

# Varieties of Radicalism. Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe<sup>1</sup>

Raul Gomez (University of Derby)  
Laura Morales (University of Leicester)  
Luis Ramiro (University of Leicester)

**ABSTRACT:** Radical left parties (RLPs) are a diverse lot and several RLP subtypes have been distinguished in the literature. However, the degree to which these subtypes are associated with significantly different policy proposals has not been analysed. At the same time, little is known about whether these predicated subtypes are associated with differences in their voters' characteristics. In this article, we analyse the policy positions of RLPs across a number of issues using manifesto and expert survey data, allowing us to assess the nature of the differentiation between types of RLPs. We find that RLPs differ in the extent to which they adopt New Politics issues, and we propose a classification of Traditional and New Left RLPs. Using cross-national survey data coming from the European Election Studies series and multilevel multinomial models, we also examine the ideological, policy and social differences in the electorates of the various types of RLPs. We find socio-demographic and attitudinal differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs that are consistent with the programmatic differences of the parties.

**KEYWORDS:** Political parties – radical left - new politics – Europe – electoral behaviour

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## INTRODUCTION

After some years struggling for their political significance, the political convulsions associated with the 2008 economic crisis have been accompanied by a growth in the support for some West European radical left parties (RLPs). These surges in radical left voting have benefitted parties of a variety of origins — such as Syriza in Greece (*Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás*, Coalition of the Radical Left, initially a coalition around a party originated in a modernizer Communist split), the Socialist Party in the Netherlands (*Socialistische Partij*, with origins in a Maoist organization), or the Red-Green Unity List in Denmark (*Enhedslisten — De Rød-Grønne*, created by, among others, the small Danish Communist party). These developments have entailed the success of ideologically quite diverse RLPs, and sometimes two very different RLPs in the same country have taken ‘turns’ in benefitting from the turmoil at different points in time since the start of the crisis — as is the case of the Portuguese Communist Party, *PCP* (within the Democratic Unitarian Coalition, *Coligação Democrática Unitária*, CDU, that they dominate) and of the non-Communist Left Block (*Bloco de Esquerda*, *BE*) in Portugal. However, in this context of renewed impetus and relevance, West European RLPs remain an under-researched party family.<sup>2</sup>

The diversity in origins and ideological outlooks of West European RLPs are not surprising. Long-lasting divisions have marked the history of the West European left, with the Russian Revolution of 1917 triggering the possibly most relevant one. The October Revolution nurtured the appearance of the Communist version of Socialism, with the creation of a number of Communist parties across Europe (Sassoon 2010). This was the origin of an

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<sup>2</sup> See, however, March (2011) and Dunphy and Bale (2011).

enduring ideological division and of the Communist party family (von Beyme 1985). Some decades later, New Left and Left Socialist parties were created around the 1960s revolts. They departed ideologically from the more orthodox versions of both Social Democrat reformism and Communist Socialism, proposing an alternative Democratic Socialism and assuming the New Politics agenda (Lane and Ersson 1987, Gallagher *et al.* 1995). Even if they were not the only divisions experienced by the Western left (as the Trotskyite and Maoist ruptures attest), the Communist and New Left/Left Socialist waves of party formation generated RLPs that have been present in many West European polities since long.

What some have identified as Communist and Left Socialist party families (Klingemann 2005), have experienced important transformations and upheavals over time. One of the most important such episodes took place around the crisis of Soviet Socialism at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, entailing a transformation in the nature of many Western Communist parties (WCPs) (Bull and Heywood 1994, Botella and Ramiro 2003, Moreau and Courtois 2014). Several of them changed their strategies and even their identity, transforming into post-Communist Democratic Socialist parties, and giving a new twist to the diversity of RLPs. The ideological evolution of the Communist and radical left post-Communist parties blurred the boundaries between the old Communist and Left Socialist families, and led to the formation of a new and distinct RLP family (Hudson 2000 and 2012, March 2011, De Waele and Seiler 2012, Escalona and Vieira 2013).

This historical trajectory leads to the inherent heterogeneity of contemporary RLPs and to the distinction between different subsets of parties within the new party family. Accordingly, this article has two core aims: to examine and measure the diversity in the programmatic appeals of West European RLPs, and to analyse whether this diversity is mirrored by the composition

of their electorates. Therefore, we address two main questions: Are RLPs significantly heterogeneous in terms of their programmatic appeals? If they are, thus appealing to different ideological and policy priorities, does the social background and attitudinal features of the voters also differ across RLPs subtypes? In addressing these questions, we explore the match between party supply and electoral ‘demand’ and we, thus, contribute to the task of specification and refinement of the party family category for the case of Western European RLPs, in line with Mair and Mudde’s (1998) recommendations.

We first describe the varieties of West European RLPs as portrayed in the literature and present our expectations regarding their differentiation in terms of programmatic appeals and voters’ profiles. Then we present the data and methods we use in our analyses. The fourth section proposes a classification of RLPs based on their policy positions, and the fifth section explores the heterogeneity of RLPs voters based on the previous classification. Finally, we conclude with a summary of our findings and suggestions for future research.

## **VARIETIES OF WEST EUROPEAN RADICAL LEFT PARTIES**

There is a general consensus around the identification of RLPs that pervades most recent approaches to this party family. Following March’s (2011: 8) description, RLPs reject the ‘socio-economic structure of contemporary capitalism and its values and practices (...) They advocate alternative economic and power structures involving a major redistribution of resources’. In this sense, RLPs advocate a transformative and systemic change, rejecting neo-liberal market-oriented policies (Dunphy 2004: 2). Their version of anti-capitalism is better described as a criticism of the current globalized capitalism than as a clear characterisation of

an alternative Socialist system — something that is, instead, difficult to find in most of their current discourses, with a few exceptions. Their proposal of a radical change refers not only to the economy but also to some key features of contemporary political systems, proposing participatory practices that complement representative democracy (March 2011: 9). These parties' self-definition places them to the left of the Social Democrats and Greens. In EU member-states, some of them are part of the Party of the European Left (PEL), while others are integrated in the group of the European United Left-Nordic Green Left in the European Parliament but are not part of PEL.<sup>3</sup>

Despite the wide agreement around the characterization of RLPs, the degree to which they respond to this general portrayal is mixed. While the differentiation between this party grouping and other adjacent party families — such as the Social Democrats and Greens — has been reinforced by the ideological moderation of the latter, the way in which RLPs effectively express an anti-capitalist discourse is variable. This differentiation in types of anti-capitalism may be the reflection of these parties showing dissimilar shades of left-wing radicalism. Thus, a distinction can be established between more 'traditional' anti-capitalist RLPs — such as those still associated with Communist ideals, like the Communist Party of Greece (*Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas*, KKE) and the Portuguese Communist Party — and more ideologically 'modernized' parties — such as the Danish Socialist People's Party (*Socialistik Folkeparti*, SF) before joining the Green family.

This distinction between ideologically traditional and modernized RLPs has been used since long to differentiate between the New Left/New Politics non-orthodox Left Socialist parties formed in the 1960s and 1970s (Gallagher *et al.* 1995), on the one side, and the allegedly

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<sup>3</sup> Still others participate in coordination bodies of Communist parties.

traditional Communist parties, on the other. It also resonates in the descriptions of the different paths taken by WCPs reacting to their organizational and electoral crisis during the 1980s and 1990s. In those years, it was possible to place WCPs in a continuum between two extreme positions represented, on the one hand, by those parties implementing deep processes of party transformation that drove them out of the traditional Communist identity and, on the other, those parties that decided to remain loyal to their classical ideological principles (Botella and Ramiro 2003).<sup>4</sup> Among those that remained in the field of the radical left some substituted Communism with a combination of Democratic Socialism and New Politics policy priorities (e.g. feminism, pacifism, environmentalism, minority rights) — as the Swedish Left Party (*Vänsterpartiet*, V) did — while others reaffirmed their Communist principles more or less assertively — as in the case of French and Portuguese Communists.

These changes and evolutions are still visible in the contemporary RLP family, giving birth to different strands of the West European radical left. Backes and Moreau (2008) identify three types of contemporary RLPs: traditionalist Marxist-Leninist, reform Communists, and red-green parties. This typology is based on a combination of party origin and party ideology features. The first two categories include more or less ideologically traditional parties that did not break — at least not completely — with the Communist identity, while the third one includes non-Communist radical left and Democratic Socialist parties assuming New Left or New Politics issues (feminism, environmentalism, participatory democracy, minority rights, etc.).

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<sup>4</sup> At the time, some WCPs abandoned the RLP family and entered the Social Democratic camp — such as the Democratic Party of the Left (*Partito Democratico della Sinistra*, PDS), successor party of the Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*, PCI) — while others moved towards the Green party family — such as the Dutch and Catalan communists, through their participation in Green Left (*Groen Links*, GL) and Initiative for Catalonia Greens (*Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds*, ICV), respectively.

March's (2011: 16) recent classification of RLPs into Communists, Democratic Socialists, Populist Socialists and Social Populists is, instead, based on an approximation to parties' ideology rather than on their origin. In March's (2011: 18-19) view, Communists are grouped around their allegiance to traditional symbols and Marxist ideology; Democratic Socialists combine Socialist socio-economic claims with policies from the New Left agenda; Populist Socialists add to the traditional left-wing socio-economic policies an emphasis on anti-establishment discourse; and, finally, Social Populists develop further the anti-mainstream discourse of the Populist Socialists by mixing left-wing appeals with others that do not belong to the catalogue of left-wing politics.<sup>5</sup>

However, as March recognizes, this classification confronts several problems. Although the categories try to group parties that are ideologically similar, they still vary in radicalism and ideological traditionalism within each of the categories. Communist parties differ in their degree of attachment to their classical ideology, and additional subcategories of Conservative versus Reform Communists are added by March (2011) to try to differentiate between the most traditionalist parties and those adopting New Left issues. Democratic Socialist parties also differ in their degree of radicalism (as illustrated by the de-radicalization process experienced by the Danish SF). In March's (2011) own view, the RLP family constitutes an ideologically eclectic one combining different modalities of left-wing radicalism, Democratic Socialist ideals, Eco-Socialism, New Politics, and populism.<sup>6</sup> Additionally, the dynamic

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<sup>5</sup> Social Populists are, according to March, only found in central and Eastern Europe.

<sup>6</sup> Applied to the current RLPs, these categories overlap to some degree. An additional problem is that changes in parties' strategies and processes of party transformation force to conceive the classification of parties as a dynamic process (March 2011: 19). Following March's (2011) categorisation (for Western Europe), the Communist subtype includes the Cypriot (Progressive Party of Working People, *Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laouí*, AKEL), French (French Communist Party, *Parti communiste français*, PCF), Greek (KKE), Portuguese (PCP), Italian (Communist Refoundation Party, *Partito della Rifondazione Comunista*, PRC and Party of the Italian Communists, *Partito dei Comunisti Italiani*, PdCI) and Spanish (Communist Party of Spain, *Partido Comunista de España*, PCE, integrated after 1986 in *Izquierda Unida*, IU, United Left) Communist parties. The Democratic Socialist subtype includes almost all other RLPs: the Greek *Synaspismos* (Coalition of Left, of Movements and Ecology, antecedent organization of Syriza), the Finnish Left Alliance

nature of parties' strategies make some of the categories appear void at some points in time or not very illuminating at others, as parties change their stances. Particularly, the Populist Socialist category is left without cases due to transformations in the two parties that populated it — the Dutch Socialist Party and the German The Left — and which, according to March (2011), are increasingly difficult to differentiate from other parties classified as Democratic Socialists.<sup>7</sup> At the same time, this category is probably not too useful due to the blurring boundaries of radical left populism, with many RLPs increasingly using anti-establishment appeals.<sup>8</sup>

In this context, an empirical approach that clarifies the usefulness of these categories, explores the way in which parties' policy proposals indeed allow distinguishing between different subsets of RLPs, and assesses if the heterogeneity in parties' programmatic appeals is associated with heterogeneity in parties' voters characteristics is needed. Thus, we analyse RLPs' policy positions in order to determine the degree to which they are homogeneous or, instead, require the differentiation of subtypes.

If the categories differentiating between subtypes of RLPs — and, especially, distinguishing between those considered ideologically more traditional (such as the Communists) and those ideologically more modernized (such as the Democratic Socialist and New Left parties) in March's (2011) terms — stand, we expect them to be reflected in differences in their

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(VAS, *Vasemmistoliitto*), the Portuguese Left Bloc, the Swedish Left Party, the Danish Red-Green Alliance (EL) and the Socialist People's Party, the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (*Socialistisk Venstreparti*, SV), and the Luxembourgish The Left (*Déi Lénk*). Finally, the Populist Socialist subtype includes the German The Left (*Die Linke*) and the Dutch Socialist Party — although only temporarily — and two smaller parties, the Irish Socialist Party and the French New Anti-Capitalist Party (*Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste*).

<sup>7</sup> See also Pauwels (2014).

<sup>8</sup> Although it could be vindicated after the arrival of new left-wing populist organizations such as the Spanish We Can, *Podemos* since 2014.



programmatic stances. Given that both subgroups are part of the same RLP family the differences cannot be expected to be very large. The main anticipation regarding programmatic differentiation is that, besides the common emphasis on traditional left-wing policies, Democratic Socialist and New Left parties will give more prominence to New Politics issues.

## **DATA AND METHODS**

The empirical analysis proceeds in two steps. In order to determine the degree of heterogeneity among RLPs we first explore their policy positions. Then, we develop an empirically informed classification of RLPs in order to assess whether there are significant differences between voters of different types of RLPs. The criteria employed to define whether a party belongs to the RLP family or not follow the academic consensus regarding this party family (Hudson 2000 and 2012; March 2011). Table 1 contains the name of the parties that, following the specialized literature, we identify as Radical Left in Western Europe, among those that are covered by either of our sources of information — the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES).

[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]

In order to explore the degree of programmatic heterogeneity among RLPs, we employ two different sources of data. First, we use CMP data (Volkens *et al.* 2013). Party manifestos are a relatively comprehensive and authoritative summary of the issues and policy positions that parties want to strategically emphasise, and have been found to reasonably anticipate their

future policy action if they reach office (cf., e.g., Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994).<sup>9</sup> The CMP uses manual coding of party manifestos divided in quasi-sentences, with each sentence assigned to a pre-designed list of codes that reflect a wide range of possible policy positions or areas. Once the whole manifesto is coded, the percentage of quasi-sentences referring to each code is computed. Thus, the focus is on emphasis/salience, even if spatial positions are often derived from a subset of the codes (cf. Budge *et al.* 2001). The CMP is the most comprehensive source to derive the position of political parties over time in democratic countries after World War II.

The use of CMP data is not without shortcomings. Among the most frequently highlighted are issues of data validity, reliability (Pennings and Keman 2002, Benoit and Laver 2007, Mikhaylov *et al.* 2012), and of comparability across parties, countries and types of texts (Gabel and Huber 2000; Benoit *et al.* 2012; Gemenis 2012). For the specific case of RLPs, an additional problem is that the way the traditional left-right scale is extracted with the CMP data relies on dimensional analyses that are very dependent on the distribution of parties used to identify the items that form the left-right scale. As RLPs manifestos — and for that matter those of other small parties — are few in number and not systematically coded (depending on their electoral ups and downs), the resulting left-right scale will not capture items that are important in properly calibrating their positions and movements along the continuum.<sup>10</sup> Some evidence of this is found in the representations of party movements over time that suggest, for

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<sup>9</sup> However, party manifestos are not the only authoritative source to identify the ideological positions of a given party. Many parties adopt policy positions and programmes at their regular party conferences, which might differ or be more detailed than their party manifestos. In choosing the electoral manifestos we highlight the strategic choices made by parties when publicly (re)presenting their ideological positions and policy commitments.

<sup>10</sup> Indeed, the inconsistency found in the results of Adams *et al.* (2011) and Adams *et al.* (2012) in relation to partisan sorting of ‘niche’ party voters depending on whether movements are measured with party manifestos or expert surveys might well be related to this problem of differential adequacy of the left-right positioning of CMP data for the more extreme and smaller parties.

example, that Communist parties have been leapfrogged by the Socialists/Social democrats in France and Sweden, and even by the Liberals in Sweden (Klingemann, Hofferbert and Budge 1994, McDonald and Budge 2005), or that there are no significant differences in left-right positions between RLPs and the Socialists/Social democrats in a number of countries — e.g. France, Norway and Portugal (McDonald and Budge 2005: 74-75).

For this reason, we contrast the information provided by CMP data with a much shorter time-series of party positions provided by the CHES between 1999 and 2010 (Bakker *et al.* 2012), which contain estimations of party positions on different issues for European Union countries. Expert data are not free from problems either, as the judgment of experts is arguably ‘stickier’ over time than observational data based on party manifestos, thus reducing the possibility of detecting short-term strategic movements by parties. Additionally, there is no single time-series of expert surveys that covers the range of countries, parties and years covered by manifesto data. Expert surveys give information on party positions basing their estimates on sources of evidence wider than manifesto analyses, so attempts to validate the result of one analysis with those from another must consider this limitation (Meyer 2013: 31). We do not aim at validating the estimates from both sources of data, but relying on both the CMP and the CHES allows using consistency in positions as a criterion for the classification of different RLPs.

In order to determine whether subtypes of RLPs can be identified, we analyse CMP data since the late 1940s with factor analysis<sup>11</sup> on a number of issues that are deemed to be,

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<sup>11</sup> Factor analysis is arguably the most widely used technique for analysing CMP data (e.g. Bakker and Hobolt 2013, Helbling and Tresch 2011, Hooghe et al. 2010, McDonald et al. 2007). Van der Brug (2001), however, argues that multidimensional scaling is more suitable for the study of party manifestos. Whilst we acknowledge

empirically and theoretically, relevant for the study of RLPs, thus refraining from the use of the CMP left-right scale for the aforementioned reasons.<sup>12</sup> Regarding CHES data, this article will focus on a variable containing expert judgements on the position of parties on the New Politics dimension (green/alternative/libertarian vs. traditional/authoritarian/nationalist).

The second part of the paper focuses on RLP voters and utilizes data from the five waves of the European Election Studies (EES) that are currently available: 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009.<sup>13</sup> These surveys have the advantage of measuring key questions over time since the collapse of Soviet Socialism in a fairly homogenised manner. They enable us to explore whether voters of different kinds of RLPs have different profiles, or whether differences at the level of the parties do not reflect on their voters.

The analyses in the second empirical part of the article will be restricted to those countries included in the EES (i.e. member states at the time of the respective EP election) and for which the EES questionnaires included at least one RLP among the parties that respondents voted for in the previous national elections. These are typically, with few exceptions, RLPs that had parliamentary representation during the period of study, either in the national or in the European parliament. Thus, the countries included in these analyses are Cyprus,

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van der Brug's (2001) contribution, we employ factor analysis because multidimensional scaling is extremely sensitive to the presence of a few outliers (Cox and Cox 2001, p.96). In fact, although our findings do not change substantively when we use multidimensional scaling instead of factor analysis, we have noticed that the proportion of the variance explained by each dimension changes dramatically with the removal of a single outlier.

<sup>12</sup> We have excluded from all the analyses cases for which manifesto data were not available and the corresponding values had been estimated by the CMP team.

<sup>13</sup> Other sources were considered but discarded because they did not provide data for an equivalently long span of time or an equivalently wide range of countries.

Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.<sup>14</sup>

Based on the findings in the first part of the empirical analysis, a variable identifying different categories of RLPs is created and used as the outcome variable in our analysis of voting behaviour. As we will show, the variable includes two categories of RLPs (Traditional vs. New Left), and so the outcome variable classifies respondents according to whether they voted, at the last national election, for (1) a Traditional RLP, (2) a New Left RLP or (3) any other party. Regarding the right-hand side of the equation, the following correlates are examined: age, gender, education, urbanization, religious affiliation, working class identification, union membership, left-right self-placement, dissatisfaction with democracy, and opinion on EU membership. Most of these variables have been found to have an effect on the probability to vote for a RLP (Ramiro 2014).

The models are estimated with multilevel multinomial regressions.<sup>15</sup> Random effects by country are estimated to take into account the clustered nature of the data (i.e. voters clustered within countries). While the two types of RLPs that we finally identify (Traditional and New Left) compete with each other in some countries, in others there is only either a traditional RLP or a New Left RLP. As the probability of choosing between a Traditional or a New Left RLP varies across countries, the country-level random effects cannot possibly be

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<sup>14</sup> As in Arzheimer and Carter (2006), excluding countries without the parties we study in Parliament does not involve selection bias, as our goal is not to explain the success of RLPs across societies but to focus on heterogeneity among RLP voters.

<sup>15</sup> Using multinomial regression instead of logistic regression will enable readers to see comparisons not just between supporters of different types of RLP, but also between supporters of the radical left and supporters of other parties.

the same for the three categories of the outcome variable. For this reason, the model will allow for random effects to be different for each category of the dependent variable.<sup>16</sup>

The next section presents the results of the first part of the empirical analysis, where we focus on the policy positions of different RLPs. The results of the analysis of voting behaviour will then be presented in the following one.

## **CLASSIFYING THE RADICAL LEFT**

The aim of this section is to analyse whether RLPs differ on the basis of their proposals and ideological statements. Unlike previous classifications, we rely on empirical data on policy and political positions in an attempt to create an empirically-informed classification of RLPs.

We start with an exploratory analysis of CMP data on RLPs since 1945. While the CMP contains information on a large number of issues, not all of them are suitable to identify RLPs. There is a debate as to whether RLPs should be considered ‘niche’ parties or not. Mostly, the disagreements relate to the underlying constitutive characteristic of ‘niche’ parties and whether they are identified on the basis of having ‘distinct’ issue focuses or on the basis of having ‘extreme’ positions (see Meguid 2005, Adams *et al.* 2006, Ezrow 2010, Wagner 2012a and 2012b, Bischof forthcoming). We agree with Bischof (forthcoming) that, in most cases, RLPs focus on the same core socio-economic issues that articulate competition between mainstream parties, albeit adopting more extreme positions than the latter.

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<sup>16</sup> We have used the `gsem` (generalized structural equation modelling) command in Stata 13. We also allow for co-variation between the random effects because the latent exogenous variables that determine the choices that voters face may not be independent from each other (e.g. the existence of different types of radical left party might be less likely in countries where one particular type – say, a New Left RLP – is very successful).

Nevertheless, as Bischof (forthcoming) shows, some issues are mentioned (or not) to the same extent by parties of different party families, and so they are unlikely to offer much insight about the peculiarities and internal differences among RLPs.

For this reason, we selected issues following two criteria: one empirical and one theoretical. Firstly, following a similar logic to Bischof's (forthcoming), and using the CMP data for RLPs since the 1940s, we selected all issues that are mentioned more often by RLPs than by other party families, provided that the difference was statistically significant and that the ratio between the mentions by RLPs and those by other parties was 1.5 or larger. Secondly, all items that could be theoretically classified as post-materialist issues were selected as well. We, thus, follow an inductive approach driven by the dimensionality of manifesto statements (cf. Robertson 1976, Gabel and Huber 2000), complemented with our expert knowledge about the issues that are of additional relevance for RLPs formation and change. This resulted in 19 different CMP issue variables that are summarized in Table 2.

[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]

With these 19 items, we explored the dimensionality of the policy positions of RLPs since the 1940s using factor analysis. As the goal of this article is to explore ideological/programmatic heterogeneity among RLPs, parties belonging to other families were excluded from these analyses.<sup>17</sup> This allows us to characterize and map the differences among RLPs without the contamination of issue positioning of other party families.

The results from the factor analysis show a two dimensional solution with one dimension clearly stronger than the other (Eigenvalues of 1.66 and 1.05, respectively). Table 3 shows the factor loadings of each of the 19 items on each dimension, and a screeplot of the

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<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the nature of our selection of issues means that these are issue topics that are more likely mentioned by left-wing parties and, hence, adding other non-RLP parties would only capture the left-right distinction again.

Eigenvalues is provided in the Appendix (Figure A1). The items with higher factor loadings on the first dimension are positive mentions of internationalism and environmentalism, both issues associated with the New Politics agenda. Following those but with considerably smaller factor loadings is the item on anti-growth economy, which can also be categorised as a New Politics issue. The second dimension seems much weaker and less clear than the first one, with considerably lower factor loadings. The emphasis on anti-imperialism, foreign special relations and democracy are among those items with high loadings, followed (with lower loadings) by a negative relation to positive emphasis to the military. It seems as if this second dimension is related to the rhetoric of old communist parties emphasising the struggle against imperialism and for peoples' democracy.<sup>18</sup>

[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]

In order to better evaluate the location of different RLPs deriving from the analyses of these issues, Figure 1 plots them according to their position on each dimension shown in Table 3. Although our dimensional analyses include parties and manifestos since the 1940s, to facilitate visualization, only the positions for party manifestoes from 1989 onwards are shown, as this corresponds with the period examined with survey data in the second part of the paper.

Three aspects stand out in Figure 1. First, the New Politics dimension displays more variance than the second dimension (which we have called anti-imperialist orthodoxy), as was already evident from the eigenvalues. This means that RLPs are more likely to differ in their positions around New Politics issues than around anti-imperialist orthodoxy. Second, the

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<sup>18</sup> Note that this item does not necessarily refer to liberal democracy. It also includes positive mentions to democracy as an abstract concept, to direct democracy, or to democracy as the goal to achieve in international organizations or elsewhere.



correlation between both dimensions, which is negligible when the whole period is taken into account,<sup>19</sup> clearly increases after 1989. Given that high positive values on the anti-imperialist orthodoxy dimension denote a lack of anti-imperialist rhetoric, this correlation indicates that parties that can be categorised as New Left after 1989 are less likely to use the traditional anti-imperialist rhetoric in their manifestoes.<sup>20</sup> Third, despite the amount of variation, many RLPs do not have a very distinct position and are located in the middle of the cloud. Given that we are analysing parties of the same family, it would be surprising if this were not the case.

[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]

The results are consistent with what one could expect based on previous categorizations in the literature on RLPs. The high anti-imperialist orthodoxy/low New Politics quadrant is dominated by parties previously characterized as traditional in their values, such as the KKE and the PCP. By contrast, the low anti-imperialist orthodoxy/high New Politics space is dominated by the Nordic RLP, such as Iceland's Ab (currently, VG - Left-Wing Movement), the Norwegian Socialist Left Party (SV) or the Swedish Left Party (V).

Given the weakness of the second dimension, together with the high correlation between both dimensions for the period that we are most interested in, there are reasons to argue that RLPs differ mainly on their position regarding New Politics issues. In order to check the robustness of these results, we employed the CHES, available for EU countries. Figure 2 shows the position of parties on two axes: New Politics (vertical axis) — the dimension we are

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<sup>19</sup> The correlation is 0.002.

<sup>20</sup> Note that the left-right position of RLPs is only weakly related to their position regarding New Politics issues. The correlation between the New Politics dimension and the CMP left-right scale is -0.11 and only significant at  $p < 0.1$ . The Anti-imperialist orthodoxy dimension and the CMP left-right scale correlate only a bit more (-0.3), suggesting that this is a rhetoric that can be found more often among RLPs with more centrist scores on the left-right CMP scale.

interested in — and economic left-right position (horizontal axis).<sup>21</sup> The New Politics dimension is measured with the GAL/TAN index, ranging from 0 (Green/Alternative/Libertarian) to 10 (Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist).

[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]

As with CMP data, the results emphasise that the largest source of variation among RLPs is their positions on the New Politics dimension. This is a non-trivial finding, as there were no reasons to expect that they might not differ as much in their economic left-right positions. Reassuringly, many of the placements of the individual parties are consistent with those obtained with the CMP data. New Politics RLPs are closer to the bottom side of the graph in Figure 2 (scores closer to zero). As can be appreciated, parties such as the KKE — categorized as a Traditional RLP according to the CMP data — are also located at the traditional extreme in the CHES, while others such as the Swedish Left Party (V) are consistently on the New Left/New Politics side. Nevertheless, the positioning of several parties in Figure 2 differs somewhat from their location in Figure 1. This is the case of the PCP, which in the CHES is on the New Politics side under the label of their electoral umbrella CDU, which consists of the PCP and its allied party PEV (Ecologist Party - The Greens).

In order to address these disparities in classification with each data source, we propose a classification that distinguishes between New Left/New Politics RLPs and other RLPs — which we will refer to as Traditional RLPs — based on the joint consideration of both the

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<sup>21</sup> The correlation between both dimensions in the CHES is -0.18 and statistically insignificant.

CMP and the CHES data. For this, we examined the distribution of RLPs first according to their factor loadings in the CMP analysis, and then according to their score in the GAL/TAN index of the CHES. Using the distribution in the CMP factor, only RLPs with values equal or higher than the value corresponding to the 3<sup>rd</sup> percentile were classified as New Politics parties. Using the GAL/TAN index, only those RLPs on the New Politics side of the scale (that is, those scoring less than 5) were classified as New Left/New Politics RLPs. Following the examination of the list of parties that fell under the New Politics category for each source, we classified as New Left parties only those that either (1) could be categorised as New Left on the basis of both the CMP and the CHES data, or (2) information on those parties was missing in the CHES, but their manifestos could be consistently categorised as New Left during the period of interest (1989 or later) according to the CMP data. This allows us to identify those cases for which there is less uncertainty about the fact that they are indeed closer to the New Left ideal type in terms of their programmatic and ideological positions.

Table 4 shows the classification that results from this combination of information from party manifestos and expert surveys.<sup>22</sup> Our empirically informed classification of RLPs is partially consistent with the positions that parties are assigned in the literature (e.g. March 2011) and adds information on parties that are not usually considered in previous typologies (as the Icelandic, Irish and Luxemburgish ones). Parties such as the Portuguese Left Bloc (BE), the German Left Party, the Spanish United Left (IU), the Swedish Left (V), or the Finish Left Wing Alliance (VAS) are classified as New Left/New Politics. In contrast, the Communist parties of Greece (KKE), Portugal (PCP), and France (PCF) cannot be considered as New Left parties. The main difference with classifications proposed by other scholars (highlighted

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<sup>22</sup> More detailed information about classification by source, party and election year can be found in the Appendix (Table A2).

in grey shade) is the identification of the Spanish IU (formed by the PCE) and of other Communist parties such as the Italian PdCI and the Communist Refoundation Party as New Left (consistently so in both the CMP and the CHES data). The opposite happens with EL in Denmark, SP in the Netherlands, and Syriza/Synaspismos in Greece, which were not consistently on the New Left side in both datasets and therefore, unlike previous classifications, are included in the Traditional RLP category. In any case, these three latter cases can be considered as ‘border-line’ ones, particularly because there is no consistent pattern between the CMP and the CHES data.

Another aspect that our results and classification highlights is that some parties change over time in their adoption of New Politics issues. Many parties start embracing New Left platforms only in the late 1980s and early 1990s — mostly Scandinavian, but also south European parties — and in some cases new parties are formed also in these same years through splits or mergers that embrace from the start New Left positions.

[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]

With this classification, in the next section we turn to the analysis of the differences (if any) in socio-demographic and attitudinal profiles between the voters of the Traditional and New Left parties. The expectation is that parties with different programmatic and ideological appeals should attract voters that will differ in a number of aspects. Primarily, we expect that the voters of New Left parties — roughly corresponding to the Democratic Socialist type for March (2011) — should resemble in the gender, age and educational attainment composition the voter profile of Left-libertarian parties (Kitschelt 1988, 1989). This implies that they will be younger, more balanced in terms of gender composition, with higher levels of educational achievement, and less likely to be members of the working class and union members. Finally,

regarding basic socio-political attitudes, we do not have clear-cut expectations regarding left-right placement, religious adscription, opinions about EU membership, or satisfaction with democracy (cf. Ramiro 2014 for a characterization of RLPs voters in general). Although there is variation across parties, both Traditional and New Left RLPs tend to have critical positions towards the EU and towards (institutionalized) religion, and both are also critical of liberal democracy.

## **RADICAL LEFT VOTERS**

As mentioned in the Data and Methods section, we employ the EES between 1989 and 2009 for our individual-level analyses of the profile of RLP voters.<sup>23</sup> Our study in this section is limited to EU member states at the time of the respective EP elections. This means that we do not have data for Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, and that our data for Cyprus, Finland and Sweden are limited to a few years only. We use multilevel multinomial logistic regression models in order to examine the heterogeneity among radical left voters, while accounting for the clustered nature of the data. We compare the voters of Traditional RLPs with those of other non-RLPs and with the voters of New Left RLPs. Although the comparison to the voters of other parties is also interesting and provides a baseline to interpret our findings, here we focus on the comparison between the two types of RLPs we have distinguished. The distribution of respondents across the three categories in the pooled dataset is presented in Table A1 in the Appendix.

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<sup>23</sup> Information about the elections and parties covered with the data can be found in the Appendix (Table A2).

The results of the multinomial regression model with the pooled dataset of the EES for all countries and years between 1989 and 2009 are shown in Table A3 (in the Appendix). In order to facilitate the interpretation of findings, Figure 3 presents the predicted probabilities of supporting Traditional and New Left RLPs for those variables with statistically significant effects: ideology, education, dissatisfaction with democracy, religion and opinions on EU membership.

[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]

The results presented in Figure 3 and Table A3 suggest that there are, indeed, a number of interesting differences between the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs. Many of them are in the expected direction, but others depart from the expectations. As a reminder, we expected that New Left RLP voters would resemble the stereotypical profile of Left-libertarian party voters: younger, more educated, middle class, secular, urban dwellers and relatively balanced in terms of gender. The picture that emerges from our findings does not depart too much from this stereotype, but it differs in certain respects. First, New Left RLP voters are no different from voters of Traditional RLPs when it comes to age and gender. Secondly, they are not more likely to be urban dwellers. Finally, they do not differ from Traditional RLPs voters in their class identification or union linkage either.

In other aspects, however, our findings are in line with the expectations of resemblance to the electorate of Left-libertarian and Green parties: New Left RLPs are more successful among the more educated voters than among the least educated ones, in contrast with the findings for Traditional RLPs, which still have a considerable support base among the least educated. Moreover, although both types are more successful attracting non-religious than religious

voters, the proportion of non-religious supporters is 1.6 times larger among New Left RLPs' voters, and thus New Left RLP voters are more secularised. This may be explained by postmaterialists' rejection of traditional, hierarchical religious institutions (Inglehart and Appel 1989).

The expectations that we had in terms of the ideological make-up of the voters of Traditional and New Left RLPs are not confirmed by the results. We expected few ideological differences in the left-right scale; yet, we find that New Left RLP voters are somewhat more centrist in relative terms. In fact, this is consistent with the results obtained at the party level through the CHES, according to which Traditional RLPs score on average 1.18 on the 0-10 left-right scale based on economic issues (LRECON) and New Left RLPs score 1.45.<sup>24</sup>

Lastly, we also find significant attitudinal differences between the two types of RLP voters. Although we had no clear expectations in relation to attitudes towards democracy and the EU, voters of New Left RLPs are less Eurosceptic than those of Traditional RLPs, as they are considerably less likely to hold negative views of the EU than Traditional RLP voters. This is consistent with significant differences in the degree of opposition to the EU between the two types of RLPs in the CHES, which indicate that opposition to the EU is somewhat lower among New Left RLPs (1.1 points less than Traditional RLPs on an 11-point scale).<sup>25</sup> Moreover, consistently with a post-materialist perspective, although dissatisfaction with democracy considerably increases the chances of supporting both types of RLPs, dissatisfied voters constitute a significantly greater proportion of New Left RLPs voters.

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<sup>24</sup> The difference is, however, only significant at  $p < 0.1$ .

<sup>25</sup> These differences are significant at  $p < 0.01$ .

Overall, thus, our findings suggest that Traditional and New Left RLP voters are sufficiently distinct in a number of socio-demographic and attitudinal traits. This lends support to the expectation that the programmatic differentiation that is visible at the level of the party supply corresponds to the social coalitions that the parties are able to forge among the electorate (the political/electoral ‘demand’). However, our expectation regarding a greater socio-demographic resemblance between New Left RLPs and Green/Left-libertarian voters was only partly confirmed because New Left and Traditional RLPs voters are only significantly different in terms of their educational attainment. In the final section, we reflect on the implications of these findings and point to future directions of this research agenda.

## **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS**

Despite being part of the same party family, West European RLPs are not all the same. In fact, there have been several attempts to develop a number of typologies of RLPs in the literature based on their varied origins and ideology (Backes and Moreau 2008, March 2011, Escalona and Vieira 2013). However, the degree to which different subtypes of RLPs show substantial differences in their policy proposals has not been analysed so far in a systematic way. This article has contributed to the literature that further addresses the ideological and electoral competition complexities of certain party families (see also Margulies 2014 on Liberal parties) by addressing two interrelated questions that increase our understanding of the match between party supply (policy positions) and demand (citizens’ positions and characteristics). First, to what extent are RLPs different in terms of their programmatic appeals? And, if they are, do these differences also reflect on their voters’ profiles?



With regard to the first question, we analyzed the policy stances of RLPs employing party manifesto data from the CMP and expert judgments from the CHES. Both data sources point to a similar conclusion: while RLPs share many similarities, there are also systematic differences in some of the policies that they stand for. In line with our expectations, we found that most of the variation among RLPs is explained in terms of their position regarding New Politics issues. Thus, while some RLPs have completely embraced the New Politics/New Left discourse and combine radical left-wing economic policies with strong environmentalism, pacifism and opposition to traditional morality, others prefer to stick (albeit to different degrees) to the classical radical left discourse. Based on these findings, we categorized RLPs into two subtypes: those that can be consistently considered as New Left RLPs in both data sources, and those that can not (which we labelled as Traditional RLPs).

Our findings are partially consistent with previous typologies of RLPs proposed in the literature in that all of them include the New Politics/New Left component in some of their categories. In contrast with previous classifications, some of the parties that were consistently found in the New Politics area in our analyses still remain loyal to the Communist identity, even though their policy stances suggest that they no longer are Traditional RLPs in terms of their positions. March (2011), for example, classifies the two Italian Communist parties (PRC and PdCI) and the Spanish United Left as ‘Communist’, but they consistently appear as New Left in our examination. A factor analysis based on a number of party manifesto items did not identify any other underlying dimension that could be helpful in order to create additional subtypes of RLPs.

The second part of the analysis examined the heterogeneity among voters of the Traditional and New Left RLPs using individual-level data from the EES. The findings show significant

differences between the voters of both subtypes. We expected voters of New Left RLPs to resemble Left-Libertarian and Green voters to a greater extent than voters of Traditional RLPs, but the results only confirm this expectation in some variables. We do not find differences regarding gender, age, subjective social class, union membership or degree of urbanization. However, compared to their Traditional counterparts there is a higher proportion of New Left RLPs who are highly educated and non-religious, consistent with our expectations. In terms of attitudes, contrary to our expectations, there are some significant differences too: voters of the New Left subtype are slightly more moderate ideologically than Traditional RLP voters; they are also less Eurosceptic and are more dissatisfied with democracy.

Our findings have a number of implications in terms of research on RLPs, and possibly other parties, in Western Europe. One is related to the mechanics of congruence or responsiveness between party supply and electoral ‘demand’. Our study detects that, for RLPs, policy change seems to be often linked to party transformations — splits and mergers — such that new RLP organizations are created either to facilitate, or as a consequence of, the policy and ideological moves. The paradigmatic example is the case of the Italian PCI and its transformation into PDS, but we can find many other examples, some of which entailed remaining in the RLP family (e.g. IU in Spain, VAS in Finland, BE in Portugal), and others that implied tilting towards the Green party family (e.g. *Groen Links* in the Netherlands or ICV in Catalonia). Until recently, thus, RLPs seemed to respond to changes in electoral ‘demand’ by organizational transformation and ‘rebranding’. This might be due to the fact that some ‘niche’ parties — among which RLPs — are penalized by voters if they pursue moderation vote-seeking strategies (cf. Adams et al. 2006) and may need to resort to organizational change to restructure their electoral coalitions. Future research could

illuminate whether existing trends towards more inclusive leadership selection processes, which have been shown to increase policy responsiveness to electoral demands (Lehrer 2012), will make it easier for RLPs to adapt to changes in the electorate without the need to resort to organizational rupture.

Additionally, our results suggest that policy change is effected in these parties through the incorporation of other ideological/cleavage dimensions. It might well be that RLPs stick to their overall positions on the traditional economic left-right dimension but that a number of them still (1) change how they frame this position — e.g. by reducing their use of Marxist and anti-imperialist references or less frequently invoking nationalizations — and/or (2) they adopt new issues that are still somewhat correlated to the left-right dimension but clearly belong to a different one (e.g. the GAL/TAN dimension), thus responding to the preferences and movements of the public over time. This opens an avenue to further research into the strategies of non-mainstream parties to adapt to social and electoral changes in ways that go beyond just moving along the left-right dimension.

The second set of implications for existing and future research is related to the need to more systematically consider the sources of variation in the classification of the policy and ideological positions of political parties, in general, and RLPs in particular. On the one hand, there are a number of cases — the PCF in 2002 and 2007, the KKE in 1996, Syriza since the mid-1990s, PRC in 1996, SP in 2006 and 2010, PCP/CDU since 1999 — for which the CMP data and the CHES evaluations yield different results in relation to their inclusion of New Politics issues. Future research should strive to illuminate which — if any — are the systematic sources of such disparity of findings. Are they, perhaps, due to the fact that some RLPs are not emphasising in the manifestos these issues as much as they are in their daily

political actions and statements — which are better captured by expert judgements — as suggested by Adams et al. (2012)? Or are they reflecting an underlying true lukewarm or ambivalent commitment to these issues by certain RLPs?

On the other hand, although our typology of RLPs partially matches existing classification efforts in the literature, there are ways in which the study of the ideological differences among RLPs could be further expanded. In this regard, an interesting expansion of the research agenda reported in this article could consider more systematically the over-time evolution of RLPs in their ideological and policy positions. Are there linear trends in the incorporation of New Politics issues within and across parties? Additionally, even though recent classifications of RLPs have introduced a ‘populist’ dimension (March 2011, Pauwels 2014), the nature of the CMP and CHES data did not allow us to identify items that could potentially capture this underlying dimension. Thus, future research could focus on whether different degrees of populism can be found among RLPs and how we can best measure these ideological traits.

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## TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. List of radical left parties in Western Europe.

Country	Party/ies
Austria	KPÖ - Communist Party of Austria
Cyprus	AKEL - Progressive Party of Working People
Denmark	SF - Socialist People Party (until 2012), EL - Red Green Alliance
Finland	VAS - Left Alliance
France*	PCF - French Communist Party
Germany	Die Linke - The Left (previously PDS - Party of Democratic Socialism)
Greece	Syriza - Coalition of the Radical Left (previously SYN - Progressive Left Coalition); KKE - Communist Party of Greece
Iceland	VG – Left Green Movement (previously Ab - People's Alliance)
Ireland	SP - Socialist Party; DL - Democratic Left; WP - Workers' Party
Italy	RC - Communist Refoundation; PdCI - Party of the Italian Communists; PCI - Italian Communist Party (until 1991); PdUP - Party of Proletarian Unity
Luxembourg	Déi Lénk – The Left
Netherlands	SP - Socialist Party
Norway	SV - Socialist Left Party (previously SF - Socialist People's Party, and NKP - Norwegian Communist Party)
Portugal	CDU - Unitary Democratic Coalition (or PCP - Communist Party of Portugal), BE -Left Bloc (previously UDP - Democratic Popular Union)
Spain	IU - United Left (previously PCE - Communist Party of Spain)
Sweden	V - Left Party (previously VPK - Left Party - The Communists)
Switzerland	PdAS - Party of Labour

\* Worker's Struggle (*Lutte Ouvrière*, LO) and the Revolutionary Communist League/New Anti-capitalist party (*Ligue Communiste Revolutionnaire/Nouveau Parti Anticapitaliste*) are, unfortunately, not covered by the sources.



Table 2. Variables from the CMP employed in the analyses.

<i>Issues that empirically distinguish RLPs from other parties</i>	
<b>Name (New Politics issues marked as NP in brackets)</b>	<b>Ratio of mentions by RLPs / mentions by others</b>
Marxist analysis	12.8
European community: negative	6.3
Nationalisation	5.8
Military negative	4.2
Anti-imperialism	3.6
Labour groups positive	2.7
Controlled economy	2.4
Opposition to internationalism	2.1
Peace positive [NP]	2.1
National way of life: negative	1.8
Foreign special-relationships: negative (e.g. Anti-US)	1.7
Social justice	1.7
Economic planning	1.7
Democracy [NP]	1.6
<i>Other New Politics issues added</i>	
Internationalism: positive	0.9
Underprivileged minority groups	1.2
Anti-growth economy	1.3
Environmental protection	1.1
Traditional morality: negative	1.3


Table 3. Factor analysis of RLPs' positions using CMP data (n = 250).

Variable	Factor 1 (New Politics)	Variable	Factor 2 (Anti-Imperialist Orthodoxy)
Environmentalism +	0.6879	Democracy +	-0.4356
Internationalism +	0.5503	Anti-imperialism +	-0.4337
Foreign special +	-0.3672	Foreign special +	0.4325
Anti-growth economy +	0.3603	Military +	0.3346
Peace +	-0.3275	Economic planning +	0.2943
Social justice +	0.3245	Peace +	0.2663
Internationalism -	-0.2836	Marxist analysis +	-0.2553
Minority groups +	0.2664	Europe -	0.2326
Anti-imperialism +	-0.2655	Social justice +	0.1935
Military +	-0.2359	Internationalism -	-0.1243
Traditional morality -	0.193	Labour +	-0.1012
Labour +	-0.185	Controlled economy +	0.0981
Economic planning +	-0.1549	Internationalism +	0.0936
Democracy +	-0.1171	Minority groups +	-0.0833
Nationalization +	-0.1014	Traditional morality -	-0.0692
National way of life -	-0.0715	Environmentalism +	0.0595
Marxist analysis +	-0.0671	Nationalization +	0.0354
Controlled economy +	0.0484	Anti-growth economy +	0.0157
Europe -	0.026	National way of life -	-0.009

Note: we highlight the variables that load highest in each factor. Variables are rank-ordered according to their factor loading on each dimension.



Figure 2. Location of RLPs in the left/right and New Politics axes according to the Chapel Hill expert surveys.



Note: Both axes represent the average positions of each RLP per year as estimated by the experts. The economic left/right position in the horizontal axis is extracted from variable LRECON of the CHES, which locates parties exclusively on their stances on economic issues, with values ranging between 0 (extreme left = wanting the government to play an active role in the economy) and 10 (extreme right = emphasizing a reduced economic role for government). The New Politics position on the vertical axis is extracted from variable GALTAN of the CHES, which locates parties in terms of their stances on democratic freedoms and rights, with values ranging between 0 (libertarian or postmaterialist parties) and 10 (traditional or authoritarian parties). See Bakker et al. (2012) for further details.


Legend: The party cases combine the party identifier and the election year. BE = Left Bloc (Portugal); CDU = Democratic Unitarian Coalition (Communist Party of Portugal); EL = Red-Green Alliance (Denmark); IE\_SP = Socialist Party (Ireland); IU = United Left (Spain); KKE = Communist Party of Greece; LINKE = The Left (Germany); Linkspartei/PDS = Party of Democratic Socialism (Germany); LO-LCR = Workers' Struggle – Revolutionary Communist League (France); NL\_SP = Socialist Party (Netherlands); PCF = Communist Party of France; PdCI = Party of the Italian Communists; PdUP= Party of Proletarian Unity (Italy); RC = Communist Refoundation (Italy); SD = Democratic Left (Italy); SL = Left and Freedom (Italy); SYN = Coalition of the Left, Movements and Ecology (Greece); SYRIZA = Coalition of the Radical Left (Greece); V = Left Party (Sweden); VAS = Left Alliance (Finland).

Table 4. Classification of West European RLPs after 1980

<i>Country</i>	<i>TRADITIONAL</i>	<i>NEW LEFT</i>
Austria	KPÖ	
Cyprus	AKEL	
Denmark	EL; SF until 1990	SF since 1990
Finland	SKDL*	VAS
France	PCF	
Germany		Die Linke/PDS
Greece	KKE & Synaspismos/Syriza	
Iceland	Ab until 1991**	Ab 1991-1995, VG
Ireland	SP & WP	DL
Italy	DP, PRC until 1994, PdCI until 2006	PRC since 1994 & PdCI since 2006
Luxembourg	Déi Lénk until 1989	Déi Lénk since 1989
Netherlands	SP	
Norway		SV
Portugal	PCP & UDP***	BE
Spain	PCE/IU until 1989	IU since 1989
Sweden	V until approx. 1982	V since approx. 1982

Source: Own classification using the CMP and CHES datasets. Notes: parties in shade are the ones for which this classification differs from that proposed by previous literature. \* Finnish People's Democratic League, *Suomen Kansan Demokraattinen Liitto*, is the antecedent party of VAS (founded in 1990). \*\* *Alþýðubandalagið* (Ab) was the antecedent party of *Vinstrihreyfingin – grænt framboð* (VG), Left-Green Movement (founded in 1999). \*\*\* *União Democrática Popular*, People's Democratic Union, was one of the parties that later created the BE.


Figure 3. Predicted probabilities of voting for Traditional and New Left RLPs for the variables with significant effects in Table A3.



Note: Figures on the y axis are population-averaged probabilities based on Table A3.

APPENDIX

Figure A1. Screeplot of the factor solution for RLPs ideological dimensions



Source: MRG/CMP data of the 19 items listed in Table 2, using all RLPs for all years in the dataset.

Table A1. Distribution of the categories of the dependent variable.

Vote	N	Percent	Cum.
Non RLP	74,709	93.28	93.28
Traditional RLP	3,457	4.32	97.60
New Left RLP	1,921	2.40	100
Total	80,087	100	

Table A2. Classification of RLPs as New Left by CMP and CHES data and years covered by the data.

Country	Party	Year	New Left in CMP?	New Left in CHES?	Defined as New Left in our analyses?
Austria	KPO	2002	no	n/a	no
Austria	KPO	2008	no	n/a	no
Cyprus	AKEL	1996	no	n/a	no
Cyprus	AKEL	2001	no	n/a	no
Germany	Linke	1990	yes	n/a	yes
Germany	Linke	1994	yes	n/a	yes
Germany	Linke	1998	yes	yes	yes
Germany	Linke	2002	yes	yes	yes
Germany	Linke	2005	no	yes	yes
Germany	Linke	2009	yes	yes	yes
Germany	Linke	2013	yes	n/a	yes
Denmark	EL (VS)	1981	no	n/a	no
Denmark	EL (VS)	1984	no	n/a	no
Denmark	EL	1987	n/a	n/a	no
Denmark	EL	1988	n/a	n/a	n/a
Denmark	EL	1990	n/a	n/a	n/a
Denmark	EL	1994	no	n/a	no
Denmark	EL	1998	no	yes	no
Denmark	EL	2001	no	n/a	no
Denmark	EL	2005	yes	yes	no
Denmark	EL	2007	no	yes	no
Denmark	EL	2011	no	n/a	no
Denmark	SF	1981	no	n/a	no
Denmark	SF	1984	no	n/a	no
Denmark	SF	1987	no	n/a	no
Denmark	SF	1988	no	n/a	no
Denmark	SF	1990	yes	n/a	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	1994	yes	n/a	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	1998	yes	yes	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	2001	yes	yes	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	2005	yes	yes	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	2007	yes	yes	yes since 1990
Denmark	SF	2011	yes	n/a	yes since 1990
Spain	IU (PCE)	1982	no	n/a	no
Spain	IU (PCE)	1986	no	n/a	no
Spain	IU	1989	yes	n/a	yes since 1989
Spain	IU	1993	yes	n/a	yes since 1989
Spain	IU	1996	yes	yes	yes since 1989
Spain	IU	2000	yes	yes	yes since 1989
Spain	IU	2004	yes	yes	yes since 1989



Country	Party	Year	New Left in CMP?	New Left in CHES?	Defined as New Left in our analyses?
Spain	IU	2008	yes	yes	yes since 1989
Spain	IU	2011	yes	yes	yes since 1989
Finland	VAS (SKDL)	1983	no	n/a	no
Finland	VAS (SKDL)	1987	no	n/a	no
Finland	VAS	1991	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Finland	VAS	1995	no	n/a	yes since 1991
Finland	VAS	1999	yes	yes	yes since 1991
Finland	VAS	2003	yes	yes	yes since 1991
Finland	VAS	2007	yes	yes	yes since 1991
Finland	VAS	2011	no	n/a	yes since 1991
France	PCF	1981	no	n/a	no
France	PCF	1986	no	n/a	no
France	PCF	1988	no	n/a	no
France	PCF	1993	no	n/a	no
France	PCF	1997	no	no	no
France	PCF	2002	no	yes	no
France	PCF	2007	no	yes	no
Greece	KKE	1981	no	n/a	no
Greece	KKE	1985	no	n/a	no
Greece	KKE	1989	n/a	n/a	
Greece	KKE	1990	n/a	n/a	
Greece	KKE	1993	no	n/a	no
Greece	KKE	1996	no	yes	no
Greece	KKE	2000	no	no	no
Greece	KKE	2004	no	no	no
Greece	KKE	2007	n/a	n/a	no
Greece	KKE	2009	n/a	no	no
Greece	SYR (SYN)	1985	n/a	n/a	n/a
Greece	SYR (SYN)	1989			
Greece	SYR (SYN)	(nov)	no	n/a	no
Greece	SYR	1990	no	n/a	no
Greece	SYR	1993	n/a	n/a	no
Greece	SYR	1996	no	yes	no
Greece	SYR	2000	no	yes	no
Greece	SYR	2004	no	yes	no
Greece	SYR	2007	n/a	n/a	no
Greece	SYR	2009	n/a	yes	no
Ireland	DL	1992	yes	n/a	yes
Ireland	DL	1997	yes	n/a	yes
Ireland	SP	1997	.	yes	no
Ireland	SP	2011	no	n/a	no
Ireland	WP	1982			
Ireland	WP	(nov)	no	n/a	no
Ireland	WP	1987	no	n/a	no

Country	Party	Year	New Left in CMP?	New Left in CHES?	Defined as New Left in our analyses?
Ireland	WP	1989	no	n/a	no
Italy	DP	1983	no	n/a	no
Italy	PCI	1983	no	n/a	no
Italy	PCI	1987	yes	n/a	no
Italy	PdCI	2001	no	n/a	no
Italy	PdCI	2006	yes	yes	yes since 2006
Italy	PdCI	2008	n/a	yes	yes since 2006
Italy	PRC	1992	no	n/a	no
Italy	PRC	1994	yes	n/a	yes since 1994
Italy	PRC	1996	no	yes	yes since 1994
Italy	PRC	2001	yes	yes	yes since 1994
Italy	PRC	2006	yes	yes	yes since 1994
Italy	PRC	2008	n/a	yes	yes since 1994
Luxembourg	Left (PCL-KPL)	1984	no	n/a	no
Luxembourg	Left (PCL-KPL)	1989	yes	n/a	yes since 1989
Luxembourg	Left (PCL-KPL)	2004	n/a	n/a	yes since 1989
Luxembourg	Left	2009	yes	n/a	yes since 1989
Netherlands	SP	1994	n/a	n/a	n/a
Netherlands	SP	1998	n/a	no	no
Netherlands	SP	2002	yes	yes	no
Netherlands	SP	2003	yes	n/a	no
Netherlands	SP	2006	yes	no	no
Netherlands	SP	2010	yes	no	no
Portugal	BE (UDP)	1980	no	n/a	no
Portugal	BE (UDP)	1983	no	n/a	no
Portugal	BE (UDP)	1985	no	n/a	no
Portugal	BE (UDP)	1987	no	n/a	no
Portugal	BE	1991	n/a	n/a	n/a
Portugal	BE	1995	n/a	n/a	n/a
Portugal	BE	1999	yes	yes	yes since 1999
Portugal	BE	2002	no	n/a	yes since 1999
Portugal	BE	2005	yes	yes	yes since 1999
Portugal	BE	2009	yes	yes	yes since 1999
Portugal	BE	2011	no	n/a	yes since 1999
Portugal	PCP	1980	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1983	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1985	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1987	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1991	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1995	no	n/a	no
Portugal	PCP	1999	no	yes*	no
Portugal	PCP	2002	no	yes*	no
Portugal	PCP	2005	no	yes*	no

Country	Party	Year	New Left in CMP?	New Left in CHES?	Defined as New Left in our analyses?
Portugal	PCP	2009	no	yes*	no
Portugal	PCP	2011	no	n/a	no
Sweden	V (VKP)	1982	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V (VKP)	1985	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V (VKP)	1988	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	1991	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	1994	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	1998	yes	yes	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	2002	yes	yes	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	2006	no	yes	yes at least since 1980s
Sweden	V	2010	yes	yes	yes at least since 1980s
Switzerland	PdA	2007	no	n/a	no
Iceland	Ab	1983	no	n/a	no
Iceland	Ab	1987	no	n/a	no
Iceland	Ab	1991	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Iceland	Ab	1995	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Iceland	VG	1999	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Iceland	VG	2003	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Iceland	VG	2007	yes	n/a	yes since 1991
Iceland	VG	2009	no	n/a	yes since 1991
Norway	SV	1981	yes	n/a	yes at least since 1980s
Norway	SV	1985	no	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	1989	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	1993	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	1997	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	2001	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	2005	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s
Norway	SV	2009	yes	n/a	yes always since 1980s

\* CHES data refer to the electoral platform CDU (PCP + Greens)

n/a = not available

Grey cells indicate that party and election are covered by the EES data.

Table A3. Multinomial multilevel models of RLP voting

	Other party v Traditional RLP (ref)		New Left RLP v Traditional RLP (ref)	
	RRR	(S.E.)	RRR	(S.E.)
Age	1.01***	(0.00)	1.00	(0.00)
Male	0.97	(0.05)	0.99	(0.09)
Education (reference= up to 14 years)				
Education 15–18	1.54***	(0.12)	1.86***	(0.24)
Education 19–20	1.81***	(0.19)	2.04***	(0.35)
Education 21+	1.24**	(0.10)	1.96***	(0.27)
Working-class identity	0.74***	(0.05)	1.12	(0.11)
Union member	0.64***	(0.04)	0.91	(0.09)
Living in big city or suburbs	0.74***	(0.04)	1.03	(0.10)
No religion	0.66***	(0.04)	1.60***	(0.16)
Left–Right self-placement (1–10)	1.93***	(0.03)	1.12***	(0.03)
Very dissatisfied with democracy	0.65***	(0.04)	1.53***	(0.14)
EU membership bad for country	0.38***	(0.03)	0.52***	(0.64)
Intercept	1.49***	(0.21)	0.08***	(0.02)
N (individuals)	41,212			
N (countries)	13			
Log likelihood	-8048.99			

Coefficients are relative-risk ratios (with standard errors in brackets).

The variance for the random component of the comparison “Other Party v Traditional RLP” is 1.57 (s.e. = 0.08); the variance for the random component of the comparison “New Left RLP v Traditional RLP” is 1.14 (s.e. = 0.07). The covariance between the random effects is -0.69 (s.e. = 0.09).

\* p<0.1, \*\* p<0.05, \*\*\* p <0.01

Source: EES, 1989-2009