THE STATE AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN:

Social Classes and Political Conflict

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor in Philosophy Department of Political Theory and Institutions by Hossein Bashiriyeh

June 1982

To my parents

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Preface

Most of the research for this study was carried out in Iran between February and April 1979 and November and May 1980. Apart from personal observations, contacts and travels, especially in the western provinces in connection with the question of the minorities, I conducted interviews with the Plan Organization, the Ministries of Labour, Commerce and Economy as well as with the bureaus of a number of political parties. The Statistical Centre and the Central Bank were helpful in providing government data and information and the Ministry of National Guidance allowed me to use its archives. For the newspapers and sources prior to the revolution, I used the Idbrary of the Majles and the Central Idbrary of Tehran University. The Ministry of Higher Education (the Scholarship Department) provided me with the necessary letters of introduction to all those agencies. I am indebted for the assistance I received from them all.

I owe a special debt to my sister, Moulood, for her assistance with the intractable and labourious job of going through piles of numerous newspapers published after the revolution.

In particular I would like to express my thanks to my supervisors, Mr. Hans Schadee and Dr. Barry Munslow for their intellectual support and encouragement. Dr. Munslow made incisive comments on the manuscript and pointed out the inconsistencies and helped strengthen the argument at various points. He also edited and refined the English and made it readable. Without Dr. Munslow's encouragement this project would still have been just a project.

ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS

The State and Revolution in Iran: Social Classes and Political Conflict by Hossein Bashiriyeh

The aim of this study is to explain the causes and the course of the revolution in Iran which began in 1978 and led to the overthrow of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. In explaining the causes of the revolution, the following aspects have been analysed: the nature of the regime prior to the revolution and its internal contradictions and crisis; the emergence of the revolutionary ideology of political Islam and its spread among the modern intelligentsia before the revolution; the emergence of some fundamental conflicts of interest between the upper class and the state; and the economic crisis of 1975-8 leading to the political mobilization and involvement of the masses.

These aspects however, constitute the short-term causes of the revolution. The long-term and underlying cause of the conflict has been sought in the nature of the state and its evolution since the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. Here the evolution of the modern state in Iran has been explained in terms of class struggles. After the breakup of the traditional polity, a plurality of social classes and political forces began to emerge and occupy the power bloc, leading to the establishment of several political regimes on the basis of shifting alliances among political forces. From this perspective, the various episodes of political conflict in Iran have been parts of a single process constituting the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. The major characteristic of this process has been the fundamental crisis of the power bloc which has remained fluid, giving rise to various configurations of political forces. The changes of regimes have been due to conflicts within the power bloc, the breaking of one segment from other segments and the formation of new alliances. As a consequence, the politics of Iran has witnessed major mobilization efforts, leading to the emergence of corporatist and populist regimes. A major factor which has led to the transformation of regimes and has prompted the emergence of authoritarianism has been economic crisis. It is one of the underlying notions of this study that liberalism cannot succeed in times of economic crisis.

Of the regimes which have emerged since the Constitutional Revolution, the one which has been studied in detail is the authoritarian regime of the royal court between 1963 and 1979. The stability of the regime was based on four foundations: its fiscal capacity, economic stabilization, clientelism and repression. In the 1975-9 period, these foundations crumbled one after another. The economic crisis affected fiscal capacity and economic stability; populist attempts by the regime undermined its clientelist relations with business; and political liberalization affected the coercive basis of the regime. At the same time, the economic crisis created public grievances on a massive scale. The Davies theory is used to help explain how a long period of economic improvement followed by a short and sharp reversal caused widespread public discontent.

The period following the fall of the monarchy has been studied in terms of the classic model of revolution derived from the case of the French Revolution i.e., the rule of the moderates and the rise of the extremists. The major conclusion of this study is that since the Constitutional Revolution, several regimes have emerged but no 'state' has developed to replace traditionally constituted authority, due to the absence of collaborative class relations in the power bloc.

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Currency and Calendar

One Pound Sterling = 160 Rials, approximately. One Tuman = 100 Rials.

The Iranian year starts at 21 March (1 Farvardin) and ends at 20 March (30 Esfand). To find the equivalent year on the Christian calendar, add 621 years to the Persian calendar. 1982 = 1361.

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Introduction

The revolution which broke out in Iran in 1978 and led to the fall of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic forms one of the major episodes of conflict in the political history of twentieth-cetury Iran. The main aim of the present study is to explain the causes of that revolution and the phases which it has gone through by putting emphasis on the socio-economic aspects of the conflict. In this endeavour the elements which will be studied include the nature of the political regime obtaining before the revolution and its internal contradictions and fundamental crisis; the development of a revolutionary ideology portraying a better possible society or a utopia before the revolution; the economic crisis leading to the disintegration of the regime and making possible the political mobilization of the masses as the 'energy' of the revolution; and the class struggles especially those following the revolution. These elements, however, constitute the short-term causes and precipitants of the revolution. The major, long-term and underlying cause of the conflict will be sought in the nature of the state and its evolution since the beginning of the century, by putting the revolution in a longer historical context of political conflict. The political regime which was overthrown in the revolution was one of several regimes which had emerged in a process of permanent and intense conflicts arising from the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11. The underlying thesis of this study is that since the latter revolution the evolving political history of Iran has witnessed the emergence of a number of regimes which secured political power but as yet there has developed no 'state' to replace the traditional constituted authority due to continuous political conflict and

disagreement on the nature of political authority. The short-term causes of the revolution will thus be considered as factors helping to bring to the surface the more fundamental political crisis of the state.

The traditional Iranian absolutism had been based on a dominant and cohesive legitimacy in that the kings wielded supreme political authority despite their fluctuating political powers. In principle there was little distinction between the public and the private, the political state and the civil society, as all spheres of the society were subordinated to the supreme authority of the kings. However, the incorporation of Iran in the World economy brought about changes in the internal social and political structures which led to the emergence of various social classes challenging the political system. Once the traditional polity and structures of power began to crumble in the Constitutional Revolution a plurality of political forces began to emerge and occupy the power arena. From then on several political regimes were established on the basis of shifting alliances of the political forces. Among these political forces the royal court, which was revived after the revolution under a new dynasty, constituted one political force among others, similarly seeking to establish their hegemony given the proliferation of the power centres resulting from the revolution. Thus the break-up of the traditional polity into conflicting interests, the erosion of the absolutist authority of the royal court and the emergence of several political forces marked the beginning of a long process of conflict for political power which has since formed the political history of Iran. Thus if we can speak of a 'generality' in the pre-Constitutional history of Iran, formulated here in terms of 'Oriental Despotism' (which recurs throughout that history), after the revolution, when a new social formation begins to emerge no such poli-

tical generalization is legitimate. Instead one has to try to capture the specificity of the moments which together constitute the post-Constitutional history.

From this perspective then, the subsequent episodes of political conflict in Iran since the beginning of the century are parts of a single process which constitutes the aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution. Thus since the salient characteristic of the evolving Iranian political history is continuous, if intermittent, political conflict and change then the essence of its politics can be grasped only by looking at the changes rather than short periods of relative stability. Yet the 'constant' which recurs through all these changes of regimes is the fundamental problem of the power bloc which in the main has remained fluid giving rise to various configurations of political forces.¹ The power bloc or the power vacuum left after the collapse of the absolutist state was the political scene of conflict among the plurality of the political actors which had thus emerged on the political arena. Each of the regimes which were later formed was a constituted power bloc formed of a number of political forces on the basis of alliances, support or acquiescense. In turn, shifting alliances within and outside the power arena led to subsequent changes of regimes.² This was due to internal conflicts, the breaking of one segment in the power bloc with other segments and the formation of a new alliance, a broadening of support base, and economic crisis affecting the existing pattern of support or acquiescense.³ Thus at any time there were a number of

¹⁻ The concept of power bloc, formulated by A. Gramsci and developed by N. Poulantzas, refers to the situation in which power is held by an alliance of dominant classes: N. Poulantzas, <u>Political Power and Social</u> <u>Classes</u>, London, 1973; and <u>Classes in Contemporary Capitalism</u>, London, 1975.

²⁻ This concept of shifting coalitions, especially in revolutionary situations has been developed and applied in: G. Almond, et al (eds.) <u>Crisis, Choice and Change: Historical Studies of Political Development</u> Boston, 1973.

³⁻ E. Laclau in <u>Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism</u>, <u>Fascism, Populism</u>, London, NLB, 1979, has elaborated this concept in particular in connection with the question of populism.

political forces within the power bloc but the formation of each regime was the outcome of the monopoly and hegemony of one segment within the power arena.⁴ In the main, the change in the dominant political force led to the change of regime. Thus the various regimes which emerged were more or less segmentary and fragmentary in that due to the fundamental crisis of the power bloc, every regime was the expression of a segmentary domination. The main political forces included the royal court, the army and the representatives of various social classes, but some of these regimes were so fragmentary that they had to rely on foreign support in order to buttress either their political domination or their economic plans devised to uphold that domination. (This study is not, however, concerned with the aspect of foreign support or the wider question of imperialism.)⁵

In these terms, since the Constitutional Revolution eight distinct regimes have emerged, each of which was based on a distinct alliance of social classes and a pattern of support, lasting for a while on a tenuous basis and then fragmenting and giving rise to the subsequent regime. The social classes involed in the power alliances, through their representatives or in the support pattern of distinct regimes, included the landed aristocracy, the middle classes, the grand bourgeoisie, the peasantry and the working class. Within the period in which the subsequent regimes emerged, the structure of the society underwent important changes, from a mainly agrarian-based economy to a semi-industrial society, so that the landed aristocracy and the peasantry became the

⁴⁻ The concept of hegemony was first formulated by A. Gramsci in connection with the political and ideological practices of the ruling class through which consent to the state is organized.See G. Williams, 'The Concept of 'Egemonia' in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci', <u>Journal of</u> <u>Historical Ideas</u>, vol.21, no.4, 1960.

⁵⁻ N. Poulantzas in <u>The Crisis of the Dictatorships: Portugal, Greece</u> and <u>Spain</u> demonstrates the primacy of 'internal factors' over the 'external factors' in the changes of regimes and shows that apart from the contextual effects of imperialism, internal factors played the principal and direct role in the overthrow of the regimes he studies. Similarly, we will show that in the evolution of regimes in Iran, internal factors play the principal role. (London NLB, 1976)

recruitment pool for the bourgeoisie and the working class. Yet the whole period following the Constitutional Revolution constitutes a single social formation -in terms of the concept of property and ownership- and technological changes do not make any difference in that regard. However, the conception of social class used in this study should be clarified here. It is based on Karl Marx's notion of class as it appears in his political works.⁷ Yet Marx's conception of class has itself been subject to dispute and diverse interpretations, among which two schools of thought in particular stand out: the economist conception and the politicist conception. According to the economist interpretation social classes are economic categories defined by their relations to the means of production. In other words they emerge at the level of the relations of production and are exclusively determined by economic considerations. In turn, through their economic organizations they appear as the agents of conflict over economic interests, and the class conflicts at the political level are the direct reflections of these conflicts in the economic process. In short, classes exist before their conflicts are reflected at the political and the ideological level. In contrast to this conception of the economic determination of social classes, the politicist interpretation maintains that classes acquire effective existence only at the political level. Accordingly, economic conflict between agents of production or economic organizations of classes are not class conflicts for at the economic level classes are absent. Instead social classes

⁶⁻ Thus, here the landed class has been considered as a class belonging to the capitalist social formation. In fact Marx described the class of big landowners as a class of the capitalist mode of production. By contrast, Lenin believed that private landed property does not belong to the capitalist mode of production (see 'The Agrarian Question', <u>Collacted Works.</u> vol.5, Moscow, 1951, pp. 120ff.) For Poulantzas the class functions as a separate class in the transition from feudalism to capitalism. (<u>Political Power and Social Classes</u>, pp. 231-2.)

⁷⁻ Karl Marx, 'The Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850' and ' The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte' in K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Moscow,

emerge at the political level only by constituting for themselves a political ideology and a political party and engaging in political conflict.⁸

The conception of class used in this study is neither of these two extremes. Rather it is based on a third interpretation. that of Nicos Poulantzas' reading of Marx, according to which classes are "the result of an ensemble of structures and of their relations, firstly at the economic level, secondly at the political level and thirdly at the ideological level. A social class can be identified either at the economic level, at the political level, or at the ideological level..."⁹ This means that social class is not an 'empirical thing' or a 'regional category' emerging effectively solely at the economic or the political level but it is a 'concept' which shows the effects of the ensemble of structures at different levels. The significance of this definition for the present study is that social class does not effectively emerge only when it represents its interests through an explicit political ideology and political organization at the political level. Social classes, at the economic level, engaged in economic conflicts are also politically effective even if they lack explicit political ideology and organization. These classes and their economic conflicts are not absent from the political class struggle so far as they are represented and articulated at the political level. Thus social classes include both classes with political organization and ideology engaged in conflict for the type of socio-political order and classes without explicit organization and ideology engaged in

9- Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes, p.63.

⁸⁻ The politicist interpretation is best presented by G. Lukács, <u>History and Class Consciousness</u>, London, 1971. The opposite economist interpretation is the orthodox Marxist interpretation associated especially with the Second and Third Internationals.

economic conflict whose economic existence is represented and articulated in the social coalition of a power bloc constituting a political regime. The difference however, is that while social classes with explicit political organization enter into patterns of alliance in the power bloc resulting in different regimes, such as the middle class or the upper class regime, social classes without organization of their own usually enter into support patterns resulting in different models of mobilization such as state corporatism, populism, clientelism and fascism.¹⁰

On the basis of these central concepts social classes in Iran can be located economically, ideologically and politically. The different regimes which evolved were the expression of various social classes in their economic, political and ideological senses: different regimes represented different class interests and stood for different socio-political orders. Also in those cases in which the hegemonic segment was not class as such but bureaucratic-military or the royal court, the nature of the regime will still have to be understood in terms of the articulation and accommodation of certain class interests or ideologies, and the model of mobilization. A basic distinction should be made here: in periods of conflict classes emerge as political classes whereas in periods of bureaucratization they appear as economic classes. The conception of class adopted in this study makes possible a class analysis of both periods. In terms of this conception, historically within the Iranian social formation it is the upper class including the landed aristocracy, the tribal nobility, the high-ranking

¹⁰⁻ The concepts of populism and fascism are specified by N. Poulantzas, <u>Fascism and Dictatorship</u>, London, 1970 and, E. Laclau, op. cit.; and those of corporatism and clientelism have been recently discussed and applied in: J. Malloy, <u>Authoritarianism and Corporatism in Latin America</u>, Pittsburgh, 1977; P.Schmitter, <u>Corporatism and Public Policy in Authorita-</u> <u>rian Portugal</u>, Sage Papers, Political Sociology, vol.I, 1975; Idem, 'Still the Century of Corporatism?' <u>Review of Politics</u>, vol.30,1974:85-131; L. Panitch, 'Recent Theorizations of Corporatism' <u>British Journal of</u> <u>Sociology</u>, vol. 31, 1980:159-187.

clergy and the middle classes including the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the new middle class which have developed political ideologies and organizations of their own and along with the royal court and the army have occupied the power bloc. On the other hand the lower classes-the working class and the peasantry- appear as economic classes in periods of bureaucratization and as the masses in periods of political conflict. The use of the term 'masses' in this study is thus justified on the grounds that its components are economic classes who at the political level do not act as classes but together as the masses. Thus despite the emergence of working class ideology among the new middle class there has been no working class movement. Within the social formation emerging after the Constitutional Revolution, the upper classes advocated a liberal-constitutional order based on a parliamentary system with a weak executive. Hence in periods when the court and the army were non-existent or weak and the aristocracy was the hegemonic segment in the power bloc, the parliament, itself dominated by the aristocracy, became the central political institution and political administration was decentralized. The electoral law adopted after the Revolution gave the vote to the propertied classes and although the electoral system was modified later, the local influence of the aristocracy ensured its dominance in the Majles. The high-ranking clergy as a fraction of the upper class which was given special constitutional prerogatives after the Revolution also advocated liberal-constitutionalism, was opposed to anti-liberal hegemony in the power bloc and disliked the reformism and modernism of the new middle class. The new middle class advocated a democratic order, administrative reform, electoral reform (the vote to be confined to educated people), economic development and industrialization. When they participated in power through their political

parties the middle classes fought with the court, the army and the aristocracy for political hegemony in the power bloc. The democratism of the middle classes and the liberalism of the aristocracy were in turn opposed by the parties seeking to represent the masses. However, when the middle classes were banned from power by the court, an alliance between the middle class parties and the parties representing the masses was more possible. Against this background of ideological crystallization the ideological position of the royal court is important, because the court until the Bahman Revolution of 1979 was a constant segment of the power bloc, at times fighing for hegemony and at times being hegemonic. This position of the court gave it the highest ideological-articulating capacity among the plurality of the fragments in the power bloc. At times of weakness, the court went along with the liberalism of the aristocracy while seeking to reorganize the modern army, created after the Constitutional Revolution by the court itself, as a patrimonial rather than an aristocratic army. From the beginning it articulated segments of the ideology of the middle class in its own political discourse as a legitimation for hegemony. Finally, the court broke the prevailing ideological crystallization and put forward a corporatist ideology of its own by assembling elements from the existing ideologies: 'reform', 'real economic democracy', 'nationalism' and 'development'. It sought to legitimize its hegemony by diverse legitimizing devices such as constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, developmentalism and traditional monarchical absolutism. In terms of the models of mobilization the royal court oscillated between clientelism, corporatism and populist-fascism depending on the stability or instability of the political conditions and the changing strength of the social classes under the bureaucratized state. The ideological manoeuvres of the court invited the opposition of the liberal-constitu-

tionalism of the aristocracy and the high clergy, the democratism of the middle classes and the popular socialism of the radical intelligentsia. The court sought to articulate some of the interests and representatives of the aristocracy; some of the interests of the middle classes but not their ideologies and parties; and some of the interests of the lower classes in terms of its own political discoure. The ideology which emerged among some of the clergy and later became the ideology of the Islamic Revolution, originally derived from the suppressed liberal-constitutionalism of the upper class, it articulated the democratism of the middle classes into its own discourse before the 1979 Revolution and after that articulated the popular ideology into a populist-Jacobinist ideology.

Thus changes of regimes and the dominant social or political interests therein have been accompanied by changes in the political ideology and legitimacy. The fundamental crisis of the power bloc resulting in segmentary domination in the post-Constitutional history has also meant an ideological crisis of legitimacy. The fragmentary regimes which emerged, despite their political hegemony, failed to establish an ideological hegemony. Instead of a dominant ideology several types of legitimacy -old and new- coexisted, and this ideological fragmentation continued to keep the polity on the verge of rupture. Thus while the regimes monopolized power, no political authority and therefore no state came to develop within the new social formation. That war or a mere economic crisis should lead to change of regimes or even to a revolution should be considered in the light of this fundamental crisis of the state. The basis of this instability is of course the concrete conflicts of social classes and political forces which rushed to the political arena when the high velocity of the expansion of World economy shook the

Iranian polity out of its traditional orbit.

In the post-Constitutional period the following distinct

political regimes can be identified:

- 1911-21 : a period of general aristocratic rule, without any hegemonic power, and of intense foreign influence.
- 1921-41 :the authoritarian military rule of Reza Shah; the hegemony of the new royal court and the modern army.
- 1941-51 : a liberal period of aristocratic rule and attempts by the new court, under a new Shah, at political hegemony.
- 1951-53 : a democratic period of the rise of the middle class parties to power and conflict with the court and the army.
- 1953-62: the presence of the court, the army and the aristocracy in the power bloc; the hegemony of the army and then the court.
- 1962-75: the hegemony of the court, breaking with the aristocracy and the establishment of state corporatism.
- 1975-78 : populist attempts by the court to broaden its base of support by mobilizing the lower classes.
- 1978-79: the revolution, the break-down of tacit alliances which held the regime together and the failure of the court to change the political regime; the alliance of diverse forces against the court.
- 1979-80 : a liberal period of rule by bourgeois parties seeking to establish hegemony in the power bloc.
- 1980---- : the hegemony of the revolutionary clergy in the power bloc and attempts to make their own alliances.

The main purpose of this study is to explain the internal mechanism of changes of regimes, especially those which led to the ascendancy of the royal court (in 1962) and subsequently to the disintegration of its regime in the revolution of 1979. The period in between will be described in detail in terms of the social alliance of the regime, the manoeuvres of the court to ensure the continuity of the regime and finally the factors which precipitated its disintegration. Thé revolution itself will be explained by its ideological, socioeconomic and political causes. Finally, the direction which the revolution has taken after the fall of the old regime will be explained in terms of the concepts already specified.

I- The Break-Up of Absolutism

During the nineteenth century Iranian society and polity passed through a process of fundamental change which amounted to a significant break with its past social and political history. The reverberations of those fundamental changes have since formed the political history of twentieth-century Iran.

The traditional Iranian political system had been based on an absolutist power structure in which the absolute monarchs (Shahs or Shahanshahs) wielded supreme political authority in the realm. As the Shadow of God, the Lord of the Realm, the King of Kings, the Manifestation of Sovereignty and the Conqueror of Territories, the Shahs were the sole holder and source of rightful authority. In times of strength, the Royal Court (darbar) subdued all society to its pervasive hold and in times of relative weakness, when the Shahs did not have sufficient power to uphold their all-embracing authority, they skillfully manipulated and neutralized all contending sources of power. In principle, however, the Shahs' rule was not restricted by any other source of authority. Through their centralized bureaucracies, at times extending into the four corners of the empire, they carried out public works, distributed rewards, appointed local officials and recruited their standing armies. The structure of authority was arbitrary and patrimonial. The Kings commissioned their officials to perform certain tasks thereby delegating power but the rulers were not bound by any consideration in the grants and commissions they made as acts of grace. Thus all lesser authorities below the King were mere beneficieries of the ruler's grants. In sum, the Kings, as the rulers of all territories under their jurisdiction, possessed supreme and

absolute authority.

This absolutism of the monarchs on the political level was founded on the absence of legal private property and the existence of state-communal property on the socio-economic level. Traditional Iranian absolutism was akin to the type of 'Oriental Despotism' based on the 'Asiatic mode of production' whereby private ownership of the means of production was absent.

Writing in the nineteenth century on contemporary oriental societies, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels raised the problem of how to explain the oriental despotic regimes which sharply differed from Western feudal regimes. Delving into the functions of governments in the Orient and the structure and organization of eastern societies, they emerged with the finding that oriental despotisms displayed a different mode of ownership and property.

> 'The absence of (private) property in land is in fact the key to the whole Orient.' '... the person of the sovereign or despot... stands above all the small communities and figures as the owner of all the land, while the communities under it figure only as the <u>possessors</u> of the land by tradition. No individual holds property in land. The property relation is understood as a grant from above, made to the individual landtillers <u>via</u> the local communities <u>by</u> the entity that represents the Overall Unity...of the society in their eyes. This overall unity "is embodied in the despot as the father of many (local) communities... the surplus product...therefore belongs to the supreme Unity. Therefore, at the core of the Oriental despotism and of propertylessness which it juridically seems to entail, there exists this tribal or communal property which is in fact its foundation". 1

Likewise Iranian absolutism had its basis in the legal absence of property. The absolute monarch was in possession of the land and the people. As a consequence, in Persian absolutism, in contrast to Western feudalism, there was no independent hereditary landed aristoćracy. Land holding was bureaucratic whereby all land belonged to the absolute ruler who granted land assignments (<u>Tuyūl</u>, Iotā, Nān-

¹⁻ H. Draper, <u>Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution</u>, vol.I, <u>State and</u> <u>Bureaucracy</u>, New York, 1977, pp.523-532.

<u>pārak</u>) as he wished, in return for some, usually military, service. As an avenue to finance the administration of the state, land assignment was temporary in nature: there was no contract between the ruler and the assignee (<u>Tuyūldār</u>) and in the absence of contractual relationships the ruler had the authority to withdraw the benefice at any time. This was in sharp contrast to Western feudalism in which

> "...some degree of stability is achieved by means of the reciprocal ties between a ruler and his vassals. The vassal swears an oath of fealty to his ruler and thus acknowledges his obligation to serve him. In return the ruler grants his vassal a fief, or confirms him in his existing possessions as a fief. Where the feudal element predominates, these grants include a guaranteed "immunity" such that within the territory held in "fief" the vassal is entitled to exercise certain juridical and administrative powers."

By contrast, in absolutist-patrimonial regimes "such powers remain either part of the royal jurisdiction or separate grants are made of them so that the king divides the powers he finds it necessary or expedient to delegate."²

Lacking in immunities and corporate rights, the landowners thus did not develop into an established, hereditary aristocracy. While the institution of state landlordism persisted in principle, landholders came and went with the rise and fall of the dynasties. In times of the weakness of the central authority, local notables would grow in power and would create local power centres. Their power, however, would give them no authority and emerging powerful kings would remould their realm on the same absolutist image.³

Besides bureaucratic landlordism, absolutism also meant the interference of the despotic state in trade, commerce and industry. The state laid the infrastructure of the economy: the roads, the ports

²⁻ R. Bendix, <u>Nation-Building and Citizenship</u>, New York, 1969, p.37.
3- A detailed account of the system of landholding is given in: A. Lambton, <u>Landlord and Peasant in Persia</u>, London, 1953; and Idem, 'The Evolution of the Iqtä in Medieval Iran', <u>Journal of the</u> British Institute of Persian Studies, 1967, pp.41-50.

and the public works. The absolutist ruler himself engaged in trade and commerce, encouraged manufacture and industry and in particular promoted those economic activities which provided the state with its needed supplies. When there was a strong centralized bureaucracy in power, trade and commerce were protected and promoted but economic policy rested in the hands of the ruler who geared the whole economy to the needs of the bureaucracy. As far as the merchants and manufacturers were concerned, state intervention in the economy meant the extension of arbitrary power in financial and commercial activities. The bazaar guilds, originally imposed from above, were channels for tax collection and the administration of the bazaar. Although the manufacturer and merchant classes prospered under powerful bureaucratic regimes they remained subordinated to the absolutist rulers.⁴

This picture of absolutism is only the ideal type of the sociopolitical history of Iran. For most part Iranian history is the history of successive despotisms. At times, however, Iranian society fluctuated between despotism and feudalism.⁵ Semi-feudal landholdings were established during the rule of foreign invaders such as under the Mongol and Tamerlane dynasties. After a long period of weakness and invasions following the collapse of the pre-Islamic empire of the Sassanids, a strong despotic state was fully revived under the Safavids

⁴⁻ An account of the economic functions of the absolutist state is given in: V.Minorsky, <u>Tadhkirat al-Muluk: a Manual of Safavid Adminis-</u> tration, London, 1943.

⁵⁻ N. Pigulovskaya, et al. <u>Tarikh-e Iran az Dowreh-ye Bastan ta</u> <u>Payan-e Sedeh-ye Hezhdahom</u>, (A History of Iran from the Ancient Times to the Eighteenth Century) translated from Russian by K.Keshavarz, Tehran,1346. These Russian scholars have studied Iranian history in terms of the four stages of the early communal society, slavery, feudalism and capitalism. The bulk of the history of Islamic Iran, in their view, consists of the emergence and demise of feudalism. By contrast, A.Ashraf, <u>Nezam-e Feodali ya Nezam-e Asiai</u>, (Feudal System or Asiatic System) Tehran, 1347, puts emphasis on the despoticbureaucratic structure of authority. See also, R. Sheiltholeslami, 'Sale of Offices in Qajar Iran', <u>Iranian Studies</u>, Spring 1972.

who ruled in the seventeenth century. The system of bureaucratic landownership was reestablished and expanded at the expense of feudal holdings. <u>Tuyuldārān</u> and tribal chiefs were subdued to the authority of Safavid Kings. A vast bureaucracy was established, the state undertook huge public works and a standing army was recruited. Trade and manufacture were encouraged by the state and bazaar guilds developed as the instrument of state supervision over trade and commerce. The state itself established and financed trading houses and became the main entrepreneur in the economy.⁶

On the whole, under absolutism the despotic state with its centralized bureaucracy dominated the whole society. The 'civil society' was not separate from the political state. No hereditary aristocracy or independent bourgeoisie were allowed to develop. Under Persian absolutism, as in all other absolutist states, property originated in power rather than power in property. As Karl Marx said of all absolutist regimes in the Middle Ages:⁷

> "... Property, trade, society, men were <u>political</u>... every private sphere had a political character or was a political sphere, or politics was also the character of the private spheres... In the Middle Ages the life of the people and the life of the state were identical."

The absolute structure of authority persisted despite the political upheavals which constituted much of Iranian history. Since property was subordinated to power and since the state was subject to instability, consequently the ownership of land and property was prone to volatility. Yet the political upheavals characteristic of Persian history i.e., internal tribal fightings and foreign invasions and conquests, only revived and reinforced the structure of absolutism. "The structure of the basic economic elements of the society remained untouched

⁶⁻ An accout of the Safavid state in given in: A. Ashraf, 'Historical Obstacles to the Development of a Bourgeoisie in Iran', in <u>Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East</u>, edited by M.A. Cook, London, 1970, pp. 308-332.

⁷⁻ Quoted by Draper, op.cit. p.470.

by the storms in the political skies."⁸

Under the Qajar dynasty which ruled in the nineteenth century (1796-1925), significant changes began to occur. The absolutism of the Qajars began to disintegrate due to compounded internal and external causes. Although the institution of state land-lordism was still intact, the growing influence of the landholders and officeholders who received benefices from the Qajars gradually led to the decentralization of the administration. Officials and tuyuldaran appropriated their benefices and developed local centres of power. In effect, the Qajars had to balance the influence of contending local powers in order to preserve their absolutist pretensions. The Qajars increasingly came to rely on emerging local powers for their obedience. Of the ovewhelming power of the absolutist court, all that was left was the image of despotism reinforced by the rule of kingly caprice. Towards the end of the century groups with independent sources of wealth and power began to emerge. "Already in the second half of the nineteenth century a reinforcement of landlord power may be noted... In this period the central government was in constant and acute need of money, partly in order to buy Western goods, including arms to defend itself. This need led to the systematization of the sale of offices. Local governorships were sold to the highest bidder every year ... "⁹ In particular the landlord class emerged more powerful and independent. As a Russian writer has pointed out: "In the shortest time many owners of villages appropriated almost all the riches of the country and became large capitalists... Until 1880 there were few millionaires and rich property owners but in 1900 one could count them in hundreds."¹⁰

8- Ibid p.524 Agrarian Change in Iran, Claremont, California, 1960, p.4. 10- Z. Abdullaev, 'Bourgeoisie and Working Class', in <u>The Economic</u> <u>History of Iran</u>, edited by Charles Issawi, Chicago, 1971, p.45.

The internal disintegration of absolutism was greatly accelerated by a force new to Persian society. This new, external force was provided by the expansion of the World economy. Western economic and political penetration into Iranian society and polity increased in the course of the century. The economic and political influence of World Powers via foreign trade came to affect the society at a time of the internal disintegration of absolutism. Although the state was saved from outright foreign control due to a conflict of interests between the two great Powers, Britain and Russia, its pervasive hold over the society suffered. Nasser Ed Din Shah, the most powerful of all the Qajar despots, wished, in despair, "that never a European had set foot on my country's soil; for then we would have been spared all these tribulations. But since foreigners have unfortunately penetrated our country, we shall at least make the best possible use of them."¹¹ Britain and Russia gained increasing footholds in the economy and bitterly competed to wrest concessions in every economic sphere.

On the whole, under the Qajars the structures of the traditional society and polity began to dissolve. The Qajars lacked the extensive bureaucracy and administration which had been the characteristic of the Safavid state. The system of <u>tuyuldāri</u> began to disintegrate and gradually a landed aristocracy emerged independent from the state. State and Crown lands were sold to finance the increasing expenses of the monarchs. Private property in land came to prevail over state ownership of land. The landholders gradually grew into local powers combining landownership with governmental positions at the local level.¹²

¹¹⁻ W.S. Haas, Iran, New York, 1946, p.35.

¹²⁻ An account of the Qajar state is given in: J. Malcolm, The <u>History of Persia</u>, vol.II, London, 1829; See also, A. Lambton, 'Persian Society under the Qajars', <u>Journal of the Royal Central</u> <u>Asian Society</u>, 1961, No. 4. E. Abrahamian in 'Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran', <u>International Journal of Middle East Studies</u>, 1974, p.3-31, shows how the Qajars, despite their absolutist pretensions, lacked effective power and instead had to manipulate local magnates in order to perpetuate their despotic position.

The weakening of absolutism also meant a loosening of state control over the bazaar. Contributing to this was the penetration of Russian and British traders, which in a situation of weakening state control, led to an overall growth in commerce and foreign trade. The merchant class greatly benefited from all this. A number of great merchant families rose to prominence and engaged in manufacture and banking. The previously cited Russian author mentions a dozen of the most powerful Iranian trading houses and merchants who competed with West European and Russian merchants and greatly benefited from the increasing involvement of Iran in the World market.

The Qajar Iran, thus witnessed the emergence of the landed aristocracy and the urban bourgeoisie. As another result of the compounded external and internal causes, it also witnessed an increase in the power of the <u>Ulama</u> (the learned men of Islam and doctors of divinity). Under the Safavids who established the first Shiite state in Iran and declared Shiism, a minority rite of Islam, the state religion, and who claimed to have religious legitimacy as descendents of the Shiite Imams, the Ulama were closely associated with the rulers, and religious ranks occupied bureaucratic positions in the state. They were also in charge of the administration of religious endowments (Ougaf) which were established and substantially expanded in the period. No conflicts occurred between the Kings and the Ulama in the Safavid era in spite of the fact that Shiism had originally been an opposition movement in Islam and the main point of its opposition concerned the nature of political authority and the qualities of the political leader. According to the Shiites, legitimate authority belonged to the Imams from the line of Ali and since the occultation of the last Imam the Ulama were believed to be the general agency of the Hidden Imam. Under the Safavids the Ulama did not develop any independent source of

power and indeed since the Safavid Kings claimed to have possessed religious authority the <u>Ulama</u> did not even have a monopoly of divine legitimacy.¹³

Under the Qajars, who had no claim to direct religious legitimacy, the state still exerted a measure of control on the <u>Ulama</u> at least in the form of the accommodation of the religious ranks in the administration. The Qajars manipulated the <u>Ulama</u> influence, granted them offices, formally appointed religious officials and delegated the administration of the endowments. The <u>Ulama</u> had connections not only with the state but also with the bazaar and its petty bourgeoisie. This meant that the <u>Ulama</u> were not financially entirely dependent on the bureaucracy. They were more dependent on the bazaar for the religious taxes they received and for the financing of mosques and religious schools (<u>madares</u>). Furthermore, law and education were the prerogatives of the <u>Ulama</u>. All this linked the religious leaders to the 'civil society' as the source of their influence.¹⁴

With the penetration of foreign interests into the Qajar society the position of the <u>Ulama</u> was to be adversely affected. The foreign influence however, contributed more to the increase in the power of the <u>Ulama</u> than to their weakness. The <u>Ulama</u> were opposed to foreign penetration and the ensuing modernization and secularization of traditional institutions. The reaction of the <u>Ulama</u> to Western influence and secularization gave them a position of influence which they came to exert at the time of the weakness of the Qajar court. Indeed the

¹³⁻ A detailed account is given in: H. Algar, <u>Religion and State in</u> <u>Iran: 1785-1906</u>, <u>The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period</u>, Berkeley, 1970. See also, L. Binder, 'Religion and Politics in Iran', in <u>Arabic</u> <u>and Islamic Studies in Honor of H.A.R. Gibb</u>, Leiden, 1965, pp. 118-40. 14- An account of the <u>Ulama</u> power is given in: N. Keddie, 'The Roots of the <u>Ulama</u>'s power in Modern Iran', and H. Algar, 'The Oppositional Role of the <u>Ulama</u> in Twentieth-Century Iran', both in <u>Scholars, Saints</u> <u>and Sufis: Muslem Religious Institutions in the Middle East since 1500</u>, edited by N. Keddie, Berkely, 1972.

<u>Ulama</u> put up much more resistance to Western influence than did the monarchs. It was <u>Ulama</u> power reinforced by that of the bazaar petty bourgeoisie that made Nasser Ed Din Shah cancel the Reuter Concession in 1872, which sold all national resources for a very low price. The same Shah's assassin was connected to Jamal Ed Din Afqani, a controversial religious leader, who opposed Western influence and called for the unity of the Islamic world. Again in 1891 the <u>Ulama</u> staged a successful mass movement against the British tobacco concession. On the whole the <u>Ulama</u> gradually emerged as a power group to be reckoned with. In spite of their increasing influence, however, the <u>Ulama</u> had no authority in the sense that the kings were not regarded as being responsible to the body of the <u>Ulama</u>; the notion of kingly responsibility was absent altogether.

The landed nobility, the bazaar petty bourgeoisie, and the clergy began to emerge from under the weakening absolutism of the Qajars. The closing decades of Qajar rule witnessed yet another development, the emergence of the modern intelligentsia. In contrast to the other classes, this new class-fragment had external roots. It emerged due to increasing contacts with the West, the spread of modern education and the beginning of modernization. Foreign education had already started from around 1800 and towards the end of the century modern faculties and colleges began to be established. The modern intelligentsia were the importers of foreign and new ideas. They were constitutionalist, nationalist, reformist, modernist, secularist, free-thinkers and followers of heretical doctrines. Among their ranks were writers. clerics, employees of the state, teachers and poets. This incipient new middle class was opposed to foreign influence and the arbitrary power of the Qajar court. It championed constitutionalism and was anticlerical and even anti-Islam. The idea of checks and balances against

royal power was entertained and propagated by the rising intelligentsia. Here was another challenge to Qajar absolutism.¹⁵

On the whole, the Qajar society was in a process of transition from traditional despotism to a new social formation. In the language of modern political science it was attaining to a new level of 'differentiation'."The passage of a given society from one stage of differentiation to another is contingent on the development within it of certain processes of change which create a degree of differentiation that cannot be contained within the pre-existing system."¹⁶ The Qajar society was becoming, likewise, too diversified to be contained within the traditional absolutist polity. As in all empires in the process of transition¹⁷

> "changes in the inter-group structure in the society, manifested in either the emergence of new groups, or in changes in the relative strength and predominance of different groups ... (such as) the rise, and growing or diminishing strength of professional, cultural, and religious elites and institutions; and shifts in the relative strengths of the monarch vs. the aristocracy and the aristocracy vs. the urban groups ... necessarily created conflicts - whether potential or actual- between at least some of the society's major groups and strata... The dislocated groups were not reaccommodated within the framework of the basic norms of the existing political system. Instead new political norms, frameworks, and symbols developed; and the continuity of the political symbols and ideology was broken."

The fragmentation of Qajar absolutism created conflicts which finally led to the shattering of the despotic glass in the Contitutional Revolution which broke out in 1905. The Revolution began with the protests of merchants against the presence of foreign officials in the financial departments of the state and the government's fiscal

16- S. Eisenstadt, 'Social Change, Differentiation and Evolution' American Sociological Review, vol. 29, 1964, pp.375-386, quote from p.378. 17- S. Eisenstadt, Political Systems of Empires, New York, 1969, pp. 310,311,313.

¹⁵⁻ Some account of the early Iranian intelligentsia is given in: N. Keddie, 'Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism', <u>Comparative Studies in Society and History</u>, vol.IV, April 1962; M. Philipp, 'The Concepts of Religion and Government in the Thought of Mirza Aqa Khan Kirmani, a Nineteenth-Century Persian Revolutionary, <u>International</u> Journal of Middle East Studies, vol.5, 1974, pp. 381-400.

policies. They closed the bazaars and took sanctuary in the holy shrines in protest against the mistreatment of merchants by Tehran authorities. After months of protest the Shah accepted their demand for the establishment of a 'House of Justice'. The failure of the government to establish such a House, however, led to the more radical demand for a constitution and the establishment of a parliament. The ailing Shah finally accepted these demands and died shortly afterwards. The revolutionaries had a more difficult task with the new Shah who attempted to restore the absolute power of the monarchy. Fighting between the Constitutionalist and the royalists culminated in the bombardment of the Parliament Building by the Shah's army. Finally in 1909, revolutionary forces arrived in Tehran from the provinces, defeated the King and restored the Constitution under a new Shah.¹⁸

All the emerging classes and groups played a part in the revolution. The merchants and the petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar who had initially benefited from the growth in foreign trade, were gradually confronted with the increasing competition of foreign entrepreneurs. Imports surpassed exports substantially, native industries began to decline and local merchants traded mainly in imported goods. Late in the nineteenth century "Iran was exporting a volume of raw materials five times larger than the volume of finished goods it was importing and was paying three times more for its imports than it received for its exports."¹⁹ Foreigners also came to control the customs and establish local banks and firms. The decline of the native bourgeoisie occurred at a time when the state was ineffective in

19- N. Keddie, The Impact of the West on Iran, Berkeley, 1955, p.60.

^{.18-} A full account of the Constitutional Revolution is given in: E.G. Browne, <u>The Persian Revolution: 1905-9</u>, Cambridge, 1910 and A. Kasravi, <u>Tarikh-e Mashruteh-ye Iran</u>, (A History of the Constitutional Movement) Tehran, 1340.

protecting the bazaar. The bourgeoisie was further opposed to arbitrary power exerted by the court and the emirs who confiscated land and property as they wished. The Revolution had itself been sparked off because of the punishment of merchants for profiteering. The petty bourgeoisie demanded that the government's conduct should be governed by law.

Allied to the bazaar were the clerical ranks and some senior Ulama. They were opposed to foreign and infidel influence as well as to the increasing threats to their privileges. They were also opposed to the arbitrary power of the court which had contributed to foreign infiltration by granting concessions and employing foreign officials. The Ulama wished to see the powers of the Shah bound by the legal principles of Islam. This notion of the responsibility of the Shahs to some laws was in line with the constitutionalism of the modern intelligentsia. Realising the influence of the religious leaders with the people the secularist intellectuals made appeals to them for common struggle against the absolutist court. Constitutionalism also found adherents among the Ulama themselves. The Constitutional Revolution was the result of an alliance among the bazaar petty bourgeoisie, the Ulama and the modern intelligentsia. Among the revolutionaries were also landed aristocrats and tribal chiefs. The revolutionary forces which arrived in Tehran in 1909 from the provinces were led by prominent tribal chiefs and local nobles and notables. After the restoration of the Constitution Bakhtiari tribal leaders came to take over major governmental positions in Tehran.

The revolutionaries succeeded in wresting a constitution from a court lacking in an effectively organized force to seriously confront the revolution. The Constitution granted all participants prerogatives and rights while limiting the powers of the court. The main objective

of the Constitution was the separation of powers. Sovereignty was considered a trust conferred by the people upon the person of the Shah who would be the guardian of the Constitution and rule accordingly. Parliament had the power to examine whatever it considered to be in the interest of the nation and to pass necessary laws. The king was absolved from all responsibility. He had to appear before the <u>Mailes</u> and take the oath to observe the Constitution. The expenses of the court would be determined by law. The powers of the king were only those explicitly mentioned in the Constitution i.e., the command of the army, the right to appoint and dismiss ministers, and the right to declare war and conclude peace. The First Parliament lowered the expenses of the court and in place of the court's treasury established a government budget. It also called for an end to the interference of the court in economic affairs.

The first Electoral Law passed in 1906 divided the electors into six categories: "(i) Princes and the Qajar tribe: (ii) Doctors of Divinity and Students: (iii) Nobles and Notables: (iv) Merchants: (v) Landed Proprietors and Peasants: (vi) Trade-guilds."²⁰ The landed proprietors had to possess property of the value of at least one thousand <u>tumans</u> and the merchants had to have a definite office and business. In Tehran the distribution of <u>Majles</u> seats was to be as follows: the <u>Ulama</u> four seats, the Qajars four seats, merchants ten seats, landowners and cultivators ten seats and the trade guilds 32 seats (one from each guild). In the first parliament elected after the Revolution, 21% of the deputies were landlords, 37% from the bazaar, 17% from the <u>Ulama</u> and 25% from the employees of government and professionals.²¹

²⁰⁻ E.G. Browne, op. cit. p.355.

²¹⁻ Z. Shajii, <u>Nemayandegan-e Majles-e Shoura-ye Melli dar Bisto Yek</u> <u>Dowreh-ye Qanungozari</u>, (The Deputies to the Twenty One Sessions of the Legislative Assembly), Tehran, 1966, pp. 137 ff.

The <u>Ulama</u> as a corporate group obtained a significant constitutional prerogative. Article 2 of the Fundamental Law ruled that the <u>Majles</u> may pass no law that was at variance with the laws of Islam. A committee of five <u>mojtaheds</u> was to attend the parliament and see to the conformity of secular laws with the religious law; its decisions were considered to be binding.

As to the landlords, one of the early acts of the <u>Majles</u> was to set up a commission to investigate the issue of landholding. The commission abolished the <u>tuyūldāri</u> system together with the land privileges of the Qajar princes. Private landed property was legally established and henceforth an independent landed nobility emerged. Landownership was thus, in principle, separated from governmental functions. Government officials would hold administrative positions not as a function of their landholding no matter whether they were themselves large landowners. A law was also passed for the sale of state lands.

As the private ownership of land was established the distinction between landlords and peasants became clear. "Traditional land rights of the peasants were abrogated, the majority of villages fell under landlord ownership, debt grew, and most peasants eventually became landless share-croppers."²² Thus, as a Russian historian of the Constitutional Revolution has pointed out "although in the revolutionary years of 1905-11 peasant movements appeared in some areas they were scattered and in any case did not turn into a struggle for the confiscation of land."²³

The institution of private property especially in land was legally established. According to the Constitution: "No property can be expropriated unless by legal sanction." And "The confiscation of

²²⁻ N. Keddie, 'Historical Obstacles', p.7.

²³⁻ M.S. Ivanov, <u>Tarikh-e Iran-e Novin</u>, (A History of Modern Iran) trans. H. Tizabi and H. Qaemnia, Tehran, n.d. p.34.

the property and possessions of the people as political punishment and retribution is forbidden unless in accordance with the law." The establishment of private property in land as the main means of production also benefited the merchant class which invested in land. On the whole the Constitutional Revolution struck a death blow to the economic and political structures of the absolutist state.

The Constitution, while limiting the powers of the court, recognized the gains of the social classes which had thus emerged from under the total power of the absolutist court. Henceforth, several classes and fractions of classes came to occupy the power bloc which was born out of the Revolution. Parliament as the main sphere of the power bloc emerged as the central political institution. Within the power arena the constitutional court, the landed aristocracy, the Ulama and the bazaar petty bourgeoisie emerged as political forces to be reckoned with. Between 1911 and 1925 the royal court under the young son of the exiled Mohammad Ali Shah continued to weaken. In the beginning the parliament was more representative of the various classes but later it became dominated by the landed aristocracy. In the period between the Revolution and the rise of Reza Shah the number of landlord deputies increased from 21% to 50% of the deputies; that of the bazaar guilds declined from 37% to 5%; the number of Ulama deputies also declined from 17% to 13%; and finally the number of professional deputies rose from 25% to 31%.²⁴ The aristocracy was the dominant political force both in the parliament and the government and although the period was marked by instability resulting from the Revolution and the First World War the political regime was liberal.

On the other hand the intelligentsia of the new middle class advocated a nationalist and reformist regime. The fact that the Cons-

24- Shajii. op. cit. p.173.

titution of 1906 was adopted from the 1831 Belgian Constitution shows the extent of the influence of the intelligentsia in the period. After the restoration of the Constitutional regime in 1909, two main political parties representing the main classes in the power bloc dominated the <u>Majles</u>. The intelligentsia formed the Social Democrats Party, a nationalist and secularist minority faction in parliament advocating land redistribution among peasants and the creation of a modern army and bureaucracy. The aristocratic and <u>Ulama</u> deputies on the other hand formed the Social Moderates Party, the liberal-conservative majority faction in parliament.²⁵

With the outbreak of the First World War the first Constitutional period (1906-14: First to Fifth Parliaments) came to an end. During the War, parts of the country were occupied, the central administration was further weakened, the <u>Majles</u> was suspended (until 1921) and in the wake of the War local rebellions broke out. In Gilan, Kuchek Khan, a clerical member of the Social Moderates Party, led the Jangali Movement during the War to fight the Russians and the British. Throughout the war Gilan was under the Jangalis' control. The advance of the Red Army after the Russian Revolution strengthened the Jangali Movement, and with the alliance of the Jangalis and the Persian Communist Party a Republic was proclaimed in Gilan. In Tabriz in 1920, local Social Democrats led by Mohammad Khiabani rose in rebellion and established a government. And in Khorasan, local Democrats led by Colonel Pessian established a government, distributed land among peasants and suppressed the local landlords.²⁶

In such circumstances - the weakness of the Qajar court, the increase in the power of local magnates, mounting local rebellions and

²⁵⁻ M.T. Bahar, <u>Tarikh-e Mokhtasar-e Ahzab-e Siasi-ye Iran</u>, (A Short History of Political Parties in Iran) Tehran, 1322.
26- An account of these movements can be found in: Ivanov, op. cit.;
I. Fakhrai, <u>Sardar-e Jangal</u> (The Chief of the Jungle), Tehran, 1344;
Sazeman-e Enqelabi, <u>Nehzat-haye Kargari pas az 1320</u> (The Working Class Movement after 1320), Tehran, 1350.

foreign influence and intervention- Reza Khan, a Colonel in the Cossack Brigade, came to power in a British-backed coup d'etat in 1921. The local rebellions were suppressed and the central government exerted a measure of control in the provinces. With the Qajar court in ruins the <u>Majles</u> introduced a bill, in 1924, to abolish the monarchy and declare a republic. In the face of opposition to the bill from the <u>Ulama</u> and the bazaar which stood for the monarchy, the <u>Majles</u> withdrew its proposal and instead Reza Khan was declared king as the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty.

Under Reza Shah (1925-41) an authoritarian and military regime was established. Through constitutional amendments the court obtained greater powers and along with the army emerged as the hegemonic force. Parliament and the social forces released in the Constitutional Revolution were subdued to the power of the modern monarchy, which established a large bureaucracy in its drive to centralize the state and modernize the society.

Under Reza Shah the landed aristocracy became firmly established in its estates through the official registration of private landed property. In 1933 a law was passed for further sale of state lands and the Shah himself bought 400 villages of those lands and altogether owned 2000 villages. Thus a new category of landownership, the Crown lands, emerged. Politically, Reza Shah interrupted the domination of the state by the aristocracy. Although landlords still dominated Reza Shah's parliaments (54% of the deputies in the 1921-41 period) it was the court and the army rather than the <u>Majles</u> which were the locus of power. In order to weaken the local power base of landlords, the court passed laws in parliament for the exchange of land among landowners throughout the country. Thus in 1932 a law was passed for the exchange of the estates of powerful Fars landlords with state lands scattered around the country.²⁷ At the local level, the officials of the central government took over the administration of affairs wherever local landlords had taken the administration into their own hands. Aristocratic titles were also abolished and in 1939, shortly before its fall, the regime introduced a law to reform the crop-sharing system and an attempt was made at land redistribution in certain parts of the country.²⁸

Under the authoritarian regime of Reza Shah the trade guilds of the bazaar petty bourgeoisie which had played an important role in the Constitutional Revolution were suppressed. Furthermore, from 1930 the 'public sector' in the modern sense began to emerge in the context of the World economic crisis and the state became the main capitalist enterprise. It monopolized foreign trade and took the initiative in establishing industrial plants. Domestic trade in major commodities was also monopolized by the state. Thus the bazaar economy was made subordinate to the public sector.

The growing power and influence of the <u>Ulama</u> also was severely undermined by the modernizing monarchy. Traditional religious practices were discouraged or banned. The anti-clerical integral nationalism of the state put emphasis on pre-Islamic Iran. In 1934, the bureaucracy extended its hold over the administration of some endowment lands traditionally administered by the <u>Ulama</u>. The <u>Ulama</u> were denied their constitutional right of having a five-<u>mojtahed</u> commission in the <u>Majles</u> despite their demands in 1922 and 1927 to that effect. During the reign of Reza Shah the number of <u>Ulama</u> deputies in the parliament decreased from 15% to 1%. The high-ranking <u>Ulama</u> of the time also refrained from

²⁷⁻ M. Soudagar, <u>Roshd-e Ravabet-e Sarmayedari dar Iran</u>, (The Growth of Capitalism in Iran) Tehran, n.d. p. 170. 28- A. Lambton, <u>The Persian Land Reforms: 1962-66</u>, London, 1969,

²⁸⁻ A. Lambton, <u>The Persian Land Reforms: 1962-66</u>, London, 1969, p. 36.

any political involvement.

The modern intelligentsia disliked the authoritarian rule of Reza Shah and many raised their voice against the Shah in condemnation and disgust. The regime silenced, imprisoned and murdered the outspoken among the intellectuals. The Persian Communist Party which had originated in the Russian Azarbayjan and had participated in the Gilan Republic in 1920 later moved to Tehran and organized trade unions in the oil fields. In 1931 however, the regime declared the party illegal and imprisoned its leaders.

The authoritarian regime of Reza Shah was, of course, not the restoration of traditional absolutism. It was rather the first such regime to develop in the context of the new social formation ushered in by the Constitutional Revolution. As such, it represented a fragment (the army) of the forces which had been released by that Revolution. Unlike the regimes which followed it however, Reza Shah's regime was more of a traditional authoritarian type which ruled over a comparatively inert population, resulting in the political exclusion of social classes rather than in their incorporation in a political party. As it appears from the political literature of the period, the word 'dictatorship' (<u>diktatori</u>), was first used in the case of Reza Shah whereas the Qajar absolutism had been known among the Constitutionalists as <u>estebdåd</u> (autocracy). The strong rule of Reza Shah came to an abrupt end after the occupation of Iran by the Allies during the Second World War.²⁹

Despite the emergence of authoritarianism, the work of the Constitutional Revolution was accomplished in that Iranian society was delivered from Oriental despotism to a new social formation in which the concepts of freedom, private property and juridical rights became predominant, i.e., the capitalist social formation. Hence the

²⁹⁻ An account of Reza Shah's regime is given in: A. Banani, <u>The Moder-</u> <u>nization of Iran:1921-41</u>, Stanford, 1961.

Revolution split the despotic state into the political state with defined domains and prerogatives and the 'civil society' with recognized rights and privileges. From this break-up of society emerged the notion of rights including the right to private property. Landed property which emerged was also a category of private property freed from all political connection. Once the absolutist state crumbled and the new social formation was established, the emerging classes of society came to the fore to shape the emerging political state. Thus the new regimes had to be viewed in relation to those fragments or classes and their interrelations, regardless of the 'historical' resemblances which could obtain between the new and the traditional states. Henceforth, no accurate account of the state could avoid taking into account the society divided into classes. Thus we enter into a class conception of Iranian history.

II- Society and Polity

Reza Shah, the first in the Pahlavi dynasty, fell from power in 1941 after the invasion of Iran by the Allies in the Second World War. He was succeeded to the throne by his twenty-year old son, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The fall of Reza Shah led to the disintegration of his authoritarian regime and ushered in a new era of political conflict within the framework of the constitutional system. As one fragment only among political forces which were unleashed, the new Shah tried to hold his place against mounting challenges for power from all classes. In the absence of a constituted political system, the evolving conflicts among the political forces tended to transform and reshape the emerging political regime. In the course of these conflicts for the reconstitution of the state, several alliances of political forces and social classes occurred and various forces emerged hegemonic within the power bloc.

1- Social classes and political forces

The historical process of the disintegration of the political structures of total power and the emergence and establishment of the institution of private property had by now led to the predominance of a stable social organization of production. With regard to this organization, Iranian society was divided into three main classes. The upper class consisting of the royal family, the landed aristocracy, the tribal nobility, the high-ranking clergy and high bourgeoisie, was in possession of the main means of production, i.e., agricultural land and mercantile capital. There were four categories of land holding: Crown lands, state lands, private lands and endowment lands. Crown lands, bought or confiscated by Reza Shah, comprised 2000 villages or 4% of all villages. They were on the most fertile lands,

located especially on the Caspian coast and worked by 300,000 peasants. In addition, the Shah was the trustee of endowments owned by the Mashhad shrines comprising 400 villages. The Crown lands were administered by the Special Bureau of the Royal Lands. State lands, or <u>khalesejat</u>, had been dwindling since 1932, when a law was passed to authorize their sale. They were purchased by government officials and large landowners. In effect, state lands disappeared in many places although the <u>khalesejat</u> department continued to exist. The remaining state lands were leased to tenants who were counted among the landed aristocracy. <u>Khalesejat</u> lands comprised 3000 villages or 6% of all villages.

Almost 80% of villages (40,000) were privately owned. Of this total, 19000 whole villages or 38% of them were owned by large landowners (omdeh-malekin) who owned more than five villages each. The omdehmalekin class comprised 37 large families. The majority of the villages were registered as private property according to the 1925 Law of the Registration of Lands and Documents. Medium landowners owned 7000 villages or 14% of them. Their holdings ranged from one whole village to five whole villages. The remaining 15000 villages (30% of all villages) were owned by small landowners (khordeh-malekin) and peasant proprietors. Altogether 76% of the villages were owned by landlords whether large, medium or small, whereas peasant proprietors owned about 10% of the villages. The remaining were state and ougaf lands. Ougaf or public endowment lands were 'immobilized' property allocated mainly for the maintenance of mosques, religious schools and shrines, and usually the Ulama were in charge of their administration. Ougaf lands comprised 6000 villages or 12% of all villages. They were mostly located around shrine cities such as Mashhad and Qum and the institutions concerned had ownership right on them.

¹⁻ The figures are taken from a survey carried out by the Fedaian Organization: '<u>Rural Research Series</u>', no.1 n.d., pp. 2-15. See also <u>The Cambridge History of Iran</u>, vol.I, 1968, p.687.

The aristocracy were from the ranks of the <u>omdeh-malekin</u>. According to one account,40% of all villages belonged to 12% of the landlords and 55% of cultivable land was owned by 1% of the population.² Some landlords owned more than 300 villages. For instance,it is said that the Batmanqilich family, of the military elite, owned lands as large as Switzerland or that the Farmanfarma family, an extensive Qajar aristocratic family, owned lands as large as Belgium.³

With the fall of Reza Shah the old aristocracy of the Qajar period emerged on the political scene partly because the rule of Reza Shah did not allow the emergence of a cadre of able politicians. The aristocracy, both those who had served Reza Shah and those who had abstained from political involvement under his authoritarian regime, occupied the major institutions of the state which had now gained their constitutional independence from the court. Between 1943 and 1960, a period in which the landed aristocracy retained power independently from the court, an average of 56% of the deputies were from the landowning class. Within the same period 17 prime ministers formed cabinets. Except for two who were from the military elite, they were all prominent members of the aristocratic families and were mostly independent from the court. The landed aristocracy had its base of strength in the provincial and rural areas, far beyond the reach of the Shah's court and the government in Tehran. Especially in the period between 1943 and 1953, before the royal court regained some of its power, the landed aristocracy was a source of challenge to the power of the King. The opposition of the old Qajar aristocracy to the court stemmed from the change of dynasties. The aristocracy disliked the military and modern bureaucracy created under Reza Shah. Under the modern monarchy the aristocracy had remained the upper class economically but had been

2- M. Soudagar, '<u>A Survey of the Land Reforms: 1340-50'</u>, Tehran, 1351, p. 76. 3- Fedaian, op. cit., p.4.

subject to the hegemonic rule of Reza Shah. Now it was the ruling class as well. As power was transferred from the court to the parliament the aristocracy was provided with room for manueovre. Although the number of deputies from the middle classes increased and so did demands for progressive legislation, the parliament remained the instrument of the aristocracy. As a newspaper wrote in 1945:⁴

> "During these four years the <u>majles</u> has not passed even one law in the interest of the third class. Even if a single clause is passed to benefit that class its implementation remains in the hands of the corrupt officials who so manipulate it and evade implementing it that when it is finally carried out it turns out to be detrimental to the interests of the third class."

Parliament was the scene of fluctuating and temporary coalitions of aristocratic deputies formed to pass legislation and to obtain or distribute political office. The constitutional regime thus worked in the interest of the nobility and in turn the nobility was in favour of a liberal-constitutional government, for the constitutionalism of the aristocracy meant no more than a patrician democracy. On the whole, the aristocracy's power had much to do with the weakness of the court.

But the aristocracy was a divided class. With the modernization of the state the aristocrat's wealth and status as a basis for political office lost its focal importance. It was now essential to have modern education to be able to function in the bureaucracy. And although the prerogative of the aristocracy from the beginning, modern education affected the attitudes of the members of the aristocracy and turned some of them into intellectuals opposed to the ongoing regime and more sympathetic to the rising middle class. In the same way members of influential families became engaged in industrial and mercantile activities or turned to the free professions. For example, members of the Firuz-Farmanfarma family were to be found in all major government

^{4-&#}x27;Azarbayjan' quoted in 'Jami', <u>Gozashteh Cherag-e Rah-e Ayandeh</u> Ast A History of Iran between Two Coups d'etat], Tehran, n.d. p.223

departments and business enterprises. They were bank - chairmen, high bureaucrats, industrialists, capitalists, university professors, engineers, ministers and managing directors.⁵

With the fall of Reza Shah the <u>Ulama</u> also regained some of the lost ground and reemerged on the political scene. While the aristocracy was able to manipulate the peasants at the polls, the religious leaders were able to mobilize the bazaari classes. Some religious leaders became actively involved in politics. They also demanded some of their lost privileges, especially the administration of the <u>ougaf</u> and control over the legal and educational systems. It appears that Reza Shah's anti-clerical rule, like foreign influence under the Qajars, led to an increase in the <u>Ulama</u>'s power and popularity. The mullahs also increased in number because of the exemption of religious students from military service, a policy which indirectly encouraged villagers and peasants who disliked military conscription to join religious schools. This was evident in the trebling of the number of religious schools during the reign of Reza Shah.⁶

Although the <u>Ulama</u> became divided in their support for the Constitution of 1906 after the Revolution, constitutionalism continued to be the major political tendency among the majority of the <u>Ulama</u>. The great Shiite doctors residing in Najaf after the Revolution were in agreement that the implementation of the religious law was impossible during the occultation of the Hidden Imam, and that constitutional government was the second best alternative. In fact, a major work on Shiite political theory written by a prominent member of the Shiite <u>Ulama</u> of the time, provided a reasoned justification for constitutional government (from the view-point of the Shiite <u>Ulama</u>). As a major source on Shiite political theory, the book continued to have wide-

5- A. Qassemi, <u>Oligarshi ya Khanedanha-ye Hokumatgar-e Iran</u>, The Ruling Families of Iran Tehran, 1354, vol.I, passim. 6- R.Arasteh, <u>Education and Social Awakening in Iran</u>, Leiden, 1962, p.68.

spread influence among the <u>Ulama</u> community.⁷ Thus the <u>Ulama</u> also advocated a liberal-constitutional regime.

Apart from the aristocracy and the senior <u>Ulama</u>, the upper class also included new elements who had joined the class under Reza Shah. In particular, the military elite, the mainstay of the modern monarchy, had received land as favours from the Shah. Land was also owned by large merchants who considered landed property as a source of prestige.

While the upper class groups were large property owners and occupied high offices, the middle classes were owners of small capital or made up the ranks of the government bureaucracy. The middle classes thus comprised two main fractions: the propertied middle class and the salaried middle class. The propertied middle class invested its capital in manufacture, the wholesale and retail trade and real estate. The class was composed of the traditional bazaar petty bourgeoisie, consisting of merchants, craftsmen, money lenders, artisans, shopkeepers and brokers. The bazaar was an integrated socio-economic organization encompassing trading houses, mosques and religious schools. The bazaaris were close to the religious community through payment of religious taxes and the financing of mosques and religious schools. Mullahs and religious students lived off the bazaar petty bourgeoisie and taught and resided in nearby schools.

Under Reza Shah the bazaar had lost its political importance. It had been hard pressed due to an economic policy aimed at self-sufficiency, a state monopoly of foreign trade and pressures for indirect taxation to finance economic projects. Further, the bazaar's political instrument, the guild system, had been suppressed. With the fall of Reza Shah the bazaar regained its place in politics and revived the guilds.

⁷⁻ M.H. Naini, <u>Tanbih ol- Umma va Tanzih ol-Mella: dar Asas va Osul-e</u> <u>Mashrutiyat</u>, Concerning the Foundations and Principles of Constitutional Government Tehran, 1334.

The bazaari middle class was opposed to the domination of political life by the court and welcomed the return of constitutional government. As one newspaper wrote in 1941:⁸

> "From now on the representatives of the nation will be able to defend our rights. From now on every Iranian can manage his own life and from today every merchant and trader can pursue his business without interference."

Like the <u>Ulama</u>, the traditional petty bourgeoisie supported constitutional government and was also opposed to the trend of secularism and modernism advocated by the intelligentsia.

While the petty bourgeoisie was an integral part of Iranian society, the beginning of modernization gave rise to a modern bourgeoisie emerging outside the bazaar. The modern bourgeoisie consisted of industrialists and financiers and was in part drawn from the landed aristocracy. It was different from the traditional petty bourgeoisie in that the latter resided in the covered bazaar and lived with its traditions whereas the former left the bazaar for modern quarters in pursuit of new economic activities. Under the modernizing rule of Reza Shah the modern bourgeoisie identified itself with the integral nationalism of the state whereas the traditional petty bourgeoisie remained ideologically close to the Ulama.⁹ But the modern bourgeoisie was only a small class. Since the late 19th century the penetration of foreign interests had resulted in the decline of traditional manufacture and the growth of trade. Thus no substantial industrial bourgeoisie emerged. Before 1900 it was the foreign entrepreneurs that invested in industry and banking. By the time of the rise of Reza Shah only eight plants had been established. Under Reza Shah the state monopolized the main fields of industry and banking. Out of 178 large industries established between 1926 and 1947, the state owned 64 and had shares in

^{8- &#}x27;Iran' quoted in Jami, op.cit. p.105.

⁹⁻R.Cottam, Nationalism in Iran, Pittsburgh, 1964, p.44.

others. State capitalism, however, facilitated the growth of the origins of an industrial bourgeoisie. Up to 1935, 954 modern private companies operating in manufacture had been formed. Total registered industrial capital increased from 118 million rials in 1935 (12% of total investment) to 5300 millions rials in 1950 (34%).¹⁰ This slow development of a modern bourgeoisie meant that the process of the emergence of middle classes in Iran was the reverse of the Western model of development. For example, contrary to the English case where the middle classes developed in the following order: entrepreneursprofessionals-managers-administrators,¹¹ in Iran the administrativemanagerial sector developed earlier than the entrepreneurial section.

In contrast to the propertied middle class, this salaried, new middle class was of a recent origin. Its emergence was the outcome of the Western impact on Iran, the spread of modern education and modernization. Modern education created a class of modern intelligentsia. As a major channel of social mobility the university transferred individuals from various classes of the traditional society into the new middle class. Further, the expansion of the bureaucracy and the establishment of a modern army in response to increasing governmental responsibilities in education and economic development required a modern staff to run the modern state. This strategic position of the new middle class in the bureaucracy, the judiciary and the university encouraged the upper and the bazaari classes to have their sons educated in modern skills and professions. Thus as the product of the transition of society to the modern age, the new middle class, far from being a homogeneous socio-economic class, derived from all classes of the traditional society. As a political class, however, the new

¹⁰⁻ J.Bharier, Economic Development in Iran, Oxford, 1971, pp.171-3; Tehran Economist, no.656, p.9.

¹¹⁻ G. Cole, 'The Conception of the Middle Classes', <u>The British</u> Journal of Sociology, vol.1,1950. pp.275-90.

class advocated democracy, nationalism and secularism.

The new middle class consisted of civil servants, professionals, lawyers, teachers, judges, engineers, clerks, physicians and army officers. Numerically it was a small class. In 1956, out of a population of 19 million the new middle class numbered no more than 300,000. By 1966 the class had expanded to 416000 out of a population of 25 million.¹² Politically, however, the new middle class was the most active among the political forces. As Manfred Halpern said of the new middle class in all Middle Eastern societies in 1963:¹³

> "By controlling the state in such a strategic historical period, this new salaried class has the capabilities to lead the quest for the status, power and prosperity of middle class existence by ushering in the machine age... Both the burden of the past and the threat of the future impel the salaried middle class to become the principal revolutionary force, creating new standards and institutions relevant to a modernizing society."

In Iran the new middle class, forming political groups and parties and vying for political power, posed the greatest challenge to the aristocracy in power. Advocating nationalism, it viewed the aristocracy as collaborators of imperialism. Adhering to democratic constitutionalism, it was opposed to the return of absolutism. For the new middle class, democracy could be achieved not merely through free elections but through fundamental reforms curbing the social power of the aristocracy. It also demanded the establishment of a modern, rational bureaucracy, a secular judiciary, industrialization, and popular political participation. Thus the new middle class entertained the ideas of revolution, reform and the transformation of the <u>status quo</u>. As one newspaper representing such views wrote in 1946:¹⁴

"We believe that a progressive economic system should be established and that the remnants of feudalism should be removed. It is necessary to industrialize the economy according to rational methods in order to raise national production."

12-Ministry of Interior, '<u>The First Census of Iran</u>; 1956; The Plan Organization, <u>National Census of Population</u>: 1966, 1968. 13-M.Halpern, <u>The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North</u> <u>Africa</u>, Princeton, 1963, p. 54. 14- <u>Mardom</u> quoted in Jami, op. cit. p. 438.

In demanding land and economic reforms, the new middle class also spoke for the lower classes. The lower classes themselves consisted of the working class, the **peasantry** and the nomads. In the 1950's the working class numbered around two million. It was employed in the oil industry, textile factories, mining, manufacture, crafts, the construction sector and manual services. The oil industry, the largest modern industry, employed 50,000 workers and around one million were employed in construction, traditional manufacture and crafts. The modern industrial workers constituted a small fraction of the working class; altogether modern industries employed 380,000 workers or 19% of the working class. The rest of the working class were employed in manual services and transport.¹⁵

The bulk of the population was formed by the peasantry who lived in 50,000 villages scattered throughout the country. In the 1950's around 70% of the population lived in the rural areas and more than half of the economically active population were peasant share-croppers. The crop-sharing system had become widespread under the Western impact from the late 19th century, when large private holdings emerged in place of the traditional forms of land tenure. With the emergence of ownership rights, the majority of villages turned into landlord property and the peasants lost their traditional rights and eventually became landless share-croppers. Although individual peasants were not bound to the land as serfs, whole villages could be bought and sold.

Relations between peasants and the landlord were regulated on the basis of the crop-sharing system or the 'five-element formula' according to which labour, land, water, seed and animals were taken as the basis for the division of the produce between the landlord and the peasants. In some places the peasant retained only one fifth of the produce, for

¹⁵⁻ The Ministry of Interior, op.cit.

he only provided labour. There were great regional variations in the application of the formula, but usually the peasant retained one third of the crop. Some landlords had mechanized their land and had replaced the crop-sharing system with wage labour relations. Some leased the land to the peasants for a fixed rent. And some 7% of peasant families were themselves proprietors.¹⁶

The crop-sharing system was recognized both by the Civil Code of 1928 as well as the religious law (under the legal principle of <u>mozarei</u>). The peasant share-cropper had no right to the land; the Civil Code did not even ensure the peasant of a minimum share of the crops. The landlord, on the other hand, had the right to choose his peasants and reallocate the village lay-out (<u>masaq</u>) whereby the lands were divided into ploughlands worked by the sitting peasants. The rural population was divided into two main sections. The sitting peasants worked the land according to their agreement with the landlord. There were 1.9 million such <u>masaqdar</u> families. The other section of the rural population comprised the <u>khoshneshinha</u> who were rural artisans, craftsmen and shopkeepers, and the agricutural labourers who did not own any of the 'five elements' but provided labour and received their wages either in kind or in cash. In 1956 there were 1.3 million families belonging to the second section.¹⁷

Whereas the peasants were settled in villages the tribal population was mostly unsettled and engaged in herdsmanship. The relationship between the tribesman and the tribal chief was not much different from that between the peasants and the landlord, except that the tribesmen were more tightly attached to the tribal community. In 1956 there were two million tribesmen living in scattered tribal units.

¹⁶⁻ Ministry of Agriculture, '<u>Agricultural Statistics</u>', 1339, vol.15,p.9. 17- M.Soudagar, op.cit.p.81.

While political conflicts were a characteristic of the cities where the aristocracy held government positions and the middle classes vied for political power and social change, the countryside was the stronghold of tradition, ignorance and indifference and the mass of the peasantry remained out of touch with the issues of the cities. Despite their subordinate social position, the peasants showed little opposition to their domination by the absentee landlords. The aristocracy faced no threat from the countryside. One observer has written by way of explanation:¹⁸

> "The townspeople in their interactions with the peasants have found them a 'polite','calm' and 'peaceful' people. There is no doubt that the fear of the landlord has resulted in such behavioural appearances".

There were a few incidents involving peasants against landlords and government officials. For instance in 1956 and 1958, conflict occurred between peasants and landlords and tax officials in Gilan and Gorgan.¹⁹ However, despite a few more protests in the 1960-62 period, the peasantry posed no challenge to the rural <u>status quo</u>. Instead, rural reform was an **issue** raised by the urban intelligentsia and those in power looking for social support.

This social structure persisted despite changes in class fractions such as the decline of the landed class, the rise of a grand bourgeoisie and the emergence of a rural middle class out of the peasantry. Given the conception of class used here, all classes came to affect the formation of political regimes through alliances whether or not they formed political parties and developed an ideology of their own.

19- M.S. Ivanov, op.cit.p.209.

¹⁸⁻ Kh. Khosrovi, <u>Jameei-ye Dehgani dar Iran</u>[Peasant Community in Iran] Tehran, 1357, p. 124.

2- Political Parties

Political parties in Iran emerged after the Constitutional Revolution. They were generated from the specific interests of the social classes which had since come to the fore, and from the political ideologies maintained by those classes. These political ideologies i.e., ideologies concerning the nature of the emerging state, developed after the Revolution and matured after the fall of Reza Shah. The political ideological constellation in Iran has since comprised four specific ideologies concerning the form of regime. These are liberalconstitutionalism, democratic-constitutionalism, non-liberal clerical fundamentalism (political Islam) and popular working class ideology. It was the upper classes including the aristocracy and the high clergy and the middle-class fractions which came to develop ideologies and organizations of their own. By contrast, there were no peasant and little working class traditions. Within this ideological crystallization, the upper classes advocated liberal-constitutionalism, the new middle class advocated democracy, the lower clergy allied to the traditional petty bourgeoisie developed the non-liberal political Islam and the radical intelligentsia allied to the urban masses advocated popular socialism.

These four ideologies were political in that they referred to the nature of the political regime. There were other diffuse and not specifically political ideologies which permeated the political ideologies. They included constitutionalism as a system of government, nationalism and anti-imperialism in various forms, 'traditionalism' vs. 'modernism' and secularism vs. religion. These ideologies were the constituents of the Iranian political culture rather than of the political ideological system.

Liberalism as the ideology of the aristocracy in power emerged in its pure form after the Constitutional Revolution and as such did not

achieve pegemony due to the instability of the power bloc. It advocated a parliamentary liberal state with the predominance of the legislative over the executive. The liberalism of the aristocracy was not articulated to economic development and had no mutual implication with the developmentalist ideology which was first articulated by Reza Shah, thus it was not modernist. It was not nationalist either, in that traditionally the aristocracy in power was divided between pro-British and pro-Russian factions. The main political tendency among the <u>Ulama</u> also was liberal-constitutionalism, although following the Revolution, some <u>Ulama</u> passed into opposition to constitutionalism (<u>mashruteh</u>) and called for the implementation of the Islamic law (<u>mashruteh</u>); this was the ideological origin of political Islam.

The new middle class fraction advocated democracy, nationalism, fascism and diffuse Islam. It represented a politics hostile to the <u>status quo</u> and called for electoral and other reforms to curb the power of the aristocracy. Early in the period, Islam as a political ideology had little influence with the modern intelligentsia and the new middle class, who were reformist, modernist, secularist and anti-tradition. Later, however, during the decade before the 1979 revolution, political Islam spread among the new middle class. (see Chapter V)

The traditional petty bourgeoisie was ideologically close to the <u>Ulama</u> and supported their liberalism and traditionalism but in association with the lower clergy and religious students it also gave rise to the non-liberal, clerical, extremist political Islam advocating the establishment of an Islamic state or order sanctioned by the legitimacy of the Islamic law. It was thus an authoritarian and elitist ideology and had developed mainly in reaction to the modernism and anticlericalism of the modern intelligentsia. It was extremely nationalist and anti-imperialist and in this it drew on nineteenth-century religious nationalist movements against foreign penetration. The parties building on this ideology not only despised the Western democracy of the new middle class but also the liberalism and quietism of the senior <u>Ulama</u>. It may be noted that despite the nature of Shiite political theory and the claims of the proponents of political Islam that Islam has always been 'political', it was from the Constitutional Revolution that Islam in Iran emerged as a political ideology advocating a particular type of political regime. The ideological streak of political Islam, however, remained overshadowed by constitutionalism and constitutional opposition to the authoritarianism of the royal court.

The popular working class ideology originated among the radical intelligentsia and in its early stage spread among the working class in industrial cities. It was anti-liberal and initially class-reductionist in that it did not seek to articulate middle class democracy. Yet the popular ideology was reformist and to that end sought to participate in power. In reaction to this reformism of early popular ideology, later more radical variants of the ideology developed.

These four ideologies then, constituted the ideological constellation which took form in the new social formation. The conflicts which occurred over the form of regime were related to these ideologies but were expressed through the diffuse ideologies (such as modernism and reformism). The four political ideologies persisted throughout the conflicts, but the political parties built upon them were more ephemeral and discontinuous. Hence in this chapter only some of the parties which were present in the conflicts up to the revolution will be mentioned and those which emerged afterwards will be discussed later (in Chapter VIII).

The four ideologies represented specific class interests. The royal court on the other hand developed its own political ideology,

which became the state ideology from within the existing ideological system by articulating elements of the existing ideologies. It was presented as a corporatist ideology seeking to create an equilibrium of classes. The court claimed to suppress the special pleadings of the upper class by substituting liberalism with 'social justice', to be more democratic than the democratic parties and to attend to the 'real interests' of the masses through 'economic democracy'. Thus the court parties were to represent the court's corporatist ideology and to incorporate diverse class interests into their structures.

After the fall of the authoritarian regime of Reza Shah which had subdued the landed aristocracy, the bazaar and the intelligentsia political parties were organized to represent diverse interests. Reza Shah had prohibited political parties considering them as plots designed to undermine his regime which in itself was no more than a 'party' to the diversity of a society in revolution. His fall thus led to the emergence of several parties seeking to represent particular segments of the population rather than formulate national programmes. They were parties originating from below as vehicles of certain interests at a time when the state was weak and the power bloc undefined. Hence they resembled factions forming around strong personalities. Although some of these parties, especially those initiated from various areas of the power bloc particularly the cabinet and parliament, sought to represent diverse class interests, they were short-lived due to conflicting interests and changing situations. By contrast, parochial and ideological parties representing certain segments of the population persisted through the unfolding political conflicts.

The aristocracy dominating the power bloc after the fall of Reza Shah was less in need of parties than were the middle classes. The

main source of its power lay in the country where it was able to marshal the peasants at the polls. And this power was enhanced in the twenty-year period after Reza Shah, when parliament was at the centre of power and elections were relatively free from court interference. In this period, landlords formed an average of 56% of the deputies. From the 14th majles, when middle class and leftist parties secured seats in parliament, several aristocratic factions began to emerge. As small groupings of notables, high-placed deputies and senior bureaucrats, they had little influence outside the majles and the bureaucracy and thus did not develop into political parties. At a time when the middle classes outside the power bloc were organizing parties, some attempts were made by the oligarchy at building political parties in order to aggregate diverse interests and thereby broaden its base of support. The most important such party, created from above, was the Iran Democrat Party which was established in 1946 by prime minister Ahmad Qavam of the old Qajar aristocracy. The party expanded rapidly through the cooption of middle-class and leftist parties which together formed a coalition government. It sought to consolidate power in the hands of the prime minister by curbing the power of the court and the influence of democratic and popular parties. In time, however, the Iran Democrat Party coalition broke down and the party itself disintegrated from within.²⁰ On the whole, aristocratic factions were no more than vehicles designed to consolidate their power and after the experiment of the Iran Democrat Party no aristocratic party developed. Later when the aristocracy lost much of its hegemony to the army and the court, it was even less capable of organization and ideological articulation.

²⁰⁻ An account of the party is given in: L.Binder, <u>Iran: Political</u> <u>Development in a Changing Society</u>, Berkeley, 1962, pp. 206-8, and L.P. Elwell-Sutton, 'Political Parties in Iran', <u>The Middle East Journal</u>, vol. III, 1949, pp. 45-62.

Unlike the aristocratic factions entrenched in power, the middle class parties were ideological, vied for political power, called for land and electoral reforms to curb the power of landlords and demanded industrialization and administrative reforms which would provide opportunity for the skills of the middle class to be used.

The major democratic party formed by the new middle class was the Iran Party which emerged in 1942, first as the Association of Engineers organized by a group of foreign-educated engineers. In 1943 membership was opened to other educated groups and the Association was declared a political party. The founders of the Iran Party were Engineers G. Farivar, M. Bazargan, Dr. Karim Sanjabi (a lawyer) and Allahyar Saleh (a judge). The party members were mostly young intellectuals, professionals and government employees. As an observer has noted, the Iran Party was the party of "doctors, lawyers, engineers, journalists, professors and teachers." ²¹ In fact, the Iran Party was the remnant of the Social Democrat Party of the Constitutional period.

The Iran Party appealed directly to the new middle class and did not attempt to mobilize other segments of the population and hence, it continued to be a small group of professionals and intellectuals commited to carry out their political demands through achieving political office. Nontheless, the party proved to be one of the permanent parties participating in the ensuing conflicts.

The Iran Party was nationalist, secularist and modernist. On the issue of secularism vs. Islam a major splinter group broke away from the party to form first, the Islamic League, and then the Freedom Movement. The leaders of the Freedom Movement included professionals such as Engineers Samii, Atai, Sahabi and Bazargan as well as clerics like

²¹⁻ R.Cottam, op.cit. p.265; some account of the party is also given in: R. Cottam, 'Political Party Development in Iran', <u>Iranian Studies</u>, Summer 1968, pp.82-96.

Ayatollah Taleqani and Zanjani. The Freedom Movement was similar to the Iran Party in most respects except that it was more diffusely Islamic. A similar splinter group was the People of Iran Party (<u>Mardome Iran</u>) combining democracy, socialism and Islam in its ideology. Party members were mostly from the younger generation of professionals.

Extreme nationalism and fascism also found adherents in the ranks of the new middle class. Pan-Iranism, a broad movement encompassing a number of groups, attracted university and high-school students and army officers during and after the Second World War. The Pan-Iranist movement was nationalist, anti-Western and statist and included three political parties. First, the Pan-Iranist Party led by Daryush Foruhar (a student) originated among army officers and advocated land reform, state control of the economy and labour legislation. Second, the Nationalist Socialist Workers Party, a party of students, had influence with the court and was opposed to the <u>Ulama</u> and their interference in politics. And third, the Arya Party was aroyalist splinter group from the Nationalist Socialist Party.

Although they originated among the new middle class, the Pan-Iranist Parties had influence in some of the trade guilds in Tehran. Similarly, the Toilers Party led by Dr. M. Baqai was a party of the intelligentsia but it also had influence in the trade guilds. The party was the result of an alliance between Baqai's group which had contact with the bazaar and Ayatollah Kashani, the leading cleric of the 1940's, and a group of socialist intellectuals. In the course of the ensuing conflicts, however, the party split: the intellectual wing broke away to form the Third Force Party while Baqai's faction maintained its contact with the bazaar.

The new middle-class parties were secular-nationalist, modernist and reformist. By contrast, Islamic petty bourgeois parties were

fundamentalist, traditionalist and religious-nationalist. They called for a return to fundamental principles of Islam and advocated the establishment of an Islamic state. The ideology of political Islam flared up mainly after the fall of Reza Shah and its stronghold was the petty bourgeoisie of the Tehran bazaar. The proximity of the religious circles to the bazaar organization provided the basis for the alliance between the lower clergy and the petty bourgeoisie which led to the emergence of fundamentalist parties. The most important Islamic party which championed the cause of the Islamic state was the Fedaian-e Islam Party. Formed in 1946 by a theology student, Navab Safavi, the party became famous for several political assassinations which its members carried out. Ahmad Kasravi a prominent anti-Shiite historian was one of the victims. The party was opposed to the democratic parties, the court and even to the 'establishment' Ulama who, in the party's view, had compromised Islam by their silence regarding un-Islamic governments. The Fedaian were based in the Tehran bazaar and although their entire leadership was executed by the order of the Shah they continued to remain on the political scene.

A similarly authoritarian and anti-democratic party was the <u>Mojahedin-e Islam</u>. It was led by Ayatollah Qanatabadi but behind him loomed the influence and leadership of Ayatollah Kashani who represented the ideology of political Islam in the 1950's. In his view:²²

> "Islamic doctrines apply to social life, patriotism, administration of justice and opposition to tyranny and despotism. Islam warns its adherents not to submit to a foreign yoke. This is the reason why the Imperialists try to confuse the minds of the people by drawing distinctions between religion and government and politics. In Islam religious leaders are to guide the people in social affairs."

The Mojahedin recruited its leaders and members from the clergy and the bazaar guilds. Similarly, the Party of the Islamic Nations which was formed by a number of theology students in 1960 originated in the 22- Quoted in Ibid, p.153. Tehran bazaar. As a fundamentalist Islamic party it advocated the establishment of an Islamic state and taught its members in the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Its objectives were "the capture of political power, the creation of a communal economy and the establishment of a dictatorship based on a single party."²³ Later, after its suppression by the regime, the remnants of the party formed the Party of God (<u>Hezbollah</u>). Other fundamentalist groupings known as the 'coalition groups' also emerged in the Tehran bazaar in the 1960's. On the whole political Islam was the movement of the lower clergy associated with the bazaar and had little appeal among the high-ranking <u>Ulama</u> who were liberal-constitutionalist. The ideology of political Islam was to gather strength under the hegemony of the royal court.

The popular working class ideology was for the first time represented on an organized basis by the Tudeh (masses) Party of Iran. Although prior to the rise of Reza Shah a Persian Communist Party and a small labour movement had existed, the Tudeh Party originated in a group of Western-educated intellectuals who circulated Marxist ideas in Reza Shah's Iran. The group was led by Dr. T.Arani who on his return from Germany in 1930 gathered a group of teachers, lawyers and professional men around himself. Arani and his followers were arrested in 1937 and tried under a 1931 Act prohibiting Communist activities. He himself died in prison but the remaining members of the group formed the nucleus of the Tudeh Party on their release in 1941.

The Tudeh Party was able to mobilize the masses and especially the rising industrial working class on a large scale. Initially avoiding any reference to communism in its programme, the party organized trade unions and mobilized workers in the main industrial centres of Esfahan, Abadan and in the northern provinces where industrialization had gone

²³⁻ B. Jazani, <u>Tarikh-e Si Saleh-ye Iran</u>(A Thirty-year History of Iran) Tehran, n.d., p. 141.

further than in other areas. In 1944 the party organized the Central United Council of Trade Unions, encompassing 47 trade unions with 50,000 members.²⁴ In 1946 it set up a workers' committee in Abadan and organized a massive strike against the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. No other party was able to compete with the Tudeh Party with regard to the mobilization of the masses.

The founding members of the party were all intellectuals, doctors and professors and the party also recruited members and supporters from among government employees, army officers and professional men. According to one account, in 1944 the Tudeh Party members numbered around 25,000 out of which 23% were intellectuals and government employees, 75% workers and 2% peasants. And "although the majority of the members were workers the participants in the Party Congress were mostly intellectuals and professionals. As a result those elected to the leadership of various party organizations were intellectuals."²⁵

The Tudeh Party set out as a democratic and reformist party. Its constituent assembly called for the establishment of democracy, the implementation of the Constitution, struggle against the reimposition of royal-military domination, land redistribution, electoral reforms and labour legislation. In 1944 the Tudeh declared itself the party of workers, peasants, intellectuals and the petty bourgeoisie and called for a common struggle against 'feudalism'. Later in 1952, after it was legally banned, the Party Central Committee denounced the Constitution, called for the overthrow of the monarchy and declared itself the party of the working class alone. The party thus became class-reductionist in that it viewed the democratic middle-class parties which obtained power in the early 1950's as the class enemy. Later in 1965 however, the

 ²⁴⁻ Sazeman-e Enghelabi, <u>Nehzat-haye Kargari pas az 1320</u> [The Working Class Movement after 1941], Tehran, 1350, p. 53.
 25- Ibid. p.54.

Tudeh changed its views concerning the Constitution and attempted to articulate democracy in its own ideology.²⁶ Thus as the party moved from its working class popular ideology to democratic-constitutionalism, divisions within the party led to the emergence of radical splinter groups. The first to defect was the Revolutionary Organization which condemned the non-revolutionary stance of the Tudeh and called for a peasant war. Other defectors formed the Tufan Organization, the Marxist-Leninist Process and the Red Star. The more important of the radical left factions was the Fedaian Organization formed in 1970 by a group of intellectuals defecting from the Tudeh and other parties. Of the founding members of the Organization eleven were students, five teachers, eight engineers, twelve workers, one government employee and one army officer.²⁷Although the Radical Left had Tudeh origins they were in the main the product of their own time. While the Tudeh fought against 'feudalism' the target of the Radical Left was 'dependent capitalism'. Early in the period, however, the Tudeh Party established the popular working class ideology by successfully mobilizing the masses. The popular working class ideology was to be of relevance in the subsequent articulation of state ideology.

Political parties were thus built on the basis of the four class ideologies and advocated different political regimes. They made and broke alliance in the course of the conflicts on the basis of the ideologies of nationalism, constitutionalism, traditionalism-modernism and secularism-clericalism. The four political ideologies were opposed to the authoritarian hegemony of the court but since the court changed position, short and implicit alliances were also made between some of the parties and the court.

26- A full account of the history and ideology of the party is given in: S. Zabih, <u>The Communist Movement in Iran</u>, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1966.

27- This information was gathered from the various publications of the Organization.

III- Political Conflicts

The reign of Mohammad Reza Shah can be divided into two periods. In the first period (1941-62) he was not at the centre of power but sought to consolidate his position against the contending political forces. In the second period (1962-79) he emerged as unquestioned ruler and built an authoritarian regime. In order to arrive at an analysis of the state which was overthrown by the 1979 revolution, this chapter investigates its origin and evolution during the first period of the Shah's reign. During this period the power bloc was occupied by various political forces. In the first decade of the period no lasting hegemonic force emerged. In the early 1950's an alliance of the middle class parties obtained power and finally in the second decade of this period a tenuous alliance of the court and the upper-class groups occurred.

In the first decade (1942-51) the political system was pluralistic and constitutional, parliament was the central political institution and various political forces sought to establish their dominance. In this period the royal court was reduced to being one actor among many political forces. It was pushed behind the scenes and lost many of its prerogatives. Under Reza Shah, ministers had been nominated by the court. Now under the young Shah parliament nominated the ministers and the Shah appointed them only after they had secured a vote of confidence from the <u>majles</u>. Thus the court lost its control of the government. Furthermore, in 1942 parliament passed a law for the transfer to the government of those Crown lands confiscated by Reza Shah. They would then be returned to their original owners.

Lacking in any power the Shah himself talked of the desirability of democracy. In one of his early speeches he said: "Democracy is the most appropriate system of government which is conducive to national unity. In such a system since the powers of the realm are in the hands of the people every one can freely pursue his interests according to his talents."¹

Under this pluralist situation parliament provided the locus of power and the arena of conflict. The emerging parties and factions competed for majles seats while the court attempted to exert control over parliament. The first parliament which was convened after Reza Shah was the 14th majles elected under Allied supervision and at a time when the court was in no position to interfere with the elections. The composition of the 14th majles, which was similar to that of subsequent parliaments convened up to 1960, pointed to the dominant forces in the state. The majles was composed of landed deputies and tribal leaders, especially from the southern provinces under British occupation, bazaari deputies and the Ulama. Of the deputies 59% were from the landlord class, 11% from the bazaar petty bourgeoisie, 27% from the upper bureaucracy (partly landlords) 2% from the Ulama and 1% from the lower classes.² Among the new political forces in parliament were the Tudeh Party, the Iran Party, Dr. Mosaddeq, an anti-court constitutionalist and some of his associates.

Confronted with strong parliaments the court sought to strengthen its position outside the <u>majles</u>. The power position of the court was enhanced due to several factors. During the War two autonomous governments had been set up in the provinces of Azarbayjan and Kurdestan, under the occupation of the Red Army, by local communist parties.

^{1- &#}x27;A <u>Collection of the Shah's Speeches and Messages</u>; Tehran, n.d. vol.II, p.964.

²⁻ Shajii, op.cit. p.173.

After the evacuation of the provinces by the Russians in 1946, the army led by the Shah defeated the autonomous regimes and recaptured the provinces and at the time of the 15th <u>majles</u> elections sent 25 royalists from these provinces to parliament. The issue thus enhanced the influence of the court and the position of the army. Also the Shah applied for and obtained military assistance from the U.S.A. Thus the court consolidated its power position for the ensuing conflicts. Also, on the pretext that parliament was interfering in areas outside its jurisdiction, the Shah demanded the right of dissolving the <u>majles</u>. Finally, despite opposition to this, a constituent assembly was convened in 1949 and revised Article 48 of the Constitution granting the Shah the right to dismiss the <u>majles</u>. Also the Crown lands which had been transferred to the government in 1942 were now ordered back to the court.

Thus the power of the court was increasing until the emergence of a new force on the political scene i.e., the National Front of Dr. Mosaddeq. It was organized by a group of politicians associated with Dr. Mosaddeq who during the 16th <u>majles</u> elections had taken to the royal palace demanding free elections at a time when court interference in elections had increased. Later the National Front launched the movement for the nationalization of the oil industry, attracted widespread public support and became a coalition of parties. With the emergence of the National Front the growing power of the court was checked.

The Alliance of the Middle Classes (1951-53)

An old time constitutionalist, a staunch opponent of Reza Shah's rule and a member of the Qajar aristocracy, Dr. Mosaddeq was carried to power on waves of popular support after he championed the nationalization movement. He was made premier in May 1951. Originally

the National Front had set out, in opposition to the increasing power of the court, as a constitutionalist movement. More specifically, Dr. Mosaddeq demanded electoral reforms in order to widen and democratize the political system, new liberal press laws, the reinterpretation of the revised article 48 of the Constitution to curb the power of the court and a change of martial law requirements to prevent the interference of the army in politics. The nationalist and democratic programme of Dr. Mosaddeq attracted extensive support both in parliament and outside and soon the National Front turned into a coalition of parties. The coalition was made up of the Iran Party, the Pan-Iranist Party, the Toilers Party, the Mardom-e Iran Party, the Mojahedin-e Islam Party and a number of bazaar guilds affiliated with the Front. It thus brought together a broad set of interests and in the main represented the middle classes, including the new middle class and the bazaar petty bourgeoisie. The National Front alliance was based on the issues of constitutionalism and nationalism advocated by the bazaar clerical parties and the parties of the intelligentsia. As a nationalist movement the Front also attracted the support of some aristocratic deputies especially the 'anti-British' faction. Also, despite the Tudeh Party's view of the Front as a 'bourgeois puppet of imperialism', Mosaddeq enjoyed the intermittent backing of the party.

So long as the nationalist cause was alive, the National Front remained united and the public rallied to the support of Mosaddeq. His emergence and the public support behind him had subdued the power of the 16th <u>majles</u>. As the dispute with Great Britain remained unsolved and the nationalist fervour subsided, the Mosaddeq government was faced with more opposition, especially with regard to its economic policy. During the 17th <u>majles</u> elections, the royal court made attempts to regain some of its lost influence in parliament. Also, the <u>Ulama</u>

competed against National Front candidates. Without government interference in the elections the local influence of the landed oligarchy ensured its victory over the candidates of the middle-class parties who had little local reputation and influence. Mosaddeq was convinced that elections had to be halted in order to prevent the army and the aristocracy from sending in more deputies hostile to the government. Out of 78 elected members there were only 25 National Front candidates; the remainder were royalists and landed magnates.

From then on Mosaddeq set out to establish his own hegemony against parliament, the court and the army. The 17th <u>mailes</u> had become the centre of opposition to the National Front and its attitude towards the oil dispute. During the first year of its government the National Front had also to face the behind-the-scenes power of the court, whose command of the armed forces gave it room for manoeuvre against Mosaddeq. To strengthen his position, Mosaddeq asked for extraordinary powers from parliament to deal with the economy and demanded control of the armed forces and a transfer of responsibility from the Shah to the minister of defence for the appointment of officers and army administration. The fulfillment of this demand would disarm the court altogether.

Confronted with the opposition of the <u>majles</u> and the court, Mosaddeq resigned in July 1952. He was, however, brought back to power after three days of widespread manifestations of popular support. The National Front called for a general strike. Crowds from the bazaar flocked to the Parliament Square to express their support for the Front and clashed with the army. The Tudeh Party also mobilized its following on, the streets in support of Mosaddeq. Ayatollah Kashani denounced the turn of events as a British plot and his Mojahedin joined forces to reestablish the National Front government. The July uprising which brought Mosaddeq back to power was an outright defeat for the court, the army and the aristocratic parliament. The <u>majles</u> had no choice but to overwhelmingly vote for Mosaddeq. His demands were fulfilled: he obtained extra-ordinary decree powers and the army came under his control as he assumed overall charge of the ministry of defence. With the army under Mosaddeq's control he purged it of royalist officers and installed his own supporters.

The court thus lost the ground gained before the advent of the National Front. To the humiliation of the Shah, the day of the July uprising was made a national holiday. The revenues of Crown estates were redirected to the government. The court had started the sale of its lands to peasants, at a time of its declining power. In 1953 Mosaddeq stopped the sale as the estates were transferred to the government. The royal family came under government scrutiny and the Senate which had been convened under court influence was dissolved. Furthermore, to define the powers of the king and the court Mosaddeq asked parliament to set up a commission to reconsider the revised article 48 of the Constitution and also to clarify the relations between the court and the army. When Mosaddeq found parliament failing to set up such a commission and obstructing government bills he finally called for a referendum to dissolve the majles itself. Deputies resigned one after another in protest, and in the referendum Mosaddeq obtained a majority. Thus Mosaddeq and his party succeeded in establishing their hegemony in the state.

Coincident with the successive victories of Mosaddeq, however, the National Front began to disintegrate while the court and the army were gathering their forces. The weakness of the National Front coalition lay, paradoxically in its very strength: the alliance between modernist-

secular parties of the modern intelligentsia and the bazaar religious parties led by the Ulama. Not unlike the period after the Constitutional Revolution when the modernist intellectuals and the Ulama separated forces, with Mosaddeq's consolidation of power, a rift developed between the modernist parties and the Ulama. Defections from the coalition occurred for reasons such as the domination of the political scene by Mosaddeq and his associates from the Iran Party to the exclusion of the Ulama followers, his assumption of plenary powers and unconstitutional rule by decree and his tolerance of the Tudeh Party. On Mosaddeq's assumption of plenary powers Ayatollah Kashani, objecting on constitutional grounds, stated that such a measure would lead to despotism. The defection of Kashani meant the withdrawal of support for the Front from the Mojahedin Party with their widespread support in the Tehran bazaar. Then came the defection of the Toilers Party in opposition to Mosaddeq's alleged leniency towards the Tudeh Party. Of the Toilers Party its intellectual wing broke away and formed the Third Force Party which continued to support Mosaddeq while the party itself sided with Kashani. Mosaddeq's toleration of the activities of the Tudeh Party especially in the summer of 1953 alienated more of his clerical allies. Finally, when Mosaddeq called for the referendum only the Iran Party, the Pan-Iranists and the Tudeh Party supported him.

The court and the purged army officers were slowly watching the National Front disintegrate. Heartened by this, the court emerged from its seclusion, but its first attempt to oust Mosaddeq with the help of the royal guards failed, leading to the Shah's flight abroad. But the purged army officers in the Retired Officers Club in Tehran continued underground activities while receiving material help and advice from the American Embassy and its military advisors. Meanwhile, the disin-

tegration of the National Front worked to the interest of the court. Clerics gradually sided with the court against the Front. Some <u>Ulama</u> ordered the holding of ceremonies in the mosques in sympathy with the Shah, after his flight. And in the day of confrontation between the army and Mosaddeq, mullahs like Behbehani, who had influence and organization in the bazaar, managed to register some popular support for the royalists while the army distributed cash among the crowds.

On August 19, 1953, the National Front was removed from power in a coup d'etat which brought General Zahedi to power. Mosaddeq was . arrested and the Shah returned from abroad.

The coalition of the middle classes had occurred on the basis of the issues of nationalism and constitutionalism. It broke apart due to disputes over the meaning of constitutionalism, conflict for power and also because of the trend of secularism associated with the modernist parties. Mosaddeq's emergence as the hegemonic force on the political scene while lacking military support antagonized disparate forces. With his fall the experiment in the government of the middle classes was ended.³

The Alliance of the Upper Classes (1953-62)

Following the fall of the National Front the royal court, relying on the army, emerged as the major power on the political scene. It regained its constitutional command of the army and further expanded it, by applying for more militiry aid from the U.S.A.. It also took command of the gendarmerie and organized the security police. The Crown lands were transferred back to the court. The middle-class opposition organized in the National Front was quelled. The bazaar guilds

⁷³⁻ The information on the National Front government was obtained from: Jami, op. cit. pp.480-590, and The Mosaddeq Press, <u>Mosaddeq</u> <u>va Movazeneh-ye Manfi</u>. (Mosaddeq and Negative Balancing), Tehran, 1351. For a class analysis of the Mosaddeq regime see: T.C. Young, 'The Social Support of Current Iranian Policy', <u>The Middle East</u> <u>Journal</u>, vol.6, 1952, pp.125-43 and E.Abrahamian, <u>The Social Bases of</u> Iranian Politics: The Tudeh Party, 1941-53, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1969.

and the associations of government employees and professionals were suppressed. So were the Tudeh Party and its military network of 700 officers.

The power of the royal court, however, depended upon support from the military elite, the landed aristocracy, the high-ranking <u>Ulama</u> and the senior bureaucrats who together constituted the upper class. Rather than being autocratic, the power of the Shah was 'limited' by the support of these groups. This new alliance was based on formal constitutionalism and an emphasis on Islam, particularly by the court. In view of the conflicts among the upper class groups and between them and the middle class parties, however, the new alliance remained tenuous.

The military elite had risen to positions of power and acquired vast landholdings to the detriment of the old aristocracy, the tribal leaders and the Ulama, who had all suffered at the hands of the military monarchy of Reza Shah. Of all the elements of the upper class the military elite was closest to the court. Yet it had its own independent power position. Following the fall of Mosaddeq, it was the army under General Zahedi that wielded power. Under Zahedi the army became the central political institution and controlled the 18th majles elections held in 1954. It sought to install deputies favoured by the military elite and to prevent some aristocratic families from standing for the elections. This caused differences between Zahedi and the court which was not willing to alienate the landed deputies, nor to accept the domination of the government by the military elite. The court was opposed to the emergence of powerful officers. Although it appointed General Razmara in 1950, when it had been confronted with strong opposition, it is reported that the Shah rejoiced in Razmara's assassination. Both Razmara and Zahedi demanded the command of the army

from the Shah. Compared to other upper class groups, however, the military was more tractable for the court.

The royal court also drew support from the high-ranking <u>Ulama</u>. At least they did not challenge the power of the court. Ayatollah Kashani who had sided with the court in the conflict of 1953 withdrew from active politics and died quietly in 1962. Ayatollah Borujerdi, the highest-ranking religious leader, had sent the Shah, on his arrival from exile, a telegram rejoicing in his return. The Shah frequently paid lip-service to Islam and visited Borujerdi at his home . Ayatollah Behbehani, the second most prominent of the <u>Ulama</u> also kept a silent posture in matters political. There was no conflict between the court and the <u>Ulama</u> to the extent that a British historian could write:⁴

> "In Tehran the divines were feasted on festive days by a busy little man who had long been active for the Shah's cause. These feasts were paid for by the government. The robed and turbaned figures who sat down to good victuals did not look like the fomenters of a revolt."

The same historian attributed the persecution in 1955 of the Bahais, a heretic religious minority, to the regime's attempt at reconciliation with the <u>Ulama</u>. The army attacked and destroyed the Bahai headquarters in Tehran. However, there were a number of the religious leaders, such as Ayatollah Milani and Zanjani, who were allied to the National Front opposition.

The aristocracy was well entrenched in the state. Under Mosaddeq, who appointed his associates(mostly from the new intelligentsia) to positions of power, a short interlude occurred in the domination of the government by the aristocracy. With Mosaddeq out of the way the old guard politicians regained their high positions and tried to bring the court under their influence. The social base of the aristocracy lay in their estates where local power, religious position, 4- P.Avery, Modern Iran, London, 1965, p.481.

tribal status and the manipulation of peasants' votes ensured the landlords of parliamentary seats. The 17th majles elections held under Mosaddeq had born witness to the fact that without government interference the landed class always managed to send its trustees to parliament. Of the deputies to the 18th majles elected under military rule, 60% were large landlords. The court was not able to bypass the local influence of the aristocracy. In the cities the government could eliminate the candidates of the National Front. But the majles seat was no patrimony of the court to grant to the courtiers. Those who were elected to parliament were there due to their own social power and thus the court and the government had to cooperate with the landed deputies. The 19th majles elections held in 1956 under Hossein Ala, a major landed aristocrat who succeeded Zahedi, bore witness to the cooperation of the court and government with the landed class. In the elections, the candidates were all nominated by the government and were all elected; 61% of the deputies were landlords with an independent source of power.

The landlords were still well established in their estates. Mosaddeq had introduced some rural reforms according to which there was to be a 20% deduction from the landlord's share of the crops, out of which 10% would be returned to the peasant and the other 10% would be earmarked for rural development. In another decree Mosaddeq had abolished all the dues levied by the landlord on the peasant. The landlord was only entitled to his share of the crops and forced labour was also abolished. With the fall of Mosaddeq most of the reforms were written off. The dues were reimposed and the 10% of the landlord's share which was to be returned to the peasant would go to the government as tax.⁵

5- A. Lambton, Land Reforms, op.cit.pp.39-40.

The court was thus the ally of the landed class and the state the executive of the upper class. The rule of the court in alliance with the upper class was bound to be authoritarian in the face of middle class opposition. If these conditions were to continue, the court would remain the partner of a divided upper class with no chance of building some social support. In short, with the upper classes the court had no power and with the middle classes no popularity. Instead, some reforms might curb the power of the landed class and ease the disaffection of the middle class. To do this the court had to prevail over parliament which was considered to be a bulwark against its attempt at reform in order to mobilize popular support. In fact the 19th <u>mailes</u> passed a bill on land reforms. But under the circumstances it was clear that the law was passed not only because it was very limited, but also because it was impossible to implement. As an observer has written 'its main purpose was to impress world opinion.'⁶

In any case the <u>mailes</u> was politically powerful and beyond the control of the court. The elections of 1960 provided the opportunity for the court to break the domination of parliament. For the first time in Iranian history, the court introduced a two-party system in order to create its own clientele. To bring the <u>mailes</u> under control, the court had to control access to parliament. The two-party system was to create a situation of controlled electoral competition. Premier Eqbal, an aristocratic courtier, formed the 'government party' and the 'opposition party' was formed by another landed courtier, A. Alam. Only the candidates of the two court parties could stand for election. The deputies in parliament had to affiliate with one of the two parties in order to be able to stand as candidates. As a result the <u>mailes</u> would be dominated by one of the two court parties without its cons-

6-Ibid. p.58.

titutional position being affected. This was designed to replace the post-War practice of free elections in which the landlords from the country and the middle class parties from the cities came to dominate parliament in the absence of a strong royal court.

In 1960 the two court parties announced their candidates for the 20th <u>majles</u> elections but only a few of the 19th <u>majles</u> deputies had been nominated for reelection. Among the government party candidates there were only 25 of the deputies of the previous <u>majles</u> whereas more than 60 had affiliated with the party. The majority of the candidates were from the middle classes: government employees, professionals, lawyers, journalists and engineers.⁷

This sudden turn of the court from the old guard deputies to the middle class in order to create a dependent clientele caused grave concern among the landed class. With the restriction of candidacy to the court parties and the elimination of old deputies prominent members of the <u>majles</u> announced their own candidacy and stood for reelection as 'independents'.In Tehran the monopoly of the court parties was badly broken by 'independents' rising one after another. A group gathered around Dr. A. Amini, a prominent landed aristocrat. Another independent group was formed by retired army officers who put forward their own candidate for the elections. Behbehani, a clerical deputy, announced the formation of his own group. Also, some of the National Front parties emerged on the pretext of the royal intentions of 'free elections' being taken at their face-value.

The emergence of independents undermined the court's design and led to a conflict between the two court parties. With the independents on the scene and the possibility of their election the government party could not let the elections be free for all. The rigging of the elections 7- Of the nominees 37 were doctors, 45 landowners, 5 engineers, 3 merchants, 4 lawyers, 8 journalists, and 3 retired officers: Kayhan, 27 Teer, 1339. brought about protests not only from the old deputies but also from the loyal opposition. Admitting the failure of the government to ensure 'free elections' the court cancelled the results.

The whole episode signified the failure of the court in its attempt to suppress the influence of the landed class and to create its own base of support. It further created a dangerous situation which could isolate the court by allying the old deputies with the middle class parties, a fact which was in the making. The court tried to break the power of the landed class but its electoral strategem failed. The 20th <u>majles</u> elections were repeated in the winter of 1960 with the court giving up some of its intentions of dominating parliament. Compromises had to be made to the old deputies. Their names were put on the government party's list of candidates while the party rigged the elections to prevent the middle class parties from entering parliament. Out of the 176 deputies in the 20th majles 96 were landed magnates. As far as the court was concerned the 20th <u>majles</u> was no more satisfactory.

The court was thus faced with two alternatives: either to surrender to the <u>status quo</u> which was based on the Constitution and maintain its weak position or to somehow emerge dominant and consolidate its power against parliament. The choice at that time lay between a patrician democracy of the upper class or the hegemony of the royal court, for neither the aristocracy nor the court could afford the democracy of the middle class.

The Ascendancy of the Royal Court: May 1961- October 1963

To assert its hegemony the court needed a transformation in the power bloc which was based on a tenuous alliance. The court had been seeking to impose its hegemony through electoral manoeuvres but had proved unable to do so within the existing constitutional structures.

Now the solution adopted by the court was to bypass those very structures, break with other segments entrenched in the constitutional status quo and directly seek to create a new base of support. To exert its hegemony and effect the shift the court had to prevail over other power institutions, especially parliament, and had to articulate at least the economic demands of the middle and lower classes. This articulation and mobilization of course, did not build on the organizational powers of those classes; rather the court later created its own political organization to incorporate diverse sectors of the society into the emerging regime. The situation which prompted the court was provided not only by the disaffection of the middle class but also by the expressed discontent of the lower classes, the result of an economic crisis (1957-61) caused by the liberal economic policy which had been resumed after the fall of Reza Shah. This economic crisis prompted the emergence of the authoritarian regime under court hegemony which disrupted the constitutional status quo and increased political intervention in the economy.

The royal court was caught between the power of the landed class and the opposition of the middle class. To this was added the pressure of the lower classes which was felt towards the end of the decade (1950-60) for the first time since the upsurge of the working class after the Second World War. Between 1957 and 1961 at least 20 important strikes occurred for higher wages, the implementation of labour laws, the recognition of the right to strike and the introduction of minimum wages.⁸

On a smaller scale the traditionally conservative peasantry of Iran was showing some signs of restiveness. In several places, especially in the prosperous provinces of Gilan and Azarbayjan, landlords came under attack by sharecroppers. Some lords were assassinated and more

8- M.S.Ivanov, op.cit. pp.207-9.

landlord property was destroyed.⁹ These emerging signs of upsurge in the landscape of conservatism may have been provoked by the court's distribution of Crown estates and recourse to the peasantry at the times of its political isolation, as had been the case in 1951-2 under Mosaddeq. With the failure of its electoral strategem the court was now in no better position.

If the protests of the lower classes were caused by the economic crisis, the opposition of the middle class parties was no passing episode. The political forces released by the failure of the court's electioneering swamped the political arena, which for a decade had been kept clear of the opposition. The National Front parties organized mass demonstrations of teachers and students demanding progressive legislation.

The court had proved incapable of dominating parliament but since the fall of Mosaddeq had succeeded in exerting its control on the government and in particular the office of the prime minister. Dr. Eqbal was the first post-Mosaddeq Prime Minister who declared himself to be the servant of the Shah. Having regained the prerogative of nominating the premier the court now attempted to curb the power of parliament through a strong cabinet. In May 1961 the Shah called upon Dr. A.Amini, a veteran politician and a landed aristocrat, to form a government. Amini made an attempt to widen the basis of the cabinet by appealing to the intelligentsia hitherto unwilling to align themselves with the government. His cabinet was composed of some intellectuals such as Dr. Hasan Arsanjani a socialist lawyer and a wellknown advocate of land and social reforms, Dr. Darakhshesh an associate of Mosaddeq and the leader of the Teachers Association, and Nureddin Alamuti one of the original founders of the Tudeh Party.

9- Ibid. p.210.

From the inception of the reform cabinet, the court and the government criticized the <u>mailes</u>. Amini argued that it was impossible to embark on a course of reforms while the <u>mailes</u> of 'feudals' hindered progressive legislation. The Shah criticized the Constitution as the guarantor of the aristocracy's power. 'The Constitution' he said later 'was a plaything in the hands of the aristocracy and the feudals who found it expedient to pretend to be constitutionalist so as to spoil the country's new democracy in their own interest.'¹⁰Thus the court issued a decree dissolving the <u>mailes</u>. Elections were indefinitely postponed and parliament was to remain in suspension for two and a half years, during which time the court struggled with various political forces and succeeded in consolidating its power, while relying on the army and ruling by decree.

Having rid itself of the parliament the court turned to the bureaucracy and the army. Sound and unsound charges of corruption were leveled against the most prominent of the army elite and civil officials. In the court's drive to shake itself free from association with the military elite, several officers considered political rivals were arrested. They included men like General Azmudeh, the judge advocate who had tried Mosaddeq. General Kia. former head of Military Intelligence, General Zarqam, former finance minister, General Hedayat, former chief of staff and others. General Bakhtiar, the powerful head of the security police was removed from office and sent to exile. Furthermore, 33 Generals and 270 Colonels were retired. From the bureaucracy A. Ebtehaj, the influential head of the Plan Organization was imprisoned. From the Ministry of Justice ten high-ranking officials were dismissed. The court was thus curbing the power of those upon whose support it had been long dependent. Having consolidated a good deal of power, the court 10- M.R.Pahlavi, The White Revolution, Tehran, 1967, p.87.

embarked on a course of reforms in order to create a new alliance as the basis of the emerging regime.

The Promulgation of Reforms

In November 1961 the court issued the government with a mandate to promote "administrative reforms in order to give priority to merit as a condition for promotion; to guarantee welfare for state employees; to put into effect the law for land reforms; to guarantee the welfare of workers through their participation in the factory's profit; and to assist factory owners by protecting domestic industry."¹¹ The reforms fell into two categories.

<u>A-Land reforms:</u> Following the issue of the decree the government prepared a land reform Act as the basic law for land redistribution. According to the law, landlords could retain one whole village and the rest of their holdings were to be redistributed among the peasants. The landlords were to be compensated by the government and the peasants were to pay for the holdings they were to acquire. The law thus affected large holdings, leaving smaller holdings intact for the time being. As such it affected 14000 out of the 50,000 villages. Land redistribution began in the large estates of Azarbayjan and soon proceeded to other areas. By 1964 some 9000 whole or parts of villages had been distributed among <u>masaqdar</u> families.¹²Only the sitting peasants received the land; agricultural labourers were not affected by the reforms. The government intensified the propaganda campaign against the landlords with the Shah himself travelling round the country and handing over title deeds to the peasants.

<u>B- Extension of the Public Sector:</u> In the two decades following the fall of the authoritarian regime of Reza Shah which had taken control of foreign trade and monopolized much of domestic trade, a period of

11- Ettelaat, 24 Aban, 1340.

¹²⁻ A. Lambton, op.cit. p.91; H.Mahdavi, 'The Coming Crisis in Iran' Foreign Affairs, vol.44, 1965:134-46, p.138.

economic liberalism set in. After the War the release of the previously suppressed demand led to heavy imports and after the short interlude of the National Front government, during which imports were restricted, the trend continued. From 1955, with the abolition of government monopolies, the advent of financial resources through foreign grants and the reactivation of the oil industry increasing imports, greatly benefited the merchant class. In the government, liberal economic policy influenced the policy maker and attempts at reorganizing the public sector through planning by the newly established Plan Organization met with the opposition of the upper bourgeoisie. Private investment increased by 20% annually. The number of enteprises increased from 45000 in 1956 to 70,000 in 1960.¹³ The thriving merchant class had also acquired influence in the government:¹⁴

> "The entrepreneurs were active in the Majles, in Ministries, with the press, at Court and in the Plan Organization... The new capitalists would, when necessary, go so far as to enlist the support of the anti-government forces against the Government Planning Authority."

Imports continued to increase (fivefold between 1955 and 1960) and the credit market expanded (sevenfold in the same period). The result was trade deficits and a sharp increase in prices (10%). In 1957 the government devalued to restore the balance of trade but that caused more inflation. The strikes mentioned above took place in this period. The new economic policy which the government was to adopt and the rise of the new regime under court hegemony were intertwined.¹⁵ With the prescription of the IMF, the government was forced to attempt major stabilization efforts to contain economic liberalism. Credit was tightened, foreign trade came under government control and customs dues were increased. The court directed the government to assist indust-

¹³⁻ J.Bharier, op.cit. pp.84-6. 14- P.Avery, op.cit. p.451. 15- Cf."Since 1945 not a single major Latin American nation has been able to preserve a competitive political system, and at the same time, achieve sustained control of inflation once the latter has exceeded 10 percent per year.": T.E. Skidmore, "The Politics of Economic Stabilization in Post-War Latin America", in J. Malloy, op. cit., p.149.

rialists in order to raise domestic production. The government also prepared a comprehensive economic plan and to finance it, taxes were to be increased and more departments of the nation's life were to be brought under control. To redirect mercantile capital into productive ventures, the government held an economic conference in 1963 in which state economic priorities were made clear. The stabilization policy despite the short-term opposition which it caused among the propertied class (see below), was to be the cornerstone of the new regime under court hegemony.

On the whole, the court ideologically switched to the middle and lower classes and sought to build an alliance with the small-holding peasants and the working class. More immediately, the court, by disrupting the constitutional status quo, created a great deal of opposition.

Opposition to the Ascendancy of the Royal Court

The royal ascendency in the power bloc which was to lead to the establishment of an authoritarian regime antagonized the aristocracy, the petty bourgeoisie, the high <u>Ulama</u>, and the parties of the intelligentsia. The issue of constitutionalism became the basis of opposition to the hegemony of the court, whose regime was to be a break with the preceding parliamentary system. The National Front parties took issue with the court on the suspension of the Constitution and challenged the lawfulness of its decrees. The high <u>Ulama</u> opposed the court on constitutional grounds and some of them found the proprietory reforms against the Constitution and the Islamic law. The court stood against the political ideologies of liberalism, political Islam and popular working class ideology and thus had to manoeuvre amidst a highly contradictory array of forces. It was finally to rely on the brute force of the army, thereby shattering some of the myth that it championed the cause of the lower classes.

The landowners did not make any concerted stand against the court and the opposition which did occur was not formidable. That the landlords did not emerge in the forefront of the opposition is not hard to explain. For one thing there had already been ample warnings of the redistribution of large estates as well as some attempts at implementing them. Since the accession of the Shah successive governments found themselves confronting the agrarian question. The question was raised in the 17th mailes, but the deputies defeated the bill by putting forward proposals which were impossible to implement. The sale of Crown lands had already set an example. Dr. Mosaddeq also attempted some reforms but these did not touch the tenural system. The first attempt at tenural reform was made in 1959 when the government backed by the court sent a bill to the 19th majles. Despite opposition from Ayatollah Borujerdi, the highest-ranking religious leader, the reform bill was passed by the majles but it was devised in such a way as to be impossible to implement. Apart from legislation, relations between peasants and landlords had been weakened in some provinces which had been the seat of rebellious and revolutionary governments, this was the case in Azarbayjan where the reforms were initially carried out. Since the collapse of the 1946 Republic, there had been irregularities in the payment of the landlords' share. 16

The landed class was itself a divided class. The opposition of those landlords who were absentees having other occupations was likely to be less formidable than that of those who resided in and lived off their estates. Some refrained from submitting a declaration of their holdings or made various arrangements so as to exclude their estates from the scope of the law. By contrast, fortylarge landowners themselves came forward to transfer their lands. In Azarbayjan there were 250 large landlords affected by the 1962 Law. These and the former forty

16-Jami, op. cit. pp.324-333.

landlords had other occupations. They were merchants in the bazaar, government officials,doctors, engineers and lawyers. Out of the 290, 206 were absentees and only 238 decided to retain a village; the rest sold off their holdings.¹⁷ By contrast, where landlords tended to live more exclusively from the land, opposition was stronger. This was the case of the landlords of Fars who engaged in open conflict with the government.

The government also made compromises to the landlords. The 1962 law, compared to a revolutionary confiscation of land was very mild, but the forthcoming laws of 1963, which were much milder, made the 1962 law look quite harsh on the landlord. According to the latter, the landlord was free in his choice of the retained village but he was not allowed to break up whole villages. The landlord's wife and dependants were counted as part of his household and could not retain additional villages. Later the government allowed the break-up of whole villages and also the landlord's children and wife were allowed to retain two villages. Furthermore, from 1963 the reforms were relaxed by the court. In a National Congress of Peasants (see below) Dr. Arsanjani, the Minister of Agriculture, talked of further land reforms in smallholdings constituting 60% of all villages. This led to growing opposition among small-holding landowners. But the court was unwilling to go to extremes and decided to slow down the reforms leading to Arsanjani's resignation. Hence, the laws adopted in 1963, concerning villages either retained by landlords or small-holdings up to one village were more favourable to the landowner. He had three options. either to rent the land, sell it to the peasants or divide it between himself and the sitting peasants. On the whole, the shift in government policy signified the primacy of political purposes over economic concerns. The reforms aimed at dispersing the grand aristocracy, but 17- A. Lambton, Land Reforms, p.41

when it came to smaller landowners, after the court had consolidated its power, they were slowed down.

The opposition of the landed aristocracy, especially those in positions of power, was phrased in terms of support for the Constitution. Sardar Hekmat and Mohsen Sadr, two landed aristocrats who had been the Speaker of the <u>Majles</u> and the President of the Senate respectively before the dissolution of the parliament, opposed the court for the suspension of the Constitution. Ahmad Bahmanyar, a landowner and the Minister of Finance under Amini, resigned after the land reform took momentum. H.Ala, the former premier and a large landlord, was from the time of the reforms, excluded from the circle of royal counsellers.

The tribal landlords put up more resistance to the reforms. The tribes had regained some of their autonomy since the Second World War. Four major tribal rebellions had already occurred between 1941 and 1953. With the beginning of the reforms tribal opposition was intensified. Land reforms in tribal areas would mean not only the loss of land by the chiefs but also the extension of central control into semi-autonomous areas. The Qashqai tribe of Fars rebelled in November 1962 but was suppressed by the army. In December the Shah went to Fars and distributed title deeds among the peasants. In 1963 the Mamasani and Boir Ahmadi tribes rebelled but they were also suppressed by the army and six of their chiefs were executed. The lands of the rebellious chiefs were distributed without compensation as a punishment and even the land reform law went out of its way to clarify the case of one particular tribal chief. According to the law, the estates belonging to the hiers of Esmail Qashqai, who had rebelled against the government in the past, were to be fully subject to distribution without any of the exemptions permitted by the law.

Land reforms affected not only the landed class, for landed interests were intertwined with mercantile interests. ¹⁸ Merchants had landed property in the same way that landlords were engaged in trade. More specifically, the economic stabilization policy which was the beginning of strong interventionism affected powerful commercial interests benefiting from the post-War liberal policy of tariff concessions and open import-export trade. Economic measures such as controlling imports, regulating prices and conserving foreign exchange hit mercantile interests. Merchants in the bazaar had large stocks in the customs and when the government demanded on-the-spot payment of dues, bankruptcies occurred among traders as taxes and duties were raised. One newspaper summed up the situation thus: 19

> "The Tehran bazaar is suffering from a deep stagnation due mainly to two factors: i) the ending of the export season ii) the restriction on imports... Merchants are under the pressure of new taxes. Last year was a difficult period for industries and the stagnancy of business that began in 1961 became more apparent ... The market standstill is continuing, mostly because the merchants are waiting for the approval of new regulations for imports and exports."

Merchants expressed their disaffection through cooperation with the constitutionalist parties. In October 1961, hundreds of traders in the Tehran bazaar organized a meeting and set up a Union for the Safeguarding of the Constitution and Individual Rights.²⁰ The Union established links with the National Front parties and expressed its vehement opposition to the reform cabinet and the suspension of parliament and called for the scrapping of the stabilization policy. The merchants had ties not only to the constitutionalist parties but also to influential Ulama.

Since 1953 the Ulama had remained politically silent and the court had benefited from their acquiescence in a quasi-constitutional system.

¹⁸⁻ L.Binder, <u>Iran</u>, op.cit. p.175. 19- <u>Ettelaat</u>, 29 Esfand, 1342.

²⁰⁻ Iran Almanac, 1963.

The main body of the <u>Ulama</u> supported the Constitution although some like Borujerdi, Behbehani and Shariatmadari were liberal-conservative, and a few like Taleqani and Zanjani joined the democratic middle-class parties. Others like Kashani and later Khomeini spoke of the revival of an Islamic political order but in times of confrontation, the Constitution was the last straw for them to catch. The <u>Ulama</u>'s support for the Constitution was thus a stabilizing influence buttressing the <u>status</u> <u>quo</u>, for if they were to resort not to the Constitution, which was the limited law of the day, but to political Islam (as did some petty bourgeois parties of the lower clergy) then they would pose a revolutionary challenge to the constitutional <u>status</u> <u>quo</u>.

The hegemony of the court and the suspension of the Constitution disrupted the <u>status quo</u> and led to a conflict between the <u>Ulama</u> and the court. In their opposition to the court the <u>Ulama</u> put emphasis on the suspension of the Constitution but there were also other issues involved. Liberal <u>Ulama</u> opposed land redistribution on the grounds that it was contrary to the Islamic juridical theory and that both the religious law and the Constitution forbade the expropriation of private property. Others objected to the enfranchisement of women introduced by the court. They all, however, opposed the authoritarianism of the court.

The first land reform bill which was submitted to the 19th <u>majles</u> brought about the opposition of the highest religious authority. But the land reform law which was passed in 1960 excluded the <u>ouqaf</u> (religious endowments) mostly administered by the <u>Ulama</u>. The 1962 law also excluded the <u>ouqaf</u> and this seemed to be a concession to the <u>Ulama</u>, especially at a time when Borujerdi had died (March 1961) and there had not yet emerged a sole, undisputed highest-ranking religious leader (<u>Maria-e</u> <u>Taolid</u>) to replace him. The 1963 laws, however, extended the reforms

to the <u>ouqaf</u> which were to be rented to peasants. This intensified the opposition of some of the <u>Ulama</u> who appealed to Ayatollah Behbehani. He sent a letter of protest to the government demanding that at least the <u>ouqaf</u> lands be saved from redistribution.²¹

The opposition of the <u>Ulama</u> had, however, been underway since the dissolution of parliament and had not been directed at the land reforms. Some <u>Ulama</u> including Khomeini, Shariatmadari and Milani disclaimed opposition to the land reforms.²² On the issue of the Constitution the <u>Ulama</u> expressed their opposition to the court. Khomeini stated: "Our forbears have bought the Constitution with their blood and we will not allow the government to suppress the Constitution. All we want is the implementation of the existing laws."²³The majority of the <u>Ulama</u> also focused their opposition on the issue of the Constitution and not the land reforms. Boycotting the referendum which was to approve the court's reforms, 27 members of the <u>Ulama</u> issued a statement which in part read:²⁴

> "As you already know the state of Iran is a constitutional state; the closure of parliament is thus a great sin... The <u>Ulama</u> are opposed to the change from constitutional and collective government to personal rule. The establishment of constitutional government is possible only through free elections but the government has abrogated some articles of the electoral laws whereas according to the Constitution bills not approved by the <u>majles</u> and the <u>Ulama</u> are not lawful. The <u>majles</u> and government which are not based on the Constitutional laws will not be legitimate."

In the light of the suspension of the Constitution, the <u>Ulama</u> also opposed a government bill which abrogated the constitutional provision for electors and candidates in local elections to be Moslem and gave the vote to women. Further, the conflict with the court awakened the Shiitenationalism of the <u>Ulama</u> who condemned the court's collaboration with

²¹⁻ Ibid, p.433. 22- H.Algar, in Keddie, op.cit. p.246.

²³⁻ Houzeh-ye Elmiyeh, <u>Zendeginameh-ye Imam Khomeini</u>, [A Biography of Imam Khomeini] Tehran, n.d., p.46.

²⁴⁻ Statement by 27 of the <u>Ulama</u> of Iran, 31 Khordad, 1342, quoted in Ibid, pp.80-81.

'American imperialism', and when the next <u>mailes</u>, dominated by the court, passed an agreement with the U.S.A. extending diplomatic immunity to American military personnel in Iran, the <u>Ulama</u> opposition erupted once again leading to the exile of Khomeini. On the whole, the <u>Ulama</u> opposed the hegemony of the court and emerged as a power group to be reckoned with.

The issue of constitutionalism united various political forces against the ascendency of the court and culminated in open conflict with the army under the Shah. It began when the opposition of the <u>Ulama</u> was intensified after the holding of the referendum in 1963 which approved the reforms. Preaching against the rule of the Shah from the pulpit of his school in Qum, Ayatollah Khomeini accused the Shah of violating Islam and the Constitution. In March the school was attacked by the police and Khomeini was arrested. The advent of the mourning month of Moharram provided the opportunity for the Ulama to turn religious rituals into political protests. In June, violent demonstrations were held leading to the arrest of senior Ulama and the suppression of the rioting crowds by the army. The Tehran bazaar was the Ulama's base of support and some Ulama had their own followers among specific guilds. Ayatollah Behbehani, for instance, mobilized green-grocers in the bazaar. Some 400 bazaaris were arrested and a few merchants were executed. Thus despite the alliance of various forces on the constitutional issue, the opposition was defeated by the army and this was to mark the eclipse of political opposition for a long time to come.

Consolidation of Court Hegemony

From the once invisible realms of the throne the Shah had now managed to emerge into the limelight of politics as the sole political

force within the power bloc. In partnership with Dr. Amini and his intellectual colleages the court had consolidated its position. It now disposed itself of the influence of Amini and replaced him with a loyal associate of the court, A.Alam.

To demonstrate its new found support among the peasantry the court ordered the convening of a National Congress of Peasants which was held in January 1963. The Ministry of Agriculture gathered together 5000 peasants from around the country. The theme of the Congress was to express the gratitude of the peasants to the Shah. In the resolution of the Congress the participants declared first and foremost their support for the monarchy.

The peasant Congress was followed by a national referendum prepared by the court to approve the reforms. Evoking the Constitution to the effect that the powers of the state spring from the people, the court sought to constitutionally justify referendum as a new source of legitimacy.

Having consolidated its position and legitimized its power the court began to recruit supporters to carry out its reforms. The choice fell upon a group of civil servants and intellectuals gathered in a grouping called the 'Progressive Centre'. The group had declared itself to be in favour of industrialization and modernization. The Shah appointed the Centre as the court's special economic research bureau.

Assured of its power the court ordered the government to prepare for the elections of the 21st <u>majles</u> which had been postponed for more than two years. The candidates for the elections were all nominated by a Congress formed by the government and attended by the members of the Progressive Centre and representatives of peasants and women. The Congress approved a list of 193 candidates for the parliament, of whom 39 were members of the Progressive Centre, 20 were land reform officials, 15 were 'representatives of workers', six were women and 14 were small-holders.²⁵ The candidates won 90% of the seats and the remaining were occupied by supporters of the court who had stood as independents. Later 150 deputies joined the Progressive Centre's parliamentary group and formed the majority faction.

With a membership of 300 civil servants the Progressive Centre emerged as the mainstay of the Shah's rule and formed the core of the 'political elite' which was recruited by the court. By the order of the court the Centre was converted into a political party, the New Iran Party, which held all the cabinet posts and thus came to control parliament and government. The party elite surrounding the court were all civil servants and bureaucrats and as 'technocrats' they were known for their lack of political ideology.

During two years of political conflicts which led to the ascendancy of royal power, the court antagonized active political forces and created a great deal of opposition. It also managed to recruit some support by instituting reforms. With the army under its firm control, the referendum as its source of legitimacy and a party of lieutenants to carry out its reforms, the court had now at its disposal all the ingredients of rulership.

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25- Shajii, op.cit. p.245.

IV- The Rule of the Monarchy

Introduction

The ascendancy of the royal court did not imply the rule of a specific social class although in certain periods since the Constitutional Revolution social classes had emerged in the power bloc and had ruled directly. The main conflict had been between the old aristocracy and the rising middle class but the important point is that no class had been able to establish a stable domination. The aristocracy was in dissolution due to the country's transformation from a predominantly agrarian to a semi-industrial society. It proved incapable of developing a political organization of its own to articulate the interests and ideology of the rising middle class. On the other hand the middle classes were weak and divided and the norm was the creation of coalitions which were unable to impose a stable domination but were only able to prevent other forces from imposing theirs. The regime which developed under the royal court was the result of this crisis of domination. Thus the fragmentation of the middle classes and the lack of community and solidarity of interest in the old aristocracy all contributed to the handing back of political power to the court. The regime of the court was thus the outcome of this crisis of class domination and an equilibrium of class forces. Neither the managing committee of the old upper class nor the regime of the middle classes as such, the court's regime sought to consolidate its power through the bureaucracy and by controlling all classes. Under the court. political rule was bureaucratic-royal rather than class rule, i.e., the hegemonic element in the state was the royal bureaucracy rather than a

specific class interest. The royal regime thus obtained a degree of autonomy from the dominant class interests. In fact, after the Constitutional Revolution the separation between the bureaucratic-military officialdom and the landed and merchant classes became increasingly distinct. Originally the modern monarchy was not associated with the landed class but rose from the army although in certain periods the court closely cooperated with the landed class. Relying on the bureaucracy and the military, the regime of the court thus became free of control by dominant class interests and as the regime of the equilibrium, it sought to maintain a class equilibrium on which to stand. This was carried out by controlling various classes through the incorporation of their organizations and interests within the structures of the emerging regime. Thus a political organization was established to encompass and coopt major class interests and articulate them in its own terms.

Although in Iran this marked a new development, enough is known historically and theoretically of this type of state to make this development recognizable. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in their works on contemporary France and Germany systematically exposed and discussed the question of the relative autonomy of the state from the dominant classes, in particular in the context of the regime of Louis Bonaparte that had emerged in France after the collapse of French absolutism. As Engels explained:¹

> "By way of exception, however, periods occur in which the warring classes balance each other so nearly that the state power, as ostensible mediator, acquires for the moment a certain degree of independence of both. Such was the absolute monarchy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which held the balance between the nobility and the class of burghers (Burgertum); such was the bonapartism of the First (under Napoleon I) and still more of the Second (Louis Bonaparte), which played off the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie against the proletariat."

¹⁻ Quoted by Draper, op. cit. p.410.

The state in certain periods is thus relatively independent from the dominant classes in the sense that its prime function is not simply to ensure the interests of the dominant class. Rather the main concern is the political one of seeking to save a political system in the process of social change and dissolution. Engels further complemented this temporal concept of the autonomy of the state by reference to the fact that the autonomous state is bureaucratic-military:²

> "The (Prussian) king, representing the central power of the state, and supported by the numerous class of government officials, civil and military, besides having the army at its disposal, was enabled to keep down the middle classes by flattering now the interests of the one, and then those of the other; and balancing as much as possible the influence of both."

On the whole, the concept of the relative autonomy of the state refers to the separation of bureaucratic and military officialdom from the dominant classes which gives the state rulers more room for manoeuvre.

Reflecting on political institution-making under autonomy conditions, John Rex has developed a similar model. According to Rex, under conditions of conflict between two contending groups

> "If the situation was one in which one of the two conflict groups dominated the society, the institutions which served the purposes of that group would be claimed to be the institutions of the social system as a whole."

This is the ruling class-subject class situation which may change due to changes in the power conditions of the dominated class.

> "When such changes occur in the balance of power there may be two possible outcomes. Either there will be a complete revolution in the social system or some sort of compromise will work out between the classes."

Thus a 'truce situation' would emerge

"If the old ruling-class adjusted itself quickly to the new balance of power." "Such compromises make possible the emergence of a value system and of social institutions which are the social institutions of neither class, but belong to the truce situation itself but the truce situation will always be precarious and could only become the basis of a new social order in exceptionally favourable conditions." 3

The bureaucratic regime which is relatively autonomous from the economically dominant classes may thus find it necessary to intervene in the economy in order to reorganize its hegemony by maintaining a balance between contending social forces. The state interest may lead it to give concessions to the subordinate classes at the expense of the upper class (from which the concept of 'revolution from above' stems⁴). Thus the relative autonomy of the state becomes evident especially at times of crisis when the state seeks to create a balance on which to stand. It is crisis that brings out the potential autonomy of the bureaucratic state and since economic intervention is justified by political concern, the maintenance of the (political) <u>status quo</u> may require the disruption of that very (socio-economic) <u>status quo</u>.⁵ Thus the autonomous state remains a crisis state without stable and lasting social bases.

The authoritarian regime which emerged under the ruling monarchy was just such a relatively autonomous bureaucratic state in that it did not represent the rule of a particular class as such but sought to control all classes. The emergence of royal hegemony had created extensive political opposition. Yet by shifting its alliance the court sought to enlist new sources of support from among various classes. It reached out to the old aristocracy, the peasantry, the new middle class, the industrial bourgeoisie and the working class for political support.

³⁻ J. Rex, <u>Key Problems in Sociological Theory</u>. London, 1961, pp. 124, 126-130. For an anthropological approach to the question, see: F.G. Bailey, <u>Strategems and Spoils: A Social Anthropology of Poli-</u> <u>tics</u>, Oxford, 1969; and N. Elias, <u>The Civilizing Process: Courtly Soci-</u> <u>ety</u>, vol.II, New York, 1978.

⁴⁻ E.K. Trimberger in <u>Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and</u> <u>Development in Japan. Turkey, Egypt and Peru</u>, New Brunswick, 1978, argues that revolution from above is generated through the autonomy of the state rulers from the landed and merchant class in response to international political and economic pressures.

⁵⁻ For the disruptive aspect of arbitrary patrimonial authority see: H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber, London, 1970, pp.295-7.

Since land reforms were directed from above and no peasant uprising occurred the landed class was not abolished. Especially in the border/ tribal areas, landlords retained much of their holdings as the regime sought to cooperate with them in order to ensure security on the borders. At the same time it sought to create a 'rural bourgecisie' benefitting from the land reforms. The court also recruited a political clientele from among the new middle class and employed a class of dependent intelligentsia occupying high bureaucratic positions. By promoting industrialization, the regime further encouraged the emergence of a modern industrial bourgecisie that prospered in a hot-house fashion. A well gallooned class, the industrial bourgecisie came to constitute a major base of support for the ruling monarchy. The state also attempted to create a 'labour aristocracy'.

To encompass these diverse classes and subordinate their organizations, the court established a corporatist political organization seeking to impose on the society a system of interest representation through subordinate organizations. The <u>status quo</u> which obtained under the ruling monarchy was based on five foundations: a) state control of large financial resources made available through massive 'external rents' (the oil billions); b) the success of the economic Stabilization Programme and the intervention of the court in the economy to ensure economic stability; c) attempts by the court to create an equilibrium of classes through their economic control and intervention in the economy; d) control of private enterprise through participation in entrepreneurial activities and the establishment of patron-client relations; and e) the expansion of the coercive forces of the state.

The Court Party

The N.I.P. was the court's political organization built to carry out its reforms and to control government and parliament. Unlike the

representative parties which had been involved in political conflicts and which had served the purposes of the society and its classes, the court party was to serve the purposes of the state. The N.I.P. was the first successful court party to dominate parliament and government and was the first of its kind to emerge in Iran. The party functioned as a channeling agency devised to bring the main interest groupings under the mantle of the state. It was generated from the reform movement and court ideology which was presented not as a class ideology but as the state ideology allegedly representing diverse class interests. Thus the party extended its control to all employers' associations, trade unions, bazaar guilds, civil service associations and rural cooperatives established in connection with the land reforms. The party brought the major employers' associations under government control and sought to define and restrict the fields of commerce. Among these associations were the Syndicate of the Owners of Textile Industries, the Syndicate of Metalic Industries, the Syndicate of Iranian Industries and the Chamber of Industries and Mines. In addition there was the Chamber of Commerce encompassing all the registered commercial companies and large trading houses. Formed under the Chamber were 25 Commercial Federations administered by commissions of large businessmen in various fields of trade. In March 1964 the new regime organized an Economic Conference between the government under the control of the N.I.P. and the Chamber and other associations in which the grievances and demands of the industrialists and businessmen regarding the reduction of income tax, credit facilities and customs exemptions were put forward. In response the government promised to meet their demands.^b

In addition, under the new regime a serious attempt was made at organizing labour unions. Previous governments had been unwilling to 6-<u>Tehran Economist</u>, Aban, 1345. organize labour. Following the establishment of the Ministry of Labour in 1946 to outmanoeuvre the Tudeh Party's trade unions, by setting up an official trade union government interest in labour affairs subsided and under 'the alliance of the upper classes', even government trade unions were discouraged. However, the new regime brought all registered trade unions under control and party slogans put stress on the workers' professional rights. The N.I.P. functioned as a mediator between workers and employers in their disputes. For instance, in 1971 it mediated a series of wage disputes between the Workers' Organization and the general Syndicate of Employers, both affiliated to the party.

The party also attempted to bring under government control the traditional bazaar guilds. The guilds lost their power after the fall of the National Front government under which they had been politically active. Especially the Guilds Law of 1957 stripped them of their independence and power. According to this, the guilds were only to be formed with the permission of the government, and the High Council of Guilds would operate under the supervision of city governors. In 1971 the guilds were brought under close party control. A new Guilds Code dissolved the High Council of Guilds and instead established the Chamber of Guilds with full supervisory power over all guilds. The Chamber. composed of party members, provided the N.I.P. with an effective instrument in implementing the guild regulations concerning the issue of trade permits, price fixing, working hours and so on. Since the guilds covered all large and small shops (with an overall membership of $500,000^{7}$) the bazaars came to feel the weight of the ruling party.

Associations of civil servants had sprung up under the National Front goverment. There were the associations of teachers, engineers, 7-<u>Iran Almanac</u>, 1972, p.583.

doctors, lawyers and so on. Most of these had been linked with various National Front parties and hence, except for the Teachers' Association which developed differences with Dr. Mosaddeq, were all suppressed under the ensuing upper class regime. In place of the old associations, the N.I.P. established its own organizations to represent professional groups.

Of great interest to the regime were the rural cooperatives. After the land reforms the Central Organization of Rural Cooperatives, an independent company, was formed to supervise the cooperatives. Later the government brought the cooperative movement under its control by incorporating the Organization into the Ministry of Land Reforms. Local party cells established links with the cooperatives and put a few peasants on party councils. Almost all of the 8000 cooperatives had affiliated to the party.⁸

The most significant political aspect of the N.I.P. was that it signaled the end of open conflict for control of parliament that had marked the years since the accession of the Shah. Thus candidates for elections had to join the court party which carried out all the necessary screening of candidates. The process of the nomination of candidates was carried out through an extensive hierarchy of organizations. The party convention nominated legislative candidates, invited delegates from towns and villages and announced party platforms. As it appears from its parliamentary slates, the party nominated candidates from diverse classes indicating the regime's attempt at recruiting a dependent clientele. It put particular emphasis on a symbolic representation of the lower classes. In the 21st <u>Majles</u>, the first which was held under the new regime, of the deputies:95 were civil servants, 32 professionals. 24 cultivators, 9 workers, 8 traders, 7 landlords,

⁸⁻ A. Lambton, 'Land Reforms and the Rural Cooperative Societies', in E. Yar-Shater (ed.), <u>Iran Faces the Seventies</u>, New York, 1971.

11 employees of the private sector and 4 were from the bazaar guilds.⁹ In the last <u>Majles</u> convened under the N.I.P., of the deputies:121 were engineers, judges, lawyers and journalists, 46 were civil servants, 23 were farmers, 22 were industrialists and businessmen, 21 were teachers and 15 were workers.¹⁰

By controlling government and the entry into parliament, the N.I.P. provided the court with an effective instrument for controlling legislation through the High Economic Council. This was a weekly session held at the court between the cabinet and the Shah to discuss(especially)economic matters and was the major source of proposals for legislation. The Council included ministers in economic and developmental affairs, the governor of the Central Bank, the director of the Plan Organization and the chairman of the Oil Company. The guidelines given by the Shah in the Council were translated into proposals for legislation by the Ministries and were sent to the N.I.P.'s Central Committee for investigation. Then the proposals were sent to the Executive Committee attended by the Party's parliamentary group and the ministers concerned. The Executive Committee finally prepared the bill to be presented to the Mailes where the N.I.P.'s majority assured its smooth passage. Thus the whole structure of the state including government, parliament and the ruling party was subordinated to the court which was at the centre of power.

Despite its organizational strength the N.I.P. remained an instrument in the hand of the court. The Party Conventions were either attended or guided by the Shah and their most important function was to update the Party's platform with the latest pronouncements of the court. Since the major function of the party was the mobilization of support for the court it was finally the Shah's discretion to the effect that the N.I.P. had failed to mobilize a wide range of interests that 9- Shajii, op. cit. p.192 10- The Echo of Iran, Dec. 6 1971.

led to the eventual dissolution of the party before the revolution.

The Bases of the Status Quo

For more than a decade (1963-75) a combination of factors held the authoritarian regime together. We will examine each in turn.

1- Oil and Economic Stability

The inflow of the 'oil billions' formed the cornerstone of the autonomy of the state by providing it with an independent source of revenue. Having little to do with domestic economic processes the oil revenues were not unlike 'external rents' given to a state which was dependent on their receipts on a regular basis. Yet these revenues enabled the regime to enlarge public expenditure without the need to extract the necessary resources from the domestic economy through high taxation. Financially the oil revenues, constituting the major source of government incomes, enabled the regime to expand regular governmental expenditures. The share of the oil revenues in total government revenues increased from 11% in 1954 to 45% in 1963. 56% in 1971 and to 77% in 1977. In the 1963-73 period the oil earnings provided between 60 and 79 percent of the state's foreign exchange income and formed an average of 50% of government revenues. By way of contrast, in the same period the share of direct taxes in government revenues did not change substantially and constituted no more than an average of 7% of those revenues. Neither did the relative share of indirect taxes increase; they formed an average of 19% of total government revenues.11

The oil revenues thus provided the regime with a regular source of, funds without the need to resort to fiscal and monetary measures

¹¹⁻ These and the following figures are taken from: The Central Bank, <u>Bank Markazi Annual Report and Balance Sheet</u>, 1960-78; Idem <u>'The National Income of Iran</u>', 1959-1971; and The Plan Organization, <u>The Main Economic Indicators</u>, Third Report, 1976.

to curtail public consumption in order to finance large governmental expenditures. Thus while taxes were kept low government expenditure did not affect private consumption. In fact, through an expansion in liquidity and credit availability private consumption and investment increased. Between 1962 and 1972 private consumption expenditure increased from 252 to 572 billion Rials and private investment from 45 to 92 billion Rials. The dependence of the state on oil revenues consequently tended to prevent the development of a regular and efficient taxation system for the mobilization of resources from within. Tax regulations remained arbitrary and subject to change at the discretion of the government. In the case of the bazaar guilds the amount of taxation was open to lengthy negotiation but the government could demand prompt payment.¹²

As a result of the substantial increase in the amount of oil revenues- from 29 billion Rials in 1963 to 182 billion Rials in 1972the government could accomplish more than ever before. Between 1962 and 1972 current expenditure by the government increased from 35 to 189 billion Rials. Previously the oil sector contribution had been low. It was only from 1964 onwards, coinciding with the ascendancy of the royal power, that oil's contribution began to accelerate. This enabled the regime to make attempts at comprehensive planning. The earlier plans had been no more than allocation of public revenues by the government. Oil revenues constituted the major source for financing the comprehensive development plans which followed. They financed 66% of the expenditure of the Third Plan (1962-7, with a total expenditure of 230 billion Rials), 63% of that of the Fourth Plan (1968-72, with a total expenditure of 810 billion Rials) and finally, 80% of that of the Fifth Plan (1973-8, with a total expendi-

¹²⁻ The procedure of taxing the guilds is elaborated in: N. Jacobs, <u>The Sociology of Development: Iran as an Asian Case Study</u>, New York, 1966, pp. 89-92.

ture of 4,698 billion Rials). Thus relying on the oil revenues the public sector was able to carry out its industrialization, electrification and communication schemes.

The Stabilization Policy adopted in 1962 was to prove successful. With the application of orthodox policies the 1963-73 period. in contrast to the preceding and subsequent periods, was marked by economic stability in prices, wages, employment and taxes. Following the period of economic crisis (1957-62) which prompted the emergence of the authoritarian reform regime under court hegemony, the government adopted a growth policy, imposed credit and trade restrictions and cut down on imports. Increasing oil revenues enabled the regime to keep prices down by imposing trade restrictions and by using government monopolies and extensive subsidization. Thus in the period between 1963 and 1972 prices rose by an average of 3%. There was also stability with regard to the increase in wages; those of industrial workers increased by an average of 7% and those of nonindustrial workers by an average of 4%, as shown in the following table.

Consumer Price Index and Wages: 1963-72

Year	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
Prices Industrial Wages	89.4	93•3	93•5	94•3	95.1	96.6	100	101.5	107.1	113.8
	77	81	83	96	100	108	116	122	130	147
Non-indus- rial Wages		-	37	37	40	44	51	52	54	63

Prices: 1969= 100. Industrial Wages: 1967= 100. Non-industrial Wages: 1974= 100. Source: The Central Bank, '<u>The National Income of Iran</u>', 1338-50.

In this period tax regulations were somewhat relaxed. From 1950 income tax laws had been subject to a process of regular revision. A law in 1955 had reduced direct taxation by introducing exemptions and allowances as well as lower rates. In 1956 the progressive tax system

established according to the first comprehensive progressive income tax law of 1930 was in the main abolished leading to substantial tax reductions. Further, the general income tax law of 1967 raised the exemption level still further and many concessions were given, especially to new firms.¹³ Indirect taxes were not charged on necessities and essential commodities. With the exception of customs revenues, half of the indirect taxes consisted of taxes on fuel for cars, 15% were excise taxes and the remainder were taxes on exchange duties and cars.¹⁴

As a result of this success in economic stabilization, the regime was able to pursue a growth policy. In the period being considered, the gross national product increased from 340 to 979 billion Rials, or by a compound rate of 10% at <u>current prices</u>. But since there was little price increase the gross national product increased at a compound rate of 8.5% in <u>constant prices</u>. As a result of such growth the rapid increase in national and per capita income in the period led to a rise in total private consumption (13% in urban areas and 5% in rural areas annually).¹⁵ On the whole the regime proved able to combine stabilization with the continuation of sustained growth.

The political significance of this factor is evident against the background of the social tension exacerbated by the preceding economic crisis which coincided with political conflicts in the power bloc and which contributed significantly to the hegemony of the royal power. In turn the relative success of the stabilization policy was due to the emergence of the authoritarian regime. The rise of court hegemony was justified by a concern for public economic prosperity, and the maintenance of economic stability was to be a major foundation

13- Bank Melli, 'Income Tax Act', <u>The Bank Melli Bulletin</u>, 1956; Ministry of Justice, '<u>A Collection of Fiscal Laws</u>', Tehran, 1353, pp.89-90. 14- F. Firoozi, 'The Iranian Budgets: 1964-70', <u>International Journal of</u> <u>Middle East Studies</u>, vol.5, 1974:328-343, pp.330-4. 15- Bank Markazi, <u>National Income</u>, p.63.

of royal power. Hence, under the authoritarian regime the state began to play a dominant role in the economy. In 1964 it adopted a comprehensive budget policy. Previously, budgets were no more than a record of revenues and expenditures based on the Financial Laws of 1911, which had been adopted from the French laws of classical liberal economy advocating government non-intervention. The new budgets expanded the role of the public sector. Under the authoritarian regime the court had an active role in economic decision making through the High Economic Council which discussed the budget, development plans and the state of the economy especially the price situation. The government was especially concerned with the provision of basic commodities. Because the consumption of bread was a major item in the family budget (17% and 30% of the budget of urban and rural families respectively) the government kept its price stable by marketing and distributing subsidized flour among the bakeries. In this period the price index of bread rose from 111.7 to 121; the wholesale price declined by 38% between 1965 and 1969.¹⁴ The government also set up its own stores to provide commodities at subsidized prices for special groups such as teachers.

On the whole the stabilization policy succeeded in terms of price behaviour while the vast financial resources enabled the regime to lift the credit restrictions initially imposed to achieve stabilization.

2- Class Support and Control

In its endeavours to maintain the stability of the regime the court sought to create a socio-economic equilibrium by granting concessions to the main social classes. In this the court was aided by the state's access to huge financial resources. But the concessions

14- Ministry of Economy, 'Price Index: 1342-49', 1349.

granted were intermittent and in the case of the lower classes were more nominal than substantial. The measures adopted were essentially political rather than socio-economic in purpose, in that they aimed at mobilizing political support for the regime.

The Industrial Bourgeoisie

In the regime's industrialization drive private initiative was strongly encouraged. This prepared the ground for the development of a modern industrial bourgeoisie emerging under the tutelage of the court. The new regime imposed trade restrictions and high tariff rates in order to prevent the growth of the commercial bourgeoisie and encourage domestic production. In this connection it adopted policies of fiscal concession, tariff protection, easy loans and credits, subsidies, industrial grants, tax exemption and monopoly concessions. Between 1961 and 1975 the Industrial Credits Bank's loans to the private sector increased from 20 to 20,000 million Rials.¹⁵ The restriction of foreign trade also ensured high prices, especially for local monopoly industries. The encouragement of foreign investment further stimulated the growth of the industrial bourgeoisie and some 200 foreign companies participated in joint ventures with local partners. To further promote private enterprise the government established a Stock Exchange in 1967.

Thus with state encouragement, a large industrial bourgeoisie began to emerge. The number of industrial establishments increased from less than 1000 in 1957 to 6200 in 1974 producing 75% of the industrial products in the latter year.¹⁶ The grand bourgeoisie was composed of some 150 families mostly from a bazaar background and they owned 67% of all industries and financial institutions. Its members sat on more than 1000 boards. Out of the 473 largest private industries 370 were owned by ten families. The grand bourgeois fami-15- <u>Iran Almanac</u>, 1975, p.287. 16- <u>Tehran Economist</u>, 22 Azar 1354; Ministry of Economy, '<u>Statistics of Large Industries</u>', 1353, p.4. lies were also closely knit together through joint investment in industrial, commercial and financial enterprises.¹⁷

Among the more prominant entrepreneurial families were: - The Farmanfarmaian family, an old landed aristocratic family with extensive interests in the economy. Its industries and companies included the Shahriar Industrial Group consisting of five large steel-rolling factories, the Shahra, Shahpur, Shahab and Shahbaz Companies, several construction companies and it also had large shares in the Iran-National Car Manufacturing Company, paper industries, cement industries as well as extensive shares in several of the private banks.

- The Rezai family owned eight large units of steel production in the Shahriar Industrial Group, the Ahvaz Steel-Rolling Industry, the Arak Machine Tools Factory, copper and lid mines, the Shahriar Bank as well as holding shares in several other banks. The Rezai family rose from the bazaar trading background.

- The Khayami family also came from a trading background and established the largest private enterprise in the country, the Iran-National car manufacturing industry and owned chain stores, agri-business enterprises, textile factories, insurance companies, and large shares in several banks especially the Industrial Bank.

- The Sabet family, another <u>nouveau riche</u> family, owned a whole empire of industries and companies in all branches of business. The family owned 41 large enterprises including the General Motors Industry, the Jeep Factory, Television factories, and the Daryush Bank. According to <u>Newsweek</u> 10% of everything in Iran belonged to the Sabet family.(October 14, 1974)

- The Lajevardi family, another family of bazaar origins, owned the Behshahr Industrial Group comprosing 22 large companies, the Behpak food industries, the Kashan velvet factories as well as holding shares in more than 45 other companies and banks.

- The Barkhordar family, again from a merchant background, owned electric industries, cement factories, carpet factories and held large shares in many other industries and banks.

- The Irvani family, from a traditional handicraft background, established the extensive Melli Industrial Group, originally a shoe-making industry but comprising food industries, transport companies and so on.

- The Elqanian Jewish family owned the extensive Plastic Industries, engaged in manufacturing and retailing and held shares in many other businesses.

- The Khosrowshahi family owned food industries, medicine industries and had shares in other enterprises and banks, especially the Industrial and Mining Development Bank.

¹⁷⁻ Information obtained from a survey in 'Rah-e Kargar', <u>Fashism</u> No. 1, '<u>Social Classes</u>', Tehran, n.d. p.5; and <u>Tehran Economist</u>, 28 Farvardin, 1355.

- The Vahabzadeh family owned car industries, machine-tool industries and also had large land holding in urban centres as well as shares in foreign banks.

- There were other equally large business families such as the Akhavans, owners of large stores and tile factories, the Fooladis, owners of the tire factories, the Bushehris who owned various industries, the Behbehanis, owners of glass factories, the Hedayats, owners of sugar factories, the Azod family, owners of paper factories, the Nemazi family who owned large textile factories, the Rastegar family, owners of many mining industries, the Yazdani family who owned large landholdings and real estate, the Laleh, Arjomand, Ebtehaj, Tajadod, Qasemiyeh families and many others.

The court maintained close links with the business community and encouraged, or ordered, entrepreneurs to invest in its favourite enterprises and invited successful businesemen to work within the scope of the regime's development schemes. The royal family itself had large commercial and industrial holdings (see below) in partnership with large industrialists. As the credit mobilier the court provided protection and access to capital for entrepreneurs. As A. Rezai, an industrial magnate acknowledged "without the Shahanshah's help and support I could never attain my present position." "This was because 70% of the capital of Rezai and his partners came from lowinterest government loans. His companies were exempt from taxes, for five years in Tehran and for twelve years in the provinces. According to him, some of his companies yielded 50 to 80 percent net profit."¹⁸ Another large industrialist, A. Khayami, also benefited from the Shah's support and established his manufacturing industries by order of the Shah.¹⁹ Thus under the authoritarian regime government-business relations were distributory i.e., the regime distributed resources among the entrepreneurs in the form of easy loans, tax exemption and monopoly concessions. The entrepreneurs also sought to influence government policies in order to increase the benefits they received from the regime. The employers syndicates affiliated with

¹⁸⁻ Le Monde, 5 October 1973. 19- Reported by R. Graham, Iran: the Illusion of Power, London, 1978, p.48.

the N.I.P. held frequent conferences with government ministries and thus influenced government policies concerning taxes and credits.²⁰ Large industrialists disliked the public sector in general and demanded that the government abolish all state monopolies and transfer state-owned industries to the private sector.²¹ Partly due to the growing influence of the grand bourgeoisie, in 1970 the government reorganized the structure of the business associations. Thus a law was passed for the integration of all the Chambers of Commerce and the Chamber of Industries and Mines in Tehran and in the provinces to form the single Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines. This was to operate in close cooperation with the Ministry of Economy and the aim was to align the activities of the industrialists with state economic policies and make possible the implementation of public sector schemes through private investment. The government further defined its preferred fields of industry putting emphasis on production in the export sector. Thus from 1970 government-business relations began to move from distribution towards the regulation of the type of business by the government. (In general three patterns may obtain in government-business interactions: distribution of resources by the state; regulation of the type of business; and redistribution of wealth and control on the size of ownership of property.)²² In spite of closer regulation there were indications, from 1972, of the regime's dissatisfaction with the speedy growth of the grand bourgeoisie. As an official source wrote: "For some time, the Government gave one hundred per cent support to this ("bourgeois") class through legislation and other protection. Over the years, over-protectionism led to compla-

20- Tehran Economist, 10 Aban, 1345. 21- Ibid, Khordad 23, 1345. 22- T.H. Lowi, 'American Business, Public Policy: Case Studies and Political Theory', World Politics, vol. 16, 1964, pp.677-715.

cency among some industries, so much so that they stopped improving their quality or raising their efficiency or lowering their prices. There were murmurs that 'industrial feudalism' was replacing landed feudalism."²³ From distribution and regulation the court policy began to move towards redistribution of industrial wealth and control on the size of ownership. In May 1972 the Shah ordered the holding of a High Social Council with great fanfare in order to deliberate on how "to narrow the gap between the rich and the other classes." The Shah's major order concerned the sale of shares in private sector industrial establishments to their workers and the public. The Council ordered the 5100 large private enterprises affected to sell 33% of their shares to workers within three years. The decision, however, was not to be carried out until 1975 when, as will be seen, its extension and implementation at a time of economic crisis was to prove disruptive to the <u>status quo</u>.

On the whole the regime, through its corporatist organization, sought to enlist the support of the high bourgeoisie while at the same time seeking to control it. In his decrees in this connection the Shah claimed to aim at creating a social balance of classes. The relations between the regime and the grand bourgeoisie, however, went beyond corporatist control (see below: clientelism).

The Working Class

The regime sought to structure relationships with the lower classes from above without politically activating them. The industrial working class was the principal object of state corporatist control, by imposing upon it official organizations. At the same time it tried to enlist its support by providing such symbolic benefits as profit sharing in industry, the setting of a minimum

23- Iran Almanac, 1972, p.514-15.

wage, intervention in labour-employer conflict and later share participation. The court ideology thus put emphasis on workingclass protectionism. The Shah presided over the annually held National Congress of Labour and set the framework for labour policy. The policies adopted by the Congress regarding wages, insurance and the formation of syndicates were implemented by the Chamber of Commerce and the government. Symbolically the Shah was the bearer of the first account number in the state-owned Workers' Welfare Bank. However, the measures adopted by the regime for the benefit of the working class affected only a small portion of that class in large industries. Among these measures was the profit-sharing scheme to distribute 20% of the profits among the workers in factories with more than ten workers. According to official figures, by 1975, 6000 factories with 295,000 workers had been affected. At that time there were 235,000 factories employing 2140,000 workers; thus only 2.4% of factories and 13.8% of the workers had been brought into the scheme.²⁴

The corporatist labour structure was specified in the labour law of 1959 and its 1964 amendment. Existing unions were disbanded and the main characteristic of the new structure which had important implications for the control of the working class was that only individual syndicates were allowed and no federation of unions was permitted. Furthermore, individual syndicates had no horizontal links with each other. The official function of the syndicates was to conclude profit-sharing agreements and set up cooperative societies. Although the law granted union members the right to collective bargaining, in practice it was the government represented by the political police stationed in most factories, which arbitrated in the disputes.

24- Tehran Economist, 10 Khordad, 1345; Ministry of Industries, Industrial Statistics, 1975.

The corporatist control of the working class occurred mainly through the wage policy. The High Council of Labour set and adjusted the minimum wage at regular periods. The major demand of the strikes which occurred during the economic crisis of the late 1950's had been for higher wages. In the period between 1963 and 1975 the success of the economic stabilization policy helped to diffuse the minimum wage issue; due to small increases in the cost-of-living index the deterioration in the real value of wages was slight. Thus changes of the minimum wage was not due to labour protest; rather the government itself continued to adjust the minimum wage and also to control inflation, thus eliminating any substantial erosion of the purchasing power of the minimum wage. Especially large industries were supervised by the regime in order to carry out wage increases. On the whole the regime politically controlled the working class through corporate organizations and sought to enlist its support through the distribution of some benefits.

The Peasantry

By instituting land reforms the court expected to reap political support in the countryside. In the beginning the distribution of land among some peasants and the raising of the expectations of others brought about some definite support for the court. The general feelings of the peasants were often expressed in sentences such as: "from serf we have become master", "so far we had laboured under oppression", "we had not been human beings", "we are freed", "our eyes have been opened" and so on.²⁵ The land reforms, however, were not turned into a peasant political movement and thus the peasantry did not emerge as a political force to be reckoned with. The peasant support, however, was by no means universal for the implementation

25- As reported by A. Lambton, Land Reforms, pp.186-7;190.

of the reforms remained partial and a large segment of the rural population were excluded. One of the major features of the reforms was that land redistribution was carried out on the basis of the existing village layouts. Thus on the one hand they did not affect the existing land allotments and only transferred the title deeds to the sitting peasants, hence the existing disparities in peasant holdings remained unchanged. And on the other hand, since land redistribution was on the basis of the existing <u>masages</u> the agricultural labourers received no land at all.

Prior to the reforms there were great differences in the size of the <u>nasaqs</u>. Out of 3.2 million rural families in 1960, 1.9 million were <u>nasaqdar</u>. Some 56% of the <u>nasaqdar</u> families had holdings between half and four hectars, 38% worked holdings between four and 20 hectares and the remaining 6% had holdings of more than 20 hectares up to 500 hectares. On the other hand, out of the 3.2 million peasant families (15 million people) 1.3 million families had no <u>nasaqs</u> and thus remained landless.²⁶

The actual results of the reforms which were carried out in three phases have been a matter of some dispute. According to official figures altogether 1.3 million peasant families obtained some land under the reform scheme.²⁷ According to another account, up to 1969 only 15% of the peasants (480,000 families) had been affected by the reforms.²⁸ The picture which emerged after the implementation of the reforms was a reflection of the pre-existing disparities in peasant holdings. The reforms eliminated the absentee landlords and rentiers but they preserved the differences among various rural strata as well as those among the landholders themselves. For instance, in

²⁶⁻ M. Soudagar, '<u>A Survey of the Land Reforms</u>', op. cit. chapter 2. 27-760,000 families (21% of the rural population) in the first phase; 210,000 families in the second phase; and 330,000 families in the third phase: <u>Iran Almanac</u>, 1974. 28- N. Keddie, 'Iranian Village before and after Land Reforms', in Development and Underdevelopment, edited by H. Bernstein, 1973,p.170.

East Azarbayjan 11% of the beneficiaries received plots of land less than one hectare (altogether comprising 5% of the arable land), 30% obtained land up to five hectares (altogether 10% of the arable land), 27% received between five and ten hectares (altogether 23% of the land), 25% obtained between 10 and 20 hectares (altogether 39% of the land) and finally 7% obtained more than 20 hectares (altogether 27% of the land). In Khuzestan the disparity was even greater: while 13% of the beneficiaries owned only 1% of the land 5% of the families obtained 20% of the land. The pattern of land redistribution was no different in other provinces.²⁹ According to one account summing up the end results of the reforms, in 1974 of the total rural population, 33% had no land, 39% owned an average of two hectares, 12% owned an average of 7 hectares, 14% owned an average of 18 hectares and 0.5% owned an average of 190 hectares.³⁰

In spite of the land reforms the remnants of the landlord class continued to possess large holdings as a result of the many legal exemptions. In 1971 there were 62,000 large landholders from the landlord class; in the main their lands were worked by wage labourers but in some areas the crop-sharing system was still in operation.³¹ A class of agricultural labourers and landless or poor peasants also became more distinctly visible. As a more direct outcome of the reforms, however, a rural middle class began to emerge, benefiting both from the reforms and some further government measures. In fact the court's explicit policy was not an egalitarian land redistribution. As the Shah had said: "Our aims are not to destroy small landlords. What we are doing is a means of making it possible to become small landlords. Those who become owners of land today, 29- 'Journal of Economic Research', nos. 9-10, p.189; 13-14, p.149 and 17-18, p.70. 30- 'Mobarezin-e Rah-e Kargar', <u>Tahlili az Sharayet-e Jamee-ye</u> Rustai (An Analysis of the Rural Conditions), Tehran, 1357, p.61.

³¹⁻ Ibid, p.62.

we hope, will become small landlords in the future."³² According to one account rural middle class families numbered 570,000, each owning an average of 20 hectares and comprising about 15% of the peasant families in 1971.³³ This rural middle class, as compared to the landless labourers, benefited from the establishment of rural cooperatives set up after the reforms to provide credit and assistance for the new farmers. The cooperatives were run by the better-off farmers. In the Central Organization of the Cooperatives, a state-financed institution, the peasants were not represented but "the local managers of that Organization were usually selected from the better-off farmers assisting government officials in the village."34 The major function of the cooperatives was to make loans to its members. Only the <u>masaqdaran</u> (who had become small-holders after the reforms) could join the cooperatives. Furthermore, since loans were granted in proportion to the members' share in the cooperatives those who had more shares obtained large loans. The landless peasants, who were not entitled to join the cooperatives, were dependent on village moneylenders and banks. According to an official account peasant debts in 1971 had grown to so high a level that "only the state can provide the means for the liberation of poor peasants from subordination to the village bourgeoisie."22

Thus while a rural middle class emerged as a result of the reforms and became the target of the regime's corporatist mobilization, the rural lower class remained unaffected and bypassed by the regime. The regime sought to enlist the support of the peasants through controlled organizations and distribution of benefits among them. Peasant cooperatives were vertically tied to the state bureaucracy and the party and the peasantry became subject to economic

32- Quoted by Keddie, op. cit. p.171. 33- Soudagar, op. cit. p.38. 34- Ibid, p.82. 35- Quoted in Ibid, p.48.

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and political control. By promoting small holding the regime sought to create a rural base of support. Some peasant support for the regime was to appear during and after the 1979 revolution.

3- Clientelism

On the surface the regime structured a corporate framework in order to channel diverse interests through state organizations. In practice the real business of politics went on behind the back of the formal organizations. In other words despite the existence of corporatist associations, the representation of interests was based on clientelism. Thus the authoritarian regime was able to keep interest participation within its own purview. Clientelism consisted of relationships between the regime, which was capable of dispensing resources, and particularistic interests with channels of access to public institutions attempting to influence public policy and extract resources. It was thus a more informal process based on individual relations between interest groupings and state institutions. Here some of these relations involving business interests, bureaucrats and public agencies will be touched upon as one of the bases of the <u>status que</u>.³⁶

Clientelistic relationships were concentrated within and among the decentralized agencies of the government of which the Oil Company was the central financial institution. It was independent from the ministries and its chairman, one of the most important posts, was appointed by the Shah and was directly responsible to him alone. The accounts of the Company were not exposed to public scrutiny and were the concern of its directorate. The Company acted as an informal source of finance circumventing the constitutional distinction between state funds and the court's private wealth. A frequent con-

³⁶⁻ Most of the following information was obtained through interviews with various commissions of the Plan Organization and the Ministry of Economy in March 1980.

siderable discrepancy was reported between the Company's statement of its sales and the foreign exchange earnings as reported in the balance of payments by the Central Bank. This discrepancy has been accounted for by the informal links which existed between the Company and the court's Pahlavi Foundation due to a regular transfer of funds from the Company to the Foundation.³⁷ The Foundation itself, formally a charity organization financed by the Shah's wealth, was the largest industrial and commercial group with extensive interests in all major economic fields and played a regulatory role in government-business relations in the sense of giving incentives or withholding favours.

While these two institutions were the major source of state and court financial resources administrative organizations played the clientelistic games. As the government's policy jurisdiction expanded parliament became a weak institution with regard to the representation of interests in the legislative process. Instead the interest groupings tended to concentrate on the administrative organs of the government in order to exert their pressures on the implementation of the policies rather than on their formulation. As already noted, government-business relations were based on the distribution-regulation pattern and since distributory and regulatory policies involved a choice as to which interests would be included and which excluded they created an environment of patron-client relations, discretionary policies and pressure to influence public policy. Business firms were concentrated in the capital where they were able to increase their access to the officials. Of the decentralized public agencies the Plan Organization was the central institution around which private business interests circulated. It had considerable financial

37- As reported by R. Graham, op. cit. p.154-5.

and administrative powers delegated by the state and was in a position to deal directly with its clienteles. In its relations with 'interest groupings' the organization encompassed a vast number of permanent commissions as well as ad hoc working groups functioning as lobbies for businessmen and contractors. Although development goals and fund allocations were defined in the Economic Plan there was enough room for flexibility in their implementation. This made possible discretionary relations and accounted for the power of manoeuvre available to the agencies in the implementation of policies and the petitionary influence of business interests. From the government side the relations between public agencies and the private sector was less subject to clear legislation and tended more to be vague and allow exemptions. Benefits were granted to industrial groups on an irregular basis. The arena of manoeuvre for handing out benefits was wide enough including import licenses, tariff rates, tax exemption, exemption to price ceilings, easy access to loans, guarantees against investment loss and coordination of public and private enterprises in order to safeguard private interests from competition. As a portion of the development budget was allocated to the private sector the Plan Organization had a major arena of influence with regard to business interests through regulation and distribution. Discretionary policies were also implemented through development banks which used credit to channel investment in priority areas broadly determined by the royal court through the High Economic Council. Clientelistic relations through development banks were especially prevalent due to the fact that the boundaries between the public and private sectors in the field of banking was blurred so that while the government had the dominant role the private sector managed to exert considerable influence. This was the

case especially in the Industrial and Mining Development Bank and the Bank of Development and Investment which were mixed publicprivate banks and had representatives of the private sector on their boards. Different agencies had different clienteles. For instance in the field of agriculture the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Cooperatives were engaged in rivalry over the beneficiaries of agricultural policy. The clientele of the Ministry of Agriculture were large landholders and farming enterprises and the Ministry advocated large agricultural schemes. By contrast the Ministry of Cooperatives advocated policies in the interest of small-holders and the grant of credits and subsidies to the cooperatives. Finally the conflict was resolved with the dissolution of the latter Minitry due to the "more powerful supportive interests" of the Ministry of Agriculture.³⁸

The influence of client groups, however, did not mean that public agencies were dominated by such groups. That influence was limited to the level of implementation. For all practical purposes economic policy making originated in the court which was also the centre of clientelistic relations. Such relations were fostered by the court's favourite policy of relying on certain priority areas of private enterprise for economic development. Thus if clientelistic relations are to be viewed as 'corruption' and 'traditional behaviour', they stemmed from the royal court. On the basis of that policy patron-client networks proliferated around the royal family and the ^Pahlavi Foundation. Apart from encouraging industrialists to invest in priority areas as indicated above, the royal family was closely intertwined with the grand bourgeoisie through the holding

of large shares in all major industries. On the whole the royal 38- M. Weinbaum, 'Agricultural Policy and Development Politics in Iran', <u>The Middle East Journal</u>, vol.31, 1977: 434-50, p.444.

family owned 80% of the cement industry, 35% of the car industry, 62% of banks and insurance companies, 40% of the textile industry, 42% of the construction industry, 70% of the hotel industry and 55% of the steel industry.³⁹ Courtiers and financial advisors of the Shah acted as brokers and held shares in large industries and companies on his behalf. Industrialists also preferred to offer the court a few shares in their industries in order to benefit from the discretionary powers of the royal family, such as the provision of credits and tax exemption.⁴⁰

The political function and significance of clientelistic relations both in the court and the public agencies was to create and maintain a dependent relationship between business and government and as such strengthened the corporatist structure of the state. Thus although large industries had an informal association among themselves particularly because various industrial groups were owned by members of an extended family or allied families they were more meaningfully related to the court. Patron-client, vertical relations between the regime and the bourgeoisie provided security for the established relations as a means of avoiding conflict. As a result the private sector was subordinated and fragmented as it spent its time and energy in clientelistic relations and on the implementation end. Above all clientelism integrated business interests into the bureaucracy.

Clientelistic relations were, however, partial in their effect in that they were confined mainly to the modern industrial bourgeoisie and did not include the traditional petty bourgeoisie which remained a marginal sector of the society. This was a reflection of

39- This was taken from a report in the magazine <u>8 Days</u>, 8 December 1979, p.6.
40- A detailed report in <u>Enghelabe Islami</u>, 22 Azar 1358, describes the relationships between the royal family and the industrialists.

the economic policy of the court which put emphasis on large modern industry. The traditional bazaar petty bourgeoisie included some 219,000 handicraft industries and workshops which employed 900,000 people. Politically the petty bourgeoisie and their guilds were subordinated to the court party but economically they were not part of the modern industrial edifice and the clientelistic relations which linked it to the state. Thus there was no tariff protection, tax exemption or credit provision policy for the petty bourgeoisie. Consequently, while the modern bourgeoisie despite its tenuous local links occupied a monopolistic position and relied on informal relations with the regime the traditional petty bourgeoisie remained self-sufficient and outside the political relations.

On the whole, clientelism enabled the regime to accommodate major interests not on the basis of group representation but of cooptation. Client groups sought patronage from the resource base of the bureaucracy while the regime effectively employed expenditure to maintain the <u>status quo</u>. The regime was held together however, not only on the basis of clientelism but also of coercion. By increasing the cost of political activity through coercion and by reducing the scarcity of financial resources through clientelism the regime maintained the <u>status quo</u>.

4- Coercive Forces

A major foundation of the authoritarian regime was its monopoly of the means of coercion and their constant use to keep down the population. These included the army and the political police. The royal court had patrimonial authority over the army which was directlý responsible to the Shah. The modern army had been created by the court under Reza Shah and had been reorganized and rebuilt by his son. As a new institution having little link with the aristocracy

it became closely identified with the court. It was the separation of the military from the landed class that enabled the court to curb the power of the aristocracy. It was also control over the military that enabled the Shah to extend his powers beyond and above the Constitution. He recruited a loyal officer corps and eliminated the older military elite which had tended to develop a power base within the army. From the time of his accession to the throne the Shah sought to restore the strength of the forces through increasing the defence budget, seeking military aid from abroad and expanding their numbers. The army was enlarged from some 100,000 in 1941 to 300,000 in 1971. Increasingly it was equipped with modern weaponry made available through military aid, provided especially by the United States of America. Constitutionally the king was the supreme commander of the army. Prior to the ascendancy of the court, powerful prime ministers had sought to disarm the monarchy from its power as the commander of the army. To ensure the loyalty of the army the court controlled military recruitment, the organization and the size of the armed forced. All promotions above the rank of major needed royal approval. The only link possible among the three forces was through the court.

From the beginning the maintenance of such a loyal army required considerable liquid assets on the part of the king to ensure adequate subsistence and high pay. Reza Shah had given land to his officers. Later the oil billions provided the court with a dependable financial resource making possible the maintenance of a privileged class of officer corps. Military expenditure rose from \$ 70 million in 1960 to \$ 9000 million in 1977.

The build-up of a large military force was not only a function of the availability of resources. It was also closely related to the

international political conditions. Large military aid was granted by the United States of America because of its international and economic interest in Iran and the region as a whole. That interest included the stability of the state in Iran under the ruling monarchy, the prevention of insurgency from within and the unity of the military. However, the recruitment of foreign military advisors and personnel made the army more dependable because they had no real contact with the subject population. More than half of the recruited foreign personnel were related to the army. This was not unlike past practices of the absolutist kings whose select military force consisted of aliens who were considered more reliable than recruits from the subject population.

While the army remained the mainstay of the regime the court used the political police to eliminate opposition. The repressive apparatus included a number of organizations. The Imperial Special Bureau and the Imperial Inspectorate had supervision over all other repressive organizations and ensured order especially within the army. The army had its own military intelligence as well. On the front line of all these was the political police (S.a.v.a.k.) dealing directly with civil opposition. It had been organized by the army and the court with active assistance and advice from the government of the United States of America since 1957. Numbering tens of thousands the political police penetrated all government institutions, trade unions, universities, bazaar guilds, the press, factories, rural cooperatives, religious institutions and so on. They enjoyed arbitrary and absolute powers in security matters and used extensive methods of obtaining information, interrogation, trial, imprisonment, torture and physical elimination. Apart from these the fear which they struck amongst the politically articulate provided the regime with an effective means of preventing organized opposition. It was the first time in Iranian modern history that the court utilized not only a single political party but also an extensive political police as instruments of rule. If the Shah's reform programme was a 'white revolution' then the S.a.v.a.k. repression which followed was its bloody Reign of Terror.

In the 1963-75 period the authoritarian regime was held together on the basis of the five elements discussed above. From 1975 the changing situation was to affect the regime's financial capacity, economic stability, the established clientelistic relations, the model of class control and mobilization and finally even the coercive capacity of the regime. In the meantime important changes also occurred within the political ideological system.

V- The Rise of a Revolutionary Ideology

"... the word 'revolution' meant originally restoration. The revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which to us appear to show all evidence of a new spirit, the spirit of the modern age, were intended to be restorations... (They) were played in their initial stages by men who were firmly convinced that they would do no more than restore an old order of things that had been disturbed and violated by the despotism of absolute monarchy... They pleaded in all sincerity that they wanted to revolve back to old times when things had been as they ought to be."

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, pp.43-4.

In a decade or so before the 1979 revolution, a new, revolutionary ideological trend developed and changed the climate of opinion among a segment of the intelligentsia. In order to account for this development, the resurgence of Islam as a political ideology, we have to make more explicit some of the assumptions underlying the discussion in Chapter I.

As a consequence of the expansion of the capitalist world market and the incorporation of Iran into the Western economic exchange system the internal social structure began to disintegrate towards the end of the nineteenth century. It led to an overall growth in trade, the decline of the native manufacture, the emergence of a dependent mercantile bourgeoisie, the establishment of private property and the emergence of a landed class. From then on capitalism began to emerge dominant in the social formation and subordinate local petty commodity production. The expansion of the capitalist exchange system to Iran had two interrelated effects. First, it resulted in a partial 'structural convergence' between the Iranian social structure and Western capitalism. This was manifested in the emergence of landed private property, in the political arrangement of the new social

formation, Western constitutional government, and in an emerging modern intelligentsia. Secondly, it resulted in a 'partial divergence' i.e., a reaction against this development in the form of nationalism expressed in terms of the dominant cultural form, the religion of Islam. The increasing competition of foreign interests undermined the traditional petty commodity production centred in the bazaars. As a result the traditional petty bourgeoisie emerged as the social bases of resistance to Western economic, political and cultural influence and as the stronghold of nationalism. The constitutional movement which was highly nationalistic, like the tobacco movement of 1891. was tenaciously defended by local groups, recruited largely from the craft guilds. It was from this conjuncture of interactions between Iranian and Western economies- and the enormous social dislocation associated with this process- that early Iranian nationalism emerged as a protest movement. It was also the nature of this conjuncture that gave Iranian nationalism its particular characteristics: nationalism was expressed in terms of Islam and Islam was expressed in terms of nationalism. The expansion of Western capitalism and its political and cultural consequences stimulated not only economic but also cultural and religious reactions so that the emerging nationalism was closely connected with social, religious and economic grievances. It was not only that the disadvantaged petty bourgeoisie reactively asserted itself in terms of nationalism through the religious institution but also that the Ulama themselves had good cause in reacting against the Western penetration. The historical cultural forms of Iran had evolved in isolation from the outside world but increasing contacts with the West and its modernizing, secularizing tendencies led to a slow transformation of these forms. Thus the reaction and reassertion of the

1- See N. Keddie, <u>Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest</u> of 1891-92, London, Frank Cass & Co. 1966.

Ulama whose sense of cultural separateness was heightened by the slow break-down of the existing social arrangements accompanied the reaction of the bazaar petty bourgeoisie to Western economic penetration. Thus the reassertion of Islam in this conjuncture was also an eruption of nationalism. The <u>Ulama</u> believed strongly in the preservation of the traditional social arrangements and values and assumed an important position of power as the result of the conjuncture of interactions. On the whole, early Iranian nationalism emerged at a time of rapid social change induced by the expansion of Western capitalism. Socially, it was founded on the petty commodity mode of production which was being subordinated by Western economic penetration.² Culturally, it was upheld by the religious institution which reacted against the threat from outside to the traditional culture and its religious foundation.³ The result was the strengthening of local culture and national consciousness formulated in terms of Islam.

It was the convergence of these economic interests and ideological trends that brought about the constitutional movement. The

3- The identity of Islam with nationalism created no problems of the sort which emerged in other Islamic countries between Islam and nationalism (See M. Khadduri, <u>Political Trends in the Arab World: The Role of</u> <u>Ideas and Ideals in Politics</u>, Baltimore, 1970.) for the Iranian version of Islam (Shiism) was a national religion exclusive to Iran. In fact it was this combination of Islam and nationalism which signified a major development in national consciousness. In terms of ideology and 'nationbuilding' two periods have been formative in the history of Islamic Iran: first the Safavid era when Iran adopted Shiism as a national religion and became once again a political unit; second the end of Qajar rule at the turn of the century. The first led to the emergence of the nation; the second to that of nationalism as a protest movement. On the former development see: V. Minorsky, 'Iran: Opposition, Martyrdom and

²⁻ The following works explain the rise of nationalism and national movements as being a reaction against the expansion of world capitalism: M. Hechter, <u>Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British</u> <u>National Development, 1536-1966</u>, Berkeley, 1975; S. Amin, <u>Unequal</u> <u>Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism. Hassocks, 1976; E. Mandel, 'The Laws of Uneven Development', <u>The</u> <u>New Left Review</u>, no. 59, 1969; T. Nairn, <u>The Break-Up of Britain</u>. <u>Iondon, 1975; Idem, 'The Modern Janus', <u>The New Left Review</u>, no. 94; and P. Worsley, <u>The Third World</u>. London, 1964.</u></u>

resulting documents curbed the absolute power of the shah- who was blamed for much of the Western political and economic penetration-, and gave the parliament binding powers concerning all financial matters especially the granting of concessions to foreign Powers, the recruitment of foreign officials and the raising of foreign loans. They also recognized the authority of the <u>Ulama</u> and the supremacy of the laws of Islam. As a consequence the <u>Ulama</u> emerged as the representatives of the nationalist movement and adhered to constitutionalism as a system of government.⁴

In the absolutist medieval Iran there had been no practical conflict between the Ulama and the state although theoretically the relationship between temporal and religious authority was ambiguous. According to the Shiite view of political authority, legitimate rule belonged to the Imams who were descendents of the Prophet. Theoretically with the occultation of the last Imam, Mohammad Mahdi in 874 A.D., there began a period of the 'specific agency' in which the Hidden Imam was represented by four deputies. After the death of the fourth there began the era of 'general agency' in which the Ulama, as the agents of the Imam, had the right to rule. Of course this was only in theory and neither the Shiite Imams nor the Ulama wielded actual power. In practice the secular ruler was considered as an approximation of the ideal ruler and in fact the Shiite doctrine of Imamate reinforced the absolutist conception of rulership. The Safavids (1500-1736) who were the first Shiite rulers of Iran claimed to have been descendents of the Imam and thus they enjoyed direct religious legitimacy. The Qajars also invoked religious legitimacy but Revolt', in G.E. Grunebaum (ed.), Unity and Variety in Moslem Civilization, Chicago, 1955; Charles F. Gallagher, Contemporary Islam: the Plateau of Particularism: Problems of Religion and Nationalism in Iran. American Universities Field Staff Reports, vol.XV, no.2, 1966. 4- The constitutional view "has established itself as the dominant one among the Iranian <u>Ulama</u> and continues to inform their attitudes in contemporary Iran." H. Algar, 'The Oppositional Role of Ulama', op.cit p.238.

towards the end of their rule a difference arose between them and the <u>Ulama</u>. Finally the <u>Ulama</u> found the adoption of a constitution to curb basically illegitimate temporal power favourable to the Shiite conception of authority- which was emerging out of its theoretical stateand necessary to safeguard Islam against foreign encroachment. The constitution institutionalized the relationship between temporal and religious authority and thus the traditional, undefined religious legitimacy was incorporated in the new system of government.

Despite the inception of the constitutional system the battle for its implementation in practice constituted much of the postconstitutional history. The Pahlavi monarchs, regardless of how they justified their actions, subordinated the constitution to their absolute power and established authoritarian regimes. Further, the early Islamic nationalism which was the movement of the <u>Ulama</u> and their petty bourgeois allies was antagonized not only as a result of the failure of the constitution but also due to the advent of integral state nationalism, secular nationalism, the suppression of the religious institution and further Western economic and political influence.

The post-constitutional regimes advocated and adopted integral nationalism which itself was a Western idea. It emerged in Western Europe due to the rise and consolidation of state power based on military and bureaucratic organizations through which the rulers could mobilize their resources.⁵ This ideal of an effectively organized community based on new types of state organization became attractive after the constitutional movement. It afforded opportunities for the accumulation of power by the bureaucratized state

⁵⁻ This process is described in: C. Hayes, <u>The Historical Evolution</u> of Modern Nationalism, New York, 1931; L. Snyder, <u>The New Nation-</u> alism, Ithaca, 1968; and H. Kohn, <u>Nationalism: Its Meaning and History</u>, Princeton, New Jersey, 1955.

and represented the structure of an alternative status system to the traditional one. The Pahlavis were determined to closely imitate the Western model in creating a state structure. The bureaucracy and the army were modelled on the Western bureaucracies and armies. Thus the Ulama and the traditional corporate organizations became subordinated to the new bureaucracy. This integral nationalism also gave impetus to the secular nationalism of the new middle class which was a result of diffusion from the West rather than an indigenous nationalist movement and was directed against the traditional religious culture and its defenders. Furthermore, with increasing Western economic influence and the expansion of the public sector to promote industrialization, the trade guilds were broken up and local manufacture declined. As a consequence, the stronghold of opposition to the authoritarian regimes modelled on the Western state was the Ulama and the bazaar. Thus after the constitutional movement Islamic nationalism was intensified by the rise of authoritarianism, increasing Western economic and political influence and the suppression of the bazaar and its craft guilds.

The conflict between the <u>Ulama</u> and the state under court hegemony erupted in 1963 not only over the constitutional issue but also over increasing Western economic and political influence encouraged by the court. The <u>Ulama</u> were constitutionalist, nationalist, anti-Western and anti-secular; the court antagonized them on all these grounds. The nationalism of the <u>Ulama</u> was particularly intensified by the conclusion of the agreement which granted capitulatory rights to the American military personnel in Iran. The <u>Ulama</u>, relying on their support in the bazaar, rose in defiance of the authoritarian regime and increasing Western influence. The major clerical figure who emerged from among the <u>Ulama</u> and voiced the opposition of the

clerics and the bazaar was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Qum. Born in 1902 into a clerical_merchant family and having achieved the degree of ejtehad in 1936, Khomeini had been long active against anti-clerical trends advocated by the state and the new middle class. He had published his first book in 1945 against the Pakdini Movement of Ahmad Kasravi, the leading anti-clerical intellectual who was eventually assassinated by a member of the fundamentalist Fedaiyan-e Islam. In that book, Khomeini attacked secularism and vaguely presented the idea of an Islamic government. During the National Front government he supported Ayatollah Kashani and condemned Mosaddeq's appeals to the U.S.A. for financial aid. After the latter's fall, in line with the quietism of the Ulama in the 1953-63 period, he remained politically silent, as did his mentor, Ayatollah Borujerdi. After the court's suppression of the constitution and the introduction of electoral reforms Khomeini voiced his opposition and firmly stood for the constitution, insisting that legislation (especially that affecting the religious law) would be valid only if passed by parliament and approved by the Ulama according to the constitution. Besides, he attacked Western economic and political influence; it was his opposition to the capitulations' agreement that finally led to his exile.

Khomeini was the hero of the petty bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisie was the stronghold of opposition to the court. He condemned Western economic influence, imperialism and the ruin of the bazaar and the home market. His Islamic nationalism was cut from the same fabric as the nineteenth-century Islamic nationalist movement, generated from the reaction of the petty bourgeoisie to the expansion of world capitalism in Iran. Thus he complained that:

> "Large capitalists from America are pouring into Iran to enslave our people in the name of the largest foreign

⁶⁻ Ayatollah Khomeini, Kashf al-Asrar (Revealing the Secrets), 1324.

investment... This is the result of the political and economic exploitation by the West on the one hand ... and the submission of the regime to colonialism on the other. The regime wants to put our agriculture, manufacture, mines and even the domestic distribution of commodities under their control, thus to enserf our people by the capitalists... Now all the resources of our nation are in the hands of the colonialists, and respectable merchants are becoming bankrupt one after another... The regime is bent on destroying Islam and its sacred laws. Only Islam and the <u>Ulama</u> can prevent the onslaught of colonialism. In recent times the salvation of Iran from collapse has been due to the endeavours of the Ulama and the Marja-e Taglid of the time, Mirza Shirazi (reference to the tobacco movement). In the present time we are confronted with the ever-increasing blows upon Islam, the enserfment of the nation by the imperialists and their control of the bazaars and all military, political and commercial aspects of life. The bazaar is no more controlled by the Iranians, and traders, and cultivators are faced with bankruptcy and deprivation."'

Along with the <u>Ulama</u>, Khomeini initially stood for the constitution. But gradually he believed that Islam and nationalism were under greater danger and thus shifted his emphasis from the constitution to Islam. He made this distinction clearly in 1962 when he stated:⁸

"We speak to the regime in its own accepted terms- not that the constitution is, in our view, perfect. Rather if the <u>Ulama</u> speak in terms of the constitution it is because Article 2 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws does not recognize any legislation opposed to the Quran as law; other than that the only accepted law is the law of Islam and the Traditions of the Prophet. Whatever is in accord with the law of Islam we shall accept and whatever is opposed to Islam, even if it is the constitution, we shall oppose."

He later elaborated his previous thoughts about an Islamic state and presented them in a treatise entitled, <u>The Rule of the Jurisprudent</u>. In this, Khomeini put forward the novel idea that monarchy is against Islam and rejected the Shiite political theory which had evolved after the constitutional movement. Instead, he reverted back to the concept of the Shiite utopian state and the rule of the Imams and the 'general agency', and propounded the original pre-constitutional Shiite political theory. Accordingly:

⁷⁻ Ayatollah Khomeini, <u>Khomeini va Jonbesh: Majmueh-ye Nameh-ha va</u> <u>Sokhanrani-ha</u>, (A Collection of Letters and Speeches), 15th-of-Khordad Publications, Tehran, 1352,pp.58-60;68-9.

⁸⁻ Quoted in Houzeh-ye Islami, <u>Zendeginameh-ye Imam Khomeini</u>, op.cit. p.95.

"Islamic government is not any of the existing types and systems of government. For instance it is not dictatorial government in which the power of the head of the state is arbitrary, allowing him to interfere with the lives and properties of the people, to grant assignments to whomever he chose and to give away people's property as he wished. The Prophet and the Imams had no such powers. Islamic government is not dictatorial or absolutist but limited and conditioned. Of course, not constitutional in its present ordinary sense in which legislation is based on the views of the individuals and the majority. It is constitutional (limited) in the sense that the rulers are bound by a collection of conditions defined by the Quran and the Traditions of the Prophet. The conditions are those rules and laws of Islam which must be observed. Thus, Islamic government is the rule by the Divine Law of the people ... No one has the right to legislate and no such legislation can be put into execution. Whereas in the constitutional monarchies and republics the majority of those who represent the majority of the people can impose their legislation on the people, Islamic government is the government of the Divine Law. In this system of government sovereignty originates in God, and Law is the word of God. In this regard the ruler must have two characteristics: knowledge of the Law and justice. He must have knowledge of the Law because Islamic government is the rule of law and not the arbitrary rule of persons. In this sense only the theologian can be the righteous ruler." 9

The resurgence of Shiite political theory in its original millenarian form was not confined to the ideas of Khomeini. Following the death in 1960 of Ayatollah Borujerdi, the highest religious leader (Marja-e Taglid) who had been known for his political quietism, a number of clerics, concerned about the increasing threats to the religious institution, advocated a more politically active role for the succeeding Maria. Forming the Islamic Associations (discussion groups), these clerics sought to define the Shiite political theory in general and the procedures for the emergence of the Marja in particular. Traditionally the highest religious authority'emerged' from among the most learned and was acknowledged as such by the community. The Islamic Associations maintaining that the secular government in the past had exerted influence over the emergence of the Marja, sought to pin down concretely that process to certain procedures. Mehdi Bazargan, a member of the Associations (and the leader of the Freedom Movement) called for 9- Ayatollah Khomeini, "Understanding Islamic Government", in Hokumat-e Jomhuri Islami, (Islamic Republic), A Collection of Essays By Khomeini, Beheshti, Taleqani, Bazargan and others, Tehran, 1358, pp.5-10.

the strengthening of the office of the Marja as a place of refuge from the injustice of the secular government. He called on the Marja to participate in social and political affairs and bring politics and religion together. Another member of the Associations, Ayatollah Taleqani proposed that a council of high-ranking Ulama should replace the office of the Marja in order to lessen political interference in the office. On the question of the state, Mohammad Tabatabai, another member, argued that the ideal Islamic state is not of the constitutional-democratic type based on the will of the people but derives its legitimacy from the Divine Law. Further, since democracy and constitutionalism have not functioned in Iran, the only way out of the injustice and tyranny of the secular state would be an Islamic state. A major function of Islam, he argued, is the administration of the society by the 'general agency' in the absence of the Imam. Hence secular government is all usurpation and cannot be legitimized by the religious law. Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti went further and argued that if the secular government deviates from the religious law it would be incumbent upon the believer to force the government to observe its Islamic duties or else to bring it down by force and install a righteous government.¹⁰ This was the first time in the history of modern Iran that a group of clerics attempted to reconsider the political aspects of Shiism in order to find out about its weaknesses and how to remove them. They all stopped short of legitimizing secular power and instead put emphasis on the point that Islam encompasses the whole life of man and that there cannot be any legitimate separation between politics and religion. The idea of an Islamic state and the revival of the pre-constitutional Shiite political theory was a significant and novel development in that since the introduction of constitutional democracy in the beginning of

¹⁰⁻ Taleqani, Beheshti, Bazargan and others, <u>Bahsi dar bareh-ye</u> <u>Marjaiyat va Ruhaniyat</u>, (A Discussion about the Highest Religious Authority and the Clergy), n.p. Tehran, 1341.

the century, Iranian apologists (even among the <u>Ulama</u>) had argued that Islamic political theory was only another form of constitutional democracy.¹¹ It was thus the first revolutionary ideology to emerge in the post-constitutional period in which all active political forces had called for the implementation of the ideology of the Constitutional Revolution and had thus posed no revolutionary challenge to what the Revolution had theoretically established. It was also a revolutionary ideology in the original sense of the term which signified a movement of revolving back to a predestined point.¹²

To be sure, this ideological development, despite its religiohistorical overtones, was not a 'utopian possibility' in the sense of being the image of a possible world not based on the existing socio-economic system and lacking any congruence with the existing modality of production. Rather it was based on an 'objective possibility' corresponding to the objective interests of a group and its particular position in the socio-economic system.¹³ It corresponded to the particular position of the petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar which had historically been the social basis of indigenous Islamic nationalism and the ally of the <u>Ulama</u>. In the 1962-79 period, the petty bourgeoisie was politically suppressed and economically excluded from the clientelistic relations of the regime. Faced with a

11- This was the case particularly with the Najaf school of the Ulama after the constitutional movement. See Naini, op. cit.

12- For the original meaning of revolution as a 'recurrent movement in space or time' see: R. Williams, <u>Keywords</u>, London, 1976. Cf. "We must prepare the ground for the re-establishment of the Islamic state which was in existence unfortunately only for a few years during the time of the Prophet and the very short rule of Ali." Khomeini, <u>Khomeini va Jonbesh</u>, pp.96-7. On the logic of the kinship of reversion and revolution on the grounds that "The advantages of a new society are hypothetical until realized; the ideals of reaction have a more powerful appeal", see: F.G. Hutchins, 'On Winning and Losing by Revolution', <u>Public Policy</u>, vol.XVIII, 1969: 1-40, quote from page 21.

13- These concepts are G. Lukács'. Lukács examines ideologies as representations of historical objective possibilities. Every historical situation contains a prefiguration of a range of potential future situations. Class ideology is thus a reflex of the reality of histoprocess of disintegration and subordination to the modern industrial edifice the bazaar resisted the regime economically and politically. The decline of the traditional petty bourgeoisie (especially its manufacturing segment) had been long underway as a result of the emergence of state capitalism promoting Western economic penetration and the emergence of modern economic and financial systems.¹⁴ Thus the bazaar with its workshops, money lenders, retail stalls, caravansaries and mosques had been gradually broken up. Furthermore, under the policy of import-substitution adopted by the regime from 1963, an attempt was made to prevent the growth of mercantile capital and promote "internal" production through the import of capital and machinery. As a result, the public sector put emphasis on 'the modern and the industrial' leading to the emergence of a grand monopoly bourgeoisie dependent on foreign capital and imports at the expense of the traditional manufacture.¹⁵ In 1976 the traditional industries numbered 219,000 and produced only 24% of industrial products whereas the 6626 modern industries produced 76% of total industrial production.¹⁶ In addition bazaar manufactories did not benefit from tariff protection, credit facilities and subsidies provided for the modern industrialists. Petty commodity production thus suffered further disintegration. According to an official account: "Since large industries are established with the participation of banks and foreign companies they benefit from state support whereas small manufactories are run by traditional people lacking necessary capital and management. The banks are only interested in granting large loans."17

rical possibilities and consists of the rational reactions imputed to a particular position in the process of production. A utopian possibility is not thus an objective possibility. G. Lukacs, <u>History and Class</u> <u>Consciousness</u>, London, 1971, pp.75-80.

¹⁴⁻ A good description of this process is given in: E. Flandin, <u>Safar-nameh-ye Eugene Flandin dar Iran</u>, (Flandin's Book of Travels in Iran) Tehran, 1324,pp.100ff. 15- See Jacobs, op.cit. chapter I. 16- Ministry of Economy, Bureau of Statistics, <u>Industrial Statistics</u>, Tehran, 1976, p.4. 17- <u>Tehran Economist</u>, 1 Aban, 1355.

An analysis of the economically active population shows that between 1961 and 1976 the percentage working in establishments with no wagelabour (a characteristic of many traditional manufactories) fell from 13.8% to 10.1%.¹⁸ Another indication of the decline of the bazaar is the rate of import—exports. The ratio of exports to imports decreased from 30% in 1950 to 22% in 1960, 19% in 1970 and 5% in 1975.¹⁹ Justifying the decline of manufactures, the same official source wrote: "In our country, like the Western countries in their process of industrialization, small manufactures gradually become uneconomical and either disappear or are absorbed in large industries. And this is in the interest of the country."²⁰ As early as 1966 as observer described the process of the disintegration of the petty bourgeoisie thus:²¹

"But today, the bazaar, which has survived the vicissitudes of invaders, is dying. It is dying even though the volume of retail trade has increased within the bazaar, for retail trade outside the bazaar has increased at an even greater rate... In the last few years, the bazaar as a way of life has come under attack. Cheap mass-produced goods of every description to meet every need- needs that the bazaar can no longer meet- flood the market. New ideas proclaim the baths, restaurants and shops of the bazaar merchants as unclean and unsuitable; new beliefs call his religious behaviour decadent and superstitious; new business ethics condemn his codes as archaic and provincial; new business methods outside the bazaar jeopardize his profits; and new banking procedures have broken down his system of finance."

Economically the bazaar counterattacked against the clientelistic edifice which the regime built around itself. In the early 1970's a group of bazaar merchants and clerics established the Mahdiyeh financial, charity and religious organization, a nationwide private organization independent of the government. It established 'Islamic banks' which gave small interest-free loans to small businessmen at a time when private commercial and state development banks were interested

¹⁸⁻ This was calculated on the basis of information obtained from: Ministry of Economy,"<u>The Results of Industrial Census</u>", 1341 and Ministry of Industries,"<u>A Record of Industrial Statistics</u>", 1356.

^{19- &}lt;u>Tehran Economist</u>, 9 Mehr, 56. 20- <u>Tehran Economist</u>, 18 Bahman 1354. 21- G. Miller, 'Political Organization in Iran', <u>Middle East Journal</u>, vol.23, 1969, pp.159; 343 (in two parts).

only in giving loans and credits to large modern industries. The Mahdiyeh institution also established hospitals and built mosques and held regular religious sermons. In addition the bazaaris in Tehran acted together to prevent the Saderat Bank (which had branches in all bazaars) from falling under the domination of an industrial magnate and associate of the regime (and a Bahai) H. Yazdani, by threatening to withdraw their accounts from the Bank. Earlier the bazaaris in Tehran had established the Sanaye Bank in reaction to the dominant private banks. However, another bank owned by the bazaaris, the Asnaf (Guilds) Bank became bankrupt in the face of competition from more successful large private (Iranian and foreign) banks.²²

The 1960's, coinciding with the rise of the authoritarian regime and the suppression of the petty bourgeoisie also witnesses increasing political resistance by the bazaar against the regime. It was in this period that the Fedaiyan-e Islam reemerged and several other fundamentalist Islamic groups based in the bazaar were organized. The Fedaiyan reorganized themselves and held regular secret meetings in the ironmongers guild and in 1964- after the granting of capitulatory rights to the Americans in Iran- planned and executed the assassination of H.A. Mansur, the first prime minister appointed by the Shah after the suppression of the constitution. In this connection twelve bazaar merchants, shopkeepers and religious students were imprisoned. Another fundamentalist party, the Party of the Islamic Nations which originated in the bazaar's theological college in the early 1960's, set out to assassinate many associates of the regime, taught its members in the tactics of guerilla warfare and aimed at destroying Western influence and setting up an Islamic state.²³ Like other similar groups.

22- "Banking and Private Banks", in <u>Majalleh-ye Kanun-e Bank-ha</u>, (Journal of the Banks' Association), no.53, Mordad 1356. 23- Anonymous, <u>Asnadi az Jamiyatha-ye Motalefeh-ye Islami</u>, Jama va <u>Hezbe Melale Islami</u>, (Documents on the Coalition Groups, Jama and the Party of the Islamic Nations), 15th-of-Khordad Publications, Tehran, 1350.

however, the party was destroyed by the government.

As traditionalist-religious groups these parties were mostly confined to the bazaar and had little influence outside. From the late 1960's the grievances of the bazaar began to surface in a new ideological trend which aimed at the radical alteration of the <u>status quo</u>. This was the development and spread of political Islam as a revolutionary ideology among a segment of the modern intelligentsia. The early Iranian intelligentsia had advocated extreme nationalism, democracy and socialism, but Islam as a political ideology had had very little appeal amongst them. From the late 1960's, however, the spread of political Islam and the revival of interest in Islamic themes among the intellectuals turned into an influential political ideology. We will first describe the new intellectual trend and its main exponents and then attempt to explain the new development and its meaning.

This trend was extremely novel in that the older Iranian intelligentsia (since its emergence from the late nineteenth century) had been known for its irreligious or even anti-religious outlook.²⁴ Some of the prominant intellectuals before and after the Constitutional Revolution such as Talebof, Akhondof, Mirza Aqa Khan Kermani, Mirza Malkam Khan, Eshqi, Iraj Mirza, Aref, Ahmad Kasravi and others went so far as to curse Islam and its exponents for all the ills and backwardness of the country. Influenced by Western liberal-constitutionalism they paid little attention and in effect turned their back on the indigenous culture. Hasan Taqizadeh, one of the secular leaders of the Constitutional Revolution, explicitly advocated the adoption of the Western civilization in all its political, social and cultural aspects.²⁵

²⁴⁻ An account of this is given in: Nezam al-Islam Kermani, <u>Tarikh-e</u> <u>Bidari-ye Iranian</u>, (A History of the Awakening of the Iranians), Tehran, 1324.

²⁵⁻ Taqizadeh's views are presented in: Mojtaba Minovi, <u>Bist Magaleh</u>, (Twenty Essays), Tehran, 1346.

Other intellectuals turned to new religious heresies or became atheist. Even Jamal ed Din Afqani, the famous Pan-Islamist of the nineteenth century, in his more private moments denounced all religion.²⁶ The case of Ahmad Kasravi, the historian of the 1905-11 Revolution, was perhaps the most extreme. As the founder of the <u>Pakdini</u> Movement (the Religion of Purity) which denounced much of the beliefs and rituals of Shiism, he launched the most vehement onslaught yet on the Shiite doctrine and the <u>Ulama</u>.²⁷ This anti-religious outlook of the intelligentsia in turn invited the reaction of the <u>Ulama</u> and the fundamentalist Islamic groups. It was not accidental that Kasravi was assassinated by a member of the Fedaiyan-e Islam. Earlier Taqizadeh had been accused of having planned the assassination of the religious leader of the Constitutional Revolution.

By contrast the young intelligentsia of the 1970's turned to Islam and presented it as a revolutionary ideology by putting selective emphasis upon it. They were in search of a new political community composed of the Islamic transcendental authority and a blend of modern ideologies. The new orientation found expression in a number of prominant intellectuals. The major exponent of the new ideological trend was Dr. Ali Shariati and his Ershad group. Previously a student of J.P. Sartre in France, Shariati was a professor of sociology until his death in exile in 1977. He lectured at the religious centre of Ershad in Tehran and drew a large audience of students and youths. Shariati sought to create a new foundation for a new political community by reformulating some of the traditional concepts of Shiism and he believed that it was quite impossible to create such a community

²⁶⁻ As it is evident in his reply to Ernest Renan quoted in: N. Keddie, 'Religion and Irreligion in Early Iranian Nationalism', op.cit. p. 281. 27- These ideas of Kasravi appear especially in his: <u>Shiigari</u> (Shiism) Tehran, 1324; <u>Sufigari</u> (Sufism), Tehran, 1323; <u>Bahaigari</u> (Bahaism), Tehran, 1323; and <u>Davari</u> (Judgement), Tehran, 1325.

outside of the Islamic context. His new political community would be built around a charismatic authority of the early Shiite type particularly identified with Imam Ali. Thus he sought to reformulate the traditional stand of the Ulama who believed that until the return of Mahdi, one must accept secular government. The procedure for the emergence of such a charismatic authority would also be different from the traditional concept. Shariati believed that instead of the Ulama, traditionally regarded as the agency of the Imam, it was the duty of the people to choose the leader of the community and give him the status of Imamate to represent the Hidden Imam. The essence of Shariati's thought was hence that although the establishment Ulama like the 'priesthood' had historically formed a segment of the upper class and had been the bastion of conservatism, Shiite Islam had always been the religion of the oppressed, the martyrs and the persecuted. In this connection he distinguished between the 'Safavi Shiism' i.e., the official religion of the establishment and the conservative Ulama, and the 'Alavi Shiism' i.e., the original messianic movement of the early Shiite martyrs. He condemned the Safavism of some Ulama and called for the revival of revolutionary Shiism. He also condemned the Westernized intellectuals as being the side effect of imperialism. While Shariati did not speak about the rule of the jurisprudent, he frequently referred to Imamate as the rule of the philosopher-king. He also admired Khomeini for his persistant opposition to the regime, as indicated in a poem which he wrote for the Ayatollah. 28

Of equal influence was Jalal Ale Ahmad in directing the climate

²⁸⁻ This account of Shariati's thinking is based on his: <u>Ommat va</u> <u>Imamat</u>, (Community and Leadership), n.p., 1347; <u>Masuliyat-e Shiah</u> <u>Budan</u>, (The Responsibility of the Shiites), Tehran 1350; <u>Entezar</u> <u>Mazhab-e Eteraz</u>, (Expectation, the Religion of Protest), Ershad Press, Tehran 1350; <u>Fatemeh Fatemeh ast</u>, Mashhad, 1350 and <u>Tashayo-e Alavi</u> va Tashayo-e Safavi, (Alavi Shiism and Safavi Shiism), Mashhad, 1351.

of intellectual opinion towards Islam. Early in life, like many intellectuals of his time, he was a member of the Tudeh Party. By the time of the conflicts between the court and the <u>Ulama</u> in 1963 he had turned to Islam. His major theme was opposition to Western economic and political influence. In his celebrated book, <u>Gharbzedegi</u> he attributed the causes of the economic backwardness of Iran to the devastating effects of imperialism and Western penetration and strongly attacked the Westernized intelligentsia of the constitutional period and after, for spreading the influence of the West and turning their back on Islam. The early deaths of both Ale Ahmad and Shariati were widely believed to be due to their liquidation by the regime.²⁹

Of less influence was Abolhasan Bani-Sadr, an exile in France. He also condemned Western political and economic influence and put forward the concept of 'Islamic economics'. According to this, in an Islamic state there would be no class economic domination and no concentration of capital; imperialist economic domination would be ended and domestic economic production and distribution would be regulated according to Islamic principles (such as the abolition of interest on capital). He also called for the merging of religion and politics but, unlike Shariati, he rejected the notion of charismatic personal authority (Imamate) over the community.³⁰

Shariati set the ideological direction for the Islamic revolutionary organization of the <u>Mojahedin-e Khalq</u> which was formed in 1965 by some members of the Freedom Movement, mainly university students. The party put emphasis on the Quran and the "qualitative difference

²⁹⁻ These ideas of Ale Ahmad appear in his: <u>Gharbzedegi</u>, (The Western Affliction) Tehran, 1346 and <u>Khasi dar Miqat</u>, (A Dust in the Desert) Tehran, n.p. 1348.

³⁰⁻ This analysis of Bani-Sadr's ideas is based on his: <u>Kish-e Shakh-</u> <u>siyat</u>, (The Cult of Personality), n.p., 1355; <u>Eqtesad-e Tawhidi</u>, Tehran, 1357 and <u>Osul-e Payeh va Zabeteh-ye Hokumat-e Islami</u>, (The Fundamental Principles of Islamic Government), 1354.

between the Islam of the Organization and the Islam of the society"31 but its aim was not to establish the rule of the theologian. The Islam of the Mojahedin was rather a 'secular religion' and their major theme was opposition to imperialism and Western influence and economic freedom from the West. They were also opposed to the concentration of wealth and the unqualified right to private property and in this their views were influenced by collectivist ideas and they interpreted Islam in such a way as to rationalize those ideas. On the whole, the Mojahedin concentrated more on the defects of the regime than on the qualities of the future society.³² The Mojahedin were active in estab. lishing 'Islamic libraries' and 'Islamic societies'. The libraries were small lending libraries established from the early 1970's in all university faculties by 'Islamic students'. Islamic societies were formed especially in the provincial towns for the purpose of Islamic teaching and propaganda and were attended mainly by high-school students and teachers.

Unmistakably the climate of opinion among a segment of the intelligentsia and the educated was altering. But why did a large segment of the intelligentsia, in contrast to the early Iranian intellectuals, increasingly turn to Islam as a political ideology? The causes of the development are undoubtedly complex; the explanation offered have can only be partial. Similar ideological shifts and intellectual trends in other societies have been explained from diverse viewpoints. A popular theme in the literature on the intelligentsia sees them as 'freefloating', changing positions and turning to diverse ideologies. A variation on this theme is Edward Shils' discussion of the intellectual

³¹⁻ Mojahedin-e Khalq, <u>Amuzesh-ha</u>, (The Teachings) No.I, Mojahedin Publications, Tehran, 1357, p.30.

³²⁻ This analysis of the Mojahedin ideology is based on their various publications, especially: <u>Sharhe Tasis va Tarikh che-ye Vaqaye Sazeman</u> <u>Mojahedin az 1344 ta 1350</u>, (A History of the Establishment of the Mojahedin Organization), Mojahedin Publications, Tehran, 1357.

evolution of the intelligentsia in the Third World and the 'phases' through which they go in terms of their political outlook. According to Shils, in the first phase, that of constitutional liberalism from its beginning up to the First World War, the intellectuals were fascinated by Western constitutionalism and sought to implant it in their own countries. In the second phase, that of 'moral renewal', "constitutional liberalism seemed to disappear or to be confined in a very narrow space (while) the movement of moral and religious reform was taken up and developed into a passionate nationalism."³³ During the second phase, ground was prepared for mutual understanding between traditional and modern intelligentsia which finally led to the assumption of power by the intelligentsia. A basically similar explanation of the same phenomenon is offered by M. Matossian who relates these ideological shifts to the instability of the intelligentsia, a kind of identity crisis, and considers them as momentary shifts of emphasis. Such explanations either rely on a World politics perspective or treat ideological shifts among the intelligentsia as irrational reactions and thus ignore the social background to the evolution of the intelligentsia and their social basis, instead of considering political ideologies and consciousness as appropriate and rational reactions to a particular position in the social structure and as a reflex of the objective interests of a particular group. From the latter point of view we can understand and explain the emergence of political Islam as a revolutionary ideology among a segment of the intelligentsia on two grounds: first the social basis of these intellectuals and second, the class-ideological position of the new intellectual trend.

^{.33-} E. Shils, 'The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States', in <u>Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries</u>, edited by John Kautsky, New York, 1964, p.225.

³⁴⁻ Mary Matossian, 'Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities', in Ibid, pp.252-264.

The intellectuals of the 1970's who turned to Islam were the product of their own time, i.e. of the spread of modern education and were mainly of the younger generation. The early intelligentsia, who had been liberal-constitutionalist, had emerged mainly from the old aristocracy at a time when modern education was the prerogative of an elite. The spread of modern education especially in the 1960's and the decline of the bazaar, transferred more children of the petty bourgeoisie who in former times would have become apprentices in their family's workshop to institutions of higher education, in pursuit of prestigious positions in the government bureaucracy. As a result, the educated strata expanded fast. Even as early as 1958 Daniel Lerner wrote that "Iran suffers from an over-production of intellectuals."³⁵ The size of the educated increased by more than 60% between 1959 and 1966 alone.³⁶ Thus it would not be surprising to see the young educated carry with them their family and corporate allegiances to the modern institutions of education. In terms of social origin the intellectuals who turned to Islam and formed Islamic radical organizations rose from a clerical-bazaar petty bourgeois milieu. Shariati, Ale Ahmad and Bani-Sadr were all sons of provincial clerics closely associated with the bazaar. Shariati's Ershad centre was financed by a group of bazaar merchants who had originally built the modern and imposing Ershad religious centre and mosque. These intellectuals only expressed Islam in a new guise in the light of their modern Western education. They were not 'free-thinkers' but their analysis was essentially shaped by the frameworks of religious concepts and categories. The Mojahedin were also mainly sons of clerics and bazaaris and were all "born into religious families". Among them were sons of merchants and high clerics,

35- D. Lerner, <u>The Passing of the Traditional Society</u>, New York,
1958, p.363.
36- Ministry of Science and Higher Education, '<u>Statistics of Education</u>;

Tehran, 1347, p.6.

such as Ayatollah Taleqani.³⁷ They also inherited the radicalism of the fundamentalist groups and like the Fedaiyan-e Islam used the method of assassination. Thus it may be said that they were all the new intellectuals of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, whose emergence seemed natural at a time when the Ulama and the Mosque were not only suppressed but also were incapable of speaking in terms of modern ideologies and communicating with a new generation brought up with modern education.³⁸

In terms of class ideology, the position of the radical Islamic intellectuals like that of the fundamentalist clerical parties, was an appropriate and rational response to the typical position of the petty bourgeoisie in the process of production. In its essentials the new ideological trend was the same as the Islamic nationalism of the late nineteenth century which had been generated from the position of the petty commodity production and its reaction to Western economic and political penetration. It was intensely anti-imperialist and its nationalism was expressed in terms of Islam. One of the major themes of the intellectuals discussed above and of the Mojahedin was that the bazaar economy was being destroyed by the encroachment of big dependent capital. They all condemned the accumulation of wealth and capital, invoking various verses of the Quran which proscribe the concentration of wealth. The intellectuals mentioned above all portray a society made up of small producers, with little or no wage-labour, in which the right to property belongs to small god-fearing individuals. They all call for the domestic economic production and distribution to be put back

37- Of the 16 founding members of the Mojahedin Organization 9 were from bazaari families, 4 were from clerical families, 2 were from government-employee families and 1 was a worker. This information was obtained from several Mojahedin publications and statements. 38- Cf. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of Millenium, London, 1978, pp. 307-19. Cohn argues that revolutionary messianism in Medieval Europe

arose when the Church failed to give the guidance the people longed for.

into the old proper order. They attack both capitalism and socialism and call for 'Islamic economics' based on moderation. Theirs was the revolt of a petty bourgeoisie caught in the clutches of Western economic domination and appropriately they put their nationalism in terms of Islam. And in view of the decline of the bazaar their view was not utopian but corresponded to the objective interests of a class and its particular position in the socio-economic system.

On the whole, we can say that the Pahlavis' authoritarian rule, the establishment of a Western-style state structure and increasing Western economic and political influence led to the revival of Islamic nationalism especially in the 1960's. The opposition of the Ulama in particular intensified. At the same time, a spirit of radical revolutionary Islam spread amongst a large segment of the intelligentsia. As a rising tide of nationalism, radical Islam was the continuation of the old Shiite-nationalism which had originated in the reaction of the petty bourgeoisie to the expansion of Western capitalism in Iran. The new ideology was a revolutionary ideology for it painted a picture of a good and righteous community. It was not that the intelligentsia were transferring their allegiance from the status quo, they had already done so; but that a large number of them were becoming more receptive to Islam as a political ideology. Unmistakably there was a new ideal spreading in the society. But great changes do not involve only the prevalence of an ideology. They would require a convergence of forces involving concrete interests and ideologies. It is to these concrete economic interests that we now turn.

VI- The Crisis of the Economy and the Crisis of the Dictatorship

In this and the next chapters we will seek to explain the causes and the precipitants of the 1979 revolution. To do this we will use a conception that will bring together several elements which by themselves are insufficient conditions for the occurrance of a revolution. These elements, which partly overlap, include the generation of economic discontent and grievances on a mass scale; the crumbling of the foundations of the regime leading to economic instability, the emergence of some fundamental conflict of interest between the high bourgeoisie and the state and the undermining of the regime's coercive capacity; the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and the articulation of their grievances by the opposition organizations; and the occurrance of a political alliance between diverse forces of opposition.¹

1- The significance of this conception becomes evident when it is contrasted to the 'volcanic' conception of revolution which underlies much of the modern theories of revolution especially those employing psychological categories such as: Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel, Princeton, 1970 ; Idem, 'A Causal Model of Civil Strife', American Political Science Review, vol.62:1104-24; J. Davies, 'Towards a Theory of Revolution', American Sociological Review, XXVII:5-19; Idem, (ed.) When Men Revolt and Why: A Reader in Political Violence and Revolution, I. Feierabend et al, (eds.) Anger, Violence and New York, 1971; I. Feierabend et al, (eds.) Anger, Violence Politics: Theories and Research, Engelwood Cliffs, 1972 and S.P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, New Haven, 1968, esp. pp.54-57. These theories divert attention from the political conjunctural nature of revolutionary situations and confine themselves mainly to the question of how grievances are generated, assuming that once discontent and grievances are created they are automatically transformed into concerted action, violence and revolution. At best they aim to explain the occurrance of violence thus ignoring the fundamental fact that there may be revolution not becuse there is violence but there may be violence, if at all, because there is a revolution. Thus these theories do not offer any explanation as far as revolution is concerned. There is no doubt that the genesis and existence of mass grievances is one of the elements which constitute a revolutionary situation but their mere existence does not explain the occurrance and success of a revolution. For a critique of the 'volcanic' theories see: R. Aya, 'Theories of Revolution Reconsidered', Theory and Society, vol.8, 1979:39-99, and J. Goldstone 'Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation', World Politics, 1979:425-53. Following the 1963-73 period of relative economic stability important economic upheavals occurred between 1973 and 1978. These upheavals not only affected the capacity of the regime in terms of its financial resources but also severely affected the conditions of the lower classes and generated mass discontent and grievances. As far as the question of the genesis of grievances on a mass scale is concerned, there exists some theoretical controversy concerning what kind of economic situation prompts a population into a revolutionary situation. In Iran during the 1973-78 period there was both economic growth and decline. How did all this affect various classes? The theoretical views on the matter fall into two groups. On the one hand some consider general economic prosperity as a factor precipitating revolutionary upheavals. The origins of such a viewpoint stretch back to ancient times. According to Aristotle:²

"In order to secure his power a tyrant must keep the population in poverty so that the preoccupation with daily bread leaves them no leisure to conspire against the tyrant; he must multiply taxes and engage in great investment projects."

Alexis de Tocqeville, the historian of the French Revolution, attributing that revolution to the growing prosperity of the French people also wrote:³

"It is a singular fact that this steadily increasing prosperity, far from tranquilizing the population, every where promoted a spirit of unrest. The general public became more and more hostile to every ancient institution, more and more discontented; indeed it was increasingly obvious that the nation was heading for a revolution."

On the other hand, an opposite postulate based on an abstract generalization derived from the work of Karl Marx holds that increasing misery precipitates revolutionary upheavals by causing discontent. Combining the two views in his classical artical, James Davies has suggested that:⁴

[&]quot;Revolutions are most likely to occur when a prolonged period of 2- <u>Politics</u>, Book V, Chapter 11, quoted by A. Gerschenkron, <u>Continuity</u> in <u>History and Other Essays</u>, Harvard, 1968, p.324.

³⁻ Alexis de Tocqeville, <u>The Old Regime and the French Revolution</u>, New York, 1955, p.175. 4- J. Davies, 'Towards a Theory', p.6.

objective economic and social development is followed by a short period of sharp reversal."

In his view, it is neither constant misery nor constant improvement but combined rapid economic growth and decline which drive the population into a revolutionary 'state of mind'. Here we will use the Davies theory to account for the genesis of mass discontent and grievances as <u>one</u> element in the conjuncture of the revolution.⁵

Looking at the situation in Iran in the light of the abovementioned theories, it seems that the 1973-78 period preceding the revolution fits the Davies theory, with rapid economic growth being followed by a sharp decline. Thus we will show how for a short while an increase in economic resources raised the expectations of the lower classes and how in the following period of crisis, while expectations continued to rise, the regime's capability of meeting these began to decline. In sum, in this chapter we will cover both how the five foundations of the regime (discussed in chapter IV) crumbled and the effects of the economic upheavals on the predisposition of the masses to revolutionary mobilization and action.

The Period of Economic Prosperity

The period between 1963 and 1973 had been one of relative economic stability in prices, wages and in the inflow of government revenues. This had been a result of the adoption of an economic Stabilization Programme and the lack of fluctuations in the international economy. The increase in the inflow of oil revenues from 1973 marked the end of that period.

⁵⁻ It should be already clear (see footnote 1) that the Davies theory despite claiming to explain revolution has nothing to say about a revolution but in fact it is a theory seeking to explain the genesis of public grievances in any situation. Strong and accurate criticisms have been levelled against the Davies theory as a theory of revolution (see Aya, op. cit.) on the grounds that it assumes an automatic relationship between the existance of discontent and the occurrance of violence and revolution. It ignores the aspects of organization and mobilization. Here we treat the revolution as a conjuncture and use Davies only to account for the genesis of mass discontent as an element in the conjuncture.

What the oil nationalization movement of 1951-53 had failed to achieve came to be gradually realized in the early 1970's. Due to the rise in the importance of the oil-producing countries and their international organization, from 1970 the Iranian government came to exert a measure of control over the foreign operating companies both in production and in pricing. At the Conference of Tehran, held under the Shah in 1971, the operators' control over prices was in effect ended and the government obtained one quarter of the companies' shares. In May 1973 a new agreement was concluded according to which the industry came under full Iranian control. From then on the Shah pressed for higher prices and he gained ground when the 1973 Middle East War broke out. That war prompted the first significant rise in oil prices. In 1973, the Conference of Tehran announced a four-fold increase in prices. Consequently Iran's annual oil revenues increased from \$ 5 to \$ 20 billion. This sudden and new financial wealth altered the course and the pace of development of the economy in Iran.

The three years following the price rises witnessed an unprecedented economic upsurge. To begin with, the Fifth Economic Plan which had started a year previously was drastically revised to double the development budget from the original \$ 36 billion to \$ 69 billion. Total expenditure during the Plan was put at \$ 120 billion of which 100 billion was to be received from oil. Some \$ 50 billion was allocated only for current expenditure. The significance of these figures becomes evident when compared with the Fourth Plan's expenditure of \$ 10 billion. The decision to revise the Plan was dictated by the Shah despite reservations on the part of economists; even the guidelines of the IMF were ignored.⁶ New policies were adopted. Education was made free from school to university. Government food subsidies were increased;

6- International Monetary Fund, Staff Report on Iran, January 1975.

essential provisions, especially wheat, were subsidized by the government. For example the subsidized price of sugar was 25 rials a kilogram whereas the price of imported sugar was 100 rials. The government also promised comprehensive health programme, housing and full employment.

Current expenditure showed an increase of 125 per cent only in 1974, and the budget was expanded by 250 per cent, an unprecedented rise. As a consequence the money supply was enlarged. In the ten-year period between 1962 and 1972 the money supply had increased threefold. Between 1972 and 1975 alone, the volume of money increased by 580 per cent. Per capita income rose from \$ 500 in 1973 to \$ 820 in 1974 and to \$ 1600 by 1976. Unemployment almost disappeared, standing at one per cent. With an increase in demand, the government had to subsidize increasing imports of food. In 1972 it imported 770,000 tons of wheat; in 1974 this had increased to 1,430,000 tons. The import of meat increased from 7,000 tons to 53,000 between 1972 and 1975.⁸ Higher incomes meant more consumption, for example, the annual per capita consumption of meat had been 28 k.g. before 1973 and had increased to 47 k.g. in 1975. Civil service salaries were directly increased. Between 1971 and 1975 the expense of the bureaucracy increased from 99 to 730 billion rials. Government employees were also granted tax reductions. Also the share of taxes in government revenues declined from 32.9 per cent in 1972 to 11 per cent in 1974 (the share of direct taxes declined from 13 per cent to 5.2 per cent and that of indirect taxes also declined from 19.9 per cent to 6.1 per cent).9

In the period between 1963 and 1972 there had been a trend towards a more unequal distribution of incomes in the urban areas. According to 7- Plan and Budget Organization, <u>The Main Economic Indicators</u>, Third Report, 1357, p.128. 8- The Central Bank, <u>Bank Markazi Annual Report and Balance Sheet</u>, (hereafter, <u>BMAR</u>), 1975-6, p.35. 9- <u>EMARs</u>, 1972 to 1975. one account, the Gini Index for the distribution of expenditure in the urban areas had increased from 0.4552 in 1959 to 0.5051 in 1971.¹⁰ From 1972, however, according to an economist:¹¹

> "There seems to be a tendency for the expenditure distribution to stabilize or even improve slightly over the two years 1972-3 and 1973-4. The expenditure share of the bottom 10 per cent of households (which had) decreased uniformly from 1.77 per cent in 1959-60 to 1.34 per cent in 1971-2...increased slightly to 1.37 per cent. Similarly, the share of the top 10 per cent of households (which had) increased from 35.4 per cent in 1959-60 to the very high level of 39.5 per cent in 1971-72 declined sharply to 36.95 per cent in 1972-73..."

Also according to another analysis the Gini Index declined from 0.5051 in 1971-2 to 0.4946 in 1973-4.¹² The impact of the economic upheaval must be examined in relation to the conditions of the major social classes, the high bourgeoisie and the working class.

The High Bourgeoisie

A direct outcome of the expansion in financial wealth was that the regime adopted an even more liberal policy towards the industrialists in order to encourage investment and increase the supply of goods, lifting all trade restrictions and controls over banking credits. Between 1971 and 1975 alone, loans to the private sector increased by 289 per cent with more than half going into trade and imports. The amount of loans going to industrialists increased 45 per cent annually. Commercial banks had to expand their capital in order to cope with the increasing demands. In the 1960's the government had imposed trade restrictions and a high-rate tariff had been in operation. Now restrictions were lifted and tariff rates were reduced. Also exchange controls were removed in 1974 and traders were not required to submit depositing guarantees any more. This trade liberalization

^{10- &}lt;u>Kayhan</u>, 30 Mehr 1357. Gini index is a measure that shows how close a given distribution of income is to absolute equality or inequality. Absolute equality is demonstrated by zero and absolute inequality by 1.

¹¹⁻ M. Pesaran, 'Income Distribution and its Major Determinants in Iran', in J.Jaqs, <u>Iran: Past. Present and Future</u>, New York, 1976, p. 268. 12- <u>Kayhan</u>, op.cit.

policy remained in operation until 1977. In the same period the number of commercial banks increased from 24 to 36 and the volume of banking transactions increased sixfold. "These banks were established by a few large industrialists and capitalists in order to provide a direct financial link between their own monopoly industries and the banks."¹³ The liberal credit policy led to a growth in urban land dealing. Speculators concentrated on the booming construction sector. In industry an even greater concentration of capital became possible. In 1974 large private industries forming 3 per cent of all industries produced 70 per cent of total industrial surplus value. Between 1973 and 1975 the number of private companies in Tehran alone increased from 1700 to 2700.¹⁴ In short, "the government's deliberate policy of extending and supporting the private sector in the form of the sale of stateowned factories, extension of banking credits and concessions to large private enterprises and the removal of customs barriers all contributed to the speedy growth of the private sector in a short period of time."15

The Working Class

For a short period following the rise in oil revenues, the working class benefited from the financial affluence. Demands for wage increases were met by the government after the occurrence of a few strikes in 1971-2. An initial 25 per cent increase in wages was granted. In large industries wage demands of 40 per cent were accepted by the government. In May 1974 the High Council of Labour announced new minimum wages, increasing the daily industrial wage from 100 rials to 204 rials.¹⁶ In practice then, wages increased sharply: in textiles there was a 100 per cent increase in 1973 and a 200 per cent increase 13- EMAR, 1357, p. 53. 14- Tehran Economist, 22, Azar 1354; EMAR, 1352, p.204. 15- Kayhan, 14 Teer 1354. 16- Iran Almanac, 1976, p.354. in 1975. In the car industry, between 1971 and 1975 wages increased by 400 per cent.¹⁷ Unemployment virtually disappeared leading to a shortage in the labour force; foreign labour had to be brought in for new jobs. In a short period after 1973, increases in wages were higher than those in the index of consumer goods. Between 1971 and 1974 the consumer index rose by 40 per cent whereas industrial wages increased by 90 per cent.¹⁸

The increase in wages accelerated rural migration. Between 1962 and 1971 some two million people had migrated from the countryside to the towns. From 1973 onwards every year 8 per cent of the rural population left for the cities.¹⁹ The rate of population growth in Tehran increased from 3 per cent before 1973 to 8 per cent from then on. Between 1967 and 1976 the urban population increased from 37.7 per cent to 46.7 per cent of the total population.²⁰ The migrants were mostly employed in the burgeoning construction sector. In 1974 alone, the number of housing permits issued by the municipalities increased by 83 per cent.²¹ Altogether there were 800,000 people working in construction. Wages of construction workers increased by 77 per cent in 1974-5.²² Thus although rural migrants were from the beginning faced with the problem of housing, high wages and subsidized prices offered them a better standard of living than they could have hoped for in the depressed and stagnant countryside.

On the whole, in the two years after the rise in oil revenues, the public benefited from an unprecedented financial affluence. The Shah promised: "We shall try to offer the people the welfare and prosperity we have promised, today." Fublic expectations were deliberately raised and the general expectation was one of continued ability to satisfy

17- Economist (London), 20 December 1975, p.69. 18- EMAR, 1974. 19- Economist (London), 28 August 1976. 20- K. Kohli, Current Trends and Patterns of Urbanization in Iran: 1956-76, Plan Organization, Report no.I, 1977, p.28. 21- EMAR, 1353, p.101. 22- Ibid, 1354, p.106.

continually rising demands.

Economic Instability

As a result of the government policy to inject the new found wealth in the economy through increasing public expenditure, per capita income increased in an unprecedented manner, leading to a widening gap between demand and supply. National income increased by an annual average of 35 per cent and in two years per capita income trebled. The volume of money increased at an annual rate of 60 per cent.²³ Higher incomes and subsidized prices increased consumption. Whereas the population grew at a 3 per cent rate demands for consumer goods rose by 12 per cent annually. There was no comparable rise in domestic agricultural production, however. In fact in the past, agricultural production had been always low, in part due to the state's emphasis on industrialization. The low productivity of agriculture became distinctly clear from 1973, against a background of rising incomes and demands. The accelerated pace of rural migration left many villages deserted. According to one account, in 1975 the inhabitants of 8000 villages had all left for the cities.²⁴ Low production and increasing demands forced the government to import foodstuffs in large quantities and sell them at subsidized prices. As long as the oil revenues ran high, an elevated level of consumption could be maintained. The value of food imports grew more than four times from 1973 to 1976. Thus because of an increase in imports and current expenditure whereas in 1974 the government had a surplus of \$ 5.2 billion, in 1975 it was left with a deficit of \$ 1.7 billion.

Increasing demands led to a sharp increase in inflation. Imports were slow in reaching the market and were insufficient. Cargo ships had to wait an average of three months before being able to unload. In 23- BMAR, 1355, p.48. 24- Tehran Economist, 29-Farvardin 1355. 1975 there were 200 ships waiting in the southern ports at any one time. Although the import of meat increased more than four times between 1972 and 1975, because of increasing consumption there were severe meat shortages in 1975 and 1976. From 1974 prices increased sharply. According to official figures the compound rate of inflation between 1973 and 1977 was 93.8 per cent or an annual average of 18 per cent. But according to <u>Kayhan</u> the compound rate of inflation between 1973 and 1976 alone, was 200 per cent or an annual average of 50 per cent. There was a 500 per cent rise in the price of land and a 400 per cent rise in rents in Tehran where a third of the population lived in rented rooms.²⁵

Gradually price increases surpassed wage increases leading to a number of strikes from mid-1974 onwards. At least seven important strikes occurred in 1974 and 12 in 1975 for pay rises and the implementation of the profit-sharing law.²⁶ As a result of inflation income gaps began to widen. As already mentioned, in the 1972-74 period the Gini Index had shown a decrease in income differences. From 1974, however, there were indications of an increase in inequality. The Gini Index which had decreased from 0.5051 to 0.4946 in 1973-4 went up to 0.5144 in 1974-5.²⁷ An official source also wrote: "although the level of public welfare has risen there are now spectacular inequalities among various social classes."²⁸

On the whole, the economic crisis undermined the economic stability which had marked the previous decade. The emerging signs of labour unrest also indicated the weakness of the regime's apparatuses for the economic and political control of the subordinate classes.

Z5- Kayhan, 18 Mehr 1357; Tehran Economist, 18 Teer 1356.
 Z6- Mardom, 22 June, 23 August, 6 September and 23 October 1975.
 Z7- Kayhan, 30 Mehr 1357.
 Z8- BMAR, 1356, p.68.

Populist Efforts

The economic crisis of the early 1960's, as already discussed, prompted the emergence of the corporatist authoritarian regime at a time of conflict within the power bloc. In the mid-1970's, although the court was the only hegemonic power, the deeper economic crisis which was affecting the foundations of the regime prompted the emergence of a short-lived fascist phenomenon. This was the second major attempt at mass mobilization after the mobilization of the early 1960's, with a higher intensity and tempo and a different structuring. The court attempted to expand the apparatus of class control by the imposition of a new single political party to mobilize the lower classes and by the articulation of an ideology more heavyly imbued with populist overtones. As it appears from the pronouncements of the court, the motivating influences were the court's determination to check the growth of "industrial feudalism" (the grand bourgeoisie); the emerging signs of working class unrest; and the inadequacy of the existing ruling party to incorporate diverse interests. The court was thus cultivating the image of being autonomous from the social classes. Undertaking a populist mobilization effort the court imposed a new political organization to mobilize the lower classes economically and politically and antagonistically activate them within, of course, official bounds. Previously the working class had had no political weight in the state ideology; it had been neutralized rather than antagonized. The new party was to increase this political weight and the previous party was denounced for not having given the working class sufficient attention. Thus what emerged was a populist attempt, in the sense of the controlled activation of the lower classes on the basis of economic gratification, in the form of high wages and some redistributive measures, to transfer property

from one social class to another. As a result of these populist moves the clientelist relations which had obtained between government and business began to weaken.

In March 1975 the Shah issued a decree instructing the formation of an 'all-embracing' single party, the National Resurgence Party, the sale of shares in industrial enterprises to workers and the adoption of measures to control businessmen through price control and anti-profiteering campaign and checks on the wealth of highranking officials. The Shah justified his moves in the name of the prevention of 'class exploitation'.²⁹ The new move was allegedly a discretion on the part of the court. The Shah claimed: "We are always more steps ahead in satisfying the workers and peasants' demands than what they would expect themselves. For this is a revolution that should always be ahead of the events of the future so that no unexpected event and no social or economic change may catch us unawares."³⁰

The new move labeled <u>Asr-e Rastakhiz</u> (the era of resurgence) had definite similarities with fascist movements in that it sought to create a one-party political system for the mobilization of the masses, especially of the youth; it put an emphasis on a state-directed collectivist social order and was motivated by a drive to catch up with the developed nations; it explicitly rejected Western liberalism and it allegedly aimed at a general defence of all classes in the interest of the nation.³¹

The centrepiece of the movement was the single party. The party was to function as "a means for the political mobilization of numerous 29- M.R. Pahlavi, <u>Besuye Tamaddon-e Bozorg</u>, (Towards the Great Civili zation), Tehran, n.d. pp.92-3.

³⁰⁻ The text of the decree published by the Ministry of Information. 31- The common features of fascist movements are analysed in: A. James Gregor, <u>The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics</u>, Princeton, 1974, pp.175-80.

groups. Its main function is the publicization of politics and the politicization of the public. It is to open the political space and make the society political all over." The previous party was denounced as having been unable to articulate the broad interests of the nation. It had been "the party of power and domination and the gathering place for political profiteers. The party had been content only with the formal existence of front organizations and trade unions and cooperatives."³² "In order to chain the small minority and bring out the large majority" the party became actively engaged in the mobilization of workers, peasants and students and established 50,000 party cells throughout the country. Party activists were mostly chosen from students, workers and youth. During the 1975 parliamentary elections the party sought to recruit a new clientele through the nomination of new candidates. It rejected more than half of the previous deputies and as a result 80 percent of the new deputies were new party recruits.53

Directly related to the political mobilization of workers was the court's redistributive policy. In the previous decade the relations between government and business had been based on distribution and regulation. Now in 1975 the court ordered the implementation of a previously adopted policy of share participation. This was the sale of 49 per cent of the holdings of 320 major private manufacturing companies and 99 per cent of the shares of state companies as an immediate measure in order to "destroy industrial feudalism and the concentration of capital."³⁴ According to the Law for the Extension of Industrial

³²⁻ Ayandegan, 18 Esfand 1353.

^{33.} The party put emphasis on the symbolic representation of workers. Of the new deputies 25 were doctors, 27 teachers, 7 professors, 7 lawyers, 11 workers, 34 farmers, 6 directors-general, 4 top officials and "only a few businessmen". (Iran Almanac, 1976, p.92.) Among these businessmen were large industrialists such as the chairman of the Chamber of Commerce and of the Carpet Employers' Union. On their election, the Shah, in line with the mobilization policy, warned the businessmen that "they will be no more allowed to pursue their own interest and exceed their limits in order to loot others." <u>Ayandegan</u> 15 Mordad 1354. 34- M.R. Pahlavi, op. cit. p.128.

Property, between August 1975 and March 1976, 102 of the large enterprises sold 20 per cent of their shares and continued the sale up to 1978, fulfilling the legal target. The other 218 enterprises affected negotiated with the government for a postponement of the legal deadline. In order to enable the workers to buy the shares the government set up a credit organization to grant them loans. By 1977, some 72,000 workers in large establishments, a small fraction of the industrial working class, had purchased shares.

Another measure adopted by the regime was the policy of price control and an anti-profiteering campaign which began in 1975 as part of the wider anti-business moves. The new party set up a price commission which in cooperation with the chamber of guilds launched an extensive campaign against profiteering. Young party recruits, especially students, checked and fixed prices, beat up businessmen and shopkeepers, smashed shops and stores, harrassed and bribed and became a major threat to the stability of the bazaar. Price control and anti-profiteering were declared to be a constant policy of the government.

Although these populist policies did not leave a deep imprint, either in economic terms or in terms of their ideological legacy, they were important in fomenting and unleashing the potential for political conflict. These policies did not lead to any change in the ruling elite, however. In fact, in the course of the following years the Shah vacillated between encouraging continued material gratification for the working class and making attempts to redress the complaints of business.

Disruption of the Clientelistic Relations

The attempt to overcome the economic crisis involved considerable challenge to the vested interests that constituted the regime's main source of support. Thus as a consequence of the court's populist

efforts some fundamental conflict of interest began to arise between the upper class and the state.³⁵ Although these efforts, especially the gestures concerning the economic gratification and political mobilization of the working class, were half-hearted, they nontheless brought about serious political and economic consequences, creating a range of incompatible political debts and commitments for the court. The industrial bourgeoisie had grown in the shadow of state protection and had become a major client and pressure group with which to be reckoned. The court's new mobilization efforts and redistributive policies struck fear in the high bourgeoisie. No confiscation of property took place of course, as the industrialists affected by the Law for the extension of property were fully compensated. Indeed, the government organization responsible for the legal transfer of the shares paid the industrialists more than the workers had paid to purchase the shares. The Prime Minister assurred the bourgeoisie that "they will still have the absolute control of their factory and of the majority of the shares. The aim is to create a sense of equality among workers."³⁶The share-holding workers were thus legally barred from participation in management and while the employers could own up to 51 per cent of the shares the maximum number of shares which one worker could buy was five.

In the previous decade the entrepreneurs had invested in a secure environment and had obtained high profits. Now the Shah claimed that "we are determined to resolve all class contradictions in Iran."³⁷ As a result of the changed situation, there was an increasing flight of capital abroad. Within one year of the introduction of the redis-<u>35- Cf. Th. Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative</u> Analysis of France, Russia and China, Cambridge, 1979.

Skocpol demonstrates that great revolutions were initiated as a result of a conflict between the state and the upper class over the extraction of resources, especially at times of international conflict. 36- Kayhan, 26 Mehr 1354. 37- Tehran Economist, 11 Ordibehesht, 1355.

tributive scheme. \$ 2 billion worth of private funds were transferred abroad 'for lack of opportunities for investment'.³⁸ The regime's antibusiness drive was further reinforced by the policy of price control, anti- profiteering and wage increases. The govenment imposed a profit margin of 15 per cent and since the cost of transportation exceeded this, businessmen declined to shift their goods from the customs, contributing to the congestion in ports. During the anti-profiteering campaign a number of large businessmen were arrested. From the grand bourgeoisie M. Vahabzadeh, the owner of car industries and H. Elqanian, the owner of plastic industries were arrested and the latter's business was closeddown for good. H. Sabet, the industrial magnate, was accused of profiteering and left his business idle. H. Hamadanian, a large businessman from Esfahan was imprisoned on profiteering charges. In a number of radio speeches, the Shah said that the richest men in the country were in prison. implying that his regime was not supporting the wealthy class. Other businessmen and large merchants were banished. 39 In the 1975 elections some major industrialists had been elected to the parliament by spending large sums on the election campaign. The Shah warned the 'wealthy deputies' not to 'exceed their limits'. Extraordinary courts were set up to deal with profiteers. Not only the wholesaler but also the petty retailer of the bazaar came under scrutiny by the party committees and 'shock troops'. The prices of 14,000 items were fixed and within a month more than 8,000 shopkeepers and owners of large stores were cast into prison and fined on charges of hoarding and profiteering. 40 The entrepreneurs were blamed as being the major cause of the economic problems. The official newspaper Kayhan wrote: "Most of the private sector enterprises have sought more and more profit-making as their sole objective.

³⁸⁻ Business Week No. 17, 1975.

^{39- &}lt;u>Ayandegan</u>, 18 Mordad 1354. 40- <u>Economist</u>, (London) 13 December 1975, p.54.

Many of these enterprises make 50 to 100 per cent profit. They attempt to produce the maximum profit with the simplest and least costly technique because they are sure of their sales under customs protection."41 Furthermore, the High Council of Labour raised the minimum wage and the government put pressure on employers to increase the wages by a set formula. The state's populist gestures meant a more favourable attitude towards the mounting demands for higher wages. Several strikes occurred for pay rises in mid-1975. The regime, through the Ministry of Labour and the security police, exerted pressure on industrialists to raise wages. On one occasion security forces watched striking workers at the Tehran Power Organization taking to the streets, until the management was forced to concede more favourable terms.⁴² Strikes for wage increases continued and in 1976-77 demands for 50 and even 100 per cent wage increases were satisfied. Furthermore, the Central Bank adopted a stabilization policy and applied control over private banking credits. The minimum reserve requirement of the commercial banks with the Central Bank was also raised and they were barred from foreign borrowing. As a result, the growth rate of banking credit going to the private sector declined from 55 percent in 1975 to 20 percent in 1977.

Undoubtedly, solutions to the problems of the economy imposed upon the regime the need for 'hard' decisions that penalized at least a segment of the upper bourgeoisie. The entrepreneurs soon began to air their complaints about increasing state intervention in the economy. K. Khosrowshahi, a grand industrialist, complained that "in a free economy the state should interfere only in those fields that are beyond the management capacity of private enterprise whereas now the state increasingly interferes in free enterprise, causing insecurity and low production."⁴³ The industrialist, Senator Lajevardi, opposing the policy of price

43- Tehran Economist, 1 Azar 1354.

⁴¹⁻ Kayhan, 14 Teer 1354. 42- Mardom, 22 June 1975

control stated: "Nowhere in the world is price control for all commodities permanently practiced. Price control is logical only for short periods of time and for goods in public demand. The economy will be healthy when profit is high."⁴⁴ Complaining about the mobilization of the working class another industrialist said: "We should be careful not to repeat the mistakes of Western countries. Workers' organizations should not be turned into a power front against the employers in the name of the protection of workers' interests and rights."⁴⁵

It was thus clear that there was no agreement between the regime and the bourgeoisie on the policies to control the economic situation. The resulting dissension was reflected on the political level within the Rastakhiz single party. The court had intended to create a united single organization in order to implement its mobilization schemes but soon the differences between the regime and the bourgeoisie surfaced inside the party. Thus within the single party two political 'wings' emerged and in the course of the following years they engaged in conflicts over political office and the economic policy of the state. The 'Progressive Wing' was the dominant bureaucratic fascist-populist wing and closely followed the mobilization policies of the court after 1975. This wing was dominated by the elite of the previous ruling party, the N.I.P., and the 'members' of the wing were mostly senior civil servants and members of the cabinet. The Progressive Wing overwhelmingly supported state economic intervention and comprehensive economic planning and, in line with the new populist moves, launched a propaganda campaign against 'monopoly capital'. The 'Constructive Wing', on the other hand, was known for its advocacy of liberal policies, the relaxation of state control of the economy and a more independent role for the private sector. It was led by the businessman and the Minister of Interior, Hushang Ansari, and among its members

⁴⁴⁻ Tehran Economist, 28 Farvardin, 1355.

there were large industrialists and capitalists, associated especially with the Chamber of Commerce. The Constructive Wing emerged as the opposition faction within the single party. In the Party Congress the dominant bureaucratic faction put an emphasis on 'independent nationalist policies' and called for a'struggle against imperialism'. Under the domination of the bureaucratic faction the foreign concerns operating in Iran were also affected by the Law for the extension of industrial property. Accordingly, foreign participants in joint ventures could retain up to 25 per cent of the stake whereas previously they had been able to own up to 49 per cent. Some foreign companies affected by the Law reacted against the new moves. For instance, the B.F.Goodrich company sold off its entire stake. Also in 1976 an American business mission to Iran, led by D. Rockefeller, failed to conclude an agreement on further U.S. investment with the cabinet dominated by the bureaucratic faction. The mission warned the government that in future it would find it more difficult to encourage further American investment in Iran. By contrast, the liberal faction of the party advocated the expansion of foreign investment in order to raise domestic production.

On the whole, the economic crisis tended to fractionalize the dominant class and in turn, the resulting dissension increased still further the difficulties of controlling the economic situation. The populist attempts by the court penalized a segment of the dominant class but these attempts did not yield quick results in terms of economic growth and price stability. Domestic entrepreneurs were clearly threatened by the populist gestures of the fascist-oriented Rastakhiz party and this threat jeopardized the prospects for political consolidation on the basis of the new policies. Thus the regime was losing the support of some of the vested interests that had thus far constituted its main source of support. Apparently it seemed that the Shah would continue the mobilization policy but due to the aggravation of the economic situation, after some vacillation, he opted for demobilization and sought to redress the grievances of the bourgeoisie.

The Economic Crisis Superimposed

The economic crisis and inflation generated from within, further worsened with a decline in the government's financial capability, which forced it to rely on a policy of high taxation. Furthermore. the monetary and direct measures to curb inflation contributed to the onset of a period of recession. The fiscal crisis began from mid-1976 when fluctuations in oil exports, after the earlier phenomenal rise in revenues, led to a reduction in the government's earnings from oil. The annual rate of growth in the oil sector had been predicted at 52 per cent but due to fluctuations it did not exceed 26 per cent. The decline in oil sales and revenues was due to a decline in the world oil market and a reduction in international oil prices. The decline was reflected in the 1976-7 budget in which foreign borrowing was to compensate for a deficit of \$ 2 billion. This was inevitable, as the pace of economic growth and expenditure had been set at 1973 pricing standards. Thus despite the decline in revenues, current expenditure continued to increase. In 1975-6 current expenditure increased by 30 per cent, whereas oil revenues increased by only 7 per cent. By mid-1977 the deficit had risen to \$ 4.5 billion. As a result, several plans and projects and such off-spins of the oil affluence as huge food subsidies, low taxes and school meals had to be abandoned. Wage increases were also discouraged and public expenditure was cut. From 1976 imports began to decline. Between 1974 and 1976 they had increased by an annual average of 60 per cent; in 1977 the rate of increase dec-

lined to 3 per cent. Thus supplies from imports were not sufficient to meet increasing demands. This led to an even higher inflation. A 40 per cent inflation continued up to mid-1977, when it slowed down due only to a severe recession which set in from mid-1976. as a result of the control over prices, anti-business moves and monetary and fiscal policies in general. Many factories closed down or cut their production. The recession also resulted in a sharp decline in land dealings and construction activities which were responsible for growing unemployment from late 1976. The rate of unemployment increased from one per cent in 1974 to 9 per cent at the end of 1977. 46 The policy of tight credit control, higher interest rates (up to 30 per cent in the bazaar) and control over the money supply led to a decline in financial transactions. The dealings of the Stock Exchange declined from a 115 per cent annual rate of growth in 1975-6 to 16 per cent in 1977.⁴⁷ From early 1977 bankruptcies occurred among merchants and traders. These were the result of heavy financial commitments undertaken in the previous years, the decrease in banking credit and heavy interest rates in the bazaar. As to agriculture, instead of the predicted 7 per centannual rate of growth, there was a one per cent decline due to the increase in the cost of agricultural production. wage increases and a shortage of rainfall in 1977. On the whole. the economic crisis worsened and was further reinforced by a fiscal crisis and recession.

In order to compensate for declining revenues the government resorted to a policy of high taxation from 1976. Receipts from direct taxes especially, increased substantially above the predicted amount. The share of taxes in government revenues which had decreased from 32 per cent to 11 per cent between 1972 and 1974, increased from 1976,

⁴⁶⁻ BMAR, 1977, p.117. 47- Ibid, p.80.

reaching more than 30 per cent in 1978. In absolute terms, due to the massive increases in government revenues the rise in taxes was substantial. Total taxes increased from \$ 2.2 billion in 1973 to \$ 5.9 in 1977. In 1975 alone, taxes were raised by 71.6 per cent. In 1977 private corporation taxes were increased by 80 per cent. Taxes on salaries were raised by 71 per cent in 1976 and 51 per cent in 1977. The following tables show the share of taxes in government revenues and the annual increase in the amount of taxes.

Composition of Government Revenues: 1972-78

Description	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978
Total Revenues	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
1- Oil 2- Taxes (Direct taxes (Indirect taxes 3- Government Services & Others	59% 32% 1 <i>3</i> % ss19% 9%	67% 28% 11% 17% 5%	86% 11% 5% 6% <i>3</i> %	78% 17% 9• <i>5</i> % 7•5% 5%	76% 19% 10% 9% 5%	7 <i>3%</i> 22% 11% 11% 5%	6 <i>3</i> % 29% 17%) 12%) 8%

Sources: Central Bank, Bank Markazi Annual Report and Balance Sheet, 1972 to 1978.

Yearly Increase in Taxes: 1973-78 (Increase in the Absolute Amount, Compared to the Preceding Year.)									
Description	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978			
Private Companies Government	30%	38%	24.8%	47%	80.5%	1.3%			
Companies Taxes on	50%	68%	224%	7%	7.6%	35•7%			
Imports Income	33%	4.8%	45%	32%	36%	-15%			
Tax Wealth	28%	12%	48%	59%	20%	1.2%			
Tax Sales and	37%	25%	21%	31%	14%	-12%			
Consumption Total Annual	21%	21%	19%	24%	35%	19.5%			
Increase	33%	20%	71.6%	26%	29%	4.5%			

Sources: <u>Bank Markazi Annual Reports and Balance Sheet</u>, 1973 to 1978. Direct tax increases during the recessionary period after 1976 were among the contributing causes of public discontent and political opposition as we will go on to show. As the latter table demonstrates, the fiscal crisis reached its climax in 1978, when the government was nearly bankrupt, as the predicted increases in taxes did not materialize because of the economic slump. In that year the government had to resort to domestic borrowing on a large scale.

The Crisis Cabinet: The Reversal of the Populist Policies

The regime was confronted with inflation hitting the public. recession affecting business and the fiscal crisis debilitating the government. During the 1975-77 period the regime's populist attempts had alienated a segment of the bourgeoisie and had caused a cleavage in the state as manifested in the factionalization of the Rastakhiz party. Yet these attempts did not stabilize the economic situation which further worsened with the onset of the fiscal crisis and recession. The redistributionist policies did not find influential advocates and on the whole, there was no agreement on the policies to control the economic situation. From 1977 the regime began to change the policies of 1975, aiming to restore relations between government and business. To heal the rifts caused by the populist moves, it sought to give incentives to entrepreneurs in order to increase domestic investment and to ease their dissatisfaction by giving some large businessmen cabinet posts and a say in the formulation of government economic policy. Thus compared to the fascist moves of 1975, a degree of economic liberalization began to obtain. Yet it soon became clear that the regime was launching a contradictory venture, seeking to fulfill fundamentally incompatible commitments. On the one hand it wanted to remove constraints on free enterprise and to reserve an important place for the bourgeoisie in the economy, and on the

other it sought to interfere in the economy to prevent public dissatisfaction. The interventionist policies which were forced on the regime by the economic situation resulted in serious distortions of the institution of free enterprise. In the end the regime satisfied neither the entrepreneurs nor the lower classes.

The regime's policy reversal brought about a change in government. In August 1977, the cabinet dominated by the bureaucratic fascist faction of the Rastakhiz party, which had carried out the court's mobilization policies, was replaced by a new cabinet with leaning towards the liberal Constructive faction. It was headed by Jamshid Amuzegar (an economist) and contained a number of industrialists. In particular, two major industrialists were appointed as ministers of commerce and of industries. To heal the rifts with business, the new cabinet was to encourage the private sector, to check the growth of the public sector, to revise the price control policy, to stop the anti-profiteering campaign, to extend banking credit to the private sector and to clarify long-term policies. In particular, a cancellation of wage increases which had been propagated by the previous cabinet was on the new cabinet's agenda. In the hope of stimulating increases in the production of consumer goods the new cabinet also planned to sell state-owned industries. The Shah spoke of judiciously granting the private sector the gradual advantage of decision making in business matters. At the same time, the government was to fully implement the workers' profit- sharing and share- participation schemes, to control prices indirectly, to ensure 'reasonable' wages and to raise taxes. In particular, the government promised a 'fundamental' campaign against inflation. 48

The government was thus trying to serve opposing economic interests. In order to encourage the bourgeoisie, the regime had to give 48- Ministry of Information, "The Programme of the Government of Dr. Amuzegar," Mordad 1356.

incentives such as tax holidays, to lift direct control over prices and to control wages and abandon the anti-profiteering campaign. At the same time, the government was committed to curb inflation and ensure high wages, which would affect the policy of free prices for business. The government policy was thus contradictory; it had to increase profits, prices and wages and to curb inflation at the same time. In actual fact, the government abandoned the policy of price control (except on essential goods). It announced a free price policy, provided financial facilities for entrepreneurs, reduced tariff restrictions, abandoned the anti-profiteering campaign and dissolved the related committee in the Chamber of Guilds. The single party declared that its participation in price control had been 'a mistake'. The government introduced a new scheme according to which the workers' share of the net profit would be paid to them on condition that they raised the output and efficiency of the factory. The government also announced a wage freeze and stabilized the salaries of government employees. But the policy of free prices led to more inflation at a time of stable wages, and hence the government was forced to intermittently control prices or increase wages. In mid-1978 the government had to call for a 50 percent increase in wages. In particular in 1978, the government was forced to control prices under increasing public pressure given an opportunity for expression under the liberalization policy (see below).

The crisis cabinet was thus riven with tensions and contradictions. The bourgeoisie was dissatisfied due to the government's economic intervention and the lower classes were discontented because of the inflation, low wages and higher taxes. We will examine the failure of the crisis cabinet in terms of the effects of its policies on the high bourgeoisie and the general public.

The new cabinet sought to accommodate industrialists through the

policy of economic liberalization and wage stabilization after two years of price control and the anti-profiteering campaign. It also decreased its intervention on behalf of workers in industrial relations, while some factories cut wages and others ended the workers' shares in profits. Thus the ratio of wage expenditure declined from 22.9 per cent in 1976 to 19.1 per cent in 1977. The mobilization of workers for party rallies was slowed down. More banking credits were granted to entrepreneurs and initially 14 large agri-business complexes owned by the state were sold out to the private sector.

However, the policy of free prices favoured by business and the campaign against inflation were particularly contradictory. Under the pressures of public dissatisfaction and increasing inflation the government was gradually forced to move towards the policy of price control. In the beginning, the government pledged to grant the private sector a say in economic decision making; in practice the Shah frequently bullied the bourgeoisie, saying that: "we are determined to raise production and lead this nation into the prosperity of a great civilization if necessary by force."49 The entrepreneurs at least wanted to have a say in economic policy-making concerning wages, prices and profit. The Tehran Economist summed up the complaints of the bourgeoisie as being: 1) the state's increasing intervention in the economy; 2) sudden changes in laws and regulations; 3) government interference in domestic trade; and 4) lack of continuity and perspective in government economic programmes.⁵⁰ The bourgeoisie demanded: "1) changes in laws and regulations in the interest of industrialists and capitalists and the provision of more credit and capital; 2) concentration of all economic policies in one single organization; 3) exemption from taxation up to 10 percent of the net profit; 4) reduction of taxation rates for industri-

50- Tehran Economist, 29 Mordad 1356.

⁴⁹⁻ Kayhan, 3 Aban 1356.

alists and traders in the provinces; 5) reduction in the price of raw materials: 6) reforms in laws regarding income tax on the basis of suggestions from the Chamber of Commerce."⁵¹ Businessmen also demanded: "a revision of the wage policy in order to stop wage increases; a revision of the regulations of the Central Bank in order to reduce the deposits of the private banks with the Central Bank, and an increase in the grant of credits to the investors."52 Industrialists also complained about the court's intervention in the economy. For instance, it is reported that Ali Rezai, a member of parliament and a major industrialist told the Shah: "You determine the prices, the wages, the profit, the customs duties and so on. It would be better if you would please take charge of the management of industries yourself."53 The policy of high taxation especially on income and private companies provided another cause for complaint by the entrepreneurs. In 1977, the government started to investigate the taxes payable in 1975 but remaining unpaid due to irregular tax collection. All past and current tax records were brought under investigation to exact the unpaid taxes. The government announced that a large number of people with high incomes had been identified for tax payment and shortly ordered payment of taxes by two million people. After a period of very low taxes or tax immunity, the adoption of a retroactive policy of high taxation caused complaints among the employers. The syndicate of machine factories and workshops encompassing 2,000 production units sent a letter to the Prime Minister complaining that in the past it had been deprived of all the privileges provided by the government for other industries and now it had to bear the burden of high taxation and warned that if the government failed to solve the tax problems it would close down its factories.

⁵¹⁻ Kayhan, 13 Bahman 1356.

⁵²⁻ Tehran Economist, 28 Farvardin 1355.

⁵³⁻ As quoted in: Mojahedin-e Khalq, <u>Dowreh-ye Zamamdari-ye Carter</u>, (The Administration of President Carter), Mojahedin Publications, Tehran 1358, p.52. 54- <u>Kayhan</u>, 1 Aban 1357.

The government also began to control urban land dealing and speculation which in the past few years had become a major field of investment, and set maximum prices for urban land. Land dealers and speculators complained that due to price restrictions imposed by the government, their dealings had drastically declined.⁵⁵ Also in order to ease public dissatisfaction with the acute housing problem the Tehran municipality leased many empty houses to applicants without the consent of their owners. These were expensive houses beyond the public's purchasing power. There were complaints about the insecurity of private property and the interferences of the members of the royal family in business affairs.⁵⁶ Flights of capital which had been already under way intensified, and an increasing number of companies were closing down in late 1977. On the whole, the regime found it difficult to appease the bourgeoisie in a situation of economic crisis.

From 1975 the petty bourgeoisie of the bazaar had been hit by the anti-profiteering campaign and price control. The bazaaris particularly disliked the Chamber of Guilds which was the watchdog of the single party in the bazaar. The Chamber had full supervisory powers over all bazaar guilds and imposed the guilds' regulations and fixed prices. Although in 1977 the anti-profiteering campaign was officially abandoned, the Chamber of Guilds continued to fix prices in the bazaars. In the month of April 1977 alone, the government received 600 million Rials in fines for profiteering, mostly from the shopkeepers of the bazaar. In the same year, 20,000 shopkeepers and traders were imprisoned and fined. Files on bazaar businessmen pertaining to taxes, fines and antiprofiteering had been compiled in the municipalities and had become a major preoccupation for the courts. In 1978 new regulations were drawn up for taxing the bazaar guilds. The 1977 tax rates were announced to

^{55- &}lt;u>Kayhan</u> 19 Mordad 1357. 56- Ibid, 24 Mordad 1357.

be the base (retroactively) for the five preceding years. The same rates were to become the basis for taxation in the following five years. Retroactive and high taxation led to protests by the bazaar guilds against 'arbitrary regulations'.⁵⁷

The measures which the government adopted to combat inflationary pressures, to end the recession and to solve the fiscal crisis imposed hardships on the public who were now faced with salary freezes. tax increases and rising prices. In the 1976-78 period, in contrast to the preceding 1974-76 period, the sharp increase in the price of consumer goods, a decline in the anti-profiteering campaign, the policy of free prices and the wage-freeze policy increasingly widened the gap between wage increases and the rate of inflation. According to official figures. in 1977 industrial wages increased by 25 per cent while the index of consumer goods showed a 30 per cent rise.⁵⁸ The daily Kayhan, however. disputed the official figures for inflation in 1977-8 and put the rate of inflation at 85 per cent. According to Kayhan, the policy of free prices adopted from early 1977 was responsible for this sharp increase in inflation.⁵⁹ The tax increases also hit the lower classes. According to Kayhan: "The real reason for tax increases was not a more equitable distribution of income; rather the pressing needs of the government for more revenues dictated the tax policy. Hence from 1975, taxation not only did not bring about a better distribution of income but in fact it worsened the situation."⁶⁰ According to a report "the pressures of high taxes and rising prices are the cause of public dissatisfaction. The tax-collecting apparatus has become a means for violence." ⁶¹ In a series of surveys carried out by Kayhan, people also complained about the government's abandonment of the anti-profiteering campaign and price control. Obviously, the government's pressing needs to extract unprece-

57- Ettelaat, 19 Mordad 1357. 59- Kayhan, 15 Mordad 1357. 61- Reported by The Group for the Investigation of Iran's Problems' quoted in Haj Seyed Javadi, <u>Daftar-haye Jonbesh</u>, (Books on the Revolution) Tehran, 1357, p.31. dentedly large financial resources from the domestic economy penalized the upper as well as the lower classes.

On the whole, during the 1975-77 period of economic upheaval. which caused large scale mass grievances, the regime undertook a fascist mobilization effort which created some important conflicts of interest between the state and the bourgeoisie. It also increased still further the difficulties of controlling the economic situation by contributing to the recession. Thus there were no good prospects for the political consolidation of the fascist-populist regime and the political situation remained fluid. Due to these problems, the regime abandoned some of the populist gestures and by instituting a new government it sought to redress the discontent of the bourgeoisie as well as the grievances of the public. Thus it was seeking to fulfill fundamentally incompatible commitments and was launching a contradictory venture. In particular, the free price policy and the campaign against inflation were irreconcilable. Thus the crisis cabinet failed to contain the economic situation, to heal the rifts with the bourgeoisie or to consolidate the political situation. Indeed, it further paved the way for the expression of economic dissatisfaction through a policy of political liberalization which made the politicization of economic grievances possible.

Political Liberalization

The new liberal economic policy which the regime adopted in 1977, in response to the difficulties caused by the populist efforts and the economic recession, was accompanied by a vague and half-hearted programme of political liberalization which was initially an internal liberalization effort, leading to the appointment of the liberal faction of the Rastakhiz party to government. However, as a result of changing circumstances, the programme later went beyond the official bounds and led to demands for a liberal-constitutional regime.

Behind the policy reversal and political liberalization lay external pressure from the court's foreign allies, especially the United States of America. Since the establishment of the single party and the anti-business moves which affected the local dependent bourgeoisie and some foreign interests, some differences had emerged between the regime and the U.S. government, especially in the field of business relations (see above, page 159). Furthermore, although the regime did not adopt a radical stance on the international issue of oil policy, the issue still caused some differences between the regime and its Western allies. Criticisms of the Shah's style of rule appeared in the Western press from 1975. There was some opposition in the U.S. Congress to the sale of large quantities of arms to the regime. In America, during the campaign for the 1976 presidential elections the Democrat party put an emphasis on the policy of 'human rights'. Following the commencement of the Carter administration, which adhered to this policy, further criticisms of the Shah's regime appeared in the U.S. press. These differences were reflected within the single party. While the party congress held under the bureaucratic Progressive wing spoke of the interferences of imperialism in national affairs the liberal Constructive wing representing the private sector supported the 'human rights policy'. That the issue of oil policy contributed to the differences between the regime and its Western allies was manifested in a Conference of Western countries (at Guadeloupe) which was held to investigate general economic conditions in the West. The Conference declared support for the 'national internal forces' and 'the private sector' vis-a-vis authoritarian regimes and put an emphasis on the 'human rights' policy. It also called for an oil price-freeze and advocated a reversal from the policy of creating 'regional powers' previously associated with the U.S. foreign policy. All these points clearly referred to the case of the authorita-

rian regime in Iran. Despite the existence of these differences, however, actual external pressure for the reversal of policies and for political liberalization seems to have been slight and following the Shah's meeting with the new U.S. president in November 1977, during which emphasis was put on the stability of the regime and the Shah agreed not to press for higher oil prices, the pressures seemed to have decreased. Whatever external pressure there was, it found suitable internal grounds in that the policy reversals had been forced on the regime from within by the economic and political crises and had been adopted in order to heal the rifts between government and business.

Although the liberalization programme initially referred to the single party since it continued to be mentioned in the official rhetoric it acquired different meanings as a result of changing situations. In the begining, liberalization was intended to be a sign of the power of the regime as had been the case with the slogans of 'development' and 'mobilization'. But gradually it appeared as an indication of the weakness and crisis of the regime. Liberalization meant an official recognition of the existing political repression. The Shah pardoned a number of political prisoners. International human rights organizations were allowed to visit prisons and investigate the extent of repression. Political trials were to be held in civil rather than military courts. The regime's pretensions to liberalization further unleashed a constitutional opposition from below. Protests by the intelligentsia were increasingly expressed in the form of open letters and petitions. In June 1977, the National Front leaders in an open letter criticized the regime for its despotism and called for a return to constitutional government. In July, lawyers called for the abolition of the non-constitutional courts. In December, a committee was formed for the protection of human rights and it held a public press conference. The National

Front leaders made contacts with the American embassy in order to put forward their criticisms of the regime. At Tehran University, students held demonstrations in support of U.S. human rights policy. Some factions broke away from the official single party to form independent groupings. Thus political groups which had been considered subversive began to reemerge. Under the pressure of public dissatisfaction and constitutional opposition the Shah promised free elections and a free press. The liberalization programme thus provided an opportunity for the expression of grievances caused by the economic crisis. It was a major immidiate factor in the regime's disintegration of power. Alexis de Tocqueville has explained the role of liberalization in precipitating revolution thus:⁶²

> "It is not always by going from bad to worse that a society falls into revolution. It happens most often that a people, which has supported without complaint, as if they were not felt, the most oppressive laws, violently throws them off as soon as their weight is lightened. The social order destroyed by a revolution is almost always better than that which immediately preceded it, and experience shows that the most dangerous moment for a bad government is generally that in which it sets about to reform. Only great genius can save a prince who undertakes to relieve his subjects after a long repression. The evil, which was suffered patiently as inevitable, seems unendurable as soon as the idea of escaping from it is conceived."

During the 1973-78 period the economic stability, fiscal capacity, class control, clientelism and coercion which had <u>en bloc</u> formed the <u>status quo</u> for more than a decade and had held the regime together began to falter. The economic crisis undermined the regime's economic basis while political liberalization made the politicization of economic demands possible. At the same time the upper class, growing discontented, could not carry on in the old way. In response, the regime sought to make new alliances through populist gestures and liberalization but its manoeuvres further intensified and politicized the ongoing crisis.

As for the general public, the five-year period witnessed great 62- de Tocqueville, op. cit. p. 178. economic upheavals. Early in the period economic growth and expansion in the resources led to a rise in the economic capabilities of the population. But the economic crisis which followed created large-scale mass grievances. Thus a long period of economic stability and growth was followed by a short period of sharp reversal and a grave economic crisis. On the whole, the convergence of several causes weakened the regime and created a revolutionary situation. In the following chapter we will explain the actual disintegration of the regime and its collapse in terms of the more immediate and political factors.

VII- The Coming of the Revolution

The constitutional opposition to the regime which had been stimulated by the political liberalization programme consisted of already organized political groups and parties whose emergence was not a novel development. The revolution began with the advent of an initially incoherent popular opposition which gradually turned into an uncontrollable force, and which rapidly outran the militancy and radicalism of the organized opposition. This mass movement passed through several phases. The early events of popular opposition were spontaneous outbursts of workers faced with a vicious price spiral which surpassed any price rises, of clerks and teachers enraged over their declining purchasing power, of recent rural migrants filled with anger at the demolition of their houses by the municipality police, and of undergraduates and intellectuals haunted by the fear of the Savak, which under the cover of official liberalization harrassed and tortured dissidents. In general the public faced increasing rents, prices and taxes. The factors which most profoundly affected the daily life of the average Iranian were acute inflation, shortages of food (because of an unequal distribution of goods) and a population explosion which had been brought about by the economic boom and which had turned 'southern' districts of large cities into cramped ghettos. Often a whole family had to live in one rented room. The urban unskilled worker who had recently migrated from the countryside remained alienated from his immediate environment and was most vulnerable to the economic crisis. The regime's symbolic manoeuvres had left no positive impact on the life of the lower classes. Instead, the government caught in a severe fiscal crisis initiated a tax system which squeezed capital out of the urban middle

class and decreased the consumption of the lower classes. The progressive break-down of the economy affected in particular the urban working class. The agricultural sector could not support consumption nationally. Land reforms which had stimulated the disintegration of the countryside against a background of increasing urbanization had created small holdings without increasing agricultural production. The public warehouses had stocks from the past but corruption and hoarding were commonplace in the bureaucracy. The public thus had good reason for strong indignation and discontent.

The upper class was also discontented because of the economic recession and symbolic changes in government policy. The redistributive policies and the economic stabilization programme had caused dissatisfaction among powerful economic interests manifested in flights of capital and capitalists. There were complaints about increasing state intervention in the economy. Within the single party, business interests had already expressed their opposition to the domination of business interests by the bureaucratic interests. Also, the increasing disunity in parliament led to the emergence of several 'fractions' (including the Pan-Iranist, the Freedom, the National Unity, the National Path and the National Ideal fractions). In particular, the Freedom Fraction was supported by business interests which had entered the Majles in 1975.¹ There was also some direct support among the high bourgeoisie for the revolution. For instance, T. Barkhordar, a major industrialist, payed 20 million rials "in order to help the movement".² Likewise some industrialists continued to pay striking workers. Merchants and traders in the bazaars set up funds to provide financial help for strikers and to distribute provisions during the revolution.³

¹⁻ Ayandegan, 6 Aban 1357.

²⁻ Kar, 17 Khordad 1358.

³⁻ $\overline{Cf.}$ "The bourgeoisie invests in revolution as they would in anything else, spreading risk and covering all options by backing all promising movements." F.G. Hutchins, op. cit. p.27.

Against this background of public discontent. in the beginning public protest was expressed by spontaneous crowds with little mobilization and organization. The economically motivated crowds reacted to rising prices, lower wages and food shortage. The expression of grievances was particularly encouraged by the liberalization programme and was given some space in the official press. In August 1977, several crowds composed of high-school students and 'by-passers' spontaneously gathered in the vicinity of the Artillary Square near the bazaar in Tehran. They complained of high prices and food shortage.⁴ Confrontation between the municipality police and rural immigrants who were building houses out of city limits led to several clashes between crowds and the police. A crowd of people whose houses had been demolished by the police set out from the south of Tehran to the Shah's Niavaran palace but were prevented from approaching the palace by the police. Their representatives explained their action in terms of the liberalization policy and the right to free expression but they were arrested and accused of sedition, and in the end no answer to their complaints came from the Shah's special bureau.⁵ During 1977, crowds of workers gathering in the south of Tehran clashed with the municipality police who continued to demolish the houses built outside the city limits. In November and December sporadic and spontaneous strikes occurred in several factories as well as government departments. In December, coinciding with the religious month of Moharram. shopkeepers in the Tehran bazaar attending religious sermons held demonstrations against government economic policy.⁶ From December there was a gradual transition from spontaneous and economically motivated crowds to more organized rallies and demonstrations. One special event acted as the precipitant of the revolution. In December, Mostafa Khomeini, son

4- Sazeman Enghelabi, <u>Shuresh dar Tabriz</u> (Rebellion in Tabriz), Tehran,
1357, p.4.
5- Fedaian-e Khalq, '<u>Reports on Struggles Outside City Limits</u>', Fedaian
Publications, Mordad 1357, pp.97-9.
6- Sazemam Enghelabi, op. cit. p.5.

of the exiled religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini, died in suspicious circumstances. Mournings were held in several towns and demonstrations were held in the Tehran bazaar in which the name of Avatollah Khomeini was often proclaimed. This was followed by the publication of an article in Ettelaat, probably at the instigation of the court, in which the regime slandered and ridiculed Khomeini. From this time on, public protest became more organized and overt and the veneer of Islam as the ideology of the revolution became increasingly more apparent as religious mythology and rituals determined the shape of the unfolding revolutionary events. On January 9, 1978 the city of Qum, the headquarters of the Ulama, witnessed the first major incident of organized popular opposition. The bazaar and the religious schools closed down in protest at the abovementioned article. A protest meeting organized by the Ulama called for the return of Khomeini from exile, the release of political prisoners, economic independence from foreign countries, dissolution of the single party and respect for religion and the Ulama.⁷ A peaceful demonstration staged by religious students came under attack by the police, killing between 40 to 200 people and martial law was declared in the city. In a statement, the senior Ulama of Qum declared the regime to be anti-Islamic and illegitimate and called for public mournings. In response, the bazaars closed down in several cities and in Tehran the Society of the Traders and Artisans of the bazaar called for a public strike in sympathy with the Ulama.

In the beginning, the emerging mass opposition possessed very few organizations of its own and had little contact with the existing political parties. Instead, the more usual informal centres of social interaction such as mosques and coffee-houses became channels of communication for getting news and rumours. The mosques and the bazaars played the most significant role in the mobilization and organization of popular 7- These were the first formulated demands put forward by the opposition,

Ibid, p.6.

opposition. After the Qum incident the bazaars began to organize massive memorial demonstrations at forty-day intervals, in accordance with the traditional pattern of mourning. On the fortieth day of the Qum incident the Ulama mobilized large demonstrations, especially in Tabriz where the bazaars closed down and severe clashes occurred between the crowds and the army.⁸ After the Tabriz confrontation several more fortieth day mournings were held in commemoration of preceding violent events. By the beginning of Ramadan, public demonstrations, rallies and surging crowds had become part of daily life. The Ulama and the bazaars undertook a massive mobilization effort, promulgated the ideology of the revolution and articulated the grievances and hopes of the public. In this the most effective tool was the elaborate rites and rituals of the Shiite religious processions, with all their emotional trappings. In September, large demonstrations were held throughout the country calling for 'Independence, Freedom, and Islamic government'. The bazaar-Ulama movement thus emerged as the leading force overtaking the constitutionalist parties. The critical attention which the regime had to pay to the movement, both in terms of seeking to divert it and to wipe it out in bloed, only added to the effectiveness and fervour of the movement. As the mobilization was stepped up the crowds became increasingly more ideological and less economically motivated, and the ideal of an Islamic state became widespread. On the whole, the revolution began with the moderate protests of the professional middle class and the intelligentsia with their open letters and petitions, but the bazaar and the Ulama soon took the initiative and organized massive demonstrations.

The Regime of 'National Reconciliation'

As the popular opposition became an increasingly formidable force to be reckoned with, the regime sought to redirect the movement by making

⁸⁻ An account of the Tabriz rebellion is given in: Mojahedin-e Khalq, Tahlil-e Jonbesh-e Khalq-e Tabriz, (An Analysis of the Movement of the People of Tabriz), Mojahedin Publications, no.2, 1358; and Sazeman Enghelabi, op. cit.

attempts at reconciliation with the opposition. On the whole two opposition forces with distinct political tendencies emerged: the liberal constitutionalist opposition and the popular revolutionary opposition. The moderate opposition called for the implementation of the Constitution and included the National Front, the Freedom Movement, the Radical Movement (recently formed by a group of professional men), the Lawyers Association, the Social Democrat party (formed by the constitutionalist minority group in parliament) and Jonbesh formed by the leading intellectual, Dr. Haj Seyed Javadi. Also, senior <u>Ulama</u>, especially Ayatollah Shariatmadari and Ayatollah Shirazi, called for the implementation of the Constitution. By contrast, the popular revolutionary opposition which had become associated with the name of Ayatollah Khomeini called for the establishment of a new, Islamic regime. Khomeini approved of no compromise and repeated his call for the destruction of the monarchy.

Faced with the constitutionalist and popular oppositions the regime sought to make an alliance with the moderates and redirect the Islamic movement. Thus the court dismissed the cabinet of economic crisis only to institute one of political crisis, the cabinet of 'national reconciliation'. The new cabinet promised free elections; freedom of the press was granted, and moderate opposition leaders were called upon for negotiations. It also granted large sums towards wage settlement; members of the royal family were forbidden from any financial dealing with public companies, and records concerning profiteering by bazaar guilds which had accumulated for some years were written off. Also, the powers of the chamber of guilds were reduced and taxes were to be cut. The moderate opposition sought to seize upon the opportunity afforded for political reform. The National Front announced its willingness for negotiation with the regime and moderate religious leaders called for the implementation of the Constitution and especially the convention of the parlia-

. mentary committee of mojtaheds to supervise legislation.9

While the regime's attempts at reconciliation with the moderate opposition had not yet born fruit, mounting popular opposition led to events which made any compromise with the regime impossible. This was the bloody massacre of Black Friday on September 8. Behind the scene of 'national reconciliation' the army generals as well as some U.S. advisors urged the Shah to adopt a hard-line stand against the opposition.¹⁰ Despite the moderates' attempt to dissuade popular street opposition massive rallies and demonstrations were held. The moderate opposition refused to join public rallies and called on the people to give the government more opportunity to liberalize.¹¹ The regime in a sudden reversal to repression, declared martial law in Tehran and other major cities. On Black Friday, between 700 and 3,000 people (according to different accounts) were massacred at the Zhaleh Square near Parliament. After Black Friday the moderate camp became increasingly radicalized. Even the parliamentary opposition minority considered the reconciliation attempts as being insincere. Increasingly the regime had to give more concessions to the moderates while they were increasingly less willing to accept them. From September the popular opposition overtook the constitutionalist opposition. Calls for strikes by Ayatollah Khomeini met with a positive response all over the country. In October. strikes occurred in government ministries. the post office. law courts. railroads, hospitals, radio and television stations, schools, the Central Bank, bus companies, banks, hotels, the bazaars, the oil industry and so on. The strike of 37,000 oil workers brought the whole economy to a standstill. There were one million civil servants on strike. In the beginning of the revolution the regime had been able to recruit some peasants and send them to the cities to attack the demonstrators. In

⁹⁻ Kayhan, 5 Shahrivar 1357. 10- For a detailed account of U.S. policy towards the regime and changes therein see: B. Rubin, <u>Paved With</u> <u>Good Intentions</u>, Oxford, 1980, chap.8. 11- <u>Le Monde</u>, 17 September 1978.

December, the inhabitants of some of the villages involved 'repented! as the revolution spread to the countryside. On the whole, against this background of increasing popular opposition, the regime's attempt at reconciliation with the constitutionalist opposition did not fall on fertile ground. In fact, the regime was too slow with concessions to the moderate opposition to the effect that it remained always one step behind developments. In the beginning, the Shah thought that minimal changes would be sufficient, changes which did not satisfy the moderates; when eventually the Shah agreed to accept everything according to the Constitution it was already too late. In the end, the regime did not succeed making an alliance with the moderates.

The Alliance of the Moderates and the Radicals

As the moderate opposition was radicalized, ground was prepared for the emergence of a revolutionary alliance between the liberal parties and the radical Ulama against the Shah's regime. In November, the leaders of the moderate opposition, Dr. Sanjabi and M. Bazargan, flew to Paris to negotiate with Ayatollah Khomeini who approved of a policy of no compromise with the Shah. The moderates finally accepted Khomeini's leadership of the revolution and announced that no compromise was possible with the Shah. In a declaration issued in Paris on November 5 and signed by Khomeini and Sanjabi it was agreed that the form of the government after the Shah would be determined by a referendum. The National Front declared that the monarchy was lacking in legitimacy.¹² At the same time, Ayatollah Beheshti, Khomeini's representative in Tehran called on "the Marxists, materialists and liberals to cooperate for some time and with one voice to continue the valuable struggle against the regime."¹³ As the possibility of an alliance with the moderates disappeared and the opposition became united against the regime. the Shah resorted to a hard-line policy of naked force. 12-Statement issued in Paris 5 Nov. 1978.13- Khomeini, et al, op. cit. p.69.

The Praetorian Regime

The army was the last resort of the Shah. On November 6, soon after the stance of the moderate opposition was made clear, the Shah dismissed the cabinet of 'reconciliation' and installed a new cabinet of seven generals headed by General Azhari, the chief of staff. This signified the impossibility of any alliance with the opposition. The military government was an ad hoc regime with no political or economic programmes. Its aim was to prevent the regime from further disintegration. The establishment of the military regime had the backing of the U.S. administration which encouraged the Shah to adopt an 'iron-fist' policy. 14 Under the generals' regime, the freedoms previously granted were withdrawn. Troops occupied the press premises in Tehran and imposed censorship. The National Front leaders were arrested and the army occupied the oil fields. Yet the Shah was as half-hearted in his hard-line policy as he had been in his liberalization programme. Azhari was rather an old man whereas the Shah could have chosen a younger and more ambitious officer such as General Khosrowdad who had asked the Shah to give him permission 'to level Tehran'. After the establishment of military government, the Shah's conciliatory speech in which he said that he had 'heard the voice of the revolution' himself, caused confusion within the army elite. There were rumours that some army officers were seeking to come to power in a coup because of the Shah's weakness. There were also rumours that the Shah was fatally ill. 15

Shortly after the army's assumption of power, however, popular opposition was heightened and the bazaars closed down indefinitely. The high point of popular opposition came in the holy month of Moharram when crowds appeared in white shrouds prepared for death. On the first day of the month alone, between 400 and 3,000 people (according to different

¹⁴⁻ New York Times, November 1, 1978.

¹⁵⁻ On the Shah's illness and its political impact see: M. Ledeen and W. Lewis, 'Carter and the Fall of the Shah', <u>Washington Quarterly</u>, vol.3, 1980:3-40.

accounts) were killed.¹⁶ On <u>Ashura</u>, the tenth of the month and the peak of the mournings, between one and three million people demonstrated against the regime in Tehran alone.

At the same time, the military regime weakened from within as the army began to disintegrate. There were rumours of mutiny in the garrisons. Earlier, Khomeini had called upon soldiers to desert. As the majority of the rank and file of the army were conscripts Khomeini's call found an increasingly positive response among them. In Tehran, soldiers and especially air force cadets deserted in large numbers. There were rumours of the arrest and execution of the cadets stationed on the ports of the Persian Gulf for supporting the revolution. There was news of the assassination of top army commanders by soldiers in the Levizan garrison.

Under the military regime the Shah still attempted a compromise with the moderate opposition which now proposed the formation of a regency council to replace the Shah. Dr. Sanjabi was taken to the court by soldiers for negotiation but he only repeated that there could be no solution under the Shah. By now there was unanimous agreement among the opposition forces that he could not be part of any political deal. The military regime only intensified the crisis.

The Constitutional Regime: A Tenuous Alliance

The U.S. administration had throughout declared its support for the regime urging the Shah to arrive at a compromise with the moderate opposition. This policy also worked the other way as the moderate opposition had made contacts with the U.S. Embassy to present its case against the Shah's dictatorship. Internally the court's position had been totally undermined; the final 'push' came with the disintegration of its foreign support. From late December the U.S. administration's support for the

¹⁶⁻ BBC and Radio Moscow broadcasts. According to one estimate, during the two months of military rule some 3,100 people were killed and many more wounded: Anonymous, <u>Veqaye-e Enghelab</u> (A Chronology of the Revolution), Tehran, 1357.

Shah wavered. In general, the interests of the administration revolved around three issues: a peaceful solution to the political crisis, the preservation of the unity of the army and the prevention of the leftward radicalization of the revolution and of the assumption of power by 'radical elements'.¹⁷ Faced with the possibility of the Shah's imminent downfall, the administration attempted to directly mediate between the regime and the moderate opposition in order to find a common ground between the two. Thus it sent the George Ball mission to Iran to negotiate with the moderate opposition. The mission's report recommended the Shah's resignation and the establishment of a regency council, reflecting the views of the moderate opposition. This became the basis of the administration's new policy and its withdrawal of support from the Shah. The new policy was to persuade the Shah to choose a government and to leave Iran. The task of the General Huyser mission which was sent to Iran in early January 1979 was to implement the new policy i.e., to obtain the army's acquiescence for the Shah's departure and to ensure its support for the new regime. It met and advised the Shah to take this course of action. The Shah continued to seek, among the constitutionalists, someone willing to form a government, now on the basis of his departure and the formation of a regency council provided for by the Constitution. Due to the opposition's rejection of any government appointed by the Shah this development took the form of a personal adventure. Dr. Shapour Bakhtiar, a leading member of the National Front met the Shah and accepted to form a government on the conditions of the Shah's departure from Iran and his own assumption of real power. The issue of the Shah's departure caused some unease within the military elite. Diehard army generals disapproved of the Shah's departure and the 8,000 strong Imperial Guards declared their full support for the Shah. But it was the Huyser mission's task to prevent dissension within the

¹⁷⁻ The State Department, 20 January 1979 reported in <u>Ayandegan</u>, 1 Bahman, 1357.

army. At the same time, to ensure the loyalty of the army the Shah appointed three of his close military advisors in command of the armed forces. Once Bakhtiar obtained parliament's vote of confidence the Shah prepared to leave. At the same time, according to Article 42 of the Constitution providing for the temporary absence of the monarch, a nine man regency council was formed. On January 16 the Shah left Tehran officially for a period of rest, which jubilant crowds saw as signalling the end of the monarchy.

As a full-blooded constitutional government, the Bakhtiar regime promised everything short of a revolution. Its programme included the dissolution of Savak, freedom of political prisoners, freedom of the press, the recognition of the Ulama's role in legislation and an end to government intervention in commerce and industry. But the new regime was from its inception rejected by the moderate and the popular opposition alike. The National Front dismissed Bakhtiar as a traitor to its cause. Everywhere the constitutional regime was denounced as being the agent of imperialism. Government employees in the ministries rejected the new ministers appointed by Bakhtiar. Although his constitutional reforms had the tacit support of the liberal opposition and the moderate Ulama. no major group was willing to run the risk of supporting a regime appointed by the Shah. When Bakhtiar sought to make political capital out of the silence of the moderate <u>Ulama</u> they issued declarations and called his regime illegal. Some large demonstrations did take place in Tehran in support of the Constitution and Bakhtiar. "Some 100,000 people mainly from the army and the rich, calling themselves the 'supporters of the Constitution and social democracy' gathered in the Parliament Square to declare their support for the Bakhtiar regime."¹⁸ But the constitutional regime was confronted with the surging crowds of the revolution who were organizing themselves into revolutionary committees and taking over the

18- Kayhan, 2 Bahman 1357.

administration of the cities. Under Bakhtiar, while the Huyser mission ensured a measure of unity in the military elite, the rank and file of army was in a process of further disintegration and passing to the side of the revolution. There was a visible decline in discipline. Air force soldiers went on hunger strike in support of the revolution. In the provinces officers met local religious leaders on their own initiative. Everywhere demonstrations were held in the air force garrisons to demand the return of Khomeini.¹⁹ On the whole, the constitutional regime was confronted with internal disintegration and the surging waves of the revolution. Members of parliament and of the regency council resigned one after another and strikes continued in the bureaucracy. There were thus no good prospects for the political consolidation of the regime.

Dual Sovereignty: the disintegration of the power bloc

Ayatollah Khomeini had already formed an Islamic Revolutionary Council mainly composed of his clerical associates in order to form a provisional revolutionary government. Upon his return from exile, soon after the departure of the Shah, he appointed Mehdi Bazargan, the leader of the Freedom Movement, as the Prime Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government which was set up to take over from the constitutional regime. The PRG called upon the Bakhtiar regime to relinquish the reins of power and the constitutional regime threatened to use force against the PRG. Between the constitutional regime and the regime of the revolution stood the army which initially supported Bakhtiar. In order to pave the way for a smooth transition of power the moderate opposition and the U.S. Ambassador arranged meetings between the two governments to discuss the possibility of a change from constitutional monarchy to a republic. Bakhtiar proposed the holding of a constituent

¹⁹⁻ Cf."Armies never fail to join revolutions when all other causes of revolution are present and they never fail to oppose them when this is not the case." G. Pettee, <u>The Process of Revolution</u>, New York, 1938, p.105. For more details see: M. Sreedhar, 'The Role of the Armed Forces in the Iranian Revolution', <u>IDSA Journal</u>, 12,1979:121_ 142.

assembly and urged that any political change should take place on the basis of the Constitution. At the same time, with the mediation of the U.S. Embassy and the Huyser mission, the PRG met with the military commanders in order to gain their support. On February 5, a meeting was held between Bazargan, General Qarabagi, the chief of staff, and General Huyser at a time when the air force cadets were increasingly passing to the side of the revolution. These negotiations finally led to an alliance between the army and the PRG. General Qarabaqi announced that the army would not interfere in politics and would remain united to back any legal government. This meant the army's withdrawal of support from the Bakhtiar regime and its indifference in the conflict between the two governments. The PRG in turn conceded that the unity of the army must be preserved. With more defections by air force cadets in support of Khomeini, General Rabii, the commander of the air force also declared the neutrality of his own forces. The army in fact was more concerned about its own unity than the defence of the Bakhtiar regime. The Huyser mission left Tehran on February 7 assuring 'the unity and neutrality' of the army. The disintegration of the army and the declaration of its neutrality made the task of the final victory of the revolution easier.

The Civil War

The increasing disintegration of the army led to open conflict between forces which had sided with the revolution and those which had remained loyal to the old regime, a possibility which the army generals had sought to avert by declaring their forces neutral. Yet on the same day that the neutrality of the army was declared, air force cadets marched before Ayatollah Khomeini and in support of the revolution. On February 9, a demonstration in the Air Force garrison in Tehran in support of the revolution led to a mutiny. The royalist Imperial Guards arrived in the

garrison in order to suppress the demonstration. Fighting broke out between the two, drawing the crowds to the side of the air force cadets. Air force officers opened the armouries to the revolutionaries and finally the Imperial Guards retreated. Crowds captured arms and attacked other garrisons and police stations. Similar events took place in the provincial cities. By February 10 the army was in great disarray and the crowds in Tehran captured all garrisons and police stations. On February 11 the High Defence Council ordered the retreat of all forces into the barracks. With the army surrendering to the revolution Bakhtiar fell and the PRG took power.

The revolution succeeded because of the superimposition of several social and political factors. It thus has to be understood against a general background of mass political mobilization and involvement, economic and fiscal crisis, the disintegration of the upper class support for the regime, the disintegration of the army and finally the wavering of foreign support. All of these together led to the collapse of the regime.

VIII- Towards the Reconstitution of the State

In the last three chapters we tried to explain the <u>causes</u> of the Iranian revolution. We now go on to study the <u>course</u> of that revolution (after the fall of the old regime) in terms of the proliferation of power centres, the disintegration of the power bloc and the attempts by the emerging classes and parties to gain hegemony.

One of the major characteristics of a revolution, which distinguishes it from other forms of political change such as coups d'etat and palace revolutions is the gap in time which occurs between the disintegration of the old regime and the reconstruction of a new power bloc. Defining the course of revolution in these terms, Peter Amann has stated:

"...revolution may be said to be a breakdown, momentary or prolonged, of the state's monopoly of power. Revolution prevails when the state's monopoly of power is effectively challenged and persists until a new monopoly of power is re-established."¹

Classical studies of revolution, notably those by Edwards, Pettee and Brinton,² have sought to develop a paradigm for the <u>course</u> of all revolutions by generalizing that of the French Revolution. They have studied the process of power proliferation in terms of three phases: the rule of the moderates, the ascendancy of the extremists, their hegemony and the establishment of a 'dictatorship'. The moderates who first come to power are more than satisfied with the political revolution and do not want to alter the socio-economic <u>status quo</u>. They seek to preserve the apparatuses of the old regime and wish to put an end to the revolution, but from the start they are confronted with dual power.

^{1,} P. Amann, 'Revolution: A Redefinition', <u>Political Science Quarterly</u>, March 1962, pp.38-9.

²⁻ L. Edwards, <u>The Natural History of Revolution</u>, Chicago, 1970; G.Petee, <u>The Process of Revolution</u>, New York, 1938, and C. Brinton, <u>The Anatomy of</u> Revolution, New York, 1960.

. While the moderates control the remnants of the old regime (the army, the bureaucracy and legal institutions) the extremists form their own parallel organizations which as an imperium in imperio await to take the place of the old organizations. The moderates finally lose out because they are unable to cope with the participation of new groups. They are neither ruthless enough to stop them nor radical enough to lead them. The extremists win out, because they align themselves with popular forces and successfully mobilize them. If in normal times they were themselves moderate men the extremists are now on the crest of a revolutionary wave. With their ascendancy, dual power comes to an end as the revolutionary clubs and committees are merged with the organizations of the old regime. Whereas the moderates are generally from a higher class position and reflect the views of the propertied class, the extremists are egalitarian and are themselves from a lower class position.³ The extremists finally suppress not only their moderate opponents but also the 'ultrarevolutionaries' who claim to be more revolutionary than the extremists. They thus monopolize state power and create the machinery of 'terror and virtue'. Finally, the revolutionary crisis ends in a Thermidor, which is the institutionalization of the work of the revolution and the transfer of power to a new group or class.

Russia provides one example of this process at work. After the fall of tsardom, the first provisional government was formed by moderates, led by Prince Lvov. This was succeeded by the second provisional government led by Kerensky, which sought to establish a parliamentary regime and introduce some limited reforms. Yet the provisional government was faced with a situation of dual power. Already the workers' soviets had undertaken administrative work, which facilitated the Bolsheviks' preparation for the assumption of power. The Bolsheviks mobilized workers in Petro-

³⁻ See Brinton, op. cit. pp.122; 129. Also see, for example, D. Underdown, <u>Pride's Purge</u>. Oxford, 1971, for a discussion of the higher class position of the moderates and the lower social status of the radicals in the English Revolution.

grad to rise against the bourgeois regime and attempts by the provisional government to suppress the soviets invited charges of despotism against a self-declared 'liberal' regime. Eventually the soviets and the Bolsheviks took over Petrograd, fought the government in Moscow and ended the rule of the moderates. Then the Bolsheviks consolidated their power by dissolving the Constituent Assembly and suppressing not only the white counterrevolution but also the ultrarevolutionary left Socialists, left Communists and Anarchists who together Lenin called the 'infantile Left'.⁴

This model of a revolution describes a good deal of the processes and events occurring after the fall of the old regimes and hence we will use it in order to explain the course and evolution of the Iranian revolution. However, the model has certain weaknesses. In particular, it provides an explanation only in terms of the actions of 'elites' and parties, the weakness of the moderates and the inherent radicalism of the extremists, and the mobilization of the lower classes by the 'elites'. It thus ignores the impact of the masses and class struggles on the course and evolution of revolutions. The radicals rise and begin to mobilize the masses in response to popular demands for more revolution which the moderates cannot permit. The radicalization of the revolution is thus due to the pressure of the masses. In Russia, for example, "it was neither the corrosive effects of Bolshevik propaganda nor the bayonets of the Red Guards which ultimately destroyed the Provisional Government. Rather, the government literally committed suicide by alienating any conceivable source of popular support." On the other hand "thousands of militant workers, peasants, soldiers and sailers flooded into the (Bolshevik) party. These recruits...bursting with the elemental radicalism of the streets, made the aspirations and mood of the masses a powerful determinant of Bolshevik policy."⁵ In this sense the masses rather than ideo-

⁴⁻ See: N. Sukhanov, <u>The Russian Revolution</u>, 1917. New York, 1955, vol.II. 5- T. Uldricks, 'The Crowd in the Russian Revolution', <u>Politics and</u>

logies are the real 'energy' of the revolution, sustaining revolutionary radicalism.⁶ The model thus ignores a major aspect of revolutions.⁷

This chapter concentrates on the disintegration of the power bloc and attempts by various classes and parties at achieving hegemony. It will discuss the rule of 'the moderates' and the ascendancy of 'the extremists'. The class struggles after the revolution, we will argue, are important to understand the continuing evolution of the Revolution. The Revolution has led to a change in the social location of state power, by transferring political hegemony to a new class. It has also created new power arrangements and has led to the emergence of a new ideology which is more heavily imbued with populist overtones than had been the case with state ideology prior to the revolution.

Society, vol.4, no.3, 1974: 397-413, pp.410,412.

6-W. Kornhauser, in <u>The Politics of Mass Society</u>. New York, 1963, puts forward the argument that mass activity in politics always leads to extremism.

7- Another weakness of the model is that, by generalizing from the course of the French Revolution, it assumes a similar pattern for the course of all revolutions. F.G. Hutchins has made a basic distinction between 'plan-fulfilling' and 'self-fulfilling' revolutions (op. cit. pp.8-16). According to his typology, in the 'plan-fulfilling' revolutions, which start from the countryside and end in the capital and are carried out by organized groups and quasi-armies, the post-revolutionary period does not witness the succession of moderates and extremists. The revolution is part of a clearly thought-out plan for the reconstruction of society. By contrast, in the 'self-fulfilling' revolution, which starts in the capital spontaneously, there is little prior planning. The revolution is not specific about its future goals; it is rather assumed that things will settle into a new equilibrium once the revolution has eliminated the specific evil it has aimed at. Hence the aftermath of the revolution is unpredictable and indeed the self-fulfilling revolution accomplishes more than it intends. The Chinese and the French Revolutions are the outstanding examples of 'plan-fulfilling' and 'self-fulfilling' revolutions, respectively. This typology thus explains why the pattern of moderates-extremists succession arises, an explanation which the classical studies of revolution have not offered. The Iranian revolution, despite the earlier development of a revolutionary ideology, was a 'selffulfilling' revolution in that there was no specific plan about the actual political arrangements and social goals to be achieved after the revolution. (This typology partly corresponds to S. Huntington's distinction between 'Eastern' and 'Western' revolutions. In the Western type the revolution begins in the capital and is largely spontaneous whereas in the Eastern type the revolution begins in the countryside and ends with the capture of power in the capital. S. Huntington, op. cit. pp.266ff.)

Political Parties

For a decade and a half the royal dictatorship had sought to suppress open conflicts among social classes by a combination of sheer force and economic control. With the dictatorship out of the way, social class conflicts gradually resumed. The revolution brought into the political arena new social classes as well as ethnic groups with novel demands. seeking to influence the process of the reconstitution of the state. As the incompatibility of opposed socio-economic interests became increasingly evident, the existing political parties came to represent specific interests and specific interests tended to organize their own political parties. The political parties discussed in this chapter are classified according to the same class-ideological basis specified in chapter II. The political ideologies discussed there (the secular-democracy of the new middle class, non-liberal fundamentalism of the clergy allied to the petty bourgeoisie, and popular working-class ideology of the radical intelligentsia) had persisted, but in addition there was the emergence of the new ideological trend of revolutionary Islam, which had spread rapidly among the intelligentsia immediately prior to the revolution. A new category of parties was thus built on this ideology.

The Liberal-Bourgeois Parties of the New Middle Class

This category included the better known of the old opposition parties and wanted to maintain the social structure existing under the old regime, whilst changing the political structure. In general they advocated the establishment of a liberal regime. In fact at one stage they had been willing to accept the constitutional monarchy according to the old Constitution (of 1906), but later they insisted that the same Constitution should provide the framework for the new political arrangements. As parties of professionals and high officials they had put their emphasis on a political change from authoritarianism to parliamentary democra-

cy. However, compared to the other parties, they were little known to the mass of the people and their support came mainly from the judiciary, the government bureaucracy and business circles.

The National Front was the major liberal-moderate party. It consisted of the Iran party, led first by the lawyer, A. Saleh, and later by Dr. K. Sanjabi, and the Iranian Nationalist party, led by D. Foruhar. The Lawyers' Association and the Socialist Society also had close contacts with the Front. After the revolution, the Front called for the ratification of a new constitution "similar to the constitutions of the democratic countries of Western Europe."⁸ It also called on the government to promote and encourage private enterprise. The goal of the revolution, according to the National Front "was to destroy the dictatorship. The revolution was a popular movement and not a class struggle, the struggle of toilers against capitalists or of peasants against landlords."⁹

The National Front was in a process of disintegration during the revolution. The expulsion of Dr. Bakhtiar prior to the revolution and the defection of the Nationalist party after it, were followed by the departure of Dr. Matine Daftari, a grandson of Dr. Mossadeq, who left to form the National Democratic party. This was a reaction to the National Front submitting to the clerical line of the revolution, from the time of the Paris Declaration. The National Democratic Front demanded the dissolution of the Revolutionary Council set up by Khomeini and the election of a new council from among government employees, guilds and workers and it opposed the intervention of the clergy in politics.¹⁰

More Islamically inclined than the National Front, was the Freedom Movement which assumed power after the revolution. The leaders of the party, Engineers M. Bazargan, Y. Sahabi, E. Sahabi, A. Haj Seyed Javadi and Amir Entezam all obtained government positions in the PRG. The party

⁸⁻ Interview with Dr. Sanjabi, in Kayhan, 3 Teer 1358.

^{9- &}lt;u>Ayandegan</u>, 10 Khordad 1358. 10- Party statement, in <u>Kayhan</u>, 8 Esfand 1358.

advocated national parliamentary democracy and was opposed to clerical rule.¹¹ On socio-economic matters, it emphasized that "what we need today is the private sector, for we have never had a private sector in our economy. In the past, the private sector was composed of a number of families associated with the court, therefore there was no free trade and no competition."¹² The Freedom Movement had also been involved in contacts with the U.S. Embassy in order to undermine the foreign support of the old regime. The party did not take 'imperialism' to be a real threat and in fact, it believed that the 'Imperial powers' had been helpful in the success of the revolution.¹³

One of the new liberal parties formed after the revolution was the Moslem Peoples' Republican Party (MPRP). Initially the party originated among the associates of Ayatollah Shariatmadari, the moderate religious leader who, along with Ayatollah Shirazi and Qumi, sided with the liberal parties. However, the MPRP went beyond the circle of clericals and included middle class professionals and as the ensuing conflicts unfolded. differences in the party led to the defection of clerics to the Islamic parties. The clerical founders of the party (Hojattolislams H. Khosrowshahi. Sadr Bolagi. R. Golsorkhi and G. Saidi) accused the more secular faction of the party of being 'capitalists', 'nationalists' and 'Westernized'. The moderate faction included businessmen, professionals and lawyers and after the defection of the clerical faction it continued party activities. Party leaders and members such as Dr. A. Alizadeh. Engineer R. Maraqii, Dr. M. Enayat, a prominent journalist, Farrokh Daftari, a lawyer, H. Besharat, a landowner, and others of the same socioeconomic status, advocated a secular constitution to be passed by a national constituent assembly.¹⁴ The party was most active in the province of Azarbayjan, where Ayatollah Shariatmadari had great following

11- Party statement in Ettelaat, 28 Shahrivar 1358.

¹²⁻ A. Haj Seyed Javadi quoted in Ibid. 13- Radio broadcast 15.3.1358. 14- Kayhan, 20, 21 Mordad 1358.

and found substantial support among businessmen and traders in Tabriz.

Associated with the MPRP and Ayatollah Shariatmadari, was the Radical Party, organized after the revolution. The founders of the party were lawyers, engineers, university professors and high officials such as Engineer R. Maraqii, Dr. J. Momtaz, a Tehran University professor, Dr. F. Nasseri, a lawyer, Engineer T. Makkinezhad, Dr. R. Abedi, Dr. H. Emami and others. The Radical Party was a secular and liberal party and called for the 'restoration of private enterprise'.¹⁵

More democratic than liberal, was the Jonbesh (Movement) created by a leading intellectual, Dr. Haj Seyed Javadi, during the revolution. Like the National Democratic Front, the Jonbesh was mainly composed of intellectuals, lawyers and professors, such as Dr. N. Katuzian of the Tehran University, Dr. K. Lahiji, a prominent lawyer, and Dr. M. Katbi. The party was supported by the Jurists' Association, the Association of Writers and the National Organization of Academics.

On the whole, the bourgeois-liberal parties were small and elitedominated parties with little links to the urban and rural masses. Lacking organizational resources and a broad social base they relied heavily on the bureaucracy and the judiciary left from the old regime, at a time when real power was exercised elsewhere in the newly emerging popular organizations.

Non-liberal Fundamentalist Parties

The Islamic parties were mostly created after the revolution. In contrast to the liberal parties, the fundamentalists had a more drastic concept of revolution and were more hostile to the old regime. They were not content with a change in the political system from the monarchy to a republic but their main objective was the unification of religion and the state. In line with Khomeini's interpretation of the Shiite political theory, the Islamic parties put forward the idea of 'the rule of the 15- Ettelaat, 2 Mordad, 1358. theologian' and considered the old Constitution based on Western liberalism as being alien to the spirit of their nationalist Shiism. The fundamentalist parties were made up mainly of the lower clergy and drew their active support from the bazaar guilds which were revived and reorganized after the revolution. The upper clergy in the main, were aligned with the moderates. The formal clerical organizations, in particular the theological colleges situated in shrine cities, were controlled by the upper clergy, namely the <u>ayatollabs</u> and <u>mojtaheds</u>, who are the source of all interpretation of Islamic law and the recipients of taxes and donations. The lower clergy, the <u>hojattolislams</u> and <u>modarresin</u>, were financially dependent on the ayatollabs, and since the clerical occupation had long lost its appeal among the urban classes, these people came mostly from a village background. Thus if the liberal parties were parties of professionals and high officials, the extremist parties were created by lowly clerics. Leonard Binder had described them in 1965 thus:¹⁶

> "Younger <u>ulama</u> and <u>tullab</u> realize that they are no longer on a par with the Westernized intelligentsia. Their learning is belittled, their behaviour is ridiculed, their clothing is mocked, and all the best government jobs are closed to them. Their incomes are bound to be small unless they are related to the landed aristocracy. The <u>ulama</u>, both old and young are on the defensive. The government and Westernized intellectuals in the ministries are ashamed of the <u>ulama</u>."

It was from among this lower clergy that the fundamentalists came. The core consisted of Khomeini's disciples and students. The main fundamentalist clerical party was the Islamic Republican Party formed in February 1979. The founders of the party were Ayatoliahs Beheshti, Mosavi Ardabili, Mahdavi Kani and Hojjatolislams A. Khamenei, M. Bahonar, Hashemi Rafsanjani, H. Ghaffari, Golzadeh Ghafuri, Nategh Nuri and non-clerical assiciates such as Dr. H. Habibi and Dr. H. Ayat. The party held that sovereignty originates in God and that all laws must be based on the Islamic law, with the head of the state a theologian or Imam.¹⁷

¹⁶⁻ L. Binder, 'The Proofs of Islam', op. cit. p.138. 17- Jomhuri-ye Islami, 25 Teer 1358.

The lower clergy, especially in Tehran and in the shrine cities. organized several small groups including the Society of the Teachers of the Qum Theological Schools, the Society of the Militant Clergy of Tehran, the Islamic Organization of Fajr, the Party of Towhid (Monotheists), the Islamic Organization of Ashtar, the Society of the Committed Clergy of Tehran, the Defenders of Towhid, the Organization of the Crusaders of Truth and the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution. Most of these were organized in the poorer districts of south Tehran. Associated with the Islamic Republican party were the Party of Towhid and the Party of God (Hezbollah), both Tehran bazaar groups. The Party of God was the continuation of the fundamentalist Coalition Groups of the early 1960's which itself was part of the Fedaiyan-e Islam party of the 1940's. After the revolution the Fedaiyan-e Islam was reorganized by Hojjatolislam Shojuni. The Society of the Committed Clergy established links with similar groups in the provinces in order to facilitate the coordinated nomination of electoral candidates. In addition, there were numerous local groups taking their names after the Shiite saints.

Compared to the liberal parties, the fundamentalist groups were in a better position to keep the population politically mobilized. The network of communication provided by the mosques and bazaars enabled the clergy to appeal to large numbers and to organize Islamic societies and guilds in the bazaars. Most importantly, the clergy were closely intertwined with the popular organizations created by the masses during and after the revolution.

The Radical Islamic Parties

This category of parties was built on the ideological trend of the spread of Islam among the modern intelligentsia before the revolution. The Islam of the radical intellectuals was highly nationalistic, putting emphasis on the struggle against imperialism and the influence of Western

capitalism in Iran. The main parties in this category were the Movement of the Militant Moslems, the Revolutionary Movement of the Moslem People (Jama), the Islamic Movement of Councils and the Mojahedin-e Khalq. In contrast to the fundamentalist parties, these radical Islamic parties were mainly composed of intellectuals and students and had their own clientele among the urban educated youth. Their catch-word was 'council democracy' or the establishment of councils in all institutions, which according to their understanding was the basic concept of government in Islam.

The Movement of the Militant Moslems led by Dr. H. Payman, Dr. Eftekhar and other intellectuals, had started as an underground party in 1965. After the revolution, the party called for the nationalization of industries, the confiscation of large properties, the establishment of workers' councils and land reforms. The party believed that in true Islam ownership is communal and that property belongs to God. According to Dr. Payman, the Prophet of Islam had changed the old relations based on private property and in his city-state, Madina, private property did not exist.¹⁸

Similarly the Mojahedin put forward demands for the nationalization of industries, the formation of a people's army and the establishment of councils.¹⁹ After the revolution, the Mojahedin expanded their Organization and established the Young Mojahedin Organization with a large following among high-school and university students. The Revolutionary Movement of the Moslem People led by Dr. K. Sami and other intellectuals also advocated radical socio-economic measures. Of the radical Islamic parties only the Mojahedin had a large following and organizational resources and emerged as a major contender for power.

^{18- &}lt;u>Ommat</u>, the organ of the Movement of the Militant Moslems, 24 Mordad 1358.


¹⁹⁻ Mojahedin statement in Ettelaat, 6 Esfand 1357.

The Popular Working Class Parties

The left included numerous factions and groupings and was mainly composed of student movements and groups. They called for the destruction of the capitalist society and advocated the establishment of a democratic socialist regime. However, despite their principal stance the leftists were far from united on ideological or tactical grounds. Some wavered towards the liberals, some cooperated with the Islamic fundamentalists and some acted independently. Apart from harsh internal differences, the left was also confronted with the difficulty of effectively penetrating into the urban masses who had been mobilized and politicized by the Islamic movement. The working class movement which emerged after the revolution was an unstructured movement within a trade union structure that had long been manipulated by the state and this provided the framework for the subordination of working class organizations into a new authoritarian corporate structure. Despite these obstacles, however, the left made a strong bid for power.

The main leftist parties and factions were: the Fedaiyan-e Khalq (majority and minority), the Paykar Organization, the Marxist-Leninist Organization of Tufan, the Organization for Communist Unity, the Communist Party of Iranian Workers and Peasants, the Revolutionary Organization, the Party of Socialist Workers, the Organization of the Militant Workers, Organization of the Revolutionary Students, the Communers Organization, the Marxist-Leninist Committee, the Organization of Revolutionary Youth, Organization of Democratic Unity, the Tudeh Party and many more.

The Fedaiyan Organization (majority) called for the formation of workers' and peasants' councils, the dissolution of the army and the nationalization of all banking and industrial capital.²⁰ While the majority faction of the Fedaiyan vacillated between supporting the moderates and the Islamic parties the minority faction (the Dehqani and Chupanzadeh 20- Fedaiyan statement in Ettelaat, 5 Esfand 1357. groups) accused the majority of opportunism and called for armed struggle. Similarly the Paykar Organization, which as a Marxist faction had defected from the Mojahedin before the revolution, rejected any compromise with the moderates and the fundamentalists who all sanctioned capitalist society in the party's view.²¹ By contrast, the position of the Tudeh Party was more equivocal in that the party was opposed to all the 'infantile leftists' and from the beginning sided with the Islamic parties. The party believed that the objective conditions for the establishment of a socialist society were lacking and it was drawn to the Islamic extremists because the latter seemed to herald the masses. The Tudeh viewed the conflicts between the liberals and the extremists as a class conflict between the bourgeoisie and the masses and hence took side with the Islamic parties.²² On the whole, the leftist groups had important differences among themselves on ideological and tactical grounds, and this was in spite of the 'Conference of Unity' which some of the factions held after the revolution, in order to resolve the most controversial issues.



21- Paykar Organization, <u>Sazeman-e Mojahedin dar dam-e Liberalizm</u> (The Mojahedin in the Trap of Liberalism), Paykar Press, 1359, pp.1-5. 22- N. Kiamuri, <u>Hezb-e Tudeh-ye Iran Che Miguyad</u> (What does the Tudeh Party Say), and <u>Ma va Chapgarayan</u> (We and the Infantile Left), Tudeh Publications, Tehran, 1358.

Political Conflicts

After the revolution, the power bloc was occupied by the liberalsecular parties of the new middle class and intelligentsia, and the nonliberal fundamentalist clerical parties drawing their active support from the bazaar petty bourgeoisie. Outside the state the two segments had distinct supporters and sympathizers. On the one hand, civil servants, lawyers, judges, professionals, professors, engineers and high officials supported the modernist moderate parties. On the other, merchants, traders, mullahs and the petty bourgeoisie of the bazaars filled the ranks of the revolutionary committees, the 'action groups' of the extremists and the nationwide network of the Islamic societies of bazaar guilds which formed the bedrock of support for the clerical parties.

The initial alliance between the two had been maintained during the early stage of the revolution in their common struggle against the old regime. Their alliance ultimately broke over their differing views of the nature of political authority in the new state. The main issues dividing the two were modernism vs. traditionalism, secularism vs. clericalism, 'Westernism' vs. 'anti-Westernism' and different views of nationalism and imperialism. The clerical parties were fundamentalist and extremely anti-imperialist and drew their intellectual strength from the traditional literati. The liberal parties were secularist and drew inspiration from diverse Western intellectual traditions.

Eventually, the moderates were ousted from the power bloc and the Islamic fundamentalists undertook a massive mobilization effort to consolidate their power. In this process, one important factor was the 'social question' i.e. the economic class struggles going on in the society at a time of economic crisis. While the liberals proved incapable of dealing with this, the Islamic parties broke their alliance with the liberals, stepped up mass mobilization and asserted their hegemony. Hence the regime they built was an authoritarian-populist regime.

The Rule of the Moderates

Dual sovereignty and the rule of the moderates had in fact started with the constitutional regime of Bakhtiar. Those who came to power after his fall were cut from the same constitutional and moderate cloth. After the revolution, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Freedom Movement, appointed by Khomeini, controlled the 'legal' apparatus of the state left from the old regime while the popular revolutionary institutions constituted the rival extralegal government. If the PRG was appointed from above and comprised the 'revolutionary elite' the popular institutions emerged from below and were made up of the revolutionary masses. Revolutionary committees, guards and councils were organized in government departments, factories, bazaars and universities and gradually assumed the bulk of actual political power. Thus as a result of dual sovereignty, the power bloc was divided into two main segments.

The 'legal' PRG took over the state apparatus, the army, the police and the judiciary left from the old regime. As the government of the moderate opposition, it had negotiated with the old regime for a smooth transition of power. Broad agreements had been reached between the moderates, the army and its American advisors, on the necessity of a peaceful transfer of power in order to prevent the radicalization of the revolution. In fact the Civil War which the PRG considered as being a'grave disaster²³ had interrupted the process of negotiations between the army and the PRG. The revolutionary committees arrested the army commanders who had been negotiating with the PRG. Thus, from the start, the government of the moderate parties was confronted with the power of popular organizations. Monarchist at heart, these parties represented the more highly placed of the old opposition and in a sense it was expected that they would take over from the old regime. The PRG was the coalition of the liberal parties including the National Front (Iran Party), the Nation-23- M. Bazargan quoted in Ettelaat, 3 Azar 1358.

. alist Party, the Freedom Movement and the Radical Party. Of the radical Islamic parties only the Jama participated in the PRG but it later resigned from the government on the grounds that the ruling parties were not radical and revolutionary enough. The PRG included industrialists. capitalists, large landowners and high officials of the old regime. Of the high officials of the old regime there were A. Moinfar (Oil Minister) an ex-minister and chairman of the Plan Organization under the old regime, A. Ardalan (Minister of Economy) a large landowner, holder of royal insignia and a close economic advisor of the old regime. Dr Mowlavi (Chairman of Central Bank) and M. Khalatbari (Finance Minister) high bureaucrats under the previous regime. Others were A. Izadi (Minister of Agriculture) a large landowner, A. Amir Entezam (Deputy Premier) a large industrialist, and R. Maraqii (Governor of Azarbaijan) a large construction industrialist. Bazargan himself was a share-holder in a company in Tehran, a fact which his opponents were to use to discredit him as a 'bourgeois capitalist'. Thus high officials of the old regime, appointed ministers under the PRG, allowed their colleagues in the bureaucracy to continue in office. Of the National Front, Dr. Sanjabi and Dr. Mobasheri (prominent lawyers) were given cabinet positions. On the whole, the PRG was the government of the bourgeoisie both in terms of the social background of its incumbants and the socio-economic policies which it was to adopt.

On the other hand, the popular revolutionary institutions were the creation of the masses and the result of their involvement in the revolution. Revolutionary committees, guards and courts emerged and exercised real power. There were a number of local revolutionary committees in every town. In Tehran there were 14 committees under the authority of the Central Revolutionary Committee, operating in the building of the old parliament. There were 34 rival revolutionary committees in Tabriz and 17 in Esfahan. In smaller towns there were usually two or three committees act-

ing as the police and sometimes as the law court. There were also revolutionary courts in opposition to the civil courts, dealing especially with counterrevolutionary activities. The Revolutionary Guards, providing an alternative security force to the army and the gendarmerie and numbering 10,000, were formed by order of Ayatollah Khomeini to protect the revolution and spread it abroad. At the head of this extralegal government stood the Revolutionary Council which had authority over the committees, the guards and the revolutionary courts. The popular revolutionary institutions were mainly made up of urban lower strata rather than rural masses (but in several places the peasants formed their own councils or unions) and of the petty bourgeoisie rather than the industrial working class (but the latter also formed their own organizations). The revolutionary committees sprang up mainly in the bazaars and were made up of mullahs. merchants, bazaar apprentices, shopkeepers and the unemployed. For instance, in the city of Hamadan there were two revolutionary committees headed by two rival mullahs. One was located in the bazaar and was made up of shopkeepers and apprentices from less affluent trades such as blacksmiths and shoemakers and mullahs. The other was located in another old district of the town and was made up of soldiers who had deserted from the army, high-school students, apprentices in the bazaar and a few unemployed. In the rural areas, especially in Kurdestan, Azarbaijan and Gonbad, the committees were dominated by local landlords and clerics, and in the provincial centres on the whole, revolutionary committees were dominated by the local clergy and bazaar merchants. Everywhere the committees were led by hojjatolislams or the lower clergy. The revolutionary courts were also formed by mullahs dispatched from the city of Qum. A revolutionary court usually consisted of a cleric, a civilian judge and a local trustee, but the cleric had the dominant position and usually carried with him a religious code recently issued by Ayatollah

Montazeri concerning how to deal with counterrevolutionaries. The courts were under the authority of the revolutionary general prosecutor appointed by Khomeini. The Revolutionary Council had supreme authority over this extralegal government and it was composed of Ayatollahs Beheshti, Montazeri, Mosavi Ardabili, Kani, Khamenei, Bahonar, Rafsanjani, Taleqani and Khomeini's non-clerical associates, A. Bani-Sadr and S. Qotbzadeh.

The struggle for power between the PRG and the extralegal government began immediately after the revolution. The PRG from the beginning sought to control the revolutionary committees and courts, transfer their power to the 'legal' government or tried to dissolve them. Much to the chagrin of the PRG, revolutionary committees obtained full power especially in the provinces where the PRG did not command much authority, and the revolutionary courts continued to execute the associates of the old regime. By the beginning of March, the interim government had become impatient with the activities of popular organizations. Bazargan complained that "the committees hinder the course of affairs and interfere in the administration and this is in contrast to the functions of the legal government. w²⁴ The PRG also called for the incorporation of the Revolutionary Guards into the armed forces. In response to the PRG's threats of resignation, the Revolutionary Council urged the committees to cooperate with the government. The PRG proposed regulations in order to eliminate the independent power of the popular institutions. According to these, the committees were to pave the way for the transfer of their powers to the government and prepare for their dissolution.²⁵ In the face of Bazargan's criticism of Khomeini on the grounds of his interfering in specific government affairs, Khomeini in effect withdrew from everyday politics and left Tehran for Qum in the beginning of March. By this time the PRG had managed to exert some control over the popular institutions.

²⁴⁻ Kayhan, 10 Esfand 1357.

²⁵⁻ The text of the regulations, in Keyhan, 14 Esfand 1357.

In spite of the differences between the PRG and the revolutionary organizations, the alliance of forces which occupied the power bloc was dominated by the PRG and its policies. From the start the PRG declared that it was not a revolutionary government and did not believe in radical actions. Instead, it professed to be following a 'step-by-step' policy. Bazargan was opposed to "those who have extreme revolutionary ideas and say that weapons must remain in the hands of the people and since the army is an imperialist army it must be smashed, and that factories must be run by the workers."²⁶ He appointed deputies of the military commanders of the Shah's army, many of whom had been arrested during the revolution, to high military positions in the new government. The PRG's policy towards the army brought about protests from the military rank and file especially in the air force who demanded democratic appointment of commanders through soldiers' councils. The policy of the PRG was to strengthen the state apparatus and to preserve the army and its hierarchy.

On economic grounds, the overall policy of the PRG was to promote the private sector. Soon the government invited the fugitive industrialists who had fled the country during the revolution to return to their business for "the government is now considering amnesty for capitalists. Islamic government in fact supports honest capitalists. Those who have money should have no fear."27 The government also offerred loans for the reopening of factories; up to July 1979 it had recommended payment for 260 applications for loans out of 950 such requests.²⁸ The Central Bank promised every facility for those industrialists who wished to return. The PRG, with the backing of Khomeini, banned all strikes. It also abolished the workers' profit-sharing scheme, under the excuse of seeking to nationalize industries. The police, the Revolutionary Guards and committees suppressed strikes and attacked workers' demonstrations.

²⁶⁻ Kayhan, 17 Mordad 1358.

²⁷⁻ Ibid, 20 Khordad 1358. 28- Ibid, 11 Teer 1358.

The PRG policy concerning agricultural land and peasants, sought to preserve the status quo in the rural areas established after the land reforms. According to a government bill, private landed property was legal irrespective of the size of the holding, hence lands belonging to landlords exempted from the land reforms were legally protected and any occupation of such lands by peasants was illegal. Such large holdings still existed in several areas, for instance in Gorgan and Gonbad on the Caspian only 20 per cent of land was peasant property. the remaining 80 per cent belonged to 800 large landowners including the Pahlavi family.²⁹ Large landlord properties also existed in Azarbaijan and Kurdestan. In this regard, the PRG had the support of Khomeini who stated that in Islam there is no limit on private property.³⁰ Accordingly, the Revolutionary Council passed a resolution forbidding any expropriation of lands by peasants and made such action punishable by death. The PRG formed a five-man commission and a special force of the Revolutionary Guards for the securing of lands occupied by peasants in the course of the revolution. This exacerbated the ongoing conflicts between peasants and landowners especially in Kurdestan, West Azarbaijan and Sistan (see below). In these areas the government distributed arms among the landlords 'in order to restore order'.³¹ In West Azarbaijan the revolutionary committees were in close cooperation with armed local landlords who had taken back their lands formerly distributed among peasants in the land reforms.³² According to the land ownership law passed by the Revolutionary Council. exploitation of land on the basis of mozarei (the five-element formula practiced mainly before the land reforms) was legal. The law, however, recognized as legal all land transactions carried out under the land reforms of 1963.

While the PRG was trying to demobilize the already politicised strata, 29- Jomhuri-ye Islami, 4 Dey 1358. 31- Ibid 24 Khordad 1358. 30- Enghelab-e Islami, 19 Mehr 1359. 32- Kar, 29 Mordad 1358.

Khomeini and some of his clerical associates sought to keep the population mobilized. Thus he urged the PRG to take steps to the benefit of the mostazafin (the downtrodden). He made water and electricity free for these people, orderd the establishment of the Mostazafin Housing Foundation and instructed the government to compensate the losses of those hardest hit during the revolution. The PRG was opposed to such 'hasty' actions. The question of housing the poor led to sharp disagreements between the PRG and the revolutionary organizations. People from south Tehran occupied empty houses in the north with the approval of Ayatollah Karrubi. the guardian of the Housing Foundation. The PRG disagreed with such measures and stopped the grant of government credits to the Foundation. Increasingly the poor occupied houses in the north while revolutionary committee men dispatched by the government to evacuate the squatters instead transfered more houses to the homeless. The conflict between the PRG and the revolutionary institutions mounted as Ayatollah Karrubi acted swiftly in housing the homeless. In this process, Karrubi seemed to have acted in an extreme manner, as he soon had to go into hiding, and shortly his revolutionary guards were disarmed. Subsequently many of the squatters were forced out.33

The PRG had announced from the beginning that it did not intend to nationalize banks and large industries, partly in order to encourage the fugitive industrialists to return. But since the government imposed no restrictions on the flight of capital and capitalists, private banks and industries came close to the verge of bankruptcy. Because of the dominance of financial capital private companies were indebted to the banks and the banks themselves were nearly bankrupt. Thus the government was forced to take some action. By nationalizing private banks and large industries the government sought to save them from total collapse. The industries nationalized included those belonging to 51 major industrial-

33- Kayhan, 21 Mordad and 11 Shahrivar 1358.

ists who had fled the country and industries whose total debt to the banks was more than their capital. The latter were also compensated.
 The PRG, however, announced that the industries would be returned to private control once they were rehabilitated.³⁴

In foreign policy, the PRG attempted to improve relations with the United States of America. The government of the liberals had from the start had the support of the U.S.A.. During the revolution, the moderate opposition leaders had frequently visited the U.S. Embassy in order to present their case against the regime. By the time the U.S. administration had finally withdrawn its full support from the Shah it had established good relations with the moderates.³⁵ After the revolution. members of the PRG frequently visited the U.S. Embassy to pave the way for better relations. In February, Bazargan himself had several meetings with the U.S. Ambassador. The Iran-America Commerce Bureau resumed its activities and the PRG paid the private banks' debts to American banks in order to attract foreign investment. It also endorsed the existing military agreements between Iran and the U.S. and the army was to receive necessary supplies from America.³⁶ In February a group of the Fedaian-e Khalq attacked and occupied the U.S. Embassy but the government forced them out and ensured the Embassy of full protection. The PRG was, however, careful not to attract public attention to its attempts at improving relations with the United States.

On the whole, under the PRG an uneasy alliance obtained between the moderates and the fundamentalists. The government sought to curb as much as possible the power of the revolutionary committees and courts and in this it had the support of the bourgeoisie. On several occasions, industrialists petitioned the PRG to control the revolutionary committees and workers' syndicates. For instance the management boards of the Lime Com-

34- Ayandegan, 19 Khordad 1358.

³⁵⁻ Bazargan referred to this on several occasions, e.g., <u>Kayhan</u>, 20 Bahman 1358. 36- <u>Kayhan</u> 30 Mordad 1358.

pany and of the Industrial Group of Varzidikar in Tehran sent a petition to the PRG to dissolve all revolutionary committees, courts and guards.³⁷ The government had already managed to exclude the affairs of commercial companies from the jurisdiction of revolutionary courts. As to the workers' syndicates, which were made up of the workers alone, the PRG sought to replace them with consultative councils representing workers and the management. The moderates, however, were confronted with a wholesale class conflict between workers and capitalists, peasants and landowners, with communal conflicts superimposed by class conflicts and with the masses who, in the words of an exasperated moderate, "for years had suffered under the oppression of the kings and could not even complain and now they think they can get everything they want,"³⁸ In short, the PRG was confronted with a quest for more social revolution. Bazargan himself frequently said, "we were only expecting a fall of rain. Now there is coming a storm."

The Social Question and the Quest for More Revolution

In explaining the political evolution of revolution, Hanna Arendt has referred to the 'social question' or the 'existence of poverty', which she argues, has been a major factor in all revolutions since 1789. Arendt argues that a liberal revolution or the liberal phase of a revolution is bound to fail because liberals typically ignore the importance of the individual's social context and relations and the social and public spheres of life in general. Instead they tend to overvalue the private person and his private rights. The abstract individualism of the liberals ignores the fact that revolutions pose more than mere political problems, that they involve social and economic problems as well. Arendt argues that faced with an acute social question, a revolution will find it impossible to produce the freedom desired by the liberals, and as the social ques-

37- Ettelaat, 14 Khordad 1358.

38- General Madani quoted in Ayandegan, 6 Mordad 1358.

tion becomes more dominant and tends to direct the course of the revolution the liberals are increasingly left behind. While the liberals are too little concerned with the social question and raising the masses above poverty, the radicals stress egalitarianism to an impossible extent and hence tend to ignore the private person and his private concerns. Arendt's conclusion is that political action by the radicals cannot solve the social question and the quest for such a solution destroys liberty and sends revolutions to their doom.³⁹

The social question will inevitably affect the political course of revolution however, by contributing to the discredit and fall of the liberals and by providing a justification for the ascendancy of the extremists. In Iran, the moderates viewed the revolution only as a political affair, concerning the form of government. With the monarchy overthrown, they considered that the revolution had gone far enough, if not too far already. Yet the revolution itself was 'degenerating' into a social conflict. Class struggle began in the countryside where peasants and landlords became involved over the appropriation of large areas of disputed land; in the cities, where industrial workers and capitalists fought over industrial management, decision-making and profit; in the areas of minority settlement, where peasant-landlord conflicts became intertwined with communal conflicts; and between the urban masses and the propertied classes.

In the rural zones, the peculiar nature of the land issue (in particular due to the agrarian reforms of 1963) had made the peasantry a very diverse social stratum. While the better-off peasants who had obtained land under the land reform feared expropriation at the hands of the remnants of the landlords, the poorer peasants and agricultural labourers

³⁹⁻ H. Arendt, op. cit. pp.59-114. For Arendt, the social question is a major but unsoluble question. For Karl Marx, to the contrary, without solving the social question there could be no revolution and no liberty. The social question for Marx revolved around class domination and exploitation and this was also considered to be a political question capable of resolution by political action. Ibid, pp. 61-2.

pushed for the immediate redistribution of large lands. The landlords sought to reoccupy lands previously redistributed among peasants, giving grounds to the widespread fears about the revolution expressed among the peasants. As already mentioned, the old regime had managed to mobilize peasant groups to attack urban demonstrations. After the revolution, peasant support for the old regime and the Shah was detectable wherever landlords reappeared as a major force on the scene.⁴⁰ While landlords formed their own unions in several places, small-holders and poor peasants throughout the country established peasant councils and unions to fight the landlords who were often supported by the PRG and the army. The land issue became a cause of sharp class conflict everywhere.

Due to the provisions of the 1963 land reform law, landlords retained parts of their estate such as land under mechanized farming and tea-farms, as well as up to 500 hectares usually including the best lands of the estate. They usually retained more than what the Law had allowed under false pretences. In addition, in several areas such as Turkoman Sahra on the Caspian, West Azarbaijan and Kurdestan, the land reforms had not been thoroughly implemented. In the area of Turkoman Sahra (Gorgan and Gonbad) the Pahlavi family itself owned large tracts of the best land (amounting to more than 10,000 hectares), the Yazdani family of the grand bourgeoisie owned 30,000 hectares and army generals also owned extensive holdings in the area. 47 In the areas of minority settlement such as Urumieh (in Azarbaijan), despite the redistribution of some land among the peasants, landlords still retained their special status as the head of peasant communities. In Kurdestan the old regime had preferred to cooperate with the landlords in order to ensure the security of the borders and landlords had had links with the army and the gendarmerie. As a result, the majority of the Kurdish peasantry (up to 72 per cent)⁴² were landless agricultural labour-40- F. Soltani, Ettehadiye-haye Dehqani (Peasant Unions), a report from Kurdestan, published by Daneshjuyan-e Mobarez, 1358, pp.17-19. 41- Jomhuri-ye Islami, 4 Dey 1358. 42- Rahai, 27 Azar 1358, p.10.

ers. After the revolution, landlords in several areas siezed peasant holdings or demanded a share of the crop. In March 1979, landlords in Char Mahal in Urumieh demanded their share of the crop for the previous twelve years, and claimed that all the laws of the old regime, including the land reform law, were now null and void. Char Mahal includes four areas each containing between 50 and 100 villages. In several of these. the pressure of the landlords for the 'ownership-share' led to armed conflicts between the peasants and the landlords' bands, and hundreds of peasant families were driven off the land. Peasant refugee camps were set up in the area while threats of violent attacks by landlords forced peasants in other villages to pay the 'ownership-share'. The revolutionary committees in the area were themselves under landlord influence and in order to ensure security in the border areas the army distributed arms amongst the landlords. In response to landlord attacks, Char Mahal peasants formed peasant councils and established a Central Union in order to enable them to present their case to the government, and to establish peasant cooperatives. During the revolution, peasants of the same area had frequently attacked revolutionary demonstrators in the town of Urumich and had been known for their support of the Shah. 43 Landlord attacks also occurred in other areas of the province. On one occasion, armed landlords with influence on the local revolutionary committee attacked peasants in the village of Qara-Agja and in order to create widespread fear they castrated two peasants with the animal-castrating machine and went on to occupy peasant lands. In Astara on the Caspian. ex-landlords and their gunmen formed a revolutionary committee and attacked peasants and took back the previously redistributed lands. In Tavalesh. Gilan, peasant demonstrations were held against ex-landlords who were returning to the area from the cities to reclaim 'their' land. In several

⁴³⁻ A report on Char Mahal in <u>Rahai</u>, 27 Azar 1358. The events in the area were reported in <u>Kayhan</u> and <u>Kar</u> as well. 44- Kar, 29 Mordad 1358.

villages peasants were driven off their land. In Fars, the army distributed arms amongst landlords and Khosrow Qashqai, a prominent tribal leader, was sent to the province as the representative of the PRG to ensure the obedience of the tribes. Wherever the landlord class was strong, as was the case in West Azarbaijan and Kurdestan, landlords established their own unions. The Voshmgir Union of landlords in Gonbad was especially formed to confront the emerging peasant unions in the area.

The peasants also sought to seize large holdings, and demanded swift and meaningful land reforms. Peasant councils were organized both among the better-off peasants who sought to fight off landlords and among agricultural labourers and poorer peasants who sought to appropriate land. Among the first councils to be formed were Kurdish peasant councils in Marivan and other areas, composed of armed peasants and established under the guidance of the Kurdish Communist Kumala Party. To ward off the landlords supported by the government forces, peasants attacked gendarmerie stations and obtained arms. The Central Peasant Union which was composed of 32 village councils became involved in a conflict with the landlords which formed a major dimension of the Kurdish question (see below). Peasant councils and unions were also organized in Turkoman Sahra. Amongst the more important of these was the Central Peasant Council of Tatar Olya, composed of nine councils. All Turkoman peasant councils were united in Setad, the central headquarters of the peasant councils, in Gonbad which closely cooperated with the local branch of the Fedaiyan-e Khalq. The councils proposed that large holdings belonging to the favourites of the old regime and landlords be cultivated by the peasant councils. The PRG responded that the peasants had no right to such lands and finally agreed that the peasants could take 20 per cent of the crops. The peasant councils, however, occupied the lands despite the attempts of the revolutionary committees and guards to prevent them, while the landlords appealed to the PRG for help. A PRG mission sent to the area failed to solve the

question and was accused by the councils of ignoring the demands of the peasants. The land issue was also one of the major issues in the conflict between the PRG and the Turkoman minority. Peasant councils were also organized in Gilan, Yazd, Baluchestan and Urumieh. The demands of the councils included the appropriation of large estates, the cancellation of peasants' debts to the banks and cooperatives, the abolition of all remaining landlord rents and dues and real land reforms. The popular slogan was 'land to those who work it'. In several places peasants occupied large estates. In Lurestan, the lands of General Palizban, a royalist rebel stationed in Kurdestan, were occupied by the peasants. In Hamadan, peasants occupied the Bani-Sadr estate belonging to F. Bani-Sadr, the public prosecutor. Everywhere agricultural labourers demanded the dissolution of agricultural companies and agri-business complexes which had been formed on the lands of local peasants. In the Qum area, peasants confiscated some land but landlords had the support of religious ranks in Qum. In other areas mullahs were often reported to have told peasants that confiscated lands were like stolen property and on these lands prayers could not be said according to religious law.

The policies of the PRG and the Revolutionary Council regarding the agrarian question, in effect worked to the benefit of large landowners, especially in areas like Kurdestan and Gonbad. The landownership Law passed by the Revolutionary Council recognized the <u>status quo</u> and the existing rights on land obtained through purchase and transfer under the 1963 Law. The government thus regarded as illegal any confiscation of land by peasants. The Revolutionary Council passed a bill according to which those confiscating land would be prosecuted in the revolutionary courts and could be sentenced to death. The Law also prohibited ex-landlords from occupying peasant lands. The government policy thus meant that, for the time being at least, there could be no more land reforms. Responding to the left's accusation that the government was supporting 'feudalism', Dr. Izadi, the Minister of Agriculture (who was himself a large landowner) commented that in Iran, feudalism had never existed. What had existed was landed property, because landlords could sell their land independent of the peasants working it.⁴⁵ Landlords, especially in West Azarbaijan, interpreted the Law to their own benefit, claiming that since confiscation of land was illegal the land reforms had also been confiscation of property, and hence they sought to take back the lands distributed in 1963. In practice, however, the PRG took the side of the landlords, especially in areas of minority settlement, in the name of ensuring security in the border areas.⁴⁶

As the PRG continued to put off further agrarian reform, increasing complaints came from peasants, to the effect that the revolution had changed nothing in their lives. A letter from the governor of Garmsar to the PRG read: "The local landless peasants had hoped to obtain land after the revolution. In spite of the just expectations of these exploited people I am ashamed to declare that I could not take any appropriate measures because in the event of any action in this regard the revolutionary courts and the five-man commission, on the basis of the Land Law and in response to the complaints of the landlords, would rule against any confiscation and occupation of land."⁴⁷

Compared to the rural multitudes, the urban proletariat was more coherent and less patient in expressing demands generated by the revolution for a profound improvement in the quality of their lives. In particular, the proletariat of Tehran, Tabriz and Esfahan far exceeded that of smaller towns in politicisation and activism. To no small extent this was because the labouring classes existed in an environment rich in numerous and active political factions and groups seeking to champion the masses in the 'cause' of the revolution. In Tehran, workers and the unem-

⁴⁵⁻ Paygam-e Enruz, 18 Farvardin 1358. 46- In this connection, M. Chamran, the Minister of Defence held several meetings with some of the chiefs and landlords of the tribal areas. 47- Enghelab-e Islami, 20 Dey 1358.

ployed would gather on the Revolution Street by the University to listen to the heated debates on the great political questions of the day. Workers would listen to the Mojahedin who would accuse the PRG of adopting anti-revolutionary policies and to the Fedaian who would tell them of the plots of the imperialists. A militant worker might belong to a factory council or a cell of some leftist party. These factory councils or committees had sprung up all over the country during and after the revolution. Originally they were strike committees, but later they sought to take over the management of the factories. Workers reopened some factories, closed because of the flight of owners and managers, and took over the management themselves. On other occasions, they expelled the managers. In the Tabriz Tractor Industry the workers chased out all the managers and set up a factory council to fulfill the management function. The council of railway workers with 57 representatives from 35,000 workers throughout the country, was established in the early days of the revolution and declared that since the railway workers had contributed a great deal to the victory of the revolution, they would expect that the government would swiftly respond to their just demands. The demands of the workers' councils included a forty-hour week, higher wages, the payment of a share of the profits, the recognition of workers' councils, the legalization of strikes, setting up an unemployment fund in the Ministry of Labour and a daily meal. Most important of all, the men in the factories clamoured for higher wages to offset the spiraling cost of living. During the first six months of the revolution, the rate of inflation was put at 47 per cent while the number of the unemployed was more than three million (out of an economically active population of eleven million). 49 Unemployed workers held marches in several places and often clashed with revolutionary committees. In Esfahan, 10,000 unemployed workers from 24 factories marched to the governor's office asking for 'work, bread and housing' but they 48- Kar, 28 Teer 1358. 49- Kayhan, 18 Mordad 1358.

were confronted by armed revolutionary guards who violently dispersed them.⁵⁰ On many occasions factory owners closed their plants when workers insisted on having some say in determining their working conditions. Workers responded to these lockouts by taking control of their factories. Employers responded by cancelling orders and stopping the delivery of supplies. Workers' councils organized numerous strikes to press their demands on the management and the government. On a single day thousands of workers in 34 large factories in Gilan went on strike and demanded the payment of their shares in the company profits. As the working class movement gained momentum, the PRG sought to control workers' councils. It passed a law concerning the formation of employers councils in place of workers councils. They were to be composed of the representatives of the management, employees and workers. Workers in many factories responded by stopping the delivery of products. In October, fishermen working for the Fishing Company in Anzali on the Caspian occupied the company on the grounds that the company which had the monopoly of fishing had breached its recent agreement with fishermen on free fishing. They staged large demonstrations and clashed with the revolutionary guards. Finally the PRG sent in the army and several fishermen were killed. The demands of the workers' councils were far from being met. The oil workers demanded, in vain, to have a representative in the Revolutionary Council but this remained a secret organization. Even after the Revolutionary Council approved the forty-hour week, the PRG insisted on 48 hours and the Council revoked its earlier decision. A worker, writing to the PRG, complained: "the dispute settlement board represents the employer. the Minister of Labour represents the employer, and the representative of workers represents the employer."⁵¹ Another worker wrote: "Mr. Bazargan whenever he talks about workers, his words are like those of the factory owner. All his words and actions are in the interest of the greedy mana-50- Kar, 23 Farvardin 1358. 51- Ibid, 3 Khordad 1358.

gers. Neither did the Imam go to a factory to see what is happening to workers."⁵²In such an atmosphere of growing alienation of the labour force, the moderate policies of the PRG damned it in the eyes of the working class as being the tool of the capitalists.

Like the industrial workers, the rank and file of the army also organized committees and councils and demanded fundamental changes in the structure of the army. In particular, the air force rank and file led the armed forces in radicalism and militancy. They were violently opposed to the reconstitution of the armed forces in the imperial style and opposed the restoration of the authority of the former military high command. Young air force officers and the rank and file organized the 'Military Wing of the Revolution' which called for the dissolution of the imperial army and the creation of a people's Islamic army, with the democratic appointment of commanders by councils. From the beginning, such councils established in the naval bases and garrisons met with the opposition of officers, who were not willing to adjust to a style of command appropriate in a revolutionary situation and expected from the rank and file the same kind of discipline as existed in the imperial army. It was the discipline issue which the soldiers found unbearable. After all, it was the air force and military rank and file who had fought the army officers in the last days of the old regime and had so contributed to the victory of the revolution. They now clamoured for the democratization of the armed forces. In June, 18,000 air force cadets staged sit-ins demanding the dismissal of army commanders and the recognition of soldiers' councils. They called for the abolition of rank and the creation of a 'classless' army and accused the PRG of recalling old officers to high military command while revolutionary courts ordered the execution of mostly low-ranking soldiers for shooting the people during the revolution.53

52- Ibid, 19 Shahrivar 1358.

53- Ayandegan, 10 Khordad 1358.

To the moderates, the whole population had gone 'crazy'holding unreal expectations. Every day deputations arrived in Qum from the provinces and tribal areas to complain about their local economic conditions. There were expectations of a rapid and profound change in social conditions. The economic crisis continuing from before the revolution hit the urban lower classes the hardest. Alongside of workers and peasants' councils there emerged numerous other societies and councils such as the Society of the Indebted, the Association of the Injured (during the revolution). the Society of the Families of the Martyrs of the Revolution, the councils of the unemployed, the society of pit-dwellers and so on. In July, in Tabriz, complaints about profiteering led to a food riot. Several processions of the poor converged on the main square and smashed any shop they could reach in the city, looting the food. Several capitalists were assassinated in Tehran. Esfahan and Gilan. In Amol, the 'supportes of Islam'. a local popular group, identified the moneylenders of the town and called for their execution. Everywhere social injustice and economic inequality were viewed as the result of the maldistribution of goods rather than as a problem of the scarcity of commodities.

Closely intertwined with the social question was the communal question. Communal opposition to the PRG began as it became clear that the government was to ensure the continuity of the state structures that had existed under the old regime. The revolution not only brought new social forces into the conflict areas but also ethnic and religious minority groups. Iran is a country of ethnic and religious minorities. Ethnically the population is divided into six sections: Persians (50%), Azaris (23%), Kurds (11%), Arabs (5%), Turkomans (3%) and Baluchis (3%).⁵⁴ After the revolution, the new (Shiite Persian) regime was confronted with demands from Kurds, Turkomans and Arabs for land reforms and limited political autonomy from the

central government.

⁵⁴⁻ These figures are taken from several publications of the Statistical Centre on various provinces and tribal areas.

The Kurdish question was intimately tied up with the land issue. Among the areas which had been little affected by the 1963 land reforms were Kurdestan and West Azarbaijan, the homeland of the Kurds. This was due to the sensitivity of the region, the traditional rebelliousness of the Kurds and their historical demands for a measure of autonomy. The old regime had thus maintained links with local landlords and notables and as a result, the remnants of the landed class were considerably more powerful in Kurdestan than in any other province. The Kurds expected that the fall of the monarchy, which had crushed the Kurdish republic of Mahabad after the Second World War and had suppressed their 1967-8 armed movements, would provide an opportunity for the redress of their ethnic and economic grievances. Yet after the revolution, the landed class which already had a strong power basis in the area, emerged forcefully onto the political scene, formed unions and employed armed men seeking to reestablish their traditional authority over the peasants. They were also either members of local revolutionary committees or had a powerful influence on them. On the other hand peasants, with the particular encouragement of the Kumala Communist party (whose history went back to the time of the Kurdish republic) organized their own councils and unions. In the conflicts between the peasants and the landlords the latter received the support of the local committees and the army which distributed arms among them in order to ensure security. There were a number of parties and groups active in Kurdestan, including the Kurdish religious leaders (mamostas), the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Kurdish radical left. Sheikh Ezzedin Hosseini, the religious leader of Mahabad emerged as the national leader of the Kurds and stood for the autonomy of Kurdestan from Tehran. The Kurdish Democratic Party, led by Dr. A. Qassemlu had been a branch of the Tudeh Party at the time of the post-War Kurdish movement. The party demanded autonomy for Kurdestan, including the establishment of a local

parliament, government and judicial system. It organized its own fighting force, <u>pishmargeh</u>, and had a large following especially in the Kurdish cities. More radical than the KDP was the Kumala Party, mainly composed of Kurdish and Persian intellectuals. As an originally Maoist party, Kumala sought to mobilize landless peasants and organized its own pishmargeh from among them. The organization of peasant councils and unions in Kurdestan was in the main the work of Kumala. Party activists travelled through the Kurdish country propagating their cause and with the help of the peasants attacked and disarmed gendarmerie posts. Armed peasants marched on the cities and clashed with landlords. This enabled the landlords to obtain arms from the government on the grounds that peasant unions and movements were part of 'Communist subversion'. Kumala called for 'land to the tiller'. confiscated large lands and redistributed them among the peasants. Thus while KDP support came mainly from the cities, Kumala was supported mostly in the villages. The government in Tehran did not recognize peasant unions and the leftist parties, hence government forces supported landlords and local notables against the left and the peasants.Confronted with demands for Kurdish autonomy soon after the revolution, the PRG sent a delegation to Mahabad to negotiate with Kurdish leaders. The delegation failed to reach any agreement and in March fighting broke out between the KDP pishmargeh and the revolutionary guards. Later an agreement was reached on limited autonomy including the establishment of Kurdish councils to administer local affairs and the recognition of cultural rights. However, more disputes arose and the revolutionary guards and the army moved into Kurdesten. The conflict continued until August when a full-scale war broke out as Khomeini ordered a general mobilization of the armed forces against the Kurds. The Kumala party was wiped out and Kurdish cities fell to the army. The war and the presence of the army strengthened the landlords who cooperated with the army. On one occasion, which became known as the massacre of Garna, some fifty people of the village of Garna were massacred by the revolutionary guards and the revolutionary committee of Urumieh composed of local landlords, in order to 'create fear among the peasants'.⁵⁵ The Kurdish war was to continue for three months.

The situation in Turkoman Sahra was similar to the Kurdish situation. Turkoman Sahra had been the personal estate of Reza Shah and after the land reforms the royal family retained the best of the Turkoman lands. Senior bureaucrats and army officers also had large holdings in the area. After the revolution, Turkoman peasants and labourers in more than 400 villages confiscated lands belonging to absentee landlords, established peasant unions and cultivated the land communally. The peasant councils organized the Central Organization of Peasant Councils in Gonbad which was supported by the local Fedaiyan Organization. On the other hand, the landlords of the region along with local mullahs dominated the revolutionary committee in Gonbad. Conflicts began between the committee, guards and the army on the one hand, and the Central Peasant Council and the Turkomans of Gonbad on the other. The Turkomans demanded representation on the committees dominated by the Persians, and limited autonomy. Landlords began to return to the region after the revolution to reclaim their lands. They sent petitions to the PRG and cooperated with the army but the peasant movement in the area had already gained momentum and become organized, and the government could not do much in that regard.⁵⁶

Unlike the Turkomans who worked on the land, the Shiite Arabs of Khuzestan were mostly employed in the industrial sector, especially in the oil industry. While the Arabs formed the bulk of the labouring class, the industrial, commercial and shipping companies were owned by Persian merchants and industrialists. After the revolution, the Arabs formed their own political organizations to express their economic and ethnic demands, including the formation of a local parliament, direct representation in

⁵⁵⁻ Pishgam Organization, Garna, Tabriz, 1359, p.15.

⁵⁶⁻ This analysis is based on: Peasant Unions, 'Turkoman Sahra News Sheet', nos. 9 to 15, 1358.

the national parliament and the allocation of a share of oil revenues for local development. Open conflict began between the Arab political organizations and the revolutionary committees in Khuzestan, leading to the intervention of the army. The Arab movement was thus suppressed.

The communal and class conflicts which occurred within six months of the fall of the old regime signified that large segments of the urban working class, peasants and tribal masses had become disenchanted with the progress of the revolution. It seemed that the performance of the revolution had fallen miserably short of the bright expectations of Bahman. The liberals in the power bloc could not realize that it was impossible to demobilize a population which was going through a revolution. Neither did they have the ability and organizational resources to undertake a massive mobilization of the countryside and the working class. The liberal system was unable to assimilate the peasant and working class organizations. It was controlled by professional politicians, lawyers and businessmen who almost exclusively relied on the largely defunct bureaucracy left from the old regime. Also, the military's previous role as a subordinate power seemed to prevent it from emerging as an actor for a successful transition from the weak liberal regime to authoritarian rule. In any case, this would require a degree of cohesion and discipline and a personal leader to provide a centre of authority, qualities which were obviously lacking especially after the revolution. On the whole, the PRG seemed discredited in the eyes of the workers and peasants and increasingly lost touch with the masses. The social question was at least in part to justify the ascendancy of the extremists. While the PRG failed to demobilize the population, the clergy in the power bloc stepped up mass mobilization.

The Demise of the Moderates and the Ascendancy of the Extremists

The conflict between the liberals and the Islamic fundamentalists began not long after the overthrow of the monarchy. Immediately after the revolution there was little dispute that the new regime would be an 'Islamic republic': this was because different parties had different implicit interpretations of such a system of government. In the first referendum to decide on the form of government (held in March 1979) almost all parties voted for an Islamic republic. For a short while it looked as if the PRG dominated the state, but as soon as the Islamic Republican Party was formed by the clerical members of the Revolutionary Council -who were also in control of the revolutionary committees, guards and courts- the dual nature of state power became more pronounced. Dr. Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigned on the grounds that there existed a state within the state. Dr. Mobasheri, a member of the National Front and Minister of Justice, continued to demand the abolition of the 'other government'. The lawyer, H. Nazih, chairman of the oil industry and a member of the National Front, urged that Islam must be kept away from the affairs of the state and the economy and that freedom had been the only aim of the revolution.⁵⁷ The PRG's complaints of its inability to govern and the strengthening of the extremists' power structure led to an agreement in July to merge the two 'governments'. The PRG and the Revolutionary Council were to govern jointly. Five members of the Council were to hold deputy ministerial posts in the PRG and in return five members of the PRG were admitted to the Revolutionary Council.

The main difference between the moderates and the extremists emerged over the nature of the constitution of the new state. The PRG published a draft constitution to be debated in a proposed constituent assembly. Like the 1906 Constitution, the draft constitution was secular and liberal. and provided for a council of guardians made up of five religious leaders

⁵⁷⁻ Ettelaat, 15 Mordad 1358.

and six jurists, in order to ensure the conformity of legislation with Islamic laws. The draft caused much controversy between the liberals and the extremists. The Islamic parties rejected both the draft constitution and the convening of a constituent assembly. Khomeini and the clerics of the Revolutionary Council on several occasions told Bazargan not to mention the word 'democratic' in relation to the constitution. After the publication of the draft, a congress of its critics was held by the Revolutionary Council and the Islamic Republican Party in the University of Tehran. At the Congress, the principle of velayat-e faghih (rule of the theologian), in line with the theories of Khomeini, was put forward and the Congress concluded that in the constitution, sovereignty must be said to originate in God. all laws must be based on Islam and that executive powers must be wielded by the ruling theologian.⁵⁸ This brought a sharp reaction from the moderates. Dr. Sahabi, a PRG minister and a member of the Freedom Movement, declared that velayat would destroy national sovereignty. Ayatollah Shariatmadari announced that according to Shiite jurisprudence velayat was applicable only in a very limited number of cases and anyway could not legally negate national sovereignty.⁵⁹

The size of the constituent assembly which was to approve the draft constitution was a matter of further dispute. The moderates proposed a national constituent assembly whereas the Revolutionary Council and Khomeini preferred a smaller body of experts on Islamic law. Finally, it was agreed between the PRG and the Revolutionary Council that a Constituent Council of Experts composed of 73 members would be elected to approve the constitution. The elections to the Council clearly divided the moderates from the extremists. In Tehran two major coalitions of parties were formed for the elections: the coalition of Islamic parties, including the Islamic Republican Party, the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, the Revolutionary Guards, the Revolutionary Council, Fedaiyan-e Islam, the Clerical 58-Jonhuri-ye Islami, 25 Teer 1358. 59- Bandad, 29 Shahrivar 1358. Society of Tehran and other smaller Islamic factions presented a ten-member slate, mostly comprising members of the Islamic Republican Party; a coalition of the moderate parties including the National Front, the MPRP, the Radical Party and some high officials of the PRG, boycotted the elections. The Freedom Movement however, stood for the elections but its candidates had only one person in common with those of the Islamic coalitions slate (Ayatollah Talegani) and while of the latter 7 out of 10 were religious leaders. 8 out of 10 candidates of the Freedom Movement were doctors. Two other coalitions were formed: the coalition of the radical Islamic parties, including the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the Islamic Organization of Counsel, Jama and the Movement of Militant Moslems. The slate of the coalition had four out of ten in common with that of the Freedom Movement and two in common with the Islamic coalition. The Leftist coalition, including the Fedaiyan, Paykar, and four smaller factions, had two in common with the Islamic Radicals' coalition and one with the extremists' coalition. These coalitions were formed only in Tehran; in the whole of the country 80 per cent of the candidates were members of the clergy.

In the elections to the Constitutional Council (held on August 3) the Islamic coalition of parties used their influence in the media, revolutionary committees and mosques to ensure victory and oust their opponents. Khomeini urged the electorate to vote for the Islamic candidates. Thus through extensive manipulation, which brought sharp reactions from the other coalitions, the Islamic parties managed to get their candidates elected both in Tehran and in the provinces.Out of the 73 elected, 60 were clerics and members of the IRP, the Clerical Society of Tehran and the Society of the Teachers of Qum Seminaries. The remainder were members and associates of the Freedom Movement. Thus the Constitutional Council was dominated by the extremists.

The division between the moderates and the extremists intensified 60- Kayhan, 8-12, Mordad 1358.

with the disintegration of the Moslem People's Republican Party. As mentioned earlier, the party was composed of clerics as well as secular moderates and was associated with Ayatollah Shariatmadari. In the elections, while the moderate group which was associated with the Jurist Association sided with the liberal parties, the clerical group broke away from the party and joined the IRP. The party however, stood for elections and won twelve seats, mostly in Azarbaijan. Yet due to manipulation by the IRP. which in cooperation with the clerical faction of the MPRP declared the party dissolved, the names of the successful candidates of the MPRP were not announced and instead IRP supportes were sent to the Council. Already the liberals were charging the Islamic extremists of seeking to obtain a monopoly of power by foul means. Certainly the extremists were not hindered by any beliefs in freedom of elections they might earlier have expressed. Thus the Constitutional Council was filled by the members of the extremist parties. Chaired by Ayatollah Beheshti, the leader of the IRP, the Council put aside the draft constitution and prepared its own draft drawn from the conclusions of the clerical Congress of Critics of the draft constitution. The domination of the Constitutional Council was a major step towards the future hegemony of the extremists. From then on, they were to oust the moderates from the power bloc in three stages which finally led to the fall of the PRG, the suppression of the MPRP and the ousting of the first president of the Republic.

Before all this happened, further events led to the strengthening of the extremists. In response to mounting criticisms of their actions during the Constitutional Council elections, the extremists introduced a press law which made any criticism of the clerical leaders punishable by imprisonment. The first open conflict between the moderate parties and the bazaar-based clerical parties occurred after a liberal daily paper, <u>Ayandegan</u>, which had been critical of the extremists' rise to power, was closed down by the Revolutionary Guards according to the new press law. The mode-

rate parties called for a protest rally during which the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, the Towhid Party and the Hezbollah. all south Tehran organizations associated with the IRP, clashed with the supporters of the National Democratic Front, the Radical Movement and the Lawyers Association. On the one side there were employees of the Plan Organization. members of the Engineers and Jurist Associations and students of Tehran University and on the other a crowd of bazaaris and apprentices mobilized by the revolutionary committes. The latter arrived from the south of the city with a truck-load of bricks to fight the supporters of Ayandegan. The same crowd with the aid of the Revolutionary Guards, attacked and occupied the offices of the Mojahedin and the Fedaiyan-e Khalq. The incident further intensified the war of words between the moderates and the extremists. Ayatollah Khomeini addressing the members of the Radical Movement said: "lawyers and intellectuals say that Islam is no good and want to cause trouble whereas it was Islam that freed them all. All our problems stem from these Westernized intellectuals; they will not be allowed to stand against Islam."⁶¹ Several of the <u>Ulama</u> issued statements and warned about the 'danger' of the liberal intellectuals for the Islamic revolution.⁶² Another defeat for the moderates came with the ousting of Hasan Nazih. chairman of the oil industry and of the Jurists' Association who was a vocal opponent of the interference of the clergy in political affairs. He was accused of maintaining the 'Westernized experts' within the industry. By August, the PRG was on the defensive. The Constitutional Council continued to pass more articles of a full-blooded theocratic constitution and approved the principle of the rule of the theologian. As it became known later, some PRG ministers planned to have the Council dissolved in a 'coup d'etat' but nothing came of the 'plot'. From Qum, Khomeini, unlike his earlier pronouncements, prescribed that the clergy should increasingly engage in politics. In exasperation Bazargan continued to ask 61- Ettelaat, 2 Mordad 1358. 62-E.g. Ayatollahs Khonsari and Ruhani, Ibid,

15 Mordad 1358.

Khomeini to move to Tehran so that he would be closer to the centre of decision-making.

The PRG had to deal both with conflicts in the power bloc and the ever pressing social question. Strikes and work stoppages were everyday occurrences and there were clear indications that large segments of the population had become disenchanted with the progress of the revolution. So far the liberals had sought to demobilize the population. Having failed in this, they now attempted to undertake a mobilization effort by raising the minimum wages and passing legislation for the exemption of the lower classes from taxes and for the redistribution of land among the peasants. 63But with increasing loss of power, the government was not able to carry out many more reforms. Furthermore, the PRG was ideologically cut off from the mass of the population and lacked the necessary organizational resources to undertake a successful mobilization effort. On the other hand, the extremists had so far been concerned with the consolidation of their own power position, without attempting mass mobilization. One indication of the growing discredit of those in power, was the turn-out of voters for elections to provincial and city councils. Barely 10 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote and there were outcries by the extremists that the revolution was in danger. The ranks of the revolution were evidently divided and with dark rumours of counterrevolutionary plots circulating, the revolution seemed to be in trouble. It seemed that only the extremists had the ideological ability and organizational resources to break through this immobilism. In particular, the personal leadership of Khomeini and the power structure at the extremists' disposal provided the necessary means for mass mobilization. Thus with a crisis in the power bloc, the Islamic parties began to step up mass mobilization, in order to break from the liberals within the power bloc and assert their power by aligning themselves with the masses. Khomeini's 63- Ettelaat, 4 Dey 1358.

. appeal carried a strong nationalist orientation. He stepped up his attacks on U.S. imperialism and attributed all the problems of the revolution to the machinations of America. There seemed to be a genuine fear that the revolution might collapse. The Islamic parties mobilized large processions at the same time that the Shah, for the first time after his departure from Iran, was admitted to the United States for medical treatment. The extremists stepped up their criticisms of the moderates for their 'cooperation' with the imperialists, and on November 4, militant students in Tehran attacked and occupied the U.S. Embassy. This marked a decisive stage in the struggles between the moderates and the extremists, for the PRG had maintained normal relations with the U.S. and Bazargan had only recently met an American political delegation. Coming under fierce attack, Bazargan soon resigned, stating his opposition to the capture of the Embassy. The Revolutionary Council took over from the PRG and although some of the liberals were coopted into subordinate roles, and Bazargan himself became a member of the Revolutionary Council, there was no doubt that some of the internal conflicts of the power bloc had been resolved in the interest of the extremists. The government of the liberals had ended in disaster and if the ruin of the revolution was to be avoided, a change had to be made.

In the struggle between the extremists and the moderates the files of the occupied American Embassy served as the marker. The students occupying the Embassy translated documents revealing the connections between U.S. officials and the moderates. The documents were related to the contacts between the constitutional opposition and the Embassy before the revolution as well as contacts made by the PRG and the liberal parties. The Freedom Movement, the Radical Movement and the MPRP were accused of cooperation with imperialism and some members and officials of the PRG were either arrested and imprisoned or went into hiding. Of course some of the clerical leaders such as Ayatollah Beheshti had also participated in negotiations with U.S. officials before the revolution, but for them only cheering could be heard.

The occupation of the Embassy led to the emergence of the students as a major power group. In fact, they emerged as a rival of the increasingly powerful IRP and made direct contacts with Khomeini through his son, Ahmad. Yet the continuing 'revelations' of the students remained confined to the Freedom and Radical Movements. This situation was due to the IRP's success in gradually subduing the Embassy power centre. The seizure of the Embassy had been a spontaneous move by a number of students with different political persuasions. By declaring support for the students, the IRP managed to infiltrate into the Embassy and as a result, some of the more radical students were gradually expelled and replaced by the revolutionary guards of the IRP. Thus the 'revelations' of the Embassy remained selective and confined to the moderates.

With the newly emerged hegemony of the extremists, a wave of populism and radicalism set in. The new regime sought to mobilize the lower classes and promised to redress their economic grievances. The Revolutionary Council which had taken over now began to blame the PRG for hindering the advance of the revolution and proposed to take more radical measures, such as solving the agrarian question, the struggle against 'feudalism', preventing the flight of capital and welfare measures for the lower classes. Those criticisms of the liberal policies of the PRG which used to appear only in the leftist press, such as the PRG's support for the bourgeoisie, now found expression in government papers. Of course, the Revolutionary Council and its main component, the IRP, had been partners of the PRG, but now the IRP was jumping on the bandwagon of the new radicalism. The extremists' declaration of 'war on imperialism' also attracted the support of the left. The Fedaiyan declared their approval of Khomeini's anti-

imperialist drive and they even proscribed demonstrations by unemployed workers as harmful to the anti-imperialist cause.⁶⁴

Concerning the question of peasants and landlords, it was now admitted that a major cause of the provincial revolts had been the land issue, and the silence or indifference of the PRG in that regard- or frequently its active support for the landlords. More immediately, a major turn around occurred on the Kurdish question. The government ordered a halt to all fighting and Khomeini sent a message to the Kurds in which he said that within the Islamic Republic, all ethnic minorities would be granted the right of self-rule in internal affairs. Celebrations were held all over Kurdestan in support of Khomeini. Clerical leaders of the IRP were now at pains to explain that Islam did not support large landownership or 'feudalism', that the Islamic principle of mozarei was applicable only in exceptional cases and that in principle, land belonged to the tiller. Members and supporters of the IRP taking over the Ministry of Agriculture. now put forward plans for Islamic land reforms. Ayatollah Dastgheib complaining to the Revolutionary Council, wrote from Shiraz:"Landlords and feudals have infiltrated high places in the government. The silence of the Revolutionary Council is by no means acceptable. Peasants should not wait for the government to give them land; they should themselves confiscate the large estates."⁶⁵ IRP newspapers now approvingly reported confiscation of land by peasants. In Gonbad, the government reportedly confiscated large estates of local landlords to redistribute them among peasants.⁶⁶ Revolutionary Guards and committees which had previously prevented the confiscation of land by peasants, now encouraged them to take the land of the 'feudals'. In Gilan, revolutionary guards joined the local peasants in asking the government to dissolve the five-man commission (formed under the PRG) which, they claimed, was composed of local landlords. 67

Regarding the industrial working class, the extremists also sought 64-<u>Kar</u>, 28 Aban 1358. 65-<u>Kayhan</u>, 6 Dey 1358. 66-<u>Jomhuri-ye Islami</u>, 15 Esfand 1358. 67-<u>Mardom</u>, 23 Dey 1358. to adopt a more radical platform than that of the PRG. The PRG had decided to abolish the profit-sharing of workers in the recently nationalized industries, on the grounds that the industries now belonged not to the employers but to the public. The workers however, continued to demand a share in the profit. One of the early acts of the Revolutionary Council after the fall of the PRG was to reintroduce the 1963 profit-sharing law with little change. As to the workers' syndicates which had emerged during the revolution, the IRP introduced Islamic councils (<u>shoura</u>) in their place. The imposition of such councils, which were only to be consultative, met with some opposition by independent workers syndicates. In response, the regime while declaring strikes counterrevolutionary, continued to incorporate workers syndicates within the ruling party.

The first round of the ousting of the moderates enabled the extremists to go ahead with the making of their Islamic constitution. The principle of velayat-e faghih inserted in the new constitution alarmed the moderates with a spectre of impending dictatorship. Even after the fall of the PRG. 17 out of 22 cabinet ministers sent a petition to Khomeini to drop the principle from the constitution. According to the constitution, the Islamic Republic was a theocratic state in which sovereignty originated in God, and in the absence of the Hidden Imam, leadership of the community was vested in a just and pious theologian whose powers ranged from the appointment of the council of guardians to supervise legislation and the command of the army, to the power to dismiss the president. However, the new atmosphere of populism and mobilization, and the fact that the extremists were more directly in charge of the government, paved the way for an easy passing of the constitution through a referendum. The clerical leaders had to give some assurances. Khomeini reassured the nation that "the faghih will not interfere inappropriately. He will only control the three powers so that they may not deviate. Velayat is not dictator-

ship but anti-dictatorship." Whereas in mid-October barely 10 per cent of the electorate had turned out in the elections to city councils, by the beginning of December, after stepping up mass mobilization, the turnout was 79 per cent. The moderate parties however, did not participate in the referendum.

The passing of the constitution unleashed the second phase of struggle between the extremists in power and the active moderate opposition. While the National Front and the Freedom Movement had been cowed by the rise of the IRP, the MPRP and its spiritual leader Ayatollah Shariatmadari put up more resistance to the centralization of power by the extremists. Before the constitutional referendum was held, Shariatmadari declared his opposition to Article 110 of the constitution referring to velayat-e faghih. In Tabriz, Shariatmadari's hometown and religious constituency, clashes occurred between rival revolutionary committees supporting Shariatmadari and Khomeini. The MPRP had armed revolutionary committees of its own and mobilized massive demonstrations in Tabriz in support of Shariatmadari. Crowds took over the whole city with the support of the local police, revolutionary guards and the army and the MPRP demanded autonomy for Azarbaijan. Finally, revolutionary guards dispatched from Tehran, seized MPRP offices and committees and arrested party leaders. Under pressure from religious leaders Shariatmadari withdrew his support from the party which was declared counterrevolutionary. Eleven party leaders and members were executed and a number of large Tabrizi businessmen were arrested and imprisoned for supporting and financing the MPRP. As to Shariatmadari, he became confined to his house and was put virtually under house arrest.

So far in the struggle between the moderates and the extremists, it was the IRP which had emerged victorious. The leaders of the party, including Ayatollahs Beheshti, Ardabili, Kani, Khamenei, Bahonar and Rafsanjani, controlled the Revolutionary Council, important government ministries, high . judicial offices and the revolutionary guards and committees. The IRP also had control over the Embassy students who provided a major centre of power and propaganda. Yet there were more positions of power to be won. Prior to the presidential elections which were to be held following the passing of the Islamic constitution, it was widely expected that the first president of the republic would be one of the leaders of the IRP and most probably Ayatollah Beheshti. However, the successive victories of the IRP by fair means and foul had already brought the party the reputation of monopolism. In an unexpected move Khomeini prohibited clerics from standing in the presidential elections. This seemed to be a response to the mounting criticism by the moderate parties, as the IRP's rise to power had already become too blatant. Although the prohibition disappointed the IRP leaders, the party did what it could to prevent those moderates still around from standing in the elections. It was shortly before election day that the Embassy students issued their documents relating to the political record of the Freedom Movement and the Radical Movement; Bazargan, Entezam and Maraqii who had declared their candidacy, soon withdrew from the elections. Several candidates stood for election, including D. Foruhar, the leader of the Nationalist Party, General Madani, a member of the National Front and Dr. Sami, the leader of Jama. Among the candidates, the one who stood the best chance of being elected was A. Bani-Sadr. a close associate of Khomeini. Despite being a member of the Revolutionary Council and the government, he had managed to remain 'untainted' by the liberalism of the PRG and the monopolism of the IRP. Although in the light of what was to follow, Bani-Sadr would look a mere moderate, he was more radical than Bazargan and put forward his ideas about a 'godly classless society' and 'Islamic economics' which he had formulated before the revolution. Yet like other moderates, Bani-Sadr was critical of the 'monopoly of power'held by the IRP. From the beginning he declared 'decentralization

· of power' as one of his major objectives which clearly ran counter to the tendency of the IRP and the trend of the revolution. The IRP gathered petitions from merchants and shopkeepers in the bazaar, its main constituency, against Bani-Sadr's electoral platform of abolishing banking interest and introducing an 'Islamic banking system'. In this heated struggle for power the IRP had to withdraw its own nominee unexpectedly. because it became known that the party's candidate was not a native of Iran. This was a setback for the party which had to hastily nominate a new candidate. In any case, Bani-Sadr obtained the majority of the votes and became the first president of the Republic. Upon Bani-Sadr's election, however, Beheshti warned of the 'danger of the liberals' and made it clear that he would oppose Bani-Sadr unless he 'went along with the revolution'. From the beginning Bani-Sadr became involved in a conflict for power with the extremists. The Revolutionary Council dominated by the latter still continued to rule. He sought in vain to curb the power of the revolutionary courts, committees and guards. In terms of ideology, Bani-Sadr remained ina limbo between the moderates and the extremists. He was shrewd enough to change position on such matters as velayat-e faghih which earlier he had found unacceptable, yet his ideological pronouncements drove him closer to the Islamic radicals, especially the Mojahedin-e Khalq.

Bani-Sadr's election was a victory for the moderates and a setback for the extremists in that some of the moderate parties which had already lost ground reappeared on the political scene and the IRP's rapid concentration of power was interrupted. With the elections for the first parliament of the Republic ahead, the IRP sought to reorganize its forces and use its electoral skills in order to regain some of the ground lost. Apart from-controlling the media the party had also already appointed its supporters to provincial and city governorships. These were to prove important assets for the party during the elections. The IRP formed an 'Islamic

68- Ettelaat, 28 Shahrivar 1358.

coalition' with eight other Islamic groups including the Tehran Clerical Society, the Islamic Mojahedin and the Islamic Teachers Society. The candidates of the coalition were all IRP members. For the elctions, Bani-Sadr formed a temporary bureau for the nomination of candidates which closely cooperated with the Freedom Movement and the National Front. During the elections the IRP used all the means available to it to obtain the majority of the seats. The Revolutionary Council and the IRP had already endorsed the simple majority double ballot system, in order to put the smaller parties of the left and the Islamic radicals at a disadvantage. During the elections, the IRP made exclusive use of the media, put its own supporters on supervisory boards and dispatched revolutionary guards to howl down opposition candidates. In cities where the leftist parties had influence and following such as Marivan and Sanandaj in Kurdestan, elections were simply not allowed to be held. Thus the Islamic coalition, using the revolutionary guards and committees and wielding its influence among the local clergy, managed to obtain the majority of the seats. Out of 245 deputies elected, 85 were members of the IRP alone (mostly clerics). The IRP deputies once again formed an 'Islamic coalition' with 45 deputies of the other Islamic parties such as the Tehran Clerical Society and the Fedaian-e Islam and thus initially held a majority of 130 deputies. Seventy five of the deputies initially emerged as the liberal faction, including members of the Freedom Movement, the National Front and supporters of Bani-Sadr. Within the liberal faction there were also a number of clerics. The left and the Mojahedin-e Khalq did not obtain any seats. Soon the Islamic majority faction set up a committee to investigate the credentials of the moderate deputies, initially leading to the expulsion of three prominent members of the National Front charged with cooperation with the old regime.

Although the presidential and parliamentary elections strengthened the liberal tendency within the power bloc the liberal opposition on the

. whole had been cowed. Parties such as the MPRP and the National Front retreated into silence. Yet with Bani-Sadr's election, the moderate opposition had found a strong voice within the power bloc. Bani-Sadr emerged as the spearhead of liberal and secular opposition to the growing power of the clerics. The issues over which he found himself in conflict with the extremists were the same as those which the other liberal parties had raised, with the difference that Bani-Sadr was the incumbent of the highest political office which he owed to popular vote rather than appointment by Khomeini. From the beginning the President's appointments of ministers and high officials was disputed by the extremist-dominated parliament. While Bani-Sadr in his appointments put emphasis on modern education, for the extremists, the main requirement for political office was faith in the doctrine of the Islamic revolution i.e., the 'line of Khomeini'. Bani-Sadr's isolation began with the parliament's appointment of M.A. Rejai to premiership (who was a doctrinaire supporter of the extremists) despite Bani-Sadr's objection. Thus the IRP added the executive power to its domination of parliament, the judicial institutions and the revolutionary organizations. Bani-Sadr's support came from the moderate parties and groups which had gathered in the 'Presidential bureau'. Members of the Nationalist Party, the National Front and the Freedom Movement were active in the bureau which, according to one of its members "were composed of literate and intellectual people and those who thought of themselves as experts. They ridiculed Islam and the Islamic doctrinaires."⁶⁹ Faced with the actual monopoly of power by the IRP Bani-Sadr intensified his criticism of the extremists in his daily paper, Islamic Revolution. His opposition to the regime, from a position as high as the presidency was not only effective in itself, it had also behind it the opposition of the moderates and the Islamic radical parties. Among the political allies of the President were the Mojahedin Organization and its large young follow-

69- Quoted in Jumhuri-ye Islami, 16 Teer 1360.

ers. For some time Khomeini had urged the IRP and the President to cooperate, but Mojahedin support for Bani-Sadr helped Khomeini in turning against him. Following the closure of his newpaper by the revolutionary public prosecutor, Bani-Sadr called for public 'resistance against the dictatorship' as his Mojahedin supporters took to the streets and clashed with the revolutionary guards. Khomeini interpreted this as revolt against Islam and dismissed him as Commander in Chief of the army. Soon after, the extremist-dominated parliament, surrounded by crowds from the bazaar mobilized by the IRP, proclaimed Bani-Sadr incompetent to stay in office. Only 20 moderate deputies risked supporting the President and not attending the session. Some large demonstrations occurred in provincial centres in support of Bani-Sadr and the Mojahedin and Paykar Organizations clashed with IRP supporters. Bani-Sadr wrote his will as he became a hunted counterrevolutionary. The fall of Bani-Sadr was a major step forward in the rise of the extremists as it intensified their hostility to the 'line of the liberals'. Khomeini condemned the National Front and the Freedom Movement as enemies of Islam and 'parties of pagans'. It was vigorously declared that the aim of the revolution was to create an anti-liberal and antidemocratic and purely Islamic state. Bani-Sadr's fall was followed by a new wave of arrests and executions of his supporters, and members of the Mojahedin. The Presidential office was taken over by Ayatollah Beheshti. the leader of the IRP, Rafsanjani, the Speaker of parliament, and Rejai the Prime Minister. In a rapid chain of events which followed amidst mounting terror and conflict between the extremists and their opponents, Beheshti, Rejai, several members of parliament and cabinet ministers were assassinated in bomb explosions which were believed to have been the work of the Mojahedin and Bani-Sadr's supporters. This marked the coming of the terror into full operation, as the extremists became even more determined to dispose of all opponents. If the fall of Bani-Sadr was the end of the rule of the moderates, the assassination of Beheshti marked the beginning of

. the full ascendancy of the extremists.

The Rule of the Clergy

Having described the political conflicts which ended with the ascendancy of the clergy, representing non-liberal fundamental Islam, we now arrive at an analysis of the regime they built. The extremists broke their alliance with the liberals in the power bloc and tried to assert their power by undertaking mass mobilization and by attempting to solve the 'social question'. Under the pressures of the masses but within the restricted capacity of the conservative men of property who direct the revolution, the new regime has taken a radical direction.

The revolution has produced a new power structure dominated by a new ruling group. The extremists in power are few in number and it is from among the clergy that they are drawn. The clergy number around 80,000 but are themselves split. In addition to the extremists there are the moderates, the apathetic, and the cautious who do not have enough confidence in the continuity of the regime and thus stay out of politics. Thus the actual number of the clerics in the ruling party and affiliated groups. may be no more than a few thousand. They are the recruitment pool for the bureaucracy, the courts and newly established institutions. In the provinces the new found power is being consolidated by the 'major generals'. the representatives of Khomeini who have authority over old and new institutions. These representatives, the nation-wide revolutionary guards, the courts and the local committees, constitute a tight apparatus of administrative and political control which originates in the capital. In addition, there are several new organizations such as housing foundations. rural reconstruction corps and campaigns for the renovation of the universitiés. The revolutionary committees and guards have now been turned into formal organizations and the extremists make sure that they are disciplined and small enough to be able to maintain the fanatical spirit of the

revolution.

This consolidation and centralization of power has enabled the extremists to undertake a massive mobilization programme. With the fall of the liberals, the IRP stepped up mass mobilization, marked by the initiation of land reforms, the incorporation of workers unions into the party as well as by the attempts to reorganize the bazaar guilds. Certainly the economic crisis continuing from before the revolution has swelled the ranks of the urban lower classes, who, encouraged by the egalitarianism of the revolution, demand strict measures ranging from the confiscation of property to decrees limiting wealth and profit. While the economic crisis provided the necessary background for mobilization, it was also the important role of the party which facilitated mass mobilization. The new regime is extending economic control through centralized intervention. The array of measures adopted in this regard, includes nationalization of industries, the 'economic mobilization programme' (which means the regulation of production), control over distribution of goods, the anti-profiteering campaign, price fixing, land redistribution and the councils' movement. Through an ideology heavily imbued with populist overtones such everyday events as property siezures are transformed into political symbols. The ruling party has started a campaign against 'liberal factory owners and managers' and has replaced many of these with 'trusted men' from the party. It has also sought to restrict the role of the private sector in the economy. According to the new Constitution there are three economic sectors: private, cooperative and state sectors, but the regime aims at expanding the cooperative sector, including rural, production and distribution cooperatives.

The populist ideology of the extremist regime puts emphasis on the mobilization of the working class, the peasantry and the small producers. Although it took the IRP sometime to learn how to penetrate the workers' syndicates and peasant councils and how to modify its ideology to meet new demands, the prior existence of bureaucratic-legal controls of working class and peasant organizations provided a framework for the subordination of these organizations into an authoritarian corporate structure. The working class movement emerging after the revolution was itself an unstructured movement lacking any central leadership. Islamic workers' councils which are encouraged in all sectors are designed to replace workers' syndicates. The ruling party has established a workers' section to encourage the establishment of councils, and the Revolutionary Guards have created a special bureau for factories. All factory councils in every town have been organized into a central council. The articulation of workers' councils to the regime's ideology is justified on the grounds that in Islam, the affairs of the community must be conducted on the basis of the principle of counsel (shoura).

The extremist regime has also encouraged land redistribution among peasants since the fall of the PRG. Land distribution committees were set up and dispatched to the provinces in order to establish peasant councils and investigate the land issue. According to the government, one million hectares were temporarily transferred to landless peasants before the establishment of their legal basis. The clerical Council of Guardians in the parliament opposed the land redistribution programme but Khomeini, accusing the clerics (who were, incidentally, appointed by himself to ensure the conformity of legislation with Islamic law) of preventing the progress of the revolution, ordered parliament to disregard their views and go ahead with radical legislation. In fact, immediately after the revolution, Khomeini had himself on several occasions confirmed the legality of all landed property but as the revolution took a more radical direction, he declared that large landed property had been originally obtained through confiscation and had no legal basis. The regime has also established some 15000 peasant councils throughout the country.

The establishment and mobilization of guilds and Islamic societies in the bazaars which constitute the regime's bedrock of support, forms the centrepiece of the mobilization programme. In Tehran, which is the epicentre of the revolution and the stronghold of the extremists, all the bazaar guilds have been organized in the Society of Guilds. The guilds are also affiliated with the ruling IRP which has established its own guild section. The party mobilizes its most active supporters, the Hezbollah, from among the guilds to confront opposition rallies. The Hezbollahis are mostly recruited from the bazaar petty bourgeoisie (small shopkeepers), have 200 stations in Tehran and are always on the alert to gather and fight the opponents of the regime. Thus the traditional complex of the bazaars, mosques and religious schools constitutes the social basis of the extremist regime.

The mobilization of guilds and peasant and workers' councils forms the basis of the populism of the regime. The extremists have picked up the language of class struggle and take side with the masses against the 'feudals and the bourgeoisie'. To tone down the language of class conflict could deprive them of much needed support. Thus Khomeini says that "we will not leave alone all these large properties".⁷⁰ And the IRP newspaper writes that: " the bourgeoisie think that the ownership of capital has no limit, oppose executions and confiscation of property and any step taken in the benefit of the downtrodden. They pose a danger to Islam and their elimination is a revolutionary task."⁷¹ The radicalism of the extremists seems to be the necessary rhetoric of the present phase of the revolution. After the revolution, the liberals in the power bloc sought to restore liberalism after two decades of corporatist and populist state ideology under the old regime. This liberalism demonstrated its total inability to offer a solution for the socio-economic questions and the absorption of the demands of the lower classes. With the power bloc divi-

70- Jomhuri-ye Islami, 28 Shahrivar 1360. 71- Ibid, 4 Mehr 1360.

ded, it was imperative that any attempt to establish stable domination should require the articulation of the pressures of the lower classes.

However, the major dominant social class within the power bloc itself is the petty bourgeoisie allied to the lower clergy. Also, in terms of class ideology the new regime is the regime of the traditional petty bourgeoisie. Of the 19 members of the cabinet appointed after the fall of the PRG, 4 were hojjatolislams, 8 were professional men from bazaar-clerical families, 1 was a Tehran bazaar merchant, 1 was a professional man from a peasant family and 5 were professionals from new middle class homes.⁷² The composition of the first parliament of the Republic also indicates the social basis of the alliance in the power bloc. Out of 124 deputies for whom background information was available. 76 were hojattolislams, 17 were from the bazaar guilds, 28 were doctors, lawyers, teachers, engineers and one writer, 2 were women and daughters of clerics. and one was a worker.⁷³ The extremist faction which continued to expand, was mainly composed of the clergy and bazaaris but there were also doctors and engineers in their ranks. By contrast, the moderate faction which continued to dwindle, was composed mainly of civil servants, engineers. doctors and one army general, who were all members of the moderate parties. Within the liberal faction there were also a number of clerics.

In terms of class ideology, the ideology of the Islamic revolution is basically the continuation of the Islamic nationalism of the late nineteenth century, based on the reaction of the <u>Ulama</u> and the bazaar to Western economic and political penetration. It is intensely anti-imperialist and its nationalism is expressed in terms of Islam. The ideology of the regime portrays the images and aspirations of small producers, peasants

⁷²⁻ These were Hojattolislams Bahonar, Khamenei, Kani and Moadikhah; M.A. Rejai, H. Ghafur, B. Nabavi, R, Zavarei, A. Velayati, M. Lavasani, H. Shahrestani and M. Kalantari; H.A. Awladi; H. Mosavi; M. Fayazbakhsh, M. Moqadam, M. Ghandi, H. Aref and M. Manafi, respectively. The background information was obtained from biographies of ministers published in various issues of <u>Jomhuri-ye Islami</u>.

⁷³⁻ The background information was gathered from <u>Kayhan</u> and <u>Jomhuri-ye</u> <u>Islami</u>, Farvardin and Ordibehesht, 1359.

and the petty bourgeoisie. According to Ayatollah Montazeri.

"In an Islamic economy exploitation will cease; the product of the worker's labour shall belong to himself; the situation of class exploitation will be ended; all the relations of capitalism and exploitation will be destroyed and Islamic regulations will govern over production, exchange and market. Economic production will be put back into the right order." 74

The society that the fundamentalists portray is one in which everybody is directly involved in production and production is on an individual basis, so that the product directly returns to the individual producer. The slogan that the product of labour should belong to the labourer projects a society made up of small producers where each man owns his own shop, workshop and stall and is capable of supporting his family without recourse to production on a social scale and to wage labour. At present the traditional petty bourgeoisie is establishing a firm base, as the regime puts the emphasis on small production and national economic independence.

However, the extremist clergy are more than the representatives of the traditional petty bourgeoisie and its socio-political order; they are real men who can be encountered in history. Thus to complement our analysis of the revolutionary regime we shall conclude this chapter by looking at the world of the immediate consciousness of the men who direct the Revolution. One recent revolutionary slogan catches this immediate consciousness by portraying the eschatalogy of the Revolution: " The Revolution will continue until the return of the Mahdi." In the eyes of the extremists the Revolution is heading towards a divine destination and to that end they have employed terror and have promoted revolutionary virtue. The aims of the Islamic Revolution are <u>Paksazi</u> (purgation), <u>Bazsazi</u> (restoration) and <u>Nawsazi</u> (renovation). The extremists believe that the lingering corruption of the old regime must be exorcized before the new order can be created; the laws and bases of the faith which had been suppressed by the old Taqut (Idolater) regime must be restored; and new organiza-

74-Quoted in Ettelaat, 29 Mehr 1358.

. tions must be established to reorganize the community of believers. Both revolutionary and Shiite asceticism require the eradication of minor vices in the Islamic Republic. Among the list of immoral practices which have evoked suppression are drinking, gambling, sexual misconduct and spreading rumours. Music is banned as 'the opium of the youth', the minimum age for marriage has been lowered and simple marriages are arranged by revolutionary committees. In the Islamic Republic, "all civil, penal, fiscal, economic, administrative, cultural, military, political and other laws must be based upon Islamic law." (Article 4 of the Constitution). For the extremists, the Revolution is not a lonely moment in history but a link in the nexus of the history to which Shiite consciousness gives meaning. Thus in bringing about the kingdom of God, the extremists are rigidly deterministic; they believe that what is happening here below is part of the second coming of the Mahdi. They think that they are the elect. destined to carry out the will of God in preparing the second coming. And if there is conflict and bloodshed so much the better, for Shiite mythology also has it that the second coming of the Mahdi will be itself a bloody revolution in which water-mills will be turned by currents of blood shed by the sword of the Imam. In this image Imam Khomeini thinks of himself as the instrument of God leading not a nationalist revolution but a crusade against the forces of the Devil. And this is confirmed in the predictions left from the Shiite saints and doctors of divinity. A Qum clerical newpaper has researched the Traditions and predictions of the Prophet and the Imams and has presented the following account about the nature and the future of the Revolution.

> "According to the Traditions of the Prophet and the Imams concerning the Revolution before the coming of the Lord of the Age quoted in <u>Bahar ol Anvar</u> (volume 60, chapter 36), <u>'The</u> <u>Awaited Mahdi'</u> (chapter 24) and <u>'On Awaiting the Imam'</u> (page 145) it is foreordained that: "There will rise a great man from Qum. He will call on the people to turn towards Truth and he will be helped by a number of brave men solid like mountains, fearless of war and reliant on God, who will carry black

flags. They will call on the tyrant of the day to obey Islamic laws but he will not accept. Then they will take arms, fight with the enemy and give martyrs until the tyrant is defeated. They then begin to implement God's laws. Qum will emerge as the centre of virtue and knowledge and the news will spread to people in east and west and to man and to genie and even to women in harems until the truth of Islam and Shiism is proved to everyone. The tyrants of earth will forget Qum as they will forget God but this is near the reappearance of the Hidden Imam and the men in Qum are the deputies of the Imam and will rule until the Imam will take charge of the state. Then the Imam will take, revenge from all those who disobeyed the righteous men of Qum."⁷⁵

The men of Qum thus believe that the Revolution is following a course which no mere human being can alter, least of all those who oppose the Republic. Hence the opponents are not just mistaken men or political enemies but sinners who stand in the way of the realization of God's will and hence must be dealt with according to the religious code of sin. As Imam Khomeini says, toleration of the opponents of Islam is not only an injustice to the believers but also harmful to the opponents themselves for the longer they live the more corruption they create on earth and the more damned they become. The acts of the opponents can but make the triumph of the Islamic Republic greater for as the extremists argue, the righteousness of the Republic is evident from the fact that there is so much opposition to it by 'the corrupt on earth'.

The Revolution is thus seeking to build the state in the image of this mythology by legitimizing political authority with an old-new concept. The new source of legitimacy introduced by the new Constitution is not a diffuse religious legitimization of power as had existed before. Rather it is constituted in a definite principle which invests power exclusively in the religious leaders. As such it is the implementation of the Shiite political theory and the establishment of the Shiite utopian state proper. As already noted, Shiism was itself a political opposition movement in Islam and although it later became the official religion of the state in Iran, its political ideals were never implemented.

75- Barresi (weekly), Qum Publications, no. 6, Khordad 1358.

The main point of Shiite opposition concerned the qualities of the political leader. Accordingly it was only the Imam, a descendent of the Prophet, who could be accepted as the ruler. In the absence of the Hidden Imam the Ulama were considered as His general agency and the community had to follow the most learned among them. Now, the Islamic Revolution has institutionalized this concept of authority in the principle of the 'rule of the theologian' (velayat-e faghih) as the agency of the Imam. According to this, authority originates in God and is vested in the Rahbar (the leader)through the institutions of Imamat and Velayat. According to the Constitution, "the Islamic Republic is a system based upon 1) faith in God as the source of sovereignty and legitimacy; 2) divine revelations and their basic role in legislation." (Article 2) And "in the absence of the Hidden Imam the administration of affairs and the leadership of the nation is vested in a just, pious, brave and thoughtful theologian." (Article 5) In case the eligible theologian who "emerges and is accepted by the majority of the people" does not emerge, then "the experts elected by the people shall confer about all those eligible for leadership and shall introduce one whom they find outstanding, or they may introduce three to five theologians as members of the council of leadership." (Article 107) The leader is accorded extensive powers by the Constitution, similar to the powers that a traditional Imam would have. They include: "1) the appointment of the Council of Gurdians, which is held in parliament in order to ensure the conformity of legislation with the Constitution and the Islamic law. It is composed of six theologians appointed by the leader and six jurists approved by parliament; 2) the appointment of the members of the High Judicial Council; 3) the command of the armed forces; 4) the endorsement of the president after his election. The eligibility of presidential candidates must be endorsed by the Council of Guardians. 5) the dismissal of the president on the recommendation of the Supreme

Court or parliament; 6) clemency and commution of punishment." (Article 110) Parliament does not legally exist in the absence of the Council of Guardians half of whose members are directly appointed by the leader. The theologian also controls the judiciary through the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In view of this overwhelming power of the theologian it is evident that the new Constitution is not a 'republicanized' version of the 1906 Constitution, for the basis of authority and legitimacy differ in the two texts. In the new Constitution, authority originates in God rather than in the nation, and the centrality of parliament is reduced. This more extensive and elaborate power is provided by the dicates of a more absolutist ideology than that of the Constitutional Revolution.

With this theocratic constitution as its base of legitimacy, a party of true believers as its crusaders and new coercive institutions under its control, the regime of the Islamic Revolution has thus consolidated its power. It is held together by its coercive capacity, increasing intervention in the economy and its ability to mobilize the population. In this new alliance, religion, apart from anything else, is a power resource at the disposal of the regime. The alliance of the old regime had been made possible by the economic resources enabling it to adopt policies of economic gratification and to control classes economically. In turn the stability of the old regime was disrupted by an economic crisis which affected its economic power resource. The power resource of the new regime is of a different nature relating to the consciousness of men which makes the omnipresence of the revolutionary regime complete.

Conclusion

It has been the purpose of this study to furnish an explanation, and provide an understanding of revolution and political change in Iran. Our focus has been essentially on social classes and class conflict. In this we have tried to capture the complexities of the political situation in Iran rather than analyse isolated aspects in detail. The following are the central themes and conclusions of the study.

1) We have put our emphasis on periods of change rather than the short periods of stability and continuity, because in Iran, as in any other society undergoing a process of rapid social and political transformation, the essence of its politics can be grasped only by explaining the discontinuity and change. This process of rapid change was initiated by the Constitutional Revolution which marked a break in the social and political history of Iran and ushered in the modern era. In general, revolutions tend to create divisions in the society, polarizing it at its very heart. Since the time of the Constitutional Revolution. Iranian society has remained divided and has been in a process of continued conflict for power. The aftermath of that Revolution has witnessed a persisting proliferation of power centres and sources of legitimacy. The divisions resulting from the revolution were a reflection of the process of differentiation which occurred in the polity prior to that revolution. In the main, this was caused by the expansion of the world capitalist economy and the incorporation of Iran into the Western capitalist system of exchange, in spite of the continued political independence of the country. The resulting socio-economic changes created pressures for a réconstructing of society. The absolutist political system was no longer in line with the newly emerging socio-economic structure and finally, the contradiction between the political-legal superstructure and the

changing economic structure was resolved by the revolution. At the same time, the ideals of liberalism and the example of Europe undermined the legitimacy of the traditional polity and provided a new formula for a new power structure. Prior to the revolution, there was no established fendal system in Iran and there was no sharp distinction between the bourgeoisie and the landed class; they were both related to land and participated in commerce. But the political system was despotic in that there was no established right to private property in land, the main means of production. The Constitutional Revolution broke the structure of total power, divided the absolutist state into a civil society and the political state and established a capitalist legal superstructure. But the expansion of the capitalist mode of production in Iran had two interrelated yet contradictory effects. On the one hand it resulted in a partial structural convergence between the Iranian social structure and Western capitalism. The emergence of landed private property, the constitutional system of government and a new class of modern intelligentsia were the consequences of this partial convergence. On the other hand it resulted in a partial divergence, in the form of a reaction against this development leading to the emergence of Iranisn nationalism. The social base of this nationalism was the traditional petty bourgeoisie whose petty commodity mode of production was being undermined by the onset of Western capitalism. As a protest movement, the early Iranian nationalism was expressed in terms of the dominant cultural form, the religion of Islam. The expansion of Western economic influence while weakening the economic substructure of the society, curiously strengthened the cultural-religious superstructure. The Ulama and the bazaar petty bourgeoisie asserted themselves against the cultural and economic influence of the West and emerged as the bastion of indigenous nationalism. Thus late nineteenth-century Iran witnessed fundamental changes in the social structure and formative developments in national consciousness .

2) Once the conjunction of economic and ideological changes brought about the revolution, a plurality of social classes and political forces began to occupy the power bloc and shape the emerging state in their struggles. The central theme of this study has been the fundamental crisis of the power bloc, which has remained fluid given the proliferation of power and sources of legitimacy after the revolution. The continuous political-ideological class conflict for power and the crisis of the power bloc prevented the emergence of a viable state structure in Iran following the collapse of traditional absolutism. This was due to the absence of collaborative class relations and of long-term class hegemony which prevented the development of a dominant political ideology. Apart from the existence of several class ideologies which since the Constitutional Revolution have formed the ideological constellation in Iran, a major characteristic of political authority in modern Iran is the disintegration of royal and religious authority which throughout the centuries had legitimized the political system. In pre-Islamic Iran, the Shah was also the ultimate religious authority, to the extent that when the Sassanid empire fell, Zoroastrianism and the whole religious hierarchy also collapsed. In the Islamic era, Iran emerged once again as a nation in the sixteenth century under the Safavids. who combined royal and religious (Shiite) authority. Under the Qajars a rift began to emerge between the Mosque and the State. Since then, royal authority has not been able to sustain itself ideologically without the sanction of religious authority. The Pahlavis sought to complement royal authority with modern legitimizing formulae such as developmentalism and secular nationalism. Thus even when the element in power was royal-bureaucratic, there was still no viable and unified legitimizing formula. In fact, the royal court presented its own corporatist ideology by articulating elements of the existing class ideologies. That the court had no absolutist pretensions and sought to legitimize its

power by the corporatist ideology of class harmony, in line with nineteenth-century corporatist social thought, shows the extent to which royal authority as such had been eroded. Given the ideological fragmentation, no state as a viable organization based on a dominant ideology and class collaboration emerged.

3) Thus the main characteristic of modern Iranian history is the fact that the liberal regime which was to be produced by the Constitutional Revolution did not become established, due mainly to socio-economic reasons. The abrupt demise and replacement of incipient liberalism by corporatist authoritarianism may have had many causes. Undoubtedly, the emergence of authoritarianism was facilitated by the historical legacy of patrimonialism and oriental despotism. Due to the absence of feudal decentralization, the contractual theories of political obligation did not emerge in Iran. Within the capitalist social formation, however. the recurrent crises of the capitalist economy and the inability of the liberal system to cope with the economic problems of growth and inflation and to solve 'the social question', significantly contributed to the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian-corporate rule, creating strong incentives for economic intervention by the state. In fact authoritarian rule emerged at the junctures of economic crises when one segment in the power bloc broke with the other segments and undertook mass mobilization. Thus modern Iranian politics has witnessed major mobilization efforts. The intensity, tempo and structuring of these efforts have depended on the depth of the crisis and the extent to which relations within the power bloc have been non-collaborative. The emergence of this politics of mobilization was facilitated by the separation of the military-royal officialdom from the merchant and landed interests. Thus, given that there was little collaboration among the segments in the power bloc, the exploitation of the economic crises for the purpose of

effecting a transformation in the power bloc and mobilizing the lower classes became distinctly possible. The 1921-41 period did not produce a politics of mobilization but Reza Shah's authoritarian rule was greatly enhanced after the 1930 depression, leading to the emergence of state capitalism and economic intervention. The economic problems of growth and inflation in the early 1960's prompted the emergence of the authoritarian corporatist regime, and the deeper economic crisis of the mid-1970's led to an intensification of authoritarian rule towards populistfascism. This economic crisis not only stimulated the overthrow of the monarchy but also jeopardized the prospects for political consolidation after the revolution, prompting the fall of the liberals and the rise of populism under the clergy. On the whole, the liberal-constitutional system did not become established and instead modern Iranian politics has been one of authoritarian rule and mass mobilization.

4) In accounting for the fall of the authoritarian regime and the revolution of 1979 we used a conception that brought together several elements which by themselves were insufficient conditions for the occurrence and success of the revolution. In particular, the genesis of mass economic grievances, the emergence of some fundamental conflicts of interest between the upper class and the state and the possibility of mobilization and the articulation of mass grievances were emphasized. Thus we have treated the revolution as a conjuncture taking into account the constituting interests of the state, conflict for power, mobilization and political alliances. The significance of this conception of revolution as a primarily political event becomes evident when it is contrasted to modern anti-political theories of revolution which divert attention from the political conjunctural nature of revolutionary situations.¹

¹⁻ The modern theories of revolution fall into two main categories: psychological and functionalist sociological. J. Davies, <u>When Men Re-</u><u>volt and Why</u>. (New York, The Free Press, 1971.), Ted Gurr, <u>Why Men</u><u>Rebel</u>. (Princeton, 1970.), I. Feierabend, et al (eds.) <u>Anger, Violence</u>

We arranged the causes of the revolution beginning with the distant structural ones to the more proximate and political ones. The distant causes included the conflict for hegemony in the power bloc, especially the conflicts of interest between the bourgeoisie and the bureaucracy and the mobilization efforts by the regime. The more immediate causes included the economic crisis, political liberalization, political alliances against the regime and the disintegration of the regime's foreign support. The convergence of these causes together with the emergence of a new ideological trend, the resurgence of Islam as a political ideology and its spread amongst a segment of the modern intelligentsia, brought about and determined the course of the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

5) Following the revolution of 1979, the power bloc was occupied by the liberal parties and the Islamic fundamentalist parties to the exclusion of both the Islamic Radical and the leftist parties. The revolution was faced with conflicts both within and outside the power bloc. The Islamic Radical and leftist parties called for radical socio-economic changes but the bourgeoisie in power considered the revolution as a mere political affair. Within the power bloc the liberals sought to establish their hegemony against the fundamentalist groupings but they were unable to do so for several reasons. The liberals were unwilling and inca-<u>and Politics: Theories and Research.</u> (Englewood Cliffs, 1972.), D. Schwartz, 'Political Alienation, The Psychology of Revolution's First Stage', in Ibid, and D. Morrison, 'Some Notes Towards a Theory of Relative Deprivation, Social Movement and Social Change', <u>American Behavioral Scientist</u>, vol.XIV, 1971: 675-90, among other works belong to the first category. Ch. Johnson, <u>Revolutionary Change</u>. (Boston, 1966), N.

Smelser, <u>Theory of Collective Behaviour</u>. (New York, 1963.) and M. Hagopian, <u>The Phenomenon of Revolution</u>, (New York, 1974.), belong to the second category. The psychological theories have sought the cause of revolution in men's 'psychic disorder' and individual frustration. In the same vein, the functionalist approach explains revolution as pathologies of the body politic and seeks its cause in the state of 'disequilibrium' and 'dissynchronization'. The psychological theories suffer from two basic flaws. First, they assume an automatic relationship between a hypothetical state of anger and the eruption of violence. Secondly, they take it for granted that violence is the same as revolution. The functionalist theories assume that society is like some hypothetical system and then they analyse the system which is made up. They deal neither with the constituent interests of the society nor with the world of immediate consciousness.

pable of mobilizing the lower classes and they relied exclusively on the bureaucracy of the old regime. The liberal parties were small and elite-dominated parties with few links to the rural and urban masses and they lacked organizational resources and a broad social base. They were also faced with a grave economic crisis which could not be solved by the liberal economic policies. Gathering strength, the Islamic fundamentalist parties broke with the liberals and undertook a massive mobilization effort. They built new power arrangements and institutions and established their own hegemony, creating a corporatist populist regime. The ideology of the Islamic revolution is the indigenous Iranian nationalism, expressed in terms of Islam, which emerged at the turn of the century. Its social base is the bazaar petty bourgeoisie which constitutes the regime's active base of support. The ideology of the revolution has an anti-Western and anti-capitalist character and expresses the bitter hostility of the petty bourgeoisie towards the modern capitalist world and its social and cultural features. Islam as the culture of the petty bourgeoisie gives expression to its economic conditions. The ideology of the revolution portrays a society made up of small producers in which every individual is the owner of his own workshop and there is no need for wage-labour. The ruling values in the Islamic Republic are not thus, the values of the economically dominant class or of the capitalist social formation. The revolution has transferred state power to a new class and has introduced a new political ideology for the establishment of a new society. The theocratic Shiite idea of the indivisibility of lay and religious power has been put into practice. The revolution is the expression of the local economy and the national consciousness; thus it is a petty bourgeois nationalist revolution. Undoubtedly though, the revolution has led to a change in the social location of political power and has brought about a new political order which is still in the making.

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