Mechanism Design for Ontology Alignment



Krysta, P, Li, M, Payne, TR ORCID: 0000-0002-0106-8731 and Zhi, N
(2017) Mechanism Design for Ontology Alignment. In: 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, 2017-5-8 - 2017-5-12, São Paulo, Brazil.

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Abstract

The aim of the ontology alignment problem is to find meaningful correspondences between two ontologies represented as collections of entities. This problem can be modelled as a novel mechanism design problem on an edge-weighted bipartite graph, where each side of the graph holds each agent's private entities, and the objective is to maximise the agents' social welfare. Having studied implementation in dominant strategies with and without payments, we report on findings that for truthful mechanisms, these problems need to be solved optimally. We also study greedy allocation rules with a first-price payment rule, and implementation in pure, mixed & Bayesian Nash equilibria, and have found tight bounds on the price of anarchy and stability.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Uncontrolled Keywords: Mechanism Design, Ontology Alignment, Non Cooperative Game Theory
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 02 Jun 2017 14:21
Last Modified: 19 Jan 2023 07:03
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3007798