹³³ Pritchett (1974, II), 223, in this instance noting the wealthy Arcadians who later composed the *eparittoi*, correctly says that this stipulation 'could only apply to citizens'.

¹³⁴ Roy (2000a), 317-19.

¹³⁵ Cf. Nielsen (1996c), 97; Roy (1971a), 572, and (2000a), esp. 321.

¹³⁶ It should not be forgotten that Arcadia possessed more hoplites than composed the standing army, and that the assembly was effectively the Arcadian army in full sitting.

upper classes;¹³⁷ and that as the league was implemented in a period when *demokratia* was an accepted norm, and many such regimes were of a conservative nature, then the League was likely to term itself as a democracy. Finally, and with some reference to the Mantineans, let us bear in mind the pasts, and futures, of some of those Arcadians very possibly involved in the initial framing.

By late 370 the Arcadians were in alliance with the Argives and Eleans. Who made the first move is uncertain, but Diodorus points to the Arcadians taking the lead in matters (Diod. 16.62.3) after their victory at Orchomenus made them realize that they may not repeat such a feat against Sparta without allies (Diod. 15.62.1-2). Xenophon says the attack was by the Mantineans alone (*Hell.* 6.5.10-15), but Diodorus could still be correct about the details concerning the alliance. Elis may well have been the key player in the Peloponnesian Alliance's successful approach to Thebes for a Boeotian alliance, following on from the rejection at Athens (Diod. 15.62.3).¹³⁹ For the Arcadians the rebuff did not render them blind to the advantages of an alliance with Athens in the future, and as such they may indeed have been the main force behind this first offer.

It was after Agesilaus' expedition into Arcadia had failed the Orchomenians and retreated home somewhat ignominiously that the Boeotians and their allies arrived in the region (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.12-21). The Peloponnesians, and none more so than the Arcadians, were confident after their unified stand against the Spartans and urged an invasion of Laconia.¹⁴⁰ The defection of many Spartan *perioeci* settled the issue (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.25). It seems clear that the Arcadians, invading by way of the pass at Oeum in Sciritis, performed gallantly and gave heart to the rest of the invading forces (Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.26-27).¹⁴¹ They, like the other Peloponnesians, would have been happy with their booty but disappointed about the failure to take Sparta.¹⁴²

¹³⁷ Larsen (1968), 194-95; Stylianos (1998), 416-17; cf. Hammond (1967²), 500.

¹³⁸ Tegea's lack of such after 370 thus left her reliant on stronger forces for protection, hence the close ties with Thebes.

¹³⁹ On both alliances see Roy (1971a), 594

¹⁴⁰ The Arcadians were now present in some numbers: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.21; cf. Roy (1994²), 190.

¹⁴¹ The Arcadians and Argives were in unison during the invasion, whilst the Eleans stayed mainly with the Thebans (see Ch. 4). It is notable that the Spartan Ischolaus is foolhardy in *Hellenica* (6.5.24, 26) but that Diodorus (15.64.3-5) depicts him as a hero; cf. Tuplin (1986b), 48.

¹⁴² Cartledge (1987), 234-35, has argued that it is doubtful if in either 370/69 or 362 Epaminondas intended to capture Sparta. There is no doubt that in both instances he was prevented from doing so by factors beyond his control. In 370/69, as Cartledge rightly says, the swollen Eurotas played a part, but so did Spartan resistance. In 362 the use of a diversionary tactic to pull the Spartans away from Mantinea was used, and because it worked the Spartans returned home in some force. But Epaminondas, now knew from experience that Sparta would put up the stiffest kind of resistance, and

Nevertheless, and despite Athenian aid (Xen.*Hell.* 6.5.33-52), Sparta had been severely mauled, especially by the refounding of Messenia, and the Arcadians would have lost no time in dedicating some of their spoils at Delphi and erecting the monument to Arcas and his sons opposite the Spartan Navarchs' Monument.¹⁴³ A united, free Arcadia had at last become a reality – or so it appeared. No time was lost in substantiating the gains made, and whilst their Argive compatriots attacked Phlius, Lycomedes led the *eparittoi* against Pellana. Unprepared, the Spartans could do nothing about this incursion into Laconia, and the Arcadians showed no mercy to the garrison installed there (cf. Diod. 15.67.2).

We know that the Eleans, keen adherents of Theban policy at this stage, would have been fully supportive of Epaminondas' second invasion of the Peloponnese in the summer of 369. This attitude would also have prevailed in Argos, which had designs on the northeast Peloponnese.¹⁴⁴ Judging by Lycomedes' actions following the invasion, opinion in Arcadia was divided.¹⁴⁵ The Arcadians undoubtedly saw the Thebans' first expedition as a necessity. The second one was a different proposition. Many Arcadians wanted the Peloponnese free of Theban interference: had they not completed their task already? Some would see them getting in the way of Arcadian ambitions, and perhaps none more so than Lycomedes. But the Arcadians were in no position to refuse to participate. As yet, they needed Thebes. At least their participation deflected from their problems and united the region to a degree. The expedition secured Sicyon and Pellene (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.18; cf. Diod. 15.69.1), though a Peloponnesian attempt on oligarchic Phlius failed.¹⁴⁶ Sparta's now formal alliance with Athens (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.1-15) and the arrival of Chabrias (Diod. 15.69.1-4) could not retrieve the situation. What initially seems a success story held grave implications

on neither occasion did he stake all on Sparta's capture – but if the opportunity had presented itself he surely would have taken it.

¹⁴³ *SIG*³ 160; *FD* III. 1. 3-11; *CEG* II. 824.7; cf. Polyb. 4.77.8; Cartledge (1987), 34-35. The Monument was in large part propaganda, but it was also meant to entice Elean *perioeci* into becoming "Arcadian". Dušanic (1970a), 299, has argued that the Arcadians had no territorial ambitions, Elis being the exception because her *perioeci* were more Arcadian than Elean. This latter is open to debate, and Dušanic notes that Thebes, problems over Megalopolis, and lack of finance limited Arcadian ambitions. This is quite so, and we should not assume that the Arcadians were different from any other Greeks in this respect. Without such limitations, the League may have adopted an imperialistic outlook.

¹⁴⁴ It should be noted that in 369 Thebes also had Pelopidas involved in Thessaly and Macedonia (Diod. 15. 67.3-4; Plut. *Pel.* 26.1-4; cf. Roy (1971a), 574).

¹⁴⁵ Arcadian forays into Laconia may have led the Spartans to make moves towards Syracuse in the first place (see Chapter 3).

¹⁴⁶ Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.5-9. The attempt does prove that the League was supporting democracies at this juncture (cf. Roy (2000a) 321), but we could also argue that Phlius had been an avid supporter of

for the future of the Arcadian League. Epaminondas allowed Sicyon and Pellene to keep their oligarchic governments, which put Arcadian loyalty to Thebes in even more jeopardy. Still officially democratic and the enemy of all things representing Spartan domination, the Arcadian League was placed in an insurmountable position by Epaminondas' arrangements. Faced by divided opinion within, Arcadia was beginning to feel the strain of her unification.

Lycomedes now commenced to harangue the Arcadians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23-26), reminding them of their Peloponnesian roots, superior numbers, and fighting prowess. Of all Greeks, the Arcadians were the finest. Rarely is it ever considered why he suddenly resorted to this strategy. It had been, after all, less than a year since the Arcadians, even though supported by their Peloponnesian allies, had been in desperate need of Theban aid. Lycomedes did not set on his risky course without good reason. Cracks within the League were now becoming apparent, and he needed a diversion to avert disaster.¹⁴⁷ The communities earmarked to be part of Megalopolis had shown their displeasure at the decision, especially when they looked back some fifteen years to the fuss made by many Mantineans upon their removal from their homes by Sparta. Now, among others, the Mantineans, and especially Lycomedes, were advocating the very same for them. At *Hellenica* 7.1.22 Xenophon informs us that up until this point, that is, immediately after the Laconian expedition, all the former members of the Spartan alliance had fought in full agreement under Theban leadership. Not only is he preparing us for Elean and Theban dissatisfaction with Arcadian attitude (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26), he is also pointing to the emerging differences of opinion within the Arcadian League. Unfortunately for the Arcadians, the truth was that they were only ever united in extreme adversity. Whilst preoccupied with the Spartan target, they were at their most unified. But the Megalopolis decision was a breach of autonomy, and probably evoked sympathy for the coerced from some Arcadian quarters. It is also very possible that once the dust began to settle on the first invasion old rivalries had come to the fore. Differences may have emerged in League meetings; perhaps the League's leadership had been criticized; more likely, the Mantineans and Tegeans had been at loggerheads over the League's future

Sparta for some ten years and was not likely to side with any alliance that had Argos among its members: see Legon (1967), 335-57.

¹⁴⁷ The statement of Nielsen (1996c), 97, that a 'high degree of unanimity' existed within the League until 363/2, should be treated very warily.

direction.¹⁴⁸ Whatever the truth, and we have little to go on beyond the Megalopolitan crisis, Lycomedes' answer was to elevate the Arcadians' opinion of themselves and thereby create some unity through pride in their achievements. Dušanic has overrated the Theban influence on the Arcadians.¹⁴⁹ His belief that 'a too great Megaleopolis, democratic excesses, continuous warfare with neighbours' were, firstly, the result of Theban policies and, secondly, not approved by Lycomedes and the Mantineans, among others, is misplaced. They may not have approved of democratic excess, but they did not disapprove of a strong Megalopolis, and probably viewed continuous warfare as part and parcel of Peloponnesian politics of the moment.¹⁵⁰ But our main point is that Thebes was never allowed to take such control of Arcadian affairs.¹⁵¹ The stand taken by Lycomedes destroyed any chance of this occurring. From the moment the first invasion ended many Arcadians assumed that in future Theban involvement would be fleeting and distant. Megalopolis, originally, had the approbation of a majority of Arcadians, and certainly the Mantineans and Tegeans.¹⁵² Far from disapproving of it, Lycomedes' actions over Megalopolis had been ruthless and belligerent, causing some of Arcadia's problems.¹⁵³

The fact that the Arcadians became so arrogant led to Theban dislike of them. When they also refused to listen to Elean pleas for the return of their *perioeci*,¹⁵⁴ matters took a considerable turn for the worse, prompting Xenophon to comment that each power within the Alliance was now full of its own importance (*Hell.* 7.1.26-27). In the autumn of 369 the League ravaged Asine and defeated its Spartan garrison (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.25); and by now Lepreum, if not also Lasion and Triphylia, had

¹⁴⁸ By now the Tegeans were controlling assembly decisions. Using hindsight, this would reinforce the League's democratic stance.

¹⁴⁹ Dušanic (1970a), 295.

¹⁵⁰ As Larsen has said (see above), constant warfare left the middle and upper classes in control. The description of Lycomedes by Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.1.23) hardly places him in the lower-class bracket: he was of the best family, rich, and ambitious. Whilst not proving that he was an oligarch, neither does this evidence speak volumes of his democratic credentials. On Xenophon's treatment of Lycomedes see Tuplin (1993), 151-52.

¹⁵¹ See the comments of Buckler (1980a), 92, on the independent policy of the Arcadians.

¹⁵² They each saw Megalopolis as a drawback to their own ambitions, but this was naturally offset by it being a menace to the other's ambitions. The protection given by Pammenes after the first invasion was not wanted, but was needed. Neither should we fool ourselves into thinking it was purely to see off the Spartan threat (see above).

¹⁵³ Considering Dušanic's view of Lycomedes and the Mantineans, it will be noted that, even though Lycomedes himself was dead, in 362 the Megalopolitans, whatever their current composition, chose Thebes rather than side with the Mantinean faction. This was due in large part to Lycomedes and the measures he had, at least, supported.

¹⁵⁴ On the details of the struggle over these *perioeci* see Ch. 4.

become “Arcadian” and joined the League.¹⁵⁵ Aegydis and Sciritis had fallen to them (Paus. 8.27.4), and almost certainly Eua in the Thyreatis (Theopomp. fr. 60, Jacoby). The Arcadians could argue they had every reason to display arrogance. But as ever in such circumstances, disaster was only around the corner.

Roy says that the failed Philiscus conference held at Delphi in spring 368 had no effect on Peloponnesian affairs.¹⁵⁶ Whilst the conference floundered over the status of Messenia, for Sparta it did bring some rewards. The Spartan army was to be complemented by mercenaries which Philiscus, the emissary of Ariobarzanes, Persian satrap of Phrygia,¹⁵⁷ would raise for them.¹⁵⁸ The Arcadians and Argives decided upon extending their influence in the northern Peloponnese. Phlius was attacked, but once again with little success (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.10).¹⁵⁹ Therefore an invitation from Euphron of Sicyon seemed to be an offer they could not refuse. The long-term result would see their relations with Boeotia reach an all-time nadir.¹⁶⁰ Having intervened in Sicyon in the name of democracy, the nature of the regime which they sanctioned was anything but democratic. Euphron was not so much of a democrat than an opportunist, but the Arcadians and Argives must have suspected this by the very nature of the *coup* which they sanctioned. The chance to strike at a regime which had pro-Spartan ties was perhaps simply too good to miss. More to the fore of Arcadian thinking was the opportunity to expand League influence at the expense of the Thebans. The *coup* did not go unnoticed at Thebes. The Arcadian determination to keep the Peloponnese free of Theban influence was shown quite clearly at Sicyon. Without an answer that did not include brute force, the Thebans chose to embark upon a strategy that introduced the threat of such without it being made overt. The “fettters of Greece”, later used extensively by the Macedonians, were to be employed in the Peloponnese at Sicyon as at Messene. Thebes would not surrender her influence meekly. Officially democratic, the Thebans were no more interested in political idealism than some of the Arcadians at the forefront of the Arcadian League. In Greek inter-state politics it was, experience

¹⁵⁵ Roy (1971a), 575, and (1994²), 194.

¹⁵⁶ Roy (1971a), 576; cf. Seager (1974) 58-59. Dušanic (1970a), 296, thinks the Arcadians did not attend, due to their bad relations with Thebes. This, I believe, is the very reason why they had to attend. Cartledge considers the conference co-sponsored by Dionysius I, who, via his Spartan links, was now finally making friendship and alliance with Athens: see Hicks and Hill (1901), 215; Tod 108, 135, and 136 (= *SV*280) with Cartledge (1987), 310.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. Buckler (1977), 141-42.

¹⁵⁸ Their presence in the events of 368 seems unlikely, cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.2.

¹⁵⁹ It is possible that at this time they did have some success at Caryae and Sellasia, as both were occupied until 365; cf. Dušanic (1970a), 296, n. 56.

¹⁶⁰ On Euphron see Chapter 1.

and history revealed, a question of sink or swim; and the pursuit of a political doctrine had never saved anyone from drowning.

The second force from Dionysius, including Celts, did play a role in bringing the Arcadians, aided by their Argive allies, down to earth. Sweeping down on Caryae, the Spartans and their allies then proceeded to rout the Arcadians and Argives at the Tearless Battle. The joy at Sparta was almost matched by that at Elis and Thebes.¹⁶¹ The Arcadians had overreached themselves, and, if our sources are correct, made the boasts of Lycomedes concerning their military prowess seem laughable. It does not require a great imagination to realize that there would be internal repercussions in Arcadia. Now, more than ever, the validity of following the Theban line became a key issue. The Arcadians had fought against this tactic almost from the first. But some now saw in defeat a weakness that had not been visible when Thebes had been involved. On our chronology, there is no direct evidence as to who, if anyone, was *strategos* at the Tearless Battle. It was prior to Aeneas' tenure of the post, and after Lycomedes' holding of it, as far as our evidence goes. The likely candidate is of course Lycomedes. The obvious candidates to condemn him would be the Tegeans, and especially in full assembly.

The Arcadian League is conspicuous by its absence in the attacks made by Argives, Boeotians, Sicyonians, and Pellenians on Phlius in 367 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.2.11-15; Diod. 15.75.3). She of course had previously joined in such actions herself, so why her inaction now? The problems within Arcadia were enough to distract her from such sideshows.¹⁶² Lycomedes' strategy had made the Thebans wary of Arcadian intentions. The Eleans were totally at odds with Arcadian actions. Now the setback of the Tearless Battle added to the internal stresses facing the Arcadians. Was Sparta about to experience a renaissance in her fortunes? Under this pressure, the Arcadians were bound to look inwards and begin to question their own policies. When a journey to Susa was in the offing in 367 the League had no option but to send a delegate.¹⁶³ If

¹⁶¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28-32; Diod. 15.72.3; Plut. *Ages.* 33.3-5; *Mor.* 218F; cf. Dušanic (1970a), 296; Cartledge (1987), 387; Roy (1994²), 192-93.

¹⁶² It is important to note that in the following two years the Argives no longer joined the Arcadians for joint actions. Arguably the staunchest democrats within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance (they, like the Tegeans, having eliminated their oligarchs), the Argives were alienated by Arcadian arrogance, divisions, and wavering stance on democracy. It would be as late as 365 before they re-joined with the Arcadians again, and only because of pressing circumstances. In 362 they finally joined with the democratic faction of the League. That this was led by Tegea ably demonstrates the effectiveness of exterminating internal opposition.

¹⁶³ The athlete Antiochus of Lepreum; cf. Paus. 6.3.9; *IG V 2*, 450; Swoboda (*RE V*), 2403. On the Susa conference: Beloch (*GG III*² 1), 189; Bengtson (*SV*), 282; Ryder (1965), 80; Dušanic (1970a),

the bond that seemed to be developing between the Thebans and Eleans was taken to its conclusion, then Arcadia might be about to lose her new League members to Elis.¹⁶⁴ This was unacceptable, despite League policy being in large part responsible, and for some Arcadians the loss would involve hostilities with Thebes if necessary. Nor can it be ruled out that a small minority were already casting sideways glances towards Sparta, should the worse come about.

When the *perioecic* question was left off the agenda at Susa the Arcadians breathed a small sigh of relief. It could only be small. Their gains at the expense of Elis could still be removed at a later date; Thebes was now favoured by the Great King; and, worse of all, Pelopidas had insulted Arcadian military virtues in front of all concerned. The thought that Lycomedes' sabre-rattling had invited such a retort would have struck many Arcadians immediately. The result was a display of solidarity by some; but for others it required a questioning of League policy and those guiding it. The cracks were getting bigger.

The Thebans brought the terms of the Susa conference to Greece for ratification.¹⁶⁵ Even if these terms had been agreeable, there was no way that Arcadia could possibly endorse what amounted to Theban hegemony of Greece. Lycomedes went to Thebes with no other intention but to wreck Theban plans almost before they could start to take shape. He had his tactics prepared in advance. Little sympathy would be on display for Theban policy from their fellow Greeks, and Lycomedes cut his cloth accordingly. Once the states' delegates had objected that they were only present to listen to terms, not to swear to them, Lycomedes immediately questioned the validity of the venue chosen. He suggested that the correct venue would have been in territory where there was fighting to be done. This was in effect questioning Thebes' unofficial position as hegemon of both the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance and Greece itself.¹⁶⁶ A Boeotian reply was imminent, as he anticipated. A Theban charge that he was disrupting the alliance presented Lycomedes with the chance to storm out of the conference in, we might say, feigned disgust. The Arcadians present, probably primed in advance, naturally followed him, but he had also precipitated a

297-98; Seager (1974), 59-61; Buckler (1980a), 152-57; Roy (1971a), 578, and (1994²), 196-97; Cartledge (1987), 387-88; Tuplin (1993), 152-53; also see Chapter 4.

¹⁶⁴ Cf. Dušanic (1970a), 298.

¹⁶⁵ Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.39-40; cf. Roy (1971a), 578-79; Seager (1974), 61-62. Sealey (1956), 196, argues that Athens was not awarded Amphipolis during the Susa conference.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 158.

firmer solidarity among the remaining Greeks.¹⁶⁷ Not even when the Thebans later went to individual cities was any oath sworn. The Corinthians were the first to refuse, but the original stand had been taken by Lycomedes. Thebes was denied her hegemony.

Lycomedes had risked the repercussions that would inevitably arise from this confrontation at Thebes, and we are entitled to ask ourselves what kind of a man would dare do this. Although we have little in the way of evidence, what is plain from what we do have is that he was a guiding force for Arcadian unity. That is not to say that he, like many other Arcadians, was not a member of his *polis* first and foremost. Due to *Hellenica* 7.1.23-25 it is assumed that he had uninterrupted control of the federal assembly. Due to his stand on behalf of Arcadian unity it is often taken for granted that he placed this item first on his own personal agenda. Let us examine these assumptions. Larsen has said that it is clear that Tegea dominated the federal administration, and Mantinea the assembly.¹⁶⁸ *Hellenica* 7.1.23-24 implies that Lycomedes had domination of the assembly. It will be noted that Lycomedes was a Mantinean. But when we look at the available evidence there is nothing to say that Lycomedes was not challenged, and that his tenure of office was not an occasionally rough ride. At *Hellenica* 7.1.23-25 Xenophon is speaking of events in 370/69 – he is not talking of what still lay in the future.¹⁶⁹ When he relates that the Arcadians worshipped Lycomedes and chose for their *archontes* whomsoever he suggested (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.24), it does not fit with the later division between magistrates and assembly. Surely, if he was the darling of the assembly and recommended magistrates to it, who would almost certainly be of his mode of thinking, then we would expect a consensus of opinion? Granted, the personnel had almost certainly changed later on. But if this was the case, bearing in mind the split, does it not imply that somewhere along the way Lycomedes had lost the ability to influence the assembly to a large degree? By implication he seems to be no longer capable of having his choice of magistrates placed in power. Lycomedes, even if he had wanted to, could not hide the fact that he was a Mantinean. The League's earliest days may have seen this dormant

¹⁶⁷ Cf. Dušanic (1970a), 298.

¹⁶⁸ Larsen (1968), 189.

¹⁶⁹ The discussion at 7.1.25 is the oddity. Here Xenophon alludes to the Arcadians saving the Argives at Epidaurus, and also to the attack on Asine: neither event had occurred at the time of which he is writing, but he relates them as evidence for Arcadia's current arrogance. Sadly, we have to accept this as typical Xenophontic reporting, but overall he is certainly not speaking of the situation appertaining to post-370/69.

handicap pushed into the background to some degree, as most Arcadians were avid for a successful union. Apart from the League's final weeks, when the current situation demanded participation, attendance at these early meetings was probably higher than in any other period of the 360s, with Arcadians travelling to Tegea in some numbers. This was the time when those present, including many Tegeans, would rubber stamp whatever Lycomedes put forward, there being little to cause any controversy. But after the initial enthusiasm had subsided, priorities had changed, and this was a reflection of Arcadian failure. By 368 questions began arising about Thebes' role in the Peloponnese, League policy, and defeat at the Tearless Battle. Tegeans had a clear majority in the assembly, and Lycomedes was no Tegean.¹⁷⁰ He could, for all we know, have presented measures blatantly favouring Mantinea, or at least some which would keep Tegea from becoming the League's leading light. Whatever, we may ask ourselves, before we shortly review related evidence (below), one important question. Did Lycomedes, already sensing in 366 that a future League split was on the cards, fashion the Arcadia-Athens alliance around the needs of Mantinea and its supporters rather than the needs of Arcadia? Athens was certainly democratic, and thus theoretically an ideal stablemate for the Tegean element within the League. But if Lycomedes knew enough to predict which way the League would divide, then he also knew exactly what Athens would never permit. That is, to allow herself to be allied to Thebes. Throughout the whole of our period, and even when allied to Arcadia, Athens never sent her troops to fight where the Thebans would appear as her ally. When the final reckoning came, Athens, Lycomedes realized, would side with Sparta and her oligarchic following rather than the hated Thebans. Did he thus buy future insurance for Mantinea, and not Arcadia?

If we doubt this, let us turn to the events following his stand at Thebes. The expected Theban riposte came in the shape of a call to arms from Epaminondas. Now it was the Thebans turn to demand an invasion of the Peloponnese (*Xen. Hell.* 7.1.41-43; *Diod.* 15.75.1-3), thus demonstrating that Thebes was still capable of calling the shots.¹⁷¹ It was to prove a fateful venture. Thebes had the best army in Greece and the

¹⁷⁰ If Tegea was not named as the permanent home of Arcadian League meetings until Megalopolis was finished, but only as a temporary venue which could be changed, then there is the chance that the Tegean majority in the assembly continually voted to keep meetings in their home city.

¹⁷¹ Cf. Buckler (1980a), 185-86.

most allies: she did not need to invade Achaëa.¹⁷² In trying to call Lycomedes' bluff, Epaminondas was about to shatter the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance and push most of Greece into war.

The Arcadians, not foolish or strong enough to refuse, duly sent their forces on what seemed a futile expedition. Some, keen democrats, may have thought Achaëa could not be left to her own oligarchic, pro-Spartan devices for much longer. Others, knowing the nature of Achaean politics, may have found the eventual reaction of the Achaeans predictable. Achaëa's oligarchs immediately came to terms with Epaminondas and Achaean garrisons in Dyme, Naupactus, and Calydon were all removed. But those terms were not to everyone's liking, and particularly Arcadia's arch-democrats.¹⁷³ If it was not enough that Achaëa's oligarchs had been left in power, Epaminondas also had them swear to follow Thebes, without reference to any other member of the Alliance. Thebes now seemed set upon dominating the Peloponnese. Complaints, naturally featuring the advantages the arrangement gave to Sparta, were sent to Thebes, and the response was the imposition of governors and, almost certainly, garrisons. Over the following months the Achaean oligarchs re-took their cities and moved closer to Sparta. The advantages for Sparta predicted by the Arcadian democrats had come about, thanks to themselves.

Around this time arose an action that has been the cause of much debate.¹⁷⁴ Outraged by Theban handling of the Achaëa situation, an Arcadian force went to remove Euphron of Sicyon from power.¹⁷⁵ It is often thought that no evidence exists for an Arcadian League split before 362, yet it has been staring at us for many years. At *Hellenica* 7.3.1 Xenophon reports on Aeneas of Stymphalus leading an Arcadian force into Sicyon and deposing Euphron. The part of the report concerning us is as follows: Aeneas of Stymphalus, now *strategos* of the Arcadians, decided that the state of affairs in Sicyon was now unendurable. So with his army he went up to the Acropolis... Let us summarize, with our own emphases, Aeneas' behaviour: *he* was general of the Arcadian League; *he* decided that the situation was intolerable; *he* took *his* army into Sicyon. This was not, quite plainly, a decision suggested to the League's

¹⁷² On the invasion see Roy (1971a), 579; Buckler (1980a), 185-93; Cartledge (1987), 388; Tuplin (1993), 154. Dušanic (1970a), 297, is wrong to think that by spring 367 relations between Boeotia and Arcadia had improved; neither is his questioning of Arcadian participation warranted.

¹⁷³ Quite possibly also Achaëa's democrats, it depends on how *Hellenica* 7.1.43 is interpreted.

¹⁷⁴ I think the action most likely around the same time as the complaints to Thebes; cf. Roy (1971a), 579.

magistrates, presented by them to the League assembly, and duly ratified by that body. This was Aeneas the disgruntled Arcadian deciding Thebes had gone too far. Although we do not know how much leeway an Arcadian League *strategos* was allowed, or even who elected him, we can surmise that a decision of such importance as this one demanded a full meeting of the assembly to debate it.¹⁷⁶ As we have seen, and as Aeneas knew, the Tegeans controlled the assembly. A Tegean controlled assembly was not going to pass this action. No matter how dubious Sicyon's democracy, it was still a democracy. Crucially, Sicyon also housed a garrison belonging to Arcadia's Theban allies. Hence Aeneas did not take his plans before the assembly. What we have witnessed is the first definite inkling of a split within the Arcadian League. No Arcadian wanted either Sparta or Thebes directing Peloponnesian politics, but sometimes there was no choice, and eventually the divided Arcadian camp would choose either one or the other. That moment was some four years into the future. Now, in 366, the first lines were being drawn. Those Arcadians pressed by economic concerns were perhaps, as Dušanic has argued, mainly in the south of the region.¹⁷⁷ Their poverty, their geographical situation, their proximity to the venue of League meetings, their being influenced by what was now an oligarchless Tegea: all these factors served to make them democrats of the most radical variety. The Thebans were not radical democrats, and could be chameleon-like when dealing with places such as Sicyon, and Pellene, and Achaëa in general. But they were prepared to support a democratic Arcadian League against any threat

¹⁷⁵ The whole Euphron episode has already been discussed in some depth in Chapter 1, and I here refer the reader to it.

¹⁷⁶ Our discussion, above, of the League constitution has noted that it seems certain that the following year saw Lycomedes back as *strategos*, despite his already having served as such for at least two terms – we now know why. Whoever was responsible for this decision, he was perhaps seen as something of an experienced moderate compared with the ultra-radical Aeneas.

¹⁷⁷ Dušanic (1970a), 303-07. I believe that there is a great deal of merit in many of Dušanic's explanations as to why the Arcadian League divided along almost regional lines (although I personally have an aversion to referring to the two camps as being "southern" and "northern"). He highlights the plight of those states eventually to be known, generally to modern scholarship, as the Tegean faction, and who were mostly from the southeast of Arcadia. They, he says, were more radical, pro-Megalopolis, and pro-Thebes. We may dismiss the belief that they were keener on the Megalopolis project than the Mantineans. Many communities incorporated in Megalopolis, we must remember, would have been placed there against their collective will. They were still, though, placed in the same geographical region and thus faced the same dangers and problems as those around them. But his case for poverty being a key factor in their stance should not be dismissed. The loss of Tegea's oligarchs in 370; the devastation caused by Spartan forays in 368 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.28) and 364 (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.21); agricultural work being interrupted because of the Megalopolis building work: all contributed to the need for strong Theban links and on-going wars which provided booty. Dušanic also points out that the Mantinean section were not anti-federalist, oligarchic, or even pro-Spartan, the turning to Sparta being

emanating from Sparta. This in turn was bound to be an oligarchic threat. In 362 the Mantinean faction of the League was to turn towards these very alternatives. In 366 Aeneas was indulging in a tit for tat retaliation against the Tegeans who were running the League, and who were responsible for the complaints to Thebes about Epaminondas' Achaean settlement. For him to successfully use the *eparittoi* at Sicyon, as he surely did, a force that was at this time composed of many poor and who in the future, if not already, would be keen supporters of radical democracy, means he disguised his motives to a degree. Aeneas told his troops that this action was in support of Arcadia, and kept politics well hidden.¹⁷⁸ He was one of many Arcadians disgusted at Thebes making inroads into the Peloponnese, disillusioned with an assembly and magistrates that seemed ever more intent on letting her, and dissatisfied with the gradually increasing radicalism of that part of the League we refer to as the "Tegean faction". Thebes had her garrison in Sicyon, and, short of open warfare, nothing could change that. But Aeneas did his best to turn matters to Arcadia's advantage. His action had changed the face of Arcadian politics forever.¹⁷⁹

Whatever the consequences for Aeneas, and we never hear of him again,¹⁸⁰ the Argives became estranged from the Arcadians over the deposition of Euphron. By the beginning of the autumn of 366 the Achaean backlash against Arcadian wishes saw the region's oligarchs moving closer towards Elis and Sparta. Arcadia's democrats had precipitated a dangerous situation. The Theban mid-summer move on Oropus nevertheless presented possibilities which Lycomedes was not slow to see.¹⁸¹ Structuring an alliance with Athens, he significantly freed Arcadia from much of her

due to the immediate danger to be faced in 362. We might question his assumption that they were not oligarchic.

¹⁷⁸ The *eparittoi* were of course paid by the state and had a close relationship with their *strategos*. We need not doubt that they would follow his commands unless his orders were particularly unethical. At this stage an attempt upon Sicyon to remove a pro-Theban tyrant would not see the *eparittoi* raise any objections. Only around 363/62 may we begin to question if they would have still undertaken such an order. Unpaid and independent, the assembly was a different matter.

¹⁷⁹ Roy (2000a), 324, has remarked that the recapture of Sicyon's harbour by the Sicyonians and Arcadians (Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.1) makes little sense in the context of Thompson's arguments concerning a split within the League. That is, why would the Sicyonian oligarchs acquire Arcadian aid to attack a Spartan-held port? I would add that it is quite possible that these Sicyonians were democrats being aided by a force of Arcadians sent by the democratically inclined magistrates of the Arcadian League to readjust matters after Aeneas' actions.

¹⁸⁰ For what it is worth, I believe that Aeneas was, as first suggested by Casaubon (1609), one and the same person as Aeneas Tacticus who wrote the manuscript on siege warfare; cf. Bengtson (1962), 458-68.

¹⁸¹ See Buckler (1980a), 193-95; Kallet (1983), 251; Roy (1994²), 197-99. On Oropus' history: see Thuc. 8.60, 95. 1-4; Lys. 31.9; Diod. 14.17.1-3; Isoc. 14.20, 37; cf. Sealey (1956), 190-91; 195-97. On the alleged arbitration: Buckler (1977), 333-34. It is at this stage, if not spurious, that the 'Redcduell' evidence would have entered into matters: see Roy (1971a), 582, n. 69.

dependency on Theban power, whilst simultaneously strengthening her position within the Peloponnese.¹⁸² He would not live to see any benefits.

The murder of Lycomedes, whether with Spartan collusion or not, was, as Dušanic says, a major blow to Arcadian hopes.¹⁸³ Whether foremost a Mantinean or Arcadian, his federalist outlook appears to have been the cementing factor which had kept the Arcadians unified. Without his leadership, and with no obvious successor, the Arcadians were left to fill a vacuum. By now the fear factor was playing its part in their thinking

The Athenian attempt on Corinth came soon after Arcadia's alliance with her, and made many Peloponnesians suspicious of Athens and, by way of association, Arcadia as well. In Elis it was enough to ensure the fall of her democrats. When matters between the two states had been at their lowest over recent years there were always factors to accommodate an understanding between both sides. Membership of the Peloponnesian and Boeotian-Peloponnesian alliances; anti-Spartan stance; democratic outlook: all had helped prevent an open breach between the pair. Now Eleans cared little for alliances that gave them nothing of what they wanted, thought the Spartans less onerous than their so-called allies, and had decided that democracy had proved their undoing. In an instant the ways of the previous half-decade were upturned. This was reinforced by Corinthian peace moves towards Thebes.¹⁸⁴ They and other Peloponnesians were granted their wish. Although Thebes did not get exactly what she wanted, the Corinthians refusing to change sides, thanks in essence to Lycomedes' efforts towards an Athenian alliance she managed to detach Sparta's northeastern allies from her. Sparta, though, was already turning her sights elsewhere. We might think that the blow struck by the Peace of 366/65 would finally cripple Sparta. But her attack on Sellasia in 365, at the very moment when she was at her lowest ebb, tells us that she was already in close contact with Elis and perhaps also Achaëa.

The first serious action by the new Elean oligarchy was to attack Lasion. Arcadia managed to make gains in her retaliatory actions, taking the fight to the very

¹⁸² Buckler (1980a), 197, no doubt correctly, believes that the alliance brought forth opposition from areas such as Asea, Tegea, and Megalopolis, all situated close to Sparta and thus naturally pro-Theban.

¹⁸³ Dušanic (1970a), 301.

¹⁸⁴ What efforts the Arcadians made, if any, is uncertain. They may have been a party to the Peace: cf. Buckler (1980a), 200. As both the Thebans and Argives were to give them aid against the Eleans (though we should not forget that Spartan involvement would have awoken both), we might suspect that they were.

agora of Elis itself.¹⁸⁵ Arcadian unity over the Elis affair was achieved, as it was among the Eleans themselves, because of the *perioecic* claim. Again, for the most part, it was a case of unity through adversity. There still remained the League's fight on behalf of democracy. This was in evidence when it was still prepared to send forces to join Elean exiles and seize Pylus, that is if 'some' Arcadians can be taken to mean an official League mission. The sequel saw the Arcadians repulsed from Elis, due to Achaean help. But in trying to steal a march on the Achaean forces and take Pellenean Olorus they also managed to concoct another awkward situation for themselves, the Pelleneans subsequently concentrating their efforts on freeing Olorus but also fighting with the local democrats.

What turned an embarrassing position into a winning one were concerted attacks on Elis. For the first time the Arcadians knew one thing with certainty: the Elean impatience which resulted in the attack on Lasion was a betrayal of the Thebans and their policy of inaction, which in turn ensured that they would not intervene on the side of Elis in any confrontation. One power might, and did. Pushed to the brink, the Eleans called in their Spartan allies, and Cromnus immediately fell to them.¹⁸⁶ An Arcadian circumvallation of Cromnus saw the Spartans besieged within it.¹⁸⁷ This was now serious enough to arouse the Argives, Messenians, and Thebans, whose entrance into matters saw a temporary resurgence of the old alliance. But this was not so much a new beginning, more of an ending. The Messenians would follow the Theban line on matters and, distrustful of Arcadia, so would the Argives. The Thebans had already lost faith and patience with the Arcadians. The Athenians, with one eye on their existing but dormant alliance with Sparta, were still wary of the Arcadian connection with Thebes: eventually all came to Arcadia's aid because of treaty obligations or the Spartan threat or both, but certainly not through concern for her plight.

In the short space since Lycomedes' death, the Arcadians had lost what little goodwill their allies still bore them. They desperately wanted to cling on to Elis' former *perioeci*. As they saw it, being the leading power in the Peloponnese, Arcadia needed to defeat Elis in this struggle to maintain her reputation. It was enough that she had recently needed the weight of her allies behind her. But Sparta was now licking

¹⁸⁵ On the three Arcadian-Elean wars, including their chronology, see Dušanic (1970a), 302-04.

¹⁸⁶ Cartledge (1979), 301, notes that 365 was a mixed year for Sparta. Despite some successes, she also lost Coryphasium and Cyparrisia (Diod. 15.77.4) to the conquering Arcadians (they gave them to Messenia, perhaps because they could do little else, hardly being able to claim them as ethnically "Arcadian").

her wounds and was unlikely to re-enter the fray against such odds again in a hurry. This meant that neither were her own allies within the Boeotian-Peloponnesian Alliance likely to come to her assistance against a lone Elis. The possibility of more Achaean aid for the Eleans may not change their minds – what had a specifically Arcadian aim, if not to say greed, to do with them? Having taken and strengthened the area around Olympia, the Arcadians decided that there was one way they could gain their allies' support and re-kindle some sympathy. The Olympic Games were due to be staged in the summer of 364. The Pisatans, long-time claimers of their right to stage the Games, had been allied to the Arcadians for some time.¹⁸⁸ If there was one state likely to gain less sympathy from the Boeotian-Peloponnesian allies than Arcadia, then it was Elis. But behind all lay an even bigger Arcadian goal. What greater propaganda prize could there be, what greater prestige, for a Peloponnesian state than to be hosts of the Olympics, thereby proving her unofficial right to be hegemon of the Peloponnese? Had Arcadia not also sided with the underdog in so doing?

The painstaking planning, which did indeed attract physical allied support for the venture, fell to pieces in the face of a reckless but brave onslaught on the Games by the Eleans and Achaeans. The Arcadians and their allies survived, but Arcadian pride and prestige had been considerably dented. When an army was now needed more than ever, a setback was about to wreak havoc within the Arcadian League.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 7.4.33-40; cf. Diod. 15.82.1-5) tells us of how the Arcadian *archontes* began to now pay the *eparittoi* from the sacred treasures of Olympia, and how the Mantineans registered their objections by voting against such usage and sent their contributions to the *archontes*.¹⁸⁹ Their response was to summon the Mantinean leaders before them, as they were harming the League, and a refusal saw the

¹⁸⁷ Cf. Tuplin (1993), 145, n. 73.

¹⁸⁸ Kunze, *Olympiabericht*, 7 (1961), 211 ff. = *SEG* 22. 339 = *SV* 285a; cf. *SEG* 29. 405. *SEG* 32. 411 is a new fragment which implies that Acrorea was also an Arcadian ally. *SIG*³ 171, 11.5 ff. suggests the Arcadians were *de facto* controlling the Games, they having a majority of the *hellanodikai*. *IvO* 16 is not relevant: Kunze, *Olympiabericht* 7 (1961), 217, n. 5. It is possible that the Pisatans were made allies of Arcadia especially for the occasion, but we should believe that they became allied immediately the Arcadians forced back the Eleans the previous year, especially in light of the fact that Messenia, Sicyon, and almost certainly Argos were also allies. The absence of Thebes should be no shock, although one wonders if the Arcadians were actually angling for this scenario.

¹⁸⁹ Dušanic (1970a), 303, n. 114, makes the point that the Mantineans returned their share of the funds, taking it from their troops, but did not pay for their *eparittoi*; cf. *IG* IV 616. Cartledge (1987), 390, dates this event to spring, 363. I agree with Buckler (1980a), 205, that *IG* IV 616 concerns arbitration over reparations made by the Arcadians over the plundering of Olympia. I have always found the role of the Stymphalians to be something of a puzzle.

Mantineans condemned in absence and the League army arrive on their doorstep but gain no entry to the city. The League assembly then became concerned about the use of the treasure, and banned all further use of it for paying the army. Upon this, those who lacked the means had to leave the army, and others who had, looking to control matters, joined up in their stead. The *archontes*, realizing they might face charges over the treasures, sent to Thebes for aid, using Sparta as an excuse. But certain figures persuaded the assembly that ambassadors should be sent to Thebes and explain that, unless asked for, no such aid was needed. Meanwhile, the assembly also decided that a return of Olympia and peace with Elis was in the best interest. Meeting in Tegea, the Arcadians, Eleans, and even a Theban officer, accompanied by 300 hoplites, all swore the oaths. But he and some of his men, the League *archontes*, still worried over accounts, and some of the *eparittoi*, set about arresting the Arcadian aristocrats in Tegea. Although the prisons soon became full, many escaped, and the Theban governor and his acolytes soon realized many of the Mantineans they wanted had got away. Once word was out, the Mantineans began to raise all Arcadia, demanded the release of all their citizens and other Arcadians imprisoned in Tegea, and promised that that they would bring anyone accused before the Arcadian assembly. The Theban released the men under arrest, apologised, and as usual, blamed the threat of the Spartan bogeyman for his actions. Although he was lying, he was nevertheless allowed to leave but was followed by a delegation demanding his death. Epaminondas said the man had been correct originally, but should not have allowed the accused to go free. Seeing that the Boeotians had mobilized for war once already, but had not been even consulted about any peace, this time they would march into Arcadia in earnest and fight alongside their allies there.

So, all was done in the best interests of Arcadia? Plainly, it was not. Are we to be surprised by all ending in a clash between Mantinea and Tegea? Clearly, we should not be. We cannot untangle every strand behind what occurred because we may suspect that several strands are missing. We shall untangle what we can.

The *archontes* were not all Tegean but, whatever their cities of origin, were clearly influenced by the Tegeans. The *eparittoi*, on this evidence composed of poorer Arcadians, were quite willing to accept payment from the sacred treasures. We do not know how long they had been paid by this method. It is notable that the term 'Mantineans' becomes interchangeable with that of 'aristocrats' (cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.36). At *Hellenica* 7.5.5 those Arcadians supporting the Thebans were the Tegeans,

Megalopolitans, Aseans, Pallantians, and those smaller communities which were surrounded by them. Plainly there existed economic, political, and geographical divisions.

The *archontes* decided that the Mantineans were acting wrongly and summoned their leaders before the assembly, and when slighted sent the *eparittoi* for them. There is no doubt that the Mantinean decision was made, officially, on religious grounds. But we may suspect that it was in reality a political one, an attempt to oust a now democratic and Tegean inspired board of magistrates from controlling the League apparatus. The Tegean faction still had control of the assembly, otherwise they would not have dared to try and drag Mantinean leaders before it;¹⁹⁰ they could now also clearly rely upon the *eparittoi* to do their bidding. This news spread throughout Arcadia, and only now do we see speakers in the assembly condemning the use of sacred treasures. We would be wrong to place too much faith in their religious scruples. The many Arcadian hoplites who did not normally travel the long distance to Tegea for ordinary League meetings were now turning up in force for such an issue – the Tegeans, perhaps for the first time ever, no longer had control of the assembly.¹⁹¹ Immediately, the poor, and thus more radically democratic elements, left the *eparittoi*, bereft of payment as they were.¹⁹² It was the Mantinean inspired Arcadians which then flooded the ranks of the *eparittoi* in some numbers in a successful attempt to become the new power within Arcadia.¹⁹³ The Arcadian League had become oligarchic.

This is clarified firstly by the panic which gripped the *archontes* when they realized that they faced certain condemnation by their fellow Arcadians for their actions; secondly when they sent to democratic Thebes for assistance;¹⁹⁴ and thirdly when the assembly countered the request.¹⁹⁵ The events at Tegea actually suggest some pre-planning by the Tegean faction in collusion with Thebes. The Theban officer was obviously acting in Tegean interests, which were now of course those of

¹⁹⁰ There is a chance that the assembly made the decision to condemn the absent Mantineans.

¹⁹¹ Cf. Roy (1971a), 572.

¹⁹² Cf. Hammond (1967²), 506.

¹⁹³ Tellingly, at *Hellenica* 7.5.3, when the Arcadians make overtures to Sparta and Athens, it is the *eparittoi* which send their own ambassadors to Sparta.

¹⁹⁴ In this case Thebes would certainly be on the side of democracy.

¹⁹⁵ In passing, we should note that this Arcadian League assembly was now keen to make peace with Elis – also recently turned oligarchic. If further proof were needed, at *Hellenica* 7.4.35 (cf. 7.5.1) Xenophon tells us that it was those with the interests of the Peloponnese at heart which refused the Theban offer of aid unless it was requested: in Xenophon's thinking these were oligarchs.

Thebes.¹⁹⁶ Farcial the whole episode soon became, pre-planned or not, and the goal of arresting key aristocrats in the hope of preventing the fruition of a truly oligarchic Arcadian League was a failure. Notably, many Arcadians were already committed to the Mantinean cause, as the Mantinean offer to take the accused before the League assembly proves. Therefore the scene was set for the final showdown, Epaminondas merely confirming to the Arcadian delegation that what had nearly occurred some little time before was now about to become reality.

Mantineia and Tegea were not, originally, much different from each other in size, wealth, or outlook. Finley views Mantineia as being mainly inhabited by a majority of aristocrats or at least those who would be supporters of the aristocracy.¹⁹⁷ He is almost certainly correct. Irrespective of Arcadian poverty or prosperity, many in both Mantineia and Tegea, often of aristocratic birth, would own enough basic land to enable themselves to earn a decent income and the respectability that goes with it. They would always tend towards conservatism, always believe in their right to be conducting the city's affairs. Rather good relations with their fellow aristocratic oligarchs at Sparta than see the lower classes running their *polis*. Mantineia did not lose her oligarchs in 370, Tegea did. Some may have become democrats, if only temporarily, others merely remained and kept their heads low. Some perhaps even chose to maintain clandestine links with Sparta, continued to be key figures within Mantineia, and perhaps also, before too long, within the Arcadian League itself.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless, when the chance came in 362 they and other Arcadian oligarchs, as Xenophon says (*Hell.* 7.4.34), decided to be in control of the *eparittoi*, instead of having the *eparittoi* controlling them. The Tegeans could do little. They had virtually no aristocrats, and thus virtually no hoplite army of any note.

¹⁹⁶ The Theban officer has caused some discussion. I now agree with Buckler (1980a), 314, n. 38, that he can be described as a *lochagus* rather than a harmost (*contra* Cartledge (1987), 353). But I remain convinced that he did not arrive from Thebes. This was some distance to travel with only 300 hoplites, and especially to a region that had only just refused Theban aid. The officer was a Theban of the Messene garrison, which was still very much alive in Messenia, though often forgotten by modern scholarship, and was planted there exactly for such actions as this one. It was the very first "fetter of the Peloponnese" which Thebes erected (see Ch. 1). If these Thebans had been in Tegea for some time, then Thebes had a fetter we have made no allowance for.

¹⁹⁷ Finley (1966), 54. See also Hodkinson and Hodkinson (1981). Roy (1971b), 439-41, envisions figures of around 2,400-3,000 for both Mantineia and Tegea at the beginning of the fourth century, which perhaps fits with the low figure of 3,500 for Asea's population calculated by Forsén and Forsén (1998), 176.

¹⁹⁸ Roy (2000a), 313, notes how *polis* politics could become League issues.

Of the manoeuvres leading up to the Battle of Mantinea, the Spartan diversion of Epaminondas, the cavalry clash outside Mantinea, we shall say little.¹⁹⁹ Heroics were performed by all concerned. The Mantinean faction joined the oligarchic Peloponnesian states, Athens being the one exception to both these qualifications, and fought against her former partners and their mainly democratic allies. Once again Athens was the anomaly in an alliance that was almost a throwback to the days of the Peloponnesian League. But it lost, and that perhaps says something of the change that had taken place on the Greek mainland.

Whether two Arcadian leagues continued in the future, or whether such were reconstituted as the Arcadian League is still debated.²⁰⁰ Any attempt at a realignment did not, and could not, take place immediately after 362/1. Despite all the efforts to attain independence from Sparta, after a decade of freedom a sizable portion of Arcadia had re-allied with her. The irony was that this move was in the name of freedom. In reality the Tegean faction had done little different except ally itself with the alternative to Sparta. The Arcadian experiment had failed. Differences in outlook, situation, and economics had taken their toll. The Periander decree from Athens, a result of (2nd) Mantinea, perhaps implies one of these differences.²⁰¹ Even if one doubts the restoration of the decree, Mantinea's recent bedfellows, excepting Athens and the absent Spartans, would seem to be oligarchic. The clause guaranteeing the existing constitutions of the signatories (ll. 24-29, 30-34; cf. Tod 147) is thus understandable in Mantinea's situation. The Common Peace's terms were probably never misconstrued by the Megalopolitans, and their revolt, quelled by Pammanes, proves that this had been a consistent problem throughout the 360s. Thebes could still act the power to a degree, still had Tegea's loyalty, but the fact that she was needed said much about Arcadia's failings. If we accept the Satraps' decree as being from 362/1,²⁰² and which is also referred to by Diodorus (15.89.1), Polybius (4.33.8 ff.), Plutarch (*Ages.* 35.3) and Demosthenes (16.9), then we might say the two factions at

¹⁹⁹ For the sources see Chapter 4. Cf. Westlake (1975), 29-40; Buckler (1980a), 213-20; Cartledge (1987), 391-92.

²⁰⁰ Nielsen (1996c), thinks no worthwhile evidence exists to make us think Mantinea and Tegea were ever re-united. Roy (2000c), 136, thinks two rumps may have continued separately for a time. There would now seem little doubt that a League of some description did exist in the later fourth century: see *IG* IV 616 with Charneux (1983), 256-62. Beloch (*GG*² III. 2), 173-77, dated *IG*² V 1 (=Tod 132) to the time of Philip of Macedon, and this has been the main evidence for a re-union.

²⁰¹ *IG* II² 112 = Tod 144 = *SV* 2. 290. At ll. 29-34 it would seem that Mantinea is referred to as an oligarchy.

²⁰² *IG* IV 556 = Tod 145 = *SV* 2. 292. Of leading states probably only Sparta remained aloof from signing.

least agreed to differ and acknowledge each other's existence. Above all, the greatest difference, the one that finally killed a united Arcadia, was the rivalry between Mantinea and Tegea. Such was it, that Sparta's divide and rule policy did not have to be employed to drive them apart – they accomplished it themselves.

Conclusion

The decade 371-361 was indeed a salient point in ancient Greek history. A crude assessment would conclude that all it did was pave the way for the rise of Macedon, autocracy being the only weapon that could quell the Greeks' independent streak. In a sense this is correct. Athens and Thebes were the only central and southern powers involved in the northern theatre. But they, as with every state we have examined, were looking after her own interests and could not foresee just how serious a threat Macedon would become. With Sparta's demise as hegemon, the main theatre was the Peloponnese, which was open to internal and external influences now that the ogre had been overthrown. In fact Sparta was no better or worse than what was to follow.

Some states, such as those of the Corinthia, one can feel some sympathy for. But perhaps only because they did not have the power to become fully engaged in the Great Game. Incapable of hegemony, it took them all their time to keep their heads above water. Phlius gave as good as she got and proved herself worthy of Xenophon's eulogy (*Hell.* 7.2.1-23). Sicyon found herself at the centre of a tug-of-war between Arcadia and Thebes. The states of the Acte survived but had to endure much along the way and were probably glad that their slightly remote geographical situation saved them from much worse. It could not save them from the obsessions of contiguous Argos. But if we think that Sparta was now trading on her past, the Argives were in a far worse position. Sparta could still prove attractive to states in need of an ally – Argos had nothing with which to attract allies. Hated by her near neighbours and thus forced to run alternately with Arcadia and Thebes, she really never stood a chance of getting control of the Corinthia. Neither the Arcadians or Thebans would sanction that goal. The Argives, from beginning to end, were superfluous to their allies' requirements, and thus effectively rendered impotent.

Further south lay the newly-founded state that actually did gain from the decade. Messenia at last had her freedom, though how much she could enjoy it was another matter. Sparta could never accept her as a state, and would continually harrass her in the future. But even Messenia, a living symbol of Sparta's downfall, had been used to a degree by Thebes. The Thebans wanted a presence, or several, in the Peloponnese, and Messenia was in no position to say no. Along with the Theban garrison at Sicyon (and perhaps even at Tegea) Messenia was a vital fetter of the Peloponnese. Elis merely went full circle in half a decade. Obsessed is an

understatement to describe her determination to re-claim her *perioeci*. Divided by *stasis* the Eleans proved to be of one mind over this claim. It eventually brought the Arcadians into their *agora*. The supreme irony was their escape plan, which saw re-alliance with Sparta. Achaea seems to have wanted little but peace. Her past loyalty to Sparta made her an object of suspicion, as did her oligarchic government, but when invasion finally came it was nothing to do with her history but rather Epaminondas' determination to bring the Arcadians into line. It was indeed a fateful decision, and allowed a re-alignment of states, which included the sidelined Spartans, opposed to Theban wishes. Achaea was another innocent victim, but like Phlius proved more than capable of looking after herself.

At the centre of matters, both geographically and politically, lay Arcadia. Never really united, the Arcadians eyed each other suspiciously, particularly the Mantineans and Tegeans. Their rivalry was intense, and if it had not been factional politics that split them apart, then it would have been something else. An Arcadian League without either Mantinea or Tegea could never work. Unfortunately, an Arcadian League with both had no chance of working whatsoever. No doubt, the majority of Arcadians were democrats and wanted a democratic Arcadian League. But there were enough oligarchs in Arcadia, enough conservatism, and enough self-interest to ensure that a fully democratic League would never materialise. If nothing else, Megalopolis stood in order to prevent Spartan overlordship, but even this would not fully curtail Sparta's ardour for Peloponnesian domination.

The outsiders, Athens and Thebes, gained no more than the Peloponnesians out of the machinations of the 360s. Athens tried, for the most part, to get her way without direct involvement – or, at least, without coming into contact with the Thebans. Thebes led from the front, supremely confident. At first Jason of Pherae kept her distracted from Peloponnesian affairs to a degree; after his death Thessaly, and also Macedonia, still proved a distraction. Therefore she could never truly give the Peloponnesians the attention she would have wished. But just as one defeat could pave the way for the death of the Spartan mirage, so the loss of one man finally shattered Theban pretensions at grandeur.

The period 371-361 was one of the darkest in Greek history and, though we give it scant thought, the misery and hardship caused by the continuous invasions must have been immense. The beginning of the decade had soon developed into a contest from which there would be only one winner to collect the spoils, yet somehow

everybody concerned lost. The immediate future would still see uneasy peace interrupted by fighting, and in this respect little had changed. We shall end our appraisal, appropriately, at (2nd) Mantinea with Xenophon: 'In fact, there was even more uncertainty and confusion in Greece after the battle than there had been previously. Let this, then, be the end of my narrative. Someone else, perhaps, will deal with what happened later' (*Hell.* 7.5.27).

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