The Spillover of Misery
A critical investigation into the social purpose of European integration using the case study of migration management

Thesis submitted in accordance with the requirements of the University of Liverpool for the degree Doctor in Philosophy by

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30/05/2016
Acknowledgements

First and foremost I want to thank my first supervisor Dr Claes Belfrage. Writing a PhD thesis is a perilous, painstaking and enriching experience. While I drifted out into open waters at least a dozen times, Claes pulled me safely back ashore. His vast knowledge, critical insight, approachability and optimism have made this dissertation possible. I also want to thank my second supervisor Prof Robin Holt. Robin always had an eye for the big picture and was keen to remind me of it.

Apart from my academic guides, I want to thank my family. Many, if not most of the ideas presented in this thesis have their origin in conversations I had with my wife Alexandra. She read my work, helped me with my field research in Greece, hugged me when I thought that I’d never finish and inspired me with original arguments. If they do not appear original, this is because I have failed to convey them. Some of these pages were written while I held my daughter Katerina in my arms, who was born in August 2015 – her cuteness kept me going. I also thank my parents, who have provided tremendous support throughout my academic endeavours.

Furthermore, I want to thank Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the University of Liverpool – I hope that their trust in me was not misplaced and I thank them wholeheartedly for not having to worry about money throughout my doctoral studies.

I also want to thank God, with whom all is possible.
Abstract

Title The Spillover of Misery: a critical investigation into the social purpose of European integration using the case study of migration management

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Irregular migrants, being defined as asylum seekers, refugees and clandestinos (people in the EU without a valid residency permit), live as a subaltern group at the fringes of European society. They are materially deprived and excluded from regular political culture. In part, this condition stems from the institutions of European integration, such as the Dublin Regulation. This dissertation attempts to understand irregular migrant subalternity by exploring its structural causes. Irregular migration and its management is used as a case study to contribute towards a deeper understanding of the social purpose of European integration.

Methodologically, this thesis relies on Critical Grounded Theory. This novel approach is rooted in critical realism and thus rejects the *tabula rasa*-view of traditional Grounded Theory, maintaining that empirics and theory should continuously inform one another. The Gramscian concept of hegemony is employed to contextualise European integration within neofunctionalism as an ideological practice and neoliberalism as a hegemonic agenda. Vulgar neofunctionalism postulates that integration occurs as the result of spillover of one policy area into another and that European integration is pushed forward by technocratic elites. To illustrate the relationship between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism, to lay bare the consequences of neoliberal and neofunctionalist practices, and to further capture the social purpose of European integration, fieldwork was carried out in five locations (Brussels, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and Germany) with different groups of interviewees (European Commission staff, national public officials, asylum seekers, clandestinos, fruit farm workers, asylum accommodation staff).
It was found that neoliberal neofunctionalism has generated a common outlook on migratory movements which has resulted in the partial harmonisation of asylum legislation and the simultaneous fortification of the EU’s external border. This has had a significant impact on the lives of irregular migrants, who are exposed to reification, commodification, biopolitics, the state of exception, xenophobia and lacking recognition. The emergence of group consciousness is undermined, preventing them from overcoming subalternity. The social purpose of European integration is identified as the (increasingly authoritarian) neoliberal restructuring of the EU which relies on neofunctionalism as its vehicle and justification. This restructuring is self-contradictory as it aims at neoliberalism while producing nationalism, biopolitics and the EU’s deepening internal division. Within the context of the European Union’s democratic deficit and the weakness of social democracy, nationalism may represent an alternative to neoliberalism, speeding up the EU’s disintegration.
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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CARA</td>
<td>Accommodation Centres for Asylum Seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAS</td>
<td>Common European Asylum System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGT</td>
<td>Critical Ground Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMECON</td>
<td>Council for Mutual Economic Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG HOME</td>
<td>Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DG</td>
<td>Directorate-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>EASO</td>
<td>European Asylum Support Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>European Cultural Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECHR</td>
<td>European Convention on Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECRE</td>
<td>European Council on Refugees and Exiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECtHR</td>
<td>European Court of Human Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMS</td>
<td>European Monetary System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMU</td>
<td>Economic and Monetary Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERT</td>
<td>European Roundtable of Industrialists</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>European Union Border Assistance Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>Foreign Direct Investment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>GT</td>
<td>Grounded Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTM</td>
<td>Grounded Theory Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>IBM</td>
<td>Integrated Border Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organisation for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSF</td>
<td>Doctors Without Borders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOAS</td>
<td>Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPD</td>
<td>National Democratic Party of Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDF</td>
<td>Portable Document Format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAA</td>
<td>Association for Intercultural Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAGRES</td>
<td>Service Activations for Growing Eurosur's Success</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPRAR</td>
<td>Protection System for Refugees and Asylum Seekers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Transnational Capitalist Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNCTAD</td>
<td>United Nations Conference on Trade and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United National High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States (of America)</td>
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“For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of this world, against spiritual wickedness in high places.”

Ephesians 6, 12¹

¹ Scripture quotations from The Authorized (King James) Version. Rights in the Authorized Version in the United Kingdom are vested in the Crown. Reproduced by permission of the Crown’s patentee, Cambridge University Press.
Introduction

In April 2011 I visited the European Parliament in Brussels during its annual open day. While it is usually difficult to enter buildings hosting a European institution, this day represents an exception, and the huge corridors of the Alterio Spinelli building were teeming with life. Being interested in migration issues, I came across a policy brief produced by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs, published by the European Parliament and edited by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union. On page 14 one finds the following excerpt under the heading 'Barrier operations – shielding the global rich from the tensions and problems of the poor':

“As the ratio of the world population living in misery and frustration will remain massive the tensions and spillover between their world and that of the rich will continue to grow. Current trends indicate that our efforts to solve this problem at its root – by curing the dysfunctional conditions prevailing among some 60 percent of the global population – are likely to fail in a significant share of the world. If so the need to strengthen our barriers against the spillover of misery will grow. This is a morally distasteful strategy, but will be unavoidable if we cannot solve the problems at their root” (Ries, 2010, 14).

These words truly struck me. Human beings were being described as spillover – like the wasted liquid you reluctantly wipe off after having chosen the wrong setting on your coffee machine. What left me truly shaken however, is that even the staunchest idealist would have to admit, that in practice the author of this policy brief was not entirely wrong – Europe cannot absorb every human being living in poverty into its own society, even if it wanted to. What I read epitomised this dilemma of European migration management.

Nevertheless, I knew that there was something profoundly wrong with this depiction. I had the feeling that Europe had done its share in the production of the misery we supposedly needed to protect ourselves from. Furthermore, this ‘distasteful’ Europe was not the one that the buildings I stood in represented – it
was not the visionary Europe of openness, freedom of speech, wealth and human rights.

From research I did for my Bachelor thesis in Malta, I knew that the ‘spillover of misery’ that made it across the border often lived in a state of utter exclusion. These individuals, who arrived in Europe not with a regular visa but as irregular migrants,\(^2\) live at the fringes of our society. They are materially deprived, excluded from the basic provisions of social welfare, and unable to participate in the regular political culture. Often an asylum application is the sole means of acquiring a regular European residency permit, even though many of those arriving are not technically refugees. The Dublin Regulation in turn, which is the corner stone of the European asylum system (European Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2013), determines that the first country where an asylum seeker has entered the EU is responsible for her asylum application. As a result of that system, asylum seekers are forced to remain within certain member states at the EU’s external border, which are then overwhelmed by the large numbers of new immigrants, erecting new barriers to prevent further immigration. At the time of my field research, Greece, Spain and Bulgaria had already set up fences along their borders with non-EU countries (see Epilogue for current developments). For the migrants and refugees affected, the mirage of ‘normative power Europe’\(^3\) had disappeared, and the EU as a civilizational project had failed. This dilapidation is the social problem that I want to address in this dissertation.

Fortunately as a student of European integration I thought I knew where to start. If European integration and the Dublin Regulation are related to precarious state of irregular migrants in Europe, I wanted to trace back the origins these institutions. The emergence of the ‘Dublin system’ was the result of the abolition of border controls with the Schengen Agreement. One theory of European integration is particularly concerned with this ‘spillover’ of integration from one policy area (in this case internal migration and transport) to another (immigration policy): neofunctionalism (Haas, 1958). The theory regards European integration

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\(^2\) The term irregular migrants is used throughout this dissertation to commonly refer to asylum seekers, clandestinos and refugees. Asylum seekers are people who have submitted an asylum application. Clandestinos are people who reside in the EU illegally without a valid residency permit. Refugees have successfully applied for asylum.

\(^3\) The idea of ‘normative power Europe’ was presented by Ian Manners in 2002. He argued that rather than as a military power, we should think of the EU as a ‘normative power’, which aims to reproduce its own ethical principles across the globe.
as an incremental process that is proliferated by a technocratic governance apparatus to eventually culminate into a European federal state. I was sceptical about the theory from the very beginning – it is strongly positivist⁴ (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003) and lacks an understanding of structural power, which Strange defines as “the power to shape and determine the structures [within which institutions] operate” (1994, 25). However, apart from that, during my research into neofunctionalism and its analysis of European migration management it became clear that the European institutions refer to the logic of spillover to justify the need for further integration. The Eurodac Regulation for example (Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2013) creates a database of biometric data of all persons who have entered the EU irregularly and is thereby clearly relevant for policy and domestic security policy. At the same time it explicitly has for its objective the “effective application” of the Dublin Regulation (ibid.). This led me to develop the initial conceptualisation of neofunctionalism not merely as a theory of integration, but as an ideology that has, in part, shaped the integration process. During my explorative fieldwork I carried out interviews with key informants in the European Commission, finding further clues that hint at this hypothesis. If neofunctionalism had indeed informed the integration process, it is not surprising that the evolution of European asylum policy was strikingly close to neofunctionalist predictions.

However, in the history of European integration there were numerous critical junctures at which the integration process might easily have taken a turn into a very different direction. The abolition of border controls led to the introduction of the Dublin system, but a different outcome could equally be imagined. The country responsible for an asylum application could for instance be determined using a system of quotas, where each EU member state handles a fixed share of all applications. This would have avoided countries along the EU’s external borders from being overwhelmed, and the humanitarian situation of the asylum seekers themselves would be vastly improved. Why was one outcome given preference over another? To answer this question, one would have to understand the social purpose of European integration (van Apeldoorn, 2002):

⁴ Positivism refers to an understanding of social science as being in essence no different from natural science.
who benefits from the EU? Who is it for? Who is excluded from the benefits of the integration process, and what is it like to be excluded? How does migration management and its fallout reflect the EU’s social purpose? If I could find answers to these questions, I would be able to understand why one outcome of the integration process occurred rather than other. I could attempt to show why irregular migrants are stuck in a precarious state, and thereby deliver a critique of European integration.

Nevertheless, if the purpose of this dissertation is to say something about European integration by looking at the case of European migration management, it ought to be explained why the latter represents an appropriate case study. I argue that this is the case for three main reasons. Firstly, irregular migration poses a challenge to one of the most important historical success stories of European integration: the abolition of border controls. If the EU’s external frontiers are insufficiently controlled and if the Dublin system seizes to operate as planned, member states may see themselves confronted with a situation pushing them to re-establish controls on their internal boundaries. Secondly, irregular migrants live on the fringes of the European Union. They are often excluded from political culture, materially deprived and excluded from basic provisions of the welfare state. Often they do not speak the languages of their host communities. They are therefore particularly exposed to the social fallout of European integration, which in turn may reveal the social purpose of the process. Thirdly, but far from least, the EU was developed as a civilisational project to reign in the dehumanising, destructive powers that the European wars had unleashed between 1914 and 1945. The failure to integrate asylum seekers and clandestinos into its society would imply the failure of the EU as a civilisational project.

Given the work I had already done, which allowed me to crystallise my research agenda, I employ the methodology of Critical Grounded Theory to structure and inform this dissertation (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). CGT does not necessarily determine research design, but rather guides the research and theorisation process as a whole. It rests on the principle of retroduction, which attempts to explain phenomena by proposing and identifying mechanisms which could produce them (Sayer, 1992). Retroduction inquires into the conditions and mechanisms that make the occurrence of a particular phenomenon possible.
(Easton, 2010; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). It calls for a conversation between the abstract and the concrete. It embraces the epistemology and ontology of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1986), which postulates that there is an objective underlying reality, that we cannot perceive of it or accurately describe it. We can only hope to produce approximations of it, knowing that some approximations are better than others. As such, all theory is tentative, always dependent on space, time as well as on the structural conditions within which it is meant to apply. Retroduction therefore requires flexibility and openness to new research findings and theories. The retroductive process of CGT is an exploration of knowledge. It arguably reflects what actually happens in many fields of science, although the predominance of the positivist paradigm prevents researchers from acknowledging how knowledge is actually formed.

In practice, the CGT process begins with the identification of a social problem, which in my case was the precarious situation of irregular migrants. At first, this social problem is provisionally conceptualised using everyday and scientific theories. While neofunctionalism is certainly not a theory that most Europeans are familiar with, it is arguably the most commonly referenced theory of European integration. These theories are then explored and initial conceptualisations are developed, which is reflected in my conclusion that neofunctionalism has had an impact on European migration management in particular, and European integration in general. Explorative fieldwork is carried out to test these initial conceptualisations. Thereupon a further theoretical review is carried out, which is grounded through more elaborate field research. The infusion of the results of this second fieldwork stage with the theoretical review results in the creation of a critical grounded theory (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015).

CGT’s rooting in critical realism, and the fact that a social problem represents the starting point of the retroductive process, makes the theory particularly suitable for the use of critical approaches to social science. As opposed to a positivist theory like neofunctionalism, critical theories aim at the liberation of “human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, 244). Critical theories acknowledge that the production of knowledge is always for “some purpose” (Cox, 1981, 128). While positivism aims at problem-solving, critical theories aim at human emancipation: “The philosophers have hitherto
only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1981). As such, this dissertation not only strives to contribute to a deeper understanding the condition of irregular migrants and the state of European integration, but also attempts to contribute to the improvement of irregular migrants’ circumstances.

During the review of the relevant literature it emerged that one of the most promising avenues for this endeavour was developed by Antonio Gramsci in the 1920s and 1930s. Rather than on a research agenda, Gramsci placed his emphasis on an agenda for social change. As one of the founding members of the Communist Party of Italy, Gramsci found himself confronted with widespread social injustice. He was frustrated by the complacency of those social groups he called subaltern or subordinate, viewing theory as a tool for these groups to understand their own situation and to eventually emerge out of it. Gramsci conceptualised social leadership using the word ‘hegemony’, by which he meant the practice of leadership. This leadership is not necessarily malevolent. Indeed, subaltern groups can exercise hegemony within a class alliance. Crucially, leadership is not established (only) by force, but by a wide range of social institutions and conventions Gramsci refers to as the ‘hegemonic apparatus’ (1971; 1992). The state can be a part of the hegemonic apparatus – but Gramsci defined the state not only in terms of the government, but also in terms of universities, schools, associations or clubs. Neo-Gramscian scholars of European integration have suggested that the EU itself is part of a hegemonic project (e.g. van Apeldoorn, 2002; Horn, 2011; Bruff, 2014).

Although the lack of a socialist revolution in Western Europe is arguably the starting point of Gramsci’s political thought, the author is often limited to the national point of view. In the case of European migration management, this is problematic. Firstly, the European Union transcends the nation state, but also has not developed fully fledged statehood – the category of the national thus cannot be applied to it. Secondly, the phenomenon of migration inherently goes beyond national boundaries. Some authors have thus attempted to translate Gramsci’s writings to the international level (e.g. Gill, 2003; Cox, 1981). However, these attempts have sometimes resulted in hegemony having been defined narrowly in terms of domination, which does injustice to Gramsci multi-faceted and complex use of the term. In this dissertation I am suggesting two possible avenues into
expanding the neo-Gramscian point of view to the global realm. Firstly, a more careful reading of Gramsci shows that he was indeed concerned with the international. He acknowledged that capitalism works differently very differently in different countries, which was arguably precisely the reason for why he favoured the national level in his analysis of hegemony (Shilliam, 2004). Secondly, the insights of dependency theory have much to add to Gramsci’s conceptualisation of the global (Dos Santos, 1971; Frank, 1972). This theory was developed in an effort to comprehend why some global regions seemingly remain perpetually stuck in a state of dependency to other global regions. It can provide insight into the causes of migration as well as into the structure of the European Union, where some regions also appear disadvantaged. As both Gramscian theory and dependency theory are rooted in Marxism, they can be used in conjunction, allowing them to be used for the development of a more nuanced and insightful understanding of European integration and migration management.

Critical scholars of European integration, and neo-Gramscians in particular, have argued that the EU is undergoing a period of neoliberal transformation (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Cafruny & Ryner, 2007; Becker & Jäger, 2012): aspects of the welfare state are becoming privatised (Cafruny & Ryner, 2003); nation states’ ability to act is being eroded through the introduction of upper limits to public spending (Bruff, 2014); the fight against inflation is given priority over the fight against unemployment (van Apeldoorn, 2003); the liberalisation of the financial markets has increased the concentration of capital in the hands of fewer people (Overbeek, 2012). The purpose of neoliberalism is to create better condition for the accumulation and concentration of transnational capital. European integration has been highjacked to become a tool towards the achievement of this goal.

Although this valuable literature thus provides insight into the social purpose of contemporary European integration, it contains some shortcomings. Firstly, it contains a bias towards the elites and rather underrepresents the role of subaltern groups such as irregular migrants (Horn, 2011). Hence this dissertation aims to shed light on whether the experiences of irregular migrants can contribute to a deeper understanding of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Secondly, while my explorative work has shown that neofunctionalism has influenced the trajectory
of European integration, the role of neofunctionalism in Europe’s neoliberal transformation has not received sufficient attention. I therefore aim to locate the practice of neofunctionalist integration within the account of neo-Gramscian European integration theory, which furthers our insight into European integration’s social purpose.

Through this dissertation I aim to contribute to a deeper understanding of the social purpose of European integration by means of an examination of European migration management. I attempt to do so through a literature review of key texts on critical European integration theory and through an examination of the role of neofunctionalism in Europe’s neoliberal transformation. However, the protagonists of this dissertation are not elites, but the irregular migrants themselves. Through fieldwork in Bulgaria, Greece, Italy and Germany I mean to bring the stories and experiences of clandestinos, asylum seekers and refugees into the spotlight, which highlight the fallout of contemporary European integration. By outlining the phenomena it produces, the European integration’s social purpose can be better understood. My thesis comprises of seven chapters, which reflect the structure of the CGT methodology. While the first chapter develops and explores the research agenda, the second, third and fourth chapters build up the methodology. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present the empirical material and draw conclusions in relation to the research agenda.

Chapter 1 represents a critique of neofunctionalism. It analyses in particular the neofunctionalist concept of spillover, which suggests that integration advances because the delegation of one competence to the European institutions creates pressure to similarly integrate other areas: European integration creates spillover effects and thus the necessity to create further institutions. The moments in time when the need for further integration arises are called ‘crises’, highlighting that according to the neofunctionalist logic crises are actually instrumental to the integration process. The work of Phillippe Schmitter (1971) is singled out as the most elaborate formulation of neofunctionalist theory, building the foundation for an application of neofunctionalism to the empirical case study of migration management. After briefly discussion the evolution of the European asylum system through the theoretical lens of neofunctionalism, the
chapter begins its critique. Firstly, it addresses intergovernmentalism which has traditionally been represented as neofunctionalism’s major antagonist. Intergovernmentalism emphasises the role of the nation state in advancing integration while neofunctionalism emphasises the role of the supranational institutions. The intergovernmentalist critique is valid insofar as states are clearly important gatekeepers in the area of migration management. Thereupon neofunctionalism’s epistemological and ontological roots in positivism are discussed in detail. Neofunctionalism lacks hermeneutic insight; it is somewhat able to explain how European integration advances, but it is utterly unable to understand the social purpose of integration. In this respect intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism are in fact strikingly similar, highlighting that the former theory is by no means a viable alternative to the study of the contemporary European Union. The chapter further discusses neofunctionalism’s inability to address structural power as one of the main causes of its failure to understand social purpose. However, the most important point of the chapter is that neofunctionalism has in fact become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This implies that the accuracy of the theory’s predictions may in fact not be due to the strength of its analytical tools, but due to its own influence on the integration process.

Chapter 2 seeks to identify alternative approaches to the study of European integration by means of a literature review, focusing in particular on neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory. While both theories are located on the Marxist spectrum of political thought, neo-Gramscian theory addresses primarily the distribution of structural power among society’s classes and social groups. Its analysis of hegemony provides an important method for understanding the location of the European project within the practice of a neoliberal hegemonic programme which works primarily in the interests of transnational capital. This provides the foundation for an exploration of the role of neofunctionalism in Europe’s neoliberal transformation. The second part of this chapter addresses dependency theory, which addresses the causes of African and Asian migratory movements towards the European continent. As neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory are to be referred to simultaneously, the ontological fit between both theories is discussed. This chapter thus defines this dissertation’s research agenda with increased clarity.
If the purpose of European integration is meant to be understood through an investigation into EU migration management and irregular migrants’ experience of it, the Gramscian category of subalternity will clearly be of significance. Chapter 3 thus attempts to discuss the concept in detail. While Gramsci’s narrative of the practice of hegemony has recently been recovered (e.g. Thomas, 2013), his treatment of ‘subalternity’ has sometimes been inaccurately employed. There has been a tendency to equate subalternity with inferiority and the Marxian lumpenproletariat. Gramsci however discusses subalternity in terms of its potential to emerge from its own subordination, continually pursuing an emancipatory agenda. The chapter also addresses neofunctionalism’s view on the subaltern. Indeed, Haas’s theory lacks the theoretical tools to deal with class issues, delegating the subaltern to the vague category of exogenous factors. The final part of this chapter discusses different ways by which neofunctionalism actually produces subalternity if put into political practice. Specifically the concepts of commodification, reification and biopolitics are addressed.

As the previous chapters have brought this dissertation’s research agenda into focus, Chapter 4 contains a discussion of its methodology and research design. It addresses the roots, claims, principles and research methods of Critical Grounded Theory. This chapter also addresses research design. Field research involved interviews with the relevant staff of national and European institutions, asylum seekers, clandestinos, irregular migrant workers and the staff of asylum accommodation facilities. My fieldwork was carried out at four locations in four different countries: Thrace (Bulgaria/Greece), Athens (Greece), Sicily (Italy) and Leipzig (Germany). The reasoning behind the recruitment process and the selection of the research locations is explained in this chapter. The interviews were subsequently transcribed, open-coded and brought into relation with the theoretical categories developed in Chapters 2 and 3.

Chapter 5 initiates the part of this dissertation which presents the research findings and draws conclusions with reference to the research questions. It establishes the context for the discussion of irregular migrants’ experience of migration management. It discusses the impact of neofunctionalism on the practice of European migration management. According to the neofunctionalist logic, the advancement of European integration in this field had to be preceded by
the emergence of a common European outlook on migration. This was facilitated by the creation of a common language to discuss this issue by European policymakers. Migration policy was transformed into an area that was no longer shaped by values and political ideas, but by technocratic decision-making. Information was supposedly all that was required to ‘manage’ irregular migration flows into the EU, and based on this knowledge, the best decisions could be taken. This has caused a seemingly contradictory development. On the internal level, spillover has resulted in the increasing harmonisation of the national asylum-regimes, leading to improved conditions for the reception of irregular migration. On the external level, the application of the spillover logic has allowed for the fortification of the EU’s external borders and the externalisation of migration management to Europe’s neighbours in Asia Minor and Northern Africa.

Within this context Chapter 6 summarises the findings that were made during field research. After contextualising irregular migrants’ experiences within the four national contexts in which it took place, these experiences are discussed in several stages that relate to the categories developed in Chapter 3. As the EU’s border regime has become ever more restrictive, irregular migrants often have no choice but to resort to the services provided by human smugglers. This experience has been linked with the concept of reification (Lukács, 1968). Upon first reception by European or national authorities, irregular migrants are screened, biometrically scanned, quarantined and vaccinated – they are thus exposed to biopolitics (Foucault, 1979). Accommodation centres are perpetually operating beyond their capacity in a permanent state of exception. The lack of regular means of immigration has facilitated the emergence of an irregular labour market for clandestinos. The subaltern state of irregular migrants and their visible manifestation of material insecurity have triggered waves of xenophobia throughout the continent which has become a significant aspects of these migrants’ everyday lives. Finally, in line with Gramsci’s emancipatory agenda, the chapter discusses the obstacles standing in the way of overcoming irregular migrants’ subalternity.

Chapter 7 returns to the research questions outlined above, bringing the findings presented in the previous two chapters into a theoretical perspective. The chapter picks up on the argument that European integration has served the social
purpose of creating conditions favourable to the accumulation of transnational capital by means of a neoliberal transformation. The chapter discusses the relationship between neoliberalism, neofunctionalism and migration management. The Washington Consensus, as the prime neoliberal development policy, is in part responsible for triggering global migratory movements. Furthermore, as neofunctionalism does not determine the development of the European Union into a particular direction, the impact of the neoliberal hegemonic programme explains why neofunctionalist integration has taken on its contemporary form. Indeed, European migration management can be seen as an instance of this neoliberal programme. Neofunctionalism in turn has served the purpose of technocratically justifying Europe’s neoliberal transformation in the context of decreasing public support, underlining that neoliberalism is becoming more authoritarian (see Bruff, 2014). The second part of this chapter addresses three contradictions that have arisen out of Europe’s neoliberal transformation, whose materialisations could be identified during field research. These contradictions have the potential to disturb the neoliberal order.

In the conclusion I will summarise the main findings of this dissertation, and I will also propose a preliminary programme that could be carried out at EU level to improve the situation of irregular migrants. I will point towards this dissertation’s shortcomings, emphasising that the CGT process is open-ended, always calling for further research.
Chapter 1: Neofunctionalism in Theory and Practice

For decades neofunctionalism had represented the obvious starting point for any theoretical discussion on European integration. It therefore represents the first proto-theory that is discussed here with reference to CGT. The theory, as developed by Ernst Haas (1958) and Leon Lindberg (1963), provided a compelling vision of the emergence of a pan-European state. Neofunctionalism puts forward that the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community had put a process in motion that would lead to ever more aspects of national sovereignty to be transferred to supranational institutions. It provided an explanation for how it was possible that states which had fought each other just a few years earlier would voluntarily embark upon their unification. As such, exploring neofunctionalism as a way to address the research agenda is an important part of the retroductive process of Critical Grounded Theory which begins with the investigation of proto theories.

This chapter represents a critique of neofunctionalism. After outlining the origins and hallmarks of the theory, it will be demonstrated how it would view the evolution of the European asylum system. Asylum is the aspect of migration management where the European institutions have the most competences, which is why it it is focused on in this chapter. On the basis of this analysis, neofunctionalism will be critiqued from several different perspectives. The theory’s positivist underpinnings, its lack of hermeneutic insight, as well as its failure to understand structural power make it inherently incapable of grasping the social purpose of European integration. In the case of migration management, its technocratic vision of governance furthermore causes it to disregard the the objects of asylum policy: asylum seekers.

Given these faults, the final argument pursued in this chapter appears particularly poignant: neofunctionalism is a self-fulfilling prophecy that has had a significant impact on the European integration process itself. While this argument is not new (White, 2003; Diez, 1999), the dangers of neofunctionalist ideology are highlighted against the backdrop of its methodological and ontological shortcomings.
Neofunctionalism in Theory

This section is going to outline neofunctionalism’s basic premises, highlighting that the theory’s primary concern is to explain why nation states are voluntarily surrendering sovereignty to a supranational institution. Nevertheless, before this can be done, the emergence of the theory ought to be placed within the intellectual context of the 1950s. Neofunctionalism can only be properly understood if its roots in functionalism and radical behaviourism are outlined.

 Origins of the Theory

David Mitrany’s formulation of functionalism (1966) provided the basis of neofunctionalist theory. Nevertheless, before addressing Mitrany’s work, I want to take one step back to examine the roots of functionalism itself. Functionalism should be regarded as an approach rather than a theory because it does not present us with a well-defined set of mechanisms of behaviour, but rather with a common agenda. Functionalists are principally concerned with finding the optimal method for the fulfilment of human needs (Niemann & Schmitter, 2009, 46). To best accomplish this task, each human being and every community are assigned a particular task in the global political system. Functionalists envision technocracy as the ideal form of government. This arguably has to do with the rise to influence of behaviourism in the United States at around the same time as functionalism. The radical behaviourist school of psychology, particularly as expressed by the works of Skinner (e.g. 1971) advocated the development of a ‘technology of behaviour’, which meant using the hypothetico-deductive method of the natural sciences to optimise human behaviour. The scientific method, which had proven so very successful in the natural sciences, could thus also be applied to human individuals, changing their behaviour, and promising the elimination of psychological disorders, the generation of optimal societal efficiency, the production of the perfect form of government and the eradication of war. In his novel Walden Two (2005) Skinner depicts his utopia in the form of a commune that adheres to the radical behaviourist principles, causing it to become perfectly
efficient, technocratically organised, and questioning the efficiency of all societal
conventions. Functionalism is thus in many ways Skinner’s radical behaviourism
as applied to the international sphere. Skinner’s (2005) idea of a ‘technology of
behaviour’ bears striking similarities to one of the founding-fathers of sociology,
Claude-Henri Saint-Simon. For Saint-Simon “science provides the means to
predict what is useful,” leading him to suggest that “scientists are superior to all
other men” (1976). Saint-Simon thus advocates a government formed by
scientists, as they can “create happiness for [themselves] and for [their]
contemporaries” (ibid.). Government is seen by Saint-Simon and Skinner as a
managerial task, which requires no elections. Through his character Frazier,
Skinner states in Walden Two that “to suggest that everyone should take an interest
[in government] would seem as fantastic as to suggest that everyone should
become familiar with our Diesel engines” (Skinner, 2005, 254). The best method
of government can be determined by scientific examination. This is in fact how
neofunctionalism portrays governance to be carried out, that it is an elite
endeavour, and that the technicalities of the problems involved can only be
understood by experts.

Mitrany’s functionalism was concerned with finding the perfect way to
conduct international relations. Rosamond states that “the foundations of
functionalism reside in a positive view of human possibility, and, to some extent,
of human nature” (2000, 31). Functionalists believed that politics ought to be
about finding a way to optimally fulfil human needs, which could only be
achieved through international cooperation. Global peace and collaboration was
thus regarded as very much possible, if not inevitable. Mitrany was very sceptical
about the ability of the nation state to optimally fulfil human needs, which is why
some tasks are best delegated to the international (or supranational) level.
Although Mitrany’s “functionalism offers a largely technocratic vision of human
governance” (ibid., 33), it is also highly normative by all standards, as it wants to
contribute to the eradication of war, and as it is very critical of the role of the
nation state, which Harrison states is Mitrany’s “basic enemy” (1974, 28).
Mitrany was dismissive of European integration, because he believed in a global
union rather than in a European union. He argued that “between the conception
of continental unions and that of a universal league there is a difference not merely
of degree but of essence,” because “the one would proceed in the old way by a definition of territory,” while the other would proceed “by definition of functions” (Mitrany, 1933, 116). For him the inefficiencies of statism and nationalism were simply transferred to the European level, which he did not regard as a significant step forward.

Mitrany believed that states were essentially a means towards safeguarding the fulfilment of human needs (1933). However, particularly within the context of the wave of European nationalism in the early 20th century, “the state [...] had become an end in itself” (Rosamond, 2000, 34). Mitrany was critical of this development because he had realised that states were materially interdependent; the concept of states hindered flexible and creative thinking about an alternative form of government, and states were incapable of dealing with the newly-emerging double-responsibility of providing for security and welfare. Mitrany thus thought that “the ‘material’ interdependence of states meant that the necessary innovative thinking ought to yield at least a measure of transnational creativity to solve problems of public management, distribution, welfare and communication” (ibid., 35). This idea can be regarded as the starting point of European integration, and also of Haas’ neofunctionalism.

**Explaining European Integration**

The story of neofunctionalism begins with a question that posed a veritable puzzle for political scientists of the 1950s: why is it that states voluntarily surrender parts of their sovereignty to a supranational institution? Indeed, against the backdrop of the dominance of Morgenthau’s realism (Morgenthau, 2006), the question seems truly perplexing; if national interests are at the core of foreign policy formulation, as Morgenthau claims, it seems irrational to establish an institution that effectively erodes policy autonomy to pursue those interests. In his preface to *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas argues that European integration may be seen as an “instance of voluntary ‘integration’ taking place before [the political scientist’s] eyes, as it were under laboratory conditions” (Haas, 1958, xi). European integration formed a nearly ideal case study for anyone wishing to tackle this research puzzle, and neofunctionalism emerged as the dominant approach to understanding European
integration. Haas formulates his research agenda very clearly, stating that “my aim is merely the dissection of the actual ‘integration process’ in order to derive propositions about its nature” (ibid., xii). By answering the question of how European integration occurs, Haas could equally address why it happens. Nevertheless, as Rosamond underlines, “neofunctionalism arose in a set of particularly extraordinary political circumstances and it cannot really be evaluated without recognition of that fact” (2000, 54). It is therefore meaningful to begin outlining the hallmarks of neofunctionalism by placing the emergence of the theory within the context of the founding of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.

When Ernst Haas published *The Uniting of Europe* in 1958, European integration was gathering momentum. The European project began with an attempt to create a common market for the French and West German coal and steel industries in 1951. Coal and steel were regarded as the essential raw materials for an economy that was geared towards war, and placing their production under a supranational authority was thought to make war between France and West Germany too costly to contemplate. By 1958, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) had evolved into the EEC, which would later remove tariffs on trade between its member states, and which brought about a Common Agricultural Policy (Bainbridge & Teasdale, 1995). The pace of early European integration was so impressive that various other regional integration attempts were launched around the globe, albeit with less success.

Numerous links can be drawn between neofunctionalism and policy practice – a fact underlined by Schmitter, when he states that “a good deal” of the explanatory strength of neofunctionalism draws “from using concepts which are rather close to the categories used by decisionmakers” (1971, 234). An analysis of the Schuman Declaration can serve as a useful starting point for understanding Haas’ theory. The Schuman Declaration, made by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, is identified by Manners (2011) as one of the major symbols of European integration. The 9th of May is since 1964 celebrated annually as Europe Day, and various rituals are performed to remember the beginning of the creation of the European Union. The Schuman Declaration is furthermore immensely helpful to understanding neofunctionalism, as it
summarises the ‘Monnet method of integration’, which describes the strategy that was to be employed to initiate European solidarity, and that was meant to culminate in a European federation. The Monnet method can be summarised using the following seven points, which have been adapted from Rosamond (2000, 51-2) with some alterations:

1. Integration must begin in an area of ‘low politics’ (i.e. an area not deemed essential to the survival of the state) which is nevertheless strategically significant. The Schuman Declaration identifies the coal and steel industry as suitable for these criteria, arguing that the creation of a common market for coal in steel in France and Germany would make “any war between [those two countries] not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible” (Schuman, 1950). Furthermore, the coal and steel industry forms the basis of the manufacturing industry, and numerous sectors of the economy are functionally linked to it.

2. To coordinate the integration process, a High Authority (i.e. Commission) should be put in place. This allowed for the circumvention of constant clashes between national interests, and overrode the need for the time-consuming harmonisation of national legislations. The Schuman Declaration states that the “decisions [of the new High Authority] will bind France, Germany and other member countries,” while at the same time assigning it with a functional, depoliticised agenda: “The task with which this common High Authority will be charged will be that of securing in the shortest possible time the modernisation of production and the improvement of its quality” (ibid.).

3. The Monnet method foresaw that this process would create functional pressure to integrate adjacent areas of the economy in a similar fashion. The integration of the coal and steel market was seen merely as “leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community” (ibid.). While other countries were meant to see the benefits of this common market, the latter was also seen as the foundation for further integration. A common coal and steel market may thus for example also require a common transport network.
4. It was hoped that the creation of a powerful High Authority would cause a shift in the loyalties of national industries and elites towards the new, supranational polity, as they would seek to fulfil their goals and interests in the fastest and most effective manner. The Declaration states that “in this way, there may be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interest which is indispensible to the establishment of a common economic system” (ibid.). Common interests, and new loyalties, would legitimate and foster further integration.

5. The European community becomes more deeply integrated, as a common market requires larger and more powerful European institutions and bureaucracies. While Rosamond does not explicitly state this, deeper integration arguably attracts more countries to participate in the increasingly significant common market (cf. Nugent, 1992).

6. The Monnet method foresees that economic integration will inevitably lead to political integration. The Declaration states that “this proposal will lead to the realisation of the first concrete foundation of a European federation” (ibid.). The efficient functioning of a common market requires for instance a common border regime, which in turn requires common migration management.

7. The Schuman Declaration is very explicit about the finality of the European integration process, viewing the ECSC as merely “a first step in the federation of Europe” (ibid.). Schuman acknowledges that “Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan,” as proposed by the federalists. European integration was meant to develop incrementally. At the same time he believes that the points outlined above “will change the destinies of those regions,” culminating in a European federal state “indispensable to the preservation of peace” (ibid.).

The Monnet method was what gave early European integration its momentum. As will be seen, it also proved a point of departure for Haas’ development of neofunctionalism’s analytical concepts. The emergence of neofunctionalism is inseparable from the unique and particular political circumstances in which it took place.
An investigation of Haas original formulation of neofunctionalism reveals the proximity of neofunctionalism to the EU’s founding fathers’ vision of European integration. Haas defines the object of regional (European) integration as the creation of a ‘political community’ (Haas, 1958, 5). This in turn, refers to the “condition in which specific groups and individuals show more loyalty to their central political institutions than to any other political authority, in a specific period of time and in a definable geographic space” (ibid.). Haas postulates that the nation state forms an example of this condition, as its citizens show near-unconditional loyalty towards the polity; they habitually obey the injunctions of the state, and they turn to it seeking the fulfilment of important expectations. Haas thus sees political integration as the process where loyalty is shifted towards a supranational polity, a process which is also alluded to in the Schuman declaration. Political integration is contrasted with economic integration, which can occur without the presence of a supranational political authority, such as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Haas acknowledges that multiple loyalties may co-exist. It must be noted that while European integration is Haas’ choice of case study, as it “provide[s] a living laboratory” of political integration, the processes involved in political integration can in principle be applied to any geographical region (e.g. Malamud, 2010).

The shift in loyalties that takes place to facilitate political integration is, according to Haas, not necessarily, and perhaps only marginally, linked to political ideology or to pressure from the new political centre. More importantly, “new loyalties are thought to grow haphazardly in their function as intermediary means to some ultimate end” (ibid., 14). This relates closely to the Monnet method, which expected that ‘political elites’ strive to realize their interests more effectively, thus turning to the European institutions without reference to ideology. This process is thought to lead to ‘Europeanism’, if it is continued for a sufficiently extensive period of time. One of the cornerstones of neofunctionalist political integration is thus the changing expectations and loyalties of political elites. Haas defines those elites as “the leaders of all relevant political groups who habitually participate in the making of public decisions, whether as policy-makers in government, as lobbyists or as spokesmen of political parties” (ibid., 17). Hence the leaders of trade unions and major corporations must also be regarded as elites.
Haas’ most important mechanism of integration is ‘spillover’. In *The Uniting of Europe*, Haas poses to the reader a series of questions:

“How would six different tax systems affect the conditions of competition? Could investments in coal be considered apart from investment in other energy sectors? How much distortion in prices can be attributed to six different wage and social security systems” (ibid., 103)?

The idea behind spillover is that the integration of one part of the economy will exert functional pressure on adjacent sectors, causing further integration. The initial integration of the Western European coal and steel industry could thus indeed become Schuman’s ‘leaven’ culminating in European federal union. This assumes sufficiently interdependent economies, highlighting the particular environment in which post-war European integration took place (Mutimer, 1989).

It is important to note that spillover is merely a label for an underlying process which occurs when actors that share a common interest are unsatisfied with the results of the level of integration that has hitherto been achieved. They will thus attempt to integrate sectors of the economy that they regard as being interdependent, optimizing the effectiveness of the strategy employed, and speeding up the time required to achieve the desired outcome (Haas, 1958). Deeper levels of integration will in turn lead to the loyalty shift described in the previous section. The interplay between functional spillover and the loyalty shift to the supranational institution creates the momentum necessary to drive the integration process towards the final goal of a European political community. It can justifiably be argued that Haas assigned a degree of automaticity to the European integration process, a view which was later rejected by other neofunctionalist authors (cf. Schmitter, 1969).

Haas’ understanding of spillover, while being at the heart of his theory of neofunctionalism, was quickly made the target of critique because of the unidirectional course that it imposed on the European integration process. Of particular importance to keeping neofunctionalist theory relevant was the work of Phillippe Schmitter (e.g. Schmitter, 1969; 2005). Schmitter identified the need to treat “politicization as […] analytically distinct” from spillover (1969, 166), by which he meant that spillover from one sector of the economy to another will
increase the controversiality of European integration. The more controversial an issue, the larger the audience that is interested in it; hence political actors would thus eventually have to agree on a “manifest redefinition of mutual objectives” (ibid.). European integration seize to be a technocratic matter and becomes highly politicised. Reaching this point is a major obstacle to the momentum of European integration, requiring conquest if a political union is meant to be achieved.

In 1971, Schmitter significantly elaborated on the idea of spillover, authoring one of the clearest formulations of neofunctionalist theory. He acknowledged that his previous attempts to develop a general theory of regional integration (cf. Haas & Schmitter, 1964), have been, “I think it fair to say, a successful failure” (Schmitter, 1971, 232), finding that neofunctionalism should not assume the uni-directionality of regional integration. Like Haas, Schmitter postulates that “the integration of formally independent political entities engages – in the contemporary world – basically the same variables and processes” (1971, 233). Neofunctionalism is seen as a universal theory of regional integration, although results of these processes will differ due to different contexts and conditions. Schmitter views the unintended consequences of political action – a hallmark of functionalist logic – as the driving force behind spillover. He argues that in a regional integration setting, national interests converge into a regional institution. These regional institutions then act to achieve common objectives, while the decisions they make are sometimes inherently contradictory. Schmitter lists four principal reasons for this:

1. A particular action or strategy may deliver an unequal distribution of benefits to participants.
2. Policy areas are treated separately, although they are deeply interconnected with other sectors.
3. In the context of global interdependence, a closed regional unit is impossible, and any strategy will cause external ripples.
4. In a regional organisation, transparency of information causes participants to be very cautious about the comparative performance of partners (Schmitter, 1971, 235-6).
As a result of those contradictions, “actors may be forced to revise their strategies and to consider alternative integrative obligations” (ibid., 236). In some cases, these alternative integrative obligations may go against the perceived national interest. Furthermore, the actors’ imperfect knowledge causes integrative policies to have unintended consequences. Schmitter describes the periods when these consequences become apparent as crises, which cause more authority to be transferred to the regional institution. This process in combination with the habitualisation of cooperation leads to a redefinition of the community’s common objectives. Schmitter emphasises that while the redefinition following the ‘decision cycle’ may result in the need for wider integration (i.e. spillover), actors may equally respond with “spill-back,” where they “withdraw from the original objective, downgrading their commitment to mutual cooperation” (ibid.). This crucial departure from Haas’ original theory frees neofunctionalism from the notion of automaticity, while at the same time making it non-falsifiable. Schmitter’s neofunctionalism aspires to explain all possible outcomes of the integration process and thereby loses much of its attractiveness. Schmitter attempts to make up for this by attempting to probabilistically predict which outcomes are more likely. He plots the decision alternatives open to a given actor on two axes. While the vertical axis refers to the level of authority of the regional institution (i.e. its decision-making power), the horizontal axis describes the scope of the institution’s authority (i.e. the number of issue areas the institution may deal with). A political community is achieved when both the level and the scope of the institution are high. Schmitter lists several different strategies actors can choose from (see Figure 1 below). In his analysis, the choice of strategy thus forms the ‘dependent variable’, which, if plotted against time, may alternate across all possible values. The time it takes to achieve a particular goal and the presumed

5 One example of this is the voluntary accession of Mediterranean member states to the Dublin regime. When Malta joined the European Union in 2004 it was clear that for many irregular migrants Malta would become the state where they would have to lodge their asylum application, which may lead to financial, logistical and humanitarian problems. Despite this, Malta joined the Dublin regime. At the same time, Malta is the only member state that does not permit unlimited EU labour migration, having included an opt-out from a core EU-policy in its accession agreement.

6 An obvious and well-known example is the institutional crisis that erupted from the sovereign debt crisis in several member states of the eurozone. Monetary integration resulted in a crisis which called for the creation of a debt settlement fund (European Stability Mechanism) and the transfer of competences to the European Commission such as budgetary supervision.
effectiveness of the strategy serve as independent variables, although actors will be constrained to selecting the lowest common denominator.

Figure 2: Plot of Alternative Actor Decision Cycles (Schmitter, 1971, 241)

To complete his version of neofunctionalism, Schmitter proposes a series of hypotheses predicting trends in decision cycles (1971, 243-6):

1. **The Spillover Hypothesis**: Contradictions will cause the unexpected performance of institutions, causing actors to revise both their scope and their level of authority, thereby creating new regional institutions to reach the same objectives.

2. **The Hypothesis of Natural Entropy**: Integration tends towards a state of rest unless disturbed by exogenous factors.

3. **Hypothesis of Increasing Mutual Determination**: The predictive power of the model increases as the impact of exogenous factors decreases over time (Schmitter, 1971, 244).
4. *Curvilinear Hypothesis*: If too many unforeseen events occur at the international level, states may react defensively, preferring non-integrative solutions. Schmitter calls this hypothesis a “necessary concession to reality” (ibid., 245).

The aim of Schmitter’s model, which he developed in conjunction with Ernst Haas, is the quantification of the independent variables involved. It is for this reason that he “remain[s] ambiguous as to whether it should best move toward econometric techniques or simulation” (1971, 264).

While discussing neofunctionalist expectations and hypotheses, the theory’s conceptualisation of crises calls for special attention. Schmitter argues that “the manipulation of […] crises by regional actors lies at the core of the integrative dynamic” (1969, 164). Crises are crucial turning points in the integration process because they reflect its incompleteness. In Schmitter’s logic, crises occur because the authority over a particular policy-area has been supranationalised to an insufficient extent, leaving decision-makers with essentially two choices: advancing integration into the adjacent area concerned (spillover) or retrenching sovereignty to the national level (spill-back). It is then assumed that “as more tasks become interrelated through inherent links or package deals the costs of disintegrative action becomes greater,” limiting the number of “political alternatives” (Schmitter, 1971, 826). As a result, “larger crises that accompany decreasing alternatives may play a productive role” in the integration process (ibid.). In the neofunctionalist vision, European integration can thus be said to thrive on crises.

These classical formulations of neofunctionalism by Haas and Schmitter treat regionalisation and regional integration as global trends, which essentially follow the same rules wherever they occur. The success of regional integration projects outside Europe has nevertheless been limited at best, and certainly falls short of European-based expectations. While Schmitter allows for disintegration, he nevertheless develops his theory for any context, rather than just for the

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7 Haas himself should not be regarded as an econometrist, employing descriptive statistics as well as process-tracing to describe regional integration in the context of the ECSC (1958). Despite Haas’ positivistic research agenda, he is certainly no econometrist. Econometric approaches to theorising European integration nevertheless do exist, such as Alker (1971) or Rose (2000).
European example. The pretensions of universality have been one of the reasons why neofunctionalism as a ‘grand theory’ of European integration fell into dismay in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent attempts to revive neofunctionalism are specifically adapted to the European context. Nevertheless, in the text books on European integration, classical neofunctionalism has remained prominent to this day, as it has “revealed the guiding logic of some of the main protagonists in the post-war uniting of Europe” (Rosamond, 2000, 73), as exemplified by similarities between Haas’ theory and the Monnet method.

**Neofunctionalism and European Migration Management**

From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, neofunctionalism underwent a crisis that was so severe that Haas himself called the theory obsolete (Haas, 1975). European integration, if it was to follow a trajectory culminating in a continental federation, had experienced several set-backs, and neofunctionalism seemingly failed to provide a credible explanation (Gehring, 1996). Nevertheless, since the late 1980s neofunctionalism is “no longer obsolescent” (Rosamond, 2005, 251). Neofunctionalism has re-emerged, perhaps not as a grand theory of European integration, but certainly as a valid framework for analysis of the processes facilitating and accompanying the unification of Europe. Corbey attributed the revival of neofunctionalism to “the sudden upswing of the EC” (1995, 265), and Niemann and Schmitter likewise argue that “the resurgence of the European integration process in the mid-1980s” has allowed neofunctionalism to make “a substantial comeback” (2009, 45). Furthermore, the increasing depth and width of European integration has resulted in a greater academic interest in the EU as a whole from which neofunctionalism has benefitted. Even the crisis of the eurozone that begun in the late 2000s provides ample examples of spillover (Cooper, 2011). Nevertheless, the evolution of European asylum legislation arguably represents the neatest fit between neofunctionalist expectations and political reality. It is worth addressing how neofunctionalists would understand this evolution, as this demonstrates how the theory is applied in practice, while simultaneously setting the scene for this dissertation’s empirical focus.
An asylum application is today the most important means of immigration to the European Union. Although each member state maintains its own rules on who is allowed to enter and reside within its territory, various regulations and directives have created a degree of harmony among the 28 national asylum systems. Neofunctionalists would regard the evolution from the European Economic Community to the contemporary European asylum system as a four stage process (see Figure 2).

The first step involved the abolition of border controls between the signatories of the Schengen Agreement of 1985. Taschner refers to this as a “natural consequence of the principle of freedom of movement as one of the foundations of the Community” (1997, 16). A Commission White Paper states that the control of individuals at intra-Community borders is an “affront to the principle of freedom of movement within a single Community” (European Commission, 1985, 16). The creation of the EEC had created local, transnational economies, whose development was obstructed by the existence of frontier checks. Transport times within Europe were unnecessarily lengthy as a result of border controls. The neofunctionalist narrative would thus regard the Schengen Agreement as an example of functional spillover from the EEC, which had increased trade volumes requiring a pan-European infrastructure that is unconstrained by national borders. Nevertheless, Schengen was an intergovernmental agreement that had no impact on the competences of the European institutions.

The second major transition in the history of the European asylum system took place because the abolition of border controls that was initiated by the Schengen Agreement required a range of ‘compensatory measures’. Open borders meant that not only European citizens, but anyone residing in the Schengen Area, including clandestinos and potential asylum seekers, could travel freely between the member states. This could lead to ‘asylum shopping’, which refers to the idea that refugees would apply in several member states, hoping to improve their

Figure 2: The four historic phases of transition in the European asylum system
chance of being accepted. The Dublin Convention was thus set out to determine which member state was responsible for an asylum application. Lavenex confirms that the Dublin Convention was a “reaction of national governments to the forthcoming abolition of internal border controls in the context of the single market project” (1999, 34). The Convention was signed by all 12 member states of the European Community on 15 June 1990. The basic provisions of the Convention were the following:

- If an asylum applicant has a family member in a member state, that state is responsible for the application. Family members are parents, if the person concerned is an unmarried minor, unmarried children or spouses.
- If the applicant holds a valid residence permit/visa of one member state, that state is responsible for the application.
- If the applicant has several valid residence permits/visas, responsibility lies with the member state that has issued the document with the longest period of residency or with the latest expiry date.
- If these criteria do not apply, and if it can be shown that the applicant has irregularly crossed the external border of the European Communities from a non-member state, the member state of first entry is responsible for the application.
- If this cannot be proven, the member state where an application was first lodged is responsible (Belgium et al., 1997).

In practice, it is the final clause that is most regularly applied.

The transformation of the Dublin Convention into the Dublin II Regulation is significant because it represents the Convention’s conversion from an international treaty into European law, and because complementary legislation was passed to allow for a more efficient implementation of the Dublin system. This occurred within the context of the Treaties of Maastricht (1992) and Amsterdam (Council of the European Union, 1997). In Article K.1 of the Maastricht Treaty, asylum policy was declared to be one of several “matters of common interest” in the field of justice and home affairs, thus placing it within the overall EU area of responsibilities (Council of the European Union, 1992).
Asylum policy being within the remit of the European institutions laid the foundation for the creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The following elements still characterise the CEAS today:

1. A “clear and workable” system to establish which member state is responsible for an asylum application.
2. Common standards for the asylum procedure.

The first point refers to the Dublin Convention which was integration into EU law as the Dublin II Regulation. There was some resistance to this by a group of member states championed by Greece, which questioned whether ‘first entry member state’ clause was still applicable (Filzwieser & Sprung, 2010, 27). This resistance was overcome by the larger group of states led by Germany, France and the UK. The other three points of the CEAS are included because if an EU regulation is to determine which member state is responsible for an asylum application, there should also be legislation making sure that the standards in all member states are harmonised. Furthermore, the Eurodac Regulation created a database of the biometric data of all persons who had entered the EU irregularly. Eurodac is characterised by “strict accessoriness to the purposes of the Dublin Regulation” (Hermann, 2010). From the neofunctionalist perspective, this is another example of spillover from one area of politics (border controls) to another (asylum and security).

The transition from Dublin II to the Dublin III Regulation forms the second stage of the creation of the Common European Asylum System, and is the fourth and most recent step in the evolution of the European asylum system. The basic provisions of the Dublin Regulation itself were left untouched, although several humanitarian clauses were introduced. The Eurodac-Regulation in the other hand had been changed very fundamentally (Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2013). The original Eurodac-database was only meant for asylum purposes, while the recast version allows for data to be used by
national law enforcement authorities and Europol. The use of the Eurodac-database for criminal investigations is however only permissible for investigating “terrorist offences or other serious criminal offences” (ibid., 14). To manage and control access to the database, Council and Parliament established the ‘European Agency for the operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Council of the European Union & European Parliament, 2011). The intrusion of European legislation into the area of police and security police was thus consolidated and new institutions were set up to manage the new European competences, which follows the logic of neofunctionalist spillover. Nevertheless, the changes that the reform of the CEAS brought are moderate, which is why this transition can be seen in the light Schmitter’s hypothesis of natural entropy, which foresees that integration tends towards a state of rest.

Although this attempt to examine the evolution of the European asylum system through a neofunctionalist lens is very basic, several problems have nevertheless become evident. Most prominently, asylum seekers and clandestinos are absent from the neofunctionalist analysis, despite the fact that they are the objects of asylum and migration legislation. They are discarded as exogenous factors which may disturb the integration process according to the curvilinear hypothesis. The following section will thus critique neofunctionalism from a variety of different angles.

**Critical Analysis of Neofunctionalism**

When neofunctionalism is applied to the evolution of European migration management a story is generated of evolving legislative documents, institutional spillover and functional linkage. However, this story does not mention how Europeans have experienced European integration, and it is certainly not the story of irregular migrants in the EU. It is not the story of tens of thousands of human beings who have drowned in the Mediterranean trying to reach the shores of Europe, and it is not the story of the humiliating conditions in Europe’s refugee camps and detention centres. This section therefore constitutes a critique of neofunctionalism. However, apart from the theory’s moral shortcomings, it can
be critiqued by demonstrating how the neofunctionalist approach is inadequate for understanding the European integration process even on its own terms. Five arguments demonstrating neofunctionalism’s inadequacy will be put forward. Firstly, neofunctionalism drastically underestimates the role of national governments in European integration (Hoffmann, 1966). Secondly, as critical scholars have pointed out, there are significant methodological problems associated with the theory’s positivism (e.g. van Apeldoorn et al., 2003). Thirdly, neofunctionalism fails to include perceptions in its analysis: there is no distinction between perceived functional links and quantifiable functional links. Fourthly, neofunctionalism is unable to consider the role of irregular migrants in the European integration process. Finally, neofunctionalism ignores the structural power that drives the integration process.

The Return of the Nation State

Stanley Hoffmann championed the resurrection of the nation state in European Studies through his so-called intergovernmentalist reading of European integration (1966). Hoffmann shared Hans Morgenthau’s negative assumptions about human nature, holding the view that nation states exist within an “international state of nature” (ibid., 864). He furthermore underlines that despite efforts towards supranationalisation, “[nation states] remain the basic units” of analysis in the study of international relations (ibid., 863). European integration may only proceed as long as supranational institutions are not asked to engage with matters of ‘high politics’, that is matters which go beyond internal economic affairs and that are of no consequence to relations with the outside world. Hoffmann argues that such a point was reached both in the attempt to create the European Defence Community in 1954, and in the Empty Chair Crisis which may be interpreted as de Gaulle’s attempt to create a European counter-balance to American military dominance. Hoffmann critiques neofunctionalism for ignoring

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8 The phrase ‘international state of nature’ translates the Hobbesian state of nature to the international sphere. Hobbes argued that human beings free of laws and authorities tend to fight one another (Hobbes, 1996). Similarly, there are no laws and authorities governing the behaviour of states. According to Morgenthau (2006) and Hoffmann and inter-state behaviour is thus anarchical and chaotic.
that the consent of the nation state is needed to move integration forward. He states that “functionalism tends to become, at best, like a spiral that coils ad infinitum” (ibid., 909), thus highlighting that the theory’s claims to the automaticity of European integration are unrealistic.

While Hoffmann’s theory acknowledged that it depended on a particular view of human nature, Andrew Moravcsik attempted to create an intergovernmentalist theory that could move beyond these ontological assumptions. His liberal intergovernmentalism seeks to explain the “broad evolution of regional integration” (Moravcsik & Schimmelfennig, 2009, 68). However, as with Hoffmann, liberal intergovernmentalism “continues to treat the state as a unitary actor” (ibid., 69). Although Moravcsik grants a larger role to supranational institutions, it is the state whose preferences are the primary determinants of the trajectory of European integration. In turn, state preferences are shaped primarily by economic interests and “general geopolitical ideas” (ibid., 69).

In liberal intergovernmentalism, states are seen as rational actors that are aware of the economic gains and losses they may make under different conditions. Moravcsik’s view, “EU integration can best be understood as a series of rational choices made by national leaders” (1998, 18). This gross simplification, made also by Hoffmann, is problematic as it brings with it a methodological rationalism that assumes the normalcy and superiority of liberalised markets. Indeed, the type of rationality that Moravcsik discussed is that of profit-maximisation. Profit in turn, is measured in economic terms; an assumption which ought not to be considered universal. Moravcsik thus inadvertently reproduces Hoffmann’s assumptions about human nature. This is a fundamental weakness of his approach.

Liberal intergovernmentalism continues to be taught to students of European Studies as the most important critique of neofunctionalism, and an argument is often made that these two ‘grand theories’ of European integration are in competition with one another. An influential narrative has been constructed whereby intergovernmentalism is defined as the “counter-point to neofunctionalism” (Schimmelfennig, 2006, 76). The rationale behind this narrative is the delineation of the spectrum of possible explanations for European integration. On one side of this spectrum is Haas’ neofunctionalism with its unidirectionality, automaticity and strong emphasis on the role of supranational
institutions. On the other side of the spectrum is Hoffmann’s intergovernmentalism, which emphasises gate-keeping (i.e. for instance the importance of European summits as turning points of the integration process) and the role of the nation state. Liberal intergovernmentalism and Schmitter’s more flexible neofunctionalism are somewhere in between these extremes, supposedly delineating the space within which the debate on European integration theory is held. Stepping outside this space, critical scholars have launched a more fundamental critique at neofunctionalism which is aimed at its methodology.

*Man as Machine*

Critical scholars have pointed out that both intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism “adopt the positivist method, intended as it is to reveal invariant causal relations, in order to support a certain transhistorical claim about human nature and its inner rationality” (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, 34). Positivists assume that the social world is governed by universal laws and regularities in the same way as the natural world. They view the world akin to “a watch […] whose real workings are governed by springs and wheels” (Hollis & Smith, 1990, 47). In the crudest sense, positivism is thus the idea that the methods used in the natural sciences can also be applied to the social sciences. It seeks to produce knowledge that is “universal, invariable and context-independent” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 57).

According to Neufeld (1995), positivism is based on three pillars. Firstly, positive knowledge must correspond to empirical facts and experience. Positivism is thus epistemologically empiricist, as only empirical knowledge is ‘true’ knowledge. Ontologically, it is materialist. Human beings are regarded to operate not unlike a very sophisticated machine, which implies that their behaviour can be predicted and analysed in the same way as a physical phenomenon.

Secondly, positivist knowledge must be objective. Positivist research observes the world searching for patterns and repetitions, requiring the methods of the observed to be unbiased, and the findings to be free of ontological assumptions (as was highlighted in the previous paragraph, positivism does of course have its own ontological assumptions). Historically, according to Comte, there have been three kinds of knowledge: theological knowledge, or the
knowledge produced by religion, which corresponds to the ‘primitive’ era of human development; metaphysical knowledge, the knowledge produced by philosophers, which corresponds to the intermediary era of human development; and, finally, positive knowledge, produced by scientists, which corresponds to the modern scientific era of human development (Neufeld, 1995). It is important to note the extent to which historical developments have impacted the understanding of knowledge, even according to this Comtean interpretation. Theological knowledge, in the case of Christian Europe, is knowledge derived from the Bible and divine revelation. Metaphysical knowledge relates to ethics or aesthetics. These two types of knowledge are rejected for being insufficiently objective, and claims related to the two realms are ignored for being ‘meaningless’ (Passmore, 1967, 52-7). Positivists argue that the information conveyed in theological and metaphysical statements cannot be objectively and empirically measured or verified, hence there is no meaning to claims such as ‘the painting is beautiful’ or ‘God exists’. Positivists acknowledge that scientists do have values, but that “the mere statement […] that values underlie all research, does not in itself lead to the inevitable conclusion that values must, by virtue of their presence, influence this research” (Easton, 1953, 225). Popper too puts forward that “the mind can never be a passive register of experience,” but that this has no impact on the validation process itself (Hollis & Smith, 1990, 52).

Thirdly, positivists adhere to the idea of the ‘methodological unity of science’. Making the proposition that the methods used in the natural sciences are ideally suited for application in the social sciences implies that its adherents acknowledge no fundamental difference between the natural and the social world. Bechtel argues that the laws of psychology, sociology, anthropology, economic or political science would eventually be viewed as “derivative laws which, in principle, can be derived from the most basic laws of physics,” and that one day those disciplines might be “subsumed within physics as a special application of physical laws” (1988, 29).

There are problems with each of the three tenets of positivism. I will now discuss these in some detail. The first assumption, that positive knowledge must correspond to the empirically observable reality, fails to capture the quintessence of human relations. Weber (1968) and the hermeneutic movement placed a large
emphasis on the subjective meanings of human interaction. The central hermeneutic theme is that “action must always be understood from within” (Hollis & Smith, 1990, 72). Depending on the context of human communication, the same word or the same action may have an entirely different meaning. Weber splits the two levels of interpretation up into understanding (cf. verstehen) and explanatory understanding (cf. erklärendes Verstehen). While the former merely enables us to understand what action is being performed, the latter allows us to understand the context. Hence in the social sciences context and interpretation ought to be considered essential aspects of human relations, rendering inadequate an approach to science that is merely based on empirical observation. Positivism ignores that human beings have the unique quality of being able to report on their subjective experience.

The positivist claim that knowledge must be objective is equally problematic. In the social sciences, the researcher herself has an impact on the observed. A good example of this is anthropological field research, during which the presence of an observer undoubtedly has an impact on the behaviour of the human beings who are being studied. This is a crucial difference between natural science and social science, as a natural scientist’s observation of a falling stone will not cause it to stop falling.

The positivist notion of the methodological unity of science reveals the ontological foundations of positivism, which turn out be very much value-laden. In stating that the social sciences can be studied in the same way as the natural sciences, positivism is implying that all human behaviour is rooted in physical laws. Positivism is based on a specific belief about the nature and substance of human beings and the universe, having a materialist ontology. While this makes positivism no less valid than other approaches to social science, its claim to ontological neutrality certainly should not make it a preferable approach. As Robert Cox writes,

“theory is always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. When any theory [represents itself as divorced from a standpoint in time and space], it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed perspective” (Cox, 1981, 128).
All theory and method is based on a particular ontology. Neofunctionalism is based on the positivist approach to social science. It is a problem-solving theory with fixed assumptions about the nature of the world. The tendency towards spillover assumes for example that “market forces are expressions of an inner rationality of universal human nature,” demonstrating that it has an inbuilt bias in favour of free markets (van Apeldoorn et al., 2003, 18). The consequences of neofunctionalism’s positivist underpinnings will be further outlined in the following sections.

**Neofunctionalism and Hermeneutics**

Neofunctionalism’s lack of hermeneutic insight that was discussed in the previous section becomes truly problematic when applying the theory to one’s case study of choice, as the difference between perceived functional linkage between policy areas and real functional linkage is insufficiently defined. In the case of border controls, the need for their abolition may for instance be falsely identified as a functional consequence of the introduction of the common market. Indeed, neofunctionalism’s profit-rationality is incapable of sufficiently explaining the removal of border controls. The United Kingdom has remained outside the Schengen Area and still maintains high trade volumes with the rest of the EU. Furthermore, from the 2000s onwards, motorway toll systems for lorries have been created in many member states, which have produced new border procedures

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9 The diversion from Weber’s terminology in this section is intentional (Weber, 1947). Differentiating between value-rationality and instrumental rationality is not necessary helpful, because particular values underlie instrumental rationality too. The latter is often used to refer to profit-maximization, which is a function of the assumption that profit represents an intrinsic good. Therefore the type of rationality that strives for profit-maximization may also be called value-rationality, with profit being the value in question. At the same time, Weber argues that values are created by human decisions (Aron, 167, 206). While Weber “holds that an agent may be more or less rational in acting consistently with his values, the choice of any one particular evaluative stance or commitment can be no more rational than that of any other” (MacIntyre, 2007, 26). Weber holds that human beings choose the values according to which they construct their rationality and their behaviour. As no choice is more rational than any other, no value is intrinsically good, making the choice arbitrary. Value-rationality refers to no particular values, and instrumental rationality refers to values which could also be covered by value-rationality. Therefore the terms profit-rationality and moral rationality are suggested to be used alternatively. While profit-rationality refers specifically to a profit-maximizing course of action which is expected of human beings in neofunctionalism, moral rationality refers to a course of action which is regarded to be intrinsically good.
that have largely reinstated the pre-Schengen complications when crossing borders. This has occurred without much protest from the European Commission which had previously pushed hard for a Europe inside which borders would be invisible. While border controls are perceived to be a symbol of the disunity of the EU, motorway tolls have failed to provoke an equivalent response. Neofunctionalism is unable to grasp the different standards that are applied in each example.

Apart from perceptions, neofunctionalism cannot understand the social purpose of European integration. This stems in part from the fact that the theory views European integration as a \textit{sui generis} phenomenon, failing to place the EU in a global context. Neofunctionalism was originally developed to be a general theory of regional integration, describing the conditions necessary for integration to occur. The inapplicability of the theory to other world regions has shifted its focus exclusively to the EU, which would ideally form a closed system, sheltered from the impact of the outside world. This assumption of laboratory conditions is to be expected from a positivist theory. However, the influx of irregular migrants in large numbers blatantly underlines that the EU is \textit{not} a closed system, and that a proper understanding of its structures calls for an understanding of Europe as part of a global political economy. It is only within this global context that the social purpose of European integration becomes manifest, which in turn allows for a better explanation of the EU’s institutional evolution.

\textit{The Uncharted Territory of Irregular Migrants}

It was highlighted earlier in this chapter that asylum seekers are absent from a neofunctionalist analysis of European asylum policy. This is highly problematic because the arrival of irregular migrants in the EU is the very reason for the existence of legislation to control irregular migration. The inability of

\footnote{There have been calls from the European Commission for the Europeanisation of toll systems (cf. EETS), but few advances have been made, possibly due to the significant profit derived from the production of the duplicate infrastructure required to maintain toll systems for the responsible private enterprises.}
neofunctionalism to include irregular migrants in its analysis stems from to two primary reasons: the theory’s inward focus as well as its elite focus.

Firstly, neofunctionalism has a poorly elaborated conceptualisation of exogenous factors (see Chapter 3 for a detailed analysis of this issue). This becomes particularly apparent when discussing the ‘hypothesis of increasing mutual determination’. This hypothesis states that the accuracy of the neofunctionalist model is lowest when the impact of exogenous factors is highest. Schmitter acknowledges that “the integration process begins with a large number of unspecified exogenous conditions [], which are very important in determining outcomes” (1971, 847). He then goes on to argue that the impact of exogenous factors tends to decline as the integration process moves forward, which in itself is seen as retrospective evidence of the accuracy of the model. The latent presence of irregular migrants in a neofunctionalism analysis of irregular migration management does not only make the model inaccurate, but also impacted upon the evolution of the Dublin system at numerous critical junctures. Nevertheless, in the neofunctionalist analysis, irregular migrants are regarded merely as a volatile, ‘unspecified exogenous condition’, seemingly unworthy of further consideration. The theory’s inward-looking methodology prevents the contextualisation of European integration within the matrix of exogenous factors. It is important to re-emphasise that this is necessarily an aspect of neofunctionalism and cannot be rectified through a refinement of the theory. Being a positivist theory, neofunctionalism assumes the EU to be a quasi-closed system. This assumption is one of the basic foundations of the theory, without which none of its hypotheses would hold.

Secondly, neofunctionalism places a strong focus on elites as determinants of decision-cycles’ outcomes. The theory therefore proceeds to consider irregular migrants’ impact on integration as insignificant. This is not only empirically questionable, but further prevents the theory from understanding the social purpose of European integration. The latter can best be understood by examining the impact of the process on groups that are most exposed to it. Given the range of legislative instruments that deal with migration managements, irregular migrants certainly form such a group.
Another critique that has been launched against neofunctionalism concerns its neglect of structural power. Susan Strange defines structural power as “the power to shape and determine the structures of the global political economy within which other states, their political institutions, their economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people have to operate” (1994, 25). She contrasts this with relational power, which essentially refers to getting others to do what they otherwise would not do. Neofunctionalism attributes relational power primarily to the supranational European institutions, while intergovernmentalism primarily attributes relational power to the nation state. Both theories ignore structural power, which is, according to Strange, essential for understanding the relationship between the state and the market. She stipulates that this relationship ought to be the focus of political and economic inquiry. May points out that “if we are to analyse bargains between authority and market, and the influence of power in these bargains, we should also consider which values are being prioritised” (1996, 174). The values concerned here are for example “wealth, security, freedom and justice,” and different societies place different degrees of priority on these values (Strange, 1985, 237). Strange makes the point that if security is prioritised over the other values, states become the centre of analysis of global politics, as states are the sole actors with the ability to disrupt the international order. If, however, power is defined as the power to create or destroy wealth, other actors will need to be considered too (May, 1996, 174). Actors have structural power if they are able to define which values are prioritised.

Van Apeldoorn et al. point out that the focus of neofunctionalism’s research agenda is relational power, highlighting that the theory “[fails] to account for the structural power that determines the particular trajectory of European integration” (2003, 17). In this context, they appeal to an understanding of European integration within the presence of American neoliberal hegemony, which sets European integration on a particular path characterised by deregulation, privatization and commodification. The social purpose of European integration ought to be considered and the question asked: which social groups benefit from the process and which groups are being excluded? European integration thus ought to be contextualised within the social purpose of capital
accumulation, which is the primary objective of transnational capital within neoliberal capitalism (Durand & Keucheyan, 2015). It should by no means be considered as an isolated event. This highlights a serious problem in neofunctionalism’s understanding of the European asylum system. While Schmitter made clear that spillover is not the only possible outcome of EU level decision cycles (1971, 241), he did not sufficiently underline that spillover too can result in different outcomes. The Dublin regime is one example of spillover from the abolition of border controls, but a distribution quota for asylum seekers was an equally plausible alternative solution. Both choices could be explained with reference to spillover. To understand why the Dublin system was given preference, one would have to understand “which values are being prioritised” (Strange, 1996, 174). As a result of neofunctionalism’s hermeneutic deficit, the theory will inevitably struggle to capture structural power.

Neofunctionalist in Practice: From Theory to Ideology

Here it will be put forward that neofunctionalism has a significant influence on the European integration process. Taking the deficiencies of the theory into consideration, especially its view of human nature, the dangers of neofunctionalist policymaking become apparent. To make this argument, this section will also discuss the notions of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ and performativity, which demonstrate the mechanisms of how a social science theory is turned into a political blueprint. The claim of neofunctionalism being a self-fulfilling prophecy will be substantiated by references to several interviews that were carried out during field research (see Chapter 4 for research methods).

The Self-Fulfilling Prophecy and Performativity

The term ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ was coined by Robert Merton, who based his idea on the so-called Thomas theorem. This theorem states that “if men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, 571-2). This theorem implies that once the meaning of a situation has been
defined, the behaviour that follows is based on and determined by that interpretation. Merton invokes the bankruptcy of the Last National Bank in 1932 which was caused by rumours of the bank’s insolvency as an example. Merton uses this point to underline the difference between the social world and the natural world. In the natural world, “predictions of the return of Halley’s comet do not influence its orbit” (Merton, 1948, 175). Merton thus defines the self-fulfilling prophecy as “a false definition of the situation evoking a new behaviour, which makes the originally false conception come true” (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether self-fulfilling prophecies do indeed have to be based on a false definition of reality. It is equally possible for a definition to be a very accurate representation of social practice, and to still become a self-fulfilling prophecy by perpetuating that practice. This in turn seemingly fulfils the original prophecy, lending it more credibility and further perpetuating its practice. It ought to be clarified that the ‘definer’ or ‘theoriser’ is not neutral: pre-ordering of the information he is presented with has already taken place through the medium by means of which he receives that information. Any theoretical interpretation thus builds on a previous theoretical interpretation made either by oneself, or by the one who transmits the information. In the case of neofunctionalism, pre-ordering had already taken place through the formulation of the Monnet method, of which neofunctionalism is essentially a description.

Performativity is a closely related concept, albeit originating from the constructivist tradition. Michel Callon, one of the chief proponents of the performativity of economic theories, puts forward that “a discourse is indeed performative […], if it contributes to the construction of the reality it describes” (2007, 316). Discursive actions are regarded to be performative if they result in change taking place in the non-verbal world (cf. Austin, 1975; Butler, 1988). A very striking example is divorce in Islam. Divorce occurs if one of the spouses pronounces the words ‘I divorce you’ three times with the intention of being divorced. This will result in the two former spouses being subject to the Islamic rules concerning appropriate conduct between unmarried and unrelated members of opposite sexes (e.g. prohibition of touching). It is important to note that the performative value of this particular action depends on a mutual understanding of the social significance of the utterance. The involved actors have to speak the same
language both literally and figuratively. A performative theory is thus one in which “the mundane social audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe and perform in the mode of belief” (Butler, 1988, 520).

While Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach stated that the point of philosophy is to change the world rather than to merely interpret it, the notion that theories attempting to predict the future can become performative suggests that all theories have the potential to change the material world. While Marxism intentionally dissolves the boundary between theory and ideology, other theories do so inadvertently. Ferraro et al. (2005) argue that theories in the social sciences can become self-fulfilling both when they are right and when they are wrong. The likelihood of this step is albeit increased by the presence of three mutually non-exclusive mechanisms. Firstly, theories are more likely to become self-fulfilling when “institutional designs and organizational arrangements – structures, reward systems measurement practices, selection processes – reflect the explicit or implicit theories of their designers” (ibid., 9). If the categories of a theory are thus congruent with the categories used by the groups or individuals studied, the theory is more likely to become self-fulfilling. Although Ferraro et al. do not sufficiently explain the causal logic behind this claim, it can be inferred from their argument that actors are more likely to accept the premises of a theory if those premises reflect ideas they already have. Secondly, whether or not a theory had predictive power when it was first created, it can become self-fulfilling if its premises “become accepted truths and norms that govern reality” (ibid.). A crucial transition occurs when an observation of how people do behave becomes a prescription of how people ought to behave. Thirdly, theories become self-fulfilling when “they provide a language for comprehending the world” (ibid.). One may add that such a language is more likely to be accepted, if it is similar or identical to the language used by the groups or individuals studied.

In 2009, Felin and Foss launched an extensive critique of Ferrero et al.’s (2005) arguments about self-fulfilling prophecies. They expressed particular concern about the idea that even false theories become performative, the assumption of which forms the very basis of Merton’s definition of self-fulfilling prophecies. They specifically argue that two boundary conditions limit the extent to which theories become self-fulfilling: objective reality and human nature.
According to Felin and Foss, “theories affect reality [only] when they are true” (2009, 656). If a theory contradicts objective reality, it cannot become self-fulfilling. They exemplify this idea with reference to ‘hyperrationality’, a concept which has been introduced by neoclassical economics, and which suggests that agents are omniscient of all conditions of the environment they operate in, and about all possible outcomes of their actions.\(^\text{11}\) While this idea forms the foundation of the neoclassical economic theory of perfectly efficient markets, it is nevertheless self-evident that human omniscience is impossible to achieve (ibid., 657). The idea of hyperrationality cannot become self-fulfilling.

The second boundary condition Felin and Foss propose relates to human nature. The essential nature of human beings limits the extent to which theories can become self-fulfilling. They argue that the malleability of human nature is not as far-reaching as is often suggested, and that there is a difference between “human nature itself and beliefs about it” (ibid.).

Felin and Foss’s critique can be questioned from numerous angles. Ferraro et al. (2009) themselves have responded to the critique, arguing that Felin and Foss have made no effort to actually engage with the three mechanisms that increase theories’ performativity, instead focusing their critique on objective reality and human nature. In their assumption that only true theories will impact behaviour, Felin and Foss clash first and foremost with Kuhn’s argument about paradigm shifts. According to Kuhn, a paradigmatic consensus is rarely dislodged merely because of the discovery of evidence to its contrary. The “political and rhetorical skills and power of [the] proponents and opponents” of a paradigmatic consensus are as important to its fate (Ferraro et al., 2009, 670). Furthermore, even Popper argued that although some theories are true, “we will not necessarily know which ones” (ibid.). Furthermore, Ferraro et al. point out that Felin and Foss’s example of hyperrationality as an instance of the failure of the performativity argument is illogical. Hyperrationality is not a behaviour, and therefore people will obviously not become omniscient simply because there is a theoretical concept that assumes this. Nevertheless, people can \textit{act} as though they

\(^\text{11}\) This is similar to Milton Friedman’s argument about the assumed omniscience of leaves on a tree (1953). He argues that the leaves on a tree seem to act as if they were all-aware – whether this is in fact the case is irrelevant as long as the assumption is not contradicted by its consequences.
were hyperrational, thus preferring the pursuit of profit-maximisation over other values. It should be added that Felin and Foss’s representation of this debate is akin to the classical ‘chicken and egg problem’: if a theory appears to be self-fulfilling is that because the theory has affected human behaviour, or because it is true? If Felin and Foss assume that all theories that affect behaviour are true, they will never be able to identify them as self-fulfilling prophecies.

The Performativity of European Integration Discourse

Scholars of International Relations have long acknowledged that theories such as realism may have an impact on the practice of foreign policy (e.g. Wendt, 1995; Houghton, 2009). Vasquez for example notes that “as an image of the world employed by policy makers, power politics promotes certain kinds of behaviour and often leads to self-fulfilling prophecies” (Vasquez, 1998, 167). In the European Studies literature, the importance of integration theory in political practice has begun to be recognised more recently.

White (2003) discusses the role that the American neofunctionalists (especially Leon Lindberg) played in shaping the policymaking of the Hallstein Commission during the 1960s. He argues that neofunctionalist expectations had a major impact on Hallstein himself and that they were in fact one of the major causes of the Empty Chair crisis.

Thomas Diez (1999) has called for the recognition of discourse as an important aspect of understanding European integration. He argues that language is central to our understanding of the world, and that the attempts to “capture the Union’s nature are not mere descriptions of an unknown polity, but take part in the construction of the polity itself” (ibid., 599). Diez provides the example of the European Economic Community (EEC) being referred to as the ‘Common Market’ in the UK, and as the ‘Gemeinschaft’ (i.e. community) in West Germany. A reference to one or the other could determine whether the EEC was conceptualised primarily as an economic necessity, or whether it was seen as a community of values. Neither conceptualisation is necessarily true nor false; they are merely different readings of the same polity. Europe has thus always been a contested concept calling for different interpretations – the discursive divergence
was a reflection of this contestation. Diez furthermore makes explicit reference to neofunctionalism, arguing that the technocratic type of governance that the theory envisioned helped to overcome the intergovernmentalism that initially constrained European cooperation. Neofunctionalist discourse resonates in the names that were given to European political institutions: commission, directive and regulation, rather than government and law. Diez argues that the non-participatory nature of spillover had prevented it from resonating well within the discourse of democracy, which is how he explains the reassertion of the nation state and the abandonment of federal union since the 1990s.

Beyond White's and Diez's articles, there are few references to the performativity of neofunctionalism (McNamara, 2010), and the impact of the theory on the European integration process is usually thought to be limited to the 1950s and 60s. It is thus meaningful to discuss neofunctionalism's impact on contemporary European integration in more detail.

How Neofunctionalism Became Ideology

As was pointed out earlier, the original strength of neofunctionalism lay in its closeness to the categories used by European policymakers themselves. Haas quotes Gehrels and Johnson when defining that economic integration must have the following characteristics:

“(1) Agreement for gradual but complete elimination of tariffs, quotas and exchange controls on trade among the member countries; (2) abandonment of the right to restore trade restrictions on a unilateral basis for the duration of the agreement, regardless of difficulties that may arise; (3) joint action to deal with problems resulting from the removal of trade barriers within the community and to promote more efficient utilisation of the resources of the area; (4) some degree of harmonisation of national policies that affect price structures and the allocation of resources (for example, social security and agricultural programmes) and of monetary and fiscal policies; and (5) free, or at least freer, movement of capital and labour” (1955).
These ideas are congruent with the principles that were established in the 1957 Treaty of Rome. Article 13 of the Treaty states that “customs duties on imports in force between Member States shall be progressively abolished,” and the phrase “elimination of customs duties” is common throughout the document, reflecting point (1) of the above definition (Belgium et al., 1957). Point (2) is referred to several times, most significantly in Article 12 of the Treaty, which states that “Member States shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new customs duties on imports or exports or any charges having equivalent effect” (ibid.). Point (3) is fulfilled as the Treaty establishes a “common policy in the sphere of transport,” and measures by which “disequilibria in [the Member States’] balances of payment [are] remedied” (ibid.). The Treaty also refers to point (4), as a European Social Fund is instituted, and as a “common agricultural policy” is set up. Furthermore, the Treaty lays the foundation for the “approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required for the proper functioning of the common market” (ibid.). The use of the word ‘required’ further reflects neofunctionalist language. Finally, one of the most important purposes of the Treaty is the instatement of the free movement of persons, services and capital across the territory of the Community (cf. Title III of the Treaty), and point (5) of the definition could hardly be referred to more explicitly.

Imagination is not required to see the extreme similarities between the categories used by neofunctionalism and the categories used by the architects of the European Union. Neofunctionalism provided the intellectual backbone of early European integration. Two of the three factors that Ferraro et al. (2005) put forward are thus clearly present: firstly, there is congruence between theory (neofunctionalism) and institutional design (European Commission). Secondly, neofunctionalism has provided a language for the design of the European institutions, whose technical names reflect the theory’s premises.

The third factor that Ferraro et al. (2005) suggest, namely the extent to which actors are convinced of the premises of a theory, is more difficult to prove, as this requires interviews with policymakers who were involved in the original construction of the European institutions. Nevertheless, I carried out interviews with current employees of the European Commission (see Chapter 6 for interview methodology), which revealed that there is great awareness of neofunctionalist
theory in the ranks of the European Commission. The following excerpt from an interview with a now former European Commissioner illustrates not only a conviction of the basic accuracy of the theory, but also that conditions were deliberately created that would allow for the fulfilment of its predictions:

**HKA:** So getting into these issues which are related to security policy also opens up the ground for getting involved with hard-core security policy, in a process of spillover?

**Interviewee:** That was at least the idea, but knowing that it would take a lot of time. But dealing with European affairs, you always have to have long-term perspectives. […] At least I had it in my mind.

**HKA:** So this prospect for future spillover was consciously meditated?

**Interviewee:** Yes, absolutely.

**HKA:** By you?

**Interviewee:** Yes, by people like me.

In this example, the conditions for neofunctionalism becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy are more than fulfilled. Furthermore, when one employee from DG Home Affairs\(^\text{12}\) was asked whether neofunctionalism provides an accurate representation of European integration, she replied:

“I think it is pretty accurate. I told you, I think for me, the only variation is the pace of this integration. But the way the system moves is pretty one-directional, if you want. […] Although, and despite, much criticism […] the process continues, and somehow I don’t, I can’t exactly explain why. Maybe it’s because it’s more of an institutional spillover. The institutions are here, they are pushing for new legislation, member states are unhappy with it, but

\(^\text{12}\) The European Commission is divided into quasi-ministries called Directorate-Generals (DGs). These DGs in turn are subdivided into Directorates and Units. The Unit for Migration and Asylum is placed within DG Home Affairs.
either way. In fact, you have no option with a Commission proposal than to act on it. So you may amend it…” (personal communication, 27 June 2013).

This stresses the structural power that neofunctionalism has brought to the European Commission. European integration can be portrayed as inevitably unidirectional, with any counter-movements rendered insignificant. Ultimately the process of integration “is going in one direction only” (ibid.). While all interviewees were familiar with neofunctionalism, the dominance of neofunctionalist principles is further evidenced by the working principles of the European Commission. In his role as European Commissioner for Administrative Reform between 1999 and 2004, Neil Kinnock introduced a series of measures that were intended to prevent the DGs’ inter-institutional isolation and to decrease corruption. The rotation principle, also widely implemented by government administrations all over the EU, meant that staff would have to move between Units, Directorates and DGs every five years (Wille, 2013, 127-8). In turn, this implied a redefinition of expertise: an expert was no longer someone who knew the subject area he was working in especially well, but someone who was an expert in governance. Governing was essentially placed in the same category as engineering: while the engineer’s environment may change, the laws of physics and the principles of engineering remain the same. In the same way the methods of governance can be applied to potentially any issue area, independent of context. As a result, the staff of the European Commission often have no deep expertise in the area they happen to be working on, at least upon assuming a new role within the institution. When asked about his previous work with asylum issues, another key European Commission employee thus stated:

“I was with a broader range of issues, let’s say, in justice and home affairs, but also on asylum I was keeping an eye, but I was not, I was far from being an expert. But yeah, this is quite classical, the standard for the Commission” (personal communication, 10 September 2013).

This vision of technocratic governance delivers the foundation for the decontextualisation of human individuals and reifying policies. It ought to be stressed that neofunctionalism is not acknowledged to be an ideology that drives
a particular type of European integration forward. Nevertheless, the presence of its language and the prevalence of its principles of technocracy and spillover are evident.

Conclusion

While neofunctionalist theory itself is of little value for understanding the social purpose of European integration, its development into an ideology is of high significance for this dissertation’s research agenda. Since the late 1980s, neofunctionalist principles have re-emerged as the dominant paradigm of integration policy. This renaissance coincided with the rise of neoliberalism which will be discussed in the subsequent chapter.

It ought to be stressed that the rise of neofunctionalism as an ideology of integration has several dangers. Firstly, the neofunctionalist idea of a technocratic governance apparatus may undermine the EU’s democratic ambitions as well as the democratic accountability of the nation state. Secondly, neofunctionalism’s utilitarian profit-rationality undermines the visionary strength of Europe as a civilizational project (see Köpping Athanasopoulos, 2015). Thirdly, neofunctionalism’s inward-looking tendencies sometimes result in a misguided conception of foreign and development policy that fails to address problems at their roots.

There is therefore a need to find alternative conceptualisations of European integration capable of understanding the EU’s role within the structure of the global political economy and of conceptualising the role of neofunctionalism in European integration. The next chapter is therefore going to provide a literature review of critical approaches to European integration.
Chapter 2: Thinking Europe Differently – A Literature Review of Critical Approaches to European Integration

The previous chapter has formulated two arguments which form the foundation of this thesis. Firstly, neofunctionalism is an inadequate method of understanding European integration (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991). The theory’s positivist underpinnings and its failure to capture structural power prevent it from showing why one particular trajectory of integration was historically given preference over another. To explain this choice, one would have to choose a different research problématique which seeks to understand the ‘social purpose’ of European integration. In this context, ‘social purpose’ refers to why European integration occurs and to the way the process benefits particular groups or classes materially or in terms of social position while excluding others. Neofunctionalism’s elite focus and rudimentary conceptualisation of exogenous factors furthermore prevents it from taking the objects of European integration seriously. In the case of irregular migration management, these objects are irregular migrants themselves. These deficiencies highlight the importance of the second major argument: neofunctionalism is an ideology of integration whose theoretical predictions have had a significant impact on shaping the expectations of European policymakers.

Given the theory’s faults, this conceptualisation of neofunctionalism may help to understand the social purpose of European integration, shedding light on the causes behind the structural position of irregular migrants, which is ultimately the goal of this dissertation. This chapter will provide a literature review of two different theoretical approaches to European integration which address many of neofunctionalism’s weaknesses. Furthermore, it will establish some of the key theoretical categories that will be employed in the remainder of the thesis. Both approaches that are addressed in this dissertation are rooted in the Marxist tradition of political economy.

Neo-Gramscian theory helps to overcome neofunctionalism’s inward-centeredness and provides the tools for locating neofunctionalism within the practice of neoliberalism. This chapter will provide a review of the most relevant Gramscian terms: hegemony, passive revolution, trasformismo and intellectuals.
Furthermore, some recent applications of Gramsci’s writings to European integration will be outlined, highlighting that they display an excessive focus on elites, which leads to understatements of the importance of the ‘subaltern’. This is problematic because it was very much Gramsci’s intention to lift marginalised, excluded and subordinate groups out of their subalternity, which calls for an inquiry into the structural causes of their condition. Moreover, while the subaltern may be marginalised, they are not powerless – as the example of migration into the European Union shows, the actions of irregular migrants have severely challenged the European institutional arrangement.

Dependency theory, in turn, helps to understand the dynamics of transnational migration as well as the position of the European Union within the global power structures. While Gramsci’s writings have focussed on hegemony as practiced within national settings, dependency theory attempts to understand global inequality. The final part of this chapter will therefore reconcile the two approaches, using their references to core-periphery relations as a starting point.

The Foundations

While the traditions that will be discussed in this chapter have distinct differences, they have common foundations making it sometimes difficult to discern which author belongs to which tradition. These foundations will be briefly outlined to contextualise the remainder of this chapter.

Marxism

Karl Marx is the founder of the historical materialist tradition. He was in many ways the first critical theorist, having designated the emancipation of the working class as the hallmark of his work. Ontologically, the original writings of Marx (e.g. 1981, *Theses on Feuerbach*) are rooted in natural materialism, which asserts that all phenomena are ultimately rooted in the material world. However, at the same time Marx criticised “the abstract materialism of natural science, a materialism
which excludes the historical process” (Marx, 1976, 493). For Marx, the key historical narrative is constituted by the way in which human beings have provided for their sustenance. He criticises how German philosophy had reduced the human condition to physiological processes, arguing instead that “the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life” (Marx, 1977). He found that history presented itself as a series of different forms of oppression of one group by another. It was this oppression, and the efforts of the oppressed group to emancipate itself, that drove human history forward. Human material conditions were thus at the core of historical development, rather than physiological phenomena or theological enlightenment. This constituted a critique of ‘bourgeois’ Hegelian philosophy in particular, which Marx regarded as “nothing but the speculative expression of the Christian-Germanic dogma concerning the opposition of mind and matter, God and the world” (Marx & Engels, 2012, 89). While materialism was adopted in the study of the natural worlds, human history was still viewed as though it was driven by an abstract spirit.

As opposed to positivism, historical materialism is not exclusively empiricist, representing rather a hermeneutic approach. Marx establishes ‘classes’ as the primary agents of human history. Values and changing interests are key drivers of human affairs, particularly as the values and interests of different classes are often directly opposed to one another. This dialectical understanding of reality thus asserts that contradictions within social relations, political systems, values or interests cause progress and development in human history. Capitalism itself is of course itself full of contradictions, which is why Marx viewed “harmonious and balanced growth under capitalism” as “purely accidental” (Harvey, 1975, 9). One of the main reasons for the crisis-proneness is the notion of the commodification of labour. Marx pointed out that capitalism “transforms a mass of individuals […] into potential free labourers, whose only property is their labour power and a possibility of exchanging it for existing values” (Marx, 1973, 502). At the heart of Marx’s critique lies the fact that labour will ultimately not act like the gears and axles of a machine.13 In the capitalist mode of production, labour creates both

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13 Alongside labour, Polanyi (1944) refers to two further fictitious commodities, namely land and money, which are not ‘produced’ for being sold on the market.
supply and demand, which creates overproduction on the one hand and excessive demand for labour (and thus higher wages and reduced rates of profit) on the other. Nevertheless, although he initially predicted that capitalism would soon meet its demise, and although vulgar readings of Marx continue to emphasise Marxian economic determinism, in the later stages of his life Marx became increasingly cautious with his claims. Particularly the Panic of 1857 and its failure to trigger revolution led to a more open approach towards historical development in *Capital* (Marx, 1976; Knafo, 2002; Crump, 1969), emphasising that “men make their own history,” although “not under circumstances they themselves have chosen” (Marx, 1974, 146).

Critical Theory

Another common feature that is shared between the approaches discussed in this chapter is their location within the critical tradition of social science (for methodological implications, see Chapter 4). While Marx was in many ways a critical theorist, the term ‘critical theory’ did not enter academic discourse until the early 20th century. In seeming allusion to Marx, Horkheimer writes that “critical theory […] has for its objective men as producers of their own historical way of life in its totality” (1972, 224) as well as the liberation of “human beings from the circumstances that enslave them” (Horkheimer, 1982, 244).

Horkheimer’s statement is strikingly similar to Marx’s eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, which states that “philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it” (Marx, 1981). Nevertheless, the scholars of the Frankfurt School drew not only on the Marxian proposition that human oppression is the result of an unjust distribution of the means of production; another major influence was Freudian psychoanalysis (Buzby, 2013). Both Marx and Freud were concerned with finding the roots of the dissatisfying

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14 The Panic of 1857 refers to a global financial crisis in the mid-19th century that was caused by speculation in the American railway industry and real estate market. The bursting speculation bubble resulted in the insolvency of the Ohio Life Insurance Company, which in turn caused the bankruptcy of several of the institution’s creditors and a bank run. The panic and uncertainty associated with the event spread to Europe and triggered an economic crisis that lasted for several years.
and oppressive circumstances of human existence. For Freud, these circumstances lie buried in the development of the psyche. Emancipation therefore not only refers to removing the causes of material enslavement by a politico-economic system, but also to removing the causes of mental enslavement.

However, as Marx had already purported, the mental and material realms did not form distinct categories. Furthermore, as Freud had demonstrated, subject and object are not intrinsically distinct (cf. Freud, 1930). This is the origin of the Frankfurt school’s concept of ‘totality’. Adorno viewed the individual in capitalist society as being forced to wear ‘character masks’ to act out her role in different circumstances. In capitalism, a worker may produce a particular good, but that good does not belong to her, nor do the tools that the good was produced with. The individual nevertheless has to surrender to ‘wage slavery’, as it is the only means to ensure survival. To endure this undesirable condition one thus wears a character mask, acting out the role demanded. The need to act and to wear character masks alienates the worker from her self which she is no longer able to express. Capitalist totality, which encompasses all social relations, thus turns the human being into “an instance of the conditions in which he lives, before he can determine his own existence” (Adorno, 1997, 42). The individual’s only way to cope with capitalist totality is through the further degeneration and regression of the ‘self’ as wearing character masks becomes increasingly permanent. It is of key importance here that capitalism is so omnipresent that there is no way to escape it – one is forced to participate in commodity exchange.

Neo-Gramscian Theory

The purpose of this section is to discuss selections of the writings of Antonio Gramsci and some of their key interpretations forming the basis of much of the critical literature that has hitherto been written on European integration. Gramsci was one of the principal figures of the Italian communist movement, which led to his eventual imprisonment from 1927 to 1935 by the fascist Mussolini government. Much of Gramsci’s work has been produced during this time in the
shape of the *Prison Notebooks* (Gramsci, 1971; 1992; 1996, 2007). Particular attention will be given to three ideas which are of high relevance for this dissertation and which also constitute important aspects of Gramsci’s work: hegemony, passive revolution and intellectuals. While hegemony refers to the practice of leadership (Thomas, 2013), the other two terms relate to the existence of institutions which uphold that leadership. Each term will be discussed in turn, and its relevance to understanding the social purpose of European integration will be highlighted.

**Hegemony**

Hegemony is arguably Gramsci’s most well-known concept, having found its way into popular political discourse. Nevertheless, Gramsci by no means invented the word. According to Boothman for example, ‘hegemony’ was used in the party organ of the Italian socialists with reference to the early 20th century struggle over ‘dominance’ in the Adriatic between Italy and Yugoslavia (2008, 202-3). Nevertheless, on the basis of the *Prison Notebooks* it was probably Lenin who held the strongest influence over Gramsci’s own theorisation of hegemony (Brandist, 2012). Gramsci writes that Lenin “constructed the doctrine of hegemony as a complement to the theory of the State-as-force and as a contemporary form of the 1848 doctrine of ‘permanent revolution’” (Gramsci, 1995, 357). This statement hints at the complexity of the Gramscian use of the term. Hegemony clearly refers to more than an order “where consent, rather than coercion, primarily

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15 Anglophone neo-Gramscians have historically been tormented by the absence of a complete translation of the *Prison Notebooks* into English. In Hoare and Smith’s first translation of Gramsci (1971), which was published as *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, an attempt is made to order Gramsci’s writings thematically rather than chronologically. The editing involved in the production of this volume has been highly problematic because different notes from different notebooks were decontextualized and combined. The notes are not labelled and it is not possible to easily trace to their origin. In part, this is due to the fact that the first complete edition of the Prison Notebooks in Italian was not published until 1975 (Gramsci, 1975). Buttigieg’s translation of Prison Notebooks 1-8 (Gramsci, 1992; 1996; 2007) stays true to their original order and contains vast amounts of explanatory notes. An English translation of Prison Notebooks 9-29 is, as of 2015, unavailable. These Notebooks contain 767 notes, compared to 1,294 notes in Notebooks 1-8.

16 In its root meaning the word *hegemony* (Greek *hēgemonía*) stems from the Ancient Greek verb *hēgeisthai* (to lead). The term’s most accurate translation would thus be ‘leadership’.

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[characterises] the relations between classes,” which is how Gill defines the concept (1989, 476).

Thomas (2013) points to four different interpretations of hegemony, all of which are essentially theories of political power. Firstly, hegemony is referred to as consensual domination of one class over other classes. This is based on the idea that the disillusionment with the myth of imminent world revolution, which had been inspired by the early successes of the Soviet Union, lies at the heart of Gramsci’s writings (Femia, 1987, 5). Domination is established subtly to achieve the consent of all subjects to the hegemonic order, which explained the failure of revolutionary movements in Western Europe. This is similar to the interpretation of hegemony put forward by Cox (1981) and Gill (1989). A second reading of hegemony understands the term to refer to the emergence of civil society and politicised public. Through the articulation of their heterogeneity, society’s groups are unified into a collective hegemonic unit which then forms the political subject (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985; Critchley, 2007). A third interpretation locates the practice of hegemony outside the realm of the state, arguing that the latter’s power rests on coercion. Hegemony is regarded here as counter-movement that seeks to undermine the power of the state (Bobbio, 1979). A fourth interpretation views hegemony as a coercive struggle between states for domination. This interpretation is the closest to its use of the term in ancient Greece, where hegemony was used to refer to the dominance of particular city-states (Fontana, 2000). Anderson (1976) and Buci-Glucksmann (1980) translate this view to struggles within the Communist International, while Gill (1989) and Cox (1981) discussed Cold War international relations, using this conceptualisation in combination with the consent-interpretation. Although all of these interpretations bear some validity, Thomas (2013) argues that they reduce hegemony to a synonym of already known concepts.

17 As the leading representative of the York School of International Relations, Robert Cox applied hegemony to the international level in the spirit of the Ancient Greek use of the term (Cox, 1981). He argued that the dominance of certain states during particular eras can be explained using the concept of hegemony. Cox argued that hegemony refers to consensual domination – the rule of a particular power is not only achieved as a result of vast military and economic resources, but by international structures that are consensually maintained by other actors involved. Cox cites the post-Cold War era of 1945-65 as the hegemonic period for the United States, arguing that US hegemony was backed and legitimated by international institutions such as the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) and the Bretton Woods system. These institutions allowed US hegemony to be viewed as universally beneficial.
Gramsci’s own characterisation of hegemony is complex and often misunderstood. In the *Prison Notebooks*, the word is often used as an apparent synonym of ‘leadership’. Although it is helpful to consider this further, this definition does not convey the entire meaning of hegemony. Gramsci distinguishes between leadership and dominance. With reference to the Italian Risorgimento, Gramsci states the following on this issue:

“A class is dominant in two ways, namely it is ‘leading’ and ‘dominant’. It leads the allied classes, it dominates the opposing classes. Therefore, a class can (and must) ‘lead’ even before assuming power; when it is in power it becomes dominant, but it also continues to ‘lead’” (Gramsci, 1992, 136-7).

Within this context, Gramsci then introduces the term ‘hegemony’:

“There can and must be ‘political hegemony’ even before assuming government power, and in order to exercise political leadership or hegemony one must not count solely on the power and material force that is given by government” (ibid., 137).

In a Machiavellian manner, Gramsci thus provides instructions for the successful practice of hegemony. The primary purpose of the term is thus not to be an analytical tool, but to provide a political agenda. Hegemony is clearly not to be equated with dominance, although it can contain coercive elements. It is rather a combination of dominance and leadership, with the latter implying the consent of the led. The most obvious example of Gramsci’s vision of hegemony would be the role of the proletariat in a Socialist revolution. Gramsci saw the role of the proletariat in consolidating and leading classes with shared interests (such as the peasants of Southern Italy). Although Gramsci principally employs the term within domestic, revolutionary contexts, he also refers to its relevance in “international relations,” citing for example the “hegemony exercised by France” during the 18th century (ibid., 151).

According to Thomas (2013), the notion of hegemony furthermore rests on ‘hegemonic moments’, two of which will be discussed here as the most influential. Firstly, hegemony should be seen as social and political leadership. Gramsci
inherited the concept of hegemony from Lenin and the Russian social democrats. In this context, hegemony referred to the potential of the working class to provide political leadership to the other classes in the fight against tsardom. Gramsci attempted to translate this idea into his own space: Italy. He argued that political leadership is the lens through which history can be read. In the East the working classes had established leadership, while the West was characterised by the lack of proletarian leadership. Gramsci understood that hegemony does not merely refer to the practice of government, but to leadership in a wider sense. In the case of the dominant class, hegemonic leadership structurally maintains the distance between the leaders and the led (and managed). In the case of the subordinate classes, hegemonic leadership helps increasing the self-awareness and political engagement of the masses. This conceptualisation of hegemony is highly relevant in relation to European migration management. It sheds light on the role of neofunctionalism in maintaining the structural power of the ruling classes. By depoliticising migration management, the issue is delegated to ‘experts’ creating distance between the leaders and the led and managed. This understanding of hegemony may provide insight into the weakness of irregular migrants as a social group and their neglect in decision-making.

The second hegemonic moment that Thomas points towards are the institutions and manifestations of the “hegemonic apparatus” (2013, 25). The notion of the hegemonic apparatus best represents Gramsci’s genuinely new and original perspective on hegemony. The apparatus is not constituted merely of the state, its parties and its other obvious political institutions. It also consists of newspapers, educational institutes or sports clubs, which all serve the purpose of consolidating the state’s influence by shaping ‘common sense’, which Gramsci refers to as “the most widespread conception of life and morals” and as the “‘folklore’ of ‘philosophy’” (Gramsci, 1992, 173). This understanding provides crucial insight into the role of organic intellectuals in a hegemonic project, which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.

It should be pointed out that the concept of a hegemonic apparatus is not identical to that of the “hegemonic bloc” (Gramsci, 1971, 52), which is another important Gramscian concept in relation to the exercise of hegemony. Indeed, the hegemonic bloc refers to the “historical unity” of social forces, as opposed to
structures (which is the case with the historical bloc). Gramsci understood social forces to refer to classes and mass movements, as opposed to institutions such as universities or parties. The hegemonic bloc has to be a “durable alliance of class forces” (Jessop, 1997, 55) which may have a hegemonic apparatus at their disposal.

Thomas argues that the purpose the Gramscian notion of hegemony is not to show that the working classes are caught in an eternal loop of endless subordination. On the contrary, Gramsci wanted to point out that the subordinate classes can employ the same techniques to abolish exploitative and oppressive social relations. The awareness of the state’s hegemonic apparatus can lead to a state of “‘permanent revolution’ in the midst of capitalist domination,” because the apparatus can potentially be used for emancipation (Thomas, 2013, 28).

The concept of hegemony will be referred to in later sections of this dissertation with reference to the potential hegemony of transnational capital (van Apeldoorn, 2002). In Chapter 7, the relevance of neofunctionalism for the consolidation of that hegemony will be demonstrated.

*Passive Revolution and Trasformismo*

Passive revolution is a term that Gramsci originally employed to refer to “a series of reforms or national wars without undergoing a political revolution of the radical-Jacobin type” (Gramsci, 1996, 232). Recognising the enormous changes that had taken places in Italy and other countries during the 19th and early 20th centuries, Gramsci thus used the term to refer to revolutionary transformations without a popular revolution (Callinicos, 2010). One of the ways that passive revolutions can take place is through what Gramsci calls *trasformismo* (i.e. ‘transformism’). *Trasformismo* refers to the “absorption of the active elements that [arise] from the allied as well as from the enemy classes,” which will “[result] in their decapitation and renders them impotent” (Gramsci, 1992, 137). This occurs because these groups lose their self-awareness and no longer formulate aims of their own. The ‘active elements’ Gramsci refers to (i.e. elites) can be absorbed through coercive measures as well as through the incorporation of their political
demands into the ideological catalogue of the hegemonic class. As a result of this process, it is hoped that potential projects challenging hegemony are weakened, as the populace is convinced that active revolutionary changes are unnecessary and can be achieved from within the current political system.

There are different interpretations also of passive revolutions and *trasformismo*. Morton (2007) explains the rise of the Mussolini government in Italy by reference to the increasing influence of foreign and particularly Anglo-American capital. This example of passive revolution stresses Gramsci’s inclusive conceptualisation of the state as consisting of more than merely political institutions. However, Thomas develops a radically different approach. In the light of his analysis, the term ‘passive revolution’ refers not only to the appropriation of the ideas of the subordinate classes by the dominant class, but also to the failure of the dominant class to fully implement its own agenda, “[highlighting] the historical failure of hegemony” (Thomas, 2013, 25). Hegemony should be understood as a means to empower the subaltern classes to develop their own, alternative conceptions of politics. Thomas refers to passive revolution as the “precise organizational obstacle to [hegemony’s] extensive practice” (idib., 29).

It will become clear in later sections that these concepts are highly useful in terms of accounting for the changes that have taken place in European migration legislation, particularly since the early 2000s. The increasing convergence of European social democrats and conservatives is the most obvious expression of *trasformismo* in the contemporary European context, as this has brought about the inclusion of progressive forces’ intellectuals into the hegemonic apparatus of transatlantic capital. Indeed, the austerity policies that have characterised the response to the so-called ‘sovereign debt crisis’ can arguably be described using the term passive revolution.

*The Intellectuals*

One of the key social groups for successful hegemonic practice are the intellectuals. Gramsci distinguishes between organic and traditional intellectuals.
However, before the nature of this group is discussed in detail, it must first be located within the wider array of the ‘hegemonic apparatus’. Gramsci argues that the power of the dominating classes is based upon “the hegemonic apparatus of one social group over the rest of society” (1971, 264-5). Thomas explains that this hegemonic apparatus consists of a wide range of institutions, including schools, universities, the mass media or political parties. These institutions are used by classes to engage in their struggle against enemy classes and social groups (2009, 226). This delimitation and inclusive conceptualisation of power also finds its expression in Gramsci’s inclusive understanding of the state, which he defines as the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971, 244). This understanding of the state as a ‘condensation of forces’ blurs and dissolves the boundary between state and civil society and permits for the consideration of the influence exercised and roles played by different social classes (cf. Jessop, 1997).

Any group which fulfils an essential function of economic production will create alongside itself a flock of intellectuals, which “give it homogeneity and an awareness of its function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (Gramsci, 2005, 49). Intellectuals thus fulfil a crucial function in allowing a group to achieve class consciousness and in defining its hegemonic agenda. Intellectuals can emerge as symbionts with a particular class, forming part of a larger social ‘organism’ with which they are coevolving. However, a class can also strive to “elaborate its own organic intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2005, 52). Gramsci distinguished between organic intellectuals and traditional intellectuals. While organic intellectuals develop alongside a social group, traditional intellectuals are inherited from previous economic structures. However, rather than delineating the status of being an ‘intellectual’ according to antiquated categories, Gramsci suggests that intellectuals are defined by their instrumental role of intellectually elaborating a group’s functions and tasks. This further underlines the inclusive approach to social relations that is also expressed in the Gramscian understanding of class and state. Gramsci also stresses that intellectuals are not merely integral to the dominant class but potentially to other classes as well. Nevertheless, Gramsci argues that the ability to “assimilate and
conquer [...] the traditional intellectuals” is a crucial factor in determining whether a social group will achieve dominance (ibid.). In addition, such a social group should elaborate “its own organic intellectuals” to be able to implement its hegemonic project (ibid.).

For the purpose of understanding the role of neofunctionalism in a European hegemonic project the category of organic intellectuals appears highly relevant. Scholars of European integration are simultaneously organic and traditional intellectuals. They are organic intellectuals because they co-evolved alongside the original European elite. As White (2003) demonstrates, early neofunctionalist scholarship was deeply intertwined with European policymakers. Not only did Haas and Lindberg theorise the process of regional integration, but their predictions shaped policymaking-decisions. Nevertheless, being located within the more ‘traditional’ disciplines of political science, sociology and international relations, early scholars of European integration also formed part of the cadre of traditional intellectuals. Gramsci would by no means consider these two groups to be mutually exclusive, having stated that “all men are intellectuals,” although “not all men have in society the function of intellectuals” (Gramsci, 2005, 51). The early neofunctionalists were traditional intellectuals, but simultaneously functioned as organic intellectuals. Nevertheless, within the changing hegemonic context of European integration, which will be discussed in the next section, the role of neofunctionalism underwent a significant transformation. According to Gramsci’s idea of the successful implementation of hegemony being in part dependent on the ability to absorb the traditional intellectuals, one would expect neofunctionalism to have become part of a particular hegemonic apparatus. It will be one of the tasks of this dissertation to explore whether this has indeed been the case.

Neo-Gramscian Theory and European Integration

This section will outline some relevant and recent analyses of European integration from a neo-Gramscian perspective. These contributions form an important part of addressing the social purpose of European integration, which,
as will be seen, rests on the neoliberal transformation of the European Union. Nevertheless, the current neo-Gramscian scholarship on European integration arguably contains an elite-bias, which will be discussed towards the end of this section.

From a neo-Gramscian perspective European integration can be regarded as being an aspect of the hegemony of transatlantic capital, which in turn facilitated the implementation of a neoliberal agenda. However, much of the Gramscian literature on European integration focusses on the origins, practices and consequences of contemporary ‘neoliberal hegemony’ (e.g. Gill, 2003; Bonefeld, 2012; Bohle, 2006). However, this term obfuscates an important aspect of Gramsci’s own conceptualisation of hegemony which emphasises that hegemony is always practiced by social classes. There is no neoliberal class; however, the implementation of a neoliberal project may be part of the agenda of a particular class. Here I will explain what neoliberalism is from a neo-Gramscian perspective and by whom it is implemented.

Harvey describes neoliberalism as a theory that “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” (2005, 2). The state’s role should be to guarantee the functioning of the market, for example through the creation of a suitable institutional apparatus or through safeguarding the supply of capital. State institutions, such as the courts or the military, should possess the means to enforce the protection of private property rights and the functioning of the markets. Where no markets exist, the state should encourage their creation, which may have profound consequences for migration management, as irregular migrants too are exposed to increasing marketisation. It is important to note that neoliberalism does not advocate the disappearance or minimisation of the state, albeit reducing it to the regulatory institution. In fact, the neoliberal state may encompass a large governance apparatus. The neoliberal economic order and post-War democracy are arguably at odds with one another (ibid.). As Merkel (2014) points out, the establishment of ‘free markets’ through deregulation limits the ability of governments to effectively implement macroeconomic policies. Technocracy and dependency on intellectuals are thus inherent features of neoliberalism.
Although neoliberalism may be part of a programme to achieve or sustain hegemony, there is no ‘neoliberal class’. A class or a durable alliance of classes (hegemonic bloc) thus still ought to be identified as the forces behind the implementation of the neoliberal agenda for European integration. While Gramsci’s own analysis is often confined to the boundaries of the nation state, European integration is by its very nature a supranational project; the agent of neoliberalism should be located at the transnational level. Sklair’s (2001; 2013) ‘transnational capitalist class’ (TCC) is a concept which can help us identifying possible candidates for this role. Sklair argues that the highly regulated Keynesian welfare states of the 1960s and 1970s increased the importance of transnational corporations attempting to escape the confinement of the state. In addition to that, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates facilitated the internationalisation of production. At the transnational level fewer constraints were imposed on capital. Indeed, this view is highly compatible with the neofunctionalist vision of the European Union, which in fact presupposes the emergence of a TCC. Haas (1958) suggested that as European integration advances, the loyalties of national elites would synchronise towards the European level. This would result in the appearance of European rather than national capital. Van der Pijl (1984; 1998) proposes a transatlantic capitalist class as a concrete example of a TCC. Via institutions such as the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) settings were created that brought together representatives of important social groups from both sides of the Atlantic, acting as a catalyst for class formation. From the Gramscian perspective, it is not surprising that a cultural institution would be part of class formation, since the notion of the historical bloc transcends class and state apparatus (Jessop, 1997; Gramsci, 1971). According to van der Pijl, the ECF was an important player in the attempt to foster a pan-European cultural identity (1998, 122). Van der Pijl argues that European integration as a whole should be placed within the transatlantic context, which is further emphasised by the United States’ perceived need for a strong Western European capitalist market as a bulwark against Communist expansion.

18 In the Bretton Woods system (1945-71) all currencies were pegged to the US dollar, which in turn was convertible into gold.
While Sklair's and van der Pijl's work create the theoretical tools for translating Gramsci's national class analysis towards the transnational (and hence European) level, van Apeldoorn (2002) explains how the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT) became the vehicle for the implementation of the emergent European transnational capitalist class's neoliberal project. In the 1950s and 60s, the spread of Fordism to Western Europe resulted in a class compromise between capital and labour. Mass production requires the institution of higher salaries to permit market expansion, as the sponsoring of labour created more demand. Both sides, capital and labour, were thus benefitting, as long as the growth cycle was maintained. In the 1960s, the limits of this growth model were apparently reached, as wages were rising faster than productivity, resulting in a fall of profits. Capital thus began to stop benefitting from the class compromise. Furthermore, the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates permitted the internationalisation of production, which in turn resulted in the emergence of increasing global competition. The competitiveness of industrial production in the capitalist heartland was reduced, since production is other parts of the world was cheaper. Van Apeldoorn (2002) explains how this resulted in the emergence of various rivalling accumulation models in Western Europe, as Fordism no longer produced the amount of growth deemed sufficient by capital. Through the erosion of the Fordist class compromise capital attempted to re-establish its dominance over labour.

The globalisation of production resulted in a crisis of European industry that was initially met with a large variety of national responses which further highlighted the differences between national political economies. Nevertheless, these initially nationalist policies were superseded by the creation of the Single Market by the late 1980s, which can be interpreted as a manifestation of the constraints globalisation had placed on national policymaking (cf. Streeck, 1993). Nevertheless, the nature of the European response to this crisis was seriously debated. By the late 1980s the European political economy had by no means become monolithic, and there were several different welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Van Apeldoorn (2002) argues that this period was

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19 Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between the liberal, the corporatist and the social democratic welfare state. The liberal welfare state has only a very elementary benefits system and private welfare schemes are sometimes subsidised. It was practiced in the United States, Canada,
characterised by competition between three European models of capitalism which would redefine the social purpose of European integration. The social democratic model was supported by trade unions, by the socialists as well as by parts of the Christian democratic parties. The neo-mercantilist model saw regionalisation as an attempt to protect European productive capital from the negative consequences of globalisation. Finally, the neoliberal model aimed at deregulating and liberalising the European market. In van Apeldoorn’s view, transnational class struggle was most clearly manifested in the struggle between the neo-mercantilist model and the neoliberal model. Van Apeldoorn distinguishes between transnational capital with a European affiliation (e.g. European industrial firms) and transnational capital with a global affiliation (e.g. financial capital and German industrial capital). The ‘Europeanist’ faction strongly identified with the neo-mercantilist model, whereas the globalist faction identified with the neoliberal faction. The fact that the neoliberal model eventually won supports the hypothesis that neoliberalism in Europe is indeed supported by a hegemonic bloc under the leadership of a transnational capitalist class with global affiliations. Van Apeldoorn’s finding that the ERT’s proposals for the architecture of the European monetary union were translated into the Maastricht Treaty offers further evidence of this claim.

Various other authors have further attempted to apply neo-Gramscian theory to the European integration process. Bohle (2005) attempts to explain the eastward expansion of the European Union in 2004 using a neo-Gramscian framework. She argues that the purpose of the enlargement process, decided upon in 1993, was to guarantee that central and eastern European states would develop the neoliberal model of capitalism. As opposed to previous enlargement rounds, the candidate countries were required to liberalise their markets before they actually entered the EU. The liberalisation agenda in the new member states was in many ways more radical than in the old member states. Furthermore, the new member states’ citizens would be exempted from the right to work anywhere in Australia and to some extent the UK. The corporatist welfare state privileges particular (industrial) social groups and classes. It provides welfare, but its bias limits the redistribute effects of that welfare. This model was practised in West Germany, France and Italy. The social democratic regime in turn aimed at providing universal welfare and was practised by Scandinavian countries. In addition to these regimes, some authors have proposed the Mediterranean welfare regime, which is based on welfare provided by the family (Hemerijk, 2002).
the EU for at least seven years, making them essentially second class EU citizens. Bohle explains this significant difference from previous rounds of enlargement by claiming that it was the result of the emergence of a transnational historical bloc. Foreign investors were seeking ways to invest directly into Central and Eastern Europe as opposed to using subcontractors. Furthermore, enlargement was an attempt to create a pan-European division of labour wherein the new member states would be responsible for the lower end of the production process. The EU steel industry for example was dominated by a few highly competitive steel corporations, who marvelled at the prospect of increasing steel demand in the new member states, and at the prospect of relocating production to regions with lower labour costs. Eastern enlargement was thus a form of passive revolution with the purpose of including Central and Eastern Europe into the transnational historic bloc.

Ian Bruff (2014) attempts to understand the eurozone crisis through the work of Nicos Poulantzas, who was in turn heavily influenced by Gramsci. Bruff particularly refers to Poulantzas’ idea of authoritarian statism. Poulantzas (2014) pointed out that authoritarianism is not only the government’s use of force, for example during a demonstration, but also the policy of the reconfiguration of the state by means of attempting to isolate policy areas from political contestation. Due to the questioning of their ability to effectively address reality, neoliberal policies seized to be backed up by wide-spread consent. As a result, coercive forms of neoliberalism became more visible. Indeed, the constitutional and legal transformations that we are witnessing in many EU member states are justified as being necessary to reanimate the European market economy. They also serve the purpose of redefining the role and function of the state. The population is thus told that the state is unable to prevent rising social inequality and the decline of social welfare because it is materially unable to do so – hence the institution of constitutional, permanent austerity by means of ‘debt brakes’.20 Furthermore, the state redefines itself as increasingly non-democratic by constitutionally limiting its scope of action. This represents a move away from seeking consent, as subaltern groups are excluded from political processes “through the constitutionally and

20 The Fiscal Compact, which was ratified by all eurozone members and some of the remaining EU member states, foresees the introduction of upper limits to annual deficits, preferably at constitutional level.
legally engineered self-disempowerment of nominally democratic institutions” (Bruff, 2014, 116). This development represents a potential contestation of the hegemonic leadership of transnational capital, as there is a clear conflict of interests between different social groups. Therefore Bruff views the rise of authoritarian neoliberalism as a window of opportunity for counter-hegemonic projects. However, between the two world wars, Gramsci realised that even a deep crisis of capitalism has ambiguous implications. It is one of the problems of the contemporary left that radical politics is practiced much more effectively by right-wing groups. Instances of trasformismo are numerous for right-wing projects, while they are scarce and extremely disputed when proposed by left-wing actors (e.g. financial transaction tax).

Laura Horn (2011) points out that much of the neo-Gramscian literature that has hitherto been written on European integration exhibits an elite focus that is contrary to the spirit of Gramsci, an argument which can arguably also be applied to Bohle’s and van Apeldoorn’s analyses. If neo-Gramscian scholarship is ultimately about overcoming the social injustice that the practices of an oppressive hegemonic bloc imply, its emphasis must be on identifying the transformative and emancipatory potential for subaltern groups.

**Dependency Theory**

Dependency theory provides an account of global underdevelopment. Dependency theory’s conceptualisation of increasing integration of the global core through regional, supranational institutions and free trade agreements provide ample material for using the approach to understand European integration, and aspects of dependency theory have been used by critical EU scholars (e.g. Becker et al., 2015). Nevertheless, dependency theory has been employed to understand global migratory movements, which is why a part of this section will be dedicated to a review of this literature. Furthermore, it will be discussed to what extent dependency theory and neo-Gramscian theory are mutually compatible (cf. 21 It also provides the foundation for world-systems analysis, which is however not referred to here as its structural determinism is incompatible with the open-ended development of capitalism.)
Lipietz, 1989; Ryner, 2002). Both approaches emphasises core-periphery relations, whether on the national, regional or international levels, and thus provide fruitful starting point for a conversation between the two theories.

*The Problem of Underdevelopment*

The foundation of dependency theory was developed by the former Director of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America, Paul Prebisch (Ferraro, 2008). Prebisch became aware that growth in the advanced economies of the world economy was not matched by growth in poorer countries. While the neoclassical theory of economics expected the ‘Pareto-optimal’ growth of the global economy, according to which all global regions benefit from the economic development of the most developed regions, some areas’ proportional share in global trade had begun to decline (Harvey, 1975). Furthermore, it seemed as though the activities of the developed countries were causing problems for the poorer countries. Prebisch thought that this condition was the result of the poorer countries’ export strategy: while the poorer countries supplied primary resources, the richer countries imported these resources and added value to them by manufacturing them into usable goods. The poorer countries then bought these goods, but because they merely supplied the relatively cheaper primary resources, they would never earn more through their exports to pay for these imports. According to the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, the terms of trade further decline as there is a tendency for the relative price of manufactured products to increase vis-à-vis primary good (Singer, 1950). The solution was obvious: by implementing import substitution industrialisation strategies, the poorer countries would no longer have to spend their foreign exchange reserves on manufactured goods. Nevertheless, there were some practical obstacles to such an endeavour. Firstly, the poorer countries’ national markets were not sufficiently big to support economies of scale. Secondly, there was a lack of political will to implement the transition to becoming an economy that is not solely dependent on the export of primary goods. Thirdly, poorer countries often possessed little control over their raw materials – they often did not have the means of accessing them or the production sites were controlled
by foreign industrial companies based in former colonial powers. The maintenance of the state of underdevelopment thus appeared to be structurally embedded. Dependency theory began to provide an answer to a question which the neoclassical theory of economics had nearly nothing to say on, apart from the idea that poorer countries had not yet developed sufficiently sophisticated economic practices (Ferraro, 2008).

Dos Santos describes dependency as a “historical condition which shaped a certain structure of the world economy such that it favours some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities of the subordinate economies” (1971, 231). Subordination is thus structurally embedded in the global economic system. Despite their fragmentation into different groups (e.g. Marxists, world-systems theorists, etc.), all dependency scholars agree that the world is divided into at least two different camps, which are variously referred to as the core and the periphery, the dominant and the subordinate, or the metropolitan region and the satellites. While the core is composed of the wealthy states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the periphery consists of those parts of Africa, Asia and Latin America that have a low GDP per capita and a large dependency on the export of a single commodity. The countries that exhibit characteristics of both groups are often referred to as the semi-periphery. Peripheral elites often benefit from this constellation which is one of the most important reasons for its continuity. Dependency theorists also agree that external forces are of critical importance to the economic development of the periphery (Sunkel, 1969). These external forces may consist of transnational corporations, foreign aid and other instruments. The interaction between the core and the periphery does not balance out, but rather increases the gap between the two groups.

The social structures and dynamics of global capitalism are regarded as the primary forces behind dependency, and dependency theory can in many ways be regarded as an application of the Marxist understanding of the domestic dynamic of capitalism to the international system (Frank, 1972). It is, however, not a theory of imperialism as laid out for example by Lenin. While imperialism is about the expansion of a state’s global influence, dependency attempts to provide an explanation for underdevelopment. It is thus a theory of the consequences of a
dimension of imperialism. Capitalism has instituted a global division of labour where dependent countries provide a market for obsolete technologies, while supplying raw materials, agricultural products and cheap labour. The theory thus sheds some light on migratory movements from the periphery to the core, as labour is treated as though it was a commodity like any other (cf. Polanyi, 1944). While some non-Marxist dependency theorists question whether capitalism is indeed the driving force behind global inequality, Ferraro (2008) nevertheless argues that they all share the following five propositions. Firstly, undevelopment ought not to be equated with underdevelopment. Underdevelopment simply refers to a situation where resources are not being used, where land remains uncultivated. Underdevelopment on the other hand refers to resources being allocated unequally, benefitting only the dominant states. Secondly, underdeveloped countries do not lag behind nor are they catching up; they were included in the economic system against their will as the producers of raw materials. Thirdly, the manner in which underdeveloped countries use their resources is one of the major reasons of underdevelopment. Instead of using their agricultural products for domestic consumption, they export them. This, it is claimed, is the cause of numerous famines. Fourthly, like realists, dependency scholars view states as the primary actors of the international system, possessing nationally defined interests. The precise nature of those interests on the other hand is left vague, implying that the meaning of the term ‘development’ is equally uncertain. Fifthly, dependency is maintained not only by the structural power of the global core, but by elites in the dependent states whose interests coincide with those of the core (Lumpenbourgeoisie). This emphasises the voluntary nature of the dependency relationship.

One of the major critiques of Frank’s and Dos Santos’ versions of dependency theory has highlighted that they are unable to account for the unequal position of dependent and peripheral countries in the global economy (Cardoso, 1973). Ferdando Henrique Cardoso, who served as the 34th President of Brazil between 1995 and 2003, significantly addressed this critique and developed a typology to account for peripheral countries’ differing conditions which had hitherto been ignored by dependency scholars. Cardoso distinguishes between three continuums where countries can be located: autonomy-dependency, centre-
periphery and development-underdevelopment. According to Cardoso, dependency refers to the internal and external relations of the conditions of national economic systems. Periphery, in turn, refers to the position of underdeveloped economies in the global polico-economic systems, irrespective of their specific social conditions. Underdevelopment denotes the level of development of the national productive system. These scales make development and autonomy independent from one another, and a country may for instance be developed and peripheral at the same time. The European Union and the United States of America may be considered autonomous-developed centres (although Panitch and Gindin (2012) attribute only relative autonomy to the EU). Brazil and Argentina belong to the dependent-developed periphery. China is an example of the autonomous-underdeveloped semi-periphery, while sub-Saharan Africa is part of the dependent-underdeveloped periphery. In line with his political ambitions, Cardoso suggested that the internal conditions of a state determine its position in the global economy, and that domestic inequality will always translate itself into international inequality. For achieving development, seen as the ultimate political purpose, it is thus essential for a state to develop autonomous decision-making powers. Nevertheless, despite the clear improvements of Cardoso’s approach, it arguably underestimates the racial divides in the periphery, falling into the trap of class-reductionism (Grosfoguel, 2000). Furthermore, Cardoso arguably overestimates the autonomy of peripheral states in his recommendations.

Underdevelopment and Transnational Migration

Massey et al. (1993) trace the origins of international migration to seven factors which are caused by the global, structural imbalance described by dependency scholars. Firstly, the consolidation of land in peripheral areas by capitalist farmers leads to the destruction of traditional, inheritance-based agricultural property relations. Furthermore, the mechanisation of agriculture reduces the need for manual labour. The reduced cost of agricultural products drives traditional farmers out of business, and ultimately uproots the local population creating migratory movements. Secondly, the extraction and production of raw materials
in peripheral regions requires manual labour that is drawn from populations that were previously engaged in traditional farming-practices, further producing a mobile labour force. Thirdly, companies from the core economies set up factories in peripheral regions to benefit from lower unit labour costs. The jobs thus creates primarily attract female workers and destroy the traditional production relations. Low pay limits the time a worker spends at a factory, causing the workforce to move on to look for other job opportunities. The predominantly female workers employed at these factories are socialised into industrial work habits and a consumption-based environment, creating ideological links with the core. All of these factors contribute to the creation of an uprooted workforce increasing transnational migration.

The three factors discussed so far concern migration within a particular region of the global economy: the periphery. Indeed, the vast majority of international migration takes place within the same region. The following four points, however, relate to migration between the core and the periphery, which is currently involving the European Union on a large scale. Firstly, Massey et al. (1993) put forward that in order to facilitate the use of peripheral resources, material links between the core and the periphery are eventually set up. Better transportation routes between global regions will reduce the cost to travel between these regions, increasing migration. There is a strong correlation between the global movement of goods and capital and the global movement of people, although capital tends to flow from the core to the periphery, while people tend to move from the periphery to the core (ibid.). Secondly, the economic penetration of the periphery by core transnational corporations builds and reinforces ideological links established during the period of colonial empires. Media broadcasts further reinforce particular positive images of the core, embedding migration paths. Thirdly, the world economy is focussed on a relatively small number of megacities which exhibit a concentration of finance and high-tech production. Nevertheless, the sheer size of these cities fosters demand for informal and low-paid jobs which in turn makes them attractive destinations for migrant workers. Finally, political instability caused by core military interventions in the periphery to protect investments there creates refugee flows (ibid.). In conclusion, migration is depicted as having very little to do with wage and unemployment
differentials. Instead, it is seen to be the result of the structural inequality of the global economy.

Core-Periphery Relations in Gramsci’s Writings

Whereas dependency theory tends towards state-centrism, Gramsci views class as the principal unit of analysis. Although Gramsci continuously makes reference to distinct national groups discussing particular national situations in the Prison Notebooks, he does not develop a theory of international relations. Dependency theory, on the other hand, attempts just that. If neo-Gramscian theory and elements of dependency theory are meant to provide the theoretical foundation for understanding the social purpose of European integration, their mutual compatibility ought to be explored.

Gramsci explicitly uses the term ‘periphery’ in a variety of contexts. In the Prison Notebooks, he refers to “peripheral forces” (Gramsci, 1971, 417) with reference to the “most marginal” of subaltern classes (ibid., 430). He mentions the “peripheries of national life,” albeit without further detailing the social role these peripheries play (ibid., 654). However, in earlier writings, Gramsci places Italy, Poland, Spain and Portugal into the category of “typical peripheral states” (Gramsci, 1978, 408), where “state forces are less efficient” and where “a broad stratum of intermediate classes stretches between the proletariat and capitalism” (ibid., 410; cf. Schwarzmantel, 2015). It is noteworthy that he discusses the international periphery primarily in terms of the domestic situation of the countries involved, rather than in terms of their role in the global political economy, as in dependency theory. Shilliam (2004) argues that this is because Gramsci believed that the crisis of capitalism takes “different forms, in the one hand in the countries of the capitalist periphery, and on the other in the advanced capitalist countries” (Gramsci, 1978, 410). He therefore considered it preferable to understand hegemony within the national context, thus formulating national emancipatory agendas (Shilliam, 2004, 72). Furthermore, Gramsci’s focus on the

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22 E.g. Q1, §43 on Italian North-South relations or Q1, §45 on national differences in the 1848 revolutions; cf. Gramsci’s essay “Some Aspects of the Southern Question” (Gramsci, 2000)
national level may be the result of his refusal to embrace determinist and reductionist tendencies that are characteristic of grand, global analyses like dependency theory.

One of the most important features of Gramsci’s writings concerns the relationship between Northern and Southern Italy. In 1926, Gramsci drafted an essay called ‘Some Aspects of the Southern Question’, in which he outlines the conditions necessary to allow the proletariat to achieve leadership of allied classes. He also describes the portrayal of Southern Italians by bourgeois intellectuals:

“The South is the ball and chain which prevents the social development of Italy from progressing more rapidly; the Southerners are biologically inferior beings, semi-barbarians or total barbarians, by natural destiny; if the South is backward, the fault does not lie with the capitalist system or with any other historical cause, but with Nature, which has made the Southerners lazy, incapable, criminal and barbaric – only tempering this harsh fate with the purely individual explosion of a few great geniuses, like isolated palm-trees in an arid and barren desert.” (Gramsci, 2000, 173).

It is perhaps a historical coincidence that Gramsci’s statement is mirrored by contemporary portrayals of irregular migrants (as well as Southern Europeans) in the tabloid press, with intellectuals such as Thilo Sarrazin (2010) providing the “‘science’ […] to crush the wretched and exploited” (Gramsci, 2000, 174). Nevertheless, Gramsci’s recognition of the quasi-colonial relationship between Northern and Southern Italy (cf. ibid., 171) provides the foundation for a conversation between neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory. In the *Prison Notebooks*, he calls the South a “semi-colonial market” which is controlled using a “police system” as well as through “the incorporation on a ‘personal basis’ of the most active Southern elements into the ruling classes through special ‘judicial’, white collar privileges” (Gramsci, 1992, 131). The similarity to the alliance between peripheral elites and core interests that Ferraro (2008) refers to is striking.
Although dependency theory exhibits determinist tendencies by ‘locking’ peripheral states into a perpetually under-developed situation, dependency theory has also inspired political action by revealing the root causes of underdevelopment. Since Gramsci shares this theory’s conceptualisation of core-periphery relations, dependency theory might be a useful starting point for applying neo-Gramscian theory to the international level, particularly if the concept of transnational classes becomes involved.

**Conclusion**

Neo-Gramscian theory is a widely employed, but also misinterpreted, social theory. Particularly the term hegemony has proven popular, not least with political scientists and scholars of international relations, albeit being often reduced to meanings implying ‘dominance’ or ‘rule by consent’. In English-speaking academia this tendency is reinforced by the hitherto incomplete translation of the *Prison Notebooks*. Hoare and Smith’s interpretation (Gramsci, 1971) has provided the foundation for much of what has been written using Gramscian theory in the English language, although this interpretation is heavily edited, being comprised of a mere fraction of Gramsci’s most notable work. This chapter has been an attempt to reconstruct some of Gramsci’s most important concepts in order to guide an analysis of the social purpose of European integration, as expressed by European migration management as well as its experience. Hegemony is essential for understanding neoliberalism, which is currently the most important ideology shaping European integration. *Trasformismo* in turn allows for an exploration of the alliance of neoliberalism and neo-nationalism. The concept of organic intellectuals captures the role of neofunctionalism in the practice of neoliberalism in the EU. Nevertheless, to truly overcome neofunctionalism’s inward-looking blinkers, dependency theory was introduced to highlight the role of the EU in the global power structures. The combination of both approaches promises to produce a meaningful outlook of the social purpose of contemporary European integration.
The list of neo-Gramscian interpretations of the EU that were referred to in this chapter is by no means exhaustive, and other texts could have been reviewed (e.g. Gill, 2001; Bohle, 2005). The reviewed texts were chosen to reflect the recent recovery of Gramsci’s original theoretical elaborations. They nevertheless suffer several shortcomings. Firstly, none of these texts extensively addresses European migration management, despite the importance of this field for the success or failure of the EU as a whole (see Introduction and Chapter 4 for a discussion of migration management as a critical case study). Secondly, these texts do not address the role of neofunctionalism in the neoliberal transformation of the European Union. Thirdly, although these texts engage very seriously with Gramsci’s writings, they are nevertheless somewhat elite-focused – a point which has also been stressed by Horn (2011). This elite-focus may be the result of an underestimation of the importance of subaltern groups in the structure of the political economy, or it may be an instance of the failure to reproduce Gramsci’s emancipatory goals, which can only be implemented through the political action of the subaltern. The elite-focus is finally reinforced by a lacking engagement with the Gramscian understanding of subalternity. The next chapter will address Gramsci’s treatment of the subaltern, highlighting also the role of subalternity in neofunctionalism.
Chapter 3: The Margins of History – Rediscovering the Subaltern

The review of neo-Gramscian theory and dependency theory that was carried out in the previous chapter has revealed an analytical privileging towards elites and an underestimation of the role and importance of the subaltern. This is not surprising, given that elites largely dominate decision-making in the European political economy. However, given the emancipatory aspirations of critical theory, it is meaningful to explore the state of subalternity, and to highlight the subaltern’s transformative potential.

This chapter will continue to lay the theoretical foundation for the empirical chapters that are to follow. It attempts to develop the concept of subalternity, applying it to the study of the political economy of European integration. It will be shown that a complete reading of Gramsci’s original writings casts a different light on the Gramscian understanding of the term. Without denying the social position, Gramsci employed the term ‘subalternity’ without reference to a particular class to highlight subaltern groups’ complex social role and transformative potential. His chief concern was revolution, and no analysis of a particular group was done for its own sake, but always with the idea in mind that the capitalist system is inherently unjust and limiting in the realisation of human potential. Secondly, as this dissertation forms a critique of neofunctionalist European integration, it will be discussed what role subaltern groups play in the neofunctionalist narrative. As Chapter 1 has shown, irregular migrants are sometimes included in the broad category of ‘exogenous factors’ in European migration management. The relationship between exogenous factors and subalternity will thus be investigated, highlighting that neofunctionalism itself is implicated in the production of exogenous groups. In the final section of this chapter, three mechanisms will be discussed by which neofunctionalist integration generates and reinforces subalternity: reification, commodification and biopolitics. These concepts will subsequently be returned to in the following chapters.
Subalternity – At the Margins of History

Subalternity is one of the most widely used Gramscian terms in academic discourse. Perhaps due to its etymology, the term is often lexically equated with the word ‘inferior’. Even authors who attempt to illuminate the detrimental position of a societal group for its own benefit employ ‘subaltern’ in this meaning (e.g. Odem, 2008; de Haas, 2006). In this way, the term subaltern not only loses the complexity that was attributed to it by Gramsci, but its use reinforces the disempowerment of subaltern classes. This first section of this chapter will review key texts that have hitherto been written on the Gramscian conceptualisation of subalternity. It subsequently turns to the original texts themselves in an attempt to construct a representation of subalternity that is true to Gramsci’s intentions.

Caricatures of ‘Subalternity’

According to Smith the word subalternity is often represented as “synonymous with either the peasantry or the proletariat” (Smith, 2010, 44). This caricatured view, further supported by Arnold (1984), has its origins in a decontextualized analysis of the Prison Notebooks, where Gramsci describes the weaknesses of the subaltern (Southern Italian) peasantry, arguing that it lacks “solid organisation” and that it is internally divided between landowners and labourers (Gramsci, 1971, 75-6). Arnold refers to “subaltern ideology,” as lacking the collective consciousness of a distinct class. He cites Gramsci discussing the common sense (senso commune) of subaltern groups, elaborating that “[subalternity’s] most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the brain of one

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23 In the most basic way, the term subaltern is composed of the Latin roots sub and alternus, sub meaning ‘under’, and alternus meaning ‘every other one’. Alternus is however also related to the verb altare, ‘to become otherwise’, which in turn stems from the Proto-Indo-European root *al-, beyond. Apart from inferior, another interpretation of the word may thus be ‘change from below’.

24 Odem (2008) for instance discusses the ‘subalternity’ of Mexican and other Latin American immigrants to the US. She states that “Mexicans were positioned as subaltern immigrants – they were accepted as cheap, temporary workers, but not desired as permanent citizens” (ibid., 361). She thus positions them as ‘inferior citizens’. De Haas similarly refers to “traditionally subaltern ethnic groups” in Morocco as “subordinate,” describing their migration as the path towards “emancipation” and “liberation” (de Haas, 2006, 571-4). He thus discursively establishes two opposite groups: the subaltern and the emancipated. While the former is powerless, the latter is empowered.
individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and actual position of the masses whose philosophy it is” (Gramsci, 1971, 325-6). Peasants are slow to accept new ideas, often constructing “more or less heterogeneous and bizarre combinations” out of them (ibid., 338). They will furthermore “[participate] in their own subordination by subscribing to hegemonic values, by accepting, admiring and even seeking to emulate many of the attributes of the superordinate classes” (Arnold, 1984, 160). In many ways this social caricature is similar to Marx’s concept of the *lumpenproletariat*, an uneducated and reactionary sub-proletarian group without a coherent class consciousness (Bussard, 1987). Arnold realises himself that the consequence of this conceptualisation of the subaltern is that they are unable to play a substantive part in the actions that are needed to overthrow capitalism (1984, 174). It is on the basis of this particular representation of subalternity that Spivak concludes in her classic work of postcolonial studies that ‘the subaltern cannot speak’ (1988).

Smith (2010) deconstructs Arnold’s equation of this particular conception of subalternity with the Southern Italian peasantry, pointing out that the exclusive association of the subaltern with the *lumpenproletariat* is incorrect. He points towards Gramsci’s discussion of the way in which bourgeois journalism discussed the messianic, Christian socialist movement of Davide Lazzaretti.25 Therein Gramsci argues that “for the social elite, the members of subaltern groups always have something of a barbaric or pathological nature about them” (Gramsci, 1996). While this reads almost like Gramsci’s critique of Arnold’s portrayal of subalternity, Smith uses it to argue for a historical contextualisation of subalternity, calling for a neo-Gramscian research agenda aimed at understanding the processes by which subalternity is produced and reproduced (2010, 45).

**Recovering Subalternity**

In the same way that Thomas clarified the Gramscian understanding of hegemony (2013), Gramsci’s use of subalternity ought to the re-evaluated in the light of

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25 Lazzaretti founded a religious, egalitarian commune during the period of the Risorgimento. He saw himself as a prophet and as the ‘Great Monarch’ whose coming was foretold in Catholic folklore and who was meant to restore the Church. In 1878 Lazzaretti was shot by carabinieri.
Gramsci’s emancipatory ambitions. Gramsci’s aim was by no means to reinforce the subordinate social position of subaltern groups, but to highlight the structural causes of their subordination, without neglecting their transformative potential. According to Green (2000), Gramsci’s engagement with the subaltern served three primary purposes: firstly, Gramsci wanted to create a methodology for the historical analysis of subalternity. Secondly, he wanted to write a history of subaltern classes. Finally, and most importantly, Gramsci wanted to use the first two points as the basis for the development of an agenda for their liberation and subordination. This section aims at recovering this research agenda.

Gramsci’s use of the word subalternity varies immensely throughout the Prison Notebooks. Indeed, Hoare and Smith’s point, that it is “difficult to discern any systematic difference in Gramsci’s usage between […] subaltern and subordinate” (Gramsci, 1971), ought to be agreed with. Gramsci refers to both terms interchangeably (e.g. in Q4, §38). Chronologically, Gramsci’s first use of the term referred to “subaltern officers in the army” (ibid., 148). In a similar usage, Gramsci argues that Engels was “in a subaltern position in relation to Marx” in terms of his theoretical skills (Gramsci, 1996, 139). Later, Gramsci uses the term to refer to groups (or classes) with a lower or subordinate social status, and Gramsci also refers to the Church as a ‘subaltern force’ (Green, 2000, 2). In Notebooks 3 and 4 other groups are similarly assigned to the category of the subaltern: the bourgeoisie before the French Revolution, trade unions, elementary school and secondary school teachers, priests or Italian emigrants (Gramsci, 1996). Gramsci refers to himself as a member of a subaltern group (ibid., 257). In 1934 he dedicates a special thematic notebook to subalternity that is entitled On the Margins of History (Notebook 25); in this notebook, slaves, peasants, religious groups, women, different races as well as the proletariat are referred to as subaltern groups. On the basis of these findings, I draw the conclusion that Gramsci refers to all non-dominant social groups as subaltern. Gramsci’s variegated employment of the word ‘subalternity’ is in direct contradiction to Spivak’s, who put forward in a 1992 interview that “Gramsci was obliged to censor himself in prison,” and that ‘subaltern’ is a code-word for ‘proletariat’. It should be noted that Gramsci’s analysis of the subaltern is most likely incomplete – his incarceration prevented
him from accessing much of the literature required to work this concept through (Green, 2000).

Green (2000) puts forward that Gramsci’s idea of the subaltern is intricately linked to his conceptualisation of the state. While Gramsci’s early references to the state referred primarily to political power in the shape of the government and its bureaucratic institutions, he came to extend this definition, developing the view that political society and civil society cannot be regarded as divorced from one another. The ‘integral state’ thus came to refer to the state-society complex where public as well as private institutions serve the purpose of reproducing the values of the dominant class. He stresses in particular the role of intellectuals in the reproduction of these values. The incorporation of these institutions and elements into the ruling apparatus of the dominant class is an important step towards achieving hegemony rather than dictatorship. Hegemony, in turn, is needed to guarantee the consent of subaltern groups to the domination of the ruling class. This is of crucial importance because it empowers subaltern groups: if their consent is needed for the establishment of sustainable domination, the subaltern have the potential to overthrow the dominant classes’ hegemony in both civil society and political society.

To understand the history of the subaltern, Gramsci developed a particular methodology which is based on the conceptualisation of subaltern history as undergoing a six-stage process. This methodology is of course not transhistorical, and in Notebook 3 Gramsci makes clear that theoretical ideas must remain flexible in cases of empirical contradiction:

“Reality is teeming with the most bizarre coincidences, and it is the theoretician's task to find in this bizarreness new evidence for his theory, to 'translate' the elements of historical life into theoretical language, but not vice versa, making reality conform to an abstract scheme. Reality will never conform to an abstract scheme” (Gramsci, 1997, 52; see Chapter 4 on Critical Grounded Theory).

Gramsci never attempts to understand the subaltern as a naturally-given, universal concept, but always backs up his theorisation with concrete examples to show how his theories “relate to people’s lived experiences” (Green, 2000, 9). The first
stage of subaltern development is regarded as a change in the economic sphere, which leads to the subordination of a particular group. Secondly, the subaltern group either conforms to the new social relations, or it attempts to change them by participating in political life. Thirdly, the dominant group creates institutions that are meant to control the subaltern classes. Fourthly, the subaltern group, upon realising that the current institutions do not represent its interests, forms its own institutions. Fifthly, the subaltern group forms a political organisation, such as a party, out of its existing institutions and attempts to participate in the political life of the state. Finally, the subaltern group realises that the politico-economic structures will always work against its interests and hence develops a different structure alongside a strategy to replace the old one (Gramsci, 1996, 91). Therefore, one can distinguish between different phases of subalternity. The Italian Communist Party that Gramsci co-founded thus represented the fifth phase of subaltern development, which completely negates Arnold’s depiction of the subaltern being necessarily political immature and ideologically primitive. Gramsci realises that subaltern groups in the early stages of development are very difficult to study, as they often have no recorded history. Often what is written on them was written through the lens of the dominant classes. In these narratives, the subaltern are usually depicted as subordinate, or perhaps as victims, which may reinforce their position of inferiority. Nevertheless, contemporary subaltern groups arguably leave far more traces of their activities, and Gramsci’s argument no longer applies as strongly as it once did.

Gramsci’s ultimate purpose is however not to develop a theory of subalternity for its own sake. As he works in the spirit of historical materialism, Gramsci’s goal is to increase the self-awareness of subaltern classes to eventually rise to replace capitalism. Gramsci views historical analysis as the foundation of theory, which is in turn the foundation for societal change; he, therefore, views his ideas as a ‘philosophy of praxis’. After narrating the history of Italian subaltern classes, such as the peasantry, Gramsci thus emphasises that the development of socialism (or Communism as he would have said) depends firstly on the subaltern rise to self-awareness. Following that step, an alliance of the subaltern classes is needed (Gramsci, 1971, 349). He viewed the proletariat as the class with the largest potential for a hegemonic position within such an alliance, which may be
the origin of Spivak’s understanding of the subaltern as being synonymous with
the proletariat (Spivak, 1988). Gramsci’s conceptualisation of subalternity thus
clearly implies an emancipatory agenda. At the end of the emancipatory
movement stands the creation of an “ethical state,” which “tends to put an end to
the internal divisions of the ruled, etc., and to create a technically and morally
unitary social organism” (Gramsci, 1971, 259). Subalternity is therefore not a
naturally given condition; in Gramsci’s vision of the ‘ethical state’, subalternity
seizes to exist as no group exerts dominance over another.

This has various implications for the study of the subaltern in the shape of
irregular migrants in the EU. Migrants are a social group which is not necessarily
always in a subaltern position. While Gramsci refers to early Italian emigrants as
having become part of the dominant groups of the societies they joined, labour
emigrants had “become incorporated in foreign nationalities in a subaltern role”
(Gramsci, 1996, 104). Irregular migrants in the European Union may be
considered to be a group that is in the first and second stages of subaltern
development. They have no political rights, and thus no possibility to become
involved in the political system. They lack political representation, except perhaps
through refugee councils and other migrant NGOs; there is no particular political
party that represents their interests. In many, if not most, instances, migrants do
not speak the language of the destination country, which further excludes them
from participation in civil society. They are fragmented, and the state reinforces
this fragmentation by sorting them into different categories such as illegal
immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, people benefitting from international or
subsidiary protection, economic migrants, clandestinos or migrant workers. They
are usually materially deprived, which forces them to earn money through low-
paid, illegal and sometimes degrading activities. They often have no documents,
sometimes no citizenship, and they have no or limited access to the educational
and healthcare facilities of the state. Much of what is written about them is written
from the perspective of the hegemonic apparatus of the integral state itself. The
criminalisation of irregular migrants on the one hand, and their victimisation on
the other, both contribute to their further marginalisation and to the consolidation
of their subaltern status. Therefore even the numerous reports of NGOs and other
organisations ought to be viewed through a critical lens.
Neofunctionalism’s Subaltern: ‘Exogenous Factors’

Although neofunctionalism is uninterested in the subaltern, it has its own means of labelling subaltern groups it considers relevant to the trajectory of European integration. This is best understood through Schmitter’s ‘exogenous factors’ that previously featured in this thesis in relation to the ‘hypothesis of increasing mutual determination’ (Schmitter, 1971). The term constitutes a largely undefined, positivist black box that is employed to variously refer to the “external environment,” the “international system,” and “disintegrative force[s]” (Niemann, 2006, 22). In this section, the use of the term “exogenous factors” in the neofunctionalist literature will be surveyed to delineate the concept as clearly as possible. It will then be shown how neofunctionalist migration policy has contributed to the construction of Fortress Europe, as the presence of exogenous factors is considered undesirable to the progress of European integration. Furthermore, neoliberal neofunctionalism contributes to the construction of exogenous factors in the shape of subaltern migrants through its technocratic trajectory of European integration and its marginalisation of alternative visions. These conclusions can then be used to contextualise migrants’ experience of European integration.

One of the major critiques that have historically been launched at neofunctionalism is its tendency to regard European integration in isolation from the environment outside its participant states (e.g. George, 1991). The theory’s attempt to deal with this environment has resulted in the formulation of the very vague category of ‘exogenous factors’. Often, this term is used interchangeably with ‘external actors’, ‘external variables’, the ‘global context’ or the ‘external environment’, presumably in an attempt to be less repetitive (Niemann, 2006; Schmitter, 1971). This imprecise terminology itself reflects the lack of clarity that the concept possesses. While the word ‘actors’ denotes acting individuals or groups (agents), ‘context’ and ‘environment’ refer to particular situations that are outside individual control (structures). To clarify what is meant, it is necessary to

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26 The word ‘exogenous’ is of Greek origin. The Greek exo means ‘outside’, and genes refers to being ‘born of’ something, or being ‘produced by’ something. Exogenous thus means ‘being produced by the outside’. Factor in turn stems from Latin factor, which refers to ‘doer’ or ‘maker’ (cf. to facilitate). Etymologically very closely related is the noun ‘fact’, which entered the English language in the 1530s to refer to an ‘evil deed’.
assess how different authors have used the concept, and to which situations it refers in the wide array of neofunctionalist literature.

Joseph Nye refers to “dramatic changes in leadership as an exogenous variable” (1970, 803). He furthermore refers to exogenous factors when he attempts to determine under what circumstances actors begin to see the integration process as having adverse effects on them, and to evaluate how these actors will be able to negatively impact the integration process (ibid., 811). The ‘background conditions’ that provide the soil for regional integration attempts are regarded as “largely determined by exogenous factors” (ibid., 812). Later on, external actors as well as the structural and perceptual conditions in which regional integration takes place, are labelled ‘exogenous factors’ (ibid., 827). Nye’s use of the term thus reflects the imprecision that was pointed out earlier. Cobham (1989) uses the term to refer to the conditions that allowed for the temporary success of the European Monetary System in the 1980s. He labels “dollar weakness” as well as “inflation” as exogenous factors (ibid., 210). In an attempt to show how neofunctionalism can be subsumed under the broader category of interdependency theory, Hix is somewhat more precise in his definition, listing “economic growth and multinational economic interdependence, international defence and security interdependence [and] the continued salience of nationalism” as exogenous factors (1994, 5). However, apart from these general phenomena he also refers to the “unpredictable actions of national leaders,” thus making clear that individuals within the EU itself can also form exogenous factors, as they fall outside the framework of the theory (ibid.). Nevertheless, explicit references to individual actors are rare, and if exogenous factors are mentioned at all, broad structural phenomena are referred to and analysis is kept shallow. It is to be expected of a reductionist and positivist theory that references to variables outside its framework of analysis are rare or absent. Indeed, as the hypothesis of increasing mutual determination shows, exogenous factors are a very undesirable factor for neofunctionalist analysis. In fact, Schmitter admits that if the influence of exogenous factors is high, neofunctionalism will at best be a very poor predictor of integrative dynamics (1971, 244). Exogenous factors will not necessarily slow integration down, but as the externalisation hypothesis shows, their presence will increase the likelihood that “disintegrative strategies are adopted” (ibid.). The
presence of exogenous factors may thus be considered as the great neofunctionalist undesirable.

According to the neofunctionalist vision the presence of exogenous factors is detrimental to the progress of European integration. Thus one of the main reasons for the construction of Fortress Europe can be identified. It was shown in Chapter 1 that the arrival of asylum seekers into the EU has had a significant impact on the development of the European asylum institutions. Therefore asylum seekers, and migrants as a wider group, clearly form exogenous factors. It is assumed that the economic stability that European integration requires to proceed would potentially be jeopardised by the large-scale arrival of unwanted migrants, which is why the presence of these exogenous factors ought to be prevented. It is furthermore supposed that the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice must be protected from such potentially disturbing influences (Ries, 2010). While the neofunctionalist literature, with its tendency to ‘phenomenalise’, would regard ‘migration’ itself as an exogenous factor, it is noteworthy that migration is very much unlike inflation, currency exchange rates, economic growth or nationalism. After all the term ‘migration’ refers to movement of large groups of people across the earth. Therefore it is not an abstract phenomenon like interdependence that forms an exogenous factor here; the exogenous factors are real human beings of flesh and blood. In turn, the arrival of these human beings in the EU has potentially adverse effects to the success of European integration.

Yet, as I argue here, neofunctionalism marginalises and weakens migrants; if migrants instead were to be conceived of as a subaltern group, this would reframe this group as possessing transformative powers. Indeed, the measures that the integral state has taken to keep the influx of migrants into the EU as low as possible potentially underlines the transformative power that this subaltern group actually possesses to change the trajectory of European integration.

It is ironic that neofunctionalist European integration, in its attempt to banish exogenous factors from the EU, has itself produced such exogenous factors. Neoliberalism favours a European system that concentrates capital within the financial and industrial institutions of the ruling classes. Technocracy and the existing migration legislation of the European Commission create distance between government and migrants. The more alienated a group is, the less
“predictable” it becomes, and the stronger is its impact as an exogenous factor (Hix, 1994, 5). As a result, exogenous factors actually become more of a threat to the neofunctionalist vision of European integration. The attempt to normalise neofunctionalism in public discourse by portraying the particular trajectory that European integration has taken as inevitable and irreversible furthermore marginalises alternative visions for Europe. This depoliticisation contributes towards rendering large parts of the population politically fatigued. Irregular migrants, with their lack of familiarity with the European institutions, will be especially affected by this incapacitation. However, the ideological incoherence that is thus generated also increases the unpredictability of these subaltern groups, highlighting the threat that they pose to the neofunctionalist European integration process.

**Producing Subalternity**

When neofunctionalism is put into practice, its ontology can produce and perpetuate subalternity by means of several mechanisms, three of which will be discussed here in some detail. Firstly, commodification refers to the process whereby objects are turned into and treated as though they were commodities. Marx points out that the commodification of human beings (and thus also of migrants) is one of the underlying fallacies of capitalism (Marx, 1964), which is highlighted by Polanyi’s notion of fictitious commodities (1944). Reification is the tendency for social relations within capitalism to resemble relations between things (Lucács, 1968). Biopolitics, finally, refers to the political management of the human body (Foucault, 1979). The relevance of the three concepts will be elaborated on, and their relationship with neofunctionalism will be explained.

**Commodification**

Karl Marx identified that within the capitalist system labour is treated as though it were a commodity like any other (cf. Jessop, 2000). When demand for it rises,
and unemployment decreases, wages increase. When demand falls and unemployment increases, wages are expected to decrease. Labour is subject to the dynamics of the supposedly self-regulating market in the typical supply and demand fashion. In Marx’s own words, “labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and the worker as a commodity – and this in the same general proportion in which it produces commodities” (Marx, 1964, 107). Tolman defines labour here as a complex of three related parts: the worker, his labour power, and the product he makes. The product is clearly a commodity, as is labour power, for this is what the capitalist purchases through wages. However, Marx furthermore argues that through employing labour power in exchange for wages, the worker commodifies himself. Marx describes the state whereby relations between human beings resemble relations with commodities as commodity fetishism (Geras, 1990). Given this premise, Jessop further argues that the essential contradiction of capitalism and any class-based mode of production is that the “increasing socialisation of productive forces” is accompanied by “private control of the means of production” (2000, 64). This estrangement of the worker from the object of his work results in alienation on three levels. Firstly, the worker is alienated from the object he produces. Although he has made it, it belongs to the capitalist. Secondly, labour is alienated from its product, which is labour power. This is similarly because the capitalist has purchased this labour power, turning it into her property. Tolman argues that the third aspect, alienation from self, occurs because the production of the worker as a commodity is so utterly contrary to human nature that it leads to self-alienation.

In The Great Transformation the political economist Karl Polanyi elaborates on Marx’s theory of commodification (1944). He defines commodities as objects used for sale on the market, whose prices in turn are determined by the difference between the cost of production and the prices of the goods produced. Labour, land and money are commonly regarded and traded as commodities, which Polanyi regards as a fundamental fallacy. He points out that “the alleged commodity ‘labor power’ cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity” (ibid., 73). Alongside land and money, which are similarly not produced, labour is a fictitious commodity, the belief in which forms one of the
organising principles of the market. With the greater sophistication of technology and machinery, industry became increasingly interdependent, requiring the safeguarding of all its elements. Polanyi regards this development to be the origin of the commodity fiction.

Neofunctionalist integration theory was involved in the gradual construction of the single European labour and capital market through the application of the Monnet method. The commodification of labour was thus reinforced through the introduction of labour mobility which was an essential aspect of the Treaty of Rome. Particularly with the enlargement of the European Union to Central and Eastern Europe, Western European labour became increasingly subject to wage pressure. The transnationalisation of the labour market, as well as the relocation of production to the new member states further embedded labour commodification. European immigration creates a labour supply from outside the framework of the state apparatus, offering only limited labour market protection. The commodification of this new labour source is an important aspect of understanding the political economy of European migration management. Irregular migrants are particularly affected by the estrangement from self that is inherent to the process of commodification. The loss of identity that accompanies irregular migration and its reduction to ‘otherness’ make this group particularly vulnerable to the acquisition of an identity that is based around its use-value as labour power. It could be assumed that this may assist irregular migrants in overcoming their state of subalternity by merging with the labour class. However, many irregular migrants (e.g. clandestinos or asylum seekers without a work permit) form a subcategory of labour which places it outside labour’s institutional apparatus. Furthermore, the existence of a large irregular labour market that is often fed by irregular migrants undermines opportunities for this group to associate with organised labour. If asylum seekers were excluded from minimum wage arrangements, the link between irregular migrants and labour institutions like trade unions would be further weakened, entrenching these migrants in the early stages of subalternity.
Reification

Although reification is related to commodification, the concept places greater emphasis on the totality of the capitalist relations of production, furthermore having different analytical applications. György Lukács describes reification (i.e. becoming a ‘thing’) as the tendency of social relations under the capitalist mode of production to assume the character of relations between lifeless ‘things’ (1968). During commodity exchange, reification takes place on three levels: (1) the objects of exchange are valuable only in terms of their potentially utilizable qualities; (2) the exchange partner is viewed merely as the ‘object’ of a profitable exchange; (3) one’s own qualities and attributes are reduced to their potential economic usefulness. All three elements of the trinity of self, other and commodity are thus turned into ‘things’. The commodity is stripped bare of the love that was invested in its manufacture. The other is seen only in terms of his potential to facilitate an exchange. The self is deprived of its intrinsic value. Lukács posits that the practice of reification has such a powerful impact on the human being that the mindset it requires becomes ‘second nature’. It is transferred from the realm of exchange towards all other areas of life; thus all social interaction becomes reified, assuming the character of exchange relations.

Axel Honneth (2005) points towards three potential reasons for why reification is problematic. Firstly, reification could be regarded as a corrupted form of human practice because it represents an epistemological error. The wrong category is chosen for interacting with other human beings, which are not things but persons. Honneth refutes this argument by pointing to the depth to which reification has impacted human behaviour under capitalism. An epistemological error can be corrected, but reification cannot simply be exorcised by pointing out that an incorrect category has been engaged for navigating through social interactions. Secondly, reification could be said to form a type of practice that is morally corrupt (Nussbaum, 2002). Honneth admits that Lukács maintains a normative character during his extrapolations on reification, arguing nevertheless that Lukács’s intention was not to point out reification’s immorality. It would require intent to make ethical considerations relevant to reification. The instinctiveness of reified social practice demonstrates that subjective intent is
absent. Honneth thus points to the third, and in his opinion correct interpretation. Reification represents neither epistemological nor moral erroneousness, but ought to be thought of as a fallacious form of practice in its totality. The lethargic, merely observing behaviour of reification is portrayed to be in violation of an original, empathetic, “better form of human practice” (Honneth, 2005, 25).

Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it is possible to define Honneth’s hypothetical ‘better form of human practice’ without reference to moral concepts. During his attempt to develop such a definition, Honneth points to places in Lukács’s text where the latter speaks of the subject as an empathetic and cooperative being, which appreciates other people for their unique qualities. Honneth is unable to reconstruct the original, uncorrupted form of human practice without referring back to morality. His emphasis on empathy is a striking example of the use of moral language, as empathy is the principle characteristic required for the practice of the Golden Rule which finds its expressions in all cultures. 27 Furthermore, the argument that reification contains no moral dimension because of the absence of subjective intent ignores that a phenomenon can certainly be morally critiqued on when it produces immoral or amoral behaviour. Reification produces both. While it is not inherently immoral, it is amoral and therefore unethical. Nevertheless, Honneth correctly points out that Lukács’s assumption that reification is solely the result of the expansion of exchange relations to all aspects of life is problematic (2005, 28). While this development is certainly one of the most important causes of the tendency towards reification, it is not an inevitable nor unique cause. Technocratic governance as manifest in neofunctionalist European integration has contributed significantly to the reification of social relations. This applies in particular within the realm of migration management, where ‘migrant flows’ are managed and computed with no reference to the individual human beings of which these flows consist.

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27 The Golden Rule is an ethical principle based on the idea that a person should treat others like she would want to be treated herself. Alternatively it can be formulated negatively, that a person should not treat others in ways she would not want to be treated herself.
While reification in the context of migration management refers to the treatment of human beings as though they were things, biopolitics refers to the political control of the human body – it thus contains an element of reification. Foucault understood biopolitics to concern what “brought life and its mechanisms into the realm of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life” (1979, 143). For Foucault, the management of human biological existence was an essential aspect of the consolidation of capitalism, as the human body is the vehicle through which labour is performed (Lemke, 2005). The advent of modernity coincided with the advent of biopolitics, and an intricate link is portrayed between the protection of life and the Nazi death camps. The establishment of secular human rights protects life only insofar as it is considered to be human. Life deprived of its humanity can thus be said to fall into an animal state. To highlight the severity and violence associated with biopolitics, it is useful to consider the process of secularisation which is closely related to the modern practice of biopolitics, whereby political life was ‘disenchanted’ of the spiritual. The Genesis account of creation describes how both animals and Adam, the prototypical human being, were endowed with nefēš ḥayah, the life spirit. As Adam was created in the image of the Creator, he was also given ruaḥ, the immortal soul. During secularisation, disenchantment and the embedding of human rights, ruaḥ has been replaced by the abstract notion of human dignity, which is however no longer intrinsic to every human being, but limited to particular geographical spaces. Modernity has reduced the human being to nefēš ḥayah, the biological life shared with animals. The extraction of the immortal soul is followed by the reification of the self; “‘humanity’ is killing both of them – and perhaps committing suicide into the bargain” (Lefebvre, 1991, 71). This is highly relevant for understanding the motivations for migration, as spiritual disenchantment leaves physical desires victorious, not because the spirit is vanquished, but because it is no longer believed to exist (cf. Galatians 6, 8). What remains is only the pursuit of bodily, material desires. Indeed, the search for physical and material security is the primary causes for millions of migrants to
settle in Europe, who in their subaltern state imitate the values of the dominant class.

Although biopolitics is clearly of great relevance to the study of migration management, the compatibility of this concept with Marxist and neo-Gramscian analysis has been put into question. Olssen (2004) for example argues that although the Foucauldian account of history bears striking similarities with Marxism, the differences between the two approaches are fundamental. While both regard social relations and practices as transitory, Foucault rejects Marx’s historical determinism and the understanding of history and society as a unified totality. Furthermore, at different times, Foucault was very critical of the Marxian reduction of the state to the task of managing productive relations, the overemphasis on class, or the lacking interest in the materiality of the body (Jessop, 2007, 141). Nevertheless, Foucault also discussed capitalism’s exploitation of the human body and time, transforming them into labour power and labour time. This led some authors to argue that Foucault had moved towards a tactical alliance with Marxism, as the “convergence of the analyses and concepts taken from Marx [became] more and more significant” (Balibar, 1992, 53). Nikos Poulantzas, who was a contemporary of Foucault, criticised the latter’s notion of biopolitics on the grounds that it “ignores the state’s real foundations in capitalist relations of production and class struggle” (Jessop, 2007, 145). Jessop however points out that later lectures at “the Collège de France did consider how these practices [of biopolitics] came to serve capital and the modern state” (ibid., 146). This highlights that Marxism and Foucault are in fact not altogether incompatible, but that particular aspects of Foucault’s work, such as biopolitics, can in indeed be incorporated into Marxist theory.

Biopolitics is inevitably an aspect of any technocratic vision of governance such as neofunctionalism. As the body is the agent of human action, the maintenance of power structures necessarily requires the management of the human body. This applies in particular to capitalist relations of production, where the human body possesses the labour power that is required for production and ultimately capital accumulation. Technocracy, with its amoral target of finding the optimal method for the fulfilment of human needs, tends towards negating the idea that the human body is inviolable if a violation is important for the physical
and physiological safety of the majority. In the context of European migration management, biopolitics finds its most vivid manifestations in the treatment of irregular migrants when they first enter the European Union, which will be discussed in Chapter 6.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a review of the use of the term 'subalternity', contextualising its meaning using Gramsci’s writings. The interpretation that subalternity is merely a synonym for inferiority, and that the term is used to refer to the Italian peasantry, has been shown to be inconsistent with Gramsci’s emancipatory research agenda. Gramsci’s conception of the different stages of subalternity provides an insightful framework for understanding subaltern development, and for revealing the obstacles that stand in its way. Furthermore, it was demonstrated how neofunctionalism refers to the subaltern in its own theoretical framework. So-called 'exogenous factors', including subaltern groups, have played a significant role in the history of European integration.

Three ways by which neofunctionalist integration reinforces subalternity have been outlined to be referred to in later chapters: commodification, reification and biopolitics. While these three phenomena are distinct, they are nevertheless related and produce one another. Commodification produces reification, because it treats the worker as though he was a part of a company’s inventory. However, commodification is also dependent on a reified notion of human life. Biopolitics in turn produces reification, because it reduces a human being to his body. However, like commodification its practice depends upon a reified view of human life. All three phenomena consolidate the subaltern condition. It is high time for critical European integration scholarship to rediscover the subaltern, if its purpose is to change the course of the European Union.
Chapter 4: Methodology and Research Design

The purpose of this chapter is to translate the ontological, epistemological and theoretical extrapolations of the previous two chapters into an articulation of a clear methodology. Neofunctionalism as the most important theoretical conceptualisation of European integration in general and European migration management in particular is unsatisfactory – in fact, neofunctionalism is arguably not merely a positivistic theory but a political ideology. Given the critical underpinnings of this dissertation calling as such for the contextualisation of ideological practices in capitalism, one must therefore ask the question: what is the social purpose of neofunctionalist European integration? This fundamental question can be approached by investigating migrants’ experience of European integration, which will permit for an inference from the concrete to the abstract in the manner proposed by Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Nevertheless, from very early on Grounded Theory has been riddled with controversy concerning the extent to which it permits previously held beliefs to impact theory development (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). However, recently, Grounded Theory has in part moved away from the positivist underpinnings it originally had. Critical Grounded Theory’s (CGT) embrace of critical realism makes it the appropriate methodological framework for a research practice that is strongly informed by existing ontology, epistemology and mid-range theory (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). The justification of this approach will form the first part of this chapter, which will also clarify why it was necessary to discuss previously held assumptions.

The second part of this chapter will deliberate the way that the research problem at hand can be tackled in practice. For this purpose, it ought to be clearly stated why migration is a potential critical case study for understanding the social purpose of European integration, which is in part inspired by neofunctionalism. This section will draw primarily on the work of Bent Flyvbjerg on case study research (2006). Thereupon this dissertation’s research design will be outlined in accordance with the two phases of field research that delivered the empirical basis of this dissertation. For both the exploratory and the main fieldwork, the sampling procedure and the interview procedure will be outlined and justified. Particularly
during the main fieldwork, there were significant deviations from the original research design. This was due to practical difficulties in the field, particularly with respect to the recruitment process. The majority of participants were recruited in site. A focus will also be placed on the ethical issues that arose out of research with irregular migrants.

**Critical Grounded Theory**

This section will outline Critical Grounded Theory as an appropriate methodology for the operationalisation of this dissertation’s research agenda. It allows for theory-building that is founded upon data derived from field work and interviews, thus linking the macro with the micro-level and the abstract with the concrete. Its critical realist ontology in turn negates naïve claims about research neutrality and permits a conceptualisation of the role of previously held theories in the research process. To clarify what exactly is meant by CGT, its intellectual lineage will now be traced back to grounded theory itself as well as to critical realism and critical theory.

*The Origins of Critical Grounded Theory*

The grounded theory method (GTM) was developed as a qualitative research method for theory-building that was meant to make the methods of qualitative investigation visible and replicable (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007). Glaser and Strauss (1967) were dissatisfied by the inferior status that was attributed to qualitative research, thus wanting to supply a method that would qualitatively produce results that are just as strong and reliable as those produced by mass surveys. Bryant and Charmaz thus argue that one of the key strengths of GTM is that it “offers a foundation for rendering the processes and procedures of qualitative investigation visible, comprehensible, and replicable” (2007, 33). GTM systematises the process of theory generation, which takes place primarily through ‘coding’. This rests upon the premise that theories can be inductively derived from a textual dataset.
Coding takes place by assigning categories to a piece of text, such as an interview transcript or a field memo (cf. open coding). Here, it is claimed that it is very important at this stage of the theorisation process not to allow previously held assumptions to influence the coding process. Glaser and Strauss condemn the notion of ‘forcing’ one’s ideas onto the data, arguing that no literature review should be conducted before field research (1967). Using the technique of theoretical sampling, codes are “corrected, trimmed, and continually fitted to the data,” and instances are located that allow for theory-construction (Breckenridge & Jones, 2009). At all stages the researcher ought to write memos to demonstrate why particular categories were chosen over others, and for what reasons links were established. Memos and codes are sorted and placed in relation to the overall phenomenon studied – this is how a grounded theory develops. It seeks to show how a category stands in relation to the phenomenon the researcher is interested in (Randall & Mello, 2012, 872). It is worth mentioning that the logical process involved in coding is induction. While the grounded theory thus developed has an arguably perfect fit with the data it is based upon, it is rather unlikely to apply to other cases. This is because it is at best problematic to arrive at general conclusions from a limited number of cases, which is however inherent to inductive logic. Furthermore, it is quite clear that while the coding process may be replicable, researchers operating independently from one another may reach quite different results.

Nevertheless, GTM, as it was originally developed, rests firmly within the positivist approach to social science. The title of the founding text The Discovery of Grounded Theory is representative of the belief in an objective reality waiting to be ‘discovered’ (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007; Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). GTM’s naive realism is especially manifest in its assumption that theory can be reconstructed from only the data without requiring inference by the theorist. As was discussed in Chapter 1, the seemingly algorithmic automaticity that is meant to characterise the positivist theorisation process is deeply problematic. As in natural scientific theories, positivist grounded theories are meant to enable the prediction of the behaviour of a system without necessarily understanding its purpose (cf. Hollis & Smith, 1991). This arguably misses the point, being a task that may equally be carried out by a computer that has no sense of meaning.
As has already been implied, the theorists’ own ontological, epistemological and mid-range theoretical assumptions are likely to have a strong impact on the production of grounded theory. This is the result of the coding process – there is no method to guarantee that two researchers will independently come up with the same categories. As a result new generations of grounded theorists have opened up to constructivism (e.g. Clarke & Friese, 2007). However, it ought to be stated that the inherent subjectivity of the GTM was already alluded to in its earliest formulations. Anselm Strauss’ background in symbolic interactionism and ethnographic field research meant that he was aware of the fact that researchers’ beliefs and assumptions necessarily have an impact on the theorisation process. In an early essay titled *Mirrors and Masks*, Strauss emphasises that “classifications are not in the object; an object gets classified from some perspective” (1959/1969, 48). In Glaser and Strauss’ study of dying patients, the authors were acutely aware of the extent to which the interviewees’ previous experience influenced their narratives (1967). Seemingly against all intuition, the authors themselves pretended to be immune to the phenomenon of theoretically informed story-reconstruction (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007).

As the previous paragraph illustrates, the foundations for Strauss’ reorientation of GTM towards social constructivism were already laid in his previous work. His divergence from Glaser finally took place via his collaboration with Juliet Corbin (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Therein the two authors develop the coding procedure into a direction that clearly allows for greater subjectivity. In addition to open coding, which is maintained, Strauss and Corbin introduce axial and selective coding. Axial coding is meant to establish links between coding categories that were established using open coding “by utilizing a coding paradigm involving conditions, context, action/interactional strategies and consequences” (ibid., 96). Selective coding then seeks to develop a core category that includes all previously developed categories. No method is in place that guarantees that researchers operating independently from one another will carry out these procedures in an identical manner, making clear that any grounded theory thus arrived at is the product of the researchers’ own perspective and preferences. Strauss’s move thus opened grounded theory up to constructivism (cf. Charmaz, 2006). Noteworthy in this regard is also the work of Robert Thornberg,
who argues that the original GTM’s “naïve empiricism fails to recognize the embeddedness of the researcher within an historical, ideological and sociocultural context” (2012, 246). He thus emphasises that it is desirable to carry out a literature review before carrying out research, as it “implies a loss of knowledge” to ignore established theories (ibid., 245). The Straussian move also permitted postmodernist streams of thought to embrace GTM (Clarke, 2008). Lyotard defines postmodernity as “incredulity towards metanarratives” (1979, xxiv). The ontological relativism that is inherent to postmodernism led Clarke to reject comprehensive social theories and to embrace 'situational analysis' (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). With an implicit reference to Strauss, Clarke argues that her social research is “based in the pragmatist soil that has historically nurtured symbolic interactionism and grounded theory” (Clarke, 2003).

Nevertheless, if GTM is meant to be employed for the generation of critical theory, both constructivism and postmodernism are evidently ill-suited. The ontological nihilism expressed by postmodernism and the “theoretical agnosticism” (Thornberg, 2012, 250) inherent to constructivism make both schools incompatible with critical theory’s commitment to human emancipation. The beliefs that the subordination of particular groups of human beings ought to be overcome and that social science ought to contribute to this are expressions neither of relativism nor of agnosticism. Despite this incompatibility, the Straussian turn and its descendants have enabled the development of Critical Grounded Theory (CGT) by allowing for the methodological possibility of critically reworking GTM.

As Belfrage and Hauf point out, the infusion of grounded theory with critical realism constitutes one of the first steps towards the generation of CGT.²⁸ As opposed to constructivism, as put forward by Charmaz (2006) and Thornberg (2006), critical realism asserts that there is an independent, objective reality, and that it is one of the goals of science and social research to approximate that reality. Hence not all truths are equally valid (Bhaskar, 1986). Both constructivists and

²⁸ As Bhaskar and Callinicos (2007) and Jessop (2001) argue, historical materialism and critical realism are compatible. Critical realism has for example an emancipatory purpose that is shared with Marxism. Nevertheless, it may seem contradictory that historical materialism acknowledges the existence ‘laws’ while at the same time being critical realist. However, historical materialist ‘laws’ are doubly tendential; they are both specific to capitalism itself as well as to specific power relations and institutional configurations (Jessop & Sum, 2006).
critical realists regard theoretical explanations as “provisional” (ibid., 253) and “tentative” (Oliver, 2012, 375). However, it is crucial to understand that while constructivists view our understanding of reality to be discursively created, critical realists believe it to be an interpretation of an underlying mind-independent truth (Mir & Watson, 2001, 1169). Bhaskar (1986) differentiates between three different domains: the empirical domain, the actual domain and the real domain. The empirical domain refers to what we experience; the actual domain refers to what happens, whether we experience it or not, and the real domain refers to the generative structures behind what happens. For critical realists, the purpose of research is to investigate the real domain, which can be done by inferring from the experiences of other people. Critical realism nevertheless concedes that our perception of reality is inevitably theoretically informed. It relies upon the reasoning-principle of retroduction which is a “mode of inference in which events are explained by postulating (and identifying) mechanisms which are capable of producing them” (Sayer, 1992, 107). While most theories and hypotheses are arrived at through inductive reasoning, and while our pre-conceptions of the field are probably arrived at through deductive reasoning, retroduction challenges existing conclusions by inquiring into the conditions/generative mechanisms that make a particular phenomenon possible (Easton, 2010, 123; Belfrage & Hauf, 2015; Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Inductively produced existing theories therefore do provide guidelines for initial qualitative or quantitative research, but rather than being tested for their validity they are exposed to the reality of the field. In the specific retroductive reasoning process however the researcher will then consider alternative explanations for explaining the phenomena at hand. This ensures the maintenance of a constant conversation between the abstract and the concrete which can bring about: the emergence of new conceptualisations; the refinement of previous concepts; the alteration of current explanations; and, to the reconstruction of existing theories (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015). These principles and assumptions are translated into a wide range of methodological considerations which will be discussed in the subsequent sections.
While critical realism provides the epistemological and ontological foundation of CGT, critical theory informs the latter’s overall research agenda. CGT accepts that all theory in the social sciences serves some purpose, embracing the normative status and emancipatory purpose of critical theory (cf. Cox, 1981). In this context, possessing an emancipatory research agenda implies being an active part of societal transformation, for example by pointing out and increasing the awareness of the structural causes behind social problems and injustices. This move is in line with critical realism as outlined above (Collier, 1994, 182). As “our knowledge of the world is never theoretically innocent” (Jessop & Sum, 2006, 305), a researcher neither enters the field nor evaluates data without being influenced by pre-existing theoretical assumptions. Similarly, theories in the social sciences always embody a social agenda. Critical theory’s morally rooted agenda stands in contrast to positivism, which aims at prediction and problem-solving. While positivist theories attempt to merely explain social phenomena, critical theories strive to explain and understand them (Bieler & Morton, 2001; also see Chapter 1 on positivism and the relationship between explaining and understanding). Critical theory and its related mid-range theories furthermore
have a strong impact on research design. If the purpose of this dissertation is to challenge neoliberal European integration and to alter irregular migrants’ subaltern condition, the bulk of the fieldwork should be carried out with the migrants themselves (Comstock, 1982, 373-9). Interviews with irregular migrations themselves become an intervention if a relationship is established in the interview between European integration and their everyday lives. Furthermore, neoliberalism can be challenged most effectively if the social exclusion and inequality it produces are understood. CGT’s rooting in critical theory makes it a suitable methodology for establishing the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and its concrete social consequences. However, this cannot be done without a comprehensive theory of society and fieldwork. Critical grounded theory permits for the coexistence and mutual enrichment of the abstract and the concrete (Belfrage & Hauf, 2015).

Critical Grounded Theory in Practice

Critical grounded theory and the principle of retroduction stipulate a particular research process. Nevertheless, CGT is not a dogmatic methodology and represents a middle-ground between positivism and radical constructivism. As such, it can be expected that researchers relying on CGT may be using methods traditionally associated with both poles.\(^29\) This section is meant to discuss this process, which will serve to lay the groundwork for the chosen research design. Furthermore, as I will explain, the use of CGT makes for a structure of my dissertation placing this methodology chapter after the literature review. It will be highlighted that in this particular case, the use of CGT calls for this format.

In GTM, initial research interests often emerge out of previous personal experiences. In the Appendix to Awareness of Dying (1965), which constitutes Glaser and Strauss’ first example of the GTM in practice, it states that Strauss’ struggle with the illness and death of his mother was an important influence in this work. The formulation of interests out of personal experiences, intuitions and

\(^{29}\) Quantitative analysis is usually associated with positivism, while qualitative research strategies are usually associated with constructivism. Nevertheless, no method belongs exclusively to one or the other camp, as traditional GTM demonstrates, which is both positivist and qualitative.
emotions is thus something that the GTM holds in common with CGT. Nevertheless, the critical underpinnings of CGT also encourage research agendas to arise out of subjectively defined social problems. This may thus in practice also be the case with GTM, but it is rarely acknowledged. Furthermore, as opposed to the grounded theory method, CGT encourages research into the area of interest before embarking upon fieldwork. Reviewing newspaper articles, policy briefs, official documents, legislative texts, video documentaries or podcasts is important for information gathering and for the acquisition of a deeper understanding of the problem at hand. As the next step, the academic literature available on the subject should be consulted. The approximations of reality derived from that literature can then be developed into initial theoretical conceptualisations which will thereupon be confronted with the reality of the field. It is crucial to emphasise that the way that this confrontation takes place is shaped by these conceptualisations, although they are not forced onto the findings. As discussed above, there are valuable insights to be gained from both the inductive and deductive moments in the research process. This does not only imply that a literature review ought to be carried out before field research takes place, but that this literature review should precede discussions of research design in an academic text.

While the researcher’s refinement of her research question(s) through the consideration of proto-theories will privilege the choice of particular research methods, the retroductive principles of CGT call for research design to be left open to adaptations and alterations during the research process. Unlike CGT, a rigid research methodology has the purpose of eliminating the possibility that differences in procedure are responsible for the generation of differing outcomes. The ‘systematicity’ of such methods and the attempt to control for particular variables aims at the discovery of universal laws which is not the ambition of CGT. While a coherent research design is an important pre-requisite of good field research, it should be adjustable to the requirements arising.

Key differences between GTM and CGT become apparent through a discussion of interviews. This interview is often viewed as a conversation whose purpose is to gather information (e.g. Berg & Lune, 2011). This applies particularly if an interview is audio recorded, transcribed and thus turned into the textual data that is the ‘end product’ of field research (cf. Blommaert & Jie, 2010).
Indeed, it is tempting to embrace this treatment of interviews because the final product of research is also text. Researchers are used to quotations and feel uncomfortable with subjective descriptions and interpretations. Positivist grounded theory itself views the transcript as the basis of open coding. However, the reduction of interviews to transcripts is deeply problematic because many qualities of an interview are usually left out of transcripts. The relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee, the emotions encountered during the interview, the interview setting and the non-verbal interactions that take place in any interview situation are just four examples of phenomena that are rarely mentioned in transcripts. While transcription is a necessary aspect of most interview research, it tends towards de-contextualisation and reduction of complexity. Field notes (or memos) and photographs thus ought to complement transcripts and audio recordings to the largest extent possible. While memos form an important part of GTM in general, they are particularly important in the context of CGT, which sets itself the task of making the theorisation process involved in field research retraceable and honest. Memos and field notes allow the researcher to retrace discoveries and to look back at how critical grounded theory actually emerged.

One of the most common attempts to categorise interviews is to describe them as structured, semi-structured or unstructured (Kvale, 2007). If the researcher’s purpose is to ‘control for’ a particular variable in order to find law-like behavioural mechanisms (in accordance with a positivist, problem-solving approach), the structured interview is the way forward, as it emphasises strict adherence to the interview schedule. The semi-structured interview similarly calls for every question in the interview schedule to be asked, albeit permitting follow-up questions. The unstructured interview is highly flexible, as it merely demands asking questions related to a set of pre-arranged themes. The latter approach allows for stark differences between interviews trying to appreciate specific phenomena as constitutive of ‘reality’ carried out as part of the same study. While CGT does not explicitly prohibit the use of structured interviews, it is nevertheless clear that they contradict the principles of retroduction and critical realism in a variety of ways. Firstly, there appears to be no meaningful way to employ structured interviews except for the purpose of finding law-like generative
mechanisms. Critical realism puts forward that we can only make estimations of mind-independent reality – the search for universal laws is in contradiction to the view that theory is necessarily historically specific and tentative. Laws can at best be tendential, as in historical materialism (see footnote 28). Secondly, the idea of retroduction requires flexibility in research design and practice. This is because research has to be responsive to the process of knowledge formation. If an interview schedule is inadequate to the experience of the field or no longer represents the researcher’s theorisation it can and ought to be changed. The rigidity of the structured interview leaves little space for such alterations. Therefore, the semi-structured and unstructured interview forms remain as the two preferable options for CGT research, as they enable a richer process of knowledge production. They allow the researcher to be flexible in the moment, responding to insights that may arise during the interview itself.

Furthermore, theorisation often takes place during and in the immediate aftermath of an interview. Interviews are not necessarily merely conversations whose purpose is to acquire information, but highly subjective experiences. The experiences, emotions, intuitions and insights encountered during an interview and field research in general often serve the goal of setting and refining the research agenda. There may be important points that are ignored by the interview schedule which emerge during the course of the interview. Particularly emotional and sensitive topics may arise unexpectedly during the interview, requiring the researcher to respond accordingly. Retroduction not only allows for these considerations but actually encourages this process. The chaotic situation encountered in the field requires constant adaptations and readjustments in the interview schedule. This is because it is the very purpose of CGT to allow for “dialogue between ideas and evidence” (Ragin, 1994, 55). During the interview the abstract is confronted with the concrete.

The retrophic principle has a significant impact on the coding procedure. Open coding assumes that the researcher is a clean slate and that theories are literally derived from just the data. The critical realist premises of CGT deny this possibility. Nevertheless, open coding can still be carried out, always remembering that the codes thus derived would not necessarily be developed by another researcher working with the same data and that the
questions asked in the interviews derive from initial conceptualisations. The categories that emerge when using this method can then be brought into dialogue with the categories of previously existing theories. One way of doing this is to look for equivalent categories within one’s theory of choice. It may thus happen that no equivalent category exists, requiring the formulation of new theories and the alteration of existing ones (although an existing theory may also turn out to be in line with the data). In this manner, the forcing of previously existing theories onto the data can be avoided. Nevertheless, a document may also be coded using the categories of existing theories. Mismatches between those existing categories and the text may still be identified and new theories developed.

**Research Agenda and Case Selection**

This section will explain the structure and methodology of this dissertation in the light of Critical Grounded Theory. It will be shown how the research agenda was formulated on the basis of my personal interests and of the literature review of grand and mid-range theories. Thereupon I will show how migration management was chosen as a critical case study to demonstrate the social consequences of neoliberal European integration and to understand the relationship between neoliberalism and neofunctionalism.

*Formulation of Research Agenda*

Glaser and Strauss’ research (1967) was based upon personal experience, and this PhD thesis certainly forms no exception to this tendency. Through my upbringing in East Germany, the gradual abolition of border controls and the introduction of the common currency I was confronted with the reality of European integration in a very concrete manner. Representing Malta at a European Council simulation on European migration policy generated a strong interest in the issue area and finally resulted in me writing my Bachelor dissertation on the impact of the Dublin II Regulation on the smallest EU member state. This interest was deepened through political activism in the area of asylum and migration, which resulted not
only in further motivation for the composition of a PhD thesis on this issue, but also in the selection of an emancipatory research agenda. Personal friendships with migrants and refugees in my home town contributed to my concern with the social exclusion of irregular migrants. Field research I carried out in Malta for my Bachelor thesis fostered the belief that this exclusion is related to European integration and to the Dublin Regulation in particular. I wanted to contribute to the creation of a counter-narrative against nationalist populism, which tended to frame irregular migration in terms of race and security while ignoring the inherent inequality of neoliberal European integration.

While I was always critical of neofunctionalism’s positivist underpinnings, I saw that there was an obvious fit between the neofunctionalist narrative of European integration and the legislative evolution of the European asylum system. This fit warranted for a closer examination of neofunctionalism as a proto theory which was carried out in Chapter 1. I found strong discursive similarities between European official documents and neofunctionalism, which prompted me to carry out key informant interviews with European Commission officials. These interviews provided evidence for my initial pre-conceptualisation of neofunctionalism having been an influence on the European integration process. I saw the latter as related to the social exclusion of irregular migrants.

Neofunctionalism’s positivism, its lacking understanding of structural power, and its disregard for issues of social exclusion made an inappropriate framework for further analysis. I therefore consulted the critical literature on its own conceptualisations of European integration. The critical literature, rather than trying to merely explain European integration, focuses on the question of who benefits from the EU as it currently exists, and on why it produced inequality. The critical literature exhibited a focus on social purpose. Reading and reviewing this literature crystallised the research agenda and allowed me to see that if I wanted to understand the exclusion of irregular migrants within the context of European integration as influenced by neofunctionalism, I would have to address the question of social purpose. Chapter 2 thus identifies the consolidation of the position of transnational capital as the primary social purpose of the contemporary

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30 Key informant interviews are carried with individuals possessing key insight into a particular community (Gilchrist, 1992).
EU – nevertheless, several other aspects of the EU’s character remained obscure: what is the relationship between the condition of irregular migrants and European integration? The analysis of Gramsci’s writings as well as Chapter 3’s analysis of subalternity is meant to provide the theoretical tools for answering that question.

Nevertheless, field research itself can provide insight into the mechanisms of social exclusion. The coding process of CGT as well as the theories outlined in Chapter 2 in turn permit for the contextualisation of these mechanisms within the European integration as informed by neofunctionalism (see Chapter 7). Critical theory’s emancipatory goals and the apparent over-simplification of the Gramscian concept of subalternity that one encounters in much of this literature furthermore calls for dialogue with subaltern groups, such as irregular migrants (Cornstock, 1982). This is further emphasised by the recent re-interpretation of Gramsci’s writings, which stresses human emancipation (e.g. Bruff, 2014; Horn, 2011; Thomas, 2013; see Chapter 2). Field research can contribute to the achievement of emancipatory goals if it is used to allow the subaltern groups concerned to develop an improved understanding of their situation in relation to the political economy at large. It is hard to envisage how increased awareness can be created through academic literature – a blog, such as the one that I wrote during and following my field research, may be a much more effective and approachable method of dialogue. Other methods with emancipatory potential that I have used include the publication of articles in public media or giving public talks.

Case Study Selection

European integration is too broad a field to be studied and researched in its entirety within the scope of a PhD dissertation. A meaningful attempt to study the social purpose of European integration ought to necessarily limit itself to one particular aspect of the European project. In turn, a study of this particular aspect is meant to say something about European integration as a whole. The careful selection of this case study is therefore of crucial importance to achieving the goals of the research agenda. Before outlining why the management of irregular migration was chosen as the most relevant case study of European integration, it
will be explained by the single case method is a suitable approach to fulfilling the objectives of this dissertation.

Flyvbjerg (2006) not only makes one of the most compelling cases for working with single case studies but also outlines how they should be chosen. While many authors (e.g. Campbell & Stanley, 1966) argue that case study research ought to be placed on the “methodological trash heap” (ibid., 220), Flyvbjerg puts forward that case study work is central to the human learning process (2001). He argues that in order to become an expert at a given task, it is not enough to study the practice of that task in a context-independent manner. Indeed, an expert is familiar with thousands of practical cases in their area of expertise. A person with no theory may thus be very good at performing a certain task if they have far-reaching experience, while they may be very bad at that task if they know the theory but lack experience. Case study research is thus essential in achieving expertise in a given subject, as it confronts theory with (subjective) reality. A similar point has been stressed by Yin, who argues that a single case study “allows investigators to focus on a ‘case’ and retain a holistic and real-world perspective” (Yin, 2014, 4). This real-world perspective can support an emancipatory agenda, as the qualitative, in-depth investigations that case study research tends to entail, may reflect the viewpoints of the subaltern groups (Feagin et al., 1991).

The second point Flyvbjerg makes is that case studies are very good at producing particular, context-dependent theories. He emphasises that “social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-independent theory;” particular theories are therefore the most promising avenue towards advancing our understanding of the social world (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 224). Individual problems can act as microcosms of larger phenomena. Nevertheless, it is often assumed that it is impossible to generalise from a single case study, as the conclusions that can be drawn from that case may not necessarily apply to all other cases in the same manner. While the critical realist foundations of this research do indeed preclude the making of strong and generalisable truth claims, the choice of the case study still aims at saying something about European integration in general. This does not negate the particularity and historical specificity of the conclusions drawn. Furthermore, as a physician can arrive at inferences about physical disorders
based on an inspection of their symptoms, a critical realist can draw some tendential conclusions on the structures of social systems based on a theoretically informed analysis of their manifestations.

Flyvbjerg suggests the critical case as the most promising avenue for the making of ‘generalisations’. The critical case is one that has “strategic importance in relation to the general problem,” allowing for deductions such as, “if this is (not) valid for this case, then it applies to all (no) cases” (ibid., 230). Flyvbjerg discusses two types of critical cases, the ‘least likely’ case and the ‘most likely’ case. The ‘least likely’ case allows for the verification of propositions, assumptions and hypotheses. An example is Robert Michels’ study of oligarchy in organisations (1962). He argued that if an organisation with strong democratic ideals (i.e. that is ‘least likely’ to be oligarchical) exhibits signs of oligarchy, it implies that most organisations are oligarchical. The ‘most likely’ case in the other hand allows for falsification. It applies to case studies where all criteria for the fulfilment of a hypothesis are met, but which nevertheless strongly deviates from the hypothesis. The thesis follows this logic because asylum policy represents an area where the neofunctionalist hypotheses should apply.

While case studies are rationalised using these criteria, the researcher’s intuition may play an important role in determining what constitutes a critical case. Flyvbjerg makes mention of this during his discussion of the paradigmatic case study, where he claims that “intuition may be the real, or most important, reason why the researcher wants to execute the project” (2006, 233). Although it is difficult to precisely define intuition, it is safe to say that intuition represents a subjective, rapid evaluative experience which is normally emotionally laden (see Weaver et al., 2014). The importance of intuition in case study research and Critical Grounded Theory as a whole cannot be understated. Indeed, it may be intuition which establishes subjective definitions of social problems and which plays the decisive role in the development of not merely case studies, but of preconceptualisations and theoretical elaborations. This applies particularly to research with vulnerable individuals such as irregular migrants, which is inherently more likely to be highly emotional and affective. Nevertheless, even if intuition is a crucial factor in the CGT process, every step of the way ought to be depicted in a traceable and logical manner to convince other researchers to draw
the same conclusions. Intuition ought to be justified and complemented by sound logic to construct a compelling argument.

While CGT's consideration of proto-theories aims at the generation of initial conceptualisations, these conceptualisations are often challenged by exposing them to the field. Case studies can be employed to generate grounded theory of the larger phenomenon in question if the case study selected is of critical importance for this phenomenon (e.g. Fernández, 2005). One method to find out which case study is of critical importance is to attempt to find a case on whose operation or failure a given phenomenon is dependent on – the weakest link (Flyvbjerg, 2006). If this is accepted in relation to the topic of this dissertation, the question arises whether irregular migration management constitutes a critical case study, of whether the success or failure of European integration as a whole rests on migration management. I believe this to be the case for three primary reasons.

Firstly, irregular migration, at least on a large scale, challenges the viability of the Schengen-system and thus of one of the cornerstones of the European project. The intergovernmental nature of the Dublin regime (see Chapter 1) is preferred to a European quota for the distribution of asylum seekers. This points to a lack of capability to deal with irregular migration at the supranational level. The Dublin regime should therefore hardly be seen as a genuinely European policy instrument. It does not advocate a European solution but protects national interests. Migration management, as the weakest link of European integration is further manifested in the contemporary public debate on the EU, which in no insignificant part focuses on the management of the ‘refugee crisis’. The mismanagement of the latter situation has become the raison d’être for europhobic neo-nationalist groups in many EU member states, the rise of which threatens the very survival of the European Union.

Secondly, the most important objects of irregular migration management – irregular migrants – form a social group that should manifestly display the character of contemporary European integration. Irregular migrants form an extreme category of EU residents because they do not possess EU citizenship and are thus excluded from the most basic means of participation in the EU’s democratic institutions. They are often materially deprived, unfamiliar with local customs and culture, unable to speak the local language, ethnically distinct and
may be unaffiliated to any particular social group or organisation in the transition and host countries. Clandestinos are excluded from access to public services taken for granted by EU citizens such as medical care and education. They clearly form a social group in the European Union that exhibits obvious and numerous differences from the majority. They are some of the economically and politically weakest members of European society. Since they form such an extreme group, it is with them that the social purpose of European integration should become the most apparent.

Thirdly and finally, migration management represents a critical case study of European integration because the failure to integrate migrants into European society represents the failure of the EU as a civilisational project. After the horrors of World War Two, the European Coal and Steel Community was founded in part to prevent another European war, to reign in the destructive inclinations of nationalism and to turn (the Western part of) the continent into a peaceful and prosperous civilisation. The failure to integrate individual in a precarious situation dismantles this civilisational project and thus provides insight into the social purpose of European integration.

In addition to these points, migration management is a suitable case study of neofunctionalist integration because it represents a policy area where the conditions for spillover are met in an especially powerful manner. There already exists a common border regime, a common visa policy, a common passport format, a common biometric database and a basic framework for the harmonisation of the 28 national asylum systems. A method to distribute asylum seekers across the Union in a proportional manner as well as the creation of a European asylum agency would be the obvious fulfilment of the neofunctionalist prophecy. If no ‘progress’ is made in this area, tremendous insight can be gained into the social purpose of neofunctionalist European integration.

Research Design for Explorative Fieldwork

This section is meant to outline the research design for the first phase of field research. The purpose of this phase was to understand the relationship between
policymakers in the European Commission and neofunctionalism through a series of semi-structured interviews. As such, they formed the explorative fieldwork carried out to substantiate the argument presented in Chapter 1, namely that neofunctionalism has in part shaped the recent European integration process. For this first phase, an emphasis will be placed on sampling procedure, interview procedure and evaluation procedure.

It is important to state that during this research phase, it was planned to limit the study to the area of asylum policy. An asylum application is the most common way for non-EU citizens to gain a regular residency status that would permit them to remain on EU territory for an indeterminate period of time. It was only afterwards that it became clear that this limitation was in fact very obstructive, which is reflected in the scope of the main fieldwork. The primary reason for this alteration is that the boundaries between different categories of migrants (particularly asylum seekers, clandestinos and refugees) are extremely loose. As will be shown in Chapter 6, the dissociation of these groups from one another represents a significant obstacle to overcoming their subaltern condition. Through asserting the boundaries between asylum seekers, clandestinos and refugees, this dissociation would be reproduced. Nevertheless, despite this alteration in the research agenda, the results of the first phase of research remain relevant because they pertain to the relevance of neofunctionalism to European policymaking in general.

*Sampling Procedure*

Interviewees were selected using the European Commission staff database and advice from other researchers who had done similar research. Altogether, eight interviewees were contacted from the European Commission Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME). DG HOME was chosen because it is the *de facto* ministry responsible for the area of migration. The European Commission represents the executive branch of the European institutions, which, according to neofunctionalist theory, pushes European integration forward. The Commission's Directorate-Generals draft EU legislation and are involved in all
stages of the legislative process. Not only do they have a large impact on the outcomes of intra-institutional bargaining, but they also have the best overview of the policymaking process in its entirety.

Contact was established using a letter in Portable Document Format (PDF) which was attached to an email sent to secretaries of relevant units within DG HOME. The letter asked European Commission officials whether they were willing to participate in a semi-structured interview on the history and evolution of the European asylum system that would last for approximately one hour. In every message, potential interviewees were asked whether they knew of any other relevant people that may be suitable for an interview, and if so, whether they could forward me their contact details. The recruitment procedure thus followed the snowballing technique (cf. Biernacki & Waldorf, 1981).

Using the above method, three interviewees were found. I was subsequently forwarded to another interviewee using the snowballing technique. To maintain anonymity, their names and positions will not be revealed, but it is fair to say that they played critical roles in relation to the research agenda. One interviewee was a former European Commissioner and, in fact, the interviewees matched the research agenda so well that further interviews with European Commission staff were considered unnecessary.

Interview Procedure

The semi-structured interviews followed a schedule that had been prepared within the context of the University of Liverpool’s ethical approval procedure. Semi-structured interviews were given preference to unstructured interviews because there were specific questions that would definitely have to be asked. The semi-structured interview allows the researcher to maintain a level of control over the interview process, while the unstructured interview implies the surrendering of control to the dynamic of the conversation (Corbin & Morse, 2003; Kvale, 1984). The latter approach may be suitable to the classical GTM, but in accordance with CGT it was preferred to confront the interviewee openly with the researcher’s initial conceptualisations.
The interviews revolved around four topics: the interviewee’s biography, the inception of the European asylum system, neofunctionalism and the evolution and practice of the Dublin Regulation. The section on biography included questions on the interviewee’s professional history and on the interviewee’s role in the construction and management of the European asylum system. The former was considered relevant because it may provide insight as to the approach to policymaking the interviewee adopts. The interview schedule contained a section on the inception of the European asylum system because this would help to illuminate whether the interviewee uses neofunctionalist logic to explain legislative evolution. An example of the questions posed is the following: ‘do you think that the need for a common asylum system arose from previously existing legislation or integration in other areas of policymaking’? The section on neofunctionalism aimed at confronting the policymakers with the theory itself. It would seek to determine whether the interviewees were familiar with neofunctionalism and whether they thought that it acted as a blueprint for their endeavours. Finally, the section on the evolution and practice of the Dublin Regulation was included because the Dublin Regulation is the most highly communitarised piece of asylum legislation. It was expected that questions on the Dublin Regulation would reveal the distance between policymakers and policy objects (i.e. asylum seekers).

To ensure ethical standards were upheld, before the interview, I sent all participants a participant information sheet via email which states the purpose of the interview and the sampling procedure. The participant information sheet contained information on consent, the withdrawal procedure, complaint opportunities, confidentiality, insurance issues as well as on the purpose of the interview. It ensured that all interviewees were aware of the consequences of their participation. In this email, potential participants were also informed in advance about some of the questions that were going to arise in the interview. All participants had to sign a consent form declaring that they have read and understood the participant information sheet, which made sure that I had proof of them having understood the participant information sheet. Both the consent form and the participant information sheet were approved by the University of Liverpool’s committee for ethical research practice.
In practice the three interviews deviated from the interview schedule in accordance with semi-structured interview practice, although the basic themes were maintained.

*Interview Evaluation Procedure*

All interviews were recorded using a voice recorder and subsequently manually transcribed. While there is a plethora of transcription methods (e.g. McLellan et al., 2003; Lapadit & Lindsay, 1999) and it is uncertain whether transcription is even a pre-requisite of coding, transcription was nevertheless carried out because text is more accessible than an audio recording. Text documents make coding easier because the origin of the code is visible. Furthermore, they can be navigated easily with word searches. All interviews were transcribed in a word-for-word manner. Words or phrases that could not be understood were left out, although a bracketed ellipsis was included in the text to indicate that some words were missing. Informal contractions (i.e. ‘wanna’, ‘gonna’) were left unaltered, and grammar was not corrected. Unfinished sentences were also marked with an ellipsis.

Since it was the purpose of these interviews to investigate whether neofunctionalism plays an important role in European policymaking, the interviews were coded specifically for neofunctionalist categories such as spillover, inevitability, elites or technocracy. In all four interviews examples of these categories could be found.31

31 Example: “The institutions are here. They are pushing for new legislation. Member states are unhappy with it, but either way… In fact, you have no option with a Commission proposal than to act on it.” (personal communication, 27 June 2013). This excerpt from an interview with a member of the European Commission staff contains the categories ‘inevitability’ (“no option with a Commission proposal than to act on it”) and ‘spillover’ (“The institutions are here. They are pushing for new legislation.”).
Research Design Main Fieldwork

During the first phase of the research process I had developed initial conceptualisations of European integration and irregular migration management on the basis of an analysis of neofunctionalism as a proto theory. I had carried out exploratory fieldwork to ground these conceptualisations. Now, having developed the theoretical context for understanding the situation of irregular migrants within the practice of European integration as informed by neofunctionalism (see Chapters 2 and 3), the social purpose of European integration can be further illuminated by investigating how irregular migrants experience everyday life in the EU. In this manner the consequences of neofunctionalist integration can be shown. The results of this study were meant to be brought into dialogue with the categories derived in Chapter 3. However, new and different research questions on site were expected to emerge as part of the retroductive logic inherent to Critical Grounded Theory.

As opposed to the exploratory field research, this study required far more detailed preparation and planning. Furthermore, the research process evolved. This section will discuss the following aspects: research site selection, sampling procedure, interview procedure, ethical issues, sampling practice and field notes, interview practice and evaluation procedure.

Research Site Selection

According to Frontex there are eight major migratory routes into the EU. The most frequented routes are the Eastern Mediterranean Route and the Central Mediterranean Route. The Central Mediterranean Route leads to Europe via Malta and Southern Italy, and the Eastern Mediterranean Route goes through Greece and Bulgaria. Between 2011 and 2014, Frontex registered 70,000 illegal border crossings per year on the Central Mediterranean Route (on average) and 40,000 illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean Route (Frontex, 2015). Both individual values exceed the number of illegal crossings on all other routes combined. It is important where these routes cross the EU external border,
as it is usually the first member state that a migrant enters EU territory through that is responsible for his asylum application (see Chapter 1 on the Dublin Regulation). Asylum in turn is highly relevant here because an asylum application is the most common way for migrants that have entered the EU via these routes to gain a residency permit. Therefore two sites at the entry points to EU territory were selected for field research: Thrace and Sicily.

Thrace represents a geographical region that is shared by Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece. The region has recently been physically divided by the construction of a border fence between Turkey and the EU. While the Greek islands on the Aegean are also important entry points for migrants, preference was given to Thrace primarily for practical reasons as research locations in both Bulgaria and Greece could be covered on the same trip. The Bulgarian towns of Kapitan Andreevo, Svilengrad, Lyubimets and Harmanli each contain important asylum accommodation facilities and Orestiada is the location of one of the largest ‘pre-removal facilities’ and ‘first reception centres’ in Greece. Other factors in favour of Thrace as a research location include proximity to Istanbul Atatürk Airport and financial feasibility. Field research in Thrace took place between the 15th and the 20th of March 2014. During this trip, it became clear that the centralisation of the Greek state would require a trip to Athens; during conversations with Greek administration officials in Orestiada, I was repeatedly forwarded to the Hellenic Coast Guard, the Asylum Service and the Greek police. All three institutions are based in Athens. Research in Athens took place between the 2nd of April 2014 and the 6th of April 2014.

Sicily represents the most important entry point on the Central Mediterranean Route. Despite its size, Sicily is small enough to be easily navigable by car and hosts one of the largest asylum accommodation facilities in Europe (Residence degli Aranci in Mineo). The research stay in Sicily lasted from 30th of April to the 5th of May, 2014.

Germany was selected as the final research location for a variety of reasons. First of all, it is the largest EU member state and receives the largest number of annual asylum applications. Furthermore, during field research in Greece, Bulgaria and Italy, many migrants had repeatedly stated that they intended on living in Germany. Field research in Germany would thus allow me
to investigate migrants’ experience in the country that represented their hopes and aspirations. Germany is a federation where the sixteen state governments are responsible for the management of asylum accommodation facilities – there was thus no obvious starting point for research with migrants. Out of a variety of options, the Saxon city of Leipzig was chosen for two main reasons. Firstly, the city is my home town and I enjoy a strong familiarity with the relevant institutions. I had already carried out interviews with potential participants as part of another study, which I anticipated would increase the likelihood of success in the recruitment procedure. Secondly, I could accommodate a wide range of dates for interviews. Field research in Leipzig took place throughout the months of May and June 2014.

**Sampling Procedure Design**

To understand how relevant groups of migrants experience everyday life in the EU, I had planned to interview six groups of people: public officials, the staff of asylum accommodation facilities, asylum seekers, clandestinos, irregular immigrants working at fruit farms and fruit farm managers. Asylum seekers, clandestinos and fruit farm workers are commonly referred to as irregular migrants. Recruitment procedure, the number of planned participants and the reasoning behind the inclusion of each group will now be explained in detail.

Public officials are of key importance for understanding the practical implementation of the European and national dimensions of migration management at the four research locations. Potentially they would have first-hand information on the ways irregular migrants are received when they enter the EU and how they are treated upon reception. The label ‘public officials’ is of course very loose and includes employees of local administrations, ministry staff, agency staff as well as local and national politicians. Essentially this group includes European, national, regional and local civil servants dealing with asylum and migration. Especially in the light of linguistic barriers that were bound to play a significant role in establishing contact with administrations in Bulgaria and Italy, inclusion criteria for this group were left as flexible as possible (I speak German
and in Greece knowledge of English is widespread). Furthermore, responsibilities are allocated very differently at the four research locations. It would be unwise to exclude participants who are not involved in the local level of administration, as this level’s role in the area of migration management may be limited. I had intended to contact public officials prior to each research trip by email. First contact was meant to be established via email in Greek, Bulgarian and Italian respectively with the help of translators. Nevertheless, in the message that would establish first contact, the recipient was made aware that all further communication would have to take place in English, German or French. Once contact is established, the potential participants were to be sent a copy of the participant information sheet along with a request to set a date for a meeting. This procedure was intended to be followed by all participants who were contacted via email. It was planned that at each research location, at least two interviews would be carried out with members of this group.

The staff of asylum accommodation facilities hold a significant amount of insight into asylum seekers’ everyday lives. Furthermore, as they will have dealt with Dublin deportations the relationship between asylum seekers’ experiences and EU legislation will be clear to them. This group also has a key role in establishing contact between the researcher and other participant groups. Based on previous field research with asylum seekers in Malta and Germany, it was assumed that every asylum accommodation facility at all research locations will have staff members. These could be local or temporary international volunteers as well as full-time employees of the facility itself and the institution that manages it. Contact with this group was meant to be established via the public officials, via email or via personal contacts. If appropriate, public officials would be asked to forward an interview request to the staff of asylum accommodation facilities along with the participant information sheet that was prepared especially for this group. If this possibility did not exist, asylum accommodation camp staff was meant to be contacted directly via email or over the telephone. Two interviews were planned at each research location, which amounts to eight interviews with members of this group. A higher number would have been impractical to evaluate. Furthermore, the amount of time spent in Italy, Greece and Bulgaria in particular would inevitably be limited due to financial constraints. As interviews would have
to be carried out with the other groups as well, there would not be enough time to interview more members of this group.

Asylum seekers are people who have submitted an asylum application that has not yet been decided on. While first asylum applications are usually treated within 18 months, the waiting time for further applications can be significantly longer. Asylum seekers arguably form the group of migrants in Europe that is most exposed to the legal effects of European legislation due to the Dublin regime. Interviews with members of this group are therefore of key significance to gaining insight into the relationship between the lives of asylum seekers and European legislation, which in turn, can advance the understanding of the social purpose of European integration. It is important to state that asylum seekers are often regarded to form a vulnerable group; the ethical issues involved in dealing with this group will be discussed in subsequent sections. Contact with asylum seekers was meant to be established via the staff of asylum accommodation facilities. In emails the staff would be asked whether it was possible to introduce me to the inhabitants of their facilities upon arrival. In these emails, a participant information sheet for asylum seekers was included. Given potential language barriers, this document was formulated in simple English. This was not done to patronise asylum seekers, but to make absolutely sure that all the participants belonging to this group had understood the implications of their participation. I had planned for two interviews to be carried out at each location with members of this group. This choice was made using the reasoning employed for the previous group.

The fourth group to be interviewed are clandestinos. In Italian this word denotes an individual without valid travel or residency documents. Clandestinos may be illegal immigrants. However, such a person may very well be entitled to humanitarian protection, which is why the term ‘illegal’ can be misleading. Moreover, in some cases it may not be possible for a clandestino to apply for asylum, even though they desire to do so. A person may thus be a *de facto* asylum

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32 After an unsuccessful asylum application it is possible to challenge the responsible authority’s decision and to reapply for asylum.

33 This may be due to the extremely poor organization of some national asylum systems, such as the Greek asylum system. More recently, although this was not the case when field research was conducted, some countries are considering the introduction of upper limits for asylum applications. In January 2016 Austria had introduced a law setting the upper limit to 37,500 asylum applications for 2016.
seeker and a *de jure* illegal immigrant. The boundary between the two groups is thus loose in a practical sense and only becomes clear in the legal meaning. Like asylum seekers, clandestinos are considered a vulnerable group and special precautions need to be taken to ensure that research with this group is conducted in an ethical manner. Contact was meant to be established through the staff of asylum accommodation facilities and through the dwellers of these facilities. The participant information sheet that was prepared for this group was largely identical to the document that was prepared for asylum seekers and was meant to be forwarded to participants in the manner outlined in the previous paragraph. Further ways of contacting members of this group were expected to be arranged on site. The number of interviews that could be carried out with members of this group was uncertain, although I had aimed for two per location. This would have amounted to eight interviews (see above paragraph for reasoning behind this).

Especially relevant for Sicily, a review of the literature had indicated that there would be a link between the local economy and irregular migration. Irregular migrants constitute a widely available source of cheap labour and to understand migrants’ experience of European integration it was considered vital to investigate this link. The connection between a potential political economy of migrant labour and European integration exists because the fortification of the Schengen external border has resulted in a vibrant business sector of human smuggling. Furthermore, in the common European market low production costs are of key significance for peripheral regions. The Sicilian economy largely depends on fruit production which is why it was assumed that fruit farmer managers would be ideal interviewees for the study of this phenomenon. Fruit farm managers could provide insight as to how the acquisition of migrant workers is organised. Furthermore, I was very interested in their views on European migration management, as this groups benefits from it due its creation of a large undocumented labour force. Potential participants would be contacted in advance via email with an especially prepared participant information sheet. Nevertheless, it was clear that the chances for successful recruitment using this method were slim, as the interview would ask participants to reveal their involvement in illegal activities. Further recruitment may thus occur on site using the snowballing
approach. Given the difficulty involved in the recruitment procedure, I had aimed for two interviews with fruit farm managers.

The sixth group of potential participants are fruit farm workers. Apart from working on a fruit farm, members of this group would also have to simultaneously be asylum seekers, a clandestinos, or undocumented workers without EU-citizenship. While fruit farm workers constituted the primary target group, other undocumented workers with one of the previous three qualities would not be excluded from the study and the relevance of this participation would have to be decided on site. Like asylum seekers and clandestinos, fruit farm workers naturally form a vulnerable group. In many ways, their vulnerability exceeds that of all other participants because of information they may choose to reveal about their employers (see section on ethical issues). If their employers do not agree to them being interviewed, they may face maltreatment or dismissal. Recruitment would take place in two ways using the snowballing technique. Although I considered it unlikely, the fruit farm managers themselves may have wanted to introduce me to their staff. Had this been the case, the fruit farm workers interviewed would most likely not have criticised their employers. Alternatively, the staff or the inhabitants of asylum accommodation facilities may forward me to people working on fruit farms. Recruitment of members of this group would be limited to Sicily and given the difficulty that would likely be involved with finding participants, I aimed for carrying out two interviews.

Altogether it was thus planned that 36 interviews would be carried out. However, given that interviews are merely one aspect of field research, and taking into consideration that this study does not aim for the generation of generalizable laws through the isolation of particular variables, it was accepted that the actual number of interviews may in fact deviate from the plan outlined here. The success of the recruitment procedure is dependent on many factors outside the researcher’s control, such as the structure of asylum accommodation facilities, language barriers or the openness of fruit farm managers towards my research. Nevertheless, conducting interviews at all these different locations would allow for potentially drawing stronger conclusions.

Gender was deliberately not included in the selection criteria. First and foremost, this was done for practical considerations. It would most likely be hard
enough to find interviewees – including the restrictive category of gender as one of the selection criteria would have made recruitment even more difficult. Furthermore, given the neo-Gramscian emphasis on class as the primary unit of analysis, I aimed at telling the story of irregular migrants as a group in its entirety. Distinguishing between a male and a female story would have contributed towards the fragmentation of this group. The problems associated with this choice will be discussed in subsequent sections.

*Interview Design*

This section will discuss three aspects of the interview procedure. Firstly, it will be shown why the semi-structured interview was selected as the appropriate interview type for this study. Secondly, the design of the participant information sheets and the consent forms will be explained. Finally, it will be outlined how a separate interview schedule was developed for each group to understand migrants’ experience of European integration and the impact of European legislation on this experience. The interview schedule for each group will not be discussed.

All interviews were planned as semi-structured interviews. The reasoning behind this choice is identical to that outlined in the section on the first phase of field research: semi-structured interviews avoid the rigidity of structured interviews, which contradicts the principle of retroduction. Semi-structured interviews were furthermore given preference over structured interviews because the former allow for control over the interview to remain in the hands of the interviewer. Unstructured interviews may be appropriate for studies without a clear research agenda, but this study started out with a set of concrete questions. The mismatch between the nature of unstructured interviews and these pre-defined questions further encouraged the use of semi-structured interviews.

In accordance with the ethical research procedure envisaged by the University of Liverpool, I planned for each participant to receive a participant information sheet before the interview begins. This document contains information on the purpose of the interview as well as the contact details of me and my supervisor. On the basis of having read and understood this document,
each interviewee would then be asked to sign a consent form to certify that they are aware of the consequences of participation. The participant information sheet as well as the consent form for asylum seekers and clandestinos was formulated in simple English to ensure that the consequences of participation are properly understood. The consent forms were nearly identical to those used in the first phase of the study.

Each interview schedule contains an opening and a closing section which are very similar in content. After the investigator introduces himself, interviewees are requested to read the consent form, to tick the appropriate boxes and to sign the consent form, if they agree with its content. The purpose of the study is outlined once again and participants are reminded that they can stop the interview whenever they want and without explanation. According to the interview schedule, it is pointed out that the interview will last for approximately 45 minutes. In the closing section of the interview, participants are encouraged to ask questions and they are reminded that everything that has been said will be kept confidential.

The interview schedule for public officials is based around the following themes: biography, national asylum system, the European asylum system, the role of migrants in the European political economy and the future of the asylum system. This interview schedule is aimed especially at public officials who deal directly with matters related to asylum, and relevant adaptations were foreseen. The section on the interviewee’s biography was included to find out how they became involved in working with migrants. This may shed light on the way migrants are viewed (e.g. as an economic burden/opportunity, as victims of exploitation, etc.). Questions on the national asylum system were included for the same reason, although there was also a genuine need for information on migration management at the research location. The questions on the European asylum system aimed at exploring the impact of European legislation on the interviewees’ work. Furthermore, the questions examined how public officials perceive the impact of European legislation on the lives of asylum seekers and migrants in general. The sections on the role of asylum seekers and migrants in the European political economy were included because of a genuine lack of information. Inevitably, the interviewees would also give their opinion on this role. Questions
on the future of the asylum system were included because public officials have to work with the existing rules. It was assumed that members of this group would be very much aware of the consequences of European migration management – they may thus be able to locate where changes are necessary.

The interview schedule that I had prepared for the staff of asylum accommodation facilities was very similar to the one prepared for public officials. The reasoning behind the inclusion of each theme was identical, although members of this group will clearly have a different perspective on the questions. Based on my previous research experience in asylum accommodation facilities, I assumed that this group would largely be sympathetic to migrants, being largely composed of volunteers. Before questions on the future of European migration management were posed, another theme was introduced: conditions in the centres. I had meant to ask interviewees on the kinds of problems they are dealing with in the camps (i.e. relations between members of different nationalities, drugs, crime, gender relations, etc.) and on their perception of the inhabitants’ everyday lives. I also intended to ask interviewees to establish links between their observations and the EU political economy. Furthermore, I wanted to ask questions about irregular migrants’ participation in the local economy.

The same interview schedule was used for asylum seekers and clandestinos, which is why it can be discussed in the same paragraph. As asylum seekers and clandestinos may have been involved in illegal activities (such as unreported employment or illegal border crossings), the interview schedule includes a reminder that confidentiality may be broken if involvement in such activities is disclosed. However, in the interview schedule it is also pointed out that this does not apply to illegal border crossings, because the majority of asylum seekers and clandestinos have crossed the Schengen external border irregularly. The interview schedule includes four themes: biography, journey to Europe, reception (and accommodation) conditions and knowledge of the European migration system. The biography section builds trust between interviewer and interviewee and furthermore establishes the context for the subsequent section. The questions that were meant to be asked in this section pertain to the interviewee’s origins, to their profession, to their reasons for leaving their country-of-origin, and, if they are an asylum seeker, to their reasons for demanding
asylum. Answers to questions on the interviewee’s travel route may already be indicative of their knowledge of the European migration system. A particular country may for instance have been chosen as the first point of entry into the EU because of the Dublin regime. This theme was also aiming at exploring the interviewees’ relationship with smugglers. The questions on reception (and accommodation) conditions were adapted according to the interviewee’s legal status. These questions aimed at investigating the extent to which the categories developed in the previous chapter (e.g. biopolitics and reification) can be applied to understand migrants’ experience. Questions on first contact and initial medical treatment may for instance be highly relevant for exploring the lived experience of biopolitics. If the participant is a clandestino, questions were asked on why the interviewee has not applied for asylum as well as on whether they have established contact with the local authorities. The fourth theme, which includes questions on the interviewees’ knowledge of European migration management were meant to find out whether the participants have made connections between their experience and the European political economy.

Fruit farm managers are a group that was foreseen to be particularly difficult to interview. Members of this group who employ clandestinos and asylum seekers may not only be involved in illegal activities but also in behaviour that is widely considered to be morally questionable. It was planned that all potential interviewees would be made aware that confidentiality cannot be maintained if illegal activities are disclosed. The first part of the interview schedule deals with the participant’s biography, which establishes trust with the interviewer and contextualises the activities of the fruit farm. The second theme concerns the undocumented employment of clandestinos and asylum seekers. Participants are questioned on whether they employ members of these groups and on their motivations for doing so. Moreover, this theme aims at finding out how the government responds to the existence of an undocumented migrant labour market. The third theme deals with the relationship between migration management and undocumented migrant labour. It aims at exploring the participants’ awareness of the Dublin regime and other European migration instruments, and whether there is a perceived link between the migrant labour market and these legislative tools. Finally, interviewees were meant to be
questioned on their views on the role of the Italian government in migration management.

The interview schedule for undocumented migrant workers is very similar to the one that was developed for asylum seekers and clandestinos. However, a further section was included on their employment. It aimed at finding out how the participants came to work on for instance fruit farms, how they are being treated, how much they earn and how the spend their everyday lives. Like asylum seekers and clandestinos, they were then asked to place their experience into relation with European migration management.

*Sampling Practice, Field Notes and Blog*

In practice, I ended up deviating from the recruitment procedure and the interview schedules. While this deviation was to a certain extent expected, recruitment nevertheless entailed several unexpected challenges. These challenges will now be discussed in relation to each of the six groups that were meant to be interviewed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Planned Number of Interviews</th>
<th>Actual Number of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public officials</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp staff</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clandestinos</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit farm managers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fruit farm workers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
<td><strong>33</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Recruiting public officials was by far the easiest aspect in organising the research. In Germany, two public officials from the city administration of Leipzig were interviewed. In Greece, public officials from the Greek Asylum Service, the Hellenic Coast Guard and the First Reception Service were conducted, and five interviews were carried out altogether. In Bulgaria, one public official from the administration of the city of Svilengrad was interviewed as well as one Austrian Frontex officer. In Italy, the recruitment procedure resulted in one interview with
a public official from the city of Catania. The limited success of the recruitment produce in Bulgaria and Italy is largely due to language barriers. Although first contact was established in Bulgarian and Italian, communication remained difficult. While interviews were arranged with a relevant member of staff of the Svilengrad city administration, the interview finally took place with the only employee who spoke English. In Italy, despite having contacted four different offices, no interviews could be conducted.

Recruiting camp staff was difficult in all research locations because in several cases the only non-residents available were security staff who did not speak English. Since the purpose of recruiting this group was to speak with people who have considerable insight into migrants’ everyday lives, the scope of recruitment was expanded to include employees of NGOs working with asylum seekers and clandestinos. Recruitment was undertaken via email, via telephone as well as via the snowballing technique. In Italy, one interview was carried out with the head of a medical aid facility in Catania. Furthermore, two employees of the Italian Refugee Council were interviewed. In Germany, an interview was conducted with an employee of the Leipzig Refugee Council. In Greece, interviews were carried out with a member of a Greek migrants’ association, with a member of staff of the NGO Metadrassi which specialises on interpreting as well as with an employee of an accommodation centre for asylum seekers. In Bulgaria, no interviews could be conducted, primarily because the camps were not staffed by anyone except security personnel. I regarded this to be a research finding in itself.

Recruitment of asylum seekers was in the six cases very different from what had been envisioned in the original recruitment plan. In Germany, three interviews with asylum seekers were arranged by the Leipzig Refugee Council and one interview was arranged through a personal acquaintance. The recruitment procedure in Athens was similar, and an interview was arranged through a member of staff of the asylum accommodation centre. In Bulgaria, the Pastrogor centre did not have specialised staff. Recruitment occurred outside the gate of the facility, where I was approached by several residents of the facility out of curiosity. Two residents were willing to be interviewed. Recruitment procedure in Sicily was identical which resulted in three interviews.
Recruiting clandestinos was not possible in Germany and Bulgaria. In the German case, this is likely due to the fact that there are very few people belonging to that group residing within German territory. This in turn is the result of comparatively small size of the German irregular labour market, as well of Germany’s geographical location. In Bulgaria, no method was found on site which would allow for contact to be established with members of this group. In Italy and Greece, the presence of clandestinos is tolerated and even encouraged for a variety of reasons, such as dependency on undocumented labour and inaccessibility of the asylum procedure. For these reasons, contacting clandestinos was easier at these locations. Recruitment in Greece occurred outside the offices of the Greek asylum service, where two people were encountered who had unsuccessfully attempted to apply for asylum. They were thus still clandestinos, although they wanted to apply for asylum. Another clandestino was encountered on a street in Athens. In Italy, clandestinos were successfully recruited. However, all interviewees were also undocumented workers, which is why they form part of the final group of participants.

The recruitment of fruit farmer managers in Italy was unsuccessful. That was somewhat expected, as the participants would potentially be involved in illegal activities, implying that confidentiality could not be guaranteed. Although potential interviewees were contacted via email, no responses were received and interviews could not be carried out.

Recruitment of persons belonging to the final group of migrant workers was carried out in Sicily only, as explained in the section on recruitment procedure. Nevertheless, the recruitment procedure deviated from what was outlined before. One female migrant sex worker was recruited on the side of a road linking two major Sicilian cities. This method of recruitment has previously been employed for sex workers in Vietnam by Johnston et al. (2006). One fruit farm worker was recruited on his way back from work near the Mineo asylum accommodation centre. The third participant sold parking tickets in the city centre of Palermo.

While gender was deliberately excluded from the selection criteria, it should be stated that out of a total of 16 interviews with irregular migrants only three were with women, two of which were carried out in Leipzig. There are two
main reasons for this. Firstly, particularly in Italy the vast majority of irregular migrants are men; this applies to asylum seekers and clandestinos in particular (Fasani, 2010). Secondly, for cultural reasons it was more difficult to recruit female irregular migrants. As a male researcher I was unlikely to be approached by a woman with a North African or Middle Eastern background outside the gates of a refugee accommodation facility. Approaching such women may also have constituted a breach of cultural etiquette. In practice this problem was negligible because the majority of irregular migrants I encountered were men.

Nevertheless, although I considered the inclusion of the gender criterion to be potentially destructive to the generation of irregular migrants’ group consciousness, there is a clear gender bias in this dissertation. The sizable literature on women and migration bears witness to the fact that there is a distinct female migration and integration experience (e.g. Arizpe, 2014; Timmermann et al., 2015). This was also confirmed by my experience in the field (see subsequent section) – indeed, it is almost self-evident that particularly migrants originating from cultures with strong sexual segregation will have a gendered migration experience. A stronger emphasis on the inclusion of both male and female interviewees at all research locations may have added more facets to the narrative of irregular migrants’ experience of European integration.

Apart from these interviews, a research journal was kept at all stages of the research process. This journal contains extensive field notes as well as information on the numerous conversations that were held with individuals who were not officially interviewed. The links that exist between the interviewees are recorded to allow for the reconstruction of the snowball-sampling procedure. Furthermore, not all interviewees were willing to have their voices recorded for a variety of reasons. The research journal was used for note-taking of these conversations. Crucially, in the context of CGT, field research allows for the refinement of one’s research agenda during field research. The journal thus contains several pages listing new research questions as they arose and further reflects on preliminary theoretical hypotheses.

Before I began my field research, it was agreed between me and my supervisor that I would write regular blog posts to provide a publically available
reflexive account of my field research.\textsuperscript{34} Most blog posts were written during field research. The purpose of this blog was threefold. Firstly, the blog enabled all interviewees to receive near-immediate feedback on the interviews. It is a much more accessible way to stay in touch with participants than a PhD dissertation. When my dissertation is complete, I plan to publish my most important research findings on \textit{EUtopia} as an attempt to implement my work’s emancipatory agenda. Secondly, the blog allowed me to stay in touch with my supervisor during field research. Thirdly, the blog permitted me to deal with emotional distress I experienced on site, which will be further discussed in the ethics section of this chapter. Apart from accounts of what I did in practice, these posts also contain initial attempts to theorise my findings by relating them to European integration more generally.

\textit{Interview Practice}

As the previous section indicates, it was in practice very difficult to adhere to the planned sampling procedure. In some locations sampling proved altogether unfeasible, although the overall number of interviews was in line with expectations. This section will discuss two other problems that arose during field research.

While all interviews with public officials and camp staff were carried out in an office environment, interviews with migrants were conducted by the gates of accommodation centres and during extensive walks. This resulted in several difficulties. Firstly, filling in the participant consent forms proved difficult in this interview setting, as it was in many cases hard to find a smooth surface to write on. The participant consent form is designed for interviews taking place in an enclosed space rather than in the open where potential bystanders may comment on or make fun of the consent procedure. Adherence to the consent form procedure was thus a constant source of annoyance and frustration (see section on ethical issues). An open environment furthermore implied that it was difficult to be alone with the participants, who were often interrupted by friends or fellow

\textsuperscript{34} The contents of this blog are accessible on \url{http://eutopia-blog.blogspot.com}. 

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accommodation centre inhabitants. This was particularly the case at the Pastrogor and Mineo sites. At the latter location, I was at one point surrounded by at least ten young asylum seekers who were curious about my motives and intentions. Interviews were also often exposed to the suspicious glances of camps’ security staff.

Especially with asylum seekers, clandestinos and fruit farm workers, who in many ways constituted the most important group of participants, it was difficult to stick to the interview schedule. This was mostly because the interviewees were sharing details of their lives that were of a highly personal nature. It seemed appropriate to allow the interviewees to lead the conversations until silences arose and a new topic could be brought up. Particularly in the case of the interview with the female sex worker, I experienced great distress. I felt very nervous not only about the recruitment procedure itself, which required me to invite the interviewee into my car, potentially causing serious misunderstandings. I also felt unprepared to discuss issues involving sexual abuse and exploitation. Although I realised that the interview was highly relevant and important for my research, I often did not know how to respond to the interviewee’s statements, especially being as a male researcher. I was unsure whether it would be appropriate to ask about the details of her work. As a result of this discomfort, the interview lasted only for fifteen minutes and I felt great relief when it was over.

Ethical Issues

There are clear ethical issues related to research involving irregular migrants and a small number of articles has been published that deal with these issues (Düvell et al., 2010; Jacobsen & Landau, 2003; Pernice, 1994). This section will focus on the ethical issues that arose during field research with migrants in Sicily, Thrace, Athens and Leipzig. Ethical questions are particularly pertinent in the context of research with irregular migrants because they are often considered a vulnerable group. Some of the issues were foreseen, while others only became apparent on site. Each issue will be briefly discussed, whereupon it will be shown how this
issue was addressed. This list is of course non-exhausting, although an effort will be made to point out all relevant aspects.

Irregular migrants are regularly being referred to as a vulnerable group because of the precarious situation they find themselves in. This label is appropriate insofar as irregular migrants might possess no legal residency status, having little access to medical treatment, the regular labour market or political participation. However, defining vulnerability in terms of “[lacking] the ability to make personal life choices, to make personal decisions to maintain independence, and to self-determine” (Moore & Miller, 1999, 1034) seems to be inappropriate in this case. Such a description would reinforce the reduction of irregular migrants to victimhood and therefore be contrary to an emancipatory agenda which places a strong emphasis on the importance of human agency. Most irregular migrants are able to move freely within the territory of the state they reside in. They are furthermore part of the undocumented labour market. Coming to Europe was in most cases the migrant’s own self-determined decision. This does not preclude the fact that irregular migrants’ ability to determine their own destinies is often limited by incarceration, persecution and a variety of discriminating legal provisions, but it is problematic to apply the label of vulnerability to irregular migrants in general. The purpose of this argument is not to negate that the migrants concerned form a vulnerable group, but to underline their ability to be the agent shaping their socio-political situation.

Seeking written consent from the participants was a major challenge during field research. Not only was it not guaranteed that all potential participants could read and write, but the ethical procedure that the University of Liverpool’s ethical review committee demanded had created an association of the interview with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, which the interviewee may perceive to work against him or her. In the case of asylum seekers, paperwork is often associated with the asylum application, which may be one of the primary causes of their lives’ (sustained) insecurity. Recruitment would have been more successful had there not been a need for the formality of the consent procedure. As Düvell et al. (2010) point out, seeking written consent can also be impractical because it can cause unnecessary risks for the participants. They may be prompted to “use false names or withdraw from the research” (ibid., 234) given that they may disclose their
involvement in illegal or criminal activities. During the first set of interviews, it was recognised that consent forms can form a barrier to recruitment. Thereupon it was decided to abstain from their use and to seek oral consent from the participants. This is conditioned upon complete honesty with the interviewees regarding the objectives of the study, the instilling of trust in the interviewee.

Field research may induce significant amounts of discomfort for the participants. Interviews may remind irregular migrants in particular of traumatic experiences which they may not want to remember. It is important that all participants are made aware of the potential consequences of their participation, which was stressed in the previous paragraph. However, during field research, it became clear that interviews can actually take on an “unexpected cathartic role, because it [allowed] the respondent to talk about both fact and feeling with someone who is listening very attentively” (Hiller & Diluzio, 2004, 13).

One ethical challenge that is often cited in this context addresses the physical risks that the researcher may be exposed to during field research. Migrant accommodation facilities are often associated with extreme material deprivation, high suicide rates, drug abuse, violence and murder. On site, the first four phenomena could be confirmed. This risk is further increased if the snowball-sampling technique fails and participants have to be personally recruited without a mediator. Lack of access to the accommodation facilities themselves implies that the interviews would have to be carried out outside the gates, that is outside the space of responsibility of the security staff. This is a well-described problem in the area of research with irregular migrants. Düvell et al. (2010) suggest that withdrawal from the research site is the only possible choice of action if danger arises. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that researchers in this area have accepted that their research involves certain risks.

During field research, the researcher will not only be exposed to physical risks, but also to significant amount of emotional distress. It may in fact happen that the researcher is expected to help a particular participant. This is ethically unproblematic as long as these expectations do not cause the researcher to engage in activities that could be considered “immoral, illegal or disproportionate” (Düvell et al., 2010, 234). It is also important to find ways to deal with the emotional distress I was likely to experience during field research. The method
that I employed for this was the composition of the aforementioned reflexive research blog.

There is an inherent ethical dimension to any sampling procedure that involves directly approaching potential irregular migrants. Residency status cannot be immediately recognised, and approaching a possible participant based on their appearance or ethnicity involves racial profiling and risks insulting the participant. This problem can be avoided using third persons, as was discussed in the section dealing with sampling procedure design. Another method to avoid this problem is to wait until approached outside an asylum accommodation facility.

While this is true only for a small number of interviews, it was the case that some interviewees were under the influence of psychoactive drugs. At least one participant openly admitted to very recently having smoked cannabis and his responses were occasionally self-contradictory. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily indicate that these interviews should be considered unreliable or meaningless. Indeed, as Wright et al. point out, receiving divergent information “can increase understanding of complex behaviour patterns” (1998, 525). While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to understand complex behaviour patterns, divergent information can provide insight into the interviewee’s perception of his situation. Furthermore, divergent information can be a problem for all qualitative research and it is also very important to capture the interviewee’s perception of his life in the European Union. It ought to be stressed that the great availability of psychoactive drugs and their wide-spread use are of course also research findings in themselves.

I had expected that participants would reveal their involvement in illegal and potentially criminal activities during the interviews. This would nevertheless relieve me of my vow to confidentiality. Yet, disclosing the participant’s involvement in such activities may still be unethical. This can be exemplified with reference to illegal immigration. While this is technically a legal violation, it is certainly not a moral breach to cross an international boundary – an act which is only illegal because the irregular migrant does not hold correct documentation. Insofar it would be unethical to disclose this information and the anonymity of the participant would have to be safeguarded. The same logic can be applied to issues related to the implementation of the Dublin regime. It is common practice
for asylum seekers to lie about where they entered the EU on their asylum application. However, when it comes to serious crimes such acts of violence or sexual assault, confidentiality ought to be breached (cf. Wright et al., 1998, 533). With regard to intoxicants and psychoactive drugs, it appeared as though their consumption was tolerated by the staff of the asylum accommodation centre in question, which is why no action was undertaken to disclose this information.

**Interview Evaluation Procedure**

Upon completion I transcribed all interviews in the manner outlined previously. However, the evaluation procedure for these interviews differed from the evaluation procedure that was used for the first phase of research. The interview transcripts were in fact open-coded to the largest extent possible (see Figure 4 for an example). It was considered important to allow the interviews with the migrants in particular to speak for themselves, as theoretically informed

**Figure 4:** Example of open coding
coding may have reinforced migrant subalternity. Coding is nevertheless inevitably a particular interpretation of the data. Once the interviews were open-coded, these codes were developed into the categories that had been developed in the previous chapter (i.e. reification, commodification, etc.).

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter was to allow the reader to trace and understand the methodology that was employed for this dissertation. It has been shown how the origins of CGT can be traced back to the Straussian move in relation to the classical GTM, which accepted that previous held beliefs have an impact on theory generation. CGT nevertheless constitutes a relatively new addition to the plethora of methods; nevertheless, many researchers may have used retroductive logic without realising that they were. The historical dominance of positivism has prevented critical researchers from being open about their theoretical preconceptions. In this regard CGT and its critical realist underpinnings contain an element of pragmatism – it is simply unfeasible to view the world as a *tabula rasa*, even if it were desirable. Not all theories are equally valid; they can however be judged based on how good they are at explaining and understanding particular phenomena.

It is certain that the research design employed for this dissertation is not flawless. While the overall number of interviews that was carried out during field research appears to be in line with the ambitions of the research agenda, the number of interviews that was carried out at each location is small. Arguably more interviews should have been carried out. However, it is not the purpose of this dissertation to interview a sufficient number of irregular migrants to allow for generalizable inferences about their condition. Attempting such an undertaking would not only contradict the principles of retroduction, but would also be unfeasible. Furthermore, one might argue that since it is the aim of this thesis to shed light on irregular migrants’ everyday experience of the distinctly European occurrence of European integration, it was necessary to interview individuals at a variety of European locations, even if the number of interviews carried out at each
location was small. The European character of the experience of irregular migrants would have been undermined by stressing the need for a sufficiently high sample from each national context.

Nevertheless, the difficulties that were in fact faced in recruiting participants were definitely underestimated. This was the case especially in Bulgaria, where linguistic barriers inhibited successful recruitment. Still, a large enough group was interviewed to allow for the creation of an idea of what it is like to experience European integration on an everyday level. The following three chapters will examine the results of this study and the conclusions that may be drawn from them in relation to the initial conceptualisations constructed through the consideration of proto-theories in Chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 will address the impact of neofunctionalist integration on European migration management itself, while Chapter 6 will address its impact on the everyday lives of irregular migrants. Chapter 7 will place neofunctionalism as well as those experiences within the context of the neoliberal hegemonic project.
Chapter 5: The Political Economy of European Migration Management

While the phenomenon of migration into the European Union manifests itself very differently across the territory of the Union, there are nevertheless some features where the particularly European nature of contemporary transnational migration ought to be emphasised. At the European level, the materialisation of neofunctionalist ideology should be most visible in European policymaking. Although the relationship between neofunctionalism and the development of the European asylum system has already been alluded to in Chapter 1, this chapter is going to focus on the way neofunctionalism has informed European policymaking in the area of migration management in general.

For many EU-Europeans, the terms European Union and Europe have become synonymous, even though the European Union covers only 44% of the geographical area of the European continent. Furthermore, the EU extends across parts of Africa and South America, and one of its member states is located entirely within Asia. Europe as a migrants’ destination is not to be equated with the European Union, particularly as Norway is one of the most desired destinations. Europe, the migrants’ destination, consists of a rather small group of states centred on Germany, Austria, the UK and Scandinavia. However, as a result of the legislation and the institutions whose development was briefly discussed in Chapter 1, migration has acquired an EU-European dimension.

Firstly, this chapter is meant to provide an overview of migration into the European Union, which in turn provides the context for understanding the manner in which migration is managed. The three most striking developments in European migration management will be critically analysed in relation to neofunctionalism: firstly, the European Union has attempted to create a shared European outlook and a common technical language of migration, regarding this to be the prerequisite for building a common migration policy (Feldman, 2012). Secondly, in the context of spillover from the Schengen Agreement, the EU has pursued the somewhat contradictory policy of fortifying its external borders, while at the same time attempting to build an ‘Area of Justice, Freedom and Security’ within the Union itself. Thirdly, and this is an argument that can easily be
overlooked by scholars who tend to understand the EU as a closed system, the Union has attempted to externalise migration management to ‘third countries’ (i.e. states that are not members of the EU) in the European periphery (Boswell, 2003; Lavenex, 2006). The latter development will be contextualised using dependency theory that was discussed in the previous chapter. From these developments, the application of a neofunctionalist-inspired policy approach for European integration is made apparent.

**Context: Migration in the EU**

Migration is a transhistorical phenomenon that has always been part of the human condition, and the European Union is today the most attractive migrant destination in the world. This is particularly striking as the EU lacks a migration system that would permit large-scale regular immigration of non-EU citizens. The only legal way to immigrate into the EU is via the so-called ‘Blue Card’-scheme, which permits ‘third-country nationals’ (i.e. people who do not hold the citizenship of an EU member state) access to the common labour market (Council of the European Union, 2009). The conditions for obtaining a Blue Card are a university degree and a job offer that pays at least 1.5 times the average salary of the EU member state in question. For Germany for example, this amounts to €46,400 per annum, with this sum being still greater in many other member states. The Blue Card is thus aimed primarily at the integration of highly skilled professionals into the European political economy. Other more precise conditions that need to be fulfilled to obtain a Blue Card differ between the member states (see International Organisation for Migration, 2009). Furthermore, some member states provide alternative possibilities to legally immigrate into the EU, for example by selling citizenship. Nevertheless, only a small fraction of immigrants arrive in the EU in this manner. Manning identifies the hope that a migrant’s personal situation will improve as well as that of his family as the main reason for migration (2005, 7). In the case of Blue Card holders, it may be assumed that a university degree is not the sole requirement for a very well-paid job offer, but that extensive work experience is needed. Although there may be a very small number
of exceptions, Blue Card holders will not have previously been in a situation where they needed to escape a situation of poverty.

Anyone who has entered the EU without a valid residency permit may be considered an ‘illegal immigrant’. Furthermore, while entry into the EU may have taken place in a regular manner, for example by means of a tourist visa, one may become an illegal immigrant once the residence permit loses its validity. In such cases, one of the most pertinent ways to require a residence permit is through an asylum application. Such an application may result in one being granted refugee status. According to the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which has been signed by 146 states including the member states of the European Union, a refugee is defined as follows:

“A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it” (UNHCR, 1967).

Poverty and economic deprivation are therefore not grounds upon which one can legitimately apply for asylum. In 2008, according to a study that was funded by the European Commission, between 1.9 and 3.8 million third country nationals resided illegally in the EU (Clandestino, 2009, 4). More precise and recent estimates are not available, and it is very well possible that the real number far exceeds this conservative estimate. It is clear however, that the large uncertainty about the real number of undocumented migrants in the EU underlines the very

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35 In the language of policymakers, the words ‘illegal’ and ‘irregular’ are often used interchangeably. While ‘illegal’ denotes the severity of the committed legal offence, the word ‘irregular’ possesses a less negative connotation. Essentially the words are however often used synonymously. The EU strives to end the use of ‘illegal’ in all official documents. There is a need to distinguish here between ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘illegal immigration’. While the EU avoids the use of the former very strictly, references to the latter may be found as illegal immigration remains a legal offence. Another word that is sometimes found in this context is ‘undocumented migrant’, particularly by NGOs and in texts that are critical of the securitisation and criminalisation of migration. By means of this rhetoric technique, the ‘undocumented migrant’ is denoted as being a member of a subaltern group. In this chapter, all three terms will be used in their appropriate contexts.
nature of the phenomenon, as migrants of this type fall outside the bureaucratic apparatus of the state.

While the management of migration in the EU was at first limited to common visa rules and the abolition of border controls, it has since evolved to encompass the full-scale surveillance and control of population movements across the entire external border of the Union (Feldman, 2012, 63). However, such a move necessitated the creation of a common language of migration.

The Creation of a Common Language on Migration Policy

The embedding of the neofunctionalist integration agenda in the area of migration required the generation of a shared common outlook on migration into the European Union. Only then would the Europeanisation of migration be regarded as necessary and unavoidable. One of the means of creating this common outlook has been the use of a common technical language in the area of migration management. Technical language aims to “organise reality” (Halliday & Martin, 1993, 169) in a manner that is accessible mostly to experts. During field research, it became clear that people working on migration issues throughout the EU are fluent in this language. Examples of this technical vocabulary are numerous: mixed flows, screening, ‘the procedure’, pre-removal centre, first-reception, ‘Dublin unit’ or subsidiary protection – all these terms have a specific technical meaning, which has been defined by various EU directives and regulations. It is very noteworthy that officials at all research locations were familiar with this vocabulary in English, even though English was not the mother tongue of any of the interviewees. Using the example of globalisation discourse, McKenna und Graham (2000) argue that the scientific appearance of technocratic language is often used as a guise for ostensibly neutral policy objectives, but which are actually very much ideologically laden. They make the argument that “a specific form of technocratic discourse […] normalises neoclassical economic ideology in the process off advancing what appears to be technical solutions” to problems (ibid., 219). Feldman (2012) sees the same type of development in the area of European migration policy. Through the “establishment of a common technical language
for separate policy problems,” the various national and regional perspectives of policy-makers are integrated into a shared European perspective (ibid., 57). Furthermore, technocratic language abstracts the very concrete issues that migrants and their respective host communities are struggling with.

The originator of this technical language is usually the European Commission itself, as it proposes legislation to be adapted and voted on by the European Council and the European Parliament. The legislation that concerns migration management always begins with an article that establishes definitions for the subject matter concerned. In the case of the reform of the Dublin II Regulation, which was discussed in Chapter 1, this article has been changed significantly (European Commission, 2008). The term ‘asylum’ for example, has been removed altogether to be replaced with ‘international protection’. The reason for this change is the Qualifications Directive of 2004, which establishes that international protection refers to both asylum and subsidiary protection (Council of the European Union, 2004). The latter in turn, relates to individuals to whom asylum law does not apply, but who would nevertheless be endangered if they were to be deported to their countries of origin. This is highly controversial, because this change allows for the removal of references to the Geneva Convention for Refugees. While the objectives of the Dublin III Regulation appear to go beyond the objectives of the Geneva Convention, the increasing irrelevance of the latter has been conducive to the externalisation of migration management which will be discussed later, but which ought to be seen as an outgrowth of the neofunctionalist integration agenda. A further paragraph that was introduced into the Definitions article of the Regulation defines the term ‘risk of absconding’, which refers to the risk that a migrant may escape when she is about to be deported. ‘To abscond’ is a verb that is used extremely rarely in the English vernacular, yet it has found its way into the technical vocabulary of European policymakers. Further examples are countless: ‘third-country national’, which in this case refers to people who are neither citizens of the EU, nor of another state which participates in the Dublin system such as Norway or Switzerland; ‘unaccompanied minor’, which refers to someone below the age of 18 who arrives in the EU without the company of an adult who is responsible for him; and, ‘hit’, which refers to a match between a migrant’s fingerprint and an
entry in the Eurodac database. Officials in both Greece and Italy, although English is not their native language, were familiar with this vocabulary.

The Development of a Knowledge-based Migration Policy

Although language plays an important part in the creation of a common European outlook on migration, it is not the only realm where an attempt has been made to standardise “modes of knowledge” (Feldman, 2012, 69). Another example concerns the visualisation of migratory routes into the EU, most pertinently using an online tool called ‘i-Map’ which harmonises the geographies of European (and other) policymakers. On its website, i-Map is introduced as “a support instrument aiming to enhance and facilitate intergovernmental information exchange, and to support the development and implementation of knowledge-based co-operation initiatives” (Interactive Map on Migration, 2011). The idea of ‘knowledge-based co-operation’ reaffirms the neofunctionalist conceptualisation of European integration and migration management as a technical matter. Underlying this is the notion that policymaking is in need of the application of Weberian ‘instrumental rationality’ (Sanderson, 2002). Migration policy is portrayed as a technical area where the ‘best’ policies can be determined if sufficient evidence is provided. Policymaking and governance are thus divorced from their inherently value-driven nature, and transformed into a state of technocracy (Fischer, 1990). The neofunctionalist template attributes great influence to epistemic communities in the European integration process (Niemann, 1998). These expert groups are thought to suggest the best cause of action to increase economic efficiency. In line with their functionalist forefathers, neofunctionalists predict that government will eventually be located where it can work most effectively, which can in turn be determined using scientific inquiry. In many cases, this will turn out to be at a supranational level. These supposedly non-normative policy prescriptions have in turn often provided the pretext to justify the implementation of neoliberal policies (McKenna & Graham, 2000). One example of this is the Schengen Agreement which permitted the free movement of people within the single European market and whose justification was derived using neofunctionalist logic. In the realm of
managing migratory flows towards the global core, expert knowledge is employed to create common ‘instrumental-rational’ policy-objectives by harmonising the individual actors’ perceptions.

The development of i-Map has provided an important tool towards this end. Although it is funded by the European Union, a very wide range of states participate in the production of i-Map, including a large number of African and Asian countries. The publically accessible version of the map provides a Mercator projection of the globe. Black, yellow and white lines distinguish between land, sea and air routes of migration. Feldman describes how “the viewer enjoys a god’s-eye view of the African land mass and the expanses of the Mediterranean Sea and a sense of mastery over clandestine movements” (2012, 70). Given the variety of supporting states, it is clear that the purpose of i-Map is not only to harmonise the perspectives of EU member states, but to bring in line the outlooks of the governments in the European neighbourhood.

Performing Neofunctionalism: The EU as an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’

The construction of a common European outlook on migration created the foundation for the pursuit of neofunctionalist integration. However, neofunctionalism is merely a method of integration, whose outcomes are determined by other factors (such as neoliberal ideology, as discussed in Chapter 2). In different contexts the neofunctionalist logic may therefore produce different conclusions. In this section, it will be shown how spillover has in fact driven migration management in two seemingly contradictory directions.

At the European Council meeting in Tampere,\textsuperscript{36} it was decided that the European Union should move towards the development of an area of freedom, security and justice. It was thought that since the EU had already built a “shared area of prosperity and peace,” it was now time to move into new areas of

\textsuperscript{36} The European Council is comprised of the heads of government of all EU member states. It is not to be confused with the Council of the European Union, which also represents the member states, but which consists of permanent national representatives. It also should not be confused for the Council of Europe, which is an intergovernmental institution with no affiliation with the EU.
governance. It is striking, that the establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice was framed in this manner, highlighting that the free movement of capital and the free movement of persons are two aims that are intricately linked. The Tampere meeting followed the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which allowed for the inclusion of the Schengen Agreement in the Union’s *acquis communautaire*. The freedom component thus related primarily to the free movement of persons across the territory of the EU, but as the Council Conclusions state, “this freedom should not […] be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union’s own citizens” (European Council, 1999). As a result, this “requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration” (ibid.). The latter statement summarises the quintessence of the contradiction that has characterised European migration policy since its inception: while significant progress has been made towards the harmonisation of the European asylum system, and while the standards of national asylum systems have in many cases improved, access to European territory has become ever more difficult, making it harder for refugees to apply for asylum in the EU.

One of the most important instruments that the EU has used to improve the standards of the national asylum systems has been the European Refugee Fund. Between 2008 and 2013, €614 million were spent on the improvement of First Reception conditions, on the creation and enhancement of asylum services, on the renovation and construction of asylum seeker and refugee accommodation facilities, on the establishment of resettlement programmes,37 and on the support of migrants to participate in civil and cultural life. A further €676 million were spent on the Return Fund, which assists projects that facilitate the voluntary return of migrants to their countries of origin. €825 million were spent on the Integration Fund, which supports programmes for improving diversity management and projects that offer intercultural training and dialogue. During field research, it became clear that the European Refugee Fund is a very well recognised funding opportunity for government as well as non-government organisations that work

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37 Resettlement refers to the transfer of asylum seekers, refugees and people under subsidiary protection to a different safe country.
with migrants. In key recipient countries Bulgaria, Italy and Greece, almost all migrant-related projects that were visited were at least partially funded by the European Refugee Fund. Under the new budget (2014-20), the three funds are combined into a single Asylum and Migration fund, which will supply €3.14 billion with the overall objective of “the integrated management of migration” (European Commission, 2014a). Compared to the previous budget, this is only a marginal increase, especially when inflation-adjusted. Nevertheless, the European Refugee Fund has contributed significantly to the improvement of migration-related infrastructure. Another way in which the EU has attempted to harmonise and improve the 28 national asylum systems in its territory has been via the creation of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which became operational in 2011. EASO’s training curriculum has had the target of improving the quality of asylum decision. By training public service employees in the asylum area to handle asylum applications more thoroughly the First Instance acceptance rates in some member states, most significantly in Greece, have risen. This will be discussed in further detail in later sections.

While the EU has attempted to harmonise and increase the quality of its asylum systems, a parallel development has taken place in the area of immigration policy that has resulted in the fortification of the EU’s external borders. To speak of asylum and immigration policy is thus an oxymoron, as one policy is aimed at humanitarian protection, while the other is aimed at deterrence and policing. The term ‘Fortress Europe’ has been employed to describe the latter development because the EU’s external border has been cordonned off in several places. Apart from the well-known examples of the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, Greece has erected a 10.5km bladed-wire fence along a critical part of its border with Turkey. Surveillance along the majority of this border is now easy. Together with the easily policed Maritsa river, the fence seals off the narrow remaining land corridor. Bulgaria has recently completed construction of a similar fence along its own border with Turkey. While the EU has not funded the construction of these fences “because it considers [them] pointless,”39 the Union has contributed to

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38 After an asylum application has been rejected, asylum seekers have to chance to reapply. First-instance acceptance rates therefore refer to the acceptance rate of asylum applications after their first submission.
39 The EU does not publically embrace the construction of fences because irregular migrants will always find another way to enter Union territory.
funding the installation of 23 thermal vision cameras along the Greco-Turkish border (Cercone, 2012; Nielsen, 2012). Between 2008 and 2013 the European External Borders Fund has provided €1.8 billion towards the establishment of common border control standards and the “protection against illegal crossing of the external border” (European Commission, 2014b). In the new budgetary period 2014-20 the fund will be replaced by the Internal Security Fund which will have a budget of €3.7 billion – a significant increase, especially when considering that the growth of the overall EU budget was marginal.

While EASO was created with the intention of improving the European asylum services, the area of immigration control has seen the crafting of a designated EU agency in 2005: the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, also known as Frontex. Frontex is headquartered in Warsaw, and concerns itself primarily with the coordination of European cooperation in the area of border protection. It operates primarily in the form of specific missions in critical parts of the EU external border. National police officers volunteer in these missions, primarily in the hope of improving their career opportunities. In the areas where field research was conducted, Frontex plays an important role in the reception and screening of irregular migrants. Levy (2005) traces the development of Frontex back to the emergence of a European discourse that ‘securitised’ migration following the 9/11 attacks. Securitisation refers here to the notion that an idea or a phenomenon is discursively framed as an existential threat to the appropriate referent object. These “perceived threats may not be real, […] yet [could] have real effects” as a result of this representation (Buzan, 2000, 186). By means of a ‘speech act’, terrorism and migration were brought together using the argument that the prevention of the former requires the control of the latter. However, Neal (2009) disagrees, and convincingly demonstrates the disappearance of the securitisation discourse in the aftermath of 9/11. While Buzan et al. (1998) predicted that the securitisation speech act would be followed by the pursuit of extraordinary means to eliminate the discursively established security theory, this urgency quickly evaporated. Initial proposals for the creation of a European Border Police were rejected primarily by the British due to concerns about the loss of national sovereignty. Nevertheless, there existed a consensus on
the need for cooperation in the area of border protection. Crucially, a different discourse however was used to justify the need for such cooperation: the discourse of neofunctionalism. Neal emphasises that “Frontex is considered a logical continuation of the integration process and the principle of free internal movement in the EU” (2009, 344). Logic is clearly defined here in the neofunctionalist sense. However, while securitisation may not have served as the pretext for establishing Frontex, the agency is nevertheless an example of the securitisation of migration. The growing presence of this armed transnational border police at precisely the hotspots of ‘illegal migration’ underlines this point.

Frontex is perhaps the most well-known example of the securitisation of migration, but there are other programmes that are equally significant in this context. The European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) that was launched in 2013 emerged out of a Commission proposal which identifies the need for European cooperation in the realm of border surveillance. Again, a neofunctionalist logic was applied, and it was shown how the existence of a common external border requires common border surveillance (European Commission, 2011). In a 2008 Communication by the European Commission, the need to “reduce the number of illegal immigrants entering the EU undetected” was pointed out as Eurosur’s number one objective. The installation of thermal cameras along critical parts of the land border was identified as one means to this end. However, critically, Eurosur is also to cooperate with one of the EU’s flagship space programmes – Copernicus. Copernicus is a satellite surveillance system that was originally conceived as a tool for monitoring environmental disasters. The programme was developed in cooperation with the European Space Agency (ESA), an intergovernmental organisation that has historically been exclusively civilian in character. While surveillance satellites can indeed be used to monitor the environment, the same systems can also be used for border surveillance. The SAGRES (Service Activations for Growing Eurosur’s Success) programme for example, which is a joint venture of Eurosur and Copernicus, is intended to monitor vessels at high seas as well as selected ports and coastlines of non-EU member states. This hints at the fact that so-called ‘third countries’ play a potentially very large role in the implementation of European asylum and migration policy, which will be discussed in the next section.
The Externalisation of Migration Management

Apart from the tendency towards simultaneous harmonisation and fortification, the logic of neofunctionalist spillover was also applied to justify the externalisation of migration management to the European neighbourhood. As the Dublin regime has placed a particularly heavy burden on member states along the EU’s external border, these states have attempted to prevent irregular migrants from entering their territories by trying to place responsibility on third countries. In this context, ‘third countries’ refers to both migrants’ countries of origin and transit countries. By framing the issue as an illegal immigration crisis rather than as a refugee crisis, the EU itself has contributed to this trend by arguing that illegal immigration can only be effectively combated through cooperation with third countries, which should stop immigrants from arriving in the EU in the first place. This framing is the result of the Schengen regime and the Dublin Regulation, which have, to some extent, delegated migration management to the European level. The spirit of neofunctionalism is thus no longer confined to the EU itself, but ‘spills over’ into its neighbourhood.

At the 1999 Tampere session of the European Council, the first step towards the creation of a common EU asylum and migration policy was not regarded to be the creation of a common European asylum system – instead, the priority was placed upon the cooperation with third countries. Boswell (2003) refers to two ways by which the EU has cooperated with the outside world in the area of migration. The first way relates to development assistance, trade, foreign direct investment and traditional diplomacy. These instruments have primarily been used in the countries of origin to prevent migratory flows from erupting in the first place. The second way refers to the externalisation of the “management of migration flows”, an objective targeted at the Tampere Council (European Council, 1999). This involves the cooperation with transit countries in the European periphery. It was assumed that while fences and increased surveillance along the EU’s external borders may be able to reduce illegal border crossings, action to combat illegal entry into the Union should ideally be taken in the transit countries themselves. Of course, the latter group has no incentive to keep migrants within their own territories, which is why they are often permitted to move on into
the EU. One Greek official stated that Turkey, being a transit country, “[helps the illegal immigrants] cross” (personal communication, 2 April 2014). The European Union has thus employed several measures to externalise the responsibility for irregular migrant flows towards transit countries in its immediate periphery, albeit with mixed results.

Boswell (2003) distinguishes between two types of externalisation. Firstly, she argues, the EU has attempted to export tools of migration control. This has involved pushing transit countries to step up their border controls with non-EU countries, and to set up functioning asylum systems in the transit countries themselves. Secondly, Boswell argues that the EU has been trying to shift migrants back into the transit countries and the countries of origin by means of ‘readmission agreements’, which allow the EU member states to swiftly and unbureaucratically deport irregular migrants. However, this distinction ignores that both policies aim at the same outcome: the reduction of irregular migrant flows into the EU. To explain this point further, two of the externalising policy measures will now be studied more carefully: readmission agreements and the intensification of border controls in transit countries.

Readmission Agreements

One of the principal ways to externalise the traditional policy tools of migration management has been the conclusion of readmission agreements with transit countries and countries of origin (Trauner & Kruse, 2008). The most recent and widely known example of such an agreement is that between the European Union and the Turkish Republic. The signing of the agreement has been widely mediatised because a large share of ‘irregular entries’ into the EU occurs via the Turkish border. The agreement concerns people without valid documentation who reside in the European Union and who possess at least one of the following three qualities: current or former Turkish citizens who have not been promised naturalisation in one of the EU member states; non-EU citizens holding a valid Turkish visa; or, those residing within the EU “after having stayed on, or transited
through, the territory of Turkey” (European Commission, 2012a). Interestingly, while Turkey also ‘enjoys’ the complete set of reciprocal rights to deport individuals to the member states of the EU, another document admits that “these agreements have few benefits for the third country concerned” (European Commission, 2011). As a result, incentives have to be offered to the country with whom readmission agreements are concluded. The two primary instruments used is the launch of negotiations on the facilitation of visa free travel as well as financial assistance. In the case of the agreement with Turkey, both instruments were employed. However, it is uncertain whether visa-free travel will indeed be realised, as the readmission agreement merely opens the door to the initiation of negotiations. The reason for readmission agreements being included in this discussion of the externalisation of migration policy is that they can be seen as an attempt to create a migration buffer zone in the EU’s periphery. The simplification of deportations to countries that border the EU gives those countries an incentive to protect their borders against ‘irregular migration flows’, since migrants that have passed through their territories will eventually have to be readmitted if their asylum applications have been unsuccessful, and if they cannot be deported to their countries of origin. It is therefore preferable to prevent irregular migrants from entering the transit country’s territory in the first place.

Externalisation of Border Controls

Another way in which the EU has externalised migration management is by pushing third countries to adopt tighter border control policies. This is particularly poignant in the Libyan example. Libya is one of the main transit countries for

40 It ought to be noted here, that this does not imply that Turkey effectively becomes a member of the Dublin regime, as someone whose asylum application is being processed very much possesses the authorisation to reside within the territory of the responsible member state. However, after an asylum application has been rejected, the rules of the agreement do potentially apply, although the EU officially tries to make sure that deportation to the individual’s country of origin is impossible. This is very often the case if nationality cannot be established with sufficient certainty, or if the supposed country of origin refused to readmit the affected person.

41 The EU currently has readmission agreements with Albania, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cape Verde, Georgia, Macedonia, Macao, Moldova, Montenegro, Pakistan, Russia, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Turkey and Ukraine. Negotiations on an agreement with Morocco have been going on since 2002, and the two entities have in 2013 signed a mobility partnership where they committed to signing a readmission agreement in the future.
migrants coming to Europe and, in 2009, it was estimated that up to two million people were awaiting passage across the Mediterranean (Milborn, 2009). The events of the 2011 civil war have transformed Libya from being largely a transit country to also being a source of migration itself. Libya features 4383km of land borders, the majority of which passes through vast and uninhabitable swathes of desert. This border can only be effectively controlled using a comprehensive array of methods such as satellite surveillance, cameras and patrols. The EU is providing assistance with all three instruments. The EU’s 2004 Aeneas Programme, which aimed at delivering financial and technical assistance to ‘third countries’ in the area of migration and asylum, was the first step towards the involvement of the EU with migration management in Libya. ‘Across Sahara’ was a project that was funded by this programme with €2 million, and which aimed at conducting a survey of the types of population movements at the border between Libya and Niger. Based on these findings, the project was meant to develop techniques to make border controls in Libya more effective, to fight against smuggling of migrants, and to facilitate “illegal immigration management” (EuropeAid, 2004). The cooperation between the EU and Libya was meant to be consolidated with the signing of the EU-Libya Framework Agreement. Although the Union never managed to complete negotiations on the agreement as a result of the fall of the Gaddafi government, the two entities had already agreed on a migration cooperation agenda which contains what would have been the most important points of a framework agreement. In the cooperation agenda, priority is given to

“strengthening cooperation between Libya and [its neighbours] in the border surveillance and in the prevention of attempts of irregular migrants and smugglers to violate Libyan borders, through promoting joint patrolling, intelligence sharing, the development of joint training, the facilitation of working contacts and the establishment of dedicated communication channels aimed at transmitting early warnings and sensible data” (European Commission, 2010).

42 To allow more thorough border controls, the EU has in 2009 offered Libya the use of the Copernicus system to observe population movements across the border of Libya and Niger (Ronzitti, 2009).
As in the case of Turkey, this is done in exchange for visa liberalisation.

This agenda is striking for several reasons. Firstly, it was negotiated with a government that several EU member states fought a war against just a few months afterwards. Secondly, Libya is not a member of the Geneva Convention on Refugees, and it does not have an asylum system. This, of course, undermines the credibility of the EU’s supposed goal of protecting refugees. Thirdly, despite the fall of Gaddafi, the most important aspects of the agenda were implemented two years later, which underlines the priority that had been assigned to this cooperation programme. The European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) has been set up within the framework of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Over 100 staff participate in this mission, which is funded with €30 million per year with the aim of establishing 'Integrated Border Management' (IBM) in Libya. The meaning of IBM is vague. Hobbing defines it as the idea that “border procedures should be governed by modern economic strategies rather than slow bureaucratic structures” (2005, 1). He argues that IBM is characterised by three basic elements: (1) the interrelated problems of trade, crime and illegal immigration are to be tackled comprehensively; (2) the different national agencies responsible for different aspects of border controls should coordinate their activities; (3) neighbouring countries should work together in the management of their common border (ibid.). This narrative of the need for more cooperation within member states, between member states and between the EU and third countries clearly contributes to the securitisation of migration, while IBM is also being presented to be increasing efficiency. IBM is thus exemplary of the technocratic governance envisioned by neofunctionalism.

The need for the externalisation of border controls towards the European periphery is portrayed as the result of functional spillover pressures emanating from the extent of integration in the Mediterranean region. The neofunctionalist policymaking approach is thus no longer confined to the EU itself, but spills over into its surroundings. EUBAM Libya trains Libyan border guards, carries out joint border-patrols and provides assistance in securing Libya’s coastline. Since 2012 the governments of the UK, France and Italy have been involved in negotiations with the new Libyan government to facilitate multibillion euro
agreements between Libya and several large European security companies. Finmeccanica for example, one of Italy’s leading industrial corporations, has signed a contract with Libya on the installation of a satellite-based surveillance system to monitor the entire border (Shennib, 2013). Pushing countries to step up their border controls thus not only (potentially) curbs ‘illegal immigration’ into the EU, but also provides clear economic incentives. The semi-peripheral countries involved, such as Libya, often do not possess the necessary technical resources to set up sophisticated systems by themselves, which is why European companies are enlisted to provide the technical implementation.

*Externalisation and Dependency Theory*

To understand the phenomenon of the externalisation of migration policy, it is necessary to briefly assess the European Union’s role in the global political economy. As was pointed out in Chapter 2, dependency theory asserts that this political economy ought to be understood in terms of a global division of labour (Dos Santos, 1971; Ferraro, 2008). Peripheral countries are in a detrimental position in this global division. The core countries on the other hand have designed institutions and mechanisms to ensure that peripheral states will remain in this position. While peripheral states are responsible for the production of raw materials and the provision of cheap labour, core countries provide money and technology. This global division is perpetuated by means of international agreements and institutions promoting free trade (see Chapter 2 on the Washington Consensus). This forces peripheral states into a position whereby they can only maintain a comparative advantage by reducing labour costs and by continuing to sell raw materials without the added value of having turned them into useable commodities. In this context, migration from poor areas to wealthy areas would serve as a balancing mechanism that challenges the high standard of living enjoyed by the core, which is why migratory movements need to be confined to taking place within the periphery. The externalisation of European migration management is exemplary of this phenomenon, as the European Union forms part of the global core. It is ironic that the principles of freedom of
movement and the abolition of border controls feature very highly on the list of the European Union’s values and priorities. Indeed, cooperation with Libya and other neighbouring states underlines that the EU regards freedom of movement by no means as a universal principle. The establishment and intensification of border controls ought to be seen as an attempt to strengthen the sovereignty of national governments, which in the EU has partially eroded with its *acquis* and its supranational institutions. The freedom of movement that supposedly came along with this erosion as a result of neofunctionalist spillover is however desirable only between states and regions that are at the core of the global political economy. Semi-peripheral countries such as Libya are encouraged to limit the freedom of movement of people holding the citizenship of peripheral states. Nevertheless, the contradictory state of global capitalism also finds its manifestations in migration management. It will be shown later, how specific sectors of the European political economy are dependent on the limited inflow of undocumented migrants, as they potentially constitute an unorganised reserve army of low-wage labour.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has served two purposes. Firstly, it has been shown how neofunctionalist logic has been applied to the practice of migration management. Secondly, this chapter has delivered the foundation for an analysis of the effects of neofunctionalist integration on irregular migrants’ everyday experience of European integration, which will be discussed in the following chapter. It has been shown that neofunctionalist principles have been applied to create an EU-European outlook on migration by means of a common technical language. Furthermore, the spillover of European migration management to third countries in the EU’s periphery has created a political economy that merits further research. Neofunctionalism has significantly contributed to the technocratisation of migration management, which has in turn widened the gap between European policymakers and migrants. A technocratic migration management apparatus has evolved as a result of the common functionalist outlook on migration and the
externalisation of migration policy instruments. This underlines the materiality of neofunctionalism as a method of European integration.
Chapter 6: Being ‘Exogenous Factors’ – Irregular Migrant Subaltemnity in the EU

This chapter aims to shed light on how irregular migrants experience neofunctionalist European integration by presenting the findings of the main fieldwork. This is in line for Gramsci’s call for studying the relationship between the subaltern and the dominant social groups. The combination of neoliberalism and neofunctionalism has produced a very particular type of European Union, and the condition of irregular migrants is a materialisation of this Union’s character. While this chapter is very much the result of a normative concern for these migrants, irregular migration management is nevertheless regarded as a critical case study of the larger phenomenon of neofunctionalist integration. The Gramscian concept of subalternity that was outlined in Chapter 3 will be employed to provide a framework for this chapter.

In its first section, four country profiles will be outlined on the four EU member states where field research took place. These profiles will emphasise the geographical, cultural and politico-economic differences between the research destinations, while also discussing each country’s experience with immigration. While Greece, Italy and Bulgaria have only become migration destinations in their very recent history, Germany has received large inflows of migrants since the 1960s. If relevant, differences in the four countries’ asylum procedures will be highlighted. Nevertheless, the main results of the field research are not included in these country profiles, primarily because this would reinforce the division of migrants along national boundaries. Instead, six different aspects of irregular migrants’ experience of the European Union will be theorised and discussed in a second section, on the basis of field research that was carried out in Thrace, Sicily, Athens and Leipzig: human smuggling, first-reception, asylum management, the political economy of migrant labour, xenophobia and becoming European. For each theme, the impacts of European integration on the lived experience of irregular migrants will be emphasised. The concept of subalternity will be returned to at the end of the chapter, when obstacles will be listed that currently stand in the way of overcoming migrant subalternity. Knowing that there is an obstacle is the first step in overcoming it.
Field research was conducted in four different member states of the EU: Greece, Italy, Bulgaria and Germany. Before looking at individual aspects of the lived experience of irregular migrants in the European Union, it ought to be made clear that each of these member states practices a different approach to the management of asylum and migration. Not only are their migration systems different, but the four countries have very different historical, cultural, politico-economic and geographical positions in the EU. Each of these aspects will be addressed in the following section on each of the four relevant member states. It should be noted that it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that irregular migrants’ experience in the EU should be regarded primarily through a national lens. The distinction between national groups of non-EU migrants is thus avoided for three reasons. Firstly, by definition a transnational migrant transcends national boundaries. Distinct national narratives of different national groups would fail to reflect the transnational perspectives of migrants in general. Secondly, the political economy of trafficking, which will be discussed later, goes beyond the category of the nation state. Smugglers operate across national boundaries and it is impossible to delineate between differing national experiences as a result. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, dividing irregular migrants into distinct groups according to the EU member state they find themselves in would contribute to the internal division of this subaltern group. While the experience of a migrant in Germany differs significantly from that of a migrant in Bulgaria, their backgrounds, aspirations and problems are strikingly similar. Overcoming the national division of migrant communities is an important step towards the generation of migrant solidarity. If irregular migrants were to become self-aware as a distinct political group with distinct problems and interests, a large leap forward could be taken towards changing their subaltern status.
Greece

As a result of its geographical location in South-Eastern Europe in close proximity to the Mashriq countries, Greece has been one of the major gateways for migration into the European Union. Greece forms the centrepiece of what Frontex describes as the ‘Eastern Mediterranean route’ into the EU. Alongside the ‘Central Mediterranean route’ via Malta and Italy, it is the most important way into the EU for non-European migrants. Greece’s proximity to the Mashriq, its 400-year history within the Ottoman Empire, as well as the conversion of a large share of the population to Islam have made Greece a melting pot of Christian and Islamic civilizations (Yale, 1958). This is particularly noticeable in Greek music and cuisine, which largely have their origins in their Arabic and Turkish varieties. Even the Modern Greek language contains hundreds of words that are either of Arabic or Turkish origin. The orientation of Greece towards Western Europe should in this context be regarded as primarily a late 20th Century phenomenon that is epitomised by the accession of Greece to the European Communities in 1981. Greece’s ties with the Mashriq were further accentuated by the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, which resulted in the immigration of approximately one million Anatolian Greeks. This caused the population to increase by almost 20% within one year. Nevertheless, within the scope of living memory, Greece has been a source rather than a destination of migratory movements. In fact, there are almost as many native Greek speakers outside Greece, primarily in the US, Australia, Germany, the UK and Canada, as there are within the Greek nation state.

The recent wave of immigration into Greece began in the early 1990s during the dismantlement of ‘actually existing socialism’, with Albania being the main country-of-origin. When the Dublin and Schengen Conventions entered into force, which Greece accepted as a fait accompli which it could do nothing about despite the foreseeable difficulties it would cause (Sitaropoulos, 2000, 110), the country experienced the first significant arrivals of African and South Asian migrants. Triandafyllidou’s (2009) analysis of the history of Greek migration management since 1991 focuses on the fact that Greek immigration legislation

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43 The Mashriq consists of Egypt, Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan and Syria.
follows the principles of the European immigration instruments very closely. The Greek migration law of 1991, which made illegal immigration and assistance to illegal immigration criminal acts had failed to reduce the number of illegal immigrants, and a parliamentary committee was set up to revise the existing migration legislation (ibid., 160). After three years of negotiations, the committee was dissolved having produced no results. As opposed to Italy and Spain, Greece remained hesitant to provide amnesties to the hundreds of thousands of clandestinos who already resided in the country. Triandafyllidou argues that this is because of very strong Greek national identity; immigration was regarded as a threat to the “cultural and ethnic purity and authenticity of the nation” (ibid., 162). Both socialist and conservative politicians regarded faster and more efficient deportations to be the primary instrument to tackle illegal immigration, and between 1992 and 1995 over one million immigrants, mostly Albanians, were deported. This represents 10% of the Greek resident population. The EU supported and partially subsidised the Greek efforts to deport illegal immigrants. In 1998, the first programme was launched that would give illegal immigrants the chance to legalise their residency status. Only 200,000 people would benefit from this programme, primarily because Greek hospitals were overwhelmed by having to issue huge amounts of ‘good health certificates’ that visa application required. Nevertheless, the 1998 regularisation programme laid the foundation for the integration of immigrants into the Greek labour market, but no efforts were made to integrate migrants into Greek society. This reinforced their subaltern status. The reforms of the Greek migration system that followed in the late 2000s occurred as a consequence of the passing of European regulations and directives, rather than as the result of political will (ibid.).

In the early 2010s, the Greek government undertook a drastic measure to curb the number of illegal border crossings from Turkey. While the majority of the Greek-Turkish land border follows the river Maritsa (or Evros), a short 12.5 km section does not and is thus difficult to control. In 2011, over 54,000 irregular migrants were detected during their attempt to cross the border in this area (Frontex, 2014a, 31). 97% of illegal border crossings occurred at the land border as opposed to the sea border. The construction of a 4-meter-tall bladed-wire border fence largely caused this migration flow to end. Between 2011 and 2013 the
number of documented illegal border crossings along the EU’s land border with Turkey dropped from 55,558 to 12,968. At the same time, the number of illegal maritime crossings increased from 1,467 in 2011 to 11,831 in 2013 (ibid.). Frontex itself confirms that the construction of the fence “produced a ‘displacement effect’ to the Bulgarian land border and the Greek sea border with Turkey” (2014b). While the overall number of irregular immigrants decreased significantly, they were willing to take a higher risk to enter Greece. This resulted in hundreds of deaths in the Aegean Sea as the small fishing boats that irregular migrants often arrive in are unsuitable for travel at high seas (e.g. Guardian, 2014).

Of particular concern in the context of the history of Greek migration management is the evolution of the Hellenic Republic’s asylum system. In 2000, Sitaropoulos described Greece as a “‘(semi)peripheral’ European state whose refugee protection regime is still only in its infancy” (105). Until 2013, the Greek asylum system was managed by the Hellenic Police, responsible for the screening of all irregular immigrants. In 2012, 0.3% of asylum applicants were granted refugee status, 0.4% were granted subsidiary protection, and a further 0.2% were granted humanitarian protection (unaccompanied minors). 99.2% of asylum applications were rejected. These figures are largely representative of a period that began with the implementation of the Dublin Convention in 1997 and ending with the establishment of the Greek Asylum Service in 2013. It is even more surprising that even though an average of 300 people crossed the Greek-Turkish border illegally every day in 2010 (i.e. over 100,000 people), there were only 10,275 asylum applications in the same year. 96.8% of these applications were rejected. Considering that the European average 85% of illegal immigrants apply for asylum (Morehouse & Blomfield, 2011), this number is very low. This is the result of a number of factors. Firstly, there was “a lack of adequate training of the border authorities dealing with asylum applications” (Sitaropoulos, 2000). Immigrants were thus often supplied with incorrect or insufficient information, and access to the asylum procedure was limited. Secondly, Greece is viewed primarily as a transit country along the path to wealthier countries with higher acceptance rates. European countries compete in a race-to-the-bottom by making themselves less

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44 Screening involves several tasks such as ascertaining the identity and citizenship of the person involved.
attractive as a migrant destination by decreasing the number of successful asylum applications and by closing down their borders. This leads to the third reason for the low number of asylum applicants: the low acceptance rates create a disincentive for migrants to apply for asylum in the first place.

There were several reasons for the transfer of responsibilities from the Hellenic Police towards specific institutions created to deal exclusively with matters related to asylum and migration. When an interviewee, an employee of the First Reception Service, was asked why this development took place, the ‘Greek Action Plan on Asylum and Migration Management’ was given as the sole explanation. Supposedly this plan was aimed at “establishing an effective, humane oriented response to the current migration challenges including the need to combat irregular migration and to address the situation of vulnerable migrants” (Greek Ministry of Public Order, 2012). This plan has two essential components: the creation of a First Reception Service to handle the screening of irregular migrants and the establishment of an Asylum Service that is the only authority responsible for judging asylum applications. The interviewee explicitly stated that the creation of these institutions was a national decision that has nothing to do with any EU intervention. Another interviewee, who is the head of a Greek migrants’ organisation, argues that this development “would not have happened [without EU pressure]” (personal communication, 5 April 2014). He speaks of “huge [EU] pressure,” stating that Home Affairs Commissioner “Malmström used to come to Greece, I don’t know how many times she came, and she would come […] again and again and again” (ibid.). An employee of the Greek Asylum Service provides another insight by identifying the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as the primary reason for the reform of the Greek asylum system. He stated that there “was a lot of pressure, friendly pressure of course, from European partners, both in the EU, and also [from the ECtGR], that the

45 In 2009 an asylum seeker who had fled Afghanistan because of persecution by the Taliban was ordered to be transferred from Belgium to Greece as the latter had been the country where he entered the EU. When we challenged this decision at the ECtHR, he was refused as the ECtHR trusted the Greek state to fulfil its obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) and the European asylum legislation. Upon arrival in Greece, he was detained at the airport, denied several of his rights, beaten, and subjected to degrading treatment. When the asylum seeker complained to the ECtHR again, the Court ruled in his favour, arguing that both Belgium and Greece were “in violation of their obligations under Articles 3 and 13” of the ECHR (Clayton, 2011). Dublin transfers to Greece were therefore effectively suspended until the Greek asylum system would undergo a significant reform.
asylum system in Greece has to be overhauled” (personal communication, 2 May 2014). If the decision of the ECtHR was indeed the trigger of the Greek asylum system’s reform, it is noteworthy that a member of the subaltern group of illegal immigrants was able to single-handedly bring about these changes. The high human rights standards that exist within the EU can thus form one means to empower migrants. However, the ECtHR’s decision (see footnote 45) is also significant because the reform it resulted in was not the outcome of concerns for the situation of migrants in Greece. It appears as though the suspension of Dublin transfers was the decisive factor that finally resulted in this reform. The Asylum Service employee confirmed this, stating that “[the suspension of Dublin-transfers] cannot continue ad infinitum, and therefore Greece’s European partners have every interest in the world to […] get Greece to overhaul its asylum system” (ibid.). At the same time, “Greece is very, very much interested in keeping the ban in place for the time being” (ibid.).

The suspension of Dublin transfers to Greece has created a situation where the Greek government can effectively blackmail the other member states by arguing that “if Greece’s European partners want the asylum system to go under once more, they can resume Dublin transfers” (employee of the Greek Asylum Service, personal communication, 2 May 2014). Greece has used this state of affairs to put pressure on other EU member states and the European Commission to provide funds for the establishment of the new asylum system. Indeed, much of the money that was invested into the improvement of Greece’s asylum and migration infrastructure has its origins in the European Refugee Fund.

Until very recently, the police was responsible for first reception and screening of irregular migrants. Even though the police’s involvement with matters of asylum embeds the criminalisation of migration into the EU, from the perspective of asylum seekers there was a distinct advantage to the old set-up: there are hundreds of police stations all over Greece. In principle it was therefore easy to access the asylum procedure, as the necessary infrastructure already existed. This changed in 2013 with the establishment of the First Reception Service and the Asylum Service.
Germany is one of the most important migrant destinations in Europe. Despite its geographic position in the centre of the EU, in 2013 no other member state had received as many asylum applications as Germany, and Germany’s net migration rate far exceeded that of France and the UK standing at 5.8 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants (Eurostat, 2014; Bauer et al., 2005). During field research and numerous conversations and interviews with migrants, it became clear that Germany in many ways represents the materialisation of the ‘European Dream’. Germany’s comprehensive welfare system, its solid industrial basis as well as its growth rates despite the global economic turmoil have generated the idea that Germany is a land where anyone has the chance to live as he or she wishes, unrestricted by cultural, economic, religious or sexual obstacles. Nevertheless, until very recently, Germany regarded itself as a ‘no immigration country’. This self-understanding is vital in the contextualisation of the experience of migrants in Germany.

Schmidt and Zimmermann (1992) have attempted to conceptualise migration to West Germany (and Germany from 1990 onward) between 1945 and 1992 as divided into four distinct phases: war adjustment (1945-54); manpower recruitment (1955-73); consolidation and restrained migration (1974-88); the dissolution of socialism and its aftermath (1988-92). The first phase was characterised by 11.5 million ‘ethnic Germans’ leaving territories that had either been formerly part of Germany, or that had historically been colonised by Germans. The second phase was initiated by an acute lack of labour that was caused by the need to rebuild destroyed industries and cities. As part of the ‘guest worker’ programme, West German companies thus recruited workers in several Southern European countries as well as in Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia. During this phase, the share of foreign workers in West Germany increased from 1.5% in 1960 to 10% in 1973. The foreign population increased from 0.5 million in 1955 to 4 million in 1973 (Bauer et al., 2005). There was an almost exact correlation between West German GDP growth and immigration rates. East Germany was faced with a similar lack of workers, and thus engaged in a parallel policy, albeit smaller in scope. The majority of these workers were from Vietnam, followed by
Mozambique and Cuba. After the first oil crisis in 1973, West German unemployment rose and the economic outlook became more pessimistic. This launched the third phase of migration into West Germany. The government seized all recruitment activities, and encouraged ‘guest workers’ to return to their countries of origin. Immigration became decoupled from GDP growth as family unifications became the major source of migrants. In 1980, the number of asylum seekers first surpassed 100,000, largely because of wars in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka. In contrast to West Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) continued its own guest worker programme after 1973. In 1988, over 100,000 foreign workers lived in the GDR. The collapse of ‘actually existing socialism’ triggered the fourth phase of immigration, which was constituted mainly of asylum seekers from formerly socialist countries. Germany became the major host for refugees escaping the Balkan Wars. The number of asylum applications in Germany reached its peak in 1992 when 400,000 applied for asylum. At the same time, the acceptance rates dropped from 29% in 1985 to merely 4% in 1992; more people thus received refugee status in 1985 than in 1992. In total, 1.2 million people migrated to Germany in 1992. The relaxation of emigration regulations in Central and Eastern Europe allowed for further ‘ethnic Germans’ to immigrate, allowing a further 400,000 to arrive in Germany between 1989 and 1990 (Bauer et al., 2005).

The arrival of hundreds of thousands of refugees caused a controversial public debate on the tightening of the German asylum law with the aim of reducing the number of asylum applications. Following the signing of the Dublin Convention, the 1993 Asylkompromiss resulted in the German constitution being changed to include Article 16a. It is noteworthy that the Dublin regime would have transgressed the Grundgesetz before this reform. The inclusion of Article 16a limited the fundamental right to asylum in Germany to people who had not immigrated through a country that was considered safe. The government thus made agreements with Romania, Poland, Switzerland, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic to allow for the swift return of asylum seekers to these countries if they had entered Germany through them. Since the Dublin Convention applied to all other countries neighbouring Germany, the latter was surrounded by ‘safe countries’. The only legitimate way for a refugee to apply for asylum in Germany
was thus to arrive via plane or ship. As a result of this constitutional reform, as well as due to the end of the Balkans Wars and the relative stability in international relations, the number of asylum applications steadily declined until 2007.

According to the Qualifications Directive, asylum seekers in Germany may receive one of the following four statuses: refugee status, subsidiary protection, humanitarian protection, or rejection. Asylum seekers in Germany are not allowed to work, and they are not allowed to leave the city or county they live in without a special permit (cf. *Residenzpflicht*). If an asylum application is rejected, migrants are asked to leave Germany voluntarily. This also applies to migrants who are affected by the Dublin Regulation. If they do not comply, they may be placed in detention until they are deported, either to their country-of-origin or to the member state that is responsible for their asylum application (Pelzer & Sextro, 2013). Until recently, so called ‘pre-removal detainees’ were incarcerated in regular prisons alongside other criminals. In July 2014, the European Court of Justice ruled that this practice constitutes a violation against the Returns Directive, demanding all detainees to be moved to facilities allocated specifically for pre-removal detention (European Court of Justice, 2014). In addition to the four statuses, Germany possesses a fifth instrument outside European legislation. If an asylum application has been rejected, and if the deportation of the affected migrant cannot be carried out, for example because there is a war in his country of origin, because the migrant possesses no travel document, or because the migrant’s country of origin is unknown, he may receive the status of *Duldung*, which translates into ‘toleration’. *Duldung* permits migrants to stay in Germany, although they are forbidden from working, from leaving the territory of the city or country they reside in without authorisation, from participating in free German classes and from leaving Germany. If they do leave German territory, they are forbidden from re-entering the country. Although the duration of possessing this status is limited to six months, it can in principle be renewed indefinitely.46

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46 The English cognate of *Duldung* is the uncommon verb ‘to thole’, which means enduring something without complaint. Old English *þolian* refers to suffering, undergoing and surviving. The proto-Indo-European root *tele* means ‘to bear’ or ‘to carry’. This illustrates the way the state views migrants who possess this status, as it presents itself as being in a condition of enduring their presence without complaint. The word *Kettenduldung* (‘chain tholing’) is used to describe a situation where the *Duldung* status is repeatedly renewed. While the reference to chains is meant to emphasise the duration and repetitiveness of the situation, it can alternatively be understood as ‘being in chains’.
The most significant legal changes in the German immigration system occurred in 2005 when the ‘Bill on the Management and Limitation of Immigration and on the Regulation of Residency and Integration of Union Citizens and Foreigners’ entered into force. The law was presented as “[ending] a period of decades, where Germany was seen against all empirical evidence as ‘no immigration country’,” because it contains an economic immigration agenda (Bauer et al., 2005, 197). Nevertheless, although the bill affected nearly every aspect of German immigration law, the changes remain superficial. Very little actually changed in practice and many clauses were of a largely semantic nature. The most controversial change allowed foreign highly skilled professionals to immigrate to Germany if they have a job offer with an appropriately high salary (€49,600 per annum in 2016). Foreign graduates of German universities can be given up to 18 months to find themselves a suitable type of employment (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2013). The recruitment stop was maintained, and it remains very difficult to immigrate to Germany.

The rich academic literature that deals with the reasons for the 2005 reform cites three major reasons for it. Renner (2005) views the bill as a step towards the establishment of a single European immigration system. Indeed, with the ‘Blue Card’ scheme of the European Union that entered into force in 2012, the German regulation on the immigration of highly skilled professionals largely became obsolete. Bauer et al. (2005) cite the contradiction between the empirical reality of Germany being an immigration country and the lack of immigration legislation as the major reason for the passing of the bill. This argument is however weakened by the fact that the reform was actually rather superficial, having very few practical consequences for the everyday lives of migrants in Germany. A more plausible reason is that the German government saw itself confronted with a public dissatisfaction with the former immigration regime. There existed a widespread impression that foreigners in Germany were insufficiently ‘integrated’ into mainstream society. So as not to seem helpless and paralysed, the government introduced compulsory ‘integration programmes’. To underline the distinction between wanted and unwanted migrants, the immigration opportunities for highly skilled migrants were enhanced, so as to give the impression that the German
policy is directed against the immigration of migrants that may ‘burden’ taxpayers. This may also explain the name of the bill.

The events triggered by the financial crisis of 2008 caused significant changes in the migration patterns in Germany. The country became the most important destination for migrants from Southern member states looking for employment. Nevertheless, a large share of these migrants left Germany very soon after their arrival. In the early 2010s, the number of asylum applications in Germany began to grow back towards the levels seen in the 1990s with 109,580 new applications in 2013 (German Federal Office for Migrations and Refugees, 2014). This number contains 35,538 so-called Dublin cases, which were requested to be transferred to the EU member state responsible (ibid.). Russians, Serbians and Afghans constituted the largest national groups among asylum seekers in Germany. The German government is thus considering declaring Serbia a safe third country to allow for a swifter return of asylum seekers from that country.

*Italy*

With the distance between Sicily and Tunisia only being 150 kilometres, Italy is a major point of entry for ‘illegal immigrants’ into the EU alongside Greece. Frontex considers the country to form the centre of the Central Mediterranean migratory route, through which 40,000 illegal border crossings have been registered in 2013 (Frontex, 2014c). Italy is a deeply divided country, with the North being highly industrialised and possessing one of the highest standards of living in Europe, and with the South being largely dependent on agriculture and being significantly poorer. The division is further underlined by the fact that only the south of Italy is a major recipient of European structural cohesion funds. In the context of the political economy of European integration, it is therefore not possible to speak of Italy as a single unit. The North and the South of Italy have entirely different functions in this political economy, which is accentuated by differing migration patterns in the two regions. The Islamic heritage which is particularly visible in the Sicilian capital of Palermo, the failure of central governance due to the influence of the mafia, and the existence of a large irregular
labour market have all contributed to the Italian South being an attractive destination for migrants from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Southern Italy’s geographical location has furthermore made the region a point of arrival for refugees. Italy is one of the major recipients of Dublin transfers.

The post-World War II history of the Italian immigration experience can be seen as a melange of the German and Greek examples. Italy has been an immigration destination since the 1960s, possessing pull factors similar to those of Germany because of its industrialised North. At the same time, the large scale arrival of ‘illegal immigrants’ has given the Italian case a very Mediterranean character and Ammendola et al. (2004) describe Italy as an example of a supposed ‘Mediterranean immigration model’. This model is thought to be characterised by large numbers of seasonal agricultural workers, a highly segmented labour market, illegal immigration, the transition from unregulated immigration towards its extensive restriction, and the exclusion of immigrants from social integration programmes. They trace the beginning of immigration to Italy back to the early 1970s, when Italy became a fallback for migrants who had originally planned on moving to West Germany and other more attractive destinations. After the oil crisis of 1973, West Germany stopped its labour recruitment programme, leaving Italy as next choice. They evidence this idea by citing statistics that show that the number of migrants in Italy grew significantly during the 1970s. Colombo und Sciortino (2004) on the other hand, argue that this widespread narrative is based on a skewed analysis of the immigration data, which is based on the number of residency permits issued per year. Colombo and Sciortino point out that these statistics include expired residency permits. If these expired permits are removed from the data, it becomes apparent that migration to Italy began before 1973 and may therefore be a new phenomenon that is not necessarily related to the more restrictive immigration policies of several Western European countries. Between 1970 and 1986 the number of legal foreign residents in Italy remained relatively constant between 150,000 and 200,000. Italy is clearly very different from the West German example, because it never had coordinated recruitment programmes. Nevertheless, the North possessed the same pull-factors as West Germany. Italian industrial companies recruited workers from various Arab countries, albeit on a far smaller scale than West German companies. Yugoslav
workers were hired to assist with the reconstruction work after the 1976 Fruili earthquake, and Tunisiанс came to Italy to work in the fishing industry. Until 1986, the largest group of immigrants were colonial elites returning from former Italian colonies and other parts of Africa. Between 550,000 and 800,000 members of this group resumed residence in Italy during this period. About 20% of residency permits were issued to students. The number of asylum applications in Italy was extremely low (2,000-3,000), primarily because only people from COMECON countries were considered to be legitimate applicants. In 1970, members belonging to the ten largest national immigrant groups made up 50% of all immigrants to Italy. Towards the 1990s, immigration to Italy became far more heterogeneous (ibid.).

1981 marked one of the first legislative interventions in the immigration field. The coalition government that was led by the Christian Democrats passed a bill that gave foreign workers with a company contract in Italy the same status as Italian workers. With the mass arrival of undocumented migrants and potential refugees the character of migration to Italy as well as the Italian immigration system changed significantly. During the 1980s, undocumented migrants began to arrive in Italy and, in 1986, an amnesty was granted to allow this group to apply for residency permits. Many of these arrivals were potential refugees, although it was impossible for them to apply for asylum unless they came from COMECON countries. Nevertheless, even after this regulation was lifted with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the annual volumes of asylum applications remained relatively modest, ranging from 680 to 2,590 between 1992 and 1997 (NOAS, 2011). The first significant increase in the number of asylum applications occurred in 1998 after the Dublin Convention came into effect. Italy’s geographical location often made it the only EU member state where refugees would be able to lodge an asylum application. The number of applications rose to 13,100 in 1998, and to over 30,000 in 1999, largely as a result of the Kosovo war. This level of applications submitted began to decline again after the war, but stayed at approximately 15,000 until 2007. This development is in stark contrast to the estimated one million undocumented migrants who resided in Italy in 2008. In January 2010, 4.2 million foreigners legally resided in Italy, further underlining

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47 The amnesty served as a role model for the amnesty policies implemented in Greece in 1998.
how Italy has turned into an immigration destination. The largest group of legal foreign residents was from Romania (887,763). Due to the Romanian language’s similarity with Italian, Italy is a very attractive migration destination for Romanians (Istat, 2010).

To understand the discrepancy between the number of undocumented migrants and the number of asylum applications, one must consider the structure of the Italian asylum system. Before 2005, all asylum seekers were interviewed centrally in Rome. Due to a lack of accommodation facilities in the Italian capital, a large share of asylum applicants did not possess a fixed address. As a result, nearly 50% of all asylum applications received no verdict because the authorities were unable to contact the applicants. Furthermore, until 2005, there was neither a national first-reception system nor facilities to shelter new arrivals. The Bossi-Fini law, which was passed in 2002 and entered into force in 2005, marked an extensive reform of the Italian asylum and migration system. The ‘Central Commission for the Recognition of the Refugee Status’ that was located in Rome was replaced by the ‘National Commission for the Right of Asylum’. The latter commission established seven (and later ten) regional asylum offices, significantly improving access to the asylum procedure. The recognition rates also increased as a result of the more thorough handling of asylum applications, from 25% in the early 2000s to 50% by 2008. The first reception Centro di Identificazione in Rome was replaced by a network of ‘Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers’ (CARA). A CARA centre is meant to host asylum seeker until their application has been completed, for a period of no more than 35 days. These facilities are not detention centres, as the residents are able to leave if they apply for permission to do so. After the completion of the asylum application, the asylum seeker should theoretically be allocated a place in a SPRAR centre. In 2002, the ‘System of Protection for Asylum Seekers and Refugees’ (SPRAR) was created to coordinate the efforts of the central government, the municipalities and NGOs to provide accommodation for these migrants. In 2010, there were 3,500 places in SPRAR facilities, which can host asylum seekers and vulnerable people for up to six months, although an extension is possible. In practice, however, the low number of places in SPRAR centres causes many asylum seekers to ask for an extension of their stay in CARA centres.
In the early 2010s, Bulgaria became a major destination for undocumented migrants entering the EU. The country’s land border with Turkey (240 kilometres) is slightly longer than that of Greece, and until very recently, few obstacles have prevented irregular border crossings. Bulgaria’s history is in many ways similar to that of Greece due to the country having formed a part of the Ottoman Empire for almost 500 years until 1878. This has left numerous visible traces in the Bulgarian cuisine, music and culture, and about 10% of the population are Muslims, which is the highest share of any EU member state. Since 1990, Bulgaria has suffered from large-scale emigration and very low birth rates. In 2013, only four countries in the world experienced a more rapid population decline than Bulgaria: Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Moldova, the Cook Islands and, notably, Syria. According to the Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, the population is set to decline to five million by 2070, down from nine million in 1989 (2014). Bulgaria has the lowest GDP per capita in the EU, standing at only 47% of the EU average. Nevertheless, alongside Greece, it forms the centrepiece of the core of the ‘Eastern Mediterranean route’. Due to the Dublin Regulation, Bulgaria is responsible for increasing numbers of asylum applications.

During the Cold War, Bulgaria formed part of the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) and maintained a very restrictive migration policy. Emigration in particular was to be prevented, especially for ethnic Bulgarians, which constitute around 90% of the population. Ethnic Turks were nonetheless able to leave the country. 160,000 ethnic Turks left Bulgaria between 1950 and 1952, and a further 350,000 left between 1982 and 1992, largely out of fears of “enforced Bulgarianization and economic problems” (Fassmann & Münz, 1994). Nevertheless, Krasteva (2006) identifies three groups that did immigrate to Bulgaria before 1990. Firstly, students from ‘third world’ countries were encouraged to study in Bulgaria in an effort to spread socialist ideas. Secondly, leftwing activists and ideological sympathisers came to Bulgaria from Greece and Turkey. A third group is comprised of recruited Vietnamese

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48 In this context, Bulgarianization refers to the loss of the distinct identity of ethno-religious groups residing in Bulgaria, and its replacement with a Bulgarian identity. The state can support this development by permitting schooling in Bulgarian only.
workers who came to work in the Bulgarian construction sector. These recruitment programmes were similar in character and scope to those in the German Democratic Republic. Bulgarian migration policy, however, changed substantially upon the collapse of the Soviet Union.

From 1990 until the accession of Bulgaria to the European Union in 2007, immigration policy was in fact largely unregulated. Nevertheless, restrictions were in place for resident foreigners, exemplified by the ‘foreigners’ clause' in the Bulgarian constitution, which stated that foreigners cannot acquire land in Bulgaria except through inheritance. This article was amended in 2005 in preparation of the country’s future EU membership. Despite this, apart from the European regulatory framework, Bulgaria does not possess “an articulated and comprehensive formal policy concerning non-citizens present within the territorial bounds of the state” (Lewis & Daskalova, 2008, 82). It is possible for non-EU citizens to work in Bulgaria under the condition that they possess a work permit. The application for this permit is submitted by the potential employer, whose foreign workforce must not comprise more than 10% of all employees, and who is obliged to pay the foreign worker a salary that is “significantly disproportionate to the minimum salary received by Bulgarian employees” (ibid., 86). Access of foreigners to the Bulgarian labour market is further complicated by ‘the triple procedure’, which requires work permit applications to be assessed by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, a Bulgarian diplomatic representation and the Ministry of Interior. Immigrants that have been granted refugee status, however, have access to the labour market, and are further supported by the National Programme for the Integration of Refugees, which was launched to fulfil Bulgaria’s humanitarian obligations as an EU member state. The programme offers language training as well as professional education, and establishes contact between refugees and their potential employers. Asylum seekers have access to the labour market, but only if their application is not processed within one year.

Between 1998 and 2012, Bulgaria received between 500 and 2890 asylum applications per year – a number that seems very low considering the country’s geographical location. In 2013, the number of asylum applications rose to 7,145, which represents an increase by over 400% compared to 2012 (Bitoulas, 2014). The majority of these applications were lodged by Syrians, for whom Bulgaria was
a fallback destination as a result of the construction of the border fence between Greece and Turkey. Bulgaria’s position as a migrant destination is thus a very recent, albeit probably temporary phenomenon, as Bulgaria has recently completed the construction of its own border fence with Turkey. The State Agency for Refugees has been created in 2002 to handle asylum applications. In line with the common practice throughout the EU, asylum seekers are detained for several weeks for identification and medical screening and for finalising their asylum applications. The status an asylum applicant will receive is in accordance with the European Qualifications Directive (i.e. refugee status, subsidiary protection, humanitarian protection or rejection). The Agency is notoriously underfunded and implicated in accusations of mismanaging money received from the European Refugee Fund in 2013 (Stamboliyska, 2014). Acceptance rates in Bulgaria are far above the EU average because the majority of asylum applications are lodged by Syrians. The civil war in Syria makes it very likely to receive the subsidiary protection status.

Despite Bulgaria having been an EU member state since 2007, Germany has undertaken extensive efforts to prevent the country from joining the Schengen Area. Although corruption and lacking the rule of law were cited in December 2013 by the German home affairs minister as the primary reasons for Germany’s policy, the European division on Bulgaria’s Schengen membership reveals that strategic considerations may be the real cause of German unwillingness to incorporate Bulgaria into the Schengen Area (Zeit, 2013). While Greece held the presidency of the European Council in the first half of 2014, it vowed to support Bulgarian aspirations to join the Schengen Area, and Italy has similarly supported Bulgaria’s bid. This is no coincidence for the expansion of the Schengen Area to Bulgaria and Romania would open a borderless land corridor between the Turkish border and the EU core. If migrants succeeded in crossing the European-Turkish frontier unnoticed, the removal of border controls between Bulgaria and Romania, as well as between Romania and Hungary would make it significantly easier to reach more desirable destinations. Bulgaria thus forms part of an asylum buffer zone.
Being ‘Exogenous Factors’

Now that the national settings of the four research locations have been established, the experiences of irregular migrants will be discussed in six thematic sections: human smuggling, first reception, asylum management, the political economy of migrant labour, xenophobia and naturalisation. Each section will theoretically contextualise and analyse these experiences as aspects of irregular migrants’ subalternity, with reference to the categories that were developed in Chapter 3.

*Human Smuggling and Reification*

If it is not possible to enter the European Union legally, creating a market for human smugglers to facilitate the transfer of migrants across the EU-border. This represents the first step towards the reification of migrants, a concept which was discussed in Chapter 3. I-Map, which plays an important role in producing the homogenous outlook on immigration into Europe that a common European migration management strategy is believed to require from a neofunctionalist perspective, projects migrants as data streams rather than as human beings. As will be shown, smuggling is another method by which migrants are reified. Thus is an aspect of subalternity as dominant groups are able to travel relatively freely without the need of smugglers for their transit. By definition, the market for human smuggling requires the existence of barriers along the European border that are difficult to circumvent, and whose crossing constitutes a legal offence. These barriers, in turn, are the result of neofunctionalist integration, as was demonstrated in Chapter 5.

Alongside war, slavery, prostitution, pornography and the illegal trade with human body parts, human smuggling is one of the ultimate forms of human reification. It represents a situation where control over one’s body is involuntarily surrendered for commercial purposes (cf. Wilkinson, 2003). It is involuntary because it arises out of the migrant’s state of need, and because there is no way to enter the EU without the use of smugglers. It is one of the ultimate forms of reification because the migrant is doubly reified. Firstly, reification takes place
during the initial financial exchange, where the migrant is seen by the smuggler not as a unique human being, but merely as a source of income. Reification is then repeated as the migrant’s body itself is the object that is being smuggled. The smugglers will expose migrants to all kinds of risks during the journey, including drowning, disease, injury, imprisonment, malnutrition and starvation, dehydration, sexual exploitation and rape, separation from one’s family, robbery, as well as extreme levels of psychological stress and anxiety. This is made possible by the lack of empathy on the part of smugglers. Ironically, the reification that occurs during the journey to Europe is associated by migrants with escaping another type of reification. Particularly for refugees, who may have been reduced to their value as weapons of war or objects of sexual gratification, coming to Europe represents the hope of being able to lead a self-determined life.

The restrictive immigration policies of the European Union have opened up a unique and unprecedented business opportunity for human smugglers. While fences and border patrols may be temporarily able to alter the direction of irregular migration flows, they have been shown to be ineffective in stopping irregular migration into the EU altogether. From the perspective of an irregular migrant, it is unimportant whether one enters Europe through Greece, Italy or Bulgaria, as all three are considered primarily as transit destinations. If it becomes more difficult to enter the EU through Greece, irregular migrants will enter through Bulgaria – the smugglers’ source of income remains. Furthermore, the more difficult it becomes to enter the EU, the more money is demanded for human smuggling, thus increasing the attractiveness of becoming involved in this business. While the EU has committed itself to “stopping those who organise irregular migration” (European Commission, 2013), the existence of a fortified external border is the very reason for the surge in human smuggling activities. Irregular migrants are willing to spend their entire possessions and to risk their lives in the attempt to reach Europe; further fortification will thus only increase their dependence on smugglers, reinforcing their subaltern state.

Different smuggling destinations come at difference prices: €300 for Bulgaria, €3,000 for Greece, €8,000 for Germany and €10,000 for Sweden and Norway. Names are often irrevocably changed and birthdays altered to supply
forged travel documents which are then more likely to produce valid asylum
claims.

Although destinations and countries of origin may differ, irregular
migrants’ experiences with being smuggled into the EU are often strikingly
similar. One Syrian refugee who applied for asylum in Bulgaria described the
existence of a ‘smuggling market’ in Istanbul (personal communication, 18 March
2014). He described how easy it is to find smugglers in the Turkish capital, that it
is actually the smugglers who approach the migrants: “Once they know that you
are Syrian, they come to you. ‘Do you want to travel anywhere? Anywhere in the
world you like…’ And every country has its own price” (ibid.). The way this
refugee conveyed his experience is reminiscent of a travel agency. Smugglers thus
try to present the smuggling experience in a non-reifying way, while at the same
time maintaining an inherently reifying stance of cognition. It is noteworthy that
the existence of the smuggling market is the result of European legislation such as
the Dublin Regulation. This completes the picture of a political economy of
smuggling. The ‘service’ provided by the smugglers themselves consisted of
bringing the migrant to a place along the border that they knew was safe to cross.
The Syrian refugee, who travelled with his wife and her parents, reported having
to walk for one hour before reaching a small fence that they climbed across to
enter Bulgaria. The risk to the smugglers themselves is thus minimal.

While land crossings across unsecured borders are relatively easy, the
construction of fences along the EU’s external frontiers has shifted migratory
routes towards the sea. Irregular migrants are well aware of the dangers inherent
in travelling on the seas, and several interviewees referred to stories heard of
deaths along the perilous journey. A former employee of the Hellenic Coastguard,
who was regularly involved in rescuing migrants on sea, reported on the state of
smuggler boats: “You will never go on board one of these boats. There is no safety,
there is no security, there is nothing. They have no life jackets” (personal
communication, 4 July 2014). The boats lack basic navigation devices, and the
irregular migrants are often merely told to roughly head for a particular direction.
It is common for smugglers to accompany the migrant boat with a second vessel,
sometimes for part of the journey, and occasionally for the entire trip, particularly
if the distances covered are short. According to the employee of the Hellenic
Coastguard, it has occurred that migrants were told by the smugglers that they were being brought to Italy, only to be left on the coast of the Peloponnese peninsula in Greece. Migrant boats regularly arrive on the coasts of Greece and Italy during extremely adverse weather conditions, when larger ships are forbidden from sailing (ibid.). This reflects the smugglers’ lack of empathy for the migrants concerned as well as their lack of expertise and experience with sea travel. A Nigerian irregular migrant who traversed the Mediterranean Sea from Libya spent five days on the vessel that carried her across 500 kilometres to Sicily. She reported that not everyone who travelled on the same boat with her survived the voyage, as six large waves nearly submerged the craft (personal communication, 4 May 2014). Particularly during adverse weather conditions, there is also a high risk of running out of petrol on the high sea. Smugglers are well aware of these risks, which explains why it is much more expensive to be smuggled into Greece than it is to be smuggled into Bulgaria.

In Sicily, the influence of the mafia plays a significant role in human smuggling operations. In most of Sicily, the mafia acts as a quasi-government which provides security to various businesses in exchange for protection rackets (Gambetta, 1996). The vast majority of Sicilian businesses are directly involved with the mafia, including the agricultural industry, which forms the backbone of the Sicilian economy (ibid.). While the dependency of agriculture in Sicily on cheap migrant labour will be discussed in later sections, it is important to mention that the mafia has turned the importation of workers from Africa into a source of income. Interviewees have reported that migrants are deliberately imported from Northern Africa to turn them into agricultural workers. An employee of the Italian Refugee Council told me that migrants have been seen to move from a Libyan smuggler vessel onto a Sicilian mafia boat before reaching Italian shores. This would at least tentatively evidence the close links between the mafia and smuggling operations. This commodification of migrants, their transformation into a cheap labour force, adds yet another level to the depth of their reification.

While smuggling is of course an important materialisation of the commodification of irregular migrants, it is nevertheless also a way to undermine the ascending hegemony of transnational capital. Smuggling and irregular migration represent the failure of the migration regime that the dominant groups
have established, whose aim is to curb irregular migration. Any opportunity for the world’s subaltern to enter Europe disturbs the hegemony that has produced migrant subalternity in the first place. In the case of neofunctionalism, this applies particularly because of the theory’s view of the European Union as a closed system. Smuggling and the possibility of irregular migration to Europe highlight the fallacy of this assumption.

*The Biopolitics of First Reception*

Upon arrival in the EU, migrants are placed in first reception centres where they undergo medical screening and where their identity and status are determined. The procedures that are carried out in first reception centres represent one of the most potent and apparent manifestations of biopolitics in the course of the experience of irregular migration to Europe. They also add another layer to their subaltern state, as members of dominant groups are unlikely to be exposed to such treatment. One of the ways in which migrants are exposed to biopolitics is through establishing urgent need for medical care as the arguably most legitimate way to achieve legal recognition (Fassin, 2001). The reduction to the ‘suffering body’ occurs when migrants receive the status of ‘vulnerability’, which is granted to pregnant women, unaccompanied minors (immature bodies) and people with serious illnesses.

Upon arrival in Europe, the state apparatus views migrants primarily as potential transport vessels for contagious diseases. Newly arrived migrants are thus placed in quarantine until they are administered with forced vaccinations against the polio virus. Although racial discrimination has become the most illegitimate way of social categorisation, the ‘racialised body’ is an empirical reality on Europe’s borders. In Sicily, the vast majority of illegal immigrants are black, leading to extreme cases of racial segregation in migrant accommodation centres.

In Greece, the newly established First Reception Service is meant to be the first government agency that an illegal immigrant comes into contact with. However, as the interview with a member of the Hellenic Coastguard showed, in
practice migrants are often first confronted with the Coastguard, with the border police, or with Frontex itself (personal communication, 4 July 2014). Both agencies are manifestations of biopolitics. Immigrants are meant to be brought to a First Reception Centre, that is a detention facility in which screening takes place. This process is extremely similar throughout the EU, although different agencies are responsible for first reception. In Germany, for example, the police is tasked with screening. Detention for purposes of identification is nevertheless standard practice. It thus becomes clear that when an illegal migrant enters EU territory, she loses control over her body. As of December 2013, the Greek First Reception Service ‘screened’ 13% of all documented illegal immigrants arriving in Greece, while the remaining 87% were screened by the police (personal communication, 2 May 2014). It is the First Reception Service’s medium-term goal to screen all illegal immigrants. There is currently only one First Reception Centre, which is located in Orestiada at the border with Turkey. A second one is under construction.

The first step of screening involves the registration of the person concerned into the Eurodac database by means of taking their fingerprints. Eurodac is clearly an aspect of biopolitics, as it is an attempt to gather information on migrants’ unique physiological features. The fingerprint has established itself as the symbol used by asylum agencies and the European Commission for migration-related matters. It can be found on the front page of an Italian brochure for asylum seekers (see Figure 5), and on the first page of the Greek equivalent. The migrant’s identity is reduced to physiology, as all other means of identification are

![Figure 5: Front page of the Italian guide for asylum seekers, whose production was funded by the European Refugee Fund](image-url)
considered to be potentially unreliable. Thereupon, the migrant is identified via her documents and an attempt is made to determine nationality. Particularly in Greece and Italy, this is not always easy, as the majority of migrants (with the notable exception of Syrians) arrives without valid travel documents. Nationality can nevertheless be determined by asking immigrants questions about the city they claim to be from, which they are expected to know the answers to. Nevertheless, no method to determine nationality is absolutely reliable and mistakes are inevitably made. In all member states, medical screening is then carried out, with the primary purpose of determining whether the immigrant has been vaccinated against diseases that no longer exist in Europe. If an immigrant is unable to prove that he has been vaccinated, the vaccination is carried out immediately. According to the employee of the Greek First Reception Service the vaccination is not obligatory, although refusal to be vaccinated will result in one being put under permanent quarantine (personal communication, 2 April 2014). This is one of the most striking representations of biopolitics, as the state has authority over aspects of the migrant’s body. The final step of screening involves the immigrant being given information on his current whereabouts and on his rights and obligations under international law. During the interview, the employee of the First Reception Service presented a brochure in French outlining the details of the information that immigrants are given. The brochure is entitled “pous les refugies et les citoyens de tiers pays qui sont venus illegalement a notre pays,” a title which contains several grave spelling mistakes. The front page depicts a painted pair of hands that suggests protection and safety. However, one of the hands is dark-skinned, and appears to be receiving, while the other is fair-skinned, and seems to be giving. Both interpretations are somewhat juxtaposed against the title of the brochure which translates into “for refugees and third-country citizens who have come illegally to our country” (Greek Ministry of Public Order, 2013a). The pages that follow contain maps of Greece and the EU. Greece is described as “the country of democratic values and respect for human rights,” as “the country that has given birth to theatre, tragedy and the attic comedy,” and as a society that “has always been receptive of difference” (ibid., 8). The brochure furthermore contains information on one’s rights as well as a list of useful phone number and addresses, among them being public institutions as well as NGOs. Once the
screening is concluded, it is determined to which of the following three groups the illegal immigrant belongs: vulnerable persons, asylum seekers or non-asylum seekers. The first group of ‘suffering bodies’ is composed primarily of unaccompanied minors, pregnant women and elderly people (Fassin, 2001). In Greece, about 10% of illegal immigrants belong into this group, which is referred on to the National Centre of Social Solidarity to be placed in accommodation facilities. The second group, which also constitutes around 10% of the total number of illegal immigrants in Greece, is referred on to the Asylum Service to submit an asylum application. The third group represents the vast majority of people who have undergone screening. Members of this group do not want to apply for asylum primary because they view Greece as a transit country. This group is referred to the Hellenic Police. The police will then arrange for members of this group to be put in so-called ‘pre-removal centres’ to wait for their deportation. These centres will be discussed later.

For the duration of the screening, irregular migrants are forced to remain at the screening facility. An official request was made to the Greek First Reception Service to carry out interviews with the residents of the First Reception Centre near Orestiada, but this request was subsequently denied with no explanation being given. The only reception centre of the First Reception Service was opened in 2013 in the small village of Fylakio near Orestiada, being capable of holding 240 people. Before the First Reception Service was created, the Fylakio facility served as a detention centre for illegal immigrants. A delegation of the German parliament’s home affairs committee which included five German MPs visited Fylakio in 2011 and reported “degrading and disgraceful” conditions inside the camp (Kolbe, 2011). Human Rights Watch also visited the camp, and described how the inmates have all “experienced or witnessed violence and ill-treatment by guards” (2009). The reduction of migrants to bare life makes them more susceptible to suffering violence as this is the only way left to punish people whose uncertain citizenship places them largely outside the jurisprudence of the state. The contrast between these brutal depictions and the claims of the employee of the First Reception Service could hardly be starker. The interviewee presented

49 Unofficial survey data exists that confirms that the overwhelming majority of migrants in Greece wants to move on to other EU member states.
photographs of children playing and laughing in the courtyard describing them as representations of “everyday life” (personal communication, 2 April 2014). Although the Fylakio centre received money from the European Refugee Fund for renovation purposes (European Commission, 2014c), there was a scabies outbreak in early 2013, and the centre lacks the daily presence of medical staff since May 2013 (Nielsen, 2014). In spite of this, the interviewee from the First Reception Service claimed that “it's nice actually, they have a good time up there” (personal communication, 2 April 2014). This underlines the distance between policymakers and their policy objects, between dominant and subaltern, which has been produced by the neofunctionalist, technocratic mind-set. Upon arrival at Fylakio, each detainee is given a list of rules, the transgression of which will result in undefined consequences. Thus it is permissible to use mobile phones, although not “for ends other than for which they were intended” (Greek Ministry of Public Order, 2013b). It is strictly forbidden to take photos or videos inside the camp, supposedly “because this could violate the rights of the Centre's other residents” (ibid.). Nevertheless, arguably the conditions at the Fylakio facility are among the best in Greece. Thousands of people are held in the country’s police stations under far less well documented conditions.

Asylum Management as the Permanent State of Exception

Asylum accommodation facilities have various names throughout the EU, but to many irregular migrants they are known by their German designation: Heim. Alongside its English cognate ‘home’, this term implies permanence, familiarity and safety. The Old Norse equivalent heimr referred to the boundlessness of the universe itself. Ironically, the CARAs and 'open centres' of Europe have become synonymous with a juristic no-man’s-land, with the materialisation of the state of exception (Hanafi & Long, 2010). The immigration situation at the EU’s borders has acquired the quality of being constantly in crisis. Indeed, a precarious state of existence is one of the hallmarks of groups in the early phases of subaltern development. The state of exception is the very nature of a type of irregular migration management that is primarily aimed at controlling and preventing the
movement of materially deprived people across national borders. While it is the obligation of every state that has signed the Geneva Convention on Refugees to establish a functioning asylum system, the creation of permanent reception and accommodation facilities may evoke the appearance of asylum being an actual immigration facility and thus act as a pull factor. Therefore, such facilities have to remain provisional. As a result, I postulate that governmental asylum and migration agencies are chronically understaffed and underfunded; the available accommodation is constantly insufficient for the number of new arrivals. Any other policy would increase the EU’s attractiveness as a destination for irregular migrants. This low-calorie diet which keeps the migration system in perpetual proximity to starvation causes it to tumble into a ceaseless state of exception.\textsuperscript{50} Irregular migration, as one of neofunctionalism’s most poignant exogenous factors, is disorder in its essential form, and the state of exception is the sovereign’s only possible response to it. Irregular migrants’ subaltern status ensures that some of their values will always be in non-conformity with the values of the integral state, which further accentuates the need for the application of the state of exception.

It is important to understand that in the neofunctionalist logic, the state of exception of thought to be a major catalyst of deeper European integration. Schmitter (1971, 235-6) lists several potential ‘contradictions’ in the European integration process as reasons for the activation of spillover processes. One such contradiction is constituted by the unequal distribution of benefits to the participants in an integrative policy. The Dublin Regulation is clearly a case where the distribution of benefits is unequal, and it is only because of the Dublin system that the states on the EU’s external frontiers bear the brunt of the responsibility for immigration management. During a period of a very high number of new arrivals in 2011, the Italian Berlusconi government issued residency permits for illegal immigrants, allowing them to pass on freely to other EU member states. The state of exception was invoked, which finally resulted in the intensification of talks to reform of the Dublin Regulation. While EU official documents strictly

\textsuperscript{50} While this argument is my own deduction, it is inspired by Agamben (1998), whose work was consulted when I began to ground my conceptualisations as part of the retroductive process of this dissertation. I later discarded direct references to Agamben due to the incompatibility between his work and critical realism. Nevertheless, the notion of the state of exception comes from his work.
avoid the discursive creation of a European immigration crisis, the necessary ‘speech act’ is performed by a variety of other actors including NGOs and the media. The European Commission invokes crisis situations mostly if it serves the purpose of furthering integrative policies. It can thus be seen that neofunctionalism indirectly produces the state of exception. If policymakers assume that the neofunctionalist spillover hypothesis holds, the creation of the state of exception can be employed to trigger further integration. Alternatively, depending on the policymaker’s intentions, the state of exception can also be employed to achieve different outcomes, including spill-back, where powers are retracted from the European level.

During field research in Sicily, the effects of the state of exception have been vividly demonstrated. An employee of the Italian Refugee Council thus complained,

“What I don’t understand is, why, in Italy, for ten years, always it’s an emergency. You cannot work only with emergency. You know that today a lot of people arrive, and you know that during the next few years people arrive. Why don’t you organise? Why do you only have emergency”
(personal communication, 2 May 2014).

While the state of exception is not identical to the state of emergency, the latter may serve as a justification for activating the former. This has indeed been the case. The most striking example of the state of exception that was encountered during field research was the Mineo Reception Centre for Asylum Seekers. Mineo is a small town situated scenically on a mountainside about 50km from Catania, Sicily’s second city. Before it became known for the CARA nearby, it had already acquired a reputation among Sicilians due to being in the vicinity of an American military base for about 400 soldiers. The US army had built an entire village for itself with a sophisticated infrastructure and reasonably high quality accommodation. When the US army abandoned the facility in the late 2000s, the so-called Residence degli Aranci (‘residence of oranges’) became a ghost town. The owner of the land it was built on, Pizzarotti, was a close associate of the former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Furthermore, he enjoys the notorious reputation of maintaining close links with the Sicilian mafia. The Pizzarotti
Company and the Italian government agreed on a deal that would convert the Residence into a reception centre for asylum seekers. As of May 2014, the centre housed 4,500 asylum seekers, or eleven times the amount of soldiers that had previously inhabited the army base. The money that is required to maintain the facility comes from the European Refugee Fund. According to the Italian Refugee Council, €37 are spent per day on every person living in the centre, which amounts to €65mn per year for the 4,500 residents. The appropriation of financial resources, which according to the interviewee end up with the Pizzarotti Company, is another reason for the establishment of the state of exception (ibid.).

According to the employee of the Italian Refugee Council, “emergency [is] the name you use in Europe to send money” (ibid.). The state of exception thus plays an important part in the construction of a political economy of European migration management. The Residence has furthermore become an important aspect of Mineo’s own local economy. While the town’s residents were initially opposed to the establishment of the camp, they quickly began to create business activities around selling goods to asylum seekers. The significant distance between the CARA and other settlements gave Mineo’s shopkeepers a monopoly position. The majority of Mineo’s population is now in strong support of the Residence.

While approaching the Residence, one is immediately struck by its location in the middle of seemingly endless fields of lemon and orange trees. There is no major town within walking distance. The refugee camp is surrounded by a barbed wire fence, and its boundaries are constantly patrolled by military Humvees. Soldiers armed with machine guns are placed along strategic locations of the fence. The houses that provide accommodation for the migrants appear to be in a very good condition at first glance. However, a closer look revealed that the glass in many windows had been replaced with garbage bags. Sometimes windows were boarded up. At the camp’s entrance gates, dozens of cars are parked for various reasons. People may come to sell goods to the residents, to offer to drive them to Catania, or to work at the Residence. All open business activity takes place outside the gates of the camp, as it is extremely difficult to gain permission to access. Money is largely unavailable to asylum seekers, and several residents emphasised that cigarettes form by far the most important currency within the facility’s fences. Although the residents are allowed to leave, they have to return to the camp within
three days, or else they are ‘dismissed’ – a term that all people I spoke with were familiar with, despite some speaking very little or no English. All residents are issued an ID card. This card contains a very low resolution photograph, name and birthdate, country of origin, gender, blood type, an ID number and a barcode. In the case of an ID card I photographed, the ID number ran into the 8000s. The migrant’s surname was gravely misspelled, and the birthdate was estimated to be the first of January. While the barcode and the ID number are also examples of reification, it is striking that the only accurate information the ID seems to contain are the migrant’s blood type and gender. The migrant is thus reduced to his physiology. While Gramsci stated that the “history of subaltern groups is necessarily fragmented and episodic” (1971, 206), this reduction of irregular migrants to bare life in fact robs them of their history. According to the residents, the CARA lacks basic medical facilities, and one young man showed me a badly scarred wound on his ankle that had obviously received only very rudimentary care.

While a CARA is intended for hosting migrants for a very limited period of time, I have spoken with people who have lived at the Residence for over three years (personal communication, 5 April 2014). The vast majority of residents are young men from different, sometimes mutually hostile, African nationalities. Up to ten people share the same bedroom and there is usually very little to do. The combination of boredom, stress and tension makes conflicts and confrontations between these young men inevitable. Suicides are common, with the last one having occurred just one week before my visit. It became immediately apparent from the dark circles and bloodshot eyes that many of the residents consumed cannabis or other drugs on a regular basis. Three out of four young men I spoke with confirmed that they smoked cannabis, one of them on a daily basis (ibid.). To understand the gravity of this situation one needs to understand that the majority of the residents are Muslims, for whom the use of psychoactive drugs is religiously forbidden. One interviewee from a Greek migrants’ organisation, who recently visited detention facilities in Italy, reported that detainees are offered sleeping pills to pass time:

“They said, ‘We do nothing. It’s a very small area, and that’s why, when we are about, we go to the doctor.’ They give them some medicine to sleep! And
they sleep for hours. So that’s why many of them have psychological problems” (personal communication, 5 April 2014).

When I asked the residents about the conditions inside the camp, they immediately complained about the food supply (ibid.). Apparently the same meal is being served everyday: pasta with oil. While this monotonous diet will cause malnutrition if consumed over a long period of time, this example is also illustrative of the further diminution of migrants to bare life. They are reduced to bodies that need to be kept alive. While many of the migrants do work, which will be discussed in later sections, the money they earn is often spent on buying something different to eat.

The difficulty involved in the submission of an asylum application in Greece is a very poignant illustration of the state of exception. Under the rules of the new Greek asylum system, it is the Asylum Service that is responsible for the examination of asylum applications. Under the police system, access to the asylum procedure was extremely limited. One example are the infamous queues that often formed at the Greek Police Directorate on Petrou Ralli Street in Athens. According to an employee of the Greek Asylum Service, the Police Directorate opened its doors to “register applications every Saturday for about two hours” (personal communication, 2 May 2014). UNHCR reported the occurrence of fights over positions in the queue, and major health concerns were raised about the fact that those wanting to apply for asylum would often wait for many hours without access to a toilet and other basic supplies. Finally, only 20 persons would be selected for an interview, which would give them the chance to apply for asylum. The establishment of the Greek Asylum Service has somewhat improved this situation. There are currently offices of the Asylum Service in Athens, Thessaloniki, Lesbos and Rhodes. There are two small offices along the Turkish border and one mobile office. This means that to apply for asylum, a migrant will need to travel to an office of the Asylum Service, which is often difficult, especially considering that there are more than 200 inhabited Greek islands and thousands of islets for migrants to arrive on. The Asylum Service hopes to set up twelve regional asylum offices in the medium-term future. The Athens asylum office is open every weekday until 16.30, allowing far more people to apply for asylum. Nevertheless, the office is far from inviting. The facility is surrounded by barbed
wire fences, and any attempt to take a photo of it will immediately be interrupted by the numerous security staff. The new Athens asylum office is also notorious for the queues that regularly develop at its gates. During field research, I witnessed an Iranian man and his daughter in their attempt to apply for asylum. They were rejected despite having arrived well within the opening hours. The lack of interpreters and translators is one of the major problems of the Greek asylum system. Without translation, it is not possible to register an asylum application. At the moment an NGO called Metadrassi has taken on the task of providing translation services. Metadrassi is funded mostly from the European Refugee Fund, although finding sufficient funding is often difficult, causing the NGO’s translators to sometimes work for months without receiving a salary. The organisation was founded in 2009 with the purpose of improving the human rights situation of migrants in Greece by enabling government agencies and migrants to understand one another. Metadrassi has therefore been a major contributor towards overcoming migrants’ voicelessness, thus arguably raising them to the second level of subaltern development.

If a migrant succeeds in applying for asylum, she is allocated to an accommodation centre by the Greek Ministry of Employment and Social Protection. The ministry holds a central database on all accommodation facilities. Contact between the centre and potential residents is established through the Greek Council for Refugees, a NGO that was founded in 1989 with the purpose of representing refugees in civil society. This Council represents one of the ways in which migrants have arguably reached awareness as a political group with distinct interests. In Athens there is a large number of decentralised accommodation centres for asylum seekers, which are operated by various NGOs. During field research, an accommodation centre was visited that was managed by Nostos, an NGO which aims to fight social exclusion and unemployment. The centre was located in a part of Athens that enjoyed a particular reputation, although the increased presence of migrants on the street was very noticeable. Until November 2011, the house that hosts the centre was used as a hotel. This was very obvious from the neatly arranged reception area and the yellow sign above the entrance door. This is the most important indicator that, despite the centre’s generally good condition, the Nostos facility is still an example of the state
of exception, as evidenced by the provisional character of the facility. The ‘hostel’, as the centre was referred to (personal communication, 5 April 2014), provides shelter for up to 70 asylum seekers, 40 of which were minors, with the majority coming from Afghanistan, Sudan and Nigeria. Asylum seekers stay in the centre for an average period of one year, after which most residents will find private accommodation, often within the same neighbourhood. While it took between three to five years to assess an asylum application under the old police-based system, the new system works faster and is more thorough. The centre provides ready-made meals at set hours, which are served in what was evidently the hotel’s dining room. The services the shelter offers appeared to be of high quality. All rooms have individual showers, and the centre has a computer room, the equipment of which was donated by the UNHCR. Many of the asylum seekers were able to speak Greek, as a result of Greek classes that are offered particularly to the children. The centre was very clean, with the residents themselves being responsible for the maintenance of the facilities. It was clear that there was a good relationship between the staff and the residents. Funding, as with the majority of migrant projects in Greece, is provided by the European Refugee Fund. As the visit to the Nostos centre was arranged through the mediation of an employee of the Greek First Reception Service, it is unclear whether this centre is truly representative of the conditions in which asylum seekers in Greece are housed. However, as an asylum application also supplies applicants with a work permit, being an asylum seeker can indeed be the first step towards living a life based on economic security. It ought, nevertheless, to be said that the majority of asylum applications are rejected. Between June 2013 and May 2014, the Asylum Service made 4,600 decisions on asylum applications, 20% of which were accepted at first instance. A further 14% were accepted at second instance (Greek Asylum Service, 2014). Although these figures are nearing the European average, they imply that the vast majority of migrants who apply for asylum will eventually be deported or live outside the legal framework of the state.

The vast majority of illegal immigrants in Greece do not apply for asylum. This affects particularly migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh. Between June 2013 and May 2014, 1,271 Pakistanis and 446 Bangladeshis applied for asylum. The first instance recognition rate for these applications was at the same time
extremely low at 2.7% and 1.5% respectively. For these groups, seeking asylum is therefore not a promising avenue towards becoming a legal EU resident. So called ‘non-asylum seekers’ as well as asylum seekers whose application has been rejected, are placed and detained in ‘pre-removal centres’ which are dispersed all over the country. Illegal immigrants can be held in these detention facilities for up to 18 months to wait for their deportation. The official capacity of these standards is approximately 6,000, although several thousand individuals are also detained in regular police stations. If a deportation cannot be arranged, the detainees are released. EU-funded voluntary return programmes are offered to migrants to allow them to leave the country without enforcement (see Chapter 4). Access to pre-removal centres is extremely difficult, and a request to visit a centre in the Evros region was denied. Nevertheless, the NGO Doctors Without Borders (MSF) has recently published a comprehensive report on the conditions inside, as the organisation provides medical care in pre-removal centres in Western Thrace. The MSF report highlights the results of the state of exception, describing extremely poor hygiene conditions within the centres. This, they claim, contributes to the spread of respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases. Detention centres often exhibit lack of ventilation, overcrowding and inadequate heating. One MSF doctor reports having “seen patients who sleep on completely wet mattresses” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014, 9). Sanitary conditions are often extremely poor. When discussing the conditions inside the Komotini centre, which holds 540 persons, the report describes “waste from the toilets of the first floor […] flooding the bathroom on the ground floor” (ibid., 10). Riots in the detention centres are common, but easily quelled by the police (e.g. Wilson, 2013). This confirms Gramsci’s statement that “subaltern groups are always subject to the activity of the ruling groups, even when they rebel and rise up” (1971, 207). In regular police stations, it is often the case that detainees have no access to natural light and fresh air. Inmates suffer from a total lack of medical care, with one man who had spent 17 months in detention stating that although he had complained about a severe toothache for weeks, he was only given medical attention when “taken to the hospital because [he] was bleeding after pulling out the tooth [himself]” (Doctors Without Borders, 2014, 12). Apart from physical health, mental health is a major concern for detainees. Migrants are often already
traumatised from their typically very difficult journey to Greece. Further trauma can be caused by misregistration. MSF has witnessed at least 100 cases where people who were obviously minors were wrongly registered as adults and thus placed in detention (ibid.).

The Bulgarian immigration situation is the most recent national case to have entered the state of exception. Following the fortification of the Greco-Turkish border, Bulgaria experienced a major influx of irregular migrants. The first accommodation facility that asylum seekers are placed in is located in the Bulgarian border town of Kapitan Andreevo. It is a first reception facility where asylum seekers need to stay temporarily before being moved to an ‘open centre’

A Syrian refugee in Bulgaria described the time he spent there:

“It was the worst experience of my life. It was humiliating. It was so bad. I have never been in jail, I have never been just inside a room, and closed by a key or something. You can’t go outside. You have permission to go to the WC, but everything else, it’s not good. But thank God, it was only a few days” (personal communication, 18 March 2014).

After Kapitan Andreevo, the refugee was moved to a semi-open camp in Harmanli. With a population of around 14,000, Harmanli is one of the bigger towns of the border region of Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey. Since October 2013, it is the location of Bulgaria’s largest asylum accommodation centre which hosts 1,100 asylum seekers, including 300 children. Like the Mineo facility, the Harmanli centre was established on a former military base, and the residents are housed primarily in military tents. During the winter of 2013/14, UNHCR and Amnesty International published reports on the catastrophic humanitarian situation in the camp. The tents that the majority of refugees slept in were designed for the summer with heaters unavailable. The Syrian refugee told me how his family

“could just leave once a day, to buy something, food, to eat, and it was so bad. Once you arrive in Harmanli, the Bulgarians seemed like they had forgotten you; no papers, no green card to leave town or something like that” (personal communication, 18 March 2014).
The UN Refugee Agency further reported that basic medical care was unavailable, and that the camp’s sanitary conditions were completely inadequate (Cheshirkov, 2013). The combination of the region’s humid subtropical climate and the mud that the camp was constructed on created ideal conditions for the spread of contagious diseases. Over 500 people had to share 10 communal latrines. A Bulgarian refugee lawyer confirmed that the camp is a manifestation of the state of exception, stating that “the camp in Harmanli is completely unlawful. There is no basis for its establishment in any of the adopted pieces of legislation” (Doychinov, 2013). An asylum seeker who resided in the camp pointed out that “if you have money, you get out [of Harmanli]” (ibid.). That is exactly what the Syrian refugee referenced earlier did: “So we paid again to move off to Svilengrad” (personal communication, 18 March 2014). The refugee’s report of having bribed someone reveals yet another aspect of the political economy produced by the inadequate provision of resources and the associated state of exception. The centre near Svilengrad is located in the outskirts of the very rural village of Pastrogor. The facility was opened very recently using money from the European Refugee Fund. According to a public official from the Svilengrad city hall, it is Bulgaria’s best accommodation for asylum seekers, being reserved almost exclusively for families (personal communication, 17 March 2014). During their stay in Harmanli, the Syrian refugee’s wife gave birth to twins, which is why they could legitimately be allocated a place in Pastrogor.

While Germany is regarded by many migrants to be their target destination, the EU’s wealthiest large country has also invoked a state of exception in matters of asylum and migration. The most important accommodation centre in the research site of Leipzig is located in an industrial part of the city, right between the city’s largest brothel and an Amazon plant. Housing between 300 and 400 asylum seekers, it is in such a dilapidated condition that the official foreigners’ representative of the Saxon Parliament has demanded its immediate closure since 2011. The maintenance of the facility has been delegated to a private security company, which nevertheless has neither the responsibility nor the competence for dealing with the social problems inside the centre. The city of Leipzig pays for two social workers, which are employed by RAA, an association that deals with
refugees. As in Sicily, this association is chronically underfunded. The head of RAA stated that there are significant drug problems in the facility. In May 2013, an asylum seeker died of an overdose of heroine while inside the camp. His body was only discovered one and a half months later, after the residents had complained of the smell. While the city has been planning to shut down the centre for several years, the exceptionally high number of new arrivals has forced Leipzig’s mayor to concede that “we cannot house that many people decentrally. We will continue to depend on centralised accommodation to overcome this” (Leipziger Volkszeitung, 2014). The word ‘overcome’ (cf. bewältigen) underlines how the current asylum situation constitutes a state of exception. The city’s strategy to place asylum seekers in decentralised accommodation facilities all over Leipzig’s territory has been met with widespread opposition involving petitions, protests and interest group formation. During an interview with the most important spokesperson of this opposition movement, it became clear that it is largely rooted in islamophobia. The city has plans to place an accommodation centre for asylum seekers in the village of Portitz, which has a population of just 1,000 people, but which nevertheless belongs to Leipzig’s territory. When I asked the spokesperson about the reasons for his opposition, he replied that children would become afraid if they saw a woman with a headscarf on their way to school (personal communication, 15 April 2013). While islamophobia is not in itself indicative of the state of exception, it nevertheless serves as a justification for the invocation of the state of exception.

The Political Economy of Migrant Labour

Having discussed reification, biopolitics and the permanent state of exception, yet another process can be added to migrants’ experience of neofunctionalist European integration: commodification. In the Marxist understanding, as was discussed in Chapter 3, commodification refers to the process whereby things that are not previously treated as commodities become bought and sold on the market.

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51 In 2014 the city of Leipzig maintained the policy that large accommodation centres should be shut down and replaced by small centres (decentralised accommodation).
like any other good. Within the capitalist mode of production, commodification is one of the quintessential qualities of subalternity since it assigns labour a monetary value, allowing it to become dehumanised and stripped of its identity. The concept is thus closely related to reification because commodification cannot occur without labour being treated like things. At the same time, reification can occur without commodification. The subaltern state of irregular migrants is emphasised by their participation in the irregular labour market which excludes them from the benefits of the welfare state.

It is not only because of their geographical location that Greece and, especially, Italy have become important migrant destinations; it is also because both countries host large underground labour markets. This simplifies the process of finding informal employment in Greece and Italy, but it also makes it easier to work in the profession one has learned, as an accreditation is not entirely necessary. In Germany on the other hand, it is often difficult to gain recognition for one’s qualifications. In the course of the post-Fordist restructuring of the Italian economy, in particular, the importance of self-employment in some sectors of the Italian economy has seen a dramatic increase facilitating the growth of the informal labour market. Between 1981 and 1995, self-employment in agriculture rose from 26.5% to 41.7%. At the same time, the share of informal workers in the agricultural business has risen from 46.7% in 1981 to 62.8% in 1995. Of course, it ought to be stated that the deregulation of the labour market that has occurred simultaneously has somewhat “weakened the heuristic value of the dichotomy formal/ininformal” (Quassoli, 2002, 228). Nevertheless, it is clear that from the perspective of a clandestino, the more informalised a labour market is, the more job opportunities there will be. The growth of the informal labour market that occurred during the post-Fordist restructuring of the Italian economy has therefore created a significant pull-factor for migration. Thus it can be explained that both Greece and Italy maintain contradictory migration regimes: on the one hand, they have been accused by other EU member states of not ascribing sufficient rigour in controlling their borders, and of having too many migrant

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52 See Chapter 5 for an explanation of reification and commodification. While commodification will always be accompanied by reification, reification can occur without commodification. One example of this is transaction in a supermarket, where the consumer is reified but not commodified.
regularisation programmes. On the other hand, they have been accused of abusing migrants’ human rights. Both Italy and Greece view immigration as a “necessary evil” (Triandafyllidou & Ambrosini, 2011, 253). While they want to prevent the arrival of more asylum seekers, they do not want to totally discourage the irregular arrival of cheap migrant workers. Nevertheless, the creation of an informal economy had already begun before migrants began to arrive in Greece and Italy in large numbers. Indeed, agricultural jobs are seasonal by their very nature, which also encourages informal employment.

The creation of an environment favourable to the reinforcement of subalternity through informal employment can be seen as an instance of neofunctionalist European integration for two reasons: firstly, the functional logic of neofunctionalism implies that government ought to be located at the level where its instruments can be applied most effectively. In the context of neoliberal hegemony, this means that some policy areas ought to be liberalised altogether. This is one of the easiest ways to prevent tensions that may cause the integration process to stagger. The EU has actively participated in the deregulation and liberalisation of the European labour market (cf. Gill, 1998), as this was an important aspect of encouraging greater labour mobility within the common market. Irregular migrants are excluded from this mobility, which is one of the reasons for the existence of very different political economies of irregular migrant labour in the EU’s core and its periphery. At the same time, and that is the second reason for the favourability of Mediterranean Europe to informal employment, the introduction of the euro has amplified the economic division of the EU. While this will be discussed in more detail later, the common currency has removed an essential element that was previously used by national governments as a means to gain a competitive advantage vis-à-vis other member states with higher rates of productivity: currency devaluation. During periods of economic stagnation, Mediterranean member states would devalue their currencies to boost their exports. The termination of this instrument leaves only the reduction of wages to increase the competitiveness of the national export industry. This applies in particular to the agricultural sector, where productivity is lower than in other member states. This produces a situation where cheap labour is needed, and where immigration is the major supplier of this commodity.
In Sicily, a political economy of migration has been created through the existence of a mafia-based link of smugglers and agricultural employers. During an interview with a representative of the Italian Refugee Council, I was told that a boat of the mafia has been observed picking up irregular migrants from a smuggler boat on sea. It is well known that the major agricultural companies in Sicily are linked to the mafia. Furthermore, the interviewee stressed the total dependence of the Sicilian agriculture on migrant workers: “I think if there are no migrants here, the agriculture is going to finish, to die” (personal communication, 2 May 2014). One manifestation of this dependency is the Residence degli Aranci itself, which is conveniently placed in the middle of endless fruit farms. During my visit to the Residence, I witnessed how hundreds of migrants returned from working in the fields. While the migrants work eight-hour shifts, their salaries amount to only €15 per day. All of the farms surrounding the Residence rely on migrant workers, with many of them producing their fruits organically. Another job that is particularly popular in Palermo is parking security. While parking is free in most of the city, one will regularly encounter people offering to watch one’s car while one is absent in exchange for a moderate fee. During a conversation with a Ghanaian man who was working in this business, I found out that the Italian employers pay between €10-20 per day to their migrant employees (personal communication, 2 May 2014). The parking security business is illegal, and it is operated by the Sicilian mafia. Employees are paid every day after they finish their shifts.

Forced prostitution of African migrants is a widespread phenomenon in Sicily. One young woman from Nigeria had her trip organised by her friend who was also from Nigeria, but who had already come to Italy. The young woman was told that she would earn a wage by taking care of an old woman when she arrived. After the long trip through the Sahara desert and across the Mediterranean Sea, her friend informed her that the job with the old woman was no longer available, and that she would have to do ‘street work’ for the time being. She was forced to

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53 The European organic label is thus no guarantee that a product has been produced using only regular workers. It may very well be that a fruit has been grown organically with the help of an exploited worker, which calls for the introduction of a fair trade label within the EU.
surrender all the money she earned to her ‘friend’. At first, she spent three months in Milan, but was soon sent back to Sicily (personal communication, 4 May 2014). The situation is very similar in Greece. During an interview a representative of a Greek migrants’ organisation spoke of thousands of cases of forced prostitution (personal communication, 5 April 2014). In the Omonia area of Athens, dozens of black young women could be seen offering sexual services.

**Xenophobia**

Gramsci argued that “for the social elite, the members of subaltern groups always have something of a barbaric or pathological nature about them” (Gramsci, 1996). It is therefore not surprising that the arrival of large numbers of migrants in the EU, legal and illegal migrants alike, has been accompanied by an upsurge in xenophobic attitudes. As a consequence of the destruction of the soul, the reification of the self and the commodification of the body, self-identification has reached its focal point in religious neo-nationalism. Through disenchantment Christianity has largely been disrobed of its spiritual core – what remains is a ‘Judeo-Christian heritage’ which is largely embraced even by non-Christians. In turn, this new Christian identity requires an ‘other’ to contrast itself against. Muslim immigration to Europe has provided this ‘other’, and islamophobia has become the most striking aspect of neo-nationalist rhetoric (Wodak et al., 2013).

The extreme poverty that irregular migrants often live in exposes other EU citizens to the true extent of social inequality and insecurity in the EU. The European Union has contributed significantly to the deconstruction of the welfare state, most recently through its demands to partially liberalise the pension systems of the 28 member states (European Commission, 2012b). Following the sovereign debt crisis, “popular austerity and the associated reductions in public expenditure [have been promoted] as the only credible solutions for the present economic deadlock” (Nousios et al., 2012, 7). The ostensible inevitability of welfare state retrenchment have caused Europeans to increasingly identify with the polity they know best: the nation state. This is because “national order offers a path to social unity as a remedy for contemporary anxieties” (Feldman, 2012, 40). The
precarious situation of irregular migrants is a materialisation of these anxieties, and their rejection in the guise of nationalist discourse can be seen as a manifestation of the fear of poverty and social insecurity. Furthermore, the association of national identity with a particular (supposedly Judeo-Christian) ethics and a particular ethnicity can be seen as a response to disenchantment. This has robbed ideas of their intrinsic worth. Nationalism counters this development, as it ascribes intrinsic belonging to a particular nationality. Migration poses a threat to this ‘natural’ identity as it changes the ethnic and cultural composition of the nation.

Exposure to racism has become an everyday aspect of irregular migrants’ lived experience of European integration. Racism and xenophobia provide an important backdrop against which the fortification of the EU’s borders can take place. Anti-immigration policies have been normalised, and they are practiced by nearly all members of the political spectrum. In Greece, for example, it was during the Socialist government of George Papandreou that the inhumane treatment of migrants was most excessive. Furthermore, the Socialist government commissioned the erection of the fence along the border with Turkey. The normalisation of neo-nationalism can be seen as an instance of Gramsci’s *trasformismo*, a term which he uses to describe the “molecular absorption of leading elements of a class into another class’s project” (Thomas, 2009, 373-4). Therefore, while radical right-wing parties may have gained considerable support among European electorates, their success has been limited by the adoption of right-wing positions by the mainstream parties. In turn, the increase in right-wing positions among populations along the EU’s border has been reinforced by European legislation. The Dublin Regulation shifts the responsibility for preventing immigration to the peripheral member states, while it also causes the concentration of migrants in these same member states. Large amounts of migrants living in poverty and having to resort to irregular means of employment have contributed to xenophobia and nationalism because of the image of migrants thus evoked. Nationalism has been instrumental in the fortification of the EU’s borders, as it has provided the ideological context for this fortification to take place.
Greece is the most well-known example of the rise of racist parties in the EU. As of April 2014, unemployment in Greece stands at 27.3% – the highest in the EU. Migrants suffer especially from the terribly difficult economic situation that the country finds itself in as a result of the austerity policies associated with the ‘sovereign debt crisis’; racist attacks that are becoming more widespread throughout the country. The rise of fascism, finding a significant expression in the growth of the Golden Dawn party, which achieved 9.4% in the 2014 European Parliament elections, has been accompanied by an increase in the number of xenophobic attacks. Golden Dawn blames immigrants for the economic crisis, having formed militias to try and deal with the perceived problem. During my visit to an accommodation centre for asylum seekers, I was told immediately upon arrival not to disclose the location of the centre to anyone, out of fear of racist attacks.

At the research location of Leipzig, xenophobia also represents a very widespread phenomenon. In 2013, the city registered 58 cases of racially motivated violence. One of the most flagrant manifestations of xenophobia is the resistance to the establishment of decentralised accommodation centres for asylum seekers throughout the city. During a meeting of this opposition movement in the village of Portitz, the vast majority of the village’s population attended the meeting to voice their disapproval of the city’s plans. This is particularly striking as the electoral turnouts in Leipzig have traditionally been very low, indicating low levels of politicisation. When the Islamic Ahmadiyya community announced its intentions to build a mosque in a part of Leipzig with a very high population density, a petition was signed by over 10,000 people to protest against the construction of the house of worship. During an incident in November 2013, the heads of several pigs were impaled and placed in a circle on the area of the future location of the mosque. The entire area was covered in pigs’ blood. In Saxony, the neo-Nazi National-Democratic Party of Germany (NPD) gained 3.6% of votes in the 2014 European elections. The NPD currently holds 8 seats in the Saxon parliament, and has based its campaign for the 2014 Saxon parliamentary elections on stopping the construction of further accommodation centres for asylum seekers. Since December 2013, the party has held a demonstration every month against an accommodation centre that was
established in very close proximity to a school building. Furthermore, the right-wing populist party Alternative for Germany, which gained 10.1% of Saxon votes in the 2014 European elections, similarly engages in anti-Islamic and xenophobic discourse.

**Becoming European**

Everyday life is shaped by countless instances of recognition. Through recognising others, we decide who they are, and recognition is one of the main tools employed to make the social world navigable and intelligible (Patchen, 2003). Furthermore, we ourselves have a strong need for recognition, as there is a perceived link between recognition and identity, which labels our defining characteristics as human beings. In his famous essay on the politics of recognition, Taylor puts forward that identity is shaped by recognition, as we tend to adopt the image that society projects back towards us. However, we are also shaped by misrecognition, which can cause massive damage if society’s projection of ourselves is demeaning and contemptible. Taylor states that “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted and reduced more of being” (1992, 25). Nevertheless, recognition is a basic human need. Given the phenomena that were described in the above sections, it is not surprising that irregular migrants would crave to be recognised. Recognition is perceived as a means of overcoming subalternity. As irregular migrants are often reduced to their ‘otherness’, their religious identity or their value as labour power, becoming European is associated with regaining a sense of self. However, xenophobia is not limited to irregular migrants. As interviews revealed, naturalised individuals equally experience being discriminated as a result of their skin colour or their religion. If irregular migrants “become incorporated in foreign nationalities,” they mostly do so “in a subaltern role” (Gramsci, 1996, 104).

During interviews, migrants referred to a variety of motivations for coming to Europe, but three themes were of particular importance: physical safety, improved material conditions, and self-realisation. These themes are not mutually exclusive. For refugees from war zones, the physical safety that the European
Union provides was the main reason for migration. One Syrian refugee stated that “I came here to live, to have my children grow up in a safe place” (personal communication, 18 March 2014). The concern for the security and wellbeing of one’s family was cited by nearly all interviewees as a primary reason for migration, and rarely were irregular migrants concerned only for their own safety. For many irregular migrants, coming to Europe was linked with the hope of improving the material conditions of oneself and one’s family. In Catania it has become a major business to offer sending money to African states. A third theme that was regularly referred to was self-realisation. One Iraqi refugee stated that his motivation to come to Europe “mainly was to have the freedom to do whatever you want to do” (personal communication, 10 July 2014). Europe is thus perceived to embody security, prosperity and freedom – it is never defined according to political institutions like the European Union. Spaces where the perceived definition of Europe does not apply, are consequently not seen as being European. Thus a refugee in Bulgaria stated, “I have not seen Europe yet,” despite his physical presence on the European continent and in the European Union (personal communication, 18 March 2014). Europe is not only a space; for many it is a utopian idea.

Nevertheless, the legal recognition that is involved in becoming a European citizen represents the ultimate materialisation of this idea. Acquiring European citizenship is linked to the hope of being recognised as a European human being rather than as a refugee, an immigrant, an alien or a black person. Naturalisation is relatively easy for refugees, but for migrants residing illegally on the territory of an EU member state this can become very difficult. In Italy and Greece, which have particularly high populations of illegal immigrants, citizenship is denied even to the children of migrants. Although exact figures are unknown, it is certain that hundreds of thousands of children of migrants in Italy and Greece do not possess a European citizenship. In 2013, Germany had very few illegal residents due to its geographical location. Naturalisation of refugees requires eight years of legal residency, adequate German-language skills, knowledge of the German constitution and a means to secure a living that does not depend on social welfare. Among other things, residing in the European Union without being a European citizen or a residency permit implies exclusion.
from political participation, exclusion from the regular labour market and discrimination in the education system. It is thus impossible to attain the goals mentioned in the previous paragraph. European citizenship furthermore represents the final goal of many migrants, because it cannot be revoked. The status of an asylum seeker is unsecure at best, as there is no certainty about the outcome of the application. Residence permits are usually not permanent and, even when they are permanent, they can be invalidated. European citizenship also gives one the ability to reside in a member state other than the one where one has applied for asylum, which is particularly important for asylum seekers who have family members in another country. Many of the sources of subalternity thus appear to be removed through the acquisition of EU citizenship.

Although European citizenship gives one the opportunity to participate in political life, it is by no means guaranteed that migrants will as a result reach the second stage of subaltern development. Indeed, upon receiving citizenship, former irregular migrants may deny that they continue to be a ‘migrant’. In Leipzig, three people were interviewed who had come to Germany as asylum seekers and who had subsequently received German citizenship. All three had little interest in European and German migration management, even though they could identify with the struggles of the hundreds of thousands of people who arrive every year on Europe’s shores. One even called for a more restrictive immigration policy. Underlying this assertion is the attitude that since one has managed to become European and to achieve the three goals mentioned earlier, every migrant has the same opportunity. Whoever does not manage to reach this status, only has himself to blame. On the one hand, this reflects that naturalised migrants want to leave their pasts behind. A group consciousness of irregular migrants does not develop because they want to feel as though they completely belong to the society they decided to move to – association with their migrant history sets them apart from mainstream society. On the other hand, the attitude that an ‘unsuccessful migrant’ only has himself to blame can be understood as a consequence of the neoliberal doctrine of being responsible for one’s own wellbeing and prosperity. Either way, migrants are in this way prevented from developing the group identity that is needed for overcoming subalternity. It is noteworthy that what Gramsci calls the “mechanistic conception” (i.e. determinism) is the “religion of the subaltern”
(Gramsci, 1971, 647) because it frees the subaltern from responsibility of taking action. The idea that subalternity is rooted in personal failure rather than social structures is in line with the neoliberal model for the political economy that is promoted primarily by liberal and conservative parties. As neoliberal theory is based on the positivist tradition, it exhibits precisely the deterministic attitude that Gramsci refers to (see Chapter 7 for neoliberalism’s ontological underpinnings).

Nevertheless, migrant organisations have begun to attempt to make an impact on policymaking in the European Union. The most important example of the politicisation of irregular migrants is the numerous refugee councils which have been established in most EU member states. ECRE, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles is an umbrella organisation of 82 migrant NGOs dispersed throughout Europe. These refugee councils and NGOs set themselves the task of “advancing the rights of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons” and of “[promoting] the establishment of fair and humane European asylum policies and practices in accordance with international human rights law” (ECRE, 2014). Refugee councils attempt to point out violations against international law in the management of asylum applications, and they often operate accommodation facilities for asylum seekers. They maintain volunteer programmes to provide psychological support, and to assist asylum seekers with the bureaucratic challenges of living in Europe. In Italy, it is very difficult for migrants without valid residence permits to access medical care. Migrants are afraid of going to the hospital because this would inevitably involve the disclosure of one’s status to the public authorities. Furthermore, they may only receive basic healthcare, which excludes for example the medication required by people with HIV. The Jesuit Refugee Service therefore provides free medical assistance for migrants, irrespective of their legal status.

Nevertheless, although Gramsci has argued that a subaltern group’s ability to form institutions representing its interests is a step towards overcoming subalternity (Gramsci, 1971, 202), one should not mistake refugee organisations’ efforts to improve the lives of irregular migrants in Europe with an attempt to change their subaltern status. It is difficult to discern charity organisations from political organisations; migrants’ organisations may have a strong interest in improving the lives of individuals, although they do not attempt to challenge the
systemic reasons of their subalternity. Moveover, refugee councils are in many
cases founded, managed and operated by non-migrants, underlining that irregular
migrants lack unity and self-consciousness as a social group.

**Obstacles to Overcoming Irregular Migrant Subalternity**

NGOs often depict irregular migrants as victims. When reading the NGO reports
on migrants, one regularly encounters expressions such as: “vulnerable people are
subjected to,” “exposure to violence,” or “serious medical cases being neglected”
suggests that migrants are rendered invisible. A victim is someone who is helpless
and unable to defend himself. A victim is passive and totally dependent on the
mercy of the perpetrators of the injustice inflicted. The passive voice that is used
in the quotations cited above further emphasises this connotation. The reduction
of migrants’ lives to victimhood does not contribute to the systemic overcoming
of their undeniably miserable condition. As Gramsci’s research agenda on the
subaltern is ultimately aimed at overcoming their subordination, it is worth
reflecting on the factors that stand in the way of this endeavour.

The nature of a migrant’s experience of being in a state of transience is a
key obstacle. The migrant community is perpetually changing. New migrants
arrive in the EU, while others are deported, or seize to identify themselves as
migrants. Asylum seekers become refugees or deportees. Refugees become
European citizens, and tourists become illegal immigrants by overstaying their
visas. The Dublin Regulation drives the involuntary movement of large amounts
of people through the EU, turning asylum seekers in Germany into asylum seekers
in Italy. Migrants often have no historical, cultural, economic or family ties with
particular European cities or regions; they move more often, which prevents the
development of close networks of friends and acquaintances. This state of flux is
detrimental to the development of political groups and to the emergence of group
consciousness. While the concentration of migrants in particular geographical
spaces tends to decrease over time, Colombo and Sciortino (2004) nevertheless
show how national groups tend to settle in the same areas of a country. The ties
that thus form are ties based on national and ethnic identity, rather than on migrant identity.

Another obstacle to overcoming migrants’ subaltern status is their re-confinement to national territories. It is potentially one of the strengths of a political organisation of migrants that it would transcend national boundaries. It is in the nature of transnational migration to move beyond the frontiers of nation states, which is why migrant group consciousness would have to necessarily be post-national. The Dublin Regulation is one of the instruments that strongly reasserts national divisions. The Dublin regime allocates each asylum seeker one specific state that is responsible for them. Asylum seekers are not allowed to leave that state for as long their asylum application is processed. Once refugee status has been granted, it is extremely detrimental to any hopes of naturalisation to move to another state, because several years of permanent residence are required to attain citizenship in the state in question. The existence of 31 different asylum procedures within the Dublin area creates strong divergence in asylum seekers’ experience of migration. While Greece and Italy employ extensive detention policies, Germany offers a relatively more positive experience. This obscures that irregular migrants are fundamentally part of the same transnational phenomenon. National differences are reasserted, causing the fragmentation of migrants into national groups.

Closely related to the previous argument is the fact that irregular migrants do not share the same background. Linguistic divisions are in the nature of a migrant community. These divisions are reinforced in asylum accommodation centres and refugee camps. Within these facilities, particular language communities quickly develop. Furthermore, migrants tend to import hostile relations between ethno-linguistic groups to their destination countries (e.g. hostility between Kurds and Arabs, Shiites and Sunnis). Furthermore, with the possible exception of French and English, migrants will rarely speak European languages. Integration into the political system is significantly more complicated if migrants are unable to speak the language of the country they reside in. For political participation, an excellent knowledge of that language is advantageous. In Germany for example, this is made even more difficult by the federal government’s refusal to offer free language classes to asylum seekers. However,
even if the national language is acquired and a sufficient proficiency is reached, this merely enables the migrant to participate in the national political system, which may further embed the fragmentation of the migrant community into national groups.

A fourth obstacle, already mentioned in the previous section, is the lack of identification of naturalised migrants with irregular migrants. The denial of belonging to a ‘transnational migrant community’ may be the deliberate result of a migrant’s desire to disassociate herself from this instable, stressful and insecure phase of her life. It may also be the consequence of the socialisation into societies within which neoliberal individualism is influential. Nonetheless, it is very detrimental to the development of a political consciousness. Naturalised migrants are the only members of the migrant community who are allowed to participate on all levels of political life in Europe. The most obvious manifestation of this is the fact that participation in national and European elections is limited to European citizens.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided the empirical foundation of this dissertation. It offers an account of how contemporary European integration is experienced by members of the subaltern group of irregular migrants. In conjunction with the previous chapter, which has discussed the contemporary character of European migration management, this chapter has provided country profiles to further establish the context in which migrants’ experience takes place. Nevertheless, while these national differences are important to understand the story that was just told, they should not obscure the fact that migrants are fundamentally part of the same European or even global phenomenon, albeit with contextual variations.

Neofunctionalist integration is an important ingredient in the production of the experiences that were outlined in this chapter. For every aspect of migrant experience that was discussed, a clear link could be made with the premises of neofunctionalism. The technocratic attitude towards policymaking that neofunctionalism embodies is a key element in human reification, because
technocracy denies that policymaking is inherently value-driven. The functionalist removal of values from human decision-making has resulted in the denial of the intrinsic value of the human being and her qualities, which are reduced to their economic valorisation. The state of exception is not only part of the system of European governance, but neofunctionalist integration is actually thought to feed on it, as crises have the potential to propel the spillover process forward. The growth of the irregular labour market is linked to the deconstruction of the welfare state. On the basis of these findings, the next chapter will show how the experience of irregular migrants has implications for the wider character of European integration. Neofunctionalism, which has provided the ideological background for this chapter, is intricately linked to the neoliberal programme.
Chapter 7: Three Contradictions of Neofunctionalist European Integration

Having examined neofunctionalism, its method of integration, its consequences on the management of irregular migration and its experience by irregular migrants, a puzzle has emerged that calls for further analysis. If the negative impacts identified were envisaged as spillovers able to drive integration forward, why has the EU chosen this particular neoliberal trajectory? After all neofunctionalist integration is not inherently neoliberal in character and therefore does not necessarily produce the hegemony of transnational capital. This chapter represents the critical grounded theory that is the outcome of the retroductive knowledge formation process of this dissertation. It will attempt to contribute to understanding the social purpose of European integration. If the European Union’s migration management is a critical case study (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2003) of European integration, some answers to this question can be arrived at. Based on the findings that were made during the main fieldwork, it will be argued that contemporary European integration has the primary purpose of shaping Europe according to neoliberal principles. The neoliberal restructuring of the European political economy is the result of transnational capital seeking conditions favourable to its further accumulation. After this argument has been presented, the relationship between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism will be developed. While neofunctionalism is not necessarily neoliberal, it will be shown that Haas’ theory has often acted as an attempt to legitimise neoliberal policies.

In his principal monograph The Great Transformation, Hungarian political economist Karl Polanyi describes the ‘double movement’ as one of the most visible contradictions of capitalism: the implementation of a free market economy is accompanied by the establishment of regulatory state institutions (Polanyi, 1944). In the context of European migration management, three further inherent contradictions that are more specific to neoliberalism ought to be highlighted in this chapter. Firstly, the neoliberal emphasis on the free movement of people, goods and capital is accompanied by nationalism (Feldman, 2011). Secondly, while neoliberalism demands the state’s retreat, it also becomes more involved in the area that Foucault called biopolitics (1997). Thirdly, the intra-European
division of labour clashes with the global division of labour, as regions that are located in the global core at the same time form part of the European periphery. Migration, both its experience and its management, illustrates this condition particularly poignantly.

**European Integration and Neoliberal Hegemony**

Having pointed out the faults of neofunctionalism’s unfounded vision of European integration as a closed system, quasi-isolated from the outside world, and having examined in detail how European integration is experienced by the subaltern group of migrants, this section will attempt to place the development of the EU within the context of neoliberal restructuring. Furthermore, the role that neofunctionalism has played in this process will be elaborated on, highlighting the social purpose of European integration.

*Europe’s Neoliberal Renaissance*

Before discussing the character of European integration, it ought to be highlighted that there are important differences between early European integration and the contemporary European Union. Several different interpretations have been offered to understand the first wave of European integration, which lost its momentum in the late 1960s. The first Kantian interpretation suggests that the collective European nightmare of World War II underlined the urgent need for a European system of peace and cooperation (e.g. Trachtenberg, 1999). In his famous ‘United States of Europe’ speech of 1946, Winston Churchill implied that European integration was the only way to avoid another European war, and the EU’s peace-making role continues to be cited as the most important *raison d’être* by European politicians. A second interpretation suggests that European integration formed part of the ideological confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (e.g. Lundestad, 1986). A Western European economic alliance would decrease the likelihood of the spread of communism, which was
considered a real threat in the post-War era. This argument resonates with the realist school of international relations. A third interpretation suggests that European integration represents the inclusion of Western Europe into the American Fordist model of accumulation (e.g. Jessop, 1995). The expansion of the market is a defining aspect of capitalism itself and it is thus unsurprising that the foundation of the European institutions may be seen as an example of this tendency. While the three interpretations were developed within three distinct schools of thought, they are nevertheless not mutually exclusive. Indeed, if the third interpretation is taken as the guiding premise, they may in fact be mutually constitutive. The inclusion into the Fordist system was predicated upon political stability and reduced vulnerability to alternative ideologies. It is worth noting that at least two of these factors address exogenous issues. Neofunctionalism tends to view exogenous factors as insignificant or disturbing influences on the integration process, which hints at the theory’s incapacity to understand European integration.

The renaissance of European integration in the mid-1980s nevertheless followed a different reasoning, which should be seen in the context of Fordism’s organic crisis at the beginning of the 1970s (see Chapter 2). Harvey argues that a period of ‘flexible accumulation’ replaced the Fordist model and it is clear that a neoliberal, finance-based accumulation strategy has played a dominant role in global economic development since the 1980s (Harvey, 1989). The rise of neoliberalism should be viewed within the context of the re-establishment of capitalist class hegemony after power had shifted towards labour – it is thus that the rhetoric of “freeing the market from the shackles of the state” can be explained (van Apeldoorn, 2002, 55). Neoliberal globalisation is characterised by processes of the globalisation of production and the globalisation of finance. The globalisation of production was motivated by the crisis of Fordism, requiring the relocation of production to new geographical areas. The reality of this process is evidenced by a dramatic rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 1970s and the rapid increase in the number of transnational corporations. An increasing share of FDI is going into developing countries. Approximately one third of global FDI originated from the 100 largest corporations, highlighting the concentration of control over global production (UNCTAD, 2014). It is very important to
underline that the globalisation of production was not linked to a class compromise between *peripheral* labour and capital. While production in peripheral economies rose, this rise was not accompanied by an appropriate increase in salaries. This is the consequence of the need to keep production costs low. Through the destruction of traditional agriculture large migratory flows towards the global core were generated.

The globalisation of production went hand in hand with the globalisation of finance. After the collapse of Fordism, the deregulation of the financial sector provided a new growth impetus. Financial regulation during the 1970s and 1980s focussed primarily on five areas (Versluysen, 1988). Firstly, through the elimination of controls on transnational capital flows, by which countries like West Germany, Switzerland or Japan had attempted to control the international use of their currencies, international capital markets were created. Secondly, financial markets, including financial firm operations, were liberalised to stimulate competition between them. A financial service provider could now simultaneously be involved in underwriting (i.e. assessor of a client’s credit-worthiness) and banking (i.e. providing loans and other financial products). This greatly increased the financial sector’s scope for international operations. Thirdly, the government bond market was restructured with the aim of curbing inflation. The diversification of the bond market was achieved for example by repackaging government bonds through breaking up the bond into several smaller bonds (i.e. ‘coupon stripping’). This stimulated demand for government bonds by a wider range of financial institutions. Fourthly, through the abolition of disclosure rules information on credit worthiness could be acquired by financial institutions. This allowed for the creation of hedge funds, who engage in the practice of pooling various types of capital with different associated risks to create securities and other financial products. Finally, the financial sector was deregulated through the harmonisation of the standards of prudential supervision. This served the purpose of enhancing the competitive conditions of financial institutions by creating a ‘level playing field’ (ibid.). The deregulation of the financial sector generated a type of capital that is far more mobile than industrial capital, being able to move across partly dismantled national financial jurisdictions. The transnationalisation
of capital markets was one of the primary reasons for the need of a new wave of neoliberal European integration.

Although there were several competing models for European integration in the 1980s (see Chapter 2), neoliberalism came to dominate as the hegemonic project of a transnational capitalist class. Van Apeldoorn (2002) highlights the significant role of the European Roundtable of Industrialist’s in Europe’s neoliberal transformation. He argues that as a result of the globalisation of production, the influence of European neo-mercantilists in the ERT was waning. At the same time, European industry was actively engaged in globalisation, making neoliberalism the most attractive economic programme for creating a favourable environment for capital accumulation. The influence of neoliberalism is especially obvious in the area of monetary integration, where the Maastricht criteria established strict rules to prevent inflation, while notably measures to curb unemployment was omitted (van Apeldoorn, 2003). It is ironic that inflation represents the greatest danger to financialised accumulation, while the interest regime of the financial market is itself the cause of inflation (Toporowski, 2000).54

Nevertheless, it was neither the Single European Act nor the Maastricht Treaty that hailed the second wave of European integration in the 1980s. Indeed, it was the Saarbrücken Agreement and subsequently the Schengen Agreement of 1984 that represented the first significant step towards deeper integration since the Treaty of Rome. It is thus meaningful to examine the relationship between the European migration regime and the neoliberal hegemonic project.

Neoliberalism and Migration Management

Before discussing the impact of neoliberalism on the European migration regime, it ought to be highlighted that neoliberal ideology has also played a significant role in fuelling global migratory movements. To a large extent, this is the result of the

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54 Inflation has the potential to destroy capital by increasing the money supply and simultaneously decreasing the value of the currency that capital is denominated in. Inflation is however the product of the interest regime, which calls for a constant increase in the money supply. This is the result of all money having been loaned by someone. The institution that loans money will ask to receive its loan back along with a particular amount of interest. This causes a constantly increasing money supply. Interest is one of the primary ways of the expansion of financial capital, but its consequence (inflation) is simultaneously threatening to destroy capital.
neoliberal approach to development. The Washington Consensus represents the clearest formulation of neoliberalism in the realm of development policy. Williamson (1990) argues that the Washington Consensus is characterised by ten key points: budgetary discipline, reduction of subsidisation, tax reform, market-determined interest rates, competitive exchange rates, trade liberalisation, openness to foreign direct investment, privatisation, deregulation and strengthened private property rights. Although the continued relevance of the Washington Consensus has been debated (cf. Stiglitz, 1998), it is questionable whether another development paradigm has indeed replaced it (Babb, 2013), or whether more recent programmes represent merely “a modest retreat from [the original] extremist neoliberal fundamentalism” (Fine, 2006, ix). The Washington Consensus’ neoliberal demands were in fundamental contradiction to European subsidies of industry and agriculture. Subsidised agricultural products from the European Union were and continue to be exported to developing countries. These countries in turn are themselves discouraged from subsidisation and encouraged to embrace trade liberalisation. This dramatically decreases the competitiveness of local agriculture in the developing world. The target of poverty alleviation is undermined by this development, which consolidates global inequality and increases migration pressures towards the global core.

Another more practical link between neoliberalism and global migration is alluded to in Harvey’s argument about the neoliberal pressure towards universal marketization (2005), which of course also applies to ‘human resources’ and labour power. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that the commodification of labour is an inherent feature of capitalism that is by no means unique to neoliberalism. If the market value of human beings is determined by their capacity to contribute to the productive processes of a particular society, it is clear that in a post-industrial society with large demands for highly skilled labour, immigrants with high levels of education are preferred to immigrants with low levels of education. Through the relocation of production to developing countries the demand for low-skilled labour in Europe has decreased. At the same time, structural global inequality that is in part the result of neoliberal development programmes has increased international migration pressures. Legal ways to migrate to Europe are thus available only to individuals possessing recognised
degrees and qualifications. Migrants who do not possess these qualifications have no choice but to opt for irregular migration paths and asylum applications. This discrimination between highly-skilled and low-skilled migrants is at the heart of the contemporary European immigration regime. As was discussed in Chapter 6, the irregular labour market that exists outside is often the only way for low-skilled migrants to receive an income.

The impact of neoliberalism on the European migration regime is evident since the onset of integration in this area. In 1991 the European Roundtable of Industrialists published a report entitled *Reshaping Europe*. Van Apeldoorn describes this as “a first step in the direction of an emerging synthesis of embedded neo-liberalism” (2002, 152). Although the report was published significantly after the Schengen Treaty was signed, it nevertheless underlines the fit between the goals of the Schengen system and the principles of neoliberalism. The report contains a map of the US and Western Europe demonstrating that border controls contribute significantly to delays in road transport. The result is ostensibly that the 2,000km journey from Chicago to Tucson takes 33 hours, while the 2,000km journey from Antwerp to Rome takes 57 hours (European Roundtable, 1991, 32). The ERT implies that the insufficient trans-European road network as well as the presence of border controls significantly increases travel times, calling for the expansion of the former and the abolition of the latter. The freedom of movement, that is deeply enshrined in the Treaty of Rome primarily, concerns workers, and the renewed emphasis that this idea received in the 1980s and early 1990s goes hand in hand with the neoliberal project. The Commission White Paper *Completing the Internal Market* of 1985 discussed the existence of border controls as a reminder for the ordinary citizen that European union is incomplete (European Commission, 1985). Allowing for the trans-European allocation of human resources according to demand calls for the abolition of such symbols, and demands the realisation of the Adonnino Committee’s ‘people’s Europe’. It is

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55 This data is in fact skewed, and its reliability should at best be called into question. The journey from Antwerp to Rome is merely 1,600km long, while the shortest distance between Chicago and Tucson covers over 2,700km.

56 In 1984 the Adonnino Committee was tasked with promoting symbols of European integration, allowing for the greater identification of Europeans with the European institutions through a ‘people’s Europe’. The common European passport design or the adoption of the flag of the Council of Europe by the European Communities is part of the Committee legacy (Adonnino, 1985).
worth highlighting that the abolition of border controls was indeed primarily a symbolic act, as this had no impact on European citizens’ right to reside in other member states. While residence in the country in which one holds the citizenship is unrestricted, one cannot reside in another member state for an extended period of time without working or studying there. Deportations from one member state to another are in fact still carried out. It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that labour is a fictitious commodity partly because it cannot be moved about like goods and money. In the human mind, symbolic boundaries can be just as manifest as physical boundaries – it is for that reason that the abolition of border controls represented an important aspect of the neoliberal agenda for European integration.

Nevertheless, the process of encouraging the free movement of European labour through the abolition of border controls is not free of contradictions. The flipside of the internal openness of the Schengen system is the EU’s external fortification, which forces refugees to rely on smugglers for entering Europe. As Overbeek points out, “migration is not the only, and for that matter numerically not the most important, way in which labor throughout the world increasingly stands in direct competition with labor elsewhere” (1998, 66). The boundless pool of cheap labour in the developing world, the possibility of the separation of the labour-intensive from the capital-intensive aspects of production, and the development of technology allowing from the transnational coordination of production and assembly facilities permitted for the creation of a global labour market that is shielded from the potentially adverse effects of transnational migration (Fröbel et al., 1977). Large-scale migration from the developing world to post-industrial economies would cause the degradation of salaries in the latter, potentially undermining consumption. The prevention and deterrence of migration towards the core (in the European case through the Schengen and Dublin regimes) is thus an essential aspect of migration management. However, this system is not fool-proof, and millions of migrants have been able to enter the European Union. Fortification and migration control have resulted in the creation of a new type of subalternity, the experience of which highlights the reifying character of contemporary European integration. In parallel, the existence of this
perspective may provide the foundation for the emergence of a counterhegemonic movement.

The financial and economic crisis that began in 2007 has caused a crisis of finance-based accumulation that has put the viability of the European migration regime into question. With the ascending hegemony of transnational capital, the importance of global finance has risen dramatically, which is reflected in the differential profit rates of financial and non-financial companies (Duménil & Lévy, 2005). The derivation of profits was achieved primarily through financial transactions rather than through productive activities, and finance-based growth had by the end of the 20th century become the dominant growth model in Europe and North America. Another method of accumulation that was employed in particular by German and French companies has been the incorporation of Southern Europe into the zone of Northern European capital. Southern European imports were to a large extent credit-financed, allowing the South to become particularly vulnerable to financial speculation (Becker & Jäger, 2012). Spain, Ireland and Portugal furthermore experienced over-investment into the real estate sector. According to Overbeek (2012), financialisation has resulted in a crisis of overaccumulation which is evidenced by the vast amounts of liquidity that have been provided by central banks to resolve the crisis. The condition dubbed ‘the sovereign-debt crisis’ has posed an existential threat to the European Union itself; the latter’s legitimacy is now in question (Cafruny & Ryner, 2011). Nevertheless, this label is a misnomer, as it was not sovereign debt itself which caused the crisis, but the rising interest rates which were caused by speculation on debt defaults within the eurozone. As the Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy were locked into an unsustainable exchange rate regime through EMU, the crisis provoked further divergence. Economic stagnation and extreme unemployment have caused the eruption of severe doubts about the sustainability of the finance-driven growth model in parts of the eurozone.

It is not a geographical coincidence that the member states which were worst affected by the financial crisis are in many cases congruent with the member states experiencing the worst problems with immigration. On the one hand, the budgetary issues of Greece and Italy removed their ability to act decisively on the provision of humane accommodation for asylum seekers. Moreover, Greece has
used its budgetary vulnerability as a means to disrupt the application of the Dublin regime arguing that austerity has made it impossible to fulfil the obligations imposed on it by the Regulation. However, more importantly, the existence of a large informal labour market in the EU periphery provides superior employment conditions for persons residing illegally in the EU. The existence of this labour market is structurally conditioned by their non-industrial, import-dependent politico-economic position within the EU, which to a large extent prevent the emergence of a strong welfare state. The austerity-fuelled euroscepticism that rose in Greece and Italy called into question the Schengen and Dublin regimes, resulting in the temporary reintroduction of internal border controls and the reform of the Schengen acquis to simplify this procedure. Increasingly authoritarian policies such as the construction of border fences along the Schengen Area’s external borders are in line with Bruff’s authoritarian neoliberalism (2014). In the same way that neoliberal governments attempt to prevent future changes to neoliberal policies by enshrining them into the constitution, the erection of border fences is very difficult to reverse.

The Neofunctionalist Connection

In this section it will be argued that neofunctionalist integration theory played the role of providing legitimacy for the neoliberal project. The neofunctionalists form one part of Gramsci’s intellectuals that always accompany hegemonic social groups. Neofunctionalism’s technocratic vision of governance allowed for neoliberal policies to be presented as necessary and inevitable. To explain and substantiate this argument, the ideological compatibility of neofunctionalism and neoliberalism will be demonstrated. Moreover, several empirical examples shall be drawn on to show how neofunctionalism has justified neoliberalism.

57 Current discussions on the future of European migration management include the establishment of European asylum offices in conflict zones. Legitimate asylum seekers could thus apply before entering the EU’s territory, allowing for the introduction of tougher border surveillance, as all those who have not already applied for asylum must be illegal immigrants. While these measures are in practice difficult to implement, they nevertheless illustrate the severity of the policies proposed.
Friedrich von Hayek is the intellectual that developed one of the clearest formulations of neoliberalism. Hayek argued that the vast majority of human institutions have arisen not because of deliberate design, but spontaneously, without guidance or planning (von Hayek, 1991). Hayek provides the example of the pricing system, arguing that it delivers the uncoordinated coordinating mechanism required by a division of labour that specialises individuals in particular fields of knowledge. Other examples of unplanned institutions include language, traditions, rules and exchange mechanisms. These findings are not only rooted in empirical observation, but also in the assumption that “there is a limit to humankind’s ability to consciously and comprehensively design, direct and predict the nature of human institutions and their outcomes” (Chia & Holt, 2009, 40). The future is unknowable because of our incomplete knowledge of all factors determining its path. Based on this idea is the neoliberal critique of state reason, which puts forward that the state’s incomplete power to know prevents it from making the right decisions. Still, Hayek assumed natural laws “based on spontaneously ordered institutions in the physical (crystals, galaxies) and social (morality, language, market) worlds” (Peters, 2001, 21). Striking similarities with positivist epistemology can thus be identified: the physical world is ruled by laws and knowable through our senses. The only reason for why we cannot predict all events within it is incomplete knowledge. This rationalist empiricism is also present in neofunctionalism, as was shown in Chapter 1.

From the abovementioned assumptions stems the foundation of neoliberal governmentality. Neoliberal policymaking presumes that human potential can best be achieved through free markets, free trade and private property rights. The role of the state is limited to creating institutions that allow for the functioning of these practices. The state should protect the integrity of money as well as the physical and legal safety of its citizens, and it should create markets where they do not exist (e.g. water, education, health care, social security). Once markets have been created, state intervention into these markets should be kept at a minimum. The role of the state is thus largely administrative rather than political (Harvey, 2005, 2). The neoliberal view of the state is thus compatible with neofunctionalism, which views the ideal state as a technocratic institution whose
decisions are not moral-rational but profit-rational (see Chapter 1 on neofunctionalism and hermeneutics).

Apart from the ontological and epistemological fit between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism, numerous empirical examples of integration show how neofunctionalism has served as a justification of neoliberal policies. As White (2003) shows, neofunctionalism has provided the intellectual framing for early European integration, specifically with regard to the Hallstein Commission (in office from 1958–1967, see Chapter 1). As the neoliberal hegemonic programme is becoming increasingly authoritarian (Bruff, 2014), neofunctionalism’s technocratic vision of government serves as the legitimation of neoliberalism. One example of this is alluded to in Chapter 1, where I highlight that the functional link between freedom of movement and the abolition of border controls is at best questionable. The British example shows that the existence of border controls is not necessarily an obstacle to intensive trade relations. Frontier checks are of no consequence to the movement of capital, and while Polish membership into the EU in 2004 caused large-scale emigration from the country, membership of the Schengen Area in 2007 was actually followed by a decrease in emigration (Kowalska, 2012). Nevertheless, it was neofunctionalist reasoning that was used to justify the Schengen Agreement, a cornerstone of European migration management as well as one of the key projects of the European integration. The Schengen system was presented as the “natural consequence” of the Treaty of Rome (Taschner, 1997, 16). This shows that neofunctionalism was drawn on ideologically and that the theory was employed to justify an ultimately neoliberal policy.

Crucially, the use of neofunctionalism as a justification for neoliberal policymaking is not limited to the area of European migration management. After the abolition of border controls, the introduction of the common currency was the next major milestone in the EU’s neoliberal transformation. Cafruny and Ryner trace the introduction of EMU’s predecessor, the European Monetary System (EMS), to the West German failure to import American inflation, causing an appreciation of the deutschmark (2007). This created the threat of competitive devaluations within Western Europe causing the Schmidt government to push for the introduction of an exchange rate regime on German terms in exchange for
supporting other currencies with German foreign reserves. The need for a stable exchange rate mechanism within the eurozone thus arose from the deep economic integration that had resulted from the creation of the Common Market. This is an example of functional spillover. During periods of substantial economic growth, other European economies raised their interest rates to release the tensions within EMS, but during economic stagnation devaluation could not be employed to boost exports. As a result, the budgetary discipline required by EMS could no longer be maintained and the system failed in 1992. The euro was meant to rectify earlier mistakes by means of the Maastricht criteria. The latter made budgetary discipline a precondition for membership of the eurozone with the primary aim of preventing inflation. The European Central Bank was created as an independent institution, whose status could only be changed through a unanimous decision within Council. The failure of the EMS called for deeper integration at the EU institutional level according to neofunctionalist principles. The creation of the euro represented a significant neoliberal policy turn, as it disabled two of the most important macroeconomic policy instruments: interest rate determination and currency devaluation. Neoliberal policies were deeply embedded into the institutional set-up of the eurozone, which was portrayed as a natural outcome of earlier integration, despite wide-spread popular resistance against the common currency.

The path-dependency that neofunctionalism prescribes was continued during the contemporary economic crisis which had brought the euro to the brink of disintegration. When Mario Draghi called the decision to introduce the euro “irreversible,” he implied that there was no alternative to the further transfer of powers to the European level, and eventually to the harsh austerity policies imposed on those countries subject to speculation (Draghi, 2012). The clauses of the fiscal compact, the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism, the fiscal union, the banking union – all these instruments and institutions were created because the costs of abandoning the monetary union altogether were deemed too high. Some commentators hailed this development as “the revenge of neofunctionalism” (Cooper, 2011). George Papandreou’s threat of holding a referendum on the Greek austerity deal sparked wide-spread panic among European policymakers, causing the EuroStoxx 50 to fall by over 10%.
Public support for austerity was limited at best, which is evidenced by the Greek general election result of May 2012, where the ruling Socialist party’s result fell by 30%. This confirms Bruff’s argument about authoritarian neoliberalism, as less and less heed is paid to public opinion. European policymakers have retreated into neofunctionalist determinism to justify their decisions.

The relationship between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism is such that the former provides legitimacy for the latter through its technocratic reasoning. Neofunctionalism is nevertheless not necessarily a neoliberal programme of integration. It can be linked with any political ideology or hegemonic project that shares its technocratic view of governance.

Three Contradictions of Neoliberal Europe

The process of the neofunctionalist neoliberalisation of Europe is not free from contradictions. Indeed, in this section, it will be shown that the process is inherently contradictory. The policy responses that these contradictions require can be seen as instances of Gramscian trasformismo, providing signs of the failure of the neoliberal hegemonic project. Firstly, as the research findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 showed, neoliberal migration management in Europe has resulted in widespread xenophobia and the resurgence of neo-nationalist movements. Secondly, while neoliberalism calls for the reduction of the state’s influence, neoliberal migration management has brought forth the state’s increasing involvement in biopolitics. Thirdly, the conjunction of neoliberalism and neofunctionalism has reinforced an intra-European division of labour that is in contradiction with the global division of labour, threatening to undermine the unity of the European Union as such.

Nationalism and Neoliberalism

European migration management has resulted in the rise of nationalist movements in most EU member states. As the majority of humanity cannot
migrate to Europe legally, irregular migration via an asylum application procedure has been the most important means for the global subaltern to reach the European continent. As an asylum application is an instrument designed to seek protection rather than as a mean to immigration, there have been widespread claims that European national asylum systems have been abused by economic migrants who have no right to political asylum. At the same time, those who receive asylum are accused of receiving disproportionate financial support, particularly when compared to unemployment benefits, which are very low in some member states such as Greece or Bulgaria. This results in two different subaltern groups – those dependent on social welfare and asylum seekers – being played off against one another. Furthermore, as the asylum applications of people who do not suffer from persecution are mostly rejected, many people reside in the EU without a regular residency permit, forcing them into a life of poverty and irregular labour outside the realm of the state apparatus. In line with Gramsci's argument, members of such subaltern groups are regarded as having a “barbaric or pathological nature” (Gramsci, 1996). Members of this group have been the primary targets of xenophobic attacks in Greece and Italy. The neoliberal migration regime, that was constructed using the integrative logic of neofunctionalism, requires Europe to “strengthen [its] barriers against the spillover of misery” (Ries, 2010, 14). The presence of undesirable exogenous factors at the margins of society is therefore inevitable, as the attractiveness of Europe as migration destination remains, while no border can be entirely shut down. The nationalist movements that result from this configuration can in turn result in the re-erection of internal frontiers within the EU and the Schengen Areas via trasformismo or electoral victories of right-wing populists, undermining the neoliberal model of European integration.

The coupling of neoliberalism and nationalism is further reinforced by the ontological fit between both ideologies. Neoliberalism, which demands the free movement of labour, and nationalism, which calls for the disintegration of the European Union and the return of the nation state, are of course in many ways located on opposite ends of the political spectrum. While one is concerned with capital accumulation, the other is concerned with identity. Nationalists pose as the defenders of the nation against the dangers of European integration and
globalisation, while neoliberals emphasise the opportunities of the free circulation of goods, capital and labour. Nationalist rhetoric focuses on the threat of islamisation and multiculturalism, while neoliberals denounce nationalism as populism and xenophobia. At first glance, the two arguments appear diametrically opposed to one another, which appears to define the range of the political spectrum on migration management. Nevertheless, nationalism and neoliberalism are phenomena that regularly co-occur (cf. Bond, 2011 on South Africa; Doğan & Haser, 2014 on Turkey). Nationalism is actually linked to neoliberalism in a variety of ways (cf. Feldmann, 2012; Calavita, 2005; Žižek, 2002). Importantly, both approaches share their lack of concern for the lives of the migrant subaltern themselves.

Harmes (2012) deconstructs the supposed theoretical dichotomy between neoliberalism and nationalism. Pointing out that both Thatcher and Reagan are examples of the neoliberal right, he puts forward that neoliberal theory is often very different from neoliberal practice. Neoliberals often employ nationalist rhetoric out of expediency rather than theoretical necessity in an effort to gain support for their agenda. Nevertheless, nationalism has played an important role in pushing the neoliberal programme for European integration forward. Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter 2, Gramsci himself would argue that a hegemonic project such as neoliberalism (in capitalism) is necessarily national in nature (Gramsci, 1978; Shilliam, 2004). The maintenance of the regional single market requires the establishment of supranational institutions. Nevertheless, these institutions’ ability to interfere with the market ought to be kept at a minimal level; nationalism is necessary to prevent the excessive transfer of regulatory powers to the regional level, which would be required to regulate effectively (e.g. financial transaction tax, re-regulation of the financial industry). Nationalism thus contributes to the embedding of neoliberal policies (cf. Buchanan, 1995).

Žižek emphasises the “structural role of the populist Right in the legitimisation of current liberal-democratic hegemony” (2000, 37). He argues that neo-nationalism plays the role of the ‘common enemy’ of the legitimate forms of political engagement. The designation of the right as the common enemy supplied the evidence for the argument that the hegemonic system is in fact benevolent. Nevertheless, Žižek puts forward that this strategy is designed to weaken the real
adversary of the dominant political forces: the radical left. As European social democrats have abandoned their formerly held notions of class struggle and anti-capitalism, the right has moved in to cover this terrain, albeit tainted with racial, national or religious parochialism. As the neo-nationalist right moves into this position, the dominant classes can point towards the dangers of extremism, allowing for the marginalisation of the left’s political programme through an association with nationalism and euroscepticism. Žižek is deeply critical of the mainstreaming of neoliberal ideas, blurring, ultimately transforming and eradicating the differences between centre-left and centre-right political movements. The most pertinent expression of this tendency is the trend towards ‘grand coalitions’ between conservative and social democratic parties (e.g. the de facto coalition between the European People’s Party and the Party of European Socialists in the European Parliament following the 2014 elections). These are either unavoidable because of nationalist electoral victories, or they occur because of the unwillingness of social democratic parties to enter coalitions with the radical left.

Biopolitics and Neoliberalism

In the previous chapter the biopolitics of migration was discussed and its lived experience described. Nevertheless, given the neoliberal character of European integration, it is somewhat surprising to find that the politics of the body plays such a significant role in the story of migrants. Given the neoliberal principle of reducing the size of the state to safeguarding the proper functioning of the free market, it is odd that the neoliberal state would have a biopolitical agenda. This contradiction will now be considered.

Rossi (2013) demonstrates the relationship between neoliberalism and biopolitics with reference to homeownership and the subprime mortgage crisis of the late 2000s. He begins his analysis arguing that the emergence of consumerism occurred with the introduction of consumer credit, which both facilitated and depended on the expansion of homeownership. Homeownership was presented as providing the sense of belonging and identity that was lost through alienation.
at the workplace, and campaigns to promote homeownership have been part of the neoliberal agenda since its inception. Thatcher, Sarkozy, Berlusconi and Cameron all promoted homeownership as one of the pillars of the Western way of life. George W. Bush referred to homeownership as the foundation of an ‘ownership society’. The expansion of homeownership, coupled with the deregulation of the mortgage market is, of course, one of the root causes of the subprime mortgage crisis. This points to the significance of the involvement of the subaltern, both on a domestic and a global level, in a financialised economy. The poor are no longer only exploited workers but also over-indebted consumers. The fact that the crisis centred on one of the essential requirements of the human body – shelter – stresses the fragility of the biopolitical pattern of accumulation. This is because the body is not a commodity produced for sale on the market (cf. Polanyi, 1944 on fictitious commodities). Neoliberalism and financialised accumulation is thus linked to the commodification of the body.

In the case of Integrated Border Management (IBM), the entanglement of neoliberalism and biopolitics becomes particularly apparent (cf. Sparke, 2006). This can be explained with reference to Polanyi’s notion of the double movement. Contrary to the expectations of neoliberalism, the implementation of free market principles will not lead to the reduction of the state’s scope of influence. Indeed, the task of maintaining the functioning of the market requires intensive bureaucratisation as well as the assembly of data on several economic variables, including migration. It is important to consider that marketization requires commodification and that labour is treated as a commodity like any other. At the same time neoliberal social practices take place within a globalised context. The biopolitics of migration management is thus in many ways comparable to the anti-counterfeiting measures and quality control procedures imposed on imported goods. The state’s increasing scope of control confirms Bruff’s argument that neoliberalism is becoming increasingly authoritarian.

*The European Core-Periphery Divide*

In Chapter 6, it was highlighted that there are strong differences in the experience of irregular migration between different territories of the European Union. While Bulgaria, Greece and Italy are usually defined as transit countries, Germany is
seen as a migration destination. This is further reflected in the smuggling prices and in some member states’ possession of a large underground market for irregular migrants (cf. Overbeek, 1998, 71). In 1992, Cox put forward that there is a core-periphery divide within the most advanced economies. While the core consists of high-skilled and high-paid labour that exhibits great levels of mobility within their particular region (e.g. the EU), the periphery consists of a “precariously employed labour force segmented by ethnicity, gender, nationality, or religion” (Cox, 1992, 28). Nevertheless, while Cox and Overbeek discuss this division in terms of distinct social groups or classes, more recent analyses of the European political economy have suggested a territorial division of Europe into core and periphery. This section is intended to answer three related questions: what are the characteristics of the European core and periphery? Does this distinction enhance our understanding of European integration? How does it relate to global core-periphery relations? Particularly the answer to the third question will clarify the contradictory nature of the EU’s internal divisions.

The use of the terms ‘EU core’ and ‘EU periphery’ became widespread after the 2004 enlargement, although a precise definition as to the content of this terminology is missing. Therefore it should not be equated with the use of the terms as employed by dependency theory. Barrios et al. (2004) define Spain, Greece and Ireland as the EU-periphery due to low levels of FDI inflows before becoming EU member states, without however defining the periphery’s counterpart. Brülhart et al. (2004) define core and periphery very simplistically according to GDP and geographical location. With reference to the 2004 enlargement, they argue that territories of new member states that are situated nearby wealthier regions are likely to benefit more from membership. Plechanovová (2011) views the core-periphery distinction within the EU in terms of social network analysis: while the members of the core are tied closely to each other, the members of the periphery have more relations with the core than with each other. While these definitions are relatively vague, the economic crisis has resulted in more precise statements about the nature of the EU’s internal divisions. Dabrowski has developed one of the most elaborate definitions of a peripheral countries, stating that they belong to one of three groups: (1) EMU members with “weak macroeconomic fundamentals” in the Mediterranean region; (2) new
member states which are not yet EMU members; (3) members of the European Economic Area, important EU-European neighbours and potential future EU member states (2010, 49). The first group is part of the periphery because of high fiscal deficits and high public debt. In turn, this implies that core member states have low fiscal deficits and low public debt levels. The second and third groups are part of the periphery because of exchange rate volatility, which has made them particularly vulnerable to the effects of the crisis, causing some to resort to demanding IMF interventions (e.g. Hungary, Latvia, Romania, Ukraine, Iceland, etc.).

Featherstone and Kazamias, albeit having published their work six years before the crisis, explicitly state that although their use of ‘EU-periphery’ stems from the dependency school, it is employed in “a much weaker, descriptive sense” (2014, 2). They identify the Mediterranean region as the EU’s periphery for the following reasons:

“the economic inequality compared to northern EU states; the historically distinctive mode of the region’s economic development and social stratification as a consequence of ‘late industrialisation’ and the relatively greater importance of agriculture and services; the financial dependence of EU development aid; the structural power of Germany in shaping the EU’s policy agenda in many areas; and the lesser bargaining strength of the ‘south’ in EU treaty negotiations” (ibid.).

This represents one of the most articulate definitions, which allowed the term ‘periphery’ to enter the diction of Marxist scholars of European integration (e.g. Overbeek, 2012). Becker and Jäger similarly embrace the idea, arguing that “the crisis has shown the ruptures between core and periphery in Europe” (2012, 169). Nevertheless, it is important to stress that while there are clear territorial distinctions between different member states’ political economies, these distinctions also exist within the territory of the member states.

In order to summarise the different conceptualisations the intra-European core-periphery divide, the following can be said: the core is understood as

58 According to this systematisation, in 2010 the European core thus consisted of Finland, Sweden, Germany, Benelux, France, the UK, Ireland, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia and a few micro-states.
possessing export surpluses, lower levels of dependence on the EU market for these exports, high levels of social equality, stable and high GDPs, high immigration levels, low unemployment rates and high industrial productivity. Furthermore, the core is the origin of intra-European foreign direct investment, while also hosting Europe’s major creditor institutions. Germany, Benelux, Scandinavia and Austria clearly belong into this group, with France traditionally belonging to it also. Furthermore, there can be said to exist a European semi-periphery, which is dependent on EU cohesion funds, exhibiting low unit-per-labour costs, lower and unstable GDP levels, low budget deficits, export deficits, industrialised economies, and high levels of financialisation driven by private household borrowing (Becker & Jäger, 2012). The semi-periphery has strong links with the financial sector of the eurozone, and is thus very susceptible to currency fluctuations. The countries belonging to this group are primarily those who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Finally, the periphery is also dependent on EU cohesion funds, being shaped by large export deficits, high levels of social inequality, service-based industries, very high levels of unemployment (especially youth unemployment), unstable GDPs with strong booms and depressions, large irregular labour markets, high levels of irregular immigration, widespread corruption, high levels of household and government-driven financialisation as well as strong political polarisation. Greece, Southern Italy, Spain and Portugal are examples of this group. It is important to note that there are significant regional differences within some member states. The economic structures of East Germany and Southern Italy significantly differ from those of their counterparts, and in many countries the capitals form distinct zones.

In the above paragraph the terms periphery, semi-periphery and core are deliberately used to create a link between the European division of labour and the global division of labour, as defined by dependency theory. There are clear parallels between the functional role of the global periphery and the European periphery, as both zones serve the purpose of sustaining their respective cores’ dominance. The global periphery fulfils this role by providing cheap labour as well as cheap raw materials. The European periphery on the other hand has imported the core’s goods using capital that was itself provided by the core. Nevertheless, apart from relatively high levels of unemployment, large irregular labour markets,
widespread corruption, and dependency on foreign aid, there are numerous differences between the European and the global periphery. The most striking difference is that the European periphery is significantly wealthier and more productive than the global periphery. Moreover, in the European periphery wealth is not necessarily an indicator of structural status.

At this point the contradictory nature of the EU’s division of labour becomes apparent. In the global power structure, the EU as a whole certainly forms part of the core, being much wealthier than the rest of the world. Nevertheless, in the European context, peripheral roles are played. In Cardoso’s terms (see Chapter 2), the region that was previously referred to the European periphery could thus be called a dependent and developed periphery. It is dependent because it depends on imports and capital from the core, and it is peripheral because it sustains the core’s structural position. This contradictory position finds a materialisation in European migration management; the Dublin Regulation makes no distinction between different European regimes of accumulation or structural zones. Migrants thus often feel as though they had not arrived in Europe yet, despite them being on EU territory. The economic crisis was similarly an expression of this contradiction, as a kind of fiscal policy was posthumously expected of the peripheral member states that their structural positions did not permit (e.g. trade surpluses to generate lower budget deficits). Nevertheless, while the crisis called for the introduction of European government bonds to decrease peripheral interest rates, the neoliberal austerity policies have actually increased the periphery’s structural dependency on the core, consolidating the core’s dominant position.

Conclusion

In this chapter, the neoliberal character of contemporary European integration was explored and its links with neofunctionalism were shown. The social purpose of neofunctionalist integration is to provide legitimacy for Europe’s neoliberal restructuring, especially when other forms of legitimacy (e.g. public consent) do not apply. Contemporary neoliberalism in Europe is therefore to a large extent
underpinned by neofunctionalist technocratic reasoning. The ideological links between neofunctionalism and neoliberalism are striking, and the compatibility of the two ideologies is therefore unsurprising. Neoliberal restructuring in turn consolidates the ascending hegemony of transnational capital.

At the same time, neofunctionalist neoliberalism has produced contradictions which find their manifestations in the precarious situation of irregular migrants (as well as other subaltern groups) in Europe. The two first contradictions that were discussed are arguably inherent features of the neoliberal governance regime. While nationalism is the result of neoliberal migration management whose construction was justified using neofunctionalist logic, biopolitics can be seen as an instance of Polanyi’s double movement. Crucially, both phenomena undermine the principles of neoliberalism and may bring about a new transformation of the political economy. Both nationalism and biopolitics require the extension of the state’s system of control. This is an expression of an increasingly authoritarian state apparatus, which undermines a consent-based hegemony of transnational capital. The development of a group of intellectuals to provide a public voice to irregular migrants could provide a unique perspective on this development which may aid this group in overcoming their subaltern position.

The third contradiction, albeit belonging to a different group, is nevertheless similarly the result of neofunctionalist neoliberalism. The stratification of the European political economy is certainly in part the result of the neoliberal principles underlying the common currency, which neglect macroeconomic mechanisms of convergence (such as European government bonds or measures to curb unemployment). Nevertheless, understanding these contradictions represents an important step towards bringing about the social changes necessary to overcome the neoliberal hegemonic programme.
Conclusion

Irregular migrants, the ‘spillover of misery’, live at the fringes of European society. Their material deprivation, their political exclusion, their reduction to being a ‘problem’ – these issues are related to the European integration process. This epitomises the social concern that forms the heart of this dissertation. If the aim of human emancipation is taken seriously, the structural causes underlying migrant subalternity in the European Union have to be demonstrated and brought into the open. In turn, the lived experience of irregular migrants can provide insight into the social purpose of European integration, which may in turn explain migrant subalternity.

As part of the retroductive logic of CGT, Chapter 1 attempted to address migrant subalternity by looking at the most popular theory of European integration: neofunctionalism. The theory’s positivist outlook and its lacking understanding of structural power make it an ill-suited approach for a critical study of the EU. Nevertheless, the closeness of its category to the emergence of the European asylum system, which in many ways contributes to irregular migrants’ precarious situation, calls for Haas’ theory to be closely examined. Chapter 1 thus proposes that the apparent relevance of neofunctionalism can be explained because the theory has in part shaped in the integration process in the area of migration management. This is evidenced by the results of explorative fieldwork and key informant interviews. While neofunctionalist integration is not necessarily neoliberal, it nevertheless poses dangers. If the theory’s technocratic vision of government is translated into political practice, this may result in the erosion of democracy. Furthermore, the theory’s reduction of exogenous factors to disturbing influences may result in inward-looking policymaking. Either way, neofunctionalism does not necessarily produce one type of political economy – it ought to be investigated why it has helped to shape Europe’s particular institutional arrangement.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 defined this dissertation’s research agenda and addressed methodology by looking at a different set of (proto-) theories. A combination of neo-Gramscian insights into structural power and dependency theory’s conceptualisation of global inequality permits for an understanding of the
(neofunctionalist) European integration within the practice of a neoliberal hegemonic programme as well as for a theorisation of migratory movements. Nevertheless, within the context of the study of European integration, authors using neo-Gramscian theory have displayed a slight elite-bias, despite Gramsci’s emphasis on the role of the subaltern. Subalternity ought to be seen not as a perpetually reproduced state of powerlessness and silence, but as a transitory state with concrete social roots that can be removed. Subalternity is thus an emancipatory term which aims at overcoming itself. Conceptualising the subaltern state of irregular migrations is therefore of prime importance to removing the obstacles that cause it. This literature review allowed for the definition of a research agenda that aimed to understand the social purpose of neofunctionalist European integration through an investigation of European migration management. This was attempted using empirical field research and interviews as well as using the theoretical tools provided by neo-Gramscian and dependency theory.

The third part presented the findings and conclusions. The practice of neofunctionalism in the area of migration management has resulted in the attempt to generate a reifying common European outlook on migratory movements. Internally, this permitted the partial harmonisation of asylum legislation. Externally, the EU has attempted to shield itself from irregular migrants through increased border surveillance. This policy of fortification has spilled over into the European neighbourhood, and the EU has strived to win over countries such as Turkey, Libya and Morocco through the offer of visa liberalisation programmes and financial assistance. EU policy has had a severe impact on the lives of irregular migrants in the European Union. Reification, commodification, biopolitics, the state of exception and xenophobia have become core aspects of these migrants’ everyday lives. True recognition, where migrants are recognised as fully fledged members of their host society, occurs rarely. Those who do attain EU citizenship tend to disassociate themselves from irregular migrants that remain at the margins. While EU migration management may be the outcome of the application of neofunctionalism’s technocratic logic, it is only through the context of the neoliberal hegemonic programme that it can be explained why neofunctionalist integration followed this particular trajectory. Nevertheless,
neoliberal migration management provides delivering fertile soil for nationalism and the increased application of biopolitics, as well as by reinforcing a divisive internal European division of labour that is in contradiction to an equally oppressive global division of labour. These contradictions may contribute to the unravelling of the European Union and a renaissance of nationalism which is a threat to the neoliberal order itself.

If the character of European integration is revealed at its weakest link, this forces one to draw a gloomy picture of the EU’s current state. While neofunctionalism implicitly assumes European integration to be a positive political project, the condition of Europe’s irregular immigrants leads one to question whether the EU is indeed a force for good. The technocratic character of the European Commission, the weakness of the European Parliament and the strength of the Council of the European Union rob the EU of the democratic accountability that the national governments of democratic states tend to possess. Democracy in the EU is further undermined by the evolution of the party system that was discussed briefly in Chapter 7: the grand coalition in the European Parliament and several member states including Germany reinforces the claim that there is no alternative to Europe’s current political economy and further marginalises the political left.

Nevertheless, it would false to portray the left as a victim of neoliberal neofunctionalism. In some cases, parties belonging to the Party of European Socialists have introduced nationalist rhetoric into own their electoral programmes. By abandoning the notion of class struggle, the left has permitted right-wing populist movements to occupy this terrain along with racism and xenophobia. In left-wing academia, this tendency is reflected by the tendency to refer to ‘neoliberal hegemony’ without identifying a particular social group with neoliberalism. There is no neoliberal class, there are merely classes whose capital accumulation strategy benefits from the implementation of neoliberal policies. In accordance with van Apeldoorn (2002) it was argued that a transnational capital class is a strong candidate for ascending hegemony. If the left fails to identify the danger inherent to the neoliberal social programme, the rise of nationalist political forces is one likely outcome. Apart from a new subalternity of irregular migrants in Europe, neoliberalism has resulted in increasing inequality and the growing
concentration of wealth in the richest segment of society (Piketty, 2014). Given neofunctionalism’s technocratic European governance apparatus, given the EU’s proneness to crises and neofunctionalism’s erroneous assumption that integration thrives on them, given the growing number of politically voiceless irregular migrants at the margins of European society, given that neoliberalism’s instrumental rationality has dominated the public debates of the early 21st century and given the ontological fit between neoliberalism and nationalism, nationalism becomes a possible alternative to neoliberalism. It is questionable to what extent the EU’s neoliberal free trade regimes can be sustained in the face of increasingly right-wing national governments with anti-EU agendas. Even the existence of the EU itself is threatened should a nationalist movement win elections in Germany or France, which, in turn, would lead to the re-erection of national boundaries. It is therefore high time for Europe’s political left to stop playing off the subaltern groups it claims to represent against another subaltern group that has recently arrived.

While it is clear that the arrival of millions of irregular migrants in the EU is unsustainable in the long run, a programme should be established to deal with the causes and consequences of irregular migration, which may contain the following points:

1. Creation of a European asylum agency: as was shown in Chapter 5, EASO already plays an important role in supporting the work of national asylum agencies. This EU agency could be transformed into a full-fledged EU asylum agency to replace the 28 national asylum agencies.

2. European asylum procedure: a common European asylum agency can only operate if there is a common asylum procedure. At the moment, the chance of one’s asylum application being accepted differs from member state to member state. The common procedures directive has been largely unsuccessful. This problem can be alleviated by instituting a common asylum procedure that is carried out by the European asylum agency.

3. European asylum fund: the European Refugee Fund provides insufficient funds for upgrading the accommodation facilities in all member states to the highest levels found in the EU. Some member states do not possess the
necessarily public money to provide for high-quality accommodation. The ERF should thus be increased from €3.1bn to €20bn for 2014-20 without cuts in other parts of the EU budget. This money can furthermore be used to assist the setting up of the European asylum agency.

4. European distribution key for asylum seekers: the Dublin system is no longer functional. Dublin transfers to countries such as Greece or Hungary have been suspended. The status quo should be maintained until the accommodation standards in all member states have been harmonised and until a common asylum procedure has been instated. When this is accomplished, a distribution key can help to distribute asylum seekers across the entire territory of the Union. The number of asylum seekers that each member state can accommodate should be determined by population size and economic strength.

5. European registration centres in conflict zones: asylum seekers should not depend on the reifying practice of smuggling to lodge their asylum applications in the EU. The Union should set up registration centres in conflict zones to permit asylum seekers to submit their application before having to resort to smugglers.

6. Deconstruction of fences along Schengen borders: border fences have not reduced the number of new irregular migrants in Europe. Furthermore, the incentive to construct them is significantly lower if the Dublin system is abolished and it no longer matters where an asylum seeker has entered EU territory.

7. Creation of legal ways to migrate to Europe: a clear boundary needs to be drawn between asylum and labour migration. There have to be legal ways for refugees and labour migrants to enter the EU. The latter group should not have to rely on an asylum application to have a chance to live in the EU. As opposed to the United States, Canada or Australia, the EU possesses no fully fledged regular immigration system. Such an immigration system should not only permit high-skilled labour to come to the EU, but it should also give low-skilled labour the opportunity to start an apprenticeship at a European enterprise. It ought to be emphasised that there will always be clandestinos, no matter which migration policy is
pursued. An effort should be made to provide them with a residency permit allowing them to join the regular labour market of the entire European Union.

8. Development policy: while Europe’s aging population has resulted in a need for immigration, it is clear that the EU cannot absorb unlimited numbers of new arrivals into its political economy. Therefore the causes of emigration from developing countries have to be addressed, requiring the EU to overhaul its development policy. By exporting subsidised agricultural products to developing countries, the EU has contributed to the destruction of local agriculture in these countries. This practice should be stopped immediately. Furthermore, the negotiation of free trade agreements with developing countries should be suspended. Agreements that had already been concluded with such countries should be phased out.

9. Arms exports: the EU and its member states have not only contributed to the arrival of large numbers of irregular migrants through its misguided development policy. By exporting arms to conflict zones (e.g. Kurdistan, Israel) as well as to countries that export them to conflict zones (e.g. Saudi-Arabia) the EU has fostered the escalation of several civil wars. Arms exports to countries outside the NATO alliance should be suspended altogether.

Although the implementation of these points would improve the situation of irregular migrants in the EU, for the long-term, a more sustainably approach to development policy is urgently called for. Some points contained within this programme would represent first steps towards overcoming the subaltern condition of irregular migrants in Europe today. Moreover, they would abandon some of the legal conditions that prevented irregular migrants from achieving group consciousness. Crucially, it is not the state that can turn the EU’s irregular immigrants into a strong political group with its own institutions and a political agenda. It is up to these migrants to establish a counter-hegemonic force amongst themselves, possibly using the existing structures of refugee councils. It may be the task of academia to provide the theoretical tools for irregular migrants to understand their structural position and the causes behind their subalternity.
Nevertheless, the inaccessibility of academic literature to the subaltern is one obstacle that stands in the way of accomplishing this task.

This dissertation has several limitations, which nevertheless open up interesting avenues for future research. Firstly, the number of interviews carried out with some groups of irregular migrants was lower than planned. At some research locations, one or more groups of interviewees could not be recruited. To some extent this was compensated for by interviews with members of other groups – nevertheless, a more balanced view could have been conveyed with more interviewees from all groups. Had there been no need for participant consent forms, this could have been achieved. However, interviews did not form the sole basis of my research. Visiting all research sites mentioned in this dissertation allowed me to get first-hand experience of the conditions on the ground. Secondly, and this relates closely to the first point, this dissertation contains an evident gender bias. Only three interviews were carried out with a female irregular migrant despite migration being a highly gendered experience. Although the inclusion of more female interviewees may have provided new insight into the experiences of biopolitics or reification, the conclusions as a whole would not have been majorly affected. This impression was reinforced by the interviews I carried out with women in Leipzig, which did not differ greatly from the interviews I carried out with men. Thirdly, the strength of the argument about neofunctionalism as an ideology of integration would have been greater had more interviews been cited. The influence of neofunctionalism on the course of European integration is arguably a research topic in itself. Finally, it was difficult to establish strict criteria for the selection of a critical case study. Flyvbjerg argues that ultimately “all that researchers can do is use their experience and intuition […] for their choice of case” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, 233). While good reasons were stated for the selection of migration management as a critical case study of European integration, a certain amount of intuition was nevertheless involved. It is possible that another researcher may see a different policy area as a critical case.

The retroductive process of CGT does not have an end point. Theories can be deepened, broadened, refined and connected to other approaches. All three points mentioned in the paragraph above open avenues for future agendas for
emancipation and research. Further interviews could be carried out with irregular migrants where the interviewees are confronted with the findings made in this dissertation. Since refugee councils seem to be the most established institutions voicing the concerns of irregular migrants, their emergence, their membership and their relationship with the state could be more closely investigated to examine irregular migrants’ current level of subaltern development. The importance of neofunctionalism’s influence as an ideology of integration could in turn be assessed in other key areas of European integration such as monetary policy or security and defence policy. Interviews would have to be carried out with administrators and policymakers from the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Moreover, Critical Grounded Theory’s compatibility with the single case study method could be further explored and more advanced criteria for the selection of case studies outlined. Finally, this dissertation did not explicitly delve into the notion of social reproduction. This would be a meaningful and complementary dimension to consider in potential future studies focusing on European integration and migration management (as informed by neofunctionalism) (Kofman & Raghuram, 2015).

In his work, Gramsci repeatedly advocates ‘pessimism of the intellect’ and ‘optimism of the will’ (e.g. 1971, 395). Gramsci painted a picture of the disunity of the subaltern and the hegemony of capital, while at the same fighting for emancipation in the Italian Communist Party. While this dissertation’s outlook on present and future of the European Union is undoubtedly gloomy, it is also important to highlight that irregular migrants have made an enormous difference to the trajectory of European integration, albeit being a subaltern group which represents less than one percent of the EU population. The absence of passport controls along the internal frontiers of the Schengen area was taken for granted by many Europeans. However, as the Schengen regime is increasingly being dismantled, it has become clear that irregular migrants have brought about radical changes through their unconsciously collective action. Furthermore, it should be noted that while the de facto merger of many European conservative and social-democrat parties may well be an instance of trasformismo, it also represents the failure of pure neoliberalism. While social democracy has largely accepted the
neoliberal consensus, conservatives have in turn adopted key social-democrat demands into their own political programmes (e.g. minimum wage laws in Germany). Moreover, Europe’s social-democrats remain democratically organised – it is up to the party members who do not agree with the neoliberal consensus to develop an alternative vision of the European Union that embodies the spirit of Gramsci and the Ventotene Manifesto.  

“This crisis must be exploited with decision and courage. In order to respond to our needs, the European revolution must be socialist, that is it must have as its goal the emancipation of the working classes and the realization for them of more humane living conditions” (Spinelli & Rossi, 2013).

The pioneers of the European project did not intend to build an avenue to further capital accumulation, but to create a fair and peaceful society.

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59 The Ventotene Manifesto was written by Alterio Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi during their imprisonment by Italy’s fascist Mussolini government. It is one of the foundational documents of European integration, forming the basic historical text of the European federalist movement. Spinelli served as European Commissioner for six years and as Member of the European Parliament for ten years. The largest building of the European Parliament in Brussels is named after him.
Epilogue

In some ways I wish I would have carried out my fieldwork later.

Since the summer of 2015 irregular migration has become the issue dominating discourse on European integration. Indeed, the question of whether migration management represents the weakest link of European integration has arguably been answered. The war in the Levant has escalated, with the so-called ‘Islamic State’ committing horrendous atrocities to the civilian populations of parts of Syria and Iraq. Afghanistan continues to be one of the least safe places in the world. This has caused hundreds of thousands of young Syrians, Iraqis and Afghans to embark for Europe, using mostly the perilous track across the Mediterranean that is described in this dissertation. In 2015 alone, 3,772 people drowned while trying to reach the European Union (IOM, 2016). Sweden, Austria and Germany have received the highest number of asylum applications per capita and the Dublin system is entirely dysfunctional. Germany alone received 1.1 million asylum applications in 2015. Calls to introduce a quota system have been rejected by Central and Eastern European states for a variety of reasons, including the fear of islamisation.

Hungary has built a fence along its frontier with Serbia and fellow EU member Croatia, forcing thousands of migrants to be stranded along the border. Austria has introduced a fixed upper limit on the number of asylum applications it will process per year. This is a significance step back from the civilizational accomplishment that the universal right to asylum represents. Austria, Germany, Denmark, France, Italy and Sweden have reintroduced border controls along their national frontiers. After more than twenty years of open borders such a move seemed unlikely to happen only a year ago – by now it seems likely that the Schengen system will remain dysfunctional for the time being. Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, has stated on the 20th of January 2016 that the Schengen system is “partially comatose,” adding that the euro “makes no sense” without the Schengen area (Escritt, 2016). The foundations of the EU as a whole are beginning to crumble.
Nevertheless, while this may have prompted me to change the focus of my field research to Germany and the Balkans, I would have only slightly changed my conclusions. The Dublin system is the product of a technocratic integration process that has arguably been informed by neofunctionalism. The failure of this system is in many ways the cause of the current crisis, which occurs because it is not possible for a single member state to deal with the crisis without the support of its European partners. It is pointless to evoke European solidarity – the Dublin system was never intended for burden-sharing.

I believe that the conclusion I come to in my dissertation is all the more poignant: the threat of nationalism looms over Europe like a sword of Damocles. Neofunctionalism has contributed to the current state of the EU through instilling its vision of technocratic governance. The European institutions have thus appeared distant and intransparent; popular identification with them has not sufficiently occurred, and the nation state remains as the main object of attachment. At the same time neoliberalism has inadvertently prepared the return of nationalism. In part, this was possible only because of the weakness of social democracy. In the UK, Germany, France or Greece it was social democrats who privatised parts of the welfare state and who introduced austerity measures. This undermined the credibility of a social democratic counter-narrative of European integration. Grand coalitions with the conservatives and Christian democrats have led to a blurring of the boundaries between the two traditional political camps. The extreme right has been portrayed as the common enemy, which has arguably become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Indeed, it no longer seems unthinkable for Marine Le Pen to win the French presidential elections, and the Alternative for Germany is disrupting the German political party system with its racist discourse. The war in Ukraine has shown that the Europeans of 2016 continue to be able to kill one another over nationalism.

It is clear that the EU no longer functions. Nevertheless, while identification with the European institutions remains low, most Europeans continue to believe in the idea of European integration in general (European Commission, 2015). Perhaps this crisis has the potential to produce a better European Union.
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