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Doctor of Philosophy
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List of Abbreviations

AKP - The Islamist Reformist Justice and Development Party (Turkey)
CDU – Christian Democratic Union (Germany)
CSU - Christian Social Union of Bavaria (Germany)
ČR – Czech Republic
ČSSR - Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
EC - European Commission
EEA – European Economic Area
EMP - Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EP – European Parliament
EU – European Union
GDR – German Democratic Republic (Former East Germany)
MCB - Muslim Council of Britain
MDP - MEDA Democracy Programme
MENA - Middle East and North Africa
MHRC - Muslim Human Rights Commission
PBS – Points Based System (UK)
SPD – Social Democratic Party (Germany)
UfM - The Union for the Mediterranean
UMO - Union of Muslim Organisations
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Abstract

The thesis deals with one of the most important challenges of our times: how to forge political unity and societal cohesion in an environment of increasing cultural diversity and ever increasing politicisation of identities. Explicitly, it investigates shifts in Muslim identity and its relationship with the European Union, European nation states and their societies from a comparative perspective. Existing literature and case studies often treat Muslims in Europe as a homogeneous group and fail to connect how policies of state and non-state actors influence Muslim identities. Located within the theories of multiculturalism, the argument introduced in this thesis suggests that Muslims in Europe are a heterogeneous group with diverse cultural, social but also religious traditions. These factors all contribute to developments in Muslim identities and their relationship with host societies. As such, the study evaluates perceptions of Muslim communities in a comparative perspective with three case study countries, the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic, on their inclusion, civic participation and belonging. This critical assessment is complemented by objective analysis of the EU strategies on religion, integration and minority groups. The purpose is to illustrate, within this complex web of relations, the most effective approach from the Muslim perspective. The novelty and unique contribution of this research to knowledge lies in its socio-political and cross-country approach which is supported by the use of structured questionnaires followed by semi-structured interviews. By using a combination of questionnaires and interviews, participants were given space in which they could gradually express their views and feelings. The results show that religious traditions and places of origin are very important. However, national policies play the most significant role in the formation of Muslim identities. Multicultural policies in Britain have been, thus far, most successful in the integration and inclusion of Muslim communities. On the contrary, the largely state-centric policies of Germany which provide social provisions but often exclude political participation, contribute to split identities and segregated communities. In the context of post-communist Europe, the Czech Republic is yet to devise policies and legislation addressing the question of religious minorities. At present, the Czech Republic stretches liberal policies to almost an extreme and fails to accommodate minority cultures. The role of the European Union has been rather minor with most participants being sceptical of the EU’s mechanisms and relevance for Muslims in Europe.
Introduction

Overview

One of the most important challenges of our time is how to create societies where political unity and cultural diversity not only meet but also coexist in harmony. The thesis addresses this challenge by focusing on Muslim identity and its formation in context of the European nation states. Avoiding generalisations or broad categorisations of the term ‘Muslim’, the argument presented identifies Muslims as a diverse group with some members organised and attending mosques regularly, with others attending rarely or only during religious festivities. The emphasis is on the self-definition of being Muslim rather than categorisation imposed by the researcher. The comparative research explores this argument through different lenses which will be explained throughout. Novelty of the research lies in its socio-political and cross-country perspective. It centres on the influence of national and European initiatives on identity developments and shifts in response to political and societal developments in Muslim identity formation. It illustrates, through the comparative approach, the success of Muslim integration and sense of belonging of Muslim communities in three case study countries. This comparative approach is supported by additional critical analysis of the European Union policies and strategies on religion and Muslim communities. The purpose of this complex investigation is to extricate data and information which could shed light on the most effective approach from the Muslim perspective. To this end, the thesis is located in the area of multicultural studies and argues that the debate needs to be underpinned by deeper understanding of Muslim views about their identity, its recent developments and its construction. The main research question seeks to clarify the role of individual nation states and their policies in formation of Muslim identities it also examines the attachment of Muslims to their country of residence. This main question is followed by three sub-questions:

1. is there intensification of Muslim identity?

2. what are the views of Muslim participants on their belonging and attachment to the country of residence?

3. what is the role of European Union in improving integration of Muslim population (and should it have any role at all)?

In line with these preliminary questions, the thesis explores different Muslim immigrant communities in three European member states: the UK (Pakistani and Bangladeshi community),
Germany (Turkish Muslims) and the Czech Republic (Bosnians and Muslims from the former USSR). The research is focused largely on the perceptions of women which was initially an unintended result of the fieldwork. It transpired during the empirical research that for female researcher access to female participants was much easier than access to male participants which was more restricted. To strengthen the data results the empirical research is underpinned by structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews distributed amongst a sample of organised and non-organised Muslim participants within the countries’ case studies. The research was conducted with participants who were in contact with the researcher over a prolonged period necessary to create a level of trust and open dialog where participants could express truthfully their views and perceptions. This aspect of the empirical research is vital in generating unique data reflecting the views of the Muslim community.

Existing research and new findings

Existing research often addresses radical Islam in national and supranational politics (Choudhury, 2007; Fekete, 2004; Fokas, 2007; Roy, 1999; Tibi, 2010; Upton 2004), problematic issues with Islam such as the *hijab / burqa* affairs (Amiraux, 2008; Kastoryano in Modood, 2003; Saharso, 2007; Silverstein, 2004; Terray, 2004) or cartoons of Prophet Mohammed (Lindekilde, Mouritsen & Zapata-Barrero, 2009; Modood, 2006; Mühe, 2012; Müller and Özcan, 2007; Saunders, 2008). Some publications offer valid points on developments in Muslim identity, but their focus is restricted to religious identity in a specific country or in a particular organised group (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Emerson, Amghar & Boubekeur, 2007; Malik, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2001; Yuval – Davis, 2006). There are a number of gaps in this existing research:

a) most research fails to connect national and supranational legislation and policies with developments of Muslim identity in a comparative perspective

b) there is little research investigating Muslim perceptions of other European Muslim communities in the EU and differences between various Muslim communities (we know very little about that)

c) there is a lack of data examining attitudes of European Muslims on the role of European Union, in particular concerning Muslims

Research proposed in this thesis will address some of these gaps to increase our knowledge and understanding of Muslim identities from the Muslim perspective. The findings seek to draw implications for more stable and integrated political communities in the EU and beyond. The
research also seeks to contribute to better understanding of the diversity amongst European Muslims. This is more or less an unknown area as politicians and some researchers classify Muslims in the EU as one homogenous group with the same views and needs. From this perspective, this research could be crucial for countries where Muslim immigration is a new phenomenon, such as the Czech Republic and others in the region, and where it is paramount that lessons from Western Europe are learned.

**Hypotheses and aims**

The aim of this thesis is not to simply repeat existing research on Muslim identity. Rather, the aim is to build on existing research and literature and expand beyond. The novelty of this research lays in its socio-political and comparative approach, highlighting different aspects from day to day life of European Muslims, reaching beyond religion as such. The project is underpinned by semi-structured interviews and structured questionnaires distributed among ordinary Muslims. Its role is threefold. First, it seeks to compare existing approaches to minority communities, namely the second and third generation Muslims in the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic. This part of the research uncovers the fluid nature of identities by illustrating their ability to be shaped and constructed in parallel to and in response to national cultures and frameworks. In particular, it draws on minority identities which depending on the specific conditions are able to mirror the way of life as practiced by the majority. Second, it aims to provide a framework for future community relations in post-communist Europe where thus far research on, or provisions for, Muslim communities are largely absent. This framework can provide guidance or informational structure for future and more in-depth research into transitional communities and their interactions with the ‘other’. From this perspective, the research data collected carries substantial value for Muslim communities in post-communist Europe and other transitional societies. In addition, it offers insight into the national consciousness of transitional communities by exploring interactions between the minority and the majority. Finally, the research hopes to connect the individual with the national and the supranational by illustrating Muslim perceptions of the European Union and other European Muslim communities. Essentially, it also outlines position of Muslim communities towards the EU in comparison to the position within the nation state.

Building on the diversity of Muslim communities in Europe, this comparative research frames Muslim identities from inside as well as outside the religious domain (Bectovic, 2011; Nielsen, 2004). It focuses on religious aspects but also reaches beyond the religious, and investigates the role of culture, language, education, personal experiences, feelings and interests. As such, the research
seeks to bridge the religious perspective with the non-religious, and similarly, the national and the European perspectives. Rather than artificially creating perceptions of Islam and Muslim identities, the objective of the research is to critically understand Muslims’ own perceptions of the issues and challenges they face in Western democracies. Islam is inevitably a part of these perceptions; it does however not exist in vacuum, or separately and divorced from other identities. Hence, the research must combine different aspects of Muslim life within the context of their respective countries and draw attention to diversity among European Muslim communities who are too often perceived as a homogenous group.

The proposed research is underpinned by following interrelated hypotheses:

H1. The paradigm of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ plays a vital role in formations of Muslim identity. The ‘self’ always creates the ‘other’ conditioned by internal and outer perceptions. How we perceive ourselves is inherently conditioned by how we are perceived by the others around us.

H.2 The narrative of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ amongst the second and third generation Muslims is often not congruent with perceptions of the home society – that of the country of residence. This disparity creates tensions and barriers towards more inclusive societies.

H3. The role of citizenship, naturalisation and integration policies of individual nation states are essential in identity formation of the second and third generation Muslim communities. The role of the European Union, on the other hand, is more limited due to its limited impact on legislation in those key areas.

H4. In line with its multicultural policies, it is expected that the UK will have most positive results in comparison to Germany and the Czech Republic. It is plausible to assume that Muslim communities in Britain will be most integrated and most involved in policies affecting them.

**Theoretical framework & methodology**

Drawing on the political and the cultural makeup of contemporary European nation states, the thesis is located within the multicultural theoretical framework as outlined by Parekh (1999, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008). In Parekh’s analysis the ideal multicultural society comprises several distinctive cultural or / and ethnic groups and minorities joined under one political umbrella of civic values and practices. Simultaneously, the society allows for cultural freedom and acceptance of individual members regardless their cultural and ethnic background. Indeed, multicultural forms of governance aim to blend individuals’ distinctiveness with greater community cohesion and overall civic unity.
Reflecting on the synopsis provided by Parekh, the ideal multicultural nation state is still in making, particularly when taking into account the recent multiculturalist backlash across Europe. Nevertheless, by utilising multiculturalism as a theoretical framework underpinning the research analysis, it enables for constructive assessment of multiple identities and loyalties of individuals as well as communities. To this end, the research presented in this thesis investigates to what degree are policies implemented in the nation states as well as the European Union successful in integration and accommodation of minority cultures, namely the second and third generation Muslim communities.

To capture developments across the European Union and individual nation states, a comparative approach addressing changes in the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic has been adopted. The aim is not to create a comparative study as such rather the objective is to establish a framework reflecting the interrelated aspects through which the nation state and the EU policies and legislations are constructed and shaped, and the degree to which they affect construction of Muslim identities. Moreover, discourses on multicultural governance are complemented by analysis of Europeanisation processes and the responses they generate to the challenge presented by migrants and Muslim communities in particular. The proposed research centres on Muslim views and experiences across the case study countries, representing diversity in terms of Muslim communities, the nation states and the European Union. The project relies on secondary quantitative data providing statistical information, mostly regarding the census and neighbourhood data, as well as secondary qualitative data such as policy and legal documentation, analysis of historical records, case-study analysis and academic literature reviews. Primary empirical research was obtained through the use of structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. In total, the research primary data comprises 30 questionnaires and 10 interviews from each case-study country aimed at eliciting empirical data and generating evidence of developments in Muslim identity. The primary research took place in Muslim organisations, Islamic centres, mosques, cafes, community centres and halls in Greater Manchester, Düsseldorf/Duisburg and Prague. The aim was to combine places of worship and religious practice with social and cultural places and meeting points. Participants were selected randomly on the basis of their Muslim identity but it transpired that for female researcher, it was easier to gain access to female participants rather than male participants. The researcher visited selected locations on a number of occasions, initially to meet members of the community, get to know the group and gain better understanding of the context in which their identities develop. This stage was crucial in gaining trust and creating a closer and more open relationship between the researcher and potential participants. Without this trust and acceptance of the researcher by the
individual communities, it would not be possible to distribute and conduct the research questionnaire and follow up interviews where participants could express their views and perceptions which they would be otherwise hesitant to share. Many of the respondents who completed the questionnaire were keen to participate in the follow up interviews which were, in most cases, conducted within a month of the initial meeting and questionnaire completion. The privileged position and access to the community enjoyed by the researcher contribute to the uniqueness and richness of the research data.

Examining possible drawbacks of the present research design a number of potential challenges have been identified. This form of empirical research inevitably reflects the position taken by the participants as well as the researcher (Almond, 2007; Bectovic, 2011; Donnan and Stokes, 2002). Thus, the aim was to retain the middle ground between ‘ethnocentrism and cultural relativism’ and assess developments of Muslim identity in the framework of national and European policies through the lens of participants rather than imposing questions which may not be relevant to them (Bectovic, 2011: 1122). The research is by no means exhaustive as it centres on one particular aspect of Muslim identity formation, namely the political environment. Other, equally important factors such as religious tradition, culture and language, are touched upon within the empirical fieldwork, but it was not possible to investigate these factors in greater detail in the present research. More comparative research is needed in order to facilitate a well-rounded discussion (Bectovic, 2011; Donnan and Stokes, 2002).

**Empirical research – rational behind the case selection**

The comparative research draws on empirical data collected in three countries – the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic. The selected countries are liberal democracies and members of the European Union; the size of their Muslim population, however, varies greatly. The primary aim was not to compare identical cases but rather to draw on different approaches to Muslim integration adopted across the nation states and evaluate the success of this integration from the perspective of Muslim participants. While comparative research of this kind is more challenging, as outlined by Donnan and Stokes (2002), when carried out successfully, it offers unique cross-country analysis. The case study countries differ significantly in their political, cultural and historical developments, with varied approach to cultural diversity: from multicultural policies in the UK to more ethnically oriented policies in Germany and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, the Czech Republic represents a post-transitional country and is a comparatively new member of the EU. There are also significant differences in the Muslim communities themselves. In case of the UK, Muslim communities originate
predominantly from Pakistan and Bangladesh and are inherently linked to British imperial history. Dominant ethnic group in Germany are Turkish Muslims; in the Czech Republic the majority of Muslims originate from the former Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia.

Research Sample:

Location of the empirical research was selected on comparable criteria with the intention to identify respondent sample sharing similar characteristics and thus strengthen the research results. The research took place in Greater Manchester in the UK, Düsseldorf and Duisburg in Nordrhein-Westfalen federal state in Germany, and Prague in the Czech Republic. Greater Manchester and Düsseldorf / Duisburg, were historically important industrial centres attracting large numbers of work migrants. Currently, they represent post-industrial areas experiencing significant shifts in production orientation, regeneration and often high unemployment rates accompanied by intense competition over scarce resources. Both areas have one of the highest and most active Muslim populations in their respective countries which is also reflected in their diverse communities. Prague is a capital city, but many parallels can be drawn with Greater Manchester, Düsseldorf and Duisburg. As a post-communist state, the Czech Republic is still undergoing economic and political reformations with Prague being at the centre of these reforms and with the highest Muslim population in the country.

To ensure that similar samples of participants were included in the questionnaire and interview analysis, focus was directed on younger Muslims born or raised in one of the case study countries; the Czech Republic excepted as the Muslim community is relatively new there. Most Muslims living in the Czech Republic are migrants or asylum seekers with second generation estimated to be largely under the age of 10. Therefore, the research respondents in the Czech Republic were mostly long term residents between the age of 20 and 45. To remain consistent with the participant sample, all research participants were recruited in Islamic centres, cultural centres, mosques, cafes or community centres and halls with all respondents identifying themselves as practicing Muslims. Some participants were attached to a particular organisation or a centre, whilst others were non-organised Muslims who attended mosque sporadically. The self-perception of being Muslim was the key determinant.

It is likely that Muslims who are attached to a specific centre or an organisation will be influenced by the thinking and the rhetoric adopted by their organisation. However, for purpose of this comparative research, it was not essential to distinguish between these groups. This was mainly due to the focus of the research being on individual self-perceptions, but also limited resources. Besides,
numerous studies addressed the influence Muslim organisations have on members’ identities (Cordier, 2009; McLoughlin, 2005; Modood, 1993; Nielsen, 2001; Phillips, 2008), while analysis of non-organised Muslims is a less explored area. Hence, this particular research allows for a mixed sample of organised and non-organised Muslims and permits closer cross examination and more in-depth analysis from a cross-country perspective. Indeed, it allows for detailed compare and contrast approach of the variables by measuring questionnaire and interview responses in addition to country specific sample characteristics such as information on citizenship, age or education.

**Structured questionnaires and semi-structured interviews:**

The primary aim of the structured questionnaires was to offer categories of respondents’ self-perceptions, identifications and associations along the three core themes devised in the following areas:

- Perceptions of Muslim belonging and membership within the country of their residence
- Muslim identity in their country of residence
- Muslim perceptions of the European Union and other Muslim communities

These broad themes acted as platforms for the follow up in-depth semi-structured interviews, permitting more comprehensive analysis of the data, examining possible correlations between individual responses on country and cross-country level.

In essence, the research questionnaire was structured to reflect the initial research questions, analysis derived from the literature review and the case country profiles in the area of citizenship provisions, integration and naturalisation processes. The questions were close-ended, offering multiple choices and providing space for free-text comments at the end of the form. The questionnaires were distributed in the community centres, cafes and mosques after Friday prayer or during important cultural events and festivals. Access to research participants was restricted by Islamic religious practices and involved mostly women which added to the uniqueness of the data.

The semi-structured interviews were conducted with randomly selected participants who agreed after they completed their questionnaire to a follow-up meeting. To enable detailed investigation of Muslim identity formations, the interviews were semi-structured steering discussion into a particular direction whilst retaining the contextual richness of individual responses. Thus, allowing for assessment of subtle nuances in responses and possible underlining concerns or issues which participants may have omitted from the questionnaire. The interviews were organised along the
questionnaire themes to ensure and maximise response validity. All interviews were conducted with the ethical approval by the University ethics committee; they were taped and transcribed unless it was specifically requested by the participant not to use tape recorder in which case the interview was recorded by hand. The average interview lasted approximately 45-90 minutes and was conducted in Czech, German or English. All interviewees signed participant consent form, but taking into account the sensitive and personal character of some of the questions, both the questionnaire and the interview were anonymous protecting identity of all participants.

Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman (1975) in their analysis of methodological techniques argued that ‘to some extent, pursuing contextual richness through open-ended, semi-structured interviews precludes the use of statistically powerful analytic techniques on the resulting data’ (1975:3). Whilst the semi-structured interviews can offer valuable insight into the respondents’ mind-set and enable for deeper understanding or clarification of specific issues, the problem is the subjectivity of individuals. In other words, by giving voice to subjective perceptions, the enquiry with the exception of pre-set interview questions, lacked consistency – this is a drawback associated with qualitative data. Indeed, this in part refers to the problem of data analysis highlighted by Aberbach, Chesney and Rockman (1975) whereby failing to adopt meticulous coding system may result in missing data or incomplete identification of research results which is particularly problematic with smaller samples. Taking into account some of the challenges associated with semi-structured interviews, the data collection technique was considered from three viewpoints to ensure maximum data validity.

The initial consideration was guided by previous research into construction of Muslim identity in Europe. By and large, the research was based on a large respondent sample or in some cases it ignored subjective Muslim views altogether (Brubaker & Cooper 2000; Emerson, Amghar & Boubekeur 2007; Malik 2009; Triandafyllidou 2001; Yuval – Davis 2006). Drawing upon existing research with comparatively large data sets (Gest, 2010; Mühe, 2012; Parekh, 2000, 2002; Silvestri, 2009, 2011), it is plausible to suggest that by examining and identifying the patterns in previously undertaken interviews, a coherent guidance on interview questions and design can be prepared for the present study. In fact, by using semi-structured interviews the research findings can build upon and enrich the existing data by providing additional layer of new findings, capturing the subjective and individualised perceptions as expressed by the research participants. As such, the research offers a novel and unique perception of Muslim respondents on specific aspects of their life combined with their opinion and awareness of the European Union.
Second consideration in support of the semi-structured interviews drew on the structured questionnaires which were then complemented by the interviews. The interview questions and processes remained uniform across all three case study countries to maximize response validity. Combining questionnaires and interviews together strengthened data analysis and verified the research findings by providing additional cross check analysis.

Final consideration guiding the semi-structured interviews addressed respondents’ willingness to share their personal views. This challenge is pivotal in research analysis on identity politics particularly in relation to categories such as belonging, citizenship loyalties, membership and acceptance. It was essential, during the research, to gain trust of respondents to encourage them to share their views and overcome initial resentment and scepticism which was particularly strong in the German context. The use of structured questionnaires acted as an opening space setting up conditions for detailed and more open debate with participants in the interview stage. The interviews thus took on an innovative role whereby they were recognised by many participants as a helpful tool for expressing opinions and experiences which they felt had to be, under ordinary circumstances, kept within the Muslim community. In other words, the comparatively open character of the interviews and the informal manner in which they were conducted encouraged participants to be more candid and critical of the mainstream society but also their own community.

Analysis of the data was divided into two categories. Structured questionnaires were coded and analysed by using SPSS analytical tool to identify any emerging patterns and correlations as well as divergences. Analysis of the interview results were simply embedded within the individual questionnaire themes, hence circumventing additional coding procedure. Taking into consideration the comparatively small respondent sample taking part in the interviews, it was more valuable to retain the data in its raw form. This approach utilised and merged both quantitative and qualitative findings and whist it maximized the concrete statistical information it also enabled individual and more subjective results to validate or dispute some of the quantitative data. It is recognised that the absence of coding for interview results was beneficial in this research due to the small respondent sample, with larger sample however, it can limit the possibilities for greater and more detailed analysis.
Impact and further research

Impact of the research findings is far greater than can be conveyed here. Muslim communities involved in the research were keen to promote dialogue within their own society and exchange ideas, knowledge and experiences amongst various community groups. Already, there was a great interest in this particular research in the Czech Republic as it constitutes a novel approach into the growing immigrant community. To date, there are very few initiatives exploring Muslim communities in the post-communist countries particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition, the empirical research was conducted mainly with women and revealed a great potential for further research into the role of women in Muslim communities rather than the traditional research which has been dominated by Muslim men.

Taking into account the sensitive and subjective nature of the research and the random respondent sample it would be challenging to precisely replicate this study, however, retaining the sample criteria and analysis could produce additional results to those obtained during this research. Further research with a larger respondent sample would enhance and elucidate developments of Muslim identity in European nation states and shed light on the relationship between mainstream societies and religious minorities. However, the guarantee of participants’ anonymity and the sceptical or more precisely suspicious attitude of many of the participants are the biggest obstacles to overcome.
1. Identity in theory and practice

Introduction

The notion of identity is complex, versatile and rather arbitrary open to individual and often subjective interpretations, meaning different things to different people. Contemporary societies have developed numerous categories aiming to capture the multifaceted character of identities and identity politics. Moving within these established labels provides individuals with a view of their own being and of the world around them. The labels are also central to the political and cultural establishments of modern societies and states, thus forming a backbone of contemporary political science. Concurrently, these conventional social, political and cultural categories are often exclusive in character and as such are becoming increasingly more complex, if not redundant, in contemporary globalised world. One of the arguments presented in this thesis signals the need to move beyond these established categories to understand and recognise identity developments in today’s societies and politics. Hence, the primary aim of this chapter is to shed some light on the theoretical concepts connected to nations and nationalism, conditioned by identity formations within the nation state. The second objective is to provide a theoretical framework for this thesis.

1.1 Identity and the nation state

Essentially, identity can relate to individuals or groups, it can be and often is classified differently by anthropologists, political scientists or sociologists. To reflect on and to understand the influence and formation of identity within the context of this thesis, it is crucial in the first instance to evaluate and analyse the developments of the nation state which is closely intertwined with identity formation in the traditional civic and political sense. In this respect, the triadic relationship between the nation state, national identity and nationalism is core to our understanding of state formation and subsequently identity formation in the field of politics as we know it. As Guibernau (2001) explains in her chapter on national identity, the three components are interdependent and highly fluid conditioning the formation of identities. Drawing upon this argument, this section will depict and evaluate the three elements, namely the nation state, national identity and nationalism, providing theoretical groundwork for subsequent chapters.

The coming of the nation state is often considered to be a modern phenomenon ensuing from the changes brought by the French revolution and the processes of industrialisation. Since its birth in the
late eighteen century, the nation state has become a leading political actor and an essential part of our lives, making the world politics incomprehensible without it. As the term itself suggests, the nation state consists of two integral parts, the nation and the state. A concise definition refers to the nation state as a political unit positioned within a legally defined territory – a state, with a key goal being the protection, union and rule of its own people – a nation. Reflecting on the historical developments of the nation state, the concept was primarily limited to Western Europe albeit the legacy soon expanded to other parts of the world by the means of colonisation and industrialisation. Subsequently, for most of the developing world the formation of a nation state was more or less alien, imposed and frequently leading to division of original communities. The traditional communities which were often established along the lines of tribal associations, language, or religion were reorganised to fit the new structure of the nation state. Mirroring these developments worldwide, the nation state together with its underlining force of nationalism, developed into a powerful political organisation capable of breaking existing states and creating new ones, instigating wars with many of its members ready to sacrifice lives for the sake of their nation. The precise impetus behind the nation state’s power to appeal to masses is not easily identified and as such is a subject to rigorous discussion, even more so today when increasing diversity and mobility of people and goods are said to undermine one of the core pillars of nation states, their homogeneity. Examining closer the relationship between the people and the nation state, Breuilly frames the concept of ‘the people’ within the nation state’s narrative.

Very few polities before claimed to be accountable to their ‘people’, let alone imagined that their subjects constituted a nation (Breuilly, 2001: 32).

In Breuilly’s argument the nation state shifts the old established order and devises a new form of relations by binding together the people and the state. The nation state utilises national myths, symbols, traditions and high vernacular culture as tools to enhance a shared sense of belonging and an emotional attachment to both the nation and the state. As argued by Hobsbawm (1990) these myths, symbols and traditions are often invented exclusively for this purpose. The result is a mix of symbolic and legal attributes defining one’s affiliation with the nation state. Associated with this emotive as well as tangible attachment, and embedded within the principle of a nation state is a conception of cultural homogeneity. Cultural homogeneity is seen as a pre-condition for successful economic and political development, acting as a warrant for distribution of rewards and obligations for all members of the nation state. Hence, the nation state’s ultimate goal for complete homogeneity. This homogeneity applies not only to linguistic but to most cultural aspects of everyday life of members of the particular nation and is perceived as a necessary stipulation for political unity,
equality and general well-being of the nation. Pitcher in his analysis of British multiculturalist policies points to the nation states’ ability ‘to mobilize and reproduce ideas of race’ and as such condition and fabricate the notion of a homogenous nation (Pitcher, 2009: 30). This brings up an important point often neglected in contemporary politics, that the nation state as we know it cannot be entirely neutral when it comes to culture, ethnicity or race. This has far reaching implications which as will be explained in this thesis restrict relationships between majority and minority communities. Indeed, the premise of one state for one homogeneous nation is enabled by the forces of nationalism including the national self-determination doctrine embedded within the international law. By employing the forces of nationalism, the nation state safeguards the dominant nation and its culture, providing legal and political protection for its members whilst also creating a long lasting and unique emotional imprint.

The ideology of nationalism is not only closely interwoven with the concept of the nation state but is also one of the key elements in the complex process of identity formation. Nationalism has been contested and debated within the field of political science and social sciences, particularly for its explosive and arguably violent nature. In his extensive work on nationalism, ethnicity and identity, Smith defines nationalism as ‘an ideological movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a human population, some of whose members conceive it to constitute an actual or potential ‘nation’ (Smith, 1999: 37). In addition, Greenfeld (1992) relates the concept of nationalism directly to ‘the people’ which resonates some of the analysis offered by Breuilly who also highlights the role of the state.

Nationalism locates the source of individual identity within a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity – people are seen as always homogenous, and only superficially divided by the lines of status, class, locality, and in some cases even ethnicity’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 1).

As Breuilly explains, ‘nationalism is inconceivable without the state and vice versa. The central nationalist goal is autonomy justified in the name of the ‘nation’ (Breuilly, 2001: 32). Within this context, the nation represents the last piece in the triadic relationship between the nation state and nationalism. Nation, in contrast to the politically and legally defined nation state or the political movement of nationalism, symbolises a cultural as well as emotive concept and as such is difficult to define. Indeed, the rubric of a nation is best described as a grouping of people, a population that has a common culture, shares historical territory, and is bound together by common myths, stories and
memories. Connor (1994), in his extensive work on ethno-nationalism explains the difficulty in theorising the nation.

Defining and conceptualizing the nation is much more difficult because the essence of a nation is intangible, this essence is a psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, from all other people in a most vital way (Connor, 1994:36).

Examining the discourses of the nation, the state and nationalism, Smith illustrates the fundamental difference between the emotive nation and the subjective state. According to Smith ‘the state is a legal and a political concept: states can be defined as autonomous, public institutions of coercion and extraction within a recognized territory; states are not communities’ (Smith, 1999: 38). This argument is supported by Miller (1995) who also draws attention to this division between the nation and the state.

Nation must refer to a community of people with an aspiration to be politically self-determining, and ‘state’ must refer to the set of political institutions that they may aspire to possess for themselves (Miller, 1995: 19).

The interpretation of the nation has been changing throughout history from the original Roman and Greek meaning of a foreign community, to community of those whose opinion was of high importance in late 13th century France, to an elite - sovereign population in 16th century England (Greenfeld, 1992). This understanding of the nation as a community of elite-sovereign people spread beyond England’s borders to other European countries notably France where after the French revolution it developed into a community of unique and sovereign people, thus giving birth to what we consider a nation today.

The concept of ‘the people’ as a unique and special group in comparison to the ‘others’, generates the essence of any nation. Indeed, with its exclusivist character ‘the people’ become central to the triadic relationship and as such form one of the founding principles of identity formation. Exclusivity of any nation derives from the idea that all members of the selected people are unique, with special qualities, in comparison to those who are not part of the group. On the whole, the people are defined by shared history, language, traditions, religion and/or ethnicity. Special focus is on the shared past and present, generating the perception of eternity and incessant future of the nation, whereby as
Discussions of nations’ origins form a part of an on-going debate between two rival theory groups of modernists and primordialists. It is not within the scope of this thesis to evaluate either of these in great detail, thus only a brief synopsis of each theory and its main arguments are outlined. Modernists, represented by their best known proponent Gellner, argue that ‘nations are products of the transition from agrarian to industrial bureaucratic societies: they are quite novel in their territorial consolidation, cultural homogeneity and political integration through legal citizenship rights’ (Hutchinson, 2001: 75; Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1991). Smith, on the other hand, corresponds to the primordial school of thought and argues that nations are the continuation of ancient ethnies and their revival depends on continued reminders and support of common myths, shared symbols, history and ethnicity which reinforce the uniqueness of the people in comparison to the others (Smith, 1986; 1993; 1998). What is perhaps of greatest significance within the framework of this thesis are not necessarily the origins of the nations but rather how nations and identities define themselves on the whole and in relation to the ‘other’. The ‘other’, be it an immigrant, a member of a minority group, or a neighbouring nation, acts as a reflection to who one is and what is his/her definition of national identity as opposed to that of the ‘other’.

Hence, parallel to the nation is the concept of national identity which as an emotive principle corresponding to ‘the people’ connects the nation state, the nation and nationalism and consequently forms an important part in individual’s identity formation. As illustrated by Greenfeld, ‘national identity in its distinctive modern sense is, an identity which derives from membership in a ‘people’, the fundamental characteristic of which is that it is defined as a ‘nation’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 7). Moreover, Gutierrez views national identity as ‘first and foremost, the self-identification of the peoples of nation states’ (Gutierrez, 2001: 6). National identity thus represents the pinnacle of nation building efforts of any nation state. Categorising national identity, Smith explains that it is a type of collective cultural identity and that ‘collective cultural identities are multiple, porous and often overlapping; ethnic, regional, religious, gender and class identities slide into each other in given situations and are easily penetrated’ (Smith, 2001: 21). As such, national identity is increasingly difficult to define, understand and conceptualise. Similarly to the cultural concept of a nation, national identity is not easily acquired. It requires substantial periods of time for national identity to be fully established and a continual emphasis ought to guarantee its momentum. Within this framework the myths, symbols, traditions (real or invented), history and vernacular culture serve as nation state’s tools keeping national identity alive and relevant. Key to this exercise is a degree of
assimilation and conformity to the dominant culture providing a platform for national identity. This argument is supported by Gutierrez and his analysis where he highlights two main components essential for establishment of national identity – archetypes and stereotypes.

While archetypes reinforce a sense of cultural pride by encouraging emulation and admiration, stereotypes convey prejudices and derogatory meanings towards other social groups by assuming their staticism and repetitive behaviour e.g. all indigenous peoples are passive political actors (Gutierrez, 2001: 11-12).

Gutierrez’s paradigm of archetypes and stereotypes is more than a mere identification of multiple facets strengthening national identity; it resonates how societies use both aspects as means to manufacture and craft a sense of shared belonging and unity within the nation. This is the case even if some of the archetypes and/or stereotypes lack concrete basis and in some cases might be seriously skewed. Gutierrez sets out an argument whereby contemporary societies are formed alongside both archetypes and stereotypes and as such they are of paramount importance in relation to national identities worldwide. Apparent examples include stereotypes such as Germans are organised, English have a dry sense of humour, Italians are bad tempered and so on. What is less clear from Gutierrez’s argument is how the archetypes and stereotypes condition national identities in increasingly multicultural nation states. Other authors, such as Miller, suggest possible answers to this question.


**Table 1 Elements of national identity (Miller, 1995)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elements of national identity</th>
<th>Characteristics</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnicity</td>
<td>The nation shares a sense of close bond, extended family and blood ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History</td>
<td>Shared history and destiny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision making</td>
<td>Shared decisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Character</td>
<td>Nation and its culture are unique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Attachment to a particular territory</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

According to his analysis there are five core elements of national identity which characterise and differentiate national identity from other collective identities, see Table 1. One of the characteristics Miller associates with national identity and community is built around the concept of ethnicity, interpreting national community as an enlarged family sharing unique attributes. This community, in
Miller’s view, believes that its members are joined by a special bond and are obliged to support and defend each other. Second element in Miller’s typology, holds that national identity is dependent on shared history. Special focus is on tragedies and victories, stressing the importance of unity and immortality of the nation. Third aspect identifies national identity as an active form of identity. According to Miller this means that a nation is epitomized by actions and decisions it makes, good and bad. Fourth component in Miller’s typology relates to the distinctive character of members of the nation, or what he refers to as the ‘common public culture’. This vernacular culture is unique and specific only to the members, making them different from the others and essentially creating separation between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Fifth characteristic proposed by Miller is directly linked to a specific territory, a homeland. Homeland is clearly defined and historically connected to the nation. This view is also shared by Connor (1994), who makes an important link between a homeland and a nation with the following:

Members of a homeland believe that they possess a primary and exclusive title to the homeland. Outsiders may be tolerated or even encouraged as sojourners (guest workers, for example), but the demand that the sojourners go home can be raised at any time and may be aimed at compatriots as well as at foreigners (Connor, 1994: 78).

What Connor underlines with his argument is the on-going tension between the home population and migrants or minorities which has been increasingly prominent in the contemporary nation states where growing migration and competition for scarce resources contributes towards the renewed sense of entitlement and protectionism amidst the local population. Particulars of this argument are essential within the framework of this thesis and its empirical findings.

Reflecting on Miller’s typology, national identity is defined by characteristics which complement and contrast each other, adding layer upon layer to create a unique and engrained set of attributes making it notoriously difficult to capture, yet with the power to mesmerize masses. Importantly, national identity is characterised by a dual process integrating self-identification of the given people which is strengthened and reinforced by national culture and history, with perceptions of the particular people by the ‘others’. However, the exhaustive description and typology provided by Miller can be criticised for omitting important historical developments conditioning the changes of contemporary national identity, specifically the broader categorisation of national identity, citizenship and nationalism residing along the lines of civic and ethnic affiliation, which are in the field of nationalism traditionally represented as dichotomies. Miller introduces the civic and ethnic
categorisation in his argument, however, does not include it in his own typology and instead adopts a hybrid form of national identity containing both the ethnic and civic elements. Miller’s classification is most appropriate for contemporary nation states, but in the context of this thesis, the origins of ethnic and civic national identity and citizenship are essential. As such, they must be explored in more detail to understand contemporary identity formations, see Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic nationalism</th>
<th>Ethnic nationalism</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uis soli form of citizenship</td>
<td>Uis sanguinis form of citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western nationalism</td>
<td>Eastern nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive and open</td>
<td>Exclusive and closed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive and developed</td>
<td>Reactionary and underdeveloped</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universal</td>
<td>Tribal</td>
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Deriving from historical developments and formations, the ethnic and civic or Eastern and Western nationalisms came to existence. Interesting comparison between the two nationalisms can be drawn from the introductory chapter of Miller’s monograph in which he offers a detailed overview of the Eastern / Western divide specifically identifying distinctions as made by Kohn:

For Hans Kohn, for instance, Western nationalism was rational and liberal in character, looking forward to a future in which all should enjoy the rights of man, whereas Eastern nationalism was backward-looking and mystical, basting itself on an exclusive, quasi-tribal understanding of nationality (Miller, 1995: 8).

In other words, under the rubric developed by Kohn, the civic form of national identity is regarded as the Western model based on inclusion and the *ius soli* concept of citizenship. On the contrary, the ethnic form of national identity is considered to be exclusivist and underdeveloped with *ius sanguinis* form of citizenship based along the ethnic lines, traditionally representative of Eastern parts of the world. Despite its precise and systematic definition, there is a growing consensus amongst scholars of nationalism that the political and geographical divide of the civic nationalism as good and the ethnic nationalism as bad is becoming increasingly redundant for the contemporary world. It is hardly the case that states adopt only one of the two nationalisms. Rather, the definition should be more flexible and porous, recognising the close and interwoven relationship between the civic and the ethnic principles, conditioning developments of nationalism, citizenship and national identity, as
for instance shown in the typology developed by Miller. The somewhat simplified dichotomy of the civic/ethnic or West/East nationalisms offers theoretical synopsis which ought to be carefully applied while examining contemporary nation states in practice (Brubaker, 1998; Kuzio, 2002; Smith, 2006; Yack, 1996). Nonetheless, it would be detrimental to simply dismiss the categorisation out of hand. On the contrary, examining origins and developments of the different nationalisms within this context outlines the trajectory of domestic policies and state political orientations today. Theorising nationalisms and national identity from the civic and the ethnic perspective, the following section will aim to clarify and connect the theoretical with the practical aspects of contemporary nationalism, national identity and citizenship before moving on to examine developments of identity as a political and social category.

Reaching beyond Kohn’s dichotomy, discourses of the civic and the ethnic identity have been at the centre of debate for many scholars in the field of nationalism, with the civic principle often retaining a more positive association. As Greenfeld explains, the civic national identity is formed around the belief that ‘the people are acting in some way as political elite, and are actually exercising sovereignty’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 10). Smith refers to civic nationalism and national identity as largely oriented by territory and political institutions ‘created by a ‘lateral’ or aristocratic ethnie (Smith, 2001: 32). These provisions primarily confined to the Western world conditioned the membership criteria, giving birth to the *ius soli* citizenship granted on the basis of territory rather than ethnicity or blood ties to the nation (Bauböck, 1994, 2003; Brubaker, 1992; Joppke, 1999, 2003; Weil, 2001).

Within this context, territory serves the function of a homeland or a birthplace, rather than a signifier of citizenship where membership is circumscribed by the ethnic attachment to the territory. Traditionally, France has been recognised as a model of the civic nationalism and *ius soli* citizenship, where focus is not on the group as such but instead the emphasis lies with the individual citizen. In other words, the broad and rather abstract understanding of national identity and citizenship within the framework of civic - Western nationalism is characterised by the equality of all members and notionally also by the provisions enabling potential members to join and acquire citizenship upon satisfactory completion of the state specific criteria such as permanent residency, linguistic competence and so on.

Rooted within the traditional demarcation of the civic and ethnic nationalisms, the ethnic nationalism and national identity are positioned alongside the ideal of vernacular culture and popular sovereignty. According to Greenfeld, this sovereignty is ‘an implication of the people’s uniqueness, its very being a distinct people, because this was the meaning of the nation, and the nation was, by definition, sovereign’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 11). In the typology developed by Smith
(2001), the focus resides with the ethno-heritage of the nations, however, similarly to Greenfeld he refers to the notion of uniqueness of ‘the people’ whereby ‘most of the community shares the vernacular culture in contrast to cultural outsiders’ (Smith, 2001: 32). Accounting for these characteristics as described by Greenfeld and Smith, the ethnic or Eastern nationalism is, on the contrary to the civic nationalism, underpinned by ethnicity, blood relations and collectivist principle. Essentially, the collectivist principle is problematic in its very nature with its defining elements being informed by the seemingly distinctive attributes, both cultural and ethnic, of one group over another. This is reflected in the *ius sanguinis* citizenship policies which to a great degree retain the ethnic component by limiting access to citizenship for those deemed to be outsiders. The *ius sanguinis* citizenship is embedded within the structure of ethnicity, blood relations and group unity, excluding individuals and members of different cultural and ethnic groups. In practice this means that citizenship can be acquired by birth and descent and only under specifically defined circumstances by the naturalisation processes. As such, the ethnic nationalism retains an exclusive status governed by the group representation and group leadership claiming to represent, act for and on behalf of all members of the group.

In *Nationalism: Five roads to modernity* (1992), Greenfeld illustrates the inherent nature of the ethnic nationalism highlighting its exclusivist tendencies: ‘one can neither acquire it if one does not have it, nor change it if one does; it has nothing to do with individual will, but constitutes a genetic characteristic’ (Greenfeld, 1992: 11). The primary concern generated by this exclusivist behaviour is embedded in the possible manipulation and exploitation of the ethnic nationalism in the form of vernacular culture and national identity by some of the charismatic group leaders to achieve their own means. It is the emotional attachment and the normative view of the nation as an enlarged family which are particularly dangerous when politicised, leading to creation of the ‘other’ vis-à-vis ‘my people’. Critics of ethnic nationalism point to what they recognise as demarcation and ‘othering’ of communities and individuals in the name of ethnic principles. Examining the origins of ethnic nationalism from historical and comparative perspectives, it exposes the conditionality of nationalism by external forces. In case of the ethnic nationalism the external conditions led to unison of fragmented ethnic groups in Central & Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa under one dominant foreign rule or an empire, thus planting the seeds for ethnic nationalism by asserting emotional attachment with one’s own group rather than the state.

The taxonomies along the lines of civic nationalism as Western – civilised and inclusive, and ethnic nationalism as Eastern – primordial and exclusive, attempt to devise a convenient formula of national identity which in fact is hardly fixed. The civic and ethnic nationalisms were conditioned by a diverse
set of parameters which by no means make them mutually exclusive. Indeed, more often than not, the two principles are intertwined, forming a hybrid mode of ‘conditional’ civic/ethnic nationalism which is to be found across many of the liberal democracies today. The fallacy of the long established civic/ethnic dichotomy retaining its clear cut boundaries between the two nationalisms, is increasingly apparent in the 21st century with the traditionally civic states adopting more restrictive measures for accession to citizenship, while many of the conventionally ethnic states gradually becoming more civic (Bauböck & Joppke, 2010; Vink & de Groot, 2010). In actual fact, no longer is it applicable to categorise the nation states as simply civic or ethnic, instead the divisive line is blurred allowing for crossover between the two principles.

Returning to the typology of contemporary national identity offered by Miller, the hybrid national identity acts as a medium through which individual members express their belonging to a nation state or an ethnic group. As Smith (1991) puts it, ‘a national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional, it can never be reduced to a single element, even by particular factions of nationalists, nor can it be easily or swiftly induced in a population by artificial means’ (Smith, 1991: 14). In combination with the essence of a nation and the forces of nationalism it provides its members with more than unity, economic security and safety, fundamentally, it offers identification of oneself by utilising the image of the ‘other’ as inherently different. Focus of the following section will draw on the concepts introduced thus far, particularly the principles of ethnicity, nationalism, national identity, nation and the nation state which are shaping identity developments within the realm of politics and social sphere.

1.2 Developments of identity as a political and social category

A pervasive need to express identity occurs when people are misunderstood and misrepresented, forcing them to rethink what they are (Gutierrez, 2001: 14).

In this statement, Gutierrez touches upon the abstract concept of identity which is generally problematic to theorise or define, leaving it open to on-going debate and questioning. Indeed, as a political and social category identity is subject to a vigorous debate with diverse pool of opinions from within and beyond academia. The scholarly debate centres on the fluid and abstract notion of identity acting as a reference of self-identification and a bond with one’s group. Parekh (2004) for example, describes identity attributes as follows:

It is the basis of people’s sense of self-worth and social standing, it bonds them to those sharing it, and it gives them both a sense of common belonging and the
collective empowerment that accompanies it. It also gives them a moral anchor, a sense of direction, and a body of ideas and values (Parekh, 2004: 207).

Smith (2001) adds ‘identity of any kind is regarded as a social construct, one that is fluid and malleable, the outcome and product of particular situations’ (Smith, 2001: 21). Huddy (2001) suggests that identity is largely dependent on subjective meaning of individual members. As such, it is fluid and constantly changing, the ethnic and religious identities, however, remain relatively stable and salient. Huddy’s analysis presents results obtained from a number of studies indicating that with regards to identity ‘the internal meaning of a group can be quite different from its meaning to outsiders’ (2001: 143). Gutierrez (2001) offers similar categorization:

Identity is a definition, an interpretation of the self that establishes what and where the person is in both social and psychological terms. The defining criteria of identity are continuity over time, and differentiation from others, both fundamental elements of national identity (Gutierrez, 2001: 76).

To expand on the premise provided by Gutierrez, one of the key elements of identity is its longevity which in his analysis Gutierrez associates with national identity. This is, however, debatable as longevity is an ethnic attribute which can and often does survive without the nation state, therefore its association with national identity is restricted. Subsequently, this is administered by the on-going maintenance and fabrication of national culture and traditions with the overarching aim of constructing an ideal nation. Globalisation of contemporary world exerts pressure on individuals as well as states, whereby continuity and perceived infinity of a nation is increasingly of paramount importance to its members. Thus, identity related issues have led to conflicts, disintegration, devolution and creation of states as well as liberation of minorities. However, identity analysis requires cautious understanding of identity politics; fabricating and amplifying identity as a social construct can circumvent other essential identities such as gender or profession to name but a few.

In their study of identity, Brubaker and Cooper (2000) argue that ‘identity tends to mean too much (when understood in a strong sense), too little (when understood in a weak sense), or nothing at all (because of its sheer ambiguity)’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 1). What Brubaker and Cooper refer to in their article Beyond identity reflects developments of modern history identity politics dating back to the 1950s United States with growing black American and equal rights movements. The rise of identity movements continued into the 1970s and 1980s while numerous activist groups thrived, for instance the feminist, gay, or race related organisations which flourished during this time. Within the scope of social and political studies this period marks a peak of identity politics, often exaggerated
and superficial. Indeed, the overriding problem with identity has been its convoluted and emotive nature which can become explosive when under pressure or politicised. In-depth analysis of identity unveils a complex web of associations and categorisations. Adopting the framework provided by Brubaker and Cooper, see Table 3, identity and its formations are characterised by a number of key elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3 Identity typology (Brubaker and Cooper, 2000)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity as...</td>
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<tr>
<td>basis of social and political action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force for collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>core aspect of selfhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>outcome of social and political action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>part of other processes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First, Brubaker and Cooper offer a broad definition of identity:

> As a ground or basis of social or political action, identity is often opposed to interest in an effort to highlight and conceptualize non-instrumental modes of social and political action (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 6).

From this broad definition the typology evolves further into three related sub-categories which according to Brubaker and Cooper complement and contrast one another. First category combines individual’s self-understanding and self-interests, building on the second categorisation which relates to individual’s uniqueness an universality, while the third category acts as a bridge between the social and political aspects.

Second principle in identity paradigm established by Brubaker and Cooper depicts identity as a force of collective action which can resume in violence. By this token, Brubaker and Cooper recognise dynamics and volatility of collective identity often formed around group attributes of sameness and unity vis-à-vis ‘the others’. Traditionally, nationalism and identity politics draw upon this powerful nature of collective identities inciting nationalist rhetoric by utilising the narrative of ‘us’ and ‘them’ and mobilising members on the basis of group solidarity. The emotive identification and wellbeing embedded within and associated with belonging to one’s own group must not be misjudged. In support of Brubaker and Cooper’s analysis of collective identities are Durkheim’s writings on religious affiliation and belonging which can be applied to contemporary identity politics. According to Durkheim ‘the individuals who compose the group feel themselves bound to each other by the very
fact that they have a common faith’ (Durkheim, 2001: 87). In essence, Brubaker and Cooper as well as Durkheim imply that collective identities display a powerful set of emotive attributes connecting members of a particular group by a strong bond which cannot be replicated.

The third principle based on analysis provided by Brubaker and Cooper positions identity within traditional social framework as ‘a core aspect of selfhood or as a fundamental condition of social being’ (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000: 7). Fourth element of Brubaker and Cooper’s study approaches identity as an outcome of political and social action, suggesting that identity determines group solidarity, group uniqueness and crucially it mirrors group’s self-perceptions. Last but not least, Brubaker and Cooper emphasise that identity must be regarded as part of other processes especially the multiple and fragmented self (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000).

The elaborate identity analysis offered by Brubaker and Cooper indicates the complexity and juxtaposition of the term as a political and social construct with the interpretations and connotations being both complementary and mutually exclusive. On one hand, collective identity constructs group loyalties and sentiments whilst on the other hand, the notion of collective identity becomes inherently problematic for those who do not fit the collective framework. Strong understanding of the collective identity according to Brubaker and Cooper’s typology assumes a level of group homogeneity which in return bonds the group together in a close union, granting it a sense of belonging distinguishing it from other groups. Moreover, strong understanding of the collective identity accepts that it is universal and applicable to all members of the group, whilst encouraging and stimulating identity sentiments often at the expense of other identities and cultural exchange. On the other side of the spectrum is what Brubaker and Cooper coin as a weak understanding of identity, with the concept recognised as fragmented, fluid, and artificially fabricated. By understanding identity as a secondary term, it can become an empty label lacking any clear associations, rendering the concept devoid of any core meaning.

Whilst identities are complex and fluid, it is important to recognise that they form essential part of our existence and are deeply embedded within the political structures of the nation states. Every individual has a number of identities by which he or she identifies such as profession, political allegiance, gender, hobbies, ethnicity, religion and others (Miller, 1995, 2000). These identities come to surface at particular times most likely when under a threat or pressure. However, returning to identity analysis of Miller (1995), he argues that regardless of the conditions and situations, the prevalence with which identities emerge is to a large degree down to the individual.
Some identities are chosen, some un-chosen, but it will be to a considerable degree a matter of choice which aspects any particular person makes central to their conception of themselves (Miller, 1995: 120-121).

Miller’s argument is particularly valid in relation to collective identities and specifically religious and ethnic identities. It is also in line with Brubaker and Cooper’s view asserting strong and weak understanding of identity, whereby the religious and ethnic identities are exceptionally vulnerable to exploitation and demagogy. As history shows the two identities have been victims of political regimes and movements utilising them as empty shells as well as the saviours of the nation. Religious and ethnic collective identities resemble a unique set of powerful attributes circumventing time, territory or class boundaries. In fact, both religious and ethnic identities are universal, appealing to members who share the same attributes, religious or ethnic. Religious identities often act in addition to national identities, taking on a hybrid form whilst adding a layer of umbrella identity. Muslim identity in the Middle East is often cited as such example. The ethnic identity is similarly to its religious counterpart transnational and can be perpetuated despite its geographical separation. Interesting example of this phenomenon is the case of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and their German ethnic consciousness. Smith (1991) explores the relationship between religious and ethnic identities in great detail arguing that ‘what began as a purely religious community may end up as an exclusive ethnic community’ as for instance the Jewish community (Smith, 1991: 7). Increasingly, we are witnessing a new phenomenon, whereby the two identities are used interchangeably blurring established boundaries, and shifting the meaning of national identity. It is the aim of the research undertaken as part of this thesis to understand this new relationship emerging in contemporary nation states with novel hybrid identities forming. Indeed, analysing individual pieces which together form the mosaic of identities with comparative and analytical approach towards national identity uncovers the complex nature of identities as political and social constructs.

By and large identities coexist in a symbiotic relationship which, nevertheless, can become strained should some of the identities conflict with the concept of national identity. Once again Miller (1995) provides concrete examples of the conflicting nature within this relationship.

If I belong to a nation whose self-definition includes Catholicism – being Catholic is what separates this people from its neighbours, say – and I decide to join a Protestant church, then inevitably there will be a clash between my religious and national identities (Miller, 1995: 121).
In his example, Miller demonstrates the tension between what are perceived as two conflicting identities. National identity acts as a tool homogenising nation state’s population which is often resisted by the minority groups, thus in the studies of nationalism a particularly problematic discord lies between national and ethnic or religious identities. The challenges are twofold; the exclusivity of each of the principles is an obstacle to any non-members, whilst the close knit relationship between all three concepts makes them difficult to disaggregate. An example can be drawn from the contemporary nation states where the dominant group, typically but not always the majority, enjoys ethnic and cultural authority. In other words, as most of the contemporary nation states include groups with a mix of civic and ethnic attributes, it is the dominant group that usually identifies ethnic and national identities as one and the same, often used interchangeably. Indeed, in this case the two identities go hand in hand or even become one. The more multicultural or multinational a state is the more distinctive the individual identities become often ensuing in a discord between the national identity and the ethnic or even religious identity. This may result in an increasing tension between the dominant and the minority groups particularly in cases where the minority group in question claims to be ethnically, culturally or linguistically different from the majority. In his case study, Miller uses the example of Muslim residents in the UK as a case in point whereby the national and the religious/ethnic identities are in discord.

To bear a Muslim identity in Britain today is not inherently political, but it becomes so if British national identity and the practices that express it are seen as containing an Anglo-Saxon bias which discriminates against Muslims and other ethnic minorities (Miller, 1995: 123).

Connor (2001) puts forward similar argument, indicating the intersection between the national and the ethnic identities and the privileges associated with the dominant group.

The notion of primal ownership – that only the members of my people have a ‘true right’ to be here – is characterized by a mind-set that perceives privileged status for the homeland people as a self-evident right (Connor, 2001: 64).

Both arguments made by Miller and Connor explore the possible discords between national and ethnic or national and religious identities which can become critical for interstate relations as well as minority rights. This account appeals to a comprehensive understanding of the multifaceted relationship amidst the national, ethnic and religious identities as a key in examining relations amongst the minority and majority groups within the contemporary nation states. Frequently, cultural differences and practices associated with the ethnic and religious identities take on a new
shape acting as manifestations of ‘otherness’ which can deepen group animosities. In effect, it is vital for any national identity analysis, to assess the role of vernacular culture which to a great degree acts as a platform from which national identity springs into action. In his paper, Hutchinson (2001) examines the significance of vernacular culture giving counter examples from the modernist and the ethno-symbolist schools of thought, and analysing the importance of culture for national identity. In his account, the modernists and the ethno-symbolists recognise vernacular culture as the essence of a nation and national identity, however, the former regard vernacular culture as a tool utilised by the state to homogenise population and to create a sense of overarching identity, whilst for the latter it represents the core of collective identity and collective action. In other words, for modernists the vernacular culture becomes fabricated and employed by the state as means of homogenisation, whereas for the ethno-symbolists it stems from within the group. Withstanding the discord between the two schools which bears resemblance to the civic and ethnic paradigm, the contemporary nation states rely on cultural sentiments to incite a sense of unity and mobilise masses. Inherently, theorising and utilising national identity, and nationalism in the civic or ethnic form, constructs the framework of any nation state. As such correlations between the interrelated concepts must be examined to help uncover contemporary constitutional arrangements.

1.3 Identity and the nation state: constitutional arrangements

The arrangement between identity and the state is a complex one, composed of multiple fragments which are continuously evolving and shifting, aimed at maintaining the attachment to the state and the group in a constant momentum. The complexity of this relationship is reflected in the dilemma between the political unity and cultural diversity of citizens and the ‘other’, challenging the propensity of the nation states to homogenise its population. In defence of the traditional nation state, the right wing political parties, and in recent years also some of the mainstream parties, lobby for national and cultural homogeneity, resenting multiculturalism which they often perceive as the antithesis of harmonious societies. However, as Kastoryano (2002) sums up, the shifts between identities and the nation states are increasingly evident.

Even though national models serve as a link to the past in order to justify the present and to reinforce national identity and state sovereignty, a common evolution toward a new stage in the development of nation-states appears to be emerging (Kastoryano, 2002:4).

As a response to this challenge, new models have been developed to manage and accommodate the growing discord between diversity and unity, and thus cement the relationship between identity and
the nation state. Prior to analysis and evaluation of these models, which will be central to the subsequent chapter, it is necessary to explain the challenge identities pose for the contemporary nation states. The dilemma is twofold, the emergence of a nation state and the notion of exclusivity embedded within its core generate national minorities, whilst the forces of globalisation and movement of people give birth to political and economic migrants including refugees, who constitute the new ‘other’. Whereas national minorities are historically established groups, often recognised and involved in negotiations with the nation state over protection of their status, it is not uncommon for the more transient new ‘other’ to over a period of time become absorbed into the receiving nation state. The recognition of groups deemed to be culturally or ethnically different, or regarded as the ‘other’, is often met with resistance from the dominant group.

The principle of a homogenous nation state which was introduced earlier in the chapter is gradually contested in contemporary multicultural and multinational world, whilst the idea that the ‘other’ could become part of ‘my’ people is becoming less obsolete as a consequence of globalisation, worldwide movements for protection of human rights and shifts in citizenship legislation. However, whilst the acquisition of citizenship may have become easier and more transparent, the channels leading to the acquisition in the form of naturalisation policies have become more difficult. The paradigm of membership, belonging and acceptance is vital to existence of any nation, but also constitutes a triadic nexus essential for the association between the dominant group and the ‘other’. Likewise, homeland carries a symbolic and emotional attachment for members of the nation who believe to possess ultimate ownership of the territory, making it intrinsically problematic for any non-members. Yuval-Davis (2004) examines the concept of a homeland in her work on ethno-nationalism and belonging, while Brubaker (1998) analyses the role of membership and belonging of the ‘other’.

Claims for changing borders, “retrieving” pieces of “the homeland”, are probably the most popular reasons, why nations go to war, next to defending the “women and children”(Yuval – Davis, 2004: 218).

The gradual transformation of sojourners into settlers, only partially and belatedly acknowledged by both immigrants and the receiving country, generates complex and delicate problems of membership (Brubaker, 1998: 134-135).

Exploring the arguments presented by Yuval – Davis and Brubaker, there is a conflict between the claims of home population and those of minorities or migrants. Indeed, the contemporary nation states are presented with a dilemma of protecting and maintaining the special bond that unites members of the group together, and the integration and accommodation of culturally and/or
ethnically diverse migrants and minorities. Assessing this complex labyrinth of relations, Connor introduces a pivotal argument of loyalty which will be central to the subsequent section. In his analysis of nationalism and ethno-nationalism, Connor argues that ‘questions of accommodating ethnonational heterogeneity within a single state revolve around two loyalties – loyalty to the nation and loyalty to the state – and the relative strength of the two’ (Connor, 1994: 81). In essence, this argument reflects the multifaceted character of the contemporary nation states, particularly the division between the dominant and the minority groups and their multiple loyalties. In addition, it refers to the nation and state building processes and the gradually fragmented relationship between the two.

By accepting Connor’s argument, one acknowledges that the population of nation states today is becoming increasingly heterogeneous, conditioning and shifting the nature of national identity, nationalism and belonging as we know it. Particularly problematic is the concept of multiple loyalties, whereby attachment to a state does not automatically suggest attachment to a nation, which also implies that the nation and state building processes are becoming incongruent. These shifts are fundamentally redefining how we see and understand the narrative of nationalism and national identity. Belonging to a nation involves a subjective and emotive bond which is frequently believed to be more powerful than a mere belonging to a state. Thus ideally, underpinned by the nation and state building processes, groups ought to feel strongly attached to both, the nation and the state. Connor’s summary below, illustrates how the two aspects of loyalty can complement or detract each other.

To people within a multinational state or to those who are so dominant within a multinational state as to perceive the state as essentially their nation’s state (e.g. the English, the Han Chinese, the Thais), the two loyalties become an indistinguishable, reinforcing blur. It is in the perception of national minorities that the two loyalties are most apt to vie (Connor, 1994: 81).

Examining the argument put forward by Connor, it is useful to draw parallels with the more traditional civic and ethnic discords which indorse Connor’s typology. This suggests the presence of often concealed internal divisions within the nation states, associated with cultural, historical and linguistic attributes. Thus, in his work Connor reflects upon the discourses of ‘us’ and ‘them’, reiterated in the multiple loyalties to a nation or one’s group, and a state. Evaluation and analysis of these ethnic or nationalist tendencies vis-à-vis the civic and patriotic orientations, are essential to the central theme of this thesis as they sketch out and depict the story of our time – how to create unity
within diversity. Henceforth, analysis of belonging and affiliation to a nation, one’s own group or a state will be introduced together with a brief synopsis indicating ramifications these loyalties have on different groups within the state.

The powerful force of nationalism, attachment to one’s own nation or a group, are associated with a strong bond which is often seen as taking precedence over the comparatively modern and constructed civic identities such as citizenship. Plausible explanation for this seemingly unfounded behaviour can be found in the emotiveness expressed within nationalism, whilst emphasising the bond of ethnicity, kinship, and shared past. Connor depicts belonging to a nation and its attractiveness as ‘a psychological bond that joins people and differentiates it, in the subconscious conviction of its members, from all non-members in a most vital way’ (Connor, 1994: 197). However, Connor’s definition is by no means limited to the concept of a nation, and in fact can be extended beyond the traditional concepts to include, for instance, ethnic or diaspora communities. As such, the vigorous belief in a distinctive character of one’s group underpinned by shared history, culture and myths is essential in fostering and maintaining loyalty to a particular group, while transcending the boundaries of states and other fixed categories. It is precisely this emotive and abstract bond that often divides communities in a most definite and concrete way, emphasising unity of a group in relation to the others, whilst simultaneously and somewhat paradoxically leading to the categorisation of ‘us’ and ‘them’. The by-product of these developments emerging strongly in the contemporary multicultural societies, are competing as well as complementing loyalties, circumventing the traditionally defined frameworks and structures. Premise of this argument ought to inform and account for the compelling evidence to avoid analysis of the national and the supranational loyalties in a vacuum, or as one single unit within their own realm.

As an alternative, the focus should lie in a broader and comparative approach, examining all actors involved in the identity formation process. Durkheim, for example, in his work *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (2001) captures the powerful character of nationalism by utilising the analogy with religious beliefs. Indeed, Durkheim’s argument is imperative to the subject of this thesis.

Because he (the man) is in moral unison with his fellow men, he has more confidence, courage and boldness in action, just like the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of his god turned graciously towards him (Durkheim, 2001: 88).

In parallel to Durkheim’s argument, Connor (1994) draws attention to the more pragmatic state induced loyalties and bonds, frequently adopted to facilitate and mobilise masses.
The state has many effective means for inculcating love of country and love of political institutions – what social scientists collectively term ‘political socializations’. Not the least effective of these is control of public education and particularly control over the content of history courses (Connor, 1994: 207).

Similarly, Pitcher (2009) in his work on multiculturalism, analyses the means by which the states exploit their authority during the times of economic or political crises, to enhance and mobilise patriotic awareness. In his view, ‘an undeclared permanent state of emergency permits the state to exercise its sovereign power outside of the normative juridical order’ (Pitcher, 2009: 155). Pitcher’s argument denotes the frequently adopted notion of a threat to one’s nation or a state from the ‘other’, whereby the ‘other’ takes on different forms, often represented by the minority groups, immigrants and refugees. What is the most prized possession of any nation state, however, is access to its citizenship, which has in recent years undergone significant changes. Thus, returning to Connor’s argument of multiple loyalties, significant parallels can be drawn between citizenship and state affiliation.

The literature review analysis of contemporary citizenship reforms (Bauböck, Perching and Sievers, 2006; Joppke, 2003, 2008, 2010; Kymlicka, 1995, 1998, 2011) see a novel trend emerging across the Western nation states. The narrative frequently adopted in the Western world depicts the concept of liberal citizenship as an inclusive form of membership, and while this is the case in most liberal democracies, the journey towards citizenship acquisition has altered its course significantly.

Gradually, naturalisation policies and citizenship tests are in addition to other requirements such as long term residency or clean criminal record, becoming indispensable parts of the citizenship acquisition processes. This emerging trend is conditioning how and on what grounds are the non-members permitted to become legally equivalent members of the society and tells us a story of the contemporary nation states.

Citizenship

The historical trajectories of citizenship can be traced back to the Greek and Roman Empires, where the principality of citizenship or Polis implied exclusive position of selected few within the society. Further advancement of the concept was mirrored on the Western liberal tradition and ideas developed by political thinkers such as Mills, Rawls or Rousseau, who located citizenship as the source of individual sovereignty, collective and national unity and equality of all members. Citizenship as we know it today has numerous attributes and layers, including obligations, rights and
duties for all members. Summary offered by Oldfield (1998) exemplifies the characterisation and desirability of citizenship as a status.

Individuals as citizens are sovereign, the threat to their sovereignty comes just as much from society, and especially the state, as it does from other individuals, and as human beings, individuals require the freedom and security to pursue their lives unhindered – within this way of thinking, citizenship is a “status”, a status to be sought and, once achieved, to be maintained (Oldfield, 1998: 76).

By acknowledging their citizenship, members and the state enter into a mutually binding agreement, or a contract, in which they recognise the rights as well as the duties placed upon them, the status as well as the obligations that come from within this agreement. All citizens of the state acquire civic duties which are civil, political and social, such as political participation, conformity with the rules, laws and regulations. This political community is bound together by civic values, but crucially also by a shared sense of belonging assumed from the membership in the ethnic or territorial group, or in most cases combination of the two. Essentially, membership in the state, and identity informed by this affiliation, are self-evident to the citizens, and by the same token, to those who are excluded from this group. Returning to Connor’s observations of national and state loyalties, and the nation / state building processes, Connor outlines the underlining internal divisions associated with the changing of citizenship policies. To understand the dilemma faced by the contemporary nation states, it is key to distinguish that membership in a state, does not guarantee loyalty to the nation, and vice versa. In fact, with the growing demographical and economic pressures on the nation states, and gradually more stringent procedures in place protecting access to citizenship, a new set of relations is emerging between the dominant groups and the minority or migrant communities. Oldfield (1998) illustrates the shift in citizenship narrative, particularly the emphasis on one’s loyalty to the state, with the following.

Citizenship cuts across both religious and secular universalism and involves recognizing that one gives priority, when and where required, to one’s political community. It simply means that to remain a citizen one cannot always treat everyone as a human being (Oldfield, 1998: 81).

The notion that membership in a political community acts as an overarching loyalty, which at specific times takes precedence over the other loyalties becomes frequently questioned with regards to the second or third generation descendants of immigrants, who obtained or are in processes of acquiring citizenship. Arguably, their pre-existing loyalties, be they religious, national or ethnic, prevent them
from maintaining an all-embracing loyalty to the political community. In the contemporary
environment of demographic and economic mobilisation, the nation states’ fears of clashing loyalties
amidst the second and third generation, result in increasingly selective and even hindering policies
leading to citizenship acquisition and membership. Frequently, the nation states adopt what can be
described as a middle ground or ‘half way house’ policies, whereby the long term immigrants and
their children, who hold permanent residence, are entitled to extended residential rights. These very
specific rights have naturalisation qualities, albeit, usually do not lead to citizenship acquisition. In
fact, it gives the impression that the aim is to deter citizenship applications from candidates who are
not fully committed and loyal to the civic and cultural values of the nation state, by granting them
the extended residential rights. As Brubaker (1998) and Miller (1995) point out, this is a rather
tenuous solution, resulting in increasingly apprehensive and disgruntled relations between the
majority and the minority groups.

Ad hoc enlargements of migrants’ rights may thus obstruct rather than clear the
path to full membership, trapping large numbers of migrants-turned-immigrants
in an intermediate status, carrying with it many of the privileges and obligations
of full membership but excluding two of the most important, symbolically and
practically: the right to vote and the duty of military service (Brubaker, 1998: 135;
Miller, 1995).

The implications of these rather limited nation and state building processes are evident in
segregating communities and isolated loyalties, contributing towards marginalisation, real or
perceived, of the second and third generation groups. Beyond the rhetoric of state apparatus and its
authority within the domain of citizenship and naturalisation policies, the argument has two sides.
The principle of citizenship is becoming more civic, whilst the path towards its acquisition has grown
more complex, drawing on internal and external fears and challenges faced by the contemporary
nation states. Simultaneously to this process, the construction of second and third generation
identities bypasses the traditionally defined and socially constructed boundaries, loyalties and
attachments, creating what are often recognised as hybrid identities. Hence, the proposed
hypothesis (H3) suggests that the role of citizenship and the pathways leading towards its acquisition,
including the processes of naturalisation, are significant in conditioning the identity formation of the
second and third generation descendant communities. It is within this context that the course of
naturalisation ought to be examined, assessing its role in maintaining and developing one’s affiliation
and sense of belonging with the state and the nation. Henceforth, the subsequent section explores
naturalisation policies and the principle of belonging, and their effect on the nation states as well as immigrants and minority groups.

*Naturalisation policies and belonging*

Recent years have witnessed a renewed interest in citizenship studies, and increasingly also in naturalisation policies which established themselves as integral part of the citizenship processes. In her study on *Naturalisation policies in Europe* (2010), Wallace Goodman argues that ‘naturalisation is the most volatile and contentious aspect of citizenship policy in the immigrant-receiving states of Europe’ (Wallace Goodman, 2010:1). Indeed, as the name suggests, naturalisation, which resides entirely within the domain of individual nation states, operates as a device to contain and naturalise immigrants into the political and social community of the nation state. However, immigration and naturalisation policies which are inherently linked are growing increasingly out of sync, to the extent where one may be contradicting the other. The precise and legally accepted definition of naturalisation is often associated with rather negative nuances, and complex procedures directly involving the applicant. In her opening chapter, Wallace Goodman explains the complexity of naturalisation with the following:

> Naturalisation is a paradoxical expression; there is nothing ‘natural’ about this process of membership acquisition. This contradiction is immediately visible when adopting a legal perspective, where the process of naturalisation is not natural at all but requires legal regulation. In this context, naturalisation is the process of acquisition where a person applies for citizenship to the state represented by relevant public authorities. This emphasis on the aspiring citizen’s process of application is key in distinguishing naturalisation from other procedures (Wallace Goodman, 2010: 2).

In her summary of naturalisation processes, Wallace Goodman emphasises the responsibility that resides with the applicant to actively seek membership and involvement in the political and social community of the receiving nation state. Thus, reflecting on her observations, it is plausible to suggest that naturalisation is virtually a practice of political and cultural absorption, where candidate’s ability to prove his/her commitment and loyalty to the receiving state, its values, culture and traditions, conditions his/her acquisition of the citizenship. From the nation state’s perspective, naturalisation denotes a process, whereby the applicant is being assessed in terms of loyalty and integration, whilst citizenship represents the end result of successful adaptation. The nation states’ persistence in retaining control over the naturalisation and citizenship policies enables them to
bypass the naturalisation processes and withhold or grant citizenship at the discretion of public authorities, in what are deemed to be special cases. This offers a degree of flexibility to the nation state, however, can it be used to exclude particular groups of applicants notwithstanding the naturalisation criteria.

The criteria outlined in the citizenship and naturalisation processes differ from country to country, however, as will be discussed, there are defined sets of rules which are principal to the majority of nation states; these include a set period of permanent residency and in some instances renunciation of prior citizenship. The former is a commonly accepted condition of naturalisation policies, whilst the latter is being increasingly challenged by the human rights groups, supranational organisations and even some nation states. The permanent residency requirements are infamous for their inconsistency even within the European Union. The Czech Republic state authorities, for instance, insist on 5 years of uninterrupted stay, Germany has a condition of 8 years of permanent residency, whilst as Wallace Goodman noted in case of the UK, ‘in 2009 there has been an increase from 5 to 8 years of residency requirement unless the candidates were on the route of earned citizenship which refers to a point-based system measuring progress towards citizenship’ (Wallace Goodman, 2010: 7).

Similarly conflicting trends can be identified in the policies concerning renunciation of prior citizenship, albeit recent years have witnessed move towards liberalisation of multiple citizenship, and currently an increasing number of European nation states allow applicants, under specified conditions, to retain their original citizenship (Bauböck & Joppke, 2010; Vink & de Groot, 2010). The shift from mandatory to increasingly discretionary citizenship renunciation policies is often presented as a testimony to more inclusive debate on multiple identities and loyalties in the nation states. The arguments challenging liberalisation of the multiple citizenship describe membership in a state as pivotal in conditioning loyalties and bonds with the nation state. This exclusive contract between the individual and the state is unattainable when duplicated with another state as it may result in split identities. The argument is frequently utilised in transitional or developing democracies, whereby the nation and state building processes often rest on the pillars of ethnicity. The counterargument, on the other hand, recognises liberalisation of the multiple citizenship as a positive development facilitating more effective integration of newly arrived or second and third generation immigrants, who are, as a result of this policy shift, able to participate in political community of their country of residence without compromising their inherited citizenship or cultural loyalties.

The dual citizenship debate stretches beyond the traditional matter of immigrants and refugees, it is particularly relevant to diaspora and national minority groups residing within the European Union.
borders, igniting what are often poignant responses from the member states. This juxtaposition is summarised by Wallace Goodman (2010) in the following paragraph:

Contrasting interpretations of citizenship, as well as varying levels of immigration across Europe and of interest in co-ethnic communities living abroad, help to account for the clustering of countries that require renunciation of prior citizenship and those that do not (Wallace Goodman 2010: 9).

The rather contentious discourses surrounding liberation of the multiple citizenship across the European Union, stress the diverse citizenship policies adopted by the individual nation states and the general lack of standardisation. Additional requirements forming part of the naturalisation procedures also vary greatly with some nation states requesting criminal or health checks, whilst others require financial guarantees including the financial resources to cover, where applicable, the often hefty naturalisation costs.

However, a new and important trend has recently emerged with the increasing number of nation states subscribing to citizenship tests including language proficiency, as Wallace Goodman explains ‘every adoption of citizenship tests in Western Europe has occurred only in the past decade’ (Wallace Goodman, 2010: 17). In their country profile case studies, Joppke (2007a, 2008 and 2010) and Wallace Goodman (2010) reviewed the extent to which the citizenship tests act as an obstacle to citizenship acquisition. In their analysis, both Joppke and Wallace Goodman conclude that the upsurge in citizenship tests, particularly in the Western European nation states, emphasises linguistic proficiency and in some instances cultural or historical knowledge, to fabricate applicant’s loyalty to the receiving state and ease the integration process. The nation states are frequently adopting a pro-active role in providing and instructing language testing and acquisition. In Germany for instance, the individual federal states, Länder, take responsibility for the implementation and content of the tests which differ from one federal state to another. Similarly, the Great Britain has in recent years adopted citizenship tests, including the linguistic and civic knowledge, with mock versions available freely online. Applicants who attend language training to improve their linguistic skills can attend civic education, as part of their training. Post-communist countries are no exception to the growing trend of citizenship tests, and they too require linguistic proficiency for all applicants, while only a few of these nation states also insist on the civic tests.

Wallace Goodman recognises the citizenship tests as rather positive, adding that ‘among the original EU-15 states, the argument for tests is clearly related to a perceived failure of past immigrant integration policies’ (Wallace Goodman, 2010:18). On the other hand, Joppke (2008b, 2010)
describes the tests as increasingly illiberal and restrictive, supporting his argument by using the examples from Germany, France or Holland. Joppke insists that the citizenship tests in some of the federal states in Germany are often used to assess candidate’s personal beliefs, character and opinions with questions aimed at religion, sexuality or gender equality, thus exploiting the power of the federal state’s authorities and targeting particular groups.

The so-called Gesprächsleitfaden (Interview Guideline used in Baden-Württemberg Lander in 2005 as part of naturalisation) originally applied only to citizenship applicants from member states of the Islamic League, thus discriminating against Muslim applicants for citizenship (Joppke, 2010: 2).

Consequently, the discord arising from the naturalisation policies and the citizenship tests in particular, present a case in point by underlining the lack of standardisation across contemporary Europe and the persistent hold of the nation states over the realm of citizenship policies. The complexity arising from this traditional relationship between the nation states and citizenship arrangements signals the persistence with which the protective mechanisms remain in place to maintain the homogenous character of the nation states. Nonetheless, these mechanisms are slowly changing in contemporary globalised world with the growing movement of people and their identities shifting between states. This challenge circumvents the traditional layers of the nation and state building processes, and ultimately brings out the pressing question of belonging in relation to citizenship and vice versa.

The debate thus far explored the dilemmas faced by the contemporary nation states, with emphasis on tangible aspects, particularly the principle of citizenship and its policies. However, the arguments presented also suggested the growing need to reach beyond the tangible aspects and connect them with the emotive elements of belonging. The aim of the analysis presented throughout this chapter was to set out a framework which can help in identifying the gap and general suspicion in the area of belonging and its fabrication, especially in relation to the second and third generation descendants of immigrants. The ultimate challenge lies in the very core of the nation states’ conventional *modus operandi*, with the nation and state building processes acting as agents to manufacture and maintain existing loyalties, whilst omitting the existence of new members or potential members who fail to match these traditional mechanisms. It is often assumed that their differences compromise their loyalties and even endanger the established culture of the state, thus making them less desirable as citizens. By the same token, the opposition claims that it is the second and third generation immigrants, who do not want to integrate and who resist any attempts made by the state authorities
for their inclusion. The dilemma addressed in this thesis is one of converging identities, whereby the role and access to citizenship and positive inclusion work in two phases. On one level, they form civic affiliation with the state, whilst on the other hand over a prolonged period of time, they organically result in belonging to the nation with multiple identities which may seem in odds, however, are constructed to such an degree that they complement one another. The challenge derives from the diverse nature of the two central concepts of citizenship and identity. The former is clearly defined and based along the lines of status, rights and duties, whilst the latter has a purely subjective and fluid character. Isin and Wood (1999) investigate the nature of identity notably with regards to its applicability:

Although identity can become a status concept, especially a social status, it should rather be thought of as the basis of recognition demanded by groups excluded from the scope of citizenship (Isin & Wood, 1999: 20).

Kymlicka and Parekh argue that citizenship can be extended to reflect identity disparities within a single nation state (Kymlicka 1995, 1998; Parekh 2000). Kymlicka (1995, 1998) explores citizenship alternatives in relation to minorities and immigrants, he refers to group-differentiated rights as one of the possible solutions. The rationale behind this model locates the state as a guardian of selected groups which have their rights and identities legally protected and incorporated into the society, both as individuals and as members of the particular group. Indeed, it is the membership in this state selected and protected group that enables the individuals to enjoy their rights and identities without further limitations. Despite its attractiveness Kymlicka’s argument has a number of flaws. Kymlicka develops his analysis for group-differentiated rights from cases such as Canada and Australia which are immigration states and historically and politically different from continental Europe where the relationship between the majorities and minorities is historically more complex and sensitive. Moreover, the group-differentiated rights can lead to divided communities and increasingly isolated pockets of culturally distinctive groups, rather than a cohesive society. Kymlicka is not clear how should states select those groups that require protection over the groups that do not, or which groups should have preference over others. In defence of his argument, Kymlicka asserts the disparity often practised under the ‘standard’ citizenship policies.

What is called common citizenship in a multination state in fact involves supporting the culture of the majority nation – for example, its language becomes the official language of the schools, courts, and legislatures, its holidays become public holidays (Kymlicka, 1998: 176).
It is evident that group-differentiated rights or citizenship in its traditional meaning can hinder as well as facilitate the sense of unity within a community. It is becoming increasingly apparent that despite renewed attempts to control citizenship inflow and create a more effective integration and naturalisation policies, it is more difficult to construct a shared sense of belonging and loyalty. In fact, formation of the emotional bond to one’s social and political community which is the primary aim of citizenship is also the ultimate challenge for any nation state. As Parekh (2000, 2004, 2008) and Yuval-Davis (2006) explain, belonging to a state and to a particular nation is a complex process, consisting of many layers.

One might enjoy all the rights of citizenship and be a formally equal member of the community, and yet feel that one is an outsider and does not quite belong to it if its cultural ethos and self-definition have no place for one (Parekh, 2000: 237).

Belonging is about emotional attachment, full acceptance and feeling at home, and justice, which is about rights and interests, satisfies only one of its preconditions (Yuval –Davis, 2006: 197).

Unlike citizenship which can be acquired, belonging is an emotive bond which is not easily reproduced. The sense of belonging denotes an invisible part of our lives and only becomes central to our existence during a war or another threat to our being, when loyalties and attachments play a vital role. In her work concerning belonging Yuval – Davis (2006) focused on a range of associations related to this emotional attachment.

The first level concerns social locations, the second relates to individuals’ identifications and emotional attachments to various collectivities and groupings and the third relates to ethical and political value systems with which people judge their own and others’ belongings (Yuval – Davis, 2006: 199).

As such, the politics of belonging centre on the discord between ‘us’ and ‘them’, or more precisely on who is in and who is out. In recent years, questions addressing belonging and citizenship as a promise of loyalty entered into the political debate. Fundamentally, this joint challenge concerns the dominant/home group as well as the minority and immigrant groups. It is imperative that the dominant group accepts new citizens as equal members of the society whilst the minority and immigrant groups ought to respect and value the civic principles of the nation state. This is a challenging task, frequently, minorities and immigrants have been targeted and blamed for worsening political and economic situation across the Western world, by right wing and more
worryingly some mainstream politicians and media. Simultaneously, terrorist attacks and armed conflict have been attributed to anti-Western militia or terrorist groups, threatening the existence of the Western world. The essence of a successful and harmonious community and the nation state lies in the nexus between one’s identity and citizenship, in other words one’s sense of belonging and loyalty to the state. Accordingly, states adopt a range of governance models such as assimilation, integration or multicultural politics as managing mechanisms in realisation of increasingly heterogeneous population. The following chapter will explore these models of managing ethnic relations and assess their success in practice with detailed focus on the multicultural framework as developed by Parekh. This framework will serve as a point of reference for remaining chapters and empirical research.

Summary

Identity is a complex and fluid concept, representing a principal part of our lives and affecting how we interpret and understand ourselves and the world around us. Theorising identity is a challenging task, requiring in-depth analysis and scrutiny of individual components conditioning identity formation. On the theoretical level these include a nation, nation state, nationalism and national identity. The relationship between identity and the state is a complex one with multiple facets which are by no means static. The intricate character of this arrangement is embedded within the political unity and cultural diversity of the ‘other’ which challenges the traditional concept of the homogenous nation state. Identity analysis, however, ought to stretch beyond the scope of theory and must be considered within the context of state and social interactions, taking into account citizenship acquisition, state policies emerging to cope with ethnic relations and the notion of belonging. The citizenship acquisition is increasingly civic, however, the path to attainment has gradually grown more convoluted, drawing on the concerns and question challenging the contemporary nation states. Concurrently, construction of the second and third generation identities circumvents the traditionally defined and constructed boundaries, loyalties and attachments, creating what are often recognised as hybrid identities.

The proposed hypothesis suggests that the role of citizenship and the pathways leading towards its acquisition condition identity formation of the second and third generation descendant communities. It is becoming increasingly apparent that despite the renewed attempts to control citizenship inflow and create a more effective integration and naturalisation policies, it is more difficult to construct a shared sense of belonging and loyalty. In fact, formation of the emotional bond to one’s social and political community which is the primary aim of citizenship is also the
ultimate challenge for any nation state. There is an apparent extrication pertaining to European Muslim identity and local populations, whereby the paradoxical nature of the contemporary multicultural nation state in the context of the globalised world striving to cope with its minority groups and cultures. The following chapter elaborates this issue in more detail and examines the multicultural framework developed by Parekh as a reference point for further research.
2. Governance in multicultural nation states

Introduction

The primary aim of this chapter is to reflect on the key approaches adopted by the nation states to manage the relationship between the majority and the minority, the individual and the state in the increasingly diverse societies. Namely, the chapter examines politics of assimilation, integration and pluralist models of governance, with special focus on multicultural politics and the role of the European Union particularly with regards to religion. This is by no means an exhaustive list of the governmental principal policies for managing identities and race relations within the contemporary nation states. While there are other forms of ethnic and race management, the chapter is limited to analysis of the three proposed key models of governance in our time. The three approaches present distinctive forms of governance, dependent on the historical and cultural trends and developments in the particular nation state.

Despite its recently acquired status as an oppressive practice of identity politics and associated with what are often deemed to be barbaric procedures, assimilation has been widely utilised by Western nation states throughout the centuries, playing a key role in conditioning identity construction and formation we see today.

Integration on the other hand, is frequently portrayed in contrast to assimilation as the culturally embrace and communities integrating approach, increasingly relevant after the atrocities committed by colonising powers and during the Second World War. The integration processes grew synonymous with governmental policies of liberal democracies and Western world, granting it a stamp of approval and legitimacy.

The multicultural approach, often referred to as pluralist model of governance, is most recent of the three models discussed, but is also most ambivalent and open to interpretation. The approach adopted in this thesis draws on Parekh’s work and is used as a framework informing theoretical and empirical sections of the research. The premise of this form of multicultural governance rests on cultural structures of the contemporary nation states, whereby as the name suggests, the aim is to maintain cultural autonomy of various groups within the civic unity. The recent backlash against multiculturalism in Europe is a tell-tale sign of the difficulties this relationship encounters from the individual communities but also the nation states.
2.1 Assimilation, integration and multicultural models of governance

Assimilation

In its literal sense, assimilation refers to the absorption of the ‘other’ into the dominant structure, or transforming of the ‘other’ to become a part of the dominant group. As May, Modood and Squires (2004) illustrate, historically assimilation has been a popular management strategy, and despite this previously wide use, has acquired a negative undertone over the last few decades. Examples of assimilation as a ‘major strategy to control differences’ are

... ‘the compulsory conversion of Jews and Moors in the wake of the Reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula, current version of assimilation is the American melting pot’ (May, Modood & Squires, 2004: 37).

By locating the sources of assimilation, the narrative becomes inherently concerned with defining elements of the nation state and its attempts to minimise cultural and social differences, whilst maintaining homogenous and culturally uniform population. Framing assimilation as a form of governance revolves around the principles of the dominant culture, whereby it absorbs cultural, linguistic and religious differences of minority and immigrant groups and compels these groups to embrace features of the dominant society and culture. The nation state is usually portrayed as forcing the minority and immigrant groups to assimilate, but it is important to recognise that this has not always been the case. In the past many immigrants wanted to be assimilated and it was not uncommon for newly arriving immigrants to change their names and deny where they came from.

As a process, assimilation aims to construct a mono cultural society, where the state fulfils the role of a provider but it is the minority groups who are responsible for their successful absorption into the society by adopting the prescribed normative values. In other words, as argued by Inglis (1996) politics of assimilation indicate that ‘no change is required by state legal, educational, welfare or health institutions (Inglis, 1996: 21).

The success often attributed to assimilation, which has been accepted as a more civilised method of managing ethnic relations in comparison to genocide or segregation, was in its perceived efficiency and quick results. However, it has become apparent that assimilation’s efficiency is short lived, precisely because the social and cultural attributes are deeply embedded within individual identities and cannot be simply replaced or overridden. The nation state’s efforts to assimilate minorities and immigrants are therefore debatable, particularly with regards to ethnic and religious identities which are almost impossible to fabricate (Abbas, 2007; Fleras, 2009). A renewed interest in identities,
belonging and the significance of identity politics, demonstrate the need for a more flexible approach of governance and management of ethnic relations, making traditional forms of assimilation practically obsolete.

The debate surrounding politics of assimilation is symbolic of the continuous tension between the unity and diversity which is replicated throughout the world. It would be premature to suggest that assimilation has vanished from the nation state’s governance, particularly since it is still a widely held belief that homogeneity encourages stability. Modood, Triandafyllidou & Zapata-Barrero (2006) suggest that there is a renewed interest in assimilation as an alternative to multicultural policies.

The governments of several ‘old’ immigration hosts like the Netherlands, Britain or France are tempted to adopt assimilationist approaches to counteract what they perceive as a (relative) failure of their former multicultural policies (Modood, Triandafyllidou & Zapata-Barrero; 2006: 1).

Nonetheless, assimilation in its conventional sense has become a rarity rather than the norm, often acting as a passing phenomenon in transitional political systems.

Integration

The integrationist form of governance emerged as a popular form of ethnic and cultural management in the aftermath of the two world wars and the subsequent decolonisation, after which the need and awareness for human rights amplified. The term integration has been widely used to refer to inclusion of different cultures and ethnicities alongside the dominant group. It is interesting to note that while in European terms integration suggests ideally a two-way process with the emphasis on the migrant becoming a member of the society, similar practice can be also located in the American form of the ‘melting pot’ which is often coined as a form of assimilation. Hence, the European integration shares similarities with the American assimilation. The emphasis on the ‘ideally a two way process’ stresses a key difficulty between the theory and practice. Integration implies a mutual respect, recognition and acceptance; this is misleading and in reality it is often a one-way process, resting on the immigrant’s effort to ‘integrate’ into the host society. In Parekh’s words integration ‘involves a particular way of incorporating outsiders into the prevailing social structure, and is sometimes either indistinguishable or only marginally different from assimilation’ (Parekh, 2008: 85).

However, focusing on the theoretical foundations of the integration processes and policies, it is worthwhile drawing on the comparison with the principle of segregation which similarly to
assimilation is often presented as the antithesis of integrationist policies. As a form of governance segregation maintains separation of communities in all aspects of their life, upholding bigotry and discriminating attitudes towards members from other groups, whilst integration as Jaret explains, ‘refers to a process whereby individuals interact as equals at all institutional levels through removal of discriminatory barriers and colour bars that divided and demeaned them (Jaret, 1995: 45). Under the mechanisms of integration, migrants and minorities ought to become integral part of the society despite their cultural differences, providing that their membership is based on mutual understanding of the overarching loyalty to the state and its civic institutions. As reiterated by Fleras, in terms of cohesion, it is essential that ‘integration is defined subsequently in terms of loyalty, participation, and adaptation’ (Fleras, 2009: 45). Thus, integration ought to enable migrants and minorities in terms of their organisational and cultural associations, whilst also providing them with the benefits of citizenship.

Despite its ideological proximity to some of the plural forms of governance such as multiculturalism, the two are not to be confused. Essentially, differences derive from within the expectations placed upon the minority and migrant groups during the integration processes whereby during the course of integration a uniform process is applied to all minority and migrant groups regardless their cultural or ethnic differences. Multicultural practices on the other hand, assume that a two-way individual approach should be applied to different communities taking into account their unique cultures, hence the name multicultural. Distinguishing between the integrationist and multicultural practices, Fleras offers a useful taxonomy of the two models:

Both are ultimately concerned with creating more inclusive governance, one that enhances minority participation, belonging, and equality without forsaking either the legitimacy of difference or commitment to national unity. On balance, however, multiculturalism may lean more toward the ‘difference’ in balancing difference – with – unity, whereas integration may emphasise the ‘unity’ in a unity – within – difference equivalence (Fleras, 2009: 47).

Drawing on this dichotomy, the subsequent section will reflect on analysis of the pluralist forms of governance and multicultural models in particular. The aim is to build a foundation for further discussion and framework which can underpin the empirical research in the latter chapters.
Pluralist governance - multicultural models

Parallel to integrationist policies, the pluralist paradigm represents an inclusive model of governance, whereby cultural individuality of migrants and minorities is accepted and embraced as part of the society by the state. Essentially, integration and pluralist governance such as multiculturalism are extension of one another and should be viewed and applied as such. Unlike the model of assimilation which identifies homogeneity as the nation state’s ultimate goal, pluralist governance is defined by heterogeneous societies and values. In essence, the theoretical and empirical backbone of this thesis rests on the multicultural form of governance and policies, specifically the multicultural typology as developed by Parekh. Thus, examination and detailed breakdown of multicultural models of governance will be central to this chapter.

The politics of multiculturalism emerged as a tailored approach seeking to manage the increasingly multi-ethnic relations within the nation states. Indeed, multiculturalism and its policies challenge the established order of the nation states by fostering heterogeneous communities, and as such offer a new vision of cultural and societal coexistence. For instance, in their study of Migration and Diversity in Europe, Vertovec and Wessendorf (2005) evaluate the trajectories of multicultural policies and the shifts in public perception of multicultural governance over time.

By the 1980s, many of the concerns around immigrants (now settled and considered ethnic minorities in many countries) and the growing cultural, linguistic and religious diversity they brought to receiving societies led to public measures that were subsumed under the broad rubric of ‘multiculturalism’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005: 2).

Multiculturalism today, however, generates a rather polemical debate often presenting contrasting views upholding multiculturalist policies as the saviour or the serpent of modern nation states. The concept of multiculturalism has been adopted by politicians, journalists, NGOs, and other state and non-state actors, drawing on its rather equivocal meaning and associations as they see fit. To some, multiculturalism is synonymous with community cohesion, cultural recognition and tolerance. To others, the concept represents platform for division of societies, ghettoization, and possibly a threat to national identity. The former understand multiculturalism as means of protecting and empowering diverse cultures, whilst the latter emphasise that maintaining heterogeneous communities may threaten national unity and community cohesion. This tension, as explained in the previous chapter, is characteristic of modern nation states pulled in different directions, encouraging cross border movement of people as well as protection and preservation of the domestic culture and
national unity. On the state level, this dilemma is manifested with growing discords between citizenship policies, naturalisation policies and belonging. The proposed argument suggests that multicultural policies solidify this environment of push and pull factors by combining what, for the modern nation states, often appears incongruent, diversity and unity. Today, some politicians, community leaders and scholars assert that we have reached a stage where multiculturalism has become redundant. As German Chancellor Angela Merkel and UK’s Prime Minister David Cameron declared in 2009, ‘multiculturalism has failed’ and subsequently ‘multiculturalism is dead’. In 2006 Britain’s Community and Local Government Secretary, Ruth Kelly explicitly stated the need for ‘a debate about who we are and what are we as a country’ adding the following:

I believe this is why we have moved from a period of uniform consensus on the value of multiculturalism, to one where we can encourage that debate by questioning whether it is encouraging separateness (Kelly speech on Integration and Cohesion at launch of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2006).

There is an on-going debate as to whether multiculturalism failed and should be replaced by other, possibly more assertive policies promoting national identity and belonging. Indeed, multiculturalism has been celebrated, rejected, and held responsible for increasing tensions within diverse communities. The role of this chapter which is underpinned by analysis of multicultural governance is therefore to evaluate the argument put forward by Parekh, suggesting that multicultural policies strengthen rather than undermine loyalties and attachment of the second and third generation Muslims to their countries of residence, which is a central argument of this thesis. In particular, the following discussion examines the degree to which have the policies of multiculturalism and the references attached to them, shaped identity formations and interactions between the minority and the majority groups and populations.

2.2 What is multiculturalism?

Symptomatic of the early stages of multiculturalism were high hopes and expectations presuming it could bring solutions to our increasingly diverse world. Indeed, in comparison to the previously popular paradigm of homogenous populations, multiculturalism embodies ethnic and cultural diversity. The multicultural ideal was short lived and gradually the parameters it set in place proved seemingly unsustainable in the current age of the nation states. In fact, it is paradoxical that in the world where the vast majority of the nation states consist of heterogeneous populations, multiculturalism is being charged with hindrance to community cohesion. What is striking, albeit perhaps is to be expected, is the national rhetoric surrounding state’s recognition of its own
multicultural population. A state and its society do not become multiculturalist by simply generating a narrative of multiculturalism whilst retaining ‘monocultural’ norms (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005).

This distortion of multiculturalism has far reaching consequences for its governance. Perhaps, it is the lack of clarity attributed to multiculturalism or its extensive use by competing actors, which contribute to its perceived downfall. The multicultural discourse has been simultaneously adopted by the media, politicians, and community leaders, all claiming their stake in multicultural politics. In response, researchers and scholars attempted to define and demystify multiculturalism and its policies within and beyond the social sciences. The following synopsis offered by Vertovec and Wessendorf (2005) provides a good starting point for a more in-depth analysis of the multiple facets of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism can variously be understood as i) a way of describing the actual makeup of a society; ii) a general vision of the way government and society should orient itself; iii) a specific set of policy tools for accommodating minority cultural practices; iv) specially created frameworks of governance allowing for the representation of immigrant and ethnic minority interests; and v) a variety of support mechanisms and funds for assisting ethnic minority communities to celebrate and reproduce their traditions (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005: 5).

Deriving from the outline provided by Vertovec and Wessendorf, it is evident that the uniform, one fits all approach is not pertinent as the concept of multiculturalism is too broad to be curbed by neatly arranged theories and definitions. Therefore the remainder of this chapter outlines some of the most frequently adopted practices of multicultural governance predominantly framed on Parekh’s work, whilst preparing ground for the subsequent chapters by elucidating multicultural policies of the case study nation states.

Analysis of multiculturalism as a political theory or a philosophical approach often discards its multifaceted character, referring predominantly to relations between diverse cultures. In response Parekh, one of the leading theorists on multiculturalism, points to multiple layers that need to be taken into consideration in order to grasp the complexity and meaning of the concept. It is essential to distinguish between the distinct cultural components which structure individual identities and shape the inward and outward facing perceptions of the world and other cultures. As such, Parekh is critical of certain aspects of liberalism which in his view discards significant values and concepts such
as family, community cohesion and solidarity which Parekh believes are embedded within the premise of multiculturalism. Thus, unlike the hypothesis suggested by the proponents of assimilation policies, founded on homogeneity and uniform culture, advocates of multiculturalism build their argument on the basis of open dialog with diverse cultures and the acceptance of cultural differences. This multiculturalist discourse, as proposed by Parekh (2000), contains three key areas which delineate its main characteristics and aims:

Human beings are culturally embedded in the sense that they grow up and live within a culturally structured world, organize their lives and social relations in terms of its system of meaning and significance, and place considerable value on their cultural identity (Parekh, 2000: 336).

a) Parekh implies that culture situates and frames parameters through which individuals perceive the world around them, and as such it is paramount to individuals’ existence and identity formation. This is not to suggest that identities and perceptions acquired through the native culture must be taken at a face value. On the contrary, Parekh insists that individuals ought to be encouraged to critically evaluate their cultural heritage and develop understanding of other cultures.

b) Distinct cultures have multiple interpretations, values, beliefs and practices. Each culture has something to offer but essentially each culture also has its limitations. Consequently, cultures should learn from each other as means to improve and expand their principles and ideals.

c) All societies are fluid and porous, open to different cultures and practices in a sense that they adopt and rewrite specific elements from outside traditions and cultures, and interpret them as their own (Parekh, 2000).

The researcher acknowledges that multiculturalism extends well beyond Parekh’s analysis (Fleras, 2009; Malik, 2009; Meer and Modood, 2008; Modood, 2005a, 2010; Nagle, 2009; Pitcher, 2009; Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005, 2010; West, 2004), but not only is it not possible to deal with multiculturalism in all its dimensions fully here, the focus of this thesis lies on Muslims’ perception of multicultural reality rather than in the analysis of it. Thus, multiculturalist framework presented by Parekh, which is often seen as the multiculturalist ideal, will be drawn upon throughout. It is essential, however, to provide a more in depth analysis, depicting the politics of multiculturalism and its governance to illustrate the imprint it has on identity developments and formations. Reflecting on Parekh’s efforts, scholars of politics of multiculturalism developed a comparative analysis and
paradigms of the doctrine further, some of which reinforce Parekh’s argument and thus are relevant to this thesis. Fleras (2009), for example, produced an excellent overview of multicultural governance in comparative perspective, where he defines different forms of multiculturalism, its policies and applications outside the formally approved structures. In comparison, typology designed by Parekh comes across as somewhat overly normative.

Governments (or states) around the world have capitalised on the principles of multiculturalism (however they may be defined) to construct official frameworks for advancing the social and the cultural without imperilling the national. Whereas an everyday or lived multiculturalism entails the mixing and merging (hybridizing) of cultural forms, an official multiculturalism (as state policy) often endorses a mosaic of fixed identities and identifiable ethnicities (Fleras, 2009: 5).

Central to this premise is the notion of multicultural multiplicity which varies to a great degree, particularly in areas of official-state multiculturalism and ideological multiculturalism. By and large, official or state multiculturalism aims to utilise procedures of ideological multiculturalism while also endorsing policies of the individual nation state. This process solidifies developments of a manifold multicultural prototype which differs from state to state. Consequently, central to multiculturalism’s existence is its capacity to deliver a peculiar arrangement whereby what may seem to be opposing aims and objectives, meet. Indeed, as outlined in preceding chapter theorising the nation states and in the proposed hypotheses on multicultural politics, it is precisely the multiple character of multicultural governance that makes it challenging for the nation states to adopt. Schlesinger, for instance, describes the multicultural conundrum as ‘managing difference by making society safe from diversity politics and the politics of difference while making society safe for diversity and difference’ (Schlesinger, 1991: 279). Schlesinger’s analogy suggests that the nation states employ state multiculturalism as a normative instrument for implementation of policies and regulations essential for the management of inter-ethnic relations.

This means that the official or state multiculturalism serves as a connecting device or a bridge between the ideal that ought to be achieved to accommodate and manage different cultures, as described by Parekh, and interests of the dominant nation, as represented by the state’s homogenising tendencies described in the previous chapter. In other words, official multiculturalism is often a crossing post or a half way house between the theory and practice. Fleras maintains this pragmatic view by proclaiming that ‘national and vested interests are counterbalanced by a commitment to social equality and cultural recognition, although, paradoxically, the attainment of
these commitments may consolidate patterns of control’ (Fleras, 2009: 7). In their study of Australian multiculturalism and the majority – minority relations, Vasta and Castles (1996) arrived to a rather sceptical conclusion observing that multiculturalism as a form of governance often acts as an instrument of authority and serves to enhance power of majority over the minorities.

As public policy, multiculturalism is concerned with the management of cultural differences. It is this apparently innocuous objective that all the ambivalence of multiculturalism arises; it is simultaneously a discourse of pacification and emancipation, of control and participation, of the legitimation of the existing order and of innovation (Vasta and Castles, 1996: 48).

Subscribing to arguments put forward by Parekh, Fleras or Vasta and Castles, the major drawbacks of multiculturalism derive not only from its complexity but also from the multiplicity of its policies, with striking cross country differences all falling under the multicultural rubric. What is less prevalent in these arguments, perhaps with the exception of Parekh, is the unison with the nation state as a political actor. Fleras and Vasta and Castles recognise multiculturalism as a double edged sort because of its vulnerability to exploitation by the state. To this end, the nation state uses multiculturalism as an agent to control and manage its minorities. What this argument does not address, are the conditions leading to this particular process or other forms of relationship between the two actors, as for instance in the case of Great Britain. This, as argued throughout the thesis, is the ultimate debate of contemporary nation states moving between diversity and unity. Solution to this conundrum is perhaps best answered by the traditional approach of the nation states to the ‘other’ which as described in previous chapter is still prevalent among most nation states. More negative approach towards the ‘other’ is often associated with the ethnic nation states, however, the civic nation states are no exception to this trend. It is here that Parekh’s ‘ideal’ multiculturalism falls short. Parekh understands and develops his multicultural typology along the civic lines as his definition of national identity is a civic one, or akin to the civic identity, whereas national identity is by nature limited to the ‘owner of the state’ – the dominant group. Settler societies and states with history of incoming migration, such as Canada, Great Britain or the United States are more resistant to ethnic tendencies and usually develop a more inclusive and civic multicultural policies, but by no means are they immune to the ethnic concept of national identity. Analysis and taxonomy of multicultural societies can facilitate a better understanding of the nation states’ choices leading to particular form of multicultural governance. Hence, before proceeding to the typology of multicultural governance, the following section will aim to evaluate and categorise multicultural societies.


2.3 Multicultural societies

The tragic events of the Second World War resulted in the creation of new states, cross-border movement of people and subsequently the rise of anti-colonial movements and ideological divisions, leading to the growing economic and political migration, whereby the nation states were becoming increasingly multinational and/or multiethnic. In the midst of these events, new forms of governance were devised across the Western world as mechanisms coping with this growing phenomenon which is in many respects deemed unnatural for the traditional nation state. It was in this context of increasingly mixed societies that multiculturalism was born. For multicultural and political theorists, to understand the complexity of the multinational and multiethnic nation states, it is essential that individual minority groups are accurately classified, as it is precisely their status that should determine their rights. Clearly, there is a distinction between ethnic and national minorities; irrespective of their differences both groups share minority status which also makes them culturally or socially different from the majority or the dominant group within the state. Harris (2009) provides a useful framework distinguishing between the two categories.

National minority is usually reserved for an established minority that claims minority rights in order to preserve their status (the language rights, other collective rights, territorial autonomy, and so on) such as the Hungarians in Romania or the Catalans in Spain, whilst an ethnic minority could also subsume migrants (Harris, 2009: 121).

Indeed, ethnic minorities are often transformed over an extended period of time into national minorities, for instance Turks in Germany; hence, states may comprise either ethnic and/or national minorities with most nation states containing a mix of both. In fact, majority of the nation states today are not only multinational and multiethnic but fundamentally also multicultural. A multicultural state, as the name suggests, compromises multiple cultures within one shared territory, as Roy explains, ‘in most societies there is a dominant, even hegemonic culture and a cluster of minority groups’ (Roy, 1999: 56). The archetypal multicultural states have traditionally been settler and immigrant societies such as Australia, United States or Canada, in addition to states with colonial history such as France, Great Britain or Portugal which attracted many former subjects after the break-up of their empire or independence of their colonies. At present, economic and historical developments as well as forces of globalisation play pivotal role shifting the traditional homogeneous composition of the nation states.
The analysis of multicultural diversity introduced by Parekh (1999) illustrates a triadic model of cultural dissimilitude with the majority of multicultural societies containing all three elements identified in his study. Parekh opens his argument on cultural diversity with the least problematic of the groups, often characteristic for members of the dominant culture who to a degree challenge established norms and traditions of their own society, such as homosexuals or transvestites. The second group also signifies members of the dominant society, who however, are strongly opposed to some of its cultural aspects or values and seek to correct and regulate them, for instance, Parekh illustrates this with the example of feminists. Last of the categories constructed in Parekh’s framework includes cultural minorities which are the most volatile and problematic for the dominant culture. Indeed, it is this last category of Parekh’s analysis that is the focal point of this thesis. These cultural minorities include ethnic and national minorities, who are often defined by their cultural or ethnic differences, however, are irrespectively of their internal diversity identified by Parekh as one group. Active organisation of this group revolves around its distinctive character, intending to preserve and secure its unique culture including the rituals, traditions and language.

As a result of their multicultural character, it is increasingly more complicated for the nation states to accommodate and manage their diversity without compromising their unity. The initial impulse leading to the birth of the nation states was solidified by the ideal of one state for one nation where belonging and national identity were easily definable. In multicultural setting, however, the mechanisms of belonging and national identity are construed and conditioned by other factors which significantly alter the traditional nation states’ paradigm. Reflecting on Parekh’s (1999) in-depth investigation of contemporary national identity in multicultural nation states, he identifies three principal components that ought to be embedded into the political and community structures to endorse national identity. These components reinforce Parekh’s understanding of national identity in civic terms:

1. The first component is primarily focused on political community and its bodies.

2. The second element centres on the conduct in which the political community reflects on itself and is perceived by its members which is also known in words of Anderson as ‘imagined community’ (1991). Parekh asserts that ‘political communities are highly complex entities, involving millions of people the individual member has never seen, but for whom he or she is expected to pay taxes, make sacrifices, and even die’ (Parekh, 1999: 67).
3. The third aspect of Parekh’s structure relates to the individual’s affiliation with his/her own community which is reinforced and fabricated by national symbols, myths, traditions and culture.

The role of national identity is of paramount importance to any nation state where it is frequently recognised not only as the guardian of the nation, but crucially also as an identity measurement distinguishing members of one nation from another. For Parekh, the function of national identity has, however, an additional and a more complex layer within the multicultural context which is inherently civic and connected to an all embracing political community. The political community must be not only inclusive but in effect must reflect interests of the collective and public as a whole without preferential conduct for the majority culture. This argument is largely based on Parekh’s assumption that minority cultures are imperil by the dominant society. This is certainly the case in some circumstances, but it should not be merely dismissed as the norm. Increasingly, there are initiatives aimed at protection of cultural minorities which in some instances, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, head in contra-direction to Parekh’s observations whereby a selected minority culture becomes accommodated at the expense of other perhaps less organised minorities such as Hungarians in Slovakia who are well organised and have strong representation unlike Roma minority groups who are often ignored by the state. Secondly, Parekh argues that while recognising that multicultural society is a mosaic of different cultures, it is essential that the society as a whole understands its multicultural character and that it values all communities and its members regardless their cultural background. The society and the state are obliged to embrace members’ multiple identities and loyalties, and under no circumstances should these members be forced to choose one form of identity over another. Therefore national identity incorporates all of its citizens regardless of their cultural background, implying that the definition of national identity is all inclusive - civic. As examples from Europe demonstrate, this poses a substantial challenge for the nation states. Croatia for instance clearly stipulates in its constitution that the Croat nation state is for Croat people whereby explicitly excluding any non-Croats from membership. Yet, Croat legislation is largely multicultural and thus brings into question the overly civic national identity incorporated into Parekh’s analysis.

Moreover, the investigation of religious affiliation in Europe illustrates that for most part Europe discarded religious dominance in public sphere with the state extensively detached from any religious affairs. Nonetheless, Christian values and principles left a long-lasting imprint and are deeply embedded within the cultural and social realm of European society as exemplified with national traditions and holidays. The relationship with religion is still somewhat muffled and often buried within the nation state’s secular rhetoric. There is an element of unease or limitation should
the state be publicly involved in religious affairs, hence the European fixation on the religion/state separation. In other words, as part of the liberal democracy politics, European democracies have always tried to separate the church from the state. A shift towards more inclusive approach has been detected in recent past and the division between the state and the church is in some cases becoming less profound, for instance in Slovakia, Poland or Croatia. In spite of this closing gap, Europe differs from the non-Western nation states where the religion and the state have a more symbiotic relationship. The emergence of European nation states, following the French revolution acted as a stimulus for Europe’s largely secular profile, establishing a normative division which has not been officially challenged. In contrast, as Burrell explains, the state/religion relationship in predominantly Muslim states is based on the premise that ‘the purpose of government is to implement the teachings of the faith’ (1989: 9). Parekh recognises these religious differences, however, he argues that individuals should be permitted to maintain their cultural and religious heritage without any threat to their civic national identity.

Achieving an all-inclusive national identity within the multicultural society is evidently challenging, nonetheless, it is an even more daunting task to accomplish the emotive bond which is expressed in a shared sense of belonging. Undoubtedly, cultural differences may result in community tensions where some members disapprove of the cultural traditions practiced by fellow citizens which might indeed undermine community relations. In Parekh’s view to fabricate a sense of belonging, it is pivotal that the nation states abandon the traditional concept of ethnic relations and instead cultivate a form of belonging formulated along the civic lines, parallel to integration and loyalty to the state. Ideally, it is the loyalty to political community, fellow citizens, and the state as a whole, rather than the sentiment of kinship and blood relations, that maintain the sense of belonging in multicultural societies. Yet, so far no one state has actually achieved it fully. Factors conditioning this shared attachment or belonging stem from the civic and cultural acceptance whereby members of the state pledge loyalty to the civic community and in return the community accepts them irrespective of their cultural or ethnic background. This mutual recognition is essential in forging relations and by the same token is the most problematic for contemporary multicultural societies to achieve.

The anxiety surfaces from within the deeply entrenched attribute of the nation states - the claim for ultimate loyalty and cultural uniformity of its members. In other words, there is a suspicion of anyone who does not belong or conform to the dominant culture. As long as the nation states do not reflect their multicultural composition with governance, policies, legislation and social provisions,
manufacturing of shared belonging will be severely hindered. In the absence of these provisions, it is questionable to what degree can the simple categorisation of citizenship forge shared belonging.

Addressing the issue of belonging and acceptance, the EU has transcended the nation states on some levels and adopted a number of internationally agreed legal provisions protecting its citizens and their freedoms including the right to freedom of religion which is of primary concern for this thesis. These provisions comprise the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights including its preambles to the Substantive Right to Freedom of Religion or Belief, and the Right to Freedom of Association and the Non-discrimination on the Basis of Religion or Belief. In addition to this extensive list, the European Union implemented two principal documents which have been, in their own right, revolutionary in the provision for religion and religious affiliation in the EU: The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms and The Treaty of Lisbon.

The European convention is one of the most important legally binding documents in the history of the European Union. It guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion within the framework of liberal democratic principles and prohibits any form of sexual, racial or religious discrimination. As stipulated under the Article 9:

Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others (Council of Europe, 2010)

Article 9 is complemented by Article 11 which refers to freedom of association and assembly. Building upon the reference to religious freedom within the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is Declaration on the Status of Churches and Non-confessional Organizations in Declaration Number 11 to the last act of Treaty of Amsterdam. Notwithstanding its comprehensive character, Article 9 and Article 11 of the European Convention as well as the Declaration Number 11 of the Treaty of Amsterdam have been criticized for their normative references to legislation of the member nation states. In this instance, the national legislation provides a precedent to be complemented rather than challenged by the EU’s legislation,
thus protecting the sovereignty of individual nation states. This implies that the faith communities are to be primarily managed by the nation states whilst role of the European Union remains neutral, respecting national sovereignty.

On the other hand, Treaty of Lisbon has from its early stages assumed a somewhat controversial position. Deemed by most member states as reducing sovereign powers of the nation states, the treaty entered into force after what can be described as a hesitant ratification on 1st December 2009. The Treaty of Lisbon approached and grasped the significance of faith organisations in a bold and innovative manner whereby as stated in its preamble, it stresses the importance of ‘the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe’ (Treaty of Lisbon, 2009). Indeed, references to God or specifically to Christianity were endorsed by some of the member states during drafting of the treaty, with final consensus on preserving religious and cultural neutrality of the preamble. The European Union adopted a universal approach by encouraging participation of organised faith communities, hence publicly managing and recognising their importance whilst regulating the realm of religious influence and protecting the boundaries between the state and the church.

Attempts by the EU to develop a common legal framework towards religion have been investigated in detail by Doe (2010) who maintains that the Lisbon Treaty is remarkably inclusive in relation to faith groups and religious representation. According to this analysis, Lisbon Treaty acknowledges and supports the contribution of churches and other religious organisations to Europe. The novelty of the Lisbon Treaty is embedded in this largely unbiased approach towards different religions, whereby as stated in its documentation ‘the Union must respect religious diversity’ (European Union Reform Treaty, 2007: Article 22), and in particular in article 15b.1 which states ‘the Union respects and does not prejudice the status under national law of churches and religious associations or communities in the member states’ (Doe, 2010:143). It is under these provisions that the EU acknowledges diverse cultural and religious identity of the European civil society, and thus the importance of maintaining an open dialog with representative faith communities and organisations. In fact, the treaty reaches beyond the anticipated level of the EU’s commitment by actively promoting and facilitating dialog with the faith groups.

The EU’s largely neutral approach enables growth of diverse religious organisations and grants them a comparatively salient position within the secular European Union. However, references to European Union’s ties with religious groups are still predominantly confined to Christian faith groups
whilst associations with minority religions, and Muslim organisations and Islam in particular are somewhat problematic.

Reflecting on these dimensions, the following section investigates the role of religion in multicultural societies and within the EU as a whole, and the multiple forms of multicultural governance in Europe with the emphasis on republican, liberal and plural forms of governance. This taxonomy also provides useful reference point for further research into the selected case studies of Great Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.

2.4 Governance in multicultural states

To understand multicultural politics of the contemporary nation states and to detangle the complexities of multiculturalism, this section reflects on the role of religion in multicultural societies including the EU which is essential to the research analysis presented in this thesis, and the three principal forms of multicultural governance – republican model sometimes referred to as conservative, liberal model and plural model, as identified by Fleras (2009), Kymlicka (1995) and Parekh (2000). The typology is by no means exhaustive, as Rex (2004) explains there are different varieties of multiculturalism and it is merely impossible to analyse them all in one chapter. This particular classification, however, enables comparative analysis of the three most common forms of multicultural governance in Europe, highlighting their applicability and implications on the individual nation states and identity formation. In return, the outlined discourse of multicultural governance enables a better understanding of religion, identity, citizenship and issues of belonging in contemporary multicultural nation states. Ultimately, the questions underpinning analysis of the multicultural governance inquire to what degree, if at all, ought to diverse cultures become intertwined, remain isolated and detached, or subsumed into the dominant culture. Further concern centres on the degree to which the diverse cultures mix, or on the contrary are permitted to abstain from elements of the dominant culture, and what rules apply in this respect. Does cultural homogeneity generate barriers amongst the individual cultures or equality entrenched in exclusion? Answers to these questions provide a key to reading policy choices of the individual states and trajectories of identity formation of cultural minorities as described by Parekh.

It has also far reaching implications for the intra-state relations within Europe, the European Union and the European minority communities. The friction between the European nation states and the minority groups often emanates from failed expectations and from the division between the public and the private spheres. Nonetheless, in the contemporary Europe interactions with minority
communities are no longer confined to the domain of the nation state. The EU is grafted onto the traditional European nation states (Laffan, 1996), modifies and transforms trading arrangements, regional development initiatives and legislative provisions for minority protection, human rights, freedom of expression and religion. All of which are intrinsically linked to the question of multicultural societies, minority integration, accommodation and identity construction. The following section explores some of the characteristics of multicultural governance in more detail, starting with the role of religion followed by the individual models of multicultural governance. The connection between identity developments and forms of governance will be investigated further in the empirical section which will test possible correlation with Muslim perceptions of the EU and the specific forms of governance.

Religion in multicultural societies and the European Union

Drawing on the work of Willaime (2010), this section will consider some of his main arguments examining developments of *laïcité* and the subsequent secular character of the contemporary Europe. The European Union is as a secular supranational organisation adherent to the principle of *laïcité*. The exact meaning of the term *laïcité* is contested and within the European Union itself there are disputes over what it actually means to embrace the *laïcité* way of thinking. Diversity of the European Union is projected into its policies and decision making processes including discourses on the role of religion where the different nation states, influenced by their own traditions and histories, have distinct interpretations of *laïcité* and the position of religion within the public sphere. In the aftermath of the French revolution a new partition has been erected disaggregating the state from the church, and thus laying claim to the principle of *laïcité* which has transformed European politics and the EU. The exact meaning of *laïcité* has proved rather difficult to translate from the French origin to most European languages albeit there is a consensus that the broad understanding corresponds to secularism.

In contrast, definition of religion is widely accepted and universal, however, once the terminology unravels to comprise individual beliefs, it opens up to subjective and contested interpretations. For the present purpose the definition of religion will derive from the General Comment No. 22, Article 18, Paragraph 2 of the UN Human Rights Committee 1993 as follows:

> Article 18 protects theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to profess any religion or belief. The terms belief and religion are to be
broadly construed. Article 18 is not limited in its application to traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics or practices analogous to those of traditional religions. The Committee therefore views with concern any tendency to discriminate against any religion or belief for any reasons, including the fact that they are newly established, or represent religious minorities that may be the subject of hostility by a predominant religious community (United Nations Human Rights Committee, 1993).

Division of politics and religion although widely applied across Europe varies from state to state. France is often regarded as an architect of the laïcité concept where the complete and ultimate separation of the state and the church is deeply embedded within the state apparatus. In comparison, as Willaime (2010) explains, it is not unusual to find references to God in the foundational state documents of the other European nation states namely Germany, Ireland and the UK, while some states also maintain close links with established religious groups. The tendency to select one, usually the ‘home’ religion as a recognised state partner, is common amongst the nation states with strong religious roots, for instance Germany, Italy or Spain. This exclusivity which complements the state / religion alliance often prevents the smaller or less prominent religions such as Islam or Judaism from forming closer partnership with the state. The success but also downfall of Judaism in Europe has been that Jews have not looked for partnership with the state but they also kept their religion within the private sphere, this is with the exception of Israel, of course. Islam on the other hand, is more problematic for the Western states because the state / religion division does not exist and as such it represents a challenge for the established structure of the European nation states. This is all the while the separation of the state and church across Europe is undoubtedly inconsistent. Willaime uses the comparison with France to emphasise the subtle nuances of European laïcité reaching beyond the French model.

If one quite simply associates laïcité with the French system of regulating religion (the law of 1905 separating church and state) and with the relationship between state and religion as it has been historically constituted in France, it is immediately easy to conclude that Europe is not secular (Willaime, 2010:19).

Willaime’s argument framing the European principle of secularism or laïcité is removed from the original French model, instead in his view, secularism in Europe enjoys a rather regulatory role where it transforms and facilitates the freedom of religious affiliation. Equally, it permits for a
flexible and individual national approach towards religion and its role in a national framework and public sphere. In other words, Willaime’s taxonomy of European laïcité is essentially founded on the reciprocal understanding of the state and the church, entering into a mutually convenient partnership. One can conclude that Christianity, as the dominant religion in Europe, altered from its traditional role to one of a social construct, adopting a new position within the contemporary nation states, eroding the relationship between politics and religion as depicted by the thinkers of Enlightenment. As the nation state transforms, challenged by the increasingly globalised world, so does religion complements this shift by servicing additional social frameworks in the private sphere.

Indeed, the European Union’s approach to religion mirrors this notion of partnership and recognition, whilst on the national level liaison between the two structures often depends on historical developments, political context and social realities with the individual states increasingly favouring one dominant religion over the others. To put it simply, European principle of laïcité on the national level refers to two parallel processes: on one hand, it moderates the role of religion in politics by forming mutually beneficial partnerships between the state and the dominant religion, and on the other hand, it guarantees religious freedom in the private sphere. Thus, what at a first glance appears as a clear division between the state and religion, on a closer inspection resembles a carefully managed alliance reflecting the needs of the contemporary nation states. This shift is perhaps less dramatic than what some of the national rhetoric would lead us to believe, confirming Willaime’s view that the French take on the principle of laïcité is an exception rather than the norm.

The relationship between the authorities and the church has been, within the European Union, formalised by a number of legally binding treaties, developing a new paradigm by which religion becomes institutionalised in a normative framework without necessarily compromising authority of the state or the Union. The European Union actively engages with selected religious representatives who are encouraged to participate in a political dialogue and the process of Europeanization as well as support the position of the EU within the individual nation states, hence the emphasis on partnership. Foret (2010) examines the nexus between the European Union and religious organisations, insisting that the European Union draws in particular on the authority and respect religion acquires within the civil society. In fact, in his analysis Foret refers to the democratic deficit attributed to the EU’s institutions arguing that as the Union aims to rebuild relationship with its citizens it utilises links with selected religious organisations to mobilise civil society. In return, some of the established religious organisations working with the European Union galvanise public support for EU’s specific policies and initiatives. For example, the Catholic Church in Hungary and Poland
actively supported the European Union membership of both countries. Thus, the preliminary classifications rejecting any substantial influence of religious organisation ignore the prominence religion can mobilise within the civil society. In contrast, the Western scholarly literature often reminds its readers that the role of religion can be easily amplified, therein as captured by Foret (2010) the power of religion as a political device refers to the individual level rather than acting as a force of public mobilisation. Drawing on this argument, the terminology adopted by Foret categorises religion as a homogenous concept, inherently confined to the institutionalised Western Christian tradition, ignoring other religious traditions such as Islam, Judaism and Hinduism, which as will be explained, do not necessarily correspond to Foret’s taxonomy.

Recognising the importance of religion and religious diversity of European population, the European Union re-visited the importance of open dialog with other religions than Christianity. The initial aim was to establish an official framework where the diverse religious groups could participate in a political debate and populist discourses. Unfortunately, this ambitious project was never properly launched and religious discourses remain to a great degree within the remit of the nation states. There are several possible explanations for this salient division, largely confined to what is recognised as an economic and trade position of the European Union, preventing the EU from greater involvement in what is understood as a domain of the nation states. Most successful with regards to religious organisations is the European Parliament (EP) which fosters participation of institutionalised faith communities in European politics, even if its enthusiasm is often dampened by the defensive approach of the religious organisations. Frequently, it is the case that faith communities lobby in the European Parliament simply to safeguard their position within the domestic politics. In response to this challenge, the European Union encourages transformative approach by shaping religious organisations into the structured units which are subsequently recognised as possible partners within the civil society. This multifaceted relationship is sealed by a series of legislative arrangements instigated by the EU with the knock on effect on member states. Some of these provisions have transformed the dialogue between the European Union and faith communities, thus challenging the established boundaries of nation state sovereignty and influence. However, despite the pressure from the European Union, the nation states retain the lead on minority issues including religious and cultural accommodation of various community groups. Within this context the following sections highlight the different state approaches to multicultural societies with the most prominent being republican, liberal and plural models of governance.
‘Republican’ model of multicultural governance

The republican model of multicultural governance resembles the traditional liberal ideal separating the state from the church and is perhaps best illustrated by the French republican system and to a degree the American politics of the ‘melting pot’, both of which are understood to contain elements of assimilation. The framework is underpinned by the notion of equality whereby all members of the society have their right to be accepted as equal citizens, hence, the tenet of non-exclusion, or rather the ultimate inclusion, is essential for this form of multicultural governance. In other words, the underlying principle of the republican model rests on the premise of equality uniformly applied across all cultures and communities without exemptions or opt outs. Indeed, the republican multiculturalism could be dismissed as a homogeneous paradigm, however, on closer observation it becomes apparent that amidst the facets of uniformity there are nuances of diversity and thus capacity for some flexibility. Tolerance for cultural differences is deliberately and exclusively situated within the private domain, which is a standard liberal democracy idea, in order to prevent any preferential treatment from hindering equality. Fleras (2009) explains this bewildering unison between diversity and unity with the following:

Cultural differences are tolerated and their support is conditional: they must comply with mainstream values, cannot be employed to justify reward or recognition, must not block the rights of others because such intolerance is intolerable in a tolerant democracy, cannot define the content of public space, and can persist so long as everyone agrees to disagree by being different in the same way (Fleras, 2009: 14).

In principle, this implies that all members of the state should be guaranteed equal distribution of resources regardless their ethnicity, race or religious beliefs. Subsequently, the notional elements of the republican model are embedded in successful governance of different cultures integrated by an overarching umbrella of the state and its dominant culture. The principal concept for this model is therefore founded on the premise that diverse cultures can live in harmony under one polity, provided that they dispose of their cultural differences for the welfare of the society as a whole. The more porous the republican model is, the more flexible becomes its perception of diversity, opening of the equality debate and supporting a more adaptable approach, albeit, under no circumstances can it obstruct equal participation of all members.
Notionally, the republican multicultural model can be, at its face value, identified as an ideal for contemporary world, proposing equal standing for settled immigrants turned migrants and minorities with state’s discretion preserving their culture within the private sphere. Moreover, the republican multicultural governance caters for the home or the dominant society by establishing its culture as the all-embracing entity within the public sphere. While successful in theory, when applied into practice the model reveals major flaws. The obligatory adoption of the dominant culture with minority cultures set aside into the private sphere is the most conspicuous critique. In fact, the paradigm of the republican multicultural governance is founded on the assumption that the dominant culture will in somewhat apathetic manner absorb outside cultures and their members, whilst manufacturing a shared sense of belonging and equality for members of the home culture as well as the newcomers. It is rather absurd to presume that ethnic, national or religious identities can be dispensed into the depths of our solitude without any form of public manifestation, in such unproblematic and painless way. More scrutiny of the republican model begs the question of possible cultural domination, as illustrated by the French example where it is assumed that the French culture is adopted by all citizens within the public domain, excluding minority cultures from any public recognition.

*Liberal model of multicultural governance*

Second approach to cultural diversity adopted by the nation states is a liberal model of multicultural governance which is most popular with the European nation states. In contrast to republican multiculturalism, the liberal model is conditioned by associations between the state and the individual, in particular between national identity and the citizen, or as Fleras argues ‘the principle of unity and equality within difference and diversity’ (Fleras, 2009: 14). Kymlicka, one of the leading scholars on the liberal approach maintains that the fundamental principle contributing to the complete and fulfilled human life is autonomy. This is illustrated further in Parekh’s auxiliary analysis of Kymlicka’s approach.

Kymlicka does not argue that the autonomy is desirable because it expresses our moral nature or leads to individuality, progress, discovery of moral truths, or happiness, but rather that it is a necessary condition of the good life (Parekh, 2000: 99).

Comprehensive analysis of this argument reveals that culture is essential particle of personal autonomy and therefore indispensable facet of one’s identity. Culture determines our values and judgements, endorses views we hold of ourselves and others, and helps to interpret the world
around us. Most importantly, culture provides us with identity and attachment, distinguishing us and those from our group from the others. In his synopsis, Kymlicka identifies culture as attached to the joint social and political community, residing in a clearly defined territory with unique language and shared history. Culture then becomes associated with sets of institutions and laws, adopting characteristics of the nation and its people, *en masse*. Parallel to this understanding, Kymlicka insists that ‘culture should be judged primarily in terms of its ability to provide its members with meaningful and worthwhile options and cultivate their capacity for individual autonomy’ (Kymlicka 1995: 101). It is precisely this argument that forms backbone of the approach. By suggesting that culture is essential to individual’s wellbeing, the model enables cultural porosity and interchange where cultures discover and learn from each other. This also forms part of the argument put forward by Fleras (2009) outlining the key aspects of the liberal model.

1. The dominant culture is prepared to tolerate diversity and embrace viable aspects of other cultures. This argument is in line with Kymlicka’s proposition of cultural exchange and consolidates the liberal character of this paradigm.

2. Minorities are permitted to identify with culture of their choice devoid of discrimination or peril in the private and public domain.

3. A two layered approach towards minorities is adopted. On one hand, minorities ought to be treated equally irrespective of their diverse cultures and differences from the majority. On the other hand, minorities require flexible approach, precisely because of their diversity.

The typology proposed by Fleras underlines a key problem entrenched within the liberal model of multicultural governance which is the paradox of equality and the differentiated treatment. The dilemma of liberal multiculturalism reflects this tension, seeking to identify circumstances under which the flexible and individual approach renders cultural acceptance. Hence, the essential principle of the liberal multiculturalism is to maintain and facilitate a dialogue between equality and difference whereby diversity is accounted for, and the aim is to circumvent discrimination based on the principle of cultural neutrality and uniformity. Parekh asserts that institutional and legal provisions can be adapted to support this form of ‘equality’:

Laws may legitimately grant exemptions to some groups and not others, political institutions may find ways of giving adequate representation or greater autonomy to marginalized or alienated groups (Parekh, 2004: 201).
In spite of the cultural porosity embedded within the liberal multicultural governance, there is an inevitable level of selectiveness suggesting that dominant cultures assess and embrace only those elements of minor cultures they deem suitable. This also presumes that the dominant culture in question is a neutral actor and can observe and select aspects of the other cultures without prejudice and bias. It is precisely this argument that can be identified as one of the main drawbacks in Kymlicka’s framework. By assigning a superior role to the dominant culture it is encouraged to embrace cultural selectivity and thus consider merely those traditions and practices from within the minority cultures that are deemed equal or progressive enough for the dominant culture to support. Some dominant cultures grow increasingly protective and inward looking in the fear of possible cultural heterogeneity and identity crises, thus preventing cultural exchange particularly with minority cultures sharing territorial space. In his observations, Kymlicka explains this cultural protectionism as part of the liberal discourse whereby ‘most liberal are liberal nationalists as the freedom they demand is not the freedom to move beyond one’s history and culture, but rather to move within it’ (Kymlicka, 1995:93; Parekh, 2000).

Returning to the relationship between the culture and autonomy, Kymlicka identifies two possible trajectories available to the nation states restricted by the composition of their societies and cultures. He distinguishes between multinational states with national minorities which are in most cases located in a particular area and represent long established or aboriginal groups, and polyethnic states where the minorities are more or less immigrants who enter the country voluntarily, often in pursuit of a better life.

Kymlicka considers this distinction of multinational and polyethnic states essential for comprehensive understanding of liberal multiculturalism. Based on this premise, he asserts that the majority enjoys relative cultural hegemony and determines the level of cultural inclusiveness affecting its minorities. In return, minorities who are conditioned by their minority status have the right to independent representation. Accordingly, assimilation as a possible mechanism of ethnic relations management is excluded from Kymlicka’s analysis mostly for its ignorance of the minority culture, which is in his view paramount to successful and productive life. As an alternative, Kymlicka proposes additional approach founded on two principles of liberal multiculturalism, the ‘non-discrimination’ principle and the ‘group rights’ model based on the multinational or polyethnic character of the state.

The non-discrimination principle reflects elements of the republican model of multicultural governance where cultural heritage and traits can be expressed freely, however, are confined
entirely to the private domain whilst the role of the state is strictly detached from any cultural bias. The emphasis is on the non-involvement of the state at all cost, and subsequently the culture and the state do not interact. This is fundamentally problematic; inevitably democratic nation states will be, as a result of their political structure, prone to make some allowances, thus breaking the culturally unbiased position and making decisions which may act as a precedent eventually becoming part and parcel of the legislative system guiding and affecting minorities.

In reverse, under the rubric of group rights model, the state transpires to be actively involved, promoting and encouraging ethno-cultural identity in both the public and the private spheres. In fact, the state apparatus is responsible for selecting of individual minority groups which are protected under this mechanism. For Kymlicka, the group rights model is founded on categorisation of minority groups as a condition to assess their claims to minority rights which can be done by following the multinational and polyethnic states template. This taxonomy distinguishes between national minorities (mostly associated with multinational states) and the immigrants (often associated with polyethnic states). The former category is represented by traditional minorities such as native Indians in the United States, who according to Kymlicka’s analysis have indisputable minority claims and ought to be accommodated in all respects, as long as they act in accordance with liberal values, principles and laws. Conversely, the latter category associated with immigrants, has in Kymlicka’s view very little right for minority claims. Therefore, for Kymlicka it is the distinction between the original minorities and the new migrant minorities that determines their status and protection under the group rights model.

Notwithstanding its appeal, the concepts of liberal multicultural governance, as well as elements of Kymlicka’s discourse, face considerable criticism. The degree to which the frequently adopted principle of non-discrimination can be applied as a truly unbiased tenet of multicultural politics is debatable. The premise that a multicultural nation state develops the aptitude to detach itself from the dominant culture and operates as an utterly neutral unit appears somewhat audacious and rather ignorant of the potency located within the national bond and sense of belonging. Applying Kymlicka’s taxonomy, the complexities of belonging to a nation and its culture are perhaps less profound in polyethnic states or settler societies, where identity formation builds upon the parallels of diversity. It is extremely intricate, however, to replicate and manufacture the same mechanisms in the nation states across Europe. Assertions akin to the non-discrimination principle overlook or disregard the density attached to most European or other non-European but traditional nation states. As described in the previous chapter, national symbols, myths, and traditions, characterise
and embody elements of the dominant culture, and whilst subject to the potency of the non-discrimination model they might be reduced, it is unlikely that they will diminish.

The second concept of Kymlicka’s analysis, the group rights model, is less prevalent precisely because of the active involvement of the state, and in particular the state’s selection of minority groups which are then formally protected. The selectivity process and criteria are often highly contentious, causing hostility amongst communities and paving the way to competing minority claims, questioning the entitlement to protection and on what grounds.

Furthermore, Kymlicka’s typology of national minorities and immigrants as well as the extent to which they ought to be accommodated, is divisive. This is exemplified with his case study of native Indians in the USA who as a historic national minority have access to minority rights, whilst some of the migrant minority communities have according to Kymlicka no right to such claims. The underlining issue is entrenched in migrant status and the time frame in which this status changes from a migrant to a minority. As explained by Isin and Wood, ‘cultural rights are determined by length or residence and access to power, not by legal citizenship’ (Isin and Wood, 1999: 39). Europe and the settler societies certainly digress in their approach towards minority groups; for the most part Europe comprises national minorities and labour immigrants turn migrants, while aboriginal populations or settlers make up the composition of Australia, Canada or the USA. Subsequently, as suggested in first chapter, Kymlicka’s argument has a limited applicability within the European context.

Criticism is also directed towards Kymlicka’s assertion where accommodation of the national minority cultures is conditioned by their compliance and respect for what he defines to be liberal values and traditions. This premise inevitably implies that particular traditions and customs of selected minority cultures are less liberal than those of Western democracies. This leads to a rather polemical debate regarding the true nature of liberal values and societies (Parekh, 2000).

Liberal multiculturalism is despite its limitations widely applied and while its multifaceted character is embedded within its very core, it is often portrayed in contrast to the rather fixed plural model which is analysed below.

**Plural model of multicultural governance**

Plural model is coined by Fleras (2009) as robust and somewhat fixed form of multicultural governance. The founding principle of this paradigm rests on the recognition of cultural diversity and builds on Kymlicka’s notion where culture is central to individual’s life. Hence, under the plural
model, cultural diversity ought to be tolerated and endorsed at all cost, preserving the hermetically sealed cultures. In this form, plural multiculturalism provides a platform for what is recognised as ‘cherished’ cultural diversity, while its maintenance becomes a priority for the state. The state is actively involved, delivering mechanisms to accommodate and protect each of its distinct cultural groups. Within plural multiculturalism, different cultures coexist on the precondition of complete equality with the other cultures. Indeed, the principle of absolute cultural parity entrenched within the plural model denotes its attractiveness for cultural minorities, yet is often feared by the nation states. The plural principle of multicultural governance is increasingly blamed for dismantling of communities and installing of separate cultural pockets within the society. In comparison to the republican and liberal models, the plural form of multicultural governance is scarcely adopted by the nation states not only for its tendency to potentially ghettoise societies, but essentially, for its complete lack of overarching loyalty, sense of belonging and identity to the state. Hitherto, no state has been willing to embrace the route of complete inter-cultural separation and absolute equality of cultures at the expense of belonging and state loyalty.

By examining different forms of multicultural governance it is possible to gain better understanding of the different pathways individual nation states and their multicultural communities embark on. In return, this offers guidance for further research into the case studies of Great Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic. By grasping the implications of the different forms of multicultural governance as well as their efficacy, a new picture emerges putting into context the civic and ethnic components of national identity in multicultural societies. Parekh’s typology of multiculturalism was identified as largely civic, akin to his idea of national identity. This, however, is in contrast to national identity in most nation states which is predominantly based on the dominant culture. As discussed in the previous chapter, the contemporary nation states have both, civic and ethnic elements within their structure. Yet, the more civic and migrant societies such as Great Britain, adopt more inclusive and open forms of multicultural policies often combining plural and liberal models, whilst the more ethnically oriented countries such as Germany and the Czech Republic are often inclined to adopt a very basic form of republican model of multicultural governance. Contemplating the multicultural debate the following section will reflect on critique of multiculturalism and its forms in contemporary nation states.

2.5 Multicultural critique – national unity or diversity

Pieterse argues that ‘a familiar line of criticism dismisses multiculturalism as the cultural wallpaper of late capitalism, as the “bourgeois eclecticism” of corporate or consumerist multiculturalism a la
Benetton’ (Pieterse, 2004: 41). As preceding sections indicate, the concept of multicultural governance is frequently confronted with critique concerning failed expectations. These are more often than not associated with the incongruous disposition of contemporary nation states. Modern nation states are expected to combine modernity and tradition which translates into a blend of seemingly contradictory factors. The former assumes that the nation states ought to embrace and accept diverse cultures, whilst the latter insists on protection of the nation in its traditional form. In this construct, the nation state becomes the modern oxymoron. This internal paradox builds on the foundations of multiculturalism’s perceived failure and suggests that perhaps in some respects multiculturalism has become victim of its own success. It was the intention of the preceding sections to provide an objective and transparent typology, offering a reference point for forthcoming analysis of minority groups in multicultural nation states, albeit theorising multiculturalism in depth is a task beyond the scope of this thesis. Consequently, the following examination of multicultural critique, its governance and policies is a broad and concise attempt reviewing the key points.

The opening quotation by Pieterse serves as a case in point of the contested character attributed to multicultural policies and governance. Is multiculturalism just a wallpaper of late capitalism or is it simply a way of nation states disguising their primary objective which is exploitation of the cheap labour and preserving of the dominant culture? The most severe forms of criticism refer to multiculturalism as a tool of capitalist exploitation (Bannerji, 2000) insisting that multiculturalism is a device seeking to suppress minorities by granting them a degree of cultural accommodation.

As a capitalist obfuscation to divide and distract the working classes, ‘multicultischism’ ghettoizes minorities into occupational structures and residential arrangements, thereby concealing the prevailing distribution of power and wealth behind a smokescreen of well – oiled platitudes (Bannerji, 2000: 20).

Furthermore, the widely debated concept of multiculturalism and its emphasis on cultural diversity are held responsible for creating parallel communities. It is argued that multicultural fixation on diversity frequently results in identity construction based solely on difference. The line between protection of distinctive cultural traditions, segregation and fabrication of identities in conjunction with difference, is often tenuous. Kim (2004) argues that multiculturalism is a mechanism enabling this segregation, ‘multiculturalism not only represents an institutionalized racism, it also essentializes racial differences by representing them as equal differences’ (Kim, 2004: 20). Hereby, Kim refers to what he identifies as an inflated importance of racial, ethnic or religious differences which have reverse impact on how are other central issues perceived or ignored, for instance a class
struggle, gender or housing discrimination. Day (2004) on the other hand, concludes that multiculturalism is simply futile when it comes to inequalities.

All too willing to give the often unwanted and generally meaningless gift of ‘cultural recognition’, multiculturalism as liberal theory and state policy remains staunchly silent on inequalities and injustices that are intimately entwined with the system of states it so desperately wishes to preserve... (Day, 2004: 24).

Progressively, the line of criticism has been directed to the contentious effects multicultural policies and governance have on national unity, belonging and identity. In light of the multicultural debate, it is the culturally ‘resilient’ minority groups in particular that are increasingly charged with the lack of loyalty and desire to integrate into the domestic structure. As Vertovec and Wessendorf explain, ‘some critics of multiculturalism ask the question – does the culture of poorly attaining groups, which has been underpinned by multicultural policies actually have something to do with their underachievement’ (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005: 14). On this account, it is worthwhile to examine the role played by multicultural polices and the means by which they condition and shape identity construction. The previous chapter outlined that essentially all national identities are defined by the existence of the ‘other’. This other provides definition of what we are not, hence the notion of unity and diversity and the challenge for multicultural, multinational and multiethnic states. The danger is that national identity rooted in one particular cultural reality, or transplanted into a pocket of tightly sealed cultural unit, renders the risk of isolation which in return acts as a platform for further segregation and pockets of culturally distinct communities without a shared common objective and cohesion. In view of this argument, multicultural governance assumes the responsibility for cultural and social demarcation of a number of communities across Europe. In his assessment of UK’s multicultural policies, Malik (2009) argues that British multiculturalism in its almost pluralist conception created a novel form of identity amongst immigrant communities. Malik’s argument centres on religious identity of migrant groups from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other predominantly Muslim states. He asserts that initially religious aspects were of a lesser importance in their identification whilst the central part of their identity was attributed to ethnicity and in some instances class or caste. Malik also insists that these migrant groups were keen to integrate into the dominant British culture and retain their cultural heritage to the private sphere. This, however, according to his argument shifted with the increasing of multicultural polices which encouraged separation and inward looking communities. Seeking to shed light on the role multicultural polices played in radicalisation of Muslim identity, Malik’s hypothesis will be tested.
with the empirical research examining, comparing and contrasting identities of Muslim communities in the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic.

By and large, critics of multiculturalism are at odds, some describe multiculturalism as too divisive, others argue that on the contrary multiculturalism performs a rather symbolic role on behalf of the nation state. Perhaps, multiculturalism ought to be observed from a broader angle, particularly its complexity and challenges for the nation states. Part and parcel of multicultural discourse is the nation state narrative; the modern nation state is exposed to forces of globalisation which renders it open to increasing cultural diversity. At the same time, the role of the nation state is to maintain and protect the dominant culture and the nation often by using the means of homogenisation embedded in the rhetoric of one state for one nation. A comprehensive study of this somewhat paradoxical nature of nation states builds foundations for more rigorous analysis of multicultural governance. In the world of the nation states, multiculturalism seeks to redefine and renegotiate traditional understanding of the relationship between the nation and the state, as chapter 1 explained, by aiming to create a diverse, equal and cohesive society.

**Summary**

Management of multicultural, multiethnic and multinational relations is largely confined to three distinctive approaches – assimilation, integration and plural form of governance also known as multicultural governance. The concept of assimilation revolves around the principles of the dominant culture which absorbs cultural, linguistic and religious differences of the minority cultures. As a process, assimilation aims to construct a mono cultural society, where the state fulfils role of a provider but it is the minority groups who are responsible for their successful absorption into the society by adopting the prescribed normative values. Integration on the other hand, is frequently portrayed in contrast to assimilation as the culturally embracive and communities integrating approach. Associated with governmental policies of liberal democracies and the Western world, integration refers to inclusion of the different cultures and ethnicities alongside a dominant group. The challenge to integration, however, is its implementation. Integration implies a mutual respect, recognition and acceptance, which in reality often translates into a one-way process, placed mostly on the immigrant or the minority group.

The approach of multicultural governance which underpins the theoretical framework of this thesis has been introduced by using the republican, liberal and plural categorisation. The three models represent multicultural politics. However, there are substantial nuances in their approach to minority integration which has been central to this chapter. In Parekh’s view, multicultural politics
and national identity are largely civic akin to liberal thinking but it is also main weakness as national identities are mostly ethnic or framed along the dominant culture. The civic/ethnic elements therefore inform the choice of multicultural policies and governance in the individual nation states. To this end, the key question propounded by multicultural policies and governance brings to attention the necessary coexistence of cultural diversity and political unity essential for the formation and governance of a cohesive society. Our understanding of the different forms of multicultural governance which is inherently linked to the civic and ethnic debate puts into context multicultural policies of the nation states and insinuates identity developments among the majority and minority communities. Hence, this debate underpins the proposed empirical research into the policies of Great Britain, Germany and the Czech Republic.

It is, however, recognised that with emphasis on cultural diversity, multiculturalism has been subjected to severe criticism, holding it responsible for community division and creation of parallel societies. Moreover, multicultural discourse suffers from excessive publicity; it has been adopted by the media, politicians, and community leaders, all claiming their stake in multicultural politics, and in process overstretching the term to the point of incomprehension and undermining its meaning.

Despite this considerable criticism, this thesis considers multiculturalism best equipped for contemporary nation states which are challenged with increasing cultural diversity. Thus, concluding theoretical frameworks informing this thesis, the forthcoming chapters address more specific questions of European Muslim identity developments on European and national levels. A successful multicultural society where cultural diversity and political unity coexist is difficult to create. Western liberal democracies adhere to the equilibrium of a nation state and an individual which is problematic for many minority groups including European Muslims for whom religion represents a way of life and thus is not easily dismissed or restrained to a purely private sphere. Building on the arguments of the nation state and multicultural politics which were presented thus far and narrowing the focus on identity of European Muslims, the next chapter centres on cultural conflicts or clashes of values between the local and Muslim communities in Europe.
3. Negotiating identity: between European Muslims and Europeans

Introduction

Conflict between European Muslims and European population have been frequently reiterated throughout the media, contributing to a growing perception of increased disharmony and in some cases, even threatening incompatibility between the local and Muslim populations. To what degree are these portrayals and accusations an accurate picture of the coexistence between the European and Muslim communities is often unclear. Frequently Muslims across Europe are presented as one homogenous group symptomatic of the ‘other’ repeatedly defined in opposition to European and liberal values. Drawing on the previous chapters, this chapter aims to reflect on such claims and critically evaluate some of the most significant controversies of recent years, such as the Rushdie Affair, the headscarf debate, bombings in Madrid and London or the cartoons controversy. These controversies refer to clashes of culture where both parties, the European Muslims and Europeans have their lessons to learn. It also suggests that the hypotheses (H1 and H2) relating to the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ as presented in the introduction and chapter 1 are largely at play in this context. Specifically, it relates to identity which is fluid and responds to the environment. It entrenches when there is a conflict or in sensitive times, when the ‘other’ is more pronounced and therefore the ‘self’ is too, but it relaxes when there is calm. This argument is central to this chapter which brings to attention the fluid character of identity and its formation amongst European Muslims.

3.1 European born Muslims and their identity – developments and formations

Overview

The arguments and frameworks presented in preceding chapters offer a valuable structure for comprehensive analysis of European Muslim identities, their formation, developments and shifts. The focus of this chapter will be on European Muslims, particularly those born or raised in Europe, thus primarily children of Muslim migrants who constitute the second or in some cases third and fourth generation. Currently, Muslims represent the largest religious minority in Europe, predominantly in Western Europe with countries such as France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK where Muslim communities represent a sizeable proportion of the population. Discussions about Muslim integration are flooding European media and politics, debating the value of multiculturalism and Muslim propensity to remain insular. As AlSayyad and Castells (2002) point out ‘Muslims are not
only the most numerous of the new immigrant populations, but culturally, they seem the most
distinctive, and to many (in the host cultures, at least) they seem the most difficult to absorb’ (2002:
54). European Muslims are often charged with split loyalties, safeguarding hybrid identity,
constructed along the lines of religion and cultural heritage. Indeed, this perception of European
Muslim population is not entirely unjustified. The hypothesis (H1) presented in this thesis illustrates
that identities, or the ‘self’, always create the ‘other’, but also that they are conditioned by internal
and external perceptions. Thus, how we perceive ourselves is inherently conditioned by how we are
seen by the others around us, and European Muslims are no exception to this.
It is often argued that social and economic conditions of Muslim populations are comparatively weak
and below that of local populations. By and large, evidence suggests that European Muslims are
often marginalised, live in relative poverty in comparison to home communities, and experience
racial or religious discrimination; hitherto, many European Muslims move within a lower end of
social strata. The matters are interrelated and exacerbated with young Muslims frequently charged
with being impervious to integration. There is a pattern evolving in the Western nation states
centred on the integration of young European Muslims and their allegedly increasing participation in
Islamic political organisations and structures, such as Muslim Brotherhood or Hizb ut-Tahrir which
are connected to the Salafi tradition. Frequently, Muslim loyalties are questioned with religious
belonging as an overarching form of their identification. This argument is often embedded within the
concept of return to ‘traditional’ Islam, claiming that increasing number of young European Muslims
search for a new meaning within Islam in its traditional form. Salafi and Tabligh organisations in
particular are charged with encouraging the young European Muslims to return to traditional Islam,
free from Western influence, fostering segregation of young European Muslims from the rest of the
community. The question of traditional Islam has arguably become increasingly important in the
identification and self-understanding of European Muslims therefore its precise role and meaning
will be examined throughout the chapter and tested in the empirical research. Expanding on the
premise of traditional Islam, Parekh puts forward another important argument suggesting that some
young Muslims are increasingly resenting the cultural heritage of their parents and see it as
submissive and weak. As Parekh explains, ‘the fact that many young Muslims were embarrassed by
some aspects of their parental culture reinforced the desire to return to the ‘true principles’ of
Islam’ (Parekh, 2008: 101). Indeed, the difference between identity of young Muslim generation
born or raised in Europe and that of their parents is pivotal in our understanding of identity shifts
and developments.
Different approaches, different Muslim groups

Essentially, one of the common denominators recurring in the disciplines seeking to uncover developments and formations of European Muslim identity is a perception of homogenous European Muslim population. This is in addition to increasing number of Muslim and non-Muslim organisations who claim to speak on behalf of, or about, all Muslims in Europe and across the world. European Muslims can be hardly labelled as a homogenous group, but this common misconception distorted numerous governmental policies and research reports. In fact, European Muslims replicate a cultural mosaic containing several fragments, each representing a unique culture and identity in addition to the shared Muslim identity. There are Muslims of diverse ethnic origins with distinct customs, languages and fundamentally, depending on the country of origin, with distinct Islamic traditions. Shia and Sunni are two main factions within Islam, with the latter compromising a majority of Muslims in the world, and specifically in Pakistan, Turkey, Indonesia and most of the Arab Middle East and Africa, with some smaller factions such as Salafis and Wahhabis located in Saudi Arabia. Shiites, on the other hand, comprise the majority in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan and Bahrain. Critically, within the European context the widely applied label, or category, of a ‘Muslim’ is in itself misleading. It assumes a certain level of devoutness which goes hand in hand with the expectation of regular mosque attendance and other prescribed religious activities. The self-identification as a Muslim, however, comprises a diverse group with some of its members attending mosques regularly, others attending rarely or only during religious festivities.

European perceptions of Muslim communities reflect a mixed picture whereby Muslim communities fail to be integrated and often hold on to what are perceived to be clashing values and traditions. Moreover, European Muslims are frequently questioned on their loyalties, in particular their attachment and belonging to the country of their residence, with some claiming that Muslim loyalties are split and compromised due to their faith. Crucially, as will be explained, it is common for Europeans to criticise religion through literature or art, most Europeans become wary of communities resisting what is in the European context seen as one of the key democratic principles, the freedom of speech. European history has its moments of shame such as Crystal Nacht when the Nazis burned books or when totalitarian regimes forbade books, films and art. Hence, Europeans are suspicious of any such behaviour and therefore it is very difficult for them to accept actions of some of the European Muslim communities, for instance the book burning of Satanic Verses or murder of Dutch film maker Theo Van Gogh. As will be explored in the next chapter, the scale to which are these suspicions embedded within the European society vary and often depend on historical
connections and ties with the specific Muslim group. Anwar (2008) for instance, explains that existence of colonial links was pivotal for new arrivals from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh or West Indies and significantly conditioned the identity formation of future generations. These historical connections are at the heart of identity related frictions between the individual Muslim communities in Europe.

The first generation of Muslim immigrants often settled in poor and deprived areas where many of them, years later, still live today. It was common for this generation to keep close ties with home countries and hold on to their cultural traditions and collective identities which were confined to the private sphere, away from the state. As chapter 1 outlined, the notions of cultural attachment, national loyalties and belonging are deeply embedded within each individual and collective, and thus are inherently difficult for any nation state to shift or replace with a different identity. Hence, identity of the first generation was utterly immersed in their home culture and traditions. Indeed, the first generation settling in Europe regarded themselves as the ‘other’ in juxtaposition to the home population, and as argued by Malik (2009) in his rather cynical view, ‘the first generation of post-war immigrants had largely accepted racism as a fact of life, they had kept their heads down and got on with the job of survival’ (2009: 40). This argument underpins the hypothesis (H2) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ where the self-perceptions of the first generation are largely parallel to the outer perceptions of the home population. In this instance, the two are congruent. Identity formation of the second and third generation is, however, removed from the congruent, no less because the second generation was born and/or raised in Europe and its members consider themselves part of the wider society with equal rights and opportunities. This growing disparity is abundantly evident as explained in Parekh’s statement:

Having grown up in a European society, young Muslims did not share their parents’ inhibitions and diffidence, and well know how to find their way around in the political system. More importantly, they increasingly began to define themselves in exclusively religious terms, not as Pakistani or Algerian Muslims, as their parents had done, but simply as Muslims (Parekh, 2008: 101).

Shaping of religious identity

Crux of this thesis centres on European Muslim identity in the social and political realm which is ultimately shaped by perceptions of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. These perceptions perform the role of mirrors, whereby on one hand they offer us a glance of ourselves which is vital to our own
understanding of the world around us and who we are. On the other hand, they act as platforms through which we recognise and characterise the others. This argument characterises the strengths of group belonging, where we feel strong connection or a bond with the ‘self’, while the ‘other’ often represents those who are different to ‘us’ ethnically, racially or culturally. Indeed, this twofold perception is essential in the framework of European Muslim identity formation, notably the construction of Muslim belonging and religious identity (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000; Amghar, Boubekeur & Emerson, 2007; Malik, 2009; Triandafyllidou, 2001; Yuval – Davis, 2006).

Drawing on their case study of Muslims born in France and Germany, Duderia (2008) and Hashmi (2000) refer to the nexus between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Duderia suggests that in the case of European Muslims, the idea of the ‘self’ developed into the socio-religious identity similar to the principle of *ummah* as opposed to the ‘other’ which refers to the broader socio-cultural identity of the West based upon the Judeo-Christian tradition. Duderia’s argument implies fixed identities which are clearly categorised into ‘us’ and ‘them’. The analysis presented throughout this thesis, however, proposes that identities are constructed and as such are constantly shifting. To this end, discourses of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ suggest that mutual perceptions are pivotal in European Muslim identity construction and community cohesion and most importantly that these can changed. It is essential to understand that Muslim identity is conditioned by the perceptions of the local population, the mechanisms in place by the state but also by the Muslim community themselves. Thus, tying this argument with the concept of national identity, stressing the religious identity over and beyond any other form of identification and assigning negative association with it, will contribute to such self-perceptions.

Examining Muslim self-perceptions is a subjective and arbitrary task, running the risk of false conclusions. Construction of the European Muslim identity has been extensively debated in the public and academic domain particularly in connection with radicalisation and terrorism. No doubt, analysis of European Muslim identity formation can provide useful answers to these critical issues. Previous chapters, however, addressed the complexities of identity formations and its nuances highlighting the importance of identity analysis within the realm of the nation states and to an extent the European Union. The question of Muslim radicalisation is simply a by-product of these complex issues and should not overshadow them. It is these developments that shape and underpin future formation of Muslim identity, whereby depending on the policies of the country of residence and country of origin, European Muslims develop identities combining a mix of their parents’
culture, which they may resist, together with the culture of their host country and the religious tradition.

Tibi (2010) has made some interesting observations in relation to Muslim religious identity, and the paradigm of ummah in particular. Ummah is an ethnically blind concept, uniting all Muslims regardless of their ethnicity or country of origin. Nonetheless, as outlined by Tibi ‘in the European diaspora ummah becomes an ethnicized community on which the constructed identity rests’ (2010: 131). Indeed, Roy (1999) expands on Tibi’s argument by putting forward interesting hypothesis exploring the nexus between religion, ethnicity and new forms of identity:

Religion allows one to start from noting: it is a code, not a culture; one can learn to be a believer, using any language and living in any society; religion is now the maker of a new invented ‘ethnicity’, void of culture, but expressing a reconstructed identity in search of recognition (Roy, 1999: 63).

Roy’s argument suggests a multi-layer level of analysis, probing deep into the core of identity formation. Assessing European Muslim identities as a standalone concept framed only within Islamic radicalisation bypasses a number of dynamics from within the identity equation. Ummah is perceived as an organic community which operates as one body, thus if one finger hurts, the whole arm hurts and therefore the whole body hurts. This has significant consequences for cultural clashes or controversies between the European Muslims and Europeans as by default they involve all of Europe’s Muslim population and in some instances reach Muslims worldwide. The challenges tied in with analysis of Muslim communities in Europe therefore relate to the heterogeneous character of European Muslim population complicated by the binding concept of ummah. This also includes the nation state policies which are frequently conditioned by historical and recent events, often in the form of controversies or ‘clashes’ between the local and Muslim communities. The following section explores some of the recent or most prominent disputes between European Muslims and European populations. The focus is on controversies leading to clashes of values or cultures, contributing to public debates on Muslim integration in Europe. Equally, it centres on controversies which support shifts in Muslim identity as the ‘other’. It also investigates the role of media in portraying European Muslims as different, opposed to European values or as anti-liberal. Hence, this chapter aims to critically evaluate these claims and controversies of recent years and frame them with the proposed hypotheses (H1 and H2) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’.
3.2 The Rushdie Affair

The 1989 Rushdie affair was by no means a first incident manifesting the conflicting relations amidst the local and migrant populations in Europe. The racially motivated Brixton riots (1981) and the Honeyford Affair (1984) targeting specifically Pakistani Muslims mark significant episodes and shifts in British race relations. The Rushdie Affair, however, denotes developments of new ethno religious nature particularly among the young Muslim population in Europe. The Rushdie Affair brought together the heterogeneous European Muslim communities, including Muslims whose religious affiliation was not particularly prominent in their self-identification. The Rushdie Affair became publicly known shortly after the symbolic book burning which was a sign of Muslim protest against the content of the book. British media and public referred to the freedom of speech and democratic principles which were not to be compromised, whilst the majority of British Muslims referred to their marginalisation, unequal treatment and the lack of respect towards their values and traditions. Despite their reservations, the mutual antagonism eventually subsided, however, the Rushdie Affair retained a long lasting imprint in British race relations. The origins of the affair can be traced to September 1988 when Salman Rushdie, a well-known writer of Pakistani origin living in Britain published his novel, the *Satanic Verses*. The core narrative of the book depicts lives of two Asian plane crash survivors who eventually find themselves in Britain. One of the survivors is a Bollywood famous actor Gibreel, whilst Saladin, the other plane crash survivor, is a devoted enthusiast of Britain. The story unravels as the two distinct characters settle in Britain confronting challenges and temptations along the way, embodied in particular in Gibreel’s dreams which explicitly question and challenge the role of religion. The crux of the story is a mix of illusions, revelations and fantasy, describing some of the Islamic sacred figures and objects such as Prophet Muhammad or Quran in a satirical, and for many Muslims controversial and unacceptable manner.

The Rushdie Affair initially unravelled in a rather inconspicuous fashion with what began as Muslim representatives’ condemnation of the novel, demanding the book to be published with a note explaining its historical and religious inadequacies. The governmental authorities ignored Muslim leaders’ request and paid little attention to the issue which eventually proved detrimental. Dismissal of Muslim leaders’ request prompted mobilisation of ordinary Muslims across Britain, reaching beyond the community representatives. The extent to which the Rushdie Affair mobilised ordinary Muslims cannot be underestimated particularly by getting through to Muslims for whom religious identity was secondary and who rediscovered their attachment and loyalties with the Muslim community. Thus, the initial dismissal encouraged mobilisation of Muslims who to begin with had little interest in the book, most of them have not even read the book, and who at this point began to
rally and demonstrate for the complete ban of the novel. Critically, British Muslims’ demands were not publicly supported by black or other minority communities in the UK. The situation escalated further in a largely Muslim part of Bradford where copy of the *Satanic Verses* was burned in a sign of a protest against what was recognised as continued marginalisation of Muslims and their demands. In European history, however, burning books and attacking content of a book relates to fascism and totalitarianism and is a sign of intolerance.

Parekh offers valuable analysis of the Rushdie Affair, scrutinising the event in great detail in several articles and book contributions, emphasising the shift in Muslim identity as well as the biased approach of British authorities. In one of his contributions Parekh explains the common misconceptions relating to the book burning by using similar incident involving Labour MPs.

No one cared to point out that only a few months earlier, several Labour Members of Parliament had burnt a copy of the new immigration rules outside the House of Commons without raising so much as a murmur of protest (Parekh, 1995: 308).

This observation raises important questions particularly in relation to what is considered to be an acceptable way of political mobilisation. Parekh’s argument is entrenched in the principle of equality whereby burning of the *Satanic Verses* by members of the Muslim community equates to the burning of the immigration rules by Labour MPs. What is omitted from Parekh’s enquiry, however, is Western dichotomy of what is deemed to be political protest and what are simply violations of the democratic principles. In other words, burning of immigration rules by a group of politicians is regarded as a political act, whilst burning of a novel by members of a particular community is regarded as freedom of speech violation, and thus violation of one of the key principles defining democratic societies. It is essential to take this framework into consideration as it applies not only to the UK but also to the vast majority of liberal democracies. As such, the Bradford book burning became symptomatic of the affair, anchored in the fusion of British Muslims’ mobilisation together with British claims for freedom of speech and liberal values.

Spiralling beyond the British borders, the Rushdie Affair was to become an international affair with Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian religious leader, making his famous speech in which he supported British Muslims in burning the book and more importantly he declared *fatwa*, a death sentence, on the author, Salman Rushdie. The public declaration of *fatwa* added a new spin on the Rushdie Affair,
exacerbating the tension and increasing suspicion towards Muslim communities in Britain and Western Europe. The reverse effect was to be detected within the British Muslim community which as a result of the Rushdie Affair and Khomeini’s inflammatory speech gained a new form of empowerment and recognition. Parekh examines this knock-on effect by concluding that for British Muslim community ‘the sense of power, combined with a mean desire for revenge at having been ignored for so long, generated a new mood of aggressive intolerance. In their new mood, they escalated their demands’ (Parekh, 1995: 309). Thus, in his analysis Parekh makes the connection between Muslim marginalisation and their subsequent empowerment generated by the affair, suggesting that new Muslim demands for a complete ban of the book and adoption of the blasphemy law to Islam, were inevitable (if radical) consequences.

Several key issues worth examining in detail were raised during the affair delineating the changing position of Muslims in British society. The Rushdie Affair heightened the unspoken divisions among the British population and its Muslim community, stressing in particular the view held by many British citizens, regarding Muslims and their descendants as immigrants, and questioning their position within the political community. Indeed, it was broadly implied and repeatedly echoed in the midst of the Rushdie Affair that a certain level of conformity with the dominant society was expected of the immigrants, especially referring to values and traditions. Acting as a platform, the Rushdie Affair brought to sharp contrast the expectations of local British community and those of young British Muslims, pointing towards a radical shift in British race relations. In fact, revision of the literature published shortly after the Rushdie Affair uncovers this shift from multiple dimensions. One such account is provided by Bhabha (1989) who asserts that the Rushdie Affair has changed ‘our perceptions’ of culture and the nation. Similarly Asad (1990) outlines changes in British political dialogue with subtle yet significant nuances concerning Muslim communities.

The Rushdie Affair has helped to promote a new political discourse on ‘Britishness’. There have been renewed calls for assimilation, the most famous of which was made by the prize-winning author Fay Weldon. “Our attempt at multiculturalism has failed”, she declared (Asad, 1990: 474).

Essentially, the absurdity exposed by the Rushdie Affair revealed that British Muslims, often portrayed as culturally distinct fragment of British society and opposed to liberal values, employed the language of liberal democracies and equality as means of protection of their religious affiliation within the context of secular Britain. The most divisive became
the question of the freedom of speech which has been regarded as one of the core pillars of liberal democracies, and was contested during the Rushdie Affair. Asad, Bhabha and Parkeh raised some critical questions about the position and mobilisation of British Muslims, nevertheless, they ignored the sensitivities surrounding the act of book burning in the European context, often associated with fundamental regimes. Legal discourses and the role of law in protecting sacred religious figures with the reference to blasphemy and communal libel, which British Muslims hoped to extend to Islam, emphasised the growing discord among the British and Muslim perceptions of what rights ought to be granted to the Muslim population. The blasphemy law has been abolished in England in 2008, however, at the time of the Rushdie Affair the refusal of British authorities to consider the inclusion of Islam intensified the inner discord and divisive perceptions between the two groups.

3.3 The Headscarf controversy
The headscarf controversies across Western Europe played another significant part in the debates concerning integration of European Muslims, their loyalties and belonging. Symptomatic of religious affiliation, the headscarf is a visible sign of Islamic identity in the largely secular and historically Christian Europe. The headscarf or a veil comes in myriad forms and styles, some covering the whole body, a face or just hair and neck, depending on the individual Islamic tradition. Most commonly used headscarves are al-amira, burqa, hijab, khimar, niqab, shayla or tchador. The most problematic are headscarves covering the whole body or/and face, which are in fact very different from al-amira, hijab, shayla or tchador which usually cover hair or part of the body but not the face. It is therefore misleading to use the broad category of ‘headscarf’ as one when the variations are so distinct. The headscarf has, in all its forms, acquired a contested meaning. For some it is a symbol of female oppression, whilst for others it simply represents a form of religious expression. Proponents of the latter refer to the headscarf as inevitable part of Islamic identity, embedded in Islamic traditions and religious practice. Critics of the headscarf suggest the garment is oppressive and purposely visible sign of Islam, claiming the identity of the woman wearing it. Transcending the secular pillars of the Western states, the headscarf, particularly in form of burqa, khimar or niqab, poses a significant challenge for many of the European nation states, questioning the religious and cultural neutrality founded in the principles of equal treatment, freedom of expression and religious affiliation.

The headscarf and the profoundly engraved symbolism it carries are often depicted as a threat to Western liberal secular values and women’s rights. Saharso (2007) has investigated the headscarf
controversy in great detail, focusing her work on the tension between the secular traditions, the freedom of religious affiliation and women’s rights in Germany, the Netherlands and Australia. The central theme of her work is built around the question of ‘what should come first: public neutrality or the right to religious freedom of the woman concerned’ (Saharso, 2007:513)? According to her study, the headscarf is a puzzling concept for most of the European nation states. France, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands, all encountered their own ‘headscarf controversies’. Indeed, the headscarf debate evolved into a Europe wide discussion, increasingly involving states with relatively small Muslim communities, such as the post-communist/Central and Eastern Europe where the headscarf, as worn by Muslim women, is still a novel and a rare sign. This novelty, however, does not mean that the headscarf is well received or even ignored by the public. The headscarf is regarded in somewhat convoluted terms, a veiled woman on the streets of most post-communist towns and cities will be looked at with a mix of curiosity and finger pointing, particularly since most people from the region have never seen a veiled woman in their life. Nevertheless, it is important to note that it is a full body veil and headscarves as worn by Muslim women, not the headscarf per se that is an issue in the post-communist Europe. Headscarves were commonly worn by peasant catholic women and can still be found in more rural and Catholic areas of Slovakia, Hungary or the Balkans. In fact, debates about the Muslim headscarf are, in the context of the post-communist Europe, largely located within the framework of Western Europe. Evoking level of suspicion, the headscarf is considered foreign, illiberal and something to be mindful of, although the broad consensus is that as long as it remains located outside the state the danger is not imminent. It is plausible to suggest that with increasing number of Muslim migrants, and especially with the coming of second generation, the situation will gradually shift. At this point, however, it is unclear to what degree, if at all, will this shift challenge the currently prevalent attitude.

Locating the narrative presently communicated across most Western Europe, the headscarf is increasingly tied in with the notion of fear and oppression. Taking into consideration the complexity associated with analysis of the headscarf controversy, centred predominantly on face covering, it is essential to distinguish and disaggregate between headscarves covering woman’s hair and neck from those covering face and body. In fact, in most European states the restrictions or bans on headscarves target specifically the full face and body covering. In France, a ban from all public places has been issued on all forms of face coverings, explicitly burqa and niqab, whilst hijab and other forms of hair and neck covering are permitted in French universities but not French schools. In 2006 Jack Straw, a British councillor for the constituency of Blackburn which has a large Muslim population, and also a Leader of the House of Commons, made negative comments regarding full
veiling of woman’s face, referring to *burqa* and *niqab* in particular. In Germany, a number of federal states introduced legislation banning the face covering all together.

The contested headscarf debate takes on increasingly feminist spin with the female liberation rhetoric often overlooking that a majority of Muslim women in Europe wear their headscarf voluntarily. It is paradoxical that the headscarf, which for devout Muslims is a symbol of respect and protection, has in fact prompted inquiries into its possibly oppressive character. Indeed, as a consequence of the debate, the symbolism explicitly attached to the headscarf circumvents the purely religious realm; it becomes a statement of belonging and a declaration of a larger, more subversive identity. This is problematic for the Western liberal democracies which separate religion and politics in public life, as explained in chapters 1 and 2.

Case studies from Germany and the UK reveal similarities in the national approach to contain and manage the ‘challenge’ of the headscarf. The German headscarf debate has been examined by a number of prominent scholars (Amiraux, 2008; Kastoryano, 2006; Saharso, 2007; Schiffauer, 2006) illustrating the inherently divisive discourse in the national media, politics and general public. The debate was sparked by Fereshta Ludin, a school teacher banned by her employer from wearing a headscarf at work. The German federal authorities played, despite their secular tradition, a prominent role in the case. Critics of the state approach referred to the largely biased position adopted by the authorities, asserting that Christian religious symbols, such as the cross or crucifix, were not banned from public places including the schools. In ruling by the German Constitutional Court in 2003, ‘banning the wearing of the Islamic headscarf for teachers is considered to be constitutional only if motivated by the protection of constitutional values and grounded on a precise legal basis’ (Amiraux, 2008: 129). The narrative generated by the increasingly hostile environment surrounding the headscarf debate implies that there is little room for Islam in German public sphere, but essentially it also insinuates that a headscarf is as much a political tool as it is religious. In his article on Turkish Muslims in Germany Schiffauer (2006) uses example of young Turkish woman interviewed by Amir Moazami shortly after the Ludin case:

> I would not fight for my rights because then everyone would say, ‘go back to Turkey’, and then they would not necessarily be a Nazi, or something like that. But it would just mean, ‘listen up, if you don’t like it here, then you can leave’ (2006: 107).
Similarly to the German case, the headscarf debate in Britain was also prominent within education and public services. Public discussion on the multicultural governance was closely intertwined with the debate, drawing on the discord between diversity, religious accommodation, and unity. Shabina Begum, a student from Luton was charged by her school for violating the dress code by wearing a headscarf which was not part of the school uniform. In this case the debate centred on the student and the flexibility around school uniforms which was eventually accepted on the grounds of respect for cultural values and traditions.

3.4 The Race Riots in the UK

The 2001 race riots in Britain’s northern cities, predating the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre, launched a surge of anti-multicultural rhetoric, questioning the policies of cultural diversity. Media reports provided details of escalating segregation of local communities leading separate and often ghettoised lives. The narrative adopted by the media and public suggested a salient populist discord amidst the local and Muslim communities, holding responsible, to a large degree, Muslim refusal to integrate. This inflammatory rhetoric ignored that for the majority of protestors and rioters the primary concern was economic marginalisation, unequal treatment and lack of opportunities, rather than religion per se. Polarizing discourses examining the root of the problem and its possible solution differed between the local and Muslim communities, often coming across as disjointed and missing a common ground. Local populations were critical of the role religion played in Muslim lives and instead emphasised the need for integration, and shared values. The Muslim community, on the other hand, reasserted their marginalisation and lacking opportunities. In his analysis of post-riot relations, Malik (2004) refers to the rapid increase of right wing votes in the area of Oldham, which has a substantial Muslim population and was one of the epicentres for the 2001 riots, as a knock-on effect of the inner community tensions shortly after the riots.

A Kurdish asylum seeker was murdered in Glasgow around the same time as the 2001 summer riots worsened community relations at the north of England, exacerbating the backlash against the British multicultural odyssey. Inflated figures of asylum seekers, immigrants and Muslims living in the UK were circulated by the media and right wing political parties, artificially creating further segregation and encouraging moral panic to spiral. This, as Malik (2004) explains, puts a new stamp on British perceptions of the outsiders or the ‘others’, synthesising new dichotomies. Fostering a renewed debate on Britishness and British identity, the period in the aftermath of 2001 race riots followed a similar thread to the Rushdie Affair which was accompanied by numerous governmental initiatives.
led by John Patten. Thus, in 2001 several reports were produced, most famously the Cantle report and the Denham report, investigating community cohesion and Muslim integration in great detail. Cantle report in particular referred to the parallel lives of British communities:

The team was particularly struck by the depth of polarisation of our towns and cities, the extent to which these physical divisions were compounded by so many other aspects of our daily lives, was very evident. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote any meaningful interchanges (Cantle report, 2001: 9).

The message prevalent within the Cantle report was of increased segregation which intensified further after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Strong connections were made with isolating Muslim communities and general suspicion towards Islam and its practices.

3.5 London and Madrid bombings

The 2004 Madrid bombing which claimed lives of 191 victims, and the 2005 London bombing with the death toll of 56 people including Muslims, will remain in modern European history as one of the first terrorist acts committed by Islamic radicals on European soil. Focus of this section will be largely on the London bombing which was the first act of organised Islamic terrorism in the UK. Debated and analysed by scholars across disciplines including law, politics, psychology and sociology (Abbas, 2007; Cole, 2007; Goodwin and Gaines, 2009; Modood, 2005a, 2005b) the 7 July 2005 London bombing became quickly known and referred to as 7/7. Whilst the reference to 7/7 may seem trivial, the associations and the symbolism entrenched in this reference have far reaching consequences within the context of identity and multicultural politics. Shortly after the bombing, media and public officials referred to the incident as 7/7 therefore drawing parallels with the terrorist attacks on the United States in 2001. The 2005 London bombing, soon developed into the UK’s adaptation of 9/11. Needless to say, that in terms of the death toll and scale the 9/11 terrorist attack or even the 2004 Madrid bombing, were more significant. However, for one reason or another, the bombing in Madrid never acquired a similar date-name such as 3/11. In fact it was the London bombing that generated a great amount of publicity, externally as well as internally, with the attack depicted in a metaphorical sense by politicians and media worldwide as an attack on British nation and British values, hence democracy in general. Within the domestic British setting the messages were rather mixed drawing the line between ‘us’, meaning the British, and ‘them’ meaning the Muslims. There was a combination of disillusion and anger on one hand, and a heightened level of national pride in...
all things British on the other. All major Muslim organisations released statements supporting Britain and distancing themselves from the bombing and radical Islamists, whilst an overwhelming majority of British Muslims also condemned the acts. Despite repeated assurances of the government that majority of British Muslims were good citizens opposed to such terrorist acts, and emphasising the importance of national unity, the hostilities towards local Muslim communities, as explained by Ansari (2005), were often severe.

Within hours of the bomb blasts there were signs that retribution had already started, ranging for instance, from more than 30,000 abusive e-mail messages posted to at least one mainstream Muslim website that caused the server to crash, to a suspicious fire at a mosque in Leeds (2005: 2).

The increasing polarity within the British society and the symbolism of 7/7 were feared to spark a backlash amongst young Muslims. Instigating a dialog with mainstream British organisations and general public, Muslim communities sought to address the segregation and marginalisation of Muslim youth to avoid possible radicalisation of future generations. Ansari offers a comparable perspective drawing the attention to the need for more structured analysis, examining formations of British Muslim identity whilst suggesting that many ‘British Muslims would favour more open discussion of the reasons why the bombing took place’ (2005: 4).

The effects of the London bombing and its immediate association with 9/11 terrorist attacks reach beyond the simple taxonomy of Islamic radicalism. Undoubtedly 7 July 2005 has made its mark in British and European history for several reasons including the violent death of 56 people and effectively shifting British race relations by demonstrating the possibility of an attack from within. In particular, London bombing exacerbated the climate of suspicion towards British Muslims in the post 9/11 era, and as such contributed towards the dialectical tension in the UK and worldwide. Within this environment a new focus emerged debating Muslim dual loyalties and split identities. It was frequently claimed that British Muslims had to choose one identity over the other as the two were not compatible. This largely secular and westernised approach deems the two categories, a British and a Muslim, as congruent only should the national identity become a primary form of identity. The Muslim identity should remain confined to the private sphere and adopt a more acceptable form of European Islam. Within this framework the European Islam is regarded as ‘good’ Islam because it has been structured and institutionalised to fit in with the liberal system and the Western nation states as we know them.
It is essential to recognise that London and Madrid bombings were acts committed by radical and extreme Islamists who represent a small fraction of the Muslim population in Europe and worldwide. Inherently, this minority has managed to tip the balance portraying Islam and Muslims as radical and illiberal and as such contribute towards societal divisions and Muslim alienation.

3.6 Media and anti-Islam publications: the anti-Islam cartoons, films and the ‘Sarrazin’ debate

Murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, Danish cartoons, or the Danish short film *Fitna* are but a few instances of the media controversies around Muslims in the new millennia, touching upon the fundamental freedoms of liberal democracies, namely the freedom of expression and the freedom of speech. Theo Van Gogh, a long standing critic of what he perceived to be an insufficient integration of Dutch Muslims into the mainstream Dutch society, was murdered by Dutch-Moroccan Muslim in 2004. This was followed by the 2005 Danish cartoons controversy and the 2008 highly divisive short film *Fitna*. The Danish cartoons depicted some of the most sacred Islamic figures in a manner offensive to Muslims worldwide, starting a range of protests in Europe and the Middle East. *Fitna* was produced by a Dutch MP criticising the teachings of Quran, for what he referred to as hateful messages. In the post 9/11 world, any such conflicts fuelled the discussion on European Muslim integration and Muslim loyalties not only to the nation state but also to the democratic values. Subsequently, in 2012 the debate continued with a US produced anti-Islam video appearing on YouTube, shortly followed by a publication of anti-Islam cartoons by a French satirical magazine, which were similarly to the Danish cartoons described by many European Muslims as insulting and disrespectful. Indeed, the plethora of anti-Islam films and publications together with the Western media coverage of worldwide Muslim protests often involving burning of Western flags, books and attacks on local embassies, suggest that Muslims do not recognise the freedom of speech and other the Western liberal values. This is often translated into a simplistic narrative as Islam’s incompatibility with the West and democracy, whilst the reality that it is rather rare for European Muslims to be involved in any violent protest is easily dismissed. This paradox is often omitted from the media and public discourses whilst the rhetoric continues to imply growing segregation of European Muslims and their disregard for liberal values. It is increasingly common to stigmatise all members of Muslim community as inherently different and anti-democratic.
The issue is, however, complex and cannot be simply dismissed as anti-Muslim rhetoric or European bias. The Danish cartoons were published and went unnoticed for weeks until one Muslim organisation used it, very successfully, as a mobilising tool. In the post 9/11 era, identities have been essentialised for both the Europeans and European Muslims. The killing of Theo Van Gogh has ruined the Dutch relations for decades to come. As outlined in the introduction and the first section of this chapter, European tradition is open to criticism of religion and religious figures. This is recognised as one of the freedoms under democratic principles. A murder cannot be dismissed or justified in the name of religion, European Muslims have a role to play in improving relations with the home populations as well as Europeans.

The debate held recently in Germany following publication of the controversial book *Germany does away with itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab)* by Thilo Sarrazin has been located within a similar framework. Drawing upon an apocalyptic and futuristic scenario, Sarrazin argues that unless the situation changes the German nation will be soon overrun by Muslims, who according to his argument, have lower levels of IQ, are bigoted and indolent. This conspiracy theory with its pessimistic view of the future presents a sinister narrative where the ‘other’, in this case Muslims living in Germany, will ultimately become accountable for the downfall of the German nation. This case is different to the cartoons publication or the film *Fitna* as this book could be banned on the principle of hate incitement. Nevertheless, Sarrazin claimed that in his book, he addressed issues already existing in German society which were, however, taboo in the public domain, the media and politics. Sarrazin who was a member of the Social Democratic Party and a board member of the German Federal Bank publicly criticised not only Muslims in Germany but also the German concept of *Leitkultur*. Mühe (2012) has analysed the impact of the debate on German Muslim communities, providing an in-depth account of Muslims as the ‘other’ in German context. In particular, Mühe refers to the tendency to define German culture in opposition to immigrants and specifically to Muslims.

The immigrants and/or Muslims and their apparent cultural or religious difference is created as the absolute ‘other’ to German society by attributing with them every negative aspect that Germans want to distance themselves from – from homophobia to anti-Semitism and misogyny (Mühe, 2012: 2).

In her account, Mühe emphasises that construction of the Muslim ‘other’ is fabricated to strengthen German national unity. Indeed, she makes comparisons between the national and the European
level, suggesting that there is a similarity ‘as it helps to define Europe through its perceived borders and “limits of tolerance” and thus supports the unification process of the diverse European countries’ (Mühe, 2012: 3). Mühe’s analysis is, however, primarily concerned with local Muslim communities and their reaction to the Sarrazin debate, thus it is somewhat removed from the broader context in which the debate took place, stressing the need for a wider examination and understanding of the anti-Islam and anti-Muslim publications on Muslim communities and their identity.

3.7 Foreign policies and international pressures

Foreign policies pursued by the Western nation states, and in some instances also the former Soviet Union, have been repeatedly held responsible for increased radicalisation of Muslim identities and growth of fundamentalist factions in Islamic and Muslim states. It is yet to be established to what degree is this accurate assessment of the situation. It is, however, plausible to assume that Western foreign policies, interventions and various conflicts contributed towards the growing antagonism and isolation of Western and Islamic worlds. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Gulf War, the rather apprehensive reaction of the Western states to the atrocities committed on Bosnian Muslims during the Yugoslav war, the on-going conflicts in Palestine and Syria, and the War on Terror as a consequence of the 9/11 terrorist acts which involved invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, are only a small selection of some of the main conflicts in the recent decades. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet army and subsequently by the Western forces as part of the War on Terror together with the offensive in Iraq, share a common thread, often perceived as expansionist attempts. These unilateral invasions are frequently justified in the name of national security and / or liberation of local people. In his analysis, Habermas (1996) draws on the forces of nationalism which he argues are repeatedly utilised to mobilise popular support for such actions, thus binding associations between nationalism and public mobilisation as outlined in the first chapter of this thesis. Similar argument has been illustrated by Pitcher (2009), who in his work deliberates on British multicultural policies and relations with Muslim communities under the New Labour, pointing towards the overriding power of the dominant nation via the means of state apparatus.

Muslims in the UK were unapologetically informed by Counter-Terrorism Minister Hazel Blears in March 2005 that some of our counter-terrorism powers will be disproportionately experienced by the Muslim community (Pitcher, 2009: 148).
The arguments proposed by Habermas and Pitcher indicate the strength of nationalism and national institutions utilised to protect the dominant group and national interests. This constructive approach is highly relevant. However, to understand the identity formation processes, it is important to incorporate the internal discords and fractions, specific to multicultural societies where the shifts in national sentiments are increasingly conspicuous in the rejection of Islam. Illustrating this point in particular are the Bosnian crisis and occupation of Palestinian territories which are very hurtful to many European Muslims. The West is seen as indifferent to Muslim suffering whilst it is quick to condemn actions of radical Islamic groups. Malik (2004) in his analysis eagerly asserts the injustices and lagging attitude of the West towards Muslim communities worldwide.

The year 2002 dawned as ‘daisy cutters’ and ‘cave busters’ rained down on Afghanistan, Chechens bled in the ruins of Grozny, Palestinians sought to escape Sharon’s mortar and tank attacks, and India and Pakistan stepped nearer the brink of a nuclear war over the disputed territory of Kashmir; whereas partitioned Bosnia remained out on a limb (Malik, 2004: 4).

Yet, the Western bias is not specific to the nation states as the European Union suffers from similar accusations and challenges. The position of the European Union is sensitive, balancing the interests of member nation states and promoting principles of human rights and freedoms whilst respecting the integrity of the nation states outside the EU. Critics of the EU’s external relations with the Muslim world argue that this juxtaposition and the EU’s track record supporting authoritarian regimes damages its authority internally and externally and significantly demoralises ordinary Muslims inside and outside the EU (Burgat, 2009; Clements, 2013; Malik, 2009). Europe’s inaction during the conflict in Bosnia, current conflict in Syria or the contentious policies of Israel, contribute towards the deteriorating faith in the European Union’s principles and authority. In his article on the EU and the Arab world Burgat (2009) observes the increasingly disheartened attitude of many ordinary citizens in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region:

Arab opinion sees Europe as complacently turning a blind eye to the worst breaches of the very norms it solemnly proclaims as forming the basis for its action. A whole generation of political dissidents in many Arab countries – and not the Islamists alone – has ceased to believe in the utility of the EU’s much touted ‘principles’ and ‘values’ (2009:4).
The European Union position is frequently exploited by political elites of transitional and authoritarian regimes who take advantage of the EU’s core principles by utilising the growing fear of Islamic militarism. It is in this framework that such elites claim to fight Islamist resistance and as a protection mechanism are forced to temporarily ignore or violate human rights and freedoms. They often appeal for financial and military support from the EU to remain in power which as they assert will guarantee subsequent transition to democracy. These polarising discourses affirm the EU’s multiple approaches in external relations towards the MENA region and the Muslim world. The developments are twofold, on one hand there is the collaboration with Turkey which started its accession talks with the European Union in October 2005 and whose application has at the moment come to a stalemate. On the other hand, there are the EU’s regional developments such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the MEDA Democracy Programme (MDP) tackling some of the most pressing issues in the region. The carrot and stick policies frequently adopted by the EU are often perceived as flawed, favouring some regimes over others. Burgat (2009) has written extensively on the European and Muslim relations, mostly within the EU/French framework, in his analysis of the European - Arab relations, he asserts strong criticism of some of the EU’s policies adopted to gain support of the Arab civil society.

The main requirement appears to be that they (NGOs) should speak the language of their European interlocutors, or at least one of the languages they know (indeed any language so long as it is non-local), and that they should employ the terminology they are familiar with, or, simply put, to say what they – the EU want to hear (Burgat, 2009: 626).

The notion of Western bias, whether real or perceived, thus plays a significant role in the global narrative of the West-Muslim relations. Essentially, it is also symptomatic of the discord in which the European Muslim identities evolve and coexist, hence the hypothesis (H1) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. It is precisely this juxtaposition that is pivotal in European Muslim identity formation.

**Summary**

The brief synopsis of the events summarising some of the most significant and influential moments shaping relations between the European and Muslim communities uphold the initial hypotheses stressing the combination of identities and belonging within the contemporary nation states and the
multicultural framework. In particular, the chapter illustrates how the internal and outer perceptions, especially in relation to controversies, condition identities and solidify discords between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. It also builds on the artificial divisions the European Islam may create by referring to good European Islam and bad non-European or ‘other’ Islam. These arguments are underpinned by self-perceptions of the first generation which were often parallel to the outer perceptions of the home population with the two largely congruent. Identity formation of the second and third generation is, however, disconnected from the perceptions of the home population as they often see themselves as part of the wider society. This is problematic as the expectations of young European Muslims of their position and acceptance within the society usually do not match the reality. Nevertheless, the problem extends beyond the anti-Muslim and biased rhetoric of Europeans. European liberal tradition allows for critique of religion expressed in the literature, media or arts and is seen as an integral part of a democratic system. Restricting such freedom is associated with fundamentalism or radical regimes and is strongly against European values. This is often challenging for Muslim communities in Europe who are not comfortable with this form of criticisms. Therefore, the challenges lie on both sides. The controversies introduced and analysed in this chapter refer to clashes of culture and values stemming from identity differences. The important point this chapter makes, however, is that identity is fluid and reacts to the environment; it becomes stronger when it is under pressure and relaxes when there is calm.

The nation states are forced to shift their cultural boundaries and accept multiple forms of identities. This unique blend of identities and cultures is often perceived to hinder national unity and increasingly also security. Frequently, Muslim communities and the religion of Islam are labelled as the ‘other’ challenging the values and traditions of the Western nation states and democracy. In return, European Muslims are caught up in a dialectic tension combining two identities which as they are frequently told, are not always congruent. The next chapter elaborates on these findings, taking into account the individual nation state policies, whilst adopting a more proactive approach in analysis of the internal debates and national rhetoric concerning Muslim communities.
4. Migration, citizenship and Muslim communities: perspectives from the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to shed light on the intricate relationship between liberal democracies specifically the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic, and their Muslim communities. The individual case studies will be underpinned by analysis of national policies within the realm of migration, citizenship, integration and other areas shaping the relationship and identities between home and Muslim population. The aim is to lay ground for empirical research and to test the proposed hypothesis (H3) that the role of citizenship, naturalisation and integration polices of individual nation states is essential in identity formation of the second and third generation Muslim communities.

It is, however, equally important to examine the broad perceptions of the European Union among the European Muslim communities. This under-researched area is intrinsically associated with the formation of European Muslim identities and forms a vital component of the proposed empirical research questions. Indeed, at present there is little data analysing European Muslims’ views and attitudes towards the EU and whilst it is possible that these are parallel with the general public, it is important to assess the degree to which is the relationship between the European Muslims and the secular European Union conditioned, if at all, by religious affiliations. Growing discords among the European nation states and their Muslim communities have often had a polarising effect on the public and media, evoking Muslim failure to integrate into the home societies and embrace Western liberal values. Chapter 2 explained that the European Union is increasingly involved in shaping some of the policies affecting European Muslims particularly in the field of migration and human rights, thus one of the aims of this chapter is also to shed light on the European Union initiatives involving Muslim communities and aspects of religious identity. This approach allows for a better understanding of the European Union dimension and the context in which the nation states operate and manage their Muslim communities. The three case study countries analysed, represent a diverse group with distinct sets of legislations, policies and strategies which are rooted in historical and national developments. From this perspective, the multicultural and multinational UK, in the wake of its post-empire era, forged strong ties with its ex-colonies, and thus attracted substantial Muslim migrant population. Affected by its war ridden history and partition, followed by unification, Germany had, unlike the UK, a rather hesitant approach towards its sizable Muslim population and its permanent position within the German state. German citizenship and integration policies
reflected this approach and are still largely based on the principle of *ius sanguinis*. In contrast to both the UK and Germany, the post-communist Czech Republic is comparatively homogenous, with Roma representing the only significant minority (estimated at 1.6 per cent). As a result of accession to the European Union and overall globalisation trends, post-communist states such as the Czech Republic with close proximity to Western Europe, are experiencing increasing Muslim migration, particularly from the former Yugoslav republics and the former USSR states. The composition of Muslim communities in the case studies presented here is equally diverse, representing a broad ethno-national spectrum, including Bangladeshi & Pakistani Muslims in the UK, Turkish Muslims in Germany, and Muslims from Bosnia and the former USSR in the Czech Republic. The following sections analyse policies and approaches of the European Union and the three European countries together with their strategies in managing and integrating their Muslim communities.

4.1 The European Union dimension

Drawing on the synopsis introduced in chapter 2, a novel approach has been developing on the EU level, complementing the bridge between the nation states and religious organisations. Yet, despite its innovative attitude, the approach has retained structures of the nation state which as will be explored complicates the relationship between the EU and the religious minority groups.

Organised religious groups are frequently invited to participate in a political dialogue as representatives of the diverse European civil society. These developments are said to be shifting the established boundaries between politics and religion, but perhaps they are better referred to as examples of innovative partnership between the EU’s organisations and faith communities. Within this trend, the EU seeks to encourage and dedicate support to Muslim organisations and Islamic religion which are currently under-represented on the European Union level as well as in the majority of member states. The European Union’s interest in Islamic religion itself is not novel, but its importance in the European dialogue has been reemphasised after the Madrid and London bombings in 2004 and 2005 respectively, after which the European Commission (EC) organised a set of meetings between the EC’s president and the representatives of the main religious groups including Muslim faith groups. By adopting these processes, the European Union aspires to construct a harmonised approach towards minority religions including Islam, acting as a supplementary or overarching layer to the rather diverse individual nation states’ policies.

In building this unique approach, the European Union faces a number of challenges inherently problematic for the institutionalised operational character of the European Union, specifically the
lack of hierarchical or organisational structure of Muslim faith organisations and the often unacknowledged heterogeneous character of the European Muslim population. As will be examined, the lack of hierarchy and structure is in contrast to the Christian church which provided the model for interreligious structure with the EU. To complicate the matter further, the message frequently reiterated throughout the European media is often biased against Muslims and the role of religion in their life. Moreover, the European tradition is anchored in an open dialog and the freedom of speech, including the political and religious arena. It is, therefore, not easy for Europeans to accept that something cannot be criticised, particularly a religion since European literature, as was explored in the preceding chapter, has often criticised religion. These individual factors filter through to the supranational level of the European Union and challenge the role of Islam and Muslim faith groups in the European Union structure. Equally problematic are perceptions of the rigorous religious practice within Islam and the lack of separation between the state and religion in Islamic tradition. As Silvestri points out, ‘beyond the perception of the Islamic threat, Europeans seem to be scared of the religious factor per se. They are shocked by a reassertion of identity and by a political participation that takes place along religious lines’ (2007a: 21). The conspicuous manifestations of Islam and the female clothing such as burqa or hijab in particular, contribute to this polarising environment. The anxiety that Islam and Muslims could contest European values, beliefs and secular tradition is becoming increasingly prevalent. As chapter 4 showed, the matter is made worse by the increasingly politicised opposition to the satirical cartoons and book burning protests which make the tension between the West and Islam more tangible. It is debatable to what degree is the anxiety anchored in identity crisis of individual nation states and the lack of confidence in the European Union, rather than Islam and European Muslims as such. Hence, any analysis of the European Union’s approach to European Muslim communities and Muslim faith groups ought to reflect this multifaceted relationship.

Institutionalising Islam in Europe

Religious representatives of Christianity, which is historically rooted in the European tradition, recognised the volatility of political systems, hence the necessity to alter their position and structure to fit in with the organisation of modern nation states and the supranational European Union. The Islamic tradition which is a comparatively new actor in the political and nation state arena in Europe lacks similar structural pillars. The absence of internal organisation and hierarchy attributed to Islam is often puzzling for the European nation states and the EU operating within a highly regulated institutional environment in line with the normative rules and structures. Based on its own
framework, the European Union encourages internal dialogue with faith groups alongside its operational arrangements, which as noted by Silvestri (2007c) is from the EU’s perspective the primary dichotomy when dealing with the Christian church and Islam.

Structure and positions of leadership are absent in Islam – in Islam there are no roles corresponding to bishops, primates, and Popes because the Prophet Muhammad did not appoint a successor nor told his disciples how to organise the community after his death (Silvestri, 2007c: 3).

This missing framework often leads to the failure of Muslim faith communities to match the representational criteria required by the European Union, whilst for the EU it becomes intrinsically problematic to engage European Muslims without the representative religious organisations in place. The European Union and its internal management of faith groups is to a great degree modelled on the hierarchical structure of Christian church, and is applied universally to all religious groups including Islam. In a report for RELIGARE, project funded by the European Commission, Carrera and Parkin (2010) confirm that Christian religious groups, who mostly lobby on social and welfare related matters, are over represented at the European Union level. This in effect brings about two main challenges which only solidify the privileged position of Christian churches. Firstly, the replica of traditional model between the state and the church which has been largely adopted by the EU entails numerous problems not least because the nation state structures are not easily imitated by the supranational EU. Secondly, the Muslim faith groups which are expected to employ similar structures often find it merely impossible within this state driven dynamic. Silvestri (2007b:8) in her in-depth analysis of Muslim religious organisations provides a summary of the EU’s normative criteria mandatory for all representative faith groups:

a) the traditional church state relations model within the secular framework of the separation between public and private sphere ought to be maintained

b) an abstract notion of integration is expected of faith groups

c) all faith groups should be representative

To tackle the problem of Muslim underrepresentation, the European Union instigated a number of initiatives encouraging developments of representative structures within the Muslim faith groups at the national and the European level which can then fulfil the required criteria. Perhaps most pivotal
in recent years have been the European Union’s efforts to shape Muslim and Islamic faith groups into what can be described as European Islam. The institutionalised form of European Islam is envisaged to circumvent radical or militant Islamic groups and embrace what are deemed to be ‘moderate’ and liberal forms of Islamic religious affiliation.

Attempts to build a moderate and institutionalised European Islam were asserted after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and perhaps even more importantly in the aftermath of Madrid and London bombings after which the need for European Islam became ever more pressing amongst national and European leaders. Silvestri (2007b, 2007c, 2009a, 2010b), who was one of the first to examine the trend of Islam’s Europeanisation in detail, notes that in spite of the EU’s lead on this initiative, there is a growing bottom-up support from within the Muslim faith groups. This can be attributed to several factors, namely the recognition of the collaborative importance and benefits such collaborations bring for Muslim organisations, and the need to redeem Islam in the eyes of European public. From this perspective, the European institutionalisation of Islam serves two rather synchronized and reciprocally conditioning functions, both operational and structural.

On one hand, it is expected that to facilitate effective participation and representation of European Muslims, the Muslim faith groups should adopt the necessary structural taxonomies parallel to those of Christian churches. On the other hand, it is argued at the EU level that institutionalisation of Islam is a platform for a major shift in religious affiliation and subsequently will lead to a liberal and moderate form of European Islam. Both concepts are largely co-dependant and whilst the challenges associated with the former have been touched upon, it is the latter that has been a matter of concern for both the European Muslims and the policy makers. When assessing the argument of European Islam in more detail it is essential to understand the narrative this conveys. The rhetoric constructed and inherently linked with the fabrication of European Islam suggests that Islam per se is antagonistic or in opposition to the European values and cultures, whilst by its institutionalisation and Europeanisation it becomes adequate to European normative requirements. In other words, it is implied that by institutionalising and Europeanising Islam, it will somehow become de-radicalised. It is less clear, however, by what means is this miracle fix of European Islam attained, or to what extent it should be a state/EU driven project rather than an organic process. Drawing correlations between Muslim de-radicalisation and European Islam creates an explosive mix, there are no guarantees that the artificially manufactured European Islam will be moderate or that it can solve our security or identity issues. In fact, the primary hypothesis (H1) proposed in this thesis would suggest that on the contrary the artificial creation of European Islam based on the
presumption that the non-European Islam is ‘bad’ will have the opposite effect. It is the paradigm of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ which forms basis of this argument and implies that individual identity is transformed by the internal and the outer perceptions. Therefore, the implications of good versus bad Islam are likely to play a crucial role in self-understanding of European Muslims. What is important to consider, however, is the role the EU plays in this process. The EU adopted innovate approach towards religious minorities and Muslim communities in particular. Yet, as this chapter suggests, the European Union retained the organisation and the framework used by the nation states. Indeed, by encouraging structure of Muslim faith groups parallel to the Christian groups and by driving the concept of one European Islam, the EU becomes, in its own right, homogenising as much as the nation states. In other words, the EU and the nation states are very different entities which, nevertheless, share one vital element when it comes to the European Muslims - the tendency to standardise. This is a significant and telling development, yet largely under-researched in contemporary politics.

The European Union’s goal to develop a synchronised European approach on Islam and Muslim faith communities is skewed. Part of the problem is the heterogeneity of European Muslim communities. By selecting a small number of Muslim faith groups as the ultimate representation, it is implied that some groups are more ‘European’ than others. Increasingly there is a tendency among the nation states and the EU to cherry pick Muslim faith groups deemed moderate, western and liberal as suitable interlocutors of Muslims across Europe and partners in civic dialogue. Drawing on work of Silvestri (2005b) and her account of Muslim council formation across Europe, she asserts that the perception of ‘good’ European Islam structured in parallel to Christian church often conditions the alleged validity of individual Muslim faith groups which is in fact at odds with the internal workings of Islam. On a parallel level, there is a caveat implying the perilous character of ‘unmanaged’ or ‘bad’ Islam versus the ‘good’ European Islam. Aside from this rather cynical account, it is recognised that structuring and institutionalising of Muslim faith groups parallel to the other representative religious groups in Europe ought to facilitate a more insightful dialogue with Muslim communities, their involvement in civic society and accommodation of their religious needs, hence preventing segregation and possible radicalisation. This juxtaposition reflects the polarising nature of the European Union’s relationship with Islam, whereby the encouragement of Muslim faith groups to participate in political dialogue is still largely a top-down approach driven by the European institutions. Moreover, it is inherently problematic to select Muslim faith groups representing the heterogeneous European Muslim communities without forcing a predefined identity of what it
means being a European Muslim which as the hypothesis (H1) suggests would be the inevitable result of such action.

*Muslim representation*

The key issue in civic representation of European Muslims at the national and more importantly the supranational level is their diversity which is manifested in the structure of Muslim faith groups. Thus, the propensity of the European Union to establish representative European Muslim organisations or more specifically Muslim councils is somewhat misguided. Indeed, the top-down approach employed by the EU and the individual nation states often generates artificial pockets of representation with self-established Muslim faith groups or councils detached from the grass-root organisations and discredited amongst ordinary Muslims. Of particular concern for the European Union is the possible influence of Islamic states and radical Islamic groups which are often associated with failed integration of European Muslims into their host societies. The overlap between the political and religious authority of these groups on European Muslim communities is frequently illustrated with the funding for some of the mosques across Europe. The Oostlander Report *'On fundamentalism and the challenge to the European legal order'* produced for the European Parliament in 1997 addresses this issue in some detail:

The role of the Iranian government in the Rushdie Affair is particularly well-known. But various other governments of Islamic countries likewise try to keep a firm grip on ‘their’ citizens in Europe. This applies, for example, to Libya, Iran, Morocco and Turkey. They try to keep such people oriented towards their country of origin even if they are nationals of a European country. These efforts hamper integration and help conflicts in those countries to ‘flash over’ into Europe (Oostlander Report, 1997: point 5.1).

The Oostlander’s taxonomy of Islamic states is flawed particularly with its references to Turkey. Oostlander ignores Turkey’s secular Kemalist ideology and suggests that the nation states with substantial Muslim population are inevitably Islamic, thus drawing parallels between the political establishment of Iran, for example, and Turkey. This difference between the Islamic nation states and states with largely Muslim population is in European popular imagination, as shown with the example of the Oostlander report, often one and the same. The report, however, also identifies that countries of origin and in particular the nation states with largely Muslim population retain ties with Muslim communities in Europe, as is the case with Turkey. The degree to which these ties function
as an obstacle to Muslim integration into the European societies is, however, unclear and requires further investigation. Silvestri (2007b) for instance offers a compelling argument with the following:

Whereas the Muslim countries of origin of these people can be supportive of an institutionalised Islam, they might oppose all attempts to create ‘national’ or ‘European’ versions of Islam that divert Muslims’ attention and loyalty from their home countries (2007b: 12).

In other words, countries of origin often fear that if constructed, European Islam will provide a platform for change in European Muslims’ allegiances and interests, whilst the European Union and the European nation states fear that in the absence of European Islam, radical Islamic groups penetrating the mosques in Europe may gain a stronghold over the Muslim hearts and minds. Construction of European Islam is therefore highly contentious whilst critics of this top-down approach assert the danger of producing artificial structures within Muslim communities which may generate a surge of resentment aimed at Europe. Testing these questions and the proposed hypotheses (H 1) whereby the ‘self’ always creates the ‘other’ and (H 3) where the role of the European Union is more limited in identity formation of the second and third generation Muslim communities due to its limited impact on legislation in key areas, will be the final section of the research questionnaire and the follow up interviews.

Examining the secondary literature, analysis and evidence presented in the controversial Oostlander report ‘On fundamentalism and the challenge to the European legal order’ from 1997 which was rejected by some members of the European Parliament for what were claimed to be simplistic argumentations, has brought to attention a number of intriguing observations, some of which are worth citing at length:

- The vast majority of Muslims in Europe have no difficulty in accepting the rules of democracy and the rule of law which prevail in Europe, partly because Islam has special rules for Muslims living in a minority situation.

- Islamic fundamentalism could become more attractive to European Muslims because of a lack of socio-economic and social prospects, the stereotyped image of Islam and Muslims in the Western media, limited public recognition of the socio-economic and social contribution which Muslims are making and have
made to European society, the appointment of spiritual leaders who lack proper knowledge of European society and have difficulty in finding their place in it, and because of persistent legal and practical obstacles to compliance with religious obligations.

- Islam should be granted rights similar to those granted to the religions already recognized in the EU countries, especially in terms of education and religious rights.

(Oostlander report, 1997)

The document makes a set of recommendations to the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Council and the member states with the objective to prevent further segregation and possible growth of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe. Two points in particular should be taken into consideration, however. The report is located within the framework of the European Union and its member states whereby it transcends the states and the organisations external to the EU, such as the non-European Islamic groups, and directs its focus entirely on European Muslims. Secondly, the report predates the fatal 9/11 attacks, but verifies the proactive role of European institutions in Muslim integration. The empirical research will test some of the conclusions highlighted in the Oostlander report and evaluate the proposed hypotheses particularly with regards to the European Union and its role in Muslim identity formation.

Retaining the European dimension, the following sections draw on the British, German and Czech case studies, highlighting the country specific policies and interactions with their Muslim communities. All three sections are organised in the same format with introductory background followed by citizenship, integration, immigration and asylum policies, and a section on local Muslim communities. The aim is to connect these findings with the proposed hypotheses and provide a platform for empirical analysis.

4.2 The UK case study

Background

The UK and the Netherlands have long been recognised as the pinnacle of multicultural governance, endorsing multicultural traditions and policies whereby established and recognised minority groups have political and social privileges enabling them to exercise citizenship rights whilst preserving their unique cultural heritage and traditions. The UK became a desirable migrant destination in the aftermath of the post-World War Two economic boom, utilising its ties with British ex-colonies and
countries of the Commonwealth, enabling it to tap into the cheap low-skilled labour resources. Workers from British ex-colonies or the Commonwealth were initially entitled to political and social rights, facilitating them with a more favourable status and position in the UK than those from other countries. With the worsening economic situation and declining job markets from early 1970s, the UK axed any political or social privileges granted to all new arrivals including its former subjects, and adopted a more restrictive immigration and asylum policies as well as family reunification legislation, which continue in its constrained mode until this day. The concept of citizenship, or rather its relative absence until 1981, has also been altered and undergone significant changes.

The deepening economic stagnation brought to halt prosperity and job prospects particularly for low skilled workers who were heading towards an increasingly fierce competition over the scarce recourses. This rather hostile situation gave birth to ‘immigrant’ as the new ‘folk devil’ across Western Europe with Britain being no exception. Hitherto, this was a rather universal heading with no explicit references to religion or Muslim identity instead the focus was on immigrants’ country of origin. Direct associations with religious identity unravelled as a simultaneous twofold process. In contrast to other migrant communities, the religious aspects of Muslim identity were allegedly impeding their successful integration, whilst at the same time the second generation of British Muslims began to reassert their religious identity. The former and the later go hand in hand and are closely intertwined with one exacerbating the other. Hence, this nexus supports the hypotheses and identity analysis outlined throughout this thesis, suggesting a mutually dependent relationship between identity formations and the two way perceptions.

At present, established minorities and religious communities in the UK have the right to politically or socially organise along the lines of cultural heritage, particularly if this should enhance their integration into the British society. Indeed, with regards to Muslim communities, Britain prides itself on the network developed between the local authorities and Muslim organisations aiming to enhance community cohesion and to break through cultural divisions. This is an admirable achievement worth praising. However, under a closer observation the relationship between the local authorities, the state and Muslim communities appears rather complicated. At the backdrop of the recent events dating back to 9/11, some literature, media and politicians point towards a reciprocal discord between British Muslims and local population. Allegedly there is a growing dissatisfaction and a sense of injustice on the part of young British Muslims, as well as a sense of growing unease with British Muslims and what is identified as their failure to integrate on the part of local population. Britain’s on-going involvement in the Middle East in addition to its role as a key ally
of the United States in the War on Terror prompted questions relating to the position of Muslims within the British society. Domestic politics, citizenship, immigration and integration policies and the economic decline from 1970s onwards complete the picture of British multicultural mosaic giving rise to what is allegedly increasing tension among the local and the minority groups with Muslim populations in particular. This is often demonstrated with Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, the Honeyford Affair, Norman Tibbet’s Cricket Test, the Rushdie Affair, the Stephen Lawrence and the Macpherson inquiry and other controversies analysed in the previous chapter. As the British post-war economic boom enticed labour immigrants to find a new home in the UK, in return the economic stagnation troubling Britain decades later contributed towards their marginalisation. This juxtaposition has had a profound impact on the domestic population as well as the formation of British Muslim identity and essentially the future liaison between the two.

**Citizenship, integration, immigration and asylum policies**

To capture the multi-layered character of British race relations, they must be examined from a number of overlapping perspectives, offering a unique and comprehensive analysis of British Muslim identity. Joppke (1998, 2003, 2007b, 2008a, 2008b, 2010, 2012) has produced a vast amount of scholarly literature assessing the citizenship and integration policies aimed at immigrants and asylum seekers in Europe, mainly in the UK, France and Germany. Joppke’s observations emphasise Britain’s unique character with regards to citizenship and human rights protection, placing it at odds with most of the other European countries. In particular, Joppke refers to ‘the lack of a written constitution and of domestically incorporated human rights conventions, which could provide a domestic foothold for the rights and interests of immigrants, and asylum seekers’ (1998: 131).

Investigating his analysis further, Joppke underlines that significant alterations to British human rights legislation can be attributed to the European Union (or until 1993 the European Commission). The European Union is no doubt forcing the nation states to accept multiple levels of belonging, hence, the role of the European Union will be investigated further with the empirical research.

In 1972 the European Commission castigated the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act as racially discriminatory - this Act had invented the principle of partial (the race loaded core principle of British immigration law) to exclude former colonial subjects (read: blacks) from access to Britain (Joppke, 1998: 131-132).
The critique from the European Commission as well as Britain’s internal recognition of its increasingly multicultural and multiethnic character prompted the instigation and further alternations of the Race Relations Act from 1968 and 1976 whereby the state was actively involved in generating policies promoting social cohesion and unity. These attempts were adopted as means of managing the new fabric of British society, aiming to integrate by now settled migrants and asylum seekers. In contrast to other Western European countries, however, the UK has demonstrated a rather reluctant approach towards migrants from outside the Commonwealth or British ex-colonies whose members were still to a great degree seen as British subjects and were entitled to British citizenship. Subsequently, with its immigration policies the UK reinforced the scope to which it retained ties with its former colonies and more importantly as argued in the hypothesis (H3) it had a profound impact on the identity formation and belonging of Muslim communities which in most cases enjoyed a privileged position in comparison to the other nationals. 

Prior to 2008, the UK had a rather complex immigration and asylum system which was known for its restrictive policies. In 2008 Britain introduced a Points Based System (PBS) which affected all non EU/EEA migrants, with the aim to monitor and strengthen mechanisms in place for controlled economic migration. The PBS also introduced aspects of integration policies specifically the English language component and the employer sponsorship requirement. Similar trends can be recorded in the asylum policies which have been increasingly restrictive since the 1990s when asylum applications in the UK reached all-time high. From 1985 to 2000 the UK received over 450,000 applications for asylum (Home Office, 2003). While the statistics for 2013 show that between ‘January and March 2013 there were 22,592 asylum applications, a rise of 14 per cent, this remains low relative to the peak in 2002 (84,132), and is similar to levels seen since 2005’ (Home Office, 2013). The general perceptions regarding asylum applications in the UK were mostly suspicious, particularly in fear of ‘bogus’ applicants, which led to the adoption of more restrictive policies and formation of ‘reception / detention centers’ in 1999 (Cwerner, 2004). In parallel, developments of citizenship policies which severely restricted access to British citizenship with the British Nationality Act 1981 affected a large number of British Muslim communities from Pakistan and Bangladesh and other former colonies. In report for OECD, Hedges (2011) explains:

The British Nationality Act 1981 came into force on 1 January 1983 and replaced citizenship of the United Kingdom and Colonies with three separate types of citizenship:
1. British citizenship, for people closely connected with the United Kingdom, the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man;

2. British overseas territories citizenship, for people connected with the British overseas territories; and

3. British overseas citizenship, for those citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies without connections with either the United Kingdom or the British overseas territories

(OECD, 2011: 304-305).

The gradual shifts in British overseas citizenship, made inside and outside the UK, are illustrated in Table 4. There is a clear change in 1983 when the British Nationality Act came into force with the increase in applications between 1991 and 1996 with the largest proportion of applicants arriving from India and Pakistan (Home Office, 2013). The newly adopted citizenship test which currently constitutes part of the naturalisation process was introduced shortly after the London bombing in 2005 and was modified in 2007. The test consists of 24 multiple choice questions based on the government publication ‘Life in the UK’, requiring a minimum pass of 75 per cent. The test can be taken several times until the individual has reached the minimum pass mark with mock versions available freely on the internet. According to EUROSTAT’s analysis of citizenship acquisition in EU27 for year 2010, Great Britain granted citizenship to 204,000 applicants which is the highest number for all of the EU in that particular year and represents 26 per cent of all new citizenships granted across EU27 (Sartori in EUROSTAT, 2011). It is somewhat paradoxical that the UK, which did not have an actual concept of citizenship until the British Nationality Act 1981, has adopted the citizenship test in 2005. This indicates the growing importance of citizenship and its acquisition in British politics. In other words, the ‘thickening’ of British citizenship refers to a new trajectory of British identity politics (Kostakopoulou, 2010; Paquet, 2012). The implications of the new citizenship test policy are far reaching for the new arrivals to the UK but also for the existing communities and Muslims especially. As the hypotheses (H1) and (H3) suggest, the national policies are essential for identity formation and are often framed along the ‘us’ and ‘them’ narrative. This means that by adopting citizenship tests shortly after the London bombing, the state authorities signalled their dissatisfaction with the existing integration and citizenship policies which was inevitably linked with the perception of isolated and increasingly radicalised British Muslims.
Table 4 Long time base grants of other British citizenship

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of grant</th>
<th>Grants of British overseas citizenship made in the UK (number of persons)</th>
<th>Grants of British Subject status made in the UK (number of persons)</th>
<th>British overseas territories citizenship granted in the British overseas territories (number of persons)</th>
<th>Grants of British citizenship made outside the UK (number of persons)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>10,876</td>
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<tr>
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<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
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<td>:</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>8,402</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>6,887</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>6,637</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>6,950</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>:</td>
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<td>:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>6,559</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>5,364</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>:</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
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<td>:</td>
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<td>5,561</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>5,955</td>
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<tr>
<td>1983</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>135</td>
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<td>1985</td>
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<td>1986</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,434</td>
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<td>1988</td>
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<tr>
<td>1989</td>
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<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4,349</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16,523</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>12,116</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>5,504</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>12,482</td>
<td>:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>29,581</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>201,549</td>
<td>:</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>7</td>
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<td>:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>:</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>:</td>
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</table>

(Source: Home Office Immigration Statistics January–March 2013, citizenship tables cz 04 q)
This new era of British identity politics, however, is closely related to British multicultural governance which radically influenced British citizenship and integration politics and conditioned to a great degree construction of Muslim identity.

The initial model of multicultural governance adopted from the 1970s was followed by a rather liberal model in its later stages. As the hypothesis (H3) suggests, it was the historical links with former ex-colonies and the Commonwealth that pave the way to this unique multicultural blend and race politics in the UK, conditioning the contemporary notion of Britishness and British identity politics. Nevertheless, British multiculturalism was blamed for neglecting the role of shared unity and belonging which help to create a strong bond between individual communities. Legrain’s argument reflects the growing discord within the individual groups:

> Without any overarching rationale to avert the drift into relatively self-contained ethnic communities, migrants and minorities assumed a right to practice their culture and religion – often with state subsidies to underwrite the costs of doing so (2006: 262).

Indeed, the communities previously joined by a shared sense of minority status, ethnic, racial or religious, began to define themselves not only in comparison to the home population but crucially also in comparison to each other. The mounting competition over state resources, allocated on the basis of difference and marginalisation escalated the internal divisions further. To obtain the state funding, community leaders faced a dilemma in which they were required to identify and even exaggerate the cultural differences and uniqueness of their particular community in comparison to the other groups. In other words, being different or disadvantaged became popular labels which almost guaranteed access to the financial benefits. Alibhai-Brown (2001) argues that ‘you get money for projects if you can show that as group A you are more excluded than group B’ (2001: 50). As such, the objective of British multicultural governance which was to celebrate cultural diversity and equality had a reversed impact with growing internal divisions including alienation of the white working class Britons. From this perspective the white working class has been racialised, and as highlighted in Pitcher’s study (2009), it grew increasingly hostile of minority groups, particularly in the deprived areas:

> The current Bradford scenario is one in which many white people feel that their needs are neglected because they regard the minority ethnic communities as
being prioritised for more favourable public assistance; some people assert that Muslims and, in particular Pakistanis, get everything at their expense (2009: 97).

These developments marked the increasing refusal and resentment towards the multicultural policies among the local and migrant communities. Malik who is less than favourable of British multiculturalism argues that ‘multicultural policies were, in fact, imposed from the top, part of a government strategy to defuse the anger created by racism’ (2009: 41). This view is also echoed by Kundnani who argues that ‘the policies that were implemented in the 1980s in the name of multiculturalism were a mode of control rather than a line of defence’ (2007: 44). Moreover, the institutional governmental processes led to empowerment of few selected Muslim representatives who were closely associated with the government but were often removed from the ordinary British Muslims. Returning to work of Malik, he connects religious and ethnic identity of British Muslims together with the multicultural policies but also with the identity perceptions in the minority-majority equation:

Over time, you come to see yourself as a Muslim and a Bangladeshi, not just because those identities provide you with access to power, influence and resources, but also because those identities have come to possess a social reality through receiving constant confirmation and affirmation (Malik, 2009: 69).

Malik’s view is supported by the proposed hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) drawing on the internal and the outer perceptions which condition how were are perceived by the others around us but also how we understand ourselves. British multiculturalism was held responsible for what was seemingly a growing segregation of British society. As Grillo points out ‘instead of an integrated society based on interaction and inclusiveness, silos of (in) difference emerged instead under Britain’s de facto multiculturalism, with a corresponding erosion of identity and unity’ (2007: 980) According to West (2004) multicultural polices were to blame for segregation of British communities and as a political project it should be abandoned. While Joppke (2003) asserts that multiculturalism in Britain was on retreat which according to his argument was demonstrated by the introduction of citizenship tests and the increasingly restrictive citizenship and migration policies. On the other hand, Modood (2010) refers to ‘re-balancing’ rather than retreat of multiculturalism in Britain. The unique British multiculturalism has certainly a number of flaws, with the failure to establish a shared sense of identity being one of them. However, the level to which this can be seen as a complete failure is yet to be determined. It is perhaps too soon to assess the future of British multiculturalism, however, as
suggested by the proposed hypothesis (H4), the policies thus far had an unprecedented impact on the formation of British Muslim identity, which will be examined in the empirical section of the thesis. This shift in British politics meant that migrants and minorities were under greater pressure to integrate into the British society and adopt British values and way of life. Indeed, the focus on Britishness and British identity became one of the important political initiatives in recent years. However, no clear definition of what British identity and Britishness actually mean was provided or even agreed. Asari et al. (2008) depict the concept of Britishness arriving at the following conclusion, ‘Britishness, once the proud mark of the in-group, rich with symbolic content, has now been reduced to an empty signifier, which as such has now become a mark of an outsider’ (2008: 12).

The transformations of British society and its ethnic, racial and cultural makeup were often subjects of tension and internal discords. A shadow Defence Secretary and member of the Conservative Party, Enoch Powell was one of the first political figures to publicly address and condemn the changing nature of British society. In his famous speech from 1968 he referred to ‘Rivers of Blood’ whereby ‘the West Indian or Asian does not, being born in England become an Englishman’ (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010: 50). By no means was the timing of Powell’s speech incidental. The year 1968 marks a significant step in British history with the first ever British Race Relations Act. Powell’s prophetic testimonial warning against Britain’s global decline and urging British society and government to reclaim and sustain true British identity, values and culture was deemed inapt by the government, costing Powell his seat as a shadow Defence Secretary. ‘Rivers of Blood’, however, also sparked a nationwide debate over the increasing number of foreigners living in the UK and their position within the British society, with an overwhelming majority of general public inclined to support Powell’s vision. Similar views circulated within the Conservative Party; Margaret Thatcher who was in favour of some of Powell’s arguments, as Parekh (2008) illustrates, was perhaps more assimilationist in her vision.

The reluctance to embrace migrant and minority groups into the British society was manifested further with Norman Tebbit’s ‘cricket test – which side do they cheer for’. In a similar vein to Powell, Tebbit argued that only those minority groups and migrants truly loyal to Britain cheered for England’s team during a cricket match. This paradigm was entrenched in a nationalising notion of competing loyalties and assimilated identities, diminishing other loyalties in the face of the dominant culture. The British national game, cricket, became symbolic of the nation itself, whilst the popularity of cricket in Britain’s former colonies and the Commonwealth was utilised as the means by which migrants from these countries could be tested.
The ‘cricket test’ exposed what would become a permanent concern with Britishness and British values and the framework within which the British Muslim identity was being formed. This framework was problematic for a number of reasons. As Fleras (2009) points out ‘the traditional concept of Britishness was highly racialised that is, British self-identity was informed by the concept of race, including the tacit assumption of white superiority’ (2009: 171). This self-identification along the lines of race and whiteness was significantly undermined from the late 1950s with the increasing immigration from the former colonies which presented a radical shift in the self-understanding and identification as British. Historically, Britain adopted approach traditionally used by the United States whereby any form of discrimination and marginalisation was recognised in terms of race and ethnicity, specifically skin colour. This approach transpired to be problematic for the increasingly multicultural Britain, where colour did not simply define primary form of identification as it often did with black African Americans. This was particularly problematic in relation to some communities from the Middle East which often regarded themselves as racially white. Moreover, Muslims were not recognised within the British legal framework as a distinctive ethnic group which significantly problematised their position. Modood (2003) explains this misleading racial/ethnic notion embedded within the UK’s system until 2010, pointing out that Jews and Sikhs were recognised as an ethnic groups which granted them specific allowances. Jews and Sikhs are free to wear yarmulke or turban at public places including their work. Wearing a headscarf for Muslim women was not legally endorsed until the European Union initiative on the Anti-Discrimination Law (on the grounds of Racial and Ethnic Origin, Religion or Belief, Disability, Age and Sexual Orientation) and the adoption of the Equality Act 2010, which replaced most of the existing equality legislation such as the Race Relations Act 1979 or the Employment Equality Regulations 2003 (including religion and belief). This is precisely the level to which the otherwise constrained European Union can challenge the nation states and fundamentally reshape the existing policies and legislations, therefore, it is vital to understand this link and connect it with the understanding and involvement of Muslim communities. The nexus between identity formation, the European Union and the nation state policies which forms a crucial part of this thesis will be addressed in the upcoming empirical sections.

**British Muslim communities**

Britain, unlike most European countries, collects data on religious affiliation in its census which takes place every 10 years, it is therefore easy to determine and even compare the size of Muslim population. At the latest 2011 census there were 2.7 million Muslims in England and Wales (5 per cent of the total population) and ‘nearly four in ten Muslims (38 per cent) reported their ethnicity as
Pakistani, a 371,000 increase (from 658,000 to over a million) since 2001. Nearly half of all Muslims were born in the UK’ (Office for National Statistics, 2013).

The history of Muslim communities in Britain, as has been outlined thus far, represents a complex relationship reaching to colonial and imperial history with most of British Muslims originating from Bangladesh, Pakistan and former African colonies. These historical ties fostered an unusual relationship between the communities, with most of these Muslims having access to British citizenship, and influenced the policies adopted to manage the changing fabric of British society. Since citizenship is often granted on basis of historical ties, it is identity formation and the notion of belonging that is at question. As previous chapter explained, identity formation and self-identification of the first generation was largely congruent with the identity assigned to them by the home population. In contrast, the second and third generation born or raised in Britain refused to embrace what they perceived to be a subservient position of their parents. In this case, the paradigm of identity construction fostered in the self-image and external perceptions confirmed the juxtaposition of their identity. By and large, their loyalties and affiliations were anchored in multiple identities, essentially consisting of ethnic origins, nationality and religious associations to name but a few. The multiple loyalties, however, proved to be divisive within the realm of British identity. The categorisation and labels dividing communities would suggest that Britishness, which is yet to be clearly defined, stood separate from Muslim identity, and the two were mutually exclusive. When asked about their multiple identities in the survey of young British Muslims conducted by the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust (2006), many participants expressed their frustration with what was perceived as a discord between the Muslim identity and Britishness:

Many Muslim participant deplored the fact that they were as they saw it, implicitly or explicitly being asked to ‘choose’ between these two identities (Muslim and British) both by the British people and the British government and they argued that the very question made them feel like ‘outsiders’ and served to reinforce their attachment to their faith (The Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, 2006: 21).

The competing identities and their labelling as not congruent by the majority population is addressed in the proposed hypothesis (H2). The challenge experienced by many young British Muslims is that of perceived exclusion from their home country but also from the country of their parents’ origin since they are often seen as too Western. Thus, some scholars (Roy, 2007; Hussain,
2006) argue that British Muslims face a dilemma of split identities, being Muslim and British simultaneously. Others (Malik, 2009) argue that on the contrary the problem is an identity vacuum with no concrete identities to refer to. That being said, when there are seemingly competing identities, it may be the same as if there were none, and subsequently new identities are being sought. Parekh (2008) draws on this notion of new identity formation amongst young British Muslims which according to his argument ‘form their own groups based on a shared subculture of defiance and victimhood’ (2008: 124). Taking into account the identity paradigm and hypotheses introduced in this thesis, a new form of British Muslim identity materialised amidst some of the Muslim youth with religious identity becoming an overarching umbrella identity. This is, as outlined in chapter 4, to a degree aided by the external perceptions emerging after the London bombing. The events of 7 July 2005 were followed by the adoption of the Prevention of Terrorism Act (2005) and the Terrorism Act (2006) granting new powers to British police who as a result can detain suspects for up to 28 days without a charge, together with the right to stop and search. The ‘Prevent’ agenda remains one of the controversial policies arguably targeting British Muslims as possible terrorists.

Examining the position of Muslim faith groups on a national level, Britain serves as a unique example of self-appointed faith groups rooted in the bottom-up approach which is largely absent from the other state selected European Muslim faith organisations. The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) for instance, acts as an umbrella organisation for a large number of UK based Muslim faith groups and although it is not recognised by British government as a partner organisation it is regularly referred to by the official spokespersons as a valid interlocutor of British Muslims. Notwithstanding its formally impartial status, the Muslim Council of Britain has been condemned by many ordinary Muslims for its rather poor response to their marginalisation in British media. The Muslim Council of Britain became increasingly regarded as a puppet of British government and its position was further exacerbated after the 2005 London bombing with many British Muslims questioning MCB’s credibility. Other strategically important organisations claiming to represent interests of all British Muslims include the Muslim Human Rights Commission (MHRC), the Union of Muslim Organisations (UMO), or the Muslim Association of Britain. In this respect, British approach to integration of Muslim faith groups is rather exceptional and in contrast with the continental vision of Muslim civil representation.

In his work, Malik (2009) offers an interesting hypothesis drawing a parallel between the growing Muslim mobilisation along the religious lines and a self-image. Malik suggests that some of the rhetoric adopted to support radical or terrorist actions such as the 9/11, London bombing or
insurgents in the Middle East, is not political as such but rather serves a social role implying a popular image of Muslim solidarity, peer admiration and respect (Malik, 2009). Furthermore, Malik argues that many of those who join radical Islam have little knowledge of Islamic teachings or Quran, and subsequently are easily swayed by militant groups. This is not to claim that those joining the path of radicalised Islam, who are by all means a minority, do so in search of popularity and peer admiration. It is, however, a valid point that must be taken into consideration and will be investigated further within the empirical analysis.

4.3 German case study

Background
Unlike the UK resting on pillars of multicultural empire, Germany was a late starter in the colonial race and was rather hesitant to acknowledge the migrant community or specifically the guest workers as a permanent feature of its society. The guest workers were, as Malik explains, ‘as late as 2001, still being called gastarbeiter (guest worker), since Germany refused to accept them as settled immigrants’ (2004: 132). It was not until the new millennia that Germany’s self-perception adjusted to the reality of its immigration and officially recognised that the migrants and guest workers residing in Germany for decades were to stay. With 6.7 million persons in 2009, Germany had the largest share of non-nationals across the EU (Green, 2012). Based on the information from 2011 census, foreigners constitute 8.2 per cent of the total population in Germany and 19.3 per cent of German population has a migrant background (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013). A substantial proportion of the migrants entering Germany in the prosperous post-Second World War period originated from Turkey, with some other guest workers from Southern Europe or North Africa, mostly Italy, Greece and the Maghreb countries. Currently, the Muslim population in Germany consisting predominantly of Turks is estimated to make up around 3 to 4 million people (Kılıçlı, 2003; Mühe, 2007). However, the German Statistisches Bundesamt is not, for reasons of data protection and privacy, permitted to collate information on individual’s religious affiliation, making it problematic to estimate the religious composition of German society.

Germany’s immigration, asylum, integration and citizenship policies have been strongly influenced by its troubled and turbulent history. Reflecting on the theories of nationalism, it was not until recently that Germany pursued citizenship policies within the realm of ius sanguinis, stressing the importance of ethnicity, descent and blood relations. Adopted in 1913, Germany’s citizenship law which was in effect until 1999 represented the pinnacle of ius sanguinis. The role of the citizenship
law was twofold, both inclusive and exclusive in its nature. On one hand, its restrictive character was to guarantee minimal access to citizenship for other ethnicities residing within the German border, specifically Poles and later on the guest workers. On the other hand, the citizenship law was designed to accommodate any Germans or descendants of German origin who no longer lived on German territory.

In Germany, hundreds of thousands of German-born descendants of migrants are still officially ‘foreigners’ (Ausländer) without full political rights. Ethnic German immigrants (Aussiedler) newly arriving from Russia, on the other hand, receive full social and political rights on the basis of a hereditary link to the nation (Koopmans & Statham, 2000: 198).

Drawing on the argument outlined by Koopmans & Statham, the emphasis of Germany’s citizenship law until 1999 and the Ausländer / Aussiedler categorisation portrayed national associations and political participation. The guest workers/Ausländer and their descendants had, in most cases, no citizenship rights and no involvement in political developments on the national level. In turn, for many of these guest workers, the lack of participation in their country of residence resulted in increasing interest in the national politics of their countries of origin. This became problematic for the second and third generation who were to a great degree alien to the countries of their parents’ origin.

Citizenship, integration, immigration and asylum policies

Until the citizenship reform in 2000, Germany’s völkish nationalism (Joppke, 1998) made it merely impossible for those of non-German descent residing permanently in Germany to obtain citizenship. Compensating for its restrictive citizenship policies, Germany implemented a highly supportive and efficient network of additional legislation on both the national/federal and the regional/individual state level, granting significant rights and protection mechanisms to long term residents. This was particularly important for the position of guest workers and their descendants, who have been directly affected by Germany’s ius sanguinis policies. Examining the political and legislative arrangements in detail, it is evident that Germany adopted policies pursuing management of its Turkish community, rather than its integration into the wider society. The hope was that the Turks would eventually return to their country of origin or would become assimilated and invisible fragment within the German society. These policies had a profound effect on German Muslim identity formation whereby as argued in the proposed hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) the nation state
policies and the creation of ‘us’ and the ‘other’ act as the key factors in identity construction. Developments of Germany’s citizenship, integration, immigration and asylum policies have, however, undergone considerable transformation in the last two decades. To understand the policy changes, particularly within the realm of citizenship, migration and integration, it is essential to deliberate on the historical factors, such as post-war developments and German unification.

Despite their significant numbers, the guest workers settled in Germany were not recognised as a responsibility of the German state, and even after several decades there were no plans for their integration into the wider society. This lack of provision for integration was compensated by a well-developed system of rights for permanent residents, which included the majority of the guest workers, with almost equal rights to those of the citizens with the exceptions of citizenship which was purposely withheld. This juxtaposition of significant rights and restricted access to citizenship was characteristic of Germany’s unique approach. The 1973 economic decline expanded this trend and prevented any new economic migration including the gastarbeiter. In fact, Germany introduced a new policy encouraging return of the guest workers to their countries of origin, with the aim to reduce economic pressure on the German society. This voluntary repatriation had a multiple effect, with some guest workers, including those from Turkey, returning to their home countries. Majority of the guest workers, however, refused to leave Germany and in fear of closing borders brought their families. The extent to which the family reunification law shaped German society was remarkable to the point that between 1973 and 1980 approximately 3 million nonnationals entered Germany under its provision (Borkert and Bosswick, 2007).

The remaining port of entry for any new nonnationals outside the merit of family reunification became asylum under the Basic Law article 16. Indeed, Germany received the highest number of asylum applications across Western Europe which as argued by Joppke (1998) indicated a uniquely liberal character of article 16 of the Basic Law. The German system was such that it was not unusual for asylum applicants unsuccessful in the UK or France, whose systems were highly restrictive, to apply in Germany where they were almost certain to be granted an asylum. The increasing number of applicants under the provision of family reunification and asylum played a key role in raising internal tensions within the German society with public debates focused on changes to the migration and asylum polices. In particular, the Basic Law and article 16 came under heavy criticism and became an important factor in federal elections.
The collapse of communism in East Germany (GDR) and the upcoming unification in 1990 increased the fears of unwanted migrants and economic decline with large numbers of ethnic Germans fleeing post-communist Europe to live in Germany. Resembling the almost transitory character of German nation in the post Second World war period and the importance of the long awaited unification reaching beyond the scope of geographical borders, was German citizenship and the principle *ius sanguinis*. Hence, the comparatively open migration and asylum policy with substantial rights for long term non-nationals and the limited access to citizenship for those without German descent. Nevertheless, as explained by Joppke (1998) the number of ethnic Germans, who with the exception of ethnic origins had in some cases very little in common with their German counterparts, reached unprecedented highs.

The Federal Republic had to absorb 3 million new migrants between 1989 and 1992, almost twice as many as the American immigrant nation took in during the 1920s – no small thing for a country that defines itself as ‘not an immigration country’ (Joppke, 1998: 127).

This trend signifies one of the most divisive policies in the history of modern Germany. The ethnic Germans from the former communist block were regardless of their cultural and political differences integrated into the German society. Whilst the descendants of the guest workers who were born or raised in Germany were often politically and culturally excluded and referred to as the ‘other’. Article 16 of the Basic Law was amended and the rule of the ‘safe third country’ was implemented as part of the asylum policies following pressure from the EU and German unification. Within the realm of the safe third country rule, most applicants for asylum were redirected to other countries, mainly the EU accession countries of the Central Eastern Europe. These measures, nevertheless, did not prevent the increasing resentment and animosity in German society towards the non-Germs and the guest workers in particular.

The generous benefits initially offered to ethnic Germans arriving into the country, which were significant incentives for any potential new arrivals, were increasingly difficult to sustain and at the beginning of the new millennium were reduced to a minimum. This was part of a nationwide strategy in which the former East Germany was expected to share the burden of migration by absorbing 20 per cent of all new arrivals. In reference to the status of Eastern Germany, Joppke (1998) explains that West Germany was misguided and ‘culpably oblivious of a depressed society that had just escaped from two subsequent dictatorships and did not know how to deal with brown
skin’ (1998: 127). The growing inner tensions provided a subtext for renewed public discourse on regulation of foreigners in the country and migration policies. Calls for citizenship reform emerged at a backdrop of this rather hostile setting with the aim to transform citizenship legislation from the traditional *ius sanguinis* to a more civic oriented *ius soli* and enable dual citizenship.

Bauböck (2003, 2006), Green (2000, 2004, 2005, and 2012), Howard (2008), and Palmowski (2008) offer detailed analysis of German citizenship including a wide range of data, thus examination of their findings will provide the framework for assessment of the citizenship law in Germany. The citizenship reform which came to force on the 1st January 2000, and replaced the citizenship law from 1913, had far reaching implications. The importance of citizenship for any nation state, especially when shifting form the ethnically oriented to the more civic citizenship, has been described and analysed in the first chapter, therefore the assessment of changing German citizenship policies will follow this theoretical framework.

Within the party politics, the new citizenship law was supported by the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Green party, who saw the legislation as means of unifying the diverse German population and were keen on the principle of dual citizenship. Opposition to the proposal came from the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union of Bavaria (CSU), who were in particular opposed the idea of dual citizenship which, as they argued, encouraged split identities and loyalties. Within this context, the 2000 Basic Law reform resembled the internal turmoil of German society on the issue. In its final form, the legislation introduced the principle of *ius soli* whereby the children born to non-nationals with at least one parent residing permanently within the country for the minimum of 8 years, were automatically granted German citizenship. The law was applied retrospectively and included all children of the non-nationals with permanent residency born after the 1st January 1990 and was directly connected to the provision of dual citizenship.

This was a revolutionary development, enabling some of the second and third generation descendants of guest workers to become citizens. Referred to as the *Optionsmodell*, the principle was founded on the notion of temporary dual citizenship and stipulated that the individual ought to opt-in for German citizenship and renounce any other citizenship they may have by the age of 23 or their German citizenship would be stripped off. The first generation affected by this provision included those born in 1990 is reaching the benchmark of 23 years of age in 2013. Nonetheless, the legislation is not clear on the monitoring and checking processes or the implications for those opting
out of German citizenship, or keeping their dual status. Problematic is also the conditionality of at least one parent permanent residency, which as Green (2012) explains is rather exclusive:

It excludes the comparatively high proportion of non-nationals living in Germany with only a temporary residence status. In consequence, only around half of all children born annually to non-national parents in the country actually qualify for *ius soli* (2012: 176).

The Basic Law amendment made the citizenship acquisition easier and more inclusive, yet critics argue that the naturalisation process became more difficult as a consequence. The new citizenship law reduced the permanent residency period from 15 to 8 years, thus enabling applicants to begin the process of naturalisation sooner, however, the fees payable for the process of naturalisation increased from €51 to €255 (Green, 2012). To address the issue of integration and naturalisation, in 2006 the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and the representatives of migrant groups held a first ever ‘Summit on Integration’. It soon became apparent that integration in German terms, also known as *Leitkultur* or ‘the leading culture’ by the conservative parties, referred to assimilation of minority cultures into the dominant German culture. This supports the hypotheses (H1 and H3) introduced in this thesis focusing on the question of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ and the role of the nation state policies in identity formation of Muslim communities. In effect, Germany’s policies of integration and naturalisation define very clearly who is part of ‘us’ and who is the ‘other’.

Significant changes to the naturalisation process transpired during the two subsequent reforms of the new citizenship law in 2004 and 2007. The 2004 reform introduced a language requirement, in form of the language tests, as a compulsory part of the naturalisation process, making it virtually impossible for those who did not possess the sufficient level of German language, to obtain the citizenship. The most controversial of the 2004 reform was the introduction of supplementary citizenship tests at a federal state/ *Länder* level. The naturalisation and citizenship processes fall within the realm of the individual *Länder* and subsequently vary from state to state. Creating disparities amidst the individual federal states, the most controversial citizenship tests were initiated by two of the more conservative *Länder*, Baden-Württemberg and Hessen. Whilst Hessen’s supplementary test was inspired by the knowledge-based tests from the USA and Canada, currently also adopted by the UK and the Netherlands, Baden-Württemberg’s tests simply discriminated Muslim applicants. Baden – Württemberg, with the support of German *Verfassungsschutz* (the Internal Intelligence Service) closely monitored Muslim organisations deemed as potentially
dangerous or fundamentalist and refused to naturalise, hence grant citizenship, to anyone who participated in or was associated with any of these organisations. In 2006 Baden-Württemberg introduced additional questionnaire, the Gesinnungstest, to the citizenship application, scrutinising candidate’s personal views. Indeed, this attempt to potentially refuse any unwanted applicants has sparked a nationwide debate on citizenship tests and in particular targeting of Muslim applicants. As proposed in the hypotheses (H1 and H3) this particular piece of legislation has a significant impact on Muslim communities in Germany including their sense of acceptance and belonging on two levels. It targets a particular group which it deems to be the ‘other’ that is also fundamentally different to German population and which it aims to exclude. It is worth citing Green (2012) who examined the tests used by Baden-Württemberg at length, to understand the bigoted character of this particular legislation.

Baden-Württemberg had chosen to complement its security checks with a series of hypothetical questions to be put by officials to applicants in an interview in an attempt to elicit their values and attitudes on a range of issues, including terrorism, equal rights and homosexuality. But what caused the most concern was the fact that the questions were only to be used in cases in which the applicants were Muslim (Green, 2012: 178).

In an attempt to harmonise the naturalisation supplementary tests across all federal states, Hessen’s knowledge-based testing was adopted and became an essential part of the second amendment of the citizenship law in 2007. Although the 2007 reform permitted dual citizenship for citizens of all EU member states, it excluded other countries such as Turkey. This brings to question possible ramifications for German citizenship policies should Turkey eventually join the EU. Moreover, requirements of clean criminal record with a maximum sentence of up to three months and the ability of applicants from 18 years of age to provide for themselves were added under the 2007 reform as part of the naturalisation criteria. Hence, Germany’s citizenship reform restricted the naturalisation processes which form an essential part leading to the acquisition of citizenship. This combination was to a large degree responsible for an overall drop in the naturalisation rates since 2000, and thus the considerably low take up of German citizenship, see Figure 1. Indeed, the changes and alternations of the Basic Law were reflected in the levels of naturalisations with 2008, first year after the 2007 amendments, having the lowest number of naturalisations since 1998. Furthermore, naturalisation of Turkish nationals reached critically low levels in 2008 and 2009 falling below 25,000 representing a fall from 1999 of over 75 per cent (Green, 2012). In 2011 the total
number of naturalisations increased slightly to 106,897 persons, with Turkish citizens as the largest group at 28,103 persons (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012). According to the latest figures, ‘more than 112,300 foreigners became naturalised German citizens in 2012 which is a 5.1 per cent increase on 2011’ (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013).

![Figure 1 Total citizenship acquisitions in Germany between 1998 and 2009 (source: Sartori in Eurostat, 2011)](image)

**German Muslim communities**

Germany’s Muslim communities represent a wide range of groups including Bosnians, Iranians, Iraqis, Moroccans, Egyptians and Turks. Turkish Muslims are the largest Muslim community in Germany with around 3-4 million which constitutes around 4 per cent of the total population (Kılıçli, 2003; Mühe, 2007). The approach adopted by Germany was to manage rather than to include and integrate its Muslim minorities into the dominant society. As a result, the descendants of Turkish guest workers, who were in most cases born and / or raised in Germany, were by and large recognised as foreigners or the ‘other’. This perception was also manifested internally by the self-recognition of German Turks as outsiders in German society. Drawing on the identity politics the German system, after the citizenship reform in 2000, embraced elements of both, inclusive and restrictive policies, which shaped the identity formation of German Muslim Turks. The argument presented in this thesis which is supported by four interrelated hypotheses implies that identity is fluid; this is a prime example of such fluidity with the changing policies and shifting identities. Yet, combination of the two competing policies is not specific to Germany, the tension between inclusion and exclusion, as chapter 1 shows, is typical for all nation states. However, in the German context it
generated a unique environment where Muslim communities were confined to a position which was unjust in offering a form of membership but only in a limited sense. Avoiding simplistic generalisations, two competing views analyse integration and interests of Turkish Muslims in Germany. On one hand, Koopmans & Statham (2003) and Shönwälder (2010), argue that as outsiders in their own country German Muslims who are mainly from Turkey, increasingly relate to culture and politics of their country of origin. This is reiterated by Turkish government with a number of cultural programmes and proposals involving German Turks, with the overarching aim to retain the on-going ties between Turkish Muslims in Germany and their country of origin. This argument fits in with the proposed hypotheses (H2 and H3) and the notion of misplaced identities which are isolated by the nation state policies. Turkey is a very nationalistic country and as such maintains and promotes the links with its diaspora, in this case German Turks.

Origins of Turkey’s relationship with Germany and the European Union date back to 1959 when Turkey officially applied for associate membership in the European Economic Community, leading to ratification of the Association Agreement in 1963, which finally led to the opening of accession talks in October 2005. Some member countries notably Austria, France and Germany have been hesitant and even opposed to Turkey’s possible membership in the European Union, citing its cultural differences, economic and human rights issues and fears of increased Turkish migration into the EU as main issues of concern. Fears of growing migration from Turkey are evident in Germany in particular, largely due to its existing Turkish migrant population comprising around 4 million people. Moreover, the on-going dispute over the island of Cyprus exacerbates Turkey’s relationship with the EU and its member states. Some of the populist discourses across the European Union question Turkey’s commitment to secular principles and in particular the repercussions of Turkey’s Islamic tradition on the composition of the European Union’s population, culture and heritage. Drawing on Turkey’s Islamic roots, there is uncertainty concerning Turkey’s ability to fight radical Islam particularly since it shares borders with some of the most volatile nation states in the region such as Syria, Iraq and Iran. In fact, should Turkey become a member state of the EU, the European Union borders would expand to neighbour these very nation states.

Investigating the internal relations with Turkey, it is essential to examine the role of Turkish Islamic parties on German politics. The Refah Partisi party replaced by the Islamist Reformist Justice and the Development Party (AKP) or the Millî Görüs, are often found in the EU states with large Turkish population such as Germany. The Refah Partisi party, as Silvestri (2006) explains in her article on Europe and Political Islam, was banned from Turkey following its 19 per cent victory in 1994.
elections largely due to its Islamic and anti-Western rhetoric. Subsequently, the Refah Partisi was replaced by a number of smaller parties following in its footsteps with the most successful being the Islamist Reformist Justice and Development Party (AKP). In 2003 the AKP’s leader Erdogan won the general elections and became Turkey’s Prime Minister sparking a new debate in Europe, questioning Turkey’s commitment to secular and democratic principles. In fact, the two political parties, AKP and the Milli Görüş, established their branches across the EU with focus on Germany where majority of European Turks reside. Within the EU framework, the Milli Görüş has been identified as an Islamist party closely associated with Muslim Brotherhood, and in Germany it has been put on a list of possible terrorist organisation. The Turkish diaspora in the European Union is increasingly connected to membership in these arguably radical organisations, maintaining their loyalties with Turkey and its political structures. Furthermore, Turkey has been frequently criticised for encouraging its diaspora in the EU to maintain close ties with their ‘homeland’ under the prefix of retaining political and property rights in Turkey. This is, as argued by the European media and politicians, at the expense of European Turks’ integration.

In 1981 Turkey reformed its citizenship policies enabling Turkish nationals living abroad to obtain dual citizenship. In 2008, also in support of Turks living abroad, Turkish government passed legislation enabling its citizens residing on permanent basis outside Turkey, to inherit and purchase property. On his visit to Germany in 2011, Turkish Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan encouraged his fellow countrymen to integrate into the German society, however, he emphasised the need to preserve their Turkish heritage and maintain close relations with their country of origin. Indeed, unable to vote in general elections in Germany unless in possession of German citizenship, substantial proportion of German Muslims of Turkish origin is, as of June 2011, able to vote in Turkish general elections. In contrast, Schiffauer (2006) believes that there was a significant shift whereby the young generation of German Turks (who are also Muslim) was progressively more oriented towards Germany and Europe, particularly the internal affairs affecting Muslim communities such as the headscarf controversy, rather than cultural and political issues in Turkey. In his analysis, Schiffauer suggests that identity of younger generation German Turks is becoming increasingly Europeanised. However, Schiffauer admits that there is a disconnect between their interests in the European politics and the lack of involvement in German politics. The explanation can be found in the citizenship and integration policies which support this paradox. In fact, the number of new applications for naturalisation from German Turks has declined and ‘only 20 per cent of Muslim Germans are naturalised citizens’ (Mühe, 2007: 15). The lack of trust between the state authorities and Muslim organisations is also palpable and contributes to the internal discord
between Muslim and German communities. Germany implemented a blend of state driven initiatives with the proactive self-appointment of Muslim faith groups. Hence, the state grants an official stamp of approval to some of the already existing groups, enabling them to politically organise and lobby whilst maintaining a regulatory role over their membership criteria and key activities. Moreover, the controversial citizenship tests and the additional questionnaires introduced in Baden-Württemberg targeting Muslim applicants increased the sense of hostility between the communities. Several scholarly research articles revealed the rather sceptical attitude towards Muslims with ‘overwhelming majority (70 per cent) of Germans who think that relations between Muslims and Western countries are generally bad’ (Mühe, 2007:55; Shönwälder, 2010).

4.4 The Czech Republic case study

Background

The case study of the Czech Republic (ČR) differs in many respects from those of the UK and Germany, particularly because unlike the UK, the Czech Republic had no imperial history, and unlike Germany it never became an advanced industrial power attracting migrants. Turbulent history of the Czech Republic as a constituent unit of Czechoslovakia dates to its establishment in 1918 in the aftermath of the First World War, subsequent occupation by Nazi Germany and the communist takeover in 1948. Coming to existence at the backdrop of post-communist transitions in 1993, as one of the two successor states of the former multinational Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic represented the larger and more industrialised of the two new states. The geographical position of the Czech Republic near such an imposing military, industrial and political power such as Germany influenced the political and the cultural makeup of its society. Moreover, the Czech Republic evolved from over 40 years of communist regime to an independent democratic state and in 2004 became member of the European Union. Historically, the Czech Republic was known to produce migrants or more precisely political emigrants, rather than receive them. However, the fall of communism and accession to the EU opened borders of the highly homogenous Czech Republic which according to the 2011 census is 96 per cent Czech (Český statistický úřad, 2013b). The process in which this opening occurred was twofold. On one hand, as part of its accession to the European Union, the Czech Republic took part in the ‘safe third country rule’, aimed at migrants and asylum seekers hoping to enter into one the EU member states. On the other hand, the Czech Republic grew increasingly attractive to migrants from ex-communist countries, particularly the former Soviet bloc.
In 2011 there were 436,319 foreigners, with Ukrainians (31 per cent) and Slovaks (17 per cent) as the most numerous groups followed by Vietnamese, Poles and Russians (Český statistický úřad, 2013b). For these migrants the Czech Republic presented an opportunity of settling in one of the most prosperous of the new accession countries with similar post-communist and Slavic background. Opening of borders after the relatively isolated period of communist rule led to the emergence of new policies and structures within the society.

A significant challenge for the Czech Republic, which is according to research analysis by Voicu (2011) one of the most secular nation states in the European Union, was the religious character of some of the migrants and asylum seekers it absorbed. Simply put, migration and asylum policies are designed to regulate ethnic relations by producing laws and regulations, however, the religious character of these migrants and asylum seekers was not addressed. The homogenous character of the Czech Republic makes it poor in diversity, thus its legislation is often weak when it comes to minorities, as is the case with Roma which is with 1.6 per cent the largest minority. Within this framework Muslim communities represent a challenge for most post-communist states including the Czech Republic.

Currently, there are estimated 11 thousand Muslims in the Czech Republic, however, the exact figure is unclear as the official statistics do not collate data on religious affiliation. Czech scholars frequently refer to anything between 10 and 15 thousand with the latest research by Topinka (2007) indicating the 11 thousand figure. Other sources, usually Islamic from outside the Czech Republic, for instance IslamOnline.net, claim numbers as high as 50 thousand. Taking into account research by Topinka, it is plausible to accept that 11 thousand reflects the most reliable estimate. In comparison to the UK or Germany, where Muslim communities comprise millions of people, the 11 thousand figure is only a small fraction of the overall 10.5 million Czech Republic’s inhabitants. Nevertheless, dismissing the importance of Muslim communities in the post-communist Central Europe, based on its relatively small size, would be misleading. Migration and asylum applications across most of the post-communist nation states, including the Czech Republic, may be lower than across the Western Europe, however, they represent a major shift for the post-communist societies which were not part of the migration trends between 1945 and 1989 and existed in relative isolation from Western Europe. Most importantly, these are very new developments in terms of national identity and accommodation of minority groups. The Czech national identity has had to adapt to political and constitutional changes resulting from the fall of communism and new independence; since 2004, this already complex reconstruction of national identity has been augmented by the accession to the EU.
Citizenship, integration, immigration and asylum policies

Following its turbulent history and border shifts, the Czechoslovak and later on the Czech citizenship legislation came to existence with the declaration of the Czechoslovak Republic in 1918. The framework used as basis for the legislation was derived from the Austro-Hungarian laws which were founded in principle of *ius sanguinis* (Baršová, 2006). Expelling of ethnic Germans and Hungarians, some of whom lived in Czechoslovakia for generations, shortly after the end of the Second World War in line with the controversial Beneš decrees served as a reminder of the ethnically oriented citizenship policies. Reflecting on chapter 1, this form of citizenship took on a purely ethnic dimension; it became a unique bond joining all members of the nation together against the non-members. The ethnic element of the Czechoslovak citizenship was retained during the communist regime which despite its efforts to eliminate ethnic differences encouraged ethnic divisions. In the multinational states such as Czechoslovakia, it was a common practice to record individual’s ethnicity (*národnost*) in official documents and ID papers and therefore sustaining their ethnic identity. Another significant shift in citizenship policies followed the demise of communist regime in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of Czechoslovakia leading to the creation of two independent nation states of the Czech and the Slovak republics.

Breakup of Czechoslovakia, low levels of external migration and the internal population shifts between the two newly emerged states were the main drivers in new citizenship legislation. Of particular concern was legislation affecting Slovaks residing on the Czech territory and vice versa, leading to debate on dual citizenship between the two states which was in the end refused by the Czech Republic. Aside from the discussions concerning dual citizenship, the provisions for settlement of Czech and Slovak citizens were largely resolved by 2000 and the matter lost prominence. Currently, the citizenship and naturalisation policies are still informed by the *ius sanguinis* principle, however, some significant changes have been made. The developments of citizenship acquisition since 2001 are indicated in Figure 2. The data shows a decline of citizenship acquisitions in recent years making it one of the lowest in the EU 27 (Sartori, 2011). In fact, in a study by EUROSTAT comparing the EU 27 member states, the Czech Republic had the lowest number of citizenships granted compare to the number of resident foreigners i.e. non-nationals resident in the member state (EUROSTAT, 2010: 1). The debates concerning citizenship policies gained importance in recent years, particularly as the issue of Czech – Slovak citizenship no longer applied, and the Czech Republic faced new challenges especially the increased levels of migration and asylum applications from the former Soviet bloc. Levels of migration and asylum are minor in comparison to the Western Europe, however, they present a considerable challenge to the self-perception of the Czech Republic.
on a number of fronts. The Czech Republic has with the exception of Roma hardly any significant minorities and historically is inexperienced in integration of migrants and culturally diverse groups. Its policies are similarly to Germany oriented towards exclusion rather than inclusion and clearly categorise who is in and who is out. As the proposed hypothesis (H3) argues, this has a significant impact on identity formation of Muslim communities who are automatically defined in opposition to the home population. As the Eurobarometer study shows, only 17 per cent of Czechs think that immigrants contribute a lot to their country, this is in comparison to 30 per cent in Germany and 47 per cent in the UK (Eurobarometer, 2006:43).

![Figure 2 Total citizenship acquisitions in the Czech Republic between 2001 and 2011 (source Český statistický úřad, 2013)](image)

The Czech citizenship legislation has undergone significant changes with 2013 amendments to citizenship acquisition and a new bill on dual citizenship, which were passed by the parliament in March 2013 and come to force on the 1st January 2014. This new legislation transforms the citizenship acquisition and naturalisation processes which directly affect children of migrants and long term residents with other than Czech citizenship. The reform has been controversial as it opens up the possibility of dual citizenship but it also makes the access to citizenship, through the naturalisation policies, more difficult. This follows the recently adopted trend in Europe whereby the citizenship is becoming more open whilst the route leading to its acquisition, in most cases through naturalisation, is becoming more difficult. Under the old provisions which are still in force, citizenship in the Czech Republic is automatically granted to anyone who has at least one parent with Czech citizenship. Children of parents who do not fulfil these criteria could obtain citizenship on the condition that at least one of the parents is a permanent resident. Similar provisions are applied to stateless persons who are automatically eligible for Czech citizenship. For other applicants,
citizenship could be acquired through naturalisation which has been renowned for its strict criteria which include:

- passing of the Czech language test
- renunciation of previous citizenship
- permanent residency for at least five years
- clean criminal record
- fee of 10,000 Czech Crowns (€400)
- evidence of contribution towards social and health insurance and tax

(Parlament České Republiky, 2003 - Own translation from the Czech text).

The pathways to citizenship acquisition remain the same under the new legislation, however, there are some key changes in the criteria requirements. Children who were born or lived in the Czech Republic since the age of 10 and whose parents do not have Czech citizenship, can apply to become Czech citizens by declaration when they reach adulthood - 18 years (Parlament České Republiky, 2013). This is a positive development which for the first time addresses the need to integrate descendants of long term migrants. There are, however, conditions attached to citizenship acquisition by declaration. The declaration must be submitted within three years of reaching adulthood (21 years of age), the child must prove that he/she is a permanent resident and has a clean criminal record.

Another positive development of the new legislation and perhaps the most revolutionary one is that applicants will be no longer required to renounce their previous citizenship. The possibility of dual citizenship applies to all applicants for Czech citizenship and also Czech citizens who take up citizenship of another country. It is expected that this particular legislation will make most pronounced and positive impact on the future citizenship applications. Some of the less positive changes apply to naturalisation processes where there is an increase in the criteria to be fulfilled by the applicant. Perhaps the most controversial of the new legislation is section 7 which affects children born to a foreign mother and a Czech father who are not married or are separated. Under the old system, the child would automatically be granted Czech citizenship upon declaration, however, the new legislation stipulates that there must be a paternity test (DNA test) to determine the father. This rather humiliating procedure exacerbates the notion of otherness and exclusion for
the non-members and potential applicants for citizenship, which as was argued in the proposed hypothesis (H3) is essential for their identity formation.

Other, less positive changes to naturalisation include:

- The Czech language test and civic test on history, constitutional system, and socio-cultural aspects of life in the Czech Republic

- clean criminal record – applicants deemed potentially dangerous to the state or its citizens will not be granted citizenship

- 5 year permanent residency for Third Country Nationals and 3 year permanent residency for the EU nationals – to be proven by the applicant with relevant documentation

- 3 years prior to the application for citizenship the applicant must not breach any rules or regulations specifically relating to health and social benefits, tax benefits and pension and can provide evidence of contribution towards social and health insurance and tax

- 3 years prior to the application for citizenship the applicant does not ‘unnecessarily’ claim state benefits

- the applicant can provide legal source of his/her income

- the naturalisation period may take up to 180 days rather than 90 days which is the current period

(Parlament České Republiky, 2013: Section 14 - Own translation from the Czech text).

In addition to these conditions, the new legislation in Section 13 also stipulates:

The citizenship of the Czech Republic may be granted, if the applicant is integrated into the Czech society, namely this relates to family, work or social integration... (Parlament České Republiky, 2013: Section 13 - Own translation from the Czech text).

Moreover, section 18 builds on section 13 and the notion of integration whereby ‘there must be a genuine link between the applicant and the Czech Republic...’ (Parlament České Republiky, 2013: Section 18 - Own translation from the Czech text).
This rather controversial requirement starts from the position that it is necessary to check applicant’s loyalty to the receiving state, implying that the applicant should not be trusted and only applicants with a ‘genuine’ link are to be welcomed. Essentially, the legislation aims to control applicant’s identities and loyalties. To determine the extent to which the applicant complies with sections 13 and 18 the new legislation grants additional powers to the Ministry of Interior. In fact, some of the naturalisation requirements, with the exception of 5/3 year permanent residency and clean criminal record, can be, under specific circumstances, exempt at the discretion of the Ministry of Interior. Waiving these requirements can be granted on individual basis and without any clear guidance. This has sparked criticism amongst the NGOs and other non-governmental groups for what they call a VIP treatment and excess powers of the Ministry. In particular, the criticism is aimed at the lack of transparency and consistency across all the applicants. This is explained by Čaňek and Čižiňský (2012) in their letter to Czech Parliament about the proposed legislation:

Potential applicants and foreigners living in the Czech Republic as permanent residents say that one of the main reasons for the low take up in applications for Czech citizenship is the lack of transparency and that they would not be granted the citizenship anyway because the Ministry of Interior officers only give it to whom they want (2012:2).

It is important to understand that despite the criticism and the very low numbers of new citizens in comparison to the rest of the EU, the new legislation represents a significant step forward in realising the changing structure of the nation which can be no longer defined in purely ethnic terms. Prior to these changes, permanent residency was locked in with citizenship and immigration policies, with immigration laws specifying the period under which the individuals could apply for permanent residency. The mandatory waiting period before any application for permanent residency could be made, was 5 years of continues legal residency. In other words, there was a total of 10 years before the applicant could submit an application for Czech citizenship. This was a significant obstacle for any potential applicants who were to submit to the long waiting period without a citizenship status. On the parallel level, the state authorities were, in the aftermath of the post-communist period, increasingly centred on personification of the nation along the ethnic lines with strict assimilative requirements on any potential applicants for
membership. The waiting and the residency period were, however, reduced in 2006 from 10 years to total of 5 years as a result of the EU harmonisation processes.

The framework for the asylum provisions is to a great degree modelled on the citizenship policies and is almost a replica of the assimilatory patterns applied in the naturalisation process. The fall of communism and the European Union accession negotiations led to significant modifications of the asylum policies and legislature in 2002, bringing the Czech Republic in line with most of the Western Europe. The application rate was comparably low, nevertheless, significant.

A particular dramatic increase was observed in 2001 when more than 18,000 asylum seekers entered the asylum procedure. The number dropped again in 2002, mainly as a result of an amendment to the Asylum Act in 2002, introducing new restrictive clauses, including the ban to work legally in the course of the first year of the asylum procedure – the recognition rate is approx. 2 per cent (European Refugee Fund, 2006: 2).

Developments of the Czech Republic’s asylum, citizenship and naturalisation policies illustrate a mixed trend observed in similar patterns across Western Europe. On one hand, citizenship acquisition is opening up in legal terms, however, the asylum and naturalisation processes forming an essential part of citizenship application are becoming increasingly restrictive. This juxtaposition produces an environment where citizenship is increasingly recognised as a reward for a complete integration into the dominant society whilst the path to this integration, in the form of naturalisation, is exclusivist.

**Muslim communities in the Czech Republic**

History of Muslim communities in the contemporary Czech Republic can be located to post World War One period with ‘the first Muslim community Moslimské náboženské obce pro Československo (the Muslim Religious Communities in Czechoslovakia) established in 1934’ (Ostřanský, 2009:1). The community was not, however, united in its views on the future developments and subsequently failed to gain the official recognition of the Czechoslovak government. Adding to the animosity were events from the Second World War with claims that members of the Muslim communities cooperated with the Nazi regime. In fact, the leading representative of the Muslim Religious Community in Czechoslovakia, a Czech convert Muhammad Abdullah Brikcius, was found guilty of collaboration with the Nazis. These accusations contributed to the overall negative perception of
Muslim communities and Islam amongst the general public which also prevented Muslim communities from establishing a new community centre after the war.

Despite the ban on their public organisation or any religious activity under the communist rule, Muslims were not prosecuted. In fact, during the Cold War the communist regime encouraged and maintained close ties with several Islamic and Muslim states (Libya, Morocco, Syria or Yemen), and encouraged student and professional exchanges. Many of these exchange students and professionals permanently settled in Czechoslovakia. With the fall of communism in 1989 the circumstances preventing public associations of Muslim communities diminished, and the first official Muslim association was established 2 years later. Ústředí Muslimských Náboženských Obcí (the Centre of Muslim Religious Communities) was founded in Prague as a national umbrella organisation which was in 2004 officially registered as association acting on behalf of Muslims in the Czech Republic. New centres were registered in other cities across the Czech Republic including Brno in 2007, Teplice in 2009 and Hradec Králové in 2010.

The progress made by Muslim groups in establishing the state recognised Islamic organisations and centres, is essential to the community. The centres are not, however, sufficiently equipped or permitted by the law to set up faith schools, perform weddings or funerals, build mosques or obtain financial support from the state. Indeed, despite the official recognition of Islamic centres, Islam is currently not registered as a state religion under the act No.3/2002. As illustrated by Bureš ‘complete registration is possible only after a ten-year waiting period (which began on 1 January 2007) and upon presenting 10, 000 signatures of adult Muslims with permanent residence in the Czech Republic’ (2011: 4). Muslim representatives appealed to the requirement of 10, 000 signatures which they argued was discriminatory and violating basic human rights, however, the request for appeal was rejected by the government. As argued in the proposed hypothesis (H3), these stringent requirements and the function they perform are vital in the identity politics and identity construction. In case of the Czech Republic, the state authorities adopted the legislation as a protective barrier or means of exclusion, making it clear that Islam may be tolerated but it was not to be embraced as part of the national culture. In fact, the relationship with Islam and Muslim communities in the Czech Republic is still problematic. This is reflected in the approach and interactions within the society which largely ignore Muslim presence, or see them as a potential threat which should be monitored. To what extent is this felt by the Muslim community itself, will be examined in the following empirical chapters.
There are no significant minority groups in the Czech Republic, with the exception of the Roma which is estimated to be around 1.6 per cent of the total population (Vláda České Republiky, 2012). According to the latest figures Roma represent the largest minority in the Czech Republic with 180,000 or 1.6 per cent of the total population. In comparison, Slovakia has 380,000 Roma which is estimated to be around 7 per cent of the total population, Hungary has between 500,000 and 700,000 Roma which is between 5 and 7 per cent, and Romania has between 700,000 and 2,500,000, which is up to 11 per cent of the total population (Národní zpráva České republiky, 2012). Moreover, religious belief in the Czech Republic is amongst the lowest across the European Union suggesting that the relationship with religious minorities may be problematic (Voicu, 2011). Adding to the challenge, Muslim community in the Czech Republic is similarly to the other Muslim communities in Europe far from homogenous. Hence, for purpose of this section, Muslim communities in the Czech Republic are divided into three broad categories. The first category represents the Czech converts to Islam who are, in most cases, women married to Muslims and their numbers are relatively small with the estimate of 400. The second category of Muslims in the Czech Republic, as Ostřanský (2009) explains, is intertwined with the communist past and mostly includes the exchange students and professionals who entered the country between the 1960s and 1980s. The last category refers to the post-communist period and represents the most numerous and ethnically diverse group including the economic migrants, university students and asylum seekers.

Ethnic origins of this Muslim group range from Albanians, Arabs, Bosnians and Turks as well as migrants from the other Balkan countries and the former Soviet Union. In contrast to Western Europe, the Czech Republic does not have one dominant Muslim ethnic group as for instance Turks in Germany or Pakistanis in Britain. For Muslims in the Czech Republic, the differences are not only in ethnic origin but also in the period in which they arrived. Unlike their counterparts from the second category, who were well educated and who arrived into the former Czechoslovakia under the national exchange programmes and who in most cases over the lengthy period of time acquired Czech citizenship, the Muslim migrants or asylum seekers arriving after 1989 encountered significant legislative barriers preventing them from easier access to citizenship. As a result, it is the last group that established several Muslim organisations to represent the multitude of interests of the diverse Muslim community.

Ústředí Muslimských Náboženských Obcí (the Centre of Muslim Religious Communities) is currently regarded as a national umbrella Muslim organisation focusing on the relations between the local and the Muslim communities, promoting the knowledge of Islam amongst the ordinary people.
Muslimská Unie (the Muslim Union) and Islámská komunita Českých sester (the Islamic community of the Czech sisters) emerged largely to promote peaceful vision of Islam and to represent Muslims in the country. Muslim students studying in the Czech Republic founded their own organisation Všeobecný svaz muslimských studentů v České Republice (the General Federation of Muslim Students in the Czech Republic) which became very active in Muslim affairs and closely cooperates with the Centre of Muslim Communities and Islámská Nadace v Praze (the Islamic Foundation in Prague). The Islamic Foundation in Prague was established in response to the lack of available places of worship for Muslims in and around Prague in the 1990s and became one of the leading Muslim organisations in the country (Ostřanský, 2009).

In 1999 in addition to the Islamic Foundation in Prague, Muslim communities collaborated and self-funded Islámská Nadace v Brně (the Islamic foundation in Brno), located in Brno, the second largest city in the Czech Republic and most importantly Islámské Centrum v Praze Kyjích (the Islamic Centre in Prague Kyje) which is often referred to as the Prague mosque. This terminology, however, is misleading as currently building mosques in the traditional Islamic architecture with minarets is illegal. This is justified under the premise that Islam is not a state recognised religion. In fact, at the moment the mosque building in the Czech Republic is restricted to prayer rooms within the Islamic centres.

The public debates on the prayer halls and possible mosque construction were increasingly generating the narrative of ‘us’ and the ‘other’, with the ‘other’ posing a threat to the home society. It was this rhetoric that mobilised the local and Muslim populations and created a highly contentious and divisive environment despite the ban on building of traditional mosques. Bureš provides some interesting statistics on public attitude towards mosque building: in 2006, ‘75 per cent of respondents rejected the building of mosques in the Czech Republic; in 2010, 61 per cent of respondents, considered the erection of mosques tantamount to the demise of the Czech nation’s values and traditions’ (2011: 29). It is therefore interesting that the prayer hall construction in the suburban part of Prague - Kyje in 1999 attracted little attention from the public or the media largely because of its inconspicuous architecture. The prayer hall in Brno, on the other hand, which was built a year earlier in 1998 was met with a substantial opposition from the local people, media and politicians and even though it did not stop the construction of the mosque, it did create tension between the Muslim and the local communities. Another example of this anti-mosque rhetoric is the spa town of Teplice, at the north of the country which hosts a significant number of clients from the Middle East, particularly from the Saudi Arabia. The idea of a possible mosque construction was met with a strong opposition from the local population and press often adopting racist remarks and
comments. Similar instances occurred in several other cities across the Czech Republic and as outlined by Bureš (2011) it was increasingly obvious that as part of the debate Muslims were framed as dangerous, alien and the ‘other’. The fears of Muslim migration, crime and terrorism are particularly surprising considering that no Muslim terrorists were ever reported in the Czech Republic. In fact, the perception of Muslims in the Czech Republic is predominantly based on the events and information unrelated to the Czech Republic itself. Information using reports from foreign media is in most cases biased and contributes to the increasingly suspicious attitude towards Muslims.

With some exceptions, such as the independent research undertaken by two major Czech universities – the Charles University in Prague and the Masaryk University in Brno (Karlova Universita Praha and Masarykova Universita Brno), the research into the integration of Muslims is sparse and lacking in deeper analysis. Drawing on the existing academic publications and reports, the following observations, regarding Muslim integration in the Czech Republic, can be made (Barša, 2001; Barša and Baršová, 2005; Bečka and Mendel, 1998; Kropáček, 2002; Křížková, 2006; Topinka, 2007):

1. Marginalisation or discrimination of Muslims is relatively rare across the Czech Republic. In cases where marginalisation and discrimination does occur, it is often specific to Muslims from Africa. The interpretation of these developments is unclear, but some sources (Barša and Baršová, 2005; Topinka, 2007) refer to racial discrimination rather than religious marginalisation.

2. Segregation is increasingly attributed to women, especially the wives of Muslim economic migrants working in the Czech Republic. It is problematic to quantitatively measure the full extent of this exclusion, due to its subjective character and requires further in-depth analysis.

3. Extensive Muslim assimilation is rather rare, however, the so-called semi-assimilation is frequently observed within the Czech Muslim community. Topinka (2007) asserts that Muslim groups susceptible to increased assimilation are often from states with relatively strong ethnic identity and weaker religious identity. In other words, from states where the role of religion is decreased by the state policies and ethnic affiliations (Topinka, 2007).
4. Successful integration into the Czech society is most likely to occur amongst those Muslims who can incorporate values and cultural traditions of the local Czech society into their lives and simultaneously retain their ethno-cultural identity. This, according to some authors, represents the fusion of Islam with modernity (Barša, 2001; Topinka, 2007).

5. Muslim representatives in the Czech Republic suggest that their Western European counterparts are better integrated and accommodated. This is attributed to the internal initiatives of the state which is seen as actively encouraging belonging of Muslim communities into the wider society. There is a consensus that the living conditions and accommodation of Muslims in the Czech Republic is improving, particularly since its accession to the European Union.

Muslim migration and asylum into the post-communist countries, including the Czech Republic, are relatively recent. Muslim migrants and asylum seekers settling in the Czech Republic represent the first generation and it is yet to be seen what developments and measures will be adopted by the state with regards to the second generation. In comparison to Western Europe, Muslims in the Czech Republic do not follow the categorisation applied across the UK, France or Germany. The framework under which they entered the Czech Republic was neither as members of ex-colonies nor as temporary guest workers. On the contrary, the first generation of Muslims settling in the former Czechoslovakia were in most cases well educated and active members of the society which as argued by Topinka (2007) made them inherently different from Western European Muslims.

Summary
Focus of this chapter was primarily on the relationship between liberal democracies and their Muslim communities. The chapter aimed to illustrate the state specific circumstances and developments in the United Kingdom, Germany and the Czech Republic in terms of the interrelationship between the citizenship laws and immigration, and its reflection on the position of Muslim communities. The chapter flags important issues which contribute to formation of Muslim identities and offers a valuable framework for the following empirical chapters. The origins of Muslim communities in the case study countries are diverse, with a broad spectrum of Islamic and cultural traditions including Bangladeshi & Pakistani Muslims in the UK, Turkish Muslims in Germany, and Muslims from Bosnia and former USSR in the Czech Republic. The case study countries also differ in their approach and the management of Muslim communities with migration, integration
and citizenship policies shaping the relationship between the home population and Muslim communities.

The role of the European Union in this context is not insignificant. The European Union has been a driving force behind the project of European Islam, whereby it is anticipated that it will strengthen the European Muslim identities and associations to Europe and prevent Islamic fundamentalism or radicalisation. The European Commission and to a lesser degree the European Parliament promote and actively encourage dialogue with Muslim faith groups aiming for a better integration of the European Muslim communities and moderate European Islam. There is a fear that radical Islamic groups will penetrate through some of the European mosques or that countries of European Muslims’ origin will hinder the prospects for their successful integration and formation of moderate European Islam. The concept of European Islam which is formed from top-down rather than evolving organically is, nevertheless, problematic and as argued in this chapter, may become counterproductive. The hypothesis of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’ (H1) suggests that playing the card of the good European Islam versus the bad non-European Islam may install a dichotomy in European Muslim self-identification and self-understanding, causing a resentment and detachment from European identity. Indeed, as an active player promoting European Islam from the top-down rather than bottom-up approach and encouraging organisation of Muslim faith groups along the lines of Christian groups, the European Union similarly to the nation states, has the tendency to homogenise when it comes to Muslim population. This is significant for relations between the European Muslims and the EU. The European Union, which is a supranational organisation challenges the domestic legislations of individual states, yet cannot detach itself from the nation state frameworks with regards to religion and Islam in particular.

Focusing on the individual nation states, multicultural Britain utilised strong ties with its ex-colonies, and attracted the majority of its Muslim migrant population through the historical ties. Germany, on the other hand recruited its Muslim migrant population mostly through the post-war guest worker scheme. The Czech Republic’s experience with migration and asylum seekers is relatively new and coincides with the fall of communism and subsequent accession into the EU in 2004. The state specific policies reflect these developments. British system is perhaps most multicultural, partly as a consequence of the UK’s history, with citizenship and integration policies more inclusive than in the other two countries. Despite the strong tradition of the civic participation the multicultural policies are criticised for their divisive impact on the individual minority communities, positioning them in direct competition over the state resources on the basis of otherness. To qualify for state funding,
individual communities often exaggerated their cultural differences and uniqueness not only in comparison to the dominant population but also to the other minority communities. German citizenship and integration policies, on the other hand, are still largely situated within the realm of *ius sanguinis* and exclusivity of the ethnic nation. Some changes have been taking places over the past 15 years, making the citizenship more accessible; however, naturalisation policies which are a leading step to citizenship acquisition became more restrictive. This is often compensated by good social provisions for permanent residents which act as a substitute for civic participation. As the section on Germany shows, this is successful to an extent but not completely as many long term residents and their children are still without citizenship. It is in this context that the role of the external homeland, in this case Turkey, becomes prominent. By maintaining and encouraging strong links with their diaspora in Germany, Turkey impedes their integration and civic involvement in German society. In contrast to the UK and Germany, the post-communist Czech Republic is comparatively homogenous, with Roma representing the only significant minority before the accession to the European Union. Since, the Czech Republic is experiencing increased Muslim migration, particularly from the other post-communist countries, such as the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. These Muslim communities, unlike Turks in Germany, have no or very weak links with their external homelands. The Czech Republic is a novice with little experience with multiculturalism and minorities and is yet to devise an appropriate legislation and policies to integrate their new minorities. One of the first steps, however, is the new amendment to the current citizenship legislation which for the first time permits dual citizenship and addresses the possibility of the second generation migrants born or raised in the Czech Republic obtaining citizenship.

In line with the country specific policies and approaches, the following chapters examine to what degree are these policies successful and their potential impact on Muslim communities and their identity formations. Explicitly, chapters 5, 6 and 7 draw on the empirical research with Muslim communities in the country case studies and analyse their views in a comparative perspective.
Chapter 5 – Muslim Identity versus National Identity

Introduction

This is first of three chapters evaluating data gathered during field work in the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic. The empirical research investigates contemporary identity amongst Muslims permanently living in Greater Manchester (the UK), Düsseldorf and Duisburg (Germany), and Prague (the Czech Republic) with special focus on young Muslims born or raised in the case study countries. It is important to note that the research reflects mostly on female position; this adds value to the data as research on Muslim communities is often dominated by men. On the other hand, it is also a limitation because it is difficult to assess how different the female voice is compared to men. The primary aim of the empirical research was to assess the self-perceptions of Muslims and their identities located within three core themes:

- Perceptions of Muslim belonging and membership within the country of their residence - this first theme is the focus of the present chapter
- Muslim identity and its possible radicalisation in their country of residence – analysed in the following chapter 6
- Muslim perceptions of the European Union and other Muslim communities – analysed in chapter 7

The aim is to compare and contrast research findings for each theme across the three case study countries and investigate any emerging patterns or differences. The empirical chapters seek to draw together otherwise isolated results for each country by using a comparative cross-country approach and bringing these together with country specific policies introduced in chapter 4. This approach generates a platform for meaningful data interpretation and allows for the construction of in-depth and multi-layered research findings. Starting with the research design and the sample group including demographic similarities, the key focus of this chapter will be on theme 1. In particular, it addresses Muslim perceptions of their belonging, equality and participation in the society and their self-identification and identity shifts. The following chapters retain similar layout with theme 2 analysed in chapter 6, theme 3 examined in chapter 7.
5.1 Research design and sample group

The analysis of the research data is based on the information collected from the sample groups, using structured questionnaires and semi-structured in-depth interviews with local Muslim communities. The total response rate for each country was determined at 30 respondents for the questionnaires followed up by 10 respondents for the in-depth interviews. All participants taking part in the research were recruited in local mosques, Islamic centres, cafes/shops or community centres. The fieldwork questionnaire, see Table 5, comprised of 8 questions broadly drawing on the devised themes. Questions 1-3 addressed Muslims’ own perceptions of their belonging and membership in the country of their residence, questions 4-5 focused on Muslim identity and its possible radicalisation and remaining questions 6-8 investigated the role of the European Union and ummah on Muslim communities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer options</th>
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| **Question 1.** How important is your Muslim identity to you in comparison with your national identity or identity of the country you permanently live in? | a) My religion is more important to me than national identity  
    b) My national identity is more important to me than my religion  
    c) They are both equally important to me  
    d) Neither is important to me  
    e) Don’t know |
| **Question 2.** Do you feel that country of your residence treats you as equal citizen/member of the society? | a) Yes  
    b) Most of the time  
    c) No  
    d) Don’t know |
| **Question 3.** Do you feel that you belong to your country of residence? | a) Yes  
    b) Sometimes  
    c) No  
    d) Don’t know |
| **Question 4.** Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs? | a) Yes  
    b) Partially  
    c) No  
    d) Don’t know |
| **Question 5.** Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful – the traditional Islam? | a) Yes  
    b) Perhaps  
    c) No  
    d) Don’t know |
| **Question 6.** Do you feel you have any knowledge of Muslims living in other European states? | a) Yes  
    b) Some knowledge  
    c) No  
    d) Not sure |
| **Question 7.** Are you interested in politics of the European Union? | a) Yes  
    b) A little  
    c) No  
    d) Not relevant to me |
| **Question 8.** Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims? | a) Yes  
    b) Some  
    c) No  
    d) Don’t know |
The semi-structured questionnaires and the themes, along which the questions were structured, were underpinned by a set of in-depth interviews. All interview participants received a set of questions (see below) and, based on their answers and questionnaire responses, additional questions were asked.

1. Can you define your identity in relation to your religion and your national identity?

2. Based on questionnaire questions 2 and 3, do you feel accepted and welcomed as Muslim in country of your residence?

3. Have you ever experienced any discrimination as a result of your religious affiliation?

4. Relating to questionnaire question 5, why do you believe that Muslims should or should not return to traditional Islam? Would you be in favour of Sharia law in country of your residence?

5. What do you think are the factors contributing to radicalisation of some Muslims?

6. Do you think you have sufficient knowledge of Muslims living in the other EU countries? Are you interested in other Muslim communities in the EU?

7. Referring to questionnaire questions 7 and 8, do you think that the EU plays an important role for Muslims in your country of residence? What is your opinion of the EU and how much would you say you know about it?

**The UK case study**

The empirical research in the UK focused on area of Greater Manchester which is ethnically one of the most diverse areas in the North West of the UK. Alongside the cities of London and Birmingham, Greater Manchester has one of the highest Muslim populations in Great Britain, particularly in areas of Bolton, Manchester city and Oldham. According to 2011 census, there are 232,859 Muslims living in Greater Manchester which constitutes around 8.5 per cent of the total population in the region (Office for National Statistics, 2013). The research undertaken as part of this study took place in Bolton, and areas of Manchester, specifically Levenshulme, Longsight and Rusholme, all of which have considerable Muslim communities.
Women comprised majority of participants with 21 out of the total 30 respondents. The follow up in-depth interviews were conducted with 7 women and 3 men, thus sustaining the predominantly female voice.

**Germany case study**

In German case study the research took place in the state of Nordrhein-Westfalen in the North-West of Germany, specifically the capital Düsseldorf and the nearby city of Duisburg. Both cities are important centres for Muslim communities in Nordrhein-Westfalen with Düsseldorf also being an important centre for the whole region. According to the Statistisches Bundesamt (2012) Nordrhein-Westfalen has the highest number of Turks (or Germans with Turkish origins) in Germany constituting around 32 per cent of the total Turkish population.

Parallel to the UK, most participants were female - in total 25 questionnaire respondents (from the total of 30) and 7 (from the total of 10) interview respondents were women.

**The Czech Republic case study**

Field work undertaken in the Czech Republic represents a fairly new research agenda, investigating Muslim communities within the framework of the post-communist nation state. The study was confined to the capital city of Prague which acts as a hub of cultural exchange and is most cosmopolitan city in the Czech Republic which according to the 2011 census had over 32.5 per cent of all foreigners in the country (Český statistický úřad, 2013b). Majority of Czech Muslims reside in Prague which is also home to several mosques and central Muslim organisations. The empirical research focused on the area of central Prague and Prague Kyje which hosts Prague mosque.

Similarly to the UK and Germany, most participants were female with 24 (from the total 30) taking part in the questionnaire and 6 (from the total 10) in the follow up in-depth interviews, therefore retaining the voice of women throughout the whole study.

**The sample group**

The respondent sample in the three countries shared particular characteristics, including religious affiliation, and long term residence in country of their stay, however, there were also differences such as age, religious traditions, culture, language and citizenship status. It is likely, that respondents’ age, possession of citizenship or level of education influence participants’ experiences and thus are reflected in their responses. As outlined in Figure 3, respondents’ age varied greatly
with the UK having the largest proportion of respondents in the under 19 and 20-29 category. In contrast, respondents from Germany and the Czech Republic were older, predominantly from 20-29 and 30-39 age groups. Significant differences were in the area of citizenship, see Figure 4, with all the UK participants having British citizenship. None of the respondents in Germany had German citizenship and only 6 respondents had dual citizenship. In case of the Czech Republic, 8 respondents had Czech citizenship with the remaining participants having other than Czech citizenship.

**Figure 3 Cross-country respondents' age**

![Bar chart showing respondents' age by country](chart1.png)

**Figure 4 Cross-country respondents' citizenship**

![Bar chart showing respondents' citizenship by country](chart2.png)
Building upon this data, Figure 5 offers an outline of respondents’ country of birth where the juxtaposition with citizenship levels becomes most apparent. It is also worth noting that in the case of the UK, respondents’ ethnicity varied greatly with the majority describing themselves as British Asian or British Somali. In contrast, the majority of German participants had origins in Turkey and mostly defined themselves as Turks or as German Turks, although 9 respondents were born in Germany. In case of the participants from the Czech Republic, most described themselves as Bosnian, former USSR, Asian, Turkish or other. The majority of participants were from the former Eastern bloc, specifically the former USSR countries and ex-Yugoslavia.

![Figure 5 Cross-country respondents' country of birth](image)

The final indication of the research sample was educational level which as shown in Figure 6 varied from the basic education to post-graduate degree. Best educational results were achieved in the UK with all respondents over the age of 18 attending or completed university undergraduate or postgraduate education and all younger respondents attending college. In Germany, most respondents completed their A-level equivalent and 4 respondents had undergraduate or postgraduate university degree, however, there was a relatively high number of participants with only basic education. The Czech Republic had similarly to Germany highest proportion of respondents who completed their A-level equivalent, with 6 participants having university undergraduate degree and 3 participants with basic education.
Drawing on these results, the sample varied greatly in areas of citizenship and education. There were some parallels between German and Czech respondents especially in relation to their citizenship, however, educational achievements were lower amongst participants from Germany. In contrast, the most encouraging conditions were in the UK with all participants as citizens and with comparatively high educational achievements. Nevertheless, the age group of participants must be taken into consideration, particularly with Britain having the youngest sample group. This suggests that age is an important variable when it comes to education and citizenship.

5.2 Theme 1 - Research findings

Questionnaires

The primary emphasis of question 1, see Table 6, was on respondents’ religious identity and national identity. The question sought to address to what degree, if at all, were Muslim loyalties to the nation state they live in, compromised as a result of their religious affiliation. Drawing on this theme were also questions 2 and 3, in Table 7 and 8 retrospectively, both addressing the self-perceptions of the individual respondents on their belonging and their integration as a result of their religious affiliation.
### Table 6 Question 1
How important is your Muslim identity to you in comparison with your national identity or identity of the country of your residence?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity Comparison</th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My religion is more important to me than national identity</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>83.4</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My national identity is more important to me than my religion</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They are both equally important to me</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither is important to me</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 7 Question 2
Do you feel that country of your residence treats you as equal citizen/member of the society?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treatment Feeling</th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most of the time</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>86.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 8 Question 3
Do you feel that you belong to your country of residence?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Belonging Feeling</th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sometimes</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UK case study

An overwhelming majority of respondents felt very strongly about their religious identity and in most cases participants regarded their religious identity more important than their national identity. In return, half of all respondents felt to be treated as equal members of the society (question 2 in Table 7), while 40 per cent of all respondents believed that this was the case most of the time. However, with regards to their sense of belonging (question 3 in Table 8), respondents were more or less divided, with just over half of respondents feeling that they belonged to the UK. Reflecting on the answers, cross analysis of question 1 and 2, in Figure 7, shows that majority of those who felt to be accepted as equal members of the society were also amongst those for whom religion was more important in comparison to their national identity. Investigating the relationship further, analysis of correlations between the questions 2 and 3, in Figure 8, indicates that respondents who felt to be accepted as equal members of the society were also amongst those who felt to belong to the UK. Indeed, respondents who did not feel to be treated equally were also less inclined to feel any sense of belonging to the UK. Based on these observations, there is a correlation between acceptance or more precisely equality and individual’s sense of belonging.
Assessing respondents’ religious and national identities, the questionnaire responses to question 1, confirm that to the majority of participants their religious identity was more important than their national identity; only 4 participants identified the two identities as equally important to them (see Table 6). Analysing these associations further were questions 2 and 3. The focus was on respondents’ perceptions of their acceptance and belonging to the country of their residence. Responses to question 2 indicate that most participants did not feel treated as equal members of the society, with only 6 participants feeling treated equally most of the time and no participant believed to be treated equally all of the time (Table 7). Parallel to this lacking sense of equality were answers to question 3, whereby only 7 respondents indicated that sometimes they felt to belong to the country of their residence and 20 respondents indicated that they did not belong to the country of their residence (Table 8). Investigating possible parallels between the three questions, Figure 9 examines correlations between the question 1 and question 2. The results indicate that most participants who did not feel treated equally also expressed that their religious identity was more important to them than their national identity. Nevertheless, a significant proportion of those who expressed to be treated equally most of the time were also amongst those who felt that religious affiliation was more important to them. Figure 10 illustrates the relationship between the questions 2 and 3 which resemble close parallels between equality and belonging. Indeed, respondents who did not feel to be treated equally were also lacking sense of belonging. Nevertheless, the research questions did not address associations between the lack of citizenship and detachment from
Germany which would strengthen any such conclusions. The correlation requires further analysis particularly in the context of Germany where majority of respondents had other than German citizenship.

Figure 9 Germany Correlations between Question 1 and 2

Figure 10 Germany Correlations between Question 2 and 3
The Czech Republic case study

Analysis of research question 1, examining respondents’ religious identity in comparison to their national identity, showed that majority of participants in the Czech Republic considered their religious identity to be more important than their national identity (see Table 6). Only 4 respondents felt that both their national and religious identities were equally important to them. In addition, the questions 2 and 3 draw on the sense of belonging and acceptance as perceived by the participants. Examining the results in detail, it emerged that in the context of the Czech Republic the two questions were opposed to each other. Majority of respondents did not feel treated as equal members of the society (question 2 in Table 7), however, most respondents believed to belong to the Czech Republic (question 3 in Table 8). Investigating the associations further, analysis of question 1 and 2, in Figure 11, suggests that respondents who indicated their religious identity to be equally important as their national identity were dissatisfied with their inequality and the lack of acceptance. Regrettfully, the sample of respondents was too small to apply this correlation and further research is needed to identify this particular development. Observing associations between the questions 2 and 3, in Figure 12, confirms the internal divisions between participants’ sense of equality and belonging. This cross analysis indicates an interesting shift in respondents’ identity whereby most participants had citizenship other than that of the Czech Republic, however, their loyalties lied with the Czech Republic.

![Figure 11 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 1 and 2](image-url)
Examining the first questionnaire theme in more detail, the semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted with 10 respondents from each country. The interviews were organised around the following questions:

1. Can you define your identity in relation to your religion and your national identity?

2. Based on questionnaire questions 2 and 3, do you feel accepted and welcomed as Muslim in country of your residence?

3. Have you ever experienced any discrimination as a result of your religious affiliation?
Interview question 1: Can you define your identity in relation to your religion and your national identity?

The UK responses

During the interviews with participants for whom religion was more important, respondents explained that their religion represented an overarching feeling of being and belonging, transcending the nation state and even personal relationships. The consensus was that this was by no means problematic in relation to their national and state loyalties. Female participant (age 28, born in the UK), interviewed in Bolton in a local café was very keen to share her view on this particular question. She felt a sense of entitlement to express her view which as she saw it was part of her citizenship rights.

I am first and foremost Muslim and then I am British. I am a loyal citizen but my religion takes over everything else.

In return, 3 participants who regarded their religion to be equally important as their national identity stressed that they felt equally Muslim and British with the two concepts overlapping, thus difficult to disaggregate.

Particularly interesting was the self-identification of interview participants, with 5 respondents describing themselves as British or British Muslim. In contrast, the remaining 5 respondents described themselves as British Pakistani or British Libyan, despite the fact they were born in the UK and had British citizenship.

One female respondent (age 21) described herself as British Pakistani even though she was born in the UK and never been to Pakistan. This respondent was interviewed in Bolton in a local café which had a mixed clientele of mostly young people from the local communities. She described herself as someone who has Muslim and non-Muslim friends and in the past did not wear a headscarf. She decided to wear the headscarf because she was proud to be British Muslim.

I am British and I am Pakistani, I cannot say I am just British or just Pakistani.
**Germany responses**

For most interview participants religious affiliation was more important than their national identity or identity of the country they lived in. Indeed, only 2 interview respondents indicated that their religious and national identities were equally important to them. Respondents who indicated their religious identity to be more important than German identity often justified this by what they perceived was the lack of their acceptance by German society.

Male respondent (age 40) born in Düsseldorf, was interviewed in a Milli Görüs mosque. At the time this particular mosque and other mosques associated with Milli Görüs were monitored by the local police and state authorities for possible terrorist actions. The fact that the mosque was being monitored made the interview more difficult as the respondent was initially very hesitant to share his views for fears of persecution.

National identity is important, I am not saying it is not but maybe it’s because I don’t feel like I belong here that I am not welcome or maybe it’s because the provisions for Muslims in Germany aren’t welcoming... but my religion is more important to me.

Female respondent (age 21) born in Turkey but brought up in Germany was interviewed in a small mosque in Düsseldorf which is attended mostly by young Turks. She was angry that she was being asked about her religious identity in comparison to her national identity which she did not deem to be on the same level.

I am Muslim and that’s all that matters to me, national identity, states, governments these are all man made and so I don’t see why I should compromise my belief just to fit in with their categories.

Male respondent (age 19) was born in Düsseldorf and had both German and Turkish citizenships. He was interviewed in a local café near his home. He was very poignant about his experiences as a young Muslim in Germany. In particular he referred to the exclusion and the lack of acceptance which he felt directly affected him and his feelings towards Germany.

This is a very personal question, I am German and I have German and Turkish citizenship but if I’m honest I don’t feel that Germans always see me as one of
them. When I’m in our mosque I feel that I’m accepted because we are all Muslims and no one is asking me about my nationality, that’s irrelevant in here.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Düsseldorf was interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre. Similar to other participants born in Germany she was nostalgic about her Turkish origins and expressed feelings of disillusion with Germany’s lack of acceptance. She was a practising Muslim but did not attend mosque regularly and saw Islam as something very personal and private.

This is a hard question; I was born in Germany but as Muslim and with Turkish heritage. I don’t feel that I’m always part of German society but I know that I will have Islam.

Female (age 37) was born in Turkey but was brought up since childhood in Germany where her parents still live today. She was interviewed in Düsseldorf Turkish Cultural Centre during a local festival. Her attitude was more or less optimistic and aware of the reality that comes with life in a non-Muslim country. She described herself as practising Muslim but she did not attend mosque regularly nor did she pray five times a day.

I am Turkish and I was born in Turkey but I was brought up in here, in this culture. I speak German, my husband is German and our kids are German. I know that lots of German people don’t approve of Turks marrying Germans and that it took a long time for people to accept us. I think that us, Turks, we are as guilty as Germans because we insist that if they don’t accept us, we will not become part of the society. I don’t think that’s right, you have to try. So although I am Muslim and Islam is important to me I also feel that my life in Germany or what you call my national identity are equally important.

Female respondent (age 33) born in Turkey but growing up in Germany was interviewed in Düsseldorf in a local Turkish café. She was proud of her Turkish heritage but was also keen to embrace her German identity.

Look, as long as we are blaming each other for not fitting in we are not going to get anywhere. Yes, I am Muslim but this country is my home and both are important to me.
The Czech Republic responses

9 interview participants indicated that their religion was more important to them than their national identity, only 1 participant regarded the two as equally important. During the interviews, respondents explained that their religious identity was an overarching identity transcending national borders, loyalties and attachments. The question of citizenship was particularly pressing, only 4 interview respondents were Czech citizens with the remaining respondents having the status of migrants with permanent status or asylum seekers. Indeed, the participants without Czech citizenship who indicated that their religion was more important to them than their national identity or Czech identity explained that their national / Czech identity was irrelevant because they were not citizens in the country of their permanent residence. Fundamentally, despite the strong association with religion, participants defined themselves alongside their ethnicity rather than religion, for instance Uzbek, Czech or Bosnian, rather than Bosnian Muslim, Czech Muslim or Uzbek Muslim. It was only when specifically asked to choose between the two identities that their religious identity became more prominent. This is an important point which demonstrates the fluidity of identities and will be examined in cross-country analysis.

Male participant (age 42) was born in Yemen but has been living in the Czech Republic for the last 21 years. He was interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre where he also worked. He was dedicated to improve the lives of Muslims in the Czech Republic and to open up debates about Islam with local communities. He was mostly optimistic about his life in the Czech Republic and was keen to share his views.

I came here as a student and I stayed because life here was better than back in Yemen. But it’s been a difficult journey. In Yemen majority of population is Muslim so living in the Czech Republic or any non-Muslim country makes you realise even more how much you love your religion. I had to get over many hurdles to become Czech citizen and work very hard, there were lots of bureaucratic procedures to go through. When you are dealing with all that, it makes you stick to the only thing that you have left…your faith. I like living here and don’t want to go back to Yemen because here I can live as a free person. But of course I’d like to see more positive attitude towards Muslims.

Female participant (age 27) was born in Uzbekistan and came to Prague with her husband as refugees. She was interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre after the prayer. She was highly educated and spoke 4 languages but felt disappointed about her country of origin.
I was born in Uzbekistan which is mainly Muslim but I became more aware of my Muslim identity here in the Czech Republic. This place means a lot to me because I realised Islam here and one of the reasons why I am here is because it is easier to practice Islam here than in Uzbekistan because of the state politics. I have my own story in this regard, state prosecution and all...

Male participant (age 32) was born in Bosnia and came to the Czech Republic as a refugee after the Yugoslavian conflict. He was interviewed in Prague Halal shop and café. Similarly to the other interviewees he was sceptical about the future of his own country. He was very active in the Muslim community and volunteered in the local halal shop.

My own country was and still is in a state of chaos. I feel Bosnian but after everything that happened to us I have no faith in the state or in national identity, I have faith in our religion, Islam. The Czech Republic is not perfect but this is my home now and hopefully it will stay that way and over time people will accept Muslims.

2 interview respondents had Czech citizenship but primarily identified with their religious community rather than their national community.

Female participant (age 34) was a convert from the Czech Republic. She was interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre after the prayer.

I was born in the Czech Republic but I don’t care about my nationality. I am first and foremost Muslim. Many Czech people don’t accept me because I am Muslim so how can I feel that my national identity is equally important or more important than my religion?

Another female participant (age 40) was also born in the Czech Republic but saw herself as Czech and African. She was interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre after the prayer.

I am what in Czech we call mixed race (mišenka), my father was from Sudan and my mother was Czech. I’ve always felt that I am Czech but not in a proper way, not like most of the people around me. I was raised Muslim which back in the 1960s was really unusual, I was aware that I was different, although I was always treated nicely by people who knew me and our family. Islam and being Muslim was always more important to me than being Czech.
The only respondent for whom religion was equally important as national identity was Czech born female convert, age 24 who felt strongly about her Czech national identity as well as her Muslim identity. She was interviewed in a local café in Prague.

I am Czech and I am Muslim. I know that people don’t like to see that here in the Czech Republic but that’s how I feel. Lots of people have problem with that and even my parents cut off any contact with me because I am now Muslim but that doesn’t change anything for me. I am sticking to my faith and that does not make me any less Czech.

Interview question 2: Based on questionnaire questions 2 and 3, do you feel accepted and welcomed as Muslim in country of your residence?

The UK responses

Responses to this question varied greatly with 6 respondents feeling accepted as Muslims in the UK most of the time or all the time. Female participant (age 28) interviewed in Bolton in a local café was mostly positive about her life in the UK.

Some people in here call me Paki and in Pakistan I am called British or even white. I am neither of those. I am British Pakistani and a Muslim. My dad is from Uganda so what does that make me? Most of the time I feel that I am treated as equal, sometimes I get shouted at racial abuse but that’s nothing major, you know what I mean. You get used to that sort of thing.

Male participant (age 21) born in Kuwait but raised in the UK was interviewed in Levenshulme in a local café. He felt treated equally most of the time, however, he made a clear distinction between equality and acceptance:

I am from Kuwait but I was raised in the UK from early age. Yeah, I feel accepted but not welcome and that is a big difference.

Female respondent (age 20) born in the UK was interviewed in Whaley Range in a local Muslim centre during a small cultural event. She was very positive about her life in the UK and did not see any conflict between her Muslim and British identities.
I feel equal and treated well. I have been wearing headscarf since I was 11 and for me it is part of my identity, it’s a cultural thing more than religious thing and it’s my choice. It doesn’t make me less British, it’s just who I am. And maybe I’ve just been lucky but I’ve never experienced any forms of abuse because I am Muslim or because I wear a headscarf.

**Germany responses**

There were a number of different responses to the second interview question.

Male respondent (age 19) born in Düsseldorf, interviewed in a local café referred to the combination of Turkish and German heritage.

I feel accepted on some level, people who know me and who are my friends accept me for who I am. I am lucky because my family has always tried to get us kids integrate with Germans, but at the same time keep our Turkish heritage and religion. So...I would say I feel accepted as Muslim by those who know me.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Germany was interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre in Düsseldorf. She felt very strongly about the distinction between different generations which indicated that at least some participants felt accepted by their peers.

I think that you have to ask different question of different generations. Like you know, I was born here and I went to German school, I speak German better than Turkish and I see myself as German Turk but I am not a citizen and I think that’s part of the problem. But I feel that most people I know accept me, most young people. But if you asked the older generation like my parents they would say that they don’t feel they are accepted or that they belong. They keep in touch with relatives in Turkey and follow Turkish politics. But the same goes for Germans, that generation does not see us as Germans, they will never accept us. Even if you are born here it doesn’t matter.

Male respondent (age 38) was very sceptical of Germans and their will to accept other cultures. He was born in Turkey and was interviewed in Düsseldorf in a local Turkish café. He explained why he did not feel accepted as a Muslim in Germany:

Germans think that they are special, they are told from early age from when they are little that they are the best, that they have achieved more than other nations,
they have all the big companies, they are number one in Europe. So when you have something like that it is almost impossible to get through to them - we are and always will be Turks. They will tolerate us but they will never accept us, you know they fear that we'll somehow destroy this perfect German machine.

Female respondent (age 29) born in Turkey but raised in Germany was interviewed in Duisburg in a Milli Görus mosque which was monitored by the local authorities. Unlike some other Muslims from the mosque, she was not overly negative about Germany and was relatively open about her views from the start of the interview.

I’d say that most people here (Muslim centre) feel that we are not accepted as Muslims. Germans don’t see Islam as part of their culture. Maybe the younger ones who were born here might feel more accepted but most of us don’t. It’s like we know it and so we accept it, most people in here expect to go back when they are old because in here there is nobody that would look after them, we don’t have German citizenship we are nobodies in here but back in Turkey we have families, friends and we are citizens.

Male respondent (age 40) born in Düsseldorf and interviewed in a local Milli Görus mosque felt very angry about the lack of acceptance he saw on part of German population.

I am German, I was born in Düsseldorf...I am Düsseldorfer, but I am not for Germans. I have university degree, I work very hard, pay tax and do all I can to make sure that the community where I live, Germans or not, is developing well, that our kids are happy. But that’s not enough for Germans, I’m simply not one of them and even if I were born here I would not be one of them. Just the other week my neighbour called me a terrorist. So there you go...

Female respondent (age 28) born in Turkey and interviewed in Duisburg in a local café felt disappointed with the lack of acceptance. She brought up the question of belonging and the desire to be accepted.

I don’t feel accepted or that I belong, I like Germany and it is part of my home but it’s hard to feel that you belong somewhere when local people don’t want you there. Even when they get to know you they only tolerate you, they will say ‘yes she’s Muslim, she goes to Friday prayers or she doesn’t eat meat and drink alcohol’ but that’s it. Because of that, even if these people are your colleagues or
friends they will see you as different, and if they’d have to publicly support you they wouldn’t do it because the rest of Germans would see them as traitors.

Female respondent (age 37) born in Turkey and interviewed in Düsseldorf Turkish Cultural Centre referred to being torn and expressed sadness over the fact that she could not be accepted the way she was.

It’s difficult. I think that quite a few of us, especially if we were born or raised in Germany feel torn. Part of us holds on to our Turkish heritage and religious traditions, but we are also Germans, at least in some way. My kids are half German and half Turkish they get lots of slack at school. They are often told that they are not proper Germans, you see little kids age 10 say this...But we are trying to show them that you can be German and have Turkish origins. As for myself I don’t feel accepted no, partially because I’m Muslim, but also because I’m Turk I think that the two are one for Germans.

Female participant (age 21) born in Turkey was interviewed in Düsseldorf in a local mosque. Similarly to the other participants she was rather angry about Germany and what she saw as a lack of acceptance.

I don’t feel like I belong or that I’m accepted no...before it was because we were Turks and now it’s taken on a new character, now it’s because we are Muslims. Germans, they are very proud people, they don’t want anyone who is not one of them to become one of them.

Female respondent (age 33) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café confirmed this view and referred to the differences between Germans and Turks.

We are two different cultures, Germans don’t want us here and I’m not sure how compatible Islam and German culture are. You can never ever mix the two, maybe I’m sceptical after living here for 20 years but I am resigned to the idea that we are not going to be accepted.

The Czech Republic responses

There was a consensus amongst interview participants that Muslims in the Czech Republic were often marginalised or excluded as a result of their religious affiliation. 9 respondents felt that they were not accepted by Czech society and only 1 respondent felt accepted most of the time.
Female respondent (age 34) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre, felt very strongly about the question of acceptance or more precisely the lack of acceptance. Her views were reiterated by the fact that she was Czech citizen yet as a Muslim she was powerless.

I think that people in the Czech Republic, as a nation, are very enclosed, there is very little tolerance and they are scared when it comes to Islam. They fear Islam and have negative outlook on Islam because they are strongly influenced by the media which portrays bad image or only negative things about Muslims. Czech people are uneducated when it comes to Islam, they know very little about it. Younger people are more interested in what Islam is about, they are also more open and they are not afraid to ask. I was really surprised when head teacher in our local kindergarten was supportive of our daughter being Muslim, making sure that while she is at school they do not give her any pork or any other of the forbidden food. It was such a great support and it made me realise that there are some good people who are happy to help. But those are still exceptions, we in the Czech Republic are missing acceptance and even support for Muslims and Islam.

Another female respondent (age 24) also a convert born in the Czech Republic, interviewed in a local café expressed very similar views.

I am proud to be Czech but I am not accepted. I was accepted when I wasn’t Muslim but now that I am following Islam it is different. My parents struggle a lot with the fact that I am following this faith, my mum is trying but my dad is finding it all very hard. I sometimes hear people on the underground or bus when I am travelling to work how they talk about me and say things like ‘look at her’. Or they make jokes about Muslims and they naturally assume that I cannot understand them, that I am foreigner. And sometimes when I am with my daughter and we speak Czech, people are in shock, sometimes they are quite rude. It is as if they cannot believe that I am Czech and Muslim. There is the notion that as foreigner you can be Muslim and people will stare at you and make jokes about you but that’s all, as foreigner you can be a Muslim. But if you are Czech and Muslim, they feel that you betrayed them, you are suddenly the outsider, a black sheep.
Male respondent (age 32) born in Bosnia and interviewed in a halal shop in Prague shared similar view. His understanding was based on the comparisons between the Czech Republic and Bosnia. Overall, he was positive despite the lack of acceptance.

I like it here, people can be a bit suspicious at first but usually once they get to know you, they are ok and tolerate you. But I don’t think that they accept you if you are Muslim. Back at home (Bosnia) we’ve had our own issues but there were lots of Muslims so I can understand that it may take a while for Muslims to be accepted in here. That’s fine, it’s new for them. But I’ve heard from some of my friends here in the mosque that Czech people who are Muslim find it hard, they are seen as traitors or something like that and that’s not fair.

Another male respondent (age 27) born in Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic centre came to the Czech Republic with his wife as refugees. Similarly to the other respondents who were refugees or escaped persecution he was, despite the relative lack of Muslim acceptance, positive about his life in the Czech Republic.

Me and my wife have been here for 6 years now and I am happy here. I like Prague and the people. Our daughter is going to local kindergarten and is very happy there. I know that people stare at me and talk about me sometimes maybe because I am Muslim and I dress a little different. Maybe it’s more because I look like a foreigner.

Female respondent (age 28) was born in Ukraine and was interviewed in a local halal shop and café. She was more critical of Czech society and preferred to keep away from any non-Muslims. She was very open about this and did not see any reason why she should integrate into the Czech society.

I think that for women it’s more difficult because we wear headscarf so we are more visible than men. Lots of Muslim men wear similar clothes to other Czech men so you cannot tell. I have two daughters and they are raised as Muslim, they speak Czech and Ukrainian and they come to mosque with us. Other kids at school were curious at first but after a while they got used to it. When you explain to kids what Islam is about and what your beliefs are then they are more accepting than adults. I personally don’t feel accepted and I try to keep myself to myself. I only meet with other women from the mosque or other Muslims from Ukraine.
Number of participants (8 in total) raised the issue of mosque building in the Czech Republic. As male respondent (age 42) from Yemen interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre explained:

As much as Czech Republic tries to support us, the state is very careful about what we can do. I know that most Muslims would welcome to have a proper mosque with minarets like you see in the Muslim countries or even in some places in Europe. But that is not permitted in the Czech Republic. What we have here are not really mosques, even though they are called mosques. They are community centres and they are built in a way that they fit in with the surrounding environment, that’s how it is required by the law. We are of course glad that we have this community centre and that we have somewhere to pray and practice our faith but ...(shrug his shoulders)

Female participant (age 28) born in Ukraine and interviewed in a halal shop and café reiterated similar concerns:

We would like to have a proper mosque here in Prague, with minarets and praying rooms. In all Muslim countries they allow to build churches and places of worship for other religions so we would really welcome if we could have a proper mosque in here.

The question of Muslim schools in the Czech Republic was also raised (by 9 participants). Female convert born in the Czech Republic (age 34) interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre felt very strongly about this particular topic. She believed that her children needed this support in order to improve their knowledge of Islam.

In the Czech Republic we have very little support for Muslims, which I think comes with support for Islamic education of our kids. We desperately need Muslim kindergartens, schools where our kids can learn about Quran and the word of our Prophet Muhammad, about Islam, Arabic and about the values that we as Muslims follow. I don’t mean for these schools to replace normal schools, they would be an addition.
Another female participant (age 27) from Uzbekistan, interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre added:

We are trying to educate our children and make them proper Muslims but it is hard when there is no school where they could all learn together. I agree that they should still go to normal school but if we could have a school for Muslims where they could learn what it means being Muslim and where they could learn about Quran that would be a great step for all Muslims in the Czech Republic.

Male participant from Bosnia (age 36) interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre also supported the idea of Muslim schools:

Of course that we would welcome the opportunity to have Muslim schools here but I can see that this is not going to happen or it will take a long time before it does. Islam is not official religion which means that we cannot set up schooling in our centres. It is a pity because it is something that most Muslims here in our community want.

Female participant from Ukraine (age 38) interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre brought to attention the problems she experienced as a result of wearing headscarf which she felt completely ignored her feelings and dignity:

Most of us wear headscarf, it is unusual for women in our mosque to wear burqa, there is only one woman that I know that wears burqa and she is from Saudi Arabia so it’s a bit different. I think that here in our mosque we all feel that burqa is too much. But even then, wearing headscarf makes you more visible. I know that people sometimes stare at me because it is unusual for them to see someone with a headscarf on. I have to take my headscarf off for official photographs like for passport, social service or immigration control, they don’t care how it makes me feel…

One female respondent interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre, born in the Czech Republic (age 40) whose father was from Africa, felt that she was more or less accepted by the society:

People must educate themselves about world religions so that they can form their own opinions and not just follow what is said in the media. I’ve always felt accepted but when I say accepted I must point out that only to a certain level. It was like ‘ok she is a mixed race so we know what to expect…’maybe it is not
exactly that I was accepted but more that I was tolerated. It felt that because I was mixed race and my dad was from Sudan, it was expected that I will be a bit different and that I will be of different religion. I suppose it would be harder have I been just Czech.

**Interview question 3: Have you ever experienced any discrimination as a result of your religious affiliation?**

**The UK responses**

By and large, interview respondents agreed that they have not experienced major forms of marginalisation or discrimination. However, 8 out of 10 participants indicated that they have experienced racial abuse and ‘name calling’ which was not directly related to their religion.

One male respondent (age 24) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range Muslim Centre local event explained:

> You know Britain is really accommodative towards Muslims and I think that lots of Muslims ignore the fact that we can live pretty much as we want in here. I personally haven’t experienced any major discrimination, but if Britain stops being welcoming towards us (Muslims), we will go somewhere else. Maybe to a Muslim country where we can practice our religion.

**Germany responses**

The consensus amongst interview participants was that marginalisation or open discrimination was rather rare. However, participants agreed that there was a sense of unspoken tension, or even unspoken marginalisation and lack of acceptance.

Male respondent (age 40) born in Germany and interviewed in a Milli Görus mosque touched upon the question of German pride and unspoken tension between Germans and the non-German population.

> Germans are a very disciplined and proud nation. They don’t violate human rights or anything like that. We are in most cases, as far as I know, allowed to attend Friday prayer which means leaving work early...they make provisions for us on
some level, yes. But it comes at a price, we are seen as the lazy and different Turks/Muslims who aren’t proper Germans.

Male respondent (age 38) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local Turkish café in Düsseldorf shared this view and reiterated the notion of unspoken tension and almost invisible exclusion which was, however, very much present.

Sometimes I hear comments or jokes about Muslims being terrorists but that’s about it. It’s hard to explain, there isn’t direct marginalisation but it’s more hidden, we are seen as outsiders who should be kept at a safe distance. So they let us be and I think that they hope we’ll not cause much trouble and most of all that we’ll not mix with them.

Female participant (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre had a more positive experience particularly with young people:

I know that some Germans are very anti-Muslim or anti-Turks but most of the people I know are indifferent. I suppose that because of the history and World War 2 there is still some kind of a stigma and Germans don’t openly discriminate or marginalise.

Female respondent (age 37) born in Turkey and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre was perhaps one of the most integrated of all the participants in Germany. She tried to avoid finger pointing and blaming either side.

Germans aren’t the ones to marginalise, I think it’s the system more than anything that discriminates Turks and Muslims. It’s harder for Turks to go to university or get good jobs.

Female respondent (age 33) born in Turkey and interviewed in Düsseldorf local café shared similar views:

I think that lots of people keep themselves to themselves so we often don’t mix with Germans, they don’t want us to mix and after a while you get used to that. I think it’s a bit different for the younger ones because they do have some friends that are German but even then, these friends are often told at home that they should not hang out with Turks.
The Czech Republic responses

Respondents agreed that they have not experienced any significant marginalisation or discrimination, however, all interview respondents admitted to have been subjected to some verbal abuse targeting their religious affiliation and to a lesser degree their ethnicity. Participants indicated that they were often stared at or mocked with inappropriate jokes. There was a consensus that the problem was a lack of knowledge amongst the Czech population about Islam and the novelty of seeing veiled women. Most respondents felt that once people got to know them and realised that they were like everyone else, they were less suspicious and became more accepting and welcoming.

Male respondent (age 42) from Yemen but living in the Czech Republic for over 21 years was more accepting of the fact that many Czechs were ignorant about Islam and on the whole was positive of the Czech society.

Czech people are not used to the idea of Islam, they are not used to seeing women with headscarves, it is a problem but usually it is the case that once they get to know you they are ok. I don’t think that I can say that they would welcome Islam and Muslims but they tolerate you and stop looking at you like you are a threat to them.

Female respondent (age 40) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre agreed with the previous participant. She was, however, more critical of Czech ignorance with regards to other cultures and Islam. She referred to the question as more personal particularly as she felt, as a non-white person, directly affected by this ignorance and racism.

Czech people are quite racist and most of them don’t believe in any religion so you can imagine that if you look different and wear headscarf you really are a target. They are negative towards outsiders because they don’t know them, they don’t understand what headscarf is about. They are quite open in their dislike but I would say that people who know me also make the effort to know why I’m wearing headscarf and even asked me questions about Islam.

Female respondent (age 38) from Ukraine interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre also mentioned ignorance of Czech people as one of the main problems.

Czech people are ignorant and they are afraid of everything that they don’t know...like Islam. They think that we live in harems, that we are forced to marry our cousins, that our husbands are oppressive and don’t let us women out of the
house or that women have to walk at least 5 steps behind their husband. This is all nonsense, their perception is from what they hear in media, what they know from old stories about the Middle East and the fairy tales. I’m not saying that this never happens, in some places it can be like that but it is rare and it’s definitely not like that in here. So yes, I think us Muslims, we are discriminated because of our religion but it’s mainly because there is ignorance in this society.

5.3 Theme 1 - Cross country analysis

Emphasis of this analysis is on participants’ perceptions of their belonging and membership in the country of their permanent residence as analysed by the questionnaire questions 1, 2 and 3. By and large, question 1, illustrated in Figure 13, shows similar results across all three countries with only minor differences. Britain had highest proportion of respondents who indicated their national and religious identities to be equally important to them, whilst the Czech Republic had a highest number of respondents for whom religious identity was more important. However, as indicated in Figure 14 significant differences were in question 2, assessing respondents’ feeling of equality. Taking into account the lack of citizenship amongst participants from Germany and the Czech Republic, it is perhaps not surprising that the UK had the largest number of respondents who felt to be treated equally all or most of the time. Drawing on the individuals’ sense of belonging, Figure 15 shows continuing disparities between respondents from the UK and the other countries. Nevertheless, high proportion of respondents from the Czech Republic indicated their attachment/belonging to their country of residence. Germany on the other hand, showed a significant lack of belonging amongst its participants with only 7 respondents implying some level of belonging.
Q.1 How important is your Muslim identity to you in comparison with your national identity or identity of the country you permanently live in?

Figure 13 Cross-country Question 1

Q.2 Do you feel that country of your residence treats you as equal citizen/member of the society?

Figure 14 Cross-country Question 2
Research findings and hypotheses

Locating research findings within the proposed hypotheses, there are number of important points for consideration. The nation state has traditionally acted as a guardian of the nation and its culture clearly distinguishing between those who are in, the citizens, and those who are out, the ‘other’. In the contemporary world with diverse communities and mixing cultures the role of the nation state is increasingly blurred and its homogenising tendencies are substantially undermined. Chapter 1 examined these developments in detail focusing on ethnic and civic identities and the role of national identity which binds together members of the nation. The hypotheses presented in this thesis argues that identities are fluid and affected by the inner and outer perceptions, hence, identities are shaped by the perceptions of one’s community as well as those from the outside. To assess these arguments, testing fluidity of identities and the role of the nation state for Muslim communities, question 1 asked participants to rank their religious and national identities and their relative importance. For most participants, the religious identity similarly to the ethnic identity, transcends borders of the nation states and cannot be easily contained. Religious affiliation becomes a primary marker of identification surpassing national identity. Reflecting on the answers given to question 1 which were followed up in the semi-structured interviews, it transpires that
religious identity as any other form of identity becomes stronger when challenged or threatened. The proposed hypothesis (H1), of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ captures this relationship and shows clear connection between the inner and the outer perceptions. As some participants explained, by being forced by the state and its authorities to choose between their religious and national identities it was implied that these two were not compatible; hence, their religious identity became stronger. Testing Miller’s argument introduced in chapter 1 where he asserts that it is down to the individual which identities emerge as the most prominent, it can be argued that the findings support this view. For some participants religious identity intensified as a consequence of the secular or anti-Muslim environment. Revisiting the argument of homogenising Western nation state, division between the religion and the state confined to the private and the public spheres, is a vital part of its structure. The division is, however, not clear cut and varies between countries. In the UK and Germany, the state authorities retain ties with selected and organised faith groups often removed from ordinary Muslims, whilst the Czech Republic is largely secular, detached from Muslim religious organisations all together.

Addressing the role of civic membership and one’s position within the society, question 2 assessed participants’ views on their equality and question 3 compared their attachment and belonging to the country of their permanent residence. As outlined in the previous chapter, the nation states use different policies and mechanisms to contain the challenge posed by the ‘other’, in this case Muslims, mostly by controlling access to citizenship, integration and migration policies. Yet, it is increasingly difficult for the nation states to construct a shared sense of belonging and attachment amongst the different groups. The argument proposed in this thesis uses Parekh’s model of multicultural governance as the ideal framework for the contemporary nation states. The argument locates multicultural policies as best equipped to integrate diverse communities and preserve the unique cultural traditions of each group. Multicultural policies are informed by civic principles, however, most contemporary nation states, including the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic are shaped by ethnic elements and the dominant culture. Balancing this juxtaposition is significant for any identity developments.

Interpreting the empirical results, multicultural policies adopted in the UK were most successful as all UK’s respondents had British citizenship and in contrast to Germany and the Czech Republic, felt in most cases as equal members of the society to which they belonged. This could be also seen as supporting the argument of national identity developments introduced in chapter 1 by Greenfeld and Gutierrez who argued that national identity takes time to develop. In this case the British Muslims were granted British citizenship and their national identity has been developing over two or
three generations. Muslims in Germany and the Czech Republic, on the other hand, have been for most part excluded from citizenship in their countries of residence and their national identity and loyalty to these countries have not been developing or have been very slow to emerge. Returning the hypothesis (H3) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, the role of citizenship is crucial for British Muslims to see themselves as civic members of British society. This in turn strengthens their associations with Britain and enables them to have a voice. These positive developments, however, do not compromise prominence of religious identity in their life. Taking into account the sample characteristics and the demographic information, the UK results may be less optimistic than initially suggested, particularly with question 3 whereby only 17 respondents indicated to belong to the UK at all times. The relatively small sample does not allow for greater analysis, however, the data suggests there are some underlining challenges which could be examined with a larger sample. Nevertheless, analysis of the follow up interviews reveals parallels with question 1, whereby some participants felt their religious identity was not always accepted and they were under the pressure to declare their loyalties to the state over their religion. There are, however, also ethnic and racial factors for consideration. Referring to the civic and ethnic divisions and homogenising tendencies of the nation states, British Muslims are accepted as members of the civic society but they are not necessarily accepted in cultural/religious and ethnic/racial terms. This juxtaposition is reflected in the largely positive outlook of respondents on their life in the UK although most respondents admitted to have experienced some form of marginalisation, often targeting their ethnicity and only to a lesser degree their religion. This is a key point, demonstrating the continual position ethnicity and national identity occupy in the contemporary nation states. Moreover, the self-identification of British participants reflects the domestic approach to racial and ethnic identity politics with many participants describing themselves as British Pakistani or British Somali, thus confirming the proposed hypothesis (H1) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ influenced by the inner and the outer perceptions.

In case of Germany, the nation state aims to contain rather than integrate the ‘other’ and adopts only the most basic of multicultural policies. Returning to chapter 4, analysis of Germany’s national policies showed that focus was on social provisions but access to civic rights was, despite the 2000 citizenship law reform, rather difficult. Indeed, German identity is still to a great degree confined within the ethno-national realm, making citizenship acquisition more difficult for applicants who are not of German descent and leaving thousands of German Turks without citizenship. This is exacerbated by the policies of Turkey which retains close ties with its diaspora in Germany, actively encouraging its Turkish identity. The nation state, in this case Germany and Turkey, utilises its own
policies to exclude Turkish population, in case of Germany, and to include the Turks, in case of
Turkey. These policies fundamentally shape identities of Turks in Germany and their loyalties to the
nation state. Indeed, the findings support Connor’s hypothesis of multiple loyalties outlined in
chapter 1, whereby the loyalty to the state does not necessarily guarantee loyalty to the nation. This
is supported by Parekh’s argument that creating the sense of belonging and loyalty to the nation is
an ultimate challenge for any nation state. This means that German Muslims may display loyalty to
the German state in form of civic participation, however, their underlining loyalties lie with their
nation, in this case the Turkish nation. This argument suggests that Turkish national identity
transcends religious identity, however, as research findings confirm, participants’ Muslim identity
became dominant when brought directly in contrast with their national/ethnic identity. Hence,
research findings thus far reveal that most participants did not feel treated as equal members of the
society, nor did they feel attached to their country of permanent residence. The lack of citizenship
and therefore equal membership has been palpable in this context with participants missing close
associations and connections with the state and its authorities. Indeed, many participants expected
their return to Turkey upon retirement age as they feared there were no provisions for them, as
non-citizens, in Germany. This suggests and supports Parekh’s hypothesis proposing that
multicultural policies contribute to more positive developments of identity formation amongst the
second and third generation Muslims.

Research findings for the Czech Republic show similar results to Germany for question 2. The Czech
Republic is largely homogenous and its citizenship, despite the recent changes, is still difficult to
acquire by applicants without Czech descent. Thus, most respondents had citizenship other than
Czech. This is reflected in question 2 whereby most participants did not feel treated as equal
members of the society. Moreover, participants’ self-identification was similarly to respondents in
Germany, mostly ethnic or national, however, when in juxtaposition with their religious identity,
being Muslim was more important which again supports Miller’s argument that individuals chose
which identities emerge as the most prominent. The state policies to integrate and include Muslim
communities in the Czech Republic are minimal and as previous chapter explained it is up to the
potential applicant for citizenship to assimilate into the majority culture. Despite its secular
approach the Czech Republic is very sceptical of Muslims. Drawing on identity politics and the
concept of the nation state, the ethno-national identity in the Czech Republic is connected to
secularism, however, this secularism has roots in Christianity. Christianity is closely intertwined with
the Czech nation and inevitably forms a part of it, in other words, Czechs are secular as long as the
religion is Christianity but less so with other religions. It is therefore intriguing that a significant
proportion of participants expressed their attachment to the country. This can be for a number of reasons and requires further analysis with a larger sample. However, it is possible that the shared post-communist history and Slavic origins play a role here. It is also plausible that participants from the other transitional post-communist countries without any close ties to their homes accept the Czech Republic as their home, hence their loyalty to the state.

Summary

The empirical research for theme 1 draws together important findings for identity formation of Muslim communities. Interpreting the results for question 1, the nation state is instrumental in the formation of Muslim identity particularly in respect to its homogenising tendencies. The results also suggest that religious identity as a marker of identity for Muslims becomes dominant when there is a pressure to choose identity. Hence, the majority of respondents indicated that their religious identity was more important to them than their national identity or the identity of their country of residence. The argument presented throughout the thesis maintains that identities are fluid; the ‘other’ is shaped by the inner and the outer perceptions. These perceptions are influenced by important events and can change over time, thus identities change. The results for theme 1 confirm that identities of the ‘other’, in this case Muslims, often adopt these outer perceptions and integrate them within their own structures. In other words, the domestic (country of residence) attitudes and the nation state policies are essential for identity formation of European Muslims and are replicated within Muslim communities. Therefore, the concern with race and ethnicity in British politics, as described in chapter 4, is also evident in the self-identification of British Muslims where nearly half of all participants described themselves as British Pakistani, British Libyan or British Somali, rather than simply British or British Muslim. This indicates the importance of ethnicity as well as religion in their self-identification. Essentially, the study illustrated the largely positive outlook of respondents on their life in the UK although most respondents admitted to have experienced some form of marginalisation, often targeting their ethnicity and only to a lesser degree their religion. In-depth analysis of associations between the questions 2 and 3 confirmed that respondents who felt accepted as equal members of the society were also amongst those who believed to belong to the country of their residence. On the contrary, respondents who did not feel to be treated equally because of their religion were also inclined to feel less attached to the county they lived in. Based on this observation it is plausible that there is a correlation between acceptance or more precisely equality and individual’s sense of belonging.
Research findings thus far suggest that in spite of the interests in global affairs and association with Muslim community world-wide, British Muslims value their ethnicity and ethnic heritage and retaining links and associations with other Muslims from their own ethnic group. Indeed, conditioned by the historical and political developments of the country of their residence, British Muslims increasingly form their identity within a triadic framework whereby their religious, ethnic and national loyalties form a novel type of overarching identity. Drawing on the analysis of multicultural policies in chapter 2 and British multicultural politics in chapter 4, the focus on race and ethnicity in British Muslim identification is also the result of Britain’s multicultural policies which encouraged such identification.

In case of Germany, most participants originated from Turkey and arrived to Germany as voluntary economic migrants rather than victims of prosecution or dictatorship or former colonial subjects. Turkey is a strong nationalising state and keeps close ties with its diaspora abroad, particularly its diaspora in Germany. Most participants in Germany did not have German citizenship and only a small sample had dual citizenship, in fact, a large proportion of participants had Turkish citizenship and maintained very close ties with Turkey. The position adopted by the two nation states, Germany and Turkey, creates an environment whereby Turkish Muslims in Germany are encouraged by German and Turkish national policies to remain and identify as Turks. Identity formation of Turkish Muslims in Germany is therefore subjected to two competing factors resulting in a strong Turkish identity with Muslim identity prevalent mostly when brought directly in contrast with their ethnic identity. This means that most participants described themselves as Turks or German Turks not Turkish Muslims. The question is, however, how this identity can change should the German policies move towards a more inclusive position and encourage Turkish Muslims to obtain German citizenship and essentially to become German. Rather alarming was the notion of returning back to Turkey when reaching retirement age as there were no provisions in Germany for non-citizens. The findings indicate that there is a direct association between equality and belonging with participants who did not feel treated equally also feeling lack of belonging to Germany. Nonetheless, further research is required particularly assessing the nexus between the lack of German citizenship, the role of existing citizenship, often Turkish, and perceptions of inequality.

Similar pattern of fluid identities adopting perceptions of the home society can be observed in the Czech Republic. Returning to the respondent sample, it is essential to take into account the national and the ethnic origins of participants. Particularly, as Muslims arriving to the Czech Republic come predominantly from ex-Yugoslavia and the former USSR – both with communist past. Hence, they share communist history, in some cases Slavic origins and affinity with the Czech Republic; this is
largely absent in context of Germany. Moreover, many participants in the Czech Republic were victims of political prosecution or ethnic cleansing whilst others were from poor post-communist countries. Their identity is often expressed in ethnic terms, however, when specifically asked to select between identities it was their religious identity that became more prominent as was the case with most German participants. This is an important point which demonstrates the fluidity of identities and will be explored further in the following chapter with analysis of the second theme. Addressing participants’ perceptions of equality and citizenship, the consensus was that they had only a minor or no power to influence developments affecting them. Participants who were Czech citizens felt empowered because of their citizenship status, however, felt disempowered as Muslims. Associated with the perception of their disempowerment was also a strong desire to have ‘proper’ mosques (with minarets), Muslim schools (which would play an additional role to state schooling) and kindergartens.
Chapter 6 – Radicalisation of Muslim Identity

Introduction

Main focus of this chapter is on theme 2 which examines Muslim identities, their developments, formations and possible radicalisation. It also evaluates how the nation states accommodate Muslim religious needs and to what degree, if at all, this has any impact on their identity developments. Central to the follow up in-depth interviews were the questions of Sharia law and the concept of traditional Islam which was purposely left vague so that participants deduced their own interpretation of the term. The purpose of the questionnaire and the interviews was to draw attention to Muslims’ own perceptions on their religious accommodation in countries of their permanent residence and possible radicalisation of Muslim identity. Hence, the chapter draws on the theoretical chapters 1 and 2, and the state specific chapters 3 and 4, to evaluate developments of Muslim identity and the success of national politics in integration and inclusion of Muslim communities.

6.1 Theme 2 - Research findings

Questionnaires

The primary emphasis of question 4, see Table 9, was on the relationship between Muslim communities and the nation states, namely accommodation of Muslims and their needs by the state authorities, legislation and policies. Exploring Muslim identities further was question 5, in Table 10, which introduced the concept of traditional Islam as used by some Muslim community leaders. The concept of traditional Islam was not described in detail as it was up to the participants to decide what meaning and significance they associated with the term. On the whole, the questions aimed to clarify participants’ perceptions of their Muslim identity and explain how they thought the state accommodated their religious needs.
Table 9 Question 4
Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs?

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<th>Percentage</th>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Czech Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>23.3</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>83.4</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>13.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
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Table 10 Question 5
Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam form the era of Prophet Muhammad when Islam was at its most successful – the traditional Islam?

<table>
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<th></th>
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<td></td>
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<td>Germany</td>
<td>The Czech Republic</td>
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The UK case study

The responses to question 4, regarding accommodation of Muslims and their religious needs, were more or less positive with only 2 participants feeling that they were not being accommodated. In contrast, question 5 which was examining the possibility of return to traditional Islam proved to be most divisive, outlining divisions within the community. Those in favour of traditional Islam argued for clearer rules and societal order guiding Muslims living in the West. Respondents opposed to the idea of traditional Islam associated the term with radicalism or fundamentalism and oppressive
religious practices rather than guidance. Associations between the two questions, in Figure 16, show that in this case the relationship is not clear. Observing possible associations with question 5 and question 2 is Figure 17. Whilst Figure 18 analyses cross theme correlations with question 3, but also without any clear parallel. Therefore, it is plausible that the desire of some respondents to revert to traditional Islam was not necessarily conditioned by their sense of belonging or acceptance; rather it referred to what they perceived as identity crises in Muslim communities. Indeed, as confirmed in the subsequent interviews, proponents of traditional Islam aimed to restore community cohesion and individual values by embracing traditional Islam.

Figure 16 UK Correlations between Question 4 and 5
Q. Do you feel that the country of you live in treats you as an equal citizen/member of the society?

- Yes
- Perhaps
- No
- Don't know

Number of persons

Q. Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful - the traditional Islam?

- Yes
- Sometimes
- No
- Don't know

Number of persons

Figure 17 UK Correlations between Question 2 and 5

Q. Do you feel that you belong to your country of residence?

- Yes
- Sometimes
- No
- Don't know

Number of persons

Q. Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful - the traditional Islam?

- Yes
- Sometimes
- No
- Don't know

Number of persons

Figure 18 UK Correlations between Question 3 and 5
**Germany case study**

Responses to questionnaire questions 4 and 5, outlined in Table 9 and 10, reveal a discord between participants’ perception of their religious accommodation, particularly between respondents who felt to be partially accommodated and respondents who did not feel that their needs were accommodated at all. However, there was no division in responses to question 5, addressing respondents’ attitudes concerning traditional Islam. Majority of respondents were in favour of traditional Islam. Figure 19 examines any correlations between questions 4 and 5, implying that for German participants there is some association between the desire to revert back to traditional Islam and perceptions of their religious accommodation. The link, however, is unclear and requires further analysis. Cross-theme analysis of question 2 with question 5, illustrated in Figure 20, and question 3 with question 5, in Figure 21, are rather vague. Nevertheless, the cross analyses indicate some association between the lack of acceptance, belonging, equality, accommodation and desire to revert to traditional Islam.

![Figure 19 Germany Correlations between Question 4 and 5](image-url)
Q.5 Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful – the traditional Islam?

Figure 20 Germany Correlations between Question 2 and 5

Q.3 Do you feel that you belong to your country of residence?

Figure 21 Germany Correlations between Question 3 and 5
The Czech Republic case study

Reflecting upon the results from previous questions there is a significant shift in participants’ perception of their religious accommodation. The majority of respondents indicated that the state did, to a degree, accommodate their religious needs with only a few participants stating the opposite. Similar developments could be observed in question 5 with most respondents in favour of return to traditional Islam, see Figure 22. Cross theme analysis of question 5 with questions 2 & 3, in Figure 23 and 24 retrospectively, indicates that there is a possible association between respondents’ lack of equality and support for traditional Islam (correlation questions 2 and 5), whilst the sense of attachment and belonging does not appear to have significant influence on the desire to revert to traditional Islam (correlation questions 3 and 5).

Figure 22 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 4 and 5

Q.4 Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs?

Q.5 Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most...
Q.2 Do you feel that country of your residence treats you as equal citizen/member of the society?

Yes | Perhaps | No | Don’t know
--- | --- | --- | ---
2 | 1 | 3 | 1

Q.5 Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful – the traditional Islam?

Yes | Sometimes | No | Don’t know
--- | --- | --- | ---
8 | 2 | 1 | 1

Figure 23 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 2 and 5

Q.3 Do you feel that you belong to your country of residence?

Yes | Perhaps | No | Don’t know
--- | --- | --- | ---
11 | 3 | 2 | 1

Q.5 Do you agree with the statement of some Muslim representatives that Muslims need to return to the form of Islam from the era of Prophet Mohammed when Islam was at its most successful – the traditional Islam?

Yes | Sometimes | No | Don’t know
--- | --- | --- | ---
11 | 3 | 2 | 1

Figure 24 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 3 and 5
Interview results

Reflecting on the results to questions 4 and 5, the interviews aimed to clarify participants’ understanding of traditional Islam and the possibility of Sharia law in country of their residence. Moreover, participants were asked why they thought some Muslims may radicalise. The interviews were organised around the following questions:

4. Relating to questionnaire question 5, why do you believe that Muslims should or should not return to traditional Islam? Would you be in favour of Sharia law in country of your residence?

5. What do you think are the factors contributing to radicalisation of some Muslims?

Interview question 4: Relating to questionnaire question 5, why do you believe that Muslims should or should not return to traditional Islam? Would you be in favour of Sharia law in country of your residence?

The UK responses

Analysis of the questionnaire results confirmed a split between participants’ opinion in relation to question 5, suggesting particularly strong associations. Based on their response, participants can be divided into three groups: those in favour of traditional Islam, those opposed to traditional Islam and those who supported the idea under specific circumstances.

Those opposed return to traditional Islam comprised of 3 respondents:

Male participant (age 28) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range in Muslim Centre during a local event saw the concept of traditional Islam as negative and did not want to be seen associated with it in any shape or form. His view of Sharia law was even more negative.

We need to find Islam which is appropriate for our time, we cannot keep looking back.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable he replied:

No way, you cannot have Sharia in Britain, if you want Sharia then go to the Middle East and see how things work there and live there but don’t bring it here.
Female participant (age 20) born in the UK and interviewed during the same event in Whaley Range had a very similar understanding of the concept. She rejected the question of Sharia law in the UK and was very clear on the fact that Muslims living in the UK should fall British laws.

We as Muslims must find our way in today’s world and in Britain and going back to what we’ve had in the past is not going to help us. I know that some Muslims like Saudis, talk about going back to the days when Islam was proper or traditional as you call it, and all Muslims were devoted, but that’s in the past, it’s time to move on.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:

No, I would not support it. We already have laws in place, UK laws.

Female participant (age 19) born in the UK and interviewed in the same event organised by the Muslim centre voiced similar concerns. In particular she reiterated the notion of distancing herself from what she understood to be radical Islam. Her opinion on Sharia law was constructed as a result of her own experiences or of experiences of her close friends. She made the comparison with predominantly Muslim countries which she felt were often idealised by young Muslims in the West.

I am against going back to traditional Islam, what does it mean anyway? This is exactly what makes Muslims look like some crazy fanatics.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:

I know that some people, Muslims, would welcome it, but I personally don’t think that it is a good idea. I know lots of people and some of my friends, who are Muslims and keep saying that we should have Sharia and all that. But when they go to Egypt or Syria as part of their year abroad in university then they come back in shock because things are not the way they thought they would be. Young girls go to parties and wear short skirts but in public they all wear headscarves and long dresses, boys drink alcohol...it’s similar to here. So, I think everyone who says they want to go back to traditional Islam and Sharia should think twice and get a full understanding of what it actually means. Islam is a peaceful religion but it is people who don’t understand it properly that make it more radical or strict.
The second group of respondents was strongly in favour of return to traditional Islam, with total of 4 participants.

Male respondent (age 21) born in Kuwait but raised in the UK was interviewed in a local café in Levenshulme. He interpreted the term of traditional Islam in a very positive sense and saw it as a way of catching up with the values that were lost. He held similar views about Sharia law and the need to implement some sort of a mechanism which would help Muslims to find their way.

Why not, it would apply only to Muslims and it would be good for us as a community. We have no morals, people are committing crime, there are lots of Muslims in prisons and lots of Muslims are doing drugs. We should have Sharia law just for us Muslims to remind us of what Islam really is, to keep us in place.

Female respondent (age 28) born in the UK and interviewed in a local café in Bolton was also in support of return to traditional Islam. She was very clear about the fact that there were good or proper Muslims and Muslims who simply lost their path which was why she favoured traditional Islam and Sharia law.

Some Muslims are weak; we lost our morals and values. These values and morals flourished in the era of Prophet Muhammad peace be upon him, so I think that we should go back to traditional Islam. It’s not that Islam is worse or that it lost some of its teachings, it’s the people and going back to traditional Islam would make us proper Muslims again.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:

I think that Sharia for Muslims in England (A note: meaning Britain) would be a good thing. It would ensure that Muslims act like Muslims and that there are laws in place to enforce it. It may be more difficult to maintain in a non-Muslim country but it could be done.

Male participant (age 24) born in the UK, interviewed in Whaley Range during a local event organised by the Muslim Centre agreed that Muslims should revert back to a more traditional Islam. He understood the concept in a positive sense but was less clear about Sharia in the UK.
Look at this society, it’s lost and people act like animals, even some of those who claim to be Muslim. We need to get our values back, keep family and communities together and Islam helps us to do it.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable he replied:

I don’t know, I would be for Sharia in Britain but I am not sure how it could work in a non Muslim country. Quran tells us that as long as the country we live in allows us to practice our faith then we can live there so I don’t know…

Last group of respondents with total of 3 participants, agreed they would support the idea of return to traditional Islam, however, only under specific conditions.

Female respondent (age 21) born in the UK and interviewed in Bolton in a local café shared the notion that traditional Islam was a positive development rather than negative. However, she referred to the practicalities of implementing it in a non-Muslim country where young Muslims were influenced by the culture of the country they lived in.

On some level I think that for us Muslims it would be a good idea, but the society is different now so we cannot completely revert back and I am not sure how it would work in practice.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:

No, I like my independence and I like that in Britain you can say and believe in what you want. I don’t think that any of this would be possible under Sharia.

Another female respondent (age 20) interviewed in a local café in Bolton shared similar views. She identified positives associated with traditional Islam but she also felt that her life would be more restricted, in particular she referred to her personal ‘freedom’.

Sometimes I think it would be good but at the same time there are things that I wouldn’t want to give up, like going to university and have my freedom. Things would be different...so... I guess that some aspects of it would be good for our society but definitely not all.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:
I don't think that it could work in a non Muslim country like the UK and from talking to my friends most young Muslims that I know wouldn't want Sharia anyway. We were brought up in here and we are used to laws of this country, it’s like we can’t imagine having Sharia if you know what I mean.

Last female participant (age 29) born in the UK and interviewed in Levenshulme in a local café also associated the concept of traditional Islam with more positive associations and in particular with restoring of values and guidance. However, similarly to the previous participant, she recognised the fact that traditional Islam may not fit into the contemporary structures.

I can see why the concept of traditional Islam is good. We (Muslims) need some guidance and spiritual leadership but the world is a different place now and lots of the rules which applied back then at the time of our Prophet Muhammad no longer apply. Maybe we need new, more contemporary Islam but it all comes down to people. Islam is perfect as it is, it is the people that need to change.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the UK and whether it would be applicable she replied:

No, I have parts of extended family in Iran and I know how state enforcing religion works, no way that I would want to live like that.

**Germany responses**

Almost half of all respondents favoured return to traditional Islam, with 5 respondents supporting the idea under specific circumstances and only 1 participant was opposed to the idea.

Participants supporting the idea of return to traditional Islam suggested the following:

Male respondent (age 38) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Düsseldorf associated the concept of traditional Islam with positive developments which he believed were important especially for young Muslims. However, he was very clear that Sharia law did not have a place in Germany or indeed in Europe.

As Muslims we live according to what is written in Quran, here in Germany we can live freely but at the same time there is the unspoken stigma of being
outsider which is difficult for many younger people who want to fit in with Germans. I think that especially for these younger people faith is very important.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable he replied:

No, I follow teachings of Islam but it is inevitable that we’ll make mistakes, we are just people. I think that Sharia law has no place in non-Muslim country…. and I don’t see why it should be in Europe.

Female respondent (age 21) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local mosque in Düsseldorf shared similar views. She interpreted the term as positive and important to all Muslims, however, she was not very clear on the role of Sharia law in a non-Muslim society and referred to Turkey in this respect.

Yes, Islam is religion of peace and I believe that Muslims should live as intended by our Prophet, if that’s what you mean by traditional Islam.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be she replied:

Yes and no, Sharia law is for Muslims and I think that if we could apply it in here some Muslims would maybe feel more guided, but at the same time we live in a non-Muslim country and I don’t think that you can ever have Sharia law in here. You need the state to support it and that will never happen in a non-Muslim country. And I don’t think that most Turks would be in favour anyway, there is no Sharia in Turkey so why should we have it here?

Female participant (age 33) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Düsseldorf confirmed this view. On one hand, she rejected face covering and Sharia law, on the other she felt that especially younger Muslims needed guidance which could be found in more traditional Islam.

I think that here in our mosque we are liberal, for example you will hardly ever see any woman wearing burqa. But I think that we could do with more guidance, especially the younger Muslims, they need to have respect for what’s sacred.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable she replied:
I think that Sharia law is going a bit too far. After all, we live in Germany not Saudi Arabia.

Respondents who expressed support for return to traditional Islam under specific conditions explained:

Male respondent (age 40) born in Düsseldorf and interviewed in a Milli Görus mosque was initially hesitant and refused to answer the question which he saw as potentially dangerous and feared his answers may be used against him. After further discussion he approached the topic himself and shared his views.

This is a difficult question, it’s very subjective and it all depends on how you interpret traditional Islam. I am in favour of living as proper Muslims should live but some people can manipulate this for their own means, claiming to speak on behalf of all Muslims which is very dangerous.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable he replied:

Again, this is very subjective I don’t like answering to questions like that because it is down to individual interpretation. I personally think that Sharia law is only applicable in Muslim countries and even then you need a reliable government in place which is increasingly difficult. It should be sufficient for Muslims living in Germany to follow laws of this country, which I think we do anyway.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Germany, interviewed in Düsseldorf in a Turkish Cultural Centre shared similar concerns. As she explained after the interview, she felt that her answers could be manipulated and used against her. She feared that local authorities could use this to label Turks as anti-German or even terrorist.

I suppose that any Muslim would say that they’d support traditional Islam, but then it depends what you understand by that. Some people will think that it means Sharia law or something like that, others will just think that it means living according to teachings of our Prophet. Lack of clarity is what makes it dangerous.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable she replied:
No, it wouldn’t work here, it wouldn’t even work in Turkey. You don’t need to be in favour of Sharia law and compromise yourself as Muslim. I think that’s one of the myths that people have about Muslims, that we all want Sharia law. I think that majority of people in this mosque would tell you that they are happy to live under laws of this country.

Female respondent (age 29) born in Turkey and interviewed in a Milli Görüs mosque in Duisburg shared her views with previous participants. The fear that research results regarding traditional Islam may be misused, particularly by the state authorities, was mentioned on a number of occasions during the interview but especially in relation to this question.

I’m a bit hesitant to answer this because it’s this sort of questions that non-Muslims ask and then label us as Islamists if we say that we are in favour of traditional Islam. Why is nobody asking this of the Catholics? Naturally, as people who follow religious faith we want to live as much as possible according to the sacred and that’s the same for any other faith, I think. But by calling it traditional it sounds a bit medieval and that’s I think what hardly anyone wants.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable she replied:

(Laughed)….no, this is what non-Muslims think we want. Here in Germany, everyone is dreading that Muslims will lobby for Sharia law and will try to cut someone’s hand because she/ he stole bread or something. If there are any Muslims who really do want Sharia law, then they are a minority.

Female respondent (age 25) born in Germany and interviewed in a mosque in Duisburg where in 2007 local Muslims protested against what they felt was their marginalisation, expressed similar views.

I think that quite a few people in here get a bit twitchy when you ask questions like this. We had people coming here before asking things like that and then we’d find out that the person published it in a newspaper or TV and presented it like we were all Islamists wanting to take over Germany. So I think you have to be very clear about what you mean by traditional Islam. We should live as our faith tells us to do, but we must also recognise that we live in a non-Muslim state.
When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable she replied:

I think that my previous answer covers this...

Male respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a local café in Düsseldorf agreed with the previous participant. His perception of traditional Islam was negative because he saw it as a form of radicalisation.

This is a difficult question, Islam is very peaceful religion but by using words like ‘traditional’ Islam you are implying something radical. I don’t agree with that, yes I’d like all Muslims to live the way we should, it’s more difficult when you live in a non-Muslim country but I’ve never lived anywhere else and for all I know there might be other issues in Muslim countries too.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be applicable he replied:

I think that some Muslims would be in favour, especially the older generation from some of the more traditional Islamic states like Saudi Arabic, but most of us have families in Turkey and as you know the government there is secular so we’d never expect to have Sharia there either. Do you know what I mean? So why have it in Germany?

Female respondent (age 28) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Duisburg was opposed to the idea of return to traditional Islam. She saw the concept as backwards looking and unhelpful to Muslims in contemporary societies.

We live in 21st century Germany, not 8th century Middle East and I think that people sometimes forget about that. This mosque is very open and liberal which I think attracts lots of young people who were born here in Germany, and trying to go back to traditional Islam would be turning a blind eye on some of the issues these young people face.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in Germany and whether it would be she replied:

It’s the same to what I just said, we live in a different era, things changed so no, I think we should try to address issues we face today.
The Czech Republic responses

The questionnaire results were united in their response with the majority in favour of return to traditional Islam, and only 2 participants directly opposed to the idea. Indeed, the follow-up interviews confirmed this support, indicating that the question of traditional Islam was seen as positive without negative associations or fundamentalist undertones. Reflecting on these interview responses, support for traditional Islam was largely associated with disintegration of society, lack of values, beliefs and morals. As many participants explained, the interpretation of what traditional Islam means is crucial in this context. Perhaps, respondents’ positive associations with the concept were intertwined with circumstances in the Czech Republic.

Female participant (age 27) born in Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre perceived the concept as very positive and inherently connected to religious piety, goodness, values and morals. She held a similar view of Sharia law and did not detect any notion of fundamental or radical Islam in either of the terms.

Of course we should have traditional Islam. When you look at society today, not just here in Czech but world-wide, there are no values or morals. Young people have too much time and many of them are unemployed, there is no respect for older generation or family. Religion, Islam teaches us all these things and reminds us of our values.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable she replied:

It’s the same, Sharia is there to reinforce rules. After all, Muslims are just people. We make mistakes and can lose our way. I would like to have Sharia here to help us Muslims live in the way that our Prophet intended but I know that it is not an option.

Male participant (age 42) from Yemen but residing in the Czech Republic for a substantial period of time was interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre. He put forward an argument shared by remaining participants whereby traditional Islam served as a path or guidance in today’s confused world. What is problematic is not Islam as such but the interpretations of Islam that individual people make.

We need to look after our community. Some Muslims are struggling to find their way. This is not problem just for Muslims, it is a problem across the whole world.
People lost their beliefs and morals, they don’t care about their community or sometimes even their family, politicians are corrupted and money takes over our lives. Islam offers a way of life that we should follow, this is the way that Prophet Muhammad showed us. Yes, there are some things which are less relevant today. Problem is that there is no officially recognised figure after Prophet Muhammad which would unite all Muslims. And so there are different interpretations of Quran and Islam. This is a problem but it doesn’t mean that we cannot follow Islam in its original form as it was intended.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable he replied:

Do I think it would be a good idea? Yes and no. Like I said, there are different interpretations of Quran and the same goes for Sharia. Everyone understands something different when it comes to Sharia law. Sharia is a set of laws and majority of these laws are the same as the non-Muslim laws. But we cannot have Sharia in its traditional form, even just for Muslims in a non-Muslim country, it simply doesn’t work.

Female participant (age 40) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre confirmed the importance of interpretation which she believed was essential in Islam.

I think that all Muslims would like to live the traditional way. But we are only people and people are weak, we make mistakes and some Muslims say they are Muslim but don’t act that way. I believe that if we keep traditional Islamic values it can show us the right path.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable she replied:

I am not sure, Sharia is part of Islam and when it is interpreted properly then it makes Muslims better Muslims. But the problem is how do you implement Sharia in a non-Muslim country?

Male participant (age 32) born in Bosnia and interviewed in a halal shop in Prague also shared this view and on the whole saw the concept of traditional Islam as positive.
Traditional Islam is how all Muslims should live. Sometimes that’s hard because we live in a non-Muslim country but if you really believe in your faith you must prevail. In my life there was a period when I and my family had really hard time but we always kept our beliefs and faith.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable he replied:

I don’t know...I grew up in a country where there were many Muslims but there were non-Muslims too and we all got on. Naturally, sometimes there were issues and clashes but nothing serious. We practiced Islam and they practiced something else and there was no need for Sharia because the laws that we followed were same for everyone and they were good for Muslims and non-Muslims.

Male participant (age 27) born in Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre felt that mosques where especially young Muslims could learn about Islam were very important, he felt that otherwise there was a danger that traditional Islam could be hijacked by radical groups.

Traditional Islam...(laughs)....the problem is that it all depends on your interpretation of Islam. I think that I live as a proper Muslim and yes, I make mistakes. There are Muslims and non-Muslims, who are not sure what their faith is, or they live in a state where they cannot practice properly. Here (in the Czech Republic) it’s not ideal, we don’t have proper mosques, schools and the state does not recognise Islam but we can practice and we can build these “mosques-centres” and express our beliefs freely. And that’s important.

When asked what he thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable he replied:

I am not sure. The world is a different place even the Muslim countries, look how bad it can be there, corruption and oppression. It’s a hard question, as a Muslim I would welcome Sharia but we are all humans and we are weak. Sometimes those in power lose their morals and use what they call Sharia for their means.
The one female participant (age 24) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague’s local café was against the idea of traditional Islam. She felt that the concept was vague and could possibly be used to justify violence. In fact, she referred to terrorist attacks by Al-Qaida in this respect.

I find this question difficult because as Muslim I want to live according to Islam in its purest form but that is very hard when your belief relies on your interpretation. I think that the question of traditional Islam is possibly very dangerous. Many of those who claim to be Muslim use it as justification of violent action and that’s wrong.

When asked what she thought of Sharia law in the Czech Republic and whether it would be applicable she replied:

It’s the same, Sharia law is what we should all follow but as with what you call traditional Islam, it can be abused by people for their own means. I don’t know it’s hard to say. I think that if you are Muslim and have proper faith in your religion then you follow the laws of Islam anyway.

**Interview question 5: What do you think are the factors contributing to radicalisation of some Muslims?**

**The UK responses**

There was an overall consensus amongst participants with regards to the question on radicalisation. In general, the agreement was that these were Muslims who ‘came off the path’ and by no means represented feelings or views of the wider Muslim community. Most participants agreed that from their personal experience there were some other underlining issues often leading to mobilisation of identity. These were for instance repeated verbal abuse, targeting of Muslims in the media and by the police, lack of confidence or belonging and most importantly peer-group pressure. Peer pressure was cited by 8 interview participants as one of the strongest factors.

Female respondent (age 21) interviewed in a local café in Bolton referred to the problem of interpretation of religion by different people who as she believed could find whatever they were looking for – violence or peace.
It is about how people interpret Islam. Some people want to find something radical in it and they will make sure that they find it even if it’s not there. I’d say it’s like that with all religions. It’s about interpretation and that’s always up to the individual.

Male respondent (age 24) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range during a local event organised by the Muslim Centre drew on personal experiences and was mostly concerned with peer pressure.

It is a lot to do with what I call Muslim pride. I have lots of friends who say – ‘yeah we have to stick together man, us Muslims, look at what the government does in the Middle East’ – and I always think – but you don’t even have all the information and facts, so how can you say all this? This, I think, is why some Muslims go radical, they don’t know much about the topic, they read Quran in the way they want and find there what they want to find and then bully some other people into it.

Female respondent (age 20) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range during the same event agreed with this. She also referred to her own experiences of Muslim community and expressed her disillusion with some of her friends’ reactions and the sense of superiority over other Muslims.

I know lots of people who don’t know much about the Palestine/Israel issue or war in Iraq and just hear something on the news. Then they make their own story and start saying that there is a conspiracy and that we as Muslims have to do something about it. And it is hard when you are the only one or there are only few of you and you say to them – ‘actually, it’s completely different, there is no conspiracy and the war is about this and that’- and they start looking at you and say – ‘are you stupid or what, can you not see that this is targeting us, Muslims’? Or they say- ‘you are with them, you are not a proper Muslim’. So when it’s like that it’s hard to stand up to them even though I think that majority of Muslims know that there is no such thing as a anti-Muslim conspiracy. Those loud Muslims who make you feel bad about yourself because for them you are a bad Muslim should get all the information first before accusing anyone and making harsh statements like that.
Female respondent (age 29) born in the UK and interviewed in Levenshulme in a local café also shared this view. She also referred to divisions existing within the smaller towns in comparison to more metropolitan areas. She felt very strongly about the occasional Muslim bias with regards to non-Muslims and political representation.

From my experience people who live in small towns are more often narrow minded and they have the tendency to hold on to what they think is Muslim power. Sometimes when you don't agree with some of the crazy statements they say, you are the outsider and stranger, sometimes even not a proper Muslim... so you just agree with them. But saying that, people from big towns can be like that too like when they come from localised areas. They are biased towards media and political representation. They say that politicians don't represent us Muslims. But even if a politician was a Muslim they would want him to be the same nationality or ethnicity, like Pakistani and then from the same village...so I don't think that there is much that can be done.

Another male participant (age 21) born in Kuwait and interviewed also in Levenshulme in a local café felt different about the issue. He was more sympathetic towards radical action as a result of persistent marginalisation or abuse. He did not refer to personal experiences but felt very strongly about the question.

I am against radical Islam but sometimes I can understand why people do it. If you get stared or shouted at or searched on the street by the police just because you are Muslim then eventually you will have enough. And when you get told you are just a Paki and that you should go back where you came from it just makes things worse.

This view was shared by a female respondent (age 28) interviewed in Bolton in a local café. She rejected the notion of violence as part of Islam, however, agreed that the ongoing marginalisation pushes young Muslims to the edge and forces them affiliate more with other Muslims than non-Muslim.

I disagree with Muslims who think that by being radical and acting out, they will achieve anything but sometimes the society pushes people up to the point that the only solution they find is in their religion, in its purest form. So if someone keeps telling you that you don’t belong here because you are a Muslim and that
you are not a proper Brit, even though you were born here, just because you are
Muslim, and your parents don't really get it because they are different generation
and see things different, then I can see why some younger Muslims do stupid
things. It gives you sense of belonging to likeminded people and it empowers you,
doesn’t it.

Female respondent (age 20) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range during event organised
by the Muslim Centre raised the issue of imams and their role in possible radicalisation of young
Muslims. She discussed her own experiences and the difference between her childhood Islamic
education and today’s system.

I think that imams can play a massive role in Muslim radicalisation. Things are
different now than they were when I was little. When I was young we had to
learn Quran and Arabic and that was it. Now, there is more space for discussion,
imams teach about values, morals and how we as Muslims should be. So if you
get a good imam in your mosque you will have a chance to talk about any issues
you have. But at the same time, if your imam is not that good or his
interpretations of Quran are more radical then it is likely that you will start to
think like that too. You know, we all talk about radical Muslims but why is nobody
looking at imams and what they teach?

Female respondent (age 19) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range Muslim Centre event
summed up the issue of Muslim radicalisation with the following statement:

It’s up to us, Muslims within the community to teach other Muslims that
radicalisation is not the way forward. People sometimes don’t realise how good
they have it here in Britain. They should go to the Middle East and see how it is in
reality when you live in an Islamic state!

Germany responses

Participants in Germany were united in their view that radicalisation may be result of continues
pressure on young Muslims by the host society and negative comments about Muslims by general
public and media. In particular, they referred to the underlining and unspoken tensions dividing the
society.
Male respondent (age 40) born in Germany and interviewed in the state monitored Milli Görus mosque expressed his frustration with what he felt to be a double treatment Germans gave to Muslims. He felt very angry about this and explained that despite being a law obeying ‘citizen’ it still was not good enough for the German society.

I don’t know in other countries, I’m sure that things are different there but in Germany or even Düsseldorf there is no tension but when you look deeper under the surface there is a lot of resentment. Islam is not a violent religion, but because lots of young people are told every day that they are not part of the society that they grew up in and that they will never be proper Germans, I think it gets them down. You know my neighbour told me that I’m a terrorist I don’t feel that I’m welcome in this society. So it’s hard and I think that sometimes it can push people over the edge. It’s by no means a way to justify any radical action but I think that the society should look at the whole picture instead of blaming Islam.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre expressed similar concerns. She also referred to the role played by the local media which in her eyes added to the tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. She also reiterated the fact that some mosques were being monitored by the state authorities which increased the resentment amongst local Muslims. The participant was not affiliated with the Milli Görus mosque but took the matter personally, she explained after the interview that it was a matter of principle and ‘once you start monitoring one mosque what is stopping you to monitor the others?’

I think everyone is asking the wrong question, why are we always hearing about radical Muslims or terrorists but never actually hear about the context and why it happened. What we often hear is that the individual got on the path of fundamental religion…it makes me angry. Islam is not radical, people make it like that. The media does not help, especially here in Germany, everyone is careful not to say anything racist, I think it’s because of the history but the media often implies that Turks / Muslims are bad for Germany and that if things aren’t changed they will take over. You listen to this again and again and sometimes it gets into peoples’ head. Mosques are being monitored, especially the Milli Gorus ones, it makes you feel like you are seen as a threat, you are always looked at with suspicion, it’s not nice.
Male respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a local café in Düsseldorf discussed the lack of belonging which was reiterated by what he saw as a constant rejection by the German society.

I think that sometimes it is because people don’t feel like they belong anywhere or that they hear for so long that they are a threat and then they accept it. But I’d like to think that other people in mosque would help with that, I think it’s our job as Muslims to make sure that things like that don’t happen.

Female respondent (age 37) born in Turkey and interviewed in Düsseldorf’s Turkish Cultural Centre was more neutral about the role played by the German society. This was in line with her overall attitude and approach to combine her Turkishness and Islam with her German life.

You never know why people decide to take radical actions, I suppose that there are many different factors, some people come from a difficult social situation or feel treated unfairly. Of course it does not give them the right to attack other people and claim that their actions are under the religion of Islam. That’s nonsense, Islam has nothing to do with it.

Female respondent (age 28) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Duisburg felt the question was unjust and contributed to further alienation of Muslims.

Why are some German people murderers, abusers or racists? Why doesn’t anyone talk about these criminals in the same way as Muslims? Muslims are now seen as the biggest threat. You always get some people who lose it, whatever the reason but you cannot blame the whole community. Once you start doing that you alienate them.

**The Czech Republic responses**

Interview respondents were largely detached from the problem of Muslim radicalisation which they often regarded as something specific to Western Europe and absent from the Czech Republic.

As male participant (age 42) born in Yemen and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre explained, radicalisation of Muslims was not something that was in his eyes an issue in the Czech Republic.
It is the same with every religion. Some Muslims can become radical but this is because Muslims are people and people are not perfect. Here in the Czech Republic we are just glad to have a community centre, there is really very little room for anyone to radicalise. If you have a status of immigrant or asylum seeker you keep quiet, do you know what I mean… because they (the authorities) can say to you ‘if you don’t like it, you can go’.

Another male respondent (age 27) born in Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre after the prayer was almost surprised at the question of possible radicalisation. He made it very clear that it was not something that the Muslim community would support.

Here it is very rare for anyone to even make some radical statements, we just practice our faith. And I think that even if someone did start with some radical Islamic vision, the Muslims community would soon put a stop to it.

Female participant (age 40) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre after the prayer confirmed the notion that for most Muslims in the Czech Republic, radicalisation was seen as a problem of Western Europe or the Middle East and Africa. She felt very strongly about the trauma many Muslims in the Czech Republic suffered before their arrival into the country which she believed contributed to the lack of radicalisation.

From the media we know that in some European, Middle Eastern or African states there are Muslim groups which are radical and commit violence in the name of Islam. But this is not the case in the Czech Republic. I was brought up Muslim and very rarely have I heard any of our Muslims say something radical. It’s not part of Islam, it is people. Let me tell you, many of the Muslims here in the Czech Republic are immigrants and have been through war or prosecution...so they know what it’s like and how difficult things can be. They came here to find peace and they are just happy that they can live a quiet life and express their faith.

Another female participant (age 27) from Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre stressed the interpretation of Islam and Quran.

There is no such thing as radical Islam. Islam is peaceful religion, it is the people who can turn it into violence. Of course I want everyone to follow Islamic path but I know that people have to find their own way and there is no point in making
them believe in something if they don’t want that themselves. It all depends on how you understand and interpret Quran.

6.2 Theme 2 - Cross country analysis

Significant cross country differences transpired in the second research theme illustrating the diversity of Muslim opinion across the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic. Addressing the developments in contemporary Muslim identity, questions 4 and 5 focused on participants’ perceptions of their religious accommodation as well as their approach towards traditional Islam. This research theme proved most divisive amongst respondents. Indeed, reactions to the questions were possibly as telling as the answers themselves. Respondents in the UK were open about their views and feelings and did not hesitate to criticise or praise fellow Muslims as well as the mainstream society. In contrast, German participant felt initially very uncomfortable discussing the questions and expressed anxiety about the results and their dissemination, particularly should these be read by German audiences. They refused to share their views until they trusted that the researcher and the final results would not be manipulated to compromise Muslim communities in Germany. Respondents in the Czech Republic were inclined to share their views with optimism, keen to communicate their ideas which they felt went often unheard, hoping that perhaps the results may contribute towards some positive developments for Muslim communities in the Czech Republic.

Figure 25 outlines the responses to question 4 which were more or less parallel to the developments thus far. The UK participants had most positive experience with only 2 respondents who did not feel that their needs were being accommodated. Results for Germany were split with half of all participants indicating that their needs were not accommodated whilst almost half of respondents believed that their needs were partially accommodated. The research findings recorded in the Czech Republic suggest that most respondents felt their needs to be partially accommodated by the state, with only 5 respondents indicating that their needs were not being accommodated at all.
Figure 25 Cross-country Question 4

Analysis for question 5, as illustrated in Figure 26, was perhaps most conclusive in the Czech Republic as only 2 participants were opposed to the idea of traditional Islam. Overall, respondents in the Czech Republic understood the concept to be mainly positive, implying guidance and support for community and family values. Respondents in Germany were also in favour of the idea of traditional Islam, however, a significant number of participants indicated that they would support the concept only under specific circumstances. Most German participants interpreted the term traditional Islam in a positive sense, however, there were reservations towards what they referred to as strict practices and a near complete rejection of Sharia law (not practiced in Turkey) or complete veiling for women. Most divisive were results in the UK with 7 respondents opposed to the idea and 6 unsure whilst only 11 participants clearly in favour, which was also the lowest number across the three countries. Indeed, respondents in the UK had very mixed feelings about the concept of traditional Islam which was often associated with radicalism. In fact, respondents opposed or unsure of the idea of traditional Islam expressed their hesitation for reasons related to oppression of women, undemocratic practices or for being labelled by the British public as fundamentalist. In contrast, respondents in favour of traditional Islam interpreted the term in a positive light, similarly to participants in the Czech Republic or Germany.
The in-depth interviews examined the question of possible radicalisation of Muslim identity with the results suggesting further disparities. Respondents in the UK indicated that possible radicalisation could be attributed to peer pressure, segregated communities, media bias and lack of trained imams who could relate to young British Muslims. The issue of peer pressure was mentioned by a number of participants and appears to be particularly problematic in the UK. Participants in Germany voiced similar concerns, however, negative attitudes towards Muslims and the lack of acceptance by mainstream society were regarded as the underlining factors. In contrast, respondents in the Czech Republic regarded Muslim radicalisation as a Western phenomenon, largely non-existent in the context of the Czech Republic.

Research findings and hypotheses

Addressing the developments in contemporary Muslim identity, questions 4 and 5 focused on participants’ perceptions of their religious accommodation as well as their approach towards traditional Islam. This research theme proved most divisive amongst the respondents. British respondents maintained a positive attitude regarding accommodation of their religious needs whilst respondents in Germany were less optimistic. Perhaps most unexpected were results for the Czech Republic where most respondents indicated that their religious needs were being partially
accommodated. This is at odds with results for question 2 on equality, however, it falls in pattern with question 3 where most respondents felt attached to the Czech Republic. Examining these trends in more detail there are parallels with theme 1 and individual policies of the nation states. As the hypothesis (H3) suggests, the nation states still operate within the realm of ethno-national identities and the effect of these policies is paramount to identity developments of Muslim communities, hence the considerable success of British multicultural policies. National policies of Germany represent ‘a half-way house’ between social provisions and civic membership whilst the policies of the Czech Republic are largely ignorant of minority cultures. The findings from Germany and the Czech Republic are parallel to Connor’s argument whereby the states with strong ethnic ties retain a preferential treatment for the home or native population which holds the ultimate ownership of the homeland. This also fits in with Connor’s dichotomy introduced in chapter 1 of ‘us’ and ‘them’ which is exacerbated by ethnic policies of the nation states. The research findings supporting Connor’s arguments and Parekh’s view of multicultural policies also outline the effects of these state centric policies in responses to question 4.

Drawing on the respondent sample in the Czech Republic, specifically their origins and citizenship status means that their expectations were rather low. Participants repeatedly referred to their desire to have ‘proper mosques’ and possibly Muslim schools, there was a sense of gratefulness despite the limited state provisions in place. It is, however, questionable to what degree, if at all, will this attitude of Muslims in the Czech Republic remain positive with coming generations. In case of Germany, responses were in line with the ‘half-way house’ of German policies, divided in their views between social acceptance and civic exclusion. The fact that German state policies provide social provisions makes accommodation of Muslim needs easier but it does not include all areas which are necessary to make German Muslims equal members of the society, specifically German citizenship.

The most positive results were repeatedly in the UK. As chapter 2 explained, the multicultural policies challenge the homogenising tendencies of the nation states and aim to combine diversity with unity. The success of multicultural policies, however, has been questioned and criticised for creating separate communities. Malik’s (2009) critique of British multiculturalism in chapter 2 reflects this view. Testing Malik’s hypothesis, the analysis of theme 1 suggests that British Muslims self-identify with their religious as well as ethnic identity which often creates pockets of ethnic clusters where different ethnic communities rarely mix. This would imply that Malik’s critique of British multiculturalism is justified as multiculturalism leads to segregated societies. However, drawing on the overall comparative results for theme 1 and most importantly theme 2, British participants were mostly positive about their equality and belonging to the UK. Results for question
4 (theme 2) confirm this with the majority of participants feeling that their needs as Muslims were being accommodated by the state.

Most divisive were results for question 5 and the concept of traditional Islam which was purposely left open to individual’s interpretation. In the UK, the notion of traditional Islam was often interpreted in a negative light with fundamentalist connotations similar to those held by general public and British media. This would suggest that Muslim identities reflect and absorb domestic attitudes. There is, however, another key factor directly associated with different Islamic traditions and their interpretations of Islam. Most British Muslims have origins in Pakistan and Bangladesh with Sunni tradition. As Chapter 4 explained, these communities have been frequently connected to radical factions of Islam. Hence, there is a need to detach oneself from such groups and draw the line between ‘us’, the moderate Muslims, and ‘them’, the radical Muslims. This can be also located within Connor’s argument which highlights this division and implies that those who are with ‘us’ have more right to the homeland than those who are ‘the other’ or ‘them’. Respondents in the Czech Republic, on the other hand, were amongst the most positive and supportive of the concept, associating it with traditional values relating to community and family. Similarly to the UK, Islamic traditions and perceptions play an essential role. Muslims in the Czech Republic are considered alien and are often viewed with suspicion, however, Muslim groups from the former Eastern bloc are considered less ‘dangerous’ than Muslims in the West. Indeed, the popular view in the Czech Republic is that Muslims from former Yugoslavia and the USSR are less radical than Muslims from the Middle East and Africa. Moreover, in the name of secularism the state authorities in the Czech Republic are considerably restrictive in allowing substantial religious rights to Muslims in order to prevent them from possible radicalisation, particularly with regards to mosque building and religious schools. Participants in Germany were largely positive of traditional Islam if applied under specific conditions avoiding strict religious practices such as full body veiling for women or Sharia law.

Similarly to the UK and the Czech Republic, distinct Islamic traditions and domestic perceptions are determining factors of German Muslim identity. The public view of Islam is mostly negative, however, it is not openly expressed. Hence, the references to unspoken tension as noted by some participants while the Islamic tradition of German Muslims who are in most cases Turks is conditioned by their country of origin. Turkey, which keeps close ties with its diaspora in Germany is a secular republic and the religious tradition does not support Sharia law or full body veiling including burqa or niqab. As previous chapter explained, Turkish Muslims in Germany represent a hybrid identity absorbing influences from their formal homeland but also from their country of
residence which explains their mostly positive view of traditional Islam but only under certain
criteria.

Similar trends can be observed in relation to possible radicalisation of Muslim identity with Czech
respondents regarding the question as obsolete, whilst respondents in the UK and to a certain
degree Germany indicated there were some factors which could contribute to possible
radicalisation. Peer pressure, community segregation and media bias were amongst most noted in
the UK, whilst the lack of acceptance by the mainstream society and negative attitude towards
Muslims were cited by German respondents. These findings suggest that the negative outer
perceptions significantly impact on Muslim identities which correlates with the proposed hypothesis
of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. In other words, these perceptions clearly reflect domestic views implying
that identities are fluid and react to the environment, they are stronger when under pressure or
threatened and relaxed when there is calm. Importantly, the UK participants did not think that
British involvements in conflicts in Iraq or Afghanistan were responsible for possible radicalisation of
British Muslims. In fact, participants agreed that it was more domestic or European issues, such as
the headscarf debate or cartoons mocking the Prophet Muhammad, that were more sensitive than
foreign intervention.

The approach and the manner in which participants responded to questions 4 and 5, reflects the
environment and the state position towards Muslim communities ultimately shaping Muslim
identities. British respondents who were also citizens felt entitled to express their views and criticise
both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. German participants who in most cases were not
German citizens and did not feel accepted by the German society were anxious of expressing any
negative comments or criticism of Germany. This fear exacerbates the unspoken division between
the Muslim and non-Muslim communities in Germany and demonstrates one of the main
weaknesses of Germany’s approach to its Muslim communities, namely the lack of civic inclusion
and integration. The case of the Czech Republic is unique as participants were optimistic and keen to
share their views despite the fact that in most cases they were not Czech citizens. Reflecting on the
interview results this optimism was largely due to the lack of involvement Muslims in the Czech
Republic have. Essentially disregarded by the state, respondents felt that participating in the
research enabled them to express their views and have a voice which was mostly ignored.
Summary

Addressing the second research theme focusing on the developments of Muslim identities were questions on accommodation of Muslim religious needs and the concept of traditional Islam. The question of traditional Islam and possible radicalisation of Muslim identity were examined further in the follow-up interviews. The interview questions explored possible factors contributing towards the radicalisation of Muslim identity and the prospects of Sharia law which were the most emotive and divisive issues. The findings for theme 2 reveal a close relationship between the inner and the outer perceptions and the effects these have on identity formation. The research findings also test the hypotheses (H1 and H2) that identities are fluid and as such can change over time or when under pressure. Moreover, the research suggests that British multiculturalism has thus far been more successful in integrating and including Muslim communities than the national policies in Germany or the Czech Republic. Muslim communities were strongly influenced by public opinion in their countries of residence particularly with regards to the concept of traditional Islam. Respondents in the UK felt mostly accommodated and associated the concept of traditional Islam with largely negative and radical connotations whilst some participants believed the concept represented traditional values and traditions. Mostly, there was a desire to detach oneself from what was seen as a negative image of Islam and specific Islamic traditions by the general public. National policies significantly affected participants in Germany whereby many respondents felt their religious needs were at least partially accommodated by the state. However, participants referred to an unspoken tension and the lack of acceptance by the society and their exclusion from the civic participation. Their interpretation of traditional Islam was mostly positive but clearly associated with the Islamic traditions similar to those in Turkey, excluding full body veiling for women or Sharia law. Similar patterns emerged in the Czech Republic where respondents had mainly positive views of traditional Islam which was interpreted as a set of traditional community and family values.

Addressing the question of possible radicalisation, British interview participants agreed that peer pressure and segregated communities were particularly important factors. Some participants brought to attention the role of imams and the positive as well as the negative influence they may have. In response to the question of Muslim radicalisation, German participants agreed that negative perceptions, the on-going media bias against Muslims and the lack of acceptance by German society can act as catalysts, segregating and alienating some members of Muslim community and possibly lead to radicalisation. For Muslim communities in the Czech Republic radicalisation was seen as irrelevant and was felt to be more of an issue in the Western parts of Europe.
Chapter 7 – The European dimension of Muslim Identity

Introduction

The primary focus of chapter 7, the last empirical chapter, is on theme 3 which draws on the analysis introduced in chapters 2, 3 and 4. Theme 3 of the empirical research investigates the role and the perceptions of the European Union among Muslim communities. It also examines participants’ interest in and information about other Muslim communities across the EU and the global community of ummah in general. The aim is to shed light on participants’ position and sense of kinship with Muslims in other European countries and gain better understanding of the role ethnic origins and religious traditions play in their perceptions. Maintaining the European dimension, the chapter seeks to examine to what degree are Muslim perceptions of the European Union influenced by domestic policies and opinions and, if at all, the respondents recognise the EU as an important political player with regards to Muslim communities.

7.1 Theme 3 - Research findings

Questionnaires

The final part of the research questionnaire with questions 6, 7 and 8 investigates the level of knowledge participants have of other Muslim communities in Europe (question 6), and perceptions and importance of the European Union amongst Muslims (questions 7 and 8). Table 11 outlines the results for question 6 focusing primarily on participants’ knowledge of other Muslim communities across Europe. Question 7 and question 8, analysed in Table 12 and Table 13, address the role of the European Union. Question 7, in Table 12, examines the interest of Muslim communities in the European Union with question 8, see Table 13, focusing particularly on the support the European Union offers or could offer specifically to European Muslims.
### Table 11 Question 6
Do you feel you have any knowledge of Muslims living in other European states?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some knowledge</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not sure</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 12 Question 7
Are you interested in politics of the European Union?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A little</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not relevant</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 13 Question 8
Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percentage The UK</th>
<th>Percentage Germany</th>
<th>Percentage The Czech Republic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The UK case study

As revealed in Tables 11 and 12, whilst the majority of respondents had some interest in the politics of the European Union, most respondents had little or no knowledge of other Muslims across the EU. Particularly striking was the positive outlook on the European Union and its role for Muslims, with the majority of respondents indicating that the EU has some means to support European Muslim population. Drawing on these associations Figure 27 outlines the correlation between questions 6 and 7 implying that those with no knowledge of other Muslims in the EU were more likely to be interested in the politics of the EU than respondents with some knowledge of other Muslim communities who were generally less interested. As shown in Figure 28, associations between question 6 and question 8 are very similar to questions 6 and 7. However, the correlation does not provide any substantial evidence confirming that in fact there are any associations between the two. Exploring the correlation further in Figure 29, the cross theme analysis of question 4 referring to the nation state accommodation of Muslim needs, and question 8 referring to the European Union, shows that there appears to be little overlap between the two. Reflecting on chapters 2 and 4 and empirical findings for theme 3, respondents were mostly positive about the European Union and showed some interest in its policies and politics, despite the comparatively little knowledge and interest of other Muslim communities in Europe.
Q.6 Do you feel you have any knowledge of Muslims living in other European states?
- Yes
- Some knowledge
- No
- Not sure

Q.8 Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims?
- Yes
- Some
- No
- Not sure

Figure 28 UK Correlations between Question 6 and 8

Q.4 Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs?
- Yes
- Partially
- No

Figure 29 UK Correlations between Question 4 and 8
Germany case study

As Table 8 illustrates, most respondents had some knowledge of other Muslim communities across Europe, which is parallel to results for question 7, in Table 12, with most respondents indicating some interest in politics of the European Union. However, addressing the role the European Union may have for Muslim communities, outlined in Table 13, suggests that most participants were sceptical or unsure, with only 7 participants (of 30) indicating that the EU had some means of supporting Muslim communities. Analysis of questions 6 and 7, in Figure 30, suggests that there is a link between knowledge of other Muslim communities across Europe and interest in the European Union policies. Moreover, Figure 31 illustrates correlation between questions 6 and 8, investigating possible associations between knowledge of other European Muslim communities and role of the European Union for Muslims. Results are unclear with a substantial proportion of respondents unsure of the European Union’s support for Muslims. Investigating the relationship further, Figure 32 outlines possible cross-theme correlations between questions 4 and 8. The findings suggest that most respondents who did not feel accommodated by the state were also amongst the majority of those who were most sceptical of the EU’s mechanisms to support Muslims. However, the correlation needs further investigation to clarify and strengthen the results.
Q.6 Do you feel you have any knowledge of Muslims living in other European states?

Q.8 Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims?

Figure 31 Germany Correlations between Question 6 and 8

Q.4 Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs?

Q.8 Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims?

Figure 32 Germany Correlations between Question 4 and 8
The Czech Republic case study

Similarly to Germany, participants in the Czech Republic indicated that in most cases they had some knowledge of other Muslim communities, see Table 11, and all respondents expressed interest or at least some interest in politics of the EU, see Table 10. Figure 33 indicates that there is a connection between the two questions, whereby participants with knowledge of other Muslim communities were also more interested in the policies of the EU. Analysis of question 8, in Table 13, implies that although or perhaps as a result of their relative knowledge of other Muslim communities and the EU policies, there was a great scepticism about the EU’s mechanisms supporting Muslims, see Figure 34. To strengthen the analysis, Figure 35 illustrates the cross theme associations between questions 4 and 8. The primary aim of this investigation was to identify any possible parallels between participants’ sense of accommodation and the role of the EU. However, the correlation needs further investigation to clarify and strengthen the results.

![Figure 33 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 6 and 7](chart.png)
Figure 34 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 6 and 8

Q.8 Do you think that there are means and policies within the EU that help/support Muslims?

Figure 35 Czech Republic Correlations between Question 4 and 8

Q.4 Do you feel that your country of residence accommodates Muslims and their needs?
**Interview results**

Referring to questions 6, 7 and 8, the main focus of the interviews was on the role and knowledge of the European Union and its policies. In addition, the aim was to clarify the interest in and the level of knowledge respondents had of Muslim communities in other European states. Interviews were organised around the following questions:

6. Do you think you have sufficient knowledge of Muslims living in other EU countries? Are you interested in other Muslim communities in the EU?

7. Referring to questionnaire questions 7 and 8, do you think that the EU plays an important role for Muslims in your country of residence? What is your opinion of the EU and how much would you say you know about it?

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**Interview question 6: Do you think you have sufficient knowledge of Muslims living in other EU countries? Are you interested in other Muslim communities in the EU?**

**The UK responses**

Majority of interview participants had little knowledge of Muslim communities living in the other EU countries, indeed only 3 participants felt that they had some knowledge of Muslim communities in the EU because of family connections in Germany, France or Holland.

As outlined by female participant (age 21) interviewed in Bolton in a local café she was interested in the EU but was not aware of any specific policies affecting Muslims. She referred to the fact that her main interests are domestic.

I am interested in EU politics but my focus is not specifically on Muslims.

Male respondent (age 24) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range during a Muslim Centre event was not interested in other Muslim communities outside the UK and did not think that he should be. For him it was more important to focus on particular events in the UK.

I don't know much about other Muslims in the EU but I care about what’s happening here in Britain and what’s going on with Muslims worldwide. I mean, I
am interested in what’s going on, like with the headscarf debate in France but that’s it really, it’s only when there is a problem or a major issue.

Female respondent (age 20) interviewed in Bolton’s local café admitted that her knowledge of other Muslims in the EU was limited but she did not think this was an issue.

I am interested in what’s happening in the world and also the EU and Britain but it’s not just about Muslims. Now that you ask me about it…it is strange because I know quite a bit about Muslims in the Middle East and Palestine but I know little about Muslims in Europe.

Female respondent (age 29) born in the UK was interviewed in Levenshume in a local café. Her family members lived in both the EU (Germany) and the Middle East (Iran) and she felt that she had ‘a relatively good knowledge of what was happening in Germany and Iran’, however, she agreed that she ‘knew less about Muslims living in other European states’.

Male respondent (age 21) born in Kuwait and interviewed in Levenshulme in a local café confirmed that his knowledge of Muslim communities in Europe came from a family member living in France:

My brother and his wife live in France so I know a little bit about the situation there. I think that once you have better understanding of Muslims outside Britain, you realise how good or bad we have it here and what we as Muslims can do better as a group.

Male respondent (age 24) born in the UK and interviewed during a local event organised by a Muslim Centre in Whaley Range also discussed his personal experiences. He felt it was quite important to know about other Muslim communities as it made him realise how his life as a Muslim in a non-Muslim country differed from the experiences of other Muslims.

My friend from university is Dutch but has been living here in Britain for the last 10 years so we sometimes talk about his family and their life in Holland. It made me realise how little I know about the life of other Muslims. Just because we share religion doesn’t mean that our lives are the same.
**Germany responses**

The research questionnaires indicated that most participants had some knowledge of other Muslim communities across the EU. Indeed, this was confirmed in the follow up interviews with many respondents having family connections in other EU countries.

Male respondent (age 40) born in Germany and interviewed in the Milli Görus mosque explained that he was interested in other Muslim communities but he simply did not have the time or energy to follow this up. He believed it was necessary for him to be involved in his local community rather than look elsewhere.

I think that with everything that’s been going on in media about the headscarf in France and Holland you can’t help but finding out about it. We have similar problems in Germany but at least in other European states Muslims have citizenship so they can try to influence what’s going on around them...here we just have to get on with it.

Male respondent (age 19) from Düsseldorf interviewed in a local café shared similar view. He implied that it was almost inevitable that Muslims in Germany heard/knew about other Muslims in Europe from the media. This was mostly in a negative sense or in connection with terrorism. He was angry about this and did not think it was the best way of presenting Islam.

When you live in Germany you end up knowing something about the other Muslim groups, there is a lot of debate about the EU in the media and there is plenty about other Muslims. I remember I read about Pakistani Muslims in England who were trying to force their daughter to marry someone in Pakistan, about Muslim suicide bombers in Holland and the headscarf debate in France...which we had in here too. I know that most of this is extreme, but most of German people don’t know that!

Female respondent (age 25) born in Germany and interviewed in a small mosque in Duisburg reflected on her personal life and experiences of her family. As a result she felt she was more insightful on life in Germany. In fact, at the end of the interview she mentioned that sometimes it was better not knowing because that way she was happier with her life and with Germans.

I know about some Muslim groups because of my extended family, my mother’s cousin lives with her family in Austria and she is quite happy there. I think it’s
similar to here but maybe because it’s smaller Muslims aren’t as visible. I think that Muslims in Germany are more disadvantaged because Germans are so proud as a nation, they are proud of who they are and they don’t want anyone else in their group.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre believed that on the contrary it was important to gain a better understanding of other Muslim communities in Europe. She was very keen to find out more about this and maybe share experiences.

I have some knowledge of other Muslims in the EU but I think that unless you have family living in another country you can’t really know enough. We should learn more about other Muslims in Europe, we can learn from one another, see how things are done, how other Muslims live.

Male respondent (age 38) born in Turkey and interviewed in a Turkish local café in Düsseldorf felt that he had a good knowledge of other Muslim communities because of his extended family. Inevitably he also made comparisons between his life and his brothers’ life in the UK or Holland which were in his eyes better.

I have quite good knowledge of Muslims in Britain and in Holland, I have members of family in there and we are very close. I’ve been living in Germany for 20 years now but before I came here I was trying to get to England, I thought that it was better for Muslims and my brother lives there. But it was almost impossible, they are really strict so I came over here. I think that Germany is ok, but after all this time I’m still not one of them whilst my brother in England and my other brother in Holland are in better position.

Female respondent (age 37) born in Turkey and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre in Düsseldorf had no knowledge of other Muslim communities which she was ashamed of and was keen to find out more. She thanked the researcher for making her think more about this.

I know it’s not good but I don’t know much about other Muslim communities outside Germany. Yes, I hear things in the media but that’s about it. Now that you ask me, I don’t know why…I suppose that I focus on what’s going on in here, in Duisburg and in Germany or in Turkey.
The Czech Republic responses

All interview participants agreed to have at least some knowledge of other Muslim communities. This was mainly because of their family connections as well as personal experience as asylum seekers or refugees staying in different countries prior to their arrival to the Czech Republic.

Female participant (age 40) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre discussed the question with references to her family. She was nostalgic about memories of her father’s family from Sudan but did not see much benefit in knowing about other Muslim communities.

I was brought up as Muslim here in Czech, my father was Muslim from Sudan and my mum who was Czech and converted to Islam when they got together. We have a large family, my brother lives in Germany and one of my sisters is currently in England. So I have some idea what it’s like in there.

Female participant (age 34) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre was also referring to her family members living abroad but similarly to the previous respondent did not see much point in knowing about other Muslim communities.

Yes, I think that I have quite good knowledge of other Muslims in some places in Europe. My husband’s family live in Germany, they are originally from Albania. My husband and his brother settled in Czech and his sister and aunt/uncle live in Munich. We are in regular contact and visit each other.

Female participant (age 24) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in a local café in Prague had more interest in other Muslim communities which as she explained made her realise how different Muslims actually were.

I am involved in the Islamic Centre in city centre (Prague) and I am in contact with many Muslims from different countries. Most of them are visiting Prague but of course that we talk about life and how things are in here or in their country. The problem is that every country is different and so are Muslims who live there.

Male participant (age 42) from Yemen and interviewed in the Islamic Centre where he also worked was very clear about his view of Muslim heterogeneity.
I don't have contact with other Muslims, just because we are Muslim doesn't mean that we are all the same. It's like if you were saying that all Christians are the same, they are not. But it is true that we share the same belief, we are connected through Allah.

Male participant (age 32) born in Bosnia and interviewed in a halal shop in Prague was insistent that Muslim communities should know about their own home country. He thought it was good to know how other communities live but he believed that it should not be the ultimate focus.

Because of where I am from (Bosnia) and my journey so far (this participant left Bosnia in year 2000, went to Austria, Germany and currently lives in the Czech Republic) I feel less attached to the state or my country. But I don't see why Muslims here should know much about Muslims in Spain. We need to worry about what's happening here. Yes, all Muslims should support each other, we are all family, but our priority should be our life here.

Female respondent (age 27) born in Uzbekistan and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre similarly to other participants had some knowledge of other Muslim communities as a result of her refugee status, however, she did not feel that the knowledge of other Muslim communities would benefit her in any way or that it was important.

Before we left Uzbekistan we didn’t know much about other countries. My husband wanted to come to Prague and we knew that it was ok, there was shared communist history and culture. But we also looked at other options like Germany.

Female respondent (age 38) from Ukraine interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre shared similar view to the previous respondent.

It can be quite hard with Muslims from other countries. Here in the Czech Republic you have a great variety because most of us came here from elsewhere and we are all trying to make our way through life. But we all come from different cultures and it’s hard to change those.
Interview question 7: Referring to questionnaire questions 7 and 8, do you think that the EU plays an important role for Muslims in your country of residence? What is your opinion of the EU and how much would you say you know about it?

The UK responses

Responses to this interview question were largely parallel to question 6. Nevertheless, in this instance all interview respondents agreed that the EU was an important political player and had a role in British politics. Respondents also agreed that specifically for Muslims the EU had a role to play but it was somewhat limited.

Female respondent (age 21) born in the UK and interviewed in a local café in Bolton was very keen to find out more about the EU and its role within the realm of religion. However, she did admit that the information that was available was not user friendly and she felt a bit put off by this.

I know some things about the EU but nothing specific to Islam or Muslims. I’d say that my knowledge of the EU is same as any non-Muslim person. It’s a shame that the EU doesn’t play a bigger role when it comes to religion or Muslims – it doesn’t, does it…?

Male respondent (age 24) born in the UK and interviewed during a local event organised by Muslim Centre in Whaley Range shared similar view. He felt that there was very little accessible information about the EU for non-academic audiences and argued that most of his friends knew very little about the EU.

As far as I know the EU does not have any special role for Muslims in the EU or England. I don’t even know about any major Muslim organisations that would have any role in the EU. There are some Christian organisations that get money from Europe but not Muslims, we always rely on Saudis or someone from the Middle East and Africa.

Female participant (age 19) born in the UK and interviewed in Whaley Range during a local event organised by Muslim Centre reinforced the views of previous respondents pointing out the lack of information about the EU and British anti-European sentiments.

I don't know much about the EU. I think it’s because living in Britain you don't get to know much about it. Maybe it would be different if we were on the continent. I’ve never heard of the EU doing something just for Muslims so I guess that as it
stands the EU isn’t so important for Muslims. But I think the EU is important for all people regardless their religion.

Female respondent (age 29) born in the UK and interviewed in Levenshulme in a local café popular with mostly Asian women drew on her family connections abroad arguing that the EU did not ‘market itself’ enough.

I know that the EU does some good things not just for Muslims but for non-Muslims too. Lots of money goes to different projects and charities and some of them are to do with religion. That’s great, but lots of Muslims here in Britain and also non-Muslims, don’t know much about it. The EU should market itself better.

Male respondent (age 21) born in Kuwait and interviewed in Levenshume in a local café was frustrated with the lack of information and engagement of the EU and local communities. He referred to local communities and the fact that their knowledge of the EU was minimal.

Here in Britain, we just don’t know much about the EU. I know that the EU funded some projects on religion and Islam but to be honest hardly any of this filters down so if you ask Muslims in Bradford or Bolton, most of them will have no idea that the EU does something like this. The EU is important in politics in general, but it could make itself more visible to its people.

Germany responses

Most interview participants were sceptical of the role the EU had for Muslim communities in Germany often referring to Turkish accession negotiations. However, participants also felt that they did not have sufficient knowledge of the EU to justify their opinion.

Female respondent (age 33) born in Turkey and interviewed in Düsseldorf’s local café expressed her scepticism and disappointment. In fact, she felt very bitter about the EU’s treatment of Turkey and Turkish application.

I am sceptical, I don’t think that the European Union can do much especially for Muslims. I think that the European Union is important but on a general level, anything specific to Muslims will be always in hands of the state, just look at the
Turkish application to join the EU, it’s because the states don’t want Turkey in there and that’s the end of it.

Female respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre was also sceptical of the EU and explained that in her eyes the EU was a minor political power whilst the states made all the important decisions.

I don’t think that the European Union can do much. German media and public discuss the EU a lot, it’s all about money and how much we pay into the budget. But that the EU could enforce some policies that would help Muslims... I am not sure.

Female respondent (age 28) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Duisburg was also very sceptical and parallel to the other respondents was disappointed with the treatment of Turkey.

I don’t have much faith in the European Union on that level. I think it’s an important institution but it’s driven by the states. They don’t even want Turkey in there because they are too scared that poor Turks will come running in.

Female respondent (age 37) born in Turkey and interviewed in a Turkish Cultural Centre in Düsseldorf discussed the lack of information which was prevalent amongst the British respondents.

I don’t know enough about the European Union to judge. What we hear is what’s in the media, we don’t get to know much about what the European Union does for individual communities.

Male respondent (age 38) born in Turkey and interviewed in a local café in Düsseldorf had more faith in the EU. However, she admitted that her knowledge of the EU was limited.

Hmmm, I think that it can force states to comply with some policies but I’d definitely say that there is a limit to what it can do. We can’t expect the European Union to come in and change everything that the states put into place. I think that normal people have little knowledge about what the EU actually does.

Female respondent (age 25) born in Düsseldorf and interviewed in a small mosque in Duisburg agreed that the public knew very little about the EU and confirmed that she herself had hardly any knowledge of the EU and its policies.
This is difficult because I don’t know much about the European politics or if they
do something for faith communities. I don’t think that it can do anything for
Muslims but some of their policies affect us as well.

Female respondent (age 21) born in Turkey and interviewed in a mosque in Düsseldorf shared her
view with other respondents and discussed the lack of information about the EU with the exception
of some TV programmes. She also reiterated the view that the older generation knew even less
about the EU than the younger people and that there was a resentment towards the EU amongst
many German Turks because of what they felt was an unfair treatment of Turkey.

I can’t say because I don’t know what the EU does for Muslims or even in general.
I know something about the policies from what we hear on TV. But my parents’
generation know even less about the EU apart from that Turkey wanted to join
and the EU doesn’t really want that. I know it’s not as simple but that’s what
most Turks in here think.

Male respondent (age 40) born in Germany and interviewed in the state monitored Milli Görus
mosque was more positive about the role the EU played for Muslims, however, agreed that there
was hardly any information available about the EU’s polices and structures.

The problem is that we know little about European work, I’m sure that they do a
lot and we don’t know about it. Most people know about the EU because of
Turkey, but they don’t know what else it does.

Male respondent (age 19) born in Germany and interviewed in a local café concluded the question
with his personal experience from school and admitted that he had little interest in the EU since he
did not think it was relevant to him.

We had some classes at school talking about the EU but nobody can ever tell you
what it does. I don’t know if it can make any difference to Muslims here in
Germany. They (the EU) should try to inform people more about what they do.
**The Czech Republic responses**

Interview responses suggest that all respondents were interested in the European Union, however, majority of participants believed the EU had very little influence over policies affecting Muslims living in the Czech Republic.

Male respondent (age 42) from Yemen interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre reflected on his time in the Czech Republic prior and post the EU membership. He believed the EU was an important political actor but questioned its role with regards to Muslims.

> The EU is important and I've seen the impact it had on politics here in the Czech Republic and also on the way that minorities are treated. It has definitely made a difference but I am not sure how much it can do for Muslims.

Female respondent (age 24) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in a local café in Prague was also supportive of the EU on a political level and stressed its importance for post-communist countries. However, similarly to the previous respondent, she did not think that the EU had any role to play for Muslims.

> The EU is important politically to the Czech Republic and I'd even say the whole post-communist bloc. I can see the changes most of them positive, that have been happening but I don't think that the EU can do much for Czech Muslims. That is up to the state and the Czech Republic still has a long way to go. We need proper mosques, Muslim schools and kindergartens and the EU is not going to help us with that.

Female respondent (age 38) from Ukraine, interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre reiterated the EU’s importance politically but confirmed that in her view there was nothing that the EU did for Muslims.

> Of course that the EU is important, Czech owes a lot to the EU. But I am not sure when it comes to Muslims how much the EU can do.

Female respondent (age 34) born in the Czech Republic and interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre shared the view of the EU’s lack of involvement with Muslims.

> I think that the EU can help minorities if they are marginalised but I don’t think that it has much involvement with Muslims directly, or at least I don’t know about anything.
Female respondent (age 28) born in Ukraine and interviewed in a halal shop and café discussed the EU with disinterest since she did not think the institution made any difference to her life.

I have some knowledge of the EU but I can’t say that I know a lot about it and I don’t think that there is anything specific that they do for Muslims.

Male respondent (age 36) from Bosnia interviewed in Prague Islamic Centre agreed that the EU was an important political player, however, as all other participants in the Czech Republic, he did not think that there was any relevance for Muslims.

I think that the EU is important but it’s not as important as the state. I don’t think that the EU can do much about Muslims, maybe in other state but not here, not in the Czech Republic.

7.2 Theme 3 - Cross country analysis

Respondents’ perceptions on the European Union were addressed by the final section of the research questionnaire with questions 6, 7 and 8. The aim was to identify knowledge of other Muslim communities across the EU, interest in the European Union politics and understanding of the EU’s mechanisms in place to support Muslim communities. As Figure 36 shows, a comparatively high number of respondents had some knowledge of other Muslim communities in Europe with the highest number in the Czech Republic followed by Germany, respondents in the UK were least familiar with other Muslim groups. The follow up in-depth interviews revealed that participants in the Czech Republic had family contacts abroad with some participants having personal experience of residing in other European country as asylum seekers or refugees prior to their arrival to the Czech Republic. Participants in Germany had also extensive family contacts in other European countries including Turkey whilst only a small part of British respondents had extended family in another European country. Similar pattern can be observed with question 7, in Figure 37, where 24 respondents from the Czech Republic indicated to have interest in the European Union politics with only 4 respondents from Germany and 12 from the UK.
The most diverse results were for question 8, analysing the EU’s role for Muslims in Europe. Taking into account responses to previous question, respondents in the Czech Republic were most...
interested in politics of the EU, followed by Germany and the UK. It is somewhat alarming that respondents in the Czech Republic, as outlined in Figure 38, were amongst the most sceptical of what the European Union can do for Muslim communities. Participants in Germany were split on the issue and the UK respondents, perhaps as a consequence of their limited knowledge, were more optimistic of the European Union’s support. Drawing on the interview results, most participants agreed that the European Union was an important political player, however, that its position in domestic and global affairs affecting Muslim communities was limited.

![Figure 38 Cross-country Question 8](image)

**Research findings and hypotheses**

Research data for questions 6, 7 and 8 suggests that a considerably small number of respondents were familiar with other Muslim communities in Europe whilst most respondents were interested in the European Union politics. The Czech Republic took lead in both areas followed by Germany and the UK, falling in line with developments in their respective countries. Indeed, the results indicate that the Czech Republic which had most interest in the EU and knowledge of other Muslim communities was also the most sceptical of the EU and the means it had available to support Muslims in Europe. The rather cynical view of the European Union and its support is parallel to views
across the Czech Republic which is very much Eurosceptic. Respondents in Germany, who had some knowledge of other Muslim communities as well as some interest in the EU, particularly in matters relating to Turkey’s accession, were divided with a high number or respondents unsure whether there were any European Union’s mechanisms supporting Muslims. The UK’s respondents were amongst the most optimistic about the European Union and the possible support it could offer to European Muslims, nevertheless, British respondents had also the least knowledge of other Muslim communities or European politics which is in line with public opinion in the UK.

Reflecting on these results, there are two main points for consideration, namely, the comparatively low interest in other Muslim communities across Europe and the low profile of the European Union. The former suggests that despite the universal concept of ummah, Muslim communities are predominantly interested in domestic affairs directly affecting their community rather than global affairs concerning other Muslims. This is in contrast to Tibi’s argument outlined in chapter 4 where he argues that the ummah represents an ethicised community on which the constructed identity rests. The research findings suggest that in fact, the importance of ummah is less prevalent as might be implied by Tibi. This is an important point which strengthens the argument that Muslim identities mirror domestic perceptions and environments. It also confirms that European Muslims are far from homogeneous and it is only when other Muslim communities elsewhere are marginalised or in conflict, that their global Muslim identity, ummah, becomes more prevalent. As some participants explained, it was only when there were issues such as the headscarf debate in France or cartoons in Denmark, that they felt an impulse to get involved and actively support fellow Muslims elsewhere. In other words, their Muslim identity intensified when it was under threat which supports the argument that identities are indeed fluid becoming more alert when under threat and relaxed when there is calm. This also applies to ummah, the global Muslim community. Drawing on chapters 3 and 4 where the concept of ummah was analysed in relation to different controversies between home and Muslim populations in Europe and connecting this analysis with the research findings, it becomes apparent that the identity of ummah is by no means fixed. The pattern is the same as with other identities, the outer perceptions are, however, crucial. As the research shows, participants were loyal to their fellow Muslims but their primary loyalties were local rather than global. Locating this argument within the proposed hypothesis (H3), the ethno-national identity of the nation states affects identities of European Muslims whose self-identification resides within the ethno-national and religious realms. This creates a unique form of identity attached to the specific national and ethnic identities joined by a more general Muslim identity.
Examining the second part of theme 3, the low profile of the European Union and considerable scepticism about its role imply that the European Union is failing to reach ordinary Muslim communities. As chapter 4 explained, the European Union initiated a number of projects promoting interfaith dialog with European Muslims hoping to include Muslim communities and create a moderate form of European Islam. Nevertheless, the manner in which the EU approaches Muslim faith communities and the structure within which the EU works are modelled on the framework of the nation states and their partnership with Christian organisations rather than the supranational European Union and Muslim faith groups. This top-down approach is problematic and leads to creation of artificial representative organisations detached from ordinary Muslims. Moreover, as argued by Silvestri in chapter 4, the focus on forging European Islam implies that the non-European Islam is bad and should be reformed or Europeanised and ultimately also homogenised. The failure of this mostly imposed European Islam to capture the hearts and minds of European Muslims was confirmed in the research findings where participants simply did not have interest in this modified form Islam. Moreover, the research findings confirm that participants were interested in politics of the EU but their knowledge and interest were in line with domestic views prevalent in their countries of residence. Hence, most interest came from the Czech Republic followed by Germany and the UK. Reverse pattern emerged with participants’ believe in the EU’s mechanisms to support Muslims. Participants with less interest, mainly from the UK were more optimistic than those who expressed more interest and had more knowledge of other Muslim communities. This is a puzzling development suggesting that participants in the Czech Republic who were mostly from former Eastern Europe had little faith in the European Union whilst German and British Muslims were more optimistic. The correlations are, however, unclear and require more in-depth research into this relatively unknown area.

Summary

The research findings for theme 3 reveal important aspects of Muslim identities in relation to the nation states, the global concept of ummah and the supranational European Union. Drawing on the multiple attributes of these diverse actors, the nation state shapes Muslim self-identification with the ethno-national identity whilst the ummah affects it with belonging to a universal Muslim community. The research suggests that most participants were attached to their Muslim identity, however, their loyalties were first and foremost local, rather than universal. This is a novel form of identity falling in line with the ethno-national identity of the nation states and the overarching
religious identity, thus confirming the comparatively low interest in other European Muslim communities. Hence, the nation state, its policies and identity are, one of the key actors in identity formation of Muslim communities. However, the nation state is circumvented by an overarching religious identity. This identity is essential to Muslim communities in Europe but is very much localised and becomes more prominent when targeted or threatened.

The European Union perspective was assessed by questions analysing the role of the EU specifically for Muslim communities and participants’ overall interest in the EU politics. Majority of respondents had little knowledge of the European Union functions and policies and whilst the interviews showed that participants were interested in the European Union and regarded it as an important political player, it was believed that EU’s relevance specifically for Muslims was minor. Respondents from the UK were more optimistic about the role of the EU for Muslims than their counterparts in the other case study countries, although this may be associated with their relative lack of knowledge of the EU polices and other Muslim communities in Europe. Participants in Germany indicated some knowledge of the European Union policies yet, almost half of all participants did not think that the EU had any mechanisms to influence policies affecting Muslims, with the remaining respondents unsure of what the EU could do for Muslim communities. Possible explanation for this discord lies in participants’ perceptions of their religious accommodation with the majority of those who did not feel accommodated by the state were also amongst the majority of those most sceptical of the EU’s mechanisms to support Muslims. Czech respondents’ perceptions towards the European Union and its mechanisms showed relatively high interest in the European politics, despite their interest participants were largely sceptical of the European Union’s means to support Muslims. These results imply that participants’ perceptions and expectations of the European Union and its policies were mostly parallel with the domestic views. The EU has not been very successful in establishing itself with European Muslims as it is the nation states that inform participants’ knowledge of the EU rather than the EU itself. The role of the European Union is perhaps most important in transitional countries of post-communist Europe where Muslims are often a new minority, however, the findings suggest that this is precisely where the EU is failing, at least in the Czech Republic.
Conclusion

The main focus of this thesis was the complex and fluid concept of identity within the context of the majority/minority relations. More specifically, the aim was to develop a more immediate understanding of Muslim identities, how they are formed and influenced by different state policies and the European Union from a comparative cross-country perspective. The theoretical framework of the thesis is underpinned by multicultural governance as introduced and defined by Parekh. The research is located in the field of politics reflecting on concepts such as nation, nation state, nationalism and national identity, drawing in particular on the multifaceted relationship between the identity and the state. The complexity of this relationship can be attributed to different factors but perhaps most challenging for the nation states is achieving a balance between political unity and cultural diversity. Confronted by the presence of the ‘other’ which challenges the traditional concept of the nation state as a homogenous political entity, the states draw on national policies and legislations to control the ‘other’ and maintain the ethno-national identity that bonds its citizens.

The course of the contemporary identity politics tends to increasingly dwell on the citizenship acquisition, the state policies of integration managing ethnic relations and the notion of belonging. These aspects of the nation-state’s existence have over the years grown more complex, introducing new challenges for the structure and politics of the states. As a result of these shifts, the construction of the second and third generation Muslim identities reaches beyond the traditionally defined and constructed narratives, boundaries, loyalties and attachments, creating hybrid identities. These hybrid identities are often portrayed as the ‘other’ from the perspective of home societies where it is becoming increasingly difficult to construct a shared sense of belonging in an environment of growing cultural diversity. The policies of integration and citizenship are becoming more open whilst the trajectories leading to their acquisition, such as naturalisation policies, are increasingly complex and restrictive.

In the world where most nation states are multicultural, it is bridging of the cultural and the political that becomes the part and parcel of modern politics. The most commonly adopted forms of governance to manage this complicated nexus are assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. The three principals have their advantages and drawbacks. Within this thesis it is argued that the multicultural politics offers the best and the most suitable solutions to our contemporary world. This has been supported by the cross country empirical research with British multicultural polices as the most successful in integrating Muslim communities and providing them with civic participation.
Drawing on the work of Parekh, three distinctive models of multicultural governance were evaluated, suggesting that each form takes on a unique approach to minorities and cultural diversity. The choice of multicultural policies is inherently conditioned by the civic and ethnic elements of individual nation states and varies from state to state. The more civic the national identity, the more likely it is that the state will embrace the more inclusive forms of governance. The critique of multicultural policies reflects the tension between the civic and the ethnic principles. This includes the increasingly negative public debates on multicultural policies holding it accountable for community segregation and creation of parallel societies. The multicultural discourse became the ‘it’ word with different meanings adopted by the media, politicians and general public reducing it to a meaningless label. It is within this debate that the thesis is located, challenging and questioning the various approaches, underpinned by the discussions on the most successful policies for contemporary societies. Specifically, focusing on Muslims as the largest religious minority in the EU, the research aimed to shed light on the strategies adopted on the national and European levels as a way of managing the changing fabric of the modern societies. Particularly, as the question of religious and national loyalties of European Muslims is often at odds with the ethno-national identity and homogenising tendencies of the nation states.

On the European level, religion has been contained within the secular rhetoric and the secular policies of laïcité. Such is the official line. Under closer observation, it becomes clear that the distinction is not as clear cut. The position of the individual nation states on secularism differ which is inherently problematic for Muslim communities. In some states, religion is strictly confined to the private sphere whilst in others it has a more prominent position. The role of the EU is predominantly within this domain, with the objective to create a flourishing relationship with Europe’s main religions. However, the EU’s interactions with religious organisations are still predominantly within the realm of Christianity. It is precisely this close collaboration with Christian faith groups and the replication of their structure that is problematic for Muslim organisations which lack the hierarchical frameworks established within the Christian tradition. To strengthen their relationship with Muslim communities, the European Union devised a number of initiatives encouraging cultural exchange and dialog. Its main project centres on European Islam which aims to consolidate Muslim identities and belonging to Europe whilst also preventing Islamic radicalism. This top-down initiative has been criticised for deliberate ‘Europeanisation’ of Islam, suggesting that Islam as such is not suitable for Europe. Drawing on the hypothesis (H1 and H2) of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’, the concept of European Islam in juxtaposition to the ‘bad’ non-European Islam may eventually create resentment and exclusion of European Muslim communities. The approach in which the EU initiated the project of
European Islam is modelled on the structure of the nation states with homogenising tendencies. Indeed, despite the EU’s supranational character the imprint of the nation state is vital for its interactions with Muslim communities. The assumption that Islam should be Europeanised has been endorsed by a number of controversies such as the Rushdie affair, the headscarf affair or the cartoon controversy, as shown in chapter 3. Such controversies are frequently hijacked by the media, Muslim and non-Muslim politicians and representatives to validate the growing tension between the domestic populations and Muslim communities. At this point it is useful to reflect on the hypotheses introduced in this thesis whereby such controversies are responsible for conditioning and solidifying of the categories of the ‘self’ and the ‘other’. Traditional borders and cultural identities are shifting and the line between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is becoming more blurred, but significant at the same time. Decline of homogeneity is seen as an obstacle to national unity and security, and as illustrated in the case study analysis of the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic, there is no unified approach to tackle this challenge.

Muslim communities in the present case study countries have different historical origins, cultural heritage and Islamic traditions. In combination with the national and the European Union policies these aspects play a vital role in identity formation for Bangladeshi & Pakistani Muslims in the UK, Turkish Muslims in Germany, and Muslims from Bosnia and the former USSR in the Czech Republic. The role of the European Union is perhaps less pronounced in this area, however, is still significant from the point of minority rights protection and accommodation of multiple identities. On a national level, Britain’s imperial history made a long lasting imprint on its immigration policies by appealing to its former colonies though historical ties. In Germany, it was the post-Second World War reconstruction that acted as a stimulant inviting cheap labour from Turkey and leading to a gradual settlement of Turkish Muslims. The Czech Republic has opened its border in the last 20 years after the collapse of communism attracting migrants, some of whom are Muslims, from the former Soviet bloc. Accounting for these differences, the internal state policies concerning citizenship acquisition, integration and migration, reflect these state specific developments and translate them into the broader framework of the majority/minority relations.

British system is mostly multicultural with citizenship and integration policies comparatively inclusive. German citizenship and integration policies are located within the internal tensions of German society towards their own history and migrants in general. The largely ethnic policies have undergone significant reform in 2000 and currently combine elements of both, the ethnic and civic principles with citizenship becoming more accessible. However, the naturalisation policies which are
the first and compulsory step to citizenship acquisition became more restrictive. In contrast, the post-communist Czech Republic is relatively homogenous, with Roma representing the only considerable minority. Parallel to world developments with globalisation and accession to the EU, even the post-communist states such as the Czech Republic experience increasing levels of migration including Muslim migrants. What is yet to be seen, however, is the approach the Czech Republic will take in relation to religious accommodation and integration of these long term migrants and their descendants.

The empirical research for themes 1, 2 and 3 collates a valuable data comparing and evaluating identity formation of Muslim communities in Europe. The research findings support the hypothesis (H3) indicating that the nation state is fundamental in identity formation of Muslim communities, their self-understanding and position within the society. As argued by Connor and Miller, the nation state with its ethno-national identity and the propensity to homogenise compels individuals to choose loyalties to the state and the nation as the overarching loyalties. The main argument presented in the thesis implies that identities are fluid and become more prominent when threatened or under pressure as is increasingly apparent with the religious identity of many European Muslims. The findings suggest that religious identity is essential in self-identification of Muslims, however, its prominence is exacerbated by the external pressure from the nation state to choose between national and religious loyalties. Thus, the states with multicultural and inclusive policies are more likely to create an environment where its members feel to be part of the society with loyalties to the state and their national identity equally important to them as their religious identity. In practical terms, the research data shows that the UK had the largest proportion of respondents who felt their religious and national identities to be equally important whilst participants in Germany and the Czech Republic indicated that their religious identity was more important to them. Moreover, the research confirmed that identities are shaped and formed by the inner and the outer perceptions as explained by the proposed hypothesis (H1 and H2). Responses to the research questionnaire and the follow up interviews confirmed that participants’ understanding of their identity was conditioned by their own community but also by the views and actions of the mainstream society.

The evidence that Muslim identities were influenced by domestic policies and public opinion was particularly striking with regards to participants’ self-perception as Muslims. British respondents, for instance, were mostly concerned with their ethnic identity and heritage which as chapter 4 explained corresponds to the developments in British society. In fact, the research showed that for
respondents in the UK, their identity was moulded by the religious, ethnic and national elements simultaneously. Drawing on chapters 2 and 4, British multicultural polices had a positive effect whereby respondents felt largely integrated as members of the society. On the other hand, the internal fragmentation of British Muslim communities alongside the concepts of race and ethnicity is also possibly a result of British multicultural polices which fostered such identification.

Participants in Germany, on the other hand, were strongly influenced by the nation state of their origin as well as their residence. In this instance, their identity was subjected to two competing forces of the nation states. The strong ethno-national identity of Turkey which retains close ties with its diaspora in Germany is met with the strong ethno-national identity of Germany which acts as a gate keeper of the German nation and significantly limits access to civic participation for any outsiders. As a consequence of these push and pull factors, the identity of Muslim communities with Turkish origin is mostly formed around Turkish civic membership and ethnic identity. Returning to the idea that identities are not fixed and are shaped by the inner as well as the outer perceptions, there may be a shift in Turkish Muslim identity should the German state include more Turkish Muslims in the civic participation. As the research findings indicate, feelings of inequality or negative perceptions are likely to undermine participants’ sense of belonging and loyalty to the state.

Similar developments can be observed in the Czech Republic with perceptions of the home society shaping formations of the local Muslim identities. The ethno-national identity of the Czech Republic is rooted in a secular tradition which is despite its nonspiritual character intertwined with Christianity and is suspicious of Muslims. In this case, the respondent sample and origins play a vital role. Most participants were from former communist countries and entered the Czech Republic as migrants or asylum seekers escaping civil war, genocide or political persecution. Hence, unlike their counterparts in Germany or even the UK, respondents in the Czech Republic did not maintain ties with their countries of origin, nor did they feel to be equal members of the society. Nevertheless, in most cases, participants adopted the Czech Republic as their new home and did not intend to return to their countries of origin in the near future. In other words, their Muslim identity was a permanent and primary form of identity which participants retained whilst adopting a new national identity and state loyalty.

Examining the scope for possible radicalisation of Muslim identities was research theme 2 which also tested the hypothesis (H2) proposing that when the ‘self’ is not congruent with the perceptions of the home society (that of the country of residence) the imbalance creates tensions and barriers towards more inclusive societies. Depicting the correlations between radicalisation and the outer
perceptions was the concept of traditional Islam which was intentionally left vague so that participants could interpret it in their own way. The analysis of individual responses shows that particularly in relation to radicalisation of Muslim identities, the public opinion played a significant role. Participants in the UK were mostly positive about accommodation of their religious needs by the state, however, in most cases they associated the term of traditional Islam with radical and fundamental connotations. This was often expressed in response to public opinion associating the non-European Islam with radical Muslims and oppression of women. Hence, many participants wanted to detach themselves from this negative perception and portray a peaceful and moderate image of Islam. Addressing the possible reasons behind the radicalisation of some Muslims, there was a consensus that peer pressure and segregated communities were the most decisive factors.

Respondents in Germany felt that their religious needs were accommodated to an extent, but many expressed feelings of unease and unspoken tension between home and Muslim communities. Despite their desire to become active members of the society, respondents referred to what they saw as their civic exclusion and marginalisation in the society as a whole. As proposed by the hypothesis, the self-perceptions of Turkish Muslims and their actual perception by the German society are often incompatible. Most participants in Germany understood the term of traditional Islam in a positive sense associated with the community and family values. They insisted, however, that this excludes *Sharia* law and full veiling of women. In response to possible radicalisation of Muslim identities, respondents agreed that the media bias, lack of acceptance and public negative perceptions of Islam and Muslims were most likely the factors.

In case of the Czech Republic, respondents felt mostly accommodated by the state and similarly to participants in Germany, associated the concept of traditional Islam with positive values and associations. Unlike their counterparts in the UK and Germany, however, respondents in the Czech Republic did not feel that the question of Muslim radicalisation applied to them and considered it a problem confined to Western Europe. Comparing the research findings across the three countries, the findings imply that those participants who did not consider themselves to be equal members of the society were more likely to relate to the principle of traditional Islam than those participants who felt to be treated equally.

The last research theme combined Muslim identities with the national, the universal and the supranational actors, namely the nation state, the global concept of *ummah* and the European Union. It was expected that the ethno-national identity of the nation states and the universal identity of *ummah* condition developments of Muslim identities. The research findings revealed that
despite their overarching Muslim identity, participants were mostly interested in issues affecting them on a national level and only under specific circumstances, when the concepts of *ummah* or their Muslim identity were threatened or under pressure, on a global level. This is contrary to the popular opinion often reiterated in the European media suggesting that Muslim loyalties are global and lie first and foremost with the other Muslim communities. Moreover, the research analysis showed that participants had a comparatively low interest in the European Union. British respondents were mostly optimistic about the EU and its role for European Muslim communities despite their relative lack of knowledge of its policies. Participants in Germany and the Czech Republic had more knowledge of the EU’s functions and policies but were also more sceptical of the EU and its mechanisms supporting Muslim communities in Europe. The results confirmed that participants’ perceptions of the European Union were similar to the public opinion and views held by their respective countries of residence. Indeed, the findings suggest that the EU is failing to reach its Muslim population at a grass root level which is particularly important in the post-communist Europe where respondents were amongst the most sceptical of the EU’s importance for Muslims.

Figure 39 Truly multicultural: Car with German and Turkish flags in Düsseldorf, Germany (July 2012).
Reflections and implications

The research findings from this study have a substantial significance for policies of multiculturalism reinforcing the view that the critique of multiculturalism and its forms of governance as outlined for instance by Grillo (2007), Kundani (2007), or West (2004) in chapter 4 is flawed. The findings strengthen the claims of Parekh (1998; 1999; 2000; 2004; 2008) that multiculturalism is the most suitable form of governance integrating the cultural differences under one political unit. The research data support theories of national identity formation and split loyalties as introduced by Miller (1994) and Connor (1993; 1994; 2001) whereby with the absence of multicultural policies the nation states draw on the ethno-national narrative in order to protect and retain control over the access to the nation. In other words, the research confirms that within the nation states there is still the desire to homogenise. This ties in with Connor’s theory that national identities and loyalties are difficult to forge, take time to develop and cannot be forced. Moreover, the research finds similar results to those outlined in the Oostlander report (1997), introduced in chapters 3 and 4, particularly with regards to Muslim openness to democratic principles and integration but also the danger of growing fundamentalism should the nation states exclude or marginalise Muslim communities in the civic and the socio-economic arena and question their loyalties. The study has its limitations however; the number of participants is comparatively low and for the most part reflects the position of women. There are, nevertheless, advantages to this as the voice of Muslim women is often lost in the academic research. Therefore the data presents a small but unique insight into this unknown area. In this sense, rather than providing revolutionary answers, the findings expose and confirm some major weaknesses of the contemporary European nation states with regards to Muslim women and Muslim minorities in general which have been subject to a vigorous debate over the years. The research also outlines the subjectivity and fluidity of identities, aspects often ignored in contemporary politics. Furthermore, the findings confirm the need to continue with this type of research in order to understand more about the changing nature of the nation states and the significance that the national policies and the EU policies have on identity formation of Muslim and minority communities in Europe.

The findings from this study show that Muslim participants in the UK were well integrated and their self-perceptions, in comparison to Germany or the Czech Republic, showed attachment and sense of belonging to their country of residence. Thus, based on the extensive interviews conducted as part of this research, it is possible to conclude that multiculturalism in the UK has been a more successful policy in terms of integration of Muslim communities. Over the years it created an environment in which more British Muslims feel the right to have their voice heard as equal citizens. This can be
interpreted in different ways. For the right wing parties multiculturalism is a poisoned chalice whereby the more is given to British Muslims, the more they expect. This is precisely where the forces of traditional nationalism and its deeply rooted homogenising tendencies are in conflict with the multicultural odyssey. The term odyssey is used deliberately to emphasise the long and complex journey that is multiculturalism. Therefore, rather than selectively pointing at the demands by British Muslims, the argument should be understood in a broader sense, located within the multicultural ethos and underpinned by the empirical results. Indeed, the comparative cross-country analysis suggests that British multiculturalism, which is far from perfect, has been in fact successful, perhaps more than elsewhere in Europe. It can be argued that British multiculturalism has been staged into different phases where the first period, centred on the integration of British Muslims and their descendants, is completed. Hence, the findings indicate that perhaps multiculturalism in Britain is entering into its next stage. This phase should not be confused with radicalisation of British Muslims, nor should it be hastily replaced. This stage, however difficult, could prepare the ground for a truly multicultural community where nationalism in its traditional form with the ethno-national identity becomes less important. Instead, the monoculture could be gradually replaced by a new form of self-understanding and belonging with truly civic identities. Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen whether this almost utopian concept is possible as the demise of nationalism in its traditional form is far from complete. The problem with the traditional nationalism is rooted in its very core, the homogenising tendencies, be it on the ethnic or the cultural level are increasingly challenging for multicultural societies. The result in the contemporary nation state is often a ‘half way house’, as for example in Germany, where minority communities receive substantial social rights but simultaneously are refused equal membership in the national community, the civic rights. The research shows that German participants were the most sceptical about their status within the German state and felt the least accepted by the local population. This implies that the push and pull between nationalism and minority cultures is amplified by the nation state’s desire to protect the nation whilst managing rather than integrating and involving the minority. This approach appears to be the least successful, yet is the most commonly applied precisely because of nationalism’s inherent propensity to protect the national core. In other words, as a result the state delivers what it most fears, the disintegration of its society alongside the ethno-national and cultural lines with competing loyalties.

In contrast, the relatively homogeneous Czech Republic is embarking on a long journey with Muslim migrants who represent a new phenomenon. At present the second generation is still too young to make any significant impact whilst the first generation is often hesitant to make any demands. The
approach taken in the Czech Republic thus far has been of a resentment and resistance to make any additional accommodation for its Muslim community. With liberalism as the founding ethos of the state, the Czech Republic has not approached the subject of religious and cultural minority in any substantial form. For the moment, parallel to the other Central and Eastern European nation states, the Czech Republic is at a cross road between multiculturalism and the ‘half way house’ of national politics.

Reaching beyond the nation state, the European Union contributes an additional layer to the identity formation of Muslim communities in Europe. The EU works on two levels, the national and the supranational. On the national level the European Union affects and often challenges national polices and legislation to be more inclusive towards minorities. On the supranational level, the EU itself works on building relationships with the individual communities including Muslims, this is however where the EU seems to falls short. The EU’s rigorous framework has a tendency to operate within the prescribed norms and as such frequently tries to replicate the Christian hierarchical structures within the diverse Muslim organisations which are alien to such constructs. Moreover, the EU seeks to form a more recognisable form of Islam which would fit better into its secular structures and would be suitably Europeanised. The implications of these initiatives are twofold. Muslim representation on the EU level is rather poor, often failing to integrate and embrace the required hierarchical systems. The representation that does exist is increasingly labelled as self-appointed and failing to represent ordinary Muslims. The empirical research conducted in the UK, Germany and the Czech Republic shows that there is a general scepticism towards the EU and its direct relevance for Muslims. Similarly, the knowledge of the EU policies and structures is rather limited, particularly in the UK, exposing the EU’s detachment from Muslim communities which is in parallel with the domestic situation and general lack of interest in the EU.

The research and data analysis point toward a positive confirmation of the proposed hypotheses that identities are not fixed and are subject to a two way process of the inner and the outer perceptions. The self-perceptions inform our own understanding of who we are and where we belong, whilst the outer perceptions shape the lens through which we see ourselves. If these perceptions are not congruent, they may lead to resentment and divisions within the society. These mutually endorsing processes perform the role of mirrors and condition the identity formation on personal and collective level. It is precisely this mutually reflecting cycle that combines individual, group or community identities and perceptions, with the national and the supranational. It is on this
level that the nation states’ polices, and in case of Europe also the EU policies, shape the identities of Muslim communities.

In addition, different Muslim communities bring into the equation different cultures, histories and traditions which inevitably contribute towards their own identity formation. Within this very complex web of relations, the identity is shaped and re-shaped. It is within this intricate network that British multiculturalism appears to succeed in comparison to Germany’s ‘half way house’ or the post-communist attempts to stretch the concept of liberalism to its extreme in the non-accommodation of minority cultures as the Czech case showed.

However, to avoid simplistic arguments and generalisations, it is necessary to recognise, as chapter 4 explained, that the historical circumstances play a pivotal role in the success of British multiculturalism. The colonial links and privileged treatment of migrants from the Commonwealth or British ex-colonies created a bond which certified a special relationship between Britain and its migrant communities, including Muslims. Similar patterns are largely absent in the context of Germany or the Czech Republic, with the former suffering from partition and a war ridden history, and the latter recovering from over 40 years of communist regime. Transcending the limitations of the nation state, the EU can make significant changes as it did in the protection of many ethnic minorities in Europe. Perhaps this can be realised in relation to Muslim communities if the EU adjusts its approach and avoids the top-down homogenising notion of European Islam and instead supports its development organically.
Bibliography:


