Sovereign Power, Biopower, and the Reach of the West in an Age of Diaspora-Centred Development

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Abstract: Why at this particular historical moment has there emerged a rousing interest in the potential contribution of diasporas to the development of migrant sending states and why is this diaspora turn so pervasive throughout the global South? The central premise of this paper is that the rapid ascent of diaspora-centred development cannot be understood apart from historical developments in the West's approach to governing international spaces. Once predicated upon sovereign power, rule over distant others is increasingly coming to depend upon biopolitical projects which conspire to discipline and normalize the conduct of others at a distance so as to create self-reliant and resilient market actors. We argue that an age of diaspora-centred development has emerged as a consequence of this shift and is partly constitutive of it. We develop our argument with reference to Giorgio Agamben's "Homo Sacer" project and in particular the theological genealogy of Western political constructs he presents in his book The Kingdom and the Glory (2011). We provide for illustration profiles of three projects which have played a significant role in birthing and conditioning the current diaspora option: the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development Programme (K4D); the US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA); and the EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D). Drawing upon economic theology, we make a case for construing these projects as elements of the West’s emerging Oikonomia after the age of empire.

Abstract: 为什么在这个特别的历史时刻，出现了对移民的潜在贡献的热烈兴趣，并且 diaspora 活动在南半球的普及是为什么，并且为什么这一 diaspora 转向在各地如此普遍？这一论文的核心假设是，对国际空间的西方式治理方式的迅速上升，不能不理解为对遥远他者的治理。从基于主权权力的治理，变为通过生物政治项目来约束和规范化他人在遥远的治理，从而创造自给自足和有韧性的市场行动者。我们提出这一论点，并将其与吉奥尔吉·阿甘本的“Homo Sacer”项目及其对西方政治结构的神学根源的分析相联系。我们将通过三个项目的例子展示这些项目的形成和影响：世界银行的发展知识项目（K4D）；美国的国际移民参与联盟（IdEA）；以及欧盟/联合国的联合移民和发展倡议项目（JMDI-M4D）。在经济神学的框架下，我们将这些项目视为西式Oikonomia在帝国时代之后的元素。

Keywords: sovereignty, biopower, Oikonomia, diaspora, development, migration

关键词: 存在权、生物权力、Oikonomia、 Diaspora、发展、迁移
Introduction

The past decade has witnessed much buzz about a new development panacea: diaspora-centred development. De Haas (2012) reminds us that from 1945 to the present, attitudes towards emigration have oscillated between “development optimism” and “brain drain” pessimism. In a new twist, emigration today is being recast as a modern and even patriotic act that spawns transnational practices which furnish countries of origin with “brain gain”, “brain incubation” and “brain circulation” (Faist 2008; Glick Schiller 2012; Kuznetsov 2006, 2013; Leblang 2010; Mercer et al. 2008; Piper 2009; Saxenian 2006; Sørensen 2014). Once disparaged as disloyal quitters, deserters and sojourners, migrants are now feted in many sending states as development actors and benefactors of their homelands. There has followed a tsunami of interest in the ways that talented and entrepreneurial expatriate communities might transform, improve, scale up, and fortify the capacity and competitiveness of migrant-sending states and their firms, communities, and workers. From a position of systematic neglect, according to Gamlen (2014), more than half of all United Nations member states now have emigrant-focused institutions, diaspora building programmes and policy instruments that are designed to court and leverage the skills, knowledge, resources and contacts of diasporic communities (see also Agunias and Newland 2012; Boyle and Kitchin 2013; Delano 2014; Gamlen 2008; Ho 2011; Ho and Boyle 2015; Ho et al. 2015a, 2015b; IOM 2013) and even foreign constituencies who share a special affinity and belong to “elective diasporas” (Ancien et al. 2009; Jöns et al. 2015).

Why at this particular juncture has there emerged a rousing interest in the potential contribution of diasporas to the development of migrant sending states? Even if still unevenly engaged and variegated in its manifestations, why is this diaspora turn gaining traction throughout the global South? Contributing processes are likely to include globalization and the expansion of the world capitalist economy; an imaginative new phase of postcolonial nation building; the scale of international mobility and critical mass of migrant communities; upward mobility and the improved socio-economic status of migrants in some host states; new conversations between migrants and sending states enabled by revolutionary ICT and transport technologies; and host state efforts to assuage guilt and recompense for labour recruitment from the global South by recasting emigration as a development panacea. It is not our intention to dismiss any of these potential explanations. But our chosen approach locates the ascent of diaspora-centred development in the context of wider world historical events and privileges in particular the role of machinations of Western power in the global South after the age of empire. Our central argument is that the surfacing of the diaspora option at this historical moment cannot be understood apart from new articulations between sovereign power and biopower in the governmental machine of the West.

Our paper aligns with and advances recent research which draws attention to the political economy of the present diaspora turn. At the heart of this work is the claim that sending state diaspora engagement strategies are best thought of as globalizing governmentalities which work for sending states to increase competitive advantage in the neoliberalized globalized economy (Gray 2012; Kalm 2013; Larner 2007; Mohan 2008; Mullings 2011). This insight has prompted
reflection on the extent to which powerful development actors located in the
global North have played a role in sanctioning and sponsoring the age of dias-
pora-centred development. Pellerin and Mullings (2013) for example suggest that
the diaspora option is becoming a significant feature in development strategies be-
cause it is predicated upon underlying assumptions, ideologies and silences which
are consistent with the “Post-Washington Consensus”. Gamlen (2014) situates the
roots of diaspora-centred development in the emergence of a coherent but
decentralized system of global governance in the area of international migration
for a new focus on the wider material, intellectual and political context, and the
role of organizations such as the OECD, ILO, UN, IOM, UNDP, World Bank, US
State Department and EU, which actively shape the ideologies and practices of mi-
grant-sending states. Sinatti and Horst (2015) also suggest that host countries lo-
cated in the global North promote diaspora-centred development so as to
peddle Western-centric models of government and economy into migrant-sending
states in the global South.

We build our argument with reference to Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s
“Homo Sacer” project (1995–2015) and in particular the theological genealogy of
Western political constructs he presents in his book The Kingdom and the Glory
(2011). According to Dean (2013:195), The Kingdom and the Glory stands as a “mas-
sive achievement” and presents itself “like a jewel box containing the most perfect,
attentive analyses and the most lapidary of theses”, but he cautions that “the gems”
in this jewel box are to be admired principally for their “uniqueness” and prove to be “very hard, if not impossible, to apply and use, and to reproduce” (2013:197).
Our intention is to demonstrate that Agamben’s gems can indeed be put to pro-
ductive use, in our case to help us better understand the genesis of the age of dias-
pora-centred development. Agamben’s point of departure is the claim that
Foucault’s genealogy of biopower stops prematurely in the mid-18th century; in
fact, the emergence of biopower can be traced back to early Christian theology.
Whilst Foucault’s excavation supports the supposition that both forms of power
are best figured in isolation, Augustinian economic theology draws attention to
the need to understand how sovereign power (an omnipotent god) and biopower
(angelic intermediaries) combine in given historical circumstances to craft providen-
tial design where otherwise there might exist “godless anarchy”. For Agamben,
pace the Holy Trinity, sovereign power and biopower are to be thought of as
“antinomical but functionally” related.

The remainder of the paper is organized into three sections. The next section in-
troduces Agamben’s theological genealogy of economy and government, and ex-
cavates the analytics of government he offers in The Kingdom and the Glory. We
then profile three interventions which have played a significant role in the determi-
nation of the current diaspora turn—the World Bank’s Knowledge for Development
Programme (K4D), the US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance
(IdEA), and the EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D)—and note the ways in which they en-
courage sustainable development in countries in the global South by building and
fortifying institutional capacity, active citizens, market actors, and self-reliant and
resilient communities. Finally we use Agamben’s analytics of government to develop a reading of K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D as elements of the West’s economy of the subject or oikonomia, which work to export to the global South Western political and economic subjectivities so as to “civilize”, “normalize” and “mainstream” polities and economies which are perceived to be corrupt, threatening and failing.

**Sovereign Power and Biopower: “Antinomical But Functionally Related”?**

Scholarship on state power has ruminated over the status of two competing conceptions of power: a transcendent, juridico-institutional and sovereign paradigm (“power over”) and an immanent, governmental and biopolitical formulation (“power to”) (Agamben 2009a). Inspired by Foucault, many scholars claim to discern a historical shift in favour of the latter since the mid-18th century, at least in advanced liberal Western states. To them, power, understood as domination over territory and absolute authority, has ceded to new machinations centred upon the management of populations through the promotion of new modes of subjectification. A fresh analytics of government has been called for, one which registers the importance of governing technes or dispositifs which craft responsible, self-disciplining, resilient and mainstreamed “active citizens”—in the neoliberal age, de facto self-reliant market actors. Concomitantly, debate has emerged over whether this shift applies equally to the actions of states and institutions in the international arena (Acuto and Curtis 2013; Dean 2007; Depledge 2014; Joseph 2010, 2012, 2014; Larner and Walters 2004). Once predicated upon sovereign power and brute force, attempts by the West to rule over distant others increasingly depends upon globalizing governmentalities and biopolitical projects which remotely discipline, normalize and align conduct. Where once there was colonial violence, imperialism and neo-colonial puppet regimes, now in addition there are governing assemblages and networks comprising multiple actors, technologies and calculative schema (standards, peer review and benchmarks).

Within studies of biopower, there has arisen a tension between those who advocate for hierarchical and top down ontologies on the one hand and those who commit to flat(er) ontologies on the other. Specifically, how best to decide between, reconcile and/or co-mobilize political economy perspectives and assemblages studies has proven contentious (Muller 2015). Some scholars foreground the ongoing importance of political economy, power geometries over the surface of the earth, and the uneven development of political capacity over space (Brenner et al. 2011; Joseph 2012). Whilst bringing questions of hegemony and governmentality into productive conversation, these scholars arguably pay insufficient attention to the claim that power is rhizomatic, dispersed, decentred and fragmented, a productive resource exercised by all actors populating networks. Informed by recent attempts to formulate flat(er) ontologies (Jones et al. 2007; Marston et al. 2005), other scholars refuse the apparent contradiction between “highly structured assemblages” and “unstably heterogeneous assemblages” (McFarlane 2009). Anderson and McFarlane (2011) and Anderson et al. (2012) focus on the importance of examining “powerful assemblages” alongside “power in assemblages” (see also
Allen 2011), and emphasize the ways in which assemblages studies might nourish and enrich political economy. But there can be a tendency in these studies to under-contextualize assemblages, take flight from questions of causality, and occlude class relations and the centring presence of hegemons in biopolitical projects.

A particularly sophisticated account of biopower and its relationship to sovereign power can be found in Giorgio Agamben's “theological genealogy” of Western political constructs presented in The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Government (Agamben 2011, originally published in Italian in 2007). Agamben's “Homo Sacer” series, of which this book is part,1 constitutes a highly original exploration of the formative influence of classical, Christian, and medieval political, economic, legal, and linguistic history, in contemporary forms of Western power and political theory. In the seminal opening text Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Agamben (1995) attends to the ongoing significance of sovereign power. For Agamben, the exercise of sovereignty by Western states today renders a “state of exception”, which strips citizens of political status (bio) and degrades them to “bare life” (zoe) by placing them outside of law and juridical protection (see also Agamben 2005). The “camp” is now sovereign power’s most emblematic expression. In contrast, The Kingdom and the Glory, arguably Agamben's most Foucauldian work, now registers the importance of governmentality and biopower. Here Agamben brings to the fore indirect rule from a distance through rationalities, dispositifs and technes of subjectification. But he rejects Foucault’s impulse to “cut off the king’s head”; his preference is for the maxim “the king rules but does not govern” (Rabinow and Rose 2006). Both sovereign power and biopower may be “antinomical” but they are “functionally related”.

In The Kingdom and the Glory, Agamben presents a detailed genealogy of what he calls “signatures of power” (see also Agamben 2009b). Criticizing Foucault's genealogy of governmentality and biopower for extending back only to the 1700s, Agamben traces these concepts to Christian theologians from the second to the fifth century AD. For Agamben, there is much to be gained theoretically and politically from tracking Western political constructs back to their classical and theological roots. Archaeological excavations and philological investigations which reach back to Augustine of Hippo and beyond, render a richer historiography of Western political theory and practice. More importantly, the use of allegorical reasoning on the bases of sacred texts also enlivens our understanding of the machinations of Western power at work both in the West itself and throughout the global South after the age of empire. Whilst often figured in isolation, if we accept that Trinitarian theology has served as a progenitor of Western political philosophy and in particular conceptions of sovereign power and biopower in Western political theory and practice, it becomes possible to think anew about the ways in which both forms of power exist as consubstantial, each implicated in the other.

Agamben contends that the modern dualism between sovereign power and biopower is but a secularized reworking of the early Christian dualism between God as transcendent (God as a supernatural being, a Godhead) and God as immanent (God as worldly praxis). This dualism spawned two theological traditions: a political theology concerned with God as a supreme but detached being, and an economic theology that reveals God’s interventions in worldly affairs. It also birthed

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two paradigms of power, juxtaposed as being and praxis, transcendent and immanent order, father and son, constituent and constituted power, law and the police, auctoritas and potestas, general providence and special providence, and above all, reign and government (Agamben 2009a). Early Christian theology toiled to affect a unity between these two paradigms and theological traditions but found a resolution in Trinitarian theology. God created humans as autonomous beings and understood the potential for this to create immanent anarchy. Eschatology reminds us that God retains sovereign power. But he (sic) also intercedes in the world indirectly using angelic intermediaries to discipline, regulate, and mainstream human behaviour so that it aligns with his (sic) divine plan. For Agamben (2011: 141), both forms of power are consubstantial:

The two levels are strictly entwined, so that the first founds, legitimates, and makes possible the second, while the second concretely puts into practice in the chain of causes and effects the general decisions of the divine mind. The government of the world is what results from this functional correlation.

Whilst Foucault prioritizes the decentred, dispersed and diffuse micro-physics of biopower, economic theology points to the ongoing proximity of sovereign power to governmentality and holds that biopower remains in important ways centred, hierarchical and orchestrated power. In making this case Agamben introduces the concept of oikonomia. Of Greek origin and promulgated by the Roman Empire, and in contradistinction to the notion polis which refers to the contested governance of the city, oikonomia refers to the management or administration of the household (Agamben 2011). He traces the development of this term within early Christianity and its appropriation into Trinitarian theology. Oikonomia came to be understood as a form of economy that was less determined than monist economies, and more determined than the Foucauldian notion of dispositif might imply. Oikonomic practices work to realize God's divine plan and to establish providential design on earth. Agamben argues that the sensibility of this concept continues to be found in the West's governmental machine. Only that it is no longer angels who serve as intermediaries between the sovereign and the governed, but the disciplining rationalities, technologies, and modes of subjectification which comprise the West's oikonomia.

Economic theology calls attention to the role of the aesthetics of oikonomia in the gathering of convinced believers. Agamben closes The Kingdom and the Glory with the image of the “empty throne” to capture the puzzling relationship between power and glory. Given that sheer power is capable of total domination, why Agamben muses, does it seem that power has an acute need for glory? In fact, glorification, doxology and acclaim are central in the constitution of sovereigns qua sovereigns. But forms of acclamation and doxology change as democratic societies mature. In the past, God's sovereignty was acclaimed through liturgy and ritual, and the insignia of monarchical power centred upon ceremony, splendour, crowns, thrones, and sceptres. Today, under the disapproving gaze of secular democrats, the significance of these rituals and invented traditions has waned. Yet acclamatory practices have not gone away. In our heavily mediated society the mass media plays
a crucial role in manufacturing consent. It serves as the principal instrument through which glory is attributed, managed, dispensed and distributed. In the society of the spectacle, the legitimacy of sovereign power increasingly rests upon the sensational and celebrity qualities of the oikonomic practices with which it is associated.

Can there be resistance to particular oikonomic practices and if so what form might such resistance take? For Agamben, sedition is rarely capable of overturning hegemonic oikonomia. Instead it is most productive when it stands as radically indifferent to, and simply profanes, the logic of these technes of power. We should not look for revolution but respond to hierarchies and power asymmetries by deactivating the categories permitting them to function. Agamben uses the concept of inoperosity to capture what is at stake: the West's governing oikonomia can be rendered inoperative if populations engage them through cognitive practices which depart from those originally intended by their architects. Profanation renders oikonomia inoperative when they systemically ignore their proper or sacred purpose, creatively play with these purposes, or draw them into alternative secular uses. The task at hand is to de-sacralize relationships which have been rendered divine through various types of consecration and to allow these relationships to be returned to their original use/natural state, or to become means without ends (Agamben 2007).

We wish to mobilize Agamben's analytics of government to yield insights into the role of Western power and its changing forms in the ascent of the phenomenon of diaspora-centred development. We build our argument in two stages. In the next section we profile three development projects originating in the global North which have played an important role in bringing the diaspora option to the global South: the World Bank's Knowledge for Development Programme (K4D); the US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA); and the EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative Migration4Development project (JMDI-M4D). We note the ways in which these projects seek to couple diasporas with homelands so as to build in sending states institutional capacity, fortify market actors, nurture active citizens, and thereafter promote sustainable development. In the section which follows, pace Agamben, we then contemplate the ways in which economic theology might enrich our understanding of these projects. We consider the implications of thinking of sovereign power and biopower as antinomical but functionally related; interpreting K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D as elements in the West's providential oikonomia. Whilst galvanizing an acclaiming public in the global South by mobilizing an aesthetic based on spectacle, heroes and celebrity, these oikonomic practices are also routinely gamed or profaned and frequently rendered inoperative.

**Building Sustainable Development in the Global South:**

**The Discovery of the Diaspora Option**

Oriented by policy dogmas which have been labelled the Washington Consensus, for some time now the international development sector has focused its attention on macro-economic reform in countries in the global South. Underdevelopment, it is argued, is a product of corrupt polities and institutional weakness and failure; the solution is to erect Western style institutional architectures which are guarantors
of basic economic and political freedoms; transparent, accountable and underpinned by the rule of law; and predicated upon appropriate incentive structures. But alongside these macro-economic corrections, and inspired in part by debate on the need for a Post-Washington Consensus, the international development community has also sought to catalyse development by building the capacity of the peoples of the global South; enhancing the social capital of communities, building the skills of workers, activating citizens, and promoting the competitiveness of market actors. The prevailing political economy has been assumed as a given; the prescription has been to equip the poor to better compete.

It is against this backdrop that the current enthusiasm for the diaspora option is to be understood. Overseas citizens are an asset or tool to be used by sending states as a source of competitive advantage. In addition to well established contributions (through remittances, philanthropy, tourist visits, the consumption of “nostalgia goods”, voluntarism, and circular and return migration), migrant communities are now to be engaged as investors, mentors, sources of knowledge, brokers, and lobbyists. Sending states are being encouraged to develop a series of policy initiatives—diaspora strategies—to better convene, leverage, harness, and fortify their relationships with well positioned, resourceful and “ethnopreneurial” expatriate communities. Complementing the emerging Post-Washington Consensus, diaspora strategies are to buttress the capacity and competitiveness of sending states and their firms, communities, and workers. The overall objective is the integration of countries in the global South into the global capitalist economy and the promotion of self-sustaining, self-reliant, and resilient development.

To illuminate this claim we now place under scrutiny three development projects originating in the global North which have played an important role in bringing the diaspora option to the global South: K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D. The aims, objectives, and methodologies of each differ. The K4D programme focuses on building diaspora knowledge networks by bridging diaspora elites with better performing institutions in the homeland. IdEA seeks to tie diaspora-centred development to US foreign policy and courts diaspora constituencies with complimentary ideological leanings. Occupied with “managed migration”, JMDI-M4D builds the social, cultural, economic, and political capital of small-scale actors by mobilizing and connecting local and regional governments in both host and destination countries. The end goal though is the same in each case, namely to reconstitute the relationship between diasporas and homelands so as to build the resilience of institutions, communities, citizens, and market actors in the global South so that they become self-reliant, responsible, and self-sustaining—at least according to Western standards.

**The World Bank’s Knowledge for Development Programme (K4D)**

The World Bank’s K4D programme can be traced to the Bank’s response to widespread critiques of the macro-economic stability (and austerity) programmes or structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) it visited upon debt-ridden countries in the global South from the 1980s. In 1996 the new President of the Bank, James
Wolfensohn, launched a comprehensive development framework (CDF) to recast the Bank’s approach towards international development. The CDF comprised two main initiatives; poverty reduction strategies (PRSs) and the K4D programme. The main objective of the K4D programme is to build the capacity of client countries (mainly in the global South) by furnishing them with “development knowledge”, directly by drawing upon the Bank’s development experience (it reframed itself as a “knowledge bank”) and indirectly by mobilizing knowledge brokers from the development industry in the global North. Client countries would assume ownership over their development and become, at least from the perspective of the Bank, more autonomous, self-reliant, and resilient market actors. Whilst the CDF presented itself as an abrupt departure from the macro-economic adjustment programmes of the past, the Bank continues to be wedded to a neoliberal model of development. The K4D programme is both aligned to and consistent with the Post-Washington Consensus.

At the heart of the K4D programme are the Knowledge Economy Framework (KEF) and the Knowledge Assessment Methodology (KAM). The KEF identifies four factors that combine to determine the knowledge resources of a country: (1) the prevailing economic and institutional regime; (2) the quality, education, and skill of the workforce; (3) the status of ICT infrastructure; and (4) the domestic innovation ecosystem. KAM is a tool that provides an assessment of countries’ and regions’ readiness for the knowledge economy through comparison with their peers. Organized around the four key factors identified in the KEF, KAM incorporates 148 KPI variables and provides measures for 146 countries. A variety of KAM scorecards are provided, including a Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) which assesses the extent to which countries are producing, accessing, disseminating and adopting knowledge relevant to their development.

To help client countries address deficits registered in KAM scorecards, the World Bank Institute launched a Skills and Innovation Policy (SIP) programme that provides analytical reports and distils pertinent “development knowledge” for client countries. The SIP programme prioritized five key themes, among which is “Diasporas of Highly Skilled and Migration of Talent”. The Bank has long recognized that diasporas contribute to the development of countries of origin through remittances and volunteerism. But inspired by Saxenian’s (2006) pioneering work on ethnic communities in Silicon Valley—Chinese, Indian, Taiwanese, Israeli, and more recently Armenian—that leverage social and business webs to promote development in their respective “homelands”, it is their role in enhancing the knowledge base of countries of origin that has prompted new directions. Starting with projects in El Salvador, the Bank first became involved in pilot initiatives in Argentina, Armenia, Chile, Mexico, and South Africa (Kuznetsov 2006). More recently, in conjunction with the McArthur Foundation and the Migration Policy Institute, it has explored the ways in which talent abroad has acted to transform domestic institutions and build indigenous capacity in Mexico, Russia, India, South Korea, and Argentina (Kuznetsov 2013).

The Bank rejects generalized appeals to diasporas, speculative partner search calls, and support for amorphous diaspora cultural and business networks as largely ineffective (Kuznetsov 2013). Instead it prefers to partner elite diaspora individuals with decisive and critical knowledge and high performing institutions and
actors in sending states who are well placed to use this knowledge (Kuznetsov 2013). A small number of high-level expatriates can make a significant difference when they serve as “antennas”, detecting entrepreneurial and dynamic segments of domestic institutions; as “search networks” to identify ongoing constraints in these institutions, finding solutions, and mobilizing expertise; and as “Archimedean levers”, bridging the competencies of the diaspora with more promising domestic institutions (Kuznetsov 2013).

According to the Bank, the case of Global Scot, an elite diaspora business network established by Scottish Development International to support the globalization of SMEs from Scotland, provides a good example of how to build special purpose networks. The Bank has sought to replicate this model in Chile (Chile Global), Mexico (Red de Talentos), South Africa (Global South Africa), and Argentina (Mendoza Emprende). The Bank’s celebrated story is of the contribution made by Chilean applied geneticist Ramón L. García to the Chilean agribusiness sector. After securing a PhD from the University of Iowa, García achieved success as a biotechnology entrepreneur and co-founded InterLink Biotechnologies, a company located in Princeton, NJ. In 1977, inspired by his roots and wishing to exploit opportunity costs, García contacted Fundación Chile, a Chilean private–public entity responsible for encouraging technology transfer into Chile. Their joint projects helped transfer to Chile technologies crucial to its continued competitiveness in the agribusiness sector.

**The US-based International Diaspora Engagement Alliance (IdEA)**

In 2010, the US Department of State and USAid launched a cost cutting Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR). Other than a strong military for defence, there is now new emphasis upon diplomacy and development, or what then Secretary of State Hilary Clinton variously labelled “smart power”, “civilian power”, and “21st century statecraft”. The first QDDR restructured the Foreign Service, making ambassadors and heads of mission the coordinators of the work of all US government departments in each client country and responsible for value for money assessments of USAid projects. Guided by a new “USAid Forward” strategy and led by USAid’s Administrator Rajiv Shah, USAid was to cut back on subcontracting development programmes to third-party intermediaries and to deal directly with development actors in client countries. Alongside providing resources for development, the Department of State was now to leverage the resources of public, private, and civil society partnerships in these countries (US State Department 2010).

Against this backdrop, in May 2011, at the instruction of Hilary Clinton, the Global Partnership Initiative, in collaboration with USAid and the Migration Policy Institute, hosted the first Global Diaspora Forum and inaugurated a new, US-based international diaspora engagement alliance (IdEA), which claims to be “a non-partisan, non-profit organization that engages global diaspora communities, the private sector, civil society, and public institutions in collaborative efforts to support economic and social development”. In 2014, The Department of State and USAid enlisted the US-based Calvert Foundation, a Community Development Financial Institution, as a co-
partner in IdEA to administer this initiative. IdEA has also entered into strategic partnerships with The Hand Foundation, One Vietnam, Boom Financial and Western Union, and programme-specific partnerships with Digicel, Scotia Bank, OPIC, International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Inter American Investment Bank, Mentor Cloud, Global Giving, New America Media, and Global Entrepreneurship Week.

Initially IdEA promoted partnership building for diaspora-centred development in five areas: (1) diaspreneurship, encouraging diaspora entrepreneurs to invest in enterprises and stimulate trade in countries of origin; (2) diasplomacy, strengthening the existing role of diasporas in diplomacy, advocacy, and peace building, including using non-traditional vehicles such as sports, arts, and culture; (3) diasporacorps, incubating diaspora volunteerism in countries of origin; (4) diaspora 2.0, fostering innovative ICT technologies to enhance connectivity to the homeland; and (5) diasphilanthropy, encouraging the diaspora to donate to areas of education, health, nutrition, and disaster relief. More recently it reorganized its activities around four new pillars: investment and entrepreneurship; philanthropy; volunteerism; and innovation. Currently, IdEA works by convening partners and facilitating networking opportunities for diasporas, private sector, non-profit and government partners; mobilizing resources and enabling diasporas to gain access to new resources through IdEA partnerships; connecting diaspora members to business competitions such as Fish 2.0, the African Diaspora Marketplace and the Caribbean Idea Marketplace; developing capacity by offering technical assistance and training; and implementing projects, together with its partners.

IdEA bears the stamp of US philosophy and mission concerning the provision of development assistance and aid to countries in the global South. It is in the interests of the US to support migrants to reach back to their countries of origin to help these homelands become peaceable liberal democracies with functioning market economies which pose little threat to US and provide new market opportunities. In an opening statement at the first meeting of the Global Diaspora Forum in Washington during 2011 Hilary Clinton said:

The truth is that it’s not possible for any government, no matter how well meaning, to meet the challenges we face, from natural disasters, to economic stagnation, to poverty or civil unrest. Therefore, we need what I call smart power, and that means employing every tool at our disposal. Building these coalitions, spurring initiative and innovation around the world, using people-to-people exchanges is actually the core of smart power. Because of your familiarity with cultural norms, your own motivations, your own special skills and leadership, you are, frankly, our Peace Corps, our USAID, our OPIC, our State Department all rolled into one.

In 2015 under the stewardship of new Secretary of State John Kerry, the US State Department published a second Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), which elevated development and diplomacy to equal status alongside defence and security. This second review set forth four strategic priorities: (1) preventing and mitigating conflict and violent extremism; (2) promoting open, resilient, and democratic societies; (3) advancing inclusive economic growth by “expanding the middle class worldwide”; and (4) tackling climate change and its consequences (US State Department 2015). At the third meeting of the Global
Diaspora forum in Washington during 2015, Secretary of State Kerry reiterated the ongoing role of immigrants in delivering this agenda for the US:

More than 60 million Americans are first or second generation. They are members of strong and vibrant diaspora communities—communities who have strong linkages to other nations but for whom America is now home. I have said time and again that foreign policy begins at home with private businesses, religious and community organizations, and private citizens. It should be no surprise that our diaspora communities are one of our most important resources. They’re our people-to-people ambassadors to far-away places and uniquely help bridge both geographic and cultural divides ... There is even more that all these communities can contribute to America’s foreign policy—helping us reorient our ties to diverse corners of the globe, helping US fuel economic growth and prosperity.

The EU/UN Joint Migration and Development Initiative Migration4Development Project (JMDI-M4D)

The European Union’s approach to international development has undergone significant reform since the establishment of the EuropeAid External Cooperation Office (AIDCO) in 2001. In 2011, AIDCO merged with the Directorate General for Development and Relations with the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific to form Development and Cooperation—EuropeAid. That same year, the European Commission adopted the “Agenda for Change Communication” to advance goals concerning human rights, democracy and good governance, and inclusive and sustainable growth in international aid programmes. Agenda for Change emphasized capacity building in poor and middle income countries so that these countries might take ownership over their development trajectories and become self-regulating and resilient market actors. In 2015, the European Commission created a new Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development with responsibility to oversee the Commission’s external relations and development policies.

The principal funds which the EU uses to promote international development are the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the Instrument for pre-Accession, and European Neighbourhood Instrument. After the EDF, the DCI is the second-largest fund. The DCI has presided over five thematic programmes, one of which is on “cooperation in the area of migration and asylum”. The programme unfolded from 2007 to 2013 and aimed to support third countries in fostering links between migration and development, overseeing labour migration, preventing and curbing irregular migration, facilitating the readmission of illegal immigrants, and protecting the most vulnerable from exploitation and exclusion. As a reflection of its emphases upon reducing migration to the EU, it focused upon two neighbouring source regions: “the South” includes the Middle East, southern Mediterranean (Northern Africa) and sub-Saharan Africa, and “the East” includes Central Asia and Eastern Europe (also the southern Caucasus). But it also prioritized migrant-sending regions such as the Caribbean, Latin America,
the Pacific region as well as South, South-East and East Asia. In 2014 this programme was subsumed under a new thematic priority titled the “Global Public Goods and Challenges” programme.

The EU/UN JMDI-M4D project emerged from the 2007–2013 thematic programmes. JMDI-M4D has developed over two distinctive phases. Phase 1 (2008–2012) was funded by the European Commission but coordinated by the UNDP. It called for competitive grant applications to run projects (total value of 15 million Euros) that fortify the contribution of diasporic populations to the development of their countries of origin. Phase 2 (2012–2016) sought to identify and capitalize on a limited number of successful initiatives from the first phase. This phase has been carried forward at the behest of the European Commission by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, increasingly in partnership with the IOM, ILO, UNHCR, UNFPA, UN Women, and UNITAR. JMDI-M4D deploys a multi-stakeholder approach encompassing civil society and other local actors (chambers of commerce, private sector, universities, community groups, diaspora lobby groups, aid agencies, charities, etc.). It also draws on the experience of local authority networks; for example JMDI-M4D works closely with the UNDP Art Gold programme (which deals with local governance and local development).

JMDI-M4D’s central claim is that decentralized diaspora strategies that build partnerships between local governments and local civil society organizations in both origin and destination countries will prove most successful and enduring in stemming the flow of migration by building the capacity of sending states as self-reliant and resilient actors in the globalized economy. Small-scale stakeholders (such as local and regional authorities) in European host states and migrant-sending states were invited to bid for competitive grants to implement initiatives designed to: (1) set up and reinforce networks of actors working on migration and development; (2) identify good practices in the field and share information on what works at the local and international level; and (3) feed grassroots wisdom back to national and international policymakers. Fifty-one projects across 16 countries in the global South were funded. Priority was given to initiatives that are already part of local strategic and national plans; in regions with high emigration rates, large immigrant populations or transitory migrant flows; and which address age and gender inequalities. JMDI-M4D has redefined European attitudes to diaspora-centred development through a handbook for practitioners, exemplars of best practice, practical toolkits, a discussion forum and blog, and hosting icebreaker events and practitioner networking conferences (JMDI 2011).

Phase 1 of JMDI-M4D sought to build four sets of “capital” in migrant communities: social, financial, human, and cultural capital. Social capital refers to the extent, density, and capacity of migrants’ social networks, not least their various connections with communities at home. For example, JMDI-M4D funded a joint project between the Mona School of Business in Jamaica and the Kajans Women’s Social and Arts Enterprise in the UK, which created an online community dedicated to improving policymaking and development planning in Jamaica. Financial capital denotes putting the economic resources of migrants to
productive use for both the migrant and the sending country. One such project is the tripartite link between Unlad Kabayan Migrant Services Foundation Inc. and the Migrant Forum in Asia, both located in the Philippines, and the Netherlands-based Commission for Filipino Migrant Workers initiative, which channels remittances towards personal savings and community development. Human capital is associated with migrants’ education, skills, talents, and competencies that might be transferred directly and indirectly to serve homeland labour markets. An example is the partnership between the Egyptian Agribusiness Association and the Athens Network of Collaborating Experts, which facilitates the development of the aquaculture and fisheries industries in Egypt. Finally, cultural capital refers to migrants’ awareness of rights—in both sending and destination states—that might enhance their capacity to transfer ideas and values back home. An example is the collaboration between the Algerian Forum for Citizenship and Modernity and the Region of Sicily to provide migrants with “pre-departure” warnings and advice.

Towards an Agambenian Rendering of the Age Diaspora-Centred Development

We now wish to draw upon the Agambenian analytics of government set out above to offer a reading of the rise of the age of diaspora-centred development which is attentive to economic theology and its interpretation of the interplay between sovereign power and biopower. We begin by posing the question, what kinds of power do projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D embody? On the one hand these projects are conceived by and operate in the shadow of powerful sovereign states such as the US State Department or organizations that exercise aspects of sovereignty like the World Bank and the European Union. But in so far as they govern indirectly by mobilizing and disciplining biosocial collectivities held together by categories such as “diaspora”, “nation”, “ethnicity”, “religion”, and “citizen”, they posture as acts of biopower. Approaching sovereign power and biopower as antimonical but functionally related, we submit that projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D are in fact best understood as elements in the West’s providential oikonomia or oikonomic practices which work to (re)produce Western political and economic subjectivities in the global South, “administering the house” in the image of the West.

Agamben’s insistence that sovereign power and biopower are to be thought together proves helpful in understanding why projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D have arisen at this particular historical moment. Our world has been shaped by centuries of Western imperialism and hegemony. In the postcolonial era, Western nations have presided over a series of nefarious “new” colonial and neo-colonial projects or military misadventures. Today, their hegemonic status continues to be complicated and threatened by a volatile and changing geopolitical landscape. In pursuit of ongoing dominance, Western institutions are relying on biopower and rule through assemblages which discipline distant subjects, but in so doing their ambitions are no less hegemonic. Biopolitical projects prove to be effective to a significant degree because they are enacted by states which retain formidable
sovereign power. Pace Augustine’s Trinitarian theology and to paraphrase Agamben, it is the West’s hard power which founds, legitimates and makes possible biopolitical projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D, but it is also biopolitical projects such as these that put into practice the chain of causes and operationalizes the influence of the Western sovereign. In short, the king rules but does not govern. The biopolitical power wielded by initiatives such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D is issued from the sovereign power of their architects, namely the World Bank, the US State Department and the EU, without which these initiatives might easily be ignored. That they are taken seriously and have had significant traction in the world underscores the claim that the progenitor matters.

Projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D constitute a new breed of mission civilisatrice. They embody a number of Western epistemes, rationalities, mentalities, and visualizations which work to civilize “unruly”, “corrupt”, “rogue”, and “failing states” in the global South by bringing to bear Western prescriptions of order. At one level, any kind of self-sustaining development will do; since events in these states are likely to rebound on the West, it is important to mitigate security risks, manage migration and refugee flows, and relax pressure on overstretched aid budgets. But at a deeper level, projects like K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D confute “capacity building” and “institution building” with “Westernisation”. Capitalist modernity becomes seamlessly associated with “development” and other ideas such as “order”, “modernization”, “progress”, and “civilization”. By exporting the West’s formula for successful development, countries of the global South can be set on the “correct” pathway to prosperity. Only by allowing themselves to be open to Western political and economic subjectivities and “normalized”, “corrected”, and “aligned” will “primitive”, “malfucntioning”, and “corrupt” global South institutions be made fit for purpose.

It is erroneous to assume that because institutions in advanced liberal states such as the World Bank, the US State Department Government, and the EU increasingly operate through a looser and more fragmented collection of actors and networks that their power is somehow weakened. Biopower works in close proximity to key loci of sovereign power and it remains a stretch to say that power is being substantially “off sited” and flattened. Certainly, K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D convene assemblages which are disparate, comprising inter alia: ministries, ministers, departments, firms, and NGOs within powerful Western host states; immigrant and emigrant fraternities, clubs, associations, networks, chambers of commerce, media, charities, and foundations; sending state ministries, ministers, NGOs, community organizations, firms, and diaspora engagement vehicles; scorecards, KPI indices, platforms for sharing best practices, policy briefs, toolkits, competitive grants, and peer review; and a surging academic and private consultancy industry. But these “knots” interact with each other in highly structured ways as a reflection of uneven geographical development and historically ingrained global power asymmetries. Because they are part of the West’s oikonomia, the morphology, and modus operandi of these assemblages are best apprehended to a significant extent as centred, structured, hierarchical, and asymmetric.

To a degree, K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D have gained traction in the global South and gathered convinced believers because they present themselves through an
aesthetic based on spectacle, celebrity (the “hero migrant”) and unbridled possibilities. Key to this is a sleight of hand permitting Western institutions to export Western ideologies by proxy to the global South. Governing from afar through oikonomia predicated upon spectacle exploits a productive gap for Western institutions and Western ideas: ethnopreneurial kin serve as effective bearers of Western recipes for success because they seem culturally proximate, cognitively accessible, less vested in securing Western interests, and more concerned with the wellbeing of their homelands and caring for intimate kin. The hero migrant is a more adept interlocutor of Western development models than Western technocrats or evangelical politicians; the stories of high-achieving celebrities, billionaire relatives, and esteemed co-nationals and co-ethnics prove more seductive and compelling to public opinion and more easily galvanize an acclaiming public.

But all sacred oikonomia can be rendered inoperative, through profanation. In the present context profanation can arise when actors and stakeholders allow themselves to be drawn into ruling assemblages but render these assemblages inoperative by performing alternative registers. Projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D are in fact routinely profaned when migrant-sending states make positive gestures towards them but mobilize diaspora communities to serve other institutions, motives, and agendas; when migrant communities engage with these projects but only to procure resources for their fraternities and associations; or when migrants capture and exploit these projects and the weight of their parent organizations, namely the World Bank, the US State Department, and the EU, to enhance their own political agendas and economic interests in countries of origin. Insights into how profanation might prove to be progressive can be found in Ho et al.’s (2015) call for a new generation of diaspora strategies which is informed by feminist care ethics, rather than essentially pragmatic and utilitarian relationships. By de-consecrating Western attempts to degrade and instrumentalize diaspora–homeland relationships, it may even be possible to “free” these relationships so that they become means without ends, with intrinsic value in and of themselves.

**Conclusion**

In his 2015 book *The Use of Bodies*, the finale to the “Homo Sacer” series, Agamben refuses the possibility of a capstone synthesis, concluding that philosophical works can only be “abandoned (and perhaps continued by others)” (Agamben 2015:5). In part a response to this provocation, this paper has mobilized the analytics of government set forth in his earlier book *The Kingdom and the Glory* (2011) to venture an explanation of the diaspora turn which is presently capturing the international development agenda and spawning a tidal wave of “diaspora strategies” in migrant sending states throughout the global South. We have argued that Agamben’s theological genealogy of the Western political imaginary helps us think anew about the co-constitution of sovereign power and biopower in the governmental machine of the West. We have claimed that the ascent of the age of diaspora-centred development cannot be understood apart from historical developments in the way the West seeks to rule over international space. Informed by Augustine’s economic theology, we have focused upon the proximity of Western sovereigns to acts of biopower.
using as case studies the World Bank’s K4D, the US-based IdEA, and the EU/UN JMDI-M4D projects. Our Agambenian rendering of the diaspora turn has allowed us to think about the functional relationship between sovereign power and biopower in these projects, the role they play as Western oikonomic instruments after the age of empire, the ways in which they gather believers by attending to an aesthetic of spectacle, and the extent to which they are vulnerable to profanation and inoperosity.

We conclude by calling attention to the need to interrogate more expansively the complex and variegated articulations of sovereign power and biopower over time and space than has been possible here. First, there is a need to be alert to the paradoxical ways in which Western sovereign power can work to eclipse and usurp Western biopolitical projects. Here we need to juxtapose our analysis with Agamben’s earlier interpretations of the “state of exception” and of “bare life”. Nye (2004) disaggregates what he calls “smart power” into traditional “hard power” and “soft power” only to argue that in the US and the EU hard power is now in the ascendancy and that the balance between both types of power needed to secure smart power is lacking. This assertion speaks to the draconian strategies currently securitizing migration from Africa and the Middle East to Europe’s Mediterranean states, and also Mexican migration to the United States, which appear to be not only antinomical but also dysfunctionally related to projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D. Second, by taking more seriously flat(er) ontologies and claims of decentred and distributed power, it might be possible to examine more carefully the ways in which processes of composition, instability, heterogeneity and multiplicity in governing assemblages can frustrate the intended outcomes of biopolitical projects and complicate the ambition of hegemons. Here, what is needed is a political economy framing of projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D which is capable of tolerating the claim that all actors in assemblages, however minoritized, are vital, lively, unpredictable and causative; threatening always, through profanation but also other forms of resistance, to over-spill power (Philo 2012).

Finally, whilst this latest tradition of mission civilisatrice finds its primary audience in migrant-sending states, it also carries important implications for migrants. Recent research points to the stubborn persistence of established policy frames in the US and some European countries that seek to repress migration inflows and promote security-orientated migration policy (Keijzer et al. 2016; Kleist 2014). Projects such as K4D, IdEA, and JMDI-M4D recast the terms of hospitality which host countries extend to migrant communities by elevating expectations of loyalty and commitment. Against the backdrop of waning enthusiasm for multiculturalism and the rise of far right politics and xenophobia, these projects risk becoming yet another citizenship test that migrants need to pass if they are to be accepted as trusted members of their new communities. It may be then that profanation is to be fought on two fronts, a primary site in migrant-sending states where imported models of government and economy are now attempting to find their feet and a secondary site in host countries where migrant groups are being conscripted to serve the interests of the exporters of these models and in so doing are falling prey to what Derrida (in Derrida and Dufourmantelle 2000) has termed a new politics of hospitality.
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Endnotes
1 The series was written across a 20-year period (1995–2015) and comprises eight volumes. Although published out of sequence and in no way linear, Agamben arranges the books into four categories: (1) Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life; (2.1) State of Exception; (2.2) Stasis: Civil War as a Political Paradigm; (2.3) The Sacrament of Language: An Archeology of the Oath; (2.4) The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of Economy and Glory; (2.5) Opus Dei: An Archeology of Duty; (3) Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive; (4.1) The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Form-of-Life; and finally (4.2) The Use of Bodies. The Kingdom and the Glory, then, represents a mid-way point in the wider project.
2 We refer to the World Bank and European Union as sovereign like to emphasize their capacity to enforce sanctions stemming from their constitutive embeddedness within the system of Western sovereign states.

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