I—The Sense of Self



Dainton, Barry ORCID: 0000-0002-6705-2070
(2016) I—The Sense of Self. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 90 (1). 113 - 143.

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Abstract

Different conceptions of the nature of subjects of experience have very different implications for the sort of relationship which exists between subjects and their experiences. On my preferred view, since subjects consist of nothing but capacities for experience, the ‘having’ of an experience amounts to a subject’s producing it. This relationship may look to be problematic, but I argue that here at least appearances are deceptive. I then move on to consider some of the ways in which experiences can seem to have subjects or owners, and argue that those who take a ‘sense of self’ to be an essential feature of all forms of consciousness may well be mistaken.

Item Type: Article
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 01 Aug 2018 10:02
Last Modified: 26 Apr 2022 12:09
DOI: 10.1093/arisup/akw007
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3003414