Negotiating British-Muslim Identity: Hybridity, Exclusion and Resistance

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Fatima Khan

Aug 2015
For my father

Ali ka naam sun kar ab bhi Khaibar kaamp ja ta hai
Shah-e-Mardané...
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Abstract

Since the events of 11 September 2001 Islam and Muslims have been the subject of intense scrutiny and open to pervasive institutional construction, both on a domestic and global level. Such constructions implicate the identities of British-Muslims, the *ummah* and Muslim countries. The all-encompassing nature of this institutional construction, most notably within the media, mainstream political discourses and State security measures has left little space for British-Muslims to publically express their beliefs, feeling and perceptions in an arena untainted by dominant discourse. This project strives to fill this void by rooting the research in the experiences of British-Muslim youth as narrated by themselves and their peers. This primary research study used a combined method of both focus groups and semi-structured interviews to examine the young British-Muslim views on three interrelated research questions: firstly, ‘To assess the impacts of counter-terrorism legislation and security measures on British-Muslims post 9/11’; secondly, ‘To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented since 9/11’; and, thirdly, ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.’
Introduction

Purpose, Rationale and Location

In recent world history it would be difficult to identify a group that has been more misrepresented, maligned and victimised than Muslims (Kundnani, 2009; Abbas, 2005). In the UK, fear and suspicion of Islam and its followers has been encouraged by politicians, the judiciary and media professionals alike (Mythen and Khan, 2013; Allen, 2010; Modood, 2005). The representation of the Muslim as the ‘other’, presenting a threat to ‘British values’, has permeated society, with a concomitant widespread social surveillance of Muslims - both formal and informal – which has rendered British-Muslims as a risky and suspect population. Repressive legislative provisions and State security measures introduced by successive British governments - and largely supported by social institutions - have effectively criminalised and sanctioned the targeted policing and surveillance of British-Muslims both at home and abroad, significantly impinging on their civil liberties such as the right to protest or a fair trial and in certain instances result in their arbitrary arrest and detainment.

The UK Government in particular has shown a high degree of tolerance toward the Islamophobic discourses and discriminatory practices of social institutions. Similarly, anti-Muslim sentiments have become increasingly pervasive amongst non-Muslim citizens, with significant rises in hate crime and support for anti-Muslim agendas of both far-right groups and mainstream political parties. In what has been, and is, an exceptionally difficult climate British-Muslims continue to negotiate hybridised identities that can be variously rewarding, challenging and, at times, contradictory. In this thesis it is my primary objective
to develop a rich and detailed understanding of British-Muslim identity. As a second-generation British-Muslim of Pakistani descent with a four-year-old child, the current plight and future welfare of British-Muslims is of personal as well as academic importance. Our freedom to express ourselves both religiously and culturally whilst retaining a meaningful sense of British identity that enables us to fully engage in and benefit from all aspects of civil and political society is of political and social significance. Building on and extending the core themes of my previous research concerning political marginalisation and social exclusion, this contribution focuses primarily on the construction and maintenance of British-Muslim identities. I consider this to be a natural progression in developing my extant research interests and also in furthering my academic career.

Whilst this area of research has obvious personal resonance, the subject area is also highly contentious given the threat Muslims are purported to pose to national and international security. While research into the plight of British-Muslims has, thankfully, developed in academia - albeit at a slow pace - over the last decade, a substantial study that focuses explicitly on the impacts of a post 9/11 securitised environment on the identity of Muslims has not been forthcoming. This thesis seeks to directly fill that lacuna. Given the relative paucity of research in this area exploratory qualitative inquiries are greatly needed. The topic under study, namely the construction, cohesiveness and articulation of British-Muslim hybrid identities, is an area of compelling cultural, political and social importance in the UK. By illuminating and giving voice to Muslim experiences this research contributes to knowledge about the relationship between this socio-economically challenged community and the wider non-Muslim British population that reportedly views it with increased suspicion and distrust since the events of 9/11 and 7/7. The primary empirical aspect of the thesis - a micro-level sociological study of young British-Muslims living in the North West of England - is both timely and of potential significance.
In addition to offering a theoretical advance, this research study seeks to fill a practical gap in the present literature by foregrounding the experience of British-Muslim youth. In so doing, it focuses on a number of key research areas. Firstly, the specific ways in which macro events and structural power relations impact on the life experiences of British-Muslims, in particular how they perceive and experience the representation of their fellow Muslims and their religion. Secondly, how these experiences and perceptions have impacted on their sense of Britishness and how they manage ‘hybridised’ identities in the face of polarised demands: simultaneously defined as the ‘enemy within’, whilst required to embrace and align with what are considered to be ‘core British values’. Lastly, it will explore the extent to which anti-Islamic ideology and foreign policies in the Middle East are serving to reinforce the solidity of an oppositional and progressive Muslim identity.

The findings of this research project have implications for the management of the ‘terrorist risk’ and seek to provoke further debate regarding the nature of Islam and the problems, hopes, needs and aspirations of young British-Muslims. In turn, these aspects raise issues with direct relevance to policy makers at a national level. Although acting as a critique of current governmental policies, the proposed study will also elucidate the ways in which disillusioned, marginalised communities such as British-Muslims can be socially included and re-engaged in the wider public sphere.

This thesis can be situated within the domain of research which seeks to address the ways in which post 9/11 security policies and surveillance practices have affected British-Muslims (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Spalek, 2012; Mythen et al., 2013). Within this overarching research area, this study hopes to give voice to the beliefs, perceptions and values of young British-Muslims of Pakistani heritage. This has particular resonance given the multiple exclusions and socio-economic deprivation experienced by this often misunderstood and disadvantaged group. In articulating British-Muslim experiences this thesis will help
develop knowledge about the relationship between this socio-economically challenged minority community and the wider non-Muslim population. Since the events of 9/11 and 7/7 Muslims have been subjected to intense scrutiny both in the UK and globally. As a solution to what is believed to be a failure of multiculturalism the dominant political rhetoric in the UK has focused on security and on integration, demanding that British-Muslims pledge more vociferously their allegiance to Britain. At the same time the all-encompassing nature of the construction of the Muslim ‘other’, as the antithesis of ‘Britishness’, has left little space for British-Muslims to freely express their personal and political views without appearing to support negative suppositions about them that dominant worldviews uphold. Research on discursive representation has shown how dominant social institutions commonly socially construct and stereotype the Muslim ‘other’ (Chomsky, 2002; Mythen and Walklate, 2006). Drawing on Michel Foucault (1972, 1980) these perspectives hold that particular discourses are dispersed as pervasive ‘truths’ throughout society. Although valuable in terms of insight into the operation of disciplinary power such studies do not detail how these representations affect the routine, habituated practices of Muslims nor how they impinge on or solidify individual and collective notions of identity. This is an area neglected by past research which has tended to emphasise the theoretical and, in doing so, failed to illuminate individual lived experiences and identities of those subject to such representations, that is, those at the point of the application of knowledge/power. Theoretically the thesis will primarily draw upon Foucault (1972, 1980) and Bhabha (1990, 1994). In so doing I hope to not only lay bare the connections between knowledge and power but also illumine the cultural mixing of identities in the Third Space or ‘in between’ cultural locations (Bhabha, 1990, 1994). To be clear on the theoretical contribution, rather than seeking to test explicit theories this thesis *deploys* theories in order to highlight social experiences and to develop new concepts. As such, the thesis
intends to make a rounded contribution that utilises theory, grows new concepts through the application of Grounded Theory Methodological principles (hereafter GTM) and provides an evaluation and critique of State policy. In its original form GTM advocates *extending or creating new theory* consisting of interrelated concepts rather than *testing existing theories*. Nevertheless, as its applications have evolved researchers have also used GTM to test and extend existing social theories (see Mythen, 2013). This study seeks to achieve both of these objectives. Therefore, whilst I intend to grow and develop concepts generated from participant narratives, I also wish to draw upon, apply and stretch existing theories. Thus, I will not be testing particular theories nor seeking to subject them to intense scrutiny. Rather, I will be deploying existing theories to elucidate aspects of the data whilst also offering my own conceptual contribution. A study guided by GTM does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical generalisability, but aims instead to explain and sometimes predict phenomena based on empirical data.

In addition to proposing new conceptual apparatus to illuminate micro-behavioural strategies - such as ‘chameleonomism’, cultural cherry-picking and performing the moderate Muslim - this thesis specifically contributes to the development of new knowledge through its application of the notion of ‘minority stress’ to explore the psychological impacts and coping strategies employed to counter the effects of the chronic social stigmatisation experienced by young British-Muslims. At the micro-level the impact on the psychology of individuals and communities creates a further, arguably more profound impact. This is the negative and intersectional impact of counter-terrorism discourses and policies on the perception of personal identity and social relations within and between communities of individuals.
Research Questions

The research objectives below direct the methods chosen and orient the theoretical trajectory of the thesis.

1) To assess the impacts of counter-terrorism legislation and security measures on British-Muslims post 9/11.
2) To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented since 9/11.
3) To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.

Whilst the Muslim experience is indubitably diverse, encompassing a multitude of different ethnic, cultural, national and sectarian Islamic groups, developing a broad understanding of all of these factors is essential to definitively root the research not only globally and domestically but also socially, politically and theoretically. To situate the study in an appropriate social, political, cultural and economic context the first two chapters focus on six key factors of importance in the construction and maintenance of contemporary British-Muslim identity. These are socio-economic conditions, the global-local nexus, State security strategies, the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims, stigma management and acts of resistance. The primarily grounded contextual factors encapsulated in the first three elements will be presented in Chapter One, whereas the more abstract elements that underpin the last three factors will be presented in Chapter Two. Each of the six elements has a reciprocal effect on the others and none should be assumed to take de facto precedence over others. Rather, they are constituted by social processes
and dynamics which overlap and intertwine. As such, the six factors are not only fundamental to the individual and collective formation of identity, but are also important drivers which help us understand how Muslims negotiate their self identities on an everyday basis.

Chapter One of this thesis focuses on socio-economic conditions, the global-local nexus and State security strategies that contextually ground the lived experiences of British-Muslims in order to assess how each impact on identity construction and maintenance. This chapter is presented in three parts. Firstly, it documents the broad socio-economic circumstances and the factors therein to show that material deprivation not only negatively affects life chances of Muslims in Britain in terms of employment, income and cultural status, but also impacts on self and group identity. A discussion of socio-economic factors is essential in the examination of British-Muslim identity as struggles against multiple deprivations are a common feature of everyday life for many British-Muslims. Secondly, it examines relations between Muslim countries and the West primarily mediated through Western foreign policy and the use of military force, which is a central issue which disrupts the national coherence of British-Muslim identities. It will be argued that many British-Muslims see themselves as part of the imagined Muslim community or ummah and as such may react strongly to any perceived unfair treatment of that community, particularly by their nation of birth and residence. In its consideration of the primary empirical data, it will make explicit how British political, economic and military and intervention in the affairs of Muslim countries are considered to be duplicitous and unjust and continues to undermine British-Muslims’ feelings of loyalty, belonging and the possibility of a cohesive ‘British’ identity. Lastly, it will show how the sense of exclusion felt by many British-Muslims has been exacerbated by hasty and ill-advised counter-terrorism and security measures that serve to reinforce a sense of being the ‘enemy within’.
It contends that one of the primary means of interaction between the Government and its Muslim citizens is through the prism of largely invasive counter-terrorism strategies. The chapter will outline key anti-terrorism legislation introduced since 2000 before going on to highlight how certain terminology associated with the provisions leaves a wide margin of discretionary power to the State in terms of what constitutes a terrorist offence, how specific aspects of legislation have impacted on attitudes towards British-Muslims to render all Muslims as suspect, and the counter-productivity of certain provisions which de-legitimise group identity, whilst reinforcing mistrust of the State and heighten the sense of exclusion, alienation and vilification in the very communities whose support might be invaluable in combating terrorism and securing a political solution.

Chapter Two draws from relevant literature in Sociology, Social Psychology and Cultural Studies to establish a theoretical framework within which the data discussed in the later analytical chapters will be situated and developed. It is presented in four parts. Firstly, the chapter examines ethnic, group and hybrid identities by briefly looking at definitions of ethnic identity and the negotiation of diasporic identities with particular reference to Homi Bhabha’s work. This provides a theoretical platform for Chapter Five and its analysis of micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect. Secondly, it explores the relationship between societal power structures and the institutional representation of British-Muslims, most notably through counter-terrorism legislation and State security measures, the media and mainstream political discourses using an analysis of Michel Foucault’s notions of power/knowledge, disciplinary power and the discursive creation of a docile public. This - allied to a reconfiguration of Edward Said’s Orientalism - provides the theoretical foundation for Chapter Six and its analysis of discrimination, regulation and discipline to illuminate how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented and the
impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies post 9/11. Thirdly, it will consider Erving Goffman’s work on stigma and impression management which will be applied to the data presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven to illuminate the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been cast as risky. Lastly, it addresses the paucity of research on the psychological impacts of chronic stigmatisation and coping strategies employed by British-Muslims in the face of heightened Islamophobia by extrapolating from relevant research conducted with other minority groups. To this end, it will transpose Meyer’s Minority Stress Theory from its original application to illuminate the current plight of young British-Muslims.

Whereas Chapter Three provides a theoretical understanding of GTM and its suitability to interrogate the particular research questions associated with this study, Chapter Four applies those principles to the current dataset to explicitly illuminate the evolution of the raw data into the four core emergent themes that underpin each of the four subsequent data analysis chapters. Together, they will explain how and why the initial three research questions were reformulated into three exploratory themes, each yielding a subset of exploratory questions which were developed to generate relevant data through each of the four focus group discussions. Transcriptions of the narratives generated by each of these focus group discussions were then deconstructed or ‘opened’ using and reconstructed as focused codes, to be further grouped and categorised into emergent subcategories and finally into four core emergent categories using a combination of hardcopy line-by-line coding and the application of QSR-NVivo CAQDAS.

Chapter Three provides a robust account of the methodological processes by which the data was generated and then analysed in relation to the initial research questions, which
both directed the methods chosen and orientated the theoretical trajectory of the thesis, and
as such provides a methodological foundation for the presentation and subsequent analysis
of the research data in Chapters Four through to Eight and comprises of five interlinked
parts. The first part focuses on the epistemological foundations of the study to examine the
issue of researcher subjectivity and the ways in which this may potentially enhance or
impede the study and reflects on measures to combat or augment ‘researcher effects’. In
doing so, it advocates a constructivist epistemological approach that asserts meaning does
not exist outside of consciousness simply awaiting discovery, but is instead constructed
through social interactions in grounded structural contexts. Part two therefore elaborates
the research design and justifies the use of the GTM, outlining its key tenets and its
suitability for the study of micro-level behaviours in comparison with other methods.
Whilst part three outlines the data collection strategies deployed and part four outlines the
mechanical process of data analysis. Lastly, it considers the ethical considerations that
arise in conducting a study of this type. By doing so it is intended to prime and prepare for
an overview and synopsis of the data in Chapter Four.

Despite the richness, scope and depth of the data yielding many other topics for
investigation, only the data most salient to the initial research questions will be presented
in Chapter Four. The research data is presented in four sections according to four core
emergent categories that correspond to each of the analysis Chapters Five through to Eight:
‘Ummatic (re) attachments and solidification of identity’; ‘Excluding Muslims:
discrimination, regulation and discipline’; ‘Embodied Islam: Gender, Surveillance and
Muslim Identities’; and, ‘Layers of Resistance, Ambiguity and Duality’. Each section
provides a brief narrative describing the most salient findings related to a particular core
emergent theme/category, organised according to a number of emergent subcategories and
using tables to show which themes or codes identified during the open coding stage it was
generated from and to illustrate how the core emergent category under discussion was arrived at.

Chapter Five is presented so as to correspond to two interconnected themes emerging from within the research data: the emergence and solidification of contemporary British-Muslim identity and the micro-behavioural strategies deployed by participants to maintain unspoilt hybridised identities. In doing so, it addresses research questions two and three: ‘To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11’ and ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’. Firstly, it documents the emergence of novel forms of British-Muslim identity, pinpointing the Rushdie Affair as the historical moment notions of an all-encompassing ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ British identity became insufficient to encapsulate new expressions of Muslim rights and how this itself facilitated the realignment of British-Muslims from a liberation movement based on race to one rooted more firmly in religion. Identifying the socio-political ramifications of the Rushdie Affair as the building block upon which Muslim discourses of exclusion are based and the prism through which subsequent Muslim related socio-political events came to be viewed. The chapter focuses on the dual processes of de-legitimisation of Muslim concerns and the simultaneous veneration of a Westernised worldview and the attendant resurgence in institutional Orientalism, against which the emergence of an Islamic pride identity rooted in, but not confined to, perceived social injustices against Muslims. It then goes on to uncover the core of contemporary debate on British-Muslim identity that underpins popular Islamophobic discourse, namely the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ which posits the incompatibility of all things Islamic with the West. It disassembles this argument on both a theological and experiential level. Firstly, in as much as Muslim identity remains of primary importance, most participants asserted the compatibility of
Islam with British values, most notably democracy, gender equality and civic engagement, citing examples from scriptural Islam to validate such claims. Secondly, participants’ largely successful negotiation of hybridity is in itself a rejection of the irreconcilability thesis. It will show how positive aspects of hybridity are embraced and incorporated into participants’ everyday lives and highlight the strategies used to overcome the more challenging aspects of a dual identity.

As evidenced throughout the data set and the secondary studies discussed, Chapter Six posits social exclusion exists in many forms from institutional discrimination through media representations, political discourse and repressive counter-terrorism legislation to race hate crime and the ‘White Gaze’. These factors are prevalent features which shade into and impact upon the everyday lived experience of young British-Muslims. This chapter directly addresses research question two: ‘To examine how British-Muslims have been institutionally represented post 9/11’. For the purposes of this thesis institutional representation focuses on the depiction of Islam and Muslims within counter-terrorism legislation and State security policies, the media and mainstream political discourses. Chapter One examines the construction of British-Muslims through State security policies and counter-terrorism legislation and the attendant mainstream political discourses that render British-Muslims as a suspect and risky population susceptible to radicalisation (Heath Kelley, 2012; Choudhury, 2012; Kundnani, 2009). Chapter Two indexes key empirical studies that have highlighted neo-Orientalist media representation of British-Muslims (McEnery et al., 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2011, 2002) to set them in the context of Michel Foucault’s notion of Power/knowledge (1980). Lastly, drawing on participant testimonies Chapters Six and Seven will present an analysis of Muslim representation within the context of the media, mainstream political discourses and State security measures to argue such constructions create a specific type of
knowledge about British-Muslims as a suspect group to be feared, scrutinised and contained.

After establishing how participants perceive themselves to be constructed and its impacts on their sense of self an examination of post 2001 legislative provisions is used to illuminate how counter-terror measures both create knowledge of all British-Muslim as risky and facilitates their surveillance, thereby addressing research question one: ‘To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims post 9/11’. Three integral aspects of legislation and security policy are unpacked: the construction of Muslim communities as risky through both discourses and practices associated with Prevent, the erosion of British-Muslim civil rights, and the counter-productive effects of counter-terrorism legislation. Finally, the impact of social exclusion on participants and their communities will be assessed to show how negative institutional representation affects identity and feelings of belonging and how this manifests itself in self-surveillance amongst participants.

British-Muslim interaction with wider non-Muslim society at both individual and institutional levels is of paramount importance in understanding the formation and perpetuation of the social, economic and political exclusion of British-Muslims. Building on this assertion, Chapter Seven explores the relationship between the Muslim ‘body’, in which the body is always more than the physical corporeal object, but rather a social object, focusing on sartorial choice and various forms of social exclusion experienced by participants. The same assumptions of a link between institutional discursive formations of Muslims and the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiments within non-Muslim public attitudes are furthered here. The chapter will show how the gendered nature of Islamophobia experienced by participants is built upon ingrained patriarchal assumptions prevalent within mainstream British society and mediated through the reproduction of gendered
Orientalist discourses that attribute certain qualities as inherent to Muslims and as such is pertinent to research question two: ‘To examine how British Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11.’ Chapter Seven will therefore be presented in three parts. Firstly, it will explore how the symbolic identification of Muslims through the embodiment of Islamic symbols based on sartorial choice and personal grooming preferences results in their neo-Orientalist stigmatisation. Secondly, drawing on wider empirical research it will highlight how the symbolic Muslim body is stigmatised within governed spaces such as the workplace. Lastly, it will provide a detailed analysis of gendered Islamophobia, particularly focusing on multifaceted, more nuanced impact of exclusion experienced by Muslim women.

Finally, Chapter Eight presents an analysis of the complex, multifaceted forms of resistance peculiar to the hybridised British-Muslim ‘self’ not only in response to structural factors such as Islamophobia, foreign policy or repressive counter-terrorism legislation, but as a response in part to internal factors emanating from within the ummah and the British-Muslim community. It is presented in two parts: the first examines elements of participants’ hybridised experiences they felt compelled to reject and the second explores the strategies of resistance that they employed. The first part provides an analysis of two focal points of resistance discussed across the sample: the misinterpretation or corruption of Islam and the adherence to inherited quasi-Islamic cultural practices over scriptural Islam at both familial and the community levels. Seeking to uncover new knowledge the second part of this chapter applies the notion of ‘minority stress’ to illuminate the psychological impact and coping strategies employed to counter the effects of the chronic stigmatisation experienced by British-Muslims and, as such, addresses research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatised identities which have been rendered suspect’.
Chapter one

Contextualising Muslim Identities in Britain

In order to situate the study in an appropriate social, political, cultural and economic context Chapters One and Two of the thesis will focus on six key elements that are consistently defined in the literature as important factors in the construction and maintenance of identities for Muslims in contemporary Britain. The six factors in sum are: socio-economic conditions; the global-local nexus; State security strategies; the negotiation of hybridised identities; discursive construction of Islam and Muslims; stigma management and the experience of minority stress. For the purposes of this discussion and to ensure breadth and depth are not sacrificed the primarily grounded contextual factors represented by the first three factors will be presented in Chapter One, whilst the more abstract elements that underpin the last three factors will be presented in Chapter Two. It should be stated at the outset, that each of the six elements detailed above has a reciprocal effect on the others and none should be assumed to take \textit{de facto} precedence over others. Rather, the factors are constituted by social processes and dynamics which overlap and intertwine. For instance, as Hamid (2011) argues, the socio-economic exclusion of British-Muslims, particularly those of Pakistani descent, serves to exacerbate feelings of stigma. These intertwined elements are not only fundamental to the individual and collective formation of identity, but are also important drivers which help us understand how Muslims negotiate their self-identities in everyday life. To be clear, these aspects do not impact on every Muslim equally, nor indeed are they the only significant factors. Aligning with an anti-essentialist position, it must be acknowledged that individuals interpret events through the multi-faceted prism of their own histories, biographies and experiences. Of course, the
Muslim experience is hugely diverse, encompassing a multitude of different ethnic, cultural, national and sectarian Islamic groups. Developing a broad understanding of all of these factors in the round is essential to definitively root the research not only globally and domestically but also socially, politically and theoretically. This chapter will focus tightly on three of the six elements that contextually ground the lived experiences of British-Muslims with the aim of assessing how each might impact on identity construction and maintenance.

This chapter will be presented in three parts. Firstly, it will consider the recent and present situation for Muslims in Britain by examining socio-economic indicators. In doing so, it will show that material deprivation not only negatively affects life chances in terms of employment, income and cultural status, but also impacts on self and group identity. Secondly, it will be argued that many British-Muslims have critical national and transnational allegiances and see themselves as part of the imagined Muslim community or ummah. As such, it should be recognised that many Muslims may react strongly to any perceived unfair treatment of that community wherever it may occur across the globe. In its consideration of the primary empirical data, the thesis will later demonstrate how the international military and foreign policies pursued by the UK and its allies are considered by many Muslims to be duplicitous and unjust to Muslim countries and peoples. Lastly, the chapter will examine some of the deleterious effects of the implementation of domestic anti-terrorism legislation within the UK on Muslim citizens. In conclusion, the integration/exclusion paradox will be flagged as a significant factor in eliciting frustration and disillusionment amongst British-Muslim communities.
Considering Muslims in Britain: Socio-economic Factors

The following section documents the broad socio-economic circumstances and the factors therein that have shaped the experiences and influenced the opportunities available to British-Muslims. In as much as the thesis will be drawing on aggregate data sets, it is intended here to develop an understanding at a population level rather than to examine the minutiae of socio-economic factors as they apply to individual British-Muslims. To this end, the researcher discusses what the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) refers to as 'the primary indicators of social exclusion; housing, employment and education’ (2007, p.8). A discussion of socio-economic factors is essential in the examination of British-Muslim identity. As Kabir (2010) asserts, struggles against multiple deprivations are a common feature of everyday life for many British-Muslims, particularly those living in urban settings. Furthermore, economic deprivation tends to aggravate problems associated with housing, unemployment and racism (Hamid 2011). Before examining the indicators of deprivation, it is first necessary to give an overview of the British-Muslim population and to briefly trace the migration and settlement of Muslims in the UK.

The UK 2011 Census identified Islam as the second largest faith in England and Wales, after Christianity and those affiliating with ‘no religion’, with 2.7 million people (5 percent) of the population. This represents an increase of 1.2 million since the 2001 Census when 1.5 million people stated they were Muslim, with Islam now the fastest growing religion in Britain. Within this increase, four in ten British-Muslims (38 percent) reported their ethnicity as Pakistani, which represents a 4.5 percent decrease since the 2001 Census. Despite this, there are an estimated 1,029,000 Muslims of Pakistani heritage living in the UK, which represents an increase of 371,000 since 2001. Of all religious groups in the UK, Muslims have the youngest age profile; 290,000 British-Muslims are in the 9-14 years age
band, whilst 48 percent of the UK Muslim population is under 25 years (Ali, 2013). Many demographic commentators such as Gest (2010) believe that this growth will continue across Europe, with the number of Muslims in Europe expected to double between 2015 and 2020.

Despite the common conceptualisation of ‘Muslim’ as a homogenous category, Ali (2013) cites 2011 Census statistics which show British-Muslims as a multi-ethnic community. A significant proportion of this group are of Asian origin (68 percent), whilst a further 10 percent are of Black African or Caribbean origin, 6 percent are Arab and 10 percent are categorised as ‘Other’.

Adding to this cultural diversity are an estimated 100,000 White converts (BBC News UK, 2011). Ansari (2004, p.192) charts three main waves of Muslim arrivals to Britain that help explain this diverse composition. He concludes that, aside from religion, there is no common cultural denominator: ‘British-Muslims originate from all over the world, speak many languages, and form many social layers’. He goes to note, that there has been a Muslim presence in Britain since the early nineteenth century when Muslim seamen began to settle in and around major UK ports. The major growth of the Muslim population can be traced to the post-war immigration from the Indian sub-continent to fulfil the labour demands that had arisen in the North-West, Yorkshire and the Midlands. Apart from London, these regions remain the areas where Muslim populations are concentrated in the UK (Hamid, 2011).

A report by the DCLG (2009) notes most Pakistani economic migrants originate from Northern Punjab regions where towns and villages were submerged by the waters of the Mangla Dam. These initial migrants aided the subsequent arrival of friends and family, mostly single men, under the ‘voucher system’ during the 1960s. In the 1970s and 1980s

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1 Many Muslims’ countries of origin correspond directly to occupied territories during colonialism. For instance, Pakistanis settled in the UK, Moroccans in Spain and Indonesians in the Netherlands (Gest, 2010).
these men were joined by their families and dearly held dreams of earning money to repatriate vanished as their children were born and raised in the UK as British-Muslims.\(^2\) Aside from rural economic migrants from Pakistan during the 1960s, a considerable number of Pakistanis also arrived from urban areas as the UK recruited professionals including qualified teachers, doctors, and engineers (Richardson and Wood, 2004).

Having provided a brief account of the British-Muslim population and an overview of patterns of Muslim migration to the UK we are now in a position to consider the present day situation of Muslims in the UK by examining the most important indicators of deprivation; beginning with unsuitable housing in deprived areas before moving on to education and employment respectively. In organising the data this way, it illuminates the life experience from childhood into adulthood for many Muslim living in the UK. This section will highlight the multiple deprivations suffered by British-Muslims, throughout their lives, with each factor influencing the others resulting in entire lives lived on the periphery of society.

As the empirical dimensions of the study focuses on the experiences, perceptions and values of British-Muslims of Pakistani descent, it is worth focussing attention on their distinct history. A Runnymede Trust analysis (2013) of 2011 Census figures reveals one in three people of Pakistani descent in England and Wales live in ‘deprived neighbourhoods’\(^3\) - as defined by the Chartered Institute of Housing and Joseph Rowntree Foundation report (2008) - compared to one in ten white Britons. These averages however mask regional variances; with almost 50 percent of those with a Pakistani ethnic origin in the Midlands and North of England living in deprived neighbourhoods, compared to only 4 and 8

\(^2\) Commonwealth Immigration Act 1962, introduced the first entry restrictions on British Commonwealth citizens in the form of ‘work vouchers’ as a primary means of immigration (DCLG, 2009).

\(^3\) Deprived neighbourhoods are defined as areas with a high turnover in tenancy, lower social networks and social cohesion due to problems of crime and safety (2008, p.11).
percent of those living in the South and London. This variance is pertinent to the current study given the sample was recruited from North-Western towns. Becares et al. (2012) report living in deprived neighbourhoods is associated with poor physical and mental health and higher experiences of racial discrimination. In addition to Muslims residing in the most deprived areas of the UK, a Race Equality Foundation commissioned report (2013) comparing tenure across ethnic groups between 1991 and 2011 found those of Pakistani descent suffered the highest decrease in levels of home ownership (-18 percent), whilst their reliance on rented accommodation in both private rented and social housing sectors showed the highest increase. A Shelter (2013) analysis to determine the impact of private renting on family life refers to the persistent suggestion that ethnic minorities prefer rented housing due to the freedom this form of tenure affords. However, this myth is debunked by a report commissioned by the Chartered Institute for Housing and Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2008), who report a preference for home ownership across all ethnic groups and found financial limitations to be the primary reason for any lack of home ownership. Albanese (2013) writing for the Shelter Policy blog goes on to claim the transience associated with the private rented sector is expensive and has a negative impact on children’s education and well-being. The Race Equality Report (2013) echoes such concerns; citing the transient nature of private renting coupled with inadequate regulation of landlords, poor maintenance standards and unpredictable rent increases. British Pakistani reliance on social renting also has its disadvantages. A report by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation investigating poverty, ethnicity and education, states residing in social housing is a ‘key indicator of overall poverty’ and that half of all children who grow up in social housing go on to live in social housing as adults (2011, p.19). To exacerbate these circumstances, an Open Society Foundation report (2009, p.139) found 42 percent of Muslim children live in overcrowded housing, compared to 12 percent of their white
counterparts; whilst 46 percent of Muslim children live in ‘non-decent’ homes. An analysis
of the 2001 Census by Peach (2006) reported the prevalence of overcrowding amongst
British-Muslims of Pakistani descent, something that the Open Society Foundation
findings show remains a persistent and unresolved issue.

Similarly to overcrowding, homelessness amongst Muslims is becoming more
prevalent. A 2004 Shelter report warned acute overcrowding in Muslim households leads
to individuals without permanent homes ‘sofa surfing’ with various extended family
members as an alternative to being street homeless. 2011 statistics cited by The Poverty
Site (2011) show ‘sofa surfing’ has translated into street homelessness, with 6 percent of
all persons assessed as street homeless identifying as Pakistani or Bangladeshi. The
National Zakat Foundation (2014) assert homeless particularly affects Muslim women to
the extent they, in collaboration with St. Mungo’s (2012), have launched homeless shelters
for Muslim women in London, Birmingham and Manchester.

Thus, while Muslims as a homogenous group are economically disadvantaged
relative to the net British population, British-Muslims of Pakistani descent
disproportionately live and raise families in deprived areas in mostly social housing linked
to conditions of poverty or privately rented housing plagued by its temporary nature and
subject to unexpected rent rises and inadequate regulation of both landlords and living
conditions. Furthermore, persistent overcrowding has led to increased homelessness
amongst Muslims to the extent public and voluntary sector resources have been deployed
to combat the problem. Following on from this, the next section will now turn to the
educational achievement of British-Muslims of Pakistani descent in comparison to the
general population.
Historically speaking, children of Pakistani heritage have fared significantly worse than other ethnicities in the education system. This has largely been attributed to poverty, social exclusion and English being a second language. However educational attainment amongst those of Pakistani heritage has considerably improved over recent years. As Department for Education figures (2014) show; whereas in 1991 26 percent of students of Pakistani heritage gained five or more GCSEs, compared with 37 percent for the student population as a whole, this gap has steadily decreased with 83.6 percent of those of Pakistani heritage gaining five or more GCSEs in 2013, compared to 82.9 percent of all other students. Shah, Dwyer and Modood (2010), attribute this significant change to the notion of ‘ethnic capital’, which they define as a ‘triad of factors … familial adult-child relationships, transmission of aspirations and attitudes…that can facilitate educational achievement’ (2010, p.1112). They also note a cultural shift in attitudes with Pakistani communities regarding the education of girls and young women. They argue familial encouragement of girls in particular has helped improve educational attainment of Pakistani children. While this is undoubtedly a positive sign, ‘ethnic capital’ loses its influence as educational mobility is affected by external forces such as discriminatory practices of university admissions or prohibitive financial costs of higher education for those from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. As Shah, Dwyer and Modood (2010) note, the effects of ‘ethnic capital’ diminish once working class Pakistani families are required to mobilise the required economic capital for education to continue or fail to make advantageous strategic decisions for their children due to a lack of social capital.

Discrimination in both accessing and participating in higher education has been well documented. A study conducted by Modood (2006), based on a random sample of 1000 candidates from each of the main ethnic groups in the UK, provided robust evidence of bias against ethnic minority candidates within the pre-1992 universities. For example,
whilst the probability of a white candidate receiving an initial offer was 75 percent, for someone of Pakistani heritage with equivalent qualifications the probability dropped to 57 percent (2006, p.249). Unfortunately, recent research shows this trend shows little signs of abating. Boliver (2013), in an analysis of admissions to the twenty universities affiliated to the Russell Group during the period September 1996 to June 2012, reported applicants with the same A-level grades were found to be equally likely to apply to Russell Group universities regardless of their ethnic background, however those from Pakistani, Bangladeshi or Black backgrounds were shown to be significantly less likely than white applicants to be offered a place despite attaining the same A-level grades. Not only are students of Pakistani heritage less likely to gain entry to prestigious universities, but as a report by the Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion (2010) detailed, students from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black backgrounds were awarded a higher proportion of lower second class degrees and were over represented within university dropout rates. Given the improved educational attainment of those of Pakistani heritage enabling them to meet university academic entry requirements and having arguably overcome greater socio-economic barriers than most of their white counterparts, economic deprivation and discriminatory practices continue to prevent many of them from achieving their full academic potential. Therefore, despite the positive effects of ‘ethnic capital’, structural discriminations persist into the labour market and continue to impinge on the life chances of young British-Muslims of Pakistani descent. This is termed ‘ethnic penalty’ by Ford

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4 This trend does not apply to the ‘new’ or post-1992 universities.
5 Members of the Russell Group between September 1996 and June 2012 and analysed in this study were: University of Birmingham; University of Bristol; University of Cambridge; Cardiff University; University of Edinburgh; University of Glasgow; Imperial College London; King’s College London; University of Leeds; University of Liverpool; London School of Economics & Political Science; University of Manchester; Newcastle University; University of Nottingham; University of Oxford; Queen’s University Belfast; University of Sheffield; University of Southampton; University College London and the University of Warwick.
(2014), a phenomenon he describes as racial discrimination in the labour market which is related to a range of poor outcomes in employment and education.

Although improved academic achievement among British-Muslims has undoubtedly occurred, this has yet to translate into improved social mobility in relation to housing, employment or wealth. The 2011 Census statistics show the groups with the lowest economic activity were Christians and Muslims. However, whereas Christian non-participation in the labour force may in part be due to an older age profile, Muslims non-participation persists despite a markedly younger age profile, with Muslims having the youngest age profile of all religious groups. Of those eligible for work, 31 percent were ‘looking after home or family’, whilst 30 percent were ‘students’ (Office for National Statistics, 2013, p.12). Whilst further official figures show that 57 percent of working men of Pakistani descent were in low skilled jobs, whereas 60 percent of women of Pakistani descent did not work at all. Of those who did work, women of Pakistani descent represented the highest proportion of those working less than 15 hours a week. According to London's Poverty Profile (2014) those Muslims who are economically active earn less on average than other groups. For example, a comparative study of Londoners’ wages by religion found 40 percent of Muslims earned less than the living wage, compared to 15 percent of white Britons. ONS figures (2014) found nearly a quarter of working age Pakistani households to be workless and predictably goes on to categorise 60 percent of such households as ‘low-income’. Low-income is strongly linked to poverty as shown by the Millennium Cohort Study (2010), commissioned by the University of London's Centre for Longitudinal Studies, which was based on tracking the lives of children born between 2000 and 2002. The study found almost three-quarters of children of Pakistani descent living in the UK are being brought up in families living on poverty level incomes.
A full discussion of the effects of poverty is beyond the remit of this thesis, however an overview of the implications of poverty indices is important to enhance understanding of the range of factors that have historically affected the community under discussion in this study. Utilising the Social Exclusion Unit’s definition of social exclusion, this section has shown the particular factors through and by which British-Muslims are socially excluded. The Department for Communities and Local Government define social exclusion as ‘a shorthand label for what can happen when individuals or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health …’ (DCLG, 2007, p.13). Whilst the Social Exclusion Unit was established as an initiative to tackle social exclusion at its roots by the last Labour Government under Tony Blair, it was also, ironically, the same Government which significantly added to the social problems experienced by British-Muslims of Pakistani descent, and Muslims in general by the introduction of rash counter-terrorism measures that resulted in the over policing of Muslim communities and exacerbated stigmatisation against Muslims, as we shall see in the later analytical chapters. However, before a fuller analysis of counter-terrorism legislation is provided, the next section will discuss how British-Muslims are set apart and ‘othered’ from wider society and how their sense of British belonging continues to be undermined by institutional discourses, State security measures and military intervention.

The Global–Local Nexus

The second part of this chapter will centre on relations between Muslim countries and the West. This discussion is crucial as it is a central issue in the compromising of British-Muslims being able to build a coherent British self. These relations are primarily mediated through Western foreign policy, particularly the use of military force, creating a
conflict at the very core of British-Muslim identities. This clash revolves around the ummah and the belief that their imagined Muslim community is being attacked by their nation of birth and residence. However, before detailing the principle matters of contention surrounding Western foreign policy, it will make explicit how British intervention in the affairs of Muslim countries continues to undermine British-Muslim feelings of loyalty, belonging and the possibility of a cohesive ‘British’ identity. To render concrete this assertion it will look at various sources that have identified this ‘push-pull’ between national and transnational allegiance felt by British-Muslims, specifically citing Home Office sponsored initiatives, intelligence agency testimony and British-Muslim opinion as evidenced in various empirical studies. All of which are set against a backdrop of unequivocal institutional denial of any link between foreign policy and legitimate feelings of anger towards, and estrangement from, Britain and Britishness.

As Hamid (2011) notes, British-Muslims have witnessed what is perceived to be the systematic oppression of the ummah and increasing numbers of Muslim casualties as a result of British foreign policy. This applies both in terms of passive inaction such as in the case of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Muslim persecution in Chechnya and Kosovo and active intervention overseas such as the ‘War on Terror’, and in particular the Western military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq and human rights violations associated with Guantanamo Bay. Perhaps of most crucial concern from a British-Muslim perspective is the continued Western ‘moral’, financial and military support for the Israeli State at the expense of Palestinians that has resulted in the diminution of Palestinian territory to 12 percent of its original landmass, whilst the West has simultaneously presided over successive failed peace negotiations (Zunes, 2002).

The public outcry against the invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be seen as the trigger for recent vocal British-Muslim dissent against British foreign policy, channeling much of the
frustration felt towards the Government through peaceful protest and galvanising Muslims of all backgrounds to assert a louder, more unified voice (Rai, 2006; Abbas, 2005). In response, the Government initiated the narrative that persists today, the unequivocal denial of any causal link between British foreign policy in Iraq and British-Muslim alienation, anger and frustration. This discourse was re-asserted ever more forcefully after the London suicide bombings in July 2005.

Shortly after the London bombings, seven community-led working groups were set up under the banner of 'Preventing Extremism Together' (PET) to develop practical solutions for tackling ‘home-grown’ violent extremism. Amongst other recommendations the government commissioned report (2005), advised ‘the responsibility for tackling extremism and radicalisation … was the responsibility of society as a whole’. All parties were united in their assertion the solution lay in tackling long standing problems such as deprivation, discrimination and inequality experienced by British-Muslims and ‘inconsistent Government policy, particularly foreign policy’ (2005, p.3). To this end they stressed the need for a public inquiry into the attacks, which they felt would be ‘instrumental in understanding and learning from what has happened in order to prevent its reoccurrence’ (2005, p.4). However according to Brighton (2007), before the PET report had been published, the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair in a press conference from August 2005, proposed a strong connection between lack of integration and violent extremist thought, citing ‘better integration of those parts of the community inadequately integrated’ (2005, p.7), thereby seemingly invalidating the need for a public inquiry before the recommendations were published. Furthermore, any potential connection between foreign

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6 The participants represented an informed and varied cross-section of the British Muslim community with experience in community work, Labour Party political activity, the business sector, race and religious discrimination legislation, research and the media.
policy, particularly the illegal invasion of Iraq, and the London suicide bombings was repeatedly and vociferously denied by the Government (Milne, 2005).

Official narrative was reinforced through legal provisions when the counter-terrorism initiative, Contest, was launched in April 2007. Whilst the next section discusses in some detail the impact of these provisions on the UK Muslim population, it is sufficient for now to suggest that institutional denials of foreign policy impacts are connected to claims made regarding the ideational aspects of the ‘process of radicalisation’. Before contesting such claims, this discussion argues that much of what is captured under this questionable umbrella is better described as ‘alienation’ and ‘estrangement’ from dominant notions of Britishness and is often better captured as expression of legitimate political protest. Defining such practices as ‘radicalisation’ is symptomatic of the clumsy usage of institutional and legislative discourses which have served to undermine and delegitimise widely held beliefs amongst British-Muslims.

Whilst the Contest strategy as detailed in the HM Govt.'s ‘Countering international terrorism: The United Kingdom's strategy’ (2006), cites a range of radicalising factors such as ‘a sense of grievance and injustice’ based on ‘highly negative and partial’ interpretations of the historical relations between Islam and the West, ‘a sense of personal alienation or community disadvantage arising from socio-economic factors such as discrimination, social exclusion, and lack of opportunity’, and ‘exposure to radical ideas’ (2006, p.10), it fails to recognise the deeply held belief among Muslims cited within the strategy itself that Islam is ‘facing an active, sustained, and long-term attack’ from the West based on ‘a long history of injustices and grievances’ (2006, p.8). Although this cannot justify the use of terror, the Government’s dismissal of radicalisation as the product of ‘perceived’ grievances based on ‘Islamist’ ideological prejudices (2006, p.9) epitomises its refusal to acknowledge complicity in, and therefore legitimacy of, Muslim anger; merely serving to
undermine its credibility and compound the sense of social alienation and political
disenfranchisement felt by many Muslims.

Kundnani (2009) notes the community engagement programme under the ‘Prevent’
strand differed greatly to what the PET taskforce had recommended. Rather than tackling
inequalities and aspects of British foreign policy profoundly affecting British-Muslim
communities, it addressed what is seen to be a ‘pernicious ideology spread by a small
minority of Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007, p.5), thereby firmly locating the problem with the
British-Muslim population en bloc and rendering that community ‘risky’ on the grounds of
its perceived susceptibility to extremist ideology. The British State has regrettably upheld
this discourse, continually reasserting the risk of a pervasive radicalisation among British-
Muslims. Current Conservative Chief Whip, Michael Gove, for instance, wrote, ‘instead,
in a curious inversion, the energy that should be devoted to analysing and combating a
totalitarian challenge is directed towards those campaigning against those who dare to take
the threat seriously’ (2006, p.3). These sentiments were later echoed by Prime Minister
David Cameron, speaking at the Munich Security Conference (February, 2011), when he
stated: ‘we need to be absolutely clear on where the origins of these terrorist attacks lie -
and that is the existence of an ideology, Islamist extremism’. Similarly, the Mayor of
London, Boris Johnson, insisted the morning after the murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich
that ‘it would be wrong to try to draw any link between this murder and British foreign
policy’ (Milne, 2013). Such comments illustrate how debate on the root causes of terrorism
has been delimited, with the political establishment remaining committed to notions of
insufficient integration with ‘British values’, the threat and management of Islamism, the
pervasive effects of extremist ideology on a susceptible Muslim community, and the
consequences for a unified British identity. As Hasan (2013) notes, ‘our leaders zealously
police the parameters of the debate, pre-emptively warning off those who connect the dots between the wars abroad and terror at home’.

Despite this blanket denial of the link between terrorism and British foreign policy by successive Governments, the thesis looks to other sources to disentangle an issue which is of central importance to the ruptured sense of Britishness at the very core of the identity conflict amongst British-Muslims. Whilst a Whitehall Joint Intelligence Committee report (Norton-Taylor and White, 2003) warned that ‘al-Qaida and associated groups continue to represent by far the greatest threat to western interests, it asserted that threat would be heightened by taking military action against Iraq’. Similarly, the former head of MI5, Elisa Manningham-Buller, acknowledged during The Chilcot Inquiry that the war in Iraq had given fresh impetus to the radicalisation of British-Muslims and went on to state the MI5 budget for combating ‘home-grown’ terrorism post-Iraq invasion had been doubled (Norton-Taylor, 2010). This indicated that the then Labour Government’s covertly accepted the negative impacts of the Iraq, whilst continuing to publically deny any link. With regards to support for Israeli oppression of Palestinians, Furedi (2009) notes, Government officials and MI5 make direct causal links between Israeli foreign policy with British-Muslim anger and increased radicalisation, citing the then Labour Government’s Counter-terrorism Minister’s assertion, ‘the business in Gaza has not helped us in our counter-radicalism strategy … key people in the Muslim community … let us know there is an issue that is causing worry’ (Lord West cited in Furedi, 2009). Indeed Lord West’s assertions were validated by an open letter to Gordon Brown,⁷ which expressed anger amongst British-Muslims that had reached ‘acute levels of intensity’.

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⁷ Among the signatories are Dr Usama Hasan, imam of Al-Tawhid mosque, London, Dilwar Hussain, head of the policy research centre at the Islamic Foundation, Zareen Roohi Ahmed from the British Muslim Forum and Ed Husain, co-director of the anti-extremism think tank the Quilliam Foundation.
As Saggar (2009) observes, attitudinal surveys repeatedly reveal a deeply held resentment toward British and Western foreign policy among British-Muslims reaching a climax in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, and as such represents the most revealing data for this study. For instance, a major independent survey conducted in the Alum Rock area of Birmingham found that 85 percent felt US/UK foreign policy had made everyday life for British-Muslims harder and 94 percent were negative about US foreign policy whilst 51 percent thought the UK and US were the biggest threat to world security (British Born Muslims, 2009). Much research examining young British-Muslim opinions on British foreign policy consistently report a tangible link between British support for the ‘War on Terror’, the Israeli regime’s often brutal treatment of Palestinians and the sense of alienation and unjust victimisation of Muslims amongst the UK Muslim population. A Labour Government commissioned task force, headed by Sadiq Khan MP, canvassed Muslim opinion across the UK in the aftermath of the 2007 London suicide bombings via the ICM Muslims Poll-February 2006. The poll found the single greatest objection to the British State to be its foreign policy objectives in the Middle East, with 80 percent of Muslims calling for the immediate military withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq (ICM Unlimited, 2006). As well as such quantitative data, many qualitative studies support such findings. For example, Mythen et al (2009), in a study of young British-Muslims living in the North-West of England, found Muslim disillusionment with the wider political system, foreign policy (in the Middle East) and global affairs, concluding that ‘disenchantment is shaded into and layered over by feelings of powerlessness and disconnection’ (2009, p.746). It would seem that the prevalence of resentment, anger and alienation amongst British-Muslims was at its peak in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq and despite the recent military withdrawal such feelings remain. In particular, British and American passive complicity in the Israeli State’s continued oppressive policies against the
Palestinians, such as its regular and prolonged devastating military assaults on Palestinian territories to keep them perpetually on the brink of collapse (Chomsky, 2014; Stratton, 2009; Nahdi, 2003), continues to feed impassioned solidarity with Palestinian Muslims and perpetuate feelings of resentment and alienation within the British-Muslim consciousness. This awareness of British complicity is facilitated by new media sources, particularly that of the ‘al-Jazeera effect’ (Seib, 2008) which offers immediate, uncensored and graphic details and opinion of British foreign policy impact.

This discussion has described a feeling of injustice amongst some British-Muslims who perceive the ummah to be unfairly targeted by the foreign policy interests of Britain and its allies and the particular use of military intervention and Western instigated economic sanctions against Muslim countries; however the salient issue is whether this can actually be shown to be the case. To explore the validity of this assertion the crux of contemporary relations between the West and the Muslim world will now be discussed, namely the ‘War on Terror’. It is first necessary however to examine the definition of ‘terrorism’ being applied, as when assessed against Chomsky's notion of ‘universality’ the legitimacy of Western responses to so-called Islamic terrorism is undermined (2002, p.70). Chomsky specifies if we adopt the principle of universality it follows that: if an action is right (or wrong) for others then it is right (or wrong) for us. The New York attacks in September 2001 reignited America’s quest to obliterate State-backed international terrorism. Using emotive language and attempting to manipulate public grief, the then President, George W. Bush promised both vengeance and a ‘War on Terror’ which would

8 The ‘War on Terror’ was replaced with the name ‘oversees contingency operation’ in 2009 (Wilson, S. & Kamen, A., 2009).
9 The ‘War on Terror’ was not declared by George W. Bush on 9/11, but by the Reagan administration twenty years earlier. The administration came into office declaring that their foreign policy would confront what Reagan called “the evil scourge of terrorism”. The main focus was Central America and the Middle East, but it also involved southern Africa and South-East Asia and beyond.
‘… not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and
defeated’ (Bush, 2001). The open-ended nature of Bush’s ‘crusade’ became a reality with
long lasting consequences. Over a decade after the initial allied military action in
Afghanistan in 2001, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and military incursions and ongoing
drone attacks in Pakistan, the Obama Administration continues to preside over military
interventions in Muslim countries such as the present day airstrikes against ISIS which not
only threaten but result in increasing Muslim civilian casualties and fatalities. The wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan have generated a huge death toll with estimates putting the death
count in Iraq and Afghanistan as 149,586 and 21,000 respectively. Moreover, Professor of
International Affairs at Harvard University, Stephen M. Walt (2009) argues ‘a reasonable
upper bound for Muslim fatalities as a result of Western policies, over the last thirty years
is in excess of 1 million’. In this light, it appears Muslim civilian deaths do not hold the
same value as Western civilian deaths. It is clear universality is not a consideration in
Western foreign policy initiatives and it is such duplicity that is the source of British-
Muslim anger (Zunes, 2002).

Muslim civilian fatalities are of central concern for most British-Muslims. In an
open letter to the Prime Minister, a number of signatories explained how British foreign
policy is putting civilians at increasing risk both in the UK and abroad, urging the
Government to instigate changes that demonstrate the value Britain places on the lives of
civilians (BBC News UK, 2006). Sadiq Khan, one of the three Muslim MPs who signed
the letter,\textsuperscript{10} has repeatedly spoken of how British foreign policy is seen by many people as
unjust. This sense of British foreign policy resulting in the unjust oppression and
indiscriminate deaths of Muslim civilians lies at the heart of British-Muslims anger and
frustrations. Whilst a full analysis of accusations of double standards and duplicity inherent

\textsuperscript{10} The letter, signed by three Muslim MPs, three peers and 38 Muslim organisations.
within British and Western foreign policy is beyond the scope of this discussion, it is pertinent here to highlight the failure of British and American governments to apply the notion of ‘universality’. The legitimacy of the ‘War on Terror’ is undermined by the intensity and duration of its associated military campaigns that have resulted in such catastrophic civilian fatalities in Afghanistan, Iraq and other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, as detailed above. The range and magnitude of American State terror\textsuperscript{11} after the Second World War is well documented\textsuperscript{12} (Chomsky, 2002; Herman and Petersen, 2001), and as such this duplicity hugely problematic for British-Muslims.

As has been shown, much evidence exists to support claims that British and Western foreign policy in some respects indeed appears duplicitous and shows, as Chomsky reasons, ‘those who are not powerful or do not conform to the beliefs of the powerful are not part of the ‘global community’, in the same way as ‘terrorism’ means terrorism directed against us and our friends’ (2002, p.75).

In summary, despite the blanket denials of successive British Governments, the often unjust and disproportionate suffering of the ummah as a consequence of British and Western foreign policy continues to elicit strong feelings of anger and resentment amongst British-Muslims which are not indexed to perceptions but are rooted in historical fact.

\textbf{Security Policy and Counter-Terrorism Legislation}

Thus far the discussion has shown Muslims living in Britain face considerable socio-economic disadvantage and has made explicit the connection between British foreign

\textsuperscript{11} As classified by its own definition set by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (1984) is as follows: ‘The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to attain goals that are political religious or ideological in nature … through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear’ (Chomsky 2002).

\textsuperscript{12} Herman and Peterson (2001, p.1) note that since the 1950’s America and its allies have been heavily ‘engaged in terrorism and has sponsored, underwritten and protected other terrorist states.’
policy, and that of its allies, and its impact on British-Muslim identities where national allegiances clash with *ummati*c loyalties to the Muslim global community. This sense of exclusion has been exacerbated over the past decade by hasty and ill-advised counter-terrorism and security measures that serve to reinforce a sense of being the ‘enemy within’ for many Muslims (Economic and Social Science Research Council, 2011, p.3). The following section contends that one of the primary means of interaction between the Government and its Muslim citizens is through the prism of largely invasive counter-terrorism strategies. It will begin by outlining key anti-terror legislation introduced since 2000 before going on to highlight how certain terminology associated with the provisions left open to interpretation leaves a wide margin of discretionary power to the State in terms of what constitutes a terrorist offence. It will then go on to examine specific aspects of legislation that have impacted on attitudes towards British-Muslims. In particular, it will be argued that the Prevent strand of the Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST), imagines the Muslim population to be suspect and seeks to engineer a de-politicised, docile State-sanctioned Islam. Further, at a micro-level, the counter-productivity of certain provisions to the Government’s overall security aims in that they serve only to de-legitimise group identity, heightening the sense of exclusion, alienation and vilification among Muslims, whilst reinforcing mistrust and suspicions of State institutions and security measures. This counter-productivity is further supported by historical comparison with counter-terrorism initiatives in Northern Ireland. It will be shown that much of the recently introduced counter-terrorism and security measures have, in some form or another, previously been applied to Northern Ireland with little, if any, success and served merely to alienate the very communities whose support might have been invaluable in combating terrorism and securing a political solution. Whilst the development of such measures in the interests of public safety is understandable, it is widely argued the British Government has gone
beyond self-protection to the detriment of British-Muslim civil rights and liberties (McCulloch and Pickering, 2005; Kramer and Kowski, 2005).

Before assessing the impact of counter-terrorism and security measures on British-Muslims it is first necessary to outline some of the key legislative provisions introduced since 2000. The existing legislation was substantially strengthened under the last Labour Government, with the introduction of five main legislative acts between 2000 and 2008: the Terrorism Act 2000; the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001; the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005; the Terrorism Act 2006; and, the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. These have since been added to by the present day coalition Government with the subsequent introduction of the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010; the revision to the Terrorism Act 2000 with (Remedial) Order 2011, and the imminent introduction of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2014-15 still awaiting royal accent. Of this legislation only those provisions most likely to affect the everyday lives of British-Muslims will be discussed.

Under the Terrorism Act 2000 the definition of ‘terrorism’ was widened to include any ‘political, religious or ideological’ cause that uses or threatens violence against people or property (Terrorism Act 2000 (S1 (1)b and c). It introduced the notion of ‘inciting terrorism’ as an offence and enhanced police powers to include authorisation to detain suspects for up to seven days without charge and to ‘stop and search’ a person or vehicle ‘where there is reasonable suspicion that the person is a terrorist’ under Section 44 of the Act (Open Society Foundations, 2012, p.13), although the latter was retracted in 2010. Whilst the subsequent Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 initially enabled the Home Secretary to indefinitely detain foreign nationals suspected of terrorism without charge or trial, this was eventually rescinded in favour of control orders under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. This allowed the restriction of the activities of those
suspected of ‘involvement in terrorist-related activity’ where there was insufficient evidence to charge (HM Govt., 2012). The Terrorism Act 2006 introduced ‘direct or indirect encouragement of terrorism’ as a criminal act, which encompasses the concept ‘glorification of terrorism’ (Hanman, 2009). Lastly, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2014-15 will introduce enhanced powers to tackle online extremist material and a statutory duty for named organisations such as colleges, universities, the police and probation services to help deter radicalisation with punitive measures put in place to enforce compliance.

Whilst some of these provisions may be necessary, many are considered to be overbroad, in that they disproportionately affect the Muslim population and effectively undermine many of their civil rights and liberties. Aspects of these provisions that are of particular relevance to this thesis will first be discussed, before providing an examination of the ideation associated with the Prevent strand of the Contest strategy which has a particularly pervasive impact on the everyday lives of British-Muslims. It will begin by describing the Stop and Search authorisations contained under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000, despite its retraction following a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 2010 that it was unlawful on the grounds it violated the right to respect for private life and its application too broad thereby failing to provide safeguards against abuse. ‘Stop and Search’ authorisations continue to retain significance for many participants within this study who were directly or indirectly affected by them whilst they were in operation, some of whom were unaware they had been rescinded. As an Open Society Foundations report (2012) shows, they were used to carry out over half a million stops between February 2001 and July 2010 (2012, p.14).

Having provided a brief overview of some of the key legislative components of British anti-terrorism legislation the discussion will now turn to index the implication of
some of the key terms used within the provisions, specifically: ‘terrorism’, ‘encouragement’ ‘glorification’ and ‘radicalisation’.

The principle focus of a recent Government commissioned report in July 2014 by David Anderson Q.C., the UK Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, was the overbroad definition of ‘terrorism’ within current anti-terror legislation that allows its application beyond the confines of combating terrorism. As he notes, the UK boasts the most extensive anti-terrorism laws in the Western world and as such their application should be confined to their ‘proper purpose’ (2014, p.1). He acknowledges there has been a ‘degree of creep’ (2014, p.1) which needs to be curtailed, advocating ‘terrorism’ should be re-defined to limit the scope of its application and deeming the notions of ‘terrorist activity’ and ‘terrorism-related activity’ as unnecessary (2014, p.3). He illustrates the point by highlighting how ‘a family member who supports someone who encourages someone else to prepare an act of terrorism’ (2014, p.4) could be successfully prosecuted under current legislation. To this already extensive range of powers afforded by an overly broad definition of terrorism can be added the offence of ‘encouragement of terrorism’.\textsuperscript{13} As Finch (2005) notes, it is no longer necessary to demonstrate the intention to encourage or glorify terrorism, but merely to prove there are reasonable grounds to believe an individual understood their statement was a direct or indirect encouragement to terrorism. As Finch asserts:

Once the necessity to prove intent is removed, criminal law offences no longer possess the clarity and precision needed to ensure that individuals understand what the law demands of them (2005, p.2).

\textsuperscript{13} Encouragement of terrorism is by defined the Government as ‘any expression of a view that armed resistance to a brutal and repressive anti-democratic regime might in certain circumstances be justifiable’. (Joint committee on Human Rights 2005-6, p.13).
Given that the notions of ‘encouragement’ and ‘glorification’ are open to interpretation anyone wishing to express what might normally have been seen as acceptable, legitimate personal opinion or political statements is left unsure as to the legality of their comments. The Home Secretary justified its scope on the basis that ‘there is nowhere in the world today that violence can be justified as a means of political change’ (Joint Human Rights Committee, 2005-6, p.13). This claim, whilst laudable raises issues of moral duality, for instance the UK’s role in facilitating regime change in Iraq by means of military offensive, whilst simultaneously condemning Palestinian resistance movements. In addition to problematizing UK foreign policy the criminalisation of such notions effectively promotes self-censorship and potentially violates the right to free speech. As the thesis will show in subsequent chapters this suggestion is borne out by the testimonies of young British-Muslims.

Aside from the introduction of what some participants see as repressive legislation, use of the term ‘radicalisation’ within counter-terrorism provisions, particularly in relation to the Prevent strand has been problematized by various commentators (Lynch, 2013; Githens-Mazer, 2012). Githens-Mazer (2012) asserts the term is a recent invention used to mean a range of concepts and ideas which has caused confusion because there is no single definition of radicalisation and ‘therefore there is no single meaningful conception of the term’ (2012, p.557). This lack of conceptual clarity has resulted in a confused approach by those involved in its application. Despite its conceptual ambiguity, it has been widely associated with Muslim youth in the West as a ‘precursor of Islamic-inspired violence against Western States’ (Lynch, 2013, p.242). This widely accepted premise that Islam is a causal factor of Muslim radicalisation is fundamentally flawed. Githens-Mazer, argues Islam cannot be causally linked to violence let alone radicalisation (2010, p.14). As intelligence services findings have shown the ‘origin’ of radicalisation is neither the
mosque nor indeed the Muslim community, citing instead that those drawn to extremism tend not to be affiliated to mosques, live outside of Muslim community life and have little scriptural understanding of Islam (Travis, 2008). As research based on in-depth case studies, carried out by the M15 Behavioural Science Unit, showed, among the several hundred individuals known to be involved in, or closely associated with, violent extremist activity in Britain there was a high prevalence of a lack of religious literacy. Very few had been brought up in households with a strong religious ethos and consequently MI5 said there is evidence to suggest a well-established religious identity actually protects against violent radicalisation (Travis, 2008).

Despite considerable evidence to the contrary, this insistence that radicalisation is an inherent product of Islam at best renders the Government’s motivations as questionable and fuels the belief its actions post 9/11 might be led by a pre-existing agenda based on British national self-interests other than the protection of its citizens from terrorism. Perhaps more importantly, as the Government’s own intelligence services acknowledge, the problem of radicalisation does not lie within mainstream Muslim communities, but rather isolated, disenfranchised individuals with little understanding of Islamic values and practices.

Having discussed the detrimental impact of some of the ambiguously defined terminology within anti-terror legislation, the discussion will now turn more fully to the ‘Contest Strategy’ or ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’ (2011, 2006) and its ramifications for British-Muslims. The Contest strategy is comprised of four strands: ‘preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals’; ‘pursuing terrorists and those that sponsor them’; protecting the public, key national services and UK interests overseas’; and ‘preparing for the consequences of terrorism’ (2011, p.6). The following discussion will concentrate mostly on the Prevent
strand of the Contest Strategy given its wide-ranging and invasive impact on the everyday lives of British-Muslims and the maintenance of their identities. Drawing on a range of academic sources it will highlight and explore the oppressive impact of Prevent ideation on the Muslim population within the UK and assess its potential to counteract the radicalisation of British-Muslims.

The Government (2011, p.7-9) asserts three main objectives of the Prevent Strand: to respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from those who promote it; to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and, to work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation that we need to address. The Government describes Prevent as ‘a community-led approach to tackling violent extremism’ (2009, p.82), which as Kundnani (2009) explains, is built on the notion that rather than directly implementing it themselves they would support and build the capacity of the UK Muslim community to do so. The Government reasoned that by entrenching their ideological campaign within the institutions of the community the strategy would be successful, because the community itself would root out and reject extremism and those associated with it. To support the community implementation of Prevent, local authorities received over £61.7 million in central Government funding between 2007 and 2011 (Kundnani, 2009, p. 11).

Despite repeated Government assertions only a minority of Muslims become radicalised, this appears tokenistic given the cursory acknowledgement of far-right extremism and animal rights activists (HM Government, 2011, p.15) compared to persistent references to Muslims and Islam throughout the Prevent strategy without reference to other ethnic and religious groups. Consequently, it effectively identifies all Muslims as problematic and therefore in need of containment and regulation if society is to remain safe. This targeted terminology evolves into practice with the allocation of Prevent
funding. There is a strong correlation between the amount of Prevent funding allocated to a local authority and the Muslim population therein (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Kundnani, 2009).

The Government’s ideological war to win British-Muslim ‘hearts and minds’ is fought on the terrain of their attitudes and opinions’ (Kundnani, 2009, p.40) and effectively renders the entire Muslim population as a potential threat to security. He surmises, Prevent divides Muslims into three groups: those who actively engage in terrorism, terrorist sympathisers and the rest of the Muslim population as perpetually at risk from falling into the other two categories.

Adding to the overarching discourse of the ‘Islamic threat’ are invasive anti-terror measures, an extension of what Foucault called the ‘panoptic gaze’ (1975, p.78) which facilitates an increasingly surveillance-orientated society to infringe the civil liberties of both Muslim and non-Muslim communities alike. The impact of stakeholders and the various power-interests on the policy outcomes within the ‘anti-terror’ arena will be returned to later in Chapter Two. Drawing on Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary power’ (1972) in the reproduction of power relations, it will be shown how the discursive construction of Muslims simultaneously locates British-Muslims as the ‘enemy within’ (Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009, p.646) and, through the production of a climate of fear, aims to create a public that is less likely to contest or resist domestic and foreign policies introduced by the State.

Extensive anti-terror legislation introduced since the New York terrorist attacks in 2001 has allowed the disproportionate scrutiny of the British-Muslim population, with this tightened surveillance focus impinging on their civil liberties. As Moeckli argues, British anti-terrorism measures ‘are aimed predominantly at members of Muslim and Arab immigrant communities ... involving broad profiles based upon religion, national origin and race’ (2005, p.524) and so are incompatible with Article 14 of the ECHR which
prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race, religion or national origin. In explicitly targeting Muslims both legislatively and through tighter policing, Prevent fosters social divisions by labeling Muslims ‘suspect’ and thereby legitimising public discrimination against that community, a phenomenon Poynting and Mason term ‘permission to hate’ (2006, p.367).

A second focus of criticism of Prevent is the assertion it is a ‘battle of ideas’ (HM Government, 2006, p.2). In doing so, the Government must explicitly define which ‘ideas’ they are battling. This definition is however implicit in the distinction the Government makes between ‘moderate’ Muslims, who are supported, including financially, in become the strongest voices within Muslim communities, or Muslim ‘extremists’, who are to be challenged, isolated and eradicated. Two issues arise from this. Firstly, Government support for particular Muslim organisations is theologically based, for example on the belief Sufis are intrinsically more moderate than Salfis (Kundnani, 2009, p.6). However as Asma Jahangir, in a 2008 United Nations report on UK counter-terrorism pointed out, ‘it is not the Government’s role to look out for the ‘true voices of Islam’ … The contents of religion or belief should be defined by the worshippers themselves’. Secondly, labels such as ‘extremist’ and ‘moderate’ are flexible enough to provide a means of marginalising those Muslim institutions critical of the State, leading Kundnani (2009) to argue Prevent funds are used to cultivate political loyalty to Government policies. The most flagrant example of this practice is the Government’s recent change in stance toward the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB). Whereas previously endorsed as representative of ‘moderate’ Muslim opinion, it has now been marginalised for its increasingly critical stance against Government policies, particularly towards Israel’s blockade and repeated bombing of Gaza. This coercive requirement for Muslim organisations to adhere to Government-dictated parameters if they are to remain engaged within the consultation process, means
participating organisations tend toward conservatism and conformity; thereby curtailing any representative function. In short, participation appears to come at the cost of conformity.

This practice of supporting ‘moderate’ versus ‘extreme’ is also imposed at an individual level through the promotion of ‘shared values’ (2009-10, p.102), Spalek and McDonald (2010) assert that not only is the term ‘values’ vague, but its scope is potentially hazardous because it can be used to interpret the ‘most normative Muslim practices as “anti-social”’ and “extreme”’ (2010, p.3) and consequently allows many Muslim beliefs and practices to be labelled as barriers to social coherence. They illustrate this with the example of the media and political constructions of Muslim women’s veiling practices as the embodiment of difference. Indeed Chapter Seven evidences participant’s perceptions that veiling has become a contentious practice that they must variously explain or defend.

As noted above, the ‘extreme’/‘moderate’ dichotomy allows Government to de-legitimise and retract funding from British-Muslim organisations that do not unequivocally support its policies, whilst the focus on shared ‘values’ provides a mechanism to set constraints on the kind of Muslim identities that are acceptable to policy makers (Spalek and Imtoual, 2007). Expression of dissatisfaction with UK foreign policy can be constructed as rejecting ‘Britishness’. Furthermore, the focus on social cohesion through ‘shared values’ effectively reduces political Islam to a single form, one that advocates terrorism and in doing so denies British-Muslims the legitimate expression of their democratic opposition to particular foreign policies. Furthermore taken in tandem with the overly broad definitions of key counter-terrorism terminology such as ‘terrorism’, ‘justification’ or ‘glorification’ as discussed, it is unsurprising advocates of human rights have argued aspects of counter-terror legislation represent a severe curtailment of the right to peaceful protest and freedom of expression.
Given the prevalence of Muslim opposition to British foreign policy and its critical implications for hybridised British-Muslim identity, acquiescence to arguably oppressive, self-serving foreign policy cannot be manufactured. Criminalising such opposition merely serves to drive it underground, adding to already established feelings of alienation and exclusion from mainstream society. In an article posted on the Reading Muslim PVE Crisis Group (2008) Birmingham councillor, Salma Yaqoob states ‘[dissent] will be expressed in private and secret with genuine extremists keen to provide a listening ear’, thereby rendering many aspects of British anti-terrorism provisions counter-productive to their stated aims. This counter-productivity of counter-terrorism and security measures has been discussed by other commentators. For instance Spalek and Lambert (2008) argue these increased activities have both alienated Muslims and failed to improve national security. Specifically, they state the disproportionate control and surveillance of the Muslim community creates resentment and mistrust amongst British-Muslims. This is directly at odds with the Government’s stated aim of enabling Muslim communities to combat extremism from within, by building a strong relationship with security forces. This argument is further solidified by Spalek, El-Awa and McDonald (2009) who examined Muslim experiences of partnership work with the Metropolitan Police, their findings show ‘hard’ strategies such as stop and search undermine the gains made with ‘soft’ community engagement approaches.

As suggested earlier, there is a contradiction between the institutional exhortations of Muslims to demonstrate their commitment to British values and the labelling of that population as potentially risky and dangerous to others. This dichotomy again forces Muslim identities to splinter as they are at once told to integrate whilst being excluded and criminalised. At such a critical time, when it is imperative the Government engage with alienated Muslim youth in particular to work towards improved social cohesion and
understanding, they introduce legislation that serve to vilify, victimise and strip British-Muslims of many of their civil rights. It has been shown in this chapter how the Muslim experience is greatly influenced by their unfair treatment at both domestically and abroad, and how this is compounded by the introduction of repressive anti-terror legislation that has served to accentuate their feelings of vulnerability and resentment.

To summarise, this chapter has explored in detail three of the six elements that lay the foundations for British-Muslim identity. It has sought to present the social-economic, political and legislative contexts within which they live as a means of outlining some of the factors central in understanding the lived experiences of British-Muslims. It has shown the prevalence of socio-economic deprivation within Muslim communities, how this is compounded by exclusion from developing a cohesive sense of Britishness due to conflicting national and transnational allegiances resulting from the perceived suffering of the global Muslim community as a consequence of British foreign policy ambitions, and the dichotomy that arises from being both British and Muslim in which demands are made for British-Muslims to integrate and accept the ‘Western’ way of life whilst simultaneously excluded through repressive counter-terrorism provisions that result in the widespread vilification of Islam and Muslims. Thus far the literature review has shown that British-Muslim identity is one that is constantly shifting between inclusion and exclusion domestically, whilst simultaneously pulled by both national and transnational factors that appear somewhat irreconcilable. Having detailed the principal contextual factors salient to an understanding of the contemporary social context in which British-Muslims live, Chapter Two focuses on the theoretical perspectives that inform and elucidate an understanding of the British-Muslim self and collective identities. In Chapter Three the methodology deployed in primary research is excavated, prior to the presentation of data in Chapter Four and the analysis of key findings in Chapter Five through to Chapter Eight.
Chapter Two

Defining the Theoretical Context

This chapter will draw from relevant literature in Sociology, Social Psychology and Cultural Studies in order to establish a theoretical framework within which the data discussed in analytical Chapters Five to Eight can be both situated and developed. The present chapter is presented in four sections: the first will examine ethnic, group and hybrid identities. It will start by briefly looking at definitions of ethnic identity, and then inspect the negotiation of diasporic identities with reference to Homi Bhabha’s work on hybrid identities (1994). The first part will therefore provide a theoretical platform for Chapter Five and its analysis of the data regarding the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain their identities; and as such the theories discussed in this section will partially address the issues encapsulated in research question one: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatised identities which have been rendered suspect’. The second section of this chapter will examine the relationship between societal power structures and the media, political and legislative representation of the British-Muslim identity through an analysis of Michel Foucault’s work. In doing so, it will investigate his notions of power/knowledge and disciplinary power through discourses (1980; 1975; 1972). It will also provide a brief overview of Edward Said’s notion of Orientalism (1978) and how it has been reconfigured as the primary representation of British-Muslims. This will become the theoretical foundation for Chapter Six and its analysis of discrimination, regulation and discipline and will inform the discussion for Chapter Seven. Whilst Chapter Six examines the over-riding discursive formation of Islam and Muslims and its impact in general, Chapter Seven
focuses specifically on discourses surrounding embodied Islam; paying particular attention
to the practice of veiling and its impact on public attitudes concerning Islam and
patriarchy. Therefore the discussion of Foucauldian theory and Said’s Orientalism
specifically addresses research question two: ‘To examine how British-Muslim identities
have been institutionally represented post 9/11’, whilst also partially addressing research
question one: ‘To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies
on British-Muslims post 9/11’. In so far as the legislative construction of a new ‘suspect
community’ to facilitate oppressive provisions, rather than the actual impacts of the
legislation. The third part of this chapter will examine Iris Marion Young’s ‘differentiated
citizenship’ (1990) and Will Kymlicka’s ‘multicultural citizenship’ (1995), both of which
address the rights of minority groups in a multicultural society and are therefore relevant to
this discussion in terms of British-Muslim rights against discrimination and for cultural and
religious expression in a secular society. Both models will be discussed in turn alongside
the criticisms that are particularly relevant to this thesis. The fourth part of this chapter will
consider Erving Goffman’s work on stigma and impression management (1963) which will
be fundamental to parts of the analysis presented in Chapters Five, Six and Seven. In
Chapter Five it will be used to illustrate impression management behaviours, for example
the notion of ‘chameleons’ which allows the social actor to perform a valid identity
appropriate to the social context, whilst maintaining internal beliefs and values, that if
exposed might ‘spoil’ the identity being performed. Whilst in Chapter Six participant’s
narratives will be used to illustrate how Muslim identity has become thoroughly
stigmatised and excluded from mainstream society in various exclusionary ways.
Goffman’s concepts are pertinent to research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level
strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities
which have been rendered suspect’. The last section of this chapter addresses the
psychological impacts of chronic stigmatisation and coping strategies employed by those who experience heightened societal discrimination.

For the purposes of this thesis Islamophobia will be defined from the Runnymede Trust report (1997) as a ‘shorthand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam- and by extension a fear or hatred of Muslims’ (Runnymede Trust, 1997 cited in Allen, 2010, p.52). This analysis extrapolates from relevant research conducted with other minority communities given the paucity of research into the psychological impacts of Islamophobia amongst British-Muslims. Therefore Meyer’s (2003) Minority Stress Theory will be transposed from its original application to lesbian gay bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) community to illuminate the current plight of British-Muslims. Similarly, due to the lack of empirical studies within a UK context exist, it is necessary to infer from the few American studies into the effects of acute Islamophobia on Muslims (Amer, 2013; Abu Rayya, 2011). This consideration of theories that focus on the psychological impact of societal exclusion will support the analysis in Chapter Eight of coping strategies and forms of resistance employed by the sample to counter the psychological impact of Islamophobia. Therefore the theoretical literature that examine minority stress is also relevant to research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.’

Before examining the first theoretical strand, the discussion will consider the definitions of ethnic identity most suited to this study. Issues of identity lie at the very heart of this thesis and identity construction and maintenance is at the forefront of much contemporary sociology and current socio-political debate, particularly in terms of British-Muslims. Chapter One has shown British-Muslim identity, their loyalties and beliefs are public property to be variously scrutinised, validated or de-legitismised in relation to socio-political events. Indeed, there has been a surge in academic interest into British-Muslims
and the impact of counter-terrorism and security policy on such subjects as citizenship and human rights (Heath-Kelly, 2013; Khan and Mythen, 2013; Spalek, 2010; McGhee, 2010) or the fluidity of hybridised identities (Mythen et al., 2013, 2009).

Bendle (2002) asserts that identity is at once problematic and essential; ‘essential’ because it is at the core of much debate and ‘problematic’ in that it is an idea that is not understood and is ‘under-theorised and incapable of bearing the analytical load that the contemporary situation (Bendle, 2002, p.1-2). Bendle’s view certainly aligns with the trajectory of this study given that identities of British-Muslims are presently under unprecedented scrutiny whilst simultaneously being poorly theorised and understood in the academic world. Defining ethnic identity is problematic. As Max Weber acknowledged ‘the whole concept of ethnic groups is so complex and vague it might be good to abandon it all together’ (1968, p.385). His discussion at this historical juncture appears to assume relatively monolithic ethnic identities and brings into sharp relief the complexities of modern hybridous identities that have resulted from globalisation, mass migration and geographical mobility. In his pioneering work Weber (1968, p.30) described ethnic identities thus:

Ethnic groups are human groups (other than kinship groups) which cherish a belief in their common origins of such a kind that it provides the basis for the creation of a community … we shall call ‘ethnic groups’ those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in the common descent because of similarities of physical type or custom…or memories of colonisation and migration.
There are important factors in Weber’s early definition of ethnicity that are applicable to this discussion. Essentially, Weber points to a belief in an ethnic group’s shared history or ‘common descent’. This idea aligns broadly with ummah which is used to refer to the concept of Muslim nation. In Arabic this refers to ‘the community’; more specifically, Muslim people that share a common ideology and culture which transcends modern boundaries of nation, class and ethnicity. While the ummah is in some senses imagined in that its members will most likely not be in personal contact, it is important to recognise that an ‘imagined community is not an imaginary one’ (Verkuyten, 2005, p.75) with the ummah providing connectivity and belonging that transcends the physical. The Muslim ummah is considered to be a single body and it is thus incumbent upon Muslims to come to the aid of fellow Muslims should they require help. The concept of the ummah is particularly important for Muslims because it is based on a Hadith (the teachings and documented precedent of the Prophet Muhammad’s, (pbuh) life), collated by Sahih Muslim which states that Muslims should remain unified ‘the similitude of believers in regard to mutual love, affection, fellow-feeling is that of one body; when any limb of it aches, the whole body aches, because of sleeplessness and fever’ (Hadith 6258, Book 32).

Weber’s definition underscores the importance of language, cultural characteristics, physical similarities and culture, all of which contribute to the definition of common descent. So, couched in Weberian terms, Muslims believe that they all have a common descent, or a common religious history of the ummah, which they are able to trace back over the course of history. It is less important that this shared history is factually accurate, more that it appears plausible and acts as a cohesive bonding device for group members. Whilst Weber looks to the past in order to point up the significance of shared histories, he proposes an essentialist account which does not encompass the fluidity and emergent nature of the British-Muslim experience. For a fuller explanation the discussion now turns
to British anti-essentialists. Modood explains this school of thought argues identities are neither ‘given … static or a temporal … they change under new circumstances, by sharing social space … heritages and influences’ (1998, p.380). Indeed as Hall describes, identity as a ‘production’ which is ‘never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation’ (1990, p.392). This thesis draws from a combination of Weber’s emphasis on shared histories and social constructionist thinkers who argue identities are continually created and re-created to provide an understanding of the present and the future, thereby indicating a shared history can be constantly re-interpreted in the light of current circumstances. The thesis has outlined the definitions of identity that are most suitable to this research study. It will now examine the four theoretical strands that together form the foundation of this research project, starting with Homi Bhabha’s core concept of hybridity (1994).

**Homi Bhabha: Negotiating the Third Space.**

Anti-essentialist theorists have proposed the notion of hybridity as an alternative to essentialist understandings of identity, typically defined by Kalra, Kaur and Hutnyk as a product of the post-colonial era where ‘the diasporic arrivals adopt aspects of the host culture and rework, reform and reconfigure’ to produce a new culture (2005, p.71). Within sociology the concept of hybridity has received extensive theoretical attention and as Werbner notes ‘… without doubt, the three great contemporary prophets of hybridity - Hall, Gilroy and Bhabha - have precipitated a … revolution in the study of cultural politics’ (Werbner, 1997, p. 13). The dialogue between these works indicates that hybridity has come to mean a mixing and combination, during the moment of cultural exchange. Gilroy (1993) applies hybridity in the field of cultural production particularly popular culture. Whilst Hall (1990) suggests hybridity has transformed British life through
'creolisation', referring to how diaspora discourse have come to encounter and accommodate itself to the experience of other minority statuses, in that they must manoeuvre their desires within the framework of other new immigrations. Whilst both conceptions of hybridity are relevant to this data to some degree, it is Bhabha's use of 'heresy' (1994, p.226), a means of valorising subaltern subjectivities, which is particularly salient in describing hybridised transgressive and productive behaviours later in the thesis.

Of the three theorists, this thesis will examine Homi Bhabha’s articulation of hybridity. As Huddart (2005, p.4) explains, in the context of cultural identities hybridity refers to the fact that cultures are not discrete phenomena, instead they remain in contact with one another leading to cultural ‘mixed-ness, even impurity’ (Huddart, 2005, p.4). Bhabha asserts hybrid identities exist in any space previously expressed in binary terms which underpin homogenous social identities. This is the liminal space, in that it ‘witnesses the production rather than the reflection of cultural meaning’. Bhabha’s notion of ‘liminality’ is the threshold between spaces (Huddart, 2005, p.4) and consequently the Third Space exists on the boundaries of identity which he asserts are malleable through social interaction across the threshold of cultures. These boundaries, located on the colonial interface, are a site of translation, negotiation and cultural production to result in allowing ex-colonials to be producers and, in doing so, challenge existing power hierarchies built on binary oppositions. As Perloff (1999) explains, rather than emphasising the difference between the coloniser and colonised, the liminal figure performs hybridity on the fault lines themselves and by doing so the difference between cultures is reduced. Subordinations created by colonialism have, according to Bhabha, surfaced to speak their own truths in ‘a complex on-going negotiation’ of authority that permits society to release its angers and move forwards (1994, p.12). Identities are therefore conceptualised as a moving concept, ambivalent not linear, emergent in a post-colonial space which no longer
recognises a ‘fixed tablet of tradition’ (Bhabha, 1994, p.2). Bhabha defines his notion of hybridity in *Location of Culture* (1994) in terms of the Third Space:

> It is that Third Space, though unrepresentable in itself, which constitutes the discursive conditions of enunciation that ensure that the meaning of and symbols of culture have no primordial unity or fixity; that even the same signs can be appropriated, translated, rehistoricised and read anew (Bhabha, 1994, p.37).

The Third Space is therefore an in-between state which is characterised by translation, negotiation, ambiguity and ambivalence (Bolatagici, 2004, p.78), where the traditional binaries of culture ‘enter, encounter and transform each other’ (Papastergiadis, 1997 cited in Werbner and Modood, 1997, p.258) to be transcended and reworked to create new understandings. In this way Bhabha offers the Third Space not only as a productive and disruptive category, but essentially as a point where ‘newness enters the world’ (1990, p.211). In an interview with Jonathan Rutherford he explains:

> The act of cultural translation denies the essentialism of a prior given original culture … for me the importance of hybridity is not to be able to trace the two original moments from which the third emerges. Hybridity to me is the ‘Third Space’ which enables other positions to emerge … it displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through received wisdom (1990, p.211).

This study uses Bhabha’s thesis to illuminate the contradictory demands in the lives
of second and third generation British-Muslims who must simultaneously incorporate their Islamic religious and cultural inheritance with demands to integrate into a Westernised ‘way of life’, whilst being depicted as the threat to that ‘way of life’. It is necessary to focus on the significance of Bhaba’s work to this thesis as it allows British-Muslims to challenge existing binaries to create new knowledge and cultures that will allow an alternative future. As Rutherford (1990) notes, the politics of the Third Space enable us to elude the politics of polarity and cultural binarism. So, as noted by Huddart (2006), the Third Space enables the introduction of unfamiliar meanings into existing fixed structures to undermine them and make possible the introduction of newness into the world. It is however not solely the fact of cultural difference and blending that creates possibility for change, but rather it is in the act of cultural translation:

Designations of cultural difference interpellate forms of identity which, because of their continual implication in other symbolic systems, are always ‘incomplete’ or open to cultural translation (Bhabha, 1994, p.162).

Bhabha accentuates the performativity of these acts of cultural translation. It is the enunciation of cultural difference, not the cultural difference in itself that gives hybridity its potential to disturb existing hegemony. By ‘Enunciation’ he means the act of utterance or expression of a culture within the Third Space and it is in the utterance that transgression arises and as such this articulation becomes the act of resistance that is so essential to challenge the fixity of historical hierarchies. As Cornell and Fahlander explain, enunciation is the key-word here, which ‘on one level can be rephrased as 'articulating', or if we put it from a perspective of practice rather than speech or text, we may also add 'performance’” (2007, p.23).
This transgressive potential of hybridity forces re-evaluations of the givens of culture and disrupts hegemonic linear progression to allow a different vision of the future to emerge or as Bhabha puts it, ‘past and future can work together to create a new outlook’ (1994, p.219). The analysis in Chapter Five examines participants’ enunciations in the Third Space, for instance becoming ‘ambassadors’ for Islam disrupts Orientalist binarism by providing another way of knowing Islamic tradition, whilst the ‘hijabista’ [British-Muslim colloquialism for modest and ‘Western’ fashion forward dress] discussed in Chapter Seven performs cultural transgressions through embodiment in the Third Space.

Whilst the data presented in Chapters Five, Seven and Eight supports the potential of hybridity as a disruptive force that empowers social actors, it is not a space free from societal power structures. As Cornell and Fahlander warn, hybridity should not be ‘misunderstood as a simple fusion of old and new elements into a crossbreed of practice’ (2007, p.19) as this neglects the inequalities of power and knowledgeability of the agents involved. Indeed, as Bhabha himself acknowledges, this aspect of the Third Space contrary to such simplification claims all social collectives from nation-States, cultures and ethnic groups are caught in a continuous process of hybridity which develops in relation to the larger context and therefore contains varying elements of the original. So from the liminal vantage point hybridised individuals remake and re-articulate the meanings of culture, however those meaning still retain elements of the original. Chapter Seven and its examination of veiling practices is a key example of how hybridised identities are subject to old power structures even whilst simultaneously transgressing through the embodiment of old and new. For instance the ‘hijabista’ performs both historical Islamic tradition and modern Western fashion, however social interactions might still draw her into colonial power structures by conversationally locating her as victim of Islamic misogyny. Additionally, the very same participants who in Chapter Five reference performance of
transgressive enunciations, also describe the psychological distress and attendant coping mechanisms in Chapter Seven which are associated with being subject to chronic stigmatisation and discrimination based on historical Orientalist binary constructions.

Homi Bhabha’s Third Space will be used as a platform to analyse the data in Chapter Five and Chapter Seven in the discussion of the maintenance of hybridised identities and in Chapter Eight in terms of performativity associated with the de-stigmatisation of British-Muslim identity. In doing so it will assist in addressing research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’.

**Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge and Discourse**

The second theoretical building block presented in this chapter seeks to provide an examination of societal power relationships by drawing on a number of conceptual mechanisms articulated by Michel Foucault, specifically the notions of ‘power/knowledge’, ‘discourse’ and ‘docility’, and to offer critiques relevant to this thesis. In doing so, it will provide a theoretical platform for the later analysis of media, political and legislative representation, discrimination and discipline of British-Muslims in Chapter Six. Foucault’s early work highlights his long-term concern with the notion of ‘rationality’ associated with the Enlightenment. His primary objective was to ‘provide a counterpoint to enlightenment narratives of progress’ (Power, 2011, p.37) to undermine normalised knowledge that forms the foundations of Western thought as historically contingent. In *The Order of Things* (1970) he notes, the epistemic shift in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries marked a growing interest in 'man’ as a new object of investigation and the various academic disciplines associated with this study created knowledge that was
historically ‘new’, in that it was incomparable with what went before.

As McNay elucidates, knowledge is not ‘a pure form of speculation belonging to a disinterested realm of inquiry, rather it is at once a product of power relations and instrumental in sustaining those power relations’ (1994, p.27). Foucault argues knowledge is inseparably bound with regimes of power and to emphasise the interdependence of these concepts he created the compound ‘power/knowledge’. He argues, ‘it is not possible for power to be exercised without knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power’ (Foucault 1980, p.52). Power (2011) explains that statements of knowledge create discourses which are the conditions of possibility of all thought and therefore action in relation to any societal phenomenon. In his essay The Order of Discourse (1981) Foucault asserts discourses are not simply a set of coherent statements, but rather a complex set of practices which keep particular 'truths' in circulation whilst restricting the circulation of others. They should be understood therefore as a system that structures the way we perceive reality and something which constrains our perceptions. By doing so, the social meaning and preferred solution of any given event can be controlled according to the interests of the dominant group. For Foucault, power is exercised over those who are ‘known’ through discourse and, therefore, those who produce discourse have the power to enforce its validity. As Power (2011, p.38) notes, who is authorised to speak is of central importance, as this both reflects and reproduces power relations in society.

It is the historically contingent production of power/knowledge that is crucial to this discussion. The governing discourse as regards Muslims in general and British-Muslims in particular is created by global and domestic stakeholders, as explained in Chapter One. Prevent and its discourse of the ‘process of radicalisation’ is the prism through which all British-Muslims have become known, whilst the ‘War on Terror’ is the principle discursive formation for the ummah. Chapter Six will extend Foucault’s analysis
to the discursive creation of Islam and Muslims to undermine that knowledge as ‘truth’ by setting it in its particular context.

Having explained how certain forms of knowledge gain more validity than others to become ‘truth’, the following discussion considers Foucault’s concern with the relationship between institutions and the individual, the point where he believes power/knowledge is most visible (Mills, 2003). An examination of Foucault’s formation of power illuminates this relationship which is derived from an anti-teleological understanding of history which he sees as a process of struggle between different power blocks that permeate all levels of society. This multiplicity of power relations is the basis of his re-conceptualisation of traditional power. Whilst he recognises this represents only one form of power, he argues it fails to account for power at the micro-level of society, ‘the power we exert over ourselves’ (Power, 2011, p.52) which makes centralised, repressive forms of power possible.

Foucault’s model of power differs from traditional notions in three ways. Firstly, power is exercised rather than being the possession of particular groups for the realisation of their collective will over the powerless. Secondly, power is likened to a ‘net-like organisation’ (Foucault, 1980, p.98) that permeates all society and, as such, is best understood using an ‘ascending analysis’ to illuminate the everyday ways in which power is enacted or contested at the micro-level, (McNay, 1994). Lastly, Foucault rejects the idea that power is merely repressive and constraining, he argues it is productive and enabling. It produces behavior through invisible strategies of normalisation whereby individuals discipline themselves according to the constant ‘interiorisation’ of dominant discourses. It is this process, he terms ‘disciplinary power’ and which operates at the level of the body, that is both the object and target of power (Rabinow, 1991, p.180), and lends itself to the analysis of power at the most specific point power that can be observed, namely the body.
Centered on the production of ‘docile bodies’ (Rabinow, 1991, p.179) through the organisation, disciplining and subjection of the human body disciplinary power is able to produce the submissive, productive and trained labour capitalism required. It is the creation of the docile body that is pivotal to understanding the normalisation of the Muslim ‘other’. Foucault argues, modern society is a disciplinary society based on the ‘indefinitely generalizable mechanism of panopticism’, in that, institutions such as schools, hospitals and army barracks all encourage self-regulation, (Foucault, 1977 in Rabinow, 1984, p.206). Such institutions control individuals through what Foucault calls the ‘disciplinary gaze’, which he explains by using the analogy of the ‘panopticon’ in The eye of power (1980, p.47) to illuminate the ‘permanent possibility of visibility’ (Power 2011, p.39). So according to Foucault, disciplinary gaze is ‘a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by interiorisation to the point that he is his own overseer’ (Foucault, 1980, p.155). Through socialisation individuals internalise a concern with a multitude of controls to internalise dominant discourses. Disciplinary power therefore functions to discipline individuals into self-control or to ‘play both roles’ as oppressor and oppressed, in line with discursive ‘truths’. Foucault’s focus in his analysis of ‘disciplinary power’ is the body, not the individual, the point where power is enacted or resisted, as he states, (Foucault, 1975, p.25).

So to briefly apply Foucauldian thought to British-Muslims, the constant, pervasive performance of power via representations transmitted by societal institutions is internalised by the individual non-Muslim as a ‘truth’, ‘becoming the vehicles of power’ (Foucault, 1980, p.98). This results in the normalising of such attitudes towards the Muslim other as the antithesis of freedom, modernity and ‘British’ values and as Muslims feel the tightening of the panoptic grip they self-govern to appear less threatening.

Chapter Six will examine the impact of institutional representations of British-
Muslims according to the sample. As previously noted, whilst Foucault implicates many of society’s diverse institutions in his analysis of ‘disciplinary power’, this thesis applies a narrower focus on the discursive production of knowledge of, and thereby power over, British-Muslims for two reasons. Firstly, it can be argued the most significant forms of institutional constructions of British-Muslims over the last fifteen years have emanated from within the media, mainstream political discourses, and counter-terrorism and State security policies as evidenced in Chapter One. In terms of media representation, the thesis draws on empirical data to conclusively show the prevalence of a neo-Orientalist bias within print media coverage of Islam and Muslims (McEnery et al., 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2011, 2002). These studies highlight how the media continually associate Islam and Muslims with the themes of terrorism, conflict, extremism and culturally incompatibility with ‘British values’. Poole for example asserts these themes have become the ‘framework of reference’ (2011, p54) in the identity construction of Muslims. The second reason for this focus on media, political and legislative discourses is that other social institutions have actively sought to counter the demonization of Islam and the British-Muslim community. The most notable example of this is provided by educational institutions who have repeatedly rejected calls for heightened internal surveillance of Muslim students. For example, the Universities and Colleges Union voted unanimously against such provisions on the grounds it would transform education into an extension of the security forces and erode trust between lecturers and students. More recently, in an open letter in The Guardian (21 July 2015) to David Cameron, educationalists have rebuffed provisions in the 2015 Counter Terrorism and Security Act that demand heightened surveillance in schools and universities to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism. They reject such provisions in favour of a more positive approach, suggesting ‘widening space in the school curriculum for
learning about citizenship, democracy, rights, justice and fairness, and developing children’s skills for critical thinking, argument and participation. Such alternatives are based on education, not surveillance’. Consequently, this thesis parts from the Foucaudian assertion that implicates societal institutions as a whole in the creation of ‘power/knowledge’ to focus specifically on the political, media and legislative constructions of Muslims in the analysis of institutional representations of British-Muslims post 9/11.

Whilst there are various critiques of Foucauldian thought, the most relevant to this analysis and that which will be presented in Chapter Five are articulated by Power (2011). He problematizes the notion of pervasive discourses, in that if they are pervasive how can their boundaries be determined. Similarly, it is hard to establish the difference between discourse and non-discourse. The other challenging issue in the application of Foucault’s concepts is that docility to disciplinary power is radically removed from individual agency. Specifically, as Power argues, ‘what is the principle of relevance by which one discourse is chosen over another’ (2011, p.46). So in terms of this thesis, the discursive formation of Muslims is very powerful in terms of its effects on the public, which will be discussed in Chapter Six, however they are obviously not all pervasive, as Chapter One has noted there is considerable opposition from a cross section of society to the legislative and political discourses surrounding Muslims.

**Edward Said: Orientalism, Power and Knowledge**

Arguably the most well-known application of Foucauldian theory to the depiction of Islam can be found in Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (1978). As Sardar (1999) notes, this book is considered significant in terms of advancing understandings of the historical
production of knowledge about the Islamic ‘other’ in the Western world. Many Post-
colonial theorists have considered Said’s work as iconic in its negation of imperialist
cultural production, marking the beginning of period of scrutiny of the image of Islam in
the West. Said applies the Foucauldian notions of discourse and power/knowledge at the
centre of his analysis of the historical discursive construction of Islam. His work is
considered to be one of the first sustained attempts to discuss Western representations of
Islam and is thus fundamental to this thesis.

Said defined Orientalism as ‘a style of thought based upon an ontological and
epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and ‘the Occident’ in which the
West is inherently superior to the East and as a ‘corporate institution for dealing with the
East’ (1978, p.2). Orientalism is therefore conceived of as an instrumental system of ideas
that has allowed Europe to ‘manage and produce the Orient politically, sociologically,
militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively’ (1978, p.2). It is this
institutionalism, Said argues, that gives the myths employed in relation to Islam ‘the
authority of a nation’ and that has ensured its continuing hegemony (1978, p.307).

In Orientalism (1978) Said analyses Eurocentric Western academic and literary
texts on the Orient and its peoples from the post-enlightenment period onwards. He claims
Orientalist discourse has been naturalised to the point of scientific knowledge based on the
use of binary descriptions within multiple disciplines to create the Orient as a mirror image
of the Occident. Thus, as the West creates the Orient it simultaneously creates itself. As
Poole (2002, p.29) notes, this means that the West creates the East in ‘essentialist and
reductive terms in which the Orient is comprised of despotism, sensuality, backwardness,
deviancy and barbarism’. In this sense the values of the East are diametrically opposed to
those valorised in the West: democracy, rational thought, social progression and justness.
A range of thinkers have drawn upon and developed Said’s pioneering work, including Derrida (1981) and Zine (2006). Derrida contends that binaries do not have a ‘peaceful co-existence’ but rather exist as a ‘violent hierarchy’ in which one ‘term governs the other … or has the upper hand’ (1981, p.41). Echoing Derrida’s sentiments, Said posits Orientalist discourses consistently place the Westerner in a ‘whole series of relationships with the East without ever losing him the upper hand’. He goes on to assert that the Arab ‘other’ is constructed through literary practices as ‘demonic hordes of hated barbarians … inveterate liars … lethargic and suspicious’ who ‘in everything oppose the clarity, directness and nobility of the Anglo-Saxon race’ (1978, p.90).

Zine (2006) argues current discourses reinvent such stereotypes in new ways to construct Muslims as dangerous foreigners, terrorists and as a threat to Western ‘freedom and way of life’. Through this binary formulation of the ‘West and the rest’ Islam has become the enemy of the ‘civilised world’. She goes on to note, Neo-Orientalist writing has gained renewed currency since 9/11, as exemplified by Orianna Fallaci whose purported anti-fascism has not prevented her from writing unashamedly racist and Islamaphobic diatribes exalting the “progress” of the West and vilifying the “backwardness” of Islamic culture (Zine, 2006, p.92). Ordinarily such blatantly xenophobic, neo-fascist diatribes would be dismissed as racist fiction, however, as Zine points out, Fallaci’s book achieved mass appeal in the post 9/11 era. It must be noted that not all Orientalists are so vitriolic in their condemnation of Islam, Orientalist discourse can be seen as a continuum ranging from the informed, yet constructively critical typified by Manji in The Trouble with Islam (2003), to the outright racism exemplified by Falacci in The Rage and the Pride (2002). Nevertheless, all works of literature form part of the discourse on Islam that circulates within and permeates the public sphere. The continuum of Orientalist discourse can be further defined by employing Said’s notions of latent and
manifest Orientalism. Whereas the former refers to the unconscious shared set of images and attitudes of what the Orient is, the latter refers to ‘touchable realities’, what is spoken and acted upon, that is, the expression in words and actions of latent Orientalism (Kennedy, 2000, p.67).

As we shall see in later analytical chapters, Anti-Islamic ‘truths’ have been utilised to justify Western intervention in the Middle East, most notably in attempts to manufacture public consent in support of aggressive foreign policy and restrictive draconian counter-terrorism legislation. Thus latent forms of Orientalism directly facilitate manifest Orientalism. Indeed, as Zine (2006) has argued, the discursive arena of the ‘War on Terror’ has re-inscribed the ideological rhetoric and reproduced the self-serving interventions of the Crusades.

Iris Marion Young and Will Kymlicka: Minority rights in a multicultural society

Tariq Modood (2011) pinpoints the Rushdie affair (1989) as the event which ‘virtually created’ British-Muslims identity politics and prompted a decline of popular liberal support for multiculturalism, which he claims was more comfortable with secular identity politics such as gay or Black rights. Since then a paradigm shift from multiculturalism to social cohesion has been evident within British political discourse, marked by the 2001 race riots in several Northern towns. Reflecting on these disturbances The Cantle report (2001) claimed isolationism amongst British Asians had led to a lack of social cohesion, which in turn had given rise to the violence. This report led the way for a reduction in support for multicultural policies and increased suspicion of supposed self-segregation amongst British-Muslims (McGhee 2005) that continues today. In 2011,
speaking in the context of hidden support for extremist Islamic ideology amongst British-Muslims the British Prime Minister, David Cameron, argued that:

Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream. We have failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run counter to our values (The Independent, 28 August 2011).

Alongside this shift in political discourse, public support for multiculturalism has decreased as evidenced by the rise of far-right political parties, increasing support for more stringent immigration controls and introduction of legislative provisions to curtail behaviours and speech that is deemed un-British (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010).

According to Vertovec and Wassendorf (2010), although managing intercultural differences and multi-group governance has been a social and political reality since the Ottoman and Roman empires, it has been rapidly intensified by the international mobility and intercultural exchanges associated with globalisation. This has created implications for how cultural diversity is framed and addressed at a national level, presenting challenges in terms of social policy, which in turn effect intergroup relations. Hall summarises the issues thus: ‘how can the particular and the universal, the claims of both difference and equality be recognised? This is the dilemma … the multicultural question’ (2000, p.235). The increasing diversity of British society raises questions such as the meaning of equality, how different and often competing cultural demands can be accommodated and if cultural difference should remain in the private sphere or be publically recognised (Howarth and Andreouli, 2013).
Referring to the notions of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) ‘differentiated citizenship’ and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) ‘multicultural citizenship’ this section will address the question of multiculturalism in terms of British-Muslims’ right to protection from discrimination and expression of cultural and religious identity in a secular society. Both models will be discussed in turn alongside criticisms pertinent to this thesis.

Iris Marion Young puts forward a key argument with regards dominant and minority group relations. She proposes ‘emancipation through the politics of difference’ and the need to move from a politics where equality is not defined as sameness, but as respect for difference (1990, p163). Young criticises liberal neutrality that promotes all social groups should be treated equally according to the same ‘neutral’ principles, rules, and standards. As Herr (2008) explains, this assimilationist idea attempts to eliminate group based differences in order to counterbalance discrimination by affording all groups equal status. Young however rejects this model of social equality. She argues supposedly neutral liberal rules are merely a disguise for dominant social norms and that ignoring social and cultural differences has three main ‘oppressive consequences’ (1990, p.164). Firstly, minority groups whose social, cultural and life experiences differ from the dominant group might be considered unable to meet normalised neutral standards and therefore the disadvantage they suffer as a result may be seen as deserved (1990, p.164). Secondly, as dominant groups are largely unaware of their socially superior position and continue to subscribe to the assimilationist ideal they unintentionally propagate ‘cultural imperialism’ (1990, p.123). She argues that a commitment to sameness makes it ‘impossible even to name how those differences presently structure privilege and oppression’ (1990, 163). Inequalities are rendered invisible and therefore unable to be eliminated (Herr, 2008). Groups who do not conform to dominant cultural norms, such as women, BME groups, the LGBT community and, relevant to this thesis, British-Muslims
are labelled ‘deviant and ‘other’ while members of the dominant group ‘continue to be privileged, often without being aware of their privilege’ (Young, 1990, p.164). Thirdly, those who are identified as ‘other’ and deviant in relation to the norm internalise devaluation and ‘suffer from self-loathing and double-consciousness’ as they do not fit into the normalised view of life experience (1990, p.165). She claims this is a reflexive process by which minority group members see themselves reflected in the eyes of society and realise they can never measure up to normalised standards or, as Young states, minority groups measure their ‘soul by the tape of the world that looks on in amused contempt and pity’ (1990, p.60). On the basis of this argument Young rejects the assimilationist ideal and calls for ‘democratic cultural pluralism’ that actively promotes ‘equality among socially and culturally differentiated groups, who mutually respect one another and affirm one another in their differences’ (1990, p. 163).

In order to achieve this social configuration, supporters of the politics of difference such as Young advocate ‘group autonomy’ so that groups can be empowered to develop ‘a group-specific voice and perspective’ (1990, p.168). Herr (2008) explains there are three significant societal benefits from Young’s approach to minority rights. Firstly, a politics of difference can be liberating and empowering as disadvantaged groups reclaim stigmatised identity as something to affirm and overcome internalised devaluation. Secondly, this reclamation allows minority groups to contribute to and revitalise the dominant culture as differences merely mean dissimilarity and cease to imply power relations of dominance, subordination and opposition. Thirdly, ‘politics of difference’ promotes group solidarity as opposed to the assimilationist championing of individual group member’s social success and as Young insists, offers ‘liberation of the whole group’ (1990, p.167).

Young’s model of democratic cultural pluralism has been criticised for inadequately defining what constitutes a group, essentialising differences and converting
politics into a practice that merely affirms group difference whilst disregarding the need for unity (Stevenson, 2003). Alain Touraine (2011) has argued multiculturalism should not be reduced to an unrestricted pluralism. A genuinely multicultural society needs to be able to establish unity and communication between different cultural groups. He asserts ‘the respect for political or religious minorities supposes that minorities and majorities of all kinds accept some institutions and some forms of common social life’ (2011, p.396). Without such a principle of unity it is difficult to see why we should be concerned to listen to the voice of the other (Stevenson, 2003). Whereas Young seems to assume certain institutional arrangements can ensure the powerful are ‘confronted’ with new perspectives which ultimately lead to social equality, against this Taylor (1992) argues, the provision of minority rights cannot guarantee equal forms of respect are granted towards minority cultures. While ‘minority’ rights might secure a ‘public presence’ for previously marginalised groups, they cannot ensure they are respected.

In *Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights* (1995) Will Kymlicka offers an account of how claims arising from cultural difference can be accommodated within the confines of liberalism without descending into limitless pluralism. He argues it is possible to articulate a multiculturalism which further accentuates liberal democracy and human rights, that is not only aligned with liberalism but can be seen as a ‘higher stage of liberalism’ by arguing that protections of cultural identity actually protect individuals in a manner compatible with liberalism (Stjernfelt, 2012, p.49). Therefore, different social groups should be culturally accommodated since the maintenance of culture as individual choice is pivotal to autonomy and autonomy is the ‘most basic liberal right’ (1995, p.26). Furthermore, he believes most people have a deep attachment to their culture that is intimately connected to how they relate to the world. We should therefore expect people to want to remain attached to their culture even when a
person has voluntarily waived their right to live and work in their own culture (Brock, 2005). So, whilst it is possible for people to leave their own culture we cannot expect them to ‘renounce something to which they are reasonably entitled’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p.86).

Kymlicka believes there are two main sources of cultural diversity. He distinguishes immigrants from national minorities. He contends the claims each group makes are different therefore the strategies of accommodation must reflect this. Immigrants, in so far as they have voluntarily entered the country, are expected to ‘participate within the public institutions of the dominant culture’ (1995, p.14). The demands they put forward to the host State, which he terms ‘polyethnic’ rights, are claims for recognition of their cultural particularity in order to integrate better into society (Brock, 2005). Polyethnic rights include exemptions from laws that would be disadvantageous to entire ethnic groups, for instance Jews and Muslims seeking exclusion from Sunday closing regulations (Brock, 2005). National minorities or those who were ‘previously self-governing, territorially concentrated cultures into a larger state’ often articulate demands for political or territorial autonomy (1995, p.10). Whilst Kymlicka explores national minority rights in some detail this discussion is not pertinent to this thesis and will not be detailed here.

As noted above, whilst Kymlicka’s support of minority rights is rooted in the role of culture in enabling free choice, he simultaneously supports the notion of a common culture that encourages unity, diffuses through society and advances the pursuit of common goals. This practice of nation-building ‘is a process of promoting a common language and a sense of a common membership in and equal access to social institutions based on that language’ Kymlicka, 1998, p.11). This process allows the provision of standardised public education, workers’ rights and a sense of mutual responsibility and solidarity to ensure a functioning democracy and welfare state. Nation-building whilst
essential does not however centre on the majority language and culture and so it is unsurprising a dominant ethno-cultural group emerges. In order to re-align this bias so that minority groups might retain a societal culture that is reflected in society and its institutions, Kymlicka proposes three main arguments for groups differentiated rights: the equality based argument, the value of cultural diversity argument and the history based argument (Brock, 2005). The third is most relevant to national minorities and is therefore not significant in terms of the current discussion and will not be expanded upon here.

Kimlicka’s argument for cultural equality claims some groups are ‘unfairly disadvantaged in the cultural marketplace’ (1995, p.14). This he asserts is a result of legislative bodies which are overwhelmingly composed of ‘middle-class, able-bodied white men’ (1995, p.32). To re-align this imbalance he suggests additional supportive measures are justified to reduce barriers to enable minority groups to create social fairness. In short, equality might be manufactured by treating different groups differently and compensate disadvantaged minority groups with special polyethnic rights (Stjernfelt, 2012). Nickel (1996) explains these include rights against discrimination, rights to financial support and legal protection for cultures practices, rights to education that recognise the cultures and languages of minorities and exemption from laws such as codes that disadvantage groups given their religious and cultural practices. In addition to these polyethnic rights he suggests rights of language and representation. The latter ensures fair representation for minorities in the political process through strategies such as proportional representation systems.

Although Kymlicka strongly advocates such protections he is also cognisant that group rights could be used by minority communities to regulate internal dissent and cultural contestation which he equates as an assault on autonomy, a core liberal value. To this end he insists on two limits. Firstly, group rights should only serve to protect from
potential external cultural erosion. They should not provide for ‘internal restrictions’ that 
infringe upon the basic democratic rights of the individual. Secondly, rights should only be 
awarded when those rights do not make it possible for a group to oppress or exploit another 
(Sjernfelt, 2012). As Kymlicka asserts, group rights must be delimited by ‘freedom within 
the minority group and equality between minority and majority groups’ (1995, p. 152). The 
second argument Kimlicka puts forward to support group differentiated rights is the value 
of cultural diversity for society as a whole. He maintains that society benefits from 
different cultures that enrich life and increase our cultural options. Additionally, it is a 
reason for the dominant cultural group to support group differentiated rights too as it is in 
their interest, rather than being centred in issues of obligations to, or fairness for, other 
groups.

Iris Marion Young (1997) and Bikhu Parekh (2000) take issue with Kymlicka’s 
model of minority rights. Their concerns are relevant to this thesis and will now be 
discussed in turn. Young (1997) rejects Kymlicka’s model which differentiates between 
national and ethnic minorities as unnecessarily dichotomous. She argues for a model based 
on cultural plurality and cites examples of anomalies to verify her critique of two mutually 
exclusive categories. Although Kymlicka (1995) excludes African-Americans from his 
dual model, he does not revise it because the he claims the situation of African-Americans 
is virtually unique in the world.14 Young points to refugees and economic migrants who 
leave their own countries to seek a better life elsewhere ‘cannot be said to be voluntarily 
forsaking their original cultures’ (1997, p.50) and therefore do not fit Kymlicka’s 
definition of immigrants.15 She goes on to add another anomalous group which is of

14 Kymlicka (1995) admits African-Americans do not fit into either category, since they are descendent from 
slaves who were transported and forcibly removed from their culture. He does not revise his model because 
the situation of African-Americans is virtually unique in the world.

15 Kymlicka does index the difference in voluntariness between refugees and immigrants but does not reflect 
this in his dual model (Brock, 2005).
particular resonance to this discussion, former colonial subjects. She argues that after the Second World War many former subjects of British, Dutch or French colonialism were promised citizenship in a ‘universal and culturally neutral state’, but once they had emigrated ‘were segregated, exploited and excluded’ (1997, p.50).

Young’s critique has significant consequence for Kymlicka’s dual categories. For instance, expanding on Young’s assertion that colonial subjects do not fit into the immigrant category because they were Commonwealth citizens and the territories conquered under the British Empire were part of the British nation. It could be argued that they existed in the Indian sub-continent before British-Empire (as Kymlicka’s ‘national minorities’ are defined), were forcibly colonised, exploited and oppressed and then invited to Britain as citizens of the British Empire. In this light ex-colonials do not fit into the immigrant status as defined by Kymlicka. Which leaves important questions such as are they national minorities because they existed in the Indian sub-continent prior to being colonised and exploited or do they occupy another category and if so what are their ‘differentiated rights’. Admittedly, this example stretches Young’s assertion to the extreme, but is intended to highlight the problems inherent to a two category model of minority rights. Young contends that ‘two mutually exclusive categories are misguided’ and should be replaced with a ‘multicultural continuum’ and suggests thinking of cultural differences between groups as a ‘matter of degree rather than kind’ (1997, p.51-2).

Bikhu Parekh (2000) questions Kymlicka’s interpretation of culture that leads him to assert the claims to special rights by immigrants are less compelling because they have left their ‘natural’ cultural home and in so doing have abandoned their right to culture and therefore must integrate into the host culture. Hence, whereas national minorities have specific cultures that require recognition, the culture of immigrants should be denied the same level of public expression. Yet in a world of unprecedented cultural mobility in terms
of peoples and symbols, it makes little sense to argue that cultures are confined to national and ethnic boundaries.

Waldron (1999) echoes Parekh’s concerns. He contends that Kymlicka’s idea of culture is questionable because it suggests that individuals are only able to live as if they are entirely products of a single national or ethnic community. So, according to Kymlicka minority cultural groups impose homogeneous cultures upon their members; their ability to maintain the authenticity of that culture depends on the ability to reduce external influences. This, as Waldron notes, leaves very little space for the intermixing of cultures, hybridity and intercultural communication. This critique is significant for the current project because its central concern is the analysis of how participants experience their hybrid British-Muslim identities. The analysis in Chapters Five and Seven will show how the majority of participants self-identify as both British and Muslim. Aligning with Parekh (2000) and Waldron (1999) the analysis will show participant identities not only transcend Kymlicka’s national and ethnic boundaries but exist in a state of constant negotiation between national, cultural and religious memberships.

The discussion presented here is of value to the analysis of the Rushdie affair in Chapter Five. Both Young’s (1990) notion of a ‘politics of difference’ and Kymlicka’s (1995) notion of ‘multicultural liberalism’ will be used to illustrate how Muslim perspectives and beliefs were side-lined in the political and media defence of majoritarian cultural practices. The analysis will go on to show the data does not support Kymlicka’s (1995, 1997) contention that British-Muslim demands for group-libel laws were sought to restrict apostasy and therefore should be rejected on the grounds they might be use as a mechanism to restrict individual autonomy within the community. It will argue this represents an assault on liberal values and therefore limits the toleration of liberal multiculturalism for religious minority rights.
Erving Goffman: Stigma and Impression Management

This chapter has proposed a framework for locating the formation of contemporary ethnic identities for Muslims in Britain, whilst also stressing the significance of dominant discourses as highlighted in the work of Foucault and Said. It will now go on to examine the theoretical literature on how social groups become stigmatised and resultant modes of stigma management which is the third theoretical strand presented in this chapter. The theoretical discussion of stigma starts with Erving Goffman’s influential work. Before providing an overview of Goffman’s work, it is necessary describe the school of thought upon which his work is founded, the pioneering thinker G.H. Mead and his seminal text *Mind, Self and Society* (1934). This perspective promotes the idea that self and society develop simultaneously through interaction. The self is a process that cannot be understood in purely psychological terms, it evolves through social interaction. The crucial component in Mead’s self is ‘reflexivity’, the ability to adopt the attitude of the other and toward the other, to be both subject and object to oneself. Mead’s social self is itself built on C.H. Cooley’s ‘looking glass self’ concept (1902, p.152) the idea that a person's self grows out of society’s interpersonal interactions and the perceptions of others. The term refers to people shaping themselves based on what they perceive is other people's perception of themselves.

The ‘looking glass self has three major components and is unique to humans (Shaffer, 2005, p.54). A person views himself or herself through others’ perceptions in society and in turn their identities are shaped. Identity or self is the result of the concept in which we learn to see ourselves as others do (Yeung and Martin, 2003) The looking-glass self begins at an early age and continues throughout the entirety of a person’s life as one will never stop modifying their self unless all social interactions are ceased. Of course, if this were the case, the internalisation of the inconsistent attitudes of every individual would
render the self unstable. It is upon this point the Mead parted with Cooley to propose the
notion of the ‘generalised other’, the self responds to the predominant views held of
oneself by others, it is this internalisation of the attitude of the generalised other that allows
the consciousness of the self as an object. To summarise thus far, the literature suggests
that the self cannot exist without society and that society exists in the minds of all its
members as well as the individual. Therefore, society exists through social relationships
and that individuals cannot exist outside social relationships. Following these assumptions,
this project will apply the social constructionist understanding of identity to the current
socio-political context which shapes the experience of British-Muslims, examining how
British-Muslim identities are created both by and through interactions in the public sphere
and the ways in which social institutions seek to regulate and police the boundaries of
Muslim identities.

To fully understand Erving Goffman’s work on stigma, its foundation, his seminal
work *The Presentation of Self in Daily Life* (1959) must be described. Based on the
Symbolic Interactionist idea of the conjoint emergence of self and society, he argues that
identity is a specific type of social ‘performance’ that is enacted in everyday interaction. In
every interaction that takes place, information about the individual is both presented and
absorbed (1959, p.13), ‘individual is likely to present himself in a light that is favourable to
him (*sic*)’ (1959, p.7). From this core idea, Goffman develops his highly influential
concept of ‘impression management’: a social world of individuals who perform in order
to project a desirable image in a constant effort to manage impressions and who are
absorbed in persuading others to believe in their character. To impart information to the
audience the actor has what Goffman termed ‘front stage’ (1959, p.32), this is the part of
the individual’s performance which functions to define the situation for the observers, or
audience. It is the image or impression he or she gives off to the audience. There are
different parts that constitute the front stage, for example the ‘setting’ for the performance includes the scenery, props, and location in which the interaction takes place. Different settings will have different audiences and will thus require the actor to alter his performances for each setting. The actor has a ‘personal front’ which is divided into ‘appearance’ and ‘manner’. Appearance functions to portray to the audience the performer’s social statuses. Appearance also tells us of the individual’s temporary social state or role, for example whether he is engaging in work (by wearing a uniform), informal recreation, or a formal social activity. Here, dress and props serve to communicate gender, status, occupation, age, and personal commitments. ‘Manner’ refers to how the individual plays the role and functions to warn the audience of how the performer will act or seek to act in role (for example, dominant, aggressive, receptive etc.). Inconsistency and contradiction between appearance and manner may occur and will confuse and upset an audience. By fixing his setting appearance and manner, the actor guide’s the audiences’ impression of himself. At the same time, the person that the individual is interacting with is trying to form and obtain information about the individual, whilst conducting their own performance. So, on both a conscious and unconscious level, social actors need to balance, readjust, and reflexively reconstruct their identities as a consequence of their social interactions with other people. So Goffman’s theory of the self is a highly constructed performance, in which every element has been developed to give the correct impression. Goffman notes that the ‘correct impression’ an actor aspires to in any social situation is that which society considers ‘normal’: the collective representation of what we imagine we ought to be, interactional activities are predicted ‘on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions…or self-sustained restraints’ (Goffman, 1983, p.3) This shared knowledge enables actors to display situationally appropriate behaviour. Acting normally, achieved by collective image of what is normal manner of conduct, and in turn the self-respect of
individuals.

In *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity* (1986) Goffman shows how important the consistency and predictability of performance are, and he suggests that homogeneity of performance is secured by a certain bureaucratization of the spirit. The notion of ‘a normal person’, a category which we all, regardless of our resources and status, employ when thinking about ourselves, ‘may have its source in the medical approach to humanity or in the tendency of large scale bureaucratic organisations such as the nation State, to treat all members in some respects as equal’ (Goffman, 1986, p.7). Being a ‘normal person’, a human being like anyone one else - means incorporating standards from wider society and meeting others’ exceptions about what we ought to be. ‘Society establishes the means of categorising persons and the complement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these categories’ (1986, p.2). So normality is not a singular episode but a continuously occurring process which is the result of mass impression management in an attempt to ‘pass for normal’ (1986, p.73). It is at this point that Goffman’s work becomes particularly salient to the thesis, he describes how individuals meticulously manage their impressions to be seen as ‘normal’. Although passing as anything other than Muslim, given their South Asian appearance is equated as Muslim, they practice ‘disidentifying’ behaviours such as ‘chameleionism’ and sartorial distance.

This discussion is concerned with identities that exist outside the parameters of socially accepted normality. People whose ‘performance’ is unable to conform to standards that society calls normal are disqualified from full social acceptance; their self-identity is discredited and they are stigmatised. Goffman defined stigma as ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ (1986, p.3), he is careful to explain that it is not the attribute itself but the reaction of others to the attribute that spoils identity, Goffman describes this process thus:
When a stranger is present before us, evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes him different from others...he is thus reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted one. Such an attribute is a stigma (1986, p.2-3).

He goes on to describe three forms of stigma: overt or external deformations such as scars, physical or social disability; deviations in personal traits including mental illness, drug addiction or a criminal background; finally and most pertinently to this discussion ‘tribal stigmas’, imagined or real this can be ethnic groups, religion or nationality that is deemed to be a deviation from the prevailing normative ethnicity, nationality or religion.

Minority Stress: Psychological and Emotional Impacts of Stigmatisation

The following section assesses the literature around the psychological impacts of social stigmatisation on the individual. Due to a scarcity of empirical studies that examine this factor with direct reference to the British-Muslim community, it will provide an overview of studies that have assessed the psychological impacts of discrimination on other stigmatised groups. In doing so the thesis intends to extrapolate these findings to the current sample thereby contributing to the development of new knowledge in the area.

In his much cited book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, Allport (1954, p.42) posed the question, ‘What would happen to your personality if you heard it said over and over again that you are lazy and had inferior blood?’ Responding to this question Crocker, Major and Steele (1998) assert that a stigmatised individual’s identity is socially devalued, whereby individuals become stigmatised due to negative stereotypes associated with the group they belong to. Research has shown that stigmatised individuals regularly confront prejudice
and discrimination; Stuart (2006) showed consequences of stigma including diminished employability lack of career advancement and a poor quality of working life. Stigmatised individuals also find difficulty in gaining access to housing, public accommodations, employment and educational resources (Corrigan and Lundin, 2001). Chapter One has detailed equivalent socio-economic deprivations suffered by British-Muslims, including living in poor and unsuitable housing in deprived areas (Runnymede, 2013) and hardships in gaining access to higher education (Boliver, 2013) and employment (The Institute for the Study of Labor, 2010) even when all relevant variables are equal.

Whilst there is a dearth of empirical investigation into the effects of Islamophobic stigmatisation, the thesis considers research into other types of social stigma to extrapolate in order acquire an understanding of its effects on an individual’s sense of well-being. Considerable research indicates that stigmatisation can lead to distress. Dagnan and Waring (2004) investigated the social experience of people with intellectual disabilities. Their sample reported high incidences cognitive processes typical of psychological distress, for example negative evaluative beliefs about the self. Additionally, Diaz, Bein and Ayala (2006) reported having multiple stigmatised identities, such as being gay and Muslim, increases the likelihood of experiencing homophobia, stigma, isolation and rejection. For the Latino and Asian American lesbian, gay and bisexual sample in this study, dual minority statuses arising from both ethnicity and sexual orientation were associated with a greater susceptibility to the adverse mental health consequences of discrimination.

A prominent theoretical and explanatory framework for understanding the experiences of marginalised individuals is Meyer’s Minority Stress Theory. The concept of minority stress derives from several social and psychological perspectives and can be described as a conflict between the values of the minority and those of the dominant. It
encompasses both the expectation of conflict with the social environment that is experienced by minority members and the coping strategies adopted to combat their stigmatisation (Meyer, 2003; Pearlin, 1999; Mirowsky & Ross, 1989). Underlying the concept of minority stress are the assumptions that stressors are unique (they are not experienced by the non-stigmatised), chronic (related to both social and cultural structures) and are socially based (involving social institutions and structures). The present study aligns itself with Pearlin’s concept of stress, defined as ‘any condition having the potential to arouse the adaptive machinery of the individual’ (1999, p.163).

Meyer (2003) examined the higher prevalence of mental disorders amongst the Lesbian, Gay and Transsexual (LGBT) community when compared to Heterosexuals. He concluded there were four main contributors to minority stress: the experience of prejudice events; stigma (including expectations of rejection and discrimination); concealment vs. disclosure; and internalised homophobia. Whilst this perspective has been applied to various populations, including immigrants, women, and the impoverished (Meyer, 2008), it is yet to be extended to the experiences of British-Muslims. For this reason, the researcher will extend Meyer’s components (2003) to align them with the experiences of young British-Muslims in the post-9/11 context. Each element will be discussed respectively.

The first of these elements ‘prejudice events’ that contribute to minority stress were verified in a study conducted by Hatzenbeuhler et al. (2010). They investigated the effects of institutional discrimination on psychiatric disorders amongst the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and transsexual (LGBT) communities in the USA. LGBT participants living in States where same-sex marriages were deemed unlawful, displayed higher mood disorders, generalised anxiety disorders and drug and alcohol disorders amongst the sample. This finding is pertinent to the current research as it can be argued that British-Muslims find themselves under similar institutional discrimination and therefore it can be assumed that
they will be susceptible to similar effects. This high level of discrimination and surveillance by the State causes a sense of isolation amongst British-Muslims in a similar way to Hatzenbeuler et al. (2010). As has been discussed in Chapter One, Prevent is targeted at the British-Muslim population rendering the whole community suspect to legitimating human rights violations under the pretext of combating terrorism. Whilst it simultaneously performing the danger of Muslims to the wider public resulting ‘permission to hate’ (Poynting and Mason 2006, p.367) evidenced in in elevated Islamophobic discrimination amongst private citizens which has had the effect of increased anti-Muslim hate crimes and support for specifically anti-Muslim political parties (Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Report, 2014).

Again a paucity of such research within a British context, leads the discussion to extrapolate from an American study. Illustrating the adverse psychological effects of 9/11 on the well-being of Muslim-Americans, Amer (2013) conducted an internet-based survey on the incidence of anxiety and depression amongst 601 Muslim-Americans of Arab descent, comparing the sample’s scores against normative figures. Respectively the Beck Anxiety Inventory and the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale were used to quantify both constructs. In terms of anxiety, 13.8 percent of the sample scored in the ‘moderate to severe’ range, with 11.1 percent falling into the ‘severe’ range of anxiety. Whilst depression scores in 50.1 percent of the sample fell above the normative score of 16 (2013). The findings demonstrated that anxiety, depression and even post-traumatic stress disorder was prevalent amongst the sample.

To infer from Amer’s research (2013), it is reasonable to assume that the study and its results could be replicated in the UK using a British-Muslim sample. Chapter One has documented the victimisation of British-Muslims inherent in the UKs counter-terrorism strategy. Garnets, Herek and Levey (1990) describe the relationship between victimisation
and psychological distress and wellbeing; whereby the authors note that feelings of victimisation render the individual vulnerable and with a tendency to self-devaluate. The second element contributing to the minority stress of LGBT, according to Meyer (2003) is the stigma and attendant expectation of discrimination and rejection. Crocker et al (1998) claim that the stigmatised need to be constantly vigilant in case of rejection and discrimination; this vigilance is repeated continually in everyday life. The exertion of this energy in maintaining the self-concept is stressful. In addition, Jones et al (1984) assert that the conflict between the self-perception and the other’s perception is an additional stressor. Ross (1985) found that anticipated social rejection was more predictive of psychological distress than actual negative experiences. The third element Meyer (2003) points to is the stress that LGBT experience when attempting to conceal their sexual orientation, in a bid to avoid stigma. This particular component however, does not apply to the experience of British-Muslims in the post 9/11 era as a typical South Asian appearance seems to be a sufficient trigger for discriminatory acts. Medina (2011, p.139) asserts that a South-Asian appearance is a signal to all that ‘one belongs to a minoritised and stigmatised social group’. An extreme and tragic example is that of Jean Charles de Menezes, the misidentified Brazilian man who was shot down by London Metropolitan Police on the 22nd of July 2005. Whilst it is commonplace for South Asians to be labelled Muslim regardless of religious belief, it is possible to reduce the outward appearance of ‘Muslimness’ as will be discussed below.

Meyer’s last component refers to the internalisation of homophobia (2003). This refers to a form of stress that is internal where despite successfully concealing their minority status, lesbians and gay men may direct negative social values towards themselves. Thoits (1985, p.222) asserts this type of self-stigmatisation as one where the stigmatised individual begins to ‘view themselves from the imagined perspectives of
others’. This phenomenon of internalised Islamophobia was noted by Mythen et al. who showed, participants adopted practices of ‘checking and hushing’ to demonstrate their ‘safeness’ and reduced the possibility of stereotyping (2013, p.8). They define ‘checking behaviours’ as those where self-inspection leads to the conscious performance of self-restraint. The examples they give include the selective use of dialect and alterations to physical and sartorial displays. The analysis in Chapter Eight shows participants internalised Islamophobia by distancing themselves from Islam both sartorially and behaviorally by displaying certain ‘vigilance behaviours’ which are actions that reduce the likelihood of future discrimination.

To summarise, Meyer’s (2003) four-pronged approach to LGBT minority stress can be utilised to enable understanding of the effects of chronic stigmatisation of British-Muslims living in a post-9/11 context. All four aspects of this modified model will be applied to the data in Chapter Eight, to establish that the participants do experience stress unique to the British-Muslim experience.

**Psychological coping strategies: Resisting stigma to safeguard the self**

Whilst useful as a framework, Meyer’s model renders the minority individual as a victim of oppressive social conditions, without agency. Meyer himself points to this critique and posits ‘stress ameliorating factors’ in response (2003, p.6). He claims that minority status is associated with stress but also with important factors such as group solidarity that protects minority members from the effects of minority stress. Therefore, coping strategies are the other side of the same coin to minority stress. Psychologists and sociologists alike have theorised and sought to conceptualise behaviours amongst minority and stigmatised groups. These theoretical perspectives are useful in understanding how
minority groups respond to stigmatisation and at an individual level the coping strategies they employ. Of these theoretical perspectives, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) is most pertinent to this research. According to Tajfel and Turner (1979) SIT is social psychological theory of intergroup relations and the social self. Brown (2000) expanded on this in his review of SIT and suggests that the theory is the solution to a classic problem in social psychology; the relationship of the individual to the group, and the emergence of a collective phenomenon stemming from the individuals’ cognitions. The idea that individuals tend to strive to achieve or maintain a positive social identity is central to SIT, in that this quest is mediated by the theory’s assumption that an individual’s identity is primarily determined by the identity of the group to which the individual belongs (‘in-group’), compared to the qualities of the group to which an individual does not belong (‘out-group’) (Tajfel and Turner, 1979, p.41). In essence, the values associated to group membership, both positive and negative, represent the individual’s social identity. Thus, the need for a positive social identity is the psychological drive behind the individual’s actions. This drive is exacerbated for members of minority groups as they are most likely to desire a change from the negative social identity afforded by their present group membership. Moghaddam and Taylor (1994) explain that an ‘inadequate identity’ is either considered to be a negative social identity or one which does not satisfy the individual. According to the evidence provided in the literature review of this paper, it can be argued that Muslims satisfy the definition of an ‘inadequate’ social identity; thus for the sake of this paper, a stigmatised identity. One of the ways in which minority groups can absolve this stigmatised identity is to embrace their minority status and make it the central facet of their identity, known as the concept of ‘centrality’ (Rosenberg, 1979). Centrality refers to the subjective importance persons attach to the various social identities that they accept as defining the self-concept. Thoits (2012) asserts that the greater the salience
ExemplifyingThoits’assertionismeuper’sexampleof‘comingout’(2003)where the individual’sgayidentitybecomingmorecentralisexpectedtorelievetheexperienced minority stress.

It standstoreasonthen,thatwhenMuslimsassertandprioritisetheirreligious identity,so toaster their minority stress be reduced. Indeed, Abu Raiya et al (2011) surveyed 138 American Muslims reporting at least one stressful event associated to their Muslim identity, and found that the non-religious coping strategy of inter-faith dialogue led to positive changes including personal strength and an appreciation of life. Whilst on the other hand, Muslims who tended to isolate themselves from others were found to be more susceptible to cases of depression and anger. Fischer et al. (2010) propose that Muslims tend to choose collective coping styles, whereby they are surrounded by like-minded similarly stigmatised individuals from whom they receive and provide positive interactions prioritising Islam. Thus, shaping a strong religious identity is the way that Muslims cope with stress and suffering. Fischer, Haslam and Smith’s research is in keeping with the assumptions laid out by SIT. It shows that the low-status group of British-Muslims strives to maintain a positive group identity in the face of stigmatisation by employing coping strategies. Chapter Eight reveals that coping strategies consist of an affiliation with other Muslims and a mutual appreciation of their religiosity; both of which are internalised thereby fulfilling the need for a positive social identity. In doing so it reveals aspects of participants narratives that exemplify such behaviours including the voluntary adoption of stigma symbols, centralising religious identity by becoming an ‘ambassador for Islam’, and by de-legitimising anti-Islamic discriminations as the product of out-group ignorance to preserve in-group social identity.

The discussion of SIT and minority stress perspective examines the psychological
effects of stigma and the attendant coping strategies explicitly addresses research question three and forms the foundation of the analysis of the micro-level strategies deployed to maintain and de-stigmatise ‘suspect’ identities presented Chapter Eight of the thesis.

This chapter has presented the five theoretical building blocks of the thesis. The first began with an overview of relevant Sociological definitions of identity-citing Weber (1968) and his emphasis on shared history. This was combined with Stuart Hall’s stress on the anti-essentialist identity as an on-going production (1990). The chapter then went on to examine Homi Bhabha’s notion of the Third Space (1994) which is located at the colonial interface and allows the transformation of existing hierarchies through a complex ‘on-going negotiation between cultures’ (1994, p.12). The second theoretical strand examined Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge (1980), discourse (1981) and docility (1975) which in combination create a form of power which he terms ‘disciplinary power’; a ‘net like organisation’ (1980, p.98) that permeates all levels of society and as such is best understood using an ascending analysis. Thereby, it is of particular relevance to the current micro-level empirical research. The chapter then indexed arguably the most well-known aspect of Foucauldian theory to the depiction of Islam: Edward Said's Orientalism (1978). The third of the four theoretical strands to be presented was Iris Marion Young’s ‘differentiated citizenship’ (1990) and Will Kymlicka’s ‘multicultural citizenship’ (1995). Both models were used to argue that societal cultures created for and by the dominant social group necessarily oppress minorities whose cultures do not adhere to normalised cultural norms. Young’s contention for a politics of difference was put forward as a mechanism to balance societal bias towards the dominant group.it went on to discuss Will Kymlicka’s Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995), which gives an account of how claims arising from cultural difference can be accommodated within the confines of liberalism and without descending into limitless pluralism. These
models will be used to discuss the emergence of British-Muslim identity in Chapter Five, and if and how demands made by British-Muslims during the Rushdie affair should be accommodated by wider society. Lastly, the chapter discussed Erving Goffman’s work on stigma and impression management (1963, 1959). He argues that identity is a specific type of social performance that is enacted in everyday life developed to give the correct impression. It then went on to discuss Goffman’s notion of stigma which is the discussion of identities which exist outside the parameters of socially accepted reality; a foundational factor in the study of stigmatised British-Muslim identities. The final part of this chapter provided an overview of ‘minority stress’ and the psychological and emotional effects of stigmatisation. This concept encompassed both the expectation of conflict with the environment that is experienced by minority members and the consequent coping strategies adopted to combat their combination. Thus far the thesis has contextualised the lives of Muslims living in the UK in Chapter One and examined theoretical perspectives directly relevant to the current study in this chapter. The next chapter will provide a rigorous analysis of the methodological foundations of the primary empirical research upon which this research is based.
Chapter three

Methodology

In order to provide a robust account of the means by which the research questions will be investigated and to provide a methodological foundation for the data which will be subsequently presented and analysed, this chapter comprises five interlinked parts. Part one will focus primarily on the epistemological foundations of the study, examining the issue of researcher subjectivity and the ways in which this may potentially enhance or impede the study, including reflection on measures that could be implemented to combat or augment ‘researcher effects’. Part two elaborates the research design and justifies the use of the GTM, explaining its suitability in comparison with other methods. Part three outlines the data collection strategies deployed, whilst part four explains the mechanical process of data analysis. Lastly, the ethical considerations that arise in conducting a study such as this will be considered. This account is intended to prime and prepare for an overview and synopsis of the data in Chapter Four. Before examining the epistemological underpinnings of the research, it is necessary to revisit the key objectives of the project. The research objectives below direct the methods chosen and also orient the theoretical trajectory of the thesis.

1. To assess the impacts of counter-terrorism legislation and security measures on British-Muslims post 9/11.

2. To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented since 9/11.
3. To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.

**Epistemological Considerations**

In Section One, I wish to locate my own position in relation to the study as a researcher and consider the epistemological considerations that arise therein. In so doing, I will be alluding to elements of the theoretical framework as defined in Chapter Two. Epistemology, seeks to connect theory and methodology. As Crotty states, ‘the theory of knowledge is embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology’ (1998, p.3). In following this definition, researchers must identify and justify their position to legitimate the philosophical stance behind their research. In this thesis a constructivist epistemological approach (1998, p.5) will be adopted. This approach asserts that meaning does not exist outside of consciousness simply awaiting discovery, but is instead constructed through social interactions in grounded structural contexts. A thorough understanding of epistemologies is an essential requirement of this thesis as it is the epistemological stance underpinning dominant discourses surrounding Muslims that is critical in understanding the values and beliefs of Muslims the UK. Indeed, the explicit concern in this regard is the production of particular sets of knowledge that come to be presented as ‘truth’ but which misrepresent Islam and cast Muslims as problematic. It is both the production of and the permeation of such ‘truths’ in Western societies that this thesis seeks to unravel, critique and oppose.

Following the work of Michel Foucault, for knowledge to be established as ‘truth’ other equally valid ways of knowing must simultaneously be denied. In *The Archaeology*
of Knowledge (1972) Foucault examines institutional practices that establish a particular knowledge as universally acceptable fact whilst concealing other ways of knowing. It is a Foucauldian critique that encourages the notion of ‘multiple truths’ which will be utilised to challenge dominant media and political discourses about Muslims that commonly vilifies and victimise in equal measure. Having said this, it should be acknowledged that a subjective, one-sided epistemological thrust can lead to what David has termed ‘epistemological polarisation’ (2008, p.341). This is where the researcher simply emulates the one-sided production of knowledge, with the opposing bias leading to the production of diametrically opposed knowledge that adds little to reasoned debate and ultimately societal progression. Having rebuffed the notion of a universal truth and identified that a one-sided epistemology may leave the research open to the very criticism it seeks to articulate, the researcher must exhibit ‘reflexive epistemological diversity’, that is they must recognise ‘that complexity and contingency require more than just one level of explanation’ (2008, p.337). Such an outlook is not without conflict or problems. Yet, as David argues, it extends the notion of ‘peer’ outside the sociological discipline to give a multifaceted understanding of ‘truth’.

Whilst dominant discourse and attendant political strategies might well hold that the problems associated with international terrorism are inherent to Islam, the bias of this epistemological stance locates all responsibility for terrorism with Muslims. Such a position not only distorts but also simplifies a complex problem, as infamously demonstrated in George W Bush’s declaration that ‘you are either with us, or against us’ during his Address to Congress (Bush, 2001). As explained in Chapter One, such chronic reductionism finds intellectual support in Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis (1993). Rather than simply absolving Islam and its followers of any responsibility for global tensions and conflicts the arguments invoked by the British State to justify its
position will be addressed. In doing so, it will apply Crotty’s notion of ‘constructivism’ to introduce ‘objectivity and subjectivity together indissolubly’ (1998, p.44), with the wider goal of uncovering the social construction of ‘multiple truths’ concerning Islam and Muslims. Having discussed the ways in which different epistemologies may influence the research we will now go on to examine how the subjectivity of the researcher may impact on research.

Of particular value to this study is the fact the researcher is a second generation British-Muslim of Pakistani descent. Therefore in relation to approaches to primary research not only were cultural reference points and language largely mutual, it is probable participants were more likely to be open and honest about their feelings and opinions. During the stages of empirical data gathering I had a strong sense that sharing thoughts and reflections with those of a shared cultural heritage, enabling me to be privy to data that someone perceived as an ‘outsider’ may not have been given access to. An example of the benefits of this position is evidenced throughout the analysis.

Narrative extracts show how participants communicated in a combination of English and Punjabi/Urdu idiom. This combined use of language is inextricably linked to the hybrid experience and allows the effective communication of behaviours enunciated in the Third Space (Bhabha, 2004, p.55) that might, if communicated in English, be lost in translation. In short, British-Muslim hybridity has its own language, culture and customs with which the researcher is conversant. This included references to popular culture, Islamic knowledge and culture specific phenomenon, for example the beraderi network [kinship system] that will be examined in relation to political participation and engagement in Chapter Eight. An ability to understand the nuances of the sample’s experiences and perceptions lies at the heart of GTM and this thesis and might have been compromised if language and cultural references between researcher and sample were not aligned. This
was particularly useful during the semi-structured interview phase, particularly for the
discussion of sensitive issues such as gender inequality in Islam. As Chapter Seven will
illustrate, some female participants felt negatively judged by both Western feminism and
inherited Islamic traditions, which they assumed as a Muslim woman the researcher would
understand and so enabled them to express themselves more candidly on issues at the
intersection of gender, religion and Britishness.

By building trust with the participants at the focus group stage the researcher was
able to gain greater insight into more sensitive aspects of being British and Muslim. Trust
is in part built on the reciprocity of the thesis’s endeavour to highlight those issues most
salient to the sample and their community. Thomas and Sanderson (2011) in a study on
young British-Muslims of Pakistani descent highlight the need to develop trust between
researcher and sample to maximise opportunities for open and honest responses and how
they enlisted the assistance of youth workers of the same ethnic background. Developing
trust is especially important in research with the British-Muslim community given their
increasing lack of trust in security agencies (Spalek 2011) and the State, as discussed in
Chapter One. This sense of comfort and sharing amongst people considered to be similar to
oneself was recognised by Erving Goffman in his much cited text ‘Stigma: Management of
a Spoiled Identity’. His concept of the ‘own and the wise’ (1963, p.19) aligns with the
participant/researcher relationship of this study, the ‘own’ being those who are perceived
to share his or her stigma and the ‘wise’ those believed to be ‘normal’ people who can
relate their stigmatised status. To underscore these effects Spalek (2005) studied the
experience of Black Muslim women post 9/11. She discusses how researcher social
positioning may affect degree of participant engagement and quality of data generated.
Whilst white female researchers may identify with Black Muslim women participants in
terms of gender, she asserts they cannot possibly understand their experience of being
Black and Muslim. She argues racial aspects of the researcher’s identity may serve to reproduce dominant power relations which significantly influence data collection and analysis. Academics working in the field of community relations and security policy, as highlighted by the Open Society Foundation 'Impact of counter-terrorism on communities: Methodology report' (2012), have critically reflected on the effect researcher demographic background may have on research outcomes. They feel if tempered by researcher honesty, transparency and reflexivity, emotions can enhance empathy and understanding of participant responses and experiences.

The knowledge and enculturation I possessed as a researcher with roots within the community under study were important preventative barriers against misrepresentation of data and opportunistic or tokenistic approaches the research. Further, the similar lived experience I shared with the sample was advantageous in terms ability to understand the intricate double-binds, conflicts and advantageous aspects of being young, Muslim and British. These issues will be examined in greater depth in Chapters Seven and Eight.

An important point regarding the relationship of researchers to the social world is drawn out by May (2003), who brings attention to the fact data is produced, rather than being ‘out there’ simply awaiting collection. This returns to the issue knowledge production. Having identified epistemology as one parameter of knowledge production, it must be noted researcher subjectivity can greatly influence the type of knowledge produced. Spalek et al assert reflexivity is a key aspect of research, as the researcher’s ‘own multiple subject positions and how these may potentially be influencing the research process and research data’ are of crucial consideration (2012, p.33). Consequently researcher honesty and transparency was of crucial concern as a female, born in Pakistan and raised as a Muslim in Britain. Following standard group indicators, as discussed in Chapter One, this may suggest social and economic disadvantage, yet as a postgraduate
student the sample may have placed the researcher in an elite category, both of which can potentially influence the approach, format and conclusions reached. As the potential impact of such subjectivities may undermine research outcomes, it is essential they are identified, reflected upon and addressed accordingly throughout the research process. However, simply aspiring to a commitment to maintain objectivity in the light of researcher social positioning is both unrealistic and naïve. The researcher will follow Becker’s (1967) postulation academic research can never be value free and nor should researchers attempt to be. Instead, academics should apply rigor in research design, data gathering processes and analytic practices. By keeping a research diary, engaging reflectively and consulting with peers and PhD supervisors I attempted to minimise potentially detrimental effects of subjectivity. Rather than obfuscating or denying close attachment to the subject matter it is better perhaps to reflect processually on the positionality of the researcher and be open to other ways of seeing and interpreting the data, akin to Foucault’s hailing of multiple truths.

To briefly discuss the contrasting scenarios that may emerge, a potential disadvantage might be I was prone to overcompensating for the perceived attack on Muslims by absolving the community under study of any blame and thereby erroneously attributing to Muslims en masse a righteous and homogeneously victimised status. This potential problem needs to be born in mind and the researcher must endeavour to report findings faithfully, for example accurately reporting an expression of prejudice or characteristics that mirror dominant representations of Muslims such as misogynistic, anti-Western or anti-Enlightenment. However, on the other hand, as a second generation British-Muslim the researcher might be better able to understand the cultural, religious and linguistic nuances of that community. Any non-Muslim writing about the religious, political and cultural values of Muslims will be prone to interpret them outside the frame
of reference of those they speak about or for. In terms of this thesis the researcher strived to express herself in a manner that both articulated with and remained faithful to the worldview of the sample. In this sense, positionality may have served to enrich the study. In this vein, the work of Gayatari Spivak (1999) promotes the value of comparable lived cultural experiences in enabling the ‘subaltern’ to speak for themselves, rather than having their views translated by those situated within the dominant hegemony. For Spivak this is the only way to contest the ‘epistemic violence’, which she defined as ‘the violence of knowledge production’, and promote ‘non-Westocentric’ ways of knowing, reflecting on and understanding the social world (1999, p.266). As discussed in Chapter Two such notions of contest and opposition are echoed by Homi Bhabha (2004, p.55) in his Third Space thesis.

**Research Methodology**

Before examining the specific methods used the discussion will outline key tenets of GTM and its suitability for this particular study. Over the last thirty years, GTM has emerged as a commonly used approach to data analysis within the Social Sciences. Strauss and Corbin (1998) - two leading proponents of grounded theory - sum up the limits and possibilities of this approach and the kinds of contexts in which it may be inappropriate to use it:

If someone wanted to know whether one drug is more effective than another, than a double blind clinical trial would be more appropriate than grounded theory study. However, if someone wanted to know what it was like to be a participant in a drug
study … then he or she might sensibly engage in a grounded theory project (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p.40).

Whereas a quantitative method is useful for measuring attitudes across large samples, GTM offers a useful framework with which the researcher can access the micro-level. The core aim of this research is to understand rather than measure the British-Muslim experience. Therefore although quantitative methods have been extremely useful in this area of research and will be used to support this study, GTM is oriented toward accessing and analysing people’s descriptions, feelings and perceptions. As Marshall and Rossman (1999) assert, GTM allows a focus on everyday life experiences, and values participants’ narratives and perspectives. Grounded theory originated in the 1960s in the United States in the fields of health and nursing studies and has diffusively developed across social science disciplines over subsequent decades. Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin’s seminal ‘The Discovery of Grounded Theory’ (1967) articulates the authors’ interpretation and application of Grounded Theory as a research strategy. At the time, it was largely seen as response to the predominantly quantitative research paradigms.

As its usage has diverged, differing approaches to grounded theory have developed over time, some which have closely followed Strauss and Corbin’s original formulation and others have drawn upon aspects of it in line with the epistemological perspective assumed. Despite the existence of variances, Hutchison, Johnston and Breckon (2009) assemble a number of common underlying principles of the methodology. These are that it uses an iterative process, that the sample is aimed at generating theory and that analytical codes and categories are derived from the data itself through coding and systematic comparisons. Using GTM enables the researcher to derive key themes and trends which
arise in the data set and to use these for theoretical comparison and conceptual development.

In its original form, grounded theory methodology advocates creating new theory consisting of interrelated concepts rather than testing existing theories. Nevertheless, as its applications have evolved many researchers have also used the GTM to test and stretch existing social theories (Mythen and Khan, 2013). This study will seek to achieve both of these objectives. The researcher intends to grow and develop concepts established directly from the testimonies of participants, as well as draw upon, apply and extend existing theories. To be clear, the researcher will not be testing particular theories nor seeking to subject them to intense scrutiny. Rather, extant theories will be deployed to elucidate aspects of the data whilst also offering the researcher’s own conceptual contribution. A study guided by GTM does not seek representativeness to achieve statistical generalisability, but instead aims to explain and sometimes predict phenomena based on empirical data. The data collection phase typically consists of focus groups and in-depth semi-structured interviews but also employed other methods such as historical archiving. GTM provides guidelines for data collection and analysis consisting of coding, comparisons between data, memo writing and theoretical sampling. These processes will be discussed in general here and in more specific detail in Chapter Four which will detail the exact processes and practices deployed in this study.

Using Grounded Theory: Data Collection and Analysis

The following section will detail how the data was collected and analysed, it will begin by discussing the focus groups then move on to discuss the semi-structured interviews. Before doing so it will give a brief overview of lessons learnt during the pilot
study, which was the empirical research aspect required in completion of the researcher’s MA in Research Methodology (Sociology and Social Policy) at the University of Liverpool.

This process allowed invaluable insight with regards to the research process. Firstly, use of only focus groups in the pilot highlighted the need to conduct semi-structured interviews for the current project. This allowed both further discussion of salient themes emerging from the focus groups and an in-built member checking facility to assure original meanings articulated by the participants were not lost once encoding commenced, thereby facilitating an efficient iterative process. Secondly, the pilot study was based on participants obtained from a snowball sample, some of whom were personally known to the researcher. Lack of distance from these participants gave rise to problems that may have affected the data including conversations within focus groups that disclosed researcher’s personal opinions on the subject under study and its attendant effects such as ‘social desirability’ in other members of the sample. In light of this, although snowball sampling was employed in the current study, the final focus groups comprised entirely of participants with whom the researcher had no prior contact. Thirdly, moderating the pilot study focus groups gave the researcher confidence and experience in both managing strong personalities, drawing out quieter voices, whilst always being mindful of eliciting as much relevant information as possible. Lastly the pilot study gave rise to a series of ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer, 1969, p.86), which became the six key elements that make up the contextual and theoretical foundations of this study, as presented in Chapters One and Two respectively.

In keeping with the principles advocated by Blumer (1969) with regards sensitising concepts, concepts identified from prior sources are permissible so long as the researcher does not impose them on emergent themes thereby corrupting the GTM process, this is the
case here. Although the sensitising concepts form the basis of the literature review and theoretical platform of this study, they do not influence the core emergent themes which are purely based on patterns that emerged from the participant narratives. Having indexed the pilot study and its usefulness in creating a rigorous methodology, the data collection and analysis process will now be examined.

Table 1: Participant details.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus group</th>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Participant</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Adnan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Catering Assistant (apprenticeship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Allah Ditta</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Telesales Call Worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fahima</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Care Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>La-Rayb</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (further education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mohsin</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nusaiba</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Full-time student (further education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Pia</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Part-time student (further education)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>Yahya</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Amina</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Faheema</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fazal Jaan</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mariam</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Naseema</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rahila</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Samina</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>17</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Sofie</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Full-time student (sixth form college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Basanti</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Full-time child carer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Henna</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Primary school teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Jay</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Youth worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Kamran</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Warehouse Operative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mumtaaz</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Post graduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rabiya</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Administrative Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Raheem</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>Trainee solicitor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>Shah Jahan</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>Retail Assistant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Amaya</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Isha</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Jalal</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Layani</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Rayya</td>
<td>F</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Rehan</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Full-time postgraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Salim</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saluddin</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Full-time undergraduate student</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The research set out to uncover the views of young British-Muslims of Pakistani origin in the North West of England by conducting primary research that consisted of two inter-connected phases of qualitative research: focus groups and semi-structured interviews. Thirty-two participants were enlisted in the research and assigned to one of the four focus groups. Three of the focus groups comprised of four males and four females, whilst focus group two comprised solely of female participants. There were eight follow up semi-structured interviews, four male and four female. Table 1 above shows both demographic background details of the sample such as age, gender and occupation and identifies those participants chosen for interview. An overview of the iterative principles of theoretical sampling is provided later on below in Figure 1.

Having examined the tools best suited to the research, the discussion will now elucidate how participants were selected. Morgan and Kreuger (1997) and Silverman (2001) agree that the quality of focus group data depends on three fundamental factors: firstly, sampling and respondent selection; secondly, data collection, especially the selection of relevant questions; and lastly, effective analysis. Each of these will now be discussed in relation to this study. GTM typically uses a form of purposive sampling, known as theoretical sampling, (Hammersley, 1989 in Jupp, 2006, p.299) where participants are selected according to criteria specified by the researcher based on the pilot study. Theoretical sampling is a foundational part of GTM advocated by Glaser and Strauss (1967). It is tied to the purpose of generating and developing theoretical ideas, rather than being aimed at producing findings that are representative of a population. This form of sampling does not take place at a single point in the inquiry process, but is a recurrent feature: at various times the researcher must ask what settings, events, people etc. it would be worthwhile investigating next in order to develop aspects of the emerging theory. This is epitomised by the selection of semi-structured interviewees from the
original sample who would further understanding of the emergent themes. In this way, theoretical sampling is guided by, and helps to generate truly *grounded* theory (Hammersley 1989 in Jupp, 2006, p.299). In terms of the semi-structured interviews the respondents were selected from the initial pool of focus group respondents. The recruitment of respondents for interview has been discussed at length by Rubin and Rubin (1995). They identify four key areas that should be addressed with some attention: finding knowledgeable respondents, obtaining a range of views, testing emerging themes and choosing those interviewees that may extend the results. In reality however recruitment can happen on an ‘ad hoc chance basis’ (Rapley, 2004, p. 17). Indeed, in the case of the current study the interviewees all came from the focus group pool. However, despite this non-random selection process, the interviewees still adhere to Rubin and Rubin’s parameters. Firstly, they are people who are expertly knowledgeable on the lives and experiences of British-Muslim youth. Secondly, the interviews are specifically designed to probe themes that emerged from the focus groups. Thirdly, the interviewees were chosen to extend data from the group discussions, they were seen to be more knowledgeable during the group interaction.

The participants were initially recruited through word of mouth amongst the researcher’s immediate community, these participants then recommended other potential participants who were approached by the researcher this process was repeated with new participants. The final group of participants were not known personally by the researcher to avoid bias, and imbalance in group dynamics such relationships might induce. The age range within the participant sample was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, as Phillips (2006) argues, second and third generation Muslims are more likely than other age groups to have hybrid identities. Secondly, as Thomas and Sanderson assert, it is younger rather than older Muslims that feel the most alienated and socially excluded and note ‘the tendency by
younger Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin young Britons to prioritise 'Muslim' identity', (2011, p.1040).
It should also be noted, three of the 7/7 bombers were British-born Muslims of Pakistani heritage, therefore, for these reasons young British-Muslims of Pakistani descent are under particular institutional and legislative scrutiny and so, for the aims of the study they are a purposive sample, which is defined as participants who would be most likely to contribute appropriate data both in terms of relevance and depth (Oliver, 2006).

In the course of data collection four focus groups, each comprising of eight participants were conducted. Figure 1 above show how each of the research questions was de-constructed into five open-ended exploratory questions to generate the focus group discussions. It also illustrates how early analysis and peer review of the data generated open-ended questions for the semi-structured interview phase. For details of both sets of questions see Table 2 below. Kreuger (1997) stresses data analysis should start with the central concerns of the study and therefore discussions were focused around the three interrelated research objectives specified above.

The research is primarily interested in how British-Muslims have been institutionally represented, most notably within media, political and legislative discourses, and how that construction has affected the maintenance and reclamation of a legitimate Muslim self from the remnants of a dismantled and stigmatised social identity. It is also concerned with the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims. Data is collected until theoretical saturation is reached, in other words until no new or relevant data emerges regarding a category and relationships between categories are established (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Once the focus group discussions had been transcribed, read thoroughly a number of times to achieve adequate understanding, analysis commenced. Transcripts were subjected to initial open coding; early areas of focus were identified by the researcher and peer reviewed. The semi-structured interviewees were then selected according to their ability to further illuminate these early areas of focus as dictated
by the principles of theoretical sampling as discussed above, this iterative process continued through the formulation of exploratory questions for the interviews, which were split into see diagram.

Table 2: Overview of the generation of exploratory focus group and semi-structured interview questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Focus group exploratory questions</th>
<th>Interview questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims post 9/11.</td>
<td>1.1 How would you define your identity? 1.2 Has your identity changed following the events of 9/11? 1.3 How could the govt. improve the quality of life for Muslims in the UK? 1.4 What would make the British suicide bombers carry out such attacks? 1.5 How are you perceived by wider British society?</td>
<td>1.1.1 Why has allegiance to the ummah become stronger? 1.1.2 Which Muslim communities do you feel most attached to and why? 1.1.3 How does that attachment manifest itself; in action or sentiment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11.</td>
<td>2.1 How are Muslims routinely portrayed in the Media? 2.2 How accurate is the media portrayal of Muslims &amp; Islam? 2.3 How do you feel about the media portrayal of Muslims? 2.4 Are your views reflected in current Public debates? 2.5 How has media coverage affected you showing visible signs of being Muslim?</td>
<td>2.1.1 How are Muslims excluded &amp; what can be done to improve integration in wider British society? 2.1.2 How do you feel about being British; giving examples of when you feel more or less British? 2.1.3 How does being Muslim conflict with being British?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.</td>
<td>3.1 What do you know about post 9/11 anti-terror legislation? 3.2 What do you think about the current anti-terror focus on Muslims &amp; Asian looking youth? 3.3 How does UK anti-terror legislation make you feel? 3.4 Have your everyday practices changed? 3.5 What are your views on British foreign policy in the Middle East?</td>
<td>3.1.1 What, if any, are the dominant stereotypes of British-Muslims and where do they come from? 3.1.2 How do you resist this stereotyping? 3.1.3 How has British society developed post 9/11 and how is it better or worse?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The research process, data collection, analysis and theory stand in reciprocal relationship with each other (Strauss and Corbin, 1990) and that theory should follow from research, not precede it (Cohen & Manion, 1989). Early analysis of data indicates issues that need exploration; hence the sampling process is guided by the on-going theory development. This iterative process is illustrated by Figure 2 below.
Data collection and analysis take place in alternating sequences. This can also be described as an iterative cycle of induction and deduction, consisting of collection of data and constant comparison between results and new findings in order to guide further data collections (Strauss and Corbin, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994). For these reasons, the development and identification of variables does not take place prior to data collection but instead as part of the data collection process. Consequently, the variables or concepts are initiated by the sample and further developed and conceptualised by the researcher. The study commenced with a pilot study.

It is this process in specific relation to the current study that will now be discussed. To facilitate this discussion a section of narrative from Chapter Six, the analysis of core emergent category two - ‘Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and discipline’, will be used to illustrate the process from participant narrative to concepts, categories and finally theoretical propositions which are the three basic elements of grounded theory.
To identify concepts, the incidents, events, happenings in the data were taken as, potential indicators of phenomena; thereby they were given conceptual labels. This is the first level of analysis is known as open coding. It is a ‘line by line’ process, which in this case was done by hand on hard copies. For example from the following extract:

**Yahya:**

… I swear I’m paranoid it’s because they know I’m Muslim. It could be anything, like feeling like the security guard is following me around a shop …

The researcher de-constructed this sentence using the open code of ‘feeling watched’. As the researcher encountered other incidents, and when after comparison to the first, they appear to resemble the same phenomena, for instance Samina’s assertion that her *hijab* elicits ‘funny looks’:

**Samina:**

It’s like me; I have to get the train to school every day and sometimes the funny looks on peoples’ faces! As soon as they realise I’m Muslim, it’s like they’ve seen a ghost.

It is only by comparing incidents and naming like phenomena with the same term can the theorist accumulate the basic units for theory. In total 286 significant statements were identified in this initial phase (examples of open codes are presented in Tables 4-7, in Chapter Four). The next phase of grounded theory process is identifying categories which
are defined by Corbin and Strauss (1990, p.7). Categories are higher in level and more abstract than the concepts they represent. They are generated through the same analytic process of making comparisons to highlight similarities and differences that is used to produce lower level concepts. Categories are the cornerstones of developing theory. So, ‘feeling watched’ and ‘funny looks’ along with other concepts were grouped into the category of the ‘White Gaze’. The third element of grounded theory is ‘propositions’, which indicate generalised relationships between a category and its concepts and between discrete categories. The process of linking concepts to create categories was repeated with categories to create propositions. For example the category of ‘white gaze’ was linked to a group of concepts that made up the category of ‘self-surveillance’ to create the proposition of ‘Disciplined bodies: interiorisation of Isalmophobia’, which formed part of the core emergent category - ‘Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and discipline’, which forms the first of the four analytical chapters.

At this point QSR-NVivo, a software program for qualitative analysis was used, primarily to assist with content organisation, coding and themes identification, largely as an administrative tool and to factor out human error possible in manual searching of long transcripts. The researcher used Nvivo and manual coding as recommend by Welsh (2002) the combination of manual and computer assisted methods provide the most efficient and rigorous form of encoded analysis. Here Welsh believe it is useful to think of the qualitative research project as a rich tapestry, where the software is the loom which facilitates the knitting. Whilst it cannot determine the final picture of the tapestry, the loom, through its advanced technology can quicken the process of producing it, as well as limiting the weaver’s errors (2002, p.9).

Figure 2 above outlining the iterative process, highlights the process of member checking during the interview stage, peer review and memo writing were all used to enable
the GTM process during analysis. Whilst member checking and peer review are discussed below with regards to credibility of the data, the advantages of memo writing will be briefly described here. Managing the iterative process was facilitated by keeping a research diary, to detail ongoing theoretical development and all analytical decisions. Not only does this demand researcher reflexivity with regards to rooting conceptual and theoretical decisions in participant’s articulations. It is also a record of theoretical decisions and conceptual links in the data that help in organisation of the long and detailed analytical process of GTM.

**Deriving Data: Rigor and Trustworthiness**

The next section of this chapter will address the measures taken to ensure rigorous analysis and trustworthiness of the data in the study. A critique often levelled at qualitative research is that validity and reliability cannot be addressed in the same way as naturalistic inquiry. Guba (1989) advocates the application of four criteria in research design: credibility, in preference to internal validity; transferability, in preference to external validity; dependability, in preference to reliability; and, confirmability, in preference to objectivity (Guba, 1989 cited in Shenton, 2004, p.64)

These criteria closely correspond with those employed by positivists in order to ensure rigorous data collection and analysis. To demonstrate reflective rigor, each of these criteria will be discussed with regards to the current study. However, it must be noted that these factors were considered by the researcher to safeguard the integrity of the research process rather than to emulate the principles of positivism.
Credibility

A fundamental aspect of positivist research is internal validity or the assurance that the study tests what is intended. Merriam (1998) asserts that the qualitative equivalent is credibility, or how congruent the findings are with reality. This factor is one of the fundamental aspects of establishing trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Padgett (1998) recommends six strategies to enhance credibility: prolonged engagement; triangulation, peer debriefing and support; member checking; negative case analysis and auditing. In the current research, the first three of Padgett’s strategies were employed: triangulation, prolonged engagement and peer debriefing and support. With regard to triangulation of method, semi-structured interviews were used to supplement the focus groups. As has been detailed above, in those interviews iterative questioning was used which allowed the researcher an opportunity to conduct some member checking in that she was able to cross check some of the analytical categories, interpretations and conclusions made from the focus group data with participants from whom the data was originally obtained. A further feature of the study pertinent to establishing credibility is prolonged engagement in the field. This refers to the researcher spending sufficient time immersed in the field of study in order to better understand the social setting or phenomenon of interest. Prolonged engagement entails observation of the various aspects of a setting, interacting with a range of people and establishing rapport with members of the culture in question. This rapport and trust is crucial for the present research as it fosters a type of co-construction of meaning between the researcher and the members of the setting. One of the benefits for this study was my location in the field - understood here in terms of the geographical and cultural environs of participants and religious and ethnic heritage. A further means of establishing credibility is by utilising peer debriefing throughout the research process. This enables the researcher not only to confirm perceived trends and
issues in the data but also to uncover perspectives which the researcher may have overlooked or taken for granted. In addition, the process of debriefing also allows the researcher to become aware of her stance towards data and subsequent data analysis, hence returning to the subject of positionality.

**Transferability**

In positivism the primary concern is the applicability of the data at hand to the wider population. This is not relevant in the case of small scale qualitative studies such as this. Rather than generalisability to a broader population, the main concern of this study is to elucidate aspects of the lived experiences and perspectives of a particular group of participants. In as much as the researcher cannot and will not be assuming that these findings pertain to or represent the views of British-Muslims in the round, I will be comparing the findings to both broader trends and cognate empirical studies. To return to transferability, one of the aims of qualitative analysis is ‘transferability’ or the degree to which the results of qualitative research can be transferred to other contexts. Lincoln and Guba (1985) argue that in order to achieve this, the researcher must provide sufficient contextual information to enable the reader to make such a transfer. They recommend ‘thick description’ as a way of achieving a type of external validity: ‘By describing a phenomenon in sufficient detail one can begin to evaluate the extent to which the conclusions drawn are transferable to other times, settings, situations, and people’ (1985, p.300). The analytical chapters accentuate the transferability of this study by comparing and aligning the data with other relevant extant studies.
**Dependability**

Positivism addresses reliability by ensuring if an experiment or study were to be repeated in a similar context, with the same methods and participants, the results achieved would be more or less the same. Of course, the dynamic and changing nature of the phenomenon analysed by qualitative researchers and the different participants that are used in studies renders this goal impossible in absolute terms. Florio-Ruane (1986) cited in Witherell and Noddings (1991) explain that the researchers observations are tied to the particular situation of the study and are thus ‘static and frozen in the ‘ethnographic present’ (1991, p.250). In terms of the current study and its focus on the inherent fluidity of hybrid identities both spatially and temporally, it is almost impossible to recreate results. Particularly as will be argued in Chapter Five that British-Muslim identities, not only co-emerged with specific socio-political events, but solidified and evolved as a reflection and reaction to such events. Therefore any such study is absolutely a snapshot of the ‘ethnographic present’. This can be applied in order to access the same level of data mining in future research, if not results which are similar. For instance, the pilot study was the prototype for the current study and its data revealed 9/11 to be the seminal moment of crystallisation for British-Muslim identity. As a result of this significant finding the researcher decided to ask the exploratory question ‘how has your identity changed since 9/11?’ anticipating similar results to the pilot study. However on this occasion, the majority of participants asserted socio-political events pre-dating 9/11 had caused the British-Muslim identity to both emerge and solidify before 2001. Additionally, given the dynamic nature of human perceptions, the current results could not be duplicated exactly in a replicated study even if the same group of participants were to be used. Nevertheless, it is possible for the thesis to provide a detailed description of all processes involved, thereby, providing a ‘prototype model’ (Shenton, 2004, p.71).
Confirmability

The concept of confirmability is the qualitative equivalent of positivist objectivity in that as far as possible the researcher must ensure that the findings are rooted in participant’s experiences rather than the researcher’s character and preferences. The issue of researcher bias is addressed above, and in line with Miles and Huberman’s (1994) recommendations the researcher has reflexively examined her own predispositions above. In addition to reflexive examination of personal bias and positionality, the use of reflexive research memos, peer review, member checking and triangulation of methods ensure the any theoretical advancement from the data is rooted in the experiences and articulations of the sample.

Matching Data Collection Strategies with Grounded Theory

The study will use both focus groups and in-depth semi-structured interviews to probe British-Muslim youth’s experiences, beliefs and perceptions and the impact of these factors on their self and collective identities, and how this in turn makes them feel, behave and think about their location in British society in a post 9/11 context. This section will discuss the methodology applied and its suitability to meeting the requirements of this study, specifically, it will argue that group discussions and subsequent semi-structured interviews provide an arena within which academic theoretical frameworks can be probed by the researcher in relation to the everyday lived experiences of participants.

The study will focus on empirical rather than library-based research and will seek to assess whether the theoretical arguments presented in Chapter Two are echoed by the lived experiences of British-Muslim Youth. This will be achieved by employing a micro-analytical approach that seeks to give voice to the views of this marginalised social group.
The research focus is explicitly rooted in the experiences and the context of young Muslims’ everyday lives: therefore the methods must facilitate such a bottom up analysis. For this reason qualitative, rather than quantitative methods will be used to produce data in the form of detailed accounts or, in Clifford Geertz’s (1972) terms, ‘thick description’. As discussed previously, the research does not purport to provide generalizable trends in the form of statistical analysis, rather its exploratory nature allows for the emergence of patterns as the study unfolds. In doing so, it adheres to GTM, in that theoretical insights or conclusions should emerge from the lived experience and values of participants. The primary method of focus groups selected for the study is advocated by Herbert Blumer as an exemplary technique of grounded theory, ‘… a discussion group is a more valuable many times over than a representative sample. Such a group discussing collectively their sphere of life and probing as they meet disagreements, will do more to lift the veil covering the sphere of life than any other device that I know of” (1969, p.41). Following these principles, the research was inductive and exploratory in nature striving to be open to the reality of the sample. The onus of the study is to understand the intricacies of the British-Muslim experience in the post 9/11 era and how this impacts on their individual and collective Muslim identities. The exploratory nature of the focus group is advanced by semi-structured interviews that are based on the most salient themes identified from the group discussions. Therefore, it is based on the ‘sensitising concepts’ (Blumer, 1969, p.86) that have arisen rather than those enforced by the researcher and as such remains faithful to the grounded theory approach. Therefore the data derived from the semi-structured interviews directly reflects the concerns of the sample and as such remains faithful to the principles of GTM.

For the purposes of the study focus groups and semi-structured interviews have been chosen above other qualitative methods. Each method will be discussed in turn and in
doing so elucidate the particular advantages of each in uncovering data relevant to the three research aims of this study, however the reasons why other qualitative methods were rejected will be briefly discussed.

Whilst content analysis of relevant literature provides a viable option the many comprehensive studies on Muslim representation (Poole, 2002; Richardson, 2001) mean a similar study would add little of significant value. Although individual interviews produce in-depth data, they have greater resource implications than focus groups which are as effective in terms of data (Fern, 1982), but more economical with regards to resources (Crabtree et. al, 1993). The particular advantage of interviews over focus groups is that each individual participant is equally able to express him/herself, a factor that is sometimes affected by group dynamics when employing focus groups. Yet focus groups also offer particular advantages over interviews in terms of this study. Firstly, as Kreuger (2003) argues, focus groups provide marginalised groups with a platform to express themselves freely. Having the security of being amongst peers with similar views may generate a more open discussion. Secondly, as Morgan (1993) asserts, focus groups are especially advantageous when investigating complex situations and attitudes. Thirdly, focus groups may provide direct opportunity to witness differences within what is perceived as a homogeneous group. Without group interaction, discussion and disagreement this would not be possible. Lastly, according to Silverman (2002) focus groups create environments that convey a humane sensitivity conducive to in depth discussions of delicate subjects, a necessity given the sensitive nature of the research.

Focus groups allow access to a range of opinions and experiences relatively quickly, but also leave scope for participants to expand on themes important to them. As each participant prompts other group members into discussing their particular views the dynamics of focus groups stimulate reflection and can produce more perceptive insights
from each participant than they might have produced without the benefits of group interaction. Spalek et al (2012) point to Lister and Jarvis’ (2012) successful use of focus groups to research citizenship and counter-terrorism measures to highlight the methods particular advantage when dealing with both hard to reach groups and ‘secretive and sensitive’ (2012, p.32) nature of counter-terrorism measures which are of key concern to this study.

Despite the advantages of focus groups in meeting the objectives of this research, their limitations must also be recognised in order to build robustness into the design. Firstly, group dynamics may obscure important individual differences of opinion and experience that might more easily be accessed in individual interviews. However, awareness and preparation on the part of the moderator can serve to minimise negative in-group dynamics. Advice for moderators is covered extensively in Kreuger and Casey (2000). They assert that moderating involves three rudimentary elements: firstly, facilitating interactions of the participants with each other, secondly, to ‘people manage’ in order to encourage quiet participants and discourage those who might takeover debate, and thirdly, to balance the discussion, keeping it relevant without impeding themes that might emerge, so to control without interference. As the researcher I adhered to this advice establishing rapport with participants, using effective prompts to facilitate group discussion and essentially encouraging group members to interact with each other, which Morgan (1988, p.12) asserts is the hallmark of an effective focus group. Despite taking such advice from the literature on moderating, it must be conceded that moderating is a skill learned over time, awareness in theory does not take the place of years of actual experience. Thus the first limitation of methodology is the difficulty of effective moderating. This difficulty was somewhat alleviated by the researcher’s experience in moderating focus groups with similar age and ethnic dynamics in the pilot study and undergraduate research.
The next part of this section will explain the choice of semi-structured interviews to enhance the understanding of the issues the participants highlighted as being the most important to them (within the subject area) during the course of the focus group discussions. It will also explain how the atmosphere of one to one interviews might provide a better environment to explore the issues pertaining to research aim three. Employing focus groups as a tool is compatible with the epistemological and theoretical background of the thesis. Semi-structured interviews are also aligned with the grounded methodology applied by the research in that they seek to explore the lived experiences of the participants rather than dictate parameters in the same way as quantitative tools. Finally, this method makes optimum use of the focus group generated data by using it as a springboard of sensitising concepts to explore in more detail that which is important to participants.

Semi-structured interviews were used to compliment the use of focus groups for a range of reasons. Semi-structured interviews, like focus groups, represent a commonly used and reliable qualitative research method (Kitchin and Tate, 2000, p.13). As Longhurst states, both are used to collect data on a diverse range of subjects and are similar in that they are conversational and informal in tone and allow for an open response in the words of the participant (2003, p.119). He goes on to define semi-structured interviews thus: ‘a semi-structured interview is a verbal interchange where one person, the interviewer, attempts to elicit information from another person by asking questions’ (2003, p.116). Further, he asserts that semi-structured interviews offer the interviewer the opportunity to explore an issue with relatively little restraint, whilst allowing interviewees to express their opinions, concerns and feelings in some depth. Semi-structured interviews essentially comprise of a conversation between interviewer and interviewee, ‘but in ways that are self-conscious, orderly and partially structured’ (Longhurst 2003, p.116). Despite this, they
have the capacity to unfold in a conversational manner that encourages participants to
explore issues they feel are important. Of course, as Kreuger and Casey (2000) point out,
the interviewer’s technique and her ability to put the participant at ease are crucial to the
collection of meaningful data. They assert that interviews are ‘about listening. It is about
paying attention. It is about being open to hear what people have to say. It is about creating
a comfortable environment for people to share. It is about being careful and systematic
with the things people tell you’ (2000, p.xi). Interview questions should therefore give as
little guidance as possible to allow the interviewees to talk about what is of importance to
them regarding a given context.

The thesis has already explained the choice of using qualitative research and how
the bottom up grounded analysis associated with GTM is the most relevant method. The
specific tool of semi-structured interviews is deemed to be advantageous for this particular
study because using both focus groups and interviews optimises the strengths of both. The
focus groups are employed in order to identify the important issues and the interviews give
the possibility of examining those factors in greater detail to generate rich data which is
grounded in the reality of the participant’s lives.

**Ethical Considerations**

Before entering the field, clearance had to be sought via the University’s ethical
research process. This entailed due examination of the ethical dilemmas and practical
management issues in conducting focus groups and interviews. A risk assessment was
undertaken and strategies for handling situations in which participants may be emotionally
unsettled were discussed with supervisors.
Aside, from adhering to the formal ethical standards and protocols, reflecting on the wider ethical issues is of much value in a study such as this. Max Weber’s concern with the bureaucratisation of societal institutions has certainly followed in academic practice. Illuminated vividly by C. Wright Mills (1959), this process has more recently become a hotly disputed concern for researchers as university lead ethics committees dictate ever more stringent regulations upon future research. Haggerty (2004) has coined the phrase ‘ethics creep’ to identify this phenomenon, and it is one which the current research had to address early in the process.

Whilst concerns about consent, beneficence and deception are easily allayed, the issues of anonymity and disclosure may be problematic as the research commences. Each of these issues will be addressed briefly. As regards consent, the study obtained written, informed consent from each participant. They were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation and that they were free to withdraw at any time. Participants were debriefed. It was envisaged that the issue of deception would not be an issue as the researcher intends to be transparent about all aspects of the study. In terms of beneficence, the thrust of the research is to give the participants a rare opportunity to voice their opinion and air their experiences. The intention of which is to initiate a fuller, less biased and more honest discourse of Islam and Muslims, in which of course the participants have a vested interest.

The ethical issues that may become problematic during the research process is that of anonymity and disclosure. At its core the study area is a very sensitive one particularly for the participants who are subject to arguably oppressive anti-terror legislation. Past research has shown frustration and anger voiced by British-Muslim youth at their treatment by police, the State and the law courts. It was recognised that focus group discussions could uncover conversations about the legitimacy of terror, justification of or the
glorification of terrorist acts. The Anti-Terror Act 2006 stipulates such opinions are now considered against the law, and would technically be deemed illegal. Of course, this would pose issues for disclosure of what the researcher has previously agreed would remain undisclosed whilst participant identities would remain anonymous.

The ethical reflections presented here may seem naïve but this may be due to researcher education in this area tends to be an ‘add on’ element at the end of a course rather than a central pillar of the social sciences at undergraduate level - a factor which returns the discussion back to Haggarty’s ‘ethics creep’. Many authors (Israel and Hay, 2006; Hemmings, 2006; Dingwall, 2007) propose that rather than increasing ethics regulation researchers should be educated to conduct nothing less than ethically sound research. They correctly reason that the ultimate responsibility lies with the researcher, because it is the individual who will make the ethical decisions during the actual study, at which time all the previously stipulated guidelines are secondary to an individual’s actual conduct. The research will be conducted only after the University of Liverpool has given its consent through the ethical procedure in which the methods selected will be subject to independent scrutiny.

To summarise, this chapter has presented the three research aims of this thesis:

1) To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security measures on British-Muslims post 9/11

2) To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented since 9/11.

3) To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.
It then went on to specify how the empirical aspect of the thesis would fulfil those aims by examining the five most important elements of that primary research; epistemology, research design, data collection strategies, data analysis and ethical considerations. Part one explored the epistemological foundations of the study, examining the issue of researcher subjectivity and how this might potentially enhance or impede the study. It also discussed measures to combat or augment ‘researcher effects’ where this might be necessary. Part two elaborated the research design, the use of focus groups and interviews and their suitability to this study in comparison with other methods. Part three outlined the data collection strategies deployed whilst part four examines the process of data analysis. Lastly, the ethical considerations relevant to the thesis were discussed. Thus far, the thesis has explored the social, political and legislative context of the study in Chapter One. Chapter Two has explored the theoretical frameworks relevant to the discussion of identity, hybridity and power. The methodological chapter has examined the most important aspects of conducting a bottom up sociological analysis. The remaining discussion will focus on the analysis of the data generated by the primary research.
Chapter four

Overview of Data

As is common in empirical studies of this kind, a wide range of rich data was gathered. In analysing the data it became clear that certain areas of experience were raised and reflected on with great frequency and in some depth. These areas of experience will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five through to Chapter Eight. What I intend to do in this chapter is to provide a clear and concise overview of the data gathered. For expediency this chapter will present only those themes which connect directly to the research questions, although the richness of the data yielded many other topics for investigation. Four core emergent categories (CEC) emerged from the focus group narratives, which are detailed below in Table 3.

Table 3: Summary of the relationship between core emergent categories and the research questions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research questions</th>
<th>Exploratory themes</th>
<th>Core emergent categories (theoretical concepts)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims post 9/11.</td>
<td>1.1 Security policy.</td>
<td>1.1.1 Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and Discipline.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11.</td>
<td>2.1 Representation.</td>
<td>2.1.1 Identity: Umma (re) attachment and the solidification of identity. 2.1.2 Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and discipline. 2.1.3 Embodied Islam: gender surveillance and Muslim identities. 2.1.4 Layers of resistance: rejection, ambiguity and duality.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.</td>
<td>3.1 Identity.</td>
<td>3.1.1 Identity: Umma (re) attachment and the solidification of identity. 3.1.2 Embodied Islam: gender surveillance and Muslim identities. 3.1.3 Layers of resistance: rejection, ambiguity and duality.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Whilst frequencies are not required in thematic analysis, particularly for a qualitative study of this size, the numbers of participants affirming a particular notion, theme or category are included to convey its prominence among the sample.

As Table 3 above shows, the initial three research questions were reformulated into three exploratory themes, each for which a subset of exploratory questions were developed to generate relevant data through each of the four focus group discussions. Transcriptions of the narratives generated by each of these focus group discussions were then deconstructed or ‘opened’ using and reconstructed as focused codes, to be further grouped and categorised into core emergent subcategories (ES) and finally grouped into four core emergent categories according to grounded theory using a combination of hardcopy line by line coding and QSR-NVivo CAQDAS. Thus, while Chapter Three provided a theoretical understanding of Grounded Theory Methodology (GTM) and its suitability to interrogate the particular research questions associated with this study, this chapter applies those principles to the current dataset and explicitly shows the evolution of the raw data to core emergent themes that provide the foundations of the following four data analysis chapters.

In keeping with the parameters of grounded theory methodology, the analytical process generated more varied and detailed themes than initially anticipated, consequently the three initial research questions yielded four core emergent categories or theoretical concepts as follows:

1) *Ummatic* (re)attachment, emergence and the solidification of identity

2) Excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination

3) Embodied Islam: gender, surveillance and Muslim identities

4) Layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality
Each of these categories corresponds to the titles of Chapter Five through to Chapter Eight respectively. Therefore, whilst the initial research questions are explicitly answered they are addressed according to one or more core emergent category and consequently subject to analysis under more than one of the following analysis chapters. For example, whereas research question one relates only to core emergent category two and is therefore only addressed in Chapter Six, research question two relates to all four core emergent categories and is therefore addressed in each of the four analysis chapters, and so on.

The research data is presented in this chapter in four sections according to four core emergent categories. Each section provides a brief narrative describing the most salient findings related to a particular core emergent category, organised according to emergent subcategories therein and is accompanied by a table to show which themes or codes identified during the open coding stage it was generated from and to illustrate how the core emergent category under discussion was arrived at. As such, they outline the coding process from the initial open coding to the focused axial coding phase, at which point the codes were collapsed to form sets of emergent subcategories (ES), which were then finally grouped into the four core emergent categories: Ummatic (re) attachments and solidification of identity; Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and discipline; Embodied Islam: Gender, Surveillance and Muslim Identities; and Layers of Resistance, Ambiguity and Duality.

(CEC 1) Ummatic (Re) Attachment, emergence and Solidification of identity

This section presents the most significant findings emerging from participant’s narratives regarding their everyday experiences of negotiating hybridised identities and their experiences of being both British and Muslim. The data is presented so as to
correspond to the three emergent subcategories shown in Table 4 below, which outlines the coding scheme used to generate the first core emergent category - ‘Identity: Ummatic (re) attachments and solidification of identity’.

Table 4: Summary of themes generated from participant narratives re: Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core emergent categories (theoretical concepts)</th>
<th>Emergent subcategories (axial thematic coding)</th>
<th>Focused codes (category development)</th>
<th>Open codes* (identification of initial themes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Ummatic (re) attachment, emergence and the solidification of identity.</td>
<td>1.1 The Rushdie Affair and challenges to British-Muslim identity.</td>
<td>1.1.1 Identity affecting events. 1.1.2 Emergence of Islamophobia. 1.1.3 Muslim politicisation.</td>
<td>The Rushdie Affair Bosnia 2001 riots ‘War on Terror’ Muslim primacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ruptured Britishness Chameleonism Strategic silence Resisting Islamophobia Ummatic allegiance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2 Domestic Orientalism, Islamophobia and ummatic oppression.</td>
<td>1.2.1 Domestic Islamophobia. 1.2.2 Ummatic oppression. 1.2.3 Reactive pride identity. 1.2.4 Irreconcilability thesis.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3 Irreconcilability: a clash of identities?</td>
<td>1.3.1 Cherry picking and Interstitial Observers. 1.3.2 Impression Management. 1.3.3 Defending Islam: performing the ‘moderate Muslim’. 1.3.4 Ruptured Hybridity.</td>
<td>Hybrid identity Gendered Islamophobia Sense of Britishness Ethnic allegiance Gender allegiance Anti-terrorism legislation Palestine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(ES 1.1) The Rushdie Affair and challenges to British-Muslim identity

The data set generated a total 9 open codes that represent the ways in which participants referenced their perception of how British-Muslim identity emerged. During the open coding phase 7 participants referred to the ‘Rushdie affair’, 9 the transition from colour racism to specifically anti-Muslim discrimination, 5 to the origins of UK Muslim mobilisation. Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 1 below.
Jay:
So we don’t even have freedom of speech. The bloody BNP do, but we don’t. Scumbags like Rushdie can say what they want about Islam, even about the Prophet (PBUH), but we can’t say anything. Freedom of speech only works one way when it comes to Muslims.

Rehan:
So they’re never going to try to understand how it is for Muslims. They’re just going to go with whatever’s going to attract attention. It’s like we’ve already said, look at Rushdie in the 80s. It was obvious to anyone with half a brain cell it was going to offend anyone Muslim because of all the distorted references to the Quran and the caricatures of the Prophet.

Saluddin:
It’s like they [the media] always have to show the ‘shock horror’ footage of Muslims. You know, like the news reports you get on Iran or the Middle East where they’re burning flags and beating their chests. It’s such a fucking cliché…, but they love that stereotype.

(ES 1.2) Domestic Orientalism, Islamophobia and ummatic oppression

Of the open codes identified with regards to solidification, 14 participants cited domestic Islamophobia and 19 cited Ummatic oppression as contributory factors. According to most participants Muslim concerns are not reflected in public discourses (19), of whom 9 alluded to how the non-Muslim British population is unable or unwilling to understand the Muslim standpoint regarding British foreign policy toward Muslim countries. Most participants expressed strong views on British foreign policy, such as their opposition war in Iraq (13) or the UK’s alleged complicity in the oppression of Palestinians by the Israeli State (14). British military intervention and the perceived exploitation of
Muslim countries are seen by many participants to generate widespread anger and resentment among Muslims (17). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 2 below.

Box 2: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 1.2

**Naseema:**
They need to take responsibility for what they’ve done, like to Muslims in Iraq, to us here in this country. They know they shouldn’t have invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. They knew it wasn’t right. They didn’t care. There the ones who’ve created this situation, turned everyone against us. That’s why we’re under constant attack.

**Rahila:**
I don’t think the government understands really. They don’t realise how much what it’s doing in Iraq and Afghanistan angers Muslims living here. They don’t understand how angry it makes us. Not that any of them care. I don’t think they see being anything to do with them. It’s just something happening that doesn’t really have anything to do with their lives. That’s why they can’t get their heads around how pissed off it makes you if you’re Muslim.

**Amina:**
Muslims are dying all over the world. Look how many have died in Afghanistan and Iraq now. Western countries aren’t interested, so long as they keep control to do what they’re doing there. No one does anything. You’re never going to get countries like Britain or America doing anything, not unless it’s going to benefit them in some way. Look at Kosovo, thousands of Muslims were killed, women, children, old people; the West did nothing until it was too late. They’re just hypocrites, only out for themselves. They’re all talk, all this talk of freedom, wanting to bring peace, its rubbish, isn’t it (?) They only get involved when there’s something in it for them, like with Iraq.
Irreconcilability: a clash of identities?

Whilst 28 participants attributed the primacy of Islam to their identity, most attributed more than one facet, with 26 asserting a strong sense of Britishness and 19 identifying themselves as having a Pakistani heritage. A further 11 participants asserted the importance of gender, of which 9 were female. Most participants asserted two or more contributory facets to their identity. Participants reported the following ways British-Muslims dealt with hybridity on an everyday basis: cherry picking and as interstitial observers (11), impression Management through ‘chameleonism’ and strategic silence (9), defending Islam by performing the ‘moderate Muslim’ (7), and ‘resisting Islamophobia and ummatic defence’ (14). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 3 below.

Box 3: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 1.3

Rayya:
If you’re Muslim, that religious, cultural identity is going to be the main thing about you. It’s always going to be key to who you are.

Sofie:
Obviously different things make up who you are, and obviously some of those things are going to be more important than others. Like, I’d see myself firstly as Muslim, then Pakistani because that’s where my parents are from, and then I’m British because this is where I grew up, and then of course I’m also female.

Yahya:
I was born here. This was where I grew up. So yeah, I’m British…, but definitely with a Muslim vibe, you know.
Naseema:
Yeah I’m British, but I still see myself as Muslim. I’m a British-Muslim because I was born here and grew up here, but if you’re British…, that doesn’t stop you being Muslim, does it (?)

(CEC 2) Excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination.

Guided by the findings emerging from the data, this section shows how participants believe themselves to be excluded at both an institutional level and through their everyday interactions with non-Muslim British society. The data is presented so as to correspond to the five emergent subcategories shown in Table 3, which outlines the coding scheme used to generate the second core emergent category of ‘Excluding Muslims: discrimination, regulation and discipline’.

Table 5: Summary of themes generated from participant narratives re: Exclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core emergent categories (theoretical concepts)</th>
<th>Emergent subcategories (axial thematic coding)</th>
<th>Focused codes (category development)</th>
<th>Open codes* (identification of initial themes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination.</td>
<td>2.1 Islamophobia: a socially acceptable prejudice? 2.1.1 Public interiorisation of institutional representation. 2.1.2 British-Muslim interiorisation of institutional representation. 2.1.3 Media representation. 2.1.4 Political representation.</td>
<td>Islamophobia examples Domestic Muslim oppression legislation Pre-emption Racial profiling Public portrayal of Muslims Media representation of Muslims Political representation of Muslims Public negativity Funny looks The ‘white gaze’ Increased experiences of Physical attack Institutional surveillance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
(ES 2.1) Islamophobia: a socially acceptable prejudice?

For most participants societal institutions are seen as having little understanding of Islam or Muslim interests (19). The majority of participants asserted the prevalence of neo-Orientalist perceptions of Muslims within British society (24), with a further 6 participants citing how Islamophobia has become almost acceptable form of prejudice. Consequently 25 participants reported a general sense of being subject to surveillance both institutionally (10) and through their everyday interactions with the non-Muslim population (13). 16 participants, of whom 12 were female, pointed to the gendered nature of Muslim stereotypes that has become normalised within public discourse, highlighting the perceived patriarchal oppression of Muslim women allegedly inherent within Islamic cultures. Participants identified similar ‘traits’ in the public and media perception representations of Muslims. Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 4 below.

Box 4: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 2.1

Fazal Jaan:
Basically we’re seen as either terrorists, or at least supporting terrorism. What do they think we’re like, like we’re all obsessed with wanting to kill the kafir [non-believer]? They make us out as idiots who can’t think for ourselves, who all believe exactly the same things. It’s so stupid.

Henna:
Generally, we’re shown as backwards, ignorant religious fanatics, who don’t really want anything to do with anyone else. They make out we don’t want anything to do with this country. It’s like we’re all social misfits.
Kamran:

They’re not interested in what we’ve got to say. It’s all about selling papers, so they’re, you know they’re always going to use that footage of Mullahs [religious leaders], all the fanatics, out there chanting, burning flags. It’s no wonder English people feel threatened by us; I mean, if that’s all they see.

(ES 2.2) Exclusionary policy and legislation: the erosion of human rights

Many participants identified how counter-terrorism legislation has effectively criminalised all British-Muslims (11), with participants asserting its implementation has significantly eroded their human rights (6). Whilst some participants cited how counter-terrorism legislation elicits fear of wrongful arrest (15), several participants recounted personal experiences, or those of male relatives or acquaintances, of counter-terrorism policing, most commonly in the form of ‘stop and search’ under section 44 (11). In addition to this general sense of the police abusing counter-terrorism legislation, participants supported the view such policing wrongly focusing on ‘Asian-looking’ youth (17). Most participants felt the treatment of Muslims by the police to be poor, citing examples of such happening involving themselves or someone they knew (9). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 5 below.

Box 5: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 2.2

Salim:

You do…, but you have to be more careful nowadays. There are certain situations you avoid. There are just some places you don’t go if you’re Muslim. You know you’re going to get trouble. If you look a certain way in them places you know you’re going to get grief, so why put yourself in that
position.

**Nusaiba:**

The thing is you’ve not really got any access to the justice system if that happens to you. Sometimes it never even gets to court. I mean, look at all those guys that ended up in Guantanamo. Most of them still haven’t had a proper court hearing, even after all this time.

**Adnan:**

The problem is you’ve got too many racists in the police. Even before all this kicked off they’d be picking on anyone Asian, anyone who’s not white really. You’re not going to stop it, are you? If you have a racist society you’re going to get a racist police force aren’t you (?)

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**CEC 3) Embodied Islam: Gender, Surveillance and Muslim Identities**

This section presents the findings relating to the Orientalist stigmatisation of Muslims based on participants’ symbolic embodiment of their Muslim identities, how embodied Islam affects participant’s perceptions and everyday interactions within wider British society and the gendered nature of exclusion experienced by Muslim women. The data is presented so as to correspond to the six emergent subcategories shown in Table 4, which outlines the coding scheme used to generate the third core emergent category - ‘Embodied Islam: gender, surveillance and Muslim identities’ (see Table 4).
Table 4: Summary of themes generated from participant narratives re: Embodiment

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*(ES 3.1) Expressing Islam: Sartorial Choice, Regulation and Identity*

12 participants referred to sartorial choice, in relation to both dress and personal grooming, and how such choices impact on both the way in which they are received by wider society and the level of integration or exclusion experienced. 17 participants cited how ‘looking’ Muslim, either by virtue of Asian descent or sartorial choice was negatively perceived within non-Muslim British society, with 6 identifying the degree of animosity or hostility faced being dependant on the extent to which a person’s Muslim identity is visible and 9 reported how visible signs such as women veiling or men with beards that identifies
someone as Muslim makes them more vulnerable to attack Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 6 below.

Box 6: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 3.1

Samina:
Yes, they have, but, I don’t think it’s mattered as much as it does now. If you look more obviously Muslim, like with a hijab or jubbah, you’re going to be more of a target. So, I think the whole terrorism thing makes Muslims more conscious of how they look. It’s going to make some people dress down, so they don’t look so obviously Muslim.

Saluddin:
I have, definitely. Like I’m careful where I go. No way would I go out in town at night in a Jubbah. You’re just asking for it, what with all the piss heads. It’s bad enough being Asian. If you’ve got the beard and clothes as well, as soon as they spot you they’re on your case immediately.

Salim:
It’s like when you go to the Mosque and you’re wearing a jubba. Loads of times you get it, groups of dickheads shouting all sorts of crap at you, you know, like they’re so original. They think they’re the first person to ever call a Muslim “Bin Laden”.

(ES 3.2) The Muslim Body, Space and Surveillance

Many participants cited how the symbolically presented Muslim ‘body’ is considered out of place in certain regulated spaces (11), supposedly governed by legislation and practices designed to protect equality of opportunity, with some participants reporting visibly Islamic symbols identifying someone as Muslim are either contested or deemed unacceptable in such spaces as the workplace (7). For some participants anti-
Islamic sentiments are not only expressed by non-Muslims in such spaces, but are expected and often accepted by participants (5). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 7 below.

Box 7: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 3.2

**Mohsin:**
I know that one. It is worse where I used to work because they’d have early and late shifts, so if they’re going out, I never get invited out, but the cheeky bastards put me on early shifts just because they’d have a hangover. They’d never ask me, just go ahead and do it.

**Kamran:**
It makes it really hard [media portrayal of Muslims]. Like at work, most people read the tabloids. They’re not the brightest, so I get a lot of crap because of how I look. I’m not being funny but you don’t get the most educated people in a warehouse, most left [school] without qualifications. Reading those crap papers; it makes them come out with all sorts of anti-Muslim crap. They don’t read anything else, so where else does that kind of racist crap come from?

**Salim:**
I think you definitely have to be more careful now, you know, watch what you say. There are certain situations you just don’t say anything, like at work.

*(ES 3.3) Gendered Islamophobia: Muslim women as public properties?*

16 participants, mostly female (12), noted how they perceive the belief Islam is inherently oppressive toward women is widely accepted within British society that. Whilst 11 participants cited how Muslim women are seen as passive, powerless victims of Islamic
patriarchy, 8 identified traits associated with Muslim men being inherently misogynistic. Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 8 below.

Box 8: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 3.3

**Amaya**

Yeah, because they [politicians] say something ridiculous, like about the *hijab*, the media gets hold of it, then before you know it, the whole country’s talking about it. They’re out there demanding women stop wearing the *hijab*. Sorry, but I just don’t see what all the fuss is about. Why is it divisive? What about that bus driver. He wouldn’t let some woman wearing a *hijab* onto his bus…

**Samina:**

So they think the women are hidden away from the "big bad world"(!) and the guys are wife-beaters. That’s how most white people think. They’ve got this view all Muslim women are downtrodden, like we don’t get to have any say in what happens to us, and they think all Muslim men are misogynists, don’t they (?)

**Salim:**

It’s weird like if I’m out with my sister, she’s younger than me so obviously I’m protective over her but we have joke you know what I mean, but white people find that odd. They’re so used to having this thing in their heads about Muslim men beating their women that when they see us just be chill, they’re surprised.

(ES 3.4) **Veiling: a contested practice**

Many female participants cited the noticeable rise in the institutionalised aversion to veiling and an increased likelihood of covered women experiencing disapproval, verbal abuse and even physical attack (11). Participants saw negative media coverage and
condemnation by public figures of veiling practices as resulting in Muslim women feeling vulnerable to, and victims of, attack (12). Whilst some participants acknowledged veiling practices may serve as a means of controlling and regulating women (9), most asserted it can be motivated by both enforced modesty or by symbolic resistance (16). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 9 below.

Box 9: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 3.4

Saluddin:
Yeah, it’s like when that dickhead Danny said something about my mother, dressing like a “ghost”, you know, because I said she wears a burqa. He thought he was so fucking funny calling it a “peep scarf”. I know he thought it was just joke, but you just don’t say that sort of thing, not about someone’s mother. Well you know what happened.

Amaya:
It’s like that harami hotel owner, the one who laughed in that old Muslim woman’s face when she tried to stay at his place. The scumbag actually asked if she was a terrorist.

Layani:
You know, you can always tell when someone’s trying to slag you off, like because I wear a hijab a lot of the time I’m always getting white girls asking if I’m forced to wear it, or why don’t I get rid of it like it’s something I don’t want to wear. They never believe me when I say I wear it because I want to. So you’re made to feel like even the simplest of things aren’t normal, that they’re a problem. You end up having to justify all sorts things about how you do things, what you eat, why you don’t drink. You know how it is.
Most participants, females in particular, highlighted the prevalence within public opinion of a perceived lack of autonomy on the part of Muslim women that has its roots in what can be described as an ‘oppressive feminism’ (11), with several female participants inadvertently alluding to a ‘double bind’ where Muslim women are both victims of patriarchal aspects of cultures associated with Islam and culturally oppressive forms of Western feminism (6). Several female participants felt ‘feminist’ condemnation of veiling practices in particular negatively affected interactions with the non-Muslim population (7). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 10 below.

Box 10: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 3.5

**Rahila**

It makes me laugh how we’re made out as downtrodden. All these white women trying to save us. What about English girls, how does wearing no clothes make you free? Don’t they realise they’re being pressured into dressing like they do? It’s not their choice.

**Faheema**

They’re [white girls] the ones who sleep around and get pregnant, raped, beaten up by their boyfriends. Its English girls it happens to, not us, because they’re the ones who walk around half naked, drinking and taking drugs to the point they don’t even know what they are doing.

**Layani**

I know what you mean. It’s not like I get attacked whenever I’m out, so I’ll stop wearing a headscarf. The worse thing is people you know who ask you those really stupid questions all the time, like why do you wear a headscarf, like it is some big problem.
Layers of resistance, opposition and ambiguity

The data is presented so as to correspond to the five emergent subcategories shown in Table 5, which outlines the coding scheme used to generate the fourth core emergent category - ‘Layers of resistance, ambiguity and duality’ (see Table 5).

Table 5: Summary of themes generated from participant narratives re: Resistance

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(ES 4.1) Simultaneous rejection of ‘War on Terror’ and Islamic fundamentalism

Several participants expressed their opposition to fundamentalist interpretations of Islam by both fundamentalist groups and certain Islamic regimes such as the Taliban and under Saddam Hussein (9), with many more identifying misinterpretation or corruption of Islam as both contributing to the characterisation of the Muslim ‘fanatic’ (17) and Muslim radicalisation through quasi-religious indoctrination (12), but also as an internal source of inequality within Muslim communities, most notably gendered inequalities (6). Some
participants expressed concern over how the notion of Islamic fundamentalism is
generically applied to all Muslims, particularly when used as a means to legitimate military
intervention in Muslim countries and the appropriation of the resources there within.
Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 12 below.

Box 12: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 4.1

**Naseema:**
Yeah, it’s dead bad. You know their version of Islam [fundamentalist] shown in the media’s not the
Islam we know, but I don’t think anyone else cares what Islam really is anyway. I don’t know why
they’ve been so awful about it all. You know the Taliban, okay, fair enough; no one is going to try
to defend them.

**Fazal Jaan:**
I know Palestinian is a big issue for a lot of Muslims; it is for most people I know. It’s not just
what’s happening to Gaza and the West Bank, but what happens to Palestinians in Israel as well,
with all the land confiscations and shootings. You know they’re only allowed to live certain places,
Palestinians have to run their own schools and hospitals. They’re just like second class citizens in
their own country.

**Raheem:**
It does fuck me off that you get tied up in the same shit, like this blanket assumption, even though I
think deep down they know they’re blagging it they know we’re not all like that but these Blair-
Bush types they’ll say it as a blanket thing and use that as a springboard then to do what the fuck
they want.

*(ES 4.2)* **Resisting inherited Islam: modern interpretations of the Quran and Hadith**

Although reticent to do so for fear of misinterpretation or contributing to the
Islamophobic stigmatisation of Islam, some participants criticised inherited cultural
interpretations of Islam, culturally transmitted inter-generationally, at both the familial and community levels (12), citing a lack of scriptural education, particularly among first generation Muslims (6). This culturally inherited Islamic knowledge is passed inter-generationally through tradition and practice rather than being based on scriptural teachings found in the *Quran* and *Hadith*. Female participants in particular cited how inherited Islam is often used to recreate male honour practices, particularly by first generation British-Muslims (7). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 13 below.

Box 13: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 4.2

**Amaya:**
There are still some things though that I don’t like about it, like some of the hypocrisy you get and how it’s used by some men to treat women. Obviously I’m not saying I’m against Islam, just how some people decide to interpret it. It’s the same with all religions I suppose.

**Isha:**
I think one of the main problems is that whenever the government wants to speak to Muslims it’s always a representative from the Muslim Council of Great Britain. They don’t even represent us. How can a small group of old men, stuck in their ways, most of them who’ve grown up in Pakistan, know what we think?

**Fazal Jaan:**
The worse thing about it all is how they [fundamentalists] constantly try to undermine what Islam’s about. They think they’ve got the right to tell everyone what it’s all about. They just see whatever why suits them. They don’t understand it properly anyway. It’s sometimes like that’s all anyone wants to talk about. People are always taking the *Hadith* [the Prophets verbal teachings] out of context. They either don’t understand.
(ES 4.3) Marginalisation, political engagement and collective resistance

Some participants spoke of the inadequacies of the British political system, particularly at the local level, as a means of addressing Muslim interests (12), citing improved political representation and participation as an important means of improving conditions for British-Muslims (9). Some participants cited the need for better political representation and participation (9) and for members of the Muslim community to attaining positions of power within key institutions such as the media (7). Some participants felt Muslim interests are generally ignored by policy makers and that efforts to engage them are rarely genuine attempts to address their concerns (6). Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 14 below.

Box 14: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 4.3

Saluddin:
I think it has definitely changed how I see things. I feel more a part of the community than I ever did. It’s like you feel part of something, you know, a closer connection to other Muslims. Thing is, we need to be more organised, get out there so we can really start changing things.

Saluddin:
Like’s been said, it feels like we’re pretty much excluded from any debates, even if it’s to do with Muslims. If there are, it’s usually the old guys, the really religious ones, like the Muslim Council of Great Britain. You never get your average hardworking Muslim being involved. It’s always the token spokesman or the outspoken fanatic making us all look dodgy.

Nusaiba:
I've said this since day, you can't change anything if you don't educate yourselves and get into positions of power, like influential I mean, you need to be getting into law, into journalism, the media. Only then can you start bringing some new shit to the table.

(ES 4.4) Minority stress: psychological and emotional impacts of stigmatisation

Many participants identified an increased Muslim vilification in the aftermath of 9/11 (19), with some referring to personal experience of non-verbal disapproval and verbal attack (14) and citing instances of physical violations or attack to themselves or somebody they knew (6). The feeling of being under constant threat of verbal or physical attack was widely expressed across the sample by 16 participants, with a further 7 participants highlighting instances where friends, colleagues and acquaintances had been subjected to non-verbal disapproval and verbal attack. 18 participants referred to the detrimental emotional impact of Islamophobia throughout their narratives. Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 15 below.

Box 15: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 4.4

**Isha:**

It gets you so angry, especially talking about it like this. It’s the unfairness. You can’t help it, not with how it has all turned out. You get sick of talking about, like it feels a waste of time. It is pointless. Nothing’s going to change. So sometimes you just want to forget about it all…, but you can’t, can you (?) The thing is virtually everyone you know is affected by it. So can’t ignore it (?)

**Layani:**

You’re going to be scared, aren’t you (?) Look at what’s happened to people. People have been
locked up, for years. Look at some of those guys in Guantanamo. Okay, some of them are going to be involved in terrorism, but not all of them. Some of them are just regular guys who got caught up in the wrong place at the wrong time.

Pia:
You can understand it though, can’t you (?) It’s more than them worrying about what’ll happen. They’re scared what we’ll get up to. They see English girls get up to and they’re scared we’ll do the same, like getting drunk, taking drugs, sleeping around. I think they’re just trying to protect us.

(ES 4.5) Psychological coping strategies: resisting stigma to safeguard the self

Most participants reported experiences of feeling stigmatised by members of society (17), whilst the majority of the sample reported negative psychological feelings (16). 7 participants reported vigilant behaviours as a form of coping strategies. Narrative examples relating to this emergent subcategory are presented in Box 16 below.

Box 16: Illustrative quotes for emergent subcategory 4.5.

Samina:
I mean I definitely think it had an impact on us as a community, I know a lot of people who aren't like me, they don't want to say anything about it, they feel so fucking beaten by the constant, blanket nature of all this shit that they just put their hands up now. Anything for an easy life I guess.

Rabiya:
How can you not be pissed off? How can any of us not feel angry, angry at what’s happened to us, having to put up with the insults, all the lies, the victimisation. I don’t think there’s anyone who’s Muslim who hasn’t been affected. That’s why I keep myself to myself as far as a lot of white
people go. Yeah, I’ll be polite, but that’s about it.

Layani:
I know what you mean. You feel like you can’t be your normal self around them. It’s like you can’t talk about some things, because of how they’d react. They just wouldn’t get me, get where I’m coming from. It’s really frustrating. I hate the way it makes you feel. You feel like you’re not being true to yourself.
Chapter five

*Ummatic (Re) Attachments, Emergence and the Solidification of Identity*

This chapter will present an analysis of the data according to the first of the four core emergent categories described in Chapter Four: *Ummatic* (re) attachments and the solidification of British-Muslim identity. Drawing extensively on the testimonies and narratives of participants, the following chapter examines everyday experiences of negotiating hybridised British-Muslim identity. It is presented in two corresponding sections: the emergence and solidification of contemporary British-Muslim identity and the micro-behavioural impression management strategies deployed by participants to maintain unspoilt hybridised identities in the face of increasing institutional stigmatisation. It should be noted, as previously discussed in Chapter Four, the exploratory nature of GTM inspires unexpected themes to be generated through the data. Indeed, contrary to initial expectations, several participants alluded to the emergence of a layered British-Muslim identity over a decade prior to 9/11. Their narratives point to the publication of Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* (1988) was the catalyst for the emergence of a new British-Muslim identity which was solidified in reaction to various domestic and global events from 1989 to 9/11 and beyond. Consequently, the following analysis will not be limited to the confines of research question two: ‘To examine how British-Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11’. Rather, in order to remain true to the data garnered, it will offer a broader historical dimension to the analysis. The first part of this chapter will therefore outline the emergence of novel forms of British-Muslim identity, pinpointing the publication of *The Satanic Verses* by Salman Rushdie (1988) as the historical moment at which the notions of an all-encompassing ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ British
identity became insufficient to encapsulate new expressions of Muslim rights. This can be seen as having facilitated the realignment of British-Muslims from a liberation movement based on race to one rooted more firmly in religion. It will go on to examine other socio-political events, including 9/11 that participants felt were key in terms of solidification of the British-Muslim identity. The attendant resurgence in media and political Orientalism will be analysed and the emergence of an Islamic pride identity rooted in, but not confined to, perceived social injustices against Muslims both domestically and abroad will be elucidated. It will argue that such discourses are of paramount importance due to the reactive nature of contemporary British-Muslim identity and show how they are reasserted in and through specific socio-political events that facilitate concomitant shifts in British-Muslim identities. The Rushdie affair will be discussed further in relation to participants’ two main concerns in the context of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) ‘politics of difference’ and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) ‘multicultural liberalism’. Their first concern was around the lack of a fair and public representation of British-Muslim anger in the context of their perspectives, beliefs and values. Their second and most significant concern, that Rushdie deliberately used his intimate knowledge of Islam as a tool to hurt and humiliate the ummah. The data shows anger is directed at the effects of the novel and the author’s intent rather than his status as an apostate.

The second part of this chapter will seek to uncover the core of contemporary debate on British-Muslim identity that underpins popular Islamophobic discourse, namely the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ which posits the incompatibility of all things Islamic with all things Western. Using participant narratives, this argument will be disassembled on both a theological and experiential level. Firstly, in as much as Muslim identity remains of primary importance, most participants asserted the compatibility of Islam with British values, most notably democracy, gender equality and civic engagement, citing examples
from scriptural Islam to validate their claims. Secondly, participants’ largely successful negotiation of hybridity in their everyday practices is in and of itself something of a rejection of the irreconcilability thesis. As the research data will show, participants experience hybridity exists on a continuum from the negative point of enforced negotiation of stigmatised identities, Islamophobia and the defects of inherited Islam to the positive benefits of cultural ‘cherry picking’ and access to varied lifestyles. It will show how positive aspects of hybridity are embraced and incorporated into participants’ everyday lives and highlight the strategies used to overcome the more challenging aspects of a dual identity. This thesis does not seek to imply identity conflict does not exist, rather it asserts that through the construction and maintenance of dual identities such conflict offers both challenges and opportunities. This analysis of micro-behaviours used in the maintenance of hybrid identities addresses research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’. In doing so it invites an analysis based on Homi Bhabha’s enunciations in the ‘Third Space’ (1994, p.37) and ‘presentation of self’ (1959) concepts offered by Erving Goffman. However, before any rebuttal of the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ is offered, the emergence of this newly formed British-Muslim identity will be first addressed. Therefore, the chapter aligns with the fourth and sixth of the key foundation factors of the thesis, as presented in the literature review.

Within political and media discourses, 9/11 is often cited as the transformative event that provided the foundation upon which the identities of young British-Muslims are built. Indeed, in some respects, this research project initially made this same assumption. As question 1:2 ‘Has your identity changed following the events of 9/11?’ illustrates, 9/11 is assumed to be the most significant event in the reformulation of contemporary British-Muslim identity. However, whilst the significance of 9/11 cannot be ignored, the
research data revealed unanticipated and potentially significant findings, in that the sample cited several other key socio-political Muslim specific events occurring prior to 9/11 that can be seen to have had a significant impact on British-Muslim identity. The first of these events and arguably the catalyst for the emergence of this new British-Muslim identity was the Rushdie Affair.

The Rushdie Affair and Challenges to British-Muslim identity

This section examines the participants’ views of the Rushdie affair which will be discussed in two ways. Firstly, it will show that against the notion of contemporary British-Muslim identities rooted in the events of 9/11, the catalyst for the emergence of British-Muslim identity was in fact the Rushdie affair which occurred over a decade earlier. Secondly, it will address participants’ two main issues with The Satanic Verses in the context of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) ‘politics of difference’ and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) ‘multicultural liberalism’. Their first concern was around the lack of a fair and public representation of British-Muslim anger in the context of their perspectives, beliefs and values. Both Young and Kymlicka’s models will be applied here to highlight how societal cultures created for and by powerful social groups unavoidably oppress those who do not align with those cultural norms. Their second and most significant concern, that Rushdie deliberately used his intimate knowledge of Islam as a tool to hurt and humiliate the ummah. The data shows anger is directed at the effects of the novel and the author’s intent rather than his status as an apostate. In this light the thesis rejects Kymlicka’s (1995, 1997) contention that British-Muslim demands for group-libel laws were to restrict apostasy and thus individual autonomy within the community. He claims use of such legislation to
confine autonomy amounts to an assault on liberal values and should be rejected on the grounds that they epitomise the limits of toleration of liberal multiculturalism for religious minority rights. Whilst other academic commentary and evidence will be used to strengthen this argument against Kymlicka’s contention, it is noted that the participant testimonies included here are not the views of the entire British-Muslim community and can only be seen as indicative of the perspectives of the sample, their families and their communities. In order to fully examine these issues it is first necessary to briefly sketch how the Rushdie affair unfolded.

In 1989 Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic verses* was published in Britain. Bikhu Parekh (1990) describes the novel as fantasy rather than fiction, a reinterpretation of Islamic history and the lives of revered Islamic figures who make up the core of Muslim beliefs and culture. Parekh applauds Rushdie’s literary ability but also contends he ‘became not just disrespectful and irreverent, but supercilious and dismissive, crude, even perhaps exhibitionist, scoring cheap points off half-real characters’ (1990, p.697). The novel sparked a global controversy and led to extraordinary political responses. British-Muslims petitioned for the book to be banned. When this failed they burned copies of it during a series of protests in January 1989. Similar protests in India and Pakistan led to several deaths. These events were followed by the defining moment when Ayatollah Khomeini declared a *fatwa* sentencing Rushdie to death. The response of the ‘white British, especially liberal response was predictable’ (Parekh, 1999, p.700). They insisted *The Satanic Verses* was only a novel, Muslims were over-sensitive and their anger was unjustifiable. The most dominant viewpoint was that British society was secular and liberal, its values non-negotiable and as they had migrated to Britain they must respect those values (Modood, 2005). The controversy crystallised the dominant public perception of Islam’s inherent incompatibility with the ‘British way of life’, bringing into sharp focus
the juxtaposition of an allegedly pre-enlightenment based religious community and the modern secular State. British commentators became instant ‘experts’ on the Quran, branding it ‘inhumane’, and labelling Muslims as ‘uncivilised’, ‘barbarians’ and ‘dangerous fanatics’ (Parekh, 1990, p.5). Many openly questioned how Muslims could be civilised and their innocent offspring protected against their parents’ medieval fundamentalism. The media discussion at the time ‘largely concentrated on the threat to Rushdie’s life, and when it discussed Muslim demands, it conceptualised the issue as one of conflict between freedom and fundamentalism, ‘the former central to and the later representing a mortal threat to the British way of life’ (Parekh, 2002, p.303). In addition to the media and political narrative the liberal papers published some of the offending passages from The Satanic Verses, but did not set them in a context of Islamic sanctity and specific terms of offense in Muslim cultures that had been deployed by Rushdie nor did they engage in a dialogue with British-Muslims (Parekh, 1990).

Having described how the Rushdie affair unfolded, the thesis will examine how participants feel the events affected the emergence of British Muslim identity. Despite its omission from the framework of exploratory focus group questions, the Rushdie affair was referenced several times across three of the four focus group discussions. For example in response to the question (1:3) ‘How could the Government improve the situation for Muslims within the UK?’ participants from focus group three allude to the Rushdie Affair as the point at which Muslims first came under direct public scrutiny as a distinct minority group:

**Basanti:**
They say it all started with Rushdie. Before that, nobody really knew what a Muslim was. No one really took any notice of us. We were all Asians as far as most people were concerned; like we were all the same.

Jay:

You’re right, before all that [the Rushdie affair] we were just foreigners. We weren’t white. We weren’t black. So we had to be Asians. I don’t think anyone knew the difference between a Muslim and a Sikh anyway. We were all Pakis … Most people just wanted us out anyway, so it didn’t really matter who we were.

Rabiya:

My brothers said it was the first time they can remember my father and my uncles swearing in front of them … They just couldn’t believe someone could get away with publically saying something so sick, so offensive. It was shameful.

Although anecdotal, the above quotes highlight how the impact of the Rushdie Affair has transcended generations as the moment Islam first came under systematic public attack. What is key about this is the extent to which knowledge of the Rushdie affair and its importance has been transmitted across generations. Participants are too young to have direct experience of the affair and attest to the fact that they have been told by family members. This shows the emotional significance of the perceived attack on the nucleus of their beliefs.

In the 1980s the political concept of ‘blackness’ was largely accepted as hegemonic (Modood, 1994), obscuring the particular experiences of different minority groups including Muslims. In wrongly equating racial discrimination with colour discrimination, the political notion of ‘blackness’ masked the religious and cultural discrimination
experienced by Muslims. As Modood notes, this notion of ‘blackness’ contained a ‘false essentialism’ (1994, p.859), in that all non-white groups are perceived as having something in common, other than how others treat them. Moreover, as Spalek (2005) asserts, the term ‘Black’ evokes African origins and thereby excludes those of Asian descent, obscuring not only the hostility they suffer but its unique character. This assertion is supported by the following comment by Mumtaz during a focus group three discussion regarding the impact of the Rushdie Affair:

**Mumtaz:**

My family were so shocked, that someone was allowed to get away with writing those things. It was the first time my dad really felt attacked. I mean he’d been called ‘Paki’ for years, he was used to all that. It was because people were using Muslim as an insult. You know, like being called a ‘Muslim bastard’, that sort of thing. It’s the first time he remembers it being used as a dirty word.

Mumtaz’s comment is particularly poignant, as it illustrates how the Rushdie affair sparked relatively virulent anti-Muslim sentiments and how Muslims became discriminated against as a distinct group. In other words, they became victims of a uniquely anti-Islamic form of racism. As Modood notes, ‘Rushdie’ became a racist taunt at street level, whilst prison warders were reported to be reading passages from Rushdie’s novel as punishment for a Muslim prisoners (1990, p.143).

Rushdie’s attack on the sanctified core of Islamic belief exposed this false essentialism and the inadequacies of political ‘blackness’ for Muslim-specific concerns in 1989. At this juncture the umbrella of black activism became deficient in terms of the emancipation of Muslims. Non-governmental British-Muslim lobbyism and political
organisation was a thing of the future, as was the notion of Islamophobia as a legitimate grievance. Liberal intellectuals, the traditional supporters of minority rights, stood in opposition to British-Muslims in defence of a perceived threat to secularity and liberalism itself. Thus, as Modood notes, ‘no minority in the history of British race relations has been as friendless as Muslims in spring 1989’, and so, for the first time Muslims had no choice but to mobilise in isolation under the banner of ‘British-Muslims’ in defence of an attack on their beliefs, religion and heritage (2005, p.260).

The above discussion has shown the stimulus for the emergence of a British-Muslim identity was the Rushdie affair rather than 9/11. This event instigated the reformulation of Muslim identity for the contemporary period, resulting in a move away from the all-encompassing notions of a ‘black’ or ‘Asian’ identity to one rooted in religion and the mobilisation of a new, more politically assertive specifically Muslim way of being British.

The following section examines the causes of the impassioned British-Muslim protests against The Satanic Verses. It will show how their narratives revolve around two issues. Firstly, a lack of fair representation for the Muslim perspective will be discussed in terms of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) concerns over the exclusion of minorities when the dominant social culture is created by and for the prevailing social group, a practice which necessarily excludes those whose experiences, beliefs and traditions do not fit with dominant practices. Secondly, Rushdie’s use of Islamic knowledge and blasphemy as a tool to humiliate and hurt the ummah. This issue will be discussed in terms of the limits of toleration minority rights in a liberal society. Of

16 The Muslim Council of Great Britain was established in 1997, whilst the seminal Runnymede report ‘Islamophobia: a challenge for us all’ was first conceived in the recommendations of a report on anti-Semitism entitled ‘A Very Light Sleeper’ (1994), and finally published in 1997, nearly a decade after Rushdie’s attack on Islam.
particular interest here is Will Kymlicka’s contention that British-Muslims demands during the Rushdie affair were opposed to fundamental liberal principles and should therefore be rejected.

British-Muslim groups had made several pre-fatwa appeals for dialogue with the Government bodies and the publishers but these fell on deaf ears and their legitimate concerns were systematically disregarded (Parekh, 1990). Without engaging with British-Muslims, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, declared blasphemy laws only applied to Christianity (Negi 1998, p.28), whilst the publishers similarly refused to engage with the Muslim community choosing instead to celebrate Rushdie’s notoriety and winning of the Whitbread Prize for best novel (Parekh, 1990). In addition, whilst the media published the offending passages, they did not seek dialogue with British-Muslims to provide context for these passages or a platform to express a coherent and reasoned argument that highlighted Rushdie’s deliberate use of Islamic knowledge and historical insults to cause offence. The refusal of the Government, publishers and media to allow British-Muslims a platform from which to represent their community in a meaningful way whilst glorifying and defending majoritarian cultural norms was noted by Raheem and Shah Jahan in a focus group three discussion of The Satanic Verses as a response to question (1.3) ‘How could the Government improve the situation for Muslims in the UK?’

Shah Jahan:

What with all the flag burning shit, it was pure drama, the usual sensationalist crap. It’s like the fatwa; all they wanted to do was make them look crazy, show how out of control we all are. Like they didn’t have anything to say, a valid reason for being angry about what he’d [Rushdie] done? Are you kidding me? All it did was stop people thinking about why it was so offensive.
Raheem:

All they [media] were interested in was showing jihadists and fanatics in places like Iran, ranting, burning books, issuing fatwas all over the place. The British press loved it. It ticked all the stereotypes, didn’t it (?) They didn’t want to know what ordinary people like our parents thought, why they were so offended by it. They were too interested in showing how backwards, how out of control we are to bother finding out why Muslims were so angry. And what did the government do? Nothing!

This extract highlights a concern about inadequate representation of Muslim beliefs and culture in comparison to extensive, sensationalist and prejudiced media coverage. Raheem and Shah Jahan’s concerns are echoed Parekh (1990) who contends that the establishment, media and indeed Rushdie himself all failed to address the obvious question: why had a normally law-abiding community felt forced to make ever more impassioned protests over the publication of *The Satanic Verses*? The fixation with the attack on liberalism and Rushdie left little if any room for an alternative viewpoint and the need for fair public representation of Muslim concerns was much needed but sorely absent during the Rushdie affair. Here the thesis turns to Kymlicka’s (1995) proposal that bias towards the dominant social culture as exhibited during the Rushdie affair should be re-balanced. One of his methods relevant here is the establishment of ‘representation rights’. These provisions would ensure a fair portrayal of minority concerns in the political processes and bodies, he argues a liberal society has a responsibility for ‘ensuring a voice for minorities’ (1995, p.131). He advocates guaranteed representation requirements and proportional representation to promote fairness by counteracting the superior political and economic power of the dominant group. Like Kymlicka, Young (1990) argues society and state
should recognise that different groups have distinctive cultures, histories and experiences and a presumption of universal humanity leads to the oppression of some social groups (Stevenson, 2003). It is well documented that the publishers, Government and media rejected repeated calls from British-Muslim groups for dialogue (Modood, 2005; Parekh, 1999). Their views and thus a fair public representation of their culture was completely absent from the controversy. The message was clear, ‘it was wrong of Muslims to insist on cultural separateness’ (Parekh, 1990 p.700). They were free to practice religion in the private sphere but it could not ‘interfere with their civil obligations … which were to assimilate into a liberal society that treated all its citizens equally and fairly’ (1990, p.700). Young (1990) rejects this articulation of equality as ‘sameness’, arguing the idea that all groups are treated equally according to ‘neutral’ liberal principles on the grounds neutrality isn’t ‘neutral’, but rather a reflection of the culture of the dominant group. The assumption that liberalism and secularity are ‘neutral’ necessarily marginalises Islamic culture because it is neither liberal (according to dominant media, political and legislative constructions) nor secular. Under this worldview an attack on such a culture is not as significant as an attack on ‘neutral’ liberalism and its values. Muslims should accept Rushdie’s attack as legitimate because it is his liberal right as a British citizen. Against this, Young proposes that different social and cultural groups ‘respect one another and affirm one another in their differences’ (1990, p 168). In place of traditional political structures that aim to create a homogenous public she calls for a ‘participatory structures’ that allow different social groups to ‘assert their perspectives on social issues within institutions that encourage the representation of their distinct voices’ (Young, 1990, p.48).

Young’s argument for respect despite group difference was articulated by Chief Rabbi Lord Jakobovits. Whilst condemning the threat against Rushdie’s life, he contended that in a civilised society all, including creative writers, had an obligation to respect and
'generate respect' for other people's religious beliefs and to do nothing that ridiculed or denigrated them, in his opinion, Rushdie had 'abused' freedom of speech, (Jakobovits, 1989 in Parekh, 1990).\textsuperscript{17}

The discussion has shown how some participants highlighted the lack of representation for the British-Muslim viewpoint during the Rushdie affair as both a result of media and political discrimination and cause for the lack of societal understanding of the Muslim perspective. Their viewpoint has been set in the context of Young and Kymlicka’s assertion dominant societal cultures should reflect minority cultures to re-align any bias toward the majority group as a result of the dominant culture reflecting and thereby normalising dominant group culture. An unconditional rejection of the \textit{fatwa} by Muslims\textsuperscript{18} and a public debate that fairly, coherently and fully explained the Muslim perspective might have set the stage for a more useful and productive debate.

The following section examines the second and most significant cause of British-Muslim anger according to participants: Rushdie’s calculated use of blasphemy as a tool to launch a clinical, multi-levelled and targeted attack on the core of Muslim beliefs specifically to provoke maximum indignation, anger and humiliation. During the controversy this denigration of Islam caused British-Muslims to call for the book to be banned. Kymlicka argues this petition represented the core of the disagreement and is a prime example of the limits of toleration of demands for minority rights in a secular society, he specifies:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Jakobovits went on to point out that free speech was not an absolute value which is why we had laws against blasphemy, pornography, libel, incitement to racial hatred, subversion and breaches of national security. The double standards and hypocrisy inherent in the liberal defence of freedom and speech is discussed at length elsewhere (Khan and Mythen, 2015).
\item \textsuperscript{18} As Modood (1990) notes, whilst vocal Muslim condemnation of the \textit{fatwa} would have validated their position as ‘victim’. Their failure to distance themselves undermined the validity of their grievances, publically equating their protest with fanaticism and opposition to freedom of speech - one of the perceived cornerstones of liberal democracy - and served only to solidify binary institutional constructions to further he detract from Muslim concerns.
\end{itemize}
It was this case perhaps, more than any other single event which has led people in the West to think carefully about ‘multiculturalism’ and the extent to which claims of minority cultures can or should be accommodated within a liberal-democratic regime (1995, p.19).

Central to his argument for ‘differentiated rights’ is the insistence that group-specific rights should be limited to protection from external economic and political power exercised by the dominant social culture and should not be used to facilitate internal restrictions of individual group members. He rejected the idea group-libel provisions were appropriate in the case of *The Satanic Verses*. He explains ‘there is reason to think that Muslim leaders seek these laws primarily to control apostasy within the Muslim community rather than the expression of non-Muslims’ (1995, p.43). He goes on to state:

> Many Muslims outside of Britain defended the banning of *The Satanic Verses* on the grounds of Rushdie’s apostasy … There is strong evidence that many Muslims inside Britain viewed the issue in the same light (1993, p 93).

At the time of the controversy, Edward Said, writing in *The Observer*, understood the cause of British-Muslim protest differently to Kymlicka, asserting:

> Why must a Muslim, who could be defending and sympathetically interpreting us, now represent us so roughly, so expertly and so disrespectfully to an audience already primed to excoriate our tradition, reality, history, religion, language and
origins? Why, in other words, must a member of our culture join the legions of orientalists in orientalising Islam so radically and so unfairly? (25 February 1989).

Whilst Kymlicka assumes British-Muslim protest was rooted in blasphemy and apostasy, therefore not legitimated in a liberal society, Said’s understanding accounts for Rushdie’s ability to ‘expertly’ disrespect Islam through his use of intimate knowledge of Islam and its universally revered figures and foundational values to humiliate Muslims and their beliefs. He argues in doing so an already marginalised minority group is further oppressed. The testimonies included here align with Said’s interpretation rather than Kymlicka’s. Participants do not problematise Rushdie’s renunciation of Islam, it his use of his Islamic heritage to abuse and humiliate the ummah rather than apostasy per se. This evidence will also be used to assert Kymlicka misunderstood the substance of Muslim anger and thus his argument for denying Muslim group-libel laws is flawed.

An examination of the narrative shows Muslim opposition to *The Satanic Verses* rests on three main inferences within the text seen as denigrating Islam. Firstly, by naming his prophet ‘Mahound’, a variant of ‘Muhammad’ meaning false god or demon (Lewis 2004, p.450), Rushdie is endorsing the vilification of the Muslim Prophet first employed by Christian writers during the Crusades and thereby gravely offending Muslims by attacking what is the revered core of Islamic expression (Esposito, 2011; Mufti, 1991). As Shah Jahan alludes to during a follow up interview discussion, an attack on the Prophet is abhorrent to most, if not all, Muslims and that many Muslims of his acquaintance believe this was a calculated incendiary strategy to exploit this sensitivity with the intention of causing a reaction and thus notoriety for Rushdie.
Shah Jahan:

Come on! He was brought up a Muslim, so of course he knew what would happen, how angry people would get, didn’t he (?) He knew the score. It doesn’t matter if you’re practicing or not, no one’s going to stand for the Prophet being insulted like that, no way. I bet you couldn’t find any Muslim who wasn’t totally offended by what he did. I mean, he was insulting the Prophet; the core of what makes us Muslims … You can’t tell me he didn’t know how hated he’d become, but he didn’t give shit, did he (?) All he was interested in was lining his own pocket and becoming famous.

Here Shah Jahan claims that reverence for the Prophet is not only a core element of Islamic faith but universally acknowledged amongst Muslims as such. He goes on to claim as someone brought up Muslim Rushdie would have known this and thus his targeted attack was a deliberate means of causing the greatest hurt and humiliation to the ummah. Secondly, by questioning the infallibility of the Prophet’s revelations, Rushdie is undermining the very legitimacy of the Islamic faith. This second point of literary violence is implicitly suggested in the title ‘The Satanic Verses’ itself and is referenced during an interview with Basanti:

Basanti:

He [Rushdie] tried to defend it [The Satanic Verses] by trying to say it was only fiction. It wasn’t though, was it? It twists the story of how Islam began; attacking how Muslims believe the Quran came about. It basically says the Prophet, salla Allah alaihiwasallam, was too drunk, not with it enough to recognise the word of God. So he’s trying to make out he was being tested and he failed, basically because of this some of the verses of Quran are ‘satanic’. I mean, it’s attacking the
foundations of what Muslims believe, what Islam’s based on. It’s not right, is it?

Didn’t he think? Didn’t he know how mortally offended people would be?

Lastly, the third point of contention concerns the denigration of the Prophet’s (pbuh) wives where prostitutes from a brothel in the city of Jahilia take on their names so as to heighten the sexual pleasure of their customers. Again, this is an explicit attack on revered figures within the Islamic faith. This point is highlighted in the following exchange regarding the ‘Satanic Verses’ between Amaya and Rayya in focus group four as a response to question (1.5) ‘How do you think Muslims are perceived by wider society?’:

Amaya:

You know how it is, you just don’t insult someone’s female relatives, do you?

Rayya:

You just don’t do it. Telling someone to ‘go sit your daughters in a brothel’, it’s like one of the worst insults you can make to a Muslim.

Amaya:

No, no matter what, you just don’t do it, do you?

Again, this conversation highlights Rushdie’s use of recognisable and highly respected figures from the Prophet’s family set in demeaning scenes. As Rayya notes, within Muslim circles it is ‘one of the worst insults’. In each of the three examples cited above Rushdie closely follows the history of Islam and the story of its inception so that its most respected figures and geography are instantly recognisable to the ummah. He then, with his first-hand knowledge of both Islam
and Muslim attitudes, manufactured situations and language drawing on Orientalist historical motifs, to create fantasy scenes that Muslims would find the most humiliating and offensive. These excerpts illustrate that the Prophet and his family, the example of his lived experience and establishment of the Islamic faith, command a deeply felt reverence and are an integral part of Muslim identity and Islamic culture. Consequently the intensity of feeling the novel elicits arises not from its obscene or blasphemous content *per se*, but from an objection to the sacred core of Muslim identity and culture being deliberately violated and defiled as a deliberate strategy to offend, whilst simultaneously adding to the wider Orientalist traditions that undermine and subjugate Muslims and Islam. Participant’s distress is rooted in the harm done to Muslim cultural identity as religious believers rather than the author’s apostasy.

The participants viewpoints presented above are strengthened by Ahsan and Kidwai (1993) who conducted a comprehensive overview of British-Muslim contributions to the debate. Their study demonstrated Western Muslims overwhelmingly unified in rejecting the Khomeini death sentence, therefore their goal was banning the book not punishing Rushdie’s blasphemy and apostasy at an individual level.

This discussion has shown how participants, their families and their community were hurt, angered and humiliated at being attacked and subsequently side-lined in the ensuing debate, rather than being intent on curtailing Rushdie’s liberal freedoms in the name of Islam. Within this data Kymlicka’s concerns that British-Muslim anger stemmed from Rushdie’s apostasy is unfounded. Therefore his reasons for reducing British-Muslim demands during the controversy to their
need for a mechanism to control internal autonomy is unfounded in the current data.

This section has shown the Rushdie affair was the catalyst for the emergence of a British-Muslim identity rather than 9/11 as assumed by the questions used in the focus groups. It then went on to discuss two of the most significant issues that arose from the controversy according to the data. The first was the lack of fair and public representation of the British-Muslim viewpoint set within the context of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) ‘politics of difference’ and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) ‘multicultural liberalism’. Both models were applied to highlight how dominant culture at the time disregarded Muslim minority rights simply because their viewpoints were not aligned with the dominant culture. In exploring participants’ second and most significant concern that Rushdie deliberately used his intimate knowledge of Islam as a tool to hurt and humiliate the ummah. Here the discussion rejected the Kymlicka’s claim British-Muslim demands for group-libel laws were to restrict apostasy and thus individual autonomy within the community on the grounds they epitomise the limits of toleration of liberal multiculturalism for religious minority rights. The data showed participants were more concerned with Rushdie’s deliberate denigration of their beliefs and culture, rather than control Muslim liberties.

**The Solidification of British-Muslim Identity: Domestic Orientalism, Islamophobia and Ummatic Oppression**

With each subsequent Muslim specific socio-political event or ‘controversy’ following the Rushdie Affair and its attendant Orientalist resurgence, the dual processes of
institutional stigmatisation and de-legitimation of Muslim concerns have been compounded and reasserted ever more forcefully. For instance, Phillips (2006) argues longstanding concerns around immigration, citizenship and national identities coalesced with the discourse of Muslim isolationism which gained institutional legitimacy in the aftermath of the 2001 riots. This process recurs with each Muslim specific event to reconstruct and reconfirm Islam as an oppositional presence in the UK. Consequently, the Rushdie Affair can be understood to have instigated the discursive framework within which such events and concerns have been institutionally addressed and contemporary British-Muslim identity evolved. As Chapter One demonstrated, each event had its associated reassertion of Orientalist discourses which coalesced with those arising out of the Rushdie Affair and longstanding concerns over immigration, citizenship and national identity and, as Chapter Six will make explicit, this institutional construction of Muslims and its impact on the public consciousness has had a profound effect on the process of Muslim identity formation in the UK. It is against this background British-Muslims variously resist, negotiate and contest to construct their sense of ‘self’ and through which a reactive British-Muslim identity has emerged and become solidified.

The analysis will now turn to briefly consider the institutional response to key Muslim specific events and concerns participants identified as having impacted on their own and others sense of ummatic allegiance. Participant narratives will be used to show how domestic Orientalist discourses, perceived ummatic oppression and the systematic suppression of legitimate Muslim grievances have served to solidify this newly formulated British-Muslim identity and continue underpin institutional responses to events domestically and abroad following the Rushdie Affair. In doing so, the analysis aligns itself with the second of the six interconnected factors explored in Chapter One: the global-local nexus, and as such is crucial to any discussion of British-Muslim identity. Relations
between Islamic States and the West are a central issue in the compromising of British-Muslims being able to build a coherent British self and create a conflict at the very core of the hybrid British-Muslim identities. As will be shown, British intervention in the affairs of Muslim countries continues to undermine participant feelings of loyalty, belonging and the possibility of a cohesive ‘British’ identity. However, as a discussion of all such events and concerns is beyond the scope of this thesis, therefore the events most emphatically cited by the example will be discussed. During a follow up interview with Nusaiba she describes how these factors affect her sense of self:

Well, it’s not like I think about it all the time…its more when I read stuff in the paper about what Muslims have done now, it’s always something to do with being a terrorist or honour killings. If it’s not that then it’s the new laws against Muslims, it’s just exhausting you know…then there’ll be some politician saying how we really should bomb another Muslim country somewhere, because it’s the right thing to do. Well what happens then is you get angry and you want to be more Muslim, and help Muslims and shout out that they can’t do this…it makes you feel like you have to do something. These things force you into taking sides and I don’t want to.

Nusaiba cites domestic and global issues that result in her being more ‘vocally Muslim’ or in other words, these Muslim-specific socio-political events serve to solidify her Muslim identity. Furthermore, her comments reflect the data, amongst the key domestic and global injustices identified by the sample that augment their religious allegiances include, the increasingly restrictive anti-terror legislation, the rise in institutional and street-level Islamophobia and, perhaps most significantly continuing British political, economic and military intervention in Muslim countries. Whilst the first
and second of these will both be discussed in more depth in Chapter Six, the latter will now be considered to show how socio-political processes set in motion by the Rushdie Affair have served to solidify British-Muslim identity.

In addition to the systematic de-legitimisation of domestic Muslim concerns and the attendant rise in Islamophobia, British-Muslim identity can be understood to be a reaction in part to wider global concerns, with British-Muslims having become increasingly aware of Muslim issues on the global stage which were being resolved in favour of Western interests at the expense of Muslim lives and resources. However, before proceeding with any examination of the impact of British foreign policy it is first appropriate to acknowledge the role of new media in making the suffering of the ummah an accessible, tangible part of participants’ everyday lives. Rehan acknowledges in a follow-up interview when asked to expand on what he considered to be the most important domestic and global concerns for British-Muslims:

**Rehan:**

You’ve got so many ways of finding out about things nowadays. There’s so much information out there. The internet’s made it so easy. It’s like Palestine; you can see what’s happening there for yourself, what’s really happening to them. You can see it all for yourself: the poverty, the conditions they’re having to live under. There’s all this footage of Israeli attacks, people being blown up, shot, even the women and kids. It’s all out there. So I ended up going out there myself the other year. I’d been involved with organising food convoys and ended up going.

Nusaiba was moved to speak out against perceived Muslim oppression whilst Rehan has been influenced by new media coverage of ummatic suffering express his allegiance through actions. Despite differences in expression, key events impact on both individuals
in a way that strengthens their sense of being Muslim. Seib (2008) argues a crucial factor in this increased awareness has been the globalisation processes of recent years, most notably the technological developments and proliferation of non-Western leaning media outlets that have given instant access to Western sanctioned atrocities and military and economic interventions throughout the Muslim world. Rehan’s assertion that internet access allows unprecedented access to the realities of Muslim suffering was echoed across the sample. Participants acknowledged the role of new media forms in providing access to ‘alternative’ viewpoints. As the following narrative excerpt generated by question (2:2)

‘How accurate is the media portrayal of Muslims and Islam?’

**Henna:**

I’d agree with most of what’s been said, but I still say you can get an alternative view to the mainstream press, but you have to hunt it out. That’s the thing, there’s so much anti-Islamic stuff about that fairer, more balanced articles are just drowned by the negative stuff.

**Jalaal:**

There’s no point in just watching the terrestrial channels. You get a better idea of what’s really going on watching things like the news on *al-Jazeera*, or off the internet. The mainstream media just tells you what the government wants you to hear. They’re not interested in showing anything that challenges the status quo. It’s only ever about ‘our’ boys, how ‘our boys’ are doing in places like Iraq or Afghanistan.
Salim:

If you really want to understand what’s going on in the world you have to make an effort. You have to search to find out what’s really happening, go on blogs, the internet, things like that.

The belief Muslim countries are being unjustly and systematically attacked by their country of birth, with Muslims themselves made culpable; make it increasingly difficult for many British-Muslims to reconcile competing allegiances. One of the most frequently cited example of these perceived injustices by the sample was foreign policy in the Middle East. This perception of an unrelenting pursuit of neo-colonialism that imposes massive civilian casualties, wilful breaches in sovereignty and appropriation of resources strikes at the heart of participants’ sense of ‘self’ and threatens to undermine British-Muslim allegiances. As Raheem asserts in his response to the follow-up interview question ‘Why has allegiance to the ummah become stronger?’:

Raheem:

You see it every day; the news is full of it: Muslims being maimed, killed, and for what? It’s happening everywhere. They’re having land taken off them, their resources stolen. You can’t get away from it. Imagine what people would say if it was happening here, but because it’s happening somewhere else, to Muslims, nobody’s interested, nobody says anything. It makes it hard to admit you’re British sometimes. You end up wanting to distance yourself from what’s happening.

The most emotive issue highlighted by the sample was the plight of the Palestinians. As Chapter One has outlined the two key issues of contention are unwavering British and American moral and military enabling of the Israeli State in its illegal annexing
and continued occupation of Palestinian territories and the continual bombardment of Palestine. This represents a continuing and almost symbolic source of injustice against Muslims. Opposition to Israeli treatment of the Palestinians continues to elicit a fervent response from Muslims across the globe, as the following excerpts from a follow up interview with Rehan show:

Rehan:

I can’t even tell you what Palestine does to me, when I see the map I just want to fucking do something … I mean it’s getting to the level of what happened with Hitler. Do you know they have taken nearly all their land? I mean how much more will we have to see them suffer? They go on about Hamas, but what do they do?

Moderator:

What do you mean?

Rehan:

I mean, Israel complain that Hamas want to obliterate them, Hamas say it…do you get me they say it…Israel are doing it. They are blowing Palestine off the face of the earth. There is no more Palestine virtually. What does Blair and all the rest of them do? They punish Palestine for saying something and support Israel as they wipe out a whole fucking country. What would Britain do if France just started building on all of Lancashire just because they wanted to? Just because some superpower gave them all the tanks and money they needed? It’s a joke, these people who talk about democracy and freedom are just having one big laugh.

This thesis contends Western inaction or selective responses in addressing Muslim concerns is evidence of a lack of ‘moral universality’, as first discussed in Chapter One. As
Chomsky asserts, ‘one moral truism that should not provoke controversy is the principle of universality: we should apply to ourselves the same standards we apply to others’ (Chomsky, 2002, p.40). Whilst Western State sovereignty, resources and civilian lives are deemed sacrosanct, the same principles are not applied to the Muslim world. It is this lack of ‘moral universality’ or double standards in the Western treatment of Muslim populations, territories and resources that elicited some of the most emotive responses from the sample, as illustrated by the following comment by Rayya in focus group four.

Rayya:

Yeah, but as soon as you show any compassion for any Muslim deaths, like all the innocent civilians who’ve died in Iraq, some who’ve been killed by British and American soldiers, you feel your loyalty’s being questioned, like you’re branded some sort of traitor. It’s like you’re only allowed to mourn British deaths. Even just talking about some you’re made out to be some sort of extremist, say something like what’s happened to Muslims in Israel or Bosnia.

As several of the sample identified, whilst sorrow for the 9/11 attacks on the Twin Towers is considered an American right, to be publicly expressed, annually commemorated and globally condemned, any expression of outrage or sorrow regarding Muslim losses such as those resulting from Palestinian and Israeli conflicts, the Bosnian genocides or following the occupation of Iraq are sometimes viewed as evidence of a radicalised outlook. Ahmed (2006) found British-Muslims were angry at the fact that Muslim civilian casualties of war are largely ignored, he asks the provocative question: ‘where are the Muslim Ground Zero’s’? (Ahmed, 2006, p.973). The existence of this double standard or lack of ‘moral universality’ as discussed above is implicit within the following extract from a follow up interview with Shah Jahan:
Shah Jahan:

It’s the hypocrisy I can’t stand. Western governments do jack shit, not unless it benefits them. They spout all this crap about having a “moral duty”, protecting people’s human rights. It’s all bullshit. It’s all about protecting their own interests. It’s got nothing to do with morals, doing the right thing. It all comes down to money for them. I mean, look at the genocides in Bosnia; they all knew what was going on. Thousands of people were being slaughtered; even women and children, and they still stood by and did nothing. Look at Srebrenica, nearly 10,000 people massacred and they still did nothing. It was only Muslims though, wasn’t it, so no one gave a shit.

As the following exchange between Raheem, Kamran and Jay in focus group three to the question (1.3) ‘How could the Government improve the situation for Muslims within the UK?’ shows, many Muslims are suspicious of Western motives, believing the American led ‘international community’ acts selectively according to elitist self-interests rather than professed humanitarian concerns:

Raheem:

It’s like Muslim lives aren’t worth as much. I mean, no one did anything to stop what was happening in Bosnia until it was too late, but with Iraq and Kuwait they didn’t hang about. They were straight in there.

Kamran:

That’s because it was about getting control of the oil fields, wasn’t it (?)
Jay:

Of course it was. They weren’t so keen to bring down Saddam in the 90s, were they?
It was nothing to do with defending Kuwait. It was about oil interests. They were too worried about all the weapons British companies were selling him to go after him.
It’s just so hypocritical, isn’t it? All this crap about defending freedom and democracy, it’s just for show, the excuse to look after their own interests, taking whatever they want.

It is such perceived injustices and the failure to apply ‘moral universality’ to Western responses to Muslim concerns domestically and abroad that have served to add to the sense of disillusionment and disenfranchisement experienced by British-Muslims.

As this thesis has posited, the Rushdie Affair instigated the emergence of a distinctly British-Muslim identity, with this burgeoning identity strengthened both as a reaction to perceived domestic and global injustices against the ummah and increases in institutional and grassroots Islamophobia. It is reactionary and, as such, fits the notion of ‘reactive pride identity’ posited by Modood (2005, p.292). Following Modood thesis argues British-Muslim identity became solidified in response to the biased discursive construction and dissemination of a series of socio-political events and an attendant ever-increasing Islamophobia. Chapter Six examines the mutually reinforcing properties of structural and street level Islamophobia through a Foucauldian prism and will apply a symbolic interactionist analysis to show how the sample feel thoroughly denigrated, stigmatised and stripped of respect because of this reciprocal Islamophobia, when interacting with most non-Muslim Britons and institutions.

This discussion has shown that Muslims in Britain responded to such pan-societal denigration with increased Islamic loyalty, pride and defiance. For Modood, this assertiveness is not ideologically framed and can take many forms ‘sometimes a religious
revival, sometimes a political identity, sometimes both’ (2005, p.282) and is seen as a means of increasing awareness of discrimination at both a personal and structural level by mobilising religious pride, individual confidence and political mobilisation to challenge Islamophobia through everyday interactions and opposing structural power relations. Gest (2010), although commenting on American Muslims, asserts this newly formed identity has gained force over time with each perceived Muslim specific injustice. Modood (1997) posits that the modern British-Muslim is much more assertive than previous generations when identity was implicit within cultural practices and partisan allegiances were kept within the private sphere. Today’s Muslim explicitly creates her identity as an assertion of a legitimate voice as part of the wider socio-political climate. Having indexed the emergence of a new British-Muslim identity and its co-solidification with socio-political events, some of which were experienced by the participants indirectly through family member’s anecdotes, the discussion moves onto their experiences of 9/11.

Many participants cited 9/11 as the definitive moment their priorities in terms of political identity were crystallised. Unlike previous socio-politically significant events, knowledge of which tended to be either passed on anecdotally or actively researched, 9/11 and the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ were experienced first-hand by the sample themselves. As the data shows, the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers was a decisive moment in terms of the development of their identities. As the following quotes highlight, the event ruptured their sense of Britishness by forcing them to re-evaluate their allegiances.

**Mumtaz:**

Like I said before, I see myself more politically Muslim now. Before 9/11 I knew I was Muslim, but it wasn’t such a big deal with me. Now though, after what’s happened to us, how we’ve been treated, not just here but in places like Iraq and
Afghanistan, you have to identify yourself as Muslim. It’s almost your duty. So, that’s what 9/11 did, it made me more aware of what’s really going on, who I am.

Shah Jahan:

Yeah, I live in Britain. Yeah, I like living here, but I still find it difficult though, to see myself as British, not because I don’t feel British, it’s more how other people can make you feel. How can you, when you’re made to feel you’re not. Since 9/11, it’s every time you open a paper or turn on the news, it’s there: “Muslims responsible for this, Muslims responsible for that.” It’s so obvious, some people don’t see us as British, that they don’t want us here.

Jalal:

But what I mean is, it’s like when this country does something against Muslims, you know, like invading Iraq, like, it stops you feeling 100% British, doesn’t it. I mean, British soldiers killing Muslims. I don’t mean the Taliban, I mean civilians, innocent people who just happen to be living there … I’m not anti-British or anything like that, it’s just, if you’re Muslim you just can’t go along with that, can you?

Whilst the previous discussion has highlighted events such as the Rushdie Affair which were anecdotally relayed to the participants and others were indirectly experienced through media reports. 9/11 and its impact on the Muslim community was directly experienced by the participants. Shah Jahan talks about the endless mediatised constructions of Muslims and how it makes him feel less British, whilst Jalal asserts the ensuing ‘War on Terror’ has created a sense of conflict.
**Irreconcilability: A Clash of Identities?**

As the data has shown, British-Muslim identity emerged and solidified as a reaction to negative discursive constructions, institutional biases, Islamophobia, and the perceived domestic and global oppression of Muslims. This reactive identity has now itself created a counter-reaction; one which locates an assertive, politicised identity as inherently compatible with Britishness. The idea Islam and Western liberal democracy are incompatible has become ubiquitous in the UK since 1989. As Parekh (1990) highlights, even Roy Jenkins, largely responsible for the introduction of the 1978 Race Relations Act, subscribed to the irreconcilability of Muslims and British society during the Rushdie affair: ‘we might have been more cautious about allowing the creation in the 1950s of a substantial Muslim communities’ (Jenkins quoted in Parekh, 1990).

Since 2001 many commentators have interpreted subsequent terrorist attacks or threat of attack as evidence not only of the demise of multiculturalism, but more specifically as incontrovertible proof Islam, and therefore Muslims, are incompatible with the ‘Western way of life’. Tariq Modood points to Giles Keppel’s ‘gleeful’ analysis of the situation where he asserts, the ‘London Bombers’ ‘were the children of Britain’s own multi-cultural society’ who had blown that project to ‘smithereens’ (Keppel cited in Modood, 2010, p.158). Whilst not all commentators expressed such delight, normalised discourses still locate British-Muslim identity as being incompatible with ‘true Britishness’. Eric Randolph (2009) observed ‘Muslims are continually identified either with terrorism or as culturally incompatible with the British way of life.’ Randolph refers to the findings of the Cardiff University study, *Images of Islam in the UK* (Moore et al., 2008), which identifies a shift in media narratives from a conflict paradigm to one focused on the cultural incompatibility of Islam and Muslims with British society increasingly focusing on the perceived failure of Muslims to assimilate.
Gest (2010) asserts it is British-Muslim ties to the supranational *ummah*, understood as superseding any local ties, that has been a major source of unrest for the wider British population. For some, this downgrading of civic roles and national expectations in favour of those based on theological values represents the absolute irreconcilability between Muslim and British identities. They assert liberal-democratic societies cannot, and should not, accommodate a religious community whose principles are perceived to be fundamentally opposed to those upon which Western democracies are based. It is this proposition the following analysis will contest. In doing so however it does not seek to offer incontrovertible proof of the compatibility of Islamic and ‘Western’ liberal democratic values, as this is beyond the remit of this analysis, nor does it propose that the hybridised British-Muslim experience is without conflict. Instead it proposes a complicated entanglement of harmony, conflict and contradiction which are subject to change over time and space. Through participant narratives it provides a rebuttal of the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ on two counts: firstly, the inherent harmony between scriptural Islam and ‘Western’ democratic values, and, secondly, participants’ successful negotiation of hybridity. However, before doing so, it will examine how participants within the study define their identities.

Primacy was universally attributed to being Muslim amongst participants when describing themselves. All but one participant, who did not specify any primary identity factor, articulated the primacy of their Islamic identity. This Islamic or *ummatic* allegiance was emphatically expressed in answer to question (1:1) ‘How would you define your identity?’ and referenced throughout their discussions. The following conversational excerpt from focus group four typifies such sentiments:
Layani:

If you’re born Muslim, you’ll always be Muslim. I mean, you just don’t hear of anyone stopping being a Muslim, because it’s more than just a religion, isn’t it (?)
Like I know loads of people who don’t pray namaaz, but they still say they’re Muslim. So even if you’ve lost your faith, you’re still going to identify yourself as a Muslim, aren’t you (?)

Rehan:

Like I’m British, but I was brought up as Muslim. So I’m a British-Muslim. I’ll always see myself as a Muslim. That’s basically who I am. It’s the most important thing about me. Being a Muslim is always going to come before anything else if you’re Muslim, isn’t it?

Salim:

It’s always going to if you’re Muslim. Like I think if you’re Muslim, it’s always going to be the most important part of who you are. I don’t think that ever changes.
Like you say, if you’re Muslim, you’re Muslim for life.

Layani:

For me, it’s definitely the most important thing in my life. Nothing else even comes close. It’s like you can be proud of where you come from or what you do for a living, but it’s never going to mean as much to you. So, yes I’m British, yes I’ve got Pakistani parentage, but living my life as a Muslim is always going to be what matters most to me.
The narrative excerpts above provide insight into participant attitudes toward their religion, not only highlighting their religious deference for Islam, but its primacy in the construction and expression of their identities. This primacy of Islamic identity is supported by large scale qualitative surveys such as ‘Attitudes to living in Britain: A survey of Muslim opinion’ (2006), which found 78 percent of the 1,000 strong sample asserting Islam to be ‘very important’ to them, whilst Peach (2006), utilising data from the 2001 Census, found 74 percent of British-Muslims attribute primacy to Islam in terms of their identity. Echoing such findings, Modood (1997) asserts how British-Muslim youth strongly associate with their family’s religious origins, with very little erosion of that group identification down the generations. As Adnan from focus group one acknowledges in his response to question (1:2) ‘How has your identity changed following the events of 9/11?’:

Adnan:

Well, hmm, if you’re Muslim, that’s who you are. It’s like, you grow up, yeah, everyone, your family, your friends, you all do the same things like praying, going the Mosque, hanging out together … It’s like, being a Muslim controls your life really, influences almost everything you do.

Whilst a cursory reading of the data shows British-Muslims prioritise Islamic allegiances at the expense of ‘Britishness’, thereby potentially lending weight to the ‘irreconcilability thesis’, a deeper analysis of both this research and other relevant empirical data shows this not to be the case. Within the current study 26 participants cite a secondary allegiance to Britain, therefore demonstrating the overwhelming majority of the sample embodies both Islam and Britishness, as the following selection of quotes highlight in response to question
(1.1) ‘How would you define your identity?’ by Yahya and Nusaiba from focus group one and Naseema from focus group three:

**Yahya:**

I’d say I’m British in more than just ‘some ways’, even though I’m Muslim. I was born here. This was where I grew up. So yeah, I’m British, but definitely with a Muslim vibe, you know.

**Nusaiba:**

It’s not something I ever think about really. To be honest, I just take it for granted. I grew up here. I’ve never lived anywhere else. So I don’t know anything. This is all I know. So yeah, even though I’m Muslim I’d still say I’m British as well.

**Naseema:**

That pretty much covers how I see it. Yeah I’m British, but I still see myself as Muslim. I’m a British-Muslim because I was born here and grew up here, but if you’re British…, that doesn’t stop you being Muslim, does it (?)

All three participants assert they are both British and Muslim, with Naseema declaring being British is not a barrier to being Muslim. This was echoed throughout the data, taking together both primary and secondary allegiances, the three most cited forms of allegiance identified by participants are Islam, Britishness and ethnicity. This suggests the majority of the sample consider themselves to have at least three dimensions to their identities, with Islam taking precedence over nationality or ethnicity.
In answer to the interview question ‘**How do you feel about being British, giving examples of when you feel more or less British?**’ Basanti emphasises her commitment to Islam, whilst asserting this does not invalidate her sense of Britishness:

**Basanti:**

Islam is my religion. It’s how I decide how I should handle difficult situations in my life. It’s where I turn when I need help. That’s got nothing to do with how much I like living in Britain. I live here it’s my home ... and I get sick of being told by the papers and politicians that I don’t love it or that I don’t love it enough… Can’t I just love both? Take a bit of everything?

Again Basanti asserts her religious affiliation has little if any bearing on her Britishness. Building on Basanti’s assertions, the thesis argues attribution of Islamic primacy by participants should be understood within the context of the findings of large-scale quantitative surveys. A report published by the University of Essex, reported by the guardian (July 2012) found 77 percent of Muslims strongly identify with Britain while only 50 percent of the wider population do. Modood (2011) argues, Muslims aspire to the concept of Britishness more so than the general population. He goes on to explain, for those Muslims whose religious identity is a salient factor, it does not follow that the religious or ideological dimension will be most prominent, rather, this could be a sense of family and community, or a commitment to collective political advancement, or righting the wrongs done to Muslims. Indeed, as Hamid (2011) asserts, the diversity of attitudes towards being Muslim cannot be overstated. The primacy of Islamic identity does not therefore equate with the primacy of normalised Orientalist constructions of Islam. Consequently, research that fails to adequately contextualise findings supporting the
primacy of Islam amongst Muslims inadvertently fuel Islamophobic sentiments and the notion of Muslim irreconcilability by using selectively chosen evidence without contextual explanations.

In response to the follow up interview question ‘How does attachment (to the ummah) manifest itself in action or sentiment?’ Rehan explains his allegiance to Islam and Muslims:

Rehan:

That’s what I don’t get. They [the media] always say ‘Muslims’, like we’re all the same thing, that we all think exactly the same way. Obviously we don’t. Surely they’ve got to be brighter than that? Even my family… we’re all different. My mum’s all about the namaaz, reading the Quran and being a good person. My brother though, well he sleeps in all day because he’s out all night at sheesha bars. He doesn’t even know what a mosque looks like anymore. He couldn’t even read the Quran now, it’s been so long. But then he’s raised loads of money for Palestine, organised help for kids out in Gaza, so he’s not all bad.

Having established the primacy of Islamic allegiance amongst the sample and the wider British-Muslim community and how that allegiance is not in the main attached to any ideological dimensions as is normatively supposed, the analysis returns to the rebuttal of the ‘irreconcilability thesis’, which will now be argued against on two levels. Both of which are rooted in the British-Muslim hybrid experience, Firstly, through analysis of the data it became apparent young British-Muslims are increasingly using Islamic scripture to disassociate what they assert to be ‘true’ Islam from both Orientalist Islam, normalised by wider society, and inherited interpretations of Islam, as practised by their parents’
Adherence to ‘scriptural’ Islam is defined by the bypassing of culturally mediated versions of Islam to adhere to the primary sources of the Quran and Hadiths. Their ability to critically assess both identities to create a new way of thinking that allows them to sidestep irreconcilability is typical of the malleable boundaries of the ‘liminal’ space as theorised by Bhabha (1994). It allows participants to not only maintain their hybrid identities, but also limit the stigma associated with an identity widely believed to be incompatible with normalised British values by reconfiguring their understanding of what Islam means.

The most notable concerns of participants with respect to the irreconcilability thesis was the incompatibility of Islam were the professed incongruence of Islam with notions of democracy, gender equality and civic engagement. Participants’ application of intellectual Islam to assert ‘British’ values, such as democracy, gender equality and civic engagement, are indeed congruent with Islamic values, and therefore serves as a rejection of the commonly held assumption Islam and the ‘West’ are fundamentally incompatible. As the following discussion between sixth form students from BMGS generated by the exploratory questions around media portrayal Muslims highlights participant concerns regarding certain omissions within institutional constructions, primarily the media, and this impacts on attitude towards Islam:

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19 The documented precedent of the Prophet Muhammad’s (pbuh) life and teachings that constitute the major source of guidance for Muslims apart from the Quran.
**Fazal Jahan:**

They never say anything about Islam and how it should really be practised. I don’t mean the small stuff. I mean the really big things, things people think are Islamic like dictators. They don’t realise it’s against Islam. That whole thing we did about leaders have to be elected by the community you can’t force yourself and your ideas on people.

**Sofie:**

They’re more interested in showing how the Taliban doesn’t want to educate women, than saying what Islam really says about it. But because they force feed Osama to everyone, all these stupid people think we’re all Osamas. No one asks us what Islam actually says, that it doesn’t say anywhere women aren’t men’s equals. I’m equal to any man …

[Laughter]

**Samina:**

That’s always going to be the problem. They’re always going to show us a particular way, according to the stereotype. There always going say how we don’t want to integrate, want to live under Sharia, but it’s never how we’re supposed to look after everyone who needs it. That it doesn’t matter who they are, isn’t that what zakat\(^{20}\) is all about?

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\(^{20}\) *Zakat* is one of the five pillars of Islam, elements incumbent upon Muslims. It refers to the wealth redistributing practice of giving a set percentage of all income to the poor or needy.
These young women both cite and reject on religious grounds, three popular misconceptions regularly cited as ‘proof’ of the incompatibility of Islam with the ‘West’: opposition to democracy, gender inequality and a tendency towards Muslim separatism. It is worth noting that in each case even a rudimentary reading of Islamic scriptures repudiates such claims. As Gest (2010) asserts, the best rejection of ‘irreconcilability’ has been made by Islamic scholars, directly engaged in the interpretation and understanding of the *Quran* and Islamic traditions, to argue Muslim minorities within Western democracies can not only coexist, but thrive. Esposito and Voll (2001), offer an in-depth discussion of Islam’s compatibility democracy and other ‘Western’ liberal democratic principles, a full examination of which is beyond the scope of this paper. The following analysis will therefore limit itself to addressing the three popular misconceptions identified by focus group two to illustrate Islam’s compatibility with ‘Britishness’ and, in doing so, oppose the notion of ‘irreconcilability’.

Fazal Jahan refers the principle of *tawheed*, which in its most simplistic form refers to the unique sovereignty of God, who has ‘no partner or peer’ (Voll and Esposito, 2001, p.3), from which it can be inferred that no individual has a right to enforce his or her rule over the community. As Mawdudi notes, ‘the authority of the caliphate is bestowed on the entire group of people’ (Abu al-Ala Mawdudi in Voll and Esposito 2001, p.4) hence Fazal Jahan’s assertion that dictatorship is against Islam is in fact founded in the scriptures. From its conception Islam has promoted democratic social and political organisation through the notion of a *shura* or group of *leaders elected by the community* who consult and select a

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21 In all traditions, as with Islam, controversies of concept interpretation occur. There are intellectual and ideological resources that can be interpreted to support absolute monarchy or democracy. This thesis puts forward the views of participants which are largely upheld by other empirical sources.
leader to represent them, (Kabbani, 2002). Another example of Islamic democratic principles is made manifest by the Prophet’s (pbuh) passing without appointing a successor to rule, an intentional omission that was designed to force Muslims to come together to collectively make what was a crucial decision based on what he had taught them.

Sofie raises the omnipresent notion of misogyny as an inherent part of Islam, a charge that is all too readily and consistently levelled at both Muslim men and women: portraying the former as barbaric perpetrators and the latter as weak facilitators of systematic misogyny through a perceived compliance and lack of protest. Islamic feminist scholars have vociferously rejected this Western construction, whilst simultaneously opposing Muslim patriarchy and the abuse of women in certain Islamic States as a cultural perversion of Islamic teachings. This dual rejection of internal and external violence again can be facilitated by re-examining the *Quran* and *Hadiths* to make cogent arguments that violence against women is anti-Islamic and that women are equal to men, as the following *Hadith* illustrates: ‘Assuredly, women are the twin halves of men’ (Tirmidhi, Book 1, Hadith 113).

Samina highlights *zakat*, which is obligatory, as an example that Muslims are duty bound under Islam to engage in the civic and political affairs of the geographic community in which they live. Modood (2007, p.142) notes, Muslim adherence to multi-faith citizenship is as old as Islam itself, ‘the prophet Muhammad founded such a polity, the first settled Muslim community in Medina was shared with Jews and other denominations and was based on an inter-communally agreed constitution’.

Interestingly, in addition to the above conversation attempting to counter the ‘irreconcilability’ claim by aligning so called British values and Islamic practice it also

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22 This process was recently employed in Afghanistan, where according to Islamic tradition, public choose representatives who then gather to choose a leader, a cabinet and national assembly. The recent *loya Jirga*, that confirmed Hamid Karzai as President, demonstrated Islamic democracy in action (Kabbani, 2002).
epitomises the notion of ‘ambassador for Islam’, a hybridised enunciation, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

As the analysis has shown, whilst the majority of the sample assert a primary allegiance to Islam, a more detailed examination uncovers two important factors: firstly Islamic allegiance varies dramatically from individual to individual and is not necessarily an allegiance to ideological Islam as commonly portrayed and assumed, and secondly, although participants, and many other British-Muslims, assert an allegiance to Islam the multi-faceted nature of identity also allows them to be passionate about their Britishness, indeed as some studies have shown, more so than other groups.

As has been shown, advocates of the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ who argue adherence to Islam and its supra-national community is incompatible with ‘Britishness’ fail to take into account the compatibility of scriptural Islamic traditions with ‘Western values’. Building on the compatibility of scriptural Islam with ‘British’ values, the rebuttal of the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ continues by highlighting the innumerable ways in which participants, and therefore British-Muslims in general, negotiate hybridity to live meaningful lives. This is in itself testament to the compatibility of Islamic beliefs with British citizenship. This does not propose however that conflict does not exist, merely that conflict, as reported by the sample, is negotiated, challenged or accepted as part of their everyday interactions in order to live rounded, successful lives as British-Muslims.

The discussion now turns to those behaviours that oppose the ‘irreconcilability thesis’ and in doing so addresses two of the four core theoretical strands presented in Chapter Two: Homi Bhabha’s notion of hybridity as a ‘Third Space’ (1994) and to a lesser extent some core concepts from Erving Goffman’s Presentation of Self in Daily Life (1959).
The data clearly shows participant identities are ‘products of cultural mixing’, as defined by Brah and Coombes (2000, cover), where identity is founded on more than one cultural experience. The narratives show how participants negotiate their British, Muslim and gendered ‘selves’ in numerous ways, which for the purposes of this analysis have been grouped into four distinct context dependant categorisations or, *qua* Weber, ‘ideal types’: ‘cultural cherry picking’ and the evaluative nature of access to ‘interstitial space’, ‘chameleonism’, ‘ambassadorship’ and ‘conflict’. The first, ‘cherry-picking’, allows individuals selective access to the interstitial space to appropriate the best of both cultures and allows them to be simultaneously inside and outside. The second, ‘chameleonism’, allows individuals to adapt themselves to a particular situation, a form of ‘mimicry’ (Bhabha, 1994, p.86), but by omission, rather than emulation, and employ strategic silences to avoid conflict and change ‘face’ to fit into the particular context. Thirdly, ‘ambassadorship’, where avoidance strategies are deemed inappropriate individuals become ambassadors for Islam allowing participants to challenge everyday Islamophobia using reasoned argument and a tolerant attitude to present Islam in the best light possible. Lastly, ‘conflict’, where every day social situations are beyond the Impression Management behaviours ‘chameleonism’ or reasoned debate individuals are exposed to conflict that may potentially result in ruptures to their sense of ‘Britishness’. It should be noted, these categories have been identified for analysis purposes and that they are not mutually exclusive in their application, the data showed participants might employ one or all methods depending on the social context, and secondly, not all social contexts invoke hybridity. Indeed, as several participants recognise, they are often unaware of hybridised states as it is not contested on a daily basis, unlike the state of ‘cherry picking’.
Facets of Identity Construction: Picking Cherries?’

The discussion starts with the least conflicted and most positive aspect of a hybridised British-Muslim identity, cultural ‘cherry picking’. A significant number of participants spoke of being able to actively embrace the aspects they found most appealing from both cultures. Participants highlighted not only the benefits of access to two cultures such as fashion, music, film, language and cuisine, but of the unique ability of appreciating and comparatively assessing both cultures from ‘almost outsiders’ position that offers them unique insight into the best and worst of both. This access to two very different, but equally rich ‘worlds’ was keenly discussed across all four focus groups. For example, as the following comments by Layani highlight in answer to question (1:1) ‘How would you define your identity?’:

Layani:

I think you can still be a good Muslim and appreciate the benefits of living in Britain. You can appreciate both cultures still. Like you can wear Western style clothes, but still wear the hijab. Living here you get the best of both worlds.

Layani’s alludes to the ‘best of both worlds’ or as Homi Bhabha would have it, her ability to cross the threshold of both cultures. This is an aspect of British-Muslim liminality that was highlighted by a discussion between two young female undergraduates in answer to the same question:

Rabiya:

I’ve got to say I love our clothes, and all the Western stuff as well. I mean, I wouldn’t want to live the rest of my life wearing one or the other. You’ve got
Devdas, Madhuri and Sabyasachi on one side and all that gorgeousness and then you can wake up and go to college channelling Kate Moss. But when I get married it’ll be full on Aishwarya in Johdaa Akbar, lengha, jewellery, embroidery, mehndi.23 No white dress for me.

Amaya:

Sometimes I literally can’t choose. Sholay or Godfather, haandi roti or fish and chips, Jay-Z or Nusrat.24

The narrative excerpt above typifies the samples’ enthusiasm for the immediacy of access to an array of cultural artefacts and expressions through their hybridised identities and reflects the essence of Homi Bhabha’s notion of cultural mixing in its most positive form.

A second perceived advantage of hybridity identified by participants is the position of ‘almost outsiders’ that affords them access to both cultures ‘outside in’. This unique vantage point epitomises the hybridised viewpoint and it is most visibly illustrated by participant visits to their country of ethnic origin as British-Muslims rather than as native Pakistani Muslims. As children of native Pakistanis participants are afforded access to, and to an extent experience, the authentic reality of life in Pakistan and therefore witness the scope of gender and class inequalities in undiluted form. Such experiences highlight Britain’s comparative commitment to equality, enshrined in legislation and, albeit theoretically, social mobility. In answer to question (1.1) ‘**How would you define your identity?**’ Nusaiba explains her “love” of visiting her parents’ country of origin and


acknowledges how different her life as a British-Muslim woman is compared to what it might have been had she been raised in Pakistan.

**Nusaiba:**

There are loads of countries women don’t get the same freedom you get here. Imagine what it’s like if you’re female in somewhere like Pakistan. I do love Pakistan, but I’m realistic. It’s not safe to go out on your own. You can’t get an education. You can’t work outside the home, you hardly any rights. Here there’s none of that. If I’m really honest, I hate saying it, but I would hate to be a woman living in Pakistan.

This point is further illustrated in the following conversational excerpt below. Kamran, Mumtaz and Basanti in focus group three recall their visits to Pakistan. This was particularly enlightening in terms of their ability to problematize power relations over there in comparison to those in Britain as a result of their unique insider/outsider positioning. Homi Bhabha (2004) terms these ‘in-between’ positions as ‘interstitial’, that is, those spaces in which the individual is able to move seamlessly between different subject positions. In this particular case, the ‘interstitial’ space allows participants to move between being British and Pakistani nationals, thereby allowing each position to be seen through the eyes of the other nationality to reveal a third way of knowing.

**Mumtaz:**

It’s like my mum’s always going on, women had to do what they were told in her day. They didn’t get an education. Men: kings of world. I’ve been to Pakistan quite
a lot, so I know what it’s like. It’s horrendous for women. I know we’ve said how bad it is being a Muslim here, but honestly, women out there, they just don’t have a chance. Let’s be honest about it.

Kamran:

I know it’s not perfect here, but at least we’ve got some kind of equality here. I’m not saying we all get treated fairly, or anything like that, but at least people try. You’ve got laws here to protect your rights. There’s nothing like that in Pakistan. It’s so corrupt, you’ve got to be rich to get anywhere.

Basanti:

It’s not just the fact things are so unequal there. I know the system here’s fairer, compared to somewhere like Pakistan. You don’t get the poverty here like you do over there. Look at the state of the street kids there. It makes you want to cry. It’s as if people don’t see them. At least we’ve got welfare services here. All kids are educated, looked after. I know, I know before anyone says it, no, we don’t have real equality here, but it’s got to be better than over there, surely?

As these comments above highlight, many participants in the sample are aware of the relative benefits of being British when compared to life in their country of parental ethnic origin. In doing so, they both recognise and celebrate the benefits of Britain’s commitment to equality of opportunity; particularly social welfare provisions which they acknowledge are virtually non-existent within most Muslim countries. This appreciation of British aspirations of equality and simultaneous condemnation of gender and class inequality in Muslim countries rarely finds voice in the mediatised constructions of Islam. As the current data shows, many British-Muslims demonstrate a respect for democratic principles
and, in particular, the benefits arising from a society in which equality is viewed, albeit theoretically, a universal right and which is allegedly enforced through legislative provisions.

**Impression Management: Chameleonism and Strategic Silence**

Whilst the previous section detailed the cultural opportunities and the unique vantage point arising from British-Muslims interstitial perspective that are actively embraced by a large proportion of the sample, this next section underscores the fluidity of hyphenated identities over time and space and the adoption of different ‘faces’ (Goffman, 1955) or images presented according to the context. In this way, young British-Muslims can be thought of as ‘chameleons’, blending into various social situations and interactions through changing their actions, sartorial choices and speech. This categorisation is derived from Bhabha’s notion of ‘mimicry’ (2004, p.125) which proposes individuals, like animals, employ mimic strategies in the struggle for survival. The data shows how several participants employed this method, not as actual mimicry, but by projecting a ‘performance’ that indicates an *appearance of being* the same as non-Muslims, by not performing difference. This is not actual emulation, but rather appearing to be the same by not calling attention to difference. In other words, blending into the contextual background and can be understood as situational time-limited mimicry. This ‘Chameleonism’ took two forms: firstly, to facilitate transitions between different social situations and, secondly, as a method of conflict avoidance during interactions through employing self-censorship in speech and demeanour.

During a discussion generated by focus group question (2:5) ‘How has media coverage affected you showing signs of being visibly Muslim?’ participants spoke of
embodiment and identification of Islam in speech, actions and dress. Although sartorial and bodily choices will be briefly considered within this discussion, embodiment of Islam will be examined in detail in Chapter Seven. This discussion is primarily concerned with the manipulation of speech and action as a means of hybridity negotiation.

Chameleon-like characteristics were used to enhance ‘Muslimness’ in the private sphere and ‘Britishness’ in the public sphere. As La-Rayb explains, she ‘ups’ ‘Muslimness’ around the family and decreases it in the public sphere.

La Rayb:

It’s like when I was younger. I’d be going out with all my friends, English friends as well, and you’d be having a laugh all the time meeting boys, going to clubs, and then you’d go home and be a completely different person. You’d play the dutiful daughter, act all demure and proper, and you’re parents wouldn’t have a clue about what you were getting up to. To be honest it’s a bit like that now. There are still things we don’t talk about, even now.

La-Rayb’s comments show how British-Muslims do not necessarily have to reconcile all identity facets in the same moment. To use Goffman’s metaphor she chooses whichever ‘mask’ (1959, p.19) is most appropriate to the situation and in doing so avoids conflict in terms of having to choose who she ‘really is’ in any given moment. This is a crucial strategy for hybridised individuals. Attempting to reconcile each facet of their identities at all times would result in a ‘self’ so fractured it would be unsustainable. To illustrate the ‘changing of masks’ in maintaining a unified ‘self’, the discussion turns to Isha and her use of the hijab to emphasis and de-emphasise her Muslim identity. Most
female participants reported an expectation of heightened ‘Muslimness’ in the private sphere. This took a particular form for Isha. Her parents believe the *hijab* to be a core part of Islam, but for her this is incongruent with her ‘Westernised’ self. To maintain both ‘faces’ Isha has created *portable Islam*, she carries her veil in her handbag, wearing or removing it as the context dictates. Modest dress in Isha’s case is a flexible part of the female British-Muslim identity.

**Isha:**

It’s like wearing the *hijab*. No one really forces me to. I just do it to please my parents really. Don’t get me wrong, I love wearing it sometimes, like at weddings, or at *Eid*, but I don’t want to wear it all the time. Loads of girls I know hardly ever wear it, but my parents think it’s disrespectful. So I just end up taking it off when I’m at college or out with friends, and putting it back on before I get near home.

Isha’s experience crystallises life in the Third Space, where identity is in a constant state of flux that not only changes over time, but also according to circumstance. Chameleon-like, the participants reported selecting the most appropriate ‘face’ (1959, p.206) for the setting, changing aspects of their personalities, and even clothing, to project the right image, or in Goffmanian terms selecting the right ‘props’ (1959, p.23) to achieve the most believable performance. Jasmine Zine explains Isha’s actions:

For some youth, what they do is develop a double persona. At home they're the good Muslim kid, they pray and they fast and go to mosque, when they go to
school they become a different person. They create a persona to fit with the competing cultural demands of home and school (Zine, 2006, p.22).

The evidence suggests negotiating the Third Space takes conscious effort and planning in some cases, as participant narratives have shown and Zine (2006) explains, negotiation of the Third Space can be difficult. To simply define hybridised identities as ‘fluid’ is facile and masks the many hardships and the emotional impact behind the spatial and temporal ‘face’ changes revealed by the data. Whereas the experiences of female participants illuminate gender specific hardships of being British and Muslim, the data revealed a more ubiquitous discomfort where fundamental ideological beliefs are subdued to maintain contextual equilibrium. Analysis of the data revealed this is because fluidity of identity does not correspond to fluidity of core beliefs and values. The former is subject to change, whilst the latter tends to remain constant, and it this incongruence between internal beliefs and externally projected ‘faces’ that creates conflict. The issue is whether that conflict is internalised or externalised, in which case it would inevitably cause a disruption in performance. To avoid potential damage to the social ‘self’, participants deployed certain strategies; removing themselves from the situation either physically or verbally, through employing strategic silences. Participants spoke of ‘compromising or hiding’ their beliefs, not ‘being themselves’ or feeling forced to walking away, thereby choosing self-censorship over conflict. This phenomenon is derived from the current data and will be coined ‘chameleonomism’. It is rooted in Bhabha's notion of ‘mimicry’ as detailed in his essay 'Of Mimicry and Man' (1984). Mimicry arises when members of a colonised society adopt the culture of the coloniser. Mimicry presents the 'other' as a point of difference that is 'almost the same, but not quite' (1994, p.126). It represents a sign of double articulation, whereby the 'other' is appropriated for power as he visualises it. Whilst mimicry is an act, ‘chameleonomism’ can be an action and a strategic thought. An individual might actively
blend in, by speech or action; or might choose to employ a silence or omission of certain facts or beliefs in order to avoid disrupting social interactions and presentation of self, as the following selection of participant quotes illustrate:

**Saladin:**

You’re different in different situations, aren’t you (?) Like at home, with your family, or when you’re with your proper friends, you don’t have to think about anything. You’re just you. But when you’re out, like college or at work, it’s harder to be yourself. You have to be more careful, consciously make an effort sometimes to fit in. I don’t mean being something you’re not…just playing some things down and concentrating on things you’ve got in common.

**Nusaiba:**

It’s like you’ve got your home life, with your family and friends, and then you’ve got your life outside that. It’s like living two places sometimes…Yes, but it’s not the same when you’re with other people who aren’t Muslim. You can’t just be the same, be like you normally are with your friends, at home. You have to compromise, in some ways, don’t you? I mean, you play up some parts of your personality and tone down other things.

**Rabiya:**

I’m always finding myself in those positions. You know, where someone’s saying something against Muslims or putting down Islam, half the time they’ve not even registered I’m Muslim, and even though you totally disagree with them you just stay quiet, or you change the subject because you can’t be bothered getting into
another argument. They just think you’re some sort of fundamentalist nutter who they try everything they can do to avoid.

**Shah Jahan:**

Like this shop I used to work in, the manager was a right idiot, always questioning me about being Muslim, making really stupid comments. Like, she’d always try getting me talk about it. Anyway, one day these two Muslim girls came in, one of them wearing a *hijab* and my manager said to me after they’d left ‘what are they doing shopping here?’ and started slagging them off for coming in. I couldn’t believe she said it, to me, a Muslim. What could I do though, she was my manager? So I just had to shut it and try to ignore what she was saying. Thing was, I didn’t want her thinking I was agreeing with her.

Shah Jahan speaks of having a ‘true self’ that is always present in thought, but only externally presented when the context corresponds with those beliefs, therefore minimising risk of social conflict or confrontation and any potential devaluation of the ‘self’. To avoid such penalties the British-Muslim ‘chameleon’ blends in by corresponding his or her performance, in both actions and speech, as the situational context requires. As with Shah Jahan, by remaining silent about his family’s veiling practices he both avoids conflict and ‘losing face’ (Goffman, 1955, p.339) in his professional environment which might have negative repercussions for his career. In this case he is unable to agree with the conversation, so in order to keep face he employs a strategic silence.

The final aspect of ‘chameleonism’ to be discussed is where an individual avoids both external conflict and potential ‘loss of face’ at the expense of internal conflict.
Feelings of anger and frustration are the result of being forced to acquiesce to societal pressure in order to maintain interactional equilibrium, as the following conversational excerpt from focus group two highlights in response to question (1.5) ‘*How are Muslims and Islam perceived by wider British society?*’:

**Sofie:**

We all do it. You feel so angry at what people are saying sometimes, but you know you can’t really say what you want to say. You just have to keep it inside, when really all you want to do is scream at them. But I don’t and then feel like a loser, like I had a small opportunity to defend Islam and I let someone trample on it and then I’m angry with myself and angry with them for putting me in that position.

**Naseema:**

I just get so angry sometimes. I can’t talk to some people. They do your head in so much, I just have to walk away…, because if I stay, I start talking to them, I’ll just go OTT [over the top] on them. I mean it man, I’ll freak out on them. And you can’t do that all the time like a psycho hijabi, they’ll put me in an asylum. Last time that happened was when Claire said Iraqis need saving by America and isn’t it good that we have the American police to keep everyone in order, oh my God, I just couldn’t hold it in, I lost the plot. I haven’t seen Claire again, I think she was shocked, I think I took all my frustration out on her. She thinks I’m the devil now.

This conversation highlights the accumulative cost of maintaining an unspoiled social ‘self’ at the expense of repeatedly repressing salient facets of one’s identity. Sofie and
Naseema show how being forced to deny or repress important beliefs can lead to frustration, anger and self-recremation.

Employing ‘chameleonism’, whether in speech, embodiment or action allowed participants to facilitate transition between the public and private spheres and avoid conflict in interactions, particularly those situations where the preservation of an unspoilt ‘self’ is a priority. The excerpts from participant narratives above clearly show interactions in which ‘chameleonism’ creates internal conflict. The next section discusses when ‘chameleonism’ and strategic silences are judged to be inappropriate within certain social contexts, whilst engagement in reasoned debate and justifications of Islam were deemed more suitable.

**Defending Islam: Performing ‘Moderate Muslim’**

Ziauddin Sardar (2002) argues, the socially accepted role for Muslims in recent years has been ‘apologist’, in other words, justifying through argument the position of Islam. Although many participants felt duty bound to justify or provide explanations of Islam, despite popular misrepresentation and certain actions of fundamentalist groups, others resented the implication *all* Muslims are ‘enemies within’ and the expectation they should publically condemn terrorism *specifically* against the West on demand if they are to prove their ‘Britishness’. Whilst the data revealed the role of ‘apologist’ has become part of daily life post 9/11, several participants recalled having to explain and justify Islamic tradition from an early age.

Muslims born in Britain find themselves reaching an understanding of Islam in a secular society, whereas previous generations gained their knowledge of Islam prior to emigration, thereby learning to perform Islamic traditions in a non-contested arena in
which Islam is held in high social regard. Religious faith in British secular society is becoming increasingly alien and open to well-meaning curiosity at best and open ridicule at worst. In a discussion arising from the interview question, ‘**How are Muslims excluded and what can be done to improve integration in wider British society?**’, Raheem spoke of a feeling of general exclusion/based on being different from an early age and having to justify those differences in response to questioning by non-Muslims and also out of a sense of duty to Islam.

**Raheem:**

You know you’re different right from being young; having to explain things about you to other people. As soon as I got to school it started. You know, like ‘why do you wear those clothes?’, ‘why can’t you sit in assemblies?’ It’s like *Ramzaan* [Ramadan]. At home it was just something normal that everybody you knew did, something special you really looked forward to. Then suddenly you have to explain yourself. Your friends asking stupid questions like: ‘why do you have to do it?’, ‘what do mean you can’t eat?’, ‘why can’t you drink?’ They try to make it sound a bit pointless, almost stupid so it just spoils it for you.

Raheem’s experience shows how young British-Muslims are exposed to the threshold between cultures Huddart (2005, p.4) from an early age at the point where social interactions take place outside the family home, particular those settings where Islamic or indeed any religious practice is uncommon. During the same discussion he goes onto reveal how as a British-Muslim he has been expected to vocally condemn anti-Western terrorism and how offensive this is:
Raheem:

It’s as if you’re somehow guilty if you don’t show how outraged you are about al-Qaeda. You have to show you’re more upset than they are every time someone mentions 9/11; mourn like it was someone from your family who was killed. If you don’t they’ll tar you with the same brush. I mean, why should we? They don’t give a damn about Muslims being killed, do they?

Whilst Raheem is frustrated at being equated with extremists simply by virtue of failing to show sufficient remorse or overt public condemnation of terrorist acts on demand other participants recognised the inherent implications of being questioned about Islam, but accept it as their duty as a Muslim to exemplify and defend Islam. In answer to question 1.5 ‘How are you perceived by wider society?’, sixth form students in focus group two explained their reasoning for defending Islamic practices:

Samina:

It’s like when they uncover a terrorist plot or something, you feel you have to put on some sort of public display to show how shocked you are…make sure people understand that sort of indiscriminate killing is against Islam. It’s almost like you have to apologise be more shocked just because you’re Muslim. Someone once asked me if I thought killing all those people on 9/11 was OK. I mean they thought there was a possibility that I would say yes I liked it when they killed 2000 innocent people.

Naseema:

Yeah, it’s changed, definitely. It’s like the older I get, the more I’ve felt I’ve had to show people what’s good about Islam, show people what Muslims are really like;
that the negative way we’re made out to be isn’t true. It’s like you have to defend yourself, even when you haven’t even done or said anything. It does my head in, because I feel like I’m in the dock, but you’ve got to look at the bigger picture and try to defend Islam.

**Layani:**

I sometimes feel I have to go out of my way to defend Islam to some people, even to some of my white friends who I know pretty well. It’s like having to prove yourself to people all the time that you’re not some secret religious fanatic. I just do it, I think as Muslims it’s really hard, but it’s my religion, my family’s religion and it is being hijacked by people who don’t really understand it.

As the participant narratives show, many young British-Muslims feel duty bound to act as ambassadors for Islam. Samina, Naseema and Layani all acknowledge the Islamophobia inherent in the interactions they describe, but make a conscious decision to portray Islam positively. Despite such discriminatory social experiences many participants felt positive about defending Islam and that it contributes toward achieving micro-level social change, whilst others felt offended by the burden of societal demands they should perform the role of the peaceful, benign Muslim. Bhabha encapsulates both these sentiments in what he calls ‘Third Space enunciation’ (2004, p.54), where he argues social encounters result in contradictory and ambivalent spaces in which identities and ideologies are questioned and negotiated. The performance of the ‘moderate’ Muslim can be understood in terms of a transgressive behaviour or enunciation that challenges binary constructions of Islam to introduce a possibility of that Islam might be understood in a
different way in the future. However performing the ‘moderate’ Muslim has its disadvantages as expressed by Fahima:

**Fahima:**

I was reading this article, about a Muslim guy. He made a really interesting point. He said he has to keep what he thinks about things like Palestine a secret because of what people might think. But when anything like the London bombings happens you’re supposed to make a public show of how devastated you are. It’s like you have to prove yourself all the time. How can one thing be worse than the other?

Fahima’s comment is telling, in that it shows how Muslims believe any emotional response or legitimate protest, in this case for the plight of Palestinians, must be suppressed, whilst similar expressions of grief for Western tragedies must be amplified. Arguably, regardless of the victims, all such similar tragedies should elicit the same emotional response and should be afforded the same respect.

The next part of the data analysis focuses on social situations specific to hybridised British-Muslim identity that cannot be negotiated by an appreciation of duel cultures, the notion of ‘chameleonism, strategic silence or the performance of Muslim ‘apologist’ or ‘ambassador’. Participants described interactions where such conflict avoidance strategies and reasoned debate are felt inappropriate. In such situations conflict does occur, causing resentment and ruptures in the equilibrium of a cohesive British-Muslim identity.
Ruptured Hybridity: Resisting Islamophobia and Ummatic Defence

As discussed in Chapter Two, Khan (1998) describes the Third Space as a location in which Muslims simultaneously answer polarised demands. British-Muslims must not only combine, but also reconcile both national and religious elements of their identity. Clearly in post 9/11 Britain there are instances where national and religious loyalties are at best oppositional, and at worst incompatible. Whilst, as has been shown, this incompatibility can be negotiated through the employing strategies such as ‘chameleonism’ or ‘ambassadorship’, they have proved inadequate mechanisms for those situations where being British and Muslim is problematic, oppositional and sometimes irreconcilable.

The following analysis of the data explores how several participants felt conflicted about certain aspects of their hybrid state and how such experiences of conflict between what they felt to be important and what is asserted as important for them by wider society results in ruptures in their ‘Britishness’. Participant discussions regarding such ruptures centre on two main points: objections to Western economic, political and military interventions in Muslim countries, particularly those resulting in civilian suffering and deaths, and the Islamophobia they experience as individuals and as part of the British-Muslim community. This takes the discussion back full circle to the solidification argument made earlier in this chapter, that is, the impact of Muslim oppression domestically and abroad, coupled with the ever-increasing institutional Islamophobia on the solidification of a reactionary British-Muslim identity. It therefore follows that these factors result in ruptures to British-Muslims’ sense of ‘Britishness’ which manifest in the solidification of Islamic identity. Therefore, to avoid repetition, the following section will briefly show how the very same factors are the most likely to create ruptures in participant’s sense of ‘Britishness’. For instance during a follow up interview Raheem stated:
Raheem:

Well, I don’t think about it normally. I never think, ‘oh! I’m Asian’…, but it just happens out of the blue, you know someone says something, and there it is. Racism. It can happen anywhere, funny looks on the train, wondering why you didn’t get that job, my sister telling me someone laughed at her, or she thinks they did. It gets you paranoid. You know that’s it, if someone sniggers at my sister’s hijab, it is past the point of explaining to them, it’s time to get it on.

In much the same vein Shah Jahan expresses similar sentiments during group discussion round UK foreign policy initiatives.

Shah Jahan:

The thing that totally does it for me is when they start bombing Muslim countries. Seriously how many dead Muslim kids do they have to see before people say no! I mean for fuck’s sake, it gets me so down, so angry, I can’t think about it too much. That’s the kind of thing that makes it really hard living here. You don’t want to have anything to do with it, but you can’t get away from Britain’s role in it all. You can’t. I don’t want that sort of shit being done in my name. I don’t want to be British in the way that means I sleep easy when they’re bomb kids.

The above conversation epitomises the notion of conflicting allegiances resulting in ruptures in ‘Britishness’. The more Jay and Shah Jahan are exposed to ideas that fundamentally contradict their positions the more they question their sense of national belonging and citizenship. In particular Jay asserts some social interactions at the boundary of ‘Britishness’ and ‘Muslimness’ are beyond the parameters of reasoned debate and into the territory of open conflict. These experiences are illustrative of the existence of
‘original’ power dynamics in the Third Space. As explained in Chapter One by Cornell and Fahlander (2007) the Third Space is not always made up of ‘equal parts’ mixing of cultures because this denies the inequalities of power and knowledgeability of the agents involved. The Third Space is still one where racism, in Jay’s case and arguably neo-Colonialist foreign policies in Shah Jahan’s case impact on hybridised individuals, bringing with them memories of historical power relations between the coloniser and colonised.

The previous section has provided a rebuttal to the irreconcilability thesis in two ways: firstly, through the application of scriptural Islam to show its compatibility with ‘Britishness’; and, secondly, through participants’ negotiation of hybridised identities by employing four distinct strategies that enable them live relatively well-adjusted lives based on a unified sense of ‘self’. The data upholds not only the anti-essentialist view of identity, but hybridised identities as defined by Huddart (2005, p.4), products of cultures that are always in contact with one another leading to cultural ‘mixed-ness, even impurity’. Cultural ‘cherry picking’ and access to interstitial spaces, was seen as positive by the participants, they revel in the variety of music, film, fashion and cuisine available to them on a daily basis whilst inhabiting the interstitial space allows them to critique, appreciate and choose to partake of either or both cultures. However, chameleonism, ambassadorship, and conflict as result of hybridity shows that the Third Space is not a neutral territory where new behaviours and practices are created. Participant discussions support Cornell and Fahlander (2007) they show that the Third Space is not always harmonious and neutral point where old power structures are mutually dismantled to make space for culturally inclusive norms, finally putting western cultural hegemony to rest. This thesis posits that British-Muslim youth are restricted by normalised discourse within the Third Space. The Third Space does exist in isolation untouched by meta-societal hegemonies. It too is subject to the power configurations of society and bound by socially prescribed norms of
what is and is not acceptable. Indeed, Chameleonism and the performance of ‘moderate’ Muslim is founded on an inherent knowledge of this fact at an individual level, therefore the paper argues that the Third Space is not neutral but steeped in the relations of power evidenced in the rest of society.

The project will draw on Foucauldian theory in Chapter Six, positioning the individuals who negotiate across the colonial interface as a key point at which power is negotiated and applied. It recognises the individuals as vessels of societal power relations which carry those dominations in the form of internalised discourses into face to face interactions inside the Third Space. Interactions can only ever exist within the context of wider society. Borrowing from Althusser (1970), non-Muslims ‘always-already’ have an internalised image of Muslims which is legitimised by societal institution and Muslims are ‘always-already’ aware of being marginalised, that their views are not ‘normal’ in western discourse. The project posits that individuals who interact in the Third Space have internalised normalised discourse, therefore rules of engagement are always already in place set in accordance to societal hierarchies and embodied by the individuals who interact within the Third Space.

In conclusion, this chapter has examined core emergent theme one; *ummatic* (re) attachments, emergence and the solidification of identity. It was presented in two corresponding sections: the emergence and solidification of contemporary British-Muslim identity and the micro-behavioural impression management strategies deployed by participants to maintain unspoilt hybridised identities in the face of increasing institutional stigmatisation. Narratives show the publication of Salman Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* (1988) can be seen as a catalyst for the emergence of a new British-Muslim identity which was solidified in reaction to various domestic and global events from 1989 to 9/11. This event pinpoints a shift from an all-encompassing ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ to encapsulate new
expressions of Muslim rights. Participant narratives showed this new identity then became solidified with each socio-political event that victimised the ummah. The Rushdie affair was discussed further in relation to participants’ two main concerns in the context of Iris Marion Young’s (1990) ‘politics of difference’ and Will Kymlicka’s (1995) ‘multicultural liberalism’. Their first concern was around the lack of a fair and public representation of British-Muslim anger in the context of their perspectives, beliefs and values. Their second and most significant concern, that Rushdie deliberately used his intimate knowledge of Islam as a tool to hurt and humiliate the ummah. The data shows anger is directed at the effects of the novel and the author’s intent rather than his status as an apostate. The second part of the chapter addressed the construction of Muslims and Islam as incompatible with British values. Narratives firmly dismantled this perspective in two ways: firstly, by citing core Islamic practice and Islamic scripture to align Islam and so-called British values, and secondly, by referencing various hybridised behaviours that show how micro-level mixing dismantles the binary constructs inherent to the ‘irreconcilability thesis’. These behaviours were examined as Homi Bhabha’s concept of the Third Space. The chapter argued that behaviours such as ‘chameleonism’ and performing the ‘moderate Muslim’, not only serve as enunciations that allow a new understanding of Islam, but also provide mechanisms for participants to manage their performances between situational contexts to lessen the likelihood of conflict or spoiled identities. The second part of this chapter addressed research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatisate identities which have been rendered suspect’.

The thesis will now examine the multiple ways in which British-Muslims are excluded in Chapter Six. The following analysis will argue that institutional representations, most notably within the media, political discourses and State security measures explicitly represent British-Muslims as a suspect group to be curtailed and
scrutinised and, in so doing, create a specific type of knowledge that firmly locates British-Muslims as the ‘other’. These forms of knowledge are exclusionary and embodied in behaviours which indicate increased anti-Muslim discrimination. In doing so it will offer an examination of core emergent theme two: excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination.
Chapter six

Excluding Muslims: Discipline, Regulation and Discrimination

This chapter will present an analysis of core emergent category two – ‘Excluding Muslims, discrimination, regulation and discipline’. It highlights social exclusion as a prevalent feature within the everyday lived experience of young British-Muslims and, as evidenced throughout participant narratives, exists in many forms: from institutional discriminations, particularly media representation, political discourse and its associated legislative provisions to increasing anti-Muslim hate crime. When talking about social exclusion, the thesis follows the broad definition provided by DCLG (2007, p.9):

Social exclusion is a complex and multi-dimensional process. It involves the lack or denial of resources, rights, goods and services, and the inability to participate in the normal relationships and activities, available to the majority of people in a society, whether in economic, social, cultural or political arenas. It affects both the quality of life of individuals and the equity and cohesion of society as a whole.

The following analysis will argue that institutional representations most notably within media, political discourses and State security measures explicitly represent British-Muslims as a suspect group to be curtailed and scrutinised and, in so doing, create a specific type of knowledge that firmly locates British-Muslims as the ‘other’. These forms of knowledge are exclusionary and embodied in behaviours, including the ‘White Gaze’ and increased anti-Muslim discrimination. The analysis will draw on Michel Foucault,
particularly his notions of ‘power/knowledge’ and disciplinary power’, as discussed in Chapter Two to explain how British-Muslims suffer multiple exclusions. In terms of the overarching objectives of the thesis, the chapter will be presented in two parts, the first address research question two and seeks to examine how British-Muslims have been institutionally represented post 9/11. In doing so it will show how participants demonstrated an understanding of the interplay of societal attitudes with both institutional constructions of Islam and power relations. The following analysis will therefore begin by identifying participant perceptions of how Muslims are portrayed within the media. It will go on to highlight their appreciation of the relationship between media representation and mainstream public attitudes to Islam and Muslims. At this juncture the discussion will briefly assess how negative institutional representations impact on identity and feelings of belonging. To this end, the analysis will be following Symbolic Interactionist assertions of the co-emergence of self and society to illustrate the impact of perceived institutional and public exclusions on participant’s sense of self and belonging.

Returning to the impacts of institutional representations on participant perceptions, the last part of the first section of this chapter will explore their understanding of the relationship between media portrayal, public perception and power relations. Having analysed the data to establish how the sample perceive themselves to be constructed and how that construction impacts on their sense of self the thesis will turn to the second part of the analysis; the impacts of post 2001 legislative provisions, As discussed in Chapter One, counter-terrorism measures and security polices both create knowledge of the whole British-Muslim community as risky and enable the disruptions and surveillance of Muslim lives on a daily basis. This section will therefore address research question one: ‘To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims post 9/11’. In responding to research question one the analysis focuses on four integral aspects
of legislation and security policy that arose in data analysis; firstly, the construction of all Muslims as risky through both discourses and practices associated with counter-terrorism legislation and security policies, Secondly, the targeted use of stop and search, thirdly, the erosion of British-Muslim human rights and lastly, the counter-productive effects of the anti-terrorism measures in terms of both securitisation and ‘community cohesion’.

Islamophobia: A socially acceptable prejudice?

This first section will examine the extent to which Islamophobia as defined in Chapter One and the discriminatory practices it gives rise to have become acceptable in Britain. In January 2011, Baroness Sayeeda Warsi gave the Sir Sigmund Sternberg Lecture at the University of Leicester, during which she controversially asserted that ‘Islamophobia has now crossed the threshold of middle class respectability … it has passed the dinner party test’. To explore the extent to which this phenomenon has impacted on participants, a Foucauldian framework will be applied to show how Orientalist institutional representations most notably within the media, political discourses and State security measures over recent years, have ‘disciplined’ British society to produce a predominantly acquiescent public that has served to exclude Muslims from many aspects of mainstream society. Using Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary power’ (1970, 1979) this analysis will show how contemporary institutional construction of Islam and Muslims shapes the normalised view of all Muslims as risky, thereby rendering them suspect.

Analysis of the data revealed how participants are subject to increasingly prevalent Orientalist discourses, that they feel have comprehensively stigmatised and excluded the Muslim community by virtue of their religion. To explain this process the thesis will apply Foucault’s notion of ‘disciplinary power’ as outlined in Chapter Two to the narratives. It
will illustrate how anti-Muslim knowledge and thus power over Muslims is created through institutional representations, which is dispersed by ‘carcerel’ institutions to permeate all levels of society.

Participants demonstrated an understanding of the interplay of societal attitudes with both institutional constructions of Islam and power relations. The following analysis will therefore begin by identifying participant perceptions of how Muslims are portrayed within the media. It will go on highlight their appreciation of the relationship between media representation and mainstream public attitudes to Islam and Muslims. Lastly, it will explore their understanding of the relationship between media portrayal, public perception and power relations.

Before drawing out key elements of the data, it is important to state that although the chapter broadly follows a Foucauldian framework to analyse participant understanding of the institutional representation of Muslims in the post 9/11 era, it is tempered by two relevant critiques of his work. Power (2011) problematizes the notion of pervasive discourses, in that if they are pervasive how can their boundaries be determined. Similarly, it is hard to establish the difference between discourse and non-discourse. The other challenging issue in the application of Foucault’s concepts is that docility to disciplinary power is radically removed from individual agency. Specifically, as Power argues ‘what is the principle of relevance by which one discourse is chosen over another’ (2011, p.46).

For this thesis, whilst the predominantly Orientalist discursive formation of Muslims in terms of its impact on public opinion is not all pervasive, as illustrated by the discussion in Chapter One there is considerable opposition from a cross section of society to legislative and political discourses surrounding Muslims. With this in mind any conclusions offered by the discussion are mitigated by an awareness that institutional representations impact differently across both Muslim and non-Muslim populations.
To set the analysis within a Foucauldian framework it is first necessary to establish how participants believe themselves to be institutionally constructed and represented by what he terms ‘carcarel network of power/knowledge’ (1975, p.304), most notably the media, education system and political ideologies. It is important to do so, given his assertion institutional constructs or dominant ‘truths’ become ‘the truth’ and are constantly reinforced and redefined through discursive formations, not as a benign neutral knowledge, but as knowledge which is definitively bound to power. With this in mind, an examination of the data revealed most participants believed that media, political and State security institutional representations of Islam are commonly negative and generally biased against Muslims. A significant majority of participants cited various Orientalist and discriminatory depictions of Muslims in the media including, terrorists or terrorist sympathisers, welfare cheats, oppressors of women or undemocratic citizens. It should be noted that none of the participants identified a positive characterisation of Muslims routinely used within mainstream media.

Generated by the question (2:1) ‘How do you think Muslims are routinely portrayed in the media?’ the following discussion from focus group four typifies how some participants believe Muslims to be depicted within the media:

Isha:

I’m so bored of it; everyone telling us how Muslims don’t fit in properly, how we’ll never fit in. Why? They think we’re all ignorant, like we’re savages who’re only interested in turning everyone Muslim, forcing them live under Sharia Law.

Rayya:
I know. They love getting on the Sharia Law thing, letting you know what they think, how wrong it is. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve been asked about it, like I’m responsible, like I want to live like that. They love going on about all that, eye for an eye, lopping off a hand for stealing…, letting you know exactly what they think about it. It’s like when they find out Muslim men are allowed four wives…

Isha:

Yeah, yeah, that really gets people going. They’re obsessed by it, aren’t they? They’re desperate to prove how backward we all are; making all the men out to be misogynists and all the women as pathetic little victims under their control. They think we’re forced to stay at home, forced to cover up, like we’re somehow incapable of making any decisions for ourselves.

Layani:

No. No, they see us all as terrorist wannabes, waiting to rise up to kill the kafirs [non-believers]; like that’s what being a Muslim is all about, none of us have got a mind of our own.

Amaya:

It’s true though; we’re like little soldiers, with our hijabi uniforms.

Despite the use of sarcasm and humour, this narrative highlights participants’ sense of the media depiction of Islam as being one of a monolithic, hegemonic political ideology,
as illustrated by Fazal Jaan’s description of the public perception of Muslims as ‘robots’ devoid of free will and individual agency and firmly positioned in opposition to secular British society, rather than attached to a spiritual belief system. Whilst Rayya and Isha highlight the significant media focus on the more extreme elements of Sharia Law and the continuous juxtaposition of male domination (indicated by Rayya’s reference to polygamy) and the subjugation of Muslim women. The above narratives recognise the Orientalist attitudes in displayed by the media and are typical of the majority of participant’s attitudes regarding Muslims in media discourses. Consequently, their discussions echo, all be it in simplistic forms, several of the elements of Orientalist discourse identified by Edward Said (1978) nearly thirty years ago, including untrustworthiness, female oppression and uncivilised attitudes set against the notion of the noble, modern and ‘free’ West.

To embed participant perceptions within a wider context it is worth noting empirical evidence that supports the findings of this research in respect to unbalanced media coverage of Islam and Muslims. Various studies have highlighted the biased, and insulting representations of Islam and Muslims in the media (McEnery et al., 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Moore et al., 2008), Within this vast body of work, the standout study is by Moore et al. (2008) the Cardiff University study, Images of Islam in the UK. They conducted an analysis of British press over between 2000 and 2008 with the aim of assessing the impact of political events such as 9/11 and 7/7 on the coverage of Islam and Muslims domestically and abroad. Their data showed Muslims are continually identified either with terrorism or as culturally incompatible with the British way of life. Furthermore they identified a shift in media narratives from a conflict paradigm to one focused on the cultural incompatibility of Islam and Muslims with British society increasingly focusing on the perceived failure of Muslims to assimilate. Whilst Elizabeth Poole (2011) concluded that the dominant topics associated with Islam, both British and global are: Islamic
terrorism, conflict, extremism and cultural value differences. She found this to be illustrative of the ‘framework of reference’ (2011, p.54) that has dominated news reporting of Islamic and Muslim affairs. In the interests of faithfully representing the data it should be noted several participants acknowledged elements of the media neither ascribe to such dominant representations nor even question them. Within a discussion generated by question (2.2) ‘Do you think the media portrayal of Muslims is accurate?’ participants in focus group two conceded significant differences exist within the media in terms of editorial approaches and that a small minority of mainstream media outlets tend to oppose overt Islamophobic representations as noted here by Amina and Mariam:

**Amina:**

Apart from a few of them, most of them have got us all wrong. They pretty much show us in a bad way, don’t they?

**Mariam:**

I think those few still matter though; there are some people who get us.

However, as the following extract from the same conversation shows, Amina quickly qualified this with the argument that the voices opposing Islamophobia are relatively powerless in the face of the overwhelmingly Orientalist media which she argues becomes ever more forceful as it combines with other types of discursive formations. Whilst Samina notes the imperative to generate profits leads to anti-Muslim sensationalism in the media rather than a leaning towards fostering understanding between mainstream society and British-Muslims.
Amina:

Yeah, but do they … Even if some of them do, it’s not enough to change things. There are too many people on the other side. Anyway, it’s not just the media; you’ve got most of the politicians backing up what they say about us, so anyone trying to challenge what they’re doing doesn’t have any weight behind them. They’re not influential enough. There’s nobody powerful enough backing them up, you see?

Samina:

Yeah. It doesn’t really matter if you’ve got a few newspapers or whatever fighting our corner, because at the end of the day, nobody wants to be seen siding with Muslims. As far as the media is concerned we’re all the same. They’re not interested in the truth, what real Muslims believe is *haram*. All they want to do is tar us all with the same brush, so they’re going to try to link us to terrorists whatever anyone else says. It sells newspapers, doesn’t it? It’s all about hiding dynamite under our *hijabs*, our *burqas*. Can you imagine us lot? An army of *hijabis* turning up at Downing Street … you know what I mean though, that’s what they want everyone to believe.

It should be noted, that in addition to mainstream or mass media sources, several participants recognised the proliferation of social media and internet based news reporting over recent years that has provided instant global access to news items and the possibility of alternative viewpoints being aired. The impact on participants of readily available images and news items regarding *ummatic* suffering, particularly through new media formats have been discussed in Chapter Five. Here, Rayya from focus group four, feels
new media sources are key in terms of balancing media constructions of Muslim-specific events:

Rayya:

You’re never going to get a balanced view from the British press. They distort anything to do with Muslims. If you really want to find out what’s really happening, you have to go to on news channels like al-Jazeera or find something on the internet. So you can get a better balanced view, but it’s like a drop in the ocean. What difference is it really going to make though?

Whilst some participants, as Rayya’s comments highlight, acknowledged the existence of media sources, particularly internet based media, which provide more balanced reporting, and indeed may even oppose the negative portrayal of Muslims, again in a similar vein to Amina, Rayya notes they were far too few to counteract the magnitude and power of mediatised Islamophobic discourses. Chapter Five has explored the role of ‘the al-Jazeera effect’ Seib (2008) in the solidification of a reactive British-Muslim identity whilst Chapter Eight investigates participants assertions that existing new media might be a blueprint for future resistance.

Collectively the sample failed to identify any positive aspects of Islam or Muslims routinely portrayed by the mainstream media. This attitude is crystallised by Mumtaz’s reflections:
Mumtaz:

I can’t say I’ve ever read one story that hasn’t made me want to rip the paper up … apart from the odd tiny article you might get at the back of The Guardian. You know, not a proper article, just some random Muslim journalist who’s been allowed to put forward their opinion that week. There’s not been any major backlash against slagging off Muslims, has there? I’ve not heard of anything. Reporters are allowed to get away with murder. It’s like it’s become okay to discriminate against Muslims. They should be ashamed of themselves.

Elizabeth Poole (2002) provides a possible explanation for the limited opposition to the overwhelmingly Orientalist British press representation of Islam and coverage of Muslim related affairs. Whilst one would expect more liberal sections of the media to be easily identifiable by their editorial perspective, Poole posits the reason why even the liberal press have not taken a more ‘pro-Muslim’ position following 9/11 is that their anti-religious and human rights stance means Islam is offensive to its liberal norms, (2002, p.185). Consequently, despite their apparent resolve to voice alternative viewpoints sections of the liberal media in effect contribute to the perpetuation of Orientalist attitudes because Islam, as they choose to interpret it, does not fit into their definition of liberal and are therefore guilty of what Poole terms ‘exclusive liberalism’, the exclusion of religious minorities from their usual positive attitudes towards minorities (2002, p.249). Baroness Warsi (2011) voiced her concerns over the silence of the liberal intelligentsia when she highlighted that over the last decade Islamophobia had become the ‘moral blind spot’ of the liberal intelligentsia who have allowed ‘slippage’ of its mask in its rush to attribute Islam with crimes against humanity. Indeed, as argued in Chapter Five, this ‘exclusive liberalism’ was apparent during the Rushdie affair when the perceived attack on free
speech meant the traditionally liberal sections of the media were as vociferous against British-Muslims as the tabloid press. Poole’s initial findings (2002) and her review (2011), are both congruent with the overriding perception of the sample that positive representations are all too rare and cannot be definitively attributed to a particular section of the media, as even those with liberal leanings are too committed to a secular worldview.

This section has so far presented participants’ perceptions on the representation of Islam and Muslim within the media and, in doing so, has set their opinions within the context of wider empirical research to verify how such representations are intrinsically Orientalist in nature. The following section will show how a large number of the sample asserted that institutional discourses are mirrored at the individual level of non-Muslim Britons many of whom they believe embody Islamophobia in the form discriminatory attitudes and behaviours. As far as participant perceptions can illuminate understandings of societal processes the next section will show that institutional representations, most notably within the media, political discourses and State security measures have become the truth by which Islam and all Muslims have become known.

The data revealed the majority of participants felt the descriptions of Muslims in institutional representations were very similar to how they believed they were perceived by individual citizens. This illustrates participants’ belief the media performs a powerful role in creating a climate of fear and distrust of Muslims that is interiorised by wider British society. Revealingly, themes emerging from participant discussions on the media representation of Islam and Muslims were very similar to those emerging during their discussions of how they are perceived by wider society. This clearly shows in the understanding of the participants, the general public internalise media constructions as truth. Although frequencies are not required in qualitative analysis, the tables below
provides a visual representation of how closely related the public perception of Muslims and media portrayal of Muslims are according to the sample.

In response to the question (1:5) ‘How do you think Muslims are perceived by wider society?’, participants were generally unwavering in their opinion neo-Orientalism was the overriding reference point for wider British society on the issue of Islam and Muslims, as demonstrated by Henna and Raheem below:

**Henna:**
I don’t like to say it, but they think we’re terrorists, or at least we’re not against terrorism… They’re definitely suspicious of us … think we’re all wife beaters, backward, all the usual stuff. It’s not anything new really is it? It’s only what our parents had to put up with. If it wasn’t happening to us, it’d be funny.

**Raheem:**
I just wanted to say, although not everyone, not everyone you know is like that … I think it’s just most people have been taken in by what the politicians have been saying and what the news says. It’s sad when we’re supposed have this fantastic independent media that everyone goes on about, that’s supposedly respected all around the world, but it’s true.

**Henna:**
Sometimes I just feel that if they had a vote to get rid of us, most people would press the button and we’d disappear.
Table 1 and Table 2 below provide an overview of the data as regards to perceived media and public attitudes, they clearly show the sample as a whole feel that media and public attitudes regarding Muslims are negative and prejudiced.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure1: Public perception of Islam and Muslims</th>
<th>Figure2: Media Representation of Islam and Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emergent coding themes</td>
<td>Total, N = 32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-enlightenment ‘othering’</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat to British public, property and</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Innately evil</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misogynistic</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patriarchal victims</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist perpetrator, sympathiser or</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With perceived public attitudes nearly perfectly mirroring how participants feel Muslims are represented in the media. Henna explicitly claims the public perceive Muslims as ‘terrorists’ ‘wife beaters’ and ‘suspect’, who non-Muslim Britons, if given the chance, would vote to completely exclude from society. Whilst it can be extrapolated from the charts that the majority of participants believe public attitudes mirror media representations, Raheem’s narrative makes the point explicitly, he asserts that anti-Muslim public attitudes are a direct result of ‘being taken in by what the politicians and news says’, highlighting the prevailing belief amongst the sample that the institutional representations are very influential in terms of shaping public attitudes.

The belief that individual citizens are influenced by the discursive formations of Muslims in the media was so prevalent that on one occasion participants in one of the focus groups challenged the moderator by pointing out the similarity of questions (1:5) ‘How are you perceived by wider British society?’ and (2:1) ‘How are Muslims routinely portrayed in the media?’.
Shah Jahan:

It’s virtually the same question as before. It’s the same way as the public see us; it’s the same question again, terrorists, anti-social, scroungers, ignorant and so on and so on. We all know the score, that’s how they want to show us. Again like the public thing, not everyone connected to the media, but most of them. So for me, it’s exactly how most of the population sees us.

Mumtaz:

I’m not going to go on and on, but that makes sense. The media puts it out there, as in they show us all in a particular way; usually as uneducated, aggressive savages, then most people take it on board because they don’t really know anyone Muslim or know any better. So yeah, the two questions basically have the same answer, they’re linked … that’s all.

Raheem:

I’d say the same. The politicians, backed by the media, makes out we’re all suspect, so we need to be carefully watched and the public start believing the same thing. They become more and more suspicious of us, until we end up like this.

The conversational excerpt above shows how Mumtaz, Raheem and Shah-Jahan are convinced the public are highly influenced by media and mainstream political constructions of Islam and Muslims to the extent that Shah Jahan argues the two questions are the same. Mumtaz claims institutional representations and public attitudes ‘are linked’ and Raheem implicates both political and media discourses in the creation of knowledge that Muslims are a suspect population that should be ‘carefully watched’, a knowledge he claims the public believe to the extent that they start to become suspicious of the Muslim community. As the description of this data above showed this attitude is not confined to the
three participants, with the majority of the sample identifying the similarity of public and media perceptions. In as much as this feeling of non-Muslim public acquiescence with media constructions as Muslims as risky is difficult to substantiate, it is clear that the strong feeling of participants was that the prejudicial representations of Muslims common in the media were reflected in and by the feelings and behaviours of the majority of non-Muslims.

At this juncture it is appropriate to further analyse how the dual exclusion by institutions and society as perceived by the majority of the sample impacts on the participants. The following discussion will briefly apply the Symbolic Interactionist concept of the co-emergence of self and society to illuminate how the Muslim self is created in the reflection of media and public attitudes identified by participants. The data shows numerous examples of how participants believe Muslims to be excluded within British society. Alone, they might be dismissed as nothing more than subjective opinion, however it is posited such subjective perceptions are of importance for three reasons: firstly, it is worth considering how such perceptions might have a very real impact on individual’s sense of belonging or Britishness; secondly, their perceptions are confirmed by their everyday interactions, as evidenced by their anecdotal examples; and lastly, they are endorsed by cognate empirical studies into British societal attitudes towards Muslims, British Social Attitudes survey (2012) and the Extremis Poll (2012) both of which will be discussed below. The thesis cautiously suggests these elements taken together provide one explanation of the way in which ways in which British-Muslims come to feel excluded. Of course, as in the application of Foucauldian thought throughout this chapter, the analysis is tentative, tempered by both the limitations of qualitative data in terms of generalisability to both Muslims and non-Muslim population and the vast differences in attitudes and individual agency amongst those populations.
The importance of the imagined perception of the ‘self’ is highlighted by Interactionist approaches. As discussed in Chapter Two, this body of work proposes the ‘self’ and society co-emerge, in that they create one another in an ongoing process of interaction. The ‘self’ is an internalised mirror image of the ‘generalised opinion of society’. When applied to the Muslim ‘self’, the generalised opinion of society of British-Muslims as ‘the enemy within’, resisting integration to reside at the periphery of society outside the accepted norm, causes it to experience itself as excluded from society both in its own mind and in the mind of society. So, applying these principles to Henna and Raheem’s subjective perceptions above, Henna feels that the generalised other sees British-Muslims as ‘wife-beaters, terrorists and backward’, whilst Raheem feel that if the wider British public were allowed a referendum they would ‘vote to make us disappear’. Mead (1934) posited the ‘self’ is created by reflecting on and internalising how one is perceived by the ‘generalised other’ (1934, p.195). If this is applied in this case of Henna and Raheem’s comments they feel themselves to be not only excluded from mainstream acceptance, but actively disliked to the point, as in Raheem’s case, of being ejected from society all together. To take this analysis one step further, participant’s narratives can be slotted in to Cooley’s notion of the ‘looking glass self’, the Muslim ‘self’ imagines the perception of others to see itself reflected back as ‘terrorist’, ‘fanatic’, ‘backward’ and ultimately unwanted by British society. In this process the Muslim ‘self’ takes the role of the other and knows it is excluded, internalises that exclusion and so experiences itself to be excluded.

To lend support to participants perceptions and build a more solid analysis of institutional discourse as power, in Foucauldian terms, it must follow that disseminated power/knowledge regarding Muslims is routinely constructed and restated as ‘truth’ by powerful organisations and agencies, not merely that the sample believe it to be so. To
avoid the charge of an incomplete analysis, based on nothing more than the participants’ subjective narratives, this analysis locates subjective perceptions of Islamophobia in an interactional context to argue such perceptions are rooted in actual lived experience of racial and religious discrimination.

The Normalisation of Muslim Surveillance: Extending the White Gaze

Thus far the discussion has established participants’ understanding of how discursive formations influence the attitudes of the non-Muslim British population towards Muslims. The following section will examine how participants feel that this has generated a climate of fear and suspicion of Muslims amongst mainstream society. They believe, this is instilled within the public consciousness by discursive constructions disseminated through various institutions, particularly the legal and political system and the media’s demonization of the Muslims and Islam. Whilst this increasing surveillance embodied by the non-Muslim population will now be discussed, more extreme forms of public Islamophobia will be discussed in terms of Islam-specific attire in Chapter Seven. Foucault explains ‘individuals are the vehicles of power, not its points of application’ (1980, p.98), the discussion interprets this assertion, as the impact of power/knowledge is best understood by examining its effect on the individual. Thus an analysis of embodied behaviours amongst both Muslims and non-Muslims is an essential factor in assessing the level of influence media, political and legislative representations of Islam and Muslims has had on society post 9/11.

Several participants described a particular form of embodied behaviour, the social surveillance of Muslims through the ‘White Gaze’. This concept Adapt the notion of ‘the
gaze’, referring to ‘the politics of looking’ (Bolatagici, 2007, p.81), the ‘White Gaze’ can be defined as the oppressive gaze of the dominant British culture that seeks to impose itself on British-Muslims. In the context of this study it can described as a micro-action performed by non-Muslim Britons that embodies the discursive constructions of Muslims as a risky and suspect population. This is manifested in fleeting glances interpreted by participants as ‘funny looks’ or social awkwardness attributed to being implicitly ‘other’ and/or made exotic due to religion. This phenomenon was recognised by several participants, as crystallised by Jay:

**Jay:**

As a youth worker I’m always having to go and see people. Half my life’s spent in meetings. You just know what people are thinking when they meet you for the first time. They’re just so uncomfortable. They don’t know where to look. Sometimes they won’t even look in your direction. There was this one time when I had to go to do a group with some college kids, I turned up just after I’d just come back from Jummah, so I was wearing topi, and this tutor sticks me in a room and leaves me. She eventually comes back and I have to explain I was there to take the group. She apologises, but says she thought I looked like one of the kids on benefits because lots of them looked like that.

During a separate semi-structured interview with Sofie recounts an experience with a non-Muslim friend’s parent:
**Sofie:**

I’d gone round this friend’s house for something to eat, this white girl I knew. I had loads of white friends where I used to live. Anyway, her mum’s face when I got there, she was in shock. She must of thought I was English, because of my name. My friend as obviously just said ‘Sophie’s coming for dinner’ and said nothing else about me. There I was in my school uniform, big white hijab. Honestly her jaw hit the floor. She didn’t know what to do. She obviously felt really uncomfortable with me being there. I’m not saying she was rude or anything. I just don’t think she knew how to handle it.

Whereas Jay and Sofie’s accounts illustrate the ‘White Gaze’ in action through interactions, in Jay’s case he describes discomfort in interactions that variously manifests in perceived latent discrimination, where individuals avoid making eye contact or in explicitly discriminatory behavior, in this case the receptionist made negative assumptions based on Jay’s Muslim specific dress and physical appearance alone, surmising they were sartorial indications of unemployed benefit seeker. Whilst Sofie felt her friend’s mother was uncomfortable with the unexpected arrival of a Muslim visitor to her house, she assumed her English sounding name had given little indication of her being Muslim. Jay and Sofie’s experiences of the negative social impact of Muslim specific sartorial choice will be examined in detail in Chapter Seven. Both these incidents are examples of palpable non-Muslim unease when faced with overtly Muslim individuals. In the incident highlighted by Samina below, During a focus group discussion around societal perceptions of Muslims and Islam Samina reports and incident in which the ‘white gaze’ is more subtle, evident only in micro-actions.
Samina:

It’s like me; I have to get the train to school every day and sometimes the funny looks on people’s faces! As soon as they realise I’m Muslim, it’s like they’ve seen a ghost. They’ll sit anywhere rather than sit next to me, or you get those people, the ignorant ones who just seem to sit there staring at you, watching whatever you’re doing. It’s really unnerving. God only knows what they’re thinking.

More elusive than the experiences of Sofie and Jay, Samina’s recollection of the ‘White Gaze’ is manifest in ‘funny looks’ ‘staring’ and the fact that the presence of a Muslim on public transport is enough for fellow commuters to physically remove themselves from her vicinity.

The data not only showed how non-Muslims embodied the negative discursive formations of Muslims. Many participants reported being effected by public surveillance, the internalisation of the ‘white-gaze’ or the belief that Islamophobia is ubiquitous. This manifested itself in self-doubt and the assumption that anti-Muslim sentiments are ever-present in everyday interactions, even when this may not be so.

Yahya:

Loads of times things happen, and I swear I’m paranoid it’s because they know I’m Muslim. It could be anything, like feeling like the security guard is following me around a shop, or if someone moves away from me when I’m on the bus… I know it’s stupid, but you can’t help feeling like that. That’s almost what I expect people to do, you know be frightened of me or think I’m up to no good.
**Fahima:**

I know what you mean. I went for this job in town, in a clothes shop, and honestly, I thought I’d definitely got it, I mean I totally thought I had it in the bag. Anyway, I got the call and they said they’d given it to someone else with more experience. I mean, I’ve worked in shops for years, since doing work experience at school. How much more experience do you need? So you end thinking it’s because of who I am, that my face didn’t fit because I’m brown. You can’t help thinking that way.

**Yahya:**

Really, I’m not surprised we’re all so paranoid. I mean, we get told negative things enough times, so you end up half expecting it happen, particularly if something doesn’t go your way. You start looking for it in some ways, rather than getting on with things.

This extract highlights the potential pervasive power of the steady drip feed of anti-Muslim sentiments expressed by key social institutions. Consequently, not only do non-Muslims embody such Orientalist discourses, but Muslims themselves become docile to them to an extent. Yahya and Fahima both confess to assuming non-Muslims are discriminating against them on religious grounds even when there is no evidence to suggest this is the case. However as Yahya asserts he is ‘not surprised we’re all paranoid’ given, as he notes the ubiquitous presence of Islamophobia in UK society, his assumption in this case is not without basis as will be illustrated by survey evidence of non-Muslim attitudes below. Fahima considers anti-Muslim discrimination might be the reason she lost out on employment, whilst it is impossible to judge either way in this specific case, Chapter One described the very real consequences of the ‘ethnic penalty’ suffered by British-Muslims as regards access to university places (Boliver, 2013) and employment.
(Rabby and Rogers, 2010) when all variables such as grades and work experience are accounted for. In both Fahima and Yahya’s case an implicit factor of their accounts is the internalisation of possible discrimination and exclusion from aspects of everyday life that non-Muslims either take for granted or never even think could be a possibility. The embodiment of institutional representations in the ‘White-Gaze’ amongst non-Muslims described in the narratives and its internalisation by many Muslims is evidence of the Foucauldian notion of power/knowledge, which McNay describes as ‘systems of power bring(ing) forth the different types of knowledge which in turn produce material effects in the bodies of social agents that serve to reinforce the original power formation’ (1994, p.63).

Thus far the discussion infers that the majority of participants feel media, political and legislative representations of Islam and Muslims are Orientalist in nature and that discursive formations of Islam and Muslims are influential in terms of the formation of public attitudes. It has evidenced how those discourses are embodied by both non-Muslim and Muslim alike. It will now provide an overview of existing empirical data from cognate studies which concurs with participants’ subjective perceptions of exclusion from wider society. The wider British population’s attitudes towards Muslims are highlighted in the British Social Attitudes Survey (2012), which suggests that ‘only one in four people in Britain feel positively about Islam’, whilst a third of the remaining respondents felt ‘cool’ towards them, and half the population would be ‘strongly’ opposed to a mosque being built in their neighbourhood. More concerning is one of the findings from an Extremis poll (2012), which found 37% of respondents admitted they would be more likely to support a political party that promised to reduce the number of Muslims in Britain. These statistics are symptomatic of worrying evidence gathered in quantitative studies conducted over the last decade which have highlighted negative attitudes towards Muslims. Moreover, there is
specific empirical evidence that this is the case. Poynting and Mason (2008) and Frost (2008) also establish strong links between negative media representation of Muslims and the rise of Islamophobia. Furthermore, Frost’s (2008) conclusion is particularly relevant. She argues Islamophobia is encouraged by media and far right groups whilst political directives specifically appeal to the public to root out extremism. As a result of her findings she recommends that freedom of the press should not go hand in hand with a lack of accountability and responsibility in what is reported. Frost’s findings have been echoed by previous studies conducted over the last decade all of which attribute the normalisation of Islamophobia in its continued and legitimised institutional representation of Muslims and Islam (Moore et al., 2008; Poole, 2002, 2011). These studies suggest that without the institutional construction of the ‘deviant Muslim’ anti-Islamic feeling would have been less likely to take root so strongly in public consciousness. Not only do such studies verify the negative institutional bias against Muslims but they also root the sample’s fears in reality.

The discussion has shown most participants feel anti-Muslim discursive representations have influenced public opinion and this perception is reinforced by their everyday experiences of individual and institutional discrimination. In addition, quantitative studies consistently report largely negative public attitude towards Muslims which some studies discussed above assert are causally linked to media representations. These factors taken alongside the institutional biases discussed in Chapter One, in the form of ‘ethnic penalty’ against British-Muslims in terms of access to higher education, employment chances and therefore social mobility leads the thesis suggests that Foucauldian notion of disciplinary power offers some insight into how Islamophobic discourses originated within institutions could become interiorised and embodied by some individuals.
The next section of this analysis shows how the sample not only make the link between the media coverage and wider public perceptions but they also make the connection between the mutual reinforcement of State policies, media coverage and public perception.

Question (2:2) ‘How accurate is the media portrayal of Muslims and Islam?’ produced a heated response in all four focus groups, generating data that showed not only that media representation was seen to be inaccurate, but why they felt it was so. The majority of participants not only felt the public is unduly influenced by the media’s depiction of Islam and Muslims. However, their narratives indicated that many participants have an understanding that securing public opinion is a prerequisite for oppressive domestic and foreign policies directed mainly at the Muslim population.

Rehan:

They [the British Government] need to keep it [Islamic fundamentalism] in the public psyche all the time; you know, ‘we’re under attack’; ‘you’re not safe because of the Muslims’. They have to make out we’re a threat so they can protect everyone else by controlling what we do. It’s not just the journalists’, there’s a reason behind it…

Salim:

They have to say we’re dangerous, don’t they. Otherwise they’d never get away with everything they’re doing to us. They have to make the public believe we’re a danger. There’s no way they’d have been able to bring in things like stop and search or all the other terrorism laws, would they.
Rehan and Salim typify the general feeling evidenced in the data that negative institutional representations, most notably associated with the media, political establishment and State security services, are not benign. In keeping with Furedi’s (2002) ‘Culture of Fear’ thesis which suggests that institutions such as the Government and the media incite fear in the general public to achieve political goals and manufacture acquiescence to State policies. Rehan believes that these attempts to instil fear are deliberate and strategic. Meanwhile, Salim argues that the institutional representation of Muslims dictates they have to be seen as a dangerous. This is the very basis of a knowledge created in the aftermath of the London bomb attack, a discourse that has concentrated attention on the process of radicalisation (Heath-Kelly, 2013). Such discourses are enshrined in the Prevent strand of Contest, and allow the scrutiny of the entire Muslim population as risky or at risk. In Chapter One it was suggested that the entire British-Muslims community is constructed as suspicious through the discourses associated with counter-terrorism legislation and security policies, has been an important factor in the heightened surveillance of British-Muslims as will be discussed later in this chapter.

Whilst Salim draws attention to domestic anti-terror legislation, some participants reasoned the aim of institutionalised oppression of Muslims was motivated by neo-imperialistic intentions in the Middle East designed to secure dominance over resources in the region. A similar strand of discussion was generated in focus group four in response to question (3:5) ‘What are your views on British foreign policy in the Middle East?’ Here university students Rehan, Jalaal and Amaya emphatically believe that Muslims in the UK and abroad must be represented as dangerous in order for the West to fulfil its neo-imperialist Foreign policies in the Middle East:
Rehan:

Like I said, they need to keep everyone thinking we’re dangerous, keep the public thinking like that. They need to make Muslims the enemy so they can say that’s why they’re in Iraq, to rid the world of evil. That’s why they had to give all that bull shit about weapons of mass destruction; to scare everyone so they had the excuse to go ahead.

Jalaal:

Yeah, they’re doing it to spread fear, create this atmosphere; keep everyone on the edge so it takes people’s attention away from what they’re doing over there [the Middle East]. It’s all about getting their hands on the oil reserves, isn’t it? That’s why.

Amaya:

They have to keep people scared enough, to get away with killing all those innocent people. If you think about it like that, how scared do people have to be, really scared?

These assertions are not unique to participants and have been picked up on by wider commentators. Coe et al (2004) argue that George W Bush’s strategic discourse in a compliant media environment facilitated the speedy passage of the Patriot Act (2001). The claims made are also applicable to the UK, in particular the raft of anti-terror legislation which was passed with great speed post 2001 leading to increasingly restrictive and undemocratic laws. As Rehan asserts the most obvious use ‘discourse manipulation’ (Van Dijk, 2006, p.371) to render a public docile and maintain power relation in recent history is
Tony Blair’s unsubstantiated WMD claim. This is a compelling example of ‘power/knowledge’ in action, a single dossier allowed the illegal occupation and devastation of Iraq, mercantile exploitation of natural resources and colossal loss of lives, that continues today. Jalaal and Amaya note that maintaining a sense of impending threat is essential because it allows the State to continue to act with a degree of impunity. As Van Dijk (2006) notes, once the public has been sensitised to the terrorist threat, continued exposure to terrorism discourse is more likely to influence public opinion in the long term. The erosion of Muslim human rights in the UK as a result of counter-terrorism measures is largely unchallenged by the general public. Vertigans (2010) suggests that this is a result of public fear based on consistent discourses that construct the threat of Islamic terrorism as always imminent and always potentially catastrophic. This results in a general attitude that curtailment of British-Muslim freedoms is a small price to pay for one’s own enhanced security.

Despite not using an academic framework or vocabulary, many participants in the study had a relatively sophisticated understanding of the notions of institutional representation and societal power relations. The sample are largely united in their views that the media portrayal of Islam and Muslims is, on the most part negative they collectively associate media representation with Islamophobic public opinion. In addition to this some participants identified the mutually reinforcing elements of political ideologies and how institutional representation of Muslims and public perception that serve to enable political aims. The general consensus was that the media as an institutional tool replicates the dominant discourses of Government and creates a culture of fear. Furthermore, in this climate of fear it is easier for the State pass domestic and foreign policy to perpetuate the domestic oppression illegal occupation of Islamic territories, massacre of civilians, strategic dominance and acquisition of resources.
To conclude the analysis of research question two, the data analysis revealed that the majority of the sample felt that Muslims were negatively portrayed by the media. This itself suggests that the Orientalist modes of representation identified by Edward Said (1978) some time ago are still prevalent in media discourse. Secondly, participants felt that these representations directly informed and influenced the perceptions of non-Muslim Britons, a viewpoint which seems to fit with the escalation of Islamophobic sentiments between the aftermath of 9/11 and the present day. Thirdly, participants placed much emphasis on the link between State policy, the culture of fear perpetuated by the press and public opinion, their conclusions have been verified by various empirical studies. Lastly, the analysis identified that the majority of the sample recognised that they are positioned on the outside of the power structure that locates them as the ‘other’ in the country of their birth. They feel that they do not have a forum in which to publicly express their values, therefore they feel they do not have the means by which to access and redirect the flow of power. The impact of their institutional construction and continued under-representation manifests itself in feelings of anger, frustration and finally helplessness, to add to that they feel a deep distrust of the Government and its institutions. The next section will consider the impacts anti-terrorism legislation and security measures of participant’s sense of belonging and ability to build a cohesive identity.

Exclusionary Policy and Legislation: The Erosion of Muslim Human Rights

This section examines the key legislative transformations in security policy which have impacted on British-Muslims over the last fifteen years, focussing on the shift towards pre-emption as exemplified in the Prevent strand of Contest. It will focus on the third of the six elements consistently defined by existing literature as essential to the discussion of British-Muslim identity; security policy and counter-terrorism legislation and
address research objective one: ‘To assess the impact of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies on British-Muslims post 9/11’.

The data highlights four areas of particular concern. Firstly, it elicits a generalised feeling that all Muslims, rather than the continuously referenced ‘criminal minority’, are both the subject of, and subject to, the anti-terrorism provisions. Secondly, the excessive and often disproportionate use of Section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 on individuals of Muslim appearance. Thirdly, it generates a sense that Muslims rights to freedom of speech and legitimate protest have been significantly curtailed, relative to White non-Muslims. Lastly, the counter-productive impacts of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies as narrated by the participants will be assessed. This section will begin by exploring participants’ sense of feeling labelled and victimised by counter-terrorism legislation.

The following discussion in focus group one, highlights how some participants believe UK anti-terror legislation has effectively criminalised all British-Muslims and significantly eroded their human rights:

**Salahuddin:**

It’s amazing isn’t it? How they’ve just decided we’re all potentially terrorists. I don’t think anyone would have believed it would be possible. We’re the only ones that get treated like criminals, without even done anything. We don’t have the same rights as everyone else anymore. It’s not innocent until proven guilty anymore, we’re guilty until proven innocent.
Rehan:

It doesn’t matter about all the lip service about it only being a ‘small minority’; it’s bullshit. It’s just to cover their backs, so they can’t be accused of being racist. Who are they kidding? I mean, let’s face it, we’re all suspects. They’ve brought in these laws to keep an eye on us. Why else? I mean, how many white people are they going to stop. They’re not, are they? As far as they’re concerned we’re all guilty, end of.

Salim:

They call it anti-terror laws. It’s anti-Muslim, that’s what it is. They should at least be honest about it, rather than trying to make out they are as concerned with our well-being as much as everyone else’s.

Salahuddin’s comments suggest that elements of counter-terrorism law have reversed the basic legal principle of ‘innocent until proven guilty’ for Muslims and this is in direct contravention of the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR Human Rights Review, 2012, p.218). Salim declaration that ‘anti-terror laws should be re-named anti-Muslim laws’ compliments the comments of Rehan who argues the entire Muslim community is rendered risky under Prevent. Furthermore, he contends ‘conciliatory noises’ (Thomas, 2011, p.1030) that reference the ‘small minority’ of Muslims as the target of counter-terror legislation by politicians, legal institutions and the media25 serves as a façade to mask the reality of the situation and to make such measures appear less discriminatory and thus more palatable.

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25 For instance, Tony Blair, the then British Prime Minister, in a statement to Parliament on the 15 of September 2001 stated: ‘We do not yet know the exact origin of this evil ... we know they do not speak or act for the vast majority of decent law abiding Muslims throughout the world.’
There is much in the literature that suggests that the perspectives of participants in the sample group are not lone or outlying voices and that there is widespread discontent amongst Muslims about various aspects of counter-terrorism and security policy. As reported in Chapter One, Kundnani (2009) has shown how the Prevent initiative implicates all Muslims by splitting the community into three groups, active terrorists, terrorist sympathisers and those who are constantly at risk of falling into those categories. As such, Kundnani’s argument chimes with Rehan’s assertions. In addition to academic arguments that Prevent has rendered the entire Muslim community suspect, expenditure for anti-radicalisation projects under the Prevent offers more tangible proof that Muslim Minority Groups are separated out from other ‘law-abiding’ citizens. As Chapter One has explained, the practice of allocating Prevent budget indicates the assumptions made about communities which are dangerous. Despite being billed as communities-led, in the first iteration of Prevent councils did not apply for and received counter-terror funds as relevant to local needs, rather funding was directed to local authorities in direct proportion to the number of Muslims living in the area. The Department for Communities and Local Government (2007, p.6) stated, ‘it is important that funds are focused on those areas with highest priority … the fund will therefore be focused on local authorities with sizeable Muslim communities’. As such, the targeting of funding to counteract the ‘radicalisation’ of Muslim communities to areas of ‘highest priority’ is effectively equated with the presence of lots of Muslims, regardless of who they might be. They determine that ‘sizeable Muslim communities’ is an appropriate enough criteria for deploying such funds for the fight against terrorism. Further evidence of such funding being utilised indiscriminately against all Muslims is highlighted by the controversial ‘Project Champion’ funded by UK Government anti-terrorism budget. This involved the installation of 218 CCTV cameras - of which 72 were covertly positioned - in the
predominantly Muslim Birmingham suburbs of Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook under the guise of ‘tackling anti-social behaviour’. After leaks about the project and community protest, it became apparent the project was a large scale surveillance exercise funded by the ‘Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund’ (Awan, 2011, p.11).

Under the Coalition Government counter-terrorism shifted away from policing violent terrorism to the governance of ‘non-violent’ terrorism (Choudhury, 2012). As Heath-Kelly (2013, p.394) notes, this facilitated the concept of the ‘radicalisation process’ and furthered the pre-emptive governance of ‘terrorism’. A report commission by CAGE (2013, p.29) evidenced the criminalisation of ‘pre-radicalisation’ by citing Sections 1, 2 and 8 of the 2006 Terrorism Act which allows the prosecution of so-called ‘thought crimes’ under the ‘glorification’ and ‘justification’ provisions, as noted in Chapter One. In short, a wide range of traditionally non-criminal behaviours can be policed as pre-radicalisation under the logic of pre-emption. Consequently, as Heath-Kelly argues, the ‘radicalisation process’ (2012, p.394) can be seen as a discourse associated with counter-terrorism legislation that has ‘made the future actionable’, in that ‘words’ as well as ‘actions’ have become subject to State intervention. To apply a Foucauldian analysis it could be argued that the new Prevent discourse of the process of radicalisation, has coalesced with existing ‘culture of fear’ (Furedi, 2002) discourses around Muslims to allow heightened technologies of discipline to be applied to the British-Muslim community in the form of accentuated terrorism legislation.

In this study, in a follow up interview with Raheem, he talked about how he, his family and friends feel about the pre-emptive governance of terrorism.
Raheem:

It used to be they were only after terrorists, people who’d actually done something wrong ... at least planning something, now though it’s anyone. They had to prove you actually did something before it was a crime, now you can’t even talk about it [terrorism] in case you get arrested. It’s not like they even need any real evidence. It’s all about what they decide is a crime. I know it sounds a bit dramatic, but that’s what it feels like. It’s like they’re watching everything we do, just in case we step out of line. I mean, I understand they [the Government] have to stop people supporting terrorism, but what they’re doing now, it’s wrong. They’ve gone too far. You can’t stop people talking, giving their opinions. All it has done is stopped anyone who’s Muslim from being able to say what they really think. It’s like you can’t even criticise what they’re doing anymore, things like Iraq, what they’re doing in the rest of the Middle East in case you’re seen to be somehow promoting terrorism. It’s ridiculous. It’s like the thought police, trying to stop anyone disagreeing with them. How can that be right? All it’s done is make people feel discriminated against, more alienated. Isn’t that the opposite of what they wanted?

Whilst Raheem recognises the need to legislate against endorsing terrorism, he opposes what he sees as the criminalisation of personal expression and what is interpreted as criminal. He perceptively notes, how the ‘radicalisation’ discourse locates terrorism as inherent to the Muslim community, whilst at the same time shift attention from external causal explanations of ‘home-grown’ terrorism such as Western foreign policy in the run up to the invasion of Iraq (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010, p.889). As Raheem argues, such provisions silence discussions regarding potentially neo-imperialistic UK foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East. Finally, his comments suggest that stifling legitimate debate could lead to alienation, which appears contrary to the Government’s stated
objectives (Kundnani, 2009). This and other counter-productive effects of security policies will be examined in further detail below.

For many participants, concern over censorship of speech and actions were usurped by their fear of comparatively more invasive methods of surveillance within the scope of Prevent:

**Basanti:**

They can stop you on the streets whenever they want, search your property; look into your finances, whatever they want. It’s a racist’s dream come true. Look what happened with Forest Gate. Everyone’s asleep, then the next minute all hell breaks loose and that guy, he ends up getting shot, for what? He was innocent. He’d done nothing and that happens to him. Imagine if that was your brother. And what happens? No charges against the police, nothing. What’s to stop something like that happening again? That’s the reality of what’s happening and there’s nothing any of us can really do about it.

**Jay:**

It could happen to any of us. First you get stopped, and then you get banged up for years for doing nothing. What’s worse is, they don’t even have to tell you what you’ve supposed to have done wrong … and that’s it, your life ruined just because you’re Muslim. And you can’t do anything? Can’t defend yourself, because there’s no bloody charge … I mean, seriously it could totally eff you up. That’s it, life over. Look at all those people in Guantanamo. You can’t tell me every single one of them was guilty.
Shah Jahan:

That’s bad enough, but what about that Brazilian guy? They killed him for nothing, and then they admit it was a mistake, but claim they had intelligence reports that he was a terrorist. What intelligence? He was innocent, how much more intelligence is there on Muslims they want to kill?

Raheem:

They can do pretty much what they want. All it takes is that one thing and they can ruin your life. They literally don’t need any real proof anymore. Look how many Muslims get arrested for nothing. They arrest more and more of us, even though most people are innocent, and then that just makes us look more suspect, like we all must be guilty. It’s a catch 22, if you get my meaning.

The above conversational excerpt highlights participant fears of being subject to preemptive strategies, particularly their recognition of how their ‘lives could be ruined’ or subjected to possible violent intervention by the police without evidence or the legal means to defend themselves or their communities regardless of whether they are actually innocent or not. Participants highlight the removal of the ‘burden of proof’ obligation on the State, provisions for detention without charge, and the circumventing of the ‘presumed innocence’ principle. All these elements are enshrined by Article 6: Right to a Fair Trial of the ECHR to which Britain is committed. Some of the more draconian pre-emptive policies introduced under counter-terrorism legislation would seem to suggest that British-Muslims are excluded from its protection. As Heath-Kelly (2012, p.400) asserts, the ideation associated with policies such as Prevent provides the ideal conditions for the creation of ‘false positives in the identification of terrorists’ (2012, p.405). Policing events that might
happen, become fertile ground for flawed intelligence that may result in innocent people being subject to police intervention and potential fatalities such as those referenced by participants: the fatal shooting of Brazilian Jean Charles De Menezes by the London Metropolitan Police at Stockwell Station London Underground on 22 July 2005, after being misidentified as one of the fugitives involved in the previous day's failed bombing attempts, or the Forest Gate incident involving 250 officers who stormed two houses, resulting in the ‘accidental’ shooting of one of two brothers who were arrested and later released without charge. Both incidents epitomise the notion of ‘false positives’. Whilst initially Jay’s fear of being falsely incarcerated and tortured as an innocent man appears implausible, this fear of Preventative measures illustrated above is supported by Hillyard (1993, p.262) who sagely alludes to the creeping ‘terror of prevention’ a phenomenon that has deep impacts on suspect communities. To underscore the potential reality of such fears the cases of Binyam Mohamed, Moazzam Begg and Bahar Ahmed are instructive. Mohamed, who was detained by the US government in Guantanamo Bay Prison between 2004 and 2009, was eventually released without charge and went on to take legal action against the British Government for the collusion of MI5 and MI6 in his torture by the United States, (Gardham, 2009). In February 2010, the UK Court of Appeal ruled he had been subjected to ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by the United States authorities’ in which the British Intelligence Services had been complicit. Unfortunately, this was not an isolated incident. Other high profile cases such as the alleged torture of Bahr Ahmed have also received public attention. Yet, as Choudhury (2012) notes, Muslims have been threatened by a whole spectrum of unjust measures ranging from stop and search, through to detention without charge, torture and shoot to kill. Within this context the ‘terror of prevention’ alluded to by Hillyard (1993, p.262) becomes reality. What may appear as fanciful notions of counter-terror legislation ‘being a racist’s dream come true’
or a means of ‘totally ruining your life’ do not, in such a light, appear to be unwarranted exaggerations? As participant narratives have shown, fears of becoming a victim of ‘false positives’ and the potentially detrimental impact it could have that weighs heavy.

Raheem perceptively identifies that the inherent ‘catch 22’ within the counter-terrorism and security policies, with its associated arrests, detention without charge, and augmentation of Muslim criminality, is it falsely presents itself as indispensable in the fight against domestic terrorism. As Choudhury (2012) notes, analysis of the 1,834 terrorism related arrests between 2001 and 2010 only 237 resulted in conviction for terrorism related offences. In theory, three quarters of these arrests therefore comply with Heath-Kelly’s definition of ‘false-positives’ and, along with Raheem’s assertions, suggest the application of ‘disciplinary power’ to illuminate the impact of the Prevent strategy on the ‘radicalisation process’ discourse. Highly publicised arrests despite, as will be shown later, the majority being ‘false positives’, allow stakeholders to perform the actions that fuel discourses which in turn demand the need for pre-emptive policies such as Prevent. As Heath-Kelly surmises, Prevent ‘performs a need for itself’ (2013, p.410), arguing it is a ‘governance’ strategy in the Foucauldian sense, in that, it actively induces specific types of conduct from the Muslim community, whilst simultaneously over-policing them as ‘suspect’. During a follow up interview with Nusaiba, we can see connections being made between the ‘radicalisation process’ and other Orientalist discourses:

By examining the data in conjunction academic commentators this discussion has shown that counter-terrorism measures and security policies render all British-Muslims as ‘risky’ and de-civilise the community through both eroding its freedoms to protect those of the majority to exclude British-Muslims from the security and rights afforded to the rest of society. In addition it has problematized the governance of the ‘radicalisation process’ on the grounds that it allows increasingly invasive techniques to be applied to benign
behaviours to create two mutually dependent illusions that Muslims are risky and therefore
counter-terrorism legislation and security policies are indispensable.

The thesis will now go on to examine specific aspects of domestic anti-terror
legislation participants found particularly problematic. The two central issues of contention
highlighted within participant narratives were racial profiling, mainly experienced in the
form of ‘stop-and search’ policing and the silencing of Muslim rights to free speech and
peaceful protest.

**Racial Profiling? The Case of Section 44 Stop and Search**

Given the salience of stop and search powers under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act
(2000)\(^{26}\) for participants, and the significance attributed to it in preceding studies, the
following section addresses its impact.

Participant narratives showed that whilst Orientalist discursive constructions tend
toward the characterisation of Muslim males as terrorists, the discriminatory experiences of
Muslim women are generally dependent on the degree to which they display visible signs
of being Muslim. When prompted to recount their knowledge of anti-terror legislation
in response to question (3:1) ‘**What do you know about post 9/11 anti-terror
legislation?**’ several participants recalled their own experiences or those of male relatives
or acquaintances of counter-terrorism policing, most commonly in the form of the
authorisations of Stop and Search powers under Section 44. The over-policing of Muslims,

\(^{26}\) It should be noted, however, that these provisions were subsequently repealed in 2010 when Liberty won a
landmark case against their use at the European Court of Human Rights. Section 44 was ruled unlawful citing
its use was arbitrary and open to discriminatory practices and therefore breached the right to privacy (Liberty
2011, p.3). Despite their repeal, an analysis of these provisions have been included as they represented one of
the most common ways in which participants have directly or indirectly been affected by counter-terrorism
provisions.
particularly males, was encapsulated in this humorous, but significant conversation between Salahudin and Rayya:

**Salahudin:**

Yeah, Muslims, we get a special police escort every time we’re out. We’re like the Royal Family.

**Rayya:**

They’re always pulling us up, all the time, just to make sure we don’t need anything. They just want to take care of us. Make sure we’re alight. All you need is a brown face to get special attention in this country.

Their sentiment regarding the over-policing of Asian males is echoed across the focus group discussions. Section 44 was repeatedly referenced for three main reasons: the perceived use of racial profiling, the volume of incidents they had either been directly experienced or that participants had been made aware of via third party disclosures from family and acquaintances and the police treatment received by those who had been stopped and searched. An emotional discussion within focus group one regarding a street level incident highlights the frustration and anger of participants at Muslims being subjected to treatment that would be deemed unacceptable if applied to the wider non-Muslim population:
Moshin:

It don’t matter what you do. If the police see you out late at night or hanging around the streets they’ll pull you. They just think all Muslims are dodgy.

Yahya:

What you going to do? Give them shit. Even start getting a bit mouthy, they’ll bang you up, no messing. So what’s the point? I’m not getting arrested for nothing. It’s like the other day. It was late on, yeah, and all I was doing was walking home from the bus stop and I got pulled. Started asking loads of daft questions like ‘Where’ve you been?’, ‘Where were you going?’ Usual shit really. They talked to me like I was shit. I so wanted to have a go, but I kept my cool, answered the questions. Didn’t give them no reason to do anything. Let them do the checks and then got off.

Allah Ditta:

They’d never get away doing it to anyone else, would they? Imagine if they’d got new laws, say just to use against Jews or blacks; so they could randomly pull them, like they do us. People would be kicking off all over the place. The news would be full of it, people saying how out of order it was, but when it’s happening to us it’s okay. They’re taking the piss.

Yahya:

It’s basically racism, isn’t it, but it’s okay to be racist to Muslims, like we don’t matter.
The absence of a requirement for the police to provide a reason for carrying out ‘stop and search’ measures under Section 44 led many participants to the conclusion that Muslims were being stopped solely on the basis of ethnicity rather than suspicion of terrorist-related offences. This is not simply their subjective opinion; statistical evidence verifies their perceptions. For many participants the absence of any requirement on the part of police to provide a reason for stopping someone had resulted in them concluding they were being stopped by virtue of ethnicity alone, as Yahya concludes ‘it’s basically racism’. This is an assertion that is hard to counter since the provision itself is not intrinsically discriminatory, it must be the subjectivity of the individual officers who choose which members of the public are ‘suspicious’. Figures for its application serve as an indictment of institutionalised Islamophobia within the police force. Statistical evidence published since its reintroduction under counter-terrorism measures since 9/11 has consistently shown ‘Muslim looking’ men are disproportionately subject to stop and search powers (Choudhury, 2012; Frost, 2008). Indeed, Ministry of Justice statistics show nationally that in 2009-2010 Asian people were stopped 4.5 times more frequently than white people.27 Tellingly, these figures are markedly lower for stop-and-search powers requiring reasonable suspicion. The inference is clear: when robust objective safeguards are removed, officers’ subjective prejudices take their place. Pantazis and Pemberton (2009) point to long historical concerns over the subjectivities of the police regarding ethnic minorities, most notably Lord Macpherson’s report (1999) which accused the police force of institutionalised racism. Spalek and Lambert (2008, p.13) highlight the Muslim Council of Britain’s concerns regarding the institutional racism highlighted by the Macpherson Report being transferred into institutional prejudice against Muslims. Recent empirical research has found a large disparity in the application of stop and search to different ethnic

27 These figures are for ‘Asians’ and could include other South Asian religious denominations, however the argument stands, as noted elsewhere in the thesis, ‘looking Muslim’ is sufficient to elicit discrimination.
minorities which have overwhelmingly been used against Black and Asian people (Bowling and Phillips, 2007). This leads Kundnani (2006) to assert that the police have used ‘racial and ethnic profiling’ to determine whom to stop and search for terrorist offences. Consolidating the statistics and studies cited is the Islamophobic institutional discourse that has accompanied anti-terrorism policies from their inception. Indeed, as Choudhury (2012, p.23) notes, Hazel Blears, the Home Office Minister at the time ‘stop and search’ measures were introduced, stated to the Home Affairs Select Committee in 2005, ‘counter-terrorist powers will be disproportionately experienced by people in the Muslim community’ and in doing so disregarded Section 44 being in contravention to Articles 5, 8 and 14 of the Human Rights Charter (Equality and Human Rights Commission, 2012), as has been proven to be the case with its repeal in 2010.

Thus far, the analysis has shown counter-terrorism measures and security policies render all British-Muslims as ‘risky’. In addition it has problematized the governance of the ‘radicalisation process’ on the grounds that it allows increasingly invasive techniques to be applied to benign behaviours to create two mutually dependent illusions that Muslims are risky and therefore counter-terrorism legislation and security policies are indispensable. More latterly, it has examined participants’ feelings about racial profiling inherent in s44 and shown how they feel victimised and unfairly and continually targeted. It will now assess and de-civilise the community through both eroding its freedoms to protect those of the majority to exclude British-Muslims from the security and rights afforded to the rest of society.
Apart from stop and search, the other most frequently cited example of a perceived erosion of British-Muslim civil liberties concerned the restrictions placed upon the free expression of personal and political views, particularly in relation to ‘Muslim-specific’ events. In short, participants felt that their rights to protest and freedom of speech had been significantly compromised, both individually and legislatively. To this end, ill-defined aspects of counter-terrorism legislation such as ‘glorification’ and ‘incitement’ had produced uncertainties about what was, in Foucauldian terms, ‘sayable’ for participants. Chapter One detailed the provisions under the 2006 Terrorism Act that criminalise speech which directly or indirectly ‘encourages’, ‘incites’ or ‘glorifies’ terrorism. Yet such aspects of legislation potentially impact on human rights in two ways: firstly, in relation to Article 10 (2) and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights that guarantees the right to freedom of expression, assembly and association; and, secondly, the ambiguity, elasticity and scope of numerous terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘glorification’, ‘justification’ and ‘incitement’. Moreover, as is not required to show ‘intent’ aspects of counter-terrorism legislation make it possible to criminalise an array of actions and create uncertainty with regards to what is and is not a criminal offence.

Whilst most participants did not possess specific, in-depth knowledge of counter-terrorism legislation, they were determined to highlight how their freedom to express their opinions as British-Muslims have effectively been curtailed under current legislation, as the following narrative excerpt generated by the question (1:3) ‘How could the UK government improve things for Muslims?’ from focus group four demonstrates:
Saladin:

Well, they could stop treating us like second-class citizens. Let us have our say, be able to talk properly about what’s going on. This country’s supposed to be all about free speech, isn’t it? But, look what they’re doing to us. I mean, it’s alright for some racist to go on a rant, say whatever, just because it’s Muslims, but we can’t say jack [nothing]? Even dickheads from the BNP get the opportunity to spout their crap. How can that be right?

Rehan:

Don’t you get it? That’s just it. You only get free speech if you’re White. It doesn’t apply to Muslims anymore, does it (?) The last thing they want is Muslims stirring it up. All this crap about free speech, it’s just empty words. That’s all it is.

Saladin:

Yeah, but that’s meant to be one of the things about this country; everyone having the right to voice their opinion. That’s what democracy’s all about. It’s meant to be a basic right here, do you get me? It’s guaranteed by the United Nations, isn’t it, so how can they ignore that?

Layani:

Yeah, so what’s that say about Britain? It doesn’t matter what they say, the fact is they’re getting away with denying us free speech. Everyone’s too paranoid about where the next attack’s coming from to worry about us. The problem is, people just want to feel safe, so they’ll go along with whatever they’re told to make them feel safer.
As participant narratives show, despite asserting personal and political expression as a basic human right, as enshrined in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights Charter and Articles 18, 19 and 20 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/), Muslim freedom of expression is seen to have been significantly delimited. Some participants went further, suggesting restrictions on Muslim expression are a purposeful attempt to suppress criticism of government foreign policy. As Rehan in a follow up interview went on to assert:

**Rehan:**

It doesn’t matter how it looks, no one’s going to do anything about it, because it’s Muslims and the way they’ve made us out. People are already suspicious of us, so they’re going to go along with whatever they do if it means they’ll feel safer. No one’s going to lose any sleep over us, are they? Sometimes it just feels like they’ve orchestrated the whole thing, you know, to justify Iraq and things like that. I mean, I’m not really into conspiracy theories or anything, but sometimes it just all seems a bit too convenient how it’s worked out.

A second focus of concern for some participants concerned the ambiguity and scope of application of certain counter-terrorism legislative terminology, with the pre-emptive nature of recently introduced provisions representing a continuing source of confusion and discomfort amongst participants and their communities, as the following narrative extract from focus group three highlights:
Raheem:

The thing is it’s not just the terrorists they’re after anymore. The Government’s trying to stop any kind of support for what they’re doing. They’re basically trying to shut down any talk of even why they [terrorists] doing it. Like, you can’t even talk about certain Muslim causes anymore, in case it’s seen as promoting terrorism. So you have to be really careful what you say now just in case it gets misunderstood. Anything that sounds even vaguely like your supporting terrorism can land you in the shit.

Shah Jahan:

I know what you mean, everyone’s too scared to say what they really think. It’s like most Muslims, isn’t it, no one’s going to agree with 9/11, but how many Muslims thought it was about time something happened to America, that they got what they deserved after everything they’ve done, but no one’s going to come out in public and say it, are they (?)

Raheem:

No, because everyone’s too paranoid to say anything, aren’t they? Nobody knows what’s okay to talk about anymore. You see, they’ve been really clever about it. Basically they’ve done is…, it criminalises any proper discussion about why we’re so pissed off. That’s why you have to be so careful about what you say, in public at least.
Jay:

If you’re going to be being really cynical, you’d say it’s been done like that on purpose, to stop any real criticism of the government, like what it’s doing in Iraq.

It’s scary how they can get away with it. I mean, where’s it going to end?

Echoing such sentiments, many participants expressed apprehension at what they perceived to be the ever-tightening legislative surveillance of Muslims as well as feelings of vulnerability and confusion. As mentioned in Chapter One, the ambiguity of certain legislative terminology offers too much scope for misinterpretation and the application of discretionary powers by law enforcement agencies and is arguably the root of many concerns. Not only does this engender a high level of uncertainty and unnecessary self-censorship among participants and their communities regarding what is and is not criminal behaviour, but it also contravenes a ruling by the ECHR which stipulates measures that restrict individual rights must be narrowly defined (Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 2011).

Central to the silencing of legitimate Muslim protest are the notions of ‘community cohesion’, ‘shared values’ and ‘community engagement’, all of which came to the fore in the aftermath of the disturbances in several Northern towns during 2001. Commentators note (Thomas, 2011; Spalek and McDonald, 2010), engagement with the Muslim community has been highly politicised since this moment. It was at this point the problem of ‘difference’ was cited by the Government as a fundamental cause of such disturbances. To counter this ‘difference’ it attempted to engineer ‘community cohesion’ by means of instilling ‘shared values’ within Muslim communities. This notion of ‘community cohesion’ however is undermined by the enforced suppression of any viewpoint opposing what the Government determines to be terrorism and the ‘shared values’ on which it is
based having not been organically achieved through mutual respect and debate at the community level, but rather scripted by Government and enshrined in law. As stated by the UK Government itself:

We will also continue to challenge views which fall short of supporting violence and are within the law, but which reject and undermine our shared values and jeopardise community cohesion. Some of these views can create a climate in which people may be drawn into violent activity…

(HM Govt., March 2009, p.87)

The following conversational excerpt between Shah Jahan and Basanti from focus group three provides an indication of how Government attempts to engender ‘shared values’ and ‘community cohesion’ through the criminalisation of ‘incitement’, ‘glorification’ and ‘justification’ of terrorism are interpreted by participants:

Shah Jahan:

The bottom line is we’re supposed to do as we’re told. They’re trying to control what we say, even what we think.

Basanti:

And they’ve got the nerve to make out we’re the ones who want to control people.
Shah Jahan:

That’s just it, isn’t it? They’re always going on about how we all want Sharia Law, how we’re all against free speech; yet they’re the ones trying to control what people think ... and they say its Muslims who want to live under a dictatorship.

Basanti:

I know. We’re the ones who get treated like crap ... and we don’t even have a right to complain about it anymore. They can’t physically deport us, so they’ve managed to make us virtually invisible. You’re right, we’re not even allowed think anymore, let alone have an opinion. It’s got to the point where we can only speak out if it agrees with the government. Isn’t that what a dictatorship is?

Basanti and Shah Jahan compare the governance of the radicalisation process to living under a dictatorship. Indeed, as Kundnani asserts, the forcible silencing of protest and dissent against perceived grievances highlights the reformism inherent in Sections 4, 5 and 8 of the Terrorism Act (2006). He argues the long-term aim is to create a community which dares not openly criticise its own oppression, fearing the ‘terrors of prevention’ (Hillyard, 1993, p.262) which will eventually force acquiescence. Heath-Kelly (2013) cites the Channel Programme to argue, even the speech and actions of school children as young as 13 years old are being monitored by teachers, who are advised to ‘flag’ those children who exhibit ‘a conspiratorial mind-set’ or ‘show expressions of political ideology such as support for an Islamic system’ amongst other things. This illustrates the Government’s reformist agenda, as Kundnani (2009) asserts, socialising Muslims into relinquishing their right to freedom of speech and dissent from an early age and manufacturing their conformity to this abuse of their rights from an early age. The following narrative excerpt
between female sixth formers from focus group two shows how Kundnani’s argument resonates with the views of Nusaiba:

**Nusaiba:**

I read how all the new laws they have stop you being able to talk about some things. Not that if you’re Muslim you’re going to say suicide bombings are right. They’re not, obviously, but what are we supposed to do, pretend there isn’t a reason why they’re doing it? So, you’ve got to be careful what you say, haven’t you? You hear these stories about people getting arrested. Look at all those guys in Guantanamo. It happens, doesn’t it? So you’ve got to be really careful about what you say. They think everyone else can say whatever they like and we’ll say nothing; like the EDL [English Defence League] and all the other racists slagging us off all the time. They’re forcing us to shut the f up basically. They’re bombing us off the face of the earth and they expect us to just say *uff.*\(^{28}\) They can’t kill thousands and thousands of Muslims and expect us to say nothing.

Spalek and Lambert point to the Preventing Extremism Together Working Group’s concerns regarding the scope of the Terrorism Act (2006) which led the latter to surmise that leads ‘inciting, justifying or glorifying terrorism as currently formulated could … undermine legitimate support for self-determination struggles around the world and in using legitimate concepts and terminology because of fear of being implicated for terrorism by authorities’ (Home Office, 2005, p.77 in Spalek and Lambert, 2008, p.13). Nusaiba expresses anger at the fact Islamophobia is becoming increasingly prevalent domestically and death rates of Muslim civilians increase with each Western military

\(^{28}\) To say ‘*uff*’ is a Punjabi colloquialism that literally translates as ‘ouch that hurt’.
campaign. She contrasts this victimisation with counter-terrorism legislations and security policies that deny Muslims the right to protest. Additionally she alludes to the foundational principle of the Human Rights Charter; universality of application which becomes meaningless if this fundamental principle is breached. Nusaiba asks ‘What’s the point going on about equality all the time if they’re going to treat us like this? Yeah, we’re all equal, not if you’re Muslim’. According to the Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘The Human Rights act covers everyone in the United Kingdom regardless of citizenship or immigration status, consequently anyone who is in the UK for any reason is protected by the provisions in the Human Rights Act’ (Equality and Human Rights Commission, n.d.).

**Alienating British-Muslims: The Counter-Productive Effects of Counter-Terrorism Policies**

The above participant excerpt and empirical studies illustrate some of the ways in which counter-terrorism legislation and policy making has eroded police relations with the Muslim community. The following section will argue such counter-terrorism measures have been largely counter-productive to their stated aims. It has been noted, both by the Government and various academic authors, ‘community engagement’, the need to build trust and support in Muslim communities is integral to national security (Spalek et al., 2009; Choudhury, 2012). The National Policing Plan (Home Office, 2008, p.22) asserts, the government’s counter-terrorism strategy is underpinned by ‘strong community ties to build and increase trust and confidence’. Clearly, the data presented in this section shows British-Muslim experiences of counter-terrorism legislation has had the opposite effect. Participants highlighted how the provisions have heightened feelings of victimisation,
created distrust of the police and security agencies which has discouraged community cohesion and engagement.

In effect, the anti-terrorism legislation, security policies and associated discourses have served to heighten the sense of victimisation and the level of oppression experienced by British-Muslims at the cost of ensuring the safety of the majority. This fact was noted by several participants and is crystallised in the following exchange between Rayya, Amaya and Salahuddin which highlights their view these new measures are designed to heighten security make them feel more vulnerable:

**Rayya:**

How come with all this protection I don’t feel any safer? All that’s happened is my family and my friends get harassed all the time. Everyone’s convinced we’re all dodgy. I feel scared, not scared really, more wary, especially if I’m out in a hijab. You just don’t know sometimes how people are going to react, especially groups of white kids.

**Amaya:**

Yeah, I know everyone feels awkward around gangs of teenagers, but you shouldn’t have to feel like that just because you’re a Muslim. The thing is, what do you do if something happens? I know so many people who just wouldn’t feel safe going to the police; not with all the stories you hear. You don’t know who they’re going to believe at the end of the day. God knows what might happen. It’s come to something when you feel you can’t go to the very people who are supposed to protect you.
Salahuddin:

Exactly, we literally haven’t got anyone to turn to. They’ve made it clear Muslims aren’t part of the plan. They can’t get rid of us, but they’ll do anything they can to separate us off; show everyone how little we matter.

The frustrations of participants exhibited in this conversation can be attributed to the notion the safety and protection of British-Muslims is sacrificed in order to secure the safety and protection of everyone else. This is referred to as the existence of a ‘state of partial security’ by Mythen, Walklate and Khan (2013, p.1), whereby the security of the majority has been prioritised over the civil liberties of British-Muslims, excluding them from the safety and security taken for granted by the wider population. Whilst Rayya expresses increased fear of hate crimes against Muslims, Amaya points out that many of her acquaintances do not trust the police to assist in such circumstances. This assertion is both indicative of feeling excluded from the protection of the police by virtue of religion but also symptomatic of the acute alienation some Muslims feel.

This particular conversation is indicative of feelings of disempowerment and hopelessness felt as a result of oppressive legislation. Additionally, this discussion in full has shown participants believe their fundamental rights to have been stripped back under counter-terror legislation. These feelings of a distinct lack of engagement are encapsulated in Salahuddin’s assertion, ‘we are not part of the plan…they’ll do anything to separate us, show how little Muslims matter to the bigger picture’. These narratives indicate that there is much reparation work to be done in terms of trust before the community participation and empowerment widely regarded as essential in establishing effective relationships between Muslim communities and the police is possible. To make matters worse, studies
show al-Qaida and other organisations closely linked to violent extremism operating within Western Europe use the social discrimination and political marginalisation of Muslims as part of their narrative for recruiting new members (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

In addition to these feelings of hopelessness and disempowerment that are so detrimental to community engagement, participants spoke of a deep distrust of the police which has permeated the community as a result of covert surveillance, stop-and-search, detentions without charge and other ‘errors of prevention’ (Hillyard, 1993, p.376). Some participants claimed such feelings lead to a mistrust of the police and law enforcement agencies to the extent they felt they would be unhelpful if they found themselves victims of crime. This sentiment is clearly articulated by Amaya in the above conversation when she highlights how some Muslims feel threatened by the very organisations that are supposed to protect them, likening fear of the police to being intimidated by a teenage gang. Muslim participants in an Equality and Human Rights Commission Research report (2011) identified a lack of accountability in the implementation of Prevent and expressed their concerns regarding how ‘hard’ (Spalek, 2009) policing tactics have undermined the Government’s central focus of community cohesion. The study showed the implementation of Prevent has resulted in the majority of Muslim respondents becoming increasingly suspicious of law enforcement agencies and led to a fear of and lack of trust in the British legal and political system. Similarly, Jarvis and Lister (2013), again using qualitative methods, found the relationship between the police and Muslim communities has been significantly damaged by the introduction of Prevent. Ryder (2009) claims, this leads to feelings of impotence, whilst Silke (2005) asserts, Prevent creates sympathy and silence within communities who feel themselves to be alienated and stigmatised, and as Werbner’s (2004, p.464) asserts, the sum effect of which results in ‘the spiralling progressive alienation of Muslim in the West’.
Extant studies have shown, counter-terrorism policies which racially profile the policing of Muslims have led to an increases in hate crimes committed against them (Githens-Mazer and Lambert, 2010; Pantazis and Pemberton, 2009; Frost, 2007). It should be recognised that certain sections of the public interpret the combination of institutional, legislative and police oppression of Muslims as an ‘ideological and moral licence for anti-Muslim hate crimes’ and as (Poynting and Mason, 2008, p.367), giving them ‘permission to hate’. This link between discourse associated with Prevent and public attitudes was noted by Kamran and Rabiya:

Kamran:

So we’re just guilty anyway. That’s why people are so suspicious of us. The government treat us like we’ve all already done something wrong, so obviously other people are going to feel like that. It’s that no smoke without fire thing.

Rabiya:

Of course, it’s obvious. If you get the police, politicians and even the Prime Minister all saying that Muslims are dodgy, then they’re giving anyone with racist views an excuse to say what they want. They’re basically leading by example; they make it acceptable to be racist.

Whilst Kamran argues the Government’s implication of Muslim guilt influences the general public, the institutional representation of Muslims as a group that requires specific and heightened legislative provisions is an indication to the public that they are different in a negative way, as Rabiya states this legitimises anti-Muslim feelings amongst mainstream society.
As participant narratives show, victimisation by the police and public by virtue of their religion combine to create feelings of isolation, discrimination and alienation, which together create a barrier between Muslims and the wider mainstream population. This sense of exclusion from wider society is not confined to the sample within this research.

Basia Spalek’s (2009) research suggests selective use of ‘hard’ tactics, alongside a foundation of ‘soft tactics’ such as long-term grass roots community engagement, might be the most effective method to counter terrorism. However, if the group discussions have any resemblance to more widely held views, it seems mistrust of police is deeply seated, making long-term community-police partnerships unlikely. The replacement of community cohesion with resentment and alienation will make gaining traction with future ‘soft’ tactics an uphill battle. This finding supports Spalek and Imtoual they assert ‘implementation of anti-terrorism laws, which might be used disproportionately against Muslims, seems to be in direct conflict with the concept of community participation’ (2007, p.199). This factor is further compounded by the next point.

Participants cited another negative impact of counter-terrorism strategies they were concerned about which was that community cohesion projects were being used to gather intelligence.

Kamran:

How many times have you heard it; people saying that they have being asked to inform, spy on their own community. No chance. Like I’d help! I’m not helping nobody put Muslims away. For what, nothing, that’s what.
Jay:

Seriously, one minute you’d be helping them, next minute you’d be in the back of a meat wagon on your way to prison. We get it all the time. We always get cops coming into work, trying to make friends with you, asking you to keep an eye out, report anyone suspicious. It happened to that lad in London, Kasim, one minute he’s doing an interview, you know some community thing, the next he’s at the station answering questions. I mean, they never arrested him for anything, but still, you don’t want that sort of shit in your life, do you?

Whilst neither participant has directly experienced being asked for information on their communities, the above narrative excerpt highlights the prevalence of mistrust of the police and State among participants. Government efforts to involve the community in its Prevent strategy such as the ‘Channel Programme’, which is set up to work with the community to refer ‘individuals of concern’ to the authorities in order to ‘counter-radicalisation’ (Home Office, 2009, p.11). Kamran and Jay, are emphatic in their opposition to such overtures from the Government and police. Moreover, suspicion of such programmes is at such a level that those which genuinely aim to build trust may still be seen as vehicles for information gathering as evidenced by the above excerpt, be viewed with hostility and suspicion as a possible means of entrapment, and so to be avoided. Indeed Jay’s assertion chimes with Kundnani’s (2009) findings based on qualitative interviews, which showed deep suspicion and mistrust of State agencies. Additionally his research identified some soft community engagement initiatives have involved police officers on fact finding missions, which supports Jay’s anecdotal evidence of a friend whose voluntary participation in community engagement resulted in arrest.
The previous section has traced the forms of exclusion experienced by participants as a result of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies. Participant narratives, along with supporting studies, offer insight into how the provisions under Prevent potentially impact on Muslim communities within the UK. Not only does Prevent implicate all Muslims in its discursive formation of the radicalisation process, it does so in tangible terms such as the distribution of funding according to Muslim population density and documented racial profiling. The result of such ‘hard’ security strategies in terms of countering the terrorist risk is negligible, whilst the effect on community cohesion, trust between Muslim communities and security agencies has been a significantly negative one, if not counterproductive, in that it has exacerbated the sense of alienation and estrangement from society experienced by British-Muslims.

This chapter has examined the various exclusions experienced by participants in the study and compared and contrasted this with evidence regarding the wider British-Muslim community. It should be acknowledged that, being comprised of young Pakistani Muslims in a particular locale, the sample is not representative - nor is it intended to be so - and the findings of the study are not generalizable. Nevertheless, the key findings on mechanisms and experiences of exclusion in the empirical study resonate with the findings of larger scale inquiries and other qualitative studies into the perspectives of Muslims.

This chapter examined core emergent theme two: excluding Muslims, discrimination regulation and discourse. The data was examined through the Foucauldian concepts of power/knowledge and disciplinary power. The analysis was presented in two parts, the first sought to address research question one, how British-Muslims have been institutionally represented post 9/11. The key findings in this context were as follows. Firstly the majority of participants felt the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims was distinctly Orientalist. Compounding this, large majority of participants felt society
mirrored in both attitude and behaviour the institutional representations. Whilst participant’s perception cannot ‘prove’ Foucauldian theory, set within this theoretical framework, their perceptions allow an understanding of how individuals might come to embody certain attitudes. For instance ‘White Gaze’ experienced by some participants was interpreted by them as the embodiment of Orientalist institutional constructions. The chapter then briefly set such perceptions within Symbolic Interactionist theory of the co-emergence of self and society, proposing that as the participants take the role of generalised non-Muslim society they feel themselves to be excluded. This sense of being on the periphery of society as a result of pervasive discourses was widely referenced in both focus groups and interview discussions. The final part of the first section compiled participant narratives that assert the discursive construction of Islam and Muslims as especially risky, was a mechanism to create a culture of fear (Furedi, 2002) that enables the State to achieve its domestic legislative goals and foreign policy initiatives.

The second part of this chapter relates to concerns encompassed in research question one: ‘To assess the impacts of counter-terrorism legislation and security measures on British-Muslims post 9/11’. Participants concerns were four fold, firstly they expressed concerns that the entire Muslim community was implicated by legislation and polices. Their narratives centred on being victimised and scrutinised and the insecurity and alienation this created. Again Foucauldian concepts were deployed to examine their testimonies. Some participants alluded to anti-terrorism discourses and their effects on the non-Muslim population by claiming these discourses legitimised public surveillance or ‘permission to hate’ (Poynting and Mason, 2008). Their second concern focused on the disproportionate use of Section 44, stop and search. Although this legislation was experienced indirectly through family members and friends in the main, it was almost symbolic of the legislative exclusions experienced by participants and their communities.
Mythen and Khan’s (2013) study aligns with the current findings, they concluded that whilst the majority of their participants hadn’t experienced Section 44 directly their testimonies suggested this was a key factor for feelings of anger and alienation. Thirdly participants noted British-Muslim freedoms were being curtailed to ensure security for the wider population, particularly freedom of expression and their right to protest. These feelings of being excluded from freedoms and rights afforded to the majority of citizens creates what Mythen and Khan call a ‘state of partial securities’ (2013, p.736). Finally, many participant discussions indirectly referred to the counter-productive effects of counter-terrorism legislation and security policies, particularly with regard to feelings of mistrust and alienation from the State and its agencies. This finding supports other extant studies, (Choudhury, 2012; Kundani, 2009; Spalek and Lambert, 2008) who claim the building block of counter-terrorism, ‘community engagement’ is being eroded by ‘hard’ legislative strategies which engender fear, suspicion and alienation amongst the British-Muslim population.

The thesis will now move onto the examination of the data with regards to the discursive construction of embodied Islam and how it impacts on participant behaviour and interactional experiences. It will pay particular attention to the Orientalist construction of the Muslim woman and their veiling practices as embodied Islamic patriarchy. These representations are then contrasted with the meaning of veiling for female participants which stand outside both western imposed meanings and traditional Islamic meanings of veiling. Whilst this chapter was built on a generalised analysis of Muslim discursive constructions and its multiple impacts, Chapter Seven will narrow this Foucauldian analysis to examine discourses of the Islamic body. In doing so it presents an examination of core emergent theme three: embodied Islam, gender, surveillance and Muslim identities.
Chapter seven

Embodied Islam: Gender, Surveillance and Muslim Identities

This chapter will examine core emergent theme three: embodied Islam: gender, surveillance and Muslim Identities. As demonstrated by Chapter Six the nature of British-Muslim interaction with wider non-Muslim society, at both an individual and institutional level, is of paramount importance in understanding the formation and perpetuation of the social, economic and political exclusion of British-Muslims. Building on this analysis, this chapter will specifically explore the relationship between the Muslim ‘body’, focusing primarily on sartorial choice, and various forms of social exclusion experienced by the participants within this study. Vannini and Vaskul (2006) note, the ‘body’ and experiences of embodiment have garnered significant academic attention and have been at the centre of sociological debate in many areas of study such as race, ethnicity and sexuality. Given the breadth of this literature, this thesis will not engage with the subtleties and nuances of these debates. Rather, it is my intention to bring fundamentals of these debates to bear to illuminate the perspectives and practices of participants in this study. In what follows an Interactionist definition of the ‘body’ and embodiment will be applied, in which the ‘body’ is always more than the physical corporeal object. The body is also a social object, which is to say that ‘it is an object that cannot be separated from the body as a subject; they are emergent from one another’ (Waskul and Van der Riet, 2002, p.510).

The analysis will apply the same Foucauldian concepts as Chapter Six to illuminate and examine participant testimonies. In this way it is built on the fourth of the six key factors examined in the literature review. This analysis intends to apply the same tentative assumptions of a link between institutional discursive formations of Islam and Muslims
and the prevalence of anti-Muslim sentiments within non-Muslim public attitudes as utilised in Chapter Six. This link will be applied to the embodiment of Islam to show how the gendered nature of Islamophobia experienced by participants is built on societal assumptions based on traditional gendered stereotypes which through Orientalist discourses attribute patriarchal qualities to Muslims.

The following chapter is based on unanticipated themes or patterns emerging out of the data analysis process. In short, the chapter presents various extracts which highlight the significance of embodied Islam and its effect on their perceptions and everyday interactions with wider British non-Muslim society. As such it does not therefore align itself explicitly with the initial research questions that form the foundation of this project. That said, the analysis does partially address research questions two and three, which will be made explicit below. The analysis examines the discursive formation of Islam and Muslims which includes negative knowledge creation about Islam specific sartorial choices, particularly those related to veiling practices. As the discussion will show, participant narratives frequently referred to sartorial choice and how such choices impact on both the way in which they are received by wider society and the level of acceptance or exclusion experienced. To this end, participants in the study cite the mediatised nature of symbolically Islamic attire such as the beard, the wearing of modest clothing, and, perhaps most notably, the practice of veiling. Such issues both invite a theoretical analysis based on Foucauldian concepts and are pertinent to research question two: ‘To examine how British Muslim identities have been institutionally represented post 9/11’. Guided and supported by the emergent themes within the data, the following discussion will show how both female and male participants recognise sartorial choice in both dress and personal grooming had a profound impact in terms of their engagement with and experiences of
wider British society. In doing so, it will show the significant gendered differences in the type of exclusion experienced.

The analysis of the data within this chapter will be presented in three parts examining prominent themes that arose across all four focus group discussions. Firstly, it will explore how the symbolic identification of Muslims through the embodiment of Islamic symbols based on sartorial choice and personal grooming preferences result in the neo-Orientalist stigmatisation of British-Muslims. In response the data revealed participants employed certain disidentifying strategies (Goffman, 1959). Secondly, drawing on wider empirical research it will highlight how the symbolic Muslim body is stigmatised within spaces formally governed by anti-discriminatory legislation such as the workplace, its impact on Muslims within the UK and how this is a society wide problem.

The final section of this chapter will provide a more detailed analysis of gendered Islamophobia, particularly focusing on forms of exclusion experienced by Muslim women. This section will be presented in five parts and as such represents the largest portion of the analysis; which is evidence of both the richness and volume of participant testimonies around gender. Discrimination against Muslim men has been discussed in detail with regards to legislation, particularly stop and search in Chapter Six. The thesis has yet to offer a female specific analysis. Therefore, whilst male orientated prejudice and discrimination will be discussed, a more in-depth analysis will be provided on how female participants experience Islamophobia. Firstly it will illuminate the social construction of the Muslim women and its attendant denigration of Islam. Secondly, it will then go on to discuss how aspects of Western feminism have been used to undermine and belittle Islamic practices such as veiling and locate Muslim women as victims of Islamic patriarchal violence. Thirdly, it will examine through both male and female narratives how the construction of Muslim women as victims necessarily depicts Muslim men as aggressors.
Fourthly, it will examine veiling as a contested practice focusing in particular on the ‘veil discourse’ and Muslim women’s understanding of this practice. Here the chapter will identify the motivations for, and the values placed, on the practice of veiling: enforced veiling, veiling as a fashion statement, the veil as a private symbol of Islamic devotion, and the veil as an expression of feminism. Finally it will apply the notion of double-bind to female narratives; this ‘double bind’ arises from the common assertion that Muslim women are both victim of, and complicit in, the patriarchal oppression that is inherent within Islam. An analysis of veiling practices is specifically pertinent to research question three: ‘To examine the micro-level strategies deployed by young British Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’. To illuminate this practice further Homi Bhabha’s concepts relating to the ‘Third Space’ will be applied to demonstrate how individual female participant motivations for veiling are novel and oppositional in that they stand outside the constraints of both the neo-Orientalist discursive formation of veiling and patriarchal Islamic izzat [honour] practices.

**Expressing Islam: Sartorial Choice, Regulation and Identity**

Throughout the focus group discussions, several participants asserted how ‘looking’ Muslim, either by virtue of Asian descent or sartorial choice, was widely perceived negatively within non-Muslim British society. As the following focus group two excerpt between Rahila and Sofie regarding the British police anti-terror focus on Asian-looking youth highlights, participants were emphatic in their recognition of how social reaction differs according to particular clothing choices.

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29 Here sartorial refers to specifically and symbolically Muslim dress: the *hijab* [headscarf], *burkha* [full face and body veil], and *shalwaar kameez* [tunic, trousers and long scarf] as worn by south Asian Muslim women; and, the *jabba* [long tunic], *tohpi* [prayer cap] and beard for men.
**Rahila:**

We’ve all had it. You know, where you go to sit next to someone … and they look at you like you’re going to do something to them. I don’t know, attack them or something.

**Sofie:**

It’s like me. When I’m wearing a *hijab* sometimes, I swear down, the kind of looks I get. It’s as if I’ve got two heads. I mean, I still get the odd look when I’m in jeans and that, but, you know, put on a *hijab* and *shalwaar kameez* and it’s like I’m the devil.

**Rahila:**

I know what you mean. Like when you’re wearing Western clothes hardly anyone notices you … you forget about the Muslim thing, completely, but as soon as you’re in Asian clothes; my God, some of the looks. I mean I normally just wear Western clothing, but my older sister, she wears the *hijab* most of the time. When I’m out on my own I don’t really get bothered that much, but when I’m with my sister, the amount of dirty looks and comments we get is amazing. Like this one time, we were in town and this group of chav girls started having a go at us, shouting out things like, “Look, Osama’s missus”. They kept following us, calling us things like “sand niggers”. My sister even got shoved. Not that hard. It didn’t hurt her, but it was scary still. That’s just the way it is I suppose.

As the above extract illustrates, several participants believe recognition of being Muslim due to visible signifiers manifests itself in a variety of potentially threatening ways such as non-verbal disapproval, as in the case of ‘dirty looks’, verbal abuse and even physical assault. These extracts echo the Chapter Six analysis of the ‘White Gaze’. This
chapter will apply the same notion but specifically with regards to embodied Islam. With Sofie asserting the *hijab* is akin to having two heads in terms of non-Muslim attention which she feels is non-existent when she is wearing jeans. Whilst the ‘White Gaze’ has been described as both invasive and discriminatory in the Chapter Six analysis, Rahila’s experiences of verbal and physical abuse as a result of Islam specific dress are significantly more worrisome. Unfortunately Rahila’s story is illustrative of a UK wide escalation in anti-Muslim hate crimes which are disproportionately directed at Muslim women who practice veiling. The Centre for Fascist, Anti-Fascist and Post-Fascist Studies (2013) analysis of ‘Tell Mama’ hotline statistics, noted a 20 percent increase in anti-Muslim hate-crimes since the murder of Lee Rigby in May 2013. Crucially for this discussion half were directed against Muslim women who practice veiling.

For many participants, this disapproval or threat of abuse or physical attack is accepted as a ‘normal’ part of everyday life for Muslims living in the UK. As Rahila concludes, “That’s just the way it is I suppose.” Similarly, Mohsin in focus group one recounts how a non-Muslim friend from school had acted in an Islamophobic manner. Again, Mohsin’s attitude is one that accepts symbolically attired Muslims experience discrimination as part of everyday life:

**Mohsin:**

A good friend of mine, white bloke - been friends since we were at school - actually said to me that he felt uncomfortable when a Muslim guy with a beard and rucksack sat next to him on the bus. That’s what they think of us when it comes down to it, after all the friendship, we’re mates and all that stuff, but when it comes down to it they still see us as bomb carriers.
Applying Foucault’s ‘disciplinary power’ (1975) to the above narrative, it not only engenders a wider non-Muslim population docile to such discourse, it also produces docility in Muslims themselves and the internalisation of the notion that as Muslims it is ‘normal’ to expect such treatment. These notions of non-Muslim surveillance of Muslims and Muslim self-surveillance supplement the discussion of public surveillance in Chapter Six. As the above discussion has shown embodied Islam elicits a strong discriminatory attitude amongst some members of the public. However as Power (2011) asserts, any application of Foucauldian thought must be tempered by two critiques relevant to this discussion: firstly, the claim that discourses are all pervasive denies individual agency, and, secondly, ‘what is the principle of relevance by which one discourse is chosen over another’ (2011, p.46). In light of this any application of Foucauldian thought is confined to the parameters of participant narratives.

The following section will extend this analysis by applying an interactionist perspective to participant’s narratives to illustrate how choosing to wear Islamic dress spoils attempts at impression management rendering the Muslim body deeply stigmatised. In Goffmanian parlance, Sofie, Rahila and Mohsin can be seen to recognise how symbolically Islamic sartorial choice precludes Muslim actors’ ‘performances’ from being accepted as normal by the wider non-Muslim population and demonstrate how participants’ narratives attest to how the Muslim ‘body’ has become increasingly stigmatised over the past decade.

Crocker, Major and Steele (1998) assert that the identity of stigmatised individuals is socially devalued with individuals being stigmatised due to negative stereotypes associated with the group to which they belong. As has already been discussed in Chapter Five, the symbiotic relationship between negative institutionalised constructions and grassroots level attitudes towards Muslims, and the attendant rise in Islamophobia - rooted in the 1989
publication of Salmon Rushdie’s *The Satanic Verses* - has become increasingly prevalent over the past decade. Symbolically, Muslim attire is a representation and re-producer of the Muslim ‘self’ and, as such, is a provoker of stigmatisation that stimulates a range of negative comments and associations. The adornment or possession of visibly symbolic signifiers of Muslimness, whether religious or cultural, means individuals are unable to ‘pass’ (Larsen, 1929 cited in Medina, 2010, p.135) for anything other than Muslim. Signifiers of Muslim identity such as the *hijab, jubba* or *topi* therefore represent a form of objectified cultural expression that is understood to signal that one *deliberately* belongs to Islam. So, to paraphrase Goffman (1963, p.2-3), when a Muslim is present before us, her sartorial choice is evidence that she is different to ‘others’. She is thus reduced from a whole and ‘normal’ person, to one defined by her ‘Muslimness’; a person who embodies all that is encompassed in the institutionally constructed perception of Islam and Muslims.

In short, visible Muslim signifiers confirm a Muslim’s ‘otherness’ from the majority White, non-Muslim population. Sofie, Rahila and Mohsin’s ‘other’ experiences correlate directly with this thesis, highlighting how symbolically Islamic attire is sufficient to elicit Islamophobic curiosity and even abuse from strangers.

Both Rahila and Sofie acknowledge how the absence of overtly visible signs of ‘Muslimness’ reduces the likelihood of both incidence and ferocity of Islamophobic reaction. This knowledge has allowed participants to control perceived stigma by selective embodiment, this ability to ‘perform safety’ through sartorial choice as a stigma management strategy will be discussed further in Chapter Eight. As for the current discussion it will suffice to examine anecdotal evidence from a follow up interview with Jalal which illustrates, albeit amusingly, the powerful effect of the Muslim body on non-Muslim attitudes:
Jalal:

I wouldn’t go to a football match in my *jubba*, can you imagine those beer drinking honkies and me in my dress? It’s not just a dress though it’s a man in a dress, I’d never live it down, but not even in a funny way, they would not stop calling me Osama and that would be it then, you’d just have to go for it.

Moderator:

What do you mean? Go for what?

Jalal:

Well, have a fight. That’s what happens, once it gets to religious insults, you kind of have to. So it’s better never to go anywhere like that, dressed in *apna* [our own] clothes … best to be as *gorah* [non-Muslim] in those situations, jeans t-shirt and loads of talk about going out and stuff, you know?

Despite his use of discriminatory language whilst highlighting his own experiences of prejudice, the excerpt shows how Jalal ‘performs safety’ (Mythen et al., 2009, p.736), he chooses not to embody Islam in certain contexts for fear of verbal attacks that could lead to more serious conflicts. He not only performs safety through sartorial choices but with selective speech too. He emphatically references what he believes to be normal male, non-Muslim behaviours, such as ‘going out’ in these interactions. This is a mechanism to dis-identify (Goffman, 1963) with Islam thereby reducing his Muslimness in the eyes of his team mates. Jalal’s strategic embodiment of Islam is aligned Jones et al (1984) argument that individuals whose stigma is visible experience more discrimination than those whose stigmatisation is concealable. This is echoed by Allen (2014) who references verified accounts of attacks on Muslims within the UK that include being spat upon, abused, threatened with violence and violently assaulted. He asserts that the likelihood of this
happening dramatically increases if you happen to ‘look Muslim’ as a result of wearing a *hijab, niqab* or other form of traditional Islamic clothing. In line with other empirical studies, the research data from this study clearly shows Islamic dress increases the likelihood of experiencing Islamophobia. Consequently, we can tentatively suggest that non-Muslim British society may be less tolerant of those Muslims who are perceived to be ‘Muslim and proud’ by virtue of displaying visible in-group symbols, with such sartorial choices and personal grooming preferences being interpreted as a wilful symbol of anti-Britishness. This phenomenon is highlighted by the following excerpts from a follow up interview with Nusaiba:

**Nusaiba:**

Once, when I told a friend that I was called a terrorist by some random on the street, she said something like well you were wearing a veil and people just think you might be ‘one of them’. Well, all I can say is she is not my friend anymore. I can’t believe it, it’s like ok well ‘you can’t help being brown but at least have the decency to try to fit in’. As if wearing *shalwaar kameez* is enough reason to abuse us. It’s because they think that if we wear *shalwaar kameez*, or a *topi* or *hijab* we are not grateful for being allowed to live here, that we are against them, they like Muslims who slag off Islam and act like they don’t like it.

Nusaiba’s story illustrates a normalisation in the public consciousness of a social penalty that is elicited by Muslim dress. Both young women interpret this according to the dual constructs of ‘Islamist’ and ‘moderate’ Muslim. The ‘moderate Muslim’ is viewed as being someone who is pro-Western, shuns Islamic bodily choices in favour of Western attire, engages in mainstream British social and leisure time pursuits, and performs the part of the good British citizen. Whereas the ‘Islamist Muslim’ wears traditional Islamic dress
and is perceived as being anti-Western, having little in common with British culture, and is consequently unaligned with Britishness. Nusaiba recognises the impact of Islamic attire and its association with the negative constructs of Islam and the reactions it can elicit. Nusaiba’s friend, who appears to suggest the act of wearing the veil elicits and implicitly justifies Islamophobia, is an argument supported by some sections of the British media. Her narrative exposes the attitude in some parts of non-Muslim population, that symbolically Islamic attire signifies their complicity in, and support for, terrorism, in that it is perceived to act as a flag for Islam and its latest Orientalist incarnation, rather than the more palatable Muslim ‘moderate’. At best these symbols are interpreted as signifiers of Muslimness and at worst as a statement of anti-British sentiment. In some respects, this summation echoes the discursive formation of ‘Islamist/extremist’ versus ‘moderate’ in counter-terror legislation. Chapter One has highlighted these distinctions and this thesis would concur with Spalek and McDonald (2010) in positing that the UK Government has, in effect, sought to legitimise certain theological strands of Islam over others. In a similar vein, Kundnani (2009) contends that this is achieved to some degree through marginalising voices that do not align with State security policies and enabling and encouraging those that do, the case in point being the allocation of Prevent funding.

The institutional legitimisation of private citizens scrutiny of Muslims, indirectly by specific anti-terror focus on Muslims and explicitly, for instance the ‘if you suspect it, report it campaign’ by the Metropolitan Police Force. They encourage the public to use an anti-terror hotline to report suspicious incidents ‘no matter how small’ has fostered what Poynting and Mason (2006) refer to as ‘permission to hate’. As discussed in Chapter Six, institutional targeting of Muslims may provide an ‘ideological and moral licence to anti-Muslim hate crime’ (2006, p.367). Chapter Six presents a fuller analysis of this concept with particular reference to counter-terror legislation. The result of this phenomenon,
rather alarmingly, is that mediatised reporting of such incidents of targeted discrimination against Muslims tend not to be labelled as race hate crimes, but are seen instead as justifiable actions in the defence of Britishness. *The Daily Mail* even went as far as to coin the phrase ‘*burqa rage*’ to describe this phenomenon (Allen, 2010), which he defined as becoming so angry, upset and offended by the sight of the *niqab* [full veil] that people react violently toward the wearer. By doing so, the blame is firmly located with the victim rather than the aggressor. This notion of the veil as an ‘act of violence’ against so-called ‘British values’ will be discussed further in the subsequent discussion on gendered Islamophobia.

The analysis has shown how institutionalised discourses of embodied Islam are accepted as ‘truth’ by some members of the public, who are more likely exhibit Islamophobic attitudes when confronted with sartorial Islam. This discussion has shown how choice of dress correlates with the moderate/extremism dichotomy, with moderates dressing in a Western manner and extremists choosing to embody Islam. It went on to explain participant testimonies through Erving Goffman’s Impression Management (1959) techniques. These strategies are employed by participants to disidentify with Islam so as to decrease the likelihood of future discrimination. In doing so, it indexed studies that have causally linked Islamic specific dress and sartorial choice with the increased likelihood of being the victim of anti-Muslim hate crimes and set the analysis of participant narratives within the wider UK context. It will now show how the Muslim ‘body’ is perceived in regulated spaces.
The Muslim Body, Space and Surveillance

So far several participants have highlighted how the Muslim ‘body’ is recognised as stigmatised within ungoverned everyday interactions, whereas the following conversation will show how the symbolically presented Muslim ‘body’ is considered out of place in regulated spaces such as the workplace, spaces that are supposedly governed by legislation and practices designed to protect equality of opportunity. This analysis will now explore how participant’s experiences show that anti-Islamic sentiments are not only expressed by non-Muslims, but both expected and often accepted by participants to consequently govern their future behaviour. The discussion will then look to wider research to examine the wider implications of workplace discrimination. As demonstrated in an exchange between Raheem, a trainee solicitor, and Kamran, a warehouse operative, although workplace environments are markedly different the discrimination they are forced to endure is strikingly similar.

Kamran:

This way of showing Muslims [Orientalist depictions] makes it really hard for me at work, most people there read the tabloids and I’ve got a beard, so I get a lot of crap, I’m not being funny but you don’t get the most educated people in a warehouse, in fact most left [school] without qualifications, so I know that reading those crap papers then makes them come out with loads of anti-Muslim stuff, because they don’t read anything else so where else can that kind of racism come from?

Moderator:

How does the portrayal of Islam and Muslims make you feel?
Kamran:

Like I said before working where I do, I’m always on the receiving end of crap about Muslims, jokes about my beard, they say stuff about my Mum wearing the hijab … well one thing it has made me do is try to talk to people I work with if they ask me reasonable questions about my religion because it’s my duty to put them straight, but even more than that it’s made me realise I need to get away from that kind of environment, educate myself and move on.

Raheem:

Don’t hold your breath brother, I did and I still get the odd snide remark where I work, its more polite but I think it’s the same, you probably would have a hard time getting a job at mine with that beard, [laughter] honestly I’m not even joking, you’d know yourself even before the interview, a neat little trimmed beard, you might get away with, anything else I don’t know.

Kamran:

I know but anything’s better than full on abuse about the hijab and jokes about looking like Abu Hamza.

[Laughter]

Raheem:

You should tell your boss, that’s bullying and racism…

Kamran:

I’d rather just leave to be honest. You can tell them to stop saying it but you can’t stop them from thinking it can you? Anyway the bosses have that same kind of laddish attitude, so what’s the point? My beard is a problem for me at work, I’m
just an easy target. I’ve thought about trimming it but I haven’t so far, I hope I never do.

Raheem:

Good for you, I toe the line at work, I have to be shaven. If I grew a beard like yours they wouldn’t give me a contract. Have you ever seen a solicitor with a proper Mullah beard [laughter] it’s just not going to happen, I don’t think you need a beard or a topi for people to be suspicious anyway, what about that Brazilian guy? They shot him because he had brown skin and a backpack.

Disturbingly, whilst few similarities may exist between the circumstances of their employment, it appears workplace Islamophobia is not only common, but experienced across a range of professions. Such experiences highlight how visibly Islamic symbols, such as the beard in this example, are either contested, as Kamran’s experience shows, or simply deemed unacceptable in the workplace, as in the case of Raheem’s acceptance that being symbolically Muslim would affect his career as a solicitor. Kamran’s refusal to seek support against the discrimination he experiences is a sad indictment of some workplace cultures and the limitations of equal opportunities legislation in delivering workplace equality.

Unlike discrimination based on race or gender in the workplace, Rabby and Rodgers (2010) assert, anti-Islamic sentiment remains largely unchecked. Their study into the impact of 9/11 and 7/7 on the employment and earnings of UK Muslims, found eighty percent of their respondents had experienced religious discrimination in the workplace. Albeit in the United States, a study conducted by Ghumman and Jackson (2010) into experiences of symbolically dressed Muslims echoes aspects of Kamran and Raheem’s conversation. Furthermore, and rather worryingly, Ghumman and Jackson’s (2010)
research on the wearing of the *hijab* in the workplace, suggests the religious identity of non-Islamically dressed Muslims remains ambiguous and so cannot be identified as stigmatised individuals. Consequently, they tend to experience less discrimination than those who choose to dress more visibly as Muslim. They found respondents not only experienced greater religious discrimination, but, as supported by the comments of participants within this study above, they *expect* to experience such discrimination and accepted it as part of the Muslim experience. One of their findings was that women who wear the *hijab* in the workplace were more likely to succeed in obtaining work in roles that involved little contact with customers or the public, in fact the less customer contact the more likely they would secure employment. As the above excerpt shows, participants appear to be accepting of the status quo and respond to what is a serious example of workplace Islamophobia with the use of humour, for example as with Raheem’s comment, ‘have you ever seen a solicitor with a proper *Mullah* beard?’

Despite participants rendering of discrimination as benign through the use of humour, Rabby and Rodgers (2010), warn the cumulative effects of such anti-Islamic sentiment in the workplace might have significant future consequences. They found an emergence of workplace discrimination against minorities fitted ‘the societal stereotypes of young Muslims’ after 9/11 and 7/7, with young Muslims finding it difficult to both secure and retain employment. They claim that this will have important implications for the future employment opportunities for Muslims within the United Kingdom. As has been discussed in Chapter One, the 2011 census shows Muslims have the youngest age profile, with 48 percent of the population aged under 25. Given the very different age profiles of ethnic minorities and the indigenous population within the United Kingdom, a significant cohort of the future working population will be Muslim. Studies such as these suggest Muslim workers are far from being well-integrated into the United Kingdom labour market. Rabby
and Rodgers (2010) recommend a greater focus on reducing the persistent employment and earnings gaps that have been discussed at length in Chapter One. A micro-level study conducted by the BBC, *Inside Out West* (2013) underscores these results. Two male journalists of similar age and ethnicity were given equivalent CVs. One of the participants used the name Mohammed and wore traditional Islamic dress to make his faith obvious, whilst the other used the name Ian and wore jeans and a shirt. Each applied for the same forty jobs which resulted in Mohammed being offered only three interviews compared to Ian’s thirteen interviews. In one incident, although Mohammed was told the vacancy had already been filled, when Ian enquired about the same position ten minutes later he was invited to do a trial shift. In another incident where both men enquired about various positions at food retailer, Mohammed was told about driving positions jobs and left his CV, whilst ten minutes later Ian was told about supervisory positions and asked to complete an application form straight away.

Analysis of the data has so far revealed the forms of exclusion, and attendant Islamophobia, experienced by participants within this study have been mediated along gendered lines. It has shown that whilst both female and male Muslims experience exclusion on the basis of sartorial choice. However, the specific types of discrimination they face differs according to gender. Generally speaking, the data showed male participants have been largely targeted by legislative provisions as they are more likely to be perceived as a terrorist threat on the grounds of ‘looking Asian’, as discussed in Chapter Six. On the other hand, female participants reported how they are subject to a more nuanced, multi-layered gendered forms of exclusion that borrow from Western feminism, gendered forms of Orientalism, and post 9/11 Islamophobia. Whilst having little or no experience of accusations of direct involvement in terrorism or State over-policing, both of which were reported by male participants, female participants mainly reported experiences
of exclusion based on their sartorial choices. The next section presents a more detailed analysis of public debates and controversies regarding Muslim women’s bodies. Firstly it will illuminate the social construction of the Muslim women and its attendant denigration of Islam. Secondly, it will go on to discuss how aspects of Western feminism have been used to undermine and belittle Islamic practices such as veiling and locate Muslim women as victims of Islamic patriarchal violence. Thirdly, it will examine, through both male and female narratives how the construction of Muslim women as victims necessarily depicts Muslim men as aggressors. Fourthly, it will examine veiling as a contested practice focusing in particular on the ‘veil discourse’ and Muslim women’s understanding of this practice. Here the chapter will identify the motivations for, and the values placed, on the practice of veiling: enforced veiling, veiling as a fashion statement, the veil as a private symbol of Islamic devotion, and the veil as an expression of feminism. Lastly, it will apply the notion of the ‘double-bind’ to female participant narratives; that is, the commonly held view Muslim women are simultaneously both victim of, and complicit in, the patriarchal oppression allegedly inherent within Islam.

**Gendered Islamophobia: Muslim Women as Public Properties?**

Although Orientalism exists in many forms, the next section discusses the point at which it intersects with Islamophobia and gender. Before any analysis of participants’ understanding of gendered Islamophobia the thesis will briefly examine what it means. The notion of veiling within Western societies has been largely misrepresented as a sartorial representation of female oppression. Hoodfar (1992) draws on historical sources to conclude, that since the 19th century the veil has symbolised the inferiority of Muslim cultures to denigrate both the Muslim male perpetrator and the Muslim female complicit in her own oppression. Whilst this notion of the Muslim female ‘other’ has been widely
accepted in the West as a ‘truth’ since colonial times, it has for the most part remained a latent construct until 2001, when it burst forth into the public consciousness in the aftermath of 9/11. Hasan (2012) explains the veil has recently re-emerged as the physical symbol of Islam’s inherent oppression of women and consequently veiled Muslim women are perceived as passive, powerless victims of Islamic patriarchy. Over the last decade the practice of veiling has come under increasing discursive attack, with the symbiotic relationship between social attitudes and institutional constructions discussed above serving to cement the practice of veiling as an alien, oppressive and archaic practice which has no place in British society. Consequently, the female Muslim body has become a public battlefield both in the United Kingdom and on the world stage, part of the terrain upon which the ‘War on Terror’ has been fought. In short, the Muslim female body has become a powerful political commodity. This discursive formation has created a knowledge about Muslim women that has permeated all strata within society, manifesting as a justification for Western State intervention to secure ‘rights’ over the Muslim female ‘body’ and even military intervention in Afghanistan. The print media in particular has played a significant role in this construction, with a noticeable rise in articles expressing an aversion to veiling. Whilst at a grassroots level the likelihood of women who veil becoming the victims of verbal and physical attack has increased.

As the data shows, participants expressed anger, frustration and dismay at the degradation of the practice of veiling. Consequently, their narrative centres on the institutional Islamophobic portrayal of Muslim women, particularly those who practice veiling, and the misguided assertion veiling and individual autonomy are mutually exclusive. Their everyday interactions with wider British society echoed the negative attitudes of the media and political establishment, which could, at the extreme end of the spectrum, be interpreted as individuals who have become docile to negative institutional
representations. This perceived lack of autonomy amongst female participants, prescribed to by sections of the non-Muslim British population, has its roots in what can be described as an ‘oppressive feminism’.

As Mohanty (1998) asserts, within Western societies the concept of the ‘Western woman’ represents all that the Muslim female ‘other’ is not, that is, progressive, modern, liberated, educated, autonomous, and so on. Whilst this is generalised application to ‘Western societies’ this chapter indexes specific media and political discourses below which epitomise these attitudes. It is such binary constructions that are central to understanding Nusaiba’s discussion of Muslim women during a follow up interview.

Nusaiba

I’m so sick of everyone talking about Muslim women, like they know what we think. I mean I don’t know the facts but really, all these people who have an opinion, how many of them know a Muslim woman personally? Forget about one that actually wears the hijab. I bet hardly anybody. It’s like the focus group thing about what does society think about Muslims, and what does the media say about us.

The contemporary ‘veil discourse’ was ignited by Jack Straw’s incendiary comments on the niqab in the Lancashire Telegraph. The then leader of the House of Commons surmised the veil operates as a barrier to interpersonal communication and that ‘wearing the full veil was bound to make better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult’ and that it represents ‘a visible statement of separation and of difference’ (5 October, 2006). As research conducted by Modood et al. (2010) into the media coverage of veiling in the wake of Jack Straw’s comments found there was near
universal condemnation of the *niqab* and the practice of ‘veiling’ in general. For example, Pearson (2006) writing in *The Daily Mail*, spoke of the feelings the practice of veiling elicits in ‘the majority of British women’. She writes, ‘women who cover their faces and bodies make us uneasy … it’s not a nice sensation to be judged for wearing your own clothes in your own country … the veil is downright intimidating …’ Pearson, like many others, sees veiling as an active act of aggression, not only against ‘most British women’s’ feminist sensibilities, but against Britishness itself. As she goes on to state, ‘I just don’t like seeing them on British streets … a nosebag over the face, modelling the latest female-inhibiting shrouds from the House of Taliban’. Here she asserts, the practice of veiling does not belong in Britain, associating it firmly with the notion of fundamentalist Islamism (7 October, 2006). A follow up interview with Basanti typically illustrates female participant attitudes to the discursive formation of veiling and its impact on some member of society.

**Basanti:**

I’m not saying everyone is like this but once you’ve been sworn at by people, you do tend to think other people might do it too. I don’t wear the *hijab* but my big sister does. I mean she’s a grown woman with kids. Not some chav who starts fights on the street. Some guy got hold of her *dupatta* [type of veil] and pulled it. It was twisted around her head so she ended up falling. You can’t even imagine what that does to me. It’s beyond anger, it makes me sad … that’s my sister. I can’t believe people write all that crap in newspapers about wearing the *hijab* and my sister gets attacked. She was born here.
Here the excerpt shows the media is blamed for the dissemination of negative discourses concerning veiling. Basanti explicitly connects negative discourses and micro-level attacks against Muslims. She fears that that institutional creation of the veil as a symbol of fundamentalism has been interiorised by some elements of the wider public is verified by data. As she asserts ‘people write all that crap in newspapers and my sister gets attacked’. Negative media coverage and condemnation by public figures of the veil has become ubiquitous since Jack Straw deemed the *niqab* ‘symbol of difference’ (October, 2006), the same period has seen a rise in attacks against Muslim women wearing the veil in the UK. According to a report submitted to *The Leveson Inquiry* citing data from the UK’s official anti-Muslim violence helpline, ‘Tell MAMA’, 58 percent of all verified incidents between April 2012 and April 2013 were against women and 80 percent of those cases the woman was wearing a *hijab, niqab* or other clothing symbolically associated with Islam. In one such reported case, a pregnant veiled woman was assaulted, whilst in another incident, a 5 year old girl, walking with her mother in Islamic dress, was knocked down in a hit-and-run incident by a car. The report stated, ‘Mrs X is clear that the individual who drove the vehicle saw both her and her daughter and deliberately failed to stop. The mother’s race and her religious attire indicated that she was a Muslim’ (Mosaddeq-Ahmed, 2012, p.23).

The report goes onto cite evidence showing a correlation between anti-Muslim media narratives and the racist discourses of the perpetrators of these attacks. Whilst such heinous acts are deserving of emphatic and widespread public condemnation, participants reported on how the depiction of Muslims within mainstream British media tends to be limited to negative news items or dramatic portrayals of Muslims which merely serve to perpetuate Islamophobic Orientalist discourses.

This analysis has established that the practice of veiling has been demonised by social commentators, politicians and particularly the media. It has been discussed
elsewhere how institutional constructions come to permeate society and individual attitudes. The grassroots level negative attitudes towards the veil are testament to this symbiotic relationship. Although there has been an abundance of media discussion on the subject, Modood et al. note only ‘two or three’ Muslim female voices have contributed to the debate (2010, p.96). Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, writing in *The Independent*, chose to use the demeaning and offensive term ‘shroud’ as a pseudonym for the veil and argued that veiling, whether ‘*hijab*, *jilbab*, *burqa* or *niqab* are visible signs of this retreat from progressive values’ (3 March, 2015). In doing so she failed to use a generally elusive platform from which to offer a balanced and reasoned argument that might have given fair representation to the diverse reasons British-Muslim women choose to practice veiling. To redress this imbalance, this thesis will take a comprehensive look at the motivations and values young Muslim women attach to the practice of veiling, as it is their voices which have remained absent from what has been largely a one-sided and acerbic assault. In addition, the analysis will uncover how mediatised discourse epitomised by commentators such as Pearson and Alibhai-Brown above attempted to hijack feminism as a façade to legitimise their gendered Islamophobia.

**Veiling: A Contested Practice**

As Bilge (2010) asserts, there are two common interpretations of the practice of veiling. By far the most common and widely disseminated interpretation attaches veiling to Islamic oppression, as evidenced above, whilst specialised academic discussion has mostly deemed the practice as one of resistance to Western hegemony. This discussion does not attach either of these *a priori* meanings to the practice of veiling and seeks to ascertain meaning from the participants’ narratives. The data revealed the veil is significant to participants on a number of levels such as a symbol of religious devotion; a tool of
patriarchal oppression within certain traditional Muslim cultures relating to familial izzat [honour] as opposed Islamic religious practice; a ‘flag’ of resistance against Muslim oppression; or as a fashion statement. In short, the practice of veiling can be motivated by both enforced modesty or by symbolic resistance. Following participants’ perspectives and lived realities, it is both of those elements and more.

The analysis of participants’ narratives concur that veiling, although on a much more limited scale than popular opinion would have it, can indeed be a tool of patriarchal oppression. It can serve as a means of controlling and regulating women, particularly in those societies where restrictions on women’s freedom are embodied within cultural practices and enshrined in the law. However it is not the purpose of this discussion to defend or oppose the practice of veiling in other countries, but to uncover its meaning for young British-Muslims. Therefore, the discussion will separate out the extreme uses of veiling in some Muslim countries and focus on the veil as a British-Muslim practice.

Female participants spoke openly on the use of the veil as a tool of controlling and subjugating women within certain traditional Muslim subcultures, but asserted that the practice of enforced veiling is limited, and extremely rare amongst British-Muslim women of their generation. Some participants did however, point to indirect experiences of enforced veiling, in that they knew of young British-Muslims whose parents insisted on them maintaining modesty by covering up in public.

During a discussion in focus group two between young women from a Muslim girls’ sixth form, the conversation turned to discussing certain families they knew who expected their female relatives to practice veiling.
Amina:

We all know that women have to cover their heads when they don’t want to, no-one is denying that. I mean if someone said there are no women anywhere who are forced to cover their heads, at all. Ever. That’s just thick.

Rahila:

I don’t think anyone’s that stupid. I mean we all know about Saudi, and how it is when we go back to Pakistan. I don’t mind playing at Amiran [fictional female protagonist in classical Mughal era love story, always depicted in modest but glamorous period costume].

[Laughter]

Fazal Jaan:

When I’m on my holiday but, I couldn’t do it for real. We all know girls who do have to and I just wouldn’t want to be like that.

This conversation shows participants acknowledge veiling can be an enforced practice in some Muslim countries as well as amongst some women of their acquaintance in the UK who are expected to dress modestly contrary to their own personal preferences. These female participants agreed veiling as a permanent practice was not an appropriate choice for them, but was more realistic as a fashion option in the right setting. Other participants were more concerned about veiling as Islamic tradition.

Sofie:

I can’t believe these parents think that they are following Islam, forcing their daughters to cover up. It’s so embarrassing these jahill [Islamically uneducated]
giving Islam a bad name. In the *Quran* women are equal. As far as I am concerned I am as good as any man. The Prophet said so. Let’s not forget that they said that ‘women are the twin halves of men’.

**Basanti:**

That’s because most Muslims don’t practice real Islam, they just do what the people at mosque expect. They just expect women to cover up, don’t they?

Sofie was determined to distance Islam from patriarchal practices and alludes to the Prophet (pbuh) and his teachings to strengthen her rights as Muslim woman. Indeed, veiling is not an exclusively Islamic practice, rather the practice predates Islam and was used to signify belonging to aristocracy or the upper classes within certain cultures. As Amin (2000) notes, it was the 10th century before the practice of veiling became common across the Middle East as a means of ‘protecting’ female chastity and was more closely linked to the preservation of family honour than scriptural Islam. Which is in keeping with Basnati’s assertion that, ‘most people don’t practice real Islam’. The implication being that Islam is generally practiced through the prism of patriarchal culture. The use of scriptural Islam to usurp the dominance patriarchal Islam and enable resistance will be examined in the next chapter. Both Fahima and Mariam in focus group two were adamant that there are multiple motivations for wearing the veil, *one* of which is patriarchal oppression; something they felt was on the wane amongst British-Muslims and that such cultural practices are mainly associated with more orthodox Muslim subcultures, particularly those evident within rural areas of some Muslim countries where there tends to be a lack of knowledge of Islamic scripture.
**Faheema:**

I mean that whole izzat [honour] thing is something from Pakistani villages. You know where they are not educated in the real meaning of Islam, or you know, it’s very old fashioned.

**Mariam:**

Well I know someone who has to wear it here, her family has that vibe you know. Well, they are *Wahabi* [orthodox]. But anyway they all have to cover their heads even at home in front of their brothers-in-law.

Having provided an examination of the role of veiling within Islamic patriarchy as interpreted by the sample, the following analysis explores some of the meanings participants attributed to veiling that stand outside of normalised veiling practices. As such these behaviours can be seen as representing new ways of bringing meaning to these practices to break the ‘tablet of tradition’ (Bhabha, 1990, p.2). This practice epitomises the creative essence of the ‘Third Space’ as one in which ‘newness enters the world’ (1994, p.303). Participants create meanings in the enunciation of veiling beyond both internally imposed izzat practices and Western imposed discourses of Islamic patriarchy. Whilst such practices represent ‘mixing’ behaviours that align with Bhabha’s notion of hybridity and associated concepts they are also indicative of Goffman’s (1959) Impression Management strategies. To clarify, Chapter Five’s concept of ‘performing moderate’ is enunciative in that it provides a new understanding of Islam at the threshold ‘Muslimness’ and ‘Britishness’. At the same time it is an Impression Management technique that disidentifies the participant from the chronically stigmatised ‘extremist’ Islam. Similarly some veiling practices are ‘enunciations’ that allow new meanings to be created, whilst at the same time they are Impression Management performances that communicate participant self identities.
to the onlooker. Therefore an analysis of this practice is specifically pertinent to research question three: ‘To examine the micro-level strategies deployed by young British Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’.

Participants described their motivations for veiling in two ways that are removed from the normalised views of veiling; as a sign of religious devotion and veiling as fashion, each will be discussed in turn. Faheema and Sofie highlight another motivation for wearing the *hijab* and *niqab*: a private symbol of respect for Islam during prayer and the holy month of Ramadan.

**Faheema:**

But really, I mean I don’t know that many girls who absolutely have to wear it. You know, none of us are really forced to wear it. I mean, yeah, yeah we all have to wear it for school, but that’s just part of the school dress code. Not at home though. I wear it when I want to wear it. It’s like, you can’t pray without it, so obviously you’re going to wear it sometimes, but nobody’s forcing me. It’s my choice.

**Sofie:**

Well yeah, no I don’t wear it at all out of school, but I do when I pray and during Ramzaan [Ramadan]. That’s a respect thing. I do when I want to show respect to my religion. It’s between me and God, so it’s got nothing to do with anyone else. So I wear it mostly when I’m on my own.

Both young women reveal they do not wear the veil as a symbol of social identity to signify modesty, fashion forwardness or identity politics. Their veiling is a personal homage to Islam, worn during times of religious significance. In this way ritualised
embodiment of Islam allows them to transcend to a religiously defined mental space. Representing a devotion to Islam through bodily choices was not confined to the women within the sample. During a conversation in focus group three, Jay and Shah Jahan discuss preparing to go to the Mosque:

**Jay:**
I only wear the *topi* and *jubba* when I pray. Its ritual, the *wudhu*, the clean clothes. It’s all about respect for God. Getting dressed like that it puts you in that frame of mind, you know that zone. It’s like you leave other stuff for a while and step into another space.

**Shah Jahan:**
Passed down from dad, that’s what you do on Friday, or during *taravee* at *Ramzaan*, of course getting ready for *Eid namaaz* is special. You wash, put on clean ironed clothes and *attar* [non-alcoholic, traditional perfume] as a love for Islam.

As these male participants explain, bodily preparations, ritualised washing [*wudhu*], special perfume and dressing are a means of mentally preparing to step from everyday activities to specifically Islamic activities such as *Eid namaaz* [morning prayer on the festival of *Eid*] and *taravee* [evening prayer during Ramadan only]. As Shah Jahan explains, these activities signify a ‘special’ space where family traditions meet religion. This aspect of Islamic embodiment is rarely if ever accessible to non-Muslims via the normalised discourses around Islamic dress. The second way in which female participants viewed veiling was as a fashion statement.

The veil is also the point of intersection of Islamic culture and modern British culture, these merge to produce the relatively new phenomenon of the ‘*hijabista*’ or a
woman who dresses fashionably whilst conforming to the Islamic modesty code. The theme of the *hijab* as a fashion statement was raised in focus group one.

**Pia:**

Well I know for the old school *Ammasit* was an *izzat* thing and it is still when I go to Pakistan but La-Rayb has turned it into the *hijab* into catwalk piece [she laughs].

Pia refers to La-Rayb who wears an elaborately folded *hijab*, much like a turban set relatively high on the crown of her head, rather than, the more discreet flat to the head style associated with traditional veiling. Tarlo (2007) dates the transformation from traditional to fashion *hijab* to the early 1990s when Muslim women were looking for ways to dress Islamically and fashionably; a means of controlling their own look rather than being controlled by the fashion industry.

**La-Rayb:**

Why can’t I be into fashion and still wear the *hijab*? I’m still covered up. My dad wouldn’t let me out if I wasn’t. I think yeah, we have changed since the *Ammas* time, but we are still covered up. I could still pray in these clothes…

**Fahima:**

Are you sure? You can barely move in those jeans, never mind pray *namaaz*.

[Laughter]

La-Rayb alludes to the change in Muslim women’s dress over one generation, *Amma* being a respectful term for mother. She goes on to make the point that fashion and Islamic dress were perceived to be mutually exclusive until recently:
La-Rayb:

Before we took control of how we wanted to dress, Muslims were so un-cool. It was either traditional or modern; we had to make a choice, *niqab* or mini skirt. This way we can do both. We can do what we like, we can mix both things, can’t we?

Nusaiba:

That’s the thing a lot of white girls don’t understand. They don’t get it. They don’t get we can decide what we want to wear. I mean, girls wear the *hijab* for all sorts of reasons. Not because we have to. Yeah, of course you wear it for religious reasons sometimes, but most of the time, it’s just because it looks good. It depends what you feel like. And let’s face it, sometimes you put it on out of habit and it doesn’t mean anything apart from you got dressed.

La-Rayb echoes Tarlo (2007) who asserts, the metamorphosis of the veil is a product ‘not of their cultural backgrounds as of the trans-cultural encounters they experience in a cosmopolitan urban environment’ (2007, p.131). Whereas Nusaiba touches on how the *hijab* empowers Muslim women’s choice, in that, they are able to be fashionable in a way that is not dictated by Western fashion houses, but instead ‘cherry pick’ from both cultures to create a ‘third fashion’ which corresponds with their own life choices. In this way the *hijabista* is a typical product of Homi Bhabha’s hybridity. As Huddart (2006) notes, Bhabha was interested in what happens in the liminal space, the space on the border between cultures which he argues is a productive and allows the creation of new forms of understanding. The essence of productive liminality with specific reference to female British-Muslim sartorial choice is the *hijabista.*
Another interesting point made by Nusaiba that is worth noting is that as a Muslim woman who practices veiling on an almost daily basis on occasion she attributes it with the same meaning and value as putting on any other item of clothing.

This modest fashion evolution is evident at both a grassroots level with young Muslim women fusing Western and traditional Islamic dress and at the elite level with the emergence of much sought after Middle Eastern designers, such as Elie Saab whose creations are coveted by prominent celebrities and Muslim fashion bloggers (www.HauteMuslimah.com). Illyas notes, interest in modest fashion is becoming more widespread since the Hermes and Christian Dior couture houses have participated in Muslim fashion events, (The Guardian, 26 April, 2012).

Veiling as a fashion statement has become the norm amongst Muslim women, to the extent that it has now become a marketable commodity, a point made by Rabiya in a conversation with Henna in focus group three.

Henna:

My Mum says that when she was my age everyone made their own clothes, here and in Pakistan. The dupatta [type of head scarf] would just be made of the same material. Thank God now Muslim fashion has moved on.

Rabiya:

Costs loads of money, big business at Eid and weddings … Rusholme packed with ready to wear collections.

As these participants touch on, the hijab and other forms of Islamic dress have become commodified products in recent years. As Callow-Landress (2014) claims, Islamic demand has started to influence the economy. She notes that over the past decade
headscarf styles change every season, as designers coordinate colours, textures, and patterns with elite European fashion houses. This concurs with the discussion above explaining how Muslim women’s clothes were largely homemade for previous generations of Muslims within the UK, whereas now they have become a commodity for mainstream fashion. Although at the time of writing there are no figures for the UK, the US Muslim fashion industry is estimated to be worth $96 billion. Talking into consideration the rapid growth of the Muslim population, as discussed in Chapter One, this market is expected to expand considerably.

In concluding it is important to move away from a cultural determinist approach to the garment, the idea that its wearing is simply a product of the ethnic or religious background of the wearer, without explaining away its adoption in terms of the alternative models available: theories of post-colonial resistance, gender performance, patriarchy, and the rise of global religious movements – all of which are relevant to some degree but which tend to undermine, if not ignore, the complexities of biographical experience and the processes by which people make meaning of their own lives (Tarlo, 2007).

In this section the discussion has shown over the last decade women’s bodies have become public property. Their sartorial choices are widely denigrated and condemned by both political and media discourses. Participant’s narratives show they attribute these discourses with the increase in discrimination against the female Muslim body. These perceptions were set in the context of existing quantitative studies that upheld the link between the increased likelihood of anti-Muslim hate crimes and the embodiment of Islam. It went on to contrast the discursive construction of veiling with the practice as described by participants. The data revealed whilst some discourses surrounding veiling, Islam and patriarchy were evidenced in the narrative, in that a minority of the sample were aquatinted with Muslim women who did not practice veiling by choice. This was tempered by
assertions that this occurred only in orthodox subcultures. Finally it showed how veiling can epitomise enunciative behaviours in the ‘Third Space’; as fashion and flags of resistance against Islamophobia. The next section will examine the inherent critique of Muslim men in the normalised discourse of Muslim women as victims. It is implicit in the construction of Muslim women as victims that Muslim men must be the aggressors.

Indexing Problems: Males as Oppressors, Females as Victims

An essential aspect of the common insistence that Muslim women are victims means one cannot talk of Muslim women as a monolithic category without implicating Muslim men also. Siddiqui (2012) argues that in portraying the Muslim female as the victim, we simultaneously locate Muslim men as barbaric, as unreasonable violent dictators. Of course, Edward Said (1978) has long argued that the West’s perception of Islamic barbarism is encapsulated by Muslims apparent maltreatment of women, with Muslim men being normalised as inherently misogynistic oppressors. During a follow up interview with La-Rayb, her dual frustrations with certain ‘feminist’ discourses that both locate Muslim women as oppressed and their male family as oppressors became apparent.

La-Rayb

I can’t even tell you how many time some woman has asked me if my dad makes me wear the hijab. And they use that special soft tone that people save for abuse victims. When they do that I want to make them a victim of abuse there and then! [Laughter]. No, but seriously, you know what I mean, you can’t be a Muslim woman and not get that.
Moderator

I think I know what you mean, will you tell me in your own words?

La-Rayb

Well basically they are saying that you are the victim of some type of abuse. I know that seems dramatic but on some level they are saying that you are being forced to do something against your will. But what they are also doing, and this really gets me right where it hurts. They make out that my dad is a monster. How dare they, how dare they say that about my dad. Who I love and he loves me. I can’t stand them, I mean I literally want to do something to them. They see it on the news about women not getting education in Iran and then they use that tiny bit of information like sheep and come to me with it.

La-Rayb’s frustrations are two-fold. Firstly she is personally offended that based on little more than Orientalist institutional constructions of Muslim women, she is also assumed to be a victim of Islamic misogyny. Secondly, she is doubly offended that her male family members are implicated as the aggressors. The flip side of the same coin was articulated by Raheem during a follow up interview. He has two sisters, both of whom practice veiling, and talks about how their decision to dress modestly reflects negatively on him during social interactions where this fact has become known.

Raheem:

I’ve got two sisters and they both wear the hijab, the older one experimented with the niqab but it wasn’t for her. Anyway they came to meet me from work and I was walking down with this guy I work with. You know everything was fine and we are quite good friends. So I meet my sisters and introduced him. Seriously it’s like they had two heads, at first he couldn’t help staring, then he said he liked Sanna’s
turban. He called it a turban, I mean the guy has lived in Manchester all his life. He sees Muslims every day. Well [his sisters] started laughing and then because it all got so awkward he said, ‘do you make your sisters wear them? I bet you are a right Osama at home’. Do you know what I just said bye and walked off, what a joker, it’s just a poor show that. I mean where do they get off? Insulting me and them. I don’t tell my sisters what to do, they don’t tell me what to do. On top of all that, just wouldn’t be that rude to anyone, but it just seems that you can do and say anything to Muslims.

Whilst Raheem is insistent that his sisters choice to veil is entirely their own, and is frustrated at a colleague’s questions regarding ‘are you a proper Osama at home’ in relation to his sister’s sartorial choices. As he expresses in this case although on this occasion Orientalist attitudes are encapsulated in humour, the implication of Muslim male misogyny is still obvious. Not only does this offend him on a personal level, insulting both him and his sisters, but he also makes the point that the interaction veered from polite too personal as he introduced his sister to his work colleague, as he says ‘it’s as if they had two heads’. As La-Rayb also noted above, some interactions with non-Muslim individuals around veiling seem to circumvent social norms of politeness with which suggests that there is a degree of public ownership of the female Muslim body which can be scrutinised, questioned and advised upon without invitation and at will. These interventions could be the micro-level reflections of State attitudes that partly justify the ‘War on Terror’ on the grounds of rescuing Muslim women from Islamic fundamentalism as discussed above. The discursive formation of the Muslim woman as victim has become so pervasive, some non-Muslim individuals feel compelled to offer respite from perceived oppressions signified by the veil.
As the narratives suggest, the majority of the sample believe veiling to be a matter of personal choice to be practiced without coercion and for purely personal reasons. However, in the interests of faithfully representing the data, there was one conversation that highlighted inherited notions of patriarchy with regards to modest dress that are apparent in a minority of cases.

**Shah Jahan:**

Two of my sisters cover and the youngest one doesn’t … to be honest our community has moved on, where the older girls all wore it and they were expected to, the younger ones aren’t. Parents are more relaxed, and I’m not bothered as their brother. But I’ll be honest though if they started wearing really revealing clothes I wouldn’t like it.

**Rabiya:**

If I were your sister I wouldn’t care what you think.

**Shah Jahan:**

You are just saying that, I know your brothers and I know that you wouldn’t go home in really revealing clothes, would you? Like a mini skirt and stuff?

**Rabiya:**

Well no, I don’t know any Muslim girl that would be in shorts and a vest at home.

**Raheem:**

Well I don’t know any man that would go home to his mother and sisters in shorts or really tight clothes. I think our community has moved on, but I still know families where the girls have to cover their heads.
Rabiya:

Yeah I do. It’s still harder for us because there are definitely clothes I want to wear that I wouldn’t wear at home. I don’t think it’s like that for men.

Shah Jahan:

Yeah you’re right; it is still different for men and women.

So there are rules of modest dress in Muslim families that apply both to men and women, however as Shah Jahan admits, it seems that the ‘modesty’ restrictions are tighter for women. In this particular instance his views are immediately contested by Rabiya who strongly argues that she dresses according to personal values. This is an assertion she partially retracts when she concedes a degree of modesty is upheld in the home sphere, when she reluctantly agrees with Shah Jahan that modesty applies differently according to gender. This conversation and the above one which expressed that some young women are expected by their parents and community to practice veiling even though it may not be their personal choice indicates a degree of cultural patriarchy still prevails in a small number of those who practice Islam.

Muslim Women and Politics: Excluded by Western Feminism?

This discussion will now move on to what Hasan notes as ‘the treasonous use of feminism,’ in that, ‘it has been misappropriated in order to serve colonial interests and support western imperialist wars of occupation that subjugation of people including women and children’ (2012, p.55). During the campaign to garner support for the ‘War on Terror’ and its illegal invasions of Muslim nations, according to Kumar and Stabile (2005) the portrayal of Middle Eastern women as victims of Islamic patriarchy became the norm.
During a radio speech, Laura Bush declared the invasion of Afghanistan had been a triumph for Afghan women; ‘because of our recent military gains in much of Afghanistan, women are no longer imprisoned in their homes … they can teach their daughters without fear of punishment … the fight against terrorism is also a fight for the rights and dignity of women’ (Bush, 2001 cited in Kumar and Stabile, 2005, p.265). Bush’s speech was applauded by a variety of critics including prominent feminists such as Gloria Steinem and Melanne Verveer (Kumar, 2012). This quote highlights how one of the liberal feminist ideals have been misappropriated and reduced to nothing more than a thinly veiled justification for neo-colonial intent in the Middle East, merely aligning with and supporting other binary constructions of Islam and the West. Amos and Parmar use the term ‘imperialist feminism’ to describe this practice (1984, p.4). They argue, although disguised by a feminist discourse, it is like all other forms of knowledge production in that it is not objective. It is a political and discursive practice insofar as it is purposeful and ideological. The effects of such imperialist feminist contentions are twofold: firstly, it obscures the systematic misogyny of Western nations and, secondly, reduces Islamic populations to the binary categories of oppressive men and victimised women. It promotes the need for Western intervention to ‘save’ Eastern women from gender oppression and in doing so appropriates women’s rights movements in the service of empire (Hoodfar, 1992). Whilst the appropriation and insincere use of gender equality rhetoric in support of military intervention in the Middle East has been discussed at length elsewhere (Kumar, 2012; Hasan, 2012; Kumar and Stabile, 2005; Hoodfar, 1992), the current analysis is concerned with how the principles of imperial feminism can be detected in the domestic socio-political context, specifically how gender equality discourses intersect with islamophobia in the domestic socio-political context.
In the following excerpts participants highlight how exclusion can take the form of gendered critiques of Islamic practices and as such the analysis focuses on a particular expression of Eurocentric feminism that conflates gender equality with Islamophobia. It is only such articulations of feminism that is under scrutiny here and so what follows is not represent a critique of feminism per se. As noted by Bowden and Mummery (2005), feminism is far from a unified project with a single aim. In doing so, they index the major theoretical approaches within this cannon of thought such as radical, liberal, Marxist, psychoanalytical and post-colonial to assert feminism is a ‘series of projects which are in constant flux’ (2009, p.6).

In addition to acknowledging the varied theoretical approaches to feminism it is important to highlight the contribution of post-colonial feminist thought in particular in challenging Eurocentric critiques that privilege Western notions of liberation and progress to portray Eastern women primarily as victims of allegedly restrictive cultures and religions to illuminate the complex ways in which gender intersects with other forms of oppression and discrimination (Mohanty, 1988).

Whilst this thesis recognises the range of articulations of feminist thought, it is primarily concerned with the conflation of Islamophobia and gender equality. As Hoodfar asserts, the failure of Western feminism to properly contextualise non-Western societies has resulted in the assumption that ‘what is good for middle-class white women is good for all women’ (1992, p.3). This historical discursive connection between cultural racism and women’s rights dates back to colonial times and is a production of power relations in which Muslim women are subservient to Western feminists (Hasan, 2012; Hoodfar, 1992). Many female participants felt this attitude was a prime factor of interaction with non-Muslim women with regards to veiling practices as illustrated by this discussion amongst the young women from BMGS, all of whom practice veiling to some degree.
Naseema:

Have you ever had the one about, why don’t you just try it, you’ll never go back?

It’s about being a free woman.

Mariam:

Try what? Having your underwear hanging out of your jeans and so much plastic surgery that you fall on your face? We don’t need to do that to be free thanks, if that’s freedom you can keep it.

Naseema’s incredulity and Mariam’s response indicate disbelief that many of those who critique the veil as a symbol of patriarchy fail to recognise they themselves are subject to such power relations. As Mariam’s comment suggests non-Muslim women are subject to hegemonic standards of feminine beauty and its associated bodily choices. In other words, being a non-Muslim British female does not preclude someone from the disciplinary effects of hegemonic patriarchy and consequently it is understandable they highlight the double standards inherent in certain feminist critiques of gendered Islamic practices. Of course, participant generalisations and simplifications regarding individual agency of the women described in these interactions does not reflect the complexity of the debate around individual choice, bodily technologies and patriarchal power.

Whilst the above extract brings to the fore how a gendered critique of Islam masks gender inequality in non-Muslim societies, Samina and Rahila emphasise most of their interactions revolving around the *hijab* fail to account for the wearers choices.
Rahila:

What does my head in about the veil thing is all these people who talk about it, only know what the papers, politicians and Taliban tell them. So when they talk to you they bring those vibes with them.

Samina:

You’ve hit the nail on the head. First there’s the whole feminism hypocrisy when all I see in the magazines is ‘how to be young and how to be sexy’, never anything else. On top of that these women, who are always trying to make us feminists just like them, don’t know who we are. How do they know what we think or why we cover? I don’t let anyone push me around and I wear the hijab. Actually if anyone is bullying us it these feminist who just won’t mind their own business, they make me feel less strong if you know what I mean.

Rahila’s comments highlight how most interactions with non-Muslim women regarding veiling practices are rooted in the institutional creation of knowledge. Samina underlines this point by arguing that whilst she feels able to practice veiling without undermining her feminist values, her self-belief is undermined by these ‘supportive’ encounters. Advocates of a ‘one size fits all Eurocentric feminism’ (Hoodfar, 1992, p.2) fail to recognise the compatibility of veiling and gender equality. It could be suggested media and political discourses that forever connect veiling to oppression have been internalised by the non-Muslims described in these interactions and is expressed in remarks that might be interpreted as Islamophobic.

A stark example of such Eurocentric expressions of feminism in the guise of ‘solidarity’ with Muslim women is provided by Femen’s culturally misjudged ‘topless hijab day’. In ‘support’, they organised to demonstrate outside a number of Mosques
across Europe using their bare chests as placards to display slogans against veiling practices. In doing so, Femen completely failed to understand the cultural context of Muslim women and their desire for both equality and Islam. Organising naked protests outside of Islamic places of worship not only degraded Islam, but also the beliefs of the very women they sought to ‘liberate’. As Chapter Five has shown, Islam is the primary identity factor for most participants and consequently any activity that belittles Islam will inevitably alienate Muslim women.

In addition to being victims of what is seen as a culture of patriarchy supposedly inherent within Islam, female participants demonstrated how they are often accused of being complicit in their own oppression by means of their sartorial choices and the imagined behaviours and characteristics attributed to them as a function of such choices. It is worth noting, the Femen leader, Inna Schevchenko, demanded Laila Alawa, an Arab-American feminist Muslim blogger, remove her hijab to prove her credentials as a ‘real’ feminist. This in tandem with the ‘topless hijab day’ suggests Femen activists are more likely to have been seen as expressing anti-Muslim sentiments than expressing solidarity with Muslim women, thereby undermining the notion of an inclusive, intra-community feminism. Moreover, they appear to possess a notion of superiority that gives them the authority to determine what voices are to be recognised or excluded within the feminist movement. As Basanti highlight, her wearing of the hijab may preclude others from seeing her as a feminist.

**Basanti:**

It’s not everybody, but I can see that if I’m outspoken … if I assert myself too much, like in a conversation, people don’t really know what to make of me. I think they see the hijab sometimes and think I should be quiet, eyes to the ground kind
of thing, and kind of like I ‘won’t say boo to a goose’. In myself though I feel I can hold my own, but the *hijab* means that other people don’t see that.

Basanti’s comment illustrates the power of Islamic misogyny discourse, as the sixth form students also noted above, the veil is inseparable from victimhood in the minds of the non-Muslim observer. This attitude fails to attribute any agency whatsoever to the *hijabi* who, to borrow from Althusser (1970) will ‘always-already’ be victims in some social interaction with some non-Muslims who have become ‘docile’ (Foucault, 1975) to this long-standing construction.

**The Double Bind of Muslim Women**

This construction of Muslim women as victims of patriarchal Islam makes the connection between cultural racism and women’s rights, which dates back to colonial times. Muslim women’s own concerns with the Islamic patriarchy are suppressed for fear of fuelling anti-Islamic sentiments as Western discourses are unable to discuss Middle Eastern women’s rights without implicating the ‘intrinsic flaws’ in Islam. Therefore, the overarching discourse that forever connects Islam to women’s rights abuses is in fact stripping Muslim women of their rights to speak out about gendered violence within their communities as they seek to defend Islam because a gendered critique would play into the hands of the Islamophobic feminists. This thesis proposes the double-bind of Muslim women as being positioned between two contrasting belief systems, neither of which yields to the other. This excludes those women who find themselves in this position from being able to express every facet of their identity in either context. Additionally this Orientalist attitude in some types of feminism hinders the emancipation of genuine victims by
blocking avenues it claims to open. The following interview extract is testimony to this position:

Samina:

I’m still young, so I want to wear the clothes I like, you know, skinny jeans, t-shirts, the sort of things all my friends do, but when I was younger I didn’t want to go against my parents either. They just wouldn’t have understood. So I ended up having to hide my clothes and sneak them out the house to get changed when I was out. I know, I know, it sounds ridiculous, but I didn’t want to hurt them. They’d have been so embarrassed. A lot of my friends at college, the English ones, didn’t know either. I was too embarrassed. You just didn’t know how they’d take it. I know they would’ve thought I was some kind of weirdo or, it’d feed their prejudices. You know the sort of thing, all Muslim women are oppressed, don’t have any choices. I just didn’t want to have to deal with that. I know I’m laughing about it now, but at the time I was always scared I was going to get found out. I don’t know which would have been worse, my parents finding out or my friends. It was like leading two lives sometimes, with you stuck in the middle, always having to think about what you were doing, worried about who might see you. You couldn’t ever relax. I still do it now. I have my clothes for home and my clothes for my real life.

Samina speaks of the ‘double-bind’ experienced by many young British-Muslims, particularly women. This is where neither family, nor non-Muslim friends or acquaintances are able to understand an individual’s actions, which for Samina, is her parents’ horror at non-modest dress which she finds too restrictive. Interestingly she is unable to confide in her ‘English’ friends for fear their support of her sartorial freedom might include a critique of Islam or her parents, resulting in what she terms as feeling ‘stuck in the middle’. This is
not simply a case of presenting a particular version of the ‘self’ that is congruent with a particular social context, but involves hiding or repressing part of one’s identity from whichever group you happen to be with. As Samina explains, her parents are unaware she wears Western clothes, whilst her non-Muslim friends and acquaintances presume she dresses as they see her at home. This interview extract is upheld by the following focus group discussion:

**Rahila:**

Well, I think the modern ways have rubbed off on the old generation a little bit, plus, we have learnt to use Islam, I mean pure Islam, not what they [parents] were taught as kids. I think the last generation did the cultural things that were done in old school Pakistan but now, that loses its influence because we know that if you actually go by Islam women have more freedom.

**Moderator:**

OK, so would you say all young Muslim women have your freedoms?

**Fazal Jaan:**

A lot do but there are many who don’t. Some have to wear the *burka* [full body covering], yeah, in their group of families the women don’t work or anything and they marry from back home. I hate to say it but they are backward like that. I wouldn’t say it to someone who wasn’t Muslim. But it is true, there are still those *Jahill* [Islamically uneducated] people who think women should stay in their parental home then marry and go to the husbands family. Done and dusted.

**Moderator:**
Why wouldn’t you say that to a non-Muslim?

**Fazal Jaan:**

Because it totally justifies that thing where everyone thinks Muslim men are terrorist and Muslim women are weak. You know they slag Islam off so much that’s it is just adding fuel to the fire. I mean loads of us have to put up with sexist crap at home but, if you are open about it, they just love it. If a white man is sexist, he’s an idiot. If it’s a Muslim man it’s because he follows Islam. To be honest I’d rather keep quiet about that stuff than have someone slag off my dad or my religion. It’s like giving the green light to say ‘I told you so’.

Interestingly, Rahila and Fazal Jaan, attribute patriarchy to *Jahill* Muslims [Islamically uneducated], adding that scriptural Islam advocates gender equality. The equality of men and women in *Quranic* and *Hathidic* teaching was discussed via participant’s narratives in Chapter Five and its use for personal empowerment will be examined in Chapter Eight. Here, the young women feel to openly criticise Islam to non-Muslims would serve to reinforce Orientalist attitudes. As shown in Fazal Jaan’s comment ‘You know they slag Islam off so much it would be like adding fuel to the fire … I’d rather keep quiet about stuff than have someone slag of my dad or my religion’. Whilst Amina asserts, for her this position is untenable, she would rather battle the gender inequalities attendant in Islamic culture alone than facilitate and reinforce Islamophobia or potentially criticise family members.

**Amaya:**

It’s like you can say bad things about your family, but if anyone else does it, it pisses you right off. I wouldn’t complain to white girls about lying to my parents,
about staying out at friends, going out, even though my brothers go out all night. I know they’d get right on my case, start saying bad things about my family, or worse, like going on about my dad being old fashioned, laying down the law. That kind of thing, I couldn’t stand it. I’d rather just do it my own way, keep certain things hidden from my family, but there’s no way I’d let any of my white friends know that. They wouldn’t get it.

Here the ‘double bind’ is patently evident, with the participant clearly refusing to comply with tighter restrictions surrounding female behaviour than for male counterparts within her family. However, rather than garnering support from her non-Muslim friends she is compelled to remain silent, fearing their reliance on Islamophobic stereotypes. The concept of ‘intersectionality’ introduced by Crenshaw (1989) explains Amaya’s double-bind, that is, subject to both gender inequality and potential Islamophobia. Intersectionality contends that discrete forms of social oppression such as racism, religious discrimination, sexism or homophobia do not act individually, rather these factors interconnect or intersect to create multiple forms of discrimination that effect the individual simultaneously. So as Crenshaw asserts ‘intersectionality simply came from the idea that if you are standing in the path of multiple forms of exclusion, you are likely to get hit by both’ (Crenshaw, 2004, p.2).

Samina, Fazal Jaan and Amaya’s narratives show the intersection of gender and religious oppression. They are subject to both inter community cultural patriarchy and external prejudiced attitudes towards Islam. Finding themselves in this double-bind and in an effort to reduce its effects they control the flow of information, releasing only that which correlates to the worldview of those in the particular context they find themselves in to reduce the likelihood of conflict. This coping strategy, reliant as it is on omission and misrepresentations, has its own negative impacts as Samina’s comment illustrates: ‘I don’t
know which would have been worse, my parents finding out or my friends. It was like leading two lives sometimes, with you stuck in the middle, always having to think about what you were doing, You couldn’t ever relax.’

This discussion has shown that the continuous barrage of negativity towards Islam, whether in daily interaction or in the media has shut down the possibility of Muslim women struggling against the real injustices in their lives that are done (incorrectly) in the name of Islam. Specifically, the charge of misogyny against Islam and the continuous defense it elicits amongst Muslim women means they are made to choose between the experiences of racism and internal sexism. Invariably as the identity discussion in Chapter Five has shown the defense of Islam comes above the defense of their rights as women. In making Muslim women unequivocally defend Islam, they cannot then complain of those injustices carried out in its name. The data in this section has shown that there is some gender inequality and in those cases there should be an avenue for young women to get help. However normalised discourse and its blind, veil fixated Islamophobia believes only denunciation of Islam will allow Muslim women to live autonomously.

This thesis contends that if discursive constructions were able to separate Islam from cultural practice and endeavoured to promote women’s rights that exist within Islam to break ingrained cultural behaviours it would be far more successful for both Muslim women who are still contending with pseudo forms of Islam and for relations and understanding between society and British-Muslims.

As previously highlighted certain feminist approaches serve only to reinforce Muslim female oppression. The thinly veiled Islamophobia masquerading as support for Muslim women’s rights such as Person’s (2006) narrow understanding and disparagement of veiling practices, Alibhai-Brown’s (2015) disregard of individual agency or Femen’s notion of veiling and feminism are mutually exclusive disregard deeply held traditions and
beliefs, thereby reproducing neo-Orientalist discourses and suppressing the voices of those they profess to ‘liberate’. Consequently, Muslim women find themselves in a double-bind where they are subject to both inter community cultural patriarchy and external intra community Islamophobia.

The role of feminists should therefore be to support Muslim women in their communities with strategies rooted in an understanding of Quran and Hathidic teachings of equality that align with their beliefs and values. In essence, creating gender solidarity across such cultural differences could play an important part in combatting culturally specific patriarchy within Muslim communities.

To summarise the findings for core emergent theme three, British-Muslim interaction with wider non-Muslim society at both individual and institutional levels is of paramount importance in understanding the formation and perpetuation of the social, economic and political exclusion of British-Muslims. Building on this assertion participant narratives were used to explore the relationship between the Muslim ‘body’, in which the body is always more than the physical corporeal object, but rather a social object, to focus on sartorial choice and various forms of social exclusion experienced by the participants. It has been shown how the gendered nature of Islamophobia experienced by participants is built upon ingrained patriarchal assumptions prevalent within mainstream British society and mediated through the reproduction of gendered Orientalist discourses that attribute certain qualities as inherent to Muslims. In doing so it was shown how the symbolic identification of Muslims through the embodiment of Islamic symbols based on sartorial choice and personal grooming preferences results in their neo-Orientalist stigmatisation, particularly focusing on multifaceted, more nuanced impact of exclusion experienced by Muslim women.
This chapter examined aspects of the regulation of embodied Islam: in ungoverned and governed spaces and the mediatised denigration of Muslim women as essentially oppressed victims of Islamic patriarchy through the veil discourse. In every instance the analysis has assessed the impacts on both the participants and, through relevant empirical research, on wider British-Muslim society. The first section assessed participant’s experiences in ungoverned, public spaces. It found their narratives centred on negative interactions, particularly those relating to specifically symbolic Islamic sartorial choices and personal grooming practices. Participants experienced a range of negative responses from non-verbal disapproval or intimidation, to verbal abuse, and even physical assault. The data showed not only did such incidents take place, but that most participants accepted, and even expected such reactions as part of the everyday British-Muslim experience. Their observations are supported by other relevant empirical research. Indeed, the likelihood of Islamophobic discrimination appears to increase in situations where Muslims dressed Islamically, increasing further for those women who wore the niqab or hijab. Wider research also showed a direct link between mediatised discourse and a rise in anti-Muslim discrimination at a grass roots level. Specifically, a high proportion of perpetrators of attacks on Muslims used language that correlates to the mediatised disparagement of Islamic dress. The thesis therefore concludes that prominent public figures and opinion setters, particularly leading politicians and members of the mainstream media, who perpetuate incendiary Orientalist discourse, are directly implicated in the increase of Islamophobic attacks.

The thesis then focussed on discrimination in the workplace, space governed by anti-discriminatory and equal opportunities legislation. The data showed that despite legislation, such spaces can be ineffective in terms of providing a non-discriminatory environment for British-Muslims. As male participants in particular highlighted,
Islamically embodied symbols are often contested in the workplace, being either the subject of derogatory remarks from colleagues or simply seen as unacceptable. Whereas Muslims in lower paid, white collar work may experience more derogatory comments, those in higher paid, professional employment. In short, being visibly Muslim is at best contested and at worst deemed unacceptable, leading to self-surveillance practices amongst many Muslims to both secure and sustain employment. Other empirical research supported this analysis. For example, one study showed that 80 percent of respondents had experienced workplace Islamophobia and, like participants in the current study, they expected to face such discrimination and consequently practised self-surveillance to reduce the likelihood and potential consequences of workplace Islamophobia. In summary, this thesis contends that unlike discrimination based on race, gender or sexuality in the workplace, anti-Islamic sentiment remains largely unchecked through government legislation.

The next section explored the institutional construction of Muslim women as victims of oppressive patriarchal practices perceived as inherent to Islam, with a particular focus on the Orientalist mediatised ‘veil discourse’. Literature showed a near unanimous condemnation of ‘veiling’ practices in institutional discourses. Again, the symbiotic relationship between media constructions and societal attitudes was evident as denunciations of modest dressing translated into the participants’ everyday interactions. Participants reported their own and others’ experiences of British society’s intolerance of ‘veiling’ practices and its association with Islamic oppression.

The thesis then explored the ‘double-bind’ experienced by some female participants: by patriarchal aspects of cultural Islam, whilst simultaneously being pressured by normalised discourses, which locate Muslim women as “victims”, are in fact taking away their agency to render them doubly victimised.
The data however rejected ‘veiling’ as a uniquely controlling practice, instead describing it in various ways by those who actually practice veiling: as a contested practice, favoured by Islamic culture and resisted by young British-Muslim women; a private symbol of religious devotion, worn in the private sphere of the home to observe Islamic traditions such as namaaz [prayer] or the holy month of Ramadan; a fashion statement, where modest dress and modern British fashion culture have merged to produce the ‘hijabista’; and as a statement of feminism, where ‘veiling’ rejects the female body as a public entity inscribed by society’s oppressive notion of femininity to reclaim the ‘body’ as object. After reviewing the data, this thesis rejects the simplistic Orientalist assumption that the practice of veiling is a tool of Islamic patriarchy and is in fact a much more nuanced, multifaceted practice that is affected by geographical location, Islamic sect, fashion considerations, politics and religious devotion.

Homi Bhabha’s (1990, 1994) conceptualisation of the ‘Third Space’ was applied to demonstrate how individual female participants’ motivations for veiling are both novel and oppositional, in that they stand outside the constraints of both the neo-Orientalist discursive formation of veiling and patriarchal Islamic izzat [honour] practices.

An interactionist perspective to participant’s narratives was also applied to illustrate how choosing to wear Islamic dress spoils attempts at impression management to render the Muslim body stigmatised. Participant narratives showed how Muslim actors’ ‘performances’ have moved from being accepted as normal by the wider non-Muslim population only for the Muslim ‘body’ to become increasingly stigmatised over the past decade. In short, visible Muslim signifiers confirm a Muslim ‘otherness’ for the majority non-Muslim population. Such narratives align with the findings of other empirical studies, indicating that Islamic dress increases the likelihood of experiencing Islamophobia (see Mythen et al., 2012; Spalek and McDonald, 2010).
The practice of veiling has come under attack in media and political discourse, with the symbiotic relationship between social attitudes and institutional construction discussed above serving to cement the practice of veiling as an alien, oppressive and archaic practice which has no place in British society. The most common and widely disseminated interpretation attaches veiling to Islamic oppression, whilst specialised academic discussion has mostly deemed the practice as one of resistance to Western hegemony. The data generated in this study suggests that the practice of veiling epitomises the creative essence of the ‘Third Space’ in which ‘newness enters the world’ (Bhabha, 1994, p.303), with participants creating meanings for veiling beyond both internally imposed izzat practices and Western imposed discourses of Islamic patriarchy. The thesis will now move onto the final analytical chapter, an examination of core emergent theme four - layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality - to present an analysis of the complex, multifaceted forms of resistance peculiar to the hybridised British-Muslim ‘self’, not only in response to structural factors such as Islamophobia, foreign policy or repressive counter-terrorism legislation, but as a response in part to internal factors emanating from within the ummah and the British-Muslim community. It will then go on to uncover new knowledge the second part of this chapter applies the notion of ‘minority stress’ to illuminate the psychological impact and coping strategies employed to counter the effects of the chronic stigmatisation experienced by British-Muslims.
Chapter eight

Layers of Resistance: Opposition, Ambiguity and Duality

This chapter will examine core emergent category four – ‘Layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality’. As with each of the major emergent themes generated by the data, the notion of ‘resistance’ is complex. It is both multifaceted, in that it occurs in many forms which change according to context, and it is also multidirectional, in that it does not occur solely as a reaction to external structural factors such as Islamophobia, foreign policy or repressive counter-terrorism legislation. Rather, resistance is also a response in part to internal factors emanating from within the ummah and the wider British-Muslim community. Indeed, participants from across the sample reported the simultaneous experience of dual resistances peculiar to the hybridised British-Muslim ‘self’. Whilst in certain circumstances resistance may be expressed through various manifestations of resistance, in others it may take the form of outright rejection or require ambiguous, often ill-defined micro-behavioural coping strategies. The chapter thus directly addresses research objective three: to analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect.

This chapter is therefore presented in two sections: the first examines elements of participants’ hybridised experiences they felt compelled to reject and the second explores the strategies of resistance that they employed. The main focus of participant resistance is articulated against Islamophobia, made manifest both institutionally and through every day individual interactions, British foreign policy initiatives in the Middle East and repressive counter-terrorism legislation. As participants’ motivations for such has been extensively
examined in the previous three chapters this chapter will seek to avoid repetition and tread fresh ground. The first section will therefore provide an analysis of two focal points of resistance discussed across all four focus groups: the misinterpretation or corruption of Islam which is promoted by extremists, fundamentalist groups and certain Islamic States and the adherence to inherited cultural quasi-Islamic practices over scriptural Islam at both familial and community levels. The second part of this chapter applies the notion of ‘minority stress’ to uncover new knowledge through considering the psychological impact of the chronic stigmatisation experienced by participants. Despite its application to LGT and disabled groups this theory has yet to be applied to British-Muslims. This chapter will thus tread fresh ground in applying Minority Stress Theory to British-Muslims and, in so doing, will seek to provide an examination of micro-level reactions to discrimination and attendant coping strategies deployed to counter the psychological effects of chronic stigmatisation.

Simultaneous Rejection of the ‘War on Terror’ and Islamic Fundamentalism

Whilst the focus of analysis of the previous three chapters has centred on matters that can be considered as originating external to and imposed upon Muslim communities, this chapter will begin by exploring the focal point of resistance that is part of the ‘internal’ Muslim experience. This will entail an evaluation of aspects of identity that emanate from within the ummah itself and which some participants felt compelled to acknowledge and address. The two main issues of internal contention were, first, a rejection of the misinterpretation or corruption of Islamic teachings by extremists, fundamentalist groups and certain Islamic regimes and, second, distancing from inherited cultural Islam at both the family and community levels, each of which will be discussed in turn. Prior to any
analysis it is worth noting participant opposition to certain internal factors from within the *ummah* itself such as rejection of Islamic fundamentalism. This serves to undermine Orientalist constructions of Islam based on the notion of a homogenised Muslim identity. This lends support to the argument presented in Chapter Five, which asserts that despite British-Muslim identity emerging and solidifying as a reaction in part to particular various Muslim-specific socio-political events and controversies, this newly formed identity has evolved in accordance to discrete experiences of other shaping factors such as gender, class and ethnicity.

Throughout both the focus group discussions and the follow-up semi-structured interviews participants - although at first reticent to do so - went on to make frequent references to misconceptions of Islam prevalent within Muslim communities, particularly the corruption of Islamic teachings by fundamentalist groups or dictatorships. These narratives were based on discrepancies between participant’s understanding of Islam and that applied by those under discussion. Participants felt Islamic fundamentalism originating from the Middle East was rooted in a lack of understanding of ‘real Islam’. Indeed, as Yilmaz (2010, p.99) in his comparative study has shown, ‘theological deprivation’ - which he defines as a lack of scriptural knowledge - is a major problem in terms of the development of fundamentalist attitudes when socio-economic and political deprivations already exist. Participants were particularly vociferous with regards fundamentalist interpretations applied in Afghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under the Saddam Hussein regime.

*Amina:*

That footage, of the woman they shot dead. How can you not get upset with things like that? Those pigs; they dare call themselves Muslims …
Mariam:

If it wasn’t for people like that, doing those disgusting things, people wouldn’t be so disrespectful about us, disrespectful about Islam. It’s because of things like that people think they know what Islam’s all about. All its done is it’s given every moron with a tongue in its head another reason to attack us.

Naseema:

I’m sorry, but that’s why I hate those harami [bastards], not just because what they did was wrong. If they hadn’t done things like that in the first place none of this would’ve happened. What was Saddam doing, killing his own people? It just gave them [the West] the green light to go in there and take what they wanted. All these oil greedy Westerners making sure they dissed Muslims just to get what they wanted.

Amina:

The thing is … when they say “Muslims did this, Muslims did that”, you have to say some of it’s true. You can’t deny some of the hideous things that have been done, supposedly in the name of Islam. Look at the Taliban, harami [bastards]; they just started murdering women and Christians, and for what?

The previous conversational excerpt above highlights participants’ rejection of fundamentalist interpretations of Islam, particularly the attendant oppression of women and other minority groups prevalent within certain quasi-Islamic cultures. Several participants acknowledged that the denigration of Islam is not solely limited to those who stand outside of Muslim communities, but is also a consequence of those Muslims who align themselves to certain sectarian interpretations of Islam; citing extremists, fundamentalist Islamic groups and particular Islamic dictatorships across the Middle East as being partially
responsible for the negative perception of Islam and Muslims prevalent across the world. Naseema, for example, says not only is she disgusted by the actions of dictatorships such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein because they are morally and Islamically wrong, but cites their role alongside fundamentalism in contributing to the legitimisation of Western military interventions and appropriation of wealth and resources across the Middle East. Nassema’s sentiments resonate across all four focus groups. Whilst the corruption of Islam by Islamism was condemned, there remained widespread revulsion and vehement rejection of the Western alternatives to fundamentalist regimes across the Muslim world:

**Raheem:**

It’s really hard, because obviously you can’t agree with what the Taliban did in Afghanistan. They’ve basically corrupted the image of Islam, particularly in the West, but that doesn’t mean you’re going to agree with them bombing the hell out of the place.

**Kamran:**

If you look what the Taliban have done, compared to all the Afghans who’ve died because of Britain and America fucking things up over there, it’s a drop in the ocean.

**Raheem:**

That’s just it; it’s mayhem over there now. You’ve all these different groups bombing the hell out of one another. I hate the Taliban, but I hate those greedy bastards more. I hate the hypocrisy; the way they make out they’re only there to help, like it’s nothing to do with money, bulls**t.
Kamran:

Either way, they’re still killing Muslims. They’re as bad as each other as far as I’m concerned.

Raheem:

You’re joking right? Yeah, the Taliban’s killed Muslims, but not on the same scale as the Yanks. They’ve gone in to someone else’s country, killed thousands of innocent people, stripped all the resources ... because they’re thieves basically … that can’t be the only option: the Taliban or Bush, for fuck sake? There’s got to be another way. Leave them to find their own way. Let them decide for themselves.

Raheem and Kamran's animated conversation illustrates one way in which dual rejection is inherent to the British-Muslim experience. Whilst expressing disgust at the actions of the Taliban and certain Middle Eastern dictatorships, they remain vehemently opposed to Western intervention in, and support for, corrupt Islamic regimes. As Raheem points out, many years of neo-imperialist conquest in the Middle East has taken more Muslim lives than the fundamentalist regimes that originated there. In addition to mass civilian casualties, Western nations have long appropriated the wealth and natural resources that should belong to the native population. The position of the participants is somewhat resonant of the double bind identified by female participants in Chapter Seven where a simultaneous rejection of both Islamic patriarchal bias and Islamophobic Western feminism exists. In the case of Kamran and Raheem, they reject Taliban oppression and its overt corruption of Islam, whilst concomitantly rejecting the oppression of Muslims by Western States. The participants identify both parties as oppressors of Muslims and assert that both - albeit in different ways - accentuate Islamophobia and the denigration of Islam.
This rejection of both - or dual resistance - is succinctly summarised in Raheem’s declaration, ‘that can’t be the only option: the Taliban or Bush, for fuck sake? There’s got to be another way’.

Resisting Inherited Islam: Modern Interpretation of the *Quran* and *Hadith*

Another significant form of ‘internal’ resistance evidenced in the data was the generational difference that arose in terms of understandings of Islamic traditions. Some participants reported the rejection of inherited Islam in favour of scriptural Islam not only as a means of knowledge attainment, but of resistance against perceived inequalities in inherited Islamic practice. Participant’s narratives show a marked difference in perception of cultural Islam and scriptural Islam. The former is seen to be the version of Islam passed from generation to generation and comprises Islamic teaching, Pakistani traditions and culture. These three elements fuse into ‘Islamic knowledge’. However, in some cases the cultural aspects of this knowledge can contradict Islamic teachings as found in the *Quran* and *Hadiths*. This issue has arisen elsewhere in the thesis and has been discussed with regards to gender in Chapter Seven, and the irreconcilability of Islam and ‘British’ values in Chapter Five. The following extract illuminates participant understanding of how Islam is interpreted by older generations.

**Mumtaz:**

I’d never disrespect my elders. It’s our culture at the end of the day. But their version of Islam isn’t right; they just repeat what their parents did. The thing is, a lot of poorer Muslims, especially older Muslims, didn’t have that much religious education. All they
learnt was to recite the Qur’an in Arabic without really knowing what it meant. It is just sounds. Then they mix that with village culture.

**Henna:**

Yeah, but they need to move on, don’t they? They don’t really know what’s Islamic. It’s like the whole thing about women not getting educated, having to cover up and stay at home. It’s crap. It doesn’t say that anywhere in any of the *Hadiths*.

**Basanti:**

I feel a bit bad saying it, but most older Muslims don’t really have a clue about Islam. To be honest, they’re pretty ignorant religiously speaking. It’s mostly things they’ve been brought up to believe, cultural things really, that they try to pass off as religious teachings. I mean, the way they practice Islam; it’s more to do with *izzat* [family honour] than Islam … and only men have *izzat*.

The conversational excerpt above highlights the transmission of inherited Islamic knowledge inter-generationally through cultural traditions and practices rather than scriptural knowledge and acknowledges the incongruence between inherited and scriptural practices. Mumtaz’s assertion, that elder generations re-created village cultural life through quasi-religious practices is supported by Akhtar (2014, p.3) who notes that earlier migrants used Islam as a means ‘of connection with the homeland and to affirm their cultural inheritance and allegiance to the subcontinent’. So religion was not a moral code as such, yet its associated cultural practices bonded the first generation of migrant Pakistani women together. Therefore, it served the functional purpose of facilitating identity maintenance, group solidarity, community and support (Sattar et al., 2013).
As Basanti and Mumtaz perceptively note, the impacts of inherited Islam are more consequential for women than men. Basanti points out that the notion of ‘izzat’ or honour, is the preserve of men and notes how traditional, inherited traditions serve only to validate or denigrate male honour. Basanti’s assertions are echoed by Al-Sayyid Marsot (1992) who bases her argument on the position of women in a historical survey of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. She shows that women’s position is determined not so much by the principles of Islam, as by social practices that have traditionally constructed women as objects of male social standing rather than individuals with agency to choose their own interpretation of the scriptures. Specifically she flags up the confining of women to the home-sphere, veiling practices and subsequent lack of financial independence as mechanisms of patriarchal power. The submissive, modest and virtuous Muslim woman is therefore controlled by patriarchal rather than Islamic authority (Shirazi, 2009). Thus ‘izzat’ is shorthand for the application of patriarchal power on the Muslim woman, and is separate from Quranic teaching.

The complications arise in States where ‘izzat’ has been legitimised through the perversion of Islam, and in some cases become enshrined in legislation. Hence a challenge to such patriarchy is seen as a particularly gruelling task as it is interpreted as a challenge to religion itself. However, in terms of the participant’s experiences, patriarchal ‘Islamic’ practice is more easily challenged because these practices are not legitimised by law or wider society in Britain, so in the case of British-Muslim females, successful resistance against family and immediate community level inequalities allows them to escape cultural patriarchy. Participant’s narratives returned time and again to female participant’s experiences of invoking Islamic traditions to counter patriarchal bias of cultural ‘Islamic’ practice. Akhtar (2014) notes that second and third generation Pakistani British women use Islam to negotiate life in the UK. They used scriptural knowledge to question the cultural
practices of their parents as a ‘conscious strategy for emancipation from cultural customs and over-protection’ (2014, p.3). The following conversation epitomises Akhtar’s assertion that female participants aid their claim for self-determination using Islam as their platform. Many of the sixth formers from focus group two, many of whom attended ‘Islamiya’ classes [study of Quranic and Hadithic texts] spoke of how women’s access to education had changed within their living memory.

Naseema:

Like my eldest sister - she’s a lot older than us - she was married at seventeen virtually straight after she left school. She says Muslim girls just didn’t go to college then. Some didn’t even go to school. They just got taken out after primary school, saying they’d gone to live in Pakistan … But then my other sister, she’s doing a law degree, she’s adamant she’s going to have a career, so am I … but she had to fight to go to Uni.

Amina:

That happened to my sister. She was one of the first girls to go to university from our area. All my Mum’s friends from Taleem [religious sermons held at home] kept coming to the house saying how it wasn’t the done thing. It was really hard on my parents, what with all the disapproving comments they got. You know what my sister’s like though, she just kept arguing her case, telling them about the Prophet’s wife and how all Muslims have a duty to be knowledgeable. Even that wouldn’t shut them up. They started with all that ‘a woman is a jewel, if you keep taking her out and showing her off, she loses her value’. Some Muslims are just so traditional in their thinking.
Faheema:

I hate that, it makes me cringe. Yeah, her generation had it much harder than we do. They really had to fight to get a career. I think it’s a lot different now. More and more Muslims see how important it is to get an education. It’s kind of normal for girls to go to Uni now. You always hear people saying how their daughters going to university now. It’s like they’ve just discovered what’s Islamic and what’s not.

Mariam:

I always go back to Hazrat Khadija.30 If it was good enough for the Prophet’s wife, sallallahu alayhi wasallam … then they just have to deal with it.

The above conversation highlights the bottom-up movement of resistance against the wrongful application of patriarchal, interpretations of Islam. The extract shows ingrained bias at the community level against women’s access to education. Naseema and Amina’s comments describe women’s education as being hard won by elder female siblings. Clearly, this initial resistance against the misinterpretation of Islam has generated momentum to the point that education for British-Muslim Women is seen as the norm. Indeed, as Faheema notes, some parents have appropriated their children’s knowledge of scriptural Islam to justify their support of their daughter’s education amongst community members who might oppose education for women. The success of this ‘resistance’ is not a result of external State interventions, nor the product of the adoption of western feminism, but by organic grass roots changes within community resistance, citing Islamic traditions to reject and overturn cultural habits at the family level. Mariam’s comment particularly

30 The first wife of the Prophet Mohammed (pbuh) widely regarded within Islam as a feminist icon (Mernissi, 1994).
shows how she feels empowered by her knowledge of Islam in a way that gives her the confidence and platform to resist ingrained patriarchal bias. This evidence of micro-level resistance is part of a much wider movement of Muslim women who demand Islam must afford equal rights to women. Hazrat Khadija has long been upheld as an icon of Islamic feminism. Like Mariam, Fatima Mersini - an eminent Islamic feminist and sociologist - cites Hazrat Khadija amongst her ‘Forgotten Queens of Islam’ (1994). The Prophet’s wife was an independently wealthy business woman who supported her husband financially. Mersini argues that freedoms available to Hazrat Khadija, 1414 years ago, during the Prophet’s (pbuh) lifetime are not available to women today under the corrupted version of Islamic law practiced in countries such as Saudi Arabia.

Female participants’ use of scripture in the pursuit of empowerment echoes extant strands of Islamic feminism. Whilst this body of work is too vast and detailed to present here, key arguments revolve around the assertion that Islam was co-opted by patriarchy after the death of the Prophet (pbuh) (Mersini, 1994) and the continued use of fiqh [judicial rules] developed by medieval jurists and their increasing irrelevance to today’s society (Shirazi, 2009).

As with interpretations of any theological text, there are controversies that rage, intricate rebuttals and vehement counter-arguments. Nonetheless, these interpretational nuances are immaterial to the current thesis. The salient aspect to draw attention to here is female participants’ interpretation of the Quran as an inspiration for resistance rather than the ‘true’ Quranic or Hathidic intent/directive.


La-Rayb:

I don’t care what the beraderi think … older women might be scared of someone; thinking family honour lives in their hair, I don’t! I wear the hijab out of respect for my religion, not because some man’s telling me what to do.

Nusaiba:

Exactly, just because you cover up, it doesn’t mean it’s going to stop me having a career because that’s my religious right. I don’t believe in izzat. I love my dad and I wouldn’t want to do anything to disrespect him, but it’s got nothing to do with staying at home. I know he understands that. I don’t think he likes it, but he knows Islamically its right.

Fahima:

I know what you mean. I think my parents would want me to stay at home, get married to someone they choose, but they know Islam doesn’t stand for that. I think they just think it’s more, I don’t know, respectable to do that.

It is clear that these participants have reduced the influence of male dominated izzat and beraderi influence with regards to their life choices. This evolution has been previously noted by Akhtar, (2014). Participants’ use of Islamic arguments to support the aspiration of gender equality is part of a wider social movement that is both beyond the current study and that of the Islamic feminist authors cited here. Shirazi (2009) notes that Muslim women are mobilising against the misapplication of Islam as patriarchy, not only on the basis of Quranic and Hathidic study that advocates gender equality, but also on a secular Human Rights basis.
An analysis of the research data highlights that many female participants felt compelled to resist factors that are internal to the Muslim experience: from the rejection of the fundamentalist co-option of Islam on a global level to individual and group adherence to cultural interpretations of Islam and its patriarchal bias at both the familial and community levels. Participants resist or acquiesce according to their particular experiences, age, gender and home circumstances. Thus it is not possible, given the space restrictions, to examine every rationale for or combination of contributory factors that invokes resistance. It is important, however, to elucidate the multi-directional nature of resistance for young British-Muslim women. Chapter Seven discussed the double bind created by Islamic patriarchy and Orientalist Western feminism created for Muslim women. This section extends that analysis by contextualising and situating that double-bind within the wider context of being female, British and Muslim in particular environs. Whilst they resist patriarchal Islam within the private sphere this does not mean they achieve what they want as they still have to combat patriarchal and Islamophobic prejudice within the public sphere such as ‘ethnic penalty’ with regards employment, anti-Muslim discriminatory practices associated with university admissions or the rise in hate crimes against Muslim women as shown in Chapter One.

**Marginalisation, Political Engagement and Collective Resistance**

The data revealed a need for social and political organisation as a means of resistance against perceived injustices against the Muslim community domestically and abroad. Whilst only a small minority of the sample were members of organisations that lobby against Muslim oppression, many others felt increased meaningful political participation would be the best possible means of resistance against institutional
Islamophobia. Alongside this, some participants expressed dissatisfaction with the representational options available to them because they felt it did not reflect the needs of British-Muslim youth and it was perceived to be largely ineffective.

Participants acknowledged Muslim organisation and political participation had improved immensely since the late eighties, specifically since the time of the Rushdie affair. During an interview with Basanti, in response to the question, ‘How are Muslims excluded and what can be done to improve integration with wider society?’

Basanti:

I don’t think we’ve done ourselves any favours sometimes. If you look at how we’ve dealt with things, it’s been pretty bad to be honest, like the thing with Rushdie. The way some people acted, the chanting, burning flags, all it did was make us look ridiculous. It’s different now though. I think we’re more organised, able to get our point across properly, in more reasonable way I suppose. There’s people speaking out for us who can put across our views in a way that’s going to get heard.

Basanti’s claims chime with Modood’s (2007) assertions that British-Muslim organisations are now numerous, sophisticated and diverse, asserting that British-Muslims now enjoy a ‘constellation of democratic organisations’ that represent them. Jones et al. (2014) note that although Muslim lobbying has had little impact on foreign policy outcomes, on a domestic level there have been notable successes, legal accommodations for halal slaughter requirements, the funding of Islamic schools and they claim the main achievement of Muslim lobbying groups has been the inclusion of a question on religious identity in the decennial national census. They argue that ‘self-identifying as Muslims rather than ‘Asian’
as a public identity has been actively fought for’ and thus represent a significant example of the benefits of British-Muslim organisation (2014, p.2).

In addition to domestic level policy victories, British-Muslim organisations have become more adept in distancing Islam and the majority of Muslims from violent fundamentalism, addressing important issues in a calm and succinct manner that exemplifies how far British-Muslim lobbying has come since the Rushdie affair. Despite this improvement in representation some participants felt there was still room for improvement, discussion during focus group four highlighted the feeling that despite the increase in participation, British-Muslims were being increasingly victimised whilst the oppression of the ummah had reached unprecedented levels.

**Salahuddin:**

Obviously, it’s good Muslims are everywhere now, like you get more Muslim newsreaders, journalists, lawyers, you even politicians now, but where’s that really getting us? They’re still killing Muslims all over the place, aren’t they (?) What do they think; letting a few Muslims get important jobs makes it all alright? I don’t think so.

**Rehan:**

I know what you mean, but we still need more Muslims with real power; that’s if anything’s going to really change. Even then though, there’s still the problem people refuse to listen to what we’ve got to say. Most of the British public aren’t interested, and as for the government, they’re not going to do anything that interferes with their agenda.
Salahuddin:

That’s what I mean. Yes, we’re in more influential positions, it’s like everyone knows a Muslim councillor don’t they, there’s loads of them, but it hasn’t stopped us being victimised, has it? It’s not going to make them pull out of Iraq. So I’m not sure how it’s going to change things enough.

In effect several participants felt, despite Modood’s assertion of the existence of a ‘constellation of democratic organisations’ (2007), the limited lobbying successes domestically, cited by Jones et al above are arguably tokenistic and allow the British Government to continue to marginalise Muslims domestically and further its foreign policy interests which have inflicted such devastation on Muslim countries and their populations abroad. Furthermore, as Salahuddin reminds us, notable Muslim representation in government at the local level has not translated into support for the most important British-Muslim concerns. As the following conversational excerpt from focus group two alludes to the large number of Muslim councillors in Northern towns:

Rahila:

I don’t know about that. Yeah, there are people out there who’re supposed to speak out for us, but who’s that? I mean, we all know how many Muslim councillors there are around here, but what do they know?

Naseema:

You can’t move for them. All you have to do is throw a stick and hit fifty of them [laughter]. Everyone’s Chacha [uncle] or Dhadha [grandfather] is a councillor, telling us how everything’s going to be alright, what we should be doing. Seriously, it’s a joke.
Rahila:

Exactly. How do they know what it’s like for us, growing up here? It’s like all those so-called community leaders who set themselves up to speak on our behalf. What do they know? I bet they were born old.

Naseema:

It’s never anyone’s Chachi or Dhadhi though, is it? 31

Sofie:

This family friend knew this guy who’s a Labour councillor over in Blackburn. Can you believe it; he had Jack Straw as a guest at his house. Can you believe it? He’s Muslim and he has that Muslim killer in his house. The man’s got no morals. I bet none of them have. I bet none of them ever said anything to Straw.

Rahila:

Well, it just shows you, they haven’t got any real power, how they don’t really do that much for the community. It’s all for show; to get themselves respect. They’re just ‘yes’ men, looking out for themselves.

This conversation shows participants are aware of the high number Muslim local government councillors there are and the little faith they have in them to represent their own interests or those of Muslim communities. This is an important extract regards why current expressions of British-Muslim political participation is rejected by some participants as an inadequate mechanism for addressing Muslim concerns. In doing so participants cited both the over-representation of first generation Muslim male ‘community leaders’ at the local level and the impotence of those elected to engender change regarding

31 Colloquial terms for family members: Chacha [uncle], Dhadha [Grandfather], Chachi [Aunt] and Dhaadi [Grandmother].
important issues such as foreign policy or the lack of female representation. Various authors (Jones et al., 2014; Tatari, 2010) have noted the concentration of Muslim participation is at the local level of governance the landscape of Muslim politicians in the UK is dominated Labour councillors who are typically first generation males verifying Naseema’s disparaging comments about everyone’s ‘chacha and dhadha being a Labour councillor’, the figures show that Muslims are overrepresented at the local level. Currently there are 227 Muslim labour councillors, 10.7 percent of all Labour councillors (Buaras, 2014).

Naseema’s remark that you ‘throw a stick and hit fifty Labour councillors’ and the general tone of the conversation, shows how these participant’s both mock Muslim participation in local government, and also consider it to be commonplace. Indeed, there are a number of Muslim Labour councillors and this is no coincidence. While actively seeking Muslim representation seems progressive at a first glance, critics such as Peace (2012) have argued that this surface improvement belies ‘perverse’ practices. He argues that South Asian communities have been used as vote-banks by drafting in ‘community leaders’ as a means to access their beraderi [kinship] networks to acquire votes by association rather than win them democratically through policies popular with the Muslim community. This situation has led to the undemocratic practice of voting according to kinship rather than political principles. The Labour Party have exploited this situation for many years and have ‘allowed biraderi politics to flourish’ (Lewis, 2007, p.52) at the expense of democratically winning votes. He goes on to argue that real Muslim concerns are submerged by the impetus to vote according to kinship rather than policies. In addition to kinship politics silencing Muslim concern. Tatari (2010) asserts that once an individual wins a local council seat he is rendered largely impotent as he is subject to Party Whip pressure to acquiesce to the party line. Whilst Tatari and Shaykhutdinov (2014) report 73
percent of Muslim Labour councillors were frustrated by Labour policy silences on Muslim issues and felt a reluctance to promote Muslims to senior positions in party ranks. Copus (2004) echoes these findings, he notes, local government in Britain is party-based with councillors often unable to dissent from party decisions in the council chamber. In this way Rehan, Salhuddin and Rahila’s frustrations at increased participation not being translated into a political platform for the Muslim voice is actually grounded in the reality of party politics for Muslims. Not only does the beraderi system bypass fundamental democratic rights of voting according to policies that are congruent with and individual’s beliefs but elected councillors are forced to adhere to party politics at the expense of Muslim issues. Freely recruited to sweep up the Muslim vote, they are then caged in junior positions at local level without power to raise Muslim-specific issues; in effect between the beraderi system and lack of promotion of Muslim councillors the Labour party has silenced Muslims in party politics.

Whist Naseema’s concern local councillors are rarely female can be attributed to the fact that beraderi networks and community organisations were traditionally conducted outside the home in a male dominated environment (Akhtar, 2014). The potential scope for corruption within the beraderi system of generating votes is highlighted by the Birmingham postal vote scandal in 2004 resulting in three Muslim Labour councillors being struck off for being implicated in the interception of women’s postal ballot papers (Peace, 2012).

This discussion has shown participants have become disillusioned with the current political system as a means of resistance despite the over-representation of Muslims at the local council level. Much like female participants have rejected the influence of the male dominated beraderi system on their life choices, these participants reject the system as a means of expressing Muslim participation in politics. The following conversational excerpt
from focus group three generated by question (2:4) ‘Are your views reflected in current public debates?’ gives some insight into how policies rather than kinship are important to participants:

**Shah Jahan:**

Voting’s a massive issue for Muslims. The thing is you can’t really just vote on what’s important as a Muslim; it’s other things too. It can’t be just the big things like foreign policy or the fact they treat Muslims here like crap. Like, I’d have never gone to Uni if I couldn’t have afforded it. So things like student fees, benefits, they’re important to me. I don’t want to be stuck working in a shop forever.

**Reheem:**

You’re worried (?) Seriously, I haven’t really earned anything yet. I have so much debt it’s ridiculous, I worked all through Uni, but I don’t want my little sister doing that. Who’s going to pay for her, me I suppose, so of course issues like that are important. You can’t just think about yourself. You’ve got to vote for what’s going to improve most people’s lives. You’re not going to get that by just voting for someone who’s Muslim.

**Basanti:**

I know what you mean, but my ideal political party would still be one that was going to pull out of Iraq and Afghanistan. As Muslim you can’t support anyone who’s got Muslim blood on their hands. Of course other issues are important; it’s like childcare’s a massive one for me. I don’t see why women have to let their careers take a nose dive just have kids. Still, it doesn’t matter that much, Muslims still have to come first.
Not only does this show engagement with domestic issues but a rejection of single issue politics, these participants epitomise the negotiated British-Muslim identity as discussed in Chapter Five. Emerging and solidifying as a reaction to the victimisation of both British-Muslims and the ummah and the denigration of Islam it has evolved in accordance to individual circumstances and requirements. All three participants express a commitment to Muslim-specific issues, but are emphatic with regards to wider social issues regardless of religious affiliation. This aligns with Dobbernack, Meer and Modood (2014), who argue British-Muslims have moved on from ‘pariah politics’ and do not lack a commitment to British politics or civil engagement. To support their argument they cite the Ethnic Minority British Election Survey (2010) which has challenged the myth British-Muslims are only concerned with Muslim-specific issues.

When all narratives are grouped according to how participants felt the situation could be improved for British-Muslims, the overwhelming proposition - aside from political participation - was for a lasting and meaningful resistance by becoming empowered individually, by means of gaining influential employment in order to affect change from a position of relative power. The previous section highlights the disillusionment with and rejection of the current means of Muslim participation in politics and it has also shown what type of representation participants think would be more appropriate for their needs. The following discussion shows other means by which participants would like to resist stigma and social exclusions:

Rehan:

You’re never going to get the media to change its stance on Muslims, not at the moment anyway. They’re in it together: the media, the politicians, companies selling arms. Look who got the rebuilding contracts for Iraq: British and American
companies, that’s who. I tell you it’s all stitched up. I’m not being a conspiracy theorist, but it’s so obvious what they’ve done.

Rayya:

That’s why things will never change, not until there are more of us in influential positions. We’re not going to make a difference sat here. We need to be the people making the decisions that matter.

Rehan:

I know what you are saying, but that’s such a long way off. We’ve got to be realistic about it. Sure, yeah we’re more likely to become doctors or accountants nowadays rather than be taxi drivers or working in takeaways, but that’s still a long way from running the country.

Salahuddin:

I’m not saying it’s happening overnight, but the only way to really make that difference is getting in those powerful positions like company directors or owners, positions where you can really push Muslim issues on the agenda. It’s not like you’re going to get things like, say Gaza, on the public radar unless you own something like a newspaper, or at least control what goes in it. Nobody but a Muslim is going to do that. That’s why we need to be successful.

The above conversation illustrates resistance against institutional Islamophobia and the oppression of Muslims globally. It also exemplifies the need for change which was expressed across all four focus groups. Salahuddin insists the means to achieve lasting and meaningful change is to gain influential platforms upon which to expose Muslim suffering.
He asserts that a challenge to existing power structures is a long-term project of incremental change from positions of institutional power. Salahuddin’s assertions, echo those of Basanti, Mumtaz and Rabiya in focus group three and Mariam and Rahila from focus group two and resonate with Gramscian thought (1992, p.235), particularly his notion of the ‘organic intellectual’. Unlike ‘traditional intellectuals’ who perpetuate the values of the dominant group, ‘organic intellectuals’ cultivate roots within their communities to develop an empowered consciousness. Organic intellectuals voice the interests of that group and ‘provide it with social, cultural and political leadership’ (Simon and Hall, 1982, p.11). As the organic emancipatory project gains momentum and fights for public recognition the group looks to these individuals for philosophical elaboration. Gramsci might have expected organic intellectuals to be scholars and academics but in the current era it is more likely to be the media, journalists and anyone connected to the culture industry.

Participants’ desire for an institutional challenge of Western media hegemony is already in evidence with the ‘al-Jazeera effect’ (Seib, 2008), an umbrella term used to describe new media that addresses global politics and in doing so reduces mainstream Western monopoly on information thereby empowering groups who previously lacked a global voice. The power of new media in helping to break Western control of war images broadcast in the West is evidenced by the condemnation of Al-Jazeera by Tony Blair, George Bush and Israeli spokesmen for ‘unbalanced’ reports of both Western military action in the Middle East and Israeli oppression of Palestinians. Wildermuth (2005) notes the threat of alternative representations of the West’s imposition of democracy were deemed so detrimental to the neo-imperial project that Al-Jazeera headquarters have been bombed repeatedly by the allied forces. Salahuddin’s contention that Muslims must create
alternative information in order to challenge the dominant discourses that malign Muslims and Islam is upheld by the impact of the ‘al-Jazeera effect’.

Whist the importance of resistance from an institutional platform was highlighted by some participants others noted the need for Muslims to become more involved in other areas of the culture industry apart from news media.

**Rabiya:**

We need more Muslims in things like fashion, the entertainment industry, that sort of thing. Doing the cool stuff, do you know what I mean? We need to be making films, publishing magazines, letting people know what we’re about. You know, making that crossover into the mainstream. That’s where it matters, being able to influence public opinion. That’s where we could really change things, help breakdown those barriers.

**Henna:**

I know what you mean; being able to change how people think without them really realising its happening. I watch those comedy news programmes all the time; you get really good points being made about things like foreign policy or Islamophobia. I just wish there was more prime time programmes like that. I’d love it even more if those comedians were Muslims.

**Mumtaz:**

You’re right; we need more of it. I don’t mean just comedy. Look how much people know about the Holocaust through all the films and documentaries made about it. That’s where we need to be, getting our views across to mainstream audiences; Muslims speaking about Muslim issues. I don’t want outsiders talking
about us, because they’ll always put their own take on things. When other people talk about Muslims they always bring their own crap into it.

These young women feel participation in popular culture other than the media is a powerful means of resistance. Whilst Rabiya’s desire to see mainstream Muslim fashion icons has yet to be realised since Muslim participation in the Western fashion world is limited to a few Couture labels or more commonly Islam specific clothing for British-Muslim women as discussed in Chapter Seven. On the other hand, Henna and Mumtaz’s arguments that popular culture created by British-Muslims would be a powerful means of resistance against Islamophobic attitudes has been examined by Ahmed (2013). He contrasts two different comedies both based on British-Muslim families; Humza Arshad’s *Diary of a Badman*, which focuses on a British-Muslim family, is written, produced and performed by Muslims on YouTube. The twenty minute episodes attracted over three million viewers and are amongst the most popular videos on the site. The satire ridicules Islamophobic attitudes and uses observational humour to resolve issues of identity inherent to the British-Muslim experience. Whilst the BBC 1 sitcom *Citizen Khan*, although produced by a Muslim, is written and acted in by non-Muslims, it is also the study of a British-Muslim family that includes characters who as parents concerned more with ‘shame’ than their children’s aspirations, children who have no interest in their faith and culture and want to escape at any cost and a relentlessly misogynistic patriarch. Ahmed argues the difference between having Muslim or a non-Muslim writer is, whilst the former satirises society’s Islamophobia, the latter reflects it. Mumtaz’s statement, ‘I don’t want outsiders talking about us, because they’ll always put their own take on things. When other people talk about Muslims they always bring their own crap into it’, maps directly onto Ahmed’s analysis.
Minority Stress: Psychological and Emotional Impacts of Stigmatisation

The following analysis is one of the key aspects of the thesis and as such seeks to break new ground. Whilst the notion of ‘minority stress’ has had limited application to the lesbian, gay and transgender communities and people with physical disabilities, and only within the context of America, it has yet to be applied to British-Muslims. Again, due to the lack of empirical research in a British context, the following analysis will draw upon Amer (2013) who carried out an internet-based survey on the psychological effects of 9/11 on Arab-Americans. The theoretical foundation for this analysis is Meyer’s (2003) Minority Stress Theory which as detailed in Chapter Two. It is built around four strands that encompass the stress associated with being part of a minority community. These four strands will be applied to the participants narratives to illustrate the impact stigmatisation has on their daily lives and sense of belonging to Britain. Meyer (2003) originally proposed four elements that combined, sum up minority stress processes; the experience of prejudice events, stigma: expectations of rejection and discrimination.

The experience of external prejudice events and conditions

This project has recounted numerous experiences of prejudice from the lives of the participants. Those subjective perceptions and experiences have been verified by broader studies throughout the thesis. It has discussed the British-Muslim experience and the overwhelming pressures they face; the multiple socio-economic exclusions, sustained attacks on the ummah, legislative scrutiny and its associated human rights erosions,
institutional discrimination, spike in anti-Muslim feeling amongst the public, from the ubiquitous ‘White Gaze’ to physical attacks..

Whilst the ‘external prejudice events and conditions’ have been carefully analysed throughout the thesis, participant’s emotional responses to chronic stigmatisation and exclusion have been alluded to at times but have yet to be considered in a systematic manner. Participants expressed various emotional responses; the most common reaction was anger and resentment, followed by fear and anxiety, whilst a small minority expressed indifference. Before moving onto Meyer’s second element, participant’s responses to the experience of prejudice events will be discussed. The most cited response to discrimination in the narrative was the anger and resentment they felt as a result of anti-Muslim prejudice. Two types of anger emerged; first was a general anger aimed at the State-sanctioned victimisation of British-Muslims, the second was anger at the sense of impotence this victimisation afforded British-Muslims in the face of the magnitude of the discursive constructions against them. Generalised anger directed at the State-sanctioned victimisation of British-Muslims was illustrated in statements such as Amina’s assertion: ‘I feel angered by the whole thing, the whole global reaction that 9/11 triggered towards Muslims.’ this feeling was echoed by Fazal-Jahan.

**Fazal Jahan:**

I feel anger at the fact Muslims are always targeted for something and it was just constant. Any other attack it was just “Muslims, Muslims, Muslims”. So, now, yeah that I’m old enough to understand definitely there is a bit of resentment in there. You know they talk about making Britain safe, but I don’t feel that way at all. I’m not safe and nor is my family.
It can also be inferred that the participant feels the stereotype of Muslims as the aggressors in every instance, has now become rather tiresome from: ‘Any other attack it was just Muslims, Muslims, Muslims’. This repetition indicates the opinion that the stereotype has now become a tedious and repetitive monologue, of which stigmatised individuals are beginning to tire. An interview discussion with Nusaiba initiated by the question ‘**What, if any, are the dominant stereotypes of British-Muslims and where do they come from?**’ produced an interesting response. Having communicated that she thought that stereotypes were rooted in Orientalism, she went on to discuss how she felt about being represented in this way.

**Nusaiba:**

I just feel so angry that they can get away with printing all that stuff about Muslims, I mean it is ridiculous. I think they just make most of it up. What if you took the word Muslim out and added Jews or Black? There would be uproar. They allow it because it fits in with their bigger aims.

**Moderator:**

What do you mean ‘their bigger aims’?

**Nusaiba:**

Well you know, they want people to write bad things about Muslims, because then they can carry on attacking us. I mean it works for them [the government] if people hate Muslims.
Moderator:

How do you feel about that?

Nusaiba:

To be honest, I try not to think about it. When I do, I get angry. I hate feeling like a victim, but it makes you a bit scared about what’s going to happen in the future. They’ve just got so much power; I mean the politicians and the media. They’re backed up by the police, and the military, so what can any of us do against that. We’re powerless. They can do what they want because they control everything. I can’t believe they’re that corrupt and the whole world knows about it, but there’s nothing anyone can do about it. They’ve dominated the Middle East by lying and bullying their way to get what they want. Who knows where it’ll all end?

Nusaiba also voices anger and resentment at discrimination experienced by Muslims. Additionally, she expresses a second variation of anger that is attached to a sense of impotence in the face of constant institutional vilification within political and media discourses and the enormity of Western hegemony in the Middle East. She feels anxiety in terms of what the future holds for Muslims across the world because: ‘We’re powerless. They can do what they want because they control everything. I can’t believe they’re that corrupt and the whole world knows about it, but there’s nothing anyone can do about it’. Another illustration of the helplessness caused by participant’s perception of a universal vilification and oppression of Muslims was given by Mumtaz.

Mumtaz:

I just felt I couldn’t do anything about it. You know, what can I do when there’s this global idea that you’re the bad guy? It just escalated. So it feels like it’s too
big a thing to even tackle. Even thinking about it is confusing, do you get me? It’s just absolute sheer head damage. At the end of the day they’re too powerful.

Again the concept of western hegemony being ‘too powerful’ is expressed as a source of anxiety or using Mumtaz’s words ‘head damage’. Her contribution relays an overwhelming when referring to the enormity of stigma directed towards Muslims post-9/11, as ‘absolute head damage’ and ‘too big a thing to even tackle’. This implies that the overpowering nature and universality of stereotypes associating Muslims with negative traits, is, for some British-Muslims, too powerful an entity to challenge; thus resulting in feelings of powerlessness. This, in turn, quells the motivation to defy the stigma directed towards them as Muslims. Similar sentiments are voiced in the academic literature by Galinsky et al. (2003). The researchers assert that the motivation to overcome stereotypes is minimised when the stigmatised individual suffers a sense of helplessness as a result of an unyielding labelling. Feelings of anger, aggression and hostility are common responses by stigmatised individuals. This claim is endorsed by Clark et al. (1999) who note that perceptions of stigma which engender anger can lead to coping strategies which include hostility, aggression or verbal expressions of the anger. These processes are writ large in the above extracts. The participants’ anger was a result of their discriminating treatment at the hands of non-Muslims and is thus in line with Clark et al.’s argument (1999) given that the common response consisted of aggression and resentment. The first part of this chapter has discussed the flip side of this coin, in that anger at chronic discrimination both domestically and globally inspires a desire for institutional change through institutional participation, most notably within the mainstream media and political establishment, as a means to direct the flow of power into Muslim hands. Having discussed the prominent
feelings of anger frustration and helplessness as a result of chronic discrimination the analysis now turns to the indifference expressed by some participants to ummatic suffering.

**Indifference**

Whilst only three participants expressed an indifference to the stigmatisation of British-Muslims, it was thought to be of analytical value as it illustrated a conflicting emotional response to those expressed by the remainder of the sample. This is illustrated by the following extracts:

**Adnan:**

It didn’t really bother me. I didn’t really know the ins and outs of it all. I just thought it was like any other bit of news really. To be honest I was more interest in going out with my mates to be thinking about doing anything, do you get me?

**Larayb:**

Yeah, I mean I wear the hijab and stuff, but I don’t really get involved in anything political. It doesn’t really interest me. It’s more about praying five times a day, fasting, rather than getting involved with all that. I don’t really think about it that much to be fair.

Adnan’s response illustrates that his Muslim identity, in accordance with Social Identity Theory is not salient, in that he alludes to other aspects of her identity as being more important, such as being a student (Tajfel & Turner, 1989). The indifference displayed by Larayb accords with the argument of Rusch et al. (2006) who assert that a
person who does not identify with the stigmatised group is likely to remain indifferent because they are of the impression that public stigma does not refer to them. Assisting us in explaining Larayb’s remark, Thoits (2012) asserts that role identities both prescribe and describe our behaviour. In this instance, the participant defines her Muslims identity in terms of abiding by the practical aspects, such as prayer and maintaining fasts. Another explanation is offered by Major and O’Brien (2005), who suggest that stigmatised individuals disengage their self-esteem from domains in which they are negatively perceived. With regard to Larayb’s response, it can be deduced that she has withdrawn herself from the Muslim collective and thus, its negative stigma, instead, opting to invoke an individual relationship with Islam, within which to root her self-esteem. An interesting finding from the discussions was other group members’ reactions to such indifference displayed by their fellow Muslims. In response to this apparent indifference to the oppression of Muslims, Yahya argues:

**Yahya:**

So what, you’re saying it doesn’t bother you at all that your Muslim brothers and sisters are getting it in the neck from every angle? What’s happening in Palestine, Afghanistan, the fact that they have the nerve to accuse us of the same shit they do themselves, none of that gets to you?

This was typical of most instances where indifference to the targeting of Muslims was expressed. The second identifier of minority stress proposed by Meyer (2003) is the expectation of prejudice events and the vigilance this requires.
The discussion has so far reviewed the anger, frustration, impotence and professed indifference cited by participants in response to chronic Islamophobia and now moves on to the second of elements in Meyer’s (2003) Minority Stress Theory.

**Stigma: The expectation of rejection and discrimination**

The second aspect of Meyer’s model deals with a phenomenon recognised by Goffman, he discussed the anxiety with which the stigmatised individual approaches interactions with society; the individual ‘may perceive usually quite correctly, that whatever others profess, they do not accept him and are not ready to make contact with him on equal grounds’ (1986, p.7). Chapter Seven has examined the anxiety associated with how wider society perceives Muslims, indexing Yahya’s account in which he presumes Islamophobia exists in social interaction even he has no concrete evidence that this is the case. According to Allport (1954) vigilance is described as one of the stressful effects developed in stigmatised individuals. The greater one’s perceived stigma, the greater their need for vigilance in interaction with dominant group members, that is, the non-Muslim population. Similarly the following discussion of participant’s narrative shows heightened vigilance to pre-empt discrimination that might happen in the future.

**Basanti:**

Talking about when 9/11 actually happened, I remember my dad telling me to be careful, not to go out on my own. You know things like make sure you’ve with someone, don’t go out at night, and go in a car. He was so paranoid something was going to happen to us. I think he was more worried about our safety than anything
else. Growing up in that sort of environment, kind of instils that way of thinking, doesn’t it?

**Isha:**

My family was the same. I remember one of my dad’s friends had stopped his daughters wearing the *hijab*. One of his daughters had her scarf yanked off at school, so he was so scared something like that was going happen again. It’s that sort anxiety among his friends that rubbed off on him. I think that’s why he’s always been so worried about us all.

**Basanti:**

It’s a defence mechanism.

**Kamran:**

My family were much harder on me than my sisters. They were a lot stricter with me. They’d end up questioning me every time I went out; where you going, who’s going to be there, what are you going to do.

This narrative undermines the former Prime Minister’s argument for the extension of counter-terrorism measures. Gordon Brown (2009) argued that the wide-ranging nature of security policies ‘leaves us better prepared and strengthened in our ability to ensure all peace-loving people of this country can live normally, with confidence and free from fear’. Unless he was excluding all British-Muslims from ‘peace-loving’, Brown vastly underestimated the negative impacts on the Muslim community as shown by the above narratives, which provide an insight into the emotional impact and feelings of British-Muslims toward high levels of stigmatisation. For participants in this study, fear, distress and attendant vigilance are part and parcel of everyday life. These accounts do not sit well
with Brown’s claims about the success of the Contest Strategy and the utopia of normal people living with confidence and without fear. For example, Basanti and Isha’s contributions indicate a constant vigilance and anxiety for the physical safety of her male family members. Their behaviour epitomises Meyer (2003, p.11) assertion that this vigilance is ‘chronic in that it is repeatedly and continually evoked’ in the everyday life of the stigmatised individual. Mirroring Amer (2013) who found high degrees of anxiety amongst her sample, Isha and Kamran point to the distress of family members that is rooted in a fear of harm for their loved ones. This appears to support Miller and Kaiser (2001) argument that stigma is also linked to an individual’s social identity. Thus increasing the potential for stress due to seeing other group members suffer from unfairness as a result of their stigmatised position is enough to result in stress and anxious responses. In terms of the participants’ discussions, Basanti and Kamran’s references to the worry of their family members, is illustrative of this.

The participants showed various responses to stigmatisation including fear, vigilance, anger and indifference. Jones et al. (1984) posit such responses render self-concept unstable. To safeguard the self from the negative effects of acute social stigmatisation the stigmatised individual must employ appropriate coping strategies, which in respect to this study fall into two broad behavioural categories: increased identification with the in-group through adopting an ambassadorial role for Islam or visibly embodying Islamic signifiers and dis-identifying with Islam either behaviourally or emotionally.

**Concealment versus disclosure**

As noted in Chapter One, the Minority Stress Theory was intended to be applied to the LGT community and so this element does not map directly onto the British-Muslim
experience. As argued in Chapter Six, a Muslim cannot ‘pass’ (Medina, 2011, p.139) for anything other than Muslim, they do not have the option of concealing or ‘coming out’ as is common in the experience of LGBT individuals. Yet for them being of South Asian appearance alone is sufficient to elicit Islamophobia. That said, whilst it is virtually impossible to appear non-Muslim, it is possible to appear less Muslim. This has been evidenced by ‘performance of safety’ behaviours in Chapter Seven and by ‘vigilance’ behaviours above. In both cases participants dis-identify with Islam through reducing visibility of bodily signifiers to thereby reduce the likelihood of future prejudicial events that can be interpreted as a degree of control over when where and how to express Islamic allegiance. In this light the notion of ‘minority stress’ can be modified to British-Muslim specific behaviours that are the equivalent of concealment amongst LGT communities.

From Internalised Homophobia to Islamophobia.

The last aspect of the Minority Stress Theory proposed by Meyer (2003) is internalised homophobia. Meyer claims this represents a form of stress that is ‘internal and insidious’ (2003, p.688). Thoits explains this as a process of self-stigmatisation in which ‘role-taking abilities enable individuals to view themselves from the imagined perspective of others’ (1985, p.222). Meyer supplements this explanation by asserting the term ‘internalised homophobia’ (Islamophobia) is the internalisation of society’s anti-gay (Muslim) attitudes in LGT community (Muslim community), this process he argues leads to the ‘devaluation of the self, resultant internal conflicts and poor self-regard’ (2003, p.688). In this study we can substitute homophobia for Islamophobia. The thesis has previously evidenced behaviours that show internalisation of Islamophobia amongst participants which manifests in practices of self-surveillance. As examined in Chapter Six,
the terrors of prevention Hillyard (1993) associated with the aggressive implementation of Prevent has resulted in some participants performing what Mythen (2015) calls ‘checking and hushing’ behaviours. Furthermore, the ‘vigilance behaviours’ associated with anticipation of discrimination also require a certain degree of internalised Islamophobia. In addition to such behaviours that facilitate remaining under the radar of discriminatory security and public attentions, a very small minority of participants expressed views that could be interpreted as internalised Islamophobia.

**Allah Ditta:**

I understand that the government need to do something, and to be honest it is the Muslims that are bombing people. I mean they give themselves a bad reputation, so I kind of get why they search us.

**Psychological coping strategies: Resisting stigma to safeguard the self**

Firstly the discussion will examine how participants deflected stigmatisation by attributing negative feedback to discrimination against the group. Crocker and Major (1989) claim that one way in which stigmatised groups may cope with threats to their self-esteem is by blaming the outcome on discrimination rather than themselves. In utilising this strategy the person deflects any damage to the internal, stable part of the self to an eternal cause, thereby, safeguarding self-esteem. The following extract from focus group two offers some insight into how British-Muslims might demean those who denigrate Islam in an attempt to attribute any negative feedback as prejudice.
Shah Jahan:

That’s exactly the kind of thing you’re taught not to do, isn’t it, not to label people like that? But it doesn’t stop all the like that racists, like some of the crap in the news you get. You know, like those really thick journalists in the tabloids who think it’s okay to say any old crap about us. They’re so ignorant it’s almost funny, funny that people can actually think.

Rabiya:

Absolutely! I mean, imagine having to live your life like that, being so bigoted. It gets me so angry. People like that don’t deserve to be called human? They’re so stupid you have to feel sorry for them in some ways. I’d honestly rather never have any money than be like that.

By applying adjectives such as ‘thick’ ‘racist’ ‘stupid’ and ‘ignorant’ to people or institutions seen as maligning Islam and Muslim, Shah Jahan and Rabiya de-legitimise content from The Sun newspaper as news ‘by bigots for bigots’. In doing so they remove the in-group from accusations of ‘being in an extremist group’ or ‘dodgy’, thereby safeguarding the standing of Muslims and consequently their self-image. It illustrates the SIT claim that the psychological drive behind the individual’s actions is an attempt to preserve a positive in-group social identity.

Amaya, whilst not as blunt as Shah Jahan and Rabiya uses the same coping strategy which garners the same result: attributing Islamophobia to out-group prejudice rather than qualities inherent to Islam and Muslims:
It’s just pure ignorance, but it’s hard to sort of, you can’t really play the blame game can you, because maybe they haven’t been around that many Muslims. So they’re not really that aware, they just get their opinions from what they see on TV or hear in the news. So many people just believe what they’re told without really bothering to find out for themselves. So you can’t really blame people for that can you?

Rather than insult the out-group, Amaya professes to understand how they have come to get the wrong impression of Muslims. Despite her empathy she absolutely rejects the validity of their views by locating them as sheltered people, without agency.

The second manner in which participants resisted acute Islamophobia was by enhancing their Muslim identities by increasing identification with Islam. Thoits (2012) explains people hold multiple identities and some of those identities are more significant for individuals’ self-conceptions than others. As explained in Chapter Two the more ‘centrality’ (Rosenberg, 1979) afforded to a particular identity the greater its positive effect on well-being. Analysis of the discussions highlights that some participants assert that heightened victimisation caused them to place greater importance on their Muslim identity. During a discussion in focus group one on whether participants affiliated less or more with their faith in the wake of 9/11, Pia was certain that her religion had become more central to her identity.

Pia:

I’d say definitely more ‘Muslim’. I’m just, I feel more conscious of being Muslim now, if you know what I mean? It’s hard to explain. Like I feel, now because we’re under so much examination so much it’d be a copout to say no. I think like I said
before, it makes me so angry, so I end up being a bit over-defensive. I don’t think I’m willing to take it lying down if you know what I mean?

Pia is certain that in the face of increased scrutiny she would not ‘copout’ and she wouldn’t take the denigration of Islam ‘lying down’. Her resistance takes the form of enhancing her outward ‘Muslim-ness’, she goes on to say, ‘after the London bombings I started wearing the *hijab* again, you know, like sticking two fingers up to them’. This echoes Gole’s (2003) examination of the voluntary adoption of Islamic stigma symbols. She found women were reverting to the veil as an expression of the pride they felt in their religiosity. Whilst Pia wears the *hijab* as a reactive resistance against the Islamophobia, Basanti claims the practice of veiling is both an expression of Islamic pride and a symbol of feminism that rejects objectification of women’s bodies.

**Basanti:**

I’m sick of them, always on their high horse, telling us how oppressed we all are for covering up. What do they want, for us to do what English girls do, develop eating disorders, wear virtually nothing and have so much surgery we look like some sort of mutant Barbies?

**Moderator:**

So during the focus group you said you thought criticism of the veil was hypocritical, what did you mean by that?

**Basanti:**
Well it’s just that I do get so tired of people saying how we all cover up because we’re forced to. They just don’t get the irony. There they are, standing there in the middle of winter, wearing a mini-skirt and not much else. I just think it’s a bit, pot calling kettle.

**Moderator:**

So what is your motivation for wearing the *hijab*?

**Basanti:**

Obviously I wear it because I’m Muslim, but it’s more than that. It frees me in some ways, you know from that constant pressure to look perfect. My friends, the ones who don’t really wear the *hijab*, they’re so obsessed with how they look. Its things like my hair doesn’t have to be perfect all the time. Modest clothes mean no one knows what size body you have, what your imperfections are, so I can just concentrate on being myself.

Basanti makes the valid point that Western societies have long placed optimum value on female physical attractiveness over all other attributes. She chosen not to be defined by her looks therefore for her the *hijab* is empowering, it is a component of her feminist outlook. Islamic feminist have argued that veiling facilitates personal liberation. In a society where the constant bombardment of ‘beauty’ is normal, some *hijabis* opt out to avoid being targets of a consumerism that imposes impossible standards of beauty. Covering reclaims the female body as a private entity rather than a public space adorned that carries the marks of societal expectations.
Major and O’Brien (2005) explain the increase of identification to the in-group alleviates the effects of stigma by tapping into the positive feelings of pride. This voluntary adoption of stigma is in line with Modood’s (2010) notion of reactive pride identity as discussed in Chapter Five. By re-claiming the tradition of veiling Pia and Basanti revive cultural practices in the face of negative socio-political environments. Another coping strategy that is linked to making the Islamic identity more salient is the adoption of the role of ‘Ambassador for Islam’, whilst this has been discussed in Chapter Five as a means of positive representations of Islam to counter the onslaught of Islamophobia, in this discussion the thesis argues it provides a positive psychological function for the ‘ambassador’. As Abu Rayya (2011) notes, accentuating Islam’s positive attributes not only counters interactional level prejudices and Islamophobia, it focuses the ‘ambassador’ on the positive nature of Islam, and his/her commitment to those positive aspects rather than those identified by external Islamophobic forces. In short, positive identification with Islam acts as a psychological barrier against anti-Muslim attacks thereby helping to maintain a de-stigmatised sense of self.

Salim:

It’s a whole different ball game now, isn’t it (?) You have to do everything you can to challenge these ridiculous stereotypes. It’s like every Muslim is an ambassador for Muslims, showing people what Islam is really about, not what Bush or al-Qaida says it is. I think we’ve got a duty to do that. Do you get me? Sometimes it feels like that’s all any of can do, go and bust some myths.
Jalal:

I really get the ambassador thing. That’s probably one of the only positives that’s come out of this mess; I mean, look at the way it’s brought us all together, made us want to show people the real meaning of what it is to be a Muslim. You have to lead by example, show people the positives through how you conduct yourself. I wouldn’t be who I am, without Islam. I’m not going to let it go.

Salim and Jalal demonstrate how the backlash against Muslims has inspired them become more tolerant. Indeed Salim believes it a ‘duty’ that Muslims take on the challenge of changing the negative perceptions of Islam, whilst Jalal hopes for the outcome of dissolution of public negativity towards Islam through positive changes in his own behaviour. By doing so he hopes to deflect the malignity directed towards the in-group and as a result, himself. This behaviour of reaching out with kindness in the face of adversity is a Sunnah the (practices and teachings of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh)). This again illustrates a return to and respect for fundamental aspects of Islam. Abu Raiya (2011) calls this ‘positive religious coping’, the process of using scriptural Islamic teaching in times of adversity to achieve positive outcomes. A statement by Shah Jahan from focus group three is testament to this: ‘It’s made me more focused on Islam, want to study it, learn from it, and then tell all those people who’ve got the wrong idea.’ Salim, Jalal and Shah Jahan’s comments align with Abu Raiyya’s (2011) research. He found participants who had reported at least one stressful event relating to their Muslim identity discovered that reaching out to others, particularly non-Muslims, resulted in positive self-identity outcomes; such as personal strength and appreciation of life. Conversely, those who isolated themselves were more prone to reporting negative outcome such as anger and depression.
Thus far, coping strategies against the stigmatisation of Islam and Muslims have shown a movement towards Islamic practices: deflecting prejudice, centralising the religious identity, the voluntary adoption of stigma symbols and showcasing Islam in its best light. On the other hand, some participants described using a coping mechanism that is based on the diminishing of Islamic attributes in order to avoid association with Islamic stigma and its negative effects on the individual; typically, these included sartorial distancing and debarking. Jay, for example, expressed sadness at negative associations between men of South Asian appearance with beards and the label of ‘terrorist’: ‘So many times I’ve thought of growing a full on beard, but we all know how that’d go down. You’d be such an easy target, all the assumptions people would make. It’d be like having a target on my back.’ Rather than deal with the potential negative prejudice a beard would attract Jay resigns himself to being clean-shaven. He relays examples of such prejudice his own experience:

Jay:

We’ve all seen it; how somebody who obviously looks Muslim, they get treated differently. I see it all the time when I’m working in the colleges. You’ll get the more traditional looking kids; they’re always asked more questions why they’re there, you know, questions they’ve not asked the other kids. It’s almost like they’re trying to put them off.

Witnessing discrimination against bearded Muslim men prompted Jay to relinquish his right to choose his appearance but in exchange he gains a positive outcome; the peace of mind from knowing that he will not be subjected to that particular discrimination. Similarly Salahuddin, like Jay, highlights the dichotomy struggle between asserting an
Islamic appearance and the cost in terms of experiencing discrimination or material costs such as career advancement.

**Salahuddin:**

Yeah, like when my brother first went to university, my Dad was like, ‘shave your beard off, what're they going to think’, and I’m like, ‘why you telling him to shave his beard, it’s the Sunnah’. We’ve had this argument going on for years. Every time my brother went for an interview my Dad would go nuts telling him to shave his beard off otherwise he wasn’t going to get it. It’s mental. Every time he didn’t get it he’d be on about it, my Dad, telling him it’s because he had a beard. In the end he trimmed it right down. I don’t know if it’s coincidence, but he did end up getting the job he wanted.

Sacrificing Islamic stigma symbols has become an accepted way of coping with the everyday issues of being Muslim. In doing so the participants were able to avoid threats to the self-concept that would otherwise arise as a result of embracing stigma symbols. Sartorial distance alleviated being victim of Islamophobia and its negative emotional impacts. This behaviour can be seen as a means of reducing anti-Muslim discrimination, as evidenced in Chapter Seven, with several participants reporting fewer instances of discrimination when dressed in Westernised clothes compared to wearing clothing associated with Islam. This is borne out by statistics on Islamophobic attacks. Tell Mama for example reports half of all anti-Muslim hate crime was committed against individuals who wore Islamic attire.

Sartorial distancing is a successful coping mechanism as is behavioural distance, some participants refused to engage in discussions about their religion, Muslims or foreign
policy. This behaviour is similar to the notion of ‘chameleonicm’ discussed in Chapter Five. Whereas that behaviour is designed to deflect attention from the participants Muslim-ness to blend into the background, this behaviour is to diminish the negative psychological effects on the ‘self’:

**Shah-Jahan:**

I just don’t want to hear it anymore. It’s always the same old crap, always the same outcome. All it does is wind me up. Nothing positive ever comes from it. If you’re not Muslim you’re never going to get it. Bottom line is they’re never going to feel it like we do.

**La-Rayb:**

Too right! I tune out when the news starts on about Muslims, like when they’re reporting on Iraq or it’s something about Palestinians. It’s not just some anonymous statistic if you’re Muslim, it’s a person. I can’t deal with it anymore. Not every day. It’s too much to handle, so why give yourself the head damage?

This disengagement with the perceived maltreatment of Muslims would at first appear to be the result of indifference to Muslim victimisation, however, upon closer inspection it reveals a heightened identification with the plight of Muslims. To illustrate, Shah-Jahan states that he ‘really cares’; so much so, that he is unable to discuss it. In a similar vein, La-Rayb’s reference to reports of Afghan and Palestinian child casualties are too distressing for her to engage with.
The analysis presented in this chapter has supported themes discussed in Chapter Five through to Chapter Seven. Participants continually referenced the spatial and temporal nature of their impression management particularly with regard to sartorial expression and the notion of chameleonism - considered here as a form of mimicry - where participants variously identify and disassociate themselves according to context. It has also aligned with the previous discussion in Chapter Five that accentuated participant’s use of Islamic scripture to reject the claim that Islam and its adherents are fundamentally incompatible with Britishness. Additionally it supported the narrative of female participants in Chapter Seven in their rejection of izzat practices and re-appropriation of Quranic and Hadithic knowledge for self-empowerment. It also highlighted that the resistances detailed here are inextricably linked and rooted in the multiple exclusions discussed throughout this thesis such as Islamophobia, foreign policy or repressive counter-terrorism legislation.

In terms of the fourth and last core emergent theme, the analysis was presented in two sections: firstly, it explored the factors of British-Muslim hybridity they were compelled to reject and the resistance strategies they employed and, secondly, it illuminated both the psychological impact and the strategies employed by participants to counter the effects of chronic stigmatisation through the application of ‘Minority Stress’.

The first section showed a duality of resistances that are specific to British-Muslim hybridity; ‘internal’ resistances, the rejection of misinterpretation of Islamic knowledge conducted by the ummah. This mis-interpretation was perceived to occur at two levels: firstly, fundamentalist groups, certain Islamic regimes and extremists and the adherence to the primacy of inherited quasi-Islamic cultural practices over scriptural Islam at both familial and the community levels; and, secondly, ‘external’ resistances directed against Islamophobia manifested both institutionally and through everyday interactions.
The resistance of factors ‘internal’ to Islam included simultaneous rejection of the ‘War on Terror’ and Islamic fundamentalism. Many participants felt fundamentalism originating in the Middle East was based on ‘theological deprivation’ (Yilmaz, 2010, p.99). This condemnation was linked to anger directed against regimes in some Muslim countries that had oppressed the population to an extent that participants felt was reflected, in a negative manner, on the entire ummah by association. However the corruption of Islam by Islamism did not equate with support for the domestic and global ‘War on Terror’. Throughout the data gathering process participants expressed emphatic revulsion and rejection of against military action associated with the ‘War on Terror’ and its associated civilian casualties and asset appropriation.

The second type of ‘internal’ resistance was the generational differences that have arisen in terms of understanding Islamic traditions. Participants perceived a marked difference in cultural inherited Islam and scriptural Islam. Some narratives evidenced the re-appropriation of core Islamic beliefs for self-empowerment. This was particularly true of female participants, who utilised knowledge based in scripture to resist male izzat practices that construct Muslim women as objects of male social standing, rather than individuals who have the agency to choose their own interpretations of the scriptures.

Another type of resistance expressed by the participants was the need for social and political organisation to overcome perceived injustices against the Muslim community both domestically and abroad. Some participants expressed dissatisfaction with the representation options available to them, which were perceived to be largely ineffective. Although they did recognise representation was more efficient and relevant than during the Rushdie Affair (1989). Their main concern was the inefficiency of the beraderi system, which they felt bypassed British-Muslim’s democratic right to vote according to personal choice rather than kinship group.
One of the key findings according to how participants felt the situation could be improved was lasting and meaningful resistance by becoming empowered individually by gaining influential employment in order to affect change from positions of relative power. This aligns with the Gramscian notion of ‘organic individual’ (1992, p.235) of developing an empowered consciousness from within communities.

The second part of this analysis sought to break new ground and contribute to new knowledge in its application of Minority Stress Theory to illuminate the emotional and psychological impact of coping strategies employed to counter the effects of Islamophobia and the chronic social stigmatisation experienced by young British-Muslims. Whilst this model has previously been applied to other minority groups it has not, until now, been applied to Muslim communities. As has been shown Minority Stress Theory provides a useful framework within which to gain a better understanding of the micro-level emotional and psychological impact of chronic stigmatisation on marginalised individuals and the strategies they use to cope. Through the data the chapter showed participants experiences were directly relevant to Meyer’s (2003) Minority Stress Theory. In line with Meyer’s (2003) analysis participants described being subject to external prejudice events throughout the analytical chapters. This discussion supplemented these discussions with how participants felt about this situation. The most evidenced emotion was anger, closely followed by fear for their own and their family’s safety, then a sense of helplessness in the face of the overwhelming stigmatisation and victimisation of Muslims. The data provided evidence that directly aligned with Meyer’s (2003) remaining three strands: the expectation of discrimination, concealment versus disclosure and internalised Islamophobia.

The final part of Chapter Eight discussed the coping strategies participants deployed to relieve the effects of chronic stigmatisation, some of which included laying blame on discrimination rather than themselves. Some participants demeaned those who
denigrated Islam as ignorant or Islamophobic thus externalising negative feedback. The second manner in which participants resisted Islamophobia was by increasing identification with Muslims. This is manifested in behaviour such as the voluntary adoption of stigma symbols and becoming an ‘ambassador’ for Islam, such behaviour alleviates the effects of stigma by tapping into the positivity associated with pride. Other coping strategies differed in that they exhibited a movement away from Islam. One significant example, vigilant behaviours, they employ to minimise the likelihood of conflict. The opposite of adopting stigma symbols. Data evidenced dis-identifying with Islam, particularly by sartorial choice.

This chapter has examined the last of the four core emergent categories derived from the data; layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality. In doing so it has addressed research question three: ‘To analyse the micro-level strategies deployed by young British-Muslims to maintain and de-stigmatise identities which have been rendered suspect’. The final section of this thesis will draw the thesis to a close by re-counting the key findings and reflexively discussing the important factors of the research process.


**Conclusion**

In drawing the thesis to a close, I wish to recount the central findings, discuss salient aspects of the research process and reflect on my own position as a social researcher. As a second generation British-Muslim of Pakistani heritage, issues of positionality and reflexivity are worthy of further discussion. In sharing common experiences and cultural reference points, the researcher was better able to understand both the subject area and the cultural, religious and linguistic inferences and nuances cited by participants. In this respect, researcher positionality may serve to enrich such studies such as this, given that participants may be more likely to offer more open, honest accounts of their opinions and viewpoints. During the stages of empirical data gathering I had a strong sense that participants’ disclosure of thoughts and reflections with someone of a shared cultural heritage was enabling the generation of data that someone perceived as an ‘outsider’ may not have been able to access. The shared knowledge and enculturation of the researcher and her roots within the community under study were also important barriers against both misrepresentation of data and opportunistic or tokenistic approaches to the research. Further, similar lived experience of the researcher was advantageous in terms of being able to understand the more subtle intricacies of participant narratives such as double-binds, conflicts and advantageous aspects of being Muslim and British.

Despite these trust-based advantages, researcher positionality may also have a detrimental impact in terms of prohibiting, tempering or altering participant responses due to such differences in gender, age or social position. For example, whilst researcher positionality as a female British-Muslim allowed intersection with female participants to yield such rich and in-depth data on the gendered nature of Islamophobia, little comparable
data was generated through male participants. As discussed in Chapter Three, researcher social positioning may affect levels of participant engagement and the data generated. Whilst white female researchers may identify with British-Muslim participants of Pakistani origin within the study in terms of gender, they cannot possibly understand their experience of being Asian and that racial aspects of the researcher’s identity might serve to maintain and re-produce dominant power relations to significantly influence data collection and analysis (see Spalek, 2004). Another area of concern arising from research positionality is over-compensating for the perceived attack on Islam and Muslims such as by failing to report expressions of prejudice or anti-Western sentiments or attributing or exhibiting characteristics commonly associated with Orientalist depictions of Muslims. Simply aspiring to maintain objectivity is both unrealistic and naïve. As Becker’s (1967) postulates, academic research can never be entirely value free and nor should researchers attempt to be. Instead, they should apply rigor and reflexivity in research design, data gathering processes and analytic practices to minimise any detrimental effects of subjectivity. So rather than obfuscating or denying close attachment to the subject under study it is perhaps more beneficial to reflect processually on the positionality of the researcher and be open to other ways of seeing and interpreting the data, in a manner akin to Foucault’s hailing of multiple truths. Potential problems of omission and bias were mitigated throughout the study by regular discussion of findings with academic supervisors and postgraduate peers and thorough data analysis.

As previously identified, researcher positionality in terms of age and gender may have affected both scope and depth of the data generated. On reflection it may have therefore been more beneficial to have separated participants into gendered focus groups and for focus group moderation and semi-structured interviews to be carried out by someone of the same gender and similar age so as to further minimise researcher
positionality effects. For example, a British-Muslim male of similar age and ethnicity may have been more effective in generating gender specific data from male participants and interviewees. Similarly, it may have been advantageous to have conducted a comparison focus group and semi-structured interviews with non-Muslim participants to compare feelings and perceptions and the extent of their knowledge within the subject under study. Aside from the temporal, financial and resource constraints of postgraduate research - given the problem of generalisability of qualitative studies such as this and the limited availability of empirical quantitative data on relevant subject matter for verification purposes - the researcher could also have conducted a small-scale survey to add weight to the key qualitative findings of this study. In terms of the research process, it should also be noted that a degree of saturation of the research questions was reached at completion of the focus group stage. In as much as one-to-one interview phase did provide an opportunity to clarify and further explore the themes generated from within the focus groups in more detail - particularly more sensitive issues such as the gendered experiences of female participants - interviews failed to generate new themes of import.

Having reflected on issues of positionality, reflexivity and bias, the key findings which emerged from data analysis will now be addressed according to the four core categories which correspond to each of the analysis chapters: ‘Umamic (re) attachment, emergence and the solidification of identity’; ‘Excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination’, ‘Embodied Islam: gender, surveillance and Muslim identities’; and, ‘Layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality’.
**Ummatic (re) attachment, emergence and the solidification of identity**

Contrary to the assumption of the reformulation of British-Muslim identity as a response to 9/11, the catalyst for such according to some participants can be seen as the Rushdie Affair over a decade earlier. As documented in Chapter Five and supported by participant narratives, the emergence and solidification of contemporary British-Muslim identity and its alleged incompatibility with ‘British’ values can be traced back to the Rushdie affair. At this point, notions of an all-encompassing ‘Black’ or ‘Asian’ British identity became insufficient to encapsulate new expressions of Muslim rights. This facilitated the realignment of British-Muslims from a liberation movement based on race to one rooted more firmly in religion. Whilst the significant impact of 9/11 on the solidification of contemporary British-Muslim identity must be acknowledged, the importance of the Rushdie affair in the emergence of oppositional forms of British-Muslim identity cannot be underestimated. The socio-political ramifications from this incident provided the building block upon which Muslim discourses of exclusion are based and the prism through which subsequent Muslim related socio-political events came to be viewed, generating the dual processes of de-legitimisation of Muslim concerns and the simultaneous veneration of a Westernised worldview and the attendant resurgence in media, political and legislative Orientalism, against which the emergence of an Islamic pride identity rooted in, but not confined to, perceived social injustices against Muslims is articulated.

In relation to the first core category, a particularly important finding for this study concerns the critical national and transnational allegiances of British-Muslims who see themselves as part of the imagined Muslim community or *ummah*. As such, it should be recognised that many Muslims may react strongly to any perceived unfair treatment of that community wherever it may occur across the globe. British and Western foreign policy in
general was seen by participants as duplicitous and unjust to Muslim countries and peoples. This concern over relations between Muslim countries and the West, primarily mediated through Western foreign policy, is crucial as it is a central issue in the compromising of British-Muslims being able to build a coherent British self. These relations, particularly the use of military force, create a conflict at the very core of British-Muslim identities that revolves around the belief Muslims are being attacked by their nation of birth and residence. Intervention by the British State and military in the affairs of Muslim countries continues to undermine British-Muslims’ feelings of loyalty, belonging and the possibility of a cohesive ‘British’ identity. This link between foreign policy and legitimate feelings of anger towards - and estrangement from - Britain and Britishness is a crucial factor in understanding the formulation and maintenance of British-Muslim identity. British-Muslims are set apart and ‘othered’ from wider society and how their sense of British belonging continues to be undermined by media, political and legislative discourses, security policies and military interventions. Counter-terrorism and security measures, fail to recognise or side-line these the victimisation felt by participants. For instance the Prevent Strategy states British-Muslim frustrations are rooted in ‘a perception of biased and Islamophobic media coverage, UK foreign policy, notably with regard to Muslim countries, the Israel-Palestine conflict and the war in Iraq’ (2011, p.18). The Government’s dismissal of British-Muslim dissatisfaction with domestic and foreign policy and Islamophobia in the media is dismissed as ‘perceived’ and thus implicitly, without foundation. This refusal to acknowledge complicity in the victimisation of Muslims in the UK and oppression of Muslims in the Middle East merely serves to undermine the Government’s credibility and compound the sense of social alienation and political disenfranchisement felt by many Muslims. Rather than tackling inequalities and aspects of British foreign policy profoundly affecting British-Muslim communities,
Prevent instead addresses what is described as a ‘pernicious ideology spread by a small minority of Muslims’ (DCLG, 2007, p.5). Avoiding the thorny issues of foreign policy, Military violence and institutional racism, Prevent firmly locates the problem of extremism as one rooted within the British-Muslim population and renders that community as ‘risky’ en bloc on the grounds of its perceived susceptibility to extremist ideology. The British State has regrettably upheld this discourse, continually reasserting the risk of a pervasive radicalisation among British-Muslims.

As the primary data presented in the thesis suggests, the primary factor in participants’ negotiation of their hybridised identities and the core of contemporary debate on British-Muslim identity that underpins popular Islamophobic discourse is the ‘irreconcilability thesis’, which posits the incompatibility of all things Islamic with the West. Using participant narratives, this argument was disassembled on ideational, theological and experiential grounds. Firstly, in as much as Muslim identity remains of primary importance, most participants asserted the compatibility of Islam with ‘British’ values, citing examples from scriptural Islam to validate their claims. Secondly, participants’ largely successful negotiation of hybridity is in itself a rejection of the irreconcilability thesis. It has been shown how positive aspects of hybridity are embraced and incorporated into participants’ everyday lives and the strategies used to overcome the more challenging aspects of a dual identity have been excavated. Participants’ ongoing enunciative behaviours in the Third Space, including interstitial vantage point, allows them to critically reflect on both cultures. As such, the incomplete notion of irreconcilability serves to obscures the reality that Islamic and Western values share many similarities. Furthermore, impression management techniques specific to British-Muslim hybridity allowed participants to selectively access the interstitial space to appropriate the best of both cultures and remain simultaneously inside and outside and thereby navigate
potentially contentious situations by employing ‘chameleonism’ as a form of mimicry. Irreconcilability is perhaps what Bhabha might label an ‘old’ cultural binarism that allows the continuation of a simplistic linear history. However, the data findings show this commonly assumed binarism to be an artefact. For most participants’ Western values and Islam are not opposed entities. Rather, they are chopped up for participants to enable progressive transgressive enunciations.

_Excluding Muslims: discipline, regulation and discrimination_

As evidenced throughout the data presented, social exclusion exists in many forms as a prevalent feature within the everyday lived experience of young British-Muslims from institutional discrimination - most notably through media representation, political discourse and repressive counter-terrorism legislation - to race hate crime and the pervasive ‘White Gaze’. Drawing on participant narratives and Foucault’s notions of ‘power/knowledge’, ‘disciplinary power’, and ‘docility’ it has been shown that media, political and legislative constructions explicitly represent British-Muslims as a suspect group to be contained and scrutinised. Three aspects of legislation and security policy are integral to this process: the construction of all Muslims as risky through security discourses and practices, the erosion of British-Muslim civil rights and the counter-productive effects of counter-terrorism legislation. Through the lens of these processes it is clear that the integration/exclusion paradox is a significant factor in eliciting frustration and disillusionment amongst British-Muslim communities. There is a contradiction between media, political and legislative exhortations of Muslims to demonstrate their commitment to British values and the labelling of that population as potentially dangerous to others. This dichotomy again forces Muslim identities to splinter as they are at once told to integrate whilst being excluded and
criminalised. At such a critical time, when it is imperative the Government engage with alienated Muslim youth in particular to work towards improved social cohesion and understanding, existing legislation has regrettably served to vilify, victimise and strip British-Muslims of many of their civil rights. An analysis of the data revealed three main forms of surveillance identified by the sample: institutional surveillance, expressed most explicitly through State counter-terrorism and security measures; public surveillance and the ‘White Gaze’; and self-surveillance.

Throughout the data participants cited the biased and often discriminatory media, political and legislative institutional representations of Islam and its followers, most notably in the form of media and political discourses. Despite the use of what may be considered as simplistic language, many participants demonstrated a relatively sophisticated understanding of the interplay between such institutional constructions and public perceptions of Islam and its followers within the context of dominant societal power relations. There was general consensus across the sample regarding the role of the media in replicating dominant political discourses and its contribution to the creation of a climate of fear and mistrust, which some participants have argued allows the pursuit of British foreign policy interests in several Muslim countries. Participants repeatedly referenced largely Orientalist depictions of Muslims as terrorists or terrorist sympathisers, anti-enlightenment, undemocratic, misogynistic or welfare cheats. Consequently, their discussions encapsulate, albeit in simplistic forms, many facets of Orientalist discourse as identified by Edward Said (1979) and the prevalence such verified by wider empirical research (Moore et al, 2008; Poole, 2011). Revealingly, many participants highlighted a similarity between media, political and legislative representations and the anti-Muslim sentiments prevalent within public attitudes and acknowledged the powerful role of the media in creating a climate of fear and distrust of Muslims that is interiorised by the wider non-Muslim
population, thereby highlighting participant understanding of how the general public internalise media constructions as truth.

Most participants alluded to and gave examples of public suspicion and disapproval encapsulated by the notion of the ‘White Gaze’ as a form of embodied social surveillance. This referred to a myriad of everyday micro-actions performed by the non-Muslim population such as fleeting glances interpreted as ‘funny looks’ or social awkwardness which mirror media, political and legislative representations to render all Muslims as a risky and suspect population. The data not only revealed how the non-Muslim public embody negative discursive formations of Muslims, but how for some participants this internalisation of the ‘White-gaze’ or the belief Islamophobia is ubiquitous manifests itself in self-doubt and the assumption anti-Muslim sentiments are an ever-present in their everyday interactions. This sense of fear and vilification prevalent across the sample is exacerbated by State counter-terrorism legislation and security policy. Whilst knowledge of counter-terrorism and security policy was limited, most participants cited the stop and search authorisations under Section 44 of the Terrorism Act (2001), the widespread use of racial profiling and criminalisation of ‘glorification’ and ‘incitement’ to terrorism. Several participants recounted personal or third-party examples of counter-terrorism policing most commonly in relation to stop and search, racial profiling and its misuse as method of both unjust vilification and racial harassment in general.

Apart from stop and search, the other most frequently cited example of the perceived erosion of British-Muslim civil liberties concerned restrictions to Muslim personal and political expression, particularly in relation to ‘Muslim-specific’ domestic and global concerns. In short, many participants believe their rights to protest and freedom of speech had been significantly compromised. To this end, ill-defined aspects of counter-terrorism legislation such as notions of ‘glorification’ and ‘incitement’ are seen to have
produced uncertainties about what was, in Foucauldian terms, ‘sayable’. The data therefore supports Spalek’s (2010) assertion counter-terrorism and security measures are with many participants articulating a fear and mistrust of the police and other security agencies. In effect, contemporary counter-terrorism and security measures and their associated discourses have served to heighten the sense of fear, victimisation and alienation experienced by British-Muslims at the cost of ensuring the safety of the majority. As Hillyard (1993) suggests, the preventative nature of certain counter-terrorism and security measures has a profound impact on suspect communities, engendering heightened self-surveillance and a fear they might be next. The impact of what is generally regarded as largely repressive legislative measures by the sample has led to widespread British-Muslim victimisation, alienation and social exclusion in various manifestations. This has led to a distancing from State officials and institutions and public ‘permission to hate’ (Poynting and Mason, 2006, p. 367). Consequently, for many British-Muslims this translates into a sense of feeling less valued than their non-Muslim counterparts, with public safety prioritised at their expense. Muslim rights continue to be eroded and public space for Muslim protest and dissent narrowed with the State’s creation of partial securities.

*Embodied Islam: gender, surveillance and Muslim identities*

British-Muslim interaction with wider non-Muslim society at both individual and institutional levels is of paramount importance in understanding the formation and perpetuation of the social, economic and political exclusion of British-Muslims. Building on this assertion participant narratives were used to explore the relationship between the Muslim ‘body’, in which the body is always more than the physical corporeal object, but rather a social object, to focus on sartorial choice and various forms of social exclusion.
experienced by the participants. It has been shown how the gendered nature of Islamophobia experienced by participants is built upon ingrained patriarchal assumptions prevalent within mainstream British society and mediated through the reproduction of gendered Orientalist discourses that attribute certain qualities as inherent to Muslims. In doing so it was shown how the symbolic identification of Muslims through the embodiment of Islamic symbols based on sartorial choice and personal grooming preferences results in their neo-Orientalist stigmatisation, particularly focusing on the multifaceted, more nuanced impact of exclusion experienced by Muslim women.

Participant narratives frequently referred to sartorial choice and how such choices impact on both the way in which they are received by wider society and the level of acceptance and exclusion they experienced, citing the mediatised nature of symbolically Islamic attire such as the beard, the wearing of modest clothing, and, perhaps most notably, the practice of veiling. This symbolic identification of Muslims through embodiment of Islamic symbols based on sartorial choice and personal grooming preferences was seen to result in the neo-Orientalist stigmatisation of British-Muslims. Drawing on wider empirical research, the impact of how the symbolic Muslim body is stigmatised within governed spaces such as the workplace has been explored. A more detailed analysis of gendered Islamophobia focusing particularly on forms of exclusion experienced by Muslim women was then given as there is little analysis of its multifaceted, more nuanced impact on Muslim women. Female participants’ experience of Islamophobia were analysed to illuminate the social construction of Muslim women and the attendant denigration of Islam, focusing in particular on the ‘veil discourse’ and their understanding of this practice. Aspects of Western feminism have been identified as undermining and belittling such Islamic practices and fallaciously locating Muslim women as victims of Islamic patriarchy. It also highlighted how this ‘knowledge’ discourse has even been employed as a
justification for Western State intervention over the Muslim female ‘body’ and how British-Muslim women are constrained by the ‘double bind’ that arises from the common assertion that Muslim women are both victim of, and complicit in, the patriarchal oppression that is allegedly inherent within Islam. In exploring participant motivations for and the values placed on the practice of veiling such as enforced veiling, veiling as a fashion statement, the veil as a private symbol of Islamic devotion, and the veil as an expression of feminism. To illuminate this practice further, Homi Bhabha’s (1990, 1994) conceptualisation of the ‘Third Space’ was applied to demonstrate how individual female participants’ motivations for veiling are both novel and oppositional, in that they stand outside the constraints of both the neo-Orientalist discursive formation of veiling and patriarchal Islamic izzat [honour] practices.

An interactionist perspective to participant’s narratives was also applied to illustrate how choosing to wear Islamic dress spoils attempts at impression management to render the Muslim body stigmatised. Participant narratives showed how the ‘performances’ of Muslim actors have moved from being accepted as normal by the wider non-Muslim population only for the Muslim ‘body’ to become increasingly stigmatised over the past decade. In short, visible Muslim signifiers confirm a Muslim ‘otherness’ for the majority non-Muslim population. Such narratives align with the findings of other empirical studies, indicating that Islamic dress increases the likelihood of experiencing Islamophobia (see Mythen et al, 2012; Spalek and McDonald, 2010).

The practice of veiling has come under attack in media and political discourse, with the symbiotic relationship between social attitudes and media, political and legislative constructions discussed above serving to cement the practice of veiling as an alien, oppressive and archaic practice which has no place in British society. Consequently, the female Muslim body has become a public battlefield both in the United Kingdom and on
the world stage, with the Muslim female body becoming a powerful political commodity. This discursive formation has created ‘knowledge’ about Muslim women that has permeated all strata within society, providing a justification for Western State intervention to secure ‘rights’ over the Muslim female ‘body’ and even a decidedly thin rationale for military intervention in Afghanistan. The most common and widely disseminated interpretation attaches veiling to Islamic oppression, whilst specialised academic discussion has mostly deemed the practice as one of resistance to Western hegemony. The data generated in this study suggests the practice of veiling epitomises the creative essence of the Third Space in which ‘newness enters the world’ (Bhabha, 1994, p.303), with participants creating meanings for veiling beyond both internally imposed izzat practices and Western imposed discourses of Islamic patriarchy.

Layers of resistance: opposition, ambiguity and duality

In relation to the fourth emergent theme, analysis of the data supported the fluidity of British-Muslim identity. Participants continually referenced the spatial and temporal nature of their impression management particularly with regard to sartorial expression and the notion of chameleonism - considered here as a form of mimicry - where participants variously identify and disassociate themselves according to context.

Applying Bhabha’s work to the analysis of the sample’s narrative, participants demonstrated their embodied liminality through various ‘new’ behaviours. For instance ‘cultural cherry picking’; this allows the liminal person to choose the cultural aspects from all their identity facets they find the most appealing. The analysis aligns with an anti-essentialist understanding of identity, in that participant testimonies showed it to be in constant production through various enunciative behaviours. These are behaviours, not
thoughts and this transgression in the act is typified by ‘performing the moderate Muslim’. Evidenced in Chapter Five through participant narratives, this involves a vocalisation of the progressive qualities of Islam, utilised in social interaction with non-Muslims when Islamic belief is challenged. Some participants reported choosing to subvert, through discussion and actions, existing binary constructs of Islam, thereby rupturing existing beliefs to pave the way for different meanings. One such act is the embodiment of transgression in the Third Space in the form of the ‘hijabista’; used to describe a Muslim woman who combines modest dress, including veiling, with Western fashion forward style. The transgressive quality in this act is the combination of traditional Islamic practice and Western fashion, which in an Orientalist worldview would be constructed as opposites.

Participant narratives were used to illuminate the complex of multifaceted forms of resistance peculiar to the hybridised British-Muslim ‘self’ not only in response to structural factors such as Islamophobia, foreign policy or repressive counter-terrorism legislation, but as a response in part to internal factors emanating from within the ummah itself and the British-Muslim community. Respondents in the sample asserted aspects of their hybridised experiences through which they felt compelled to reject the strategies of resistance that they employed. Focal points of internal resistance were evident across the sample such as the misinterpretation or corruption of Islam and the adherence to inherited quasi-Islamic cultural practices over scriptural Islam at both familial and the community levels. Meyer’s notion of ‘Minority Stress’ (2003) was applied to illuminate the psychological impact and coping strategies employed by participants to counter the effects of the chronic stigmatisation experienced by British-Muslims.

In reflecting on the novel contribution to knowledge made by the thesis, it is fair to say that this can be located at different levels: conceptual, theoretical, empirical, and policy based. Rather than seeking to explicitly test existing theories, this thesis has instead sought
to deploy theories in order to develop new concepts. As such, it seeks to make a rounded contribution that has built a panoramic view of young British-Muslims, utilising theory, growing new concepts through the application of GTM principles and providing an evaluation and critique of counter-terrorism and security policies.

This research study generated two areas of new knowledge. Firstly, it has added to existing knowledge regarding the impacts of extensive surveillance on British-Muslims (Mythen et al., 2013; Choudhury, 2012; Allen, 2010). Secondly, it creates new knowledge around impression management strategies, embodiment and gender by stretching concepts in existing theory and the development of new concepts. Although the notion of a double-bind is an established sociological concept it has had limited, if any application to young female British-Muslims in the post 9/11 context. A minority of female participants reported being subject to both cultural pressures to conform to embodied izzat practices whilst simultaneously experiencing pressure to assimilate to ‘Western’ feminist values. Neither pressure understands nor yields to the other, rendering the participants at the centre in a double-bind. The thesis proposes the double-bind of Muslim women as being positioned between two contrasting belief systems, neither of which yields to the other. This excludes those women who find themselves in this situation from being able to express every facet of their identity in either context. Additionally this Orientalist attitude in some types of feminism hinders the emancipation of genuine victims by blocking avenues it claims to open.

In addition to the double-bind of Muslim women is the concept of ‘chameleonism’. Although rooted in Homi Bhabha’s ‘mimicry’ (1994), it diverges from actual emulation to projecting a performance that indicates an appearance of being the same as non-Muslims. Whilst it is a Third Space behaviour because it characteristically occurs at the threshold of Muslimness and Britishness it also aligns with Erving Goffman’s impression management
strategies (1959) in that it allows the individual to move between various social situations blending (or not blending) into the background according to how the context suits internal beliefs.

This thesis specifically contributes to the development of new knowledge through its application of Minority Stress Theory to illuminate the emotional and psychological impact of coping strategies employed to counter the effects of Islamophobia and the chronic social stigmatisation experienced by young British-Muslims. As discussed in Chapter Eight, the Minority Stress perspective provides a framework which enables an understanding of the emotional and psychological impact of chronic stigmatisation on marginalised individuals at the micro-level and, as such, encompasses both expectation of conflict and the coping strategies or vigilant behaviours employed by individuals to reduce the likelihood of conflict. Whilst this model has previously been applied to the LGBT community and those with disabilities it had not, until now, been applied to Muslim communities. Therefore, the application of Minority Stress to the data presented in Chapter Eight is both original and ground-breaking. In addition to the application of Minority Stress Theory, the data showed the use of Islamic scripture for the purposes of self-empowerment. Whilst there is some academic discussion of inherited Islamic traditions being replaced by specifically Hathidic and Quranic traditions (Akhtar, 2013), Chapter Seven provides a detailed analysis of the use of the Quran and Hadith for personal empowerment. Specifically, many young female British-Muslims using scripture to overcome aspects of patriarchy associated with izzat. Female participants asserted it is now commonplace in certain contexts to utilise Islamic knowledge to challenge long-standing gender inequalities for personal self-empowerment.

Throughout the thesis it has been demonstrated that Muslims suffer multiple socio-economic deprivations, multi-levelled exclusions and, as a result, are prone to suffering
negative psychological and emotional impacts. The implications of the findings presented here for counter-terrorism and security policies are clear, blanket surveillance and potentially ostracising the British-Muslim community as a whole accentuates both mistrust of security agencies and encourages feelings of disenfranchisement and exclusion.

The final part of the thesis will be given over to four recommendations in the light of the data discussed throughout the analysis chapters. Firstly, Chapters One and Six highlighted the ambiguity of key terms in counter-terrorism legislation that leaves a large margin of discretionary power to the State to allow legal mechanisms to restrict British-Muslim rights that are protected under the Human Rights Act (1998). It is therefore recommended that tighter definitions of terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘radicalisation’, ‘glorification’ and ‘justification’ are put in place in order to focus on individuals who may be reasonably suspected of intent to commit, finance or incite terrorism, whilst reducing any potential infringement of individual rights for the British-Muslim community as a whole. Secondly, the analysis of embodied Islam, particularly the practice of veiling in Chapter Seven, highlights how media and mainstream political discourses conflate such practices with anti-Britishness. Consequently a public defence of the right to freedom of religion is needed, even for those who choose to adopt beliefs, traditions and practices that do not align with dominant cultural practices. Thirdly, as the analysis in Chapter Six shows, double standards in Western foreign policy at the expense of Muslim lives and resources is a continuing significant source of frustration, distress and anger amongst British-Muslims. State recognition that the invasion of Iraq and subsequent killing of civilians, resource appropriation and ongoing catastrophic consequences for the region were the result of the deliberate endorsement of false intelligence is required. In addition to this, an acknowledgement is needed that such foreign policy decisions have a significant effect on the likelihood of domestic terrorist events. Lastly, the multiple deprivations, inequalities
and discrimination faced by British-Muslims, as highlighted in Chapters One and Six, means that longstanding issues of social exclusion within the British-Muslim community must be meaningfully tackled, with the implementation of strategies to address social processes that hinder higher educational participation and employment opportunities in particular.
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