Judge: Don't Vote!

Balinski, Michel and Laraki, Rida ORCID: 0000-0002-4898-2424 (2014) Judge: Don't Vote! OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 62 (3). pp. 483-511.

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Abstract

This article argues that the traditional model of the theory of social choice is not a good model and does not lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing. It presents a more meaningful and realistic model that leads naturally to a method of ranking and electing—majority judgment—that better meets the traditional criteria of what constitutes a good method. It gives descriptions of its successful use in several different practical situations and compares it with other methods including Condorcet's, Borda's, first-past-the-post, and approval voting.

Item Type:	Article
Uncontrolled Keywords:	methods of electing and ranking, Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, strategic manipulation, faithful representation, meaningful measurement, figure skating, presidential elections, jury decisions
Depositing User:	Symplectic Admin
Date Deposited:	26 Jan 2018 11:40
Last Modified:	19 Jan 2023 06:42
DOI:	10.1287/opre.2014.1269
Related URLs:	Author Publisher
URI:	https://livrepository.liverpool.ac.uk/id/eprint/3016771