Constrained Pure Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games



Simon, Sunil and Wojtczak, Dominik ORCID: 0000-0001-5560-0546
(2017) Constrained Pure Nash Equilibria in Polymatrix Games. .

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Abstract

We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on incoming edges from players who picked the same strategy augmented by a fixed integer bonus for picking a given strategy. These games capture the idea of coordination within a local neighbourhood in the absence of globally common strategies. We study the decision problem of checking whether a given set of strategy choices for a subset of the players is consistent with some pure Nash equilibrium or, alternatively, with all pure Nash equilibria. We identify the most natural tractable cases and show NP or coNP-completness of these problems already for unweighted DAGs.

Item Type: Conference or Workshop Item (Unspecified)
Additional Information: Extended version of a paper accepted to AAAI17
Uncontrolled Keywords: cs.GT, cs.GT
Depositing User: Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited: 03 Jul 2017 13:48
Last Modified: 19 Jan 2023 07:02
Related URLs:
URI: https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3008197