POST-ESTABLISHED HARMONY: KANT AND ANALOGY RECONSIDERED

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There is no word, however, which is used more loosely, or in a greater variety of senses, than Analogy. (Mill 1974 444)

This essay is a response to John Milbank’s comparison of Kant and Aquinas’ doctrines of analogy in ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’. Milbank’s essay forms the point of departure for my reconstruction of Kant’s actual theory of analogy. I conclude that Kant’s doctrine is more fundamental to his philosophical project and more innovative (with respect to philosophical traditions) than Milbank gives it credit for. In so arguing, I draw on Guérin’s neglected 1974 essay ‘Kant et l’ontologie analogique’ to designate Kantian analogy, ‘post-established harmony’.

‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’ forms part of the Radical Orthodox project to resurrect Thomism as a viable option for thinking today. As this suggests, Kantian analogy is invoked in Milbank’s argument only as an inferior foil to Thomist analogy. The latter is the only legitimate form of analogy, because it is theorised therein as ontology. Everything else is either an inchoate precursor (Aristotle) or a later corruption (Kant). Aquinas was the only theorist of analogy to fully ground analogical predication in an analogical ontology – an analogia entis. The task of the present essay is to dispute this. There is an irreducible multiplicity to theories of analogy after Aquinas, hence Kant’s is to be understood on its own terms not those of Thomism. In order to justify this claim, I begin by tracing the history of the recent
attack on Kant’s theory of analogy. In the second half of the essay, I go on to unpack Kant’s theory itself with reference to the *Prolegomena* and the *Critique of Judgment*.

1. Milbank’s Challenge

1.1 The Prehistory of ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’

Milbank’s essay, ‘A Critique of the Theology of Right’ emerges out of two prior interventions on the question of the relation of Aquinas and Kant’s theories of analogy. David Burrell’s 1973 *Analogy and Philosophical Language* argued that Aquinas’ use of analogy has been systematically misrepresented by generations of scholars as ‘a doctrine or canonised set of procedures’ (1973 11). Its reduction to a discursively-stable doctrine is, he claims, a mistake (1973 124). Whereas commentators usually define Thomist analogy by the formula, a:b::c:x (‘as a is to b, so c is to x’)\(^1\), in his mature writings Aquinas eschews this formula (1973 9-11).

Burrell’s contention informs Milbank’s own analysis. However, Milbank decisively parts ways with Burrell on at least two points. First, Burrell’s remains an entirely semantic account: analogy is a mode of *predication* and nothing more. For Milbank, on the other hand, it is precisely the ontological grounding of Thomist analogy – the extent to which it is more than a merely semantic account – that means it eschews formulae. Milbank reads his metaphysically-strong interpretation of Aquinas onto Burrell’s distinction. Second, Burrell, *pace* Milbank, actually stresses the similarities between Aquinas and Kant, and so provides ‘an interpretation of Aquinas that is inspired by Kant’ (1973 134). Milbank explicitly criticises Burrell for

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\(^1\) This is Kant’s notation, as we shall see.
this (1997 13): it is a further symptom, he claims, of Burrell’s semantic reading. Seen from an ontological perspective, on the other hand, any apparent similarity between the two vanishes.

The second intervention is Ernst Jüngel’s 1982 *God as the Mystery of the World*. Jüngel argues that both Aquinas and Kant’s theories of analogy stand in a classic metaphysical tradition of theorising God-talk (1983 263). However, this tradition is fatally flawed and its flaw revolves once more around the distinction between a form of analogy formulisable as a:b::c:x and *analogia entis*. According to Jüngel, every metaphysical theory of analogy – including those of Kant and Aquinas – implicitly or explicitly employs both forms: ‘The analogy of naming cannot be absolutely separated from the question of being… It implies, in some sense or other, an analogy of being.’ (1983 262) There is a ‘factual intermingling of the two analogies.’ (1983 276) The problem is, however, that these two forms of analogy generate a vicious circle: they each presuppose the other. In the wake of this failure of both Kantian and Thomist analogy as modes of God-talk, Jüngel turns to a Barthian *analogia fidei*.

Milbank’s response, to which I turn in detail in what follows, is to question Jüngel’s conflation of Kant and Aquinas’ positions. There is not one illegitimate metaphysical tradition of analogy, but one illegitimate tradition of which Kant is a part on the one hand and one legitimate Thomist conception of analogy on the other. The former reduces analogy to the formula, a:b::c:x; the latter conceives analogy as *analogia entis*.

1.2 *Analogia Proportionalitatis* and *Analogia Attributionis*
It is evident from the foregoing that central to recent debates about the value of Kantian analogy is the distinction between a form of analogy reducible to the formula, a:b::c:x, and analogic ontology. Traditionally, these two ways of theorising analogical relations are dubbed *analogia proportionalitatis* and *analogia attributionis*, respectively. Milbank’s argument is that every legitimate theory of analogy is *analogia attributionis*. *Analogia proportionalitatis* (which operates according to the formula, a:b::c:x) is a pale and perverse imitation, for it tries to predicate analogically without the requisite ontological grounding.

While Aquinas’ mature work is the template for *analogia attributionis*, his early work also provides an influential statement of *analogia proportionalitatis*. An oft-quoted passage from *De Veritate*, for example, reads as follows,

> Knowledge is predicated neither entirely univocally nor yet purely equivocally of God’s knowledge and ours. Instead, it is predicated analogously, or, in other words, according to a proportion… [Here, the analogy is] not between two things which have a proportion between them, but rather between two related proportions – for example, six has something in common with four because six is two times three, just as four is two times two… There is no reason why some name cannot be predicated analogously of God and creature in this [second] manner. (1952-4 vol. 1, q.2 a.11)

Aquinas here articulates a version of *analogia proportionalitatis* by means of rejecting a simpler type of analogical predication (*analogia proportionis*). The latter is a two-term variety of analogy in the form of a simple ratio (‘two things which have a proportion between them’). No such simple ratio is possible between God and the world, Aquinas implies, since this would not do justice to God’s alterity. It is for this reason that Aquinas instead proposes a form of *analogia proportionalitatis*, a four-term variety of analogy which sets up two analogously-related sets of ratios. This
ensures God’s relation to the world remains indirect. The analogy reads, ‘as six is to three, so four is to two’ – or, more formulaically, a:b::c:x. Thus, in terms of God’s knowledge and human knowledge, Aquinas here implies that ‘knowledge pertains to God in analogy to the way knowledge pertains to humans.’ The relation that holds between humans and their knowledge is the key to understanding the relation between God and His knowledge – even if we know nothing about God himself. This last clause is key to all variations of *analogia proportionalitatis*: it remains completely agnostic about the *analogatum* (‘x’).

According to Milbank, Aquinas soon changed his mind and rejected his early interpretation of analogy as *analogia proportionalitatis*. In its place, Aquinas deploys *analogia attributionis*. That is, the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologiae* provide a more faithful reference point for Aquinas’ thinking about analogy; here we clearly see the mature Aquinas think analogy as *analogia attributionis*. In the *Summa Theologiae*, for example, Aquinas writes,

> Whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this mode of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. (1981 part 1, q.13 a.5)

Central here is Aquinas’ appeal to God as principle and cause. Jüngel, for example, defines *analogia attributionis* as follows: ‘If, in the analogy of proportionality, A relates to B as C to D, then in the analogy of attribution, B, C, and D all relate in varying ways to A, on the basis of which they are commonly named.’ (1983 270) That is, while *analogia proportionalitatis* is founded on a mathematical inference from one ratio to another (a:b::c:x), *analogia attributionis* is grounded in the ontological relation that holds between causes. *Analogia attributionis* directly reflects how the
world works – the very metaphysical order of things (hence, the alternative name, *analogia ordonis*).

The question therefore follows: why is causation – and so the metaphysical order of things – analogical for Aquinas? The answer lies, on the one hand, in his rejection of any *ens commune* holding between God and world in order to emphasise God’s utter transcendence over worldly things. The creator/created relation cannot be univocal. On the other hand, however, God *is* the cause of the world, and for Aquinas the neoplatonic maxim still holds true: ‘an effect is like its cause, indeed pre-eminently exists in its cause’ (Milbank and Pickstock 2001 31). Thus, equivocal predication is just as impossible. Hence, Aquinas emphasises an analogical relation between God and world.

Aquinas’ model for the God/world relation is at bottom neo-Platonic, a ‘metaphysics of participated being’ (Milbank and Pickstock 2001 46). Analogical attribution is possible because every effect of God is like Him insofar as it is caused by Him, but unlike Him insofar as God exceeds it. God is the excessive paradigm of all qualities. For example, finite objects can only be ascribed goodness to the extent that they participate in God’s goodness and so ‘borrow’ the property from Him to some small degree. There is no ‘measurable visible ratio’ (Milbank and Pickstock 2001 8), yet still a ‘harmonious’ (2001 8) community of being – ‘a hidden bond between finitely remote categories and things.’ (2001 47)

There are therefore three possible types of analogy: *analogia proportionis*, *analogia proportionalitatis* and *analogia attributionis* – and the relation Aquinas establishes between them is reminiscent (at least on Milbank’s reading) of Hegelian

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2 This metaphysical account has epistemological consequences. Mind and world are distinct, yet harmoniously ordered, owing to their respective participation in the divine (2001 15-8).
dialectic. In his early work, Aquinas negates *analogia proportionis* in favour of *analogia proportionalitatis*; however, he later finds this one-sided negation unsatisfactory, so he negates *analogia proportionalitatis* in turn in favour of *analogia attributionis*. Yet, *analogia attributionis* is in many ways *analogia proportionis* theologically understood (or ontologically enriched). This negation of the negation is a return to a two-term ratio, this time envisaged as holding between cause and effect.

1.3 Kant Read through Aquinas

By means of... analogy, I can obtain a relational concept of things which are absolutely unknown to me. For instance, as the promotion of the welfare of children (=a) is to the love of parents (=b), so the welfare of the human species (=c) is to that unknown God (=x), which we call love; not as if it had the least similarity to any human inclinations, but because we can posit its relation to the world to be similar to that which things of the world bear one another. (Kant 2001 4:358)

Such is Kant’s classic statement of analogical predication in a footnote to the *Prolegomena*. Traditionally, such a statement has been identified with Thomist analogy. Gill, for example, expresses this doxa when he writes that the above ‘could be mistaken as coming directly from Aquinas’ “own pen”’ (1984 22). Lash has made similar claims (1982 81). This traditional contention rests on a reading of Thomist analogy through the lens of *De Veritate* – and therefore presents both Kant and Aquinas as proponents of *analogia proportionalitatis*. In this passage from the *Prolegomena*, Kant (just like Aquinas in *De Veritate*) conceives the operation of

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3 All citations to Kant’s works are to English translations. However, volume and page references are to the German Akademie edition, except in the case of the *Critique of Pure Reason* where they are to the A and B editions.

4 Jüngel also notes that on reading the *Prolegomena* ‘one is involuntarily reminded of the corresponding expositions of Thomas Aquinas.’ (1983 266) One justification for this position is that both Kant and Aquinas here rely on the same, common source – Aristotle’s *Topics* 108a.
analogy through two ratios. The analogy reads in Kant’s own symbolism, ‘as a is to b, so c is to x’, and so his example reads, ‘as parent’s love relates to their children’s welfare, so God’s love relates to the welfare of humanity’. Again, the analogy holds between two relations, not between any entity in those relations. As Kant puts it elsewhere in the Prolegomena, not ‘an imperfect similarity of two things, but a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things.’ (2001 4:358) It is precisely this four-term type of analogy – analogia proportionalitatis – which Kant and Aquinas seem to share.

Milbank’s essay (following in the wake of Burrell) puts paid to this simplistic identification. Milbank agrees with Gill to the extent that Kant’s conception of analogy is a form of analogia proportionalitatis. However, he counters by drawing attention to Aquinas’ recourse to analogia attributionis in his later works. A conclusion like Gill’s ‘conflicts with at least the appearance of Aquinas’ mature texts, which talk preponderantly about attribution’ (1997 9). In consequence, to compare Kant to the Aquinas of De Veritate is misleading, because the latter work does not reveal the grounds of Aquinas’ thinking about analogy. That is, Milbank contends that Kant’s theory of analogy utterly lacks the ontological aspect so crucial to Aquinas’ theory. While Aquinas makes recourse to an ontological ground, Kant does not. Kant’s employment of analogy is utterly divorced from any analogia entis (1997 15). For Kant, analogy is ‘primarily a linguistic doctrine’ (1997 15).5

Kant’s ontology is, Milbank argues, in no way analogical. Instead, it is structured by a ‘metaphysics of the sublime’ (1997 11) – that is, a metaphysics which insists on univocal relations between all phenomena and an equivocal relationship between phenomena and noumena. Everything within the sensible domain of

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5 Of course, this is also a polemic against those, like Burrell, who interpret analogy semantically in the twentieth century.
experience is univocally related; however, once one attempts to move beyond the limits of possible experience, once one attempts to cross from the sensible to the supersensible, then one encounters an abyss:

Kant’s entire philosophy is in a sense an aesthetic of the sublime in which one is brought up against the margin of organised… experience, and at this margin becomes overwhelmed by the intimation of the materially formless and infinitely total. (1997 10)

While everything in the phenomenal realm is fully knowable, we can obtain only ‘a minimality of content… concerning the noumena’ (1997 10), precisely because the noumena is equivocally – and not analogously – related to our own possible experience. Milbank interprets Kantian dualism in terms of equivocity. In consequence, the supersensible is emptied of all content – that is (in more Kantian terms), the same categories cannot be legitimately applied to the two domains. Kant here inaugurates ‘a new thinking of the transcendent as the absolutely unknowable void… [in which] all that persists of transcendence is sheer unknowability or its quality of non-representability and non-depictability.’ (2004 211-3) There is therefore no analogic ontology in Kant’s philosophy, and so no trace of *analogia attributionis*.

It is here that Milbank claims to justify the superiority of *analogia attributionis* to *analogia proportionalitatis*. Grounding analogy in ontology is the only possible way of maintaining a theory of analogy, because otherwise analogy undermines itself. And this is exactly what happens in Kant’s philosophy. Kantian agnosticism is rigid and ultimately dogmatic – insofar as God is known, He is known univocally; insofar as God is not known, He is not known equivocally. Hence, insofar as ‘c:x’ is known from ‘a:b’, it is known univocally. Milbank writes,
While, from one point of view, proper proportionality is ‘more agnostic’ than attribution, from another point of view it is less so, because the common ratio can be universally specified. In Kant’s usage, analogy of proper proportionality tends to posit a specifiable, fixed, precisely known sort of relation of God to the creation. (1997 9)

In other words, Kantian analogy deconstructs itself: no proper analogous relation is possible, owing to his commitment to a metaphysics of the sublime. This is Milbank’s proof that there can be no legitimate analogy without analogic ontology.

Kantian ontology is, according to Milbank, a non-analogic ontology, and, as such, Kant’s use of analogical reasoning is not in any way grounded in an underlying ontological structure. It is therefore deficient – especially when judged by the norm of Thomist analogy. However, a qualification is necessary. Milbank’s invocation of ontology with respect to Kantian philosophy is extremely controversial – and meant to be so. The category of being is notoriously absent from Kant’s redescriptions of experience (Heidegger 1998; Lord 2003). Milbank’s polemical use of the term ‘ontology’ is oblivious to this, for the basic reason that only by talking of Kantian ontology can Kant be read through Thomist lenses. Aquinas talks of being, so Kant must be made to as well. In order to achieve this end, Milbank interprets the place of ontology in Kant’s philosophy as twofold: first (and this is the element on which most of Milbank’s emphasis falls) it comprises the relation of the sensible to the supersensible; second, it comprises the relation between phenomena in the sensible realm. These two elements constitute what Milbank means by ‘Kant’s ontology’ – and below I follow him for the sake of argument. Therefore, the question of whether Kant subscribes or not to an analogic ontology is the same question as whether the sensible
and the supersensible are analogically related or whether phenomena are analogically related to each other.⁶

2. Analogy Beyond Aquinas

Before, however, turning to Kant’s theory of analogy itself, I want to flag up the limitations of reading modern theories of analogy through Thomist lenses. Analogy has been a concept with which to experiment and to innovate and Kantian analogy marks one more creation of a new category irreducible to tradition.

2.1 Analogy in Early Modern Science

Each theory of analogy is singular. This is true not only of philosophical, but also scientific deployments of the concept. Mary Hesse has been one of the most strident voices in distinguishing between Scholastic, metaphysical uses of analogy and its use in scientific discourse. The two cannot be conflated – and no genealogy, she claims, can appropriate the latter as a mere derivative reformulation of the former. (Hesse 1966 57, 130) It is a well-rehearsed point that early modern science does away with analogical ontology. However, what is noted far less is that analogy is redeployed during this period in a manner that bears no resemblance to – and little obvious dependence on – Scholastic theories of analogy. For example, Cajetan’s attempt to formalise Thomist analogy (Burrell 1973 100-121, 176-96) is not the beginnings of

⁶ There are, I am implying, many other (more sophisticated) ways of reconstructing a Kantian ontology (the references to Heidegger and Lord above provide two such examples). Indeed, as an anonymous reviewer of this paper suggested, the relation between analogy and ontology in Aristotle may well prove a key starting point for any such reconstruction. Callanan (2008 761) insists on the need for future investigation into the Greek origins of Kant’s doctrine of analogy generally.
modernity, but the end of premodernity. With early modern science (Boyle, Newton), something new begins when it comes to analogy (Hesse 1966 130-50).

In early modern science, analogy is synonymous with *induction*, a method of moving from the particular to the general. An early scientific example is to be found in Boyle’s work,

> Apposite comparisons do not only give Light, but strength to the passages they belong to, since they are not always bare Pictures and Resemblances, but a kind of Argument, being oftentimes, if I may so call them, Analogous Instances, which do declare the Nature, or Way of operating, of the thing they relate to, and by that means do in a sort prove, that as 'tis possible, so it is not improbable, that they may be such as 'tis represented. (1690, ‘Preface’)

Through comparing various phenomena, one is able to infer a law of nature. Analogy is a means of working out how phenomena work (on, as we shall see, the presupposition of a univocal ontology). This usage of analogy was also popular in theological contexts: Butler, for example, labels his teleological argument a form of analogy (1961 2). Again, analogy is a means of reasoning from what is observed to what is unobserved on the presupposition that the same laws are always obeyed. As late as the early nineteenth century, Mill could claim, ‘The word “analogy”, as the name of a mode of reasoning, is generally taken for some kind of argument supposed to be of an inductive nature.’ (1974)

It is Newton, however, who most exemplifies this tradition. His third ‘rule of reasoning in philosophy’ states, ‘The qualities of bodies… which are to be found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.’ (1953 3) From the constant recurrence of properties during an experiment, the constant recurrence of properties in the rest of the universe is inferred. Such reasoning is only possible on the assumption that nature
is homogenous, that all realms of being subscribe to the same laws – that is, *that Nature is univocal*. This assumption is dubbed the ‘analogy of Nature’: nature is ‘simple and always consonant with itself’ (1953 4). ‘This is the foundation of all philosophy’, Newton continues (1953 4). Without the ‘analogy of Nature’, induction could not occur – premised as it is on synchronic and diachronic homogeneity throughout the universe.⁷

This scientific deployment of analogy bears little resemblance to Thomist use of the concept. As Hesse points out, it is not ‘a third way between univocity and equivocity’ (1966 141) – this fundamental feature of all Scholastic employments of analogy is lacking. To read Newton’s analogy of Nature in the terms of either *De Veritate* or the *Summa Theologiae* would be a fundamental mistake.

2.2 Leibniz

Analogy plays a central, if very different role in Leibniz’ philosophy. Here, analogy becomes ontological once more, yet still without being derivative of earlier Thomist understanding.

The concept of analogy emerges in Leibniz’ early essay, *What is an Idea?*. Taking issue with Spinoza’s conception of idea as act, Leibniz conceives of an idea as an ‘ability [or faculty] to think about a thing’ (1969 207). In so doing he reintroduces a referential relation between idea and thing so thoroughly avoided in Spinozan epistemology. The notion of analogy is introduced to explain this correspondence. He writes, ‘‘There are relations [in an idea] which correspond to the relations of the thing expressed.’ (1969 207) Leibniz makes his appeal to analogy explicit at the end of the same paragraph: ‘Hence it is clearly not necessary for that which expresses to be

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⁷ For more examples and discussion of analogy as inference in early modernity, see Callanan 2008 749-50.
similar to the thing expressed, if only a certain analogy is maintained between the relations.’ (1969 207) In other words, Leibniz attempts to refute Spinozan monism in which the idea and its referent are substantially identical through deploying the resources of analogy. Analogy is a way of preserving some sort of ontological connection between mind and world without reducing them to the same substance. Analogy – as always – mediates between sameness and difference.

The model sketched in What is an Idea? is an early version of the fundamental Leibnizian doctrine of pre-established harmony. Everything – including mind and world – are indirectly but harmoniously related. During Leibniz’ career, pre-established harmony goes on to determine the relation between soul and body, monad and monad as well as nature and freedom. For example, thirty six years after What is an Idea?, Principles of Nature and Grace, based on Reason lays bare the analogical foundations of pre-established harmony once more. In the very title of Principles of Nature and Grace, based on Reason, we have a theological foreshadowing of Kant’s problematic in the Introduction to the third Critique: how can the laws of physics and the dictates of morality (or, in Leibniz’ terms, ‘God as architect’ and ‘God as monarch’) be reconciled? Just like Kant, Leibniz wants to retain some modicum of separation between the principles of salvation and those of the natural world (for salvation must not occur ‘by a dislocation of nature’), whilst at the same time ensuring that there is communication between the two ‘realms’ (1969 640). And this is precisely what pre-established harmony achieves: the indirect interconnection of nature and grace occurs ‘by virtue of the harmony pre-established from all time between the realms of nature and of grace, between God as architect and God as monarch.’ (1969 640; Deleuze 1990 329)
Pre-established harmony is therefore another name for analogic ontology; it is a new, innovative formation of *analogia entis*. That is, Leibniz’ conception of *analogia entis* in particular is very different from its Thomist predecessor; for example, Leibniz uses analogy to maintain a distinction between the two series of nature and grace, whereas Aquinas does so precisely to overcome this distinction. We must conclude therefore that there is not merely one stable form of the *analogia entis* as Milbank would like to believe, but a plurality of irreducible experiments in analogic ontology.

3. Analogy in the *Prolegomena*

The *Prolegomena* is the standard text on which critiques of Kantian analogy have focused. I will argue, however, that the *Prolegomena* only provides a preliminary orientation to Kantian analogy.

Kant raises analogy at a crucial moment in the text, during the Conclusion, ‘On the Determination of the Bounds of Pure Reason’. Despite this title, Kant is not primarily concerned with undermining the pretensions of those who go beyond the limits of possible experience, but on demonstrating the possibility of a new metaphysics set on firm foundations (2001 4:360). And it is analogy which makes it possible. In a post-critical philosophy, metaphysics will often be speaking of what is unknown – and Kant names ‘analogy’ that mode of thinking by which legitimate inferences are made about the unknown. For analogy provides no constitutive knowledge of an unknown object, but merely allows us to ‘obtain a relational concept of things’ (2001 4:358) – that is, to infer what external relationships this unknown
object must possess in terms of other similar relationships. Analogical reasoning is
indirect: it makes claims about one relation only through prior acquaintance with
another relation.\(^8\)

In analogy, the object ‘remains unknown to me in its intrinsic character’
(2002b 20:280), only its relations become visible: ‘Though what is unknown should
not become the least more known – which we cannot even hope – yet the notion of
this connection must be definite, and capable of being rendered distinct.’ (2001 4:354)
The fourth term remains intrinsically unknown, just as in De Veritate. Kant
emphasises this in the first Critique, when distinguishing between mathematical and
philosophical analogy: ‘From three given members we can obtain a priori knowledge
only of the relation to a fourth, not the fourth relation itself.’ (1929 A179-80/B222)
Nothing about the nature of the analogatum can even be thought. Analogy takes the
subject beyond normal representation into a mysterious beyond which exceeds both
sense and thought. To this extent, Milbank is of course correct in his diagnosis of a
metaphysics of the sublime.

Therefore, only analogy can satisfy both the limitations on knowledge
imposed by the first Critique as well as the human need to think about what lies
beyond such limits. Analogy is the (tentative) mode in which reason legitimately
transcends experience. For example, God-talk is only made possible by ‘tak[ing]
away the objective anthropomorphism from our concept of the Supreme Being’ (2001
4:358) – that is, by reinterpreting, rather than replacing, propositions about the divine.
Future metaphysics is ‘symbolic’, instead of ‘dogmatic’ (2001 4:357). It is a

\(^8\) On the relation of Kant’s theory of analogy to induction and to the early modern account of analogy
as induction, see Callanan 2008 753. As Callanan points out through a study of the development of
Kant’s employment of ‘analogy’ from the pre-critical lectures to the Critique of Pure Reason, it is
Kant’s distinction between a mathematical use of analogy (premised on a univocal ontology) and a
philosophical use (analogia proportionalitatis) which differentiates him from this this early modern
tradition (753).
hermeneutic enterprise of reinterpreting the traditional statements of metaphysics in a way that retains the mystery of the unknown object ‘x’.\(^9\) Whereas the dogmatists supposed that their metaphysical statements provided them with determinate knowledge about transcendent objects, post-critical metaphysicians will, on the contrary, be fully aware that their statements can only be understood analogically. The difference resides in the *type of judgment*: past metaphysics has been done in a determinative key, while future metaphysics will be reflective. The same propositions are asserted in a different mode (reflected, not determined).

Crucial is the convergence of three key terms – analogy, symbol and reflective judgment. The destiny of the concept of analogy in the Kantian oeuvre is fundamentally tied to the uses to which symbol and reflective judgment are put. And yet Kant’s conception of analogy here seems to play into Milbank’s hands. Analogy is envisioned as an epistemological tool that predicates properties of God ‘as if’ they ‘really’ applied. In other words, properties are predicated whether or not they do determinately apply to God. There is a stress on the subjective act of judging in Kant’s account that seems indifferent to the way the world actually is, that seems to forego any appeal to analogic ontology. What exists beyond the sensible is unknowable – and to that extent Milbank’s notion of a metaphysics of the sublime is confirmed. Yet, in what follows, I contend that Kant’s presentation of analogy in the *Prolegomena* does not get to the heart of his thinking on the subject. The *Critique of Judgment* provides a much richer picture, one in which analogy is ontologically grounded (always remembering that I am using ‘ontology’ in Milbank’s sense as the relation between the sensible and the supersensible). The rest of this essay is devoted to uncovering this implicit account of analogic ontology in the *Critique of Judgment*.

4. Analogy and the Symbol

Kant’s concern with analogy comes explicitly to the fore in §59 of the *Critique of Judgment*. In this section (‘Beauty as a Symbol of Morality’), Kant defines the symbol as ‘a *Darstellung* in accordance with mere *analogy*’ or as an ‘indirect *Darstellung* according to analogy’ (1987a 5:352). Kant repeats such a view fourteen years later in *On the Progress of Metaphysics since Leibniz and Wolff*: ‘The symbol of an idea is a *Darstellung* of the object by analogy’ (2002b 20:279). In fact, at times, analogy and symbol are employed interchangeably (1987a 5:354). It therefore seems fair to interpret Kant’s symbol as analogical, and it is this intimate link between symbols and analogy that I consider further in this section.

4.1 The Definition of the Symbol

The definition of symbol is reached through a series of distinctions between different forms of *Darstellungen* (exhibitions, presentations). The first set of distinctions is between ‘example’, ‘schema’ and something else which is impossible. These terms name the different possibilities for *Darstellungen* that ‘establish’ the objective reality of their concept. Examples are intuitions which show the ‘reality’ of empirical concepts, while schemata are the corresponding intuitions which exhibit the twelve categories in the sensible realm; however, Kant continues,

> If anyone goes as far as to demand that we establish the objective reality of the rational concepts (i.e. the Ideas) for the sake of their theoretical cognition, then he asks for something impossible, because absolutely no intuition can be given that would be adequate to them. (1987a 5:351)
No corresponding intuitions are possible for Ideas of reason, since by definition such Ideas lie beyond all possible experience (1929 A327/B384). They are precisely what cannot be directly intuited.

The problem that faces Kant, then, is that if the reality of ideas cannot be ‘established’ by intuition, it is not clear what other way of exhibiting them intuitively there can be. The answer he gives to this problem is – by means of symbolism. That is, Kant switches perspectives. While he began by listing ways in which concepts can be ‘established’ in intuitions, he now considers alternatives to establishing. The schematic mode is that of establishing; the alternative is the symbolic mode of exhibition: ‘All hypotyposis (Darstellung) consists in making sensible, and is either schematic or symbolic’ (1987a 5:351). The schematic mode produces intuitions that determinately exhibit a concept: it ‘establishes’ concepts in intuitions (and hence examples and schemata are instances of such schematic intuitions). Kant’s point is that Ideas cannot be exhibited schematically, but he goes on to contend that Ideas can in fact be exhibited symbolically.

So, in these first few lines of §59, there are two types of distinction at play: the first set of distinctions names the different possible instantiations of schematism (depending on whether it is an empirical concept, a category or Idea being schematised); the second set of distinctions goes on to question whether schematism is the only possible mode of Darstellung, and answers negatively: symbolism is another option.

4.2 The Nature of the Analogy in Symbolic Exhibition
Here is how Kant defines this symbolic mode of Darstellung:
In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think and to which no symbolic intuition can be adequate, and this concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising. (1987a 5:351)

It is analogy which makes possible symbolic Darstellung of Ideas. Instead of a direct, ‘demonstrative’ relation holding between intuition and Idea, symbolism is indirect, employing analogy.

To understand the appeal to analogy, one first needs to consider how direct, non-analogic Darstellung – schematism – functions. Chapter One of the Analytic of Principles in the Critique of Pure Reason begins, ‘In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be homogenous with the concept’ (1929 A137/B176). It is precisely this circumstance that gives rise to examples, for here the properties of empirical concepts are continuously exemplified in the intuitions subsumed under them. In examples, concept and intuition are commensurate. However, the opening of the second paragraph seems to put paid to this general rule when it comes to the special case of categories: ‘But pure concepts of the understanding being quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions, and indeed from all sensible intuitions, can never be met with in any intuition.’ (1929 A137/B176) Categories are on first glance heterogeneous to intuition, raising the problem of how intuitions can exhibit them. Yet, Kant is quick to qualify such a statement, for, while in terms of content it is true that categories and intuitions are heterogeneous, in terms of form they are still commensurate, because both are intimately related to time. Hence, Kant writes, ‘A transcendental determination of time is… homogenous with the category’ (1929 A138/B177). Thus, to the extent that time is a form of all intuition, intuitions turn out to be commensurate with categories. ‘Thus,’ Kant concludes, ‘an application of the category to appearances becomes
possible by means of the transcendental determination of time, which, as the schema of the concepts of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the appearances under the category.’ (1929 A139/B178)

The schema’s role therefore is to make explicit the temporal conditions pertaining to the use of categories – conditions which are already implicit in their objective constitution. Schemata are that ‘third thing, which is on the one hand homogenous with category, and on the other hand with appearance, and which thus makes the application of the former to the latter possible.’ (1929 A138/B177) They are products of the imagination and so mediate between categories and intuitions, just as the imagination mediates between understanding and sensibility. They do so by flagging up the pre-existing common ground between the two.

For our purposes here, what needs to be emphasised is, pace Kant’s initial claim, the ultimate commensurability of categories and intuitions, which schemata reveal. The very fact that ‘this mediating representation’ can ‘in one respect be intellectual… [and] in another be sensible’ (1929 A138/B177) tells in favour of the univocal relation that holds between categories and intuitions. This univocal relation is grounded in the fact that time pertains to both elements in the very same manner. Schemata merely make such univocality explicit.

Returning to the symbol, one can see straight away that this common element is precisely what is lacking between the Idea and its intuition. Ideas are thought outside of temporal conditions. Between Ideas and intuitions this formal element is not shared. No schema can be generated which mediates between the two. The question therefore becomes more insistent: how do symbols mediate between Ideas

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10 Thus Kant is able to accomplish a difficult balancing act: to bring the conceptual and the intuitive into communication, while at the same time maintaining their distinctiveness (a key tenet of the critical project as such).
and intuitions? Kant answers this question by appeal to analogy: the Idea ‘is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way merely analogous to the procedure it follows in schematising’ (1987a 5:351; my emphasis). In a later paragraph of the third *Critique*, Kant develops these comments further:

Symbol exhibition uses analogy… in which judgment performs a double function: it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition; and then it applies the mere rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol. (1987a 5:352; see also 2002b 20:279-80)

In terms of the mathematical proportions of the *Prolegomena*, ‘symbol:effect::Idea:its effect’. What is exhibited by the symbol is not a representative of the Idea itself but a representative of the relations this Idea has (2002b 20:280). The analogy involved in symbolic reasoning can be characterised thus: the subject reflectively compares the way a sensible representation works with the way an Idea is thought to function (Flach 1982 457, Deleuze 1984 54). Symbolism is thus a form of reflective judgment; indeed, as we shall see, it is the exemplary instance of this kind of judgment.

4.3 Schema, Symbol and Sign

As well as emphasising the analogous nature of symbolic representations, §59 of the *Critique of Judgment* insists forcefully on their non-discursive nature. The distinction between the schematic and the symbolic is a distinction between types of operations that make thought intuitive:

The intuitive can be divided into *schematic* and *symbolic* presentation: both are *hypotyposes*, i.e. exhibitions, not mere *characterisations*, i.e. designations of concepts by accompanying sensible signs. (1987a 5:351-2)
Both symbols and schemata are means of making intuitive and so ‘must be contrasted with the discursive’ (1987a 5:351). On the side of discourse stand ‘characterisations’ or ‘signs’. Although they are intuited, signs in fact speak solely to the understanding: they are externalised shorthand for conceptual relations. Here is how Kant defines the sign:

Such signs contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object; their point is the subjective one of serving as a means for reproducing concepts… They are either words, or visible (algebraic or even mimetic) signs, and they merely express concepts. (1987a 5:352)

Signs are merely subjective, arbitrary aids for communicating concepts. As such, their relation to their concept is merely extrinsic. They do not exhibit it in any way. Symbols, on the other hand, are exhibitions (Darstellung) – not ‘designations’ – and to this extent still have an intrinsic connection to their Idea.

Symbols are therefore the middle term of a three-term series: on the one hand, they are not designations; however, on the other hand, this relation is in no way direct. Symbols – and by extension analogy – fall somewhere between signs and schemata. This three-term series, moreover, is remarkably similar to the univocity/analogy/equivocity series of premodern theories of analogy. Schemata are employed when there is a hidden univocal relation between category and intuition: time can be predicated in the very same manner of both. On the other hand, signs are grounded on an utterly equivocal (and thus philosophically banal) relation between intuition and conceptual thought. As Kant categorically states, ‘Such signs contain nothing whatever that belongs to the intuition of the object.’ (1987a 5:352) Between these two extremes, the symbol is to be found. There is no common ground between a symbolic intuition and the Idea it evokes, for Ideas (unlike categories) exist independently of time. However, in an indirect and mediated way, the intuition still
manages to exhibit the Idea – that is, although there is nothing in common between them, through a ‘leap of the imagination’\textsuperscript{11} they are brought into communication. The symbol is positioned at the mean between univocity (schemata) and equivocity (signs).

The same story can be told from the point of view of transcendental psychology. Sensibility and the understanding are \textit{univocally} related, precisely because imagination is the ‘common root’ between them (1929 A15/B29). It is the mediating role of imagination that means that time can be predicated by each of them in exactly the same manner. Out of this process schemata emerge. On the other hand, reason is related to sensibility in two possible ways, depending on the type of judgment in operation. From the perspective of determinative judgment, reason is equivocally related to sensibility; however, from the perspective of reflective judgment (i.e. symbolism), reason is indirectly and analogously related to it.

4.4 Reality as Reflected

The appeal made above to two different perspectives (determination and reflection) is absolutely crucial to my argument. At the beginning of §59, Kant considers the possibility of exhibiting Ideas from two perspectives. First, he considers this possibility in terms of intuition directly ‘establishing’ such Ideas. This, he concludes, is impossible. In other words, from the \textit{perspective of determinative judgment}, intuition is heterogeneous to Idea. However, this is not true when it comes to \textit{reflective judgment}: the subject can reflectively judge intuitions as symbolising Ideas – and, as we have seen at length, analogy is the means by which this is achieved. In consequence, when the perspective is switched from determination to reflection, the

\textsuperscript{11} Such, I suggest, is a useful way to conceive of reflective judgment.
symbol is then made possible. By means of analogy, the intuition is reflectively judged to correspond to an Idea to which determinatively no intuition corresponds.

However, one must not conclude from this that symbolic correspondence is somehow artificial or fictional. There is little sense in claiming that determinate judgment reveals reality ‘more’ or ‘better’ than reflective judgment. All domains of Kantian reality (or ontology) are idealist: they are all (partially) creations of the interaction of the faculties. In fact, as we shall soon see, Kant claims that reflective judgment is the better, more revealing mode in which to understand some domains of reality or ontology. I am here arguing against the common assumption that just because reflective judgment is subjective, it therefore makes no claims about how the world is. The consequence of this assumption is that determinative judgment is given priority. However, its flaw is that it does not account for many of the roles Kant ascribes to reflective judgment. For example, reflective judgment makes determinative judgment possible by first forming the concepts which determinative judgment employs. If reflection were divorced from reality in some way (although what this would mean on transcendental idealist terms is difficult to tell), then so too would determinative judgment.

Once the above is realised, the following I contend is the consequence: there are two modes of Kantian ontology – reality as determined and reality as reflected. Schematism (the process of determination) and symbolism (the process of reflection) are therefore two differing but equally significant ways in which reality is constructed. Moreover, as we have seen, symbolism operates by means of analogy. In other words, reality as reflected is analogous. This is the reason Kantian ontology is analogic ontology. In the next section, I spell this out in greater detail with reference to the ‘ontological’ relation between the sensible and the supersensible.
5. The Analogy between Nature and Freedom

5.1 The Two Domains

The Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* is Kant’s fullest ontological statement, as well as both the ‘conclusion’ and ‘key’ to the critical project (Nuzzo 2005 88). It begins by outlining the results of the first two *Critiques*, ‘Our cognitive power as a whole has two domains, that of the concepts of nature and that of the concept of freedom’ (1987a 5:174), and, corresponding to these domains, ‘understanding and reason have two different legislations’. Even though Kant is fond of speaking of a ‘gulf’ separating the two domains (the sensible and the supersensible) (1987a 5:175, 5:195), it is (as he himself concedes) somewhat of an exaggeration. The third Antinomy demonstrated that the two realms are necessarily ‘compatible’ (1929 A538-58/B566-86) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* argued that the necessity of the highest good and the postulate of God ensure that duty can, and so must, be actualised in the sensible realm of phenomena. Hence, Kant writes in the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*,

> Even though the sensible cannot determine the supersensible in the subject, yet the reverse is possible (…with regard to the consequences that the concept of freedom has in nature); and this possibility is contained in the very concept of a causality through freedom, whose effect is to be brought about in the world. (1987a 5:195)

The gulf Kant draws attention to is then only a partial gulf, or (more exactly) a ‘one-way gulf’. While, according to the first *Critique*, access is denied theoretical cognition hoping to progress from the sensible to the supersensible, the conclusion of the second
Critique results in an asymmetry, for the same is not true of practical cognition, which can progress from the supersensible back into the sensible realm.

In fact, this leads Kant to insist that the domains must be unifiable after all. The problem is merely that the first Critique was unable to discover this unity from the side of theoretical reason; there was something in its manner of approaching the problem that meant it missed the theoretical unity of freedom and nature – and it is the task of the third Critique to supplement its predecessor in this regard. ‘So,’ Kant concludes, ‘there must after all be a basis uniting… [what] underlies nature and the supersensible that the concept of freedom contains practically’ (1987a 5:176). The Critique of Judgment must discover this unity theoretically.

In other words, the first two Critiques underdetermined the relation between the sensible and the supersensible, and this relation will only be fully articulated in the third Critique. Kantian ontology (in Milbank’s sense) is therefore only fully and adequately articulated in this work.

5.2 Reflection
Kant discovers the basis of such theoretical unity in reflective judgment; it succeeds where the determinative judgment of the first Critique failed. This is crucial for my purposes. Kant implies that determinative judgment captures the relation between the sensible and the supersensible less than reflective judgment. It is properly approached through reflective judgment (which is synonymous with analogy).

Determinative judgment is defined as the subsuming of intuitions under concepts (the particular under the universal) (1987a 5:179). This is the relation of intuition and concept that gives rise to schematism. In determinative judgment, the concept ‘is given’, hence judgment is ‘only subsumptive’; there is no creativity to its
action, merely a mechanical synthesis between the materials which the understanding and sensibility have already supplied. Reflective judgment, on the contrary, is creative. Kant writes, ‘If only the particular is given and judgment has to find the universal for it, then this power is... reflective.’ (1987a 5:179) Reflection proceeds hermeneutically, because it ‘is obliged to ascend from the particular in nature to the universal’ (1987a 5:180). In so doing, new concepts are invented:

[Reflection is] the state of mind in which we first set ourselves to discover the subjective conditions under which we are able to arrive at concepts. It is the consciousness of the relation of given representations to our different sources of knowledge. (1929 A260/B316; my emphasis)

How does this ascension from particular to universal occur? Reflective judgment requires a rule to guide its action in deciding how a given intuition is to be conceived in terms of concepts which, in turn, have not been given (1987a 5:180). The rule by which reflection discovers new concepts is purposiveness:

Judgment’s principle concerning the form that things of nature have in terms of empirical laws in general is the purposiveness of nature in its diversity. In other words through this concept we present nature as if an understanding contained the basis of the unity of what is diverse in nature’s empirical laws. (1987a 5:180-1)

The potential to be systematised or purposiveness constitutes the a priori principle belonging uniquely to reflection. Purposiveness is, Kant emphasises, a regulative principle – to acquire new concepts it must be postulated irrespective of whether it can be proven determinatively: ‘We had to assume that there is such unity even though we have no insight into this unity and cannot prove it.’ (1987a 5:184) Nonetheless, some form of systematicity must inhere in the intuitions we reflect upon for us to produce concepts (1987a 5:183-4). Aesthetic judgment is Kant’s primary
example of a form of reflective judgment. It takes account of ‘the harmony of the form of the object (the form that is in the apprehension of the object prior to any concept) with the cognitive powers’ (1987a 5:192). What is most beautiful is the intuition which accords most with purposiveness.

Stepping back, it is possible to discern how reflective judgment, guided by purposiveness, is able to fulfil the task Kant sets it and unify the two ‘ontological’ domains of nature and freedom. Purposiveness provides a theoretical criterion by which to judge the world’s accordance with the mind; therefore beautiful objects provide a means by which one can theoretically reconcile the sensible realm with the mind’s demand for freedom. In short, beautiful objects provide evidence for the sensible realm’s positive relation to the supersensible. Kant writes,

The concept of a purposiveness of nature... makes possible the transition from pure theoretical to pure practical lawfulness, from lawfulness in terms of nature to the final purpose set by the concept of freedom. (1987a 5:196)

The two domains are no longer separated by a gulf thanks to reflective judgment. Kant concludes, reflective judgment ‘mediat[es] the connection of the domain of the concept of nature with that of the concept of freedom’ (1987a 5:197). Reflection is thus key to understanding Kantian ontology. And in the next section I demonstrate that the analogic nature of reflection necessitates the analogic nature of Kantian ontology.

5.3 The Unity of the Critique of Judgment

The centrality of analogy to the Critique of Judgment has been most persuasively argued by Angelica Nuzzo. In her words, ‘analogy is somehow constitutive of reflective judgments own principle and procedure.’ (2005 177) Nuzzo obtains this
conclusion by arguing for an overarching unity to the contents of the third *Critique*. This is a controversial position: the standard view in the Anglo-American literature is that the third *Critique* consists of a plurality of very different solutions to the problem of theoretically ascending from the sensible to the supersensible. Its argument is therefore aggregative. For example, Paul Guyer argues that, within the aesthetic portion of the work alone, Kant proposes six distinct ways to complete critical philosophy (2006 426). Guyer writes, ‘Each of the strands in the cables of a bridge helps to hold it up even if no one of them is unconditionally necessary for the bridge to stand.’ (2006 439) Symbolism, for instance, is one of these partial ‘strands’ (2006 430). Beauty as a symbol of the good partially points to the connection between nature and freedom, but only when combined with other aspects of Kant’s aesthetic and teleological theories can it do so fully.

However, following Nuzzo, I contend that all these seemingly disparate ‘bridges’ from the supersensible to the sensible are essentially one. They share the same fundamental structure. All of them proceed by the logic of reflection and this means that all proceed analogically. Analogy is the key to the relation between the sensible and the supersensible, and so the symbol of §59 is paradigmatic in the way it mediates analogically between the two domains (Nuzzo 2005 326, Guérin 1974 533).

Nuzzo’s argument turns on the nature of the work reflective judgment performs. As we have seen, reflective judgment invents new concepts by evaluating an intuition’s susceptibility to systematisation. Yet, there is an additional characteristic of these judgments we have yet to consider:

> Since the laws that pure understanding gives a priori concern only the possibility of a nature as such (as object of sense), there are such diverse forms of nature, so many modifications... which are left undetermined by
Kant contrasts the scope of his conclusions in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where determinative judgment was at stake, with his current concerns. While previously he had only concerned himself with ‘the possibility of nature as such’, there is now the problem of ‘diverse forms of nature’ which his theory of reflective judgment must answer. In Nuzzo’s terms, the realm in which the first *Critique* takes place is ‘a realm where all phenomena and objects are viewed as completely homogeneous’; the trick is now to conceptualise what is heterogeneous (2005 186). As Kant pointedly puts it in his First Introduction, the task of the third *Critique* is to discover ‘a system that connects the empirical laws under a principle even in terms of that in which they differ’ (1987b 20:204). To invent new concepts is to discern resemblances in what is heterogeneous.

Reflective judgment is therefore analogy – the search (to recall the words of the *Prolegomena*) for ‘a perfect similarity of relations between two quite dissimilar things’ (2001 4:358). Analogy is precisely that activity which is intent on discovering likenesses in objects while preserving their diversity. Symbolism, for example, ensures Ideas and intuitions remain incommensurable, even while exhibiting Ideas in intuitions. Hence, analogy is behind Kant’s claim to have realised a system that connects empirical laws even as they differ.

Therefore, Nuzzo concludes, analogy is in fact ‘the internal logic – or the way of thinking – proper to the reflective faculty of judgment.’ (2005 318) She continues,

> Analogy designates the *heuristic* procedure followed by reflection… The theme of analogy unifies the activity of the faculty of judgment in realms as different as the sphere of the beautiful and the sublime, empirical cognition, the cognition of life and organisms. (2005 319)
As Guérin also puts it, ‘Analogy is the type or model for all regulative principles’.

(1974 539) Pace Guyer, Nuzzo insists that ‘Kant recognises that analogy is the way in which the faculty of judgment is at work in the most different spheres.’ (323) There is only one bridge in the Critique of Judgment, and this is analogy.\(^{12}\)

Nuzzo goes on to apply this conclusion to the sensible/supersensible relation (2005 255). Reflective judgment is a way of connecting the two heterogeneous domains of being without confusing them. Nature and freedom are analogously related (just as for Leibniz) – one cannot predicate properties of them in the same way, but they do indirectly communicate. Reflection through the operation of analogy unifies philosophy and completes the critical project.

6. **Analogy in the Critique of Judgment: Some Conclusions**

This analysis leads to a number of conclusions that demonstrate that Kantian analogy is far more innovative than Milbank gives it credit for. Like all the great theories of analogy before it, it is revolutionary.

6.1 The Analogical Nature of Reality as Reflected

In the last two sections, I have shown that the relation between the sensible and the supersensible is analogous *when this relation is reflected upon*. This puts paid to Milbank’s interpretation of the relation in terms of a ‘metaphysics of the sublime’. Milbank’s reading may be correct when the relation is experienced from the

\(^{12}\) One important consequence of this is that the sublime (despite its superficial differences from the beautiful) also operates by means of analogy (as well as Nuzzo 2005, see Zammito 1992 264, 275-9). Here alone one might refute Milbank’s characterisation of Kant, for the sublime does not do away with analogy, but is a surreptitious form of it.
perspective of determinative judgment. However, the whole purpose of the third
_Critique_ is to suggest that reality as determined gives a misleading, underdetermined
version of the sensible/supersensible relation. Only reality as reflected provides an
accurate picture, and it exhibits this relation as analogous. This is the central insight of
the _Critique of Judgment_ which Milbank ignores: experience is constructed in two
distinct modes, either determinatively or reflectively, and it is reality as reflected
which is the best way to approach the transition between domains of being. Insofar
then as this transition is a crucial element of what Milbank dubs ‘Kantian ontology’,
Kantian ontology is analogic.

The proposals for an analogical post-critical metaphysics in the _Prolegomena_
thus have a basis in reality – reality as reflected. Analogic ontology implicitly
underwrites Kant’s theory of analogic predication. Kant proposes an _analogia entis_,
just like Aquinas, but his _analogia entis_ is very different. One way, for example, it
differs is in its idealism. The subject constructs reality for Kant or, more specifically,
the analogic ontology of reality as reflected is a projection of the analogous relations
that hold between reason and sensibility. While understanding and sensibility are
univocally related (and so the synthesis of categories and intuitions is possible
univocally), this does not hold for the relation between Ideas and intuitions. The
exhibition of an Idea is possible only analogically. From this starting point in faculty
psychology, Kant shows how the subject goes on to understand the relation between
the sensible and the supersensible along the same lines. Kant insists on such
projection in _On a Discovery whereby any new Critique of Pure Reason is to be made
Superfluous by an Older One_. Leibnizian pre-established harmony – that is, the
Leibnizian theory of analogy – only makes sense in reference to transcendental
psychology. Only from the starting point of a ‘harmony’ between the faculties (2002a
8:249) can this metaphysical doctrine be properly understood. Pre-established
harmony is interpreted as

a predetermination, not of the things existing in separation, but only of the
mental powers in us, sensibility and understanding... [Leibniz] extends pre-
established harmony to [the relation] between the Kingdoms of Nature and of
Grace, where a harmony has to be thought between the consequences of our
concepts of nature and those of our concept of freedom, a union, therefore, of
two totally different faculties, under wholly dissimilar principles in us, and not
that of a pair of different things, existing in harmony outside each other. (2002a
8:250)

Here, under the guise of a summary of Leibnizian pre-established harmony, the
argument of the Critique of Judgment is rehearsed. A critical metaphysics of analogy
must be erected on the analogous relation between the faculties ‘in us’. This
metaphysics will reaffirm the analogous relation between nature and grace first
articulated by Leibniz. Thus it is the Critique of Judgment (and not the Critique of
Pure Reason as Kant claims) that ‘might well be the true apology for Leibniz, even
against those of his disciples who heap praises upon him that do him no honour.’
(2002a 8:250)

The analogous relation between sensibility and reason is projected onto the
sensible/supersensible relation – and this generates analogic ontology. This basis in
transcendental psychology is one reason Kantian analogy breaks with the past.

6.2 Analogy without God: Kant beyond Leibniz

It is the reflective subject that guarantees the analogy between the sensible and the
supersensible in the Critique of Judgment. This marks one of Kant’s most decisive
departures from the various traditions of analogical thinking. Unlike Aquinas and
unlike Leibniz, God does not maintain the analogy between domains of being; the subject does. This is very evident in the discussion of pre-established harmony in *On a Discovery*. The discipline which investigates analogous relations is now psychology, not theology. Similarly, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant explicitly criticises Leibniz’ appeal to God (1929 B293).

Ontology does not pre-exist the subject; there are no analogous relations waiting there to be discovered. Analogy is constructed as the subject constructs experience.¹³ And while there are huge similarities between Kant’s conception of the analogical relation between nature and freedom and Leibniz’ claim for the pre-established harmony of nature and grace, this is where they decisively part ways. It is the faculty psychology of the subject which ensures that analogy holds, not a supernatural principle. This is not a theory of pre-established harmony, but, in Michel Guérin’s felicitous phrase, ‘post-established harmony’ (1974 534).¹⁴ The analogous relation between the two domains of being is a product of the reflective judgment of the thinking subject. Kantian analogic ontology is created *post factum*:

> Leibnizian harmony establishes an analogy between the realm of nature and the realm of grace… Kantian thought preserves the harmony, but liberated from its theological implications. Far from analogy being expressed within a totality that is *created as harmonious*, it marks for Kant a… creation. (Guérin 1974 546)

Indeed, it seems plausible to provisionally dub this the first *atheistic* theory of analogy (Guérin 1974 543) This claim can only be provisional, for its truth would depend on a thorough analysis of the role of the appendix to the *Critique of Judgment* and the relevance of its discussions of arguments for God (for which there is no room

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¹³ If it is this that Milbank objects to, then the problem is not one of ontological grounding, but of the very idea of not being a realist.

¹⁴ Latour has coined the same phrase in (as far as I can tell) a completely unconnected context (see, for example, 1988 164).
here). However, it is still clear that Kant strips analogic ontology of its traditional, theological ground.

7. Towards an Account of the Analogical Nature of Reality as Determined

Analogy so far seems to pertain solely to the relation between the sensible and the supersensible; however, I claimed that Milbank’s definition of ‘Kantian ontology’ comprises not just this relation between domains of being, but also the relation between phenomena themselves. As I pointed out above, the role of reflective judgment in the third *Critique* is not merely to comprehend how domains of reality relate, but also to conceptualise the relationship between heterogeneous individual phenomena. They too – owing to the fundamentally analogic character of reflection – are analogously related. To the extent that individual phenomena are considered reflectively in their interrelation, therefore, Kantian ontology is still analogic.

However, such a picture is still incomplete, for there remains reality as determined. Milbank’s appeal to a Kantian metaphysics of the sublime assumes, I have suggested, the priority of reality as determined; his claim is that *determined* phenomena are univocally related to each other. There remains the possibility that determinative judgment operates without analogy. While there is no room in this essay to provide a full refutation of this claim, I do still want to suggest in conclusion that *even* when it comes to reality as determined, analogy plays a crucial part. Kant indicates this in his aptly named, Analogies of Experience.\(^{15}\)

\(^{15}\) Whether the Analogies are ‘aptly named’ is a moot point in the critical literature. Bennett, most polemically, speaks of the various labels for principles of the understanding as ‘arbitrary, undescriptive, proper names’ (1966 165). And, indeed, much ink has been spilt on how the analogies of experience operate analogically (for example, Guyer 1998 67-70, Callanan 2008). My brief concluding
While the earlier sections of the Transcendental Analytic are concerned with locating the conditions for the possibility of objects in general, the Analytic of Principles switches subject matter to deal with the conditions of possibility of particular, existent objects and ‘the co-existence of these objects in a world.’ (Guérin 1974 536) That is, it locates those conditions which pertain to knowing the actual entities that constitute a world. The Analytic of Principles treats the worldliness of experience, and as we shall see, the third analogy of experience is particularly important in this regard.

The analogies of experience identify the way in which the categories of relation (permanence, succession and co-existence) determine appearances. Any claim to the concept of analogy here hinges on the mathematical/dynamic distinction:

The principles of mathematical employment will be unconditionally necessary, that is, apodeictic. Those of dynamical employment will also indeed possess the character of a priori necessity, but only under the condition of empirical thought in some experience, therefore only mediately and indirectly. (1929 A160/B199-200)

As dynamic principles, the three analogies possess ‘merely discursive certainty’ (1929 A161/B201). They are applied to experience in an indirect manner.

The reason why the analogies lack the intuitive certainty of mathematical principles stems from their concern for the existence of objects:

These principles have the peculiarity that they are not concerned with appearances and the synthesis of their empirical intuition, but only with the existence of such appearances and their relation to one another in respect of their existence… Since existence cannot be constructed, the principles can

comments on the role of analogy in the Analogies of Experience are by no means intended to replace such commentary (especially Callanan’s rigorous and fruitful reading).
apply only to the relations of existence, and can yield only *regulative* principles. (1929 A178/B220)

Dynamic principles cannot be applied directly, because the fact that an object exists cannot be constructed in advance. In other words, dynamic principles, unlike their mathematical correlates, have to take account of the contingencies of actuality – of what is ‘only accidental’ (1929 A160/B200). Guérin makes much of this: dynamic principles, he argues, cannot apply logical categories immediately to experience, but must mediate logic through the vicissitudes of existence. The result – an *ana*-logic – is Kant’s method for coping with a world of actuality not pure concepts. The analogies of experience ensure the ‘coherence of the contingent… a genuine *post-established harmony.*’ (Guérin 1974 534)

Kant explains how analogy achieves this as follows: temporal relations between appearances must symbolise the temporal determinations of the categories of relation (which are themselves unperceivable) (1929 B218-9). By judging these representatives or symbols according to the categories of relation, every relation between existent objects – and reality as determined as a whole – is judged in this way. It is therefore through symbolism that this process occurs. The analogies of experience operate on exactly the same model as the symbol. The subject judges relations holding between existential objects as if they resembled categorical relations. This is the reason (or at least one of the reasons\(^\text{16}\)) the Analogies of Experience are named analogies.

According to Guérin, moreover, the third analogy demonstrates even more clearly Kant’s commitment to the analogic nature of reality as determined. He describes the third analogy as ‘the privileged model of analogy in general.’ (1974 543) The third analogy is, for Kant, an attempt to prove ‘the principle of community’

\(^{16}\) See footnote 15 above.
(1929 A211) – that is, to demonstrate that the co-existence of entities can only be guaranteed by taking mutual interaction or influence as a symbol of this category in appearance.

The key to the third analogy is therefore the idea of influence. Influence is a type of causality very different to the conventional efficient causality usually associated with Kant’s work (Watkins 2004). It is a reciprocal causality (reminiscent of organism in the *Critique of Judgment*) where each entity is both cause and effect. Guérin insists, furthermore, that it operates analogically. It is, he claims, ‘a symbolic causality’ (1974 542). Cause and effect remain indirectly, yet harmoniously connected. In Kant’s words, ‘Through this *commercium* the appearances, so far as they stand outside one another and yet in connection, constitute a composite.’ (1929 A215/B262) Entities remains distinct, but still influence each other. Kant gives the (rather neoplatonic) example of light: ‘The light, which plays between our eye and the celestial bodies, produces a mediate community between us and them, and thereby shows us that they coexist.’ (1929 A213/B260) Light is a third term which ensures the harmonious heterogeneity of mind and world (Guérin 1974 541). The third analogy, according to Guérin’s argument, instantiates an analogous relation between phenomena, a post-established harmony. Reality as determined is also analogic, just like reality as reflected. Analogy defines the relation between determinate phenomena, as well as the relation between reflected phenomena and the sensible/supersensible relation.

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17 Central to such a claim is Kant’s distinction between a connected and a composite community (1929 B201-2). The parts of a composite community are *not* connected together in a necessary way; their aggregation is a more contingent, mediated affair. This is precisely the type of community the third analogy is intended to establish – ‘*mediated commerce*’ (Guérin 1974 542).
Here then is the final refutation of Milbank’s challenge. It is not just that the ‘ontological’ relation of the sensible and supersensible domains is made analogous through the subject’s reflective judgment; analogy structures reality as determined as well (and the third analogy of experience makes this particularly clear). For Kant, analogy is not just ‘the essence of thought’ (Guérin 1974 544), it is the essence of reality as well.

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