It Pays to Pay in Bi-Matrix Games - a Rational Explanation for Bribery



Gupta, Anshul, Schewe, Sven ORCID: 0000-0002-9093-9518 and ACM,
(2015) It Pays to Pay in Bi-Matrix Games - a Rational Explanation for Bribery. In: Unspecified , 1361 - 1369.

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Item Type: Book Section
Uncontrolled Keywords: Nash Equilibrium, Bi-matrix Games, Leader Equilibrium
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 22 Feb 2017 10:56
Last Modified: 03 Apr 2021 12:10
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URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3005476