Gairing, M 
ORCID: 0000-0002-0569-7113, Kollias, K and Kotsialou, G
(2017)
Cost-sharing in generalised selfish routing.
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Abstract
© Springer International Publishing AG 2017. We study a generalisation of atomic selfish routing games where each player may control multiple flows which she routes seek-ing to minimise their aggregate cost. Such games emerge in various set-tings, such as traffic routing in road networks by competing ride-sharing applications or packet routing in communication networks by competing service providers who seek to optimise the quality of service of their cus-tomers. We study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in the induced games and we exhibit a separation from the single-commodity per player model by proving that the Shapley value is the only cost-sharing method that guarantees it. We also prove that the price of anarchy and price of stability is no larger than in the single-commodity model for general cost-sharing methods and general classes of convex cost functions. We close by giving results on the existence of pure Nash equilibria of a splittable variant of our model.
| Item Type: | Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified) |
|---|---|
| Uncontrolled Keywords: | 46 Information and Computing Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
| Date Deposited: | 19 May 2017 15:11 |
| Last Modified: | 07 Dec 2024 04:17 |
| DOI: | 10.1007/978-3-319-57586-5_23 |
| Related URLs: | |
| URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3007552 |
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