Demougin, D 
ORCID: 0000-0002-1744-0390 and Fluet, C
(1998)
Mechanism sufficient statistic in the risk-neutral agency problem.
JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS-ZEITSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, 154 (4).
pp. 622-639.
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Abstract
This paper analyzes the efficient use of information in an agency relationship with moral hazard, when parties are risk-neutral. We show that, given an arbitrary information system, all relevant information from a mechanism-design point of view can be summarized by a binary statistic. We then show that this allows a complete ordering of information systems for the risk-neutral agency problem. These results are obtained under a weak convexity condition which does not rely on an exogenous ordering on signal sets. The condition is shown to be more general than existing requirements for justifying the first-order approach.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | D2, D8 |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 15 Aug 2016 09:59 |
| Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 07:32 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3002939 |
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