Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Klima, R, Bloembergen, D, Savani, R ORCID: 0000-0003-1262-7831, Tuyls, K, Hennes, D and Izzo, D (2016) Space Debris Removal: A Game Theoretic Analysis. Games, 7 (3). p. 20.

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Abstract

We analyse active space debris removal efforts from a strategic, game-theoretical perspective. Space debris are non-manoeuvrable, human-made objects orbiting Earth, which pose a significant threat to operational spacecraft. Active debris removal missions have been considered and investigated by different space agencies with the goal to protect valuable assets present in strategic orbital environments. An active debris removal mission is costly but has a positive effect for all satellites in the same orbital band. This leads to a dilemma: each agency is faced with the choice between the individually costly action of debris removal, which has a positive impact on all players; or wait and hope that others jump in and do the ‘dirty’ work. The risk of the latter action is that, if everyone waits the joint outcome will be catastrophic, leading to what in game theory is referred to as the ‘tragedy of the commons’. We introduce and thoroughly analyse this dilemma using empirical game theory and a space debris simulator. We consider two and three player settings and investigate the strategic properties and equilibria of the game, and find that the cost/benefit ratio of debris removal strongly affects the game dynamics.

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	11 Aug 2016 09:34
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 07:32
DOI:	10.3390/g7030020
Open Access URL:	https://doi.org/10.3390/g7030020
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3002872