On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms

Christodoulou, George, Sgouritsa, Alkmini and Tang, Bo (2015) On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms. .

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Abstract

We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial auctions where m all-pay auctions run in parallel, one for each good. For fractionally subadditive valuations, we strengthen the upper bound from 2 [Syrgkanis and Tardos STOC'13] to 1.82 by proving some structural properties that characterize the mixed Nash equilibria of the game. Next, we design an all-pay mechanism with a randomized allocation rule for the multi- unit auction. We show that, for bidders with submodular valuations, the mechanism admits a unique, 75% efficient, pure Nash equilibrium. The efficiency of this mechanism outperforms all the known bounds on the price of anarchy of mechanisms used for multi-unit auctions. Finally, we analyze single-item all-pay auctions motivated by their connection to contests and show tight bounds on the price of anarchy of social welfare, revenue and maximum bid.

Item Type:	Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Additional Information:	26 pages, 2 figures, European Symposium on Algorithms(ESA) 2015
Uncontrolled Keywords:	cs.GT, cs.GT
Subjects:	?? QA75 ??
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	08 Jun 2016 09:43
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 07:36
DOI:	10.1007/978-3-662-48350-3_30
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3001549

Available Versions of this Item

• On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms. (deposited 29 Jun 2015 07:46)
  • On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms. (deposited 20 Jul 2015 08:26)
    • On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms. (deposited 08 Jun 2016 09:43) [Currently Displayed]