Balinski, Michel and Laraki, Rida ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424
(2014)
Judge: Don't Vote!
OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 62 (3).
pp. 483-511.
![]() |
Text
JudgVoteRevision2.ORstyle.pdf - Author Accepted Manuscript Download (474kB) |
Abstract
This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Uncontrolled Keywords: | methods of electing and ranking, Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, strategic manipulation, faithful representation, meaningful measurement, figure skating, presidential elections, jury decisions |
Depositing User: | Symplectic Admin |
Date Deposited: | 26 Jan 2018 11:40 |
Last Modified: | 19 Jan 2023 06:42 |
DOI: | 10.1287/opre.2014.1269 |
Related URLs: | |
URI: | https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3016771 |