Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Demougin, D ORCID: 0000-0002-1744-0390 and Fishman, A (1991) Efficient budget balancing cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring Economic Theory, 1 (4). pp. 373-383. ISSN 0938-2259, 1432-0479

Text demougin fishman 1991.pdf - Unspecified Download (515kB)

Abstract

We modify the infinitely repeated Cournot game with imperfect monitoring of Green and Porter (1984) and Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1986) to include heterogenous products and the possibility of balanced budget side payments (Holmström 1982). It is shown that a transfer mechanism which induces the efficient outcome exists under a reasonable technical assumption in contrast to the preceding authors. Intuitively, the existence of an observable random price vector rather than a single price makes it possible to identify "likely" defectors, eliminating the need for collective punishments. © 1991 Springer-Verlag.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	38 Economics, 3801 Applied Economics, 3803 Economic Theory
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	21 Apr 2016 09:50
Last Modified:	24 Jan 2026 00:42
DOI:	10.1007/BF01229315
Related Websites:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3000544
Disclaimer:	The University of Liverpool is not responsible for content contained on other websites from links within repository metadata. Please contact us if you notice anything that appears incorrect or inappropriate.