Common knowledge and limit knowledge

Bach, Christian W and Cabessa, Jeremie (2012) Common knowledge and limit knowledge THEORY AND DECISION, 73 (3). pp. 423-440. ISSN 0040-5833, 1573-7187

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Abstract

We study the relationship between common knowledge and the sequence of iterated mutual knowledge from a topological point of view. It is shown that common knowledge is not equivalent to the limit of the sequence of iteratedmutual knowledge. On that account the new epistemic operator limit knowledge is introduced and analyzed in the context of games. Indeed, an example is constructed where the behavioral implications of limit knowledge of rationality strictly refine those of common knowledge of rationality. More generally, it is then shown that limit knowledge of rationality is capable of characterizing any solution concept for some appropriate epistemic- topological conditions. Finally, some perspectives of a topologically enriched epistemic framework for games are discussed. © Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2011.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	Aumann structures, Common knowledge, Epistemic game theory, Interactive epistemology, Limit knowledge
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	10 Feb 2016 09:15
Last Modified:	16 Jun 2026 12:02
DOI:	10.1007/s11238-011-9257-4
Related Websites:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/2050581
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