Schelling on Individuation

Whistler, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-8662-3211 (2016) Schelling on Individuation. Comparative and Continental Philosophy, 8 (3). pp. 329-344.

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Abstract

This paper traces Schelling’s discussions of individuation from the 1799 Erster Entwurf eines Systems der Naturphilosophie to the 1802 dialogue, Bruno. It argues that the Erster Entwurf is unable to solve what Schelling there calls “the highest problem of the philosophy of nature,” because nature as pure productivity necessarily tends to annihilate all individuality. It is only in 1801 and 1802, the years that mark Schelling’s construction of an Identitätssystem, that a solution emerges. This solution is based on the rejection of one of the defining orthodoxies of German Idealism, Spinoza’s dictum that omnis determinatio est negatio, and on the subsequent theorization of a form of infinite finitude. Consideration of Schelling’s changing attitude to the problem of individuation is intended as a case study of the more general shift from Naturphilosophie to Identitätssystem.

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	## TULIP Type: Articles/Papers (Journal) ##
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	13 Apr 2016 14:30
Last Modified:	17 Dec 2022 01:37
DOI:	10.1080/17570638.2016.1231884
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3000285