Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem



Miller, Gregory ORCID: 0000-0003-0685-4632
(2018) Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem. Ratio, 31 (2). pp. 137-154.

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Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title><jats:p>Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted.</jats:p>

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Clinical Research
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 10 Apr 2017 13:40
Last Modified: 16 Mar 2024 14:33
DOI: 10.1111/rati.12166
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3006928