Why essentialism requires two senses of necessity

McLeod, SK ORCID: 0000-0003-1457-2942 (2006) Why essentialism requires two senses of necessity. RATIO, 19 (1). pp. 77-91. ISSN 0034-0006, 1467-9329

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Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>I set up a dilemma, concerning metaphysical modality <jats:italic>de re</jats:italic>, for the essentialist opponent of a ‘two senses’ view of necessity. I focus specifically on Frank Jackson's two‐dimensional account in his <jats:italic>From Metaphysics to Ethics</jats:italic> (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). I set out the background to Jackson's conception of conceptual analysis and his rejection of a two senses view. I proceed to outline two purportedly objective (as opposed to epistemic) differences between metaphysical and logical necessity. I conclude that since one of these differences must hold and since each requires the adoption of a two senses view of necessity, essentialism is not consistent with the rejection of a two senses view.<jats:sup>1</jats:sup></jats:p>

Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	## TULIP Type: Articles/Papers (Journal) ##
Uncontrolled Keywords:	5003 Philosophy, 50 Philosophy and Religious Studies, 5002 History and Philosophy Of Specific Fields
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	17 Oct 2016 13:44
Last Modified:	07 Dec 2024 14:52
DOI:	10.1111/j.1467-9329.2006.00310.x
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3003823