

**SOCIAL AND SPATIAL MOBILITY UNDER
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT: A STUDY OF
KINGSTON, JAMAICA**

**Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of
Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy by Jeremy Douglas Holland**

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ABSTRACT

TITLE: Social and Spatial Mobility under Structural Adjustment: A Study of Kingston, Jamaica

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The urbanisation process has been described in terms of the penetration and accumulation of capital in the periphery through the incorporation of a largely 'precapitalist' rural labour force into a monetised economy of production, exchange and consumption. The most fundamental shift in peripheral accumulation since colonisation has been that from direct (mercantilist) surplus extraction (primarily) through unequal external exchange relations to extraction of surplus labour value through its incorporation in unequal relations of production within the urban industrialisation process.

It is this shift that leads us to define the urban system principally in terms of the nature of its labour relations. Hence, while the incorporation of Jamaica into the global economic system has involved a continuing reliance on the extraction and cultivation of primary commodities, with wealth accumulation defined primarily by external terms of trade, there has, in the post-War period, been a certain diversification of the economy to incorporate secondary and tertiary activity, whose wealth accumulation is based primarily on internal relations of production.

The philosophical shift from demand-fuelled Keynesian economic growth to a supply-side neoclassical paradigm has served to underline the primacy of labour relations in peripheral urbanisation, through its emphasis on the laws of comparative advantage. The export-oriented and free-market principles attached to the programme of 'structural adjustment' advocated by neoliberal luminaries envisages internally sustainable economic growth based on the attraction of globalising international capital to low-wage economies characterised by a flexible and efficient labour force. Labour market restructuring and the combined effect of real wage devaluation, price inflation and public sector retrenchment on living standards have jointly impacted upon the "reorganisation of social classes" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 80) by presenting the urban population with opportunities for, and constraints upon, social and spatial mobility.

This study analysed how different socioeconomic groups have been affected by the restructuring of employment and consumption opportunities under the shocks and trends of macroeconomic adjustment. In concentrating on the siting of the individual within the labour market through asset ownership and its relationship with 'market capacity' and vulnerability, the study identified which groups of individuals are likely to be more or less mobile under the adjustment process.

The study concluded that the structure of opportunity within which individuals and households seek to improve their standard of living devalues the 'human resource' potential of the urban labour force and therefore denies the potential returns to improvement of human resources that may be achievable even in the face of reduced effective demand.

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ABBREVIATIONS

BENO	Business Enterprise Number
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CBI	Caribbean Basin Initiative
CD	Certificate of Deposit
CEE	Common Entrance Exam
CEPAL	Comision Economica para America Latina y el Caribe
CHFC	Caribbean Housing Finance Corporation
CPI	Consumer Price Index
CXC	Caribbean Examination Certificate
EAP	Economically Active Population
EFF	Extended Fund Facility
EOI	Export Oriented Industrialisation
EPZ	Export Processing Zone
EU	European Union
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCE	General Certificate of Education
GCT	General Consumption Tax
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
HEART	Human and Employment Resources Training (Jamaica)
IADB	Inter-American Development Bank
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (The World Bank)
IBA	International Bauxite Association
ICI	Informal Commercial Importer
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISI	Import Substitution Industrialisation
JLP	Jamaica Labour Party
JNIP	Jamaica National Investment Promotion Ltd
KMA	Kingston Metropolitan Area
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NIC	Newly Industrialising Country
NHT	National Housing Trust
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PNP	People's National Party (Jamaica)
PREALC	Programa Regional de Empleo para America Latina y el Caribe, International Labour Organisation
SAL	Structural Adjustment Loan
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
TNB	Transnational Bank
TNC	Transnational Corporation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNESCO	United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

CHAPTER 1

UNDERSTANDING JAMAICAN URBAN SPACE UNDER STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT

1.1 Introduction

This study is an analysis of the reproduction of urban capitalist relations. It aims to look beyond abstract theories of 'the uneven geographical development of capitalism' in order to identify those processes which give value to urban space, and which site the urban dweller within a particular framework of opportunity. By so doing, the study recognises the role of social relations and institutions in giving heterogeneous interest groups a spatial and socioeconomic homogeneity, but also emphasises the contingent relations within communities and households that give rise to different outcomes in people's lives. Critically, the study is based on the twin central premises that urban space is given value through its commodification, and that urbanisation represents a 'rational landscape' for capital accumulation and continuous transformation (Harvey, 1989: 23).

This interpretation is based on a neo-Marxian conception of international production relations. It can be contrasted with the emphasis within classical Marxism on production relations within nations, and the reductionist emphasis of some dependency and world-systems theorists on market relations between nations. Instead, this study allies itself with Luxemburg's crystallisation of the concept of capitalism's need to avoid a 'realisation crisis' by exchanging goods and labour time at the interface of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. Harvey (1982; 1989) describes the absorption of the overaccumulation of capital in industrial centres by the 'spatial fix': the "geographical expansion of urban industrialism in pre-capitalist regions through capitalisation,

commodification and penetration of the labour force" (1989: 33).

What follows is an attempt to locate the spatial articulation of social practices within the logic of capital accumulation, exchange and circulation that represents the urbanisation process in general, and urbanisation under conditions of macroeconomic adjustment in particular. It is argued that while levels of access to the means of consumption reflect strong social identities and opportunities, it is access to capital that is the prime determinant behind the social construction and valorisation of the city, both through relations in the sphere of production and in the realm of consumption.

1.2 Production, Exchange and Urbanisation

Although it is unwise to rely on the inconsistent definitions, and therefore measurements, of 'urban' populations, and on simplistic extrapolations of urban population growth (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986), the indications are that in most Third World nations urban growth has been far more rapid than rural population growth (Cohen, 1991; Menendez, 1991). There has been in the last 100 years an unprecedented growth in urban populations, characterised by their concentration in large cities within "an ever more integrated and city-based world economy (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1984: 308).

The process of urbanisation is driven by the dynamic of global competition, and the investment of international capital in peripheral urban industrial growth under conditions of modern industrial colonialism (King, 1989).¹ The expansionary nature of capitalistic growth has its geographical expression in the penetration of capital into pre-capitalist global peripheries through urban growth in the Third

¹ Henderson (1986: 63) describes the methodologically abstracted 'closed system' treatments that preceded this structurally-based treatment of urban systems in terms of the fallacy of the 'ontology of the urban'.

World, and their incorporation for production, exchange and consumption. Urbanisation enables the restructuring and diversification of peripheral economies for surplus extraction by organising the integration of pre-capitalist labour, through rural-urban migration (Roberts, 1978), within a capitalist institutional framework and money economy. The increased urban class complexity in the periphery that emerges under the development of capitalist relations of production is discussed in Chapter 3.

The Latin American 'dependency school' arose out of a questioning of orthodox trade and development theory from the late 1940s by the economists of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) under Raul Prebisch. The common ground amongst the early dependency theorists, from the emphasis of ECLA economists of the maintenance of inequality by the trade cycle onwards, is an emphasis on (spatial) *market relations of exchange* between national economies.

By conceiving of international economic relations in terms of 'centre' and 'periphery', dependency theorists viewed Third World cities as "the institutional structures that permit the accumulation of capital in the Third World countries and its siphoning off to the metropolitan centres of developed countries" (Armstrong and McGee, 1985: 11). Frank's (1967) and Amin's (1974) conceptualisation of 'active underdevelopment' of the Third World by capitalist forces outlines a chain of dependency in which surplus value is transmitted from satellite to metropolis. Later dependency theorists Cardoso and Faletto (1978) move away from a dualist interpretation of development and underdevelopment as stages or states of a productive system and towards a conceptualisation of them as functions within an international system of 'dependent development'.

A fundamental theoretical difference of emphasis is reflected in the approach to development adopted by classical Marxists. Structuralist approaches, such as those of Poulantzas (1975) and Castells (1977) reject external (exchange) relations in

order to focus on *internal relations of production*. In this framework urbanisation is the process which allows the progressive accumulation of surplus value through the exploitation of labour by the owners of the means of production. Urban capitalist society is thus constitutive of the articulation of these class relations, as mediated by the state and other institutions (see Chapter 3).

Wallerstein, in recognising the dialectical relationship between the production and realisation of surplus value, integrates what Hoogvelt (1982) terms the 'circulationist' and 'productionist' approaches to development theory. He also advances beyond a bipolarised framework in developing a diverse 'world systems' treatment of exchange relations. This allows for "*intermediate* elements in the surplus-extraction chain...[to] gain at the expense of those at the *core* of the system...(representing) a shift in...relative profit[s] to the semi-peripheral nations" (Wallerstein, 1974: 464). This greater conceptual sophistication allows for a more positive interpretation and powerful explanation of the differential growth rates of developing economies; it accepts, in other words, that not all profit flows to the core. From within the Marxist tradition Warren (1973) goes even further in arguing that integration of Third World countries has created the conditions for rapid independent capitalist development through urban industrialisation.

Wallerstein's integration of production and exchange relations informs much contemporary interpretation, arising out of both classical Marxist and dependency traditions, of the dynamic of urbanisation and economic development, which stresses the *interaction* of internal and external relations of production and exchange:

The primary basis for understanding the nature of society's evolution and its potential for change must centre on its current internal situation set in the context of its historical experience. Centre/periphery generalisations are of value in fixing the international setting and establishing first approximations about the uneven global nature of capitalism. Consequently we believe in research of internal social structures and class relationships, since these are the prime movers in the development process.

(Armstrong and McGee, 1985: 37)

The urbanisation process has been explained powerfully, if in a functional and deterministic fashion², by Harvey (1982; 1985; 1989) in terms of a 'rational landscape' for the accumulation, exchange and circulation of capital. Reflecting the convergence of neo-dependency and neo-Marxist thinking, he describes:

a geographical grounding of [the circulation of capital] through the patterning of labour and commodity markets, of the spatial division of production and consumption...and of hierarchically organised systems of financial coordination.

(1989: 22)

This framework absorbs both the concentration of early dependency writers on market relations between nations and the emphasis of classical Marxists on production relations within nations. The result is a prioritisation of international relations of production and exchange. Critical to Harvey's argument is the imperative under capitalist growth of 'accumulation for accumulation's sake, production for production's sake'. Under this imperative, "the tension between the need to produce and absorb [urban] surpluses of both capital and labour power lies at the root of capitalism's dynamic" (1989: 23) and creates the tendency toward overaccumulation (and underconsumption). Under the rise of capital as a hegemonic mode of production and circulation, labour power is produced through the separation of labourers from control over their means of production and their conversion to wage labour. This reflects a fundamental "shift from the appropriation of surpluses through [trans-national] trade, monopoly and military control to the production of surpluses through [trans-national] command over labour processes" (1989: 28), with the industrial city as a "new centrepiece of

² In a critique of the 'structural determinism' that underpins Harvey's thesis, Ball observes:

Yet, consistently in his (Harvey's) work an overwhelming capital logic appears. The real-life 'mediations' and complications that the social relations of the built environment generate within capitalist societies are all shown to be chimeras, concealing, but only weakly, the fundamental struggle between capital and labour in which the first has not only got the upper hand but also a permanently decisive one. Capital - the big 'C' - always knows what it wants and always gets its own way.

(1986: 52)

accumulation" (1989: 29). It is this 'fundamental shift' that informs the central critique of early dependency theory; namely that:

the route to a more adequate explanation of 'uneven development' lay in a shift of attention from the problem of the realisation to the problem of the production of surplus value.

(Henderson, 1986: 65)

In this way the elements of production and exchange that underpin the 'rational landscape' of the capitalist city are identified by Harvey in terms of its labour processes. Under conditions of declining profitability in the core, (manufacturing) capital relocates to peripheral regions within the core (Massey and Meegan, 1982) and through globalisation to the semi-periphery and periphery (Palloix, 1977), "in search of the application of...labour power to particular labour processes" (Henderson, 1986: 69). The production of surplus value is achieved through the mechanism of the 'super exploitation' of human labour, as TNCs decompose their technical division of labour in order to relocate labour intensive operations in the periphery, aided by innovations in transport and communications as well as by favourable investment climates in 'export processing zones' (EPZs) of Third World industrial centres (Henderson, 1986: 66-71). Hence in the context of global competition and the 'new international division of labour', the industrial centre becomes "a concrete means toward the definition of abstract labour on the world market" (Harvey, 1989: 30). The city becomes classified within the shifting world market for labour and market sites, and this increasingly played out through the internal strategic production and marketing reorientation of globalising TNCs (Slater, 1985).

This definition, in much of the Third World, is characterised Harvey argues by the overaccumulation of labour power,³ as "immense quantities of labour power have to be dispossessed to release very little capital, creating massive and chronic

³ It is the tendency towards a crisis of overaccumulation, with the resultant devaluation of either capital or labour, which is the key dynamic in urban development and structural change. Given that dominant power relations favour capital, and the ability of capital to replace labour through innovation, "the likely persistent condition...the hallmark of much of contemporary Third World...will be that of capital shortage and labour power surpluses" (Harvey, 1989: 25).

surpluses of labour power in a context of serious capital shortage" (1989: 25). The tendency for the capital-owning sector to favour capital-intensive growth - "for capital intensity with low wages permits high rates of surplus value appropriation" (Chatterjee, 1989: 129) - then exacerbates this growth of surplus labour. Hence in Latin America, between 1950 and 1980, the trend was towards "[capital-intensive] technology geared to the needs of the labour-scarce economies of the industrial economies" (Mazumdar, 1989: 68), explaining both the high productivity of the urban formal sector and the inability of the sector to absorb all of the increase in the urban labour force, despite quite high rates of capital accumulation.

Portes and Walton (1981) emphasise the central theoretical significance of wage differentials and the costs of reproduction of labour power between the core and periphery. In doing so they argue that the 'informal'⁴ sector of the urban labour market is a permanent structural feature of peripheral accumulation, and a principal mechanism for depressing wages in the 'formal' sector. This view - whose influence lies in the discussion of exchange relations in core-periphery, world system theory - contradicts the consensus-based interpretation of the modernisation process, in which surplus labour is absorbed by the urban formal sector during economic growth. Under the dual sector labour market model, rooted in classical economics and developed by W A Lewis (1954; 1976), surplus labour created by low marginal productivity in the (rural) subsistence sector, would be absorbed at little cost to the modern industrial (urban) sector, thus leading to full employment.

⁴ The concept of the 'informal sector' was introduced by Hart (1973) from empirical work in Ghana, based on a distinction between wage earning and self-employment, and perceived as a thriving, non-regulated economic sector capable of dynamic, evolutionary and autonomous growth. A strict definition of the informal sector includes self-employed workers, unwaged family members and waged workers in micro-enterprises (employing 1 to 5 workers)(Diaz, 1993: 10). Other formulations reject this emphasis on scale of operation, and prefer to emphasise the illegality or irregularity of economic activity. By this definition, the transnational operations of large-scale narcotics dealers and black market operations are defined within the same framework as a kerbside petty producer of jerk chicken, merchant in plastic sunglasses or (service sector) prostitute (Witter and Kirton, 1990). The market-based articulation of 'informal' and 'formal' sectors is discussed in greater depth in Section 3.4.3.

On the basis of the same hypothesis the Harris-Todaro (1970) model predicts that rural-urban migration will continue while 'expected wage' (the sum of the actual wage and the probability of securing a job) exceeds the rural wage. Unemployment in this framework "becomes a kind of investment that the migrants are prepared to shoulder in the hope that a higher stream of earnings will come to them in the future" (Mazumdar, 1989: 57). The consensus-based explanation arising out of this model for 'overurbanisation' is that the oversupply of unemployed labour in the easy-entry 'parking lot' informal sector is caused by high wages in the formal sector. Consequent policy initiatives aim to reduce these 'labour price distortions' in the formal sector by ending protection of markets, curbing trade union power and abolishing minimum wage legislation.

Unrelentingly high rates of unemployment and underemployment in both sectors "have led many policy makers to abandon the dual labour market model as an inaccurate framework for employment policy" (Panton, 1993: 76). Segmented labour market theory counters the Harris-Todaro hypothesis of relatively easy movement from informal sector to formal sector, and thus that the urban informal sector represents a staging post between rural underemployment and formal sector employment. It does so on the basis of supply-side and demand-side tendencies, outlined by Mazumdar (1989), which characterise a structural segmentation of the labour market. The relationship between the formal and informal sector of the urban labour market is based on product market and labour market links of dependency that challenge the dualism of classical models of traditional or pre-capitalist versus modern or capitalist sectors (see Section 3.4).

The informal sector is, in other words, more than a pre-capitalist pool of labour whose presence drives down the price of labour in the formal sector, and the contingent relations through which it operates are central to the following discussion of macroeconomic change and its implications at the meso- and micro-levels. Through product market and labour market links, the informal sector produces goods and services *at a lower cost*, and it persists *because of the extent*

of low-income individuals in the urban economy. They provide the market for goods and services produced by the informal sector, and provide the cheap labour power that enables survival even in competition with superior technology and productivity (Mazumdar, 1989: 64). The low ceiling to the supply price of urban labour is maintained by underemployment in the rural sector and/or in-situ urban population growth.

The loss of faith in the principle of accelerated growth spreading benefits universally in the context of Third World cities is evidenced by increasing levels of poverty accompanying absolute economic expansion. The implications for standards of living amongst the population that makes up the labour surplus are clear. "The growing relevance of the urban dimension of poverty" (Menendez, 1991: 6) is indicated not only by continuing urban population increases, but by the extent of poverty among Third World urban populations. Urbanisation for most Third World nations means the increasing concentration of population and economic activity in one or two cities or 'core regions'; the unequal national income distribution that accompanies urbanisation is reflected in this concentration of urbanisation, as well as in the polarisation of consumption practices within urban centres (Hardoy and Satterthwaite, 1986).

In Latin America and the Caribbean in 1988 330 million urban dwellers, or 27 per cent of the urban population, were 'poor', a figure higher than that for Asia (23 per cent) but significantly lower than that for Africa (42 per cent), where increases in urbanisation were also more rapid. Whilst these proportions of urban dwellers in poverty might be expected to decline by the end of the century, there are forecasted increases of as much as one third in the absolute numbers of urban poor (Menendez, 1991: 6). The 1990 *World Development Report* points to urban poverty as the most significant problem to be faced in the next century.

1.3 Macroeconomic Change and Urban Adjustment

In discussing the need for a revitalisation of research into the urban sector, Cohen comments:

It is apparent that neither governments nor donors have sought to understand the impacts of macroeconomic policy on urban economic activities.

(1991: 5)

The process of urbanisation is, as we have seen, a manifestation of structural economic change. The concentration of urban growth in a few centres, and the socioeconomic polarisation of consumption practices within the urban system, reflect inequalities of opportunity inherent in that structural transformation (see, for example, Cornelius and Trueblood, 1975). Latterly, the proponents of the 'structural adjustment' of certain Third World economies have argued that in order to achieve long-term sustainable growth with redistribution, short-term intensification of poverty in Third World cities must be accepted - with some attempts to mitigate these impacts - as a necessary cost of the adjustment process. This study documents the influence of macroeconomic change on production and consumption practices in urban Jamaica. The aim is to assess what are the short and long-term implications of these changes for the survival strategies of urban dwellers of different socioeconomic backgrounds, and whether these strategies ultimately represent a sustainable way of life for individuals and groups of individuals.

Global processes, in the form of economic liberalisation and export-oriented industrialisation, represent macroeconomic goals aspired to by international financial donor institutions, and which inform the policy conditionality behind most bilateral and multilateral loans to highly indebted Third World governments. These conditions aggregate to effect a 'structural adjustment' of the economies of debtor nations. Jamaica - with its small, fragile and highly dependent economy (see Section 2.3) - has come to represent a 'test bed' for the structural adjustment process; and the 1980s was the decade when successive Jamaican governments

complied with the IMF prescription of free-market economics (see Section 2.4). The decade progressed under the conviction that unbridling the market and shrinking the 'social wage' increases efficiency and profit margins, leading to a virtuous circle of capital accumulation and reinvestment. At one level it echoed Jamaican economic policy of the 1950s and 1960s which stressed private capital, both domestic and foreign, as the main motor of growth. There was, however, an additional commitment to shifting the economy from import-substitution to export-orientation. The goal was to break away from the constraints on development of primary commodity production, with its inherent market instability, and of import substitution industrialisation, with its inherent market limitations (Girvan, 1971; Clarke 1983). Multilateral lending institutions looked to the newly industrialised countries of South East Asia - the 'trump card' of orthodox economics - for their role model of development.

The term 'structural adjustment' has been used interchangeably with 'supply-sideism', "whose essence is that resource allocation and economic outcomes should be left to 'the market', that macro-economic policy should be geared primarily to monetary stability and that government should concentrate on the preservation of a legal framework in which 'business' can be done" (Standing, 1991: 5). Before the advent of the orthodoxy of the 1980s, demand-side Keynesian policy operated as a macro-economic 'counter-cyclical stabilisation device', "involving tax cuts in recessionary phases to boost aggregate demand and tax increases in booms to curtail economic overheating" (Standing, 1991: 7).

The post-war construction of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates backed by the convertible dollar, discussed in Section 2.2, led to international economic growth on the back of a massive US balance of payments deficit. Fordism had failed to deal with the debt-financed overaccumulation and crisis of 1929-45, treating it as an underconsumption problem and raising wages. There followed a conversion to state-managed Keynesianism and New Deal institutional reforms and politics. Harvey explains the Keynesian city as "a consumption

artifact...organised around the theme of state-backed, debt-financed consumption" (1989: 38). In this way overaccumulation crises were averted by debt-financed infrastructure formation and investment in the social fund, with suburbanisation a key investment process to insulate against underconsumption. This trend was exacerbated by loose fiscal policies, creating accelerating inflation and continued escalation in the deficit. Loss of international confidence in the dollar led to a run on gold, so that the US gold holdings plummeted to the point where the US could no longer meet the demands for redemption. Nixon suspended gold sales in August 1971, signalling the end of the Bretton Woods system (Adams, 1993).

Demand-side Keynesian urbanisation collapsed, Harvey believes, because of the false assumption of "an automatic and appropriate supply-side response to match the debt-financed growth of effective demand". However, "investment in the physical and social infrastructures for consumption, coupled with the politics of redistribution, does not necessarily create a favourable climate for capitalist production" (Harvey, 1989: 42):

The production of the Keynesian city was a real response to the surface appearance of underconsumption as the root of capitalism's problems. That real response to a surface appearance created...as many problems as it solved.

(Harvey, 1989: 42)

The crisis, in the shape of the collapse of the property market worldwide and the New York fiscal crisis of 1974-75, "were opening gambits in a whole new mode of the urban process based on non-Keynesian approaches" (Harvey, 1989: 38). At the same time that urban crisis and the introduction of new adjustment priorities indicates an increasingly *laissez faire* approach to the operation of the market, it also reflects an increasing externalisation of city management, as a wider range of actors and agencies are drawn into the policy debate (Drakakis-Smith, 1993). The mechanisms through which supply-side economic philosophy is implemented - and the impact of this macroeconomic adjustment on socioeconomic outcomes - are discussed in the following section.

1.4 The Implications of Macroeconomic Change


1.4.1 Overview

Establishing causal links within a political economic framework of structural adjustment between policy measures and socioeconomic outcomes is extremely difficult. The complexities of the macroeconomic environment allow for a breadth of interpretation which can be fashioned more by ideology than by objectivity. **Figure 1.1** represents an attempt to establish links from macroeconomic policy shifts through meso-level changes in the structure of production and consumption, down to the implications for household and intra-household level survival strategies.

The adoption of macro-economic policies for structural adjustment involves the acceptance of two complementary orthodoxies; those of an outward-oriented development policy combined with supply-side **'stabilisation'** and **'adjustment'** policies (Standing, 1991). Short-term stabilisation, overseen by the IMF, prioritises tight monetary policy to combat inflation and suppress domestic demand, thereby limiting imports. This involves **'demand management'** austerity measures, acting to reduce domestic absorption through reducing public expenditure, wage capping, credit restriction and higher taxes and interest rates.

Following these essentially deflationary measures, the medium to long-term adjustment policies applied represent a shift of emphasis to **'supply-side incentives'**, aimed at expanding the economy by redirecting resources from consumption and domestic production to production for exports. These incentives are pursued by abolishing restrictions and dismantling controls over foreign-currency exchange, and by effecting a shift in relative prices in favour of tradeable over non-tradeable goods and services.

Figure 1.1 Macro-Meso-Micro Level Relations under Structural Adjustment



The combined effect of these short-term and medium to long-term policies is to devalue currency, facilitated by deregulation (the abolition of price controls, privatisation of government enterprises and/or increasing the prices charged by them), and the drastic reduction of government expenditure - especially 'social' spending and basic needs subsidies. The division of roles has broadly resulted in the IMF concentrating on fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy and the World Bank organising loan programmes, to which it attaches conditions linked to commercial policy on imports, exchange control, transfers and subsidies and privatisation. The emphasis of the World Bank is particularly on applying profitability criteria to enterprise. This necessitates privatisation or, where public enterprise is profitable, divestment of government activity.

What follows is a more detailed assessment of the meso-level implications of stabilisation and structural adjustment policies, with particular emphasis on the Jamaican (urban) economy.

1.4.2 Stabilisation

Stabilisation, to suppress domestic demand and reallocate resources, emphasises demand management measures, particularly the reduction of the public sector deficit. Conditionality obliges governments to cut employment levels and/or salaries, and to reduce spending on the social fund for public goods and services and investment in the built environment for consumption. Monetary targeting through raised interest rates limits public sector access to domestic credit, while encouraging private investment. Nominal or real exchange rate devaluation acts to suppress domestic demand for imported goods. The combination of increased interest rates, higher cost of consumption and restrictions on public sector expenditure will, it is argued, shift resources from public and private consumption to private investment.

The inflationary impact of devaluation, and latterly exchange-rate liberalisation has affected the prices of most basic food items in Jamaica.⁵ Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 show the deterioration of the cost of feeding a family of five in its relation to the national minimum wage, particularly between 1979 and 1983 and again between December 1990 and December 1991 (following the liberalisation of the exchange rate in September 1991). Davies and Anderson observed in 1987 (p 227) that "there is no relationship between the minimum wage and even the most basic level of subsistence". The acceleration in the widening of this gap after exchange rate liberalisation in autumn 1991 is particularly apparent. By March 1992 the minimum wage as a percentage of food cost had dropped to an all-time low of 18.6 per cent, before recovering to 40 per cent after an increase in the minimum wage in July 1992. The impact of these price rises, and emerging from the sample survey, has been to effect a change in consumption patterns, both in terms of the content and regularity of meals. Many families, particularly those dependent on a single wage earner and those with little or no external support, are consuming less meat, fish and milk and are replacing regular meals with snacks.

The supply-side orthodoxy behind structural adjustment deems the public sector as a 'market distortion', "'financially crowding out' private investment and growth, while being unproductive, unresponsive to market forces and an inappropriate standard setter for wages and conditions of employment" (Standing, 1991: 30). Almost invariably retrenchment of public expenditure has resulted in shrinking public sector employment, with cuts or freezes in recruitment a typical condition of IMF-World Bank structural adjustment loans. There is a widespread presumption of a bloated and socially unproductive public sector, with excessive wages and fringe benefits.

⁵ Partly due to the legacy of Jamaica's export-oriented agricultural production system, most basic food (flour, cornmeal, rice, chicken backs and wings, cooking oil, canned fish and condensed milk) along with basic non-food items (kerosene, cooking gas, medicines and transport fuel) are imported. This renders them particularly vulnerable to exchange rate devaluations (Levitt, 1991).

Figure 1.2 Food costs and minimum wage, Jamaica, 1979-92





Figure 1.3 Minimum wage as a percentage of food cost for a family of five, Jamaica, 1979-92



Source: Nutrition Department, Ministry of Health

Often more significant than job cuts, therefore, is the deterioration in public sector wages relative to equivalent positions in the private sector. This has serious implications for public sector employees as consumers, but also for levels of quality and productivity within the public sector.⁶ There is a tendency also towards a differential impact of this retrenchment, in that while a smaller group of more senior employees are protected from demand management levels, a larger group of more junior employees will experience the brunt of wage cuts and job loss. At the same time this group tends to be the least skilled technically and therefore least mobile in the shift from non-tradeables to tradeables. They are also more likely to be exposed to the insecurity associated with contracting out of work under privatisation (Standing, 1991: 31). The public sector has been associated with equity, not only in terms of its welfare outcomes to consumers, but also in its impact on the labour market. Female employment levels tend to be relatively high in the public sector. Furthermore, the public sector traditionally provides many more professional and managerial jobs for women than the private sector (Elson, 1987). However, the 'feminisation' process, discussed below with respect to the private sector under export-led industrialisation, is mirrored in the public sphere, and with the same associations of gender-related inequality:

Paradoxically, privatisation may have increased the feminisation of public sector employment, probably because of the deterioration of wages, benefits and labour security.

(Standing, 1991: 31)

In Jamaica, the government sector - and in particular the health and education services - suffered a continuous decline in its share of jobs between 1977 and 1985 (falling from 18 per cent to under 13 per cent), and this trend continued after 1985 (falling further to under 11 per cent by 1989). These changes are a consequence of severe public sector retrenchment under the deflationary imperative of fiscal restraint. They are also characterised by emigration of professionals, including many female nurses and teachers, in response to

⁶ Cases of 'daylighting', for example, by civil servants and other public sector employees are widely cited (Standing, 1991).

continuing erosion of their real wages and deteriorating working conditions (Elson, 1987; Anderson and Witter, 1991).

Reduced social spending, privatisation and the application of profitability criteria reflects the shift away from the distributive and welfare emphasis of Keynesian macroeconomic policy. Social equity in terms of access is eroded when goods and services shift from the public into the private sphere, and when the criterion of 'need' is replaced by that of 'effective demand'. The imperative of reducing consumption has clear adverse impacts on real wages and on effective demand, at the same time that access to public goods and services becomes a function of income. This trend can be interpreted by neoclassical economists in terms of increased 'efficiency' of supply and demand for goods and services. In reality, however, it may simply reflect a shift of costs from the *paid economy* to the *unpaid economy* - or 'reproductive economy' (Elson, 1991; 1994) - adding to the reproductive role carried out unpaid by women, on the implicit assumption that women's voluntary labour is *elastic*: "able to stretch so as to make up any shortfall in other resources for reproduction and maintenance of human resources" (Elson, 1987: 2).

In Jamaica the implications for access to the means of consumption of reduced social spending and public employment have been catalogued (see for example Anderson and Witter 1991; Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991; Boyd, 1988; Davies, 1988; Levitt, 1991; Witter and Anderson, 1991). Levitt discusses the pressure to reduce public expenditure in terms of constraints on "the government's ability to sustain acceptable levels of basic social and community services" (1991: 50). Expenditure cuts often have a greater impact on recurrent expenditure than on capital expenditure (Elson, 1987), and it is these cuts that tend to be recouped through the introduction of user fees.

In the sphere of education government expenditure has declined, particularly

during the two years in the mid-1980s when demand management measures were harshest (Levitt, 1991). The introduction of termly school fees at government schools to cover books, medication etc., along with fees charged per exam at the CXC (Caribbean Examination Certificate) or GCE (General Certificate of Education) 'O' level stage, prohibit automatic attendance and exam sitting. Declining real wages of teachers and low morale have contributed to an outflow of teachers from the state sector. The consequent shortfall of teachers, within deteriorating school infrastructures and with limited equipment provision, has severely affected the quality of educational provision and intensified its polarisation, as both teachers and the children of the wealthy (or those willing and able to divert consumption expenditure to education) seek the sanctity of the private sector.

The public health sector has been subject to similar levels of cuts in expenditure throughout the 1980s: by 42 per cent in terms of per capita outlays between 1982/83 and 1986/87. As with educational provision, the effects have been seen in the deteriorating quality of capital stock, reduced availability of equipment and supplies and in the reduction in medical personnel:patient ratios - both through 'rationalisation' and by the flight of personnel into the private sector and abroad (Levitt, 1991: 50-51). Consumers denied access to the private health sector are therefore further marginalised by the declining quality of public health provision. Added to this, the imposition of, and subsequent increases in, user fees is putting even public health beyond the reach of many people. Some longitudinal analyses of the health sector have questioned interpretations of trends that tie deteriorating health indicators to the most severe period of adjustment in 1984/85 (see, for example, Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991). Others question the interpretation of trends in terms of deterioration themselves (see, for example, Grosh, 1990). There do seem to be clear indicators of deterioration, however: the stock of registered nurses shrank by almost a half between 1975 and 1989; the ratio of nurses to population declined from 1:1,009 in 1980 to 1:1,671 in 1988 (the recommended ratio being 1:769); and an evaluation report on the rationalisation process initiated

in 1984 concluded that it had failed to enhance efficiency and effectiveness:

the restructuring of the hospital services was no more than a euphemism for cutbacks. Those who could afford it sought specialist medical care overseas, while many had no alternative but to suffer.

(Anderson and Witter, 1991: 121)

The exorbitant cost of private transport in Jamaica presents a massive barrier between public and private consumers. The escalating cost of importing gasoline and government failure to intervene with strategic subsidies have had serious implications for the quality of the now privately franchised bus system. A public bus company that had become inefficient and inadequate by the early 1970s was now replaced by a privatised but atomised service, whose organisational structure created "a situation of cut-throat competition in which the lives of all road-users were constantly at stake...[and in which] the elaborate regulatory framework of the Transport Authority was ignored" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 102). The system of minibus associations operating under franchises was subsequently discarded at the end of the 1980s so that bus owners now had to deal directly with the Transport Authority under increased surveillance. But the deregulation of petroleum prices increased the pressure on operators. Operating on tight profit margins, bus operators (both legal and illegal) tend to neglect (particularly rural) routes for which there is less demand, and turn their buses into sardine cans, while often preventing access to children and the elderly at busier times because of the lower fare for these passengers.

The effective demand for services and utilities has been severely constrained by the impacts on disposable income of prices, as the introduction of profitability criteria and the raised cost of oil imports under devaluation combine to push them up.

Housing consumption is complicated by the political-economic make up of the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA), and the partisan identity lent to working class residential areas by political clientelism and coercion (Edie, 1989; Kaufman, 1985; Stephens and Stephens, 1986). Outside the sphere of clientelism, the

residential choices of the urban population are limited by severe accommodation shortage in a climate of hyperinflation in the property market and in the face of a government that can no longer finance low-cost housing projects (Levitt, 1991: 56) when faced with escalating costs of material imports and the imperative of reducing the public deficit. Housing provision, both public and private, caters to a level of effective demand which excludes even consumers above the average income level (Klak, 1992; Boyd, 1988).⁷ The rate of housing construction fell by 59 per cent between 1983 and 1985 (Davies and Anderson, 1987). Lack of affordable housing for lower-middle class and stable working class groups in the KMA, combined with urban decay and political violence (a consequence of the patron-client relations mentioned above), is reflected in the redistribution of the population into the parish of St. Catherine (Anderson and Witter, 1991). This redistribution has seen the development of the dormitory suburb of Portmore (which lies within the KMA), as well as by the expansion of Spanish Town in St. Catherine (see Figure 1.4).⁸

1.4.3 Adjustment

Adjustment assumes that the private sector is able to respond to supply-side incentives, so that resources released by the public sector are utilised efficiently by private entrepreneurs. The emphasis is very much on shifting resources from

⁷ Klak identifies macroeconomic policies "that neglect reproduction issues in favour of exports" (Klak, 1992: 89). The channelling of foreign investment, loans and imports through Jamaican-based parastatals, whose policy priorities support IMF philosophy, denies access to housing provision in the first instance to the informal sector, and in the second to those consumers considered unable to repay loans. The policy environment encouraged by the three principal agencies, United States Agency for International Development (USAID), National Housing Trust (NHT) and the Caribbean Housing Finance Corporation (CHFC), is therefore one which rewards demand rather than need. As a result over 90 per cent of Jamaican households are unable to afford even the cheapest housing unit offered by the private sector.

⁸ Witter and Anderson (1991) also point to a wider geographical trend of declining urban primacy in Jamaica in response to income earning opportunities outside the KMA, notably in the tourist and mining industries and in ganja cultivation.




Figure 1.4 Jamaica: major cities and parishes

non-tradeable to tradeable goods and services in an effort to strengthen the balance of payments. Incentives are realised when 'prices are right', namely the price of foreign exchange, the price of credit and the price of labour. The price of labour is controlled by wage guidelines, while raising interest rates and ensuring a high rate of return to capital through exchange rate devaluation are intended to attract resources and investment into the national economy, thus strengthening the balance of payments (Levitt, 1991).

The IMF's governance of market-led allocation of resources at the macroeconomic level is matched by the World Bank in the emphasis of their structural adjustment programmes on 'microeconomic allocative efficiency' through the liberalisation of the regime of trade and payments (Levitt, 1991). Public enterprises not showing profit margins should be privatised and those that are profitable should divest. Prescriptions for deregulation and trade liberalisation place particular emphasis on the import regime. This includes the abolition of quantitative restrictions and import licensing, and the progressive lowering of tariffs.

The structural shift in employment penalises medium and small domestic manufacturers and farmers faced with a combination of high interest rates on borrowing,⁹ increased utility prices, increased taxes, lack of foreign exchange for imports, increased competition from cheap imported foodstuffs and manufactured goods and the effect of a devalued local currency on imported component prices.

In contrast, the foreign owners of large export-based industries are favoured by the combination of devaluation and a favourable climate for location created in export processing zones by host governments. Trade liberalisation and tax incentives are combined with the adjustment of the relative price of labour in

⁹ Levitt (1991) points out that most recently the IMF and World Bank have specifically prohibited discrimination of interest rate policies in favour of particular productive sectors, such as small business and farmers.

order to encourage the location of transnational corporations taking advantage of this labour price adjustment:

The outcome of the internal reorganisation is to cement a set of international political and economic relations which define the location of Jamaica's economy within the international division of labour...defined as a supplier of cheap, low-skill labour, with little opportunity for increasing value-added production, and thus improving productivity and the rewards to labour.

(Anderson and Witter, 1991: 46)

Consequent expansion of offshore production sites by multinational corporations is often characterised by few significant forward linkages or multiplier effects within the domestic economy, and with little technological transfer. Hence the export-led path of producing non-traditional goods in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) "provide(s) no guarantees for industrial transformation" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 46). Furthermore, the precarious position of cheap-labour manufactured exports is discussed in Chapter 3. In the case of garment production, exports are perilously dependent upon continued negotiated access to the US market, open to competition from other Caribbean low-wage locations, and facing the threat of redundancy in the face of US high-tech innovation (Levitt, 1991; Nurse, 1992). Their decisions are based in large part on the cost of labour inputs into the production sites. With the universal adoption of measures for increased competitiveness in export-based development, the relocation strategies of transnational capital are subsidised by competing Third World economies driving down the price of production sites (Nurse, 1992).

There is an expected period of transition as resources are reallocated in the shift to export-oriented industrialisation (EOI). This period is characterised by high unemployment, particularly in those economies previously pursuing an import substitution industrialisation (ISI) strategy. Supply-side proponents argue that unemployment levels fall to their 'natural' level under market mechanisms, and that any evidence of prolonged unemployment is the result of 'market failure' or 'voluntary unemployment' (Standing, 1991).

In Jamaica, the 'secondary-formal'¹⁰ sector experienced rapid growth, especially in the second half of the 1980s:

As both rural and urban areas suffered a weakening of their traditional employment base, the new growth areas became the secondary sector industries and informal sector employment.

(Anderson and Witter, 1991: 66)

The longer-term expansion of formal sector employment under structural adjustment is, however, characterised by low-wage, low-skill, largely female labour force in the modern sector, or what Anderson (1987) calls 'unprotected secondary' employment.¹¹ The garment industry is the largest industrial employer of women in the Caribbean, employing a fifth of female manufacturing workers, and is an industry in which 80 per cent of all workers are women (Gomez de Estrada and Reddock, 1987). In the English-speaking Caribbean an estimated 20,000 women now work in 750 garment factories producing primarily for the US market (Green, 1990). In Jamaica, manufacturing expansion has largely been created by the growth of the garment industry in Kingston's 'Free Zone', where working conditions are documented by Anderson (1988) as characterised by short job tenure, low earnings, flexible 'over-time' arrangements, non-unionisation and physical stress and illnesses. Greater flexibility and labour cost reduction is being achieved through the 'putting out' of garment assembly to unregulated and less protected workshop and homeworking activity. Lawson (1992) emphasises this *spatial restructuring* of production networks and their technical divisions of labour through industrial subcontracting. Similarly, Diaz (1993: 13) refers to "a reduction in the internal vertical integration of

¹⁰ Under Anderson's (1987) labour market segmentation framework, the secondary sector represents the low-skilled productive and service sector.

¹¹ Critical here is the sexual division of labour in the labour market and its implications for the strategies of employers and workers. Gender relations and sex stereotyping creates a hierarchical framework, in which rewards are based not simply on market place capacities such as skill and educational levels, but on gendered notions of the appropriateness and value of women's participation in different areas of the labour market (Young, 1991). In this way, for example, the locational strategies of transnational corporations and of governments in establishing export processing zones are based on perceptions of women's role and worth in the international division of labour (Dunn, 1991).

corporations...[leading to] a new set of asymmetrical relations between large and small capital...institutionalised neither by the state nor by collective negotiation, but rather by agreements between individual workers and employers".

There is a tradition of female economic activity in both rural and urban labour markets in the Caribbean. It is based on a sexual division of labour of the internal marketing system - already established by the late eighteenth century and with West African antecedents - in which men were the principal food cultivators and women dominated urban marketing. From petty trading, or 'traditional higglering' in agricultural produce, accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation introduced an urban-based petty mercantilist trade - or 'modern higglering' - in locally produced manufactured goods. From the mid-1970s onwards female traders have responded to the market opportunities presented by scarcities of foreign foodstuff and goods in times of economic crisis by bringing in items from neighbouring countries, often in direct competition with established merchants and traders. These women were initially labelled 'foreign higglers', then later became known as 'informal commercial importers', or ICIs (LeFranc, 1985; Taylor, 1988; Witter and Kirton, 1990).

This emphasis on economic activity amongst Caribbean women, along with their relative lack of militancy compared with male workers, has made Caribbean urban locations attractive for transnational corporations to locate (internally structured or subcontractual) low-skill, labour intensive and low value-added operations.¹² This attractiveness, combined with the expressed need of working class women to increase their economic activity under conditions of spiralling price inflation and fiscal retrenchment, has set in train a process of increased participation, reflected in the expansion of total employment levels in the late 1980s.

Hence macroeconomic adjustment has acted to shift the distribution of income

¹² This set of contingent labour market conditions remind us that industrial location decisions and labour process outcomes both shape *and are shaped by* urban labour markets (Peck, 1992).

away from domestic industrial and agricultural producers, and wage earners (ie those who rely on labour power as their key asset) towards the multinationals and external trade, as well as to international financial services and speculators (Witter and Anderson, 1991; Levitt, 1991). Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara (1989) outline a process of '*internationalisation*' and '*informalisation*' taking place under the 'politics of conditionality' which comes with capital loans. *Internationalisation* gives transnational corporations a greater ability to withstand crisis than domestic producers and effectively removes the power of decision making from the hands of national government. The internationalisation process and the growth of the 'high income' economy, characterised by the expansion of the financial sector and the servicing of imports through plaza construction, in turn reflects intensified polarisation of the income structure of the country. Levitt refers to this shift as "a partial internationalisation of the price structure", and argues that there is a redistribution of incomes in favour of the 'internationalised' elites:¹³

asset owners gain; wage and salaried workers lose. Where assets are initially maldistributed, the effect is magnified.

(Levitt, 1991: 23)

Long-term productive efficiency is seen by economic adjustment architects as realisable through encouraging labour-intensive productive activities, and reducing constraints on informal sector participation:

Structural adjustment policies at the macro level are intended over the longer term to create an enabling policy environment for more productive urban economies. Such an environment would increase the efficiency of firms and households and would thus support the economywide adjustment and resumption of growth.

(Cohen, 1991: 6)

¹³ This partial internationalisation process, and the growth of financial speculation is also associated with the urban property market, which is characterised by an accelerating polarisation of market values:

The adoption of the ability to pay criterion for access to basic goods and services, such as housing and transportation, has caused land rents and materials prices to escalate with demand and supply imbalances.

(Chatterjee, 1989: 130)

The *informalisation* process is characterised by two distinct trends. First, the realignment of the division of labour under subcontractual relations represents a "new process of informalisation" (Diaz, 1993: 13) which has seen the growth in importance of informal labour market links, for example in garment production. Secondly, prohibitive formal sector entry costs, and the need to increase income-raising under devaluation, has led to the growth of informal sector activities that coexist with the formal sector through product competition (see Section 3.4). Under adjustment in Jamaica, despite some growth in large export manufacturers, whose contribution to sustainable growth is questioned above, it has been the service and trading sectors that have been central to growth of employment opportunities, and within these sectors informal operations play a key role. Men have become increasingly dependent on own-account activities, and in this respect "their employment patterns grew closer to that traditionally associated with women" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 58).¹⁴

Informalisation is therefore reflective of the narrowing economic opportunities open to domestic producers, prohibited by high entry costs from entering the formal production and service sectors. It is also a reflection of the labour market linkages between the modern sector and small-scale 'flexible specialists' on the basis of subcontractual relations, which enable the modern sector to reduce their wage bill and cope with fluctuations in external demand for their products, but which leave individuals unprotected and precarious in their employment (see Section 3.4.3). The shift of individuals into an expanding informal sector - in higglering (both domestic and international), street vending, sub-contracting and petty commodity production - therefore raises questions about the 'employment

¹⁴ Women have maintained a high profile in the Jamaican informal sector through their domination of domestic higglering, and latterly informal commercial importing, but also operate in street vending, petty commodity production (under the garment industry's 'putting out' system) and small-scale services (such as laundering, cosmetics and private domestic work for their middle class sistren). Men's role in the informal sector has traditionally been in artisan services, such as carpentry, metal working and mechanic work, as well as in street vending. However the financial and demographic scale of male criminal occupations, particularly in drug operations, is increasingly a major, though largely undocumented, area of informal sector activity.

adequacy'¹⁵ of a sector which owes its existence to its economically and technologically dependent, and institutionally and legally marginalised position within existing controls of resources and existing exchange mechanisms.

1.5 Summary

Structural adjustment policies act to shift investment away from domestic consumption and production and towards investment in production for export. They achieve this by imposing shock stabilisation measures - fiscal retrenchment and raised interest rates - then putting in place the necessary supply side incentives to encourage investment for export, namely a deregulated framework and a devalued currency.

Although the burden of increasing price inflation is keenly felt by both urban and rural populations, there is a greater depressing effect on the urban labour force because its restructuring (away from higher paid primary-formal jobs) is more fundamental. This is reflected in a falling 'index of (urban-rural) dissimilarity', as urban and rural parishes grew closer together in their experience of income inadequacy" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 77).

The desired shift of resources away from wage and salary earners has a strong recessionary impact, with significant implications for the welfare of both local producers and consumers (Levitt, 1991). Increased taxation on consumption and the introduction of charges for public utilities hits wage earners and those with no income, while supply-side incentives include a reduction of the tax burden on the private sector.

¹⁵ The term 'employment adequacy' adopted by Anderson and Witter, is measured by earnings. This is considered particularly relevant and important given the inflationary tendencies in the cost of living under structural adjustment, reflected in the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and discussed in Section 1.4.1.

Most of the new jobs are located in the informal sector or in the 'secondary' (Anderson, 1987) formal sector of the labour market, "characterised by low wages, low skills, job instability and the virtual absence of worker protection" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 46). The structural change in employment opportunities is characterised by a feminisation process, but with dubious strategic benefits to urban low income Jamaican women. The integration of women in their productive role is into a labour market which has come to be defined as a supplier of cheap, low-skilled labour (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 46). The participation rate of women in the Jamaican labour market is one of the highest in the world, but women are marginalised in their productive role, occupying as they do low status, low income, unstable jobs, within a narrow range of occupations¹⁶ and with fewer job opportunities. Kiarang (1992) argues that women are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of structural adjustment policies because of the structural limitations placed on their occupational choices.

The combined effect of the erosion of public investment through demand management measures - over and above the ethical implications of denying individuals access to what might be considered 'public' goods and services - is one of a continuing and debilitating functional deterioration of the country's (urban) human resource base. Menendez (1991) comments that growing cities and the human resources within them contribute heavily to the Gross National Product (GNP), that they serve as markets and channels for the distribution of goods and services, and as such to improve their social fabric is to 'strengthen broader economic development'. Increasingly the productivity of the urban economy will have a direct bearing on national economic growth (Cohen, 1991), so that the function of cities in economic development requires that they be infrastructurally sound.

¹⁶ Occupational 'crowding' of workers into certain occupations is particularly apparent when the labour market is disaggregated by gender. Hence where women are employed in manufacturing they are concentrated in certain occupations or industries. This drives down the supply price of women, not only in that sector but throughout the economy (Mazumdar, 1989).

What has been outlined in this chapter is structural shifts that have taken place within an urbanising economy under the imperative of a neo-liberal development philosophy. In particular it has focused on the meso-level outcomes of macro-level change, as introduced in **Figure 1.1**. The resultant restructuring of opportunity within the labour market and in the sphere of consumption will be discussed in terms of the micro-level implications of change for individuals and groups of individuals in different circumstances in the course of chapters 5, 6 and 7. First we turn to an analysis of the position of the Jamaican political economy within external international relations of trade and finance. This is in order to understand in the first instance how and why the country has arrived at a consensus over the need to adjust its economy, and in the second instance what effects this structural adjustment has had on the internal and external relations of production and exchange of the Jamaican economy.

CHAPTER 2

THE JAMAICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT

2.1 Introduction

Whether it can be demonstrated that the structural adjustment programmes discussed in Chapter 1 are against the best interests of those whom they impact upon is an issue steeped in controversy. Any assessment of the appropriateness of contemporary macroeconomic philosophy must be undertaken with reference to the sustainable development of the national political economy.

In Chapter 1 it was established that the urbanisation process is an expression of the interaction of internal relations around the production of surplus value and external exchange relations around capital transfer. The industrialisation and urbanisation of Jamaica has, as in many urbanising peripheries, created urban (and left rural) societies open to the external economic events and relations. The prescriptions of international financial institutions to whom many Third World countries are now beholden have well-defined implications for the playing out of both internal relations of production and external exchange relations.

In Chapter 3 we will examine, with specific reference to Jamaica, the construction and reproduction of internal urban capitalist class relations, and the implications of labour market relations for social mobility. First, this chapter examines the positioning of the Jamaican political economy within global and regional economic relations, and with respect to the key international financial institutions whose prescriptions are critical to this process. The build-up to crisis and the instigation of macroeconomic adjustment policies for a structural transformation

of the economy are set in their historical context, and the debates surrounding the appropriateness and timing of stabilisation and adjustment measures in Jamaica are outlined. The implications of neoclassical development initiatives for Jamaica's positioning within global and regional relations of trade and the 'new international division of labour' are also discussed.

2.2 The Political Economy of Development Financing

2.2.1 Post-War International Relations, IMF Ideology and the Role of the World Bank

A First World belief in the imperative of mutually unrestricted trade relations stemmed from the escalating competitive devaluations amongst Western governments in the 1930s, set in the economic crisis of the Great Depression and contributing, according to many, to the Second World War. In particular, the widely held view that US isolationism had contributed to the economic chaos of the inter-war years, provided the incentive for the US to take a lead in institutionalising the post-War agenda. American dominance of proceedings was ensured "by virtue of the fact that it alone had the resources to make these institutions work" (Adams, 1993: 22).

The ensuing commitment to dismantling trade barriers was formalised during the Bretton Woods¹⁷ negotiations, where it was agreed that:

political harmony and economic welfare were served best by a system of unrestricted multilateral aid and convertible currency.

(Quoted in Pantin, 1989: 8)

The process of removal of trade barriers to free trade ensuing from the Bretton

¹⁷ A 'United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference' was held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1944, to which the US president invited 43 countries. From the Bretton Woods Conference "were born the two pillars of the post-war multilateral financial community, the IMF and the World Bank" (Adams, 1993: 21).

Woods Agreement, and discussed each subsequent decade in GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) negotiations, was facilitated by the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF). This Fund provided short-term assistance to countries with balance of payments difficulties, thereby oiling the wheels of international free trade by preempting any perceived need for renewed protectionism.

Ironically, it was US insistence on 'conditionality' (those policies that a member is expected to follow in order to be able to use the Fund's resources) being attached to IMF loans which almost rendered the Fund still-born.¹⁸ It was faced with universal opposition from Western European governments, who argued for 'automaticity' of loans on the grounds that "the external imbalance of most countries was too acute for them to abandon protective controls and to accept the obligations which Fund assistance entailed" (Scammell, 1975, quoted in Adams, 1993: 24).

As it turned out, the ideological imperative and the sheer economic scale¹⁹ of generating quick and sustained economic recovery in Western Europe under the threat of Communism and planned economies, led to a bypass of Bank-Fund involvement. Instead the 'European Recovery Programme' (or 'Marshall Plan') provided the mechanism for the US to channel massive bilateral reconstruction aid to Europe outside the ideological and economic confines of the Bank-Fund:

The emphasis shifted from the pursuit of world-wide multilateralism through the Bretton Woods institutions to the more limited objective of the recovery and 'integration' of Western Europe.

(Gardner, 1972, quoted in Adams, 1993: 23)

¹⁸ These conditions were centrally concerned with bringing into balance externally the supply and demand for foreign exchange, through achieving a 'realistic rate of exchange' by monetary and fiscal measures.

¹⁹ It is interesting to note that in the context of the imperative of reconstructing Europe at that time it was considered inappropriate to lumber these economies with an "unsustainable debt burden" (Adams, 1993: 23) which would have resulted from Bank funding of a recovery programme.

It was partly this bypassing of the IMF during the first ten years of its existence, as the US pursued politically-motivated direct relationships with Europe, that promoted a shift in the operations of the Fund towards financial involvement with the developing world. By this stage, the very countries that had rejected IMF liquidity on the grounds of retaining 'automaticity' were now determining the role of the IMF as major contributors, and therefore as major voters.²⁰ Thus members of the 'Group of Ten' - the newly formed First World coalition that assumed political control of the Fund - condoned, and began to act on, the precedent of conditionality. The significance of this application of double standards by the industrialised nations lies in the process of appropriation of governance that had been set in train:

This asymmetry (of influence and control) takes on particular importance in view of the fact that the Bretton Woods system involved, for the first time in history, the assignment of tasks to an international organisation requiring the exercise of authority over its members, thus encroaching on their sovereignty.

(Adams, 1993: 30)

By the end of the 1950s, the 'politics of conditionality' (Ghai and de Alcantara, 1990), whose guidelines had been introduced by the IMF's Executive Board at the beginning of the decade, became working practice.

As with the IMF, the role envisaged for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) by the Bretton Woods negotiators was soon transformed in the wake of the Marshall Plan. Originally conceived as a vehicle for post-war reconstruction financing, its purpose quickly shifted to that of development financing, and more specifically development financing of developing countries. Better known as the World Bank, its mandate was to provide long-term (in some cases decades) loans at low interest rates to countries with profound economic problems.

²⁰ Voting power at the IMF is proportional to the quota contribution of each member nation. Hence while there are over one hundred developing country members of the Fund their combined contribution is only 30 per cent, and their lack of influence in policy making reflects this.

2.2.2 Independence, Growth, Crisis, Recession and Adjustment

World Bank and IMF involvement with developing countries from the late 1970s was in large part a response to an escalating debt burden fuelled by sustained balance of payments deficits. Before the onset of crisis and recession, however, the 1960s had started with a wave of decolonisation, and within a context of ongoing expansion of the world economy.

Between 1945 and 1973, "large US balance of payments deficits financed the whole international trading system" (Payne, 1988: 1218). Consequently there existed no fundamental payments disequilibrium for developing nations, and during this period it was the general consensus that those countries experiencing balance of payments problems had therefore achieved this through economic mismanagement - for example overconsumption of imports - rather than as a result of a global lack of liquidity (Payne, 1988).

The IMF ideology during these years attracted relatively little controversy, for with the world economy growing, its remedy of a temporary deflation of demand combined with the provision of credit was able to quickly restore external balance and recreate the basis for expansion. Prolonged US balance of payments deficits, however, instilled an international crisis of confidence in the convertibility of the dollar into gold. The eventual suspension of this convertibility by the US in 1971 heralded the termination of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and "an inflationary explosion (that) shook the world" (Girvan, 1980), and whose long-term effects have dominated development ever since. Commodity prices doubled and the price of oil quadrupled following the instigation of price rises by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973-74, and again in 1979.

Initially, Third World commodity exporters benefitted from the price boom in non-oil commodities, but by 1975 world recession depressed the prices and volumes of these exports. Consequently, large current account deficits built up in

'non-oil' developing economies, where import price increases were no longer matched by rising export revenues: between 1973 and 1975 their combined deficits increased from US\$11.6 billion to US\$46.5 billion, and again to \$US99 billion by 1981 (Bernal, 1982). As Girvan (1980) notes, this phase marked a qualitative change in the nature of such deficits, which had in the past generally resulted from increasing import volumes, and to a lesser degree declines in export volumes and prices. Its effect was to precipitate a cumulative dependence on foreign loans to rectify serious balance of payments deficits.

Loans to governments of developing nations (at rates of interest above those to industrial nations) came largely in the shape of the recycling of capital surplus invested in transnational banks²¹ by OPEC members. Lending was spurred by a lack of demand amongst recession-hit developed nations at a time when banks were pursuing profits and asset growth in an expanding and fiercely competitive transnational banking sector (Bernal, 1982). Initially, countries in deficit tended to bypass the (relatively limited) credit tranches of the IMF because of the rigorous conditionality attached to them. Instead they were able to secure loans with other bilateral and multilateral sources, from the transnational banks and from Euromarket bond issues. In so doing, however, these governments were ensuring an escalating level of indebtedness:

The non-oil developing countries faced the choice of draconian reductions in economic growth and standard of living, with the probability of serious social and political upheaval, or financing payments deficits by borrowing from private sources.

(Bernal, 1982: 78)

The "loss of 'credit-worthiness'..(amongst) a small but significant group of these countries" by 1976 (Girvan, 1980: 57) shut the door to private financial loans, and

²¹ The United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations defines a transnational bank (TNB) as a deposit-taking bank with branches or subsidiaries in five or more different countries. They emerged after the middle of the nineteenth century as financiers of trade expansion and capital outflow from Europe. Their development accelerated after World War II "as a functional complement to the internationalisation of production by transnational corporations" (Bernal, 1982: 72).

bilateral and multilateral agencies could not or would not make up the deficiency. In these instances countries desperate for foreign exchange with which to continue financing imports finally turned to the IMF. Only by adhering to the subsequent programmes of economic 'stabilisation' would they be guaranteed the Fund's stamp of approval and thus be restored to credit-worthiness.

In this way the crises and subsequent recession from the early 1970s exposed the externally-dependent nature of post-War growth amongst peripheral nations. Deceleration of growth in the First World, introduction of tight restrictions on domestic monetary and credit expansion (as well as on overseas development aid) and increases in the real rate of interest had combined to produce contractionary effects on those developing economies linked to them through trade and financial relations. As a result, developing countries were faced with sharp rises in interest rates, devouring ever more of their export earnings through debt service just when those earnings are shrinking with the stagnation of world trade and the depression of commodity prices. The total external debt of non-oil developing countries increased from US\$96.8 billion in 1973 to US\$502 billion in 1982 (Bernal, 1982). Relations characterised by debt servicing continued through the 1980s: in Latin America between 1982 and 1985, for example, the capital inflow of \$38 billion was heavily outweighed by debt servicing amounting to \$144 billion, a net transfer of \$106 billion (George, 1988). The decline in the general balance of payments position of this group of borrowing nations has been "so continuous and so serious that there can be little doubt that it can only be described as 'structural' or 'fundamental' in its nature" (Brett, 1983: 219).

2.2.3 Structural Adjustment: a New Orthodoxy

It was in this climate of persistent structural payment imbalances amongst oil importing developing countries that the IMF's role of disciplinarian of the international monetary system was so dramatically enhanced. Private lending institutions now looked to the IMF to take the lead in restoring equilibrium in their external accounts. Instead of unilaterally engaging in loan arrangements,

transnational banks now acted on the success or otherwise of the developing country in meeting the targets integral to IMF programmes. The IMF itself can only provide enough money to prevent the collapse of an economy: it is the lender of last resort. But by virtue of this position it is able to impose conditionality on borrowers which will restore the confidence, and ensure the flow of loans, from other lenders. Bernal describes an "uneasy alliance" between the IMF and the transnational banks, in which "the IMF needs the banks to supplement its inadequate financing of balance of payments deficits and the banks need IMF adjustment programmes to ensure repayment of loans to developing countries" (1982: 82). Similarly, it is only by participating successfully in an IMF programme that developing countries with prolonged balance of payments problems can increase their chances of gaining access to the larger pool of finance available from private lenders.

Structural adjustment programmes, implemented in fifty-five countries by 1987, aim to restore in the first instance macroeconomic balance, but also emphasise microeconomic efficiency of resource allocation in order to revive or accelerate growth. The division of roles between the two institutions in this endeavour has seen the IMF overseeing the governance of macroeconomic variables with the purpose of reducing domestic absorption, particularly through reducing the availability of credit to the public sector. The World Bank, on the other hand, direct their structural adjustment programmes at achieving microeconomic 'efficiency', by liberalising the regime of trade and payments, and removing market 'price distortions' (Levitt, 1991).

The relationship between the World Bank and the IMF has continued to be one of cooperation, reflecting their common adherence to neo-Ricardian doctrines of free trade and comparative advantage and their opposition to a government's intervention in its nation's economy. The rise of the economic adjustment concept and its implementation reflects a recognition by the IMF that payment imbalances, now structural in kind, could as such "only be dealt with on the basis of longer

adjustment periods than had been adopted in the past" (Payne, 1988: 1219). Perhaps more significantly, it represented, with its emphasis on the need for production, a defensible strategy against the charge that its preoccupation with deflation served primarily to retard rather than promote growth.

Yet despite such a defence there remains a considerable degree of scepticism and a conviction that the remedies of non-intervention, devaluation and low wages represent any real change in the Fund-Bank approach at all:

Its new prescriptions were more sensitive to the timing and pace of the adjustment being demanded but were still firmly based in liberal orthodox economics.

(Payne, 1988: 1220)

Others criticise the (conspiratorial) motives of the international financial institutions:

Countries that consistently import more than they export need financial help so as not to withdraw from trade. No loans, no purchases. IMF intervention not only maintains them as participants in world markets but also, through adjustment programmes, forces them to increase that participation, even if this is demonstrably against the best interests of the people concerned.

(George, 1988: 50)

The 'Arusha Initiative', drawn up by the Jamaican and Tanzanian governments in 1980, similarly condemned the IMF policies as political interventionism designed to subordinate states to the free play of national and international market forces, and to the continuing benefit of traditional centres of power (*Development Dialogue*, 1980:2, 10-23).

Yet the ideological conviction behind structural adjustment is voiced with a conviction to match its opponents. Clive Crooks, economics editor of *The Economist* (23.09.89) seeks to place "the setbacks in the 1980s - high interest rates, debt servicing difficulties, falling export prices" into the perspective of "an aberration....(such that)....the current pessimism is greatly overdone". He attacks the "protectionist apparatus" of import tariffs and licences, and dismisses the

'dirigiste dogma' of import substitution industrialisation. History, he believes, has chosen the "invisible hand" of outward looking non-intervention:

The countries that have gone the fastest kept inflation under control by pursuing prudent monetary and fiscal policies; promoted exports by refraining from discriminating against exporters; left their economies open to foreign competition which spurred internal efficiency; left their domestic price system largely intact instead of supplanting them with marketing boards and other state monopolies; allowed their financial systems to provide adequate returns to savers and gave the private sector a big role in deciding where those savings should go.....The question is whether to rely on imperfect markets or on imperfect governments.

(The Economist, 23/09/89)

2.3 Jamaica and the International Economy

2.3.1 Introduction

The advent of the orthodoxy of economic liberalisation and export-oriented industrialisation has been accompanied by a 'politics of conditionality' which informs political economic relations between international financial donor institutions and highly indebted Third World governments. Jamaica - with its small, fragile and highly dependent economy - has come to represent a 'test bed' of the structural adjustment process, an experimental arena which now only echoes dimly to the post-independence ideological battles fought for control over the development process.²² With one eye on the newly industrialising countries

²² The ideological shift of the People's National Party (PNP) during the 1980s is perhaps most clearly reflected in the 'sea change' in the rhetoric of Michael Manley. In a message to the 1980 'South-North Conference on the International Monetary System and the New International Order', he states:

IMF prescriptions are designed by and for developed capitalist economies and are inappropriate for developing economies of any kind..[and]..without any real prospect of a favourable economic outcome.

Twelve years later, in a broadcast to the nation shortly before his resignation from office, Manley indicated his commitment to a monetarist policy in line with IMF prescriptions:

The immediate challenge that we now face is the control of inflation..[which] does not exist in a vacuum and is related to the overall public sector deficit and the exchange

(NICs) of South East Asia and the other on the balance of payments deficit, politicians from across the two-party divide are united in their acceptance of the Bank-Fund programme of liberalisation, deregulation and export-oriented growth. This ideological convergence is perhaps more than anything else a testimony to the neutralising power of extreme indebtedness. But, whether it is out of ideological conviction or through a pragmatic acceptance of the country's dependence on continued multilateral and bilateral loans, a consensus has been created and a creed accepted.

The genesis of successive Jamaican governments' negotiations with the IMF (and associated private, bilateral and multilateral lending institutions that act on the IMF's 'seal of good housing'), stems from two key phases of economic development: a two-decade period of neo-classically driven 'industrialisation by invitation' and a shorter, if more dramatic, experiment with democratic socialism in the 1970s. What follows is a historical descriptive account of these phases of development and their culmination in negotiations with the IMF and World Bank for stabilisation and adjustment.

2.3.2 International Relations and Internal Shifts in Jamaican Political Economic Ideology

The political-economic experience of post-War Jamaica, both in terms of its ideological shifts and in its relations with the international economic community, provides a telling example of the difficulties of overcoming dependency faced by small, economically-open and politically hamstrung nation-states.

Bullock summarises the relationship between Caribbean economies and the world economic system thus:

rate...The control of inflation and the stabilisation of the dollar will...require [the continuation of] high interest rates...[which are] absolutely essential...to create the stable, predictable economic environment which will encourage investment and growth...So let us not waste time blaming everything on the IMF. Some of these things we had to do anyway.

Caribbean economies have been characterised as open, dependent and structurally underdeveloped. Historically their process of integration into the world capitalist system has left them as specialists in the production of primary products where most of their consumption and investment needs are imported from the rest of the world. This pattern of specialisation makes Caribbean economies very vulnerable to economic fluctuations in their developed trading partner economies, and to extended periods of declining terms of trade.

(1986: 138)

Categorised as a 'pure plantation economy' by the Caribbean dependency school (see for example Beckford, 1972), the extreme economic dependence of Jamaica as a sugar producing colony on the British metropole continued, as first banana then later bauxite and tourism came to characterise the vertically integrated, enclave nature of the industrialisation process:

The chief economic effects of the system were an inherent structural dependence on metropolitan capital, supplies and markets, and an inherently hostile labour force and therefore unstable regime.

(Girvan, 1971: 6)

The abolition of slavery in the first half of the nineteenth century undermined but did not destroy the plantation system. Instead it created a dual agricultural economy characterised by differences in quantity and quality of land, capital and technology, production and marketing as the 'new peasantry' expanded domestic production on private land. By the end of the century the cultivation of bananas added to and exceeded the traditional sugar staple export. The rigidity of this dichotomised agricultural structure served only to perpetuate economic inequality while depressing the internal market for manufactured goods (Girvan, 1971). Small scale marketing of agricultural produce and low level informal sector trading provided the only employment challenge to foreign financed companies, as the lack of land for further settlement ended the expansion of the peasant sector and precipitated the growth of non-agricultural employment and migration.

From the country's first elections in 1944, elected governments were heavily influenced by W. Arthur Lewis' semi-protectionist but export-oriented

'industrialisation by invitation' model, based on economic growth through attracting both foreign and domestic capital. Because of the nature of Jamaica's relations with the international economy, the 1950s and 1960s were decades of growth tied to global economic expansion and foreign capital investment. As well as dominating the public and financial sectors of the Jamaican economy, and while maintaining hegemony in export cropping, foreign capital exploited and rapidly expanded bauxite extraction and export. From non-existence in 1950, the industry came to provide 10 per cent of the GDP by 1967. Growth averaged 5.85 per cent per annum over this period and, despite rapid population growth, real per capita GDP had increased by 180 per cent between 1950 and 1969 (Boyd, 1988). But industrial development lacked internal integration and transformation, and growth remained sustainable only as long as foreign capital inflows in the highly concentrated export sector continued. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s foreign ownership of the bauxite industry, and its capital-intensive nature, deprived the Jamaican economy of diversified outlets (making it vulnerable to economic cycles in North America), lacking in forward integration and providing employment for less than 1 per cent of the employed labour force (Girvan, 1971).

Hence economic expansion was accompanied by a widening trade deficit, financed by foreign investment in bauxite, tourism and manufacture, as well as by loans (Stephens and Stephens, 1986). Furthermore, rising living standards belied deepening income polarisation and only a marginal decrease in unemployment by 1970 (Jefferson, 1972), and this despite periods of unusually high emigration (Boyd, 1988). Post-war expansion was brought to a halt in the early 1970s with world recession and the decision of the multinationals to stop investing. The government was faced with a capital-intensive and highly dependent productive sector, with few linkages and multiplier effects, a stagnating though (potentially) labour-intensive agricultural sector and a deepening trade deficit, fuelled by spiralling imports in both the production and consumption spheres.

The weakness inherent in import dependency was underlined by rising oil and food prices and the entrenched Anglo-American influence on consumption aspirations. Inevitably, questions were raised about the efficacy of this development model. Contemporary commentators have raised similar questions over the ideology driving that period of economic development. Boyd, for example, questions the prudence of Jamaican economic management during the 1950s and 1960s. Comparing Jamaica to Taiwan, he laments the lack of any push in Jamaica towards the sorts of land reform and food production policies that promoted the agricultural and industrial development of that country. He argues that the "macroeconomic disequilibria" of the 1970s and 1980s stemmed directly from this earlier mismanagement:

The fundamental causes of macroeconomic disequilibria were established in the 1950s and 1960s when the economy experienced a prolonged period of export-led expansion and considerable foreign capital inflow..[the windfall gains from which were used not to reduce single-industry export dependency or promote domestic agriculture, but] to finance consumption and imports and the development of trading, in preference to productive capital expansion and the development of an agricultural base...A heavy reliance on imports for food, raw material and capital goods was rapidly established, and the oil price shocks and world inflation of the 1970s showed the vulnerability of the economic structure.

(Boyd, 1988: 2)

The ensuing ideological debate produced a shift within the Peoples National Party (PNP) towards a socialist, state sector led model, thus ending two decades of ideological overlap between the PNP and its opponent within the two-party system, the Jamaica Labour Party (JLP).²³ Outbreaks of large-scale violence and the threat of societal breakdown in the early 1970s ushered in the Manley PNP government in the 1972 election, and so began the democratic socialist experiment. However, with the commanding heights of the Jamaican economy under foreign ownership, and with a highly import-dependent and export-oriented, and already indebted, economy possessing an inactive, inefficient and

²³ Lacking ideological distinction up until this point, the parties had traditionally amassed support through clientelism, and latterly gun politics coercion, rather than by appeals to 'supra-party values' (Edie, 1989: 29; Stephens and Stephens, 1986: 56).

ideologically unpolished state machinery, the conditions were hardly in place for a smooth transition to a socialist model:

All this made the introduction of an economic model characterised by state-sector led growth, trade diversification, increased self-reliance, equalisation and employment creation very difficult.

(Stephens and Stephens, 1986: 59)

From its instigation in 1972 up until the accession to IMF austerity measures of 1977, the PNP democratic socialist programme was dominated by attempts to wrest control of the leading sectors of the economy from the multinationals, while implementing redistributive programmes within a climate of creating an ideological consensus amongst the marginalised majority of the population.

Acquisition of bauxite lands, along with 51 per cent of existing bauxite operations, enabled Manley to diversify Jamaica's foreign trade partners, thereby reducing dependence on North American and British markets. The takeover of three banks, and subsequent control over a greater amount of bank credit, allowed the government to prioritise agriculture and small business and so reduce import dependence. Yet the cost of reducing dependence on foreign capital was an increased financial dependence on foreign loans that the takeover and upgrading of utilities, sugar estates and factories and hotels demanded. Ultimately, it was this heightened indebtedness that, by 1977, sucked the government into an ideological dependence on the IMF and (IMF approved) conditional loans:

This greater indebtedness and more intense debt service pressure are clearly the most serious obstacles to the pursuit of policies designed to reduce dependence.

(Stephens and Stephens, 1986: 273)

There is an argument, therefore, that the ultimate failure of this ideological departure was due to the inability of its authors to remain financially independent. Added to the expenditure involved in takeovers and upgrading is the misprioritising of the expenditure of the US\$100 million received from the government's imposition of a bauxite levy. Instead of instigating greater state-sector investment to make up for the fall-off of private sector investment, the

priority was placed on social spending for public consumption - a "simplistic populist policy" (Levitt, 1990: 42) of redistribution in health, education and housing - the result being redistribution without growth (Sharpley, 1983; Levitt, 1983; Boyd, 1988):

Jamaica during the 1970s...provides a clear example of how government policies designed to improve income distribution can bring about a deterioration in the economy, because the policies were largely ill-designed, maladministered, or both. Analyses of income distribution data indicate that any gains that occurred in the early 1970s were more than eroded by the end of the decade.

(Boyd, 1988: 2)

Yet despite criticisms of political ineptitude during this period, there is no doubt that the structural conditions within which any attempt at radical reform was to operate, imposed severe, if not insurmountable obstacles to its success:

The factors impinging on the 1977 IMF decision as well as the problems experienced in attempting to do without IMF loans in 1980 demonstrate just how difficult it is for a country which is already deeply in debt and still very economically dependent on the developed capitalist countries (especially the U.S.A.) to develop rapidly new sources of loans and trade outside Western commercial banks, multilateral lending institutions and corporations.

(Stephens and Stephens, 1986: 282)

The combination of internal and external factors which underlay this entrenchment, and which preceded IMF intervention between 1977 and 1980, are interpreted with greater or lesser degrees of significance attached by commentators. Such priorities invariably guide the critiques of contemporary economic policy adopted in response to the crisis. Hence Girvan *et al* (1980), George (1988) and McAfee (1991), who emphasise external factors - OPEC's influence, declining terms of trade, increasing debt service payments, declining net capital inflows, a rising outflow of investment income, the effects of political hostility on tourism - are critical of IMF prescriptions centred on orthodox liberal development. George argues that the bauxite levy, imposed on the Transnational Corporations (TNCs) by the PNP, along with the formation of the International Bauxite Association (IBA: a producers' association modelled on OPEC) were

manifestations of the socialist government's attempt to wrest control of its bauxite production from the TNCs in order to finance social reform. She believes that this challenge to the power base of the TNCs precipitated their retaliatory exodus to Australia and Africa, and that this disinvestment, combined with alleged anti-PNP propaganda in the tourist industry and with capital flight from private Jamaican investments meant that the foreign exchange rug was pulled from under the feet of the socialist administration.

In contrast, Sharpley (1983) represents that significant body of opinion which stresses deficiencies of domestic policy and internal structural factors which affected the demand for non-oil imports, the supply of exports and the net receipt of foreign exchange. The (not insignificant) impact of external factors was, she believes, outweighed by wage-fuelled inflation, or what Bullock (1986) describes as a redistribution from capital to labour, weak demand management, inappropriate policies and lagging production. Both Sharpley (1983) and Levitt (1983) believe that expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, fuelled by the bauxite levy and with fiscal deficits inappropriately financed by external commercial credits, combined with overemphasis on social welfare (redistribution without growth), the delaying of devaluation and ineffective foreign exchange management, served to heighten the existing contradictions between domestic acceleration of the pace of income redistribution and contraction of the external account. Boyd (1988: 3), in stressing inappropriate economic management during the growth decades of the 1950s and 1960s, describes an economy "particularly vulnerable to the exogenous shocks of the 1970s and [which made] improvement in the economic welfare of individuals difficult". Within this context he argues that the redistributive policies of the PNP regime in the early 1970s "played an important role in limiting the economy's adjustment to external shocks..(that)..resulted in macroeconomic crisis by 1975".

That the developing crisis of the 1960s had been entrenched is evident: between 1972 and 1980 real GDP per capita declined at an average annual rate of 4 per

cent, savings and investment fell yearly and by April 1980 unemployment had risen to 27.9 per cent. Inflation, higher on balance than in the 1960s, peaked at 47 per cent in 1978-79, and the current account (balance of payments) was mostly in deficit, with net capital inflows contracting, as reflected in the plummet of net foreign reserves from J\$188 million in 1972 to J\$-82 million in 1980 (Bullock, 1986).

That the crisis might have been reversed within the ideological shift of the 1970s, through better informed political economic management, remains open to lively debate (see also Kaufman, 1985: 216-223). The violent election of 1980 - a final death blow to the PNP ideological departure - morbidly echoed the clash of class interests between the foreign and domestic business classes and the working and non-working poor (Witter and Anderson, 1991). Its resolution in a victory for the free-market heralded a decade and more of structural transformation under a domestic political consensus forged from a combination of ideological conviction and political powerlessness.

2.4 The Years of Stabilisation and Adjustment

George (1988) points out that Jamaica in many ways represents an ideal model for an economy which should respond favourably to the economic dictates of the IMF and World Bank. Apart from Manley's eight year experiment with a semi-protectionist form of socialism, the Jamaican economy has remained outward looking; adherent to the doctrines of comparative advantage and openness to external trade and foreign investment. The island is among the top 20 per cent of the world's most trade-dependent economies and imports ten times more food per capita than the average Third World country.

With IMF intervention in 1977, and adjustment measures pursued by Seaga's JLP government from 1980 (and since 1989 by an ideologically transformed PNP

administration), Payne comments:

it is not too much to claim that for the past several years the Jamaican economy has effectively been under international, rather than national, management.

(1988: 1217)

The package of policies pursued by the JLP, consistent with the principles introduced in Section 1.3, are summarised by Everton Pryce and cited by Payne (1988). They included:

- i) A 'stabilisation' policy designed to adjust the imbalance in the economy between earnings and spending and effected via tight monetary policies, devaluation and increased taxation.
- ii) Resource transfer from domestic to export production, even at the expense of dislocation, closures, lay-offs and the possible extinction of whole areas of domestic production.
- iii) Import deregulation, or the liberalisation of imports, with the aim of preparing local producers to compete in export markets.
- iv) An income policy, intended to strengthen the capitalist sector in the expectation that it would invest and provide the desired 'engine of growth'.
- v) Borrowing, with whatever economic and political dependence on the sources of the loans involved.

The policy shift displayed echoes of JLP policy in the 1950s and 1960s, which stressed private capital, both domestic and foreign, as the main motor of growth, but with a new commitment to shifting the economy from import-substitution to export-orientation. This new-found commitment was pursued in order to break away from the market instability inherent to primary commodity production and market limitations associated with import substitution industrialisation (Payne, 1988). Economists looked to the NICs of the Pacific Rim for what they perceived to be an ahistorical and universal role model of development: "the trump card of orthodox economics" (Hamilton, 1983: 36).

Jamaican economic policy and Bank-Fund conditionality have during the 1980s been dominated by three main IMF programmes. These programmes are characterised by specified IMF performance targets and punctuated by Fund tests in relation to those targets: indicators of level of commitment and adherence to their policies, with the presumed iteration of this success throughout the economy.

A two-year Stand-By Agreement was signed between the Jamaican government and the IMF in July 1977. Demand restraint measures were included in the agreement, although the Fund "against its standard preferences accepted the existence of a dual exchange rate, import controls and a relatively liberal wage control policy" (Bullock, 1986: 141).

In December 1977 the government was subjected to the first of the many performance tests. This test was failed, and an Extended Fund Facility Agreement was negotiated which provided SDR (Special Drawing Rights: the Fund's own composite currency) 200 million (270 per cent of Jamaica's quota) with repayment in eight years, the maximum time allowed. The 'targets' attached to this loan package emphasised demand management, despite referrals to growth objectives, and included devaluation to a uniform exchange rate and a cut in real wages by 25-30 per cent over that year. External factors such as oil price increases, higher interest rates on external debt, weak extra-IMF capital inflows and the effects of floods on the agricultural sector (Girvan *et al*, 1980), as well as governmental lack of fiscal restraint (Sharpley, 1983), contributed to the need for renegotiation of the agreement. It was finally terminated by the IMF in December 1979 when the Jamaican economy failed to meet these performance targets. The Jamaican government withdrew from negotiations for a new Stand-By Agreement in March 1980, being unwilling to fulfil IMF requirements for tighter wage controls and lay-offs in the public sector. In October of that year Manley's PNP government lost the general elections to Edward Seaga's opposition JLP.

The Seaga administration "began in an atmosphere of great confidence" (Payne,

1988: 1211) and in April 1981 signed a three year Extended Fund Facility with the IMF "on remarkably lenient terms" (Payne, 1988: 1211), and with a full awareness of the new Reagan Administration's political interest in detente:

Following the strongly anti-western stance of the latter years of the Manley regime, a new pro-Washington Seaga Government was warmly welcomed by the US Administration since it represented a major shift in the geopolitical alignment of forces in the Caribbean region...resulting in direct White House pressures to disburse loans.

(Harrigan, 1991: 331)

The Facility was to be a cornerstone of the Economic Recovery Programme, aimed at stimulating growth in the most important productive sectors as well as stimulating improved fiscal performance. In fulfilling this role it was anticipated that the Facility "would serve as a catalyst for the inflow of further financing" (Bullock, 1986: 144). The Recovery Programme was accompanied by a "dramatic increase" (Harrigan, 1991: 331) in US bilateral aid to the Jamaican Government during this period, through its non-military assistance channel, the US Agency for International Development (USAID).²⁴ In 1983, Jamaica received the third largest per capita amount of US foreign aid funds in the world, reflecting what McAfee (1991: 52) describes as an "international patronage system that rewards US political allies". This injection of finance reflected, however, a certain conflict of priorities between the bilateral and multilateral funders; the political agenda of the White House eased the Jamaican balance of payments crisis and offset the

²⁴ In addition to channelling direct financial assistance to pro-US governments, USAID's primary purpose is in stimulating private investment in recipient countries. This has the dual effect of recycling funds in the form of contracts back to US-owned businesses and of expanding export opportunities, for example in conjunction with Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) trade legislation, of US manufactured consumer goods. The intended benefits this policy agenda are widely questioned:

There is a fundamental discrepancy between the major AID goal of promoting US business interests in the Caribbean and the goal of increasing employment, economic development and stability in the countries which receive US aid. AID recipient countries are required to purchase US exports, but US exports are costly; buying them undermines Caribbean countries' ability to keep their economies afloat...[and] displace[s] local products, often forcing producers out of business.

(McAfee, 1991: 54)

pressure for, and delayed the pace of, stabilisation and adjustment of the economy. Comments Gladstone Bonnick, Chief Technical Director of the Planning Agency at the World Bank:²⁵

Well, they [the JLP administration] got the funds, they got the resources, a good time was had by all, but very little adjustment took place.

(Personal interview, Washington DC, February 1994)

An acceptance of balance of payments support without a genuine reform effort is "double edged" in that it not only leads to harsher future adjustment requirements but "compounds the magnitude of the future adjustment problem by adding it to the burden of higher debt servicing obligations" (Harrigan, 1991: 333).

Thus in a short period of time, and because of the IMF seal of approval and US bilateral support, the Jamaican economy had gained a short-term foreign exchange windfall, but with the longer-term burden of a foreign debt millstone.²⁶ Problems arose when Seaga's plans for expansion, based on anticipated increases in bauxite production - from 1980's 12 million tonnes to 26 million tonnes in three years, and in alumina production from 2.4 million tonnes to 8.6 million tonnes over the same period - were dashed by the major investing aluminium companies cutting back production levels in response to decreasing world demand for alumina. Bauxite production fell accordingly and disastrously to 7.3 million tonnes in 1983, with revenue dropping from US\$206 million in 1980 to US\$137 million in 1982 (Payne, 1988). Continued dependence on a narrow primary export base, and status of victim to the fluctuations of the world market, earned the JLP temporary

²⁵ Gladstone Bonnick was at the Bank of Jamaica and was a lead negotiator for the Government when the IMF initiated negotiations for stabilisation late in 1976. He resigned in the face of continued heavy drawing on the Bank of Jamaica and high public spending by the PNP administration.

²⁶ By 1985, Jamaica possessed one of the highest per capita debt ratios in the world. By 1984, debt servicing represented over 40 per cent of total government expenditure. The rapid growth in debt servicing during this period was due primarily to the use of currency devaluation as a stabilisation instrument (see Section 1.3), rather than a growth in the total stock of debt (Harrigan, 1991).

alleviation when the US agreed to purchase 1.6 million tonnes of Jamaican bauxite for its strategic defence stockpile. This is described by Payne (1988: 1234) as "an impressive demonstration of solidarity in support of Seaga by the dominant forces of the international liberal economy". The deterioration in the balance of payments was exacerbated by poor performances in sugar and banana production during the same period. Expectation of economic growth on the back of traditional export industries gave way to what Payne sees as an earlier than anticipated reliance on non-traditional exports, which themselves suffered at the hands of apprehensive foreign investors.

Record level international interest rates, Jamaica's reputation (for violence, extremism and bureaucratic inefficiency) and concern over the adequacy of its infrastructure combined with the delayed implementation of Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and its exclusion of textiles, apparel and other goods to ensure that the number of investment enquiries handled by Jamaica National Investment Promotion Ltd (JNIP)²⁷ remained low during its early years. The Jamaican capitalist sector, quick to flee the market stability-threatening environment of a democratic socialist administration in the 1970s, retained its "traditional preference for quick and easy profits over entrepreneurial risk-taking, new investments and a search for new markets" (Stephens and Stephens, 1986: 255).

Sharpley, amongst others, has identified a greater degree of generosity and flexibility on the part of the IMF than displayed during their dealings with the PNP government in the late 1970s. The deteriorating fiscal and balance of payments situation led to a failure of the March 1983 test and a weakened bargaining position for the Jamaican government, yet the IMF responded with this new found flexibility by granting a waiver. By so doing, the Fund was able to manoeuvre for itself a toughening of conditionality attached to the 'adjustment effort' for the fiscal year 1983-4: "additional taxes, tighter tax administration, a

²⁷ The JNIP was set up in 1981 to facilitate the inflow of foreign investment.

sharp cut in capital expenditure and increased prices to establish the financial viability of public utilities" (Bullock, 1986: 145).

Consistent with this intensification of the programme of adjustment there was a formalisation of the parallel (informal) foreign exchange market through the commercial banking system, in anticipation of the 'benefits' of a flexible yet formal exchange rate. This move constituted a *de facto* recognition of a second market in foreign exchange flows and a perceived need to gain greater control over their direction (Bullock, 1986).

Structural decline in production levels persisted despite this redoubling of IMF policy such that the agreement was terminated six months early. Talks began on a second Facility in November 1983 and the IMF, with its renewed demands for further devaluation, was given *carte blanche* by election victory for Seaga in December of that year, an election boycotted by the PNP.²⁸

An additional blow to the balance of payments, dealt by Reynolds Companies' decision to shut down its bauxite operation, pushed the government into further deflationary tax rises in order to meet IMF budget deficit-related targets. But with the Jamaican dollar continuing to slide on the floating exchange, Seaga's second major IMF loan was granted in June 1984; US\$143 million to last until March 1985. Thus a process of debt rescheduling was once again possible, and deemed necessary, to provide sufficient respite for the free market benefits to be realised at last. Despite this, the Jamaican economy failed subsequent tests and the domestic repercussions of economic decline sparked off the 'IMF' riots of January 1985, with an additional reminder of market frailty given by Alcoa's decision to shut down its alumina refinery operation.

²⁸ Seaga announced a snap election on the back of a "surge of populist support" following Jamaican troops' involvement in the US invasion of Grenada. This violated an earlier agreement not to hold elections until the electoral register had been updated to include younger voters, perceived to be largely PNP supporters. This led to the PNP boycott of the election (Harrigan, 1991: 341).

The third phase of negotiation from April 1985, brought with it warnings from Seaga of yet more domestic hardship in the shape of further public sector job losses, higher interest rates and heavier taxation. The Alcoa plant reopened in July, notably through JLP intervention in the creation of a (loss making) government company which would take on all operational responsibility; the sanctity of the bauxite industry thus prevailing over free market philosophy. The IMF agreement involved a twenty month credit of US\$120 million to run from August 1985 to March 1987. Once again domestic crisis arose from conditionality; this time Jamaica's first post-independence strike over the ceiling on public wage increases of 1/3 of the rate of inflation.

During this period PNP support was growing and Seaga's domestic political agenda brought about a shift in his economic stance and a plea to the IMF in October 1985, following yet another failed quarterly test in September - and a currency slide which forced Bank of Jamaica intervention - to accept a lessening of the pace of adjustment. A more expansionary budget in May 1986 ended the 'stalemate' (Payne, 1988) that had developed between the Fund and the JLP government during the third period of negotiation. Its essentially reflationary policy pledges reflected both an ease-up in world oil prices and a need to buy short-term political popularity in the face of impending local elections. It also marked a turnabout in the JLP policy stance which had culminated in Seaga launching an attack on IMF inflexible austerity measures during a joint Bank-Fund meeting towards the end of 1985. He strongly opposed any further devaluation of the exchange rate, relaxing monetary policy to stimulate investment and reviewing any further push for fiscal retrenchment. Significantly, World Bank officials were in open agreement with Seaga in his assertion of the adverse impacts of earlier monetary-based stabilisation policies on economic growth (although they later failed to back Seaga's call for an expansionary policy). This reflected a continuing inconsistency between the IMF programme for stabilisation and the World Bank trade and liberalisation policies through the early 1980s, in which exchange rate uncertainty and high interest rates were discouraging private

sector growth:

The lesson which emerges from this period is that Fund neutrality regarding the use of monetary, fiscal or exchange rate policies to attain stabilisation can be inimical to Bank-guided adjustment and growth efforts.

(Harrigan, 1991: 356)

A fall in world oil prices throughout 1986 improved the Government's balance of payments and fiscal accounts and allowed them to bargain with the IMF over a fourth agreement, eventually reached in March 1987. The Fund agreed to a 'draw down' of US\$132.8 million over fifteen months until 31st March 1988. Harrigan points to the influence of the 'disbursement dilemma' in also influencing this agreement, arguing that the rapid build up of Jamaica's debt servicing obligations in the early 1980s served to weaken the donor policy bargaining position through "a growing pressure to disburse in order to avoid default on the part of the recipient" (1991: 350).

Following the March stand-by agreement, the Government embarked on what Harrigan (1991: 356) believes was a "more appropriate mix" of fiscal and monetary policy which, in the context of a less confrontational approach by the Bank-Fund, represented an 'internalisation' of policy reform. With a greater emphasis on fiscal measures to control demand and improve the balance of payments and reduce inflation, international competitiveness was enhanced and private sector confidence and investment encouraged. For the first time since the mid-1970s GDP growth rates were positive for longer than a twelve month period, and early signs of growth in non-traditional exports, particularly textiles, were impressive. Economic performance, however, remained (and remain) dependent on favourable exogenous factors with respect to oil import and traditional export prices; and adjustment policy options have been "heavily mortgaged" by the external debt burden (Harrigan, 1991: 359).

At the same time, the increasing effort of the JLP administration at fiscal restraint, and their commitment to export-led growth through real wage decline

had its domestic political fallout in the sweeping victory of the PNP in the February 1989 general election. The new Manley administration, in a radical shift from their fiscal expansiveness of their last period of office, implemented severe stabilisation measures in their first fiscal year of office.

The major step taken by the new PNP administration was the full liberalisation of the exchange rate mechanism in October, 1991. This had the effect of sending the Jamaican dollar into a tumbling devaluation to as low as J\$28 to the US\$ with consequent inflationary effects on debt repayments, import prices for production, real wages and consumption prices in the subsequent three years (see Section 1.3). The pace of reform has quickened in other areas since the beginning of the 1990s. The Government has removed wage and price controls, introduced the General Consumption Tax (GCT) and lowered the rates of import duties and income taxes. Victory for the PNP under their new leader 'PJ' Patterson in the elections of March 1993 facilitated the continuation of stabilisation and adjustment measures.

At the end of 1992 the IMF agreed to allow the Jamaican Government (which owed them alone US\$337 million) access to SDR109.1 million (US\$153 million) under a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) to be drawn down by December 1995. This is to run simultaneously with an arrangement concluded with the Paris Club to reschedule some US\$281.2 million of Jamaica's debt. The first part of the Paris Club debt will be repayable in the year 2000 and the second part in 2004. Of Jamaica's external debt of US\$3.8 billion in the Spring of 1993, 50 per cent was owed to the Paris Club, 35 per cent to multilateral agencies, 9 per cent to commercial banks and the remainder to other institutions.

Despite this continuing debt burden, the IMF agreement was accompanied by PJ Patterson's announcement of his expectation that this would be the last credit agreement Jamaica would have with the IMF on the basis that foreign reserves would be rebuilt by 1995 (*Financial Times*, 16/12/92; *The Financial Gleaner*, 12/03/93). This is described as a 'pipe dream' by Jamaican Economist (and

former Governor of the Bank of Jamaica) Headley Brown. In order to avoid future usage of IMF credits, he argues, the Government cannot simply rest on a predicted growth rate of 3.5 per cent over three years, but must attain a high level of credit-worthiness in order to access capital markets without the IMF seal of approval. Credit worthiness depends on the perceived ability and willingness of the recipient to repay, and repayment credibility derives from sufficiently high levels of net resources (the surplus of traded goods production over traded goods consumption) and Gross International Reserves (which must stand at a minimum of the equivalent of three months imports). He concludes that "strong growth in exports is therefore the underpinning to external borrowing in the capital markets of the world" (*The Financial Gleaner*, 2/04/94). Exports have grown marginally since 1990, and there is no likelihood of a sudden improvement in export performance, hence Dr. Brown's scepticism. In the following section we turn to an analysis of Jamaica's development path and the likelihood that the growth perceived as necessary to gain the confidence of the international financial community is a realistic prospect.

2.5 Structural Adjustment and Sustainable Development

Jamaica the 'test bed' of structural adjustment has experienced severe social austerity, economic decline and political unrest through the 1980's - the years when the policies of the IMF and government synthesised in their adherence to non-interventionism. The decade has been built on the conviction that unbridling the free market and shrinking the 'social wage' increases efficiency and profit margins, leading to a virtuous circle of capital accumulation and reinvestment.

There are many who believe that statistics belie this notion. They point to capital flight (with its double return to banks) outweighing reinvestment; to Jamaica's deeply entrenched but powerless attachment to international markets for its primary exports (despite US\$495 million aid from the US and duty-free access to the US market under Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative); to the inflationary consumer booms, and overwhelming exposure of local producers to well-established international competitors, sparked off by import liberalisation; to a doubling of Jamaica's indebtedness to US\$3.3 billion; to mass general unemployment with a high percentage of youth unemployment; to a retardation of the progress in public service provision from the 1970s; and to a government reduced of its own volition to a purely notional political economic role.

It is stressed by those who contest this position that we must distinguish the social costs of recession from the transitional costs of adjustment:

If the pre-adjustment situation was unstable and thus non-viable, some form of adjustment would have had to take place....what outweigh the transitional costs are the long-term benefits.

(World Bank, 1987: 23)

It is argued that we must look at the alternative scenario, the counterfactual, which they believe to be the more damaging option. Tseng (cited in Bullock, 1986: 137), in supporting structural adjustment, stresses that "the costs of such adjustment must be measured against those of not adopting timely adjustment policies".

Given the option of fiscal restriction and exchange rate devaluation under economic adjustment or inflationary government spending and private consumption with an overvalued local currency, it is sometimes argued that inflation is the 'cruellest tax' on the poor (Streeten, 1987). The damage is seen in higher prices of basic needs, the tendency of assets not to accrue with inflation and money incomes to lag behind inflation. Bullock (1986) cites further costs of deficits in an economy as including: a depletion of international reserves; evasion of international credit-worthiness and withdrawal of trade credits; capital and raw material shortages; adverse speculation; and capital flight.

Indeed, these claims could be substantiated by figures emerging from the PNP's period of democratic socialist government between 1972 and 1980: a drop in real incomes of 25 per cent, inflation up by 320 per cent, unemployment hitting a record 31 per cent in 1979 and debt soaring to US\$1.7 billion. Such statistics lead even George (1988: 174), slightly grudgingly, to conclude that "the party was not exactly a model of prudent economic management and political acumen".

Furthermore, there is a strong body of opinion that states that economic mismanagement was carried over into the era of structural adjustment, thus limiting its chances of success. A tripartite Fund/Bank/USAID 'Fresh-Look Mission' to Jamaica in 1986 concluded that the failure of policy reform to achieve stated objectives during the previous six years "was due to the Government's failure to abide by previous agreements as opposed to the inappropriateness of their design" (Harrigan, 1991: 345). Consequently the Mission simply restated the need for a market-determined exchange rate and tighter fiscal and monetary policy (public spending restraint and higher interest rates) to reduce inflation. Harrigan herself believes that "the long lag in supply-side responses arose not so much from the inappropriateness of SAL policies, as from the failure to implement a sustained and compatible stabilisation programme" (1991: 356), which also had the effect of creating "an economic environment characterised by uncertainty" (1991: 358).

James Dinsmoor, macro economist at the Inter-American Development Bank, believes that complete liberalisation of the exchange rate mechanism has to be a prerequisite for the successful implementation of structural adjustment policies. Until then, inflation will outrun interest rates and capital flight will outstrip investment resulting in a lack of global competitiveness. Exchange rate liberalisation brings with it painful transitional costs, but it is the trigger to structural transformation:

You can have a lift but we'll crash, or you can have a lift, the route will be tortuous, but we'll get there.

(Personal interview, Washington DC, October 1991)

Gladstone Bonnick agrees, and in opting for a gravitational metaphor stresses that the harmful effects of tardy acquiescence cannot be automatically halted:

You can tell the child that they shouldn't go down the slide. If the child goes down the slide it doesn't mean you can design an adequate rescue or compensation once he's in the slide

(Personal interview, Washington DC, February 1994)

He believes that successive administrations both failed to curtail public expenditure and unwisely avoided early deregulation of the exchange rate:

You have a situation where the government was trying to do two things that don't fit together. On the one hand it wanted to hold the exchange rate, and on the other hand it wanted to have massive public expenditures without an increase in taxes to sustain it...Its not the devaluation that's caused the hardship, its the wrong-headed policy belief that you can have an expansionary fiscal policy, hold on to an exchange rate long after you have lost reserves, and deal with the problem by giving people exchange rate guarantees without any reasonable expectation that down the pipeline you're going to have a bonanza allowing you to honour these guarantees. So, sooner or later, you had to let the exchange rate go, and when it went you had to buy foreign exchange at a high price in order to make it available to honour the guarantees made at a much lower price.

(Personal interview, Washington DC, February 1994)

Even now that the exchange rate has been liberalised, he is still sceptical about the fiscal management of the present administration:

I don't think their demand management is what its cooked up to be...[if it were] why is it that the government owes the Bank of Jamaica J\$27

billion, and why did that increase by J\$3 billion during the last year? That is money that has been created and injected into the system.

(Personal interview, Washington DC, February 1994)

There have, furthermore, been widespread claims of financial irregularity at the Bank of Jamaica, relating to their purchasing of foreign exchange at above the inter-bank rate. Headley Brown argued in early 1993 that the prevailing single exchange rate of J\$22, attained after a post-liberalisation plummet to J\$28, was a facade; hiding a system of multiple rates "to enable the public sector to maintain a much higher level of spending than is supportable by the country's receipt of foreign currency and its stock of foreign assets" (*The Financial Gleaner*, 26/02/93a). The Government had, in other words, been borrowing money from the Bank of Jamaica in order to finance the budget deficit created by its own "fiscal indiscipline"; and the outcome of 'printing money' is to increase the money supply with inflationary consequences. The Bank of Jamaica is now adopting aggressive open market policies to 'mop up' this excess liquidity. This has involved issuing Certificates of Deposit (CDs) - conceived as a monetary fine tuning instrument - as a "heavy instrument of liquidity compression", paying interest of 50 per cent or more (*The Financial Gleaner*, 22/01/93a). Gladstone Bonnick concludes:

Now, where does the Central Bank get the wherewithal to pay 50 cents on each dollar it gets? It has to print...The Central Bank, just to manage this debt of CDs, was generating quite a bit of inflation.

(Personal interview, Washington DC, February 1994)

Certainly, political economic management during the 1980s was characterised by the continuing reluctance of the Seaga administration to allow full devaluation through the liberalisation of the exchange rate, given the political risk of its short-term recessionary impact and his loss of faith in the private sector's responsiveness to incentive measures. The political risk, or 'negative welfare effect', of fiscal restraint and devaluation of fiscal restraint was apparent throughout the decade (see Section 1.3), and evidenced in periodic strikes and protests, often followed by an easing up of fiscal and/or exchange rate policy. But disappointing private sector performance reflects at least in part the seeming

contradiction between monetarist policies and the incentives provided by devaluation and the deregulation of the trade regime. For observers such as Headley Brown, this is merely evidence of political mismanagement of the stabilisation process, whereby loose fiscal policy remedied by printing money means that even if the exchange rate does appreciate sufficiently to stabilise prices "monetary policy will be so tight and so restrictive as to ensure a slow-down in private investment and export activities" (*The Daily Gleaner*, 20/01/93)

It leads other observers, however, to question the appropriateness of the monetary theory of the balance of payments to an economy such as Jamaica's, "characterised by imperfect finance markets and high levels of uncertainty" (Harrigan, 1991: 338). While it is accepted that successful stabilisation is a prerequisite for successful adjustment with growth, Harrigan argues that this does not mean "stabilisation at any cost":

The form of stabilisation programme and the type of policy instrument used to effect it, are equally crucial to adjustment efforts.
(1991: 342)

But even assuming a successful stabilisation of the economy, and its adjustment to an economic environment removed of all price distortions is finally achieved, there are two central and interrelated concerns that remain unaddressed by the architects and supporters of the adjustment process. The first concern relates to the commitment to a free market, export-led growth path based on low growth and devalued labour:

Under both the [1977-1981] Manley and Seaga regimes the policy area in which the Fund and Bank encountered greatest resistance related to the use of devaluation as a policy tool to increase competitiveness via real wage reduction. Real wages have fallen in recent years, and much of the growth in non-traditional exports has been facilitated by this factor. However, in view of growing competition from low wage economies such as Haiti, the Dominican Republic and China, the question arises as to whether Jamaica's recent strategy of using low real wages to attract foreign investment is a viable long-term strategy both in terms of the external economic, and domestic political environment. The landslide electoral victory of the PNP in early 1989 indicated the growing popular dissatisfaction with declining wages and living standards, and illustrates

the difficulty of sustaining a low wage strategy in a popular democracy.
(Harrigan, 1991: 354)

The second concern arises over the ability of the Jamaican economy to compete - unprotected and open - in the global economy (and by doing so achieve the necessary productivity increases to reduce the burden on real wage reduction):

the centrally important question is whether markets are sufficiently developed to make universal reliance on market forces a preferred policy alternative...[and] whether completely liberalised trade between developed and underdeveloped countries can be 'equally advantageous' to both.
(Bullock, 1986: 138)

The continuing reliance of the Jamaican economy on economic sectors that are vulnerably dependent on the external economic events is clear from an analysis of its export base and trade relations today. The extraction of bauxite remains vertically integrated with the production processes of North American trans-national corporations, traditionally characterised by the exclusion of much sorting, processing, reduction and fabricating activities from Jamaica itself. Alumina and bauxite extraction together remain vital foreign currency earners, yet precariously vulnerable to exogenous forces. Over the last fourteen years the vulnerability of the Jamaican mining sector to fluctuations in the international market has been clear. In 1981 alumina and bauxite accounted for 78 per cent of merchandise exports, but this proportion fell to 67 per cent in 1984 and again to 52 per cent in 1985. Towards the end of the 1980s upward pressures on oil prices increased the cost of producing substitutes to aluminium, thereby increasing demand for primary aluminium to the point where the mining industry planned an increase in the capacity of its bauxite refineries. Most recently, however, international prices have been depressed by the flooding of the market by the Russian Republic and the sector also awaits the impact on prices of the US decision to gradually sell off its strategic stockpile at a third of the market price. A lack of response of international demand to these supply imbalances has caused a successive downfall in earnings over the last two years. Yet such is the industry's confidence in a recovery of world prices that it plans to go ahead with its plan to roughly double the island's refinery capacity to 5 million tonnes per

year by the year 2000, within a policy framework of exporting less and refining more (*Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report*, No. 4, 1990; *The Financial Times*, 28/02/94).

The value of agricultural output declined in absolute terms during the 1950s and 1960s, and its share of total output fell from 24 per cent in 1950 to 7 per cent in 1969 (Boyd, 1988: 5). Multinational banana and sugar exporters, unconcerned by efficiency of production (particularly as their U.K. markets were protected) made profits through refining and marketing, while Jamaica's (sugar) production levels declined throughout the 1960s, to the point where it was unable to meet its quota in protected markets (Kaufman, 1985). At the same time small farmers were hampered by infrastructural weakness (storage, transportation and marketing), marginal land and a liberal food import policy. Average exports of bananas halved in the 1970s, and for the last fifteen years have been set back several times by the additional hazard of poor weather. Jamaica's sugar production levels have declined steadily over the last thirty years to under half their 1960s levels.

Presently banana and sugar producers face the possibility of an end to their protected markets. The trend towards deregulation of international trade and the progressive dismantling of preferences within the context of emerging single market trade blocs threatens such preferential access (Serbin, 1991).²⁹ The danger is particularly acute for the banana producers' access to the European Union (EU), which at present imposes a 2 million tonne per year quota on the cheaper Latin American producers. While there is no such immediate threat to the sugar industry, it is widely accepted that in an open market production would be uncompetitive. The government has recently either sold or divested state-owned mills in the hope that this will increase production levels and reduce production costs (*The Financial Times*, 28/02/94).

²⁹ A framework of preferences established by the Lome Convention ensures the maintenance of a given level of Caribbean exports of rum, bananas and sugar to the EEC.

With the banana and sugar exports soon likely to be joining the mining sector in being exposed to the vagaries of international supply-demand imbalances and unrestricted competition, tourism and non-traditional exports have become increasingly important. Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee is targeted at the luxury market and, with demand outweighing supply fourfold, the industry plans to more than double production by the year 2000 without affecting price levels. But at present farmers face economic, infrastructural and climatic hurdles. Prohibitive interest rates on loans for expansion and development have combined with the raised the cost of many imported inputs under devaluation. In addition, there is little evidence of public investment in the transport system, and unseasonably heavy rains during the flowering period have adversely affected this year's production (*The Financial Times*, 28/02/94).

The effect on the trade deficit of the weak market in bauxite and alumina has been primarily responsible for the dramatic increase in the country's trade deficit in 1993 to US\$1 billion. This decline has been partially offset by continued buoyancy in the tourist industry, which is now the single largest contributor to official foreign exchange earnings,³⁰ as well as income from apparel exports, foreign currency remittance flows and from financial services operating in foreign markets. Local employment levels in the tourist industry have doubled over the last ten years, to approximately 26,000 people (*The Financial Times*, 28/02/94). Tourism, however, like mineral extraction displays many of the characteristics of an enclave operation - vertically integrated with the US tourist industry to the point where knock-on benefits are limited to local employment and food supplies, and the Bank of Jamaica experiences difficulties accessing the foreign exchange

³⁰ It should be noted here that the black market in foreign exchange fuelled largely by illegal export of narcotics to the US market is considered by some to be the single largest foreign exchange earner in the economy as a whole. Witter and Kirton (1990) report that the black market grew steadily between 1977 and 1983, to the point where in 1983 estimated black market foreign exchange supply was almost double earnings through official exports. An eradication campaign in 1986 against ganja growers seems only to have shifted illegal activities to the re-export of cocaine. A study reported in *Caribbean Update* (1989: 12), and cited by Panton (1993), calculates that between 1986-1989 narcotics exports contributed more to the economy than the three largest legal exports combined.

earnings of the industry. There is, furthermore, an environmental limitation placed upon the development of tourism in the sought after locations on the North Coast of the island (Levitt, 1991). Regional competition in tourism is also intensifying from lower price locations, such as the Dominican Republic, and from the emerging Cuban tourist industry (*The Financial Times*, 28/02/94).

The expansion of light manufacturing activity in Jamaica was sparked off from 1984 under the US-sponsored CBI.³¹ Various interpretations in terms of US strategies to maintain domestic capital accumulation by increasing competitiveness (see, for example, Lipietz, 1986, 1987; Coppin, 1992) the effect was a shift to offshore Caribbean locations of production processes that were uncompetitive under conditions of a strengthening domestic currency. Subsequent expansion of light manufacturing activity, particularly during the worldwide economic boom of the late 1980s, contributed to an upsurge in such labour-intensive activity as garment manufacture.³² Jamaica is now the third largest CBI clothing exporter to the US behind the Dominican Republic and Haiti. Asian firms in particular have been attracted to Jamaica in order to circumvent stringently applied domestic quotas in clothing access to the US market (Nurse, 1992). Indeed, while less than 10 per cent of the new investment was by textile and apparel firms, this sector accounted for almost half of the new jobs created (Coppin, 1992). In Jamaica by 1987 garment production accounted for over 90 per cent of all manufactured exports.

³¹ The CBI provides a one-way duty free trade system in certain products from the Caribbean over a twelve year period, along with tax exemption for US taxpayers operating certain activities in the region.

³² Besides the lure of cheap labour, governments throughout the Caribbean have actively sought to attract foreign manufacturing investment, primarily through EPZs that effectively lie outside their customs territories (Klak and Rulli, 1992). The institutional and legal framework established to encourage the location of multinationals includes special duty concessions and incentives, host country incentive programmes such as free-trade zones, double taxation relief, repatriation of profits, tax holidays, subsidized factory space, import and export duty exemption, trade union activity moratoria and development corporations which 'oversee' foreign investment programmes.

At the same time, however, EPZs are vulnerable as highly dependent entities. They have traditionally been net importers of capital equipment and management level staff, and have been characterised by undercapitalisation, weak domestic multiplier effects and low profit margins. The concentration of production amongst a few producers also leaves them highly exposed to the potential effects of large firm flight (Nurse, 1992). Neither does the interest of large firms reflect a certain and secured source of demand. That neoclassical economic drive to create a hemispheric-wide free-trade scheme is the same process that will lead inevitably to the deindustrialisation of some countries to the benefit of others (Nurse, 1992). The tenability of cheap-labour manufactured exports in the country and in the region is therefore in question. In the case of garment production, exports are largely dependent on continued negotiated access to the US market. They operate against stern competition from other Caribbean low-wage locations, and are highly vulnerable to large firms "discriminating between countries in the Caribbean basin regarding the relative cheapness, docility and stability of their labour pools" (Klak and Rulli, 1992: 14). The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) serves to remove restrictions to the flow of investments, goods and services between the US, Canada and Mexico. Already its expansion to a trans-continental scheme is being realised through the signing of bilateral free trade 'framework agreements' between the US and countries throughout Latin America and the Caribbean. This will reduce the preferential advantage of Caribbean economies, and pitch them into direct competition with other exporters in the region (in particular Mexico) over export markets and investors (Hosten-Craig, 1992; Lewis, 1991):

It is the rapid development of global trading blocs and the increasing decline of protectionist tenets...which have thrown the region into a veritable situation of survival of the fittest.

(Lewis, 1991: 64)

Devalued labour, it seems, is insufficient to provide the basis for structural change within this international environment of free trade blocs:

Is cheap labour a significant resource, which can attract foreign investors, if massive devaluations can make it cheap enough?.... Yes there are export

processing zones, but they cannot serve as more than marginal and transitory sources of employment and foreign exchange. Even in Jamaica, where wages are now at the level of Haiti, the Free Zone is an unstable and marginal economic activity.

(Levitt, 1990: 35)

Added to this, the ability of North American industry to employ technological innovation in order to substitute capital for labour threatens to extinguish the very 'comparative advantage' upon which the Caribbean's export-led strategy is based.

In the long-term, therefore, the industry faces the threat of extinction in the light of such high-tech innovation, whose high capital costs mitigate against the development of an integrated textile-based production base in the urban labour markets of the Caribbean:

If during this period [of offshore location] these firms are investing at home in a more capital-intensive technology - in particular if their international competition is doing the same - it is hardly likely that there will be long-term benefits for the Caribbean basin region from hosting any particular industry.

(Coppin, 1992: 38)

The stark effects of these trade relations illustrate the fragility of the Jamaican economy - oil-importing, narrow-based, primary-resource dominated and vertically integrated - as a self-sustaining entity, and help to explain why it remains dependent on imports, financed by borrowing, and suffering persistent indebtedness. Jamaica has one of the highest per capita debts in the developing world, and between 1980 and 1987 the percentage of export earnings channelled into debt service payments increased from 14 per cent to 50 per cent (*Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, 1987-88*). The overall foreign debt burden has been lightening - from \$4.1 billion in 1980 to \$3.6 billion in 1993 - although this is partly due to continuing rescheduling arrangements (see Section 2.4). It is also being achieved only through measures of fiscal restraint; cuts in public sector investment with disastrous welfare implications and which should otherwise be complimenting and stimulating private sector investment (*The Financial Gleaner, 19/03/93*). Jamaica's external balance of trade, meanwhile, is deteriorating. The

loss of earnings on bauxite, coupled with the reduction of import duties on motor vehicles in 1993, magnified the effect on the merchandise trade deficit of a 22.4 per cent rise in imports in 1993. The result: a widening of that deficit from \$533.3 million to \$830.3 million between 1992 and October, 1993 (*The Financial Times*, 28/02/94).

2.6 Summary

Structural Adjustment and the return with a vengeance to a non-interventionist and open-economy based development model prompts direct comparisons with Jamaica's economic strategy during the growth decades of the 1950s and 1960s. During that period the government assumed an essentially back-seat role, "facilitating the initiatives taken by both private capital and labour" (Boyd, 1988: 14). During that period also, an illusion of growth was created which was not realised and which left Jamaica vulnerable to external forces and guilty of reinforced internal inequality.

This chapter has detailed the historical development of the external relations of exchange of the Jamaican economy, and traced the outcomes of a switch to an open, export-led growth path on these external trade relations. In outlining the continuing relations between Jamaican administrations and multilateral lending institutions in the context of Jamaican economic relations with global economic forces, the chapter has attempted to provide an overview of the potential of the country to transform itself into a sustainable entity based on the principles of open, free-market economic relations.

The fundamental payments imbalances of oil importing developing nations heralded acquiescence to IMF-coordinated disciplinarian measures for economic stabilisation, attached to continuing trans-national loans to these countries. The actions taken following the 'stabilising' restoration of macroeconomic balance

amount to 'adjustment' measures to remove microeconomic distortions from the operating of market forces. These are based on a post-Keynesian 'new orthodoxy' conviction that efficiency is more likely to be achieved in the market place than in the hands of the state. The implications of this *laisse faire* approach for the external relations of many nations in the Caribbean region are profound. The inefficiency of the production of traditional Caribbean export staples such as sugar and bananas is being exposed by threats to preferential market access under regionalisation of free trading blocs. Consequently the importance of tourism as the principal export (service) industry is enhanced, particularly given the implications of the vagaries of international commodity prices on the contribution of the bauxite industry. The efficiency of local manufacturers and agricultural producers is being tested by the removal of distortions in the price of local currency through exchange rate liberalisation. The weight of expectation of comparative advantage is shifting onto the shoulders of the local labour force as they compete with urban labour pools elsewhere in the region, as well as those of China and Eastern Europe, unhindered by wage-price distorting forces such as those conferred by union bargaining power and fringe benefits. Sustainable development under this regime of low wage growth is predicated on the ability of producers in the region to emulate those of the NICs and achieve capital transfer to the region in the shape of technology adoption and adaptation and productive investments for internal wealth accumulation.

The emphasis of the following chapter on internal relations of production, indicates a recognition that the urbanisation process does not merely reflect (and remain dependent on) external economic forces, but is instead the outcome of an interaction of the internal forces of production of surplus value and external relations of transfer of surplus value (see Section 1.2). The dialectical relations of production that create and reproduce urban class relations are examined in the context of the structuring of Jamaican urban society through historically contingent relations of class, race, colour and gender. The discussion seeks to establish on what grounds individuals attain a position of security, particularly

with respect to the urban labour market. It is on this situating of the individual within urban capitalist relations that the research process, discussed from Chapter 4 onwards, is based.

CHAPTER 3

URBAN SPACE, CLASS AND MOBILITY

3.1 Introduction

In Chapter 1 we discussed the urbanisation process in terms of the interaction between internal forces of production of surplus value and external exchange relations governing the transfer of that surplus value, and went on to look at general trends in the internal spheres of production and consumption under structural adjustment. It was explained in Chapter 2 that the restructuring of the Jamaican economy under IMF-World Bank governance aims to create the conditions for sustainable internal economic growth by leaving the playing out of external exchange relations to the sovereignty of market forces. The implications of this neoclassical imperative for the restructuring of internal relations of production are equally profound as the architects of structural adjustment strive for a virtuous accumulation of wealth through export-led growth and the shift from 'non-tradeables' to 'tradeables', based principally on the comparative advantage of the price of the Jamaican labour force.

In order to understand *the differential impact* of economic restructuring on urban socioeconomic groups we must first arrive at an interpretation of the functioning of internal social structures. This chapter takes as its conceptual starting point a Marxist interpretation of the organisational structure of society, in which classes are derived from the capitalist division of labour and where individuals within a class are united by their relations to the factors of production. It goes on to examine the construction of social identity in urban space, recognising that away from the relations of production the development of common identities and the

mobilisation of groups around areas of mutual interest are largely played out in the consumption sphere, around consumption of goods and services in the built environment. Having sought an explanation for social and spatial differentiation in terms both of production and reproduction of class relations, the discussion turns to the mobility of the individual, and adopts a 'situational' approach to explain how essentially conflicting class relations within a given 'structure of opportunity' are contained through ideological consensus, and consequently how residential differentiation and *social stability* is maintained through the promotion of the ideal of limited degree of *individual mobility*.

These theoretical considerations inform the subsequent interpretation of Jamaican urbanisation and the development of an historically contingent urban class structure. This interpretation, though essentially class-based, is sufficiently 'flexible' to recognise the residual 'political' forces of 'class structuration' - particularly race, colour and gender - that have influenced the urban capitalist class structure and associated residential characteristics.

Given the starting point, shared by classical economists and Marxists alike, that (beyond the inheritance of fixed capital) labour forms the foundation of all value, the chapter returns to the relations of production, and the build-up by the individual of 'market capacity', as the key to understanding individual mobility chances. It is the interrelationship between this individual 'market capacity' and the wider 'structure of opportunity' which ultimately determines social outcomes. This recognition of the interaction of structure and agency in determining the nature of the reproduction of urban relations then sets the context for analysis, from Chapter 5 onwards, of the differential impacts of macroeconomic change.

3.2 Class Identity and Individual Mobility

3.2.1 Class Identity in Urban Space

The logic of accumulation inherent to capitalism was discussed with respect to the urbanisation process in Chapter 1. In turning to the 'structuration'³³ of the urban population and the differentiation of urban space, the relations of production and exchange that exist in the capital-labour dialectic are put forward as the prime movers in these processes. The accumulation of capital, Marx argues, is achieved through the expropriation of surplus value of paid labour power by the owners of the means of production. All individuals in this exchange therefore define themselves in terms of their relationship to the mode of production. Marx arrived at three defined classes: wage-labourers (the proletariat), capitalists and landowners (jointly the bourgeoisie). The dialectical nature of class formation is for Marx grounded in conflict: 'individuals form a class only in so far as they are engaged [consciously or unconsciously] in the common struggle with another class' (cited in Calvert, 1982: 70).

The conflict-based nature of class formation and its containment is discussed further in Section 3.2.3. What needs to be more clearly understood when looking at urban space is the nature of the spatial articulation of socioeconomic practices: "the precise way in which spatial form is related to social forces" (Wolch and Dear, 1989: 5). Is the assertion of class conflict theory that the 'social relations of production' are central to the structuring of classes and class relationships sufficient to explain local identities constructed and reproduced by groups who associate with each other by means of shared values and practices? Thrift and Williams refer to a 'political economy of development opportunities':

encapsulating (locale-specific) social relations (and opportunities) generated by institutions which provide people with other people to intermix with...(and which are)...more or less effective in bending

³³ According to Mach and Wesolowski (1986: 32), "processes of structuration may be broadly conceived as all manifestations of class formation".

particular people's consciousness in certain directions rather than others.
(1989: 16)

This common identity often has a clear basis in mutual interest over consumption issues. Castells in his later work shifts from a concern with production-centred class divisions (1977; 1978) to a 'popular unity' of mobilisation around consumption issues, expressed through urban social movements, which are no longer subsumed by the wider class struggle (1983). He outlines a process of social identity arising out of a conflict-based expression of these mutual interests. In this way individuals in urban social movements, through the dynamics of social struggle, articulate and transform spatial forms through political practices. Similarly, Thrift and Williams argue that class struggle around the ownership of the means of production cannot simply be mapped on to social and political life:

any analysis of class formation as a historically contingent process arising out of reciprocal actions must step outside the social relations of production and venture into the social relations of reproduction.
(1989: 8)

Central to this line of reasoning is the notion that there is a form of class-based conflict and consciousness that arises to a lesser or greater degree independently of the production sphere. This conflict, it is argued, is centred on 'exploitation', not with respect to capitalist relations of production, but in terms of exclusion from crucial consumption resources (Saunders, 1984). This consciousness is based around social reproduction of common values and norms, whose homogeneity provides it with a spatial identity. Collective interest in the ownership of the means of collective consumption becomes a means by which groups strengthen this common identity.

This argument can very easily, however, shift towards a functionalist deconstruction of class identity, and its reduction to the expression of individual free will. This tendency is reflected, for example, in Friedman's (1989) perception of the *barrio* movements of Latin America as a rational response to the marginalising effects of late capitalism, expressed through everyday (organised) survival strategies. Comparing the potential of this contemporary

consumption-based movement with the traditional class-based success of the nineteenth century labour movement in bringing the modern welfare state into existence, he argues that the 'moral economy' represents a point of departure from capitalist ideology, in which a worker is not identified by use or exchange value but as an individual.

Friedman's approach echoes much of Castells' later thinking on the significance of urban social movements. The deterministic 'Capital' is muted and we are left with a 'prolific social tissue' (Castells, 1983) which can, on its own, change the character of the urban form. Experience, claims Castells, both contemporary and historical, shows that all over the world people have continued to mobilise collectively to change their lives and preserve new ones against those who underpin the old order. Urban social movements are not 'random expressions of discontent' ranging from city to city, but in their structure and their three-fold goal of collective consumption, cultural identity and political self-management they together reflect a conscious agenda for change.

This creeping dualism between the spheres of production and reproduction is indicative of a more widespread retreat from meta-theory that I find as reductionist as the Althusserian structuralism of Castells' earlier work. The significance of the ideas expressed in Castells' *The City and the Grassroots* (1983), and echoed in Friedman's paper, is that relations within 'the urban' as a sphere of consumption are given the power to act independently of the production sphere. They point to 'consumption sector cleavages' (Dunleavy, 1980: 78-86) and the formation of 'classes' (Thrift and Williams, 1989) which are distinguishable from the class divide of the production sphere. Consumption becomes "as important in shaping people's lives and in determining the patterns of social relations and conflicts as the more traditional class cleavages" (Saunders, 1986: 290). Consequently society gives significance to urban space which Castells terms 'urban meaning', and which is constituted from "a process of conflict, domination and resistance to domination directly linked to the dynamics of social

struggle (Castells, 1983: 45).

However, both Castells (1983) and Roberts (1989) (in his critique of Friedman) recognise that the city and its 'form', as projected by the institutions that have arisen out of present social conflict, "cannot be connected to an alternative mode of production and development" (Castells, 1983: 49). Consequently urban social movements are limited by their own ideological constrictions to attempts to transform urban life without being able to transform social relations.

What is useful about the above work, however, is its elucidation of *identity* in urban space; that value attachments to urban space are contingent upon the local alliances and identities and the common material life chances that Saunders (1986) and Castells (1983) see as shaped by consumption. Urry (1983) argues that the increasing 'distanciation' of the production process, separating deskilled worker from centralised capital results in a replacement of the 'proactive' class division with 'reactive' popular alliances at the local level within the urban. Drakakis-Smith (1990: 211) describes a shift in interpretation of the urban social movement away from that of a powerful consumption-centred tool for social transformation to that of "granulated socialism attempting to democratise contemporary global capitalism on a localised basis".

This conceptualisation of the formation of local consumption-based identities can then be sited within the wider environment of urbanisation as production, exchange and circulation of capital. Norton (1978), in her study of the class make-up of Kingston, recognises the structural influences of the urban system on the consumption sphere, but goes only as far as identifying the unfair operation of the housing market in her analysis (see also, for example Pahl, 1979). Chatterjee (1989), however, looks beyond 'urban gatekeepers' to address the wider issue of commoditisation of land, monopoly power conferred by private ownership, and resulting inequality of access to land and property; a process which she considers "functional for industrial capitalism in Third World cities"

committed to "production and realisation of surplus value":

At the local level, manifestations of poverty such as slums and squatter settlements are all expressions of domination by economically and politically powerful groups seeking to maximise their class interests either through ownership of urban space or privileged access to urban infrastructure investments.

(Chatterjee, 1989: 130-131)

Harvey (1985) describes the 'recapitalisation' of the consumption sphere through private sector investment in the 'built environment', otherwise termed the 'secondary circuit of capital'. He discusses this commoditisation process by viewing land as a form of 'fictitious capital', and landowners, particularly in urban areas, as capable of extracting 'class-monopoly rent':

We simply have to recognise that within the complex matrix of urban development, situations arise in which space can be collectively monopolised and a given pattern of the circulation of revenues trapped within its confines.

(Harvey, 1989: 102)

According to Harvey, land is fictitious capital in that it can be used to appropriate the wage surplus of future labour power. It is a capital-yielding asset, a "property right over some future revenue" (1989: 95), which can thus be traded as a commodity. Through its development in the hands of private owners, "new spatial configurations of the built environment" can be created, with "new opportunities for rental appropriation" (1989: 102). This appropriation takes a monopoly form is termed 'class-monopoly rent' because of the 'privileged' location of sites relative to previous investments. This 'privilege' is maintained by a hierarchy of property values based on scarcity relative to the class-based effective demand for that property, "be it landlords within the confines of the ghetto or developers peddling loft space to affluent young professionals" (1989: 102).

The division between the owners and non-owners of private consumption is in the first instance the means by which urban space acquires a capitalised value and in the second instance the means by which individuals identify and evaluate those urban forms. In the context of extreme social and spatial polarisation in a Third

World city it is not merely exploitation within capitalist relations of production, but *exclusion from crucial consumption resources* (underconsumption) which has highly significant implications for the life-chances of present and future generations. It is this form of identification, with its range of responses, from communal self-help to sporadic mobilisation in the form of urban social movements, which informs the above emphasis on consumption issues.

From this premise, it could be concluded that it is the change of status of individuals as consumers that has the most direct bearing on their social and spatial mobility. The argument would run that by shedding the orthodox Marxist conception of consumption as merely reproduction (see for example Massey, 1984) and recognising the commoditisation of the consumption sphere we are able to conceptualise social and spatial identification in 'the urban' as a consumption issue (Saunders, 1979; 1984). Yet this is also to overlook the essential Marxist insight that it is the relationship between capital and labour that drives social structures and shapes class configurations. If we are to accept that capital-labour relations remain the key relationship in capitalist accumulation, and therefore in the reproduction of capitalist social relations, then we cannot simply remove a commoditised consumption sphere and the actions of collective consumers from the capital-labour dialectic.

Harvey describes 'displaced class struggle' over consumption issues: "struggle that has its origin in the work process but that ramifies and reverberates throughout all aspects of the system of relations which capitalism establishes" (1985: 27). It is the need for a surplus urban population (in order to depress the cost of labour) which creates conflict over the provision of consumption goods and services, and which provokes the switch of capital flows into the consumption fund and social expenditure. In this way, mobilisation around consumption issues "can assume a certain relative autonomy from that waged in the factory..[so that] the principle of community can then become a springboard for class action rather than an antidote to class struggle" (1985: 30).

The important point here is that a set of values defines and reproduces a social group with a spatial identity, but that the values have their roots in the relationship between labour and capital (Mingione, 1981). The reproduction of those value systems with their homogenising effects takes place through decisions taken with respect to the built environment for consumption and to the social fund. Their resolution in social identities can be likened to the acquisition of 'class status' in the Weberian³⁴ sense of a socioeconomic position gained "not [through] their relationship to the means of production but in their relationship to the means of consumption, the market place" (Calvert, 1982: 97). Any subsequent political actions arising out of 'community consciousness' cannot, as Castells admits, alter the structure of class identity, whose transformation can only be achieved in the 'class conscious' relation of labour to capital; in other words in the production sphere. The distinction being made is between reproduction (with change) and transformation, and in this there has to be a determining role for relations of production.

The effect is one of a relative permanency of social groupings, a permanency that is manifest in the "structure of residential differentiation" (Harvey, 1989: 120). Furthermore, social aspiration to increased quality of (private) consumption means that the likelihood of significant social change arising out of transformations in the relations of production is challenged by aspirations for *individual* social mobility, characterised by spatial movement across socially defined spatial boundaries. In section 3.4 we examine the mechanisms that facilitate such mobility; those that enhance the 'market capacity' (Giddens, 1973: 103) of the individual. First we turn to a discussion of the way in which structural conflict and change is contained through the fostering of the ideal of individual mobility under a hegemonic value system.

³⁴ Weber makes a clear distinction between 'status group' (*Stand*) and 'class' (*Klasse*). Classes are characterised by internal relationships founded upon "a rationally motivated adjustment of interests" and interact in a sphere of economic life characterised by "economic domination". In contrast, status groups are defined by a "communal relationship", which at its purest is "based on a subjective feeling of the parties [members], whether affectual or traditional that they belong together" (Quoted in Mach and Wesolowski, 1986: 25-26).

3.2.2 The Organisational Context of Social and Spatial Mobility

In the preceding section, we argued that class identity arises in the first instance out of the relations of production, but that class identity is reproduced through the acquisition of social status; a manifestation of shared values and aspirations in the consumption sphere. We concluded that it is this social homogeneity of groups of individuals by status that defines and distinguishes residential areas.

We now turn to an analysis of the constraints and opportunities influencing the social aspirations of individuals within those communities. A functional, or consensus-based approach assumes that barriers to mobility are essentially removable, that the principle of social movement is attainable for all. This framework is identifiable in explanations of inequality that emphasise the capabilities of the individual over the structure of opportunity within which they operate. In a study of urban poverty in Jamaica, for example, Clarke (1970; 1975) presents a pathology-based interpretation of a social landscape in which the reproduction of poverty and hopelessness stems from established (sub)cultural value systems - "'slums of despair' rather than 'slums of hope'" (1970: 320) - that inhibit participation in the modern sector. This approach is identifiable with Oscar Lewis' 'culture of poverty' thesis. In a (1964) study of a poor Mexican urban family, Lewis contends that poverty is more than simply a state of economic deprivation, but in its day to day reproduction takes on a structural rationale and a set of defence mechanisms for coping with diversity. From this study Lewis develops the proposition that this way of coping with life generates a culture unique to poor communities, perpetuating itself from generation to generation, and representing a collective adaptation to environmental conditions (Lewis, 1966; Valentine, 1968). It is, however, both a survival mechanism and a block to change, so that adopted values compatible with a life of poverty inhibit flexibility in reacting to opportunity if and when it knocks. The inherited 'culture of poverty' - which manifests itself in such traits as fatalism and an inability to defer gratification - is, in other words, 'inelastic' (Wade, 1976) in its response to new

opportunities, with resultant self-perpetuation of marginality.³⁵

The pluralist school also centres its explanation of difference in 'culture'. M. G. Smith's (1965) 'cultural pluralism' thesis, for example, describes the development of a dual society through the playing out of 'culturally' based differences rooted in ethnicity and race. The generation of codes and values that identify and distinguish groups is discussed in the preceding section, and the concept that such value systems tend to reproduce themselves is not in question. The problem comes, as Wade points out, when 'cultural differences' are used to explain why people remain poor but not to explain why some people become poor and others don't:

If the same explanation cannot account for both persistence and change, it is not a good explanation for persistence.

(Wade, 1974: 18)

In contrast, the 'situational school' emphasises the structure of opportunity within which groups of individuals operate. Charges of explanatory weakness are made against those who recognise conflict but interpret it in terms of 'cultural' differences. Take, for example, Mills' (1987) dismissal of M.G. Smith's (1965) 'cultural pluralism' thesis as a crude, dualistic form of consensus theory which fails to explain how society absorbs contradictions to remain homogenous. Smith, he believes, assumes a dualism between plural and unitary societies that denies the existence of the integrating powers of force and persuasion, coercion and consent that underpin all class societies. Austin (1984: 223) likewise stresses the need reject this duality of cultural pluralism on the one hand against value integration on the other, in favour of a framework of "conflict contained by domination". Conflict and consensus are dialectical rather than separate and opposing entities; there is no universal absolute state of consensus.

³⁵ This argument also forms the basis of the Latin American marginality school, with derived policies of breaking the 'cycle of poverty'. The school's 'ideal type' of the Brazilian *favelados*, for example, is that they possess neither the values nor the credentials to be productive members of the labour force. They do not place a high value on work, are not 'achievement-oriented' and lack the institutional norms of precision, promptness and consistency.

The 'apathy and rejection' label applied by the 'marginality' school and the 'cultural' divisions outlined by pluralists are replaced by structural constraints in the spheres of production and consumption that marginalise sections of the urban population. The result is a class-based interpretation of mobility, with a distinction in terms of ownership of, and access to, the means of production and of economic and social resources. There is still a place for a 'culture of poverty' in this framework, but it is a 'culture' that is sited in a persistent lack of structural opportunity, and which implies the *underlying* ability of individuals to respond to new opportunity. Hence Mingione describes a "crystallisation of...modalities of family reproduction" arising out of the 'stagnation effect' of an urbanisation process which is not accompanied by increases in skilled or well remunerated productive employment opportunities: "A certain elasticity of reproduction with very low monetary incomes can be obtained by increases in the quota of the labour force engaged in self-work or in informal activities exchanged between families" (1983: 326).

Within this scenario the organisational structure of society - or what Althusser (1971) calls the 'ideological state apparatus' - reproduces the economic, political and ideological-cultural relations constitutive of the capitalist mode of production. Conflict is contained through a dialectic of resistance and subjugation to a dominant, or hegemonic ideology. This hegemony is achieved and maintained by the propagation of ideas and values by powerful classes through their control of those institutions that reproduce and legitimise inequality (Gramsci, 1957). A state of hegemony persists so long as marginalised groups define themselves according to its rules even while those groups are expressing resistance.³⁶

The rise to prevalence in Jamaica of a dominant ideology is discussed by Austin (1984) in the context of the contradictory relationship between two urban (Kingston) communities of different class make-ups, within a unifying value

³⁶ There is in this positing of a dialectical relationship the desire to avoid the reductionism of both structural determinism and of an uncritical model of 'utility maximisation'.

system. Discussing "the way in which a powerless class lives with an ascriptive ideology", she argues that the ability of a powerful class of owners to prescribe and propagate their values, and to co-opt the ideals of others, inevitably leads to a victory of individual aspiration and mobility over social transformation. As such, she is underlining the "double-edged" nature of working class cultural mobilisation:

If black consciousness, Rastafarianism and folk culture have become the banners of a new cultural nationalism...the reality behind this facade is that the middle class co-option of these cultural products has destroyed them as rallying points for Jamaica's peasantry and working class.

(Austin, 1984: xx)

Mills (1987: 79) outlines Gramsci's dialectic between the homogenising power of ideology and "a pole of ideational opposition" (counter-hegemonic belief systems that exist as potentialities). Gramsci's argument is that "there is a deep and intimate relationship between ideology and practice" (Mills, 1987: 77); in other words that ideologies are prescriptive of appropriate behaviour. He describes the role of ideology in this dialectic: that of legitimating practice (whether repressive or emancipatory) and undermining opposition. The 'cultural output' from this dialectic develops according to the contingencies of the given society:

In the Caribbean it is precisely in the *tension* between two poles - the hegemonic, justificatory ideas and values of a white ruling class, and the liberatory, oppositional currents in a black subordinate class - that we will find the dynamic of cultural development.

(Mills, 1987: 100)

Thus labour forces fragmented and marginalised by relations with cohesive, centralised capital in the production sphere, are diverted from conflict by their subjugation to an ideological system consistent with continuing capital accumulation. The result is internally cohesive, yet distinct and alienated groups within urban society. The Gramscian hegemonic and legitimising function of education results in an effective working class endorsement of an education system to which they have unequal access, and which reproduces a class system based on upper class values of 'success' and 'failure' (Bowles, 1980).

By outlining this organisational 'context of mobility' (Mach and Wesolowsky, 1986) we are able to reconcile a focus on individual choice and mobility with systemic features which promote and reproduce *stability*. Intra- and inter-generational social mobility achieved by individuals reflects the expansion and contraction of the 'structure of opportunity' for the individual within a reproduced class structure. Herein lies the distinction between a functional approach to mobility that emphasises the distributive nature of social groups (see for example Gordon, 1986; Gordon and Graham, 1979; R T Smith, 1988) and a conflict approach that emphasises the relations and institutions that perpetuate inequality but permit individual mobility within a structural situation of stability.

While recognising the structural importance of class relations in contextualising mobility, we must also find a place for *plurality* in explaining conflict and change. Clarke (1991) makes the case for pluralism in a conflict-driven society, rather than simply as conflict within a potentially unified society. He does so by distinguishing between the shared value system implied by the consensualist school and "the social tension, if not conflict" which is integral to both Marxist and pluralist models. In both these conflict-based models, he argues, tension is created by differential access to power. For Marxists this is primarily determined in the economic sphere, while for pluralists it is often 'politically' determined; through racial, cultural or ethnic criteria. The more flexible the pluralist or Marxist framework, the more it allows for the possibility that class or 'political' criteria respectively can play a reinforcing role in societal conflict. Phillips echoes this stance in his interpretation of the common aims behind social movements, or 'anti-system responses':

To paraphrase Marx, though the form of the struggle is multifarious, dependent on the particulars of race, class, gender and national origin, the substance - transformation of the existing social order - is constant.

(Phillips, 1988: 100)

Certainly, we can neither separate from nor subjugate 'political' conflicts

to class relations.³⁷ Gordon (1988) describes the change in social classes as rooted in the transformation of the mode of production. But this transformation, from a paternalism based on an ideology of racial superiority to a competitive class-based system, does not remove the need for racial interpretation. Under the capitalist mode of production, analyses of race and ethnicity in the light of class relations will show ethnic, cultural and gender allegiance to be strong where there is a convergence of 'political' and economic interests. On this basis the Caribbean is characterised by racially structured class societies:

The legacy of slavery was a social structure where race and class were coterminous....unsurprisingly then, the dominant ideological framework - the prism through which people understood the world - was racial in character.

(Mills, 1987: 94)

This historical dominance and mutual reinforcement of race, class and colour in the Caribbean has, however, peripheralised the issue of gender in analyses of power, dominance and change (Wiltshire-Brodber, 1991). Cuales predicates the position of women within the class structure on the nature of family institutions and the prevailing sexual division of labour:

The fact that a woman is allocated a secondary place in the labour market is justified by the fact that she is a woman, her primary place is in the family, and her needs are met by a male breadwinner. This also determines the distinctive place that women occupy in the class structure of a society since their class is defined by the status of their husbands. But the family alone does not account for the position of women in the class

³⁷ Wade, for example, in arguing against the secondary role accorded race by sociological studies of Afro-Latin America, points out that while class is a more accurate way of defining groups:

race inevitably adds to the pressures that such a system exerts...The use of the racial idiom...[in] socioeconomic discrimination...transforms the nature of such processes in fundamental ways.

(Wade, 1985: 234)

Gordon agrees: to dissolve race into class is "to deny the relative autonomy and historical validity of racial and national struggles" (1988: 279). Cuales suggests that while the relationship between class and racial consciousness is "fairly clear...The interconnection between class consciousness and gender consciousness still remains an unexplored area in the region" (1991: 123).

structure. The sexual division of labour is itself determined by forces within capitalist production.

(Cuales, 1991: 121)

The above description of a family institution is of course historically and culturally specific, but the principle of positioning women in the class structure through their productive and reproductive relations can be applied universally to historically contingent gender relations. Under plantation slavery, the enforced separation of men and women, and consequent establishment of visiting relations was typical:

The division of household labour, economics, marital and gender relations within households are subject to degrees of transformation depending upon what occurred in the cultures prior to their incorporation in the new international division of labour.

(Bolles, 1991: 32)

In turning in the final section of this chapter to an examination of urban labour market in Jamaica I am positing that the 'opportunity' that is the central variable in the 'situational' thesis is largely tied up in the sale of labour. Individual movement across relatively rigid social and spatial boundaries is, in the urban context, a manifestation of the 'political' and class-based positioning of the individual within the labour market. First, I turn in more detail to the development of the Jamaican class structure, and adopt what Clarke (1991) might describe as a 'flexible Marxist position'. This leads me to consider the development of a class-based system under a capitalist mode of production in the context of historically contingent 'political' (which I take to include race/colour, ethnicity and gender) tensions.

3.3 The Jamaican Class Structure

3.3.1 The Legacy of the Plantation

Clarke (1991) devises a four-fold typology of Caribbean societies based on the relative significance of Smith's pluralism, Marx or Weber's conceptions of class and the Parsonian consensualist school:

Jamaica during [plantation] slavery, for example, represented a classic plural-stratified society that in its origins involved ranked cultural sections, legally defined and largely correlated with colour.

(Clarke, 1991: 7)

The political-racial stratification and tensions under plantation slavery are persistent features of pre-capitalist social relations that retain a strong influence on contemporary Jamaican society. Girvan (1975) refers to the 'terms of incorporation' of manpower into the colonial-planter regime as being based on a racist ideology that legitimated outright exploitation. In contrast, relations of gender under plantation slavery were eclipsed by the intensity of colonial-slave relations:

To speak of Caribbean male dominance in the context of slavery is to parody the concepts of power and dominance. Laws made property of men, women and children and the yoke of oppression assaulted the humanity of the slaves. Survival became the issue of importance.

(Wiltshire-Brodber, 1991: 145)

The institution of slavery "gave no explicit place to the patriarchal family" and "weakened the jural status of males" (Hart, 1989: 19-20), and while work roles could be disaggregated by gender (men generally placed in more skilled and privileged jobs) "there was no sexual division of labour in the traditional sense of conjugal interdependence over a wide range of tasks" (Hart, 1989: 19).

The legacy of the 'terms of incorporation' under plantation slavery is a society characterised by a high degree of coincidence between cross-cultural differentiation and race/colour stratification (Hall, 1977) and in which domestic and labour market gender roles are distinguished by the separation of social

production from domestic reproduction under slavery (Hart, 1989). Described by Harvey (1989: 112-113) as "residual forces of class structuration", and by Drakakis-Smith (1990: 203) as "[persistent] pre-capitalist cultural or ideological values", their influence underlines the need for an historically contingent analysis of capitalist class structuration.

Beckford and Witter (1985: 44) identify five characteristics of class formation in the post-emancipation period:

- 1) the emergence and growth of the black Jamaican peasantry;
- 2) the formation of a black agro-proletariat "with deep social, cultural and economic ties with the peasantry" (44)
- 3) "the growth of a mulatto middle class, or petit bourgeois of professionals, preachers and small proprietors" (44), described by Beckford and Witter as "a buffer class between the white capitalists and the black working class". This group performed a role characterised by the contradictions inherent in their position; playing out the dialectic of the vested interests of a propertied class against their experience of political-economic, social and racial prejudice;
- 4) the rise of a predominantly foreign mercantilist class, initially English merchants exporting sugar, but later 'Syrian', Chinese and Indian itinerant traders and small shop owners, "catering to the consumption needs of the peasantry" (45).³⁸
- 5) the retention of a minority white European plantocracy, including 'creole' Europeans, who maintained control of the ownership of land and the means of production, as well as the legislative and executive processes of state.

³⁸ Austin (1984) argues that the first entrepreneurs in Jamaica were those merchant planters who accumulated profit through services to British plantation owners, with the banana industry providing wealth for the first truly indigenous capitalist class. Foner (1973) suggests that the desire to gain credence amongst whites promoted conspicuous consumption over investment in agriculture and business amongst the creole elite, thus leaving the door open to the new immigrant groups to dominate the mercantile establishments.

The emerging class structure was highly identifiable in racial gradation. With European capitalists maintaining control over the means of production, indentured labour and immigrants with trading backgrounds filled the newly created domestic mercantilist niche. The 'brown' or 'red' children of plantation owners and raped slave women filled the petit bourgeois role, taking up administrative, professional and clerical positions within the colonial infrastructure, while the mass of black slave descendants remained without property or power. Patriarchal family relations were established where ex-slaves were able to sustain a subsistence livelihood, but were counteracted by the interests of planters in maintaining a dependent waged agro-proletariat (Hart, 1989).³⁹

The establishment of a universal ideal-type value system meant that "the mores, values and ideology of the bourgeoisie dominated the society and permeated all social classes" (Beckford and Witter, 1985: 45). The assimilation of white culture was not only considered desirable but was actively promoted by planters "since it internalised values of white superiority...and therefore facilitated the task of maintaining their subjection" (Girvan, 1975: 6). A contradiction emerged prior to emancipation, for example, between the political opposition of the emerging brown petite bourgeoisie⁴⁰ to the white European metropole in their campaign for full legal rights and their desire to emulate and absorb the European value system. Consequently:

[In order] to differentiate themselves from blacks and assimilate aspects of European civilisation...[they] not only adopted white values...[but] were harsher masters than the whites.

(Heuman, 1981: 14-26)

³⁹ Hart's thesis is that male power in gender relations is an outcome of the strength of the relationship between social reproduction and the sexual division of labour. This relationship is at its strongest under agrarian patriarchal relations, and is dissolved by the industrialisation process "to the extent that it displaces agricultural production as the basis for human society...[and relocates] much of social production and reproduction outside the domestic sphere of family life" (1989: 21-22).

⁴⁰ BY the 1830s 'free persons of colour' outnumbered the white planters in Jamaica three to one: in 1834 they numbered 45,000, compared with 15,000 whites and 311,100 slaves (Foner, 1973).

Education quickly came to play the role of class vehicle, of establishing and divesting the norms and ideals that form the basis of social order (Foner, 1973). Those mulatto children of plantation owners, often paternalistically given educational opportunities, tended to aspire to the social norms that their class position dictated. Towards the end of the nineteenth century up until the time of the first elections based on universal adult suffrage in 1944, academic high schools catered for that tiny minority of mainly light skinned children whose parents couldn't afford to send them to England. The rest of the (predominantly black, peasant) population left school at the elementary level, a handful moving on to vocational or teacher training colleges (Gordon, 1989: 3).

This process provided the transition from the homogenising effect of a dominant plantation system to a post-plantation stratified system under urban capitalism, dominated ideologically as well as politically and economically by a minority 'brown' middle class.⁴¹

3.3.2 Post-War Transformations, Class Structure and Mobility

The structural development of Jamaica's external economic relations in the post-war period from a (narrow) plantation economy "to a more diversified and dynamic...[but still] deeply dependent...capitalism" (Gordon, 1987a: 2) was discussed in Chapter 2. It brought with it an internal modification of the class composition of the country as emphasis shifted from external extraction of surplus value to internal production of surplus value through labour incorporation (see Section 1.2) within the post-War international industrial division of labour (Girvan, 1971; Beckford and Witter, 1985).

The urbanisation of Jamaica was the spatial manifestation of this shift from a

⁴¹ Girvan (1975) argues that because the ranking of racial groups remained essentially unchanged over two generations after the abolition of slavery, it is unsurprising that resistance movements (such as Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association in the 1920s) would be ideologically dominated by race.

plantation-dominated wage labour force to an urban-industrial proletariat. An urban labour force emerged, therefore, as a formal and informal response to the demands of expanding industrial and service sectors, as Jamaica shifted into manufacturing, mining, tourism and banking and finance.

The rapid and intensive growth of Jamaica's capital city⁴² was comparable, in process if not in scale, with that of Latin American primate cities. Post-independence trends of infrastructural deterioration and worsening living conditions accompanied urban growth in Jamaica. The urbanisation process was characterised by poor sanitation, multiple family occupancy and high population density in the older tenement areas,⁴³ along with increasing numbers of unserviced 'squatter' settlements, often located in marginal physical land in suburban areas (Clarke, 1970; Norton, 1978).

Clarke (1975) draws on neoclassical urban rent theory and Burgess' (1926) ecological analysis of competition for urban space deriving from the operation of market forces. He describes the resulting operation of concentric zones around the Central Business District, with social status increasing with distance from the centre. Norton (1978) relates the inability of residential households to move to "more desirable areas" to the steeply rising price of land, construction costs and rents (due to excess demand over supply). Consequently there was a delay in

⁴² Between 1943 and 1970 the population of Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) doubled from 202,000 to 472,321, in-migration being more intensive during the first two decades of this period (3.2 per cent growth 1943-60 compared with 2.5 per cent 1960-70) while remaining considerably above the national average growth of 1.6 per cent in the 1940s and 1950s and 1.5 per cent during the 1960s (Norton, 1978). During the 1970s and 1980s growth of the KMA has slowed further, although has continued to outpace the national rate of population growth. By 1991, the KMA population of 587,798 accounted for a quarter of the national population. Significantly the larger secondary urban areas, notably Montego Bay, Mandeville and May Pen have expanded more rapidly than the KMA, so that by 1991 the population of 'selected urban centres' represented 43 per cent of the total population (Population Census Report, 1991).

⁴³ Norton maps these high density populations, which predominate in the low lying areas close to the CBD and which extend westwards to form a wedge of high density housing adjacent to the port and warehousing area (Newport West) and the industrial zone lying behind.

(Hoyt's) 'filtering down' of older housing to lower socioeconomic groups. For the same reason new private housing schemes, originally intended for a low income population, were instead being occupied by middle income buyers; a downward invasion of the housing sector. Meanwhile, in those shantytowns where security of tenure was evident, upgrading of property was seen to occur (Norton, 1978).

Both Clarke (1975) and Norton (1978) emphasise the correspondence between the social and spatial structure of Kingston, easily observed suggests Clarke through "the sharp contrast between 'haves' and 'have nots'" (1975: 133) that emerges out of polarisation. Clarke stresses topographical features as contributing to the lack of change in the social value placed on the Liguanea Plain on which Kingston has grown up. The upper plain has remained the residence of the 'high colour' elite while West Kingston demonstrates the symptoms of overcrowding which remains the only alternative to migration for recently arrived migrants and the children of the resident marginalised population.

The post war expansion of social space at all social levels included a dramatic opening up of opportunity for urban middle class professionals, and the creation of a 'labour aristocracy' based on two trends. First, urban industrialisation heralded "the emergence of a native commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and an expanding small capitalist sector" (Gordon, 1987a: 3). Secondly, the post-war broadening of opportunity in the previously "narrow and constricted" middle class was facilitated by the need for a "broad-based urban managerial, professional and clerical middle class in the state and private sectors" (Gordon, 1987a: 3).

Austin (1984) refers to this new group of indigenous civil service, party political and private-sector administrators as a 'service class'. The distinction, she argues, between the colonial indigenous service class and the (larger) post-colonial class group is that, with political autonomy, the Jamaican service class took on economic responsibility, gaining control over a significant range of productive resources within Jamaican society.

The newly established urban working class is disaggregated by Austin (1984) in the following way:

- 1) An elite of skilled labour in privileged export sectors;
- 2) An industrial proletariat in less stable sectors operating for the domestic market; and
- 3) An urban personal service class working in "own account activity".

The formation of the Jamaican urban working class was also subject to historically contingent gender relations, through which urbanisation was characterised by the outnumbering of men by women in the towns, thus giving a matrifocality to many urban working class households:

It may be that women had more to gain than men from evading rural patriarchy (in both its old plantation and new peasant forms). At the same time, successive waves of male emigration have tended to emphasise the dependence of families on their female members.

(Hart, 1989: 19)

The post-independence development model has under-prioritised agriculture to the point where "many women found their base of livelihood and independence eroded" (Wiltshire-Brodber, 1991: 151). Increased internal migration by women to urban working class areas was a direct outcome of this process.

A "working class pattern of conjugal visiting, unstable unions and matrifocality" (Hart, 1989: 19) has been explained, in addition to the above characteristics of urbanisation and emigration, in the historical context of slave owners' hostility to kinship group formation. The outcome is one which has lent a strong identity to West Indian household structures which defy not only Eurocentric middle-class ideals of the nuclear family, but also raises questions about the Western feminist notion of universal male domination.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Hart goes further in arguing that the Caribbean, as an "avant-garde crucible of modern social movements and cultural forms" (1989: 5) has outpaced Western gender relations of family and labour division as they move away from sexual domination and inequality, thereby turning the

Austin (1984) argues that the urban working class remains essentially unified by the sale of labour. But it is also a workforce characterised by tensions - high rates of service employment, unemployment and underemployment, and major wage inequalities between sectors - such that a common identity and a commonality of political ends are not easily identifiable.

The post-War transformation of the capitalist class, broadening of the middle class and widening of working class occupational choice, represented for Gordon (1987a: 3) an expansion of 'social space', and leads him to discuss the mobility opportunities associated with these developments in the class structure.


The ongoing reform of the education system from 1958, discussed by Gordon (1989), reflected efforts to facilitate within this urban class structure mobility based on merit rather than income (Kuper, 1976). The legacy of a colonial education system allowing for the separate high school education of an elite, light-skinned minority is a class-based 'dual track' educational structure in which the majority of pupils after grade 6 continue their education in All Age schools, which succeeded the original elementary schools (see **Figure 3.1**).

The introduction of educational reforms in 1957 and 1962 was aimed at the expansion of places in secondary high school education and beyond for children of the working class. This expansion, however, failed to disguise a system still based on a dual track process of social advancement, mediated by the Common Entrance Exam (CEE). A 1983 UNESCO report concludes:

Those sixth grade students who are selected by the CEE go to the High Schools and those not selected go to the other schools. The High School curriculum has an academic bias and orientation holding out the promise of post-secondary studies, whereas, for the other schools, the curriculum is largely intended to be terminal and oriented towards basic skills needed for the world of work.

(cited in Gordon, 1989: 4)

Figure 3.1 Jamaica's education system



The introduction of a meritocratic selection procedure for entrance to High Schools, and the widening of the number of places available, did little to reduce the real inequalities in access to this 'elite' track:

Although the 1957 and 1962 reforms widened access to secondary and higher education for the lower middle and subordinate classes, their impact on them was insignificant relative to the upper and middle classes...(thus encouraging)...the traditional elitist system of secondary education for a selected few.

(Woolcock, 1984: 91)

Results of a national sample survey on social mobility conducted in 1984 support this assertion, showing that "the Common Entrance system does not seem to have had any clear effect in equalising class chances in access to high schools" (Gordon, 1989: 21). Hence the expansion of high schools meant absolute gains in access for working class children "even while their relative chances of entry (remain) slim" (Gordon, 1989: 22). Furthermore, the survey results reveal that these structural inequalities extend to incorporate residual racial associations with social differentiation, in different ways.⁴⁵ The "stubborn strength of racial differentials" (Gordon, 1989: 18) hides a more subtle and interesting distinction by class. This is that whereas in the middle class the introduction of the CEE has allowed for the extension of the racial advantage of light-skinned over black children, within the working class this expansion of opportunity for a merit-based access to high school education has narrowed the racial bias that exists in favour of light-skinned children. Similarly the slight inequalities in access by gender in favour of boys that may have existed within the working class have been eliminated following these educational reforms.

Objection to continuing inequality in access to education often rests on the implicit assumption that equality is not only desirable but achievable:

⁴⁵ Gordon concludes that while class differentials within the majority black population were declining, the educational reforms had effected a widening of the existing gap between the brown middle and brown working classes: "these two trends cancelled out to produce an effect of constant class inequalities" (1989: 15)

Can social justice be substantially increased merely by sharing more equitably what little there is?...we perpetuate a viciously stratified society by constantly creating a tiny educational elite...[we require] nothing less than a complete transformation of the entire educational system both in its structure and operation.

(Nunes, 1976: 208)

In contrast, the maintenance of an essentially elitist educational system is, according to Woolcock (1984) functional for the reproduction of capitalist class relations. This belief coincides with Gordon's thesis that post-War social space expansion within classes continued to deny any transformation of the class structure itself (see also Gronseth, 1978). This, for him, is the central issue to be addressed:

The fundamental issue which research into social mobility in Jamaica must confront is the paradox of large scale social mobility generated by the opening up of new positions coexisting...with gross and, perhaps, even widening inequalities of opportunity between the minority at the top and the majority at the bottom of the social order.

(Gordon, 1987a: 2)

Austin (1984) explains this paradox by arguing that the post-War expansion of an urban middle class bureaucracy served to increase the hold of a hegemonic value system over conflict and change. This consolidation of stability for Austin underlines the role of the education system in both serving the aspirations of a minority of working class Jamaicans to upward mobility and in reinforcing and perpetuating the position of middle class Jamaicans. Hence social stratification - stability - allows for, and is in part maintained by limited individual aspiration to mobility, most notably through the education system. According to Miller (1990: 271) the minority of individuals who benefit from skill acquisition (the 'emerging middle class') are intent on providing their children with the "educational and associated status" which they perceive to form the basis for success within this system, and which distinguishes them from the traditional middle class:

The defining features of the emerging middle class are that it enjoys income similar to that of the traditional middle class, with which it shares common values, attitudes, expectations and lifestyle, but from which it differs in level of education, status and family background.

(Miller, 1990: 271)

Reproduction of existing class relations create social fixities that reflect ongoing lack of social opportunity for the majority, reinforced by spatial fixity in the urban landscape. It is because of the limited nature of inter-generational mobility that "social distinctions become relatively fixed features of the social landscape and provide the possibility for the crystallisation of social differentiation of the population as a whole" (Harvey, 1989: 117).

That this inequality of wealth and opportunity has its roots in the exploitative nature of class relations in post-plantation, urbanised and industrialised Jamaica is clear. That the polarisation of wealth and opportunity is ongoing and intensifying is the issue which this research addresses in its analysis of mobility under the adjustment of the macro-economy, undertaken at the behest of international financial donor institutions.

3.4 'Market Capacity', 'Structure of Opportunity' and Mobility

It was argued in Section 3.2 that stability arises from a set of unequal social relations - maintained and legitimated through hegemony - which are not a systemic flaw, but are functional to that system's persistence:

Stability is at least in part produced by a specific asymmetrical relationship which is of paramount importance for the existence of the structure of classes and strata...The mechanisms of stability cannot be treated...in the sense of a 'theory of social lag'.

(Mach and Wesolowski, 1986: 87)

If a network of social relations, based on private ownership of capital, remains unchallenged by individual social and spatial mobility, what is it that bestows advantages and opportunities on those individuals who do achieve (intra- or inter-generational) mobility? The uneven distribution of capital influences the 'structure of opportunity' within which individuals survive and strategise. More specifically, the commoditisation of urban space leaves the control of significant urban capital

commodities in the hands of a few and removes the majority of producers from direct contact with the means to produce. Urban industrialisation marks "a progressive shift...from high levels of work for direct consumption to ever higher levels of monetary consumption" (Mingione, 1983: 314). The reality for the majority of the urban population, lacking capital and land assets, is either self-employment, or to enter into direct exchange relations with the owners of capital in order to survive.⁴⁶ They are left with their labour power as their key asset in raising income.

It is from this premise that we suggest that realisation of an increased return on that labour power is ensured when three conditions are met. First, in the area of labour supply, the 'market capacity' of the individual is enhanced. Harvey defines market capacity thus:

that bundle of skills and attributes which permits individuals to market their labour power within certain occupation categories or to operate in certain functional roles.

(1989: 117)

To enhance the market value of labour is to equip it with the means to make itself, or the product of its labour, a scarcer commodity, so that the price which those who buy that labour power, either directly or indirectly, is greater. Individuals can improve the physical quality of their labour power through consumption of adequate goods and services. Similarly the level of specialisation of that labour can be enhanced through education and training.

Secondly, they are able to gain access to the (hypothetical) source of demand for labour. Improving the physical access might involve increasing the provision of, and effective demand for, transport for instance. Improving the temporal access of that labour to the source of demand might necessitate reducing reproductive time demands, for example by increasing provision of creche facilities or

⁴⁶ Often individuals are unable to produce and consume on a self-sufficient basis in an urban environment where, in addition to other factors such as praedial larceny and soil quality, the capitalisation of land puts its value beyond the level of use for self-sufficiency.

providing public water supply to each dwelling. These limitations on an individual's access to work are those that place further constraints on the market capacity of the individual.

The first two conditions rest on the ability of the individual as a *supplier* of labour to consume strategically over and above subsistence consumption. The third condition, however, relates to the *demand* for labour that is established by a given structure of opportunity, or what Mingione calls 'labour market conditions and processes': "the need to mobilise or freeze specific sections of the labour force at certain costs and qualities" (1983: 314).

Just as the structure of opportunity leaves most individuals solely as negotiators of their own 'human capital', it also places limits on the demand for labour of ever-inflating value by denying far-reaching changes in the distribution of capital. An increasing division of labour and specialisation of function under urban capitalist growth (Harvey, 1989: 113) puts in place the framework of opportunity for labour. But under a process of capital accumulation based on expropriation of surplus value through the command of the labour process (see Section 1.2), there is necessarily a ceiling on the ability of urban labour to translate its value into income.

3.4.1 Market Capacity and the Sale of Labour

The acquisition of a particular market capacity is dependent upon access to consumption goods and services, but this access must be gained within a structure of opportunity that mitigates against the redistribution of capital:

The working class may be considered as dominated, since it is deprived of the characteristic economic, political and cultural resources of the dominant class. Within this perspective, one of the main features conducive to the reproduction of this class is the lack of economic resources necessary to make realistic attempts towards upward mobility.
(Mach and Wesolowski, 1986: 91)

Recognition of the centrality of labour power to the strategies of the majority of

the urban population leads to a vicious circle in which access to the means of consumption required to enhance market capacity can only be obtained by enhanced market capacity. In this way, the consumption of certain key public goods and services, such as education and health, becomes critical to breaking out of this trap and reducing vulnerability.

Swift (1989), in looking at rural vulnerability, seeks to explain the importance of *assets* in increasing or decreasing the security of the individual. He argues that assets include investments (human skills and economic assets like animals), stores (money, granaries) and claims (on patrons or the government).⁴⁷ It is the erosion of these assets that signifies and explains increasing vulnerability.

In the context of urban vulnerability and mobility, we can interpret this formulation in terms of increasing market capacity. Investments in human skills act to increase the scarcity, and thus the value of the individual's labour power. Investments in economic assets, such as a sewing machine or a food cart, enable the individual to utilise those labour skills. Money stores allow for strategic investment for production over and above the necessary daily consumption priorities (survival). Alternatively they permit expenditure on domestic labour saving devices and services (such as a washing machine or a creche service) in order to reduce reproductive demands and so increase access to employment. Claims, such as those on public goods and services or on familial networks, allow for effective investment in human well-being and/or skills, or in domestic goods and services, without having to deplete private money stores.

Differences in the level and nature of access to assets thus play a key role in determining individual security and mobility. In the context of an internal or external '*shock*' (such as ill health or redundancy) the relative security of individuals and households becomes evident (Amis, 1994b). Additionally, if

⁴⁷ Chambers and Conway (1992) add that assets can either be tangible (such as physical resources and stores) or intangible (such as claims and certain human investments).

macroeconomic '*trends*' (such as continuing devaluation of real wages or retrenchment of public sector provision) require the sustained depletion of assets merely for subsistence consumption or reduce the accessibility and quality of public goods and services, the tendency towards increased vulnerability and the increased limitations placed on mobility become apparent. It is this tendency and its differential effects on social groups and on individuals, which will be explored and discussed from Chapter 5 onwards.


3.4.2 Structure of Opportunity and the Demand for Labour

Traditionally, education and training have been seen as the key mechanism for enhancing the asset of labour power in the labour market. But enhancing market capacity means little if there does not exist the appropriate demand from the labour market. If, for example, an individual has increased the hypothetical value of their labour through training but the demand only exists for low-skill, low-wage labour, then that individual's exchange value may be too high.

Under the reorganisation of capital-intensive 'regimes of accumulation', peripheral capitalist growth has become characterised by the devaluation of labour through the extraction of small capital surpluses from vast numbers of workers (see Section 1.2). The labour market of most Third World cities has become increasingly segregated (Diaz, 1993). Not only is the formal labour market characterised by extremes of socioeconomic conditions, but there operates a distinct but interdependent informal urban labour market which operates according to (and survives because of) very different principles.

The relationship between formal and informal sectors of the labour market was introduced in Section 1.2 and explained in terms of the distinguishing characteristics of informal operations: namely their small scale, low capital-intensity and/or lack of regulation or legal status. These characteristics translate into a conceptual distinction which rests on two principles of *mode of production* and *freedom of entry* (Mazumdar, 1989), and is represented in Figure 3.2:

Figure 3.2 Vulnerability and earnings in the labour market



1. Differentiation between the sectors by the mode of operation of the production units reflects a *technological dualism*. A formal sector firm operating with modern technology requires a structured workforce, whether this workforce be directly employed or subcontracted as an informal sector self-employed unit in a geographically realigned technical division of labour (Lawson, 1992).⁴⁸ The difference in remuneration levels between the informal and formal sectors can be partly explained by this technological gap and its implications for relative labour productivity levels.

2. Freedom of entry is of particular relevance to wage earners in the informal sector, whether casual (daily) or longer-term, and is ensured given that their supply price is below the prevailing wage. These workers sell their labour power in a *flexible wage* sector; in other words "there is no institutional mechanism to hold wages at a level higher than the supply price of such labour". At the same time, "the economic factors responsible for higher wage levels in large firms are much weaker [in the informal sector]" (Mazumdar, 1989: 40).

Hence the informal sector is linked in a dependent way to the operation of the formal sector, and transfers surplus value to monopolistic sections of the economy by 'self-exploitation': a devaluation of the informal labour supply (Obregon, 1974). These dependent relations are perpetuated through *labour market links* within the goods-producing areas of the formal and informal sectors which arise, Mazumdar argues, through 'segments of complementarity'.

Complementarity prompts labour market links through subcontracting relations between formal sector firms and informal sector 'petty commodity producers', whether individuals or small-scale workshops (Moser, 1978). The demand for regimes of flexible accumulation, arising out of intense international competition,

⁴⁸ If the self-employed are using fixed (equipment) or working (finance) capital belonging to a large entrepreneurs, then they are effectively wage labourers employed on a piece-rate system (Mazumdar, 1989).

has persuaded many firms to extend further the new international division of labour into these subcontracting relations in order to achieve greater flexibility. Within a technical division of labour that extends beyond the formal workplace into the homes of informal sector workers, relations are characterised by unprotected and individualised employer-employee relations, low capital-intensity and low returns on the long working hours that typify 'overemployment'.

But formal-informal sector relations are also characterised by a *coexistence of activity*, in which the informal sector survives in product competition with the formal sector by operating on a level at which formal sector intervention would not be profitable. According to Mazumdar, this coexistence of products is sustained for three reasons. First, there is a *difference in the ratio of the factor prices* in the two sectors which gives informal sector activities a poorer capital composition,⁴⁹ This difference is maintained by the *segmentation of capital markets* in many developing countries which denies informal sector firms access to organised capital necessary to operate at higher capital intensity and productivity (a factor that Mazumdar believes far outweighs the cost of regulation as a deterrent to growth). Secondly, there is an emphasis on *different qualities or 'attributes'* of products between the sectors, with informal sector firms often producing necessities for the low-income market. Thirdly, informal sector firms are able to hold their own against economies of scale by providing *specific services valued by low-income customers* (daily purchases of small quantities of diverse products, temporal and spatial accessibility, and close relationship with customer, especially with respect to assessing credit-worthiness, an important part of selling to low-income customers).

The urban informal sector effectively depresses the supply price of the secondary formal labour force through certain product competition links in 'segments of

⁴⁹ Mazumdar (1989) describes a 'discontinuity in the production function', meaning that below a certain volume of capital per unit output there is a quantum jump to a much lower level of capital:labour ratio and labour productivity.

complementarity' (where the factor price ratio is the only difference) and through segments of complementarity.⁵⁰ In addition internal segmentation of the formal sector distinguishes and segregates employees by skill level, the strength of the wage:efficiency relationship and the elasticity of the demand function for labour. Anderson (1987) similarly disaggregates the formal sector into 'primary' and 'secondary' formal occupations.⁵¹ It is those employees in the secondary formal segment who are rendered insecure by low skill levels, low earnings and relative expendability. Furthermore, security afforded by union membership and certain legal rights in the formal sector is threatened by any state erosion of union strength, individualisation of employer-employee relations, erosion of social protection and casualisation of the workforce (Standing, 1991). These tendencies represent an 'informalisation' process, the implications of which we will discuss further in Chapter 7.

Self-employed workers in the informal sector will always supply their labour jointly with entrepreneurship and capital. The fixed capital may be small or even negligible while, given a slow rate of turnover, working capital requirements may be higher. The self-employed can be subdivided by the amount of capital owned, whereby there is a positive correlation between the rate of return to capital and the volume of capital employed: "the wide disparity in their use of capital and enterprise account for the dispersion of earnings in this sector" (Mazumdar, 1989: 41).

In some instances of self-employment the informal sector, far from being a reservoir of labour as portrayed in the Harris-Todaro (1970) model, is more a sector of advancement and upward mobility, with labour moving from the (secondary) formal sector into segments of the informal sector that require capital

⁵⁰ An informal sector 'reserve pool' of labour is only likely to depress wages in the formal sector if there are no barriers created by, amongst others, 'closed shop' operations, internal labour markets, occupational 'crowding' or 'educational credentialism' (Mazumdar, 1989)

⁵¹ Under Anderson's (1987) labour market segmentation framework, the secondary sector represents the low-skilled productive and service sector.

investment. Formal secondary sector workers who see an opening for entrepreneurial investment face the prospect of both independence and higher earnings - given their ability to invest capital - in informal sector self-employment. This move may be particularly necessary for advancement given the 'closed shop' policies of labour aristocracies in the formal sector towards those lower in the hierarchy.

Given the relationship between formal and informal sector described above, however, there is a fundamental flaw in the hypothesis that the informal sector can be an 'engine of growth' in which potential wealth creation is unlimited. The ability of individuals in the formal sector to achieve high earnings is caused by institutional restrictions preventing labour access to the market. In the informal sector, however, high earnings are achievable, but in an environment which is saved from formal sector appropriation by virtue of its low capital composition and/or illegality. In general, the urban informal sector persists *because of* the extent of low-income individuals in the urban economy. They provide the market for most goods and services produced by the informal sector, and provide the cheap labour power that enables survival even in competition with superior technology and productivity (Mazumdar, 1989). This strategy of 'self exploitation' (Chant, 1994) ensures a transfer of surplus wealth from the 'marginal pole' of the economy to the formal sector through the structural articulation of the two sectors (Obregon, 1974; Moser, 1978; Portes et al, 1989). Hence the ability of a minority of individuals to achieve relatively high earnings in the (segmented) informal sector *is dependent upon the majority of informal sector workers operating at low capital-intensity levels.*

3.5 Summary

The necessary relations of unequal exchange between capital and labour formed the conceptual basis for the discussion internal production of surplus value under urbanisation. These relations impact upon effective demand in the consumption sphere, and generate differentiation of social 'identity' across the urban built environment.

Class-stratified social relations are reproduced by ideological consensus, while the structure of opportunity allows for the movement of individuals through permeable social and spatial boundaries. This individual movement within an environment of stability is characteristic of the highly individuated nature of urban capitalist society.

An historical description of the development of Jamaican society has revealed the interaction of class relations of production with 'political' relations of colour, race, ethnicity and gender. The strength of colour-class correlation is the result of a political-legal framework imposed from Europe, and whose implications for stratification stubbornly persist after emancipation and latterly after independence and the widening of the education system to introduce more meritocratic avenues for mobility. The contingent nature of gender relations denies a simple imposition of "the Western feminist premise of universal male domination" (Wiltshire-Brodber, 1991: 146). Instead, the prevalence of matrifocal households, particularly amongst the urban working class, opens up the issue of female productive and reproductive relations and their participation in the workforce with respect to the sexual division of labour.

We developed a conceptual framework that prioritises relations of production and the sale of labour as being a key indicator of vulnerability and predictor of mobility. The returns to labour are predicated on its market capacity with respect to a given structure of opportunity. Market capacity is in turn influenced by the

individual's access to assets; be they tangibles, such as capital goods or money stores, or intangibles, such as investment in education and training or claims on extended social networks. The structure of opportunity interacts with individuals through the workings of the labour market, represented in Figure 3.2. The restructuring of the labour market, introduced in Section 1.2, has been further explained here in terms of the demands of reorganising transnational capital for regimes of flexible accumulation. These demands manifest themselves in increasing segmentation of the formal sector of the labour market, with the retention of a small high earning sector protected by a 'monopolisation'⁵² of qualifications, information and resources; and the increasing casualisation of unprotected formal sector employment and reliance on labour market links with the informal sector for flexibility and depression of the supply price of labour.

In the chapters that follows we turn to a detailed examination of the interaction of a changing structure of opportunity with groups of individuals at different levels of disaggregation who are differentiated by their market capacity. By interpreting this playing out of structure and agency amongst heterogeneous socioeconomic and 'political' groups, we can explain differences in levels of vulnerability and mobility experienced within the urban population. First we must explain how we arrived at different levels of disaggregation of groups of individuals as a basis for the research process. It is to this disaggregation process that we turn in the following chapter.

⁵² 'Monopolisation' "signifies the limitation by a group of other group's access to goods and values, through various principles of exclusion which restrict access only to specially authorised persons" (Mach and Wesolowsky, 1986: 35).

CHAPTER 4

CONSTRUCTING A METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding chapters a conceptual framework was established for interpreting the likelihood of individual mobility in terms of the relationship between individual 'market capacity' and the 'structure of opportunity' that is presented through the workings of the urban labour market. The principles and mechanisms of 'supply-sideism' were outlined in Chapter 1, and general trends in the spheres of production and consumption under structural adjustment in Jamaica were examined and explained in terms of these underlying principles (see Figure 1.1).

This study aims to link these macro and meso-level trends, established through analysis of secondary material, with an examination of trends within two urban communities with distinct socioeconomic characteristics. More specifically the study aims at a detailed analysis of the differential impact of macroeconomic change on the structure of opportunity for labour market participation and on the ability of different groups of individuals to enhance their labour market capacity in response to labour market opportunities. The following key questions inform the research process:

1. which groups of individuals are able to enhance their market capacity in the face of the recessionary effects of deflationary stabilisation measures (such as currency devaluation, price increases, interest rate rises, reduced public spending), and which groups become increasingly vulnerable under these macroeconomic conditions;

2. what survival strategies are employed by individuals in response to external shocks and recessionary trends, and how significantly do these strategies erode their market capacity; and
3. in what circumstances has the restructuring of the labour market under supply-side adjustment (for example through liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation) had either a virtuous or a negative impact on the structure of opportunity.

There are many ways in which a heterogeneous population can be disaggregated in order to assess the differential impacts of change. A decision was made that rather than isolate a group of workers from a particular industry (see for example Anderson, 1988) or look at consumption trends within a specific sector (see for example Klak, 1992) the study would aim to look cross-sectionally at residential communities defined by given socioeconomic indicators to examine the differential impact of external shocks and trends within defined groups over a period of time defined by the structural adjustment process. This allows us to examine more closely the relationship between an individual's relation to the sphere of production and their consumption choices and strategies. It is hoped, in other words, that through this research approach an understanding of mobility can be built for defined groups of individuals with respect to the interaction of production and consumption.

The decision to look at temporal socioeconomic change within defined spatial areas, rather than concentrating, for example, on changes within sectors is not without its problems. These are posed by looking at static residential areas longitudinally when trying to explain trends in structures of opportunity and strategies adopted by a population which could in fact be a very fluid one. With a shifting population it becomes difficult to come to conclusions about how process affects a community. How can we be sure, in other words, whether it is the opportunities that have changed rather than the (type of) population? The questions in the sample survey relating to residential history of respondents provide a detailed picture of the extent of inflow and outflow of residents over

a given period, and we examine these in Section 4.2.3.

In this chapter we turn to the field area and to a discussion of the process of selecting representative populations and appropriate research instruments and techniques for examining those populations. Thus far we have established that the particular concern of this piece of research is to examine the implications of a set of political economic processes on an urban population. The country has been selected because it is argued that it is representative of economies that have switched from a regime of import-substitution industrialisation to one of export-led industrialisation under the supply-side adjustment imperatives attached as conditions to the loans of international financial institutions. The main urban area in this country is argued to be representative of the accumulation, exchange and circulation of capital that is typical of the peripheral urban industrialisation process that sets in place demands on the movement of people and capital within the nation state.

It is then suggested that the implications of macroeconomic change are not uniform, but are contingent upon socioeconomic and other characteristics of populations within areas and within households. In the first instance the urban area is disaggregated on the basis of key socioeconomic characteristics, and a random and representative sample of households within selected areas are surveyed. Later, in the light of findings from this survey, households are disaggregated in order to establish differential impacts of change at a smaller scale. It is then argued that certain characteristics of individuals within households justify their examination with respect to external change.

There is, in other words, a progressive disaggregation of the population under examination, but at each stage of disaggregation there is an effort to ascertain the distinctiveness of sub-groups and to ensure the representativeness and/or relevance of the samples selected. We will now follow this process of disaggregation and explain the rationale for methodological decisions taken at each stage.

4.2 Establishing Representativeness

4.2.1 Jamaica

The Caribbean Basin "defines the region comprising the small, developing economies which border the Caribbean sea" (Coppin , 1992: 22). Jamaica is representative of the 'Central Caribbean'⁵³ belt of labour-intensive, light-industrial, low-wage urban economies that includes Haiti and the Dominican Republic. It followed a post-independence path of 'import substitution industrialisation' and in the 1970s entered a short-lived phase of intensified protectionism and demand-led growth within a programme of nationalisation and expropriation of domestic resources (see section 2.2).

Jamaica, as we have seen is a country which has undertaken a neo-classical restructuring of its economy in line with the prescriptions of the IMF and World bank, and its Government is still "strongly committed to the completion of the adjustment process on which more sustained economic growth will depend" (World Bank, 1993).

Since 1988 the Government has implemented policies of domestic deregulation, in which prices were decontrolled, public sector prices liberalised and government trading monopolies abolished. The opening up of the economy to imports involved the introduction of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Common External tariff (CET) in 1991, along with the elimination of most import stamp duties. Domestic consumption was discouraged through the imposition of a general consumption tax (GCT) in the same year. The competitiveness of Jamaican exports was encouraged by the devaluation of its currency, achieved through the full liberalisation of the exchange rate in September 1991 (World

⁵³ Coppin (1992) disaggregates the Caribbean Basin into three distinctive regions, according to their economic characteristics. Hence the 'Central American' region is relatively land-abundant; the 'Central Caribbean' relatively labour abundant and characterised by high population densities; and the 'Other Caribbean' region relatively capital-abundant.

Bank, 1993).

The main policy priorities pursued, as described by the World Bank (1993) are:

1) in the short-term, to maintain stability through tight fiscal and monetary restraints, particularly by achieving an overall surplus in the public sector operations and by addressing the issue of quasi-fiscal deficit of the Bank of Jamaica, re-establishing the conditions for growth; and

2) for the medium-term, adherence to an economic programme that emphasises:
i) maintenance of the liberalised foreign exchange system, stepped-up liberalisation of the trade regime to a 5-20 per cent import tariff range, and further deregulation of the economy; ii) consolidation of measures, including further divestment, to ensure a sustainable fiscal balance that will allow for essential infrastructure investments and the development of social services, while providing scope for an expanded private sector in an improved incentive system; iii) an effective implementation of the PSIP to improve the efficiency in the use of resources; and iv) a gradual reduction of the external debt burden, through moderation in foreign borrowing and further efforts towards debt rescheduling and relief.

Jamaica is in many ways an 'ideal model' for a state that should be responsive to the adjustment process (George, 1988). It has for the most part remained outward looking and committed to the doctrine of comparative advantage. It remains heavily trade dependent, and therefore anxious to attract foreign capital investment. It was one of the earliest nations to submit to the IMF programme, and was the subject of intense geopolitical interest to the US Reagan administration in the early years of adjustment. At various times it has had the highest per capita debt in the world, and remains committed, if for no other reason than extreme indebtedness, to the neoclassical doctrines that attach themselves to transnational loans.

4.2.2 The Kingston Metropolitan Area

The Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) is almost self-evidently the most representative urban area to select for analysis of longitudinal trends. It is very much the primate city of Jamaica, containing 24.8 per cent of the total population of the country and 58 per cent of the population of selected urban areas (Table 4.1). It has continued to expand in the post-independence phase of urban industrial growth as the administrative, political, manufacturing, service and financial centre of the country. In addition, the latest phase of industrial location in Export Processing Zones has occurred primarily in Kingston's 'Free Zone' in the West of the city. Indeed, the only recent growth area in manufacturing has been in garment assembly, concentrated in the Kingston and Montego Bay Free Zones.

The diversity of urban occupations in Jamaica is therefore at its highest within the KMA. Opportunities for middle class public and private sector employment are highly concentrated here, and working class productive, sale and service activity is present in great diversity. For the same reason the informal sector is intense and widespread in its urban connections.

Table 4.1 Population trends in selected urban centres, 1991 and 1992

Parish and Town	Population 1991	Population 1982	Growth rate per annum, 1982-1991 (% of population)
KINGSTON ST. ANDREW Metropolitan Area	587,798	524,638	1.30
ST. THOMAS Morant Bay	9,185	8,828	0.44
PORTLAND Port Antonio	13,246	12,285	0.84
ST. MARY Port Maria	7,651	7,508	0.21
ST. ANNE St. Anne's Bay	10,518	9,058	1.67
TRELAWNY Falmouth	7,245	6,713	0.85
ST. JAMES Montego Bay	83,446	70,265	1.92
HANOVER Lucea	6,002	5,652	0.67
WESTMORELAND Savanna-la-mar	16,553	14,912	1.17
ST. ELIZABETH Black River	3,675	3,601	0.23
MANCHESTER Mandeville	39,430	34,502	1.49
CLARENDON May Pen	46,785	40,962	1.49
ST. CATHERINE Spanish Town Portmore	92,383 90,138	89,097 73,426	0.40 2.30

Source: Population Census, 1991, Preliminary Report (Statistical Institute of Jamaica)

There are areas of urban economic activity, however, which are not represented to the same extent in Kingston. Perhaps most notable by its absence is the buoyant tourist sector, which employs some 26,000 local people. The industry is concentrated on the North coast of the island, with population expansion outside the KMA particularly intense in the urban centres of the parishes of St. James and

St. Anne (see Table 4.1).⁵⁴ It is apparent also that the expansion of some of these secondary urban centres (some at greater rate than the KMA) is due to the dynamic in-migration of individuals responding to newly created job opportunities, whereas in Kingston most of the expansion is due to the population growth rate amongst the *in situ* population.

The importance of tourism, with its employment base outside Kingston, cannot therefore be overlooked. Indeed, there are those who are of the opinion that the future lies not in an expanded export-based productive sector but in diversification of the export of service sector attractions, such as retirement resorts and up-market long-term medical centres. We will return to this theme in Chapter 7. In concentrating on the impacts of change on communities in Kingston, therefore, it is necessary to bear in mind that economic expansion in certain sectors is not represented in the KMA.

4.2.3 The Residential Areas

In chapter 3 we discussed Jamaica's class formation in historical context and sought to outline the socioeconomic make-up of its urban population. In undertaking this study it was anticipated that the processes of macroeconomic restructuring undertaken by successive Jamaican governments would have different implications for different urban socioeconomic groups. It was necessary, therefore, to establish a representative sample of these groups, broadly separated into the urban working class and the urban middle class, and to do so requires the identification of indicators that allow us to apply socioeconomic labels to residential areas. Ultimately the research was targeted at two communities within the Kingston Metropolitan Area (KMA) - Franklyn Town and Drumblair - delineated using the 1991 'Special Areas' boundaries established by the Census

⁵⁴ The 1991 Population Census Preliminary Report flags as particularly significant the growth of St. James. In 1970, 5.5 per cent of the population lived in this parish. This proportion increased to 6.2 per cent by 1982, and in 1991 was 6.6 per cent, an annual growth rate of 1.6 per cent since 1982.

Office. Three indicators were then identified in order to differentiate these residential areas (RAs) along socioeconomic lines: market value of their sites, and the educational attainment and occupational profile of their respective populations.

4.2.3.1 The context

The direction and size of residential aspirations and flows within Kingston that inform this choice of residential areas for analysis are rooted in the particular nature of Jamaica's urbanisation process. There follows a brief historical contextualisation of this process, with emphasis on the developing socio-spatial characteristics of Kingston.

The population of Kingston increased by almost 80 per cent between 1828 and 1921, and by the turn of the century almost half the population growth in Kingston and urban St. Andrew (which together make up the present day Kingston Metropolitan Area or KMA) was due to in-migration. This population growth was accompanied by an expansion of the built-up area, including the addition of Franklyn Town at the turn of the century.

Potential migrants to Kingston had, between 1881 and 1921, been drawn away from the city by the establishment of a free peasantry and a period of heavy emigration to the United States, Panama and Cuba. The decline of work opportunities abroad and the almost full occupation of cultivatable peasant land, set within the context of a growing population, meant that these 'magnets' were effectively withdrawn after the First World War. The subsequent doubling of the population of Kingston between 1921 and 1943 was largely due to rural-urban migration. This migration flow was heavily biased towards Kingston, so that its share of the urban population increased from 55 to 69 per cent during this period.

Clarke (1975) points out that there was a continuing strong negative correlation between socioeconomic status/housing quality and population density. At this time Franklyn Town was part of an area of East Kingston of medium socioeconomic status, containing the largest concentration of the city's mulatto population, and immune to the population pressures of West and inner East Kingston: population densities of between 27 and 54 persons per acre were typical here. In contrast, the largest concentration of newly arrived poor, black rural migrants was in West Kingston, where densities exceeded 191 persons per acre in the single-story tenements typical of this area of the city.

Residential mobility within the corporate area started with the shift of the elite white and mulatto populations from the parish of Kingston to the suburbs of St. Andrew after 1911, where population densities of less than 9 persons per acre prevailed. Hence almost a quarter of newcomers to urban St. Andrew between 1921 and 1943 were cross-town migrants from Kingston parish. As the city expanded, "segregation by social status became increasingly marked", (Clarke, 1975: 62), underlining and polarising the general pattern of population density increasing - and social status decreasing - from north to south and from east to west.

Between 1943 and 1960 the population of Kingston increased by 86 per cent, the acceleration due in part to a doubling of the rate of natural population increase during this period. By 1960 almost one quarter of Jamaica's population lived in the city. The 1950s were a period of rapid suburban expansion, so that by 1960 further northward expansion was largely prohibited by the Blue Mountain range. An internal temporal-spatial residential flow of Kingston's population was established during this period, with the movement of low income populations from the east to the west of the city, and of longer established middle income dwellers from the east northwards.

Within this flow, Franklyn Town and surrounding areas experienced an increase

in population density and a decrease in the socioeconomic status of its residents as the more mobile poor left the high density 'slums' of West Kingston at the same time that the more mobile middle class sought to maintain their social position by moving out to newly built housing in the north of the city.

Drumblair is one of many suburban housing schemes developed in the 1950s and 1960s, and has maintained a middle class character, although, as revealed from sub-sample interviews in Chapter 6, there has been a certain outward flow of relatively elite sections of the community into the foothills of the Blue Mountains and an inflow of an upwardly mobile younger generation.

4.2.3.2 Grading the communities

An analysis of a residential location stratification exercise carried out by Knight and Davies underlines the impact of these residential flows on the contemporary socioeconomic make-up of the city, and provides the basis for the socioeconomic disaggregation of the KMA adopted by this study. Their analysis was based on the 1970 population census, and updates Clarke's mapping of the spatial distribution of social, economic and cultural groups in 1960.

Knight and Davies argue that there are a number of factors which combine to create urban residential land patterns, notably policy interventions (designed, for example to zone residential densities) and the operation of the housing sector "operating in conjunction with the socioeconomic system" (415). Their study is therefore based on the hypothesis that there is a close correlation between the socioeconomic characteristics of the population and the 'grades' of the RAs in which they live. They evaluate and stratify residential 'cells' by age and size of dwelling units and by the market value of their sites, and then match these stratified RAs against the socioeconomic status of residents, indicated by their occupational groups and educational levels at the time of the 1970 census. This line of enquiry does indeed unearth a close relationship between the gradations of residential area and socioeconomic status, and suggests a circular relationship

between spatial and social strata:

Not only does the socioeconomic structure have a profound effect on the spatial pattern, but the pattern itself reinforces the differentiation between social classes, thus providing a cycle of deprivation of lower-income residents.


(1978: 423)

Given this process of mutual definition between the social and the spatial, we are left with an almost tautological relationship between the residential value of an urban area and the agglomerated socioeconomic status of its inhabitants. Consequently, in the present study I have chosen to collapse the two relatively interchangeable categories in my definition of the field areas, but in the knowledge that the sample populations will be disaggregated in the analysis that follows.

The land valuations used by Knight and Davies are those undertaken approximately every ten years by the Land Valuation Office. This evaluation of individual lots is based on an assessment of such characteristics as elevation, access to amenities and infrastructural provision. To this indicator is added weighted values based on the age and size of each housing unit (the latter derived from the mean number of rooms per unit).

The resulting choropleth map, showing the spatial distribution of residential strata throughout the KMA, is reproduced in **Figure 4.1**. As indicated on the map, Franklyn Town falls amongst the lowest scoring cells on the residential hierarchy, while Drumblair lies in the second highest cell grouping. An examination of trends in land values over the twenty years since the figures were published upon which Knight and Davies' study is based was conducted for this study. While we are unable to 'score' the respective communities using Knight and Davies' system because of the level of inflation in the intervening period, the figures do indicate a clear trend of polarisation in land prices between these two residential areas.

Figure 4.1 Kingston Metropolitan Area, Residential Strata, 1978



Source: Knight and Davies (1978: 417)

Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show that between 1974 and 1983, and again between 1983 and 1993 lot value appreciation in Drumblair far outstripped that of Franklyn Town. While the increases in Franklyn Town remain dramatic, particularly in the second period, it must be remembered that these proportional increases were from a smaller original price anyway, and that all increases in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties occurred during a period of accelerated devaluation of the Jamaican dollar.

In the absence of disaggregated data on income levels, Knight and Davies relied on two other commonly used surrogates to analyse socioeconomic stratification of the KMA: educational attainment and occupational classification. They construct an index of occupational status for the labour force and employ as a measure of educational attainment the percentage of male adults over 17 years whose maximum attainment is at the primary level. Finding a close relationship between position on the residential scale and gradations in the two indices of socioeconomic status they conclude "that the distribution of residential resources...is mirrored by location patterns of the socioeconomic classes" (1978: 419).

Given this interdependency between the two socioeconomic variables and the composite 'housing quality' variable, and recognising that income levels "by means of the property market delineate the choices in residential areas open to various groups" (1978: 422), they categorise the four grades of residential area shown in Figure 4.1 by income level as follows: 'very low income' areas (cells scoring 4-7), 'low to lower-middle income' areas (cells scoring 8-11), 'upper middle income' areas (cells scoring 12-15) and 'high income' areas (cells scoring 16-18). Within this grading scheme, Franklyn Town falls amongst 'very low income' areas and Drumblair amongst 'upper middle income' areas.

Table 4.2 Land values of selected lots, Franklyn Town, 1974-1993

ED (1991)	Size (ft ²)	Value 1974 (J\$)	Value 1983 (J\$)	Value 1993 (J\$)	Increase 1974-1983 (%)	Increase 1983-1993 (%)
C90	7,423	5,000	7,500	60,000	50.0	700.0
C89	15,500	7,000	10,000	70,000	42.9	600.0
C91	17,050	8,000	11,000	70,000	37.5	536.4
C94	22,500	10,000	16,000	70,000	60.0	337.5
C93	18,493	12,000	15,000	70,000	25.0	366.7
C92	5,993	7,000	8,000	50,000	14.3	525.0
C95	5,758	6,500	8,000	50,000	23.1	525.0
C82	2,401	3,500	5,000	50,000	42.9	900.0
C88	3,025	3,000	5,000	50,000	66.7	900.0
C81	6,391	10,000	16,000	60,000	60.0	275.0
C83	3,325	3,500	5,000	50,000	42.9	900.0
C87	1,700	2,500	5,000	30,000	100.0	500.0
C96	5,035	3,000	5,000	40,000	66.7	700.0
C86	1,575	3,000	5,000	30,000	66.7	500.0

Source: Land Valuation Office, Kingston

Table 4.3 Land values of selected lots, Drumblair, 1974-1993

ED (1991)	Size (ft ²)	Value 1974 (J\$)	Value 1983 (J\$)	Value 1993 (J\$)	Increase 1974-1983 (%)	Increase 1983-1993 (%)
NE54	11,954	12,000	40,000	500,000	233.3	1150.0
NE53	20,038	16,500	50,000	600,000	203.0	1100.0
NE49	20,707	16,000	50,000	550,000	275.0	1000.0
NC9	10,500	11,000	40,000	500,000	263.6	1150.0
NC11	1,136		20,000	250,000		1150.0
NC10	6,588		30,000	400,000		1233.3
NE31	5,000		9,000	120,000		1233.3

NB Gaps left where valuation pre-dates property construction

Source: Land Valuation Office, Kingston

Turning to the 1982 Population Census data on occupations and educational attainment, the lack of a precise explanation of the grading system prevents us from directly comparing the status of the two communities over time. We do know, however, that Knight and Davies adopt an occupational ranking system which weights occupational groups thus:

<u>Occupational Groups</u>	<u>Weights</u>
Professional, administrative and managerial	5
Sales	4
Clerical and related	3
Service workers	2
Transport, communication, production and labourers not elsewhere classified	1

On this basis we are able to establish that a gap in the socioeconomic levels of the two populations is still evident by 1982. The disaggregation of the working population by occupational category in Table 4.4 indicates the relatively high proportion of Drumblair workers in white collar professions, and similarly the higher incidence of service and production activity amongst Franklyn Town's workers.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Note that occupational data made available from the 1982 Census does not aggregate clerical and sales activity into a single category. The implication that the two groups are compatible in socioeconomic terms is misleading given the marginal nature of much sales activity in the urban Third World. For the same reason the heavier weighting that is ascribed sales activity by Knight and Davies (1978) is also considered misleading. On this basis all of the subsequent interpretation carried out on the 1992 sample surveys treats sales and clerical activity separately, as well as disaggregating these two categories to get a better idea of the nature of activities.

Table 4.4 Occupational status of adult working population by gender, Franklyn Town and Drumblair, 1982

	Franklyn Town			Drumblair		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Prof/Tech	6.2	10.0	8.0	26.1	22.7	24.2
Manager/Admin	1.4	1.6	1.5	12.9	7.1	9.7
Clerical, sales etc	15.5	29.9	22.2	15.8	39.7	29.0
Service workers	14.2	37.8	25.2	9.1	24.1	17.4
Agri/forest/fish	0.9	0.0	0.5	5.9	1.3	3.4
Prod & transport	47.3	16.1	32.7	30.2	5.1	16.3
Unskilled manual & general	14.5	4.6	9.9	8.9	1.3	4.7
Total (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total (No.)	698	609	1,307	418	519	937

NB Excludes 'not stated' category

Source: Population Census of Jamaica, 1982 (Statistical Institute of Jamaica)

Knight and Davies argue also that as unemployment in the KMA relates to a large percentage of the labour force, the unemployed should be included in this index, and give them a weighting of 0. From the data made available in the 1982 Census we can establish that the proportion of the adult population (as opposed to the economically active population) working was far higher in Drumblair (55.7 per cent) than it was in Franklyn Town (38.5 per cent).


We also know that Knight and Davies establish a gradation of educational attainment on the basis of the proportion of the working population (represented by male adults over 17 years) whose maximum attainment is at primary level only. When analysing the educational attainment of the population of the cluster of RAs in which Franklyn Town is included, they find that 83 per cent of male adults reach primary level only. In the RA cluster which includes Drumblair, however, the proportion of adult males at primary level only drops to 42 per cent.

By the time of the 1982 census, not only had there been a radical improvement in the educational attainment of the two populations, but the gap between the two areas had narrowed dramatically. The proportion of post-school men in Drumblair who had attained primary level education now only stood at 25 per cent, and in Franklyn Town at 28 per cent. The difference between the educational attainment of the two populations was now seen, however, in the proportion of adults that had reached CXC or 'O' levels and beyond. In Drumblair this had been achieved by 44 per cent of post-school men, and in Franklyn Town by only 26 per cent. Hence while overall educational standards amongst the urban population had improved dramatically during the 'seventies, the gap in educational attainment between the residential areas remained significant further along the educational system.

Having indexed the socioeconomic status of the urban population, Knight and Davies then site these gradations within the dynamic of the city's growth as a physical form by creating spatially distinct residential zones (see Figure 4.2). Franklyn Town is grouped with surrounding Special Areas to form the 'central downtown area' (Community A), which in turn is part of a defined band of communities collectively termed the 'downtown/waterfront district' (Communities A to F), and containing the lowest residential stratum established by the socioeconomic indicators. Hence the 'downtown/waterfront district' is characterised by:

- 1) obsolescent housing of tenements, shanty dwellings and the majority of post-second world war low-income government housing schemes;
- 2) 80-90 per cent of the population with educational levels corresponding to primary level or below;
- 3) unemployment rates of between 17 and 42 per cent; and
- 4) 70 per cent of the employed labour force in the worker/labour category.

Figure 4.2 Kingston Metropolitan Area, Community typology, 1978



Source: Knight and Davies (1978: 420)

Within this district the residents of the 'central downtown area', amongst whom are the Franklyn Town residents, "rank among the highest" in terms of socioeconomic indicators, equivalent to the residents of Community C and second only to Community B (Communities B and C comprising the eastern waterfront area). It contains the largest proportion of tenement accommodation in the district so that, while infrastructural features such as piped water and sewers are in place, "overcrowding is excessive" (1978: 423). In the area to the west of central downtown in the downtown/waterfront district (Community D) squatter levels and population densities are higher and occupational status and educational attainment far worse than those of residents of the central downtown community. Further west still is Riverton City (Community E), whose ranking on the socioeconomic indicators places it at the extreme of the district as a whole. Of male adults, 42 per cent were unemployed, and in the context of an extremely youthful population contributing to a situation where three-quarters of the residents are economically dependent. Only 2 per cent of adults had attended school beyond primary level and the workforce contained the largest proportion of marginal informal sector activity in the district.

Drumblair is grouped by Knight and Davies into Community O and classified as a 'sub-urban/housing scheme' community. These communities are typically middle income housing schemes, and therefore each scheme tends to attract residents from a particular section of urban society, making them both internally homogenous and mutually distinct. Hence there is a range of socioeconomic identities associated with each scheme, from the clustering of Government and University professionals in Community M to the salaried white-collar sales and service workers in Community P. As well as occupational variations there is also a great variation in the quality and type of housing units and of income levels between schemes.

4.2.3.3 Selection rationale

The decision to select **Franklyn Town** and **Drumblair** as the two populations for study arose from a number of conceptual and practical considerations. In the first instance, the areas selected are census-defined 'Special Areas', making it possible to organise a rigorous sampling procedure and to analyse longitudinal trends.

Franklyn Town is an established working class community in a the downtown /waterfront belt and is described as 'very low income' by Knight and Davies. My decision to conduct interviews in this area, as opposed to elsewhere in the district, was based initially on a concern for personal safety.⁵⁶ The choice of this particular area - representative of a working class community in terms of the socioeconomic indicators described above, but not the most marginalised of the areas that it represents - holds, however, particular advantages in terms of the conceptual rationale of the study. It is suggested here that 'choices' can only be made on the strength of effective demand, and that amongst the lowest income groups, the extent of their marginalisation reduces choice to a minimum. As such it was felt that if opportunities for mobility were to present themselves it would be more likely that this community would be secure enough to take certain risks or adopt strategies that a less asset-worthy community would be unable to respond to. Similarly, if there is discovered to be a structural trend that erodes the ability of individuals to make strategic decisions, then the resultant 'downward' shift of increasing vulnerability would be more evident in a community that is not already the most marginalised in society.

Balanced against this context of potential opportunities for mobility is the need

⁵⁶ After discussion with far more knowledgeable individuals, it was suggested that I would be well advised not to conduct such a prolonged piece of research in the East of the Downtown/Waterfront area. For the same reason I decided not to live in the community while conducting the research, choosing instead to travel to the area every day. I am in no doubt that if I had lived in the area this would have enriched the qualitative element of the study, but at the same time feel that I spent long enough getting to know people outside the confines of the questionnaires and interviews so as to be able to bring a comparable depth of perception to the research.

to make confident statements about trends over time. Critical to the process of establishing longitudinal trends within a given community, rather than for a given population, is that the community be sufficiently stable for conclusions based on temporal comparisons - specifically between 1982 and 1992 - to be made with confidence. If a community is characterised by a high residential turnover then it quickly becomes unclear whether it is the nature of opportunities that are changing or the population itself. Franklyn Town, as described in Section 4.2.3.1, has not historically been an area of high population flux from where newly arrived rural-urban migrants move on. Its selection for study was based on the hypothesis that this is a relatively consolidated community, experiencing a certain residential throughflow, but constrained to a great extent by the prohibitive operation of the housing market.

This hypothesis was proved correct by analysis of the residential histories of surveyed heads of household. This revealed that 66 per cent of household heads had lived in Franklyn Town for more than ten years, the vast majority of whom (97 per cent) stayed in Franklyn Town once moved there rather than moving out of the area and returning at a later date. Indeed, some 55 per cent household heads had lived in the same dwelling in Franklyn Town for over ten years.

Drumblair is very representative of the upper middle income urban population that makes up the majority of Kingston's middle class. It was decided not to select a 'high income' area on the strength of the hypothesis that the richest section of an adjusting society is better protected against the impacts of macro-economic 'shocks' by their ability to access foreign exchange and the accompanying tendency towards an 'international' lifestyle. The salaried middle class, however, are more likely to be profoundly affected by the policies of adjustment. It is for this reason more likely to experience a certain amount of population throughflow, with new entrants being more numerous and visible in this section of the population. At the same time it was felt that different sections of the middle class would be affected in different ways, and therefore that it

would be preferable to select a middle class community heterogeneous in its socioeconomic make-up. As Drumblair's Community O is regarded as one of the least internally homogenous of the 'sub-urban/housing scheme' type, having been developed over a longer period of time and including as it does non-scheme units, it appeared to be an appropriate selection.

It was also important, as with Franklyn Town, to show that Drumblair is essentially a stable and consolidated community, so that conclusions about the impact of external events over time can be made with some confidence. Of the heads of household interviewed, 52 per cent had lived in Drumblair for over ten years. While this implies a population in a greater state of flux than that of Franklyn Town, it is important to note that when the household heads who have lived in the area for less than ten years are disaggregated, 40 per cent of this group had moved to Drumblair from an 'upper middle income' or 'high income' area (cells scoring 12-15 and 16-18 respectively in Figure 4.1), leading to the conclusion that a large majority of the Drumblair population has consistently remained in a specified socioeconomic group over a ten year period, if not in the community itself. This consistency could be further strengthened if we assume that at least a minority of the heads of household who arrived in Drumblair from outside the KMA (representing a quarter of the population that has lived in Drumblair for less than ten years) had previously lived in a middle income household or residential area elsewhere in Jamaica.

4.3 The Sampling Procedure

4.3.1 The Sampling Unit

In order to avoid bias in the sampling procedure I chose as uniform sampling unit the household, defined for compatibility as laid down in the population census of Jamaica.

There is much controversy surrounding a definition for the 'household' as the unit

of enumeration. The United Nations defines the 'housing unit' as a structurally separate and independent place of abode, and the 'private household' as a group of persons who combine to occupy the whole or part of a housing unit and provide themselves with food and other essentials for living. According to this definition it is possible for an occupied housing unit to contain more than one household (for example a lodger occupying a separate room or rooms) or for a household to occupy more than one housing unit, where persons in separate units share meals.

The definition recommended by the Inter-American Statistical Unit in 1959 combines the concept of the housing unit with that of the household. Hence the private household is made up of all the occupants of a housing unit, whether relatives, lodgers or live-in domestic helpers, so that each housing unit contains only one household.

For the purposes of this survey a definition is being adopted consistent with that given by the 1982 Population Census and based upon the U.N. definition:

A household may consist of one person who lives alone or a group of persons who, as a unit, jointly occupies the whole or part of a dwelling unit, who have common arrangements for housekeeping and who generally share at least one meal. The household may be composed of related persons only, of unrelated persons or of a combination of both persons.

The choice of the household as the sampling unit in the surveys is in acceptance of its significance as a collective unit of productive and reproductive activity which has a direct bearing on the life chances of the individuals that make it up. This does not reflect, however, an adherence to the neo-classical perception of the household as a consensus-based 'joint welfare function', but is instead a recognition of the process of 'cooperative conflict' (Sen, 1984)⁵⁷ that defines the

⁵⁷ Sen (1984) introduces the concept of the household as a site of 'cooperative conflict'. This is a bargaining model in which the household is a site of a bargaining process "between parties whose bargaining power depends on their position as individuals within the larger economy. Cooperation will take place - the household persists - as long as, on balance, it is in the interests of its members. Where there is a conflict of interests, decision-making outcomes will reflect the

tensions within the household. Indeed, the survey actively seeks to look beyond the aggregated household level in its analysis of differential impacts of the adjustment process on individuals. But if we are to accept that the household as an entity perpetuates, for example, the ideological and material subordination of women, then we must look all the more closely at its functioning in order to assess the likely impacts of external change on the strategic needs of individuals within it:

Viewing the household as a convenient conduit for data collection rather than as a conceptual construct runs the danger of leaving important questions unasked and therefore unanswered.

(Kabeer and Joekes, 1991: 2)

4.3.2 The Sample Selection

The sample population is derived from the 'Special Areas' selected to be the sampling frames for each survey. These Special Areas were delineated by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica, used in the 1982 Census of Population, and revised slightly in the 1991 census.⁵⁸ In order to reduce the possible influence of spatial bias in the sampling procedure (as it has already had to be assumed that the Special Area itself has a general socioeconomic identity that merits its selection as a population for sampling) the Special Areas, namely Franklyn Town and Drumblair, were then stratified by their constituent enumeration districts (EDs), each of which contains on (approximate) average 100 households. The sample population (of households) was weighted amongst each ED according to the size of its population (see Tables 4.5 and 4.6).⁵⁹ It should be noted that because at the time of the field study no household data were available disaggregated to the level of Special Areas, the 10 per cent sample had to be based on the population

differential bargaining power of household members" (Kabeer and Joekes, 1991: 2).

⁵⁸ At the time of collecting the secondary data the only available results of the 1991 census were in the shape of a 'Preliminary Report', published by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica and providing aggregated demographic trends only.

⁵⁹ Note that, having decided on the household as the sampling unit, the use of the term 'population' refers to the number of households rather than the number of individuals.

figures given in the 1982 census. I did not have the time nor the money to employ field assistants, which would have been required to conduct an updating census of household numbers in the Special Areas.

A compromise between random and systematic methods was then adopted for the sampling of the stratified population in order to bypass the need for detailed mapping of each household⁶⁰ while keeping bias to a minimum. Having decided on a 10 per cent sample of all households in the two Special Areas, each ED was allocated a randomly selected digit (n). I then selected every n th household as I walked systematically round each district. This procedure involved establishing the number of households in each 'yard' as I went, and where the household to be selected fell amongst this group, randomly selecting a household from amongst them.

⁶⁰ While maps of all 1982 EDs were available, showing individual housing unit, this is not particularly useful in the case of Franklyn Town because the majority of units are shared by several tenant households and there are several less permanent dwellings which are not mapped. In Drumblair a similar problem exists where apartment blocks house several individual flats, or where housing postdates the existing maps.

Table 4.5 Distribution of sampled households amongst Enumeration Districts, Franklyn Town, 1992

Enumeration District (1991)	Number of Households (1982)	Number of households sampled	Number of 'no returns'
C81	110	11	1
C89	152	15	1
C83	136	14	2
C82	88	9	1
C86	100	10	1
C93	164	16	1
C94	101	10	0
C87	134	13	0
C88	85	8	0
C90	109	11	1
C91	156	16	2
C92	87	9	0
C95	101	10	0
C96	78	8	0
TOTAL	1601	160	10

Table 4.6 Distribution of sampled households amongst Enumeration Districts, Drumblair, 1992

Enumeration District (1991)	Number of Households (1982)	Number of households sampled	Number of 'no returns'
NE54	61	6	0
NC9	114	11	0
NC10	105	11	0
NC11	130	13	0
NE53	78	8	0
NE49	250	12	0
NE31		13	0
TOTAL	738	74	0

NB The EDs NE49 and NE31 were produced by a subdivision of a 1982 ED. The resulting sample weighting is based on the assumption that there are an equal number of households in both EDs.

The disaggregation of Franklyn Town into its constituent EDs reveals a community that is relatively internally homogenous in terms of its socioeconomic characteristics.

The clearly delineated socioeconomic identities lent residential areas by the segregating effect of land price variations can be distorted, however, by the presence of isolated clusters of low income dwellings adjacent to storm-water gully courses in the northern suburbs. The presence of just such a socioeconomic 'outlier' is apparent from a disaggregated examination of the area of Drumblair by its component Enumeration Districts. Hence one ED - NE31 - is characterised by a population whose socioeconomic make-up is significantly different from the rest of the Special Area.

An examination of NE31 with respect to nature of educational attainment, occupational status and nature of tenure of its residents confirms that there is a marked difference in these indicators when compared with the rest of Drumblair. While some 37 per cent of all Drumblair adults completed secondary level education, this level of educational attainment was achieved by only 9 per cent of NE31 adults. Similarly, while over 60 per cent of working adults in Drumblair are employed in professional, administrative or clerical positions, these professional categories account for only 20 per cent of NE31's working population. Finally, almost two thirds of Drumblair households own their property, in contrast to NE31 where private owners represent only half the population.

This distinction in socioeconomic indicators between ED NE31 and the rest of the Special Area is sufficiently marked for it to be labelled an 'outlier'. As such it poses the threat of exerting a 'skewing' effect on the analysis of data from the sample survey. In the course of Chapter 5, therefore, I shall refer to the 'revised' population of Drumblair in instances where I have excluded this ED from data analysis.

4.3.3 The Questionnaire and Sub-Sample Interview

The questionnaire (see Appendix I) is clearly annotated as to which groups of individuals are to be asked which sets of questions, and breaks down as follows:

- 1) household level information (asked of household head) relates only to the physical characteristics of the housing unit and its amenities;
- 2) all household members were asked questions about their nationality, relationship to head of household, age, marital and parental status, sources of income and daily transport arrangements;
- 3) all household members over the age of 16 were asked questions relating to residential plans, residential mobility history, occupation (see Appendix II) and occupational mobility;
- 4) all female household members over the age of 16 were asked questions relating to the division of their time and their perceptions of their employment status; and
- 5) all household members attending school were asked questions relating to their education and welfare.

Although I designed the questionnaire before conducting the survey, I wanted to be sure that the question format and content were appropriate and comprehensive. I therefore treated the first 30 households of the Franklyn Town as a pilot survey. On the strength of this initial group I then included additional questions in the survey as a whole, which I also applied to the Drumblair survey so as to maintain a consistency. The questionnaire was tightly structured, with coded answers to allow for easy data analysis, ease of comparability between the two field areas and for compatibility where possible with longitudinal data sources. I made a point, however, of making notes of interesting points arising out of more open-ended question and answers that tended to occur during the course of the administration of the questionnaire. These notes were additionally important in selecting the sub-sample population.

Trends emerging from this analysis informed the choice of 'representative' individuals selected for interview in a round of follow-up, in-depth interviews carried out with this sub-sample population. It was decided to conduct a secondary in-depth sub-sample survey in order to gain greater insight into the experiences and strategies of 'key' respondents who were considered representative of individuals whose differing circumstances impacted upon their life chances and mobility opportunities. In this way the in-depth experiences and strategies of these selected individuals are not merely anecdotal appendages to the main body of research, but are considered representative of sub-groups within the population (Sollis and Moser, 1991).

These respondents were usually household heads, and were chosen because of such representative aspects as type of household structure, nature of asset ownership, household dependency ratio and type of income-earning activity. A brief summary of each selected respondent is presented in Appendix III.

The interviews were loosely structured but covered the themes introduced as sub-headings in Chapter 6, namely:

- 1) changing employment opportunities;
- 2) income accessing strategies and constraints on raising income;
- 3) nature of asset ownership of respondents and implications for mobility;
- 4) changing expenditure and access to the means of consumption, disaggregated by subsistence expenditure and expenditure for mobility;
- 5) perceptions of change in the local community; and
- 6) aspirations to mobility through international migration.

4.4 Review Critique of Field Methodology

This section contains a brief review of the advantages and disadvantages of the field methodology adopted for the study, and includes suggestions as to how the process and content of the field research might be changed in order to enhance the status of the study.

I was unable to delegate any part of this research process, mainly for financial reasons. In retrospect, however, I consider that the experience of administering all the questionnaires myself to have been critical to my gaining a sense of the issues that would inform the secondary qualitative interviews. The other big advantage of being the sole interviewer is that it becomes possible to ask the same question in different ways in order to ensure a certain consistency in the way that questions are (eventually) interpreted by respondents (Croll, 1984).

My status as a white foreigner enabled me to gain entry to both communities and to most households without the suspicion and/or unhelpfulness with which a middle class Jamaican researcher may have been met. Certainly in Franklyn Town my status as 'neutral' outsider seemed to reduce the hostility that may have accompanied suspicion of some 'political' agenda on my part. I also experienced few problems with language in Franklyn Town, where respondents were patient and helpful enough to repeat phrases or slow down if they realised that I was in difficulties. It is recognised that the way in which the respondent perceives the interviewer to some extent influences the content and emphasis of responses, it is argued that no interviewer can establish a 'perception free' relationship with a respondent. Once this is recognised, the situation of being the sole interviewer at least produces a consistent 'bias' of interpretation, allowing the critical reader to decide the nature and extent of that bias.

It was decided at an early stage not to ask respondents to quantify their income

levels and consumption expenditure in the preliminary questionnaires. The decision not to quantify income levels was based on scepticism about the accuracy of such studies, given the conscious and unconscious inaccuracies in the responses of interviewees (see for example Witter, 1987). In a community where a large proportion of the workforce is either outside the formal sector or working on a casual or temporary basis in formal sector occupations, there is already a problem associated with accuracy of income data. On top of this there may be a conscious decision on the part of the respondent to mislead the interviewer. Although some income levels were divulged by sub-sample respondents, I believe in retrospect that some attempt to quantify different income sources in the questionnaire survey would have allowed a greater insight into the 'adequacy' (in terms of earnings) of different types of employment and income earning opportunities. This in turn would have added weight to conclusions made about the implications of external trends for the vulnerability and mobility of different individuals.

The decision to base the study on longitudinal trends within communities rather than within sectors or sub-sections of the workforce was justified on the grounds that it allows a deeper insight into the combination of factors that influence an individual's ability to respond to changing events inside and outside the household. Confidence in statements made about change within communities was strengthened by the ability to establish that both residential areas were characterised by a largely stable population over the ten year study period, but also by a small but significant population throughflow. While I believe that this proved a successful approach, analysis of external trends could have been enriched by interviews with key informants from different sections of the urban employment base - such as manufacturing and service sector employers - as well as with actors in government. The insights gained from interviews with representatives from HEART (Human and Employment Resources Training) and with a former employee of the Bank of Jamaica underline the value of adopting this approach more extensively as a compliment to the community studies.

4.5 Summary

It could be said that Jamaica has been a sort of 'guinea pig' for the trial of structural adjustment policies by the international donor community. Even if this were not the case, it is as an erstwhile follower of import substitution industrialisation (ISI) a typical target for supply-side adjustment advocates. Its suitability for outward looking growth seems assured by its external relations: a very open economy which remains highly dependent on imports, while at the same time lacking a sustainable internal market. The long and well-documented association of the country with adjustment proponents has produced a post-'social democracy' script of neoclassical development, punctuated by the adoption of measures for stabilisation and adjustment, and make it particularly suitable as a study of an economy in transition.

It is an urbanising economy, with the rural to urban shift of its peasant population accentuated by its legacy of plantation slavery and maldistribution of productive land (Austin, 1994). Its urban population is heterogeneous if skewed in its socioeconomic make-up, as the post-independence transition allowed for the expansion and establishment of a minority middle class, and largely light skinned 'labour aristocracy'. The majority of the urban population have benefitted from universal primary education and the social welfare aspects of the delivery of health and other services. Yet it is an urban population which has been continually characterised by high levels of unemployment, with critics blaming this on ISI with its capital-intensive production techniques and a reluctance to develop according to the country's comparative advantages. The onset of structural adjustment, and the shift to export-led industrialisation according to neoclassical principles of comparative advantage therefore presents an opportunity to test for the implications of such a restructuring for the structure of opportunity of its urban population.

That adjustment has had differential impacts on different social groups is well

established, and there is a particular focus among many research projects on the 'new poor' amongst the middle classes. This study aims to look at mobility across the socioeconomic spectrum, and further at differing levels of vulnerability, security and mobility within defined socioeconomic groups. It was therefore decided to choose a 'working class' community within which there would be the possibility for some asset strengthening or ownership, and thus some opportunity for strategies to be adopted beyond the subsistence level of survival. Similarly, a 'middle class' area which was heterogeneous in its occupational make-up was chosen in order to analyse the differing impact of external shocks and trends on specific groups of individuals. In the following two chapters we turn to the sample surveys conducted in these two areas and identify micro-level trends for different urban groups under structural adjustment.

CHAPTER 5

EMPLOYMENT, CONSUMPTION AND MOBILITY: INTER AND INTRA-HOUSEHOLD TRENDS EMERGING FROM THE PRELIMINARY SURVEY

5.1 Introduction

The survey work conducted for this study examines the implications for its population of the restructuring of an urban economy in the context of macroeconomic change. The philosophical shift from demand-fuelled Keynesian economic growth to a supply-side neoclassical paradigm has served to underline the primacy of labour relations and the extraction of surplus labour value in peripheral urbanisation, through its emphasis on the laws of comparative advantage (Chapter 2). The export-oriented and free-market principles attached to the programme of 'structural adjustment' envisages internally sustainable economic growth based on the attraction of globalising international capital to low-wage economies characterised by a flexible and efficient labour force.

The mobility of the individual is achievable through the improvement of their human resource value, or 'market capacity' (Chapter 3). The level of improvement achievable is influenced by the limits to effective demand placed upon the individual by external shocks and trends under macroeconomic adjustment (Chapter 1). Labour market restructuring and the combined effect of real wage devaluation, price inflation and public sector retrenchment on living standards have jointly impacted upon the "reorganisation of social classes" (Anderson and Witter, 1991: 80) by presenting the urban population with opportunities for, and constraints upon, social and spatial mobility.

In this and the following Chapter, we will attempt to analyse how the different socioeconomic groups, defined in Chapter 4 and represented by the populations of Franklyn Town and Drumblair, have been affected by the restructuring of employment and consumption opportunities under the shocks and trends of macroeconomic adjustment. In concentrating on the siting of the individual within the labour market through asset ownership and its relationship with 'market capacity' and vulnerability, we will attempt to identify which groups of individuals are likely to be more or less mobile.

5.2 Employment Trends and Mobility

5.2.1 Employment trends in Franklyn Town

In this section we will examine the changing structure of the labour forces of both areas over the ten year period from 1982-1992. This examination takes place in the context of the intergenerational occupational mobility of the present workforce and future occupational change. It concentrates particularly on general trends in participation rates amongst the adult EAPs and disaggregates the labour force in order to establish the internal restructuring of each workforce in response to the external structure of opportunity.

5.2.1.1 Inter-generational mobility context, Franklyn Town

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 provide a picture of vertical occupational mobility for the male and female EAP⁶¹ still resident in Franklyn Town, and the picture is *one of stasis, with little evidence of a shift in occupation between generations on the Franklyn Town population.*

The breakdown does illustrate, however, *the occupational shift from small farming into urban semi-skilled occupations*, notably the service sector. Some 44 per cent of male service workers' fathers were/are farmers and 31 per cent of their mothers. Furthermore, the majority of mothers that are or were in sales sector activity are revealed to be agricultural higglers, *reflecting the gendered division of labour within the agricultural informal sector.*

Evidence of *(limited) mobility into the professional sector for individuals remaining in Franklyn Town* is provided by taking a look at their parent's occupations. A large minority (46 per cent) of male professionals have fathers who are/were in the productive sector, and the same proportion have mothers who are/have been in the clerical sector.

⁶¹ This covers only the (majority of the) EAP that declare an occupation in the survey.

Table 5.1 Working men by parents' occupational group, Franklyn Town, 1992

	Unskilled		Industry & Transport		Services		Sales		Clerical		Prof/Admin	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
FATHER												
Unskilled	1	20	7	11.3	2	5.6						
Ind/Trans	1	20	26	41.9	7	19.3	2	28.6	2	40.0	7	41.1
Agri/For	3	60	19	30.7	15	41.6	2	28.6			2	11.8
Service			5	8.0	4	11.2	1	14.2	2	40.0	4	23.5
Sales			1	1.6	1	2.8						
Clerical												
Prof/Admin					2	5.6					2	11.8
None					1	2.8						
Not Stated			4	6.5	4	11.1	2	28.6	1	20.0	2	11.8
MOTHER												
Unskilled			1	1.6	1	2.8					1	5.9
Ind/Trans			3	4.8	2	5.6	1	14.2				
Agri/For	2	40.0	9	14.5	11	30.5	2	28.6			1	5.9
Service	1	20.0	20	32.3	9	25.1	2	28.6	2	40.0	3	17.6
Sales	2	40.0	10	16.1	6	16.6	2	28.6			2	11.8
Clerical			4	6.5							4	23.5
Prof/Admin			4	6.5	1	2.8			2	40.0	4	23.5
None			9	14.5	6	16.6			1	20.0	2	11.8
Not stated			2	3.2								
TOTAL	5	100	62	100	36	100	7	100	5	100	17	100

Table 5.2 Working women by parents' occupational group, Franklyn Town, 1992

	Unskilled		Industry & Transport		Services		Sales		Clerical		Prof/Admin	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
FATHER												
Unskilled			2	8.3	3	7.3					2	20.0
Ind/Trans	1	25.0	8	33.3	4	9.8	4	21.0	14	60.9	2	20.0
Agri/For	1	25.0	7	29.2	21	51.2	8	42.1	3	13.0	2	20.0
Service	1	25.0	4	16.7	2	4.9	3	15.8	2	8.7	1	10.0
Sales					1	2.4			2	8.7	1	10.0
Clerical											1	10.0
Prof/Admin					2	4.9	1	5.3	2	8.7		
None												
Not Stated	1	25.0	3	12.5	8	19.5	3	15.8			1	10.0
MOTHER												
Unskilled	1	25.0			1	2.4			2	8.7		
Ind/Trans			9	37.5	1	2.4			3	13.0	2	20.0
Agri/For	1	25.0	4	16.7	16	39.1	7	36.8			2	20.0
Service	1	25.0	2	8.3	11	26.8	6	31.6	9	39.2	3	30.0
Sales			3	12.5	6	14.7	2	10.5	2	8.7		
Clerical												
Prof/Admin			1	4.2	1	2.4			2	8.7	1	10.0
None	1	25.0	3	12.5	4	9.8	3	15.8	5	21.7	2	20.0
Not stated			2	8.3	1	2.4	1	5.3				
TOTAL	4	100	24	100	41	100	19	100	23	100	10	100

In the productive sector, as in the unskilled labour sector, there is no inter-generational sectoral shift beyond that from rural small scale farming and higglering. The vast majority (over 80 per cent) of fathers of male workers are from the agricultural, productive and unskilled sectors, and about 30 per cent from the agricultural sector alone. A higher percentage of their mothers than fathers hail from sales sector, again reflecting the rural division of labour.

For the women working in the productive and unskilled sectors, while parents in the agricultural, productive and unskilled sectors predominate (61 per cent of

fathers and 47 per cent of mothers) the proportion of agricultural sector parents is less significant, and the proportion of service sector workers far more significant (amounting to about 25 per cent of both mothers and of fathers). This reflects the younger age group of female productive workers and thus that they are less likely to be first generation urban dwellers.

Respondents were asked if they had definite plans to change occupation, and if so whether these plans involved the need for further training or education. *Under 10 per cent of the male EAP stated an intention to change occupations (or to change jobs within an occupational category).* A third of this small group are moving into the professional category, the remainder being spread fairly evenly across the occupational categories. Almost 80 per cent of this potentially mobile group express an intention to return to training/education in order to achieve this occupational shift.

Of the female EAP, 13.5 per cent express the intention of changing occupation. These women are most likely to be moving into clerical and related activity, rather than into the professional and administrative sectors. *More men than women, in other words, are intending to shift into/within the professional sector.* As with the men, the majority of women (77 per cent) are intending to return to education or training. Perhaps most significant is *the lack of future mobility reflected in the small minority of occupational movers.*

5.2.1.2 Participation trends, Franklyn Town

The dramatic increases in the size of the working population in Franklyn Town mirrors, albeit in an exaggerated form, the trends in employment levels in the Jamaican labour market as a whole (see Table 5.3). Between 1977 and 1983 unemployment⁶² in Jamaica increased at an average of 8,500 (4 per cent of 1977

⁶² Note that the 'unemployed' in Jamaica are defined so as to include those adults who are not actively seeking employment, but have stated both the desire and the availability for work. This inclusion of 'non-seekers' tends to produce higher figures than that definition of unemployment which includes only those people who are actively seeking work.

level) annually. This dropped to 2,700 (1.5 per cent of 1983 level) annually between 1983 and 1985, before decreasing rapidly by 17,400 (11 per cent of 1985 level) annually between 1985 and 1989.

In this context of labour market fluctuation we can turn to the meso-level employment trends as they affect Franklyn Town between 1982 and 1992, then look more closely at household and intra-household implications and trends.

The increase in the percentage of adults working has been significant for both men and women: by 18 percentage points amongst both groups. But this translates into *a more dramatic increase in the female working population*, given their considerably lower active participation level in 1982 (a 58 per cent increase compared to a 37 per cent increase for men).

Table 5.3 Unemployment rate (%) by gender, Jamaica, 1977, 1985 and 1989; Franklyn Town, 1992; and Drumblair, 1992

Unemployment Rate	1977 Jamaica	1985 Jamaica	1989 Jamaica	1992 Franklyn Town	1992 Drumblair
Male	15.2	15.7	10.9	22.0	8.3
Female	34.7	36.0	26.1	42.0	27.7
Total	24.2	25.0	18.0	33.0	20.4

Source: Labour Force Surveys 1977, 1985 and 1989 (Statistical Institute of Jamaica); Sample surveys, 1992 (author)

The active participation rate remains, however, much higher for men than for women (see Table 5.4). Some 78 per cent of the male labour force⁶³ are economically active in the 1992 survey, compared with 58 per cent of economically-active adult women. Yet because of the existence of a larger female EAP, there is a nearly even gender balance in the working population; 52 per cent of working individuals are male and 48 per cent female.

⁶³ The adult labour force, or economically active population (EAP) is here defined as including all adults working, actively seeking work or desiring to (and available for) work.

Table 5.4 Employment Status of adult population (%), Franklyn Town, 1982 and 1992, and of economically active population (EAP), Franklyn Town, 1992

	1982 (Adult pop)			1992 (Adult pop)			1992 (EAP)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Working	49.0	31.0	38.5	67.0	49.0	57.0	78.0	58.0	67.0
Not working	51.0	69.0	61.5	33.0	51.0	43.0	22.0	42.0	33.0
TOTAL (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (No.)	1,480	2,016	3,497	198	247	445	171	208	379

5.2.1.3 Occupational trends, Franklyn Town

The 1992 sample survey enables an exploration of the changing nature of employment opportunities open to different socioeconomic groups. We are also able to take a longitudinal look at occupational change in the survey area by comparing this survey with employed labour force statistics for that area from the 1982 census.

Of particular significance to occupational trends in Franklyn Town is *the expansion of informal sector activity* observed at the national level (see Table 5.5). Between 1977 and 1989 the informal sector in Jamaica expanded by 60 per cent to employ over 200,000 people, almost a quarter of the entire workforce. This expansion was far more dramatic in rural areas, where employment fall-out from the waged agricultural sector led to an increase in informal activity of over 80 per cent during this period. In the KMA urban labour market, however, informal sector expansion was still significant; *the proportion of KMA urban workers in informal activity increased by 20 per cent between 1977 and 1989*, well over the total urban labour market expansion of 7 per cent (Witter and Anderson, 1991).

Table 5.5 Distribution of Urban Employment by Labour Market Sector, KMA 1977, 1985 and 1989; Franklyn Town, 1992; and Drumblair, 1992

	1977 (KMA)	1985 (KMA)	1989 (KMA)	1992 (Franklyn Town)	1992 (Drumblair)
Govt/Soc. Services	25.8	20.0	15.8	22.0	66.7
Primary Sector	10.9	9.7	11.9		
Secondary Sector	35.1	38.1	43.9	43.0	20.4
Informal Sector	22.3	27.5	25.0	34.6	12.2
Agriculture	5.9	4.7	3.4	0.4	0.7
Total (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total (No.)	223,900	467,300	239,600	254	152

Source: Anderson and Witter (1991); Sample Surveys (author)

In Franklyn Town, over the ten year period 1982 to 1992, this trend is reflected in the *heavy fall-out of male employment from formal sector 'Production and Related' activity* (see Table 5.6). The proportion of men working in this sector fell by 25 per cent - from 62 per cent to 46.5 per cent of the male working population. Significantly, the largest group of male productive sector workers are *now largely informal sector artisans*. Traditional strength of representation in formal sector industrial occupations has been eroded, with resultant narrowing of employment opportunities in industry and transport.

At the same time, there has been a *marked shift of male workers into largely formal service sector activity*, their representation in services increasing by almost 90 per cent (from 14 per cent to 26.5 per cent) over the ten-year period. This mirrors the national level expansion of the service sector from 13.8 per cent in 1977 to almost 20 per cent in 1989 (Witter and Anderson, 1991). It appears that the increasing opportunities for men in this sector have been in security and other protective occupations, which account for almost two thirds of all male service sector activity.

Table 5.6 Occupational categories of adult workforce (percentage), Franklyn Town, 1982 and 1992

	1982 (%)			1992 (%)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
PROFESSIONAL	6.0	10.0	8.0	10.5	6.0	8.0
Technicians/scientists				3.5	0.0	2.0
Teachers				0.0	1.0	0.5
Accountants				3.0	1.0	2.0
Nurses				1.0	2.5	1.5
Other				3.0	1.5	2.0
ADMN/EXEC/MANAGERIAL	1.5	1.5	1.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
Directors/managers				0.0	0.0	0.0
Supervisors				2.5	2.5	2.5
CLERICAL & SALES	15.5	30.0	22.0	13.5	35.5	24.0
Clerical				6.5	16.5	11.0
Company sales				0.5	0.0	0.5
Sales assistants				0.0	5.5	2.5
Small shop owners/assistants				1.5	2.5	2.0
Yard petty sales				2.5	6.5	4.5
Walking street higglers				1.5	0.0	0.5
Market site higglers				1.5	3.5	2.5
ICIs				0.0	1.0	0.5
SERVICES	14.0	38.0	25.0	26.5	34.5	30.5
Personal domestic & laundry/ironing				0.0	13.0	6.5
Office cleaning etc				0.0	10.5	5.0
Food preparation and service				4.5	2.5	3.5
Cosmetology etc.				0.0	5.0	2.5
Protective services				16.0	3.5	9.5
Transport operatives				6.0	0.0	3.0
AGRI & FORESTRY	1.0	0.0	0.5	1.0	0.0	0.5
Farmers & farm labourers				0.0	0.0	0.0
Fisherpeople				1.0	0.0	0.5
INDUSTRY & TRANSPORT	62.0	20.5	42.5	46.5	21.5	34.5
Operatives				10.5	13.0	12.0
Artisans				25.5	8.5	17.5
Construction				5.0	0.0	2.5
Drivers				1.5	0.0	0.5
Unskilled manual	14.5	4.5	10.0	4.0	2.5	2.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	698*	609#	1,307	133	121	154

* Excludes 26 N/S

Excludes 17 N/S

In contrast, trends in female service sector employment reflect *a contraction of opportunity amongst female service workers relative to other sectors*. The overall dramatic increase in female participation discussed above implies that there has been an absolute increase in female service sector activity, but that this has been outpaced by other segments of the labour market, notably sales and manufacturing activity. This loss of 'labour market share' is indicative of a shrinking disposable income over and above basic necessity expenditure. On the one hand this is manifested in a ceiling on middle class demand for domestic workers, reflecting the downward pressure on purchasing power amongst the middle class under public sector cuts and real income decline. On the other hand it points to the relatively low saturation point of the informal sector in areas such as cosmetics, laundering and other small scale services, where sustainability is dependent on continued demand within low income communities themselves, and where impacts of macro-economic change on purchasing power have been most severe. These issues will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 7.

The *expansion of the Jamaican manufacturing sector* over the same period⁶⁴ reflects *a significant realignment by gender of the composition of this sector*. Manufacturing expansion has been characterised by the increased representation of women through the growth of the garment industry in Kingston's 'Free Zone'. In Franklyn Town, the 'labour market share' of women employed in 'Production and Related' activity has increased only marginally between 1982 and 1992. However, given the overall increase in the proportion of working women during this period involved in formal sector operative work and informal sector artisanal subcontractual operative work within the female productive sector, it is *evident that there has been an absolute increase in female employment in manufacturing*. Female operatives are almost exclusively employed in garment production. Similarly, female artisans are predominantly homeworkers, sewing to order under

⁶⁴ Manufacturing's share of Jamaican employment increased from 10.9 per cent in 1977 to 12.2 per cent in 1983, and then to 15.4 per cent by 1989 (all figures from the Labour Force Surveys of 1977, 1983 and 1989, and cited in Witter and Anderson, 1991).

'putting out' employment conditions.

In confirmation of this gender realignment in the manufacturing sector there has been in Franklyn Town *a significant relative decline in male employment in the productive sector* between 1982 and 1992. Notably construction work accounts for only a small proportion of male productive work, reflecting the contraction of demand amongst domestic producers for investment in the built environment. Instead it is informal sector artisanal work which predominates, characterised by low capital intensity and dependent for its returns on the scale of demand amongst the local community.

The fallout of male workers from the productive sector *has not been accompanied by an increase in male representation in the sales sector, where female domination has in fact intensified*. The traditional prevalence of women in mercantilist higglering activity remains intact, but *the more capital intensive and entrepreneurial informal commercial importing now accounts for only 1 per cent of the entire female labour force*. Indeed, female sales activity is largely made up of non-capital intensive petty yard sales and small shop ownership. *The 'adequacy' of female sales activity as its importance increases is therefore called in to question*.

Female predominance in clerical activity also remains apparent, and serves as a reminder of labour market segmentation in this area. In contrast, *the overall fall in professional representation is entirely due to decreasing female percentages in that category*.

The working population has a *very youthful age structure*, reflecting the age distribution of the population as a whole (Table 5.7). The breakdown in Table 5.8 also shows a very similar age-distribution of the working population by gender: for both men and women most working (and most economically active) individuals are in the 20-24 and 25-29 year-old groups. Amongst women, there

is a significant drop-off in economic activity beyond the age of 45, and this drop-off is earlier still amongst men.

For both male and female occupational groups there is *a small minority of individuals involved in secondary occupations*. In both cases 90 per cent of the respondents state that they are not involved in secondary occupations. It is suggested here that high levels of overemployment, characterised by long working hours in low capital-intensive activity for poor remuneration levels, prevent many individuals from entering a secondary occupation. *The secondary occupation for many, in other words, is the extension of working hours in the same occupation.*

Table 5.7 Age-sex distribution of total population, Franklyn Town, 1982 and 1992

AGE	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	1982	1992	1982	1992	1982	1992
0-4	12.8	12.0	10.9	10.0	11.8	11.0
5-9	12.5	12.5	10.7	12.0	11.5	12.0
10-14	13.2	11.5	10.5	10.5	11.7	11.0
15-19	11.3	9.5	11.4	10.0	11.3	9.5
20-24	10.9	11.5	10.7	10.0	10.8	10.5
25-29	8.7	11.5	8.7	11.0	8.7	11.0
30-34	6.8	9.5	7.7	7.0	7.3	8.5
35-39	5.0	5.0	5.1	5.5	5.0	5.5
40-44	3.4	2.0	4.2	5.5	3.8	4.0
45-49	2.8	3.0	3.5	2.5	3.2	2.5
50-54	2.6	2.0	3.2	5.0	2.9	4.0
55-59	2.8	3.0	2.6	2.0	2.7	2.5
60-64	1.5	1.5	2.9	4.0	2.3	3.0
65-69	2.2	2.0	2.7	2.0	2.5	2.0
70+	3.5	3.0	1.4	3.0	4.5	3.0
TOTAL (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (No.)	2499	319	3073	384	5572	703

Sources: Population Census, 1982 (STATIN); Sample Survey (author)

Table 5.8 Age-sex distribution of working population, Franklyn Town, 1992

	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
15-19	6	4.5	5	4.0	11	4.5
20-24	29	22.0	18	15.0	47	18.5
25-29	30	22.5	24	20.0	54	21.5
30-34	23	17.5	18	15.0	41	16.0
35-39	12	9.0	12	10.0	24	9.5
40-44	6	4.5	14	11.5	20	8.0
45-49	7	5.0	5	4.0	12	4.5
50-54	5	4.0	10	8.5	15	6.0
55-59	8	6.0	2	1.5	10	4.0
60 plus	7	5.0	13	10.5	20	7.5
TOTAL	133	100.0	121	100.0	254	100.0

5.2.2 Employment trends in Drumblair

5.2.2.1 Inter-generational mobility context, Drumblair

A means of examining the *inter-generational mobility of the working population* of the sample population is to cross-tabulate the occupations of respondents (by gender) by those of their parents (see Tables 5.9 and 5.10).

There is clear evidence of an *expansion of opportunity for individual mobility into middle class professions*, a trend introduced in Section 3.3. Approximately half of all women - and well over half of all men - in professional or administrative, executive and managerial professions have fathers from outside those sectors. There is a direct generational shift, for example, for 21 per cent of the male professional sector whose fathers were/are in the productive sector.

Table 5.9 Working men by parents' occupational group, Drumblair, 1992

	Industry & Transport		Services		Sales		Clerical		Admin		Prof	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
FATHER												
Unskilled	1	7.7			1	50.0					1	6.0
Ind/Trans	4	30.8	3	30.0			1	16.7	1	6.3	3	17.6
Agri/For	1	7.7					2	33.2	3	18.8	3	17.6
Service	2	15.4	3	30.0			1	16.7	1	6.2	2	11.8
Sales					1	50.0						
Clerical							1	16.7	1	6.3		
Admin	1	7.7	1	10.0			1	16.7	5	31.2	3	17.6
Prof	2	15.4	1	10.0					1	6.2	3	17.6
None												
Not Stated	2	15.4	2	20.0					4	25.0	2	11.8
MOTHER	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Unskilled												
Ind/Trans	4	30.8					2	33.3	3	18.8	2	11.8
Agri/For	1	7.7					1	16.7	4	25.0	3	17.6
Service	3	23.1	3	30.0							1	5.9
Sales	1	7.7	1	10.0			2	33.3				
Clerical											1	5.9
Admin	1	7.7							1	6.2		
Prof	1	7.7			2	100			3	18.8	6	35.3
None	1	7.7	2	20.0			1	16.7	3	18.8	3	17.6
Not stated	1	7.7	4	40.0					2	12.4	1	5.9
TOTAL	13	100	10	100	2	100	6	100	16	100	17	100

Table 5.10 Working women by parents' occupational group, Drumblair, 1992

	Industry & Transport		Services		Sales		Clerical		Admin		Prof	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%			No	%
FATHER												
Unskilled			1	6.7							1	7.1
Ind/Trans	4	50.0	1	6.7	1	11.1	2	14.3	2	8.4	1	7.1
Agri/For	1	12.5	2	13.3	4	44.5	2	14.3	4	16.7	5	35.7
Service	1	12.5	2	13.3	2	22.2	2	14.3	3	12.5		
Sales												
Clerical												
Admin			1	6.7	1	11.1	3	21.4	7	29.1	3	21.5
Prof			1	6.7			1	7.1	5	20.8	4	28.6
None												
Not Stated	2	25.0	7	46.6	1	11.1	4	28.6	3	12.5		
MOTHER	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%
Unskilled											1	7.2
Ind/Trans	1	12.5	1	6.7	2	22.2	1	7.1	3	12.5	4	28.6
Agri/For			2	13.2	2	22.2			3	12.5	3	21.4
Service	3	37.5	4	26.6								
Sales	1	12.5	1	6.7	4	44.5						
Clerical			1	6.7	1	11.1	1	7.1	1	4.2		
Admin			1	6.7			3	21.5	5	20.8		
Prof			1	6.7			3	21.5	6	25.0	3	21.4
None	2	25.0	3	20.0			5	35.7	5	20.8	3	21.4
Not stated	1	12.5	1	6.7			1	7.1	1	4.2		
TOTAL	8	100	15	100	9	100	14	100	24	100	14	100

There is also evidence of *a single generational shift amongst the EAP from the agricultural sector into urban white and blue collar professions.*⁶⁵ Between 15 and 30 per cent of both men and women in professional, administrative and clerical posts have fathers who work(ed) as farmers. The relatively wide range of capital intensity within the service sector is reflected by the fact that a quarter of female service workers have fathers who worked in professional, administrative or clerical posts.

There are signs of self-motivated attempts at intra-generational occupational mobility in Drumblair. Future plans for a change in occupation are being considered by a little over a fifth of the EAP, over 80 per cent of whom are intending to undergo further education or training to achieve this goal. *This represents a comparable level of planned skilling to that of the EAP in Franklyn Town.*

Of those that are considering this change, over two thirds are planning to move within or into the professional and administrative sectors, all by undergoing further training. Disaggregating the group of individuals moving into the professional and administrative sectors, however, reveals that only 14 per cent of them have parent(s) who are/were working outside 'white collar' professions.

Analysis of women's reproductive obligations, and their effect on female entry into the employment market, underlines the width of the gulf between the two areas under study. Of all women over fifteen years old, 36 per cent spend over three hours a day in domestic work, and only 19 per cent spend over six hours a day in these activities. Employment of domestic help is predictably widespread: 54 per cent of the women employ, or are in a household which employs, domestic help. Of these, 21 per cent employ helpers for more than six hours a day.

⁶⁵ It should be noted that the survey didn't distinguish farmers by the size of property when respondents were asked about their parents' professions.

5.2.2.2 Participation trends, Drumblair

In Drumblair longitudinal analysis reveals *a trend of an increase in the proportion of actively participating adults, both male and female (Table 5.11)*. This trend mirrors, but to a far less exaggerated extent, the trends in participation rates in Franklyn Town. Turning to unemployment levels, Table 5.3 indicates that *unemployment among economically active men in Drumblair was in 1992 below the national average of 1989*.

While unemployment amongst economically active women remains above that national average, *a far higher proportion of economically active women are employed than in Franklyn Town*. Even more significant is that *only 10 per cent of the female EAP perceive themselves unemployed or underemployed*.

Table 5.11 Employment Status of adult population (%), Drumblair, 1982 and 1992, and of economically active population (EAP), Drumblair, 1992

	1982 (Adult pop)			1992 (Adult pop)			1992 (EAP)		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Working	62.8	50.9	55.7	70.2	61.9	65.2	91.7	72.3	79.6
Not working	37.2	49.1	44.3	29.8	38.1	34.8	8.3	27.7	20.4
TOTAL (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (No.)	716	1,066	1,782	94	139	233	72	119	191

Table 5.12 Age-sex distribution of total population, Drumblair, 1982 and Drumblair, 1992

AGE	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	1982	1992	1982	1992	1982	1992
0-4	10.5	17.0	9.0	8.4	9.6	12.2
5-9	10.2	8.9	8.2	8.9	9.1	8.9
10-14	11.0	7.5	7.7	9.4	9.1	8.6
15-19	9.4	8.9	10.5	8.4	10.0	8.6
20-24	9.7	8.9	14.8	14.7	12.6	12.2
25-29	12.3	6.8	12.1	9.9	12.2	8.6
30-34	9.6	11.0	9.4	11.0	9.5	11.0
35-39	5.7	3.4	5.9	4.7	5.8	4.2
40-44	4.4	5.5	4.3	6.3	4.3	5.9
45-49	2.4	4.8	3.0	4.2	2.8	4.5
50-54	3.8	6.2	3.7	4.2	3.7	5.0
55-59	3.4	3.4	2.7	3.1	3.0	3.3
60-64	2.7	1.4	2.0	3.1	2.3	2.4
65-69	2.6	2.1	2.4	2.1	2.5	2.1
70+	2.3	4.2	4.3	1.6	3.5	2.5
TOTAL (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (No.)	1077	146	1461	191	2538	337

Sources: Population Census, 1982 (STATIN); Sample Survey (author)

Intriguing is the *consistently low level of male workers relative to female, despite a lower male unemployment level*. The answer lies in the age-sex distribution of Drumblair over the ten-year period. During this period men have accounted for only 40 per cent of the adult population (Table 5.12). Similarly, in 1992 the male EAP represented only 38 per cent of the total EAP of Drumblair. An explanation for this continued imbalance in the population may lie in the greater intra- and international mobility of the middle class male EAP. This is supported by the fact that boys make up almost half (48 per cent) of Drumblair's child population, and therefore that the imbalance occurs in adulthood.

5.2.2.3 Occupational trends, Drumblair

The most important point to underline at the outset of this analysis is that *the Drumblair workforce is overwhelmingly based in the formal sector.*⁶⁶ Table 5.13 shows that amongst the workforce of Drumblair as a whole almost 80 per cent of the population work in the formal sector. When the population of the outlier ED is removed (see Chapter 4 for a justification of this revision of the population of Drumblair) this proportion increases to almost 90 per cent. In both instances the male workforce is even more emphatically formal sector than the female workforce.

Table 5.13 Distribution of working population by formal and informal sector activity, Franklyn Town, 1992; Drumblair, 1992; and Drumblair (revised), 1992

	Franklyn Town			Drumblair			Drumblair (revised)		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
Informal	36.1	33.9	35.0	16.7	23.3	20.4	9.3	15.6	13.1
Vendors	4.5	9.9	7.1	0.0	5.8	3.3	0.0	3.1	1.9
Services	3.0	16.5	9.4	6.1	14.0	10.5	2.3	12.5	8.4
Artisans	27.8	7.4	18.1	9.1	3.5	5.9	4.7	0.0	1.9
Agriculture	0.8	0.0	0.4	1.5	0.0	0.7	2.3	0.0	0.9
Formal	63.9	66.1	65.0	83.3	76.7	79.6	90.7	84.4	86.9
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	133	121	254	66	86	152	43	64	107

⁶⁶ Formal sector workers are defined in this survey as individuals working in an enterprise employing more than five people.

Table 5.14 Occupational categories of adult workforce (percentage), Drumblair, 1982 and 1992, and revised Drumblair, 1992

	1982			1992			1992 (revised)		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
PROFESSIONAL	26.1	22.7	24.2	25.8	16.9	20.8	32.6	23.0	26.9
Technicians/scientists				0.0	1.2	0.7	0.0	1.6	1.0
Teachers				3.0	8.4	6.0	4.6	11.5	8.6
Accountants				10.6	2.4	6.0	11.6	3.3	6.7
Other				12.2	4.9	8.1	16.4	6.6	10.6
ADMIN/EXEC/MANAG	12.9	7.1	9.7	24.2	28.9	26.8	34.9	33.1	35.6
Directors/managers				18.2	18.1	18.1	27.9	23.0	25.0
Supervisors				6.0	10.8	8.7	7.0	13.1	10.6
CLERICAL & SALES	15.8	39.7	29.0	12.1	28.9	21.6	11.6	29.5	22.1
Clerical				9.1	16.9	13.5	9.3	21.3	16.3
Company sales				3.0	0.0	1.3	2.3	0.0	1.0
Sales assistants				0.0	6.0	3.4	0.0	4.9	2.9
Small shop own/assist				0.0	6.0	3.4	0.0	3.3	1.9
Yard petty sales				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Walking street higglers				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Market site higglers				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
ICIs				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SERVICES	9.1	24.1	17.4	16.7	13.3	14.8	7.0	9.8	8.6
Domestic/laundry/ironing				1.5	3.6	2.7@	2.3	1.6	1.8@
Office cleaning etc				1.5	2.4	2.0	0.0	1.6	1.0
Food prep & service				1.5	2.4	2.0	0.0	1.6	1.0
Cosmetology etc.				0.0	4.9	2.7	0.0	5.0	2.8
Protective services				1.5	0.0	0.7	2.3	0.0	1.0
Transport operatives				10.7	0.0	4.7	2.4	0.0	1.0
AGRI & FORESTRY	5.9	1.3	3.4	1.5	0.0	0.7	2.3	0.0	1.0
Farmers & farm labourers				1.5	0.0	0.7	2.3	0.0	1.0
Fisherpeople				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PROD AND REL	30.2	5.1	16.3	19.6	12.0	15.3	11.6	1.6	5.8
Operatives				6.0	7.2	6.7	4.7	1.6	2.9
Artisans				9.1	3.6	6.0	4.7	0.0	1.9
Construction				3.0	0.0	1.3	2.2	0.0	1.0
Drivers				0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Unskilled manual	8.9	1.3	4.7	1.5	1.2	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	418*	519#	937	66	83	149	43	61	104

* Excludes 32 N/S

Excludes 24 N/S

@ Excludes 3 live-in employees

In order to examine longitudinal change in the occupational status of the Drumblair working-age population, as with the Franklyn Town sample population, the 1982 census has been used to produce a percentage occupational breakdown of the population by gender. This is compared with the 1992 breakdown in **Table 5.14**.

The general trend for both men and women is that of *an expansion in the proportion of the population working in 'primary formal' occupations*. Male representation in the professional sector remains constant, at just under 25 per cent over the ten year period, while both the administrative, executive and managerial almost double its representation, balanced by a slight reduction in all other sectors other than services. *This means that in 1992 half of all working men are in professional, technical and related and in administrative, executive and managerial occupations; a rise of 11 per cent from 1982*. It is also worth noting that this trend is exaggerated if we remove the outlier ED.

The increase in the proportion of men working in services in Drumblair is occurring exclusively in the outlier ED, where, as in Franklyn Town there is a shift amongst men away from productive activity and towards service sector activity. This shift is confirmed by looking at trends in the productive sector for Drumblair, where a decline in productive activity is evident.

Changes in the female employment breakdown are more dramatic over the decade. *A significant reduction in female representation in the professional, technical and related category has occurred, while a large contraction of the clerical sector employment representation is more than balanced by a corresponding expansion of opportunity⁶⁷ in the administrative, executive and managerial sector*. Removing the outlier ED both modifies the extent of relative

⁶⁷ Any conclusion assuming a change in opportunity for a particular socioeconomic group on the basis of trends in a selected area has to assume a reasonably constant resident socioeconomic make-up over the period in question. This is discussed in greater detail with reference to the field areas in Chapter 4.

decreasing opportunity in clerical work and magnifies the relative increase in opportunity in administrative occupations. Clearly, given the overall expansion of female participation in the workforce there could still be absolute increases in clerical work, and in any other occupations that are seen to be in relative decline.

The result of these trends is that *female representation in professional and administrative occupations has increased by over a half, from 30 per cent to 46 per cent of the female workforce.*⁶⁸

The proportion of women working in services has decreased by almost a half, as relatively more women enter the workforce in professional and administrative positions. Meanwhile the increase in female representation in the productive sector is taking place exclusively in the outlier ED, and supports the trends of increased female participation in operative and subcontractual work observed in Franklyn Town (see Section 5.2.1)

Taking on a secondary occupation to raise income levels is a relatively important strategy for Drumblair workers. Some twenty per cent of the workforce, both in Drumblair as a whole as well as in the revised population that excludes the outlier ED, work in secondary occupations, the majority investing less than twenty hours per week. We must remember, however, that this is an important strategy because it is a feasible strategy for this socioeconomic group. Two thirds of those involved in secondary occupations are from the professional and administrative sectors. In contrast to re-regulated secondary formal and unregulated informal sector activity, characterised by overemployment, the primary formal sector, with its more structured work schedule and shorter working day, allows individuals to respond to declines in real income by working outside those hours in primary employment. In addition, and in a similar way in Franklyn Town, the upsurge in female participation in the workforce amounts to the adoption of a secondary

⁶⁸ The term 'workforce' is defined here as those actually in work, rather than the larger economically active population (EAP).

occupation at the household level.

5.2.3 Summary of employment trends and mobility

Characteristics of rural-urban population and urban employment in Jamaica reflect the plantation system of land ownership and the narrow industrial base of the economy (Austin, 1984).

The survey confirms that much intergenerational mobility amongst Kingston's working class is directly from rural smallholding (with women often ascribed in agricultural higglering of produce) to urban service sector. Beyond this rural-urban shift any intergenerational occupational shifts for children of urban residents tends to be from the service sector into productive activity, such as artisanal and operative work. The survey also indicates that there is little upward mobility without spatial mobility for individuals shifting into white collar occupations. This positive relationship between social and spatial mobility is confirmed by the intergenerational mobility characteristics of the Drumblair population, where post-War expansion of opportunity in urban middle class professions is reflected in the direct generational shift of children of productive sector workers, and even rural farmers, into the professional sector.

Amongst the adult working class population few adults have any intention of changing occupation, through further training/education or otherwise.

During the period of adjustment there has been a dramatic increase in the proportion of working adults in Franklyn Town. Although it is expected that part of this increase reflects underreporting of petty informal sector activity in the 1982 census, and perhaps also the effect of the outmigration of adult men during the period reducing the size of the EAP, the increase remains significant. Of particular interest to this study is the 'adequacy' of these new employment opportunities and of any evident labour market restructuring during the period. There is a confirmation of the 'informalisation' process (Ghai and De Alcantara,

1990), of the growth of 'precarious employment' (Diaz, 1993) and of 'spurious tertiarisation' (Pinto, 1984). The contraction of working class male employment in the protected formal sector reflects increasing instability in their employment opportunities. Much new male employment is in service sector protective activities related to the growth of the 'high income economy' (Levitt, 1991) rather than the productive economy, or what Gatica (1986) describes as 'tertiarisation with deindustrialisation'. At the same time the rapid expansion of female active participation in the labour market reflects realignment of the manufacturing sector with women employed, either directly or through subcontractual artisanal relations, as garment operatives.

Beyond this increase in female employment in the export sector, there has not been the expected shift, in other words, from 'non-tradeables' to 'tradeables' under the adjustment process. Their increased participation occurs in precarious domestic and other service sector activity, as well as in low capital-intensity sales activity. Indeed, over a third of both male and female workers in Franklyn Town are in small scale, or 'informal' activity. Increased female participation does not reflect a 'levelling up' by gender in the labour market, rather a 'levelling down' (Elson, 1994) as male employment becomes more precarious and deskilled.

The widely held view (see for example Anderson and Witter, 1991) that individuals take on secondary income earning activities in addition to their main work is not borne out in the survey, and this is explained by the tendency towards 'overemployment' by informal workers in low capital:labour ratio activities. Instead, in many cases it may be women's entry into the workforce that represents a household's secondary income.

Participation levels have also increased amongst the middle class EAP of Drumblair during the period of adjustment - though less dramatically and from a higher initial participation rate than in Franklyn Town - so that male unemployment is below, and female unemployment only slightly above, the

national average. The male EAP remains consistently lower than that of the female EAP, reflecting perhaps a greater propensity for international (often circulatory) migration amongst male middle class professionals (Thomas-Hope 1983; 1988). Drumblair workers are overwhelmingly based in the formal sector, and the predominance amongst men of professional and managerial occupations has intensified further over the ten year period so that now over half of all men are in these white collar occupations. The most dramatic increase for men, and particularly for women, has been in administrative, executive and managerial positions, reflecting a long term trend away from the more traditional professional activity, with its greater emphasis on enhanced market capacity through tertiary level education (see Table 5.20). The upsurge in women's participation, unhindered by the reproductive responsibilities faced by the majority of women in Franklyn Town, can also be interpreted as a strategic response to the need for a second income under real wage devaluations.

5.3 Consumption Trends and Mobility

This section aims to explore the links between the consumption of goods and services and social and spatial mobility. It moves from an examination of the residential histories of adults in the two areas to examine educational attainment and its relationship with occupational status. It then turns to access to financial assets, and in particular the relationship between remittance flows and consumption strategies. The aim is to differentiate degrees of mobility through an analysis of certain aspects of 'market capacity' (see Section 3.4.1).

5.3.1 Consumption trends in Franklyn Town

5.3.1.1 Residential mobility context, Franklyn Town

The earlier confirmation *that upward occupational mobility and residential stasis*

rarely go together prompts an examination of the residential history and future plans of the Franklyn Town respondents. Adopting the residential grading system used by Knight and Davies (1978) and based on the age, size and value of units (see Chapter 4) the residential mobility history of Franklyn Town respondents over sixteen years old (as far as the penultimate move) is represented in Table 5.15. Each place of residence in the chronological history of adult respondents is initially disaggregated by its location (whether outside Jamaica or whether outside the KMA). Those places of residence that are inside the KMA are then further disaggregated using Knight and Davies' socioeconomic categorisation. Of the population born outside the present household, *only 20 per cent have moved more than four times* (including the move to the present household) and this percentage drops rapidly beyond that number of moves. This pattern appears to counter the popular perception that low income individuals and households typically have a high level of spatial mobility and residential turnover, and that they experience a high number of short-term residential moves as renters at the mercy of a landlord's decision to give notice.

Table 5.15 Residential history of adult population by type of community, Franklyn Town

	Number of individuals	Distribution by residential typology (%)					
		Very low income	Low to middle income	Upper middle income	High income	Outside KMA	Outside Jamaica
Birthplace	446*	35.0	11.5	0.5	0.5	52.5	0.0
First move	275	54.5	27.0	2.0	2.5	12.5	1.5
Second move	166	52.5	29.0	4.0	2.0	10.0	2.5
Third Move	80	47.5	41.0	2.5	1.5	5.0	2.5
Fourth move	37	43.5	49.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	2.5
Fifth move	21	38.0	52.5	0.0	0.0	9.5	0.0
Sixth move	10	87.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.5	0.0
Seventh move	7	20.0	80.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

* Note: 48 of these individuals have never moved from their present address

Over 50 per cent of respondents were born outside the KMA, and the trend

among these rural-urban migrants is to move directly to Kingston: the proportion rural-urban migrants living outside the KMA drops from just over 50 per cent to just under 15 per cent within the first move, of whom only 1.5 per cent have migrated out of Jamaica.

The proportion of respondents living in very low income or low-to-lower middle income areas remains consistently high, rising from 80 per cent in the first move to over 90 per cent by the fifth move.

There is no way of knowing how many previous residents have returned permanently to rural areas. It is clear, however, that *the rural to urban shift tends not to take on characteristics of circulatory migration*, with little evidence of return migration to areas outside Kingston. Furthermore, *very few respondents have been circulatory migrants outside Jamaica.*

5.3.1.2 Education and mobility, Franklyn Town

Looking initially at the occupational breakdown of individuals in Franklyn Town by gender, we can relate the educational attainment of post-school men and women in the survey to their occupational status. The structure of Jamaica's educational system is represented in **Figure 3.1**. Longitudinal trends in educational attainment of men and women in the survey are established in **Figure 5.1**, which shows the educational attainment of the post-school male and female population in relation to their present age. The evidence here is clear: *educational attainment among the adult population has improved significantly over the last thirty years*, as reflected in the domination of the observations for less than eight years schooling by men and women over thirty-five years old.

Three quarters of all women in the sample have had nine or less years schooling. In other words they have left school at or before grade 9, without having taken CXC's or their equivalent. Less than a quarter have progressed to CXC/GCE level, and only 15 per cent beyond that. As **Figure 5.3** shows, by far the most

Figure 5.1 Educational status of post-school adults by their present age, Franklyn Town, 1992





Figure 5.2 Educational status of post school adults by their present age, Drumblair, 1992





Figure 5.3 Reasons given for leaving education by gender, Franklyn Town, 1992





Figure 5.4 Reasons given for leaving education by gender, Drumblair, 1992



cited reason for not staying in school (given by 41 per cent of all women) is that *their families couldn't afford to pay for their continuing education*. Also important in influencing women's exit from the education system are *the demands placed on women in their productive and reproductive roles in supporting the household*. Almost a third of post-school women were either expected to work to earn money for the family or to work at home. Pregnancy proves to be a less important determinant in the decision to leave school.

The educational attainment figures for post-school men reveal a similar level of attainment to those of women. Table 5.16 shows a comparable level of educational attainment between Franklyn Town's male and female adult population, *with the majority leaving school without completing secondary education*. The major distinction lies in the reasons given by men for leaving education at this stage. *The early productive expectation placed on men by the household is most prominent, combined with the assumption of entering a trade or job without any further school education*.

Table 5.16 Educational attainment of adult population, working population and unemployed population Franklyn Town, 1992

	ADULT POP			WORKING POP			UNEMPLOYED POP		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
None/No education	5.1	7.3	6.3	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.8
Incomplete primary	4.5	6.1	5.4	0.8	6.6	3.5	7.9	3.5	4.8
Complete primary	6.1	8.5	7.4	6.0	8.3	7.1	7.9	5.7	6.4
Incomplete secondary	68.2	64.4	66.1	72.1	63.6	68.1	76.3	81.7	80.0
Complete secondary	12.1	10.9	11.5	15.8	15.7	15.7	7.9	8.0	8.0
Tertiary	4.0	2.8	3.4	5.3	5.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	198	247	445	133	121	254	38	87	125

This raises the question of the relevance of secondary and post-secondary education to this population given the reality of existing labour market demands,

as well as the difficulties in deferring returns to educational investment in the face of the immediate demands placed upon school age individuals as human resources by their households (reflected also in the expressed unaffordability of ongoing education).

When circumstances have allowed relatively prolonged investment in children's education, the shift into professional and administrative and clerical professions is evident (Table 5.17). Over 80 per cent of those in professional and administrative posts have completed secondary education, and a third have attained some level of tertiary education. Similarly, over a half of those in clerical positions have completed secondary education. In contrast, the majority of the population who are in sales, service or production and related sector activity have consistently failed to complete secondary education. Clearly, while educational achievement has improved from an intergenerational perspective amongst the Franklyn Town respondents, it appears that it is still only a minority of individuals that leave education with the necessary qualifications to allow them entry into clerical, administrative or professional occupations.

Of the present post-basic/infant school generation, some 90 per cent of Franklyn Town pupils are government grant-aided, with *less than 10 per cent private fee-paying students*. Looking at the educational performance of post-infant pupils, however, reveals that *the great majority (almost 90 per cent) have never repeated a grade at school*. Of those that have, most have had to repeat a grade at primary level. Looking at the situation of pupils missing days at school, *there is again a majority (76 per cent) of post-infant pupils that had not missed more than three days school in the last month*. Furthermore only 10 per cent of those that had missed school had done so due to the inability of the family to afford clothes, books etc., the remainder having been sick for this period.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ It is worth noting at this point the effectiveness of the programme of targeted intervention for improving nutritional intake of school-age children. Over three quarters of all primary and all-age grades 1-6 school pupils are receiving daily milk and/or nutribun, and over 80 per cent of these pupils pay 50 cents or less for these. While just over a third of secondary school age pupils

Table 5.17 Educational level of working population (percentage) by occupational category, Franklyn Town, 1992

	Professional & Admin etc	Clerical	Sales	Service	Artisans	Other industry & transport
None/No education	3.7	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Incomplete primary	0.0	0	3.0	7.5	4.3	0.0
Complete primary	0.0	0	12.1	8.8	6.4	7.3
Incomplete secondary	14.8	44.0	81.8	72.5	80.9	85.4
Complete secondary	48.1	40.0	3.0	11.3	8.5	7.3
Tertiary	33.3	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	27	25	33	80	47	41

5.3.1.3 Remittances and mobility, Franklyn Town

One important aspect of mobility is the potential role that remittances play as assets in influencing the consumption decisions made by individuals and households. Hence respondents were asked about the size and regularity, source and intended recipients [in terms of household level or individual(s) within the household] of remittances.⁷⁰

Of all individuals in the Franklyn Town survey, 46 per cent are receiving remittances, and 35 per cent of the population are receiving foreign remittances. Almost 70 per cent of foreign remittance flows are from North America, and most of the remainder from the UK.

If remittance flows are a feature, though a far from universal feature, of income raising in Franklyn Town, they are not always a secure source of income. *The majority (52 per cent) of remittance receivers receive, by their own definition,*

get a daily cooked meal at school almost all have to pay for this.

⁷⁰ For the purposes of this survey 'remittances' are taken to include money gifts from outside the household but inside Jamaica, although this element is excluded when examining certain relationships.

only occasional small sums, while 29 per cent receive small but regular sums, 13 per cent receive large regular sums and only 6 per cent receive occasional large sums. This is also the case when we isolate that group receiving foreign remittances (53 per cent receive occasional small amounts, 23 per cent regular small amounts, 17 per cent regular large amounts and 7 per cent occasional large amounts).

Looking at the destination of remittance flows, *the tendency is for cash gifts to be given for a household rather than to a particular individual*. Over three quarters of these remittance receivers are sent money as part of a household, with the remainder receiving money intended for them only. Taking only those individuals receiving foreign remittances this tendency is accentuated further. Over 90 per cent of all foreign remittance receivers are part of a household which receives money rather than being individual receivers.

The importance of remittance flows beyond reducing vulnerability at a short-term subsistence level can be gauged by looking at the occupational and educational opportunities and strategies associated with remittance receivers. Outside the professional and administrative sectors, *regular and occasional large remittance receivers are most prevalent in both absolute and percentage terms in the productive sector* (where 20 per cent of remittance receivers state regular large amounts while 10 per cent state occasional large sums). More significant is the flow of smaller cash gifts from within Jamaica to women working in the clerical, sales and the service sectors, reflecting the importance of income diversification for the survival strategies of many women in Franklyn Town.

Looking at the relationship between type of educational institution attended and remittance status, it is interesting that *there is no tendency for those children of remittance-receiving households, whether the money is intended specifically for them or for the household as a whole, to be attending fee-paying schools*. Only a handful of children in households receiving foreign remittances and in regular

or occasional large sums, are attending private schools. Similarly, of those post-school young adults in the 15-24 age group, *there is little evidence of a relationship between educational attainment and receipt of remittances*. Only a quarter of those individuals reaching GCE/CXC level or beyond are in households receiving privately channelled foreign exchange. This should be borne in mind when we turn later to discussing the role of remittances in reducing vulnerability and enhancing mobility.

5.3.2 Consumption trends in Drumblair

5.3.2.1 Residential mobility context, Drumblair

Table 5.18 shows the residential history of Drumblair's sample population up to their penultimate place of residence. The pattern of upward residential mobility is clear.

At birth only 17 per cent of the population lived in what are now categorised as upper-middle income or high income areas, with almost half the population living outside the KMA. The influx of population after the first move (reducing the population living outside the KMA to 12 per cent) mainly went to (present day) very low and low-to-lower middle income areas (57 per cent) while the population in the higher two categories rose only to 29 per cent. This proportion then grows steadily at the expense of the lower two categories.

Of the one hundred and ninety five people, now over sixteen years old and born outside the present household, less than a quarter have moved more than four times up to and including the present household, and this like Franklyn Town drops off rapidly.

Table 5.18 Residential history of adult population by type of community, Drumblair

	Number of individuals	Distribution by residential typology (%)					
		Very low income	Low to middle income	Upper middle income	High income	Outside KMA	Outside Jamaica
Birthplace	337*	17.0	16.0	7.0	10.0	46.0	4.0
First move	125	25.5	32.0	18.0	10.5	12.0	2.0
Second move	77	18.5	25.0	27.5	10.5	17.0	1.5
Third Move	46	30.5	13.0	32.5	11.0	11.0	2.0
Fourth move	24	8.5	25.0	37.5	8.5	16.5	4.0
Fifth move	12	8.5	25.0	41.5	16.5	0.0	8.5
Sixth move	7	0.0	14.0	43.0	28.5	14.5	0.0
Seventh move	4	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	0.0

* Note: 38 of these individuals have never moved from their present address

It is interesting to note that throughout the residential chronology of this population there has been a consistently tiny proportion of individuals that have lived abroad; almost continually under 5 per cent. This implies either that there is little return migration amongst this socioeconomic group, or that the nature of circulatory migration is such that respondents don't perceive (short) periods spent abroad as being residential moves.

5.3.2.2 Education and mobility, Drumblair

The evidence for Drumblair is again clear-cut with respect to educational status and its role in occupational mobility. Figure 5.2 shows that for both women and men there are a large proportion of individuals (33 per cent of women and 45 per cent of men) that have continued in education beyond 'O' levels/CXCs, and that it is the older age groups that constitute much of the representation in the lower levels of education.

Men, however, have benefitted from higher levels of educational attainment than women in Drumblair. Whilst an equivalent proportion of women and men progressed to ten years schooling or more (60 per cent of women and 64 per cent

of men), relatively more men progressed beyond 'O' level/CXCs (45 per cent, compared with 33 per cent of the women).

This distribution is reflected in the occupational statistics for women and men in Drumblair. A sizeable minority of the female population (15 per cent of the total) left school after ten years schooling and are now working in clerical positions, mainly as secretaries. In contrast there is a less concentrated distribution of occupations for those men that left school after ten years, many going into clerical and sales, service and production activities.

A comparison of educational attainment of the adult population by work status reveals that a *smaller proportion of unemployed adults in Drumblair have completed secondary education, and none reached tertiary level (Table 5.19)*. Given the relatively low levels of unemployment in Drumblair, however, this disparity in the 'market capacity' of adults is of less significance than it might otherwise have been, and this is reflected in the comparable educational attainment of adult population (which includes those adults not in the EAP) and the working population.

Table 5.19 Educational attainment of adult population, working population and unemployed population Drumblair, 1992

	ADULT POP			WORKING POP			UNEMPLOYED POP		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
None/No education	12.9	8.6	10.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Incomplete primary	0.0	0.7	0.4	0.0	1.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0
Complete primary	4.3	4.3	4.3	1.5	1.2	1.3	0.0	6.7	5.6
Incomplete secondary	44.1	56.1	51.3	46.2	57.0	52.3	100	73.3	77.8
Complete secondary	18.3	12.9	15.1	24.6	15.1	19.2	0.0	20.0	16.7
Tertiary	20.4	17.3	18.5	27.7	25.6	26.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	93*	139	232	65*	86	151	6	30	36

* Excludes 1 N/S

When the working population is disaggregated by occupational category (Table 5.20), *a clear relationship emerges between educational attainment and occupational group*. Within the white collar professions the great majority of professionals have attained tertiary education, whilst entrance into administrative, managerial and executive occupations is less contingent upon tertiary qualifications. The educational barrier continues to be lower for clerical workers, the majority of whom have not completed secondary education. The proportion of workers failing to complete secondary education jumps significantly amongst sales, service and productive sector workers.

The reasons given for leaving full-time education (see Figure 5.4) are dominated for men by entry into employment, which reflects positive returns on education when it is viewed in relation to levels of educational and occupational attainment respectively. For women there is an additional emphasis on inability to afford continuing education. However, for both men and women the other barriers to access to education are far less significant than in Franklyn Town.

Of the secondary school-age population,⁷¹ *the vast majority of children attend secondary high school*, while comprehensives, new secondaries and all-age (grades 7-9) schools hardly feature in the attendance distribution. Amongst all children in primary and secondary education *there is a high level of consumption of private education*: 43 per cent are fully fee-paying pupils. Similarly, over 90 per cent of these pupils have never repeated a grade at school, and 94 per cent have not missed more than three days school in the last month.⁷²

⁷¹ Amongst the school-age population primary school attenders account for only 20 per cent, reflecting the more narrowly-based age-sex pyramid when comparing with the Franklyn Town population (Figures 5.7 and 5.12).

⁷² The successful targeting of the government milk/nutribun programme, combined with the difference in take-up levels according to need, is reflected in the fact that only a quarter of pre-secondary school children from the Drumblair sample receive it. Over a third of the secondary age pupils get a cooked dinner, with most paying over JS10 for that meal.

Table 5.20 Educational level of working population by occupational category, Drumblair, 1992

	Professional		Admin/excc/ managerial		Clerical		Sales		Service		Industry & transport	
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No.	%	No	%
None/No education	0	0.0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
Incomplete primary	0	0.0	0	0	0	0.0	1	8.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
Complete primary	0	0.0	0	0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	9.0	0	0.0
Incomplete secondary	4	12.9	13	32.5	12	60.0	10	83.4	16	72.7	21	91.3
Complete secondary	4	12.9	15	37.5	4	20.0	0	0.0	4	18.3	2	8.7
Tertiary	23	74.2	12	30.0	4	20.0	1	8.3	0	0.0	0	0.0
TOTAL	31	100	40	100	20	100	12	100	22	100	23	100

5.3.2.3 Remittances and mobility, Drumblair

The data for Drumblair respondents with respect to remittances *reveal a similar proportion of the population to Franklyn Town receiving private cash flows*. Well over a third (38 per cent) of the population receive remittances, although only a quarter of the population are receiving foreign remittances (most of which are from North America).

Like Franklyn Town again, however, *there is a question mark over the ability of remittance receivers to count on a regular and substantial supply for strategic consumption*. Half of the individuals receiving foreign remittances state that they only receive small sums on an occasional basis, while 30 per cent are receiving regular small sums and 20 per cent occasional large sums. Furthermore, only one quarter of this number are receiving remittances meant specifically for them, rather than for the household in general.

Looking at the breakdown of Drumblair's working-age population in terms of remittance flows, *there is a fairly even spread of remittance receivers (both of general extra-household gifts and of foreign remittances) across the occupational*

spectrum. This is also the case for different sizes and regularities of flows, although it is worth drawing attention to the fact that there is a danger in holding a perceptually based variable (ie perceptions of size and regularity) constant across a range of groups and individuals.

Of the individuals in the workforce planning to invest in further training (see Section 5.2.2.1), one third are receiving foreign remittances, but well under 20 per cent are receiving regular or occasional 'large' remittances. It seems then, that in this case *remittance flows are not a particular trigger to occupational mobility*.

Turning to the implications for mobility of remittance flows amongst the school attending population, almost two thirds of the primary and secondary school fee-paying pupils are part of a foreign remittance receiving household (one third of these being regular large sums remitted). In contrast, three quarters of government school pupils are receiving no foreign remittances at all. While this could indicate that a relationship exists between remittance flows and private education take-up, it could also merely reflect the other socioeconomic factors that separate households, particularly given the presence of the outlier ED in the population. It would be perhaps unexpected that there is a relationship of this kind in a population that generally has better access to foreign exchange, and therefore that would not necessarily rely so heavily on remittance flows. Remittance flows in this context, therefore, *are perhaps merely another indicator (like private education) of a more structurally defined wealth, rather than being causal agents of change*, part of which is an international circulatory flow of migrants and money capital (see Thomas-Hope, 1988). In Franklyn Town, and areas like it, on the other hand, remittances on their own may be a far more important agent of opportunity, yet not be sufficiently large and/or regular to allow long-term changes in consumption, such as in health or education.

Looking at the post-school 15-24 age group, two thirds of those that progressed to GCE/CXC or beyond are not receiving foreign remittances. This provides an

inconclusive picture of the effect of remittances on recent school leaver's educational attainment, particularly as it is present day remittance flows that are being referred to.

5.3.3 Summary of consumption trends and mobility

Analysis of the residential histories of the Franklyn Town and Drumblair populations confirms the earlier supposition, discussed in Section 1.2 and explored further in the analysis of intergenerational occupational mobility, that there tends to be a direct shift from rural peasantry to a low income urban environment for the majority of migrants. In the case of almost half the Drumblair adult respondents, a single generational shift from a rural environment to an urban middle class environment has been achieved, but for the most part with an intervening period of residence in a lower income area. Of those individuals born in Kingston, the majority have moved 'upwards' from lower income residential areas, so that overall less than a fifth of the Drumblair population were born in middle or upper income areas. It must be remembered, however, that for the older respondents, the changing socioeconomic make-up of parts of residential East Kingston in particular may have prompted a move from what was once a middle class neighbourhood. In these instances it is the area that has changed rather than the individuals.

In both areas there is a strong correlation between occupational status and educational attainment, adding weight to the argument made earlier (see Section 3.4.1) that education and training are key assets in the strengthening of an individual's market capacity. The educational achievement of the working class community reflects an intergenerational improvement in educational attainment consistent with the post-independence universalisation of primary education and widening of access to high school education (see Foner, 1973; Gordon, 1989; Miller, 1990). A relative gap in educational attainment still exists by socioeconomic status, however, and this indicates a continuation of the socioeconomic differentiation observed by Knight and Davies (1978). The

majority of the Franklyn Town population leave school before completing secondary education, and this prevents an occupational and residential shift. Low income individuals are discriminated against by the inability of their households to consume strategically for their education. School attending children can be differentiated by socioeconomic group in terms of the level of private consumption of education. Similarly there is a greater tendency amongst Franklyn Town children to leave education on the basis of the shorter-term returns to households of their labour power. Working class women in particular also have domestic demands placed on them either externally by household members or, in a minority of cases, by the 'self-imposed' responsibility of pregnancy. These factors combine to constrain the ability for long-term strategies that defer returns to educational investment through the cumulative enhancement of market capacity (see discussion of poverty and opportunity in Section 3.2.2). This is despite the fact that parents seem to prioritise their children's school attendance at this early stage of their education, as is reflected in the attendance and grade repetition figures.

The flow of remittances into low-income households seems to play only a marginal part in influencing market capacity. The unpredictability of their size and flow reduces their value for strategic long-term investment (in training for example) or a one-off purchase of an economic asset (such as a sewing machine). Consequently there is no relationship between remittance receipt and occupational status or educational attainment. Instead remittances can become an important boost to subsistence consumption. The characteristics of unpredictability are also present amongst remittance receivers in Drumblair, and again there is a serious doubt as to whether remittances can play a significant role in enhancing market capacity. Furthermore, given the higher levels of economic consumption amongst the Drumblair dwellers, it seems likely that only in exceptional cases of international flows would remittances alone create the opportunity for innovation in strategic consumption.

5.4 Household and Intra-household Level Trends

In this section we disaggregate the household in order to examine impacts of macroeconomic change on levels of vulnerability within different household types. We concentrate on the implications of 'shocks' (such as illness or redundancy and of trends (such as continuing wage devaluation or public sector retrenchment) for the opportunities and strategies of households of different structures and for different individuals within households. We ask which households and individuals are most vulnerable, and by the same token which are most likely to be able to enhance their mobility prospects by strengthening market capacity and/or responding to given structures of opportunity.

5.4.1 Intra-household relations in Franklyn Town

5.4.1.1 Headship and marital status, Franklyn Town

From the survey, clear patterns emerged regarding gender, headship and vulnerability. Less than a quarter of the adult population sample of Franklyn Town have never been 'married',⁷³ and most of those individuals are from the 16-19 age group. Over half of the adult population are married at present and, taking live-in partners as a single unit, there is a virtually even split (51:49) between individuals with live-in partners and those in visiting unions.

It emerges that *distinguishing between married women by type of union is critical when assessing intra-household capital flows*. Figure 5.5 indicates that women in coresidential unions are *financially less vulnerable* than those in a visiting relationship.⁷⁴ Over two thirds (68 per cent) of women with live-in partners state that they receive regular financial support from their partners, compared

⁷³ The term 'married' here applies to all individuals in a consensual union, whether legal or common-law. Some 56 per cent of the Franklyn Town sample are married, while 15 per cent are 'divorced' (i.e. legally divorced or separated) and 6 per cent widowed.

⁷⁴ For a discussion of the role and significance of visiting relationships in West Indian Society see, for example Massiah, 1983; Senior, 1991.

Figure 5.5 'Married' women by level of financial support from partners, Franklyn Town, 1992





Figure 5.6 'Married' women by level of financial support from partners, Drumblair, 1992



with 56 per cent of women in visiting unions.

It is also worth noting that this greater financial security in terms of partners' support experienced by married women with resident partners is *not necessarily caused by the presence of dependent children* as there is little difference between the proportion of women in the two groups that are supporting children; over three quarters of both. Similarly, a tiny minority (only 3 per cent) of all women receiving support state that the sole motive behind this financial contribution is because they are supporting their partner's child(ren). There is also a *clear distinction in age* between married women by their type of union. Over 80 per cent of women in visiting unions are under 30 years, compared with only 42 per cent of women in coresidential unions. Hence it tends to be *older married women who are more secure in their intra-household relations*.

Survey data for married men clearly show them in their role as expected, if not necessarily actual, *providers rather than receivers of financial support*. Less than 10 per cent of this group receive regular financial support and almost three quarters receive none at all. For live-in couples there is also an imbalance, though less severe, in the level of mutual financial support between partners: less than half of the men receive financial support from their partners, compared with over two thirds of women in this position. The significance of these relative degrees of dependency exerted by household members is strongest in their *implications for the degree of socioeconomic independence enjoyed by women, and ultimately the extent of their subordination to men*.

These *relations of dependency often centre on the respective roles of men and women in the upbringing and support of children*. Of those men that support children, for example, 79 per cent are supporting them outside the household. Similarly, of those married men with live-in partners, 70 per cent support children in the household, while 78 per cent support children in and/or outside the household.

A key relationship in establishing political relations within the household is that of *headship*. Of the sample survey, 43 per cent of household heads are female (Table 5.21). Davies and Anderson (1987) point out the contradiction in Jamaican society between the formal equality of women indicated by headship⁷⁵ and their inequality in relations of production and reproduction, particularly their relative lack of skill training and the paucity of support they receive for the maintenance of children. It follows that the relations of dependency inherent to reliance on support for maintenance are weakened by women's ability to compete in the labour market and share the reproductive burden, either through personal support networks or through public or private consumption. In other words, the fulfilling of 'practical gender needs' through financial support, is replaced by empowerment through meeting 'strategic gender needs' (Moser, 1993).

Table 5.21 Headship status of all adults, Franklyn Town, 1992

	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>de jure</i> single head	5	2.5	49	19.8	54	12.1
divorced	1	0.5	33	13.4	34	7.6
widowed	3	1.5	14	5.7	17	3.8
never married	1	0.5	2	0.8	3	0.7
<i>de facto</i> single head (visiting union)	7	3.6	7	2.9	14	3.2
household head (coresidential)	49	24.7	9	3.7	58	13.0
joint household head	24	12.1	24	9.7	48	10.8
spouse	9	4.5	49	19.8	58	13.0
son/daughter	73	36.9	64	25.9	137	30.8
other	31	15.7	45	18.2	76	17.1
Total	198	100.0	247	100.0	445	100.0

⁷⁵ In Jamaica, 45 per cent of all households are female headed (Davies and Anderson, 1987). In the Franklyn Town survey, 43 percent of households are female headed, and 16 percent are jointly headed.

The vast majority of male household heads are married and in coresidential unions, while most female heads of household are *de jure* single. The vulnerability of single female heads is revealed not only in the paucity of external support - over 80 per cent of divorced single female heads receive little or no financial support from ex-partners - but more strategically in the disaggregation of employment statistics in the following section.

5.4.1.2 Household type and dependency, Franklyn Town

In Franklyn Town the *dependency ratio has decreased, through an overall increase in the proportion of working individuals, and this despite an increase in the average household size*. In 1982 there was a mean of 0.84 people working per household and a dependency ratio of 1:3.1 (1,350 working, 4,222 not working and 1,601 households).⁷⁶

By 1992 the mean number of people working per household had doubled to 1.69. Despite the dramatic increase, by over one per household, in average household size over the same period (from 3.5 to 4.7) this increase in participation rate had still reduced the dependency ratio in Franklyn Town to 1:1.8 (254 working, 449 not working and 150 households).

Almost half (49 per cent) of the dependents in 1982 were children and, given the increase in working adults, this proportion had dropped to 43 per cent by 1992.

The overall decline in the ratio of household dependents to workers in Franklyn town masks two important issues. First, and arising out of the changing make-up of the workforce, is that while the overall level of participation has increased fast enough to outweigh the increase in household size, *this increase has been taken up by poorly remunerated female petty sales activity and operative work* (see

⁷⁶ The dependency ratio is calculated as the total non-working population (regardless of age) divided by the total working population.

discussion above). Second, when the overall dependency ratio is disaggregated by household type, it is found that *there are particularly high levels of dependency within single female headed households* (see Table 5.22).⁷⁷, which make up 37 per cent of the surveyed households (see Table 5.21).

Table 5.22 Household characteristics by household type, Franklyn Town, 1992

	Frequency (%)	Mean household size	No. children per household	Mean workers per household	Dependency ratio
Nuclear	35.3	4.1	1.6	1.68	1:1.4
Couple extended	19.3	6.4	2.1	2.45	1:1.6
Single female headed*	37.3	4.1	1.6	1.38	1:2.0
Single male headed	8.1	4.1	1.2	1.33	1:2.1
All households	100	4.7	1.7	1.69	1:1.8

* NB All figures for single female headed households have one outlier removed; a household of 23 people.

Examining the labour force participation levels among different household types, in other words, allows an assessment of vulnerability as it relates to accessing an independent source of income. The great majority (89 per cent) of stable coresidential unions have at least one partner working, and in 38 per cent of cases both partners are working. Looking more specifically at nuclear households, whilst child dependents make up a relatively high proportion of the population (38 per cent), the older average age of coresidential partners, the higher number of workers per household and lower dependency ratio reflect the relative security of employment amongst these households. *Nuclear households in Franklyn Town are therefore the least vulnerable household type.*

⁷⁷ There is also a high dependency ratio among male headed households, but these households are relatively insignificant within the population.

The unemployment rate⁷⁸ for *de jure* single female household heads is 35 per cent, a little over the unemployment rate for all adult women. More significantly, just under half of this group of household heads are not working, and are therefore dependent on the incomes of other household members or of extended support networks. An important contributing factor in the high dependency ratio seen in single female headed households is the fact that children in single female headed households make up 40 per cent of the population, compared with 32 per cent in couple extended households. This is indicated by the tendency of female heads of household to be younger than their male counterparts (see Figure 5.7). This means that *the highest dependency ratio exists within single female headed households at the same time that the ratio of economically active potential workers to children remains low.*

5.4.1.3 The non-working population, Franklyn Town

Of the 43 per cent of the adult population that is not working, Table 5.23 gives a breakdown of this group by activity.

Table 5.23 Breakdown of adult non-working population by activity, Franklyn Town, 1992

	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Spouse	3	4.6	30	23.8	33	17.3
Student	11	16.9	16	12.7	27	14.1
Retired/long-term sick	16	24.6	23	18.3	39	20.4
Other non-working	35	53.9	57	45.2	92	48.2
TOTAL	65	100.0	126	100	191	100.0

If we remove the 27 adults who are enrolled at school and the 39 respondents who are retired or suffering long-term ill-health, we are left with an unemployed

⁷⁸ The unemployment rate, in contrast to the phrase 'not working', is here defined as the number of individuals not working but actively seeking work as a proportion of the total economically active population (those working + those actively seeking work).

Figure 5.7 Heads of household by age and gender, Franklyn Town, 1992





Figure 5.8 Heads of household by age and gender, Drumblair, 1992



economically active population (EAP) of 125 individuals. *This unemployed group represents one third of the total EAP.* It is examined by age-sex distribution and household status in Tables 5.24 and 5.25 respectively.

Table 5.24 Age-sex distribution of unemployed population, Franklyn Town, 1992 and Drumblair, 1992

AGE	FRANKLYN TOWN			DRUMBLAIR		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
15-19	15.8	10.3	12.0	16.7	10.0	11.1
20-24	21.1	19.5	20.0	33.3	20.0	22.2
25-29	15.8	20.7	19.2	0.0	13.3	11.1
30-34	21.1	10.3	13.6	16.7	13.3	13.9
35-39	10.5	9.2	9.6	0.0	3.3	2.8
40-44	2.6	8.0	6.4	0.0	3.3	2.8
45-49	5.3	4.6	4.8	0.0	3.3	2.8
50-54	5.3	10.3	8.8	16.7	13.3	13.9
55-59	0.0	3.4	2.4	0.0	6.7	5.6
60 plus	2.6	3.4	3.2	16.7	13.3	13.9
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	38	87	125	6	30	36

As already noted, *the male unemployment rate, at 22 per cent, is a dramatic improvement on the 1982 level for Franklyn Town, yet remains at twice the national rate.* Half of the unemployed men are sons of the household head and or spouse, reflected in the youthful age structure of the group: 37 per cent of male unemployed are under 25 years old. The age structure of the male working EAP is a slightly older one (26.5 per cent of employed men are under 25), indicating that *youth unemployment remains a critical issue.*

The female unemployed represent 42 per cent of the EAP. This group, on the other hand has a more evenly spread age distribution, supporting the earlier discussion as to the gendered domestic roles of women, and this despite the relatively high participation of the female population. However, the relatively high

incidence of female headship amongst Jamaican women, is reflected in the household status of unemployed women: unemployment is not dominated by spouses, but is spread across the household. Also unsurprising, given the revealed gendered nature of headship, is that there is virtually no such thing as an unemployed male spouse.

Table 5.25 Household status of adult unemployed economically active population (percentage), Franklyn Town, 1992 and Drumblair, 1992

	FRANKLYN TOWN			DRUMBLAIR		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Head of Household	28.9	20.7	23.2	0.0	23.3	19.4
Joint head of household	5.3	6.9	6.4	16.7	6.7	8.3
Spouse of household head	2.6	26.4	19.2	16.7	20.0	19.4
Child of household head/spouse	50.0	29.9	36.0	50.0	26.7	30.6
Nephew/niece of household head/spouse	2.6	5.7	4.8	16.7	0.0	2.8
Parent of household head/spouse	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sibling of household head/spouse	5.3	5.7	5.6	0.0	6.7	5.6
Other family	5.3	4.5	4.8	0.0	16.6	13.9
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	38	87	125	6	30	36

It is in examining the household structure of the unemployed EAP that the issues of labour as asset and of residential mobility discussed in Chapter Three are seen in the context of dependency. *The same adults whose labour power is their single most important asset, are those who exert additional strain on a household's survival when they are unable to realise aspirations to mobility of any kind.*

Some 15 per cent of the unemployed EAP are extended family members.⁷⁹ Hence in addition to dependent presence of unemployed adult sons and daughters within the household, *there is a considerable dependence exerted by unemployed*

⁷⁹ I define 'extended family' members as individuals that are not the household head, spouse or child of the household head and/or spouse.

adults within extended family networks. It should not be forgotten at this point, however, that these extended household members may well play an important reproductive role - reducing expenditure on consumption for reproduction and releasing other household members into income earning activity - within the household and we shall turn to this in the later discussion.

This hindered mobility is reflected in the educational attainment of the group when compared with that of the working population (see Table 5.26). Although almost universal primary educational attainment is common to both groups, over 20 per cent of the working EAP proceeded to complete secondary education or enter tertiary education, compared with only 8 per cent of the unemployed EAP. Clearly then, barriers to the labour market at the lower skill end are low, while for those jobs where selection and skill level require certain qualifications, lack of educational attainment remains an effective barrier to entry. Noteworthy also, is that there is little disparity in the level of educational attainment by gender in either the employed or unemployed populations. It is not access to the education system, therefore, that differentiates occupational characteristics by gender, but the structure and demands of the labour market itself, within the context of socialised gendered productive and reproductive roles.

Table 5.26 Educational attainment of adult population, working population and unemployed population Franklyn Town, 1992

	ADULT POP			WORKING POP			UNEMPLOYED POP		
	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total	Male	Fem	Total
None/No education	5.1	7.3	6.3	0.0	0.8	0.5	0.0	1.1	0.8
Incomplete primary	4.5	6.1	5.4	0.8	6.6	3.5	7.9	3.5	4.8
Complete primary	6.1	8.5	7.4	6.0	8.3	7.1	7.9	5.7	6.4
Incomplete secondary	68.2	64.4	66.1	72.1	63.6	68.1	76.3	81.7	80.0
Complete secondary	12.1	10.9	11.5	15.8	15.7	15.7	7.9	8.0	8.0
Tertiary	4.0	2.8	3.4	5.3	5.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL (%)	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
TOTAL (No.)	198	247	445	133	121	254	38	87	125

Under adjustment the reproductive burden shifts increasingly from the state to the household, and it is assumed that women's time is sufficiently 'elastic' to take up these extra demands (Elson, 1987). Pressures on women's time - increased demands on their reproductive role - can be examined by looking at the amount of time spent doing the daily cooking, cleaning, washing and child minding; 66 per cent of all women over 15 years of age spend over three hours per day and 38 per cent spend over 6 hours a day in these activities. Unsurprisingly, less than 2 per cent of women employ paid domestic help of any kind.

In all 41 per cent of the adult female respondents state that they are either unemployed and seeking employment, or underemployed. Of these, 54 per cent gave as the reason for this position the lack of job availability/extra hours. Insufficient education or skill training and insufficient capital to start up a business both account for 13 per cent of the respondents while 14 per cent state that reproductive activities prevent them from entering the productive sector.

5.4.2 Intra-household relations in Drumblair

5.4.2.1 Headship and marital status, Drumblair

A longitudinal examination of the average household size⁸⁰ in Drumblair shows that over the ten year period, like Franklyn Town, there has been *an increase of just over one per household in the average household size* of this residential area. Yet unlike Franklyn Town it is less constant through individual EDs, with the two EDs NC9 and NE31 showing a particularly marked increase, of 2.87 and 1.41 per household respectively. This longitudinal trend raises two important questions.

⁸⁰ The total population represented in the 73 sampled households in Drumblair is 337 individuals, whose age-sex distribution is illustrated, and compared with the distribution constructed from the 1982 census figures for Drumblair, in Table 5.12. The two pyramids show similar characteristics, although the 1992 sample population exhibits a relatively high proportion of under 5 year olds, of whom over 60 per cent are male. However, with the exception of this category, the population distribution over the ten year period in Drumblair shows a slow down in population growth for age groups under 20 years, in contrast to Franklyn Town whose population distribution in these age groups remains constant, though not increasing significantly.

First, given that the population is not becoming more youthful, is this increase in household size a reflection on the limits to residential mobility being placed upon young adults by a combination of housing market inflation and decreased purchasing power? Secondly, is the presence of additional adult potential wage earners in households reducing vulnerability or merely worsening the dependency ratio?

Of the 71 married women in Drumblair, **Figure 5.6** clearly illustrates that the vast majority (over 80 per cent) of the women in coresidential unions receive regular financial support from their partners. For those women in visiting unions, the proportion that receive regular support remains well over 60 per cent. Comparing these figures with those of Franklyn Town, it emerges that, although in both cases around two thirds of married women are in coresidential unions, married women in Drumblair - whether in coresidential or visiting unions - *are more financially secure with respect to financial support from their partners.*

In Drumblair the age bracket with the highest number of women supporting children is 30-34, whereas in Franklyn Town the highest single age bracket is the 25-29 age group (see **Figures 5.9 and 5.10**).⁸¹ If this comparison implies that middle class women are able to postpone starting a family through greater educational and mobility opportunities, then we can begin to draw comparisons between the women of both survey areas in terms of their relative socioeconomic independence from men.

⁸¹ The presence of teenage mothers in Drumblair is again a reflection of the NE31 ED influencing the distribution: all four of these teenage mothers are from this district.

Figure 5.9 Distribution by age of women supporting children, Franklyn Town, 1992





Figure 5.10 Distribution by age of women supporting children, Drumblair, 1992



The nature of household headship in Drumblair is revealed to be not as significantly class specific as one might expect when comparing the two residential areas. *The composition of the households, when disaggregated by nature of headship, is very similar to that of Franklyn Town*, and the presence of NE31 in the sample has little impact (compare Tables 5.21 and 5.27). Most interesting is that the *percentage of single female household heads in Drumblair is only slightly lower than that of Franklyn Town* (and is not affected by NE31). Some 34 per cent of Drumblair's households are headed by single women compared with 37 per cent of the Franklyn Town households. It is evident, however, that a higher proportion of Drumblair's single female heads are *de facto* heads, or in other words are in a visiting union. Given the context of higher home ownership and the relative absence of multiple households within a single yard in Drumblair, this implies a greater degree of financial independence amongst women than in Franklyn Town.

Table 5.27 Headship status of all adults, Drumblair, 1992

	Male		Female		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<i>de jure</i> single head	7	7.4	20	14.4	27	11.6
divorced	3	3.2	17	12.2	20	8.6
widowed	3	3.2	1	0.8	4	1.7
never married	1	1.0	2	1.4	3	1.3
<i>de facto</i> single head (visiting union)	3	3.2	5	3.6	8	3.4
household head (coresidential)	23	24.5	2	1.4	25	10.7
joint household head	13	13.8	13	9.4	26	11.2
spouse	2	2.1	23	16.5	25	10.7
son/daughter	28	29.8	39	28.1	67	28.8
other	18	19.1	37	26.6	55	23.6
Total	94	100.0	139	100.0	233	100.0

Of those divorced/separated female household heads, 82 per cent are receiving no financial support at all from their ex-partners, while only one woman in this

category is receiving regular financial support. The fact that almost 60 per cent of these women don't support children, however, reflects the social contexts of separation which distinguish the two communities. In Drumblair *divorce doesn't bring with it the expectation of the support that in Franklyn Town is often associated with the obligation of a 'baby father' to his child.*

The only significant difference in headship lies in *the proportion of households headed by single men, which in Drumblair significantly outweigh those in Franklyn Town* (14 per cent of Drumblair's households, and in Franklyn Town only 8 per cent). In addition *Drumblair's household heads are on average slightly older, and therefore perhaps better established and less vulnerable, than those in Franklyn Town, with the median of the distribution falling in the 45-49 age group.*

5.4.2.2 Household type and dependency, Drumblair

In Drumblair *the dependency ratio has decreased: the increase in the mean number of workers per household outweighing the increase in household size.* In 1982 the census recorded a population of 2,538, with 993 workers and 738 households. The 1992 sample survey recorded a population of 337, with 152 workers and 73 households. As Table 5.28 indicates, the average household size in Drumblair increased between 1982 and 1992 by over a third, from 3.4 to 4.6 per household. Yet the percentage of the population in work also increased, from 39 per cent to 45 per cent, and this was sufficient to reduce the dependency ratio from 1:1.5 to 1:1.2 for the entire population. Furthermore, if we remove the outlying enumeration district NE31, the mean household drops back to 4.1 per household (giving a smaller increase in household size of 21 per cent) and the dependency ratio drops still further to 1:1.1.

Table 5.28 Household characteristics by household type, Drumblair, 1992

	Frequency (%)	Mean household size	No. children per household	Mean workers per household	Dependency ratio
Nuclear	28.8	4.2 (3.8)	1.4 (1.1)	2.00 (1.94)	1:1.1 (1:1.0)
Couple extended	23.3	7.7 (7.0)	2.4 (1.7)	3.60 (3.55)	1:1.1 (1:1.0)
Single female headed	34.2	3.7 (3.4)	1.2 (1.1)	1.50 (1.39)	1:1.5 (1:1.4)
Single male headed	13.7	3.2 (2.6)	0.5 (0.3)	1.40 (1.25)	1:1.3 (1:1.1)
All households	100	4.6 (4.1)	1.4 (1.1)	2.08 (1.98)	1:1.2 (1:1.1)

* NB Figures in parentheses exclude the outlying ED NE31.

When comparing these trends to those of Franklyn Town it is clear that the pattern is the same, but not as extreme as it was shown to be in the Franklyn Town survey. A possible interpretation is that *stagnation in residential mobility means that the average ratio of economically active adults to children in each household is increasing, with enough finding work to decrease dependency ratios within the context of increasing household sizes.* Clearly this process is far more pronounced in Franklyn Town than it is in Drumblair.

Whether we look at Drumblair with or without the outlying enumeration district, single women head one third of all households in the area. As in Franklyn Town, it is *single female headed households that have a higher dependency ratio* than the other household types. Also clear in the comparison is that in both areas *it is nuclear households that are least vulnerable* in terms of their dependency ratios. Couple extended households, while having a comparable household size to those in Franklyn Town, have almost half as many again more workers per household. Consequently, in terms of dependency ratio, *couple extended households, along with nuclear households, are the least vulnerable group in Drumblair, and relatively less vulnerable than their equivalents in Franklyn Town.*

The longitudinal trend of increasing household size has therefore benefitted Drumblair more than it has Franklyn Town, as extended households in Drumblair have been better able to translate their extra adults from dependents into workers.

5.4.2.3 The non-working population, Drumblair

Some 35 per cent of Drumblair's adult population is not working. As Table 5.29 indicates, however, half of this non-working group are either students, in retirement or suffering long-term sickness. If we remove this group, we are left with an unemployed EAP that represents 15 per cent of the total adult population, and 20 per cent of the total EAP, giving an unemployment rate in Drumblair of 20 per cent. Removing the outlying ED NE31 from the data results in a drop of less than a percentage point in the unemployment level.

Table 5.29 Breakdown (%) of adult non-working population by activity, Drumblair, 1992

	MALE		FEMALE		TOTAL	
	Drum1	Drum2	Drum1	Drum2	Drum1	Drum2
Student	42.9	45.5	22.6	27.8	29.6	34.5
Retired/long-term sick	35.7	36.4	20.8	16.7	25.9	24.1
Non-working EAP	21.4	18.1	56.6	55.5	44.5	41.4
TOTAL (%)	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
TOTAL (No.)	28	22	53	36	81	58

Drum1 Refers to original sample survey population

Drum2 Refers to survey population with outlying ED removed

The proportion of adults not working has fallen significantly in Drumblair for both men and women between 1982 and 1992 (see Table 5.11). The male unemployment rate of 8 per cent is below the national rate. The female unemployment rate remains relatively high at 28 per cent. More significant, however, is that only just over half of this group of unemployed women believe themselves to be either unemployed and seeking employment or underemployed. Some 17 per cent of female respondents are in this situation, and a third of these

women cite insufficient education or lack of training for this. This point is underlined further when the outlying ED NE31 is removed. We then find that only 10 per cent of women state that they are unemployed or underemployed, and the majority of this group cite lack of education or training as the reason for this. The outstanding contrast with female unemployment in Franklyn Town is that *the same proportion of women in Franklyn Town (just over 40 per cent) are both technically unemployed and perceive themselves to be either unemployed or underemployed*. This has important implications for the later discussion on the quality, or adequacy, of lower skilled female employment, as well as the relative need for active female participation in the labour force in response to macro-economic shocks and trends.

A closer look at the age-sex distribution of the unemployed EAP of Drumblair (Table 5.24) reveals that *unemployment is particularly low for those adults in the middle years of their working life*. Less than 10 per cent of this unemployed group are aged between 35 and 50 years. In contrast, almost 60 per cent of the group are under 35 years, and over a third under 25 years. The indication is that *youth unemployment is a feature, if not as extreme a feature as in Franklyn Town, of the Drumblair population*. This interpretation is supported by household status (Table 5.25); a third of the unemployed group are children or nephews and nieces of the household head and/or spouse. The indication here is again one of hindered intergenerational mobility, reflecting youth unemployment and/or reduced effective demand, and reflected in increasing household sizes.

It is apparent also that *a relative lack of educational attainment is associated with unemployment in Drumblair* (see Table 5.19). Almost a half of the working population have completed secondary education (the proportion rising to almost 60 per cent when the outlying ED is removed), with over a quarter attaining tertiary level education. In contrast, less than 20 per cent of the unemployed group have completed secondary education (although this rises to 24 per cent with NE31 removed), and none has reached tertiary level education.

5.4.3 Summary of household and intra-household level trends

At the micro level, disaggregation reveals the importance of household structures and intra-household relations in influencing individuals' employment and consumption strategies. Most notably, clear patterns emerge regarding gender, household structure and vulnerability.

An analysis of intra-household relations has revealed that headship and household structures are two key variables in determining levels of mobility. The putative gender equality implied by the high proportion of female household heads in both areas masks gendered relations of dependency in Franklyn Town, indicated by a strong reliance amongst female heads on external financial support. This has its roots in this group of women's relatively poor market capacity. Characteristically, they have low educational levels and low mobility under the necessity of balancing their (prospective) productive with existing and increasing domestic roles.

The relationship between household structures and vulnerability can again be differentiated between the two residential areas. The relatively high proportion of extended households in both communities reflects the role that households play in absorbing individuals whose mobility has been limited by internal and external shocks and trends. The difference, however, lies in the greater ability of Drumblair adult members to secure 'adequate' employment and generate income for their household. Youth unemployment levels in Franklyn Town are a particular problem, and reflect this differential in the ability of adults to translate their labour potential into financial reward and security.

In Franklyn Town it is single female headed households, 63 per cent of which are extended in structure, which have the highest dependency ratios and the highest levels of vulnerability. Mothers tend to be younger in Franklyn Town, and female household heads have a higher proportion of child dependents than in Drumblair. This increases their domestic burden and means that there are more individuals

in the household with no immediate potential for income generation.

The increase in female workers observed for Franklyn Town is particularly evident amongst female headed households, as 61 per cent of these heads have 'stretched' their time by taking on a productive role. Meanwhile, in extended households female participation has helped reduce dependency ratios despite increasing household size. In middle class households female headship doesn't bring with it the same associations of vulnerability, as women are more likely to be de jure household heads who have the independence and security of owning their own property.

The extension of households in Drumblair to absorb extra household members is also less of a household-threatening trend, in that members have a greater market capacity and are more likely to be able to work and generate income. In both cases, however, it is nuclear households that are afforded the greatest security by household productive workers.

5.5 Summary

The sample survey reveals several clear trends in employment characteristics among the population of Kingston. There has been a significant increase in the proportion of the adult population in work. In Franklyn Town the majority of men remain within the formal sector, but have shifted out of production and related activity into 'spurious' tertiary sector work. In contrast, the increased entry of women into the workforce has not been marked by a shift in their predominance in any one sector. The increase has been absorbed in part by tradeable activity in the productive industries, either in the formal sector or through subcontractual relations in the informal sector. Apart from this uptake, women have found work in traditional employment areas, most notably petty service and sales activity. These activities are characterised by their low capital intensity and high labour

input. The increase in the adult workforce from Drumblair is significant but less dramatic than that of Franklyn Town. The unemployment rate for the adult population of Drumblair is now closely comparable to the national average. Both men and women are based overwhelmingly in formal sector 'protected' professions, and there has been an intensification of their participation in white collar occupations over the ten year period. Men remain more likely to be in professional jobs, while women's increased employment has been most dramatic in administrative posts. In Franklyn Town it is single female headed households that have highest dependency ratios. In Drumblair single female heads tend to be more secure and have fewer child dependents, while extended households are better able to translate their income earning potential into financial security.

The Franklyn Town population is not as spatially mobile as many might expect. Less than a quarter of the adult population have moved more than four times indicating a friction effect on mobility caused by supply and demand imbalances in the housing market. In Drumblair there has been a similar level of previous residential mobility among the population. In both communities approximately half of the present population moved to Kingston from outside the KMA, and this is reflected in the prevalence of farmers amongst parental occupations.

There are strong indications of intergenerational mobility amongst the Drumblair respondents. The younger adults have achieved higher levels of education, and a large minority of white collar individuals have parents who are from an urban working class or rural background. There has also been an improvement in educational attainment among the Franklyn Town population, but the socioeconomic characteristics of the resident population confirms the relative position of the area allocated by Knight and Davies. There has not, in other words, been a marked socioeconomic shift in the Franklyn Town population in the last ten years. Their educational improvement mirrors national level trends, and there has not been an 'upward' shift into white collar professions.

CHAPTER 6

CAUSALITY IN JAMAICAN URBAN ADJUSTMENT: AN ANALYSIS OF THE IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to pick up on themes arising out of the statistical evidence presented in chapter 5 in an attempt to deepen understanding of the macro-meso-micro links that have become apparent through quantitative analysis. The following discussion takes its framework from Figure 1.1, and interprets the experiences of individuals⁸² from the two survey areas within the macro-meso trends that were introduced in Section 1.3, and discussed with reference to micro-level outcomes in Chapter 5. What is emphasised through the course of the chapter are the implications for vulnerability - and thus for mobility - of the various strategies adopted by households and individuals within households in response to external 'shocks' and trends.

Section 6.2 analyses the implications of macroeconomic trends for income raising strategies and mobility chances, paying particular attention to the household status of individuals, and the degree of security afforded them by asset ownership and their relationships with partners and other individuals within and outside the household.

Section 6.3 establishes, for the convenience of the discussion, a dualistic division between consumption for subsistence and consumption for mobility. Access to

⁸² The names of all individuals interviewed in the survey areas, and mentioned in this chapter, have been changed. The initials 'Dr' indicate that the individual lives in Drumblair. Similarly, the initials 'FT' indicate Franklyn Town as the place of residence.

consumption goods and services covered by the first of these categories - encompassing food, utilities, health and transport - clearly influences, though perhaps not quite so directly, the mobility chances of individuals. Concentrating on education and property under the second category is therefore an acknowledgement of the very direct relationship that exists between these variables and mobility. Again attention is focused throughout the section on the various channels through which individuals and households are able to access income in order to meet practical and/or strategic needs.

Section 6.4 looks at the very direct 'escape route' of international migration, and explores the constraints on, and motivations behind a decision to migrate abroad.

6.2 Employment and Income Accessing Strategies

6.2.1 The Expansion of Low-Skill, Low-Wage, Female Employment

The implications of *lack of qualifications, lack of capital* and *reproductive responsibilities* for women's employment are brought out by looking at the restrictions on employment opportunities perceived by Miss Dixon (FT). Miss Dixon became pregnant while at Vineyard Town secondary school (she could not get into Secondary High school having failed the common entrance exam). She has no cash income, and has not worked for two years. Her last job had been working in a bar for J\$280 per week, usually from 8.00 am to 12.00 pm/1.00 am during the week and longer at weekends. She would like either a babysitting job or to work in a store/haberdashery, "but me caan get none". If she were to get a job she would have to leave her son at a creche (J\$80 per week), or alternatively with her sisters.

Despite these restrictions on entrance into the workforce, she has witnessed increasing participation by women in the production and service sectors:

One time women never used to work. They used to stay home and look

after the man clothes and them food and them house, but now they have to go out there working. Is how time running; man alone can't really do every 'ting and women have fi help him....'cos tings is harder. The harder life get the more we have fi work.

The effect of this *combined reproductive and productive role* on the family is that "sometime women tired bad". The only free day - Sunday -has to be taken up in "cleaning, cooking and washing pickneys":

You have some good man that help you, but you have some not help you - the work could a kill you and no business - they just find another woman and carry on. They just feel for them not supposed to do nutten through them a man.

6.2.1.1 Expansion of female employment in Export Processing Zones

The expansion of formal sector 'unprotected secondary' employment for women in light manufacturing has been noted in Chapter 1 and documented in Chapter 5. Miss Bassett (FT), in commenting on changes in the nature of job opportunities for women over the last ten years, singles out the expansion of the garment industry, and also believes that there is an over-supply of workers which forces down pay and working conditions:

For women they build up a new factory on Marcus Garvey Drive; they call it the Free Zone. But I wouldn't work there; too much women work there and them don't pay much....sometime you can't even sit down when you're tired.... and I don't like to slave.

Miss Brown (Dr) is working in the Free Zone on Marcus Garvey Drive, for a Hong Kong textile company that produces clothes (shorts, pants, blouses and dresses) for export. She gets paid hourly: J\$7.50 per hour (about J\$300 for a six day week). If she gets sick they have a sick bay at the factory. If she has to stay away from work through sickness they do not pay her. Furthermore if you are sick for more than three days you have to get a doctor's sick note. If people stay away from work or take a stand against the Company they can be fired. She does not know of any union representation in existence. She signed a company disclaimer (i.e if anything happens to her they are not responsible) but is not aware of ever having signed a contract.

She estimates the breakdown of employees by gender at about 70 per cent female to 30 per cent male. The men are employed in pressing and cutting, while the women do the sewing, checking for quality, pressing, and constructing boxes to pack the clothes in.

The machinists work on a piece-rate system. This means that if they work fast they can earn more than those employed on an hourly rate; up to J\$1000 per week. Despite the potential of earning more money in the machinist section, Miss Brown would still rather stay in quality control, which she says is easier work.

Women commute from a wide area to the Free Zone, from as far afield as Spanish Town, Bull Bay and Linstead. Some employees have worked at the factory for over five years "cos job is very hard to find". But some leave quickly because the working conditions are so hard. They have to stand up all day, apart from a one-hour lunch break, and sometimes do an hour overtime. Promotion opportunities at the factory are not evident to her.

She works from 7.00 am to 4.00pm (5.00pm with overtime). This means that she has to leave her yard at 6.00am, get a bus downtown, then another bus out to Marcus Garvey Drive. She usually reaches home just before 5.00pm. The *importance of extended reproductive support networks* to Miss Brown as a single female household head supporting children is brought out here. Her friends in the yard mind her daughter between when she gets home from school until her daughter Clarissa gets home.

Miss Brown believes that job opportunities at the Free Zone have expanded over the last few years, and that there is still a great demand for the jobs:

better to work and get a lickle something than just sit down and do nothing cause 'tings is very dear.....its not that them like it you know.

This view that there is still a great demand for jobs in garment factories is challenged, however, by Mr. Stanley of the Planning and Project Development

Division of the government's 'Human Employment And Resource Training' (HEART) agency.⁸³ Their six-week 'Garmex', low-grade operator programme is not proving too attractive to trainees. Miss Bassett's (FT) assertion that she 'doesn't like to slave' is aptly placed in context by the revelation that *women are not taking places because of the sweatshop conditions and low wages*. This is also true of data entry, construction and agriculture sectors. There is now the joint problem in garment and data entry of people leaving the factories and less people coming in to be trained.

There was a lot of excitement in the mid-1980s that the '807 approach'⁸⁴ would be an introduction into the garment industry. But, according to Mrs. McKenzie they did not take the opportunity to develop a domestic garment industry in terms of investment in product engineering etc, which they are only now getting into. The new approach to training is not just skill development but engineering capability and product design.

⁸³ HEART was set up in 1982 to produce quality workers as a response to unemployment among young people and in an effort to strengthen the productive base of the economy. It was also intended that HEART would expand training opportunities and coordinate & monitor training system-wide. USAID helped them build and equip four academies [Stoneyhill-commercial skills; Portmore-building skills; Garmex (Kingston) and Kennilworth (Hanover)-garment assembly]. HEART is a statutory organisation, originally under the Ministry of Finance but now under the Ministry of Education.

The idea was to prevent parish out-migration by having an academy in each parish. Other academies/schools established since its inception include tourism and cosmetology. The mission statement talks of "sectors relevant to national development priorities". The base has also been expanded to include a National Training Agency (since 1991) with responsibility for governance.

Its sectoral priorities are set by the economic policy unit of the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) and the investment arm of the government, JAMPRO, according to their identification of sectors with export potential. Over the last few years garments, furniture, tourism and agriculture have shown most potential. Other sectors are important in reducing the flow of foreign exchange out of the country; for example information processing.

HEART is now funded by a 3 per cent levy on firms that have a wage bill of \$7,222 per month. They can either train the number of people that their wage bill dictates, not train but hand over the 3 per cent or part-train and part-levy.

⁸⁴ 'Super 807' is a preferential trading agreement, established in February 1986, through which CBI-eligible countries are granted unlimited access to US markets for textile/apparel exports, provided they are produced from US fabric.

A typical Garmex trainee has no CXC's and most have difficulty passing the HEART Grade 9 equivalent, so that they have to give them a Grade 4 equivalent and an aptitude test, which involves simple adding and subtracting but no word problems. They are 21-30 year olds who left school early, have children and need a little money. But for many mothers, having to pay for daily transport,⁸⁵ lunch and child minding, along with the cost of cleaning work clothes, it is just not worth their while. It is true also of the data processing industry which starts at J\$250-350 per week. Opportunities for promotion are there; bosses say that if people stick around in data processing they can be earning up to J\$1,200 per week. HEART is seeing if it can work with the private sector to cut down the length of training so as to encourage women to whom the *opportunity cost* of training is too high.⁸⁶

6.2.1.2 Expansion of employment through 'putting out' relations

The garment industry also operates on an *informal, putting-out basis*. Under this system employees rights are further weakened, to the point where the national minimum wage can be ignored and workers have few protective rights.

Miss Bassett (FT) is a single household head, supporting four children, and receives *no regular financial support from outside the household*. She benefits from *extended reproductive help and financial 'credit' from neighbours in her yard*, and *has family in the US* - mother, sisters, aunt and uncle and cousins - *who send her US\$50, perhaps three times a year* (Christmas, Easter and September). *Very much dependent on her own labour power for survival*, she had just found employment two weeks previously, after looking for work for a year. She now works in a local garment workshop, making baby diapers, kiddies shirts and vests on a subcontractual basis for local retailers. The workshop itself is run by a

⁸⁵ Public transport fees have also risen, from 80 cents to J\$2, and since the interviews were conducted have risen again.

⁸⁶ At the time of the interview, training in data entry took four months, at a cost of \$12,000, or more if it is a residential course.

woman and employs about twenty workers, all women, aged between 17 and 35. Her first week's wage was J\$200 (£6) but she was been told that her second week's wage would be J\$300 (£9), which represents the national minimum wage (set in October/November, 1992):

its not really good but its what you can deal with right now;....just to earn some money you'll do anything.⁸⁷

Pay is calculated on a piece-rate basis, so that more experienced employees who do trimming and pressing on the machine can get J\$500 (£16) and over per week. She seemed unsure about sickness allowance and other employee benefits but did not think that these were offered to employees. She also did not know anything about union representation, but is paid cash-in-hand and therefore has little or no security.

Miss Bassett's productive role is now added to her reproductive responsibilities. During the week she gets up at 5.00 am to get the girls ready for school and get herself ready. She spends an hour and a half cooking (although "sometime no food to cook") and washing in the evening, and on top of this sometimes has to wash her son's uniform; "when I finish that I tired like a log". *Her daughters share the reproductive burden* by washing the dishes and sweeping the yard.

Although Miss Bassett's family connections in the States bring her an additional source of income, albeit at long intervals, *this has detrimental effects on her economic relationship with her youngest child's father*, who either believes that his son does not need his support, or is using the remittance flows as an excuse, along with his having to support two other children, for not playing the financial role expected of him:

[he] feel that I have it [sufficient money] through my people is in the

⁸⁷ A week after the interview, Miss Brissett took a few days off work to try and sort out new accommodation, but has decided not to return to it, partly because her boss only payed her \$200 for her second week's work.

States...and him say him have two more daughter too...so him not supporting.

She does not have any money in a bank and has never borrowed money. She has not heard of any low-interest loan programmes, such as that offered by the Micro-enterprises Development Agency (MIDA).

6.2.1.3 Informal sales and services trends

It was established in Chapter 5 that the expansion of informal sector sales activity amongst low-income women was characterised by low capital-intensity and poorly remunerated petty sales from yards and small shop ownership. In contrast *those sales sector workers in higher capital intensity occupations - market site higglers and informal commercial importers - were poorly represented* amongst the 1992 Franklyn Town female EAP.

This expansion of informal sector sales is therefore questioned for its 'adequacy', particularly in terms of poor remuneration and 'overemployment' (long hours with little return). The trend of increasing entrance into this 'inadequate' activity is happening, furthermore, at a time when purchasing power amongst the local community that constitutes the market for these goods is diminishing. In this way high inflows of entrants into the informal sales sector are saturating it, raising further questions about its capacity to sustain employment growth with adequate remuneration. Hence Miss Bassett (FT), for example, in contemplating a shift into sales activity, argues that there are already too many higglers competing over the local market: "it would be slow... there is too much people have the same thing".

The argument that reduced effective demand combined with increased supply places a ceiling on the capacity of the informal sector to cope with new entrants applies equally to services. The relative contraction of service sector activity amongst the Franklyn Town female EAP, although within the context of an absolute increase in the female workforce, hints at this. Such considerations deter

Miss Bassett from shifting into the service sector, and her comments reflect the above interpretation. Of cosmetology, for example, she comments that "there's a lot around the place", and also points to the expense of cosmetology services prohibiting consumption: J\$250 for a jerry curl, J\$150 to cream hair and J\$80 for a wash.

She does mention opportunities for doing a day's washing for other people (both in Franklyn Town and uptown) which pays J\$100 plus lunch, and which along with domestic work, was revealed to be the most important service sector activity for Franklyn Town women (see Table 5.6). Reliance on doing 'a day's work' however, reflects underemployment and instability amongst those workers. Reliance on domestic work also becomes more insecure in the face of eroded middle class purchasing power. She does believe, however, that more recently there has been an increase in domestic workers, some of whom sleep in during the week and some who come home every night. She has a friend who earns J\$300 per week plus meals as a domestic helper.

One of the most dramatic declines in recent years has been the exit of women from informal commercial importing. Miss Lindsay (FT), for example, has abandoned importing in the face of rising overheads, expanding supply and contracting demand. She argues that women⁸⁸ are drawn into informal commercial importing in the first place by the combination of limited opportunities elsewhere and the demands placed on single female household heads in their productive role:

that is the easiest thing to do caw you can't get no work so....if you have the money it better you do a little buying and selling...Most of the women them are mother and father for them children so them have fi find a way out and something fi do and that is the easiest thing you know.

⁸⁸ Most ICIs are single women, with children, aged anything between 18 and 50. When the women are on trips abroad they pay someone to look after their children or leave them with family. Miss Lindsay used to leave the children with her mother, or by themselves until their father got in from work.

Miss Lindsay is 29 years old and rents rooms in a tenement building with partner Rudolph and their three children aged 13, 11 and 8. Rudolph is presently employed as a tyre dresser at a garage on the Spanish Town Road, *and therefore the household is not dependent on her income alone*. This perhaps is a significant factor behind Miss Lindsay's decision to give up informal commercial importing.

She started importing clothes as an ICI in the early 1980s, as she could not get a job and it was the easiest thing to do. Again *the importance of extended networks is apparent, in this context in the raising money to invest in income earning activity*; "you have friends doing that [informal commercial importing] and they tell you and give you a start".

Hence she saved enough money to buy her first consignment of goods by using the 'partner' system⁸⁹ and "saving a lickle five five dollar".

She started going to Curacao and Haiti because it was cheaper to fly there than to Panama (at that time J\$600 for a return flight to Curacao and J\$800 to Haiti. She flew out on Tuesday and would return on Thursday. Initially she would take with her about US\$300 and bought shirts, shorts and children's clothes. She would usually go with a group of friends so that they could pool together to buy, say, a dozen shirts and then share the profits, and by so doing "stretch the money".

Not all the foreign exchange could be spent on purchasing goods; she had to "leave back a money" for hotel bills (US\$5 per night) and to pay the overweight luggage fee.

On returning to Jamaica she used to take the cheaper clothes to Falmouth (on the

⁸⁹ This is system of money-saving which also enables an individual to access a large sum of money at a pre-arranged time. A group of friends deposit an agreed amount of money into a central kitty, and then take it in turns to withdraw the lump sum from the kitty by arrangement with the group.

north coast) to sell wholesale to local higglers from Montego Bay. She would also take orders from friends in Kingston. Each consecutive trip would increase the level of disposable income which she could reinvest in foreign exchange for the next trip ("each time you sell you go up a lickle"). Hence once into the groove she might make US\$150 profit on each trip.

Talking about why she stopped importing, she says that after buying food and paying bills "you nah make nutten you know. Nutten. Them feel say we a make money. They try make every'ting hard fi we...so me jus' say, 'leave it alone, yaa, don' bother; too much 'eadache".

Commenting on changes in import laws implemented by the Jamaican government over the last few years, Miss Lindsay points to the *introduction of income tax on ICIs*⁹⁰ as one of the harshest measures, believing that the government felt the ICIs were too successful:

Most of the time cos them feel say we make a bag o' money. They wouldn't like know [i.e. they do not want to hear anything different].

When it is suggested that they are trying to stop people importing she agrees but does not know why:

but you pay out there so and fi come back, but you never know which part start sell.....Sometime when them done charge you out there so, you pay, you comin' like you buy it over again....it a foolishness. Me no know why them haffi charge so much for tax. No man, it too much man....caw them [the goods you've bought] would a stay 'pon you and no sell. Sometime the women down there for the whole week and nutten no sell; two weeks and nutten no sell. If you can't sell the goods you've bought what you a go do. You have you children you haffi send school or your bill them a pay. Bare foolishness a gwaan.

Miss Lindsay's reaction to the suggestion that there is a widespread perception

⁹⁰ The government introduced this attempt to tax ICIs in 1986 by indicating that in order to clear goods through customs the traders had to register and be assigned a Business Enterprise Number (BENO), which in turn required an Income Tax Number and a National Insurance Number (Taylor, 1988).

that many ICIs have become wealthy through their trading, is to distinguish between those individuals that started importing from the late 1960s before profit margins were reduced by legislation and, latterly by the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar, and the mass of the later starting ICIs:

only those can make fi dem money already and have fi dem house. We who jus' come....we nah get nutten at all now. Notice, all...de big one dem. We nah hear from them long time there, and if them not a in it from long time them wouldn't bother wi'it now, cos I have friends dem in the arcade; big, big ladies dem and them saying...nutting no inna it now. Now you might just make back your fare only.

She argues that (deregulation means that) *the big domestic stores can now import freely* and therefore the need for an informal import sector has been effectively removed:

The big women in the 'sixties used to buy in Panama and sell to the stores, but now the stores man dem now go buy dem 'tings demself. So every way you get lef'.

She also believes that there are *too many importers competing for a market whose real income has been dramatically reduced*. A woman from the office which allocates BENOs (Business Enterprise Numbers) called Miss Lindsay recently to confirm that she was still at the same address. She was not surprised to hear that Miss Lindsay had stopped "caw she know that everybody has stopped".

She stopped importing three or four years ago, and has *resorted to petty sales from her yard*, selling bag juice, cigarettes and sweeties, and occasionally buying "a lickle wholesale earring, clip to sell". She sees *no openings in the job market for ex-ICIs*: "me nah see nutten for me...no work nat here". She cannot sew and does not want to work for other people, especially when they only pay J\$200 per week; "what you buy? Plus you have bills".

Miss Davison represents those ICIs that have continued to operate in the face of narrowing profit margins. She has been an ICI since 1988. She started after she was made redundant from Pheonix printery, where she was a book binder.

Encouraged by friends who were ICIs, she used the *redundancy money* (J\$3000) to start importing. She buys clothing - shirts and children's clothes - from Curacao every month (spending between US\$500 and US\$700⁹¹) and then sells wholesale to local higglers, who in turn "sell in the country or go".

When she first started importing you did not have to have tax compliance because customs did not officially clear any goods. The government tightened up on tax compliance in the 1990s, so that *ICIs now have to pay income tax* through BENO registration on top of the (increased) import duties. She pays about 10 per cent tax on her income, which is sorted out by her vendors' association.⁹² *Duties have been increasing steadily* over the last few years, and the *customs officials are now stricter*, counting items one by one.

In the "early days" (the 1970s), when duties were cheaper and their imposition more relaxed, and when foreign exchange was cheaper, ICIs would make greater profits. These women would buy houses and "drive posh cars". Some are still involved in informal importing, and tend to have established arrangements with big stores, enabling them to get immediate payment and thus a faster turnover of capital. Others have gone abroad or 'retired'.

Unlike Miss Lindsay she does not think that informal commercial importing is saturated "cos everybody [still] sell" because "they have to wear clothes and they have to eat food, so the two main things are OK".

⁹¹ Buying US dollars for purchasing goods in Curacao involves making an appointment at the bank. This may come too late for your trip, and in any case allows for an exchange of US\$150-200 maximum at any one time, making it necessary to make several appointments with different banks. The government is attempting to cut out informal, or black market, foreign exchange transactions by trying to increase the availability of foreign exchange within the formal banking system while increasing the punitive disincentives to black market purchases.

⁹² Miss Davison is a member of the Dunstan Whittingham Vendor's Association. They deal with Tax Compliance Certificates (TCCs) for a fee of J\$300 every three months. Other expenditure deducted from her income includes National Housing Trust contributions, educational tax, National Insurance and Income Tax: "the lickle money gone down again".

She later states however that customers are able to barter ICIs down because the increasing numbers of other suppliers. She points out that the market space is being expanded in the face of oversupply downtown by an expansion of sales from the home to friends and people in the neighbourhood. Hence international higglers can still operate and there is still operation space for newcomers, but at a vastly reduced rate of profit because of government crackdowns and the lower value of the dollar, which affects the cost of both goods purchased abroad and the cost of air travel. It now costs J\$4818 (£150) to fly to Curacao; when Miss Davison first started you could get a flight for J\$1000 on a special offer.

Miss Davison has to continue importing simply because she *does not have anything else she can do*. She believes that she does not have an alternative to this type of employment. Even so she would not like to work with anybody else, valuing her self-employed status "because you know, when you do this now you handle your own money".

She is doing more trips now in order to try to save more. In an attempt to increase turnover to facilitate more frequent trips, Miss Davison has shifted from selling from her house to selling to the arcade higglers downtown. This enables her to get cash in the hand more quickly, which is critical in speeding up the process of buying foreign exchange for each trip. If business is bright she can do a trip once every two weeks: she did two trips in December.

6.2.2 Income Raising Under Reduced Real Wages

In response to the devaluation of public and private sector salaries and pensions, individuals have established clearly identifiable strategies in order to reduce vulnerability. These include, notably, occupational shifts and/or adoption of secondary occupations. Arising out of the following case studies is the importance of assets and/or financial support in allowing a shift into self-employment in the face of high interest rates on loans and increased prices. The strategy adopted by a fairly large minority of workers in Drumblair of taking on a secondary

occupation is shown to depend on flexible working hours as well as necessary assets. Overall, within the context of public and private sector rationalisation and an increase in self-employment, there is a discernable shift from the security afforded salaried middle class professionals by elite level of educational attainment, to the strategic advantages granted those households which are able to utilise asset ownership.

6.2.2.1 Occupational shifts and/or multiple occupations

Mr. Harrison (Dr) feels that the most significant macro-economic changes over the last few years that have affected him have been those that have *prevented him from achieving his aspirations for his family while in salaried employment* at the Bank of Jamaica. He saw an *effective reduction in his salary through devaluation* and a raised cost of living.

The *second household income* from Mrs. Harrison's job has not only insulated them from the impact of inflation on the cost of living, but has allowed him to *take the risk of setting up his own business*, an attempt to break free from the *constraints on income earning imposed by regular employment*. She had been in international travel services, but was made redundant when the company went bust in 1992. She then worked for three or four months as a management consultant, where she received a substantial increase in salary. She is now also considering leaving her job and concentrating on the accounting arm of her husband's company, again because it would give her independence, and she would be able to earn more. It would also give their children a business to come into.

His company was registered in 1991, while he was still at the bank, but was not highly active. After he was made redundant in October 1991 (he was a senior internal auditor, and asked to be among the number that were made redundant last year), he was then able to throw himself into building up the company (again cushioned by his wife's income), and in fact it has picked up quicker than he

anticipated. He had been at the Bank for 17 years and his career had not been progressing as quickly as he had hoped. Besides, he wanted to go on his own; to be "the architect of my own future".

Miss Callow (Dr) has observed the *large outflow of (particularly younger) teachers, attempting to move into the financial sector*. This trend, she believes, is universal within the Jamaican secondary education system as private schools are no better paid than state schools. The next generation of teachers are those that did BA degrees and could not get jobs elsewhere, so opt for teaching as a stop gap until they can move into another profession. Additionally, now that there are user fees introduced at UWI this will discourage students further from training for a profession which does not remunerate them. The outcome, she argues, is that there will be less and less qualified and motivated teachers in the education system.

Teachers of Miss Callow's generation have few occupational routes open to them. She is a high school maths teacher who retired four years ago at the age of fifty five, but could not get by on her pension, so *had to go back to teaching* after a few months. She returned to her previous school to teach part-time until January last year, then got at her present school teaching full-time.

She now gets a *state pension* - not much, just over J\$1,000 per month - on top of her salary. She also does *extra maths tuition* from home which brings in J\$40 per lesson, feeling that she cannot charge more because everyone else is in the same situation. She has cousins abroad but she cannot turn to them for financial help. She has no siblings to get help from and only one daughter as a potential money earner.

Mrs. Simons (Dr) had always intended to *return from retirement* as a means of gaining a state pension on top of an income. She is now teaching full-time at a

private school, having previously taught at a state school.⁹³ Several of her colleagues were "compelled" to retire at the same time, particularly those who had not bought a house and *needed the lump sum of money that comes with retirement*. Many of these people have come back in, but to a private prep school. Like Miss Callow she also has adopted *other income earning strategies*.⁹⁴ These include doing occasional workshops, adjudicating at festivals for the Ministry of Education and teaching part-time upgrading English at a factory in the Free Zone (6 hours a week).

Mr. Finnigan (Dr) left UWI in June 1991 with a BSC in Economics & Accounting and was employed in the Ministry of Finance. Prospects for promotion are not wide because promotion goes on seniority & qualifications rather than merit. Despite the two pay rises that Mr. Finnigan has received over the last two years, notably a 75 per cent salary jump following liberalisation of the exchange rate, he is still behind the rate of inflation.

At the moment he is *teaching two adult evening classes* at Excelsior Community College - an 'O' level class and a first year diploma class - which brings an extra J\$2,000 per month. But he will stop teaching from May to concentrate on his part-time studies in Law. Apart from their joint daily income and his evening teaching they do not have any other sources of income. His girlfriend's income

⁹³ Teaching in the private sector does not give her a higher salary than the state sector. In 1984/5 it paid 15 per cent over the government salary, but as the latter started to go up it levelled out the difference. The advantages of the private sector are that you have smaller classroom sizes, better access to materials and shorter working hours.

⁹⁴ Mrs. Simons has developed a philosophy around diversity of income earning strategies that seems particularly poignant to the need for multiple occupations under economic crisis. She argues that Jamaicans have traditionally believed that to have one profession or skill is sufficient. She has always taught her children to equip themselves to be able to make a living in all circumstances. A lot of (formal sector employee) Jamaicans have jobs but if anything goes wrong they are in trouble, and this is a phenomenon of both the public and private sector employees:

I think everybody in the world should have more than one skill and that the education system should provide for that...I tell my pupils if you're going to be a doctor learn dressmaking.

from her work at a garment factory is unimportant to the household income, and he does not impose upon relatives for income because he would rather remain independent.

6.2.2.2 Access to fixed-capital assets

As a means of assessing vulnerability, the degree and nature of their access to fixed assets is critical (see Section 3.2.3). Under macroeconomic adjustment, there is a shift of opportunity away from those dependent on their own labour and on family networks, towards those able to invest in the financial sector and in the consumption sphere. In this way the dividing line between owners and non-owners of fixed assets takes on an added significance. In Franklyn Town individuals are separated by ownership of property, either in the country or in Franklyn Town itself. Rent from rooms let out in an owned yard separates landlord from tenant, while access to land in the country could mean a source of food as well as a residential escape route. Drumblair respondents are clearly divided along these lines, with the traditional salary earners being forced into a reliance on their assets, or into financial speculation, in the face of the real and effective devaluation of their earnings.⁹⁵ Middle class consumers are divided not only by sector - between renters and property owners - but temporally by the date of purchase. Those residents of Drumblair that bought property before prices began to spiral after the mid 1980s, are now sitting on property far in excess of its purchase value (see Section 6.3.3.2).

Apart from extending her working options - by coming back from retirement and by taking on extra tutoring - Miss Callow (Dr) *has turned to her fixed assets as a route to accessing extra income*. By turning her car port into a little flat two and a half years ago, she has been able to rent it out for J\$1,600 per month (up

⁹⁵ The latest round of pay rises gave teachers an increase of 60 per cent in the first year and 30 per cent in the second. The whole of the public sector received pay rises well above the usual level of 12.5-15 per cent. The teacher's offer, which will amount to over 100 per cent over the two years, is much higher than they are used to getting, despite the fact that the cost of living index is so much greater than in the past.

from J\$1,200 in January) plus electricity. She has the option of selling up and buying a smaller property, but those are very expensive anyway. Once her daughter leaves she would be able to live in the flat and rent the house. She only pays a little on the mortgage - J\$653 per month - because it was twelve years ago that she bought the house, so it is comparatively low.

She is now also *considering entering into stocks and shares* for the first time in her life, but thinks about it with trepidation. Her colleagues are more or less in the same boat. *None of them is trained to invest.* She would be able to access money capital to invest by *selling off land* that her mother has in the country.

The rental income from the property that Mr. Kemp (Dr) owns on his land in the hills is the *more important source of income* than his pension for him, although the land itself, while increasing in value, is a *frozen asset* until sold. He used to deal in real estate as an investment strategy, but sold most of his lands off as he became older, partly for peace of mind (the hassle of dealing with it) and also because of access to town (his wife still drives, but to a minimum) and with the kids gone. He does not intend to build on the land now, but thinks the children will benefit from the remaining land in the future.

Mr. Digby (Dr) bought the lot on which his house now stands fifteen years ago *with the financial assistance of his daughter.* He has made an apartment upstairs *which he has rented out* in the past to increase his income. At the moment he is looking for 'suitable' tenants.

The Harrisons (Dr) moved into their present house in 1985, paying J\$200,000 for it and also receiving a concessionary 3 per cent mortgage rate through Mr. Harrison's employment at the Bank of Jamaica. Now self-employed he no longer has this privilege and their mortgage is effectively doubled. *His wife's income, however, has allowed him to make this shift.* The house is now worth J\$2.1 million. He revealed that at the same time that he bought his present house he

bought a two-bedroom National Housing Trust (NHT) house, on a low-interest mortgage, where they lived for a little while, when times were tougher at the Bank of Jamaica, before moving to the present house. They continue to maintain this house, *and rent it, which comfortably covers the cost of the mortgage*. This second house is valued at a little less than the Springway house, and he would prefer to sell it of the two. He has put both houses on the market for a little over J\$2.2 million, and if someone offers him the full price, preferably for the NHT house, *he would buy a lot of land in Kingston and sink the rest of the money into the business and expand it*.

6.2.2.3 Property investment for entrepreneurial profit-making

The reason why real estate continues to inflate, argues Mr. James (Dr) is that *Jamaica is sufficiently small for the market to be manipulated*. There are certain big players⁹⁶ who, if land prices were to fall several companies would take a significant cut in the value of their fixed assets. Therefore while the value of real estate "is all inflationary, there's nothing solid to it", if that value did start to fall you would find certain major people starting to speculate in order to raise inflation. Mr. Harrison (Dr) agrees with this interpretation. He has watched the housing market increase steadily since the mid-eighties, and then accelerate since the devaluation that came with liberalisation. The real estate arm of his business has allowed him to monitor the housing market, and he believes that the price of real estate is not about to burst. Although there has been a steady reduction in the number of buyers due to inflation outstripping salaries, *it is the cash-rich financial sector that is keeping the price of commercial properties up*. Indeed it is because the exchange rate is not fully liberalised that foreign investment is not being encouraged as it should be, and the market continues to be manipulated.

⁹⁶ The insurance company 'Life of Jamaica' for example, has a massive property in New Kingston and an investment portfolio of over JS3 billion. Their whole profitability, argues Mr. Jones, is predicated on these real estate investments:

A large part of the real estate market is just inflation, the fact that people keep it up. If the value started to fall you'd find certain major people starting to speculate so that the prices would stay up.

Potential investors are shying away because the continued instability of the dollar means that they could lose on their investment if the dollar continues to devalue.

Hence for those with *sufficient entrepreneurial zeal*⁹⁷ and the *initial money capital or credit-worthiness* to back it, investment in real estate or property, or the use of real estate as collateral for financial speculation, can be a means of maintaining and/or improving on standard of living. Real estate and property investment in a climate of spiralling land and property prices, provides an avenue for financial profit well beyond the level of survival.

Mr. James (Dr) was able to call on various credit facilities - families, banks etc. - to pursue his investment strategies. He is also able to access collateral for pursuing investment strategies through his involvement in a middle class equivalent of the 'partner system': a group of friends who pass money between themselves.⁹⁸ He believes that it is becoming pretty popular and that its quite widespread, but that you just do not see it. He purchased a town apartment, which he now rents out, for J\$90,000 in 1987. Today it is valued at J\$750,000. This means that he can use this as security to secure further loans. He is considering buying the house that he and his family are now living in, but also believes that investment in farming land - *with a view to exporting specialist crops* - would be

⁹⁷ Mr. James believes that if the people in upper echelons had that sort of entrepreneurial spirit typical of informal commercial importers, Jamaica would not be in its present situation:

The trouble starts when people who are used to getting a pay packet can't meet their expenditure needs. Jamaicans have now been forced to move out of that...so what you find now is that most people earn more money outside their regular jobs...and quite a few brave ones have...left their regular jobs altogether, particularly government workers...its open, its right across Jamaica, only the desperately poor wouldn't have that, and even so they can pick up bottles off the road. So there is an opportunity there...its just a matter of thinking 'do I want to eat or don't I want to eat?'

⁹⁸ He would describe it as a 'bredren system' operating between 'bonafide bredren'. It is interesting how it affects the wives. His wife might say 'I don't know why you're lending him all that money', and he senses it in other wives as well: "but its necessary you know. These women will never understand...this understanding among men".

prudent:⁹⁹

my particular orientation has been, whether the government changes or not, I will succeed, I will get what I want. Whether the policies go up, down, sideways or whatever.

Mr. Finnigan (Dr) also reckons that the best way of investing against inflation in Jamaica is to invest in property. He plans to save regularly with the building society over a four or five year period and then get a mortgage. Property values move with inflation, so that the 'time to buy' is when you have the money. Real Estate continues to inflate, he argues, not being a cyclical process.

Hence for consumers with access to capital, while rampant inflation in the housing market makes initial investment costly but *gives handsome long-term returns on property investment*. In this way middle class consumers are divided not only by sector - between renters and property owners - but temporally by the date of purchase. Those residents of Drumblair that bought property *before prices began to spiral* after the mid 1980s, are now sitting on property far in excess of its purchase value.

As such many young people, even those of Mr. Finnigan's (graduate) educational level, find that the *initial high cost of entry into the housing market is prohibitive*. Mrs. Simons' (Dr) son pays his way in the house ("he wouldn't be here if he didn't"). He told her that previously if he told anyone that he lived with his mother they would scoff; now if he told them this they would say he was lucky.

⁹⁹ I suggest to Mr. James that he is representative of a small group in Jamaican society who through their presence in the only buoyant sector of the economy - the financial sector - and through their education and financial entrepreneurship, have managed to remain upwardly mobile despite economic crisis. He responds that it is not the financial sector as such but the decision to acquire some asset, whatever sacrifice it takes:

The philosophy is 'don't bellyache, something is happening somewhere so align yourself to it'...that is the other side of inflation.

6.2.2.4 Unfavourable conditions for domestic businesses and a shift into production for export and financial services

The documented expansion of the financial sector has provided a fast track to profit-making to those with the qualifications and credit to exploit the market. By contrast small businesspeople are losing out to large companies in the face of escalating mortgages and cost of material inputs.

Mr. Digby (Dr) is a self-employed businessman who runs a photography business in the Constant Spring Plaza. He specialises in portraits and passports, and tends to rely on his long-term customers rather than on impulse custom or advertising. The income from his regular customers is *not keeping pace with the increasing rent and overhead costs*, and he perceives a *dwindling middle class clientele*. At the same time the *cost of materials* for photography has also increased sharply. He buys the cheapest film, but even that still goes up steadily. He now improvises by buying a roll of film and cutting it. He readily admits that *if it were not for the financial input of his daughter he would not be afloat now*.

The last four years have seen a 300 per cent increase in this rent, from J\$2,000 in 1989 to J\$3,000 in early 1992 and then a sudden jump since last year to over J\$6,000; he now owes J\$80-90,000 in backpayments to his landlord. Quite a few places have been locked up in the plaza, but Mr. Digby has been spared thus far because he is a long-term tenant of twenty four years, ever since the Village plaza was first opened. He believes the increases are designed to flush out the smaller, and less profitable businesses. The commercial character of the plaza has changed, being dominated now by household appliance and clothes stores; local companies that are replacing small operators and family businesses.

Mr. Harrison (Dr) now runs an investment, finance and accounting services company. When setting up the company, the real estate arm, effectively brokering (buying and selling), did not take much money to start up. The accounting arm is primarily the concern of his wife, who is a chartered accountant. The finance

arm was *started using his redundancy capital, along with investment of capital by his good friends.*

Mr. Harrison's *saving and investment strategies* have been concentrated in *ploughing money into the company.* Previously *he had played the stock market* and made money that way. He has 21 acres of *land inherited from his parents,* who are "rural, peasant farmers", in the country. Within the last year he has *started growing pimento for export as a means of diversifying his income earning.* The *foreign exchange aspect of pimento export* attracted him to it. He has a cousin in England and he is hoping to set up a market through him. His parents look after the pimento.

6.3 Expenditure and Access to the Means of Consumption

6.3.1 Introduction

In Jamaica, cuts in social spending throughout the 1980s exacerbated the crises affecting several sectors of the Jamaican population (see **Figures 1.2 and 1.3**), and removed the safety net that had helped sustain the poorest sector (Levitt, 1991; Anderson and Witter, 1991). At the same time the effective demand of the poor has been severely reduced, as a devaluation in their earning capacity has combined with accelerating increases in the cost of consumption. Increases in subsistence expenditure on this scale reduce disposable income still further for the urban poor in general. This becomes apparent in its effect on particular groups of individuals from the sample survey and interviews carried out in 1992/3. At the level of survival many families, particularly those dependent on a single wage earner and with little or no external support, are consuming less meat, fish and milk and are replacing regular meals with snacks.

A single female household head, Miss Bassett (FT), has a single source of external support: a triennial cash gift of US\$50 from her family in New York.

This money goes on basic, subsistence items. There is no disposable income for utilities (they do not have electricity) or education for herself or her children. Yet this respondent felt that the remittance flows put them in a better position than other households in the yard.¹⁰⁰ The reality is, however, that the prioritising of consumption expenditure on basic items, along with the often unpredictable nature of remittance flows, does not allow for substantive changes in longer term strategies, such as a shift into private consumption in housing, health, education or transport or an investment in the productive sector, for example in starting up a small business.

6.3.2 Consumption Priorities: Subsistence Expenditure

The inflationary impact of devaluation on the price of basic food items is discussed in Chapter 1. For low-income households, the effective demand for services and utilities has been severely constrained by the impacts on disposable income of prices, as the introduction of profitability criteria and the raised cost of oil imports under devaluation combine to push them up. Over 40 per cent of the survey respondents in Franklyn Town have no legal source of electricity and almost a quarter are denied access to water by the combination of rising utility prices and reduced real incomes. Several respondents admitted to illegally bridging overhead lines and bypassing water pipes. During the period of in-depth interviews two respondents narrowly escaped a J\$10,000 fine by being out of their yards when the police came round to cut off the illegal electricity supplies.

Respondents fall into three groups when commenting on their strategies in the face of food price increases. They are able either to continue to consume the same quantity and quality of food, do so at the expense of other consumption items, or to have to reduce overall consumption of food and other goods and services.

¹⁰⁰ Increasingly a small and irregular supply of foreign exchange remittances can distinguish a household from others in the yard. Of the surveyed population in Franklyn Town only 35 per cent receive foreign remittances, almost exclusively from the US, Canada and the UK, and over half of this number receive only 'small' amounts on an 'irregular' basis, 30 per cent receive 'small but regular' sums and 20 per cent 'large' sums on either a regular or irregular basis.

Drumblair respondents were less likely than Franklyn Town respondents to have to make significant compromises in their consumption of subsistence goods and services.

6.3.2.1 Reduced quality and/or quantity of food and reduced expenditure on utilities

Miss Bassett's (FT) consumption priorities from her (J\$200) weekly income are reduced to essential food items. Weekly expenditure at the market downtown alone accounts for the J\$200 ; "banana, seasoning, yam, callaloo, plantain, eggs....and that's it, J\$200 and over".

Citing some current prices for saltfish, chicken back, fish, eggs, tinned milk and bread she says that *these prices are simply too much for the poor people*. She no longer buys milk but drinks mint, vanilla or lemon tea mixed with sugar. She has stopped buying meat, now cooking mostly vegetables. Considering changes in the price of foodstuffs over the last ten years and its implications for her household's consumption, she says:

ten years ago you can get goat and chicken, any amount you want...I don't know why the price gone up 'cos it is the same chicken and the same goat.

She has only just started doing a weekly shop since starting her job:

Before I start working I doesn't go shopping. And I still don't see what I working for, still don't see it, 'cos two days after, no money -the food alone take it up.

She *cannot grow anything in the yard* because of lack of space, and an attempt to rear chickens proved expensive and ultimately failed when most of the first batch died.

She is unable to afford electricity: "I have to 'tief some electric now and then (electricity costs J\$700-1,000 per month) but the place have to repair before ..they

can pass (electricity) through".¹⁰¹ Her phone has been cut off.

Another area of consumption which she has to take into account when considering her finances is health. The Bustamante (public) children's hospital at Upper Camp charges for registration, medicines and for extra treatment. Anyone over twelve years old has to attend the Public hospital downtown whose costs are similar. There used to be a community health clinic in Rollington Town (an adjoining community) "but they closed it down".

Miss Bassett is presently forced into debt in order to maintain access to health care. If she does not have the money to pay for her children's medical charges, she has to owe it to the hospital, and they write to remind her of this. Alternatively she makes use of the credit that is effectively provided her by a local private doctor who is a friend and who will treat her or her children even if she does not have the money:

He say 'money or no money just bring them'...Right now I owe him some money still - don't know when I'm going to pay him but I know I'm going to pay him.

Miss Boyne (FT) also comments that the cost of various basic foods has gone up dramatically. Chicken, and other staples such as flour and rice, have also shot up: "nothing has been left untouched".¹⁰² She estimates that stocking up on basic food alone for the week costs about J\$200. She and her son eat meat and vegetables on some days and make do with snacks on other days. Her son's breakfast is a bowl of porridge. Talking about her consumption over the last few

¹⁰¹ A week after the interview the police spotted the illegal line running from the overhead line into the yard of Miss Bassett and other households. Luckily no one was in the yard at the time, so they avoided a J\$10,000 fine, but now are left with no electricity.

¹⁰² While admitting that she can obtain fruit and vegetables from her sister in Clarendon if she travels out there, she says that she has not visited her sister for three years. This source of basic foods has not therefore been accessed and it is unclear why this is so:

J.D.H.: "So you could get food if you want out there at weekends?"

D.B.: "Yeah but, cho, I'm a loner, so sometimes I don't bother".

years she says that while they still eat meat occasionally, they buy less and therefore eat less than they used to. With respect to health expenditure, if Miss Boyne's son gets sick she takes him to the Bustamante (public) children's hospital and if she gets ill she goes to the Kingston public hospital. The fees for both institutions have gone up; its now "a whole bag 'o' money" to access public health services.

Miss Dixon (FT) does not buy food because she does not have the money, *relying instead on her mother*, who buys and keeps the food at her house. She has no relatives in the country and therefore no other source of food. She cannot grow vegetables in the yard because "them would a 'tief it". She gets food stamps - J\$90 per month, which can be changed for money in some places and in others has to be spent on food -because her baby is under 4/5 years old. The state provides no other direct benefits other than the daily cheap milk and nutribun at school. Miss Dixon's household has not had electricity for a long time. Two weeks previously they had 'bridged the light', but someone informed on them and the police came round to the yard. Luckily they were not in when they came round and so escaped the J\$10,000 fine. She has 'unofficially' bridged the water supply after it was cut off, so her household has a regular, if illegal, supply of water.

The intra-household welfare implications of the differential attitude children's respective fathers towards financial support are clear in the case of Miss Dixon's household. The tendency for some of the children of a household to have different fathers has implications for the life chances of those individual children. Miss Dixon is a twenty two year old 'divorced' single head of household and mother of two children, aged five and one year and three months. Her two children are 'for' different baby fathers. The father of her elder son, Renaldo lives nearby and owns the room that Nadine and her two children live in. He lets them live there rent free and also buys clothes for Renaldo, cooks him an evening meal and pays his school fees. *He is in other words supporting Renaldo directly, rather than*

through Miss Dixon, but expects her to look after Renaldo. The only effective contribution he is making to the household as a whole, despite the fact that he has a full-time job as a supervisor, is to allow them stay in the room rent-free.

In contrast, Miss Dixon has not seen Nevin's (her younger son) father, who lives outside Franklyn Town, for six months now, so has to support Nevin alone. Nevin's father is also working - he runs a betting shop - but because Miss Dixon is not interested in him he is not helping to support Nevin, "to spite me" she believes. Hence while Renaldo gets food and clothes and other support, Nevin is getting what Miss Dixon (and her family) can provide, and Miss Dixon herself is going without. She took Renaldo to the children's hospital recently, for example, and his father paid. Meanwhile she prays everyday that her other son Nevin will not get sick. Thus *intra-household inequality in access to consumption is established*, during a period when she believes the cost of health care, amongst other goods and services, as gone up. Miss Dixon herself goes to the public hospital downtown, where she perceives there to be fewer doctors than at the children's hospital, and where she has to wait hours: "you have to be a dead sometimes before they look 'pon you".

In addition to the weekly food bill for her and her daughter, Miss Brown (FT) has to pay primary school fees and school lunch (J\$20 per day) for her daughter, who walks to school. Miss Brown's own daily expenditure includes an J\$8 bus fare each way, a J\$14 box meal and J\$6 box drink. This adds up to J\$168 per week. The priority consumption for her remaining weekly income (about J\$150) is on food (tomato, scallion, onion, thyme, rice and sugar), soap and bleach. Her income cannot cover meat. *Her sister sometimes gives her money to buy extra things*. She works at a restaurant as a supervisor, having also left school at 17.

6.3.2.2 Maintained quantity and quality of food at expense of other goods and services or vice versa

Miss Callow's (Dr) consumption pattern is not very different; she does not eat any less than she did but *she finds ways of cutting costs*. It is very much a hand-to-mouth existence because she has no savings. Food is the most expensive item in Miss Callow's weekly budget. She buys food weekly, but comments that at the supermarket and you have to spend the same amount to get less. Sometimes she buys items wholesale for the month. Utilities -electricity, telephone and water - can easily take up all your salary if you are not careful. She had to get rid of her old fridge which defrosted automatically, using a lot of electricity. Even though her new fridge was more expensive, she got a little for the old fridge and managed to "squeeze" and buy it. However there is a minimum level of electricity consumption below which she feels 'you cannot go'. Electricity can take up a quarter of your salary. They estimate your electricity and water meters, perhaps for up two three months (the bills are monthly), and then when they do read the meter you have a massive bill to pay. Utility costs have been creeping since the early 1980s she says.

Miss Callow subscribes to a health scheme for government employees, and their families which is arranged through her salary. This covers most of the hospital bills, and dental and optical bills up to J\$4,000 per year. This has cushioned her, but a certain amount is taken from the salary every month. Sometimes she thinks that it is too much to be paying out of her salary, but then she knows that one day she may need it.

The implications for Mrs. Simons (Dr) of reduced purchasing power for monthly expenditure are similar to those of Miss Callow. She has a family of three, so food consumption accounts for over half of expenditure. They have cut down on 'unnecessary' food items, and in particularly imported goods such as American apples and other foods. Hence it is 'luxury' items rather than meat and other foods on which they are cutting right down. She goes for bargains, buying them

wholesale if they have a long shelf-life. After that she buys what she needs. But she does not rush around all the supermarkets looking for bargains because of the price of petrol. Mrs Simons, like many public and private sector employees, *has a health plan* at the school where she works (deducted at source - less than 1 per cent), although it has not been upgraded to keep pace with price rises. An eye examination and a (cheap) pair of glasses cost her nearly J\$4,000, but she was given only J\$250 over two years to cover these costs. Furthermore it does not cover her children because they are over eighteen, although her daughter at the University of the West Indies (UWI) is covered while studying there. In light of these Mrs Simons will consider taking out a health plan when she leaves Queen's.

Mrs. Simons is still able to afford to run her car, *but plans her route so that it is the most fuel-economic*. She is able to walk to work, but her daughter needs the car to go to University every day, as public transport on that route is "difficult to cope with". She bought this car recently and emphasises the high cost of tires and particularly insurance, although her insurance is reduced because she has never had an accident. She never thought that she would keep a car longer than five years. She had the last one for eighteen years, paying J\$3,500 for it new and selling it recently for J\$16,000. Even this was a giveaway as the man who bought it from her sold it the next week for J\$30,000.

For Mrs. Rose (Dr) food and electricity "take away everything" from her monthly expenditure. Mostly food: "food, food, food". She says that the inflationary impact of devaluation on food prices means that now they cannot buy the types of food they used to, and they cannot buy as much food as they used to. Although they eat more or less the same, "some brand names you can't get again". She has stopped shopping weekly and now shops fortnightly, at the market in Crossroads and wholesale at Halfway Tree, buying in bulk and putting it in the deep freeze: she cannot afford supermarket prices every week". Utility prices have also shot up. Although Mrs. Rose has tried to cut down on consumption, she believes that you end up paying the same. Two years ago it was J\$300-400 for the light bill,

now its J\$2,000 (for 2 months) and they are not using anything different. They used to try to consciously cut down (turning off lights and not going in the fridge so often), but it does not work so they have stopped trying. Other expenses include the helper and her present evening classes, which the bank is not paying for: "I'm doing it on my own, just to improve my own self".

The Rose family, like many other employees, *is relatively unaffected by deteriorating quality of public health and the introduction of user fees*, because Mrs. Rose has a family health scheme through her workplace which is deducted at source and is valid at any hospital. The insurance company also pays up to J\$3,000 per year for drugs.

Mr. Addison (Dr) also says that prices have changed "drastically". His light bill has increased between four and sixfold since liberalisation. The telephone bill has increased in a similar fashion. Although cutting down on consumption, Mr. Addison *has been cushioned from price increases and increased user fees by his regular foreign exchange pensions from the UK and Sweden*, where he worked before returning to Jamaica. In addition *his children, all of whom are migrants or circular migrants, provide regular financial support*.

Consumption escalations for Mr. Kemp (Dr) have been "frightening, disturbing". He says of the utility bills, "when they move up they really move up sharply; its very high, its crippling. But the one that is most crippling is your food bill; its ridiculous". His wife does all the budgeting and does a lot of innovations with food but they make sure they have a minimum vitamin intake. Although they make every effort to economise on food and utility consumption, they have not compromised on their consumption of health care.

Health, says Mr Kemp is "very expensive, there's no question about that..but we try to keep ourselves healthy". Doctors are looking for J\$450 a visit. They have stayed outside the public health system "because its almost humiliation..the long wait and the coarse language". Overcoming the shortages and better training of

staff "would ease the pain that the patients face". On non-essential consumption, the Kemps "dine out occasionally". Devon House is nearby and although not cheap the atmosphere is pleasant.

Mr Finnigan (Dr) has few overheads (although plans to get a second hand car) and no children to support. Consequently he is not having to adjust his way of life as much as others. *He also benefits from a preferential rent price on his house*, which is owned by a cousin living in the UK. Mr. Finnigan is planning to arrange a private health plan in addition to the Blue Cross scheme that he gets through work, so as to have additional coverage. The Blue Cross does not cover certain services plus only gives a small percentage to cover private hospital charges. The private plan is only about J\$1,200 per quarter, which is "within my scope". This covers ambulance and about half of the medical expenses. "A lot of Jamaicans" are now "taking the bull by the horns" and getting private cover *because of the "very poor" quality of the public health service*: "its in a shambles". The problems relate to the unavailability of resources, but also:

as a nation..we need to prioritise certain sectors, whether its health, education, law and order - basic infrastructure..Health..should be number one.

The Kingston Public Hospital is "appalling", he says, and the UWI hospital, with one of the finest infrastructures in the Caribbean, has declined over the years, with wards closing and staff leaving due to poor salaries and working conditions.

6.3.2.3 Overall maintained quality of consumption

Miss Davison's (FT) most important consumption priority is food. She is able to be able to continue to buy the same groceries, but *has to spend more money to maintain the same level and type of food consumption*. She *adopts strategies, however, to keep consumption costs down* as much as possible. She buys oil and peas, for example, in bulk in Curacao, and her mother buys meat every two weeks in Mandeville where it is cheaper. They also buy fruit and vegetables every week in the market downtown. They *cannot grow anything in the (large) yard* (other

than having an ackee tree) because the soil is not good enough. She, like Mr. Finnigan, *benefits from support in kind from relatives*. Her aunt in the States owns the house, and does not charge them rent. Their only responsibility in terms of expenditure is the upkeep of the yard.

The Marshalls (FT) have been able to maintain their food consumption pattern, despite having to eat a lot of expensive non-starch vegetables because of his wife's dietary needs. Both Mr. and Mrs. Marshall *are returned migrants, and receiving regular sterling pension payments from the UK*, thus strengthening their purchasing power as the dollar devalues. Nevertheless Mr. Marshall is staggered by the price of 'Irish' potato and breadfruit. Utility bills include J\$2,000 per month on electricity. Mr. Marshall claims the bills have escalated with the arrival of the new government; before that he was paying about J\$270 per month for light. Much of the Marshall's monthly expenditure goes on Mrs. Marshall's medication; she is sick now and her regular medicines have both increased in price. He denies that elderly people get free health care in Jamaica, despite a recent announcement that exemption from fees has been extended to pensioners amongst other vulnerable groups. Mr Marshall goes to a private doctor because he is not prepared to compromise when it comes to his wife's health. For the same reason he insists on buying the best (and most expensive) drugs.

The Westby (Dr) household has not made significant changes in its levels or priorities, having been able to absorb macro-level change without adjustment of their standard of living. The *recent increase in University salaries* has made things far easier for the household. It 'hasn't been possible' to reduce electricity consumption as the entire family is studying, and Mr. Westby himself has more work on at the moment. His weekly food bill is around J\$800-1000 for a family of five. He particularly loves fish, which is expensive. His expenditure on petrol and oil for weekend trips to his farm indicates that it is not a money saving operation. He spends J\$400-500 for a weekend trip and another J\$100-200 for in-town driving.

The Westby family does not have a health plan, but Mrs. Westby has just been looking into buying into one; he does not know what the cost is. He and his eldest daughter have free health service at the University, but this is not available to the rest of the family. Mr. Westby believes that health schemes, whether University or Company, should include children, as it is the under 15s who get ill most often. At the moment his wife and two younger children would have to go to the family doctor. He feels that a private health plan would be a good idea, but only as a stop-gap "until we have a national health plan...we must have a national health plan". Having studied the British and Canadian systems Jamaica should be able to come up with one, and they have the workforce that could support it. The biggest stumbling block is party political acceptance by politicians who believe that it would be 'leading the people'.

Mr. Harrison (Dr) estimates that last year's inflation rate was about 91 per cent. The rises in utilities were accommodated by their family because his wife changed jobs; *her (increased) income has allowed them to maintain their standard of living* throughout the price rises. Hence even though their mortgage will resort to a commercial rate of 19 per cent from June (having received a concessionary rate of 3 per cent from the Bank of Jamaica since 1985) his wife's income will allow them to absorb this increased consumption cost. Mr Harrison had a *private health scheme* when he was an employee. Even now his wife has a health scheme at work which covers the family and is deducted at source. The Harrisons have *two cars*, and they are helped in achieving this level of consumption by *their operation within formal credit systems*. His car came with a Bank loan, so he has now consolidated that with the mortgage and pays about J\$3,000 per month in total. His wife's car comes with her job. They perceive themselves to have very little 'luxury' expenditure.

Mr. James (Dr) has not had to cut consumption of essential and non-essential goods, although his wife would like him to. He is *insulated to a certain extent by his membership of the 'bona fide bredren' system*, which provides security as well

as allowing him to pursue investment strategies (see Section 6.2.2.3).

Miss Ingham's (FT) household has not consciously cut down on their consumption of utilities, as *her mother's business has continued to thrive despite the recession*. When Miss Ingham was working at the cookshop, they would both eat their meals there. But now that she is at home with the baby she has to cook supper there. However this is not a major financial problem.

6.3.3 Consumption for Mobility: Education and Housing

6.3.3.1 Access to education

The low levels of retraining and further education being pursued or being planned by adults in Franklyn Town indicated by the preliminary survey reflect a shrinking of disposable income over and above subsistence expenditure. This again becomes particularly relevant in the case of single headed households supporting children and with little external support. Miss Boyne (FT) is just such an individual, clearly aware of the need for further education to realise her ambitions, but equally aware of the restrictions upon her which prevent this move.

Miss Boyne is a twenty one year old single household head, with a five year old child, *receiving little help from her child's father, and no financial help from relatives abroad*. The child's father lives in Jamaica and provides help only "when he feels like it", enough to buy a few basic items. She does not regard it as important: "something that only comes to you now and then shouldn't be important in your life". She has relatives in the US but is not in contact with them. They are not sending remittances nor are they applying for her to gain an admission visa, although she would like to migrate:

Everybody does hope one day to go somewhere apart from their own country. Well I'm still hoping.

Neither does Miss Boyne's educational attainment provide her with an asset upon which to build life strategies. She left school at the age of sixteen without any exam certificates, having got pregnant. Her mother had died when she was ten

years old, and she had no father, so from that time on she grew up with her grandmother in the country. This she feels had a significant impact on her life chances:

Not having anyone to put out a definite interest in you, you tend to, well there are certain things you cannot get.

She was unable to pay the fees and get the necessary books to take the Common Entrance Exam, and so went to an all-age school then on to secondary. She got pregnant at the end of the ninth grade and was unable to take 'O' levels in eleventh grade, instead leaving school immediately. At this time she was still living with her grandmother in Kellits, Clarendon but moved to Kingston soon after getting pregnant, and managed to find the room that she still lives in now through the 'baby father', who knows the owner. Once she had the baby she had to start earning a living. The baby father "was around, now and then, for a few years but...he's not really important". She stresses that she will have more children (only) "when I get married".

As a single household head supporting a child, and without any outside source of income and no other assets, Miss Boyne is therefore *reliant on her own job as her sole source of income*. She has been working as a helper at a private pre-school for the past three weeks. The school charges parents \$180 per week. She works five days a week and at least eight hours a day, but often has to stay longer if parents arrive late. She is paid J\$300 per week - the minimum wage - which "although it stinks, it helps". Before finding this job she was selling from a stall in downtown but that was about two years ago. The minimum wage at that time was lower because of the prevailing cost of living, so that she was paid less in absolute terms than she is now. In order to continue working and looking after her son, however, Miss Boyne pays someone J\$50 per week to look after him for the time between him getting back from school and her getting back from work. Thus her weekly income is effectively reduced by one sixth to J\$250. She manages to pay for things by careful budgeting, and has a bank account (a rarity in Franklyn Town). She is jovially scornful of the 'partner' system, arguing that

a bank account is a "safer" option.

Opportunities for increased responsibility/pay in the present job exist, but "that's not what I want...its not as if I'm going to settle down and say 'OK I'm planning to stay here now - no, no!". She wants to be a private secretary with a firm, but realises that she needs to go back to school in order to achieve this. She is aware of the existence of training institutions such as those set up by HEART, *but is not interested in the content of HEART-type training*, despite it being free: " *t h e* trainings I'm after they wouldn't offer me free, definitely not". She can sew already, making her own and her son's clothes, but again is not interested in it as an employment option because "(in Jamaica) there are so many people in that field". She would, for the time being, consider sewing from home, but does not own a sewing machine.

The obstacles to her career development are identified unhesitatingly as her lack of education. She knows that even though she could do some of the jobs now "they won't have you if you don't have the qualifications". She is, furthermore, *being prevented from returning to education by her lack of disposable income* over and above the day to day support of herself and her son. Hence she could not give up her day job to go back to school, and in order to go to evening classes she would have to save some money first. The charges at a local evening class institute - Excelsior community College - are J\$500 per term for one 'O' level subject.

Miss Brown (FT), like Miss Boyne a single female household head with a young child, would also like to "reach further" than her present position, but cannot afford the extra education or training: "every'ting a money do it you know". When she was not working *she was supported by her sister*, with whom she has lived in the same yard for six years. Her sister continues to pay the rent of J\$120 per month. The baby father lives in the country and *does not provide any support*, apart from when her daughter goes to the country to visit him. *She does not have*

any relatives abroad.

In many respects Miss Ingham (FT) is in a similar situation, being a young, single parent with little education but a desire to pursue further education. However, as she herself points out, *the financial and reproductive support, and encouragement that she receives from her mother is enabling her to realise these ambitions.* She receives no support from the baby's father, and the household does not receive any remittances from elsewhere, yet the sole income of the household, that from her mother's business, is sufficient to place her at a distinct advantage over the single mothers discussed above. Her mother runs a cookshop downtown and *the household therefore has a steady and reliable source of income,* even if it is the only source of income. She cooks the food herself and, until she had the baby in November 1992 was helping serve the food. She now stays at home with the baby and sews. Her mother's business has not suffered recently, and she continues to do good trade. She makes, before overheads, about J\$2,000+ per day at least, and more on Thursdays and Saturdays when it gets very busy. Costs include rent (J\$1,500 per month, including water and light), workers and food. She does not pay tax. The cost of food has increased, but this is covered by increasing the cost of meals.

Miss Ingham left school with a grade 1 CXC in Textiles, a grade 3 in Mathematics and a fail in English. With no design courses being run in Jamaica, she opted for pattern making, and attended evening classes at Excelsior college two nights a week and was awarded a diploma. These classes cost J\$500 for the first year and J\$550 for the second, for which her mother paid. Now she is about to start her own sewing business, making children's clothing to sell wholesale to higglers downtown. She already *has her own electric sewing machine which her mother bought her, and her mother would help her with the initial outlay.* She has the contacts because many of them eat at her mother's cookshop. She would not need to find someone to look after her baby as she would be working from home anyway.

Miss Ingham also has a longer term career strategy, which involves going back to evening classes in September to do Maths (they now do not recognise grade 3), English and Accounts. Although the evening classes are two hours in length, her mother is happy to babysit for that time. She recognises that her mother's financial support has been critical in allowing her to pursue further education and go about setting up her own business, although she would prefer to be financially independent:

Let me tell you now, on my side....every'ting come from my mother now.

Access to further education is noticeably greater amongst the Drumblair respondents, even though the need for it may not seem so obvious. Mr. Finnigan (Dr), a 25 year old graduate of UWI, is studying part-time for a Law degree. He is taking exams for four courses (English Law, Law of Contract, Criminal law and English legal system) in June 1994 for the University of London. This is the first stage of an LLB and he has to pay the exam fee of £200 by November. He is studying from home on a three year correspondence course. He will have to go to the UK in the final year on paid study leave to an institution. After that he will come back to Norman Manley Law School as a barrister then do two years on paid study leave to become an Attorney. After qualifying he will have to do three years work in the civil service attached to a govt department connected with his studies.

His girlfriend works in a downtown garment factory for a Far East Company, but is attending 'O' level night classes two evenings a week. The garment factory for her is a stop-gap rather than a career reality. In a relationship of support comparable to that of Miss Ingham and her mother, he can give her the confidence, as well as the financial backing, to go back and try and get an education. Mr. Finnigan is only too clear about the enhanced importance of qualifications in the present climate:

In Jamaica, 'tings rough yes, but people are still trying, still trying to get some education...its the qualification that counts.

Equally, *the influence of 'qualification inflation' on education and mobility* is evident in his argument that Jamaicans cannot afford to rest on their laurels. In the UK, he believes, manual workers can drive nice cars and have a decent lifestyle. But because of the crisis in Jamaica, even people who get degrees cannot stop there - they have to go on studying.

This argument is illustrated by the case of Mr. and Mrs. Rose (Dr), both of whom are pursuing further education outside working hours. Mrs. Rose is a supervisor at a bank, and has been working at the same bank for twenty years, having entered employment there straight from school. She has been taking evening classes all that time, and at present is studying for a diploma. Her husband also went straight into a job without higher education. At the moment he is in the final year of a part-time degree in Accounting at the University of the West Indies, which he has financed himself. Having both entered employment without having university degrees, *they have worked their way up and got into the housing market at exactly the right time*. Furthermore their jobs provide them with certain benefits, notably a health scheme and preferential interest rates, *which cushion them against external shocks*. Consequently both are now in the position where they have both the commitment and the resources with which to pursue further education.

The intra-generational mobility of Mr. Harrison (Dr) echoes that of the Mr. and Mrs. Rose. He is forty years old and married with three children: a 'typical' middle class nuclear Jamaican family. Both husband and wife are professionals and upwardly mobile. He is from a rural peasant farming background and went to high school in the parish. He then came to Kingston to finish off his high school studies. After returning to his parent's parish to work for a bauxite company for two years, he studied for a two year business administration course, before joining the Bank of Jamaica. While at the Bank he did a University degree part-time.

Mr. Digby (Dr) is also from a working class background has established his own business, *yet has not pursued further education, and this has left him less flexible in responding to macroeconomic crisis* as he struggles to keep his business afloat (see Section 6.2.2.4). *Instead it is the mobility afforded his daughter through education that has provided Mr. Digby with a cushion against external shocks.*

His mother was a dressmaker in Kingston - "poor like hell" - and the family all lived in one room. He left elementary school at fourth or fifth grade, and is self taught in his profession; "I really needed school but I couldn't get it". In 1939 he got a job working on a ship, and was a sailor for thirteen years. His daughter studied at Cornell University in New York, and is now living in Switzerland, married to a Danish diplomat.

Miss Davison (FT), still reasonably successful in her informal commercial importing but unable to take up any other job, is not convinced that investing disposable income in evening classes or some form of training would improve her occupational mobility:

sometime you have education and still not getting work; job is so hard to get.

Paradoxically, while questioning the value of education in this context, she later stresses that she wants to give her daughter "the best chance" in terms of an education. Indeed she is prepared to pay for private education for her daughter because "I don't want she to do the same thing".

The prioritising of children's education indeed seems evident given the comparably low rates of absenteeism and year repetition (see Sections 5.3.1.2 and 5.3.2.2) amongst the present Franklyn Town and Drumblair populations.

There are also distinctions in access between the children of the two areas, notably in the comparative levels of private education, that are explored further in the secondary interviews.

In many instances education costs are prioritised in a context of marginal purchasing power beyond subsistence expenditure. Miss Boyne (FT), for example, *is prepared to pay for her son to attend a semi-private primary school:*

I want him to get the best start possible there is, so I had to send him to a school that I know has a good reputation.

School fees for her son amount to J\$600 per term (made up of a J\$100 fee plus J\$500 security fee). On top of this she must provide daily lunch and bus money - minimum J\$20 per day. His father did not help with the previous term's bill (this is his first year at Excelsior) but she hopes that he will be "a good Samaritan" and help with the next one. She hopes that he will pass the Common Entrance exam, upon which he would leave his present school at grade 4, go to a "nice" school then to college and end up with a good job.

The Harrisons (Dr) are working around the clock to make their new business financially successful enough to put their children, aged between 1 and 8 years, through private education. At present they pay about J\$5,000 per term for the two attending nurseries, and about another J\$2,000 per term for the eldest child at prep school. On this basis it is assumed that they will take the Common Entrance exam and attend high school, and afterwards university.

For the majority of parents and guardians in Franklyn Town who send their children to state schools, *there are still creeping costs which they feel reduce access and opportunity.* Miss Bassett (FT) is a single household head, living in a rented tenement room with her four children, aged 13, 11, 8 and 5 years. Each child has a different father. The father of the eldest died, the second is living in England, the third in Mandeville and the fourth in Franklyn Town. *None of the three baby fathers provides financial or any other type of support.* Consequently she is struggling to find the money to continue to support her children's education in the face of increased fees in state schools. She has to spend money on books, stationary and lunch for her daughters who attend a state school. In addition she pays J\$420 per term "for some medical business". Her youngest child Theo,

attends a private kindergarten, but has had no support from his father, even though he lives in Franklyn Town. Miss Bassett has recently had a letter from Theo's prep school saying that Theo will be sent home if she does not pay the J\$200 term fee:

From the youth born it is me that pay it - from him start go to school from him two years old....mangy business dem 'ting there.

At times she has to borrow money from a friend in the yard and repay her when she can. The emphasis here, as so often in Franklyn Town, is on informal credit networks for financial support. Indeed Miss Bassett has never borrowed from a bank.

Miss Dixon's (FT) elder son, like Miss Bassett's three elder children, attends a state school, yet she has to pay between J\$300 and J\$400 per term: "coming like every year they raise it". Similarly, Miss Callow (Dr) has a sixteen year old daughter who is technically a non fee-paying pupil at a secondary high school, having passed her common entrance exam (see **Figure 3.1**). The reality, however, is that everyone has to pay a minimum 'fee' of J\$1,800, even if they have passed the Common Entrance Exam. This is the charge fixed by individual school for maintenance; the government provides some support, but its not enough. When she started at the school five years ago the school fees were J\$200. In the last year or so its moved from J\$1,200 to J\$1,800. In addition, pupils buy some books, at great expense, and have to rent others at about J\$60 per book per year. Some schools charge a bigger fee which covers everything. Miss Callow, however, *in prioritising this expenditure over other consumption goods and services, does not compromise her daughter's education*; "she doesn't live in luxury but I still manage".

The increased emphasis on cost recovery extends beyond secondary education to the tertiary sector. The introduction of tuition fees at the University of the West Indies (UWI) is characteristic of this trend. When Mr. Finnigan (Dr) left UWI in June 1991 UWI was charging a faculty-based fee (where Arts & Social Science

faculty students had to pay J\$1,600, Natural Science students paid J\$2,400, and Medical students paid J\$3,000), along with a few miscellaneous costs, such as library fees and a stipend for health. From the academic year 1993/1994, however, and arising out of a study showing that the cost to the University was about J\$300,000 per graduate over three years, the University has introduced tuition fees, again based on Faculty. Students have to pay 10 per cent for the coming academic year but this will gradually increase. Hence Arts & Social Science students would eventually have to pay J\$15,000, Law students J\$24,000, medical students J\$50,000 per year.¹⁰³

In this way, the inequalities in access to secondary and tertiary education inherent in the post-war education system, discussed in Section 3.3, are compounded by reduced purchasing power and the introduction of user fees.

Mr. Westby's (Dr) concern is that (talented) kids of struggling parents are discriminated against as 'fees' go up. He argues that there should be a greater equity within the system in order to allow individual 'escape' and national resource development. Elitism cannot level a society. Instead, there should be a liberal approach to education, so that you can identify your best brains to develop a country:

The economic trap is like a lead ball around your [the student's] feet. They say 'Run! you're a good athlete!' but you can't.

¹⁰³ UWI has started a fund-raising operation, hoping to raise J\$300 million by August. They are approaching staff, students, private domestic and international organisations. This will then be disbursed to needy students in soft grants, loans and bursaries.

6.3.3.2 Access to property

The implications of the changing characteristics of a residential area are integral to patterns of residential mobility. The movement of low-income households within the rental sector that emerged Section 5.3, represents a consumption trap that deepens with the polarisation of property and land prices across Kingston that has accompanied inflationary speculation and housing shortages. A secular decline in the construction industry began in 1972 and mirrored economy-wide recession. Although construction has picked up from the mid 1980s, this has been characterised by a shift from housing into infrastructural construction of offices and plazas to service the export-led development of services and commerce. There is consequently at present a back-log of housing needs of at least 12,500 units per year (*Jamaica Business*, 1993).

Contextual issues such as clientelism and landlords' preference for tenants without small children play an important part in determining access and the nature of mobility. For those financially able to break out of rented accommodation, the spatial gradient in property prices prohibits a residential move into areas with a higher 'quality' of environment. Residential strategies that bypass these concerns include returning to live with relatives or on the land of relatives in the country or migrating abroad. Moving to the country often means a disruption of employment opportunities and of children's education, given that usually the household does not have access to private transport and or the land in the country is too far away for daily commuting to Kingston.

Mr. Marshall (FT) moved to live and work in England in the 1950s, and bought the house in 1966 when he was down in Jamaica on a visit. By 1974 the mortgage was paid off. On his permanent return to Jamaica he realised the neighbourhood had changed. When he was a young man in the 1940s this was a residential area with doctors and lawyers: "decent people lived here". When Manley won in the 1970s he built housing for his "politics people". The doctors and lawyers had "disappeared from the scene" even before this, in the 1960s.

Since then the area has been "run down" by the politician who built a "ghetto down the bottom" ('Dunkirk') which has a "criminal element" and "killings going on". Now, if you call a taxi at night, for example, they don't want to come, because they know that "down there is no good", while not knowing that "up here is alright".

Miss Bassett (FT) has been living in Franklyn Town for twenty five years and has witnessed drastic changes:

Well, the place mash up; guys on the corner, people cuss every day and 'nuff gunshot a fire....its different now.

She blames the change on (younger) people moving in to the area ("from all about"):

I don't know, I don't know what to say. The younger heads. Most of them who at war doesn't come from Franklyn Town. They come from a different area and comes into Franklyn Town...Who is here from dem small you don't find dem war.

Miss Bassett is unable to move, even though her need for alternative accommodation is urgent. A few days before the interview the combination of an earthquake and flooding had caused a wall of one of her two rooms to collapse and had left the wall of the remaining room on the point of collapse. The upkeep of the tenement building had been neglected by the (absentee) landlord, so that it had already been weakened by structural deterioration.

Faced with the urgent need to find alternative accommodation, many problems associated with residential mobility for low-income households surface. In Franklyn Town *demand for rented rooms far outweighs supply*, and *the cost of renting in other areas in which she would consider living is far too high*; the first place she enquired about, in Vineyard Town, cost J\$2,000 per month.

Once households have lived in a tenement building for a considerable period of time *the jump in rent levels can be impossibly high when faced with finding a*

new place. Often individuals and their families *manage to find cheap accommodation in yards owned by relatives or friends* and this becomes an important factor when assessing vulnerability in a household. In Miss Bassett's case she had not been paying rent because the rooms were in such a poor state, bringing her the short-term gain of less income detracted from other areas of consumption but with the longer term upheaval of having to find alternative affordable accommodation.

She is prepared to live "anywhere...[but]..not 'down' in Franklyn Town - 'up' not 'down' - because it too violent ..sometimes, especially when election is near; gunfighting, this party against the other party, the [corner] guys fighting away, all this stuff".

Her family has some land in the country near Mandeville, *providing her with an escape outlet*, as well as with the opportunity to grow food on a subsistence level. However she *regards this as a last resort because it would be even more difficult to find employment* (and she does not have private transport to commute), *it would mean removing her children from their various schools*, added to which *she prefers city life.*

Miss Boyne (FT) pays J\$300 per month for the rent on the single room for her and her child. Although she is secure in her present room, she has been looking for a new place for a year as she is "not satisfied with my environment. I want somewhere a little bit nicer". Mobility within the rented sector is, however, severely restricted by availability:

everywhere you go you have people asking you if you know of any rooms to rent.

She, like Miss Bassett, has the comfort of still having relatives in the country - a sister with some land in Clarendon - to fall back on for accommodation, but this would inevitably involve disruption of her employment and her son's education.

Miss Dixon's (FT) room is owned by the father of her elder son Renaldo and she does not have to pay rent for it. The downside of this situation, however, is that *she does not feel totally secure in this dependent relationship*. She is not sure what Renaldo's father is up to, but feels he may be pressuring her to leave. If this were to happen she would not know where to go, particularly as her mother's place is "not comfortable".

Miss Ingham (FT) and her mother *are intending to buy a house across the road in Franklyn Town when it becomes available*. The house is on the market at J\$375,000, which would give them a mortgage of about J\$6,000 per month. When asked if she would want to move out of Franklyn Town, Miss Ingham expresses horror at the cost of housing elsewhere, and says that *they could not afford to live somewhere like Vineyard Town or Harbour View*.

Miss Davison (FT) wants to work harder at her informal commercial importing in order to *save enough money to buy a house*, probably in Portmore (an area of new housing development to the West of Kingston) because of availability and affordability - "me caan do no better". A new, two-bedroomed house in Portmore costs J\$56,000.

The significance to investment strategies of the polarisation of residential land values (see Chapter 4) is highlighted by the contrasting fortunes of two returned migrants. **Mr. Addison (Dr)** returned from Sweden in 1974 and bought his present property in Drumblair. Since then he has seen the value of that property increase steadily, and latterly at a rapid pace. **Mr. Marshall (FT)** bought his house in Franklyn Town in 1966 while back on a visit, and by 1974 the mortgage was paid off. However the value of Mr. Marshall's property has fallen far behind the general rate of property market inflation.

More significantly for these two returned migrants, that are able to live reasonably on foreign exchange pensions, is the polarisation of the 'quality' of their

environments. Commenting on Drumblair, Mrs. Simons (Dr) says that when she visited the area as a teenager (in the 1940s):

up here was considered (an) upper, upper, upper class area, and you still find remnants of white Jamaicans on the street - remnants is not the word I have to use! That's ill-advised. You find one or two remaining...[the others] have moved out and gone up high.

This outmigration of the upper echelons was, she believes, partly in response to the commercialisation of the area around Drumblair, and partly because it became fashionable to live elsewhere, for example in 'Beverley Hills'.

Mrs. Simons stresses, however, that *Drumblair has changed little, in its residential composition in the last twenty years*. Generally the composition of Drumblair is "upper middle class Jamaicans", with houses sold twenty years ago to a lot of civil servants who at that time were at the top of the middle strata of the civil service and just breaking into the upper strata, and who, according to Mr. James (Dr), would not have been affected by the most recent civil service cuts. The breakdown is now, he reckons, about 40 per cent public and 60 per cent private sector.

Miss Callow (Dr) believes that *residential turnover in Drumblair has been slow*. Houses are not changing hands, so few if any young people with children moving in and the resident population is an aging one. Many people in her age group started in this scheme, and others like herself came in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The composition is both private and public, lower and upper middle class groups.

Mr. Kemp (Dr) sees the population of Drumblair as largely middle business people and civil servants, young professionals and the odd high court judge, lawyer and police superintendent. There is not a great deal of movement in and out of the area. The Kemps themselves are living in Drumblair from choice. They "could have gone up to the hills then [early 1970s]" when many top professionals in the public and private sector moved out. They chose to stay and now would be

unable to move, partly because of retaining access to town but also because of their drop in real income with inflation. Of his neighbourhood Mr. Kemp says that in the twenty five years that he has lived here he has had "no real problems with the place".

The area of Gore Terrace, where Mr. Finnigan (Dr) lives, has mainly long-term tenants of absentee landlords living abroad or elsewhere in Jamaica. They are middle ranking private and public sector in the 30 plus age groups, on about J\$70,000 - J\$150,000 per annum. The rent goes up to about J\$2,500 - J\$3,000 per month.

Since 1984 there has been very little change because hardly any of the home owners have moved out. Mrs. Simons (Dr) does not foresee anyone moving out of the area in the near future. She will soon move because she only wants a one-bedroom studio flat when the others in her household have gone. She is thinking about moving to the country, and into a complex where you can pay the maintenance and forget about it.

Only one other person has moved in since Mr. James (Dr) and his family moved there, and that because the previous owner died. People do not tend to sell their houses in Drumblair because they were built on a reasonable size plot of land even though the area "is not considered upper, upper, upper St. Andrew, but it is considered a fairly decent area".

He is probably the youngest head of household in Drumblair, because the tendency has been for people of his age and situation to move into apartments/town houses, but he preferred to have space in house and garden for children. Also a lot of people might feel either that a house would be outside their scope or that they do not want to draw attention to themselves for security reasons. The Rose family (Dr) are also a very young household in the area, and had always put getting a house as their first priority.

The *dramatically spiralling property* values in 'upper' Kingston that began in the early to mid-eighties, are apparent from Drumblair residents' accounts, and those who bought property before prices began to spiral are now owners of property far in excess of its purchase value. Mr. Harrison (Dr) has watched the housing market increase steadily since the mid-eighties, and than accelerate since the devaluation that came with liberalisation. Mrs. Rose (Dr) believes that, since 1989, whenever prices have gone up it has been "by 100 per cent every time". The Rose family moved to Drumblair in 1987, and managed to get the house cheap. Over the last five years its value has increased dramatically, from J\$250,000 to J\$3 million over the last five years.¹⁰⁴ Paying the mortgage is not a problem for Mr. and Mrs. Rose because she gets a 3 per cent mortgage rate at the bank. The official bank rate is 27 per cent and building societies about 19-29 per cent. She agrees that others in the neighbourhood are probably suffering under these interest rate increases, and describes her concessionary rate as a privilege.

For most of those who bought their property before the price escalations, however, the raised interest rates are not a major problem. Mrs Simons (Dr) bought her house just at the time when house prices were about to escalate, in 1984 ("if I'd waited three months more I couldn't have bought it"). She can now get "nearly a hundred times" what she paid for this house right now. She part-owns the house with her cousin, and her small pension covers the mortgage. From Miss Callow's (Dr) monthly salary she pays only a little on the mortgage because it was twelve years ago that she bought the house. Mr. Westby (Dr) also bought his property at the right time, and his mortgage has already been paid off. They bought the house in 1980/81 before the boom, and so are now no longer lumbered with the burden of a high interest mortgage.

¹⁰⁴ Furthermore the mortgage has never been a problem because Mrs. Ross gets a 3 per cent mortgage rate at the bank. The official bank rate is 27 per cent and building societies about 19-29 per cent. She thinks that others in the neighbourhood are probably suffering under these interest rate increases, describing her concessionary rate as a "privilege".

6.4 Mobility through International Migration: Escape and Circulation

For those with close relatives in the States a possible, but incredibly tortuous route out of the low-income rented sector, is migration. For most low-income individuals still resident in Franklyn Town, their contacts with relatives abroad are not sufficiently strong to set in train the process of applying for a temporary visa, let alone a permanent one. They are also denied access to this strategy by the prohibitive costs involved, including the requirement to prove that you have sufficient assets in the country as to deter attempts at illegal emigration. In Drumblair asset-worthiness and financial means allow individuals to enter the ranks of the population of 'circulatory migrants' (Thomas-Hope, 1988).

Miss Ingham (FT) says that she would take the chance of going to live abroad, but that it is difficult - "an effort" - to organise it. If the chance came up she would take it. She has asked her grandmother in the UK for a trip but has not heard anything from her. Miss Dixon (FT) sometimes thinks about migrating but dismisses it because of *the impossibility of getting both a visa and the money for the airfare*. Miss Boyne (FT) has relatives in the US, but is not in contact with them. They are not sending remittances *nor are they applying for her to gain an admission visa*, although she would like to migrate:

Everybody does hope one day to go somewhere apart from their own country. Well I'm still hoping.

Miss Davison also has relatives in the States. She tried to get a temporary visa from the US Embassy in 1991 *but was refused it on the grounds that they did not consider her to have enough ties*. She is circumspect about the idea of moving to the States (if this were possible), saying instead that she "would go and come, see what it is like" before making a decision. Sonia, her mother, wants to migrate to the States, but cannot because her surname was not on her birth certificate before she was twenty five. Her sister, on the other hand was able to migrate, and Sonia's eldest son is now also in the States. Sonia intends to try the Canadian Embassy.

Miss Bassett's despondency about her household's hand to mouth existence combines with a conviction that a move to the US holds a promise of a lower costs and a higher standard of living:

I know in the States you get the food cheap. You can eat right in the States.

Her mother filed for her from October 1989, but *as yet she is still on the US Embassy waiting list*. She hopes to "get through" by September 1993. She intends to take her children with her, *but this depends on how "strong" her mother's bank account is*; she has to have about US\$10-12,000 for the whole family to show she can take care of them until they get a job, *as well as finding Miss Bassett a job in advance* so that she can take a job letter to the US Embassy in Kingston.

Of middle class migration Mr. Finnigan believes that of the 20,000 people that migrate to the US every year, 20-30 per cent have had higher education, *representing a considerable brain drain*. While he considers himself quite lucky to have avoided the redundancies, as only 2 per cent of the Jamaican population have University degrees, you can pick up jobs somewhere.

Some people, particularly those with young families, in Mr. Finnigan's road are suffering in the aftermath of redundancy. Apart from a group of older public sector employees who were persuaded to take voluntary redundancy, most of the civil service redundancies have been among junior people without higher degrees. They are middle ranking private & public sector 30 plus age groups on about J\$70,000 - J\$150,000 per annum. These unqualified people then consider shifting into self-employment, but are faced with astronomical start-up costs and crippling interest loans. Consequently the only alternative for many people in this situation is migration, particularly if they have relatives abroad.

Neither has the process of rationalisation been restricted to the public sector. A friend of his who lost his job in a bank (because removal of exchange controls rendered his department defunct), migrated to the States where he has family. A

lot of Jamaicans, once they have got temporary visas, stay in the US illegally. Having done that, however, they are prevented from working in the formal sector. His friend was going to find odd jobs and try to sort himself out eventually with a green card.

Even for individuals with University degrees the devaluation of salaries in the public sector makes migration an attractive alternative. A way out for many teachers, for example, is, according to Miss Callow (Dr), domestic work in the States. But its not always easy for teachers to get those domestic jobs and very few teachers manage to upgrade themselves and get into teaching in the US. Its much easier for nurses to follow their profession. She tells the story of a friend who works in insurance who sold her car to get a mortgage, but then could not work without a car. She went to the States to work as a domestic then return to pick up where she left off. She has been there since October and things are not working out as she planned. Similarly, a friend of Mr. Finnigan (Dr) with a University degree but a salary only twice her rent and a daughter to bring up, considers migration to be the only alternative; she has a visa and plans to go.

Miss Simons (Dr) has the opportunity to migrate - her daughter is a speech pathologist in the States and has Immigrant's status, so that she can apply for members of her family to join her after five years or so. She considered going a couple of years ago - she could work from 'home' as a music tutor ("I don't think I'd go to a US school to teach") for two or three years, save up a lot of money, come back and then not work at all, but decided against it.

For certain groups of individuals, migration is always a realistic option, but is an option which can be fitted into a longer term strategy which involves such considerations as investment options, realisation of assets and ages of children. The Harrisons (Dr), for example, while having relatives abroad (Mrs. Harrison's father lives in the UK) do not plan to move abroad at this stage of their life.

For others it is simply a question of preference. Mr. James (Dr) envisages responding to the government's export drive by buying land in the country and growing specialist crops - flowers, onions, garlic & spices - for the export market. Once this happens Mr. James would think about investing abroad. However he likes being in a society where he has "recognition", where he could go and knock on the prime minister's door and the prime minister would want to know why. Also the good will of the people, such as those who hand out coconuts and broad beans when you visit them in the country, is difficult to duplicate.

The Rose family (Dr) have not considered migration, although Mrs. Rose points out that "if it was me alone I would have gone". All her relatives are abroad apart from her sister, and her husband is the only one in his family who is still in Jamaica:

he's just against migrating. He would go through all the hardships and every'ting. He just love Jamaica and is just going to stay here. Unless it really comes to the worse.

They have a temporary visa, however, *and they go to the States whenever they want to* - once or twice a year.

Mrs Rose's father left in the early sixties and her mother in the seventies. They were working class, uneducated and saw a better chance in US. It worked out well for them as they were able to buy a house in Jamaica and also one in the States.

There is a common tendency amongst elderly returned migrants to have put thoughts of living abroad again behind them, even though it is more likely that these individuals or couples will have children living abroad. The children of Mr. and Mrs. Marshall (FT) want them to go and live in the States but Mr. Marshall is worried about his wife's health, about leaving the house unattended and perhaps most importantly, does not want to live abroad again, having spent six years in US and twenty five in England. Important in this decision is that there

is no problem with visiting the children because "he has a good record" with immigration. Similarly he could go to England any time because he gets his pension from there.

Mr. Addison (Dr) worked in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s, before returning to Jamaica in 1974. He first migrated to the UK in 1956, working three years in the Liverpool docks and two years in construction in London before moving to Sweden, where he settled until his eventual return. His decision to leave Jamaica in the 1950s was a difficult one, because at that time "everything was nice" and he was playing in one of the biggest night clubs in Jamaica. But after the war lots of people went up, particularly RAF and munitions workers, and wrote back saying how nice it was "(so) I said 'Boy I'm gonna take a chance'".

He now receives a monthly pension from Sweden, and from time to time his children give him money, all of whom are either living abroad or who travel abroad regularly.

While only one of Mr. Addison's children entered higher education, many of those children who have been encouraged to pursue higher education have subsequently migrated. **Mr. Kemp (Dr)** speaks, perhaps slightly regretfully, of his children's decisions to live abroad. Some went away to improve their education, then came back. Eventually, however, all decided to migrate:

I think that especially...after all the difficulties in the 'seventies they decided, 'let's go and see what's happening'...and I wouldn't blame them. I miss them...we encouraged them and they haven't regretted it... and we're glad for them.

Mr. Kemp himself would not want to leave Jamaica; he loves the island too much. Whenever a time approaches when is making a trip abroad, he starts wanting to get back already!

What seems certain is that, among those who are able to migrate, whether through familial ties, financial or social clout, or a combination of these, if they are not

under pressure or out of work they do not necessarily consider it. *In other words it is because they can get a visa that they are not continually thinking about going to live abroad.* Indeed, for many in this category, Jamaica is just like a part of the States in terms of their access and their regularity of travel.

6.5 Summary

What becomes apparent throughout the chapter is the importance of multiple sources of income as a survival strategy, underlining the relationship between accessing capital and market capacity within populations and households. In assessing vulnerability, security and mobility, the degree and nature of access to fixed assets is shown to be critical.

Under macroeconomic adjustment, there is a shift of opportunity away from those dependent on their own labour and on family networks, towards those able to invest in the financial sector, in production for export and in the built environment. In this way, the dividing line between owners and non-owners of fixed assets takes on an added significance. Working class individuals are separated by ownership of property, either in the country or in the city itself. Rent from rooms let out in an owned yard separates landlord from tenant, while access to land in the country could mean a source of food as well as a residential escape route. The urban middle class is clearly divided along these lines, with the traditional salary earners being forced into a reliance on their assets, or into financial speculation, in the face of the real and effective devaluation of their earnings. Real estate and property investment in a climate of spiralling land and property prices, provides an avenue for financial profit well beyond the level of survival.

The two communities are clearly differentiated by the nature of their consumption of goods and utilities. As prices rise and purchasing power declines, Drumblair

respondents have tended to cut back on luxury expenditure and modify their consuming behaviour in order to save money. In contrast, many Franklyn Town consumers have had to cut back even basic food consumption and forego, or illegally consume, utilities.

Spiralling property prices and the introduction of cost recovery charges also has differential impacts by community on the more strategic consumption of education and housing. In both communities household size has increased and constraints on intergenerational residential mobility are apparent. Most Drumblair respondents, however, are cushioned against property inflation by house ownership, while most Franklyn Town dwellers are caught in a rental housing trap where demand far exceeds supply and the polarisation of housing prices across the city makes outward mobility an unlikely prospect. In Franklyn Town, reduced disposable income places even greater constraints on the individual's ability to consume strategically for mobility. Most respondents with young children prioritise their children's education over their own further training or investment in productive assets.

There are clear differences in vulnerability levels within both communities. In Drumblair, traditional salaried workers in the public sector are particularly badly hit by the reduction of their real incomes. The most vulnerable public sector employees are those lacking the financial and capital assets and/or the entrepreneurial flexibility to adopt alternative income earning strategies. In these circumstances, educational attainment does not necessarily provide an effective cushion against external shocks and trends. Individuals in Drumblair who are benefitting from devaluation and inflation are those with the necessary capital and insight to invest shrewdly for financial gain. In Franklyn Town the most vulnerable households are those dependent on a single income earner or those without an income earner that are dependent on unreliable external support. It is in these categories that single female headed households often fall. Many women in this position have been forced into the workforce by the increased cost of

living, but can only do so if they can call upon extended support networks to allow them to balance their domestic and income earning roles.

Above all, the 'employment adequacy' of many of the work of these new entrants into the workforce is also called into question. Many women are forced by a lack of qualifications and capital, and/or by the need to balance productive and domestic work, into labour intensive petty sales and service work. Most women working in tradeable activity in the formal sector or through subcontractual relations in the informal sector are earning minimum wages or even less. The minority of individuals with sufficient capital to operate in more capital intensive activity, such as informal commercial importing or restauranteering, are achieving higher levels of remuneration, but are still finding their profit margins reduced by spiralling overheads and reduced effective demand in the market place.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION: HOW SUSTAINABLE IS URBAN ADJUSTMENT?

7.1 Introduction

Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Jamaica has undergone a process of stabilisation and adjustment, initiated and enforced under the conditionalities attached to ongoing loans by multilateral and bilateral lending agencies. *Stabilisation* has involved drastic demand management measures to control domestic absorption and inflation; notably severe cut-backs in public sector employment and in public expenditure, and raised interest rates. These measures tend to affect urban dwellers disproportionately for two reasons. First, they are particularly vulnerable to external shocks because of their monetised integration into the urban economy as producers and consumers and general lack of assets (Moser *et al*, 1993). Secondly, urban dwellers had come to expect to benefit from public goods and services because "it was in the cities where most of the limited activity [of social welfare intervention] had occurred" (Drakakis-Smith, 1993: 11). The overall effect of stabilisation is a 'redistribution' of real income towards rural populations (Elson, 1987: 15). *Adjustment* has centred on the use of supply-side incentives - fiscal and exchange-rate policy - to encourage private sector investment, combined with tightened wage guidelines, increased restrictions on union activity, and a shift to 'flexible' labour market relations. In choosing between maintaining or improving wage levels and increasing employment, this strategy demands the latter option of low wage employment creation (Amis, 1994b).

This study has established a set of processes occurring at different levels of the

urban political economy. Based on secondary literature, a causal chain of action and outcome was introduced in Chapter 1, through a discussion based around **Figure 1.1**. Its relevance to urban Jamaica under structural adjustment was tested in subsequent analysis of questionnaire surveys carried out in two residential areas with distinct socioeconomic characteristics, and of in-depth interviews with selected 'representative' individuals from those areas.

It has already been stated, but should be reemphasised at this stage, that not only the critics but also the architects of the structural adjustment process agree that there are short-term, painful socioeconomic impacts under macroeconomic stabilisation and a shift to a supply-side, export-oriented political economy. The disagreements begin over the longer-term implications of such policies for sustainable national growth and for the welfare of different groups of individuals within a nation. This final chapter attempts to review the trends that have emerged in earlier discussion, and to discuss the implications of such trends for the sustainable development of Jamaica, as well as adjusting countries whose political economies are comparable.¹⁰⁵

Within an earlier established framework which emphasises the relationship between asset ownership, urban vulnerability and individual mobility, the following discussion also disaggregates the urban population at every level in order to assess in which situations and with which individuals opportunities and constraints on mobility are most apparent. The discussion ends on a consideration of some policy issues - at macro-, meso- and micro-level - that arise out of this critique.

¹⁰⁵ See Mosley et al (1993) for a detailed discussion of the 'grouping' of adjusting economies by given indicators.

7.2 The Road to Adjustment: a Summary

As a country that during the post-war period adhered to the doctrine of import-substitution industrialisation, it was always likely that Jamaica would be targeted by supply-side advocates for macroeconomic change. That the country pursued for a short period in the 1970s a form of neo-populist autonomy, which was politically sympathetic with its communist neighbour, Cuba, and which attempted to achieve economic growth on the back of a growing public debt (ultimately characterised by redistribution at the expense of growth), only served to hasten the country's journey into the arms of the multilateral financial institutions in Washington.

Post-War economic growth was based on Arthur Lewis' 'industrialisation by invitation' model, designed to attract domestic and foreign investment for autonomous economic growth and the production of goods to displace imports. It was criticised for its emphasis on capital intensive activity - with consequent high urban unemployment and segmented labour markets - and for its rejection of development according to the country's 'comparative advantage'. The key to the export-led growth model introduced by the IMF and the World Bank is to achieve international competitiveness by altering relative prices, in particular wage rates. Typically, this results in the creation of a large surplus urban population providing a flexible, low-cost labour supply and acting "as a disciplinary threat to those in employment" (Standing, 1991: 19). The initial security of the compliant Seaga-led JLP government was bolstered by early leniency of terms applied to IMF loans for stabilisation, and by a massive flow of bilateral aid from the Reagan administration. A strategy of open, export-oriented development pursued under World Bank conditionality was further encouraged by a certain enhancement of access to the US market under Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative, as well as through intensified efforts by the US to open up the Jamaican economy for private investment through USAID soft loans.

During the early 1980s the Jamaican government failed to control fiscal policy at the same time that they were building up a huge external debt burden. During this period also, the emphasis placed by the Seaga Administration on monetary policy for stabilisation over fiscal restraint and exchange-rate devaluation reflected a lack of coordination between the Bank and the Fund: the high interest rates imposed to limit money supply were severely limiting the ability of private entrepreneurs to access capital for export-based productive investment. A greater synthesis between the demand management priorities of the Fund and the supply side incentives prescribed by the Bank was reflected after the mid-1980s, when the Jamaican government made greater efforts to control public spending and introduced limited devaluation of the exchange rate, thus taking the pressure off interest rates as the main tool of demand management. Seaga remained critical of the overwhelming emphasis of the IMF on deflationary policy, aware of the domestic political instability being caused by macroeconomic contraction and a low-wage growth strategy. A heavy commitment to debt servicing, however, continually drained the Jamaican Government of foreign exchange and political-economic sovereignty. There was indeed in the late 1980s a recovery of the Jamaican economy, with a growth in employment figures as trans-national corporations began locating assembly operations in Kingston's export processing zone. This upturn, however, was still heavily reliant on the recovery of world prices in primary commodities, as a subsequent economic downturn has proven.

The conviction of adjustment proponents that international competitiveness and efficiency would only be achieved by full liberalisation of the exchange rate mechanism was finally realised at the beginning of the 1990s under the new PNP Administration. This caused a plummeting devaluation of the Jamaican dollar, and was accompanied by ever-tightening fiscal policy: reduced public spending and the monetisation of social services; a shake-out of public sector employment under the imperatives of privatisation, divestment and rationalisation of public activity; and the introduction of a general consumption tax. This policy environment coincided with unfavourable world market prices to plunge the

Jamaican economy back into a recession, characterised by decreasing purchasing power and decline or removal of public goods and services. The result is a deterioration of the nation's 'human resource base', as access to services becomes a function of income at the same time that real incomes are reduced and more money has to be channelled into subsistence expenditure. The growth of the 'high income' economy and financial speculation has had hyper-inflationary effects on the property market, and further polarised access to housing, in a policy environment that perpetuates the severe shortage of socially targeted housing supply.

These 'painful effects' of stabilisation are expected, and considered necessary costs of the adjustment process, to be mitigated with welfarist programmes of targeted school feeding and fee waiving. The long-term benefits of this short-term pain are perceived in the sustainable development path of export-oriented growth, realised through the desired shift from consumption to investment for export. Foreign capital investment is encouraged by a cheapened location environment, through the spending power of their foreign exchange, through removal of 'price distortions' in the domestic economy and through location incentives such as tax and tariff concessions.

7.3 Adjustment and Labour Market Restructuring: A Summary

The Jamaican labour market has traditionally been characterised by a male dominance of the protected 'secondary' labour market (Anderson, 1987). The contraction of the formal sector, combined with a progressive destruction of skilled secondary sector employment under the 'deindustrialisation' process, represents a 'levelling down' of gender inequality in the labour market rather than a 'levelling up' (Elson, 1994). At one end of the labour market mobility is becoming further restricted as forms of protectionism are strengthened, while at the other end competition from new entrants into the informal sector squeezes

remuneration levels, in an environment which is only sustained by the presence of low-income producers and consumers.

The removal of 'price distortions' in a market economy doesn't simply apply to the removal of subsidies or of protection for local goods and services. Critically, in a policy environment geared to creating an attractive environment for low-wage growth, it means removing price distortions in the labour market. In an urban economy where the majority of the population have few economic assets, stores or claims, income generation is very much dependent on human labour power, and social mobility on skill enhancement. But, given a policy environment that emphasises low wage growth and an efficiency-improving 'flexible' relationship between employer and employee, workers are devalued and are less likely to receive a return on skill enhancement. This devaluation is ensured not only by devaluation of the exchange rate but by removal of distortions - such as job security, fringe benefits and union representation - that equate with worker protection in the labour market (Elson 1987; Standing, 1991).

The demand for labour over the last thirty years in Jamaica has been a sensitive indicator of the political economic climate. Unemployment increased consistently from macroeconomic crisis in 1974. After five years of continued increase in unemployment levels after IMF intervention in 1977, this trend was reversed and the labour market entered a period of expansion. Increasing employment levels are reflected in the longitudinal trends between 1982 and 1992 in Franklyn Town and Drumblair. Export-led growth and the substitution of declining primary production with light manufacturing has adjusted the nature of the demand for labour in the region (Coppin, 1992; Wood, 1991).

In discussing prospects for the restructuring of the Chilean economy - which, like Jamaica, is small and open - Diaz (1993: 4) points to the segmentation of the labour market and the "massive presence of precarious employment" under adjustment, but adds that the situation "is not necessarily permanent", in that there

is "a progressive development of manufacturing industry and productive services". In Jamaica, however, the growth of employment in manufacturing 'tradeables' is characterised above all by its limited prospects and increasing insecurity. It continues to be limited to offshore assembly operations, documented as low-waged, unstable and legally unprotected (Anderson, 1988), resulting in expansion of formal sector 'unprotected secondary' employment. Furthermore, these operations, under intense international competition, are forced into achieving even greater flexibility in production through subcontracting relations with the unprotected flexible wage sector (see Figure 3.2). Individuals enter an expanding informal network of sub-contracted petty commodity production which owes its existence to its economically and technologically dependent, and institutionally and legally marginalised position within existing controls of resources and existing exchange mechanisms.

In this way the reorganisation of the labour market has increased its segmentation and increased the unstable and precarious nature of employment opportunities, under a 'squeezing' and casualisation of formal sector employment. Neither is there much scope for human capital development in an environment of manufacturing restructuring in which the production process has been 'decomposed' to isolate tasks that require little or no skill training (Nurse, 1992). While there are some exceptions to this conclusion,¹⁰⁶ it is evident from interviews with women in Franklyn Town that the supply price required of female labour has already dropped too low for them to come forward to be trained or to take up places directly in the industry. The residentially targeted nature of the study leaves this conclusion open to scepticism. Certainly, there are poorer residential areas in the KMA and its environs, where the 'reservation wage' of female labour could well be lower. But a critical point to emerge from an

¹⁰⁶ *The Financial Gleaner* (22/01/93b) reported, for example, that a South Korean company is sending trainee supervisors to Seoul for tuition in Korean production line techniques, with the ultimate aim of turning over the entire management and supervision of its Jamaican plant to local staff.

interview with representatives of the Human Employment and Resource Training agency (HEART)¹⁰⁷ is that Jamaican women are refusing to take up assembly positions because wage levels are barely sufficient to cover the costs of daily travel and meals. Similarly, persistent vacancies at the factories in the Free Zone are forcing the firms reassess their conditions of work and their own training programmes.

The depression of wages through informal sector expansion and flexible labour relations is the same process that depresses effective demand and thus prevents expansion of the economy as a whole. On 'putting out' relations in textile production, Gilbert comments:

While the costs of the clothing industry are certainly subsidised by the informal sector, the very poverty of the people employed in that sector prevents [its] expansion.

(1990: 108)

Beyond the seemingly unsustainable growth in low-wage assembly operations, there has not been the anticipated shift of employment opportunities from 'non-tradeables' to 'tradeables'. Instead it has been the informal petty service and trading 'non-tradeable' sectors that have been central to growth of employment opportunities. Anderson and Witter (1991) discuss this "tremendous reorganisation in modes of livelihood" in terms of the 'adequacy' of the employment opportunities created:

the trade-off from structural adjustment was that where employment increased, job adequacy in terms of earnings decreased.

(Anderson and Witter, 1991: 46)

The contraction of protected male formal sector employment - described by Amis (1994b: 2) as the "unmaking of a 'labour aristocracy'" - along with inflationary effects on real wages in the wage-earning sector, might be expected to promote

¹⁰⁷ According to its 1989/90 *Annual Report*, HEART provides youngsters with "a second chance at developing their productive potential", by stressing marketable skills in its training programmes. Since 1982, it claims, "thousands of Jamaicans have been diverted from delinquent activities" (see Section 6.2).

a shift into self-employment of workers anxious to protect their living standards. Indeed, in the case of the survival strategies of middle class employees there has been a trend of movement out of the primary formal sector into self-employment, either on a full-time or part-time basis. The trend amongst working class men, however, has been to shift into formal sector service activity, typically the protective services. This shift is indicative of a wider process of 'tertiarisation with deindustrialisation' (Gatica, 1986), and mirrors the national level expansion of the service sector in Jamaica. These occupations are at the low-earnings end of the formal sector, characterised by low skill levels, a weak wage:efficiency ratio and an elastic demand function for labour (see Section 3.4.2).

Although the numbers of women in the workforce has increased significantly, their position in the labour market has not changed as markedly. Their entry into the labour market is in either 'precarious employment' in the (realigned) manufacturing sector or in marginal sales and, to a lesser extent, service sector 'nontradeable' activity; collectively described by Pinto (1984) as 'spurious tertiarisation'. Anderson (1988: 16) points out that "urban-based [higglers] tend to be found at the bottom of the economic hierarchy". Low capital-intensity sales from the yard, or from a small shop adjoining the yard, typically involves *overemployment* - long periods of labour investment for small returns. It is an informal sector activity which coexists in product competition with the formal sector (see Section 3.4.2), but on the basis of a depression of the supply price of labour. Alternatively, women find work in casual service occupations - doing a day's washing or ironing - based purely on the sale of labour on the open labour market, and characterised by *underemployment*. The 'employment adequacy' of these female activities is such that they could be justifiably viewed as 'disguised unemployment'. In contrast, almost all women who had found a niche operating in relatively high capital-intensity informal commercial importing have been forced out of business by spiralling overheads under devaluation, increased import duties, regulation designed to bring them into the tax system, and shrinking domestic demand.

Gilbert (1990: 107) believes that the informal sector is "only functional to the needs of capital in specific circumstances", and describes the 'informalisation' process as that which demands "a shift to a more flexible relationship between labour and capital, so that labour can be absorbed or discarded in a more sensitive response to economic market forces". Hence the internal labour market structure that has traditionally typified and protected the formal sector is eroded by the separation and removal of those formal sector workers whose low skill level and weak wage:efficiency relationship creates an elastic demand function for labour. It is an informalisation process that is characterised by a weakening of trade union power through the individualisation of employer-employee relations, and the erosion of social protection for workers as their position becomes casualised and insecure. It necessitates a contraction of the formal sector to an elite workforce, secured and reproduced by 'monopolisation' and 'professionalisation'.

The informalised and casualised workforce is engaged either in competition with formal sector operations (by operating successfully at margins for which formal sector participation would be unprofitable) or in market links with the formal sector (by producing goods through sub-contractual links at income levels per hour below those on the formal sector and often below the minimum wage). Both these types of relationship between informal and formal activity are characterised by 'self-exploitation' of the informal sector labour force; *reducing the supply price of their labour* in order to be competitive in either capturing markets or in selling labour power.

In Jamaica the role of the informal sector is recognised, and informal entrepreneurial activity encouraged, particularly after a commitment by the government in August 1992 to pay particular attention to the small business sector.¹⁰⁸ But the informal sector survives because of the fact that the majority

¹⁰⁸ The state-run Micro Investment Development Agency (MIDA), for example, provides low-interest credit and technical assistance to small businesses in an attempt to oil the wheels of the informal sector, and are pressuring the Government to secure a larger amount of international soft loans to support and finance micro-enterprise (*The Financial Gleaner*, 26/02/93b). In February

of the population operate at low levels of capital intensity and enterprise. Informal sector activity is distinguished and protected from formal sector appropriation by the low-income of its producers and consumers. The ability of a few entrepreneurs in the 'dynamic informal sector' (Gilbert, 1990) to achieve high income levels requires that these characteristics remain in place (see Section 3.4.2).

There has in the last few years been a return to the facilitatory approach to the informal sector that characterised the approach of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) in the early 1970s. The 'new right' (see, for example De Soto, 1989) perceives the informal and formal sectors as complementary, and distinguished by the institutional mechanisms which prevent informal sector access to markets and resources. It places the problem of employment and wealth creation in the informal sector, not in its relations with the formal sector, but in a system of legal and economic apartheid which discriminates against informal sector operators, and deny the potential of their ingenuity and resourcefulness. This conceptual approach is reflected in Caribbean policy prescriptions aimed at facilitating informal sector growth (see for example Lloyd-Evans and Potter, 1990). In contrast, the approach to informal-formal sector relations expounded above is based on a conceptualisation of the informal sector as involutory rather than evolutionary (Moser, 1984), whose growth cannot be achieved simply by removing institutional and legislative bias. This raises serious doubts about its capacity to provide 'the engine for growth' under structural adjustment. As Levitt comments on remunerations for higglers in Jamaica:

It is a favourite myth of the middle classes that the typical higgler is able to buy a fine house for straight cash in the most exclusive residential areas

1993, MIDA had assisted in the setting up of two 'Community Development Funds', in Kingston and St. Thomas, based on the pooling of local residents' funds (and the matching of sums by MIDA and other lending institutions) to set up a community lending agency providing interest on savings and capital for local productive ventures. Meanwhile in St. Catherine MIDA has made funds of JS2.7 million available to new local business ventures through the St. Catherine Co-operative Credit Union (*The Financial Gleaner*, 5/02/93).

of Kingston. If this were indeed the case, Jamaica's economic problems would long have been solved.

(1991: 38)

There are certainly instances in the Jamaican case when informal activity has been shown to be of higher remunerative value than many activities in the protected formal sector. These include the early successes of the ICIs and, most notably, the continuing profitability of the black market in narcotics exports and associated currency dealing (Witter, 1987; Witter and Kirton, 1990). It seems equally clear, however, that segmentation within the loosely defined informal sector creates opportunity for monopoly capital through the exclusion of less capital intensive operations (House *et al*, 1993). Even then, highly remunerative informal sector operations are often *illegal* operations, which are thus spared appropriation by the formal sector. Hence the recent 'institutionalisation' - and in that sense 'formalisation' - of ICI activity in order to bring it into the formal taxation system, reflects a form of 'appropriation by legalisation' that takes capital intensive activity out of the informal sector for fiscal rewards. In this case the government has defined the limits to the expansion of the informal sector. Far from being a shot in the arm for those who recommend deregulation, it is symptomatic of the limits placed on the informal sector by the imperative of appropriation through legal or economic means. The same could well be true of the liberalisation of the exchange rate if this proves to dampen demand for an informal black market in foreign exchange.

It is possible, as Diaz (1993) argues of Chile, that this low-productivity, low-income tertiary sector activity is "a refuge for labour in a time of crisis and restructuring" which in Chile returned to 'normal' levels during the recovery of 1983-1989 and post-1989 expansion. If, as critics of Jamaican political economic management during the 1980s argue, the Jamaican economy is only now entering a true phase of stabilisation, then the rise of 'spurious tertiary' activity could be a recessionary trend which will follow the Chilean economy into retreat once economic growth is achieved. In the same way, the 'tertiarisation of deindustrialisation' could become the basis for a sustained development path

rather than a residual shelter of inadequate employment.

7.4 Social and Spatial Mobility Under Structural Adjustment: Disaggregating Impacts on an Urban Population

It is evident from longitudinal analysis that average household size has increased significantly in both residential areas. This trend above all else indicates a 'universal' stagnation of an intergenerational spatial mobility that at one time was very evident in the KMA. The post-independence mobility opportunities of the the Jamaican urban population are reflected in the social backgrounds of (the parents of) many Drumblair respondents. These channels of mobility have been narrowed by a combination of external shocks and trends. Lack of affordable housing is preventing young adults from all socioeconomic backgrounds from moving out of family households. The surprisingly low level of mobility reflected in the residential histories of Franklyn Town respondents indicates that, for those who have been unable to move out of the area, acute housing shortages and inflation in rental and owner housing mitigates against a rapid turnover of residential moves. Instead, housing densities increase as households extend and adopt 'nesting' strategies (of households within households) as intrahousehold responses to these external trends in the housing market.

In the short-term the absorption of extended household members tends to increase household vulnerability because the extending household acts as a safety net for those dependents whose decision to move is often a strategy to cope with their own increasing vulnerability. Over time, however, absorption of kin can operate to the long-term advantage of the host household if the new household member shifts from being a dependent to being an asset. If they are able to raise income, this both adds to total household income and diversifies income raising strategies, thus reducing vulnerability to external shocks and trends. If additional members contribute to the household through taking on reproductive responsibilities such

as childcare provision, this can reduce expenditure on social goods and services and/or release other members of the household for productive work.

The implications of increasing household size, beyond a universal stagnation of intergenerational mobility, generally seem to be that extra adult household members in the middle class household increase its assets, as enough are finding work to be able to decrease the dependency ratio despite increasing household size. In this way middle class couple extended and nuclear households are relatively less vulnerable than their working class equivalents, being better able to translate extra adults into extra income-earners.

The ability to raise income is directly related to an individual's market capacity, and educational attainment is a critical component of that capacity. Despite post-independence improvements in access to education, the majority of Franklyn Town residents have left school without secondary school qualifications. The inability to defer returns to educational investment is primarily influenced by the costs of education, both the direct costs of schooling and the indirect costs of forfeiting the productive and reproductive labour of the individual while they are at school. Amongst working class parents there is an almost unanimous endorsement of the education system as a vehicle of mobility for their children. It is not, therefore, a scepticism of the possible benefits of education that causes children to leave without qualifications.

However, the nature of the structure of opportunity that develops under structural adjustment and labour market restructuring is such that a degree of scepticism as to the benefits of a secondary education may in fact be merited. As discussed above, a policy emphasis on dismantling price distortions in the economy is part of an incentive structure which encourages export-led, low wage growth. In the short- to medium-term at least, there seems to be no place for a highly educated, highly skilled and therefore overpriced labour force in the Jamaican economy.

The emergence and expansion of a post-War urban professional and managerial middle class professional brought with it all the associations of education, occupation and income. Joseph argues, however, that structural adjustment programmes have "altered the situation [of the middle class] dramatically, causing disjuncture between these formerly highly correlated markers" (1993: 22). The disjuncture she refers to is that between educational/occupational status and income levels. Miller's (1990) notion that members of the 'emerging middle class' will ensure that their children acquire the middle class status attained through the education system is therefore called into question under structural adjustment. The growth of traditional professions associated with tertiary level education has slowed (or has been transferred abroad through migration) in comparison with administrative, managerial and executive occupations of lower educational status. There is a question mark now over whether there is a desire to strengthen class status achieved through increased wealth with the traditional educational attainment and a possible generational shift into traditional middle class professions.

The research disaggregates the implications of macro-level change for life chances of *different members of the urban middle class*. Middle class public sector employees have suffered under the IMF's macroeconomic imperative of correcting the balance of payments deficit through the reduction of domestic absorption. Key elements of this strategy include devaluation (which acts as a demand management measure in restricting consumption, and a supply-side incentive in encouraging production for export) and reducing public sector employment (as part of a wider fiscal retrenchment policy and privatisation programme). Those that have borne the brunt of job cuts have been those in relatively junior positions and who are therefore likely to have fewer assets and be more vulnerable.

At the same time public sector salaries have been markedly devalued in real terms, forcing public sector employees into adopting strategies for increasing earnings. These strategies are contingent upon the ownership of key assets,

particularly fixed and money capital and skill levels or professional qualifications.

They include:

1. Taking on a secondary occupation, such as extra tutoring or consultancy; retiring and then coming out of retirement into the private sector in order to retain a state pension and access a salary;
2. Obtaining two full-time jobs at separate institutions and only turning up for half the time at both institutions;
3. Renting out all or part of their property;
4. Selling off capital assets, such as land;
5. Shifting occupations entirely, particularly into the private financial and trading activity under the meso-level growth of the 'high income' economy;
6. Migrating, sometimes illegally, and accepting low-skill jobs for wages in foreign exchange; and
7. Altering consumption patterns either through economising or through accepting a more significant drop in standard of living.

Middle class private sector employees, while not suffering the dramatic employment shake-out of the state sector, are still feeling the effects of reduced purchasing power under devaluation. For those with access to money capital, strategies include a shift into self-employment, particularly in export trading and financial services, and investment in financial and property markets. Indeed, investment in real estate or property, or the use of real estate as collateral for financial speculation, in a climate of spiralling land and property prices, provides the clearest avenue for financial profit well beyond the level of survival.

Middle class women are also entering the workforce in greater numbers, although in a different role. Their increased participation often reflects a household strategy of second income earning rather than a single household head's survival strategy. In the context of a shift by the household's main income earner into self-

employment, for example, the decision of spouses to enter into the workforce can be seen as an income diversification strategy to allow the household to risk-take in this way.

Strategies to access money capital can operate, through force of circumstance or personal preference, outside the formal banking system. Working class individuals, most of whom lack the credit-worthiness to borrow through formal channels, are reliant on informal credit networks to raise capital for either consumption or production purposes. This may range from an *ad hoc* money loan from a yard neighbour or extended family member to a more organised money pooling, or 'partner' system. Many middle class borrowers, particularly those on fixed local currency incomes putatively enjoy easy access to formal lending channels, but see their effective demand reduced by the macroeconomic policy of raised interest rates (designed to discourage consumption and encourage external trade). Larger-scale versions of the 'partner' system amongst middle class entrepreneurs are a thus strategic response to these macro-economic barriers.

Secondary occupations are a 'luxury' of the middle class workers. Their participation in occupations characterised by a relatively high capital:labour ratio keeps their working hours low enough to allow the adoption of a secondary income earning strategy, and is more likely to provide them with the necessary financial capital to put this strategy into effect. In contrast, low income workers, forced into 'self exploitation' by their participation in labour intensive activity, often lack the time and capital to diversify their income raising by taking on a secondary occupation.

A reduction in the ability to consume above subsistence level is apparent within different socioeconomic strata, but to different degrees. For some residents of Drumblair this shift may force them into abandoning or modifying their consumption of labour- or time-saving appliances or services (for example by changing fridges to a model that doesn't automatically defrost and therefore use

up energy; by reducing the number of hours of employment of a domestic worker; or by carefully planning the daily car journey so as to minimise fuel consumption). For others in Drumblair it may involve cutting down on 'luxury' subsistence expenditure (such as the consumption of imported fruit or the dining out at restaurants) or changing consumption strategies (such as switching to a bulk weekly shop at a market rather than regular small purchases at a more expensive supermarket).

For households in Franklyn Town there is less consumption over and above subsistence expenditure and less asset ownership, and therefore fewer opportunities to make such modifications in lifestyle while maintaining consumption of 'basic human needs'. Strategies are widely related to compromising minimum subsistence standards (for example by reducing calorie and nutritional intakes) or by illegally maintaining a minimum consumption level (for example by bridging water pipes or electricity lines or avoiding tenancy, service, health or school fee payments). The other key strategy is to rely even more heavily on informal consumption, or the exchange of labour between households or family networks. Hence the ability of a single female household head to continue working in the 'Free Zone', or to undertake lengthy trips to Curacao to import clothing, is predicated on the 'claims' she can make on friends, neighbours or extended family for the care of her children.

Informal support networks also include the financial 'claims' that individuals and households can make for remittances from external individuals. A foreign remittance flow into a working class household represents an important contribution to subsistence expenditure, given the purchasing strength of foreign currency. Generally, however, it cannot be relied upon sufficiently to be used for more strategic consumption, such as of education or of capital assets for production. Formal remittance flows to returned migrants in the shape of pensions place these individuals and households in a relatively secure position, as they see the value of their regular income enhanced by the devaluation of the local

currency under exchange rate liberalisation. It is not clear how strategic a role foreign remittances play for middle class households and individuals, as in many cases such individuals are already highly asset-rich and mobile.

From the survey, clear patterns emerged regarding gender, household structure and vulnerability. At the micro-level, disaggregation reveals the importance of household structures and intra-household relations in influencing individuals' employment and consumption strategies. The erosion and monetisation of collective welfare services has increased the domestic reproductive burden on those women unable to purchase labour-saving appliances or services. At the same time the informalisation and casualisation of employment are characterised not only by underemployment and overemployment, but by the increase in work for 'self consumption' by households (Mingione, 1983: 327). In integrationist terms this reduces the ability of women to be productive in the labour market, and increases their vulnerability by denying them full access to remunerative activities. Many women are therefore reliant on (claims to) family welfare networks or the income of another household member, or have to resort to an erosion of their economic assets or stores (see Section 3.4.2).

The declining role of the state in the reproduction of human resources is directly linked to the constraining effect of urban infrastructural deterioration on economic growth and wealth creation. The effects of the dissolution of 'public' goods and services on 'human resources' is, however, a discriminatory one. Those low income households dependent on a single income are extremely vulnerable to the effects of ill health on that income earner. The implication of this external 'shock' on single female household heads is particularly acute, and much depends on the subsequent ability of those households to draw on assets, such as cash gifts or external social support networks.

The urban household structures that have arisen out of the tension between Jamaica's historically contingent set of gender relations and urbanisation process

serve to counter reductionist arguments about women's domestic subordination. In a society where 45 per cent of households are headed by women, there is a degree of social, economic and political autonomy that cannot be subsumed by "the primacy of family organisation", as Gomez de Estrada and Reddock (1987: 149) imply. The key historical contingency to be noted here is that:

industrialisation entails the cumulative separation of social production from domestic reproduction. This separation was already begun in the Caribbean region's late agrarian phase, by slavery.

(Hart, 1989: 24)

While this raises our awareness of the "highly particular and variable" (Hart, 1989: 21) contextual reality of gender relations, it is clear that Jamaican urban women are anything but models of independence. The need displayed by many female household heads in the survey to rely on absent partners, ex-partners and male relatives in the upbringing of children introduces a sense of 'invisible' gendered dependency, and raises questions about the true extent of the political independence of urban working class women. It also reflects the dual pressures placed upon female household heads to take on an increased domestic reproductive burden whilst also being presented to transnational corporations as the cornerstone of a low wage industrial growth policy. These conflicting pressures, and the questions they raise about the strategic benefit to women of structural adjustment, are exacerbated and perpetuated by the poor remuneration levels achieved by women in manufacturing, service and trading activity. The upsurge in their entry into the labour market, as discussed above, is less a voluntary assertion of independence than an involuntary sign of desperation.

It is single female headed households across the socioeconomic groups that are most vulnerable. The vast majority of male household heads are in stable coresidential unions, while most female heads of household are *de jure* single, and are financially more vulnerable than women in coresidential unions. The great majority of stable coresidential unions have at least one partner working. The unemployment rate for *de jure* single female household heads reflects their relatively greater dependence on the incomes of other household members or of

extended support networks. The average age of single female household heads is younger than that of coresidential partners, and they tend to have more child dependents in the household. This means that a high dependency ratio within single female headed households exists at the same time that the ratio of economically active potential workers to children remains low. Whilst there are a large minority of female headed households across socioeconomic strata, middle class female heads are more secure. They are typically older women, and therefore better established), more likely to be home owners and in visiting unions.

7.5 Policy for Sustainable Urban Adjustment

Harvey (1989) argues that capitalist urbanisation under supply-side macroeconomic policy can take one or more of four forms:

1. Improving competitive position with respect to the international division of labour, either by raising the rate of exploitation of labour (absolute surplus value), or through technological or organisational innovation (relative surplus value).
2. Improving competitive position with respect to the spatial division of consumption in order to appropriate surpluses from the circulation of revenues, for example in the leisure and tourism industry or in the construction of totally new living environments, such as retirement communities. (In this scenario the polarising effects of the tendency to publicly subsidise consumption by the rich at the expense of local support of the social wage of the poor, are hard to keep in check).
3. Competing for key control and command functions, particularly finance capital, information gathering or government decision making.
4. Competing for redistribution of economic power from higher government levels through given channels.

The thrust under structural adjustment and the emphasis on comparative advantage is for growth through the accumulation of absolute surplus value. In this final section we will discuss the viability of such a development path and look at alternative scenarios with respect to the future political economic management of Jamaica.

There is a clear difference, Elson (1987) argues, between survival strategies and strategies "for sustained growth and development, both on a personal and national level". Hence compensatory measures designed to protect vulnerable groups (see for example Cornia et al, 1987), such as the Jamaican food stamp programme, "run the danger of deteriorating into paternalism", focussing "mainly on the detrimental impact of adjustment on women, and not on the contribution that women can make to effective adjustment" (Elson, 1987: 16)

This view is shared by the authors of a recent World Bank Country Economic Memorandum:

Poverty in Jamaica is a problem more of insufficient growth in incomes than of inadequate support of social programs that mitigate the detrimental effects of poverty. Thus, a poverty strategy should include policies both for accelerating sustainable growth and for assisting the poor by increasing their access to productive assets, raising the return on these assets, and raising the quality as well as the number of jobs available...Sufficient urban demand for labour is also important to ensure a continued and sustained reduction in poverty.

(World Bank, 1994)

In turning from policies for protection to policies for promotion of growth, there is a more optimistic perception amongst adjustment proponents of the macroeconomic climate. The progressive tightening of the government's fiscal stance from 1989 onwards is seen by many to be the key to an improved macroeconomic framework (World Bank, 1994). Another cornerstone policy long exhorted by the multilaterals - that of adopting a market-determined exchange rate regime - has also now come into being, and the hope is that an encouraging climate for foreign and domestic investment and a virtuous circle of growth has

finally been created. Gladstone Bonnick believes that now that price distorting subsidies on food have been removed, and now that the exchange rate has been allowed to devalue and find its own level, we should see a revitalisation of domestic agriculture in Jamaica. His central thesis is that if you get fiscal magnitude under serious control, then the pressures on the exchange rate are eased. If, at the same time, you have avoided the distortions that lead you to prefer to import - namely food subsidies and an artificially low exchange rate - rather than to produce for yourself and export, this will create the environment for domestic producers to compete. Until then, cheaper imports act against the tendency towards import substitution in agriculture, and measures that hold the exchange rate at artificial levels hit both domestic and export producers.

Not only has subsidising imported food impoverished domestic agriculture, he argues, but the welfare impacts of subsidisation have acted merely to encourage rural-urban migration and subsidise urban consumption without adding significantly to the social product:

They can come to Kingston, sit around, not be regularly employed, but on the basis of an odd job that probably adds very little to the social product, can earn enough to allow them to buy a certain standard of living on the basis of subsidised goods.

(Personal interview, February 1994)

Despite this optimism, supply-sideists remain adamant that Jamaica could do more to make itself more attractive to investment for export:

Despite measures taken [to attract investment], more competitive wage rates, and repeated government exhortations to businessmen, relatively few successes have been attained...There is no doubt, however, that this situation can be reversed, since, with appropriate rewards to exporters, Jamaica can reasonably expect to repeat - and even surpass - the successes achieved by some other developing nations.

(Inter-American Development Bank, 1990: 2-3)

First, there is an acknowledgement that, because of negative real interest rates, demand management measures have suppressed productive investment rather than consumption. In particular, small businesspeople are losing out to large companies

in the face of escalating mortgages, inflated input costs and a prohibitively high interest rate for borrowing. Jamaica's dependence on imported material inputs has put a severe strain on small domestic businesses, particularly those with a relatively high capital input. The meso-level outcome of demand management through raised interest rates has clear implications for businesspeople. It means raised rents on commercial properties in a climate of spiralling inflation in the property market, as well as raised utility prices. In addition, those businesspeople who have had to take out capital loans, or those who are forced in to taking out loans because of raised overheads and decreasing demand from domestic consumers, face the prospect of spiralling indebtedness:

Central to the achievement of specified growth and employment targets...is the required growth in the exports of goods, non-factor services, domestic savings and domestic investment...[however] the fall in the external current account deficit has been secured [only] through a scale-down of domestic investment [rather than consumption] activities...[This has] resulted in the failure of export and domestic savings to grow with sufficient strength to create the base for strong growth...There is [therefore] the need to switch from negative real interest rates [which also encourage massive capital flight] to high positive real interest rates supplemented by tax initiatives and investment incentives to shift the burden of the high real interest rates from investment to consumption activities.

(The Financial Gleaner, 19/03/93)

Secondly, there is a particularly urgent demand, stemming from observation of the success of NICs in international markets, for greater labour market flexibility so that, in response to external signals, companies can "readjust their use of labour to maximise their competitiveness" (*The Financial Times, 6/12/94*).

This belief is reflected in the pressure for reform of labour legislation and for "re-inventing" the trade union movement as truly democratic, inclusive and non-confrontational" (*The Financial Times, 6/12/94*). Gladstone Bonnick believes that not enough has been done in Jamaica to curb the power of the unions, and so lower the supply price of labour in the formal sector. The traditional links in the country between the trade union movement and party politics make this process difficult but, he argues, ultimately necessary:

We have to get rid of the bloody notion of trade unionism. That is finished. That is dead on the hoof...its a pain in the ass. You can't have a bunch of people who only supply muscle and a very low-grade negotiation skill..sooner or later people will begin to realise that they cannot deliver what the economy's not producing, and if they attempt to do it they'll bring production to a halt.

(Personal interview, February 1994)

It seems clear that urban adjustment will only be successful when it reduces vulnerability, but that given the nature of human integration into the urbanisation process, this can only be achieved by improving the quality of the labour supply. In terms of a neoclassical endorsement of the universal virtues of economic growth, policy endorsements stress improving the human capital of the urban poor, and thus increasing their productivity, through education and training.

The reduction of domestic investment discussed above has not only involved a contraction of private investment for production and growth but also of public investment for physical and human resource development. Hence "[while] the reduction of the fiscal deficit over the years and the targeting of a fiscal surplus for 1992/93 is a huge positive, ...its benefits are being negated by the massive scale-down in public sector investment which underpins it" (*The Financial Gleaner*, 19/03/93). This has profound implications for the quality of both the physical and social infrastructure.

In the light of the above emphasis on improving human capital, the detrimental effects of fiscal retrenchment on the quality of educational and health provision have particular significance. In Jamaica, good access to education - universal primary education and low drop-out rates - masks the poor quality of that service (World Bank, 1994). While, as discussed in Chapter One, the quality of education and health services have continued to deteriorate, there is now a clear danger of reduced access under the government policy of cost recovery of education- and health-related items. Elson (1987) argues that public expenditure cuts should be prioritised and targeted in order to promote the retention of primary health care and education. This would also have the beneficial effect of increasing women's

employment in these public services. Targeting should also be implemented by differentiating user fees for basic services such as electricity, water and sanitation by socioeconomic residential area.

A policy initiative in favour of increased access to housing can be similarly justified in neoclassical terms of increasing the the human capital of the labour supply. The vulnerability that is created by overcrowding and poor mobility translates into a detrimental impact on the productivity of the poor. Government efforts to increase access to affordable housing would protect the poor from the effects of inflation on rental costs.

Ultimately, it seems unlikely that any amount of price distortion removal will deter the flight of export manufacturers to cheaper labour pools, either in the region (particularly with the long-term extension of NAFTA) or in Eastern Europe or China. Gladstone Bonnick himself is firmly of this belief, and adds that in the long run US and Japanese technological innovation will make labour redundant,¹⁰⁹ and therefore the supply price of labour irrelevant anyway (Personal interview, February 1994). If this is the case then the manufacturing sector must concentrate less on expanding opportunities for amassing absolute surplus value and concentrate instead on creating relative surplus value through technological or organisational innovation. This involves effecting the transfer of appropriate technology and skills to the country, so that growth can be both internal and sustainable.¹¹⁰ A renewed emphasis on sustainability should also recognise the importance of diversifying sectoral linkages in an export-led growth model. There have been calls, for example, for a reconsideration of a regional plan for domestic aluminium production, using Jamaica's alumina, Guyana's bauxite, smelted using Trinidad's natural gas, or possibly hydro-electric power

¹⁰⁹ He adds on a more philosophical note that if society could deal with the problem of how to make sure everyone benefits from growth, then the replacement of labour by capital wouldn't intrinsically be a problem.

¹¹⁰ See Girvan and Marcelle (1990) for a case study of the successful transfer of appropriate technology by a Jamaican firm.

from a new dam in the Blue Mountain Range, which could also stimulate the growth of light industry. Locally produced aluminium could stimulate the growth of light industry and, if used to can processed local foods, could provide a direct link with the agricultural sector (*The Financial Gleaner*, 2/04/93a).

The opportunity for future employment directives, Bonnicksen believes, is in the service sector, and tourism is only one of many potential areas for development of competitiveness in the spatial division of consumption. In positing this policy direction, he echoes Harvey's (1989) second supply-side policy option; that of improving competitive position with respect to the spatial division of consumption in order to appropriate surpluses from the circulation of revenues. He points out that Jamaica has been exporting nurses for a long time. If Jamaica can produce the nurses, there is no reason why you can't have a situation where you provide *in situ* nursing care. Just as you have hotels, you can build old people's homes for rich people who want to retire to a warm climate. High-skill labour and technical equipment could be imported from the US, while providing a labour intensive area of expansion for locally trained staff. Other services requiring investment in skills he points to include information servicing activities, such as those developed in Barbados.

At present, it is the nature of a particular set of (gendered) labour market expectations providing the demand for labour that many consider leaves the labour market, and the workforce within it, exposed and vulnerable. If the structure of opportunity doesn't exist that permits that level of specialisation,¹¹¹ then the process of adding value to labour through training is one which will

¹¹¹ The structure of opportunity may exist on a wider, intra- or international, spatial level, but that would require the individual to have the physical and temporal access to demand at that level also.

reduce its attractiveness to foreign investors.¹¹²

Urban female headed households have been shown to be particularly vulnerable under structural adjustment. Despite gains in educational attainment, and in this respect women have made great strides since independence, improving the quality of the female labour supply in a drive to integrate women into the process of accumulation is not by itself the means to decrease the vulnerability of urban women, for two reasons. The first concerns the difference between addressing the practical and strategic needs of women in the labour market,¹¹³ and the second relates to the structural conditions giving rise to the demand for female labour.

It could be argued that an increase in the 'employment adequacy' of female employment, and thus a decrease in 'invisible' dependency experienced by many women, would strengthen women's position in urban production and consumption spheres, and thus address gender inequality from a position of productive independence in urban society. In Jamaica, however, the nature and reinforcement of labour market segmentation under adjustment is such that 'employment adequacy' for women cannot be improved significantly without first addressing their strategic gender needs in the workplace. This is to refute the proposition that bringing women into the labour market, for example on grounds of economic efficiency and productivity, is an integrating process. Instead, it is the very fact that women are not fully integrated into the workforce, in terms of the value of

¹¹² This argument is critical to the present debate around reducing inequality at the workplace through skill training or upgrading as a means of increasing the quality of the female labour force (see for example Davies and Anderson, 1987; *Lovat et al*, 1991).

¹¹³ Moser (1993) distinguishes two key movements in gender studies and their implications for the success of the gender planning process. WID (Women in Development), she argues, is a policy add-on designed to bring women, as productive human resources, into the development process (for example by increasing access to credit & employment), thereby increasing efficiency. This approach tends to target women on the basis of biological difference, and serves only their 'practical gender needs'. GAD (Gender and Development), she argues, is a more confrontational approach, designed to increase equity, which shifts the agenda to the social construction of gender roles and relations, thereby politicising gender policy, and addressing 'strategic gender needs'.

their labour, that allows them to be temporarily exploited¹¹⁴ under the global and regional restructuring and feminisation of manufacturing activity (see, for example Gomez de Estrada and Reddock, 1987).¹¹⁵

The gender division of labour within the Jamaican labour market remains extremely stratified; even where women are employed in manufacturing it is concentrated in certain industries and occupations within industries. The 'levelling down' of gender inequality in the labour market has involved a 'feminisation' process, but this is not a process which has strategically challenged the gender division of labour,¹¹⁶ because there has not been a substitution of women for what were men's jobs (Elson, 1994). Instead the feminisation has been with respect to labour relations, contracts and degrees of protection that have previously separated a large part of the male and female workforce. It is witnessed in the 'shake-out' of male workers from the stable environment of the protected formal sector nucleus of the company, which provided full-time and permanent employment based on a legal contract.

¹¹⁴ Gomez de Estrada and Reddock interpret the 'temporary' nature of this exploitation in three ways. First, the geographical mobility of capital under industrial restructuring is designed so as to be able to move easily between sites of low-cost labour. Secondly, the companies once *in situ* reserve the right to 'streamline' its labour force in response to production requirements, a reflection of the casualisation of employment which has intensified under conditions of export-led growth. Thirdly, the women employed are dispensable to their employers once the quality of their labour, for example their eyesight, deteriorates. So it is that the average age of women working in EPZs tends to be lower than that of the EAP as a whole.

¹¹⁵ For this reason can we make a consensus-based leap towards concluding that the 'modernising' processes of industrialisation and modernisation are those that are democratising gender relations in the path towards a 'universal ideal'? If it is the case that the nature of peripheral capitalism in the cities of the central Caribbean is not creating the conditions for the type of 'peripheral fordism' (Lipietz, 1987) experienced by the NICs of the Pacific rim, then that loaded question need not be asked in the first place.

¹¹⁶ This argument refutes the reactionary feeling within Jamaican male society that men are on the receiving end of a sexual backlash:

Clearly Jamaican men must begin to look to their own self-interest. What is needed is one individual with the concern, the time and the consciousness to get a group of men together to become proactive in tackling the issue...The fact is that there is a problem and it has to be tackled so that there is some sexual parity in this country.

(Carl Wint, Assistant Editor, *The Daily Gleaner*, 22/01/93)

Ongoing informal and non-governmental efforts to skill and reskill women in traditionally male occupations (see for example Antrobus and Rogers, 1982; Women's Construction Collective 1991; Kiarang, 1992) certainly address the 'strategic gender needs' of Jamaican women, in that they seek to address existing inequalities in the labour market. However, much of present State intervention, through training schemes, serves 'practical gender needs' while reinforcing existing inequality in access to employment and remuneration. The result is an intensification of 'occupational crowding' by gender into narrow bands of the job market which drives down the supply price of women, not only in that sector but throughout the economy (Mazumdar, 1989).

In order for economic growth to be sustainable, there is a need to concentrate not only on human resources and the improvement of human capital as a stimulant to growth, but to recognise that the structure of opportunity within which resource development occurs is equally critical to the accumulation and equitable distribution of wealth. In Jamaica, as individuals are deskilled by the erosion of the social and physical infrastructure and limited expectations in the market place, this means a reversal of the devaluation of labour that is occurring on both these fronts.

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Appendix I: Sample Survey Questionnaire

Date:
 Questionnaire No.:
 ED Code:
 Address:
 Name:

I. For each household member:

1. ID Code:

2. Sex:

Male	1
Female	2

3. Relationship to head of Household:

Head	1
Joint Head	2
Partner	3
Daughter/Son of Head	4
Father/Mother of Head	5
Sister/Brother of Head	6
Niece/Nephew	7
Son/Daughter of Partner	8
Brother/Sister of Partner	9
Father/Mother of Partner	10
Other relative of Head/Partner	11
Employee or his/her Relative	12
Tenant or his/her Relative	13
Other person not related	14

4. Date of Birth:

Day/Month/Year

5. Age Now:

Years if > 5 years
 Years and months if < 5 years

6. Present Marital Status:

Married/partner	1
Divorced/separated (<i>go to Q.8</i>)	2
Widower (<i>go to Q.10</i>)	3
Never married/partner (<i>go to Q.10</i>)	4

7. Does the partner live in this household?

Yes	1
No	2

- 8. Does the partner/ex-partner provide financial support?**
 Yes, often 1
 Sometimes 2
 No, never 3
- 9. Is this because you are looking after their child(ren)?**
 Yes 1
 Yes, partly 2
 No 3
- 10. Do you support children?**
 Yes, in household 1
 Yes, outside household 2
 No 3
- 11. ID Code of Partner**
- 12. Present Nationality**
 Jamaican 1
 Other Caribbean 2
 Other 3
- 13. For how many months in the past twelve months have you lived in this household?**
 < 3 months 1
 > 3 months 2
- 14. Do you receive remittances?**
 Regular small 1
 Occasional small 2
 Regular large 3
 Occasional large 4
 None (*go to Q.17*) 5
- 15. Who are the remittances for?**
 Respondent specifically 1
 General household 2
 General household + respondent 3
- 16. Where are the remittances from?**
 Jamaica 1
 US/Canada 2
 UK 3
 Elsewhere 4
- 17. Do you have to support individuals outside the household?**
 Children 1
 Parent(s) 2
 Other relations 3
 No 4

II. For school attenders**18. What type of school are you attending this academic year?**

Basic/Kindergarten/Nursery	1
<i>(go to next respondent)</i>	
Primary	2
All Age School (grades 1-6)	3
All Age School (grades 7-9)	4
New Secondary	5
Comprehensive	6
Secondary High	7
Technical	8
Vocational/Agricultural	9
University	10
Other <i>(go to next respondent)</i>	11

19. Fee Paying Status

Full fee-paying pupil	1
Government grant-aided pupil	2
Partially grant-aided pupil	3

20. What grade are you in at school this year?**21. Have you ever repeated a grade (state number of years)?**

Yes, in primary school	1
Yes, in secondary school	2
Yes, both	3
No	4

22. In the last month, how many days school have you missed?

< 3 days <i>(go to Q.24)</i>	1
3-9 days	2
10-16 days	3
> 16 days	4

23. What is the main reason for not going to school?

Sickness	1
Pregnancy	2
Working for money	3
Working at home for no money	4
Handicapped	5
Can't afford clothes, lunch, books	6
Registered but refuse to attend	7
Other <i>(specify)</i>	8
Don't know	9

24. Does this school provide a meal?
- | | |
|--|---|
| Yes, milk/nutribun | 1 |
| Yes, free cooked meal (<i>go to Q. 26</i>) | 2 |
| Yes, other (<i>go to Q. 26</i>) | 3 |
| No (<i>go to Q. 26</i>) | 4 |
25. How much do you pay for the milk/nutribuns?
- | | |
|-------------|---|
| < 50 cents | 1 |
| < J\$1 | 2 |
| J\$1-2 | 3 |
| < J\$5 | 4 |
| < J\$10 | 5 |
| > J\$10 | 6 |
| FREE | 7 |
| Doesn't buy | 9 |
26. What type of school did you last attend?
- | | |
|--|----|
| Basic/Kindergarten/Nursery
(<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 1 |
| Primary | 2 |
| All Age School (grades 1-6) | 3 |
| All Age School (grades 7-9) | 4 |
| New Secondary | 5 |
| Comprehensive | 6 |
| Secondary High | 7 |
| Technical (<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 8 |
| Vocational/Agricultural
(<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 9 |
| University (<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 10 |
| Other (<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 11 |
| None (<i>go to next respondent</i>) | 12 |
27. What was the highest grade you achieved at that institution?

III. For all adults aged 16 years or over

- 28. Are you planning to become/in process of becoming a citizen or permanent resident of another country?**
- | | |
|-----|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
- 29. Do you have plans to move?**
- | | |
|--|---|
| New dwelling in this community
(go to Q.31) | 1 |
| New community (area code)
(go to Q.31) | 2 |
| No wish to move (go to Q.32) | 3 |
| Would like to move but can't | 4 |
- 30. Why can't you move?**
- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Can't afford | 1 |
| Can't sell this house | 2 |
| Nothing available | 3 |
| Other (specify) | 4 |
- 31. What is your main motive for wanting to move to new dwelling?**
- | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|
| Affordable rent/mortgage | 1 |
| Stay with relations/friends | 2 |
| Size of dwelling | 3 |
| Want to buy | 4 |
| Security | 5 |
| Size of yard | 6 |
| Given notice by landlord/forced out | 7 |
| No answer | 8 |
| Move with parent(s), guardian(s) | 9 |
- 32. What is your main motive for wanting to move to new community?**
- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Social/physical environment | 1 |
| Transport provision | 2 |
| Shopping facilities/access | 3 |
| Health facilities/access | 4 |
| Education facilities/access | 5 |
| Employment opportunities/access | 6 |
| Area of affordable housing | 7 |
| No answer | 8 |
| Move with parent(s), guardian(s) | 9 |

III. For all adults aged 16 years or over

NB Questions 33-38 should be repeated for each new place of residency

33. Place of Birth/Residency

34. Form of Tenure

Owned	1
Leased	2
Privately rented	3
Government rented	4
Rent free	5
Squatted	6
Other (<i>specify</i>)	7

35. Length of Residency (years)

36. Year of Leaving

37. Main + Secondary Motive for Move to new Dwelling

Affordable rent/mortgage	1
Stay with relations/friends	2
Size of dwelling	3
Want to buy	4
Security	5
Size of yard	6
Given notice by landlord/forced out	7
No answer	8
Move with parent(s), guardian(s)	9

38. Main + Secondary Motive for Move to new Community

Social/physical environment	1
Transport provision	2
Shopping facilities/access	3
Health facilities/access	4
Education facilities/access	5
Employment opportunities/access	6
Area of affordable housing	7
No answer	8
Move with parent(s), guardian(s)	9

IV. For all adults aged 16 years or over**39. Level of Education Attained****40. Is there a reason why you didn't gain a higher level of education?**

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Had to work at home | 1 |
| Had to work to earn family money | 2 |
| Pregnancy | 3 |
| No desire | 4 |
| Went into trade/job | 5 |
| Sickness | 6 |
| Couldn't afford to continue | 7 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 8 |

41. Employment Status

- | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|
| Employed | 1 |
| Unemployed/seeking employment | 2 |
| Unemployed/not seeking employment | 3 |
| Retired | 4 |
| Long-term sickness | 5 |

42. Main Employment Description (+ hours per week)**43. Secondary Employment (+ hours per week)****44. Father's Main Occupation (+ secondary occupation)****45. Mother's Main Occupation (+ secondary occupation)****46. Do you plan to change occupation?**

- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Yes (<i>give details</i>) | 1 |
| No | 2 |

47. Do you plan to go back into education/training?

- | | |
|---------------|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
| Would like to | 3 |
| N/A | 4 |

V. For all women aged 16 years or over

48. How much unpaid time do you spend daily cooking, cleaning, washing and looking after children?
- | | |
|-----------|---|
| < 1 hour | 1 |
| 1-3 hours | 2 |
| 3-6 hours | 3 |
| > 6 hours | 4 |
49. Do you employ a helper?
- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| Yes (<i>give hours per week</i>) | 1 |
| No | 2 |
50. How much unpaid time do you spend weekly working with community groups?
- | | |
|-------------|---|
| < 2 hours | 1 |
| 2-7 hours | 2 |
| 7-14 hours | 3 |
| 14-28 hours | 4 |
| > 28 hours | 5 |
| Used to | 6 |
| None | 9 |
51. Are you either unemployed and looking for work or not working as many hours as you would like?
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No (<i>go to Q.53</i>) | 2 |
52. Why do you think this is (secondary reason in parentheses)?
- | | |
|---------------------------------|---|
| No jobs/extra hours available | 1 |
| Insufficient education/training | 2 |
| Household/childcare commitments | 3 |
| Community activity commitments | 4 |
| Illness/pregnancy | 5 |
| No money for business | 6 |
| Discriminated against | 7 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 8 |

VI. For all respondents (where appropriate)

53. How do you usually get to the following (give hours in parentheses):
- | | |
|----|------------------------|
| a) | Market |
| b) | Supermarket |
| c) | Health centre/hospital |
| d) | Primary school |
| e) | Secondary school |
| f) | Work |

VII. For all households

- 54. Type of Housing Unit (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Detached house | 1 |
| Semi-detached | 2 |
| Apartment building | 3 |
| Town house | 4 |
| Improvised unit | 5 |
| Part of commercial building | 6 |
| Tenement building | 7 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 8 |
- 55. Age of Dwelling in Years (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- 56. Use of this Dwelling (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Residential only | 1 |
| Residential/Professional | 2 |
| Residential/Commercial | 3 |
| Residential/Agricultural | 4 |
- 57. Main Material for Outer Walls (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Concrete blocks | 1 |
| Stone | 2 |
| Bricks | 3 |
| Nog | 4 |
| Wattle and daub | 5 |
| Wood | 6 |
| Wood and Concrete | 7 |
| Wood and Brick | 8 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 9 |
- 58. Main Material for Roof (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Metal sheeting | 1 |
| Shingles/wood | 2 |
| Shingles/other | 3 |
| Tile | 4 |
| Concrete | 5 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 6 |
- 59. Main Material for Floor (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Dirt | 1 |
| Concrete | 2 |
| Wood | 3 |
| Tile/marble | 4 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 5 |
- 60. Number of Households Occupying Dwelling (give previous dwelling in parentheses)**

61. Number of Rooms Occupied by Household (give previous dwelling in parentheses)

TYPE	NUMBER
Bedroom	
Living room	
Dining room	
Living cum bedroom	
Living cum dining room	
Other	

62. Was the total amount of space in your previous dwelling:

Less than what you have now	1
About the same	2
More than what you have now	3

63. Is there a kitchen?

Yes, inside	1
Yes, outside	2
No	3

64. Are the kitchen facilities shared with other households?

Exclusive use	1
Shared	2

65. Is there an inside toilet?

Yes	1
No	2

66. Do you share it with another household?

Yes
No

67. Where does your water supply come from?

Public piped into dwelling	1
Public standpipe	2
Own catchment	3
Other (<i>specify</i>)	4

68. What is your main source of light?

Electricity (<i>go to Q.70</i>)	1
Gas	2
Candles/flashlight	3
Keros inc/meths	4
Other (<i>specify</i>)	5

69. Why was this source chosen?

Cost of electricity	1
Availability of electricity	2
Other (<i>specify</i>)	3

- 70. What is your main source of fuel?**
- | | |
|--------------------------|---|
| Electricity | 1 |
| Gas | 2 |
| Wood/charcoal | 3 |
| Kerosine | 4 |
| Other (<i>specify</i>) | 5 |
| None | 6 |
- 71. Does this household have a telephone?**
- | | |
|-----|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |
- 72. Does anybody in the household male or sell things in the dwelling?**
- | | |
|-----------------------------|---|
| Yes (<i>give details</i>) | 1 |
| No | 2 |
- 73. How many household members have not been living in the dwelling in the past seven days?**

Appendix II: Population Census 1982 Occupational Sub-Groups

<u>Code</u>	<u>Description</u>
101	Architecture, Engineering and Technical Assisting Occupations
102	Mapping, Surveying and Draughtsmen Occupations
103	Physical Scientist and related Technicians
104	Biology, Agronomy, related Life Science and Assisting Technical Occupations
105/06	Medical, Dental, Veterinary and related Workers
107	Mathematicians, Statisticians, Systems analysts and related Occupations
108	Economist, Sociologist and related Occupations
109	Accountants and Auditors
110/11	Occupations in Education
112	occupations in Religion and Theology
113	Judicial Occupations
114	Artistic, Literary, Recreational and Related Occupations
116	Librarians and Archivists
117	Aircraft and Ship's Officer Occupations
118	Social Welfare Occupations
119	Other Professional and Technical Occupations, n.e.c.
220	Legislative, Administrative and Executive Occupations - Government
221	Directors and Managers - Private Sector
222	Working Proprietors
223	Occupations in Administrative Specialisation
229	Other Administrative, Executive and Personnel Occupations, n.e.c
330	Corresponding, Filing and library Occupations
331	Stenographic and Typing Occupations
332	Electronic Data Processing Occupations
333	Book-keeping, Account-Recording and Office Machine Operating Occupations
334	Material, Planning and Recording and Production Scheduling Clerical Occupations
335	Reception, Information and Mail Distribution Occupations
336	Miscellaneous Clerical Occupations
337	<i>Company Sales Occupations</i>
338	<i>Sales Assistance and related Occupations</i>
339	Miscellaneous Sales Occupations
340	<i>Sales from Yard</i>
341	<i>Walking Street Higgler</i>
342	<i>Market Site Higgler</i>
343	<i>Informal Commercial Importer</i>

- 440 *Private Household workers*
- 441 *Office Cleaning and related*
- 442 Food and Beverage Preparation and Servicing Occupations (*self-employed*)
- 443 Launderers, Dry Cleaners and Pressers
- 444 Barbering, Cosmetology and related Occupations
- 445 *Food and Beverage Preparation and Servicing Occupations (employee)*
- 446 Police, Firefighting and related Occupations
- 447 Other Protective service Occupations n.e.c.
- 448 Transportation Services
- 449 *Deliveries and related Occupations*
- 550 Crop and Plant Farmers
- 551 Animal Farmers
- 552 Farm Managers and Supervisors
- 553 Crop and Plant Farming Occupations
- 554 Animal Farming, Fishing and Hunting Occupations
- 555 Forestry Occupations
- 559 Other Agricultural Occupations, n.e.c.

- 660 Miners, Quarrymen, Well Drillers and Related Workers
- 661 Metal Processors
- 662 Wood Preparation, Paper Makers, cabinet Makers and Related Wood Workers
- 663 Cabinet Makers and Related Workers
- 664 Chemical Processors and Related Workers
- 665 Spinners, Weavers, Knitters, Dyers and Related Workers
- 666 Tanners, Feltmongers and Pelt Dressers
- 667 Food and Beverage Processors
- 668 Tobacco Preparers and Tobacco Product Makers
- 669 Tailors, Dressmakers, Sewers, Upholsterers and related Workers
- 670 Shoemakers and Leather Goods Makers
- 671 Stone Cutters and Carvers
- 672 Blacksmiths, Toolmakers and Machine Tool Operators
- 673 Machinery Fitters, Machine Assemblers and Precision Instrument Makers (except Electrical)
- 674 Electrical Fitters and related Electrical and Electronics Workers
- 675 Broadcasting Station and Sound Equipment Operators and Cinema Projectionists
- 676 Plumbers, Welders, Sheet Metal and Structural Metal Preparers and Erectors
- 677 Jewellery and Precious Metal Workers
- 678 Glass Formers, Potters and related Workers
- 679 Rubber and Plastics Products Makers
- 680 Paper and Paperboard Products Makers
- 681 Printers and Related Workers
- 682 Painters
- 683 *Artisan and Related Workers, n.e.c*
- 684 Bricklayers, Carpenters and Other Construction Workers
- 685 Stationary Engines and related Equipment Operators

686	Material-Handling and Related Equipment Operators, Dockers and Freight Handlers
687	Transport Equipment Operators
688	<i>Mechanics</i>
689	<i>Garment Factory/Workshop Machine Operators</i>
690	Craftsmen and Production Process Workers
691	Quarrying and Construction Occupations
692	Material Transporting and Packaging Occupations
792	<i>Factory Line Workers</i>
797/98	Miscellaneous Labourers

NB Use of italics indicates adaption or addition

Appendix III: Summary of Sub-Sample Respondents
(NB All names have been changed)

Drumblair

Miss Callow: 55 year old *de jure* single household head with one school attending daughter; retired state school teacher now teaching full-time at a private school; home owner with no external support.

Mr. Digby: 75 year old single household head; self-employed businessman; home owner; receiving remittances from a daughter in Europe.

Mr. James: 34 year old married head of a nuclear household with pre-school age children; employee in life insurance company; wife not working; home owner; no external support.

Mrs. Rose: 36 year old joint household head of a nuclear household with school attending children; employee in bank and husband working; home owner; no external support.

Mr. Harrison: 40 year old married head of a nuclear household with school attending children; ex-bank employee, now self-employed director of finance company and wife working; home owner; no external support.

Mrs. Simons: 57 year old single head of nuclear household with university attending daughter and working son; retired state school teacher, now teaching full-time at a private school; home owner; no external support.

Mr. Westby: 52 year old married head of nuclear household with school and university attending children; university lecturer and wife working; home owner; no external support.

Mr. Kemp: 81 year old married head of nuclear household with no children at home; retired businessman and wife also retired; home owner; adult children abroad but doesn't depend on them.

Mr. Finnigan: 24 year old 'married' head of nuclear household with no children; civil servant and partner working; rents house from a relative; no external support.

Mr. Addison: 72 year old single household head living alone; retired and receiving pension from Sweden; home owner; external support from children in Jamaica and abroad.

Franklyn Town

Miss Bassett: 30 year old *de jure* single head of nuclear household with pre school and school attending children; employee in local garment workshop; tenant; receives regular but small remittances from relatives in the States.

Miss Lindsay: 29 year old 'married' joint household head of nuclear household with school age children; ex-informal commercial importer, now selling biscuits, sweets and drinks from her yard; husband working; tenant; no external support.

Miss Boyne: 21 year old *de jure* single head of nuclear household with a pre-school child; works in a pre-school day care centre; tenant; no external financial or child care support.

Miss Dixon: 22 year old *de jure* single female head of nuclear household with pre-school children; unemployed; tenant; in-kind support from sister (same yard) and mother (across the road); occasional support from one 'baby father'.

Miss Ingham: 20 year old single daughter of *de jure* single female head of extended household with a pre-school child; sews at home and looks after baby; mother runs cookshop downtown; tenant; no external support.

Miss Davison: 29 year old 'married' daughter of *de jure* single female head of extended household with pre-school child; informal commercial importer; tenant; mother looks after her baby; 'visiting' partner provides regular financial support.

Miss Hill: 38 year old *de jure* single head of nuclear household with pre-school and school attending children; higgler - sells sweets and biscuits from yard; no external support.

Miss Lewis: 51 year old *de jure* single female head of extended household with a working and an unemployed daughter and a granddaughter living at home; unemployed; tenant; occasional remittances from daughter in the States.

Miss Brown: 25 year old *de jure* single head of nuclear household with a school attending child; works in garment factory at Free Zone; extended family child care and financial support; no support from baby father and no remittances from abroad.

Mr. Marshall: 72 year old married head of nuclear household with no children at home; retired and wife retired; home owner; receives pension from UK; remittances from children in the States.