^aInstitute for British-Irish Studies, School of Politics and International Relations, University College, Dublin, Ireland. E-mail: cillian.mcgrattan@ucd.ie

Abstract

Consociational accounts of the Northern Ireland conflict claim that successive British governments gradually learned how to manage the ethnic divisions, and encourage power sharing. This article examines recently released archival material from the Labour governments of Wilson and Callaghan (1974–1979) that reveal that the reality was much more subtle. It argues that owing to an essentially teleological approach, the consociational policy learning narrative distorts the complicated dynamics of British state intervention in Northern Ireland. In fact, rather than an overarching vision of conflict management, government policymaking was based on a multiplicity of voices and options. Not only did Labour inherit policy legacies from the previous Conservative government, but also the continued ambiguity in state intervention was itself self-reinforcing and effectively contributed to the entrenchment of inter-communal division. The article concludes by highlighting a fundamental implication of the consociational approach – namely, that it serves to recycle dominant understandings of the Northern Ireland conflict regardless of the historical record.