A defence of the resemblance meaning of 'What it's like'

Gaskin, RM ORCID: 0000-0003-2101-4674 (2019) A defence of the resemblance meaning of 'What it's like'. Mind, 128 (511). pp. 673-698.

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Official URL: https://academic.oup.com/mind/article-abstract/128...

Abstract

It is often held to be definitive of consciousness that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state. A consensus has arisen that ‘is like’ in relevant ‘what it is like’ locutions does not mean ‘resembles’. This paper argues that the consensus is mistaken. It is argued that a recently proposed ‘affective’ analysis of these locutions fails, but that a purported rival of the resemblance analysis, the property account, is in fact compatible with it. Some of the implications of this argument are briefly explored: it is suggested that the meaning of ‘what it’s like’ does not, in itself, have any special bearing on consciousness, and that the implications for the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness are deflationary.

Item Type:	Article
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	06 Nov 2017 10:59
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 06:51
DOI:	10.1093/mind/fzx023
Related URLs:	Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3011538