During the Occupation of France, food was a national obsession. Rationing and shortages were the focus of daily life, and the subject of countless conversations within families, between neighbours, or in the interminable queues outside shops. Here recipes and tips were shared, the government’s latest directives were discussed, rumours were spread, anxieties were nourished, and arguments were sparked. Food stories were rarely off the front pages of any of the authorized newspapers, fuelling food concerns. Food poverty threatened the health and well-being of young and old alike. In _Ritournelle de la faim_ (a novel inspired by his mother’s life in the 1930s and 1940s) J. M. G. Le Clézio defined wartime hunger as ‘une sensation étrange, durable, invariable, presque familière pourtant. Comme un hiver qui ne finirait pas’. Shortages commonly featured in urban children’s playground songs, with such telling refrains as ‘Y’a pas de pain chez nous’. Wartime diaries are littered with references to food issues, with inequality of access a recurrent theme. The journalist Jean Galtier-Boissière, for example, who enjoyed fine wining and dining before the war, reflected in his diary on the food riches available to some in the black-market restaurants of occupied Paris, while the Groult sisters detailed the ever-worsening restrictions, and the health consequences, in their _Journal à quatre mains._ Memories of the obsession lingered. When asked in 1969, twenty-five years after the Liberation, to identify the principal wartime preoccupation of the French, Marcel Verdier, the pharmacist interviewed in Marcel Ophüls’s _Le Chagrin et la pitié_, replied emphatically ‘La nourriture. La nourriture!’
Food is of course tied to human needs and desires; but—indeed, nowhere more so than in France—it is also tied to national culture and identity. In wartime, food can become a replacement currency, when, for example, neighbours swap eggs for fuel; or, on a more sinister level, it can be a means of control used by those with food power, rendering it in extreme cases a weapon of starvation. Beyond such material applications, but precisely because of its material significance, food can equally be employed as a formidable weapon of propaganda in a battle for influence over public opinion. Many French wartime players understood this, from Vichy itself, to the internal resistance and the resistance leadership outside France.

This article focuses on one war of words over food fought between two specific opposing Francés, namely the Vichy regime in France and Free France in London. While Vichy swamped French people with propaganda on radio (on which we shall focus here), on film and newsreels, and in the press, Free France’s principal means of communication with metropolitan France from June 1940 was the BBC’s French Service. Its most important programme was the thirty-minute *Les Français parlent aux Français*, broadcast daily at 8.30 p.m. between 6 September 1940 and 22 November 1944. During the Second World War, radio, then in its heyday, was heavily used as an instrument of propaganda by the different parties in the conflict. Its reach was significant in France, where between 31 and 43 per cent of households had a licensed wireless during the war, rising to between 47 and 58 per cent if estimated unlicensed sets are included. Germany and Vichy both feared the BBC; each banned listening in June and October 1940 respectively. But large numbers of people listened nonetheless, as Vichy knew. A report dated 16 October 1940, on public opinion in the occupied zone, confirmed that ‘à Paris, dans les files d’attente, au seuil des magasins des quartiers populaires comme des quartiers bourgeois, les gens échangent à haute voix
leurs commentaires sur la “Radio anglaise”.

Moreover, correspondence received by the BBC from later 1940 confirmed that listeners were tuning in across France, with one ‘typical’ letter received in May 1942 noting that 105 out of 110 wirelesses in a village of 150 households were regularly tuned to its broadcasts.

Jean-Louis Crémieux-Brilhac, a key Free France operative in London and later historian, argued that people in France listened to the BBC because they appreciated its swift reporting of news and thought it more lively and honest than Radio Vichy. He contended that the BBC’s influence was immense by 1944, as the landings approached, but noted that many were also by then listening regularly to Vichy’s star broadcaster, Philippe Henriot.

The ferocity of the war of words between Henriot and the French Service, to which further reference will be made, was perhaps the clearest confirmation that both sides considered radio work as war work, and strategically important in their propaganda efforts.

Research on wartime broadcasting in French has confirmed radio’s significance in the wider propaganda war, alongside the importance of the specific encounter between these two Frances. Hélène Eck, Aurélie Luneau, Tim Brooks and Kay Chadwick have all supported Crémieux-Brilhac’s conclusions about the BBC’s appeal to listeners in France, alongside the draw of Henriot’s broadcasts. Their analyses of programme substance and strategy have concentrated on the political and military messages propagated about resistance or collaboration, key incidents or players, or the progress of the conflict. The French Service and Vichy frequently mobilized the same topics to their respective propaganda ends, for example, Joan of Arc, the French Empire or Anglo-French historical relations; and food was no exception. Food’s critical importance to human survival gives it a tangible closeness to the everyday which renders it especially important in any war of words, and yet its importance to wartime radio propaganda has thus far been overlooked. By focussing on
food, this article offers a fresh understanding both of the lived experience of the Occupation and of the ways in which that propaganda functioned. It investigates how the French Service and Vichy dealt with the growing challenges of food production, supply and access in occupied France, competing to gain control of discourses about food in this time of shortage. It examines how both sides exploited food issues via a straightforward blame game in which each side held its enemies responsible for France’s food woes. For the French Service, this meant Vichy and Germany; for Vichy, it meant Britain and her Allies, the Free French abroad, and those considered unwelcome at home, principally foreigners, Jews and Communists. At the same time, the article analyses how both the French Service and Vichy mobilized food issues to speak to French people on trickier questions of national unity and solidarity, and assesses the problems they faced in their endeavours as they tried to square their claims and arguments with the experiences of the wider public.

II

The challenges posed by food production, supply and access grew incrementally from the early days of the Occupation. These, and the food-related behaviours they sparked, have been substantially explored by historians of the period. For example, Michel Cépède’s early study of food policy and output charts Vichy’s protracted efforts to establish a framework for agricultural activity in the form of the Corporation paysanne, positioning this alongside a narrative of falling production (especially after 1941, even in primarily agricultural regions), rising prices and diminishing rations. More recent analyses by Debbie Lackerstein and Éric Alary show that Vichy failed to understand farmers—despite claims to the contrary from Pétain—and failed to make the most of France’s agricultural potential, leading to
disintegrating relations with producers. For consumers, a ration ticket was no guarantee of supply, and German requisitioning exacerbated the shortages. The result was that, as Polymeris Voglis records, individual standard rations fell from 3000 calories per day before the war to 1365 calories in 1941 and 1115 in 1944, while those in Germany remained stable. People got by as best they could, by means of what Dominique Veillon calls ‘des ripostes graduées et multiformes’, such as help from family or friends who lived in better-provisioned rural areas, raising small animals for food in urban environments, or purchasing on the developing black market—whose existence was proof that food was readily available, albeit at a price. Elsewhere, Paul Sanders, Fabrice Grenard and Kenneth Mouré highlight how the wartime food situation fuelled extensive parallel- and black-market activity, produce fraud (for example, shopkeepers who watered down milk, or sold stale goods as fresh), small- and large-scale profiteering and crime, and was the root of significant corruption within official circles. Such studies reveal a disparity of experience between the financially comfortable and those with fewer means, and between town and country, which raised questions of fairness and cast shadows over notions of social and national cohesion. Generally, urban dwellers suffered more than country folk, with near-famine conditions in some cities. But it has been amply demonstrated that a simple town–country dichotomy is unsatisfactory, and that experiences across urban and rural France were uneven. Cépède notes, for instance, that Marseille endured more food deprivation than Paris, which benefited from a nearby self-sufficient agricultural tradition. Elsewhere, quasi-monocultural localities such as Hérault—where viticulture accounted for 80 per cent of output to the detriment of basic produce—meant food disadvantage, whereas polycultural Mayenne, where foodstuffs were the principal resource, was a ‘feeder’ department. Moreover, as demonstrated in Shannon Fogg’s study of the Limousin—a region of diverse
and plentiful agricultural production—such areas where there was a surplus faced significant demands both from requisitioning by Vichy and the Germans, and from ordinary people who travelled in search of food. Urban–rural relationships came under significant pressure as a result.\textsuperscript{22}

Understandably, then, food was a critical issue for Vichy to handle in its relations with civil society. The theme could be mobilized to Vichy’s advantage, if the regime could foster confidence in its ability to manage supply and distribution, if it could convince people that it was able to deal with food irregularities and crime, and if it could successfully lay the blame for food difficulties with its enemies. But the domestic food situation also posed huge problems for Vichy, and offered easy and potent ammunition to the French Service. Rationing and shortages were issues of discontent for a hungry population, well aware of Pétain’s promise—made in a radio broadcast on 13 August 1940—that the government’s first task would be to ‘procurer à tous [...] une alimentation suffisante’, and angered by the occupier’s pillaging of French resources in summer 1940 and by Vichy’s failure to prevent the Germans from excessive requisitioning.\textsuperscript{23} Vichy itself can have been in no doubt of the harsh food circumstances under which French people lived, or of their impact on public opinion. On 9 August, just days before Pétain’s broadcast, a summary of prefects’ reports on their regions noted that the food situation in many \textit{départements} was tragic, and that fears for the harvest suggested that worse was to come.\textsuperscript{24} Pétain’s broadcast is evidence of the political significance of food at the time, and was manifestly an attempt to reassure. But subsequent summary reports stressed the preoccupation of ordinary people with their worsening situation, as Vichy failed to deliver on its promise and fundamental foodstuffs became progressively rarer.\textsuperscript{25}
Food anxieties featured frequently in letters the BBC received from France from the early months of the Occupation. On 5 August 1940, for example, one correspondent wrote bitterly of the ‘pillage systématique des ressources françaises par les Allemands pourvus de francs qui ne leur coûtent rien’; on 9 September, another wrote that the Germans had just plundered the city of Clermont-Ferrand, leaving only two hundred sheep to feed the entire population that week; while, on 8 December, another lamented that ‘la nourriture se fait de plus en plus rare’.26 Such letters in all likelihood confirmed to the team in London that food was a valuable means to attack both Vichy and Germany, a conclusion borne out by the frequency with which French Service broadcasts thereafter operated to capitalize on French discontent. Moreover, as we shall see, food would subsequently be considered an important propaganda tool by the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE), which produced directives for BBC broadcast content from August 1941.27 But, equally, food was territory on which a bold defence of British action was needed, as Vichy repeatedly described France’s food problems to its list of British ‘crimes’. Its favourite strategy was to argue that Britain’s ongoing economic blockade of Germany, which had severe consequences for the provisioning of mainland Europe, was to blame for France’s hunger. The offensive began in earnest following Winston Churchill’s famous ‘The Few’ speech on 20 August 1940, in which he confirmed that Britain would not allow food to pass the blockade since this would either sustain Germany directly, or be pillaged by her from the countries under her control. In response, Paul Baudouin, Vichy’s ministre des Affaires étrangères, broadcast on 22 August that Britain’s blockade was ‘[un] terrible présage de famine’, and her commitment to maintain it was ‘un acte d’hostilité, pire peut-être que le douloureux attentat de Mers el-Kébir’.28 Setting France’s hunger in the context of the recent controversial incident at Mers el-Kébir, on the coast of then French Algeria—where Britain had attacked the French fleet
on 3 July 1940 to prevent Germany seizing the ships, causing 1,297 French deaths—was a
blatant attempt to foster Anglophobia by nurturing the idea that far more French would die
from hunger as a result of the blockade than had died at Mers el-Kébir. The French Service
was swift to respond. On 23 August, Pierre Bourdan and Georges Boris separately charged
Baudouin with lying. Both instead blamed what they termed the German blockade within
France, which forbade the movement of food from France’s provision-rich occupied zone to
the needier unoccupied zone.29 The policy militated against the sharing of foodstuffs
between French people, against promises by Pétain.30 Then, two days later, André Labarthe
lambasted the ‘pillage organisé’ of France by the occupier and, echoing Churchill, argued
that the blockade would hasten Germany’s defeat.31

The nature and tone of this opening engagement demonstrate that both Vichy and the
French Service considered the argument about food crucial to their propaganda, but that
each was also aware of the challenges it posed them. Vichy knew from its prefects’ reports
that problems with the circulation of food between and within the two zones were highly
damaging for both producers and consumers. It also knew that the French people blamed
these problems on the absence of an overall plan for food supply and distribution, which
put the regime in the front line for popular discontent.32 But if Vichy could tap into age-old
Anglo-French tensions and convince the population that Britain cared nothing for ordinary
French people, then this could shake confidence in Britain as a friend and ally, and possibly
divert critical attention from the regime. If effective propaganda is based on factual truth—
as the arch-propagandist Goebbels believed, and as the sociologist Ellul has discussed—then
this was a potentially damaging argument for the French Service, for none could deny the
reality of the Mers el-Kébir incident.33 Although not unconcerned by events off North Africa,
the French in France were, however, more likely to fixate on a truth closer to home and
more relevant to their personal circumstances. From September 1940, French Service strategy emphasized consistently that French privations resulted not from the British blockade, but from Germany’s calculated decision to starve the French by enacting a systematic plan to asset-strip France and reduce her to misery. The argument connected more intimately than Baudouin’s with the actual experiences of listeners. They knew that pre-war France had been virtually self-sufficient in a number of foodstuffs. Now, however, they could no longer access food produced elsewhere in the country and witnessed pillaging by the Germans first-hand, going hungry as a result, as the BBC’s correspondents from France had described.

When it came, rationing—presaged by Pétain in his broadcast on 13 August and introduced on 23 September 1940, and applying first to the staples of bread, meat, sugar and fats—was rapidly incorporated into this attack. As Grenard notes, the need for rationing in France had become apparent even before the Germans arrived in the summer of 1940, but its introduction corresponded in people’s minds with their presence, a context which compromised the creation and reception of the system. Georges Boris—a pre-war economist who became the French Service’s principal speaker on food and economic issues—capitalized on this association. On 27 September, he emphasized that German exactions and pillaging were the only explanation for the introduction of rationing in a country which had enjoyed near food autonomy pre-war. The occupier’s requirement that all French people be allocated lower rations than the Germans was proof that Hitler considered France an inferior country, and Vichy’s compliance was nothing short of capitulation. The possible power of such an argument was not to be underestimated. Conscious of the likely negative impact on public opinion of the introduction of rationing, Vichy sought in early October 1940 to dissociate itself from responsibility, and to emphasize
to French people ‘[que] l’armée d’occupation consomme sur notre territoire une portion
très appréciable de denrées alimentaires et que les taux des rations ont été fixés
conformément aux indications expresses des autorités allemandes’. 38 Pétain himself
broadcast the line to the French on 9 October, defining rationing as ‘une pénible nécessité’
and packaging it in moralistic terms which strove to boost faith in Vichy and to generate and
appeal to a sense of national solidarity: ‘[N]ous avons voulu assurer l’égalité de tous devant
le sacrifice’, he announced. ‘Chacun devra prendre sa part des privations communes sans
que la fortune puisse les épargner aux uns et la misère les rendre plus lourdes aux autres’. 39
But the regime was already failing on its promises, for, just days later, a report on the
situation in the occupied zone highlighted the ‘inégalité des fortunes’ faced by the Parisian
working classes. Obliged to survive on bread and potatoes due to a combination of the
scarcity of other foods at official prices and the high prices demanded by an already
emerging black market, they now found even these basics unobtainable. Moreover, while
milk was plentiful in rural regions, notably Normandy, supplies to Paris were painfully
irregular, a failing that was causing ‘incidents’ as shops turned customers away. France, the
report headlined starkly, was on the threshold of ‘un hiver qui s’annonce difficile’; and it
warned that public opinion was marked by anti-German feeling, a renewal of Anglophilia,
and a worrying detachment from Vichy, widely judged guilty of food mismanagement. 40 The
prevailing grim circumstances fired these attitudes, and they were compounded by the
French Service’s broadcasts. In November 1940, public opinion was judged ‘extrêmement
sensible à la propagande de la radio anglaise’, blaming Germany and Vichy for everything. 41
London knew this, and used propaganda to target specific communities. On 2 March 1941,
for example, a gendered, highly emotive broadcast by the evocatively named Mme Paris
praised demonstrations by Parisian mothers who had no milk for their children, while German soldiers had plenty.  

III

Food has been described as Vichy’s Achilles heel. The regime failed to honour its pledge of equality of access, and this was one of the major causes of the divorce between the regime and public opinion from 1941. Food miseries overshadowed the lives of many ordinary people during the extremely harsh winter of 1940–41. In his New Year broadcast on 31 December 1940, Pétain admitted that, in 1941, ‘nous aurons faim’. Unsurprisingly, he neither admitted to deficiencies by Vichy in food management nor attributed responsibility to Germany’s exactions, but instead blamed the war for depriving France of much of her harvest, as well as Britain’s ongoing blockade. But his earlier pledge to ensure ‘une alimentation suffisante’ was now modified. Vichy would do what it could, he said, but ‘Je fais appel à l’ingéniosité des Français pour qu’ils improvisent eux-mêmes les moyens de compléter leur alimentation’.  

Whether the message was intended or not, Pétain’s words can easily be construed as an endorsement of alternative methodologies and markets, and were no doubt thus interpreted by many French. Insufficient official rations inevitably prompted consumers to supplement their provisions elsewhere. In urban areas especially, by early 1941, those who could were already compensating for the shortcomings of Vichy’s systems. By May, the population was increasingly blaming the Ravitaillement général (RG)—Vichy’s food supply body—for their food problems, taxing it ‘de malhonnêteté et d’incapacité’. At the same time, Vichy’s systems brought it into conflict with food producers, discouraging observance
of its many rules. Farmers rapidly resented the low fixed food prices imposed by Vichy, as well as what they considered excessive requisitioning by the RG, considered unsympathetic to different local circumstances. In response, as Mouré argues, some farmers halted output, or withheld produce from official markets, either consuming more themselves or selling for better prices elsewhere.\footnote{46} Rationing, the black market, and a widespread perception that farmers were benefiting from the exceptional circumstances increased tensions between town and country, as wartime diaries and letters received by the BBC indicate.\footnote{47} But hunger-based antagonisms also raged within towns and cities. Here, for example, customers suspected shopkeepers of reserving stock for rich black-market clients and selling food intended for ordinary people to restaurants at inflated prices; or they grumbled about the priority cards accorded to certain consumers (principally \textit{familles nombreuses} and \textit{mutilés de guerre}) which allowed them to bypass queues.\footnote{48}

The fracturing of social and economic interests between rich and poor, city and countryside, posed a real challenge to both the French Service and Vichy’s efforts to foster French unity and solidarity, which both considered of significant political value in the wider wartime context. From August 1941, the British PWE’s French Service directives increasingly referred to mutual solidarity between the French in France as one of the most effective contributions to resistance which ordinary people could make. But the PWE was also aware that there was a ‘concrete problem of French unity’, and that broadcasts needed ‘to avoid any line which suggests that we are dividing France against herself’. To boost morale, it advised, the French ‘must be given every encouragement to think they are united, or are at least doing their utmost to sink their differences’. Food was an obvious theme to aid in the promotion of this message, given that ‘the major immediate preoccupations of Frenchmen are to get rid of the Germans and to get something into their tummies’.\footnote{49} Vichy was similarly
conscious of tensions across France, and that these needed to be addressed. To that end, it equally focussed on French solidarity, packaging this as a duty, as the PWE noted. In a retrospective document produced in March 1944, the PWE detailed how Vichy had striven consistently ‘to explain the worker and the farmer, the town and the country, one to the other, stressing the importance of their collaboration and mutual understanding’, manifestly in the interests of national cohesion. Both Vichy and the French Service endeavoured to tailor their food propaganda to convince these different communities that they recognized and were sympathetic to their particular (and often dissimilar) situations and grievances. Broadcast content was thus influenced by the increasingly fraught food situation on the ground, and by resultant food behaviour. As we shall see, encouraging ethical food conduct and positioning this as patriotic was central to their messages. Censuring greedy or dishonest food behaviour was an obvious way of connecting with the sentiments of hungry French. Food citizenship was encouraged from those who had more, whether farmers themselves, or those with useful connections in the country, or the financially comfortable who could buy easy access to food. But these strategies had to be implemented so that they did not alienate those whose food behaviour was not entirely principled, whether consumers looking to find ways to fill their stomachs or farmers keen to safeguard their livelihoods.

IV

Throughout the Occupation, both Vichy and the French Service expended much energy on getting France’s farmers on side. Vichy understood that it was important ‘de ne pas irriter profondément le paysan sur la bonne volonté duquel repose en définitive la bonne marche
du système’, for, if farmers could be persuaded to cooperate with Vichy’s food edicts, this
could serve to boost public opinion of the regime. For the French Service, if producers
could be convinced that Vichy was anti-farmer, this could serve to entrench negative
reception of Vichy’s food policies and foster support for resistance. Appealing to farmers,
the PWE directed, was thus a ‘long-term task’.

From summer 1940, Vichy strove to flatter farmers as key instruments of national
regeneration. Its star agricultural enterprise was intended to be the Corporation paysanne,
envisioned as an independent body which would unite France’s rural forces and—in Pétain’s
words—‘donner à la paysannerie la place qui lui a été longtemps refusée dans la nation’. But the Corporation failed to materialize as intended. Lackerstein contends that escalating
food shortages and German requisitioning instead swiftly turned it into ‘a state bureaucracy
to control supply and prices’. This fed farmers’ perceptions that it was, as Alary
summarizes, ‘une abstraction administrative conduisant à les éloigner du Maréchal’ and ‘un
instrument au service du pillage allemand’. Moreover, the delay between the
Corporation’s creation on 2 December 1940 and its formalization in law on 16 December
1942 proved damaging to its prospects, for, in between, farmers largely ignored its
projects. By the time the Corporation was finally established in 1943, it was too late to
reverse attitudes, and prefects commented that the body lacked authority over farmers.
The French Service forcefully exploited farmers’ perceptions of the Corporation, arguing on
4 July 1943 that it was ‘un produit du nazisme’ whose ‘tendance autoritaire’ threatened
their cherished autonomy. At the same time, broadcasts strove to foster confidence in the
Allies, emphasizing that French agricultural renewal was actively on their agenda for post-
war France. Together, these broadcasts contained a powerful double message: Vichy’s so-
called agricultural reforms had emptied the French countryside to the benefit of the
Germans and the detriment of farmers; and Germany—the ultimate food villain—was debilitating France with Vichy’s connivance.\textsuperscript{60}

The French Service’s representation of the Corporation paysanne formed just one component of its extensive programme from summer 1940 to persuade farmers that trusting in Vichy made neither financial nor patriotic sense. On 13 August, Pétain broadcast Vichy’s commitment to the rapid return of rural life to its usual rhythm after the disruption and devastation caused by the German invasion, pledging a significant pot of cash to hasten revitalization.\textsuperscript{61} The promise, and the strategy, went neither unnoticed nor unchallenged by the French Service. On 26 August, it also spoke to farmers in financial terms. Farmers were no fools, it said, and knew that Vichy’s promises meant nothing, for French agriculture would find itself sacrificed to the occupier in the same way as French industry. This would compound farmers’ current financial difficulties, for Germany would compel them to sell their produce to her at low prices, and poverty would result.\textsuperscript{62} Further thematically connected broadcasts followed from each side. On 31 December 1940, and no doubt in cognizance of their swift resentment of the RG, Pétain called on farmers to increase output in spite of the difficulties they faced, effectively positioning the assuaging of French hunger as their patriotic duty.\textsuperscript{63} Three weeks later, the French Service equally engaged with the question of output, albeit rather differently. Boris sympathized with farmers, stating that it was understandable that many preferred to halt their output rather than ruin themselves in a high-inflation context which meant that it cost more to produce food than could be recouped at official prices. A few exceptions aside, farmers were no profiteers, he asserted, but simply ‘de malheureuses victimes des Allemands tout comme les gens des villes’, a statement which, in the interests of promoting national solidarity, was no doubt intended as much for town-dwellers as for farmers themselves.\textsuperscript{64}
References to national solidarity pervaded Vichy’s addresses to farmers about the supply of wheat and the production of bread, a food staple of symbolic cultural value in France, as Strand notes.\textsuperscript{65} When bread poverty threatened France in spring 1941 and spring 1942, Vichy heaped blame on the British blockade and applied moral pressure on farmers. On 2 March 1941, Jean Achard, \textit{secrétaire d’État au Ravitaillement}, appealed to ‘le sentiment de solidarité des agriculteurs’, arguing that, since bread was sacred to them, they understood better than anyone its importance to every French person. But he added a healthy note of pragmatism in case this reasoning failed to persuade, offering farmers a time-limited financial incentive in return for their wheat.\textsuperscript{66} Subsequently, on 20 April, Pétain emphasized Vichy’s principles of service and obedience when he called on farmers to deliver their entire yield into the food chain, as required by Vichy’s food rules, defining respect for these by producers and consumers alike as ‘une discipline vitale pour tous’.\textsuperscript{67} In response, the French Service headlined the same message throughout 1941: German requisitioning and Vichy’s acquiescence, not farmers, were responsible for all instances of bread deficiency.\textsuperscript{68} But by October prefects across the occupied zone were complaining of ‘l’égoïsme paysan’, deploring behaviour which demonstrated ‘l’âpreté la plus sordide et un manque total de solidarité’.\textsuperscript{69} Farmers could not be challenged in such inflammatory terms, of course, if Vichy wanted their compliance. But, when the bread situation worsened in 1942, after another bad winter, Pétain adopted a harder line. On 29 March, he insisted that farmers deliver all their reserve wheat stocks to the RG within three weeks: hiding or wasting wheat would deprive country people and townsfolk alike of bread, and was ‘un crime impardonnable’; no farmer should fail to comply.\textsuperscript{70} On 16 April, Paul Creyssel, Vichy’s \textit{directeur des Services de la propagande} since 30 March, followed up with a cautionary broadcast, indicating that Pétain would much prefer farmers to hand over their wheat freely
than to have to coerce them. Then, on 20 April, Pierre Laval, reinstalled as head of the French government two days earlier, outlined his programme to ‘save’ France. Willing to employ a confrontational vocabulary, Laval stated that privations had resulted from widespread ‘égoïsme et appât de gain’. He then called for solidarity, before paying court to farmers’ ‘générosité quand la vie de France est en jeu’. Force was not the answer, he indicated, offering instead the inducement of the eventual return of their freedom to operate without state intervention, and asking them meanwhile to work the land in the national interest as passionately as he would defend it. Such broadcasts offered the French Service an opportunity to contend that Vichy was alternately threatening, blaming and flattering farmers; instead, it should acknowledge its own part, alongside Germany’s, in France’s hunger. Boris attacked Laval explicitly, claiming his reference to French greed was specifically directed at farmers. But farmers knew, he affirmed, that Laval’s masters—the Germans—were really to blame. Creyssel took to the airwaves again on 28 May 1942 to affirm that ‘la bataille du blé a été gagnée’, a claim no doubt designed to instil confidence in Vichy and to coax hesitant farmers into compliance. But the assertion was hollow, as confirmed by the continuing bread shortages on the official market, and by Vichy’s own repeated exhortations to farmers throughout 1942 and 1943.

A significant problem faced by the French Service was that Laval’s connection of French privations with greed in April 1942 had some basis in truth, and farmers in particular were in a position to profit. One striking letter sent to the BBC on 27 July 1942 noted that townsfolk largely held farmers responsible for the lack of goods at market and condemned their ‘goût de gain [qui] ne connai[t] aucune retenue’. In September, the PWE concluded that farmers’ unwillingness to send their produce to markets was a major factor in the poor urban food situation, and that the rift between town and country was becoming more
dangerous. The French Service was just as keen as Vichy for farmers not to withhold their produce. But it is notable that it never directly confronted farmers about their practices, preferring to engage with them differently. Where Vichy’s patriotism required farmers to turn their goods in to the RG, the French Service endorsed and encouraged non-compliance with Vichy. It offered farmers a moral alternative which suggested how they could operate in support of their compatriots, on the basis that ‘l’entraide de tous doit tenir les Allemands en échec’.

Notably, in 1943, the French Service promoted fair trade practices outside Vichy’s systems, calling on farmers to ‘organise[r] la vente directe, et à juste prix, de vos produits aux gens des villes’. Broadcasts emphasized Vichy’s willingness to adopt increasingly draconian measures—mimicking the occupier—to compel farmers to hand over their wheat reserves at one go, and called on farmers to deliver only the minimum required at regular monthly intervals. Keeping wheat back from Vichy and Germany in this way was ‘résistance énergique’ and part of ‘le bon combat pour la libération de notre patrie’.

Reserves should instead be put to ‘better’ use by donating them to ‘patriotes traqués’ in hiding from the STO. Boris pushed the patriotism button determinedly: Vichy was the ‘anti-France’ which had declared war on agricultural workers, thereby suggesting an easy logic which offered farmers an appealing self-image as the incarnation of the ‘true’ France.

In the light of the steadily worsening food situation, from early 1943 the PWE further emphasized that advocating complete solidarity between French people in France during the tough months ahead was an important way to help them realize how they could best contribute to ‘present and future resistance’. Any French in a relatively privileged position had to be made to understand that they should use that margin to help others less fortunately placed. Farmers were not the only ones to be food-privileged, of course, but they formed a substantial proportion of that category. So, putting the PWE’s policy into
practice, French Service broadcasts encouraged townsfolk and farmers respectively to understand the difficulties the other faced. Others profiled positive images of interaction and cooperation between town and country, no doubt in the hope that these would encourage their emulation across France. Many of these used children’s experiences as an emotional lever, either praising the aid farmers were already offering—such as taking in city children—or appealing for their help so that children might have enough to eat or so that more could escape urban misery. This portrait of French solidarity made no reference to instances of tension between suspicious farmers and anxious urban parents. Nor did it engage with increasing urban hostility to farmers throughout 1943, of which the PWE was well aware.

V

Vichy’s attack on Britain and her allies as France’s food enemies took on a new ferocity when Philippe Henriot entered the war of words in February 1942. A specialist in alarmism, Henriot unashamedly manipulated French hunger, endeavouring to stoke up Anglophobia in particular: France’s pain was intentional, he contended, for Britain was behind ‘des famines scientifiquement organisées’. Significantly, Henriot added ‘false’ French to the British on his list of food ‘criminals’. In one particularly emotive broadcast designed to alienate the inhabitants of metropolitan France from the Free French in London, Henriot argued that, well fed by the British, those in London had forgotten those who suffered at home as a result of Britain’s seizure of food cargo in passage from the French Empire to the metropole. As the Allies took Vichy-controlled Madagascar in May 1942, he described North Africa, ‘le dernier grenier de notre ravitaillement’, as a quarry on which Britain
preyed. Then, when the Allies landed in North Africa on 8 November 1942, cutting off supplies to France, while Creyssel soberly explained the food problems this posed for France, Henriot melodramatically foretold famine. On 18 November, Max Bonnafous, then Vichy’s ministre de l’Agriculture et du ravitaillement, also outlined the food difficulties France would face. In London, the PWE predicted that enemy propaganda would further exaggerate the deficiencies and present these as the ‘Anglo-Saxon seizure of larder’.

Henriot didn’t disappoint. On 6 December, he portrayed the British gorging on desirable foodstuffs such as oranges and figs which had been intended for France, but which had been offered up instead to the so-called liberator by ‘les Giraud, les Darlan, les Boisson’. These men had switched allegiance from Vichy to the Allies, before or at the time of the landing. Henriot’s message was unambiguous: French who thus ‘abandoned’ Vichy were the anti-France, and were colluding in the starvation of their compatriots back home.

Throughout 1943, Henriot further used food issues to try to undermine confidence in Britain as France’s friend and liberator. No doubt inspired by Vichy’s reports that public opinion was concerned about food supply following the landing, he repeatedly stressed that Britain had taken France’s Empire and her food, and that her blockade of continental Europe was intended to foment civil war in France. British actions had placed Vichy in the position where, in the absence of resources from North Africa, it had had to ask farmers to attempt the impossible if France were not to starve. Britain, not Vichy, was to blame for French hunger and for the pressure on farmers.

Blaming ‘outsiders’ for food shortages could unite ‘insiders’ in support of Vichy, but the case needed to be credible. The PWE considered that the French would not be convinced by Henriot’s claims when they were set against Germany’s systematic pillaging, especially because events in North Africa raised hopes in France of the shortening of the
Consequently, the French Service adopted a twin strategy: it reinforced its representation of the occupier’s food behaviour; and it contrasted the difficult food situation in France with the relatively better situation in Britain, where, contrary to the claims of German propaganda and despite rationing, the British did not go hungry. This was potentially a risky approach since it could rile hungry French. Indeed, the French Service conceded that it could seem cruel. But it justified its references to hunger, maintaining that these confirmed that listeners’ food pain was recognized, and that they had not been abandoned, as Henriot alleged. Moreover, it was equally essential, it explained, to communicate to those who might not have witnessed German pillaging that this was the true reason for their hunger. Other broadcasts profiled Britain’s rationing system as an efficient operation based on cooperation between government and growers, which ensured that Britons had at least ‘le nécessaire’.

The contrast with the failings of Vichy’s official food systems was stark, and unlikely to have been missed by listeners. Many people saw only too well the inconsistency between the dismal reality of their daily lives and propaganda films such as ‘Nourrir la France’ (1942) or ‘Terres fidèles’ (1942), which portrayed a regime in control, working hard successfully to manage food supply and distribution. People could see that there was food available, but that it was going to those with privilege, power, opportunity and money, often via the black market. Vichy officially deplored the black market, and the daily press was littered with the specifics of its food legislation alongside particulars of the punishments handed out. But Vichy itself did not practise what it preached. As Grenard demonstrates, Vichy used the black market to supply the restaurants its ministers frequented, protecting the traffickers involved from pursuit under its own laws. Elsewhere, dishonest RG staff misappropriated foodstuffs, facilitated trafficking or illegally traded ration tickets. The French Service
exploited this context with the aim of cultivating a disconnection between ordinary French people and Vichy. It contended that the regime fostered profiteering, for Vichy had made it easy for ‘un malin sans scrupule [de] faire son beurre dans la Révolution nationale’, but it neatly distinguished the unscrupulous from ‘le peuple français [qui] a soif de vengeance’. It also contrasted the situation of people who survived on a few francs a day with that of big-name Vichyites such as Darlan and Joseph Barthélemy, who ‘n’aime point à se priver’ and ate fabulous multi-course meals in fine ‘ministerial’ restaurants. Targeting high-ranking Vichy officials or discredited politicians who had espoused the German cause was a major tenet of PWE policy. Significantly, the PWE refused to implicate ordinary French people who worked in the lower ranks of Vichy’s administration; rather, they should be encouraged to help the Allied cause. But the PWE equally emphasized that these French could not be expected to speak openly in favour of resistance and Britain should not give the impression that this was expected. The policy demonstrates how important the PWE considered it not to alienate ordinary people in France. It thus sharply criticized Jacques Duchesne’s broadcast on 22 September 1942, in which he glibly maintained that Vichy’s supply and distribution inspectors had become ‘maîtres chanteurs, de véritables gangsters’. The PWE was concerned that such people, if attacked, might be discouraged from obstructing Germany’s exploitation of France. There is no evidence that French opinion received this broadcast badly. But the French Service was clearly back on message by 9 October, when Jacques Borel delivered a long broadcast which emphasized the distinction between corrupt Vichy officials and the ‘true’ ‘peuple français’. A significant problem for both Vichy and the French Service was that, for many in a position to profit, the pursuit of self-interest far outweighed the principle of national solidarity: unethical traders manipulated food prices and rules to their advantage;
unscrupulous rail or postal workers stole food parcels in transit; and even charitable
collections organized by Vichy’s Secours national were diverted for personal gain.\textsuperscript{109} A black market for food existed because the shortcomings of Vichy’s systems, combined with
Germany’s exactions, created the need for alternative food sources; and it spiralled during
the Occupation because needs grew as the situation on the ground worsened. As the black
market escalated, consumers reportedly wanted Vichy to impose stricter controls, together
with tough punishments for profiteers.\textsuperscript{110} However, as extensive archival research by
Grenard confirms, while in 1940–41, the black market was largely the preserve of profiteers
operating ‘en marge du commerce normal et honnête’, from late 1941 it came to involve
‘tout un peuple en marge de la légalité’.\textsuperscript{111} So, lambasting it in blanket terms could prove
counter-productive for both the French Service and Vichy. Such an approach could suggest a
lack of sensitivity to listeners forced to negotiate hugely difficult circumstances who, in
order to ‘get by’ or to ‘help out’, used aspects of the black market such as swapping or
trading foodstuffs, or buying direct at unofficial prices from producers in the country.\textsuperscript{112}

The French Service’s and Vichy’s respective points of view accidentally coincided when
both relativized the existence of the black market. Both consistently took issue with
recidivist profiteers, a strategy likely to find a receptive audience amongst the many people
who could not afford to access the black market, as well as those who used it but resented
the high prices they had to pay. Both targeted those they deemed responsible for the black
market (although their villains differed), exonerating the majority of French people. But
each side also found ways to rationalize the black market as this became more widespread,
often constructing their argument around their respective notions of patriotism and
national solidarity in an effort not to alienate opinion. In his New Year broadcast on 1
January 1942, for example, Pétain described black-market traffickers as ‘adversaires de
The same year, official propaganda films positioned profiteering as unpatriotic: in ‘La France est foutue’, for instance, a bright-eyed young patriot castigates a louche profiteer and extols the ‘real’ France. But, at the same time, Vichy’s approach evolved towards greater tolerance of small-scale trafficking, for on 15 March 1942, it passed a law which established ‘une répression différenciée’ between those who sold on the black market for profit, whose practices were deemed particularly harmful to France, and those who traded to feed their families. Radio propaganda took the attack on profiteers much further, to try to score precise political points. While Creyssel, for example, positively profiled Laval as the defender of ordinary French exploited by undefined black-market profiteers, Henriot added a political angle to the identity of black-market criminals which targeted Vichy’s enemies but without pointing the finger at French people generally. In an oblique nod to the legislation of March 1942, he affirmed that the black market did not mean farmers occasionally selling the odd item from the farm door, perhaps at a price modestly above the official rate, or ordinary folk driven by desperation to get food for their families. Rather, the black market meant the colossal trade in which the unscrupulous indulged. Highlighting two recent such incidents reported in the press, Henriot queried how many of those who operated in the black market were Gaullists or Anglophiles. This was a natural question to ask, he insisted sarcastically, given that ‘Pour les gaullistes de tout poil, en effet, le marché noir est une vertu patriotique, recommandée depuis le début par la radio anglaise’. The French Service’s encouragement to farmers from February 1943 not to hand over their foodstuffs to Vichy’s RG, which we noted earlier, was one example picked out by Henriot of its promotion of the black market. His equation was simple: food villains were all Gaullists and Anglophiles, justified in their behaviour by a French Service in London which had a skewed notion of patriotism and no care for the French collective. For its
part, the French Service held Germany and Vichy responsible for the black market. It contended that Vichy’s failure to feed France adequately condemned the less well-off to famine and prompted the wealthier to turn to the black market, intensifying social inequalities. Unjust as it was, without it many more French would die of hunger. The black market was also a means for the French Service to drive a wedge between the French people and Vichy. To that end, it argued that, while German pillaging and Vichy’s failings had brought about the black market, and while German use of the black market was exacerbating the problems, Laval preferred to place responsibility for it on ordinary people, who were simply trying to survive. As 1943 progressed, the black market underwent ‘un processus de légitimation patriotique’, with failure to respect rules increasingly presented as acts of sabotage and resistance. This evolution was reflected in French Service output, which positively spun black-market practices within a narrative of national solidarity. Hence, for example, it contrasted the torrent of black-market produce flooding to Germany—with Vichy’s connivance—to the ‘petites fournitures privées que commande la solidarité nationale’, which it represented as ‘un ruisselet qu’alimente l’amitié entre Français’. The message was one of empathy: those who calculatingly profited from the misery of others were very different to ordinary French people who exchanged or traded supplies in what the French Service termed a ‘marché blanc’.

Henriot repeatedly marshalled food-related incidents to cultivate a disconnection between ordinary French people and the resistance similar to the one fostered by the French Service between the people and Vichy. Thefts from farms, crop-burning and harvest sabotage occurred throughout the Occupation, but increased in number in 1943 and 1944. Such episodes became a focus for Henriot’s speciality of scaremongering propaganda, as he attempted to recruit to Vichy’s law and order message farmers who had
experienced or were fearful of attacks on their lands. Harvest fires were burning across France, he proclaimed, and farmers were being killed. Those responsible were ‘false’ French, ‘terrorists’ and ‘bandits’, his favourite terms for the Maquis, France’s domestic resistance movement.\textsuperscript{125} In early 1944, Henriot painted an unremittingly negative portrait of the Maquis as thieves, which was designed to isolate them from the nation by positioning ordinary French as their victims. Appealing to mothers in particular, on 9 February 1944, for example, he evoked the Maquis as ‘assassins d’enfants, affameurs d’enfants’ in his account of the theft on 19 January of 112 cases of condensed milk from a dairy factory in Rumilly (Haute-Savoie), carried out, he claimed, by a ruthless gang of forty so-called ‘patriotes’, most of them foreigners or Jews.\textsuperscript{126} Throughout February, the French Service responded with a positive portrayal of the Maquis as ‘fils de France’ and of a population ‘mobilisée pour les secourir’.\textsuperscript{127} It depicted Maquis fighters as honest and disciplined, who paid for goods they needed if these were not donated, who abided by a rulebook, and who dealt firmly with any undesirable elements.\textsuperscript{128} The truth behind the Rumilly affair is not known. No details have been traced in archives, and no newspaper reports have been found. An account of the incident written post-war by a local historian states that seventeen members of the Maquis took seventy cases of milk, some of which they donated to refugee children. This suggests that Henriot had exaggerated, a plausible conclusion given his tendency for alarmist propaganda. But, although the post-war narrative is ostensibly based on local archives, no traceable source is cited as proof.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the French Service’s representation of the Maquis would have rung hollow with those French who had faced shortages as a result of the Maquis’s requisitioning of supplies, or who had witnessed criminal food behaviour by ‘faux Maquis’ as opposed to ‘des résistants dignes de ce nom’.\textsuperscript{130} Neither representation of the Maquis can therefore be considered reliable. But together
they sharply demonstrate the relativities of interpretation in play at the time. What was important was whom the French chose to believe.

VI

Since food was so important to daily existence during the Occupation, winning the hunger blame game was a potentially valuable way for both the French Service and Vichy to score propaganda points against one another. Both consistently used the food supply situation to foster a disconnection between the French people and the ‘enemy’ and to promote their own narrative of patriotism. For each, affameurs were the villains of the wartime food landscape. As we have seen, in Vichy’s world this meant Britain, her allies, ‘false’ French abroad, and ‘undesirables’ at home; for the French Service it meant Vichy and Germany. It was an uncomplicated dichotomy which underpinned their respective propaganda endeavours throughout the Occupation. Despite Vichy’s intensive efforts, public opinion seems overall to have held the occupier and the government primarily responsible for the worsening domestic food situation, no doubt because Germany’s exactions and Vichy’s failings were directly experienced at close hand on a daily basis across France. The French Service constantly exploited the opportunities that this situation offered.

Trickier to handle for both the French Service and Vichy was the food behaviour of the French at large, as moral boundaries disintegrated in the difficult context of widespread hunger. Getting by and profiteering had to be differentiated if ordinary French were not to feel attacked, which could risk their wider alienation. While the French Service and Vichy both criticized large-scale profiteers, smaller-scale trading was downplayed. This meant that the food survival strategies of many ordinary people were linked both to the special
circumstances as well as to the message of French solidarity and patriotism which each side sought to promote in the interests of their overall political message. Farmers’ role in food supply and distribution rendered them a particular target for the respective propaganda efforts of the French Service and Vichy, and each constructed an appropriate empathizing narrative. In one respect, the French Service had the easier part, since, unlike Vichy, it did not have to deal with the fallout of farmers’ reluctance to comply with the food rules, something which put regime and paysannerie on a collision course. Whilst never itself directly criticizing farmers, the French Service took advantage of this situation to allege that Vichy was anti-farmer and could not be trusted.

To suggest that all farmers were driven by profit rather than patriotism, or that all town-dwellers suffered misery as a result of farmers’ practices, would be to fail to take sufficient account of the nuances of wartime behaviour and experience. Indeed, resistance was also an important feature of rural life in France. Many farmers supported the Maquis, especially as the landing in June 1944 approached, and must have abhorred Vichy’s propaganda.\textsuperscript{131} But, at the same time, prefects’ reports for Vichy in early 1944 especially show that other farmers regarded the Maquis’s requisitioning of food as theft, and must have wondered why the French Service called on them to support those they perceived as lawless.\textsuperscript{132} Equally, urban French who were living in food penury must have wondered why the French Service did not speak to farmers more robustly, while many who were surviving in all likelihood turned a deaf ear to the message of food solidarity. Such vast differences of experience and individual interest perhaps explain why both the French Service’s and Vichy’s efforts to foster national solidarity through food seem not to have been widely heeded. Indeed, their repeated calls for French unity were a tacit acknowledgement that disunity prevailed throughout the Occupation. Tensions even worsened in the early months
of 1944, giving serious cause for alarm. The French Service and Vichy both worked to gain the advantage in the battle for public opinion over food. But, in the end, and precisely in the interests of not alienating opinion, both opted for the safer territory of the middle ground in their discourse on food to ordinary French people. Food propaganda in France thus responded to sensitivities and competing interests, and was advanced in an uneasy and very uncharacteristic state of compromise.

---

1 P. Achard, *La Queue: ce qui s’y disait, ce qu’on y pensait* (Paris, 1945). This small, often ironic book was written between 1940 and 1942, inspired by conversations Achard overheard in queues. It was banned by the German censor and only published post-Occupation (E. Alary et al., *Les Français au quotidien, 1939–1949* (Paris, 2006), 268).


8 Lizzie Collingham notes how the Nazis used food against Polish Jews, for example, allocating them just 184 calories per day: The Taste of War: World War II and the Battle for Food (London, 2011), 5.


24 Synthèses 1940–1944, 9 August 1940.

25 For example, the report for 28 October 1940 notes that ‘la population se montre, à l’approche de l’hiver, de plus en plus sensible aux misères provoquées par le chômage croissant et aux difficultés—présentées et futures—du ravitaillement: bref, elle est beaucoup
plus absorbée par la situation matérielle, déjà mauvaise et qu’elle pressent pire, qu’elle ne s’intéresse aux problèmes de politique générale et à l’œuvre de reconstruction poursuivie par le Gouvernement’ (Synthèses 1940–1944).

26 Luneau, Je vous écris de France, 44, 52, 65.


30 ‘Les mensonges de M. Baudouin’ and ‘Réponse à M. Baudouin’, l[nstitut d’]H[istoire du] T[emps] P[resent], BBC French Scripts, folder B50 (June 1940)–folder B101 (September 1944), B52, 23 August 1940. Transcripts of the broadcasts may also be consulted at the BBC WAC.

31 ‘Le pillage organisé’, IHTP-B52, 25 August 1940.

32 Synthèses 1940–1944, 9 August 1940.


From 1935–38, France was 93.3 per cent self-sufficient in cereals, 99.5 per cent in potatoes, and 98.6 per cent in meat (R. Munting and J. Holderness, Crisis, Recovery and War: An Economic History of Continental Europe, 1918–1945 (Hemel Hempstead, 1991), 102).


Synthèses 1940–1944, 4 October 1940.

Pétain, Discours aux Français, 84.

Synthèses 1940–1944, 16 October 1940.

Ibid., 17 November 1940.

‘Manifestation à propos du lait’, IHTP-B59, 2 March 1941.


Pétain, Discours aux Français, 107–08.

Synthèses 1940–1944, 7 May 1941.

Mouré, ‘Rationing and the Black Market in France’, 269–70.


Achard, La Queue, 15–16; 31.

PWE directives, 14–28 December 1942, 4–18 October 1942.

PWE directives, 14–27 March 1944.

Synthèses 1940–1944, 7 May 1941.

PWE directives, 14–28 June 1942.

Pétain, Discours aux Français, 123.


Ibid., 197.

Synthèses 1940–1944, February 1943 and April 1943.

‘Aux paysans français’, IHTP-B88, 4 July 1943.


‘Amis paysans’, IHTP-B92, 3 October 1943.

Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, 74.

‘Appel aux paysans de France’, IHTP-B52, 26 August 1940.


‘L’inflation organisée’, IHTP-B57, 21 January 1941.


Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, 123.

‘Le rationnement de pain’, IHTP-B59, 4 March 1941; ‘La question du blé’, IHTP-B60, 5 April 1941; ‘Pas de pain’, IHTP-B61, 2 May 1941; ‘Le pain, instrument de manipulation’, IHTP-B62, 6 June 1941; ‘Régime sans pain’, IHTP-B65, 9 September 1941.

Synthèses 1940–1944, 15 October 1941. Complaints about farmers’ behaviour also appear in the reports dated 13 December 1941 and 13 January 1942.
70 Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, 243–44.


73 ‘Pénurie de pain’, IHTP-B72, 14 April 1942.

74 ‘Les paysans ne sont pas dupes’, IHTP-B72, 25 April 1942.

75 ‘Vêtir ceux qui sont nus’, in *PMF*, 22–24 (22).


77 PWE directives, 7–20 September 1942.

78 ‘Amis paysans’, IHTP-B78, 28 October 1942.

79 ‘Adresse aux paysans français’, IHTP-B89, 12 September 1943.

80 ‘Paysans français’, IHTP-B84, 27 February 1943.

81 ‘Le blé caché’, IHTP-B83, 23 March 1943. See also ‘La croisade du blé’, IHTP-B83, 18 March 1943; ‘L’aide donnée par la paysannerie française aux Français désignés à la déportation’, IHTP-B84, 3 April 1943.


84 ‘La situation des paysans français’, IHTP-B83, 12 March 1943; ‘Courrier de France’, IHTP-B84, 2 April 1943.

85 ‘Il faut que les enfants de France mangent’, IHTP-B84, 11 April 1943; ‘Paysans des Pyrénées accueillent des enfants des villes’, IHTP-B84, 15 April 1943; ‘Il faut que les enfants
de France mangent’, IHTP-B84, 28 April 1943; ‘Aux paysans français’, IHTP-B88, 23 August
1943; ‘Aux paysans et paysannes de France: recueillez les enfants des villes’, IHTP-B89, 5
September 1943.


87 ‘Hostility between town and country’, PWE directives, 14–27 March 1944.

1943) [hereafter *IRF*], 7–8, 26–27.


91 Creyssel, ‘Il n’y a pas de quoi illuminer!’, 12 November 1942, *PMF*, 91–95; Henriot,

92 ‘L’agression contre l’Afrique du Nord va imposer aux consommateurs français de

93 PWE directives, 29 November–13 December 1942.


95 Synthèses 1940–1944, 15 December 1942.

96 ‘Panneau électoral’, 10 January 1943, ‘Rivalités autour d’une épave’, 24 January 1943, and
‘La France partout perdante’, 16 May 1943, in Philippe Henriot, *Et s’ils débarquaient?* (Paris,

97 PWE directives, 29 November–13 December 1942; Synthèses 1940–1944, 15 December
1942.

‘Courrier de France’, IHTP-B82, 6 February 1943.


The films are available, listed by title only, at the Centre national du cinéma, BnF.


‘Portrait d’un profiteur de la défaite’, IHTP-B78, 9 October 1942.

‘La journée d’un Parisien sous l’occupation’, IHTP-B60, 30 April 1941; ‘La France affamée’, IHTP-B61, 6 May 1941; ‘Privations’, IHTP-B73, 11 May 1942. Barthélemy was ministre de la Justice between January 1941 and March 1943.

PWE directives, 2–15 August 1942.


Pétain, *Discours aux Français*, 212.

The film is available, listed by title only, at the Centre national du cinéma, BnF.


‘Paysans français’, IHTP-B82, 13 February 1943.

‘Il y a marché noir et marché noir’, IHTP-B87, 15 July 1943.


132 Synthèses 1940–1944, January, March and April 1944.

133 PWE directives, 14–27 March 1944.